[Cite as Johnson v. State, 2011-Ohio-3470.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

Nos. 95842, 95843, 95844, 95845, 

95846, 95847, 95848, and 95849

MICHAEL JOHNSON, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

vs. 

STATE OF OHIO

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeals from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-666875, CV-648395, CV-649493, CV-655194, 

CV-648100, CV-646671, CV-650694, and CV-652766 

BEFORE: Boyle, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 14, 2011
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Daniel T. Van 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

8th Floor, Justice Center

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

For Thomas J. Keppler, Jeffrey S. Mader, 

Clemon Crawford, Joseph A. Dohar, Guy Brewer, 

and Earnest Tisdel, Jr. 

Robert L. Tobik 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

BY: Cullen Sweeney 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Avenue 

Suite 400 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

For Alan D. Christine, Jr.

Michael V. Heffernan 

75 Public Square, Suite 700 

Cleveland Ohio 44113 

Michael P. Shaughnessy 

Thomas E. Shaughnessy 

11510 Buckeye Road 

Cleveland, Ohio 44104 

Michael Johnson, pro se 

1373 West 80th Street, #5 

Cleveland, Ohio 44102 
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MARY J. BOYLE, J.: 

{¶ 1} This consolidated appeal arises from the trial court’s ruling in eight sex offender 

reclassification cases. Defendant-appellant, the state of Ohio (“State”), appeals the trial 

court’s judgments granting relief from reclassification under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act 

(“AWA”) for the plaintiffs-appellees, Michael Johnson, Jeffrey Mader, Alan Christine, Jr., 

Clemon Crawford, Joseph Dohar, Thomas Keppler, Guy Brewer, and Earnest Tisdel, Jr. 

(collectively referred to as “appellees”). We affirm. 

{¶ 2} All eight appellees were initially classified by operation of law under Ohio’s 

Megan’s Law. But after Ohio enacted the AWA, the appellees were reclassified, subjecting 

them to new reporting and notification requirements. Consequently, in 2008, each of the 

appellees filed a petition with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, contesting their 

reclassification and the application of the AWA. While appellees’ petitions were pending, 

the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 

2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, wherein the Court held that, “R.C. 2959.031 and 2950.032, 

the reclassification provisions in the AWA, are unconstitutional because they violate the 

separation-of-powers doctrine.” Bodyke at ¶2. 

{¶ 3} Consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Bodyke, the trial court 

subsequently granted the appellees’ individual petitions and restored each appellee to his 

previous sex offender status under Megan’s Law. 
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{¶ 4} The State appeals, raising the following two assignments of error: 

{¶ 5} “I. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 

2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who was not classified under Megan’s Law by an Ohio court 

because under these circumstances there is no violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 

{¶ 6} “II. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 

2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 

that they were previously classified by an Ohio court.”

{¶ 7} The gravamen of the State’s appeal is that (1) Bodyke is not applicable to the 

appellees because their original classifications arose by operation of law — not a 

court-ordered classification; and (2) absent evidence that they were originally classified by an 

Ohio court, they were not entitled to relief. 

{¶ 8} Recently, however, this court has addressed and overruled these same 

arguments and issues that the State raises in the instant appeal, recognizing that Bodyke

applies when an offender’s classification under Megan’s Law arose by operation of law. See, 

e.g., Speight v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 96041-96405, 2011-Ohio-2933; Hannah v. State, 8th Dist. 

Nos. 95883-95889, 2011-Ohio-2930; Rollins v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 96192-96194, 

2011-Ohio-3264. Indeed, “regardless of the manner in which appellees were originally 

classified, R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 have been severed and may no longer be enforced.” 

Rollins at ¶23. Consistent with this authority, we find that the trial court did not err by 
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granting appellees’ petitions and reinstating their prior sex offender classifications that arose 

by operation of law under Megan’s Law. The State’s assignments of error are overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas 

court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR