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2024 IL App (5th) 230448-U 

NO. 5-23-0448 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 06-CF-731 

 ) 

LAQUIZE McMATH, ) Honorable 

 ) Julie K. Katz, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cates and Boie concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court properly denied leave to file a successive postconviction petition

where defendant’s claims were based on a video he had never seen. The record did

not establish that the State withheld the video or that it was likely exculpatory. As

any argument to the contrary would lack merit, we grant defendant’s appointed

 counsel on appeal leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 

 

¶ 2 Defendant, Laquize McMath, appeals the circuit court’s order denying him leave to file a 

successive postconviction petition. His appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State 

Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that 

the court erred in doing so. Accordingly, it has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel along with a 

supporting memorandum. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). OSAD has notified 

defendant of its motion, and this court has provided him with ample opportunity to respond, but 

he has not done so. After considering the record on appeal and OSAD’s motion supporting brief, 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 05/01/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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we agree that this appeal presents no reasonably meritorious issues. Thus, we grant OSAD leave 

to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with first degree murder and other offenses in the shooting death 

of Lawrence Townsend outside the Private Mathison Manor apartments. At trial, three 

eyewitnesses, Terrance Wells, Travis Wells, and Gary Bailey, placed defendant at the scene, 

holding a gun, and threatening Townsend. Travis Wells testified that he was inside when he heard 

gunshots. When he went to the porch to investigate, he saw defendant backing up, holding a gun 

that he was putting under his shirt. Defendant then ran away through a hole in the fence. He found 

Townsend on the ground, bleeding. Terrance Wells and Bailey also testified that defendant was 

present with a gun and targeted Townsend. Centreville detective Kiwan Guyton and Illinois State 

Police special agent Dave Fort described their investigation of the crime scene. Defendant testified 

that he was with his brother in St. Louis at the time of the shooting. The jury found defendant 

guilty. 

¶ 5 In a pro se posttrial motion, defendant asserted that defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to subpoena his brother, Shaun Kyles, to corroborate his alibi, and three additional 

witnesses who allegedly would have testified that defendant was not the shooter. After questioning 

defense counsel, the trial court denied the motion.

¶ 6 On direct appeal, defendant again argued that defense counsel was ineffective for not 

calling the witnesses defendant had identified. We rejected defendant’s claim, noting that it was 

“grounded upon conclusory and speculative allegations.” People v. McMath, No. 5-07-0496 

(2008), order at 3 (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). We emphasized that 

trial counsel stated that he made a strategic decision not to call Kyles and could not locate the other 
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three witnesses. We further noted that “there is nothing in the record by way of affidavits or 

posttrial motion testimony for this court to determine whether the proposed witnesses could have 

provided any information or testimony favorable to the defendant.” Id. In the succeeding years, 

defendant instituted a number of collateral proceedings, which included an initial postconviction 

petition, which the circuit court summarily denied, two motions seeking leave to file successive 

postconviction petitions, and several motions for forensic testing.

¶ 7 On March 1, 2022, defendant again sought leave to file a successive postconviction 

petition. He raised an actual-innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence, as well as a 

Brady (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)) violation for the State’s failure to disclose 

surveillance video from the crime scene. Defendant alleged that he had discovered, through a 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, that a DVD recording from a surveillance camera 

near the scene of the shooting had been delivered to the Centreville Police Department on May 9, 

2006. He stated that the housing authority retained a “computer disc purportedly containing 

recordings related to the homicide” but was unable to view it because it was in “DBX format.” 

According to Fort’s report of his investigation, the video “revealed several people leaving the area 

after the incident,” and “a vehicle[, Terrance Wells’s 1999 White Cadillac Escalade bearing Illinois 

registration 9948107,] leaving the area after the shooting.”

¶ 8 Defendant further claimed that the disc had not been disclosed to defense counsel and 

contended that it was exculpatory because it reportedly showed people fleeing the scene. 

According to defendant, it would either show him fleeing the scene, which would allegedly show 

that he was not the shooter, or it would show that he was not present, thus corroborating his trial 

testimony to that effect. He acknowledged that he had not actually seen the video.
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¶ 9 The trial court denied defendant’s request for leave to file, citing his failure to show cause 

and prejudice. As to cause, the court found that defendant’s representation that he was not aware 

of the video when he filed his first postconviction petition was “not credible,” and that it was 

“unfathomable that his attorney would not have obtained a copy of the police report” prior to trial.

As to prejudice, the court found that defendant could not establish that the evidence was favorable 

to him, because “he does not have possession of the video footage, nor has he ever reviewed it.” 

Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 OSAD concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the circuit court 

erred by denying defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition. The Post-Conviction 

Hearing Act (Act) provides a mechanism by which a criminal defendant may assert that his 

conviction resulted from a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) 

(West 2020); People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 253 (2008). Proceedings under the Act are 

collateral. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. As a result, issues that were decided on direct 

appeal or in previous collateral proceedings are barred by res judicata (People v. Pitsonbarger, 

205 Ill. 2d 444, 458 (2002)), and issues that could have been raised earlier, but were not, are 

forfeited (People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-44 (2005)).

¶ 12 The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition and provides in section 

122-3 (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2020)) that “[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional 

rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.” People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 

121450, ¶ 15. To file a successive petition, a defendant must obtain leave of court, which may be 

granted where the defendant demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or 

her initial postconviction proceedings and prejudice resulting from that failure. 725 ILCS 5/122-
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1(f) (West 2020). “Cause” in this context refers to any objective factor, external to the defense, 

which impeded the petitioner’s ability to raise a specific claim in the initial postconviction 

proceeding. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462. “Prejudice” is shown when the defendant presents a 

claim of constitutional error that so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence 

violates due process. People v. Williams, 392 Ill. App. 3d 359, 366 (2009). A defendant may also 

raise a claim of actual innocence, which is exempt from the cause-and-prejudice requirement. 

People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 330 (2009).

¶ 13 In his petition, defendant claimed that the DVD was material evidence that supported an 

actual-innocence claim. He further alleged that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to 

turn over the allegedly exculpatory video. OSAD concludes that defendant’s inability to attach the 

video to his petition or to accurately summarize its contents is fatal to both claims. We agree.

¶ 14 We note the potential unfairness in finding that defendant is responsible for failing to view 

a video that the State wrongfully withheld. However, as we explain, the record refutes defendant’s 

assertions that the State withheld the video or that it was likely exculpatory. As a result, defendant 

cannot advance a successful actual-innocence claim nor can he establish the cause and prejudice 

necessary to file a successive postconviction petition in the absence of an actual-innocence claim.

¶ 15 The elements of a claim of actual innocence are that the evidence in support of the claim 

must be “newly discovered,” material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character 

that it would probably change the result on retrial. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 32. “Newly 

discovered” evidence is that which “has been discovered since the trial and that the defendant 

could not have discovered sooner through due diligence.” Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 334.

¶ 16 Defendant cannot establish any of these elements here. Fort’s report refers to the video. 

The State’s initial response to defendant’s discovery request indicated that all relevant police 
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reports were being tendered and that all physical evidence was available for inspection. In denying 

leave to file the latest petition, the circuit court found it “inconceivable” that defense counsel would 

not have reviewed the police reports before trial, which would have revealed the existence of the 

video. 

¶ 17 Moreover, there is no reasonable likelihood that the video would have been material and 

conclusive evidence of defendant’s innocence. Defendant relies on Fort’s description of the video 

as showing “several people leaving the area after the incident,” and showing a car with a specific 

license plate driving away. From this, defendant speculates that either the video would show him 

as one of the people running away—thus supposedly excluding him as the shooter—or it would 

not, which would have corroborated his trial testimony that he was not there.

¶ 18 There are obviously other possibilities for which defendant’s theory does not account. But 

even assuming the correctness of his theory, it does not establish that the evidence would have 

been material and conclusive. Had the video shown defendant running away from the scene, it 

would have contradicted his trial testimony that he was in St. Louis at the time. Moreover, it might 

well have corroborated Travis Wells’s testimony that he saw defendant running from the scene 

after the shooting.

¶ 19 The failure of the video to show defendant would likewise not have been material. Fort’s 

description of the video was quite vague. It does not say how many people were running away or 

whether anyone was specifically identifiable. It does not indicate where the camera was in relation 

to the shooting. Obviously, a fixed security camera would show only a small portion of the scene. 

There could have been other people present behind the camera or on either side. Thus, the video 

could not conclusively prove that defendant was not present. At most it would have been 

cumulative of defendant’s alibi testimony. Thus, the video was not newly discovered evidence 
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material to the issue of his guilt, so his actual-innocence claim fails. Even if defendant could 

produce the video, this result would not likely change.

¶ 20 The above analysis largely disposes of defendant’s Brady claim as well because he cannot 

establish cause for or prejudice from failing to raise the claim in his initial postconviction petition. 

While a valid Brady claim could establish cause for failing to raise the issue, the record here, as 

noted, gives no indication that the State withheld the report: it was referenced in a police report 

which the State presumably turned over in discovery. Defendant was apparently able to get Fort’s 

report and confirm the video’s existence through FOIA requests, which shows that the State was 

not actively attempting to hide it. Moreover, the court found incredible his claim that the defense 

had not had it earlier.

¶ 21 Moreover, defendant cannot establish prejudice as the claim would fail in any event. To 

establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable 

to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) the evidence was suppressed by 

the State either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the evidence 

is material to guilt or punishment. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73-74 (2008).

¶ 22 As discussed above, there is no reasonable likelihood that the video would have been 

material to defendant’s guilt or innocence. At worst, it would have undermined his own alibi 

testimony and corroborated the testimony of a State witness. At best, it might have offered some 

partial corroboration of his testimony but would not have conclusively proved that he was not at 

the scene.

¶ 23 CONCLUSION

¶ 24 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and 

affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 
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¶ 25 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.