[Cite as State v. Henry, 2017-Ohio-7426.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 

ANJUAN HENRY 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2016-CA-57 

Trial Court Case No. 1999-CR-296 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 1st day of September, 2017. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

ANDREW P. PICKERING, Atty. Reg. No. 0068770, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark 

County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Fourth Floor, Springfield, Ohio 

45501 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

ANJUAN HENRY, Inmate No. 401-154, London Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 69, 

London, Ohio 43140 

 Defendant-Appellant-Pro Se 

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WELBAUM, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Anjuan C. Henry, appeals from the decisions of the 

Clark County Court of Common Pleas denying both his pro se motion for a new trial and 

his pro se motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. For the reasons outlined below, 

the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this Opinion. 

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} On June 14, 1999, the Clark County Grand Jury indicted Henry on one count 

of willfully eluding or fleeing a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), one count of 

receiving or retaining stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51, and one count of 

possession of crack cocaine in an amount exceeding one hundred grams in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11. The drug possession count had a major drug specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2925.01. Dkt. 1. The three counts were brought against Henry in Clark County 

Court of Common Pleas Case No. 99-CR-296. 

{¶ 3} On February 28, 2000, the trial court consolidated Case No. 99-CR-296 with 

Case No. 99-CR-584, which involved two counts of drug trafficking in crack cocaine 

brought against Henry. Dkt. 24. Henry’s jury trial in the consolidated cases began on 

May 15, 2000. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts of drug trafficking and 

one count of possession of crack cocaine with a major drug specification. Dkt. 29, 37. 

On September 22, 2000, the trial court sentenced Henry. Dkt. 37. On appeal, we 

reversed Henry’s convictions and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent 

with our Opinion. State v. Henry, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2000-CA-80, 2002 WL 125717 (Feb. 
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1, 2002). 

{¶ 4} After we remanded the cause, the two criminal cases were severed. In June 

2003, Henry was re-tried in Case No. 99-CR-296. The jury found Henry guilty of the 

possession charge. Dkt. 54. On June 27, 2003, the trial court found that Henry was a 

major drug offender pursuant to R.C. 2925.01 and 2929.13(F) and sentenced Henry to a 

total prison term of seventeen years. Dkt. 55. On appeal, we affirmed Henry’s 

conviction and sentence in Case No. 99-CR-296. Dkt. 61; State v. Henry, 2d Dist. Clark 

Nos. 2003-CA-47 and 2003-CA-88, 2005-Ohio-4512. On January 7, 2011, the trial court 

issued an amended judgment entry of conviction. Dkt. 64. 

{¶ 5} On April 5, 2016, Henry filed a “Crim. Rule 33(B) Motion For Leave To File A 

Delayed Motion For A New Trial” in Case No. 99-CR-296. Dkt. 65. Henry attached two 

affidavits to this motion. First, his March 21, 2016 affidavit stated, in pertinent part: 

In Feb of 2016, my ex-fiancée and children’s mother, Erica Bibbs, did 

inform me that leading up to and during my June 2003 jury trial for 

possession on [sic] cocaine, she was having an affair with my trial attorney. 

She was reluctant to provide the affidavit attached to the motion for 

leave because she said it would make her “look bad” and also inquired as 

to whether his attorney could “get in trouble” if this came out. 

{¶ 6} The second affidavit was a March 14, 2016 affidavit of Erica Bibbs. The 

affidavit stated: 

I Erica Bibbs, aver and attest to the following . . . before and during 

my ex fiancé and my children’s father, (Anjuan Henry), June 2003 jury trial, 

I was engaged in a romantic relationship with his attorney. 
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{¶ 7} On May 20, 2016, Henry filed a motion to include a supplemental affidavit in 

support of his previously filed motion for leave. Dkt. 66. Henry’s May 16, 2016 affidavit 

attached to the motion stated, in pertinent part: 

In April of 2013, my ex-fiancée and I began communicating on an 

intimate level again. 

We both came to an agreement to try to repair our relationship. 

We’ve been successful in that endeavour [sic] for the past few years. 

In Feb of 2016, my ex-fiancée Erica Bibbs, told me that, years ago 

she did something that she regrets, and that she was tired of living with the 

guilt of it. That’s when, for the first time, she revealed the affair she had 

with my trial attorney, while he was representing me. 

{¶ 8} On June 14, 2016, Henry filed a “Criminal Rule 33(A)(1) New Trial Motion 

(Irregularities In Proceedings During Trial And Subsequent To Sentencing).” Dkt. 67. 

In this filing, Henry cited, among other things, Disciplinary Counsel v. Owen, 142 Ohio 

St.3d 323, 2014-Ohio-4597, 30 N.E.3d 910. In response to Henry’s Motion, the State 

cited State v. Caulley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1000, 2012-Ohio-2649, for the 

proposition that “in order to satisfy a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

a conflict of interest, a criminal defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of 

interest adversely affected trial counsel’s performance.” Dkt. 72, p. 1. 

{¶ 9} In a September 8, 2016 Entry, the trial court stated (Dkt. 76): 

The matter is before the Court on the motion of the Defendant for a 

new trial on the grounds that his trial counsel in [sic] conflict of interest. The 

defendant alleges that the conflict of interest was based upon a relationship 
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between his attorney and the defendant’s girlfriend at the time. The motion 

does not contain any information, assuming that an improper relationship 

existed between counsel and the defendant’s girlfriend, as to how said 

relationship adversely affected counsel’s representation of the defendant. 

Court has reviewed the motion and the response filed by the State. 

The Court finds that the defendant’s motion fails to state sufficient grounds 

for a new trial. 

Therefore, the Court finds the motion is not well taken and the same 

is DENIED. 

{¶ 10} The trial court subsequently issued a November 8, 2016 entry, stating (Dkt. 

79): 

This matter is before the Court on the pro se motion of the defendant 

for leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial. Upon review of the 

arguments and the record, the Court finds the motion is not well taken and 

the same is DENIED. 

{¶ 11} Henry appeals from the trial court’s September 8, 2016 and November 8, 

2016 decisions. 

II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Henry’s Motion For Leave 

Without Making A Credibility Determination 

{¶ 12} Henry’s first assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING 

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY 
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CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF UNAVOIDABLE 

PREVENTION. 

{¶ 13} Henry filed his motion for a new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33(A)(1), which 

provides: “A new trial may be granted on motion of the defendant for any of the following 

causes affecting materially his substantial rights: (1) Irregularity in the proceedings, or 

in any order or ruling of the court, or abuse of discretion by the court, because of which 

the defendant was prevented from having a fair trial.” 

{¶ 14} Crim.R. 33(B) provides the deadlines for filing a motion for new trial. 

Crim.R. 33(B) provides, in pertinent part: 

Motions for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence shall 

be filed within one hundred twenty days after the day upon which the verdict 

was rendered, or the decision of the court where trial by jury has been 

waived. If it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the 

defendant was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence 

upon which he must rely, such motion shall be filed within seven days from 

an order of the court finding that he was unavoidably prevented from 

discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day period. 

{¶ 15} Pursuant to Crim.R. 33(B), Henry first filed a motion for leave to file a motion 

for new trial in which he stated that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the 

evidence of the affair between his trial counsel and his ex-fiancé. If the trial court granted 

this motion for leave, Henry would then have seven days from the trial court’s order to file 

his motion for new trial. Crim.R. 33(B). 

{¶ 16} A defendant is entitled to a hearing on a motion for leave to file a motion for 
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a new trial “if he submits ‘documents that on their face support his claim that he was 

unavoidably prevented from timely discovering the evidence’ at issue.” State v. 

McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800, 2007-Ohio-1181, 869 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) 

(Citations omitted.). The affidavits submitted with Henry’s motion for leave, if found to 

be credible, arguably support his claim that he was unavoidably prevented from the 

discovery of the alleged affair between his trial counsel and his ex-fiancé, which is the 

evidence on which he must rely in his subsequent motion for new trial. Crim.R. 33(B). 

{¶ 17} In assessing the credibility of affidavits, the Supreme Court has provided 

the following relevant factors to be considered: 

(1) whether the judge reviewing the postconviction relief petition also 

presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical 

language, or otherwise appear to have been drafted by the same person, 

(3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants 

are relatives of the petitioner, or otherwise interested in the success of the 

petitioner's efforts, and (5) whether the affidavits contradict evidence 

proffered by the defense at trial. Moreover, a trial court may find sworn 

testimony in an affidavit to be contradicted by evidence in the record by the 

same witness, or to be internally inconsistent, thereby weakening the 

credibility of that testimony. 

State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 285, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999), citing State v. Moore, 

99 Ohio App.3d 748, 754-756, 651 N.E.2d 1319 (1st Dist.1994). 

{¶ 18} “[O]ne or more of these or other factors may be sufficient to justify the 

conclusion that an affidavit asserting information outside the record lacks credibility.” 
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Calhoun at 285. “Such a decision should be within the discretion of the trial court.” Id. 

“A trial court that discounts the credibility of sworn affidavits should include an explanation 

of its basis for doing so in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, in order that 

meaningful appellate review may occur.” Id.

{¶ 19} Although the Calhoun case involved a review of a petition for postconviction relief rather than a motion for new trial, we have held that the Calhoun factors 

“also comfortably appl[y] to affidavits submitted in support of a motion for new trial.” 

State v. Coleman, 2d Dist. Clark Nos. 04CA43, 04CA44, 2005-Ohio-3874, ¶ 25. 

{¶ 20} The trial court overruled Henry’s motion for leave without providing 

reasoning for doing so. If accepted as true, Henry’s affidavits arguably support a finding 

that he is entitled to a hearing on his motion for leave. But one or more of the Calhoun

factors may apply to discount the credibility of the affidavits submitted in support of 

Henry’s motion for leave. The trial court, though, did not make any credibility 

determinations when it overruled Henry’s motion for leave. Therefore, based on the 

record before us, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling 

Henry’s motion for leave without a hearing. A remand is necessary for the trial court to 

consider, in the first instance, whether the affidavits submitted by Henry in support of his 

motion for leave credibly establish, by clear and convincing proof, that he was 

unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence of the affair between his trial 

counsel and his ex-fiancé. 

{¶ 21} Henry’s first assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶ 22} Henry’s second assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING 
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APPELLANT’S CRIMINAL RULE 33(A)(1) MOTION WHICH WAS 

SUPPORTED BY OHIO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT, IN ADDITION 

TO UNCONTROVERTED AFFIDAVITS. 

{¶ 23} On remand, the trial court will consider whether the affidavits submitted with 

Henry’s motion for leave credibly establish that he was unavoidably prevented from 

discovering the evidence of the affair between his trial counsel and his ex-fiancé. We 

conclude that it would be premature for us to address Henry’s second assignment of error 

relating to his motion for new trial prior to the trial court ruling on Henry’s motion for leave 

to file his motion for new trial. Crim.R. 33(B). Consequently, Henry’s second 

assignment of error is overruled at this time. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 24} Having sustained Henry’s first assignment of error, the trial court’s 

November 8, 2016 decision is reversed and the cause is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

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FROELICH, J. and TUCKER, J., concur. 
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Copies mailed to: 

Andrew P. Pickering 

Anjuan Henry 

Hon. Richard J. O’Neill