FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID JAMES GARRISON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-50137

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-00922-DDP-6

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 6, 2018*

Pasadena, California

Filed April 25, 2018

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit 

Judges, and Dana L. Christensen,** Chief District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould

 * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, Chief United States District 

Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
2 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

SUMMARY***

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for conspiracy to 

distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, in a case in which the government offered evidence 

that the defendant and his co-conspirators had abused their 

positions as healthcare providers by intentionally 

prescribing OxyContin for no legitimate medical purpose as 

part of a scheme to sell the drug on the street.

The panel held that the evidence was sufficient to allow 

a reasonable jury to draw the inference that the defendant 

was prescribing OxyContin with the intent to do so for no 

legitimate purpose, and was sufficient to lead a reasonable 

jury to conclude that the defendant had agreed to further the 

scheme to illicitly distribute OxyContin.

The panel also held that there is no error in the remedies 

the trial court crafted for the government’s late disclosures 

or in the jury instructions the court gave regarding the abrupt 

departure of two co-defendants from the trial and the 

dismissal of charges against a third co-defendant.

 *** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 3

COUNSEL

Michael R. Belter (argued), Salinas, California, for 

Defendant-Appellant.

Angela J. Davis, Assistant United States Attorney, Major 

Frauds Section; Lawrence S. Middleton, Chief, Criminal 

Division; United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, 

California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

After a jury trial, David James Garrison was convicted 

of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846. During trial, the government offered 

evidence that Garrison and his co-conspirators had abused 

their positions as healthcare providers by intentionally 

prescribing OxyContin, a powerful opioid pain reliever, for 

no legitimate medical purpose as part of a scheme to sell the 

drug on the street. Garrison appeals his conviction, arguing 

(1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction, and (2) that the district court should have 

dismissed the charges against him, acquitted him, or granted 

him a mistrial because the government did not timely 

disclose certain information. We affirm.

I

There is now an epic crisis of deadly opioid abuse and 

overuse. In 2016, roughly 11.5 million people in the United 

States misused prescription opioids. U.S. Dep’t of Health 

and Human Services, About the U.S. Opioid Epidemic

(2018), https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/ 
4 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

(last visited March 8, 2018). That same year, 116 people on 

average died every day from opioid-related drug overdoses. 

Id. And in 2017, the Acting Secretary of Health and Human 

Services declared the national opioid abuse epidemic a 

public health emergency. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 

Services, HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health 

Emergency to Address National Opioid Crisis (2017), 

https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhsacting-secretary-declares-public-health-emergencyaddress-national-opioid-crisis.html (last visited March 8, 

2018).

In the midst of this crisis, we trust doctors and healthcare 

professionals to be conscientious gatekeepers to these 

dangerous and potentially fatal drugs. But unfortunately 

some medical professionals betray their duty to do no harm 

as healthcare providers and abuse their prescription pads. 

This is exactly what happened at the Lake Medical Group 

clinic (the “Clinic”), where Garrison worked as a licensed 

physician’s assistant from summer 2009 until the Clinic was 

closed in February 2010.

The Clinic was what is often described as a “pill mill,” 

and the activities of people working there led to the illicit 

street-sale of more than a million maximum-strength 

OxyContin tablets. From August 2008 to September 2010, 

the Clinic generated 13,207 prescriptions for OxyContin—

all but six of which were for the drug’s maximum dosage. 

The Clinic employed “patient recruiters” who induced 

people living in homeless shelters and rescue missions to 

visit the Clinic. These of course were not true “patients” in 

the ordinary sense of that word. The Clinic would then use 

the names and Medicare or Medi-Cal cards of the recruited 

patients to generate fraudulent OxyContin prescriptions. 

The recruited patients did not retain the OxyContin that they 
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 5

were prescribed. Instead, people working for the Clinic 

retrieved the drug from participating pharmacists or from the 

recruited patients, and the Clinic operators then had the pills 

sold illegally. The government learned of the Clinic’s 

operations and took steps to shut the Clinic down and 

prosecute those it believed responsible for the scheme.

A

On September 28, 2011, Garrison and eleven other 

codefendants were indicted. Garrison was indicted for 

conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 846, based on his alleged role in the conspiracy 

to distribute OxyContin for no legitimate medical purpose.1 

A second superseding indictment was filed, and the case 

proceeded to trial. Garrison was tried with four alleged coconspirators: Elza Budagova, who acted as a medical 

assistant at the Clinic, and pharmacists Theodore Yoon, Phic 

Lim, and Perry Tan Nguyen.

An expert testified that there were indications from the 

Clinic’s medical files that the prescriptions from the Clinic 

were not for a proper medical purpose. Many files had 

minimal patient histories and in other files the patient 

histories were virtually identical, indicating that they had 

been forged. Further, there was expert testimony that 

immediately prescribing maximum strength OxyContin, as 

was done at the Clinic, was not a proper medical practice.

At trial, the government offered documentary and 

testimonial evidence against Garrison. Garrison stipulated 

 1 Other codefendants were charged with conspiracy to commit 

health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349; unlicensed wholesale distribution of 

prescription drugs, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 333(b)(1)(D), 353(e)(2)(A); and 

aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2.
6 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

that he wrote and signed hundreds of prescriptions for 

OxyContin with similar diagnoses on the prescription pads 

of other medical professionals. Garrison also agreed that it 

was his handwriting on numerous prescriptions for 

OxyContin that appeared to have been pre-signed by other 

persons working at the Clinic. He also signed and left blank 

prescription forms in his own name, apparently for the use 

of others in making prescriptions to the phony patients.

Recruited patients testified at trial that they had never 

been examined by anyone at the Clinic, yet their medical 

files reflected that they had been given an OxyContin 

prescription in Garrison’s handwriting, though on other 

physicians’ prescription pads. There was also video 

evidence of Garrison prescribing OxyContin to a person 

posing as a recruited patient after a six minute interaction. A 

medical expert testified that there was no medical need for 

that OxyContin prescription.

Garrison also lied to an investigator about the extent of 

the physician oversight he received at the Clinic—claiming 

that almost all of his patient examinations were signed off on 

by a physician, whereas the investigator found that the vast 

majority of Garrison’s examinations were not cosigned by a 

licensed physician.

Two cooperating witnesses testified against Garrison: 

Eleanor Santiago and Julie Shishalovsky. Santiago, a former 

licensed physician, had pled guilty to health care fraud after 

falsifying Medi-Cal claims while she was working at the 

Clinic. Santiago testified that the Clinic was a pain 

management clinic with a focus on people suffering from 

chronic pain, which meant that many of the patients had 

already tried to use less intense pain medications. She 

testified that Garrison saw patients without her oversight and 

that Garrison had prescribed OxyContin on a prescription 
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 7

slip that Santiago had pre-signed. Santiago also testified that 

Garrison would sometimes give her medical charts to cosign, 

and that she had noticed that he had prescribed all his 

patients OxyContin. She told Garrison that some of the 

patients did not need that drug, but he continued prescribing 

OxyContin for them anyway.

Shishalovsky worked as a receptionist at the Clinic and 

testified that the Clinic’s operators directed that all of the 

Clinic’s patients should be prescribed the highest strength 

OxyContin, even when there was no need for OxyContin. 

She also testified that Garrison completed pre-signed 

prescriptions “very often,” and also pre-signed his own 

prescriptions.

Garrison made extensive efforts to impeach the 

credibility of both of these witnesses, stressing that they both 

had criminal records and had engaged in fraudulent conduct 

in the past. Garrison did not call any witnesses of his own 

in his defense. Garrison’s main line of defensive argument 

was that he was not aware of the conspiracy and that he did 

not knowingly participate in the conspiracy.

B

Before and during trial, the government made grave 

mistakes in its prosecution of the case by repeatedly failing 

to timely disclose information to the defense, as was required 

by law. First, a witness who testified at trial, Bernard Harris, 

admitted at trial that he had submitted a false medical report 

to his probation officer and to a judge, and Harris said that 

Santiago and Shishalovsky helped him fabricate the record. 

The government questioned Santiago about Harris’s 

statement the morning before she testified, and she admitted 

that she had helped falsify the medical records. But the 

government did not turn over its notes documenting 
8 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

Santiago’s statement to the defense, although it questioned 

Santiago about assisting in the falsification during her trial 

testimony. Santiago testified that she had helped falsify a 

letter regarding Harris’s medical records. Shishalovsky also 

admitted during trial to falsifying medical records, and the 

government stated that Shishalovsky had told them about 

this months before trial, although, the interview report from 

that discussion did not contain this pertinent disclosure.

Also, the government delayed turning over to the defense 

documents relating to Shishalovsky’s plea negotiations with 

the government until a couple of days before Shishalovsky 

testified. The government has conceded that it should have 

turned over this information much sooner pursuant to Giglio 

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), which requires the 

disclosure of promises made to witnesses in exchange for 

their testimony. Importantly, the newly-disclosed 

negotiations informed the defense for the first time that in 

exchange for testimony, the government agreed that 

Shishalovsky would be able to continue working in the 

healthcare field. The government failed to disclose this 

agreement, either during Shishalovsky’s sentencing or 

during her direct testimony at trial. The district judge was 

also belatedly informed of this agreement, and during a 

break in Shishalovsky’s testimony the court advised the jury 

of the government’s and Shishalovsky’s failure to disclose 

this agreement, and told the jury that it could consider this 

background in evaluating Shishalovsky’s credibility. The 

judge also commented to the jury on the irregularity of the 

agreement.

There were other problems with disclosure. Matthew 

Cho was an alleged co-conspirator and a former pharmacist. 

Cho and two other codefendants, Yoon and Lim, entered into 
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 9

a joint defense agreement.2 Shortly before trial, Cho’s 

counsel emailed a letter to the government and to counsel for 

Yoon and Lim that appeared to cover information shielded 

by the joint defense agreement. The government then 

realized that other letters that it had received from Cho’s 

counsel might also contain information that should have 

been protected under the joint defense agreement.

The government also learned that Cho had been 

forwarding confidential information that was potentially 

covered by the joint defense agreement to his FBI agent 

brother. Those emails concerned how Cho might get a deal 

from prosecutors in exchange for his testimony. The district 

court characterized those emails as material that should have 

been turned over pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

83 (1963), which requires a prosecutor to turn over 

potentially exonerating evidence to the defense. The 

government agreed that it did not timely inform the defense 

of Cho’s discussions with his FBI agent brother. Cho was 

not called as a trial witness.

Weeks into trial, the government moved to dismiss its 

charges against Yoon and Lim. The government conceded 

that it had repeatedly failed to timely turn over Brady and 

Giglio evidence, and that it accepted Yoon’s and Lim’s 

counsel’s representation that Cho’s counsel had wrongfully 

disclosed evidence that prejudiced Yoon and Lim. The 

district court granted the motion and also dismissed the 

charges against pharmacist defendant Nguyen that had also 

 2 A joint defense agreement extends attorney-client privilege to 

disclosures made between the attorneys for codefendants, between 

codefendants, and between one codefendant to another codefendant’s 

attorney. See United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 

2012).
10 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

been brought against Yoon and Lim, leaving only the charge 

against Nguyen for financial structuring of transactions to 

avoid reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C. 

§ 5324(a)(3). The district court then gave an instruction 

telling the jury not to read anything into the fact that Yoon 

and Lim were no longer part of the case and that counts had 

been dismissed against Nguyen.

Garrison moved for a dismissal or mistrial arguing that 

the government’s discovery violations prejudiced him and 

that Yoon’s and Lim’s sudden absences from the trial 

inescapably would lead the jury to assume that Garrison was 

guilty. Although the government conceded that it had failed 

to timely produce all of the material to which the defense 

was entitled, it argued that any prejudice would be cured by 

jury instructions. The government also noted that Garrison 

was not a party to the joint defense agreement. The district 

court denied Garrison’s motion.

At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury 

by advising of the government’s failure to timely comply 

with its constitutional obligations, and telling the jury that it 

could draw adverse inferences from this failure. The court 

also advised the jury that this consideration could lead the 

jury to find reasonable doubt as to Garrison’s and his 

codefendants’ guilt.3 The jury was again instructed not to 

 3 The instruction the district court gave was as follows:

Under the United States Constitution, in order for the 

defendant to receive a fair trial, the Government must 

inform the Defense of any information known to the 

Government that tends to suggest the defendant might 

not have committed the crimes or crime charged . . . 

and any information that casts doubt on the credibility 

of the Government’s own evidence. In this case, the 
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 11

speculate as to the reason for Yoon’s and Lim’s absences 

from the trial or to draw inferences for or against the 

remaining defendants based on Yoon’s and Lim’s absences.4 

Upon being instructed, the jury deliberated and delivered a 

verdict finding all the remaining defendants guilty.

Garrison again moved for a new trial or for an acquittal, 

arguing (1) that the government’s Brady and Giglio

violations required a new trial; (2) that Yoon’s and Lim’s 

dismissal in the midst of the trial and the dismissal of a 

portion of the charges against Nguyen prejudiced Garrison; 

and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

Garrison. The district court denied this motion, explaining 

that it considered Garrison to be differently situated from the 

pharmacist defendants and that it was not uncommon for 

some defendants to be dismissed from a multi-defendant trial 

during trial. Additionally, the district court reasoned that 

there was significant documentary evidence against 

 

Government violated those important Constitutional 

principles upon which the fair administration of our 

system of justice depends on multiple occasions. In 

evaluating the merits of this case, you can decide what 

weight, if any, to give to the Government’s violations 

of these Constitutional principles. The Government’s 

actions standing alone or in combination with other 

facts presented in this case, may create a reasonable 

doubt in your mind about the defendant’s guilt.

4 The instruction the district court gave was as follows:

For reasons that do not concern you, the case[s] against 

defendants Theordore Yoon and Phic Lim are no 

longer before you. Do not speculate why. This fact 

should not influence your verdicts with reference to 

the remaining defendants. And you must base your 

verdict solely on the evidence against the remaining 

defendants.
12 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

Garrison separate and apart from any witness testimony. 

The parties then proceeded to sentencing where Garrison 

received a 120-month sentence. Garrison appeals.

II

When faced with a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, 

we “must consider the evidence presented at trial in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution” and then must determine 

whether the evidence is sufficient to allow “any rational trier 

of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 

1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations, quotation marks, and 

alterations omitted) (en banc). Nevils applied the wellknown standard developed by the Supreme Court in Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), which vests in the jury a 

great deal of leeway in reaching its verdict, and promises that 

a jury verdict will be sustained when a rational trier of fact, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, could find all elements of the crime proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318–19. Our decision on 

sufficiency of the evidence is made de novo. United States 

v. Green, 592 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010).

By contrast, we review for abuse of discretion a district 

court’s decision about what sanction to impose for the 

untimely disclosure of Brady and Giglio material. See 

United States v. Struckman, 611 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 

2010); see also United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 512 

(4th Cir. 2013).

III

Garrison was charged with conspiracy to distribute 

OxyContin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 on the grounds 

that he had distributed OxyContin outside the course of usual 
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 13

medical practice and for no legitimate medical purpose in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. “To establish a drug 

conspiracy, the government must prove (1) an agreement to 

accomplish an illegal objective; and (2) the intent to commit 

the underlying offense.” United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 

1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). Further, to demonstrate the underlying 

violation of § 841 the government must prove three 

elements:

(1) that the practitioner distributed controlled 

substances, (2) that the distribution of those 

controlled substances was outside the usual 

course of professional practice and without a 

legitimate medical purpose, and (3) that the 

practitioner acted with intent to distribute the 

drugs and with intent to distribute them 

outside the course of professional practice.

United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 

2006). Here, Garrison is not challenging that there was a 

conspiracy to run a pill mill out of the Clinic; rather, he 

contends that there was inadequate evidence at trial to 

demonstrate that he was aware of the conspiracy or 

knowingly participated in the conspiracy.

We do not consider this to be a close case on sufficiency 

of evidence. As to the underlying violation, there was expert 

testimony that Garrison acted outside the scope of usual 

medical practice and that he participated in distributing 

OxyContin in an alarmingly high volume and strength for no 

legitimate medical purpose. Further, Garrison pre-signed 

prescriptions, filled out pre-signed prescriptions, and wrote 

OxyContin prescriptions for people neither he nor anyone 

else at the clinic had ever examined. He also lied to an 
14 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

investigator about his standard practices. Inconsistencies or 

lying can lead a jury to infer intent. United States v. HaroPortillo, 531 F.2d 962, 963 (9th Cir. 1976). This evidence 

was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to draw the 

inference that Garrison was prescribing OxyContin with the 

intent to do so for no legitimate medical purpose. See 

Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1007.

Even though there was no direct evidence that Garrison 

had entered into an agreement to participate in a drug 

conspiracy, it is well-established that “a jury may infer the 

existence of an agreement from circumstantial evidence, 

such as the defendant’s conduct.” United States v. Reed, 

575 F.3d 900, 924 (9th Cir. 2009). There is no dispute here 

that there was a conspiracy to improperly distribute 

OxyContin. “[O]nce a conspiracy is established only a slight 

connection to the conspiracy is necessary to support a 

conviction,” meaning “that a defendant need not have known 

all the conspirators, participated in the conspiracy from its 

beginning, participated in all its enterprises, or known all its 

details.” United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d 1092, 

1095 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Garrison had much more than a slight connection 

with the conspiracy. He was a major actor in it. He filled 

out prescriptions for OxyContin that had been pre-signed by 

other medical professionals—often repeating similar 

diagnoses to support those prescriptions—and he pre-signed 

his own prescription pad, apparently so others could draw 

prescriptions from it. Coordination like this is “strong 

circumstantial proof of agreement” in a conspiracy case. 

Reed, 575 F.3d at 924 (internal citation and quotations 

omitted). Garrison need not have been aware of or 

participated in the full scope of the scheme—so long as he 

had agreed to further a portion of its illicit operations by 
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 15

colluding in writing fraudulent prescriptions, he could be 

convicted. See Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d at 1095. There 

was sufficient evidence to lead a reasonable jury to conclude 

that Garrison had agreed to further the scheme run out of the 

Clinic to illicitly distribute OxyContin.

IV

Garrison next contends that because charges were 

dismissed against Yoon, Lim, and Nguyen, charges should 

also have been dismissed against him. He further contends 

that because the government repeatedly failed to timely 

disclose evidence revealing weaknesses in its case, there is 

“little doubt” that, if that evidence been timely disclosed, 

Garrison would have been acquitted. Garrison also argues 

that Yoon’s and Lim’s sudden absence from the trial 

prejudiced him and implied his guilt. We disagree on all 

these points.

District courts have discretion in shaping the remedies 

for Brady and Giglio violations. See Struckman, 611 F.3d at 

577. Remedies for such violations, however, “should be 

tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional 

violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on 

competing interests.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)). Because dismissing 

an indictment is a “drastic step,” it is “disfavored.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). But, where a defendant was 

prejudiced by the late disclosure and there was flagrant 

prosecutorial misconduct, dismissal with prejudice may be 

an appropriate remedy. Id.

At the outset, none of the issues regarding Cho were 

relevant to Garrison—Garrison was not a party to the joint 

defense agreement and Cho did not testify at Garrison’s trial. 

Indeed, during the hearing on Garrison’s motion for acquittal 
16 UNITED STATES V. GARRISON

and a new trial, his counsel said that the issues regarding Cho 

“really had nothing to do with Mr. Garrison.” In this way, 

Yoon and Lim were differently situated from Garrison. 

Nguyen was also differently situated because, unlike 

Garrison but like Yoon and Lim, he was a pharmacist, not an 

insider at the Clinic. It was not inconsistent for the district 

court to dismiss the charges against Yoon, Lim, and Nguyen, 

while leaving the charges against Garrison in place.

There is no dispute here that the government failed to 

comply with the requirements of Brady and Giglio when it 

disclosed evidence late regarding Santiago and Shishalovsky 

falsifying records for Harris, and failed to timely disclose the 

side deal with Shishalovsky. All of the late disclosed 

evidence, however, was given to the jury. And the district 

court gave a jury instruction telling the jury that the 

government had disclosed evidence late and that the jury 

could draw adverse inferences from that late disclosure. 

From the instruction it is clear that the jury was empowered 

to exonerate Garrison because of the government’s 

misconduct, if it chose to do so. But the jury instead found 

Garrison guilty. In light of the extensive evidence against 

Garrison, we cannot conclude that any prejudice stemmed 

from the late disclosure. See United States v. Howell, 

231 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no prejudice 

where the defendant was able to effectively cross-examine 

witnesses about the evidence the prosecutor disclosed only 

during trial and there was significant other evidence of the 

defendant’s guilt).

Finally, Yoon’s and Lim’s sudden absences from trial 

and the dismissal of charges against Nguyen, were not 

prejudicial to Garrison. In instances where defendants 

depart from a multi-defendant trial late in the trial, we have 

stated that “the best course may be simply to tell the jury that 
UNITED STATES V. GARRISON 17

the defendant is no longer part of the case.” United States v. 

Bussell, 414 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). This is exactly 

what was done here. The district court also instructed the 

jury not to speculate as to the reason for Yoon’s and Lim’s 

absences and the dismissal of charges against Nguyen, and 

specifically highlighted that the absences and the dismissal 

of charges in no way weighed toward a finding of guilt as to 

the remaining codefendants. There is an “almost invariable 

assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions,” 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987), and 

Garrison has offered no reason to depart from this 

assumption here.

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain 

Garrison’s conviction. We also conclude that there is no 

error here in the remedies the trial court crafted for the 

government’s late disclosures or in the jury instructions the 

court gave regarding the abrupt departure of Yoon and Lim, 

and the dismissal of some charges against Nguyen.

AFFIRMED.