### FILED July 20, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appe llate Court Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE JANUARY 1999 SESSION

JERRY LEE CRAIGMIRE * C.C.A. No. 03C01-9710-CR-00440 Ap pe llan t, * KNOX C OUNTY
vs . * Hon. Richard Baumgartner, Judge STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Post- Convicti on) Appellee. *
For Appell ant : For Appell ee : Mark E. Stephens John Knox W alkup Distr ict PublicDefender Attor ney General and Reporter 1209 Euclid Avenue 42 5 F ifth A ve nu e N orth Knoxvil le, TN 37921 Nashvill e, TN 37243-0493 Paula R. Voss Eli zabeth B. Marney Assist ant Publi c Defender Assist ant Att orney General 1209 Euclid Avenue Criminal Justi ce Divisi on Knoxvil le, TN 37921 42 5 F ifth A ve nu e N orth Nashvill e, TN 37243-0493 John Halstead Assist ant Publi c Defender Robert Jol ley 1209 Euclid Avenue Assist ant Dist ri ct Att orney General Knoxvil le, TN 37921 City- County Buil ding Knoxvil le, TN 37902

OPI NION F IL ED:

AFFIRMED
NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE2 OPINION

Th e p etitio ne r, J err y L ee C raig m ire, ap pe als the Kn ox C ou nty C rim ina l C ou rt’s dismissal of his peti ti on for post- convicti on reli ef. On appeal, t he petit ioner rai ses the fol lowing issues for ourrevi ew: 1. W

he the r his co nv ictio n a s a n h ab itua l offe nd er vio late d th e d oc trin e o f co llate ral es top pe l. 2. W he the r the trial c ou rt’s in stru ctio ns to th e ju ry a t the co nc lus ion of th e p etitio ne r’s h ab itua l crim ina l tria l shifted the b urde n of p roof to the p etitione r, there by viol ati ng his ri ght to due process. 3. W he the r the ac tion s o f the trial c ou rt an d th e pro se cu tor d urin g c los ing arg um en ts in the pe tition er’s ha bitu al c rim ina l tria l de nie d th e p etitio ne r the effe ctiv e a ss ista nc e o f co un se l, du e p roc es s, a nd a fa ir tria l. 4. W hether t he petit ioner’ s counsel was ineff ecti ve at tri al and on direct appeal in f ail ing to r aise the i ssues rela ting to c olla ter al e sto pp el a nd the pe tition er’s clo sin g a rgu m en t. Fo llow ing a th oro ug h re vie w of th e re co rd a nd the pa rties ’ brie fs, w e a ffirm the jud gm en t of th e p ostco nv ictio n c ou rt.
I. Factual Background O n N ov em be r 16 , 19 87 , a K no x C ou nty jury fou nd the pe tition er g uilty of o ne co un t of larc en y a nd on e c ou nt o f rec eiv ing sto len pro pe rty. T he pe tition er’s co nv ictio ns aro se from his the ft of
a w om an ’s p urs e a nd his co nte m po ran eo us po ss es sio n o f a s tole n c ar. T he se co nv ictio ns w ere the trig ge ring offe ns es un de rlyin g th e p ros ec utio n o f tw o c ou nts of th e p etitio ne r’s in dic tm en t, ch arg ing him
w ith b ein g a n h ab itua l crim ina l. Th e ju ry a cq uitte d th e p etitio ne r of b ein g a n h ab itua l crim ina l w ith res pe ct to the lar ce ny co nv ictio n. W ith r es pe ct to the pe tition er’s co nv ictio n fo r re ce ivin g s tole n property, the jury was unable to reach a verdict , and the court declared a mistr ial . Foll owing a second1 The reco rd ref lects that th e Ho nora ble Jo hn J. Dun can , Jud ge, p resid ed ov er the petitio ner’s trial for the s ubs tantiv e offe nse s and the p etition er’s fir st thre e hab itual c rimin al trials . The Hon orab le Ran dall E . Nich ols, J udg e, co ndu cted the p etition er’s fin al hab itual c rimin al trial, w hich resu lted in his convicti on. 3 m istria l, a ju ry fin ally retu rne d a gu ilty v erd ict o n F eb rua ry 8 , 19 89
. 1 In accordance wi th t he habit ual crim ina l sta tute s, th e p etitio ne r re ce ive d a se nte nc e o f life im pris on m en t in th e T en ne ss ee D ep artm en t of Correcti on for t he offense of r eceivi ng stolen property.

At th e p etitio ne r’s F eb rua ry 8 , 19 89 , ha bitu al c rim ina l trial, th e S tate intro du ce d in to evidence indi ctments and judgments of convict ion ref lect ing that , i n additi on to the t rigger ing off ense of
rec eiv ing sto len pro pe rty, J err y L ee C raig m ire h ad pre vio us ly b ee n c on vic ted on M arc h 1 8, 1 98 2, o f attempti ng to pass a forged prescri pti on on a day in January, 1981, and recei ving stol en property on January 2, 1981. The indi ctments and judgments also refl ected that , on March 18, 1982, Jerry Lee C raig m ire ha d b ee n c on vic ted of th e fo llow ing offe ns es pu rsu an t to h is p lea s o f gu ilt: re ce ivin g s tole n pro pe rty in Fe bru ary , 19 81 ; rec eiv ing sto len pro pe rty a nd se co nd de gre e b urg lary in A pril, 1 98 1; tw o cou nts o f rece iving s tolen p rope rty an d tw o co unts of se con d de gree burg lary in M ay, 1 981 ; three co un ts o f se co nd de gre e b urg lary an d o ne co un t of th e s ale of c red it ca rds by a p ers on oth er th an the issuer or i ssuee in June, 1981; and one count of f irst degree burglary i n October, 1981. For t hese offe ns es , the pe tition er h ad rec eiv ed an effe ctiv e s en ten ce of e lev en to tw en ty-f ive ye ars inc arc era tion in the Tennessee Department of Correcti on. The State addit ionall y intr oduced the testi mony o f C ha rles C ole m an, a L ieu ten an t w ith th e K no xv ille P olic e D ep art m en t, w ho tes tified tha t the pe tition er w as the sa m e J err y L ee C raig m ire w ho ha d c om m itted the trig ge ring offe ns e a nd the fou rte en pri or offe ns es . T he pe tition er p res en ted no pro of. T he rec ord ref lec ts th at th e ju ry r etu rne d a ve rdic t of g uilt follo w ing thr ee m inu tes of d elib era tion

.
O n d irec t ap pe al, th e p etitio ne r ch alle ng ed the su fficie nc y o f the ev ide nc e s up po rtin g his co nv ictio n fo r re ce ivin g s tole n p rop erty ; the ad eq ua cy of th e ju ry’s ve rdic t of g uilt a s s tate d b y th e jury for em an; an d, w ith r es pe ct to the pe tition er’s co nv ictio n o f the ha bitu al c rim ina l ch arg e, th e tr ial4 co urt ’s fa ilure to g ran t a c on tinu an ce to th e p etitio ne r ba se d u po n th e S tate ’s fa ilure to p rov ide a w ritten list o f pre dic ate co nv ictio ns in a dv an ce of tria l. Th is c ou rt affir m ed the pe tition er’s co nv ictio ns . State v. C raigm ire , No . 126 2, 19 90 W L 29 736 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. a t Kn oxv ille, Ma rch 2 2, 19 90).

On June 5 , 1991, t he petit ioner f il ed a petit ion forpost-convi cti on reli ef. On June 17, 19 91 , the po st-c on vic tion co urt a pp oin ted the pu blic de fen de r to r ep res en t the pe tition er, a nd the petit ioner submitt ed an am

ended petit ion. The post- convicti on court conducted a heari ng on July 23 an d 2 5, 1 99 7. A t the he arin g, th e p etitio ne r as se rted nu m ero us gro un ds for r elie f, inc lud ing the fol lowing: 1. W he the r the pe tition er’s ha bitu al c rim ina l co nv ictio n v iola ted the do ctrin e o f co llate ral es top pe l. 2. W he the r th e tr ial c ou rt’s ins tru ctio ns to th e ju ry d urin g th e p etitio ne r’s hab itual crim inal trial sh ifted the burd en o f proo f to the p etitione r, viol ati ng his ri ght to due process. 3. W he the r th e p ros ec uto r en ga ge d in m isc on du ct d urin g th e p etitio ne r’s ha bitu al c rim ina l tria l by ob jec ting du ring the pe tition er’s clo sin g arg um en t tha t the “jur y h as no righ t to ig no re th e la w ... .” 4. W he the r th e tr ial c ou rt e rro ne ou sly res trict ed the pe tition er’s clo sin g argu m ent in the h

abitua l crim inal trial, de

nyin g the petition er du e pro ce ss of la w . 5. W hether t he petit ioner’ s counsel was ineff ecti ve at tr ial and on direct appeal.

At the he arin g, th e p etitio ne r te stifie d. H e c on ce de d th at h is c rim ina l re co rd inc lud ed the fou rtee n p rior co nv ictio ns up on w hic h th e S tate relie d in the ha bitu al c rim ina l pro ce ed ing s. H e furt her test if ied t hat t he parti es presented t he same evidence and the same arguments in both habi tual crim ina l pr oc ee din gs . A dd ition ally , the po st-c on vic tion co urt qu es tion ed the pe tition er’s tria l co un se l, Byron Bryant, concerni ng his closi ng argument in the peti ti oner’s f inal habitual criminal tri al. Mr. Bryant tes tified tha t, du ring clo sin g a rgu m en t, he atte m pte d to arg ue tha t the ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s s ho uld not a pply in the petition er’s c ase . The trial cou rt proh ibited M r. Bry ant fro m eng agin g in th is arg um ent5 an d th rea ten ed to h old M r. B rya nt in co nte m pt o f co urt if h e p ers iste d.

M r. B rya nt c on ce de d th at h e d id n ot c ha llen ge on dir ec t ap pe al th e tr ial c ou rt’s lim itatio ns up on his clo sin g a rgu m en t or c ha llen ge the pe tition er’s ha bitu al c rim ina l co nv ictio n o n th e bas is of do uble jeop ardy . He exp lained that h is lega l rese arch reve aled sev eral T enn ess ee S upre m e C ou rt ca se s w hic h w ere dire ctly co ntra ry to tho se arg um en ts. H e c on clu de d, “I d id th e b es t I co uld.”

At the co nc lus ion of th e h ea ring , the po st-c on vic tion co urt m ad e th e fo llow ing observati ons: [I]t is p

retty cle ar to m e fro m this arg um en t tha t this is n ot a n ine ffec tive as sis tan ce of c ou ns el. .. . M r. B rya nt d id e ve ryth ing he could humanly do. He raised all these issues t hat you have raised, m ad e a ll tho se arg um en ts to the C ou rt, a nd did the m for ce fully

. Su bs eq ue ntly , on Se pte m be r 5, 1 99 7, th e p os t-co nv ictio n c ou rt dis m iss ed the pe tition for p ostconvicti on reli ef. I n a me

morandum opinion, the court agai n concluded that t he petit ioner had recei ved co m pe ten t rep res en tatio n a nd ad ditio na lly c on clu de d th at th e tria l co urt’s lim itatio ns up on the petit ioner’ s closi ng argument in his habit ual cri minal tr ial did not const it ute a denial of due process.
II. Analysis A. Collateral Estoppel

Th e p etitio ne r firs t co nte nd s th at h is h ab itua l crim ina l co nv ictio n v iola tes the do ctrin e of c olla tera l es top pe l. Th e p etitio ne r did no t rais e th is is su e o n d irec t ap pe al, th ere by w aiv ing the iss ue . Po st-c on vic tion relie f is g en era lly n ot a va ilab le to litiga te is su es tha t ha ve be en w aiv ed . Te nn. Code. Ann. § 40-30-111 (1991). However, the peti ti oner also argues that his att orney was ineffect ive
on dire ct a pp ea l in fa iling to ra ise this iss ue . In th is c on tex t, w e m us t de term ine w he the r ap pe llate co un se l’s fa ilure to r ais e th is is su e w as be low the ran ge of c om pe ten ce de m an de d o f atto rne ys in crim ina l ca se s, Baxter v. Rose , 523

S.W .2d 9 30, 9 36 (T enn . 197 5), an d w heth er this fa ilure w as pre jud icia l. Stri ckland v. Washington , 46 6 U .S. 6 68 , 68 7-6 97 , 10 4 S .C t. 20 52 , 20 64 -20 69 (19 84 ). See2 We note that, although the post-convi ction court concluded general ly that the petitioner received the

effecti ve assistance of

counsel, t he post-convi ction court did not expl icit ly address t he petitioner’s c ollateral esto ppel issu e in its mem orandu m opinio n dismis sing the p etition for pos tconvicti on reli ef. Tenn. Code.Ann. 40-30-118( b) (1991) requi red that the post-convi ction court set forth i n an order or written memorandum of the case all grounds presented and state t he findi ngs of fact a nd co nclu sion s of la w w ith reg ard to each suc h gro und . How eve r, failur e to a bide b y this requirem ent does not alwa ys ma ndate a r eversa l of the post-c onviction court’s jud gmen t. Rickman v. State , 972 S.W .2d 687, 6 92 (Ten n. Crim. A pp. 1997 ). We co nclude th at the reco rd of the po stconvic tion proce edings is sufficient to effe ctuate m eaningfu l appellate re view. Id. 6 also Po w ers v. S tate , 942 S.W.2d 551, 557 (Tenn. Code. Ann. 1996). Because the petit ioner must establi sh both inef fecti ve performance and prejudi ce in order t o prevail on a claim of inef fecti ve assist ance of counsel, we need not evaluat e counsel’s perf ormance if the peti ti oner has not es tab lish ed pre jud ice

. H en ley v. S tate , 96 0 S .W .2d 57 2, 5 80 (T en n. 1 99 7), cert. denied , U.S. , 119 S.Ct. 82 (1998). In order t o ascertai n if appel lat e counsel’s perf ormance w as prejudi cial , we must ad dre ss the m erit s o f the iss ue ne gle cte d o n a pp ea l. 2

C iting Ashe v. Swenson , 397

U.S . 436 , 90 S .Ct. 11 89 (1 970

), the p etitione r argu es tha t prin cip les of c olla tera l es top pe l pre clu de d h is c on vic tion as an ha bitu al c rim ina l in th is c as e. In es se nc e, th e p etitio ne r as se rts tha t, w he n th e ju ry a cq uitte d th e p etitio ne r of the ha bitu al c rim ina l ch arg e re latin g to his lar ce ny co nv ictio n, th e ju ry n ec es sa rily d ec ide d th e is su e o f the pe tition er’s ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tus w ith re sp ec t to th e c on vic tion for r ec eiv ing sto len pro pe rty.

In Ashe, 39

7 U .S. at 4 45 -44 6, 9 0 S .C t. at 11 95 , the Unite d S tate s S up rem e C ou rt h eld tha t the do ctrin e o f co llate ral es top pe l is e m bo die d in the Fif th A m en dm en t gu ara nte e a ga ins t do ub le jeo pa rdy

. State v. Vic kers , 98 5 S .W .2d 1, 7 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 7), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. 19 98 ); State v. McKennon

, N o. 0 1C 01 -97 10 -C C -00 45 6, 1 99 8 W L 8 49 28 7, a t **2 -4 ( Te nn. C rim . Ap p. at N as hv ille, D ec em be r 3, 1 99 8). T he C ou rt ex pla ine d th at “‘c olla tera l es top pe l’ ... m ea ns sim ply tha t when an issue of ulti mate fact has once been determined by a valid and fi nal judgment, t hat issue can not a gain be litiga ted b etw een the s am e pa rties in a ny fu ture la ws uit.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. The petit ioner bears t he burden of demonstrating t hat the i ssue he seeks to forecl ose from co ns ide ratio n w as ne ce ss arily de cid ed in th e firs t trial. Dowling v. Uni ted Stat es , 493 U.S. 342,7 35 0, 1 10 S.C t. 66 8, 6 73 (19 90 ). See also Vick

ers , 98 5 S .W .2d at 7 -8 ( “th e b urd en is o n th e a pp ella nt to p rov e b y c lea r an d c on vin cin g e vid en ce tha t, in t he ea rlier tria l, the co urt or a ju ry n ec es sa rily de cid ed the iss ue of fa ct w hic h is an ele m en t at is su e in the pre se nt in dic tm en t”).

In d ete rm inin g w he the r th e p etitio ne r ha s m et th is b urd en, a c ou rt m us t en ga ge in a tw o-p art in qu iry. See, e.g. , Unite

d S tate s v . G il , 14 2 F .3d 13 98 , 14 01 (11 th C ir. 19 98 ). F irst, a reviewing court must “‘examine the record of a prior pr oceeding, t aking int o account the pleadi ngs, ev ide nc e, c ha rge , an d o the r re lev an t m atte r ... ” in ord er t o s ee w ha t fac ts, if a ny , w ere ne ce ss arily de term ine d b y a n a cq uitta l at th e firs t trial. Ashe, 39

7 U .S. a t 44 4, 9 0 S .C t. at 1 19 4; Gi l , 142 F.3d at 14 01 . S ec on d, a co urt m us t de ter m ine w he the r th e p rev iou sly de ter m ine d fa cts co ns titute an es se ntia l ele m en t of th e p ros ec utio n c urr en tly u nd er c on sid era tion

. Gi l , 14

2 F .3d at 1 40 1. If the pre vio us ly de ter m ine d fa cts co ns titute an es se ntia l ele m en t of t he su bs eq ue nt p ros ec utio n, c olla ter al e sto pp el w ill co m ple tely ba r the su bs eq ue nt p ros ec utio n. Vick ers, 985 S.W.2d at 7.

Be ca us e th e d oc trine of c olla tera l es top pe l is e m bo die d in the Fifth Am en dm en t gu ara nte e a ga ins t do ub le je op ard y, w e in itially no te th at o ur s up rem e c ou rt h as he ld th at th e d ou ble jeo pa rdy pro vis ion s o f the sta te a nd fed era l co ns tituti on s d o n ot g en era lly p rec lud e a se co nd tria l an d co nv ictio n u nd er t he ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s if a de fen da nt is co nv icte d o f a s ec on d tr igg erin g offe ns e. Pe ars on v. S tate , 521 S.W .2d 2 25, 2 27 (T enn . 197 5). In s o ho lding, o ur su prem e co urt ob se rve d th at “ the ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s d o n ot c rea te a n in de pe nd en t cr im e, b ut d efin e a nd pre sc ribe a s tatu s” p erm itting the en ha nc em en t to lif e im pris on m en t of t he pe na lty fo r vio latin g o ne of the pre sc ribe d fe lon ies

. Id . Moreover, contr ary to t he petit ioner’ s argument in his bri ef, t he occurrence of two tr iggeri ng convicti ons on the same d ay foll owed by du

al habit ual cri minal prosecuti ons does not ge ne rally im plic ate princ iple s o f do ub le je op ard y. W he the r a de fen da nt is co nv icte d o f tw o tr igg erin g offenses on t he sam

e day or on successive days, habit ual cri minalit y is a vehicl e for t he enhancem ent of p un ish m en t, no t a s ep ara te o ffen se , an d je op ard y d oe s n ot a ttac h. Id. See also M

oo re v . Sta te , 563 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1977)(ci ti ng Pearson an d th e h ab itua l crim ina l sta tute s, th is8 co urt affir m ed tw o s ep ara te, c on se cu tive life s en ten ce s im po se d fo llow ing on e tr ial fo r trig ge ring offen ses com m itted at th e sa m e tim e an d pla ce a nd o n the sam e oc cas ion).

Ac cord ingly, w e are direc tly con fronte d w ith the q ues tion of w heth er ou r sup rem e court’ s holdi ng in Pearson

precludes appli cati on of the doctr ine of col lat eral est oppel to successi ve ha bitu al c rim ina l pr os ec utio ns . W e c on clu de tha t it do es no t. “C olla ter al e sto pp el a pp lies in c rim ina l proc eed ings inde pen den t of do uble jeop ardy princ iples, a nd o ne n eed not b e tw ice p lace d in jeo pard y of c rim ina l pu nis hm en t for c olla tera l es top pe l to a pp ly.” 5 0 C .J.S

. Ju dg m en ts § 919(a) (1997) . The Se ve nth C ircu it C ou rt o f A pp ea ls e xp lain ed : The government’s ar gument assumes that because coll ateral es top pe l is “e m bo die d” in th e D ou ble Je op ard y C lau se , es top pe l is co -ex ten siv e w ith th e D ou ble Je op ard y C lau se ’s o the r pr ote ctio ns . Thus, the government asks us to hold t hat coll ateral estoppel can never apply in ci rcumstances where double jeopardy does not. Such a holding would eli minate coll ateral estoppel f rom criminal cases and overrul e Ashe. A criminal defendant has no need for the benef it s of issue prec lusion if his en tire pro sec ution is barre d by dou ble jeo pard y

... . Precisely contrary to the government’s assertio n, collateral estoppel is applicable in criminal cases only when double jeopardy is not

. Unite d S tate s v . B ailin , 97 7 F .2d 27 0, 2 75 (7th C ir. 19 92 )(e m ph as is a dd ed ). See also United States v. Sh enb erg, 89 F.3 d 1 46 1, 1 47 9 (1 1th C ir. 19 96 ); State v. Butler , 505

N.W . 2d 8 06, 8 09 (Io wa 199 3); State v. Chase

, 58 8 A .2d 12 0, 1 22 -12 4 (R .I. 19 91 ); Ex Parte Tarver , 72

5 S .W .2d 19 5, 1 97 (T ex . C rim

. Ap p. 1 98 6). But see United Stat es v. Mil ler , 79 7 F .2d 33 6, 3 41 (6th C ir. 19 86 ). But cf. Vick

ers , 985 S.W.2d at 7-8.
Accordingly, relyi ng upon the doctri ne of coll ateral estoppel, the peti ti oner in t his case arg ue s th at, in the pe tition er’s first h ab itua l crim ina l trial, th e ju ry n ec es sa rily d ete rm ine d b y its ac qu ittal tha t the fou rtee n p rior co nv ictio ns pre se nte d b y th e S tate did no t ren de r the pe tition er a n h ab itua l crim ina l. H e a na log ize s h is c as e to Ashe, arg

uin g th at th e s ing le, d isp os itive , fac tua l iss ue be fore the jury du ring the first tr ial w as w he the r the pe tition er p os se ss ed the req uis ite n um be r of prior co nv ictio ns . T hu s, a cc ord ing to th e p etitio ne r, it m ak es no diffe ren ce tha t the trig ge ring offe ns e in3 If the p etition er ha d bee n con victe d follo wing the firs t hab itual c rimin al trial, th e Sta te co uld have reli ed upon the same pri or convictions in successive habitual criminal

prosecution s, consistent with the Fifth Amendment to the United Stat es Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Tennessee Cons titution. Pearson , 521 S.W.2d at 228.
4 While the petiti oner clai ms that thi s was the sole i ssue at the f irst habi tual cri minal trial and that the same evidence was presented i n both habitual cri minal proceedi ngs, the pet iti oner did not challeng e his prior c onviction s during th e seco nd proc eeding. Also, as noted ear lier, at the post- convicti on hearing the peti tioner t estif ied that, at the ti me of his tri als in thi s case, his r ecord did in f act incl ude the fourteen pri or con viction s relie d up on b y the State

. 9 ea ch ha bitu al c rim ina l pr oc ee din g w as diffe ren t. T he jur y’s ac qu ittal f ollo w ing the firs t ha bitu al c rim ina l tria l co llate rally es top pe d th e S tate ’s p ros ec utio n o f the se co nd co un t us ing the sa m e p rior convicti ons. 3

In Ashe, thr ee or four masked m en robbed at gunpoint si x men e ngaged in a poker ga m e. Ashe, 39

7 U .S. a t 43 7-4 38 , 90 S.C t. at 1 19 1. T he pe tition er, a lon g w ith th ree oth er m en, w as ch arg ed w ith s ix s ep ara te c ou nts of a rm ed rob be ry o f ea ch of th e s ix p ok er p lay ers . Id. at 4 38 , 11 91
. Th e S tate first tried

the p etitione r for the arm ed ro bbe ry of o ne o f the p oke r play ers, a nd th e jury ac qu itted the pe tition er. Id. at 4 38 -43 9, 1 19 1-1 19 2. S ix w ee ks late r, the Sta te trie d th e p etitio ne r for the arm ed rob be ry o f an oth er p ok er p lay er, a nd the jury retu rne d a gu ilty v erd ict. Id. at 4

39 -44 0, 1 19 2. Th e C ou rt ob se rve d th at, a t the first tr ial, th e “s ing le ra tion ally co nc eiv ab le is su e in dis pu te b efo re th e jury w as w he the r the pe tition er h ad be en on e o f the rob be rs. A nd the jury by its v erd ict fo un d th at h e had not.” Id. at 4

45 , 11 95 . A cc ord ing ly, th e C ou rt c on clu de d th at th e p etitio ne r’s s ec on d tr ial w as pre clu de d b y th e d oc trine of c olla tera l es top pe l. Id. Th e C ou rt fur the r ex pla ine d th at it d id n ot m atte r that t he second trial involved a di ff erent vi cti m, because “the name of the vi cti m, in the ci rcumstances of th is c as e, h ad no be arin g w ha tev er u po n th e is su e o f w he the r the pe tition er w as on e o f the robb ers.” Id. Similarl y, the pet it ioner would argue that the name of the tri ggering off ense in his case ha d n o b ea ring up on the iss ue of w he the r he po ss es se d a su fficie nt n um be r of p rior co nv ictio ns to b e an h abitua l offend er. 4
Thus, we must determine i f t he only fac tua l iss ue be fore the jury at th e firs t ha bitu al criminal tri al, which result ed in an acquitt al, was the num ber of t he petit ioner’ s prior

convicti ons under10 the ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s. H ow ev er, w e n ote tha t the tran sc ript o f the pe tition er’s first h ab itua l crim inal trial is n

ot be fore th is cou rt. Aga in, und er Ashe, 397

U.S . at 44 4, 90 S.C t. at 119 4, a c ourt
m ust re view the re cord of the prior p roce edin gs in orde r to de term ine if the doc trine o f collater al es top pe l is a pp lica ble . Th e p etitio ne r be ars the bu rde n o f de m on stra ting the do ctrin e’s ap plic ab ility. Dowling , 49

3 U .S. a t 35 0, 1 10 S.C t. at 6 73 ; Vick ers , 1997 WL 3

70357, at *5. The petiti oner also ca rrie s th e b urd en of e ns urin g th at th e re co rd o n a pp ea l co nv ey s a fair, a cc ura te, a nd complete ac co un t of w ha t ha s tra ns pire d w ith re sp ec t to th os e is su es tha t are the ba se s o f ap pe al. T en n. R

. Ap p. P . 24 (b)

. See also Th

om ps on v. S tate , 95 8 S .W .2d 15 6, 1 72 (T en n. C rim . Ap p.), perm. to appeal denied , (T en n. 1 99 7). T he failu re to do so ord ina rily re su lts in a w aiv er o f su ch iss ue s. Id

.
Th e d efic ien cy of th e re co rd w as ad dre ss ed at th e p os t-co nv ictio n h ea ring . At the hearing, the State specul ated that during t he petit ioner’ s fi rst habi tual cr iminal pr oceeding the j ury was co nfu se d a bo ut w he the r lar ce ny , in c on tras t to re ce ivin g s tole n p rop erty , co uld trigg er th e h ab itua l crim ina l sta tute s p urs ua nt to Te nn. C od e. A nn. § 3 9-1 -80 2 (R ep ea led N ov em be r 1, 1 98 9)( listin g th e offe ns es w hic h tr igg er t he ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s). In o the r w ord s, th e S tate as se rte d th at th e ju ry’s acquitt al fol lowing the f irst tri al was based upon a legal issue unrel ated to t he legal and fact ual issues pres ente d du ring th e se con d ha bitual c rimin al pro cee ding . The petition er’s p ost-c onv iction a ttorne y responded: Judge, as to that explanati on, obviousl y, I wasn’t there, and that i s not

a p art o f the rec ord in th es e c as es or p art o f the tran sc ript th at w as pre pa red , be ca us e h e w as n’t a pp ea ling fro m tha t pr oc ee din g. S o, if the C ou rt is g oin g to co ns ide r tha t, I w as n’t a w are tha t w as go ing to be the arg um en t tha t the re w as a le ga l tec hn ica lity a s to w hy the y ac qu itted on on e, b ut n ot th e o the r. I w ou ld a sk tha t firs t pr oc ee din g be transcri bed, if in fact that i s what the Court is goi ng to rel y on. Th e S tate the n c on ce de d th at th e re co rd o f the pri or p roc ee din g w ou ld n ot c on firm or ref ute the St ate ’s theory. W it h respect to t he State’s t heory, t he post-convict ion court merely observed, “[ T]hat i s one fea sib le e xp lan atio n. T he re m ay be oth ers . I m ea n, w ho kn ow s w ha t the jury w as thin kin g.” O n th e ba sis of th is e xc ha ng e, p etitio ne r’s p os t-co nv ictio n c ou ns el d id n ot p urs ue su pp lem en tatio n o f the record.11 As no ted ea rlier, ho w ev er, th e p etitio ne r did tes tify a t the po st-c on vic tion he arin g th at the pa rtie s p res en ted the sa m e e vid en ce an d th e s am e a rgu m en ts d urin g b oth ha bitu al c rim ina l proceedings. The Stat e did not contest the peti ti oner’s assert ion. The record of the second proceedi ng is

be for e th is c ou rt. H ow ev er, w e c on clu de tha t the pe tition er’s tes tim on y is alo ne ins uffic ien t to s atis fy h is b urd en to d em on stra te th at, in the ea rlier tria l, the jur y n ec es sa rily d ec ide d a n iss ue of fa ct. Dowling , 49

3 U .S. a t 35 0, 1 10 S.C t. at 6 73 ; Vick ers , 1997 WL 370357, at *5.

M ore ov er, w e re jec t an y a ss ert ion tha t, un de r th e p art icu lar circ um sta nc es of th is ca se , the rec ord is s uffic ien t as it sta nd s, b ec au se the on ly fa ctu al is su e th at is ev er b efo re t he jur y in an ha bitu al c rim ina l pro ce ed ing is w he the r a d efe nd an t po ss es se s th e re qu isite nu m be r of p red ica te co nv ictio ns . See 39 -1- 80 1 (R ep ea led 19 89 ). See also M

ou ltrie v . Sta te , 584 S.W.2d 217, 219 ( Tenn. C rim . Ap p. 1 97 8)( “[t]he on ly fu nc tion of th e ju ry in su ch ca se s is to h ea r pr oo f on prio r co nv ictio ns of a de fen da nt, u po n c ha rge s c on stitu ting felo nie s u nd er t he sta tute , an d to de ter m ine if a d efe nd an t’s rec ord of re cid ivis m w arr an ts e nh an ce d p un ish m en t as pre sc ribe d”) . In o the r w ord s, w e re jec t the arg um en t tha t a ju ry’s ac qu ittal o f a d efe nd an t on a c ha rge of h ab itua l crim ina lity w ill per se coll ateral ly estop t he State fr om prosecuting a second habitual cr iminal charge i f the Stat e reli es upon the exact same p riorconvicti ons in both proceedi ngs.

In a n h ab itua l crim ina l pro ce ed ing, a ju ry is in fa ct c on fron ted w ith m ore tha n o ne fac tua l iss ue . T he ap plic ab le p atte rn jury ins tru ctio ns pro vid e th at, in ord er t o fin d th at a de fen da nt is an ha bitu al c rim ina l, a ju ry m us t find the follo w ing es se ntia l ele m en ts b ey on d a rea so na ble do ub t: 1. the d

efen dan t has bee n co nvicte d of a t least th ree fel onies .. . pri or to convi cti on for t he present off ense; 2. at le

as t thre e o f the prio r felo ny co nv ictio ns w ere for se pa rate offe ns es , co m m itted at d iffere nt tim es , an d on separate occasions; 3. no t les s th an tw o o f the se thr ee pri or c on vic tion s w ere for th e c rim es of (n am e c rim es ch arg ed ) ... ; 4. the

de fen da nt w as ch arg ed in th e p res en t ind ictm en t12 with th e co m m ission of the crim e of (n am e crim e), an d w as co nv icte d o f it; 5. the def endant must have been charged wit h being an habit ual cr iminal in a separat e count ofthe present ind ictm en t. T.P .I. C rim . N o. 3 2.0 1 (1 98 8)( foo tno tes om itted ). T he first th ree ele m en ts re late to th e v alid ity o f the prio r co nv ictio ns un de r the ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s. H ow ev er, th e ju ry m us t als o fin d th at th e pe tition er w as co nv icte d o f the trig ge ring offe ns e a nd tha t the ha bitu al c rim ina l ch arg e w as co nta ine d in a se pa rate co un t of th e in dic tm en t. W hile the se tw o fa ctu al is su es w ou ld ra rely , if ev er, b e d isp ute d, it is c on ce iva ble tha t a ju ry c ou ld la w fully retu rn a ve rdic t of a cq uitta l de sp ite its find ing tha t a defendant possessed the requi sit e num ber of pri or convict ions under the habi tual cr iminal st atutes.
The Supreme C

ourt i n Ashe, 39

7 U .S. a t 44 4, 9 0 S .C t. at 1 19 4, w arn ed ag ain st a tec hn ica lly re stric tive ap plic atio n o f the do ctrin e o f co llate ral e sto pp el. See also United States v. Leach , 63 2 F .2d 13 37 , 13 40 (5th C ir. 19 80 )(th e m ere fac t tha t a ju ry c ou ld te ch nic ally ha ve ac qu itted the de fen da nt w itho ut r es olv ing the fac tua l iss ue as se rte d b y th e d efe nd an t did no t ba r th e a pp lica tion of th e d oc trine of c olla tera l es top pe l). N ev erth ele ss , in th e a bs en ce of th e re co rd o f the first h ab itua l criminal proceeding, we decli ne to apply t he doctri ne in thi s case.

Additi onally, the record bef ore thi s court suggests t hat the pet it ioner’ s defense counsel
w as effe ctiv ely pe rm itted to a rgu e ju ry n ullific atio n in the pe tition er’s first th ree ha bitu al c rim ina l trials

. A d efe nd an t m ay no t es se ntia lly a rgu e to the jur y a t tria l tha t it sh ou ld ig no re t he fac ts b ec au se the law is u nfa ir a nd the n o n a pp ea l in a su bs eq ue nt c as e c on ten d th at th e ju ry’s ac qu ittal n ec es sa rily d ec ide d a fa ctu al is su e. Cf. State v. Blache , 48

0 S o.2 d 3 04 , 30 9 (L a. 1 98 4)( if the ac qu ittal in the firs t tria l ha d been against the weight of the evi dence, the j ury’s exerci se of it s power of nulli fi cati on might have pre clu de d a pp lica tion of th e d oc trine of c olla tera l es top pe l). Contrast Gi l , 142 F.3d at 1401 n. 4 (t he po ss ibility of ju ry n ullific atio n c an no t en ter in to th e a na lys is o f co urts m ak ing co llate ral e sto pp el5 The post-conviction court additi onally neglected to address this i ssue in it s memorandum opinion dis missing the petition for post-co nviction re lief. 13 inq uirie s); Leach , 63

2 F .2d at 1 34 1 (a co urt sh ou ld n ot c on sid er t he po ss ibility of ju ry n ullific atio n in ap ply ing the do ctrin e o f co llate ral es top pe l). In an y c as e, fo r th e re as on s s et fo rth ab ov e, th is is su e is
w itho ut m erit.

B. Jury Instructions

Th e p etitio ne r ne xt c om pla ins tha t the trial c ou rt’s in stru ctio ns to th e ju ry d urin g th e se co nd ha bitu al c rim ina l pr oc ee din g s hifte d th e b urd en of p roo f to t he pe tition er, the reb y v iola ting his right to due process. 5 The trial court i nstruct ed the jury:

Records of prior

convicti ons of the defendantare evidence which you m ay co ns ide r of on ly a s p roo f tha t he is in fac t an ha bitu al c rim ina l as tha t term ha s b ee n d efin ed ab ov e. A jud gm en t of c on vic tion of a ny person under t he same nam e as thatof t he defendant c reates an infe ren ce tha t the ide ntity of s uc h p ers on is th e s am e a s th e de fen da nt. Th e p etitio ne r cit es ou r su pre m e c ou rt’s de cis ion in Lo w e v . Sta te, 80 5 S .W .2d 36 8 (T en n. 1 99 1), in su pp ort o f his arg um en t.

Th e S tate co nte nd s, in tur n, th at th e p etitio ne r ha s w aiv ed this arg um en t du e to his failu re t o ra ise this iss ue on ap pe al. H ow ev er, the su pre m e c ou rt’s de cis ion in Lowewas issued on Fe bru ary 25 , 19 91 . Th e p etitio ne r w as co nv icte d o f be ing an ha bitu al c rim ina l on Fe bru ary 8, 1 98 9, an d th is c ou rt a ffirm ed his co nv ictio ns an d s en ten ce s o n M arc h 2 2, 1 99 0. T his co urt ha s p rev iou sly he ld th at, u nd er th es e c ircu m sta nc es , this iss ue rem ain s a via ble gro un d fo r po st-c on vic tion relie f. Se e, e .g., Jo ne s v . Sta te , 89 1 S .W .2d 22 8, 2 30 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 4); H op so n v . Sta te , No. 03C01- 9212 -C R -00 44 9, 1 99 3 W L 3 60 71 9, a t *2 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. a t Kn ox ville , Se pte m be r 10 , 19 93 ). But see Jones , 89

1 S .W .2d at 2 31 -23 2 (T ipto n, J., co nc urr ing )(o pin ing tha t this gro un d fo r re lief w as av aila ble w ell b efo re t he su pre m e c ou rt’s de cis ion in Lowe ). In an

y c as e, th is is su e is w itho ut m erit.
Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-1- 804 (Repealed November 1, 1989), provi ded:14 [A] ju dg m en t of c on vic tion of a ny pe rso n in this sta te, o r an y o the r state, country or t erri tory, under the same nam e as that by which such person i s charged wit h the commission, or att empt at co m m iss ion , of a felo ny un de r th e te rm s o f this ch ap ter , sh all b e prima facie evi dence that t he identi ty of such person i s the same. In Lowe , 805

S.W .2d a t 371 , the S

upre m e C ourt h eld tha t the trial co

urt’s ins truction to the jury pu rsu an t to th is s ec tion im pe rm iss ibly sh ifted the bu rde n o f pro of to the de fen da nt in vio latio n o f du e pro ce ss . H ow ev er, the su pre m e c ou rt d ec line d to str ike do w n th e s tatu tor y p rov isio n a s un co ns tituti on al p er s e, fu rth er h old ing tha t a ju ry in stru ctio n p urs ua nt to this sta tuto ry p rov isio n c ou ld pa ss co ns titutio na l m us ter if p hra se d in term s o f a p erm iss ive infe ren ce . Id.

In thi s case the tri al court offer ed the fol lowing explanat ion to t he jury: Th e C ou rt ha s c ha rge d th e ju ry c on ce rnin g a ce rtain infe ren ce tha t the jury m ay m ak e in reg ard to c erta in e vid en ce in th is c as e. H ow ev er, th e ju ry is no t req uire d to m ak e th is in fere nc e. It is the exclusi ve province of t he jury t o determine whether the fact s and circ um sta nc es sh ow n b y a ll the ev ide nc e in the ca se w arr an t the inferen ce w hich the la w p erm its the jury to d

raw . Th e in fere nc e m ay be reb utte d b y d irec t or c ircu m sta ntia l ev ide nc e, o r bo th, w he the r it ex ists in th e e vid en ce of th e S tate or is offe red by the de fen da nt, a nd the bu rde n o f pro of re m ain s, a s a lw ay s, u po n th e State t o prove beyond a reasonabl e doubt each and every el ement tha t co ns titute s th e o ffen se be fore the de fen da nt c an be co nv icte d. Altho ugh not re quire d by law to do so, w hen the d efen dan t offers pro of o f an ex pla na tion to r eb ut th e in fer en ce thu s ra ise d, y ou sh ou ld co ns ide r su ch pro of, a lon g w ith a ll the ev ide nc e, to de ter m ine no t on ly the co rre ctn es s o f the infe ren ce , bu t the rea so na ble ne ss of th e de fen da nt’s ex pla na tion

. You are not bound to acc ept ei ther and, as aforesai d, t he burden of pro vin g g uilt o f the offe ns e c ha rge d b ey on d a rea so na ble do ub t is upon the Stat e. W e c on clu de tha t the trial c ou rt’s in stru ctio ns to th e ju ry s atis fied the du e p roc es s re qu irem en ts o f bo th the federal and state consti tuti ons.

C. Closing Argument

Th e p etitio ne r fur the r ar gu es tha t, in th e s ec on d h ab itua l crim ina l pro ce ed ing, the6 We no te that, with re spect to this issue, th e petitioner’s brief conta ins inade quate c itation to authorit y purs uan t to Te nn. R . App . P. 27 and Ct. o f Crim . App . Rule 10 , ren derin g the task o f this c ourt mor e diffic ult. Generally, t his defi ciency resul ts in waiver of the iss ue before this court. Ct. of Crim. App. Rule 10(b) . Nevertheless , in the inter ests o f justic e an d in o rder to affo rd th e pe titione r a fu ll hea ring, we will a ddre ss the me rits of t his iss ue. 15 ac tion s o f the tria l co urt an d th e p ros ec uto r du ring clo sin g a rgu m en ts d en ied the pe tition er a clo sin g arg um en t, pre jud ice d th e ju ry, a nd sh ifted the bu rde n o f pro of to the pe tition er, th ere by de ny ing the pe tition er t he effe ctiv e a ss ista nc e o f co un se l, du e p roc es s, a nd a fa ir tria l. A ga in, th e p etitio ne r fa iled to ra ise this iss ue on dire ct a pp ea l an d n ow alle ge s th at h is a pp ella te c ou ns el’s om iss ion co ns titute d ineff ecti ve assistance. In order t o evaluate t he prejudi cial impact of appell ate counsel’ s performance,
w e w ill ad dre ss the m erits of th is is su e. Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580. 6

Th e p etitio ne r sp ec ifica lly c on ten ds tha t the tria l co urt err on eo us ly p rec lud ed his atto rne y fr om m ak ing the follo w ing arg um en ts in clo sin g: La die s a nd ge ntle m en, yo u lo ok ed at th e re co rds tha t w ere en tere d. Ev ery on e o f the se offe ns es oc curre d in 19 81 . Th e re co rd is sile nt o n an y o ffen se s o n h im oth er th an this rec eiv ing sto len pro pe rty th at h e was convicted on i n Novem ber of 1987. * * * La die s a nd ge ntle m en, the re a re lo ts o f thin gs tha t yo u c an us e to look at in t his matt er - t he records t hat have been enter ed here - and yo u c an us e y ou r ow n s en se of fre ed om , jus tice , an d fa ir pla y in this

. La die s a nd ge ntle m en, I as k y ou: Is it fa ir for a p ers on to b e sentenced t o serve a li fe sent ence? H e a ss erts tha t, be ca us e h e w as pre clu de d fro m m ak ing the ab ov e a rgu m en ts, “th e c ou rt an d s tate de priv ed [the pe tition er] o f any m ea nin gfu l clo sin g a rgu m en t ... .” In co nn ec tion w ith h is c laim tha t he
w as de nie d a clo sin g a rgu m en t, the pe tition er a lso co nte nd s th at th e p ros ec uto r’s o bje ctio n to his clo sin g a rgu m en t co ns titute d p ros ec uto rial m isc on du ct. M ore ov er, the pe tition er c on ten ds tha t, in li gh t of th e lim itatio ns pla ce d u po n h is c los ing arg um en t, the Sta te’s reb utta l arg um en t w as im pro pe r. Fina lly, the p etitione r argu es th at the con duc t of the p rose cuto r and the trial c ourt s hifted th e bu rden of pro of to the pe tition er, de ny ing him du e p roc es s o f law

.
Fo llow ing the po st-c on vic tion he arin g, th e p os t-co nv ictio n c ou rt m ad e th e fo llow ing16 find ing s o f fac t an d c on clu sio ns of la w : Th e g rav am en of [th e p etitio ne r’s] c om pla int in this pro se cu tion for hab itual offen der s tatus w as th at his la wy er w as n ot allow ed to argu e that it w as u nfair to s ente nce this ind ividua l to priso n for life fo r a relat ivel y minor felony of fense; t hat is, receivi ng stolen property. Th e rec ord, o f cou rse, e stab lishes that h e ha d the requ isite nu m ber o f pre vio us co nv ictio ns to p lac e h im in th e s tatu s o f be ing an ha bitu al offe nd er, a nd un de r the law in e ffec t at th e tim e, h e w as elig ible to b e co ns ide red an ha bitu al o ffen de r. His law yer h ad s ucc ess fully, on two

prior o cca sion s, arg ued to a ju ry that t his was the only of fense that he had had in a num ber of years; that i t was a relat ivel y minor offense, and that t hey should not send Mr. Craigmire to pri son for t he rest of hi s li fe forthis of fense of receivi ng stolen property. Th ose trials en ded in a m istrial. He wa s retried then in 19 8[9] b efore Jud ge N icho ls. At the urgin g of [the pros ecu tor], the C ourt admon ished [def ense counsel] not t o make , basical ly, a jurynu llifica tion arg um en t. Du ring th e co urse of [de fens e co uns el’s arg um ent] ... ob jection s w ere m ad e b y th e S tate an d, a pp are ntly , su sta ine d b y th e C ou rt, alth ou gh w e d o n ot h av e th e b en efit o f the be nc h c on fere nc e th at to ok pla ce . W e do not h ave that o n rec ord. B ut I think eve rybo dy w ould agre e tha t the C ou rt a dm on ish ed him an d th rea ten ed ev en to h old him in co nte m pt, if h e c on tinu ed in th at a rgu m en t. Th e a rgu m en t, es se ntia lly, w as tha t it jus t w as no t fair to s en d th is m an to p riso n fo r th e re st o f his life fo r co m m itting w ha t w ou ld a m ou nt to, basi call y, a class- E felony. For what its wort h, my personal op inio n is tha t he pro ba bly sh ou ldn ’t ge t life in p riso n fo r co m m itting a cla ss -E felo ny . B ut th at w as no t the law in e ffec t at t he tim e. It is c lea r to m e, in rev iew ing the ca se s, th at it is no t ap pro pria te to argu e jury nullification

to the jury. ... I wo

uld n ot allow him to arg ue that t hey were allowed to disr egard the law, but I thi nk I would have allo w ed him to a rgu e th at th is w as a r ela tive ly m ino r of fen se . B ut, in es se nc e, h e g ot to do tha t du ring his clo sin g a rgu m en t, alt ho ug h it w as ve ry b rief. In c on clu sio n, I a m of th e o pin ion tha t the re w as no t de nia l of d ue pro ce ss . T he re w as no de nia l of e ffec tive as sis tan ce of c ou ns el in thi s case. Th es e fin din gs of fa ct a re c on clu siv e o n a pp ea l un les s th is c ou rt find s th at th e e vid en ce pre po nd era tes ag ain st th e fin din gs of th e p os t-co nv ictio n c ou rt. Alle y v . Sta te , 95 8 S .W .2d 13 8, 1 47 (T en n. C rim

. Ap p.), perm. to appeal denied , (Ten n. 19 97).17 i. Denial of Closing Argument As no ted ea rlier , the pe tition er c on ten ds tha t the tria l co urt effe ctiv ely de nie d h im a clo sin g a rgu m en t by su sta inin g th e S tate ’s o bje ctio ns du ring his atto rne y’s pre se nta tion. In Herring v. Ne w Y ork , 42 2 U .S. 8 53 , 85 8, 9 5 S .C t. 25 50 , 25 53 (19 75 ), the Unite d S tate s S up rem e C ou rt he ld th at the rig ht to the as sis tan ce of c ou ns el in clu de s th e ri gh t of c ou ns el fo r th e d efe ns e to m ak e a clo sin g su m m atio n to the jury

. See also Patty v. Bordenkir cher , 60 3 F .2d 58 7, 5 89 (6t h C ir. 1 97 9)( the tria l cou rt’s refus al to p erm it defen se c oun sel in a n ha bitual c rimin al trial to m

ake a fina l argu m ent co ns titute d a de nia l of th e ri gh t to c ou ns el). A tria l co urt ’s re fus al to pe rm it clo sin g a rgu m en t is rev ers ible err or p er s e. See, e.g. , Unite

d S tate s v . D av is , 99 3 F .2d 62 , 64 (5th C ir. 19 93 )(“[g ]ive n th e dif fi cult y of determini ng the prejudi cial impact of t he fail ure to aff ord summ ati on, the deni al of a r equest for it is rev ers ible err or p er s e); Patty , 603 F.2d at 589 (the r ule announced i n Herring is a per se r ule, pre clu din g h arm les s e rro r an aly sis ); United Stat es v. Bowden , 579 F. Supp. 337, 343 (M.D. Tenn. 19 82 ), aff ir med , 72 3 F .2d 91 1 (1 98 3)( “it w ou ld h av e b ee n re ve rsib le e rro r pe r se to h av e d en ied [the de fen da nt] a n o pp ortu nity to m ak e a ny clo sin g a rgu m en t at a ll”).
However, the Courtin Herring , 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. at 2555, also observed: Th is is no t to s ay tha t clo sin g a rgu m en ts in a c rim ina l ca se m us t be un co ntro lled or e ve n u nre stra ine d. T he pre sid ing jud ge m us t be an d is gi ven great lat it ude in control li ng the durati on and limit ing the scope of c los ing su m m atio ns . H e m ay lim it co un se l to a rea so na ble tim e and m ay terminate argument when continuati on would be repetit ive or redu nda nt. H e m ay e nsu re tha t argu m ent d oes not s tray u ndu ly from the m ark , or o the rw ise im pe de the fair a nd ord erly co nd uc t of th e tria l. In a ll the se res pe cts he m us t be giv en bro ad dis cre tion

. See also St

ate v. N es bit, 97 8 S .W .2d 87 2, 9 00 (T en n. 1 99 8), cert. denied , 19 99 WL 18156 6 (U. S. 19 99 )(tria l co urt s a re a cc ord ed w ide dis cre tion in c on tro lling clo sin g a rgu m en ts). Th us , in Bowden

, 57 9 F . S up p. a t 34 3-3 44 , the fed era l dis trict co urt de nie d th e d efe nd an t’s m otio n fo r ne w tria l, co nc lud ing tha t the co urt ha d p rop erly for bid de n d efe ns e c ou ns el fr om “ar gu ing the law ” du ring clo sin g argument. The court observed:

“B ec au se it is th e c ou rt’s fu nc tion an d d uty to in stru ct th e ju ry o n th e co ntro lling law [it is] th e b ette r pr ac tice ... , of c ou rse , ... tha t an y7 Following the peti tioner’s habitual criminal

trial , the tr

ial cour t observed that

he had sustaine d the prosecutor

’s objection to def

ense counsel’s statement concern ing the si lence of t he record on

18 arg um en ts o f this typ e b e lim ited so lely tow ard de m on stra ting ho w the ev ide nc e, o r re as on ab le in fere nc es the refr om , co nfo rm to th e la w ... .” Id. at 34 4 (citatio n om itted).

Itis apparent f rom the record in t his case that the tr ial court si milarl y li mited defense
co un se l to a rgu ing ho w the ev ide nc e o r re as on ab le in fer en ce s th ere fro m co nfo rm ed to th e la w . It is eq ua lly a pp are nt in this ca se tha t the re w as no qu es tion tha t the pe tition er p os se ss ed the req uis ite numbe r of pri or convict ions to est abli sh his stat us as an habitual cr iminal and t hat the Stat e otherwise ad du ce d s uffic ien t pro of a t trial to su pp ort a ll the ele m en ts o f the ch arg ed offe ns e. A cc ord ing ly, a s no ted by the po st-c on vic tion co urt, th e p etitio ne r’s re al c om pla int is tha t, be ca us e h e w as in fa ct g uilty of being an habit ual off ender, he was left with nothi ng to argue in cl osing except j ury null if icat ion, which arg um en t the trial c ou rt pr oh ibite d.
ii. Jury Nullification In o the r w ord s, d es pite the pe tition er’s pro tes tatio ns , w e a gre e w ith th e p ostcon viction cou rt that the exc lude d arg um ent c ons tituted a n atte m pt by defe nse cou nse l to pro m pt jury nu llifica tion. As no ted ea rlier, the Sta te w as req uire d to es tab lish be yo nd a re as on ab le d ou bt th at th e pe tition er h ad be en co nv icte d o f a tr igg erin g o ffen se ; the ha bitu al c rim ina l ch arg e w as co nta ine d in a se pa rate co un t of th e in dic tm en t; an d th e p etitio ne r ha d p rev iou sly be en co nv icte d o f thre e fe lon ies , as pre sc ribe d b y s tatu te. T en n. C od e. A nn. § 3 9-1 -80 1 to -80 3 (R ep ea led N ov em be r 1, 1 98 9). Th ere for e, th e d efe ns e a ttor ne y’s ref ere nc es to th e n um be r of inte rve nin g y ea rs b etw ee n th e p rior co nv ictio ns an d th e tr igg erin g o ffen se an d th e a bs en ce of a dd ition al o ffen se s d urin g th os e in ter ve nin g years were not relevant to any issue atthe habit ual cri minal tr ial other t han the possibi li ty of nullification

. Ra ther, d efen se c oun sel w as c learly a ttem pting to argu e tha t the p etitione r had not co m m itted a c rim e in se ve ral ye ars an d th at, th ere for e, th e ju ror s s ho uld ex erc ise co m pa ss ion notwithst anding the harsh mandates of the habi tual cr iminal st atutes. 7 Sim ilarl y, d efe ns e c ou ns el’soffenses committ ed during t he interven ing years, because the stat ement was misleadi ng. The tri al court noted that, at the ti me of his habi tual cri minal trial, the petitioner was bei ng prosecuted f or offenses committ

ed during t he interven ing years, includi ng grand larce ny, possession of a control led sub stan ce, a nd bu rglar y. W e con clud e tha t the tr ial cou rt’s lim itation of clo sing argu men t on th is bas is was not unduly restrictive. As noted subseq uently, the petitioner was permittedto argue bri efly t hat the prior

convicti ons occurred in 1981 and the triggeri ng offense occur red in 1987. Furthermore, the absence of int

ervening cri minal conduct was only relevan t to the possibil ity of

jury nul lif icati on. 19 query to the j ury concerning t he fair ness of imposing a li fe sentence was, in t he context ofthis case and in light o f defe nse cou nse l’s failure to

poin t to an y de ficienc y in the proo f, an inv itation to th

e jury to e xe rcis e its de fac to p ow er o f nu llifica tion

.
A tr ial c ou rt no t on ly h as the dis cre tion to c on trol c los ing arg um en t bu t a d uty to prevent i mproper argum

ent. Arguments by counsel must be based upon the evidence intr oduced at trial. Sta te v . Ta te, N o. 0 2C 01 -96 05 -C R -00 16 4, 1 99 7 W L 7 46 44 1, a t *10 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 7). M ore ov er, c on fus ing or ir rele va nt a rgu m en ts s ho uld no t be pe rm itted

. Id. On the basis of these guideli nes and the foll owing discussion, we conclude that the t rial court corr ectl y prohibi ted defense
co un se l from arg uin g ju ry n ullific atio n. T o th e e xte nt th at d efe ns e c ou ns el’s arg um en t w as furth er lim ited by the ev ide nc e a dd uc ed at tria l, this lim itatio n w as ce rtain ly n o fa ult o f the trial c ou rt.

A defendant does not possess a consti tut ional right , whether pur suant t o the due pro ce ss pro vis ion s o f the sta te a nd fed era l co ns titutio ns or e m bo die d in tho se do cu m en ts’ g ua ran tee s of a rig ht to a tr ial b y a n im pa rtia l jur y, to pla ce the iss ue of ju ry n ullific atio n b efo re a jur y in a c rim ina l tri al. Thus, Tennessee courts have upheld refusal s by tri al court s, i n response to defendants’ req ue sts , to in form jurie s th at th ey m ay dis reg ard the ap plic ab le la w in re ac hin g a ve rdic t. Se e, e .g., State v. Taylor , 77

1 S .W .2d 38 7, 3 97 (T en n. 1 98 9); Ja no w v. S tate , 56 7 S .W .2d 48 3, 4 85 (T en n. C rim

. App. 1978). Moreover, i n State v. W est , No. 182, 1988 W

L 13559, at * 1 (Tenn. Cri m. App. at Kn ox ville , Fe bru ary 22 , 19 88 ), a ca se ari sin g u nd er t he ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s, th is c ou rt a dd ition ally reje cte d th e p rop riet y o f ev ide nc e a nd arg um en t by a d efe nd an t co nc ern ing jur y n ullific atio n: [D]e fend ants sou ght to hav e the jury d eterm ine tha t they we re no t deserving of a l if e sentence even though the record cl early shows the y w ere ha bitu al c rim ina ls a s d efin ed by sta tute . In e ffec t the defendants wanted to convince t he jury by i rrel evant evidence,8 The sta te cons titutions of India na and Maryla nd prov ide that jurors are judge s of law an d fact. Therefore, trial co urts in those states i nstruct j urors on the “ prerogative” of nul lif icati on and presum ably defe nse co unsel arg ues ac cording ly. People v. Dougl as , 680 N.Y .S. 2d 145 , 150 n.1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 20

inst ructi on, and argument to ignore r elevant f acts, l aw, and evidence and to retur n a not guil ty verdi ct i n this phase of t he tri al. This is not pro pe r ... . Again, i n State

v. Sh rops hire, 874 S.W .2d 6 34, 6 39 (T enn . Crim . Ap p. 19 93), th is cou rt note d tha t “a tria l co urt ca nn ot b e h eld in e rro r fo r pr oh ibitin g a de fen da nt fr om ad vis ing a ju ry n ot to follo w the law as the trial c ou rt ins truc ts it.”

Th is is su e is ofte n a rticu late d in ter m s o f a lim itatio n u po n ju ries ’ rig hts no tw iths tan din g the ir de fac to p ow er o f nu llifica tion. In W righ t v. S tate , 394 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1965), another case aris ing un de r th e h ab itua l crim ina l sta tute s, fiv e ju ror s file d a ffida vits follo w ing the de fen da nt’s co nv ictio n s tatin g th at th ey felt th e d efe nd an t’s p rior co nv ictio ns w ere no t se riou s e no ug h to m ak e th e de fen da nt a n h ab itua l crim ina l. Id. at 8 84 . Th ey ex pla ine d th at th ey ha d v ote d to co nv ict th e de fen da nt, b ec au se , as the y u nd ers too d th e c ha rge of th e c ou rt, if th e d efe nd an t ha d b ee n c on vic ted of c rim es as de fine d in the ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tute s, th ere w as no thin g e lse for th em to d o. Id. at 8 85
. Th e S up rem e C ou rt re sp on de d, “A s a m atte r of fa ct th ey did n’t h av e th e right to di sregard what t he legisla ture h ad d efined as m akin g an hab itual offen der.” Id. at 885 (emphasis added) . Just as the jury ’s d e fa cto po w er o f nu llifica tion is n ot a “rig ht” o f the jury , the po w er c on fers no co ns titutio na l righ ts upon defendants.

Tennessee case law is consistent wit h the early Unit ed States Supreme C ourt case of Sparf v. United Stat es, 15

6 U .S. 5 1, 1 5 S .C t. 27 3 (1 89 5). In tha t ca se , Ju stic e H arla n s tate d: [U]pon pri ncipl e, where the matter i s not control led by express co ns titutio na l or s tatu tory pro vis ion s, it c an no t be reg ard ed as the righ t of c ou ns el to dis pu te b efo re th e ju ry th e la w as de cla red by the C ou rt.... 8 W e m us t ho ld firm ly to the do ctrin e th at in the co urts of th e Unite d S tate s it is the du ty o f jur ies in c rim ina l ca se s to tak e th e la w from the co urt, a nd ap ply tha t law to th e fa cts as the y fin d th em to b e from the evi dence.21 * * * Und er a ny oth er s ys tem , the co urts , alth ou gh es tab lish ed in o rde r to dec lare th e law , wo uld for eve ry pra ctical p urpo se b e elim inated from ou r sy ste m of g ov ern m en t as ins trum en talitie s d ev ise d fo r the pro tec tion eq ua lly o f so cie ty a nd of in div idu als in th eir e ss en tial rig hts

. W he n th at o cc urs ou r go ve rnm en t w ill ce as e to be a g ov ern m en t of law s, a nd be co m e a go ve rnm en t of m en. Lib ert y re gu late d b y la w is the un de rlyin g p rinc iple of o ur in stitu tion s. Id. at 10 2-10 3, 29 3 (foo tnote add ed).

Oth er jurisd ictions hav e ap plied th is princ iple in a ddre ssing the q ues tion of w heth er a de fen da nt p os se ss es a c on stitu tion al rig ht to pro po se nu llifica tion to a jury du ring clo sin g a rgu m en t. Thus, i n Medley v. Comm

onwealth , 70

4 S .W .2d 19 0, 1 91 (K y. 1 98 5), a K en tuc ky co urt he ld th at, in a pro se cu tion un de r K en tuc ky ’s p ers iste nt fe lon sta tute , a d efe nd an t did no t ha ve the rig ht to arg ue in clo sin g th at th e ju ry c ou ld d isre ga rd th e la w if it be liev ed tha t the m inim um pe na lty w as too se ve re. In United Stat es v. Brown , 54

8 F .2d 20 4, 2 10 (7t h C ir. 1 97 7), the Se ve nth C ircu it C ou rt o f A pp ea ls h eld tha t the trial c ou rt pr op erly pre clu de d d efe ns e c ou ns el fro m ad dre ss ing in c los ing arg um en t the his tor ica l ro le o f the jur y a s th e c on sc ien ce of th e c om m un ity. T he co urt ob se rve d th at a llow ing this arg um en t in th e c on tex t of th at c as e “w ou ld h av e b ee n a n in vita tion to th e ju ry to dis reg ard the instruc tions o f the c ourt; a s su ch it w as c learly im prop er.” Id. In United Stat es v. Sepulveda , 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993), the Fi rst Cir cuitCourt of Appeals observed:

[W ]hile jur ors m ay ch oo se to fle x th eir m us cle s, ig no ring bo th la w an d ev ide nc e in a g ad are ne rus h to ac qu it a c rim ina l de fen da nt, n eith er the c ourt n or co uns el sh ould enc oura ge ju rors to exe rcise this po

we r. ... A trial ju dg e, th ere fore , m ay blo ck de fen se atto rne ys ’ atte m pts to se ren ad e a jur y w ith th e s iren so ng of n ullific atio n. ... To the ex ten t tha t ap pe llan ts, d urin g c los ing arg um en t, m an ag ed to m en tion nu llifica tion , the y re ce ive d m ore tha n w as the ir due . See also Pe

ople v. M oore , 662 N.E .2d 1 215 , 123 1 (Ill. 199 6)(a d efen dan t has no rig ht to a rgue nu llifica tion to th e ju ry); State v. Bjerkaas , 472 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (a defendant has no rig ht to e nco urag e jury nullification

durin g clo sing argu m ent).22 In a ny ca se , as no ted by the po st-c on vic tion co urt , the pe tition er w as effe ctiv ely pe rm itted to a rgu e n ullific atio n, a lbe it br iefly . D efe ns e c ou ns el a rgu ed the follo w ing w itho ut o bje ctio n: Ladies and Gentl emen, you are the sol e tri ers of t he fact s and cir cumstances of t his case. You have to go back ther e and de libe rate , an d m ak e u p y ou r m ind s w he the r M r. C raig m ire is to rec eiv e a life s en ten ce for rec eiv ing sto len pro pe rty, or w he the r he is to be al lowed to be sent enced by Judge Nichols. Sentence between three and ten years i n the State pent it entiary. * * * La die s a nd ge ntle m en, all th es e th ing s h ap pe ne d in 19 81 . T he n h e is convicted of receivi ng stolen property i n 1987. Ladies and G en tlem en, thre e to ten ye ars in th e S tate Pe nite ntia ry is en ou gh for anyone to serve for a r eceivi ng stolen property. Th us , co ntra ry to the pe tition er’s arg um en t, he rec eiv ed “m ore tha n w as [his ] du e.” W e c on clu de tha t the trial c ou rt’s lim itatio ns up on the pe tition er’s clo sin g a rgu m en t did no t de priv e th e p etitio ne r of th e effect ive assist ance of counsel, due process, or a fai r tr ial by an impartial jury.

iii. Prosecutorial Misconduct In a simil ar vein, the peti ti oner also chall enges the prosecutor’ s objecti on to defense
co un se l’s q ue ry, “Is it fair for a p ers on to b e s en ten ce d to se rve a life se nte nc e? ” In the jur y’s pre se nc e, th e p ros ec uto r ar gu ed to th e c ou rt th at “ [t]he jur y h as no rig ht to ign ore the law in th is pa rticu lar ca se . . . . T ha t is e xa ctly w ha t M r. B rya nt is as kin g th em to d o.” H av ing alr ea dy co nc lud ed tha t the pe tition er’s arg um en t co ns titute d a n a pp ea l for ju ry n ullific atio n, w e d ec line to fin d th at th e pro se cu tor e ng ag ed in m isc on du ct b y o bje ctin g to the arg um en t. D efe ns e c ou ns el o pe ne d th e d oo r to the pro se cu tor’s ob jec tion w ith h is im pro pe r ar gu m en t. Se e, e .g., State v. Duke

, No. 89-74- II I, 1989 W L 11 120 4, at *4 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. a t Na shv ille, Sep tem ber 2 7, 19 89).

Ad ditio na lly, e ve n a ss um ing tha t the pe tition er e sta blis he d p ros ec uto rial m isc on du ct, he w as still r eq uire d to de m on stra te to the po st-c on vic tion co urt tha t the im pro pe r co nd uc t pr eju dic ially affe cte d th e v erd ict in his ca se . H arr ing ton v. S tate , 38 5 S .W .2d 75 8, 7 59 (T en n. 1 96 5); Judge v. State , 53 9 S .W .2d 34 0, 3 44 (T en n. C rim . A pp . 19 76 ). T he pe tition er a rgu es tha t the pro se cu tor ’s23 sta tem en t tha t the jur y “h as no rig ht to ign ore the law ” an d th e tr ial c ou rt’s cu rat ive ins tru ctio n effe ctiv ely dire cte d a ve rdic t of g uilt. In res po ns e to the pro se cu tor’s ob jec tion, the trial c ou rt ins truc ted the jury: Ladies and gent lemen, I woul d inst ruct y ou: You are t o have no

sy m pa thy an d p reju dic e. L oo k a lon e to tru th a nd jus tice , an d a fair ve rdic t ren de red , ac co rdin g to the law an d th e e vid en ce as pre se nte d. Th at is w ha t yo u a re t o b as e y ou r de cis ion on . I w ill tell y ou he re in jus t a fe w m inu tes
. Proceed.
First, w e no te tha t both the p rose cuto r’s ob jection and the trial c ourt’s in struc tion w ere co rre ct s tate m en ts o f the law . In State v. Willi amson

, 919 S.W.2d 69, 80 ( Tenn. Crim. App. 19 95 )(cita tion om itted ), this co urt o bs erv ed tha t it is, in fac t, the du ty o f the jur y to ap ply the law co nta ine d in the ch arg e o f the tria l court t o the ult imate fact s determined by the jur y. .. . “I t i s the duty of the c ourt to direc t the jury wh at the law is, and it is the d uty o f the jury to a pp ly it, u nd er th e d irec tion of th e c ou rt, ... to the fac ts in ev ide nc e. Th ey m us t trea t it as ap plic ab le to the fac ts, a nd ap ply it as the y dete rm ine the facts to be.” Se co nd , it is u nd isp ute d th at th e S tate ov erw he lm ing ly p rov ed the pe tition er’s ha bitu al c rim ina l sta tus
. Thus, the only way in which t he prosecutor’ s objecti on and the ensuing inst ructi on could have pre jud ice d th e p etitio ne r w as by inh ibitin g th e ju ry in the ex erc ise of its de fac to p ow er o f nu llifica tion

. W e ha ve a lread y co nclu ded that the petition er po sse sse s no right to ju ry nu llifi cation nor d oes the jury po ss es s a ny rig ht to dis reg ard the ins tru ctio ns of th e tr ial c ou rt a s to the ap plic ab le la w .
Sim ilarl y, w e d o n ot a gre e th at th e p ros ec uto r’s o w n re fer en ce to fa irne ss du ring his rebutt al argument consti tuted misconduct or prejudi cial ly aff ected the verdi ct i n the peti ti oner’s case. Th e p ros ec uto r ar gu ed in r eb utta l: [D efe ns e c ou ns el] w ou ld s ay : Is it fair to s en ten ce him for tha t? W ell, was it fai r for

him to vict imize all these people, ordo we have a res po ns ibility ? W e h av e a res po ns ibility to fo llow the law , ou r oa th, our re spo nsib ility to m em bers of the com m unity, s o tha t there are people other t han victi ms in these cases.24 W e in itially no te th at th e p etitio ne r did no t ob jec t to th e S tate ’s re bu ttal a rgu m en t at tr ial. M ore ov er, th e pros ecu tor w as a gain resp ond ing to the p

etitione r’s jury n ullification a

rgum ent. T he b oun ds o f prop er arg um en t are es tab lish ed by the fac ts in ev ide nc e, th e c ha rac ter o f the trial, a nd the co nd uc t of op po sin g c ou ns el. State v. Seay

, 94 5 S .W .2d 75 5, 7 63 (T en n. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 6). See also Nesbit , 97 8 S .W .2d at 9 01 . W ithin the se bo un ds , the pro se cu tion m ay po int o ut th e g rav ity o f a p art icu lar crim e a nd em ph as ize the im po rtan ce of la w en forc em en t. C ok er v . Sta te , 911 S.W.2d 357, 368 ( Tenn. C rim . Ap p. 1 99 5). A pp lyin g th es e s tan da rds , the pro se cu tor’s reb utta l arg um en t w as ap pro pria te a nd did no t de priv e th e p etitio ne r of d ue pro ce ss an d a fair tr ial. M ore ov er, a s n ote d a bo ve , the pro se cu tor ’s s tate m en ts d id n ot p reju dic ially affe ct th e o utc om e o f the pe tition er’s tria l.

iv. Burden of Proof Fin ally , the pe tition er a ss erts tha t, ge ne rally , the co nd uc t of th e p ros ec uto r an d th e trial c ou rt du ring clo sin g a rgu m en ts s hifte d th e b urd en of p roo f to th e p etitio ne r. In es se nc e, th e pe tition er a rgu es tha t, be ca us e th e p ros ec uto r an d th e tr ial c ou rt in for m ed the jur y th at it m us t ap ply the law as ins truc ted by the trial c ou rt to t he fac ts a s fo un d b y th e ju ry, h e w as de nie d d ue pro ce ss . W e s im ply no te th at c ou rts ha ve up he ld s im ilar jury ins tru ctio ns . F or e xa m ple , in United States v. Kyzyske, 83

6 F .2d 10 13 , 10 21 (6t h C ir. 1 98 8), in r es po ns e to jur ors ’ inq uirie s d urin g d elib era tion concerning null if icat ion, t he court responded:

Th ere is n o s uc h th ing as va lid jury n ullific atio n. Y ou r ob liga tion is to follo w the ins truc tion s o f the C ou rt as to th e la w giv en to y ou. Yo u would violat e your oath and the law if you wilful ly broughtin a verdi ct contrary t o the law given t o you in thi s case. Id. Th e S ixth C ircu it C ou rt o f A pp ea ls, n otin g th e tr ial c ou rt’s du ty to up ho ld th e la w an d to ap ply it im pa rtially , co nc lud ed tha t the ins truc tion w as ap pro pria te. See also United Stat es v. Boardman , 419 F.2 d 1 10 , 11 6 (1 st C

ir. 1 96 9)( “jur ors m ay ha ve the po w er t o ig no re t he law , bu t the ir duty is to ap ply the law as inte rpr ete d b y th e c ou rt, an d th ey sh ou ld b e s o in stru cte d”) ; Unite d S tate s v . D ou gh erty , 473 F.2d 1113,1131-1138 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(the exi stence of t he de facto power of j ury null if icat ion has coex iste d fo r m an y y ea rs w ith th e le ga l pra ctic e a nd pre ce de nt u ph old ing ins truc tion s to the jury tha t the y25 are req uire d to follo w the ins truc tion s o f the co urt o n th e la w an d a pp ly th e la w to th e fa cts ); Farina v. United Stat es , 62

2 A .2d 50 , 61 (D .C . C t. Ap p. 1 99 3)( an ins truc tion tha t the jury m us t find the defendant guil ty i f i t fi nds that t he governmen t has proven every element of t he offense beyond a
rea so na ble do ub t is n ot a dire cte d v erd ict); People v. Dougl as , 680 N.Y.S.2d 145, 151 (N.Y.App.Di v. 19 98 )(b ec au se co urt s h av e a du ty to pre ve nt im pro pe r nu llifica tion co nd uc t, the tria l co urt pro pe rly ins tru cte d th e ju ry o f its d uty to c on vic t the de fen da nt if t he St ate ha d p rov en the ele m en ts o f the crim e be yo nd a re as on ab le d ou bt); State v. Megg

yesy , 95 8 P .2d 31 9, 3 21 -32 2 (W as h. C t. Ap p.), revi ew denied , (W as h. 1 99 8)( trial c ou rts d o n ot in va de the pro vin ce of th e ju ry o r oth erw ise vio late a de fen da nt’s righ t to tr ial b y jury in ins truc ting jurie s th at it is the ir du ty to retu rn a ve rdic t of g uilt if th ey fi nd thateach element of a cr ime has been proven beyond a reasonabl e doubt). But see State v. Lowrence , No . 1, 19 91 W L 44 219 , at **3-4 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. a t Jac kso n, A pril 3, 19 91)(th e co urt no ted tha t it fo un d n o a uth orit y fo r a tria l jud ge to in stru ct th e ju ry t ha t it ha s “n o o ptio n” b ut to follo w the law ).

W

e conclude that at tempts by the prosecutorand the tri al court to prevent def ense co un se l from en co ura gin g ju ry n ullific atio n d id n ot s hift th e b urd en of p roo f to th e p etitio ne r or dire ct a verd ict in this c ase . Instea d, the action s of th e pro sec utor a nd th e trial co urt en sure d tha t the jury pro pe rly a pp lied the law s o f this sta te, in clu din g th os e p ert ain ing to th e b urd en of p roo f in a crim ina l trial. In fac t, the trial c ou rt re pe ate dly ins truc ted the jury tha t the bu rde n o f pro of re ste d w ith th e S tate
. Of course, the t rial court al so instr ucted the j ury thatitshould base it s verdict upon the evidence and the law pre se nte d. C on trar y to the pe tition er’s arg um en t, the bu rde n o f pro of d oe s n ot s hift to a crim ina l de fen da nt m ere ly b ec au se the ev ide nc e a nd the law pre se nte d e sta blis h h is g uilt.

III. Conclusion Fo r the fo rego ing re aso ns, w e affirm the ju dgm ent o f the p ost-c onv iction c ourt dis m iss ing the pe tition for p os t-co nv ictio n re lief.26 Norma M cGee O gle, Judge

CONCUR:

James C urwood W it t, Jr., Judge

John K. Byers, Senior Judge