IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-2095

Filed July 19, 2017

GARY L. RIEDESEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

THE ESTATE OF LLOYD W. FURLONG, II,

LLOYD W. FURLONG, II,

BECKY FURLONG,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, John D. 

Telleen, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss the 

decedent and decedent’s estate from the litigation for failure to timely serve the 

petition pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). AFFIRMED.

Cynthia Z. Taylor of Zamora, Taylor, Woods & Frederick and Carrie E. 

Coyle of Carrie E. Coyle, P.C., Davenport, for appellant.

Brian T. Fairfield of Brooks Law Firm, P.C., Rock Island, Illinois, for 

appellees.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.

On October 30, 2013, Lloyd Furlong, a resident of Ohio, was driving a 

pickup truck when he rear-ended the vehicle of Iowa resident Gary Riedesel. 

Thereafter, Riedesel’s attorney negotiated with Lloyd’s insurer concerning the 

personal injury damages Riedesel sustained in the collision, and in November 

2014, the insurer sent a proposed settlement agreement offering to compensate 

Riedesel in exchange for a full release of all claims against “Lloyd and Becky 

Furlong and the Estate of Lloyd Furlong.”1 It was evident at this time to Riedesel 

that Lloyd had since passed away.

On October 22, 2015, Riedesel filed suit against Lloyd, Becky, and Lloyd’s 

estate (collectively “Defendants”). At no time did Riedesel verify that the estate 

was open—it was not; in fact, the estate was released from administration with 

the Ohio probate court’s approval in August 2014. Nevertheless, Riedesel 

attempted to serve the suit papers upon Becky, in both her individual capacity 

and as the executor of Lloyd’s estate. After several unsuccessful attempts to 

serve Becky, Riedesel filed a timely motion seeking an extension of time for 

service upon Defendants. The court then granted Riedesel “until February 28, 

2016, to attempt personal service of the court documents upon Defendants.” 

Becky was served on February 4, 2016.

Becky, in her individual capacity, subsequently filed an answer. Later, 

Lloyd and Lloyd’s estate filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to timely 

serve the estate. In the motion, it was admitted that Becky had been served 

within the extended time granted by the court. However, the motion noted that 

 

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Lloyd and his wife, Becky, co-owned the pickup truck.
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the estate had not been served and that Riedesel had not taken any affirmative 

steps to do so, since there had been no filing seeking to reopen Lloyd’s estate for 

the purpose of pursuing the suit and serving the estate. Since Riedesel failed to

serve the estate within the time granted by the court, the motion sought dismissal 

of dismissal of Lloyd and Lloyd’s estate from the suit. 

In response, Riedesel essentially argued that, based upon the language in 

Lloyd’s insurer’s settlement offer, Riedesel had a good-faith belief an estate had 

been opened for Lloyd and “was still in process” at the time of the offer. Riedesel 

complained he had received no notice of the estate being opened or closed. He 

argued he had good cause for another extension of time for service based upon

his belief an estate was open when he filed the suit, and Becky’s alleged evasion 

of service delayed service, and because Becky was the only person who would 

receive notice on behalf of the estate—as administrator—and she had already

been served anyway. At the hearing, Riedesel requested an extension of time to 

allow him to reopen Lloyd’s estate and have its personal representative served. 

Following a hearing on the motion, the district court, in a well-reasoned 

ruling, granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit against Lloyd and 

Lloyd’s estate without prejudice. The court noted Riedesel’s counsel “appeared 

to have made no efforts to determine if there was still an existing entity, the 

Estate of Lloyd W. Furlong, before filing suit.” The court found Riedesel had not 

been diligent in serving the estate as required under the rules. The court 

explained that attempting service upon Becky, even identified as the executor of 

the estate, could not effectuate service upon the nonexistent estate. The court 

noted Becky had no obligation to notify Riedesel of the estate’s closure and that 
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there had been sufficient time for Riedesel to discover the estate was closed and 

have it reopened pursuant to Iowa Code section 633.227(3) (2015), which allows 

creditors to open an administration of probate. Because Riedesel had made no 

attempt to reopen the estate, the court denied his request for an extension of 

time under rule 1.302(5) dismissed Lloyd and Lloyd’s estate from the litigation.2 

Riedesel now appeals, arguing the district court erred in denying his 

request for additional time and in dismissing Lloyd’s estate from the suit. He 

advances the same arguments raised before the district court—that he, in good 

faith, believed the estate remained opened because of the language used by 

Lloyd’s insurer and because Becky never informed him otherwise, and that he 

diligently attempted to timely serve Becky, who has been and would be, when 

reopened, the executor of Lloyd’s estate, so there is no question she was aware 

of Riedesel’s intention to bring a suit against Lloyd’s estate. Our review of the 

court’s ruling is for correction of errors at law. See Brubaker v. Estate of DeLong, 

700 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Iowa 2005).

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5) requires service of the notice be 

made upon the defendant within ninety days after the petition is filed, but the time 

can be extended if the filing party “shows good cause for the failure of service.” 

“Inadvertence, neglect, misunderstanding, ignorance of the rule or its burden, or 

half-hearted attempts at service” are generally not sufficient to show good cause. 

Brubaker, 700 N.W.2d at 327. Rather, the filing party must show he or she

 

2 Riedesel filed an application for interlocutory appeal of the ruling on Becky’s motion to 

dismiss, which was subsequently denied by the Iowa Supreme Court. In a later 

motion—not at issue here—the district court granted Becky’s motion for summary 

judgment, thus ending the litigation at the district court level. 
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affirmatively tried or was prohibited from trying, through no fault of his or her own, 

to serve the defendant. See id.

Riedesel points to his affirmative attempts to timely serve Becky as 

justification for his failure to timely serve the estate. The problem with his 

argument is that, even accepting for the sake of argument that Becky evaded 

service of process, there is nothing in the record that shows this would have 

made any difference concerning service upon the non-existent estate. That 

Becky knew Riedesel wanted to sue the estate did not matter; there was no 

estate to sue. See id. at 326-27; see also Brown v. Roberts, 205 N.W.2d 746, 

748 (Iowa 1973) (“For another reason the notice given defendant-owner’s former 

executor was insufficient. She was discharged before she was served with any 

notice. The notice was therefore ineffective to bind the estate.”).

The plaintiff’s suit in Brubaker suffered a similar fate; specifically, Brubaker 

served the person who was to be the administrator of the decedent’s estate 

before the estate was opened, rendering that service defective. See Brubaker, 

700 N.W.2d at 326-27. Brubaker then served the administrator after the estate 

was opened, but it was not within the extended time granted by the court. See 

id. It mattered not that the administrator already had notice within the applicable 

time period that Brubaker intended to sue the estate; Brubaker had to show good 

cause for his failure to do so within the extended time but offered no reason for 

the delay. See id. at 327. The supreme court concluded this was the result of 

inadvertence, neglect, and half-hearted attempts to obtain service over the 

defendant. See id.
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Riedesel’s failure to timely inquire into the status of the estate once he 

learned of Lloyd’s death clearly falls into one of the categories that do not excuse 

the failure to serve—inadvertence, neglect, misunderstanding, or ignorance of 

the rule or its burden. While the rules are to be liberally construed, we cannot 

simply ignore them. See Wilson v. Ribbens, 678 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 2004). 

We find no error in the district court’s denial of Riedesel’s request for a further 

extension of time under rule 1.302(5) because Riedesel failed to show good 

cause why he did not reopen and timely serve the estate’s personal 

representative. We affirm the decision of the district court granting the motion to 

dismiss.

AFFIRMED.