IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2323 C.D. 2014

: Argued: April 12, 2016

Port Authority of Allegheny County :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: May 24, 2016 

Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 85 (Union), appeals from an order 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), which denied the 

Union’s petition to vacate an arbitration award. The arbitration award denied the 

Union’s grievance concerning the Port Authority of Allegheny County’s 

(Port Authority) revision of its performance code governing employee 

absenteeism. We now reverse the trial court’s order to the extent that it affirmed

the arbitration panel’s disposition of the merits of the grievance.

The Union and the Port Authority are parties to a Collective 

Bargaining Agreement (CBA). On November 25, 2008, the parties executed a new 

CBA for 2008 through 2012, which amended some of the terms of the CBA in
2

effect prior to 2008. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 15-17.)1 One of the new terms 

of the parties’ CBA required the parties to “establish a committee to discuss and 

deal with any excessive absenteeism and methods to rectify the same.” (Id. at 16.) 

On July 1, 2011, the Port Authority, without the Union’s agreement, revised a 

portion of its employee performance code concerning the penalties for 

absenteeism. The Union filed a grievance on September 21, 2011, alleging that the 

Port Authority violated the parties’ CBA by revising its performance code. 

(Id. at 18.) The Port Authority denied the Union’s grievance, and the Union 

requested arbitration to resolve the parties’ dispute. (Id. at 19.) 

The matter proceeded to arbitration, and an arbitration panel

comprised of a partisan arbitrator for the Port Authority, a partisan arbitrator for

the Union, and a neutral arbitrator conducted a hearing. The parties presented 

evidence in support of their opposing positions concerning the Port Authority’s 

right to revise the performance code without the Union’s agreement. The Port 

Authority also contended, in the alternative, that the matter was not arbitrable, 

because the Union’s grievance was not filed within thirty days of the Port 

Authority’s revision of the performance code as required by Section 106(A)(2) of 

the CBA. (Id. at 29, 72.) The Port Authority thus contended that the Union’s 

grievance should be denied as untimely or, alternatively, that the grievance should 

be denied on the merits. (Id. at 36.) 

The neutral arbitrator, considering both the procedural and substantive 

issues raised by the parties, issued a draft opinion and award denying the Union’s 

 

1

The agreement provided that the terms of the parties’ previous CBA “not specifically 

changed [in the November 25, 2008 agreement] shall remain as is.” (R.R. at 17.) 
3

grievance. In so doing, the neutral arbitrator concluded that despite the language 

of the parties’ November 25, 2008 amendment to the CBA, the role of the 

absenteeism committee was intended to be advisory and, therefore, the Port 

Authority did not violate the CBA by revising its performance code. (Id. at 76-77.) 

The arbitrator further concluded that the Union’s grievance was untimely filed:

Regarding the question of timeliness raised by the Port 

Authority, the record evidence shows that the revisions to 

the performance code occurred on July 1, 2011. It is also 

clear that a grievance was not filed until September 21, 

2011. Section 106, Section A.2 [of the CBA] provides 

that grievances are to be filed within 30 calendar days 

from occurrence of the incident. Obviously, the 

grievance was filed beyond the required 30 calendar day 

period. In this case the evidence has shown that there 

may have [been] some discussion between [a Union 

representative] and a Port Authority representative, but 

such discussion has not been shown to have resulted in 

any kind of agreement for an extension of time to file a 

grievance. While I recognize there may be instances 

where the parties do in fact extend grievance filing time 

limits, there is no such evidence to support such a finding 

in this case. Consequently, it is my determination the 

grievance was untimely filed.

(Id. at 77.) The arbitrator thus addressed both the merits of the grievance and the 

procedural issue.

After the draft opinion was issued, the Union requested an executive 

session. The Union objected to the neutral arbitrator’s opinion on the basis that the 

arbitrator’s conclusion that the Union’s grievance was untimely filed deprived the 

arbitrator of jurisdiction to address the merits of the dispute. The neutral arbitrator 

declined to revise the draft opinion so as to eliminate the portion of the opinion 

deciding the merits. On September 30, 2013, the Port Authority’s partisan 

arbitrator signed the award, indicating his acceptance of the neutral arbitrator’s 
4

opinion and award. (Id. at 79.) The Union’s arbitrator did not sign the award. 

(Id.)

The Union filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award with the trial 

court on October 30, 2013. In its petition, the Union argued that the merits portion 

of the arbitration award should be vacated, because the arbitration panel, having 

found that the Union’s grievance was untimely, issued an arbitration award that did 

not draw its essence from the CBA. The Port Authority opposed the Union’s 

arguments as to the merits portion of the arbitration award, explaining that the 

arbitration panel properly addressed both of the issues before it. The 

Port Authority also argued that pursuant to the terms of the CBA, the failure of the 

Union’s arbitrator to sign the award constituted a deemed acceptance of the award, 

thereby barring the Union from requesting that the award be vacated. Upon 

consideration of the parties’ briefs, the trial court issued an opinion and order,

denying the Union’s petition to vacate the arbitration award. The trial court, 

applying the essence test, explained that “[t]he decision by the Arbitrator dealt with 

a subject that was clearly within the scope of the [CBA]. The Union proceeded 

with the evidentiary hearing and never asked to bifurcate the procedural from the 

substantive issues.” (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) The trial court did not address the Port 

Authority’s argument as to the Union’s ability to request that the trial court vacate 

the award.

On appeal to this Court,2the Union argues that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the arbitration award drew its essence from the parties’ CBA. 

 

2

The proper standard of review for an appeal of an arbitration award arising under the 

Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

Specifically, the Union contends that the merits portion of the arbitration award has 

no foundation in the terms of the CBA, because the arbitration panel found that the 

grievance was untimely filed. The Port Authority counters that the Union waived 

that issue and was barred from appealing this matter to the trial court due to the 

failure of the Union arbitrator to sign the award.

We first address the Union’s argument that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the arbitration award drew its essence from the CBA. Because the 

arbitration panel found that the grievance was untimely, the Union maintains that 

the arbitration panel’s holding as to the merits is not within the terms of the CBA,

nor can it be rationally derived from the CBA. The Union requests that we vacate 

the arbitration panel’s ruling on the merits. The Port Authority counters that the 

Union did not request bifurcation, and, consequently, the arbitration panel properly 

addressed both the procedural and substantive issues raised by the parties. Further, 

the Port Authority argues that the issues presented to the arbitration panel—

namely, the timely filing of grievances and the Port Authority’s right to revise the 

performance code—are both issues that are governed by the CBA, and, therefore, 

the arbitration award derives its essence from the CBA. Finally, the Port Authority 

argues that the Union should be precluded from arguing before this Court that the 

arbitration panel could not address the merits of the grievance after finding the 

grievance untimely, as the Union did not raise the issue before the arbitration 

panel.

 

(continued...)

§§ 1101.101-.2301, is the essence test. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland 

Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 939 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 

2007) (Westmoreland I.U. # 7).
6

We agree with the Union that the merits portion of the arbitration 

award does not satisfy the essence test, because the arbitration panel found that the

grievance was untimely filed. An arbitration panel’s award satisfies the essence 

test if it “draw[s] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.” State Sys. 

of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof’l Ass’n (PSEA-NEA), 

743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999). A court reviewing an arbitration panel’s award 

under the essence test must conduct a two-prong analysis: 

First, the court shall determine if the issue as properly 

defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining 

agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the 

agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, 

the arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the arbitrator’s 

interpretation can rationally be derived from the 

collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court

will only vacate an arbitrator’s award where the award 

indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or 

fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining 

agreement.

Id. “Where the arbitrator’s words exhibit an infidelity to the agreement, courts 

have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.” S. Tioga Educ. Ass’n v. S. 

Tioga Sch. Dist., 668 A.2d 260, 262 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (quoting Riverview Sch. 

Dist. v. Riverview Educ. Ass’n, PSEA-NEA, 639 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1994)), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 1996).

Section 106(A)(2) of the CBA provides that “[a]ll grievances with the 

exception of claims for welfare must be filed within thirty (30) calendar days from 

occurrence of incident or issuance of discipline.” (R.R. at 12 (emphasis added).) 

Here, the arbitration panel found that the grievance was filed beyond this thirty day 

deadline, and neither party appealed the arbitration panel’s finding as to the 

untimely filing of the grievance. Because the arbitration panel found that the 
7

grievance was untimely, the merits portion of the arbitration award does not derive 

its essence from the terms of the CBA. Specifically, the bargained-for terms of the 

parties’ CBA allow for an arbitration panel to consider the merits of grievances 

that are filed within thirty days of an incident. Despite the Port Authority’s 

contention that the merits of the grievance are within the terms of the CBA, there is 

no provision in the CBA allowing an arbitration panel to resolve the merits of 

grievances filed beyond thirty days.3,4 Where an arbitration panel has found a 

grievance untimely, no adjudication as to the merits of the grievance can logically 

flow from a CBA that expressly requires timely filing of grievances. See State Sys. 

of Higher Educ. v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local Union No. 509, 612 

A.2d 645, 647-48 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (reversing arbitration award which resolved 

merits where arbitrator’s finding that grievance was timely did not draw its essence 

from CBA), appeal denied, 618 A.2d 403 (Pa. 1992). Because the merits portion 

of the arbitration award cannot logically flow from the CBA due to the arbitration 

panel’s disposition as to timeliness, the arbitration award does not satisfy the 

essence test. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed to the extent that it 

 

3 Regarding the Port Authority’s additional argument concerning bifurcation, it is of no 

moment that the Union failed to request bifurcation of the procedural and substantive issues. 

The Union’s failure to request bifurcation did not grant the arbitration panel any more authority 

than it already had to resolve the merits of an untimely grievance. As explained above, the 

arbitration panel’s resolution of the merits was not within the terms of the CBA. Although 

bifurcation may have prevented this outcome, it was not incumbent upon the Union to request it. 

We, therefore, reject this argument.

4 We recognize that in resolving the merits, the arbitration panel may have acted out of 

caution. Specifically, if the arbitration panel’s conclusion as to timeliness were overturned on 

appeal, the merits decision could be considered. Where, as here, the ruling on timeliness 

prevails, the arbitration panel’s discussion of the merits is, at best, an advisory opinion and 

cannot serve as a binding interpretation of the CBA.
8

affirmed the arbitration panel’s disposition of the merits of the grievance, and the 

matter is remanded to the trial court with instruction that it vacate the merits 

portion of the arbitration award.

We further reject the Port Authority’s argument that the Union failed 

to preserve the issue of the arbitration panel’s ability to address the merits of the 

grievance after finding the grievance untimely. The Union raised a substantive 

issue before the arbitration panel, the Port Authority challenged the substantive 

issue and raised a question as to the timeliness of the Union’s grievance, and the 

arbitration panel ruled in the Port Authority’s favor on both issues. By challenging 

the timeliness of the grievance, the Port Authority thus raised a question

concerning the arbitration panel’s ability to resolve the merits of the dispute if it 

found the grievance to be untimely.

5

 Now, the Port Authority seeks to preserve the 

entirety of the favorable award by arguing that the Union failed to raise this issue 

before the arbitration panel. Generally, a party must raise an issue at the earliest 

opportunity. Campbell v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 86 A.3d 

344, 349 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Here, it was not until the arbitration panel ruled on 

both the merits and the timeliness of the grievance that the Union could have raised 

the issue as to whether the arbitration panel could address the merits after finding 

the grievance untimely. The Union objected to the arbitration panel’s resolution of 

 

5 We note that before the arbitration panel, the Port Authority contended that “[t]he 

arbitrator must deny this grievance as untimely. Even if the arbitrator could decide this 

grievance on the merits, it should still be denied.” (R.R. at 36 (emphasis added).) The Port 

Authority did not ask the arbitration panel to address both issues. Rather, the Port Authority 

requested that the arbitration panel deny the grievance as untimely. If, however, the arbitration 

panel were to find the grievance timely, the Port Authority sought for the grievance to be denied 

on the merits. 
9

the merits during the executive session, and, before the trial court, the Union

challenged the arbitration panel’s jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 

grievance in the face of an untimely request for arbitration. The Union thus raised 

the issue at the earliest possible opportunity. We, therefore, reject the Port 

Authority’s argument that the Union failed to preserve the issue of the arbitration 

panel’s ability to address the merits of the grievance after finding the grievance 

untimely.

6

Last, we address the Port Authority’s contention that the trial court 

erred because the Union is barred from appealing this matter due to the failure of 

the Union arbitrator to sign the award. Specifically, the Port Authority argues that 

the language of Section 106(F) of the CBA7indicates that a party who fails to sign 

 

6

The Port Authority further contends that allowing the Union to prevail on this issue 

would essentially permit the Union to repeatedly file untimely grievances as a method by which 

the Union could fully litigate the procedural and substantive issues of a dispute and then seek to 

have unfavorable awards vacated “on the basis of some latent procedural issue.” (Port Authority 

Br. at 18-19.) It is not for this Court, however, to divine the Union’s intent in pursuing this 

particular litigation strategy in the future. We note that the disposition of this matter will not 

result in a different outcome for the Union as to the denial of its grievance. Even if the merits 

portion of the arbitration panel’s award is vacated, the Union has not appealed the arbitration 

panel’s ruling as to timeliness and, consequently, the grievance remains denied as untimely. We, 

therefore, reject the Port Authority’s argument.

7

Section 106(F) of the CBA provides:

Upon issuance of the neutral arbitrator’s decision to the party 

arbitrators, the parties shall have fifteen (15) business days to 

request an executive session. The parties shall have fifteen (15) 

business days after the conclusion of the executive session, if one 

is requested, or if no executive session is requested, thirty (30) 

calendar days from the date of issuance from the neutral arbitrator, 

to sign the award indicating either concurrence or dissent. The 

failure to sign the award in accordance with this section shall 

constitute that party’s concurrence in the neutral’s decision.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
10

an award is deemed to have concurred in the award. The Port Authority contends 

that as a consequence of the Union’s concurrence in the award, the Union may not 

now appeal. 

We interpret the Port Authority’s argument as a contention that the 

Union violated the CBA by appealing the arbitration panel’s award when, by 

operation of Section 106(F) of the CBA, it was precluded from appealing. 

Whether a party has violated the CBA, however, is a question that must first be 

addressed through the grievance process. The proper procedure here, therefore, 

was for the Port Authority to raise the issue before the trial court, file a grievance 

concerning the Union’s right to appeal the arbitration panel’s award, and seek a 

stay of the proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of the grievance. 

If, after the parties have had the opportunity to fully grieve the issue pursuant to 

the terms of the CBA, a dispute continues to exist between the parties as to the 

interpretation of Section 106(F) of the CBA, Section 903 of the Public Employe 

Relations Act (PERA) mandates that such a dispute be submitted to an arbitration 

panel for resolution.8 Only after a dispute has reached this stage is it appropriate 

for a party to seek judicial review of the issues addressed during the grievance and 

arbitration process. See Campbell v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., Office of Emp’t 

Sec., 471 A.2d 1331, 1334 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (“[Petitioner’s] grievance . . . must 

 

(continued...)

(R.R. at 13.)

8 Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.903 (“Arbitration of 

disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining 

agreement is mandatory.”); see also Section 106(E) of the CBA (“Should any dispute arise 

between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of any section . . . in this [CBA] 

. . ., the matter shall be submitted to a board of arbitration for decision.”).
11

be submitted to arbitration before petitioner may seek judicial redress; and since he 

has not yet exhausted that mandatory remedy, this Court has no jurisdiction over 

the instant action.”) Here, rather than following the procedure outlined above, the 

Port Authority improperly sought to have the trial court resolve the issue

concerning Section 106(F) of the CBA.

9

 Neither this Court nor the trial court, 

however, may resolve disputes as to issues that have not first been grieved and 

arbitrated pursuant to the terms of the parties’ CBA. See Section 903 of PERA; 

Campbell, 471 A.2d at 1334; Section 106(E) of the CBA; see also Shumake v. 

Phila. Bd. of Educ., 686 A.2d 22, 24 (Pa. Super. 1996) (explaining that common 

pleas courts do not have jurisdiction over disputes concerning interpretation of 

CBA until party exhausts remedies under CBA). We, therefore, reject the Port 

Authority’s argument concerning Section 106(F) of the CBA, as the issue 

concerning the Union’s right to appeal is not properly before this Court. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed to the extent that it 

affirmed the arbitration panel’s disposition of the merits of the grievance, and the 

matter is remanded to the trial court with instruction that it vacate the merits 

portion of the arbitration award.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

 

9 We note that at this stage in the proceedings, the Port Authority likely would be unable

to prevail on a grievance concerning the Union’s ability to appeal in the instant matter. As 

explained above, Section 106(A)(2) of the CBA requires the parties to file grievances within 

thirty days of the incident at issue. Here, the Union filed its petition to vacate the arbitration 

award on October 30, 2013. The Port Authority would have had to file a grievance within thirty 

days of this date for the grievance to be timely.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2323 C.D. 2014

:

Port Authority of Allegheny County :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2016, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) is hereby REVERSED to the 

extent that it affirmed the arbitration panel’s disposition of the merits of the 

grievance filed by Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85, and the matter is 

REMANDED to the trial court with instruction that it vacate the merits portion of 

the arbitration award.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge