### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ary 7, 200 6
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CLARICE PERKI NS
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. 05-160 Roge r P age, Judge

No. W2005-01643-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled March 28, 2006

Th is i s a n a

pp e a l f ro m th e or de r o f the tria l c ou rt de nying theDe fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to with dr a w g uil ty pleas a nd motion to di smiss all charg es. The D efe ndant, Clarice Perkins, wa s co n v i ct ed of two counts of agg ravated assault pursuant to entry of guilty pleas. She re ceive d an ef fec tive eig ht-y ear sentenc e to be se rv ed o n p ro b ation. After sentenc ing, but be fore the judg ments became final, the Def endant f iled pro se motions to withdraw her g uilty p l ea s and to di smiss all charg es. Afte r conducting an evide ntiary hearing, the trial court de nied bot h m o tions. On appea l, the Def endant
raise s tw o is su e s: the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de nying (1 ) the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to wi thdra w h e r g uil ty pleas, a nd (2) the D efe ndant’s motion to dism iss all charg es. W e af fi rm t h e judgme nt of the trial
c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h J ER R Y L. S MI TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Clarice Per

kins, Pro Se.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Wil lis , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Jer ry Woo da ll, Di stric t Attorne y Ge ne ra l; a nd Jim Th omp so n, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F AC TS

The issues raised in this appeal stem fr om an Octobe r 2004, alter cati on betwee n the Def endant and two employ ees of a walk-in medical clinic in Jackson. A Madison Countyg rand jury returne d an indictment ag ainst the Def endant in F ebrua

ry of 2005, char g ing he r with two counts of
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult wi th a de a dly

we apo n f or inj uring on e pe rs on a ndpla c ing a no the r i n f e ar o f b od ilyT he r ecor d re f l ect s t hat t he St at e amended t he i ndi ct ment at t he gu i l t y pl ea hea r i ng t o conform t o t he evi dence , 1

m o vi ng t he al l egat i o n of b o d i l y i njury f rom co unt one t o co unt t wo , and t he al l egat i o n of p l aci ng a no t her i n f ear of i njury fro m c o u n t t w o to c o u n t o n e

.

T h e D ef en dan t l at er c h an g ed h er mi n d c on ce r n i n g t h e f ac t s , a n d i n a n a f f i dav i t a cc ompan y i ng he r “ M ot i on 2

to D ism iss A ll C h a rg e s,” sh e re c o u n te d the c o n fro n ta tio n w ith the two vic tim s q u ite d iff e re n tly: A s I preced ed [s i c] t o l eave I t o l d the m that t hey were t he R ud est pe o p l e t hat I have seen. W hen I t ur ned t o l eav e t he off

i ce, t he nu r s e s t r ut [ s i c] me ha r d, wh en I as ked h er wh y s he hi t me s he pus h [ s i c]

me a n d t ol d m e t o g e t ou t of t h e off i c e

. Sc u f f l e en s u e d w h e n s h e pu s h e d me af t e r s t r i k i n g me on my
arm and hand

. W hen t he scuf f l e st art ed t he secret ary cam e a ro u n d a n d st art ed hi t t i ng m e f rom t he back and k i cki ng me. I was t r y i ng des pera t el y t o g et out of t he off i ce I was i n f

ear of my l i fe. T hey pu l l ed my w i g of

f a n d con t i n u e t o pur s u i t [s i c] an d fi g h t m e a s I s t r u g g l e ou t of t h e door

. Af

t er I g ot
o ut of t he d o o r and was st ruggl i ng t o get away, one of t he wo m en hi t m e and s p ray ed m e wi t h a f i re ext i ng ui s her af

t er I got out t he do or, wh en we w er e on t he gr ound o ut s i de t he do or. T he wom an t hat

w a s h itt ing m e w ith the fi re e x ting u ish e r h it the w o m a n tha t I w a s tus sling w ith se v e ra l t im e s a lso w ith t he f i re ext i ngui sher t hat s he w a s h itt ing m e wi t h, t hat i s when t he wo m an was i njured. H er f ri end i nj ur ed he r , not me.
-2- inj ury . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 39- 13 -1 02

. Th e De fe nd a nt wa s ar raig ne d an d ap po int e d c ou ns e l in Marc h of 2005. Appointed c ounsel was subseque ntly allowed to w ithdraw beca use the Def

endant
re ta ine d ne w c ou ns e l, (“ Tria l Cou ns e l” ). On June 22 , 2 00 5, theday be fo reDe fe nd a nt w a s to g o to trial, she informe d the court she wished to ac cept a plea a g ree ment, and a g uilty p l ea h ea ri ng was conducte d.
At the g uiltyplea he aring , the fa cts underlying the convictions at issue we re de scribed by the pr os e c uto r a s f

oll ow s:
[T] he State would show upon a trial in reg ard to Count One that on Oc tober the 15 th , 200 4, in M a dis on Cou nty , T e nn e sse e , th e De fe nd a nt d id i nte nti on a lly and/or knowing ly

cause Debr a Frenc h, the victim, to be in rea sonable fe ar of imminent bodil y

injury by use of a deadly wea pon; to wit: a heavy

object. I think proof would show this turned out to be a heavy tape dispense r. I n reg ards to Count Two the State would show that on this date in Madison Cou nty , T e nn e sse e , the De fe nd a nt did int e nti on a lly c aus e bo dil y inj ury to the vic tim , B ro nw y n H e nry , n ow I

thi nk B ro nw y n B e ntl e y , by us e of a de a dly we apo n; t o w it: a hea vy object that turne d out to be a hea vy tape dispense r. 1

Th e De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t th e se fa c ts, a s r e c ou nte d b y the pr os e c uto r, we rec or

re c t. 2

The trial c ourt conduc ted a thoroug h plea colloquy in w hich he aske d the Def endant, a mong other inquiries, the f

ollowing: if at anytime durin g t h e p l ea hearing that y ou do not understand
so me thi ng , will y ou sp e ak up; is the inf orma tio n on th e ple a

a g re e me nt andtria l w a ive r f orm c or re c t;
a nd , d o y ou “ un de rs ta nd e ve rythi ng on thi s fo rm ? ” To the se qu e sti on s th e De fe nd a nt ans we re d in the a ff ir mativ e . T he tria l c ou rt ne xt e xpla ine d to theDe fe nd a nt that sh e ha d th e ri g ht t o: a tr ia l; t o plead not g uilty ; to counsel; to confront witnesses; to te stify in he r defe nse; and the right to appe al a convic tion if she lost at trial. Upon explanation of these rig hts, the following e x chang e took place :T h e r ec or d r ef l ec t s t h at t h e D ef

en dan t e n t er ed a “ bes t i n t er es t ” pl ea t o c ou n t on e of t h e i n di ct men t a n d a 3

sta n d a rd gu ilt y p le a to c o u n t t w o

. -3-

TH E CO UR T: No w, do y ou un de rs ta ndthe se ri g hts ?

THE DEF ENDAN T: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: By pleading g uilty y ou’re g iving up y our right t o a trial, to an appea l, to a sentenc ing he aring , as we ll as all these other rig hts I ’ve just gone over. B y ple a din g g uil ty

y ou ’r e a dmi tti ng to me tha t y ou c omm itt e d th e c ri me to wh i ch y o u ar e p l ea d i n g. I f I acc ept y our plea

it will close y our ca se as far as y our g uilt or innocence is c on c e rn e d. Also , y ou wi ll h a ve a c on vic tio n o n y ou r r e c or d f or the se Cla ss C fe lon ie s.

. . . D o y ou un de rs ta nda ll this ?

THE DEF ENDAN T: Yes, sir.

The trial c ourt also aske d the Def endant if he r plea s w er e b ei n g enter ed knowing ly and voluntarily , to which she re plied, “Ye ah.” When asked i f any one had threatened her or promised her
a nythi ng to c oe rc e he r i nto ple a din g g uil ty , s he re pli e d inthe ne g a tive. Th e tria l c ou rt a lso specific ally

asked the Def

endant if she understood the recommende d sentenc e outl ined i n the plea
a g re e me nt, a ndif

ple a din g g uil ty

a nda c c e pti ng the a g re e d s e nte nc e wa s “ re a lly wha t y ou want t o do,” to which the D efe ndant re plied in the aff irmative. Additionally , the Def endant testified that she wa s satisfied with the re prese ntation she rec eived f rom Trial Counsel. Afte r completing the plea colloquy , the trial court acc epted the Def endant’ s two g uilty pleas and entered convictions for two 3 counts of Class C felony

ag g ravat ed as s au l t

. The c ourt sentenc ed the De fendant to four y ear s for
eac h conviction to be served conse cutively for an eff ective se ntence of eig ht y ear s, to be served on probation.

On June 27 , 2 00 5, fi ve day s a fter pl ead ing g uil ty , th e De fe nd a nt f ile d a pr o s e mot ionto withdraw he r g uiltypleas a lleg ing she was “ misled” and coer ced into a cce pting a plea ag ree ment she did not understand. A few day s later, the Def endant filed a pro se motion to “Dismi ss All Charg es,” alleg ing the re w as insufficie nt evidence to char g e her for the crimes for which she was convic ted. She st at ed t h at the State could better utiliz e its resourc es by

dropping the ca se ag ainst her a nd
conce ntrating on “crimes worthy of its time and ener g y .”

I n J uly of 2005, an e videntiary

hearing w as conduc ted on the De fendant’s two motions, at which the De fendant, proce eding pro se, c alled one w itness. Ms. Gertrude Randolph testified that she sat in on a meeting betwee n the Def endant and Trial Counsel, and that Trial Cou n s el was “irritable ” at this meeting . On cro s s -e x am i n ation, Ms. Randolph testified that Trial Counsel was “for cef ul” in prese nting he r views, opinions and a dvice.-4-

The De fendant also testified at the he aring that she did not rea d the pl ea ag ree ment and trial waiver form bef ore she signe d it; that she did not understand the f orm; and that the form was neve r re a d to he r or e xpla ine d to he r. Th e De fe nd a nt fu rthe r te sti fi e d that Tria l Co un se l c oe rc e d h e r i nto
acc epting the plea a g ree ment in part by claiming she wa s not ready to take the c ase to trial.

On cr oss-examination, the Defe ndant admitted t hat s he was informed of all her rights at the g uiltyplea he aring by

the judg e. She also said she knew she was to spe ak u p i f s h e d i d not
un de rs ta nda nythi ng , a ndfu rthe r a dmi tte d th a t sh e sta te d a t the he ari ng that sh e didun de rs ta nda ll of her rig hts as well as everything contained in the pl ea ag ree ment and trial waiver form. Howeve r, the Def endant maintaine d that despite what she said at the g uiltyplea he aring , she ac tually did not understand. T he De fendant also admitted that she told the judge she was e ntering her g uiltypleas knowing ly and voluntarily at the plea hearing, but a g ain insisted that she did not rea lly know what she wa s say ing. A dditionally , the Def endant a dmitted that she initi ally told the tria l co u rt that she was satisfied w ith Trial Counsel’s repr esentat i o n

. W h en asked if she was unde r the influenc e of drug s or suffe ring from a me ntal defe ct when she enter ed her pleas, t h e Defendant re plied in the neg ative but adde d that she wa s under sig nificant stre ss.
Trial Counsel t estified that she had twenty -three y ear s of ex perie nce as an attorney and had
a mpl y pr e pa re d f or the De fe nd a nt’ s tria l. Tria l Coun se l sta te d tha t she tho ro ug hly dis c us se d w ith the De fe nd a nt he r op tio ns of a c c e pti ng the ple a a g re e me nt o r g oin g to t

ri a l a ndfa c ing the po ssi bil ity of jail time, and that the Defenda nt understood these options. Trial Counsel further stated that the De fe n d an t s eemed most concerned with simplyavoiding jail time. Trial Counsel describe d the Def endant’ s sentence of t otal probation as “a swe ethea rt dea l,” and noted that the Def endant wa s by all acc ounts happy

with the plea a g ree ment rig ht up to the time she called he r probation officer and thought he was “rude ” to he r. On cr oss-examination, Trial Counsel stated that she neve r promised the Def endant that she would be “f ully exonerated.” Rather, Trial Counsel stated t hat s he informe d the Def endant she could g et her

out of doing jail time, and that is ex actly what her plea a g ree ment allowed he r to do.

At the conc lusion of the evidentiary hearing the trial court f

ound that, wit h rega

rd to the Def endant’ s motion t o withdraw he r g uilty p l ea s , “w h at we ha ve her e is a pe rson who is, number one, trying to a

buse the sy stem and, number two, is try ing to a void harsher punishment.” The c ourt
c on c lud e d:

So b a se d o n th e tot a lit y

of the c ir c ums ta nc e s, I ’m g oin g to f ind , b a se d o n w hat I

sa id to h e r d uring theg uil ty ple a pr oc e e din g s and ba se d on th e e vid e nc e that w e ha ve thi s mor n ing, that Ms. Perkins did understand that plea and that it was knowing ly and voluntarily

g iven. B ased on the totalityof the c ircumstance s I ’m not g oing to a llow
a wi thdra wa l.T he t ri al co urt i ss ued a form al o rder d enyi ng the t wo m o t i o ns o n J ul y 1 9 , 2 0 0 5

. T he co urt de cl ared t hat t he 4

m o tio n to w ithdraw gui l t y pleas was denied b ecause t he D efend ant “ ent ered her gui l t y plea[s ] knowingl y and

v o lun ta rily,” a n d sh e “faile d to s h o w a n y m a n ifest inj u stice w o u ld re su lt in n o t allo w ing the w ithd ra w a l o f he r p le a [s ].” T he t r i al cour t deni ed t he mo t i on t o di s mi s s al l ch ar ges becau s e i t “ has not gr ounds t o s uppo r t i t

. ”

“I ss ues whi ch are not supp o rt ed by argument, ci t at i o n t o a ut ho ri t i es, o r ap p rop ri at e ref erences t o t he reco rd 5

w ill b e tre a te d a s w a ive d in this c o u rt.”

“An argum ent , whi ch m ay b e p reced ed b y a sum m ary o f a rgume nt , set t i ng fort h the content i o ns o f t he ap p el l ant 6

w ith re sp e c t t o the issu e s p re se n te d , an d th e r e a so n s the re fo r, inc lud ing the re a so n s w h y the c o n te n tio n s re q u ire a p p e llate

r el i ef , wi t h c i t at i ons t o t he aut hor i t i es and appropri at e r ef er enc es t o t he r ecor d (w hi ch may be quot ed ve r bat i m) r el i ed

on. ”

W hi l e t he D efend ant m akes a f ew ref erences t o do cum ent s i n t he reco rd o n ap p eal , t hese r eferences s up p o rt 7
h e r a rg u m e n t o f a c tu a l in n o c e n c e o r in su ff ic ie n t ev id e n c e , an a rg u m e n t t h a t i s ina p p ro p ria te fo r th e issu e s o n a p p e a l. A s su c h , w e d o no t co n sid e r th e se c ites “a p p ro p ria te ” re fer e n c e s to the re c o rd

. -5- As to the motion to dismiss , the trial court simply conclude d that it “obviouslywill also be denied.” 4 This appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S The Defendant now claims in her pro se appe llate brief that the trial court erre d in deny ing her motion to withdraw g uiltypleas a nd motion to di smiss all charg es. To support these claims, the Def endant, in no pa

rticular or der, makes the following basic a rg uments: the court “mis-use d” [sic] the law to “c lear

the docke t with reckle ss disreg ards [sic] for law and the judicial proce ss;” she wa s “o v erch ar ged an d m i s -c h ar ged [ s i c ] w i t h aggr av at ed as s au l t ; s h e w as “[ c] o er ce d i n t o ac ce p t i n g a plea ba rg ain against her will; ” she was “g iven a harsh sentence ;” s he had ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel; “she is a black fema le and has been discriminated ag ainst;” there is insufficient evidenc e to c on vic t he r o f a g g ra vate d a ssa ult ; a ndthe tria l c ou rt

a ndthe Di strict At torne y “ ha ve be e n in collusion in conspiring to tre at Def endant pr o se g rossly

unfairly

. ” I n our view, the Def endant’ s arg uments do not gain her re lief.

I. P roce dural In adequacies The State a

rg ues in its appellate brief that both of the D efe ndant’s cl ai m s on appea l are waived dueto the Def

endant’ s failure to cite to any authority to support her a

rg uments and fa ilure to make appr opriate c ita t i o n s t o t h e record. We note that our Court re quires that appe llants, on appea l, present an argum en t, make appr opriate r efe renc es to the re cord, and cite re levant leg al
auth ority in s up po rt

of the ir arg ume nts . Se e Te nn . Ct . Crim. Ap p. R. 1 0( b)

. Ad dit ion a lly , a ll 5 Te nn e sse e app e llate c ou rt s r e qu ir e the app e llant’ s b ri ef t o c on ta in an a rg ume nt, c itatio ns to
auth oriti e s, a ndapp ro pria te re fe re nc e s to the re c or d. Se e Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 2 7( a )( 7)

. Fail ure to 6

c omp ly wi th the se ba sic ru le s w ill or din ari ly c on sti tut e a waive r of the iss ue . See Te nn . Ct . Crim. App. R. 10(b); State v. Thompson, 36 S.W .3d 102, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

.
I n h e r a pp e llate brie f the De fe nd a nt f a ils to c ite to any auth ority in su pp ort of he r a rg ume nts and fails to m ake “a p p ro p ri ate r efe renc es to the re cord.” Additionally , the majority of the 7-6-

De fe nd a nt’ s “ arg ume nts ” are e ith e r i na pp ro pria te fo r the iss ue s r a ise d o na p p e al, s uc h a s h e r mult ipl e challeng es t o the s ufficie ncy of t he evidence, or are mere ly conclusory

statements conc erning how she wa s, in her view, tr eate d unfairly . All of the Def endant’ s arg uments are larg ely unsupported by the e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in there c or d o n a pp e a l. U nd e r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s w e areno t ob lig a te d to revie w any of the De fendant’s issues as they are prese nted. See State v. Ke ller, 813 S.W.2d 146, 150 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 91 ) (“ B a ld a sse rt ion s u na c c omp a nie d b y le g a l a rg ume nt o r c itatio ns to authorities ar e wa ived.”) . Nonethele ss, because an ad equate rec ord has be en provide d for our revie w, we w ill overlook these def iciencie s and addr es s t h e m erits of the issues raised by the De fe nd a nt o n a

pp e a l.

II. Motion to Withdraw Guilty P leas I n her f irst issu e on appea l, the Def endant c laims that the trial court e rre d in deny ing he r mo ti o n to w ith d r a w h e r

g u il ty p le a s

. T o s upport this cl a im , th e D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s th a t “ [n ]o inv e sti g a tio n w a s d on e by a ny on e that r e pr e sent ed d e fe nd a nt p ro se , h e r p ub lic de fe nd e r t ri e d to make he r take a plea

barg ain, the next attorney t h at s h e re tained lef t her in court at a pre liminary hearing and did not properly repr esent he r and w ould not return her phone ca lls.” Also, the Def endant c laims she was “[c] oerc ed int o acc epting a plea barg ain against her will,” and that if she ha d “ g oo d c ou ns e l, sh e wo uld no t ha ve be e n in dic te d. ” We i nte rp re t th e se a lle g a tio ns to b e a c la im that she r e c e iv e d in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is tan c e o f

c o u n s e l an d th e r e f

o r e h e r g u il ty p le a s w e r e e n te r ed
u n k n o w i n g l y a n d i n v o l u n t ar i l y. Our supre me court has rec ently explained the standard f

or re viewing a trial c ourt’s denia l of
a mot ionto w ith dr a w a

g uil ty ple a a s f oll ow s:
A def endant doe s not have a

unilatera l rig ht to withdraw a plea. Whether a defe ndant should be permitted to withdraw a plea is a matter addr essed to the sound d i s cr et i o n o f t h e t ri al co u rt , re gar d l es s o f w h en t h e m o t i o n i s fi l ed

. T h e t ri al j u d ge “should alway s exercise his discretion with caution in re fusing to set aside a ple a of g u i l t y , t o t h e end that one ac cused of crime may

have a fair and impartial trial.”

“ [ W ] he n a

c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n is sh ow n, the tria l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n is stric tly curta iled.” The trial court’ s decision “will not be reverse d unless it clea rly appea rs that there was a n abuse of discretion.” A n abuse of discretion exi s t s if the re cord lacks substantial evide nce to support the trial court’s c onclusion.
State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Tenn. 2005) ( internal c itations omi tted).

The withdra wal of a

g uiltyplea is g overne d by Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedur e 32(f ): A motion to withdraw a plea of g uilty may be made upon a showing by the def endant of a ny fair a nd jus t re a so n only be fo re se nte nc e is i mpo se d; b ut t o c or re c t manif

e st injusti ce, the court a fter se ntence , but before the jud gm en t becomes f inal, may set aside the judg ment of convic tion and permit the def endant to withdra w the plea

.-7-

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Our high court has noted t hat “[t] he more demanding standard, ‘ to corre ct manifest injustice,’ a

pplies to moti ons [l ike the De fendant’s motion] whi c ha r e filed a fter imposition of sentenc e. This standar d is based ‘upon pr actica l considerations im portant to the prope r administration of justice.’” Crowe, 168 S.W .3d at 741 (quoting Kadwe ll v. United S tates, 315 F .2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963)).
Although “manife st injustice” is not define d in the rules of c riminal proce dure, c ourts have identified on a c ase- by -ca se basis circumstance s that meet the manifest injusti ce sta ndard ne cessa ry for withdra wal of a

plea. See State v. Turner , 919 S.W .2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Our suprem e co u rt has held that withdra wal of a g uiltyplea to cor

rec t manifest injustice is warr anted wher e: (1) the plea was enter ed through a misunderstanding as to its effe ct, or throug h fea r and f raud, or whe re it wa s not made voluntarily ; (2) the pr osecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidenc e as require d by Br ady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963), and this failure to disclose influenc ed the entry of the plea ; (3) the plea

was not knowing ly , voluntarily , and under standing ly enter ed; and ( 4) the def endant wa s denied the eff

ective assistance of counsel in c onnection with the entry of the plea

. Se e Cr ow e , 1 68 S.W. 3da t 742. Ad dit ion a lly , “ [w]he rethe reis a de nia l of du e pr oc e ss, the re is a manifest injustice as a matter of law.” State v. Davis, 823 S.W .2d 217, 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.
Howeve r, it is a lso w ell-settled law that a defe ndant’s mer e chang e of he art a bout pleading g uil ty , or a de fe nd a nt’ s diss a tis fa c tio n with the pu nis hme nt ult imate ly imp os e d d oe s n ot c on sti tut e manifest injustice wa

rrantin g wi t hdraw al. See Crowe , 168 S.W .3d at 743; Henning v. State, 201 S.W .2d 669,671 (Tenn. 1947) ; Turner , 919 S.W .2d at 355. Moreove r, the de fendant bears the burden of establishing that a plea should be withdrawn “ to preve nt ‘manifest injustice.’” Turner , 919 S.W .2d at 355.

I n this case, the D efe ndant ar g ues that her g uiltypleas should b e withdrawn be cause they
wer e not knowing ly , understanding ly or voluntarily enter ed. We beg in our ana ly sis by noting that the determination of whether a plea was e ntere d voluntarily

and k n o wing ly

is made base d on the totalityof the c ircumstance s. See Turne r, 919 S.W.2d at 353. Upon considering the totality of the circ umstances in this case we c annot conc lude that the De fendant es t ab l i s h ed that she did not kn ow ing ly

a ndvo lun tari ly

e nte r h e r g uil ty ple a s. Th e tr a ns c ri pt fr om the g uil ty ple a he ari ng re fl e c ts that the trial court thoroug hly and methodically explained the nature of the c harg es the De fendant fac ed, all of he r rig hts as an ac cused, and the conse quence s of entering a plea of g uilty . The c ourt
re pe a te dly a sk e d the De fe nd a nt if sh e un de rs too d its inst ru c tio ns , to wh ic h s he a lw a y s a ns we re d in the a ff ir mativ e . The c ou rt a lso a sk e d the De fe nd a nt if sh e wa s “su re ” sh e wante d to g o th ro ug h w ith the ple a a g re e me nt, to wh ic h s he a lso a ns we re d inthe a ff ir ma tiv e . T he De fe nd a nt w a s a lso e xpre ssl y asked if she enter ed her

pleas knowing ly and voluntarily , to w hich she answe red y es, and w as aske d if sh e wa s b e ing c oe rc e d in any ma nn e r, to wh ic h she a ns we re d no. F urthe rm or e , the De fe nd a nt a lso stated that she wa s satisfied with Trial Counsel’s re prese ntation.

At the hea

ring on the motion to withdraw, the De fendant failed to prese nt any evidenc e that would indicate her pleas wer e enter ed unknowing ly or involuntarily . To the contra ry , the Def

endant testified t h at s h e wa s neither unde r the influenc e of any narc otics nor suffe red f

rom any mental-8-

defe cts. The De fendant stated only that she wa s under stre ss. Additionally , Trial Counsel testified that she thoroug hl y d i s cu ssed the De fendant’s case with her a s well as the “ pros and c ons” of
acc epting the plea of

fer . Under

these c ircumstance s, we c annot conc lude th at t h e Defendant established that she e ntere d her gu il ty p le a s u n kn o w in g ly

or involuntarily . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that there was no manifest injusti ce in this case , and there fore the trial court did not err in denying the Def endant’ s motion t o withdraw he r g uiltypleas. This issue is without merit.

III. Motion to Dism iss All Charges I n her se cond issue on appea l, the Defenda nt asserts that the t rial court err ed when it denied he r m oti on to d ism iss a ll c ha rg e s. I n th e mot ionto d ism iss , th e De fe nd a nt a rg ue d th a t “ sh e is g uil ty
o f n o t h i n g and us [sic] completely innocent of a ll charg es.” In her a ppellate brief, the D efe ndant ag ain ar g ues that there was insufficient evidenc e to support he r convictions. Whil e the De fendant has not provided e vidence bey ond her ow n self-se rvi ng statements to support this alleg ation, we conclude that the Def

endant ha s waived a ll right to cla im actual innoce nce or challeng e the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence upon which her convictions wer e based. The law is f irmly established that the entry

of a knowing and voluntary g uilty plea waives any challeng e to the suff

iciency of the evidenc e on appe al. See Hobbs v. State 73 S. W. 3d 155, 158-59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (holding “[a]bsent some proof in t h e re co rd t hat [the defendant’s] guilty plea wa s not knowingly and volunta r il y e n te r e d , th e o n ly

c o n c lu s io n th a t c a n b e r e a c h e d is th a t [ th e d e f e n d a n t] w a iv e d a ny challeng e to the suff

iciency of the e vidence upon entry of the g uiltyplea.” ).

I n this case, the Defe ndant’s convictions wer e ente red upon he r plea s of g uilty , in acc ordanc e with a neg otiated plea a g ree ment. After the judgme nts of conviction wer e enter ed, the De fendant moved to dismiss the cha rg es ag ai n s t her ba sed on her assertion that she was “g uiltyof nothing .” The trial c ourt found the motion to be without merit and denied the motion. We conclude that the trial court did not er

r. CO NC LU SION B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g re a so nin g a ndauth oriti e s, we a ff ir m the jud g me nt of the tria l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE