and fall. Appellant further failed to show that Clark County had express 

knowledge of the alleged condition, the district court found, and thus, the 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. This 

appeal followed. 

This court reviews summary judgments de novo. Wood v. 

Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and other evidence on file, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate that no 

genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. To withstand 

summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rely solely on general 

allegations and conclusions set forth in the pleadings, but must instead 

present specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual 

issue supporting her claims. NRCP 56(e); see also Wood, 121 Nev. at 731, 

121 P.3d at 1030-31. 

Appellant argues on appeal that the factual dispute regarding 

who had control of the area where appellant fell should be resolved by a 

jury, and that the facts, among others, that the area was near the front of 

Planet Hollywood, that Planet Hollywood's construction had been going on 

shortly before appellant's fall, and that there was no way to walk to Planet 

Hollywood from the direction appellant approached without walking on 

the boards create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary 

judgment. Appellant also argues that NRS 41.033 does not shield Clark 

County from liability when Clark County was aware of the hazardous 

condition. 

Having considered the parties' briefs and appendices, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

in favor of respondents. Respondents submitted evidence in support of 

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, J. 

their summary judgment motion showing that the Planet Hollywood 

construction project was completed before the date that appellant alleges 

she fell and that they were not engaged in construction in the area where 

appellant alleges she fell. In response, appellant failed to produce any 

evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to 

whether respondents were responsible for the condition of the sidewalk in 

the area where appellant alleges she fell, despite that she was allowed 

additional time to conduct discovery to determine who was in control of 

the area. NRCP 56(e); see also Wood, 121 Nev. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1030-31 

(concluding that while pleadings and other proof must be construed in a 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that party must set forth 

specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial). 

Additionally, appellant failed to provide any evidence that creates a 

genuine issue of material fact for trial as whether Clark County had 

express knowledge of any hazardous condition of the sidewalk. See NRS 

41.033 (prohibiting actions against political subdivisions of the state based 

on failure to discover a hazard). We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of respondents, 

and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

ACt.A AA; 

Hardesty 

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cc: Hon. Douglas Smith, District Judge 

Kathleen J. England, Settlement Judge 

Stovall & Associates 

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP/Las Vegas 

Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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