United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1681 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH BUFFIS, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Mark G. Mastroianni, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Thompson, Selya, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

Seth Kretzer and Law Offices of Seth Kretzer on brief for 

Appellant. 

Francesco Valentini, Attorney, William D. Weinreb, Acting 

United States Attorney, Kenneth A. Blanco, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, and Trevor N. McFadden, Acting Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, on brief for Appellee. 

August 14, 2017 
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Buffis, our appellant 

and the town of Lee's (now-former) Chief of Police, took $4,000 

from a duo accused of running a house of ill repute--and in return, 

he promised to halt their prostitution prosecution. Buffis now 

claims he didn't coerce the duo--they were completely 

"comfortable" forking over their funds--so he cannot be guilty of 

extortion. According to him, that means the jury verdict finding 

otherwise must be overturned. According to us, Buffis is wrong. 

Here's why we affirm his conviction. 

Background1

Our sordid story begins with a bust. Tom Fusco and Tara 

Viola owned and operated an inn in Lee, Massachusetts, frequented 

by folks from all over the country. Viola also offered massages--

with sexual services on the side. An informant spotted Viola's 

online ad and tipped off Lee police. A raid ensued. Distraught, 

Viola immediately 'fessed up to the prostitution, then offered to 

donate her proceeds to charity and to help bring down other sex 

workers and Johns by cooperating in reverse-sting operations. Lee 

Police Officer Ryan Lucy and Massachusetts State Police Sergeant 

Christopher Meiklejohn turned down the first proposition--"any 

forefeiture of monies," Meiklejohn told her, "would be done through 

 1 We frame these facts in the light most favorable to the 

jury's verdict. United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 246 (1st 

Cir. 2012). 
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the courts and in front of a judge." The officers wanted to take 

her up on the second--a good informant is hard to find. But if 

word got out about the bust, Viola would lose her value as a 

cooperator. (After all, if potential Johns knew not to go to the 

inn, there would be no further busts to make.) So Lucy and 

Meiklejohn tried to keep the raid on the down-low. 

Cue our appellant Buffis, who was then serving as Chief 

of Police for the town of Lee. Meiklejohn clued him in on the 

plan to use Viola as an informant--and explained that for the plan 

to work, secrecy was of the essence, so he and Lucy didn't arrest 

Viola and Fusco. And yet, Buffis rang up the local paper and 

(falsely) reported that the duo had been arrested for prostitution. 

The local paper ran with the story--as did news outlets all over 

the east coast. With that, law enforcement lost a promising path 

to future busts, the inn lost a load of business, and Viola became 

terrified she would lose her kids. Viola and Fusco wanted the 

mess done with "as quietly and as efficiently as possible." 

Buffis butted in once again, this time offering a 

seemingly simple solution to Fusco and Viola's troubles (troubles, 

remember, that he helped create): if Viola and Fusco agreed to 

donate the prostitution proceeds to a local charity, Buffis would 

"make things go away quietly" by having the case dismissed. 

(Indeed, it was Buffis' call whether the charges would go forward 

at all--if he decided not to sign the criminal complaint against 
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Viola and Fusco, criminal proceedings would halt.) Buffis told 

Fusco that they would meet in private before Viola and Fusco's 

first scheduled court appearance, Buffis would bring "an 

agreement," and if the three came to terms, the case would be 

dismissed. Buffis didn't specify the charity and said he couldn't 

set the price--another officer would deal with the "donation"--

but it could be anywhere from zero to ten grand. And, he advised, 

unless you want to waste your money, don't bring a lawyer. Fusco 

"felt pretty comfortable" with the idea of forfeiting the money if 

it meant the charges wouldn't go forward, so he agreed. 

When Viola and Fusco got to the courtroom, lawyerless 

but armed with a blank check, Buffis asked the two court employees 

(including Clerk-Magistrate Thomas Bartini, who was to preside 

over the hearing) to clear out. He then presented Viola and Fusco 

with an agreement--on Lee Police Department letterhead--labeled 

"Accord & Satisfaction." Here's what it said: 

(1) Clerk-Magistrate Bartini had found "probable 

cause to issue criminal complaints" against Viola 

for Sexual Conduct for a Fee, and against both her 

and Fusco for Keeping a House of Ill Fame and 

Conspiracy; 

(2) the proceedings that day were confidential and 

subject to a non-disclosure agreement; 

(3) Viola and Fusco waived their rights to sue the 

Town; and 

(4) "[p]roceeds in the amount of $_________ shall 

be donated to the Laliberte Toy Fund as a voluntary 

donation in lieu of criminal fines or civil 
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forfeiture action, by the close of business this 

date." 

Fusco and Viola didn't like the terms. For one thing, 

Fusco wanted to be able to tell everyone that the case had been 

dismissed (and limit the impact on the inn's legitimate business). 

And for another thing, Fusco and Viola wanted to donate to an 

animal rescue charity, not to a toy fund they had never heard of. 

And the kicker: they planned to donate one grand, but Buffis 

insisted on four. Buffis wrote $4,000 into the contract at the 

hearing, and Fusco wrote the check. Fusco didn't have the cash to 

cover it, so he told Buffis to sit on the check for a few days 

until Fusco could transfer funds from the inn's account. Viola 

and Fusco didn't like it, but they "didn't feel like [they had] a 

choice"--so they did "what [they] in a court of law were told to 

do." 

Buffis brought Clerk-Magistrate Bartini back into the 

courtroom. Buffis explained that Viola and Fusco's case was going 

to be continued to the end of the day--at which point, Fusco 

thought, the whole thing would be dismissed (he was right). Fusco 

pushed Buffis to let him talk about the dismissal, but Buffis said 

no--and Bartini pointed out that if the parties did not abide by 

their agreement "Buffis can actually bring another . . . complaint 
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for the same thing and go forward with it."2 The local paper 

reported the scoop: "Secrecy in sex case involving owners of the 

Inn . . . Authorities are tight-lipped about the results of [the] 

show cause hearing . . . [and] say they can't divulge the outcome" 

because of a "nondisclosure agreement among the parties." 

Now here's where things started going downhill for 

Buffis. Bartini told Buffis before the hearing that it seemed 

"crazy" not to go forward with the charges because it was such a 

high-profile case--the district attorney's office agreed and asked 

Massachusetts state police to investigate. Captain Richard Smith 

paid a call on Buffis, who explained the donation situation, 

claiming that half went to the Laliberte Toy Fund (a Lee police 

charity that bought toys for kids in need, according to Buffis), 

half went to DARE (the police-run drug abuse prevention program), 

and that $1,000 of the DARE money had already been spent. 

Evidently believing this fib wouldn't hold Smith off for long, 

Buffis frantically phoned Bartini to figure out how to resurrect 

the charges against Viola and Fusco. Smith's suspicions grew when 

Buffis changed his tune: he hadn't spent any of the money, Buffis 

said, and he had a (fishily post-dated) donation "refund" check in 

hand to prove it. 

 2 Sixteen months later, the same charges were in fact brought 

again--but this time not by Lee police.
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Buffis was full of bull: no money went to DARE, or to 

toys. Buffis was using the Laliberte Toy Fund as his personal 

piggy bank, and he blew all but ten bucks of the Viola-Fusco 

"donation" in about a month. 

A grand jury indicted Buffis for extortion by wrongful 

use of fear and under color of official right in violation of the 

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), plus a slew of money launderingrelated charges stemming from his management of the Laliberte Toy 

Fund. At trial, Buffis was acquitted of all charges but one: 

extortion under color of official right. Buffis moved for a 

judgment of acquittal; the district court denied the motion. 

Buffis now appeals, and that brings us up to today. 

Buffis' Claim 

Buffis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his extortion conviction. Specifically, Buffis says he 

did not coerce Viola and Fusco into paying up; without proof of 

coercion, he continues, he cannot be guilty of extortion. We 

review preserved challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de 

novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict. Turner, 684 F.3d at 257.3 "The test is whether the 

 3 We assume here that Buffis preserved the arguments he now 

raises on appeal--though it seems that the arguments he raised 

below are not the same as those he presses now. Both focus on 

Viola's offer to pay, but in his post-trial motion Buffis contended 

that her offer proved that he did not know he was accepting money 

in exchange for an exercise of his official power. Here, on the 
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evidence, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, would 

permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the defendant was guilty of the crime charged." United States v. 

Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2006). Appraised under 

this standard, we agree with the government that the trial evidence 

was sufficient for a jury to find Buffis guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and that Buffis' legal arguments to the contrary have no 

merit. 

First, the elements of Hobbs Act extortion. "Whoever in 

any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 

movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or 

extortion or attempts or conspires so to do" has violated the Hobbs 

Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). To show Buffis committed Hobbs Act 

extortion, the government had to prove that Buffis "obtain[ed] 

property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use 

of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color 

of official right." Id. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added). In cases 

 

other hand, he argues that Viola's proposition proves that she and 

Fusco were not coerced into donating the funds. He does not renew 

his knowledge-based argument on appeal; indeed, in his final point 

in his brief--"at most, the government proved bribery, not 

extortion"--he seems to concede that he knew the money was given 

in exchange for an exercise of his official power. But the 

government does not press the point (in fact, it addresses his 

knowledge argument in its brief) so we give him the benefit of the 

doubt and review the argument before us de novo. Though as we 

explain, neither argument gets him anywhere. 
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of extortion "under color of official right"--like what the 

government says (and the jury found) Buffis did here--the 

government can prove up the charge by showing that the defendant 

"obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the 

payment was made in return for official acts." Turner, 684 F.3d 

at 253 (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)). 

The government presented sufficient evidence of each of 

these elements for the jury to find Buffis committed extortion 

under color of official right beyond a reasonable doubt. Buffis' 

bribe money came out of Fusco's business bank account for the inn, 

and the inn hosted visitors from all over the country; egro, the 

extortion affected commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 

United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (motel serving interstate 

travelers operates in interstate commerce); United States v. 

Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 99 (1st Cir. 2004) (requisite "de minimis 

effect" on commerce established under Hobbs Act if conduct 

"minimally depletes the assets of an entity doing business in 

interstate commerce" (citation omitted)). Buffis also received a 

payment he was not entitled to collect: the four-thousand-dollar 

check, which he deposited into his own personal slush-fund. See 

Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d at 73. Contrary to Buffis' argument below, 

ample evidence suggests that Buffis knew the payment was made in 

return for an official act--agreeing not to sign the criminal 

complaint against Viola and Fusco and getting the criminal charges 
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dropped.4 Indeed, Buffis explicitly told Fusco that if they 

reached an agreement, he would have the case dismissed. And 

although the government didn't have to prove that the defendant 

followed through on his end of the bargain, see Turner, 684 F.3d 

at 255-58, in this case it presented evidence of that, too: after 

Fusco tendered the check, Buffis told the Clerk-Magistrate he 

wanted the case continued to the end of the day; then at the end 

of the day, the charges were dismissed. Buffis' botched attempt 

to cover his tracks with the bogus refund check shows his 

consciousness of guilt--and is further evidence supporting the 

conviction. Id. at 258-59. 

Nevertheless, Buffis says, the evidence was insufficient 

to convict because Viola and Fusco did not feel coerced into paying 

up at the time they made the "donation"--in fact, Fusco said he 

felt completely comfortable with it. The "Accord & Satisfaction" 

 4 Buffis seems to argue that because Clerk-Magistrate Bartini 

had a role to play at the show cause hearing--determining whether 

there was probable cause to issue a complaint--Buffis' own power 

to affect Viola and Fusco's situation was limited, and that this 

fact should have some (to us, indiscernible) relevance to our 

analysis. We note here that "it is irrelevant" that Buffis was 

not the only state actor who played a role in whether the complaint 

against Viola and Fusco would go forward; it is enough that Buffis 

"in [his] official capacity, had the power to facilitate [Viola 

and Fusco's] government business, and it was that power that [Viola 

and Fusco] paid [Buffis] to exercise." United States v. Rivera 

Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 485 (1st Cir. 2005). In the event that 

Buffis meant to argue something else, his undeveloped argument is 

waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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agreement, he says, is his ace-in-the-hole because both Fusco and 

Viola signed the paper saying the donation was "voluntary." 

Without a showing of coercion, the argument goes, he cannot be 

convicted of the crime of extortion. And besides, he can't be 

guilty (according to him) because Viola had the idea to begin with. 

The government disagrees, and for good reason: we have repeatedly 

rejected both arguments. 

First, "an element of duress such as a demand" is not an 

element of the offense of Hobbs Act extortion under color of 

official right. Evans, 504 U.S. at 267-68. "The 'color of 

official right' and 'fear' prongs provide alternative, 

independently sufficient grounds for finding extortion; thus, 

adequate proof of one obviates any need for proof of the other." 

Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d at 73. In other words, where the government 

presents evidence that the government official received a payment 

under color of official right, it need not prove that the official 

induced the payment through fear. There goes Buffis' coercion 

argument.5 

 5 This point also disposes of Buffis' argument that without 

proof of coercion, the government has only proved bribery (not 

extortion). To the extent that he means to argue that proof of 

bribery cannot be proof of extortion (and vice-versa), he is wrong 

about that, too: although "it seems unnatural to prosecute bribery 

on the basis of a statute prohibiting extortion, . . . Hobbs Act 

extortion under color of official right includes the rough 

equivalent of what we would now describe as taking a bribe." 
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As to the second point, as the government points out, 

neither "[t]he fact that [the payer] approached [the public 

official] first" nor the payer's "readiness and even eagerness to 

play the game," "mean that extortion did not occur." United States 

v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting United 

States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 395 (1st Cir. 1976)); accord 

Evans, 504 U.S. at 265 ("the word 'induced' is part of the 

definition of the offense by the private individual, but not the 

offense by the public official"); Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d at 73–74 

(the government need not prove "any affirmative act of inducement 

on the part of the corrupt official"). It is immaterial that Fusco 

and Viola approached the police first--as the district court put 

it, "[t]he government was not required to show that Defendant 

originated the idea for the donation, rather than simply developing 

and capitalizing on a concept suggested, out of desperation, by 

Ms. Viola." 

The End 

We affirm Buffis' conviction. 

 

Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 (2016) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 260).