Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-760 | October 12, 2018 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Lisa M. Johnson

Brownsburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE DCS

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Kyle Hunter

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination of 

the Parent-Child Relationship of 

K.K.M., Minor Child, and K.M., 

Mother,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

 and

Child Advocates, Inc., 

Co-Appellee.

October 12, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-760

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge

Pro Tem

The Honorable Larry Bradley, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1705-JT-466 

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-760 | October 12, 2018 Page 2 of 19

[1] K.M. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights 

with respect to K.K.M. Mother raises two issues which we restate as whether 

the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 8, 2016, K.K.M. was born, and Mother and baby tested positive for 

cocaine. Mother, who was born on January 19, 1984, used cocaine “like once 

every few months” from the time she was twenty-two years-old until K.K.M.’s 

birth and, approximately a month before his birth, she “did it like maybe once a 

week for a month.” Transcript Volume II at 8-9. On May 11, 2016, the 

Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging K.K.M.

was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and stating that Mother had 

previously given birth to a drug-exposed infant, had a history with DCS and 

was previously offered services through a CHINS action, and “continues to 

demonstrate an inability to provide the child with a safe, drug-free home,” 

despite prior services having been offered. Petitioner’s Exhibit 19. On May 12, 

2016, the court held an initial hearing and issued its Order Regarding Children 

in Need of Services Initial/Detention Hearing which indicates that Mother had 

no objections to DCS’s recommendations because “she and grandmother have 

a good relationship” and that DCS noted K.K.M. remained in relative care 

with his maternal grandmother1 and requested continued placement and for 

 

1

In her brief, Mother indicates that K.K.M. went home with his maternal grandmother when he left the 

hospital on May 10, 2016. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-760 | October 12, 2018 Page 3 of 19

authorization for foster care. Petitioner’s Exhibit 18A. The order, which 

indicates that the family case manager states “this is Mother’s second 

substance-positive infant and they would like to see a length of time of negative 

screens before they recommend relative care supervision,” authorized Mother 

to have supervised parenting time “contingent upon continued submission of 

clean screens.” Id. 

[3] On August 15, 2016, the court held a hearing on the CHINS petition, which 

Mother did not attend, continued K.K.M.’s placement and adjudicated him to 

be a CHINS, and found: Mother had three random drug screens and tested 

positive for cocaine, alcohol, and hydrocodone on May 10, 2016, and for 

alcohol on May 12, 2016, and May 25, 2016; Mother’s attorney withdrew due 

to not having contact with her; and Mother had not had any parenting time 

with K.K.M. On the same day, the court issued both a dispositional order and 

a participation order. The latter required Mother to engage in home-based 

therapy and case management and follow all recommendations, to complete a 

substance abuse assessment and all treatment recommendations, and to submit 

to random drug and alcohol screens. 

[4] On May 1, 2017, the court held a permanency plan hearing, which Mother did 

not attend, and found that she “has not participated in services and has been 

discharged a couple of times” and that the family case manager met last week

with Mother who “acknowledged that she has not been engaged in services.” 

Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. 
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[5] On May 22, 2017, DCS filed its verified petition for involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights. On October 23, 2017, the court held a hearing, in 

which Mother indicated that she continued using cocaine, marijuana, and 

alcohol after K.K.M.’s birth “every day” until September of 2017; that she spent 

“twenty bucks,” or “not much at all,” per week on drugs and alcohol; that she 

was living at her brother’s home; that she was not currently working; that she 

had a ten year-old child and a five year-old child who were in their father’s care; 

and that she was in a car wreck “maybe six months ago” in which she was 

driving her brother’s car and was under the influence of alcohol, cocaine, and 

marijuana. Mother also stated that she had a criminal history related to her 

drug use that included possession of marijuana and operating while intoxicated

that “was like six months ago”, and that she did not successfully complete the 

services ordered by the court in the CHINS matter. Transcript Volume II at 11, 

13-14. When counsel for the guardian ad litem asked if Mother’s child, Ca., 

was born drug positive, Mother answered affirmatively and indicated she had 

been using cocaine, and the following exchange regarding Ca. and Mother’s 

other child, Co., occurred:

Q: And at the time that the CHINS was filed for [Ca.], in two 

thousand eleven, was your other child made a child in need of 

services at the same time?

A: My oldest son?

Q: Mhmm.

A: No.
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Q: If I have paper work showing an order to file on both 

children, would you disagree with that, or does that help refresh 

your memory?

A: I really don’t understand – I don’t – I don’t understand, I am 

saying like I have the thing with [Ca.], so I don’t think [Co.], I 

didn’t have any problem with my oldest son.

Q: During that child in need of services case, did you complete 

any services to address your drug use?

A: No, actually, my kid’s father took custody of my son.

Q: So that case closed eventually with the children going to their 

dad’s?

A: Mhmm.

* * * * *

Q: Okay. Would it have been April twenty ninth twenty thirteen 

when the case closed? You don’t remember?

A: If it says it, I guess that is it.

* * * * *

Q: Did you have an opportunity through that prior CHINS case 

to do drug treatment services?

A: Um, yes, I think so. I would think they would give thos [sic] 

– I kind of don’t remember, but I would think they –

Q: You weren’t able to complete them during that case?

A: I mean because with the – with my kids’ father – just with the 

whole situation – he just adopted [Ca.], so – I don’t think, I know

– I don’t remember.

Id. at 17-18.
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[6] Mother agreed that all of the services ordered as part of the CHINS case for 

K.K.M. were appropriate and she needed them, that she missed “a lot of drug 

screens,” and that some of them would have been positive if she had taken 

them. Id. at 20. When asked if she felt that she needed treatment before she 

could provide K.K.M. with a safe home, she stated, “I would think I need some 

– I need some structure in this – with this drug thing. I am clean, but I am 

battling it, I am struggling. I think maybe I can get some tools or something.” 

Id. at 22-23. She indicated that she felt she needed treatment “with the tools 

and stuff,” and stated “when I went to Valle Vista, I think I can wipe this out,” 

that she needed “a little more time,” and that “[s]ix days aint going to do it for 

me.” Id. at 23.

[7] DCS family case manager Bradley Riddle testified that he assessed K.K.M. in 

May 2016, made the decision to remove K.K.M. from Mother based on the 

previous DCS history involving her two other children and the positive drug 

screens at the hospital, and that DCS ended up substantiating Mother for the 

neglect of K.K.M. The court heard testimony from case manager Sharon 

Sanders who began visitations with Mother in January 2017 and later 

conducted home-based case management in March of 2017 and who stated that 

Mother’s visits “started to trail off due with [sic] [Mother] cancelling [and] there 

were times where she was late.” Id. at 40. When asked when she noticed the 

change in Mother’s attendance, case manager Sanders answered “about three 

months in . . . is when she started to give excuses why she could not come to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-760 | October 12, 2018 Page 7 of 19

visits” and indicated that Mother missed about half of her visits with K.K.M. 

Id. 

[8] Case manager Sanders also testified that Mother’s initial goals included 

admission into rehab, employment, and housing. She answered in the negative 

when asked whether Mother felt like she could manage her addiction without 

treatment and indicated Mother received referrals to the Terra Treatment 

Center and Volunteers of America, needed to go to the detox center before she 

could be admitted to Terra, and attended Valle Vista for detox during the first 

week of September 2017.2 She indicated Mother was fired from Caito Food 

Service because she did not complete her application correctly, and testified

“[b]etween mom and her brother” when asked where Mother was living at the 

time of her client assessment and “[s]ame, between mom and brother” when 

asked where Mother was living now. Id. at 43. When asked to identify 

Mother’s greatest barriers to achieving her goals, case manager Sanders 

answered “communication with me” and “waiting to be admitted to a bed,” 

and indicated later that Mother did not communicate with her when she was 

under the influence and that communication was a problem “because we were 

unable to complete any goals or objectives.” Id. at 45, 52. 

 

2 Respondent’s Exhibit VV indicates that Mother was admitted on August 29, 2017, to Valle Vista Health 

System, and was discharged on September 6, 2017. On the “Reason for Hospitalization” line, the “detox” 

box is marked. Respondent’s Exhibit VV at 3. 
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[9] Case manager Sanders testified that she had seen Mother intoxicated at an

August 8, 2017 court hearing,3 and that Mother had told her she had been 

drinking. After indicating that Mother attended Fairbanks “for about seven 

days, six days” before attending Valle Vista, she agreed with counsel for DCS 

that Mother used after that period of time and indicated that it was because 

Mother “verbally has stated that she has used.” Id. at 77. She testified that she 

did not believe that Mother was currently able to care for a child because “she 

has not had the treatment that she needs.” Id. at 47. She also indicated that the 

house of Mother’s mother was inappropriate for a child “due to the traffic in the

home.” Id. at 69.

[10] Guardian ad litem Jennifer Ankney (“GAL Ankney”) testified that Mother 

attended one child and family team meeting and was not in attendance at the 

other ones, that she did not recommend placement of K.K.M. back with 

Mother because she did not believe Mother had “demonstrated her ability to 

address her sobriety or maintain her sobriety,” and that she recommended 

continuing with the plan of adoption with foster parents, who “have provided . 

. . a very safe, loving home” for K.K.M. for nearly a year and with whom he 

had bonded. Id. at 84. She indicated it was in K.K.M.’s best interests that 

Mother’s rights be terminated because she did not believe Mother had 

addressed her ability to provide a safe and stable home for him and 

 

3 The record contains a copy of the chronological case summary for the CHINS case involving K.K.M. and 

Mother which indicates that a placement review hearing was completed on August 7, 2017. 
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characterized Mother’s participation in the CHINS case as “[n]on-existent, 

really.” Id. at 85. 

[11] On January 10, 2018, the court continued the hearing and Mother’s mother 

testified that she never left K.K.M. alone with Mother “[f]or his protection.” 

Id. at 218. Nia Williams, K.K.M.’s family case manager since September 2016 

(“FCM Williams”), testified that when she was assigned to the case, Mother 

was not engaging in services and that her whereabouts were unknown, that she 

talked with Mother about engaging in services in November 2016, and that she 

made a new referral for drug screens as well as referrals for home-based care 

management with supervised visitation, a substance abuse assessment, and 

home-based therapy. She indicated that Mother had not completed any courtordered services and that the next time she spoke with Mother was mid-to-late 

April 2017, when she made Mother aware of the May 1, 2017 permanency 

hearing. FCM Williams stated she had met with Mother prior to an August 7, 

2017 hearing and that Mother was “under the influence that day” and behaving 

very erratic, kissed her, and “tripped over like nothing that was there.” Id. at 

104-105. She testified that K.K.M. has not been returned to Mother’s care since 

he was removed and Mother had not remedied the conditions for DCS’s initial 

involvement and for K.K.M.’s continued placement, and that Mother “was 

completing treatment, and then she relapsed. She chose not to engage when 

referrals were made for her previously.” Id. at 107. 

[12] FCM Williams agreed when asked if continuation of the parent-child 

relationship between Mother and K.K.M. would pose a threat to his well-being 
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and explained that Mother’s “situation right now isn’t stable. Again, she 

doesn’t have a stable home.” Id. at 108. She agreed that termination of the 

parent-child relationship was in K.K.M.’s best interests because “she is not able 

right now to meet [K.K.M.’s] needs. She is not able to parent appropriately 

until she regains and maintains her sobriety.” Id. at 109. During crossexamination, counsel for the guardian ad litem asked FCM Williams if the drug 

treatment that Mother was currently engaged in was the only drug treatment 

she had received during K.K.M.’s life, and FCM Williams answered negatively

and stated that Mother had “went through Fairbanks prior to this” and 

“completed a substance abuse assessment, I believe through Families First 

before this.” Id. at 111.

[13] The court heard additional testimony from Mother in which she testified that 

her current residence was at Volunteers of America (“VOA”), a recovery 

treatment center, that she had been there since October 2017 and finished the 

acute program at one point, that when she “was on the second phase, a screen 

came back positive for marijuana” and she had to “drop back down,” and that 

she was still on the twenty-one day acute phase.4 Id. at 226. When asked if she 

thought she could return to her employment at Taco Bell that she had started

on her second phase, she stated “I can. I still have employment there.” Id. at 

 

4 The VOA Fresh Start Recovery Center Monthly Report from December 2017 indicates that Mother was 

“due to complete the Step-Down Phase of and discharge from the Fresh Start Recovery Center” on January 

17, 2018 and that Mother restarted the Acute Phase on December 29, 2017, when she tested positive for 

THC. Respondent’s Exhibit TT. 
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227. She answered negatively when asked by her counsel if she used drugs 

before December 17, 2017, and stated “[n]o ma’am I didn’t” when asked “[y]ou 

had a positive screen on December seventeenth, did you use?” Id. at 229. She 

indicated that she did not have any explanation for the positive screen. (Id.) 

She testified that she had not seen K.K.M. since April 2017 and, in explaining 

what happened when she stopped visiting, stated: 

[DCS] stopped my visits because I wasn’t – I honestly wasn’t –

would have visits. Sometimes I would cancel visits. I was still 

using and um when I would have my visits some days, I would 

call and let them know because I had become under the 

influence, so I would have my visits – I wasn’t consistent 

honestly with my visits.

Id. at 232. She answered negatively when asked if she believed she still had 

visits and stated “[t]hey told me I couldn’t receive my visits until I got into 

treatment.” Id. at 232-233.

[14] On March 13, 2018, the court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights, which provided in part: 

10. [Mother] was to undergo a substance abuse assessment and 

follow recommendations due to [Mother] having a long history 

of cocaine, marijuana and alcohol abuse. She was involved in a 

CHINS case approximately six years ago when another child was 

born cocaine positive. That case ended with her child being 

placed with the father due to [Mother] being unsuccessful at 

services.

11. [Mother] has had periods of sobriety but has not maintained 

it for the past eleven years.
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12. After a lapse in time, [Mother] did go to Fairbanks Hospital

to address substance abuse. She later relapsed.

13. [Mother] went through a seven-day program with Fairbanks 

but relapsed thereafter.

14. In September of 2017, [Mother] went through a 

detoxification program through Valle Vista.

15. As of the first day of trial in this matter, [Mother] was 

awaiting a bed in a drug program through Tara. [Mother] felt 

she needs treatment and struggles with her sobriety.

16. [Mother] did not go to Tara, but in late October of 2017, 

commenced a program through [VOA].

* * * * *

20. As of the time of trial in this matter, [Mother] had not 

successfully completed any of the Court ordered services.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 16-18. The order concluded that there was 

a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in K.K.M.’s removal 

and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied by Mother 

“who has failed to successfully complete a service, maintain[] employment and 

housing, and has not demonstrated she is able to maintain sobriety,” and that 

termination of the parent-child relationship was in K.K.M.’s best interests. Id.

at 18. 

Discussion

[15] The issue is whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental 

rights. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to 

allege and prove, among other things:
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(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition 

described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[16] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases 

“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-

1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a 

‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social 

consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y., 

904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that 

heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our wellsettled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. We do not reweigh the 

evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the 
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evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence. Id. We confine our review to two steps: whether the 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the 

findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. 

[17] Reviewing whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, 

or the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, is not a license to 

reweigh the evidence. Id. “[W]e do not independently determine whether that 

heightened standard is met, as we would under the ‘constitutional harmless 

error standard,’ which requires the reviewing court itself to ‘be sufficiently 

confident to declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. 

(quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 1991) (citing Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967))). “Our review must ‘give “due 

regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses 

firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or judgment unless clearly 

erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A))). “Because a 

case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in 

person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court 

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. 

[18] We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive 

and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-

2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we 

limit our review to whether DCS established that there was a reasonable 
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probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement 

of K.K.M. outside the home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i).

[19] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in K.K.M.’s removal will 

not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 

642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a 

parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent 

improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there 

is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that 

delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior 

history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. 

Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not 

preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of 

future behavior. Id. 

[20] “The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for 

purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but 

also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home.” In re 

N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). A court may consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal 

history, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing 
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and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent’s response to 

those services, and, where there are only temporary improvements and the 

pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find 

that under the circumstances the problematic situation will not improve. Id. A 

trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient 

lifestyle such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth are 

permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re 

Z.C., 13 N.E.3d 464, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 

[21] Mother challenges several of the court’s findings, contends that K.K.M. was 

“removed from Mother solely because he and Mother tested positive for 

cocaine” at the time of his birth, and argues that there is no clear and 

convincing evidence that this condition will not be remedied. Appellant’s Brief 

at 12. She asserts, in part, that the court’s findings that Mother failed to 

complete any services and failed to demonstrate an ability to maintain sobriety 

are not supported by the evidence given she successfully completed a substance 

abuse assessment and a detoxification program, submitted to many random 

drug screens, is actively engaged in and receiving intensive therapy at a 

residential treatment program at VOA, and is fully engaged in home-based case 

management. Mother admits that the court’s finding that she has not had 

parenting time with K.K.M. since April 2017 is factually accurate, but argues 

that it does not support the conclusion that the removal conditions are unlikely 

to be remedied. 
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[22] DCS contends Mother’s refusal to engage in court-ordered services and failure 

to provide a drug-free home contributed to the continued removal of K.K.M. 

and argues that the trial court’s conclusion that Mother will not remedy the 

conditions is not clearly erroneous and is supported by the facts that she did not 

participate in substance abuse services until after the petition for termination 

had been filed, failed to complete court-ordered services, and did not have any 

visitation with K.K.M for approximately six months by the first day of the 

termination hearing. DCS argues that “[u]ltimately, it was Mother[’s] long 

history of drug use, her consistent refusal to participate in services over multiple 

years and multiple CHINS cases, and her history of relapses that lead [sic] the 

trial court to determine that there was a reasonable probability that Mother 

would not remedy the reasons that Child was removed from her care.” 

Appellee’s Brief at 25.

[23] The record reveals that Mother had used cocaine, prior to K.K.M.’s birth, since 

she was twenty-two years-old and, approximately a month prior to his birth on 

May 8, 2016, Mother used it “like maybe once a week for a month.” Transcript 

Volume II at 8-9. K.K.M. was Mother’s second child who was born drug 

positive while she was using cocaine. After K.K.M.’s birth, Mother had three 

random drug screens in which she tested positive for cocaine, alcohol, and 

hydrocodone on May 10, 2016, and for alcohol on May 12, 2016, and May 25, 

2016; and she admitted, at the October 23, 2017 hearing that she continued 

using cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol after K.K.M.’s birth “every day” until 

September of 2017, spent “twenty bucks” per week on drugs and alcohol, and 
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was in a car wreck “maybe six months” prior in which she was driving her 

brother’s car and was under the influence of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana. 

Id. at 11, 13. Mother also agreed at the hearing that she had an opportunity 

through her prior CHINS case to complete drug treatment services, that all of 

the services ordered as part of K.K.M.’s CHINS case were appropriate, and that 

she missed “a lot of drug screens,” some of which would have been positive if 

she had taken them. Id. at 17-18, 20. While we observe Mother’s completion 

of the acute program at VOA at one point, we note that the trial court is given 

discretion in balancing her very recent efforts at improvement against the

habitual patterns of her conduct, in determining that the evidence of Mother’s 

prior history is the best predictor of her future behavior, and in finding that

Mother “has had periods of sobriety but has not maintained it for the past 

eleven years.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 16. Considering Mother’s 

unresolved substance abuse issues, together with the trial court’s other findings, 

we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s 

determination that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading 

to K.K.M.’s removal will not be remedied. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that there was a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that led to the children’s removal, including substance abuse, would 

not be remedied and noting that “while [the mother] remedied two of the 

conditions that led to the children’s removal, there was no evidence that she 

would remedy her substance abuse,” and “[e]ven though [father] attended a 

month of treatment at Aspire, he failed to attend the last eight weeks of his 

program, which caused Aspire to discharge him for non-attendance”). 
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[24] While Mother does not argue that termination of her parental rights was not in 

K.K.M.’s best interests, we observe that case manager Sanders answered in the 

negative when asked whether Mother felt like she could manage her addiction 

without treatment and that Mother indicated she needed more treatment and “a 

little more time.” Id. at 23. We also observe that GAL Ankney testified in 

support of the request for termination and indicated it was in K.K.M.’s best 

interests because she did not believe Mother had addressed her ability to 

provide a safe and stable home for him; and that FCM Williams agreed that 

termination was in K.K.M.’s best interests because Mother “is not able right 

now to meet [K.K.M.’s] needs. She is not able to parent appropriately until she 

regains and maintains her sobriety.” Transcript Volume II at 109. Our review 

of the evidence as set forth above and in the record reveals that the evidence 

supports the trial court’s best interests determination.

Conclusion

[25] We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental 

rights. 

[26] Affirmed.

Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.