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*********************************************** 
IN RE ADRIAN K.*

(AC 42633)

Keller, Bright and Devlin, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father, whose minor child, A, previously had been adjudicated neglected, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial

court denying his motion to dismiss an order of temporary custody and

modifying the dispositive order from protective supervision with the

respondent mother to commitment to the custody of the petitioner,

the Commissioner of Children and Families. After the trial court had

adjudicated A neglected, it had ordered placement of A with the mother

with protective supervision. The petitioner thereafter placed a ninetysix hour hold on A and filed a motion for an order of temporary custody,

which was granted ex parte. The court scheduled a preliminary hearing

on the order for temporary custody, and the petitioner filed a motion to

modify the dispositive order from protective supervision to commitment.

The trial court sustained the order of temporary custody and denied

the father’s motion to dismiss, and the father appealed to this court. Held:

1. The respondent father could not prevail on his claim that the trial court

improperly denied his motion to dismiss the order of temporary custody,

which was based on his claim that the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction ended when protective supervision expired on December 6, 2018,

and that the court’s jurisdiction was not continued as a result of the

petitioner’s failure to file a timely motion to modify as required under

the applicable rule of practice (§ 33a-6 [c]), which provides that a motion

to modify protective supervision shall be filed no later than the next

business day before a preliminary hearing on an ex parte custody order:

the father’s claim that the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction was

limited by § 33a-6 (c) was unavailing, as rules of practice do not and

cannot create or circumscribe jurisdiction, and, thus, whether the timing

requirement of § 33a-6 (c) is mandatory or directory and whether the

motion to modify protective supervision was timely filed are irrelevant

to the question of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction

to sustain the order of temporary custody; moreover, on the basis of

the plain language of the relevant statute (§ 46b-129 [b]), which provides

that a motion for an order of temporary custody may be granted subsequent to the filing of a neglect petition, as had occurred in the present

case, the court had jurisdiction to enter an ex parte order of temporary

custody, as the neglect petition was pending when the order of temporary

custody was signed, and the fact that a new petition was not filed with

the motion for order of temporary custody was irrelevant, and although

§ 46b-129 is silent as to whether an order of temporary custody modifies

an order of protective supervision, given the purposes underlying § 46b129 and the clear language of the statute (§ 46b-121 [b] [1]) that gives

the petitioner authority to enter orders regarding the protection and

proper care of a child, an order of temporary custody issued pursuant

to § 46b-129 (b) necessarily suspends or interrupts a period of protective

supervision, such that previously ordered protective supervision cannot

expire and terminate the underlying neglect petition while the order of

temporary custody is in place; accordingly, when the order of temporary

custody was granted, it essentially modified the existing period of protective supervision by suspending it, and the order of temporary custody,

which suspended the order of protective supervision, was ongoing at

the time the motion to modify was filed, and, therefore, the court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the order of temporary custody when

the petitioner subsequently filed the motion to modify the disposition.

2. The respondent father could not prevail on his claim that the court’s

denial of his motion to dismiss violated his rights to substantive and

procedural due process, which was based on his unpreserved claims

that the court’s interpretation of the applicable rule of practice (§ 33a6 [c]) as directory rather than mandatory created jurisdiction, thereby

leaving A in the petitioner’s care in violation of his right to family

integrity, and deprived him of timely notice, as he failed to demonstrate
the existence of a constitutional violation pursuant to State v. Golding

(213 Conn. 233): because the trial court, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-129

[b]), had ongoing jurisdiction to rule on the order of temporary custody

even though neither a new neglect petition nor a motion to modify had

been filed by December 6, 2018, and because Practice Book § 33a-6 (c)

could not confer or circumscribe the court’s jurisdiction, the father’s

substantive due process rights were not violated; moreover, the court

did not deprive the father of his right to family integrity and timely

notice because although he has a vital interest in directing the care and

custody of his biological child, the court’s decision to allow the petitioner

to file a motion to modify one day late did not deprive the father of

procedural due process or create a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest of the father, who had notice of the ex parte

order of temporary custody in advance of the preliminary hearing, was

represented by counsel and had an opportunity to be heard and to

contest fully the order of temporary custody and motion to modify

before the court sustained the order of temporary custody and modified

disposition to commitment.

Argued May 29—officially released July 18, 2019**

Procedural History

Petition to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child

neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Middletown, Juvenile Matters, where the

court, Woods, J., adjudicated the child neglected and

ordered protective supervision; thereafter, the court,

Sanchez-Figueroa, J., issued ex parte orders granting

temporary custody of the child to the petitioner; subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion to open and modify

the disposition; thereafter, the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J., sustained the orders of temporary custody and

denied the respondent father’s motion to dismiss, and

the respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Karen Oliver Damboise, for the appellant (respondent father).

Carolyn A. Signorelli, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney

general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Christopher DeMatteo, for the minor child.
Opinion

BRIGHT, J. The respondent father, Luis K.,1 appeals

from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion

to dismiss an order of temporary custody and modifying

the dispositive order from protective supervision with

the mother to commitment to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The

respondent claims that (1) the court improperly denied

his motion to dismiss the order of temporary custody

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the

court’s denial of his motion to dismiss violated his right

to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant. On November 29, 2017, the petitioner filed a

neglect petition on behalf of the infant minor child. An

addendum to the petition stated that the mother had

used poor judgment by leaving the child alone in a car

with the respondent, who had physically abused the

child in October, 2017, despite the ‘‘clear recommendation’’ of the Department of Children and Families

(department) that the respondent be supervised at all

times when he was with the child. The child was adjudicated neglected on March 6, 2018. The court, Woods,

J., ordered placement of the child with the mother with

six months of protective supervision until September

6, 2018. Specific steps for the respondent and the

mother were ordered. On April 10, 2018, the respondent

was convicted of risk of injury to a child and assault

in the third degree arising out of his physical abuse of

the child in October, 2017. At the respondent’s sentencing, the court issued a standing criminal protective

order prohibiting the respondent from having any contact with the child until January 1, 2083. On August

2, 2018, the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J., granted the

petitioner’s motion to extend protective supervision of

the child in the mother’s custody until December 6,

2018. Following an in-court review on November 1,

2018, the court ordered that full custody was vested

with the mother and confirmed that the period of protective supervision would expire on December 6, 2018.

On November 26, 2018, the department received a

new referral alleging that the mother was engaging in

substance abuse and was allowing the respondent

access to the child. After an investigation, the petitioner,

pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101g, placed a

ninety-six hour hold on the child and removed him

from the mother’s custody. On November 29, 2018, the

petitioner filed a motion for an order of temporary

custody, which was granted ex parte that same day.2 A

preliminary hearing was scheduled for December 7,

2018. In light of the order of temporary custody, the

petitioner, pursuant to Practice Book § 33a-6 (c),3

should have filed a motion to modify protective supervi-
sion at least one business day prior to the preliminary

hearing. The petitioner, however, did not file a motion

to open and modify the dispositional order of protective

supervision to commitment until the morning of the

hearing on December 7, 2018.

At the December 7, 2018 preliminary hearing, the

respondent argued that protective supervision had

expired on December 6, 2018, the motion to modify

was filed one day late according to Practice Book § 33a6 (c), and that ‘‘as of today, there is no underlying

neglect petition that accompanies this order . . . of

temporary custody . . . . Therefore, we would argue

that the court does not have jurisdiction, as there is no

underlying neglect petition and the department did not

file any such motion to modify protective supervision,

pursuant to this Practice Book section within the time

period specified in that Practice Book section.’’

The court sustained the order of temporary custody

without prejudice until further order of the court. The

court allowed the respondent, who was represented by

counsel, time to brief his jurisdictional argument. The

respondent filed a motion to dismiss on December 21,

2018. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion

to dismiss on January 17, 2019, reasoning that Practice

Book § 33-6a (c) is directory and that the court had

jurisdiction to act on the motion for an order of temporary custody. The court stated that the fact that the

motion for an order of temporary custody was granted

on November 29, 2018, further solidified the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction because the order of temporary custody was filed and signed while the existing

neglect petition was still active, and the motion for an

order of temporary custody served as a ‘‘tacit request

to modify the disposition of the protective supervision.’’

After a contested hearing, the court, on February 19,

2019, sustained the order of temporary custody and

committed the child to the care and custody of the

petitioner. The court found that the child would be in

immediate physical danger from his surroundings if he

were returned to the care and custody of the mother

or the respondent. The court noted that the respondent

could not have custody of the child due to his incarceration, and that the mother had not reached a level of

understanding to make sure the child was kept safe

and away from the respondent when he is released from

incarceration. This appeal followed.

I

The respondent claims that the court improperly

denied his motion to dismiss. He contends that the

court’s subject matter jurisdiction ended when protective supervision expired on December 6, 2018, and that

the only mechanism to continue the court’s jurisdiction

was for the petitioner to file a timely motion to modify.

He argues that there was no pending controversy

because the petitioner’s motion to modify was filed
untimely on the day of the preliminary hearing in contravention of what the respondent argues is a mandatory

requirement of Practice Book § 33a-6 (c) to file such a

motion one business day before the preliminary hearing.4 We do not agree.

‘‘[I]t is well established that, in determining whether

a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. . . .

When reviewing an issue of subject matter jurisdiction

on appeal, [w]e have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . .

Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the

court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented

by the action before it . . . . [A] court lacks discretion

to consider the merits of a case over which it is without

jurisdiction. . . . The subject matter jurisdiction

requirement may not be waived by any party, and also

may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte,

at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531–32, 46 A.3d

102 (2012).

The respondent’s claim is premised, in part, on his

argument that Practice Book § 33a-6 (c) acts as a limit

on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In particular,

he argues that ‘‘[b]y [the petitioner] failing to file the

motion [to modify protective supervision] within the

mandatory time frame prescribed by . . . [§ 33a-6 (c)],

the court lacked jurisdiction to continue to preside over

the matter.’’ The respondent’s reliance on a Superior

Court rule of practice is misplaced. The law is clear

that rules of practice adopted by our courts do not

and cannot create or circumscribe jurisdiction. General

Statutes § 51-14 (a) explicitly provides that the rules

adopted by the justices of the Supreme Court, the judges

of the Appellate Court and the judges of the Superior

Court ‘‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right or the jurisdiction of any of the courts.’’ See

also State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 776 n.14, 894 A.2d

963 (2006); State v. Carey, 222 Conn. 299, 307, 610 A.2d

1147 (1992). Consequently, whether the timing requirement of § 33a-6 (c) is mandatory or directory and

whether the motion to modify protective supervision

was timely filed are irrelevant to the question of whether

the court had subject matter jurisdiction to sustain the

order of temporary custody.

The real crux of the respondent’s argument is that

because the court-ordered period of protective supervision ended on December 6, 2018, there was no longer

a neglect petition pending in the court on December 7,

2018, when the court held its preliminary hearing on

the order of temporary custody. According to the

respondent, because the case involving the child ended

on December 6, 2018, and no new neglect petition had
been filed on behalf of the child, there was no statutory

basis for the court to proceed with the hearing.

The petitioner argues that the respondent’s claim is

legally incorrect in that General Statutes § 46b-129 (b)5

specifically provides that a motion for an order of temporary custody may be granted subsequent to a neglect

petition, which is what occurred in this case. According

to the petitioner, once the motion was granted, the court

maintained continuing jurisdiction to conduct further

hearings on it. The petitioner further argued in opposition to the respondent’s motion to dismiss in the trial

court that ‘‘an [order of temporary custody], by its

nature, modifies a custodial order. It removes custody

from the parent and vests it in the [petitioner] in this

case. Therefore, the . . . custody of the child that was

vested in the parent under protective supervision, has

been modified. That protective supervision order itself

has been modified. The custodial portion of that has

been changed to vest that custody in the petitioner.’’

The petitioner also relies on General Statutes § 46b121 (b) (1), which provides, in relevant part, that ‘‘[i]n

juvenile matters, the Superior Court shall have authority

to make and enforce such orders directed to parents

. . . as the court deems necessary or appropriate to

secure the welfare, protection, proper care . . . of a

child subject to the court’s jurisdiction or otherwise

committed to or in the custody of the [petitioner].’’

According to the petitioner, this statute gave the court

authority to enter orders regarding the child, who was,

at the time, in the petitioner’s custody. We agree with

the petitioner.

On the basis of the plain language of § 46b-129 (b),

there is no question that the court had jurisdiction to

enter the November 29, 2018 ex parte order of temporary custody and schedule a hearing on the order. Section 46b-129 (b) provides that an order of temporary

custody may arise ‘‘from the specific allegations of the

petition and other verified affirmations of fact accompanying the petition and application, or subsequent

thereto . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The language ‘‘or

subsequent thereto’’ clearly indicates that the legislature envisioned situations wherein a child’s circumstances may change subsequent to the filing of a neglect

petition, thereby requiring the filing of a motion for an

order of temporary custody. Therefore, the court may

grant a motion for an order of temporary custody subsequent to the filing of a neglect petition. In the present

case, the neglect petition was still pending when the

order of temporary custody was signed on November

29, 2018, and the fact that a new neglect petition was

not filed with the motion for an order of temporary

custody is not relevant. In fact, before the trial court,

the respondent conceded that, at the time it was issued,

the November 29, 2018 order of temporary custody ‘‘was

a valid order.’’
The key issue then becomes whether the order of

protective supervision expired on December 6, 2018,

thereby ending the pending neglect petition, or whether,

in essence, it was modified by the trial court’s issuance

of the ex parte order of temporary custody on November 29, 2018. We note that § 46b-129 is silent as to

whether an order of temporary custody in any way

modifies an order of protective supervision. Nevertheless, logic, the purposes underlying § 46b-129, and the

clear language of § 46b-121 (b) (1) lead us to conclude

that an order of temporary custody issued pursuant to

§ 46b-129 (b) necessarily suspends or interrupts a

period of protective supervision, such that a previously

ordered period of protective supervision cannot expire

and terminate the underlying neglect petition while the

order of temporary custody is in place.

First, logically, protective supervision ceases to exist

when an order of temporary custody issues. Protective

supervision involves the petitioner supervising someone else’s, typically a parent’s, custody of the child. In

this case, the mother’s custody of the child was the

subject of the petitioner’s supervision. Once the petitioner took custody of the child pursuant to the ninetysix hour hold, the petitioner was no longer supervising

the mother’s custody, but had assumed temporary custody of the child pending further order of the court.

Consequently, as a matter of fact, at that point in time,

the disposition of protective supervision had been modified and interrupted.

Second, the respondent’s position would lead to

bizarre results at odds with protecting a child suffering

from serious physical illness or serious physical injury

or who is in immediate physical danger, which is the

purpose of orders issued pursuant to § 46b-129 (b). For

example, under the respondent’s analysis, if the ninetysix hour hold had been invoked by the petitioner at

11:59 p.m. on December 6, 2018, the petitioner would

have been required to return the child to the mother

at 12:01 a.m. on December 7, 2018, because the period

of protective supervision would have ended. Thus, the

petitioner would have been required to return the child

to the same unsafe circumstance she had removed the

child from just minutes before. We will not conclude

that the legislature intended such an absurd result. See,

e.g., In re Corey E., 40 Conn. App. 366, 373–74, 671

A.2d 396 (1996) (rejecting interpretation of statute that

would lead to ‘‘bizarre’’ result of forcing department to

return child to parent whose neglect caused commitment); In re Adrien C., 9 Conn. App. 506, 512, 519 A.2d

1241 (rejecting interpretation of statute that would lead

to return of child to ‘‘what could be a hostile, unsafe

and dangerous environment’’), cert. denied, 203 Conn.

802, 522 A.2d 292 (1987).

In reaching this conclusion we find instructive the

Superior Court case of In the Interests of Felicia B.,
Superior Court, judicial district of Middletown, Docket

Nos. FO4-CP-000291, FO4-CP-000292, FO4-CP-003125,

FO4-CP-003126, FO4-CP-003373 (April 21, 1999) (Quinn,

J.), which addressed the interplay of orders of protective supervision and orders of temporary custody on

facts similar to those in the present case. In Felicia B.,

five children were adjudicated neglected and, on August

5, 1998, placed with their mother under protective

supervision, which was set to expire on March 5, 1999.

Ex parte orders of temporary custody were then issued

on September 18, 1998, and a hearing was scheduled

for September 24, 1998. The hearing did not go forward

on that date and eventually was scheduled to proceed

on March 18, 1999. At that time, the respondent moved

to dismiss the orders of temporary custody because the

period of protective supervision ended on March 5,

1999, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected the respondent’s argument.

It first noted that ‘‘[c]ustody of the [children] with [the

petitioner] is inherently contradictory to orders leaving

the children with their mother under protective supervision. The [orders of temporary custody] must therefore

either have terminated or suspended the earlier orders

of protective supervision.’’ Using tenets of statutory

construction, the court interpreted the conflicting

orders harmoniously and concluded that the orders of

temporary custody suspended the orders of protective

supervision. The court determined that ‘‘the date provided for the expiration of the orders of protective

supervision, March 5, 1999, was merely a courtesy

extended by the court to compute the six month period

and not the controlling jurisdictional date.’’ The court

denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and concluded that the orders of temporary custody suspended

the period of protective supervision such that there

were still four and one half months remaining on the

protective supervision orders, meaning that the court

continued to have subject matter jurisdiction.

We agree with the trial court’s approach in Felicia

B., to harmonize the conflicting orders. In the present

case, the order of temporary custody, which placed the

child temporarily in the custody of the petitioner, and

the order of protective supervision, which placed the

child in the custody of the mother, cannot coexist. Realistically, the petitioner’s ninety-six hour hold on the

child followed by the court’s order of temporary custody, both of which occurred prior to the expiration of

protective supervision, had the effect of removing the

child from the care and custody of the mother. Accordingly, when the order of temporary custody was

granted, it essentially modified the existing period of

protective supervision by suspending it. The order of

temporary custody, which suspended the order of protective supervision, was ongoing at the time the motion

to modify was filed. Therefore, the court had subject

matter jurisdiction over the order of temporary custody
when the petitioner subsequently filed the motion to

modify the disposition.

We further note that § 46b-121 (b) (1) provides in

relevant part: ‘‘In juvenile matters, the Superior Court

shall have authority to make and enforce such orders

directed to parents . . . as the court deems necessary

or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper

care and suitable support of a child subject to the court’s

jurisdiction or otherwise committed to or in the custody

of the [petitioner]. . . .’’ Even if we were to conclude,

which we do not, that the protective supervision

expired on December 6, 2018, and the underlying

neglect petition had been terminated, the trial court

nonetheless had the authority to issue an order of temporary custody pursuant to § 46b-121 (b) (1) to protect

the child who was ‘‘otherwise . . . in the custody of

the [petitioner].’’

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

trial court had jurisdiction over the order of temporary

custody. Accordingly, the court properly denied the

respondent’s motion to dismiss.

II

The respondent next claims that his constitutional

rights to (1) substantive and (2) procedural due process

were violated by the court’s denial of his motion to

dismiss. We are not persuaded.

A

The respondent argues that the court’s interpretation

of Practice Book § 33a-6 (c) as being directory improperly created jurisdiction thereby leaving the minor child

in the petitioner’s care in violation of his constitutional

right to family integrity.6 We disagree.

The respondent concedes that this claim is unpreserved and seeks review under State v. Golding, 213

Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by

In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

Under Golding, ‘‘a [respondent] can prevail on a claim

of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all

of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is

adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the

claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the

[respondent] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the [petitioner] has failed to demonstrate

harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation

beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one

of these conditions, the [respondent’s] claim will fail.’’

(Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) Id.; see In re

Yasiel R., supra, 781, (modifying third prong of Golding

by eliminating word ‘‘clearly’’).

The record is adequate for review, and the claim,

which involves the custody and care of the respondent’s
biological child, is of constitutional magnitude. See In

re Zoey H., 183 Conn. App. 327, 348, 192 A.3d 522 (‘‘[p]arents have a substantive right under the [d]ue [p]rocess

[c]lause to remain together [with their children] without

the coercive interference of the awesome power of the

state’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied,

330 Conn. 906, 192 A.3d 425 (2018). Therefore, the claim

is reviewable.

Regarding the third prong of Golding, we conclude,

however, that the alleged constitutional violation does

not exist. Interpreting Practice Book § 33a-6 (c) as

directory does not expand the trial court’s jurisdiction

because, as we stated in part I of this opinion, the rules

of practice cannot confer or circumscribe the court’s

jurisdiction. Under § 46b-129 (b), the trial court had

ongoing jurisdiction to rule on the order of temporary

custody even though neither a new neglect petition nor

a motion to modify had been filed by December 6, 2018.

Accordingly, the respondent’s substantive due process

rights were not violated.

B

The respondent next argues that by failing to interpret

Practice Book § 33a-6 (c) as being mandatory, the court

deprived him of his right to family integrity and timely

notice. The respondent’s claim meets the first two

prongs of Golding for the same reasons as stated in

part II A of this opinion and, therefore, is reviewable.

The respondent’s claim fails to satisfy the third prong

of Golding because the alleged constitutional violation

does not exist.

‘‘The United States Supreme Court established a

three-pronged balancing test in Mathews [v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)]

to determine what safeguards the federal constitution

requires to satisfy procedural due process. Courts apply

that balancing test when the state seeks to terminate

parental rights. . . . The three factors to be considered are (1) the private interest that will be affected

by the state action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest, given the existing procedures,

and the value of any additional or alternate procedural

safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including

the fiscal and administrative burdens attendant to

increased or substitute procedural requirements. [Id.,

335.]’’ (Citations omitted.) In Re Shaquanna M., 61

Conn. App. 592, 606, 767 A.2d 155 (2001).

Under the first factor, the respondent has a vital interest in directing the care and custody of his biological

child. See In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 279, 618

A.2d 1 (1992) (‘‘the interest of parents in their children

is a fundamental constitutional right that undeniably

warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection’’). We are not persuaded, under

the second factor, that the court’s exercise of its discre-
tion to permit the department to file a motion to modify

one day late created a substantial risk of an erroneous

deprivation of the respondent’s private interest. The

respondent had notice of the ex parte order of temporary custody in advance of the preliminary hearing. He

was represented by counsel and had an opportunity to

be heard at the preliminary hearing. Furthermore, the

respondent had an opportunity to contest fully the order

of temporary custody and the motion to modify the

disposition before the court sustained the order of temporary custody and modified disposition to commitment on February 19, 2019. Regarding the third factor,

‘‘the express public policy of this state [is] to provide

all of its children a safe, stable nurturing environment.’’

State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 171, 425 A.2d

939 (1979).

In balancing the factors, we conclude that the court’s

decision to accept the petitioner’s motion to modify,

which had been filed one day later than the time set

forth in our rules of practice, when the respondent had

notice of the order of temporary custody over which

the court had jurisdiction, and when the respondent

was afforded an opportunity to contest fully the order

of temporary custody, did not deprive him of his right

to procedural due process. Accordingly, we conclude

that the respondent has not demonstrated the existence

of a constitutional violation.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** July 18, 2019, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The father is referred to herein as the respondent. The mother, Kali D.,

although also a respondent in the underlying proceedings, did not appeal,

and for convenience is referred to herein as the mother.

2 The court also ordered specific steps, which required, inter alia, that

the mother comply with the lifetime criminal protective order as it pertains

to the respondent and the child.

3 Practice Book § 33a-6 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If the judicial authority finds, based upon the specific allegations of the petition and other verified

affirmations of fact provided by the applicant, that there is reasonable cause

to believe that: (1) the child or youth is suffering from serious physical

illness or serious physical injury or is in immediate physical danger from

his or her surroundings and (2) that as a result of said conditions, the

child’s or youth’s safety is endangered and immediate removal from such

surroundings is necessary to ensure the child’s or youth’s safety, the judicial

authority shall, upon proper application at the time of filing of the petition

or at any time subsequent thereto, either (A) issue an order to the respondents or other persons having responsibility for the care of the child or

youth to appear at such time as the judicial authority may designate to

determine whether the judicial authority should vest in some suitable agency

or person the child’s or youth’s temporary care and custody pending disposition of the petition, or (B) issue an order ex parte vesting in some suitable

agency or person the child’s or youth’s temporary care and custody.

‘‘(b) A preliminary hearing on any ex parte custody order or order to

appear issued by the judicial authority shall be held as soon as practicable

but not later than ten days after the issuance of such order.

‘‘(c) If the application is filed subsequent to the filing of the petition, a
motion to amend the petition or to modify protective supervision shall be

filed no later than the next business date before such preliminary hearing.’’

4 The attorney for the minor child argued in his appellate brief that the

court improperly denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss because the

expiration of protective supervision deprived the court of subject matter

jurisdiction, and the ex parte order of temporary custody did not interrupt

or toll the period of protective supervision. The attorney for the minor child

adopted the brief of the petitioner as to the respondent’s constitutional

claim, which is addressed in part II of this opinion.

5 Section 46b-129 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘If it appears from the

specific allegations of the petition and other verified affirmations of fact

accompanying the petition and application, or subsequent thereto, that there

is reasonable cause to believe that (1) the child or youth is suffering from

serious physical illness or serious physical injury or is in immediate physical

danger from the child’s or youth’s surroundings, and (2) as a result of

said conditions, the child’s or youth’s safety is endangered and immediate

removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child’s or youth’s

safety, the court shall either (A) issue an order to the parents or other

person having responsibility for the care of the child or youth to appear at

such time as the court may designate to determine whether the court should

vest the child’s or youth’s temporary care and custody in a person related

to the child or youth by blood or marriage or in some other person or

suitable agency pending disposition of the petition, or (B) issue an order

ex parte vesting the child’s or youth’s temporary care and custody in a

person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage or in some other

person or suitable agency. A preliminary hearing on any ex parte custody

order or order to appear issued by the court shall be held not later than

ten days after the issuance of such order. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

6 The respondent’s purported concern about his right to family integrity

is somewhat curious given that he is prohibited from having any contact

with the child until January 1, 2083.