SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4776-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHERRY A. LOALBO,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Argued March 12, 2019 – Decided April 22, 2019

Before Judges Yannotti and Gilson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 17-

038.

John M. Loalbo argued the cause for appellant.

Paula Cristina Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Paula Cristina Jordao, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant appeals from a judgment entered by the Law Division finding 

defendant guilty of failing to yield to a pedestrian, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-

36(a), and sentencing her to pay a fine of $200 and $33 in court costs. We 

affirm.

This matter arises from an incident which occurred on May 15, 2017, in 

Mendham. On that date, Officer Christopher Irons of the Mendham Police 

Department (MPD) was on duty in a marked police vehicle, and assigned to 

crosswalk enforcement. Irons was parked on the westbound side of the road, in 

a driveway on East Main Street, which is also referred to as Route 24. 

Irons was facing the crosswalk. He observed a pedestrian enter a marked 

crosswalk. Three vehicles passed through the crosswalk before the pedestrian 

could cross. Defendant was the operator of the third vehicle. Irons stopped the 

vehicle and issued a summons to defendant, charging her with failing to yield to 

a pedestrian, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a). 

The matter was tried in the Washington Township Municipal Court. At 

the trial, Irons testified that he has been employed by the MPD for eight years 

and, at the time of the trial, he was a detective. Irons stated that he has had 

training in New Jersey's motor vehicle laws, including violations of Title 39. As 

part of his training, he has been involved in the enforcement of the laws 
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governing pedestrians crossing within crosswalks. He stated that when a 

pedestrian reaches the double yellow line in the roadway, the driver must stop 

and yield to the pedestrian. 

Irons testified that at around 7:40 a.m. on May 15, 2017, he was on duty 

and assigned to crosswalk enforcement. He noted that the speed limit on the 

road in that location is thirty-five miles per hour. He also noted that there were 

vertical signs in the roadway. There also were pedestrian crossing signs on both 

sides of the crosswalk, about 100 to 150 feet from the crosswalk. 

The State played a video recording of the incident, and Irons provided a 

narration while it was being played. The parties stipulated that defendant was

driving a 2014 black sedan. The officer stated that based on his training and 

experience, it was possible for defendant to stop her vehicle, in the exercise of 

due care, and allow the pedestrian to cross safely. 

Irons noted that after the pedestrian entered the crosswalk, two vehicles 

preceded defendant's vehicle through the crosswalk. He stated, however, that 

the first vehicle did not have a reasonable amount of time to stop for the 

pedestrian, and the second vehicle would be "questionable." He testified that 

defendant "had [a] reasonable [amount of] time to react and stop." He did not 

observe defendant attempt to slow or stop her car. He also stated that while he 
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did not know how fast defendant was driving at the time, or how many feet it 

would take for her to stop her vehicle, he believed she had a reasonable amount 

of time to stop.

On cross-examination, Irons was asked how many feet it would take for a 

vehicle traveling thirty-five miles per hour to stop. He stated that he did not 

know how fast defendant was traveling. Defendant's attorney showed Irons the 

Driver's Manual (the Manual) issued by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle 

Commission (MVC), which includes estimated stopping distances for passenger 

vehicles. 

Irons agreed that according to the Manual, it would take about 135 feet 

for a passenger vehicle to stop under certain conditions. Defendant's attorney

asked the officer to estimate the distance between defendant's car and the 

crosswalk, when he first observed defendant's car. He estimated that the 

distance was about 100 to 125 feet. 

The municipal court judge denied defendant's motion for a judgment of 

acquittal. The judge then placed his decision on the record, finding defendant 

guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a). The judge noted that Irons had based 

his opinion on his experience as a police officer, his observations of the traffic, 
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and opined that defendant's vehicle could have stopped before approaching the 

crosswalk. 

The judge stated that the videotape was compelling and it showed that 

defendant "made absolutely no attempt to slow or stop" which indicated that "it 

mattered not" how far the vehicle was from the crosswalk. The judge concluded

that the State had presented sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a).

Defendant filed an appeal, seeking de novo review by the Law Division. 

Judge Catherine I. Enright heard oral argument and on May 9, 2018, filed a 

written opinion in which she thoroughly reviewed the evidence. Judge Enright 

noted that the municipal court judge had not questioned Irons's credibility. She 

also found Irons's testimony to be credible. She stated that she had reviewed the 

video recording several times, and it showed that the sequence of events 

"unfolded rather quickly." 

The judge pointed out that "the crosswalk was clearly marked[,] and there 

were vertical signs alerting drivers that they had to stop for pedestrians[.]" The 

judge observed that "[t]here [was] nothing in the record confirming how fast 

defendant was driving [when] she entered the crosswalk." Nevertheless, the 
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video recording showed that two cars passed after the pedestrian stepped fully 

into the crosswalk. 

The judge stated that defendant's car followed and the recording showed

her car was not immediately behind the second car. The judge concluded that

based on this video and Of[ficer] Iron[s]'s testimony 

(which corroborated what is reflected in the video), . . . 

the State met its burden in establishing, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that defendant had ample opportunity 

to slow her vehicle and yield to the pedestrian who was 

already in the walkway and in defendant's lane of 

traffic. The court further finds the pedestrian who was 

crossing did not walk or run into the path of defendant's 

vehicle making it impossible for defendant to yield or 

stop. As defendant failed to yield to this pedestrian, 

even though she could have done so, she violated 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-36a.

The judge ordered defendant to pay a fine of $200 and $33 in court costs. 

The judge memorialized her decision in a judgment dated May 18, 2018. This 

appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues: 

I. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE EACH 

ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE BY SUFFICIENT, 

CREDIBLE EVIDENCE BEYOND A REASONABLE 

DOUBT AND, THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT.

II. OFFICER IRONS'[S] TESTIMONY WAS 

IMPROPERLY ACCEPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 

AND, IN ANY EVENT, FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
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DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE 

DOUBT.

A. Lay Opinion v. Expert Opinion.

B. Lay Opinion.

1. Standard.

2. Officer Irons'[s] Testimony Was 

Conclusory on Guilt, Not Rationally Based on 

Directly Observed Inferences and, Therefore, Is 

Inadmissible as Lay Opinion Testimony.

C. Expert Opinion.

1. Standard.

2. Officer Irons Lacks the Credentials to 

Qualify as an Expert In This Matter, and There Is 

Insufficient Evidence on the Record to 

Substantiate an Expert Opinion.

3. The Lower Courts Erred in Admitting 

Officer Irons'[s] Net Opinion as Conclusive of 

Defendant's Guilt. 

III. THE COURT IMPUTED LEGAL 

REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE 

STATUTE AND, THEREFORE, ERRED IN 

CONVICTING DEFENDANT FOR A VIOLATION 

UNDER [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-36.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record in light of these contentions, and 

conclude that defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extended 

discussion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm defendant's conviction substantially 
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for the reasons stated by Judge Enright in her thorough and well-reasoned 

opinion. We add the following comments. 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-36 provides that

a. The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to 

a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any unmarked 

crosswalk at an intersection, except at crosswalks when 

the movement of traffic is being regulated by police 

officers or traffic control signals, or where otherwise 

regulated by municipal, county, or State regulation, and 

except where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead 

pedestrian crossing has been provided:

(1) The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain 

stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway 

within a marked crosswalk, when the pedestrian is 

upon, or within one lane of, the half of the roadway, 

upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is 

turning. . . . 

(2) No pedestrian shall leave a curb or other place of 

safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which 

is so close that is impossible for the driver to yield or 

stop. 

Here, the State presented sufficient evidence for the Law Division judge 

to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a). 

As we have explained, that evidence consisted of Irons's testimony about the 

incident and the video recording he made. Irons testified that there were vertical 

signs in the roadway and pedestrian crossing signs, which warned drivers they 

were approaching a pedestrian crosswalk. The officer testified, based on his 
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training and experience, that defendant had a reasonable time in which to stop 

her car and let the pedestrian safely cross the roadway.

Defendant argues, however, that the State had to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that she had sufficient time to stop before she reached the 

crosswalk. She contends the State's evidence on this issue was deficient because 

the State did not present evidence establishing her distance from the crosswalk 

when the pedestrian entered the crosswalk. 

In support of her argument, defendant relies upon the MVC's Manual, 

which states that a passenger vehicle traveling thirty-five miles per hour would 

require about 135 feet to stop. However, as the State points out, the Manual 

merely approximates the stopping distance, which depends on a variety of 

factors including speed, motorist reaction time, weather conditions, visibility, 

vehicle weight, brake conditions, conditions of the tires and their type, and 

conditions of the roadway. 

Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by accepting Irons's

testimony, which defendant contends was improper lay opinion testimony. We 

disagree. Rule 701 permits a witness, who is not testifying as an expert, to 

provide "testimony in the form of opinions or inferences . . . if it (a) is rationally 

based on the perception of the witness, and (b) will assist in understanding the 
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witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue." N.J.R.E. 701. Lay opinion 

testimony is permitted to show "what was directly perceived by the witness."

State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 460 (2011). 

Irons's testimony that defendant had sufficient time in which to stop 

before the crosswalk was proper lay opinion testimony under Rule 701. The 

officer based his opinion on his personal observations and perceptions. He was 

present and observed the pedestrian enter the crosswalk. He also observed 

defendant's vehicle and the speed at which it was traveling. His observations 

and perceptions provided a sufficient basis for his opinion that it was possible 

for defendant to bring her vehicle to a stop so that the pedestrian could safely 

cross the roadway. 

Defendant also contends the trial court erred by imputing legal 

requirements that are not set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:4-36. Defendant asserts the 

municipal court judge stated that a driver must "attempt to slow or stop" at the 

crosswalk. She also notes that Irons had testified that he did not see defendant 

attempt "to slow or stop" her car. 

We find no merit in this argument. We review the judgment of the Law 

Division, not the municipal court. See State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 

175-76 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 
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(App. Div. 2001)). Here, Judge Enright commented "that defendant had ample 

opportunity to slow her vehicle and yield to the pedestrian who was already in 

the walkway and in defendant's lane of traffic." The judge's comment did not, 

however, impose requirements in addition to those in N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a). The 

judge merely referenced evidence, which supported the conclusion that 

defendant had sufficient time in which to stop her vehicle. 

Affirmed.