16-832-pr Porter v. Goord, et al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AF TER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROC EDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELEC TRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION

A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seco nd Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United Stat es Courthouse, 40 Foley Sq uare, in the City of New York, on the 17 th day of January, two thousand seventeen. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- LARRY PORTER, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 16-832-pr GLENN GOORD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- FOR APPELLANT: Larry Porter, pro se , Malone, New York. FOR APPELLEES: Barbara D. Un derwood, Solicitor General, Victor Paladino, Jeffrey W. Lang, Assistant Solicitors General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York, Albany, New York. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Leslie G. Foschio, Magistrate Judge ).2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERE D, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on February 23, 2016, is AFFIRMED. Larry Porter, pro se , appeals from the dismissal of his motion for enforcement of a stipulated settlement with four Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) officials, which re solved Porter’s excessive fo rce claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Porter claims he is owed 41 days’ interest. We assume the parties’ familiarity with th e underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. The district court properly dismissed Porte r’s motion to enforce for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Enforcing a settlement pur suant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) “is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). To retain ancillary jurisdiction “o ver enforcement of a settlement agreement, Kokkonen prescribes that a district court’s orde r of dismissal must either (1) expressly retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, or (2) incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.” Hendrickson v. United States , 791 F.3d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 2015). The district court’s text order of dismissal did neither. Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter juri sdiction to entertain Porter’s motion. We have considered all of Porter’s re maining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court