United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-10937

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Natalie Angeles, also known as Natalie Deschamps, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CR-14-A

Before Smith, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

Natalie Angeles appeals the sentence she received after pleading guilty

of drug trafficking. Her sole argument is that the district court coerced her 

into withdrawing objections to her presentence report by threatening to deny 

an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. We affirm.

I.

Angeles pleaded guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 

841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). She admitted to coordinating delivery of liquid 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 24, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-10937

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meth from sources in Mexico to distributors in California, Georgia, and 

Texas from 2016 to 2018. Given the volume of meth involved (a converted 

weight of 749,800 kilograms), the presentence report (“PSR”) calculated 

Angeles’s base offense level as 38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1(c)(1). It added three 

two-level enhancements because the meth was imported from Mexico, 

because Angeles distributed meth from her garage, and because she recruited 

and supervised drug couriers. See id. §§ 2D1.1(b)(5), 2D1.1(b)(12), 3B1.1(c). 

Deducting three points for accepting responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a), (b), her 

total offense level was 41. Her criminal history category of I resulted in a 

guidelines range of 324 to 405 months.

Angeles raised numerous objections to the PSR. Relevant here, she 

contested the drug quantity attributed to her, the three enhancements, and 

the lack of a reduction for her allegedly minor role in the conspiracy. An 

addendum to the PSR rejected Angeles’s objections and concluded she was 

frivolously denying relevant conduct such that she should forfeit any 

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Angeles withdrew her objection to 

the importation enhancement but filed supplemental objections regarding

drug quantity. In response, the probation officer reduced some of the meth

attributed to Angeles, but this did not change her base offense level.

The day before the sentencing hearing, the district court issued this

order:

After having considered the presentence report pertaining to 

defendant, Natalie Angeles, and the other sentencing items, the 

court tentatively has concluded that the objections made by 

defendant to the presentence report are without merit. Also, the 

court tentatively has concluded that defendant should not receive 

any reduction in her offense level based on acceptance of 

responsibility. . . . The parties should take such tentative 

conclusions into account in making decisions as to the 

presentations to be made at the sentencing hearing.

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At the hearing, the court began by asking whether Angeles intended to pursue 

any objections to the PSR besides those already withdrawn. Angeles’s 

counsel answered that she would pursue her objection to the drug-premises 

enhancement but would otherwise defer to the court’s ruling. The court 

responded that it had reached only “tentative” conclusions and urged

counsel to specify which objections Angeles wished to pursue. After briefly 

consulting with Angeles, counsel stated that Angeles would withdraw all 

objections.

The court proceeded to the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. It 

noted its “tentative conclusion” that the reduction was unmerited, but 

invited counsel to present evidence. Counsel argued that Angeles accepted 

responsibility, asked that she not be “penalized for zealous representation,” 

and pointed out that she had withdrawn all objections to the PSR.

Unconvinced, the court expressed “misgivings” that Angeles had met her 

burden under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 to “clearly demonstrate acceptance of 

responsibility.” The court pointed to her PSR objections which, although 

withdrawn, appeared to be “frivolous . . . and false denials of relevant 

conduct.” In response, Angeles’s counsel argued that—notwithstanding her 

specific objections to the PSR—Angeles had “never denied what her 

behaviors were with regard” to the basic facts of the crime. At that point the 

court relented, stating “I’m not going to deny her acceptance of 

responsibility.”

The court then accepted the PSR’s calculations with the resulting 

guideline range of 324 to 405 months. After hearing statements from one of 

Angeles’s children and from Angeles herself, however, the court imposed a 

below-guidelines sentence of 280 months, combined with a five-year term of 

supervised release.

Angeles timely appealed.

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II.

Because Angeles’s coercion argument was not raised in the district 

court, we review for plain error. United States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d 

293, 296 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Sykes, 559 F. App’x 331, 331 

(5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (reviewing similar unpreserved coercion 

argument for plain error). “To prevail on plain error review, a defendant 

must show (1) an error that has not been affirmatively waived, (2) that is clear 

or obvious, and (3) that affected his substantial rights.” United States v. 

Lindsey, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 4497205, at *2 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Puckett 

v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). “If a defendant satisfies these 

three conditions, we have the discretion to correct the error but should do so 

only if it ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, --- U.S. -

--, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1905 (2018)).1

III.

Angeles’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court “effectively 

coerc[ed]” her into withdrawing her objections to the PSR by threatening to 

withhold an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. We disagree. We have 

before rejected similar coercion arguments in unpublished opinions, and we 

follow the same course now. See United States v. Schenck, 697 F. App’x 422, 

423 (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished); United States v. Medina, 432 F. App’x 349, 

352 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).

“The spectre of judicial coercion . . . [may] arise where the court tells 

the defendant that he must withdraw the objection or lose the possibility of 

1 Angeles claims it is immaterial whether her coercion claim was preserved because 

it involves “structural error” that “require[s] automatic reversal.” She cites no authority 

for that proposition, however. The two cases she does cite involve, like this one, plain-error 

review of unpreserved claims of sentencing error. See United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 

281, 289–91 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying “plain error review” to unpreserved objection to 

sentencing enhancements); Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d at 296–99 (same).

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gaining a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.” Medina, 432 F. App’x 

at 352. We see no such strong-arming here, however. Rather, the court 

treated withdrawalseparately from acceptance. The court first explained that 

Angeles could persist in her objections if she wished. See, e.g., id. (noting the 

court “allowed Medina the opportunity to persist in the objection or 

withdraw it”). Only after Angeles withdrew her objections did the court 

analyze acceptance of responsibility. While recognizing that Angeles had 

dropped her objections, the court nonetheless examined whether the 

objections showed she had “frivolously contest[ed] or falsely denie[d] 

relevant conduct.” This was directly relevant to whether Angeles had 

“clearly demonstrate[d] acceptance of responsibility for [her] offense.” 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); see id. comment. (n.1(A)) (an “appropriate 

consideration[] include[s]” whether defendant “falsely denies, or frivolously 

contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true”).2 Indeed, 

the fact that the court deemed withdrawal irrelevant to Angeles’s acceptance

reduction, “[i]f anything, . . . demonstrates the absence of coercion.” Medina, 

432 F. App’x at 352 (emphasis added).

Finally, the court did not pressure Angeles into abandoning her 

objections by conveying before the hearing its “tentative conclusion” that 

her objections were “without merit.” “[I]t would be absurd for a detrimental 

legal ruling on an objection to be construed as the court’s coercing a 

defendant to withdraw that objection.” Id. To the contrary, it is appropriate 

for a district court to “express concern that a defendant is frivolously denying 

relevant conduct and explain this could be a reason to deny an acceptance 

reduction.” Schenck, 697 F. App’x at 423 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., United 

2 See Schenck, 697 F. App’x at 422–23 (affirming denial of acceptance reduction 

where, “despite pleading guilty and truthfully admitting to some relevant conduct,” 

defendant “acted in a manner not consistent with acceptance of responsibility by 

attempting to falsely deny material relevant conduct”) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. 

(n.1(A)).

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States v. Trevino, 829 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 2016) (court did not 

“improperly coerce defendant into withdrawing his objections to the PSR’s 

drug quantity findings” by “accurately warning defendant of the 

consequence of pursuing frivolous guidelines objections”) (cleaned up).

3

Here, the district court did no more than that and so did not cross the line 

into coercing Angeles to withdraw her objections.4

We therefore find no error, much less the “clear or obvious” mistake

necessary to overcome plain-error review. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.

AFFIRMED.

3 Notably, Angeles does not argue that her objections to the PSR had any merit. 

Nor does she contradict her probation officer’s assessment that her objections amounted 

to “falsely denying and frivolously contesting . . . relevant conduct.” Thus, this appeal 

does not address the situation where a district court allegedly coerces a defendant into 

withdrawing potentially meritorious objections to a PSR.

4 Instead of addressing our precedent, Angeles relies on cases finding “judicial 

coercion” where judges improperly pressure defendants to plead guilty by threatening a 

harsher sentence if they go to trial. See, e.g., Longval v. Meachum, 693 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 

1982) (finding judicial coercion where court stated that it “might be disposed to impose a 

substantial prison sentence” if defendant did not plead guilty). Such authorities are offpoint. Aside from the fact that no similarly coercive tactics appear in the record, Angeles 

admits that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure strictly prohibit courts from 

participating in plea negotiations. See also, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 197 F.3d 156, 158 

(5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “Rule 11(e)(1) is clear in its prohibition against all forms of 

judicial participation in or interference with the plea negotiation process”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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