SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

231 

CAF 12-01651 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF BRANDON A., 

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

---------------------------- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LIVINGSTON COUNTY ATTORNEY, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

JOHN M. LOCKHART, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, GENESEO, FOR RESPONDENTAPPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Livingston County

(Robert B. Wiggins, J.), entered April 9, 2012 in a proceeding

pursuant to Family Court Act article 3. The order, inter alia,

adjudicated respondent to be a juvenile delinquent. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the petition is

dismissed. 

On appeal from an order, inter alia, adjudicating respondent to

be a juvenile delinquent based upon his admission that he committed an

act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of

criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law

§ 220.31), respondent contends that the petition was facially

insufficient. We agree. We note at the outset that, because a

facially sufficient petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

adjudicating respondent a juvenile delinquent, respondent’s admission

does not preclude his challenge to the petition (see Matter of Shane

B., 4 AD3d 650, 651). A juvenile delinquency petition is facially

sufficient when “the allegations of the factual part of the petition,

together with those of any supporting depositions which may accompany

it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the respondent committed

the crime or crimes charged” and when “non-hearsay allegations of the

factual part of the petition or of any supporting depositions

establish, if true, every element of each crime charged and the

respondent’s commission thereof” (Family Ct Act § 311.2 [2], [3]; see

Matter of Angel A., 92 NY2d 430, 433). 

Respondent correctly contends that the petition fails to include

sufficient nonconclusory factual allegations to establish reasonable

cause and a prima facie case for the crime charged. The petition

alleged that respondent knowingly and unlawfully sold a controlled

substance, i.e., Adderall (see Penal Law § 220.31). The Court of

Appeals has made clear that “[s]tanding alone, a conclusory statement

that a substance seized from a defendant was a particular type of
-2- 231 

CAF 12-01651 

controlled substance does not meet the reasonable cause requirement”

(People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229). Petitioner must provide factual

allegations that establish a reliable basis for inferring the presence

of a controlled substance (see id.; Angel A., 92 NY2d at 434-435). 

The petition here is supported by only the conclusory statements of

respondent’s classmate and an officer that the substance was Adderall. 

Their statements are not “supported by evidentiary facts showing the

basis for the conclusion that the substance sold was actually

[Adderall]” (People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731; cf. Kalin, 12 NY3d at

229-231; Angel A., 92 NY2d at 432-435; People v Pearson, 78 AD3d 445,

445, lv denied 16 NY3d 799).

Entered: April 26, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court