alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          13,958
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,807,252
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    320,785
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,403,252
<PP&E>                                       2,369,300
<DEPRECIATION>                                 221,363
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,116,651
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,913,888
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        24,180
<OTHER-SE>                                     935,776
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,116,651
<SALES>                                      6,809,760
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,809,760
<CGS>                                        3,865,118
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,865,118
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,743,873
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             350,137
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (149,368)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (149,368)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (149,368)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)


</TABLE>
RENWICK KEEL

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 3018

___________ __________________/

Opinion filed November 1, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County

. William F. Stone , Judge

.

Renwick Keel, pro se

, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
DECEMBER 31, 1998 CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE TWELVE-MONTH 
PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE 
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND THE FOOTNOTES THERETO.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                             145
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    400,417
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               400,562
<PP&E>                                       2,374,292
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,156,854
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                 11,616,300
<COMMON>                                     9,654,206
<OTHER-SE>                                (16,444,150)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,156,854
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               519,669
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                14,528
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             504,718
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,038,915)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   107,956
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,146,871)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.229)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (.229)
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Deborah Goodwin, an Attorney, Resignor.

[801 NYS2d 170]

Voluntary resignation accepted and name removed from roll of attorneys *(see Matter of Manown,*240 AD2d 83 [1998]). Present—Green, J.P., Scudder, Gorski, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
IIB 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5528 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 24, 2008 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 120 Commercial Street in Brockton, Massachusetts, as the ‘‘Rocky Marciano Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

HR 5528 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. ROCKY MARCIANO POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 120 Commercial Street in Brock4 ton, Massachusetts, shall be known and designated as the 

5 ‘‘Rocky Marciano Post Office Building’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Rocky Marciano Post 

10 Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives April 23, 2008. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6476

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GREGORY STEVEN HORN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

James K. Bredar, District Judge. (1:12-cr-00138-JKB-1; 1:15-cv-03420-JKB)

Submitted: June 22, 2017 Decided: June 27, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gregory Steven Horn, Appellant Pro Se. Rachel Miller Yasser, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Gregory Steven Horn seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Horn has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 5, 2016

No. 04-16-00085-CV

WHATABURGER, INC., CA Development LLC, CA Real Estate LLC, Cinco Aguilas LLC, 

Tres Aguilas Enterprises LLC, Tres Aguilas Management LLC, Whataburger International LLC, 

Whataburger Real Estate LLC, Whataburger Restaurants LLC, et al.,

Appellants

v.

WHATABURGER OF ALICE, LTD.,

Appellee

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016-CI-01431

Honorable Gloria Saldana, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellee’s Unopposed Second Motion for Extension of Time is hereby GRANTED. NO 

FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF TIME WILL BE ALLOWED. Time is extended to September 6, 

2016.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 5th day of August, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-10672

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

NICHOLAS DIAZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:11-CR-135-1

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Nicholas Diaz has

moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th

Cir. 2011). Diaz has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and

the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 17, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-10672 Document: 00511823926 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2012
No. 11-10672

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

Case: 11-10672 Document: 00511823926 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/17/2012
DODRILL v. JERRY RHYNE'S COLLISION REPAIR.

No. COA05-1408.

North Carolina Court of Appeals.

Filed July 5, 2006.

Certification Date July 25, 2006.

Appeal from NC Industrial Commission (I.C. #331691).

Case without published opinion. Affirmed.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS Appeal of

-- SGT, Inc. Under Contract No. NAS5-03079 etal. APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: ) ) ) ) )

APPEARANCES FORTHE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA No. 60032

David M. Nadler, Esq. Justin A. Chiarodo, Esq. Stephanie M. Zechmann, Esq.

Blank Rome LLP Washington, DC E. Michael Chiaparas, Esq.

DCMA ChiefTrial Attorney Samuel W. Morris, Esq.

Trial Attorney Defense Contract Management Agency Chantilly, VA ORDER OF DISMISSAL The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice. Dated: 5 May 2016

MARK N. STEMPLE Administrative Judge Acting Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Order ofDismissal ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60032, Appeal ofSGT, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:
JEFFREY D. GARDIN Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LEONARD RICKY KELLY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 95-6914

FRANKLIN FREEMAN; ERNEST B.

FULLWOOD; ROBERT L. FARMER,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

James C. Fox, Chief District Judge.

(CA-95-198-5-F)

Submitted: October 31, 1995

Decided: April 23, 1996

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per

curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Leonard Ricky Kelly, Appellant Pro Se.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Leonard Ricky Kelly appeals from a district court order dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim. We affirm the order in part, vacate

in part, and remand.

Kelly's suit involves his transfer from a North Carolina prison to

an Oklahoma prison. He contends that one state judge improperly

failed to advise Kelly about the possibility of such a transfer. He contends that another state judge denied him due process by dismissing

his state claim against the first judge. Finally, he contends that the

state Secretary of Corrections breached Kelly's plea agreement by

transferring him to an Oklahoma prison to serve the remainder of the

sentence.

The district court properly found that the two state judges were

immune from damages because they were not acting in the clear

absence of jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The

district court, however, operated under a fundamental misconception

of law regarding Kelly's claim that his plea agreement was breached.

The court believed that the claim was not federal in nature. This is

incorrect. E.g., Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Thus,

the district court abused its discretion is dismissing this claim under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988). James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th

Cir. 1993) (abuse of discretion to dismiss under§ 1915(d) where

exercise of discretion flawed by erroneous legal premise).

Thus, although we affirm the order with regard to the dismissal of

the complaint against the state court judges, we vacate that portion of

the district court order dismissing Kelly's claim against the Secretary

regarding breach of the plea agreement. We remand that claim for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We express no

opinion on the ultimate merits of the claim or other defenses to the

claim. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED 

 2
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JAN 21, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-11410

_____________

D.C. Docket No. 2:07-cr-00350-IPJ-PWG-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus

CARMISE MATTHEWS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

____________

(January 21, 2011)

Before TJOFLAT, HILL, and ALARCON,* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

___________________

* Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by

designation.
This is an appeal from a twenty-four month sentence imposed upon Carmise

Matthews by the district court for violating the conditions of his supervised

release. Matthews claims that the district court plainly erred by failing to provide

specific written reasons for his sentence, which exceeds the range suggested by the

Chapter 7 policy statements to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, in his

judgment according to the dictates of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). We

agree.

The statute reads:

The court, at the time of sentence, shall state in open court the reasons

for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence . . . is

not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in subsection (a)(4),

the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that

described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the

written order of judgment and commitment . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).

We have reviewed the record in this appeal, the briefs and the arguments of

counsel. By failing to provide written reasons for a sentence exceeding the

statutory guidelines, we find that the district court plainly erred by failing to abide

by the terms of the statute. See United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350, 1354

(11th Cir. 2007). We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand to the

district court for the limited purpose of providing a written and specific statement

2
of the reasons for its upward departure in Matthews’ sentence pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.

3
#### In the Matter of the Claim of David J. Oles Jr., Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[801 NYS2d 104]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed October 9, 2003, as amended by decision filed December 30, 2004, which, inter alia, ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because he was not totally unemployed.

Substantial evidence supports the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s ruling that claimant was ineligible to receive *1189unemployment insurance benefits and a trade readjustment allowance under the federal Trade Act of 1974 *(see*19 USC § 2271*et*seq.) because he was not totally unemployed during the time that he received those benefits *(see Matter of Sarubbi [Commissioner of Labor],*9 AD3d 723, 723-724 [2004]; *Matter of Holmes [Commissioner of Labor],*307 AD2d 575, 575-576 [2003]). The record establishes that claimant did not disclose on his application for benefits that he was a 95% shareholder of a limited liability company that he had formed with his father in 1995. As a signatory on the company checking account, claimant occasionally wrote checks on behalf of the business during the period in which he was collecting benefits. Although claimant did not receive any income from the company, he nevertheless realized a financial benefit since he deducted the company’s losses and expenses on his personal income tax return.

Furthermore, since claimant admitted to reading the informational handbook which advises him of the reporting requirements, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that he made willful misrepresentations and is liable for recoverable overpayments *(see Matter of Zegelbone [Commissioner of Labor],*19 AD3d 986 [2005]; *Matter of Holmes [Commissioner of Labor], supra*at 576). Nevertheless, claimant maintains on this appeal that a Department of Labor employee would confirm his assertion that he provided the correct information when he filed his claim and, therefore, did not make a willful misrepresentation. However, the record reflects that, although the Commissioner of Labor’s attorney requested an adjournment for the purpose of obtaining the testimony of that employee, claimant did not join in that request or make an objection when such motion was denied *(see Matter of Acabeo [New York City Bd. of*Educ.— *Sweeney],*234 AD2d 851, 851 [1996]). Accordingly, this argument has not been preserved.

Claimant’s remaining contentions have been considered and found to be without merit.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Mooney Aerospace Group, Ltd. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Gretchen L. Jahn, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)   The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.


Dated: August 31, 2006              By: /s/ Gretchen L. Jahn
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        Gretchen L. Jahn
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

LESLIE CHARLIE VAN WINKLE, AKA 

Leslie C Van Winkle, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-10499 

D.C. No. 3:01-cr-00181-SPL-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Steven P. Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2019**

Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

Leslie Charlie Van Winkle appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the 30-month sentence imposed upon his third revocation of supervised 

release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Van Winkle first argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 22 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-10499 

to address his arguments regarding his brain damage and to explain the aboveGuidelines sentence. The district court did not plainly err. See United States v. 

Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). The court considered 

Van Winkle’s arguments and sufficiently explained that the upward variance was 

warranted in light of Van Winkle’s repeated breaches of the court’s trust, the need 

to protect the public, and Van Winkle’s unsuitability for supervision. See United 

States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

Van Winkle also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in 

light of his brain damage and resulting cognitive deficiencies. The district court 

did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) 

sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; 

United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007).

We decline to consider issues not specifically raised in Van Winkle’s 

opening brief. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005).

Van Winkle’s unopposed motion for judicial notice is granted.

AFFIRMED.