Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Claypool Drainage & Levee District v. Weber,

2015 IL App (3d) 140614

Appellate Court 

Caption

CLAYPOOL DRAINAGE AND LEVEE DISTRICT, PlaintiffAppellee, v. STEVE WEBER, Will County Treasurer and ex officio

County Collector, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-14-0614

Filed August 20, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Grundy County, No. 13-MR-57; the 

Hon. Lance R. Peterson, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

James Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Philip A. Mock, Assistant 

State’s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant.

Charles L. Schmidt, of Morris, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Schmidt and Holdridge concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Will County treasurer, Steve Weber, appeals from the decision of the circuit court granting 

a writ of mandamus to the plaintiff, Claypool Drainage and Levee District. The circuit court 

held that the county treasurer’s attempt to withhold funds from the drainage district for the 

extension and collection of drainage district assessments was prohibited by section 9 of article 

VII of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 9(a)). On appeal, the treasurer 

argues since the district failed to appoint a district treasurer to collect the taxes and 

relinquished collection responsibilities to the county treasurer, he may be lawfully reimbursed 

for services provided to the drainage district. We hold that the treasurer’s attempt to withhold 

funds violates the state constitution and affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The Claypool Drainage and Levee District was established in Grundy County by statute in 

1896. The district is responsible for maintaining proper storm water drainage within the 

drainage district, which covers portions of Grundy and Will Counties, and is funded by the 

levy of assessments on properties located within the district under section 5-19 of the Illinois 

Drainage Code (70 ILCS 605/5-19 (West 2012)). 

¶ 4 Prior to 1998, the district collected assessments by sending landowners and municipalities 

invoices through the mail. In 1998, the district relinquished responsibility for collection of 

drainage assessments to the Will County treasurer’s office, and the county treasurer began 

serving as collector of assessments for the district. Since that time, assessments have been 

collected in the same manner as general property taxes and are shown as a line item on real 

estate tax bills issued by the county treasurer. 

¶ 5 In 2013, the county treasurer sent a letter to the district stating that he intended to charge a 

“25-cent per parcel fee” for the cost of providing collection of assessment services in 

accordance with section 4-37 of the Drainage Code. In the letter, the treasurer quoted a portion 

of section 4-37, which states that the collector “shall be reimbursed by each district and 

subdistrict for the actual costs for his services” and that the costs shall be paid out of district 

funds (70 ILCS 605/4-37 (West 2012)).1

 In response, the drainage district filed a two-count 

complaint against the treasurer in his capacity as the Will County treasurer and ex officio

collector for the district. Count I was dismissed by defendant’s motion and has not been 

appealed. Count II alleged an action for mandamus, seeking to compel the treasurer to pay over 

to the district the full amount of the drainage assessments. 

¶ 6 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the mandamus claim. The 

district argued that the treasurer misconstrued its authority under section 4-37 of the Drainage 

Code and that, even if the code allowed the treasurer to charge for assessment collections, it 

would violate article VII, section 9(a) of the state constitution. Attached to the district’s motion 

was an affidavit signed by Robert Koerner, the commissioner of the drainage district. Koerner 

 

1

Prior to 2013, no fees for collection services were withheld in accordance with a 1998 settlement 

agreement between the former Will County treasurer and the district, which prevented the treasurer 

from charging the fee. 
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averred that the county treasurer performed no other services on behalf of the district other than 

the collection and remittance of annual drainage assessments. He further stated that accounts 

payable, bank reconciliations, and other banking and account functions were performed by 

drainage district, not the county treasurer. 

¶ 7 In his motion, the treasurer claimed that retaining the cost of collection from the district 

was authorized by statute and did not violate article VII, section 9(a), of the constitution 

because the district chose to have the county treasurer collect its levied assessments rather than 

collecting them through an appointed district treasurer as permitted under section 4-38 of the 

Drainage Code (70 ILCS 605/4-38 (West 2012)). 

¶ 8 Following a hearing, the trial court granted the district’s motion for summary judgment and 

denied the treasurer’s motion. In ruling in favor of the district, the trial court noted that the 

basis for its decision was that the parties did not dispute that the Will County treasurer was 

only responsible for levying and collecting the assessments. The court granted mandamus

relief and entered an order instructing that the office of the Will County treasurer could not 

charge or withhold a fee for the extension and collection of drainage assessments. 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 The issue as framed by the parties is whether article VII, section 9(a), of the state 

constitution precludes a county from charging a drainage district for the cost of extension and 

collection of assessments levied by the district where the district has the ability to collect its 

own taxes. 

¶ 11 Article VII, section 9(a), of the Illinois Constitution states: 

“(a) Compensation of officers and employees and the office expenses of units of 

local government shall not be paid from fees collected. Fees may be collected as 

provided by law and by ordinance and shall be deposited upon receipt with the 

treasurer of the unit. Fees shall not be based upon funds disbursed or collected, nor 

upon the levy or extension of taxes.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 9(a). 

¶ 12 As it relates to the compensation of county tax collectors, section 4-37 of the Drainage 

Code provides: 

“County collector to collect assessments. Except as hereinafter provided in Section 

4-38, the County Collector of the County in which any of the lands of the district are 

situated shall collect all drainage assessments provided for by this Act and assessed 

against lands in his county. His official bond as County Collector shall stand as his 

bond as district collector. The collector shall perform such other duties and functions as 

are specified elsewhere in this Act. The collector shall be reimbursed by each district 

and subdistrict for the actual costs for his services. Such costs shall be paid out of the 

funds of the district for which the services were rendered.” 70 ILCS 605/4-37 (West 

2012) (amended by Pub. Act 83-739, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1984)). 

In conjunction with the collection provisions of section 4-37, section 4-38 provides that the 

commissioner of the drainage district “shall appoint a treasurer of the district.” 70 ILCS 

605/4-38(a) (West 2012). The district treasurer “may also serve as district collector and then 

shall collect all drainage assessments provided for by this Act, and perform such other duties 

and functions as are imposed upon district treasurers and collectors elsewhere in this Act.” 

70 ILCS 605/4-38(b) (West 2012). 
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¶ 13 In City of Joliet v. Bosworth, 64 Ill. 2d 516 (1976), the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the 

collection of taxes as a county function under article VII, section 9(a), of the state constitution. 

In that case, the parties addressed the constitutionality of a portion of a statute concerning “fees 

and salaries” which allowed counties to bill the taxing district for its proportionate share of 

actual costs incurred by the county in extending and collecting taxes on behalf of all taxing 

districts. The supreme court held that article VII, section 9(a), of the constitution makes the 

collection of taxes a county function to be supported solely by county taxes and precludes 

counties from being reimbursed by other taxing districts for the collection of assessments. 

Id. at 524. The court concluded that the fees and salaries statute was unconstitutional, finding 

that the intention of article VII, section 9(a) was to eliminate the practice of counties charging 

local taxing districts for tax collection services. Id. at 529. In reaching its conclusion, however, 

the court noted that “[s]ection 9(a) of article VII is, of course, limited in scope to the particular 

functions specified therein, and does not purport in any way to limit or restrict counties and 

local taxing districts from contracting among themselves as to other matters.” Id. at 531. 

¶ 14 The interrelation of article VII, section 9(a) and a county’s ability to withholding funds 

from a taxing district was also discussed in Century Community Unit School District No. 100 v. 

McClellan, 27 Ill. App. 3d 255 (1975). There, the trial court granted a writ of mandamus to a 

local school district, ordering the county treasurer to pay over funds withheld from the school 

district to cover the costs of assessment, extension and collection of the taxes levied by the 

district. Id. at 257. On appeal, the court held that the district was entitled to the writ under the 

dictates of the constitution. The court interpreted article VII, section 9(a) and concluded: 

“As we understand this constitutional provision, it means that fees not based upon 

funds disbursed or collected and not based upon the levy or extension of taxes may be 

collected, providing they are collected according to a law or ordinance, deposited with 

the treasurer of the unit, and are not used to pay corporate officers or employees or to 

pay office expenses.” Id. 

¶ 15 In this case, the treasurer attempted to charge the drainage district for services rendered in 

the “extension” and “collection of assessments” for the district. In light of the plain language of 

the Illinois Constitution, the county treasurer may not charge fees based on the collection, levy 

or extension of taxes. See People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 518 (2006) (in construing a 

statute, we must look to the terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning). Thus, the 

trial court properly granted summary judgment in the district’s favor and granted mandamus

relief compelling the treasurer to pay over all drainage assessments collected on its behalf. 

¶ 16 Nevertheless, the treasurer maintains that reimbursement for the actual costs of services is 

expressly permitted under sections 4-37 and 4-38 of the Drainage Code and does not violate 

article VII, section 9(a) because the drainage district is permitted to collect its own taxes but 

has delegated that duty to the county treasurer under the statutory scheme. He cites Little v. 

East Lake Fork Special Drainage District, 166 Ill. App. 3d 209 (1988) in support of his 

position. 

¶ 17 In Little, the county treasurer filed suit against the drainage district for the cost of his 

services for the district. There, the treasurer not only collected drainage assessments but also 

served as treasurer for the drainage district. The services provided by the county treasurer 

extended beyond levy and collection and included services such as maintaining books for each 

account, maintaining computer records, handling investments, maintaining money market 

accounts, sending out special billings, collecting and depositing funds, disbursing checks and 
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preparing the financial reports for the district. Id. at 213. The court held that the reimbursement 

of the treasurer for the actual costs of such services under sections 4-37 and 4-38 of the 

Drainage Code was not prohibited by article VII, section 9(a), of the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 

217-18. 

¶ 18 Here, it is undisputed that the Will County treasurer provides no services to the drainage 

district in the capacity of district treasurer. All recording, banking and accounting functions are 

provided by the district treasurer, who has been appointed by the district commissioner under 

section 4-38. The county treasurer acts solely as the collector for the district, and the only 

service the treasurer provides is the execution and collection of assessments. Unlike the county 

officer in Little, the county treasurer in this case is charging fees solely for the service of 

levying and collecting drainage assessments, rather than the additional services of district 

treasurer. Thus, contrary to Little, the application of sections 4-37 and 4-38 to allow the county 

treasurer to charge a drainage district for the collection of assessments intrudes on the 

constitutional limitations of section 9(a) of article VII of the Illinois Constitution. As the 

supreme court stated in Bosworth, the intent expressed in section 9(a) is to “preclude counties 

from seeking, in any form, reimbursement from the various taxing bodies for county services 

rendered in the collection of taxes.” Bosworth, 64 Ill. 2d at 524. In this case, the treasurer 

cannot charge the drainage district a fee for the general service of collecting assessments 

without violating that express intention. 

¶ 19 CONCLUSION 

¶ 20 The judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County is affirmed. 

¶ 21 Affirmed.