alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5657 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5657

  To clarify the authority of States to use funds as the non-Federal 
  share of Medicaid expenditures for certain regional medical centers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 31, 2008

  Mr. Cohen introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To clarify the authority of States to use funds as the non-Federal 
  share of Medicaid expenditures for certain regional medical centers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF TREATMENT OF STATE AUTHORITY TO USE FUNDS 
              AS THE NON-FEDERAL SHARE OF MEDICAID EXPENDITURES FOR 
              CERTAIN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTERS.

    (a) In General.--Nothing in section 1903(w) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1396b(w)) shall be construed by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services as prohibiting a State's use of funds as the non-
Federal share of expenditures under title XIX of such Act where such 
funds are transferred from or certified by a publicly-owned regional 
medical center located in another State and described in subsection 
(b), so long as the Secretary determines that such use of funds is 
proper and in the interest of the program under title XIX.
    (b) Center Described.--A center described in this subsection is a 
publicly-owned regional medical center that--
            (1) provides level 1 trauma and burn care services;
            (2) provides level 3 neonatal care services;
            (3) is obligated to serve all patients, regardless of 
        ability to pay;
            (4) is located within a Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
        Area (SMSA) that includes at least 3 States;
            (5) provides services as a tertiary care provider for 
        patients residing within a 125-mile radius; and
            (6) meets the criteria for a disproportionate share 
        hospital under section 1923 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1396r-4) in 
        at least one State other than the State in which the center is 
        located.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 10.42

2009 Base Salaries for Named Executive Officers

The Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors (the Committee) annually sets forth compensation levels and equity awards for the Companys executive officers using the following process: after reviewing the data set
forth in a compensation survey provided by Radford Surveys + Consulting, a global life sciences and technology industry compensation consulting firm, the Committee determines on an annual basis for each executive officer, (1) a target annual
compensation package, (2) the appropriate allocation of the total compensation package between base salary, short-term performance based compensation and long-term equity incentive compensation, and (3) whether there should be any changes to the
compensation packages to better align our executive officers interests with those of our stockholders. Adjustments to the base salary of our executive officers is determined by the Committee in February of each year, with the adjustments
becoming effective March 1st. For 2009, the Committee
approved the salaries listed below for each of the Companys named executive officers.



|                                                                              |  |                     
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | --------------------
|Named Executive Officer                                                       |  | Base Salary for 2009
|Claes Glassell President and Chief Executive Officer                          |  | $490,000            
|                                                                              | 
|Kevin D. Green Vice President, Finance and Chief Accounting Officer           |  | $220,000            
|                                                                              | 
|Laurence M. Corash, M.D. Senior Vice President and Chief Medical Officer      |  | $375,000            
|                                                                              | 
|William M. Greenman Senior Vice President, Business Development and Marketing |  | $312,000            
|                                                                              | 
|Howard G. Ervin Vice President, Legal Affairs                                 |  | $311,531
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION OF


CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Cardtronics, Inc. (“Cardtronics”) for the period ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Cardtronics.








Date:  November 5, 2010
/s/ Steven A. RathgaberSteven A. RathgaberChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)








Date:  November 5, 2010
/s/ J. Chris BrewsterJ. Chris BrewsterChief Financial Officer
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-18-00276-CV

CECIL G. KNICKERBOCKER,

Appellant

v.

DONALD KNICKERBOCKER AS INDEPENDENT 

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID 

KNICKERBOCKER AND ROY MATHIS,

Appellees

From the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 8976 PR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cecil G. Knickerbocker appealed an adverse judgment rendered against him on 

June 21, 2018. Knickerbocker has now filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. The motion 

is granted, and this proceeding is dismissed. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). 

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice
Knickerbocker v. Knickerbocker Page 2

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed October 10, 2018

[CV06]
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and the Vice President and Cashier of
Communitycorp (the Company), each certify that, to his or her knowledge on the date of this certification:



| | 1. | The annual report of the Company for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the Report) fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |     |  |                         |  |                                      
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ----------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: March 29, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ W. Roger Crook     
|                     |  |     |  |                         |  | W. Roger Crook                       
|                     |  |     |  |                         |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                     |  |    
|Date: March 29, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ Gwendolyn P. Bunton
|                     |  |     |  |                         |  | Gwendolyn P. Bunton                  
|                     |  |     |  |                         |  | Vice President and Cashier
STATE v. KNIGHT.

No. COA05-1310.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed April 18, 2006.

Certification Date May 8, 2006.

Appeal from the Edgecombe, (03CRS53543).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

JAMES NAUGLE, as Personal Representative of the

ESTATE OF LUCINDA NAUGLE, deceased,

Appellee.

No. 4D14-1852

[January 6, 2016]

Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jack B. Tuter, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

2007-CV-036736 (19).

Joseph H. Lang, Jr. of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tampa, and 

Lauren R. Goldman of Mayer Brown LLP, New York, New York, for 

appellant.

Richard B. Rosenthal of The Law Offices of Richard B. Rosenthal, P.A., 

Miami, and Robert W. Kelley, John J. Uustal and Todd R. McPharlin of 

Kelley Uustal, PLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is the third appearance of this case in this court. See Philip Morris 

USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 103 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Naugle I”); Naugle 

v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 133 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Naugle II). 

In Naugle I, we affirmed on the issue of liability, but reversed for “a new 

trial on the issue of damages.” 103 So. 3d at 949.

After the retrial on damages, the court interviewed the jury foreperson. 

The interview disclosed that, after the return of the verdict in the damages 

retrial, the foreperson received a text message from a second juror which 

indicated that, over the weekend before the verdict, the second juror had 

googled the previous verdict in the case. Receipt of non-record information 

concerning the amount of the prior verdict is an overt act “‘which might

have prejudicially affected the jury in reaching their own verdict.’” Baptist 

Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1991) (quoting § 
2

90.607(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Ann. (1987) (Law Revision Council Note-1976)); see 

also City of Winter Haven v. Allen, 589 So. 2d 968, 969 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). 

The existence of the text message from the second juror established 

reasonable grounds to believe that some juror misconduct occurred, which 

constitutes a legal basis for an interview of the second juror. See Sterling 

v. Feldbaum, 980 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). We therefore 

remand for the trial court to conduct an interview of the second juror.

We have considered the other issues raised by appellant and find no 

reversible error. On the cross-appeal, the appellee waived the comparative 

fault issue by failing to cross-appeal that point in Naugle I. See Airvac, 

Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 330 So. 2d 467, 469 (Fla. 1976). We also note that 

appellee failed to lodge a specific objection as to the application of 

comparative fault at the retrial.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

GROSS, GERBER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Reuben LOREDO, and J. Frank Wood, Jr., as Guardian ad Litem of Stacey Jazmine Loredo, and Thomas Berkau, as Administrator of the Estate of Henry Loredo, minor/deceased, and Amelia Torres, Administratrix of the Estate of Victoria Torres, Plaintiffs, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, Inc., Norfolk Southern Corporation, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, and D.A. Gilbert, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs v. Amelia Torres, as Administratrix of the Estate of Victoria Torres, Family Home & Garden, Inc. (f/k/a Family Farm Supply, Inc.), Walter B. Horne and wife, Janet G. Horne, individually and d/b/a Family Egg Market, Third-Party Defendants.

No. 297A05.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 3, 2006.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 169 N.C.App. 508, 610 S.E.2d 225 (2005), affirming an order granting summary judgment for defendants entered on 26 June 2003 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 February 2006.

Mast, Schulz, Mast, Mills, Johnson & Wells, P.A., by Charles D. Mast, George B. Mast, David F. Mills, and T. Marie Mobley, Smithfield, for plaintiff-appellants Loredo, Wood, and Berkau, and Ward & Smith, P.A., by W.L. Allen III, Greenville, for plaintiff-appellant Torres.

Millberg, Gordon & Stewart, by Frank J. Gordon, Raleigh, for defendant-appellee CSX Transportation, Inc.

Bode, Call & Stroupe, L.L.P., by Odes L. Stroupe, Jr. and John S. Byrd, II, Raleigh, for defendant-appellees Norfolk Southern *778Corporation, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, and D.A. Gilbert.

John J. Korzen, Kernersville, counsel for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-29-1997
<CASH>                                            3071
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    29428
<ALLOWANCES>                                      3696
<INVENTORY>                                      44460
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 89765
<PP&E>                                           49259
<DEPRECIATION>                                   20245
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  147798
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            25546
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           242
<OTHER-SE>                                       80940
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    147798
<SALES>                                          64894
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 64894
<CGS>                                            47261
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    47261
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 28782
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                1729
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (12797)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (5119)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (7678)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (7678)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.32)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                       5
<MULTIPLIER>                     1000

<S>                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                     JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                       DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                   17925
<SECURITIES>                                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                             1059
<ALLOWANCES>                               (91)
<INVENTORY>                              19950
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         40825
<PP&E>                                   24762
<DEPRECIATION>                          (12725)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           56413
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                     8363
<BONDS>                                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<COMMON>                                   132
<OTHER-SE>                               46528
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             56413
<SALES>                                 109573
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        109573
<CGS>                                    46491
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            55145
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        (395)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           8332
<INCOME-TAX>                              3136
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       5196
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                              5196
<EPS-BASIC>                               0.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                             0.43


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Martha E. Hamlin, Appellant.

[800 NYS2d 255]

Mercure, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (McGrath, J.), rendered October 13, 2004, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of driving while intoxicated and the traffic infraction of driving while ability impaired.

The primary issue before us concerns defendant’s one-year prison sentence upon her conviction of statutory driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor. The conviction arose from an incident in which a pedestrian died after being struck by a vehicle operated by defendant and was based upon uncontradicted proof at trial that defendant had a .13% blood alcohol content at the time of the accident. Defendant asserts that her sentence should be reduced, arguing that because the jury acquitted her on a count of criminally negligent homicide, the fact that she caused a death should have been eliminated from sentencing consideration. She further argues that County Court failed to take into account her youth, lack of criminal history and expression of remorse. We disagree with her contentions.

A sentence that falls within the permissible statutory range will not be disturbed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court or extraordinary circumstances war*702ranting modification in the interest of justice *(see People v Hanrahan,*9 AD3d 689 [2004]; *People v Calkins,*6 AD3d 744, 746 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 671 [2004]). Manifestly, a sentencing court must consider all circumstances relating to the crime and the defendant when imposing a sentence following conviction *(see generally*Penal Law § 65.00 [1] [a]). Accordingly, defendant’s acquittal on the homicide charge did not require County Court to overlook the fact that the circumstances of defendant’s crime included a death. Moreover, defendant has failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction of County Court’s sentence in the interest of justice. Simply stated, defendant drank several beers and made an egregious error in judgment by choosing to drive after doing so, and a young man’s life was tragically extinguished. Because we conclude that the lawful one-year sentence for driving while intoxicated was not harsh or excessive *(see People v Abel,*166 AD2d 841, 842 [1990], *lv denied*76 NY2d 983 [1990]; *People v Hilker,*133 AD2d 986, 988 [1987], *lv denied*70 NY2d 875 [1987]), we affirm the judgment of conviction. Defendant’s remaining arguments have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.

Cardona, P.J., Carpinello, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and matter remitted to the County Court of Rensselaer County for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).
Exhibit 32.2



Certification of

Chief Financial Officer

of HealthTronics, Inc.



This certification is provided pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and accompanies the annual report on Form 10-K (the
Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2004 of HealthTronics, Inc., a Georgia corporation (the Issuer).



I, John Q. Barnidge, the Chief Financial Officer of the Issuer, certify that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (i) | the Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer.
| | ---- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: March 11, 2005



/s/ John Q. BarnidgeJohn Q. BarnidgeSenior Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerHealthTronics, Inc.




The foregoing certification is
being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-K or as a separate disclosure document.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting
the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Issuer and will be retained by the Issuer and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.