John Allen Wilkinson v. Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary’s County, Maryland 

and Christopher and Barbara Aiken, No. 0478, Sept. Term 2020. Opinion by Zic, J.

REAL PROPERTY – DEED – CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

When construing a deed’s language, “the basic principles of contract interpretation 

apply.” Gunby v. Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 174 Md. App. 189, 242, 

aff’d, 402 Md. 317 (2007). If the deed’s language “is plain and unambiguous, there is no 

room for construction” and “there [is] no need to construe it through the use of extrinsic 

evidence.” Gilchrist v. Chester, 307 Md. 422, 424-25 (1986) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State 

Colls. v. Sherman, 280 Md. 373, 380 (1977)).

A landowner conveyed the disputed property to the State via a deed in 1945. The deed’s 

terms are unambiguous in that it did not create an easement over the disputed property, 

but rather, conveyed the disputed property “forever in fee simple.” Because the deed is 

unambiguous and conveyed the disputed property in fee simple, there is no need to 

consider extrinsic evidence. Moreover, the deed did not convey the disputed property in 

fee simple determinable, but rather, fee simple absolute. While the deed specified that 

the purpose of conveying the disputed property was to create a highway, such a statement 

of purpose does not debase the fee.

REAL PROPERTY – CREATION OF A PUBLIC ROAD – DEDICATION

A public road may be established by one of three legal methods: (1) public authority; (2) 

dedication; or (3) long, uninterrupted use by the public as a road, for twenty years or 

more, “which, though not strictly prescription, yet bears so close an analogy to it that it is 

not inappropriate to apply to the right thus acquired the term prescriptive.” Thomas v. 

Ford, 63 Md. 346, 351-52 (1885). Pursuant to the second method, “[a] completed 

common law dedication ‘requires an offer and acceptance.’” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, 

Inc. v. County Comm’rs of Kent County, 137 Md. App. 732, 755 (2001) (quoting Wash.

Land Co. v. Potomac Ridge Dev. Corp., 137 Md. App. 33, 40 (2001)).

The circuit court erred in concluding that no public road was created south of Station 

Marker 14. Instead, there was a complete dedication. First, there was an offer to 

dedicate the disputed property to public use where landowner conveyed disputed property

“for a public highway,” and a recorded plat laid out the road. Second, acceptance 

occurred when the State assumed control of the disputed property via acceptance of a 

deed or other record.
Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County

Case No. C-18-CV-18-000489

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 0478

September Term, 2020

JOHN ALLEN WILKINSON, Trustee, 

Wilkinson Family Trust

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

OF ST. MARY’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

and

CHRISTOPHER AND BARBARA AIKEN, 

Trustees, Aiken Family Trust

Leahy,

Zic,

Ripken,

JJ.

Opinion by Zic, J.

Filed: July 28, 2022

* Kehoe, Christopher B., J., did not participate 

in the Court’s decision to designate this opinion

for publication pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-

605.1.
This case concerns a dispute over ownership and access rights regarding a piece of 

real property located in St. Mary’s County. The property is an irregularly shaped strip of 

unimproved land of approximately 0.196 acres bordering the shore of the Chesapeake 

Bay (“disputed property”), which is located in a subdivision known as Scotland Beach. 

John Allen Wilkinson, trustee for the Wilkinson Family Living Trust (“Wilkinson”),

owns property that lies on either side of the disputed property. The disputed property 

bisects Wilkinson’s property into (1) one large portion to the west of the disputed 

property, consisting of approximately one and one-half lots, including a house, and (2) a 

small triangle-shaped piece of shoreland to the east of the disputed property. Wilkinson 

filed suit against the Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary’s County (“County”), 

asserting ownership of the disputed property. Christopher and Barbara Aiken, trustees of 

the Aiken Family Trust (“Aikens”), own undeveloped property to the south of 

Wilkinson’s property and the disputed property. The Aikens successfully intervened as 

defendants, asserting that they have access rights over the disputed property.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County 

found that the County owned the disputed property in fee simple and denied Wilkinson’s 

motion for summary judgment. The court further granted the County’s motion for 

summary judgment as to all claims asserted by Wilkinson and the Aikens. As to the 

claims between the Aikens and Wilkinson, the court denied the Aikens’ motion for 

summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Wilkinson. Wilkinson then 

appealed and the Aikens cross appealed.
2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Wilkinson presents three questions,which we have slightly rephrased as follows:

1. Did the court err in holding that the Brady deed is unambiguous and 

erroneously fail to consider evidence extrinsic to the deed?

2. If the court erred in holding that the Brady deed conveyed a fee simple 

interest instead of an easement, whether the court erroneously 

disregarded Wilkinson’s claims of abandonment and estoppel of the 

easement thereby created?

3. If the court correctly held that the Brady deed conveyed a fee simple 

interest, whether the court erred in holding that the interest conveyed 

was a fee simple absolute?

As to the first question, we determine that the court did not err in holding that the deed is 

unambiguous. For the second question, because we hold that the court did not err in 

holding that the Brady deed conveyed a fee simple interest, we do not reach Wilkinson’s 

contentions regarding abandonment and estoppel. As to the third question, we hold that 

the court did not err in determining that the County owns the disputed property in fee 

simple absolute.

In their cross appeal, the Aikens raise the following questions:

1. Whether the circuit court erred in determining that there was no public 

road south of Station Marker 14?

2. Whether the circuit court erred by dismissing the Aikens’ claim to quiet 

title?

3. Whether the circuit court erred by dismissing the Aikens’ tort claim for 

interference with easement for failure to provide notice to the County?

Regarding the Aikens’ first question, we hold that the court erred in concluding that there 

was no public road south of Station Marker 14. For the second question, we hold that the 
3

court did not err by dismissing the Aikens’ claim to quiet title. For the third question, we 

hold that the court did not err by dismissing the Aikens’ claim for interference with 

easement. We therefore affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

BACKGROUND

The Scotland Beach subdivision is located on a peninsula that juts into the 

Chesapeake Bay. The Chesapeake Bay lies along the eastern shore of the peninsula, 

while Tanner Creek is along the west side. The Scotland Beach subdivision plat, 

recorded at Liber EBA 19, folio 408 on January 29, 1920 in the land records for St. 

Mary’s County, is excerpted below1:

The State Roads Commission of Maryland proposed a series of road projects to 

construct a State highway, designated “Scotland Beach to Point Lookout,” to run through 

the peninsula. The proposed highway was intended to follow the northern boundary of 

1 A full reproduction of the Scotland Beach subdivision plat is included in 

Appendix A to this opinion.
4

the Scotland Beach subdivision and turn south, continuing along the shoreline of the 

Chesapeake Bay toward Point Lookout. The portion of the highway along the 

Chesapeake Bay was referred to as “Scotland Beach Road.” As an adjunct to the 

Scotland Beach to Point Lookout highway, the State sought to extend an internal road, 

formerly known as Ed’s Road, through the middle of the Scotland Beach subdivision. 

The internal road was to be designated as “Bay Front Drive” and would run from the 

northern end of the subdivision to the southern end, with its southern terminus connecting

to Scotland Beach Road along the Chesapeake Bay shoreline.

In the 1940s, the State Roads Commission acquired property for Bay Front Drive

through condemnation proceedings and conveyances from landowners. In 1945, Joan 

Brady, a predecessor-in-interest to Wilkinson, deeded portions of her land to the State 

Roads Commission (“Brady deed”) to be used for the Scotland Beach to Point Lookout 

highway and extension of Bay Front Drive. Ms. Brady owned Lots 17, 18, and 19, and 

the planned southern portion of Bay Front Drive would cut through a portion of Lots 18, 

19, and 20. The Brady deed, recorded at CBG 15, folio 137, transferred the disputed 

property to the State and reads in part:

WHEREAS, the State Roads Commission of 

Maryland, acting for and on the behalf of the State of 

Maryland, finds it necessary to acquire land, easements, and 

or rights, etc., shown and or indicated on State Roads 

Commission of Maryland’s Plat No. 1919 which is duly 

recorded, or intended to be recorded, among the Land 

Records of St. Mary’s County in the State of Maryland in 

order to lay out, open, establish, construct, extend, widen, 

straighten, grade and improve, etc., under its Contract SM154-1-811 and or improve in any manner a highway and/or 

bridge, together with the appurtenances thereto belonging 
5

known as the Scotland Beach to Point Lookout, as a part of 

the Maryland State Roads System, and, thereafter use, 

maintain and/or further improve said highway and/or bridge, 

and

WHEREAS, the laying out of said highway and/or 

bridge and their appurtenances, in addition to being required 

for public convenience, necessity and safety, is a material 

benefit to the undersigned,

NOW, THEREFORE, THIS DEED AND RELEASE

WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the above 

premises, One Dollar ($1.00) and other good and valuable 

considerations, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, 

we do hereby grant and convey unto the State of Maryland, to 

the use of the State Roads Commission of Maryland, its 

successors and assigns, forever in fee simple, all our right, 

title, and interest, free and clear of liens and encumbrances, in 

and to all the land, together with the appurtenances thereto 

belonging, or in any wise appertaining, lying between the 

lines designated “right of way line” as shown and/or 

indicated on the aforesaid plat, all of which plat is made a 

part hereof, so far as our property and/or our rights may be 

affected by the said proposed highway and/or bridge and the 

appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining . 

. . .

(emphasis added). The Brady deed states that the property is conveyed “forever in fee 

simple . . . free and clear of liens and encumbrances.” It specified that the deeded

property lies between the “‘right of way line[s]’ as shown and/or indicated on [Plat 

1919],” which effectively transferred a portion of Lot 18 and portion of Lot 19.

Bay Front Drive is depicted on Plats 1918 and 1919, both of which were recorded 

on June 19, 1952 and again on March 26, 1986. Plat 1918 shows the northern portion
6

(beginning at the northern intersection of Scotland Beach Road to Station Marker 10). 

An excerpt of Plat 19182is reproduced below:

Plat 1919 shows the remaining southern portion of Bay Front Drive (continuing 

from Station Marker 10 to the fantail-shaped portion at the end of the road, which would 

connect to the southern intersection of Scotland Beach Road), an excerpt of which is 

shown below3:

2 Plat 1918 is reproduced in full in Appendix B to this opinion.

3 Plat 1919 is reproduced in full in Appendix C to this opinion.
7

Bay Front Drive was paved on the northern portion, ending around Station Marker 

14. The southernmost portion of Bay Front Drive (from around Station Marker 14 to the 

fantail), however, was never paved due to erosion by storms and hurricanes, particularly 

Hurricane Hazel in 1954. The portion of land between Station Marker 14 and the 

disputed property is graveled. The storms eroded the land on the Chesapeake Bay side of 

the Scotland Beach peninsula, submerging much of the land where Scotland Beach Road 

was planned along the Chesapeake Bay shore and a portion of the southern fantail of Bay 

Front Drive. Due to the erosion, the planned extension of Scotland Beach Road was not 

completed.
8

In 1974, a predecessor-in-interest to Wilkinson granted St. Mary’s County an 

easement to build and maintain a revetment along the shoreline to protect it from further 

erosion. The easement, which was recorded, is over a small corner of Lot 19 that was not 

conveyed by the Brady deed.

In 1988, the State Highway Administration, on behalf of the State, granted and 

conveyed “all right, title[,] and interest” in the land “lying between the lines designated 

‘right of way’” as shown on Plats 6016, 1918, and 1919 to St. Mary’s County (“1988 

deed”). The 1988 deed was recorded at Liber 451, folio 415 on December 22, 1988 and 

states in part:

WHEREAS, the State Highway Administration has agreed, 

for good and valuable considerations, to convey unto the 

“GRANTEE(S)” herein, certain land, hereinafter described, 

which the “Grantor” has determined is no longer needed by it 

in connection with the construction, operation, maintenance, 

use and protection of the State Highway System . . . .

. . . .

THE GRANTORS DO HEREBY GRANT AND 

CONVEY unto St. Mary’s County all right, title and interest

of the Grantors in and to all the land, together with the 

appurtenances thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, 

lying between the lines designated “right of way line” as 

shown and/or indicated on the State Roads Commission of 

Maryland’s plats numbered 6016 (revised 4-25-45), 1918 and 

1919, recorded or intended to be recorded among the Land 

Records of St. Mary’s County, Maryland.

CONTAINING: 1.38 acres plus or minus.

BEING ALL OF THE BED of the road known as Bay 

Front Drive . . . .
9

BEING PART OF THE BED of the road known as 

Scotland Beach Road . . . .

. . . .

BEING ALL OF THE LAND which by deed recorded 

August 14, 1945 among the Land Records of St. Mary’s

County in liber C.B.G. no. 15 folio 137 was conveyed by 

Joan K. Brady to the State of Maryland to the use of the State 

Roads Commission of Maryland.[4]

(emphasis added).

At some point, the County placed a sign near Station Marker 14 on Bay Front 

Drive stating, “End of County Maintenance,” which is where the paved portion ends.

5

 

Currently, there is a pedestrian footpath across the disputed property that leads to the 

revetment and beach. The County uses both the disputed property and the easement over 

Lot 19 to access the shore and revetment for maintenance.

In July 1995, John and Susan Wilkinson purchased Lots 17, 18, and 19 in the 

Scotland Beach subdivision and later transferred it to the Wilkinson Living Trust in May 

2016. The Aikens purchased undeveloped land south of the Wilkinson property in 2004

and transferred the land to the Aiken Family Trust in 2006.

4

In addition to the disputed property originally conveyed by Ms. Brady to the 

State, the property conveyed in the 1988 deed included land that the State had obtained 

through condemnation proceedings and other conveyances from neighboring landowners.

5

It is not clear from the record when exactly the sign was placed, but the parties 

agree the sign is located at or near Station Marker 14.
10

The current boundaries of the disputed property are shown on the recorded 

Chesapeake Trails Surveying, LLC’s boundary survey (Liber 4391, folio 390)

6

and by an 

exhibit plat prepared by DH Steffens Company that was introduced in the proceedings 

below by the County. The DH Steffens Company exhibit plat depicts the disputed 

property bisecting the Wilkinson property:

6 A full reproduction of the Chesapeake Trails Surveying, LLC’s boundary survey 

is included in Appendix D to this opinion.
11

In the reproduction of the exhibit plat, the dashed lines depict the land deeded from Ms. 

Brady to the State. The disputed property, covering a portion of Lots 18 and 19, is 

represented by the dashed lines highlighted in yellow. The disputed property, which is 

unimproved, is 80 feet long at its greatest length and 40 feet wide at its greatest width. At 

its narrowest point, between Wilkinson’s property on the western side and the stone 

revetment on the eastern side, it is approximately 10 feet wide. Lot 17 and the remaining 

portion of Lot 18 are to the left of the disputed property, and the revetment is depicted 

along the shore. The Aikens’ property (alleged to be Lots 23, 24, and 25) is located to 

the south of the disputed property. Lot 19 is partially under water, while Lots 20 and 21 

are fully submerged. The County’s “End of County Maintenance” sign at Station Marker 

14 is highlighted in red at the top of the reproduction. The court found that the disputed 

property is “not physically suitable for a road.”

In December 2007, Wilkinson petitioned the County, pursuant to Chapter 109 of 

the Code of St. Mary’s County, “to close, or not to open” the disputed property as a road. 

Wilkinson requested that the County “close up (not open) the portion of Bay Front Drive 

traversing said Lots 18 and 19 . . . as a public road.” The petition alleged that “the 

portion of Bay Front Drive traversing Lots 18 and 19 [i.e., the disputed property] is not 

the only way for the [Aikens] to access Bay Front Drive as there are multiple back alleys 

already in existence.” Wilkinson argued that the disputed property “cannot be 

constructed, maintained, or designed” due to its location in the Chesapeake Bay Critical 

Area and it “therefore, should not be opened to the public.”
12

A public hearing was held on November 15, 2016 “for the closing of part of Bay 

Front Drive.” On August 1, 2017, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2017-23 “To Close 

Bay Front Drive (Extended)” (“Ordinance”), with an effective date of August 15, 2017. 

The Ordinance specifies that the County is “authorized to open, alter or close certain 

public roads.” The County “initiated a proposal that a portion of the right of way 

designated as Bay Front Drive, a public road, . . . be closed” and subsequently 

“determined that the public interest will best be served by closing said portion of Bay 

Front Drive.” The County ordered “[t]hat portion of the road designated as Bay Front 

Drive”—as shown by the entire yellow highlighted area depicted on the DH Steffens 

Company exhibit plat above—“be closed.”

The Parties’ Claims

Wilkinson filed suit against the County in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, 

asserting ownership of the disputed property based upon theories of adverse possession, 

abandonment, and estoppel. The complaint initially contained three claims: declaratory 

judgment, quiet title, and slander of title. Wilkinson later amended his complaint, 

retaining only his claim for declaratory judgment. The County filed a counter complaint 

against Wilkinson, asserting a claim for declaratory judgment that it owns the disputed 

property in fee simple.

The Aikens intervened as defendants and filed a combined cross and counter

complaint, asserting various causes of action against both Wilkinson and the County. As 

against both Wilkinson and the County, the Aikens asserted claims for declaratory 

judgment (Count I), injunctive relief (Count III), and interference with easement (Count 
13

V). The Aikens asserted a claim to quiet title (Count II) against Wilkinson.7 The Aikens 

additionally asserted an inverse condemnation claim (Count IV) against only the County.

Specifically, Count I sought a declaratory judgment that the Aikens have a right to 

use Bay Front Drive to access their own property, to “requir[e] the County . . . to keep the 

entire remaining width of Bay Front Drive open for ingress and egress,” and to prohibit 

Wilkinson from interfering with the Aikens’ right to use the disputed property. Count II

sought to quiet title to the Aikens’ property (alleged to be Lots 23, 24, and 25) and for the 

court to “declar[e] that the Aikens are the absolute owners in fee simple of all of the 

Aiken property, subject only to the [County’s] easements.” Count II also admitted that 

the County “maintain[s] an easement over the Aiken property in order to maintain the 

erosion control systems on the property.” Count III sought injunctive relief, requiring the 

County to keep the alleged public road over the disputed property “open for ingress and 

egress” and prohibiting Wilkinson from blocking the alleged public road. Count IV 

alleged that, if the County “caused the public’s and the Aiken’s easement over Bay Front 

Drive to be lost,” this constitutes a taking and that the Aikens should be compensated for 

the loss of value to their property. Count V asserted interference with easement, which 

sued the County in tort for allegedly failing to consistently remove barriers repeatedly

erected by Wilkinson on the alleged public road and sued Wilkinson for compensatory 

and punitive damages for interference with the Aikens’ alleged easement.

7

In its memorandum opinion, the court explained that “Count II is asserted only 

against the Wilkinsons” because “[i]t does not seek relief from nor set forth any 

allegations against the County.”
14

The County filed a motion to dismiss the Aikens’ cross claims against the County 

(Counts I, III, IV, and V), but the court neither held a hearing nor issued a ruling on the 

motion.

Motions for Summary Judgment

The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment. Wilkinson moved for 

summary judgment on his declaratory judgment claim. In the County’s motion for 

summary judgment, the County argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on its 

declaratory judgment claim against Wilkinson and on Wilkinson’s declaratory judgment 

claim. The County also argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on all counts of 

the Aikens’ cross complaint (Counts I, III, IV, and V). Furthermore, the County 

reasserted its arguments that it made in its motion to dismiss. The Aikens moved for 

summary judgment only with respect to Count II of their counter complaint, seeking to 

quiet title against Wilkinson. The County filed an opposition motion.

Following a hearing, the court issued an order and accompanying memorandum

opinion on June 19, 2020. The court determined that there were “no material facts in 

dispute” and that it “may decide all issues presented as a matter of law.” The court 

“f[ound] and declare[d]” the following: (1) the “County is the owner in fee simple of the 

disputed property, free and clear of any and all claims, easements, liens[,] and 

encumbrances”; (2) neither Wilkinson nor the Aikens have “any private property interest 

in or with respect to the ‘disputed property’”; and (3) the current boundaries of the 

disputed property owned by the County “are as shown on the recorded Chesapeake Trails

[Surveying, LLC’s] [b]oundary [s]urvey (Liber 4391, Folio 390)” and as shown on the
15

exhibit plat prepared by DH Steffens Company. The court also stated that “[t]here was 

no dedication of the disputed property as a public road, nor was there an acceptance of 

that dedication by competent authority.” It further noted that “[t]here has only been 

public pedestrian use of the disputed land to traverse the disputed property to get to the 

beach and the use of the property by the County to access the revetment for maintenance”

and such “public use does not transmorph [sic] the area into an alleged public road . . . .”

The court denied Wilkinson’s motion for summary judgment and granted the 

County’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Wilkinson’s claim for 

declaratory judgment. The court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment 

with respect to all claims asserted by the Aikens against the County (Counts I, III, IV, 

and V). As between Wilkinson and the Aikens, the court denied the Aikens’ motion for 

summary judgment on Count II (quiet title) and dismissed the claim without prejudice. 

With respect to the Aikens’ claims against Wilkinson in Counts III and V, the court 

granted summary judgment in favor of Wilkinson.

Wilkinson noted this appeal, appealing the circuit court’s June 19, 2020 order. 

The Aikens noted a cross appeal, appealing the same judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 2-501(f), summary judgment is proper when the circuit court 

determines that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that the moving 

party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Whether a circuit court properly 

granted summary judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Kennedy 

Krieger Inst., Inc. v. Partlow, 460 Md. 607, 632-33 (2018). “[W]e independently review 
16

the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact, 

and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 

632 (quoting Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 455 Md. 462, 482 (2017)). “We review 

the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable 

inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party.” Rogers v. State, 

468 Md. 1, 13 (2020) (quoting Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 460 Md. at 632-33). 

Furthermore, “an appellate court ordinarily may uphold the grant of a summary judgment 

only on the grounds relied on by the trial court.” Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 80 

(1995).

When the “denial of summary judgment turns on [the court’s] interpretation of a 

statute—as opposed to a determination that facts are in dispute—that ruling rests on a 

question of law” and we review the issue de novo. Bell v. Chance, 460 Md. 28, 52 

(2018); see also Baltimore County v. Quinlan, 466 Md. 1, 13-14 (2019) (explaining that 

appellate courts typically “review the denial of a motion for summary judgment for abuse 

of discretion” but “[t]here are occasions in which the appellate court reviews nondiscretionary matters without deference to the trial court, even on denials of summary 

judgment”). Likewise, “[w]hen we consider a declaratory judgment in tandem with the 

grant of summary judgment, and no material facts are in dispute, we consider ‘whether 

that declaration was correct as a matter of law.’” Connors v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 442 

Md. 466, 474 (2015) (quoting Springer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 439 Md. 142, 155-56 (2014)).

“[T]he interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory and 

case law” is reviewed de novo. Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 (2006). Similarly, 
17

“[t]he interpretation of mortgages, plats, deeds, easements and covenants has been held to 

be a question of law.” White v. Pines Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 403 Md. 13, 31 

(2008). In this case, there are no disputes of material fact and our review is limited to 

whether the court was legally correct.

DISCUSSION

I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE COUNTY OWNS 

THE DISPUTED PROPERTY IN FEE SIMPLE.

Wilkinson argues that the circuit court “failed to recognize the self-terminating 

action” of the Brady deed and that it erred by finding that the Brady deed was 

unambiguous. Instead, Wilkinson contends that the deed is ambiguous and that the court 

should have considered extrinsic evidence. Wilkinson further maintains that the Brady 

deed granted an easement to construct and maintain Scotland Beach Road and Bay Front 

Drive, which was terminated by abandonment and estoppel. Alternatively, Wilkinson 

asserts that even if the court did not err in finding that the Brady deed conveyed the 

disputed property in fee simple, it was conveyed in fee simple determinable rather than 

fee simple absolute.

The County contends that the court correctly determined that the County owns the 

disputed property in fee simple absolute. It also asserts that because the County received 

the disputed property in fee simple, Wilkinson’s abandonment and estoppel claims do not 

apply. Even if the County’s interest was an easement, the County maintains that 

Wilkinson’s abandonment and estoppel arguments fail. Lastly, the County argues that 
18

Wilkinson’s contention that the disputed property was conveyed in fee simple 

determinable was not preserved.

When construing a deed’s language, “the basic principles of contract interpretation 

apply.” Gunby v. Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 174 Md. App. 189, 242, 

aff’d, 402 Md. 317 (2007). “The determination of ambiguity is a question of law” that is 

reviewed de novo. Id. at 243. “[T]he clear and unambiguous language of an agreement 

will not give way to what the parties thought the agreement meant or intended it to 

mean.” Gilchrist v. Chester, 307 Md. 422, 424 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Bd. of Trs. of State Colls. v. Sherman, 280 Md. 373, 380 (1977)). Where the language of 

a deed “is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and it must be 

presumed that the parties meant what they expressed.” Gilchrist, 307 Md. at 424

(quoting Sherman, 280 Md. at 380). “[I]f the deed . . . [is] clear and unambiguous, in the 

absence of fraud and mistake, there [is] no need to construe it through the use of extrinsic 

evidence.” Gilchrist, 307 Md. at 425.

Turning to the Brady deed, we conclude that its terms are unambiguous in that it 

did not create an easement over the disputed property, but rather, conveyed the disputed 

property to the State in fee simple absolute. Initially, we note that there is no allegation 

of fraud or mistake. In the granting clause of the Brady deed, for consideration of one 

dollar, Ms. Brady did “grant and convey unto the State of Maryland, to the use of the 

State Roads Commission of Maryland, its successors and assigns, forever in fee simple, 

all our right, title, and interest, free and clear of liens and encumbrances.” (emphasis 

added). As for the property conveyed, the deed conveyed “all the land, together with the 
19

appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining, lying between the lines 

designated ‘right of way line’ as shown and/or indicated on [Plat 1919].” (emphasis 

added). Pursuant to § 2-101 of the Real Property Article, the word “grant” in a deed 

“passes to the grantee the whole interest and estate of the grantor in the land mentioned in 

the deed unless a limitation or reservation shows, by implication or otherwise, a different 

intent.” (emphasis added). In this case, the Brady deed unambiguously conveyed a fee 

simple interest: the Brady deed “grant[ed]” the “whole interest” mentioned in the deed—

“forever in fee simple”—and conveyed the property “lying between the lines designated 

‘right of way line,’” which included the disputed property. See Md. Code Ann., Real 

Prop. § 2-101. And, as discussed more fully below, the Brady deed does not contain any

express reservation or limitation evidencing a different intent.

While “the terms ‘right-of-way’ and ‘easement’ are synonymous,” Gregg Neck 

Yacht Club, Inc. v. County Comm’rs of Kent County, 137 Md. App. 732, 754 (2001)

(quoting Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 126 (1999)), this 

language in the Brady deed did not convey an easement. “An express easement by 

reservation arises when a property owner conveys part of his property to another, but 

includes language in the conveyance that creates a right to use some part of the 

transferred land as a right-of-way.” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 753 

(noting that “[a]n easement is ‘a non[-]possessory interest in the real property of 

another’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688 

(1984))). Notably, “when a deed conveying a right-of-way fails to express a clear intent 

to convey a different interest in land, a presumption arises that an easement was 
20

intended.” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 755 (quoting Chevy Chase 

Land Co., 355 Md. at 128). Here, there is no such presumption because the Brady deed 

expresses a clear intent to convey the property “forever in fee simple.” Cf. Gregg Neck 

Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 761-63 (holding that the deed conveyed an easement 

where the deed conveyed a right-of-way but “omitted any mention of the term ‘fee 

simple’”). The Brady deed contained no language creating a right to use the disputed 

property as a right-of-way. Instead, the Brady deed merely identified the property

conveyed as the land “lying between the lines designated ‘right of way line’ as shown . . . 

on [Plat 1919],” i.e., the disputed property. This language was merely the legal 

description; it did not convey a right-of-way. See Gilchrist, 307 Md. at 426 (“[I]n the 

absence of accompanying restrictive language, the plat[, which referred to the land as a 

‘school parcel,’] does not do anything more than identify the property being conveyed. . . 

. [T]he legal description is just that and nothing more. It does not demonstrate the 

interest in the property being conveyed.”).

Separate from the paragraph conveying the disputed property in fee simple

absolute, the Brady deed further granted the following easement to the State:

AND the grantors do further grant to the State of 

Maryland to the use of the State Roads Commission of 

Maryland, its successors and assigns, the right to create, use 

and maintain on the land shown hatched . . . on the above 

mentioned plat,[8]such drainage structures, stream changes 

and facilities as are necessary . . . to adequately drain the 

highway and/or adjacent property and such slopes as are 

8 Plat 1919 does not contain any such hatch marks, but the plat does indicate the 

“easement area” to be two narrow strips of land outside of the “right of way line[s]” 

located on either side of Bay Front Drive. See Appendix C.
21

necessary to retain the said highway and/or adjacent property, 

it being understood between the parties hereto, however, that 

at such time as the contour of the land over which this 

easement is granted is changed so that the easement required 

for slopes is no longer necessary to support or protect the 

property conveyed in fee simple, then said easement for 

slopes shall cease to be effective.

At oral argument, Wilkinson relied on this paragraph to support his contention that the

disputed property was conveyed as an easement. The “easement for slopes” to drain the 

planned highway and maintain the slopes along the planned highway, however, is 

separate from the disputed property that was conveyed by fee simple absolute. Indeed, 

the deed states that this “easement for slopes shall cease to be effective” when it “is no 

longer necessary to support or protect the property conveyed in fee simple.” (emphasis 

added). Moreover, as shown on Plat 1919, the “easement area” is the land outside of the 

“right of way line[s].” Because we determine that the Brady deed did not convey the 

disputed property as an easement, we need not consider Wilkinson’s arguments regarding 

abandonment and termination of an easement by estoppel.9 We conclude that the Brady 

deed is unambiguous and conveyed the disputed property in fee simple absolute, thus 

there is no need to consider extrinsic evidence as suggested by Wilkinson.10

9 A fee simple interest cannot be lost by abandonment. Cristofani v. Bd. of Educ.

of Prince George’s County, 98 Md. App. 91, 91 (1993). And because we conclude that 

no easement over the disputed property was conveyed, there is consequently no easement 

to be terminated by estoppel.

10 In support of his contention that the Brady deed is ambiguous, Wilkinson cites 

to several forms of extrinsic evidence and claims that the court erred by not considering 

such evidence. For instance, Wilkinson would have this Court consider an option 

contract that pre-dates the Brady deed, land surveys from the 1980s depicting various 

termination points for Bay Front Drive, and letters from the State Highway 

Administration and the Department of Public Works expressing different opinions about 
22

Lastly, as an alternative argument, Wilkinson maintains that the disputed property 

was conveyed in fee simple determinable rather than fee simple absolute because the 

Brady deed describes the State’s purpose for obtaining the disputed property. We 

assume, without deciding, that the fee simple determinable issue was not preserved and 

exercise our discretion to consider the issue. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (providing that an 

appellate court has the discretion to hear issues not raised in the circuit court “if 

necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another 

appeal”).

The Brady deed provides, in relevant part:

[T]he State Roads Commission of Maryland . . . finds it 

necessary to acquire land, easements, and or rights, etc., . . . 

in order to lay out, open, establish, construct, extend, widen, 

straighten, grade and improve, etc., . . . and[/]or improve in 

any manner a highway and/or bridge, . . . and, thereafter use, 

maintain and/or further improve said highway and/or bridge . 

. . .

The Brady deed also states that “the laying out of said highway and/or bridge and their 

appurtenances, in addition to being required for public convenience, necessity and safety, 

is a material benefit to the undersigned.” Wilkinson claims if the deed conveyed the 

the nature of the interest conveyed to the State. Wilkinson suggests that “[i]f the Brady 

deed was unambiguous, . . . there would not be this level of confusion regarding the 

interest granted.” Our task, however, is to objectively consider the language of the deed 

to ascertain its meaning; it is improper to consider extrinsic evidence to determine 

whether a deed’s language is ambiguous. See Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 435-39, 

447 (1999) (holding that, where a provision in a mortgage contract was unambiguous, the 

court erred in awarding summary judgment based on extrinsic evidence to interpret the 

provision). Because we conclude the deed is unambiguous, we need not consider 

extrinsic evidence. See Gilchrist, 307 Md. at 425.
23

disputed property in fee simple absolute, there would be no need for the State to delineate 

the specific purpose for obtaining the land. The Brady deed further provides that the 

disputed property is conveyed “forever in fee simple . . . so far as our property and/or our 

rights may be affected by the said proposed highway and/or bridge and the appurtenances 

thereto belonging, or in any wise appertaining.” Wilkinson claims that this “proposed 

highway” language acts as a reversionary clause and reverts the property to Ms. Brady’s

successors in interest (here, Wilkinson) because the highway was never constructed.

We disagree with Wilkinson’s contentions and conclude that the Brady deed did 

not convey the disputed property in fee simple determinable. Even though the Brady 

deed described the State’s purpose for obtaining the disputed property, a statement of 

purpose does not automatically create a fee simple determinable:

If the deed or will creates a fee, a mere statement of 

the purpose of the grant or devise is not sufficient to reduce 

the fee simple absolute to a determinable fee, an easement, 

nor to a fee upon condition subsequent. A statement of 

purpose will not alone “debase” a fee.

2 Thompson on Real Property § 17.05, at 617-18 (3d Thomas ed. 2014) (footnotes

omitted); see also Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236, 249 

(1923) (“[T]he conveyance was absolute and for a valuable consideration, and a mere 

purpose to attain a particular end . . . could not have the effect of debasing the fee.”). The 

Court of Appeals has similarly stated:

[W]hen the language of an instrument does not clearly 

indicate that grantor’s intention that the property is to revert 

to him in the event it is diverted from the declared use, the 

instrument does not operate as a restraint upon alienation of 

the property, but merely expresses the grantor’s confidence 
24

that the grantee will use the property so far as may be 

reasonable and practicable to effect the purpose of the grant.

Gordon v. City of Baltimore, 258 Md. 682, 704 (1970) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Sands v. Church of Ascension & Prince of Peace, 181 Md. 536, 542 (1943)). While the 

Brady deed specified that the purpose of conveying the disputed property was to create a 

highway, such a statement of purpose does not debase the fee. See, e.g., Rydzewski v. 

Vestry of Grace & St. Peter’s Church, 145 Md. 531, 535 (1924) (concluding that a deed 

provision, which conveyed land to a church and “declared that the property was to be 

used for a certain purpose[,] d[id] not make the estate conveyed an estate on condition”).

Furthermore, there is no express reversion of property interest nor reversionary 

clause in the Brady deed. “[T]he language of a deed must be sufficiently definite and 

clear in order to create a reservation or exception” and “[i]n accord with the general rule 

that deeds are to be construed against the grantor, exceptions and reservations are to be 

narrowly construed.” Conrad/Dommel, LLC v. W. Dev. Co., 149 Md. App. 239, 276-77 

(2003) (quoting 9 Thompson on Real Property § 82.09(c), at 597-98 (2d ed. 1999)). The 

“proposed highway” language does not act as a reversionary clause and nothing in the 

Brady deed indicates that if the State did not construct the highway, the disputed property 

would revert to Ms. Brady or her successors-in-interest. See Columbia Bldg. Co. v. 

Cemetery of the Holy Cross, 155 Md. 221, 229 (1928) (holding that a provision in a deed,

which granted land “to be held and used as a cemetery,” was not enforceable as a 

condition subsequent where the provision did not include an intention that the land 
25

should revert in the event changed conditions made it impracticable to use the land as a 

cemetery).

The 1988 deed subsequently conveyed the disputed property to St. Mary’s County. 

It conveyed “all right, title and interest of the Grantors in and to all the land, together 

with the appurtenances thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, lying between the 

lines designated ‘right of way line’ as shown and/or indicated on . . . plat[] . . . 1919.” 

The 1988 deed specified that such land was “all of the land which by deed recorded 

August 14, 1945 . . . was conveyed by Joan K. Brady to the State of Maryland to the use 

of the State Roads Commission of Maryland.” The 1988 deed therefore conveyed the 

entire interest conveyed to the State by the Brady deed. Consequently, the County owns

the disputed property in fee simple absolute, and the court did not err in granting the 

County’s motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim and did not err 

in denying Wilkinson’s motion for summary judgment.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WAS NO PUBLIC 

ROAD SOUTH OF STATION MARKER 14.

We now turn to the issues raised by the Aikens’ in their cross appeal. In granting 

the County’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that “the County 

established, built, paved and maintained the Northern part of Bay Front Drive only” and 

that “the County placed an ‘End of County Maintenance’ sign at or around Station 

Marker 14.” The court concluded that “the disputed property is not a public road, as a 

matter of law” and that “[n]o public road was established or exists after [Station Marker 

14], though there exists to the South of the paved portion a gravel private road, before the 
26

strip of land in dispute.” Consequently, the court determined that Counts I, III, IV, and V 

of the Aikens’ cross and counter complaint failed as a matter of law because the Aikens 

did not “show that they have a valid interest in the disputed property, whether as 

adjoining landowners or members of the public” because the Aikens’ “claims are all 

based on the incorrect legal conclusion that there is, or was, a public road on the disputed 

property.”

The Aikens contend that the court erred in determining that no public road was 

established or exists south of Station Marker 14. The County argues that no public road 

exists on the disputed property. Wilkinson agrees with the County. We determine that 

the court erred in concluding that no public road was established after Station Marker 14. 

We explain.

A public road may be established by one of three legal methods: (1) public 

authority; (2) dedication; or (3) long, uninterrupted use by the public as a road, for twenty 

years or more, “which, though not strictly prescription, yet bears so close an analogy to it 

that it is not inappropriate to apply to the right thus acquired the term prescriptive.” 

Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 351-52 (1885); see also Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 

424 Md. 253, 269-70 (2012). As there is no genuine dispute of material fact, we review 

this issue as a matter of law. Because we determine that a public road was created by 

dedication, we need not address prescription.

11

 We do, however, briefly discuss public 

11 The third method of creating a public road is by long use by the public or, in 

other words, a prescriptive easement, see Clickner, 424 Md. at 269-71 (citing Thomas, 63 

Md. at 351-52), which “share[s] substantially the same elements” as adverse possession. 

Breeding v. Koste, 443 Md. 15, 34-36 (2015) (relying on adverse possession law in cases 
27

authority as the court and the Aikens appear to blur the line between public authority and 

dedication. We then address dedication.

A. Public Authority

The first method of creating a public road is by condemnation by a public 

authority. See Thomas, 63 Md. at 355 (stating that a public road may have “its origin by 

condemnation, dedication[,] or prescription”). Here, the disputed property was not 

obtained by condemnation but instead was conveyed from Ms. Brady to the State in fee 

simple absolute.

In its opinion, the court stated that, pursuant to the first method, “a public road 

may be shown by its recordation in the official plat recording a subdivision.” To support 

this proposition, the court cited to Whittington v. Good Shepherd Evangelical Lutheran 

Church of Palmer Park, 236 Md. 185 (1964), Mayor of Rockville v. Geeraert, 261 Md. 

709 (1971), and Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679 (1984). These three cases, however, 

concerned the second method of creating a public road—dedication—not condemnation 

by public authority. See Whittington, 236 Md. at 192 (determining that, pursuant to an 

involving prescriptive easements). The existence of a public road “may be established by 

evidence of an uninterrupted user by the public for twenty years; the presumption being 

that such long continued use and enjoyment by the public of such way had a legal rather 

than an illegal origin.” Thomas, 63 Md. at 352. The Aikens do not appear to contend 

that a public road was created via this third method and, in any event, “title to property 

held by a municipal corporation in its government capacity, for a public use, cannot be 

acquired by adverse possession.” Siejack v. Mayor of Baltimore, 270 Md. 640, 644-45

(1974) (“Property which is held in a governmental capacity or is impressed with a public 

trust, cannot be disposed of without special statutory authority.” (quoting Montgomery 

County v. Md.-Wash. Metro. Dist., 202 Md. 293, 303 (1953))); see also Clickner, 424 

Md. at 281 (“As a general rule, permissive use can never ripen into a prescriptive 

easement.” (quoting Kirby v. Hook, 347 Md. 380, 393 (1997))).
28

applicable statute, the recordation of a subdivision plat approved by the appropriate 

public officials “constitutes [both] a dedication and acceptance of the areas on the plat 

shown as streets, roads, [and] avenues”); Geeraert, 261 Md. at 715 (“[I]t has been 

established in Maryland that proceeding under an appropriate statute, the recordation of a 

subdivision plat, containing an approval of the appropriate public officials, constitutes 

both a dedication and acceptance of the areas dedicated to public use without more.”); 

Boucher, 301 Md. at 692-93 (stating that “a plat that sets out a street or alleyway creates 

a presumption that a dedication was intended” and “purchasers who relied upon the plat 

were entitled to a private right of way [(an implied easement)] over the street or alley 

regardless of whether the dedication was ever accepted”). We believe that these three 

cases are more appropriately discussed in the next section concerning dedication.

We also note that the Aikens posit that the State Roads Commission “was a 

‘public authority’ authorized to create roads” and that it did so by “survey[ing] and 

plat[ting] a road bounded by ‘Right-of-way’ lines and fil[ing] it in the land records on a 

properly prepared plat.” In other words, they argue that the State Roads Commission

created a public road by filing Plat 1919, which laid out Bay Front Drive between the 

designated right-of-way lines, because it is a public entity. We believe that the Aikens’ 

arguments are also better addressed in the next section.

B. Dedication

Pursuant to the second method, “[a] completed common law dedication ‘requires 

an offer and acceptance.’” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 755 (quoting 

Wash. Land Co. v. Potomac Ridge Dev. Corp., 137 Md. App. 33, 40 (2001)). First, there 
29

must be a “voluntary offer[] to dedicate land to public use.” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, 

Inc., 137 Md. App. at 755 (quoting City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 357 Md. 484, 503 

(2000)).12 The owner’s intent to give his or her land over to public use “must be clear 

and unequivocal.” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 756 (quoting Wash.

Land Co., 137 Md. App. at 41); see also Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 419 (1942)

(“[N]o particular form or ceremony is necessary to dedicate land to public use. No deed 

is necessary to evidence a dedication, nor any grantee in esse to take title. . . . [A]ny act 

of a landowner clearly manifesting such an intention is sufficient.”).

Second, an offer to dedicate is generally accepted by one of the four following 

methods: “acceptance of a deed or other record; acts in pais, such as grading, at public 

expense; long use; or express statutory or other official action.” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, 

Inc., 137 Md. App. at 756 (quoting Wash. Land Co., 137 Md. App. at 44). “Acceptance 

may occur when the ‘appropriate entity assum[es] control and maintenance of the 

property offered.’” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 755 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Waterman, 357 Md. at 504). An offer may be accepted by a public 

authority or the general public. N. Beach v. N. Chesapeake Beach Land & Improvement 

Co. of Calvert County, 172 Md. 101, 116 (1937). The acceptance requirement “protect[s] 

12 “Ordinarily, the fee owner of land conveys an interest in the land ‘to the public; 

usually to the local government having jurisdiction over the land[,]’” but “[t]he owner 

retains a fee simple interest in the dedicated parcel, ‘subject to an easement for the 

public.’” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 755 (first quoting Waterman, 

357 Md. at 506; and then quoting Maryland-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n v. McCaw, 

246 Md. 662, 675 (1967)). As we previously determined, however, the County owns the 

disputed property in fee simple absolute.
30

municipalities from having someone impose upon them the responsibility for 

maintenance or repair of streets or highways.” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. 

App. at 755-56 (alteration in original) (quoting Waterman, 357 Md. at 504). Until there 

is an acceptance, an offer to dedicate may be revoked or modified by the original 

dedicator or successors-in-interest. Town of Glenarden v. Lewis, 261 Md. 1, 4 (1971).

1. Offer

First, there was an offer to dedicate the disputed property to public use as 

evidenced by the Brady deed and Plat 1919. While the court did not specify whether 

there was an offer as it focused primarily on acceptance in its analysis, we conclude that 

the record supports proof that Ms. Brady intended to dedicate the disputed property to 

public use. As illustrated by the Brady deed, Ms. Brady conveyed the disputed property 

to the State for a public purpose, namely “for a public highway.” The Brady deed 

provided that “the laying out of said highway and/or bridge . . . [is] required for public 

convenience, necessity and safety.” Plat 1919, which is incorporated in the Brady deed,

further evidences clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the disputed property to public 

use because “when a plat is recorded, it is [generally] presumed that there is an intent to 

dedicate particular types of land interests to public use, such as roads, parks, etc.” Olde 

Severna Park Improvement Ass’n v. Gunby, 402 Md. 317, 330 (2007) (“The offers [to 

dedicate] are generally, although not exclusively, made by showing roads, parks or 

similar facilities on plats without any limitations on dedication, and the recording of those 

plats.” (alteration in original) (quoting Waterman, 357 Md. at 503-04)). Plat 1919, which 

was recorded on June 19, 1952 and again on March 26, 1986, lays out the southern 
31

portion of Bay Front Drive without any language suggesting that a dedication was not 

intended, thus raising a presumption there was an intent to dedicate the disputed property 

to public use. The Brady deed and Plat 1919 constitute clear and unequivocal evidence 

of an offer to dedicate.

As previously noted, the Aikens argue that the filing of Plat 1919 created a public 

road because the plat was created by the State Roads Commission, a public authority. To 

support their argument that the mere filing of Plat 1919 created a public road, the Aikens 

rely on Day v. Allender, 22 Md. 511 (1865), where the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he 

existence of a public way is proved either by a copy of the record, or by other 

documentary evidence of the proper laying out by the proper authorities, pursuant to 

statutes, or by evidence either of immemorial usage, or of dedication of the road to public 

use.” Id. at 525 (emphasis added).

Maryland caselaw, however, establishes that, in the absence of a statute that 

provides otherwise, the filing of a plat merely constitutes an offer, and dedication is not 

complete until there is acceptance. The Court of Appeals has explained:

[W]hen a plat is recorded, it is presumed that there is an intent 

to dedicate particular types of land interests to public use, 

such as roads, parks, etc., and when that offer of dedication is 

accepted, the dedication is complete and the local government 

will generally have jurisdiction over that land.

Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, 402 Md. at 330 (emphasis added); see also

Shapiro v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Prince George’s County, 219 Md. 298, 302 (1959) 

(“The mere filing of the plat . . . did not effectuate a complete dedication, but constituted 

an offer to dedicate which had to be accepted in order to make a final and irrevocable 
32

dedication.”); Taussig v. Van Deusen, 183 Md. 436, 440 (1944) (explaining that “[t]he 

filing of the plat was nothing more than an offer which does not become a dedication 

until accepted” where “[t]he avenues and streets laid down on the plat were never 

actually laid out on the ground” and there was no acceptance by the public); Harlan v. 

Town of Bel Air, 178 Md. 260, 266 (1940) (“[A] deed and plat are insufficient to establish 

a public highway until the conveyance has been accepted.”). Plat 1919, on its own, did 

not create a public road. It merely evidences an offer to dedicate the disputed property 

for public use.

Moreover, the Aikens’ reliance on Day v. Allender is misplaced as subsequent 

cases in Maryland have explained that, pursuant to an applicable statute, the recording of 

a subdivision plat may constitute both an offer and an acceptance of the roads or streets 

depicted on the plat. For instance, as discussed in Whittington, the Code of Prince 

George’s County expressly provided that when a subdivision plat is recorded, the 

portions designated on the plat “as streets, roads, avenues, lanes, alleys and public parks 

or squares . . . are hereby declared to be forever dedicated to public use.” 236 Md. at 

190-92. The Court of Appeals determined that, pursuant to the Code, the approval and 

recording of the subdivision plat constituted both a dedication and acceptance. Id. at 192; 

see also Maryland-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n v. McCaw, 246 Md. 662, 673

(1967) (affirming the rule, “that under the [same] statute [considered in Whittington], the 

dedication to the public is complete and the interest of the public has vested when the 

subdivision plat is filed”). In Geeraert, the applicable section of the Montgomery County 

Code similarly provided that “[w]hen the (approved) plats are so recorded, those portions 
33

. . . designated on the plats as . . . streets . . . shall be and the same are hereby declared to 

be forever dedicated to public use.” 261 Md. at 715. The Court determined that there 

was “public acceptance of the dedication . . . upon the approval of [the City] and the 

filing of the plats.” Id. at 716. It also clarified that, in Maryland, “it has been established 

. . . that proceeding under an appropriate statute, the recordation of a subdivision plat, 

containing an approval of the appropriate public officials, constitutes both a dedication 

and acceptance of the areas dedicated to public use without more.” Id. at 715. Thus, 

pursuant to an appropriate statute, “the dedication to the public is complete and the 

interest of the public has vested when the (approved) subdivision plat is filed.” Id.

(quoting McCaw, 246 Md. at 673).

While the State Roads Commission was created and tasked with the power to 

establish and lay out roads,

13 the Aikens do not point to any state statute or local public 

law, and we find none, expressly providing that once the State Roads Commission or 

other public entity approves and records a plat depicting a road in St. Mary’s County, 

13 Chapter 141 of the Acts of 1908 created the State Roads Commission and 

granted the Commission “full powers to construct, improve, and maintain public roads 

and highways.” Huffman v. State Rds. Comm’n of Maryland, 152 Md. 566, 575 (1927). 

The Commission was further granted with the power and duty to:

select, construct, improve and maintain such a general system 

of improved state roads and highways, as can reasonably be 

expected to be completed with the funds herein provided in 

and through all the counties of this state; . . . condemn, lay 

out, open, establish, construct, extend, widen, straighten, 

grade and improve, in any manner, any main road, of the 

system, in any county of this state and establish or fix the 

width thereof . . . .

Id.
34

dedication is complete and a public road is thereby created. Additionally, the subdivision 

plat establishing the Scotland Beach neighborhood does not depict Bay Front Drive. See 

Appendix A. We cannot conclude such statutory dedication occurred here. Acceptance 

of the offer to dedicate is required.

2. Acceptance

Having determined that there was an offer as evidenced by the Brady deed and 

Plat 1919, we now turn to acceptance. The court determined that “none of the . . . 

possible methods of acceptance was utilized.” We disagree and conclude that the State 

accepted the offer to dedicate the disputed property to public use as evidenced by 
35

acceptance of a deed or other record,

14 namely the 1945 deed. The 1988 deed further 

provides support that there was an acceptance.

15

14 We briefly discuss two other methods of acceptance, acts in pais and long use, 

as applied to the instant case. First, an offer to dedicate may be accepted by acts in pais, 

such as construction, maintaining, grading, or leveling the road at public expense. See 

Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 756. Acceptance “may be implied from 

repairs made and ordered or knowingly paid for by the authority which has the legal 

power to adopt the street or highway.” Canton Co. of Balt., 124 Md. at 632 (quoting 

Pope v. Clark, 122 Md. 1, 9 (1913)). While it is undisputed that a majority of Bay Front 

Drive was paved but the disputed property was not, we note that physically constructing a 

road is merely one way to prove acceptance. The County incorrectly asserts that a road, 

regardless of how it is designed or platted, “does not become a public road until it is 

constructed and there is an (1) acceptance; and (2) a dedication by the government.” 

(emphasis added). Construction or maintenance of a road is merely one way to evidence 

acceptance of an offer to dedicate—construction is not required to create a public road 

contrary to the County’s belief. See Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 756 

(explaining that “acceptance . . . is shown by one of four methods,” which are 

“acceptance of a deed or other record; acts in pais, such as grading, at public expense; 

long use; or express statutory or other official action” (emphasis added)).

Second, acceptance may also be proven by long use by the general public, such as 

showing “an entry upon the land and enjoying the privilege offered.” N. Beach, 172 Md.

at 116. “The user by the public . . . need not be for such a length of time as would be 

sufficient to establish an easement by prescription or to acquire title to the land by 

adverse possession.” Id. All that “is required is for the user to be continued for so long a 

time as will establish a clear intention on the part of the public to accept.” Id. 

Nevertheless, “the mere fact that the public may have used a way over private property 

for many years is not sufficient to raise the presumption that the way has been accepted 

by the public authorities as a public street.” Blank v. Park Lane Ctr., Inc., 209 Md. 568, 

576 (1956); see also Harlan, 178 Md. at 266 (“Evidence that the public may have used a 

way over private property for some years does not of itself establish the presumption that 

it has been accepted by the authorities.”). The County admitted, in its motion for 

summary judgment and appellate brief, that “the only continued use by the public has 

been pedestrian use” and that it “has permitted only public pedestrian use of the property” 

to access the beach. The court found that “[t]here has only been public pedestrian use of 

the disputed land to traverse the disputed property to get to the beach.” It would be, 

however, inappropriate for this Court to conclude that acceptance has occurred via long 

use by the public where there was no finding, or evidence in the record, indicating how 

long the public has used the disputed property to access the beach.
36

First, the State Roads Commission, acting on behalf of the State, assumed control 

of the disputed property via the 1945 deed. Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. 

at 755 (noting that acceptance may occur by assuming “control and maintenance” of the 

offered property (quoting Waterman, 357 Md. at 504)). The disputed property was 

conveyed to the State Roads Commission “as part of the Maryland State Roads System,” 

to “use, maintain and/or further improve said highway and/or bridge.” The disputed 

property remained in the State’s control until 1988, when it transferred its obligations to 

the County. The State accepted the offer to dedicate by accepting the property via the 

1945 deed.

In the 1988 deed, titled as “Road Conveyance Deed,” the State Highway 

Administration, acting on behalf of the State, conveyed the disputed property to the 

County. The 1988 deed, which was recorded, refers to Bay Front Drive as a whole—it

15 We also note that, based on our review of the record, there is no evidence that 

the offer to dedicate lapsed, or was revoked or refused. There is no evidence that the 

State or the County disclaimed its interest in the disputed property or that its use was 

inconsistent with that of a public road. See Mauck v. Bailey, 247 Md. 434, 444 n.1 

(1967) (“For an offer of dedication to be considered to be lapsed, revoked or refused 

because it was not accepted within a reasonable time, the municipality must have 

affirmatively intended not to accept or must have allowed the dedicator or his successors 

to make valuable improvements without objection.”); Hackerman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 

212 Md. 618, 625 (1957) (explaining that it cannot be claimed that an offer was “was not 

accepted within a reasonable time unless the municipality has shown affirmatively an 

intent not to accept, or has allowed the owner to make valuable improvements without 

objections so that he would be materially injured were the dedication insisted upon”); cf. 

United Fin. Corp. v. Royal Realty Corp., 172 Md. 138 (1937) (determining that “the 

failure of the municipality to act on [an offer] for over 50 years, coupled with the use by 

the owners of the land within the street lines, for purposes inconsistent with its character 

as a public highway, and the acceptance of taxes thereon, throughout that period, must be 

construed as a definite refusal to accept [the offer]”).
37

does not treat the portion comprising the disputed property any differently than the paved 

northern portion. The 1988 deed first states that the State Highway Administration “has 

constructed, or is about to construct (a) certain State Highway(s) and/or Bridge(s) known 

and designated as SM 154-001-511 Bay Front Drive (Formerly Ed Road) Scotland Beach 

to Point Lookout – County Road No. 3411.” The 1988 deed further describes a “rights of 

way conveyed by the State Highway Administration” as “Bay Front Drive (formerly Ed 

Road).” The property conveyed included the land “BEING ALL OF THE BED of the 

road known as Bay Front Drive (formerly Ed Road), County No. 3411” and “BEING 

ALL OF THE LAND which by deed recorded August 14, 1945 . . . was conveyed by 

Joan K. Brady to the State of Maryland to the use of the State Roads Commission of 

Maryland.” It is telling that Bay Front Drive is called a “County Road.”

In addition, the 1988 deed expressly references Plats 1918, 1919, and 6016 to 

describe the land conveyed, which depict the entirety of Bay Front Drive, including the 

portion constituting the disputed property. See Boucher, 301 Md. at 689 (explaining the 

common law rule that when a deed references a plat, it “incorporates that plat as part of 

the deed”). The 1988 deed acknowledges that the plats were recorded and describes the 

plats as “show[ing] the land, easements, rights and controls of access which have been 

determined by said ‘Grantor’ as necessary to be retained by the State for the construction, 

operation, maintenance, use and protection of the highway(s) and/or bridge(s) 

constructed, or to be constructed, as aforesaid.” (emphasis added). Plats 1918 and 1919 

do not treat the portion of Bay Front Drive over the disputed property any differently than 
38

the northern portion and do not single out any portion of the road—Bay Front Drive is 

referred to as a whole.

The County moreover accepted the 1988 deed subject to “each and every 

reservation, restriction, condition, covenant and control set forth in this instrument of 

writing.” And while the 1988 deed specified that the land conveyed was “no longer 

needed by [the State Highway Administration] in connection with the construction, 

operation, maintenance, use and protection of the State Highway System,” the 1988 deed 

is titled as a “Road Conveyance Deed,” indicating that the land was conveyed to the 

County for a transportation purpose. In addition, the 1988 deed states: “WHEREAS, 

under the provisions of § 8-309 of the Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of 

Maryland, it is necessary for the Board of Public Works of Maryland to join in the 

conveyance of any land by the State Highway Administration of the Department of 

Transportation.”

Upon closer inspection of § 8-309 of the Transportation Article, subsection (a) 

explains that “[t]he purpose of this section is to return unneeded land to the tax rolls of 

the counties and to make this land available for use by a county or municipality for any 

transportation purpose.” 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 489, § 8-309(a) (emphasis added).16 

Section 8-309 further provides that “if land acquired under this subtitle is not needed for 

present or future State, county, or municipal transportation purpose or other public 

purposes,” the land shall be disposed “as soon as practicable after the completion or 

16 The current version of this statute provides for the same. See Md. Code Ann., 

Transp. § 8-309(a)–(b).
39

abandonment of the project for which the land was acquired.” 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 489, § 

8-309(b)(1). And “[i]f the land is not needed for a county or municipal transportation 

purpose, the person from whom the land was acquired or the successor in interest of that 

person has the right to reacquire the land.” 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 489, § 8-309(b)(2)(ii). 

The 1988 deed conveyed the entire property within the right of way lines depicted on 

Plats 1918, 1919, and 6016—the entirety of Bay Front Drive. The conveyance to the 

County was for a transportation purpose. The disputed property additionally was not 

offered or deeded back to Ms. Brady or her successors in interest, thus indicating that the 

land conveyed was not determined to be “not needed for a county or municipal 

transportation purpose.” 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 489, § 8-309(b)(2)(ii). The 1988 deed and 

the relevant plats refer to Bay Front Drive as a whole and do not treat the southern 

portion of Bay Front Drive after Station Marker 14 any differently than the northern 

portion of the road. Based on all of the foregoing, the offer to dedicate was accepted. 

Furthermore, the County’s 2017 Ordinance “To Close Bay Front Drive 

(Extended),” while not evidence of acceptance via express statutory or other official 

action, effectively confirms that there was an acceptance of the offer to dedicate before 

the Ordinance was issued. We disagree with the circuit court that the Ordinance was “not 

relevant or material” and “a mere formality.” The County acknowledged that Bay Front 

Drive is a “public road,” and it exercised its authority to close public roads within St. 

Mary’s County. The Ordinance specified that the County “initiated a proposal that a 

portion of the right of way designated as Bay Front Drive, a public road, . . . be closed.” 

(emphasis added). The County concluded “that the public interest will best be served by 
40

closing the said portion of Bay Front Drive,” which included the disputed property, and 

consequently ordained that the “portion of the road designated as Bay Front Drive . . . be 

closed.”

In issuing the Ordinance, the County acted pursuant to Chapter 109 of the Code of 

St. Mary’s County, which provides that the “County Commissioners of St. Mary’s 

County are authorized and empowered to control and regulate the public roads and 

bridges in the county.” St. Mary’s County Code § 109-1 (2017) (emphasis added). 

Chapter 109 further provides that the County may, by petition, “[c]ondemn, lay out, open, 

extend and make new public roads” and “close up, in whole or in part, any existing public 

road.” Id. § 109-2 (emphasis added). If the disputed property was never established as a 

public road, then the County would not have had the authority to close it pursuant to 

Chapter 109.

Moreover, it is telling that during the public hearings on the petition to close a 

portion of Bay Front Drive, the County attorney stated that “as an unimproved section, 

[the disputed property] creates a potential liability . . . that attaches to the issues of 

maintenance of public streets.” As noted previously, when an offer is accepted, 

municipalities have “the responsibility for maintenance or repair of [the] streets or 

highways.” Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md. App. at 755-56 (quoting Waterman, 

357 Md. at 504). The County attorney thus recommended that the County “clos[e] the 

road as public highway . . . to limit potential liability of the County in the event of some 

sort of motor vehicle accident” and advised the County to “adopt the proposed ordinance 

to simply close the road, declassify it [out of the county system] . . . as a public highway, 
41

to protect the County.” In issuing the Ordinance, the County followed the County

attorney’s recommendation. The Ordinance was not “surplusage” as concluded by the 

court but supports our interpretation that the 1945 and 1988 deeds and Plats 1918 and 

1919 evidence the County’s acceptance.

We determine that there was a complete dedication and that the court erred in 

concluding that no public road was created south of Station Marker 14 and consequently 

erred in granting the County’s motion for summary judgment as the Aikens’ Counts I, III, 

IV, and V are premised on the existence of a public road. For the same reason, the court 

additionally erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Wilkinson as to the Aikens’ 

Counts III and V. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further proceedings on the 

Aikens’ Counts I

17 and III as against both the County and Wilkinson, Count IV as against

the County, and Count V as against Wilkinson.

18

 On remand, the court should take into 

consideration that the portion of Bay Front Drive over the disputed property was 

statutorily closed in 2017.

17 Count I of the Aikens’ cross and counter complaint was a claim for a declaratory 

judgment. Upon consideration of Count I on remand, the circuit court should consider 

that its declaration that the County owns the disputed property in fee simple, as discussed

in Section I, was correct. As explained in Section II, however, the court cannot rely on 

its determination that the disputed property was not a public road. Accordingly, the court 

should re-issue a declaratory judgment concerning the Aikens’ Count I on remand. See 

GPL Enter., LLC v. Certain Underwiters at Lloyd’s, 254 Md. App. 638, 663-64 (2022) 

(holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing a claim for a declaratory judgment 

without declaring the parties’ rights as required).

18 We do not remand Count V against the County because, as explained in Section 

IV of this opinion, the Aikens failed to plead compliance with the notice requirement of 

the Local Government Tort Claims Act.
42

III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE AIKENS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING THE AIKENS’ CLAIM TO QUIET 

TITLE.

The Aikens argue that they were entitled to summary judgment on their quiet title 

claim (Count II) against Wilkinson. They claim that they were not required to provide 

notice to or join adjacent property owners and further argue that the County cannot defeat 

their claim to quiet title “by casting doubts on the Aikens title” but instead “must come 

forward with a claim of its own.” In response, the County asserts that the Aikens failed 

to provide notice to or join adjacent property owners and the “others” who allegedly 

challenged the Aikens’ ownership of the property at issue and, accordingly, that the court 

did not err in dismissing Count II. Wilkinson does not contest the Aikens’ quiet title 

claim in this appeal.

The purpose of a quiet title action is to “protect the owner of legal title ‘from being 

disturbed in his possession and from being harassed by suits in regard to his title by 

persons setting up unjust and illegal pretensions.’” Porter v. Schaffer, 126 Md. App. 237, 

260 (1999) (quoting Wathen v. Brown, 48 Md. App. 655, 658 (1981)). “[T]he plaintiff 

has the burden of establishing both possession and legal title by ‘clear proof.’” Porter, 

126 Md. App. at 260 (quoting Steward v. May, 111 Md. 162, 173 (1909)). The quiet title 

action statute, § 14-108 of the Real Property Article, provides in its entirety:

(a) Any person in actual peaceable possession of property, or,

if the property is vacant and unoccupied, in constructive and 

peaceable possession of it, either under color of title or claim 

of right by reason of the person or the person’s predecessor’s 

adverse possession for the statutory period, when the person’s 

title to the property is denied or disputed, or when any other 

person claims, of record or otherwise to own the property, or 
43

any part of it, or to hold any lien encumbrance on it, 

regardless of whether or not the hostile outstanding claim is 

being actively asserted, and if an action at law or proceeding 

in equity is not pending to enforce or test the validity of the 

title, lien, encumbrance, or other adverse claim, the person 

may maintain a suit in accordance with Subtitle 6 of this title

in the circuit court for the county where the property or any 

part of the property is located to quiet or remove any cloud 

from the title, or determine any adverse claim.

(b) The proceeding shall be deemed in rem or quasi in rem so 

long as the only relief sought is a decree that the plaintiff has 

absolute ownership and the right of disposition of the 

property, and an injunction against the assertion by the person 

named as the party defendant, of the person’s claim by any 

action at law or otherwise. Any person who appears of 

record, or claims to have a hostile outstanding right, shall be 

made a defendant in the proceedings.

(emphasis added). Stated otherwise, § 14-108(b) provides that a person who claims to 

have an adverse claim or “a record owner of property that is subject to an action to quiet

title [are] necessary part[ies] and must be joined as . . . defendant[s] to the action.” Estate 

of Zimmerman v. Blatter, 458 Md. 698, 732 (2018).

Furthermore, § 14-108(a) instructs an action to quiet title to be maintained “in 

accordance with Subtitle 6 of this title,” which was added by the General Assembly in 

2016. See Zimmerman, 458 Md. at 705. In turn, §§ 14-601 to 14-621 of the Real 

Property Article “set forth general procedures governing actions to quiet title and 

provides specific procedures by which a plaintiff may file an action to quiet title and join 

all necessary defendants, despite the existence of a defendant who is not known to the 

plaintiff.” Id. at 722. Specifically, § 14-608(a) requires that “[t]he plaintiff shall name as 

defendants . . . the persons having adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff that are of 
44

record or known to the plaintiff or reasonably apparent from an inspection of the 

property against which a determination is sought.” (emphasis added). If a defendant is 

unknown to the plaintiff, § 14-609(a) provides that “the plaintiff shall state in the 

complaint that the name is unknown and shall name as parties all persons unknown in the 

manner provided in § 14-613 of this subtitle.” Section 14-613 details that unknown 

defendants may be named as: “all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable 

right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to 

the plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on the plaintiff’s title to the property.”

In denying the Aikens’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Count II 

without prejudice, the court determined that Count II failed as a matter of law because the 

Aikens failed to comply with § 14-108 and failed to join necessary parties. In Count II, 

the Aikens alleged that that they are in constructive and peaceable possession of Lots 23, 

24, and 25, which are vacant and unoccupied. They further alleged that “[t]he 

Wilkinsons and others have asserted a right to use the Aiken property and/or questioned 

the Aikens’ ownership and have otherwise created a cloud on the Aikens’ title.”19 

(emphasis added). We agree with the court that the Aikens did not comply with § 14-108

by failing to join these “others” as defendants.

First, we agree with the court’s conclusion that William Reagan, a neighboring 

landowner, should have been joined. In their motion for summary judgment, the Aikens 

19 The Aikens noted that their quiet title claim is subject to the easements held by 

the County and the Maryland Department of Natural Resources to maintain erosion 

control systems on the property.
45

asserted that “[t]here is no dispute between the Aikens and the Reagans concerning the 

boundary” and, in an attached affidavit, Christopher Aiken attested that “[t]he garage 

associated with the Reagan property is on land owned by the Reagans.” As noted above,

however, § 14-108(b) provides that “[a]ny person who appears of record, or claims to 

have a hostile outstanding right, shall be made a defendant in the proceedings.” Section 

14-608(a) further explains that “the persons having adverse claims to the title of the 

plaintiff that are . . . reasonably apparent from an inspection of the property against which 

a determination is sought” shall be named as defendants. The court determined that the 

Chesapeake Trails Surveying, LLC’s boundary survey indicated that there is a dispute 

concerning Lot C, which is owned by Mr. Reagan (Liber 533, folio 119),

20 and the 

adjacent Lot 25, claimed in its entirety by the Aikens in their cross complaint.

21

 The 

survey, excerpted below, shows that an existing garage is built over Lot C (which we 

have highlighted in yellow)22 and Lot 25 (which we have highlighted in blue):

20 We take judicial notice of Mr. Reagan’s deed pursuant to Rule 5-201.

21 As noted by the court, the Aikens attempted to amend Count II “orally and 

through motions . . . by altering their claim of ownership to only half of Lot 25.” More 

specifically, the Aikens asserted that the Reagans and the Aikens “each own part of what 

was originally platted as Lot 25 and the Reagan’s garage is entirely on land owned by the 

Reagans.” The Aikens, however, did not seek leave to amend their cross complaint and 

did not file an amended cross complaint. The court concluded that the Aikens could not 

alter their claim to half of Lot 25 orally or through motions.

22 Although the boundary of Lot C was not expressly delineated by the court, its 

opinion can be reasonably understood as referring to the yellow highlighted lot located at 

the top of the excerpt. The top of the excerpt points west and the fantail of Bay Front 

Drive is located on the right side of the excerpt.
46

Mr. Reagan appears “of record” and it is “reasonably apparent from an inspection of the 

property,” as indicated by the boundary survey, that Mr. Reagan should have been named 

as a defendant. Real Prop. §§ 14-108(b), 14-608(a). Moreover, given that the Aikens 

allege that they own the entirety of Lot 25, Mr. Reagan may be a person who claims to 

have a hostile outstanding right with respect to Lot 25 because the survey shows that onehalf of the garage is built on Lot C and the other half is built on Lot 25. Mr. Reagan was 

required to be joined.

Second, the Aikens asserted that “others” have created a cloud on the Aikens’ title. 

The Aikens, however, did not name these “others” in their counter complaint or any 
47

pleading. In an affidavit attached to their motion for summary judgment, Christopher 

Aiken attested that he is “not aware of any person that makes a specific claim of title to 

our property that is not a party to this case” but that they “have, however, been subjected 

to . . . rumors and general accusations by members of the community that [they] own less 

than what is in the deeds.” Even if the Aikens were unaware of what members of the 

community were casting doubt on their title, §§ 14-609(a) and 14-613 outline the 

procedures for naming unknown persons in a complaint, which the Aikens did not follow. 

The Aikens’ assertion that “others” have created a cloud on their title “leaves unclear 

who is directly interested in the case, much less whether the directly interested people 

know of the case.” Rounds v. Maryland-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 441 Md. 621, 

647 (2015) (quoting Rounds v. Maryland-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 214 Md. 

App. 90, 112 (2013)).23 We conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying the 

23 The court relied on Rounds v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning 

Commission, 441 Md. 621 (2015), in denying the Aikens’ motion for summary judgment. 

We note that the court inaccurately stated that in Rounds, “[n]o statute required notice or 

joinder and, yet, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that both were required.” But in 

Rounds there was an applicable statute that required joinder: the Declaratory Judgment 

Act, which provides that “[i]f declaratory relief is sought, a person who has or claims any 

interest which would be affected by the declaration, shall be made a party.” Md. Code 

Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-405(a)(1); see Rounds, 441 Md. at 648 (explaining that the 

general rule for declaratory judgment actions is that “all persons interested in the 

declaration are necessary parties” (quoting Williams v. Moore, 215 Md. 181, 185 

(1957))). Joinder is not required, however, if the non-joined party had knowledge of the 

litigation and the ability to join but failed to do so. Rounds, 441 Md. at 648-49. The 

Court held that the court did not err in granting the motions to dismiss for failure to join 

necessary parties. See id. at 649-50. The Court explained that the petitioners’ assertion 

in their amended complaint—that the “other adjacent property owners [who were not 

joined in the case] have agreed not to contest the relief sought herein”—was conclusory 

and insufficient to demonstrate that the adjacent property owners had knowledge of and 

ability to join the suit and failed to do so. Id. at 647, 649. While Rounds involved a 
48

Aikens’ summary judgment motion and dismissing their claim to quiet title without 

prejudice.

IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE COUNTY’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE AIKENS’ INTERFERENCE WITH 

EASEMENT CLAIM.

The Aikens argue that the County’s motion for summary judgment should not 

have been granted on their interference with easement claim (Count V) because “there 

were material facts at issue concerning notice.” Count V alleged that the Aikens and the 

public have an easement over Bay Front Drive, as a public road, and that Wilkinson 

“repeatedly erected barriers preventing the Aikens from using Bay Front Drive for 

ingress and egress to their property.”24 That count also alleged that the County 

“sporadically removed the barriers” and has “allowed Bay Front Drive to be blocked for 

extended periods of time—years in some instances.” In other words, the Aikens alleged 

“that the County did not do enough to ensure that the Aikens and the public had access 

over Bay Front Drive.”

The Aikens claim that they were not required to provide statutory notice pursuant 

to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) because the County had notice of 

the circumstances giving rise to their injury. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-

declaratory judgment action and this case involves a quiet title claim, the Aikens’ 

assertion that “others” have created on a cloud on their title suffers from the same issue: 

it is unclear who is interested in the case.

24 We note that the court’s opinion did not state whether the barriers or 

obstructions were placed specifically by Wilkinson but only stated that they were erected 

by someone.
49

304. The County avers that the Aikens’ cross complaint failed to allege that the Aikens 

provided notice as required by the LGTCA and consequently Count V failed as a matter 

of law. In addition, the County argues that Count V was barred by governmental 

immunity because the County was acting in its governmental capacity. The Aikens do 

not present any argument addressing governmental immunity on appeal.

Under the LGTCA, “a local government [is] liable for any judgment against its 

employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the 

employee within the scope of employment with the local government.” Cts. & Jud. Proc. 

§ 5-303(b)(1). The LGTCA requires a claimant to notify the local government of its 

claim, specifying that “an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a 

local government or its employees unless the notice of the claim required by this section 

is given within 1 year after the injury.” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(b) (detailing that 

“notice shall be in writing and shall state the time, place, and cause of the injury”). The 

purpose of the requirement is to provide the local government with notice of “its possible 

liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation, . . . while the evidence was 

still fresh . . . to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and its responsibility in 

connection with it.” Rounds, 441 Md. at 642-43 (quoting Prince George’s County v. 

Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 466 (2011)).

In the absence of strict compliance, substantial compliance may satisfy the notice 

requirement. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Stokes, 217 Md. App. 471, 480-81 (2014)

(listing the common law requirements for substantial compliance). The General 

Assembly codified the concept of substantial compliance in 2016, when it added § 5-
50

304(e). Hine v. Prince George’s County, No. TDC-20-2929, 2021 WL 5882615, at *3

(D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021) (applying § 5-304(e) of the LGTCA); Edwards v. Montgomery 

Coll., No. TDC-17-3802, 2018 WL 4899311, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2018) (same).

25

 That 

subsection provides: “This section does not apply if, within 1 year after the injury, the 

defendant local government has actual or constructive notice of: (1) The claimant’s

injury; or (2) The defect or circumstances giving rise to the claimant’s injury.” Cts. & 

Jud. Proc. § 5-304(e). Thus, pursuant to § 5-304(e), a claimant who does not provide 

notice is not barred from proceeding with a claim if the local government has actual or 

constructive notice of the injury or the circumstances that gave rise to the injury.26

Plaintiffs are required to plead their strict or substantive compliance with the 

LGTCA’s notice requirement. Hansen v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670, 694 (2011). The 

failure to do so subjects the complaint to dismissal because the notice requirement is a 

condition precedent to maintaining a suit against a local government. Id. at 682-85, 694.

25 It is this Court’s policy to permit “the citation of unreported opinions of federal 

courts or the courts of other states for persuasive value, provided that the jurisdiction that 

issued any particular opinion would permit it to be cited for that purpose.” CX 

Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Johnson, 252 Md. App. 393, 414 n.7 (2021).

26 In the Fiscal and Policy Note accompanying the bill that became § 5-304(e), the 

General Assembly explained that the purpose of the section was to “create[] an exception 

to the notice requirement under the [LGTCA] if, within one year after the injury giving 

rise to the claim, the defendant local government has actual or constructive notice of the 

claimant’s injury or the defect or circumstances giving rise to the claimant’s injury.” Md. 

Dep’t of Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note Revised, H.B. 637, at 1 (2016). The 

General Assembly noted “that a person who can prove compliance with this actual or 

constructive notice condition and wishes to file a claim under LGTCA simply needs to 

comply with the standard three-year statute of limitations for civil actions to proceed with 

the claim.” Id. at 3.
51

Absent strict or substantial compliance, a claim may still proceed if the claimant 

demonstrates “good cause.” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(d). If good cause is shown, then 

the burden is on the local government to “affirmatively show that its defense has been 

prejudiced by [the claimant’s] lack of required notice.” Longtin, 419 Md. at 467 (quoting 

Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(d)).

In granting the County’s motion for summary judgment, the court stated that 

“Count V is barred by the Aikens’ failure to provide [a] notice of claim.” The court did 

not address whether the Aikens strictly or substantially complied with the notice 

requirement, but it explained that Count V failed as a matter of law because the Aikens 

“fail[ed] to allege that [they] provided a notice of claim to the County as required by the 

[LGTCA].” We agree.

The Aikens did not plead compliance with § 5-304 as a substantive element in 

Count V. Indeed, the Aikens do not mention the LGTCA in their cross complaint. “A 

plaintiff must not only satisfy the notice requirement strictly or substantially, but also 

plead such satisfaction in [the] complaint.” Hansen, 420 Md. at 694. On this basis alone, 

the Aikens’ Count V failed for failure to plead compliance with the LGTCA notice 

requirement.

The Aikens, however, argue that § 5-304(e) of the LGTCA applies and that “the 

County knew of the circumstances of [their] injury.”27 The Aikens contend that the 

County had notice under § 5-304(e) because the County knew that the obstructions were 

27 The Aikens do not argue strict compliance or good cause.
52

placed on the disputed property and had admitted as much in its counter complaint and 

motion to dismiss. Specifically, in the County’s counter complaint, the County alleged 

that Wilkinson placed “No Trespass[ing]” signs and obstructions on the disputed 

property, which “imped[ed] or block[ed] the County’s and the public’s access” over the 

disputed property, that the County requested that Wilkinson remove the obstructions in 

letters dated in June 2007, June 2009, November 2012, and May 2016, and that the 

County has removed such obstructions at its own expense. The County stated the same in 

its motion to dismiss, which was incorporated into its motion for summary judgment. 

The County’s motion to dismiss further had a heading entitled, “Barriers, Obstacles, and 

‘No Trespassing’ Signs Have Been Unlawfully Placed on the County’s Property by the 

Wilkinsons and Have Been Removed by the County.” The Aikens argue that because the 

County’s counter complaint and motion to dismiss included these allegations and 

statements, “the County was on notice of the issues with respect to the blocking of the 

easement” and thus they were not required to provide notice under the LGTCA.

This argument fails because § 5-304(e) does not apply to claims accruing prior to 

October 1, 2016. The legislation enacting the subsection provided that § 5-304(e) 

“appl[ies] only prospectively and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on 

or application to any cause of action arising before the effective date of this Act.” 2016 

Md. Laws, ch. 624, § 2; see also Md. Dep’t of Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note 

Revised, H.B. 637, at 1 (2016) (explaining that the § 5-304(e) “applies prospectively to 

causes of action arising on or after the bill’s October 1, 2016 effective date”). Here, the

Aikens did not attach any evidence to their cross complaint or opposition motion to the 
53

County’s motion for summary judgment detailing that their alleged injury arose after

October 1, 2016. In their cross complaint, the Aikens did not allege dates on which the 

alleged obstructions occurred but merely alleged that the County has “allowed Bay Front 

Drive to be blocked for extended periods of time—years in some instances.” The Aikens 

similarly did not provide any dates in their opposition to the County’s motion for 

summary judgment. Notably, the letters that the County sent to Wilkinson, on which the 

Aikens rely, predate October 1, 2016. And while there is no date associated with the 

pictures of the “No Trespass[ing]” signs and other obstructions, the Aikens admitted, in 

their answers to the County’s interrogatories, that they “were able to drive their vehicle 

over the [disputed property]” on August 6, 2016. They also attached a picture depicting 

the disputed property with the barriers removed, which they said was taken on August 6, 

2016. Based on our review of the record, the Aikens have not provided evidence 

establishing that a cause of action arose on or after § 5-304(e)’s effective date of October 

1, 2016. Therefore, § 5-304(e) is not applicable.28

The court was correct in granting the County’s summary judgment motion on 

Count V for failure to plead compliance with the LGTCA’s notice requirement.

28 We note that to establish substantial compliance under the LGTCA as it stood 

before October 1, 2016, the plaintiff must “make[] ‘some effort to provide the requisite 

notice’” and “does ‘in fact’ give some kind of notice.” Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City v. 

Woodland, 438 Md. 415, 428 (2014) (quoting Ellis v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 346 

Md. 331, 342-43 (2013)). The notice also must give “requisite and timely notice of facts 

and circumstances giving rise to the claim.” Id. Lastly, the notice must “fulfill[] the 

LGTCA notice requirement’s purpose” of “appris[ing] [the] local government of its 

possible liability at a time when [it] could conduct its own investigation . . . while the 

evidence was still fresh.” Id. (third alteration in original).
54

CONCLUSION

We conclude as follows: (1) the court did not err in determining that the County 

owns the disputed property in fee simple, thus we affirm the court’s denial of 

Wilkinson’s motion for summary judgment and grant of the County’s motion for 

summary judgment as to Wilkinson’s Count I (declaratory judgment); (2) the court erred

in determining that there was no public road south of Station Marker 14 and thus erred in 

granting the County’s motion for summary judgment; consequently, we vacate and 

remand the Aikens’ Counts I (declaratory judgment) and III (injunctive relief) as against 

both the County and Wilkinson, Count IV (inverse condemnation) as against the County, 

and Count V (interference with easement) as against Wilkinson; (3) the court did not err 

in denying the Aikens’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Aikens’ Count 

II (quiet title), and thus we affirm; and (4) the court did not err in granting the County’s 

motion for summary judgment as to the Aiken’s Count V (interference with easement)

against the County, and thus we affirm.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR ST. MARY’S COUNTY AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND VACATED IN PART; 

REMANDED FOR FURTHER 

PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT

WITH THIS OPINION.

COSTS TO BE PAID 50% BY APPELLANT

AND 50% TO BE SPLIT EVENLY 

BETWEEN APPELLEES.
55

APPENDIX A
56

APPENDIX B
57

APPENDIX C
58

APPENDIX D