******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
MARY ANN BRITTO v. JOHN J. BRITTO, JR.

(AC 36973)

(AC 37117)

DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Agati, Js.

Argued March 8—officially released June 14, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Hon. Howard T. Owens, Jr., judge trial

referee.)

William B. Kellogg, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy F. Butler, with whom was Meredith F.

McBride, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, John J. Britto, Jr., appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Mary Ann Britto. In these consolidated appeals,1

the defendant claims that the court’s

findings as to his annual income and the values assigned

to certain real estate holdings were clearly erroneous

in light of the evidence in the record, and that the

court abused its discretion by entering financial orders

applicable to the defendant that were erroneous and

burdensome. We reverse the judgment of the trial court

limited to its findings regarding the values it assigned

to the real estate holdings because we conclude that

the courtimproperly disregarded the parties’ stipulation

as to those valuations.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. The parties were married

on September 4, 1994, and two children were born of

the marriage.2 The plaintiff filed for dissolution of marriage on March 28, 2012, and a trial commenced on

September 18, 2013.

The defendant was the principal owner of A-1 Janitorial, LLC, a single-member limited liability company,

and he also owned several residential rental properties

in Bridgeport. Prior to the trial, a forensic accountant

was hired to determine the defendant’s income from

his janitorial company. The defendant did not provide

the accountant or the court with tax returns from the

previous year (2012) or certain other business records

that could have aided in determining the defendant’s

income. Ultimately, the court found that the defendant

had intentionally tried to hide assets: ‘‘The court is

particularly concerned with the [defendant’s] flagrant

violations of the court orders relating to the transfer

of assets. He fully acknowledged that several transfers

of cash and real property were made deliberately subsequent to the service of process and the complaint in

this dissolution action.’’3

On October 8, 2013, the court rendered judgment

dissolving the marriage. The court issued its memorandum of decision on December 20, 2013, and ordered

the defendant to pay alimony of 30 percent of his net

annual income for sixteen years from the date of the

judgment. Net income was defined by the court as: ‘‘all

gross receipts from [the defendant’s] self-employment,

including but not limited to A-1 Janitorial, LLC, and A1 Properties, LLC, after deductions for reasonable and

actual business expenditures and state and federal

taxes.’’4 On the basis of the forensic accountant’s analysis, the court concluded that the defendant’s net income

for 2012 was $230,000. Income taxes were not deducted.

The defendant did not provide the court with evidence

of income tax liability, and he did not claim to owe

taxes on his income.5
The court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the cash equivalent of 60 percent of the value of

four Bridgeport properties. The court found that the

properties had been purchased by the defendant’s girlfriend and his father using marital assets provided to

them by the defendant while the divorce was pending.

The court identified the four properties and their

assigned values as: 25 Cartright Street, Unit 1K

($106,917); 2980 Madison Avenue, Unit G ($106,892);

2950 MadisonAvenue, UnitC ($72,444); and 3012-7 Madison Avenue6

($107,041). The defendant was also

ordered to pay to the plaintiff $191,641.95, representing

the amount of marital assets that was transferred to

the defendant’s father while the dissolution of marriage

was pending.7 This appeal followed.

‘‘The standard of review in family matters is well

settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s

orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has

abused its discretion or it is found that it could not

reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has

abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor

of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review

of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the

clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s

findings are binding upon this court unless they are

clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed. . . . Therefore, to

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we

must find that the court either incorrectly applied the

law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mensah v. Mensah, 145 Conn. App. 644, 651–52, 75 A.3d

92 (2013).

I

The defendant claims on appeal that the court erred

in calculating his net income for purposes of alimony.

The defendant argues that the court’s finding was

clearly erroneous because the court relied on evidence

of his gross income and did not consider his tax liability.

We disagree.

‘‘It is well settled that a court must base its child

support and alimony orders on the available net income

of the parties, not gross income. . . . Whether or not

an order falls within this prescription must be analyzed

on a case-by-case basis. Thus, while our decisional law

in this regard consistently affirms the basic tenet that

support and alimony orders must be based on net
income, the proper application of this principle is context specific.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Cleary v. Cleary, 103 Conn. App. 798, 801, 930 A.2d

811 (2007).

This court cannot pass on issues of credibility and

must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment thereof.

Mensah v. Mensah, supra, 145 Conn. App. 651–52. The

court, as trier of fact in this case, imputed a net income

of $230,000 to the defendant.8 A review of the record

supports the court’s finding that $230,000 was the defendant’s income net of taxes.

The court was not provided with the defendant’s

income tax filing for the previous year (2012), and the

defendant testified that he had represented to the Internal Revenue Service that he had no tax liability for

2012. The testimony of the forensic accountant only

covered the valuation of A-1 Janitorial, LLC, and the

veracity of the company’s records. The accountant did

not testify as to the defendant’s personal tax liability.

On the basis of the evidence, the court could reasonably

conclude that the defendant’s gross income was equivalent to his net income because he testified that he had

no tax liability. The defendant has complained about a

lack of evidence presented to the court to establish

his income after taxes, but if evidence of tax liability

existed, the defendant was in the best position to disclose that information, and he failed to do so. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the

court’s finding that the defendant’s income after taxes

was $230,000.

II

The defendant also claims that the court’s findings

as to the values of the four Bridgeport properties that

were acquired for the defendant by his girlfriend and

his father were clearly erroneous. The court ordered

the defendant to pay the plaintiff 60 percent of the value

of the four properties acquired in this manner. Before

the court entered its order, the parties stipulated as to

the values of each of the four properties. However, the

court’s judgment relied upon values that were greater

than the parties’ stipulation. We conclude that the court

exceeded its authority by disregarding the stipulation.

The court’s findings as to valuation are severable from

its financial orders. Remanding this issue to the court

does not implicate the correctness of the court’s other

financial orders.

The following additional facts are relevant to the

defendant’s claim. The parties stipulated as to the value

of thirteen properties that were potentially marital

assets.9 This stipulation contradicted an earlier submission by the plaintiff as to the values of some of the

properties. In fact, several of the properties were

assigned an agreed upon lower value than the plaintiff

had previously proposed.10 The stipulation was entered
as an exhibit with the court.

In its financial orders, the court awarded the plaintiff

title to the marital home, a time-share, and four residential rental properties. The defendant retained title to all

other properties that were listed in his name. As for

the properties in dispute, the court elected to award

the plaintiff 60 percent of the value of four of the properties. The court disregarded the stipulation agreed to by

the parties regarding valuation of the four properties.

Instead, the court used the higher valuations that the

plaintiff had originally proposed. In its memorandum

of decision, the court made no finding as to its basis for

adopting the higher valuations. A review of the record

reveals that the court did not notify the parties that it

was disregarding the stipulated values.

A

We begin with our standard regarding a stipulation.

‘‘In general, the effect of a trial stipulation by the parties

is well established. While stipulations are not necessarily binding on the court and may justifiably be disregarded in certain circumstances, they ordinarily are

adopted by the court. . . . If the court decides that it

cannot adopt the parties’ stipulation, the court should

state on the record its disapproval of the agreement,

as well as the reasons for its disapproval. . . . The

court also should offer the parties an opportunity to

present evidence prior to proceeding to judgment. . . .

A trial court exceeds its authority if it disregards the

terms of the parties’ stipulation without notifying the

parties and providing them an opportunity fully to litigate the controversy.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cupe v. Commissioner of

Correction, 68 Conn. App. 262, 268–69, 791 A.2d 614,

cert. denied, 260 Conn. 908, 795 A.2d 544 (2002).

At no point did the court state on the record its

disapproval of the stipulation or provide its reasons for

disregarding it. The record does not indicate that the

court notified the parties that it was disregarding their

stipulation or that the court provided the parties an

opportunity to fully litigate the valuation issues.

Although the court may have had a sound basis to

disregard the stipulation, the court abused its discretion

by not complying with our well settled procedural

standards.

B

Having concluded that the court abused its discretion, we must consider whether reversing the court’s

judgmentregarding the valuations willrequire reconsideration of the entirety of the court’s financial orders.

‘‘We previously have characterized the financial orders

in dissolution proceedings as resembling a mosaic, in

which all the various financial components are carefully

interwoven with one another. . . . Accordingly, when

an appellate court reverses a trial court judgment based
on an improper alimony, property distribution, or child

support award, the appellate court’s remand typically

authorizes the trial court to reconsider all of the financial orders. . . . We also have stated, however, that

[e]very improper order . . . does not necessarily merit

a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s financial

orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in

any way interdependent with other orders and is not

improperly based on a factor that is linked to other

factors. . . . In other words, an order is severable if

its impropriety does not place the correctness of the

other orders in question.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn.

80, 124–25, 995 A.2d 1 (2010).

Only the plaintiff’s portion of the real property in the

marital estate will be diminished by adopting the values

stipulated to by the parties.11 The plaintiff has informed

this court that upon a finding of error by the trial court,

she has no interest in opening the remaining orders of

the judgment. There is no evidence in the record that

the court’s valuation findings were interdependent with

other orders and are based on a factor that is linked

to other factors. Accordingly, the valuation findings are

severable from the court’s financial orders.

III

We now address the defendant’s claim that the court

erred by distributing the same marital asset twice. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erred by

awarding the plaintiff $99,505.77 that he had transferred

from the marital estate, in violation of the court’s automatic stay on transfers, as well as 60 percent of the

value of the real estate that these transferred funds

were directly used to purchase.12 We disagree. The

defendant has failed to show that the court’s financial

orders were clearly erroneous.

The court found that the defendant transferred

$191,641.95 out of the marital estate in violation of the

court’s automatic orders prohibiting dissipation of marital assets.13 As part of its financial orders, the court

ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff 100 percent

of these funds. The defendant presented evidence that

some of these funds were directly used to finance the

purchase ofresidentialrental properties where title was

acquired in the name of the defendant’s girlfriend and

his father. The plaintiff was awarded 60 percent of the

value of four properties that were purchased by the

defendant’s girlfriend or his father using marital assets

provided to them by the defendant.14

An appellant bears a heavy burden to show that the

court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. In re

Halle T., 96 Conn. App. 815, 825, 902 A.2d 670, cert.

denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006). ‘‘With

respect to the financial awards in a dissolution action,

great weight is given to the judgment of the trial court
because of its opportunity to observe the parties and

the evidence. . . . Our function in reviewing such discretionary decisions is to determine whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous in view of

the evidence and pleadings in the whole record. . . .

In other words, judicial review of a trial court’s exercise

of its broad discretion in domestic relations cases is

limited to the questions of whether the [trial] court

correctly applied the law and could reasonably have

concluded as it did. . . . In making those determinations, we allow every reasonable presumption . . . in

favor of the correctness of [the trial court’s] action.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Wood, 160

Conn. App. 708, 723, 125 A.3d 1040 (2015).

Throughout the trial and even now on appeal, quantifying the full extent of the assets available to the defendant and tracing the prohibited transfers of marital

assets is akin to the challenge of hitting a moving target.

During the trial, the defendant admitted that while being

deposed he lied about assisting in the purchase of a

condominium for his girlfriend.15 The court found that

the defendant made ‘‘flagrant violations of the court

orders relating to the transfer of assets’’ and attempted

to hide assets. Now on appeal, the defendant represents

to this court that in his initial brief he confused which

properties were purchased with the marital assets transferred in violation of Practice Book § 25-5.

The defendant clearly sought to deceive the trial

court, yet now complains that the court in fact misapprehended the conversion of marital assets into real

estate and the total value of the marital estate. It is the

defendant’s burden to show how the court’s financial

orders were clearly erroneous. Instead, the defendant

has adopted a narrow view of the court’s financial

orders and has not presented a clear and concise

accounting of all ofthe marital assets that he transferred

from the marital estate. As the trial court noted in its

memorandum of decision, ‘‘[t]he [defendant] has in fact

turned a relatively uncomplicated dissolution action

into a knotty and labyrinthian exercise . . . .’’ In view

of the entire record in this case, we conclude that the

trial court’s division of assets was not clearly erroneous.

IV

In his final claim, the defendant argues that the court

abused its discretion in entering financial orders that

the defendant cannot satisfy. The defendant complains

that he has been ordered to make monthly payments

of child support, alimony, restitution for money transferred out of the marital estate, and the plaintiff’s interest in the defendant’s real estate holdings. We conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

‘‘Our review is guided by the well established principle that [t]he resolution of conflicting factual claims

falls within the province of the trial court . . . [and]
[t]he trial court’s findings are binding upon this court

unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence

and the pleadings in the record as a whole.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Hopfer v. Hopfer, 59 Conn.

App. 452, 457, 757 A.2d 673 (2000).

Apart from the argument advanced in part II of this

opinion, the defendant does little more than express

general dissatisfaction with the court’s financial orders.

The court made detailed findings concerning the parties, including but not limited to those related to the

amount and sources of their incomes, their financial

assets, and their liabilities. The defendant has not provided any detailed facts to refute these findings or to

demonstrate his inability to meet the court’s financial

orders. The court did not abuse its discretion.

The judgment is reversed only as to the trial court’s

decision to disregard the parties’ stipulation as to the

values assigned to certain real estate holdings and the

case is remanded with direction to incorporate the stipulated values in the financial orders in accordance with

this opinion. The judgment is affirmed in all other

respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 On June 27, 2014, the defendant appealed (AC 36973)from the dissolution

judgment as amended and clarified. On August 19, 2014, after the trial court

issued a second clarification and a postjudgment order that the defendant

pay the fees of a forensic accountant, the defendant filed a second appeal

(AC 37117) claiming error in regard to the ordered fees. In December, 2014,

the defendant amended his appeal in AC 36973 to challenge additional trial

court rulings on numerous postjudgment motions, including motions for

contempt and motions for counsel fees. On January 6, 2016, this court

ordered that the appeals be consolidated.

The defendant has not briefed the claims of error identified on his appeal

form in AC 37117 or on his amended appeal form in AC 36973. The defendant

has therefore abandoned these claims. See Deutsche Bank National Trust

Co. v. Bertrand, 140 Conn. App. 646, 648 n.2, 59 A.3d 864, cert. dismissed,

309 Conn. 905, 68 A.3d 661 (2013).

2 Both children were minors at the time of the dissolution judgment.

3

In an articulation issued by the court on June 12, 2015, the court further

stated: ‘‘[A]s set forth in the original order, the court found that the defendant

wilfully and intentionally failed to disclose his true income on his financial

affidavit which was relied upon by the court in the Stipulation and Order

Regarding Support dated June 21, 2012.’’

4 The court provided its definition of ‘‘net income’’ in an amendment to

and clarification of its order.

5 During his testimony, the defendant was shown a federal income tax

extension form for tax year 2012 that was sent to the Internal Revenue

Service and prepared by the defendant’s accountant. The defendant testified

that the form stated that he would have zero tax liability for 2012.

6

In their briefs, the parties refer to this property as 3012 Madison Avenue,

Unit F.

7 The court also issued orders dividing other assets of the marital estate

and awarding child support. These orders have not been appealed.

8

In the text of his brief, the defendant implies that the court’s finding of

$230,000 of gross income was not supported by evidence. After reviewing

the record we disagree. On the basis of those partial business financial

records that were obtained despite the defendant’s recalcitrance, the forensic accountant testified at trial that A-1 Janitorial, LLC, generated $221,869

in earnings for the defendant in 2012. The accountant testified that he tested

his assumptions about the business by also looking at the defendant’s annual

cash flows and personal expenses over a three year period. Using this

approach, the accountant concluded that on average the defendant received

$180,000 in earnings from A-1 Janitorial, LLC, per year and an additional
$52,000 per year in salary from A-1 Janitorial, LLC.

In estimating the defendant’s 2012 earnings as $221,869, the accountant

testified that the figure did not include any income that the defendant may

have received from anotherjob he worked orrental properties that he owned.

In addition, the accountant testified that he believed that A-1 Janitorial, LLC,

had unreported sales in 2012 based on tax documents and the defendant’s

own representations.In his calculations,the accountantincluded an estimate

for the unreported sales, but he also testified that if actual sales were higher,

then his estimate of the defendant’s earnings from the business would be

higher. Finally, he testified that the defendant did not draw a salary from

A-1 Janitorial, LLC, in 2012.

On the basis of the record, there was evidence to support the court’s

conclusion that the defendant’s income was $230,000.

9 When the stipulation was submitted to the court, the defendant’s counsel

informed the court that, although he agreed with the property values, he

did not agree that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over all of the

properties listed. The defendant’s girlfriend and his father held title to six

of the properties listed as part of the stipulation.

10 The valuations of the following properties decreased in the stipulation:

25 Cartright Street, Unit 1K, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $70,400); 2980

Madison Avenue, Unit G, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $49,500); 2950 Madison Avenue, Unit C, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $60,500); 3012 Madison

Avenue, Unit F, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $60,500); 50 Greenhouse Road,

Unit 41D, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $63,800); and 65 Hedgehog Road,

Trumbull (stipulated value: $291,500) The plaintiff was not awarded any

portion of the value of the real estate located on Greenhouse Road and

Hedgehog Road.

11 The sum of $152,394 is the difference between the values that the court

adopted from the plaintiff’s proposed amended orders that were submitted

on September 19, 2013, and the values that the parties stipulated to in court

on October 8, 2013. Applying the trial court’s 60 percent allocation in favor

of the plaintiff to the lower values from the stipulation will reduce the

plaintiff’s financial award by $91,436.40. The plaintiff’s counsel stated during

oral argument before this court: ‘‘The court can easily just order the valuations changed, it doesn’t impact the rest of [the financial orders]. That is a

detriment to my client, she’s going to get less money as a result of that, she

understands that. . . . The mosaic that would be upset if it’s upset in any

fashion, it’s only to the detriment of my client, and she’s aware of this and

so advised me to relay to the court.’’

12 In his brief, the defendant argued that the court had erred as to its

financial orders regarding three Bridgeport properties: 3012 Madison Avenue, Unit F; 2890 Madison Avenue, Unit G; and 25 Cartright Avenue, Unit

1-K. In his reply brief, he has dropped this claim as it pertains to 2890

Madison Avenue, Unit G and 25 Cartright Avenue, Unit 1-K. However, he

now argues that his claim also applies to the real estate located at 2950

Madison Avenue, Unit C, Bridgeport. The defendant’s only explanation for

the change is that he confused the properties.

13 The rules of practice address automatic orders in family matters. Practice Book § 25-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The automatic orders shall be

effective with regard to the plaintiff or the applicant upon the signing of

the complaint or the application and with regard to the defendant or the

respondent upon service and shall remain in place during the pendency of

the action, unless terminated, modified, or amended by further order of a

judicial authority upon motion of either of the parties . . . [i]n all cases

involving a marriage or civil union, whether or not there are children . . .

[n]either party shall sell, transfer, exchange, assign, remove, or in any way

dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or an order

of a judicial authority, any property, except in the usual course of business

or for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable attorney’s

fees in connection with this action . . . [and] [n]either party shall conceal

any property. . . .’’

14 The plaintiff contends that additional cash was withdrawn from the

business during the pendency of the divorce and that there was no accounting for the size of these withdrawals or how this money was used by

the defendant.

15 ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Do you recall being asked these questions

about 2950-C Madison Avenue condominium at your deposition?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I believe so.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And do you recall me specifically asking you

whether you made any contributions to that property?
‘‘[The Defendant]: I think so, yes.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And do you recall hearing this question: And

is—question, and it’s your testimony that none of the income that you have

earned has gone towards or been contributed towards the purchase of the

condominium as far as you know that was done by Elizabeth Pereira. And

your answer was, excuse me, yes, that’s correct. Do you recall that testimony?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah, I believe I do.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Pardon?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I believe I do.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: So that testimony that you gave was false, is

it not?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m sorry, is it false?

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Is it false?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I have interest into it, yes.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: So at the time when I asked you on June 19,

2013, under oath whether you had an interest in it, you denied it. Now today,

you acknowledge it.

‘‘[The Defendant]: After speaking to my attorney, correct.’’