If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 21, 2019

v No. 344844

Genesee Circuit Court

GARY ANTHONY MAHAN, LC No. 17-040672-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and GADOLA and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of kidnapping, MCL 

750.349(1)(c), and first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1), against the 

victim, SD.1 The jury acquitted defendant of the same charges against another victim, JB. The 

trial court, applying a “super habitual” supplement under MCL 769.12(1)(a), sentenced 

defendant to two concurrent terms of 25 to 371⁄2 years’ imprisonment. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from events beginning in the late hours of October 23, 2016, and 

stretching through the morning of October 24, 2016. On the night of October 23, 2016, 17-yearold SD and 18-year-old JB were drinking alcohol, and went with some friends to Angela 

Shirley’s home in Flint. Angela was defendant’s girlfriend at the time. One of the people that 

SD and JB went to Angela’s house with was a friend of Angela’s son, Michael Shirley. As the 

night progressed, everyone decided to go to defendant’s house, where they had a bonfire. SD 

 1 The jury was provided with two alternative theories for CSC-I: penetration under circumstances 

involving a kidnapping, see MCL 750.520b(1)(c), and penetration while armed with a weapon, 

see MCL 750.520b(1)(e). The jurors were informed that for purposes of conviction, unanimity 

was not required regarding which aggravating circumstance applied, as long as each juror found 

an aggravating circumstance.
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and JB continued to drink heavily, and, as a result, they were unable to remember many of the 

events from that night. Everyone agreed, however, that SD and JB’s friends left SD and JB at 

defendant’s home that night. Everyone also agreed that, after SD and JB’s friends had left,

Angela became angry with defendant for having SD and JB over, and so defendant sent SD and 

JB over to his neighbor’s home for a period of time. Finally, everyone agrees that, in the early 

morning hours of October 24, 2016, SD and JB returned with defendant to his bedroom.

This is where the relevant events from the evening occurred, and where the testimonies of

defendant and the victims diverge. SD testified that she remembered waking up in defendant’s 

room and saw defendant lying “on top of” JB. SD said that defendant was “[t]ouching” JB and 

that “her pants were halfway down.” It looked to SD as if defendant’s hands were “down [JB’s] 

pants.” SD testified, “I looked over at her and I kind of like mouthed did you want that to 

happen and she mouthed back to me and said no.” SD described JB as being “really messed up”

and “under the influence of something.” JB somewhat similarly testified that defendant got on 

top her and tried to kiss her, which she did not want.

SD testified that she asked defendant to use his phone multiple times, but he would not 

let her. JB similarly testified that she and SD asked to use defendant’s phone, but he refused and 

“got really mad.” Both SD and JB testified that defendant took out a gun from somewhere in the 

room and pointed it at SD and JB, and made them take off their clothes. Defendant then asked 

each of them to take a pill, which JB did but SD did not. Both testified that JB asked to use the 

bathroom, but defendant refused to let her and made her use a trash can instead.

Both SD and JB testified that, while still holding the gun, defendant put his penis in JB’s 

mouth. JB testified that she could not remember a lot of details, but she said that during this

time, defendant was lying on the bed with his legs off the bed, and SD was “[o]ver top by his 

head.” SD testified that, while defendant’s penis was in JB’s mouth, defendant pulled down 

SD’s pants and underwear and, while holding a gun in one hand, put his mouth “[i]n her vagina,”

which she did not want. On cross-examination, SD said that defendant’s mouth came into 

contact with her vagina while she was seated and that, at the same time, defendant was lying on 

his back while JB performed oral sex on him. JB testified that defendant ejaculated in her 

mouth, on her hands, and on her pants or shirt.

According to defendant, he took the girls to his neighbor’s house after 5:30 a.m. and the 

girls returned “after 7:00 in the morning.” At that point, all three (defendant, SD, and JB) went 

back to defendant’s bedroom, and everyone went to sleep. Defendant said that he did not own a 

gun at the time2 and did not “pull a gun” on SD or JB. He denied giving the girls pills, and said 

that he did not refuse to let them use his telephone or refuse to allow them to use the bathroom. 

He denied performing oral sex on SD and denied having JB perform oral sex on him. He said 

that the girls were “making it up.”

 2 Angela, defendant’s girlfriend, admitted at trial that she had seen a handgun at defendant’s 

house in the past, and text messages from October 24, 2016, between Angela and defendant 

show that Angela warned defendant that if the police investigated SD’s and JB’s allegations, his 

“[g]un” would “need[] to go.”
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SD testified that the following morning, after defendant fell asleep or passed out, SD “got 

off the bed as quietly as [she] could and . . . crawled on the floor and . . . creeped down the 

stairs.” She found a woman, later identified as Holly Watters, in a bedroom and asked to use her 

telephone. SD said that Watters “was confused” and thought that the girls had wanted to be in 

defendant’s bedroom. SD did not think she could get JB downstairs without help because of 

JB’s intoxicated state, so Watters helped SD get JB downstairs. Watters also let SD use her 

phone and provided the address of the home. SD messaged her boyfriend about what happened 

and where she was. SD’s boyfriend told his mom, Julie Henderson, who went and picked SD 

and JB up. JB testified that she remembered waking up and getting a ride from Henderson.

Henderson took SD and JB to a hospital. At the hospital, JB “didn’t want to be 

examined,” so she left. SD, on the other hand, consented to an examination by a SANE (sexual 

assault nurse examiner). SD recounted the above events to the SANE. The SANE testified that 

SD was anxious, crying, and withdrawn. The SANE also testified that she observed JB the same 

day and saw that she was scared and anxious, although she never examined JB. During SD’s 

examination, the SANE collected evidence, including cuts of SD’s underwear and vulvar swabs, 

which she sent to the Michigan State Police (MSP).

Erica Castor, a forensic scientist in the biology and DNA unit of the MSP, was qualified 

as an expert in forensic biology. She examined evidence collected from SD at the hospital. 

Castor submitted a cutting of SD’s underwear and vulvar swabs for further DNA analysis. For 

the underwear cutting, there was a mixture of DNA, so “STRmix” software was used to help 

with the analysis. Jennifer Morgan, Castor’s coworker, was also qualified as an expert in 

forensic biology, and testified that STRmix is “a mathematical software that looks at mixtures 

and it can help with the interpretation process of the mixture . . . [and] provide[] a likelihood 

ratio or a statistic for any comparisons that are made to the evidence sample.” The tissue from 

the underwear cutting was divided into “fraction one” from skin cells and “fraction two” from 

sperm cells. Morgan testified:

So, based on the DNA typing results from the underwear cutting fraction 

one, it is at least 1,600 times more likely if it originated from [SD] and 

[defendant] then [sic] if it originated from [SD] and an unrelated, unknown 

contributor. And this analysis provides strong support that [defendant] is a 

contributor to the underwear cutting fraction one.

* * *

And based on the DNA typing results obtained from the underwear cutting 

fraction two, it was at least 5.6 times more likely if it originated from [SD] and 

[defendant] then [sic] if it originated from [SD] and an unrelated, unknown 

individual. So, this analysis of the underwear cutting fraction two was 

uninformative.

Theresa Scott, another forensic scientist with the MSP, was qualified as an expert in 

“biology and body fluid identification.” She received two sweatshirts and a pair of yoga pants 

belonging to JB, and examinations did not reveal any seminal fluid on them. Scott said that it 

was possible that any seminal fluid was washed away because the clothes were not turned over to 
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the police until approximately nine days after the night in question. Scott testified that she also 

examined SD’s underwear cutting after the DNA testing was completed, and identified one 

sperm cell from it. Tests also showed the “possible” presence of blood and saliva on the 

underwear cutting.

The jury convicted defendant of the charges of kidnapping and CSC-I related to SD, and 

acquitted him of the charges of kidnapping and CSC-I related to JB. This appeal followed.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant first contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 

his convictions. We disagree. “This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his or her conviction.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 

57; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).

In reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, this Court “review[s] the evidence in a 

light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find 

that the prosecution had proved the crime’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Direct 

and circumstantial evidence can be considered in determining whether the prosecution offered 

sufficient evidence to support a conviction. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 

158 (2002). “It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may 

be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” 

Id.

We first address defendant’s conviction of CSC-I under MCL 750.520b(1). MCL 

750.520b(1) states, in pertinent part:

A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or 

she engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following 

circumstances exists:

* * *

(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the 

commission of any other felony.

* * *

(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a 

manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.

“Sexual penetration” means “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any 

other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or 

anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” MCL 

750.520a(r).

Defendant’s CSC-I conviction was supported by (1) SD’s testimony that defendant, 

without her consent, pointed a gun at her and performed cunnilingus on her while holding the 
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gun; (2) the SANE’s testimony about SD crying and being withdrawn; (3) Morgan’s testimony 

that there was “strong support” for the DNA mixture on SD’s underwear having come from SD 

and defendant, and (4) the evidence of kidnapping as discussed later in this opinion.

Defendant takes issue with the fact that only one sperm cell was located in SD’s 

underwear. But this evidence did not cut against the evidence that supported defendant’s 

conviction. Defendant was not alleged to have ejaculated on SD, but was alleged to have 

performed cunnilingus on her. Morgan testified that it was “fraction one”—and not “fraction 

two”—of the underwear cutting that led to statistically significant results. Fraction one consisted 

of “predominantly skin cells,” while “fraction two, if there are sperm present would contain more 

of the male component, or the sperm fraction of the sample.” Thus, it was the analysis of the 

“skin cells” fraction that led to “strong support” for defendant’s DNA being present in the DNA 

mixture, which in turn supports SD’s allegations that defendant performed cunnilingus on her.3

Defendant also argues that the offenses likely were committed by his neighbor, but 

nothing in the record supports this assertion. JB testified about the neighbor offering money or a 

bus ticket in exchange for sex, but the record does not support defendant’s assertion that the girls 

somehow confused defendant with the neighbor when detailing the acts leading to defendant’s 

convictions.

Defendant was also convicted of kidnapping under MCL 750.349(1). That statute states, 

in pertinent part:

A person commits the crime of kidnapping if he or she knowingly 

restrains another person with the intent to do 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(c) Engage in criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact . . .

with that person. [MCL 750.349(1).]

“ ‘[R]estrain’ means to restrict a person’s movements or to confine the person so as to interfere 

with that person’s liberty without that person’s consent or without legal authority. The restraint 

does not have to exist for any particular length of time and may be related or incidental to the 

commission of other criminal acts.” MCL 750.349(2). MCL 750.349(4) states, “This section 

does not prohibit the person from being charged with, convicted of, or sentenced for any other 

violation of law arising from the same transaction as the violation of this section.”

Defendant’s kidnapping conviction was supported by SD’s testimony about cunnilingus 

combined with her testimony that defendant would not let the girls leave and that “anytime we 

tried to move or, you know, gesture towards anything he pointed [the gun] at us.” A reasonable 

 3 We would also note that the testimony about the sperm was from Scott, not Morgan. Morgan 

was the one who testified about the STRmix, and so the testimony of the sperm cell was not 

relevant to the “strong support” for the DNA mixture on SD’s underwear.
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inference from all the evidence, see Hardiman, 466 Mich at 428, is that defendant restrained SD 

with the intent to engage in criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact in violation of 

MCL 750.349(1)(c).

III. STRMIX TESTIMONY

Defendant raises three challenges to the admission of the STRmix testimony: (1) that 

STRmix evidence does not satisfy the requirements of Daubert4 or MRE 702; (2) that the 

STRmix testimony admitted at trial violated MRE 403; and (3) that trial counsel was ineffective 

in responding to the STRmix testimony. None of the challenges warrant relief.

A. DAUBERT

The trial court conducted a Daubert hearing before trial and ruled that the STRmix 

evidence was admissible. After the trial court’s ruling, in People v Muhammad, 326 Mich App 

40, 57; 931 NW2d 20 (2018), this Court likewise ruled that STRmix evidence is admissible 

under Daubert and MRE 702. Defendant acknowledges that Muhammad is “controlling 

precedent” and explains that he raised the Daubert issue “for later review or in the event of a 

change in law.” Thus, this issue does not warrant appellate relief.

B. MRE 403

Defendant contends that despite Muhammad and the threshold admissibility under 

Daubert and MRE 702, the evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403. That rule

states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. [MRE 403.]

Defendant contends that, based on Morgan’s testimony that it was at least 1,600 times more 

likely that the DNA mixture in fraction one of the underwear cutting was from SD and defendant

as opposed to SD and an unknown contributor, “at least 255 people” in Genesee County alone

could have been the second contributor. But Morgan explained that a probability between zero 

and 99 would be “uninformative,” “100 to 999 is our moderate support and then 1,000 to 9,999 is 

our strong support category, and then 10,000 or greater is considered very strong support.” The 

jurors, therefore, were adequately informed about the meaning of Morgan’s testimony. In 

particular, they learned that the STRmix program gave only “strong support”—as opposed to 

“very strong support”—to the hypothesis that defendant contributed to the DNA mixture. There 

was no “danger of unfair prejudice” in informing the jurors about the probabilities produced by 

 4 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 

(1993).
-7-

scientifically reliable software. And even if there were a danger of unfair prejudice, the 

probative value of this evidence was not “substantially outweighed” by that danger.

Defendant contends that the evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403 

because only one sperm cell was found on SD’s underwear. But, as noted, this one sperm cell, as 

testified to by Scott, was found after the DNA testing and was not pertinent to Morgan’s 

testimony about the STRmix analyses.5 The finding of only one sperm cell does not somehow 

weaken the STRmix evidence. Defendant was not alleged to have ejaculated on SD, but was 

alleged to have performed cunnilingus on her—so the finding of one sperm cell is not 

particularly surprising. The evidence was thus admissible under MRE 403.6

C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of 

fact and constitutional law. A judge must first find the facts, and then must decide whether those 

facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of 

counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). A court’s findings of 

fact are reviewed for clear error, and questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. Id.

To obtain relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a party must show (1) that 

counsel’s performance fell short of an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that, but for 

counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 

would have been different. People v Ackley, 497 Mich 381, 389; 870 NW2d 858 (2015). A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

Defendant contends that counsel should have challenged the STRmix analyses on crossexamination—or by way of a defense DNA expert—based on what he contends are flaws in its 

methodology, such as that it involves amplification of DNA, that certain “input” factors are 

 5 As already stated, the statistically significant test came from testing skin cells from “fraction 

one,” not “fraction two.” Explaining the difference of these “fractions” at the Daubert hearing, 

Morgan testified:

[T]he extraction method or part of the DNA process with samples that could 

potentially contain sperm is a little bit different; and so we can—we isolate 

fraction one, which would be essentially the female portion or the portion that 

would contain predominantly skin cells, and fraction two, which is the fraction 

that would contain the male fraction—or, if sperm were present, the sperm cells 

may be there in fraction two.

6 Defendant argues that defense counsel at trial was ineffective for not objecting to the admission 

of the STRmix testimony under MRE 403, but because the testimony was admissible under MRE 

403, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object based on that rule. People v Horn, 279 

Mich App 31, 39-40; 755 NW2d 212 (2008) (discussing futile objections).
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determined by human operators, and that the governing standards are voluntary. But the trial 

court had already deemed the evidence admissible under MRE 702.7

MRE 702 requires that the testimony in question be, among other things, “the product of 

reliable principles and methods[.]” It was not below an objective standard of reasonableness for 

counsel to fail to challenge the reliability and methods of a scientific and mathematical procedure 

that had already been deemed admissible before trial by the trial court (and later verified as 

admissible by this Court in Muhammad). To the extent that defendant is attempting to allege that 

the analyses in this case were flawed because of improper input factors or similar erroneous 

actions that somehow brought the evidence in this case out of the purview of reliability as 

discussed in Muhammad, he has not supported such allegations with any evidence or affidavits. 

People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 80; 867 NW2d 452 (2015) (explaining that a defendant 

bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for a claim of ineffective assistance).

Defendant also argues that counsel should have brought out more information on crossexamination regarding how easily DNA is transferred. He states, “The jury . . . needed someone 

to make them aware of the possibility that the one sperm found on [SD’s] underwear got there 

from contact with the bed, not a sexual act.” Even disregarding the fact that it was fraction one 

of the underwear cutting and not the sperm-containing fraction two that led to the statistically 

significant results, counsel elicited from Scott that “an average ejaculate should contain millions 

upon millions of sperm cells.” Counsel then asked, “[W]hen you examined this, you only found 

a single sperm cell[,] correct?” Counsel also elicited from Scott that epithelial cells can 

sometimes be mistaken for sperm cells. And he elicited that it would probably take multiple 

washings for sperm cells to be removed from clothing such as JB’s pants and sweatshirts. 

Counsel’s cross-examination of Scott was indeed quite extensive. It is not apparent that further 

cross-examination would have likely affected the outcome of the trial, Ackley, 497 Mich at 389, 

especially when defendant puts forth no evidence or expert analyses on the likelihood of 

defendant’s DNA ending up in the area of SD’s underwear from which the cutting was taken.

IV. ADMISSION OF JB’S PRIOR FALSE ALLEGATION

On April 16, 2018, the prosecutor filed a motion in limine requesting that “no witnesses, 

including SD’s and JB’s friend Kayla Estep, be allowed to make unsupported statements about 

either victim’s alleged sexual history, whether consensual or nonconsensual.” The prosecutor 

stated:

In her interview with police, Kayla Estep made a statement that [JB] has 

made similar allegations like this in the past. There is no indication that this 

statement is true or has any merit. There are no pending cases regarding any of 

these allegations and there has not been a showing made by the [d]efense that 

allegations have been made.

 7 The Muhammad panel, too, specifically concluded that STRmix analyses were admissible 

under MRE 702. Muhammad, 326 Mich App at 57.
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Defendant objected. As an offer of proof, defendant stated in his motion:

Based on the police report provided by the people, Kayla Estep told . . .

[Detective Sergeant] Surface that:

a) “[JB and SD] are lying”.

b) “[JB] has accused other people of the same thing a few times.”

c) “[JB] does this to get out of trouble because she has a boyfriend, a job, 

and misses her curfew.”

He added:

Further, upon information and belief, Kayla will testify that:

a. [JB’s] parents filed a runaway petition because [JB] has not returned 

home.

b. When [JB] was eventually found, she stated that she was with a man, 

believed to be Damian Peterson, who refused to allow her to leave him and return 

home.

c. The reason [JB] told her parents this was because she did not wish to 

get into trouble.

At the hearing, defendant’s attorney also stated on the record:

[Estep] informed me there had been a prior incident where [JB] . . . may or may 

not have run away from home and her parents had filed a runaway petition against 

her, and then [JB] had informed her parents that she was with a young man by the 

name of Damien Peterson. And the reason that she was with him and had not 

returned home was because he would not allow her to return home. 

Based on this offer of proof, defendant requested that the trial court conduct an evidentiary 

hearing in camera and decide whether JB’s prior false allegation was admissible. The trial court 

ultimately granted the prosecution’s motion to disallow evidence about JB’s prior false allegation

without conducting defendant’s requested evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, defendant argues that this ruling was error. Assuming without deciding that 

the trial court erred—that it should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine if 

evidence of a prior false accusation by JB was admissible—defendant is still not entitled to 

relief. MCL 769.26 states:

No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or reversed or a new trial be 

granted by any court of this state in any criminal case, on the ground of 

misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for 

error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court, 
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after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error 

complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 

This statute “places the burden on a defendant to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice[.]” People 

v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 494; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). In addition, an appellant bears “the burden 

of furnishing the reviewing court with a record to verify the factual basis of any argument upon 

which reversal [is] predicated.” People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). 

Defendant has not provided this Court with any information beyond his initial offer of proof to 

demonstrate that evidence of a false allegation by JB would, in fact, have been admissible 

following an evidentiary hearing. Thus, he has not met his burden of establishing that reversal is 

warranted.

Defendant also argues that the trial court’s decision to exclude the prior false allegation 

violated defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. Because defendant did not raise 

this issue in the trial court, it is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v 

Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Under the plain-error doctrine, the 

threshold inquiry is whether a “clear or obvious” error occurred that “affected the outcome of the 

lower court proceedings.” Id. Because defendant has not provided this Court with any 

information beyond his initial offer of proof to demonstrate that evidence of a false allegation by 

JB would have been admissible following an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that defendant has 

not demonstrated the existence of an outcome-determinative error.

V. COMPROMISE VERDICT

Defendant argues that the jury’s decision to convict defendant for the allegations that 

pertained to SD but not the allegations with respect to JB was inconsistent and necessarily the 

result of compromise, and so was impermissible. We disagree. This unpreserved issue is 

reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764.

In People v Putnam, 309 Mich App 240, 251; 870 NW2d 593 (2015), this Court 

explained that inconsistent verdicts by a single jury are permissible absent a showing that the 

jurors were “confused, that they misunderstood the instructions, or that [they] engaged in an 

impermissible compromise.” Defendant argues that the verdicts here were inconsistent, that they 

must have resulted from an impermissible compromise, and that, therefore, reversal is warranted. 

But the premise of defendant’s argument is faulty because the verdicts were not inconsistent.

In order to obtain a conviction, a prosecutor must “prove the elements of [a charged] 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). 

The obvious corollary of this is that acquittal is necessary when the prosecutor has not proven the 

elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

JB’s testimony differed from SD’s in that she had more lapses in memory about the 

alleged sexual assaults. When asked what defendant did after he made SD and JB take off their 

clothes, JB said, “I don’t remember.” She also said, “I don’t remember” when asked what 

happened after she swallowed a pill from defendant. SD testified that she (SD) did not swallow 

the pill from defendant but that JB did, and that, after taking the pill, JB “couldn’t really do 

much” and her “eyes were rolling in the back of her head.” In addition, there was “strong 
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support” that defendant contributed to a DNA mix on SD’s underwear, while JB refused to be 

examined at the hospital. It is entirely possible that the jurors concluded that the prosecution 

adequately proved the offenses related to SD but that, because of JB’s lapses in memory, JB’s 

impairment due to the pill ingestion, and the lack of DNA evidence related to JB’s allegations, 

the jury found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 

sexually penetrated JB or restrained her for the purpose of committing sexual penetration or 

contact. MCL 750.520b(1); MCL 750.349(1). No clear or obvious error is apparent with the 

jury’s verdicts. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.

VI. CHALLENGES TO SENTENCE

Defendant argues that he was inappropriately designated a “super habitual” offender 

because two of the prior felonies that the prosecution relied on to give defendant that designation 

appear to have arisen from the same transaction, which is not allowable under MCL 

769.12(a)(a). Defendant additionally argues that Offense Variables (OVs) 4 and 7 were scored 

incorrectly. None of defendant’s challenges to his sentence warrant relief.

The claim involving the “super habitual” supplement involves an allegation that the trial 

court relied on inaccurate information in sentencing defendant. In People v Harrison, 119 Mich 

App 491, 496; 326 NW2d 827 (1982), this Court stated that a “judge’s response to a claim of 

inaccuracy is within his or her sound discretion and that discretion is to be exercised with the 

view of imposing a sentence based upon accurate information.” As for the arguments about the 

OVs, “Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s factual determinations are reviewed 

for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 

Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013), superseded in part by statute as stated in People v 

Rodriguez, ___ Mich App ___, n 3; ___ NW2d ___ (2019) (Docket No. 338914); slip op at 3 n 

3. “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by 

statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which 

an appellate court reviews de novo.” Id.

MCL 769.12(1) states, in part:

If a person has been convicted of any combination of 3 or more felonies or 

attempts to commit felonies, whether the convictions occurred in this state or 

would have been for felonies or attempts to commit felonies in this state if 

obtained in this state, and that person commits a subsequent felony within this 

state, the person shall be punished upon conviction of the subsequent felony and 

sentencing under section 13 of this chapter as follows:

(a) If the subsequent felony is a serious crime or a conspiracy to commit a 

serious crime, and 1 or more of the prior felony convictions are listed prior 

felonies, the court shall sentence the person to imprisonment for not less than 25 

years. Not more than 1 conviction arising out of the same transaction shall be 

considered a prior felony conviction for purposes of this subsection only.

The definition of “serious crime” includes a violation of MCL 750.520b. MCL 769.12(6)(c). In 

addition, “ ‘Listed prior felony’ means a violation or attempted violation” of various statutes, 
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including MCL 750.82. See MCL 769.12(6)(a)(iii). MCL 750.82 deals with “assault[] . . . with 

a . . . dangerous weapon,” otherwise known as felonious assault. Defendant was convicted in 

2001 of attempted assault with a dangerous weapon.

In the prosecutor’s notice of intent to seek sentencing enhancement, she stated that the 

prior convictions being relied on were the following: (1) LC No. 93-11147-FH, “B&E 

W/INTENT,” with a conviction date of March 16, 1993, in Mason County in Michigan; (2) LC 

No. 92-11144-FH, “CCW,” with a conviction date of March 16, 1993, in Mason County in 

Michigan; and (3) LC No. 01-06331-FH, “FA,”8 with a conviction date of November 13, 2001, 

in Wexford County in Michigan.

At sentencing, after the parties discussed the scoring of various OVs, the court noted that 

the guidelines range for defendant’s minimum sentence was 171 to 570 months’ imprisonment. 

The court then acknowledged that “the prosecution did file a timely notice of habitual offender 

fourth,” and stated that “171 to 570 are the advisory guidelines, but this [c]ourt does not have 

any discretion in your case in terms of the minimum sentence. The [c]ourt must sentence you to 

25 years.” The court imposed sentences of 25 to 371⁄2 years’ imprisonment. It stated that it had 

the discretion to impose consecutive sentences but was declining to do so.

Defendant contends that the 25-year minimum sentence in MCL 769.12(1)(a) was 

inapplicable because “two of the prior felonies appear to arise out of the same transaction.” He 

argues, “If [the convictions] arose from different transactions, nothing in the record indicates that 

and the burden is on the moving party, the filer of the supplement, to show different transactions 

were involved.” The PSIR gives an offense date and an arrest date of “12/04/1992” for LC No. 

93-11144-FH and for LC No. 93-11147-FH. Ignoring anything provided on appeal and looking

solely at the lower court record as it stands, it is certainly a possibility that the two offenses arose 

from the same transaction. It is not, however, an apparent fact, considering that the two cases 

were assigned different numbers in the circuit court. Indeed, one would assume that if the 

breaking-and-entering offense and the carrying-a-concealed-weapon offense were part of the 

same transaction, a single circuit-court number would have been assigned, just as a single circuitcourt number was assigned for the various charged offenses in the present case. As noted earlier, 

an appellant bears “the burden of furnishing the reviewing court with a record to verify the 

factual basis of any argument upon which reversal [is] predicated.” Elston, 462 Mich at 762. In 

our opinion, defendant has failed to provide this Court with sufficient information to conclude 

that an error occurred with regard to the “super habitual” supplement. That is, defendant has not 

carried his burden of showing entitlement to any appellate relief because the existing record is 

insufficient to demonstrate that an error occurred.

Turning to defendant’s challenge to the scoring of his OVs, he received 10 points for OV 

4. For this OV, which deals with “psychological injury to victim,” a score of 10 points is 

warranted if “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a 

 8 This is a reference to defendant’s conviction of attempted felonious assault.
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victim.” MCL 777.34(1)(a).9 MCL 777.34(2) states, “Score 10 points if the serious 

psychological injury may require professional treatment. In making this determination, the fact 

that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive.”

In People v White, 501 Mich 160, 163; 905 NW2d 228 (2017), the trial court approved a 

10-point score for OV 4, stating that because the victim had been afraid, had been held at 

gunpoint, and had heard what she thought was a trigger being pulled, it was a reasonable 

inference that the victim suffered psychological injury. The White Court concluded that (1) a 

court cannot assume the existence of psychological injury merely based on the circumstances of 

the crime and (2) a mere expression of fearfulness is insufficient to support a 10-point score for 

OV 4. Id. at 163-165. However, the White Court also stated:

Of course, a victim’s fear while a crime is being committed may be highly 

relevant to determining whether he or she suffered a “serious psychological injury 

[that] may require professional treatment” and thus may be considered together 

with other facts in determining how to score OV 4. We merely hold that, absent 

other evidence of psychological harm, fear felt during the crime is insufficient to 

assess points for this variable. [Id. at 165 n 3.]

Evidence showed that SD was afraid during the incident. The SANE described her as 

anxious, crying, and withdrawn after the incident. Henderson described her as “very, very 

upset,” crying, and shaking. Most significantly, Henderson testified that SD’s “whole 

personality changed” after the incident and that SD became “very depressed” and “wouldn’t get 

out of bed for days.” Henderson stated that SD missed many days of school because “she just 

couldn’t emotionally handle it.” The assessment of 10 points for OV 4 was thus appropriate 

because the evidence was indicative of a serious psychological injury requiring professional 

treatment.

Defendant also challenges the trial court’s scoring of 50 points for OV 7. MCL 

777.37(1)(a) provides for a score of 50 points for OV 7 if “[a] victim was treated with sadism, 

torture, excessive brutality or similarly egregious conduct designed to substantially increase the 

fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense.” MCL 777.37(2) states, “Count each 

person who was placed in danger of injury or loss of life as a victim.” In determining whether 

conduct was designed to increase fear and anxiety in a victim, a court should assess whether “the 

defendant engaged in conduct beyond the minimum necessary to commit the crime, and whether 

it is more probable than not that such conduct was intended to make the victim’s fear or anxiety 

increase by a considerable amount.” Hardy, 494 Mich at 443.

SD testified that defendant “stuck [the gun] on [her] forehead.” She used her index finger 

to make a gesture at trial to demonstrate the action. When asked, “Do you remember if he ever 

told you nobody was gonna find you guys,” SD answered, “Yeah.” SD said that defendant 

“proceeded to tell me that I wasn’t going home and that my parents didn’t care about me.” SD 

 9 MCL 777.34 was amended in 2018, but the amendment does not implicate the present case in 

any fashion. See 2018 PA 652.
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testified that she believed him and was scared. Significantly, she said, “I think he was just trying 

to psyche me out.” SD also noted that defendant “made” JB take a pill, that JB’s eyes “were 

rolling in the back of her head” afterwards, and that defendant made JB urinate in a trash can.10 

This evidence supported a finding that defendant engaged in highly egregious conduct that went 

beyond the minimum necessary to commit the crimes and that was designed to substantially 

increase SD’s fear and anxiety. Thus, the trial court’s scoring of OV 7 was not error.

VII. STANDARD 4 BRIEF

Defendant raises several challenges in his Standard 411 brief, none of which warrant 

appellate relief. We address each challenge in turn.

A. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the elements of 

kidnapping because the court did not include an asportation element. Defendant also argues that 

the trial court’s instructions for CSC-I were insufficient because the court allegedly failed to state 

that a conviction for CSC-I requires penetration. Neither argument has merit.

Defendant did not object to the instructions at trial, so our review is for plain error 

affecting substantial rights. . People v Danto, 294 Mich App 596, 605; 822 NW2d 600 (2011).

With regard to the charge of CSC-I against SD, the trial court instructed the jury, in 

relevant part, that the prosecutor needed to prove “that the defendant engaged in a sexual act that 

involved [the] touching of [SD’s] genital opening with the defendant’s mouth or tongue.”

A conviction under MCL 750.520b(1) requires “sexual penetration.” “Sexual 

penetration” means “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other 

intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal 

openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” MCL 750.520a(r). 

In People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 132; 494 NW2d 797 (1992), this Court stated that “[a]n 

act of cunnilingus, by definition, involves an act of sexual penetration.” The Court explained

that “cunnilingus requires the placing of the mouth of a person upon the external genital organs 

of the female which lie between the labia, or the labia itself [sic], or the mons pubes [sic].” Id. at 

133 (quotation marks and citation omitted; bracketing added by Legg). The Legg Court stated, 

“Defendant’s touching with his mouth of the urethral opening, vaginal opening, or labia establish 

cunnilingus.” Id. The trial court’s instructions were in accordance with this applicable law, so 

defendant’s argument is without merit.

As for kidnapping, defendant cites cases suggesting that, to sustain a conviction for 

kidnapping involving forcible confinement, the prosecution must prove asportation (movement 

 10 Defendant’s actions toward JB would have had an effect on SD, who observed them.

11 Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4.
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of the victim). See, e.g., People v Wesley, 421 Mich 375, 384; 365 NW2d 692 (1984). And he 

correctly notes that the trial court did not instruct the jury on asportation. The Wesley Court 

stated, “In order to preserve the forcible confinement section of the kidnapping statute from a 

charge of unconstitutionality, this Court has interpolated the element of asportation in connection 

with it.” Id. at 385. In People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 696; 580 NW2d 444 (1998), this

Court stated, “Although not mentioned in the statute, asportation of the victim is a judicially 

required element of the crime of kidnapping by forcible confinement or imprisonment.”

The kidnapping statute, before the enactment of 2006 PA 159, stated, in pertinent part:

Any person who wilfully, maliciously and without lawful authority shall 

forcibly or secretly confine or imprison any other person within this state against 

his will, or shall forcibly carry or send such person out of this state, or shall 

forcibly seize or confine, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent 

to extort money or other valuable thing thereby or with intent either to cause such 

person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his will, or in any 

way held to service against his will, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by 

imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years. [1970 CL 

750.349; see also People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 296 n 17; 519 NW2d 108 

(1994).]

Since the enactment of 2006 PA 159, MCL 750.349 now states:

(1) A person commits the crime of kidnapping if he or she knowingly 

restrains another person with the intent to do 1 or more of the following:

(a) Hold that person for ransom or reward.

(b) Use that person as a shield or hostage.

(c) Engage in criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact 

prohibited under chapter LXXVI with that person.

(d) Take that person outside of this state.

(e) Hold that person in involuntary servitude.

(f) Engage in child sexually abusive activity, as that term is defined in 

section 145c, with that person, if that person is a minor.

(2) As used in this section, “restrain” means to restrict a person’s 

movements or to confine the person so as to interfere with that person’s liberty 

without that person’s consent or without legal authority. The restraint does not 
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have to exist for any particular length of time and may be related or incidental to 

the commission of other criminal acts.

[12]

The prosecutor contends that the judicially-created asportation element did not survive 

the 2006 amendment of the kidnapping statute. We need not address this issue, however, 

because our reading of Wesley leads us to conclude that defendant’s argument does not warrant 

relief. In Wesley, 421 Mich at 385, the Court indicated that the asportation element was 

judicially added to the statute to avoid the danger of prosecutorial overcharging. It explained 

that several offenses, such as assault, robbery, or rape, often necessarily involve some amount of 

forcible confinement, so a prosecutor could elevate a misdemeanor charge of, for example, 

simple assault into a felony charge of kidnapping even if no other elements were present aside 

from the simple assault itself. Id. The Court elaborated, however, that “a specific intent 

requirement obviates the need to read an asportation element into the statute.” Id. at 390. The 

Court concluded that such a requirement obviates the dangers “of overcharging or inappropriate 

punishment[.]” Id. The Court in Wesley was dealing with the specific intent to secretly confine 

or the specific intent “ ‘to hold to service[.]’ ” Id. at 390-391. In essence, it concluded that proof 

of these intents abolished the concern about overcharging. Id. at 390. These principles also 

apply to a specific intent to commit criminal sexual penetration—the intent at issue here. Indeed, 

if a person restrains another with the intent to commit sexual penetration or contact, this restraint 

is separate from the restraint involved during the penetration or contact itself and represents a 

separate wrongdoing.13 That is, it involves a “separately cognizable offense.” See, generally, id. 

at 387 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Wesley Court cited favorably the opinion of Justice KAVANAGH in People v Barker, 

411 Mich 291; 307 NW2d 61 (1981).14 See Wesley, 421 Mich at 390. In his opinion in Barker, 

Justice KAVANAGH opined that overbreadth in regard to the offense of kidnapping could be 

avoided by insisting that, to justify a conviction, the confinement be for purposes as specified in 

the statute; he opined that no asportation element should be judicially “imported” into the statute. 

Barker, 411 Mich at 303 (KAVANAGH, J., concurring). He stated, “In the instant cases while the 

defendants in fact confined the complainants, the ultimate purpose of such confinement was 

shown to be criminal sexual conduct. Confinement for that purpose is not covered by our 

 12 The statute was amended by 2014 PA 330, effective January 14, 2015; this amendment added 

subparagraph (1)(f), as well as the phrase “prohibited under chapter LXXVI” in subparagraph 

(1)(c).

13 Under MCL 750.349(1)(c), the pertinent intent for kidnapping is the intent to “[e]ngage in 

criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact[.]” (Emphasis added.) When sexual 

penetration becomes “criminal” only because it is occurring “under circumstances involving the 

commission of any other felony,” see MCL 750.520b(1)(c), and the “other felony” is kidnapping, 

then the issue of intent becomes a bit circular. The fact remains, however, that restraint with the 

intent to commit penetration is separate from restraint occurring during penetration. 

14 The majority opinion in Barker was partially overruled by Wesley, 421 Mich at 386 n 3.
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kidnaping [sic] statute.” Id. Now, “[c]onfinement for that purpose” is covered by the 

kidnapping statute. See MCL 750.349(1)(c). 

Ultimately, the Wesley Court stated that “asportation is required as an element of 

kidnapping only where the charge is forcible confinement (a),” Wesley, 421 Mich at 391

(emphasis added), which, as defined by the Wesley Court, involved confining a person against 

that person’s will, without mention of any intent, see id. at 383. In light of Wesley and the 

principles discussed in that case, defendant’s argument on appeal is without merit because he 

was convicted for restraining SD “with the intent” to commit criminal sexual penetration or 

criminal sexual contact. MCL 750.349(1)(c). Thus, an asportation element was not required 

under the holding of Wesley.

15

B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Defendant argues that his protections against double jeopardy were violated; he contends

that he received multiple punishments for the same offense because the kidnapping offense was 

used as the basis for the CSC-I offense. We disagree. This Court “review[s] an unpreserved 

claim that a defendant’s double jeopardy rights have been violated for plain error that affected 

the defendant’s substantial rights, that is, the error affected the outcome of the lower court 

proceedings.” People v McGee, 280 Mich App 680, 682; 761 NW2d 743 (2008).

Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution contain protections 

against double jeopardy. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. One of these doublejeopardy protections is the protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. People 

v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). In People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 315-316; 733 

NW2d 351 (2007), our Supreme Court explained that where the Legislature clearly intends to 

impose multiple punishments for the same offense, imposition of such sentences does not violate 

the Constitution.

The kidnapping statute states, “This section does not prohibit the person from being 

charged with, convicted of, or sentenced for any other violation of law arising from the same 

transaction as the violation of this section.” MCL 750.349(4). And the statute, in defining the 

crime of kidnapping, explicitly refers to the chapter of the Michigan Penal Code containing 

CSC-I. MCL 750.249(1)(c). Accordingly, the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent to 

authorize multiple punishments for defendant’s two crimes, so his multiple convictions do not 

violate double jeopardy protections. See Smith, 478 Mich at 315-316.

C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and 

call Dr. Kelli T. Fritz and Michael Shirley. Dr. Fritz was the physician who examined SD and, 

 15 Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective for not challenging the jury instructions 

at trial. Because the instructions were proper, counsel was not ineffective for failing object to 

them. Horn, 279 Mich App at 39-40 (discussing futile objections).
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according to defendant, “may have had valuable information.” Defendant also contends that 

Michael was present at the scene of the crimes alleged and “may have had important information 

that may have determined the outcome of [d]efendant’s case.”

To obtain relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish a 

reasonable probability that counsel’s actions affected the outcome of the proceedings. Ackley, 

497 Mich at 389. The “possibility” of valuable information does not demonstrate such a 

reasonable probability. Defendant has simply not established any factual predicate for the claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the failure to present, and the alleged 

failure to interview, these two witnesses. Cooper, 309 Mich App at 80.

Defendant also argues that trial counsel “failed to capitalize on the flaws in the State’s 

case regarding identification of the defendant.” Defendant’s assertions in this regard are vague. 

He provides no information regarding what these supposed flaws were or how his attorney 

should have “capitalize[d]” on them. He cites a police report and a “Patient Examiner form,” but 

(1) these documents are not in the record provided to this Court, and (2) defendant does not tell 

us what relevant information they supposedly contain. “An appellant may not merely announce 

his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may 

he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 

231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

Defendant lastly argues that trial counsel “failed to object to inaccurate information stated 

by the prosecutor during her closing arguments . . . concerning the presence of defendant’s 

saliva . . . on [SD’s] vagina.” Defendant’s assertion of error does not warrant reversal. Scott 

testified that an analysis of SD’s underwear showed “the possible presence of salivary amylase,”

which is “the protein or enzyme that is found in saliva.” She stated that the test was “a 

presumptive test because there are the known false positive[s] with other bodily fluids.”

Defendant is correct that the prosecutor should not have said, “You heard that there was 

salivary amylase” in SD’s underwear, because Scott testified only about the “possible presence”

of it. But a prosecutor’s remarks are to be viewed in context, and a prosecutor “is permitted to 

argue . . . all reasonable inferences arising from” the evidence. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 

450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Viewed in context, the gist of the prosecutor’s remarks was 

that defendant’s DNA and saliva were in SD’s underwear because he had performed cunnilingus 

on her, as detailed by SD. In addition, the trial court stated that the remarks of counsel were not 

evidence and were “only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal 

theories.” Also, defense counsel elicited that the presumptive test for salivary amylase can show 

a positive result from other substances, such as urine, and it was undisputed that the underwear 

cuttings contained a mixture of DNA. In other words, counsel took steps to undercut the 

assertion that defendant’s saliva was in SD’s underwear. Under these circumstances, defendant 

has not established the prongs for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in 

connection with counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s remarks. Ackley, 497 Mich at 389.
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Affirmed.

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ James Robert Redford