J-A01014-17

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

2017 PA Super 93

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.T. AND D.T., 

MINOR CHILDREN ADJUDICATED 

DEPENDENT 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.Z., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 1032 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 6, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Civil Division at No(s): 25 and 26 2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.T. AND D.T., 

MINOR CHILDREN ADJUDICATED 

DEPENDENT 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

APPEAL OF: A.Z., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 1035 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 16, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Civil Division at No(s): 26 2016

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2017

A.Z. (“Mother”) appeals from the respective orders entered on June 6, 

2016, wherein the juvenile court changed the permanent placement goals of 
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her two children, L.T. and D.T., from reunification to adoption.1 In addition, 

Mother appeals the June 16, 2016 order that awarded Erie County Office of 

Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) authority to make all medical 

determinations, including end of life decisions, relating to D.T.2 We reverse 

the permanency review order relating to L.T., dismiss the appeal from the 

order relating to D.T.’s end of life decisions, and remand for further 

proceedings. 

L.T. and D.T. were born during October 2014 and September 2015, 

respectively. D.T. died on July 15, 2016 as a result of non-accidental 

traumatic brain injuries sustained during February 2016, while in the care of 

N.T. (“Father”).3 Specifically, then-four-month-old D.T. sustained a skull 

fracture and hematoma on the right side of his brain. The child presented at 

UPMC Hamot in Erie, Pennsylvania, unresponsive and in critical condition due 

____________________________________________

1 Mother concedes that the goal change order relating to D.T. is moot 

because that child is now deceased. See Mother’s brief at 30 n.10. 

Accordingly, we address only the portion of the juvenile court order relating 

to L.T. 

2 While Mother purports to appeal the June 16, 2016 order as to both 

children, the certified record confirms that the pertinent order related only to 

D.T. and was entered at 26 of 2016, the action number corresponding to 

D.T. The court did not enter a correlating order at L.T.’s action number. 

3

Father was ultimately arrested and charged with criminal homicide, 

aggravated assault, simple assault, and endangering welfare of children. As 

of the date of this opinion, Father remained incarcerated while awaiting trial. 

He did not appeal either of the orders we address herein. 
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to elevated intracranial pressure. He was subsequently transferred to 

Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh. The physicians characterized D.T.’s injuries 

as near-fatal child abuse.

CYS obtained protective custody of the siblings and filed petitions 

alleging that L.T. and D.T. were dependent under § 6302 of the Juvenile Act, 

in that they lacked proper parental care and control. On March 16, 2016, 

Mother and Father stipulated to the adjudications of dependency for the 

reasons that CYS stated in its petitions. Significantly, aggravated 

circumstances were neither alleged in the dependency petitions nor found by 

the trial court to exist against either parent.4 The juvenile court awarded 

CYS legal and physical custody of the children. D.T. remained in a medically 

induced coma at Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, where he was expected to 

remain hospitalized indefinitely. CYS placed L.T. in kinship care with her 

maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). 

The court-ordered permanency goal was reunification, and the juvenile 

court granted Mother a pair of two-hour supervised visitations with L.T. per 

week at Grandmother’s home. However, Mother, who was recovering from 

____________________________________________

4 The statutory definition of aggravated circumstances incudes situations 

where, “[t]he child or another child of the parent has been the victim of 

physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual violence or 

aggravated physical neglect by the parent.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. Instantly, a 

finding of aggravated circumstances against Mother or Father would have 

effectively alleviated CYS’s obligation to employ reasonable efforts to reunify 

the children with that parent. 
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an automobile collision that Father intentionally caused, was prohibited from 

residing in the home with her daughter. Mother was granted visitation with 

D.T. “as often as she is able to visit” the medical facility. Dispositional 

Order, 4/8/16, at 3. Although the Commonwealth had not yet leveled 

criminal charges against Father, the juvenile court suspended Father’s 

visitation with D.T. indefinitely and precluded Father from supervised 

visitation with L.T. until he demonstrated compliance with the sobriety and 

parenting components of the court-ordered services. Prior to making any 

progress toward the visitation prerequisite, Father was arrested in the 

underlying criminal case and confined to county jail. Given the seriousness

of the dependency case, the juvenile court fashioned an abbreviated 

calendar and scheduled the first permanency review hearing on June 1, 

2016, approximately thirty days from the date of the dispositional order. 

At the outset of the June 2016 hearing, CYS noted the presence in the 

court room of an unidentified media outlet and objected to its participation in 

the closed juvenile proceeding. The respective guardians ad litem for both 

children, Mother, and Father all joined the agency’s objection. The juvenile 

court overruled the collective objections noting that, “given the fact that this 

case already [garnered] a significant amount of media attention because of 

[Father’s] criminal cases[,]” no compelling state interest existed to close the 

court room. N.T., 6/1/16, at 4. Accordingly, the juvenile court permitted 

the media to attend the permanency review hearing. Id. at 6. 
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Next, in addressing the proposed testimony of D.T.’s nurse regarding 

the child’s status, treatment, and prognosis, the trial court noted, sua 

sponte, that it was contemplating changing both children’s permanency 

goals from reunification to adoption. Specifically, the court stated, “The 

agency is recommending a goal of reunification, but from what I’m looking 

at in the summary [prepared by the CYS caseworker], I am not sure I’ll go 

along with it. So for all intents and purposes this is a change of goal 

hearing.” Id. at 7. 

During the hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Patty Bush, the 

CYS caseworker assigned to the family, and Tina Ferraro, the director of 

Project First Step, the organization tasked with providing Mother 

reunification and visitation services. As noted supra, D.T.’s nurse testified 

about his current condition, and Mother testified on her own behalf. Distilled

to its essence, the combined testimony from the agency’s two witnesses 

branded Mother as immature, possessing a mentality of entitlement, and 

dependent upon others for satisfying routine obligations. For example, 

expecting to be evicted from subsidized housing on the day of the hearing 

due to the non-payment of utilities, both witnesses stressed that Mother 

resided in squalor and lacked any concrete plans to obtain suitable housing. 

In sum, Mother did not demonstrate the urgency that Ms. Bush and Ms. 

Ferraro believed the situation demanded.
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However, the witnesses both testified that, while Mother’s current 

situation remained unacceptable, she had made an effort toward 

reunification during the brief period that they were involved in the case. 

Specifically, Ms. Bush stated that Mother started, but had not yet completed, 

a psychological evaluation and parenting and domestic violence programs. 

Indeed, CYS’s petition for a permanency hearing and the summary that Ms. 

Bush prepared for the juvenile court in anticipation of that hearing 

recommended that the agency continue providing Mother reunification 

services. During the hearing, however, she expanded the recommendation 

to include “looking for an adoptive resource for [L.T.]” Id. at 38. 

Similarly, Ms. Ferraro indicated that Mother had not progressed in the 

one month that she had been in the program. She had various interactions 

with Mother, including the intake interview and two supervised visitations 

with L.T. Ms. Ferraro characterized Mother’s demeanor as agitated and 

defensive, and she noted her primary concern that Mother appeared to lack 

motivation. Nonetheless, Ms. Ferraro did not recommend terminating 

services at that juncture. To the contrary, she stated, “I will work with her 

as long as she’s willing to work on herself.” Id. at 72. 

At the close of evidence, the juvenile court invited brief argument 

about the children’s permanency goals. It stated, “I’m certainly not leaving 

the goal of reunification.” Id. at 101. Mother and Father persisted in 

arguing that reunification was an appropriate goal in light of the fact that the 
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family had only been in service for two and one-half months. Similarly, 

L.T.’s guardian ad litem recommended concurrent goals of reunification and 

adoption because the dependency proceeding was in an early stage. Id. at 

105 (“Having said that, we are only two and a half months in[.]”). D.T.’s 

guardian ad litem advocated changing the goals to adoption. Id. at 105. 

Likewise, while CYS’s pre-hearing filings recommended continuing the goals 

of reunification, following the hearing, the agency argued to change the 

goals to adoption. Thereafter, the trial court announced its intention to 

change the children’s permanency goals to adoption. Two days later, the 

juvenile court entered a permanency review order memorializing the goal 

change and directing CYS to cease its services to Mother, including 

visitations, and to pursue the termination of parental rights. Mother filed a 

timely appeal and a concomitant statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1925(b). 

Meanwhile, as the dependency matter proceeded toward the 

permanency hearing that resulted in the goal change, D.T.’s guardian ad 

litem, Stephen George, Esquire, filed and withdrew multiple petitions 

seeking the juvenile court’s guidance concerning D.T.’s end-of-life decisions. 

Attorney George filed the most recent iteration of his entreaty on June 10, 

2016, with the benefit of the medical testimony presented during the 

permanency hearing. During the ensuing hearing on Attorney George’s 

petition, it was revealed that D.T. was technologically dependent, i.e., 
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required specialized medical equipment for life support, but he was not in an 

emergent state that required “heroic efforts . . . to sustain his life.” N.T., 

6/16/16, at 5. Albert Veverka, Esquire, the attorney representing Children’s 

Hospital of Pittsburgh, characterized D.T.’s condition as neither requiring nor 

precluding a do not resuscitate (“DNR”) order. He summarized the 

perspective of the supervising physician, Robert Clark, M.D., as follows: “If 

. . . a mother or father . . . came . . . and said . . . [‘]I want a DNR,[’] [Dr. 

Clark] would say . . . [‘]Okay, we can do that.[’]” Id. However, “[i]f the 

same situation arose and the parents . . . said . . . [‘]I don’t want a DNR at 

this point, [Dr. Clark] would say . . . [‘]Okay, I respect that [too’]. He is of 

the opinion that[,] at this point in time[,] we’re not in that emergent 

circumstance where a DNR is absolutely necessary or absolutely not 

necessary.” Id. 

At the close of the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order 

confirming that the prior award of legal custody in favor of CYS included the 

responsibility over “all medical decisions, . . . including end-of-life decisions, 

in the best interest of the dependent child, [D.T.].” Trial Court Order, 

6/16/16, (unnumbered at 2). The juvenile court reasserted that Mother was 

not only prohibited from contacting D.T. directly, but that she also was 

precluded from contacting Children’s Hospital for updates on his condition. 

Eventually, the juvenile court relented and permitted Mother one final 

visitation with her son prior to his death. Trial Court Order, 7/14/16. 
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Mother filed a timely appeal from the June 16, 2016 order, which we 

consolidated with her earlier appeal from the order changing the children’s 

permanency goals to adoption. 

Mother presents five issues for our review:

A. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of 

discretion and/or error of law when it permitted, over unanimous 

objection, the presence of the media at the permanency review 

hearing held on June 1, 2016.

B. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of 

discretion and /or error of law when the agency petitioned for a 

change of goal and the juvenile court considered the change of 

goal without providing adequate notice to the parties that a 

change of goal was to be contemplated at the permanency 

review hearing held on June 1, 2016.

C. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of 

discretion and/or error of law when it determined the current 

permanency goal of reunification was no longer feasible and 

dispensed with the goal of reunification after only one (1) month 

and twenty-seven (27) days when the record failed to support a 

conclusion that it was in the best interest of the minor child to 

change the goal.

D. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of 

discretion and/or error of law when it determined that visitation 

should cease between the appellant and the minor children 

following the change of goal to adoption when the record failed 

to support a conclusion that it was in the best interests of the 

minor children to no longer have visitation with their mother.

E. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of 

discretion and/or error of law when it denied the appellant the 

opportunity to participate in the medical decision making for the 

minor children. In the alternative, whether the juvenile court 

was manifestly unreasonable when it denied the appellant the

opportunity to participate in the medical decision making for the 

minor children. In the alternative, whether the juvenile court 

deprived the appellant of her rights under the United States and 
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Pennsylvania constitutions when it denied her the right to 

participate in the care and control of her minor children in 

violation of due process of law.

Mother’s brief at 3. 

At the outset, we address whether the trial court erred in permitting 

the media to attend the June 1, 2016 permanency review hearing.5 We 

review the juvenile court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. In re M.B., 

819 A.2d 59, 61 (Pa.Super. 2003) (“When an appeal challenges a trial 

court's decision to grant or deny access to judicial proceedings, we will 

reverse only if we find that the trial court abused its discretion.”). 

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336(d), except for a declaration of contempt 

of court or one of the enumerated circumstances that are implicated in 

delinquency proceedings, “the general public shall be excluded from hearings 

under this chapter.” The provision continues, “Only the parties, their 

counsel, witnesses, the victim and counsel for the victim, other persons 

accompanying a party or a victim for his or her assistance, and any other 

____________________________________________

5 Neither CYS nor D.T.’s guardian ad litem addressed this issue. L.T.’s 

guardian ad litem argues unconvincingly that the issue is moot, ostensibly 

because the consequences of the court’s determination on the June 1, 2016 

hearing cannot be undone. This argument ignores the continuing nature of 

dependency proceedings in that permanency review hearings are scheduled 

at least once every six months until the dependency case is closed. Thus, 

unless we confront the issue at this juncture, the media will have continued 

access to L.T.’s dependency proceedings, subject only to the reversal of the 

juvenile court’s attitude. Hence, we address the merits of Mother’s 

argument.
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person as the court finds have a proper interest in the proceeding or in the 

work of the court shall be admitted by the court.” Id. Hence, it is beyond 

cavil that the statutory framework promotes confidentiality.

In In re M.B., supra, this Court addressed whether the press could 

access a dependency proceeding. Citing the Juvenile Act approvingly, we 

found that § 6336(d) “demonstrate[d] our legislature's compelling interest in 

safeguarding children involved in juvenile proceedings.” Id. at 62. 

However, referring to an official comment to § 6336(d) specifying that 

reporters were within the class of people with a “proper interest” in 

attending dependency proceedings, we observed that a juvenile court may 

elect at its discretion to grant the press access. Id. at 65. We found a 

rebuttable constitutional presumption that juvenile court proceedings, like 

most other judicial proceedings, are open to the public, and concluded that 

juvenile courts “possess an inherent power to control access to their 

proceedings and may deny access when appropriate.” Id. at 60, 62–63. 

However, we also recognized that the rebuttable presumption of openness is 

not absolute, and the juvenile courts may still deny access if they find that 

confidentiality serves an important governmental interest and no less 

restrictive means exist to serve that interest. 

We explained the applicable resolution of the contrasting dynamics 

between the presumption of openness and the court's inherent power to 

control access as follows:
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In this case, where the constitutional presumption of 

openness applies and where the trial court has exercised its 

discretion to close the proceedings, we employ a constitutional 

analysis [to determine whether the court's decision was an 

abuse of discretion]. Once an interested party, such as the 

press, seeks access to such proceedings, the party seeking to 

keep the proceedings closed may rebut the presumption of 

openness by demonstrating that: (1) the denial of public access 

serves an important governmental interest, and (2) no less 

restrictive means to serve that interest exists. To satisfy these 

requirements, the party seeking closure must demonstrate that 

the material is the kind of information that the courts will protect 

and that there is good cause for the order to issue. A party 

establishes good cause by showing that opening the proceedings 

will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking 

closure. We have emphasized that only a compelling government 

interest justifies closure and then only by a means narrowly 

tailored to serve that interest. Ultimately, the decision whether 

to grant or deny public access is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court.

Id. at 63–64 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In sum, we 

concluded that the protection of minors from psychological and emotional 

harm and the trauma and embarrassment associated with testifying in public 

were compelling interests that militated in favor of privacy concerns. Id. at 

64, 65. We also reasoned that, unlike delinquency proceedings, dependent 

children have not brought attention upon themselves and therefore “the 

public’s interest is less keen than it is in delinquency proceedings.” Id. at 65 

n.5. In addition, this Court observed the informal and non-adversarial 

nature of dependency hearings and highlighted the chilling effect that 

publicity associated with open proceedings would have upon the testimony 

of caseworkers and service providers. Id. at 64.
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In addressing this issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the juvenile 

court concluded that Mother “failed to show a compelling reason why the 

hearing ought to be closed.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/16, at 16. The court 

initially reasoned that Mother did not have standing to challenge the media’s 

presence on behalf of the children, presumably because they had been

adjudicated dependent, and that she failed to demonstrate an injury to 

herself. Thereafter, the court provided an alternative basis to reject 

Mother’s argument on its merits, which was the children’s ages. 

The juvenile court’s rationale demonstrates its misapprehension of the 

relevant concerns regarding the children’s interests that we stressed in In 

re M.B., supra. First, despite the juvenile court’s suggestion to the 

contrary, Mother was not required to assert that she would suffer harm as a 

result of opening the proceedings. As we explained supra, the focus of the 

constitutional analysis is the effect of the media’s intrusion upon the 

children. Therefore, any reference to Mother’s privacy rights is misplaced. 

Second, regardless of the dependency adjudication, Mother’s parental rights 

remained intact. Thus, she retained a fundamental interest in the care, 

custody, and control of L.T. and D.T., including the preservation of privacy 

concerns and the prevention of psychological and emotional harm flowing 

from the invasion of their privacy rights. Hence, we reject the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that Mother lacked standing to object to the media’s 

presence at the dependency hearing. 
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Moreover, we also find unpersuasive the trial court’s alternative 

argument addressing the merits of Mother’s complaint. Essentially, the trial 

court determined, “given the media attention this case received because of 

the criminal charges filed against the father, and the young age of the 

children, allowing the press to be present at the review hearing posed little 

or no danger their privacy interests would be invaded more than had already 

taken place.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/16, at 16. Noting the children’s 

respective ages and the fact that D.T. is now deceased, the juvenile court 

reasoned that the children would not suffer psychological and emotional 

harm as a result of the media’s intrusion. For the following reasons, we 

disagree with the juvenile court’s conclusion that the intrusion would not 

cause psychological or emotional harm. 

Preliminarily, we note that this case is procedurally defective. 

Typically, in situations involving hearings that are closed to the public by 

statute, the party seeking access to the closed proceedings files a petition to 

open the hearing, and upon notice of the petition, the party seeking to keep 

the record closed is tasked with rebutting the presumption of openness 

under the two-pronged test we discussed supra. See e.g., In re M.B.,

supra; In re J.B., 39 A.3d 421 (Pa.Super 2012). This procedure did not

occur in the case at bar. 

Presently, the still unidentified media outlet neglected to file a petition 

announcing its request to open the closed proceeding. It just appeared at 
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the scheduled permanency review hearing. Then, without prior notice to the 

parties, the juvenile court acknowledged the media’s presence and asked the 

parties if they wanted to address that issue. Thereafter, the parties 

uniformly objected to the media’s participation, and the court questioned, 

“How do we know really know that the media is going to invade the privacy 

of the children. . . [?]” N.T., 6/1/16, at 5. Then, after rebuffing an attempt 

by the guardian ad litem for L.T. to explain the legislatures’ interest in 

enacting the confidentiality component of § 6336(d), the juvenile court 

invoked its interpretation of In re M.B., and purported to balance the 

children’s privacy rights against the public interest in disclosure and 

determined, “given the attention the media has already given to this case, 

[the collective objections do not demonstrate] how the public interest is 

overridden here.” N.T., 6/1/16, at 6. Having found that the public interest 

prevailed over the children’s privacy rights, the juvenile court did not 

confront whether a less restrictive means existed to protect the children's 

privacy rights other than the total closure of the dependency proceedings. 

The procedural defects in this case are manifest. By failing to require 

the media to provide a written petition to open the dependency hearing, or 

even issue notice of its request, the juvenile court denied the parties to the 

dependency proceeding an opportunity to prepare a measured response that 

addressed the relevant aspects of the constitutional analysis. The juvenile 

court’s abridged, impromptu discussion regarding the merits of opening the 
J-A01014-17

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dependency hearing to the media was insufficient in light of the nuanced 

evaluation of the countervailing interests that we outlined in In re M.B., and 

ultimately proved to be a disservice to the children’s privacy interest. 

Moreover, we reject the juvenile court’s argument that publicizing the 

dependency proceedings was harmless due to potential dissemination of 

information during Father’s corresponding criminal matter. At its core, the 

trial court’s reasoning is premised upon the notion that the related criminal 

case had revealed all of the facts previously hidden. The logical foundation 

of that rationale is faulty. First, the premise ignores the reality that the 

majority of the information discussed during closed permanency review 

hearings is wholly irrelevant to the Commonwealth’s case against Father or 

his defense, and therefore, it would not be disclosed in the criminal 

proceedings. For instance, pursuant to § 6351(e), permanency review 

hearings address, inter alia, the feasibility and compliance with the 

permanency plan, the date by which permanency goals might be achieved 

and whether placement continues to be best suited to the child’s safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare. In addition, the juvenile 

court must also determine the appropriateness and continuing necessity for 

placement, the appropriateness of the current placement goal, and the date 

by which the placement goal might be achieved. In scenarios where the 

children do not testify, this information is gleaned from the testimony 

provided by parents, foster parents, caseworkers and service providers. 
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Father’s criminal case, which the juvenile court cited as the main 

reason for permitting the media’s participation in the dependency 

proceedings, would not reveal these confidential aspects of L.T.’s and D.T.’s 

lives because they are irrelevant to the criminal matter. As Mother 

accurately notes, this Court rejected the juvenile court’s precise rationale 

regarding the superseding effect of concomitant open criminal proceedings 

on a dependent child’s privacy rights, and it characterized the assertion as 

“spurious.” In re M.B., supra at 64. We explained, “While it is true that the 

children's names and certain details about their family life have been 

publicized, we believe . . . that the fact that they have received some 

publicity enhances their need for privacy now.” Id. In addition we endorsed 

the trial court’s observation, “the more information that is revealed, the 

more stress the children experience, the more they are stigmatized, 

embarrassed, and subject to whispers and speculation.” Id. at 65 (citation 

omitted). 

Stated plainly, the existence of a related criminal matter is not the 

dispositive consideration. As noted, few of the highly personal facts that are 

essential to the permanency review determination in this case would be 

subject to disclosure during Father’s criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the 

harm stemming from the continued dissemination of this delicate 

information in open dependency proceedings overrides the public’s interest 

in disclosure. We stressed this latter concept in outlining the parameters of 
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the two-prong constitutional analysis in In re M.B., supra at 64 quoting In 

re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439,451 (Oh. 1990), “Intense publicity surrounding the 

events which have brought a child into the juvenile court may 

psychologically harm the child, making it more difficult, if not impossible, for 

the child to recover from those events.” In addition to highlighting the 

chilling effect that open dependency hearings would have upon a witness’s 

willingness to speak candidly about the child’s best interest, this Court noted 

that publicity “is inconsistent with the nonadversarial nature of juvenile 

proceedings.” Id. at 64 (quoting San Bernardino County Dep't. of Pub. 

Social Servs. v. Superior Ct., 283 Cal.Rptr. 332 (Cal.App. 1991) (“Private 

hearings were not intended to simply avoid publicity and its resulting stigma, 

but were also part and parcel of the informal and nonadversarial nature of 

juvenile court hearings.”)); see also T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 448–49 (juvenile 

courts differ from courts of general jurisdiction in that “[h]earings are 

informal, and based on an inquisitorial model rather than an adversarial 

one”). 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that the juvenile court abused 

its discretion in permitting the unidentified media member’s access to the 

closed dependency proceedings without first requiring a formal petition, 

notice, and the opportunity for the parties to prepare an informed response 

to satisfy their burden of persuasion regarding both prongs of the 

constitutional analysis. Moreover, the juvenile court exaggerated the 
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significance of Father’s criminal trial in reasoning that the public had already 

garnered much of the confidential information that would be disclosed in the 

ongoing dependency proceedings. Thus, we direct the juvenile court to close 

the dependency proceedings consistent with § 6336(d). If, upon subsequent 

petition, notice, and measured argument beyond the existence of a related 

criminal matter, the juvenile court finds that the presumption of openness is 

unrebutted, the court may enter an appropriate order at that juncture. 

Next, we address Mother’s contention that the trial court erred in 

changing the children’s permanent placement goals from reunification to 

adoption. The appropriate standard of review of a juvenile court's 

permanency determination is as follows:

In cases involving a court’s order changing the [court-ordered] 

goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of 

discretion. To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we 

must determine its judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that 

the court disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by 

the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the 

court’s inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a 

responsibility to ensure that the record represents a 

comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied 

the appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore, our 

scope of review is broad. 

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted); see 

also In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). 

In In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa.Super. 2007), this Court 

stressed that the focus of dependency proceedings is upon the best interest 
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of the children and that those considerations supersede all other concerns,

“including the conduct and the rights of the parent.” Again, in In the 

Interest of D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009), we explained, “In 

a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and not the 

interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the parent’s rights are 

secondary.” Id. Likewise, this Court has held, “a child’s life simply cannot 

be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle 

the responsibilities of parenting.” In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818 ,824 (Pa.Super. 

2006) (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super. 

2003)).

With those principles in mind, we outline the relevant considerations 

set forth in the Juvenile Act regarding permanency planning:

Pursuant to § 6351(f)[6] of the Juvenile Act, when 

considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, 

____________________________________________

6 During permanency review hearings, trial courts must address the 

following considerations relevant to the child’s well-being. 

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the 

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the 

current placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the 

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize 

the permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

. . . .

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the 

last 22 months or the court has determined that 

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts 

to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from 

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve 

and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be 

made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to 

join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify, 

recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the 

child[.]

. . . . 

(f.1) Additional determination.--Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant 

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one 

of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the 

child's parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing 

necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the 

extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent 

of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and 

feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a 

likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) 

the child's safety; and (7) whether the child has been in 

placement for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months.

In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa.Super. 2011). Additionally, courts 

must consider whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the 

permanency plan in effect. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(5.1). 

Mother’s first challenge to the goal change order asserts trial court 

error in failing to provide formal notice that the court was considering 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

return of the child is best suited to the safety, protection 

and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. 

(2) If and when the child will be placed for 

adoption, and the county agency will file for termination 

of parental rights in cases where return to the child's 

parent, guardian or custodian is not best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare 

of the child. 

. . . .

(g) Court order.--On the basis of the determination made 

under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the 

continuation, modification or termination of placement or 

other disposition which is best suited to the safety, protection 

and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6) and (9), (f.1) (1) and (2), (g) (emphases 

added). 
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changing the permanency goals to adoption. Relying upon select segments 

of the Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook (“Dependency Benchbook”)7, 

she argues that the juvenile court should have first waited for CYS to file a 

petition for goal change and then provide notice to the parties that the 

petition would be addressed at the ensuing permanency review hearing. 

Mother relies primarily upon the following passage: 

“Best Practice – Goal Change Initiation”

While not required by Pennsylvania statute or rule of court, 

the request to change a goal can come in many forms. The 

official change in goal by the court is most commonly initiated by 

the agency. This is typically done by the agency petitioning the 

court for a permanency hearing with notice they are requesting a 

goal change.

Additionally, nothing precludes the court from initiating a 

change of goal. In some counties the judge informs all the 

parties at the Permanency Hearing that a hearing to change the 

goal will occur at the next scheduled Permanency Hearing. It is 

particularly beneficial to provide all parties with the date of the 

upcoming goal change hearing to prevent any issues of parties 

not receiving appropriate notice.

See Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook 2

nd at § 13-3, Office of Children 

and Families in the Courts (2014). 

____________________________________________

7 The Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook is a compendium on 

Pennsylvania dependency law that provides an overview of the subject for 

juvenile court judges to refer to while presiding over a case. It is not “a 

substitute for statutory, procedural or other legal authority.” See 

Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook, Office of Children and Families in the 

Courts, 2010. 
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Mother asserts that, since neither of the foregoing scenarios outlined 

in the “Best Practices” notation occurred herein, the juvenile court failed to 

provide adequate notice that a goal change was contemplated and that it 

was error to change the children’s goals with deficient notice. We disagree.

It is irrelevant that the juvenile court’s decision to change the 

permanency goals did not follow a typical procedural course. As the notation 

that Mother seeks to invoke states explicitly, there is no statutory 

requirement that a juvenile court must provide express notice that it is 

contemplating a goal change. Indeed, while Mother is correct in noting that 

the Dependency Benchbook refers to goal change hearings, the Juvenile Act 

does not discuss goal change hearings or mention the phrase “goal change” 

at all. In In re R.J.T., supra at 1183 n.6, our Supreme Court highlighted 

that the phrase “goal change,” is used as a term of art that is synonymous 

with the juvenile court’s mandated determination regarding “the 

continuation, modification or termination of placement” that a juvenile court 

must render pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 (f), (f.1), and (g) at the 

conclusion of every permanency hearing. Id. (“We conclude that an order 

to continue, modify, or terminate the current placement, as required by the 

statute, is synonymous with a decision to continue or change the 

permanency plan goal.”). 

Moreover, while Mother concedes that the Juvenile Act authorizes 

juvenile courts to alter permanency goals sua sponte, she focuses on the 
J-A01014-17

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Dependency Benchbook’s notation that, having initiated the issue, some 

judges elect to schedule a goal change hearing during the next scheduled 

permanency review hearing. She reasons that, since the juvenile court did 

not provide advance notice that it was going to contemplate the goal change 

at the June 2016 hearing, the court erred in addressing that issue. Mother is 

mistaken. While it is clear from the foregoing notation that the authors of 

the Dependency Benchbook recommend that trial courts issue prior notice of 

a goal change, the statute forewarns the parties that the issue will be 

addressed as a matter of course during every permanency review hearing. 

Regardless of the Dependency Benchbook’s observation concerning the 

scheduling preferences of “some” judges, the Juvenile Act remains the 

dispositive authority in dependency cases. As we discussed, supra, § 6351 

of the Juvenile Act directs that a juvenile court not only consider the 

appropriateness and feasibility of a child’s current goal during the 

permanency review hearings, it also mandates that the court enter an order 

addressing whether to continue, modify or terminate placement. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351 (f)(4), (f.1), and (g). Hence, despite Mother’s complaint that 

she was not provided notice that a goal change would be at issue during the 

June 2016 permanency review hearing, a review of the current goal’s 

feasibility is a required component of every permanency review hearing. 

The certified record confirms that the juvenile court issued Mother formal 
J-A01014-17

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notice of the June 1, 2016 permanency review hearing. Accordingly, her 

challenge fails. 

Having found no error regarding notice, we address the merits of 

Mother’s assertion that the trial court erred in changing L.T.’s permanency 

goal from reunification to adoption after only approximately two months of 

services. She contends that the decision to change L.T.’s permanency goals 

ran contrary to the Juvenile Act’s foremost purpose “to preserve the unity of 

the family whenever possible [.]” 42 Pa.C.S.§ 6301(b)(1). Similarly, citing 

the statutory requirement pursuant to §6351(f)(9), that an agency typically 

must request a goal change when a child has been in care for fifteen to 

twenty-two months, Mother contends that the act “contemplate[s] remedies 

. . . that extend fifteen (15) to twenty-two (22) months.” Mother’s brief at 

38. Thus, she argues the juvenile court’s decision to change her daughter’s 

permanency goal was procedurally premature. 

Similarly, invoking the Dependency Benchbook’s discussion concerning 

early stages of dependency, Mother asserts that the juvenile court should 

have utilized the June 2016 permanency review hearing to consider her 

initial progress and to make minor adjustments to the permanency plan. In 

addition, highlighting the May 19, 2016 court summary that Ms. Bush 

prepared and CYS submitted in anticipation of the permanency hearing, 

Mother observed that she was compliant with the plan and had initiated the 

recommended services. Furthermore, the agency recommended the 
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continuation of her reunification efforts. Hence, she concludes the juvenile 

court’s decision to change L.T.’s permanency goal to adoption after only two 

months was hasty. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the juvenile 

court order changing the goal from reunification to adoption. 

In addressing these issues, the juvenile court first correctly highlighted 

that Mother’s reliance upon the fifteen-to-twenty-two-month period is 

misplaced in that the Juvenile Act does not prohibit it from altering a child’s 

permanency goal at any time that the court determines that reunification is 

no longer viable and that another more appropriate goal exists. Next, the 

court attempted to bolster its position by citing to In re D.P., supra and In 

re M.S., 980 A.2d 612 (Pa.Super. 2009), two cases where this Court 

affirmed juvenile court goal change orders at the dispositional phase. 

First, we agree with the trial court’s characterization of the Juvenile 

Act’s timing requirements. It is beyond cavil that the fifteen-to-twentymonth period outlined in § 6351 is not a prerequisite to a goal change, but 

rather, an aspirational target in which to attain permanency. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6351(f.1)(9) (“If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 

22 months . . . [the court must determine] whether the county agency has 

filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights[.]”). Thus, 

Mother’s citation to that provision for the proposition that she was entitled to 

the full extent of the fifteen-to-twenty-two month term is unpersuasive. 
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Nevertheless, the juvenile court’s reliance upon In re D.P. and In re 

M.S. is plainly misplaced. In re D.P. involved an extensive procedural 

history spanning ten years between the agency’s initial involvement with the 

family and the goal change order. Also, unlike the case at bar, the facts 

underlying our review of In re D.P. included a prior adjudication of 

dependency and reunification as well as an express finding of aggravated 

circumstances against one of the parents. In addition, the agency was 

actively involved with the family for approximately three years between the 

pertinent adjudication of dependency during September 2005 and the July 

2008 dispositional order granting the goal change. 

Our holding in In re M.S., supra, may appear to support the juvenile 

court’s positon insofar as we affirmed a juvenile court’s order establishing 

adoption as the initial permanency goal. However, upon closer inspection, 

the perceived support is ephemeral. Like the facts underlying our review of 

In re D.P., supra, the pertinent aspects of In re M.S., supra, included “a 

longstanding relationship. . . going back approximately 12 years” as well as 

the trial court’s implicit finding that Mother’s failure to protect the child from 

repeated sexual assaults “by at least one but in all likelihood more than one 

of her brothers” constituted aggravated circumstances that warranted

setting adoption as the initial permanency goal for the 12-year-old child. Id. 

at 613, 614-615. 
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More importantly, unlike the case at bar, our review of the certified 

record in In re M.S. supported the juvenile court’s finding. We explained 

that the mother’s “apathy and indolence in taking corrective measures 

[were] the root problems of [that] case, [and that her inaction] smack[ed] 

squarely in the face of achieving M.S.'s best interests.” Id. at 618. Indeed, 

our citation to the In re D.P. Court’s reasoning in In re M.S. provides a 

conspicuous illustration of why the juvenile court’s reliance upon those cases 

is misplaced herein. In affirming the court’s purportedly abrupt invocation of 

adoption in In re M.S., this Court recounted approvingly, “It is not 

reasonable to suggest that after many fruitless years of providing services to 

Mother that the Agency should be expected to continue providing the same 

services over and over again.” Id. quoting In re D.P., supra at 1231. 

Instantly, however, as we explain, infra, the facts do not demonstrate the 

futility of CYS’s reunification efforts, and more importantly, it does not reveal 

a prolonged exhaustion of reunification resources. To the contrary, CYS 

provided Mother services for no more than three months. Thus, neither of 

these cases supports the legal principle for which they were cited, i.e., that 

this Court routinely affirms goal change order following truncated 

reunification efforts.

As indicated in the preceding discussion, our review of the record 

sustains neither the juvenile court’s finding that “[r]eunification is not a 

viable option in this case” nor its determination that “the safety and 
J-A01014-17

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wellbeing of L.T. is seriously threatened by Appellant's inability to take 

responsibility for herself, her failure to address problems with domestic 

violence, her homelessness and deplorable home conditions when she did 

have housing.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/16, at 21. 

In rendering its decision, the trial court focused primarily on the 

brutality of D.T.’s severe physical injuries, Mother’s belief that Father was 

not capable of inflicting the savage beating upon their infant son, and the 

immaturity and perceived lack of urgency that twenty-one-year-old Mother 

revealed during the hearing. The trial court discounted Mother’s compliance 

with the agency’s plan and the progress that she achieved during the shortlived period that she received reunification services. More importantly, the 

juvenile court disregarded the undisputed evidence that L.T. thrived during 

the brief period that she was placed in Grandmother’s kinship care, that 

Mother and L.T. shared a close bond, and that it was in the child’s best 

interest to continue reunification efforts. 

The record bears out Mother’s compliance in light of the circumstances 

that she faced in this case. Recall that Mother was required to: 1) 

participate in a psychological evaluation to determine any mental health 

deficiencies and follow treatment recommendations; 2) complete an 

approved parenting program; 3) attend medical appointments; 4) attend 

visitations regularly and demonstrate appropriate parenting; 5) complete a 
J-A01014-17

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domestic violence program; 6) maintain safe and stable housing; and 7) 

execute necessary releases. 

Unfortunately for Mother, she struggled to maintain safe and stable 

housing. The record confirms that Mother has lived in squalor for the 

duration of the agency’s involvement with the family and that she 

anticipated being evicted from her subsidized residence on the date of 

thepermanency review hearing. On the verge of homelessness, Mother still 

rebuffed Ms. Ferraro’s attempts to register her into a temporary shelter, 

apparently because she did not want to be confined to the city of Erie 

without access to transportation. Mother informed both caseworkers that 

she intended to reside with a neighbor temporarily until she and her new 

boyfriend could obtain a residence together. Along with the severity of 

D.T.’s injuries and its interpretation of Mother’s poor attitude, Mother’s 

housing predicament was among the juvenile court’s primary motivations for 

the goal change. 

While the certified record plainly supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that Mother failed to satisfy the housing requirement, the court’s rationale 

discounted Mother’s physical limitations due to injuries stemming from a 

recent automobile collision. Ms. Bush testified during the hearing that 

Mother suffered extensive injuries, some of which required surgery, to her 

collar bone, ribs, and shoulder from the car accident. Id. at 44. The 

injuries limited the use of one arm and affected her ability to clean her home 
J-A01014-17

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without assistance. Id. In fact, Ms. Bush testified that Mother had 

complained that she could barely care for herself with the use of only one 

arm. Id. Rather than appreciate the reality of Mother’s physical 

impairment, the juvenile court twice chastised Mother for blaming 

Grandmother’s inability to help her with housekeeping for the condition of 

the home. Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/16, at 8. Likewise, while Mother’s 

makeshift housing arrangement was inadequate and her plan for stable 

housing was still uncertain, those deficiencies did not demonstrate Mother’s 

long-term inability to reunite with L.T. Thus, although the record supports 

this aspect of the juvenile court’s finding, under the circumstances of this 

case, we do not believe that Mother’s housing predicament is a basis to 

change the dependency goal from reunification to adoption.

With regard to the remaining objectives, Mother made moderate 

progress during the two months that she received services. She executed 

the necessary releases and regularly attended supervised visitations with 

L.T. N.T., 6/1/16, at 40. Mother demonstrated appropriate parenting 

behavior, and even though L.T. recognized Grandmother as the primary 

caretaker, Mother’s bond with her daughter was evident. Id. at 41, 53-54, 

65. Hence, those aspects of the plan were satisfied. 

In addition to satisfying the visitation and clerical components of the 

goals that we documented above, Mother completed the initial portion of her 

psychological evaluation on May 10, 2016. However, as Ms. Bush explained 
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during the evidentiary hearing, Mother could not attend the scheduled 

follow-up session scheduled for May 19, 2016, because she had been 

subpoenaed as a witness at Father’s preliminary hearing on that date. N.T., 

6/1/16, at 34, 45. The appointment was rescheduled for June 6, 2016, 

approximately one week after the permanency review hearing. Id. at 34. 

Thus, she was compliant with this aspect of services. 

Likewise, Mother was compliant with the domestic violence 

component. Ms. Bush indicated that Mother enrolled in a twenty-four week 

domestic violence program and attended the first three classes. Id. at 35;

CYS Case Summary, 5/19/16, at 8. Further, Ms. Bush testified that Mother 

advised her that she recognized that her relationship with Father was toxic 

and that she terminated it. N.T., 6/1/16, at 32. 

Mother also satisfied her obligation to enroll in a parenting education 

program. She began Project First Step on May 5, 2016. While Mother’s 

personality initially clashed with the assigned caseworker, Ms. Ferraro, who 

found mother defensive, agitated and resistant to independence, she had 

completed approximately one month in the program prior to the hearing. 

Significantly, although Ms. Ferraro stressed Mother’s deficiencies, she did not 

recommend terminating services and stated that she was committed to work 

with Mother as long as she stayed committed to the program. Id. at 72. 

In sum, notwithstanding Mother’s well-documented parenting 

deficiencies, she complied with services during the brief reunification period 
J-A01014-17

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and her bond with L.T. was further evidence that continued reunification 

efforts were in the child’s best interest. As the guardian ad litem for L.T. 

opined in her brief in support of Mother’s position, 

As Guardian Ad Litem for the minor child, I am not clearly 

convinced that reunification is not a viable option in this case. 

Mother had made some progress in the two months between the 

Dispositional Hearing and the Permanency Hearing, and it is 

worth noting that during those two months, she herself was 

injured and she was struggling to cope with a traumatically 

injured child.

Given the circumstances, I cannot, as Guardian Ad Litem 

state that changing the goal to adoption is in the child's best 

interests. That is a determination that will come with time; 

adequate time to determine whether Mother is genuinely 

motivated and capable. Two months is simply not enough time 

to make that determination.

L.T.’s Brief at 13-14. 

We agree with the foregoing insofar as the juvenile court’s decision to 

change L.T.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption after only two 

months under the facts of this case is tantamount to abuse of discretion. 

While the juvenile court branded Mother as an immature 21-year old who 

has yet to exhibit self-reliance or independence, the certified record is more 

revealing. Mother is no longer romantically involved with Father, and 

through her domestic violence program, she recognized that the children did 

not deserve to be victimized by Father’s aggression. Likewise, the certified 

record confirms that Mother maintained a loving relationship with both 
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children and exhibited appropriate parenting skills during the supervised 

visitations with D.T. and L.T. 

Despite lacking a driver’s license she secured transportation from Erie 

County to Pittsburgh to sit with D.T. regularly while he was in Children’s 

Hospital. Even after Father demolished the family vehicle, Mother persisted, 

cobbled together resources, and with the assistance of CYS, family, and 

friends, she continued to make the two-hour trek to Pittsburgh to visit her 

son. Similarly, as it relates to L.T., the record not only demonstrates that 

Mother maintained regular visitation, the case workers identified a close 

bond between Mother and L.T., who has never showed any sign of abuse. 

Plainly, this is not a case where it is obvious that an uninterested parent is 

wasting reunification resources while a child languishes in foster care. 

Mother made some progress during the brief period of reunification, and it is 

in L.T.’s best interest to grant Mother a legitimate opportunity to 

demonstrate that reunification is viable. Accordingly, we reverse the order 

altering L.T.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.8 

Next, Mother assails the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her 

supervised visitations with L.T. She argues that the record does not sustain 

____________________________________________

8 At a minimum, the juvenile court should consider concurrent permanency 

goals that would permit CYS to develop simultaneous reunification and 

adoption plans.
J-A01014-17

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the trial court’s finding that the abrupt cessation of visitation was in her 

daughter’s best interest. Mother asserts that the trial court’s rationale in 

support of its decision ignored the relevant best-interest factors that it was 

required to consider pursuant to our discussion in In the Interest of M.B., 

674 A.2d 702 (Pa.Super. 1996).9 

Our standard of reviewing a juvenile court’s visitation order depends 

on the child’s goal. When reunification is contemplated, a juvenile court 

cannot deny or reduce visitation absent a “grave threat” to the dependent 

child. Id. at 705 (“As a usual rule, parental visitation is not denied except 

where a grave threat to the child can be shown”). This standard 

“underscores the importance of each parent's maintaining a meaningful and 

sustaining relationship with the child.” Id. In contrast, when the goal is an 

alternative to reunification, the juvenile court may limit or deny visitation as 

long as the reduction satisfies the best interest of the child. This alternative 

standard recognizes that when reunification is unlikely, the parent-child 

relationship is no longer paramount. Id. We have indicated that “The ‘best 

interests’ standard, in this context, is less protective of parents' visitation 

____________________________________________

9 This Court fashioned the best-interest factors to guide the trial courts in 

the absence of statutory guidelines concerning parental visitation of 

dependent children when the the goal is no longer reunification. See In the 

Interest of M.B., supra at 705-706, n.3 (“The Juvenile Act does not 

contain any guidelines or suggestions for granting or reducing visitation once 

the child has been adjudicated dependent and removed from his/her natural 

parents.”).
J-A01014-17

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rights than the ‘grave threat’ standard.” In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting In re C.J., 729 A.2d 89, 95 (Pa.Super. 1999)). 

We explained this dichotomy as follows: 

When the child is in foster care, the grave threat standard 

supports the goal of family reunification as provided in the 

Juvenile Act. Allowing visitation except in extreme 

circumstances encourages continued parental interest and 

contact in order to prepare the child and family for eventual 

reunification.

However, when the court finds that reunification is no 

longer the goal, the grave threat standard is not a proper guide, 

and must be replaced by a standard that recognizes that the 

natural family is not likely to be a viable entity. 

Id. at 705-706 (citation omitted).

In light of our finding that the juvenile court erred in altering the 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption, we do not confront the 

merits of Mother’s assertion that the court was required to address the bestinterest factors outlined in In the Interest of M.B. Instead, we remand the 

matter for the juvenile court to address the issue of visitation pursuant to 

the grave threat standard, i.e. whether Mother “demonstrates a severe 

mental or moral deficiency that constitutes a grave threat to the child.” In 

re C.B., 861 A.2d 287, 294 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Mother’s final issue challenges the juvenile court’s June 16, 2016 order 

confirming CYS’s authority, as the legal and physical custodian pursuant to § 

6357, to make end-of-life decisions in D.T.’s best interest. The appeal from 

this order was docketed at 1035 WDA 2016. Mother’s argument is a 
J-A01014-17

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confused presentation of distinct constitutional principles. Initially, Mother 

asserts that the juvenile court’s order infringed upon her parental rights. 

Mother’s brief at 47. While she frames the initial inquiry as requiring strict 

scrutiny, she failed to provide any legal argument in support of her positon 

that the denial of her right to participate in the decision making process 

under the relevant circumstances would not pass constitutional muster. Id. 

Instead, she levels an alternate complaint that the juvenile court violated 

her due process rights because it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing 

prior to confirming the agency’s statute-based authority over D.T.’s end-oflife medical decisions. Id. at 48. 

The guardian ad litem for D.T. attempts to counter Mother’s elusive 

constitutional challenges; however, CYS and the trial court both contend that 

the issue regarding the agency’s authority to make end-of-life medical 

decisions for D.T. is moot because the infant is deceased. The guardian ad 

litem for L.T. declined to address the issue, presumably because she 

understood that the order did not apply to L.T. 

Upon review, we find the appeal docketed at 1035 WDA 2016 is moot. 

In In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799 (Pa.Super. 2015) we recently reiterated the 

relevant legal framework as follows: 

As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all 

stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as 

moot. An issue can become moot during the pendency of an 

appeal due to an intervening change in the facts of the case or 

due to an intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, 
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an opinion of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue 

before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot 

enter an order that has any legal force or effect.

Id. at 811 quoting In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en 

banc). 

Presently, the appeal is moot because the only child that was subject 

to the order is now deceased. Thus, any decision rendered in this appeal 

would be entirely advisory. Mother and the guardian ad litem for D.T. 

recognize that the appeal is technically moot, but relying upon our 

discussion in In re J.A., supra, they both assert that the appeal is excepted 

from the mootness doctrine because it raises an issue that is prone to 

repetition yet likely to evade review. We disagree. 

In In re J.A., we confronted a pair of technically moot appeals and 

found that they were excepted from the mootness doctrine. The first appeal 

was from a juvenile court order that appointed KidsVoice as the medical 

guardian of a dependent child. However, after the child’s mother filed her 

notice of appeal, the juvenile court entered a subsequent order terminating 

the appointment. Hence, as we pointed out in In re J.A., supra at 811, 

“[t]he juvenile court's [latter] order . . . effectively granted the relief 

requested [in Mother’s appeal.]” Thus, it was moot.

Nevertheless, reasoning that the juvenile court could reverse its 

course and re-appoint KidsVoice as the child's medical guardian, we found 

the issue capable of repetition. Id. at 812. Similarly, noting the fluidity of 
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the child’s best interest throughout the juvenile court proceedings, we 

determined that the issue of whether the appointment of a medical guardian 

was in the best interest of the child at any given time was apt to evade 

review. Id. 

We employed a similar analysis to the second appeal, which pertained 

to an order entered before the court reversed itself. During an evidentiary 

hearing, the juvenile court precluded mother from presenting testimony in 

support of her desire to regaining medical decision-making rights from 

KidsVoice. Invoking Pa.R.A.P. 1701, the juvenile court rebuffed the evidence 

concerning the propriety of the appointment of KidsVoice because the issue 

was pending on appeal. As noted, the court subsequently withdrew the 

appointment. In order to evade the mootness doctrine and address the 

issue regarding the juvenile court's decision to reverse itself on the 

applicability of Rule 1701, the Court in In re J.A. reasoned that the juvenile 

court’s reversals were prone to repetition and that the fact-based 

determination of the child’s ongoing medical needs was likely to evade 

review. Id. at 812. 

As noted, both Mother and the guardian ad litem for D.T. seek to apply 

this rationale in order to circumvent the mootness doctrine. The crux of our 

reasoning in In re J.A., was that best-interest determinations are 

dependent upon up-to-date facts that are fluid over the course of the 

dependency proceedings and are therefore necessarily apt to evade review. 
J-A01014-17

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See id at 812 (“the question of what is in a child's best interest is a fluid 

concept, potentially changing throughout the life of a dependency case”). 

This reasoning is misplaced herein.

Unlike the fact-based determinations regarding a child’s best interest 

that we found to be apt to evade review in In re J.A., the issue in the case 

at bar involves the functional determination of the juvenile court’s statutory 

authority to empower CYS to make end-of-life decisions under 23 Pa.C.S. § 

6357. There are no nuanced factual considerations in the case. The issue 

regarding whether § 6327 authorizes the juvenile court to act in this matter 

raises a question of law, not L.T.’s best interest. Accordingly, the issue is 

not inclined to evade review due to any perceived fluidity. 

Additionally, we observe that the issue also is not likely to evade 

review under a typical mootness analysis. Instantly, Mother neglected to file 

in the juvenile court either a petition to stay the court’s June 16, 2016 order 

pending her appeal or an injunction prohibiting CYS from making a final endof-life determination for the child. Pointedly, subject to limited 

circumstances that are not applicable herein, “[a]n order that grants or 

denies, . . . an injunction” may be appealed as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 

311(a)(4). 

Similarly, even after filing her notice of appeal, Mother could have, but 

did not, petition this Court for a writ of supersedeas. Mother even declined 

to seek any form of stay upon receiving notice of CYS’s ultimate decision to 
J-A01014-17

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remove D.T. from the ventilator. If granted, these entreaties would have 

enabled appellate review of the issue while an actual case or controversy still 

existed. Thus, contrary to the arguments leveled by Mother and the 

guardian ad litem for D.T., this issue is not prone to repetition yet likely to 

evade review. Indeed, Mother’s inaction, rather than some latent difficulty 

with the appellate process, is the principal reason that the July 16, 2016 

order is now moot. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the juvenile court order 

appealed at 1032 WDA 2016 that changes L.T.’s placement goals from 

reunification to adoption and close the dependency proceedings consistent 

with § 6336(d) and our discussion in In re M.B., supra. We dismiss the 

appeal docketed at 1035 WDA 2016 as moot. Case remanded for 

proceedings consistent with the opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judge Olson joins the opinion.

Judge Strassburger files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2017
J-A01014-17

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