### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 00 65 -C R

______________________________ BRENT E L L I S ERI CKSON, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 336th J udicial District Court

Fa nnin County , Texas Trial Court No. 20669

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyThe trial c ourt did not subsequent ly suspend Erickson' s sentence
. SeeT EX . C ODE C R IM . 1 P R OC . ANN . a

rt . 4 2. 12 , § 3( a ), (e ) ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 07 ) ( pe rm itt ingtr ia l c ourt to gra nt c omm un ity supervision if sentenc e does not e x cee d ten y ear s). 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON A Fa nnin County

jury found B rent Ellis Erickson guilty of attempted inde cenc y

with a child. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 15.01 (Ve rnon 2003) ( definingcriminal attempt), § 21.11 ( Ver non 2003) (de fining crime of

indece ncy

with a child). The victim, Erickson' s stepdaug hter, wa s eig hteen y ear s of ag e at the time of t rial, but she was only twelve or thirteen when the crime occur red. The tri al co u rt assessed E rickson' s punishment at ten y ear s' imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00. 1 Erickson now appea ls, raising two issues. For the reasons set forth below, we overrule both issues

and a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ' s ju dg me nt. I. Adm iss ion of t he Ext r ane ous Offen se I n his first issu e, E ri ck s o n contends the tria l court er red by admitting evide nce ( over Erickson' s objection) of a rec orded inter

view conduc ted by

Lubbock police of

ficials. We re view a trial court' s admission or exclusi on of ex trane ous offe nse evidence for abuse of discre tion. Moses

v . S tate , 105 S.W .3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial court' s evidentiar y ruling will not be disturbed on appe al as longas that ruling falls within the zon e of r easona ble disag ree ment. Id. ; Blac k we ll v . S tate , 193 S.W .3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, pet. re f' d). A trial court may

not admit evidence conce rning an extraneous c riminal offe nse mere ly for the purpose of

showing the ac cused' s propensity to commit crime. T EX . R. E V ID . 4 04 (b ); se e als o3

Ma y es v . S tate , 8 16 S.W. 2d 79 , 86 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); W ill iam s v . S

tate , 662 S.W .2d 344, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Howeve r, evide nce ab o u t an extraneous c riminal offe nse may "be admissible f

or other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppor tunity , intent, pr epar atio n , p lan, kn owl edge, i den ti ty , o r abs ence o f m is tak e or a cci den t .
. . ." T EX . R. E V ID . 4 04 (b ); Ma yes , 816 S.W. 2d a t 86 ; see W

illiams , 662 S.W .2d at 346. Ex t ra n eo u s -o ffense evide nce ma y further be admitted to rebut a de fensive the ory . Ab sh irev . S tate , 62 S.W .3d 857, 860 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. re f' d). "I f an obje ction is made to e x trane ous offe nse evidenc e under Rule 404(b), the propone nt of the evidenc e must persua de the tria l court that the e vidence has re levanc e apa rt from c hara cter
con for mi ty

. . . . " Id. "Whether

extraneo u s o ff

en s e evidence ha s releva

nce a part fr om char acte r
con for mi ty , as requ ir ed b y Ru le 40 4(b ), is a qu est io n fo r t he t ri al c ou rt ." Moses , 105 S.W .3d at 627. The c ase at bar illustrates a some what troubling conflict fa cingthe trial cour t in ruling on the admission of evidenc e of prior extraneous offenses, particularly those involving the se x ual abuse of a child. Clearly , the infere nce which may be drawn by the jury is that this evidence is likely to show a patter n of conduc t and that " if he did it once be fore , then he pr obably did it aga in," a

n infere nce which ca n be hea vily prejudicia l. Howeve r, an ap p el l at e court owes no less defe renc e to the trial court in making this dec ision of releva ncy apar t from cha rac ter c onformity

than the re viewingcourt aff ords the trial court in making a ny other re levanc y

deter minations. Id. (c i t i n g Mo ntg om e ry v . S tate , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on re h' g )).This prior assault on a c hild had some cog ent similarities to the one for which Erickson wa s 2 being tried. I n both circumstanc es: (1) the victim was a pre pubesce nt female , (2) the a buse occ urre d in t he c hil d' s h ome wh ile the c us tod ia l pa re nt was a

bs e nt, (3 ) E ri c ks on

wa s in a pa re nta l or a du lt a uth or ity fi g ur e ro le , ( 4) the a

bu se c ame un de r t

he g uis e of

dis c ipl ine of

the vic tim , a

nd (5 ) t he a bu se involved fondling or touching

. 4 Er ic ks on ' s f

ir st a pp e llate iss ue c omp la ins of the tr ia l court ' s dec isi on to a dmi t State ' s E xhibi t 4, a voice -re corde d interview la sting six m inutes and fifty -eig ht seconds. During this interview , Erickson c onfesse d to office rs with the Lubbock, Te x as, police d ep ar t m en t , that in J anuar y 2006, he had sexuall y

a s s a u lt e d ane ig h t- y e ar - o ld

N o la nCo u n ty g ir l ( a v ic ti m s e p ar a te f

r o m t h e o ne rele vant to Erickson' s conviction now on appe al bef ore this Court). 2 Th e State argue d b e fo re the tr ia l c ourt , a s it do e s a g a in n owon

a pp e a l, t hat th is e xtra

ne ou sof f e n s e e v i d e n c e w a s a dm i s s i b l e t o s h o w E r i c k s o na c t e d k n o w i n g l y an d i n t e n t i o n a l l y , an d

w i th intent to arouse or

g ratify his sex ual desire with respec t to the Fa nnin County crime alleg ed to have
oc c ur re d f ive y e ars e arl ie r. Th e State c or re c tly no te s th a t in te nt i s an e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t he c ri me of attempted inde cenc y

with a child. SeeT EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 15 .0 1(a ). Th e State su g g e sts Er ic ks on ' s c ri min a l in te nt " c ou ld not be inf e rr e d sole ly fr om his a c ts" on the date in q ue sti on be c a us e Erickson ha d claimed elsewher e that he was mere ly trying to g ive the victim in this case a hugand that any touching of the victim' s brea st was mere ly acc idental. Additio n all y , the re cord shows Erickson' s defe nse strate g y was that he lacke d any

intent to commit the crime at i ssue, and the rec ord further demonstrates Er ickson first ra ised this issue in his opening rema rks t o the j ury

(bef ore a ny evidenc e wa s prese nted by the State). More specific ally , Erickson' s counsel told the jury t h at the5

c e ntr a l is su e in t

he c a se wo uld

be " no t w he the r [E ri c ks on ] tr ie d to g ive [the vic tim ] a hug , [but] whether he was doing this for sexual gr atification." Eric kson' s counsel also a rgued in his opening statement (made prior to the pre sentation of anyevidenc e):

No w, the qu e st io ns th at y ou wi ll h a ve a t th e e nd

of thi s c a se are , d id Mr . E ri c ks on a c tua lly

tou c h th e br e a sts of

[the vic tim ]? I t' s p os sib le . I ' m g oin g to g ive y ou that. Did he do it for sex ual g ratification? The a nswer is a

bsolutely no. And i f t here was a touching , could i t have be en ac cidental a nd not for the pur

pose of sexual gra

tification? After y ou hear the evidenc e in this ca se, there is only one conc lusion y ou can c o m e t o an d

t h a tc o n c l u s i o ni s t h a tM r . E r i c k s o ni s n o t g u i l t y o f w h a tt h e S t a t e s ays he did. Duringthe pre sentation of evide nce a nd on cross-e x amination, Erickson a sked L isa Scamp, the State ' s fi rs t wi tne ss a

nd an o utc ry wi tne ss, wh e the r s he ha d s e e n E ri c ks on ph y sic a lly

or se xua lly assault the victim. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.072 (Ve rnon 2005) (cr eatingstatutory
e xce pti on to he ars ay

ru le fo r c hil d o utc ri e s) . Sc a mp r e pli e d th a t sh e did no t pe rs on a lly

wi tne ss Er ic ks on c omm it a ny a ssa ult a g a ins t th e vic tim . T he purp os e of thi s li ne of

qu e sti on ingwa s c le arl y to sugg est the alleg ed assa ult was a fic tion o f t he victim' s desig n to cause harm to her stepfathe r, Erickson. I n W he e le r v . S

tate , 67 S.W .3d 879, 886–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) , J udg e Cochran, writing for a majority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appe als, revie wed a conviction for ag g ravated sexual
ass a u lt in w h ic h th e St a te h a d b r o u g h t f o rth e v id e n c e o f o th e r mo le s tati o n s c o mm itte d by the appellant. Judge Cochran note d that Wheeler' s opening statement to the jury had outlined a theor y of lack of opportunity for Wheele r to have committed the crime. Id. a t 88 7 n .2 1 ( c iti ngfa vo ra bly6

this Court's dec ision in Ab sh ire ). Howeve r, the defe nse had also introduce d testimony from seve ral witnesses that Wheel er l ac k ed any opportunity

to commit the crime, and suc h evidenc e wa s prese nted be

for e the State proff

ere d the extraneous-of

fense evidenc e at issue in that ca se. Id. The W heele r c ourt no ted , " B e c a

us e nume ro us wi tne sse s te sti fi e d to a pp e lla nt' s la c k o f o pp or

tun ity to sexually molest S.E ., the re buttal testimony by S.S. provided, at a minimum, t he ' small nudge ' tow ard s c on tr a dic tin g a

pp e lla nt' s d e fe ns ive the or ie s and tow ard s p rovi ng that th e mol e statio n d id in deedoccu r." Id. at 888 (footnote omitted). I n conclusion, the c ourt held that the trial c ourt did not abuse its discre tion by

admitting the e x trane ous-offe nse evide nce. Id. at 888–89. I n Po we ll v. Sta te , the def endant ha d, during his opening statement, set for th a def ensive the or y that th e a lle g e d mo le statio n d id n ot oc c ur be c a us e oth e rs we re pr e se nt i n th e ro om at th e tim e of the a lle g e d o ff

e ns e . 6 3 S. W.3 d 43 5, 43 6 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ). Th is d e fe ns ive the or y wa s a lso prese nted duringPowell's c ro s s -e x amination of the victim. Id. The prose cution then counter ed Powell's attempts to negate the State' s evidenc e b y p r e s e nti n g , d

u ring its case- in-chief

, four witnesse s who testified that Powell had molested the m "unde r circ umstances a lmost i dentical to those of the char ged off

ens e." Id. a t 43 7. On

re vie wi ngPow e ll' s c la im that th e tr ial cou rt had a bu se d it s discretion by

admitting the e xtr a

n e o u s - o f f e n s e e v id e n c e , th is St a

te ' s highe st criminal court c oncluded the tri al co u rt " could have rea sonably decide d that the extraneous off ense e vidence at issue had nonchar acte r confo rm i t y re levanc e whe re it re butted appellant' s defe nsive theory that he had no
o p p o r tu ni ty

to com mi t t he o ffen se b ecaus e he w as n ever alo ne w it h t he co mp lai nan t. " Id. a t 4 3 8.7

Th e ma jor ity opin io n, a

uth or e d b y

Judg e He rv e y , th e n w e nt f ur the r a nd e xpre ssl y

dis a g re e d w ith J udg e Johnson's conc urringopinion that a n o p en ing statement ca n never serve to "ope n the door" to the S tate' s use of Rule 404(b) evidence in its case-in-c hief. Id. at 4 3 9

– 4 0 (c i t i n g United States v. Ba ri , 7 50 F .2 d 11 69 , 11 80 (2 nd Cir . 1 98 4) ; United States v. Price , 617 F.2d 455, 459–60 ( 7th Cir. 19 79 ); United States v. Olsen , 589 F.2d 351, 352 ( 8th Cir. 1978)). This Court has previously held that a de fenda

nt's ope ning statement can by itself "ope n the door" to Rule 404(b) e vidence

. J on es v . S tate , No. 06-07-00088-CR, 2007 Tex . App. L EXI S 9490, at *6 (Te x . App.—Texarkana Dec . 5, 2007, no pet.) (de signated for publication). Two other intermediate appellate courts of this State have rea ched a simil ar c onclusion, althoug h both have done so in unpublished opinions. Se e Aran da v . S tate , N o . 1 3

- 0 3

- 0 0 3 0 2

- C R , 2 0 0 4 T e x . Ap p . LE X IS 10370, at *3–4 (Te x . App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 18, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated f or pu bli c a tio n) ; Gu

zm an v . S tate , No
. 1 3

- 0 3

- 0 0 3 0 3

- CR , 2 0 0 4 T e x. Ap p . L E X I S 7 6 9 3 , a t * 6

– 8 ( T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i A ug . 2 4, 20 04 , n o pe t.) (m e m. o p. , n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) ; Mc

Do we ll

v . S tate , No. 05-02-00542- CR, 2002 Tex
. App. L EXI S 8191, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 20, 2002, pet. re f' d) (not desig nated for publication). Other c ourts (including our own, a t times) have been mor e ca

utious, c oncluding that a def endant' s opening statement mig ht open the door, but such decisions appe ar to have also included situations wherein the de fenda nt vigor ously

cross-e x amined the g overnme nt's w itnesses in further ance of that defe nsive theory and such e vidence came befor e t h e j u r y be for e the prosecution broug ht forth the a dditional ex trane ous-offe nse evide nce. See, e .g. ,8

Price , 6 17 F .2 d at 45 9– 60 ; Mo ra le s v . S tate , 22 2 S.W. 3d

13 4, 14 7–48 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 2 0 0 6 , n o p e t
. ) ; Ph il li

ps v . S tate , No. 06-06-00018- CR, 2006 Tex . App. L EXI S 10622, at *12–16 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na De c . 1 4, 20 06 , n o p e t.) (m e m. o p. , n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) ; Thomas

v . S tate , No. 05-03-01445- CR, 2004 Tex . App. L EXI S 6448, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 20, 20 04 , n o p e t.) (n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) ; an d cf. Bo ok

e r v. S tate , No. 02-02-00119- CR, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 9248, at *16–22 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas Oct. 30, 2003, no pet.) (not desig nated f or publication) (noting State had ar g ued that appe llant opened door to ext rane ous evidenc e via ope ning statement as we ll as vigor ous cross-e x amination of witness, but court avoide d issue by finding that

a pp e lla nt w a s n ot ha

rm e d w ith out ne c e ssa

ri ly de c idi nge xtra

ne ou s a dmi ssi on

wa s e rr or ); Mattox v. Sta te , N o. 06 -0 1- 00 21 2- CR, 20 03 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 90 07 , at *2–11 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na Oc t. 23, 2003, no pet.) (not desig nated for publ ication) (counsel' s opening statement, cr oss-examination of victim, and def

endant' s own testimony

espousing a lac k of opportunity defe nsive theory

supported tr ia l c ourt ' s de c isi on to a dmi t e xtra ne ou s- of fe ns e e vid e nc e ); Ke e n v . S tate , 85 S.W .3d 405, 412–15 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, pe t. ref' d) (c ounsel' s opening statement and vig orous cr oss-examination of victim reg ardingdefe nsive theory opened door for State to se ek admission of extraneous off ense)

. Erickson' s case does not requir e us t o h old that a def endant' s opening statement, standing

a lon e , may jus tif

y a dmi ssi on of Rul e 40 4( b) e vid e nc e to r e fute an o utl ine d d e fe ns ive str a te g y . T his is beca use, in addition to outli ning ( during his opening statement) a defe nsive theory about the lac k of int e nt, Er ic ks on

purs ue d a n atta c k o n the State ' s evi de nc e via c ro ss- e xami natio n th a t f

ur the re d th isThe State a nd Erickson ha d previously ag ree d to reda ct ce rtain audio port i o n s o f t he 3 confe ssion. A similar instruction appea red in the tria l court' s written jury char g e. 4 9 previously -outlined defe nsive strateg y . Only there afte r di d the S tate seek admission of the at-issue Rul e 40 4( b) e vid e nc e in thi s c a se . Th e tw o c on sid e ra tio ns of Er ic ks on ' s c ro ss- e xami natio n a nd his opening statemen t co m b i n ed to provide the trial c ourt with a re asonable justification to admit the S t at e's n ea rl y

s ev en -m i nu t e v i d eo t ap edR u l e 4 0 4 (b ) e v i d en ce as p ar t o f a s t ra t egy t o re b u tE ri ck s o n 's defe nsive strateg y

reg ardinga lac k of intent to comm it the crime then on tria l. No abuse of discretion is appa

rent fr om the appellate rec ord. We overrule Erickson' s first point of err or. II. Ja il C lot hing I n h is s e c on d point of er

ro r, Er ic ks on c on te nd s the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y pe rm itt ingthe State to show an hour- long vide otaped inter view of Eric kson by

law enf orce men t o ff

i ce rs; during the 3 interview, Erickson is c lad in distinctive orang e- and white-striped prisoner overa l l s . E ri ckson objected to the State pla

ying the videotape at trial on the basis that the videotape ' s visual depiction of Eric kson wea

ring jai l cl o thes violated his rig ht to due proce ss by impingingon his right to be presumed by the jury to be innocent. The trial court overr uled Erickson' s objection, permitted the State to play

the videotape , and ins tructed the jury (prior to publication of t he videotape ) that the fa ct Erickson wa s arr ested or othe rwise c onfined for the alleg ed crime should not be see n by the jury as pr ov idi ngan in fe re nc e of g uil t. On

a pp e a l, E ri c ks on

a tte mpt s to e qu a te (a ) a llo wi ng th e jur y to 410

watch a one-hour videotaped inter

view of him dressed i n jail clothes wit h (b) forcing him to wear ja il c lot hin g thr ou g ho ut t

he e nti re ty

of his tr ia l. T he br ie fi ngby Er ic ks on is s ke le ta l on

thi s p oint, ba re ly su ff ic ie nt t o r a ise the iss ue . Er ic ks on ha s ma de no e ff or t in his a pp e llate br ie f t o d e mon str a te that the allege d err or i s not harmless. I n fac t, Erickson' s appellate brief c ontains absolutely no harm analy sis or any

sug g estion of the ty

pe of ha rm ana ly sis which should be applied. I t is g e ne ra lly

ina pp ro pr iate to c omp e l a

c ri min a l de fe nd ant to sta nd tr ia l in pr iso n c lot

he s. Estelle v. W

illiams , 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976). Doingso deprives the defe ndan t o f t h e ri g ht to be presumed innoc ent. Ra nd le v . S tate , 8 2 6 S.W .2d 943, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Howeve r, briefly seeingthe ac cus ed i n h an dcuff s or other ja il clothing does not a utomatically

cre ate a
reve rsible er

ror. Gr e e n v . S

tate , 829 S.W .2d 938, 939 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 1992, no pet.) (pe r
c ur ium ) (m ome nta

ry ha llw ay

g lim ps e of a c c us e d in

ja il c lot he s d id n ot n e c e ssi tate mis tr ia l) ; se e als o W right v. Texas , 533 F.2d 1 8 5 , 1 8 7 (5 th Cir. 1976) (" We have c onsistently held that a br ief a

nd fortuitous encounte r of the de fenda nt in handcuff

s by jurors is not preju d i ci al and r equire s an
a ff ir mativ e sh ow ingof

pr e jud ic e by th e de fe nd ant. " ). No r d oe s th e fa c t th a t a jur y se e s so me photogr aphic e vidence that the ac cused w as once dresse d in j ail clothes nec essar ily cre ate e rror . Ho lli s v . S tate , 219 S.W .3d 446 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (int roduction of a mug shot of
an ac cused dr essed in jail clothing , taken at time of arr est, is not error ). I n this case , Erickson was not require d to wear jail clothes at any

point during the trial; rather , the only opportunity

during which the jury

was a llowed to view him in jail ga rb wa s on the11

approximately

one-hour -long videotaped inter view. The trial lasted four day s and duringthat entire period of time, Er ickson was pr esent befor e the jury , wea ring a suit. The jury

was c erta inly

awa re t h at h e h ad b een c harg ed with a major felony and it is common knowledg e that people who ar e simil arly char g ed ofte n spend at lea st a ce rtain amount of time in ja il; ther e is nothing in the showing
o f th is v id e o ta

p e to s u g g e s t t

h a t E r ic k s o n r e ma in e d in c ar c e r a te d f o r an y le n g thy p e r io d o f

ti me . We cannot sa y that playing a

one-hour videotaped inter

view in which Er i ck s o n appea rs in jail clothes
e ve n c los e ly

a pp ro xima te s b e ingc omp e lle d to we ar j a il c lot he s in the jur

y ' s p re se nc e fo r t

he e nti re ty of a f our-da y trial. To furthe r saf

eguard ag ainst the pos sibili ty that members of

the jury might infe r that the videotape d interview showingErickson dre ssed in jail clothes m ight taint their pre sumption of innoce nce, the trial court a dmonished the jury corr ectly that it should not ; even if it had be en er ror to admit the videotape o f E rickson we aringjail clothes into evidence , the admonishments and instructions provided by the court sufficie ntly cure d any such error. Theref ore, w e nee d not—and do not—presume that the t rial court abused its di scre tion by admitting the c omplained-of e vidence in this case. Be y o n d a re as onable doubt, under the circ umstances of

this trial, the showing of the videotape of

Erickson did not impinge on his c onstitut ionally -protec ted presumption of innoce nce. Havingno basis for a

finding of er

ror in having permitted the jury to vie w the videotape, w e nee d not eng ag e in any

harm a naly sis. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(a).12

Conclusion Fo r t h e r ea s o n s s t at ed , we o v erru l e E r i c k s o n 's p o i n t s o f e rr o r a n d af fi rm t h e t ri al co u rt 's jud g me nt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: J anuar y 10, 2008 Date D ecide d: Fe bruar y 15, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh