J. S 84 0 38 /1 8

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA v. : : RYHEIM C. HILL , : No. 1117 E DA 20 18 : Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, March 16, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No. CP

- 51

- CR

- 1010321

- 2002

BEFORE: BENDER , P. J. E. , OTT , J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 2 4 , 2019 Ryheim C. Hill appeals pro se from the March 16, 2018 order dismissing
his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PC RA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546, as untimely. W e affirm.

A ppellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of first

- degree murder and possessin g an instrument
of crime 1 in connection with the May 2, 2002 shooting death of the victim over a $30 drug debt. On August 3, 2005, a panel of this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our supreme court denied allowance of appeal on December 30, 2005

. See Commonwealth v. Hill , 885 A.2d 576 (Pa.Super.
2005 ), appeal denied , 892 A.2d 822 (Pa. 2005). Appellant filed his fi rst

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 250 1 and 907 , respectively.J. S 84 0 38 /1 8

- 2

-

pro se P CRA petition on June 12, 2006, and counsel was subsequently appointed to represent him

. On November 21, 2008 , a panel of this court
affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of appellant’s petition , and our supreme court denied allowance of appeal o n June 17, 2009. See Commonwealth v.
Hill , 964 A.2d 942 ( Pa.Super. 2008 ), appeal denied , 973 A.2d 1005 (Pa.
2009 ). On August 21, 2012 , appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition

. Following the issuance of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) notice, the PCRA court dismissed appellant’s petition without a hearing on March 16, 2018.
The record reveals that appellant’s judgment of sentence became final

on March 30, 2006, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal and the deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (providing “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review[]”). Accordingly, appellant had until March 30, 2007, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (stating that all PCRA petitions, includ ing second and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes final) . Here, appellant’s petition was filed more than six years after his judgment of
sentence became final and is patently untimely, un less appellant can pleadJ. S 84 0 38 /1 8

- 3

-

and prove that one of the three statutory exceptions to the one

- year jurisdictional time

- bar applies. Appellant contends that his sentence of life imprisonment is unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court’s deci sions in
Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. L ouisiana , 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). 2 (Appellant’s brief at 11

- 13. ) However, as appellant concedes in his brief, he was born on January 27, 1982 , and was 20 years old
at the time he com mitted the crimes in question. ( Id. at 13, 21.) As such, these cases are inapplicable. See , e.g. , Commonwealth v. Furgess , 149 A.3d 90, 91

- 94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that petitioners who were older than
18 at the time they committed murder are not within th e ambit of the Miller
decision and , therefore , may not rely on that decision to invoke a PCRA
time

- bar exception). Accordingly, we discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.

2 In Miller , the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right for juveniles, holding that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crim es violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments .’” Miller , 567 U.S. at 465 . In Montgomery , the Supreme Court recently held that its rule announced in Miller applies retroactively on collateral review. Montgomery , 136 S.Ct. at 736.J. S 84 0 38 /1 8

- 4

-

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/19