NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-961

GIUSEPPE CRACCHIOLO & another1

vs.

BRADLEY K. BASS & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Bradley Bass appeals from a judgment entered after the 

judge assigned to these matters allowed the plaintiffs' motion 

to enforce a settlement agreement. The crux of Bass's argument 

on appeal is that the judge's finding that Bass had intended to 

be bound by the terms of an unsigned settlement agreement is 

clearly erroneous. In addition, among other things,3 Bass argues 

that, in light of his pro se status, he should have been given 

1 Maria Cracchiolo.

2 Jean E. Bass and Catherine A. Barry, as personal 

representatives of the estate of Cindy L. Bass; neither is a 

party to this appeal. Bradley Bass is sued in his individual 

capacity and as personal representative of the estate of Cindy 

L. Bass.

3 To the extent Bass is attempting to raise additional arguments, 

they are difficult to discern from his brief and, in any event, 

do not rise to the level of appellate argument.
2

more time to prepare an opposition to the motion to enforce the 

settlement, that the judge timed the entry of judgment to thwart 

him from taking an interlocutory appeal, and that the judge made 

misleading statements during the June 6, 2022 pretrial 

conference that induced him to enter into the settlement. Bass 

also argues that the judge erred in not deciding his motion for 

judgment on the pleadings before entering judgment. We affirm.

Bass's late mother, who died intestate, owned a property on 

Harriet Road in Gloucester. After Bass and his two siblings 

(Bass siblings) became personal representatives of their 

mother's estate, they entered into a purchase and sale agreement 

(P&S) with the plaintiffs to sell them the property. The sale 

never took place. The plaintiffs brought the underlying actions4

seeking, among other things, to compel specific performance of 

the P&S. Subsequently, the Bass siblings sought leave to bring 

a third-party complaint against attorney Sean Z. Keough, who had 

represented them in the probate proceedings. On May 2, 2022, 

the Bass siblings sought to bring a third-party complaint 

against the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MassHousing) 

after MassHousing gave notice of foreclosure of its mortgage on 

4 The plaintiffs filed suit in both the Superior Court and the 

Land Court. The Land Court judge was interdepartmentally 

assigned as a justice of the Superior Court to handle the 

Superior Court claims in addition to those asserted in the Land 

Court complaint.
3

the property; they also sought an injunction against the 

foreclosure. At a hearing on May 9, 2022, MassHousing agreed to 

postpone the foreclosure until July 1, 2022. The cases were in 

this posture when the following actions, hearings, discussions, 

communications, and statements concerning settlement took place.

On May 19, Bass sent an e-mail message to plaintiffs' 

counsel referring to settlement discussions and setting out a 

demand that the plaintiffs "come to $460K to get this done." On 

May 20, 2022, Bass sent another e-mail message to counsel for 

the plaintiffs, stating:

"Here is the deal.

"I will sell your clients the house for $450K. We 

want an additional $10K to release all claims. I need 

a yes or no in the next hour."

Not long thereafter, Bass sent a follow-up e-mail message 

saying, "Write it up for $445 and $5K." A few hours later, 

after plaintiffs' counsel noted that Bass would need to close 

the probate to deliver clear title, Bass sent another e-mail

message to plaintiffs' counsel stating:

"We agreed to $445K and $5K in principle. You agreed, we 

agreed."

On May 22, 2022, Bass sent an e-mail message to plaintiffs' 

counsel to "clarify our terms" and stating, among other things, 

that "[w]e sell your clients the house for $450K as part of a 

global settlement with Sean Keough."
4

At a status conference held on May 23, 2022, the parties 

reported that they were having ongoing settlement discussions.

The following day, Bass sent an e-mail message to 

plaintiffs' counsel with the subject matter "One remaining 

condition." He stated: "We are settling this case based on the 

belief that your clients will be buying the house to live in 

it."

On May 28, 2022, Bass told counsel for attorney Keough to 

draft up the settlement based on Keough paying $72,000 and the 

plaintiffs paying $450,000 for the property.

At a status conference on May 31, 2022, the parties 

reported that they were close to a settlement agreement. 

Despite that progress, the judge set the cases down for trial on 

June 7 - 10, 2022, with a pretrial conference set for June 6, 

2022. Later that day, counsel for attorney Keough circulated a 

draft settlement agreement to plaintiffs' counsel for review. 

The draft reflected the terms set out in the May 28 e-mail

message.

On June 2, after a neighboring property went on the market 

for $1.5 million, Bass wrote to all counsel that "it has been 

over a week since we agreed to a settlement in principle, but we

have not seen [a draft settlement] agreement yet, I think we are 

best off going to trial." Counsel responded that a draft would 

be circulated in two hours, which in fact it was. That draft
5

agreement again reflected that attorney Keough would pay 

$72,000, and that the plaintiffs would buy the property for 

$450,000. Also on June 2, 2022, Bass wrote that "[w]e agreed in 

our hearing with Judge Foster to closing on June 30th and during 

our post hearing zoom -- it was agreed upon. We need to stick 

to the agreed upon terms."

On June 5, 2022, counsel for attorney Keough wrote that he 

and Bass had connected and cleared up a few points and had "very 

few remaining actions open."

At 8:36 A.M. on June 6, 2022 -- the date of the scheduled 

pretrial conference -- counsel for the plaintiffs sent through 

an e-mail message a revised settlement agreement showing changes

from the previous draft. Again, the essential terms remained 

that attorney Keough would pay $72,000 and that the plaintiffs 

would pay $450,000 for the property. There were only two 

changes to the agreement: one eliminated the requirement that 

Bass use the Keough payment to satisfy the MassHousing mortgage; 

the other merely called for the purchase price to be paid in one 

lump sum of $450,000, rather than in a preliminary $5,000 

payment with $445,000 to follow.

The docket reflects that, at the pretrial conference on 

June 6, 2022, the parties reported the case settled. The 

transcript of the hearing shows that the following exchange took 

place after the Basses were sworn:
6

THE COURT: ". . . Where do we stand here?"

PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL: "Your honor, I think we're in good 

shape. It's been a bit of a bumpy road the last week or 

so. Yesterday, [Bass] and I had a good conference call, 

and I believe we have this settled in principle. Jen got 

up early this morning and has worked on the settlement 

agreement, which in all fairness to the Basses, they 

probably saw it around 8 a.m. so they may not have had time 

to review it all.

"But I would like to report to the Court that we have 

it settled subject to completion of that settlement 

agreement, with a closing on June 30th. So I think the 

goal today would be to stay this action until we can 

actually -- we're going to be able to dismiss it if the 

settlement comes through, because the settlement 

contemplates our turning the property back over to the

Basses if we don't close on June 30th."

THE COURT: "Mr. Bass?"

MR. BASS: "I agree with him."

THE COURT: "OK. Ms. Bass, you agree?"

MS. BASS: "Yes, I do."

THE COURT: "Ms. Barry?"

MS. BARRY: "I do."

Based on these representations, the trial was removed from the 

court's docket.

In an undated letter, the Bass siblings wrote to counsel 

for attorney Keough and counsel for the plaintiffs in which they 

acknowledged that although a "verbal settlement agreement [had 

been] agreed to on Sunday, June 5, 2022," they were nonetheless 

withdrawing from it based on their concerns about differing 
7

dates of signatures on a document called "Rider I."5 

Nonetheless, the Bass siblings stated that, if their concerns 

over the signature dates were satisfied, they were still willing 

to complete the settlement that had been agreed to.

On June 10, 2022, the Bass siblings filed a motion for 

judgment, indicating that they no longer agreed to the 

settlement, and on June 14, 2022, they filed a statement 

withdrawing from the settlement agreement. At the same time, 

their motion for judgment sought specific performance of the 

purchase of the property by the plaintiffs. However, Bass 

wanted adjustments made to the purchase price based on the 

passage of time and the increase in real estate values.

On June 15, 2022, the parties appeared for a status 

conference during which Bass represented that the defendants 

were withdrawing from the settlement agreement on the ground 

that the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith. When asked why the 

Bass siblings were withdrawing from the settlement, Bass 

acknowledged that he had agreed to the settlement and that he 

had represented to the court on June 6 that the case had been 

settled. He stated that the issue surrounding Rider I and the 

date on which it was signed was what caused him to withdraw from 

5 It is not clear from the appellate record what Rider I was. 

But no one challenges the judge's description of it as an 

extension of the P&S.
8

the settlement. In brief, the electronically signed version of 

Rider I had a different date of execution than the version that 

was signed in handwriting. Bass's view was that the date of 

execution on one of the versions of Rider I was either false or 

forged and that his contention in this regard justified stepping 

away from the settlement. In the end, Bass stated to the judge 

the Bass siblings needed to sell the property, wanted to sell it 

to the plaintiffs, were able to complete the settlement, but 

that he did not want to release the plaintiffs from any claims 

so that he could pursue them further for the "windfall" of 

getting the property. Counsel for the plaintiffs countered that 

they intended to file a motion to enforce the settlement. The 

judge ordered that any such motion be filed by the end of the 

day, including the terms of the agreement, and that any 

opposition be filed within two days thereafter.

As anticipated, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce 

settlement. Bass's opposition to the motion stated, among other 

things,

"The house next to ours did sell for over a million 

dollars -- it totally influenced us, though, that is why it 

went under contract on Saturday, June 4th and we went to 

Court on Monday, June 6th and told the court we agreed to a 

settlement [emphasis added]."

On June 21, 2022, the judge held a hearing on the motion to 

enforce settlement, at which the Bass siblings chose not to 

appear. The judge then allowed the motion in a detailed and 
9

thoughtful memorandum explaining his analysis and reasoning. 

The Bass siblings subsequently moved for reconsideration, which 

was also denied and judgment thereafter entered. This appeal 

followed.

Discussion. Bass's primary argument on appeal is that the 

judge erred in finding that the parties had reached a settlement 

as of June 6, 2022, when they appeared for the pretrial 

conference. We review the judge's factual determination for 

clear error. See Basis Tech. Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 71

Mass. App. Ct. 29, 36 (2008). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous'

only when, 'although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" 

Fecteau Benefits Group, Inc. v. Knox, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 204, 

212-213 (2008), quoting Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc.,

424 Mass. 501, 509 (1997).

Bass has failed to show clear error here. The record 

easily permitted the judge to find that when the Bass siblings 

stated that they agreed with plaintiffs' counsel's report that a 

settlement had been reached, the parties had in fact reached 

agreement on all material terms of the agreement. Indeed, Bass 

himself did not dispute that, on June 6, he informed the judge 

that a settlement had been reached. Nor does he identify any 

material term of the settlement that had not been reached by 
10

that date. See Situation Mgt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 430 

Mass. 875, 878 (2000) (to create enforceable contract, there 

must be agreement on all material terms). Nor could he credibly 

do so. The record before the judge showed that the parties had 

been in agreement on the material terms of a settlement over 

several versions of the draft written contract: attorney Keough 

would pay $72,000 to the Bass siblings, and the plaintiffs would 

pay $450,000 for the property with a closing on June 30, 2022.

Instead, Bass argues that his post-agreement discovery that 

there were two different versions of Rider I signed on different 

days justified "withdrawing" from the settlement agreement. A

material breach of a contract may, in appropriate circumstances, 

justify the other party from walking away from a contract and no 

longer being bound by it. See G4S Tech. LLC v. Massachusetts 

Tech. Park Corp., 479 Mass. 721, 734 (2018). "[A] material 

breach of a contract occurs when the breach concerns an 

essential and inducing feature of the contract [quotation 

omitted]." Id. at 733-734 The judge did not err in concluding 

that the signature date of Rider I was not a material term of 

the settlement. Indeed, the only references to Rider I were in 

two whereas clauses in an exhibit to the draft settlement 

document, and those references merely recited extension dates

contained in Rider I. The agreement imposed no obligation on 
11

the plaintiffs with respect to Rider I, let alone one that they 

could be said to have breached.

In light of our conclusion that the judge did not err in 

finding that the parties had reached agreement on all material 

terms of a settlement by June 6, when they all reported the case 

settled, we need say little about Bass's remaining arguments. 

We are unpersuaded by Bass's contention that the judge conducted 

the June 6 pretrial conference in a manner that induced him to 

report the case settled. The transcript shows that the parties 

reported the case settled at the outset of the conference; at 

that point the judge had done nothing more than inquire as to 

the status of things. We also discern no abuse of discretion in 

the judge's schedule for briefing the motion to enforce 

settlement, nor did Bass object below to the timetable. 

Although the judge imposed tight deadlines for the submissions, 

he did so with an equal hand on both sides. Bass was not 

entitled to special treatment as a self-represented litigant. 

See Briscoe v. LSREF3/AH Chicago Tenant, LLC, 481 Mass. 1026, 

1027 (2019), quoting International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 

Mass. 841, 847 (1983) ("A pro se litigant is bound by the same 

rules of procedure as litigants with counsel"). We also see no 

support in the record for Bass's contention that judgment 

entered prematurely for the purpose of depriving him of an 

interlocutory appeal. In any event, Bass has failed to explain 
12

how an interlocutory appeal would have provided something that 

this full appeal does not. Finally, having allowed the motion 

to enforce settlement, the judge was not required to act on any 

pending unresolved motions, including Bass's motion for judgment 

on the pleadings.6

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Wolohojian, 

Shin & Ditkoff, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: October 18, 2023.

6 We allow the appellees' request for an award of attorney's fees 

and costs on appeal against Bass. In accordance with the 

procedure specified in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 

(2004), the appellees may, within fourteen days of issuance of 

the rescript, submit an application for appellate attorney's

fees and costs with the appropriate supporting materials. Bass

shall have fourteen days thereafter to respond.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.