IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2022 WY 160

 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2022

December 21, 2022

NATHAN JESS MICHAEL SCHUERMAN,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-22-0103

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County

The Honorable Stuart S. Healy III, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public 

Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Elizabeth B. Lance, Lance & 

Hall LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 

General; Catherine M. Mercer*, Assistant Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

* An Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel was entered on September 2, 2022.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are 

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 

permanent volume.
1

GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Nathan Jess Michael Schuerman of two counts of aggravated 

assault for attempting to cause harm to others after he led law enforcement on a high-speed 

chase and nearly collided with an officer in his vehicle. Mr. Schuerman appeals one 

aggravated assault conviction. He argues the district court erred when it instructed the jury 

that it could find him guilty if it found he acted knowingly. Finding error, we reverse and 

vacate the appealed aggravated assault conviction. Because the record is unclear as to the 

state of Mr. Schuerman’s second aggravated assault conviction, we remand for clarification 

and resentencing, if necessary.

ISSUE

[¶2] Mr. Schuerman presents a single issue on appeal: Did the district court abuse its 

discretion when it instructed the jury that attempted aggravated assault under Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) could be committed knowingly?

FACTS

[¶3] On April 17, 2020, Mr. Schuerman and his girlfriend had a fight in Moorcroft, Crook 

County, Wyoming, and 911 was called. A patrolman from the Moorcroft Police 

Department arrived on the scene. When he arrived, he encountered Mr. Schuerman who 

indicated he had a gun in his pocket and refused to show his hands. Almost immediately, 

Mr. Schuerman managed to flee the scene. He got in his truck and drove to Campbell 

County where he led law enforcement officers on a high speed chase. During the chase, 

Mr. Schuerman drove his truck straight at the patrol car occupied by Deputy Coxbill and 

only narrowly missed colliding with him. Shortly afterward, Mr. Schuerman rolled his 

truck and was apprehended. A handgun and ammunition were found in the glove box of 

the truck. 

[¶4] Mr. Schuerman was charged with seven counts: two counts of aggravated assault 

and battery (the first, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i), for attempting to cause serious 

bodily injury to Deputy Coxbill; and the second, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii), 

for threatening Deputy Coxbill with a vehicle), interference with a peace officer,

possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, aggravated eluding, destruction of 

property, and reckless driving. Initially Mr. Schuerman entered a plea of not guilty by 

reason of mental illness or deficiency, but, after a mental health evaluation, amended his 

plea to no contest to Counts I, III, and IV. After a second mental health evaluation, he 

changed his pleas to not guilty on all counts and exercised his right to a jury trial. 

[¶5] At the pretrial conference, the State proposed a jury instruction for the first 

aggravated assault and battery charge. The proposed instruction delineated the elements 

of aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (“attempts to cause 
2

serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”). The proposed instruction 

described the applicable mental state as “Intentionally OR Knowingly OR Recklessly.” At 

the pretrial conference, Mr. Schuerman, relying on Kite v. State, 2018 WY 94, 424 P.3d 

255 (Wyo. 2018), objected to that instruction, arguing that “recklessly” is inconsistent with 

the specific intent required to prove an “attempt” to cause serious bodily injury. The district 

court agreed and removed “recklessly” from the instruction. At trial, Mr. Schuerman, 

based upon Kite, again objected to the instruction, and requested that the court also remove 

“knowingly” from the instruction. The court denied the request and instructed the jury: 

INSTRUCTION NO. 11 

The elements of the criminal offense of 

Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in Count I 

of this case, are: 

1. On or about April 17, 2020; 

2. In Campbell County, Wyoming; 

3. The Defendant, Nathan Schuerman; 

4. Intentionally or knowingly; 

5. Attempted to cause serious bodily injury to Deputy 

Eric Coxbill. 

If you find from your consideration of all the 

evidence that each of these elements has been proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 

defendant guilty. 

If, on the other hand, you find from your 

consideration of all the evidence that any of these 

elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. 

The special verdict form likewise allowed the jury to find Mr. Schuerman guilty of Count 

I, aggravated assault and battery, if it determined he acted intentionally or knowingly or 

both. Using the form, the jury rendered the following verdict as to Count I: 
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Count I: We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the 

above entitled cause, do find that as to the crime of Aggravated 

Assault and Battery, the Defendant is: 

 Not Guilty 

 X Guilty (mark one or more below) 

 a. We unanimously find that 

the Defendant intentionally attempted to 

cause serious bodily injury to another. 

 X b. We unanimously find that 

the Defendant knowingly attempted to 

cause serious bodily injury to another. 

The jury, by marking alternative b., found Mr. Schuerman guilty of aggravated assault and 

battery for “knowingly” attempting to cause serious bodily injury. The jury also found Mr. 

Schuerman guilty of aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii), 

possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, aggravated eluding, destruction of 

property, and reckless driving. It acquitted Mr. Schuerman of interference with a peace 

officer. 

[¶6] At sentencing, the State raised a double jeopardy concern regarding the two 

aggravated assault and battery convictions. In response, the district court entered its Order 

Amending Judgment and Vacating Conviction for Count II, removing the direct reference 

to Count II and amending Count I to read: “Aggravated Assault and Battery, a felony, in 

violation of Wyoming Statutes §§ 6-2-502(a)(i) and/or (a)(ii), (b), and 6-10-102[.]” The 

district court sentenced Mr. Schuerman to nine to ten years of imprisonment for aggravated 

assault and battery, four and a half to five years for possession of deadly weapon, four and 

a half to five years for aggravated eluding, one hundred eighty days for destruction of 

property, and one hundred eighty days for reckless driving. Mr. Schuerman appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

[¶7] Mr. Schuerman objected to the jury instruction and verdict form at trial, establishing 

our review for an abuse of discretion. Neidlinger v. State, 2021 WY 39, ¶ 41, 482 P.3d 

337, 349 (Wyo. 2021) (because defense counsel objected to special verdict form, review 

was for abuse of discretion); Schmuck v. State, 2017 WY 140, ¶ 45, 406 P.3d 286, 301 

(Wyo. 2017) (when defense counsel objects at trial, we review jury instructions for an 

abuse of discretion). 
4

District courts “are afforded substantial latitude to tailor jury 

instructions to the facts of the case.” Dugan [v. State, 2019 WY 

112, ¶ 34, 451 P.3d 731, 742 (Wyo. 2019)] (quoting Birch v. 

State, 2018 WY 73, ¶ 12, 421 P.3d 528, 533 (Wyo. 2018)). So 

long as the verdict form and “jury instructions correctly state 

the law and adequately cover the issues presented in the trial, 

reversible error will not be found.” Id.; see also Kite v. State, 

2018 WY 94, ¶ 21, 424 P.3d 255, 262 (Wyo. 2018). 

“An incorrect ruling on an instruction [or verdict form] 

must be prejudicial to constitute reversible error.” Schmuck, 

¶ 45, 406 P.3d at 301 (quoting Hurley v. State, 2017 WY 95, 

¶ 8, 401 P.3d 827, 830 (Wyo. 2017)). A defendant is not 

prejudiced unless he can establish that the given instructions or 

verdict form confused or misled the jury. Tingey v. State, 2017 

WY 5, ¶ 40, 387 P.3d 1170, 1181 (Wyo. 2017) (“Because the 

purpose of jury instructions is to provide guidance on the 

applicable law, prejudice will result when the instructions 

confuse or mislead the jury.”); Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, 

¶ 14, 96 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Wyo. 2004) (“Prejudice will be 

determined to exist only where an appellant demonstrates that 

the instruction given confused or misled the jury with respect 

to the proper principles of law.”). 

Neidlinger, ¶¶ 41–42, 482 P.3d at 349. Our review considers whether the instruction 

correctly stated the law, and, if it did not, whether it misled or confused the jury. 

[¶8] Mr. Schuerman asserts that use of the term “knowingly” in the instruction and 

verdict form was erroneous. This claim of error presents a question of statutory

interpretation. “Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which this Court 

reviews de novo.” Marfil v. State, 2016 WY 12, ¶ 17, 366 P.3d 969, 973 (Wyo. 2016)

(citing Robert L. Kroenlein Tr. ex rel. Alden v. Kirchhefer, 2015 WY 127, ¶ 14, 357 P.3d 

1118, 1124 (Wyo. 2015)). 

ANALYSIS 

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury that attempted 

aggravated assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) could be committed knowingly?

[¶9] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) defines the crime of attempted aggravated assault: 

(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he: 
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(i) Causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 

another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 

value of human life[.] 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2019). Mr. Schuerman, relying on Kite, 

argues that the district court erred when it instructed the jury that attempted aggravated 

assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) could be committed “knowingly.” 

[¶10] As Mr. Schuerman suggests, our analysis is governed by Kite. In Kite, Mr. Kite was 

charged with aggravated assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) and (ii) after 

engaging in a high speed chase with law enforcement. Kite, ¶¶ 5–7, 424 P.3d at 258. The 

trial court instructed the jury that the elements of aggravated assault under subsection (a)(i) 

included that the defendant “Intentionally OR knowingly OR recklessly under 

circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to the value of human life . . .

attempted to cause serious bodily injury . . . .” Id. ¶ 18, 424 P.3d at 262. Mr. Kite argued 

that the district court erred when it instructed “the jury that an attempted battery could be 

committed knowingly or recklessly as well as intentionally.” Id. ¶ 19, 424 P.3d at 262. 

We agreed, explaining that attempted aggravated assault under subsection (a)(i) is a 

specific intent crime because it requires an intent to create an additional consequence—

serious bodily injury. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25, 424 P.3d at 263. With regard to the term “recklessly,” 

we explained, 

The term [recklessly] has no place as an element of an 

attempted crime. A conscious disregard of a risk, and even an 

extreme indifference to the value of human life, differs from 

an intent to cause a particular result. It simply makes no sense 

to say that an individual can specifically intend a further act or 

consequence through conscious disregard or extreme 

indifference. Because we presume that the legislature acts in a 

thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing 

law and intends new statutory provisions to be read in harmony 

with existing law, we presume the legislature did not intend to 

use the terms “recklessly” and “extreme indifference” to 

modify the phrase “attempts to cause.” 

Id. ¶ 29, 424 P.3d at 264. 

[¶11] We concluded that because Mr. Kite did not actually cause bodily injury, to prove 

attempt, the “State was required to prove that Mr. Kite acted with a specific intent to cause 

serious bodily injury.” Id. ¶ 33, 424 P.3d at 265. We nevertheless upheld the instruction 

in Kite because “although the elements instruction for subsection (a)(i) did instruct the jury 

that it could find Mr. Kite guilty of attempted aggravated assault and battery if it found he 
6

acted recklessly or knowingly, the instruction also offered the correct option for Mr. Kite’s 

state of mind, that he acted intentionally[,]” and the verdict form indicated the jury found 

his actions were “an intentional attempt to cause serious bodily injury.” Id. ¶ 33, 424 P.3d 

at 265. 

[¶12] The State argues that Kite merely “implied” that attempted aggravated assault could 

not be committed knowingly. We disagree. While analysis of the term “recklessly” was 

the focus of the discussion in Kite, the holding was clear. We said: “The attempt portion 

of this statute requires a person to act with the intent to commit a further act, the act of 

causing bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon.” Id. ¶ 24, 424 P.3d at 263 (quoting 

Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, ¶ 72, 401 P.3d 834, 857 (Wyo. 2017)). 

The State was required to prove that Mr. Kite acted with a 

specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. Fortunately, 

although the elements instruction for subsection (a)(i) did 

instruct the jury that it could find Mr. Kite guilty of attempted 

aggravated assault and battery if it found he acted recklessly or 

knowingly, the instruction also offered the correct option for 

Mr. Kite’s state of mind, that he acted intentionally. 

Id. ¶ 33, 424 P.3d at 265. The state of mind that must be proven for a conviction of 

attempted aggravated assault and battery is the defendant acted intentionally. 

[¶13] Alternatively, the State invites the Court to expand its jurisprudence and “recognize 

the existence of a knowing attempt” as a mental state sufficient to sustain a conviction 

under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i). We decline the invitation. 

[¶14] The State argues that “[i]n practice, this Court has also repeatedly equated” 

intentionally and knowingly and cites several cases in support of its contention that the two 

are synonymous. Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 1999) (Rejecting a claim that 

child abuse is a specific intent crime and holding there was no requirement for the jury to 

be instructed on specific intent.); Barrett v. State, 2022 WY 64, ¶ 36, 509 P.3d 940, 948

(Wyo. 2022) (Finding sufficient evidence of the element knowingly to support conviction 

of sexual exploitation of a child under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(b) a general intent 

crime.); Sena v. State, 2019 WY 111, ¶ 27, 451 P.3d 1143, 1149 (Wyo. 2019) (Affirming 

a conviction of a probation violation and defining the term willful. In this circumstance, 

the term “[w]illfully means intentionally, knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, 

deliberately, and without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently, 

accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly.” (quoting Edrington v. State, 2008 

WY 70, ¶ 9, 185 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Wyo. 2008))). These cases provide no basis for equating 

the term knowingly with intent in the context of a specific intent crime. 
7

[¶15] The statutes do not define “knowingly.” When terms are not defined by statute, we 

apply their common definition. See Bernal-Molina v. State, 2021 WY 90, ¶ 17, 492 P.3d 

904, 909 (Wyo. 2021); see also Marfil, ¶ 25, 366 P.3d at 975–76 (explaining that “where 

a term used in a criminal statute is not given a statutory definition, we presume the 

legislature did not mean for the term to have a specialized meaning” (citations omitted)). 

“We previously held that ‘the term ‘knowingly’ requires no clarification because the legal 

meaning of the term is not so separate from its ordinary meaning.’” Hopkins v. State, 2019 

WY 77, ¶ 26, 445 P.3d 582, 589 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Adekale v. State, 2015 WY 30, ¶ 42, 

344 P.3d 761, 770 (Wyo. 2015)). 

[¶16] Merriam-Webster defines “knowing” as “1 : having or reflecting knowledge, 

information, or intelligence[;] 2 a : shrewdly and keenly alert, ASTUTE[;] b : indicating 

possession of exclusive inside knowledge or information[;] 3 : COGNITIVE[;] 4 : 

DELIBERATE[.]” Knowing, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/knowing (last visited Dec. 19, 2022). Applying the most common 

definition of knowing, to commit a crime knowingly, a defendant must commit the crime 

with knowledge or information about it. 

[¶17] The State asserts that if we were to “recognize the existence of a knowing attempt,” 

specific intent to cause bodily harm would not be required. Rather, it would suffice for a 

defendant to know bodily harm is a likely result of the defendant’s conduct. If we were to 

adopt the State’s position, the line between specific intent and general intent crimes would 

be obscured. As we pointed out in Kite, we presume the legislature “intends new statutory 

provisions to be read in harmony with existing law, [and] we presume the legislature did 

not intend to use the terms ‘recklessly’ and ‘extreme indifference’ to modify the phrase 

‘attempts to cause.’” Kite, ¶ 29, 424 P.3d at 264. We apply the same reasoning to the term 

“knowingly.” 

[¶18] Consistent with our analysis in Kite, we conclude the legislature did not intend to 

create a general intent attempt crime when it defined attempted aggravated assault. In 

2009, the legislature changed the language in subsection (a)(i) from “causes serious bodily 

injury” to “causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury.” Cecil v. State, 2015 WY 

158, ¶ 12, 364 P.3d 1086, 1090 (Wyo. 2015); 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws 674. When the 

legislature added the attempt language to subsection (a)(i), it “intended no more than to 

create the crime of attempted [aggravated assault and] battery, which is a specific intent 

crime.” Kite, ¶¶ 30–31, 424 P.3d at 264. 

[¶19] To establish the crime of attempted aggravated assault and battery under subsection 

(a)(i), the State was required to prove that Mr. Schuerman acted with specific intent to 

cause serious bodily injury—in other words, that he intentionally attempted to cause 

serious bodily injury to Deputy Coxbill. Knowingly differs from an intent to cause a 

particular result and is not sufficient to prove that Mr. Schuerman acted with specific intent 

to cause serious bodily injury. The error in the instruction was carried over in the verdict 
8

form which allowed the jury to find Mr. Schuerman guilty of aggravated assault and battery 

if it determined he acted intentionally or knowingly, or both. The jury chose between 

knowingly and intentionally when it marked the option that Mr. Schuerman “knowingly 

attempted to cause serious bodily injury” and left blank the space indicating he 

“intentionally attempted to cause serious bodily injury.” Here, unlike Kite, we cannot

conclude that the instruction and the verdict form provided the “jury a correct and legally 

sufficient basis on which to convict” Mr. Schuerman of attempted battery under subsection 

(a)(i). See Kite, ¶ 34, 424 P.3d at 265. Mr. Schuerman’s conviction for violation of Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) is reversed and vacated. 

[¶20] Finally, we note that Mr. Schuerman was also convicted of aggravated assault under 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii), Count II. While Mr. Schuerman does not challenge that 

conviction, the record is unclear whether the court vacated the conviction under subsection 

(a)(ii) or merged Counts I (subsection (a)(i)) and II (subsection (a)(ii)). The Order 

Amending Judgment and Vacating Conviction for Count II appears to vacate the conviction 

under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii). However, the sentencing order reads: “Defendant 

was previously adjudged guilty” of “Aggravated Assault and Battery, a felony, in violation 

of Wyoming Statutes §§ 6-2-502(a)(i) and/or (a)(ii), (b), and 6-10-102[.]” We remand for 

clarification and sentencing on Count II, if appropriate. 

[¶21] We reverse, vacate, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.