In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-19-00009-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 235th District Court

Cooke County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV15-00769

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel

IN THE INTEREST OF B.W., A CHILD
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This is a private termination proceeding in which the parental rights of

Appellant C.W. (Father)1 to his son Blake2 were terminated on the petition of

Appellee D.S. (Mother) following a bench trial. In two issues, Father argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion by not appointing an ad litem to represent Blake and 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of his parental 

rights to Blake. Because the record does not demonstrate that the trial court abused 

its discretion by not appointing an ad litem for Blake and because sufficient evidence 

supports an unchallenged predicate ground of termination, we affirm.

II. Background

During the termination trial, the trial court heard testimony from Mother, 

Paternal Grandmother, Paternal Grandfather, Paternal Great Aunt, and Paternal 

Uncle.

A. Mother’s Testimony

Mother and Father never married. Mother testified that she and Father were 

together about two years and stayed together about six months after Blake was born

 1

See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d) (providing that on the court’s 

own motion, it may in its opinion identify the parties by fictitious names or by their 

initials only).

2

See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2) (requiring court to use aliases to refer to minors in 

an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights).
3

in 2013.

3 At the time of the termination trial, Mother testified that Blake was five 

years old and was in kindergarten.

Mother testified that when she and Father had dated, he had assaulted her, but 

she did not file charges. Mother testified that when she was pregnant with Blake, 

Father yelled at her, pushed her up against a wall, and then held her down in the front 

yard. Mother said that Father had been violent towards her while Blake was present 

by verbally abusing her when Blake was only a few months old to a year old.

The record demonstrates that in 2015, Father was charged with aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon and was placed on deferred-adjudication community 

supervision. Mother testified that Father’s criminal charge was a result of his 

assaulting his then-girlfriend.

Mother had concerns that Father was using drugs around the same time.

4

Mother testified that Father’s drug usage created a situation that had endangered 

Blake’s physical and emotional well-being. Mother explained that Father had anger 

issues and was very violent when he was on drugs. Mother said that Father had 

 3

The record demonstrates that Father was ordered to pay monthly child 

support of $256 beginning January 1, 2014, and to provide health insurance for Blake.

4

Mother was not sure how long Father had been on drugs and was not sure if 

he had used drugs during the time that they had lived together.
4

demonstrated violent tendencies toward his family,5 his ex-girlfriend, and Mother. 

Mother testified that, to her knowledge, Father had not been violent towards Blake.

Mother testified that her concerns about Father’s drug use were confirmed 

when his community supervision was revoked due to failed drug tests and he was

adjudicated guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A copy of the 

judgment adjudicating Father’s guilt was admitted into evidence. The judgment 

reflects that Father was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision in 

2015; that the State filed a motion to adjudicate, alleging that Father had violated 

multiple conditions of his community supervision;6 that he pleaded true to the alleged 

violations; and that the trial court found the allegations to be true, adjudicated Father

 5

Mother testified that she had seen Father hit Paternal Grandmother on the 

back with a broomstick and that he had been verbally abusive to Paternal 

Grandmother and Paternal Grandfather.

6

The State alleged that Father had failed to report to the Cooke County 

Community Supervision and Corrections Department for four months; had failed to 

work his community service hours for twenty-four months; had failed to pay the 

urinalysis testing fee; had failed to abstain from consuming any illegal substance 

during his community supervision; had failed to attend the “SOP program” as 

directed by his community supervision officer; had failed to pay the probation fee for 

eighteen months; had failed to pay court costs; had failed to pay the $2,500 fine; had 

failed to attend and complete a Life Skills Class and provide proof of completion to 

his community supervision officer; had failed to attend and successfully complete an 

intensive anger management class as directed; and had failed to attend and 

successfully complete Batterer’s Intervention programs approved by his community 

supervision officer.
5

guilty of aggravated assault, and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement. The record 

reflects that Father’s parole eligibility date is January 13, 2023.7

After Father tested positive for drugs, Mother filed her petition to terminate his 

parental rights in April 2018. In addition to Mother’s concern that Father’s drug 

usage might cause him to injure Blake, Mother testified that Father did not make any 

child support payments during 2017 and that he was not in prison and was able to 

make payments during that year.

Mother testified that before Father went to prison, his involvement with Blake 

was “[v]ery little.” Mother said that Blake would visit often with Paternal 

Grandparents but that Father never picked up Blake or brought him back to Mother. 

Mother explained that there were occasions when it was Father’s visitation time, but

Paternal Grandparents would visit with Blake while Father went out partying with his 

friends.

Mother was not sure if Father loved Blake. Mother said that Father “had five 

years to see [Blake]. He could have c[o]me and seen him anytime he wanted, and he 

never did.”

Mother testified that by the time of the termination trial, she had been married 

to T.S. for almost a year, that they had dated for several years prior to marriage, that 

he had been in Blake’s life for four years, and that T.S. was the only real father figure 

 7

The record demonstrates that if Father is not released on parole in 2023, he 

will not be released from prison until January 2028, at which point Blake will be 

fourteen and a half years old.
6

that Blake had known. Mother testified that T.S. planned to adopt Blake. Mother 

said that Blake had talked to her about changing his last name and wondered why his 

last name was different from hers. Mother requested that the trial court change 

Blake’s last name to T.S.’s last name due to the poor reputation associated with 

Father’s last name as a result of his criminal conviction.8

Mother opined that it was in Blake’s best interest for the trial court to terminate 

Father’s parental rights. Mother also requested that the trial court appoint her as sole 

managing conservator of Blake.

On cross-examination, Mother testified that she loved Paternal Grandparents 

and that they got along well with Blake. Mother said that Paternal Grandparents had 

offered her money to help her out and that she had “kindly told them that [she] didn’t 

need it.” Mother testified that Blake was on her insurance at work, so she did not use 

the Medicaid that Paternal Grandparents had renewed on Father’s behalf for the 

benefit of Blake.

Mother testified that she had seen Father be verbally defiant towards Paternal 

Grandparents and refuse their instruction. As a result, Mother was concerned about 

Blake’s going to visit Paternal Grandparents after Father gets out of prison. Mother 

had spoken to Paternal Grandparents about her concerns, but they would not agree to 

 8

Ultimately, the trial court decided not to change Blake’s last name and left that 

for any future adoption proceeding.
7

her request to not allow Father around Blake because they wanted Father to be 

allowed to be around Blake at family gatherings.

The trial court asked Mother why it would be in Blake’s best interest for 

Father’s parental rights to be terminated, and she said,

[Father’s] had violence, drug abuse, and anger issues. He hasn’t been a 

father. He’s had five years to be a father[,] and he hasn’t. I don’t want 

[Blake] seeing the way he lives. It would be in [Blake’s] best interest, his 

safety and well-being, for my current husband to raise him and teach 

him the way of life. [Father], I don’t see him doing that.

B. Paternal Grandmother’s Testimony

Paternal Grandmother testified that she and her husband have a very close 

relationship with Blake. Paternal Grandmother said that she called Mother whenever

she wanted to see Blake and that Mother had been very cooperative in allowing 

Paternal Grandparents to see Blake. Paternal Grandmother admitted that Mother had

been a great mother to Blake.

Paternal Grandmother testified that when Father was not using drugs, he was 

“amazing.” Paternal Grandmother said that Father began using drugs at the end of 

high school and had used drugs off and on for eight years. Paternal Grandmother 

knew that Father had used K2, but she did not know that he had used 

methamphetamine and Xanax. Paternal Grandmother admitted that when Father was 

doing drugs, he would push her, yell at her, and scream at her and Paternal 
8

Grandfather. Paternal Grandmother did not recall an incident in which Father had hit 

her with a broom.

Paternal Grandmother testified that Father truly loves Blake and wants to see 

Blake even though Blake is too young to visit Father in prison. Paternal 

Grandmother said that Father had not been “influential the whole time” and that he 

had regretted not spending as much time with Blake as he could have. Paternal 

Grandmother testified that when Father had spent time with Blake, they had ridden

four-wheelers, had gone fishing, and had hung out and enjoyed their time together. 

Paternal Grandmother testified that Father and Blake “truly have a bond” and that 

Blake asks about Father “all the time.”

Paternal Grandmother testified that it would not be in Blake’s best interest for 

the trial court to terminate Father’s parental rights because

[Father] loves [Blake] very much. He went through some real bad times, 

and we don’t condone anything that he did. He made some bad choices. 

But I don’t feel that terminating [Blake’s] relationship [with Father] 

should be done because of that. He is in the penitentiary. He is -- once 

he gets to his permanent place, he is taking classes to work with his 

problem -- problems that he has.

He -- he’s never hurt [Blake], never hit [Blake], never in any way 

showed any kind of hostility towards [Blake]. His -- when he had 

hostility with other people, I do blame it on the drugs he was doing. But 

he’s going to be in there five years. He is going to be drug free when he 

comes out. He’s going to church every Sunday. I just don’t believe that 

terminating [Blake’s] relationship with his father would do any justice for 

either one of them.
9

Paternal Grandmother said that it would be in Blake’s best interest to have contact 

with his family.

On cross-examination, Paternal Grandmother admitted that someone who had 

abused drugs and had committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was not a 

good, stable parent. Paternal Grandmother could not guarantee that Father would 

stay clean after he is released from prison. Paternal Grandmother agreed that it 

concerned her that Father could not stay clean and follow the court’s orders back 

when he was on community supervision and was facing up to twenty years in prison.

C. Paternal Grandfather’s Testimony

Paternal Grandfather admitted that he and Father had engaged in verbal 

altercations but not physical altercations. Paternal Grandfather did not condone 

Father’s “prior problems.”

Paternal Grandfather opined that Father loves Blake. Paternal Grandfather 

testified that before Father went to prison, he visited with Blake when they brought 

him to their house as long as it was not during Father’s work hours. Paternal 

Grandfather said that Blake cried every time they took him home because he did not 

want to go home. Paternal Grandfather testified that taking Blake away from his 

family was not in Blake’s best interest.

On cross-examination, Paternal Grandfather testified that he was unaware of 

Father’s drug use when Father was living in a small apartment behind Paternal 

Grandparents’ home while he was on community supervision. Paternal Grandfather 
10

agreed that Father had been given numerous opportunities to get clean and to be a 

good father to Blake and that in spite of those opportunities, Father had not taken 

advantage of them and would be in prison until at least 2023. Paternal Grandfather

admitted that Mother is a great mother to Blake and wants what is in his best interest.

D. Paternal Great Aunt

Paternal Great Aunt testified that Blake is very attached to Paternal 

Grandfather, Paternal Grandmother, Father, and the rest of the family and gets “a 

great deal of love and support from the family.” Paternal Great Aunt opined that it 

“would be wrong . . . to take that [love and support] away from any child.” Paternal 

Great Aunt testified that she had seen Father with Blake six times in five years, that 

Father had acted lovingly towards Blake, and that Blake had seemed to be very 

attached to Father.

E. Paternal Uncle

Paternal Uncle testified that Blake loves Father. Paternal Uncle testified that 

Father’s parental rights should not be terminated because he is a loving father and is 

not a threat to his son “whatsoever.” Paternal Uncle testified that Father had never 

physically hit him and that Father did not have a violent temper. Paternal Uncle knew 

that Father had used methamphetamine before he went to prison but testified that 

Father had never shown any kind of aggression towards Blake. Paternal Uncle did 

not believe that it was a trait of a good father to use drugs in violation of a court order 

prohibiting him from using drugs.
11

F. Trial Court’s Disposition

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the trial court found 

by clear and convincing evidence that Father had

engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who 

engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional wellbeing of the child.

By his own admission, in Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 1, he was 

physically abusive to a girlfriend, he committed the offense of aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon, he used while on -- he was given an 

opportunity on probation, and he didn’t take advantage of that 

opportunity. He admitted to using Xanax, methamphetamine, 

amphetamine[,] and THC.

He was given an opportunity to help him with his anger issues. 

He failed to attend the life skills class[ and] the intensive anger 

management class, [and] he failed to complete the batterer’s intervention 

program.

So I find by clear and convincing evidence that he’s engaged in 

conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in 

conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the 

child.

I also find by clear and convincing evidence that he -- by virtue of 

[Petitioner’s] Exhibit No. 3, which shows no child support payment at 

all in 2017, while he was not incarcerated and was supposed to be

working, according to the terms of his probation, that he failed to 

support the child in accordance with his ability during the period of one 

year, ending within six months of the date of filing of this petition.

The [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that he used a 

controlled substance, as defined by Chapter 481 of the Health and Safety 

Code, in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child.

And finally, the [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that he knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his 

conviction of an offense, and his confinement or imprisonment and
12

inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date of 

filing the petition.

By the time [Father] gets out of the penitentiary, that is -- the 

child’s 5 now. That’s almost his entire lifetime again. He’ll be out in 

four and a half years.

The [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the 

best interest of [Blake] to terminate the parent[–]child relationship 

between [Father] and the child.

The trial court’s oral rendition was memorialized in a written order terminating 

Father’s parental rights to Blake.

III. No Abuse of Discretion Shown in Not Appointing an Ad Litem

In his first issue, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

appointing an ad litem under section 107.021.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Texas Family Code section 107.021 provides for the discretionary appointment 

of counsel in private termination suits as follows:

(a) In a suit in which the best interests of a child are at issue, other than a 

suit filed by a governmental entity requesting termination of the parent[–]child

relationship or appointment of the entity as conservator of the child, the 

court may appoint one of the following:

(1) an amicus attorney;

(2) an attorney ad litem; or

(3) a guardian ad litem.

(a-1) In a suit requesting termination of the parent[–]child relationship 

that is not filed by a governmental entity, the court shall, unless the court 

finds that the interests of the child will be represented adequately by a 
13

party to the suit whose interests are not in conflict with the child’s 

interests, appoint one of the following:

(1) an amicus attorney; or

(2) an attorney ad litem.

(b) In determining whether to make an appointment under this section, 

the court:

(1) shall:

(A) give due consideration to the ability of the parties to 

pay reasonable fees to the appointee; and

(B) balance the child’s interests against the cost to the 

parties that would result from an appointment by taking 

into consideration the cost of available alternatives for 

resolving issues without making an appointment;

(2) may make an appointment only if the court finds that the 

appointment is necessary to ensure the determination of the best 

interests of the child, unless the appointment is otherwise 

required by this code; and

(3) may not require a person appointed under this section to serve 

without reasonable compensation for the services rendered by the 

person.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.021. We review a finding made under this section for an 

abuse of discretion. See In re C.A.P., No. 04-12-00553-CV, 2013 WL 749825, at *2 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 27, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

B. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law

Here, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact and 

conclusions of law:
14

3. On September 29, 2016, this Court entered an Order in Suit to 

Modify Parent[–]Child Relationship in this cause removing [Mother] and 

[Father] as joint managing conservators and naming [Mother] as Sole

Managing Conservator of the child [Blake].

4. In the Order in Suit to Modify Parent[–]Child Relationship rendered 

by this Court on September 29, 2016, the Court found that [Father] has 

a history or pattern of committing family violence during the two-year 

period preceding or during the pendency of the suit.

5. Also in the Order in Suit to Modify Parent[–]Child Relationship in 

this cause entered on September 29, 2016, [Father] was ordered to make 

payments to [Mother] for current child support in the amount of 

$256.00 per month and retroactive child support in the amount of 

$57.00 per month for the support of the child the subject of this suit.

6. [Mother] filed an Original Petition to Terminate Parent[–]Child

Relationship on April 5, 2018, requesting the Court to waive the 

appointment of an Attorney Ad Litem for the child and to terminate the 

parent[–]child relationship between [Father] and [Blake].

. . . .

8. [Mother], the mother and sole managing conservator of the child[,]

has been the primary caregiver and decision maker for the child for the 

entirety of the child’s young life.

9. [Mother] is a great mother to the child as witnesses called on behalf 

of [Father] stated in their testimony.

. . . .

Conclusions of Law

. . . .

18. The mother’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the 

child[;] therefore[,] the interests of the child are adequately represented 

by the mother[,] and thus the appointment of an attorney ad litem was 

not necessary in this case to determine the best interests of the child.
15

C. Analysis

Father argues that the trial court ignored the statute’s first requirement—to 

give due consideration to the ability of the parties to pay reasonable fees to the 

appointee—because the trial court accepted as evidence only Father’s incarceration. 

A plain reading of the statute, however, demonstrates that the trial court is not 

permitted to appoint an attorney ad litem in a private termination unless the trial court 

finds that the appointment is necessary to ensure the determination of the child’s best 

interests. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.021(b); see also Vargas v. Vargas, No. 01-15-

00690-CV, 2016 WL 3227964, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 9, 2016, no 

pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the trial court specifically found that an appointment was 

unnecessary. Therefore, whether the parties could pay an ad litem’s fees never 

became relevant. See Vargas, 2016 WL 3227964, at *3.

The record reflects that the primary interest of Mother—who had previously 

been the victim of a physical assault and verbal assaults by Father and who had 

witnessed him verbally assault Paternal Grandparents—was to protect Blake from 

Father. Mother testified that she was concerned that Father might injure Blake 

because Father had anger issues and was very violent when he was on drugs. And the 

trial court had previously found that Father had a history or pattern of committing 

family violence. Because this constitutes some evidence to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that Mother adequately represented Blake’s interests, we hold that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by not appointing an attorney ad litem for Blake. See 
16

C.A.P., 2013 WL 749825, at *2 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by

not appointing an attorney ad litem for child because mother’s testimony supported 

trial court’s finding that child’s interests were adequately represented by mother); In re 

R.J.C., No. 04-09-00106-CV, 2010 WL 816188, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

Mar. 10, 2010, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing 

to appoint an attorney ad litem for child because trial court found that mother had no 

interest adverse to child and adequately represented child’s interests and because 

record demonstrated that mother was trying to protect child from father); see also In re 

A.C.W., No. 12-11-00137-CV, 2012 WL 1379653, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 18, 

2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by not 

appointing an attorney ad litem for child because trial court followed the statute in 

making its findings); In re T.L.W., No. 12-10-00401-CV, 2012 WL 1142475, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 30, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court did not

abuse its discretion by failing to appoint an attorney ad litem for child).

Father relies on In re D.M.O. for the proposition that “where parents are 

adversaries in a suit to terminate one parent’s rights, the trial court can seldom find 

that one party adequately represents the interests of the children involved or that their 

interests are not adverse.” No. 04-17-00290-CV, 2018 WL 1402030, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio Mar. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Father, however, recognizes 

that D.M.O. and many of the other cases he cites involve situations in which the trial 

court did not make any determinations or findings under section 107.021, but he 
17

argues that this case is fundamentally no different because the trial court did not 

follow the guiding rules and principles of the statute and “performed a five-question, 

perfunctory inquiry rooted in expediency for the trial court.” We disagree.

First, D.M.O. is distinguishable from the facts before us; the father in D.M.O. 

testified at trial that he wished to maintain a relationship with his child and brought 

evidence to support his arguments, and there was no evidence that the father in 

D.M.O. had engaged in violent or physically abusive behavior, had been incarcerated, 

or had otherwise engaged in conduct endangering the child. Id. at *4. Second, the 

statute does not set forth a set of questions that must be asked or a checklist of tasks 

that must be performed before the trial court can find that the appointment of an 

ad litem is not necessary to ensure the determination of the best interests of the child. 

See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.021(b). Moreover, as set forth above, the trial 

court followed the statute in making its finding, and its finding is supported by the 

record.

Father further argues that the trial court “seemed more than anything frustrated 

that a request for an ad litem came the day of trial” and that the trial court’s “clear 

bias to appointing an ad litem cleared the way for it to avoid its statutory obligations.” 

Father has not demonstrated that the trial court was biased because judicial rulings 

alone do not constitute a basis for bias. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 

240–41 (Tex. 2001). Moreover, as set forth above, the trial court did not avoid its 

statutory obligation but fulfilled it by finding, as allowed by the statute, that the 
18

appointment of an attorney ad litem was not necessary in this case to determine the 

best interests of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.021(b)(2).

Accordingly, we overrule Father’s first issue.

IV. Sufficient Evidence Supports Unchallenged Termination Findings

In his second issue, Father challenges whether there is clear and convincing 

evidence to support the termination of his parental rights. [Ant’s Br. @ 8, 20] In 

particular, Father argues that there is insufficient evidence that he engaged in conduct 

that endangered Blake’s well-being or that his drug use endangered Blake. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(E), (P).

A. Burden of Proof and Sufficiency Standards of Review

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking 

termination must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that the 

parent’s actions satisfy one ground listed in family code section 161.001(b)(1); and 

2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id.. § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C., 384 

S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is 

clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or 

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. 

Code Ann. § 101.007; E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.

To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination 

cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding 

to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction 
19

that the finding is true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We assume that 

the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable 

factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable 

factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is 

contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a 

reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable 

factfinder could not. See id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ 

credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the 

factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child 

relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due 

deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant them or the judgment with 

our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record 

to decide whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that 

the parent violated at least one subsection of 161.001(b)(1) and that the termination of 

the parent–child relationship would be in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder 

reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually 

sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.
20

B. Unchallenged Section 161.001(b)(1) Findings

Father acknowledges in his brief that his parental rights were terminated based 

on four grounds: endangering conduct (subsection (E)); failure to support Blake

(subsection (F)); use of a controlled substance in a manner that endangered Blake

(subsection (P)); and criminal conduct that resulted in a conviction and confinement

(subsection (Q)). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (F), (P), (Q). But 

Father’s arguments on appeal challenge only the endangering-conduct ground and the

controlled-substance ground. By failing to challenge the trial court’s findings under 

subsections (F) and (Q), Father has waived any complaint about the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support these findings. See id. (requiring only one predicate ground to 

support termination); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (interpreting 

section 161.001(b) as requiring only one predicate ground); see also Toliver v. Tex. Dep’t 

of Family & Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 102–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2006, no pet.) (holding failure to challenge all of trial court’s predicate-ground 

findings resulted in waiver).

Nevertheless, the record before us contains sufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s unchallenged subsection (F) and (Q) findings.9 As demonstrated by the 

 9

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) provides that the trial court may 

terminate the parent–child relationship if the trial court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent has
21

“Texas Child Support Disbursement Unit Payment Record” from the Office of the 

Attorney General, Father did not make a single child support payment from January 

through December 2017, which was within six months of April 2018—the date when 

Mother filed her petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to Blake, and by 

Mother’s testimony that Father was not in prison and was able to pay child support

during 2017. See In re K.A.H., 195 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) 

(holding evidence sufficient to support finding that father did not support his child 

for a period of one year). Moreover, Father does not dispute that he knowingly 

engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in (1) his conviction and (2) his 

imprisonment and inability to care for Blake for not less than two years from the date 

Mother filed her petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q).

 

(F) failed to support the child in accordance with the parent’s ability 

during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the 

filing of the petition[ or]

. . . .

(Q) knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the 

parent’s:

(i) conviction of an offense; and

(ii) confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the 

child for not less than two years from the date of filing the 

petition[.]

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(F), (Q).
22

Because only one ground under section (b)(1) is necessary to support 

termination, we overrule Father’s second issue. See In re G.H., No. 02-18-00080-CV, 

2018 WL 3968788, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(overruling issues challenging other section 161.001(b)(1) grounds for termination 

because the record contained sufficient evidence to support an unchallenged section 

161.001(b)(1) ground).

10

V. Conclusion

Having overruled Father’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to Blake.

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel

Justice

Delivered: May 9, 2019

 10Father also includes within his second issue a one-sentence argument 

challenging the trial court’s best-interest finding: “Father further disputes that 

termination is in the Child’s best interest.” Father does not, however, cite the seminal 

case of Holley v. Adams, does not list the Holley factors, and does not provide any 

analysis to support his one-sentence argument. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 

Accordingly, the argument is insufficiently briefed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). As 

such, Father has waived any challenge to the trial court’s best-interest finding. See In 

re D.N.M., No. 07-18-00251-CV, 2018 WL 4374705, at *3 n.4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

Sept. 13, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant’s inadequate briefing 

waived any challenge to best-interest finding); In re D.V., No. 06-16-00065-CV, 2017 

WL 1018606, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 16, 2017, pets. denied) (mem. op.) 

(same); In re C.L., No. 04-03-00638-CV, 2004 WL 86136, at *3 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Jan. 21, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant waived error by 

providing nothing more than a four-sentence “argument” summarily claiming there 

was no evidence that termination was in children’s best interest).