Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1581 | April 1, 2020 Page 1 of 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark S. Lenyo

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Rahim Brumfield,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 1, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1581

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. 

Sandford, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D03-1802-MR-2

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1581 | April 1, 2020 Page 2 of 21

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Rahim Brumfield (Brumfield), appeals his conviction for 

murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1, and the jury’s determination that he 

was eligible for a firearm sentencing enhancement, I.C. § 35-50-2-11. 

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUES

[3] Brumfield presents this court with three issues on appeal, which we consolidate 

and restate as the following two issues:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain 

evidence; and 

(2) Whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In January 2018, Brumfield and seventeen-year-old T.C. had been in a romantic 

relationship for about four years. On the night of January 17, 2018, leading 

into the early morning of January 18, 2018, Brumfield and T.C. exchanged text 

messages via Facebook Messenger. Brumfield accused T.C. of being unfaithful, 

and T.C. wanted to terminate the relationship. At some point, T.C. asked 

Brumfield to stop contacting her and to leave her alone. 

[5] Later that day, T.C. was at her best friend’s, D.K., house. At approximately 

5:30 p.m., T.C. left D.K.’s house; however, they both intended to get together 
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again later that evening to go to Walmart. At approximately 8:00 p.m., T.C. 

called D.K., and T.C. seemed upset about something. At around the same 

time, Michael Onax (Onax) was driving home from work. Onax observed a red 

vehicle parked in the middle of Clover Street in South Bend, and he “only saw 

one person in[side] the vehicle. It was a woman.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 99). 

As he drove closer, he saw a man who was wearing a red hooded sweatshirt 

trying to open the front passenger door. Onax then saw the man with the red 

hooded sweatshirt grab onto the “passenger’s side mirror” and hold on as the 

red car sped off. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 99). Since there was snow on the ground, the 

man was “just slipping and sliding . . . down the street.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 99). 

Onax then saw the man with the red hooded sweatshirt “lift up his hand” and 

heard “gunshots fire rapidly.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 100). 

[6] Aaron Maurer (Maurer), who lived on Clover Street, was rocking his baby by 

the window. Maurer first heard somebody yelling, and then he saw a man with 

a “red hoodie [with his] arm inside the car being pulled along the street. The 

car was accelerating and taking him with it.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 108). Once the red 

vehicle was out of his view, Maurer heard “about nine or ten shots.” (Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 108). Also, around the same time, Maria Santos (Santos), who also 

resided on Clover Street, was in her bedroom sleeping. Santos was awakened 

by the sound of gunshots. When she looked out of the window, Santos saw 

that a red vehicle had crashed into a house and flipped on its side. Santos saw a 

man with a hooded sweatshirt attempt to pull the vehicle down. When that 

failed, the man stated, “[s]hit, I need to find a fucking car,” and the man ran 
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toward an alley. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 140). Another neighbor who heard the 

gunshots called 911. 

[7] When South Bend Police Department officers arrived at the scene, they found 

T.C. inside the red vehicle. She was unconscious and had no pulse. T.C.’s 

cause of death was later determined to be from a “gunshot wound to the back of 

her head.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 19). The police recovered seventeen casings at the 

scene of the shooting. 

[8] On January 19, 2018, Brumfield’s mother contacted Detective Timothy Wiley 

(Detective Wiley), and stated that she was bringing Brumfield to the police 

station. After Brumfield was given his Miranda warnings, Brumfield stated that 

he had been with T.C. earlier that day, but he denied arguing with T.C. and 

having any involvement in her killing. During questioning, Brumfield gave 

Detective Wiley his phone number. Shortly thereafter, Brumfield stated that he 

did not want to talk, but the questioning continued.1 After the interview, 

Brumfield was released.

[9] Using Brumfield’s cellphone number, Detective Wiley discovered Brumfield’s 

Facebook account under an alias, Gunna Hardaway, and he obtained a warrant 

to search that account. The Facebook messages between Brumfield and T.C., 

which were exchanged a day before she was murdered, indicated that the two 

1

 The trial court ultimately excluded all of Brumfield’s statements after he stated that he no longer wished to 

continue with Detective Wiley’s questioning. 
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were having relationship problems. The messages further showed that when 

T.C. ended her four-year romantic relationship with Brumfield, Brumfield was 

upset and he threatened to kill T.C. Some of Brumfield’s messages to T.C. 

stated: “When I pop yo ass don’t say nun . . . I’ll kill yo [] anybody [] think we 

over . . . When I say ima kill [] yu I mean that . . . I’m not letting go unless its 

from putting inna dirt.” (State’s Exh. Vol. 5, pp.118, 125, 137) (mistakes 

throughout). 

[10] Based on Brumfield’s death threats to T.C., Detective Wiley obtained a warrant 

for Brumfield’s cellphone location which revealed that on January 18, 2019, at 

approximately 8:12 p.m., Brumfield was at the murder scene and he had moved 

away from the area by 8:16 p.m. 

[11] On February 7, 2018, the State filed an Information, charging Brumfield with 

murder. The State further claimed that Brumfield was eligible for a sentencing 

enhancement because he had used a firearm in the course of committing the 

murder. A warrant was issued for Brumfield’s arrest. On February 24, 2018, 

Brumfield turned himself in and spoke with Detective Wiley. At the start of the 

interview, Brumfield was given his Miranda warnings. Brumfield denied being 

involved in T.C.’s murder, indicated that he knew who killed T.C., but stated 

he did not want to be a “snitch.” (State’s Exh. Vol. VI, p. 184). When 

Detective Wiley pressed Brumfield to identify T.C.’s killer, Brumfield began 

floating an idea that T.C. was killed by a gang. When asked to identify the 

gang, Brumfield declined to answer the question, instead, he stated that he 

would “just rather have a lawyer.” (State’s Exh. Vol. VI, p. 184). No 
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additional questions were asked; instead, Detective Wiley sought to clarify 

Brumfield’s request for an attorney. Rather than persisting with his request for 

an attorney, Brumfield stated that he wished to continue with the interview. 

Brumfield then resumed explaining his theory that T.C.’s killing was gang 

related, and he identified the gang as “Four Corner Hustlers.” (State’s Exh. 

Vol. II, p. 185). Detective Wiley proceeded to ask Brumfield whether he and 

T.C. had a verbal altercation on the day before she was murdered. Brumfield 

admitted arguing with T.C., and he also admitted that he regularly messaged 

T.C. on Facebook. When Detective Wiley indicated that he had not “even 

got[ten] to the hard questions yet,” Brumfield stated that he wanted to stop the 

interview. (State’s Exh. Vol. VI, p. 192). Based on the request, Detective 

Wiley concluded the interview, and Brumfield was remanded into custody. 

[12] On January 27, 2019, pursuant to Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), Brumfield 

filed a motion in limine, requesting the exclusion of any evidence of him making 

any threats to kill T.C. and past physical abuse toward T.C. 

[13] On May 9, 2019, at the start of his bifurcated jury trial, Brumfield requested, 

but was denied, the suppression of the transcript and recording of his February 

24, 2018, interview conducted by Detective Wiley. Also, the parties litigated 

Brumfield’s motion in limine. The State argued that Brumfield’s prior bad acts, 

i.e., his Facebook messages to T.C. in which he threatened to kill T.C., were 

admissible to prove motive and intent pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 

404(b). Brumfield argued that the State had not provided him with pretrial 

notice of its intent to use those Facebook messages for that purpose. Excusing 
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the lack of pretrial notice, the State argued that Brumfield had notice, “a long 

time ago” since Brumfield’s death threats to T.C. had been referenced in the 

probable cause affidavit. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 4). At the close of the parties’ 

arguments, the trial court granted Brumfield’s motion, in part, by stating that it 

was “going to let all threats [] come in under the basis of motive but not to show 

intent.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 10). The trial court indicated that it would issue a 

limiting instruction pursuant to that ruling. 

[14] During the first phase of Brumfield’s trial, Jermon Gavin (Gavin), an inmate 

who was confined about the same time with Brumfield at the St. Joseph County 

Jail, testified that Brumfield had disclosed to him that on the day of the 

shooting, Brumfield had seen T.C. in the car with “J-Dot,” a man that T.C. 

“was messing with.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 161). Brumfield further divulged to Gavin 

that he “got mad and began shooting.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 161). Gavin added that 

Brumfield told him that “he wasn’t trying to hit [T.C.], . . . he was just trying to 

scare [T.C.]. But it is what it is.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 161). Brumfield indicated to 

Gavin that he had “shot over twelve times.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 161). 

[15] After the parties’ arguments, a jury instruction conference was held. Based on 

Gavin’s testimony that Brumfield fired many shots toward a vehicle occupied 

by J-Dot and T.C. and that the shots were not intended for T.C., the State 

offered an instruction on transferred intent. Over Brumfield’s objection, the 

trial court issued that instruction to the jury. The jury consequently found 

Brumfield guilty of murder. During the second phase of Brumfield’s trial, the 

jury found Brumfield guilty of using a firearm during the commission of the 
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murder. On June 14, 2019, the trial court sentenced Brumfield to fifty-five

years for his murder conviction, and it enhanced that sentence by five years 

based on the use of a firearm, resulting in an aggregate term of sixty years. 

[16] Brumfield now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION 

I. Admission of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review 

[17] Trial courts are vested with broad discretion in determining whether to admit or 

exclude evidence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015). A trial 

court’s decision to admit or exclude certain evidence is subject to review only 

for an abuse of discretion. Id. On appeal, “[w]e consider all the facts and 

circumstances surrounding the trial court’s decision to determine whether it is 

‘clearly against the logic and effect’ of what those facts and circumstances 

dictate.” Id. (quoting Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. 2014)). We 

“‘may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any theory supported by the 

evidence.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1188 (Ind. 2004)).

Even if we find that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence, 

such error will be “disregarded as harmless error” unless it “affect[s] the 

substantial rights of a party.” Hubbell v. State, 754 N.E.2d 884, 890 (Ind. 2001). 

[18] Brumfield first asserts that during his second recorded interview with Detective 

Wiley, he invoked his right to counsel and that request was ignored. As such, 

Brumfield contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into 
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evidence the statements he made at that interview following his request. 

Furthermore, Brumfield claims that the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting into evidence his Facebook messages to T.C. pursuant to Indiana 

Evidence Rule 404(b). We will address each contention in turn. 

B. Request for an Attorney

[19] “The right to have counsel present during [custodial] interrogation ‘is 

indispensable’ to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.” Jolley v. State, 684 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ind. 1997) (quoting 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). 

“When a suspect asserts his right to counsel during custodial questioning, the 

police must stop until counsel is present or the suspect reinitiates 

communication with the police and waives his right to counsel.” Id. at 492

(citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 

(1981)). Importantly, “the prosecution may not use statements stemming from 

that interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 

effective to secure [the suspect’s] privilege [.]” Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 726, 

733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1602), 

trans. denied.

[20] “Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some 

statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for 

the assistance of an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 

S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). While the suspect need not invoke any 

magic words, “[t]he cessation of police questioning is not required ‘if a suspect 
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makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal[.]’” Carr v. 

State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). A 

statement is considered ambiguous or equivocal when “‘a reasonable officer in 

light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might 

be invoking the right to counsel.’” Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459).

[21] After Brumfield was charged with the instant offenses, a warrant for his arrest 

was issued, and he turned himself in. On February 24, 2018, Detective Wiley 

conducted a recorded interview, and after Brumfield was given his Miranda

warnings, he denied any involvement in T.C.’s murder but stated that he had 

heard that a gang was responsible. When Detective Wiley pressed Brumfield to 

identify the gang, the following exchange occurred: 

[Detective Wiley]: So . . . you know the group[?]

[Brumfield]: I don’t know the group, . . . I heard . . . what the 

streets told me. If you go . . . to the streets, the streets tell you the 

same thing[.] I’m just not gonna tell you what everybody tell me 

because it’s like that’s gonna make me a snitch at the end of the 

day. They’re gonna classify me as a snitch []. I’m not no snitch. 

* * * *

[Detective Wiley]: So you’re not gonna tell us what group you 

think killed your girlfriend?

[Brumfield]: I don’t think, I know. 
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[Detective Wiley]: You’re not gonna tell us what group you 

know did it?

[Brumfield]: No, I don’t, I’d just rather have a lawyer. 

[Detective Wiley]: You don’t . . .

[Brumfield]: You know, for my lawyer can do ‘cuz at the end of 

the day y’all just keep on. And . . . I just came in here. . . 

[Detective Wiley]: Okay. 

[Brumfield]: . . .to let y’all know . . .

[Detective Wiley]: [Brumfield] 

[Brumfield]: . . . that I did not do this. 

[Detective Wiley]: . . . you just said you wanted a lawyer. Do 

you want a lawyer and you wanna stop? Is that what I’m 

hearin[g]?

[Brumfield]: I mean if . . . at the end of the day I’m gonna have 

to get a lawyer anyway ‘cuz y’all are not gonna . . . .

[Detective Wiley]: That, that’s not what I asked.

[Brumfield]: . . . go by my. . .

[Detective Wiley]: What I, what I asked was do you want us to 

stop now so you can have a lawyer. Is that what I’m hearing?
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[Brumfield]: No.

[Detective Wiley]: Is that what you’re saying . . . .

[Brumfield]: No, I’m, I’m. . . .

[Detective Wiley]: Okay. 

[Brumfield]: . . . .that’s not what I came here for. 

[Detective Wiley]: So we can continue?

[Brumfield]: Yeah, I came here to cut . . . [T]o talk. . . . so y’all 

can . . . get the right understandin[g,] so y’all can go do y’all job. 

(State’s Exh. Vol. II, pp. 184-85). Brumfield argues that his statement, “I’d just 

rather have a lawyer” was a “plain, simple, and straight forward” request and 

that Detective Wiley did not honor his request for a lawyer, and he improperly 

engaged in “further discussion to change [his] mind about it.” (State’s Exh. 

Vol. II, p. 184; Appellant’s Br. p. 20). We disagree. 

[22] When Brumfield was asked whether he was going to identify the gang that

actually killed T.C., he responded that he was not going to identify the gang

and “[he]’d just rather have a lawyer.” (State’s Exh. Vol. II, p. 184). 

Brumfield’s comment, “I’d just rather have a lawyer” only hinted at a potential 

desire for an attorney, not a clear and unequivocal request for one. See Powell v. 

State, 898 N.E.2d 328, 336-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Nonetheless, Detective 

Wiley asked Brumfield no other questions about the case, and he immediately 
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asked some follow-up questions geared toward clarifying Brumfield’s request

for an attorney. See Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 959 (Ind. 1992) (holding 

that “[I]f a suspect’s request for counsel is perceived to be inherently 

ambiguous, or equivocal in light of the preceding events, any further 

questioning should be narrowly limited to clarifying whether the suspect 

actually wished to have counsel present.” (quoting Sleek, 499 N.E.2d at 754)). 

When Brumfield stated that he did not wish to have an attorney, Detective 

Wiley continued with the questioning. Thus, we conclude that any statements 

derived after Brumfield’s equivocal request for an attorney were properly 

admitted at his jury trial and were not in violation of his Fifth Amendment 

right. 

[23] The State further argues that even if it had been error, the admission of any 

subsequent statements made after Brumfield invoked his right to counsel as

harmless. We agree. Statements obtained in violation of the federal 

constitution and erroneously admitted are subject to harmless error analysis. 

Storey v. State, 830 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We review a claim 

of federal constitutional error de novo, and the error must be harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. The State has the burden to demonstrate that the 

improper admission of a defendant’s statement did not contribute to the 

conviction. Alford v. State, 699 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Ind. 1998) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “‘To say that an error did not contribute to the 

verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the 

jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’” Id.
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(quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 

(1991), disapproved on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 

475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). In other words, if the State has presented other 

overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, then an erroneously admitted 

statement may be deemed harmless. Storey, 830 N.E.2d at 1021. 

[24] At no point during the interview did Brumfield admit to killing T.C., rather, 

Brumfield maintained his theory that a gang was responsible for T.C.’s murder. 

Brumfield’s other statements related to the dynamics of his relationship with 

T.C. The only possible incriminating statement that Brumfield made at the 

interview was him confirming his Facebook username as Gunna Hardaway and 

that he regularly messaged T.C. from that Facebook account. Moreover, we 

find that Brumfield’s confirmation of his Facebook username and use of that 

account was of no consequence because the record reveals that, two days prior 

to the interview, Detective Wiley had applied and received a warrant for 

Brumfield’s Facebook account. 

[25] Further, the record reveals that Brumfield’s statements at the interview were 

unnecessary for his murder conviction. The State presented evidence that 

Brumfield argued and threatened to kill T.C. via Facebook Messenger a day 

before she was murdered; Brumfield’s cellphone was traced to the location of 

the crime scene; and Gavin, an inmate who was confined at around the same 

time with Brumfield at the county jail, testified that Brumfield professed to him 

that he fired about twelve shots toward a vehicle occupied by T.C. At the crime 

scene, the police recovered seventeen bullet casings. Thus, Brumfield’s
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statements at the interview following his request for an attorney were

unnecessary for his murder conviction, and the admission of his statements was

harmless at best. 

C. Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)

[26] Brumfield challenges the admission of his Facebook messages to T.C., arguing 

that he was given insufficient notice that they would be admitted at his jury

trial. Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is 

not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that 

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake, or lack of accident. On request by a 

defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:

(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any 

such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; 

and

(B) do so before trial—or during trial if the court, for good 

cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

The purpose of this notice provision is to reduce surprise to the defendant and 

promote the early resolution of questions of admissibility. Abdul-Musawwir v. 

State, 674 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. The notice 
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provision is a prerequisite to the admissibility of evidence of a crime, wrong, or 

other act. Id. Failure to comply with the requirements of the rule generally 

results in the evidence being inadmissible. Id. 

[27] Brumfield contends that the State failed to provide him with proper pretrial 

notice of its intent to offer into evidence the death threats he made to T.C. via 

Facebook Messenger as prior bad acts pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 

404(b). 

[28] The record reveals that the State did not offer its notice of intent to use 

Brumfield’s Facebook messages as evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to 

Evidence Rule 404(b), nor is there any evidence in the record that Brumfield

made a specific discovery request for such information. However, the record 

reveals that following discovery, Brumfield filed a motion in limine seeking to 

thwart the State from producing his Facebook messages as evidence of his prior 

bad acts. Ahead of his jury trial, the parties litigated Brumfield’s motion in 

limine. The State argued that its lack of pretrial notice should be excused 

because Brumfield had notice, “a long time ago” since Brumfield’s Facebook 

threats to kill T.C. had been referenced in the probable cause affidavit. (Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 4). Brumfield’s counsel subsequently admitted that inasmuch as 

there was no formal notice by the State, Brumfield was aware of the State’s 

intention to use Brumfield’s Facebook messages as evidence, and that fact 

prompted him to file the motion in limine. Consequently, the trial court denied 

Brumfield’s motion. 
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[29] Notably, at his trial, Brumfield did not object to the State’s presentation of his 

Facebook messages pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b), neither did he argue that 

the State did not provide him with reasonable notice, or argue that he was 

prejudiced by the State’s lack of pretrial notice. Failure to object to the 

admission of evidence at trial normally results in waiver and precludes appellate 

review unless its admission constitutes fundamental error. Whatley v. State, 908 

N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The fundamental error 

doctrine is extremely narrow. To qualify as fundamental error, the error must 

be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible. 

Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 444-45 (Ind. 1999). To be fundamental error, 

the error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or 

potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the 

defendant fundamental due process. Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.

1987). In the present case, the State did not offer Brumfield’s Facebook death 

threats to T.C. to show that Brumfield had a propensity to commit murder or 

that his behavior was in conformity with this character trait. Instead, the State 

offered the evidence to establish that he had a motive to commit T.C.’s murder, 

an acceptable use under Rule 404(b)(2). Consequently, we conclude that 

Brumfield has failed to demonstrate the admission of his Facebook threats to 

T.C. constituted fundamental error.

II. Jury Instruction on Transferred Intent 

[30] The manner of instructing the jury lies within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Snell v. State, 866 
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N.E.2d 392, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In reviewing a trial court’s decision to 

give or refuse tendered jury instructions, the appellate court considers: (1) 

whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in 

the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the 

substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions that are 

given. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 629 (Ind. 2002).

[31] Over Brumfield’s objection, the trial court gave the State’s tendered instruction 

on the doctrine of transferred intent, stating: 

The crime of murder is defined by law as follows: a person who 

knowingly kills another human being.

When a person intends to kill another person and instead kills a 

different person, his intent is transferred from the person to 

whom it was directed to the person actually killed, and he may be 

found guilty of murder of the person who was killed.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 44). Brumfield concedes that the transferred-intent

instruction is a correct statement of law and he does not argue that its substance 

was covered by other instructions. His sole argument is that there was no 

evidence to support the giving of the instruction. 

[32] First, he directs us to Onax’s testimony that on the day of the shooting, Onax 

observed only a woman inside the vehicle and a man with a red hooded 

sweatshirt holding on to the passenger’s side mirror as the vehicle sped off. 

Brumfield then directs us to other neighbors who testified about the shooting, 

and he argues that there was conflicting evidence about T.C. being the only 
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person inside the vehicle. He additionally claims that “none of the other 

witnesses from the neighborhood said they saw or heard anything other than 

two (2) people being involved.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 26). Dismissing the State’s 

claim that there was another person on the scene of the crime, Brumfield 

contends 

Although [Gavin,] the jail house informant, indicated that 

Brumfield told him about J-Dot being there, the [S]tate quickly 

dispelled that argument through Jeramiah Moore’s (J-Dot) 

testimony by showing that J-Dot had been in California from 

January 14, 2018 through February l, 2018 and therefore could 

not have been present at the scene as testified by [] Gavin.

(Appellant’s Br. p. 26). He further directs us to the fact that the State 

impeached J-Dot on the stand through his testimony that he was in California 

visiting his father from January 14, 2018, through February 1, 2018, therefore 

implying that J-Dot was not present when T.C. was murdered. As such, 

Brumfield contends that there was no evidence to support an inference that his

intent to kill J-Dot was transferred to T.C. The State posits, “[I]f the jury had 

accepted Gavin’s testimony about Brumfield’s statements regarding J-Dot” 

being present, “it needed to be instructed that Brumfield could still be guilty of 

T.C.’s murder even if he were trying to kill J-Dot instead.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 

23). 

[33] Each party to an action is entitled to have the jury instructed on his particular 

theory of complaint or defense. Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005). Notwithstanding the fact that the State impeached Gavin by 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1581 | April 1, 2020 Page 20 of 21

having J-Dot testify that he was in California when T.C.’s murder occurred, 

Gavin unequivocally testified that Brumfield had informed him that J-Dot was 

inside the vehicle with T.C. on the day of the shooting; Brumfield was upset 

with T.C. because she was with J-Dot; Brumfield fired about twelve shots in a 

vehicle occupied by J-Dot and T.C.; and Brumfield stated that his shots were 

not intended for T.C. 

[34] While there was conflicting evidence as to whether T.C. was the only occupant 

inside the red vehicle, Gavin’s testimony, although weak and inconsistent as 

compared to J-Dot’s testimony, supported the jury instruction on transferred 

intent. See Snell, 866 N.E.2d at 396 (stating that evidence that has some 

probative value is sufficient to support the giving of an instruction, even if the 

evidence is weak or inconsistent). 

[35] Further, we find that even if it had been error to issue the instruction, it was 

harmless. “Generally, errors in the giving or refusing of instructions are 

harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury 

could not properly have found otherwise.” Matheny v. State, 983 N.E.2d 672, 

681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. We find that any

error from giving the instruction was harmless since the State presented strong 

evidence of Brumfield’s guilt: Brumfield’s Facebook death threats were strong 

evidence to prove Brumfield’s motive to commit T.C.’s murder; Brumfield’s 

cellphone location placed him at the scene of the crime; Gavin testified that 

Brumfield informed him that he fired about twelve shots toward a vehicle 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1581 | April 1, 2020 Page 21 of 21

occupied by T.C.; and the police recovered seventeen shell casings at the scene 

of the crime. 

[36] Furthermore, we find that the instruction unlikely impacted the jury’s verdict. 

Final Instruction 6B advised the jury that they were the exclusive judges of the 

evidence, that they were the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight to be given to their testimony, and that they should not disregard the 

testimony of any witness without due consideration and without just cause, but 

that they were to decide who to believe and who to disbelieve. Thus, even if it 

was error to give the transferred intent instruction, the instruction did not assist 

the jury in its factfinding role. We assume a jury follows the instructions it is 

given. See Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 20 (Ind. 2015). Therefore, we 

conclude that the giving of the transferred intent instruction was harmless.

CONCLUSION 

[37] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by admitting the statements Brumfield made at the interview, or the

Facebook threats he made to T.C. Further, we hold the trial court did not err in 

giving the transferred intent instruction. 

[38] Affirmed.

[39] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur