T he Hon or abl e Da nn y C. Re e ves , Un i t e d S t a t e s Di s t r i c tJ ud ge f orth e Ea s t e rn Di s t r i c tof

K e nt uc ky, * sittingby des ig nation. -1- NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

File Na me: 06a0734n.06 Filed: Oc tober 5, 2006 No. 04-2179 UNIT ED STATES COU RT OF APP EALS F O R TH E S IXTH C IR C U IT J OSE PH T
. HUEY, P etiti on er-A pp ellant,

v. WI LLI E O. SMI TH, Res pondent -Appell ee. ________________________________/ ON AP PEAL FR OM THE UN I TED STA TES D I STRI CT C OUR T FO R TH E EAS TERN DI STR I CT O F MI CH I GAN

Bef ore: M AR T IN and D AU GH T RE Y, Cir cui t J udges ; a nd RE E VE S, Dis tr ic t J udge. * DA NN Y C
. RE E VE S, Dis tr ic t Ju d ge. Peti ti oner- Appell antJ os eph Huey , a Michi gan pri s oner, appea ls the dis tr ic t court ’ s deci s ion deny ing his s econd pet it ion f or w ri t o f ha b eas
co rp u s for failu re to file w ith in th e o n e- y e a r s t a t u t e o f lim ita tio n s set for th in 2 8 U .S .C . § 2244(d). T he di s tr ic t c ourtis s ued a c ert if ic at e of appeal abi li tyon the ques ti on of whether equi table tol li ng is appl ic abl e i n thi s cas e. For the rea s ons dis cus s ed bel ow, we AFFI RM the d istr ict co u rt ’s de ter m in ati o n th at e q u ita b le t o llin g d o es n o t ap p ly u n d er th e fa cts p re sen ted

. Huey was convi ct ed in 1994 in M ic higa n of f ir s t- degre e murder, two co u n ts o f f el ony
as s aul t with int entto m u rd er, and t hree count s of f el ony -f ir ear m and ca rry ing a conce al edNo. 04- 2179

H uey v. Sm ith

-2- weapon. He w as s ent ence d to li f e i mpri s onmentwithoutthe pos s ibi li tyof parol e. Direc t r evi ew of Huey’ s convi ct ion e nded on Februa ry 25, 1999, when the M ichi gan Supreme Court de nie d his appl ic at ion f

or l eave to appeal

. On F ebrua ry 17, 2000, af te r two hundred and s ix ty-s even day s had run on t he one- y ears ta tut e of li mit at ion s, H uey f

il ed a pe ti ti on f

or writof

habea s corpus with the dis tr ic t court
. How ever , beca us e the habe as pet it ion c onta ine d both e xhaus te d and unexhaus te d cl ai ms, the dis tr ic t courtdis mis s ed i t without pr ej udic e on J uly14, 2000, f or f ai lur e to exhaus t. Huey r eturned t o s ta te courtf or pos t- convi ct ion r el ie f on August 10, 2001, approxi mat el y thi rt een months af te r the dis mis s al of

his ini ti al pet it ion. Huey’ s pos t- convi ct ion pr oc e e di ng s wer e c on c l ud e d i n s t a t e c ou rt on Oct ob e r 31 , 20 03 , whe n t he Mich igan S up re me Co urt d enied leave to ap peal. On Janua ry 22, 2004, Huey f il ed a s econd pet it ion f

or writ of habea s corpus . T he di s tr ic t courtdis mis s ed t his pet it ion a s bei ng barr ed by the one-y ear s ta tut e of li mit at ions s etf

ort h in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). T here af te r, on October12, 2004, the dis tr ic t court grant ed Huey’ s moti on f or
a ce rt if ic at e of appea labil it y on the is s ue of “ whetherthe one-y earli mit at ions peri od cont ai ned in 28 U. S.C. § 2244(d)( 1) was s ubje ctto e quit abl e t oll ing i n thi s cas e. ” We revi ew de novo the dis tr ic t court ’ s det ermi nat ion tha t H uey ’ s cl ai ms were barr ed by the s ta tut ory li mit at ions p er io d

. C o o k v. Stega ll , 295 F.3d 517, 519 (6t h Cir. 2002). Upon review , we c on c l ud e t ha t t he di s t ri c t c ou rt pr op e rl y de t e rm i ne d t ha t Hue y i s no t e nt i tled to equi table tol li ng of

the one-y earli mit at ions peri od.No. 04- 2179

H uey v. Sm ith

-3- T he Anti te rror is m and Eff ect ive Death Pena lty Act (“ AE DP A”) cont ai ns a one- y ear statute of limitati on s durin g w hich a stat e p r is o n e r m u st f ile a § 22 54 petition. H uey fi led his f ir s t habeas pet it ion on Februar y 17, 2000, nine ty -ei ght da y s pri or t o the expi rat ion of one-y ear limitati on s period . Ho w ever , the districtcou rt dismissed the petition b ecause it con tained b oth exhaus te d and unexhaus te d cl ai ms. Huey wait ed approxi mat el y thi rt een months af te r hi s ini ti al pet it ion was dis mis s ed bef ore f il ing a moti on f

or pos t- convi ct ion r el ie f

in s ta te court
. M oreove r,
on ce he finally exhau sted his st ate cou rt claims, he w aited almo st t hree mo nths to re- fi le his habea s pet it ion i n f

eder al court
. Huey c oncede s tha t he did n o t tim ely f il e hi s s econd habeas pet it ion, but a rgues tha t t he di s tr ic t j udge s hould ha ve equi tablytol le d the li mit at ions peri od and

con sidered h is petit ion o n its merits. In s upport of his pos it ion, Huey rel ie s upon thi s Court’ s deci s ions in P almer v. Carl ton , 276 F.3d 777 (6t h Cir. 2002), and G rif fin v. R og ers , 3 9 9 F .3 d 6 2 6 (6 th C ir . 2 0 0 5 ). P almer and G rif fin establis hed a form o f “ man dator y eq uitable tolling,” w hich is app licable in situation s in which the dis mis s al of a mixed peti ti on coul d je opardi ze the ti mel ine s s of a s ubs equentpet it ion. Under P almer

and G rif fin , if the district court fails to gr a n t a stay, a petit ioner is entit led to

m an d ato ry e q u ita b le t o llin g o f th e A E D P A p er io d if h e/s h e files in state co u rt w ith in th ir ty d ays of the federal cou rt dismissal and return s to f eder al cou rt no later than thirty days f ollow ing state

co u rt ex h au stio n . See P a lm er, 276 F.3d a t 781- 82 (endor s ing the t wo thir ty -dayti me periods adopt ed by the Second Circ uitin Zarv el a v. A r tuz , 254 F .3d 3 74 (2n d C ir. 200 1)) ; G rif fin , 399 F.3d a t 633.No. 04- 2179

H uey v. Sm ith

-4- Although H uey conce des tha t he is not e nti tl ed t o mandat ory equi table tol li ng, he ar gues tha t he is ent it le d to equi table tol li ng. T he fol lowing f ive f act ors are cons ide red i n det ermi ning

w h eth er eq u ita b le t o llin g sh o u ld ap p ly: (1 ) t h e p eti tio n er ’s l ac k o f no tic e o f th e fili n g re q u ir em en t; ( 2 ) t h e p eti tio n er ’s la ck of cons truct ive knowledge of the f il ing r equi reme nt; ( 3 ) d il ige nce i n purs uing o n e’s r ig h ts; (4 ) ab sen ce o f p re ju d ice to th e re sp o n d en t; an d (5 ) th e p eti tio n er ’s re a s on a bl e ne s s i n re ma i ni ng i gn or a ntof t he l e ga l re qu i re me ntf

orf i l i ng hi s c l a i m. G rif fin , 399 F.3d a t 635 ( ci ti ng A ndrews v. O rr , 851 F .2d 1 46 , 151 (6th C ir

. 19 88 )). T hese f act ors “ are not c omprehe ns ive , nor i s eac h of the f ive f actor s re lev ant i n al l c as es . ” Cook v. Stega ll , 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6t h Cir. 2002). Ins te ad, court s mustcons ide r equit abl e tol li ng on a

“ cas e-by -ca s e bas is

. ” Id

. M oreove r, to pres erve the us ef ulne s s of s ta tut es of

li mit at ions as rul es of la w, t he Supreme Court ha s hel d tha t e quit abl e t oll ing s hould be invoke d only “ s pari ngly ” and

s hould not be us ed to res cue a li ti gant f rom his own l ack of due dilige n ce . Irw in v

. Dep’t of V eterans A ffairs , 498 U .S. 89 , 95 (1 99 0); Bal dwi n Cou nt y Wel c ome Ct r . v . Br own , 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984). Huey’ s pri mary f

ocus is on the thr ee Andr e ws f act ors tha t were atis s ue i n G rif fin : ( 1) l ack of actual knowledge of

the f il ing requi reme nt; (2) lac k of cons truct ive knowledge of the f il ing

r e q u i r e me n t ; a n d ( 3 ) r e a s o n a b l e i g n o r a n c e o f t h e l a w. In G ri ffi n , the court

f ound tha t t he pet it ione r was e nti tl ed t o equi table tol li ng ina s much as s he l acke d cons truct ive knowledge a nd

was re as onabl y ignor ant of the f il ing de adl ine

. Speci f

ic al ly , the courtnote d tha t the l aw rel at ing to the f il ing de adl ine s was “ uns table and uns et tl ed” a t the “ cruc ia l t ime of [ her] m ista k e.”No. 04- 2179

H uey v. Sm ith

-5- G rif fin , 399 F.3d a t 637. In addi ti on, the courtf ound tha t, des pit e notreturni ng to s ta te courtf or six and on e-ha lf

mo nths, she w as diligent in p ursuin g h er righ ts because he r cou nsel “ had to prep a r e a n d f

i l e a c o mp l e x r e c o r d a n d r e s e a r c h c o mp l e x q u e s t i o n s o f l a w b e f o r e f i l ing he r pet it ion i n s ta te court
. ” Id

. I . Huey’s Lac kof

Act ual or Cons tr uc ti ve Know l e dge of th e Fi l i ng Re q u i r e me nt and R eas onable I gnorance of the Law Simi la r to the ci rcums ta nces in G rif fin , at the time the district cou rt dismissed H uey’s fi rst habea s pet it ion, the s ta te of the la w w ith res pectto “ mixe d” peti ti ons , f il ing de adl ine s and equi table tol li ng was uns et tled. Huey’ s f ir s t habeas pet it ion was dis mis s ed i n J ulyof 2000, approxi mat el y ei ghte en months bef ore the thi rt y -daywindow w as adopt ed by the P almer Court in J anuary 2002 and t welve mont hs pri or t o the Second Ci rcui t’ s opini on in Z arvela

. Nevert hel es s , al though Huey may not ha ve bee n aware of the ti me per iods es tabli s hed by the P almer

and Z arvela deci s ions , the dis tr ic t c ourtopini on, unli ke t he one i n G rif fin , was not “en tir ely s ile n t as to h o w [H u ey] sh o u ld p r o ce ed in o rd er to b ri n g a ti m ely h ab ea s p eti tio n .” G rif fin , 399 F.3d a t 636. T he dis tr ic t court ’ s order s peci f ic al ly ci te d AE DP A and a number of aut hori ti es ref

ere nci ng the one-y ear li mit at ions peri od and AE DP A’s goal of f ina li tyand s peed of res olut ion. M oreove r, the dis tr ic t c ourt opini on inf ormed Huey t hathe was requi red t o s eek pos t- convi ct ion r el ie f

in st at e court and that the one-y ear s ta tut e of li mit at ions would be t oll ed

w hile he sou gh t post-con viction r elief in state court.No. 04- 2179

H uey v. Sm ith

-6- Huey c onte nds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourtorderwas mi s le adi ng. Speci f ic al ly , he ar gues tha t itwas hi s bel ie f

, bas ed on t he l anguage of the order , tha t “ the s ta tut e of li mit at ions would be tol le d not only af

te r [ he] f il ed his pos t- convi ct ion moti on, but a ls o duri ng the ti me i n which [ he]

s ought t o f

il e the moti on. ” How ever , in li ght of the aut hori ti es ci te d in the di s tr ic t c ourtopini on and A E DP A’s goal of f

ina li ty and spee d of res olut ion, itwas notrea s onabl e f or Huey to be li eve tha t the one- y ears ta tut e of li mit at ions would be t oll ed f or thi rt een months af

te r hi s ini ti al pet it ion was di s mis s ed prior to the f il ing of a mot ion f

or pos t- convi ct ion r el ie f

in s ta te court
. Under the f act s pres ent ed her e, Huey’ s la ck of knowledge of the f il ing deadl ine does not e quit abl y tol l the sta tu te o f lim ita tio n s. E ven i f Huey la cked actual knowledge, thi s Court has repe at edl y hel d tha t “ ignor ance of the la w al one is not s uf

f ic ie nt to warr antequi table tol li ng. ” A ll en v. Y uki ns , 366 F.3d 396, 403 (6t h Cir. 2004) (quot ing R ose v. D ole , 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6t h Cir. 1991)). “ E quit abl e t oll ing f ocus es pri mari lyon the pla int if f ’ s excus abl e i gnoranc e of the li mit at ions peri od. ” G rif fin , 399 F.3d at 636 (ci ti ng Lehman v. Unite d Stat es , 1 5 4 F .3 d 1 0 1 0 , 1 0 1 6 (9 th C ir . 1 9 9 8 ). H er e, H u ey’s ignor ance of

the f il ing de adl ine was notrea s onabl e. I I . H uey ’s Lack of

Dili gence i n P urs uing H is Rights W e m u st a lso co n sid er w h eth er H u ey e x er cis ed d ilig en ce in p u rsu in g h is r ig h ts. See G rif fin , 399 F.3d a t 639 ( “ Dili gence is the key to equi table tol li ng . . . ”) (Gil man, J
. , dis s ent ing)

. As not ed above, Huey wait ed approxi mat el y thi rt een months to return t o s ta te court
. In addi ti on, aft er h e fi nally exhau sted his st ate cou rt claims, he w aited almo st t hree mo nths to re- fi le hisNo. 04- 2179

H uey v. Sm ith

-7- hab eas petition in federal cou rt. Wh ile Hu ey did no t have a set deadline to return to state court, he s hould have been aw are tha t, under A E DP A, he had only one yea r to f il e a habeas pet it ion a nd that, at t he v ery least , ti me w as of t he essence in go ing to and from state cou rt. In R hine s v. Weber , 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the Supreme Courtdis cus s ed t he i s s ue of what

con sti tutes reasonab le delay in return ing to stat e cou rt. Altho ug h the C ou rt did n ot define w ith prec isi on ho w long a district cou rt cou ld give a petitioner to return to s tate cou rt, it c it e d w ith approva l the Z

arvela opini on f

rom t he Second Ci rcui t thatins truct ed dis tr ict court s to gi ve pet it ione rs thi rt y day s to go to s ta te courtand t hir tyday s f rom t he t ime tha t the s ta te court p ro ce ed in g s en d ed to re tu rn to fed er al c o u rt
. Id . at 278. S pecificall y, the C ou rt no ted that: [ t] hough, gener al ly , a pri s oner’ s pri nci pal int ere s t i s in obt ai ning s peedyf eder al rel ie f on his cl ai ms, not a ll pet it ione rs have a n inc ent ive to o b tai n f eder al rel ie f as quic klyas pos s ibl e. In par ti cul ar, capi ta l pe ti ti oners mightdel ibe rat el y engage in di la tory ta ct ic s to pr olong thei r in ca rc er ation and avoi d exec uti on of the s ent ence of

death. Wit hout t ime li mit s , pet it ione rs coul d f rus tr at e AE DP A’s goal of f ina li tyby draggi ng out i ndef ini te lythe irf

eder al habea s revi ew. Thus, dis tr ic t court s s hould pl ace rea s onabl e t ime li mit s on a pet it ione r’ s tr ip to s ta te courtand b ac k

. R hine s , 544 U.S. a t 277- 78 (i nte rnal ci ta ti ons omit te d). In a r ece nt unpubl is hed deci s ion, thi s Court hel d tha t wai ti ng approxi mat el y te n months to re tu rn to sta te co u rt co n stitu tes u n re aso n ab le d ela y. Wiedbr auk v. Lavigne , 174 Fed. Appx. 993 (6t h Cir. M ay 17, 2006 ). R el y ing on the Supreme Court’ s deci s ion i n R hine s , thi s Court

no ted that: T he dis tr ic t c ourtin the R hine s cas e gave the peti ti oner s ixty day s f or ea ch t ri p, and t he Supreme Court did notcommenton thi s le ngth of ti me. In cont ras t t o aNo. 04- 2179

H uey v. Sm ith

-8- grac e per iod of

on e t o two months , which t he R hine s Co urt w ou ld pr esum ably deem reason able, W iedbr auk w aited app rox imately ten mon ths to retur n to state court
. . . [ w]a it ing t en mont hs withoutjus ti f ic at ion was too l ong. Wiedbr auk , 174 Fed. Appx. at999 (i nte rnal ci ta ti ons omit te d). A t th e ti m e th e d istr ict c o u r t d i s m isse d H u ey’s fir st h ab ea s p eti tio n , H u ey h ad n in etyei ght da y s to timely f

il e wit hin the s ta tuto ry p eri od withoutinvoki ng the equi table tol li ng provi s ions

. Ins te ad, he f ai le d to pur s ue exha us ti on of his s ta te cl ai ms unt il thi rt een mont hs af te r dis mis s al of

his ini ti al habea s pet ition and te n months af te r t he expi rat ion of

the s ta tue of limitati on s. H uey con tends t hat waiting thirteen mon ths to return t o s tate cou rt w as reasonab le ina s much he i s a pr o s e pet it ione r and had to rese arc h compl ex is s ues of la w. Speci f

ic al ly , he note s tha t this courtin G rif fin f ound tha t a del ay of s ix and one- hal f months was re as onabl e f or an attorn ey to research issues of law

. H ow ever , H uey’s delay w as tw ice as long as the delay in G rif fin

. G iv en th e r ec en t o p in io n s o f R hine s and Wiedbr auk , which were de ci ded af te r G rif fin and i nvolve d s hort er de la y s tha n the peri od of ti me her e, we f

ind thatHuey’ s del ay of

thi rt een to r eturn t o s ta te courtwas unre as onabl e and tha t he fa il ed to exerci s e due dil ige nce i n purs ing h is r ig h ts. CO NC L US I ON We AFFI RM the de cisi on of the district court in d ism is si n g H uey’s petition an d its concl us ion thathe i s not ent it le d to equi table tol li ng of the one-y earli mit at ions peri od cont ai ned in 28 U. S.C. § 2244(d)( 1).