J-S10034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES YELVERTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1523 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-23-CR-0007473-1977, 

CP-23-MD-0004545-1978, CP-23-MD-0004546-1978, 

CP-23-MD-0004549-1978, CP-23-MD-0004550-1978, 

CP-23-MD-0004551-1978, CP-23-MD-0004559-1978, 

CP-23-MD-0004560-1978, CP-23-MD-0004561-1978

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2023

Appellant, James Yelverton, appeals from the order entered on April 27, 

2022 by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County denying as untimely 

his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.1 Upon review, we affirm. 

The factual and procedural background of the instant appeal is not at 

issue here. Briefly, 

[i]n December, 1978, [A]ppellant pled guilty to one charge of rape 

and sixteen charges of burglary and property offenses. On two 

subsequent occasions he moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The 

motions were denied. On July 13, 1979, [A]ppellant was 

sentenced on his guilty pleas to an aggregate twenty-one to forty-

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1 As it will be explained later, Appellant’s “motion” is in fact Appellant’s seventh 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. 
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two years[’] imprisonment. Thereafter, he moved for 

reconsideration of the sentences. This motion also was denied. 

On December 17, 1979, [A]ppellant filed a [Post Conviction 

Hearing Act2 (“PCHA”)] petition, pro se, challenging his sentences 

and the validity of his guilty pleas, and claiming that the trial court 

erred in not granting his petition to withdraw the pleas because 

the Commonwealth allegedly violated the plea bargain and 

because of ineffective assistance of counsel. New counsel was 

appointed to represent [A]ppellant. After hearing on the issues, 

the PCHA court found that the guilty pleas were voluntarily, 

intelligently and knowingly made and not induced as a result of 

the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court, however, 

granted [A]ppellant the right to appeal his judgments of sentence 

to the Superior Court nunc pro tunc due to the failure of trial 

counsel to timely perfect an appeal from the judgments of 

sentence. An appeal was taken[.]

Commonwealth v. Yelverton, No. 628 Philadelphia 1986, unpublished 

memorandum at *1-2 (Pa. Super. filed January 28, 1987). 

On December 28, 1984, we affirmed the judgments of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Yelverton, No. 3555 Philadelphia 1982, unpublished 

memorandum (Pa. Super. filed December 28, 1984). As Appellant sought no 

additional review before our Supreme Court, Appellant’s sentences became 

final on January 28, 1985. 

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2 The PCHA was repealed in part, modified in part, and renamed the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), effective April 13, 1988.
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Following multiple unsuccessful PCRA petitions, on April 26, 2022, 

Appellant pro se filed a “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas,”

3,4 which the lower 

court denied on April 27, 2022. This appeal followed.

There are several problems with the instant appeal. First, it appears 

that this appeal, which was filed on June 7, 2022, is untimely as it was not 

docketed within 30 days of the service of the order denying relief (i.e., by June 

3, 2022).

5

 

The trial court record, however, reveals that Appellant filed with the trial 

court a notice of appeal on May 26, 2022. The clerk of courts, however, failed 

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3

In the underlying “motion,” Appellant alleged ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, which resulted in a denial of his right to a direct appeal. According 

to Appellant, trial counsel’s error can be redressed by allowing him to withdraw 

his guilty pleas. See Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, 4/26/22, at 2-3.

4

It should be noted that on April 4, 2022, Appellant filed a PCRA petition, his 

sixth. On April 12, 2022, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s sixth PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 907(1). It does not 

appear, however, that the PCRA court has entered a final order dismissing the 

April 12, 2022 PCRA petition. 

In the meantime, on April 26, 2022, Appellant filed the underlying “motion,”

which the lower court denied the following day. It appears, therefore, that 

the instant “motion” was filed and disposed of while the previous PCRA petition 

was still pending. The PCRA court was not precluded from considering the 

underlying “motion” because of the pendency of Appellant’s sixth PCRA 

petition. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (en banc) appeal denied, 647 Pa. 570, 190 A.3d 1134 (2018).

 

5 The trial court docket shows that the April 27, 2022 order was mailed to 

Appellant on May 4, 2022 via first-class mail. Accordingly, the notice of appeal 

was due by June 3, 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 105(b); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1);

Pa.R.A.P. 121(f), and Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
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to timely forward it to this Court, as required under Pa.R.A.P. 905(b), and 

decided instead to return it to Appellant.

6

 Subsequently, on June 7, 2022, 

Appellant filed another notice of appeal from the April 27, 2022 order. 

Given the June 3, 2022 deadline, the notice of appeal filed by Appellant 

on May 26, 2022, was timely filed, whereas the notice of appeal filed by 

Appellant on June 7, 2022, was untimely. 

Because the delay in docketing the instant appeal was due to the clerk 

of courts’ error and considering that Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, 

we decline to find that the instant appeal violates Rule 903. Commonwealth 

v. Valentine, 928 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“Absent a breakdown in 

the operations of the court, [t]ime limitations on the taking of appeals are 

strictly construed and cannot be extended as a matter of grace.”). See also

Stout v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 421 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1980) 

(Superior Court abused discretion in quashing appeal from decision rendered 

by the court of common pleas due to failure to transmit copy of notice of 

appeal, proof of service, and docketing fee to prothonotary of appellate court, 

where appeal was otherwise timely perfected in all respects). Accordingly, for 

the reasons stated above, the notice of appeal filed on June 7, 2022, is 

deemed timely filed. 

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6 The clerk of courts not only failed to forward the notice to this Court, but

also apparently decided to return the notice to Appellant because the 

“numbers were wrong.” See Trial Court docket entry for May 26, 2022. 
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Next, the June 7, 2022 pro se notice of appeal docketed in this Court 

contained nine trial court docket numbers in the caption,

7 which is consistent 

with the caption of the lower court’s April 27, 2022 order.

It appears, therefore, that Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 

(Pa. 2018) is implicated here.8 In Walker, which applies to all cases filed 

after June 1, 2018, our Supreme Court held that appellants are required to 

file separate notices of appeal when a single order resolves issues arising on 

more than one lower court docket. 

While at first glance the instant notice of appeal appears to violate

Walker, there is an exception to the rule announced in Walker that applies 

here. In Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 160 (Pa. Super 

2019), this Court concluded that a breakdown of the courts occurs when a 

PCRA court advises petitioners that they can pursue appellate review by filing 

a single notice of appeal, even though the order disposed of petitions pending 

at two separate docket numbers. See also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 

A.3d 350, 352-54 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (reaffirming Stansbury). 

Here, in its April 27, 2022 order, the lower court completely failed to 

advise Appellant of his appellate rights, an error far worse than the one 

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7 The caption of the May 26, 2022 notice of appeal also contained multiple 

trial court docket numbers.

 

8

It is worth noting that on October 14, 2022, we issued a rule directing 

Appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of 

Walker. Appellant failed to file a response. On January 17, 2023, we entered 

an order discharging the rule to show cause.
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sanctioned in Stansbury. In light of the foregoing, we conclude the error by 

the lower court constituted a breakdown in the court’s operations, thus 

allowing us to proceed with Appellant’s instant appeal. See Stansbury, 

supra; Larkin, supra.

Next, Appellant filed a “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas,” which the 

lower court, apparently, failed to treat as a PCRA petition.9 Treating the 

underlying “motion” as a PCRA petition, the lower court should have 

determined the timeliness of the same as it would under the PCRA. It did not

do so.

Under the PCRA, any PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent 

petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes 

final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final 

“at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The 

PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may 

not address the merits of an untimely petition. See, e.g., Commonwealth 

v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).

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9 Regardless of how the pleading is titled, courts are to treat a pleading filed 

after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests 

relief contemplated by the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 

715, 716 (Pa. Super. 2019). Here, Appellant appears to argue ineffective 

assistance of counsel, see Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, 4/26/22, at 2-3, 

which is a claim cognizable under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). 
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Appellant’s judgments of sentence became final on January 28, 1985, 

30 days after this Court affirmed his judgments of sentence, and the time for 

filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of had 

Pennsylvania expired. Because Appellant filed the instant “motion” on April 

26, 2022, his “motion” is facially untimely.10 

Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the appellant

pleads and proves one of three exceptions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be

filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

A review of the “motion” and Appellant’s brief reveals that Appellant 

never addressed the timeliness of the “motion” under the PCRA. Accordingly, 

given that the “motion” is facially untimely for purposes of the PCRA, and 

given that Appellant did not allege or prove the applicability of one the 

exceptions to the one-year time bar, we are unable to review the merits of his

claims. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Woods, 179

A.3d 37, 42 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The petitioner bears the burden to plead and 

prove an applicable statutory exception. If the petition is untimely and the 

petitioner has not pled and proven an exception, the petition must be 

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10 We note that since Appellant’s judgments of sentence became final prior to 

the effective date of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545, Appellant had until January 16, 

1997, to file his first PCRA petition. However, because Appellant filed the 

instant “motion” on April 26, 2022, it is manifestly untimely.
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dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.”).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the claim raised here (ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, which resulted in a denial of his right to a direct 

appeal) was addressed in connection with Appellant’s first PCHA petition.

As noted above, the record shows that: (i) the PCHA court found that 

trial counsel was ineffective in connection with the untimely filing of the direct 

appeal; (ii) the PCHA court granted Appellant the right to appeal nunc pro tunc

from his judgments of sentence, (iii) Appellant actually filed a nunc pro tunc

direct appeal, and (iv) we affirmed the judgments of sentence. Yelverton, 

No. 3555 Philadelphia 1982, at *1; Yelverton, No. 628 Philadelphia 1986, at 

*1-2. Thus, to the extent Appellant argues ineffective assistance of counsel 

in connection with the filing of the direct appeal, Appellant was already 

granted relief. Id. To the extent Appellant argues that trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness prevented him from seeking and/or obtaining direct review 

from our Court, the claim is devoid of any merit as the record shows that he 

was able to seek and obtain direct review from this Court.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude, therefore, that the lower court 

correctly denied relief. Thus, albeit on other grounds, we affirm the order of 

the lower court denying Appellant relief. See Commonwealth v. 

Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted) (“[W]e 

may affirm the PCRA court’s decision on any basis.”).

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/30/2023