SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3941-17T2

JAYMIE M. CORNINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JONATHAN S. PUCCIA and

BORGATA HOTEL CASINO

& SPA,

Defendants-Respondents.

____________________________

Argued January 30, 2019 – Decided January 14, 2020

Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Sussex County, Docket No. L-0342-15. 

Richard Arthur Dunne argued the cause for appellant.

Justin A. Britton argued the cause for respondent 

Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa (Cooper Levenson, PA, 

attorneys; Russell L. Lichtenstein, Justin A. Britton and 

Jennifer Broeck Barr, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3941-17T2

NUGENT, J.A.D.

This personal injury action stems from defendant Jonathan S. Puccia's 

assault of plaintiff, Jaymie M. Cornine, in the Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa in 

Atlantic City. Plaintiff appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of his 

complaint against Borgata. The trial court granted summary judgment to 

Borgata because plaintiff had not served an expert report addressing Borgata's 

security. Because plaintiff did not allege Borgata's security, in general, was 

inadequate, and because the summary judgment record demonstrates a jury 

question as to whether Borgata employees negligently failed to take minimal 

action to prevent the assault—a matter not beyond the ken of a lay person—we 

reverse and remand for trial. 

The personal injury complaint plaintiff filed in May 2015 alleged four 

causes of action. The first count, which contained allegations only against 

Borgata, alleged Borgata breached its duty "to properly supervise the premises 

and use reasonable care to make those premises safe for their invitees like 

[plaintiff]." Borgata breached this duty, according to the complaint, through its 

employees, who "carelessly, recklessly and negligently allowed various 

circumstances to evolve and develop, about which the defendants were aware as 

those circumstances were evolving and developing, to the point of creating a 
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A-3941-17T2

dangerous condition on and/or inside the premises they managed, supervised 

and/or controlled . . . ." The allegation added that the dangerous condition 

"could have readily been eliminated and/or prevented had . . . defendants taken 

reasonable steps to eliminate and/or prevent them, which they didn't, lead[ing]

directly to a vicious assault and battery of [plaintiff]." The first count also 

alleged plaintiff sustained injuries proximately caused by Borgata's negligence.

The complaint's second count, which included allegations against both 

Puccia and Borgata, alleged Borgata negligently failed to take any action to 

prevent the assault or stop the assault during its commission. The third count 

alleged Borgata's employees had knowledge of Puccia's violent propensities and 

heard him threaten to harm plaintiff sufficiently in advance of the assault to take 

action to prevent it, but did nothing, thus breaching the duty they owed plaintiff, 

a business invitee. The fourth count alleged defendants' conduct rose to a level 

of culpability warranting punitive damages. 

Defendant Puccia defaulted. Following completion of discovery, Borgata 

moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion. The court 

apparently perceived plaintiff's action as one involving professional negligence 

and the assessment of proper security protocols, which required expert 

testimony. The court concluded that absent expert testimony addressing this 
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A-3941-17T2

issue, "the jury cannot determine what response would have been appropriate at 

the time of the incident." 

The court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the 

court entered a default judgment in the amount of $160,000 plus pre-judgment 

interest against Puccia. This appeal followed. 

The motion record, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the 

non-moving party, Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman, 233 N.J. 

236, 256 (2018), discloses the following facts. Puccia assaulted plaintiff on 

January 1, 2014, at Borgata, shortly after five o'clock in the morning, after the 

two exchanged words while playing craps—a dice game. Plaintiff was playing 

craps with a friend for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes before Puccia 

assaulted him. An unknown gentleman was beside plaintiff and his friend, to 

their right. Puccia's girlfriend was to the right of the unknown gentleman, and 

Puccia was to the right of his girlfriend. Plaintiff and his friend were talking

with Puccia and his girlfriend about Puccia's hometown, mutual friends, and 

boating. Plaintiff gave this account of the assault in his interrogatory answers:

I remember that I was speaking with another gentleman 

who was next to me at the table when defendant, 

Puccia, and his girlfriend joined the conversation. At 

first, the conversation was pleasant but suddenly, and 

without warning, and for no reason that was apparent to 

me, defendant, Puccia, became irate and told me to 
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A-3941-17T2

"shut the fuck up." I was totally baffled as to why he 

would say that to me, as the conversation leading up to 

this statement seemed friendly and pleasant. Not 

knowing what prompted the defendant to react in that 

manner I told him to calm down. His girlfriend also 

tried to calm him down, but when she did he struck her 

hard in the face with the back of his hand.

When Puccia hit his girlfriend I told him not to strike a 

woman. Soon after I told him not to strike a woman 

Puccia became even more aggressive, picking up and 

throwing a glass with ice at me that was located to his 

right on the ledge of the "craps" table and then 

attempting to leap across the table and strike me with 

his closed fist. When he failed to connect with his 

punch after leaping across the table he then ran around 

to my side of the table and continued trying to punch 

me. After avoiding another punch he threw I was 

somehow able to wrap him up in a bear hug, but in 

doing so he pushed and then tackled me to the ground. 

That is when I began to experience excruciating pain in 

my left knee. I remember screaming for help while 

trying to control the defendant, but it seemed like an 

eternity before security personnel from the casino 

finally came and pulled Puccia off me. As far as I could 

tell nobody employed by the casino made any attempt 

to intercede and stop Puccia from behaving the way he 

did, not even when he hit his girlfriend.

In fact, when several videos of the event(s) are 

reviewed that were created by cameras located inside 

the casino, it can clearly be seen that no attempts were 

made by either casino security or pit bosses in the area 

to remove and/or escort Puccia from the table between 

the time he struck his girlfriend in the face and the 

moment the videos show him picking up a glass with 

ice and throwing it at me even though one of the pit 

bosses is seen approaching him after seeing him strike 
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A-3941-17T2

his girlfriend.[1] According to the timers on the various 

videos at least sixteen (16) seconds elapsed between 

those two very aggressive and inappropriate acts he 

committed, which was more than enough time for 

personnel from the casino to take steps to have him 

removed from the area on account of his inappropriate 

behavior. Had the appropriate action been taken by 

personnel from the Borgata, with Puccia being escorted 

away from the table after striking his girlfriend, he 

would have never had the opportunity to charge me and 

injure my knee. Even after he threw the glass at me the 

videos show nearly ten (10) more seconds elapsed 

before he charged towards me and injured my knee. 

Those same videos show a [Floorperson] standing right 

beside Puccia for the entire ten (10) second span doing 

nothing to [defuse] Puccia's obvious explosive and 

physically inappropriate behavior.

During his deposition, plaintiff explained he spoke to Puccia and Puccia's 

girlfriend for approximately five to ten minutes before Puccia told him he should 

shut up. After Puccia told plaintiff to shut up and used the expletive, Puccia's 

girlfriend tried to calm him down, but he became irate and struck her. Puccia's 

anger intensified after plaintiff said he should not hit a woman. 

Plaintiff said it appeared Puccia knew the Floorperson from the way they 

were conversing. Puccia had also been conversing with the dealer. After 

1

 Throughout the motion transcript, witnesses refer to this and other similarlyemployed Borgata employees as "pit boss," "table games supervisor," "floor 

supervisor," and "Floorperson." For the remainder of this opinion, we will refer 

to such employees as "Floorperson." 
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A-3941-17T2

"backhanding" his girlfriend, Puccia "proceeded to throw his cup of ice and 

beverage on [plaintiff]." Plaintiff described the drink as a "full cup of ice with 

a little bit of liquid. An alcoholic beverage was in the cup." Puccia then tried 

to jump across the table and punch plaintiff. 

Plaintiff estimated approximately thirty seconds elapsed between Puccia 

backhanding his girlfriend and attacking him. Plaintiff estimated ten seconds 

elapsed between Puccia jumping across the table to strike him and the physical 

altercation during which Puccia took plaintiff to the ground. According to 

Borgata's incident report, Puccia was detained and eventually evicted, 

permanently, from Borgata. 

The video surveillance corroborates plaintiff's testimony. Significantly, 

after Puccia made threatening gestures and threw his ice and what remained of 

his drink at plaintiff, he attempted to grab some gambling chips to throw at 

plaintiff. A Borgata Floorperson (the first Floorperson) intervened by grabbing 

Puccia's arm. While in the presence of the first Floorperson, Puccia desisted 

from his threatening and assaultive conduct. Yet, the first Floorperson appears 

to have taken no further action to defuse the situation or prevent Puccia from 

attacking plaintiff. Within seconds thereafter, Puccia ran around to plaintiff and 
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A-3941-17T2

assaulted him. Approximately five to seven seconds after Puccia took plaintiff 

to the ground, Borgata security officers pulled Puccia off. 

Plaintiff's friend corroborated plaintiff's testimony. The friend testified 

that after plaintiff had been conversing with Puccia and Puccia's girlfriend for a 

while, Puccia became silent and appeared to be getting angry. The friend 

deduced Puccia's anger from his clenched fists and facial expressions. 

According to the friend, plaintiff continued to talk with Puccia's girlfriend. 

Asked by defense counsel at his deposition if he had any idea why Puccia was 

becoming angry, the friend responded, "[f]rom my knowledge, I mean, just from 

what I think, I think it's because Mr. Puccia's girlfriend was talking to 

[plaintiff]." Asked by defense counsel what prompted Puccia to tell plaintiff to 

shut the f*** up, the friend replied, "I don't really think it was anything. I think 

he just wanted [plaintiff] and his girlfriend, Mr. Puccia's girlfriend, to stop 

talking." 

Plaintiff's friend testified that after Puccia struck his girlfriend the dealer 

reached over to try to stop Puccia from continuing. Then, according to the 

friend, the first Floorperson came over and asked if everything was "all right." 

After describing the intervening events, plaintiff's friend testified Puccia "tried 
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A-3941-17T2

walking around the table and I think the [first Floorperson] stopped him[.]" The 

friend then described Puccia's assault on plaintiff.

The first Floorperson claimed to have no memory of the assault or the 

events leading up to it. When deposed and questioned about the surveillance 

video, the first Floorperson identified himself, a second Floorperson, and the 

dealer. The first Floorperson also described his actions as depicted in the 

surveillance video. He acknowledged he was the person who grabbed Puccia's 

arm after Puccia "pick[ed] up a drink and toss[ed] it to the gentleman on the far 

side." He grabbed Puccia's arm because it appeared Puccia "was trying to pick 

up some chips from the table game and . . . toss them to the gentleman on the 

far side." 

Continuing to view the surveillance video, the first Floorperson described 

himself "backing away" after Puccia threw his drink and tried to throw chips at 

plaintiff. He surmised he was backing away because he believed that everything 

was under control. 

Plaintiff deposed the second Floorperson, who also claimed to have no 

memory of the assault or the events leading up to it. Viewing the video did not 

refresh his recollection. He was, however, able to identify the first Floorperson, 

the craps dealer, and himself in the video. Unlike the first Floorperson, however, 
10 A-3941-17T2

the second Floorperson acknowledged that Puccia's throwing the contents of the 

glass at plaintiff would warrant calling security; it would compel him to contact 

security. 

The second Floorperson explained there were two ways to notify security: 

pushing a button mounted on the side of a "pit stand" depicted in the surveillance 

video or using a phone. He identified a third Floorperson seen in the video as 

the one who pushed the panic button when Puccia assaulted plaintiff. 

Borgata retained "a self-employed security and risk management 

consultant." According to his report, his "responsibilities while employed by 

various employers included performing security functions, training and 

managing proprietary security forces, overseeing contracted security services, 

and off-duty special employment law enforcement officers." According to the 

expert's report, during his career, the expert had "developed an in depth 

understanding of security applications, target hardening applications, asset 

protection techniques, and security force administration through practical 

experience, education, trade associations, public sector interaction, and 

professional certification." 

After providing an overview of the incident, enumerating nine of his 

observations from the surveillance video, summarizing certain deposition 
11 A-3941-17T2

testimony, and citing certain documents, the expert provided thirteen paragraphs 

of "Professional Opinions." For example, the expert noted "plaintiff knew of

Puccia's girlfriend from mutual acquaintances," and "Puccia, his girlfriend and 

others were conversing while gaming at the craps table prior to the altercation. " 

He added, "[t]he conversation between the parties quickly escalated from 

friendly to hostile in nature." Most of the remaining "professional observations"

are readily apparent to anyone viewing the surveillance video. The expert

offered four conclusions:

10. Borgata casino games management response to 

the verbal banter and then to the physical altercation 

was reasonable and proper.

11. In compliance with regulatory requirements 

imposed by the New Jersey Casino Control Act and the 

New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, the 

Borgata table games pit where the incident took place 

possessed telephones and two duress/trouble alarms 

that were configured to silently alert the Security 

Department, the Surveillance Department, and the inhouse office of the Division of Gaming Enforcement 

(DGE) simultaneously.

12. In accordance with the policy of Borgata, the 

duress alarm in the pit was activated by casino games 

supervisor Raphael Villa when the disturbance at the 

craps table turned physical.

13. When notified, Borgata security properly reacted 

. . . by responding to the pit and separating the involved

parties, detaining Puccia, offering medical assistance to 
12 A-3941-17T2

the plaintiff, and offering to contact the DGE on behalf 

of the plaintiff. 

The gist of the expert's opinion is concisely summarized in a sentence 

taken from the "conclusion" section of his report: "The evidence revealed that 

the plaintiff's assault at the hands of Puccia was sudden and not telegraphed by 

any discernible pre-incident indicators." The expert added: 

This event is categorized as an act of sudden violence

in that there were no discernible pre-incident indicators 

that placed Borgata on-notice [sic] that co-defendant 

Joseph Puccia was going to strike the plaintiff. No 

threat of bodily harm was communicated by Puccia to 

the plaintiff during the brief verbal interaction that took 

place just prior to the sudden aggressive actions taken 

by Puccia against the plaintiff. Thus, this event could 

not have been prevented by Borgata despite its 

employment of reasonable and customary security 

industry measures.

The expert does not cite any specific "security industry measures" concerning 

these observations. 

As previously noted, the court granted summary judgment to Borgata, and 

this appeal followed.

Appellate courts "review[] an order granting summary judgment in 

accordance with the same standard as the motion judge." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 

N.J. 22, 38 (2014). Our function is not "to weigh the evidence and determine 

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
13 A-3941-17T2

trial." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)); accord, R. 4:46-

2(c). A trial court's determination that a party is entitled to summary judgment 

as a matter of law is not entitled to any "special deference," and is subject to de 

novo review. Cypress Point Condo. Ass'n v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 226 N.J. 

403, 415 (2016).

The trial court granted summary judgment to Borgata on the ground that 

plaintiff was required to produce expert testimony to prove Borgata's 

negligence. To present a prima facie claim of negligence against Borgata, 

plaintiff was required to prove "(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) 

proximate cause, and (4) actual damages." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 

(2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)). "The 

determination of the existence of a duty is a question of law for the 

court." Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 479 (1995) (citing Wang v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2, 15 (1991)).

Here, Borgata does not dispute that plaintiff was a business invitee. As 

such, Borgata owed plaintiff a duty "to provide a reasonably safe place to do

that which is within the scope of the invitation." Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 

N.J. 270, 275 (1982). This included "a duty to protect patrons 
14 A-3941-17T2

. . . from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties occurring on their premises." 

Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 149 N.J. 496, 504 (1997) (citing Butler,

89 N.J. at 280). Borgata argues plaintiff needed an expert to establish a breach 

of its duty and that Puccia's assault of plaintiff was foreseeable. We disagree.

"There is no general rule or policy requiring expert testimony as to the 

standard of care . . . ." Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 127 (2004) (quoting 

Butler, 89 N.J. at 283). Nor is expert testimony always required to assess 

whether a particular defendant acted negligently. Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power 

& Light Co., 452 N.J. Super. 494, 505 (App. Div. 2017). "Indeed, expert 

testimony is not necessary when the jury can understand the concepts in a case 

'utilizing common judgment and experience.'" Ibid. (quoting Campbell v. 

Hastings, 348 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div. 2002)). Thus, "expert testimony 

'should not be permitted unless it concerns a subject matter that is "so 

distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be 

beyond the ken of the average layman."'" Ibid. (quoting Biunno, Weissbard & 

Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1 on N.J.R.E. 702 (2017)).

Here, expert testimony is unnecessary and should not be permitted. A jury 

is quite capable of understanding the concepts of duty, breach, and proximate 

cause.
15 A-3941-17T2

We first note that Borgata, not plaintiff, characterized the theory of 

liability as one of "negligent security." The jury, however, will not have to 

determine "proper security and crowd control procedures necessary to safely 

operate a casino" as Borgata suggests. The jury will not, for example, be 

required to determine whether Borgata had an adequate number of security 

personnel on its premises or whether security personnel were adequately 

positioned throughout the casino. Nor is such testimony is required—as Borgata 

argues—"because the casino industry is so highly regulated and the security 

procedures that go into safe operation of a casino are esoteric in nature." That 

is not the issue.

Borgata's duty is defined by the general duty owed by the owner of a 

business to its invitees. Moreover, the jury is quite capable of utilizing common 

judgment and experience to determine whether Borgata breached its duty. The 

jury will be presented with a video of the occurrence, supplemented by the 

testimony of plaintiff and his friend. From that evidence, the jury can infer 

Puccia had something alcoholic to drink and shortly after 5:00 in the morning 

on New Year's Day engaged in an episode of irrational behavior and aggression 

directed at plaintiff, apparently for no other reason than plaintiff was talking to 

his girlfriend. During this irrational episode, Puccia told plaintiff to shut the 
16 A-3941-17T2

f*** up, threw ice and what was left of an alcoholic beverage at plaintiff, 

attempted to throw chips at him, and attempted to leap across the craps table to 

punch plaintiff. Puccia was deterred only by the presence of an authority figure, 

namely, the first Floorperson. The jury can infer the dealer witnessed all of 

these events unfold. The jury can also infer the first Floorperson observed some 

if not most of them. Under those circumstances, the jury can reasonably infer it 

was foreseeable Puccia would harm plaintiff if the casino personnel who had 

witnessed these events took no further action.

The first Floorperson did not ask Puccia to leave the craps table or leave 

the casino. He made no attempt to call security, notwithstanding—according to 

the second Floorperson—that Puccia's throwing a drink at plaintiff compelled 

contacting security. And the first Floorperson did not remain with Puccia and 

ask the second or third Floorperson to call security. 

The jury does not need an expert to assess this episode of irrational human 

behavior and determine whether it was foreseeable Puccia would harm 

plaintiff—absent some action from the employees who were present other than 

simply walking away. Just as "[a] jury does not need a fire expert to explain 

. . . the dangers that might follow when a lit cigarette is thrown into a pile of 
17 A-3941-17T2

papers or other flammable material," Scully, 179 N.J. at 127, a jury does not 

need an expert here. 

Although Borgata's expert cites four generic references to industry 

standards, he has cited no standard that addresses the precise situation that 

unfolded in this case. For example, the expert asserts, "plaintiff's assault at the 

hands of Puccia was sudden and not telegraphed by any discernible pre-incident 

indicators." He adds, "[n]o threat of bodily harm was communicated by Puccia 

to the plaintiff during the brief verbal interaction that took place just prior to the 

sudden aggressive actions taken by Puccia against the plaintiff." 

We disagree that absent Puccia verbalizing his intent to harm plaintiff, a 

jury could not conclude it was foreseeable that he would do so. After all, 

Puccia's aggressive behavior toward plaintiff escalated from a verbal epithet to 

throwing objects and then to leaping across the craps table in an effort to punch 

plaintiff. As we have indicated, the only thing that momentarily deterred Puccia 

was the interaction and presence of the first Floorperson. Given those 

circumstances, we conclude a jury could determine the foreseeability of Puccia 

harming plaintiff even in the absence of Puccia announcing an intent to do so. 

The expert also characterizes Puccia's attack as "stealthy" in nature. The 

jury can readily determine from the video surveillance and testimony whether 
18 A-3941-17T2

the attack was "stealthy," as the expert asserts, or whether the entire record 

demonstrates that Puccia's attack was anything but stealthy. 

Indisputably, as Borgata asserts, the casino industry is highly regulated. 

However, Borgata has not cited any industry standard that addresses the specific 

issues of duty and proximate cause presented here. Borgata has failed to 

demonstrate that these issues "are so esoteric or technical to be beyond jurors' 

common notions of reasonableness." Jacobs, 452 N.J. Super. at 507-08. 

Although the provision and operation of a security force are matters beyond the 

ken of a lay person, that is not what must be decided here. The situation that 

arose at 5:00 in the morning on New Year's Day could have occurred in a bar or 

any number of other establishments providing entertainment or alcohol, 

regardless of whether industry regulations require such an establishment to 

maintain a security force.

Our opinion should not be construed as suggesting how a jury should 

decide this matter. We have merely determined that a jury is quite capable of 

deciding the issues of duty and proximate cause, under the court's instructions, 

without the necessity of expert testimony. These issues should be submitted to 

a jury for determination. See Winstock v. Galasso, 430 N.J. Super. 391, 418

(App. Div. 2013) ("Ordinarily, proximate cause is a jury question."). Nor do we 
19 A-3941-17T2

address the claim for punitive damages, as that issue has not been presented on 

appeal.

Reversed and remanded for trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.