21-1483

Barlow v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 30th of March, two thousand twenty-two.

PRESENT: Dennis Jacobs,

Richard C. Wesley,

Steven J. Menashi,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

MICHAEL BARLOW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 21-1483

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, 

a Delaware limited liability company, 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., 

a national corporation, 

FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCE CORPORATION,

a Delaware corporation,

Defendants-Appellees,

____________________________________
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For Plaintiff-Appellant: Michael Barlow, pro se, Sanborn, N.Y.

For Defendants-Appellees: Charles Jeanfreau, McCalla Raymer 

Leibert Pierce, LLC, Iselin, NJ, for 

Nationstar Mortgage LLC.

Connie Flores Jones, Winston & 

Strawn LLP, Houston, TX, for Bank of 

America, N.A., and First Franklin 

Finance Corporation.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western 

District of New York (Vilardo, J.; Schroeder, M.J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

In 2018, Michael Barlow sued Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of America”), 

Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”), and First Franklin Finance Corporation 

(“First Franklin”), alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and violations of N.Y. Gen. 

Bus. Law § 349 and N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 1303, 1304, 1320, and seeking relief 

from a 2016 state court judgment of foreclosure based on his failure to make loan 
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payments to the defendants.1 Barlow also had filed a previous complaint on the 

same issues against Bank of America and Nationstar in 2016 in district court; the 

district court dismissed that complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Barlow v. Nationstar Mortg., Inc., No. 16-cv-818, 2017 WL 397329, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 

Jan. 30, 2017). After the defendants moved to dismiss Barlow’s amended complaint 

in the instant action, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation to dismiss based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and denied 

leave to amend. Barlow appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of 

Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2005). We afford pro se litigants “special 

solicitude” by interpreting a complaint filed pro se “to raise the strongest claims 

that it suggests.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). In addition to the complaint, we may consider 

1 The state court foreclosure action was brought in 2013 by U.S. Bank, National 

Association (“U.S. Bank”). First Franklin had assigned Barlow’s mortgage to U.S. Bank in 

2012. 
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documents that are “integral” to the complaint, Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 

F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that a document is integral to the complaint 

“where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), as well as “any matters of which judicial notice may be taken,” 

including public documents. Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1092 

(2d Cir. 1995). 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction 

over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. 

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It applies if the plaintiff (1) lost 

in state court, (2) complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, 

(3) invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment, and 

(4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state court judgment was 

rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 

2014). The doctrine “recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original 

jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction 
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over state-court judgments,” with such jurisdiction reserved exclusively to the 

Supreme Court. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 

n.3 (2002).

The district court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction under RookerFeldman.2 First, Barlow lost in state court. In his opposition to U.S. Bank’s motion 

for foreclosure in state court, he argued that Bank of America and Nationstar 

falsely stated that he had “escrow account” deficiencies and had “cheated and 

deceived” him by “distorting” the amounts he owed on his mortgage. The state 

court rejected his arguments by entering a judgment of foreclosure, meaning that 

it ruled for U.S. Bank and against Barlow. The adverse state court decision satisfies 

Rooker-Feldman’s first prong.3

2 Barlow waives any challenge to the district court’s denial of leave to amend by not 

raising it in his appellate brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5)-(8); LoSacco v. City of 

Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e need not manufacture claims of error for 

an appellant proceeding pro se, especially when he has raised an issue below and elected 

not to pursue it on appeal.”).

3 On appeal, Barlow contends that it was U.S. Bank’s claims—not his—that were brought 

before the state court, meaning that he could not have “lost” those proceedings for 

purposes of Rooker-Feldman. His argument is unavailing. Rooker-Feldman is concerned 

with state-court judgments, and the foreclosure judgment was indisputably adverse to 

Barlow. 
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Second, the injuries of which Barlow complains were caused by the state 

court judgment. We have applied Rooker-Feldman when the relief sought by a 

plaintiff demonstrated that the injury was the state foreclosure judgment itself. See 

Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 427 (“[T]he injury of which Vossbrinck ‘complains’ in this 

claim for relief, and which he seeks to have remedied, is the state foreclosure 

judgment. This is evident from the relief [he] requests—title to and tender of his 

property and ... to have the state judgment declared ‘void.’”). In this case, the 

primary relief Barlow sought—including a TRO and injunction against foreclosure 

“activity” and an “accounting” of his loan payments—was based on the 

foreclosure judgment and the amount that the state court determined he owed on 

his mortgage. Seeking additional relief, Barlow also alleged the following injuries: 

he had “suffered extreme emotional distress” due to the foreclosure proceedings; 

he “ha[d] suffered damages since the ... Loan’s delinquency caused [his] ...

Property to fall into foreclosure proceedings”; he had “lost equity”; and he had 

“suffered the slander of his [reputation] due to the fact that ... foreclosure 

proceedings [were] attributed to him and reported to credit reporting agencies.” 

These injuries followed from the state court judgment of foreclosure on his 
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property: without that event, he would not have otherwise suffered emotional 

distress, loss of equity, reputational harm, and credit issues. Because Barlow 

requested relief from foreclosure “activity” and its associated impacts, the state 

court judgment caused the alleged harms, satisfying Rooker-Feldman’s second 

prong.

His argument to the contrary—that his injuries were not caused by the state 

court because the alleged fraud and misrepresentation existed prior to the 

foreclosure judgment and therefore are separate torts—is meritless. During the 

foreclosure action, he alleged that the amount due on his mortgage was incorrect 

and that Nationstar had “cheated and deceived” him (that is, defrauded him) by 

“distorting” the amounts he owed. However, even if he could establish that the 

alleged fraud “existed” prior to the state court judgment, that fact would be

irrelevant because the injuries that he claimed in district court, as noted above, 

were produced by the foreclosure judgment, and the primary remedies he sought 

could be addressed only by reversing it. See Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 

105 (2d Cir. 2021) (concluding that “[b]y effecting the divestiture of Plaintiffs’ 

interest in their property, the state court judgments ... directly inflicted the injury 
8

complained of”).

Third, Barlow’s action “invite[d] review and rejection of [the state court] 

judgment.” Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 426 (alteration omitted) (quoting Hoblock, 422 

F.3d at 85). In Vossbrinck, this court held that the third prong of Rooker-Feldman was 

met when the plaintiff “ask[ed] the federal court to grant him title to his property 

because the foreclosure judgment was obtained fraudulently”; entertaining such a 

request for relief would “require the federal court to review the state proceedings 

and determine that the foreclosure judgment was issued in error.” Id. at 427. 

Likewise, Barlow’s claims that he had been, among other things, “cheated and 

deceived” would require a federal court to determine that the state court 

erroneously entered the foreclosure judgment. 

Fourth, the “state judgment was rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced.” Id. at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this 

case, the state court entered a judgment of foreclosure in September 2016, which 

Barlow never appealed. The district court action under review was filed in August 

2018. 

Because the four Rooker-Feldman factors are met in this case, the district court 
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correctly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. This court therefore 

does not reach alternative grounds for dismissal, such as res judicata or failure to 

state a claim for relief. Moodie v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., 58 F.3d 879, 882 (2d Cir. 

1995).

We have considered Barlow’s remaining arguments, which are without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court