Filed 8/17/17

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDWARD BENJAMIN BUTTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D070341

 (Super. Ct. No. SCN337266)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Harry M. Elias, Judge. Affirmed.

Allison L. Ehlert, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and 

Christine Yoon Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110, this opinion is certified for 

publication with the exception of part III.A.
2

I.

INTRODUCTION

A jury found Edward Benjamin Button guilty of one count of corporal injury to a 

spouse or roommate (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))1 (count 1), and one count of assault 

by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 2). With 

respect to both counts, the jury found true the allegation that Button personally inflicted 

great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)).2 The trial court imposed a 

sentence of 240 days in the custody of the Sheriff, stayed execution of the portion of the 

sentence that Button had not yet served (220 days), and placed Button on formal 

probation for three years.

On appeal, Button claims that the People failed to present sufficient evidence that 

he was not acting in self-defense when he punched the victim in the face, breaking her 

nose and causing her to suffer a concussion. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, 

we conclude that there is plainly evidence upon which the jury could have reasonably 

found that Button did not act in self-defense.

Button also claims that the jury's true findings on the serious felony allegations 

(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) must be reversed because the findings are premised on an invalid 

stipulation entered into between the People and the defense pursuant to which Button 

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.

2 Section 1192.7, subdivision (c) defines "serious felony" as including "any felony 

in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an 

accomplice." (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
3

effectively admitted the truth of the allegations. Button contends that the stipulation is 

invalid because the trial court failed to admonish him pursuant to Boykin-Tahl3 and their 

progeny with respect to the constitutional rights that he was foregoing by entering into 

the stipulation, and also failed to advise him of the penal consequences of the stipulation. 

We conclude that the trial court was not required to provide the admonishments because 

the stipulation did " 'not have the definite penal consequences necessary to trigger the

Boykin-Tahl requirements.' " (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 171 (Cross).) 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.4

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The People's evidence

1. Button punches the victim in the face twice

At the time of the charged offenses, Button and the victim,5 B.D., were students at 

Palomar College. They had been in a dating relationship for approximately a year and a 

 

3 (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin); In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 

(Tahl).)

4 Button also filed a petition for habeas corpus (In re Button, D071889) that we 

deny by way of a separate order filed today.

5 As of January 1, 2017, California Rules of Court, rule 8.90 (Rule 8.90) became 

effective. Rule 8.90, subdivision (b) requires appellate courts to "consider referring to"

certain individuals "by first name and last initial or, if the first name is unusual or other 

circumstances would defeat the objective of anonymity, by initials only," in order to 

protect those individuals' privacy. The list of people to whom this rule applies includes 

victims of crimes. (Rule 8.90(b)(4).) After consideration, we have decided to refer to the 

victim in this case by her initials, in order to try to provide the victim with some measure 

of anonymity.
4

half and had previously been engaged. Their engagement ended a couple of weeks prior 

to the incident giving rise to the charged offenses.

Although their engagement had ended, on the day before the incident, Button and 

B.D. had sexual intercourse. According to B.D., Button told B.D. that they could 

continue to be "lovers" if she would agree not to reveal the nature of their relationship to 

anyone.

The next day, B.D. and Button had a class together. During class, B.D. learned 

that a group of Button's friends were going to a restaurant after class. One of the friends 

invited B.D. to come along. While B.D. was gathering her belongings after class, 

everyone left without her. Shortly thereafter, B.D. called Button a couple of times and 

sent him some text messages. She received no immediate response.

Later that day, B.D. received a call from Button. B.D. asked Button to meet her so 

that they could talk. They agreed to meet in front of a building on campus. When Button

arrived to the meeting, he appeared to be very upset. His hands were clenched and his 

face and voice conveyed anger. Button accused B.D. of telling two of his friends that 

they were still dating. B.D. denied the accusation, and Button called her a liar.

B.D. took off her glasses because she was crying. She then stepped forward with 

her arms open in order to give Button a hug. Button grabbed both of B.D.'s biceps and 

began squeezing her. B.D. was shocked and struggled to get free. Once B.D. escaped 

Button's grasp, she slapped Button across the face with an open hand.
5

Button immediately punched B.D. in the face, twice. B.D.'s hands were at her 

sides at the time Button punched her. B.D. bent over and blood rushed into her mouth. 

Immediately after the incident, the two walked to a health services office on campus.

2. Button's statement to police

Officer Stephen Wilson, a police officer at the college, responded to the health 

services office. According to Officer Wilson, immediately upon seeing Officer Wilson, 

Button said, "I know, I know, I did it, I punched her, you might as well arrest me now." 

Button held his arms out and gestured as if he wanted Officer Wilson to handcuff him.

Button told Officer Wilson that when he met B.D. in front of the building where 

the incident took place, he was upset that B.D. was telling people that they were still 

together. Button also admitted to starting the fight by grabbing B.D.'s arm.6 According 

to Button, after grabbing B.D.'s arm, B.D. slapped him on the side of the face, and he 

punched her. Button told Officer Wilson that he knew he was wrong for punching B.D.

and that he knew he was going to go to jail. At no time during their conversation did 

Button say that he had acted in self-defense.

3. B.D.'s injuries

B.D. suffered a concussion as a result of the blows to her face. In addition, B.D. 

suffered three acute fractures of her facial bones—a hairline fracture through her left 

 

6 At trial, B.D. testified that Button grabbed both of her arms.
6

nasal bone and two additional fractures through the frontal process of the maxillary 

bones.7 B.D. eventually underwent surgery in order to treat the injuries.

B. The defense

Three students who had been at the lunch with Button and who witnessed the 

incident from a considerable distance, testified. The witnesses stated that B.D. struck 

Button first, and that Button then struck B.D.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's implicit finding that Button did not 

act in self-defense

Button claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's implicit 

finding that he was not acting in self-defense when he punched B.D. in the face.

1. Governing law

a. The law governing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, "the 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) "[T]he 

court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to 

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is 

 

7 The jury was told that the frontal process of the maxillary bones are "the most 

posterior or deepest part of the nasal bones where they connect with the maxillary 

sinuses."
7

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 

578.)

b. Relevant law pertaining to self-defense

In order to act in lawful self-defense, a defendant must have "reasonably believed 

he was in imminent danger of violence, reasonably believed the immediate use of force 

was necessary to defend himself, and used no more force than was reasonably necessary 

to defend against the threat." (People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 747.) "[T]he 

People have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act 

in self-defense" in order to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged offenses. 

(People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1429.)

2. Application

In finding Button guilty of the charged offenses, and thereby implicitly finding 

that Button did not act in lawful self-defense, the jury could have reasonably relied on 

evidence that Button was angry at the outset of the incident, that he instigated a physical 

confrontation with the victim, that he punched the victim twice in the face with sufficient 

force to cause three fractures and a concussion, and that he told a responding officer that 

he was guilty and should go to jail. (See pt. II.A, ante.) Evidence that Button was angry, 

instigated a physical confrontation, and made statements evincing a consciousness of 

guilt shortly after the incident all support a finding that Button did not punch B.D. 

because he "reasonably believed the immediate use of force was necessary to defend 

himself." (Hernandez, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 747.) Evidence that Button punched B.D. 
8

twice in the face with sufficient force to cause three broken bones and a concussion (see 

pt. II.A, ante) supports a finding that Button acted with more force than was reasonably 

necessary to defend against B.D.'s open hand slap. (See ibid.)

Button's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Button argues that evidence 

that he "immediately" punched B.D. in response to her slap "suggest[s] that he was trying 

to protect himself against any further aggression on B[.D.]'s part." While the jury might

have found that Button's punches were an attempt to prevent further aggression from 

B.D., the jury also could have reasonably found that Button punched B.D. out of anger 

rather than a reasonable belief in the need to defend himself.

Button also argues that "the amount of force . . . was not unreasonable under the 

circumstances," noting that there was evidence that B.D. outweighed Button by 120 

pounds. In support of this contention, Button argues that in determining whether a 

defendant acted in lawful self-defense, the question is "not whether the force used 

appears excessive in hindsight but whether it appeared reasonably necessary to avert 

threatened harm under the circumstances at the time." (People v. Ross (2007) 155 

Cal.App.4th 1033, 1057.) We agree with the Ross court's observation. However, as the 

Ross court also stated, the question of whether a defendant used excessive force is 

ordinarily "a question entrusted to the jury." (Ibid.) In this case, despite evidence that

B.D. weighed considerably more than Button, a reasonably jury could have found that 

Button's two forceful punches were excessive, given evidence that B.D. had slapped 

Button only once with an open hand and had her arms down at her sides at the time 

Button punched her.
9

Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's 

implicit finding that Button did not act in self-defense.

B. The trial court was not required to admonish Button pursuant to Boykin-Tahl and 

their progeny prior to accepting the parties' stipulation that Button personally 

inflicted great bodily injury on B.D.

Button claims that the trial court erred in failing to admonish him pursuant to 

Boykin-Tahl and their progeny prior to accepting the parties' stipulation that Button 

personally inflicted great bodily injury on B.D.

1. Factual and procedural background

The amended information in this case alleged, with respect to both counts 1 and 2, 

that Button "personally inflicted great bodily injury upon [B.D.], not an accomplice to the 

above offense, within the meaning of . . . section 1192.7, [subdivision] (c)(8)." During 

the trial, the following colloquy occurred:

"[The prosecutor]: [I]t is stipulated between the parties that the 

defendant Edward Benjamin Button personally inflicted great bodily 

injury upon [B.D.] within the meaning of Penal Code section 

1192.7[, subdivision] (c)(8) as to counts one and two.

"The court: So stipulated?

"[Defense counsel]: So stipulated.

"[The prosecutor]: So stipulated."

Immediately thereafter, the court instructed the jury that it was "to take all of those 

facts as contained in [the stipulation] as having been conclusively proved."

The jury found Button guilty of both charged offenses and, with respect to both 

offenses, found true that "in the commission of the . . . offense, [Button] personally 
10

inflicted great bodily injury upon [B.D.], within the meaning of . . . section 1192.7[, 

subdivision] (c)(8)."

2. Governing law

a. Boykin-Tahl and their progeny

In Cross, the California Supreme Court summarized well established law 

governing admonishments that a trial court must provide and the waivers that a court 

must obtain before accepting a guilty plea to a charged offense:

"When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is 

required to ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary. (See 

Boykin[, supra,] 395 U.S. [at pp.] 243–244. . . .) As a prophylactic 

measure, the court must inform the defendant of three constitutional 

rights—the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right 

to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers—and solicit 

a personal waiver of each. ([Citation]; see Boykin, at pp. 243–244; 

In re Tahl[, supra,] 1 Cal.3d [at pp.] 130–133. . . .) Proper 

advisement and waiver of these rights, conducted with 'the utmost 

solicitude of which courts are capable,' are necessary 'to make sure 

[the accused] has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and 

of its consequence.' (Boykin, at pp. 243–244.)" (Cross, supra, 61 

Cal.4th at p. 170.)

The Cross court explained that in In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 (Yurko), the 

California Supreme Court held that Boykin-Tahl's requirements apply when a defendant 

"admits the truth of a prior conviction allegation that subjects him to increased 

punishment." (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 170.) The Cross court explained the 

rationale of Yurko as follows:

"We explained [in Yurko]: 'Because of the significant rights at stake 

in obtaining an admission of the truth of alleged prior convictions, 

which rights are often of the same magnitude as in the case of a plea 

of guilty, courts must exercise a comparable solicitude in extracting 

an admission of the truth of alleged prior convictions. . . . As an 
11

accused is entitled to a trial on the factual issues raised by a denial of 

the allegation of prior convictions, an admission of the truth of the 

allegation necessitates a waiver of the same constitutional rights as 

in the case of a plea of guilty. The lack of advice of the waivers so 

to be made, insofar as the record fails to demonstrate otherwise, 

compels a determination that the waiver was not knowingly and 

intelligently made.' [Citation.] We concluded that 'Boykin and Tahl

require, before a court accepts an accused's admission that he has 

suffered prior felony convictions, express and specific admonitions 

as to the constitutional rights waived by an admission. The accused 

must be told that an admission of the truth of an allegation of prior 

convictions waives, as to the finding that he has indeed suffered such 

convictions, the same constitutional rights waived as to a finding of 

guilt in case of a guilty plea.' " (Ibid.)

The Cross court also explained that Boykin-Tahl requirements do not apply in 

certain circumstances:

"[O]ur case law since Yurko has drawn a distinction between, on one 

hand, 'a defendant's admission of evidentiary facts which [does] not 

admit every element necessary to conviction of an offense or to 

imposition of punishment on a charged enhancement' and, on the 

other, 'an admission of guilt of a criminal charge or of the truth of an 

enhancing allegation where nothing more [is] prerequisite to 

imposition of punishment except conviction of the underlying 

offense.' (People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal.4th 570, 577 (Adams).)

The requirements of Boykin-Tahl and Yurko apply to the latter type 

of admission but not the former. [Citation.] [¶] In Adams, for 

example, we held that a mere stipulation to being on bail 'does not 

admit the truth of . . . every fact necessary to imposition' of 

additional punishment under section 12022.1 and therefore 'does not 

have the definite penal consequences necessary to trigger the 

Boykin-Tahl requirements.' " (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171.)

Thus, "Boykin-Tahl requirements do not apply to a stipulation of 'evidentiary facts, 

even facts crucial to a conviction,' if the stipulation does not encompass 'all of the 

evidentiary facts necessary to imposition of the additional penalty.' " (Cross, supra, 61 

Cal.4th at p. 171.)
12

Applying this law to the facts in Cross, the Supreme Court concluded that a 

stipulation pursuant to which the defendant admitted that he had suffered a prior 

conviction that "authorized the trial court to impose a greater punishment on [the 

defendant] if the jury found that he was guilty of the charged offense" (italics added),

required Boykin-Tahl warnings. (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 174.)8 The Cross court 

reasoned in part:

"In Adams, we said that a stipulation has 'definite penal 

consequences' if it establishes 'every fact necessary' to support an 

'additional punishment.' (Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 578, 580; 

[citation].) A stipulation may establish every fact necessary to 

support an increased punishment even if the trial court decides not to 

impose that punishment. Thus, our cases suggest that the phrase 

'definite penal consequences' means definite exposure to additional 

punishment. Because the stipulation here established every fact 

necessary to expose Cross to a penalty beyond the four-year 

maximum term available . . . , it resulted in a definite penal 

consequence. '[N]othing more was prerequisite to imposition of [the 

elevated] punishment except conviction of the underlying 

offense . . . .' (Adams, at p. 577.)" (Id. at p. 175.)

b. The law governing serious felony allegations

Section 1192.7, subdivision (c) contains a list of serious felonies9 and provides in 

relevant part:

 

8 The Cross court explained that, pursuant to the statutory scheme at issue, "Cross's 

prior conviction exposed him to a prison term of two, four, or five years instead of two, 

three, or four years," and that "[t]he trial court sentenced Cross to the maximum term of 

five years." (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 168.)

9 "While most of the categories of serious felonies set forth in subdivision (c) are 

based on defined offenses, subdivision (c)(8) . . . include[s] as [a] serious felon[y] 'any'

felony in which the defendant 'personally inflicts great bodily injury' on a 

nonaccomplice . . . . (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)[(8)].) Thus, while a robbery, rape or 

murder conviction is ipso facto a serious felony conviction, a conviction for an offense 
13

"As used in this section, 'serious felony' means any of the 

following: . . . (8) any felony in which the defendant personally 

inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an 

accomplice . . . ."

The Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subd. (b)) provides for 

enhanced penalties for those previously convicted of a serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (e), 

1170.12, subd. (c)), and defines serious felony by reference to section 1192.7, subdivision 

(c). (See §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b) ["Notwithstanding any other provision of 

law . . . a prior serious . . . conviction of a felony shall be defined as: (1) . . . [A]ny 

offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state"].)

Section 969f states:

"(a) Whenever a defendant has committed a serious felony as 

defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, the facts that make the 

crime constitute a serious felony may be charged in the accusatory 

pleading. However, the crime shall not be referred to as a serious 

felony nor shall the jury be informed that the crime is defined as a 

serious felony. This charge, if made, shall be added to and be a part 

of the count or each of the counts of the accusatory pleading which 

charged the offense. If the defendant pleads not guilty to the offense 

charged in any count which alleges that the defendant committed a 

serious felony, the question whether or not the defendant committed 

a serious felony as alleged shall be tried by the court or jury which 

tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty. If the defendant pleads 

guilty of the offense charged, the question whether or not the 

defendant committed a serious felony as alleged shall be separately 

admitted or denied by the defendant."

 

which does not fall within any of the subsections of subdivision (c) other than subdivision 

(c)(8) . . . is not a serious felony conviction unless it can be established that the 

offender . . . personally inflicted great bodily injury on a non-accomplice in the 

commission of the offense." (People v. Yarbrough (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 469, 474 

(Yarbrough).)
14

"[T]he legislative history of section 969f shows that it was enacted in order to 

prequalify a crime as a serious felony in the event of a defendant's future conviction of 

another serious felony." (People v. Leslie (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 198, 204 (Leslie); see 

also Yarbrough, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 477 ["The legislative history of Penal Code 

section 969f demonstrates that it was intended to identify serious felony offenses for the 

sole purpose of enhancing future convictions"].)

3. Application

The parties have not cited, and our own independent research has not uncovered, 

any case law extending the requirements of Boykin-Tahl to a stipulation that has the 

effect of "prequalify[ing] a crime as a serious felony in the event of a defendant's future 

conviction of another serious felony." (Leslie, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 204.) In 

Cross, the California Supreme Court stated that a stipulation must have " 'definite penal 

consequences . . . to trigger the Boykin-Tahl requirements.' " (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

p. 171, italics added.) Button does not dispute that the true findings on the serious felony 

allegations premised upon the parties' stipulation had no penal consequences in this case. 

However, he notes that"[b]ecause the true findings on the [serious felony] allegations 

renders [Button's] conviction a strike offense, he now faces the risk of a significantly 

enhanced punishment in a future prosecution — no less than the doubling of his term of 

imprisonment on a future felony conviction." (Italics added.) Button contends that 

"there is no principled reason why a court should be required to give Boykin-Tahl

warnings when the risk of punishment is immediate, but not when it is possible but 

uncertain."
15

We disagree. A punishment that is "possible but uncertain"10 (italics added),

does not constitute a " 'definite penal consequence[ ]," as that phrase has been used in 

California cases applying Boykin-Tahl. (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171, italics 

added.) While an admission of a prior conviction that exposes a defendant to additional 

potential punishment in that case is "sufficiently like a plea of guilty to require the same 

procedural protections" (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1177, citing Yurko, 

supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 863), the same cannot be said of the admission of a serious felony 

allegation that has no immediate penal consequence and as to which any future 

consequences would be incurred only upon a conviction for an offense committed in the 

future—an event that may or may not occur.

In Yurko, the court reasoned that the prospect of additional severe punishment in 

the case in which the admission of the prior conviction is made warranted mandating 

Boykin-Tahl requirements. (See Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 863 ["Because of the 

significant rights at stake in obtaining an admission of the truth of allegations of prior 

convictions, which rights are often of the same magnitude as in the case of a plea of 

guilty, courts must exercise a comparable solicitude in extracting an admission of the 

truth of alleged prior convictions"].) The Yurko court explained: 

"Undoubtedly the particular rights waived by an admission of the 

truth of the allegation of prior convictions are important. Although 

there is not at stake a question of guilt of a substantive crime, the 

practical aspects of a finding of prior convictions may well impose 

upon a defendant additional penalties and sanctions which may be 

even more severe than those imposed upon a finding of guilt without 

 

10 We quote here from Button's reply brief.
16

the defendant having suffered the prior convictions. Thus a finding 

of prior convictions may foreclose the possibility of probation 

[citation], may extend the term for the basic crime to life 

imprisonment [citation], and may substantially extend the time 

served on such a life sentence before the defendant becomes eligible 

for parole." (Id. at p. 862.)

In contrast, in this case, Button was not exposed to any additional penalties or 

sanctions as a result of the stipulation. While Button cites the Cross court's statement 

that "our cases suggest that the phrase 'definite penal consequences' means definite 

exposure to additional punishment" (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 175), it is clear that 

the Cross court was talking about definite exposure in the case in which the allegation is 

admitted, and not potential exposure in a hypothetical future case. This is made clear by 

the fact the very next sentence of the Cross opinion explained that the defendant's 

admission of the prior conviction exposed the defendant to additional punishment in that 

case. (See ibid. ["Because the stipulation here established every fact necessary to expose 

Cross to a penalty beyond the four-year maximum term available . . . , it resulted in a 

definite penal consequence"].)

The Supreme Court has also made clear that Yurko does not apply where the 

"admission of the priors . . . [does] not . . . subject [the] defendant to an increased 

penalty." (People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1184 (Ramirez).) In Ramirez, a 

death penalty case, defense counsel stated, at the outset of the penalty phase, that the 

defendant would stipulate to having suffered three prior convictions. (Id. at p. 1183.) On 

appeal, the defendant claimed that "his stipulation to the priors was improper under 

[Yurko, supra,] 10 Cal.3d 857, because . . . defendant did not expressly waive his 
17

privilege against self-incrimination or his right to a jury or court trial on the prior 

convictions." (Ibid.) The Attorney General argued that "Yurko is not applicable in this 

context, because defendant's stipulation to the priors was not analogous to the admission 

of the truth of a sentence enhancement as in Yurko, but was instead comparable to a 

stipulation to the admission of a subsidiary evidentiary matter." (Ibid.) The Ramirez 

court concluded that "[t]he Attorney General's position is well taken." (Ibid.) The court 

reasoned:

"Unlike the defendant's stipulation in [Yurko], supra, 10 Cal.3d 857,

which automatically subjected the defendant to an increased 

sentence under the California habitual criminal law and thus was 

somewhat comparable to a guilty plea as to which a waiver of rights 

is constitutionally required (see Boykin[, supra,] 395 U.S. [at p.] 

242; [Tahl, supra,] 1 Cal.3d at pp. 132–133), defendant's admission 

of the priors in this case did not inevitably subject defendant to an 

increased penalty. Here, the priors were simply evidence in 

aggravation that the jury was to consider along with all of the other 

aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase. 

Neither Yurko nor any other California decision requires an on-therecord waiver of rights by the defendant when the defendant or 

defense counsel stipulates to the admission of a subsidiary item of 

evidence of this nature." (Id. at pp. 1183-1184.)

As in Ramirez, Button's stipulation did not "automatically subject[ ] the defendant 

to an increased sentence" (Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1158 at p. 1183), and for this 

reason, is not akin to a prior conviction stipulation triggering Yurko's requirements. 

(Ramirez, supra, at pp. 1183–1184.)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was not required to admonish Button 

pursuant to Boykin-Tahl and its progeny prior to accepting the parties' stipulation that 

Button personally inflicted great bodily injury on B.D.
18

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

NARES, J.