N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT J.P., by a nd through his Gua

rdia n Ad Lite m , Sha

nnon Villa

nue v a ; SHANNON VILLANUEVA,

Pla i ntiffs-Appe lle e s,
v. C OUNTY OF ALAM EDA; DIANE DAVIS M AAS; SUE M AY,

De fe nda n ts-Appe lla

nts,
a nd TR IAD FAM ILY SER

V IC ES; M AR IA R EFUGIO M O OR E,

De fe nda n ts. No. 18-15963 D.C . No. 4:17-c v-05679-YGR
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Yvonne Gonz a le z R oge rs, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d

July 17, 2019 Sa n Fra n c isc o , C a lifornia 

# FIL ED
MAR 2 2020 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.B e fore : PAEZ, R AW LINSON, a

nd M UR PHY, ** C irc uit Judge s. Dia ne M a a s (M a a s ), Sue M a y (M a y ), a nd the C ounty

of Ala m e da (C ounty , toge the r with M a a s a

nd M a y , the Appe lla

nts) a p pe a l the distric t c ourt’ s orde r de ny ing qua lifie d im

m u n ity for c la im s brought pursua nt to 42 U.S.C . § 1983 (§ 1983) (1) unde r the sta t e -c re a te d-da

nge r a nd spe c ia l -re la tionship doc trine s; a n d (2) unde r the First Am e ndm e nt for fa m ilia l a ssoc ia t ion. Our jurisdic tion de rive s from 28 U.S.C
. § 1291, a

nd we re v ie w the de nia l of qua lifie d im m unity de nov o . Se e K e ate s v . K oile , 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th C ir. 2018). 1. The sta

te ra re ly ha s a n obliga tion to prote c t c itiz e ns from priva te ha rm . Se e De Shane

y v . W inne bago C

nty . De p’t of Soc . Se rv

s. , 489 U.S. 189, 195- 96 (1989). Howe v e r, the re a re two e xc e ptions: (1) “ whe n the sta

te a ffirm a tive ly pla c e s the pla intiff in da

nge r by a c ting with de libe ra te indiffe re nc e to a known or obvious da

nge r (sta te -c re a te d da

nge r e xc e ption)” ; or (2) whe n a spe c ia l
re la tionship e xists be t

we e n the pla i ntiff a

n d the sta te (spe c ia l-re la t ionship
e xc e ption). Pate l v . K

e nt Sc hool Dist. , 648 F.3d 965, 971-72 (9th C ir. 2011) (c ita tions a nd inte rna l quota

tion m a rks om itte d). W e ha ve he ld tha

t the “ c le a rly

e sta blishe d” spe c ia l-re la tionship doc trine

* * The Honora

ble M ic ha e l R . M urphy , Unite d Sta te s C irc uit Judge for the U .S. C ourt of Appe a ls for the Te nth C irc uit, sitting by de signa tion. 2a

pplie s to c hildre n in foste r c a re , c re a ting a

duty to provide a t le a st re a s ona ble
sa fe ty
. He nry

A. v . W illde n , 678 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th C ir. 2012). Unde r this doc trine , a

pla intiff m

ust e sta b l ish: (1) “ a

n obje c tive ly

substa ntia l risk of ha

rm ” ;
a nd (2) tha

t a re a sona ble offic ia l would ha

ve be e n c om

pe lle d to dra

w a n infe re nc e

“ tha t a substa ntia l risk of se rious ha

rm e xiste d.” Id. a t 1001 (c ita t ion om itte d).

“ To de te rm i ne whe the r qua lifie d im m unity a pplie s in a give n c a se , [c ourts]
m ust de te rm ine : (1) whe the r a public offic ia l ha s viola

te d a pla intiff’ s
c onstitutiona

lly prote c te d right; a

nd (2) whe the r the pa

rtic ula r right tha t the offic ia l ha s viola t e d wa s c le a rly

e sta blishe d a t the tim e of the viola tion.” Shafe r v . C

ity of Santa Barbara , 868 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th C i r. 2017) (c ita t ion om itte d).

“ For a right to be c l e a rly

e sta blishe d, c a se la

w m ust ordina rily ha ve be e n
e a rlie r de ve lope d in suc h a c onc re te a nd fa c tua lly

de fine d c o nte xt to m a ke it obvious to a ll re a sona

ble gove rnm e nt a c tors, in the de fe nda nt’ s pla c e , tha

t wha t he
wa s doing viola

te s fe de ra l la

w.” Id. a t 1117 (c i ta tions om itte d). The sta te -c re a te d da nge r e xc e ption “ o nly

a pplie s in situa

tions whe re the pla i ntiff wa s dire c tly

ha rm e d by a third party .” W illde n , 678 F.3d a

t 1002 (se c ond
e m pha sis in the

origina l). Appe lle e a l le ge d tha t the Appe l la

nts’ fa ilure to re m ove him from his foste r hom e c a

use d him e m otiona l distre ss, e xposing him to pote ntia l ha rm from drugs. Appe lle e ne ve r a lle ge d a ny dire c t ha rm to him , only

to his
3sibling. Our c a se s ha ve not re c ogniz e d a

Fourte e nth Am e ndm e nt viola tion unde r the s e two e xc e ptions for e m otiona l distre s s a lone , or for dire c t ha rm to a nothe r pa rty
. Se e , e .g. , W illde n , 678 F.3d a

t 998-1003; se e also Tamas v . De p’t of Soc . & He alth Se rv

s., 630 F.3d 833, 843-47 (9th C ir. 2010). B e c a use no la w c le a rly
e sta blishe d tha

t c hild we lfa re worke rs c ould be lia ble to a sibling who suffe

re d no dire c t injury

a s a re sult of a

sta te -c re a te d da

nge r or spe c ia l re la tionship, the de fe nda n ts we re e ntitle d to qua lifie d im m u nity
. S e e Shafe r , 868 F.3d a

t 1117 (holding tha

t qua lifie d im

m unity a pplie s if no c le a rly

e sta blishe d la w e xists on the issue ); se e also W

hite v . Pauly , 137 S. C t . 548, 552 (2017) (re ite ra ting tha t c le a rly
e sta blishe d la w m ust not be de fine d “ a t a

high le v e l of ge ne ra lity ” but

“ pa rtic ula riz e d” to the fa c ts of the c a se ). 2. The disse nt’ s re l ia

nc e on Robe rts v . U.S. J

ay c e e s , 468 U.S. 609 (1984) is c om p le te ly m ispla c e d, a s it doe s not e ve n a d d re ss foste r hom e pla c e m e n t or sibling re la tionships. R

a the r, tha t c a se involve d the e xc lusion of wom e n from a fra te rna l orga

niz a t ion. Se e id. a t 621-22. Nothing in tha t c a se supports the disse nt’ s position tha

t c hild we lfa re worke rs c ould be lia ble for indire c t injury

to a sibling, or the a

rgum e n t tha

t a loss-of-fa

m ilia l-a ssoc ia tion c la im

e xists for siblings unde r the First Am e ndm e nt. As disc usse d be low, our pre c e d e nt is to the c ontra ry . No via ble loss-of-fa

m ilia l-a ssoc ia t ion c la im e xists for siblings unde r
4the First Am e ndm e nt. A fa m ilia l re la t ionship grounds the loss of fa m i lia l
a ssoc ia tion c la i m s unde r the First a nd Fourte e nth Am e ndm e nts. S e e Robe rts , 468 U.S. a t 618-20. Thus fa

r, tha t fa m ilia l re l a tionship ha s be e n lim ite d to tha t be twe e n
a pa re nt a nd c hild. Se e Smith v . C

i ty of Fontana , 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th C ir. 1987) , re v ’d on othe r grounds in Hodge rs-Durgin v . de la Vina , 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th C ir. 1999). In W ard v . C ity of San J

o s e , 967 F.2d 280, 283 (9th C ir. 1991), as ame nde d , we e xplic itly rule d tha t siblings do not posse s s a c ogniz a ble libe rty inte re st to a sse rt a

loss of fa m ilia l a ssoc ia tion c l a im

unde r the Fourte e nth Am e ndm e nt. No ba sis e xists to disre ga rd this pre c e d e n t sim

ply be c a use the c la im is ra ise d unde r the First Am e ndm e nt ra t he r tha n the Fourte e nth Am e ndm e nt. Nota bly , the disse nt c ite s no c a se to tha t e ffe c t. RE V E RSE D and RE M ANDE D
.

51 J.P. v. Cty. of Alameda , No. 18

- 15963 PAEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I agree in full with the district court’s thorough and reasoned analysis of J.P.’s constitutional claims in the order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss
. See Order Granting In Part & Denying In Part County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 52 ), J.P. v. Cty . of Alameda , No. 17

- cv - 5679 , 2018 WL 1933387 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018 ). F or those reasons, and as further explained below, I would affirm
. Ninth Circuit precedent clearly establish es that children “ha[ve] a protected liberty interest in safe foster care placement once they [become] wards of the state.” Tamas v. Dep ’ t of Soc. & Health Servs. , 630 F.3d 833, 847 (9th Cir. 2010)
. The child welfare workers here were thus well on notice that they had an affirmative obligation to (i) “safeguard [J
. P
. ’s] wellbeing” after he was placed in their custody in foster care , s ee id. at 843 ; and (ii) not act with deliberate indifference towa rd a known or obvious risk of danger, see id. at 844 . They overlooked these obligations when they allowed J.P. and his three

- year - old sister to continue living in a foster home even after she had ingested methamphetamine there
. See id. And, contrary to the majority’s position , J.P. did allege that he suffered a direct harm , even though he did not personally ingest methamphetamine ; he claims that he suffered emotional distress as a result of 

# FILED

MAR 2 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 losing his younger sister when she died from ingest ing methamphetamine a second time at that home
. See Memphis Cmty. School Dist. v. Stachura , 477 U.S. 299, 307 (holding that damages awards under section 1983 “may include not only out

- of

pocket loss and o ther monetary harms, but also such injur i es such as . . . mental anguish and suffering ”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted) ; Harper v. City of L.A. , 533 F.3d 1010, 1029 (9th Cir. 2008)
. 1 I also disagree that it was not clearly establish ed that the First Amendment protects cohabiting sibling s from unwarranted government interference in their relationship. As the Supreme Court recognized almost forty years ago , c hildhood siblings share precisely the “kind[] of highly personal relationship” that warrant a “substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.” See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). “[C]ertain kinds of person al

1 T he majority’s reliance on Henry A. v. Willden , 678 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) is misplaced. Willden did not hold that the state

- created danger exception requires a showing that a third party directed harm at the plaintiff
. We rejected only the proposition that a state official could escape liability simply by claiming that the danger pre

- existed the state action. See id. Thus, to incur liability, t he state official need not do more than expose the plaintiff to a danger he “would not have o therwise faced .” Id. at 100 2

– 0 3 ; see also Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield , 439 F.39 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006)
. In dicta, we stated: “ by its very nature, the doctrine only applies in situations where the plaintiff was directly harmed by a third party

— a dan ger that, in every case, could be said to have ‘already existed.’” Willden , 678 F.3d at 1002
. W hether the plaintiff establishes a sufficient showing of harm as a result of the state’s created danger is not part of the danger

- creation exception analysis. For the reasons provided by the district court, J.P. has made the requisite showing. See J.P. , 2018 WL 1933387, at *4.3 bonds,” such as those built from “cohabit[ing] with one’s relatives , ” enjoy constitutional shelter because of the “emotional enrichment” one develops from doing so and the way it enables individuals to “cultivat[e] and transmit[] shared ideals and beliefs.” Id. at 619

– 20 (emphasis added) . Because defendants interfered with J.P.’s relationship with his siste r , however, he can no longer live with his sister, enjoy the emotional enrichment from doing so, or cultivate and transmit shared ideals and beliefs with her. See id. O ur decision in Ward v. City of San Jose , 967 F.2d 280, 283 (9th Cir. 1991), does not compel us to hold otherwise. Ward held only that the Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association does not protect a relationship between adult siblings
. See 967 F.2d at 284. Ward did not , however, address the right to intimate familial association s under the First Amendmen t . Although the majority insists that there is “[n]o basis” to treat the First Amendment claim differently, Maj. Disp. at 5, t he rights protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
are doctrinally distinct and must be examined separately. That is because the Supreme Court and our court have developed different tests under both amendments to determine whether a certain activity or relationship is entitled to constitutional protection. For example, w hether an al leged right constitutes a “liberty” interest under the Fourteenth Amendment depends, in part, on the “historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it has been4 accorded special protection.” See Michael H. v. Gerald D. , 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) ; see also Rochin v. Cal. , 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding due process right protects against state action that “shocks the conscience”). In Ward , we ultimately determined that the right of an adult to associate with an adult sibling was not a substantive due process right. On the other hand, the First Amendment goes beyond protecting what we deem “historic” or traditional , or against government action that shocks the conscience . It protects “certain intimate human relationships . . . that presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal a spects of one’s life.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana , 68 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club , 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) ) (quotation marks omitted). The
re lationship between two sibling children raised in the same foster home

— and the emotional attachments that derive therefrom

— would , in my view, certainly fall under the type of intimate relationship protected under First Amendment. I therefore respectfully dissent.