IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 88 / 05-2127 

Filed October 12, 2007 

TYSON FOODS, INC., 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

MIGDALIA HEDLUND, 

 Appellee. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. 

Blink, Judge. 

Employer seeks further review of a case involving application of 

judicial estoppel. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.

 Coreen K. Sweeney and Scott A. Sundstrom of Nyemaster, Goode, 

West, Hansell & O’Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant. 

 Randall P. Schueller of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for 

appellee. 
2

CADY, Justice.

 In this appeal we must decide whether an employer may contest 

liability for an injury to its employee after admitting liability for the injury 

at a previous alternate medical care hearing. The workers’ compensation 

commissioner determined the employer was unable to deny liability 

based on the doctrine of issue preclusion. The district court affirmed. 

The court of appeals also affirmed, but held the liability issue was not res 

judicata. Instead, the court of appeals applied the doctrine of judicial 

estoppel and held the employer was estopped from contesting liability. 

On further review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse 

the judgment of the district court, and remand to the commissioner for 

further proceedings. 

 I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Migdalia Hedlund (Hedlund) was employed by Tyson Foods, Inc. 

(Tyson Foods). On January 10, 2005, Hedlund filed a workers’ 

compensation claim asserting she sustained a work-related injury to her 

bilateral hands, wrists, elbows, arms, right shoulder, and neck on 

February 1, 2004. 

Hedlund’s treating physician was Dr. Timothy Schurman. On 

November 8, 2004, Dr. Schurman diagnosed Hedlund with “underlying 

inflammatory problems, possibly rheumatoid arthritis.” Dr. Schurman 

also recommended Hedlund be seen by a rheumatologist. 

 On January 4, 2005, Tyson Foods submitted a series of written 

questions to Dr. Schurman. Tyson Foods asked: 

 1. “Are you able to state within a reasonable degree 

of medical certainty that the diagnosis of rheumatoid 

arthritis was caused by her work activities at Tyson Foods, 

Inc.?” 
3

2. “Your 11/08/04 note indicates ‘possible RA 

aggravated by the work place’. Did the aggravation 

physically change the underlying condition?” 

3. “Will further treatment be indicated for any work 

caused injury?” 

Dr. Schurman responded in the negative to all three questions. 

On February 11, 2005, Dr. Schurman diagnosed Hedlund with 

“underlying inflammatory arthritis, which has been materially aggravated 

by the work place.” In a February 18, 2005 letter, Dr. Schurman 

indicated Hedlund’s condition was aggravated by her work at Tyson 

Foods. 

 Tyson Foods considered Dr. Schurman’s opinions to be conflicting 

and requested an independent medical examination of Hedlund as 

allowed by Iowa Code section 85.39 (2005).1 An appointment with 

Dr. Delwin Quenzer was scheduled for this purpose. Hedlund, however, 

believed the appointment with Dr. Quenzer was an attempt to change her 

treating physician. 

As a result, Hedlund filed a petition with the workers’ 

compensation commissioner for alternate medical care on April 14, 2005 

(April petition). At the hearing on the April petition, Tyson Foods clarified 

that the appointment with Dr. Quenzer was only for the purpose of an 

Iowa Code section 85.39 independent medical evaluation. Consequently, 

a deputy commissioner dismissed the petition. In a written dismissal 

order, the deputy found, “[a]s a result of claimant setting forth that the 

basis for the application for alternate medical care no longer exists, there 

is, therefore, no issue to be resolved.” The deputy commissioner also 

 1Section 85.39 provides: “After an injury, the employee, if requested by the 

employer, shall submit for examination at some reasonable time and place and as often 

as reasonably requested . . . .” Iowa Code § 85.39 (2005). 
4

indicated in the order that, “[d]uring the course of the [April alternate 

medical care] hearing, [Tyson Foods] was asked whether liability was 

accepted on this claim and the attorney for [Tyson Foods] stated it was.” 

 Tyson Foods was subsequently not able to reschedule the 

independent medical examination with Dr. Quenzer and was unable to 

retain a rheumatologist willing to see Hedlund. Instead, Tyson Foods 

scheduled the independent medical examination with Dr. Donna Bahls. 

On June 6, 2005, Hedlund filed a second petition for alternate 

medical care (June petition). Hedlund claimed Tyson Foods refused to 

provide her with the care of a rheumatologist. Tyson Foods filed an 

answer to the petition, but did not indicate it disputed liability of the 

claim. 

On June 13, 2005, Tyson Foods received the results of Dr. Bahls’ 

independent medical examination of Hedlund. Based on those results, 

Tyson Foods filed an amended answer to the second petition for alternate 

medical care, indicating it was disputing liability. 

On June 21, 2005, a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner 

held a hearing on the second petition for alternate care. Tyson Foods 

sought to amend its answer to specifically deny liability based on new 

medical information obtained from Dr. Bahls. The deputy commissioner 

determined Tyson Foods was precluded under the doctrine of 

res judicata from contesting liability for the injury after it admitted 

liability in the first alternate medical care proceeding. Pursuant to a 

delegation of authority by the workers’ compensation commissioner, the 

deputy commissioner’s decision constituted final agency action.2 

 2See Iowa Code § 86.3 (allowing a deputy commissioner the power to issue a 

final agency decision pursuant to a written delegation of authority by the workers’ 

compensation commissioner). 
5

Consequently, Tyson Foods filed a petition for judicial review with the 

district court. On December 6, 2005, the district court likewise found 

the issue of liability to be res judicata. 

Tyson Foods appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of 

appeals. The court of appeals held the doctrine of issue preclusion did 

not apply because the issue was not actually raised and litigated in the 

first alternate medical care proceeding. However, it concluded Tyson 

Foods was judicially estopped from denying liability for Hedlund’s injury 

after it had conceded the issue at the April alternate medical care 

hearing. 

 II. Standard of Review.

“We apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19 in our review 

of workers’ compensation decisions.” R.R. Donnelly & Sons v. Barnett, 

670 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Iowa 2003). “On our review of the district court’s 

decision, we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine if our 

conclusions are the same as those of the district court. If so, we affirm; 

otherwise, we reverse or otherwise modify.” Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. 

Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Iowa 2006) (citing Hill v. Fleetguard, 705 

N.W.2d 665, 669 (Iowa 2005)). 

In this case, the district court relied on the doctrine of res judicata, 

as did the deputy commissioner, to support its conclusion that Tyson 

Foods was precluded from contesting liability. The court of appeals 

affirmed, but relied on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. As an “equitable 

doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion,”3 the appropriate standard 

 3New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 1815, 149 

L. Ed. 2d 968, 977 (2001). 
6

of appellate review would normally be for an abuse of discretion.4 

However, on further review from a decision of the court of appeals, we 

nevertheless review the decision of the district court. Therefore, we 

review, as did the court of appeals, for corrections of errors at law. IBP, 

Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). 

III. Issue Preclusion. 

We first consider whether the district court correctly applied the 

doctrine of res judicata or issue preclusion. One important element of 

issue preclusion is that the issue to be precluded must have been “raised 

and litigated” in the previous proceeding. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d at 572. 

Because the liability issue was admitted in the first proceeding, the issue 

was not actually raised and litigated. Id. Consequently, the district 

court erred by holding that Tyson Foods was precluded from contesting 

liability based on issue preclusion. 

IV. Judicial Estoppel.

 A. General Principles. We next consider whether the decision of 

the district court can be upheld under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 

Although this theory was not raised or argued before the district court, 

we have previously stated: “[B]ecause judicial estoppel is intended to 

protect the integrity of the fact-finding process by administrative 

agencies and courts, the issue may properly be raised by courts, even at 

the appellate stage, on their own motion.” Id. at 573. 

 4“The mainstream of American jurisprudence,” including a majority of the 

federal circuit courts of appeal, agrees. See Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., ___ 

So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007) (Parker, J., concurring) (“A survey of opinions from other 

jurisdictions indicates that Alabama would join the mainstream of American 

jurisprudence in adopting an exceeding-discretion standard in matters involving 

judicial estoppel.”); Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006) 

(“A majority of our sister circuits that have addressed the issue apply the abuse of 

discretion standard.”). 
7

 We first engaged in a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of 

judicial estoppel in Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Insurance Co., 405 

N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1987). Id. at 814 (observing that “[t]he rule has been 

sparingly applied in other jurisdictions and only alluded to in our own”). 

There, we observed that judicial estoppel is a “commonsense doctrine” 

that “prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted 

a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a 

subsequent proceeding.” Id. Moreover, it is “designed to protect the 

integrity of the judicial process.” Id. It applies to administrative 

proceedings as well as court proceedings. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d at 573–

74. The doctrine 

addresses the incongruity of allowing a party to assert a 

position in one tribunal and the opposite in another, thereby 

creating the perception that at least one court has been 

misled. 

Vennerberg Farms, 405 N.W.2d at 814. Yet, as the United States 

Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘[t]he circumstances under which judicial 

estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any 

general formulation of principle.’ ” New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 121 

S. Ct. at 1815, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978 (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 

F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)). We have likewise been flexible in our 

past application of the doctrine and view its flexible parameters as a 

strength in its ability to achieve its goal.5

 5For example, we have only irregularly required an intent to mislead the court by 

adoption of the inconsistent positions. Compare Roach v. Crouch, 524 N.W.2d 400, 403 

(Iowa 1994) (stating “application of the doctrine requires proof of an intentional attempt 

to mislead the court with the inconsistency”); Graber v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 410 N.W.2d 224, 

228 (Iowa 1987) (stating “an intentional attempt to mislead the court with the 

inconsistency must be shown”); Vennerberg Farms, 405 N.W.2d at 814 (basing our 

holding in part on a conclusion that “there is no evidence that Vennerberg misled the 

court” in the first proceeding), with Haverly, 727 N.W.2d at 573–75 (estopping a party 

from advancing an inconsistent position, but not requiring intent to mislead the court); 
8

 Nonetheless, we have often affirmed 

[a] fundamental feature of the doctrine is the successful 

assertion of the inconsistent position in a prior action. 

Absent judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position, 

application of the rule is unwarranted because no risk of 

inconsistent, misleading results exists. 

Vennerberg Farms, 405 N.W.2d at 814; accord Haverly, 727 N.W.2d at 

573; Wilson, 666 N.W.2d at 166; Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d at 687; Roach, 524 

N.W.2d at 403; Graber, 410 N.W.2d at 228. The judicial-acceptance 

component of the doctrine is the focal point of the resolution of this case. 

B. Judicial Acceptance. The court of appeals held that the 

admission of liability by Tyson Foods was judicially accepted by the 

commissioner at the first alternate medical care hearing. Tyson Foods 

asserts on further review that its initial acceptance of liability was never 

accepted by the commissioner in rendering the decision. 

 

State v. Duncan, 710 N.W.2d 34, 43–45 (Iowa 2006) (discussing judicial estoppel, but 

not mentioning intent to mislead); Wilson v. Liberty Mut. Group, 666 N.W.2d 163, 166–

67 (Iowa 2003) (estopping a party’s inconsistent position, but not imposing an intent-tomislead requirement); State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 686–87 (Iowa 2000) (discussing 

judicial estoppel, but not addressing intent to mislead); Ezzone v. Hansen, 474 N.W.2d 

548, 549–51 (Iowa 1991) (discussing the “elements” of judicial estoppel, but not 

mentioning intent to mislead). Our past inconsistency in requiring an intent to mislead 

reflects national equivocation on the question of whether intent should be relevant to 

application of judicial estoppel. See Brian A. Dodd, Civil Procedure Intent and the 

Application of Judicial Estoppel: Equitable Shield or Judicial Heartbreak?, 22 Am. J. 

Trial Advoc. 481, 481 (1998) (observing “[t]he degree to which a court will consider the 

intent of a litigant in the application of judicial estoppel is an issue causing great 

division among the jurisdictions, with no clear or unequivocal guidelines”). We believe 

the better approach is to refrain from “establish[ing] inflexible prerequisites or an 

exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel.” 

New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751, 121 S. Ct. at 1815, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978. As such, a 

party’s intent to mislead is not a mandatory requirement, but may be considered 

insofar as it is relevant to pursuit of the stated goal of judicial estoppel: protection of 

the integrity of the judicial process. Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 591 S.E.2d 870, 

891 (N.C. 2004) (refusing to impose a scienter requirement but allowing “it would weigh 

heavily in favor of invoking the doctrine” of judicial estoppel). 
9

 We have never explicitly defined what constitutes “judicial 

acceptance.” However, examination of our previous judicial estoppel 

jurisprudence demonstrates we have found judicial acceptance only 

when the previous, inconsistent assertion was material to the holding in 

the first proceeding. For example, we applied the doctrine of judicial 

estoppel in Wilson v. Liberty Mutual Group, 666 N.W.2d 163 (Iowa 2000). 

In Wilson, 

a workers’ compensation claimant settled his case with his 

employer under the provisions of Iowa Code section 85.35. 

As required by that statute, Wilson admitted there was a 

bona fide dispute with his employer regarding the cause of 

his injury. His employer’s insurance carrier paid benefits 

under the settlement agreement. Wilson then filed a lawsuit 

against the insurance carrier for alleged bad-faith failure to 

settle the claim. 

Haverly, 727 N.W.2d at 574 (citing Wilson, 666 N.W.2d at 165). We held 

Wilson was estopped from claiming a bad-faith failure to settle because 

the court relied on his prior acknowledgement of a bona fide dispute over 

liability in approving the settlement agreement. Wilson, 666 N.W.2d at 

166–67. See generally Iowa Code § 85.35 (requiring parties to a 

contested case to submit a settlement to the workers’ compensation 

commissioner for approval). We observed that 

[p]lainly Wilson’s position in the bad faith action is 

inconsistent with the position he asserted in the workers’ 

compensation litigation. To prevail on his bad faith claim, 

Wilson would necessarily have to prove that Liberty Mutual 

had no reasonable basis to deny his claim. Yet in the section 

85.35 proceedings before the workers’ compensation 

commissioner, Wilson successfully asserted there was a 

bona fide dispute as to whether his injuries were workrelated so as to entitle him to additional benefits. These 

positions are clearly inconsistent. 

Wilson, 666 N.W.2d at 167. 
10

 In contrast, in Vennerberg Farms we held an issue was not 

judicially accepted when the position asserted was not material to the 

disposition of the prior litigation. 405 N.W.2d at 814. In that case, 

Vennerberg Farms, Inc. was owed money by Stennett Elevator, Inc., a 

licensed grain dealer, under various deferred-payment contracts. Id. at 

812. However, the state commerce commission revoked Stennett 

Elevator’s grain dealer’s license, resulting in the appointment of a 

receiver. Id. In such a circumstance, Iowa Code section 542.12 required 

Vennerberg Farms to file any claims against the grain dealer (Stennett) 

and its surety within 120 days of the revocation of the license. Id. at 

811–12. 

Vennerberg Farms subsequently filed a claim, which the surety 

denied as untimely. Id. at 812. Vennerberg Farms then filed a petition 

in district court, which required the court to decide whether Vennerberg 

Farms filed its claim within 120 days of the revocation of Stennett’s grain 

dealer’s license, as required by statute. Id. at 814. 

In a previous proceeding, Vennerberg Farms had asserted 

Stennett’s license was revoked in November of 1983. Id. The surety 

argued Vennerberg Farms was bound to its assertion in the previous 

lawsuit under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Id. However, we refused 

to apply the doctrine to bind Vennerberg Farms on the grounds that 

“[t]he precise date of Stennett’s license revocation was immaterial in the 

prior litigation and no particular date can reasonably be claimed to have 

been accepted unequivocally by the court.” Id. 

 Consequently, it is apparent judicial estoppel applies only when 

the position asserted by a party was material to the holding in the prior 

litigation. This approach most closely tracks the rationale underlying 

judicial estoppel, as reflected in our prior pronouncement that, “[a]bsent 
11

judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position, application of the rule is 

unwarranted because no risk of inconsistent, misleading results exists.” 

Id; accord Haverly, 727 N.W.2d at 573; Wilson, 666 N.W.2d at 166; 

Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d at 687; Roach, 524 N.W.2d at 403; Graber, 410 

N.W.2d at 228. When the inconsistent facts are not material to the 

disposition of the successive proceedings, these facts do not pose a risk 

of producing inconsistent or misleading results. Consequently, where 

there is no risk of inconsistent or misleading results, the rationale 

underlying the judicial estoppel doctrine is not advanced and there is no 

reason to apply the doctrine. 

Vennerberg Farms—our seminal case addressing the doctrine of 

judicial estoppel—is an apt example. The date of revocation of Stennett’s 

grain dealer’s license was not material to the outcome of the first 

proceeding. That date was, however, dispositive in Vennerberg Farms, 

405 N.W.2d at 813, the second proceeding. Yet, even if the two 

proceedings yielded misleading or inconsistent results, those results did 

not occur as a result of Vennerberg Farms advancing inconsistent 

positions regarding the date of revocation in the two proceedings. As 

Vennerberg Farms implies, the application of the doctrine of judicial 

estoppel under such circumstances simply does not advance the policy 

goal of avoiding inconsistent, misleading results. 

With these concepts in mind, we turn to the circumstances of this 

case. There is no doubt Tyson Foods asserted a position in the first 

proceeding for alternate medical care inconsistent with its position in the 

second proceeding. Yet, as our cases have developed, the fighting 

question is whether the inconsistent position asserted in the first 

proceeding was accepted by the commissioner in the disposition of the 

matter. 
12

When an injured worker files a petition for alternate medical care, 

the admission of liability can be, and usually is, an essential issue to the 

resolution of the matter. Liability is normally an important component of 

the course of an alternate medical care proceeding because “the 

commissioner cannot order that the alternate care sought by the 

employee be furnished by the employer prior to a determination of 

compensability of the injury.” R.R. Donnelly, 670 N.W.2d at 197. Thus, 

if the employer accepts liability, the commissioner is permitted to 

determine the “reasonableness and necessity of medical care sought by 

an employee as an alternative to the care furnished by the employer.” Id. 

Conversely, if the employer denies liability, the commissioner must deny 

the petition. Id. Under this approach, the issue of liability, in both 

situations, is usually necessary to the disposition of the petition. 

Accordingly when an employer takes a position on liability during the 

proceedings on alternate medical care, the commissioner normally relies 

on that position in disposing of the application. See Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 

at 575. This case, however, is an exception. 

In this case, Tyson Foods clearly took a position on liability at the 

first hearing. However, the commissioner did not act in any way to 

dispose of the application based on that position. Instead, the 

commissioner dismissed the petition solely because the grounds for 

alternate medical care asserted by Hedlund in the petition were 

determined to be mistaken, and the mistake was unrelated to the issue 

of liability or the acknowledgement of liability by Tyson Foods. Once the 

mistake was clarified at the hearing, the employee no longer needed the 

commissioner to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the 

medical care. The alternate medical care issue was rendered moot, and 

the proceeding was, as a result, a nonevent. The admission of liability by 
13

Tyson Foods played no role in the dismissal of the petition by the deputy 

commissioner. Consequently, judicial estoppel does not apply. 

Hedlund argues that the failure to apply judicial estoppel to the 

circumstances of this case will permit employers to accept liability during 

the course of a workers’ compensation proceeding for the purpose of 

controlling medical care, and then later allow employers to deny the 

claim at the hearing in an effort to avoid responsibility for the injury. 

She argues this situation will enable employers to undermine the 

purpose of the alternative medical care process. Tyson Foods 

acknowledges tension can exist between employers and employees over 

the control of medical care, but points to its own problems when forced 

to take a position on liability before all relevant medical information may 

be known. 

We recognize the problems that can arise between the parties over 

medical care. Yet, we think our existing legal principles, of which judicial 

estoppel is only one, serve to allay the competing concerns. Even though 

judicial estoppel applies only when needed to protect the integrity of the 

judicial process, a “broader analytical framework of estoppel and 

preclusion doctrines” exists to allow courts to equitably address the 

concerns of the parties. See Whitacre P’Ship, 591 S.E.2d at 879. In 

other words, there are additional considerations beyond the judicial 

acceptance component of judicial estoppel to guide in a fair resolution of 

the concerns over medical care hypothesized by the parties. Such 

concerns are not presented under this record. 

 V. Conclusion. 

The workers’ compensation commissioner and district court 

erroneously applied the doctrine of issue preclusion. The doctrine of 

judicial estoppel does not apply. We vacate the decision of the court of 
14

appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case 

to the workers’ compensation commissioner for further proceedings. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.