In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-1812 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

QUINCY CAMPBELL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 2:17-cr-20040-CSB-EIL-1 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2021 — DECIDED JUNE 27, 2022

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI,Circuit 

Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Quincy 

Campbell was convicted on four counts of distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 

(b)(1)(C). He appeals his sentence of 120 months in prison followed by 72 months of supervised release. 
2 No. 21-1812 

An important issue in sentencing was whether Campbell 

should be sentenced as a career offender under the Sentencing 

Guidelines. The district court ultimately determined that 

Campbell should be deemed a career offender. He qualified 

only because the district court determined that certain uncharged drug sales beginning in the summer of 2016 were relevant conduct. Including these transactions as relevant conduct stretched the beginning of the offenses of conviction back 

far enough in time so that Campbell’s 1998 conviction for aggravated battery would count as a predicate offense under the 

career offender Guideline. When combined with another 2013 

drug conviction, the 1998 conviction qualified Campbell as a 

career offender and called for a much higher offense level under the Guidelines.

On appeal, Campbell argues the district court made a procedural error by including the 2016 drug sales as relevant conduct. He also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 

sentence. We affirm. The district court properly calculated 

Campbell’s range under the Guidelines, but also recognized 

the narrow margin by which he qualified as a career offender. 

It was appropriate in this case for the court to rely primarily 

on its consideration of the statutory sentencing factors under 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to decide on an appropriate sentence.1

1 Campbell’s sentencing took place after Judge Bruce had completed a suspension from handling cases involving the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

Central District of Illinois. See In re Complaints Against District Judge Colin 

S. Bruce, Nos. 07-18-90053 & 07-18-90067 (7th Cir. Jud. Council May 14, 

2019), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/judicial-conduct/judicial-conduct_2018/07_18-90053_and_07-18-90067.pdf; see also United States v. 

Gmoser, 30 F.4th 646 (7th Cir. 2022). 
No. 21-1812 3

I. Factual and Legal Background

Campbell has a long history with the criminal justice system. In 1998, he pled guilty in state court to escape and felony 

aggravated battery. He was released with his sentence discharged in November 2001. He was later convicted in state 

court on felony drug offenses, including a February 2006 conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to 

deliver and a February 2013 conviction for unlawful delivery 

of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of church property.2

Campbell was arrested in July 2017 and charged in this 

federal case with four counts of distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) after 

making several sales of crack cocaine and heroin to a confidential source. Campbell pled guilty on all counts and the 

court accepted his plea. In preparing for sentencing, the probation officer eventually filed four different presentence investigation reports (PSRs). The first three versions of the report all found that Campbell was a career offender under 

§ 4B1.1 of the Guidelines in part because he had two prior 

qualifying felony convictions for a controlled substance offense—his February 2006 and February 2013 convictions. 

A defendant qualifies as a career offender if (i) he was at 

least eighteen when he committed the offense of conviction; 

(ii) the offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime 

of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (iii) the 

2 Campbell had other prior convictions that are not relevant here. The district court accepted without comment the probation office’s recommendation that his other convictions did not qualify as predicate offenses for career offender status. The parties do not dispute this matter.
4 No. 21-1812 

defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for a crime 

of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.1(a). A prior felony conviction counts as a predicate for 

career offender status only if the sentence exceeded one year 

and one month and was either (i) imposed within fifteen years 

of the commencement of the offense of conviction; or (ii) resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any part of 

the fifteen years prior to the commencement of the offense of 

conviction. See § 4A1.2(e)(1). 

Status as a career offender can have a significant impact on 

a defendant’s sentencing range under the Guidelines. That 

impact was unusually dramatic in this case. As a career offender, Campbell’s total offense level was 31, his criminal history category was VI, and the range for his sentence was 188 

to 235 months. If he were not a career offender, his total offense level would be 10, his criminal history category would 

drop from VI to V, and the range for his sentence would be 21 

to 27 months. 

Campbell objected to being sentenced as a career offender. 

After the third PSR was issued, he convinced an Illinois state 

court to vacate his 2006 conviction for possessing a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver. The U.S. Probation Office 

then issued a fourth and final PSR, which found that Campbell was not a career offender because his newly vacated 2006 

conviction could not qualify as a predicate offense. On this 

basis, the fourth PSR listed his guideline range as 21 to 27 

months in prison.

The government challenged the fourth PSR’s calculation 

and argued that Campbell still qualified as a career offender. 

The government relied on evidence that Campbell had made 

additional drug sales before November 2016. Counting that 
No. 21-1812 5

conduct as relevant under the Guidelines, the offenses of conviction would have commenced within 15 years of Campbell’s November 2001 release from prison for the 1998 aggravated battery conviction, meaning it would count toward career offender status. 

At the first sentencing hearing, the district court heard testimony addressing these questions. The court credited testimony from Emily McGrath, who claimed she had purchased 

drugs from Campbell regularly starting in early summer 2016 

and that she had made about ten deliveries of drugs for 

Campbell in 2017. At a second hearing, the court heard evidence in mitigation from Campbell’s friends and family. 

At a third and final hearing, the court announced that it 

was crediting McGrath’s testimony and that Campbell’s 2016 

drug sales counted as relevant conduct. Based on those findings, the court held that Campbell qualified as a career offender, giving him the higher guideline range of 188 to 235 

months. The court then heard final sentencing arguments 

from both sides and listened to Campbell’s allocution, in 

which he discussed his desire to help his community and his 

hopes to raise his daughter and young son.

In explaining the final sentence, the district judge noted 

that he was “primarily applying the factors as set forth in 

3553(a)” to determine an appropriate sentence. He weighed 

each factor in turn, placing special emphasis on Campbell’s 

history and characteristics and the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities. The judge then imposed four concurrent terms of 120 months—a sentence 68 months below the 

bottom end of the calculated guideline range but well above 

the range that would apply without the career offender adjustment. The judge also imposed four concurrent six-year 
6 No. 21-1812 

terms of supervised release and added that even if his findings as to relevant conduct under the Guidelines were wrong, 

he would impose the same sentence.

Campbell appeals, arguing that the district court erred 

procedurally by finding that his relevant conduct included 

the 2016 sales to McGrath and erred substantively by imposing a sentence greater than necessary under the circumstances. 

II. Discussion

We review the sentence imposed by a district court in two 

steps. We first review de novo for any procedural error. United 

States v. Marin-Castano, 688 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2012). Next, 

we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Taylor, 701 F.3d 1166, 1174 

(7th Cir. 2012). 

A. The Guideline Calculation

For a procedural challenge, we may consider “whether the 

sentencing judge properly calculated the guideline range, recognized that the guideline range wasn’t mandatory, considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), selected a 

sentence based on facts that weren’t clearly erroneous, and 

explained the sentence adequately.” United States v. Annoreno, 

713 F.3d 352, 357 (7th Cir. 2013). Campbell argues that the district court erred procedurally in calculating his guideline 

range by incorrectly determining that his sales of heroin to 

McGrath starting in the summer of 2016 were relevant conduct.

There was no error. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a 

sentencing court considers relevant conduct in calculating the 

defendant’s sentencing range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Relevant 
No. 21-1812 7

conduct includes “all acts and omissions committed, aided, 

abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant” “that were part of the same 

course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense 

of conviction.” United States v. Tankson, 836 F.3d 873, 883 (7th 

Cir. 2016), quoting § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2). Here, the court 

relied on Emily McGrath’s testimony to find that Campbell’s 

relevant conduct began around July 1, 2016, when the court 

estimated that she began to buy drugs regularly from Campbell. This is a factual finding that we review for clear error. 

Tankson, 836 F.3d at 883; see also United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 

1035, 1040–43 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying clear error standard to 

calculation of drug quantity based on relevant conduct). 

Campbell claims these 2016 sales were not relevant conduct because (i) they were not part of the same course of conduct as the 2017 offenses of conviction; and (ii) McGrath’s testimony about the sales was not credible. The principles for applying the relevant conduct provisions to Campbell’s case are 

well established. See Tankson, 836 F.3d at 883. “We consider 

significant similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of 

the uncharged conduct with the convicted offense, as well as 

common victims, accomplices, purpose, or modus operandi.” 

United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 373 (7th Cir. 2008). When 

the offense of conviction is the final transaction “in an unbroken series of deals regularly made,” a court may find the prior 

transactions were part of the same course of conduct. Id. 

As noted, Campbell’s status as a career offender depends 

on the district court’s relevant conduct finding. The finding 

that sales to McGrath starting in the summer of 2016 were relevant conduct was the only basis for finding that the 2017 offenses of conviction—which includes any relevant conduct, 
8 No. 21-1812 

see Tankson, 836 F.3d at 886, citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.8.—

occurred within fifteen years of Campbell’s final day of incarceration for aggravated battery in November 2001. Without 

this finding, his aggravated battery conviction would be too 

old to count as a predicate for career offender status and he 

would not have the two required predicate felonies. See 

§§ 4A1.2(e)(1) and 4B1.1(a). 

Campbell contends that his sales to McGrath in 2016 were 

not part of the same course of conduct as the 2017 offenses of 

conviction because the groups of transactions involved different parties playing different roles. Campbell notes that during 

the purchases McGrath described as occurring before November 2016, she was a customer and not a dealer or courier. In 

contrast, he argues, only in 2017 did McGrath begin to deliver 

drugs for him, and she was paid for those deliveries in heroin. 

In Campbell’s view, this different role that McGrath played in 

the earlier transactions distinguishes them as a different 

course of conduct. 

The district court viewed her testimony differently. The 

court emphasized that the conduct described by McGrath 

“from summer 2016 to summer 2017 is strikingly similar to 

the instant offense conduct.” The offenses were similar, involved sales of the same drug in similar small quantities for 

personal use, and occurred in the same general area in Kankakee. The transactions were conducted in a similar way and 

were repeated and regular. Both McGrath and the confidential source to whom she delivered drugs described making 

purchases from Campbell at least every other day, and the 

string of purchases from summer 2016 through Campbell’s 

arrest in July 2017 was unbroken.
No. 21-1812 9

As the district court noted, this court has upheld relevant 

conduct findings on similar facts before. See, e.g., Tankson, 836 

F.3d at 883–86 (affirming finding that relevant conduct for 

heroin distributor included his testimony that he made 100 

orders in two years for same drug with similar modus operandi); United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 347–49 (7th Cir. 

2008) (affirming finding that relevant conduct included “more 

or less consistent” drug trafficking over nine-year period).

Campbell points to minor differences between the purchases 

included within the district court’s relevant conduct determination, but he does not show the court made a clear error. 

Next, Campbell argues that the district court erred in relying on McGrath’s testimony to determine relevant conduct 

because she was not credible. If this were so, it could be a reversible error. United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 738 (7th 

Cir. 2010) (“a guidelines range based on false evidence can 

certainly constitute clear error”). However, we review deferentially a district court’s decision to credit such witness testimony. E.g., United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 

2016); Etchin, 614 F.3d at 738. 

Campbell highlights discrepancies between McGrath’s initial statement to a law enforcement officer and her later testimony at sentencing. He argues that she is an unreliable witness because of her personal stake in avoiding prosecution, 

her history of drug abuse, and her poor memory. He emphasizes that McGrath’s initial statement to law enforcement indicated she purchased heroin from Campbell continuously 

for the two years prior to his arrest in 2017. Her testimony at 

sentencing, however, revealed a gap in these purchases before 

the summer of 2016. McGrath explained the discrepancy at 

sentencing by saying that, while drugs had affected her 
10 No. 21-1812 

memory, she had thought about it and provided the most accurate information she could. We are not persuaded that the 

district judge clearly erred in crediting her testimony. 

As we noted in Tate, “drug traffickers rarely keep reliable 

business records,” and the district court was entitled to listen 

to witness testimony at sentencing from a customer and to 

draw conclusions about drug sales based on that testimony. 

Tate, 822 F.3d at 373. The district court considered and rejected 

Campbell’s arguments in making its credibility determination. The court acknowledged that McGrath had memory issues related to drug use, that there were small inconsistencies 

between her prior statement to law enforcement and her testimony at sentencing, and that she testified under a use-immunity agreement with the government. After considering 

these factors, the court still found her credible: “At no point 

during her testimony did the court perceive McGrath to be 

evasive, engaged in fabrication, or being anything less than 

truthful to the extent allowed by her memory.” Nor does her 

cooperation agreement with the government make her testimony incredible as a matter of law. See United States v. Saulter, 

60 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1995). 

The district court was in the better position to determine 

whether McGrath was telling the truth. Nothing that Campbell raises on appeal overcomes the substantial deference we 

give the district court’s finding on credibility. See Tate, 822 

F.3d at 373. The district court considered how personal interest and discrepancies in McGrath’s statements affected the reliability of her testimony and explained its reasoning when it 

found her credible. That finding was not clearly erroneous. 

E.g., Austin, 806 F.3d at 431 (noting that a district court may 

credit testimony even from a “large scale drug-dealing, paid 
No. 21-1812 11

government informant as long as the court evaluates the evidence carefully” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, there was no clear error in the district 

court’s relevant conduct determination, and Campbell has not 

shown that the district court erred by applying the career offender Guideline.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Next, Campbell argues that even if there were no procedural errors, his sentence was substantively unreasonable in 

light of the circumstances of his case. We review under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard the district court’s decision to sentence Campbell to four concurrent terms of 120 

months. Taylor, 701 F.3d at 1174. We do not ask what sentence 

we would impose; we ask whether the district judge imposed 

a sentence for logical reasons that are consistent with the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Bonk, 967 F.3d 643, 650 

(7th Cir. 2020). In addition, the sentence here was below the 

calculated guideline range. We will presume such a sentence 

is reasonable against an attack by a defendant claiming that 

the sentence is too high. United States v. Purham, 795 F.3d 761, 

765 (7th Cir. 2015).

Here, the district judge thoroughly discussed his consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and carefully explained his reasons for imposing a sentence 68 months below the bottom of 

the guideline range. After hearing Campbell’s allocution, the 

district judge noted that he was “primarily applying the factors as set forth in 3553(a)” to determine an appropriate sentence rather than relying unduly on the Guidelines. He gave 

particular emphasis to two factors: history and characteristics 

of the defendant and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. On the first factor, the judge pointed out that 
12 No. 21-1812 

Campbell had a “horrendously bad criminal history.” Still, he 

was impressed by the statements in mitigation given by 

Campbell’s nephew and older brother, and he called the latter 

“one of the best statements made by an older brother I’ve 

heard in a long time—or any witness in a long time.” On balance, he found Campbell’s history and characteristics 

“slightly weigh in favor of a lighter sentence.” 

The second factor, however, weighed in favor of a higher 

sentence. The judge was troubled by the danger of imposing 

a sentence so low that it might create unwarranted sentencing 

disparities among defendants with similar records found 

guilty of similar conduct. He said that he thought he could 

justify a sentence at the top of the guideline range under the 

circumstances (235 months), but he ultimately chose to impose a much lower sentence based on Campbell’s history and 

characteristics. After weighing all the § 3553(a) factors, the 

judge clarified how he reached the sentence he was about to 

impose:

Let me add that even if I am wrong, even if I am 

wrong, if all my findings as to the sentencing 

guidelines on relevant conduct are way off and 

dead wrong ... , using my discretion, based 

upon my application of the statutory sentencing 

factors, I would impose the same sentence because I spent a lot of time going through those 

factors and thinking about them and really trying to correctly apply them, using my discretion.

The district judge’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors and 

his explanation of the sentencing decision were reasonable. 

He imposed a sentence well below the guideline range that he 
No. 21-1812 13

thought would be “pushing the envelope of a sentencing disparity.” The judge calculated the guideline range accurately 

but also recognized the jarring arbitrariness of the guideline 

calculation in this case, where a difference of five months in 

Campbell’s release from prison in 2001 or in the precise scope 

of his relevant conduct in 2016 and 2017 made the difference 

between a total offense level of 10 v. 31, with a roughly ninefold difference in the recommended prison sentence. In particular, the judge noted the “thin reed” by which Campbell 

qualified as a career offender and discounted his career offender status when considering factors such as 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A), the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense. 

At sentencing, district judges “have discretion over how 

much weight to give a particular factor. Although the 

weighting must fall ‘within the bounds of reason,’ those 

bounds ‘are wide.’” United States v. Reibel, 688 F.3d 868, 872 

(7th Cir. 2012), quoting United States v. Busara, 551 F.3d 669, 

674 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, the sentencing judge’s assessment of 

the § 3553(a) factors and his explanation of the sentence fell 

well within the bounds of reasonableness. We find no abuse 

of discretion in the final decision about Campbell’s sentence. 

The underlying problem here is that guideline calculations 

can generate a sentencing cliff for defendants like Campbell, 

who may qualify as career offenders, or not, by a thin and 

hotly contested margin. Campbell’s range under the Guidelines was either 188 to 235 months as a career offender or just 

21 to 27 months without that enhancement. The Guidelines 

can provide useful guidance in the difficult task of sentencing, 

helping to focus on relevant factors and encouraging relatively consistent treatment of similarly situated defendants. 
14 No. 21-1812 

But in many cases the Guidelines can produce seemingly arbitrary results. A judge considering a large swing based on 

such potentially arbitrary factors as the timing of uncharged 

but relevant conduct, as in this case, or arbitrary applications 

of the categorical approach to a prior conviction, would do 

well to ask why the disputed guideline issue should make a 

difference in the ultimate decision. See United States v. Marks, 

864 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Dixon, 

27 F.4th 568, 571 n.1 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Query how courts would 

apply the ‘arbitrary or capricious’ standard of administrative 

law to an agency’s decision based on the kind of logic that 

courts must use under the categorical method, where the actual facts of a defendant’s earlier crime do not matter and hypothetical questions can be decisive.”).

The district judge recognized here that rigid adherence to 

the Guidelines in this case would be unwise. After making the 

required guideline calculations, he gave a sentence based primarily on his thoughtful consideration of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). Campbell’s case illustrates well why it is a 

reversible error for a sentencing judge to presume that a 

within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable without considering 

the § 3553(a) factors. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–

50 (2007) (“[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue 

for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district 

judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a 

party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines 

range is reasonable.”); cf. United States v. Horton, 770 F.3d 582, 

585 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting only method for defendant to rebut 

presumption that within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable is 

via showing under § 3553(a) factors). 
No. 21-1812 15

Long before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States 

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Sentencing Commission recognized that wooden application of the Guidelines could 

sometimes produce arbitrary results. Even as adopted in their 

original form in 1987, the Guidelines encouraged sentencing 

departures for over- or under-representative criminal history. 

See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (1987). That encouragement remains in 

place in the version of § 4A1.3 in effect in 2022. After Booker, 

we have encouraged district judges to do just what the judge 

did here by concentrating on careful consideration of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.