IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00140-CR

CESAR RANGEL,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court No. 32063-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Upon his plea of guilty, the trial court convicted Cesar Rangel of the offense of 

evading arrest or detention and assessed punishment at 8 months confinement in a state 

jail facility and a $1000 fine. We affirm.

Background Facts

Cesar Rangel was arrested on May 19, 2008 for the offense of evading arrest or 

detention. He posted a surety bond on May 23, 2008, listing his address as 6207 Latta 
Rangel v. State Page 2

Street, Dallas, Texas. Rangel was indicted on June 19, 2008, and a Dallas Deputy 

Constable attempted to serve Rangel at the 6207 Latta address on July 23, 2008, July 30, 

2008, August 18, 2008, August 22, 2008, September 11, 2008, September 12, 2008, 

September 18, 2008, and October 29, 2008. On August 11, 2008, Rangel requested a courtappointed attorney, and his application listed the 6207 Latta address. The trial court 

appointed Bill Price to represent Rangel on August 11, 2008.

Rangel did not appear at a status hearing on April 14, 2010, and a capias was 

issued. Rangel was served with the capias on December 16, 2014, in Navarro County, 

and he appeared in court on December 29, 2014 with his attorney Bill Price. Rangel 

indicated to the trial court that he hired Eddie Hernandez to represent him, and the trial 

court did not arraign Rangel at that time. On February 5, 2015, Rangel appeared in court 

with his retained counsel, Eric Puente, the trial court arraigned Rangel, and Rangel orally 

requested a speedy trial. On March 12, 2015, Rangel filed a motion for dismissal because 

he was denied a speedy trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied the 

motion.

Speedy Trial

In his sole issue on appeal, Rangel argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to dismiss for failing to provide a speedy trial. An accused is guaranteed the right 

to a speedy trial by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Barker v. 

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643 
Rangel v. State Page 3

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Barker sets out four factors that must be considered in analyzing 

a speedy trial claim: 1) length of delay, 2) reason for delay, 3) assertion of the right, and 

4) prejudice to the accused. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

The State has the burden of justifying the length of delay while the accused has the 

burden of proving that he asserted the right and showing prejudice. Id. The Barker factors 

are not weighed equally; rather, the accused's burden on the last two factors varies 

inversely with the State's degree of culpability for the delay. Id. Thus, the longer the 

delay and the more bad faith or negligence attributed to the State, the less an accused 

must show on the prejudice and diligence in asserting the right. Id. at 280-81.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on Rangel’s speedy trial claim, we apply a 

bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual 

components, and a de novo standard for the legal components. See Cantu v. State, 253 

S.W.3d at 282. Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact 

determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole ... is a purely legal 

question. Id.

The Barker test is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be 

"presumptively prejudicial." Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 281. Once the Barker test is 

triggered, courts must analyze the speedy-trial claim by first weighing the strength of 

each of the Barker factors and then balancing their relative weights in light of "the conduct 

of both the prosecution and the defendant." Id. No one factor is "either a necessary or 
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sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial." Id. 

Instead, the four factors are related and must be considered together along with any other 

relevant circumstances. Id.

Dismissal of the charging instrument with prejudice is mandated only upon a 

finding that an accused's Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was actually violated. 

Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 281. Because dismissal of the charges is a radical remedy, a 

wooden application of the Barker factors would infringe upon "the societal interest in 

trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal 

error." Id. Thus, courts must apply the Barker balancing test with common sense and 

sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a 

defendant's actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed. Id. The 

constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not dismissal of the charges. Id.

The State agrees that the seven year delay is presumptively prejudicial, and thus 

triggers a review under the Barker test. We will first address the second factor, reason for 

the delay. The record shows that the State attempted to serve Rangel multiple times at 

the address he provided. At the attempted service on September 18, 2008, the State was 

informed that Rangel had moved to an unknown location. Rangel did not appear at a 

status hearing in April 2010. The record shows that the State attempted to serve Rangel 

multiple times, but Rangel did not provide accurate contact information. The trial court 
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found that the State met its burden of justifying the reason for the delay, and the evidence 

supports that finding.

The defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, but a defendant does have the 

responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 283. The 

defendant's assertion of his speedy-trial right (or his failure to assert it) is entitled to 

strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the 

right. Id. In Cantu, the Court noted that “The Supreme Court has held that ‘invocation 

of the speedy trial provision ... need not await indictment, information, or other formal 

charge.’" Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 283-4. It was incumbent upon Rangel to show that 

he had tried to get the case into court so that he could go to trial in a timely manner. See 

Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 284.

Rangel was arrested on May 19, 2008, posted bond on May 23, 2008, and was 

indicted on June 19, 2008. Rangel was served with the capias on December 16, 2014. 

Rangel orally requested a speedy trial on February 5, 2015, and on March 12, he requested 

a dismissal. Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a 

speedy-trial claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one. 

Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 283. If a defendant fails to first seek a speedy trial before 

seeking dismissal of the charges, he should provide cogent reasons for this failure. Id. 

Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of the defendant, while the 
Rangel v. State Page 6

failure to make such requests supports an inference that the defendant does not really 

want a trial, he wants only a dismissal. Id.

Rangel did not present any evidence at trial that he diligently tried to move the 

case forward. See Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 283. There is nothing in the record to 

indicate Rangel had any contact with the district attorney’s office or trial court to check 

on the status of his case. Rangel requested and was appointed trial counsel indicating he 

was aware of the charges against him. The trial court found that Rangel failed to meet 

his burden of proving his assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and the evidence 

supports that finding.

We will now consider whether and to what extent the delay has prejudiced Rangel. 

We analyze the prejudice to Rangel in light of the interests that the speedy-trial right was 

designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize the 

accused's anxiety and concern, and (3) to limit the possibility that the accused's defense 

will be impaired. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d at 285.

Rangel did not testify at the hearing on his motion and did not present any 

evidence. There was no evidence that Rangel was subjected to oppressive pretrial 

incarceration, and there was no evidence that Rangel had anxiety or concern over the 

pending case. The State presented evidence from the arresting officers who testified that 

they made a written report after Rangel’s arrest and had a video recording of Rangel 

fleeing arrest. Rangel argues on appeal that he is unable to locate his co-defendant; 
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however, he did not present that evidence to the trial court. The trial court found that 

Rangel failed to meet his burden of proving he suffered prejudice, and the evidence 

supports that finding.

We find that the trial court did not err in denying Rangel’s motion to dismiss for 

failing to provide a speedy trial. We overrule the sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 3, 2016

Do not publish

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