### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs S ep te m be r 9, 200 8

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . DEVON WI GGI NS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Dyer County No. C06-248 R ussell L ee M oore, Jr ., Judge

No. W2007-01734-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed May 15, 2009

A Dy er County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Devon Wigg ins, of two counts of selling
on e -h a lf g ra

m or mor e of c oc a ine wi thi n a dru g -f re e sc ho ol zone , an d the tr ia l c ourt se nte nc e d h im to t we nty -f ive y e ars fo r e a c h c on vic tio n to be se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y wi th e a c h o the r b ut c on se c uti ve ly to prior sentenc es. The tr ial court a lso ordere d the appellant to pay a five -thousand-dollar

fine for
eac h conviction. On appeal, the appellant c ontends that (1) Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39- 17-432 (2005) violates due proc ess and re s ulted in his rece iving a n excessive sentenc e; (2) the evidenc e is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court e rre d by denying his motion for
a bif ur c a te d tr ia l; ( 4) the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by re fu sin g to i ns tr

uc t th e jur

y on the sa le of

a c ounte rf e it substance; ( 5) the trial court err ed by failing to instruc t the jury on fac ilitation as a lesser inc luded offe ns e; (6) the tr ial court e rre d by not rec using itself; (7) the prosec utor’s closing statement wa s improper; and (8) the c umulative eff ect of the er rors wa rra nts a reve rsal of his convic tions. Base d upon the re cord a

nd the par ties’ brief s, we a ffirm the judg ments of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court are Aff irm ed.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. G L EN N and C A M I LLE R. M C M UL L EN , J J ., joined. H. Tod Tay

lor, Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Devon Wig g ins.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Sop hia S. L e e , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; C. Ph ill ip B ive ns , D istri c t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and L anc e Web b, As sis tant D istri c t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound-2-

Kim Pierce te stified at t ri al that she a cted a s a conf idential informant for

the police a

nd boug ht cra ck coca ine from the a ppellant, whom she kne w as “ DD,” thr ee times. The first drugbuy
occur red on Dec ember 21, 2005. On that date, the police met with Pier ce in he r apar tment at the
corne r of Sampson and Colleg e S tree ts in Dy ersbur g

. Pierce called the appellant’ s cellular te lephone number a nd told him t o “bringme fifty .” The police re corde d Pierce ’s ca ll to the appellant, and the State play ed the audiotape for the jury

. Pierce said the pol ice officer s sear ched her, a ffixed a wire transmit t er to her body , and g ave he r fifty dollars. When the appe llant arrive d, Pierce walked downstairs fr om her a

partment a

nd outside to the appellant’ s dark- colore d Pontiac Gra nd Am. She g ave him fifty

dollars, and he g ave he r roc k coca ine i n a bagg ie. Pierce walked ba ck upstairs to her apar tment and g ave the coca ine to the police.

Pierce testified that the sec ond drugbuy occur red on J anuar

y 18, 2006. She telephoned the appellant a

nd spoke with someone named “Tasha.” She told Tasha that she wante d “[e]ighty ,” and Ta sh a tol d h e r, “ He ’s on his wa y ri g ht no w. ” Th e po lic e ta pe re c or de d Pi e rc e ’s c a ll, and the State pla y e d th e a ud iot a pe fo r t he jur y . Pi e rc e sa id th e po li ce se arc he d h e r a nd g a ve he r e ig hty

do lla rs

. Twenty or thirty minutes later, the appellant had not a rrived with the coca ine, so Pierce telephoned ag ain and spoke with him. S hortly there afte r, the a

ppellant ar

rived in fr ont of Pierce ’s apa rtment driving a g ree n Thunderbir d, and Ta sha wa s wit h h i m

. P i erc e we nt downstairs and g ave him the money in exchan g e f

o r c r a c k c o c a in e

. Sh e r e tu

r n e d to h e r a p artm e n t a

n d g a v e th e c o c a in e to the police.

Pierce testified that the third drugbuy occur red on J anuar

y 25, 2006. Pierce telephoned the appellant a

nd told him s he wa

nted “[e]ighty .” The appellant told her , “All rig ht.” The police tape
re c or de d Pi e rc e ’s c a ll t o th e a pp e lla nt, and the State pla

y e d th e a ud iot a pe fo r t he jur y . Pi e rc e sa id the police se arc hed her , attache d a wire transmitter to her body , and gav e h er eig hty dollars. She went downstairs a

nd g ave the money

to the appellant, who w as dr i v i n g a maroon Dodg e Ne on. Pierce stated that the police paid her seventy dollars as compensation f or her pa rticipation in eac h drugbuy and that she w as g oing to r ece ive one hundr ed dollars f o r t es t i fy ing in c ourt. She
a c kn ow le dg e d th a t sh e ha d mu lti ple pr ior c on vic tio ns fo r m isd e me ano r t he ft

. On cross-examination, Pierce testified t hat she used to smoke c rac k coca ine but that she had been “ clea

n” for one y ear . She stated t hat s he had known t he appe llant for eig ht y ear s and that she previously

had sex with him in exchang e for cra ck coc aine. At the e nd of 2005, Pierce approa ched the police a

bout becominga conf

idential informant. S he ac knowledg ed that she use d two differ ent telephone numbe rs to contac t the appellant. However , she said she w as unaw are that one of the phone numb e r s w h ic h s h e u s e d to c o n ta c t t

h e a p p e ll an t o nJanu ar

y 1 8 , 2 0 0 6 , b e lo n g e d

to T asha Ak ins

. She sa id that alth ou g h the te le ph on e may have be e n r e g ist e re d to Ak ins , th e ph on e a c tua lly belong ed to the appe llant. She acknowle dg ed that in addition to her prior convictions for misdemeanor the ft, she h a d p r io r c onvictions for cr iminal impersonation, attempted theft, a nd failure to appea r. She also ac knowledg ed that a c harg e for felony theft wa s pending ag ainst her.

Of fi c e r T od d T hay e r o f t

he Dy e rs burgPol ic e De pa rtme nt t e sti fi e d th a t he me t w ithKi m Pierce on Dec ember

2 1 , 2 0 0 5 , and that she told the police she could buy drug s from “D D.” The-3-

police told her to buy fifty dollars worth of c ocaine , and Pierc e telephone d the appe llant. After the phone ca ll, the police sea rche d her. D uring the sea rch, the police ch ec k ed P i erce’s poc kets and patted her down. Pierce also had to take off h er s h o es and pull out her shirt a nd bra to make sure nothing f ell out. The police attached a wire transmitter to her body and gave her f ifty dollars. The office rs par

ked down the stre et from Pierc e’s a partment a

nd listened to the drug buy

. They also tried to videotape the tr ansac tion but could not beca use i t took place at ni g ht. Offic er Tha y er sa w Pierce leave her a

partment and walk to the drive r’s side of a ca r. Off icer Thay er sa id he thoug ht the car was a lig ht-colore d Pontiac Gra nd Am. Pierce went back inside; called the office rs; and told them, “I t’s done.” T he off

icer s went i nto her apartment, and she gave them the cr ack c ocaine . Offic er Tha y er put th e c o c a in e in a s ma ll b a g an d s e ar c h e d Pi e r c e a g a in

. A lt h o u g h Pi e r c e d id n o t know the appellant’ s rea l name, Of

fice r Thayer kne w t hroug h his work at the pol ice department that “DD” was the appe llant. Moreover , office rs showed Pierc e a photog raphic arr ay , and she ide ntified the appellant a s “DD.”

Offic er Tha

y er te stified that he also wor ked with Pierce on J anuar y 25, 2006, and that they went throug h the same pr ocedur e as they did on Dece mber 21. The police g ave Pier ce e ighty dollars to buy drug s, and the appellant arrived at the apartment in a red Dodg e Neon. Pierce went outside, made c ontact with the appe llant, a nd came back upstairs to her a partment. Of

fice r Thayer sa

w the appellant dr iving the N eon and vide otaped the tr ansac tion. The State play ed the videota pe for the jury . Offic er Tha

y er sa id Pierce boug ht coca ine from the appellant and g ave it to the police. Of fice r Th ay e r p ut t

he c oc a ine in a

sma ll b a g and

se arc he d Pi e rc e a g a in. He sa id t hat Pie rce was pa id seventy dollars for her participation i n eac h drug buy and that she was paid fifty dollars for a ppear ing in court. H e s t ated that he r pay ment for a

ppear ing in c ourt did not depend on the outc ome of the trial.

Offic er Tha

y er te stified that t h e poli ce de partment ofte n had to use pe ople with prior
c on vic tio ns a s c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ants be c a us e the y kn e w d ru g de a le rs . H e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t F ir st Methodist Church, located a t the corne r of Sampson and Colleg e S t re et s , operated a da y car e and presc hool. Office r Thayer state d that the police use d a mea suring whee l at crime sc ene investigations and that the measur ing wheel had a counter on it. He stated that in order to use the whee l, a per son had to rese t it to z ero, put it on the g round, and walk with it. As the person wa lked, the wh e e l turn e d an d “ c lic ke d o ff ” the c ounte r. He sa id t

hat a lth ou g h n o o ne ha d e ve r s ho wn him how to use the measuring whee l, it wa s “pre tty much self- explanatory ,” and he acknow ledg ed that the police de partment a cce pted the whe el as re liable. Off icer Thay er state d t h at he used the measuri n g wh eel to mea sure the distanc e fr om the corne r of Colleg e and Sampson Stree ts to the presc hool’s front door a

nd that the distance was eight hundred eig hty -eig ht fee t. Using a differ ent route, Investig ator Jeff B ox from the public de fende r’s o ff i ce measure d the distance from the loc a tio n o f t

he dr ugde a ls t o th e c ur

b o f the pr e sc ho ol. Th e dis tanc e wa s e ig ht hund re d s e ve nty

fe e t.

On cr oss-examination, Office r Thayer te stified that Pierce was in the car with police offic ers on De c e mbe r 2 1, 20 05 , w he n s he te le ph on e d th e a pp e lla nt. Af te r s he c a lle d him, sh e we nt b a c k in to her a partment to wa it for the appe llant to arrive, a nd the offic ers did not sea rch he r home. The office rs could not strip sear ch Pierce beca use she was fema le. He stated that he did not know whe re-4-

or whe n the police de partment purc hased the measuringwhee l, that he had ne ver rea d any instructions on how to use the whee l, that he had never seen anyone calibrate it, a nd that he did not kn o w i t s r a t e o f

e r r o r

. H e a c kn o w l e d g e d

t h a th e d i d

n o tkn o w i f

t h e w h e e l m e a s u r e d

a c c u r a t e l y.

I nvestig ator Thomas L ang ford of the Dy ersbur g Police Depa rtment test i fi ed t hat he wa s involved in the drug buy on J anuar y 18, 2001. On that date, of fice rs met with Pierce in her home, and I nvestig ator L ang ford asked P ierc e to buy eig hty dollars worth of cocaine. Pierce telephoned the appel lant, and

I nv e sti g a tor

L ang fo rd

re c or de d th e ir

c on ve rs a tio n. Af

te r t he ph on e c a ll, I nvestig ator L ang ford se arc hed Pierc e’s pe rson for money or controlled substanc es and w ired he r with an elec tronic transmitter. I nvestig ator L ang ford waited at the window with a video r ecor der a nd
s aw t h e a p p e l l an tar

r i v e dr i v i n g a

g r e e nT h u n d e r

b i r d

. T h e S t a t e p l aye d

t h e v i d e o t a

p e f o r t h e j u r y. I nvestig ator L ang ford sa id P i er ce we nt downstairs to the stree t, conducted the transac tion, and returne d to her apartment. Pierce g ave the drug s to the office rs, and the of fice rs sea rche d her a g ain. The police paid Pierce seventy or eig hty dollars for he r work that day . I nvestig ator L ang ford state d that th e a mou

nt o f h e r p ay

wa s n ot a ff

e c te d b y the outc ome of

any tr ia ls.

On cr oss-examination, I nvestig ator L ang ford acknow ledg ed that a per son would have be en unable to see the drug transac tion f rom the back door of the Fir st Methodist C hurch, a nd he stated that he did not measure the distance from Pierc e’s a partment to the c hurch. He said he did not make Pierce take of

f her bra w hen he se arc hed her but ma de her “[s] hake it out.” He also did not feel he r brea sts, pubic are a, or buttocks during the sea rch. Pierc e told I nvestig ator L ang ford the te lephone number that she use d to contact the a ppellant, but I nvestig ator L ang ford did not watch he r dial the number. He acknow ledg ed that one- third to one-half of the g ree n Thunderbir d’s wi n d s h i el d was darkly tinted and stated that he did not know if a passe ng er w as in the ca r with the appe llant. He acknow ledg ed that as a

result of a

n incident t hat occ urre d on Marc h 22, 2006, L atasha Akins was char g ed with selling a Schedule I Icontrolled substanc e within a school zone.

I nvestig ator Mar

k Rey nolds of the Dy ersbur g Police Depa rtment testified that he de livered the evidenc e re cover ed in this case to the T ennesse e Bur eau of I nvestig ation (TB I ) L aboratory . On
cross-e x amination, he ac knowledg ed that on Marc h 22, 2006, Paul I som and Micha el Nanc e we re indicted with L atasha

Akins for selling coca ine within a school zone.

TBISpe c ia l A g e n t D an a Pa r me n te r te s ti f

ie d a s an e xp e rt in f

o r e n s ic c h e mi s tr

y th a t she analy zed the evidenc e in this case

. Color tests on substances re ceive d by the Dy ersbur g police on Dec ember

21, 2005, J anuar

y 18, 2006, and January

25, 2006, wer e p ositive for coc aine. Ag ent Parmenter

also perf ormed a naly sis on the evidence using a mass spectrome ter. She explained that

“ y o up u t t

h e [e v id e n c e ] s amp le in

th e in s tr u me n t, y o ug e t a

[g r a p h ] p r in to u t, y o uc o mp ar e that pr int ou t to a

kn ow n sta nd ard [ gr a

ph ] fo r c oc a ine and

if the y matc h e xac tly

y ou kn owthe sampl e contains coc aine.” She stated that the re sults from the mass spectrome ter showe d the evidenc e fr om the three drugbuy s was coc aine. The coca ine pu rc h as ed o n Dec ember 21, 2005, weig hed 0.51 g rams; the coc aine pur chase d on J anuar y 18, 2006, weig hed 0.8 g rams; and the c ocaine purcha sed on J anuar y 25, 2006, weig hed 1.3 g rams.-5-

On cr oss-examination, Age nt Parmenter te stified that she we ighe d the drug s on April 7, 2006, and that the sc ales ha d been c alibrate d on April 5, 2006. She stated that the mass spectrome ter
ana ly sis pr od

uc e d a g ra phfo r e a c h p ie c e of

e vid e nc e a

nd that sh e vis ua lly c omp are d the g ra ph s to the standar d g raph f

or pure coca ine. All of the g raphs “ had the same peaks” as the sta ndard g raph. S h e s t at ed that she did not know the rate of e rror for the ma ss spectromete r and that, to her knowledg e, it did not have a r ate of err or. Al t h o u gh the appe llant had bee n char g ed with selling one-ha lf g ram or mor e of c ocaine in a school zone on Dec ember 21, 2005 (count one ), January 18, 2006 (count two), a

nd J anuar y 25, 2006 (count thre e), the jury acquitted him of count one and f ound him guilty

of counts two and thr ee.

II. Ana lys is

A. Drug -F ree School Z one Ac t

The a ppellant contends that Tennesse e Code Annota ted sec t i o n 39-17-432, the D rug -F ree School Z one Ac t (DF SZA ), i s u n co n s tituti onal bec ause it violates due pr ocess. Spec ifically , he contends that subsec tion (b)(3) is va g ue and c ontradicts subsec tions (b)( 1) and (c)

. I n a re lated issue, he conte nds t hat bec ause subse ction (b)( 3) super sedes subsec tion (c), he rec eived a n excessive
se nte nc e . T he State con te nd s th a t th e a pp e lla nt h a s w a ive d th e c on sti tut ion a lity iss ue and that, i n any event, the statute is not unconstitut ional and the appellant did not rec eive a n excessive sentenc e. We conclude that the appellant is not entitled to relief

.
I n a pretrial motion, the appellant ar g ued that Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-432
was unc onstitut ional beca use subsec tion (b)(1) stated t h at a violation of the D FSZ A re quired p u n is h me n t o n e c la s s if

ic a ti o nh ig h e r

th ann o r ma ll y p r o v id e d f o r s u c ha v io lati o n , b u t s u

b s e c ti on (b)( 3) stated that a violation within cer tain school zones, such as the zone of a pr eschool, “ shall not be subj ec t t o ad ditional incarc eration as a re sult of this subs ection (b) .” Thus, he c ontended the statute was unc onstitut ional beca use it was contr adictory and “so vag ue, indef inite and unce rtain that persons must speculate as to its meaning .”

At a hearing on the motion, the State conce ded that while the statute was “ poorly worde d,” it w a s n ot u

nc on sti tut ion a l. T he State a c kn ow le dg e d t hat becau se the sc ho ol zo ne a t is su e in t his
c a s e w a s a

p r e s c h o o l , s u b s e c t i o n( b ) ( 3 ) p r o h i b i t e d p u n i s h i n g t h e a

p p e l l an t ’ s v i o l a t i o n , t yp i c a l l y a Class B fe lony , as a C l as s A fe l o n y . Howeve r, the State a rgued that if the jury

convicted the appellant, he still would have to serve the entire minimum sentenc e in the ra ng e in conf

inement as
re qu ir e d b y

su bs e c tio n ( c ). Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d n o me ri t to the a

pp e lla nt’ s c on sti tut ion a lity

c la im and denie d his m o t i o n

. Af t er the jury

convicted the appellant, the tr ial court he ld a sentenc ing hear ing. T he trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppellant as a

Rang e I I I , persistent off

ender to twenty -five y ear s, the midpoint in the rang e for a Class B felony , for e ach c onviction. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 40 -3 5- 11 2(c) (2)

. On

a pp e a l, t he a pp e lla nt m a int a ins that th e DF SZ A i s unc on sti tut ion a l be c a us e subsections (b)( 1) and (b)(3) contra dict eac h other and beca use subsec tions (b)(3) a

nd (c) contra dict
eac h other. In a related arg ument, he also contends that subsection (b)(3) super cede s subsection (c) and, ther efor e, he c annot be r equire d to serve the entire minimum sentenc e in the ra ng e as r equire d-6-

by su bs e c tio n ( c ). We d isa g re e wi th t he a pp e lla nt’ s a rgume nts

. “Due proce s s r e q

u ir e s th a t a s ta tu te provide ‘ fair w arning ’ and pr ohibits hol ding a n individual
c ri min a lly

lia ble fo r c on du c t th a t a

pe rs on of c omm on int e lli g e nc e wo uld

no t ha ve re aso nab ly understood to be pr oscribed.” State v. Bur khart, 58 S .W.3d 694, 697 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Gra y ned
v. City of Roc kf or d, 40 8 U .S. 10 4, 92 S. Ct. 229 4 (19 72 ))

. “ A statut e is v oid fo r v a g ue ne ss i f i t is so vag ue, indef

inite, and unce rtain that persons must spec ulate as to its mea ning, a nd if it fails to give
a pe rs on of or din ary int e lli g e nc e fa ir

no tic e tha

t hi s o r h e r co nd

uc t is fo rb idd e n by

the statut e .” State v. Whaley , 982 S

. W

. 2 d 3 4 6, 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . “The vagueness doc trine does not invalid at e ev ery

statute which a

revie wing court be lieves could have bee n draf ted with g reater pr e c isi on .” State v. L y on s, 80 2 S. W.2 d 5 90 , 5 92 (Ten n. 19 90 ). Th is c ourt ha s a duty to “ a do pt a
c on str uc tio n w hic h w ill su sta in a statut e and

a vo id c on sti tut ion a l conf li ct if its re c itatio n p e rm its such a c on s tr

u c ti o n

. ” I d

. a t 5 9 2

. We r e v ie w is s u e s o f s tatuto r y c o n s tr u c ti o n d e n o v o

. St ate v. Goodman, 90 S.W.3d 557, 563-64 (Tenn. 2002).

As c ha rg e d in the ind ic tme nt, Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 3 9- 17 -4 17 (a )( 3) make s it unlawful for

a p erson knowingly

to sell a controlled substanc e. I f a pe rson sells one-ha lf g ram or more of c ocaine , a Schedule I Icontrolled substance, the offe nse is a Class B f elony . See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417( c)( 1), -408( b)(4) . Prior to 2005, Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-17-432 pr ov ide d in

re le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: (a) I t is the intent of this sec tion to cre ate Drug -F ree School Z ones for the purp os e of pr ov idi ng a ll stud e nts in thi s st a te an e nv ir on me nt i n which they

can le arn w ithout the dist rac tions and dang er s t h at are in cident to the occ urre nce of drugactivity

in or around sc hool fac iliti es. The enhanc ed and mandatory minimum sentenc es re quired by this section for drug of

fense s occur

ring in a Drug -F ree School Z on e are ne c e ssa

ry to s e rv e a s a

de te rr e nt to s uc h una c c e pta ble
c on du c t. (b) A violation of § 39- 17-417 .

. . that occur s on the g rounds or fa cilities of any school or wit hin one thous and fe et (1,000' ) of the
re a l pr op e rt

y that c omp ri se s a

pu bli c or priva te e le me nta

ry sc ho ol, middle s ch o o l or sec ondary school shall be punished one (1) classification higher

than is provided in § 3 9 -17-417( b)-( i) for suc h violation. (c) Notwithstandinga

ny o th e r p rovision of law or the sentenc e imposed b y t h e court to t he contr ary , a def endant se ntence d for a vio lati o no f

s u b s e c ti o n( b ) s h a ll b e r e qu ir e d to s e r v e a t l e a s t the min i m u m sentenc e for

such def

endant’ s appropr iate ra

ng e of sentenc e. Any

sentenc e re duction cre d i ts such defe ndant may be elig ible for or ear

n shall not operate t o permit or allow the release of-7- such def endant pr ior to the full service of such minimum sentence

.
I n 2 00 5, the le g isl a tur e ame nd e d th e DF SZ A t o r e a d, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s: (a) I t is the intent of this section to create Drug -F ree Z ones for the purpose of

providing v u l n er able pe rsons in this st ate a n enviro n me n t i nw h ic h th e y c a nle ar n , p la y an d e n jo y th e ms e lv es without the distractions and dang ers t h at are incident to the
o cc u rre nce of

illega l drug activities. The e nhance d and mandatory minimum sentenc es required by this section for drugoffe nses oc c ur ri ngin a Dr ug -F re e Z on e are ne c e ssa

ry to s e rv e a s a

de te rr e nt t o such unac cepta

ble conduc t. (b )( 1) A v iol a tio n o f § 39 -1 7- 41 7, or a c on sp ir a c y

to v iol a te the sec tion, that occurs on the grounds or fa cil i t i es o f any school or within one thousand fee t (1,000' ) of the re al prope rty that comprises a pu b lic or private elementa ry school, middle school, seconda ry school, presc hool, child car e ag ency , or public librar y , rec reational
c e nte r o r p ark

sh a ll be punis he d o ne (1 ) c la ssi fi c a tio n h ig he r t ha n is provided in § 39-17- 417(b)- (i) for such violation. (2) In addition to any

other pe nalty

imposed by

this section, a per s o n co n victed of violatingthis subsection (b) shall also be
s u b j ec tt o t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

. . . . (D) U

pon conviction of a Class B fe lony , a fine of not more than sixty

thousand dollars ($60,000) ; and (E) U pon conviction of a

Class A felony , a fine of not more than one hundred thousand dollar s ($100,000). (3) A pe rson convicte d of vio l at i n g this subsection (b), who is w ith in t he pr oh ibi te d zo ne of a

pr e sc ho ol, c hil dc are c e nte r, pu bli c library , rec reational c enter or park shall not be subject to ad d i t i onal inc arc e ratio n a s a

re su lt o f t

his su bs e c tio n (b) but sha ll be su bje c t to the additional fines imposed by this section. (c) Not w it h s ta n d ing a ny other provision of law

or the sente nce imposed by

the cour t to the contrar

y , a def endant s en t en ced for a violation of subsection (b) sha ll b e re quired to ser ve at lea st the minimum sentenc e for the defe ndant’s appropr iate rang e of sentenc e.-8- Any sentenc e re ducti o n cr ed its the defenda nt may be elig ible for or
ear n shall not operate to permit or allow the re lease of the de fenda nt prior to full servic e of the minimum sentenc e.

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 39 -1 7- 43 2 (2 00 5)

. Th e DF SZ A is no t a se pa rate of fe ns e bu t is on ly

int e nd e d to enhanc e pena lties for violations of the DrugControl Act. State v. Smit h, 48 S.W .3d 159, 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

I nitially , we note that the S tate contends for the first time on appea l that the appe llant waived any issue reg ardingthe constitutionality of the statute be cause he fa iled to provide notice to the Attorney Gene ral a s require d by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 29-14-107( b) and Rule 24.04, Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure . Howeve r, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29-14-107(b)
re qu ir e s n oti c e to t

he a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l w he n th e c on sti tut ion a l val id it y of a g e ne ra l st a te law i s challeng ed in a dec laratory judgme nt action. Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 24.04 re quires
no tic e to t he a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l w he n the c on sti tut ion a l va lid ity of a state statut e is c ha lle ng e d in a c ivi l action. The Tenne ssee Rules of Civil P roce dure g ener ally do not apply

to criminal ca ses. See Alley
v. State , 8 82 S.W. 2d

81 0, 81 6 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). Ne ith e r t he statut e no r t

he ru le is a

pp lic a ble in this case. The ref

ore, notification was not require d. Turning to the appellant’ s claim, we r ecognize that this court pre viously has he l d that the DF SZ A i s n ot o ve rb ro a d o r v a g ue and , th e re fo re , d oe s n ot vi ol ate pr inc ipl e s o f d ue pr oc e ss g uara nteed by the Four teenth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and ar ticle 1, sec tion 8 of the Te nnessee Constit ution. Smit h, 48 S.W .3d at 164-68; State v. J enkins, 15 S.W .3d 914, 917- 18 (T en n

. C ri m

. App. 1999). However , as noted by the appe llant, we have not considere d a
c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e to t he Ac t si nc e the 20 05 a me ndme nt. L ike the pr e vio us ve rs ion of the Ac t, the cur rent ve rsion provides that a de fenda nt “shall be punished one (1) c lassification h i gh er tha n is provided in section 39-17- 417(b)- (I ) for s u ch violation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-432(b) (1). I n oth e r wo rd s, a de fe nd ant c on vic te d o f s e lli ngon e -h a lf g ra m or mor e of c oc a ine , o rd ina

ri ly a Cla ss B f elony , would be punished for a Class A fe lony

if the def endant sold the drugwithin one thousand fe e t of a sc ho ol. Ho we ve r, su

bs e c tio n ( b) (3 ) o f t

he a me nd e d A c t specif

ic a lly e xemp ts c e rt a in
sc ho ols , s uc h a s p re sc ho ols , f ro m the highe r c la ssi fi c a tio n in su bs e c tio n ( b) (1 ). Whil e we a g re e wi th the State that the statute is “poor ly worde d,” the subsec tions are not contr adictory or vague, and the exemption in subsection (b)( 3) made the appellant subject only to the period of inc arc eration for a C l a s s B f e l o n y.
The a ppellant also conte nds that subsections (b)( 3) and (c ) ar e contr adictory and violate due proce ss beca

use subsec tion (b)(3) in the 2005 amendment e x empts a def endant c onvicted of se lling drug s within c erta in sc hool zones from “additional incar cer ation” while subsection (c ), whi ch
rema ined uncha n ged fr om the previous ver sion of the Act, mandates additional incar cer ation by requiringa def

endant to ser

ve the e ntire minimum sentence in the r ang e. In a re lated ar g ument, he
a lso c on te nd s th a t su

bs e c tio n ( b) (3 ) s up e rc e de s su bs e c tio n ( c ) a

nd pr oh ibi ts h im f

ro m se rv inghis entire minimum sentence in the rang e in conf inement.-9-

Ag ain, we disa g ree with the appellant’ s contentions. Subsec ti o n ( b ) ( 3 ) s ta tes that a de fenda

nt shall not be subjected to a dditional incarc eration “as a r esult of this subsection (b) but shall be subject to the additi onal fine imposed by this section.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-417(b) (3). When
a me nd ingthe statut e , th e le g isl a tur e c ou ld h a ve sp e c if ie d in subs e c tio n (b) (3 ) t

hat a de fe nd ant a lso would not be required to serve the minimum puni shment in the rang e as r equire d by subsection (c ). The fa ct that the leg islature fa iled to apply the exemption to subsection (c) demonstrate s to us that
a lth ou g h th e le g isl a tur e did no t inte nd fo r de fe nd ants wh o s e ll d ru g s w ith in c e rt a in s c ho ol zo ne s to be sente nced in a

highe r ra ng e of punishment, it intended for all of them to at le ast serve the entire minimum sentenc e in the appr opriate r ang e. Subsections ( b)(3) and (c) are not contradic tory , and subsection (b)( 3) does not super cede subsection (c ). The a ppellant is not entitled to relief.

B. Suff iciency of the Evidenc e
Th e a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio ns be c a

us e the State fa iled to prove that the substances tested by the TBI wer e coca ine. Specifica lly , he ar g ues that A g e nt P arme nter “ irrationally” testified that no diff ere nces e x isted betwee n the standar d coca ine g raph and the g raphs c reated by the mass spec trometer when such diff ere nces c lear ly

exis ted. He also contends that the State failed to prove that the di stance betwee n the cr imes and the pre school was less than one thousand fee t. I n support of his argument, he notes that Of fice r Thayer te stified that he did not know when the police depa rtment ac quired the me asuringwhee l, that he neve r re ad any instructions for prope r use of the whee l, and that he did not know if the wheel wa s ever calibrated. We conclude that the appe llant is not entit led to relief

. When an appe llant challeng es the suff iciency of the c onvicting e vidence , the standar d for
re vie w b y an a pp e llate c ourt is “ wh e the r, a ft e r vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to the prosec ution, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond
a re a so na ble do ub t.” Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9 ( 19 79 ); Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ). Th e State is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti mate vi ew of the e vid e nc e and a ll
rea sonable or le g itimate infere nces w hich m ay be dra wn there from. State v. Cabba g e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions conce rning the cr edibility of witnesses a

nd the weig ht and value to be af forde d the evidenc e, as w ell as all fa ctual issues raised by the evidenc e, ar e re solved by the trier o f fa ct. State v. B land, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This court will not rew eig h or
ree valuate the evidenc e, nor will this court subst itute its i nfer ence s drawn f rom the circ umstantial evidenc e for

those infer ence s drawn by t h e j u ry

. I d. Be cause a jury conviction re moves the presumption of i nnocenc e with which a defe ndant i s initially cloake d at trial and r eplac es it on appea l with one of guilt, a convicted de fenda nt has the burde n of demonstrating to this court that the evidenc e is insufficient. State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). As stated pre viously , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-17-417(a )(3) prohibits a person from knowing ly

selling a controlled subst ance , such as coca ine. I f a pe rson sells one-ha lf g ram or more of c ocaine , the offe nse is a Class B f elony . S ee T en n

. Code Ann. § 39-17- 417(c) (1). Fur thermore , the DF SZAcre ates a “buff er zone” of one thousand fee t a round schools. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 432(b)( 1).A c c o rd ing to the a p p e n d ix, the a p p e llan t co m p iled the p h o to c o p ie s o f t h e trial e x h ib its p u rs u a n t t o R u le 1 2 8 , T enness ee R ul es of A p p el l at e P roce d ure. R ul e 2 8 “ al l o w[s] an ap p el l ant t o f i l e an ap p end i x co nt ai ni ng rel evant p o rt i o ns o f

a record

. H o wever, t he d o cum ent s f i l ed i n an ap p end i x m ust al so b e i ncl ud ed i n t he reco rd.” Stat e v. K en n et h Sh an e St or y , N o. M 2005- 02281- CC A- R3- CD , 2006 T en n

. Cr i m. App. LEX I S 621, * 14 ( N as h v i l l e, Au g

. 9, 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t at i o n om i t t ed ).
-10- Th e a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio ns be c a

us e Ag ent Parmente r’s testimony that the g raphs g ener ated by the mass spec trometer f or the substanc es in t his c a se did

no t di ff e r f ro m th e sta

nd ard g ra phg e ne ra

te d f or pure c oc a ine wa s in c or re c t. Although the g raphs in que stion we re admitted into e vidence at trial, they wer e not included in the
rec ord on appe al. In fac t, the only ex h i b i t included in the appe llate re cord is the a ppellant’s prese ntence repor

t. I t is the appellant’s duty to prepa re a rec ord which c onvey s a fa ir, ac curate, and complete r ecor d on appea l to enable mea ningf ul appellate r eview. See T en n

. R

. App. P. 24(a) (providing that the re cord on a ppeal sha ll consist of t he original ex hibits filed i n the trial cour t). The appellant c reated an “APPENDIX TO APPEL L ANT’S BRI EF,” containing various photocopies of tr ia l exhib its , inc lud ing ph oto c op ie s of pho togra ph s, Ag e nt P arm e nte r’ s f

or e ns ic c he mis tr

y re po rt s, and the g ra ph s g e ne rate d b y

the ma ss s pe c tr ome te r. Ho we ve r, “ a pp e nd ic e s to br ie fs do no t c on sti tut e e vid e nc e to b e c on sid e re d in the re vie w o f a c a se .” B e st v. State , 7 08 S.W. 2d 42 1, 42 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1985). Wit hout t h e graphs introduced into evidenc e at tria l, we ar e unable to addre ss the

1 appellant’ s argument. The issue ha s been w aived.

The a ppellant also conte nds that the State failed to prove that he sold the c ocaine within one thousand fee t of t he preschool. Offic er Thay er testified that he used a measuring whee l to measure the dis tanc e be tw e e n th e loc atio n o f t he dr ugtr ans a c tio ns and

the pr e sch oo l at F ir st M e tho dis t Church and that t h e d i s t an ce w as eig ht hundred e ighty -eig ht fee t. He also testified that an investigator from the public defe nder’ s office measure d the distance, using a slightly differ ent route, and that the distanc e wa s eig ht hundred seventy fee t. The de fense questioned Off icer Thay er a bout his training to use the wheel and the whee l’s calibration. The fa ct that the whe el was not c alibrate d g oe s to the we ig ht and c re dib ili ty of the e vid e nc e . Se e State v. Se an Ro g e rs , N o. 9- 95 -5 0, 19 96 Oh io App. L EXI S 1715, at **9-10 (3d App. Dist., Apr. 24, 1996) ( stating that “fa ct that the roll-a -whe el used to measur e the distance wa s not calibrate d . . . g oes to the we ight or cre dibilit y

the jury may wish to assign to the evidence ”). The jury obviously

conclude d that the State had de monstrated the dr ugtr ans a c tio ns oc c ur

re d w ith in o ne tho us and

fe e t of the pr e sc ho ol. Th e e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o su pp or t th e c on vic tio ns

. C. Bifurc ated Tr ial

Th e app e lla

nt c onte nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt , b y de nyinghis mot ion

fo r a bif ur c a te d tr ia l, preve nted him from pre senting a defense. The S tate contends that the t rial court proper ly denied the appellant’ s motion. W e conc lude that the appe llant has waive d this iss ue.
The rec ord ref

lects that prior to tr ial, the appellant filed notice of intent to use a n entra pment defe nse. Acc ording to the appellant’ s brief, he also filed a motion in limine, requesting that the trial court bifur cate his trial. The appe llant claims that a bifurc ated tria l was wa rra nted-11- to a llo w the de fe nd ant, if

c on vic te d o f s a le of c oc a ine , to pr e se nt h is prior cr iminal recor d reg ardingdrug s to show that he ha d not in the past sold drug s in a school zone and had no propensity to do so and thus, support an en t ra p ment defe nse as to the issue of sale of contra band in a sc hool zone. Although the appellant include d a copy of the motion in the appendix to his brief, he failed to include in the appellate rec ord the motion; a transc ript of the motion hear ing, if any ; or the trial c ourt’s ruling on the motion. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(a) , (b). Moreover , as not ed by the S tate, the appellant fa iled to cite to any

authority reg arding bifurcation or to suppor t his position that a bifurcated trial denied him his constitutional rig ht to prese nt a defense. The appe llant responds that he f ailed to cite to any authority beca use “this fa ct patter

n is novel” and the re is no case law directly on point. However , bif ur c a tio n it se lf

is n ot n ov e l. M or e ov e r, a lth ou g h the re may be no c a se law d ir e c tly on po int in t his state, this court often tur

ns to other jurisdictions for persuasive authority

. See, e.g ., State v. Denton, 938 S.W .2d 373, 377 (Tenn. 1996) . The issue ha s been w aived.

D. Counterfe it Cont rolled Substance I nstruction

The a ppellant contends that the tria l court er red by failing to instruct the jury on the sale of a counte rfe it controlled substance

. He a rgues that the e vidence justifies the instruction beca use a compar ison of t h e s t an dard c ocaine g raph w ith the gr aphs g ener ated by the mass spec trometer
re ve a ls that th e su

bs tanc e s in

thi s c a se we re no t coc a ine . The State c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt did not err by failing to g ive t he ins truction beca use t he sale of a counter feit controlled substance is not a lesser included off

ense of the sale of

a contr olled substance a nd beca u s e t h e evidence did not
war rant the instruc tion. We conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to instruc t the jury on the sale of

a counte rfe it controlled substance

. “I t is the duty of a trial judge to g ive a c omplete cha rg e of the law applica

ble to the fa cts of
a c a se .” State v. Ha

rb iso n, 70 4 S.W. 2d 31 4, 31 9 (T e nn

. 19 86 ). I n oth e r wo rd s, “ a de fe nd ant h a s a constitutional right to a c orre ct and c omplete cha rg e of the law.” State v. T eel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990) . Gene rally , the trial cour t must i nstruct the jury on the rules of law applica

ble to the issues that are fairly

raised by the evidenc e adduc ed at t ri al

. State v. Townes, 56 S.W.3d 30, 36 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p

. 2 0 0 0 ), overr uled on other g rounds by State v. Terr

y , 118 S.W .3d 355 (Tenn. 20 03 ). I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r j ur y ins tr uc tio ns are e rr on e ou s, thi s c ou rt mus t r e vie w t

he c ha rg e in its entirety

and invalidate the char g e only if, when rea d as a whole, it f ails to fairly

submit t he leg al issues or misleads the jury as to the applica

ble law. State v. Va

nn, 976 S.W .2d 93, 101 (Tenn. 1998)

. The a ppellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt should have instructe d the jury on the s al e of a counter feit controlled substanc e bec ause the g raphs introduc ed into e vidence at trial show that the substances a lleg ed to ha

ve been sold w ere not c ocaine

. Howeve r, as noted previously , the appe llant failed to include the g raphs in the recor d on appea l. I n any event, the a

ppellant was not indicted f or the sale of

a counte rfe it control l ed s u b s t an ce, a nd he ac knowledg es that it is not a lesser include d offe nse of the c harg ed offense, sale of a controlled substance. There fore , the trial cour t did not err-12-

by failing to give the instruction to the jury

.
E. Fa cilitation I nstruction

The a ppellant also conte nds that the trial cour t erre d by

failing to instruc t t h e jury on fac ilitation as a lesser included offe nse of the charg ed offenses. The S tate conte nds that the appe llant waived the issue beca

use he did not re quest a fa cilitation inst ruction at trial and fa iled to raise the issue in his mot ion for new trial. The State a lso argues that t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fa ilure to instruct on fac ilitation does not rise to the l evel of plain err or because the evidenc e established that the appe llant sold cr ac k co ca i n e to Kim Pi erc e and, the ref ore, c onsideration of the err or is not nece ssary to do
su bs tanti a l ju sti c e . We a g re e that th e a pp e lla nt has wai ve d th e iss ue and that he is n ot e nti tle d to plain err or re lief.

As no te d by the State , th e a pp e lla nt f a ile d to re qu e st a

fa c ili tatio n in str

uc tio n at tr ia l. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-18-110(c ) provides that a par ty ’s failure to reque st in writing an instruction on a lesse r included offe nse results in a waiver of the issue on a

ppeal. F urthermor e, our supre me cour

t has co n cl u d ed that “the wa iver of a lesser- included off

ense f or purpose s of plenar y appellate revie w is constitutionally permissible.” State v. Pag e, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tenn. 2006). Ne verthe less, the cour t stated that appe llate cour ts may revie w the issue under the plain er ror doctrine. I d. at 230.

Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proc edure 52(b) provides that this c ourt may addre ss “[a]n error which has a ffe cted the substantial r ights of a n acc used . .

. at any time, e ven though not r aised in the motion for a new

trial . . . wher e nece ssary

to do substantial just ice.” See also Te nn. R. Evid. 103(d). We m ay on ly c on sid e r a

n is su e a s p la in e rr or

wh e n a ll f

ive of the fo llo wi ngfa c tor s a

re me t: (a ) t he re c or d mu st c le arl y

e sta bli sh wh a t oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ourt ; (b) a clea r and unequivocal rule of law must have been br eac hed; (c ) a substantial rig ht of the ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) t h e ac cu s ed did not waive the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e ) consideration of the err or is “nec essar y to do substantial just ice.”

State v. Ad

kis so n, 89 9 S.W. 2d 62 6, 64 1- 42 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ) ( fo otn ote s o mitte d) ; se e a lso State v. Smith, 24 S.W. 3d 27 4, 28 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) (a do pti ng the Ad kis so n tes t for

de te rm ini ngpla in
err or). F urthermor e, the “ ‘“pla in error ” must be of such a gr eat magnitude that it probably chang ed the outcome of the trial.’” Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642 (quoting United States v. Ker ley , 838 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 1988)). “ I n applying the lesser- included off ense doc trine, three questions arise: (1 ) whe the r a

n o ff e ns e is a les se r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e ; ( 2) wh e the r t

he e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a lesser- included off

ense instruc tion; an d (3 ) whether an instructional e rror is harmless.” State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tenn. 2002).

Fa cilitation is a lesser included of fense of the c harg ed off

en s es u nder the Bur

ns test, part (c) (1). See State v. Bur

ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 466-67 (Tenn. 1999). We must now determine whether-13-

the evidenc e supports an ins truction on fac ilitation. Facilitation of a fe lony occur s when a

defe ndant knows that “a

nother i n t en d s to commit a specific f elony ” and “ knowing ly

furnishes substantial assistance ” i n co m m itting that fe lony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-403(a ) (a lso directing that the fac ilitating def

en d an t is one who lac ks “the intent re quired for criminal re sponsibili ty ”). The evidenc e in the re cord be fore us shows that on J anuar y 18 , 2 006, Kim Pierce te lephoned the appellant. She spoke with Tasha a nd told Tasha that she wanted to buy eig hty dollars worth of c rac k
c oc a ine . T a sh a

tol d Pi e rc e tha

t th e a pp e lla nt w a s o n h is w ay . Wh e n th e a pp e lla nt d id n ot a

rr ive in a timely manner , Pierce telephoned a g ain and spoke with him. The appellant a rrived in a

g ree n Thun de rb ir d, and I nv e sti g a tor L ang fo rd saw Pi e rc e a

pp ro a c h th e a

pp e lla nt’ s c ar a nd g ive him e ig hty dollars i n exchang e for

cra ck coc aine. On January 25, 2006, Pierce telephoned the appellant, spoke with him, and told him that she wa nted t o buy

another eig hty dollars worth of c rac k coca ine. Off icer Thay er w itnessed the appe llant arrive driving a re d Do dg e Ne on. He sa w Pierce approa ch the ap p el l an t ’s ca r an d s aw P i er ce gi v e t h e m o n ey t o t h e ap p el l an ti nex ch an ge f o r c o ca i n e. Al t h o u gh the def ense the orized that the appe llant merely delivere d the drug s to Pi er ce for Ta sha, “[t] he evidenc e, not the theor ies of the pa rties, controls whe ther a

n instruction i s re q u i re d

. ” Allen, 69 S.W. 3d a t 188. B a se d on th e e vid e nc e in t he re c or d f

or our r e vie w, we c on c lud e that th e pr oo f d id not support an instruction on fac ilitation.

F. Improper Closing Statement

The a ppellant claims that the prose cutor made an im proper statement duringclosing
argume nts . The a

pp e lla nt a c kn ow le dg e s th a t w hil e the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt d oe s n ot c on sti tut e re ve rs ibl e e rr or , th e c omm e nt, a lon g wi th t he oth e r e rr or s th a t oc c ur re d, wa rr ants a re ve rs a l of

his
c on vic tio ns . T he State c on te nd s th a t th e pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt, wh ile imp ro pe r, wa s n ot p re jud ic ia l. We conclude that the appellant is not entitled to relief

.
Dur in g t he Sta

te ’s c los ingargume nt, the pr os e c uto r r e fe rr e d to de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s c ro sse xami na tio n of Ag e nt Parm e nte r and state d that de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s “ tr yingto c on fu se y ou

wi th s ome numbers.” D efe nse counse l objected, a nd the trial cour

t sustained the objection. The prosec utor apolog ized, and the State’s closingargument resumed.

I t is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d that c los ing argume nt i s an im po rt ant t oo l f

or bo th p art ie s d

ur inga tr ia l; thus, c ounsel is g ener ally g iven wide latitude during closing argument, and the tria l court is g rante d wide dis cre tion in controlling closing arguments. See S tate v. Carr uthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 577-78 (Tenn. 2000) (appe ndix ). “N otwithstanding such, a rguments must b e t em p erate, base d upon the evidenc e introduce d at trial, re levant to the issues beingtried, and not othe rwise imprope r under the fac ts or law.” S t at e v

. Go ltz , 111 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) . “The prosec ution is not pe rm itt e d to re fl e c t un fa

vo ra bly up on de fe ns e c ouns e l or the tr ia l ta c tic s e mpl oy e d duri ng the c ours e of the tr ia l.” State v. Ga

rn e r D wi g ht P a dg e tt, No . M 20 03 -0 05 42 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 4 T e nn . Cr im. App. L EXI S 938, at *34 (Nashville, Oc t. 21, 2004).

“ I n de te rm ini ng wh e the r state me nts ma de in c los ingargume nt c on sti tut e re ve rs ibl e e rr or , it is n e c e ssa ry to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he state me nts we re imp ro pe r a nd , if so , w he the r t

he imp ro pr ie ty-14-

a f f e c t e d th e v e r d i c t

. ” S t a t e v

. P u l l i a m , 9 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 3 6 0 , 3 6 7 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 6 )

. In
c onne c tio n w iththi s is su e , w e mus t e xami ne the fo llo wi ngfa c tor s:

(1) the c onduct complained of viewed in co ntext and in light of the fa c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he c a se [;] (2) the cu ra t i ve mea sures unde rtake n by the cour

t and the pr os e c uti on [;] (3 ) t he int e nt o f t

he pr os e c uto r i n ma

kin g the state me nt[; ] (4) the cumulative effec t of t he im proper conduct a nd any other e rror s in the rec ord[; and] (5) the r elative stre ng th or wea kness of the c ase.

I d. at 368 (quoting J udg e v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976)). Turning to the instant case, the prosec utor’s comment wa s brief, a nd there is no evidenc e he intended to unduly

prejudice the appe llant by his remar ks. Moreove r, althoug h the trial court g ave no curative instruction to the jury , the appe llant did not ask for an instruc tion. W e have found no other e rror s, and, base d upon the re cord on a ppeal, the State’ s case wa s s t ro ng . There fore , we conclude that the appe llant is not entit led to relief

. G. Recusa l

Ne xt, th e a

pp e lla nt c la ims tha

t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by fa ili ngto r e c us e its e lf fr om t he c a se beca use the trial judg e wa s a member of the F irst Me thodist C hurch. The appellant a lleg es that the trial judg e, ther efor e, had “ inside information reg ardingcruc ial evidenc e in t his cause” that require d him to recuse himself sua sponte. The State argues that the appellant waived this issue beca use he failed to objec t pretrial or at t rial and that, in any

event, nothingin the rec ord indicate s that the trial judge had any

persona l knowledg e about the di sputed fac ts, that his impartiality was que stionable, or that he e x hibited any

persona l bias or pre

judice. We conc lude that t h e ap pellant is not entitled to relief.

The a ppellant first ra ised this issue in his motion for new trial. At the hea ring on the motion, the tr ia l ju dg e state d, “ Iam a me mbe r o f F ir st M e tho dis t Chur c h. Th is of fe ns e wa s not a

n o ff e ns e ag ainst the churc h. Irea lly see no r eason f

or me to rec use my self and no reque st w as made and I see no prejudice at all.” The appellant a rgues on appe al that re cusal wa s nece ssary beca use the jud ge made immediate r

ulings in fa

vor of the State w ithout requiring the State to lay the prope r fo u n dations. As an example, he c ontends that during Offic er Tha y er’ s direct testimony , the trial court a llowed Off

icer Thay er to testify , over the appellant’ s objection and without any foundation, about his persona l knowledg e that the c hurch ope rate d a pre school or daycar e.-15-

“A judg e shall disqualify

himself . . . in a proc eedingin which the judg e’s impar tiality might
re a so na bly be qu e sti on e d. ” Te nn . Su p. Ct. R. 1 0, Cano n 3 E( 1) . “ [A] tr ia l ju dg e shou ld g ra nt a
rec usal whene ver the judge has any doubts a bout his or her ability

to preside impar

tially .” Alley

v. State, 882 S.W .2d 810, 820 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Howe ver, r ecusa l also is necessa ry “whe n a person of ordinary pru dence in the judge ’s position, knowing a ll of the fac ts known to the judge , would find a re asonable basis for que stioning the judg e’s impartiality .” I d. This objective standa rd “‘takes into acc ount that disqualification is require d if there is an appe ara nce of p ar t i ali ty

to the
rea sonabl e observe r, and it pre cludes a judge from avoidingrec usal mere ly by avowinghis or her impartiality .’” State v. Conwa y , 77 S.W .3d 213, 225 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (q u o t ing State v. Connors, 995 S.W .2d 146, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) ); see a lso St ate v. Schief elbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 136-37 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2007). “Adve rse r uli n gs b y a trial c ourt are not usually sufficie nt g rounds to establish bias.” Alley , 882 S.W .2d at 821. T h e “i s s u e to be determined is not the propriety of the judicial c onduct of the trial judge , but whether he committed an e rror

which re sulted in an unjust dis p o s i t i o n of the c ase.” State v. Hurley , 876 S.W .2d 57, 64 (Tenn. 1993) ; State v. B og g s, 93 2 S. W.2 d 4 67 , 4 72 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). A tri a l ju dg e ’s re fu sa l to gra nt a mot ion to
rec use will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standa rd. State v. Raspber

ry , 875 S.W .2d 678, 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. The re cord doe s not r evea l when the appellant lear ned about the judg e’s be ing a member of the c hurch. Although the appellant first raised the issue in his motion for new trial, he doe s not alleg e that he lear

ned about the judge ’s potential conf lict after the trial. The f

ailure to file a

motion to r e c us e pr ior to tr ia l wa ive s the iss ue

. Se e Th omp so n v . St a te , 9 58 S.W. 2d 15 6, 17 2 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1997). I n any event, we ha ve ca ref ully revie wed the tr ial transcr ipt and nothing indicates that the trial cour

t was biased a g ainst the appe llant. There fore , he is not entitled to relief.

H. Cumulative Error s

F ina lly , th e a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e c umu lativ e e ff e c t of the e rr or s in

thi s c a se wa

rr ants
a re ve rs a l of

his c on vic tio ns . We fi nd no me ri t to thi s c la im.

III. Conclusi on

B a se d u po n th e re c or d a

nd the pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ourt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGL E, J UDGE