IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

LORIE FLETCHER, Ph.D., No. 56795-4-II

Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE HEALTH 

EXAMING BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY,

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Respondent.

VELJACIC,J. — Dr. Lorie Fletcher appealed the Examining Board of Psychology’s decision 

to deny her application for a psychologist license after it found that Fletcher had not met the 

education and experience requirements. Fletcher sought judicial review in Thurston County 

Superior Court. The superior court dismissed Fletcher’s petition for review because it was 

untimely. We reverse the superior court and remand for additional proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

FACTS

Fletcher applied for licensure as a psychologist to the Examining Board of Psychology (the 

Board). In the application, Fletcher listed her educational credentials and her supervised 

experience.

The Board denied Fletcher’s application. The reason given was “failure to submit 

verifiable documentation that she met the requirements for licensure,” because she “had not met 

the credit requirements found in WAC 246-924-046(3), and that [she] had not provided sufficient 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

December 5, 2023
56795-4-II

2

documentation to demonstrate that she met the required preinternship and post-doctoral 

supervision hours.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 113-14.

Fletcher requested a hearing to contest the decision. The Board held a de novo hearing and 

once again denied the application. The Board found that Fletcher failed to meet the coursework 

requirements of WAC 246-924-046(3). The Board also found that Fletcher did not prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that she met the 1,500 hours of experience required by WAC 246-

924-043(1)(c)(ii). 

The final order denied Fletcher’s credential to practice as a psychologist in the state of 

Washington. On January 22, 2021, the Board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final order 

were served to Fletcher via mail. The order specified a 10-day deadline to file a petition for 

reconsideration and a 30-day deadline to file a petition for judicial review. On February 8, Fletcher 

filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied because it was filed beyond the 10-day 

deadline.

Fletcher then filed a petition for judicial review in Thurston County Superior Court that 

was date stamped by the clerk’s office on February 23. At the time, due to COVID-19 protocols 

implemented to prevent infection, the clerk’s office was using a drop box to accept these filings.

The Board moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under CR 12(b)(1) because the petition 

was untimely under RCW 34.05.542(2). In response, Fletcher argued that because the order was 

sent by mail, CR 6(e) allowed an additional three days to file. She also submitted a supplemental 

response to the motion asserting that she had filed the petition on February 22. The supplemental 

response included time-stamped photos, purporting to show that she delivered the petition to the 

clerk’s drop box on February 22 at 4:34 PM. 
56795-4-II

3

The superior court held a hearing and granted the Board’s motion to dismiss. In its ruling, 

the court explained that: (1) Fletcher did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s 

(APA) deadline because she “did not file a petition for judicial review with [the] court within thirty 

days after service of the Board’s Final Order”; (2) Fletcher’s “petition for judicial review does not 

comply with the timing requirements in RCW 34.05.542(2) for filing a petition for judicial 

review”; and (3) as a result, the “court lacks jurisdiction to hear Fletcher’s petition for judicial 

review.” CP at 179. The court emphasized in its oral ruling that “the court needs to rely on the 

official documents, and the official document is the date stamp from the clerk’s office saying that 

the filing occurred on February 23rd.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Feb. 11, 2022) at 30. 

Fletcher moved for reconsideration, asserting the same argument: that she filed on February 

22, and that she was entitled to three extra days to file under CR 6(e).

The Board’s position was that the petition was filed untimely, as stamped, on February 23, 

and that CR 6(e) does not apply because the APA governs service of agency final orders. The 

court heard argument but then continued the matter pending an investigation into the timing of the 

filing of the petition for judicial review (per Fletcher’s request to the Thurston County Superior 

Court Clerk’s Office). The Chief Deputy Clerk wrote a letter to Fletcher saying: 

I have reviewed your petition filed in the court file which if filed on 2-23-21 at 

11:04 a.m. In your letter you stated that you had deposited the petition in our 

dropbox on 2-21-21 at 4:34 p.m. It is our practice to check the dropbox a minimum 

of three times daily with the last check at about 4:45 p.m. Our office does not keep 

any kind of log of when we check the dropbox. 

RP (May 6, 2022) at 11-12. 

The court held argument once more and then denied the motion for reconsideration. The 

court found that “[n]o CR 59 grounds exist for this court to reconsider its February 11, 2022 Order 

Granting Dismissal of Petitioner’s Petition for Judicial Review.” CP at 241. In its oral ruling, the 
56795-4-II

4

court acknowledged that “if the Clerk’s investigation had indicated that there was an issue with 

the processing of a petition for judicial review, making it timely, then the Court could have 

considered that” but that “[t]he Clerk’s investigation as documented from [the] Chief Deputy[‘s]

letter did not produce new evidence.” RP (May 6, 2022) at 13-14. 

Fletcher appeals the dismissal of her petition and a notice of supplemental appeal from the 

denial of the motion for reconsideration. 

ANALYSIS

I. THE EXAMINING BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY’S AUTHORITY 

The Board regulates the practice of psychology in Washington and has the authority to 

grant or deny applications for licensure. RCW 18.130.050(15); RCW 18.83.035 (“There is created 

the examining board of psychology which shall examine the qualifications of applicants for 

licensing.”); RCW 18.83.050(2) (“The board shall examine the qualifications of applicants for 

licensing under this chapter, to determine which applicants are eligible for licensing.”). 

When an application is denied, the Board sends a notice of decision and provides an 

opportunity for the applicant to contest the decision. RCW 18.130.055(3) (“The disciplining 

authority shall give written notice to the applicant of the decision to deny a license or grant a 

license.”); RCW 18.130.055(4) (“A license applicant who is aggrieved by the decision to deny the 

license or grant the license with conditions has the right to an adjudicative proceeding.”). The 

Board “shall make the final decision regarding disposition of the license.” RCW 18.130.050(10). 

II. TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION 

Fletcher argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition for review because it was 

timely filed with the Thurston County Superior Court Clerk’s office. We hold that the trial court 
56795-4-II

5

abused its discretion in ruling that the petition was untimely and dismissing the petition for review 

for lack of jurisdiction. 

A. Standard of Review 

The APA, chapter 34.05 RCW, governs appeals from the Board’s actions. RCW 

18.130.100 (“The procedures governing adjudicative proceedings before agencies under chapter 

34.05 RCW, the [APA], govern all hearings before the disciplining authority.”); RCW 34.05.510 

(“This chapter establishes the exclusive means of judicial review of agency action.”). “A court 

does not obtain jurisdiction over an appeal from an agency decision unless the appealing party 

timely files and serves the petition for judicial review on the agency and all parties.” Clark County 

v. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 10 Wn. App. 2d 84, 94, 448 P.3d 81 (2019); Skagit Surveyors & 

Eng’rs LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wn.2d 542, 555, 958 P.2d 962 (1998). To invoke 

appellate jurisdiction, the party requesting judicial review has the burden to demonstrate that they 

have met all of the requirements of the APA. See Diehl v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’g Bd., 118 

Wn. App. 212, 219, 75 P.3d 975 (2003). 

B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Ruling that Fletcher had Not Filed Her 

Petition on February 22

Under the APA, “[a] petition for judicial review of an order shall be filed with the court 

and served on the agency, the office of the attorney general, and all parties of record within thirty 

days after service of the final order.” RCW 34.05.542(2). This is a necessary condition for 

appellate jurisdiction. Union Bay Pres. Coal. v. Cosmos Dev. & Admin. Corp., 127 Wn.2d 614, 

617, 902 P.2d 1247 (1995). 

The superior court acts in a limited capacity when reviewing an administrative decision. 

Id. “[T]he superior court does not obtain jurisdiction over an appeal from an agency decision 

unless the appealing party files a petition for review in the superior court and serves the petition 
56795-4-II

6

on all of the parties.” City of Seattle v. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm’n, 116 Wn.2d 923, 926, 809 P.2d 

1377 (1991).

“When reviewing an administrative decision, the superior court is acting in its 

limited appellate capacity, and all statutory procedural requirements must be met 

before the court’s appellate jurisdiction is properly invoked. Therefore, under the 

administrative procedure act (APA), the superior court does not obtain jurisdiction 

over an appeal from an agency decision unless the appealing party files a petition 

for review in the superior court and serves the petition on all of the parties.” 

Union Bay Pres. Coal., 127 Wn.2d at 617-18 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Pub. Emp. Rel. 

Comm’n, 116 Wn.2d at 926. If the statutory procedural requirements are not met, the court must 

dismiss the matter. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Dep’t of Ecology, 12 Wn. App. 2d 977, 

982, 460 P.3d 1107 (2020).

The time at which a document was filed is a factual determination. We review the trial 

court’s factual determination for abuse of discretion. State v. Ortega, 120 Wn. App. 165, 171, 84 

P.3d 935 (2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when it relies on unsupported facts in issuing 

its decision. Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 181 Wn.2d 1, 7, 330 P.3d 168 (2014). An abuse of 

discretion also occurs if the factual assumptions made by a trial court do not meet the requirements 

of the governing legal standard. Hoffman v. Kittitas County, 4 Wn. App. 2d 489, 495-96, 422 P.3d 

466 (2018). As long as some factual basis exists to support a trial court’s decision, the abuse of 

discretion standard is met and further scrutiny is unwarranted. Id. at 496.

Here, it is uncontroverted that Fletcher placed her petition in the clerk’s drop box on 

February 22. Indeed, Fletcher presented uncontroverted evidence as to this fact in the form of her 

supplemental response declaration, which attached the time-stamped photos While the clerk’s 

stamp demonstrates when documents were stamped as filed, it does not demonstrate when they 

were placed in the drop box. To that point, the clerk’s stamp does not contradict that Fletcher 
56795-4-II

7

placed the documents in the drop box when the time-stamped photos show she did, that is on 

February 22. 

Assuming without deciding that the unsworn letter from the clerk’s office is properly 

considered under the evidence rules, it merely states that it is the clerk’s office’s “practice to check 

the dropbox a minimum of three times daily with the last check at about 4:45 p.m.” and the “office 

does not keep any kind of log of when [it] check[s] the dropbox.” RP (May 6, 2022) at 11-12. 

While a statement of general practice, the letter does not definitively assert that the clerk’s office 

did in fact check the drop box at 4:45 PM on February 22. So neither the letter nor any other 

evidence contradicts that Fletcher submitted her petition on the afternoon of February 22. The 

petition could both be delivered to the clerk’s office timely on February 22 and stamped by the 

clerk on February 23; pointedly, these occurrences are not mutually exclusive. There is no 

evidence to suggest that the clerk’s office, as is likely in non-pandemic times, contemporaneously 

time-stamped filings as they were made. Indeed, the understandable practices undertaken by the 

clerk of utilizing a drop box to insulate its employees from infection during the COVID-19 

pandemic militates against any inference of contemporaneous time stamping of filed documents. 

Under these unique circumstances, where the clerk’s office had COVID-19 protocols in 

place and Fletcher’s declaration was the only admissible evidence on the issue of when the petition 

was delivered to the clerk’s office, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in relying 

solely on the clerk’s stamp and disregarding the evidence presented. 

CONCLUSION

In light of our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding Fletcher’s 

filing was untimely, we need not reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the 
56795-4-II

8

motion for reconsideration. We reverse the trial court and reinstate Fletcher’s appeal to the 

superior court from the Board. We remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Veljacic, J.

We concur:

Maxa, P.J.

Che, J.