2022 WI App 54

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN

PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2020AP2076

Complete Title of Case: 

NEIL KLOSTERMAN,

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

 V.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF OMRO,

 DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Opinion Filed: September 28, 2022

Submitted on Briefs: December 1, 2021

Oral Argument: 

JUDGES: Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ. 

Concurred:

Dissented: Grogan, J.

Appellant

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the 

briefs of Brian D. Hamill of Dempsey Law Firm, LLP, Oshkosh. 

Respondent

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the 

brief of William E. Fischer of Von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Neenah. 
2022 WI App 54

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

September 28, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP2076 Cir. Ct. No. 2020CV182

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

NEIL KLOSTERMAN,

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

 V.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF OMRO,

 DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Winnebago County: 

BARBARA H. KEY, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ. 

¶1 GUNDRUM, P.J. The Omro School Board became concerned with 

then middle-school teacher Neil Klosterman’s physical contact with male middleschool students and his refusal to avoid such contact in the future, as reported by a 

police/school safety officer who confronted Klosterman about it. The board 
No. 2020AP2076

2

ultimately banned Klosterman from School District of Omro (District) property and 

has maintained that ban even after Klosterman resigned from his teaching position. 

¶2 Klosterman’s legal challenge to the ban fell flat before the circuit 

court as it granted summary judgment to the District. On appeal, Klosterman insists 

the board lacks legal authority to impose and maintain such a ban and further insists 

that even if the board did have such authority, no reasonable grounds were present 

in this case for the board to impose such a ban against him. We disagree with 

Klosterman and conclude that the board had and reasonably exercised the authority 

to impose the ban in this case.

Background

¶3 While still a teacher in the District, Klosterman was placed on 

administrative leave after repeatedly engaging in physical contact with middleschool boys on District property and, according to Police/School Safety 

Officer John Peeters, expressing that he would not stop engaging in such contact. 

In conjunction with the leave, the District banned Klosterman from District 

property, and it continued that ban after Klosterman eventually resigned his teaching 

position. On multiple occasions, Klosterman sought to have the ban lifted, but the 

board has remained steadfast in maintaining the ban. 

¶4 An affidavit by the superintendent, and exhibits attached thereto, 

identify the reported conduct of concern. Peeters wrote a report related to his 

District-requested investigation and first-hand observations of Klosterman’s 

conduct, which report is included with the affidavit and exhibits. The report 

indicates the following.
No. 2020AP2076

3

¶5 Spring 2018 footage from a hallway security camera shows 

Klosterman in a middle-school hallway, as phrased by Peeters, 

[R]each[ing] down with both hands toward a male student 

sitting on the ground in the hallway. Klosterman then 

assisted this student to his feet and then quickly transitioned 

into Klosterman having his arms around the student’s upper 

body as well as the neck and head region. They were very 

close together, as Klosterman and this young boy’s body 

were touching. Their faces were very close and the video 

appeared as though Klosterman was kissing this male 

student, however, the video was not definitive in that regard.

Peeters followed up with the student, and the boy “indicated that nothing 

inappropriate had happened between him and Mr. Klosterman,” so Peeters 

“determined that no criminal violation had occurred.”

¶6 At a home football game on September 7, 2018, Peeters observed 

Klosterman “as a lone adult intermingling among [a] middle school crowd” and 

“either hugging or placing hands on shoulders or arms” of multiple middle-school 

boys; however, Peeters “did not see any touching of private areas.” Later that 

evening, Peeters observed Klosterman “standing somewhat isolated from other 

people at the football game with one male student.” They were “standing very close 

to each other face to face. Both Klosterman and this male student were holding 

hands with both hands” for approximately one and one-half minutes. Peeters opined 

that the nature of the hand holding appeared to be “more intimate.” During the 

game, a school staff member approached Peeters and asked him if he was observing 

Klosterman’s conduct. Peeters later informed the school district administration of 

his observations, but acknowledged in his report that he had not observed any 

criminal violations.

¶7 Subsequently, Peeters also viewed video footage that had been taken

at the game, which showed Klosterman walking up to and “hug[ging] from behind” 
No. 2020AP2076

4

two male students. Shortly thereafter, Klosterman “puts his arm around a student.” 

A few minutes later, Klosterman approaches another student and “bends his knees 

to lower himself to the approximate height of this student and has full contact with 

the front of his body against this student and hugs this student” for about five 

seconds in what Peeters describes as a “full body hug.” Minutes later, Klosterman 

“giv[es] another student a hug,” in which he “physically picks the student up off of 

the ground while hugging.”

¶8 On September 17, 2018, Peeters was informed that the school district 

board had been made aware of concerns related to Klosterman’s physical contact 

with students, and the board requested that Peeters speak with Klosterman about 

these concerns. Peeters spoke with Klosterman, but Klosterman told Peeters “that 

he was not going to change his behavior,” explaining that if he did so, students 

would notice the change “and then start questioning if something was wrong with 

their previous interactions with Klosterman.” Peeters relayed this conversation to 

the school administration.

¶9 On October 10, 2018, a staff member reported to the District 

“uncomfortable” conduct by Klosterman that the staff member had observed. The 

staff member’s written statement1indicates that two or three weeks earlier the staff 

member had observed Klosterman in a classroom sitting back-to-back with a male 

student in the same bean bag chair, and it appeared that Klosterman “was moving 

side to side, rubbing his back against the back” of this student. Then, on October 8, 

2018, this same staff member observed Klosterman sitting next to a male student 

who was wearing shorts; the staff member believed this was the same student as in 

 

1

 The staff member wished to remain anonymous, so that person’s identity is not identified 

in the written statement or elsewhere in the record.
No. 2020AP2076

5

the bean-bag-chair incident. Klosterman “was leaning against the student” with his 

arm “lying lengthwise down the student’s [t]high” and his hand “cupping the 

student’s knee.” When Klosterman noticed the staff member, he “changed his 

behavior by quickly taking his hand and arm off of the student and separating 

himself from the student.” The staff member believed Klosterman’s contact with 

the student to be “inappropriate ... for a student/teacher relationship.”

¶10 The District, “concerned about the welfare of their students,” sought 

to investigate further. On October 12, 2018, Peeters, the superintendent, and the 

human resource officer, attempted to speak with several of the students and parents 

regarding interactions with Klosterman. In one meeting with the parents of one of 

the students, the mother reported that her son confides in Klosterman. She also 

reported that Klosterman had previously informed the parents that if they were to 

observe him hugging their son, it is because the son often approaches Klosterman 

“for the hugs and ... affection.” The son was then brought in to the meeting, during 

which time Peeters learned that the son had been in counseling over the past year. 

The son reported that he “d[id] not feel uncomfortable by any of the interactions 

that he has with Neil Klosterman.”

¶11 Peeters, the superintendent, and the human resource officer also made 

phone contact with the father of a student who used to attend the middle school 

where Klosterman taught.2 The father reported having observed Klosterman at 

varsity basketball games “sitting on the bleachers[,] leaning back, [and] putting his 

arm around young boys.” The father expressed his concern about the amount of 

time Klosterman spends with young minors.

 

2

 This father is identified by name in Peeters’ report, but because his name is not pertinent 

to our decision, we do not include it here.
No. 2020AP2076

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¶12 Later that same day, Peeters and the superintendent met with the 

student involved in the bean-bag-chair incident, along with the boy’s mother. The 

boy “denied any physical contact ever between he and Klosterman other than 

high 5’s.” When asked about the reported incident in which Klosterman allegedly 

was cupping the boy’s knee just days earlier, the boy “appeared to have a difficult 

time remembering the details and his story did change a few times.” The boy “did 

acknowledge sitting next to Klosterman during this study hour” and did admit that 

he was wearing shorts that day, but “[h]e stated that ... Klosterman’s hands were on 

the desks and were never at any point on his leg.” The boy “indicated that he has 

never felt uncomfortable with any of the interactions between him and 

Neil Klosterman.” Peeters and the superintendent also learned that the boy had been 

paid to mow Klosterman’s lawn, did other work at Klosterman’s home, and would 

be left at Klosterman’s residence “with Klosterman without any other adult 

supervision and would play Fortnite in Klosterman’s theater room.” 

¶13 On October 15, 2018, Peeters and the superintendent met with 

Patti Crump, a former law enforcement officer with “over 20 years of investigating 

sensitive crimes and sexual offenders.” Crump expressed that many of 

Klosterman’s actions “mirror” sex offenders she has investigated. She further 

expressed her opinion that Klosterman “should not be around kids.”

¶14 A staff member, who wished to remain anonymous,3informed Peeters 

that he/she had been in the school on a weekend in the past when the staff member 

observed Klosterman walking down the hall with his arm around a young male 

 

3

 Even though the staff member wished to remain “anonymous,” Officer Peeters appears 

to have been aware of the staff member’s identity as Peeters reinterviewed the staff member 

multiple times.
No. 2020AP2076

7

student. The staff member confronted Klosterman away from the student, “asking 

him what he is doing and explaining that that was inappropriate behavior.”

¶15 At the end of his report, Peeters indicated that he was closing the case 

because no criminal violations had been alleged. 

¶16 Also included with the superintendent’s affidavit and exhibits was a 

letter received by the superintendent from a “Concerned Middle School Parent and 

Co-Worker” as well as the reports of two other individuals, named “Mark” and 

“Danielle.” The letter addresses observations the parent/co-worker had made of 

Klosterman’s conduct at the September 7, 2018 football game, including that 

Klosterman had “more than one time put his arm around male students” and had 

given male students “long hugs with arms wrapped all the way around.” The 

parent/co-worker added that he/she “thought I even saw [Klosterman] run his hand 

down the side of a student’s face, as to say it was alright” and that he/she further 

observed Klosterman “go up to a group of kids, talk to them all for a bit, then it 

appeared he would separate himself from the group and pull [one] male student at a 

time ... out of the larger group to give them a hug or talk with them.” This parent/coworker reported these observations to the high school principal as well as to Peeters 

and asked both of them to help keep an eye on Klosterman’s behavior at the game.4 

The reports of Mark and Danielle indicate that on September 5, 2018, they observed 

Klosterman in the middle-school hallway with his arm around a male student’s 

shoulder. Klosterman then slid his hand down to the middle of the student’s back, 

before moving away from the student.

 

4

 Though not clear from the record, it is possible this parent/co-worker is the same District 

staff member who approached Peeters during the September 7, 2018 football game and asked him

if he was observing Klosterman’s conduct. See supra ¶6.
No. 2020AP2076

8

¶17 By letter of October 15, 2018, the District informed Klosterman that 

he was being placed on administrative leave “pending the District’s investigation 

into allegations of inappropriate conduct with minors.” Klosterman was instructed 

that during the leave, he was “not to enter any District grounds or buildings, unless 

you are given prior express permission by” the human resources director or the 

superintendent.5 Klosterman resigned his employment with the District on 

December 10, 2018.

¶18 More than once following his resignation, Klosterman requested that 

the District lift the prohibition against him coming onto District property. The 

superintendent’s affidavit explains that the superintendent attended a school board 

meeting on June 17, 2019, in which the board considered Klosterman’s request. The 

board was provided with “documents and information collected during 

Mr. Klosterman’s personnel investigation, and was shown the [Spring 2018] video 

footage” from the hallway security camera, which showed Klosterman with his arms 

around a male student’s head and neck region with their bodies touching. 

Additionally, the board “heard from a former law enforcement specialist in 

investigating sensitive crimes and sexual offenders, who opined that 

Mr. Klosterman’s behavior was consistent with ‘grooming’ behaviors exhibited by 

sexual predators.” “After reviewing the documents and information available to it, 

 

5

 In addition to the prohibition against entering onto District property without permission, 

the October 15, 2018 letter also placed other restrictions on Klosterman, who was still an employee 

of the District at the time, including that Klosterman was to have “no contact with students, parents, 

or District staff,” except for the human resources director and the superintendent. On appeal, no 

party seeks review of, develops arguments related to, or suggests that these other restrictions are 

still in effect now that Klosterman is no longer a District employee. Indeed, in a July 1, 2019 letter 

to Klosterman, the school board president wrote that the board had considered Klosterman’s request 

that the board “reconsider its position” but that the board unanimously agreed to “continu[e] the 

directive that you remain off premises.” For these reasons, we only discuss the prohibition against 

Klosterman entering onto District property without prior approval from either the superintendent 

or human resources director.
No. 2020AP2076

9

which included credible testimony and concerns from multiple independent sources, 

including several staff members and law enforcement professionals, the [b]oard 

determined that Mr. Klosterman’s presence on school grounds would be detrimental 

to the good order of the school.” The superintendent further avers that “[d]ue 

consideration was paid to the fact that criminal charges had not been filed against 

Mr. Klosterman. However, the [b]oard concluded that allowing Mr. Klosterman on 

school grounds would unnecessarily expose students to potentially dangerous 

behavior.” A July 1, 2019 letter from the school board president informed 

Klosterman that the board had unanimously agreed to “continu[e] the directive that 

you remain off premises.”

¶19 The board met again on September 25, 2019, for the purpose of 

considering a letter from Klosterman’s legal counsel requesting that the board lift 

the ban against Klosterman entering upon District property. The board again 

reviewed the “background documentation and information garnered during the 

investigation, and considered whether any intervening circumstances warranted 

reversal of the [b]oard’s earlier decision.” The superintendent expressed to the 

board his belief that Klosterman should not be permitted near students on District 

property, and the board again voted unanimously to reject Klosterman’s request to 

lift the ban.

¶20 Klosterman filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that his ban 

from District property is unlawful and prohibiting the District from “block[ing] or 

enjoin[ing]” him from District property. The District moved for summary 

judgment, which the circuit court granted. The court concluded that the school 

board had the legal authority to act as it did, had a “rational basis” for banning 

Klosterman, did not erroneously exercise its discretion, and did not act arbitrarily or 

capriciously. Klosterman appeals.
No. 2020AP2076

10

Discussion

¶21 Klosterman contends the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment to the District because the school board cannot lawfully impose and 

maintain a prohibition against someone entering upon District property. He further 

asserts that even if the board does have such authority, it lacked reasonable grounds 

to impose such a ban against him. We disagree with Klosterman on both points.

¶22 Our review of a circuit court’s decision on summary judgment is 

de novo. Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 2009 WI 71, ¶11, 318 Wis. 2d 

622, 768 N.W.2d 568. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine 

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Id.

School Board Authority to Ban an Individual from District Property

¶23 WISCONSIN STAT. § 120.13 (2019-20) identifies various “School 

board powers.”6 In this case, both parties erroneously focus their attention on 

§ 120.13(35), which states:

PRESENCE IN SCHOOL BUILDINGS. (a) A school board may 

adopt rules applicable to persons who enter or remain in a

building operated by the school board, including 

requirements that such persons identify themselves and sign 

in when entering or remaining in the building or any 

specified portion of the building and designating time 

periods during which such persons may enter or remain in 

the building or any portion of the building.

(Emphasis added.) This provision does not govern this case as it deals with the 

establishment of rules and conditions related to persons who do enter District “buildings” 

 

6

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2020AP2076

11

specifically whereas the board has more broadly prohibited Klosterman from even entering 

in the first instance upon any District property. Other statutory provisions govern this case.

¶24 WISCONSIN STAT. § 120.12 provides: “School board duties. The 

school board ... shall: (1) ... have the possession, care, control and management of 

the property and affairs of the school district.” The introductory language of WIS.

STAT. § 120.13, again, relating to “School board powers,” provides that a school 

board “may do all things reasonable to promote the cause of education.”

And WIS. STAT. § 118.001 provides: 

Duties and powers of school boards; construction of 

statutes. The statutory duties and powers of school boards 

shall be broadly construed to authorize any school board 

action that is within the comprehensive meaning of the terms 

of the duties and powers, if the action is not prohibited by 

the laws of the federal government or of this state.

(Emphasis added.) 

¶25 As Klosterman questions in the first instance the legal authority of the 

board to ban an individual from coming onto District property, we must interpret 

these provisions to determine if they afford a board such authority. Interpretation 

of statutory provisions is a legal matter we consider independently. State v. Muniz, 

181 Wis. 2d 928, 931, 512 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1994). Together, these three 

statutory provisions provide that a school board has the power to do “all things 

reasonable to promote the cause of education” and the duty to care for, control and 

manage the property and affairs of the District, and we are required to broadly 

construe such already broad powers and duties so as to authorize “any” school board 

action that is within the “comprehensive meaning” of the terms of such powers and 

duties, so long as the action—here, the banning of an individual from District 
No. 2020AP2076

12

property—is not prohibited by state or federal laws.7 See WIS. STAT. §§ 120.13, 

120.12, 118.001.

¶26 In Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education

Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976), the United States Supreme Court, reviewing a decision 

of our state supreme court, observed that under Wisconsin law, and WIS. STAT.

§ 120.12(1) specifically, school boards have “broad power over ‘the possession, 

care, control and management of the property and affairs of the school district.’” 

Id. at 487. The Court recognized that in Wisconsin, the board “is the body with 

overall responsibility for the governance of the school district; it must cope with the 

myriad day-to-day problems of a modern public school system,” and it indicated 

that the board should be permitted “to make ... decision[s] [that] preserve[] its 

control over school district affairs.” Id. at 495-96. The Court questioned whether 

a judge 

can generally make ... as good a judgment as the School 

Board, which is intimately familiar with all the needs of the 

school district.... More important ... it will be the School 

Board that will have to cope with the consequences of the 

decision and be responsible to the electorate for it.

Id. at 496 n.5. A year later, our state supreme court echoed that “[a]s much control 

as possible should be left with the school board to set policy and manage the school.”

Naus v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Sheboygan Falls, 76 Wis. 2d 104, 112, 250 

N.W.2d 725 (1977) (citation omitted). 

 

7

 Although Klosterman asserts the ban violates his “constitutional rights,” he fails to even 

state which “rights” he is referring to and fails to explain how the lone case he cites—a non-binding, 

federal decision out of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Johnson v. Perry, 859 F.3d 

156 (2d Cir. 2017)—applies to this case. Furthermore, WIS. STAT. § 120.13(35) does not operate 

as a state law that “prohibits” a ban such as the one in this case, and Klosterman has developed no 

argument to suggest that it does. Klosterman has identified no other state or federal laws that might

possibly prohibit the ban here.
No. 2020AP2076

13

¶27 In 1995, the legislature created WIS. STAT. § 118.001 and amended

WIS. STAT. § 120.13 to add the introductory language providing that a school board 

“may do all things reasonable to promote the cause of education.” 1995 Wis. Act 

27, §§ 3931, 4024. In Madison Metropolitan School District v. Burmaster, 2006 

WI App 17, 288 Wis. 2d 771, 709 N.W.2d 73, we noted that prior to these changes, 

case law “construed the statutory authority of school boards under the enumerated 

powers doctrine, whereby the powers were limited to those expressly conferred by 

statute or necessarily implied.” Id., ¶16. Considering the 1995 changes, we

expressed that “the introductory language [of § 120.13], when read in the context of 

the rest of § 120.13,” means that “school boards have powers beyond those 

enumerated in subsecs. (1)-(37) [now (1)-(38)].” Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 288 

Wis. 2d 771, ¶20. We further stated that the changes “express[ed] the legislature’s 

intent to give school boards broader powers and wide discretion in exercising those 

powers.” Id., ¶18 (citing Pritchard v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2001 WI App 

62, ¶14, 242 Wis. 2d 301, 625 N.W.2d 613). We added that WIS. STAT. §§ 120.12(1) 

and 120.13 give school boards a “broad grant of powers” that § 118.001 mandates 

must be “liberally construed.” See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 288 Wis. 2d 771,

¶23; see also Pritchard, 242 Wis. 2d 301, ¶14. 

¶28 In Pritchard, we considered whether a school board could lawfully 

authorize the payment of health insurance benefits for “unmarried partners of school 

district employees” when WIS. STAT. § 66.185 specifically authorized the payment 

of such benefits only for “employees and officers ... and their spouses and 

dependent children.” Pritchard, 242 Wis. 2d 301, ¶¶5, 14. We noted that 

WISCONSIN STAT. § 120.44(1) provides that a unified school 

district has “the power to sue and be sued, to levy and collect 

taxes, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to do all 

other things reasonable for the performance of its functions 

in operating a system of public education.” Under WIS.
No. 2020AP2076

14

STAT. §§ 120.44(2) and 120.12(1), the management and 

control of the District is vested in the school board. 

WISCONSIN STAT. § 120.13 provides the school board “may 

do all things reasonable to promote the cause of education, 

including establishing, providing and improving school 

district programs, functions and activities for the benefit of 

pupils”; and this includes “spend[ing] money as needed to 

meet the immediate expenses of operating and maintaining 

the public instruction in the school district,” § 120.13(33).

Id., ¶11 (alteration in original; emphasis added; footnote omitted). We determined 

that in light of the broad construction of school board powers mandated by WIS.

STAT. § 118.001 and the powers granted under WIS. STAT. ch. 120, the powers of a 

school board “include the power to provide health insurance benefits to [unmarried] 

partners.” Pritchard, 242 Wis. 2d 301, ¶16; see also Larson v. Burmaster, 2006 

WI App 142, ¶23, 295 Wis. 2d 333, 720 N.W.2d 134 (considering WIS. STAT. §§ 

118.001, 120.12 and 120.13 and concluding that a teacher’s requirement that 

students do summer homework “fits comfortably within the range of what is 

reasonable”).

¶29 As indicated, the legislature has provided that school boards have the 

power to “do all things reasonable to promote the cause of education,” WIS. STAT.

§ 120.13, and have the duty to possess, care for, control and manage “the property 

and affairs” of their respective districts, WIS. STAT. § 120.12(1). Moreover, we are 

expressly directed to construe such powers and duties broadly so as to “authorize 

any school board action that is within the comprehensive meaning of the terms of 

the duties and powers,” WIS. STAT. § 118.001 (emphasis added), so long as the 

action is not prohibited by state or federal laws. If a school board’s discretion is 

wide enough to allow it to authorize an entire category of persons to be eligible for 

health insurance benefits beyond the categories specifically enumerated in the 

statutes, as in Pritchard, certainly it is wide enough to authorize a ban from District

property of an individual whose presence on District property the board has 
No. 2020AP2076

15

determined “would unnecessarily expose students to potentially dangerous 

behavior.” In light of the legislature’s broad and strong language deferring to the 

judgment of school boards, we have no difficulty holding that a board has just such

authority. See Anderson v. Hansen, 489 F. Supp. 3d 836, 845 (E.D. Wis. 2020) 

(“[N]o person has an absolute right to enter school property.”).

The Ban of Klosterman

¶30 We next consider whether the school board here erroneously 

exercised its “wide discretion” related to its “broad[] powers” in specifically 

banning Klosterman from District property. See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 288 

Wis. 2d 771, ¶18; see generally Klinger v. Oneida County, 149 Wis. 2d 838, 844, 

440 N.W.2d 348 (1989) (“The legislature vested discretion in the [county] Board 

[of Adjustment] and did not intend a circuit court to substitute its discretion for that 

committed to the Board.”); Tagatz v. Township of Crystal Lake, 2001 WI App 80, 

¶¶9-10, 243 Wis. 2d 108, 626 N.W.2d 23 (reviewing for an erroneous exercise of 

discretion where statute affords town board the discretion as to whether to lay out a 

road). We conclude it did not.

¶31 As the District here notes, the record upon which the school board 

made its decision to ban Klosterman was undisputed. We conclude that the board 

acted reasonably in enacting this ban, first and foremost because the ban is designed 

to keep students safe on District property, and, as the board understandably 

determined, “allowing Mr. Klosterman on school grounds would unnecessarily 

expose students to potentially dangerous behavior.” Additionally, based on the 

board’s foreknowledge of Klosterman’s physical contact with middle-school boys

and refusal to cease such contact, the ban also protects the District against future 

criticism and legal action if Klosterman were to harm a child on District property.
No. 2020AP2076

16

¶32 Klosterman relies heavily upon the fact that he has not been criminally 

charged and his teaching license has not been revoked. But the school board needed 

neither a criminal conviction nor license revocation before it could act to protect 

children under its care, and Klosterman has identified no law suggesting it did. By 

the time a person has been convicted of a crime, harm has long since already 

occurred. The board need not wait for such harm to its students (and the civil 

lawsuits against the District which would likely follow).8 Instead, as indicated, the 

 

8

 To put this in another context, what if Klosterman had instead been observed (perhaps 

videotaped) “making out”—but with no sexual contact as defined by state statutes—with a thirteenyear-old girl at a local park. It is not at all clear that this conduct would constitute a crime under 

state statutes, yet the school board would certainly act reasonably to promote the cause of education 

if it banned Klosterman as it did in this case. While the facts before the school board in this 

particular case are different than making out with a thirteen-year-old girl, the question is the same—

whether this board, based upon these facts, acted reasonably to promote the cause of education in 

instituting and maintaining this ban. Or, put another way, since the votes in favor of this ban have 

always been unanimous, whether every one of these locally elected school board members acted 

unreasonably in voting for it. 

It is worthwhile to note that since the ban was first implemented in October 2018, there 

have been at least four new school board members who have replaced prior members. See School 

Dist. of Omro, School Bd., https://www.omro.k12.wi.us/district/school-board.cfm (last visited 

Sept. 14, 2022) (identifying four board members who have served since 2019 or later). The school 

board elections that have taken place since Fall of 2018 obviously have afforded the electorate a 

ready-made opportunity to replace “unreasonable” school board members with members it deems 

more “reasonable” and willing to modify or repeal this ban. Despite this opportunity, the board has 

not modified or repealed it, although Klosterman has repeatedly asked the board to repeal it.

Significantly, the board still has the power to modify or repeal it at any time. Klosterman himself 

ran for the Omro School Board in the April 2020 election but came in last out of four candidates, 

garnering 19.8% of the ballots cast and failing to secure a seat on the board. The top two votegetters were incumbents who have repeatedly voted to maintain the ban. School Dist. of Omro, 

School Bd., Bd. of Canvassers Meeting Minutes, Apr. 15, 2020,

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YNXtywGCbdKZjUIiUjQl5zggBdCg8gxYyMxDFmyb_S

0/edit.

To reiterate what the United States Supreme Court has emphasized—specific to Wisconsin 

no less—the school board “is the body with overall responsibility for the governance of the school 

district; it must cope with the myriad day-to-day problems of a modern public school system” and 

should be permitted “to make ... decision[s] [that] preserve[] its control over school district affairs.” 

Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1976). The 

case before us is a tailor-made example of the Court’s doubts as to whether “a judge can generally 
No. 2020AP2076

17

board has its own independent powers to “do all things reasonable to promote the 

cause of education,” WIS. STAT. § 120.13, as well as the duty to “care [for], control 

and manage[] the property and affairs” of the District, WIS. STAT. § 120.12(1). 

¶33 In this case, the record before the school board was replete with 

evidence supporting the ban.9 According to Peeters’ report, the hallway security 

camera footage showed Klosterman with a male middle-school student in a school 

hallway with Klosterman 

reach[ing] down with both hands toward a male student 

sitting on the ground in the hallway. Klosterman then 

assisted this student to his feet and then quickly transitioned 

into Klosterman having his arms around the student’s upper 

body as well as the neck and head region. They were very 

close together, as Klosterman and this young boy’s body 

were touching. Their faces were very close and the video 

appeared as though Klosterman was kissing this male 

student, however, the video was not definitive in that regard.

In an affidavit submitted for summary judgment purposes, Klosterman averred that 

the student had been “poked in the eye,” so Klosterman “looked right in [the boy’s] 

face to take a look at his eye.” To begin, Klosterman directs us to nothing in the 

record, and we are able to find nothing, suggesting he has at any time presented this 

explanation to the board. That said, we doubt such an explanation would have gone 

far with the board as our own review of the still photos from that video—which 

video footage the board specifically reviewed before denying Klosterman’s postresignation request to have the ban lifted—shows that whether or not Klosterman 

 

make ... as good a judgment as the School Board, which is intimately familiar with all the needs 

of the school district.” Id. at 496 n.5. And, of note, the Court’s strong observations regarding 

Wisconsin law as to school board authority were made before the legislature even more greatly 

broadened the powers, duties and discretion afforded to school boards in 1995. See supra ¶27.

9

 Klosterman has developed no argument challenging the reliability of any of the reports 

considered by the school board, even those from anonymous sources. As a result, we need not 

delve into an analysis of such an issue. 
No. 2020AP2076

18

had looked at the boy’s eye at some point, he also engaged in physical contact with 

this student that is completely consistent with Peeters’ reported description.

¶34 Peeters also reported personally observing Klosterman at a football 

game standing with one male student “somewhat isolated” from others and “very 

close to each other face to face,” and Klosterman and this student were “holding 

hands with both hands” for approximately one and one-half minutes. Peeters’ 

impression of the hand holding was that it appeared “more intimate.” A school staff 

member at the game approached Peeters, also concerned about Klosterman’s 

conduct that night, specifically asking Peeters if he was observing Klosterman’s 

conduct. Peeters reported that video footage from the game revealed Klosterman 

approaching and “hug[ging] from behind” two male students and later hugging a 

student in such a manner that Klosterman had “full contact with the front of his body 

against this student,” in a “full body hug” for about five seconds. Minutes later, 

Klosterman hugged another student in which he “physically pick[ed] the student up 

off of the ground while hugging.”

¶35 The school board asked Peeters to speak with Klosterman about its 

concerns with such behavior. When Peeters did so, Klosterman told him “that he 

was not going to change his behavior.”

¶36 Around this same time period, a staff member reported observing 

Klosterman in a classroom sitting back-to-back with a male student in the same 

beanbag chair, and Klosterman appeared to be “moving side to side, rubbing his 

back against the back” of this boy. On a later date, the staff member observed 

Klosterman sitting next to a male student who was wearing shorts, and who the staff 

member believed was the same male student as in the beanbag-chair incident. 

Klosterman “was leaning against the student” with his arm “lying lengthwise down 
No. 2020AP2076

19

the student’s [t]high” and his hand “cupping the student’s knee.” When Klosterman 

saw the staff member, he “changed his behavior by quickly taking his hand and arm 

off of the student and separating himself from the student.” It was the staff 

member’s opinion that Klosterman’s contact with the student was “inappropriate ... 

for a student/teacher relationship.” When Peeters and the superintendent 

subsequently spoke with this student directly, he “denied any physical contact 

between he and Klosterman other than high 5’s,” but when asked specifically about 

the reported incident of Klosterman having his hand on the boy’s knee just days 

earlier, the boy “appeared to have a difficult time remembering the details and his 

story did change a few times.” The boy “did acknowledge sitting next to 

Klosterman during this study hour” and did admit that he was wearing shorts that 

day, but denied that Klosterman’s hand was on his leg. Peeters and the 

superintendent also learned that the boy had been paid to mow Klosterman’s lawn, 

did other work at Klosterman’s home, and would be left at Klosterman’s residence 

“with Klosterman without any other adult supervision and would play Fortnite in 

Klosterman’s theater room.” 

¶37 When Peeters and the superintendent met with a former law 

enforcement officer with “over 20 years of investigating sensitive crimes and sexual 

offenders,” the officer expressed that Klosterman’s actions and statements “mirror” 

sex offenders she has investigated, and she expressed her opinion that Klosterman 

“should not be around kids.”

¶38 Klosterman’s excessive physical contact with young male students, 

including engaging in full body hugs/contact, and his refusal to abstain from such 

contact in the future posed a significant risk—a physical and psychological risk to 

children on District property and a legal/financial risk to the District and ultimately 
No. 2020AP2076

20

District taxpayers.10 Even if the anonymous reports are not considered, there was 

ample evidence of the risk posed by Klosterman. The full body touching displayed 

in the hallway video, the face-to-face closeness and intimate handholding in an 

isolated area at the football game, and the “full contact with the front of his body 

against [a] student” in a “full body hug” at the football game provided enough 

evidence to make the board’s decision to ban Klosterman reasonable to promote the 

cause of education by keeping students safe. Adding to that the experience-based 

opinion of the seasoned law enforcement officer, the board acted extremely 

reasonably in instituting and maintaining the ban against Klosterman coming onto 

District property; it certainly did not erroneously exercise its “wide discretion.” 

Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 288 Wis. 2d 771, ¶18.

¶39 Additionally, it is worth noting that the board did not institute and 

does not maintain an absolute ban on Klosterman entering upon District property. 

Instead, Klosterman was directed “not to enter any District grounds or buildings, 

unless you are given prior express permission” by the human resources director or 

the superintendent. (Emphasis added.) The record suggests that Klosterman has 

made no attempt to seek permission from the superintendent or human resources 

director to attend specific functions or events.11 Thus, as far as we know at this 

point, had such a request been made, it may have been granted either outright or 

with conditions that would allow Klosterman to participate in or observe a particular 

 

10

 Though the District has remained focused on the security and well-being of its students, 

no doubt there would also be concern about liability to which it would be exposing District 

taxpayers if it failed to act on the information it had regarding Klosterman’s penchant for excessive 

physical contact with young male students, especially after learning that Klosterman’s conduct 

“mirror[ed]” that of sex offenders a seasoned law enforcement officer had investigated.

11

 In his appellate briefing, Klosterman says he “is asking to be allowed access to sporting 

events that are open to the general public.” To this concern, we note that the board’s restriction 

only applies to Omro School District property; there has been no suggestion that it would prohibit 

attendance at sporting events held off District property. 
No. 2020AP2076

21

event and yet help ensure the safety of children. See, e.g., Jackson v. McCurry, 762 

Fed. App’x. 919, 923, 928-29 (11th Cir. 2019) (concluding the superintendent did 

not violate clearly established law by barring a father who was found to “pose[] a 

threat to the safety of the school’s employees and students” from making any 

“unauthorized” appearances at school or extracurricular activities where students 

would be present, except to drop off or pick up his daughter, and if he did attend a 

school event, he was required to “remain in the designated area for parents”). 

By the Court.—Order affirmed.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

1

No. 2020AP2076(D)

¶40 GROGAN, J. (dissenting). I agree that WIS. STAT. § 120.12(1) 

provides school boards with the authority to manage “the property and affairs of the 

school district” and that WIS. STAT. § 118.001 requires “[t]he statutory duties and 

powers of school boards” to “be broadly construed[.]” But, both of these statutes 

include limitations,1and neither confers unfettered discretion upon a school board.2 

And, a school board’s statutory authority does not trump an individual’s personal 

liberties guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. See § 118.001. The 

majority affirms a ban that has continued for approaching four years—apparently 

without a single violation—in the small community of Omro (population of

approximately 3,500), where the “school grounds” include walking trails and other 

 

1

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 120.12 provides that “[t]he school board of a common or union high 

school district shall:”

Subject to the authority vested in the annual meeting and to the 

authority and possession specifically given to other school district 

officers, have the possession, care, control and management of the 

property and affairs of the school district, except for property of 

the school district used for public library purposes under s. 43.52.

Sec. 120.12(1).

WISCONSIN STAT. § 118.001 provides:

The statutory duties and powers of school boards shall be broadly 

construed to authorize any school board action that is within the 

comprehensive meaning of the terms of the duties and powers, if 

the action is not prohibited by the laws of the federal government 

or of this state.

2

 “School board,” “Board,” and “Omro School Board” are used interchangeably.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

2

areas that are open to the public. It bases its decision on the introductory language 

of WIS. STAT. § 120.13, which says a “school district may do all things reasonable 

to promote the cause of education,” and § 118.001’s text requiring broad 

construction of a school board’s duties and powers. But, “all things reasonable” 

cannot mean “anything and everything[,]” see James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶22, 

397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (“What is reasonable and necessary cannot 

be reasonably read to encompass anything and everything.”), and the text of 

§ 120.13 itself says “all things reasonable” must directly relate “to promot[ing] the 

cause of education[.]”3 

¶41 Without fully analyzing WIS. STAT. § 120.13—a very lengthy statute

that primarily ties the “promot[ion] [of] the cause of education” language to actions 

by “pupils”—the majority blithely expands the Board’s statutory authority far 

beyond the statute’s text and opens wide a door through which any school board 

 

3

 The majority, like the circuit court, appears to base its analysis almost exclusively on 

what was purportedly before the Board at the time the Board made its decision to ban—and 

subsequently to continue to ban—Klosterman, despite recognizing that procedurally, this matter is 

before the court on an appeal of a grant of summary judgment. I therefore consider the entirety of 

the Record as it pertains to the summary judgment filings. See WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2) (“The 

[summary] judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law.”). Therefore, assuming the majority has correctly construed WIS. STAT. § 120.13 and its 

applicability here, the question is not whether the Board’s decision to ban Klosterman is 

“reasonable to promote the cause of education” based exclusively on the information before the 

Board (and it is not even clear what, exactly, comprises the entirety of the information before the 

Board or whether that information remained static throughout or was instead supplemented each 

time Klosterman requested the ban be removed), but rather whether there are any genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether the Board’s decision was “reasonable to promote the cause of education” 

based on all of the summary judgment filings. Importantly, failing to consider the full scope of the 

summary judgment filings and instead limiting review to the information before the Board at the 

time it made its decisions would effectively give the Board an unfettered ability to define the scope 

of materials it considers and, in turn, allow the Board to both define and limit the scope of 

documents and information subject to judicial review on summary judgment. 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

3

could take any action to exert authority indefinitely over any person in regard to his 

presence on any school property (not just school buildings) under the guise of it 

being related to the promotion of education.

4

 I respectfully dissent.

¶42 Before I begin, it is important to identify the legal issues that are—

and are not—involved here. This appeal is not about the administrative restrictions

in place during the time Neil Klosterman, while still a School District of Omro (the 

District) employee, was on paid administrative leave in October 2018 while the 

District investigated an anonymous staff member’s report about feeling

uncomfortable after allegedly observing Klosterman physically touch a student.5 

Rather, this appeal requires consideration of the circumstances, if any, under which 

a school board has the authority to impose restrictions over a member of the public, 

and if so, whether, in the context of a summary judgment motion, this school board 

has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether 

the restrictions imposed upon Klosterman are “reasonable to promote the cause of 

education[.]”

 

4

 One need look no further than the majority opinion’s footnote eight to see just how far 

the majority opinion’s “interpretation” of the statute extends a school board’s power. Majority, 

¶32 n.8.

The majority opinion props up its statutory “interpretation” by pointing out the school 

board’s refusal to lift the restrictions was unanimous. But, unanimity is not a relevant factor in 

interpreting a board’s scope of statutory authority. Likewise, the majority opinion’s reliance on the 

statements it pulls from Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass’n, 

426 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1976), are unpersuasive. Hortonville involved a school board’s authority to 

fire teachers who broke the law. Id. at 496. This case is not about whether a school board has the 

statutory authority to dismiss its teachers.

5

 Although both Klosterman and the student involved denied inappropriate touching, the 

report triggered an investigation to determine the truth and validity of the expressed concern. 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

4

¶43 Specifically, Klosterman challenges the Board’s refusal to lift the 

restrictions—which are based solely on a combination of almost four-year-old 

conduct that made anonymous staff members feel uncomfortable and “facts” built 

on multiple layers of hearsay—after the District concluded its October 2018 

investigation. Those restrictions include the following:

1. You are ordered not to enter any District grounds or 

buildings, unless you are given prior express permission by 

myself [the Human Resources Director] or Superintendent 

Rieckmann; 

2. You are directed to have no contact with students, 

parents, or District staff, with the exception of myself and 

Superintendent Rieckmann[.]

[6]

 

The majority, noting that Klosterman addresses only the property restriction on 

appeal, declines to address the second restriction and instead presumes the nocontact restriction ended when Klosterman resigned. Majority, ¶17 n.5. It is 

unclear, however, whether the no-contact restriction remains in place, as the Board’s 

brief points out that Klosterman’s Complaint “sought the blanket removal of all

restrictions placed upon him” (emphasis added), and Klosterman’s own affidavit 

alleges the restrictions—plural—in place during his administrative leave “exist 

today, including the inability of me to be on the school grounds, even those parts 

which are public property and areas that are open to the public.” Because the 

majority declines to address the second restriction, the question of whether the 

Board has authority to impose an unqualified ban on having any contact with any

student, parent, or staff member remains unresolved, as does the question of whether 

the unqualified ban violates Klosterman’s constitutional rights. 

 

6

 The remaining two restrictions in the District’s October 2018 directive were directly 

related to the investigation that occurred while Klosterman was still employed and are therefore 

not relevant here.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

5

¶44 In addressing the first restriction, the majority concludes the Omro 

School Board has the statutory authority to prohibit anyone from ever coming onto 

school grounds without prior permission—regardless of whether students are 

present. It likewise concludes the Board acted reasonably to promote the cause of 

education despite: (1) the fact that it did not identify any student who alleged 

inappropriate physical contact during the thirteen years Klosterman taught, coached, 

and mentored students in the District; (2) the investigations having been closed 

without finding evidence of any inappropriate conduct, let alone conduct rising to 

the level of a criminal violation; (3) DPI7 not having found any basis to revoke his 

teaching license; and (4) Klosterman never having been charged with, tried for, or 

convicted of a crime related to the incidents described—or any other crime at all. 

According to the majority, it is reasonable (to promote the cause of education) for 

the Board to ban a member of the public from school grounds (not just school 

buildings and not just during school hours), regardless of whether students are 

present, despite such a ban being based on nothing more than anonymous reports 

from distant observers (made years ago) who were unfamiliar with the students or 

the context in which the conduct occurred and despite a lack of concern about any 

physical contact from the students (and their parents) involved. 

 

7

 DPI is the acronym for the Department of Public Instruction, which oversees licensing 

for teachers in the State of Wisconsin. While the school was investigating Klosterman, 

Superintendent Kelly Rieckmann referred the matter to DPI, which conducted its own 

investigation. 

Klosterman’s brief reports that DPI concluded there was no basis to revoke his teaching 

license, and the District does not contest this. The DPI website, which I take judicial notice of, 

confirms that Klosterman’s teaching license has not been suspended or revoked. Wis. Dep’t of 

Pub. Instruction, Educator Licensing Online,

https://elo.wieducatorlicensing.org/datamart/licenseDetails.do?xentId=248085 (last visited 

August 10, 2022). See WIS. STAT. § 902.01(2)(b).
No. 2020AP2076(D)

6

¶45 Again, this appeal comes to us after the circuit court granted the

District’s summary judgment motion. “In reviewing a decision on summary 

judgment, we utilize the same methodology as that applied by the circuit court. A 

reviewing court thus will not reverse a summary judgment decision unless the 

record reveals that one or more genuine issues of material fact are in dispute or the 

moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Strasser v. Transtech 

Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, ¶30, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142

(citations omitted); see also WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2). The dispositive question then 

is: was summary judgment properly granted? In answering that question, we need 

to decide both whether the statutes authorize the District’s action, and if so, whether 

the summary judgment submissions create any genuine issues of material fact with 

respect to whether the Board’s refusal to lift the broad and indefinite restrictions it 

imposed on Klosterman almost four years ago are “reasonable to promote the cause 

of education[.]” 

¶46 The majority concludes as a matter of law that “the board acted 

extremely reasonably in instituting and maintaining the ban against Klosterman 

coming onto District property[.]”8 Majority, ¶38. However, in doing so, the 

majority selects facts from the Record that support the outcome it reaches without 

providing the full context necessary to fairly and objectively resolve this summary 

judgment appeal. In doing so, it relies heavily on the affidavit of nowSuperintendent Jay Jones, still images from a Spring 2018 video (the video itself is 

 

8

 In reaching this conclusion, the majority fails to connect “reasonableness” to promoting 

the cause of education, which is, under the majority’s statutory interpretation, what WIS. STAT.

§ 120.13 requires.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

7

not part of the record), and what purports to be Officer John Peeters’ “report.”9 

Significantly, Jones became the Omro Superintendent in August 201910 and avers 

he has neither met Klosterman, nor was he personally involved in the 2018 

investigation or imposition of restrictions. Jones explains that, before he became 

Superintendent, his only knowledge of Klosterman’s situation “was through public 

outlets,” he never met Klosterman, he “never had any direct or indirect relationship 

with” Klosterman, and attaches to his affidavit what purports to be Peeters’ 

“narrative report,” which is not signed by Peeters—or anyone at all—and does not 

look like an official police report. Rather, the report is simply typed paragraphs of 

text (which appears to be in a Word document) that is not on official letterhead, is 

not officially dated, and is not paginated. Because the majority fails to describe, let 

alone consider, the full scope of evidence presented in the Record, it is necessary to

provide the full context of what occurred before reviewing whether the circuit court 

erred in granting the District’s summary judgment motion.

I. THE FULL RECORD AND CONTEXT

¶47 The majority glaringly omits many facts presented in the Record, 

particularly those that reflect favorably on Klosterman. This is particularly 

concerning given that this matter is here on appeal after a grant of summary 

judgment, which looks to whether any issues of material fact exist. See WIS. STAT.

§ 802.08(2). According to documents in the Record, Klosterman began teaching in 

 

9

 The “report” is more akin to an informal summary log rather than an official police 

report.

10

 Former Superintendent Rieckmann, who was involved in the underlying district-level 

proceedings, resigned effective June 2019. 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

8

the District in August 2005. During Klosterman’s first two years of employment, 

he received criticism for his discipline of “‘difficult students[.]’”11 After he was 

transferred from eighth grade to seventh grade, Klosterman enjoyed “nine years 

without any recorded incidents.”12 By many accounts,13 he was a beloved teacher, 

coach, and mentor. The Record contains numerous examples of the praise and 

support Klosterman found within the Omro community:

 A close friend who coached basketball in Omro stated Klosterman 

“seemed to have an impact on each and every kid that he taught. 

All my players through the years had nothing but positive things 

to say about [him] and loved when he helped with the team[.]” He 

also said multiple students described Klosterman as their favorite 

teacher, and he described Klosterman as “loyal, dependable, 

honest, and kind.” 

 Numerous colleagues described Klosterman’s positive impact on 

students, his ability to form strong student-teacher relationships, 

his positive mentorship, and his dedication to his work. 

 One colleague described Klosterman as “the exact teacher I would 

want my children to have. His mix of care and dedication, 

charisma and outgoingness, drive and excitement are everything 

each and every student deserves to have in their classrooms.” 

Another colleague described Klosterman as “genuinely caring and 

trustworthy” and “an honorable individual and a caring member of 

his community.” 

 A former middle school athletic director and science teacher 

described Klosterman as “a man of integrity” and wrote that she 

“was impressed with the knowledge, the creativity, and the passion 

[Klosterman] brought to [the teaching] team.” She stated that 

 

11

 Devi Shastri, School leaders tried to let a beloved teacher go. Now, his 

supporters want them gone., OSHKOSH NORTHWESTERN (July 12, 2018),

https://www.thenorthwestern.com/story/news/education/2018/07/12/omro-school-board-rehiresteacher-neil-klosterman-after-public-outcry-and-support/595330002/.

12

 Id.

13

 All of the individuals supporting Klosterman signed their names and did not request 

anonymity, but there is no reason to include their names for the purposes of this dissent.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

9

“[s]tudents came first to [Klosterman], and he always was looking 

for ways to help our kids in every way possible. He truly inspired 

many of his colleagues to become better teachers by encouraging 

us to find new ways to do things, while respecting the things that 

were already in place.” She also described Klosterman’s passion 

for teaching and coaching, stating Klosterman “instilled so much 

confidence in all of the kids. His team building techniques and 

coaching strategies allowed each student to excel at their own 

pace. He showed the utmost respect for each and every student he 

encountered. I loved seeing their faces light up when they 

accomplished something new, and the gentle way that [he] 

encouraged them along the way.” She “NEVER ... felt 

uncomfortable with the way he interacted with his students.” 

 Multiple parents whose children were Klosterman’s students 

praised his teaching skills, expressed gratitude for the positive 

impact Klosterman had on their children, and described him as a 

valuable member of the Omro community. 

 Numerous former students recounted positive experiences in 

Klosterman’s classroom and expressed gratitude for having had 

Klosterman as a teacher and coach. 

 A former student confirmed he “never felt uncomfortable” with 

Klosterman and said students “chose to be in his classroom” 

because they “knew they would be safe and could rely on 

Mr. Klosterman to help and guide them in any situation.” This 

student also recounted community events where Klosterman was 

“often surrounded by former students and players, along with their 

families” and said it was “difficult to see [Klosterman’s] hardearned reputation tarnished and his life turned upside-down due to 

the school district’s actions[.]” 

¶48 Despite the clear sentiment that Klosterman was a valuable member 

of both the Omro community and school district, conflicts arose during the 

2016-17 school year, which Klosterman attributed to the new administration—

specifically new superintendent Kelly Rieckmann. He alleges he was “unjustly 

reprimanded, and after a decade of having no disciplinary action, was written up in 

2016.” Parents and Klosterman’s colleagues support the narrative that the new 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

10

superintendent “targeted” him, and one even suggested there was a “vendetta” 

against Klosterman.14 One longtime colleague described the changes within the 

District when “a new administration” took over, stating it was his “personal 

perception” that the new administration’s “focus was in emphasizing curriculum 

over the individual student[,]” which “appealed to a handful of teachers who found 

more satisfaction meeting curriculum design goals than doing the hard work of 

engaging a classroom of individual students, attempting to meet them where they 

were and helping each one flourish.” He explained that as a result of these changes, 

“[t]he staff started to split into one of two camps; those of us who had strived to 

develop a child-centered school and those who favored a curriculum-based school.” 

He believed that Klosterman’s “refusal to lay down and accept what was happening 

at Omro” led to “this whole saga[.]”

¶49 In April 2018, the District decided it would not offer Klosterman a 

contract for the 2018-19 school year. It is unclear whether that decision arose at 

least in part from the Spring 2018 video showing Klosterman’s interactions with a 

 

14

 One set of parents, who saw Rieckmann’s actions as “personal,” said: 

We have been very troubled over the last 2 years watching the 

previous Superintendent and the Omro School District Board 

target [Klosterman] by tarnishing and ruining [his] reputation 

which he has so painstakingly built over decades. 

 It is our sincere hope that the court realizes that there is no 

justification to keep Mr. Neil Klosterman from attending Omro 

School Functions where he can watch his former students grow 

into successful adults. 

The former middle school athletic director and science teacher similarly said the “apparent vendetta 

against [Klosterman] was unfair, unjust, and has damaged his career[,]” and she believes 

Klosterman “was singled out and wrongly accused” and “was not treated equally amongst his 

peers” by Rieckmann. 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

11

student in the hallway; however, the District was certainly aware of the video as it 

had called on Peeters, a patrol officer at the time, to review it in Spring 2018. 

Although it appears Peeters did not draft a report related to his review of that video 

until he was again called on to investigate Klosterman in October 2018, Peeters’ 

report stemming from the later investigation describes the Spring 2018 video. 

Specifically, he said the video shows Klosterman:

[R]each[ing] down with both hands toward a male student 

sitting on the ground in the hallway. Klosterman then 

assisted this student to his feet and then quickly transitioned 

into Klosterman having his arms around the student’s upper 

body as well as the neck and head region. They were very 

close together, as Klosterman and this young boy’s body 

were touching. Their faces were very close and the video 

appeared as though Klosterman was kissing[15]this male 

student, however, the video was not definitive in that regard. 

The report continues on to explain that Peeters identified the student, who explained 

that the incident related to him being poked in the eye during lunch or at recess and 

“that nothing inappropriate had happened between him and Mr. Klosterman.” 

Peeters determined that no criminal violation had occurred. 

¶50 When the community learned the Board decided not to offer 

Klosterman a contract for the 2018-19 school year, a large number of community 

members attended the May 2018 Board meeting to speak on Klosterman’s behalf 

and convinced the Board to renew his contract. The community protested and 

marched in support of Klosterman with signs stating, “Save Mr. K.!” and “Keep 

 

15

 The apparent “kissing” appears to be to the student’s forehead or eye area. However, 

the Record contains only photos depicting screen shots, presumably from the video, with black 

circles superimposed over the student’s face, which makes it difficult to determine this with any 

degree of certainty.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

12

The Good Ones[.]”16 According to a newspaper article, “many residents and former 

students described [Klosterman] as a life-changing educator.”17 “Several parents 

told the board their children specifically asked to get into ‘Mr. K.’s’ class. One 

mother told the board Klosterman effectively saved her daughter’s life.”18 That 

mother, whose daughter suffers from anxiety and depression, said her daughter 

“‘reads now instead of harming herself, because of Mr. Klosterman[.]’”19 

¶51 The Board unanimously reversed its decision at the meeting and 

renewed Klosterman’s contract for the 2018-19 school year20—despite the conduct 

observed on the Spring 2018 video. At the same time, community members 

expressed discontent with Superintendent Rieckmann and “lined up to sign a 

petition calling for the superintendent’s immediate resignation[,]” claiming 

Rieckmann was “‘trying to rule by fear and intimidation[.]’”21 The petition had over 

400 signatures as of July 2018, and the community members who were supporting 

Klosterman and who were unhappy with Rieckmann also started a Facebook page, 

which grew to over 800 members in July 2018.22 

¶52 Shortly into the 2018-19 school year, however, the District placed 

Klosterman on paid administrative leave amid an investigation by Peeters, now the 

school resource officer, into concerns raised by an anonymous staff member who 

 

16

 Shastri, supra note 11.

17

 Id.

18

 Id.

19

 Id.

20

 Id.

21

 Id.

22

 Id.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

13

thought it was inappropriate for Klosterman to socialize with his students at a 

September 7, 2018 high school football game and who did not like seeing 

Klosterman put his arm around a student’s shoulder or hug students. 

¶53 Ten days later, on September 17, 2018, Peeters spoke with 

Klosterman about his conduct at the football game. In his report, Peeters 

acknowledged that Klosterman “has a good rapport with the students and that many 

students and families like him and many students do like him as an effective 

educator” but that in Peeters’ opinion, that good rapport can be “possible without 

the frequent physical contact[.]” Klosterman, who could not remember the specific 

incidents from the football game, told Peeters that at teacher orientation, the teachers 

“were advised how important physical contact is with students and that some 

students really needed [it.]” Peeters agreed with Klosterman that “physical contact 

with a student could sometimes be situational and depend on the context of the 

situation.” Peeters admitted he “had only observed [Klosterman’s] behavior from a 

distance and was not close enough to listen to any sort of conversations” and that he 

(Peeters) was “still learning [students’] faces and names[.]” It was during this 

conversation that Klosterman indicated he would not change his conduct. It is 

unclear whether anyone from the administration ever demanded that Klosterman 

refrain from all physical contact.

¶54 In October 2018, Peeters brought two families to the Omro Police 

Department for interviews during his investigation. According to Peeters’ report, 

the first family expressed fondness for Klosterman and concern about the 

“animosity” “some members of the community” saw “between the School District 

Administration and Neil Klosterman.” That family told Peeters their son confides 

in Klosterman, they were aware of the hugging, and that they had no issues with it. 

Peeters showed them a video of a hug between Klosterman and their son, and neither 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

14

parent saw anything improper. The mother told Peeters that in other cultures, this 

sort of physical contact is “completely normal and acceptable[.]” Peeters later 

discovered that Klosterman had taught for two years in Spain before coming to the 

Omro schools. Peeters also indicated in his report that the son, when questioned, 

did not report feeling uncomfortable with any of his interactions with Klosterman. 

¶55 After the interview, this same mother sent the Omro administrators a 

letter expressing her concerns about Peeters and the interview itself.23 She provided 

a description of what her son said in that interview that does not appear in Peeters’ 

report and said she felt that Peeters had “an agenda when asking questions, and it 

was not to gather facts and information.” She also said neither she nor her husband 

had any concerns with Klosterman’s actions in the video or “with what we have 

witnessed in person as parents” and indicated that the questions asked of her son 

were “leading” and that “when the answers given didn’t fit, the questions changed 

to try to get different answers.” She went on to state that her “child’s answers were 

honest and direct, and stated that he at no time felt uncomfortable in any situation 

with the staff member in question, nor any other staff member or coach, for that 

matter.” She also questioned whether Peeters was “properly trained to work with 

children, teens, and young adults, both in regards to questioning them, and 

understanding their particular social and emotional developmental stages[.]” 

 

23

 Given that this letter was sent in October 2018, it would appear likely that the Board 

had this information when it decided to continue the ban. Thus, even if this court was limited to 

reviewing the materials the Board considered when it made its decisions to continue the ban, the 

mother’s concerns—particularly her disagreement with the District’s portrayal of Klosterman’s 

interaction with her son—are likely sufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether banning 

Klosterman was “reasonable to promote the cause of education[.]” See WIS. STAT. § 120.13.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

15

¶56 The second family Peeters interviewed at the police station was the 

family of the student involved in the alleged knee touch and back-to-back contact.24 

The student denied having any physical contact with Klosterman besides “high 5’s.” 

Peeters’ report indicates that when specifically asked about Klosterman cupping his 

knee, the student said Klosterman’s hands were only on the desk and not his leg and 

that none of his interactions with Klosterman made him uncomfortable. 

¶57 Peeters’ report explains he also spoke with Patti Crump, a retired law 

enforcement officer who started a program for sensitive crime victims in 

Waushara County.25 Peeters says: “I did share some of the circumstances with Patti 

and did express great concern by the behaviors that were described that have been 

exhibited by Neil Klosterman.” According to Peeters, Crump “indicate[d] that 

many of [Klosterman’s] behaviors ... and the things he has said mirror other sexual 

offenders that she has investigated” and that Klosterman, who she appears to have 

neither met nor spoken with, “should not be around kids.” It also does not appear 

that Crump ever spoke with any of the students or families identified in Peeters’ 

investigation, and because the Record does not contain Crump’s affidavit or formal 

statement, it is unclear what information Crump based her opinion on or whether 

Peeters’ opinions and perceptions influenced her own. 

¶58 Peeters’ report also discloses that he reached out to Oshkosh Police 

Officer Deana Brandl, a forensic interviewer, and asked her to conduct interviews 

with a few Omro Middle School students. Peeters’ report reflects that Brandl spoke 

 

24

 Due to redacted student names throughout the Record, it is at times difficult to confirm 

which students were purportedly involved with the alleged physical touching incidents and whether 

certain references in Peeters’ report pertained to the same student or different students. However, 

one of the anonymous staff member complaints said that he/she believed it “was the same male 

student” involved with both the knee touching and back-to-back contact. 

25

 Omro is in Winnebago County.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

16

with three students, one of whom said he was never at Klosterman’s house and that 

although he reported having been “hugged or physically contacted about a dozen 

times ... he was not uncomfortable.” Another student said he had been to 

Klosterman’s house but was never inside. A third student said he was paid ten 

dollars to mow Klosterman’s grass. The third student had also done yard work for 

Klosterman—this student’s mother was friends with Klosterman, and the mother 

and son had been at Klosterman’s house together. The mother also left her son at 

Klosterman’s house, and he “would play Fortnite in Klosterman’s theater room.”26 

¶59 As part of his investigation, Peeters contacted Child Protective 

Services (CPS) to “inform them of everything that we had learned about and the 

rumors that we have heard and did explain the situation to them.” (Emphasis 

added.) The parents who CPS contacted declined forensic interviews of their 

children, and CPS took no action. Peeters concluded his report by noting “no 

criminal violations have been alleged at this point” and closed the case. It is unclear 

what date the case was specifically closed, although the last date in the report is 

October 29, 2018. 

¶60 During the course of the District’s investigation, Rieckmann notified 

DPI, which required the District to send Klosterman’s entire personnel file. DPI 

also contacted Klosterman and considered his version of events. Klosterman told 

DPI the following: 

 “I have never engaged in any inappropriate relationship or 

immoral conduct with any student.” 

 

26

 Again, because the Record contains only a redacted copy of Peeters’ “report,” it is 

unclear exactly which students the report refers to in recounting the students’ accounts.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

17

 There were “four occasions where students came to my house for 

the purpose of doing yardwork” with “parental permission[.]”27 

 “On at least two of those occasions, the mother of two of the 

students ... was present.” 

 Three years ago, he hosted a pizza party with the freshman 

basketball team and their coach to watch the movie Hoosiers. 

Klosterman had coached most of those boys when they were in 

junior high. Permission slips were signed, and the “students’ 

parents picked up and dropped off their sons from my house.” 

 He has “never been contacted by police or child protective services 

as part of any investigation into my interactions with students. No 

parent has ever communicated to me that they felt I had an 

inappropriate relationship with their child.” 

 He believes “the superintendent recommended me for nonrenewal 

due to my outspoken disagreement with administration regarding 

changes to the District’s educational policies.” 

 He explained the discord taking place in the Omro community, 

including the turmoil between the community and the 

superintendent/administration. 

DPI, after considering all of the evidence, concluded there was no basis to revoke 

Klosterman’s teaching license.

¶61 Klosterman ultimately resigned in December 2018, and he has since 

requested that the Board lift the restrictions that were put in place during the 

District’s October 2018 investigation. The Board has declined to lift the restrictions, 

both via an email dated January 2, 2019, and a letter from the Board president in 

July 2019. Neither denial relied on any statutes, let alone WIS. STAT. § 120.13’s 

 

27

 The majority references a student who “had been paid to mow Klosterman’s lawn, did 

other work at Klosterman’s home, and would be left at Klosterman’s residence ‘with Klosterman 

without any other adult supervision and would play Fortnite in Klosterman’s theater room[,]’” 

Majority, ¶36, but the majority fails to explain why it seemingly believes this conduct supports its 

conclusion that banning Klosterman was “reasonable” as it relates to “promot[ing] the cause of 

education[.]” See WIS. STAT. § 120.13. 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

18

introductory language. The formal letter does not say the Board decided to retain 

the restrictions to “promote the cause of education,” see § 120.13, or that 

Klosterman posed a danger to students. To the contrary, it says: “Allegations at the 

time involved concerns with your ability to follow District rules and directives. We 

believe that time is needed for the District to heal following those years of 

controversy. Maintaining the current directive to have you remain off premises is 

an effort to allow that healing process.” 

¶62 Klosterman asked the Board again in September 2019 to lift the 

restrictions, but the Board’s attorney communicated the Board’s denial in a 

September 30 letter, citing WIS. STAT. § 120.13 generally and § 120.13(35) 

specifically (a subsection that even the majority concludes does not provide 

authority here). The letter, noting that WIS. STAT. § 118.001 requires broad 

construction of these statutes, points to two school policies that the attorney believed 

warranted the continued unqualified ban. First, the letter cited the “School Visitors” 

policy, which allows it to “prohibit the entry of any person to a school or to expel 

any person” if “there is reason to believe” his or her presence “would be detrimental 

to the good order of the school” or request police assistance if someone “refuses to 

leave the school grounds or creates a disturbance[.]” Second, it cited and attached 

the “Spectator Conduct” policy, which it said requires “that spectators shall refrain 

from verbal or physical conduct that is disruptive and embarrassing to the students, 

the school district and the entire community.” The letter explained that 

Klosterman’s “conduct on school grounds in the past” violated both policies and 

“merit[ed] continued exclusion ... from school property and activities.” So, 

although the Board’s lawyer, for the first time, cited to the statutes examined in this 

appeal, the Board’s refusal to lift the restrictions relied on school policies that do 

not authorize continuance of the unqualified ban. The first policy addresses 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

19

presence in school buildings or disturbances requiring police assistance, and the 

second policy plainly relates to insisting that spectators, like the student participants, 

“display mature behavior and sportsmanship.” 

¶63 After repeatedly28 asking the Board to allow him to come onto school 

property, specifically for sporting events, with no success, Klosterman filed suit 

against the District seeking a judgment that the District’s restrictions violated his 

rights and enjoining the District from prohibiting him “from being lawfully on 

school grounds as any member of the public would be[.]”29 The Board filed a 

motion for summary judgment asserting the restrictions were lawfully imposed and 

that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Klosterman opposed the 

summary judgment motion and filed multiple supporting affidavits. Klosterman 

argued that summary judgment should be denied because the case involved many 

genuine issues of material fact. He asserted the District “has violated his 

constitutional rights to be on the property and that there are no statutory or common 

law grounds for them to restrict him in such a matter.” The circuit court granted 

summary judgment for the Board, concluding the Board had the authority to 

continue the restriction under WIS. STAT. § 120.13 for the “good order of the school” 

and that no constitutional right “usurp[s] the authority of the School District[.]” 

 

28

 The majority says Klosterman never requested permission to come onto school grounds, 

and so we do not know whether his requests would be denied. Majority, ¶39. But that is exactly 

what he repeatedly did by requesting that the Board remove the restrictions so he could come onto 

school grounds for sporting events, and we do know that every request was denied. There is nothing 

to suggest that, had Klosterman narrowed his request to a specific event on a particular date, it 

would have been granted.

29

 Klosterman also filed a motion for injunctive relief, which the circuit court denied. 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

20

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory authority and reasonableness

¶64 The full text of WIS. STAT. § 120.13’s introductory language provides

as follows: “The school board of a common or union high school district may do 

all things reasonable to promote the cause of education, including establishing, 

providing and improving school district programs, functions and activities for the 

benefit of pupils, and including all of the following:[.]” After the colon, § 120.13 

lists forty-five subsections across many pages—none of which authorize banning a 

community member from school property. Subsection (35), titled “Presence in 

school buildings[,]”

30 comes closest, but it covers only school buildings and 

addresses only rules related to people who “enter or remain in a [school] building.” 

 

30

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 120.13(35) provides:

PRESENCE IN SCHOOL BUILDINGS.

(a) A school board may adopt rules applicable to persons who 

enter or remain in a building operated by the school board, 

including requirements that such persons identify themselves and 

sign in when entering or remaining in the building or any specified 

portion of the building and designating time periods during which 

such persons may enter or remain in the building or any portion of 

the building.

(b) 1. Except as provided in subd. 2., any person entering or 

remaining in a building or portion of a building in violation of the 

school board’s rules is subject to a forfeiture of not more than 

$1,000. Any person entering or remaining in a building or portion 

of a building in violation of the school board’s rules under 

circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace 

may be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more 

than 90 days or both.

 2. Subdivision 1. does not apply to pupils, parents of pupils, 

school district employees or officials or agents of a certified or 

recognized representative of school district employees who are 

included in a collective bargaining unit.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

21

The majority concedes the text of subsection (35) does not apply to the Board’s

actions banning Klosterman from school grounds/property. Majority, ¶23. 

¶65 The concession that subsection (35) does not apply leads the majority 

to the introductory language of WIS. STAT. § 120.13—“reasonable to promote the 

cause of education” “for the benefit of pupils[.]” And, although these terms are not 

statutorily defined, the legislature identified many specific tasks authorized by the 

statute. Subsection (1), which addresses pupil suspension and expulsion rules,

covers three and one-half pages in the statute book. Subsections (2) through (38) 

address insurance, contracts and leases, on-farm training to eligible veterans, books 

and equipment purchases, federal aid, teachers and administrators exchange 

program, funds for rewards, contracting with architects and engineers, food and 

legal services, employing nurses and dentists, historical records, prekindergarten 

classes, child care programs, special high school courses, paying school board 

membership fees, renting out school premises for non-school functions, acquisition 

of property, renewable resource facilities, establishing community programs and 

services, selling and purchasing property, providing free lectures for “adult residents 

of the school district[,]” leasing cable and data services, bonds, contracts with other 

governmental units, leasing school property, contracting for education services not 

available in the school, contracting for special education services and mental health, 

transportation of non-pupils and indigent pupils, designating records custodians, 

borrowing money, awarding credit for hunter education programs, school crossing 

guards, school board orientation, spending money, employing permit officers, 

leasing prekindergarten/kindergarten space, awarding high school diplomas to 

veterans, operating single-sex schools, and allowing hunting in school forests. See 

§ 120.13(2)-(38). Conspicuously absent from this long list is a subsection banning 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

22

a law-abiding community member from entering school grounds indefinitely, at all 

times, regardless of whether students are present. 

¶66 When interpreting statutes, we begin with the statutory language. 

State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 

633, 681 N.W.2d 110. “‘If the meaning of the statute is plain,’” we need not inquire 

further. Id. (citation omitted). “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, 

and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases 

are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id. We also interpret 

statutory language “in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 

a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and
No. 2020AP2076(D)

23

reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46. The majority 

decision does not even cite Kalal let alone apply Kalal’s analytical framework.31

¶67 Instead, the majority seizes on a few of WIS. STAT. § 120.13’s 

introductory words and does not fully analyze the Board’s authority under the 

statutes to do what it did here, and it is not necessary for me to do a full analysis 

either, because even assuming the statute provides the authority the majority says it 

does, and even assuming the Board’s broad, indefinite restrictions do not infringe 

on constitutional rights, the Board nevertheless failed to show, as a matter of law, 

that banning Klosterman was “reasonable to promote the cause of education” when 

it refused to lift the restrictions. See id. The Board’s refusal to lift the restrictions 

 

31

 Instead of analyzing the statute, the majority relies on Pritchard v. Madison 

Metropolitan School District, 2001 WI App 62, ¶16, 242 Wis. 2d 301, 625 N.W.2d 613, a case 

where this court held the school district could authorize health insurance payments for unmarried 

partners of school district employees. Pritchard, however, relied on a specific subsection of WIS.

STAT. § 120.13—subsection (33)—which authorizes “spend[ing] money as needed to meet the 

immediate expenses of operating and maintaining the public instruction in the school district.” 

Pritchard, 242 Wis. 2d 301, ¶11 (alteration in original); see also § 120.13(33). No subsection in 

§ 120.13 authorizes the restrictions imposed by the Board here. The majority also cites to the 

federal district court case Anderson v. Hansen, 489 F. Supp. 3d 836 (E.D. Wis. 2020), for the 

proposition that “no person has an absolute right to enter school property[.]” Id. at 845. Anderson

does say that, but it was not a holding in that case and was further qualified. Anderson involved a 

parent who was banned from entering school property without first asking permission after the 

parent voiced concerns about the mask mandate at a school board meeting. Id. at 839. The court 

granted the parent’s motion for injunctive relief, in effect voiding the ban, and permitting the parent 

“to access District property on the same terms and conditions that apply to all other members of 

the public who have children enrolled in District schools.” Id. at 846. The court concluded that 

“forcing the plaintiff to obtain permission before entering school property is itself a form of 

irreparable harm” and that while, “as the defendants point out, no person has an absolute right to 

enter school property, parents are generally allowed to enter school property without first asking 

permission to do things such as pick up their children and attend recitals and school plays.” Id. at 

844-45 (emphasis added). That phrase, pulled out of Anderson, may be generally true, but it is not 

a holding, and Klosterman is not asserting that he has an absolute right to enter school property. 

He just wants to have the same rights that other members of the Omro community enjoy. Further, 

this court is not bound by decisions of the federal district courts. State v. Mechtel, 176 Wis. 2d 87, 

95, 499 N.W.2d 662 (1993).
No. 2020AP2076(D)

24

is either unreasonable as a matter of law, or the summary judgment materials create 

a genuine issue of material fact on the question. 

¶68 Either way, the majority ignores the full context at play here and fails 

to identify sufficient evidence to explain how Klosterman’s total banishment is 

“reasonable to promote the cause of education[.]” See id. (emphasis added). 

Instead, in relying on case law not involving school boards and failing to 

meaningfully apply the summary judgment standard of review, it simply rubberstamps the Board’s decision.32

 Even if I assume the majority’s statutory 

interpretation is correct, there nevertheless must still be a reasonable connection 

between the restrictions and supporting the “cause of education[.]” And, at the very 

least, this summary judgment record demonstrates that there are disputed material 

facts as to whether the Board’s continued restrictions banning Klosterman are 

reasonable to promote the cause of education.

¶69 The majority certainly evokes strong emotions by suggesting 

Klosterman is a sexual predator who the Board must keep away from school grounds 

to protect Omro students. Indeed, protecting students from pedophiles and criminals 

is something we all strive to do, and we likewise desire to provide children with a 

safe learning environment that ensures they are protected from adults who are 

 

32

 The majority sanctions the Board’s decision by citing to Klinger v. Oneida County, 149 

Wis. 2d 838, 844, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989), which involved a county board of adjustment’s findings 

of fact involving entirely different statutes from those governing the Board in this case. The 

majority also relies on Tagatz v. Township of Crystal Lake, 2001 WI App 80, 243 Wis. 2d 108, 

626 N.W.2d 23, which involves statutes affording discretion to a town with respect to “whether it 

is in the public interest to build a road to a landlocked parcel.” Id., ¶1. Neither case supports 

affording a school board discretion to take action beyond what is authorized by the statutes or the 

Constitution, and neither case requires this court to look the other way when a Board’s actions 

violate either.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

25

predators, criminals, or acting with intent to harm. We have many laws that are in 

place to afford those protections. See WIS. STAT. §§ 948.01-948.70.33 Here, 

however, despite Peeters’ apparently extensive and exhaustive investigation, the 

District could not locate a single student who felt uncomfortable receiving hugs or 

other physical contact from Klosterman. Not one. After teaching for thirteen years, 

no purported victim came forward to accuse Klosterman. There is no evidence any 

child was harmed. Nevertheless, the Board continues to prohibit Klosterman from 

coming onto school property open to the public based on a couple of anonymous 

staff member complaints that they—despite being unaware of any context, including 

whether Klosterman may have had personal relationships with a student and his 

family outside of school—felt uncomfortable seeing Klosterman hug some students 

or put his arm on their shoulder.

¶70 The majority says the record “was replete with evidence supporting 

the ban.”34 Majority, ¶33. Yet, the “evidence” it relies on all comes from the 

affidavit of Jay Jones—a person whose “only knowledge” of the situation comes 

 

33

 WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 948, “Crimes Against Children,” includes statutes regarding, inter 

alia, sexual assault (§ 948.02), child abuse (§ 948.03), mental harm (§ 948.04), sexual exploitation 

(§ 948.05), trafficking (§ 948.051), incest (§ 948.06), child enticement (§ 948.07), solicitation for 

prostitution (§ 948.08), child pornography (§ 948.12), and child neglect (§ 948.21).

34

 It is unclear from the majority opinion whether it limits its decision to the Board’s initial

imposition of the ban or whether it concludes that the Board’s subsequent refusals to lift the ban 

years later are reasonable promotions of the cause of education. At this point, we should be focused 

on whether the Board’s refusals to lift the restrictions are authorized and/or reasonable.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

26

from “public outlets.” What does that even mean?

35

 The majority also relies on 

still images of the Spring 2018 video and dismisses Klosterman’s explanation of his 

conduct because the Record does not show Klosterman provided his explanation 

about the student being “‘poked in the eye’” to the Board.36 See Majority, ¶33. But 

the student himself, who was the subject of the video, provided Peeters with the 

same explanation Klosterman provided—and the Board certainly had the student’s

explanation. 

¶71 The majority also points to Peeters’ observations at the 

September 2018 football game, in particular, a hand-holding exchange that Peeters 

saw as “more intimate.” See Majority, ¶6. Yet, Peeters admits he observed only 

from a distance, could not hear the conversation or the context, and had no student 

describe Klosterman’s contact as “intimate.” The majority then points to the 

knee-cupping/back-to-back contact reported by an anonymous staff member, 

Majority, ¶12, which the student involved flatly denied. This appears to be the same 

student whose mother was friends with Klosterman, and she and her son spent time 

 

35

 “Affidavits in support of a motion for summary judgment must contain evidentiary facts, 

of which the affiant has personal knowledge.” Hopper v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 130, 

256 N.W.2d 139 (1977) (emphasis added) (citing Kroske v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 70 Wis. 2d 

632, 641, 235 N.W.2d 283 (1975), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Mullenberg 

v. Kilgust Mech. Inc., 2000 WI 66, ¶¶13-14, 235 Wis. 2d 770, 612 N.W.2d 327). See also WIS.

STAT. § 802.08(3) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge and 

shall set forth such evidentiary facts as would be admissible in evidence.”).

36

 Likewise, the majority dismisses Klosterman’s explanation and simply says that 

regardless of “whether or not Klosterman had looked at the boy’s eye at some point,” the video 

shows Klosterman “engaged in physical contact with this student that is completely consistent with 

Peeters’ reported description.” Majority, ¶33. That may be true. But what the majority blatantly 

ignores is that context is important and that the physical contact here did not occur in a vacuum. 

While the context of this interaction—a student reporting being poked in the eye and a staff member 

thereafter checking the student’s eye in response—may be inconvenient to the majority, the 

majority is nevertheless not entitled to ignore it.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

27

together at Klosterman’s house, and the mother clearly felt comfortable leaving her 

son there.37 

¶72 The majority also cites to former Officer Crump’s informal hearsay

“opinion” Peeters recounted in his “report.” In doing so, the majority ignores the 

informality of Crump’s “opinion” or what the bases were for it. See Majority, ¶13. 

We do not know what information Peeters shared with Crump. There is no official 

report from Crump in the Record, and it does not appear that Crump ever met 

Klosterman or talked to him or any of the alleged victims or their parents. It is 

unclear what information Crump had or whether Crump’s opinion was influenced 

by Peeters’ opinions and perceptions. We have no affidavit or formal statement 

directly from Crump, nor do we have her curriculum vitae to even know the extent 

of her background and experience. And we do not know whether Crump was told 

that all the students who were hugged or otherwise had physical contact with 

Klosterman—and all their parents—found Klosterman’s actions to be appropriate, 

welcome, and in no way problematic. Relying on Crump’s offhand, casual, 

unsworn comments is not proper. 

¶73 Additionally, the majority ignores the context surrounding the 

Klosterman investigation. Klosterman alleges he has never inappropriately touched 

a student, and there is much in the Record to support his position. Klosterman also 

alleges he was targeted not because of this physical contact but because he voiced 

his disagreement with the new administration, and evidence in the Record supports 

this assertion. Klosterman believes Rieckmann had a vendetta against him because 

it was Rieckmann’s treatment of Klosterman that seemed to motivate the Omro 

 

37

 Because the Record does not contain an unredacted copy of Peeters’ report, this cannot 

be confirmed with certainty.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

28

community to take action to remove Rieckmann. The July 2019 letter from the 

Board denying Klosterman’s request to lift restrictions attributes the reason for the 

continued ban as “to allow ... healing” of the conflict between Klosterman and the 

administration. Once attorneys got involved, however, the explanation shifted from 

“time ... to heal” to Klosterman being “detrimental to the good order of the school” 

with reference to WIS. STAT. § 120.13. 

¶74 The majority also ignores that Klosterman has not been charged with 

violating any laws, let alone been convicted of any crime related to the conduct at 

issue. And, at least two independent, neutral agencies—DPI and CPS—saw no 

basis to take action against Klosterman. If DPI, knowing all the facts, sees 

Klosterman fit to actually teach—to be alone in a classroom with students—how 

can it be reasonable to prohibit him from coming onto school grounds to attend 

public sporting events? How can the Board insist that keeping Klosterman off 

school property regardless of whether students are present promotes the cause of 

education when an independent agency saw Klosterman fit to teach? 

¶75 Interestingly enough, the Omro School District apparently has less 

concern about registered sex offenders coming onto school property than it does 

about Klosterman because it imposes no restrictions on registered sex offenders “if 

the person will be on school grounds to vote in an election or to attend a 

non-school sponsored event occurring on the school grounds.” In contrast, the total 

ban on Klosterman makes no exception for him to vote or be on school grounds for 

a “non-school sponsored event[.]” Moreover, according to the District’s policies, 

any other time convicted sex offenders want to come onto school property, they 

need only notify the Superintendent that they are doing so:

Sex Offenders on School Property
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Any person that is a registered sex offender under Wisconsin 

Law is required to notify the Superintendent of the specific 

date, time and place of the person’s visit to any school 

facility and must notify the Superintendent of his/her status 

as a registered sex offender. 

Registered sex offenders do not need to ask permission to attend sporting events on 

school grounds; they must simply give notice of their intent to be present.

¶76 Similarly, under the same policy, the District does not restrict parents 

who are convicted sex offenders from entering school property; rather, those parents 

must simply notify the Superintendent at the beginning of each school year of their 

status:

Parents of students enrolled in the District must notify the 

Superintendent of his/her status as a registered sex offender 

and that s/he has a child enrolled in the District. Notification 

must occur at the beginning of each school year or at the time 

the individual is required to register or whenever the child is 

first enrolled, whichever occurs first. 

¶77 The majority says the Board acted reasonably to promote the cause of 

education because allowing Klosterman “‘on school grounds would be detrimental 

to the good order of the school’” and “‘unnecessarily expose students to potentially 

dangerous behavior.’”38 Majority, ¶18. But the majority does nothing to connect 

 

38

 Throughout its opinion, the majority largely analyzes the “reasonableness” of the 

Board’s action with little direct reference to whether the Board’s action was “reasonable to promote 

the cause of education” (emphasis added), as required by WIS. STAT. § 120.13. For example, the 

majority’s only connection between the Board’s action and the statutory requirement does not come 

until the penultimate paragraph where it states that based on Klosterman having hugged students 

and briefly held hands with a student, “the board acted extremely reasonably in instituting and 

maintaining the ban against Klosterman coming onto District property” because doing so, in light 

of Klosterman hugging students, would “promote the cause of education by keeping students safe.” 

Majority, ¶38 (emphasis added). However, the question is not whether the Board’s action was 

reasonable but whether the action was “reasonable to promote the cause of education,” and the 

majority does nothing to explain how or why the ban keeps students safe under these circumstances. 

In light of the majority’s failure to consider the entirety of the Record in favor of presenting only 

those facts from the Record that support its conclusion, it is unsurprising that it largely glosses over 

this required connection.
No. 2020AP2076(D)

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Klosterman’s apparently welcomed, friendly hugs and arms around a shoulder to 

either good school order or danger. How does keeping Klosterman off of school 

property indefinitely and at all times—regardless of whether students are present—

make education better for the students? The majority does not say.

¶78 Based on the information in the Record, Klosterman’s conduct did not 

offend or upset Omro’s student body, it did not cause disorder in the school, and it 

did not cause disorder at sporting events. No student reported being harmed or that 

he felt threatened or endangered by Klosterman’s actions, nor did the parents of any 

of the students identified during the course of the District’s investigation raise any 

such concerns. Rather, a few staff members felt uncomfortable, and Rieckmann 

apparently disliked Klosterman’s personality. That does not make the Board’s 

continued ban on Klosterman an act that is “reasonable to promote the cause of 

education,” particularly approaching four years after it was first imposed. 

“Reasonable” is defined as “[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances; 

sensible.” Reasonable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “[P]romote” 

is defined as “to contribute to the growth or prosperity of[.]” Promote, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/promote

(last visited July 14, 2022). See State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 

187 (1998) (“For purposes of statutory interpretation or construction, the common 

and approved usage of words may be established by consulting dictionary 

definitions.”). 

¶79 Put simply, it is undisputed that Klosterman hugged some of his 

students, put his arm around students’ shoulders, and that he helped a student up off 

the floor and hugged him. He did those things—as many male 

teacher/coaches/mentors do with their male students/players, particularly in small 

towns where teachers may be personal friends with some families. Despite the 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

31

majority’s suggestion, not all hugs (or other physical contact) are criminal, let alone 

sexual in nature.39 See Joseph L. Daly et al., “Gray Touch”: Professional Issues in 

the Uncertain Zone Between “Good Touch” and “Bad Touch,” 11 MARQ. ELDER’S 

ADVISOR 223, 232 (2010) (giving examples of good touch as: “the enthusiastic, 

encouraging coach hugging the student-athlete after a win in the track event” and 

“[t]he encouraging wrestling coach hugging and encouraging the young wrestler 

who has just lost a match is the kind of touch that every parent wants for his/her 

child.”). 

¶80 When the conduct forming the basis of the Board’s decision to 

maintain the restrictions imposed upon Klosterman is viewed in its full context, 

rather than within the confines of the majority’s cherry-picked version of events, the 

Board’s statutory authority to impose such restrictions on a community member, 

assuming such statutory authority exists, cannot be seen, as a matter of law, as being 

“reasonable to promote the cause of education” under these circumstances. To 

conclude otherwise, as the majority does, leaves any adult who hugs a student or 

puts an arm around a student or holds a student’s hands on school grounds at risk of 

being deemed a suspected sexual predator who poses a threat to the “promot[ion of] 

the cause of education[.]” See WIS. STAT. § 120.13. 

B. Constitutional claim

¶81 Both Klosterman and the Board address the constitutional issue: 

Klosterman alleges the ban violates his constitutional rights, and the Board argues 

that any constitutional interests Klosterman has are outweighed by the need to 

 

39

 The majority, based primarily on a few complaints from Klosterman’s colleagues, 

describes Klosterman’s conduct as “excessive physical contact” and opines that “his refusal to 

abstain from” “full body hug[s/contact]” going forward “posed a significant risk”—both “physical 

and psychological”—to the student body. Majority, ¶38 (emphases added).
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protect the health and safety of Omro students. The majority ducks the issue 

because it says Klosterman did not adequately describe which constitutional rights 

were implicated. Majority, ¶25 n.7. I agree Klosterman could have better identified 

the particular constitutional violations potentially involved here, but this court could 

have ordered supplemental briefing on the constitutional issue or held oral 

argument. We all took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and 

the Constitution of the State of Wisconsin. We should have ordered additional 

briefing on the constitutional issues and/or held oral argument in this case. 

III. CONCLUSION

¶82 The majority concludes the Board has the statutory authority to 

continue its indefinite ban of Klosterman from school property and that the Board 

acted “reasonably” without properly connecting “reasonableness” to “promot[ing] 

the cause of education” as the text of WIS. STAT. § 120.13 requires. The majority 

renders its decision without a full analysis of the statutes involved, on limited facts, 

and without providing the full context—contrary to the summary judgment standard 

of review—and by relying on “evidence” derived from “public outlets” instead of 

personal knowledge. It also ignores Klosterman’s constitutional claim. 

¶83 Without question, school boards have been given broad discretion by 

the legislature. But even broad discretion has limits, both statutory and 

constitutional, and even assuming WIS. STAT. § 120.13 authorizes the Board’s 

ability to ban community members from school property under certain 

circumstances, the summary judgment submissions do not demonstrate the Board is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rather, the summary judgment submissions 

either raise genuine issues of material fact that need to be resolved by a factfinder 

or show that continuing the Klosterman ban was not “reasonable to promote the 
No. 2020AP2076(D)

33

cause of education,” making Klosterman entitled to the relief he requested as a 

matter of law. By failing to apply the summary judgment standard of review and 

limiting its review to the District’s submissions, the majority improperly acts, as the 

circuit court did, as a rubber-stamp of the District’s decision based on anonymous 

hearsay statements and inadmissible evidence. It is not the role of this court to 

decide whether we personally view Klosterman’s physical affection for his students 

to be right or wrong. The court is tasked with deciding whether the statutes provide 

a school board with the authority to indefinitely ban someone from school property, 

and if so, whether the summary judgment submissions here raised a genuine issue 

of material fact as to the Board’s actions. The majority failed to properly analyze 

the statute and failed to recognize that the summary judgment materials require 

reversal of the circuit court’s order. I respectfully dissent.