NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER THOMAS KEGLER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10177 

D.C. No. 

2:15-cr-00106-MCE-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 7, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: BERZON and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,** District 

Judge.

Before pleading guilty to charges of Possession with Intent to Distribute 

Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and Felon in Possession of a 

Firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), Kegler moved to suppress evidence of 

drugs and a firearm found in his hotel room. After an evidentiary hearing, the 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 27 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

district court found that Kegler had voluntarily consented to a search of the hotel 

room. Kegler appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the 

evidence, having conditioned his plea on the right to appeal that order. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo, United States v. 

Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008), and review the district court’s 

determination of voluntariness for clear error, United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234

F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2000). We view the evidence related to consent in the light 

most favorable to the fact-finder’s decision. United States v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410, 

414 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 501

(9th Cir. 2004)).

Kegler argues that the district court erred because the five factors that we 

generally apply to determine the voluntariness of consent to search, as set forth in 

Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d at 502, and United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2000), counsel against finding voluntariness in this case.

A valid consent to search is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 

warrant requirement. Brown, 563 F.3d at 414-15 (citing Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973)). In Schneckloth, the Supreme Court 

explained that the government bears the burden of demonstrating that consent to 

search is voluntary, “to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” 
3 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223, 227. We have elaborated that “[w]hen viewing the 

surrounding circumstances, there is no single controlling criterion.” United States 

v. Perez-Lopez, 348 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. 

Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 622 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Here, the Cormier-Patayan Soriano factors do not readily inform the 

voluntariness inquiry because it was Kegler himself who initiated and broadened 

the search that resulted in the discovery of the methamphetamine and the gun. 

Soon after the officers entered his hotel room with an arrest warrant, Kegler 

requested assistance from a deputy United States Marshal in finding a sweatshirt so 

he could keep warm at the police station. At Kegler’s direction and with Kegler’s 

assistance, the deputy searched two suitcases, including one that was locked and 

for which Kegler provided the combination. And, in response to the deputy’s 

question about how he wanted to handle his property in light of his arrest, Kegler 

expressed his desire to take his possessions with him to the police station, rather 

than leave them at the hotel. Kegler was informed that this request would 

necessitate a search of all of his property. In response, Kegler told the deputy that 

the officers could “search whatever they want.” It was shortly after that the deputy 

discovered the methamphetamine in a duffel bag. 

After the discovery of the methamphetamine, Kegler was read Miranda

warnings, and he again consented to a search of his possessions. After Kegler told 
4 

another officer that he had a gun in one of his bags, Kegler provided the officers

with the precise location of the gun. They then discovered the gun by following 

Kegler’s instructions.

It is difficult to square Kegler’s claim of the involuntariness of his consent 

with his initiation of the search of his property and his broadening of the search by 

electing to take his property to the police station, even after he had been advised 

that this choice would require an expanded search. Kegler’s continuing

cooperation in the search, including providing access to a locked container and 

offering precise directions for finding the gun, further support the finding of 

voluntariness. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district 

court’s findings, and considering the totality of the circumstances, Kegler’s 

consent was voluntary. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; Brown, 563 F.3d at 414-

15. 

AFFIRMED.