# IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL S OF TEXAS

NO. P D-1156-10

THE S TATE O F TEXAS

v. JED JORDAN, Appellee

On Discretionary Re view of Case 03-09- 00530-CR of the Thi rd Court of Appeals, Travis County

Womack, J ., delivere d the opinion of the unanimous Court.
Appellee J ed Jordan was c harg ed by information with misdemeanor D riving Whil e I ntox icated. Prior to tria l, he moved to suppress e vidence obtained upon execution of a war rant for se izure of his blood. The trial cour t gr anted his motion and, upon the State’s interloc utory
appea l, the Third Court of Appe als aff irmed. We gr anted r eview.

1 2

S t a t e v
. J

o r d a n , 3 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 6 6 0 ( T e x . A p p . – A u s t i n 2 0 1 0 )

. 1

O n o u r o w n m o t i o n , w e a l s o g r a n t e d r e v i e w t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e r e c o r d m u s t r e f l e c t t h e e v i d e n c e 2
s u p p r e s s e d b e f

o r e a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m a y c o n s i d e r s u c h a n a p p e a l

. I n l i g h t o f o u r r e c e n t h o l d i n g i n S t a t e v
. C h u p i k , P D 0 9 6 0

- 1 0 ( T e x . C r . A p p . J u n e 1 5 , 2 0 1 1 ) , t h a t t h e r e c o r d n e e d n o t r e f l e c t t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p r e s s e d , w e n o w d i s m i s sJ o r d a n - 2



## We hold that the Court of Appea ls’ analy sis of the war rant a ffidavit fa iled to consider

rea sonable infe renc es that provided a substantial basis for the mag istrate’s de termination of probable cause . We shall rever se the de cisions of the cour ts below.
I . Affida vit A mag istrate of the Municipal Court in Austin was prese nted with an Af fidavit for Sea

rch Warrant in the e arly

morning hours of June 6, 2008. I n the af fidavit, Austin Poli ce Ser g eant K. Suitt deposed tha t he or she ha d “g ood rea son to believe that he retofor e, on or a bout the 6th day of June, 2008, ... J ed Jordan ... did then and ther e commit [t he off ense of Driving Whil e I ntox icated].” Suitt then deposed that he or she had pr obable c ause f or this belief by

rea son of

cer tain fac ts. The fa cts listed by Suitt comprised obse rvations by fellow police office rs that the appellee drove the wrong way on a one- way

street a nd exhibi ted var ious sy

mptoms of intox ication, but the af

fidavit did not state specific ally that the observa

tions were ma de on June 6th. The af

fidavit was subscr ibed and swor n to before the mag istrate on June 6th, and the
mag istrate issued a Sea

rch Warr ant for B lood at 3:54 a.m. on that same da te.

I I . Motion to S uppress The a ppellee f iled a pre trial motion to suppress evidence obtained by a sea rch of the appellee ’s per son pursuant to an invalid sea rch w arr ant. At a he aring on the motion, the trial court stated tha t the mag istrate made a re asonable and per missibl e infe renc e that police observa tions were ma de on June 6th. However , the cour t stated that “time is a cr itical issue and needs to be specific ally

included in the fa cts of an a ffidavit for a wa rra nt to seiz e somebody ’s blood in a DWI case .” B eca use the a ffidavit did not state “the time that the observa tions of the

t h i s g r o u n d f

o r r e v i e w a s i m p r o v i d e n t l y g r a n t e d

.J o r d a n - 3



## conduct of

the def endant we re ma de,” the trial court g rante d the motion. The Third Court of A

ppeals a ffirme d beca

use the a ffidavit did not establish the date of the observations: Suitt ’s statement in his aff idavit that “I

have g ood rea son to believe that here tofore, on or

about the 6th day

of June, 2008 in the Count y of Tra vis and State of Texas, J ed Jordan ... did then and ther e commit” the of fense of driving while intox icated w as not a stateme nt of fac t; it was merely a stateme nt of the off

icer ’s belief. A police off

icer ’s conc lusion that a crime ha s been c ommitt ed does not g ive a mag istrate a substantial ba sis for deter mining that proba

ble ca use exists . I t is the fac ts giving rise to the off icer ’s suspicion that are deter minative, and the aff idavit in this case was c ompletely silent as to the date a

nd time when Jordan was stopped by

For shee a

nd observe d by

Gilbert, and w hen Gilber t passed on his information to Suitt . There fore , althoug h the fa cts containe d in the aff idavit were sufficie nt to warra

nt the conclusion that Jordan had bee n driving while intox icated on some date, the aff

idavit contained no f

acts fr om which a r easona ble infer ence could be dr awn a s to what that date w as. 3 

## The Court noted that it expressed no opinion as to whethe r the wa rra nt would have be en insufficient for

failure to specify

the time even if

the date ha d been pr operly established. 4


## I I I . Standard of Re view The F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that “no w arr ants shall issue, but upon probable c ause, suppor ted by oath or a ffirma

tion, and particula

rly descr ibing the place to be sea

rche d, and the pe rsons or thing s to be seized.” Unde r Article 18.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , a sea rch w arr ant may

be obtained f

rom a mag istrate only

afte r submission of an af fidavit setting f

orth substantial fac ts establishing proba ble ca use. 5


## Probable c ause e x ists if, under the totality of the c ircumstance s set forth in the af fidavit

J o r d a n , 3 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 6 6 3 ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. 3

I d

. , a t 6 6 3 n . 2

. 4

T E X
. C O D E C R IM
. P R O C
. a r t

. 1 8

. 0 1 ( b )

. 5J o r d a n - 4



## befor e the mag istrate, ther e is a “ fair pr obability ” that contra band or e vidence of a c rime will be 6 

## found in a pa

rticular pla ce a

t the time the war

rant is issued. The mag istrate may interpre t the 7


## aff idavit in a non-tec hnical, common-se nse manne r and ma y drawrea sonable infe renc es fr om the fac ts and circ umstances c ontained within its four corne rs. 8 

## Reviewing courts g ive g rea t defe renc e to a mag istrate’s de termination of proba ble ca use. 9 

## “[T] he duty

of a r eviewing court is simply to ensure tha t the mag istrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exis ted.” 1 0

I l l i n o i s v
. G a t e s , 4 6 2 U

. S

. 2 1 3 , 2 3 8 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; F l o r e s , 3 1 9 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 7 , 7 0 2 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 1 0 ) ; 6 R o d r i g u e z v
. S t a t e , 2 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 5 5 , 6 0 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 7 )

.

S c h m i d t v
. S t a t e , 6 5 9 S

. W

. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 1 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) ( “ T h e f a c t s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e . . . 7

m u s t b e s u f

f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f

y t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y t h a t i s t h e o b j e c t o f t h e s e a r c h i s p r o b a b l y o n t h e p r e m i s e s t o b e s e a r c h e d a t t h e t i m e t h e w a r r a n t i s s u e s . ” ) ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) ; C a s s i a s v
. S t a t e , 7 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d 5 8 5 , 5 8 8 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 6 )

.

F l o r e s , 3 1 9 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 7 0 2 ; C a s s i a s , 7 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d , a t 5 8 8

- 8 9

. I n U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. V

e n t r e s c a , 3 8 0 U

. S

. 1 0 2 , 8 1 0 8

- 0 9 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t d e s c r i b e d t h e f l e x i b i l i t y t h a t s h o u l d b e a c c o r d e d t o m a g i s t r a t e s : T h e s e d e c i s i o n s r e f

l e c t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t ’ s c o m m a n d s , l i k e a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , a r e p r a c t i c a l a n d n o t a b s t r a c t

. I f t h e t e a c h i n g s o f t h e C o u r t ’ s c a s e s a r e t o b e f o l l o w e d a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i c y s e r v e d , a f f i d a v i t s f o r s e a r c h w a r r a n t s , s u c h a s t h e o n e i n v o l v e d h e r e , m u s t b e t e s t e d a n d i n t e r p r e t e d b y m a g i s t r a t e s a n d c o u r t s i n a c o m m o n s e n s e a n d r e a l i s t i c f

a s h i o n . T h e y a r e n o r m a l l y d r a f t e d b y n o n l a w y e r s i n t h e m i d s t a n d h a s t e o f a c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T e c h n i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f e l a b o r a t e s p e c i f i c i t y o n c e e x a c t e d u n d e r c o m m o n l a w p l e a d i n g s h a v e n o p r o p e r p l a c e i n t h i s a r e a . A g r u d g i n g o r n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e b y r e v i e w i n g c o u r t s t o w a r d w a r r a n t s w i l l t e n d t o d i s c o u r a g e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s f r o m s u b m i t t i n g t h e i r e v i d e n c e t o a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r b e f o r e a c t i n g . T h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t p r o b a b l e c a u s e c a n b e m a d e o u t b y a f f i d a v i t s w h i c h a r e p u r e l y c o n c l u s o r y , s t a t i n g o n l y t h e a f f i a n t ’ s o r a n i n f

o r m e r ’ s b e l i e f t h a t p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t s w i t h o u t d e t a i l i n g a n y o f t h e “ u n d e r l y i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ” u p o n w h i c h t h a t b e l i e f i s b a s e d

. R e c i t a l o f s o m e o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t h e a f f i d a v i t i s e s s e n t i a l i f t h e m a g i s t r a t e i s t o p e r f o r m h i s d e t a c h e d f u n c t i o n a n d n o t s e r v e m e r e l y a s a r u b b e r s t a m p f o r t h e p o l i c e . H o w e v e r , w h e r e t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e d e t a i l e d , w h e r e r e a s o n f o r c r e d i t i n g t h e s o u r c e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s g i v e n , a n d w h e n a m a g i s t r a t e h a s f o u n d p r o b a b l e c a u s e , t h e c o u r t s s h o u l d n o t i n v a l i d a t e t h e w a r r a n t b y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e a f

f i d a v i t i n a h y p e r t e c h n i c a l , r a t h e r t h a n a c o m m o n s e n s e , m a n n e r . A l t h o u g h i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e i t m a y n o t b e e a s y t o d e t e r m i n e w h e n a n a f f i d a v i t d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e , t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f d o u b t f u l o r m a r g i n a l c a s e s i n t h i s a r e a s h o u l d b e l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e p r e f e r e n c e t o b e a c c o r d e d t o w a r r a n t s . G a t e s , 4 6 2 U

. S

. , a t 2 3 6 ; R o d r i g u e z , 2 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 5 9

- 6 0

. 9

G a t e s , 4 6 2 U

. S

. , a t 2 3 8

- 3 9 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. 1 0J o r d a n - 5 

## I V. Analy sis
I n this case the Court of

Appea ls analy

zed separately

the af fiant’s introductor

y statement and the subseque nt description of fa cts, instead of c onsidering the totality of the c ircumstance s contained w ithin the four cor ners of the af fidavit. I t is true, as the Court stated, that “ a police office r’s c onclusion that a cr ime has bee n committed does not g ive a substantial basis for deter mining that proba

ble ca use exists .” For

that proposition the Court cited Gates , which 1 1


## relied on Nathanson v. United States and Aguilar v. Texas

. I n both Nathanson and Aguilar , 1 2 1 3 

## the problem wa s “bar e bones” aff idavits providing only

conclusory

statements that an of

fense 1 4


## had bee n committed and evidenc e would be f ound at a pa

rticular loc ation. The a ffidavits did not provide a ny underly ing f

acts to allow the ma g istrate to make the judgme nt as to probable c ause. Under Nathanson and Aguilar , Suitt ’s introductory statement that an of

fense had bee n committed on J une 6, 2008, would not be suff icient on its own to establish probable c ause. B ut that does not mean tha t the introductory statement should not be consider ed in conjunction with the fa cts descr ibed below that state ment. Testing the two par ts of the af

fidavit separ ately

for probable cause runs af

oul of the Supreme Court’ s instruction to review the “ totality of the circ umstances” set forth within the four corne rs of the a ffidavit. 1 5


## I n the pre sent aff

idavit, Suit t first said that the appe llee committed the off ense of Driving

J o r d a n , 3 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 6 6 3

. 1 1

2 9 0 U

. S

. 4 1 ( 1 9 3 3 )

. 1 2

3 7 8 U

. S

. 1 0 8 ( 1 9 6 4 )

. 1 3

G a t e s , 4 6 2 U

. S

. , a t 2 3 9

. 1 4

G a t e s , 4 6 2 U

. S

. , a t 2 3 8

. 1 5J o r d a n - 6



## Whil e I ntox icated on June 6, 2008, and then de scribed the driving and intox ication that constituted elements of tha t offense . The mag istrate nee ded to know whe n the appe llee wa s stopped in order

to determine the probability that evidenc e of a

n offe nse would be f

ound in the appellee ’s blood at the time the wa rra nt issued. Under the fac ts and circ umstances of this case, the af fiant’s introductor

y statement that the off

ense oc curr ed on June 6, 2008, provided the
mag istrate with a substantial basis to infer that the driving and intox ication eleme nts then descr ibed in the af

fidavit wer e obser

ved on that same date. An instructive contr ast is found in Garza v. State

. I n that Prohibiti on Era c ase, the 1 6


## aff iants stated their be lief that there was “ on this date” a private dw elling owned by the appe llant and that “w hisky , wine, bee r, mash, the sa me being intox icating liquors, are illega lly possessed, sold and manufa cture d in said private dwe lling.” This belief wa s based on the f ollowing f

act: 1 7


## “J.L . Cook say s he per sonally saw a man leave the house a fore mentioned with some bee r he claimed to have purcha sed there in.” The a ffidavit wa s found inadequate bec ause nothing in the 1 8


## aff idavit adequa tely

descr ibed when the Cook observation took place – it could have oc curr ed “at some remote date pre ceding the making of the a ffidavit.” Unlike the pre sent ca se, the be er 1 9 

## possession observed by

Cook was offe red to e stablish probable c ause to be lieve that evide nce of
a sepa rate possession offense would be found in the dw elling. I n Garza it was there fore not a

rea sonable infe renc e that the da te of the Cook obser vation was the sa me as the da te of the a lleg ed

4 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 2 5 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 3 2 ) ( o p . o n r e h ’ g )

. 1 6

I d

. , a t 6 2 6

. 1 7

I d

. 1 8

I d

. , a t 6 2 7

. 1 9J o r d a n - 7



## offe nse. The Court of Appe als also stated that Schmidt “contr adicts any

arg ument that a police office r’s stateme nt that he believe s that events occ urre d on or about a cer tain date, without any fac ts to support that belief, is sufficient to support an inf ere nce tha t the events did occ ur on that date.” We find Schmidt to be distinguishable.

2 0


## I n Schmidt , office rs soug ht a sea rch w arr ant for a

vehicle. T he af

fiant alleg ed that Schmidt possessed coca ine “on or about the 9th day

of April, 1980.” The a ffiant state d that he 2 1 

## had “pr oba[b] le ca

use for said belief” by

rea son of ce rtain fa cts. Among those fac ts was that 2 2 

## Schmidt “is presently

under me dical attention af ter be ing f

ound in the above de scribed ve hicle,
appar ently

in need of

medical a ssistance. [An] ambulance wa s called a nd Tim Bell and My

ra Stephens responde d. When they arr ived, ... Schmidt told t hem that he ha d been sniff ing c ocaine since he left F lorida to stay awa ke.” 2 3


## We found that the af

fidavit was insuff

icient for the following rea son: The a ffidavit ... fa ils to st ate whe n the af fiant re ceive d the information fr om Be ll ... or whe n Be ll obtained his information. There is nothing in the af fidavit to demonstrate w hen the incide nt it describes took plac e. The only ref ere nce to time in the aff idavit is that the appellant “is pre sently under me dical attention” a fter being “found” in the automobile. No asser tion is m ade a s to how long the appellant ha d been “ under me dical attention”- whether for a few hours or a

few months. 2 4

J o r d a n , 3 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 6 6 4

. 2 0

S c h m i d t , 6 5 9 S

. W

. 2 d , a t 4 2 1

. 2 1

I b i d

. 2 2

I b i d

. 2 3

I b i d

. 2 4J o r d a n - 8



## The proble m in Schmidt was that the a ffiant de scribed a series of events of inde terminate duration – fr om driving w hile sniffing coca ine, to finding the vehicle , to calling the ambulanc e, to providing me dical tre atment. The ma g istrate nee ded to know how much time e lapsed be tween the eve nts and the submission of the aff idavit in order to dete rmine the proba bility of evide nce’ s being found in the vehic le when a war rant issued. B ut the only

date g iven was tha t of the alleg ed possession, while the eve nts supporting the a lleg ation could have occur red a t some remote time. The pre sent aff

idavit does not prese nt the same proble m as Schmidt . The obser vations of driving and intox ication desc ribed in the sec ond part of the aff idavit were the eleme nts of the offe nse alleg ed in the first pa rt of the a ffidavit. Unde r the c ircumstance s of this case, it wa s a

rea sonable infe renc e that the obse rvations occ urre d on the same da te that the off ense w as alleg ed to have oc curr ed. We there fore hold that the Court of Appea ls erre d in failing to consider the totality of the c ircumstance s contained w ithin the four cor ners of the af fidavit in review ing the
mag istrate’s ba sis for deter mining proba

ble ca use. We also find that the mag istrate had a substantial basis for dete rmining pr obable c ause despite the fa ilure of the a ffiant to spec ify the time of the stop. B eca use the wa

rra nt was issued on
J une 6th at 3:54 a.m., less than f our hours c ould have e lapsed be tween the observa tion of the offe nse, the stop, and the issuanc e of the war rant. The a ppellee a rg ues, “When the le ng th of time from the point of ar rest stretc hes into hours, the less ac cura te the test of the sa mple will be on its face , and the testimony of the e x pert, if such evide nce is e ven ava ilable, bec omes eve n more spec ulative. And ce rtainly not ever y case will provide enoug h fac ts for an e x pert to eve n venture an opinion about the def endant’ s level of intox ication at the time of the arr est using this method of ‘ retrog rade extrapolation.’”J o r d a n - 9



## Whil e we have r ecog nized that “testing ne are r in time to the time of the alleg ed off ense incre ases the a

bility to determine the subject’s off ense- time BAC,” retrog rade extrapolation to a 2 5 

## specific blood-alcohol c oncentr ation was not nec essar y for the a ppellee’ s blood to be evidenc e of

a cr ime. Evidence of any amount of alc ohol, or any other substanc e or c ombination falling 2 6


## within the definition of “intox icated” in Section 49.01(2) of the Penal Code, could be probative of intox ication bec ause it would provide e vidence that the appe llee had introduc ed such a substance into his body

. Given the sy mptoms of intox ication desc ribed in the a ffidavit, we hold 2 7 

## that the mag istrate had a

substantial basis to determine that e vidence of intox ication would probably be found in the a

ppellee’ s blood within four hours of the stop. The a ppellee a lso arg ues that “if the sample is just being ta ken to show that [the appellee ] had consume d alcohol[,] that would be mer ely cumulative evide nce” beca use police ha d alre ady deter mined that the appe llee had c onsumed alcohol. The appellee fails to cite, nor do w e know of, any authority for the pr oposition t hat evidenc e fr om a blood test is merely cumulative of f

ield sobriety tests, or for the proposition that the potential for the c ollection of cumulative e vidence should invalidate a mag istrate’s de termination of proba ble ca use. We reve rse the judg ment of the Court of Appe als and re mand to the trial cour t for fur ther

M a t a v
. S t a t e , 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 9 0 2 , 9 1 6 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 1 )

. 2 5

S e e G a t e s , 4 6 2 U

. S

. , a t 2 3 8

- 3 9 ( “ T h e t a s k o f t h e i s s u i n g m a g i s t r a t e i s s i m p l y t o m a k e a p r a c t i c a l , 2 6
c o m m o n - s e n s e d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r , g i v e n a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s e t f o r t h i n t h e a f

f i d a v i t b e f

o r e h i m , i n c l u d i n g t h e

‘ v e r a c i t y ’ a n d ‘ b a s i s o f k n o w l e d g e ’ o f p e r s o n s s u p p l y i n g h e a r s a y i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e r e i s a f

a i r p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t c o n t r a b a n d o r e v i d e n c e o f a c r i m e w i l l b e f o u n d i n a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e . ” )

. S e e S t e w a r t v
. S t a t e , 1 2 9 S

. W

. 3 d 9 3 , 9 6 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 4 ) ( b r e a t h

- t e s t r e s u l t s w e r e r e l e v a n t d e s p i t e 2 7 l a c k o f r e t r o g r a d e e x t r a p o l a t i o n t e s t i m o n y b e c a u s e t h e y p r o v i d e d e v i d e n c e t h a t S t e w a r t h a d c o n s u m e d a l c o h o l ) ; M e c h l e r v
. S t a t e , 1 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 5 , 4 4 0

- 4 2 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) ( b r e a t h

- t e s t r e s u l t s w e r e n o t m o r e p r e j u d i c i a l t h a n p r o b a t i v e d e s p i t e l a c k o f r e t r o g r a d e e x t r a p o l a t i o n t e s t i m o n y )

.J o r d a n - 1 0



## proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion. 2 8



## Deliver ed June 29, 2011. Publis h.

D e s p i t e o u r h o l d i n g , w e n o t e t h a t t h e b e t t e r p r a c t i c e i s f o r a f f i a n t s t o s p e c i f

y t h e t i m e s o f c r i t i c a l e v e n t s 2 8 d e s c r i b e d s o t h a t m a g i s t r a t e s h a v e m o r e p r e c i s e i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h w h i c h t o d e t e r m i n e p r o b a b l e c a u s e .