* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAY 10 2005 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

WORLD WIDE ASSOCIATION OF SPECIALTY PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS, a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. THOMAS G. HOULAHAN, a foreign individual, Defendant - Appellee. No. 04-4181 (D.C. No. 2:04-CV-107-DAK)

(D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff World Wide Association of Specialty Progr ams and Schools, an association of specialty schools for troubled teens , filed this diversity case alleging defamation and intentional interference wi th prospective economic advantage. The district court granted defendant T homas G. Houlahan’s motion for dismissal, based on lack of personal jurisdicti on. We affirm. Background Facts The World Wide Association of Speciality Programs and Schools (the association) maintains its principal place of busin ess in St. George, Utah. Mr. Houlahan, a reporter who resides in Washington, D.C., researched a story for United Press International about alleged abuse at a ssociation schools located in New York, South Carolina, Jamaica, and Mexico. In its lawsuit, the association alleged that, while investigating the story, the re porter made defamatory statements to potential students, former students, parents of potential and former students, an employee of a state agency responsible for licensing a member school, and a Utah attorney who had filed numerous suits against plaintiff. At the time of the contacts, these individuals were locate d in Alaska, North Carolina, South Carolina, and California. Discussion The association asserts that, under Utah’s long-arm statute, the court was authorized to exercise specific jurisdiction over M r. Houlahan because the alleged1 The Utah long-arm statute authorizes an exercise of specific jurisdiction over: Any person ... whether or not a citizen or residentof this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the follo wing enumerated acts, submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or related to: . . . (3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or bybreach of warranty. -3- acts caused injury in Utah: harm to the associatio n’s sole source of funding – the dues paid by member schools. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. 1 “This Court reviews the district court’s ruling on personal jurisdiction de novo .” Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Intern., Ltd ., 385 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10th Cir. 2004). “The burden of establishing personal j urisdiction over the defendant is on the plaintiff.” Id. at 1295. Where, as here, “the evidence presente d on the motion to dismiss consists of affidavits and other written materials the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing. The district court must resolve all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (citations omitted). The Utah Long-Arm statute is to be “applied so as t o assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. And to satisf y the constitutional requirement of due process there must be “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310,-4-

316 (1945)). “When the ‘defendant has purposely dir ected his activities at residents of the forum,’ courts in that state may exercise specific jurisdiction in cases that ‘arise out of or relate to those activities.’” Bell Helicopter Textron , 385 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985) (further quotations omitted)). To support specific jurisdiction, there must be “so me act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privile ge of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Phila. Resins Corp ., 766 F.2d 440, 445 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Hanson , 357 U.S. at 253). The requirement of “purposeful availment” rules out personal jurisdiction as the result of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Burger King , 471 U.S. at 475 (further quotation omitted). Inthe instant case, the district court correctly determined that the record lacked any evidence of the requisite purposeful availment. Plaintiff also asserts that the court abused its di scretion by denying limited discovery designed to uncover the publication of de famatory comments in Utah. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 458 (3rd Cir. 2003) (determining that district court erred in denying p laintiff’s “specific, nonfrivolous,” and “reasonable” request for jurisdicti onal discovery, in order to “help-5-

determine whether jurisdiction exists under the fed eral long-arm statute”). Plaintiff apparently made a general request for dis covery in its response to defendant’s dismissal motion. In the absence of an explicit, supported motion for discovery, this court cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the request. Appellant’s motion to file a reply brief out of tim e and motion to resubmit reply with proper address are GRANTED. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge