### CON CU RRING O PIN ION No. 04-09-00069- CV IN THE INT EREST OF A.M. , A.M., and B .M., Children Fr om the 131st District Court, Bexar County , Texas Trial Court No. 2008-PA-01447 Honora ble Antonia Arte ag a , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Concurringopinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons , J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Febr uary 24, 2010 Iconcur in the judgme nt; however , Iwrite sepa rat el y t o u rg e the L eg islature to amend the Family Code so as to avoid the inequitable result re ache d in this case. Cha pte r 1 02 of

the Te xas F a mil y

Cod e se ts f

or th t he pr ov isi on s g ov e rn ingthe fi lin g of a su it
a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- c hil d re la tio ns hip
. Se c tio n 10 2. 00 5 lis ts the ind ivi du a ls wh o have sta nd ingto file a suit for adoption. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 102.005 (Ve rnon 2009). Section 102.006, on the other ha

nd, lists t he individuals who lack standingto file such a suit, i ncluding “a f amily member or relative .
. . of . . . a former pa rent whose pare nt-child relationship has been ter minated . . . .” Id. § 102.006(a) (3). Howeve r, section 102.006 also provides an exception to this exclusion, which as applicable here , is “an a

unt who is a sister of a

pare nt of the child . . . .” Id. § 102.006(c). To establish her standing to file a suit aff ecting the parent-child relationship, the aunt mus t satisfy one of three require ments; she (1) has a continuing rig ht to possession of or ac cess to the c hildren under an existi ng court orde r; (2) has the consent of the childre n’s manag ing c onservator, g uardia n, or leg al custodian to bring the suit; or (3) files a n orig inal suit “not later than the 90th da y afte r the date the04
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-2- pare nt-child relationship between the ch i l d an d t h e pare nt is terminated in a suit filed by the De pa rtme nt of F a mil y and Pr ote c tiv e Se rv ic e s re qu e sti ng the te rm inatio n of th e par ent- c hil d relationship.” Id. § 102.006(b), ( c). Chapter 162 of

the Texas Fa

mily Code sets forth the provisions spe cifica lly g overningthe adoption of a c hild, incl u d i n g a re quirement that, “ [u] nless the manag ing c onservator is the petitioner, the wr itten consent of a manag ing c on s er v ator to the a doption must be filed.” Id. § 162.010(a)
. Howeve r, section 162.010 allows the court to “wa ive t he requirement of consent by the manag ing c onservator if the cour t finds that the consent is be ing ref used or has been r evoked w ithout g ood cause .” Id. Unlike s ec t i o n 1 6 2
. 0 10(a) , section 102.006(b) does not include the same g ood
cause component. Although I must ag ree with the majority ’s conc lusion that there is no statutory basis to import the good c ause r equire ment of section 162.010(a ) into section 102.006(b), I believe the State ’s int e re st i n k e e pin g fam il ies to geth e r i s b e st s e rv e d b y a me nd ingse c tio n 1 02 .0 06 (b ) t o include such a

require ment. The c hildren at issue in this c ase lived with the ir aunt for two y ear s until t hey wer e re moved by the De pa rtme nt base d u

po n uns ub sta

nti a te d a lle g a tio ns of

a bu se . A ft e r d e te rm ini ngthe a bu se alleg atio n s w e r e un s u

b s ta n ti a te d , th e D e p artm e n t a ll o w e d th e a u n t t o v is it

th e c h il dr e n , in c lu ding unsupervised ove rnig ht visit s. The aunt believed, based at least in part upon the De partment’s ow n
a c tio ns , that sh e wo uld

be a llo we d to a do pt t

he c hil dr e n. Ho we ve r, on c e sh e mov e d f or wa rd wi th her attempt to adopt the children, the D epar tment filed a motion to dismi ss ba sed on lack of standing despite her

substantial past contac t with the children. See id. § 1 02 .0 05 (5 ) ( a llo wi ng“ ano the r a du lt04
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-3- whom the cour

t determines to have had substantial past contac t w ith the child sufficie nt to wa rra nt standing ” to file a

n original suit requesting adoption). B eca use ninety -day s had passe d since the termination of the pa

rent-c hild relationship, the Department could ref use consent for a

ny rea son or for no rea son at all. And, because section 102.006(b) doe s not include a g ood cause component, the trial c o u rt is p r e v e n te d f r o m h e ar in g e v id e n c e o n th e is s u e o f c o n s e n t. I d o n o t b e li e v e the L eg islature intended to g ive the De partment such u n chec ked author ity ; theref ore, I ask the L eg islature to amend se ction 102.006 to allow the t rial court to waive the require ment of conse nt by the Depa rtment if the court finds that the consent is being ref used or ha s been r evoked w ithout good
cause .
Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice