COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

VIRGINIA H. SARVER, F/K/A 

 VIRGINIA S. SORUM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1950-97-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 JUNE 16, 1998 

HARVEY J. SORUM 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 

Jay T. Swett, Judge 

 Peter L. McCloud (Boyle, Bain & Downer, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Ralph E. Main, Jr., for appellee. 

 The parties were divorced by final decree entered August 1, 

1996. Four months later Mr. Sorum moved to reopen the case and 

to allocate $27,000 of debt incurred to educate their children. 

He also asked the court to affirm the exact amount of his 

obligation on a credit card debt. By order dated July 11, 1997, 

the trial court affirmed the amount of the credit card debt at 

$5,922 which was the amount set out in the decree of August 1, 

1996. The court ordered the husband to pay that amount within 

thirty days. The court also found that the failure to address 

the education debt in the August 1996 decree was a mutual mistake 

by the parties and decreed that each pay half. 

 The decree of August 1996 allocated the parties' MBNA credit 

card debt to the husband and ordered that he pay it "holding [the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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wife] harmless." When the court made its decree of July 1997, it 

found that $5,922 was the precise amount owed when the 1996 

divorce decree was entered and ordered the husband to pay that 

amount only. The court did not make any provision for interest 

or other charges that accrued on that account between the date of 

the first decree and the subsequent one. We hold that when the 

court did not make such provisions, the court failed to give 

recognition to the hold harmless provision in its first decree. 

The decision is reversed and remanded with the direction that the 

decree be modified to order that the husband pay, in addition to 

the principal amount, any sums that accrued because of his 

failure to pay the debt as originally ordered to do. 

 The trial court had no authority to entertain the request to 

allocate the education loans that had not been addressed in the 

August 1996 decree. The trial court's inherent power to amend 

the record should not be confused with the power to create. See

Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 149, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996). 

"'While the power is inherent in the court, it is restricted to 

placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has 

actually been taken, and presupposes action taken at the proper 

time.'" Id. (citation omitted). The trial court loses 

jurisdiction twenty-one days after entering the final decree. 

"All final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms 

of court, shall remain under the control of the trial court and 

subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days 

after the date of entry, and no longer." Rule 1:1. 
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 If fraud has been practiced, the trial court can reopen a 

case after twenty-one days has past. See Code § 8.01-428. The 

initial motion filed by the husband to reopen the case pleaded 

fraud as the reason the court had not dealt with the matter of 

student loans. However, the trial court found that fraud was not 

shown. No objection was taken to that finding. Because no fraud 

was practiced on the court, the court had no authority to 

adjudicate the issue twenty-one days after the final order. 

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court to allocate this 

debt is reversed. 

 Reversed and remanded.