RENDERED: JUNE 28, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-0013-MR

DAYELIN GONZALEZ ALVAREZ APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 22-CI-002647

ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND 

CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, A. JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Dayelin Gonzalez Alvarez (“Alvarez”) is appealing the 

Jefferson Circuit Court’s orders granting Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance 

Company’s petition under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 304.39-280(3) to 

conduct a second Examination Under Oath (“EUO”). Finding no abuse of

discretion, we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2022, Alvarez was involved in a collision with another 

vehicle. Both vehicles remained in service, and no party reported injuries at the 

time of the incident. Alvarez subsequently alleged that she had sustained injuries

resulting from the collision. The vehicle in which Alvarez was traveling was 

covered by an insurance policy with Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance 

Company (“Allstate”). Alvarez sought reimbursement from Allstate for medical 

expenses. After applying with Allstate for Basic Reparations Benefits (“BRB”),

also known as “no-fault” benefits, Allstate requested that Alvarez submit to an 

EUO pursuant to KRS 304.39-280(3), which Allstate conducted in April 2022. 

Following Alvarez’s first EUO, Allstate filed a petition in Jefferson 

Circuit Court on May 27, 2022, for an order compelling Alvarez to submit to a 

second EUO. As grounds, Allstate cited the minor damage to both vehicles, the 

lack of injuries reported at the scene, and its suspicion that Alvarez had been 

improperly solicited by a medical provider the day after the accident. Along with 

its petition, Allstate provided six (6) exhibits, including the police report stating 

that it was a non-injury accident, Alvarez’s BRB application, the applicable 

Allstate policy, and the contract between Allstate and Alvarez. Alvarez objected to 

Allstate’s request for a second EUO, claiming that Allstate had obtained all the

relevant information at the first EUO.
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After a hearing on August 31, 2022, the circuit court entered an order 

on October 14, 2022, granting Allstate’s petition for the second EUO. In its order, 

the circuit court stated the following:

Kentucky law does not prohibit a second EUO, and the 

circumstances of this case warrant it. EUOs are 

permissible for investigating the circumstances 

surrounding an accident. [State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 

v. Adams, 526 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2017)]. While Ms. 

Alvarez would limit the circumstances to just the 

accident itself, the scope is necessarily broader. The 

medical care received as a result of an accident logically 

falls under the circumstances surrounding an accident. If 

insurance companies are required to investigate claims to 

prevent fraud, then they must be able to carry out those 

investigations. KRS 304.47-080. Allstate’s request here 

is proper and not an attempt to unduly harass or delay 

Ms. Alvarez and her claim.

The circuit court’s order further stated that “[t]he EUO shall occur within thirty 

(30) days from issuance of this order, and be limited to a reasonable time.” 

Thereafter, on November 14, 2022, Allstate filed a motion to enforce 

the circuit court’s October 14, 2022, order. After a hearing, the circuit court 

granted the motion and entered an order requiring Alvarez to “submit to an [EUO] 

at a mutually convenient date and time no later than thirty (30) days from the entry 

of this Order[.]” The order further stated that “[t]he EUO shall include questioning 

regarding [] alleged injuries from subject accident, medical treatment for subject 

accident and solicitation.” Alvarez subsequently filed this appeal.

We will discuss further facts as they become pertinent.
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ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

As the Kentucky Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he issue before us is 

one of law, which we review de novo.” Adams, 526 S.W.3d 63 at 65 (citation 

omitted). Nevertheless, in a case such as this, where a statute tasks the circuit

court with making a good-cause determination, “the question of good cause is 

essentially one of reasonableness to be determined by the particular facts of each 

case.” Nichols v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 677 S.W.2d 317, 321 

(Ky. App. 1984). This Court will reverse the circuit court’s decision only upon a 

showing that it abused its discretion in making its decision. Miller v. U.S. Fidelity 

& Guar. Co., 909 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Ky. App. 1995). “The test for abuse of 

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, 

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 

914 (Ky. 2004) (citation omitted).

2. Discussion

The Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (the “MVRA”) 

provides that “every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance 

or use of a motor vehicle has a right to [BRB.]” KRS 304.39-030(1). Because a 

claimant is only entitled to receive BRB for motor vehicle accident-related losses, 

reparation obligors are entitled to conduct a reasonable investigation to determine 
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if such a relationship exists. Indeed, Allstate has a duty under Kentucky law to 

investigate questionable BRB claims and to “maintain effective procedures and 

resources to deter and investigate fraudulent insurance acts prohibited by this 

subtitle, including a unit that will investigate suspected fraudulent insurance

acts[.]” KRS 304.47-080. 

To expedite that investigation, the MVRA provides for the disclosure 

of certain information by BRB claimants. If a dispute arises between the claimant 

and the reparation obligor regarding “information required to be disclosed, the 

claimant or reparation obligor may petition the Circuit Court . . . for an order for 

discovery including the right to take written or oral depositions.” KRS 304.39-

280(3). 

In this case, Alvarez argues on appeal that the scope of permissible 

questions in an EUO is limited to the accident itself. However, as the circuit court 

correctly held, “the scope is necessarily broader.” In Adams, the Kentucky 

Supreme Court addressed the scope of KRS 304.39-280(3) and was tasked with 

determining whether an insurance company “is permitted unilaterally to require 

that a person seeking coverage undergo” an EUO. 526 S.W.3d at 64. In Adams, a 

vehicle in which three passengers were riding was rear-ended by another vehicle. 

Id. The passengers complained of injuries and submitted applications for BRB

benefits. Id. Because of alleged suspicious circumstances concerning the claim, 
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State Farm requested the adult passengers submit to an EUO. Id. One of the 

passengers refused to do so, and State Farm denied the claim of the noncooperating passenger for refusal to appear for the EUO. Id. at 65.

The Kentucky Supreme Court held that “nothing in the MVRA 

prevent[ed] State Farm from requiring a person seeking benefits under the policy 

to submit to a[n] [EUO] as to the circumstances surrounding the accident.” Id. at 

68. Thus, the Court held that the circuit court had properly entered summary 

judgment in favor of State Farm dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. Id. In reaching 

this decision, the Court stated: 

Because some of the issues listed by State Farm involved 

the acquisition of accident-related information, the circuit 

court correctly found that Adams was required to submit 

to questioning under oath regarding those issues as a 

condition precedent to coverage. 

Id. 

Ultimately, the Adams Court concluded its analysis with the following 

statement: 

Finally, we recognize that the distinction between issues 

involving medical-related questions and issues involving 

accident-related questions may not always be obvious 

and that those issues may sometimes be inter-related. 

However, we have faith that our trial courts and the 

parties will be able to perform the necessary analysis to 

make those distinctions until such time as the General 

Assembly deems it appropriate to address this potential 

dilemma.
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Id. 

Similarly, we see no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s goodcause determination in this case. As in Adams, some of the issues listed by Allstate

pertained to the acquisition of accident-related information. Moreover, Allstate’s 

claim investigation deemed Alvarez’s claim suspicious. Indeed, the day after the 

accident, Alvarez went to a medical provider known by Allstate to solicit in 

violation of Kentucky law. Further, the medical provider billed Alvarez for an 

“extensive amount of chiropractic treatment” resulting from a “non-injury 

collision” with “minor” damage to both vehicles. Allstate further expressed 

concerns that the medical provider billed for services not rendered and that an 

unlicensed individual performed the treatments allegedly rendered to Alvarez. We 

see nothing “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal 

principles” in the circuit court’s good-cause determination. Miller, 146 S.W.3d at

914 (citation omitted).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s orders

requiring Alvarez to submit to a second EUO.

JONES, A., JUDGE, CONCURS.

CALDWELL, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE 

OPINION.
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CALDWELL, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent. In my 

view, the trial court abused its discretion as its decision is not supported by sound 

legal principles. See Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)

(“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was 

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”). 

In the present case, Allstate has already examined Alvarez under oath 

concerning the circumstances of the accident itself in the first EUO. And Allstate 

has not requested records related to Alvarez’s medical care through the means 

specifically provided for in the MVRA. See KRS 304.39-280(1)(b)-(c). 

Therefore, there was no dispute about medical information required to be disclosed 

prior to the filing of the petition to examine Alvarez under oath, which Allstate 

indicated was premised partly under KRS 304.39-280(3). But I read KRS 304.39-

280 as a whole to only permit depositions about medical issues if there has been a 

denial of a reparation obligor’s requests for medical records to be made available 

under KRS 304.39-280(1)(b)-(c). 

After all, KRS 304.39-280(1) states in pertinent part:

(1) Upon request of a basic or added reparation claimant 

or reparation obligor, information relevant to a claim 

for basic or added reparation benefits shall be 

disclosed as follows:

. . .
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(b) The claimant shall deliver to the reparation 

obligor a copy of every written report, previously 

or thereafter made, relevant to the claim, and 

available to him, concerning any medical treatment 

or examination of a person upon whose injury the 

claim is based and the names and addresses of 

physicians and medical care facilities rendering 

diagnoses or treatment in regard to the injury or to 

a relevant past injury, and the claimant shall 

authorize the reparation obligor to inspect and 

copy relevant records of physicians and of 

hospitals, clinics, and other medical facilities.

(c) A physician or hospital, clinic, or other medical 

facility furnishing examinations, services, or 

accommodations to an injured person in 

connection with a condition alleged to be 

connected with an injury upon which a claim is 

based, upon authorization of the claimant, shall 

furnish a written report of the history, condition, 

diagnoses, medical tests, treatment, and dates and 

cost of treatment of the injured person, and permit 

inspection and copying of all records and reports 

as to the history, condition, treatment, and dates 

and cost of treatment.

And KRS 304.39-280(3) only provides that a petition for discovery including a 

deposition may be filed “[i]n case of dispute as to the right of a claimant or 

reparation obligor to discover information required to be disclosed[.]” 

Without having first requested the medical records discussed in KRS 

304.39-280(1)(b)-(c) and so not having been denied this information to which it 

was entitled on request, Allstate was not entitled to depose Alvarez about any 

issues related to her medical treatment pursuant to KRS 304.39-280(3). 
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Consequently, there was no good cause to order a deposition about medical 

treatment issues regardless of Allstate’s expressing concerns about possible 

solicitation. 

Furthermore, the trial court clearly misread our Supreme Court’s 

guidance in Adams, 526 S.W.3d at 63, in deciding to permit Allstate to conduct a 

second EUO based on Allstate’s alleged concerns about solicitation to permit 

inquiry about the circumstances of Alvarez’s medical treatment after the accident.

The trial court stated that EUOs to investigate the circumstances surrounding an 

accident were permissible, citing Adams, 526 S.W.3d at 68. After citing Adams, 

the trial court stated: “The medical care received as a result of an accident 

logically falls under the circumstances surrounding an accident.” But the trial 

court failed to recognize that Adams permitted EUOs only for the purpose of 

investigating the circumstances of the accident itself, and not for the purpose of 

obtaining information solely related to medical treatment. See id. at 66-68. 

Our Supreme Court noted that the MVRA provided for specific means 

for obtaining information about the claimant’s medical condition and treatment. 

Id. at 66-67. “However, the MVRA does not specifically provide for the 

disclosure of information regarding the underlying motor vehicle accident.” Id. at 

67. So, our Supreme Court stated: “nothing in the MVRA prevents State Farm 
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from requiring a person seeking benefits under the policy to submit to a statement 

under oath as to the circumstances surrounding the accident.” Id. at 68. 

But our Supreme Court also made clear that information relating 

solely to medical issues rather than the circumstances of the accident must be 

sought under relevant MVRA provisions rather than through an EUO:

Because the MVRA specifically provides for the sharing 

of documentation regarding a claimant’s medical 

condition and methods for resolving disputes regarding 

failure to provide that documentation as well as for 

resolving disputes regarding a claimant’s mental or 

physical condition, a reparation obligor must avail itself 

of the provisions of the MVRA to resolve such issues. A 

reparation obligor cannot attempt to resolve those issues 

through “questioning under oath” or any other similar 

procedure that is outside the boundaries established by 

the MVRA.

As noted above, State Farm listed four issues as 

being problematic: (1) whether the bodily injury or 

property damage was caused by the accident; (2) whether 

the injury was caused by a hit-and-run vehicle; (3) 

whether the accident arose out of the ownership, 

maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle; and 

(4) whether Adams had made false statements in 

connection with her claim. The first of these issues 

involves medical information and State Farm should have 

pursued resolution of that issue through the provisions of 

the MVRA. The second and third issues are related to 

the accident itself and are proper subjects for questioning 

under oath. The fourth issue may involve both medical 

and accident-related questions. As with the first issue, 

State Farm should have pursued any medical-related 

questions through the provisions of the MVRA. Because 

some of the issues listed by State Farm involved the 

acquisition of accident-related information, the circuit 
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court correctly found that Adams was required to submit 

to questioning under oath regarding those issues as a 

condition precedent to coverage. 

526 S.W.3d at 68. 

Adams approved the use of an EUO to obtain information about the 

circumstances of the accident such as whether a hit-and-run occurred or whether an 

uninsured motor vehicle was involved. Adams explicitly disapproved of using the 

EUO to determine whether the accident caused the personal injury – a medical 

issue. And regarding issues about whether the claimants made false statements in 

connection with the insurance claim, Adams perhaps indicates that examination 

under oath about statements made concerning the accident would be proper but 

suggests that examination under oath about statements made in seeking medical 

care would not be proper. Id. 

Our Supreme Court recognized that: “the distinction between issues 

involving medical-related questions and issues involving accident-related questions 

may not always be obvious and that those issues may sometimes be inter-related.” 

Id. But it expressed faith that trial courts and parties could make the necessary 

distinctions between issues about the circumstances of accidents and purely 

medical issues. Id. 

While perhaps in other circumstances it may be difficult to separate 

medical issues from issues about the circumstances of an accident, it is not difficult 
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to see here that questions about Alvarez’s seeking medical treatment later are 

distinct from questions about the circumstances of the accident itself. And yet, 

Allstate has obtained from the trial court an order requiring Alvarez to submit to a 

second EUO for “questioning regarding [] alleged injuries from subject accident, 

medical treatment for subject accident and solicitation.” 

The trial court’s order allowing this type of questioning directly 

related to Alvarez’s medical treatment and “solicitation” violates our Supreme 

Court’s clear direction in Adams, 526 S.W.3d at 66-68, that EUOs must not be 

permitted for the purposes of obtaining information related solely to medical care 

and not related to the accident itself. Therefore, I would reverse. 

I recognize that there is a lack of published Kentucky precedent about 

if or under what circumstances a reparations obligor may be entitled to conduct an 

examination under oath or a deposition concerning whether improper solicitation 

may have occurred following a motor vehicle accident. But in my estimation, 

Allstate was not entitled to file a petition for a deposition concerning any 

information related to medical treatment because it had not sought nor been denied 

medical records to be made available upon request under the MVRA. See KRS 

304.39-280. And Adams clearly prohibited examinations under oath – outside the 

type of depositions which might be permitted upon denial of requests for 
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disclosure of medical records – on issues which did not relate to the accident itself 

but were solely related to medical treatment. 526 S.W.3d at 66-68. 

Therefore, the trial court’s ordering Alvarez to undergo an 

examination under oath about her medical treatment and solicitation was not 

proper pursuant to either KRS 304.39-280(3) or Adams, 526 S.W.3d at 63. So, I 

would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with directions to dismiss the 

request for a second EUO. 

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

John Patrick Ward, Jr.

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

R. Christian Garrison

Louisville, Kentucky