IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Endre’ Glenn,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

Walter T. Keane, PC; and Walter T.

Keane,

Respondent and Appellee.

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PER CURIAM DECISION

Case No. 20120240‐CA

F I L E D

(June 28, 2012)

   2012 UT App 178

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Third District, Salt Lake Department, 090915207

The Honorable Kate A. Toomey

Attorneys: Endre’ Glenn, Redmond, Washington, Appellant Pro Se

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Before Judges Davis, Thorne, and Christiansen.

¶1 Endre’ Glenn appeals a judgment denying his motion to vacate an arbitration

award, confirming the Utah State Bar’s fee arbitration panel’s award of $1800 in

attorney fees to Walter T. Keane, and dismissing Glenn’s petition for a wrongful lien

injunction.  This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary

disposition.

¶2 Glenn argues that the district court erred by ordering the parties to participate in

fee arbitration, thereby denying him the statutory remedy of seeking to nullify an

allegedly wrongful lien.  See Utah Code Ann. § 38‐9‐7 (2010) (authorizing petition and

procedure for removal of a wrongful lien against real property).  The claim is without

merit. Keane filed the attorney’s lien to secure payment of his fees.  See id. § 38‐2‐7(2).

At a hearing on his petition seeking to remove the lien, Glenn disputed the claimed fee

and raised the retainer agreement’s requirement to arbitrate any fee dispute.  Glenn

cannot now argue that the court erred in requiring the parties to participate in fee

arbitration where the retainer agreement required it, Glenn invoked the provision, and
20120240‐CA 2

he agreed to arbitration.  Furthermore, the requirement to arbitrate fee disputes did not

prevent Glenn from pursuing the statutory remedy of petitioning for removal of an

allegedly wrongful lien.  His arguments fail to recognize that only a lien determined to

be wrongful is subject to removal.  See id. § 38‐9‐1(6) (defining a wrongful lien as one

that, when recorded, is not expressly authorized by statute, contained in a court order

or judgment, or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real

property).  The notice of lien in this case was expressly authorized by the attorney’s lien

statute.  See id. § 38‐2‐7.  The arbitration award supported Keane’s claim for attorney

fees in the amount of $1800.  Glenn was not prevented from pursuing an action to

remove the attorney’s lien, but he failed to prevail on the merits of that action.  Under

the circumstances, the attorney’s lien was not wrongful, and the district court did not

err in dismissing the petition seeking a wrongful lien injunction.

¶3 Glenn concedes that he argues for the first time before this court that the

arbitration award should be vacated under a judicially‐created public policy exception

and that he did not preserve the claim for appeal.  See Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers,

925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996) (allowing a court to vacate an arbitration award if it

violates a well‐defined and dominant public policy of the state).  “Under ordinary

circumstances, we will not consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal unless

the trial court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist.”  State v.

Nelson‐Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 16, 94 P.3d 186.  “[I]n order to preserve an issue for

appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court

has an opportunity to rule on that issue.”  438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶

51, 99 P.3d 801 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Even if we were to consider the

arguments under the public policy exception, Glenn demonstrates no basis for

determining that the fee arbitration panel’s award would violate a well‐defined and

dominant public policy of the State of Utah.

¶4 We affirm the judgment.

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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Michele M. Christiansen, Judge