FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-4587

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GREGG SHANNON,

Appellant,

v.

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, and OBO

CHARLES C. SMITH, a minor,

Appellees.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County.

Kelvin C. Wells, Judge.

July 23, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Gregg Shannon, appeals a permanent injunction 

for protection against stalking that was entered against him. 

Appellant argues, and we agree, that the trial court’s 

determination that he stalked Appellee, Christopher Smith, his 

neighbor, is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 

We, therefore, reverse the injunction. 

In his September 2018 petition for a stalking injunction, 

Appellee relied upon a May 2017 incident in which Appellant 

allegedly stole signs from the neighborhood, a May 2017 “blow me” 

email sent to him from Appellant, a July 2017 incident in which 

Appellant allegedly put flyers in Appellee’s “flyer box,” a July 2017 
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sign stealing incident, a November 2017 sign throwing incident, a 

January 2018 incident in which Appellant allegedly yelled at other 

neighbors, a January 2018 incident in which Appellant allegedly 

chased Appellee, who was riding his bike, and yelled profanities at 

him, a February 2018 email in which Appellant allegedly 

threatened Appellee about his “TV job” and mentioned Appellee’s

“morals clause” with his employer, a July 2018 email sent to 

Appellee’s employer, and an August 2018 incident at the 

homeowner’s association (“HOA”) meeting that, according to a 

police report, involved a verbal altercation between Appellant and 

Appellee. 

In setting the matter for a hearing, the trial court found that 

the petition did not set forth a sufficient factual basis upon which 

it could enter a temporary injunction. During the subsequent 

hearing, the trial court asked Appellee how Appellant had stalked 

or cyberstalked him. Appellee testified about Appellant stealing, 

throwing, and damaging signs in the neighborhood that pertained 

to a lawsuit that some neighbors, including Appellee, were 

involved in against a home builder, and about Appellant chasing

him down the street while yelling profanities. Appellee 

acknowledged that the email to his employer that he relied upon 

in his petition was sent from an anonymous Gmail account and 

that it was possible that another neighbor who opposed the lawsuit 

could have sent it. A video was played of the HOA meeting during

which Appellant and Appellee had a verbal altercation. A second 

video was also played of an encounter Appellant had with another 

neighbor elsewhere in the neighborhood. After the trial court 

asked Appellant whether the language he used at the HOA 

meeting was an appropriate or nice thing to do, in response to 

which Appellant acknowledged it was not, the trial court stated, 

“Well, it may not arise to a criminal; however, based upon the 

videos I have seen, they were aggressive in nature and the Court 

is going to enter an order of injunction prohibiting [Appellant] from 

having any contact with [Appellee] or his family.” This appeal 

followed. 

In 2012, the Legislature created a cause of action for an 

injunction for protection against stalking. See § 784.0485(1), Fla. 

Stat. (2012). “Stalking” is defined as “willfully, maliciously, and 

repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another 
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person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). “Harass” means “to 

engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which 

causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no 

legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). “Course of 

conduct” means “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts 

over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity 

of purpose.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). “Cyberstalk” means 

to “engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be 

communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use 

of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a 

specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that 

person and serving no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(d), Fla. 

Stat. (2018). 

To be entitled to an injunction under section 784.0485, a

petitioner must prove by competent, substantial evidence a single 

incident of stalking. Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1145 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2018); see also Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986, 

989 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). In determining whether an incident 

causes substantial emotional distress, courts use a reasonable 

person standard rather than a subjective one. McMath v. 

Biernacki, 776 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). While a trial 

court has broad discretion to grant an injunction, the question of 

whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an 

injunction is a question of law that is reviewable de novo. Pickett, 

236 So. 3d at 1143-44. 

Based upon the hearing transcript, the trial court entered the 

stalking injunction because of what it considered to be Appellant’s 

aggressive behavior toward Appellee at the HOA meeting and 

toward a different neighbor on another occasion. However, 

whether Appellant was verbally aggressive toward someone other 

than Appellee has no bearing on whether he stalked Appellee. 

Moreover, a verbal altercation between two neighbors during an 

HOA meeting in no way warrants the entry of an injunction 

against stalking. The same can be said of the other incidents 

relied upon by Appellee in his petition, some of which Appellee 

himself described as being petty. As for the July 2018 anonymous 

email that was sent to Appellee’s employer, Appellee 

acknowledged below that another person could have sent it.
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In Corrie v. Keul, 160 So. 3d 97, 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), this 

Court, in reversing an injunction against repeat violence, rejected 

the appellee’s argument that his allegations and the testimony 

presented at the hearing showed that the appellant, his neighbor,

engaged in stalking and harassment. The appellee had alleged 

that the appellant threatened to take his house and have him 

thrown in jail, screamed at him, chased him and his dog down the 

sidewalk on one occasion, and told him that “it hold 1 in the 

chamber and 8 more.” Id. We explained that while the appellee 

argued that there are certain threatening and violent situations 

between neighbors where courts have no choice but to enter an 

injunction, the case at hand did not present one of those situations. 

Id. This case does not present one of those situations either. 

Similarly, in Power v. Boyle, 60 So. 3d 496, 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2011), we reviewed an injunction against repeat violence and 

determined that although the incidents at issue, which involved 

neighbors and included yelling obscenities, letting a dog urinate on 

the other party’s garage door, and writing profane and 

inappropriate notes on mail, were immature and uncivil, they did 

not constitute violence or stalking. We reasoned that it appeared 

that the relationship between the parties was more “tit-for-tat 

than stalker-victim.” Id. This case can be characterized in the 

same manner. 

In addition, Appellant correctly argues that Appellee provided 

no testimony that any of Appellant’s actions caused him 

substantial emotional distress. As we have explained, the 

substantial emotional distress that is necessary to support a 

stalking injunction is greater than just an ordinary feeling of 

distress. Venn v. Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). 

While the anonymous email sent to Appellee’s employer and 

Appellant’s behavior at the HOA meeting may have frustrated and 

embarrassed Appellee, and rightfully so, embarrassment does not 

equate to substantial emotional distress. See David v. Textor, 189 

So. 3d 871, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“That they [online postings] 

may be embarrassing to [the appellee] is not at all the same as 

causing him substantial emotional distress sufficient to obtain an 

injunction.”). Without evidence of this necessary element, the 

injunction should not have been entered. See Roach v. Brower, 180 

So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (noting that “without 
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competent, substantial evidence that . . . the petitioner, suffered 

substantial emotional distress, the circuit court could not enter an 

injunction against [the appellant] based upon the stalking 

statute”); see also Klemple v. Gagliano, 197 So. 3d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2016) (noting that the appellee did not testify as to any 

emotional distress caused by arguing with the appellant and 

reasoning that the stalking statute did not allow the trial court to 

enter injunctions simply to keep the peace between parties who are 

unable to get along and behave civilly towards each other); Jones 

v. Jackson, 67 So. 3d 1203, 1203-04 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (concluding 

that the appellant’s threatening phone calls and text messages to 

the appellee, and his statements to third parties suggesting he 

would do violence to the appellee, would not have caused a 

reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress); 

McMath, 776 So. 2d at 1040-41 (“No evidence exists in the record 

that a reasonable person would suffer substantial emotional 

distress from these incidents.”). Appellant is also correct that the 

evidence failed to establish stalking as to Appellee’s minor child. 

Even if the child were present during the HOA meeting and 

unfortunately heard from Appellant what the trial court described 

as inappropriate language, that incident would not constitute 

stalking warranting an injunction. 

In conclusion, although we in no way condone any of 

Appellant’s actions or his behavior, we must reverse the injunction 

for the reasons set forth herein.

REVERSED.

LEWIS, B.L. THOMAS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Hayward Dykes, Jr., and Casey Jernigan King of Hand Arendall 

Harrison Sale, Destin, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellees.