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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 44574

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHYNNA DAWN NUSE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2017 Opinion No. 54S

Filed: December 14, 2017

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

SUBSTITUTE OPINION

THE COURT’S PRIOR OPINION

DATED OCTOBER 25, 2017,

IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge. 

Order withholding judgment, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

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HUSKEY, Judge

Chynna Dawn Nuse appeals from the district court’s order withholding judgment after a 

jury found her guilty of battery against health care workers. Nuse argues the State’s evidence 

was insufficient to support the verdict. The district court’s order withholding judgment is 

affirmed. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2015, Nuse went to the emergency room complaining of abdominal pain. A doctor 

examined Nuse and ordered a number of tests based on her complaints. The doctor also ordered 

intravenous fluids which began to be administered to Nuse early in her hospital stay. Nuse was 

offered a pain medication, but refused it. The doctor’s examination did not indicate the need to 

take emergency action, so the doctor recommended Nuse be discharged and for her to follow up 

with her primary care doctor. Upset, Nuse told the doctor she thought the doctor did not address 
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Nuse’s pain appropriately and she asked for more testing, which the doctor said was 

unnecessary. Nuse began cursing at the doctor, stood up on the gurney, and the doctor started 

backing out of the room. Nuse then pulled out her IV and flung it at the doctor. While the IV 

itself did not make contact with the doctor, IV fluid made contact with the doctor’s glasses and 

two drops of blood made contact with the doctor’s right cheek. The doctor called for security 

and law enforcement. 

Nuse was charged with battery against health care workers in violation of Idaho Code 

§§ 18-903 and 18-915C. At trial, the jury was instructed that the State had to prove, among other 

elements, that Nuse committed a battery on the doctor “by ripping out her IV and throwing it at 

him, striking him in the face with fluids from the IV line.” The district court further instructed 

the jury that: “Battery is committed when a person actually intentionally and unlawfully touches 

or strikes another person against the will of the other,” mirroring the language from I.C. § 18-

903(b). The jury returned a guilty verdict. The district court entered a withheld judgment and 

placed Nuse on probation for three years. Nuse timely appeals to this Court. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt 

will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 

trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 

elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 

P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. 

App. 1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the 

witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 

684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 

121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 

III.

ANALYSIS

Nuse argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because no 

rational juror could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Nuse touched or struck the 
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doctor. In other words, Nuse contends no juror could find that either the IV fluid made contact 

with the doctor’s glasses or that the two drops of blood made contact with the doctor’s right 

cheek constitute “striking” within the meaning of I.C. §§ 18-903(b) and 18-915C because Nuse 

did not physically touch the doctor. 

Both parties cite to State v. Billings, 137 Idaho 827, 54 P.3d 470 (Ct. App. 2002), for the 

discussion of the criminal state of mind required to commit a battery. However, Billings also 

provides an example of “striking” without a physical touch. In Billings, a defendant, after 

issuing threats, fired a shotgun into the ground immediately next to two men. Id. at 828, 54 P.3d 

at 471. Pellets from the gun ricocheted and struck one of the men in the elbow, throat, and side, 

causing him to bleed. Id. At no point did the defendant physically touch either of the men. 

However, because the jury found the defendant intended the pellets from the gun to strike the 

men and because this Court held the jury’s finding was supported by sufficient evidence, the 

defendant’s battery conviction was upheld. Id. at 830-31, 54 P.3d at 473-74. Though the Court 

did not explicitly base its holding on I.C. § 18-903(b), the fact that the Court repeatedly framed 

the issue using the phrase “would strike [the victim]” is instructive. 

But Billings is not a lone example of the elements of battery being fulfilled by an 

instrument other than physical touch. State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 886, 865 P.2d 972, 977 

(1993). In Townsend, although the jury was instructed as to all the methods by which battery 

could be committed, the Court explicitly stated that “the use of a motor vehicle to intentionally 

strike another occupied motor vehicle may constitute battery.” Id. at 885, 865 P.2d at 976. The 

Court further explained that “the willful use of force or the intentional striking of another person 

which is made criminal by the statute may be committed indirectly through an intervening 

agency which the defendant set in motion.” Id. The Court explicitly held the evidence was 

sufficient to support the battery conviction “based upon Townsend’s use of his pickup truck to 

strike the car which his wife was driving,” thus implicating I.C. § 18-903(b), as opposed to I.C. 

§ 18-903(a). Townsend, 124 Idaho at 887, 865 P.2d at 978.

Here, Nuse committed the “striking” element of battery by literally setting in motion the 

fluid and blood that made contact with the doctor. Like the shotgun pellets from Billings and the 

vehicle from Townsend, the fluid and blood constitute an intervening agency. Although Nuse 

did not physically touch the doctor, Nuse’s act of flinging the IV, which ejected the fluid and 

blood, is an act which a reasonable jury could have found to establish, beyond a reasonable 
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doubt, that Nuse struck the doctor. The testimony concerning Nuse’s actions at trial provided 

substantial evidence for this finding.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The jury’s verdict finding Nuse guilty of battery against health care workers is supported 

by substantial evidence. We affirm the district court’s order withholding judgment. 

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.