alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                            MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

     I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the annual report on
Form 10-K/A of Marine Exploration, Inc. for the period ending June 30, 2008:

          (1) complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
     Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material aspects, the financial condition and results of operations of
     Marine Exploration, Inc.


/s/ Miguel Thomas Gonzalez
--------------------------
Miguel Thomas Gonzalez
Chief Financial Officer
October 1, 2008


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to Marine Exploration, Inc. and
will be retained by Marine Exploration, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission upon request.


<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Richard Willett, certify that:



1. I have reviewed
this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Teleglobe International Holdings Ltd;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of this period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and;



5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.



Date: November 12, 2004



|       |  |                                                     
|------ |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|       |  | /s/ RICHARD WILLETT                                 
|Name:  |  | Richard Willett                                     
|Title: |  | Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk January 29, 2010

d0125 

# Order

January 29, 2010

139353

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 139353 COA: 289555 Charlevoix CC: 03-081609-FH CHRISTOPHER DAVID THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 3, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7419** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. CHARLES LEE TORIAN , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Danville
. Norman K. Moon, Senior District Judge. ( 4:01

- cr - 70057

- NKM

- 1 )

Submitted : January 14, 2016 Decided: January 20, 2016

Before AGEE, WYNN, and FLOYD , Circu it Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Charles Lee Torian, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Charles Lee Torian appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for a sentence reduction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the d istrict court. United States v. Torian , No. 4:01

- cr - 70057

- NKM

1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the de cisional process.

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 32.1**

**Section 1350 Certification**

 

In connection with the annual report of Puradyn Filter Technologies Incorporated (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Joseph V. Vittoria, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

| April 10, 2009 |        | /s/ Joseph V. Vittoria                                                            |
|----------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|           |   | Joseph V. VittoriaChairman and Chief Executive Officerprincipal executive officer |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
STATE v. HARGETT.

No. COA04-1693.

North Carolina Court of Appeals.

Filed September 6, 2005.

Certification September 26, 2005.

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
NO. 07-05-0361-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B AUGUST 30, 2006

______________________________ LAQUANNA LASHAE MEANDER, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A PPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 320 TH DISTRIC T COURT O F POTT ER COUNTY; NO. 50,898-D; HONORABLE D ON EMERSON , JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Appellant

LaQuanna LaShae Meander appeals her drug posses sion convi ction and accompanying sentence of five years confinement in the Instit utional Div ision of the Texa s Department

of Criminal Justice. W e will affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant coun sel’s moti on to withd raw. Appellant

was indi cted for the offense of possess ion of a controll ed substance in a drug free z one. On September 30, 2005, appellant entered an open pl ea of guilty to the of fense. Appellant and her counsel acknow ledged she r eceived and r

eviewe d writte n2

admonishment s. Appellant further signed a j udicial confession of her g uilt to theoffense as alleged i n the indictment. Having determined that appellant was menta lly competent, and that her actions in court were freely and voluntarily take n, the trial court accepted appellant’s plea of guilt y. Appell ant was the only witness called to test ify during the punishment

phase. Foll owing the punishment phaseof the trial, the trial court sentenced appellant

to five years in the Ins tituti ona l Divi sion of the Texas Department of Cri minal Justice. Appellant’s counsel hasfiled a brief stating that he has carefully reviewed the record in this case and concl udes there is no revers ible error and that the appeal is fr ivolous. See Andersv. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 - 45 (1967). Counsel has al so filed a motion to withdraw and, by lette r, in forme d appellant of her right to file a pro se bri ef. Johnson v. State , 885 S.W .2d 641, 646 (T ex.Ap p.–Waco 1994, pet. ref’d). By letter dated April 19, 2006, t his court al so notified appell ant of her opportuni ty to submit a response to t he Andersbrief and motion to withdraw filed by her

counsel, gr

anting her

until May

19, 2006 to do so. This court’s letter also reminded a ppellant to contact her counsel if she needed to review any part of

the appellate record to prepare a r esponse. Appell ant has not filed a brief or other

response. We have independent ly exa mined the entire record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous grounds which might suppor t the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988); Stafford v. Sta te , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.C rim.App. 1991). We have found no such grounds. After revi ewing t he record before us and counsel’s brief, we agr ee with3

counsel that the appeal is frivolous. See Bledsoe v. St ate , 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Cri m.App. 2005). Acco rdin gly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and th e trial cour t’s judgment is affirmed.

James T. Campbell Justice Do not publish
.
IN RE P.L.M.E.

No. COA05-125.

North Carolina Court of Appeals.

Filed January 17, 2006.

Certification Date February 6, 2006.

Appeal from Gaston (01J346).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.4

              INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

      NUMBER                                                      SHARES

                       U.S. DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE 50,000,000 COMMON SHARES, 10,000,000 PREFERRED SHARES, AND 
                        4,000 SERIES C PREFERRED SHARES

                           PAR VALUE $.01 PER SHARE

                           SERIES C PREFERRED STOCK

This certifies that                                is the registered holder of
                    ------------------------------
                                 Shares of the capital stock of the above named 
--------------------------------
corporation, fully paid and non-assessable, transferable only on the books of 
the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or by Attorney upon surrender of 
this Certificate properly endorsed.

In Witness Whereof, the said Corporation has caused this Certificate to be 
signed by its duly authorized officers and its Corporate Seal to be hereunto 
affixed this               day of               A.D. 19  
             -------------        -------------        --

  ----------------------------------       ----------------------------------
              SECRETARY                                 PRESIDENT
<PAGE>
 
     The following abbreviations, when used in the inscription on the face of
this certificate, shall be construed as though they were written out in full
according to applicable laws or regulations:


TEN COM   -as tenants in common         UNIF GIFT MIN ACT-......Custodian.......
                                                          (Cust)         (Minor)
TEN ENT   -as tenants by the entireties            under Uniform Gifts to Minors

JT TEN    -as joint tenants with right of
          survivorship and not as tenants            Act........................
          in common                                             (State)

    Additional abbreviations may also be used though not in the above list.

 
     For Value Received, _______ hereby sell, assign and transfer unto _________
________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ Shares
represented by the within Certificate and do hereby irrevocably constitute and 
appoint _______________________________________________________________ Attorney
to transfer the said Shares on the books of the within named Corporation with 
full power of substitution in the premises.
     Dated: _______________________ 19 ___
            In presence of
                                          ______________________________________
_________________________________________


                   NOTICE  THE SIGNATURE OF THIS ASSIGNMENT
               MUST CORRESPOND WITH THE NAME AS WRITTEN UPON THE
             FACE OF THE CERTIFICATE, IN EVERY PARTICULAR, WITHOUT
               ALTERATION OR ENLARGEMENT OR ANY CHANGE WHATEVER
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 10, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50791

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FERNANDO VARGAS-PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-03-CR-507-ALL-DB

--------------------

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Fernando Vargas-Perez appeals the sentence imposed following

his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States

after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Vargas-Perez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element

of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have

been alleged in his indictment. Vargas-Perez maintains that he
No. 03-50791

-2-

pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds

the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed

for that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Vargas-Perez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6158

ASTON EARL MCCRAE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

ROBERT J. BECK,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T.S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CA-93-941-AM)

Submitted: May 16, 1996 Decided: June 5, 1996

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Aston Earl McCrae, Appellant Pro Se. Katherine P. Baldwin, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) petition. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. McCrae v.

Beck, No. CA-93-941-AM (E.D. Va. Nov. 29, 1995). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed December 14, 2016.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D14-1025

Lower Tribunal No. 06-16991

________________



### Derrick McPhee,

Appellant,

vs.



### The State of Florida

, Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the

Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William L. Thomas

, Judge.

Joseph W. Gibson, Jr., for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jill D. Kramer, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, C.J., and WELLS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

SUAREZ, C.J.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

The State of Florida moves for rehearing of this Court’s denial of its motion

to recall the August 29, 2014 mandate in order to allow appellate review oftranscripts from a Rule 3.850 evidentiary hearing. Although we grant the State’s

motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior November 3, 2016 opinion and substitute

it with the following, we do so solely to correct the legal basis for denying the

State’s motion to recall the mandate.

We agree with the State that State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Judges of the

District Court

, 405 So. 2d 980, 982 (Fla. 1981) is no longer valid in light of the

Florida State legislature’s repeal of Florida Statute section 35.10 by Laws 2013, c.

2013-25, § 1, effective January 1, 2014. That repeal eliminated terms of court for

purposes of recalling an appellate mandate. The Court’s ability to recall a

mandate, however, is still limited by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340(a),

which states that “the court may direct the clerk to recall the mandate, but not more

than 120 days after its issuance.” Because the State moved to recall the mandate

more than 120 days from its issuance on August 29, 2014, this Court is without

jurisdiction to recall the mandate.

Motion for rehearing granted and denial of the motion to recall the mandate

and to reopen the case affirmed.

2
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 JULY 22, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-15694 

Non-Argument Calendar

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cv-23076-JAL

ROY GEER, 

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner - Appellant,

 versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lRespondent - Appellee.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Southern District of Florida

 ________________________

(July 22, 2011)

Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Roy Geer appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion

attacking his drug conviction. Geer claims his counsel, Ed Shohat, was ineffective
for denying his right to testify at trial. We previously remanded this case so that

the district court could hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the

performance prong of the Strickland test was violated. Strickland v. Washington,

1

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052 (1984). After hearing conflicting testimony from

both Geer and Shohat, the district court found that Shohat more likely than not

followed his normal practice and advised Geer of his right to choose whether he

wished to testify. The district court further found that Shohat convinced Geer not

to take the stand because of Geer’s prior drug conspiracy convictions. “[I]f

counsel believes that it would be unwise for the defendant to testify, counsel may,

and indeed should, advise the client in the strongest possible terms not to testify.” 

United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 

After reviewing the record we find no clear error in the district court’s

findings of historical facts. See Gallego v. United States, 174 F.3d 1196, 1198

(11th Cir. 1999) ( “It is perfectly legitimate for the district court to find, based on

all the evidence in the record, that a defendant’s testimony about his participation

in a drug scheme is not credible.”). And we further find no error in the

determination by the district court that Geer failed to make a substantial showing

that Shohat deprived him of the right to testify in violation of the Sixth

Geer v. United States, 354 F. App’x 417 (11th Cir. 2009). 1

2
Amendment. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Geer’s § 2255

motion.

AFFIRMED

3