### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 11, 200 6

PA UL WILSON v. S TEP HEN DO TSON , WA RD EN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Hardem an Coun ty

No. 05-02-0070 JoeH. Walker, Judge

No. W2005-02317-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled May 4, 2006

Th e pe tit ion e r, Pa ul Wilso n, app e a ls the su mma ry dis mis sa l of his pe tit ion fo r writ of ha be a s c or pu s, arg uing that prior j udg ments used t o enhanc e his 2005 ag g ravated robbery sentenc e were illeg al and
vo id. F oll ow ing ou r r e vie w, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt dis mis sin g the pe tit ion fo r w ri t of ha be a s c or pu s. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Paul Wi lson, W hiteville, Tennesse e, Pro Se.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r, a nd Ra c he l E. Willi s, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F AC TS

The re cord on a

ppeal is spar se and we g lean the alleg ed fa cts conc erning the judg ments the pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s a re ill e g a l f ro m hi s pro se ha

be a s c or pu s p e tit ion a ndhis pro se appellate brief. O n October 14, 1985, he was char g ed with agg ravated ra pe and a g g ravated kidnapping and wa s relea sed from jail on bond. On De cembe r 21, 1985, while out on bond, he was char g ed with three c ounts of
ro bb e ry wi th a de a dly we apo n. On F e br ua ry 14 , 198 6, the pe tit ion e r ple d g uil ty in S he lby

Cou nty Criminal Court to rape, kidnapping , and thre e counts of r obbery with a deadly

wea pon and re ceive d a six- y e ar s e n te n c e f

o r th e k id n ap p in g c o n v ic ti o n a n d te n

- y e ar s e n te n c e s f o r th e r ap e and ea ch
ro bb e ry c on vic tio n, a ll t o be se rv e d co nc ur re ntl y fo r a tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

te n y e ars . O n July 15, 1993, the petitioner wa s char g ed with sale of a contr olled substance an d re l ea s ed on bail. On Aug ust 17, 1993, w hile on bail, he was char g ed with unla wful possession of a c ontrolled substance with intent to sell. On J anuary 4, 1994, the petitioner pled g uiltyin Shelby CountyCriminal Court-2-

to both char g es and rec eived c oncurr ent eig ht-y ear sentenc es. I n J anuary

2005, a Shelby

Countyjury convicted the petitioner of ag g ravated robbery and he was sente nced to thirty y ear s at six ty

perc ent
as a car eer offe nder. On direc t a ppeal, this c ourt aff

irmed the conviction. See State v. Paul Wi lson, No. W2005-00307-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 3533339, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec

. 2 2 , 2 0 0 5), applic. for

perm. to appe al filed (T enn. F eb. 22, 2006).

On Au gu s t 4 , 2 005, the petitioner filed a pro se habea s corpus pe tition i n the Har deman CountyCircuit Court arg uing that his 1986 judg ments wer e illeg al bec ause his ra pe and kidna

pping sentenc es we re r

un concur rently with his robbery with a deadly wea pon sentenc es. He a

rg ued that this is contrary

to state law that mandated the sentenc es be r un consec utively

beca use he ha d been rele ased on bond f

or the rape and kidnapping char g es when he committed the robbe ry char g es. He arg ued the same about his 1994 judgme nts, claiming that they wer e illeg al bec ause he was on bond for his sale of

a contr olled substance char g e when he commit ted unlawf ul possession of a controlled substance with intent to se ll a nd, there fore , the sentenc es should ha ve been run consec utively , rathe r t h a n c o n c u rr e n t l y. On September

28, 2005, the trial court denied the petitioner habea s corpus relief beca use the petitioner is no longe r conf ined as a result of the 1986 a nd 1994 sentenc es bec ause “ [t ]he sentence s complained of

expired in 2000.”

AN AL YSI S

As we unde rstand, the pe titioner is seeking habea s corpus re lie f fr o m the 1986 and 1994 j u d g m e n t s t h a tw e r e “ u s e d f o r e n h a n c e m e n t ” o f

h i s 2 0 0 5 a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y s e n t e n c e

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, the petitioner a

rg ues that the 1986 a nd 19 94 judgme nts are the result of a n “[i] nvoluntary plea ag ree ment” bec ause he “did not knowing ly ag ree to illega l sentence s.” F urther, he “conte nds that the [198 6 an d 199 4] judg me nts e nte re d in [ the 20 05 ] re c or d to enh a nc e la te r o ff e ns e we re fa c ia lly void on judgme nt in direc t c ontrave ntion of T.C.A. § 40-20-111( b) and Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedur e Rule 32(c )(3) .” The State responds that the trial court appropriately denied ha beas c orpus relief beca use the 1986 a nd 1994 sentenc es t he petiti oner sought relief from wer e alr eady expired. We ag ree with the State.
The g rounds upon which ha beas co rp u s relief

may be g rante d in this st ate a re na rrow. Hickman v. State, 153 S.W .3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) (citations omitted). Relief will be g rante d if the p e ti ti o n e s ta

b li s h e s th a t th e c h a ll e n g e d ju d g me n t is v o id

. I d

. A ju d g me n t i s v o id“ ‘ o n ly w h e n ‘ [i ]t
app e ars up on the fa c e of

the jud g me nt o r the re c or d o f the pr oc e e din g s u po n w hic h th e jud g me nt i s rende red’ that a convic ting c ourt was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a def

endant, or that a def endant' s sentence of imprisonment or other r estraint has e x pired.’” I d. (quoting State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted)). The petitioner bea rs the burde n of establishing e ither a void judgme nt or an illega l confine ment by a preponderance of the evidenc e. Passare lla v. State, 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

.-3-

Acc ording to the petitioner, as we understand, the 1986 and 1994 judgme nts w er e i l l egal beca use they wer e order ed to be se rved c oncurr ently and, in his view, could not be use d to enhanc e his 20 05 se nte nc e

. Ho we ve r, in H ic kman, ou r s up re me c ou rt e xpla ine d th a t ha

be a s c or pu s r e lie f i s no t a va ila ble fo r e xpir e d s e nte nc e s th a t are us e d s ole ly to e nh a nc e a

su bs e qu e nt c on vic tio n: [A] pe rs on is n ot “ re str a ine d o f l ibe rt y ” fo r p ur po se s o f the ha

be a s c or pu s st a tut e u n l es s t h e c h al l en ged j u d gm en ti t s el f i m p o s es a r es tra i n tu p o n t h e p et i t i o n er 's fre edom of a ction or movement. Us e o f t h e chall enged judgme nt to enhance the
se nte nc e im

po se d o n a se

pa ra te c on v ic tio n is no t a re str ain t of lib e rty suffici e nt to permit a habeas corpus c hallenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expire d

. 15 3 S. W.3 d a t 23 (e mph a sis a dd e d) (f oo tno te omi tte d) . Co ns e qu e ntl y , th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in deny ing the petitioner habe as cor pus relief on his ex pired 1986 a nd 1994 sentenc es.
CO NC LU SION

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g a uth oriti e s a ndre a so nin g , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE