J-S53009-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARCUS JONES 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2512 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered October 9, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001100-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and NICHOLS, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2019

Appellant, Marcus Jones, appeals pro se from the order entered on 

October 9, 2019, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Because Appellant filed his 

PCRA petition prematurely while his direct appeal from the underlying 

judgment of sentence was pending, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal 

and are constrained to quash it.

On August 21, 2017, following a bench trial, the trial court convicted 

Appellant of attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and theft by 

unlawful taking.1 On August 21, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

13 to 26 years of imprisonment for attempted murder, with a 10-year 

consecutive term of probation for robbery. The convictions for aggravated 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502/901, 2702(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 3921(a), 

respectively.
J-S53009-19

- 2 -

assault and theft by unlawful taking merged for sentencing purposes. 

Subsequently, upon Appellant’s request, the trial court allowed counsel to 

withdraw. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal, challenging his judgment 

of sentence, on August 31, 2017.2 

Thereafter, prior to the resolution of Appellant’s direct appeal, Appellant 

filed a pro se PCRA petition on April 10, 2018. The PCRA court denied relief 

by order dated July 17, 2018. On August 10, 2018, Appellant filed the instant

pro se appeal that was docketed with this Court at 2512 EDA 2018. 

We cannot reach the merits of Appellant’s claims because, as discussed 

below, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s pro se PCRA 

petition while his direct appeal remained pending before this Court.3 This 

Court has stated that “[a] PCRA petition may only be filed after an appellant 

has waived or exhausted his direct appeal rights.” Commonwealth v. 

Leslie, 757 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa. Super. 2000) (emphasis in original; citation 

omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) (stating that a PCRA petition “shall 

be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” and “a 

judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review[.]”). 

When a direct appeal is still pending, a PCRA petition is premature and an 

appeal taken from the denial of collateral relief is subject to quashal. 

Commonwealth v. Seay, 814 A.2d 1240, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2003)

____________________________________________

2

 Appellant’s direct appeal was docketed with this Court at 3020 EDA 2017.

3

 “We may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. 

Culsoir, 209 A.3d 433, 435 (Pa. Super. 2019).
J-S53009-19

- 3 -

(“Inasmuch as Appellant's direct appeal is still pending [...], it is patently clear 

that this PCRA petition is premature, and we must quash it.”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 114 A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“When a PCRA 

court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of a [PCRA] petition, we likewise 

lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the disposition of the petition.”). 

Accordingly, we quash this appeal because this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider an appeal from the dismissal of Appellant’s prematurely filed PCRA 

petition. 

Appeal quashed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2019