NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

ROBERT N. STROVINK, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

CHIFFON V. JONES, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0604

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2011-005366

The Honorable Susan M. Brnovich, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert M. Strovink, El Mirage

Petitioner/Appellant

Chiffon V. Jones, Phoenix

Respondent/Appellee
STROVINK v. JONES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma 

joined.

GOULD, Judge:

¶1 Robert N. Strovink (“Father”) appeals the family court’s 

decree awarding joint legal decision-making authority to him and his exspouse, Chiffon V. Jones (“Mother”). Father also appeals the family court’s

award of child support in favor of Mother, and its denial of his petition for 

in loco parentis custody of his stepchild. For the following reasons, we 

affirm.

1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Mother were married in 2003. The marriage 

produced one child, S.S. Mother also has a child, A.J., from a previous 

relationship. Father filed a petition for dissolution in 2011, and both parties 

sought sole legal decision-making authority for S.S. Father also requested, 

over Mother’s objection, for in loco parentis custody of A.J. 

¶3 The family court conducted a one-day hearing at which both 

parties testified. The court then filed a decree awarding the parties joint 

legal decision-making authority for S.S., designating Mother as the primary 

residential parent, and ordering Father to pay child support to Mother. The 

family court also denied Father’s request for in loco parentis custody of A.J.

¶4 Father, who had filed a pre-trial request for findings of fact 

and conclusions of law, moved to amend the court’s findings and 

conclusions regarding legal decision-making authority and child support. 

Mother agreed with Father that the parenting time order should be 

amended because it conflicted with her work schedule. The family court 

subsequently amended the decree, in relevant part, by filing two orders 

 

1 Mother did not file an Answering Brief. Because child custody is at 

issue, we will not treat this omission as a confession of error. See Hoffman 

v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85, 417 P.2d 717, 719 (1966); see generally Ariz. R. 

Civ. App. P. 15(c).
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Decision of the Court

3

stating that (1) neither party was designated as the primary residential 

parent and (2) awarding both parties equal parenting time. The family 

court then revised the amount of child support to reflect the fact that 

Mother and Father shared equal parenting time, and reduced Father’s 

monthly child support obligation from $293 to $76 per month. 

¶5 Father timely appeals from the decree. 

DISCUSSION

I. Default/Sanctions

¶6 Father initially contends that the family court should have 

entered a default or sanctioned Mother by denying her a “defense” based 

on her failure to respond/untimely responses to his pleadings and motion 

to compel. Whether to impose sanctions is an issue generally left to a family 

court’s sound discretion. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 202 Ariz. 179, 180, ¶ 2, 

42 P.3d 610, 611 (App. 2002). The child’s interest is paramount, however, 

and we cannot agree that Mother should forfeit the right to present 

evidence based upon these actions. “When custody of children is involved 

in a court proceeding, it seems to us to be the duty of the trial court to hear 

all competent evidence which may be offered.” Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99,

103, ¶ 21, 67 P.3d 695, 699 (2003) (citation omitted) (vacating evidentiary 

sanction in child custody case). Nor can we agree with Father’s 

unsupported statement that the failure to award sanctions against Mother 

was a “tribute to [the trial judge’s] own bias and prejudices.” 

II. Joint Legal Decision-Making for S.S.

¶7 Father contends that the family court erroneously awarded 

the parties joint legal-decision making for S.S. Father argues that he should 

have been awarded sole legal decision-making authority and designated as 

the primary residential parent. We review the family court’s determination 

as to legal decision-making for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. Blackhawk, 

206 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶ 7, 79 P.3d 667, 669 (App. 2003). Because Father 

requested findings of fact and conclusions of law prior to trial, the family 

court must expressly state the basis for its conclusions. Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 

Ariz. 49, 50-51, 918 P.2d 1067, 1068-69 (App. 1996). We will uphold the 

family court’s factual findings absent clear error. In re Marriage of Berger, 

140 Ariz. 156, 161, 680 P.2d 1217, 1222 (App. 1983). 

¶8 As a preliminary matter, we note that Father has failed to 

provide a transcript of the dissolution trial. As the appellant, Father is 

required to provide a complete record to this court, including a trial 
STROVINK v. JONES

Decision of the Court

4

transcript. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(b)(1). In the absence of a transcript, 

we presume the record supports the family court’s findings and 

conclusions. See Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73, 900 P.2d 764, 767 (App. 1995) 

(affirming decision in the absence of a transcript).

¶9 In challenging the family court’s joint legal decision-making 

determination, Father argues that the findings made by the family court 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403(A) were insufficient, and that the evidence 

presented at trial did not support its findings. In making a determination 

concerning legal decision-making, the family court must consider the best 

interests of the child and all of the factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-403(A). 

Additionally, the family court must make express findings as to each factor 

and explain its reasoning in support of each finding. A.R.S. § 25-403(B). 

¶10 Here, the decree reflects that the family court made findings 

as to each factor under A.R.S. § 25-403(A), and cited specific evidence to 

support all of its findings. We find no error. 

¶11 Nonetheless, Father asks this court to reweigh the evidence 

presented at trial, contending that it supports an award of sole legal 

decision-making to him. However, this court’s “duty on review does not 

include re-weighing conflicting evidence.” Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, 

¶ 16, 219 P.3d 258, 262 (App. 2009). The family court was in the best position 

to weigh this evidence, and we will not re-weigh it on appeal. Gutierrez v. 

Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347-48, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d 676, 680-81 (App. 1998); see 

also Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 

205 (App. 2002) (explaining that the trier of fact is in the best position to 

weigh evidence). Additionally, because there is no trial transcript, we 

presume the record supports the family court’s findings. See Baker, 183 

Ariz. at 73, 900 P.2d at 767. 

¶12 Accordingly, we conclude the family court did not err in 

awarding joint legal decision-making to the parties.

III. In Loco Parentis Custody of A.J.

¶13 Father also contends the family court erred by denying his 

request for in loco parentis custody of A.J. We review a family court’s 

decision regarding in loco parentis custody for an abuse of discretion. Egan 

v. Fridlund-Horne, 221 Ariz. 229, 240-41, ¶ 43, 211 P.3d 1213, 1224-25 (App. 

2009). 

¶14 In order to show he stood in loco parentis to A.J., Father was 

required to prove A.J. treated him as a parent and that he had “formed a 
STROVINK v. JONES

Decision of the Court

5

meaningful relationship” with A.J. “for a substantial period of time.” A.R.S. 

§ 25-401(1), -415(A)(1) (2012).2 In addition to establishing an in loco parentis

relationship, Father was required to prove “[i]t would be significantly 

detrimental” for A.J. “to remain . . . in the custody” of Mother, who in fact 

wished to retain custody. A.R.S. § 25-415(A)(2) (2007). A rebuttable 

presumption exists that it is in A.J.’s best interest to award custody to 

Mother, her legal parent. See A.R.S. § 25-415(B);see also A.R.S. § 25-415(G)(2) 

(defining a “legal parent” as “a biological or adoptive parent whose 

parental rights have not been terminated”). To rebut this presumption, 

Father was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that 

awarding custody to Mother was not in A.J.’s best interests. See A.R.S. § 25-

415(B).

¶15 The family court determined that Father failed to show he 

stood in loco parentis to A.J. The family court found that despite the fact 

Father was A.J’s stepfather for seven years, Father treated A.J. “differently 

than his natural daughter,” and there was “no evidence” that a fatherdaughter bond ever developed. We presume that the transcript supports 

this finding. See Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73, 900 P.2d at 767. 

¶16 The limited record available to us also supports the family 

court’s finding. Mother took A.J. to Michigan before this case commenced. 

The family court also found that Father admitted to hitting A.J., and that

Mother sent A.J. to Michigan “to protect her from [Father].” During her 

absence, Father acknowledged that A.J. did not want to return home. 

According to Mother, A.J. has had no contact with Father since March 2011 

and has told Mother on several occasions that “she wants nothing to do 

with [Father] and wishes he would leave her alone.” 

¶17 On this record, we affirm the family court’s finding that 

Father failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he stood in an 

in loco parentis relationship with A.J. 

 

2 The trial in this case occurred in 2012. The Arizona Legislature 

revised the statutes for third-party rights effective January 1, 2013. The 

applicable statute is now A.R.S. § 25-409 (Supp. 2014).
STROVINK v. JONES

Decision of the Court

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IV. Child Support3

A. Earning Capacity

¶18 Father argues that the child support order erroneously 

attributes monthly income to him of $2800 per month, or $33,600 annually, 

when his last tax return reported earnings of $19,188. We review the family 

court’s child support determination for abuse of discretion. Little v. Little, 

193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5, 975 P.2d 108, 110 (1999). Our review of the court’s 

interpretation of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, A.R.S. § 25-320 

app. § 5(E) (Supp. 2014) (“Guidelines”), is de novo. Clay v. Clay, 208 Ariz. 

200, 202, ¶ 5, 92 P.3d 426, 428 (App. 2004).

¶19 Courts may look to earning capacity and prior work 

experience in evaluating a parent’s income for purposes of child support. 

Guidelines § 5(E) (if a parent is unemployed or working below full earning 

capacity, the family court may consider the reasons and “may attribute 

income to a parent up to his or her earning capacity”); Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 

188 Ariz. 333, 337, 935 P.2d 911, 915 (App. 1996). Father sustained a 

shoulder injury in 1997 but continued to work as a carrier for the U.S. Postal 

Service until 2005. He is now unemployed. Mother contended that the 

family court should attribute at least part-time income of $1200 per month 

to Father in view of his paralegal associate degree. The family court 

adopted Mother’s income figure and added it to Father’s monthly $1600 

payments from Social Security. The court found “no evidence” of a 

disability preventing Father from working as a paralegal. 

¶20 The family court acted within its discretion in implicitly 

rejecting Father’s claim that job prospects offering much lower earnings, 

such as a light cashier, represented his actual earning capacity. Because we 

lack a trial transcript, we assume that the trial record supports the family 

court’s income attribution. See Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73, 900 P.2d at 767. 

¶21 Moreover, the limited record before us fails to support 

Father’s argument. According to Father, a ruling by an administrative law 

judge (“ALJ”) supports his inability to secure employment as a paralegal.

 

3 Father also claimed that the family court should have attributed a 

different annual income to Mother. Because he failed to cite legal 

authorities and the record, and did not otherwise develop this argument, 

we decline to address it. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491 n.2, 

¶ 6, 154 P.3d 391, 393 n.2 (App. 2007) (declining to consider an undeveloped 

argument mentioned in passing); see generally Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(6). 
STROVINK v. JONES

Decision of the Court

7

That November 30, 2012 ruling, however, post-dates the decree and was 

only submitted to the family court with a motion for reconsideration. 

Although acknowledging Father’s shoulder injury, the ALJ found that 

Father was “not under a disability” and “there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have 

performed.” Examples of occupations “in significant numbers” available 

to Father include mail clerk, cashier, and ticket taker. The ALJ did not state 

that Father was incapable of working as a paralegal; rather, the ALJ noted 

that Father had told a physician he had unsuccessfully sought work in that 

field. 

¶22 Accordingly, on this record, we hold that the family court 

appropriately attributed part-time income to Father. See Taliaferro, 188 Ariz. 

at 336-37, 935 P.2d at 914-15 (affirming attribution of income to father who 

was capable of gainful employment notwithstanding his receipt of 

disability benefits).

B. Support Calculation

¶23 Father argues the family court’s child support calculation is 

erroneous because it credits Mother with a half-day of parenting time when 

she actually spends six hours with the child that day. As the family court 

noted, Father never states what the adjustment should be, and the court had 

already revised its support calculation to reflect equal parenting time. Even 

assuming that the family court erred in crediting Mother for six extra hours 

per week, any impact on the $76 monthly support award was de minimis 

and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

C. Insurance Cost

¶24 Father further complains that he is required to pay “all” of

Mother’s health insurance costs and contends that the funds are not child 

support. We disagree.

¶25 Mother’s affidavit of financial information states that her 

medical plan charges $87.23 for insuring S.S., and the dental plan charges 

$16.62. The combined charge is $103.85. The family court explained that it 

attributed $100 to this expense, not the $300 as Father had claimed. The cost 

of this insurance qualifies as child support. See A.R.S. § 25-500(9) (Supp. 

2014) (defining “support” as “the provision of maintenance or subsistence 

and includes medical insurance coverage, or cash medical support, and 

uncovered medical costs for the child, arrearages, interest on arrearages, 

past support, interest on past support and reimbursement for expended 

public assistance”). 
STROVINK v. JONES

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶26 We affirm the family court’s decree.