[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12928

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

THOMAS EUGENE JOINER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01321-ACA

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12928

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Joiner applied to the Social Security Administration 

for supplemental security income and was denied. He appealed the 

denial to the district court, which affirmed the decision. Now, he 

appeals to us, and we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

In February 2019, Joiner applied for adult supplemental security income for a disability that began about ten years earlier. 

Joiner listed ten medical conditions that allegedly limited his ability 

to work: a back problem, degenerative disc disease, a bulging disc, 

pinched nerves, arthritis in both legs, a pitting edema, no cartilage 

in the right knee, hypertension, anxiety, and depression. And he 

said that before he became unable to work, he had jobs as a painter 

for a residential contractor and as a pipe fitter for a construction 

company. 

The Administration denied Joiner’s application, and Joiner 

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. At the 

hearing, Joiner testified about his living situation, his employment 

and medical histories, the limitations allegedly caused by his medical conditions, and how he dealt with the limitations. Then, a vocational expert testified about how an individual like Joiner could 

hypothetically work in the national economy. 

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The administrative law judge had started the hearing by accepting into evidence Joiner’s medical records from 2014 to 2019. 

These records included a May 15, 2019 report in which Joiner’s consultative examiner, Dr. James Temple, concluded: “With [his] difficulty with movement without pain, [Joiner] had to stop work because of his inability to carry on his job. I feel he is disabled at this 

point in time.” In his closing argument, Joiner (through a non-attorney representative) mentioned Dr. Temple’s disability determination. 

The administrative law judge denied Joiner’s request for 

supplemental security income. The administrative law judge

“careful[ly] consider[ed]” all evidence—including Joiner’s “complete medical history”—and concluded that Joiner “ha[d] not been 

under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act 

since” he applied in February 2019. The administrative law judge

followed the Administration’s “five-step sequential evaluation process” to determine whether Joiner was disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a). The administrative law judge concluded that Joiner 

was not disabled at the fifth step because Joiner was “capable of 

making a successful adjustment to other work that exist[ed] in significant numbers in the national economy.” 

In reaching this conclusion, the administrative law judge

mentioned Dr. Temple’s disability determination and noted that 

administrative law judges “c[ould ]not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any prior administrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s), including those 

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from medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). The administrative law judge also stated that Dr. Temple “did not offer a functionby-function analysis of [Joiner]’s abilities and limitations” and that 

the “blanket determination[] regarding [Joiner]’s disability status

[wa]s a finding . . . reserved for the . . . Administration.” Id.

§ 416.920b(c)(3)(i).

Joiner appealed the administrative law judge’s decision to 

the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied his request 

for review because the administrative law judge didn’t commit an 

abuse of discretion and the Appeals Council found no other reason 

to review the decision. 

Joiner filed a complaint in the district court seeking review 

of the administrative law judge’s decision. In his memorandum in 

support of disability, Joiner argued that the administrative law 

judge “wrongly rejected” Dr. Temple’s opinion that Joiner was disabled, improperly substituted his own judgment for Dr. Temple’s, 

“failed to accord proper weight to the opinion,” “failed to recontact” Dr. Temple “to determine the basis of [the] opinion,” and 

“failed to state with at least ‘some measure of clarity’ grounds for 

decision in repudiating the opinion.” Joiner also cited an out-ofcircuit case—Wilder v. Chater, 64 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1995)—and 

asked the district court to apply the “higher degree of review” that 

the case requires when an administrative law judge “disregards the 

consultative evaluation” of a medical expert selected by the Administration. 

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The district court affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision. The district court said that the administrative law judge specifically explained why he rejected Dr. Temple’s opinion, was not 

required to recontact Dr. Temple, and didn’t “substitute[] his opinion for that of Dr. Temple.” The district court also recognized that 

this court does not follow the Wilder standard, and in any event, it 

found Wilder distinguishable. And “[s]ubstantial evidence,” the 

district court explained, “support[ed] the [administrative law 

judge]’s denial of . . . Joiner’s application for supplemental security 

income.” 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In social security appeals, we review de novo whether the 

correct legal standards were applied. See Washington v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018).

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Joiner restates the arguments that he made in the 

district court, contending that the administrative law judge erred 

as a matter of law when he disregarded Dr. Temple’s disability determination, and asking us to apply the Wilder standard. In asserting that the administrative law judge erred when he disregarded 

Dr. Temple’s disability determination, Joiner cites cases decided 

under the “treating-physician rule,” which required that an administrative law judge defer to a treating physician’s medical opinion 

in determining whether an individual was disabled under the Social 

Security Act. As we recently clarified, the regulation that the 

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administrative law judge applied in Joiner’s case, 20 C.F.R. section 404.1520c, abrogated the older treating-physician rule. See

Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 38 F.4th 892, 896 (11th Cir. 

2022) (“Because section 404.1520c falls within the scope of the 

Commissioner’s authority and was not arbitrary and capricious, 

it abrogates our earlier precedents applying the treating-physician 

rule.”).

Under the current regulations, Dr. Temple’s opinion that 

Joiner was disabled was a statement on an issue reserved to the Administration—whether Joiner was “disabled, blind, able to work, 

or able to perform regular or continuing work.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920b(c)(3)(i). Accordingly, it was “[e]vidence that [wa]s inherently neither valuable nor persuasive.” Id. § 416.920b(c). And the 

administrative law judge didn’t need to “provide any analysis about 

how [he] considered such evidence in [his] determination or decision.” Id. Thus, the administrative law judge didn’t err as a matter 

of law when he disregarded Dr. Temple’s disability conclusion.

Finally, we agree with the district court that Wilder is distinguishable. In Wilder, the consulting physician’s opinion was the 

only medical evidence regarding the applicant’s mental health impairments, so the rejection of the opinion by the administrative law 

judge, the Seventh Circuit concluded, was “rank conjecture.” 64 

F.3d at 338. But, where the medical evidence is conflicting, as it is 

here, we’ve held that it was not error for the administrative law 

judge to give less weight to the consulting physician’s opinion. See

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 

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2004) (“The ALJ correctly found that, because Hartig examined 

Crawford on only one occasion, her opinion was not entitled to 

great weight. . . . [T]he ALJ’s findings regarding Crawford’s mental 

capacity were supported by the findings of Dr. Mehta, the psychiatrist who had examined Crawford on two occasions and reported 

that Crawford was cooperative clear, spontaneous, but without 

any evidence of loose associations, flights of ideas, or pressure of 

speech.” (cleaned up)). That’s what happened here. The administrative law judge explained why he rejected Dr. Temple’s disability 

conclusion—Dr. Temple did not offer a function-by-function analysis of Joiner’s abilities and limitations and his blanket determination that Joiner was disabled was reserved for the Commissioner—

and instead credited the testimony of the medical evidence showing that Joiner had residual functional capacity to perform jobs in 

the national economy. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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