[Cite as State v. Hinojosa, 2013-Ohio-4110.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SENECA COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-12-41 

 v. 

CHRISTAL A. HINOJOSA, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 11 CR 0291 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: September 23, 2013 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Jonathan G. Stotzer for Appellant 

Derek W. DeVine and Rhonda L. Best for Appellee 
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SHAW, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Christal A. Hinojosa (“Hinojosa”), appeals the 

September 13, 2012 judgment of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas 

journalizing her conviction by a jury for one count of child endangerment resulting 

in serious physical harm to the child, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), (E)(2)(c), 

and one count of permitting child abuse, in violation of R.C. 2903.15(A), and 

sentencing her to serve thirty-six months in prison. 

{¶2} In December of 2010, Hinojosa had custody of K.M. (born September 

2008). K.M.’s father lived in Georgia, where he was employed as a member of 

the military. On December 17, 2010, Hinojosa and her two minor children, K.M. 

and A.H. (born April 2010), moved into a home in Fostoria, Ohio, with Hinojosa’s 

boyfriend, Dave Roberts (“Roberts”). Roberts’ minor son also lived in the home 

on a part-time basis. Between December 2010 and February 2011, family 

members and friends began observing suspicious bruising on K.M.’s body. The 

following testimony was adduced at trial regarding the nature of these injuries. 

December 2010

{¶3} Kelly Stephens, Hinojosa’s aunt, testified that she first noticed 

something strange with K.M. during Christmas 2010 when she observed him 

wince in pain as his grandmother picked him up. She saw K.M.’s grandmother lift 

his shirt to reveal a huge bruise on his lower back. Kelly asked Hinojosa how 
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K.M. received this bruise and she responded that Roberts told her that K.M. fell 

down the stairs while she was at work. 

January 2011

{¶4} Deb Puffenberger, Hinojosa’s grandmother, testified that she first 

noticed bruising on K.M. in the early part of January 2011 when she saw a large 

black and blue bruise on K.M.’s tailbone. When she asked Hinojosa about the 

bruise, Hinojosa responded that Roberts told her that K.M. fell down the stairs 

while she was at work. Deb testified that Hinojosa and her children lived with her 

prior to moving in with Roberts and she never noticed K.M. to have strange 

bruising or trouble with the stairs. 

{¶5} April Robbins, a family friend, testified that she has known K.M. 

since his birth and saw him often. April explained that Hinojosa would let her 

“have” K.M. and his sister for days or weeks at a time and that Hinojosa would 

simply contact her every couple days to see how the children were doing. April 

recalled that after K.M. began living with Roberts, he would cry when she dropped 

him off at home. April testified that K.M. did not want to be at the home he 

shared with Roberts. 

{¶6} On the stand, April recalled the last time she saw K.M. On January 

15, 2011, Hinojosa dropped K.M. off to spend time with April and her family at 

April’s parent’s home. April explained that she was not at home at the time, but 
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received a phone call from her parents telling her she needed to come home 

immediately. April’s sister, Ashley, had just given K.M. a bath and noticed 

extensive bruising all over K.M.’s body. Ashley testified at trial that these bruises 

were all down K.M.’s back and in “random” places on his body. Ashley stated 

that she had never seen bruising like this on K.M. 

{¶7} April recalled that when she returned home that night Ashley and her 

father pulled her into the kitchen and lifted up K.M.’s shirt. April testified that she 

observed bruises all down his back, under his bottom, down his legs and on his 

upper arms. April stated that some of the bruises were new and some were older. 

She had never seen bruising like this on K.M. The extensive bruising on K.M. 

prompted April’s father to contact the Fostoria Police Department and take K.M. 

to the police station. 

{¶8} At the police station, Officer Brandon Bell examined K.M. and 

observed bruising all over his body, including on his face, back, and chest. Officer 

Bell took several pictures of K.M.’s body, which depicted numerous bruises in 

various stages of healing. Officer Bell wrote a complaint and contacted the 

Seneca County Department of Job and Family Services (“SCDJFS”). No arrests 

were made or charges filed as a result of this incident. The record indicates that 

SCDJFS conducted an initial investigation but then closed the case, finding any 
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allegations of abuse to be unsubstantiated. K.M. returned home with April and her 

family from the police station. 

{¶9} After the incident, Hinojosa told April that K.M. received the bruises 

from falling down and rough playing with Roberts’ son. However, April recalled 

that it was not typical of K.M. to play rough and that the bruises, especially the 

ones on his back, did not seem consistent with falling down. Hinojosa no longer 

permitted April to have contact with K.M. once she learned that April took K.M. 

to the police station. 

February 2011

{¶10} On February 15, 2011, Deb Puffenberger, Hinojosa’s grandmother, 

babysat K.M. while Hinojosa ran an errand. At that time, Deb noticed bruising on 

K.M.’s face. She also recalled that K.M. could barely stand up and appeared to be 

walking with a limp. After Hinojosa returned, Deb went to the home of her 

daughter, Kelly Stephens. Kelly testified that she also recalled seeing K.M. walk 

with a limp during this time. Deb testified that she was very upset about K.M.’s 

physical state and worried about his safety. 

{¶11} Deb contacted the Fostoria Police Department and met with Officer 

Shilo Frankart to fill out a police report. Kelly was with Deb at the police station 

and recalled that Deb was so upset and nervous that she could not complete the 

report. As a result, Deb dictated what she observed to Kelly, who filled out the 
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report. Officer Frankart asked Deb to bring K.M. to the police station so that he 

could observe and document K.M.’s injuries in a controlled environment. Deb 

testified that she went to Hinojosa and Roberts’ home to retrieve K.M. while 

Hinojosa was at work. However, Roberts would not let her have K.M. Deb 

recalled that Roberts told her to leave the residence and slammed the door in her 

face. Deb then went to Kelly’s home and Kelly contacted K.M.’s paternal 

grandparents. 

{¶12} When Deb was unable to bring K.M. to the police station, Officer 

Frankart then went to Hinojosa and Roberts’ home to investigate. Officer Frankart 

arrived at the home and was greeted by Roberts. Hinojosa was not home during 

this visit. Officer Frankart advised Roberts of the child abuse allegations and 

asked to come in. There, he observed three children in the home, K.M., A.H. and 

Roberts’ two-year-old son. Officer Frankart noticed “severe” bruising on K.M’s 

face, neck, and back. Specifically, he recalled seeing approximately twenty 

bruises on K.M.’s body. He inquired to Roberts about the bruises, who stated that 

some of the bruises were caused by K.M. falling down the stairs and some were 

caused by K.M. falling out of a booster seat and hitting his face on the kitchen 

table. 

{¶13} Officer Frankart recalled seeing finger marks along K.M.’s face. He 

asked Roberts specifically about these marks. Roberts then admitted to slapping 
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K.M. Roberts explained that K.M. bit him as he was wiping K.M.’s face. Roberts 

claimed he slapped K.M. as a reflex and was very apologetic about the incident. 

Other than the bruising, Officer Frankart did not observe a limp or any other 

injury. He recalled that K.M. was alert and behaving normally. He advised 

Roberts of his concerns about the bruising. Officer Frankart then left the home 

and contacted a caseworker at the SCDJFS, who indicated that an investigation 

was underway. 

{¶14} Later that day, Officer Frankart received a call regarding a 

disturbance at Hinojosa and Roberts’ home. When Officer Frankart arrived at the 

home, he observed K.M.’s paternal grandparents attempting to remove K.M. from 

the residence. During this time, Officer Frankart learned that K.M.’s paternal 

grandparents had previously filed a police report in their hometown of Fremont, 

Ohio, regarding bruising they found on K.M. during a visitation. K.M.’s paternal 

grandparents expressed that they were extremely concerned about K.M.’s wellbeing living with Roberts. 

{¶15} At this time, Hinojosa was now at the home. Officer Frankart 

testified that he did not observe any new injuries on K.M. However, he advised 

Hinojosa to take K.M. to the hospital for a physical examination to alleviate any 

family concerns about abuse. Hinojosa took K.M. to the Fostoria Community 

Hospital, where a medical examination was performed. There, Officer Frankart 
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took several pictures of K.M.’s body, which depicted numerous bruises, some 

severe, all over his face, neck, and body. 

{¶16} Jennifer Hartson, an R.N. assigned to the emergency room at the 

Fostoria Community Hospital, testified that she treated K.M. on February 15, 

2011, and documented 28 different bruises on his body of various sizes and in 

different stages of healing. She recalled Hinojosa explaining that some of the 

bruises on his face occurred from him falling off a chair onto the hardwood floor 

and being slapped by Roberts. However, when asked about several of the other 

bruises, Hinojosa responded that she did not know how they occurred. Nurse 

Hartson testified that an X-ray revealed K.M. had a broken clavicle that was in the 

process of healing. After a couple of hours, K.M. was treated and released. He 

spent a few days with Deb before returning home with Hinojosa, who continued to 

live with Roberts. 

{¶17} Kelly testified that she continued to see new bruises on K.M. every 

time she saw him. She explained that when she asked Hinojosa about the injuries 

Hinojosa would simply repeat the same explanations given to her by Roberts about 

falling down the stairs, falling out of the booster seat, and rough playing with 

Roberts’ son. Kelly testified that all of these injuries happened when Hinojosa 

was at work and K.M. was in Roberts’ care. Kelly recalled that Hinojosa became 

very defensive when asked about K.M.’s well-being in the home and she insisted 
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that family members were out of line for telling her how to raise her children. 

When confronted about Roberts’ role in the injuries, Hinojosa denied that Roberts 

would do anything to hurt K.M. 

{¶18} Deb testified that she also continued to notice strange bruising on 

K.M. Deb expressed concern about the injuries to Hinojosa, in particular she 

found it alarming that the injuries consistently occurred when Hinojosa was not at 

home. However, Hinojosa retorted that she did not find Roberts’ explanations of 

the injuries suspicious and became increasingly defensive. Deb recalled explicitly 

telling Hinojosa that she believed Roberts was abusing K.M. Deb testified that 

Hinojosa became angry and told Deb to leave her home and never return. 

{¶19} On February 28, 2011, while Hinojosa was at work, Roberts called 9-

1-1 and reported K.M. to be unresponsive. K.M. was transported to the Fostoria 

Community Hospital by ambulance. The medical testimony at trial indicated that 

K.M. was limp and unable to breathe on his own. Due to his critical condition, 

K.M. was life-flighted to the Toledo Children’s Hospital. There, medical 

personnel determined K.M. to be suffering from a brain injury—specifically a 

subdural hematoma and retinal hemorrhaging, both of which are indicators of 

shaken baby syndrome. According to the testimony elicited at trial, Roberts was 

the last person to be with K.M. before he suddenly collapsed. Roberts’ 

explanation was that he was playing with K.M. and his sister by throwing them on 
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the mattress when K.M. expressed that he was tired and entered his bedroom to 

put on his pajamas. Roberts claimed that as K.M. pulled the shirt over his head, he 

observed K.M.’s eyes roll back into his head and then he collapsed. 

{¶20} However, Roberts’ explanation of the injury was inconsistent with 

the testimony of medical personnel who determined the cause of K.M.’s brain 

injury to be non-accidental or abusive trauma. Specifically, Dr. Randall 

Schlievert, one of K.M.’s treating physicians and a child abuse expert, testified 

that an injury such as K.M.’s is caused by one of two things or a combination: (1) 

an isolated severe shaking event or (2) an isolated severe impact—i.e., where the 

head is struck with an object or slammed into something. Dr. Schlievert explained 

that this injury is caused by the brain essentially moving at a differential rotation 

in the skull. Dr. Schlievert testified that K.M.’s collapse and unresponsiveness 

was an immediate reaction to the trauma causing his brain to rotate inside his 

skull. Dr. Schlievert further testified that rough play or being thrown on a mattress 

could not have caused K.M.’s injury. Several medical personnel testified that in 

their expert opinions the bruising, the broken clavicle, and the traumatic brain 

injury all suggested that K.M. was exposed to a pattern of repeated abuse. 

{¶21} Upon his release from the hospital, K.M. was placed with Deb 

through the Seneca County Juvenile Court. Deb testified that K.M. suffered from 
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blindness, and paralysis on one side. She also recalled that K.M. could not walk or 

feed himself and described him as an “infant” again. 

{¶22} On March 9, 2011, K.M. was hospitalized for 21 days after having a 

seizure at Deb’s home. K.M. underwent brain surgery to relieve pressure on his 

brain, which was also causing his eyes to turn inward. The pressure was caused 

by the subdural hematoma. The surgery involved drilling holes in K.M.’s skull to 

release excess fluid and to prevent permanent neurological damage. Deb recalled 

that after the surgery K.M. was able to see again, but he still had to go through 

intensive rehabilitation to learn how to walk. 

{¶23} Despite the conclusions of the medical professionals regarding K.M. 

being repeatedly abused, Hinojosa continued to live with Roberts, who eventually 

fathered her third child (born in December 2011). In May of 2011, K.M. was 

adjudicated as an abused child. In August of 2011, K.M.’s father gained custody 

of him and K.M. moved to Georgia. According to the record, K.M. still has 

trouble walking and requires the use of braces on his legs. 

{¶24} On December 28, 2011, Hinojosa was indicted on one count of child 

endangerment resulting in serious physical harm to the child, in violation of R.C. 

2919.22(A), (E)(2)(c), and one count of permitting child abuse, in violation of 

R.C. 2903.15(A). The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial, where the jury 
Case No. 13-12-41 

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heard the testimony of 19 witnesses, including Hinojosa. The jury subsequently 

returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. 

{¶25} On September 12, 2012, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, 

where several family members spoke on K.M.’s behalf. The trial court determined 

that the offenses were allied offenses of similar import and the prosecution elected 

to proceed on the child endangerment conviction. The trial court sentenced 

Hinojosa to serve the maximum sentence of thirty-six months in prison. 

{¶26} Hinojosa now appeals asserting the following assignments of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM 

POSSIBLE PENALTY. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II

THE VERDICTS OF GUILTY TO ENDANGERING 

CHILDREN AND PERMITTING CHILD ABUSE MADE BY 

THE JURY ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE AND MUST BE REVERSED. 

{¶27} For ease of discussion, we elect to discuss Hinojosa’s assignments of 

error out of order. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶28} In her second assignment of error, Hinojosa argues that the jury 

verdicts convicting her child endangering and permitting child abuse are against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 
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{¶29} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “ ‘[weigh] the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and 

[determine] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 78 

Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 

(1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact 

appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the 

credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 

212 (1967). 

{¶30} Hinojosa was convicted of child endangerment, in violation of R.C. 

2919.22 (A), (E)(2)(c), which states in pertinent part: 

No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person 

having custody or control, or person in loco parentis of a child 

under eighteen years of age or a mentally or physically 

handicapped child under twenty-one years of age, shall create a 

substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating a 

duty of care, protection, or support[.] 

* * * 

If the violation is a violation of division (A) of this section and 

results in serious physical harm to the child involved, [the 

offense is] a felony of the third degree[.] 
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{¶31} Hinojosa was also convicted of permitting child abuse, in violation of 

R.C. 2903.15(A), which states in pertinent part: 

No parent, guardian, custodian, or person having custody of a 

child under eighteen years of age or of a mentally or physically 

handicapped child under twenty-one years of age shall cause 

serious physical harm to the child, or the death of the child, as a 

proximate result of permitting the child to be abused, to be 

tortured, to be administered corporal punishment or other 

physical disciplinary measure, or to be physically restrained in a 

cruel manner or for a prolonged period. 

{¶32} Even though Hinojosa does not articulate her manifest weight 

argument in the terms of the specific elements of the offenses, it is apparent that 

Hinojosa is taking issue with the jury finding that she created a substantial risk to 

the health or safety of K.M., by violating her duty of protection, and that she 

permitted K.M. to be abused. 

{¶33} With regard to the child endangerment conviction, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio as held that “[i]t is not necessary to show an actual instance or 

pattern of physical abuse on the part of the accused in order to justify a conviction 

under R.C. 2919.22(A).” State v. Kamel, 12 Ohio St.3d 306, 308 (1984). Rather 

is sufficient to show “an inexcusable failure to act in discharge of one’s duty to 

protect a child where such failure to act results in a substantial risk to the child’s 

health or safety is an offense under R.C. 2919.22(A).” Id. A “ ‘[s]ubstantial risk’ 

means a strong possibility, as contrasted with a remote or significant possibility, 
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that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist.” R.C. 

2901.01(A)(8). 

{¶34} Furthermore, R.C. 2919.22(A) requires proof of a culpable mental 

state of recklessness as an essential element of the crime of endangering children. 

State v. McGee, 79 Ohio St.3d 193, 195 (1997). A person acts recklessly when, 

with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known 

risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain 

nature. R.C. 2901.22(C). “The crime of felony child endangering under R.C. 

2919.22(A) may be committed by omission: where a child suffers serious physical 

harm as a result of a parent or guardian “recklessly” failing to protect the child 

from a substantial risk of harm, the parent or guardian is guilty of child 

endangering.” State v. Elliott, 104 Ohio App. 3d 812, 817-18 (10th Dist.1995) 

citing State v. Kamel, 12 Ohio St.3d 306, 309 (1984). 

{¶35} On appeal, Hinojosa argues that prior to K.M. suffering his lifethreatening brain injury on February 28, 2011, she did not know that K.M. was 

being abused. In support of her position, Hinojosa points to the fact that neither 

law enforcement nor children protective services upon conducting their 

investigations concluded that immediate removal of K.M. from her home was 

warranted. Hinojosa claims that this coupled with Roberts’ seemingly innocuous 

explanations for how K.M.’s injuries occurred in her absence demonstrates there 
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was not a strong possibility that K.M. was being abused. However, at trial, 

testimony from both law enforcement officers and children services caseworkers 

indicated that it was not typical protocol to immediately remove a child unless 

there is an apparent life threatening situation and that at the time of their 

investigations K.M.’s situation did not seem to meet this criterion. 

{¶36} Notwithstanding this fact, Hinojosa gives no credibility to the ample 

testimony of her friends and family members—the people closest K.M. and most 

knowledgeable about changes in his daily well-being—who continued to express 

concern and questioned the increasing severity and frequency of K.M.’s injuries. 

The testimony at trial revealed that these people were so alarmed upon viewing the 

extensive bruising on K.M.’s body that they felt compelled to report the possibility 

that K.M. was being abused to the authorities. In fact, the record establishes that 

in the months leading up to K.M.’s life threatening brain injury there were three 

isolated instances in which either a friend or a family member independently 

contacted law enforcement with concerns that K.M. was being abused. Many of 

these people specifically suspected Roberts to be K.M.’s abuser. Nevertheless, the 

record is replete with examples of Hinojosa’s willful blindness and heedless 

indifference to the strong possibility that her son was being repeatedly abused. 

{¶37} Aside from the numerous red flags raised by friends and family 

members to Hinojosa regarding the strong possibility that K.M. was being abused, 
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the medical evidence documented on February 15, 2011, two weeks before K.M. 

suffered his near fatal injury, independently confirmed that K.M. was likely being 

abused. Specifically, during the physical evaluation at the hospital it was revealed 

that K.M. had a healing broken clavicle, in addition to the 28 bruises in various 

stages of healing. The testimony of medical experts at trial established that these 

both are indicators of a pattern of ongoing abuse. However, the record 

demonstrates Hinojosa chose to ignore all the warning signs that someone with 

daily access to K.M. was abusing him, and instead chose to continue to live with 

Roberts and leave K.M. in Roberts’ care while she was at work. 

{¶38} Based on the extensive testimony and medical records presented at 

trial, we find that the evidence supports a determination by the jury that Hinojosa’s 

actions of putting her personal relationship with Roberts before her own child’s 

well-being constituted an inexcusable failure to act in discharge of her duty to 

protect K.M. and that her failure to act resulted in K.M. suffering serious physical 

harm. Likewise, we also find that the evidence supports a determination by the 

jury that Hinojosa, by her inaction, caused serious physical harm to K.M. as a 

proximate result of her permitting K.M. to be abused. Accordingly, we are not 

persuaded by Hinojosa’s arguments on appeal that the jury lost its way and created 

a manifest miscarriage of justice. We therefore find that Hinojosa’s convictions 
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are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The second assignment of 

error is overruled. 

First Assignment of Error

{¶39} In her first assignment of error, Hinojosa argues that the trial court 

erred when it sentenced her to the maximum sentence of thirty-six months. 

{¶40} An appellate court must conduct a meaningful review of the trial 

court’s sentencing decision. State v. Daughenbaugh, 3d Dist. No. 16–07–07, 

2007–Ohio–5774, ¶ 8, citing State v. Carter, 11th Dist. No.2003–P–0007, 2004–

Ohio–1181. In particular, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides the following regarding an 

appellate court’s review of a sentence on appeal. 

The court hearing an appeal * * * shall review the record, 

including the findings underlying the sentence or modification 

given by the sentencing court. 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a 

sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for 

resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is not 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate 

court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly 

and convincingly finds either of the following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s 

findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division 

(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 

2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 
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{¶41} Furthermore, a sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably 

calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which are 

to protect the public from future crimes by the offender and others and to punish 

the offender, and shall be commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and 

consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 

offenders. See R.C. 2929.11(A),(B). 

{¶42} Hinojosa does not dispute that the thirty-six month sentence falls 

within the permissible statutory range for third degree felonies. R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3). Instead, Hinojosa argues that the trial court improperly considered 

the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Hinojosa contends that the maximum 

sentence is improper in light of the fact that she has no prior criminal record and 

argues that her recidivism is unlikely to occur. 

{¶43} On appeal, consistent with her statements at trial, Hinojosa also 

makes a revealing argument attempting to lessen the severity of her conduct by 

characterizing the actions leading to her conviction for child endangerment as 

simply “trusting the wrong person and expecting too much proof from others 

before acting herself.” (Appt. Brief at 11-12). This argument only highlights 

Hinojosa’s continued lack of accountability for her inexcusable failure to act in 

discharge of her duty to protect her child from the hands of an abuser. Notably, 
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the record demonstrates that Hinojosa continued to live with Roberts, even after 

she finally acknowledged that he was responsible for K.M.’s near fatal brain 

injury. 

{¶44} At sentencing, the prosecution presented evidence demonstrating 

that, even after sitting through a three-day trial where the injuries her son suffered 

as a result of being abused were repeatedly described in painstaking detail, 

Hinojosa continued to place phone calls to Roberts from jail to express her love 

for him. Thus, Hinojosa has demonstrated that she learned nothing from the 

experience of her son nearly dying because of her conduct. Moreover, one of the 

factors the trial court must consider in sentencing is the protection of the public 

from future crimes by the offender. While Hinojosa’s chances of recidivism with 

respect to K.M. may be lessened, Hinojosa still has two other children—one 

fathered by Roberts—both of whom need to be protected from being subjected to 

similar abuse as result of Hinojosa’s unwillingness to fulfill her duty as a mother 

and protect her children from serious physical harm. 

{¶45} Based on the above, we find that the trial court properly considered 

all of the appropriate statutory factors. Therefore, we also find that the record 

supports the trial court’s conclusion that the imposition of the maximum sentence 

is necessary in order to punish Hinojosa and to protect the public. Hinojosa’s first 

assignment of error is overruled. 
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{¶46} For all these reasons, the conviction and sentence of the Seneca 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

 Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI and ROGERS, J.J, concur. 

/jlr