IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

March 26, 2024 Session

BRAYLEN BENNETT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 107676 Steven Wayne Sword, Judge

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No. E2022-01746-CCA-R3-PC

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The Petitioner, Braylen Bennett, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, 

arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, that his guilty pleas 

were unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, and that the cumulative effect of trial 

counsel’s deficiencies in performance warrants post-conviction relief. Based on our 

review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Ann C. Short, Knoxville, Tennessee (at hearing and on appeal) and Donald Bosch, 

Knoxville, Tennessee (at hearing), for the appellant, Braylen Bennett.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Abigail H. Rinard, Assistant Attorney 

General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Ta Kisha Fitzgerald, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

This case arises out of the Petitioner’s participation with six other men in a June 26, 

2014 home invasion-robbery that resulted in the shooting death of the homeowner, John 

Huddleston. In October 2014, the Knox County Grand Jury returned an indictment 

06/14/2024
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charging the Petitioner, Melvin King, Roderick Curtis, Dwaine Love, and Charles Byrd 

with twenty-five felony offenses: three counts of aggravated burglary (in concert with two 

or more persons); one count of employing a firearm during the commission of an 

aggravated burglary; two counts of the especially aggravated kidnapping of Jeremiah 

Gilman; two counts of the especially aggravated kidnapping of John Huddleston; eight 

counts of the first degree felony murder of John Huddleston; one count of the aggravated 

assault of Sydney Smith (in concert with two or more persons); two counts of the attempted 

especially aggravated robbery of Daniel Nicely; two counts of the attempted especially 

aggravated robbery of Jeremiah Gilman; one count of aggravated animal cruelty for killing 

a companion animal; and one count of aggravated animal cruelty for seriously injuring a 

companion animal. See State v. King, No. E2016-01043-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2242295 

at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017). The 

other two men involved in the crimes, identified as “BJ” and Brandon Phelps, had not been 

located by the police by the time of Co-Defendant King’s trial. Id. at *3-4. 

On the morning that his trial was scheduled to begin, the Petitioner accepted a plea 

offer from the State that resulted in his pleading guilty to the lesser offense of facilitation 

of first degree felony murder and to the other offenses as charged in the indictment, many 

of which were merged, in exchange for an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee 

Department of Correction (“TDOC”), with the first twenty-five years to be served at 100% 

for an especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and the remaining fifteen years at 30% 

for the facilitation of first degree murder conviction. As a condition of his pleas, the 

Petitioner agreed to be debriefed by the police and to testify truthfully if called as a witness 

at Co-Defendant King’s trial. Co-Defendants Curtis, Love, and Byrd received the same 

plea bargain as the Petitioner, and Co-Defendants Curtis and Byrd ultimately testified for 

the State at Co-Defendant King’s trial. 

According to the stipulated facts recited by the prosecutor at the Petitioner’s guilty 

plea hearing, in the early morning hours of June 26, 2014, Drew Nicely, Sydney Smith, 

Jeremiah Gilman, and Cody Hall were with Mr. Huddleston at Mr. Huddleston’s Knoxville 

home. Mr. Huddleston was in his back bedroom, Mr. Nicely and Ms. Smith were in their 

bedroom, and Mr. Hall and Mr. Gilman were sleeping and/or watching television on the 

sectional sofa in the living room when someone lightly knocked on the door. Believing 

that it was his brother who lived next door, Mr. Gilman got up to answer the door. As he 

was about to open it, the door was forced open and a group of men rushed inside demanding 

to know the location of the “dope.” 

In the chaos that followed, Mr. Gilman was held at gunpoint by one of the intruders, 

while Mr. Hall was held at gunpoint by another. Other intruders rushed through the house 

searching for marijuana. Some of these men forced Mr. Huddleston from his bedroom to 
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the living room, where they sat him in a chair and demanded the “dope.” Others kicked in 

the bedroom door of Mr. Nicely and Ms. Smith, where Co-Defendant King, whom Mr. 

Nicely recognized from an earlier encounter, pointed a gun at Mr. Nicely’s face as he 

demanded to know the location of the drugs. Although not specifically mentioned by the 

prosecutor in the recitation of facts, Mr. Nicely, who rented a room from Mr. Huddleston, 

“sold marijuana from the house and often kept cash and a quantity of marijuana in a small 

safe or in other locations around the house.” Id. at *1. 

In the meantime, Mr. Gilman was complying with the demands of intruders in the 

living room by disconnecting the Xbox from the television and placing it in a backpack. 

At some point, Mr. Huddleston grabbed his own gun and ran down the hall to help Mr. 

Nicely and Ms. Smith. However, instead of shooting the intruders, Mr. Huddleston 

attempted to tackle them. Although he managed to get the intruders away from Mr. Nicely 

and Ms. Smith, he was killed when Co-Defendant King fired multiple gunshots that struck 

him in the arm, midsection, and head. Ms. Smith suffered a gunshot wound to her leg, and 

two pet dogs in the home, a pit bull and a beagle, were both shot, with the pit bull dying 

from his injuries. The police later recovered nine shell casings from the scene, all of which 

came from a recovered .40-caliber handgun that Co-Defendant King admitted he had used 

during the crimes. 

Before the home invasion began, neighbors had called 911 to report the suspicious 

activities of the Petitioner and his co-defendants, who arrived to the neighborhood in CoDefendant King’s car and in the Petitioner’s green Jeep. The pertinent portion of the 

prosecutor’s recitation of facts concerning the 911 calls reads as follows: 

On . . . a street before you get to Valley View [the murder victim’s 

street], neighbors happened to be watching television, and they looked 

outside, and they noticed a Jeep that parked in an apartment complex next to 

their. . . home, and . . . what stood out to them was that they noticed getting 

out of the Jeep three individuals, and they described the individuals as three 

black men. They noticed the driver to get out, along with two other 

individuals from this Jeep. The one person was described as wearing black 

pants and dressed all in black. The other two were described as wearing 

shorts. They described two of the individuals as having backpacks and one 

of the individuals as having a long gun, and this phone call was about 1:50 

a.m. on June 26, 2014.

Across the block on Valley View, there is another apartment complex, 

and there happened to be a lady who just got off of work. She returned home. 

She’s Spanish-speaking. She called 911, asked for a Spanish-speaking call 
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processor. Unfortunately, there was not one available. So her son got on the 

phone and attempted to interpret for her, and what she reported to the 911 

processor was that there was a car - - there was four individuals who was 

[sic] there in the parking lot, walking around, looked suspicious. 

The police, they began to circulate the area, and in circulating the area, 

they are on Whittle Springs Road, because what was lost in the translation 

was it wasn’t . . . Whittle Springs. It was Valley View, but the police thought 

it was Whittle Springs. As the police are looking for this Jeep, a green Jeep, 

the three individuals from the Jeep meet up with the four individuals from 

the car, and they walk up to the victim’s house. 

The prosecutor stated that the proof would show that police officers who were 

already searching for the suspicious individuals reported by neighbors were able to respond 

quickly to Ms. Smith’s 911 call about the home invasion. The prosecutor stated that one 

of the neighbors had reported the tag number of the Petitioner’s green Jeep, and within an 

hour and a half of the crimes, the police located the Petitioner driving the vehicle with CoDefendants Curtis, King and Byrd as passengers. Co-Defendant Curtis had a gunshot 

wound to his arm and gave a statement to police describing how he and his co-defendants 

had gathered with the plan of entering the victim’s house to rob its occupants of their 

marijuana in order “to smoke their marijuana and profit from the marijuana.” CoDefendant Curtis identified all of the co-defendants charged in the indictment as 

participants in the crimes. Co-Defendants Byrd and King also gave statements to police in 

which they identified the Petitioner and the other co-defendants as fellow participants in 

the crimes. In addition, the Petitioner and Co-Defendants King and Curtis talked together 

about the crimes as they were being processed at the Knox County Sheriff’s Office, and an 

inmate by the name of Hurst overheard their conversation. Co-Defendant Love also 

confessed his role in the crimes to a friend and told a coworker that he would have to “go 

away for a long period of time.” 

On March 24, 2016, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction 

relief alleging, among other things, “that the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel 

rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary.” Bennett v. State, No. E2016-02276-

CCA-R9-PC, 2018 WL 585472, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2017). Following the 

appointment of post-conviction counsel, he filed an application for Rule 9 interlocutory 

appeal to this court, which was granted, to address the State’s discovery obligations in a 

post-conviction proceeding. This court

affirm[ed] the post-conviction court’s conclusion that the State has an 

affirmative duty to provide Rule 16 discovery materials within the context of 
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the post-conviction proceeding and reverse[d] and remand[ed] for 

reconsideration the post-conviction court’s holding that Rule 16 discovery 

was not relevant to any issue raised in the initial pro se post-conviction 

petition. 

Id. at *8. 

The Petitioner subsequently filed an amended petition in which he renewed his 

claims of unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas and ineffective assistance of counsel and 

added a claim of cumulative error. An evidentiary hearing was held over various dates in 

2022 and early 2023. Senior trial counsel, a 1998 law school graduate who had founded 

his own law firm and had extensive experience in criminal law, testified that he was 

retained by the Petitioner’s mother to represent the Petitioner. He was assisted by the 

following members of his firm: a former associate attorney (“former associate trial 

counsel”); an attorney who was hired as a replacement at about the same time that former 

associate trial counsel left the firm (“junior trial counsel”); a woman who worked as his 

law clerk during the pendency of the Petitioner’s case but was currently an associate at the 

firm (“law clerk”); George Lambert, a former agent with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation who worked as the firm’s investigator; and Angi Alred, senior trial counsel’s 

paralegal. 

Post-conviction counsel introduced numerous documents as exhibits to the hearing, 

including documents obtained from senior trial counsel’s file of the Petitioner’s case. 

Senior trial counsel identified one of those documents from his file as a summary of the 

Petitioner’s charges, which he believed had been prepared by former associate trial 

counsel. Senior trial counsel testified that it was standard practice in his office for someone 

to prepare a summary of charges at the beginning of a case. From his review of his file, he 

knew that Mr. Lambert debriefed the Petitioner in person within a few days of his firm’s 

being retained, and that former associate trial counsel and junior trial counsel also visited 

the Petitioner at various points. He did not know if anyone took the summary of charges 

on those visits, but he was confident that they would have taken the indictment, explaining 

that it was his firm’s standard practice to review the indictment with each client. 

Senior trial counsel testified that the Petitioner sent an email to his office on 

September 10, 2015, in which he brought up the possibility of pursuing a plea agreement 

for facilitation. He also recalled that he and the prosecutor had some conversations about 

a plea offer but could not remember who initiated them. He had no memory of a fortyeight-year offer; what he recalled was an offer from the State to “plead straight up . . . the 

Counts of the Indictment” with the exception of the felony murder count, which was to be 
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amended to facilitation for an effective sentence of forty years. His recollection was that 

the offer was made the weekend before trial. 

Senior trial counsel identified the Petitioner’s waiver of trial by jury and request for 

acceptance of guilty plea, which the Petitioner signed on September 14, 2015, the day that 

the trial was scheduled to begin. He testified that he and junior trial counsel together met 

with the Petitioner that morning, and that junior trial counsel prepared the handwritten 

portions of the form. When asked to look at pages two and three, on which the indicted 

offenses and sentence ranges were handwritten, he acknowledged the following errors: the 

three counts of aggravated burglary were erroneously listed as Class C felonies with a 

possible range of punishment of three to six years, instead of Class B felonies; an 

aggravated assault was erroneously listed as a Class C rather than a Class B felony; and 

four counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery were erroneously listed as Class A 

felonies. He further acknowledged that the summary of charges prepared by former 

associate trial counsel erroneously listed the aggravated burglaries as Class C felonies, 

erroneously listed the firearm count as having a release eligibility percentage of thirty 

percent, and erroneously listed a thirty percent release eligibility date for all the especially 

aggravated kidnapping counts of the indictment. 

Senior trial counsel’s recollection was that both he and junior trial counsel reviewed 

and explained the waiver of rights with the Petitioner after junior trial counsel prepared it. 

When asked if he noticed the discrepancy between the charges as listed on pages two and 

three of the form and the charges to which the Petitioner pled, he responded that he did not 

recall but that the information was obviously not corrected on the waiver form. He stated 

that his “focus was on the Counts that [the Petitioner] was pleading to at the time”; had he 

noticed the discrepancies, he would have had them corrected. 

When asked what involvement he had in drafting the motion for severance, senior 

trial counsel responded that there were some Bruton issues discussed during a staff 

meeting, and that he either dictated the motion or directed someone else to draft it for his 

review and signature. He then acknowledged that the summary of the charges in the first 

paragraph of the motion was incorrect. He did not believe that former associate trial 

counsel was still employed by his firm at the time that motion was drafted and could not 

recall who prepared the erroneous first paragraph of the motion.

Senior trial counsel could not recall if he accompanied former associate trial counsel 

on various legal visits reflected in the jail log. He explained that he would sometimes sign 

into the jail on his legal visits, but oftentimes he was allowed to bypass security and enter 

without signing in. He specifically recalled that he was not required to sign in when he 

visited the Petitioner on Sunday, September 13, 2015. 
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Senior trial counsel recalled that the “fairly hotly contested” preliminary hearing 

lasted a number of hours and that he was the lead attorney in cross-examining the witnesses. 

He could not remember if any of the witnesses at that hearing specifically identified the 

Petitioner but recalled that one witness identified someone who was tall and matched the 

Petitioner’s description. Senior trial counsel estimated that the Petitioner was 6’3” or 6’4” 

in height. When directed by post-conviction counsel to a portion of the transcript of the 

preliminary hearing, he recalled “highlighting to the court that there was no specific 

eyewitness identification, only general descriptions of African American males.” He also 

recalled that, in arguing that the Petitioner’s case should not be bound over to the grand 

jury, he had highlighted the confusion among the witnesses regarding the number of 

intruders inside the house, the circumstantial nature of the identification of the Petitioner’s 

Jeep, and the lack of credibility of the jailhouse informant. 

Senior trial counsel agreed that the trial court issued its ruling on the Petitioner’s 

motion to sever on May 11, 2015. When asked how he would characterize the trial court’s 

ruling, he responded that he thought it very positive because it prevented the State from 

calling Mr. Hurst as a witness at trial: 

In terms of a trial strategy perspective, I thought the Court’s ruling 

was very positive. Basically, what it left the State was the choice of whether 

to use Mr. Hurst or not use Mr. Hurst. Mr. Hurst’s testimony [and] the video 

were extremely damaging as it related to [the Petitioner]. The video depicted 

[the Petitioner] demonstrating kicking one of the victims. So that was a very 

key point - - that’s my understanding - - to what we were trying to do. So 

we felt we had a win-win. And I thought the Court analyzed the Bruton issue 

very correctly. And it basically forced [the prosecutor] not to call Hurst. So 

we viewed that as a positive. 

Senior trial counsel identified the “Official Forensic Biology Report,” which was 

produced as supplemental discovery by the State on June 2, 2015. When asked whether 

there was any item on that report that created any particular concern, he responded that 

“there was a DNA match as it related to . . . the toboggan that was found at the scene.” He 

agreed that the report reflected that a partial DNA profile was obtained that was a mixture 

of genetic material in which the major contributor matched the Petitioner’s DNA profile. 

He stated that it was concerning because it was new evidence that was “potentially 

inculpating, as it related to [the Petitioner] and his defense.” He said his office reviewed 

and discussed the report but did not file any motions relating to it because the Petitioner’s 

DNA on an item from the crime scene was not surprising. From the beginning, the

Petitioner had admitted to senior trial counsel and his staff that he had been present at the 

crime scene and that he had a weapon: 
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Because, from the very beginning, when [the Petitioner] was 

debriefed, he indicated he was there. He indicated that he had a firearm. The 

911 call puts him there. You’ve reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript. 

The green Jeep was [the Petitioner’s]. Witnesses put him there. The codefendants put him there, in their statements, Byrd, Curtis. 

So, you know, what we were trying to do was separate and mitigate 

[the Petitioner’s] involvement. Whether that . . . was one of the kickers for 

the felony murder - - there were eight Counts of first-degree felony murder, 

et cetera. You know, it - - it wasn’t a positive when you had DNA linking 

your client. But was it a surprise on what we knew or what our theory was 

that would prompt us to go further? No.

Senior trial counsel testified that he discussed the DNA report with the Petitioner 

“at - - some point in time” but could not recall exactly “when or where.” When pressed, 

he repeated that he could not recall when or where but was certain that he had a

conversation with the Petitioner about the DNA results and indicated it was in the context 

of a discussion about the Petitioner’s constantly changing accounts and his repeated 

jailhouse phone calls. He said his office did not interview the Tennessee Bureau of 

Investigation (“TBI”) agent who performed the DNA analysis of the toboggan and did not 

do any legal research regarding the DNA found because they were not “focused on the 

battle of the DNA, but rather, if the State could prove the kickers for the felony murder 

alleged in the indictment.” 

Challenged by post-conviction counsel about the number of visits he had with the 

Petitioner, senior trial counsel repeated that many of his meetings with the Petitioner were 

not reflected in the jail log. He testified that the jail staff was “professionally 

accommodating at times” and, as an example, related that on the Sunday that the prosecutor 

extended the plea offer, he called Chief Tramel1to tell him that he was busy preparing for 

trial but needed to go over a potential plea offer with the Petitioner. He said Chief Tramel 

told him that he would make a phone call and that senior trial counsel should come in 

through the back door. Senior trial counsel then called Co-Defendant Love’s trial counsel 

to tell him that he would have Chief Tramel also “pull [Co-Defendant Love.]” Senior trial 

counsel testified that when he arrived at the jail and walked in the back door, “[the 

Petitioner] was waiting.” 

 

1

 We note that the post-conviction court spelled this individual’s name as “Trammell” in its order 

denying the petition. We use the spelling contained in the transcript. 
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Senior trial counsel acknowledged he did not interview the officers listed on the 

indictment but said that they interviewed every witness the Petitioner “asked [them] to 

interview that [the Petitioner] felt could have had relevant evidence to what was going 

on[,]” and reviewed discovery, which included interrogations, police videos, and 

summaries. He stated that they did not interview the victims who testified at the 

preliminary hearing because they felt that “their testimony was very positive as it related 

to [the Petitioner].” He acknowledged they had not issued any trial subpoenas for defense 

witnesses as of September 7, 2015. He explained that their defense strategy was focused 

on defending against the felony murder charges and attempting to minimize the Petitioner’s 

role in the crimes, and that they did not identify anyone not already on the State’s witness 

list that they thought would be helpful to that reasonable doubt defense. 

Senior trial counsel agreed that none of the victims was able to identify the Petitioner 

and no forensic evidence placed him inside the house. When asked if they investigated the 

possibility of “a suppression issue predicated on the legal justification for the [automobile] 

stop[,]” he responded that they thought of it but decided to file an ultimately unsuccessful 

motion in limine regarding the hearsay statements that led to the stop. He said they were 

aware of a number of 911 calls regarding the Jeep, and it “came on [their] radar” that a 

BOLO had been issued with a tag number provided by an unidentified witness to Knoxville 

Police Department (“KPD”) Officer Kuykendall. Senior trial counsel testified that they 

were concerned that the unidentified tipster would not be subject to cross-examination, and 

therefore were “doing everything [they could] to not have that information brought before 

the jury and allow Kuykendall to testify to hearsay, without the ability to cross-examine 

the declarant.” 

Senior trial counsel conceded that he did not interview Officer Kuykendall and did 

not know if Officer Kuykendall was the actual source of the tag number relayed by the 

citizen informant. He said that in some respects, they were on a fishing expedition. He 

stated that they reviewed all the discovery, including the search warrant and the 

information retrieved from the Petitioner’s cell phone, and he believed that he addressed 

the issue in the motion in limine. When asked if he would have pursued the source of the 

tag number had it “come on [his] radar earlier that in discovery there was specific 

information related to this tag number and how it was obtained,” he replied that he could 

not say at the current time what they would have pursued, but that they filed what they “felt 

was appropriate in terms of the motion to sever, the motion for a 12(d)(2) notification, 

based on the volume of evidence that [they] received, the motion in limine.” 

Asked if he recalled the Petitioner’s having said in a jailhouse phone call that he 

“ran away like a b****,” senior trial counsel testified that he could not recall the specifics 
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of every one of the Petitioner’s jailhouse phone calls, but that the Petitioner’s repeated 

phone calls were of great concern: 

There were a number of jail calls. I was concerned. I asked him to 

quit giving statements on the jailhouse calls to individuals that were not 

covered by the attorney-client privilege. I think at one point he started 

whispering. And I - - because the story was changing so significantly, I think 

we had a memo to the file regarding [the Petitioner’s] potentially testifying 

truthfully. 

So there was a number of calls. And we felt they were extremely 

problematic as to what he was saying to people that was not covered by the 

attorney-client privilege. We were experiencing a changing narrative. So 

there was a variety of calls during the tenure of our representation. 

Senior trial counsel testified that the prosecutor expressed her belief that the 

Petitioner played a leadership role in the crimes, which was why she wanted the Petitioner 

to be debriefed as part of his plea deal. He repeated that he had no memory of any initial 

offer that involved a sentence of forty-eight years. He recalled only the forty-year offer

and some discussions with the prosecutor about the effective net sentence with respect to 

how the sentences would be stacked. He said that his staff was preparing for the Monday 

trial throughout the entire preceding weekend. The prosecutor extended the offer that 

Sunday, and when he presented it to the Petitioner during their meeting at the jail, the 

Petitioner wanted time to think about it. The next morning, he and junior trial counsel met 

with the Petitioner in a back room at the courthouse, where they reviewed the offer with 

him. He testified that the Petitioner wanted to know if Co-Defendant Love was taking the 

offer before he decided to accept it. Senior trial counsel said that both he and junior trial 

counsel asked the Petitioner if he understood the offer and if he was comfortable with his 

decision to plead guilty. The Petitioner appeared to understand the plea agreement, to be 

making an intelligent decision regarding his acceptance of the plea deal, and to be 

“steadfast and comfortable in his decision.” 

Senior trial counsel testified that one month after he had entered his pleas, the 

Petitioner emailed senior trial counsel’s office wanting to know if his plea deal was still

good because Co-Defendants Byrd and Curtis had testified in Co-Defendant King’s trial 

but the Petitioner had not. In addition, a short time after being debriefed, the Petitioner 

contacted senior trial counsel’s office to express his desire to be transferred to the TDOC. 

The Petitioner never expressed any buyer’s remorse or other concerns, and both senior and 

junior trial counsel “felt comfortable that morning that he made a knowing, intelligent, 

voluntary decision.” 
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Cross-examination of senior trial counsel occurred at a later date, and after senior 

trial counsel had obviously refreshed his memory with a review of his file. Senior trial 

counsel testified that Mr. Lambert asked the Petitioner three questions during his initial 

debriefing interview: whether he was at the home, whether he had a gun, and whether he 

had told him the truth. The Petitioner’s responses to those questions, along with the 

Petitioner’s interactions with other members of senior trial counsel’s staff, “set the stage 

for the direction [they]were going to take.” 

The Petitioner’s story to counsel, however, kept changing, resulting in a series of 

inconsistent accounts. Senior trial counsel testified that the toboggan was significant 

because it was located outside the victim’s fence, which provided a “potential defense that 

[the Petitioner] never breached the fence, but, again, his story evolved and changed over 

time.” The Petitioner struck him as someone who was very intelligent but also very naïve, 

thinking that he could change his story “to kind of fit - - explain felony murder, so he 

wanted to jump over the fence, back over the fence, back door, front door, you know, so it 

kind of changed.”

Senior trial counsel testified that the Bruton issue arose from the outset due to the 

fact that there were five co-defendants. He said that the problem with a motion to suppress 

was that the license plate of the Petitioner’s Jeep had been reported in a 911 call, and the 

Jeep with that license plate had returned to the crime scene. He testified that a citizen by 

the name of Mr. Mount described the Jeep in a 911 call, and he believed that Mr. Mount’s 

wife reported the license plate number while her husband was on the phone. He said they 

filed the motion in limine in an attempt to keep those hearsay statements out, and to “lock 

[the prosecutor] in to changing [her] theory of the case[.]” Senior trial counsel testified 

that although he did not file motions merely for the sake of filing motions, there was always 

an aspect of “playing a legal game of chess” with the prosecutor, “trying to get [the 

prosecutor] to change [her] story,” because he “knew that if [Co-Defendants] Curtis and 

Byrd flipped, that would be a problem.” 

Senior trial counsel testified that he had no advance notice of the damaging 

testimony of Mr. Hurst, whom senior trial counsel dubbed the “super snitch[,]” until the 

preliminary hearing. He said he asked the Petitioner if he had said anything in front of Mr. 

Hurst, and the Petitioner replied “no[.]” Senior trial counsel described it as “kind of a mic 

drop moment” when the prosecutor put Mr. Hurst on the stand and they realized that he 

was going to be a problem. He agreed that the State not only had Mr. Hurst’s testimony, 

but also a video from the detention center that showed the Petitioner demonstrating kicking, 

which corroborated Mr. Hurst’s account of what the Petitioner had said. In addition, Mr. 

Hurst used the phrase “long gun,” which was consistent with how the other co-defendants 

described the Petitioner’s weapon. 
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Senior trial counsel indicated that he expected the State to initiate plea negotiations 

after the trial court issued its ruling on the motion to sever, which, in essence, prohibited 

the State from using Mr. Hurst as a trial witness unless the cases were severed. He said he 

thought the State might make an offer to both the Petitioner and Co-Defendant Love 

because the State’s case against them was the weakest in the respect that they both had the 

wherewithal not to give incriminating statements. When no offer was forthcoming, he 

realized that the State thought its case against the Petitioner was strong. 

Senior trial counsel testified that the trial was continued from the initial June trial 

setting due to the late receipt of the DNA report. He said an expert “wasn’t going to change 

[his] theory,” pointing out that the toboggan was found outside the fence, which did not 

hurt his case. He said that rather than objecting to the entire report, they were going to 

object to the report’s coming in in its entirety or request that it “at least be redacted as it 

related to all the different DNA.” He explained that he thought that evidence of the DNA 

of someone other than the Petitioner could help their case if the portion of the report stating 

that the co-defendants had been excluded as contributors was eliminated. 

Senior trial counsel testified that they were preparing for trial, and were not pushing 

to work out a plea deal. He had a vivid memory of a motion hearing one week before trial 

where he saw the attorneys who represented Co-Defendants Byrd and Curtis talking to the 

prosecutor during a break. Senior trial counsel expressed his concern to Co-Defendant 

Love’s trial counsel that the other attorneys might be trying to “flip and take a deal[,]” and 

at the conclusion of the hearing directly asked the prosecutor, who confirmed it. Senior 

trial counsel described it as a “game changer” that caused significant concern because they 

now had two people who put the armed Petitioner inside the house. 

Senior trial counsel testified that they received the email from the Petitioner asking 

about the possibility of a deal involving facilitation, which was then followed by another 

email stating that he wanted to go to trial. He said he informed his staff that he did not 

think they had a realistic chance of any offers, and that all of them continued their intense 

preparation for trial, which included working throughout the weekend. At approximately 

4:30 p.m. that Sunday afternoon, while he was meeting with the Petitioner’s mother at his 

office, the prosecutor called to extend the offer of twenty-five years at 100% to the 

especially aggravated kidnapping and fifteen years at 30% for the facilitation of felony 

murder, “stacked to the hard 25.” 

Senior trial counsel repeated his account of how he called Co-Defendant Love’s trial 

counsel and arranged with Chief Tramel for them to visit with their respective clients in 

the jail. He recalled that after he explained the entire offer to the Petitioner in detail, the

Petitioner responded that if Co-Defendant Love accepted the offer, he would too. Senior 
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trial counsel said that he told the Petitioner that he did not want him to decide right then, 

to think about it overnight, and that they would talk again in the morning. When he 

returned to his office, he told Ms. Alred that he thought they might have a deal but 

cautioned her not to mention anything about that possibility to junior trial counsel or to law 

clerk. The next morning, he and junior trial counsel had the conversation with the 

Petitioner in the back room of the courthouse in which the Petitioner told them that he 

wanted to accept the offer. 

Senior trial counsel testified that Co-Defendant King’s trial was continued due to 

the change in the number of co-defendants that would potentially be testifying against him 

at trial. Approximately thirty days after the Petitioner entered his pleas, and after CoDefendant King’s trial had concluded, the Petitioner’s judgments were entered. Before the 

judgments were entered, the Petitioner sent senior trial counsel’s office the email in which 

he expressed his concern that his deal might not still be on because he had not been called 

as a witness at Co-Defendant King’s trial, followed by the email inquiring if his transfer to 

TDOC could be expedited. The Petitioner never communicated that he did not understand 

the plea and never complained about senior trial counsel’s representation. Several months 

after the Petitioner was transferred to TDOC, the Petitioner’s mother reached out to senior 

trial counsel’s office about a problem with some of the numbers in the judgment, and his 

office was able to get a corrected judgment entered. Senior trial counsel testified that 

throughout the course of his representation and beyond, he had a “very good relationship” 

with the Petitioner’s mother and “nothing but very positive communication” with the 

family. 

With respect to the Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty, senior trial counsel testified 

that the very intelligent Petitioner “understood the domino effect of people cooperating, 

the change in dynamics.” However, senior trial counsel was prepared to go to trial if the 

Petitioner had rejected the State’s offer, and he would not have recommended that the

Petitioner accept the plea if he had thought the Petitioner was not making a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary decision. 

Junior trial counsel testified that he was licensed to practice law in 2013 and was 

currently employed as an assistant district attorney at the Knox County District Attorney’s 

Office. To the best of his recollection, the Petitioner’s case was either in the grand jury or 

just returned from the grand jury at the time he began his employment with senior trial 

counsel’s law firm. He said that he was essentially hired to replace former associate trial 

counsel, and that his role was to assist senior trial counsel, who took the lead on the case. 

He stated that the Petitioner was a young man in his early 20s who, to the best of his 

recollection, had no criminal record. He said that he met with the Petitioner several times 

over the course of his representation and, although he had no specific memory of it with 
- 14 -

the Petitioner, his general practice was to review the charges and relevant statutes with 

each client. 

Junior trial counsel testified that the Petitioner was warned that jail calls were 

monitored and recorded but did not heed their advice not to discuss the case on jail calls. 

He recalled that in a video call, the Petitioner placed himself at the scene, saying that he 

was not concerned because he did not go in the house. He also recalled a video of the 

Petitioner in the back seat of a police car with one of his co-defendants, which showed the 

Petitioner “essentially telling that individual what to say.” There were “quite a few 

communications[,]” but those were the two that “stuck with [him] over six years.” To the 

best of his recollection, law clerk prepared a discovery index, and he reviewed the 

discovery in the case. He had no specific memory of listening to the 911 calls but said it 

was something that he would have done in his preparation of the case. Likewise, although 

he had no specific recollection of reviewing discovery with the Petitioner, it was something 

that he would have done. 

Junior trial counsel recalled reviewing the DNA report on the toboggan and said it 

was significant because it was additional evidence that placed the Petitioner at the scene. 

He said he would have watched the officer body camera video of the stop of the Petitioner’s 

Jeep. He was unaware of any legal basis to suppress the stop, “given the matching 

descriptions and where the vehicle was located and the proximity between the shooting and 

when that vehicle was seen again.” 

Junior trial counsel recalled that there was a court hearing leading up to the trial, 

and perhaps some conversations about an offer being extended to some of the codefendants. However, the State was unwilling to extend an offer to the Petitioner at that 

time because the prosecutor believed the Petitioner was a leader in the offense. He had a 

clear memory of the conversation that he and senior trial counsel had with the Petitioner 

on the morning of trial about the plea offer that was ultimately extended, and of the 

Petitioner’s “being very inquisitive as to what [Co-Defendant] Love was going to do[.]” 

He recalled that Co-Defendant Love’s trial counsel let them know that Co-Defendant Love 

had accepted the offer. 

Junior trial counsel recalled having had a discussion with the Petitioner about 

criminal responsibility, and how the Petitioner, not unlike other individuals in a similar 

situation, indicated that he thought it unfair that he could be facing a life sentence for felony 

murder when he had not killed anyone. Junior trial counsel stated that the case would been 

a hard one to defend, but that they were prepared to go to trial. Had they proceeded to trial, 

they would have attempted to impeach the State’s witnesses, to show that the State’s 
- 15 -

witnesses had an incentive to exaggerate the Petitioner’s role in the offenses, and to hold 

the State to its burden of proving the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

When asked about his Thursday, September 10, 2015 legal visit with the Petitioner

that was reflected in the jail log, junior trial counsel testified that he recalled having a 

general conversation about where the case was and why resolving it with a plea deal might 

be beneficial. However, it would have been contingent on the State’s extending an offer 

for the Petitioner to accept, which had not happened at that point. Junior trial counsel 

identified an email the Petitioner sent at 8:52 a.m. the next day to Ms. Alred, which read: 

“I’m going all the way with this. Let’s do it.” He had no memory of having asked the

Petitioner to send that email or of any sort of conversation on September 10 in which he 

asked the Petitioner to let him know what he wanted to do. 

Junior trial counsel recalled working on the Saturday preceding the Monday trial 

date. He could not remember if he worked on Sunday as well but said it was entirely 

possible that he did. He recalled that he brought files with him to the courtroom on Monday 

in anticipation of a trial, that Co-Defendant Love’s trial counsel approached to inform him 

that Co-Defendant Love had decided to accept an offer, and that he and senior trial counsel 

then had the conversation with the Petitioner about accepting the plea offer, which junior 

trial counsel understood had been extended the previous day. Junior trial counsel had no 

specific recollection of reviewing the rights paperwork with the Petitioner. He said he was 

the one who filled out the plea paperwork. He could not recall if the Petitioner signed it in 

the room where he and senior trial counsel discussed it with him, or at counsel table in the 

courtroom. He had no memory of being in the courtroom during the plea colloquy but did 

recall being present one month later when the judgments were entered. He recalled 

listening to the victim impact statements and that the Petitioner expressed remorse by 

apologizing for his actions. 

On cross-examination, junior trial counsel was asked about various emails 

exchanged between the Petitioner and senior trial counsel’s law firm. These included a 

March 10, 2015 email that the Petitioner sent to Ms. Alred indicating that he was interested 

in a plea deal of probation; an April 16, 2015 email that the Petitioner sent to Ms. Alred in 

which he, among other things, stated that his mother told him that senior trial counsel was 

“not a man to strike a deal[,]” but if the Petitioner felt that a deal was best, that was what 

he wanted; a May 19, 2015 email from the Petitioner to Ms. Alred stating that he wanted 

to talk to junior trial counsel and that he might have an alibi but was unsure if he should 

use it; a September 10, 2015 email from Ms. Alred to the Petitioner with a message from 

senior trial counsel that he was confirming that they had met with the Petitioner to discuss 

the new dynamics of the case regarding the DNA and the fact that two co-defendants were 

now cooperating with the State, and that senior trial counsel had been “clear and 
- 16 -

unequivocal” that the Petitioner could not make false statements should he testify at trial; 

an October 14, 2015 email from the Petitioner to Ms. Alred stating that he needed to speak 

to junior trial counsel and inquiring whether his deal was still on because Co-Defendants 

Curtis and Byrd had testified at Co-Defendant King’s trial; and an October 16, 2015 email 

from the Petitioner to Ms. Alred wanting to know if he could get a speedy transport now 

that he had “produced [his] statement[.]” Junior trial counsel testified that he thought the 

Petitioner had some concerns that his plea agreement would be impacted by not having 

testified at Co-Defendant King’s trial. 

Junior trial counsel testified that the Petitioner initially indicated to him that he went 

to the murder victim’s house with the intent to purchase marijuana and that he had a gun 

with him. Ultimately, the Petitioner changed his story, admitting that he had gone to the 

house with the intent, with others, of committing a robbery. The Petitioner’s admissions 

to junior trial counsel, combined with the information junior trial counsel reviewed in 

discovery, made the Petitioner’s suggestion of an alibi “obviously very concerning.” 

Junior trial counsel recalled that the conversation in which the Petitioner suggested that he 

could come up with an alibi occurred at the Knox County Detention Center in the presence 

of law clerk. He said he was very concerned at the Petitioner’s suggestion, and that he 

conveyed his concern to senior trial counsel, who shared his concern. 

TBI Forensic Scientist Kim Lowe, the expert in forensic biology who analyzed the 

DNA on the black toboggan, described her testing process and the difference between 

touch DNA, left by someone casually touching an item, and wearer’s DNA, created when 

someone deposits his DNA on an item of clothing he is wearing. She testified that the 

partial DNA profile obtained from the toboggan was a mixture of genetic material from at 

least three individuals, one of which was male, and that the major contributor was the 

Petitioner. She said she was unable to determine who last wore the toboggan and when the 

Petitioner deposited his DNA on it. She stated that no one from senior trial counsel’s law 

firm ever contacted her about the report and agreed that, had they done so, she would have 

been able to explain to them “what can and cannot be determined based on wearer’s DNA 

and major contributors[.]” 

The Petitioner testified that he was currently twenty-nine years old, had been 

arrested on June 26, 2014, and, to date, had been incarcerated for seven years, eleven 

months, and thirteen days. He said that his mother retained senior trial counsel to represent 

him within three or four days of his arrest. He recalled that he first met with senior trial 

counsel in a conference room on the top floor of the detention center. Senior trial counsel 

spoke well, dressed well, and carried himself in a manner that impressed the Petitioner. 

The Petitioner said that he was twenty-one years old at the time of his arrest, had never 
- 17 -

before been arrested, had never been represented by a lawyer, and had never seen a real 

trial. 

The Petitioner testified that the first major court hearing in his case was the 

preliminary hearing. He thought senior trial counsel did a really great job at that hearing; 

senior trial counsel “was a dog” and “a beast” and “everything that [the Petitioner] wanted 

him to be.” Senior trial counsel “went after” the witnesses and was “aggressive” with Mr. 

Hurst, who said that the Petitioner had told him that the Petitioner “kicked down the front 

door with a chopper.” Senior trial counsel did a good job of challenging Mr. Hurst’s 

credibility, and the Petitioner was very pleased with his performance. 

The Petitioner testified that he first met junior trial counsel when junior trial counsel 

and former associate trial counsel came to visit him at the detention facility on November 

12, 2014. During that meeting, junior trial counsel explained that he was going to be “just 

filling in with [former associate trial counsel].” The Petitioner could not recall when his 

indictment was returned but remembered that junior trial counsel, probably accompanied 

by former associate trial counsel, brought him a copy of the indictment, which scared him

with its number of felony counts. The Petitioner identified the summary of charges 

prepared by former associate trial counsel as a document that one of his attorneys showed 

him to let him know what his offenses were and the sentence range for each offense. He 

stated that he did not learn that the summary was inaccurate until he and post-conviction 

counsel were reviewing the file. Similarly, he did not learn that the summarization of 

charges on pages two and three of his waiver of trial form was inaccurate until his review 

of the document with post-conviction counsel. When he learned of the inaccuracies on 

those documents, he felt a mixture of emotions, foremost of which was a feeling of being 

hurt that senior trial counsel, who was supposed to have his best interest at heart, was not 

looking out for him. 

The Petitioner testified that he was informed at some point that law clerk would be 

replacing former associate trial counsel, who had left the firm. He said that his lawyers 

reviewed the discovery materials with him “piece by piece” and that there was so much of 

it that it seemed as if every legal visit was about discovery. He stated that his attorneys 

discussed motions with him, and that the most important one appeared to be the motion to 

sever. He said that senior trial counsel explained they were going to try to sever his case 

from his co-defendants so that he could be tried alone, but that it would be a challenge. He 

recalled that senior trial counsel told him that the trial court’s ruling on that motion was a 

positive outcome. He said he took senior trial counsel at his word but would have preferred 

to be tried alone. 

Referring to a timeline of hearings and attorney visits that post-conviction counsel 

had prepared, the Petitioner testified that, after a May 26, 2015 court hearing, he did not 
- 18 -

receive any legal visits until September 8, 2015. He described it as a “dead period” during 

which he did nothing but watch television and wonder where his attorneys were. Referring 

to the log of jail visits, the Petitioner testified that junior trial counsel visited him for 

approximately three hours during that September 8, 2015 legal visit. He recalled that the 

meeting was mostly about discovery, and that he was frustrated because it was the first 

time that he heard of the toboggan DNA report. He said he did not learn that his attorneys 

had received the report on June 2, 2015 until he and post-conviction counsel were 

reviewing the file. When he found out that his attorneys had known about the report on 

June 2 but failed to inform him until September 8, he cried. Had he known earlier about 

the report, he would have inquired how DNA works, the pros and cons of the report, and 

how the information contained in the report might be used to help his case. 

The Petitioner testified that his attorneys never discussed trial strategy with him, the 

exhibits, their thoughts on opening, or any specifics about what they planned to do at trial. 

No one ever told him that the jury would be required to work through each of the twentyfive charges at trial, and he surmised on his own that it was a “one for all” situation, where 

if he “beat the felony murder, then [he] beat everything” but if he did not beat the felony 

murder charge, he would be convicted of everything. He had no understanding of lesserincluded offenses, no one ever told him how the jury would be instructed with respect to 

accomplice testimony, and he was never informed about the voir dire process. 

The Petitioner testified that in a meeting at the courthouse after the September 10, 

2015 court hearing, senior and junior trial counsel informed him that his co-defendants 

were “flipping,” that the prosecutor wanted him to get the maximum time because she 

thought he was a leader in the commission of the offenses, and that it would be a hard case 

to beat. He said that senior trial counsel told him that both Co-Defendants Byrd and Curtis 

would testify that the Petitioner entered the house with a gun. The Petitioner stated that it 

was only later, through post-conviction counsel, that he learned that was not an accurate 

assessment of their testimony because only one of the co-defendants testified at CoDefendant King’s trial that the Petitioner went into the house. 

The Petitioner testified that he sent an email that night to senior trial counsel’s law 

firm asking for senior trial counsel to try for a deal for facilitation. He said the first time 

he heard the word facilitation was earlier that day when senior trial counsel mentioned it 

during their meeting. Junior trial counsel visited him at the jail that evening and again on 

Friday, September 11, 2015, but no one from senior trial counsel’s law firm came to see 

him on the Saturday or Sunday before the trial. The Petitioner testified that he viewed 

senior trial counsel’s testimony that he visited with him at the jail that Sunday as “just more 

of the betrayal.” The Petitioner also disputed senior trial counsel’s testimony that CoDefendant Love’s trial counsel visited Co-Defendant Love that Sunday at the same facility 
- 19 -

where the Petitioner was housed, testifying that Co-Defendant Love was at a different 

facility at that time. 

The Petitioner testified that he did not learn of the proposed plea deal until the 

Monday morning of trial when senior and junior trial counsel met with him in the holding 

tank to tell him that the prosecutor was offering him the same plea deal as his codefendants. Senior trial counsel asked him if he wanted to accept it, and he told him no. 

The Petitioner testified that he was “trying to wrap [his] mind around how do we go from 

we’re ready for trial to the first conversation we have on Monday morning is a 40-year 

sentence?” He stated that senior trial counsel told him that he did not have to accept the 

plea. However, senior trial counsel did not say that he was ready for trial, and the Petitioner 

sensed that senior trial counsel did not have the same energy that he had exhibited in the 

past. He recalled that senior trial counsel told him that it would be best for him to accept 

the plea, and that he should look on the bright side and realize that he would be only fortyfour or forty-five, the approximate age of junior trial counsel, when released from prison. 

Although senior trial counsel did not say so, the Petitioner knew that senior trial counsel 

thought that forty years was the best that they could do. 

The Petitioner testified that during his conversation with senior trial counsel, junior 

trial counsel was already filling out the paperwork. He said that senior trial counsel then 

reviewed the paperwork with him, “kind of skim[ming] through” the rights he would be 

waiving by entering his guilty pleas. He was not certain but thought it was possible that 

senior trial counsel also explained the questions that he would be asked by the trial court

during the plea colloquy. 

The Petitioner testified that he asked senior trial counsel if he could have a minute 

to think about it. Junior trial counsel left the waiver on a chair, and senior and junior trial 

counsel left him alone for five or ten minutes. The Petitioner said that he picked up the 

packet of materials, looked at it, and “instantly start[ed] to cry.” He then thought about 

how senior trial counsel appeared to lack the fire that he had exhibited at the preliminary 

hearing. The Petitioner said he had thought that senior trial counsel was ready for trial, 

until he found out that morning that he was not. Because he could not go to trial with an 

attorney who was not ready, he tearfully signed the paperwork and then answered the 

questions posed by the trial court during the plea colloquy. He said that the trial court 

never asked him whether he thought senior trial counsel was prepared for trial that day. 

Had he been asked that question, he would have responded that he wanted to fire senior 

trial counsel and start over with a different attorney, even if he had to be represented by a 

public defender. 
- 20 -

On cross-examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that he had been enrolled in 

college for approximately a year and a half before the crimes, and that he was a good 

student. He admitted that he went to the house with his co-defendants and that he had a 

long gun but denied that he entered the house, testifying that he was in the backyard with 

a co-defendant ready to enter when someone in the house screamed and he jumped back 

over the fence and ran to his Jeep. He acknowledged that he initially left the scene in his 

Jeep with Co-defendants Curtis and Love but returned to pick up Co-Defendant Byrd, and 

was then stopped by the police and arrested. He denied that he attempted to convince CoDefendant Byrd to change his story, explaining that he was merely upset that Co-Defendant 

Byrd falsely told the police that he had run inside the house with his long gun. He admitted 

that he and his co-defendants talked together in the presence of Mr. Hurst while in a holding 

cell but denied that he demonstrated to Mr. Hurst how he had kicked in the door. He 

explained the kicking video as his having demonstrated what his co-defendants had falsely 

told the police that he had done. 

The Petitioner acknowledged that Mr. Hurst testified at the preliminary hearing that 

he told him he “kick[ed] in the door with the chopper.” He could not recall any witness 

testifying that there was a tall man with a long gun in the kitchen of the house. He said he

was not the tallest member of the group, and that the one who was not charged in the 

indictment, Felix Netherland, whom he knew as BJ, was 6’4” or 6’ 5” tall while he was 

only 6’3”. He acknowledged there was some discussion at the preliminary hearing about 

criminal responsibility, and that he was therefore at least aware of the concept. He further 

acknowledged that he admitted to Mr. Lambert that he was “part of the discussion to go to 

the house to rob them of marijuana [,]” and that he was armed with a gun. He admitted he 

sent emails to his attorneys about the possibility of a plea and in a recorded jailhouse phone 

call with a friend spoke of watching “Law and Order” and of knowing that “the person first 

in gets the best deal[.]” The Petitioner further acknowledged that he told the trial court that 

he was satisfied with the representation of his trial counsel, that he was guilty, and that he 

had no questions. He testified, however, that although he knew that facilitate meant to 

help, he did not understand that he was pleading guilty to a lesser-included offense of 

felony murder. 

On redirect examination, the Petitioner agreed that the jail logs reflected that CoDefendant Love was housed at the Knox County Detention Center on the weekend prior to 

the scheduled start of trial, while the Petitioner was housed at the Knox County Jail. 

The Petitioner’s final witness was KPD Officer Ryan Kuykendall, who testified that 

as he was searching for the suspects in the area, a resident approached and gave him a 

description and tag number of a vehicle possibly involved in the shooting, which Officer 

Kuykendall then broadcast over his police radio. Officer Kuykendall said he did not know
- 21 -

the informant’s name and had no further contact with him. He stated that no one from 

senior trial counsel’s office ever talked to him. On cross-examination, he identified 

dashcam videos, previously admitted as an exhibit at the hearing, that were downloaded 

from his police cruiser on June 26, 2014 at approximately 2:10 and 3:18 a.m. 

Co-Defendant Love’s trial counsel, called as a witness by the State, corroborated 

senior trial counsel’s testimony of how Chief Tramel arranged for him and senior trial 

counsel to enter the jail through the sally port on Sunday, September 13, 2015, so that they 

could talk to their respective clients about the State’s plea offer. On cross-examination, he 

testified that the original offer from the State was for either forty-five or forty-eight years, 

which he negotiated down to forty years. When shown the records that reflected that his 

client was at a different facility on the date in question and asked if it refreshed his memory, 

he responded emphatically that he knew exactly where he met with his client that Sunday, 

and that it was downtown.

On November 15, 2022, the post-conviction court entered a lengthy written order 

denying the petition. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. 

ANALYSIS

The Petitioner argues on appeal that the “totality of the circumstances, including the 

plea colloquy and evidence developed at post-conviction hearing, provide clear and 

convincing evidence” that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary; 

that his trial counsel were deficient in performance, resulting in prejudice to his case, for 

“failing to identify and investigate information that would have led to a successful motion 

to suppress the seizure of the vehicle” and “for failure to identify and investigate available 

information that would have benefitted [the Petitioner]’s defense regarding the scientific 

limitations on the conclusions that could be reached from the DNA extracted from the 

toboggan”; and that “the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors and deficient 

performance magnifies the prejudicial effects . . . requiring post-conviction relief.” 

Post-conviction relief “shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or 

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of 

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The 

petitioner bears the burden of proving factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). When an evidentiary hearing is held in the postconviction setting, the findings of fact made by the court are conclusive on appeal unless 

the evidence preponderates against them. Wiley v. State, 183 S.W.3d 317, 325 (Tenn. 

2006). When reviewing factual issues, the appellate court will not reweigh the evidence 

and will instead defer to the post-conviction court's findings as to the credibility of 
- 22 -

witnesses or the weight of their testimony. Phillips v. State, 647 S.W.3d 389, 400 (Tenn. 

2022) (citations omitted). However, review of a post-conviction court’s application of the 

law to the facts of the case is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Id. (first citing 

Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001); and then citing Mobley v. State, 397 

S.W.3d 70, 80 (Tenn. 2013)). The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, which presents 

mixed questions of fact and law, is reviewed de novo, with a presumption of correctness 

given only to the post-conviction court's findings of fact. Id. at 400 (citing Dellinger v.

State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 294 (Tenn. 2009)).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has the 

burden to show both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1997) (noting that the same standard for determining ineffective assistance of 

counsel that is applied in federal cases also applies in Tennessee). The Strickland standard 

is a two-prong test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.

This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s 

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable.

466 U.S. at 687.

The deficient performance prong of the test is satisfied by showing that “counsel’s

acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness 

under prevailing professional norms.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) 

(first citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; and then citing Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 

936 (Tenn. 1975)). The reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that the 

conduct of counsel falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance, see

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, and may not second-guess the tactical and strategic choices 

made by trial counsel unless those choices were uninformed because of inadequate 

preparation. See Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982).

The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., 

a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s 
- 23 -

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694.

Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address 

both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 

466 U.S. at 697; see Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either 

deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective 

assistance claim”). In the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show a reasonable 

probability that were it not for the deficiencies in counsel’s representation, he would not 

have pled guilty but would instead have insisted on proceeding to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tenn. 2001).

In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), the United States Supreme Court 

held that there must be an affirmative showing in the trial court that a guilty plea was 

voluntarily and knowingly given before it can be accepted. A plea is not “voluntary” if it 

results from ignorance, misunderstanding, coercion, inducements, or threats. Blankenship

v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court must determine if the guilty

plea is knowing by questioning the defendant to make sure he or she fully understands the 

plea and its consequences. State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999); 

Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904. Because the plea must represent a voluntary and 

intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the defendant, the trial court may look 

at a number of circumstantial factors in making this determination. Blankenship, 858

S.W.2d at 904. These factors include: (1) the defendant’s relative intelligence; (2) the 

defendant’s familiarity with criminal proceedings; (3) whether the defendant was 

represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confer with counsel about 

alternatives; (4) the advice of counsel and the court about the charges against the defendant 

and the penalty to be imposed; and (5) the defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty, 

including the desire to avoid a greater penalty in a jury trial. Id. at 904-05.

In denying the petition, the post-conviction court specifically found senior trial 

counsel to be a credible witness, and the Petitioner not credible in aspects of his testimony, 

including why he accepted the plea deal. The post-conviction court found that the 

Petitioner “took the final plea offer because he believed that if the case went to trial he 

would likely be convicted and receive a longer sentence including a life sentence on the 

felony murder charge” but later experienced “buyer’s remorse” about his decision. The 

post-conviction court further found that senior trial counsel was fully prepared for trial, 

“used the full resources of his firm to investigate the State’s evidence and look for potential 

defenses in the case[,]” filed appropriate motions, formed a reasonable defense theory, and 

continued to prepare for trial up until the point that the Petitioner decided to accept the plea 

offer on the morning that trial was scheduled to begin. The post-conviction court found 
- 24 -

that the record did not support the Petitioner’s claim that his counsel did not fully inform 

him of the charges and possible sentences, and that the record showed that the Petitioner 

“completely understood the details of the plea offer.” The post-conviction court therefore 

concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating any deficiencies 

in the performance of his trial counsel or that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and 

voluntarily entered. 

The record fully supports the findings and conclusions of the post-conviction court. 

Senior trial counsel, a very experienced criminal defense attorney whose testimony was 

specifically accredited by the post-conviction court, testified that he and his staff were fully 

prepared to proceed to trial had the Petitioner not accepted the State’s last-minute plea 

offer. He stated that the Petitioner was informed of the charges he faced, the charges to 

which he would be pleading guilty, and the ramifications of the guilty pleas. Both he and 

junior trial counsel believed that the Petitioner understood the plea agreement and entered 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary pleas. Senior trial counsel also provided a reasonable 

explanation for why he did not pursue a motion to suppress the results of the stop of the 

Petitioner’s vehicle, and chose instead to rely on a motion in limine, as well as why he did 

not waste time researching or filing motions with respect to the toboggan DNA report. 

Although the Petitioner had no prior familiarity with the criminal justice system, the 

record establishes that he was twenty-one-years-old, had completed approximately a yearand-a half of college, and was a good student. Senior trial counsel testified that the 

Petitioner appeared to be very intelligent and to understand the changing dynamics of the 

case caused by his co-defendants having agreed to enter plea agreements and to testify 

against the Petitioner at trial. Senior trial counsel’s assessment of the Petitioner’s 

understanding of the changing dynamics caused by his co-defendants’ guilty pleas was 

corroborated by the Petitioner’s jailhouse phone call to his friend in which he indicated 

familiarity with the guilty plea process from watching “Law and Order.” Notably, the 

Petitioner never indicated to either the trial court or his trial counsel that he was unhappy 

with his plea deal or with counsel’s representation, or that he did not understand his pleas. 

In fact, in the month that elapsed before his judgments were entered, the Petitioner reached 

out to his counsel indicating his concern that his plea deal would not go through because 

he had not been called as a State’s witness at Co-Defendant King’s trial. 

From the record, there is more than enough proof to justify the post-conviction 

court’s finding that there was no deficiency in the performance of the Petitioner’s trial 

counsel. Trial counsel conducted a thorough investigation into the case and developed a 

cogent defense strategy. The Petitioner was kept informed of the progress in the case and 

gave input to his trial counsel about the facts and strategy. Trial counsel gave advice, 

informed by adequate investigation, that the Petitioner should accept the plea agreement,
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and the Petitioner agreed. Nothing in the guilty plea hearing indicates that the Petitioner 

did not enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. In light of all this evidence, we agree 

with the post-conviction court that the Petitioner has not shown that either senior or junior 

trial counsel was deficient in his performance, or that his guilty pleas were unknowing and 

involuntary.

The Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel’s alleged various deficiencies in 

performance magnifies their prejudicial effect, warranting post-conviction relief. The 

cumulative error doctrine requires relief when “multiple errors [are] committed in trial 

proceedings, each of which in isolation constitutes mere harmless error, but which when 

aggregated, have a cumulative effect on the proceedings so great as to require reversal in 

order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76-77 

(Tenn. 2010) (internal citations omitted). However, there can be no cumulative error in the 

absence of any error. Accordingly, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of his 

cumulative error claim. 

CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying 

the petition for post-conviction relief. 

__________________________________

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE