1

NO. PD-_______________

TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

Quinn Ford Jr., Appellant 

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

***************

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

***************

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH, TEXAS

NO. 02-14-00176-CR, 02-14-00177-CR

TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1267457, 1267459

R. Scott Walker

STATE BAR # 24004972 

222 W. Exchange Avenue

Fort Worth, TX 76164

(817) 478-9999

(817) 977-0163 FACSIMILE

scott@lawyerwalker.com

Attorney for Appellant

PD-0800&0801-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 6/29/2015 5:21:30 PM

Accepted 7/1/2015 1:36:55 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
2

IDENTITY OF TRIAL JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL

The following is a complete list of all 

parties, as well as the names and addresses of all 

counsel.

Trial Judge: Honorable Everett Young

Appellant: Quinn Ford, Jr.

Trial Counsel: Edward E. Castillo

Attorney at Law

2101 Moneda St.

Fort Worth, Texas 76117

Michael P. Garcia

Attorney at Law

6207 Airport Freeway

Fort Worth, Texas 76117

Appellate Attorney for R. Scott Walker

Appellant: Attorney at Law

222 W. Exchange Avenue

Fort Worth, Texas 76164

Appellee: The State of Texas

Trial Attorney for Colin T. McLaughlin, &

Appellee: James R. Hudson

Tarrant County Assistant 

District Attorneys

401 W. Belknap,

Fort Worth, Texas 76196

Appellate Attorney for Sharen Wilson

Appellee: Tarrant County 

District Attorney

401 W. Belknap,

Fort Worth, Texas 76196
3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

IDENTITY OF TRIAL JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL . . 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

STATEMENT DECLINING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE. . . 6

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER ONE (THE TRIAL JUDGE 

ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR BAD ACT). 6

ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER TWO (The evidence was 

insufficient to prove that Appellant was guilty 

of evading arrest in a vehicle) . . . . . . . . 14

PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Jackson v. State,

17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Crim.App., 2000) . . . . 15

Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Montgomery v. State,

810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) . 6, 7, 10

State v. Beechum,

582 F.2d 898 (US Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1978).12, 13

STATUTES

Texas Penal Code,

§38.04 (Vernon 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Texas Rules of Evidence,

§403 (Vernon 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 16

STATEMENT DECLINING ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument of this case is not requested on 

behalf of Appellant, and is hereby waived.
5

All references to Texas statutes, rules, etc. 

are references to the latest edition published by 

West Publishing Company, unless otherwise 

indicated.

QUINN FORD, JR., Appellant-Applying for Review

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

************

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

************

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF 

TEXAS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal has resulted from a criminal 

prosecution for aggravated assault and evading 

arrest. On April 21, 2014, Appellant, Quinn Ford,

Jr., pled not guilty to the second degree offense

of aggravated assault and the third degree offense 

of evading arrest. On April 23, 2014, after 

evidence was presented, the jury found Quinn Ford,

Jr. guilty. The jury set punishment at 12 years 

confinement. (C.R., Vol.1 p.56). 
6

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision and 

delivered its written non-published memorandum 

opinion on May 28, 2015. The deadline for filing a 

Petition for Discretionary Review is June 29, 2015.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1)Whether the trial judge erred by admitting 

evidence of a prior bad act. R.R. Vol. 3, p. 9-39.

(2)Whether the evidence was legally sufficient 

to prove that Quinn Ford was guilty of evading 

arrest in a vehicle. R.R. Vol. 3, p. 114-123. 

ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER ONE

APPLICABLE LAW: The trial judge erred by 

admitting evidence of a prior bad act. Finding 

prior bad act evidence to be relevant is the first 

step in a trial court’s determination of whether 

the evidence should be admitted before the jury. 

Relevant evidence means evidence having any 

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 

of consequence to the determination of the action 

more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810 
7

S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). If the trial 

court finds that the evidence is relevant, then the 

trial court is to consider whether the evidence is 

admissible under Tex. Rules of Evidence 403. If 

the probative value of the evidence is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, the evidence is to be excluded. 

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 377

(Tex.Crim.App. 1990). 

Analysis

The Court of Appeals opinion states that 

evidence showing that the Complainant “fled to 

SafeHaven” could not have constituted a prior bad 

act of Appellant separate and apart from the 

threats that allegedly were made at the time 

Complainant went to SafeHaven, and that such 

evidence could not have harmed Appellant. Neither 

of these propositions is supported by the record.

The trial judge clearly erred by admitting 

evidence of a prior bad act. Immediately prior to 

trial, Defense Counsel presented three oral motions 

in limine, the third of which related to any prior 
8

bad acts of Appellant that may be offered in the 

guilt/innocence phase of trial. Counsel for the 

State responded by asking to make an offer of 

proof. The prosecutor stated that he intended to 

solicit testimony from Ms. Ford that three days 

prior to the offense, she had moved from the home,

where she and Mr. Ford lived, to ‘SafeHaven,’ due 

to domestic problems in the home, without 

specifically stating the nature of the domestic 

problems. As noted by Defense Counsel, it is 

common knowledge that ‘SafeHaven’ is a home for 

battered women. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 9-10). 

There is no doubt that allowing the testimony would 

make it clear to the jury that Ms. Ford was a 

battered woman and that Mr. Ford had assaulted her 

in some way about three days prior to the incident 

in question. The fact that the prosecutor brought 

this up in response to Defense Counsel’s Motion in 

Limine on prior bad acts indicates that even the 

prosecutor believed it was evidence of a prior bad 

act. During the discussion on the Motion in 

Limine, Defense Counsel objected on relevance 
9

grounds, (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 14-18), 404(b) 

grounds, (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 10, lines 1-3), and 403 

grounds, (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 11-13). During 

the trial, when the evidence was presented, Defense 

Counsel renewed his objection and was given a 

running objection by the trial judge. (R.R. Vol. 

3, p. 39, lines 1-7).

After the discussion on the oral Motion in 

Limine, the trial judge ruled that he would allow 

the State to solicit testimony that, due to a 

domestic situation, Ms. Ford had moved to 

‘SafeHaven,’ in effect, overruling Defense 

Counsel’s motion. Therefore, the evidence 

indicating that Mr. Ford assaulted his wife three 

days prior to the incident in question was allowed 

into evidence. The ruling was erroneous. It 

should also be noted that the prosecution went 

beyond the judge’s ruling by stating multiple 

times, in front of the jury, that Ms. Ford fled to 

‘SafeHaven.’ (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 39, lines 9-10), 

(R.R. Vol. 4, p.38, Lines 22-23). At one point,

Ms. Ford and the prosecutor even referred to 
10

‘SafeHaven’ as ‘the shelter’. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 50, 

line 23-25).

Saying Ms. Ford ‘fled,’ instead of moved, is 

even a stronger implication that Quinn Ford must 

have assaulted Ms. Ford in some way. There is no 

doubt that these statements constituted evidence of 

a prior bad act.

As previously mentioned, Defense Counsel 

objected on relevance grounds. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, 

lines 14-18). Ms. Ford moved to ‘SafeHaven’ three 

days prior to the incident in question. Therefore, 

the assault that caused her to move happened at 

least three days prior to the incident in question. 

The only relevance would be to show bad character 

of the defendant and that he acted in conformity 

therewith on the day of the offense. However, 

any evidence that has any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence is 

relevant. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 375 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1990). The assaultive behavior that 
11

is implicit in the use of the word ‘SafeHaven,’

would certainly make it more likely that Mr. Ford

was guilty of the Aggravated Assault offense that 

allegedly occurred three days later. Therefore, 

Appellate Counsel concedes that the evidence was 

legally relevant. In fact, it is so relevant that 

it is very likely that without the evidence, Quinn 

Ford would have been found not guilty.

The State may argue that the contested evidence 

is actually contextual same transaction evidence. 

However, the evidence in question is not contextual 

same transaction evidence. As pointed out by 

Defense Counsel (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 5-13), 

that argument simply does not hold water. The wife 

could have simply stated that she had moved out of 

the house, without mentioning ‘SafeHaven.’ The 

evidence was not in any way necessary to put the 

events in context. The trial judge abused his 

discretion by allowing the ‘SafeHaven’ language.

Also, Defense Counsel objected to the evidence 

under Rule 403. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 12, lines 11-13). 
12

Rule 403 States:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence. TRE 403.

The probative value which is compared to the unfair 

prejudice is the probative value that relates to 

the permissible purpose. United States v. Beechum 

582 F.2d 898, 914 (US Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1978). In 

this case, the permissible purpose is to put the 

events on the day of the offense in context. The 

prosecution argued that the ‘SafeHaven’ language 

was necessary to put the events in context, and 

without the language, it would not make any sense 

to the jury about what was going on. (R.R. Vol. 3, 

p. 10-11). Again, this argument is absurd. Ms. 

Ford could say that she moved out three days 

earlier without mentioning ‘SafeHaven.’ That would 

make perfect sense. Therefore, the probative value 

of the ‘SafeHaven’ language is miniscule at best. 

In contrast, the danger of unfair prejudice is 

enormous. Telling the jury that Quinn Ford 
13

committed an offense against the same victim three 

days earlier is extremely prejudicial. The Fifth 

Circuit pointed out in Beechum that one of the 

dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic 

offense evidence is that the jury may convict the 

defendant not for the offense charged, but for the 

extrinsic offense. The opinion further states that 

this danger is particularly great when the 

extrinsic activity was not the subject of a 

conviction, and the jury may feel that the 

defendant should be punished for that activity even 

if he is not guilty of the offense charged. United 

States v. Beechum 582 F.2d 898, 914 (US Ct. App. 5th

Circuit, 1978). The concerns in Beechum outline 

precisely the unfair prejudice created in the 

instant case by using the ‘SafeHaven’ language. 

Also, the reason the evidence is relevant in the 

first place is that evidence of a domestic offense 

against the same victim three days before the 

charged offense certainly makes the jury believe it 

is more likely that Quinn Ford committed the 

offense in which he is charged. The prejudice is 
14

certainly unfair and greatly outweighs the 

miniscule probative value. The trial judge erred 

in admitting the evidence. For these same reasons, 

it is obvious the error was harmful. It is very 

possible the jury would have voted not guilty had 

this evidence been excluded. 

ARGUMENT QUESTION NUMBER TWO

APPLICABLE LAW: (legal sufficiency): The 

evidence was legally insufficient to prove that 

Quinn Ford was guilty of evading arrest in a 

vehicle. In general, the test for determining 

legal sufficiency requires the Appellate Court to 

review all the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the verdict and determine whether any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, (1979); 

Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 

2000).

In order for one to be convicted of evading 

arrest, he or she must intentionally flee from a 
15

person he knows is a peace officer or federal 

special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest 

or detain him. (Texas Penal Code §38.04) There is 

no definition of ‘flee’ in the Texas Penal Code, 

but the commonly used definition is to try to 

escape by running away.

ANALYSIS

The Court of Appeals opinion states that while 

there is very little law that delineates what does 

or does not constitute “intentionally” fleeing from 

a peace officer, it does not appear that speed is a 

consideration in making the determination. Speed, 

as well as all the other facts relating to the 

incident should certainly be considered when 

determining whether a person “intentionally” flees 

from a peace officer. Any and all cases that hold 

otherwise should be overruled. This area of the 

law certainly needs clarification from this 

Honorable Court. 

The evidenc, in the instant case was legally 

insufficient to establish that Quinn Ford was 

guilty of evading arrest or detention. The 
16

evidence showed that when officers attempted to 

stop the vehicle, Mr. Ford, at a reasonable rate of 

speed, drove around the block and stopped his 

vehicle in his driveway. He immediately told 

police that he did so in order to prevent his car 

from being towed. (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 118-123).

The statute requires that a defendant must 

intentionally flee from officers. Quinn did not 

intentionally flee. He simply drove around the 

block, stopped, and told the officers that he did 

not want to get his car towed. He did not violate 

the statute. When the prosecutor asked the police 

officer what his opinion was as to whether Mr. Ford 

was attempting to flee, his response was, “I mean, 

I feel that, you know, with us being uniformed 

police officers having a marked vehicle and we were 

trying to – we were trying to effect a stop and he 

continued to drive away from us, that he was 

evading.” (R.R. Vol. 3, p. 114). It is obvious 

that the officer believed that if the detainee does 

not stop immediately, he or she is guilty of 

evading. That is not the law. The person must be 
17

fleeing or trying to get away. The evidence is 

insufficient to show that Quinn Ford was guilty of 

evading arrest in a vehicle.

 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Quinn Ford,

Jr., Appellant, prays that this petition be 

granted, the case be reversed, or for whatever 

other relief he has shown himself entitled. 

Respectfully Submitted,

s/Scott Walker

_________________________

By: Scott Walker

Attorney for Appellant

222 W. Exchange Avenue

Fort Worth, Texas 76164

(817) 478-9999

(817) 977-0163 FAX

scott@lawyerwalker.com

State Bar No. 24004972
18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of this petition was served by first 

class mail to the Office of Criminal District 

Attorney, Tarrant County Courthouse, 401 W. 

Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76196 and to the State 

Prosecuting Attorney at P.O. Box 12405, Austin, 

Texas 78711 on the 30th day of June, 2015.

/s/ R. Scott Walker

R. SCOTT WALKER

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document complies with the 

length requirements as set forth by the Texas Rules 

of Appellate Procedure in that this document 

contains 2734 words, and that the document is in 14 

point type.

/s/ R. Scott Walker

R. SCOTT WALKER
19

APPENDIX
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00176-CR

NO. 02-14-00177-CR

QUINN FORD, JR. APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NOS. 1267457D, 1267459D

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

A jury convicted Appellant Quinn Ford, Jr. of aggravated assault and 

evading arrest or detention using a vehicle, charged in separate indictments. 

The jury assessed his punishment at twelve years’ and two years’ confinement, 

respectively. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. Appellant brings two 

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

issues on appeal, challenging the admission of evidence of a prior bad act and 

the sufficiency of the evidence of evading arrest in a vehicle. Because we hold 

that the trial court did not reversibly err, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Brief Facts

Complainant testified that Appellant, who was her husband at the time of 

the incident, intentionally struck her vehicle, with her inside it, with his car while 

traveling at speeds of up to forty miles per hour. Three days before the incident, 

she had moved from their home to SafeHaven because of marital issues. She 

did not take the couple’s three children with her when she left, and after a couple 

of days, Appellant dropped the children off with Complainant’s sister. Appellant 

had dropped the children off with only the clothes they were wearing, so when he

called Complainant the next day to tell her to come to the house to pick up the 

children’s clothes or he would destroy them, she agreed to do so.

Complainant asked Appellant to put the clothes outside, but he refused, so 

she went inside the house upon her arrival. The clothes were not inside the 

house, and Appellant explained that he had wanted her to come inside the house 

so they could talk. He hugged her, put her on his lap, and spoke of 

reconciliation. They eventually engaged in sexual intercourse, and when 

Appellant said he was hungry, Complainant drove the two of them to a pizza 

restaurant.

Complainant testified that she was afraid of Appellant. She believed that 

she could not get away from Appellant and tried to appease him, agreeing to 
3

reconcile with him. When they returned to the house, Appellant became angry 

when she refused to get out of the car. He punched and kicked the dashboard, 

cracked the windshield with a Snapple bottle, and threatened to kill her. She 

turned off the ignition and pretended to get out of the car. Appellant got out of 

the car, and when he closed his door, Complainant locked the doors and started 

the car. As she was trying to drive away, Appellant ran around the car and threw 

the bottle at the driver’s side window, shattering the bottle. Complainant drove 

off, and Appellant chased her in his car, trying to block her car with his. Rather 

than going to SafeHaven, she went to the police station, calling ahead so officers 

could meet her in the parking lot. As she pulled into the parking lot, Appellant 

swerved around her, hit her car on the passenger side, and fled. The police

broadcast instructions for other officers to go after him, assuming that he was 

heading home.

Two officers saw Appellant near his house. They followed him and 

engaged their lights and sirens. Appellant continued driving until he reached his 

house and pulled into his driveway. They placed him under arrest, and he told 

the officers that he had not stopped because he did not want his car towed.

Evidence of Prior Bad Act

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court reversibly erred by 

admitting evidence that Complainant was living at SafeHaven, a shelter for 

battered women, because that was evidence of a prior bad act. He raised his 
4

objection in a motion in limine, which was overruled, and again when the 

evidence was offered. He was also granted a running objection to the evidence.

In support of his argument, he points out that the prosecutor stated

“multiple times, in front of the jury, that [Complainant] fled to ‘SafeHaven.’”

Appellant also notes that the prosecutor referred to “SafeHaven” as “the shelter.”

Appellant concedes that the evidence was relevant, although at trial one of the

objections was to relevance, but argues that the State provided no rule 404(b)

notice of the extraneous bad act, although he had made a proper request before

trial. He also concedes that there is no such request in the record. He also

candidly concedes that the State provided “timely notice prior to trial that it would

offer evidence of the prior threats which allegedly occurred three days before the

incident in question.” He argues, however, that although the State’s notice lists

twenty-eight separate prior bad acts, “there is no notice of the evidence offered at

trial, being that [Complainant] fled to ‘SafeHaven’ three days prior to the incident

in question.”

We frankly cannot understand how Complainant’s fleeing to SafeHaven

three days before the events alleged as the offenses at bar is a bad act of

Appellant separate and apart from the threats that allegedly were made at the

time Complainant went to SafeHaven. Even if it could be construed as a

separate bad act of Appellant and even if we found its admission erroneous, we

fail to understand how Appellant could have been harmed. Appellant does not

allege constitutional error. We would therefore apply the standard of review
5

required for nonconstitutional error, disregarding it if it did not affect Appellant’s

substantial rights.2

 A substantial right is affected when the error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.3

 

Conversely, an error does not affect a substantial right if we have “fair assurance

that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.”4 Complainant

testified that she had left her home and her children because she was afraid of

Appellant. She testified to the prior acts of misconduct of which Appellant had

notice. If the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Complainant went to

SafeHaven, a shelter, which we do not hold, then any such error would have

been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the evidence admitted

showing Complainant’s fear of Appellant and his prior acts of misconduct. We

overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Evading Arrest or Detention

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to 

prove his guilt of evading arrest with a vehicle because he did not flee. He 

alleges that he merely drove around the block and pulled into his driveway so his 

 2

See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 194 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997).

3

King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing 

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1946)).

4

Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. 

State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
6

car would not be towed. A person commits the offense of evading arrest or 

detention with a vehicle if, using a vehicle, he “intentionally flees from a person 

he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to 

arrest or detain him.”

5

 There is very little law on this issue that arises from similar 

facts. Our sister courts have held that failing to submit to an officer’s show of 

authority is sufficient to satisfy the elements of evading arrest.6

 Speed 

apparently is not a consideration in determining whether a person is guilty of 

evading arrest. Even crawling away from a police officer has been seen to 

constitute evading arrest.7

In reviewing the evidence for sufficiency, we consider the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.8

 Applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold that the jury as trier 

of fact rationally could have found the elements of the crime of evading arrest or 

detention with the use of a vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt if they believed

 5

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04 (West Supp. 2014).

6

See Lopez v. State, 415 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, 

no pet.); Horne v. State, 228 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no 

pet.); Mayfield v. State, 219 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no 

pet.).

7

Leos v. State, 880 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no 

pet.).

8

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
7

that, after the officers engaged their lights and sirens, Appellant continued driving 

instead of pulling over at the earliest possible moment on the residential street. 

We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgments.

/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: May 28, 2015
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00176-CR

Quinn Ford, Jr.

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From the 297th District Court

of Tarrant County (1267457D)

May 28, 2015

Opinion by Justice Dauphinot

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot______________

 Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot