[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. School Choice Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati Pub. School Dist., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio5026.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5026

THE STATE EX REL. SCHOOL CHOICE OHIO, INC. v. CINCINNATI PUBLIC 

SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. School Choice Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati Pub. 

School Dist., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5026.] 

Public records—R.C. 149.43—Requestor has clear legal right to access personally 

identifiable information of school district’s students whose parents had 

consented to release of the information—Requestor failed to establish clear 

legal right to compel district to amend its student-information policy—Writ 

of mandamus granted in part and denied in part. 

(No. 2014-0749—Submitted January 26, 2016—Decided July 21, 2016.) 

IN MANDAMUS. 

_____________________ 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} This is a mandamus action in which a company seeks to compel a 

school district to comply with a public-records request. We grant the request for a 

writ of mandamus in part and deny it in part. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Relator, School Choice Ohio, Inc. (“School Choice”), is a private, 

nonprofit corporation that informs Ohio parents about alternative educational 

opportunities for their children, including publicly funded scholarships to attend 

private schools. It provides this information by contacting parents via telephone, 

e-mail, or mail. School Choice obtains the students’ contact information by 

submitting public-records requests to Ohio public school districts. 

{¶ 3} Respondent, Springfield City School District (“Springfield” or “the 

district”),1 is a public school district that includes one preschool, ten elementary 

schools, three middle schools, one high school, and one alternative school. In 

compliance with federal and state law, Springfield maintains extensive educational 

and personal information about its students. Pursuant to federal and state privacy 

laws, Springfield has an official policy in place to safeguard its students’ private 

information. 

{¶ 4} For the 2012-2013 school year, Springfield’s policy provided notice 

that some student information would be designated as “directory information” and 

that prior parental consent to the disclosure of this information would be presumed. 

The policy deemed the following nine categories of student information “directory 

information”: (1) name, (2) address, (3) telephone number(s), (4) date and place of 

birth, (5) participation in officially recognized activities and sports, (6) achievement 

awards or honors, (7) weight and height, if a member of an athletic team, (8) dates 

of attendance, and (9) date of graduation. The policy also informed parents that 

 

1

 School Choice’s claims against the other respondent, Cincinnati Public School District, were 

dismissed after those parties entered into a settlement agreement. 
January Term, 2016 

3

unless they “affirmatively withdr[ew] their consent to release in writing,” the 

district would be free to release the directory information to requesting parties 

without prior written consent. 

{¶ 5} In January 2013, School Choice sent a public-records request to 

Springfield, asking the district to provide information regarding students enrolled 

in the district during the 2012-2013 academic year. The request specifically asked 

for the following information: 

1. Student and Parent’s/Guardian’s Name, 

2. Parent’s/Guardian’s complete address, including e-mail address, 

3. Parent’s/Guardian’s telephone contact information, and 

4. Student’s Grade Level for the 2012-13 School Year. 

Springfield complied with the request in part. In its letter responding to School 

Choice’s request, the district explained that it would release only information that 

its 2012-2013 policy explicitly designated as directory information, which did not 

include students’ grade levels or parents’ personal information. Springfield 

therefore provided to School Choice only the names and addresses of enrolled 

students. 

{¶ 6} For the 2013-2014 school year, the district changed its studentinformation policy. It designated the same nine categories of student information 

as “directory information” but stated that the designation applied only to former 

students and not to current students. For current students, Springfield provided 

parents with a form entitled “Consent for Disclosure of Student Information for 

Superintendent Approved Purposes” (the “consent form”). The consent form listed 

the same nine categories of information that the prior policy had designated as 

“directory information” but identified the list as “personally identifiable 

information.” The consent form informed parents that their written consent was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

now required in order for Springfield to release the student information falling into 

the nine categories. But once given, parental consent would be implied on a 

continuing basis unless the parents affirmatively withdrew their consent in writing. 

Thus, under the updated policy, the same student information was subject to the 

same ongoing release, though the information bore a different label and affirmative 

parental consent was initially required. 

{¶ 7} Additionally, the new consent form specified categories of requesters 

who would be eligible to receive student information. The form provided that 

student information could be subject to disclosure only “for purposes approved by 

the Superintendent or his designee.” It identified two categories of approved 

purposes: (1) school-directed events or activities, such as yearbook publication or 

theater presentations, and (2) “educational, health, service, or other non-profit 

programs which may provide a benefit to the students of the District” that are 

directed in part or in full by third-party “community leaders, community 

organizations, and school-related organizations” approved by the superintendent as 

“partnering” organizations. 

{¶ 8} In October 2013, School Choice sent another public-records request 

to Springfield. This request sought the following information: 

1. Student and parent’s/guardian’s name, 

2. Parent’s/Guardian’s complete address, including email address, 

3. Parent’s/Guardian’s telephone contact information, 

4. Student’s grade level for the 2013-14 school year, and 

5. Student’s school building for the 2013-14 school year. 

In a reply e-mail, without specifying whether it was accepting or rejecting School 

Choice’s request, Springfield attached a copy of the new student-information policy 

that it had adopted for the 2013-2014 school year. After School Choice sent a letter 
January Term, 2016 

5

following up on its request, Springfield eventually articulated in January 2014 that 

it was categorically denying the request based on the new student-information 

policy. But on other occasions during the same school year, the district released 

students’ personally identifiable information to other organizations, including 

Clark State Community College, Springfield Christian Youth Ministries, Global 

Impact STEM Academy, Jostens, Inc., and the Clark County Combined Health 

District. 

{¶ 9} In a May 2014 complaint, amended in October 2014 after the claims 

against Cincinnati Public School District were dismissed, School Choice sought a 

writ of mandamus compelling Springfield to produce the 2013-2014 student 

information requested in October 2013 and to amend Springfield’s studentinformation policy, including the parental notice-and-consent procedure. In the 

first and second counts2

 against Springfield, School Choice asserted that it was 

entitled to the information under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, and 

Student Privacy Act, R.C. 3319.321. In the third count, School Choice asserted 

that it was entitled to the requested relief regarding Springfield’s studentinformation policy pursuant to Ohio’s Student Privacy Act and Public Records Act 

as well as the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. 

1232g. School Choice also requested an award of statutory damages, attorney fees, 

and costs. 

{¶ 10} We issued an alternative writ in December 2014, 140 Ohio St.3d 

1519, 2014-Ohio-5251, 20 N.E.3d 728, and the parties presented evidence, filed 

 

2

 The first, second, and third count against Springfield are counts two, four, and six of the amended 

complaint. The remaining counts relate to the dismissed respondent, Cincinnati Public School 

District, and will not be addressed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

briefs, and gave oral arguments. The cause is now before us for consideration of 

the merits.3

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Access to Student Information through the Public Records Act 

{¶ 11} The first count of the complaint for a writ of mandamus seeks to 

compel Springfield to release under R.C. 149.43 the student information that 

School Choice requested in its 2013-2014 public-records request. “Mandamus is 

the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public 

Records Act.” State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio 

State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, 

¶ 6. Accord R.C. 149.43(C)(1). To be entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling 

the production of public records, a relator must establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that the relator has a clear legal right to the records and that the respondent 

has a clear legal duty to provide them. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 

142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 10. The respondent, in turn, 

has the burden of proving that the records are exempt from disclosure under R.C. 

149.43. State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 

526 N.E.2d 786 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 12} The policy underlying the Public Records Act is that “open 

government serves the public interest and our democratic system.” State ex rel. 

Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 20. 

Therefore, R.C. 149.43 must be construed “liberally in favor of broad access, and 

any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public records.” State ex rel. 

 

3

 Springfield argues for the first time in its merit brief that mandamus is not appropriate here because 

School Choice has named the wrong party and Springfield lacks the capacity to be sued. Civ.R. 

9(A) requires parties to claim lack of capacity by “ ‘specific negative averment,’ ” or else the matter 

is waived. State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 107 Ohio St.3d 347, 2006-Ohio-8, 839 N.E.2d 911, ¶ 30, 

quoting Civ.R. 9(A). Because Springfield failed to raise its lack of capacity in its answers to School 

Choice’s complaint and amended complaint, it has waived the argument and we will not consider 

it. 
January Term, 2016 

7

Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334 

(1996). And exceptions to disclosure must be strictly construed. State ex rel. 

Thomas v. Ohio State Univ., 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 247, 643 N.E.2d 126 (1994). 

{¶ 13} The first step in considering the merits of School Choice’s publicrecords request is to determine whether the information requested meets the 

definition of “public record.” Generally, to constitute a public record, a document 

must be a record and it must be “kept by any public office.” R.C. 149.43(A)(1). 

Springfield is a public office, given that “school district units” are specifically 

enumerated in the statutory definition of public offices. Id. See also State ex rel. 

Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Schools, 123 Ohio St.3d 410, 2009-Ohio-4762, 916 

N.E.2d 1049, ¶ 14. To be a “record,” the personally identifiable student information 

that Springfield maintains must be of a nature that “serves to document the 

organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 

activities of the office.” R.C. 149.011(G). 

{¶ 14} School districts are required by law to collect the personally 

identifiable information of all their students and to compile the information in a 

variety of forms: districts must collect student information, including names and 

addresses, and a variety of data for demographic and funding purposes, R.C. 

3301.0714(D)(1); district superintendents must keep uniform records regarding all 

enrolled students, including names, studies pursued, and standing, R.C. 3319.32; 

and reports of student names, ages, and addresses must be provided to the school 

district board of education, R.C. 3321.12. Because a school district’s maintenance 

of student information is one of its integral functions, the records containing 

personally identifiable student information that Springfield maintains are records 

within the meaning of R.C. 149.011(G). 

{¶ 15} Although school districts are public offices and the records 

containing students’ personally identifiable information are records for purposes of 

R.C. 149.011(G), they are not public records if they fall under one of the exceptions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

enumerated in R.C. 149.43(A)(1), one of which is “[r]ecords the release of which 

is prohibited by state or federal law.” R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). Springfield contends 

that the records containing students’ personally identifiable information are records 

prohibited from release by federal and state law. Specifically, the school district 

asserts that release of the information is prohibited by FERPA and R.C. 3319.321 

and that therefore the information is not a public record. 

{¶ 16} Both the federal and state statutes must be considered. 

A. Prohibition by Federal Law

{¶ 17} FERPA was enacted to protect the privacy rights of students and 

their parents “ ‘by limiting the transferability of their records without their 

consent.’ ” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 295, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 

309 (2002), quoting 120 Cong.Rec. 39858, 39862 (1974). The receipt of federal 

education funds by Ohio’s schools and education agencies, including Springfield, 

is conditioned on their compliance with the privacy provisions of FERPA. State ex 

rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 132 Ohio St.3d 212, 2012-Ohio-2690, 970 

N.E.2d 939, ¶ 19. If FERPA restrictions apply to a particular record, the release of 

the record is prohibited by federal law under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 18} FERPA broadly prohibits the release of education records but 

provides a variety of exceptions to this prohibition. The only exception applicable 

to this dispute is the exception for directory information. Thus, education entities 

may not have “a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records 

(or personally identifiable information contained therein other than directory 

information, * * *) of students without the written consent of their parents.” 

(Emphasis added.) 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1). 

{¶ 19} FERPA defines “directory information” as including the following: 

Student’s name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, 

major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities 
January Term, 2016 

9

and sports, weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of 

attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent 

previous educational agency or institution attended by the student. 

20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(5)(A). 

{¶ 20} Springfield asserts that because it no longer calls its nine categories 

of student information “directory information,” none of the FERPA provisions 

related to directory information apply. This argument is not well taken. While it 

is true that FERPA affords school districts the choice whether to “mak[e] public

directory information” (emphasis added), 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(5)(B), it does not 

afford them discretion to change the categories that fit within the term “directory 

information” as defined in 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(5)(A). See United States ex rel. 

Munoz v. Computer Sys. Inst., Inc., No. 11 C 7899, 2015 WL 4052853, *2 (N.D.Ill. 

June 30, 2015), quoting Electronic Privacy Information Ctr. v. U.S. Dept. of Edn., 

48 F.Supp.3d 1, 20 (D.D.C.2014) (“ ‘Under FERPA, each educational institution 

can choose whether to make the various categories of directory information public 

or not’ ”). 

{¶ 21} A school district may release directory information without 

obtaining parental consent for every request as long as it satisfies three conditions 

provided in 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(5)(B). First, the school district must choose which 

of the eligible categories of directory information to “mak[e] public.” Id. Second, 

the school district must give public notice identifying its chosen categories of 

information and its intended ability to release the information without prior parental 

consent. Id. Third, the school district must allow parents an opportunity to opt out 

by withdrawing their consent. Id. Parental consent is the key to whether 

information can be released without violating FERPA. 

{¶ 22} Application of FERPA’s directory-information exception to this 

case requires consideration of two aspects of Springfield’s notice-and-consent 
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10 

procedure: (1) its initial-consent option and (2) its limitation of disclosure to 

specific parties and for specific purposes. 

1. Parental notice and consent: initial-consent option 

{¶ 23} Under the terms of Springfield’s 2013-2014 policy, the district chose 

to designate nine categories of student information—all of which fit the statutory 

definition of directory information—as subject to release. The district notified 

parents that it intended to disclose the information in response to future requests 

without obtaining additional parental consent at the time of disclosure. But instead 

of presuming parents’ initial consent and allowing them to opt out, the district asked 

parents to give their initial written consent to this process. Springfield’s noticeand-consent procedure thereby satisfied the first two conditions of 20 U.S.C. 

1232g(a)(5)(B) and partially satisfied the third. 

{¶ 24} Because Springfield did not notify parents that their consent would 

be presumed unless they opted out, Springfield would violate FERPA by releasing 

the directory information of any students whose parents had failed to sign the 

consent form. But Springfield would not violate FERPA by releasing personally 

identifiable information of students whose parents had signed the consent form. 

2. Parental notice and consent: specific parties and purposes 

{¶ 25} FERPA’s provisions regarding directory information, 20 U.S.C. 

1232g(a)(5)(A) and (B), identify the information that may be released without 

parental consent, but the provisions are silent regarding the parties who are eligible 

to receive the information. Further guidance, however, is provided in 34 C.F.R. 

99.1 et seq., which “set[s] out requirements for the protection of privacy of parents 

and students” pursuant to FERPA. 34 C.F.R. 99.2. The regulation governing 

directory information, 34 C.F.R. 99.37, provides: 

In its public notice to parents * * *, an educational agency or 

institution may specify that disclosure of directory information will 
January Term, 2016 

11 

be limited to specific parties, for specific purposes, or both. When 

an educational agency or institution specifies that disclosure of 

directory information will be limited to specific parties, for specific 

purposes, or both, the educational agency or institution must limit its 

directory information disclosures to those specified in its public 

notice * * *. 

(Emphasis added.) 34 C.F.R. 99.37(d). 

{¶ 26} Pursuant to this regulation, a school district has the power to adopt 

policies and use consent forms that limit the scope of disclosure to specific parties 

or for specific purposes. But if a district provides such limitations, disclosing 

student-directory information to parties or for purposes that are outside the scope 

of the notice given to parents would violate FERPA. Id. Again, parental notice 

and consent is the key factor. 

{¶ 27} The relevant portion of Springfield’s consent form limits disclosure 

to “community leaders, community organizations, and school-related 

organizations” involved in “educational, health, service, or other non-profit 

programs which may provide a benefit to the students of the District.” Releasing 

student-directory information to parties or for purposes that are outside the scope 

of these limitations would violate FERPA. But as a nonprofit organization whose 

mission is to inform parents about the full range of educational opportunities 

available to students in Ohio, School Choice easily fits the description of a 

community or school-related organization involved in an educational or other 

nonprofit program that could provide a benefit to the students of Springfield. 

Accordingly, given the language in Springfield’s consent form, FERPA would not 

prohibit Springfield’s release of student-directory information to School Choice 

under the foregoing limitation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

{¶ 28} Springfield also argues that the consent form limits its ability to 

disclose student information to “partnering” organizations and “for purposes 

approved by the Superintendent or his designee.” Through this argument, 

Springfield implies that if the superintendent does not want to partner with a 

requesting organization or approve of the purpose involved, it would violate 

FERPA to release student-directory information to that organization. Not so. 

{¶ 29} Allowing the superintendent to make discretionary limitations after

consent has been given does not limit the scope of parental consent. It therefore 

would not violate FERPA for the superintendent to approve any party or purpose, 

as long as disclosure to that party or for that purpose “may provide a benefit to the 

students of the District,” as the consent form requires. Because School Choice fits 

within the limitations specified in Springfield’s consent form and because the 

superintendent cannot create a FERPA prohibition by making post-consent 

discretionary decisions, disclosure of Springfield’s student-directory information 

to School Choice would not be prohibited by FERPA. 

{¶ 30} In sum, after considering the two foregoing aspects of Springfield’s 

parental notice-and-consent procedure, we conclude that FERPA’s directoryinformation exception applies to the information of students whose parents had 

signed the consent form. Release of these students’ information pursuant to 

Springfield’s policy in response to School Choice’s request is not prohibited by 

federal law.4

B. Prohibition by State Law 

{¶ 31} Ohio’s Student Privacy Act, R.C. 3319.321, was enacted to bring the 

state’s public schools into compliance with FERPA. 1987 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 

 

4

 We observe that a portion of School Choice’s 2013-2014 request seeks information that does not 

fall within the nine categories of personally identifiable student information enumerated in 

Springfield’s policy and consent form. Disclosure of this information, being outside the scope of 

20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(5)(A), would violate FERPA, and it is not a public record as defined by R.C. 

149.43(A)(1)(v). 
January Term, 2016 

13 

87-037, at 2-255; see also Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Summary of 1976 

Enactments, January-July, at 87 (summary of Am.S.B. No. 367). 

{¶ 32} The state law bears many similarities to its federal counterpart, and 

although it does not explicitly include many of the detailed requirements present in 

FERPA, it incorporates by implication FERPA’s directory-information provisions. 

See R.C. 3319.321(B)(2)(a). Ohio law’s only prohibition on the release of directory 

information that is in addition to the FERPA prohibitions is found in R.C. 

3319.321(A), which prohibits school districts from releasing directory information 

if it is “for use in a profit-making plan or activity.” R.C. 3319.321(A). 

{¶ 33} The parties do not dispute that School Choice does not intend to use 

the requested information in a profit-making plan or activity. Because the Student 

Privacy Act prohibition against the release of student information for profit-making 

purposes does not apply to School Choice, state law does not prohibit the release 

of the requested information. 

{¶ 34} In the absence of any prohibition on the disclosure under either 

federal or state law, the Public Records Act exception set forth at R.C. 

149.43(A)(1)(v) is inapplicable. Therefore, the personally identifiable information 

of Springfield’s students whose parents had provided written consent is a public 

record subject to disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43. 

II. Access to Student Information through R.C. 3319.321 

{¶ 35} The second count against Springfield in School Choice’s mandamus 

complaint contends that even if R.C. 149.43 were inapplicable, Springfield is 

independently obligated under Ohio’s Student Privacy Act to release any student 

information that it has already provided to other third parties. School Choice 

contends that it has a right to the same 2013-2014 student information that was 

provided to third parties, including Clark State Community College, Springfield 

Christian Youth Ministries, Global Impact STEM Academy, Jostens, Inc., and the 

Clark County Combined Health District. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

{¶ 36} To be entitled to the writ on this basis, School Choice must establish 

that the Student Privacy Act provides School Choice with a clear legal right to the 

requested information, imposes a clear legal duty on Springfield to provide it, and 

does not allow for an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex 

rel. Brown v. Lemmerman, 124 Ohio St.3d 296, 2010-Ohio-137, 921 N.E.2d 1049, 

¶ 9. 

{¶ 37} The Student Privacy Act provides no statutory mechanism for the 

enforcement of its terms, and we have recognized that mandamus is an appropriate 

vehicle to compel compliance. Id. at ¶ 12. In an attempt to establish a clear legal 

right and corresponding duty under the Student Privacy Act, School Choice cites 

the following provision: 

[N]o school district board of education shall impose any restriction 

on the presentation of directory information that it has designated as 

subject to release in accordance with the “Family Educational 

Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,” 88 Stat. 571, 20 U.S.C. 1232q [sic, 

1232g], as amended, to representatives of the armed forces, 

business, industry, charitable institutions, other employers, and 

institutions of higher education unless such restriction is uniformly 

imposed on each of these types of representatives. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 3319.321(B)(2)(a). 

{¶ 38} School Choice contends that this language means that “a school 

district cannot impose any burden on the release of information that qualifies as 

‘directory information’ unless it imposes that same burden on all third parties.” But 

the foregoing provision does not reach all third parties. It applies only to 

“representatives of the armed forces, business, industry, charitable institutions, 
January Term, 2016 

15 

other employers, and institutions of higher education.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 

3319.321(B)(2)(a). 

{¶ 39} The reach of this language can be determined by its plain meaning, 

construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. State ex rel. 

Antonucci v. Youngstown City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio St.3d 564, 565, 

722 N.E.2d 69 (2000). The placement of the term “other employers” in a separate 

clause indicates that it is a catchall provision that supplements the list preceding it. 

See State ex rel. Gyurcsik v. Angelotta, 50 Ohio St.2d 345, 346, 364 N.E.2d 284 

(1977). See also Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 499 

Fed.Appx. 559, 564 (6th Cir.2012), quoting 82 Corpus Juris Secundum, Statutes, 

Section 443, at 572 (“ ‘The presence of a comma separating a modifying clause in 

a statute from the clause immediately preceding it is an indication that the 

modifying clause was intended to modify all the preceding clauses * * *’ ”). 

Accordingly, other than representatives of “institutions of higher education,” the 

statutory provision addresses representatives of employers, including “the armed 

forces, business, industry,” and “charitable institutions.” 

{¶ 40} Even if the language of R.C. 3319.321(B)(2)(a) were ambiguous, the 

legislative history and stated purpose of the language point to the same conclusion. 

When subdivision (B)(2) was added to R.C. 3319.321 in 1987, the preamble stated 

that the purpose of the amendment was to prohibit school districts “from imposing 

any restriction on the presentation of career information to students” and to ensure 

uniform release of student-directory information to entities related to that goal. 

(Emphasis added.) Am.S.B. No. 75, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 151. See also Ohio 

Legislative Service Commission, 1987 Summary of Enactments, January-August, 

at 107-108 (summary of Am.S.B. No. 75) (“restrictions on the presentation of 

career information” must be “uniformly imposed on representatives of the armed 

forces, employers, and institutions of higher education,” and “restrictions on the 

release of student directory information [must] be uniformly imposed on these same 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

types of representatives”). Given the stated purpose behind adding R.C. 

3319.321(B)(2) to the Student Privacy Act, we conclude that the uniformrestriction rule applies only to entities that seek to employ students and to 

institutions of higher education. Neither of these categories applies to School 

Choice; it is not a prospective employer or an institution of higher education, and 

although School Choice promotes the opportunity to learn about education 

institutions, those institutions serve students in grades kindergarten through 12. 

Compare R.C. 3310.03 (the educational-choice scholarship program applies only 

to students in grades kindergarten through 12) with R.C. 3345.12(A)(2) (“higher 

education” refers to colleges and universities). 

{¶ 41} Moreover, School Choice provides no argument to establish that it 

fits within the categories of representatives listed in R.C. 3319.321(B)(2)(a). 

School Choice has the burden of proving its right to the requested relief by clear 

and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-

Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 13. By failing to provide any argument—let alone 

evidence—that it fits within the categories of representatives listed in R.C. 

3319.321(B)(2)(a), School Choice cannot establish that it has a clear legal right to 

student records pursuant to Ohio’s Student Privacy Act. 

{¶ 42} Because School Choice cannot satisfy any element of its mandamus 

claim premised on R.C. 3319.321, we deny the writ with respect to this count. 

III. Amendments to Springfield’s Student-Information Policy 

{¶ 43} In its third count against Springfield, School Choice seeks to compel 

Springfield to amend its student-information policy—i.e., to change its definition 

of “directory information” and to change its notice-and-consent procedure—so that 

its policy requires the disclosure of the requested student information to the 

company. School Choice relies on rights and duties that it purports are provided 

under Ohio’s Public Records Act and Student Privacy Act—and indirectly under 

FERPA. 
January Term, 2016 

17 

{¶ 44} As discussed in our above analysis of School Choice’s second count 

against Springfield, the company has not established a clear legal right to any relief 

under the Student Privacy Act. The appropriate relief under the Public Records Act 

would be the disclosure of records, which we already granted in part with respect 

to School Choice’s first count against Springfield. Finally, as we have explained 

above, neither FERPA nor 34 C.F.R. 99.37(d) require Springfield to allow all third 

parties to access its student-directory information. And FERPA does not convey 

any private rights to third parties like School Choice. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 

287, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (“FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions fail to 

confer enforceable rights”); 34 C.F.R. 99.60 et seq. (FERPA is enforced through 

administrative action). 

{¶ 45} School Choice cannot establish a clear legal right to this separately 

requested relief. We therefore deny the writ with respect to School Choice’s third 

count against Springfield. 

IV. Fees, Damages, and Costs 

{¶ 46} Because we are granting the writ in part and ordering compliance 

with a portion of School Choice’s request pursuant to the Public Records Act, R.C. 

149.43(C)(1) requires an award of $100 for each business day that Springfield 

withheld the information requested, up to a maximum of $1,000. And because 

School Choice complied with the requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1) in bringing its 

action, we are required by R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) to award court costs. Finally, we 

find that Springfield did not provide a timely affirmative or negative response to 

School Choice’s October 2013 public records request and that School Choice is 

entitled to a mandatory award of attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b)(i). See 

State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 138 Ohio St.3d 367, 2014-Ohio-538, 7 N.E.3d 

1136 (“the absence of any response over a two-month period constitutes a violation 

of the ‘obligation in accordance with division (B)’ to respond ‘within a reasonable 

period of time’ per R.C. 149.43(B)(7)” [emphasis sic]). Although it is within our 
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discretion to reduce the statutory damages award pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(a) 

and (b) and to reduce the award of attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c), 

we decline to do so in this case. 

{¶ 47} We therefore grant $1,000 in statutory damages and costs and 

attorney fees associated with School Choice’s mandamus action requesting relief 

pursuant to Ohio’s Public Records Act. School Choice must provide the court with 

a detailed application for reasonable attorney fees and costs to be awarded pursuant 

to R.C. 149.43(C). 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 48} We hold that School Choice has a clear legal right to access the 

personally identifiable information of Springfield’s students whose parents had 

consented to the release of the information. We also hold that School Choice failed 

to establish a clear legal right to compel Springfield to amend its studentinformation policy. 

{¶ 49} Accordingly, we grant in part and deny in part the complaint for a 

writ of mandamus. Springfield is ordered to provide the records requested by 

School Choice that pertain to students whose parents had signed Springfield’s 

consent form and that fall within any of the nine categories of personally 

identifiable information identified in Springfield’s consent form. We award costs, 

statutory damages, and attorney fees, the total amount of which will be determined 

pending School Choice’s itemized application. 

Judgment accordingly. 

PFEIFER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment in an opinion that FRENCH, J., joins. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part in declining to award 

attorney fees. 

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January Term, 2016 

19 

O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 

{¶ 50} I agree with the majority that the personally identifiable information 

of students of the Springfield City School District (“Springfield or “the district”) 

whose parents have provided written consent to disclose that information is a public 

record subject to disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43, that School Choice Ohio, Inc. 

(“School Choice”) failed to prove its mandamus claim premised on R.C. 

3319.321(B)(2)(a), that School Choice did not establish a clear legal right to compel 

Springfield to amend its student information policy, and that School Choice is 

entitled to statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees. However, in my view, the 

reason that R.C. 3319.321(B)(2)(a) does not apply is because it precludes a school 

district board of education from imposing “any restriction on the presentation of 

directory information that it has designated as subject to release in accordance with 

the ‘Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,’ 88 Stat. 571, 20 U.S.C. 

1232q [sic, 1232g], as amended” to representatives of certain entities and 

Springfield had not so designated the information at issue. 

{¶ 51} Instead of following the procedure set forth in 20 U.S.C. 

1232g(a)(5)(B) to make directory information available to the public, i.e., 

designating categories of public directory information, giving public notice of the 

categories of information so designated, and giving parents a reasonable time to opt 

out and inform the district that any or all of the designated information should not 

be released without prior parental consent, Springfield created a policy whereby 

certain categories of student information could, with prior written parental consent, 

be disclosed to third parties “for purposes approved by the Superintendent or his 

designee.” One approved purpose was the release of information to partnering 

“community leaders, community organizations, and school-related organizations” 

involved in “educational, health, service, or other non-profit programs which may 

provide a benefit to the students of the District.” 

{¶ 52} The majority aptly observes that 
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20 

as a nonprofit organization whose mission is to inform parents about 

the full range of educational opportunities available to students in 

Ohio, School Choice easily fits the description of a community or 

school-related organization involved in an educational or other 

nonprofit program that could provide a benefit to the students of 

Springfield. 

Majority opinion at ¶ 27. Nonetheless, the superintendent exercised his discretion 

to deny the request of School Choice for student information even though he 

granted requests made by other entities, such as Clark State Community College, 

Springfield Christian Youth Ministries, Global Impact STEM Academy, the Clark 

County Combined Health District, Jostens, Inc., and the Miami Valley Educational 

Computer Association. 

{¶ 53} “ ‘An abuse of discretion implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable attitude.’ ” State ex rel. Greene v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 121 Ohio St.3d 631, 2009-Ohio-1716, 907 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 12, quoting 

State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio 

St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 238 (1997). 

{¶ 54} Here, the superintendent had no rational basis for treating School 

Choice differently than the entities to which he released student information. 

According to the superintendent, the district had no partnership with School Choice 

whereby it could be certain that School Choice “would include any of the 

opportunities offered by Springfield in the information it disseminated to students” 

or “ensur[e] the accuracy of the information dispensed.” However, the district 

cannot ensure the accuracy of information dispensed to students by any outside 

organization, and the policy created by Springfield focuses on the possible benefit 

to the students from the release of their personal information—not the benefit to 
January Term, 2016 

21 

the district. Accordingly, in my view, the superintendent acted unreasonably and 

abused his discretion when he denied the request of School Choice. 

{¶ 55} Moreover, the superintendent’s release of student information to 

other entities operated as a waiver of the right to claim that the information was 

excepted from disclosure pursuant to the public records law. See State ex rel. 

Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Dupuis, 

98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 22 (“Voluntarily disclosing 

the requested record can waive any right to claim an exemption to disclosure”). 

School Choice is therefore entitled to the student information pursuant to the Public 

Records Act. 

FRENCH, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., David T. Movius, Matthew J. Cavanagh, and 

Mark J. Masterson, for relator. 

Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, Lawrence E. Barbiere, and Scott 

A. Sollmann; and Martin, Browne, Hull & Harper, P.L.L., and Karen W. Osborn, 

for respondent. 

Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., Mark Landes, and Mark H. 

Troutman, urging denial of the writ for amici curiae Ohio School Boards 

Association, Buckeye Association of School Administrators, and Ohio Association 

of School Business Officials. 

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