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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Robert Scott Carpenter,

Defendant Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 18-0683 (Kanawha County 13-C-1452)

Ray Walker and Donnie Walker,

Plaintiffs Below, Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Robert Scott Carpenter, by counsel Alexander Macia,

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appeals the July 2, 2018, 

order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County entering a default judgment requiring petitioner to 

(1) connect to a different gas line; (2) remove portions of his driveway, including the concrete and 

gravel, that extended outside his boundary line; and (3) pay Respondents Ray Walker and Donnie 

Walker $5,000 in general damages for annoyance and inconvenience. Respondents, by counsel O. 

Gay Elmore, Jr., filed a summary response in support of the circuit court’s order. Petitioner filed 

a reply. 

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure and is appropriate for a memorandum decision rather than an 

opinion. For the reasons expressed below, the decision of the circuit court is reversed, and this case 

is remanded for further proceedings. 

The parties are neighbors involved in a property dispute and have had claims pending 

against each other since 2013. Respondents assert that petitioner’s receipt of natural gas through a 

certain gas line and his placement of a driveway have interfered with respondents’ use and 

enjoyment of their property. Petitioner filed a counter-claim against respondents alleging adverse 

possession. 

 

1Petitioner initially represented himself in this appeal until Attorney Macia filed a notice 

of appearance on his behalf on November 27, 2019. On December 20, 2019, Attorney Macia filed 

a motion for a stay of the circuit court’s July 2, 2018, order until the resolution of petitioner’s 

appeal. By order entered on April 29, 2020, we granted the motion.

FILED

May 26, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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On August 30, 2013, respondents filed a motion for a preliminary and/or permanent 

injunction based on their claims against petitioner. By order entered on October 23, 2013, the 

circuit court awarded respondents a preliminary injunction, and by order entered on November 19, 

2014, awarded respondents a permanent injunction, enjoining petitioner from engaging in further 

construction activity. Petitioner appealed the October 23, 2013, and November 19, 2014, orders to 

this Court on December 17, 2014.2 By dispositional order entered on February 9, 2016, this Court 

found that neither of the circuit court’s orders contained findings of fact and conclusions of law 

sufficient to permit appellate review of the preliminary and permanent injunctions. Accordingly, 

this Court dismissed petitioner’s appeal and remanded the case for the entry of orders in 

compliance with Rules 52 and 65 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Notably, following remand, the circuit court failed to enter orders setting forth findings of 

fact and conclusions of law supporting the award of the preliminary and permanent injunctions to 

respondents. The parties continued to litigate their underlying claims in the circuit court. On May 

26, 2017, petitioner’s then-counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representing petitioner. 

Petitioner did not file a response to his counsel’s motion until August 28, 2017. The circuit court 

set a hearing on the motion to withdraw for September 8, 2017. On September 6, 2017, petitioner

filed a motion for a continuance “[d]ue to circumstances beyond [his] control.” The circuit court 

rescheduled the hearing to November 3, 2017. On that date, petitioner failed to appear for the 

hearing. By order entered on November 27, 2017, the circuit court (1) granted counsel’s motion to 

withdraw; (2) awarded petitioner a thirty-day continuance to find new counsel; and (3) warned that 

no further continuance would be permitted. In addition, the circuit court set the trial date as 

February 26, 2018, and scheduled the pretrial conference for February 8, 2018.3

On or about February 5, 2018, petitioner received a phone message from the circuit court’s 

law clerk incorrectly informing petitioner that the pretrial conference was scheduled for February 

18, 2018. Following petitioner’s failure to appear at the February 8, 2018, pretrial conference, 

respondents filed a motion for a default against petitioner. The circuit court held a hearing on that 

motion on February 15, 2018, and petitioner was represented at the hearing by an attorney who 

made a one-time appearance on petitioner’s behalf. By order entered on February 22, 2018, the 

circuit court granted respondents’ motion for a default, finding that petitioner engaged in a “pattern 

and practice of delay” that was prejudicial to respondents. The circuit court set a hearing on the 

scope of respondents’ relief for February 27, 2018. On February 26, 2018, Mr. Carpenter filed a 

motion to vacate the default against him.4 

Petitioner was self-represented at the February 27, 2018, hearing, and the circuit court 

denied petitioner’s motion to vacate. The circuit court found that even if the court’s law clerk 

misinformed petitioner as to the date of the pretrial conference, petitioner’s pattern and practice of 

delay justified the entry of default. The circuit court then heard the parties’ testimony regarding 

 

2We take judicial notice of petitioner’s appeal in Case No. 14-1331. 

3The circuit court directed that a certified copy of its November 27, 2017, order be sent to 

petitioner at his address.

4Petitioner labelled his motion a motion for reconsideration. 
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respondents’ requested relief. Finally, respondents asked the circuit court to dismiss petitioner’s 

counter-claim, arguing that any claim based on adverse possession would have to be proven “by 

testimony[,] and that’s not why we’re out here today” given the entry of default against petitioner. 

By order entered on July 2, 2018, the circuit court entered a default judgment requiring 

petitioner to (1) connect to a different gas line; (2) remove portions of his driveway, including the 

concrete and gravel, that extended outside his boundary line; and (3) pay respondents $5,000 in 

general damages for annoyance and inconvenience. In addition, the circuit court dismissed 

petitioner’s counter-claim against respondents. It is from the circuit court’s July 2, 2018, order 

that petitioner now appeals. 

Rule 55(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[f]or good cause 

shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, 

may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).” “A motion to vacate a default judgment 

is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court’s ruling on such motion will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Syl. Pt. 1, Hardwood 

Group v. LaRocco, 219 W. Va. 56, 631 S.E.2d 614 (2006) (Internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Furthermore,

“In determining whether a default judgment should be . . . vacated upon a 

Rule 60(b) motion, the trial court should consider: (1) The degree of prejudice 

suffered by the plaintiff from the delay in answering; (2) the presence of material 

issues of fact and meritorious defenses; (3) the significance of the interests at stake; 

and (4) the degree of intransigence on the part of the defaulting party.” Syllabus 

point 3, in part, Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 163 W. Va. 464, 256 

S.E.2d 758 (1979).

. . . .

In addressing a motion to set aside a default judgment, “good cause” 

requires not only considering the factors set out in Syllabus point 3 of Parsons v. 

Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 163 W. Va. 464, 256 S.E.2d 758 (1979), but also 

requires a showing that a ground set out under Rule 60(b) . . . has been satisfied. 

Id. at 58, 631 S.E.2d at 616, syl. pts. 3 and 5. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), a defaulting party may 

show good cause on the basis of “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or 

unavoidable cause.” (Emphasis added).

On appeal, petitioner argues that this Court should reverse the circuit court’s default 

judgment against him and remand this case for further proceedings. Respondents counter that the 

circuit court properly found petitioner in default and then entered the default judgment in 

respondent’s favor. Based upon our review of the record, we agree with petitioner. Here, we find 

that each of the Parsons factors weighed in favor of setting aside the default judgment against 

petitioner and, further, that there was “good cause” to do so pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).
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First and foremost, the record does not support the circuit court’s finding that petitioner 

engaged in a “pattern and practice of delay” that was prejudicial to respondents. Rather, the record 

reflects that the circuit court and both parties treated this Court’s February 9, 2016, remand order 

in petitioner’s prior appeal as a reversal of the circuit court’s November 19, 2014, order. In the 

November 19, 2014, order, the circuit court awarded respondents an injunction enjoining petitioner 

from engaging in further construction activity; however, we were unable to review that decision 

due to the lack of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in the circuit court’s order. The 

circuit court did not comply with our directive to set out findings sufficient to permit appellate 

review of the November 19, 2017, order. Rather, the parties proceeded to prepare the case for trial. 

Therefore, we find that the “delay” in obtaining a result in this case is not attributable solely to 

petitioner, but was also prolonged by the inactions of the circuit court and respondents.

Next, we find that issues of material fact and meritorious defenses are present in this case 

to preclude award of a default judgment to respondents. At the February 27, 2018, hearing, the 

circuit court found that it did not have to decide between the parties’ competing claims of 

ownership given the entry of default against petitioner. As a result, petitioner was not allowed to

testify in support of his adverse possession claim. Furthermore, we find that, here, there are 

significant interests at stake. As a result of respondents’ claims, the circuit court has required 

petitioner to (1) connect to a different gas line; (2) remove portions of his driveway, including the 

concrete and gravel, that extended outside his boundary line; and (3) pay respondents $5,000 in 

general damages for annoyance and inconvenience.

Finally, we find that petitioner’s nonappearance at the February 8, 2018, pretrial conference 

was the result of excusable neglect, not intransigence. We have reviewed the audio recording of 

the phone message, wherein the circuit court’s law clerk incorrectly informed petitioner that the 

pretrial conference was scheduled for February 18, 2018, rather than February 8, 2018.5

It is settled law in West Virginia that a case should ordinarily be disposed of on its merits. 

As we stated in State ex rel. Richmond American Homes of West Virginia, Inc. v. Sanders, 226 W. 

Va. 103, 113, 697 S.E.2d 139, 149 (2010), “the sanction of default judgment ‘should be used 

sparingly and only in extreme situations [in order to effectuate] the policy of the law favoring the 

disposition of cases on their merits.’” (quoting Bell v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 175 W. Va. 165, 172, 

332 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1985)). Therefore, based upon the particular facts and circumstances of this 

case, we reverse the circuit court’s July 2, 2018, order entering default judgment against petitioner 

and remand this case for further proceedings. 

 

5Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(2)(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitioner 

certified that the contents of his appendix were true and accurate copies of items contained in the 

circuit court record in this case. In their response, respondents argue that the appendix was 

“erroneously designated” but fail to specify the portion(s) of the appendix to which they object. 

Therefore, we decline to consider this issue as not sufficiently raised by respondents. See State v. 

LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996) (stating that “[a]lthough we liberally 

construe briefs in determining issues presented for review, issues which are not raised, and those 

mentioned only in passing but are not supported with pertinent authority, are not considered on 

appeal”). 
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Reversed and Remanded.

ISSUED: May 26, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

Justice Evan H. Jenkins 

Justice John A. Hutchison

NOT PARTICIPATING:

Justice Margaret L. Workman