NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0574n.06 No. 08-5791 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

DO NA LD H. M AC DE RM ID , I ndiv idua lly and a s A dm inis tr at orof t he Est at e of N ina K ayM ac De r m id, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. DI SCO VE R F IN AN CI AL SER VI CES, d/b /a Discover Charge Car d, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT COURT FOR THE MI DDL E DI ST R I C T OF TENNESSEE

BEF OR E: KEITH , C OLE, and W HIT E, C ir c uitJudg e s. KEITH, Circuit Judge . I n this diversity action, Plaintiff-Appe llant Donald H. Mac Der mid, on behalf of the Estate of Nina K ay MacD ermid, his late wife , challeng es on appe al the district court’s de nial of his Motion to Alt er or Amend an o rd er grantingsummary judgme nt in favor of Def endant- Appellee Discover Financ ial Service s . Plaintiff specifica lly argues that a material question of fa ct exist s as to whether Discover ’s threats of criminal prose cution ag ainst his wife during debt collec tion constitut ed outra g eous conduc t under Te nnessee law. F or the follow i ng

rea sons, we AF F IRM the district court’s de cision to deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Alt er or Amend. I. A. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound I n the summer of 2002, N ina Kay MacD ermid [ “M rs. M acD ermid”], the late wif e of Plaintiff-Appellant Do n ald H. MacDer mid [ “Plaintiff”], submitt ed thre e sepa rate I nterne tCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 2 a pp lic a tio ns fo r D e fe nd ant- Ap pe lle e Di sc ov e r F ina nc ia l Se rv ic e s, L L C [“ Di sc ov e r” ] cr e dit c ard s. ROA 151-52, 984-85. The application contained te rms of use whic h require d that “the infor mation be ingsu bmi tte d [be ] tr

ue and a c c ur a te .” RO A 7 04 . I t w a s a vio lation o f t

ho se te rm s to re qu e st “issuance of a Discover cre dit c ard in a party ’s name without that party ’s consent or k n o wledg e.” Id. On ea ch of the three applications, Mrs. Mac Der m i d listed her husband a s the “Primary Applicant” a

nd listed herself a s an “Authori z ed Bu y er . ” ROA 986-97. She also provide d her h u sband’s birth date and socia l security number. Id. A l l t h r e e c r e d i t c ar d s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d in Plaintiff’s name a s individual accounts, rather than joint ac counts share d betwee n the couple. ROA 985. Plaintiff did not apply for t h e cr edit car ds and the a pplications submitt ed to Discove r we re made “ without his knowledge or permission.” MacDe rmid Br ief App’ x Vol. I , 6; ROA 141, 144. After rec eiving the Discove r car ds in late summer 2002, Mrs. Mac Der mid made a se ries of purcha ses on the new ly

established ac counts totaling approximately $15,000, without he r husband’ s knowledg e. ROA 1 5 2-54. The r ecor d does not indicate that Plainti ff or Mrs. MacD ermid made pa y me nt t o D isc ov e r f

or the se c ha rg e s. Plaintiff alleg ed that betwe en F ebrua ry 2003 and June 2003, Discover c ollection repr esentatives, particular ly Ms. Adonica Gilmore (“Ms. Gil m o re ”) , repe atedly phoned the MacD ermid re sidence and thre atene d Plaintiff and his wife with criminal prosecution if they ref used to p ay the ou tst and ingdeb t owe d o n th e Di sc ov e r a c c ounts . RO A 5 01 . Pl a int if f s tate d th a t Ms

. Gi lmo re sp e c if

ic a lly thr e ate ne d c ri min a l pr os e c uti on on Ap ril 9, 2003 , w he n M s. Gi lmo re tol d Plaintiff reg ardingMrs. MacD ermid, “I don’t think you want [ Mrs. MacD ermid] going. . . well y ou kno w . ” RO A 5 0 2

. I t w a s f u rth e r a ll e g e d th a t M s . G il mo r e s tate d th a t if th e matter could not beCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 3 resolved, “ ‘I ’ll just call [ a re prese ntative of the Giles Country District Attorney ’s Office] and have the authorities ‘take a little trip out to y our house.’ ” ROA 502. At some point during spr ing 2003, Ms. Gilmore filed a police repor t with t h e Gi l es County

Sheriff O ffice based upon Plaintiff’s state me nts to he r that he ha d not autho ri zed or c on se nte d to his wi fe ob ta ini ngthe c re dit c ard s in his

name. ROA 702-03, 730. A repr esentative from the Giles County District Attorney ’s offic e later told Ms. Gilm ore that no fraud ha d been c ommitt ed. ROA 731. On J une 13, 2003, Mrs. MacD ermid committed suic ide using a hand-gun she had pur chase d. ROA 120, 239, 383. She left behind a handwritten note to Plaintiff expl aining the “pr essure just got the be st of me. ” RO A 3 83 . T he no te did no t me nti on

Di sc ov e r, c re dit

c ard s, c oll e c tio n e ff

or ts, threats of jail, or fea

r of inca rce ration. ROA 383. Dr. John Koome n , t h e p sy chiatrist treating Mrs. Ma cDe rmid in the months prece ding he r death, pr ovided a sworn statement that her medical history indicated a “history of bipolar disea se, which had r esulted in prior hospitalizations followed by periods of r elative stability .” ROA 486. One manif

estation of this condition was episodes of “extreme fi n an ci al i rre sponsibili ty .” Id. Dr. Koomen obser

ved that Mrs. Mac Der

mid was “ter

rified at the prospec t of g oing to jail and ca using further embar rassment to her family , particula rly her husba

nd.” ROA 487. He conclude d based on his m ed i cal ex pertise that the a lleg ations of cr edit car d fra ud “appe are d to be the primar y stressor which contr ibuted to the deter ioration of her em o t i o n al an d mental condition in April and May 20 03 .” RO A 48 8. Dr

. Ko ome n fu rt he r te sti fi e d that it wa s “ mor e pr ob a ble tha n no t, wi th r e a so na

ble

me dic a l c e rt a int

y , th a t th e pr e c ipi tatin g fa c tor in t he c a us a tio n o f t

he de ath o f N ina

Ka y Ma c De rm idCase No. 08- 5791

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in. Se rv s.

Pag e 4 wer e the threats of criminal fr aud prose cution and inca rce ration” by

Discover ’s collec tion repr esentatives. Id. B. Pr ocedural History Following Mrs. MacD ermid’s suicide, Plainti ff filed this diversity action ag ainst Discover in the Middle District of Tenne ssee on Oc tober 9, 2 0 0 3 , ra i sing se vera l claims in his indi vidual capa city and in his capa city

as administrator of t h e es t at e of his dece ased w ife. The district court

summa ri zed the le ng thy

se qu e nc e of ev ent s le a din g up to i ts r uli ngon Di sc ov e r’ s Mo tio n to Re c on sid e r, wh ic h Pl a int if f u lti mate ly

c ha lle ng e s in

the ins tant a

pp e a l: I n [hi s] C omplaint, Pl aintiff ra ised claims of outra g eous conduct a nd intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Te nnessee Consumer Protection Act, fraud and civil ex tortion, violation of the F a ir De bt C oll e c tio n P ract ic e s A c t, a nd c omm on

law c re dit de fa matio n/l ibe l. T he Court g ra nte d De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to D ism iss the intentional infliction of emotional distress and Te nnessee Consumer Protection Act c laims. The Court s u bsequently g rante d Def endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment with reg ard to the other claims asser

ted by Plaintiff. [ Ma c

De rm id v . Di

sc ov e r Fi n. Ser v

s. (“ MacD ermid I

”), N o. 1:03 -0 1 1 1, 2006 WL 1454743 (M.D. Te nn. May 12, 2006).] Pl a inti f f a p p e a le d to th e Si xth Ci r c u it , w h ic h a f f ir me d all the dis mis sa ls e xcept the i nte nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss claim. See MacDe rmid v. Discover Fin. Servs. [(“ MacD ermid II

” ) ], 488 F. 3 d 7 2 1 (6th Cir. 2007). The Six th Circuit stated in part as fo llo ws : We cannot ag ree with the dismiss al of the outrag eous c on du c t c la im at th e [Rule ] 12( b)( 6) st a g e . Wh ile Discover is corre ct that it wa s actua lly owed the de bt in q ue sti on , w e dis a g re e wi th its c on te nti on that Mr s. MacD ermid wa s nece ssarily crimin all y

liable for cr edit car d fra

ud. As such, Mr. Ma cDe rmid has at least stated a claim for outr a g eou s conduct ba sed onCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 5 Di sc ov e r’ s thre a ts o f c ri min a l pr os e c uti on fo r f a ilure to p ay

a pure ly c ivi l de bt.

. . . I t w ou ld s e e m th a t so me thi ng be y on d th e ple a din g s is re qu ir e d f or D isc ov e r t o s ho w that Mr s. Ma c De rm id had in fa ct committed fra ud ag ainst the company -for example, via a copy

of the on-line application and a n explanation of the materia l misreprese ntations contained the rein. 488 F.3d at 729, 731-32. After remand, the parties e ng ag ed in additional discover y and De fe nd ant f

ile d a Mo tio n f or Sum mary

Judg me nt s e e kin g to d ism iss Plaintiff’s claims for outra g eous conduc t. On April 3, 2008, the Court e ntere d an Orde r g ranting in pa rt and denying in part Def endant’ s Motion fo r Summary J udg ment. [ MacD ermid v. D is c o v e r F in

. S ervs. (“ MacD ermid II

I ” ) , N o . 1 :0 3

- 0 1 1 1 , 2 0 0 8 WL 918489 (M.D. Te nn. Apr. 3, 2008).] The Court gr anted the Motion to the extent that Plaintiff’s individual claims ag ainst Defe ndant wer e dis mis se d, e xce pt f

or his c la im b a se d upo n De fe nd ant’ s thr e a ts o f j a il and criminal prosec ution direc ted to him. The Court also g rante d the Motion to t he extent that Plainti ff’ s claims conce rn ing thr eats by Def endant of

civil liti g at ion ag ainst Mrs. MacD ermid we re dismiss ed. In all other re spects, howe ver, the Motion for Summary J udg ment was de nied. The e ffe ct of that de nial was to leave in place Plaintiff’s individual cl ai ms for outrag eous conduc t and Plaintiff’s claims, as Administrator of Mrs. MacD ermid’s Estate, for outrag eous conduct ba sed upon De fenda nt’s threats of criminal prose cution direc ted to her. On April 25, 2008, De fenda nt filed a “ Motion to R econside r”, a sking the C o u rt to rec onsider its Order denying D efe ndant’s Motion for Summary J udg ment. Wit h the Motion to Reconsider, De fenda nt submitt ed the Affida

vit of Valer ie Kokoszka [“Ms. Kokosz ka”] and thr e e Exhi bit s- the I nte rn e t a pp lic a tio ns su

bmi tte d b y

Ms. MacD ermid. MacD ermid v. Discove r Fin. Servs. (“ MacD ermid V

”), No. 1:03-0111, 2008 WL 2235332, at *1-2 (M.D. Te nn. May

29, 2008).Case No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 6 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d D isc ov e r’ s Mo tio n f or Re c on sid e ratio n a

nd dis mis se d w ith prejudice , on summary

judgme nt, Plainti ff’ s claim of ou t rage ous conduct in his capa city as Administrator of

M r s . MacD ermid’s Estate

. MacD ermid v. D iscove r Fin. Servs. (“ MacD ermid IV

”), No. 1:03-0111, (M.D. Te nn. May 1, 2008); ROA 1019. The district c ourt rec onsidered i t s prior de nia l of summa ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e of its fi nd ing that the ne wl y su bmi tte d e xhibi ts a

nd a ff ida vit of Ms. Kokozska, a Discover Depa rtment manag er who handled fra udulent claims, established that Mrs. MacD ermid’s c onduct appe are d to violate various provisions of the Tenne ssee c riminal code, specific ally

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 14-118(a ) and ( b)(4) , relating to fr au d , as well as Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-14-150, pe rtaining to identity theft. R OA 1017-19. A ccor dingly , the cour t concluded Di sc ov e r’ s “ thr e a ts t o c ri min a lly pr os e c ute Ms. Ma c De rm id co uld no t, as a matte r o f l aw, c on sti tut e outrag eous conduc t.” ROA 1019. On May 5, 2008, the di strict court g rante d Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismiss al without prejudice of his claim for outr ag eous conduc t asserte d in his in dividual capa city . ROA 1025-26. That same da

y , Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Ame nd t he district cour t’s order g ranting Discover ’s Motion for Reconside ration. ROA 1027-33. H e ar g ued that the r ecor d did not support the conc lusion that, as a matter of law, Mrs. Mac Der

mid was guilty of a criminal act. ROA 1030- 32. I n denying Plainti ff’ s Motion to Alter or Amend on May 29, 2008, the di strict court de clar ed: [i]t was n o tn e c e s s ar

y f o r [D i s c o v e r ] t o p r o v e t h a tM s . M a c D e r m i d w a s a c tua lly

“ g uil ty” of

any thi ng , n or wa s it nece ssa

ry fo r t he Court to m a ke any

ru lin g wi th reg ar d to th is is s u e . T h e f a c t th a t M s . M a c D e r

mi d ’ s c o n d

u c t f it p r e c is e ly into the langua g e of

se ve ra l c ri min a l st a tut e s in dic a te s th a t [ Di sc ov e r] co uld have re a so na

bly prosec uted Ms. MacD ermid had it chose n to do so. Under those circ umstances, no re a so na ble jur or c ou ld f ind tha t D e fe nd ant c om mi tted

outr a g e ou s c on du c t in threatening to do so, and summary judgme nt in Defe ndant’s fa vor wa s mandated.Case No. 08- 5791

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Pag e 7 MacD ermid V

, 2008 WL 2235332, at *7. Plaintiff timely appea led. ROA 1059. II. “While [ we] g ener ally

revie w[ ] the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgme nt f

or an abuse of discre tion, [ we a pply ] a de novo standard of revie w [ ] when the Rule 59(e) motion s ee k s revie w of a g rant of summar

y judgme nt.” Coc k

re l v . S he lby Cou nty Sc h. Di st. , 270 F.3d 1036, 1047 ( 6th Cir. 2001). “The question on summary judgme nt is whether the movingparty has demonstrated that the evidenc e ava ilable to the cour t establishes no g enuine issue of materia l fac t such that it is entitl ed to a judgment as a matter of law.” Dobrowski v. Jay DeeContractors, Inc. , 5 71 F .3 d 5 51 , 5 54 (6 th Cir . 2 00 9) . T he pa

rt y mov ingfo r s umm ary

jud g me nt b e ars the ini tia l bu rd e n o f s ho wing the re is

no m at er i al i ssue in dispute. Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 7 7 U. S

. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1 9 8 6 ). I nev al u at i n g a pa rt y ’s mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, thi s c ourt

“ mus t vi e w the fa c ts a

nd any inf e re nc e s r e a so na

bly drawn from them in the lig ht most favorable to the party ag ai n s t wh o m judgme nt was ente red.” Kalamazoo Acquisitions v. W estfield Ins. Co. , 395 F.3d 338, 342 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Be cause we sit in diversity , we a pply the law of

the forum state of Tenne ssee whe n revie wing Plaintiff’s outrag eous conduct claim. See U hl v. Komatsu Forklift Co. , 512 F.3d 294, 302 (6th Cir. 2008). III . The s o le c a

u s e o f a c ti o n b e f

o r e th is Co u rt is Pl a in ti f

f ’ s c la im f o r in te n ti o n a l in f

li c ti o nof emotional distress made in his ca pacity as Ad m i n i s t rator of

the Estate of

Mrs. MacD ermid. He

argue s th a t a

g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t e xists a s to wh e the r D isc ov e r’ s c ondu c t to wa rd Mr s.Case No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 8 Ma c De rm id w a s su ff

ic ie ntl y outr a g e ou s so as to g ive ri se to tor t liab ili ty . A c c or din g ly , h e c la ims the district court e rre d in gr anting Discover summary judgme nt a

nd in de nying his Motion t o Alter or Amend. As this Court st ated in MacD ermid II , “Te nnessee state cour

ts recog nize t h e tort of intentional infliction of emotional distre ss, a lthough they ty pically ref

er to this tort as ‘outra g eous

co n d u ct

. ’” 4 8 8 F. 3 d a t 7 2 9 ( c i t i n g Ba in v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 n.3 (Tenn. 1997) ). “O ne wh o b y e xtre me and

ou tr a g e ou s c on du c t in te nti on a lly or re c kle ssl y

c a us e s se ve re e mot ion a l di str e ss to a no the r i s su

bje c t to lia

bil ity fo r suc h emo tio na l distr e ss, and if bo dil y ha rm to t he oth e r r e su lts from it, for suc h bodily

harm.” Ba in , 9 36 S .W .2 d at 62 2 ( qu oti ngRe state me nt ( Se c on d) of To rt s § 46(1))

. To prove liabili ty for outrag eous conduct under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the c on du c t c omp la ine d o f wa s int e nti on a l or re c kle ss; (2 ) the c on du c t wa s so outr a g e ou s th a t it is not tolerated by

civiliz ed society ; and (3) the conduct c omplained of re sulted in serious mental injury

. Id. Plaintiff argues on appe al that the district cour t erre d when it ruled D isc over’ s conduct du r in g d e b t c o ll e c ti o n d id n o t s a ti s f y th e s e c o n d e le me n t o f th e te s t a s a matt e r o f la w . As the Tenne ssee c ases e stablish, “[t ]he outrag eous conduc t re q u i rement is a high standa rd which ha s consistently been reg arde d as a significa nt limi tation on rec overy .” Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Cat ho licDi oc ese of N

as hv ill e , 154 S.W .3d 22, 39 (Tenn. 2005). L iability does not arise f or “me re insults , i n d ignities, thre ats, annoy ance s, petty oppression or other

trivialities.” Ba in , 936 S.W .2d at 6 2 2 (q u o t i n g Medlin v. Allied I nv. Co. , 3 98 S.W. 2d

27 0, 27 4 ( Te nn . 1 96 6) ). No r i s it

e no ug h th a t th e de fe nd ant h a s a c te d w ith an inte nt whic h is tor tio us or e ve n c ri min a l, or that he ha s intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his c onduct has bee nCase No. 08- 5791

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in. Se rv s.

Pag e 9 char acte rized by

‘malice ,’ or a

deg ree of ag g ravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damag es for another tort. L i ab i l i ty

has bee n found only

wher e t h e c o n d u ct h as b ee n s o o u t ra geo u s i n ch ar ac t er , an d s o ex t re m e i nd egr ee , as t o go be y on d a ll b ound s o f d e c e nc y , a nd to b e re g ard e d a s atr oc iou s a nd utt e rl y int ole ra ble in a civilized community . Gene rally , the ca se is one in which t he re citation of the fa c ts t o a n ave ra g e me mbe r o f t

he c omm un ity wo uld aro us e his re se ntm e nt a g a ins t the ac tor, and lea d him to ex claim, ‘Outra g eous.’ Id. at 6 2 3 (q u o t i n g Me dli n , 398 S.W .2d at 274 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)) ). Plaintiff argues that the tac tics employ ed by Discover during debt c o l l ec t i o n constituted “outra g eous conduc t.” In particula r, he takes issue with the allege d threats of criminal prosecution levied ag ainst Mrs. MacD ermid by Discover collection represe ntatives betwee n Fe bruar y 2003 and J une 2003. Te nnessee courts have previously rec og nized that ag g ressive debt collec tion practice s can g ive rise to liability

for outra g eous conduc t. See, e .g. , Moorhead v. J.C. Penny Co. , 555 S.W .2d 71 3, 71 7- 18 (T e nn . 1 97 7) . In g e ne ra l, a “ c re dit or ha s a ri g ht t o urg e pa

y me nt of a jus t de bt, and

to threaten to resor

t to proper leg al proc edure to enforc e the oblig ation.” Id. at 718 (interna l citation omitted). By

extension, a cr edit or is not liable for injuries r esulting f rom an attempt to collect by “re asonable means.” Id. B ut a c re dit or c an b e he ld l ia

ble if it r e so rt e d to “ imp ro pe r m e thods ” to collect a debt. Id. As e la

bo rate d u po n b y the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt : the view g ener ally taken is that improper methods used to collec t a debt may be the basis for the ma int en an ce o f an action for a mental or e motional dist urbanc e produced there by , or for

a bodily injury or illness resulting from such me ntal or e mot ion a l di sturb anc e , e sp e c ia lly wh e re the c ir c ums tanc e s atte nd ingthe e ff or t to c o ll e c t th e c la im ar e s u c h a s to inv o k e th e g e n e r a l r u le th a t o n e w h o wilfully or int e nti on a lly

c a us e s g re a t e mot ion a l di str e ss, without justif ication , is liable for suc h inj ur ie s. Id. (empha sis added).Case No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 10 We applied the above principles in MacD ermid II and found, in re levant par t, that alleg ations of “fa lse threats by Discover em p l o y ee s o f c rim ina l pr os e c uti on ” we re su ff ic ie nt t o ma

ke a c la im for outra g eous conduc t at the pleadingstag e. See 488 F.3d at 731. As the par ties ag ree , a cr editor may not threaten criminal prosec ution solely for “failure to pay a pure ly civil debt.” See id. at 729. Discover had ar g ued, h o we v er, that criminal prosec ution of Mrs. MacD ermid wa s warr anted beca use Mrs. Ma cD er m i d had “c ommitt ed cr edit car d fra ud by unlawfully

submitt ing Plaintiff’ s persona l information to obtain the cre dit cards f rom Discover

via the interne t.” Id. But the Court ref used to dismiss t he cla im on this g round bec aus e i t conclude d that “something beyond the ple a din g s is re qu ir e d f

or Di sc ov e r t o s ho w that Mr s. Ma c De rm id ha d in fa c t com mitte d f ra ud a g a ins t the company .” Id. MacD ermid II

did not deny

Discover ’s motion to dis miss because it found that threats of criminal prosecu tion during de bt collection wer e outra g eous per se. Rather , the Court found dismiss al of P laintiff’s claim of out rag eous conduct on behalf of his wife’ s estate inappr opriate at the pl eadi ng sta g e be c a us e Di sc ov e r h a d n ot o ff e re d a c tua l e vid e nc e that Mr s. Ma c De rm id committed fraud. See id. Neve rtheless, the Court lef t the door open f

or Discove r to offe r such evi dence by

e xpre ssl y

su g g e sti ngthat f

ra ud c ou ld b e pr ov e n thro ug h s ub mis sio n o f M rs . MacD ermid’s “ on-line application and an e x planation of the material misrepr esentations contained there in.” Id at 732. Th e C o u rt h eld, consistent with Tenne ssee law , that threatening criminalCase No. 08- 5791

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in. Se rv s.

Pla int if f a llo c a te s a subs tanti a l por tio n of h is b ri e f s umm ari zingc a se s d e a lin g wi th c la ims 1 of outrag eous conduc t in the context o f debt c ollection, none of which involve threats of criminal prosec ution. The extent of Plainti ff’ s actua l application of these case s to the instant facts a ppear s to be a c ursory

analog y to Moorhead , whe re t h e T ennesse e Supreme Court held that a cla im for outrag eous conduc t survived summary judgme nt when ther e wa s evidenc e that the c reditor ag g ressively

pursued c ollection of a non- exis tent debt ag ainst the p l ai ntiffs. See M oorhead , 555 S.W .2d at 717. Ma cDermid II alre ady found Moorhead

ina pp lic a ble to t he ins tant c a se be c a

us e Discover had a leg itimate rig ht to pursue pay ment ag ainst Mrs. MacD ermid. 488 F .3d at 731. Plaintiff has not offe red a ny rea son why

we should re visit t his issue nor why we should not ac cept M a c D e rm id I I ’s broade r holding that threats of criminal prose cution do not constitute outrag eous conduct whe n justified. Pag e 11 prosec ution during de bt collection is not a basis for tort liability as a matter of la

w when suc h prosec ution would be justified. 1 I t is no ta ble that MacD ermid II emphasized that Discover ’s threats of prosec ution must be based upon c riminal conduct directed at Discover, r ather than at Plaintiff, for the m to be justified. Id. a t 73 1- 32 . Sp e c if

ic a lly , th e Court state d Dis c ov e r ne e de d to pro du c e e vid e nc e “ to sho w that Mr s. MacD ermid had in fa ct committed fra ud against the company ” in orde r for Plaintiff’s claim to be dismiss ed as a

matter of la

w. Id. (empha sis added). The Court further rema rked: if Discover

is somehow alleg ing that Mrs. MacDe rmid co m m i t t ed fr aud on her hu sb and a s o pp os e d to the c omp any , th e n w e do no t see how D isc ov e r c ou ld rea sonably sug g est to Mr. MacD ermid that cr iminal fraud c harg es would be pur sued ag ainst M rs . MacD ermid on his behalf , unless of cour se he ha d consente d to such action. Id. at 732. In other wor ds, MacD ermid II h e ld D is c o v e r c o u ld n o t v ic ar io u s ly a s s e rt Plainti ff’ s rig hts as a victim under Te nnessee criminal law unle ss he conse nted to it. See id. I n her affidavit, Discover collection represe ntative Adonica Gilmore cla imed that a cr iminal complaint was filed a g ainst Mrs. MacD ermid base d on Plaintiff’s s t at em ent that his wife ha d committed f

raud a g ainst him. SeeRO A 7 03 . D isc ov e r a lso su g g e sts thi s in the br ie f i t f

ile d w ithCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 12 thi s Co ur t. B ut P la int if

f r e pe a te dly

de nied t hat Mrs . M a c De rm id h a d d e fr a ud e d h im d

ur inghis deposition. ROA 181-82. He instea d claimed it was Discover who commi tted fra ud by issuing the

car ds in his name without his consent. ROA 186, 217, 291. On t h re e o cc as i o n s b et we en Fe b ru ary an d M ar ch 2 0 0 3 , Di s co v er re qu es t edP l ai n t i ff t o s i gn a pre pare d aff

idavit and assist in the prosec ution of Mrs. MacD ermid for fra ud. ROA 402-06. The re is no evidence , howeve r, that Plaintiff complied with this re quest. ROA 403 (a ffidavit lef t blank and unsigne d). More over, in a letter d at ed M ar ch 3 , 2003, Plaintiff plainly indicated to Discove r that he wou ld no t ass ist

in t he pr os e c uti on

of his wi fe . RO A 4 01 . H e te sti fi e d to the same duri nghis deposition. ROA 333-35. I n light of this e vidence , there is at le ast a g enuine issue of fac t, if not conclusive e stablishment of one in Plaintiff’s favor , that Plaintiff did not consent to the prosec ution of his wife. There fore , Discover ’s threats of criminal prosec ution must stem from cr iminal conduct

c omm itt e d b y

Mr s. Ma c De rm id a g a ins t th e c omp any , rathe r tha n a g a ins t Pla int if

f, fo r D isc ov e r t o b e s h i e l d e d

f r o m o u t r a g e o u s c o n d

u c tl i a b i l i t y. A. Evidentiary Stand ard Plaintiff does not challeng e the c onclusion of MacD ermid II that justified threats of c riminal prosec ution during de bt collection ar e not g rounds fo r outrag eous conduc t. Nor does Disc over

c on te st the inv e rs e pr opos it io n th a t un jus tif ie d thre a ts o f c ri min a l pr os e c uti on wo uld e sta bli sh Discover ’s conduct as out rag eous. Thus, the instant appe al hing es on whe ther Discove r had g rounds to file a c riminal complaint ag ainst Mrs. M ac De rm id such that its threats of c riminal prosec ution

wer e justified.Case No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d Pl a int if

f’ s Mo tio n to Am e nd

or Al te r ba se d on its fi nd ingthat Mr s. 2 MacD ermi d

c o u ld h av e b e e n“ r e a s o n a

b ly p r o s e c u te d ” u n d e r

T e n n e s s e e ’ s c r im in a l c o d e “ h ad [Discover] chosen to do so.” MacD ermid V , 2 00 8 WL

22 35 53 32 , at * 7 . But th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e la bo rate up on

wh a t it me ant b y “ re a so na bly pr os e c ute d” no r did it c ite to T e nn e sse e a uth or ity for this proposition. Pag e 13 A key issue befor e the Court is which e videntiary standard to apply

in deciding whether Discover ’s threats of criminal prose cution wer e justified. I t doe s not appea r Tenne ssee c ourts have 2

a dd re sse d th is p re c ise iss ue . N e ve rt he le ss, we are no t w ith out guidance a s th e y have pr e vio us ly

ana ly zed civ il cla im s f

or outr a g e ou s c on du c t ba se d o n a de fe nd ant’ s actual causation of cr iminal prosec ution, rather tha

n m ere threat of one, unde r a ma licious prosecution fr amewor k. See Southeastern Mfg. & Indus. Supply v. E quifax , 198 4 Te nn . App . L EX I S 33 75 , at *13 -1 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. De c . 28, 19 84 ). Ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on , w hic h in vo lve s th e qu e sti on

of c ivi l li a bil ity fo r t ho se wh o tr ig g e r t

he c ri min a l pr os e c uti on

of inn oc e nt p e rs on s, be ars re le va nc e to the c a se a t ba

r b e c a us e Plaintiff essentially

argues that Mrs. Mac Der mid was innocent of c riminal conduct and that she could not have be en leg itimately prosec uted had Disc over c arr ied out its threats to do so. To sustain a succ essful cla im of malicious prosecution, in addition to showing the defe ndant broug ht the action wi t h “malice ” and that the underly ing c riminal prosec ution terminated

succe ssfully

in pla i n t i ff ’s favor, one must demonstrate an abse nce of probable cause . Roberts v. Fede ral Express Corp. , 8 42 S.W. 2d 24 6, 24 7- 48 (T e nn . 199 2) (i nv olv ing an emp loye e ’s su it a g a ins t his e mpl oy e r fo r c a

us inghis arr e st f

or g ra nd larc e ny ); see Schlueter v. S. Energy Hom es, Inc

. , 252 F e d. Ap p’ x 7, 9 (6 th Cir

. 20 07 ) (r e c og nizi ng Te nn e sse e law r e qu ir e s th e a bs e nc e of pr ob a ble c a us e to maintain a malicious pro secution cla im). Probable ca use is established whe re “ fac ts and

c ir c ums tanc e s [are ] suf

fi c ie nt to l e a d a

n o rd ina ri ly pr ud e nt p e rs on

to b e lie ve the a c c us e d w a s guil tyCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 14 of the cr ime char g ed.” Id. at 248 (interna l citation omitt ed). A pply ing this objec tive standard to the

case at bar , Discover

would be jus tified in threate ning Mr s. MacDe rmid with criminal prosec ution for purposes of the outrag eous conduct claim if an ordinarily prudent pe rson could believe she wa s g uilty of cr iminal conduct. I t must be emphasiz ed that actual g uilt or innocence of the tar g et of the prosec ution is immaterial to a probable cause deter mination. See Lantroop v. More land , 849 S.W .2d 793, 797 (Tenn. A

pp. 1992). All that matters is whethe r Mrs. Mac Der mid could have be en leg itimately

prosec uted, not nece ssarily convicted, at the time Discover ma de its threats. B. A pplic at ion of P r oba ble Ca use I n g ra nti ngDi sc ov e r’ s Mo tio n f or Re c on sid e rat io n, the dis tr ic t c ourt c ite d thre e se pa

rate provisions of the Tenne ssee criminal code, which it determined Mr s. MacDe rmid violated: (1) Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 9 -1 4 -1 1 8 (a) and (b) (4); and ( 2) Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-150. ROA1016-19. Be cause we f

ind there w as proba

ble ca use to prosec ute Mrs. MacD ermid under § 39-14-118( a) a

nd (b)( 4), we need not de cide whe ther grounds similarly exis ted under

§ 39-14-150. Section 39-14-118 g overns the una uthor ized use and possession of cr edit car ds. Part (a) states that “[a] person commits the crime of illega l possession of a cre dit or debit car d who, knowing the per son does not havethe conse nt of the o w n e r o r issuer , t akes, e x erc ises control over or otherwise use s that car d or information from that card

. ” T en n . Code. Ann. § 39-14- 118(a) (empha sis added). Par

t (b)( 4) of § 39-14-118, on the ot her hand, prohibits the “f raudule nt use” of

a c re dit c ard by an in div idu a l if he or sh e do e s so wi th t he kn ow le dg e tha

t us e of the c ard isCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 14-118 (b ) s t ates in relevant par t: “A per son commits the crime of 3 fra udulent use of a

cre dit or debit car d wh o u s es, or allows to be used, a c redit or de bit card or inf or matio n f ro m tha t card , for the purp os e of ob ta ini ngpr op e rt y , c re dit , s e rv ic e s o r a

ny thi nge lse of value with knowledg e that . . . . (4) For any o t h er re as o n the use of the car d is unauthorized by either the issuer or the pe rson to whom the cr edit or debit ca rd is issued.” Pag e 15 “ unauthorized by

either the iss ue r or the pe rs o n t o wh o m the cr edit or debit ca rd is issued.” (empha sis added). 3 An “issuer ” re fer s to “the business org anization or financia l insti tution or its dul y authorized ag ent which issues a

cre dit or debit car d.” Te nn. Code. Ann. § 39-14- 102(5). In this case, the busine s s org anization issui ng the ca rd wa s Discover . The re fer ence to “issuer” in § 39-14-118 ind ic a te s th e pr ov isi on s p ro te c t D isc ov e r’ s ri g hts a g a ins t fr a ud ule nt po sse ssi on and

us e of its c re dit

car ds, in addition to those of the car dholder. Consequently , as discussed above, Discover would not have ne eded Plaintiff’ s consent to ca use Mrs. Mac Der

mid’s prosecution und er the statute. See M a c D e rm id II

, 4 8 8 F.3d at 732 (requir ing Plaintiff’ s consent to the extent Discover’ s threats of criminal prose cution wer e pre mised on violations of his, rather than Discover ’s, rig hts under criminal law)

. Un dis pute d e vid e nce i n th e re c or d e sta bli sh e s th e re wa s p ro ba

ble c a us e to p ro se c ute Mr s. MacD ermid under b o t h § 39-14-118( a) a nd (b)( 4). Plaintiff admits that he did not apply for Di sc ov e r c re dit

c ard s and that he did

no t a uth or ize his wi fe to o bta in t he c re dit c ard s a t is su e on

his be ha lf . ROA 14 4; Pla int if

f’ s Br . App ’x, Vo l. I , 6-7

. Th is is sig nif ic ant be c a us e the e le c tr on ic c re dit

car d application on Discove r’s website contained terms of use, which included a ce rtification that any information submitted was true a nd acc urate . ROA 704. T h ese te rms are violated when a n applicant r equests issuance of a c ard w ithout consent or knowle d ge of the named c ardholde r. Id.Case No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pla int if f c la ims that MacD ermid II established a se ries o f f a c tu a l p r o p ositions, i ncluding that 4 Mr s. Ma c De rm id “ a

pp lie d f or a joi nt c re dit

c ard .” RO A 3 3. B ut MacD ermid II mere ly held that it could not gr ant a Rule 12(b) (6) motion for Plaintiff’s c laim of outrag eous condu ct base d on the alleg ations in his complaint. See 488 F.3d at 72 9 , 7 32. I t did not establish the ex istence of any fac ts. One c ould argue, althoug h Plaintiff doe s not, that the re is a lack of evide nce in the r ecor d

5 to establish that the violation of the terms o f u s e n ece ssarily meant that her

possession and use of the ca rds was not “ authorized” by Discover g iven that the ter

ms of use are not actually

in the rec ord. I n o t h er wo rd s , we should infer that Mrs. MacD ermid could have lied on her application and vio late d th e te rm s o f u se wh ile sti ll en joy ing a uth or ity to pos se ss an d use the Di sc ov e r c re dit c ard s. The Court finds this not to be a “r easona bly drawn” infe renc e fr om which the nonmovi ng party may benef it on su m m ar y judgme nt. See Kalamazoo Ac quisiti ons , 3 95 F .3 d at 34 2. Th e ve ry ph ra se “ te rm s o f u se ” ind ic a te s that autho ri ty to u se the c ard

is c on dit ion e d o n c omp lia nc e wi th t he te rm s set forth by

the cre dit c ard company . There fore , we de cline to find this minor imperfec tion in the re c or d a s g ro un ds fo r a

g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t. Pag e 16 Acc ording to copies of Mrs. Ma cDe rmid’s cre dit card a pplications and the sworn s t at em en t of Valer ie Kokoszka, the Discove r mana g er who handled f rau d cl aim s, Mrs. MacD ermid filled out three applications on Discove r’s we bsite reque s t i n g cr ed i t car ds solely in Plainti ff’ s name. ROA 984-97. Althoug h Plaintiff claims in his brief the car ds were joint accounts shar ed betwe en he a nd his wife, all of the evidenc e in the re cord indicates she wa s merely an “Authorized Buy er” for the

acc ounts. ROA 984-97.

4 B y r e qu e s t i n g a c r e d i t c ar d i n P l a i n t i f f ’ s n a m e w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t o r kn o w l e d g e , M rs . MacD ermid violated Discove r’s ter ms of use and w as ac cording ly deprive d o f Discover ’s conse nt and auth o r it

y to p o s s e s s an d

u s e it s c r e d it

c ar d s . Wh il e Pl a inti f

f ar g u e s th a t n o th in g in

th e r ecor d 5 indicates Mrs. Ma cDe rmid made a “fa lse or fr audulent stateme nt” to Discover or that she sig ned any do c ume nt af

fi rm ing the tr

uth fu lne ss of he r ap pli c a tio n, he ig no re s the un c on tr ov e rt e d f a c t th a t Mr s. MacD ermid wa s require d to elec tronically cer tify the t ruthfulness of the i nformation she pr ovided. I n light of the s e ci rc u m s t ance s, the Court finds that the weig ht of the evide nce w ould “lead a nCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 17 ordinarily prudent pe rson t o believe” that Mrs. MacD ermid had c ommitt ed fr audulent possession and use of a cre dit card unde r § 39-14- 118(a) and (b) (4). The ref ore, the re w as p ro b able c ause that she eng ag ed in cr iminal conduct such that thre ats of prose cution would have be en justified. C. Jur y D e te r m ina ti ons of P r oba ble Ca use Pla int if f d oe s n ot me anin g fu lly dis pute that the e vid e nc e , vie we d in a lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to him, supported the exist ence of proba ble cause under § 39-14-118( a) and (b)( 4). I ndeed, he does not mention either of the se provisions in his brief, much less a naly ze their application to the ca se at ba r. Plaintiff does contend, how ever , that a jury deter mination is require d to resolve fac tual issues, such

a s Mr s. Ma c De rm id’ s in te nt, in o rd e r t o a sc e rt a in i f s he e ng a g e d in pr os e c uta

ble con du c t. Ac c or din g ly , h e de nie s th e su ita bil ity of de c idi ngpr ob a

ble c a us e on summa ry jud g me nt. Tenne ssee c ourts hold that a jury is require d to det ermine pr obable c ause in a malicious prosec ution context “whe re reasona ble m inds could di ffe r” as to its ex istence. Ro be rts , 842 S.W .2d at 249. In Ro be rts , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court revie wed a lower co urt’s aw ard of

summary jud g me nt o f t

he pla int if

f’ s cla im of ma lic iou s pro se c uti on in f a vo r o f h is e mpl oy e r F e de ra l E xpre ss. Id. at 2 4 6

. F e d e r a l E xp r e s s h a d c a u s e d th e p la in ti f

f ’ s ar r e s t w ar r an t f o r g r an d la

r c e n y a fter he alleg edly soug ht to remove various small items from the shipping war ehouse w here he wor ked. Id. at 247. Ro be rts ultimately reve rsed the district c ourt’s entry of summary

judgm en t in favor of F e de ra l Expre ss be c a

us e the c ourt c on c lud e d “r e a so na ble min ds c ou ld d if

fe r a s to wh e the r p ro ba

ble

cause exis ted for br ingingchar g es ag ainst [t he] [ p]l aintiff.” Id. at 249. Although Ro be rts did not provide an e x planation for its holding , it is apparent f rom the op i n ion’s extended rec itation of the fac ts that the court found it quite possible that the plaintiff’sCase No. 08- 5791

Ma c De rm id v . D isc ov e r F

in. Se rv s.

Pag e 18 “thef t” was unintentional. See id. at 247. In p ar t i cu l ar , t h e cour t called attention to the plaintiff’s “exemplary

job rec ord” w ith the company over nine y ear s as well as hi s demonstrated hone sty in the workplac e, including an instance wher e he tur ned in a box of 13 diamond ring s that spilled out of a packa g e. Id. The court also noted that the plaintiff had he lped Fe dera l Ex press unc over e mploy ee theft on prior oc casions. Id. Wit h respe ct to the alleg ed theft, the court indicate d that the plaintiff wa s very drowsy the day the items wer e discovere d in his jacke t poc ket beca use he was taking Valium for se vere back pa in. Id. Fur thermore , the cour

t mentioned that the pl aintiff, without prompting, ha d told a co-w orker that he had spotted the items lying a rou n d o n the war ehouse f loor and that he intended to turn them in, a revelation which a prospe ctive thief is unlikely to make. See id. Finally , the cour t mentioned that t h e p l ai n t i ff

wa s d i s co v er ed wi t h t h e it em s i n h i s j ac k et b y an el ec t ro n i c s cr ee n i n g d ev i ce ev en t h o u gh he wa s well awa

re of other e x its in t he wa

rehouse that did not have such a device –another sign that the plaintiff wa s not attempting to steal f rom the workpla ce. Id. I n light of the se ci rcumst anc e s, Ro be rts conclude d that “re asonable minds could differ a s to whether pr obable c ause e x isted for bring ing c harg es ag ainst [t he] [ p]l aintiff.” Id. at 249. None of the s ort of ex culpatory fac ts found in abundanc e in Ro be rts are prese nt in this case . Pla int if f ha s no t c ite d to any

e vid e nc e that w ou ld h a ve un de rm ine d D isc ov e r’ s c a se fo r p ro ba ble c a us e had it in i t i at ed Mrs. MacDer mid’s prosecution. The overwhelming e vidence , as explained su pra , would have le d an “or dinarily prudent pe rson to believe , ” e v e ni f n o t c o n c l u d e w i t ha b s o l u t e c e rt a i n t y, that M rs . MacD ermid wa s g uilty of unlawf

ul cre dit card posse ssion and use. Id. a t 24 8 ( e mph a sisCase No. 08- 5791

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in. Se rv s.

Pag e 19 a dd e d) . T he re fo re, w e fi nd that r e a so na ble min ds c ou ld n ot d if

fe r a s to the e xiste nc e of

pr ob a ble

cause such that a jury

deter mination was requir ed under Ro be rts

. D. Rele vance of Su bject ive Belief Finally , P l ai n t i ff maintains Discove r ca nnot argue Mrs. Mac Der mid was culpable under Te nn e sse e c ri min a l law be c a us e he c la ims Di sc ov e r ha d a su bje c tiv e be lie f t

hat sh e ha d n ot a c tua lly

c omm itt e d a

c ri min a l of

fe ns e wh e n it

thr e a te ne d h e r w ithpr os e c uti on. Dur in g o ra l argume nt, Plaintiff’s counsel as s erted the separ ate, but re lated, proposition that Discover ’s conduc t was

o u t r a g e o u s b e c a

u s e i tl a c k e d

a g o o d f a i t hb e l i e f

t h a tM r s . M a c D e r m i d

h a d c o m m i t t e d

a c r i m e . In

su pp or t of the se argume nts , Pl a int if f c a lls a tte nti on to Ms. Gi lmo re ’s a dmi ssi on that th e Gi le s Co un ty District Attorney ’s offic e had informed her that Mrs. MacDe rmid’s conduc t did not constit ute fra ud. ROA 731. Discover

dismiss es the sig nificanc e of this detail by pointing out that Ms. Gilmore furthe r testified that she made no further threats of criminal pro s ec u tion ag ainst Mrs. MacD ermid af ter she had spoken w ith the District Attorney ’s offic e. ROA 732. The issue of whethe r Di s co ver subjec tively believed that Mrs. MacDe rmid’s ac tions were

c ri min a l is ult imate ly

imm ate ri a l to the outc ome of thi s app e a l. B e c a us e we sit in d ive rs ity , w e mus t apply Tenne ssee law

. See U

hl , 512 F.3d at 302. As noted above , the eva luation of evidenc e for probable cause is an objective a naly sis which occur s throug h the per spective of the “or dinarily

prudent person.” Se e Ro be rts , 8 42 S.W. 2d a t 24 8. Gi ve n th a t th e e xiste nc e of pr ob a ble c a us e de fe a ts a

c la im of malicious prosec ution in Tennessee even when the pr osecution wa s made with malice , see id. at 24 7- 48 , M s. Gi lmo re ’s state of min d d oe s n ot r a ise a

fa c tua l qu e sti on who se re so lut ion wa rr ants

reve rsal of summar

y judgme nt.Case No. 08- 5791

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Pag e 20 E. Conclusi on Analy sis of

the fa cts in light of the sta ndard of revie w on summary

judgme nt demonstrates that probable cause clea

rly exis ted to prosec ute Mrs. MacD ermid under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 14-118(a ) and (b) (4). Ac cording ly , Discover ’s leg itimate threats of c riminal prosec ution ag ainst her dur ing de bt collection fa iled to constitute outrag eous conduc t as a matter of law. The ref

ore, t h e d i s t ri ct court pr op e rl y de nie d Pl a intif

f’ s Mo tio n to Al te r o r A me nd its pr ior or de r gra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt t o Discover on the intentional i n fl iction of emotional distress claim made in Plainti ff’ s capa city as Administrator of Mrs. Mac Der mid’s E s tate. To the e x tent Plaintiff offer s other ar g uments not expressly addre ssed by

this opini on, we f

ind them without merit. IV. Acc ording ly , for the rea sons stated above , we AF F IRM the district c ourt’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Alt er or Amend.