NO T PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPE ALS

FOR T HE THIRD CIRCUIT

____ _______

No. 2 1

- 1 9 0 2

_ _________

VICTOR B. PERKINS

,

Appellant

v.

PROCT E R & GAMB LE C OM PANY;

ASTRA ZENECA MANUFACTURING CO

.

_ ________________________ ___________

On App eal from the United States Distr ict Court

for the Dist rict of Delaware

(D.C. C ivi l N o. 1: 1 9

- cv

- 0 0491 )

District Judge: Honorab le Richard G. And re ws

______________________ ____ __ ________

Sub mitted Purs uant to Th ird Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

F e b r u a r y 1 5

, 2 0 2 2

Befor e: R E S T R E P O

, P H I P P S a n d C O W E N *

, Circuit Judges

(O pinion filed : April 15, 2022 )

__________ _

OPINION *

__________ _

* The Honorable Robert E. Cowen assumed in active status on April 1, 2022 after the

argument and conference in this case , but before the filing of the opinion. This opinion is

filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 46(d) and Third Circuit I.O.P.

Chapter 12.

* Th is dispo siti on is n ot an opinion of t he ful l C ou r t a nd pursu an t to I

. O.P. 5 .7 do e s n ot

cons titute b inding pr ecedent.2

PER CURIAM

Pro se a ppella nt Vict or Perkins i s a n i n v o l u n t a r i l y c o m m i t t e d c i v i l d e t a i n e e a t t h e

Federal Medical Cen te r in Rochester, Minneso t a

. I n 2 0 1 9

, P e r k i n s filed a c o m p l a i n t

a g a i n s t P r o c t e r & G a m b l e a n d A s t r a Z e n e c a

. P e r k i n s a l l e g e d t h a t i n 2 0 1 5 h e s u f f e r e d t w o

m a s s i v e h e a r t a t t a c k s

, e a c h t r a c e a b l e t o h i s u s e o f t h e pr oton pump inhibitor P r i l o s e c

. †

S c r e e n i n g t h e c o m p l a i n t u n d e r 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 9 1 5 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( B )

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t sua

sponte dismissed w i t h p r e j u d i c e P e r k i n s ’ s a p p a r e n t c l a i m u n d e r t h e C o n s u m e r P r o d u c t

S a f e t y A c t

, 1 5 U

. S

. C

. § 2 0 7 2

. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s m i s s e d

, w i t h l e a v e t o a m e n d

,

P e r k i n s ’ s a p p a r e n t c l a i m s u n d e r 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 1 9 8 3 a n d D e l a w a r e pr o duct s l i a b i l i t y l a w

.

C o n c e r n i n g t h e l a t t e r c l a i m

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o b s e r v e d t h a t i t w a s f a c i a l l y u n t i m e l y i n

l i g h t o f t h e a p p l i c a b l e t w o

- y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s u n d e r D e l a w a r e l a w

.

I n h i s s u b s e q u e n t l y f

i l e d c o m b i n e d a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t a n d m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y

j u d g m e n t

, P e r k i n s r a i s e d o n l y h i s p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y c l a i m

, a l l e g i n g l i t t l e m o r e t h a n t h e

† For Perkins, Prilosec and heart attacks a r e recurring lit igation topics

. For exa mple,

Perkins twice sued his Pri losec

- pr escrib ing ph y s ician for medical malp ractice. S e e

Perkins v. Sta nton , DC Civ

. No. 18

- cv

- 0 2465 , 2019 W L 3545890 (D. Minn. Aug. 5,

2019) ; Perkins v. Stanton

, DC C i v. No. 16

- cv

- 0 107 0 , 2017 WL 780573 (D. Minn. Feb.

28, 20 17) ( “ Stanton I ” )

. Perkins also filed a h abeas actio n c la imi ng that forced u se of

psych o tro pic medication caused his heart attacks. See Perkins v

. Trump

, DC Civ. No. 21

-

cv

- 0 1219 , 2021 WL 3701852 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 202 1 )

. He also sued the Food and Drug

Admi nistration , claiming that i t failed to p ro te ct him a n d other s from the alleg ed dangers

of Pri losec an d another drug

. See Perkins v. FDA

, DC Civ. No. 19

- cv

- 00 822, 2019 WL

6173413 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2019), aff ’ d

, 827 F. A p p ’ x 325 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

. In addition, Perkins facilitated a suit on b eh alf of his ste pfather, whose d eath he att ributes

to the use of Prilosec

. ( T hat matter is currently pending in t his Court

, s e e P erkins v.

Proct e r & Gamble Pharm

. Co. , C.A. N o. 21

- 2138 (3d C i r. ) )

.3

f a c t s o f h i s h e a r t a t t a c k s a n d u s e o f Prilosec

, a n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s k n e w b e f

o r e

d i s t r i b u t i n g P r i l o s e c o f i t s c a p a c i t y t o c a u s e c e r t a i n i n j u r i e s

. P e r k i n s s o u g h t f

i v e m i l l i o n

d o l l a r s i n c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s

.

T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g P e r k i n s ’ s a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t w i t h

prejudice a n d d i s m i s s i n g h i s s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n a s m o o t

. C o n d u c t i n g a n a n a l y s i s

u n d e r § 1 9 1 5 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i i )

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a g a i n determined t h a t P e r k i n s ’ s p r o d u c t s

l i a b i l it y c l a i m i s f

a c i a l l y u n t i m e l y u n d e r D e l a w a r e ’ s t w o

- y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. T h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o d e t e r m in ed t h a t the c l a i m wa s

, i n a n y e v e n t

, d e f i c i e n t l y p l e a d e d

,

r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r i t w a s g o v e r n e d b y D e l a w a r e o r M i n n e s o t a l a w

.

P e r k i n s a p p e a l e d

, a n d w e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 9 1

. Our review of

a sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a cl aim u n d e r § 1 9 1 5 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i i ) , like that of a

d is missal on a party ’ s motion under Fede r al Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) , is d e n o v o

.

Se e Allah v. Seiverling

, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d C ir. 2000)

. ‡

U l t i m a t e l y

, w e d i s c e r n n o e r r o r i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b e l o w

. W i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e g a r d t o

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s t i m e l i n e s s d e t e r m i n a t i o n

, w e a d d t h e f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s

.

‡ In addition t o determin ing that dismissal was pro per under § 1915 ( e)(2)(B )(ii) because

Pe rkins failed to state a claim on which relief may be g ranted, the District Court also

deter mined that Perkins ’s amended complaint was “frivol o us ” under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

B ecause our analysis under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) i s disp o sitiv e of thi s appea l, we nee d n ot,

and do not, assess the correctness of the District Court ’s § 1915(e)(2)( B )(i)

determination

. Cf. Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 32 5 (1989) ( “[A] complaint,

containing as it does both factual allegations and le gal co nclusi o ns, is frivolous where it

lacks an arguable basis eithe r in law or in fact. ”).4

Ordinarily, the s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s is an affirmative defense that must be ple aded

and that is subject to waiver. See Chainey v. Street

, 523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008)

.

H o w e v e r

, w h e n a p p l i c a t i o n o f a time

- bar and the absence of a n y me r itorious to l ling

issues a r e obvious from the f a c e of a complaint, a d i s t r i c t c o u r t m a y properly d ismiss t h e

c o m p l a i n t under § 1 9 1 5 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i i )

. See Jones v. Bock

, 549 U .S. 199, 2 1 5 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ;

Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks

, 58 9 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) ; c f

. Bethel v. Jendoco

Const. Corp. , 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a “ limitat ions defense

may be raised on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), but only if ‘ the time alleged in the

statement of a claim s ho ws that the cause of action has not b e en brought w ithin the

statute of limitations ’ ” ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

.

U p o n i n i t i a l s c r e e n i n g i n t h i s matte r

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o m p a r e d t h e y e a r t h a t t h e

a l l e g e d i n j u r i e s w e r e s u s t a i n e d ( 2 0 1 5 ) w i t h t h e y e a r t h a t P e r k i n s f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n ( 2 0 1 9 )

a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a t P e r k i n s ’ s p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y c l a i m i s t i m e

- b a r r e d u n d e r D e l

. Code Ann.

tit. 10, § 8119 (“ No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim for alleged personal

i njuries shall be brought after the expiration o f 2 years from the date upon which it i s

claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained.”)

. T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w a s r i g h t t o a p p l y

t h e D e l a w a r e s t a t u te o f l i m i t a tio n s

.

T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s s u b

j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n a m e nd e d c o m p la i n t

ad v a n c i n g o n l y a s t a t e

- l a w p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y c l a i m w a s g r o u n d e d

, i f an y w h e r e

, i n t h e5

d i v e r s i t y

- j u r i s d i c t i o n s t a t u t e

. S e e 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 3 3 2 ( a )

. § “ A federal court, sitting in

diversity, follows the forum ’ s choice of law r ules to dete rmine the applicable statute of

lim i tations. ” Ross v. Johns

- Manville Corp.

, 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1985)

. P e r k i n s

f i l e d s u i t i n t h e D i s t r i c t o f D e l a w a r e

, s o t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i s s e t t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e

t o D e l a w a r e l a w

. C f

. Stephe ns v

. Clash , 796 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2015)

.

W e n e e d n o t e n g a g e i n a f a c t

- i n t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s u n d e r D e l a w a r e l a w t o det er m i n e

w h et h er D e l a w a r e o r M i n n e s o t a b e a r s t h e “ m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p ” t o t h i s c a s e

. C f

.

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake , 594 A.2d 38, 47 (Del. 1991)

. E v e n a s s u m i n g P e r k i n s ’ s

c l a i m a r o se i n M i n n e s o t a

, D e l a w a r e ’ s b o r r o w i n g s t a t u t e w o uld p a v e t h e w a y t o w a r d

a p p l i c a t i o n o f D e l a w ar e ’ s s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

.

T h e b o r r o wing s t a tu t e p r o vi d e s

, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : “ W here a cause of ac tion arises

o utside of [Delaware], an action cannot be broug h t in a court of [Delaware] to enforce

s uch cause of action after the expiration of whichever is shorter, the t ime limited by the

law of [Delaware] , or the time limited by the law of the state or country where the cause

of action arose, for bringing an act i on upon such cause of action

. ” Del. Co d e Ann. tit. 10,

§ 8121 ; s e e a l s o Nat ’ l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int ’ l, Inc.

, 983 F.2d 485, 494 (3d Cir.

199 2) (noting that “the traditional rule that statut e s of limitat ions are governed by forum

§ Perkins argu es on appeal

, see Br. 5, that the District Court should have applied 15

U.S. C. § 150 1 ( concerning, inter alia, establis hment of the U.S. Department of

Comm e rce)

. E ven ass uming that Per ki ns intended to reference the Lanham Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. , the argument is baseless.6

law has been modifie d by [ D e l a w a r e ’ s borrowing] statute” )

. ** A c c o r d i n g l y

, D e l a w a r e ’ s

s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s b e i n g s h o r t e r t h a n a n y p o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e o f l i m i ta ti o ns

u nd e r M i n n e s o t a l aw

, c o m p a r e D e l

. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8119 w i t h Minn. Stat. § 541.05 ;

Karjala v. Jo h ns

- Manville Prod. Corp. , 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975)

, t h e f o r m e r

w o u l d p r e v a i l

.

P e r k i n s t h u s h a d t w o y e a r s a f t e r h i s c l a i m a c c r u e d t o f

i l e s u i t

. S e e Bro wn v. E.I.

duPont de Nemours & Co.

, 820 A.2d 362

, 3 6 5

- 6 6 ( D e l

. 2003) ( a p p l y i n g § 8 1 1 9 t o a

p r o d u c ts l i a b i l i t y c l a i m )

. †† H e f a i l e d t o d o s o a n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t properly c o n c l u d e d a s

m u c h

.

O n a f

i n a l n o t e

, w e o b s e r v e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t s h u t t h e d o o r o n

P e r k i n s ’ s p r o d uc t s l i a b i l i t y c l a i m w i t h o u t n o t i c e o f t h e s t a t u te

- o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s i s s u e

. I t

i d e n t i f i e d t h a t d e f

e c t f o r P e r k i n s on in it i a l s c r e e n i n g a n d t h e n g a v e h i m a c h a n c e t o

** Delaware ’s borrowing statute is de signed to cu rb forum shopping. See Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Oetrochemical Co

., Inc. , 866 A.2d 1, 16

– 17 (Del. 200 5)

(“Borrowing statutes such as Section 8121 are typically designed to address a specific

kind of forum shopping scenario

— cases where a plain tiff brings a claim in a Delaware

court that (i) arises under the law of a juri sdictio n oth e r than Delaware and (ii ) is barred

by that jurisdiction ’s statute of lim itations but would not be time

- barred in Delaware,

which has a longer statute of limitations

. Under that ‘standard scenario,’ the borrowing

statute operates to prevent the plaint iff f rom circ umventing the s horter limitations period

mandated by the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose.”). While t here is no

indication in t his case that P e rk ins sought a tactical advantage by fil ing suit in the District

of Delaware , t he plain langu age of t he bo rrowing st atute applies just the same.

†† P roducts liability cla ims under Delaware law may proce ed under a negligence theory

of liability ; strict liabil ity is not available. See LeJeune v. Bliss

- Salem, Inc. , 85 F .3d

1069, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996)

.7

a m e n d t h e p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y c l a i m

. W i t h h i s a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t

, i t w a s p e r h a p s p o s s i b l e

( a l b e i t u n l i k e l y ) t h a t P e r k i n s c o u l d h a v e o f f e r e d a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t w o u l d c u t a g a i n s t

d i s m i s s a l ( e

. g

. , a l l e g a t i o n s s u g g e s t i n g a d i f f e r e n t c l a i m

- a c c r u a l d a t e o r a b a s i s f o r t o l l i n g )

.

H e d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o d o s o

, h o w e v e r

. ‡‡

F o r t h o s e r e a s o n s

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s d i s m i s s a l o f P e r k i n s ’ s p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y

c l a i m w a s p r o p e r

, a n d w e w i l l a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t i n t h i s c a s e

.

‡‡ Now o n appeal, Perkins argu es that he is entitled to tolling because of an unspecifi ed

“ disability. ” B r. 3

- 4

. That argument, conclu sory as it i s, do es not undermi ne the District

Court ’ s judgment

. Furthermore, Perkins ’s litig ation history

, se e Footnote 1

, supra

, of

w hich we have take n judicial no tice, de monstrates that Perkins connected his heart

attacks an d his us e of Pri losec as early as May 16, 2016

, when he file d the complaint in

Stanton I

.