NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v. 

DUANE LEE THREADGILL, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0842 

FILED 10-6-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-002129-001

The Honorable Susan M. Brnovich, Judge Retired

The Honorable Sam J. Myers, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee

Branscomb Wilhite Law Firm, Laveen

By Monique Branscomb Wilhite

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. THREADGILL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Duane Lee Threadgill appeals his felony convictions and 

sentences for kidnapping, armed robbery, first-degree burglary and 

possession of a narcotic drug. Because he has shown no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 A masked man scaled the front fence of a Phoenix home, 

clutching what one victim described as an “Uzi,” before opening the fence 

door for two masked conspirators to join him. The masked trio entered the 

home and ordered two victims to the floor. One victim was struck “upside 

[the] head with a gun” before the intruders seized his cell phone and 

around $800. 

¶3 Police were alerted to the ongoing home invasion and 

dispatched a helicopter. The intruders heard the helicopter overhead and 

fled on foot to a parked get-away car. The helicopter unit directed patrol 

units to the parked car. A patrol officer arrived on scene and approached 

the car with her weapon drawn. The officer successfully ordered one of the 

intruders to the ground; the others “took off running.”

¶4 Police found a second intruder, Threadgill, hiding in a 

neighbor’s yard. He was arrested without incident. The third intruder, 

Darquine Wilson, was found and arrested in a nearby home (the 

“Monterosa Home”), where officers also found the victim’s cell phone and

keys. 

¶5 Officers recovered an AR-15 pistol on the ground outside the 

get-away car; and inside the car, officers discovered a Ruger P-95 handgun, 

two cell phones, and a small bag of cocaine and marijuana. Threadgill’s 

fingerprints were found on the bag. His DNA was also found on one of the 

cellphones; that cell phone contained images of Threadgill and the AR-15 

1 We recount the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

jury’s verdict. State v. Gunches, 225 Ariz. 22, 25, ¶ 14 (2010).
STATE v. THREADGILL

Decision of the Court

3

pistol, along with incriminating call logs and text messages between 

Threadgill and Wilson. 

¶6 Threadgill and Wilson were indicted on several class 2 

dangerous felonies, including two counts of kidnapping, two counts of 

armed robbery and one count of first-degree burglary. See A.R.S. §§ 13-

105(13), -1304(A)(4), -1507(A), -1508(A), -1902(A), -1904(A)(1). Threadgill 

was also charged with possession of a narcotic drug. A.R.S. § 13-3408(A). 

The State alleged aggravating circumstances against Threadgill under 

A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(1), (2), (4) and (6). 

¶7 Threadgill unsuccessfully moved to sever his trial from codefendant Wilson’s trial, but the court did sever the counts against Wilson 

involving the Monterosa Home. The jury found both defendants guilty as 

charged. The court sentenced Threadgill to a combination of concurrent 

and consecutive prison terms totaling 25 years, with appropriate 

presentence incarceration credit. Threadgill timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1) (2020).

DISCUSSION

A. Confrontation Clause

¶8 Threadgill first contends the superior court erroneously 

admitted testimony from the State’s forensic DNA analyst, Ms. Palmer,

because the analyst relied on a DNA profile performed by another 

technician at the same laboratory, Ms. Duckworth, who did not testify at 

trial. Threadgill argues that Palmer’s testimony about Duckworth’s 

involvement was inadmissible hearsay and violated his rights under the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Although the court’s 

admission of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, State 

v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 187, ¶ 18 (2010), rulings involving the 

Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo, State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 

129, ¶ 42 (2006).

¶9 We find no Confrontation Clause violation, having rejected 

similar arguments in similar cases. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 226 Ariz. 165 

(2010) (rejecting similar Confrontation Clause challenge where analyst 

“formed her own opinions, based on a type of data normally relied upon 

by experts in her field.”); State v. Ortiz, 238 Ariz. 329 (App. 2015). Although 

partially relying on Duckworth’s work, Palmer performed her own analysis 

and “reached her own conclusions and was subject to cross-examination as 

to those conclusions.” Gomez, 226 Ariz. at 170, ¶ 23. She detailed the five-
STATE v. THREADGILL

Decision of the Court

4

step procedure she used to match the DNA profiles from start to finish. See 

id. at 166, ¶ 4. Nor was her testimony a “mere conduit” to allow the 

admission of a non-testifying declarant. See State v. Joseph, 230 Ariz. 296, 

299, ¶ 11 (2012). Threadgill also had a full and fair chance to cross-examine 

the DNA analyst.2

B. Severance

¶10 Threadgill next argues the trial court should have granted his 

motion to sever. We review the denial of a severance motion for an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 25 (1995). To warrant reversal, 

Threadgill “must demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial 

court was unable to protect.” Id. (quotation omitted).

¶11 Defendants may be tried together “if each defendant is 

charged with each alleged offense, or if the alleged offenses are part of an 

alleged common conspiracy, scheme, or plan, or are otherwise so closely 

connected that it would be difficult to separate proof of one from proof of 

the others.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3(b). Still, the trial court must order a 

severance of defendants if necessary to promote a fair determination of any 

defendant’s guilt or innocence of any offense. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4(a).

¶12 Threadgill argues that evidence pertaining to Wilson 

improperly “rubbed-off” and created a negative impression of Threadgill 

for the jury. Specifically, Threadgill refers to testimony describing the 

Monterosa Home as a “crime scene,” and the homeowner’s statement to 

police that someone “broke in.”3 Based on this evidence, Threadgill claims 

his convictions were “most likely based on his association with [Wilson.]” 

2 Threadgill also suggests he was denied the right to confront one 

victim who never testified at trial, but does not articulate or develop the 

argument and cites no legal authority. It is therefore waived. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 31.10(a)(7)(A). Even so, Threadgill’s claim is meritless because the 

victim’s hearsay statements were not admitted at trial. See Joseph, 230 Ariz. 

at 299, ¶ 11 (“But here, no testimonial ‘statement’ by [the non-testifying 

witness] was admitted into evidence.”).

3 Despite Threadgill’s assertions to the contrary, the jury did not hear 

evidence that the homeowner told police officers he “escaped” after the 

intruder entered the home, nor was the jury otherwise “exposed to all the 

facts of the second home invasion.” 
STATE v. THREADGILL

Decision of the Court

5

¶13 Threadgill’s speculation aside, he shows no prejudice 

resulting from the joint trial. Although the jury heard references to a crime 

scene at the Monterosa Home, the testimony did not imply that Threadgill 

was involved. And on the “break[] in[]” at the Monterosa Home, the trial 

court ordered the evidence stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it.

Further, during closing instructions, the court generally admonished the

jury to “consider the charges against each Defendant separately [because] 

[e]ach Defendant is entitled to have a jury determine the verdict as to each 

of the crimes charged based on that Defendant’s own conduct and from the 

evidence that applies to that Defendant, as if the Defendant were being tried 

alone.” The jury is presumed to have followed the instructions and 

therefore convicted Threadgill based on the evidence relating to his own 

conduct. See Murray, 184 Ariz. at 25. The court’s denial of Threadgill’s 

severance motion was not an abuse of discretion.4

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶14 Threadgill next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug, which here 

required proof that he knowingly possessed cocaine. See A.R.S. §§ 13-

3401(5), (20)(bb), -3408(A)(1). He argues the court should have granted his 

Rule 20 motion for acquittal on this charge because the State presented no 

evidence of actual or constructive possession other than his fingerprint on 

the bag of cocaine. 

¶15 We review de novo the court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion, 

State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 461, ¶ 168 (2016), and affirm the conviction 

if substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 

60, 75, ¶ 50 (2012); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). “Substantial evidence is 

proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a 

conclusion of [the] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 

Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290 (1996).

¶16 Substantial evidence supports Threadgill’s conviction. 

Although there is “no way to determine if the cocaine was in the bag when 

[his] [finger]print was made,” possession may be proven by circumstantial 

evidence, State v. Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 10 (App. 2013), and we 

resolve all reasonable inferences against Threadgill, Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 

461, ¶ 169. The jury could also infer that Threadgill had cocaine based on

4 Threadgill also argues the superior court erred by denying his 

requests for a mistrial after the jury heard “prejudicial information” about 

the Monterosa Home. We find no error for these same reasons.
STATE v. THREADGILL

Decision of the Court

6

the bag’s proximity to other evidence connected to Threadgill. See State v. 

Gill, 248 Ariz. 274, ¶ 8 (App. 2020) (drugs and paraphernalia in vicinity of 

defendant’s belongings was substantial evidence from which a jury could 

find that he possessed the drugs).

D. Sentencing

¶17 Threadgill last asserts the court erred in running his sentences 

for kidnapping, armed robbery and first-degree burglary as to one victim

(Counts 2, 4 and 5) consecutive to his sentences for kidnapping and armed 

robbery as to another victim (Counts 1 and 3). He claims that A.R.S. § 13-

116 prohibits consecutive sentences here because the offenses “occurred 

simultaneously” and arose out of a single act. “We review de novo a trial

court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences in accordance with A.R.S. 

§ 13-116.” State v. Urquidez, 213 Ariz. 50, 52, ¶ 6 (App. 2006).

¶18 We reject the argument. Consecutive sentences are proper 

where multiple convictions arise from a single act that harms two or more 

victims. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 47, ¶ 21 (App. 1999). The trial evidence, 

as reflected in the verdicts, establishes that the homeowner and his guest 

were victims in the home invasion.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm Threadgill’s convictions and sentences.