RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 23a0202p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT SEAN REED,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CAMPBELL COUNTY, KENTUCKY,

Defendant,

MICHAEL RAY CURTIS; KYLE G. GRAY,

Defendants-Appellants.

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No. 22-5751

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington.

No. 2:20-cv-00158—William O. Bertelsman, District Judge.

Argued: July 27, 2023

Decided and Filed: August 30, 2023

Before: MOORE, ROGERS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jeffrey C. Mando, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & DUSING, PLLC, 

Covington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Michael Jay O’Hara, O’HARA, TAYLOR, SLOAN, 

CASSIDY, BECK PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey C. Mando, 

Jennifer L. Langen, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & DUSING, PLLC, Covington, 

Kentucky, for Appellants. Michael Jay O’Hara, Colby B. Cowherd, O’HARA, TAYLOR, 

SLOAN, CASSIDY, BECK PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GRIFFIN, J., joined, and 

ROGERS, J., joined in part. ROGERS, J. (pp. 20–23), delivered a separate opinion concurring 

in part and dissenting in part.

>
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Police officers Michael Curtis and Kyle 

Gray responded to a 911 call reporting a domestic dispute. When they arrived at the reported 

location, all was quiet, and they could not detect any signs of an altercation. The officers 

knocked on Robert Reed’s front door. After a brief verbal exchange, Reed refused to engage 

further with the officers because they did not have a warrant. The officers then broke down 

Reed’s front door, pointed a gun at his head, and removed him from his home. Reed filed a suit 

against the officers in their official and individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Upon 

motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity for 

Reed’s Fourth Amendment claims of unlawful entry, false arrest, and excessive force. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

Shortly before 9:00 p.m. on April 11, 2020, the Campbell County dispatch center 

received a 911 call. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 10) (Page ID #3); R. 60-1 (911 Call Tr. at 2–5) (Page ID 

#1000–03). The caller reported that “the people that live behind me, I don’t know if they’re 

having a domestic dispute or what” and that while in her backyard she “just heard him yelling 

and what sounds like him hitting something. . . . I don’t know if he’s hitting dogs or if he’s 

hitting humans.” Id. at 2:3–5, 3:9–12 (Page ID #1000, 1001). She gave the dispatcher the 

address as 7 South Cottonwood. Id. at 2:8–9 (Page ID #1000). She identified herself by her first 

name. Id. at 3:4 (Page ID #1001). The dispatcher then communicated to police: “7 South 

Cottonwood for a domestic. Caller’s advising it sounds like they’re outside (inaudible) verbal 

and physical.” Id. at 3:20–23 (Page ID #1001). Officers Michael Curtis and Kyle Gray 

responded to the call at 7 South Cottonwood. See R. 31 (Curtis Dep. Tr. at 68:9–12) (Page ID 

#166). They wore body cameras, which were engaged and recording throughout the incident. 

R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 0:30–0:50); R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 0:42–0:57).
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 3

When Officers Curtis and Gray arrived at 7 South Cottonwood, they did not see or hear 

anything amiss. R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 0:30–0:50); R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 0:42–0:57); R. 31 

(Curtis Dep. Tr. at 68:4–8, 69:3–24; 70:19–71:17) (Page ID #166, 167–69); R. 32 (Gray Dep. Tr. 

at 89:8–13, 92:10–11) (Page ID #307, 310). Officer Curtis walked around the right side of the 

house and told Officer Gray “I don’t see anything or hear anything,” before returning to the front 

of the house. R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 0:57–1:21); R. 31 (Curtis Dep. Tr. at 70:6–9) (Page ID 

#168). Officer Gray went onto the front porch and looked through a window, through which he 

could see that there was a light on in the house, though he could not see anyone from his vantage 

point. R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 1:07). He said to Curtis “I can’t tell if somebody is on the back 

porch or not.” Id. at 1:15–17; R. 32 (Gray Dep. Tr. at 98:15–22) (Page ID #316). The officers 

then walked around the left side of the house. R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 1:18–28); R. 39-4 (Curtis 

Cam. at 1:28–38). Gray asked, “I thought they said they were outside, no?” and Curtis 

responded, “That’s what they said.” R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 1:20–21); R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 

1:33). The officers saw nothing out of the ordinary in the left side of the yard. R. 39-3 (Gray 

Cam. at 1:31–58); R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 1:44–2:14).

The officers then returned to the front door. Gray opened the screen door and knocked. 

Curtis was positioned to the right of the front door and could see through the front window. R. 

39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 2:30–2:45). Curtis told Gray that he saw “a guy coming to the door” and “a 

female in the back bedroom.” R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 2:37–2:52). Curtis later testified at his 

deposition that the woman “seemed kind of standoffish, kind of timid,” which he had seen before 

in domestic violence victims, but he did not express that to Gray at the time. R. 31 (Curtis Dep. 

Tr. at 83:12–21) (Page ID #181); R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 2:29–2:55). Curtis also conceded in 

his deposition that the woman was “kind of just standing there in the background,” she was not 

crying, and he could not observe any injuries on her. R. 31 (Curtis Dep. Tr. at 84:8–23) (Page ID 

#182).

Robert Reed then answered the door. R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 2:40–2:45). Gray asked 

Reed, “Do you mind stepping out here and talking to me for a second, sir?” Id. Reed asked “Uh, 

you got a warrant?” Id. at 2:45–2:47. Gray replied, “nope.” Id. Reed then asked, “What is this 

about?” Id. at 2:47–2:50. Gray then explained that “somebody called and said that somebody 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 4

was fighting and arguing over here.” Id. at 2:50–2:53. Reed said, “Wasn’t here. Sorry, 

Officer.” Id. at 2:54–2:56. Gray then asked if anyone else was inside the house. Id. at 2:56–

2:58. Reed said, “Yes, but do you got a warrant?” and added that the officers “don’t have 

probable cause.” Id. at 2:58–3:04. Gray responded that they did have probable cause and that 

the officers had been “nothing but nice and respectful.” Id. at 3:05–3:09. Reed replied, “I know, 

but I just don’t want to deal with any officers in my house. I don’t know who called; I don’t 

really care.” Id. at 3:07–3:14. Gray then said, “if there’s any other adults in the house, I need to 

talk to them,” and warned that “if not, then we can come in, because it’s called exigent 

circumstances.” Id. at 3:25–3:30. Reed then responded, “if you don’t have a warrant, goodbye,” 

and closed his front door. Id. at 3:33–3:37. Throughout the entire conversation, Reed had 

remained in the confines of his home. Id. at 2:40–3:40.

As Reed closed the door, Gray warned him, “don’t do that.” Id. at 3:33–3:37. Officer 

Curtis immediately joined Gray at the front door and kicked the door down. R. 39-4 (Curtis 

Cam. at 3:50–3:54). Curtis shouted “open the goddamn door!” and stepped into the home, drew 

his firearm, and pointed it at Reed’s head. Id. at 3:53–3:58. Curtis then put the gun away, 

grabbed Reed by the arm, and pulled Reed onto the porch. Id. at 3:58–4:01; R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. 

at 3:43–47). Gray then grabbed Reed’s arm, led him to the driveway, and pushed him on the 

chest to back him up against the car. R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 3:48–3:55). Gray instructed Reed to 

turn around, and Reed repeatedly refused and asked if the officers had a warrant. Id. at 3:57–

4:20. Gray then grabbed Reed’s right shoulder, physically turned him around, and patted him 

down. Id. at 4:17–5:19. Other officers arrived and spoke with members of Reed’s family, who 

had emerged from the home. Id. at 5:19–16:00. Once the officers were satisfied that everyone in 

Reed’s house was safe, they documented the damage to Reed’s door and left the scene. R. 39-3 

(Gray Cam. at 12:30–13:02, 16:03–16:49). There were no arrests made or citations issued in 

connection with the incident. R. 34 (Reed Dep. Tr. at 101:2–5) (Page ID #694).

Reed filed a complaint against Officers Gray and Curtis in their individual and official 

capacities and against Campbell County. R. 1 (Compl. at 1, ¶¶ 6–8) (Page ID #1, 2). He raised 

nine claims: excessive force, unlawful entry, false arrest, unlawful Terry stop, a Monell claim 

for failure to train, assault and battery, common law false arrest/imprisonment, intentional 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 5

infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 35–84 (Page ID #6–11). The 

defendants moved for summary judgment, and Reed moved for summary judgment for all of his 

claims except for his Monell claim and his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

and punitive damages. R. 39 (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 1–21) (Page ID #803–823); R. 41 

(Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1) (Page ID #834).

The district court dismissed the claims against Campbell County, R. 61 (Mem. Op. & 

Order at 25–28) (Page ID #1029–1032), and against the officers in their official capacities, id. at 

8 n.2., 29 n.9, 32 n.12 (Page ID #1012, 1033, 1036). It dismissed the Terry claim as 

“duplicative” of the false arrest claim. Id. at 21 (Page ID #1025). It dismissed Reed’s claims for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. Id. at 30, 32 (Page ID #1034, 

1036). And as is relevant to this appeal, it declined to award qualified immunity to Officers 

Gray and Curtis on the individual capacity unlawful-entry, excessive-force, and false-arrest 

claims as well as the state-law assault and battery and false-arrest claims. Id. at 18, 21, 25, 29–

31 (Page ID #1022, 1025, 1029, 1034–35). The officers timely filed a notice of appeal. R. 62 

(Notice of Appeal at 1) (Page ID #1037).

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Though a denial of summary judgment is not ordinarily a reviewable order because it is 

not a final judgment, “the ‘denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on 

an issue of law, is an appealable “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.’” Browning v. Edmonson County, 18 F.4th 

516, 523 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). In such an 

interlocutory appeal, “this court may review only ‘purely’ legal arguments.” Est. of Bing v. 

Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 

2005)). The defendants here have agreed to “take the undisputed material facts in a light most 

favorable to Reed and appeal only the District Court’s legal conclusion denying them qualified 

immunity.” Appellants Br. at 1. We therefore have jurisdiction over this appeal, and we review 

de novo the district court’s legal conclusions. McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 

2012).
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 6

III. ANALYSIS

A. Qualified Immunity Standard

The defendants argue that the district court “failed to acknowledge and adhere to the 

standard for qualified immunity.” Appellants Br. at 16. Qualified immunity shields public 

officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

818 (1982)). To overcome the qualified-immunity defense, a plaintiff must show that the official 

“(1) [] violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their 

conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–

63 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). A right is clearly established 

when “every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that 

right.’” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 

635, 640 (1987)) (alterations in original). The district court did not err in setting out the 

qualified-immunity standard in its opinion. R. 61 (Mem. Op. & Order at 8) (Page ID #1012). 

We apply the standard to each of Reed’s claims below.

B. Unlawful Entry

1. Constitutional Violation Inquiry

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. At 

its core, the Fourth Amendment protects the right of an individual to “retreat into his own home 

and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 

573, 590 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). It is therefore 

“a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a 

warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Id. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 

U.S. 443, 477 (1971)); see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam) (same).
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 7

The Fourth Amendment, however, “does not prohibit all unwelcome intrusions ‘on 

private property’––only ‘unreasonable’ ones.” Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1599 (2021) 

(quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). Thus, there are some exceptions to the 

warrant requirement for searches or seizures within a home, including an exception for “exigent 

circumstances.” Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2021). This “well-recognized 

exception applies when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so 

compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 

Williams v. Maurer, 9 F.4th 416, 431 (6th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Kentucky v. 

King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). “[T]he need to assist persons who are seriously injured or 

threatened with such injury” is one such exigent circumstance. Id. (quoting Brigham City v. 

Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). The Court has held that “law enforcement officers may enter 

a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an 

occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. Though “‘[o]fficers do not 

need ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid 

exception,’ . . . they must have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that ‘a person within 

the house is in need of immediate aid.’” Gradisher v. City of Akron, 794 F.3d 574, 584 (6th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47, 49). And “their decision to enter must be based on more 

than a hunch or ‘the mere possibility’ that someone inside needs immediate aid.” Id. (quoting 

Nelms v. Wellington Way Apartments, LLC, 513 F. App’x 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2013)). “To 

determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a 

warrant,” we must “look[] to the totality of circumstances.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 

149 (2013). If a reasonable jury could conclude that there were no exigent circumstances, then 

there was a constitutional violation. See Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 949 (6th Cir. 2020).

The parties agree that the defendants made a warrantless entry into Reed’s home. We 

must assess whether a reasonable jury could believe that exigent circumstances existed that 

would have excused the lack of a warrant, and therefore we must consider whether the officers 

had an “objectively reasonable basis for believing that ‘a person within the house is in need of 

immediate aid.’” Gradisher, 794 F.3d at 584 (quoting Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49). We hold that, 

taking Reed’s version of the facts, a reasonable jury could find that the officers did not have an 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 8

objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone in Reed’s home was being (or in danger 

of being) harmed.

The officers proffered the following factors as indicative of exigent circumstances: the 

911 caller reported a potential verbal and physical altercation outside of Reed’s house, Curtis 

saw a woman in the house who looked “timid,” Reed “refused to give others in the house the 

option of coming to the door so Curtis and Gray could ask about their welfare,” Curtis was 

concerned that Reed would retaliate against the woman he saw in the house if he believed she 

made the 911 call, and Curtis feared that Reed was arming himself.1 Appellants Br. at 20. We 

must also consider other factors: everything was quiet on the scene when the officers arrived, 

there was no sign of a dispute either inside or outside of the house, and the officers saw no one 

who appeared to be injured or upset.

The 911 call alone is insufficient to justify the officers’ warrantless entry. The 911 call 

report was vague regarding sounds of yelling and hitting of dogs or humans. The officers needed 

more than just that phone call to make a warrantless entry into a home. But when they 

investigated, they did not find more. When they arrived at the scene, they heard nothing and saw 

nothing amiss. R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 0:57–1:21); R. 39-4 (Curtis Cam. at 1:20–1:23); R. 31 

(Curtis Dep. Tr. at 69:3–24) (Page ID #167); R. 32 (Gray Dep. Tr. at 89:2–13; 91:4–92:11) (Page 

ID #307, 309–10). The circumstances at the scene therefore contradicted the 911 caller’s report 

of the verbal and physical altercation outside. Cf. Williams, 9 F.4th at 435–36 (no exigent 

circumstances when police responded to a report of a domestic disturbance and found no signs of 

a disturbance or forcible entry); United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 563–64 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(no exigent circumstances when there were no physical signs of a crime to justify a warrantless 

entry into a home in response to a neighbor’s 911 call reporting a burglary).

The officers point to Marsha Reed’s presence in the home and to Reed’s refusal to let 

them speak to others inside the home as indications that there were exigent circumstances. The 

officers’ inability to see potential victims inside the home may contribute to exigency. Baker v. 

1The officers also contend that Reed was hostile, but we must take the facts in the light most favorable to 

the party opposing summary judgment. A reasonable juror could view the body camera footage and conclude that 

Reed was not hostile, but respectful while asserting his Fourth Amendment rights.
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 9

City of Trenton, 936 F.3d 523, 532 (6th Cir. 2019); Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323, 330–31 (6th 

Cir. 2010). But this case is significantly different from those the defendants point to. In 

Schreiber, a 911 caller reported a domestic dispute between a daughter and her father. 596 F.3d 

at 330. The caller heard screaming while on the phone with the daughter and feared she was 

being beaten. Id. When the officer reached the scene, he heard a male voice shouting inside the 

home, verifying the 911 caller’s observation that there had been shouting and suggesting that 

there was an altercation of some kind occurring inside the home. Id. When the officer knocked 

on the door and asked about the girl’s welfare, the father told the officer to leave and 

“bombarded him with a slew of profanities.” Id. These observations corroborated the 911 

caller’s report and, combined with the fact that the officer could not see the child to verify her 

safety, constituted an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that the child was in danger of 

an imminent injury. Id. at 331. In Baker, an individual called 911 to report that a friend of his 

had pulled a knife on him and took his cell phone. He reported that the friend was also yelling at 

his mother and threatening her with a knife or possibly a shotgun in their home. 936 F.3d at 532. 

Calls to the friend’s home were met with busy signals. Id. In each of these cases, the 911 caller 

made a significantly more detailed report and there were other indications that there was an 

altercation occurring and an individual within the home that was in immediate need of help—an 

individual that the officers could not see.2 In this case, the officers arrived at the scene to find no 

evidence corroborating the 911 call, and even though the officers were not able to speak with 

Marsha Reed, they were able to see her through the front window. R. 31 (Curtis Dep. Tr. at 

84:8–23) (Page ID #182). Curtis testified that she was not injured or crying, as far as he could 

tell. Id.

2

In Fineout v. Kostanko, 780 F. App’x 317, 326 (6th Cir. 2019), which the defendants also cite, there were 

other circumstances at play besides the refusal to let the officers see the children who were potentially being abused; 

the officers had been given the (erroneous) information that the home was “red-tagged” by the city and therefore 

legally uninhabitable, and before the entry the officers discovered that there was an active arrest warrant for one of 

the occupants. Id. at 326–27. The 911 call in that case also provided a much more detailed account of the dispute: 

the caller reported that “adults in the home were ‘scream[ing] profanities and . . . hitting their children” and that a 

“‘little girl . . . between the ages of 1 and 2’ lived in the house.” Id. at 326. The court in Fineout also resolved the 

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim on the clearly established prong and did not hold that the facts stated above 

amounted to exigent circumstances. Id. at 326.
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 10

Officers may not need to see “outward manifestations of violence” to find that there are 

exigent circumstances, Schreiber, 596 F.3d at 331, but they do need something beyond the 

present 911 call––whether or not the phone call is anonymous, see Williams, 9 F.4th at 435–36;

McClain, 444 F.3d at 563–64; Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 254 n.2 (6th Cir. 

2003). The presence of a woman inside a home who appeared “timid” to a police officer, 

without more, does not constitute exigent circumstances. The officer’s perception of timidity by 

the woman is purely subjective and, most importantly, conveys no emergency or imminent risk 

or harm which could justify not applying for a search warrant. One of the officers could have 

remained at the scene while the other applied for a warrant.

The officers contend that they were worried Reed was arming himself or could have 

retaliated against Mrs. Reed for calling the police. Appellants Br. at 20. A reasonable jury could 

conclude, however, that this was pure speculation on an unreasonable “hunch.” Gradisher, 794 

F.3d at 584. The scene was calm, Reed denied that a domestic dispute had occurred, and the 

officers did not see Mrs. Reed injured or in distress. “[G]eneric possibilities of danger cannot 

overcome the required particularized showing of a risk of immediate harm.” Morgan v. Fairfield 

County, 903 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 2018).

In light of the lack of evidence corroborating the 911 report, a jury could conclude that 

the officers did not have a reasonable basis for believing that there was someone inside of Reed’s 

home who needed immediate aid. Thus the officers violated Reed’s constitutional rights by 

entering his home without a warrant.

2. Clearly Established Inquiry

To satisfy the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, the officers’ 

unconstitutional conduct must violate clearly established law. Williams, 9 F.4th at 437. 

“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the 

challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable 

official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’” Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 

741 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640) (alterations in original). Though there need not be 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 11

“a case directly on point, [] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate.” Id.

We have repeatedly held that “it [i]s clearly established that warrantless entry into a home 

without an exception to the warrant requirement violate[s] clearly established law.” Barton, 949 

F.3d at 949; Williams, 9 F.4th at 437–38; Coffey v. Carroll, 933 F.3d 577, 587 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(affirming a district court’s denial of qualified immunity when “the district court defined the 

right at issue as the Fourth Amendment right against an officer entering a person’s home without 

a warrant”); Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 332 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[W]arrantless 

entries based on the emergency aid exception require both the potential for injury to the officers 

or others and the need for swift action. The right to be free from warrantless search under this 

exception absent these factors is clearly established.”); Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 

676, 687 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[B]edrock Fourth Amendment principles . . . demonstrate that the 

officers’ forced warrantless entry into [the plaintiff’s] home was presumptively unreasonable, 

and the Court’s exigency decisions . . . clearly show that [the defendants] had no objectively 

reasonable basis for believing that their warrantless entry” was justified by an exigency 

exception).

As in Williams, “a reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ warrantless entry into 

Plaintiff[’s] home violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.” 

9 F.4th at 438. And if the jury finds that there was no exigent circumstance, then, as in Barton, 

Defendants’ warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s home “violated clearly established law.” 949 F.3d 

at 949; see also Williams, 9 F.4th at 438; Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 332. Foundational principles of 

the Fourth Amendment establish that forced warrantless entry into an individual’s home is 

presumptively unreasonable, and when an officer has no objectively reasonable basis for 

believing that the warrantless entry was supported by exigent circumstances, the officer is not 

entitled to qualified immunity. See Barton, 949 F.3d at 950.
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 12

C. False Arrest

1. Constitutional Violation

The officers also appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Reed’s false 

arrest claim. The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” “seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. Officers need “probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being 

committed” to support a warrantless arrest, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004), or “a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting [a] particular person of criminal activity” to 

support an investigatory stop, U.S. v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United 

States v. Shank, 543 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2008)). And “warrantless seizures of persons in 

their homes violate the Fourth Amendment, absent exigent circumstances . . . regardless of 

whether the officers at issue were conducting an arrest or an investigatory detention.” United 

States v. Saari, 272 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2001).

Both sides agree that the officers seized Reed without a warrant when they broke down 

his door, took him from his home at gunpoint, escorted him onto his driveway, and held him 

there for about twelve minutes. Reed argues that even if it was a detention and not an arrest, the 

officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Appellee Br. at 42.

The officers contend that this was a temporary investigatory detention, and that Gray and 

Curtis had “reason to suspect that Reed was intentionally obstructing them from performing their 

official duties” in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 525.015. Appellants Br. at 28. They 

then suggest that they had reasonable suspicion to believe that Reed had assaulted or was about 

to assault someone in the home, in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 508.030. Id. at 29. 

Even assuming the officers did have reasonable suspicion to believe that Reed was committing 

either of these offenses, they are misdemeanors. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 525.015(3) (“Obstructing an 

emergency responder is a violation for a first offense, and a Class B misdemeanor for a second or 

subsequent offense”); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.030(2) (“Assault in the fourth degree is a Class A 

misdemeanor.”). The Supreme Court has long held that there is a presumption against 

warrantless entries to investigate minor crimes or to arrest individuals for committing them. 

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 13

In order for the arrest or investigatory detention to have been permissible, then, there had 

to have been exigent circumstances excusing the lack of a warrant. But as delineated above, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that there was no objectively reasonable basis for believing that 

the officers’ warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances, and therefore the detention 

was a constitutional violation.3

2. Clearly Established

It is clearly established that an arrest warrant is required to seize an individual in their 

home, even if an officer has probable cause. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 602–03. And as of 2020, 

both Payton and Welsh had been the law for more than thirty-five years, “making it clear that a 

double presumption guarded against warrantless entries into a home to arrest a misdemeanor 

suspect.” Smith v. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d 926, 933 (6th Cir. 2013). The offenses that the officers 

contend that they reasonably believed Reed had violated are both misdemeanors;4it has been 

reaffirmed by this court as recently as 2013 that warrantless arrests of a misdemeanor suspect 

inside the home are impermissible. Id. at 933. Without exigent circumstances, the arrest was 

presumptively unreasonable. And as above, without an objectively reasonable basis for 

concluding that someone inside the home needed emergency aid, it is clearly established that the 

officers could not enter to arrest Reed.5

3The district court refers to our previous statements that there is a “general right to detain without 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause” when “the officers making the seizures acted out of a justifiable fear of 

personal safety.” R. 61 (Mem. Op. & Order at 19–20) (Page ID #1023–24) (quoting Ingram v. City of Columbus, 

185 F.3d 579, 591 (6th Cir. 1999)). But this “general right to detain” is applicable only when “necessary to secure 

the scene of a valid search or arrest and ensure the safety of officers and others.” Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743, 

755 (6th Cir. 2011). Because we have concluded that a reasonable jury could determine that there were no exigent 

circumstances justifying the officers’ warrantless entry into Reed’s home, it follows that there would be no “valid 

search or arrest” pursuant to which the officers could detain Reed.

4The officers also cite Kentucky Revised Statute § 508.032, which makes a third or subsequent offense of 

assault in the fourth degree against a family member or member of an unmarried couple a class D felony. Ky. Rev. 

Stat. § 508.032(1). But the officers offered no evidence to suggest that they had any reason to believe that Reed had 

been convicted of at least two other assaults against a family member or member of an unmarried couple in the 

previous five years, which are the preconditions for § 508.032 to apply rather than § 508.030.

5Even if Reed had not been inside his home, his arrest would likely have been invalid. We held in 2020 

that, as of 2014, “it was clearly established that a non-eyewitness neighbor’s call reporting criminal activity without 

further corroborating information does not provide probable cause for an arrest.” Barton, 949 F.3d at 952.
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 14

D. Use of Force

1. Constitutional Violation

We analyze claims that an officer used excessive force when arresting a person “under 

the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 388 (1989). We must “ask ‘whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in 

light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation.’” Coffey, 933 F.3d at 588 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). Factors relevant to 

this inquiry include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Each officer can 

be held liable only for his own wrongdoing, and so we review the actions of each officer 

separately. See Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010). We also review 

separately each use of force by the same officer. See Barton, 949 F.3d at 952–55.

a. Curtis

A reasonable jury could conclude that Curtis used excessive force when he pointed a gun 

at Reed’s head, grabbed Reed by the arm, and pulled him out of his home and onto the porch. 

The severity of the crime at issue was minimal. The officers contended that they reasonably 

suspected Reed was obstructing their investigation in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute 

§ 525.015, which makes obstruction of a public official a violation for a first offense or a 

misdemeanor for a second offense. There are good reasons to conclude that, even if this offense 

could have justified the officers’ seizure, Reed did not violate the statute. “When law 

enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door . . . the occupant has no 

obligation to open the door or to speak. . . . And even if an occupant chooses to open the door 

and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and 

may refuse to answer any questions at any time.” King, 563 U.S. at 469–70. If the state could 

criminalize refusing entry to one’s home to police officers, it would eviscerate the core 

protections of the Fourth Amendment; the exercise of “Fourth Amendment rights can hardly be 

grounds for police to circumvent the core right protected by the Amendment.” Williams, 9 F.4th 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 15

at 434. In addition, because the officers’ investigation failed to corroborate the 911 caller’s 

report, Curtis had little reason to believe that Reed had committed an assault in violation of 

Kentucky Revised Statute § 508.030. See Williams, 9 F.4th at 439 (reasoning that because “the 

information known to [the police officers] did not support a conclusion that there was a ‘real 

exigency’ within [the] home that required a warrantless entry,” the use of force was not 

reasonable to ensure the safety of the occupants of the home).

Curtis also had no reasonable basis to believe that Reed posed a threat to safety. Reed 

denied that a dispute had occurred, declined to interact further with the police because they did 

not have a warrant, and remained within the safety of his home. Cf. Shumate v. City of Adrian, 

44 F.4th 427, 444 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[The plaintiff] may have been minimally threatening insofar 

as his behavior was rude, annoying, untoward, and uncooperative. However, mere ‘agitated 

hand gestures’ and profanity, unaccompanied by threats, fall short of the prototypical behavior 

that would make an officer fear for his physical safety.” (quoting Kent v. Oakland County, 

810 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 2016)). The officers contend that they feared Reed would obtain a 

weapon. But “[w]e do not credit an officer’s subjective fear that an individual has a weapon 

where objective indicia are absent.” Id.; see also Browning, 18 F.4th at 528 (“[T]he remote risk 

that [the suspect] could have been armed does not establish that he posed a reasonable threat of 

danger.”).

Finally, Reed did not resist being detained. The officers frame Reed’s behavior as 

“openly hostile” because “[t]he first words out of his mouth in response to a simple greeting 

were, ‘You got a warrant?’” Appellants Br. at 31. The question of Reed’s hostility is a question 

for the jury; a reasonable jury could watch the body camera footage and conclude that Reed was 

not hostile. True, Reed did not facilitate the officers’ request to speak with others in the house 

and attempted to end the encounter. But withdrawal into the home does not constitute resistance. 

In Goodwin v. City of Painesville, we concluded that an individual who refused to comply with 

an order to leave his home was engaging only in “passive resistance that was not sufficient to 

legitimize the officer’s use of force.” 781 F.3d at 323–24. We determined that “[a] holding that 

a simple refusal to exit one’s own home—and surrender the heightened Fourth Amendment 

protections it provides—constituted active resistance of an officer’s command sufficient to 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 16

justify a tasering would undermine a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 327. 

Likewise, we conclude that refusing to permit police officers to enter one’s home or refusing to 

continue an interview with an officer outside of one’s home also cannot constitute “active 

resistance” sufficient to justify a use of force. “[A]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 

stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 

governmental intrusion.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 589–90 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 

(second alteration in original)). It would undermine the foundational principles of the Fourth 

Amendment to say that retreating into one’s home constitutes active resistance justifying the use 

of force. Reed’s retreat into his home was passive resistance at worst and is better characterized 

as no resistance at all. And the body camera footage shows that Reed did not physically resist 

when Curtis pulled him from his home. R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 3:42–3:49).

The totality of the circumstances did not justify Curtis’s actions. Curtis pointed his 

service weapon at Reed’s head, which is a considerable use of force. See Vanderhoef v. Dixon, 

938 F.3d 271, 277 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[P]ointing a firearm at an individual and making a demand 

of that individual . . . communicates the implicit threat that if the individual does not comply 

with the [] demands, the [one pointing the firearm] will shoot the individual.” (quoting United 

States v. Bolden, 479 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original)). A reasonable jury 

could find that Curtis did so after entering Reed’s home without exigent circumstances and 

without any basis to think that Reed committed a serious crime or posed a threat to Curtis’s or 

others’ safety. See Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 870 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[B]randishing a 

firearm without a justifiable fear that [the plaintiff] was fleeing or dangerous was unreasonable 

and constituted excessive force.”).

A jury could also conclude that Curtis’s subsequent actions—grabbing Reed by the arm 

and pulling him out of his home—were also unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 

“[E]ven minor uses of force are unconstitutionally excessive if they are ‘totally gratuitous.’” 

Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Township, 364 F.3d 763, 772 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988)). Because the jury could conclude 

that the officers “had no right to be inside [Reed’s] home” to detain him in the first place, it 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 17

would follow that Curtis “had no right to use force” because such force would necessarily be 

gratuitous. Williams, 9 F.4th at 440.

Curtis argues that the “type and degree” of force he used was similar in kind to that used 

by the defendant officer in Neal v. Melton, 453 F. App’x 572 (6th Cir. 2011), in which we held 

that there was no unreasonable force when an officer took a non-resisting plaintiff’s arm and 

escorted him away from a car. Appellants Br. at 32; Neal, 534 F. App’x at 576–77. But that 

case dealt with a traffic stop, not a warrantless entry into a home, and it also did not involve 

pointing a lethal weapon at the plaintiff’s head. A reasonable jury could conclude that Curtis’s 

uses of force were gratuitous.

b. Gray

Gray likewise used excessive force against Reed when he grabbed Reed by the arm and 

led him to the driveway, pushed him on the chest towards a car, and placed his hand on Reed’s 

shoulder to turn him around. The analysis of the first two Graham factors are the same; the 

severity of the alleged crime Reed was suspected of is minimal and the threat to safety remained 

nonexistent.

As far as whether Reed was actively resisting his detainment, a reasonable jury could 

conclude that he was not. Gray repeatedly ordered Reed to turn around when they were standing 

in Reed’s driveway, and Reed repeatedly asked, “Do you have a warrant?” instead of complying. 

R. 39-3 (Gray Cam. at 3:55–4:22). But “if there is a common thread to be found in our caselaw 

on this issue, it is that noncompliance alone does not indicate active resistance; there must be 

something more.” Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 326 (brackets omitted) (quoting Eldridge v. City of 

Warren, 533 F. App’x 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2013)); see also Moser v. Etowah Police Dep’t, 

27 F.4th 1148, 1154–55 (6th Cir. 2022); Kent, 810 F.3d at 393–95 (determining that an 

individual who yelled at officers but did not make threats of harm was not engaging in active 

resistance, and weighing the fact that the individual was in his home, “one of the most sacred of 

spaces under the Fourth Amendment’s protections,” id. at 394).

Though “[n]ot every push or shove . . . violates the Fourth Amendment,” Graham, 

490 U.S. at 396, we have never imposed a de minimis injury requirement for Fourth Amendment 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 18

excessive-force claims. Williams, 9 F.4th at 439–40; Morrison v. Bd. of Trs., 583 F.3d 394, 406–

07 (6th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). Any force used to accomplish an unlawful detention could 

be deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Williams, 9 F.4th at 440 (“If Defendants 

forcibly entered Mitchell’s home armed with neither a warrant nor an exception to the warrant 

requirement, the use of any amount of force to effectuate this unconstitutional action constituted 

unreasonable ‘gratuitous violence.’”). As a result, a reasonable jury could conclude that Gray 

used excessive force when he grabbed Reed, pushed him, and turned him by the shoulder.

2. Clearly Established

a. Curtis

It is clearly established law that officers may not use gratuitous violence against 

individuals who are not actively resisting. E.g., Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 453 F.3d 

681, 688 (6th Cir. 2006); Smith v. City of Troy, 874 F.3d 938, 945 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); 

Barton, 949 F.3d at 954; Shumate, 44 F.4th at 450 (“By 2019 . . . the right to be free from 

physical force when one is not actively resisting the police was clearly established.” (citing cases 

from 2007, 2010)). We have determined that “[d]rawing the line at a suspect’s active resistance 

defines the right at a level of particularity appropriate for a claim pursued under § 1983.” Coffey, 

933 F.3d at 589; see also Meadows v. City of Walker, 46 F.4th 416, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2022) 

(same).

Even though we can simply draw the line at active resistance, we have in the past held 

that “it [is] clearly established . . . that brandishing a firearm without a justifiable fear that [an 

individual] was fleeing or dangerous was unreasonable and constituted excessive force.” Wright, 

962 F.3d at 870. We determined that this was clearly established at least as of 2016. Id. at 860, 

870. Curtis was therefore on notice that it is unreasonable and constitutes excessive force to 

point a firearm at Reed without a justifiable fear that Reed was dangerous or fleeing.

b. Gray

As stated above with regard to Curtis, it is clearly established law that officers may not 

use gratuitous violence against individuals who are not actively resisting. E.g., Shreve, 453 F.3d 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 19

at 688; Smith, 874 F.3d at 945; Coffey, 933 F.3d at 589; Barton, 949 F.3d at 954; Shumate, 

44 F.4th at 450. Because Reed was not engaging in active resistance and because Gray was 

using force against him to effectuate an unlawful seizure, a reasonable jury could conclude that 

the use of force against him was gratuitous.

IV. CONCLUSION

A reasonable jury could find that, by intruding into Robert Reed’s home without a 

warrant and without any exigent circumstances to excuse their warrantless entry, Curtis and Gray 

committed a constitutional violation. It was clearly established before the date of their intrusion 

that a warrantless entry without exigent circumstances was unconstitutional. A reasonable jury 

could also find that it was a constitutional violation to seize Reed from his home without a 

warrant, and it was clearly established that such an action violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Finally, a reasonable jury could find that Curtis violated Reed’s constitutional right to be free 

from excessive force when he pointed his gun at Reed’s head and that Gray violated Reed’s right 

to be free from excessive force when he pulled Reed into the driveway and pushed him against 

the car. It was clearly established that using force against an individual who is not actively 

resisting the police is unconstitutional.

For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to 

both Curtis and Gray on the unlawful-entry, false-arrest, and excessive-force claims.
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 20

_____________________________

CONCURRENCE / DISSENT

_____________________________

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I dissent from the 

holdings that by entering the house and seizing Reed the officers in this case violated clearly 

established constitutional law. 

Several facts in the record supported the officers’ belief that exigent circumstances 

justified a warrantless entry. Dispatch received a 911 call from a neighbor, Jennifer, who 

reported a physical and verbal altercation happening outside of a specific address, 7 South 

Cottonwood. The call was not anonymous. Officer Curtis later called back and spoke with 

Jennifer himself. When the officers knocked on the front door of 7 South Cottonwood, they 

encountered Reed, who was “slurring his words” and “unable to follow simple directions,” 

causing them to reasonably believe that he was intoxicated. Officer Curtis also noticed a “timid” 

woman standing towards the back of the house. Yet Reed refused to let officers speak to that 

woman or to others in the home, even after the officers explained to Reed that they were 

responding to a report of domestic violence. 

The officers in this case clearly believed that—given the report of the sounds of domestic 

violence at a particular address—they could go to the door and request to speak with adults in the 

house, and that, faced with a flat refusal and obstruction, they could enter the house for the 

limited purpose of asking the other inhabitants to speak briefly with them. Indeed, the officers 

warned Reed that his refusal to let them speak with others in the home would provide “exigent 

circumstances” for a warrantless entry. They acted upon that belief. Indeed, as the district court 

recognized, “at no point did [Officer] Gray ask Reed to allow the officers entry into his home. 

[Officer] Gray only asked that the other adults come to the front door to speak with him.” 

Officers Gray and Curtis are entitled to qualified immunity unless the law is clearly 

established that entry for such a limited and reasonable purpose was forbidden by the 

Constitution. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). No such clearly established 

prohibition has been shown.
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 21

First, cases where we have found qualified immunity cannot clearly establish a 

constitutional violation by negative inference. That the majority could distinguish these cases, in 

other words, does not lend any affirmative support to its qualified immunity analysis. For 

instance, in Schreiber v. Moe, the holding that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry 

when an officer responded to a potential domestic dispute, heard shouting, and received “a slew 

of profanities” from the homeowner, does not imply that anything less falls short. 596 F.3d 323, 

330 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Baker v. City of Trenton, 936 F.3d 523, 532 (6th Cir. 2019); 

Morgan v. Fairfield County, 903 F.3d 553, 564-65 (6th Cir. 2018); Thacker v. City of Columbus, 

328 F.3d 244, 254 (6th Cir. 2003); Fineout v. Kostanko, 780 F. App’x 317, 326 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(per curiam). 

Second, cases involving searches to obtain physical evidence or to make an arrest are 

categorically different. E.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984); Coffey v. Carroll, 

933 F.3d 577, 587 (6th Cir. 2019); Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 319, 332 (6th 

Cir. 2015). Here the police did not seek to search the house, or arrest anybody. They only 

wanted to briefly interview the inhabitants. This is a pretty unintrusive request. If Reed had 

merely permitted the woman in the house to come to the door and talk with the police, as they 

politely requested, there would have been no entry at all. It was reasonably clear to the police 

that Reed did not want the woman to have the chance to speak with the police. Moreover, the 

record shows that the other adults in the home ultimately complied with the officers’ request to 

speak with them outside of the house in a polite and congenial way. 

The few cases relied upon by Reed which both held in favor of the plaintiffs and did 

involve a domestic disturbance call are substantially different. For instance, Barton v. Martin is 

different because the 911 call there reported not domestic violence but the shooting of a cat. 949 

F.3d 938, 948 (6th Cir. 2020). After officers responded to the scene, the homeowner admitted to 

having a BB gun, denied shooting the cat, and declined to come out of his house. Id. The court 

held that these facts did not amount to exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry. Id.

at 949. We held that “[w]ithout additional evidence of a threat against the police or bystanders, a

report of an armed suspect inside his home does not justify warrantless entry.” Id. Here the 
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 22

exigency was clearly more than a report of an armed suspect who may have shot a cat: officers 

responded to a report of domestic physical abuse. 

Williams v. Maurer is also substantially different from Reed’s case. 9 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 

2021). To deny qualified immunity we relied on the anonymous nature of the report, and the fact 

that the 911 caller later called 911 again and “retracted her identification of Apartment 103 as the 

site” of the disturbance. Id. at 433. Officers saw broken glass outside of Apartment 103 and 

heard screaming in a different apartment. Id. at 434. When officers knocked on the door of 

Apartment 103, the homeowner declined to engage with them. Id. The court concluded this mix 

of facts did not justify a warrantless entry. Id. Here an identified caller was consistent in 

identifying the location. 

Lastly, although Cummings v. City of Akron did involve a warrantless entry following a 

report of a domestic disturbance, the asserted exigency was hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, the 

felony being the resident’s having slammed the door on the officer’s foot. 418 F.3d 676, 686 

(6th Cir. 2005). Our holding that there was no objectively reasonable basis for hot pursuit of a 

fleeing felon, id. at 686–87, says little about merely insisting on talking to a possible domestic 

abuse victim.

In sum, plaintiff has not adequately shown clearly established law that prevents officers, 

on reasonable suspicion of domestic physical abuse, from insisting on talking with possible 

victims. The law of qualified immunity supports this conclusion. In Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 

7, 12 (2015) (per curiam), for instance, the Supreme Court cautioned against defining the right at 

too high a level of generality in the Fourth Amendment context. In Gradisher v. City of Akron, 

794 F.3d 574, 585 (6th Cir. 2015), we held that the law not clearly established when “no 

law confirm[ed] that the officers . . . were clearly wrong for deciding to enter on those 

bases.” Furthermore, in Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1996), we 

reasoned that “[e]ven if the officers’ belief that someone within [a residence] could be in danger 

is a close question, the officers are entitled to the benefit of the doubt under the qualified 

immunity standard.”
No. 22-5751 Reed v. Campbell County et al. Page 23

For similar reasons, Reed’s false arrest claim also fails on the clearly established prong. 

The district court borrowed its clearly established analysis on the false arrest claim from the 

warrantless entry claim, reasoning that it “was clearly established at the time of [Officer] Gray 

and [Officer] Curtis’s alleged violation” that “absent an exigent circumstance, police may not 

detain someone inside their home.” As explained above, the absence of exigent circumstances in 

this case was not clearly established under existing case law. 

However, I agree with the majority’s opinion that at this stage the officers were not 

entitled to qualified immunity for engaging in the degree of force that they employed—rough 

handling and briefly pointing a weapon at Reed’s head—and a jury should resolve those issues.