Filed 6/21/23 P. v. Lopez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CASEY SANCHEZ LOPEZ,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G061504

 (Super. Ct. No. 13NF2674)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Affirmed.

Matthew A. Siroka, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Lynne 
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McGinnis and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

* * *

Casey Sanchez Lopez appeals from the trial court’s postconviction order 

denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1section 1170.95, now 

renumbered as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) As part of the factual basis for 

the guilty plea he entered before his preliminary hearing, Lopez attested under penalty of 

perjury that he harbored “the specific intent to kill” when he “attempt[ed] to murder John 

Doe” on August 3, 2013. A petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing if he 

or she acted with intent to kill. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) While the 

trial court may have misunderstood the record in several ways, including by stating that 

Lopez was the victim’s actual killer, Lopez’s renewed attempt on appeal to avoid the 

legal effect of his inculpatory admission is without merit. We therefore affirm the order 

denying his resentencing petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

An initial complaint filed on August 6, 2013, alleged that three days earlier 

Lopez, his older brother Eric, and Luis Arturo Calderon murdered a John Doe victim with 

malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The complaint included a special circumstances 

allegation that the trio committed the murder for a criminal street gang purpose. (§ 190.2, 

subd. (a)(22).) The complaint also alleged counts for street terrorism (§ 186.22, 

subd. (a)) and conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) to commit murder. The alleged overt acts 

of the conspiracy included that “Defendants retrieved a gun,” “Defendants went looking 

for the victim,” and “Defendants shot the victim three times.” A gang enhancement was 

attached to the conspiracy count (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), and, as pertinent to the Lopez

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All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

brothers, another gang enhancement alleged vicarious discharge of a firearm causing 

death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)) on the murder and conspiracy counts.

A second amended complaint, filed in June 2015, amended the overt acts 

slightly and omitted charges against Calderon; as to Lopez, the complaint alleged the 

same counts. The modified overt acts included that Calderon, the Lopez brothers, and a 

fourth individual “travelled in a vehicle to retrieve a gun,” “Calderon and Casey Lopez 

searched for the victim,” and “Calderon shot the victim.” 

A third amended complaint, filed in December 2015, dropped the murder 

and conspiracy counts, replacing them with an attempted murder count against the Lopez

brothers. The complaint also omitted the gang murder special circumstance allegation 

and added instead a standard gang enhancement to the attempted murder count. The 

complaint otherwise remained the same. 

Lopez pleaded guilty to the third amended complaint. On the Tahl2form he 

submitted to the court in connection with his guilty plea, Lopez declared “everything on 

this form is true and correct.” Lopez executed that form under penalty of perjury. The 

Tahl form included as the factual basis this statement: “In Orange County, California, on 

August 3, 2013 I did unlawfully, and with the specific intent to kill, attempt to murder 

John Doe, a human being.” Lopez also included further factual statements to support the 

vicarious discharge and gang enhancements on the attempted murder count, and to 

support the street terrorism count. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Lopez to 19 years 

in prison. 

In February 2022, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing under 

section 1172.6. In support of his petition, he submitted a declaration stating that he could 

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In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d. 122.
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not “presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made to 

Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” 

The trial court appointed counsel at Lopez’s request. Lopez’s brief in 

support of his petition for resentencing included a request for a full evidentiary hearing 

on his petition; it also added the following details as to the circumstances of his plea: 

Lopez alleged the plea agreement he and his brother “negotiated with the [P]eople” was 

“contingent on their potential truthful testimony in any further proceedings regarding 

Calderon,” but the “People ultimately never sought testimony” from either of them. 

Instead, according to Lopez, while Calderon’s trial date was pending, the 

People filed a second amended information against Calderon charging him with 

voluntary manslaughter and street terrorism (§§ 192, subd. (a); 186.22, subd. (a)).

Calderon pleaded guilty to those charges and admitted to an enhancement for personal 

use of a firearm and a gang enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a); 186.22, subd. (b)). Under 

Calderon’s plea terms, he received a 25-year prison sentence. The factual basis for 

Calderon’s plea included his statement that he “‘unlawfully and without malice killed 

John Doe, a human being, upon a sudden quarrel and heat of passion.’” 

The trial court denied Lopez’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie 

stage of the proceedings, i.e., without a full evidentiary hearing. The court’s minutes 

state that the court concluded Lopez was “ineligible for relief . . . inasmuch as the 

defendant, as part of his plea, admitted to personally killing another human being, 

without malice, and to personally discharging a firearm in connection with the killing. 

As such, he has failed to meet the prima facie standard.” 

DISCUSSION

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 

(2017-2018 Reg. Sess., Senate Bill 1437) to limit the scope of the traditional felony 

murder rule; the new legislation also eliminated the natural and probable consequences 
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theory for murder. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Pursuant to 

Senate Bill 1437, murder liability can no longer be ‘“imposed on a person who [was] not 

the actual killer, [who] did not act with the intent to kill, or [who] was not a major 

participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”’

(Lewis, at p. 959.) Senate Bill 1437 amended the law of murder embodied in sections 

188 and 189 to reflect these changes. (People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 672.) 

Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, 

clarified that the same restrictions now apply to attempted murder and manslaughter, 

such that persons convicted of those offenses “under a theory of felony murder [or] the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons 

convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)

Together the two bills created a procedure through which petitioners 

convicted under the former laws governing murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter 

can seek sentencing relief. (§ 1172.6.) The procedure is available to defendants 

convicted by either a guilty plea or by a trial verdict. (People v. Rivera (2021) 

62 Cal.App.5th 217, 236 (Rivera).) It was Lopez’s burden as the moving party to make a 

prima facie showing in the trial court that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. (Lewis, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.)

Although the trial court’s minute order reflects an evident mistake in 

confusing the factual basis for Calderon’s plea with the plea entered by Lopez, 

respondent invokes the rule that “‘“a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be 

disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.”’” (People v. Zapien

(1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.) It is well-settled that the prima facie determination is a 

question of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) Denial of a section 1172.6 

resentencing petition at the prima facie stage ““‘is appropriate only if the record of 

conviction demonstrates that ‘the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.’”’” 
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(People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) Because this is ““‘a purely legal 

conclusion,’”” our review is de novo. (Ibid.) 

Several legal principles guide our review. Attempted murder “require[s] a 

specific intent to kill” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653), but under the 

former natural and probable consequences theory of attempted murder, a specific intent 

to kill could be imputed from an accomplice (People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 

1001, 1007; see People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259).

Respondent acknowledges that “[h]ad the case gone to trial” on the third 

amended complaint, “the prosecution would not have been precluded from arguing that 

appellant was guilty under a natural and probable consequences theory.” (See, e.g., 

Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 233 [natural and probable consequences doctrine 

need not be separately pleaded].)

As Lewis explained, the record of conviction “will necessarily inform” the 

prima facie inquiry as a means “to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those 

that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) A defendant’s 

admissions in entering a guilty plea “pursuant to a negotiated plea” are not ‘“stray 

comment[s]”’; to the contrary, they are “binding” and part of the record of conviction. 

(People v. Romero (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 145, 153.)

“If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the 

defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. 

Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)

A defendant who acts with the intent to kill is among those expressly 

excluded from the Legislature’s ameliorative changes, including resentencing. (People v. 

Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.)

With the foregoing principles in mind, Lopez’s admission in his plea 

agreement that he harbored an intent to kill the victim precludes resentencing relief

absent some distinction that it was Lopez’s burden to demonstrate. He does not rely on 
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appeal on the unsworn background details suggested in his resentencing brief, such as the 

terms of Calderon’s plea agreement.3

Lopez instead relies on Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 217 and People v. 

Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967 (Eynon). We find those cases are distinguishable. In 

Rivera, the defendant in his plea agreement “made no admissions related to the murder 

other than pleading no contest to the count as charged.” (Rivera, at p. 234.) Because 

there was “no basis on which to infer that Rivera admitted to acting with actual malice,” 

he was not categorically barred at the prima facie stage from resentencing relief. (Id. at

p. 235.)

Similarly, in Eynon, the defendant’s plea statements included: ‘“I agree 

that I did the things that are stated in the charges that I am admitting”’ (Eynon, supra, 

68 Cal.App.5th at p. 971), and that ‘“this was a first-degree murder by virtue of being a 

felony murder; that being murder that occurred during the commission of a robbery”’ (id.

at p. 972). Because the generic manner in which the charge was pleaded did not preclude 

the People from proceeding on theories of felony murder or murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine, and the defendant’s factual admissions did not preclude 

conviction based on either theory (and indeed suggested the former), the defendant 

remained legally eligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. 

(Eynon, at p. 979.)

In contrast, the absence of any factual basis in the record to call into 

question Lopez’s admission that he harbored an intent to kill the victim conclusively 

renders him ineligible for resentencing relief.

3 We do not suggest that doing so would—or would not—have had merit. 

While we note that it has long been held that an aider and abettor may be guilty of a 

greater offense than the direct perpetrator (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 

1120), we express no opinion on whether that principle would have precluded Lopez 

from resentencing relief. Lopez did not raise the issue, and the question is therefore not 

before us.
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DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Lopez’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition 

is affirmed.

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.