alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Amendment to Wafer Foundry Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.12.1 
  
 AMENDMENT 
 TO 
 SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING
AGREEMENT 
  
 This Amendment serves to amend
the Wafer Manufacturing Agreement (“Agreement”) originally executed on or about May 1, 2002, by and between Advanced Analogic Technologies, Inc. (“CUSTOMER”) and Hynix Semiconductor Inc, and Hynix Semiconductor America Inc.
(“FOUNDRY”). The parties hereby agree the below terms and conditions are added to and made a part of the Agreement, effective May 1, 2005: 
  
 WHEREAS, since the Effective Date of the Agreement, the Agreement has been assigned from FOUNDRY to MagnaChip Semiconductor Inc. 
  
 WHEREAS, the initial Term of the Agreement is scheduled to expire on May 1,
2005; and 
  
 WHEREAS, both parties desire to amend Section 6.1 of
the Agreement to extend the Term of the Agreement to November 30, 2005; 
  
 NOW THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
  
 Section
6.1 shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
  
 “This Agreement will become effective as of the Effective Date when signed by the parties and will continue in effect until November 30, 2005, unless it is earlier terminated as set forth below. The term of this agreement may be
extended by the written, mutual consent of the Parties at any time prior to the expiration date of this Agreement.” 
  
 All other terms and conditions of the Agreement which are not in conflict with the terms and conditions stated herein shall remain in full force and
effect. 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have caused this
Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized representatives and is effective as of the date first set forth above. 
  

							
	MagnaChip Semiconductor Inc.	 	Advanced Analogic Technologies, Inc.
				
	Signature:	 	 /s/ YOUM HOH

	 	Signature:	 	 /s/ KEVIN D’ANGELO


	Name:	 	YOUM HOH	 	Name:	 	KEVIN D’ANGELO
	Title:	 	PRESIDENT & CEO	 	Title:	 	Vice President
	Date:	 	JULY 20, 2005	 	Date:	 	JULY 21, 2005

  

 1
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Report on Form 10-Q (the "Report") of Del Mar Income
Partners, Ltd. (the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2008, each of the
undersigned, Stephen D. Replin, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Wanda E. Wages, the Secretary and Treasurer of the Company, each hereby
certifies that, to the best of her/his knowledge:

     1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and


     2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated:  August 13, 2008


/s/ Stephen D. Replin                             /s/ Wanda E. Wages
---------------------                             -----------------
 Stephen D. Replin                                Wanda E. Wages
 Chief Executive Officer                          Secretary and Treasurer
(Principal Executive Officer)                    (Principal Financial Officer)
STATE v. GRAHAM.

No. COA05-1223.

North Carolina Court of Appeals.

Filed July 5, 2006.

Certification Date July 25, 2006.

Appeal from Forsyth (03CRS14599, 03CRS56458).

Case without published opinion. No error.
MAYFIELD v. HANNIFIN, et al.

No. 699P05.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 2, 2006.

M. Duane Jones, Jeff Kadis, Charlotte, for Parker Hannifin.

Linda Hartwell, Kathleen Sumner, Greensboro, for Willie Mayfield.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 2nd day of February 2006 by Defendant to Withdraw Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference this the 2nd day of March 2006."
##### 



Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Patrick L. Beach, the President of GP4 Asset Acquisition, LLC, the manager of Captec
Franchise Capital Partners L.P. IV (the Partnership), certify that: (1) The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Partnership for the period ended December 31, 2004
which this certification accompanies fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership. /s/Patrick L. Beach
Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Holt CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE

,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

JAHLIL HO LT

,

Defendant and Appellant. B 3233 11

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. S A 100631 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Lana Kim , Judge. Affirmed.

Evan D. Williams , under appointment by the Court of

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.2 On May 29, 2019, defendant Jahlil Holt (defendant )

entered an AT&T retail store near Los Angeles International

Airport carrying a duffle bag

. 1 H e approached a store cl erk

standing behind the c ounter, displayed a gun, and escorted the

clerk to the breakroom where another store employee was eating

lunch

. At gunpoint, defendant directed the two employees to the

store’s safe room where he ordered them to open the sa f e and fill

the duffle ba g with cellular phones and other products.

D efendant fled the s tore with the loaded duffle bag , and t he

authorities apprehended him shortly thereafter.

Defendant was charged with two co unts of robbery (Pen.

Code, § 211 ). A trial jury found him guilty as charged . T he trial

court placed defendant on probation for three years, including a

condition that he spend a year in county jail.

Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction and

this court appointed counsel to represent him. After examining

the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. On

November 21

, 2023 , this court advised defendant he had 30 days

to personally submit any contentions or issues he wanted us to

co nsider. We received no response.

We have examined the appellate record and are satisfied

defendant ’ s attorney has complied with the responsibilities of

counsel and no arguable issue exists. ( Smith v. Robbins (2000)

1 During the course of the criminal proceedings below,

defendant changed his name to Master Alexandria. To avoid any

confusion at trial, defense counsel proposed that his client be

referred to by his prior name . T he trial court agreed. We adopt

the same convention.3

528 U.S. 259, 278

- 82; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 122

-

24; People v. W

ende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

KIM , J.

LEE, J. *

* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,

assigned by th e Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of

the California Constitution.
Exhibit 32   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002    In connection with the Quarterly Report of Network Dealer Services Holding Corp. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Quarterly Report), we, Joshua A. Griffin, President, and Paul D. Stevens, Chief Financial Officer, Vice President and Treasurer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Registrant.  Date:November 15, 2010By:/s/Joshua A. GriffinJoshua A. Griffin, President  and Director  Date:November 15, 2010By:/s/Paul D. StevensPaul D. Stevens Chief Financial Officer, Vice President,  Treasurer and Director
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

457 KA 11-00432 PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHARLES T. WILLIAMS, ALSO KNOWN AS CHARLES GUS THIGPEN WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

BRIDGET L. FIELD, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATAVIA (WILLIAM G. ZICKL OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Genesee County Court (Robert C. Noonan, J.), rendered September 2, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.06 [5]). As defendant correctly concedes, he failed to preserve for our review his contention that a conflict of interest between the probation officer who prepared the presentence report and a police officer at the scene of the arrest required the preparation of a new presentence report and resentencing ( see CPL 470.05 [2]). We decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). The sentence is not unduly harsh or

severe.

Entered: April 27, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-95,135-01

EX P ARTE JEREMY CHRISTIAN MOF F ITT, Applicant
ON AP P LICATION F OR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 114-0071-21-A IN THE 114TH DISTRICT COURT

F ROM SMITH COUNTY
Per curiam . O P I N I O N Applicant was convicted of evading arrest or detention that caused serious bodily injury and sentenced to twenty y ears’ imprisonment. He f iled this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county o f conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07. Applicant c ontends that he was denied the rig ht to a n appeal because appellate counsel who
was initially appointed to represent him on appeal failed to timely file a notice of appeal. B ased on the r ecord, the trial court has found that Applicant’s rig ht to an appeal was denied because appellate counsel did not take timely steps to secure the n otice o f appeal as required. W e a g ree that Applicant
was denied his rig ht to appeal, but find that it was d ue to a breakdown in the sy stem as opposed to2

the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Relief is granted. Ex parte Riley , 193 S.W .3d 900 (Tex
. Crim. App. 2003). Applicant may file an out-of-time appeal of him conviction in cause number 114-0071-21 from the 114th District Court of Smith County
. W ithin ten d ay s from the date of this Court’s mandate, the trial court shall determine whether Applicant is i n d i gent. I f Applicant is indig ent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent h im o n d i r e c t appeal. Should Applicant decide to appeal, he must file a written notice of appeal in the trial court within thirty day s from the date of this Court’s mandate. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the T e x as Dep a r t m e nt o f C r i m i n a l Ju s t ice–Correctional Institutions Division and the B oard of Pardons and Paroles.

Delivered: F ebruary 14, 2024 Do not publish
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO QUARTERLY REPORT OF

POSTER FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Landrys Restaurants, Inc. (the
Company), does hereby certify [, to such officers knowledge,] that:



The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 (the Form 10-Q) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Form 10-Q.



Date: November 14, 2005



/s/ Tilman J. FertittaTilman J. Fertitta Chairman of the Board, President
and Chief Executive Officer/s/ Rick H. LiemRick H. Liem Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer




[The foregoing certification
is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q pursuant to Item 601 (b)(32) of Regulation S-K and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Sections 1350, Chapter 63 of the Title 18, United
States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before
or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.]
##### 



EXHIBIT (31.2)
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
RULE 13a/15d OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form
10-Q of Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc.
(registrant);2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements,
and other financial information included in this
report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I
are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and have:
 (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and
procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report
is being prepared;(b)
    
    (omitted pursuant to SEC Release No. 33-8238);(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in
this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
end of the period covered by this report based on
such evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal
quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I
have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrants auditors and the audit committee of the
registrants Board of Directors (or persons performing
the equivalent functions):
 (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrants ability
to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.
  /s/ Lloyd R. SorensonLloyd R. SorensonExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
(September 9, 2005)

#### In the Matter of Alexander L. Katagas et al., Appellants, v Carole Berman et al., Respondents, and Independence Party County Committee of Nassau County et al., Respondents, and Michael Camardi, Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of James L. Kapsis, Appellant, v Carole Berman et al., Respondents, and Independence Party County Committee of Nassau County et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[800 NYS2d 519]

In two related proceedings, inter alia, pursuant to Election Law § 16-102 (1) to invalidate the October 4, 2004 organizational meeting of the Independence Party County Committee of Nassau County, Alexander L. Katagas, Harry G. Kapralos, James L. Kapsis, and Michael Camardi appeal from an amended final order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (LaCava, J.), dated September 6, 2005, which denied the petitions and dismissed the proceedings.

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notices of appeal from a final order of the same court dated August 31, 2005, are deemed to be premature notices of appeal from the amended final order dated September 6, 2005 *(see*CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the amended final order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof denying so much of the petition in proceeding No. 1 as was asserted by Harry G. Kapralos and denying the petition in proceeding No. 2; as so modified, the amended final order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, so much of the petition in proceeding No. 1 as was asserted by Harry G. Kapralos is reinstated, the petition in proceeding No. 2 is reinstated, the final order dated August 31, 2005, is modified accordingly, and the matters are remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings on the petitions.

*914The claim of “over-designation” relating to the designating petitions of the appellants Harry G. Kapralos and James L. Kapsis that placed them on the ballot for the September 2004 primary election leading to their election as committee members of the Independence Party County Committee of Nassau County (hereinafter the County Committee) is time-barred *(see*Election Law § 6-134 [3]; §§ 6-154, 16-102; CPLR 404 [a]; *Matter of Lichtman v Board of Elections of Nassau County,*27 NY2d 62 [1970]; *Matter of Cerreto v Sunderland,*307 AD2d 1004 [2003]; *Matter of Keal v Board of Elections of State of N.Y.,*164 AD2d 962 [1990]). Therefore, Kapralos and Kapsis have standing as County Committee members to challenge the validity of the subject organizational meeting of the County Committee *(see generally Matter of Graziano v County of Albany,*3 NY3d 475 [2004]; *see also Matter of Klein v Garfinkle,*12 AD3d 604 [2004]). Upon this record, it does not appear that the appellants Alexander L. Katagas and Michael Camardi were members of that County Committee. Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Rivera and Spolzino, JJ., concur.
July 15 , 2014



### JUDGMENT


## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

EDUARDO ENCARNACION ASCENCIO , Appellant

NO. 14

- 14

- 00266

- CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________ This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. The record indicates that the appeal should be DISMISSED. The Court orders the

ap peal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion.

We further order appellant pay all costs expended in the appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1816

_____________________________

AMBER JOSEPH,

Appellant,

v.

JAX ANESTHESIA PROVIDERS,

LLC., a Florida Profit 

Corporation, JOHN THOMPSON,

Appellees.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Eric C. Roberson, Judge.

September 11, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Andrew Michael Bonderud of The Bonderud Law Firm, P.A., 

Jacksonville; Kristopher M. Nowicki of the Law Office of Nooney 

& Roberts, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Dinah S. Stein, Aneta A. Kozub, and Mark Hicks of Hicks, Porter, 

Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami; Tyler E. Batteese and Brendan W. 

Rowe of Josepher & Batteese, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gary Nau, Appellant.

[800 NYS2d 584]

Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from an order of the County Court, Nassau County (LaPera, J.), entered April 13, 2004, which denied, without a hearing, his motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of the same court (Kowtna, J.), rendered May 18, 1999, convicting him of falsely reporting an incident in the first degree (two counts) and falsely reporting an incident in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and arson in the third degree, upon a separate jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Nassau County, for a hearing and a new determination on the motion.

The defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. In support of the motion to vacate the judgment, the defendant submitted evidence which did not appear in the record on the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction. In fact, the County Court itself acknowledged that many of the issues on the motion could not have been raised on direct appeal from the judgment. In particular, the presentence report indicated that the defendant suffers from an impulse disorder and is incapable of controlling his behavior. Based upon this evidence, the defendant contends that his trial counsel should have called an expert psychiatric witness, pursuant to CPL 60.55, to explain that the defendant’s “organic mental disorder,” inter alia, prevented him from formulating the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged, *569and supplied the basis for asserting the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect *(see*Penal Law § 40.15).

As the defendant set forth facts which did not appear in the record on direct appeal which, if established, could entitle the defendant to the relief sought, and since the failure to investigate or call exculpatory witnesses may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel *(see People v Bussey,*6 AD3d 621, 623 [2004], *lv denied 4*NY3d 828 [2005]; *People v Fogle,*307 AD2d 299, 301 [2003]; *People v Jones,*65 AD2d 802 [1978]), the County Court erred in denying the motion without first conducting an evidentiary hearing *(see*CPL 440.10; *People v Castaneda,*189 AD2d 890, 891 [1993]; *People v Liggins,*181 AD2d 916 [1992]; *People v Hughes,*181 AD2d 912, 913 [1992]; *see also People v Ferreras,*70 NY2d 630, 631 [1987]). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the County Court, Nassau County, for that purpose and for a new determination on the motion. Santucci, J.P., Luciano, Crane and Skelos, JJ., concur.