UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4928

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JOHN LAWTON LEDINGHAM, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, District 

Judge. (6:07-cr-00007-nkm) 

Submitted: June 30, 2009 Decided: August 7, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Joseph A. Sanzone, SANZONE & BAKER, P.C., Lynchburg, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, United States Attorney, Jean B. 

Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 A jury convicted John Lawton Ledingham of possessing a 

firearm (Count 6) and ammunition (Count 7) after having been 

convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(2006). He appeals his convictions, challenging the district 

court’s evidentiary rulings and asserting that the Government 

violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm. 

 Ledingham argues that the district court erred in 

allowing the Government to cross-examine him regarding his prior 

convictions after he stipulated that he was a convicted felon. 

We review a district court’s determination as to the scope of 

cross-examination for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002); cf. United States v. 

Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We review 

evidentiary rulings of the district court for abuse of 

discretion.”). 

 In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), 

the Supreme Court held that, when a defendant stipulates to his 

felony status at the time of his alleged possession of a firearm 

in violation of § 922(g)(1), the Government is precluded from 

offering other evidence to prove the prior conviction. Id. at 

191; see United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441, 442-43 (4th 

2 
Cir. 2006). The Government, however, did not offer any 

additional evidence on Ledingham’s prior convictions in its 

case-in-chief. When the Government elicited testimony regarding 

Ledingham’s other convictions on cross-examination, Ledingham 

already had testified to part of his criminal history. See

Williams, 461 F.3d at 451 (“The fact that the jury already knew 

of [defendant’s] felon status when it heard the names of his 

prior . . . convictions mitigates any damage that may have been 

caused by the introduction of those names.”). 

 Turning to Ledingham’s claim that the district court 

erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions under Rule 

609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Ledingham focuses on 

the district court’s failure to conduct the required balancing 

test set forth in Rule 609(a)(1). See United States v. Gray, 

852 F.2d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 1988). Because he did not rely on 

this ground in the district court, this court’s review is for 

plain error. United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 763 (6th Cir. 

2008); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993) 

(providing standard). 

 Assuming that the district court’s failure to conduct 

the balancing test amounted to error that was plain, we find 

that such error did not affect Ledingham’s substantial rights. 

The prior convictions included drug offenses and possession of 

3 
stolen property, none of which were similar to the instant 

§ 922(g)(1) offense. Cf. United States v. Saunders, 964 F.2d 

295, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding evidence of similar prior 

convictions inadmissible under Rule 609(a)). Moreover, the 

district court gave the jury a cautionary instruction regarding 

the use of prior convictions. See Williams, 461 F.3d at 451 

(“We have held that [curative] instructions mitigate the 

possibility of prejudice from improperly admitted evidence of 

the defendant’s criminal history because [w]e generally follow 

the presumption that the jury obeyed the limiting instructions 

of the district court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s evidentiary ruling. 

 Next, Ledingham contends that the district court erred 

by denying his motion for a mistrial after the Government 

cross-examined him about a prior conviction he did not commit. 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial 

for an abuse of discretion and find none in light of the 

district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. See United 

States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating 

standard of review); Williams, 461 F.3d at 451 (noting that this 

court presumes jury follows trial court’s limiting 

instructions). 

4 
 Ledingham also asserts on appeal that the Government 

violated Brady by failing to disclose a Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“BATFE”) asset claim form, in 

which his wife stated that she owned the guns seized during the 

search of his home. Due process is violated if the evidence in 

question: (1) is favorable to the defendant because it is 

either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was suppressed by the 

government either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) is 

material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). 

“[H]owever, where exculpatory information is not only available 

to the defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable 

defendant would have looked, a defendant is not entitled to the 

benefit of the Brady doctrine.” United States v. Jeffers, __ 

F.3d __, __, 2009 WL 1678046, at *10 (4th Cir. June 17, 2009) 

(No. 06-5289) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Moreover, “there is no Brady violation if the defense is aware 

of the evidence in time to reasonably and effectively use it at 

trial.” Id.

 Although the original BATFE asset claim form could 

have been used to impeach Mrs. Ledingham’s testimony that the 

guns belonged to Ledingham, we find that the nondisclosure of 

the form itself did not undermine the outcome of the trial. See

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (providing 

5 
standard). Our review of the record on appeal leads us to 

conclude that Ledingham was aware of the information contained 

in the form before trial and could have taken reasonable 

measures to obtain a copy of the form from the BATFE. See

Jeffers, 2009 WL 1678046, at *10. Thus, this claim fails. 

 Finally, Ledingham asserts that the district court 

erred by allowing his wife to testify after he asserted a 

marital communications testimonial privilege. We review the 

trial court’s resolution of the marital privilege issue for an 

abuse of discretion and find none. See United States v. Acker, 

52 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating standard of review). 

Because Ledingham and his wife jointly were involved during 

their marriage in ongoing criminal activity (i.e., conspiring to 

lie to federal officials on the BATFE asset claim form regarding 

the ownership of the firearms seized during the search of his 

home), he cannot rely on the marital communications privilege. 

United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1987) 

(recognizing “that where marital communications have to do with 

the commission of a crime in which both spouses are 

participants, the conversation does not fall within the marital 

privilege”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

6 
7 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED