2024 UT App 86

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL IGNATIUS KUFRIN,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20210499-CA

Filed June 6, 2024

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Kraig Powell

No. 171402277

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, and Melissa Jo

Townsend, Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Jonathan S. Bauer,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 After a thirteen-day trial, a jury convicted Michael Ignatius 

Kufrin of murdering his girlfriend, Peggy Sue Case (Peggy), in 

1988. Kufrin appeals that conviction, asserting that the trial court 

should have declared a mistrial after one of the State’s witnesses 

mentioned that Kufrin had “previous cellmates”; that the court 

improperly admitted expert testimony from the medical examiner

(Examiner) regarding timelines for stages of body decomposition; 

and that his trial attorneys rendered constitutionally ineffective 

assistance by not lodging a particular objection to testimony from 

Peggy’s coworkers about the status of her relationship with 

Kufrin at the time of her disappearance. For the reasons set forth, 

we reject all of Kufrin’s arguments and affirm his conviction.
State v. Kufrin

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BACKGROUND1

Peggy’s Mysterious Disappearance

¶2 On Saturday, July 9, 1988, Peggy and Kufrin—a 

romantically involved couple who resided together—attended, 

along with some of Peggy’s coworkers, a company barbeque and 

a follow-on “hot tub party.” Some people at the events noticed 

something off about Kufrin. One person thought that Kufrin “was 

maybe the only person there that wasn’t having fun.” Others 

noted that he appeared “angry-looking,” was not very social, and 

spent his time “kind of in the distance.” Peggy, on the other hand, 

“was having a good time” and was at times seen in the hot tub 

socializing with some other men. At around 11:00 p.m., Peggy and 

Kufrin left the party together, accompanied by no one else. That 

was the last time anyone other than Kufrin saw Peggy alive.

¶3 On the following Monday, Peggy did not show up to work. 

Her office did receive an explanation for her absence, though; 

Kufrin called in that day and explained that Peggy was unable to 

come to work because she was “going up to Salt Lake to look at a 

car.” Meanwhile, Peggy’s family was worried and thought Peggy 

might be missing; Peggy’s sister went over to Peggy and Kufrin’s 

residence that evening and saw Kufrin outside “watering the 

lawn.” Peggy’s sister observed that Kufrin was nervous—so 

nervous, in fact, “that the water in his hand was shaking.”

Concerned, Peggy’s sister asked Kufrin where Peggy was. Kufrin 

responded, “Well, she’s gone,” and he explained that Peggy had 

gone “to Reno to get a car.”

1. In an appeal from a jury trial, “we review the record facts in a 

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts 

accordingly,” and we “present conflicting evidence only as 

necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Speights, 

2021 UT 56, n.1, 497 P.3d 340 (quotation simplified).
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 3 2024 UT App 86

¶4 Over the next few days, Kufrin called Peggy’s office at least 

two more times to explain her absence. In these later calls, Kufrin 

told Peggy’s coworkers that Peggy “wasn’t feeling well” and 

therefore couldn’t come to work. One of Peggy’s coworkers was 

concerned, and she called Peggy’s telephone number; Peggy did 

not answer, but the coworker heard a message on Peggy’s 

answering machine that Kufrin had recorded, apparently 

intended for Peggy. In the message, Kufrin stated, “If you have 

any more trouble with the car, call the friends in Sparks and they 

will come and get you, and then I will come and get you.”

¶5 By Friday, police had started an investigation into Peggy’s 

disappearance. Officers interviewed Kufrin, and he said that 

Peggy “had gone with [a friend] to Reno” to buy “a 1986 silver 

Honda Prelude.” (That friend would later testify that she did not 

go on a trip with Peggy to Reno.) Kufrin also said that he had last 

seen Peggy on Sunday but that he had spoken with her on both 

Tuesday and Thursday. According to Kufrin, Peggy told him

during one conversation that she was in Lake Tahoe and was on 

her way to see her brother who was serving a religious mission in 

California, and that she would be back by Monday. (That brother 

would later testify that Peggy never went to see him.)

¶6 Starting Monday, officers regularly checked the residence

where Kufrin and Peggy lived to see if a new car was parked out 

front, which would perhaps signify that Peggy had come home. 

But every time they went by, they saw no new car. During a 

Tuesday visit, police knocked on the door. Kufrin answered, and

he said that Peggy had come home. He pointed to a blue duffle

bag that he claimed Peggy used while traveling, and he explained 

that Peggy had gone to pick up her paycheck and that she would 

be back at the house soon. (That paycheck was never picked up.)

He then promised that when Peggy came home, he would tell her 

to go over to the police station.
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20210499-CA 4 2024 UT App 86

¶7 Over the course of the investigation, officers discovered 

that Kufrin had been telling different stories to different people 

about where Peggy was and what had happened to her. At trial, 

the State presented testimony from many witnesses about the 

various accounts—in addition to the ones already discussed—

that Kufrin gave, including the following:

• A neighbor testified that, on the day after the hot tub 

party, Kufrin said that Peggy had “got[ten] drunk and 

left” the party “with a couple of her coworkers” and 

would call him in a few days and then come home.

• A coworker testified that, three days after the party, 

Kufrin said that Peggy had gone to get a car because she 

was mad that Kufrin “wouldn’t marry her.”

• A friend testified that, sometime in 1988, Kufrin said 

that the “cops” were “accusing him of killing Peggy” 

and that she had left Utah to go buy a car.

• Another friend testified that, sometime during the 

week of Peggy’s disappearance, Kufrin said that Peggy 

“needed to get away for a few days and that she had 

gone out of town.”

• That same friend also testified that, near the end of July, 

Kufrin said that Peggy had come home for a night and 

that “he had to send her back . . . to California” where 

she was either “getting a job or had got one.”

• A neighbor testified that, sometime at the end of July or 

in early August, Kufrin said that “Peggy had been in 

contact with him and that she had an RV and they were 

going to meet somewhere and then leave from there.”

• One of the friends also testified that, sometime in 1988, 

Kufrin said that Peggy “was at a motel in Nephi, but 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 5 2024 UT App 86

she was not allowed to talk to anybody per her lawyer’s 

advice.”

• That same friend also testified that, sometime in 1988, 

Kufrin said that he had just taken Peggy up to Park 

City, that they were “going to get married,” and that 

they wanted the friend to be a witness at the wedding.

¶8 Kufrin’s claim that he and Peggy were going to get married 

was one that Peggy’s friends and coworkers found “surpris[ing].”

Prior to her disappearance, Peggy had told one coworker that she 

was “dissatisfied” and “unhappy,” and that she was “looking for 

a more committed relationship” with “someone who could plan 

with her . . . for her life and her future.” She had left another 

coworker with the “impression” that she “wanted to improve her 

situation.” One of Peggy’s friends told police that Peggy had 

“decide[d] that she wanted more out of her relationship with” 

Kufrin and that if Kufrin “didn’t set some goals and have more 

ambition, she was going to leave him.” A neighbor also testified 

that before Kufrin moved in with her, Peggy “seemed happy,” but 

that after Kufrin moved in, Peggy “became very withdrawn” and 

“wouldn’t communicate at all.” 

¶9 In August 1988, the police searched Kufrin’s trash. In it, 

they found a “ripped-up photograph” of Peggy, as well as a tornup tendered check from Peggy’s account. The check was dated 

one month after Peggy’s disappearance and was made out to 

Kufrin in the amount of $100, and it bore a suspicious-looking 

signature. Police also found one of Peggy’s bank statements, also 

torn up, which indicated that the check made out to Kufrin had 

effectively drained Peggy’s account.

¶10 With this new information in hand, police obtained a 

warrant to search the residence Kufrin had shared with Peggy.

The police utilized both human officers as well as dogs (referred 

to as K9s) in this search of the premises, but the K9s used in the 

search were not trained and certified as “cadaver dogs.” During 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 6 2024 UT App 86

the initial search, which took place in early September, police 

searched not only the house but also a “root cellar” located at the 

back of the property.

2 This search of the root cellar was conducted 

by both officers and a K9, and they found nothing of interest in 

this first search of the root cellar.

¶11 In October, about a month after this initial search, Kufrin 

moved out of the residence. But despite his relocation, 

neighborhood rumors continued to run rampant that Peggy had 

been murdered and buried somewhere on the premises. In an 

attempt to quell these rumors, officers contacted the owner of the 

premises and obtained “permission to go under the house and 

around the yard and look for Peggy.” Officers (this time without 

a K9) again searched the root cellar, and this time they “spaded” 

the dirt floor with a shovel, although they did not go “more than 

two spades deep in any one spot.” Officers again found nothing.

¶12 Police interviewed Kufrin again in January 1989. In that 

interview, Kufrin stated that the last time he saw Peggy was at the 

2. A “root cellar” is generally defined as “a structure, usually 

underground or partially underground, used for storage of 

vegetables, fruits, nuts, or other foods,” and the “name reflects the 

traditional focus on root crops stored in an underground cellar.”

See Root Cellar, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_ce

llar [https://perma.cc/3NB8-WXJP]. In this case, though, the “root 

cellar” was not located underground. Instead, it was located 

entirely on ground level; it had concrete walls, a concrete roof, and 

a dirt floor, and it required an average-sized person to crouch 

down in order to enter. As depicted at trial, it was located away 

from the house at the back of the property and was about ten feet 

wide, eight feet long, and, once past the entryway, less than six 

feet high. Even though this structure—essentially, an aboveground concrete storage shed—does not entirely comport with 

the general definition of “root cellar,” we use that term in this 

opinion because that is the term the witnesses used to describe it.
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 7 2024 UT App 86

hot tub party at around midnight. He also claimed that Peggy had 

later returned with a new car but that he never saw her. And he 

said he delivered a cedar chest to her location in California, but he 

declined to give the police “a specific location or a person that 

[they] could confirm that with.”

¶13 After that, for nearly three decades, the case went cold. 

The Discovery of Peggy’s Body

¶14 In 2012, a new tenant (Tenant) moved into the residence 

where Peggy and Kufrin had lived in 1988. He used the root cellar 

in the backyard for storage. When Tenant moved in, he found a 

table and a five-gallon bucket of concrete in the root cellar that he 

considered too heavy to move, so he placed his items around the 

table and bucket. As he was doing so, he noticed that the dirt floor 

underneath the table was “concave” and exhibited “a definite 

depression,” and it made him wonder whether something might 

have been buried there that had decayed. But Tenant took no 

further action at that time.

¶15 A few years later, in 2016, Tenant was having a 

conversation with a neighbor—who happened to be a former 

police officer—about construction of a retaining wall along the 

boundary between their respective properties. While talking, the 

neighbor told Tenant about Peggy’s disappearance and 

mentioned that “[h]er body [had] never been found.” Halfjokingly, the neighbor pointed at the root cellar and said, “Maybe 

she is in there.” This caused Tenant to think of the concave 

depression he had observed in the floor of the root cellar, and he 

told the neighbor, “Well, I know where she is at.” Tenant then 

took the neighbor to the root cellar and showed him the 

depression. Because of the heavy table and bucket, they did not 

dig into the root cellar’s floor that day. But Tenant resolved to dig 

into the floor later, when he moved from the property.
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 8 2024 UT App 86

¶16 About a year later, in May 2017, Tenant was about to move 

out of the residence, and he asked a friend to help him move. After 

they moved Tenant’s belongings out of the root cellar, they 

decided to dig into the root cellar’s floor where the depression 

was. About eighteen inches down, they found a blanket, and after 

cutting a hole in the blanket they eventually found what looked 

like a “skull.” At that point, Tenant and his friend “ran out of the 

building” and contacted police.

¶17 Officers soon arrived and conducted an excavation of the 

root cellar, and they were eventually able to identify the remains 

as Peggy’s. The blanket was identified as one that Peggy’s mother

and sister had made for her decades earlier and that Peggy had 

kept in her house. Officers also found a black tank top and black 

shorts at the scene, which were the exact clothing Peggy had been 

wearing at the hot tub party in July 1988. Investigators were also 

able to use dental records to identify the remains as Peggy’s.

¶18 After examining the remains, investigators ruled Peggy’s 

death a homicide, and they specifically found that she had 

sustained “sharp force trauma,” likely from “a bladed 

instrument” forcefully inserted into her ribcage. Peggy also had a 

fractured bone in her neck, a fact that suggested she had been 

strangled. Examiner eventually determined that Peggy died from 

strangulation and “sharp force” injuries.

¶19 Investigators also determined that the root cellar was not 

the first place that Peggy’s body had been interred. Peggy’s hair 

was not located anywhere in the root cellar, a fact that suggested 

that Peggy’s body had been “moved from the place where she was 

initially left” and that her “body had undergone some 

decomposition prior to moving to [her] final resting place.”

¶20 Officers tested the items found in the root cellar—

including the blanket and clothing—for DNA, but the results of 

this testing were inconclusive and could neither confirm nor 

exclude Kufrin as a possible contributor.
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 9 2024 UT App 86

¶21 Police eventually obtained an arrest warrant for Kufrin, 

then located him and interviewed him in July 2017, more than 

twenty-eight years after their last interview with him. In this 

interview, Kufrin claimed that Peggy “ran away from home” after 

the hot tub party, and he stated that he had nothing to do with her 

disappearance.

The Trial

¶22 After completing its investigation, the State charged Kufrin 

with murder. Eventually, the case proceeded to a thirteen-day 

jury trial. Tenant testified about finding Peggy’s body. Various 

law enforcement officers testified about the investigation. Some of 

Peggy’s coworkers and friends testified about the hot tub party

and about their communications with Kufrin. A forensic 

anthropologist testified about Peggy’s injuries. And Examiner 

testified about what he thought caused Peggy’s death. Three parts 

of the State’s evidence are especially relevant to this appeal, and 

we discuss these parts in more detail.

¶23 First, the State asked some of Peggy’s coworkers and 

friends to offer testimony about their perceptions of Peggy’s 

relationship with Kufrin. During trial, Kufrin objected to the 

admission of this testimony, and his objection was largely based 

on hearsay grounds (although at one point Kufrin asserted that 

the testimony was “not helpful to the trier of fact”). The court 

entertained argument on these objections, and the attorneys 

debated whether and to what extent various hearsay exceptions 

applied to the testimony. The court largely overruled Kufrin’s 

objections, although it did exclude one statement and cautioned 

the State against offering others. The State then introduced the 

evidence already described. See supra ¶ 8. At no point did Kufrin 

ask the trial court to exclude this evidence pursuant to rule 403 of 

the Utah Rules of Evidence.

¶24 Second, the State presented testimony from Examiner 

regarding Peggy’s remains. Relevant here was the testimony that 
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20210499-CA 10 2024 UT App 86

Peggy’s hair was not found in the root cellar, leading investigators 

to conclude that Peggy had initially been buried somewhere else. 

In particular, the State previewed, during its opening statement, 

that Examiner would testify that it was possible for Peggy’s scalp 

and hair to have detached from her skull, due to partial 

decomposition of the body, “in a matter of days, if not a few 

weeks, at most,” after her death. Such evidence was important to 

the State because Kufrin moved out of the residence in October 

1988, some three months after Peggy’s disappearance, and it was 

important for the State to establish that Peggy’s reburial—without 

scalp and hair—in the root cellar could have taken place at some 

point less than three months after her death.

¶25 Kufrin objected to Examiner’s proffered testimony that the 

“scalp slippage” could have occurred within just a few days or 

weeks after Peggy’s death. Kufrin’s objection was grounded in 

rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The court held an 

evidentiary hearing, in the middle of the trial but outside the 

jury’s presence, to consider Kufrin’s objection. Examiner was 

present and testified at that hearing, and he was questioned by 

counsel for both sides as well as by the court directly.

¶26 During that hearing, Examiner testified that during his 

career, he had done about 5,000 postmortem exams, about onethird of which had involved at least “mild to moderate . . . stages 

of decomposition.” He testified that he had “seen bodies at every 

stage of decomposition” during the course of his career. His 

knowledge about body decomposition and scalp slippage came 

not only from his own experience but also from consulting with 

“other seasoned pathologists in [his] office.” He discussed his 

familiarity with studies done at “body farms down in 

Tennessee”—which he considered to be “fairly reliable”—where 

“they essentially subject corpses to different conditions” to learn 

about how decomposition works. He also offered his view that 

“empirical data is available from time immemorial when 

people—scientists and laypeople would observe . . . bodies that 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 11 2024 UT App 86

were left in . . . different conditions.” Based on this knowledge and 

experience, he concluded that Peggy’s “body had undergone 

some decomposition prior to moving to [her] final resting place.”

¶27 With regard to timing, Examiner noted that in the typical 

situation, where “the body is intact and buried, the hair remains 

with the body,” and he reiterated that, “without manipulation, . . . 

the scalp hair doesn’t slough [off] on its own.” But he explained 

that, once the body has begun to reach even “the initial stages of 

decomposition,” the “hair can slip off with minimal physical 

disturbance of the body with the scalp.” And he opined that the 

decomposition processes, “given enough time,” will “undermine

the scalp to the point [that] when [a] body is disturbed, the scalp 

hair sloughs off,” and that “under the right conditions” this could 

occur “within a matter of days or weeks.” Examiner 

acknowledged that he was unaware of “any studies that are 

unique to the state of Utah or conditions that you see in the state 

of Utah,” and that conditions in other parts of the country—due 

to humidity—could be different from Utah. Later, in front of the 

jury, he explained that the fastest time frame he had observed 

“from last seen alive to full skeletonization happened . . . in [a case 

in] Georgia,” in which “the whole decomposition process” 

happened “within 12 to 14 days.”

¶28 The court then made a lengthy oral ruling overruling 

Kufrin’s objection to Examiner’s testimony. The court noted the 

“large body of experience and knowledge” underlying 

Examiner’s testimony, and it observed that Kufrin would be 

calling a competing expert on the same topic (body 

decomposition and scalp slippage). In this situation, the court 

concluded that both experts would be allowed to offer their 

opinions on the matter and that Examiner’s testimony was 

“appropriate as opinion testimony for the jury to help 

understand, appropriately, from two different and possibly 

opposing witnesses, when this event might have transpired.” 

Later, in front of the jury and in accordance with the court’s 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 12 2024 UT App 86

ruling, Examiner testified that it would have been possible for

Peggy’s scalp and hair to have separated from her body during 

reburial if the body had been moved at least “days to maybe a 

week or week-and-a-half, two weeks” after her death.

¶29 Third, one of the State’s law enforcement witnesses

mentioned—apparently inadvertently—during his testimony 

that, during the investigation, he had spoken with some of

Kufrin’s “previous cellmates.” The State had come into the trial 

with the belief that “it would be error to” introduce Kufrin’s prior 

criminal history to the jury, and it had apparently made at least 

some effort to educate its witnesses, before testifying, not to 

mention anything about Kufrin having been previously 

incarcerated. But despite those efforts, a mishap occurred. While 

the State was examining the lead detective in the 2017 

investigation, it asked, “Since that arrest in July of 2017 what else 

have you done to further this investigation?” The detective

responded as follows:

Well, at that point, um, obviously I had been in 

contact with the county attorney’s office, the 

prosecution. I followed up on any leads or requests 

that they may have had, whether it was—you know, 

I went back and interviewed maybe previous 

cellmates or family members or talked to [Kufrin’s]

mother and just any leads that—some of this had 

also hit the media. We’d get phone calls randomly. 

Just any leads we may or may not have had from 

people . . . just randomly calling.

At that point, Kufrin’s counsel asked for a sidebar, which request 

the court granted, even though it later commented that, in the 

moment, it “didn’t know what the issue was.” During the sidebar, 

Kufrin’s counsel asked the court to declare a mistrial, asserting 

that the witness’s reference to “previous cellmates” had 

“suggest[ed] to the jury” that Kufrin “has a criminal record and a 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 13 2024 UT App 86

history of being an inmate in jail or prison,” which counsel

asserted “is a prejudicial statement . . . of character evidence.” The 

State opposed the motion, and it cited some cases to the court as 

support for its position. The court noted that it was a Friday 

afternoon, and it declined to immediately rule on the motion for 

a mistrial; instead, it gave the parties the opportunity to submit 

additional authorities, and it indicated that it would revisit the 

matter on Tuesday morning when the trial reconvened.

¶30 On Tuesday morning, the court indicated that it had read 

all the cases the parties had mentioned on Friday and in addition 

had read “some others that are cited in those cases.” The court

heard extensive oral argument from counsel, and then took a 

recess until lunchtime so that it could compose a written decision 

on the matter. When the court reconvened, it read aloud a written 

decision it had composed that morning, in which it denied 

Kufrin’s motion for a mistrial. The court noted that the State had 

not intentionally elicited the witness’s comment, that it had been 

made only in passing, and that it was relatively “innocuous 

because it was only two words in a trial that has already lasted 

seven days and is less than half over.” The court specifically 

determined that the detective’s reference to “previous” cellmates 

was “not unduly prejudicial.” 

¶31 After the court’s ruling, the trial continued, and it lasted six

more days. Eventually, the State rested its case, and Kufrin then 

presented five witnesses in his defense, including the following: a 

soil scientist who noted that some of the soil found inside the 

blanket was not from the root cellar, and who agreed with the 

State’s investigators that Peggy had initially been buried 

somewhere else; a dog handling expert who testified about the 

abilities of cadaver dogs and dogs generally, and who opined that 

even a non-cadaver dog would likely have exhibited “an alert 

behavior of some level” in the root cellar during the September

1988 search; and a forensic pathologist who offered his own 

opinions about body decomposition and scalp slippage. The 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 14 2024 UT App 86

pathologist testified that Examiner’s timeline—that Peggy’s body 

could have experienced scalp slippage in “as little as a few days 

and at most a few weeks if the remains were disturbed or 

manipulated”—was “a little fast,” especially for Utah’s low 

humidity conditions. He offered his view that it would take “[a]t 

least weeks to months” for scalp slippage upon reburial to be 

possible “in a Utah grave,” but he agreed on cross-examination 

that a “mechanical intervention like a hand pulling it” could 

“speed up the process” and result in scalp and hair removal “even 

though the natural process hadn’t run its full course.”

¶32 After deliberation, the jury found Kufrin guilty. Later, the 

court sentenced Kufrin to a prison term of five years to life.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶33 Kufrin appeals his conviction, and he raises three issues for 

our consideration. First, he challenges the trial court’s decision to 

deny his motion for a mistrial. We “review the denial of a motion 

for a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard,” State v. 

Sorenson, 2023 UT App 159, ¶ 10, 542 P.3d 529 (quotation 

simplified), and “we will not reverse the court’s decision unless it 

is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury 

that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial,” State v. 

Suhail, 2023 UT App 15, ¶ 70, 525 P.3d 550 (quotation simplified), 

cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).

¶34 Second, Kufrin challenges the trial court’s decision to 

permit Examiner to offer timeline testimony regarding scalp 

slippage. We review a “trial court’s determination regarding the 

admissibility of expert testimony” for “abuse of discretion.” State 

v. Griffin, 2016 UT 33, ¶ 14, 384 P.3d 186. Under this standard, “we 

will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of 

reasonability.” Id. (quotation simplified).
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 15 2024 UT App 86

¶35 Finally, Kufrin asserts that his trial attorneys rendered 

ineffective assistance by not lodging a rule 403 objection to 

testimony about Peggy’s relationship with Kufrin. “When a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on 

appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must 

decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective 

assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Guerro, 2021 UT 

App 136, ¶ 25, 502 P.3d 338 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 

P.3d 1254 (Utah 2022). 

ANALYSIS

I. Mistrial Motion

¶36 First, Kufrin asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 

by denying his motion for a mistrial, made after the lead detective 

mentioned that Kufrin had “previous cellmates.” While we agree 

with Kufrin that this remark was unfortunate, we discern no 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the 

remark did not warrant a mistrial.

¶37 “A mistrial is strong medicine.” State v. Whytock, 2020 UT 

App 107, ¶ 16, 469 P.3d 1150, cert. denied, 481 P.3d 1043 (Utah 

2021); see also State v. Roberts, 2019 UT App 9, ¶ 15, 438 P.3d 885

(“Declaring a mistrial is a particularly drastic remedy that is 

warranted only when no reasonable alternatives exist.”

(quotation simplified)), cert. denied, 440 P.3d 694 (Utah 2019). And 

in this context, we afford “a high level of deference” to a trial 

court’s decision “because trial courts are in an advantaged 

position to determine the impact of courtroom events on the total 

proceedings.” Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 17 (quotation 

simplified). Accordingly, “we will not reverse the court’s decision 

unless it is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced 

the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial.” 

State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 39, 108 P.3d 730 (quotation simplified).
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 16 2024 UT App 86

¶38 Our supreme court, after reviewing Utah appellate 

decisions in this area, has noted that “a mistrial is not required 

where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made 

in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony 

presented.” Id. ¶ 40; see also State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶ 47, 27 

P.3d 1133 (finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial 

where the improper testimony was not intentionally elicited and 

was “vague” and “fleeting”); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 39, 993 

P.2d 837 (finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial 

where the improper testimony was “vague” and where “the 

proceedings . . . move[d] along without undue interruption” 

following the testimony), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 

Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. Three cases, in particular, are 

especially relevant, not only because those cases present factual 

situations similar to the one presented here, but also because they 

illustrate the “high level of deference” we afford trial courts in this 

context. See Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 17.

¶39 In State v. Wach, a defendant was accused of assaulting and 

kidnapping his mother, and the court made a pretrial ruling that 

no evidence of the defendant’s previous bad acts would be 

admitted. 2001 UT 35, ¶¶ 2, 19, 24 P.3d 948. During the mother’s 

testimony, she volunteered information that implied that the 

defendant may have previously assaulted her. Id. ¶ 19. The 

defendant moved for a mistrial, but the court denied the motion. 

Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Our supreme court affirmed, saying that the

statement “was not elicited by the prosecutor, and was an 

isolated, off-hand remark, buried in roughly 244 pages of 

testimony,” and concluding that the “isolated remark . . . did not 

render [the] trial so unfair that the trial court was plainly wrong 

in denying” the motion. Id. ¶ 46 (quotation simplified).

¶40 A few years later, in Allen, our supreme court held that a 

court had not abused its discretion in denying a motion for a 

mistrial when one of the State’s witnesses made an unsolicited 

reference to the defendant being asked to “come in for a lie 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 17 2024 UT App 86

detector test.” 2005 UT 11, ¶¶ 36, 43 (quotation simplified). In 

analyzing the situation, the court listed six reasons that supported 

its decision to affirm: (1) the prosecutor did not intentionally elicit 

the statement; (2) the reference was “vague” and did not indicate 

that the defendant had passed or failed any lie detector test, only 

that he had been asked to take one; (3) the “reference was brief”; 

(4) after the statement, “the proceedings continued without 

undue interruption”; (5) the State brought “no further attention” 

to the statement; and (6) the trial court offered to give a curative 

instruction, which offer the defendant declined. See id. ¶ 43.

¶41 More recently, in Whytock, we held that a court had not 

abused its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial after one 

of the State’s witnesses “volunteered,” without being asked, that 

she had “got [the defendant] out on ankle monitor to her dad’s 

house from the Salt Lake County jail.” 2020 UT App 107, ¶¶ 10, 49 

(quotation simplified). The defendant asserted that this comment 

had prejudiced him by implying that he had a criminal history. Id.

¶ 15. We agreed with the defendant “that the statement should 

not have come into evidence,” but we nevertheless concluded 

that, under the circumstances, the court had not abused its 

discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial. Id. We noted that the 

State had not intentionally elicited the statement, that it had been 

made “in passing,” and that the State “made no further mention 

of [the defendant’s] criminal history generally or of [the witness’s] 

statement in particular.” Id. ¶ 24.

¶42 These cases are quite similar to the instant case, and they 

compel the same result. As in these other cases, the detective’s 

statement here was made in passing, it was not intentionally 

elicited by the State, and the State made no further mention of it—

or of any criminal history Kufrin might have had—at any point in 

the trial. We also note the ambiguous nature of the brief two-word 

allusion and thus credit the trial court’s determination that the 

statement was “relatively innocuous” in the overall context of the 

trial. The jury would have known that Kufrin was arrested in July 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 18 2024 UT App 86

2017 after Peggy’s body was discovered; in this context, a 

reference to “cellmates” would not necessarily have triggered an 

assumption that Kufrin had an unrelated criminal history. And it 

is worth noting that the trial judge himself—who listened to the 

statement in the moment—was unaware, until Kufrin’s counsel 

explained his motion, that a potentially inadmissible statement 

had been uttered. As in the other similar cases, the trial court’s 

refusal to declare a mistrial was not an abuse of its discretion.

¶43 Kufrin resists this determination on two basic grounds. 

First, he focuses on the word “previous” and asserts that the 

reference to “previous cellmates” had to have referred to pre-2017 

cellmates and not to cellmates Kufrin had following his arrest for 

Peggy’s murder. We do not interpret the reference in quite the 

same way as Kufrin does; in our view, it is quite possible that the 

jury simply assumed the reference to be to post-arrest cellmates. 

But even assuming, for purposes of the discussion, that the 

reference was clearly one to pre-arrest cellmates and thus clearly 

implied that Kufrin had a previously undisclosed criminal 

history, that would not change our analysis. The statement was 

made in passing, was unsolicited, and was never again mentioned 

during the course of the thirteen-day trial. As illustrated by 

Whytock—where the reference to criminal history was much

clearer than this one—a trial court retains discretion, depending 

on the circumstances, to determine whether even direct references 

to inadmissible criminal history warrant a mistrial. See id. For the 

reasons already discussed, the trial court did not abuse that

discretion here.

¶44 Second, Kufrin directs our attention to two other cases that 

he believes compel reversal, but these cases are distinguishable. 

In State v. Courtney, the defendant was on trial for drug crimes, 

and a potential juror stated, during voir dire in front of the entire 

jury panel, that she knew the defendant from her “years in law 

enforcement” and explained that she had had “affiliations with” 

the defendant “during the time that [the potential juror] was 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 19 2024 UT App 86

serving as an agent for the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force.”

2017 UT App 62, ¶ 2, 415 P.3d 604. The court denied a motion for 

a mistrial, and we reversed, finding an abuse of discretion given 

the type of charges in the case and the direct implication that the 

defendant had a history of criminal drug charges. See id. ¶¶ 23–24 

(noting that the comment “suggested that [the defendant] had 

repeatedly had some involvement in the type of crimes he was on 

trial for”). Such concerns are not present here, where the comment 

about “previous cellmates” contained no implication that Kufrin 

had ever had involvement in any type of violent crime, let alone 

the specific type of crime (murder) involved here.

¶45 Kufrin also directs our attention to State v. Craft, in which a 

police detective stated—unsolicited and in passing—that the 

defendant’s codefendants had said the defendant was present at 

the scene of the crime. 2017 UT App 87, ¶ 13, 397 P.3d 889. The 

defendant’s “entire defense” was that he hadn’t been present, and 

he had successfully moved, prior to trial, to sever his trial from his 

codefendants’ “for the very purpose of avoiding the introduction 

. . . of incriminating statements made by his codefendants.” Id.

¶ 26. The offending statements thus directly implicated the 

defendant; in that context, we determined that counsel had 

rendered ineffective assistance by not moving for a mistrial. Id.

¶ 33. But the context here is materially different: the detective’s 

statement did not directly implicate Kufrin in the commission of 

the very crime in question.

¶46 Thus, this case is much more like Wach, Allen, and Whytock

than it is like Courtney and Craft. Under the circumstances here, 

we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination 

that the detective’s statement was relatively innocuous in the 

context of this thirteen-day trial, and we thus conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to deny 

Kufrin’s motion for a mistrial.
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 20 2024 UT App 86

II. Examiner’s Testimony

¶47 Next, Kufrin contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by allowing Examiner to offer expert testimony that 

included a possible timeline within which body decomposition 

and scalp slippage could have occurred. We discern no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s ruling.

¶48 We begin our analysis with a discussion of the particulars 

of Examiner’s testimony. In this regard, it is important to note that 

the timeline opinion Kufrin challenges did not concern an 

undisturbed body at rest; rather, Examiner’s opinion had to do 

with time frames within which it might be possible, given 

progressing decomposition, for a “disturbed” or “manipulat[ed]” 

body to have its scalp and hair “slip off” during a reburial process. 

Indeed, Examiner clarified that his opinion “presupposes some 

. . . external physical disturbance to the body.” And Examiner did 

not offer any opinion about when scalp slippage must have 

occurred; rather, his opinion was couched in terms of when it 

would have been “possible” for scalp “slippage to have 

occurred.” So, to sum up, the opinion that is here challenged by 

Kufrin amounted to this: that the scalp and hair slipped off of 

Peggy’s body when her body was moved, and that it would have 

been “possible,” due to progressing body decomposition, for this 

to have occurred as early as “maybe a week or week-and-a-half, 

two weeks” after her death.

¶49 Kufrin challenged the admissibility of this opinion under 

rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule allows “a witness 

who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education” to “testify in the form of an opinion or 

otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 

or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702(a). But in order 

for expert testimony based on “[s]cientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge” to be admissible, the proponent of that 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 21 2024 UT App 86

evidence must make “a threshold showing that the principles or 

methods” used “(1) are reliable, (2) are based on sufficient facts or 

data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” Id. R. 702(b); 

see also State v. Lopez, 2018 UT 5, ¶ 20, 417 P.3d 116.

¶50 Kufrin does not challenge Examiner’s qualifications or the 

general helpfulness of Examiner’s testimony. Instead, Kufrin 

asserts that the State failed to make the “threshold showing” that 

Examiner’s timeline testimony on “scalp slippage” was reliable 

and based upon sufficient facts or data. In support of this 

assertion, Kufrin claims that Examiner’s opinion was based 

entirely on “his observation of one drowning death in Georgia,” 

and argues therefrom that “[o]ne anecdotal example is not 

‘sufficient facts or data.’” And Kufrin further claims that 

Examiner’s “principles and methods” were not “reliably applied 

to the facts” of this case, because Examiner had not adequately 

accounted for how Utah’s weather and atmospheric conditions 

might differ from more humid environments. We find Kufrin’s 

assertions unpersuasive.

¶51 Examiner’s opinion was based on much more than one 

isolated drowning death in Georgia. To be sure, Examiner used 

that case as one example in which he had seen “full 

skeletonization” occur “within 12 to 14 days” after death. But 

Examiner’s opinions about when it would be possible for a 

disturbed body to experience scalp slippage were based on much 

more than just this one example. As already noted, at the 

evidentiary hearing, Examiner testified that he had done some 

5,000 postmortem exams, about one-third of which had involved 

at least “mild to moderate . . . stages of decomposition,” and that 

this experience had allowed him to see “bodies at every stage of 

decomposition.” He further stated that his knowledge about body 

decomposition and scalp slippage came not only from his own 

experience but also from consulting with “other seasoned 

pathologists in [his] office,” as well as from familiarity with “fairly 

reliable” studies done at “body farms down in Tennessee” where 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 22 2024 UT App 86

“they essentially subject corpses to different conditions” to learn 

about how decomposition works. He also referenced “empirical 

data . . . from time immemorial when people—scientists and 

laypeople would observe . . . bodies that were left in . . . different 

conditions.” And during his testimony in front of the jury, he 

mentioned that he had done “a literature search” on the topic.

Examiner’s opinion was thus based on far more than just one 

isolated example, and Kufrin’s argument to the contrary is 

unsupported by the record.

¶52 Next, we acknowledge Kufrin’s point that some of the facts 

and data forming the basis for Examiner’s opinion came from 

places like Tennessee and Georgia, where environmental 

conditions might be materially different from those in Utah. But 

we do not see this as something that, in this situation, would 

disqualify Examiner from offering his opinions; instead, this point 

is something that can readily be (and was) explored during crossexamination and that goes to the weight of the testimony rather 

than its admissibility. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, ¶ 60, 

61 P.3d 1068 (stating that “opposing experts, additional tests, 

experiments, and publications, all of which may increase or lessen 

the value of [an] expert’s testimony,” do not “preclude admission 

of the expert’s testimony—they go to the weight, not the 

admissibility” of the testimony (quotation simplified)); see also

Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Center, 2010 UT 59, ¶ 12, 242 P.3d 

762 (stating that the “degree of scrutiny that should be applied to 

expert testimony by trial judges is not so rigorous as to be satisfied 

only by scientific or other specialized principles or methods that 

are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria 

fashioned to test reliability” (quotation simplified)).

¶53 Finally, we note that Kufrin’s own expert offered scalpslippage timeline testimony that was, in important ways, not all 

that different from Examiner’s testimony. When asked about it, 

Kufrin’s expert opined that Examiner’s timeline was “a little quick 

for a Utah grave,” but even he acknowledged that scalp slippage 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 23 2024 UT App 86

upon body disturbance could have occurred within “weeks to 

months” of death, a timeline that could still allow for reburial to 

have occurred before October 1988. Under these circumstances, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled 

Kufrin’s objection and allowed Examiner to offer expert opinion 

regarding possible time frames for scalp slippage to have 

occurred upon disturbance of Peggy’s body. We therefore reject 

Kufrin’s argument to the contrary.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶54 Kufrin’s final argument is an assertion that his trial 

attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by not lodging a 

particular objection—one grounded in rule 403 of the Utah Rules 

of Evidence—to testimony from Peggy’s friends and coworkers 

about their perceptions of her relationship with Kufrin. We reject 

this argument because Kufrin has not carried his burden of 

demonstrating that his attorneys performed deficiently by not 

making that objection.

¶55 To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

Kufrin must demonstrate both (1) “that counsel’s performance 

was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense” so as to “deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Kufrin must 

make a successful showing on both elements; indeed, if “either is 

lacking, the claim fails and this court need not address the other.”

State v. Ames, 2024 UT App 30, ¶ 17, 546 P.3d 356 (quotation 

simplified), cert. denied, No. 20240319 (Utah May 24, 2024).

¶56 In our view, Kufrin’s claim fails on the deficient 

performance prong. That part of the test requires Kufrin to show 

that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness.” State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 31, 462 P.3d 350

(quotation simplified). In evaluating the reasonableness of 

counsel’s actions, courts will often look to whether the actions 

counsel took were motivated by trial strategy. See id. ¶ 35 (“To be 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 24 2024 UT App 86

sure, the performance inquiry will often include an analysis of 

whether there could have been a sound strategic reason for 

counsel’s actions.”). And while “the ultimate question is not 

whether there was a possible strategic reason for counsel’s 

conduct, but instead whether that conduct was objectively 

reasonable,” see id., “[i]f it appears counsel’s actions could have 

been intended to further a reasonable strategy, a defendant has 

necessarily failed to show unreasonable performance,” State v.

Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34, 469 P.3d 871.

¶57 In the specific context presented here—where a defendant 

contends that his trial attorney performed deficiently by not 

lodging a particular objection—Utah appellate courts have often 

stated that an attorney does not perform deficiently if lodging the 

objection in question would have been a futile exercise. See, e.g., 

State v. Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶¶ 43, 47, 424 P.3d 845 (holding that,

where “counsel could have reasonably believed that an objection 

was futile,” counsel did not perform deficiently by not lodging

that objection); State v. Akers, 2018 UT App 235, ¶ 22, 438 P.3d 70 

(“Defense counsel does not render deficient performance if 

counsel refrains from making futile objections.”). In this case, 

Kufrin’s trial attorneys could reasonably have believed that 

making a rule 403-based objection to the testimony in question 

would have been a futile exercise, and that such an objection 

lacked any other strategic value. 

¶58 “Trial courts have wide latitude in making determinations 

of relevance, probativeness, and prejudice under rules 401 and 

403.” State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶ 23, 25 P.3d 985 (quotation 

simplified). And “it’s settled that under rule 403, courts should 

indulge a presumption in favor of admissibility.” State v. Forbush, 

2024 UT App 11, ¶ 44, 544 P.3d 1 (quotation simplified), petition 

for cert. filed, Feb. 26, 2024 (No. 20240205). For evidence to be 

subject to exclusion under rule 403, a court must conclude that the 

risk of “unfair prejudice” posed by the evidence’s admission 

“substantially outweigh[s]” “its probative value.” Utah R. Evid. 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 25 2024 UT App 86

403. In this situation, the evidence in question had appreciable 

probative value, yet the risk of unfair prejudice posed by its 

admission was not especially significant.

¶59 As for probative value, the testimony in question shed light 

on, and provided context for, a possible reason Kufrin may have 

had for being upset with Peggy, especially in the wake of a hot 

tub party at which Peggy socialized with other men. In cases

where a boyfriend stands accused of murdering his girlfriend, 

testimony about the state of their relationship can often provide 

important context for their actions or statements. And this was 

certainly the case here.

¶60 We find unpersuasive Kufrin’s argument that the 

testimony’s probative value was significantly diminished due to 

the passage of time. To be sure, some of the witnesses stated 

that—after the passage of some three decades—they could not 

come up with “specific words” that Peggy had said to them, and 

that they were offering more of a general perception of the status 

of the relationship. But Kufrin was able to cross-examine the 

witnesses about the extent to which their memories had faded 

over time, and he even called a memory expert to discuss the 

shortcomings of memory. Generally, these kinds of 

“shortcomings go to the testimony’s weight, not its admissibility.” 

See State v. Nunez, 2021 UT App 86, ¶ 35, 498 P.3d 458, cert. denied, 

502 P.3d 270 (Utah 2021).3

3. We likewise find unpersuasive Kufrin’s argument that the 

testimony had diminished probative value because “the defense 

had no opportunity to cross-examine Peggy concerning her 

statements to her coworkers.” This is at least potentially the case 

with all hearsay-type evidence admitted pursuant to one of the 

many exceptions to the general ban on hearsay evidence. We 

simply do not agree with Kufrin’s contention that his inability to 

(continued...)
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 26 2024 UT App 86

¶61 And we do not perceive this evidence as creating much risk 

of unfairly prejudicing the jury. “All effective evidence is 

prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party against 

whom it is offered,” and “rule 403 does not require a court to 

exclude all prejudicial evidence.” State v. Suhail, 2023 UT App 15, 

¶ 85, 525 P.3d 550 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 

(Utah 2023). Thus, evidence is not subject to exclusion under rule 

403 simply because it is “prejudicial” to a party; to be subject to 

exclusion, evidence must “create[] an undue tendency to suggest 

decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an 

emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, 

retribution or horror.” Id. (quotation simplified); see also State v. 

Sorenson, 2023 UT App 159, ¶ 17, 542 P.3d 529 (“Unfair prejudice 

results only where the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest 

decision upon an improper basis.” (quotation simplified)).

¶62 Certainly, the testimony from Peggy’s friends and 

coworkers to the effect that Peggy was unhappy and unsatisfied 

in her relationship with Kufrin, and that she was contemplating 

leaving him, was not helpful to Kufrin’s defense. But this does not 

mean that it was unfairly prejudicial. Kufrin does not even attempt 

to argue that this evidence might have caused the jury to convict 

him based on bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, or the like.

¶63 Instead, he notes that the statements were admitted into 

evidence under rule 803(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence4

—the 

exception to the hearsay rule for statements of a “declarant’s thenexisting state of mind”—and he asserts that statements admitted 

under this specific hearsay exception carry a danger that the jury 

might use them “as evidence of a defendant’s intentions, acts, or 

cross-examine Peggy about the statements in question 

appreciably reduced the probative value of those statements.

4. Kufrin does not mount an appellate challenge to the trial court’s 

decision to admit these statements under rule 803(3).
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 27 2024 UT App 86

culpability rather than the victim’s state of mind.” In support of 

this argument, Kufrin cites State v. Auble, a case in which a friend 

of the victim was allowed to testify that the victim told him that 

the defendant “threatened to kill her if she moved out.” See 754 

P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). But Auble is materially distinguishable 

from this case because the statement at issue there went directly 

to the defendant’s state of mind, in addition to the victim’s. In this 

case, by contrast, none of the testimony in question included 

statements made by Kufrin; it consisted entirely of witnesses’ 

descriptions of their own perceptions of Peggy’s relationship with 

Kufrin, as well as witnesses’ recollections of things Peggy had said 

to them about her own perception of that relationship. This case, 

therefore, simply does not present the same concerns as Auble

because there is no risk that the jury would use the friends’ and 

coworkers’ testimony as evidence of Kufrin’s specific intentions 

or actions. And we note, in any event, that the trial court’s 

decision, in Auble, not to exclude the friend’s testimony under rule 

403 was affirmed by our supreme court. See id. at 937–38.

¶64 Accordingly, Kufrin’s trial attorneys could have 

reasonably believed that any objection based in rule 403 would 

have been futile and that lodging it had no other strategic value, 

and for that reason Kufrin has not carried his burden of 

demonstrating that his attorneys performed deficiently by not 

lodging that particular objection. On that basis, we reject Kufrin’s 

ineffective assistance claim.5

5. Kufrin also raises a cumulative error argument. But because we 

have not identified any errors, Kufrin cannot succeed in making a 

cumulative error argument. See State v. Modes, 2020 UT App 136, 

¶ 12 n.5, 475 P.3d 153 (“Because we conclude that there are no 

errors to accumulate here, the cumulative error doctrine is 

inapplicable in this case.” (quotation simplified)). 
State v. Kufrin

20210499-CA 28 2024 UT App 86

CONCLUSION

¶65 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Kufrin’s motion for a mistrial, nor did it abuse its discretion in 

allowing Examiner to offer timeline testimony about body 

decomposition and scalp slippage. And Kufrin has not carried his 

burden of demonstrating that his trial attorneys rendered 

ineffective assistance in not lodging a rule 403 objection to various 

witnesses’ testimony regarding their perception of Peggy’s 

relationship with Kufrin. Indeed, after reviewing the record in 

this case, we are left with the impression that the trial court, the 

prosecutors, and the defense attorneys all rendered exemplary 

work in trying Kufrin’s case. Accordingly, we reject all of Kufrin’s 

appellate arguments and therefore affirm his conviction.