IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 426 M.D. 2018

 : Submitted: March 22, 2019

Amy Dreibelbis, Esquire, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 7, 2019

Presently before the Court are the Preliminary Objections (POs) filed by 

Amy Dreibelbis, Esquire, Prothonotary of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

(Prothonotary) to Alton D. Brown’s (Petitioner) pro se Petition for Review 

(Petition) in this Court’s original jurisdiction. In his Petition, Petitioner challenges 

Prothonotary’s actions in dismissing two of his Petitions for Allowance of Appeal 

(PAAs) for failure to perfect the appeals in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 3115, Pa.R.A.P. 3115.1 In her POs, Prothonotary argues that 

 

1 Rule 3115 provides in relevant part:

The prothonotary shall list for general call at the first session held after September 

1 of each year all matters which appear to be inactive for an unreasonable period 

of time and shall give notice thereof to the parties . . . . If no action is taken or no 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

she is protected from Petitioner’s claims by sovereign, quasi-judicial, and qualified 

immunity, and the relief Petitioner seeks is improper and contrary to the law. For

the reasons that follow, we sustain the POs and dismiss the Petition, with 

prejudice. 

Initially, when considering POs, “we accept as true all well-pleaded material 

allegations in the [P]etition . . . , as well as all inferences reasonably deduced 

therefrom.” Saxberg v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 42 A.3d 1210, 1211 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2012). Further, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Warren v. Ridge, 762 A.2d 1126, 1129 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). 

We will sustain POs only if it “appear[s] with certainty that the law will not permit 

recovery, and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them.” Saxberg, 

42 A.3d at 1212.

Petitioner alleges as follows in his Petition. Petitioner is incarcerated at the 

State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI-Fayette). Petitioner filed a PAA for 

Commonwealth v. Brown (Pa., No. 205 M.T. 2018), on May 16, 2018, by handing 

the PAA to a corrections officer. Petitioner filed a second PAA in the matter of 

Commonwealth v. Brown (Pa., No. 206 M.T. 2018), on May 17, 2018, by hand 

delivery to a corrections officer for purpose of placing it in a prison mailbox.2 

(Petition ¶¶ 5, 6.) Prothonotary returned the PAAs to Petitioner on May 21, 2018,

_____________________________

(continued...)

written objection is docketed in the matter prior to commencement of the general 

call, the prothonotary shall strike the matter from the list and enter an order as of 

course marking the matter “Terminated . . . .”

Pa.R.A.P. 3115.

2 Petitioner avers that Prothonotary issued orders on April 27, 2018, for the respective 

cases, notifying Petitioner that he was required to file his PAAs by May 17, 2018.
3

and notified him that the PAAs were “dismissed ‘for failure to perfect’ in 

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 3115.” (Petition ¶ 7.) Petitioner then submitted 

Applications for Reconsideration of the orders and attached cash slips as evidence 

that the appeals were timely submitted in accordance with the prison mailbox rule 

under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 121, Pa.R.A.P. 121.3 In his 

Applications for Reconsideration, Petitioner also requested that Prothonotary 

provide him with copies of the envelopes in which he sent the PAAs. He did not 

receive these copies.

Petitioner further avers that his cash slips, which can be verified by the 

mailroom at SCI-Fayette, demonstrate that the PAAs were timely filed. The 

Prothonotary was without authority to reject the PAAs under Rule 3115, as that 

rule relates to inactive matters; thus, Prothonotary acted contrary to customary 

practice for inmate litigation. Prothonotary’s actions in not providing the postmark 

on the envelopes, “deviat[ing] from normal practice” for pro se prisoners, and 

rejecting the PAAs “were motivated by the desire to both silence and punish 

Petitioner because of his attacks and exposure of the illegal criminal justice 

system.” (Petition ¶ 16.) Under Rules 121 and 1112 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

 

3 Rule 121 provides in relevant part:

A pro se filing submitted by a prisoner incarcerated in a correctional facility is 

deemed filed as of the date it is delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of 

mailing or placed in the institutional mailbox, as evidenced by a properly 

executed prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence of the date that 

the prisoner deposited the pro se filing with the prison authorities.

Pa.R.A.P. 121.
4

Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 121, 1112,4the Prothonotary has a duty to file 

Petitioner’s PAAs and his Applications for Reconsideration. Petitioner has a 

constitutional right of access to the courts to redress his grievances, which 

implicates his due process rights. (Petition ¶¶ 18, 21-23.) Petitioner has no 

remedy other than mandamus to compel Prothonotary to file his PAAs and 

Applications for Reconsideration and Petitioner has suffered irreparable harm.

Petitioner asks this Court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction 

enjoining Prothonotary from “sabotaging Petitioner’s prosecution of the underlying 

matters in the Supreme Court”; seeks a declaratory judgment that Prothonotary 

violated his constitutional rights; and requests damages, costs, and any other relief 

deemed just and appropriate by the Court. (Petition, Wherefore Clause.)

Prothonotary filed the instant POs, asserting that Petitioner’s claims are 

barred because Prothonotary is entitled to sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial 

immunity, and qualified immunity; and Petitioner’s requested relief of injunctive 

relief, declaratory relief, and money damages are contrary to law. Petitioner filed 

an Answer to the POs denying these assertions.

In support of the POs, Prothonotary argues5that Petitioner’s claims against 

her cannot succeed because she is protected by quasi-judicial and qualified 

immunity. Because her job duties are integral to the judiciary, Prothonotary argues 

that she “act[s] as an extension of the [Supreme] Court,” and is a quasi-judicial 

official who should receive immunity. (Prothonotary’s Memorandum at 4.) 

According to Prothonotary, Petitioner’s allegations in the Petition arise from 

 

4 Rule 1112 governs appeals by allowance to the Supreme Court and provides the filing 

procedures regarding dates of mailing, receipt, fees, and filing of petitions for allowance of 

appeal with Prothonotary. Pa.R.A.P. 1112.

5 We have rearranged Prothonotary’s arguments for ease of discussion.
5

Prothonotary’s functions and duties, which are integral to the judicial process, such 

as filing and maintaining pleadings. It is necessary to extend quasi-judicial 

immunity to court personnel, such as herself, Prothonotary argues, because it 

precludes dissatisfied litigants from expressing their frustration at clerks and court 

staff. Additionally, Prothonotary argues that qualified immunity is intended to 

protect public officials from interference with their job duties arising from threats 

of liability; thus, it should apply here.

Prothonotary also argues that she is protected by the Sovereign Immunity 

Act6from Petitioner’s claims because Petitioner is suing Prothonotary in her 

official capacity as a state agent of a government entity – the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. Section 102 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 102, defines the 

Commonwealth government to include the Courts, Prothonotary asserts, and 

therefore courts and their employees are “arms of the state.” (Prothonotary’s 

Memorandum at 3.) Prothonotary further contends that none of the statutory 

exceptions to sovereign immunity are applicable here and the defense has not been 

waived; thus, Petitioner has not stated a claim.

Finally, Prothonotary asserts that Petitioner’s request for relief is improper. 

Prothonotary contends that if this Court granted Petitioner the relief that he seeks, 

it would be interfering with the hierarchy of the Pennsylvania court system by 

instructing the Supreme Court on how to manage its cases. Prothonotary further 

argues that “Petitioner does not seek declaratory relief in the true legal sense,” as it 

is set forth in the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7531-7541, and that 

an actual controversy does not exist such that declaratory relief is proper. 

(Prothonotary’s Memorandum at 7.)

 

6

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8521-8527.
6

Petitioner responds7that Prothonotary’s assertion of sovereign immunity is 

frivolous and constitutes an admission of wrongdoing. Petitioner further argues 

that public officials sued in their public capacity for injunctive and declaratory

relief, as is the case here, are not entitled to sovereign immunity. Prothonotary’s 

actions of which Petitioner complains were not taken at the direction of the 

Supreme Court, Petitioner asserts, and therefore Prothonotary is not entitled to 

absolute immunity. Moreover, because Petitioner has filed his Petition against 

Prothonotary in her official capacity and because Petitioner seeks injunctive relief, 

qualified immunity does not apply. Petitioner contends that Prothonotary was 

without discretion regarding her duty to file his PAAs; thus, he has stated a claim 

for mandamus to compel Prothonotary to perform her mandatory duty. If 

Petitioner can prove that Prothonotary did not perform her required duty under the 

law as he has averred, he contends that he is entitled under Section 8303 of the 

Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8303,

8

to the damages he seeks. Also with regard to 

the propriety of the relief he seeks, Petitioner asserts that he does not seek relief 

from the Supreme Court but rather from Prothonotary for her specific obligations

under Rules 3112 and 3305 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

 

7 After Prothonotary filed the memorandum of law in support of POs, this Court, by order 

dated September 11, 2018, ordered Petitioner to file a brief in opposition on or before October 4, 

2018. Petitioner then filed two applications for extension of time to file the brief in opposition, 

both of which were granted by this Court, extending the deadline to December 5, 2018. 

Petitioner sent this Court two more applications for extension of time to file his brief, both dated 

December 5, 2018, and filed his brief on December 10, 2018. This Court granted the most recent 

applications for extension of time to file briefs by order dated December 18, 2018. Accordingly, 

we shall regard Petitioner’s brief as timely filed.

8 Section 8303 provides that “[a] person who is adjudged in an action in the nature of 

mandamus to have failed or refused without lawful justification to perform a duty required by 

law shall be liable in damages to the person aggrieved by such failure or refusal.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 

8303.
7

Pa.R.A.P. 3112, 3305,

9

to perform the duties of prothonotary and dispose of 

administrative motions, respectively. If this Court does not provide Petitioner with 

the injunctive relief he seeks, he asserts he will be barred from access to the courts. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to declaratory relief, as he seeks to 

determine the validity of a public official’s acts, and an actual controversy in 

which he has a substantial present interest exists.

We begin with Prothonotary’s assertion that Petitioner’s claims against her 

are barred because she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. “In order to 

determine whether an individual is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, we must 

first examine the nature of the actions complained of to ascertain whether they 

were performed within the quasi-judicial adjudicatory function.” Pollina v. 

Dishong, 98 A.3d 613, 621 (Pa. Super. 2014). Petitioner avers that Prothonotary 

denied him access to the courts when she issued the orders notifying him that the 

PAAs were “dismissed ‘for failure to perfect’ in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 3115.” 

(Petition ¶ 7.) Rule 3115 requires the Prothonotary give notice to litigants whose 

cases have been inactive for an unreasonable period of time and mark those matters 

terminated if the parties do not take action in response to the notice. We must 

determine whether Prothonotary’s actions in dismissing a matter under Rule 3115 

are that which are typically considered quasi-judicial.

Pennsylvania courts and federal courts have recognized the quasi-judicial 

immunity of prothonotaries, court administrators, and court staff for actions taken

 

9 Rule 3112 establishes the office of prothonotary for each appellate court and authorizes 

the prothonotaries to perform the duties vested in them by law. Pa.R.A.P. 3112. Rule 3305

provides that the prothonotary of the Supreme Court “is authorized to dispose of motions relating 

to the preparation, printing and filing of appendix and briefs and those motions generally relating 

to calendar control, along with the authority to recommend the appropriate sanction for the 

violation of any applicable rule or order.” Pa.R.A.P. 3305.
8

pursuant to court orders and at the direction of judges. As this Court recognized in

Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), a court administrator has 

quasi-judicial immunity in certain circumstances. There, a petitioner sought 

declaratory relief relating to alleged constitutional violations in relation to his 

requests under the Right-to-Know Law.10 The petitioner sought relief in this 

Court’s original jurisdiction against various members of a county judiciary, the 

court administrator, and other county officials, alleging constitutional violations for 

their actions in denying him access to certain documents. This Court noted that not 

only are judges absolutely immune when performing judicial acts, but the court 

administrator, “acting under direction of a common pleas judge,” had quasijudicial immunity from the petitioner’s constitutional and civil rights claims. Id. at 

405 n.11 (citing Feingold v. Hill, 521 A.2d 33, 37-38 (Pa. Super. 1987)). 

We held that quasi-judicial immunity extends to prothonotaries in Schneller 

v. Prothonotary of Montgomery County (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1316 C.D. 2016, filed 

September 12, 2017),11 where a petitioner brought an action in mandamus to 

compel a county prothonotary to accept and file his notice of appeal. The 

prothonotary notified the petitioner it was declining to file his notice of appeal 

based on an injunction issued by the trial court enjoining the petitioner from 

making certain claims in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

without an attorney. Because the petitioner filed the action in mandamus five 

years after the prothonotary notified the petitioner it would not file the appeal, this 

Court concluded that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

 

10 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.

11 Schneller, an unreported opinion, is cited for its persuasive value in accordance with 

Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures. 210 Pa. Code 

§ 69.414(a).
9

Id., slip op. at 13. Nonetheless, this Court also acknowledged that to the extent the 

petitioner advanced a constitutional tort law claim against the prothonotary, that 

claim was “barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity because the 

[p]rothonotary’s refusal to file the notice of appeal was clearly done in connection 

with her official duties as an officer of the court, and also pursuant to the trial 

court’s order enjoining” the petitioner. Id. at 13 n.10.12

Following a similar rationale, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Third Circuit has also determined that prothonotaries and court administrators are 

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. For example, in Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 

F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969),

13 the petitioner averred a violation of his 

constitutional rights when the prothonotary of the Pennsylvania Superior Court did 

not accept the petitioner’s filings “at the direction of the Court.” Id. at 457. The 

district court granted summary judgment to the prothonotary on the basis that the 

prothonotary was acting pursuant to court order and, therefore, was immune from 

liability. The Third Circuit agreed, and quoted Ginsburg v. Stern, 125 F. Supp. 

596, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1954), aff’d, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955), a case which 

addressed the rationale underlying judicial immunity for the prothonotary of the 

Supreme Court: “‘the Prothonotary is the Clerk of the Supreme Court and is 

required to follow the instructions of the court which he represents. In this 

connection there existed no discretion on his part but to obey the order and 

mandate of the court . . . . were the Prothonotary who holds his position by 

 

12 We also note that this Court has often determined county prothonotaries are generally 

immune from suit as local agencies protected from liability under the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. 

§§ 8541-8542. See Ullman v. Symons (Pa. Cmwlth., 2131 C.D. 2007, filed May 12, 2008), slip 

op. at 5-6.

13 Although not binding, decisions from the Third Circuit have persuasive value. 

Kutnyak v. Dep’t of Corr., 923 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
10

sufferance of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to refuse to obey its mandate, he 

would be contemptuous of that court and subject to summary dismissal.’”

Lockhart, 411 F.2d at 460. The Third Circuit also described “the danger of 

influencing public officials by threat of suit, the deterrent effect of potential 

liability, the drain on time caused by frivolous suits,” and the “manifest unfairness 

of subjecting” a prothonotary to liability as a consequence of actions taken at the 

direction of public officials. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded the 

prothonotary was immune from suit. Id.

The Third Circuit reiterated this point in Gallas v. Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 773 (3d Cir. 2000), where it extended quasi-judicial 

immunity to a deputy court administrator of the Family Court Division of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The deputy court administrator had 

released documents to a newspaper reporter pursuant to a judge’s order, and the 

Third Circuit concluded that the deputy court administrator “should be absolutely 

immune” from liability for that action. Id. at 772. In so doing, the Third Circuit 

noted this was consistent with federal court precedent acknowledging quasijudicial immunity for officials performing quasi-judicial functions. Id. at 772-73

(citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226 (1988); Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 

1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1996); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 

1992); Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 1989)). See also 

Davis v. Philadelphia Cty., 195 F. Supp. 2d 686, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding 

that a clerk of judicial records had quasi-judicial immunity from claims for alleged 

failure to perfect appeals).

Here, “accept[ing] as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the 

[P]etition . . . , as well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom,” we 
11

conclude that “the law will not permit recovery” for Petitioner because Petitioner 

complains of quasi-judicial actions taken by Prothonotary. Saxberg, 42 A.3d at 

1211-12. Petitioner’s claims are a challenge to actions taken by Prothonotary that 

are integral to the judiciary, including filing and maintaining pleadings. 

Prothonotary “serve[s] at the pleasure of the [Supreme C]ourt,” Pa.R.A.P. 3111, 

and carries out duties pursuant to rules and directives set forth by the Supreme 

Court. This includes disposing of administrative motions, directing parties with 

regard to filing matters, and maintaining dockets and records. Pa.R.A.P. 3301, 

3305, 3113. Prothonotary’s duties are further set forth in the Supreme Court’s 

Internal Operating Procedures, which specify that “motions, petitions[,] and 

applications will be monitored by the Prothonotary’s office for compliance with 

applicable appellate rules. Proposed filings that are not in compliance will not be 

docketed.” 210 Pa. Code § 63.7. Therefore, when Prothonotary dismisses cases, 

she is acting pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court as set forth in its internal 

operating procedures and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Prothonotary’s action 

of dismissing Petitioner’s PAAs pursuant to Rule 3115 was “clearly done in 

connection with her official duties as an officer of the court,” and Prothonotary is 

protected by quasi-judicial immunity from Petitioner’s claims. Schneller, slip op. 

at 13 n.10. Moreover, because quasi-judicial immunity is absolute, Prothonotary is 

immune from suit not only for Petitioner’s claims for damages but from the 

equitable relief he seeks as well.14 DeFerro v. Coco, 719 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. 

Pa. 1989); see also Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 405 n.11.

 

14 Taking as true Petitioner’s averments that Prothonotary dismissed his PAAs as 

untimely, although his PAAs were timely filed, Petitioner’s relief is with the Supreme Court in 

the form of a petition to file his PAAs nunc pro tunc rather than the relief he seeks here.
12

When Prothonotary is acting pursuant to rules and internal operating 

procedures with regard to filings and the docket, her actions are taken without 

discretion but pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directives, and civil liability cannot 

“be imposed upon a public official acting pursuant to court order and direction.”

Lockhart, 411 F.2d at 460. Further, we acknowledge “the danger of influencing 

public officials by threat of suit, the deterrent effect of potential liability, [and] the 

drain on time caused by frivolous suits,” that arises should prothonotaries and court 

administrators be subject to civil liability for their quasi-judicial actions taken 

pursuant to governing statutes and rules of the court for which they serve. Id.

Petitioner’s claims arise from actions taken by Prothonotary as an arm of the 

judiciary; thus, Prothonotary is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for any of the 

relief Petitioner seeks. Because we conclude that Prothonotary is protected by 

quasi-judicial immunity, we do not need to address the other grounds set forth in 

the POs. Accordingly, we sustain Prothonotary’s POs and dismiss the Petition, 

with prejudice.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 426 M.D. 2018

 : 

Amy Dreibelbis, Esquire, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, August 7, 2019, the Preliminary Objections of Amy Dreibelbis, 

Esquire are SUSTAINED, and Alton D. Brown’s Petition for Review is 

DISMISSED, with prejudice.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge