2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
11-14-2003 

# B lo o d v . C omm S o c i al S ec ur it y P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-1030

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

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w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/1061 NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 03-1030
KE NN ET H C . BL OO D, J R.,

Appellant
v. JO AN NE BA RN HA RT , COMM ISSI ONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt

for the Dis tri ct of New Jersey (Dist. Court No. 02-cv- 00173) Distri ct Judge: Hon. Stephen M. Orlofsky
Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

October 15, 2003 Be for e: S LO VI TE R, R OT H a nd C HE RT OF F, Circuit Judges (Fil ed: November 14, 2003)
OPI NION
CH ER TO FF , Circuit

Judge Kenneth Blood appeal s from an Administ rati ve Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)2

determi nation t

hat he i s not entitl ed to dis abili tyinsurance benefit s or suppl emental securi tyincome under Tit les I I and XVI, respe ctive ly , of theSocial Sec urity Act. The Distri ct Court be low exerci sed jurisdi ction pur suant t o 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 138 3(c )(3) a nd a ffir me d th e A LJ’ s de cisio n. W e ha ve ju risdi ction und er 2 8 U .S.C . § 1291. For the foll owing reasons we wil l vacate the Dist rict Court’s order and remand for fur ther pro cee din gs.


### I. Our role here is t

he same as theDistri ct Court’ s—w e must dete rmine whether the AL J ba sed his d ecis ion on s ubs tanti al ev iden ce. See Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). Subst antial evide nce is “l ess than a preponderance of the evi dence but more than a mere s cinti lla. ” Jesurem v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum an Servs. , 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (ci ting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “It means s uch rele vant evi dence as a r easonablemind might acc ept as adequate. ” Ve ntura v . Shala la , 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Perales , 402 U. S. at 401) (internal qu otations om itted).


### II. A claimant must

establ ish that he i s “disabled”—within theterm’s meaning under the S ocia l Se cur ity Ac t, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d) , 1382c(a) (3)—in order to be eli gible f or1 “Thela w and re gul at io ns g ove rn in g the d et er min at io n of di sabi li tyar e the s ame for both di sabil ity

insurance benefit s and [suppl emental s ecurit y i ncome].” Greenspan v. Sha lala , 38 F.3d 2 32, 236 (5 th Cir. 1994) . We provide par alle l cit ations throughout the opi nio n.

2 The relevant

regulat ions were amended as of August 26, 2003. We cite to t he regulat ions as t hey appl ied as of t

he date of t

he ALJ’s decis ion, Apri l 19, 2001. 3 disa bility ins ura nce ben efits or su ppl em enta l sec urity in com e. See 42 U .S.C. §§ 42 3(a)(1), 1381a. 1 The Social Security Administr ation ha s promulgated a five- step evaluation process f or the Commissi oner of the Social Sec urity Adminis tration to us e in det ermining wh ethe r an ind ivid ual is disa bled
. See 20 C .F.R. § § 40 4.152 0, 416 .920; Plummer , 186 F.3d at 428 . The proc ess req uires a n A LJ to sequ entially dete rmine the fo llow ing: 1. Fir st, whether theclai mant is cur rently engagi ng in subst antial gainf ul act iv ity . I f s o, th e cl ai mant is not el ig ib le for

di sabi li tyben efi ts . 2 0 C. F. R. §§ 404 .1520(b), 41 6.920(b). 2 2. Secon d, whe ther the claiman t is suffering from a severe im pairmen t. If not, t he clai mant is not

eligible for di sabil ity

benefit s. 20 C.F. R. §§ 404.152 0(c), 416.920 (c). 3. Thir d, whether t

he evidence e stabl ishes t hat theclai mant suffer s from any ai lment i n a lis t of ai lments presumed seri ous enough to pr eclude gainf ul w ork. If s o, the c laima nt is auto matic ally eligible f or disa bility benefit s. I f not, t

he Commissioner proceeds to t he next step. 20 C.F. R. §§ 404 .152 0(d ), 41 6.92 0(d ). 4. Fo urth, w hethe r the cla iman t retains th e “resid ual fu nction al cap acity” to perform his past r elevant work. If so, the cl aimant i s not el igibl e for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.152 0(e), 416.920 (e). 5. Fift h, whether—given theclai mant’s medi cal i mpairments , age, educati on, past

work experienc e, and “r esidualfuncti onal capaci ty ”—jobs exist in si gnific ant numbers i n the national e conomy that the c laimant can perform. I f so, t

he clai mant is not

eligible for be nefit s. 20 C.F. R. §§4

404.152 0(f), 416.920 (f). The claim ant bears the b urden o f proof a t the first four steps, and the Com missioner be ars the b urd en a t the f ifth. See Fargno li v. Massan ari , 247 F.3 d 34 , 39 ( 3d C ir. 20 01)
. The ALJ determined that appel lant met his burde n at thefirs t two st eps—he found that Blood was n ot engag ing in substan tial gainful activity and suffered from a severe impairment . The ALJ concluded that appel lant’ s impairment did not fall into one of

the per se d isab ility cate gor ies (s tep th ree) , how eve r, an d he ther efo re co ntin ued to ste p fo ur. Step fou r (as well as step f ive) requires the A LJ to determ ine the claiman t’s resi dual functional c apacity. “‘Residualfuncti onal capaci ty ’ is de fined as t hat which an ind ivid ual is still ab le to d o de spite the li mita tion s ca use d by h is or h er im pair me nt(s) .” Hartanraft

v. Apfel , 181 F.3 d 35 8, 35 9 n.1 (3d Cir . 199 9) (c iting 20 C .F. R . § 404.1545(a) ). Thi s Court’s precedent requires an ALJ making a resi dual functional capacity determination to “c onsider all e vidence before him.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). I n additi on, “[a] lthough t he ALJ may weigh the cr edibil ity

of the evi dence, he must give some indi cati on of the evi dence he rejec ts and hi s reason( s) for di scounti ng such evidenc e.” Id. ; see also Farg noli , 247 F.3d at 40-43. The ALJ considered the foll owing evidence to determi ne appell ant’s resi dual functi on capacity: (1) documentation of Bl ood’s three back surge ries in 1995, 1996, and 1997, (2) d iagnoses f rom B lood’s treating ph ysician, Dr. Frederick M cEliece; (3) a rep ort3 The ALJ’s analy sis appe ars ful lyon page four of hi s decis ion.
4 An AL J can use th e ma trix at 20 C.F .R. Pt. 4 04, S ubp t. P, Ap p. 2, T able N o. 1 if he finds the claimant can perform “substantially all” of the tasks requ ired for sede ntary wo rk. See Jesurum , 48 F .3d at 1 19 (c itations o mitted ). Her e the A LJ u sed th e ma trix because he fou nd that B lood cou ld perform the “dem ands of the full range o f sedentary wo rk.” Ap p. 18
. 5 from Healthsout

h Rehabili tati on Center; (4) the medicine Bl ood was currentlytaking; (5) a consult ativemedical evaluati on conducted on October 13, 1999 byDr. Kutumba Pitt a; and (6) a phy sicalresi dual functional c apacity as sessment prepared bya StateAgency Medical Consult ant and dated May 18, 1999. 3 The ALJ concluded that Blood had a resi dual functional c apacity t o perform the full r ang e of “se den tary w ork ,” as def ined in th e ap plica ble r egu latio ns. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) , 416.967( a). He furt her found that, gi ven Blood’s r esidualfuncti onal
ca pa ci ty , B lo od w as unabl e t o pe rf or m hi s p as t wo rkas a mari ne mec ha ni c ( step fo ur ). At step fi ve, however, the ALJ considered appell ant’s resi dual functional c apacity, age, educati on, and past

work experienc e and concluded—using the matri x set forth at 20 C.F.R. Pt . 404, Subpt . P, App. 2, Table No. 1—that there exist jobs i n the national economy i n which Blood could engage
. 4 As a result , the ALJ found that Blood was not disabl ed.


### III. We cannot find that theALJ’s decisi on that Bl ood had a resi dual functional6

capacity t o perform thefull r ange of sedent ary work was based on subst antial evide nce. The AL J failed to con sider a ll the ev idenc e bef ore h im. In p articular , he fa iled to re fer to the follow ing eviden ce in his decision : (1) reports and d iagnoses f rom on e of B lood’s treat ing phy sici ans, Dr. John Tydi ng; (2) evidence regarding a wrist i njurysustai ned by Blood; (3) report s and diagnos es from Dr. McEliecethat pos t-date February15, 2000; and (4) e vid enc e reg ard ing Blo od’ s fo urth bac k su rge ry on F ebr uar y 14, 2 001
. “Although we do not expect the ALJ to make refe rence t o everyrelevant treatment note in a case wh ere the claim ant . . . has v olum inou s me dical re cord s,” w e exp lained in Farg noli , “we do expect t he ALJ, as the f

actfi nder, to consider

and evaluate the medica l evidence in the record consistent with his responsibil ities under the regulations and case law.” 24 7 F.3d at 4 2. Here, the A LJ failed to ref er to any evidence from o ne of B lood’s treat ing phy sici ans, Dr. Tyding, despite the rul e that opinions of a clai mant’s t reati ng physi cian are e ntitle d to sub stan tial w eigh t. See 20 C .F.R. §§ 40 4.1527(d )(2), 416 .927( d)(2); Co tter v. H arris , 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1982). And the ALJ did not refer to any evi dence regar ding Blood’s wrist i njury , while the appl icabl e regulations requ ire an A LJ to “ana lyze the cu mu lative ef fect o f all the c laima nt’s im pairm ents in determi ning whether s he is capable of performing work and is not dis abled. ” Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F .3d at 4 28 (c iting 20 C.F .R. § 4 04.15 23); see also 20 C .F.R. §§ 40 4.1545(a ), 416.945(a) (“If y ou have more than one i mpairment, we will consi der allof your impairment (s) of whic h we are aware.”) . Indeed, the ALJ did not c onsider any evi dence7

th at p os t-d ate d F eb ru ar y 15 , 20 00 w he n d ete rm in in g B lo od ’s r es id ua l fu nc tio na l ca pa cit y. In ad dition, th e follo win g evid ence
— mo st of w hich th e A LJ f ailed to discu ss in his decision— tends to sup port Bloo d’s conten tion that he is unab le to perform sedentary work: (1) doc uments and dia gnoses from Blood’ s tre ating phy sici ans; ( 2) evidenc e
re ga rd in g B lo od ’s w ris t su rg er y; an d ( 3) ev id en ce re ga rd in g B lo od ’s f ou rth ba ck su rg er y. Ye t the A LJ d id n ot in dica te w hy he rejec ted o r disc oun ted th is ev iden ce. See Farg noli , 247 F. 3d at 4 3 ( “Whe re th er e i s c onf li ctin g probati ve ev id en ce inth e r ec or d, we recognize a particularly acute need f or explana tion of the reaso ning beh ind the A LJ’s conclusi ons, and wil l vacate or remand a cas e where such an expl anati on is not pro vid ed.” ).


### IV. For th e reaso ns state d abo ve, w e vac ate the Distric t Cou rt’s orde r and rema nd w ith instruc tions to rema nd to the C om missio ner fo r add itional p rocee ding s con sistent w ith this opinion. The ALJ must consider t he rele vant probat

ive evi dence when determi ning Blood’s re sidualfuncti onal capaci ty ; in par ticul ar, evi dence from appel lant’ s tre ating physici ans that the ALJ failed to address in his original decisi on. If the ALJ reaches a decisio n that te nds to contra dict pro bative evide nce, h e mu st exp lain w hy he de cided to disc oun t or re ject th e ev iden ce.8

TO THE C LERK:

Please fi le theforegoing opi nion.

/s/ Michael Chertof

f, Circ uit J udge Circuit Judge