Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-CR-842| December 15, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael R. Fisher

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Williams,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 15, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1704-CR-842

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Grant Hawkins, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G05-1601-MR-2851

49G05-1511-F3-40597

Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Michael Williams appeals his convictions for felony murder and Level 3 felony 

robbery. We affirm.

Issue

[2] Williams raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient 

to sustain his convictions.

Facts

[3] On October 31, 2015, eighteen-year-old Raymond Alvarez and his sixteen-yearold girlfriend, N.B., stopped by Alvarez’s parents’ apartment in Indianapolis to 

pick up N.B.’s backpack. N.B. stayed in the car while Alvarez went inside. A 

vehicle parked next to Alvarez’s car, and Kevin Wilkerson got out of the 

passenger side of the vehicle and approached N.B. Williams was driving that 

vehicle. Wilkerson asked N.B. for a lighter, which she provided to him. 

Alvarez then returned, put N.B.’s backpack in the back seat of his vehicle, and 

started to back out. 

[4] Wilkerson made a motion to Alvarez that he needed a lighter again, and 

Alvarez started to pull back into the spot. Alvarez handed a lighter to 

Wilkerson, who turned his back to Alvarez and N.B. When Wilkerson turned 

back around, he had a gun in his hand. Wilkerson told Alvarez to empty his 

pockets, but Alvarez said he did not have anything. Wilkerson then demanded 

the backpack. Alvarez reached into the back seat to retrieve the backpack and 

placed it on his lap. Around this time, Williams said, “don’t do no stupid s***, 
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bro.” Tr. Vol. II p. 43. N.B. was not sure if Williams was talking to Wilkerson 

or Alvarez. Wilkerson grabbed the backpack and threw it onto the passenger 

seat of Williams’s vehicle. N.B. saw the backpack, which was in the car with 

Williams, moving around, but she could not see Williams’s hands. Wilkerson 

then demanded again that Alvarez empty his pockets. Alvarez said again that 

he did not have any money but that he did have candy that his brother gave 

him. Wilkerson said, “You think this s*** is funny, you think this s*** is a 

game.” Id. at 47. Wilkerson then shot Alvarez, resulting in his death. 

Wilkerson jumped into the passenger seat, and Williams drove away quickly. 

[5] On November 15, 2015, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Williams entered a Family 

Dollar store in Lawrence. Williams handed the manager a note demanding 

cash, and she asked him “if he really wanted to do this.” Id. at 136. Williams 

said, “maybe this will make you change your mind,” and he showed her 

something in his pocket that was black and had ridges on it. Id. The manager 

believed it was a gun. The manager and assistant manager then opened the safe 

and gave the money to Williams. During the incident, a customer approached 

the counter, and Williams and the other employees told her that the store was 

closed. The customer, Courtney Delaney, thought the interaction was strange. 

She left the store, drove across the street to a gas station, and called 911. 

[6] Williams left the store and got into the passenger side of a red vehicle driven by 

Wilkerson. Delaney gave a description of the vehicle to the 911 operator. 

Officers immediately found the vehicle and attempted to stop the vehicle, but 

the driver refused to stop. During the pursuit, the vehicle got a flat tire and 
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stopped. The two men started running away on foot. Officers found two 

young children hiding in the backseat of the vehicle. During the foot chase of 

Williams, an officer saw him discard an item and keep running. A black 

firearm with ridges on the handle was later recovered from that location. When 

Williams was apprehended, he had the money from Family Dollar and the note

he showed to the Family Dollar manager in his possession. 

[7] Testing on the firearm revealed that it was the same gun used to kill Alvarez. 

Williams’s DNA was found on the firearm’s magazine. Williams admitted to 

robbing the Family Dollar but denied that he had a weapon during the robbery. 

Williams also admitted that he was driving when Wilkerson shot Alvarez, but 

he denied knowing what Wilkerson was doing. 

[8] The State charged Williams with murder, felony murder, and Level 2 felony

robbery for the incident involving Alvarez and N.B. and alleged that Williams 

was an habitual offender. Separately, the State charged Williams with Level 3 

felony robbery for the Family Dollar incident and again alleged that Williams 

was an habitual offender. Williams was tried for both cases at a bench trial in 

January 2017. With respect to the incident involving Alvarez and N.B., the 

trial court found Williams not guilty of murder but guilty of felony murder and 

Level 2 felony robbery. With respect to the Family Dollar incident, the trial 

court found Williams guilty of Level 3 felony robbery. Williams then pled 

guilty to being an habitual offender.
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[9] The trial court sentenced Williams to fifty-five years for felony murder 

enhanced by twenty years for his status as an habitual offender. The trial court 

sentenced Williams to twelve years for the Level 3 felony robbery conviction. 

The trial court did not sentence Williams for the Level 2 felony robbery count 

associated with Alvarez and N.B. or the second habitual offender allegation due 

to double jeopardy concerns. The trial court then ordered that the sentences 

run consecutively for an aggregate sentence of eighty-seven years. Williams 

now appeals. 

Analysis

[10] Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence 

nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 

2015). We only consider “the evidence supporting the judgment and any 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. A conviction 

will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting 

each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “‘It is the job of the factfinder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves 

each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most 

favorably to the trial court’s ruling.’” Id. at 1066-67 (quoting Wright v. State, 828 

N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005)).
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[11] Williams first argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction 

for felony murder. Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-1(2) provides that a person 

who “kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit . . . 

robbery . . .” commits felony murder. Our supreme court has held that felony 

murder can be based on accomplice liability. Wieland v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1198, 

1202-03 (Ind. 2000). Indiana’s accomplice liability statute provides that a 

person “who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person 

to commit an offense commits that offense . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. We 

consider several factors to determine whether a defendant acted as an 

accomplice, including: “(1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) 

companionship with another engaged in a crime; (3) failure to oppose the 

commission of the crime; and (4) the course of conduct before, during, and after 

the occurrence of the crime.” Wieland, 736 N.E.2d at 1202.

[12] According to Williams, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction 

because “there was no showing that he participated in, or was even aware of, 

the robbery of Raymond Alvarez . . . .” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. Williams 

contends that N.B. said in a deposition she did not see Williams with the 

backpack, that he did not participate in the robbery, and that his statement, 

“Don’t do no stupid s***, bro,” was directed at Wilkerson. Id. at 14. 

[13] The State presented evidence that Williams was driving Wilkerson on the night 

of Alvarez’s death. They parked next to Alvarez’s vehicle, and Wilkerson 

asked N.B. for a light, which she provided. They stayed next to the vehicle 

until Alvarez arrived, and Wilkerson again asked for a light. When Alvarez 
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gave him a lighter, Wilkerson pulled a gun and demanded money. Wilkerson 

took N.B.’s backpack, and Williams said, “don’t do no stupid s***, bro.” Tr. 

Vol. II p. 43. N.B. was not sure if Williams was talking to Wilkerson or 

Alvarez. Wilkerson grabbed the backpack and threw it onto the passenger seat 

of Williams’s vehicle, and N.B. saw the backpack moving but could not see 

Williams’s hands. After Wilkerson shot Alvarez, he jumped into the passenger 

seat, and Williams drove away quickly. 

[14] Williams admits that he was present at the scene. His comments could have 

been interpreted as directing Alvarez to comply with Wilkerson’s demands. 

N.B. saw the backpack moving, and Williams was the only person in that 

vehicle. Further, after Wilkerson shot Alvarez, Williams helped him escape the 

area. The evidence demonstrated that Williams was a participant in the 

robbery, not a bystander. Williams’s argument is merely a request to reweigh 

the evidence, which we cannot do. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient 

to sustain his conviction for felony murder.

[15] As for the Level 3 felony robbery conviction associated with the Family Dollar 

incident, Williams argues that we should reduce his conviction to a Level 5 

felony. Indiana Code Section 35-42-5-1 provides that a person “who knowingly 

or intentionally takes property from another person . . . (1) by using or 

threatening the use of force on any person; or (2) by putting any person in fear; 

commits robbery, a Level 5 felony.” The offense is a Level 3 felony if it is 

committed while armed with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. The 

State alleged that Williams committed the robbery while armed with a deadly 
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weapon. Williams does not dispute that he committed the robbery; rather, he 

argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was armed with a 

deadly weapon at the time. 

[16] The State presented evidence that, during the robbery, Williams showed the 

manager something in his pocket that was black and had ridges on it. The 

manager believed it was a gun. During the foot pursuit, an officer saw 

Williams discard something, and a black firearm with ridges on the handle was 

discovered at that location. Williams’s DNA was found on the firearm’s 

magazine. Williams’s argument is again merely a request to reweigh the 

evidence, which we cannot do. The evidence is sufficient to show that 

Williams was armed with a deadly weapon during the robbery. 

Conclusion

[17] The evidence is sufficient to sustain Williams’s convictions for felony murder 

and Level 3 felony robbery. We affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.