UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4881

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WINSTON R. IRONS, a/k/a Tony,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey,

Chief District Judge. (2:12-cr-00016-JPB-JSK-1)

Submitted: July 18, 2013 Decided: August 6, 2013

Before KING, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Scott C. Brown, SCOTT C. BROWN LAW OFFICE, Wheeling, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United 

States Attorney, Andrew R. Cogar, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Winston Irons appeals his convictions for possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). On appeal, he challenges the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and admission 

of prior bad acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We affirm.

Irons first argues that the district court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized on October 5, 

2011, challenging the informant’s reliability. In reviewing the 

denial of a motion to suppress, “we review a district court’s 

factual findings . . . for clear error[] and the legal 

determinations de novo,” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 

537 (4th Cir. 2013), and “view the facts in the light most 

favorable to the Government, as the party prevailing below.” 

Id. at 534. “We defer to the district court’s credibility 

findings, as it is the role of the district court to observe 

witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion 

to suppress.” United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 n.1

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[A] police officer may, consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer 

has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 

is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) 

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Reasonable 
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suspicion requires an officer to have “a particularized and 

objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” based on “the 

totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 

U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In 

cases where an informant’s tip supplies part of the basis for 

reasonable suspicion, we must ensure that the tip possesses 

sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Perkins, 

363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004); see Griffin, 589 F.3d at 152 

(discussing factors courts consider in determining whether 

officer had reasonable suspicion to effectuate stop based on 

informant’s tip).

Our review of the record on appeal leads us to 

conclude that the officer to whom the informant reported the tip 

“had objective reason to believe that [the] tip had some 

particular indicia of reliability[,] . . . [which] support[ed]

[the officer’s] decision to investigate further.” Perkins, 363 

F.3d at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Florida v. 

J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (stating that known informant’s 

tip generally is more reliable than unknown informant’s because 

known informant “can be held responsible if [his] allegations 

turn out to be fabricated”). In his investigation, the officer 

learned that Irons had a revoked driver’s license, and Irons was 

observed driving a car without a valid license along the 

anticipated route the informant had provided. Thus, we conclude 
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that the stop did not violate Irons’ Fourth Amendment rights. 

See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.

Irons next asserts that the district court erred by 

admitting evidence of his prior bad acts in 2006 and 2008. He 

contends that, because he was never prosecuted for those acts, 

the Government introduced them solely to demonstrate that he 

acted like a drug dealer. Irons also argues that the 2006 act 

was too old to be reliable. The Federal Rules of Evidence 

prohibit the admission of evidence of “other crimes” solely to 

prove a defendant’s bad character, Fed. R. Crim. P. 404(b)(1), 

but such evidence “may be admissible for other purposes, such as 

proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 

Id. 404(b)(2); see United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 395-

96 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing Rule 404(b) and four-factor test 

used to determine admissibility). We review the district 

court’s admission of evidence of prior bad acts for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 395.

Contrary to Irons’ arguments on appeal, we conclude 

that the evidence of the 2006 controlled buy and the June 2008 

traffic stop were probative of Irons’ intent. Although Irons 

suggests that the prior bad acts are not relevant due to the 

lapse of time between those acts and the instant offenses, we 

conclude that the acts are not too remote to render the evidence 
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inadmissible given the similarities between the prior bad acts 

and the charged offenses. See United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 

433, 437 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that conviction occurring 

twenty-two years prior was admissible because similarities 

between charged offense and prior crime were significant and 

lapse of time alone did not render conviction inadmissible). 

Moreover, the risk of any unfair prejudice was mitigated by the 

district court’s thorough and repeated cautionary instructions 

on the proper use of the evidence of prior bad acts, and the 

jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions. United 

States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 204 (4th Cir. 2012). Thus, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

challenged evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED