FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-3132

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KENYA J. WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

November 6, 2018

B.L. THOMAS, C.J. 

In this Anders1 appeal, Appellant was charged with first 

degree murder, attempted armed robbery with a firearm, armed 

robbery with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, all arising out of an incident that occurred in the early 

morning hours of March 22, 2015. We affirm.

At trial, the State presented evidence that on the night of the 

incident, Michael Williams (the victim) went to Club Karma with 

two cousins, where they sat talking in the car outside the club. 

One cousin soon left to talk to a nearby friend, leaving the victim

and his other cousin, Ambernesia President, in the car. Suddenly

 1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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a man with a gun opened the front door of the car, and another 

man opened the rear door and told the victim to “give it up.” The 

men started robbing them, but the victim laughed as though it 

were not serious. The man at the front door told the other man to 

“handle that” and walked toward the rear of the car; one or both 

men then shot and killed the victim. Ms. President ran to find 

her other cousin, and they drove off and called 911. 

Ms. President later identified Appellant in a photographic lineup 

as the man who opened the rear door of the car, which was 

admitted into evidence over defense counsel’s motion to suppress. 

Ms. President also identified Appellant in court. 

A few hours after the shooting, a man approached two 

women and asked if he could use their phone. The man was 

sweaty and covered in grass. He told the women he had been in 

an altercation at Club Karma and that “some guys at the club 

jumped me. I went home, got my gun, I unloaded my whole clip 

in their [expletive].” The man told the women that his mother 

had a house on Apalachee Ridge and that his girlfriend lived on 

Keith Street. He borrowed a phone and made a few calls. At 

some point, one of the women received a call from the victim’s 

family friend, and the man ran away. The women called 911, and 

police apprehended Appellant based on the 911 description. A 

police officer drove one of the women to where Appellant was 

detained, and she identified Appellant as the man who borrowed 

her phone. At trial, she was shown a photograph of shoes and 

testified that the shoes in the photograph were the same shoes as 

those worn by the man who borrowed the phone. The trial court 

overruled defense counsel’s objection to the witness being shown 

the photo before identifying Appellant.

Appellant’s former girlfriend testified that a few hours before 

the incident, she and Appellant were drinking and smoking drugs

at her house. She testified that at some point during the night, 

she left Appellant at her home with a man whom police later 

identified on the Club Karma surveillance video. She testified 

that when she returned home, she got into an argument with 

Appellant, and he took her phone; she then threatened to call the 

police for taking her phone. The State asked, “Weren’t you 

threatening to call the police because you knew he had the gun 

that he just used to empty a clip in someone at Club Karma?” 
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She denied that assertion, as well as the State’s question about

whether she initially told police that Appellant left the house 

between 2:00 and 4:00 am, and that she had not seen him since. 

She admitted that she had been convicted eight times for crimes 

of dishonesty. The trial court then admitted, over defense 

counsel’s relevance objection, jail visitation logs revealing that 

Appellant’s former girlfriend had visited Appellant eighty times 

while he was in jail. 

Several police and forensic witnesses testified about the 

crime and about evidence recovered at the crime scene. Russell 

Huston, a former investigator with the Tallahassee Police 

Department, testified that he interviewed Appellant and that 

Appellant understood his rights and signed a form indicating his 

desire to speak to police. Appellant admitted to police that he 

told the women on the porch that he had been involved in a 

shoot-out at Club Karma, but claimed to have fabricated the 

story, because he did not want to tell them about the argument 

with his girlfriend. When asked whether his timeline of the 

events remained consistent, defense counsel objected on the 

grounds that the question called for a legal conclusion.

At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for 

judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State relied on one or two 

eyewitnesses and that there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence 

tying Appellant to the crime. The trial court denied the motion. 

The jury found Appellant guilty as charged, finding as to the first 

degree murder charge that guilt had been established by felony 

murder. 

Analysis

“[T]here are circumstances where a court-appointed 

appellate counsel will, ‘after a conscientious examination,’ find 

their client’s case to be ‘wholly frivolous.’” Redmon v. State, 211 

So. 3d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 

744). In such cases, counsel must “submit ‘a brief referring to 

anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.’” 

Id. In Redmon, the Anders requirements were met, as counsel 

outlined the facts and procedural history of the case, noted raised 
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objections, provided clear citations to the record, and identified 

possible issues with citations to appropriate legal authority. Id.

Like the counsel in Redmon, appellate counsel here gave a 

thorough description of the facts and procedural history, 

identified potential issues, and cited relevant authority for each 

issue to explain why no reversible error exists. We thus hold that 

appellate counsel satisfied the requirements established in 

Anders. We affirm without discussion those issues where there is

no feasible basis for reversal. As to the remaining issues, after 

reviewing the merit of the issues identified by appellate counsel,

and conducting an independent review of the record, we find no 

basis for reversal, and affirm for the reasons set forth below. 

As to the State’s peremptory strike of an African-American 

man from the venire, when a peremptory strike is used on a 

member of a distinct racial group to which the defendant belongs, 

and the opposing party requests a reason for the peremptory 

strike, the court must ask for a reason and the party must 

provide a race-neutral explanation. Melbourne v. State, 679 

So. 2d 759, 765 (Fla. 1996). If the explanation is facially raceneutral and the court believes it is not pretextual, the strike will 

be sustained. Id. Here, because the State cited the potential 

juror’s criminal record and noted specific instances where the 

potential juror failed to respond to questions or pay attention, we 

find no abuse of discretion in granting the peremptory strike. 

Regarding the trial court denying defense counsel’s cause 

challenge, “[w]here a defendant seeks reversal based on a claim 

that he was wrongfully forced to exhaust his peremptory 

challenges, he initially must identify a specific juror whom he 

otherwise would have struck peremptorily.” Trotter v. State, 576 

So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990). As Appellant accepted the jury, he 

has no basis to appeal this issue. See id.; Couch v. Dunn Ave. 

Shell, Inc., 803 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 

Regarding the photographic line-up, the test for admissibility 

of an out-of-court identification is: “(1) did the police employ any 

unnecessarily suggestive procedure in obtaining an out-of-court 

identification; (2) if so, considering all the circumstances, did the 

suggestive procedure give rise to a substantial likelihood of 
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irreparable misidentification.” Willis v. State, 242 So. 3d 1195,

1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); see also Pierre v. State, 990 So. 2d 565, 

570 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that a detective “correctly told 

the victim and the victim’s mother to focus on faces, not 

hairstyles, because hairstyles may change”). 

We conclude that instructing Ms. President not to focus on 

hairstyle or facial hair before showing her the photo lineup did

not render the procedure unduly suggestive. Ms. President

insisted that she was certain of her identification, and she 

testified that no one suggested in any way that she should pick a 

particular photo. The officer testified that he did not even 

prepare the lineup, he only presented it, and the trial court noted

that the photographs were taken on a different date than when it 

was shown to Ms. President. This procedure was not unduly 

suggestive. 

As to the State showing a photograph to a witness before the 

witness’s in-court identification, “a witness may not testify to a 

matter unless evidence is introduced which is sufficient to 

support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 

matter.” § 90.604, Fla. Stat. Here, in identifying the shoes worn 

by Appellant, the State showed the witness a photograph of shoes 

worn by a person in ankle chains, showing the person’s legs up to 

the shins. Because the witness had personal knowledge of the 

shoes, she could properly testify about the photograph. Although 

the witness had not yet identified Appellant, the photograph did 

not taint her later identification, as it did not show a person’s 

face. 

Moreover, if the court erred, such error would be harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 

1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). The witness’s identification of the shoes 

that Appellant was wearing, when he asked to borrow her phone,

merely corroborated evidence that Appellant was the man who 

spoke to her on the porch. Appellant’s identification was 

supported by the witness’s in-court identification of Appellant as 

the man she met, by phone records, by out-of-court 

identifications, and by Appellant’s own statement to police. 
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No reversible error occurred when the State asked 

Mr. Huston if his timeline remained consistent. Lay witnesses 

must confine their testimony to facts and may not give opinions 

and conclusions. Thomas v. State, 317 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1975). The State’s question asked for a factual response, 

not an opinion: Whether Mr. Huston modified his own created

timeline upon receiving new information. It remained for the 

jury to determine the timeline of events, and the State’s question 

did not usurp that determination.

As to the jail visitation log, defense counsel admitted that 

the evidence fell within the business records exception to

hearsay, but argued that the evidence was irrelevant and that 

the State was improperly impeaching its own witness. A party 

may impeach its own witness with evidence of bias, if there is a 

foundation for bias. Gosciminski v. State, 132 So. 3d 678, 704 

(Fla. 2013). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting this evidence, as Appellant’s former girlfriend’s visits 

to see Appellant in jail were relevant to show that the witness 

was biased.

Finally, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s 

motion for judgment of acquittal. “In reviewing the trial court’s 

ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the task of this 

court is to determine whether the state produced competent 

evidence to support every element of the crime.” Thomas v. 

State, 589 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Appellant was 

identified as the shooter by an eyewitness, and multiple 

witnesses identified him as the person who admitted to recently

“emptying his clip” into someone at Club Karma. Any argument 

regarding the weight of the evidence does not negate the 

competent evidence that was presented as to each element of the 

charged offenses. See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 

2002). We conclude that the trial court correctly denied 

Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 

AFFIRMED. 

MAKAR and WINSOR, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Candice Kaye Brower, Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal 

Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Region One, Gainesville; 

Melissa Joy Ford, Assistant Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal 

Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Region One, Tallahassee, for 

Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.