[Cite as Queensgate Terminals, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati, 2013-Ohio-4219.] 

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Dismissed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 27, 2013 

Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, W. Stuart Dornette and Emily C. McNicholas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

Terrance A. Nestor, Chief Counsel, City of Cincinnati Solicitor’s Office, for 

Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Please note: these consolidated cases have been removed from the accelerated 

calendar.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

QUEENSGATE TERMINALS, LLC,

 Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross- 

 Appellee, 

 vs. 

THE CITY OF CINCINNATI, 

 Defendant-Appellee/Cross-

 Appellant. 

:

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-110653 

 C-110671 

TRIAL NOS. A-0708182 

 A-0907363 

 A-0909060 

 

 O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

Per Curiam. 

{¶1} Appellant/cross-appellee Queensgate Terminals, LLC (“Queensgate”), 

and appellee/cross-appellant the city of Cincinnati each appeal from the trial court’s 

entries of judgment in these cases to determine the measure of damages due 

Queensgate for the city’s denial of access to an abutting public road. Because the 

judgments have been satisfied, we dismiss the appeals as moot. 

{¶2} The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this court’s granting of a writ of 

mandamus to compel the city to institute an appropriation proceeding to determine 

the compensation due to Queensgate for the city’s September 12, 2005 taking. See 

State ex rel. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 118 Ohio St.3d 131, 2008-

Ohio-1966, 886 N.E.2d 839, ¶ 41. The city had denied Queensgate and its lessor, 

Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., a curb cut, denying them access to their riverfront 

property from an abutting public road. The city initiated the appropriation action, 

and it was consolidated with other litigation in the trial court under the case 

numbered A-0708182. 

{¶3} On March 2, 2010, the trial court ordered the city to deposit $1,680,783 

with the court to secure the recovery of Queensgate’s anticipated damages. From March 

15 to March 21, 2011, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the matter. On March 22, 

2011, the jury returned a verdict of $500,000 for Queensgate. The same day, the trial 

court issued an order of distribution of the deposited funds. Queensgate received the full 

amount of its judgment plus interest. And the city received the remainder of the deposited 

funds. 

{¶4} The gravamen of each appeal is that the trial court erred in 

instructing the jury on how to compute the damages due to Queensgate for the city’s 

taking. Queensgate argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the city’s 

$5 million settlement with Hilltop, and in admitting evidence of events that took place 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3

after the date of the taking. The city argued, inter alia, that Queensgate’s rights in the 

appropriation action had been determined by its lease, which contained a condemnation 

clause limiting its recovery to its improvements, equipment, and relocation expenses. 

{¶5} But the satisfaction of a judgment renders an appeal from a judgment 

moot. See Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 245, 551 N.E.2d 1249 (1990); see 

also Wiest v. Wiegele, 170 Ohio App.3d 700, 2006-Ohio-5348, 868 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 

12 (1st Dist.); Art’s Rental Equip., Inc. v. Bear Creek Constr., LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

Nos. C-110544, C-110555, C-110558, C-110559, C-110564, C-110785, C-110792, C110797, C-110798, C-110799, C-110800, C-110801, C-110808, and C-120309, 2012-

Ohio-5371, ¶ 7. Absent a fraud upon the court, where a judgment has been 

voluntarily paid and satisfied, that payment puts an end to the controversy. It takes 

away “the right to appeal or prosecute error or even to move for vacation of 

judgment.” Blodgett at 245, quoting Rauch v. Noble, 169 Ohio St. 314, 316, 159 

N.E.2d 451 (1959). 

{¶6} A party acts voluntarily in satisfying a judgment when it fails to obtain 

a stay of the trial court’s judgment pending appeal. See Wiest at ¶ 12. If a party 

seeking an appeal fails to obtain a stay of the judgment, and the judgment is 

satisfied, the appeal must be dismissed because the issues in the case have become 

moot. See id., citing Hagood v. Gail, 105 Ohio App.3d 780, 664 N.E.2d 1373 (11th 

Dist.1995). In Rauch, a highway-appropriation action under former R.C. Chapter 

5519, the director of highways had placed funds with the clerk of courts to cover the 

judgment awarded to a landowner. After the full amount of the judgment had been 

distributed to the landowner, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the director’s 

appeal, holding that because the judgment had been distributed to the landowner by 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4

order of the court, “[t]he litigation was, therefore, terminated, and the cause [had] 

become moot.” Rauch at 316. 

{¶7} Here, on the same day that the jury returned a verdict awarding 

Queensgate $500,000 in damages, Queensgate and the city appeared before the trial 

court. Queensgate sought distribution of its award from the deposited funds. 

Queensgate offered a suggested amount of interest due, and the city did not oppose 

Queensgate’s calculations. Although the city initially suggested that the court hold 

the funds or require a bond to be posted, it did not pursue the matter. The city’s 

principal response to Queensgate’s request was that if the court released the funds, 

the city “would like the balance of funds [already deposited] released to the City of 

Cincinnati.” The court agreed and journalized its order of distribution providing an 

immediate distribution of $667,038 to Queensgate with the balance to the city. 

{¶8} The certified copy of the trial court’s docket and journal entries reflects 

that on the same day, March 22, 2011, the clerk of court issued checks to Queensgate 

in the amount of $667,038 and to the city in the amount of $936,837.17. 

{¶9} Although the trial court did not enter judgment on the jury’s verdict 

until July 6, 2011, at no time after the March 22 order of distribution did Queensgate 

or the city seek a stay or post a supersedeas bond in either the trial court or in this 

court. 

{¶10} In its reply brief, the city argued that the appeals had become moot 

with the distribution of the funds. At oral argument, Queensgate’s counsel argued 

that the appeals were not moot because, under R.C. 163.06(C), withdrawal of the 

deposited funds would not “interfere with the action.” But it is clear that R.C. 

163.06(C) does not abrogate the general rule that satisfaction of a judgment renders 

an appeal moot. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5

{¶11} R.C. 163.06 provides a procedure whereby a public agency 

appropriating contested property deposits with the court the value of the property 

appropriated. The property owner may receive withdrawals as needed, for example, 

to maintain the property during the litigation. R.C. 163.06(C) permits the owner to 

withdraw those funds during the action, “except that the sum so withdrawn shall be 

deducted from the sum of the final verdict or award.” Thus the ability to withdraw 

funds ends with the entry of judgment or the award of damages. 

{¶12} From that point on, R.C. 163.19 provides that appealing parties must 

follow the general rule: “any party may prosecute appeals as in other civil actions 

from the judgment of the court. The owner may request, and the court may grant, a 

stay on appeal, provided that the owner posts a supersedeas bond in an amount the 

court determines.” 

{¶13} Here, the jury awarded Queensgate $500,000 in compensation for the 

taking that occurred on September 12, 2005. The deposited proceeds have been 

distributed. Neither party has sought a stay of the trial court’s order of distribution 

or of its judgment. Neither party has posted an appeal bond. The jury’s award has 

been satisfied, and the funds deposited by the city to secure Queensgate’s anticipated 

recovery are no longer under the jurisdiction and control of the court. Therefore, the 

appeals must be dismissed as moot. See Art’s Rental Equip., 2012-Ohio-5371, at 

¶ 13; see also Rauch, 169 Ohio St. at 316, 159 N.E.2d 451. 

Judgment dismissed. 

HILDEBRANDT, P.J.,HENDON and CUNNINGHAM,JJ.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.