alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 11 - STATEMENTS RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


                          Appalachian Bancshares, Inc.
                   Computation of Net Income Per Common Share

The following tabulation presents the calculation of basic and diluted earnings
per common share for the years ended December 31, 1999, 1998, and 1997.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                        1999               1998              1997
                                                                 ----------------   ---------------    ---------------
<S>                                                              <C>                <C>                <C>
BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE:
   Net income................................................    $      1,265,774   $     1,208,231    $     1,017,766
                                                                 ================   ===============    ===============

   Earnings on common shares.................................    $      1,265,774   $     1,208,231    $     1,017,766
                                                                 ================   ===============    ===============

   Weighted average common shares outstanding - basic........           1,326,196         1,166,425          1,154,990
                                                                 ================   ===============    ===============

   Basic earnings per common share...........................    $            .95   $          1.04    $          0.88
                                                                 ================   ===============    ===============

DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE:
   Net income................................................    $      1,265,774   $     1,208,231    $     1,017,766
                                                                 ================   ===============    ===============

   Weighted average common shares
     outstanding.............................................           1,326,196         1,166,425          1,154,990

   Net effect of the assumed exercise of stock
     options - based on the treasury stock method
     using average market price for the year.................              97,329            54,551              7,216
                                                                 ----------------   ---------------    ---------------

   Weighted average common shares outstanding -
     diluted.................................................           1,423,525         1,220,976          1,162,206
                                                                 ================   ===============    ===============

   Diluted earnings per common share.........................    $           0.89   $          0.99    $          0.88
                                                                 ================   ===============    ===============
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF IXL ENTERPRISES, INC. FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         120,812
<SECURITIES>                                    34,895
<RECEIVABLES>                                   66,857
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,021
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               246,947
<PP&E>                                          73,398
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (21,125)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 357,855
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           47,497
<BONDS>                                         48,955
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           676
<OTHER-SE>                                     259,419
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   357,855
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               218,343
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  125,725
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   161
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               165,195
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 987
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (70,213)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (70,213)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (70,213)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (2.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (2.08)


</TABLE>
STATE of North Carolina v. James Antonio MURCHISON.

No. 107P05.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 18, 2005.

Russell J. Hollers, III, Durham, for James A. Murchison.

Richard E. Slipsky, Special Deputy Attorney General, Thomas H. Lock, District Attorney, for State of NC.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 22nd day of February 2005 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 18th day of August 2005."
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 10.7


                                AMENDMENT TO THE

                           METROPOLITAN LIFE AUXILIARY

                           SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN

1.    Section 2.2 of the Plan is hereby amended as follows, effective July 1,
      2005:

      "'Company' means a Participating Company as defined under the Savings and
      Investment Plan."

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this amendment to be executed
in its name and behalf this first day of August, 2005, by its officer thereunto
duly authorized.

                                             METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY



                                        By:         /s/    Graham S. Cox
                                             -----------------------------------
                                                       Vice President
**Exhibit 99.1****REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM ON SCHEDULE**To the Stockholders of INX Inc.We have audited in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board(United States) the consolidated financial statements of INX Inc. (formerly I-Sector Corporation)and subsidiaries referred to in our report dated March 5, 2008, which is included in the Company’s2007 Form 10-K. Our report on the consolidated financial statements includes an explanatoryparagraph, which discusses the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(revised 2004), *Share-Based Payment,*and discusses thecumulative effect adjustment recorded as of January 1, 2006 inconnection with the adoption of SEC Staff Accounting BulletinNo. 108, as discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financialstatements. Our audit was conducted for the purpose of forming an opinion on the basic financialstatements taken as a whole. Schedule II for the years ended December 31, 2005, 2006 and 2007 ispresented for purposes of additional analysis and is not a required part of the basic financialstatements. This schedule has been subjected to the auditing procedures applied in the audit ofthe basic financial statements, and in our opinion, is fairly stated in all material respects inrelation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole./s/ GRANT THORNTON LLPHouston, Texas
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Marketing WorldWide, Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
James Marvin, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my
knowledge that:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
        Company.

/S/ JAMES MARVIN
-----------------------
James Marvin
Chief Financial Officer
Date: February 15, 2006



                                       26
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 2373** 

ESPERANZA GUERRERO , Plaintiff

– Appellant , and JUAN GUERRERO; JJG, Minor; MG, Minor; JG, Minor; MARIA MUNGUIA; KG, Minor , Plaintiffs ,
v. DAVID L. MOORE, in his official and individual capacity , Defendant

– Appellee , and CHARLIE T. DEANE, in his official capacity; LUIS POTES, in his official and individual capacity; ADAM HURLEY, in his official and individual capacity; DOES 1

- 6, in their official and individual capacities; ROES 1

- 5, in their official and individual capacities; PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY; MATTHEW CAPLAN, in his official and individual capacity; KAREN MUELHAUSER, in her official and individual capacity; DOES 1

- 5 , in their official and individual capacities , Defendants
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria
. James C. Cacheris , Senior District Judge. ( 1:09

- cv - 01313

- JCC

- TRJ )2 Submitted : March 21, 2013 Decided: April 2, 2013

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Esperanza Guerrero, Appellant Pro Se. Jeffrey Notz, Mary Alice Rowan, COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Prince William, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: Esperanza Guerrero appeals the district court’s summary judgment order disposing of all but one of her various claims , and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict for D efendant Moore on th at remaining claim. As for the claims disposed of on summary judgment, t his c ourt reviews the district court’s summary judgment order de novo, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt , 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We have reviewed the record and find no error on the part of the district court. As for the claim decided by the jury, this

c ourt is without authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, in light of Guerrero’s failure to raise an appropriate post

- verdi ct motion in the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 59
. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift

- Eckrich, Inc. , 546 U.S. 394, 404 (2006); A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cnty. , 515 F.3d 356, 369

- 70 (4th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and affirm both the district court’s order and the4 jury’s verdict . We dispense with oral argumen t because the facts and legal c ontentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
#### Tara A. Nelson, Respondent, v Salvatore C. Amicizia, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 87]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Molia, J.), dated May 27, 2004, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent*A *Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955 [1992]). The defendant submitted the affirmed medical reports of an orthopedist and a neurologist, who both examined the plaintiff about three years after the accident, and determined that she had completely recovered from her injuries and suffered from no disabilities or impairments, and that she was able to perform all of her normal work and daily living activities without restrictions.

The affirmations of the plaintiffs physicians and affidavit of the plaintiffs chiropractor were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. One physician’s affirmation and the chiropractor’s *1016affidavit were based upon examinations of the plaintiff conducted within about one month of the accident and more than three years prior to the motion for summary judgment *(see e.g. McKinney v Lane,*288 AD2d 274 [2001]; *Bucci v Kempinski,*273 AD2d 333 [2000]). Another physician’s affirmation failed to set forth the objective tests used to arrive at his opinion of a loss in range of motion *(see Kauderer v Penta,*261 AD2d 365 [1999] ), and appears to have been mainly based upon the plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain *(see Barrett v Howland,*202 AD2d 383 [1994]; *LeBrun v Joyner,*195 AD2d 502 [1993]; *Coughlan v Donnelly,*172 AD2d 480 [1991]). The mere existence of a bulging herniated disc in the plaintiffs thoracic spine is not conclusive evidence of a serious injury in the absence of objective evidence of a related disability or restriction *(see Kearse v New York City Tr. Auth.,*16 AD3d 45 [2005]; *Guzman v Michael Mgt.,*266 AD2d 508 [1999]).

Finally, the plaintiff failed to submit any competent medical evidence to corroborate her claim that she was unable to perform substantially all of her daily activities for not less than 90 of the 180 days immediately following the subject accident as a result of the accident *(see Sainte-Aime v Ho,*274 AD2d 569 [2000] ; *Jackson v New York City Tr. Auth.,*273 AD2d 200 [2000]; *Greene v Miranda,*272 AD2d 441 [2000]).

Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Adams, J.P., Cozier, Ritter and Skelos, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference inRegistration Statement No. 333-20829, No. 333-20833, and No. 333-3764 on Form S-8 of our report dated March 7, 2007, relatingto the financial statements of MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. and subsidiaries(which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatoryparagraph for the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.123R “Share-Based Payment”), and of our report on internal control overfinancial reporting dated March 7, 2007 (which report expresses an adverseopinion on the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financialreporting because of a material weakness) appearing in this Annual Report onForm 10-K of MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006.

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHELLP

Denver, ColoradoMarch 7, 2007

 

----
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5302 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on D-Mannose. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 7, 2008 

Mr. PASCRELL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on D-Mannose. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. D-MANNOSE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.01.94 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 D-Mannose) is amended by striking ‘‘12/31/2009’’ and in7 serting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

10 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

11 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL GONZALO RIANO,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-72360

Agency No. A072-534-072

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 13, 2012** 

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. 

Manuel Gonzalo Riano, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to remand

and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying cancellation

of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse

FILED

NOV 19 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-72360

of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand, Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey,

538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008), and review de novo due process claims,

Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny in part and

dismiss in part the petition for review. 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Riano’s motion to remand

to pursue adjustment of status where the BIA considered the evidence submitted

and acted within its broad discretion in determining that the evidence was

insufficient to warrant a remand. See Romero-Ruiz, 538 F.3d at 1062 (“The BIA

abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”)

(internal quotations omitted). 

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Riano’s motion to

remand so that he could apply for voluntary departure where Riano declined

voluntary departure before the immigration judge, and he did not raise a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931,

934 (9th Cir. 1986) (aliens are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys,

absent egregious circumstances). 

Riano has not established a violation of due process or equal protection. See

Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (an alien must show error and

substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim). 
3 09-72360

We lack jurisdiction to review Riano’s contention that his case should have

been remanded to consider new evidence of hardship related to his children

because he failed to raise that issue before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358

F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (this court lacks jurisdiction to review contentions

not raised before the agency). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and

Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors

so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 15-BG-457

IN RE: ROBERT SEGUIN,

Respondent.

Bar Registration No. 938449 BDN: 23-15

BEFORE: Thompson, Associate Judge, and Nebeker and Farrell, Senior Judges. 

ORDER

(FILED – July 23, 2015)

On consideration of the certified order disbarring respondent from the practice

of law in the state of New Jersey by consent, this court’s May 27, 2015, order

directing respondent to show cause he should not be disbarred as reciprocal

discipline, and the statement of Bar Counsel, and it appearing that respondent has

failed to file either a response to this court’s order to show cause or the affidavit

required by D.C. Bar R. XI, §14 (g), it is

ORDERED that Robert Seguin is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in

the District of Columbia. See In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483 (D.C. 2010); In re Fuller,

930 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 2007) (rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal

discipline applies to all cases in which the respondent does not participate). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that for purposes of reinstatement the period of

respondent’s disbarment will not begin to run until such time as he files a D.C. Bar.

R. XI, § 14 (g) affidavit. 

PER CURIAM
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4929 

To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that the antidumping and 

countervailing duty laws apply to the production of low-enriched uranium, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 19, 2007 

Mr. WHITFIELD of Kentucky introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that the antidumping and countervailing duty laws apply to the production of low-enriched uranium, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PRODUCTION OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM. 

4 (a) ANTIDUMPING DUTY.—Section 731 of the Tariff 

5 Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1673) is amended in the last sen6 tence— 

7 (1) by inserting ‘‘(a)’’ after ‘‘includes’’; and 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•HR 4929 IH

1 (2) by inserting before the period at the end the 

2 following: ‘‘, and (b) any contract or transaction for 

3 the production of low-enriched uranium’’. 

4 (b) COUNTERVAILING DUTY.—Section 771 of that 

5 Act (19 U.S.C. 1677) is amended in paragraph (5) by 

6 adding at the end the following: 

7 ‘‘(G) PURCHASE OF GOODS.—For purposes 

8 of subparagraphs (D)(iv) and (E)(iv) of this 

9 paragraph (5), the phrases ‘purchasing goods’ 

10 and ‘goods are purchased’ include a contract or 

11 transaction involving payment for the produc12 tion of low-enriched uranium.’’. 

13 (c) APPLICATION TO PENDING PROCEEDINGS.—The 

14 amendments made by this section apply in all pending or 

15 resumed antidumping and countervailing duty pro16 ceedings, including investigations, and in all appeals that 

17 have not become final and conclusive as of the date of en18 actment of this Act. 

19 (d) APPLICATION TO NAFTA COUNTRIES.—Pursu20 ant to Article 1902 of the North American Free Trade 

21 Agreement and section 408 of the North American Free 

22 Trade Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 3438), 

23 the amendments made by this section shall apply with re24 spect to goods from NAFTA countries. 

Æ 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS