* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 9 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LINDA J. GRAVITT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 98-7156 (D.C. No. 97-CV-380-S) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , BARRETT , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Claimant Linda J. Gravitt appeals from the districtcourt’s order affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Securitythat she is not entitled to disability insurance benefits and supplemental secu rity income disability benefits. After “closely examin[ing] the record as a whole to determine whether the [Commissioner’s] decision is supported by substanti al evidence and adheres to applicable legal standards,” Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 531 (10th Cir. 1995), we affirm. Ms. Gravitt claims that she is disabled due to painand other limitations arising from a right shoulder rotator cuff tear, an d carpal tunnel and cubital tunnel syndrome in both hands and elbows. The administrat ive law judge (ALJ) determined at step five of the five-step sequential process, see Williams v.
Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), that altho ugh she cannot return to her former position as tireworker, she can perform a reduced range of sedentary work. He therefore concluded Ms. Gravitt is not di sabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. On appeal, Ms. Gravitt argues that the ALJ failed t o properly evaluate her pain and other limitations. She also contends thatthe ALJ’s determination was erroneous because the vocational expert identified a job with an insignificant number of positions available to her, in light of t he distance she would have to travel from her rural home.-3-

The medical evidence shows that Ms. Gravitt has und ergone surgery on her right shoulder and both hands, during the period fr om September 30, 1992 to April 28, 1994. On August 1, 1994, her treating physician determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement, with a 16% permanent partial medical impairment of the whole person. The physic ian released her for work with permanent restrictions on lifting; pushing, pu lling, and twisting; use of pneumatic or vibrating hand-held tools; and use of hands in repetitive working activities for more than three to five hours a day. On March 29, 1995, when seen for a consultative examination, Ms. Gravitt continu ed to complain of pain and limited use of her shoulder, pain in her elbows, an d pain and loss of strength and dexterity in her hands. Ms. Gravitt challenges the ALJ’s determination thather subjective complaints of disabling pain are not fully credible . Concerning this issue, we must bear in mind that [c]redibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such d eterminations when supported by substantial evidence. Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990)). Here, the ALJ appropriately dis cussed the relevant evidence, including claimant’s medical record, frequency of m edical contacts, daily activities, level of pain medication, and motivatio n, and, based on that discussion,1 Ms. Gravitt emphasizes the vocational expert’s cros s-examination

testimony that the available surveillance systems j obs would be reduced by 50% for an individual with very limited hand movement. This fact is irrelevant to our disposition of the appeal. Based on his weighing o f the evidence, the ALJ did not include this limitation in his RFC determination. See Decker v. Chater , 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996) (hypothetical questions t o the VE need only reflect (continued...) -4- found that Ms. Gravitt’s pain was not as severe as alleged. See Kepler , 68 F.3d at 391 (addressing factors relevant to consideratio n of claimant’s pain complaints and requiring the ALJ to affirmatively link credibi lity findings to substantial evidence). The record provides substantial evidenc e supporting the ALJ’s credibility determination. Similarly, there is support for the ALJ’s determination that Ms. Gravitt has the residual functional capacity for a reduced range of sedentary work in spite of her severe musculoskeletal impairment. The ALJ’s f indings on this issue are fully consistent with the medical opinion of the treating physician and reconcilable with that of the consulting physician. Ms. Gravitt also argues that the ALJ erred in findi ng that there are a significant number of jobs that she could perform . In response to the ALJ’s hypothetical question concerning jobs available to a person with the limitations noted by the treating physician, the vocational exp ert (VE) identified the job of sedentary surveillance systems monitor. The VE tes tified there were 500 such jobs in Oklahoma and 70,000 nationwide. 11 (...continued)

impairments and limitations that are borne out by the evidentiary record). -5- Ms. Gravitt contends that common sense dictates that most surveillance monitor jobs are in urban areas, and that her disab ility prevents her from traveling the distance from her rural home to perform such wo rk. Essentially, she argues that, without the urban jobs, the occupational base does not contain the requisite significant number of jobs that plaintiff could per form and, therefore, she should be eligible for benefits. The argument is flawed. If claimant’s RFC is “not enough to enable [her] to do any of [her] previous work,” the Commissioner “must decide if [she] can d o any other work . . . that exist[s] in significant numbers in the national eco nomy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 1561, 416.961. “[W]ork exists in the national economy wh en it exists in significant numbers either in the region where [claimant] live[ s] or in several other regions of the country. It does not matter whether . . . [ w]ork exists in the immediate area in which [claimant] live[s].” Id. , §§ 404.1566(a); 416.966(a). Thus, “the number of jobs that contributes to the 

### < significant number of jobs’ standard looks to the national economy--not just a local area.” Harmon v. Apfel , 168 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 1999). “Congress inte nded ‘to provide a definition of disability which can be applied with uniformity and consistency throughout the Nation, without regard to where a particular individual may-6-

reside. . . .’” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, 30 (1967)). In “‘tightening the definition of disabil ity,’” Congress eliminated consideration of commuting difficulties as an influ ence on the disability determination. “‘A person, otherwise able to work, is in effect offered a choice: he can choose either to commute the distance to his job or he can move closer and avoid the expense and inconvenience. Disability in surance is not available to fund his decision to live far from his job.’” Id. at 292-93 (quoting Lopez Diaz v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare , 585 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1st Cir. 1978)). We will not disturb the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. G ravitt can perform work which exists in significant numbers in the loc al economy.
AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge