FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-1681

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STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

JUSTIN DAVID LANTZ,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

John T. Brown, Judge.

February 23, 2018

PER CURIAM.

The State appeals an order suppressing a number of 

incriminating statements made by Justin Lantz after invoking his 

right to counsel. We reverse in part and remand because some of 

the incriminating statements suppressed by the trial court were 

offered voluntarily by Mr. Lantz and were not the product of 

questions, or other actions by law enforcement that were 

reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. 

I.

Mr. Lantz was charged with first degree murder of his mother

and he entered a plea of not guilty. After being arrested late one 

night under a bridge, and in close proximity to his dead mother’s 

floating body, Mr. Lantz was brought to an interrogation room at 
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the police station. He was told of his rights to remain silent and to 

counsel. And he asked for a lawyer. At this, the officers told Mr. 

Lantz that they’d like to talk to him again after he got a lawyer. 

They told him that he would leave the room to go to the jail after a 

crime scene technician arrived to process him for physical evidence

(he had scrapes and cuts on his body). But then, they had to wait 

for the technician to arrive for about two hours. In the meantime, 

officers got Mr. Lantz coffee and they waited for the technician to 

arrive. During this period, Mr. Lantz became chatty and made 

incriminating statements. He has filed a motion to suppress the 

statements, arguing that he made them within the context of an 

unlawful interrogation after he had invoked his constitutional 

right to counsel. 

After a suppression hearing, the trial court ordered some of 

his statements suppressed and others not. The State appeals the 

suppression order asserting that six portions of his statements 

shouldn’t be suppressed because Mr. Lantz volunteered the 

information without law enforcement asking questions of him or 

taking other actions reasonably likely to elicit his incriminating 

responses.

II.

A ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed by the appellate 

court with a presumption of correctness. Martin-Godinez v. State, 

225 So. 3d 926, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (citing Spivey v. State, 45 

So. 3d 51, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). “This Court applies a mixed

standard of review, giving deference to the factual findings that 

are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing 

the determination of constitutional rights de novo.” Id. The 

ultimate question here, of whether the action of officers constitutes 

“interrogation” for Miranda purposes, is a legal question that we 

review de novo. See Everett v. State, 893 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 

2004); United States v. Yepa, 862 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2017).

A.

The Florida and United States Constitutions protect those 

arrested for committing crimes against being compelled to become 

witnesses against themselves in their own criminal cases. U.S. 

Const. amend. V; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; Ramirez v. State, 739 So.
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2d 568, 572–73 (Fla.1999). Suspects arrested for crimes must be 

notified of their “right to remain silent, that any statement [made] 

may be used as evidence against [them], and [of the] right to the 

presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). “Once warnings have been 

given, the subsequent procedure is clear. . . . If the individual 

states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease 

until an attorney is present.” Id. at 473-74. Continuing with an 

interrogation after invocation of the right to counsel risks 

suppression of whatever exculpatory or inculpatory statements 

arise from the interrogation. Id. at 479 (“[U]nless and until such 

warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, 

no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used 

against him.”). But see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 

651 (1984) (recognizing limited exceptions to the prophylactic 

rule).

Once the right to counsel has been invoked, Miranda requires 

counsel during interrogations. But it does “not require counsel’s 

presence for all further communications; only for interrogations.” 

Everett v. State, 893 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2004) (emphasis in 

original); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981)

(“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to

have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Absent such 

interrogation, there would have been no infringement of the 

right.”). Thus, Miranda is implicated only when a defendant in 

custody is subjected to questioning or “its functional equivalent.” 

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); see also Traylor v. 

State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992) (“These guidelines . . . do not 

apply to volunteered statements initiated by the suspect or 

statements that are obtained in noncustodial settings or through 

means other than interrogation”). Interrogation “refers not only to 

express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part 

of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit 

an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 

301; see also Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966, n.17 (“Interrogation takes 

place for Section 9 purposes when a person is subjected to express 

questions, or other words or actions, by a state agent, that a 

reasonable person would conclude are designed to lead to an 

incriminating response.”). However, “no interrogation occurs 
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where an officer does not initiate a conversation and merely 

responds to the suspect.” Gordon v. State, 213 So. 3d 1050, 1053 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2017). “Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply 

by hoping that he will incriminate himself.” Arizona v. Mauro, 481 

U.S. 520, 529 (1987). 

B.

In this case, the State challenges the suppression of five parts 

of a police-station dialogue between Mr. Lantz and officers after he 

had invoked his right to counsel. The State argues that it was not 

interrogating Mr. Lantz when he voluntarily offered inculpatory 

statements, and we partly agree.

The State first challenges the suppression of statements found 

in the record, page 114, line 9 through line 20, of the interview 

transcript. The statements are immediately preceded by dialogue 

that the trial court did not suppress. In this section, the officer 

responded to a question posed by Mr. Lantz regarding potential 

sentences for murder as follows: 

Mr. Lantz: What’s murder these days? Life?”

[Investigator]: I don’t know anything. I’ve been doing this 

27 years, to be honest with you, sir. It [sic] really, case by 

case (unintelligible).”

Mr. Lantz: I didn’t – I didn’t kill the b****, but somebody 

paid me to f***ing help him. That was a good way to make 

money.

[Investigator]: No.

Mr. Lantz: Somebody else killed her. I didn’t kill her. The 

body was there. He told me to come get her. 10 grand 

(unintelligible) pay me. Never going to see that money. 

And now he got away with murder, and I get the f***ing 

rap.

In this instance, there wasn’t officer questioning, or words or 

actions by an officer “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 

response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. The officer 
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simply responded to an unsolicited question from Mr. Lantz

regarding the sentence for murder, and did so in way that didn’t 

invite Mr. Lantz’s incriminating response. These circumstances do 

not constitute interrogation requiring suppression of Mr. Lantz’s 

incriminating statements. See Gordon, 213 So. 3d at 1054 (finding 

no interrogation where the officer responded to the suspect’s 

question and “did not initiate the conversation, nor did he assume 

wrongdoing on appellant’s part, and finally did not call for 

appellant to respond”).

For similar reasons, we conclude that the trial court 

erroneously suppressed statements found in the record at page 

126, line 6, through page 128, line 10; and page 134, line 1 through 

page 135, line 16. As in the first instance, the officers in these later 

parts of the transcript variously responded to questions posed by 

Mr. Lantz. But they did not ask questions, or take actions that 

were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating statements. We thus 

reverse the suppression order also with respect to these parts of 

the dialogue.

In all of these instances, it wasn’t unlawful for officers to wait

with Mr. Lantz for the crime scene technician to arrive, even if Mr. 

Lantz was intoxicated at the time. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 

496 U.S. 582, 600-606 (1990) (holding that an intoxicated suspect’s 

statements to officers over a period of time were not the product of 

interrogation); Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529 (recognizing that police 

don’t “interrogate” a suspect simply by hoping he will confess). Nor 

do we think that giving Mr. Lantz coffee was reasonably likely to 

elicit incriminating statements. See, e.g., Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 

23, 29 (2011) (finding that a defendant’s statements were 

voluntarily made, in part, because he “was given water and offered 

food, and was not abused or threatened”).

With respect to all other parts of the transcript challenged by 

the State, we affirm.

III.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LEWIS, OSTERHAUS, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Justin Karpf, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.