REVERSE and RENDER and Op inion Filed June 30, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01545-CV IN THE MATTER OF DEMPSTER A. ROSS On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 416-02315-2019 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, Justi ce Goldstein, and Justice Garcia Opinion by Justice Garcia Appellant Dempster Ross, pro se, appeals the denial of his petition to expunge arrest records related to an indictment th e State dismissed. Appellant raises three issues that we collectively construe as complaining about the denial of his expunction petition. For the reasons that follo w, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying the petition, reverse the trial court’s order, and render judgment granting appellant ’s petition fo r expunction. I. B ACKGROUND Appellant was arrested for burglary on February 17, 2013, and the case was indicted on April 2, 2013. On August 15, 2014, a jury convicted appellant of arson and he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. During the punishment phase of the–2– arson trial, the State adduced evidence relati ng to the investigation of and appellant’s arrest for burglary. On April 30, 2019, appellant filed a ve rified petition for expunction of records relating to his burglary arrest and attached a copy of the State’s motion to dismiss the burglary case and the order granting that motion. The motion to dismiss the case stated: The defendant was convicted [in the arson case] . . . Evidence in [the burglary case] was presented dur ing sentencing and taken into consideration by the court prior to sentencing. Due to the costs of prosecuting the cas e, coupled with th e fact that any sentence imposed in this case would not in all probability increase the time he is presently serving [,] prosecution . . . of this case cannot be justified. The order granting the motion was signed on August 8, 2014. The State filed an answer opposing th e expunction and argued that appellant is not entitled to expunction because he wa s “effectively convicted” of the burglary offense. According to the State, appella nt was convicted of burglary because evidence of that offense was adduced during the punishment phase of his arson trial. The State further argued that because the burglary evidence was used in the arson case, it is entitled to retain the record s pursuant to article 55.02 §4(a-2). See T EX
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. art. 55.02 §4(a-2). Finally, the State argued that appellant is not entitled to relief “to the extent” he seeks to expunge information received by the police prior to his arrest.–3– The trial court conducted a hearing on appellant’s petition. The State’s evidence, admitted over appellant’s objecti on, included a three-page offense report offered to show how and when the burgl ary case was develope d and one volume of the reporter’s record from the punishment phase of the arson trial. When the hearing concluded, the court denied appellant’s petition. That denial is the subject of this appeal. II. D ISCUSSION We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for expunction for abuse of discretion. State v. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018). However, to the extent a ruling on expunction turns on a question of law, we review an y legal conclusions de novo. See Ex parte R.P.G.P., No. 19-1051, — S.W.3d —, 2021 WL 1933952, at *3 (Tex. May 14, 2021); see also Collin Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Fourrier , 453 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2014, no pet.). Expunction is a statutorily created remedy that allows a person who has been arrested for the commission of an offense to have the records and files relating to the arrest expunged if the person meets the stat utory requirements of article 55.01 of the code of criminal procedure. Fourrier , 453 S.W.3d at 539; see T EX
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. art. 55.01. The purpose of the ex punction statute is to “protect wrongfully–accused people by eradi cating their arrest records.” In re State Bar of Texas , 440 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Tex. 2014). Because the cause of action is created by statute, all provisions are mandatory and re quire strict compliance for the action to–4– be sustained. Fourrier , 453 S.W.3d at 539; see also T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d at 620 (“A person is not entitled to expunction until all of the statutory conditions are met.”). The trial court has no equitable power to extend the statutory protections beyond the statute’s stated provisions. Fourrier , 453 S.W.3d at 539. Although the expunction statute appears in the code of criminal procedure, an expunction proceeding is civil in nature and the petitioner carries th e burden of proving compliance with the statutory requirements. Id .; see also Texas Dep’t of Pub. Serv. v. Velazquez , No. 05- 16-01326-CV, 2017 WL 4003427, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Appellant sought expunction of his burglary arrest r ecords pursuant to article 55.01(a)(2)(B), which provide s in relevant part: (a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a fe lony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relati ng to the arrest expunged if: (2) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no l onger pending and there was no courtordered community supervision unde r Chapter 42A for the offense, unless the offense is a Class C misdemeanor, provided that: (B) prosecution of the person for th e offense for which the person was arrested is no longer possible because the limitations period has expired. T EX
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. art. 55.01(a)(2)(B).–5– There is no dispute that the burglary case was dismissed and the limitations period has expired. 1 Nonetheless, the State argued th at appellant is not entitled to expunction because he was “eff ectively convicted” for burglary. In support of this proposition, the State’s an swer opposing e xpunction cited Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Wallace , 63 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.), but failed to explain its purported application to this case. In Wallace , the court concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to expunc tion because he completed deferred adjudication community supervision and the statute expressly precludes expunction for such a case. Id . The community supervision provision of the statute is not at issue here. Article 55.01 does not perm it expunction of records resulting in a final conviction. See S.J. v. State, 438 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. A pp.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.); T EX
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. art. 55.01(a)(2). Thus, the focus of our analysis is whether admission of the burglary eviden ce in the punishment phase of the arson case constitutes a final conviction for burglary under the expunction statute. The evidence that was adduced consis ted of testimony from the State’s witnesses concerning the police investigati on and the analysis of DNA evidence that did not exclude appellant as the perpetra tor of the offense. The State provided no

1 In addition, the record does not reflect how long appellant was incarcerated after his burglary arrest, but appellant’s verified petition stated that he had been “released,” and the State did not dispute it. Appellant was incarcerated for the arson conviction at the time of the expunction hearing.–6– authority, nor are we aware of any, hol ding that the use of such evidence in circumstances such as these equates to conviction for the unadjudicated offense. Article 37.07, §3(a), governs the admi ssibility of evidence during the punishment stage of a non-cap ital criminal trial. Erazo v. State , 144 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); T EX
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. art. 37.07, §3(a). The statute provides that “evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sent encing, including . . . evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act.” Id . Unlike the guilt-innocence phase, however, the question at punishment is not whether th e defendant has committed a crime, but instead what sentence should be asse ssed. Whereas the gu ilt-innocence stage requires the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, the punishment phas e requires the jury only to find that the prior bad act is attributable to the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith v. State , 577 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex . Crim App. 2019). Thes e are not equivalent. Therefore, we reject the proposition that the mere introduction of the burglary evidence in the punishment phase of the arson case compels a c onclusion that there was a final conviction for purposes of the expunction statute. Likewise, the record does not demonstr ate that the arson case was a plea in bar offense under section 12.45 of the penal code. See T EX
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. § 12.45. Section 12.45 of the penal code provides that, during a sentencing hearing and with the State’s consent, a defendant may admit his guilt of an unadjudicated–7– offense and request that the court take th e offense into account in determining the sentencing for the offense for which he stands adjudged guilty. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §12.45(a). If the trial court takes an adm itted offense into ac count under section 12.45, prosecution for that offense is barred. Id . §12.45(c). Recognizing the discord between admitting guilt to an offense and asserting entitlement to an expunction for that offens e, this court, like many of our sister courts, has interpreted the st atutory requirement that “the charge has not resulted in a final conviction” as prohibiting e xpunction of a plea in bar offense. See Fourrier , 453 S.W.3d at 542 (unadjudicated theft o ffense resulted in final conviction for purposes of expunction st atute because guilt for o ffense was admitted and considered in determining punishment for evading arrest offense); see also State v. N.R.J ., 453 S.W.3d 76, 82 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (when pursuant to section 12.45 of penal code, defendant adm its guilt of an offense by pleading guilty or nolo contendere to a second offense and requests that the trial court account for that admission in senten cing for the second offense, the admitted, unadjudicated offense is not expungable; “that is, the unadjudicated offense has resulted in a final conviction for purposes of the expunction statute because guilt for the offense was admitted and considered in determining punishment, albeit for another offense”); Ringo v. State , Nos. 09–14–00251–CV, 09–14–00252–CV, 2014 WL 5409060, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (criminal actions against petitioner we re barred from further prosecution under–8– section 12.45 of the penal code, and, for that reason, petitioner was not entitled to expunction of criminal actions dismissed under section 12.45). As one court has observed, this interpretation “is consis tent with those cases holding that a defendant’s admission of guilt to an unadj udicated offense becomes a part of the judgment and the defendant’s criminal record.” In re O.R.T., 414 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet. ). But nothing in the instant case establishe s that this was a plea in bar offense or that appellant otherwise admitted that he was guilty of burglary. Indeed, we have before us only a solitary volume of th e multi-volume reporter’s record in the punishment phase of the arson trial. That volume includes testimony from the State’s witnesses and appellant’s te stimony concerning counsel’s advice about testifying at trial. There is no mention of appellant’s plea in the arson case, nor is there an admission of guilt in the burglary case. Accord ingly, there is nothing to establish a final burglary conviction for pur poses of the expunction statute. In the court below, the State also ar gued that it was entitled to retain appellant’s burglary arrest r ecords pursuant to article 55.02 § 4(a-2), which provides: (a-2) In the case of a person who is the subject of an expunction order on the basis of an acquittal , the court may provide in the expunction order that the law enforcement ag ency and the prosecuting attorney retain records and files if: (1) the records and files are ne cessary to conduct a subsequent investigation and prosecution of a pe rson other than the person who is the subject of the expunction order; or–9– (2) the state establishes that the r ecords and files are necessary for use in: (A) another criminal case, including a prosecution, motion to adjudicate or revoke community supervision, parole revocation hearing, mandatory supervision revocation h earing, punishment hearing, or bond hearing; or (B) a civil case, including a civil su it or suit for possession of or access to a child. T EX
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. art. 55.02 § 4(a), (a-2) (Em phasis added). As reflected in the unambiguous language of the statute, the statutory exception applies to cases resulting in acquittal. See id. There was no acquittal here. Instead, the burglary case was dismissed because the State deemed it neither economical nor advantageous to pursue. The only other statutory exception allo wing the State’s retention of files that might otherwise be expunged pertains to cas es in which a person is still subject to conviction because the statute of limitations has not run, and that exception is also not applicable here. See id . § 4(a). Finally, the State’s answer opposing exp unction asserted that “to the extent [Ross] seeks expunction of information recei ved by the police prior to his arrest he is not entitled to relief.” In support, the State relied on Ex parte S.C ., 305 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.), a case in which the court considered whether an expunction orde r was overly broad because it required expunction of more than the records and files related to the petitioner’s arrest. Id . at 260. The court concluded that the order was overly broad because the statute does–10– not “encompass investigative files and record s that existed prior to, and independent of, the arrest.” Id. at 263. But we need not consider the permissi ble breadth of a hypothetical order; the trial court denied the petition and did not issue an order. Moreover, we do not read appellant’s petition to request expunction of files independe nt of the arrest or to otherwise include anything more than wh at the statute requires—expunction of the records and files relating to the burglary arrest. See T EX
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. art. 55.01(a)(2)(B). Because appellant proved that he is entitled to expunction of the records and files related to his arrest, the trial cour t abused its discretion by denying the petition. We sustain appellant’s complaint about th e denial of his expunc tion petition, reverse the trial court’s order, and render ju dgment granting appellant’s petition for expunction. 2

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2 We need not consider any remaining issues. T EX
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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
IN THE MATTER OF DEMPSTER A. ROSS,
No. 05-19-01545-CV On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 416-02315- 2019. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Chief Justice Burns and Justice Goldstein participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that: Ross's petition for expunction is GRANTED. It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered June 30, 2021.