NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WENDI MEER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

DENNIS DILLON AUTO PARK & 

TRUCK CENTER, INC.; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-35681

D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00025-BLW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2016**

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 

Wendi Meer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in 

her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a vehicle lease 

agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-35681 

Munger v. City of Glaslow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000). We 

may affirm on any basis supported by the record. United States v. State of Wash., 

969 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Meer’s claims

regarding the repossession of her leased vehicle because Meer failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants breached the lease 

agreement. See Idaho v. Shohone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1098-00 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (applying Idaho contract law and concluding that “[c]ontract terms are 

to be given their ordinary meaning, and when the terms of a contract are clear, the 

intent of the parties must be ascertained from the contract itself.” (citation 

omitted)). 

Summary judgment was proper on Meer’s credit reporting claim against 

Northwest Leasing and bank withdrawal claim against Dennis Dillion Auto Park & 

Truck Center, Inc. because Meer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact 

as to whether the credit reports were fraudulent or whether her monthly lease 

payment for April 2011 was improperly withdrawn from her bank account. See 

Friedman v. Live Nation Merchandise, Inc., 833 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016)

(burdens of persuasion for summary judgment). 
3 14-35681 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Meer’s motion to 

disqualify Chief Judge Winmill because Meer failed to show “extrajudicial bias or 

prejudice.” Thomassen v. United States, 835 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(standard of review); see also United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 

(9th Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, the alleged bias must stem from an extrajudicial 

source. [J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or 

partiality motion.” (alteration in original, citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Meer’s request to convert her motion to disqualify Chief Judge Winmill 

into a Writ of Mandamus, set forth in her opening brief, is denied. See Bauman v. 

U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977).

The district court properly denied Meer’s motion to transfer her action to 

this court prior to the resolution of her claims before the district court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1291; Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 

1986) (standard of review).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters 

not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett 

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Defendants’ request for fees and costs, set forth in their answering brief, is
4 14-35681 

denied without prejudice to renewal in a properly filed bill of costs and attorney’s 

fees motion.

AFFIRMED.