[Cite as State v. Geter-Gray, 2011-Ohio-1779.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

LISA LYNETTE GETER-GRAY 

 Appellant 

C. A. No. 25374 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 08 12 4206 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: April 13, 2011 

 

DICKINSON, Presiding Judge. 

INTRODUCTION 

{¶1} Lisa Geter-Gray beat up Stephanie Williams in a fight at Ms. Geter-Gray’s house 

that both blamed the other for starting. A jury convicted Ms. Geter-Gray of felonious assault, 

and the trial court sentenced her to four years in prison. Ms. Geter-Gray has appealed, arguing 

that her convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court 

incorrectly instructed the jury about self-defense, that her lawyer was ineffective, and that the 

trial court exercised improper discretion when it imposed her sentence. We affirm because Ms. 

Geter-Gray’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the self-defense 

instruction was not plain error, her lawyer was not ineffective, and the trial court exercised 

proper discretion when it imposed Ms. Geter-Gray’s sentence. 
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FACTS 

{¶2} On December 8, 2008, Ms. Geter-Gray and Ms. Williams met at Ms. Williams’s 

home to talk, watch movies, drink alcohol, and use drugs. According to Ms. Williams, Ms. 

Geter-Gray said that it was her birthday, so she gave Ms. Geter-Gray some of her clothes and a 

used computer as gifts. 

{¶3} Later in the evening, Ms. Geter-Gray invited Ms. Williams to her house to 

continue their activities. Ms. Williams testified that they went into Ms. Geter-Gray’s den and 

started drinking. After they were done, she got up to leave. Ms. Geter-Gray got up too and 

started walking in front of her, as if she was going to walk her out. When they got to the door of 

the den, however, Ms. Geter-Gray locked it, turned around, pulled Ms. Williams’s jacket over 

her head, and began hitting her in the face. According to Ms. Williams, Ms. Geter-Gray’s initial 

blows made her eyes bleed, causing her to lose most of her sight. When she asked Ms. GeterGray why she was hitting her, Ms. Geter-Gray answered that it was “[b]ecause you got 

everything.” 

{¶4} Ms. Williams testified that Ms. Geter-Gray hit her with an object that she 

assumed was a bottle, and she fell to the floor. Ms. Geter-Gray next wrapped something around 

Ms. Williams’s neck and began choking her, causing her to lose consciousness. When she 

regained consciousness, she heard Ms. Geter-Gray screaming her name. She saw some other 

people out of the corner of her eye that she thought were Ms. Geter-Gray’s boyfriend and 

children and heard them discussing what they should do with her, whether they should take her 

to the hospital or dump her somewhere. According to Ms. Williams, she waited until they 

carried her outside, then broke free and ran across the street to a relative’s house. She passed out 

when she reached the door of the relative’s house, but vaguely remembered riding in an 
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ambulance and arriving at the hospital. She also remembered trying to tell whoever was near her 

what had happened. Ms. Williams testified that, as a result of Ms. Geter-Gray’s attack, she had a 

lot of bruising, swelling, and deep cuts on her neck and face. 

{¶5} Ms. Geter-Gray testified that she went to Ms. Williams’s house to drink and 

watch a movie. She also tried to smoke marijuana that she thought she had in her purse, but 

couldn’t find it. She, therefore, got out her crack pipe instead. Ms. Geter-Gray testified that, 

when she attempted to smoke the pipe, Ms. Williams started whining about her smoking in front 

of her. Ms. Geter-Gray explained that she regularly provided drugs to Ms. Williams because Ms. 

Williams did not have much money. Ms. Geter-Gray testified that, because it was her birthday, 

she did not want to be disturbed while she smoked. She, therefore, stopped the movie and called 

her boyfriend to pick her up. As she was waiting for her boyfriend to arrive, Ms. Williams asked 

if she could go too, and Ms. Geter-Gray eventually gave in. 

{¶6} Ms. Geter-Gray testified that, when they arrived at her house, Ms. Williams and 

she went to the den. Ms. Geter-Gray explained that she locked the door behind them so Ms. 

Williams would not wander around the house. Ms. Geter-Gray testified that, after they had a 

shot, she took out her crack pipe again and started to take a hit. Ms. Williams, however, started 

complaining and asking if Ms. Geter-Gray could take her somewhere so that she could trade 

prescription pills for crack. Ms. Geter-Gray testified that Ms. Williams’s conduct was rude, 

explaining that “[y]ou’re not supposed to interrupt nobody when their elbow is bent.” Ms. 

Geter-Gray stood up to leave, but then Ms. Williams “snapped,” grabbed a bottle, and swung it at 

her. Ms. Geter-Gray dodged the bottle, grabbed one of her own, and hit Ms. Williams with it. 

Ms. Williams grabbed an extension cord and started twirling it around like a lasso, but Ms. 
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Geter-Gray caught the end of it, which caused the rest to wind around Ms. Williams’s neck. Ms. 

Geter-Gray testified that they fought for a couple more minutes until Ms. Williams gave up. 

{¶7} According to Ms. Geter-Gray, after the fight ended, Ms. Williams continued 

verbally harassing her. Ms. Geter-Gray asked her boyfriend to call her children to the house. 

When her children arrived, they discussed calling an ambulance for Ms. Williams. When Ms. 

Williams heard them talking about paramedics, however, she slumped over and played dead. 

Ms. Geter-Gray repeatedly called Ms. Williams’s name, but Ms. Williams acted like she could 

not hear. Ms. Geter-Gray eventually ordered Ms. Williams to stand up, which Ms. Williams did. 

She then ran outside. According to Ms. Geter-Gray, her daughter called 911 while her boyfriend 

and she looked for Ms. Williams. Her boyfriend spotted Ms. Williams lying on the ground 

across the street, and he directed the paramedics to her when they arrived. 

MANIFEST WEIGHT 

{¶8} Ms. Geter-Gray’s first assignment of error is that her conviction is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. If a defendant argues that her conviction is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, this Court “must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. 

Otten, 33 Ohio App. 3d 339, 340 (1986). 

{¶9} A jury convicted Ms. Geter-Gray of felonious assault under Section 

2903.11(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code. Under Section 2903.11(A)(1), “[n]o person shall 

knowingly . . . [c]ause serious physical harm to another . . . .” Ms. Geter-Gray has argued that 

the jury should have found that she acted in self-defense. “Self-defense is an affirmative defense 
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that requires a defendant to prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: ‘(1) the 

defendant was not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) the defendant had a bona fide 

belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that her only means of 

escape was the use of force, and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid 

the danger.’” State v. Goff, 128 Ohio St. 3d 169, 2010-Ohio-6317, at ¶36 (quoting State v. 

Thomas, 77 Ohio St. 3d 323, 326 (1997)). “The defendant is privileged to use that force which is 

reasonably necessary to repel the attack.” State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St. 3d 247, 249 (1990). 

{¶10} Ms. Geter-Gray has noted that, although her children did not see the fight, they 

corroborated that Ms. Williams was awake and alert after the fight. Her daughter further 

corroborated that Ms. Williams verbally harassed her after the fight and that Ms. Williams 

“play[ed] . . . possum” while she called 911. Her daughter also refuted Ms. Williams’s story that 

they carried her out of the house. 

{¶11} Ms. Geter-Gray has also argued that Ms. Williams’s testimony was inconsistent 

with what she told medical professionals the day of the fight. Ms. Geter-Gray has noted that Ms. 

Williams told a paramedic that she had had two beers, but testified at trial that she does not drink 

beer. Ms. Williams told a nurse that Ms. Geter-Gray threw alcohol in her face, but did not repeat 

that at trial. Ms. Williams also did not tell the nurse that she had used any alcohol or drugs the 

night of the fight. Ms. Williams further told a paramedic that “they” “held her all night,” but 

testified at trial that it was only Ms. Geter-Gray who restrained her. 

{¶12} The jury was entitled to reject the testimony of Ms. Geter-Gray’s children, who 

were not impartial witnesses. Ms. Geter-Gray also undermined her own credibility by admitting 

that she had smoked crack the morning she gave her testimony, and that she has a bad memory. 

According to Ms. Geter-Gray, “I could say that I’m [going to go] to the store and then at five 
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minutes later, I say what did I just say because my memory does what it wants to do.” In 

addition, there were some inconsistencies in her testimony. Although Ms. Geter-Gray testified 

that Ms. Williams used a bottle during the fight, she did not tell that to police. She also testified 

that her boyfriend had called her children to come over, while both of her children testified that it 

was Ms. Geter-Gray who had called them. Furthermore, Ms. Geter-Gray admitted that she was 

annoyed with Ms. Williams for repeatedly interrupting her crack use. Accordingly, although 

there were some minor inconsistencies in what Ms. Williams told the paramedic, the nurse, and 

the jury, they do not convince us that the jury lost its way in finding that Ms. Geter-Gray failed 

to establish that she acted in self-defense. Ms. Geter-Gray’s first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 

{¶13} Ms. Geter-Gray’s second assignment of error is that the trial court gave the jury 

confusing instructions regarding self-defense. Her third assignment of error is that her trial 

lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to the instructions. Because these assignments of error 

are related, we will address them together. 

{¶14} Ms. Geter-Gray has argued that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury about 

when the duty to retreat arises. According to her, because it was undisputed that the fight 

occurred in her home, the court should not have said anything about the duty to retreat. 

{¶15} Because Ms. Geter-Gray did not object to the retreat instruction, she has forfeited 

all but plain error. Crim. R. 52(B). Although Rule 52(B) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal 

Procedure permits appellate courts to take notice of plain errors, such notice is to be taken “with 

the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage 

of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St. 2d 91, 97 (1978). To prevail on a claim of plain error, Ms. 
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Geter-Gray must show that, “but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been 

otherwise.” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St. 3d 516, 532 (2001) (quoting State v. Campbell, 69 

Ohio St. 3d 38, 41 (1994)). 

{¶16} The trial court told the jury that, to establish self-defense, Ms. Geter-Gray had to 

prove “that [she] was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the offense of felonious 

assault . . . [that she] had reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief, even though 

mistaken, that she was in immediate danger of great bodily harm and that her only means to 

protect herself from such danger was by the use of deadly force, and [that she] has not violated 

any duty to retreat, escape or withdraw to avoid the danger.” The court explained that Ms. 

Geter-Gray had a duty to retreat if she created the situation, did not reasonably believe she was in 

immediate danger, or did not reasonably believe that the only means of escape from the danger 

was by the use of deadly force. 

{¶17} Although the trial court explained the duty to retreat, it also told the jury that, “[i]f 

[Ms. Geter-Gray] was assaulted in her own home, [she] had no duty to retreat or escape and 

could use such means as are necessary to repel the assailant from the home . . . .” Accordingly, 

because the court told the jury that Ms. Geter-Gray did not have a duty to retreat if she was 

attacked in her own home, Ms. Geter-Gray has not demonstrated plain error. See Beckett v. 

Warren, 124 Ohio St. 3d 256, 2010-Ohio-4, at ¶18 (noting that a jury is presumed to follow the 

instructions given to it by the judge). 

{¶18} Ms. Geter-Gray has next argued that the trial court incorrectly used the term 

“deadly force” throughout its instructions. She has argued that, by describing the force she used 

to repel Ms. Williams as deadly, the trial court necessarily implied that the force she used was 

sufficient to cause “serious physical harm” under Section 2903.11(A)(1). The instructions, 
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therefore, removed the issue of whether she caused serious physical harm to Ms. Williams from 

the jury’s province. 

{¶19} The trial court told the jury that, if Ms. Geter-Gray “had reasonable grounds to 

believe and an honest belief, even though mistaken, that she was in immediate danger of great 

bodily harm and that her only means to protect herself from such danger was by the use of 

deadly force[,]” she “was justified in using that force, even though she was mistaken as to the 

existence of the danger.” Ms. Geter-Gray objected to the instruction for two reasons. She 

objected to the court’s use of the phrase “great bodily harm,” arguing that she had a right to 

defend herself if she was afraid of any bodily harm. She also objected to the court’s use of the 

term “deadly force,” arguing that she had the right to defend herself with less than deadly force. 

After discussion, the court changed its instruction regarding Ms. Geter-Gray’s first objection, 

explaining to the jury that Ms. Geter-Gray had the right to defend herself “even if she was in 

imminent or immediate danger of bodily harm, just bodily harm[.]” Ms. Geter-Gray told the 

court that she was satisfied with the instruction. We, therefore, will only review Ms. GeterGray’s argument for plain error. See Crim. R. 52(B). 

{¶20} Regarding the amount of force Ms. Geter-Gray used, the trial court did not say 

that Ms. Geter-Gray used deadly force, it only instructed the jury to determine whether she “had 

reasonable grounds to believe . . . that she was in immediate danger of great bodily harm,” such 

that she honestly believed “that her only means of escape from that danger was the use of deadly 

force[.]” It told the jury to consider Ms. Williams’s conduct and “decide if her acts and words 

caused [Ms. Geter-Gray] to reasonably and honestly believe that she was about to receive serious 

bodily harm.” It also explained that “[t]he law does not measure nicely the degree of force 

which may be used to repel an attack,” and told the jury that, if Ms. Geter-Gray “used more force 
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than reasonably appears to be necessary under the circumstances, and if the force that is used is 

so greatly disproportionate to her apparent danger as to show an unreasonable purpose to injure 

[Ms.] Williams, then the defense of self-defense is not available.” 

{¶21} Even if the jury concluded that Ms. Geter-Gray honestly believed that her only 

means of escape was the use of deadly force, it does not mean that the jury concluded that she 

used deadly force. Moreover, considering that Ms. Geter-Gray admitted to telling an 

investigating officer that she choked Ms. Williams with an extension cord, she can not 

demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the court’s references to deadly force. See R.C. 

2901.01(A)(2) (defining deadly force as “any force that carries a substantial risk that it will 

proximately result in the death of any person.”). We conclude that Ms. Geter-Gray has failed to 

demonstrate that the trial court’s mention of deadly force was plain error. 

{¶22} Ms. Geter-Gray has next argued that the trial court should have defined the term 

“situation” because the phrase “creating the situation giving rise” is ambiguous. If an instruction 

is claimed to be “ambiguous and therefore subject to an erroneous interpretation,” a reviewing 

court should normally ask “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 

challenged instruction” incorrectly. State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St. 3d 246, 250 (2002) (quoting 

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Because Ms. Geter-Gray did not object to the 

instruction, however, our review is limited to plain error. See Crim. R. 52(B). 

{¶23} The trial court told the jury that, to establish self-defense, Ms. Geter-Gray had to 

prove “that [she] was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the offense of felonious 

assault .” Ms. Geter-Gray has argued that the instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to find 

that she created the “situation” by drinking and using drugs with Ms. Williams, even if it 

believed Ms. Williams was the one who started the fight. She has argued that the court should 
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have used language from State v. Gillespie, 172 Ohio App. 3d 304, 2007-Ohio-3439, instead. Id. 

at ¶17 (concluding that defendant had “to show that he was not ‘at fault’ in creating the situation; 

that is, that he had not engaged in such wrongful conduct toward his assailant that the assailant 

was provoked to attack the defendant.”). 

{¶24} The language criticized by Ms. Geter-Gray has been approved by the Ohio 

Supreme Court in several cases. See State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St. 3d 21, 24 (2002); State v. 

Palmer, 80 Ohio St. 3d 543, 563 (1997) (quoting State v Melchior, 56 Ohio St. 2d 15, 20 

(1978)); State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St. 3d 247, 249 (1990) (quoting State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St. 

3d 74, paragraph two of the syllabus (1979)). We, therefore, conclude that there was no error, let 

alone plain error. 

{¶25} Ms. Geter-Gray has also argued that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury 

that she had the burden of proving self-defense. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) 

(concluding that Ohio practice of requiring self-defense to be proved by the defendant is 

constitutional). She has argued that, even though self-defense is an affirmative defense under 

Section 2901.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code, the statute has been abrogated by District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). According to Ms. Geter-Gray, in Heller, the United 

States Supreme Court held that every individual has an inherent right to self-defense. Because 

self-defense is a constitutional privilege, an individual acting in self-defense is always acting 

lawfully. Since the State had the burden of proving that she was acting unlawfully, it was the 

State’s burden to prove that she was not acting in self-defense. 

{¶26} Ms. Geter-Gray has misread Heller. Heller was about whether the Second 

Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 

(2008). The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to 
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possess a firearm. Id. at 635. Although it identified the right to self-defense as “central to the 

Second Amendment right” it did not in any way modify the underlying right to self-defense. Id. 

at 628. 

{¶27} Ms. Geter-Gray has further argued that her trial lawyer was ineffective for not 

objecting to the trial court’s self-defense instruction, resulting in confusing instructions being 

given. To establish that her lawyer was ineffective, Ms. Geter-Gray “must show (1) deficient 

performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable 

representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the 

proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St. 3d 118, 2008-Ohio3426, at ¶204 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); State v. 

Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136, paragraph two of the syllabus (1989)). “A reasonable probability is 

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

{¶28} We have reviewed the jury instructions as a whole and conclude that the selfdefense instruction was not confusing. See State v. Jalowiec, 91 Ohio St. 3d. 220, 231 (2001) 

(noting that “a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be 

viewed in the context of the overall charge.”) (quoting State v. Price, 60 Ohio St. 2d 136, 

paragraph four of the syllabus (1979)). Accordingly, Ms. Geter-Gray has not established that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for her lawyer’s failure to object, the result of her trial 

would have been different. Ms. Geter-Gray’s second and third assignments of error are 

overruled. 

SENTENCE 

{¶29} Ms. Geter-Gray’s fourth assignment of error is that the trial court exercised 

improper discretion when it sentenced her to prison. In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St. 3d 23, 
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2008-Ohio-4912, a plurality of the Ohio Supreme Court determined that, in light of State v. 

Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, when appellate courts review criminal sentences, they 

must apply a “two-step approach.” Id. at ¶4. The first step is whether the sentence was contrary 

to law. Id. The second step is whether the court exercised proper discretion in imposing the 

term of imprisonment. Id. at ¶26. The parties agree that Kalish provides the correct standard of 

review in this case. 

{¶30} Ms. Geter-Gray has argued that her four-year sentence was excessive in light of 

her minimal criminal record. She has also argued that it was based on the trial court’s incorrect 

belief that she had hit Ms. Williams “in excess of 30 or 40 times just because you feel 

disrespected[.]” According to Ms. Geter-Gray, there was no evidence presented that she hit Ms. 

Williams 30 to 40 times or that she did so because she felt disrespected. 

{¶31} Ms. Geter-Gray’s felonious assault conviction is a felony of the second degree, 

meaning the trial court could sentence her to “two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years” 

under Section 2929.14(A)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code. As noted earlier in this opinion, Ms. 

Geter-Gray testified that, just before the fight began, Ms. Williams interrupted her while she was 

smoking crack. According to Ms. Geter-Gray, “[y]ou’re not supposed to interrupt nobody when 

[they are smoking crack]. That’s disrespectful to whatever they paid to smoke.” Furthermore, 

the State presented 67 photographs of the injuries Ms. Williams suffered to her eyes, cheeks, 

lips, chin, forehead, nose, arms, hands, fingers, knees, throat, back, and shoulders. The trial 

court’s characterization of the number of times Ms. Geter-Gray hit Ms. Williams was reasonable 

in light of the medical evidence presented. We conclude that the trial court complied with the 

applicable sentencing laws and exercised proper discretion when it imposed Ms. Geter-Gray’s 

sentence. Her fourth assignment of error is overruled. 
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CONCLUSION 

{¶32} Ms. Geter-Gray’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

the trial court’s self-defense instruction was not plain error, Ms. Geter-Gray’s lawyer was not 

ineffective, and the trial court exercised proper discretion when it sentenced her. The judgment 

of the Summit County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 CLAIR E. DICKINSON 

 FOR THE COURT 

MOORE, J. 

BELFANCE, J. 

CONCUR
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APPEARANCES:

TODD M. CONNELL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.