UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4494

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KENDALL R. JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior 

District Judge. (3:04-cr-00392-RLW-1)

Submitted: March 18, 2010 Decided: May 13, 2010

Before MICHAEL,1 MOTZ, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

 

1 Judge Michael was a member of the original panel but did 

not participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by a 

quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
2

Brian J. Grossman, CROWGEY & GROSSMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Roderick 

C. Young, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kendall Jones was convicted of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, 

two counts of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams 

or more of cocaine base, and possession with intent to 

distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine powder. He was 

sentenced to 300 months in prison.2

Prior to trial, Jones’ attorney filed a Motion to 

Produce Information and to Continue, seeking: (1) to obtain

information about Government witness Michelle Campbell; and 

(2) a continuance so that he might have time to review such 

material. He stated that he had already received from the 

Government and reviewed the criminal records of Campbell and 

another witness in order to prepare for cross-examination. 

However, counsel expressed concern about Campbell’s criminal 

record in New York, which included a 1987 robbery conviction and 

several bench warrants, the latest of which was issued in 1992 

and vacated in 1993. Counsel believed that files related to 

 Jones now appeals, 

challenging his convictions on two grounds. We affirm.

 

2 Subsequent to Jones’ sentencing, the district court 

granted his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion and reduced his 

sentence to 240 months. 
4

these New York matters might have some relevance to her 

credibility.

The district court denied the motion after argument. 

The court found that there was no factual or legal basis for the 

relief requested. Additionally, the court observed, “Everything 

stated by the defendant [in terms of what the files might 

reveal] is either speculative or conclusory.” 

On appeal, Jones argues that the district court 

improperly denied his motion. With respect to the request for 

information, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to 

disclose to the defense prior to trial any exculpatory or 

impeaching evidence in its possession. See Giglio v. United 

States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

83, 86-88 (1963). Evidence need only be disclosed, however, if 

it: (1) is favorable to the defendant; (2) was suppressed by the 

Government; and (3) is material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 

263, 281-82 (1999). Undisclosed evidence is material when its 

cumulative effect is such that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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Mere speculation about the existence of potentially 

exculpatory or impeaching evidence is insufficient to give the 

defense access to materials under Brady and Giglio. United 

States v. Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1986); United 

States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1984). 

Further, Brady does not require the Government “to gather 

information or conduct an investigation on the defendant’s 

behalf.” United States v. Tadros, 310 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 

2002).

Here, the district court properly denied Jones’ 

request for information. Jones only speculated that information 

in Campbell’s New York file would have produced exculpatory or 

impeaching evidence. Moreover, the evidence he sought by way of 

his motion was not material. There was overwhelming evidence 

against Jones, including the testimony of Campbell, which was to 

a great extent corroborated by Special Agent Baldwin’s 

testimony. In light of this, there is not a reasonable 

possibility that the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different had counsel had access to the records he sought. 

We also conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying the requested continuance. See United 

States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 739 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating 

standard of review). The sole reason for seeking the 
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continuance was to have time to review Campbell’s New York 

files. Because Jones had no right to disclosure of that 

material, there was no need for the continuance. 

We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED