Present: All the Justices 

CURTIS TYRONE BROWN 

v. Record No. 050315 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 November 4, 2005 

VIRGINIA STATE BAR 

FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 

 In this appeal of right, Curtis Tyrone Brown challenges 

the jurisdiction and rulings of the Virginia State Bar 

Disciplinary Board (Board) in a proceeding in which the Board 

suspended Brown's license to practice law in this Commonwealth 

for a period of one year. The dispositive issue is whether 

Brown was entitled to a hearing before a three-judge panel 

when the Virginia State Bar (Bar) stipulated that his demand 

for such a panel was timely. Because we conclude that the Bar 

submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the three-judge panel 

when it stipulated that Brown's demand was timely, we will 

reverse the decision of the Board and remand the case for 

further proceedings before a three-judge panel. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

On September 30, 2003, the First District Subcommittee of 

the Virginia State Bar served Brown with a Subcommittee 

Determination (Certification) alleging multiple violations of 

the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. In response, 

Brown mailed to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary System 

Clerk's Office his demand that proceedings before the Board be 
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terminated and that further proceedings be conducted before a 

three-judge panel pursuant to Part Six, § IV, Para. 

13(I)(1)(a)(1)(b) of the Rules of Court (2003).1

 The Bar filed 

an objection arguing that the demand was untimely because it 

was not filed with the Clerk within 21 days after Brown 

received the Certification as required by Para. 

13(I)(1)(a)(1). The Board entered an order on January 9, 2004 

setting a briefing schedule on the Bar's objection and 

scheduling a telephone conference call to consider the matter. 

In its response filed pursuant to that order, the Bar withdrew 

its objection to Brown's demand for a three-judge panel and 

stipulated that the demand was timely. 

Brown responded to the January 9 scheduling order noting 

that, "the Assistant Bar Counsel has withdrawn his objections 

to the demand for a three-judge panel, therefore, there are no 

issues in dispute." Brown again demanded a three-judge panel 

and asserted that the Board did not have jurisdiction to 

consider the matter. On January 22, 2004, the Board entered 

an order stating: "The parties are hereby advised that [the 

Bar's objection] will be considered at said hearing 

 1

 Part Six, § IV, Para. 13 (I)(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 

was amended in 2004 and 2005. Because the relevant 

proceedings in this case began in 2003, we apply the rule as 

it existed in 2003. Further references to subsections of Part 

Six, § IV, Para. 13(I)(1)(a) of the Rules of Court (2003) will 

be cited as "Para. 13(I)(1)(a)" along with the relevant 

subsections. 
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notwithstanding Bar Counsel's retraction of the objection to 

Respondent's demand that further proceedings be conducted 

before a three-judge court . . . ." 

The Board considered the matter by telephone conference 

call on August 6, 2004 and ruled that the Bar may not waive 

the 21 day requirement for filing the demand for a three-judge 

panel because that requirement is jurisdictional. The Board 

entered an order declaring Brown's demand untimely. Following 

a hearing, the Board found that Brown violated the Virginia 

Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended Brown's license 

for one year. Brown timely appealed to this Court, and this 

Court stayed suspension of his license pending appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

 At the time Brown filed his demand for a three-judge 

panel, Para. 13(I)(1)(a)(1) provided in relevant part: 

 After a Subcommittee or District Committee 

certifies a matter to the Board, and the Respondent 

has been served with the Certification, the 

Respondent shall, within 21 days after service of 

the Certification: 

(a) file an answer that shall be conclusively 

deemed to be a consent to the jurisdiction of the 

Board; or 

(b) file a demand that the proceedings before 

the Board be terminated and that further proceedings 

be conducted pursuant to Va. Code § 54.1-3935, 

whereupon further proceedings before the Board shall 

terminate, and Bar Counsel shall file the Complaint 

required by Va. Code § 54.1-3935. 

We have held that the requirements of this Rule, while 

jurisdictional in nature, do not involve subject matter 
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jurisdiction. Fails v. Virginia State Bar, 265 Va. 3, 7, 574 

S.E.2d 530, 532-33 (2003); Smolka v. Second Dist. Comm. of the 

Virginia State Bar, 224 Va. 161, 165-66, 295 S.E.2d 267, 269 

(1982). Both the Board and a three-judge panel have subject 

matter jurisdiction to consider charges of a district 

disciplinary committee. The issue in this case is which 

entity acquired jurisdiction over the parties to the 

proceeding. 

 When considering the appropriate forum for a bar 

disciplinary proceeding, the respondent is analogous to a 

plaintiff who may choose the court in which to file an action. 

Under Para. 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a), when a respondent files an 

answer to a Certification, the answer is "conclusively deemed 

to be a consent to the jurisdiction of the Board." Brown 

never filed an answer to the Certification and, therefore, did 

not invoke the jurisdiction of the Board. Compare Fails, 265 

Va. at 7, 574 S.E.2d at 532-33. Rather, Brown sought to 

invoke the jurisdiction of the three-judge panel. 

 The Bar, in a posture analogous to a defendant, may 

object to the election made by the respondent based on defects 

in the service of process. However, like a defendant who 

objects to defects in the service of process but then enters a 

general appearance, the Bar may waive those objections. See

Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 579, 581, 515 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1999) 
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(citing Nixon v. Rowland, 192 Va. 47, 50, 63 S.E.2d 757, 759 

(1951)). In this proceeding, when the Bar withdrew its 

objection to Brown's demand for a three-judge panel and 

stipulated that the demand was timely filed, the Bar submitted 

itself to the jurisdiction of the three-judge panel. At that 

point the Board's jurisdiction over Brown and the Bar 

terminated. Therefore, the Board did not have jurisdiction to 

enter an order suspending Brown's license to practice law. 

Accordingly, we will reverse the Board's order of 

November 24, 2004 and remand the matter with directions to Bar 

Counsel to "file the Complaint required by Va. Code § 54.1-

3935." Para. 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(b).2

Reversed and remanded. 

 2

 Because of this disposition, we need not consider 

Brown's remaining assignments of error.