DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

INLET COLONY, LLC,

a Florida limited liability company,

Appellant,

v.

WIGHT MARTINDALE, III and BETSY MANNING MARTINDALE,

Appellees.

No. 4D21-2330

[June 1, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Jaimie R. Goodman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502020CA008512.

Tim B. Wright and Paul J. Parton of Wright, Ponsoldt & Lozeau Trial 

Attorneys, L.L.P., Stuart, for appellant.

James S. Telepman of Cohen, Norris, Wolmer, Ray, Telepman, 

Berkowitz & Cohen, North Palm Beach, for appellees.

WARNER, J.

A seller appeals a summary judgment in favor of the buyers, requiring 

the return of a deposit on a contract for sale of a home, which transaction 

did not close. The trial court determined that buyers had the right to 

terminate the contract and receive the refund of the deposit because the 

“drop dead” date of closing in the contract had passed, entitling buyers to 

terminate. Further, seller had not cleared the title, because seller had not 

obtained full discharge of a notice of lis pendens filed against the home 

within the time prescribed in the contract. We affirm, concluding that

buyers had the right to terminate the agreement for failure to close by the 

“drop dead” date of the contract and also because the notice of lis pendens 

could not be considered discharged for purposes of obtaining clear title 

until the time for filing a petition for certiorari or appeal from the order of 

discharge expired.

Buyers and seller entered into a real estate sales contract to purchase 

a residence. At the time of the contract, the residence was occupied by 
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tenants. The contract provided for a closing date of May 1, 2020, or the 

date that the tenants vacated the property. In the event the closing did 

not occur by June 1, 2020, buyers had the right to cancel the contract and 

receive a full refund of the deposit. In addition, the contract contained 

standard provisions allowing seller a period of thirty days from the date a

title defect is made known to seller to cure the title defects.

After the contract was signed, buyers delivered their deposit to the 

escrow agent, and seller initiated eviction proceedings against the tenants. 

A title commitment was delivered by the closing agent to buyers.

On May 1, 2020, the closing date in the contract, the tenants vacated 

the property but filed a counterclaim in the eviction proceedings seeking 

an equitable lien on the property. The tenants also filed a notice of lis 

pendens against the property. Because a notice of the lis pendens was 

filed, the closing did not take place.

On May 6, buyers requested an updated title commitment, and the 

following day, buyers sent objections to the title based upon the notice of 

lis pendens to the closing agent. The next day, the closing agent sent a 

letter to seller notifying seller of buyers’ objections. The letter listed the 

requirements for seller to close which included a release with prejudice of 

the lis pendens. Seller sent a letter to the closing agent acknowledging the 

objection and noting that it had thirty days to cure and clear the title, or 

until June 8, as the thirty days would have fallen on a weekend.

Days later, the tenants released their notice of lis pendens but filed an 

amended notice to correct a clerical error. Seller then proceeded to seek 

discharge of the notice through a hearing in the eviction case, which was

set for June 1. At the hearing on June 1, the court ordered the tenants to 

post a bond by 5:00 p.m. on June 6, a Saturday, as a condition to maintain 

the second notice of lis pendens. If the bond was not posted, the lis 

pendens would be dissolved with prejudice without further order. The 

tenants failed to post the required bond.

On June 8, buyers’ attorney sent a letter to seller, noting that the title 

defect had not been cured to the satisfaction of the title insurer. The title 

insurer required the appeal period for the discharge of the notice of lis 

pendens to expire. As the title exception had not been timely cleared, 

buyers terminated the contract, noting also in their letter that the closing 

did not occur by June 1, giving buyers the right to terminate the contract.
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When seller refused to return buyers’ deposit, buyers filed suit for 

breach of contract. Seller responded and filed a counterclaim seeking to 

retain the deposit. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.

The court granted buyers’ motion on two grounds. First, the court 

determined that June 1, 2020, was a “drop-dead” date for closing (the term 

used by the trial court). Buyers had the right to cancel if closing did not 

take place, which it did not. Second, even if seller was entitled to the 

additional thirty days to cure title from the date of buyers’ title objection, 

title was unmarketable on that date, and buyers had a right to cancel. 

From this order, seller appeals.

“A trial court’s interpretation of a contract is reviewed de novo. The 

same standard applies to the review of the entry of summary judgment.” 

Nationstar Mortg. Co. v. Levine, 216 So. 3d 711, 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) 

(quoting 19650 NE 18th Ave. LLC v. Presidential Est. Homeowners Ass’n, 

103 So. 3d 191, 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)).

“Drop Dead” Closing Date

Seller argues that the trial court erred in determining that June 1, 

2020, was a “drop dead” date on which buyers had the right to cancel. 

The parties signed a standard Florida Bar/Florida Realtors approved 

contract containing the following section regarding closing:

4. CLOSING DATE: Unless modified by other provisions of this 

Contract, the closing of this transaction shall occur and the 

closing documents required to be furnished by each party 

pursuant to this Contract shall be delivered (“Closing”) on 

[date crossed out] (“Closing Date”), at the time established by 

the Closing Agent.

Handwritten directly underneath this paragraph it stated, “*See 

addendum with additional closing date items.” The addendum contained 

the specific closing date and “drop dead” date:

Seller and Buyer make the following terms and conditions part 

of the Contract; Closing will occur [the] later of tenants 

vacating the property or May 1st, 2020. In the event closing 

does not take place by June 1st, Buyer can cancel contract 

and received (sic) the full refundable escrow deposit of monies 

paid by the Buyer.
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Seller contends that section 4 of the standard provisions allowed the 

closing date set forth in the addendum to be modified by permitting the 

inclusion of a cure period for title defects1, thus extending the “drop dead” 

date. We disagree that this is a reasonable interpretation of the contract. 

The addendum itself states that its terms and conditions are “part of the 

Contract[.]” As such, the addendum is modifying the terms of the contract 

with respect to section 4 dealing with the closing to set the closing as “the 

later of tenants vacating the property or May 1, 2020.” Buyers are given 

the ability to cancel the contract and receive the deposit back “[i]n the 

event closing does not take place by June 1st.” The parties made clear 

that June 1 was to be the final deadline because they entered into an 

addendum rather than including the closing date in section four of the 

contract.

“Courts, without dispute, are not authorized to rewrite clear and 

unambiguous contracts.” Anderson Windows, Inc. v. Hochberg, 997 So. 

2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citation omitted). “And where a 

contract is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written.” Id.

(citations omitted). “In construing a contract, the court should consider 

its plain language and take care not to give the contract any meaning 

beyond that expressed.” Walker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 758 So. 2d 

1161, 1162 (Fla 4th DCA 2000) (citing Walgreen Co. v. Habitat Dev. Corp., 

655 So. 2d 164, 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). “When the language is clear and 

unambiguous, it must be construed to mean ‘just what the language 

therein implies and nothing more.’” Id. (quoting Walgreen, 655 So. 2d at 

165).

Here, the contract provides that if the sale does not close by June 1, 

2020, buyers could terminate the contract and get their deposit back. The 

contract does not provide for contingencies for seller to extend that date. 

Moreover, section 18(R) of the contract provides that addenda to the 

contract control over printed portions of the contract if there is a conflict 

between them. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that 

June 1 was the “drop dead” closing deadline.

Alternatively, seller contends that material issues of fact remain 

regarding its affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. Seller contends 

that buyers, through their silence, accepted the time to cure the lis 

pendens defect which would extend the closing date to June 8, 2020, thus 

waiving buyers’ right to insist on the June 1 “drop dead” date. As to 

waiver, however, section 18(P) of the contract provides that “[n]o 

1 Section 18.A(ii) provides seller with thirty days to cure after receipt of a buyer’s 

notice of defects that render title unmarketable.
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modification to or change in this Contract shall be valid or binding upon 

Buyer or Seller unless in writing and executed by the parties intended to 

be bound by it.” This is consistent with the requirements of the Statute of 

Frauds. See § 725.01, Fla. Stat. (2020) (“No action shall be brought 

whereby . . . to charge any person . . . upon any contract for the sale of 

lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of any uncertain interest in or 

concerning them . . . unless the agreement or promise upon which such 

action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in 

writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some other 

person by her or him thereunto lawfully authorized.”). No writing modified

the document signed by buyers. Therefore, seller’s waiver affirmative 

defense fails. See Bradley v. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d 218, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2006); see also Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins, 587 So. 2d 519, 521–

22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (finding where contract contained an anti-waiver 

provision that the relevant provision could not have been waived unless 

there was a writing signed by the party against whom the waiver was 

asserted).

Likewise, seller’s estoppel argument fails as a matter of law. The 

Statute of Frauds does not contain an estoppel exception. See DK Arena, 

Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2013); see also Wharfside 

at Boca Pointe, Inc. v. Superior Bank, 741 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). 

The trial court was correct in determining that buyers had the right to 

terminate and demand the return of the deposit after the transaction failed 

to close on June 1, 2020.

Order Discharging Lis Pendens

As a second ground for granting summary judgment to buyers for the 

return of their deposit, the trial court determined that a cloud remained 

on the title which was not cleared even by the extended date of closing 

relied on by seller. We find that because the order discharging the lis 

pendens was still subject to review by the appellate court until the appeal 

time passed, the lis pendens continued to be a cloud on the title on June 

8, 2020, the closing date on which seller demanded that buyers close or 

forfeit the deposit.

The parties’ contract provided in section 18(H) that the “[s]eller shall 

convey marketable title to the Real Property by statutory warranty . . . deed 

. . . subject only to matters described in STANDARD A and those accepted 

by [b]uyer.” “Marketable title” has been defined as “one that is clear and 

free from reasonable doubt . . . . a title unencumbered and free from 

reasonable doubt as to any question of law or fact necessary to sustain its 

validity.” Bailey v. First Mortg. Corp. of Boca Raton, 478 So. 2d 502, 504 
6

(Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (quoting 44 Fla. Jur. 2d. Real Property Sales and 

Exchanges § 82 (1984)).

Section 48.23, Florida Statutes (2020) controls the discharge of a lis 

pendens. It provides:

(1)(a) An action in any of the state or federal courts in this 

state operates as a lis pendens on any real . . . property 

involved therein or to be affected thereby only if a notice of lis 

pendens is recorded . . . and such notice has not expired 

pursuant to subsection (2) or been withdrawn or discharged.

(b)1. An action that is filed for specific performance or that is 

not based on a duly recorded instrument has no effect, except 

as between the parties to the proceeding, on the title to, or on 

any lien upon, the real . . . property unless a notice of lis 

pendens has been recorded and has not expired or been 

withdrawn or discharged.

2. Any person acquiring for value an interest in, or lien upon, 

the real or personal property during the pendency of an action 

described in subparagraph 1., other than a party to the 

proceeding . . . shall take such interest or lien exempt from all 

claims against the property that were filed in such action by 

the party who failed to record a notice of lis pendens or whose 

notice expired or was withdrawn or discharged, and from any 

judgment entered in the proceeding, notwithstanding the 

provisions of s. 695.01, as if such person had no actual or 

constructive notice of the proceeding or of the claims made 

therein or the documents forming the causes of action against 

the property in the proceeding.

. . . .

(3) When the pending pleading does not show that the action 

is founded on a duly recorded instrument or on a lien claimed 

under part I of chapter 713 or when the action no longer 

affects the subject property, the court shall control and 

discharge the recorded notice of lis pendens as the court 

would grant and dissolve injunctions.

The statute thus provides that the lis pendens will not constitute a lien 

against property when it has expired, been withdrawn, or discharged, 
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which discharge is controlled by the court as it would “grant and dissolve 

injunctions.”

Seller contends that section 48.23(1)(b)2. does not include the time for 

an appeal in determining the time when the safe harbor commences for a 

purchaser for value to take free and clear of the notice of lis pendens. We 

disagree with seller’s position that the safe harbor provision provided

buyer with protection and clear title immediately upon the failure of the 

tenant to post the bond pursuant to the court order without awaiting the 

time for appeal to expire.

Section 48.23(1)(b)2. was adopted to prevent a lis pendens from 

continuing to be a cloud on title for a purchaser for value after it is 

discharged. See Gerald F. Richman & Mark A. Romance, Specific 

Performance of Real Estate Contracts: Legal Blackmail, 72 Fla. Bar J. 54 

(Nov. 1998). We conclude that including the time for an appeal to expire 

on an order discharging a notice of lis pendens is not contrary to the terms 

of the statute. Section 48.23(3) provides that discharge is in the control of 

the court “as the court would grant and dissolve injunctions.” Because 

the court controls the discharge, the matter is governed by court 

procedural rules and procedural rights due to litigants, including the 

important right to seek appellate review. Until such orders on a lis 

pendens become “final” by way of the expiration of the time for appeal, or, 

after appeal, a final judicial ruling, the lis pendens remains a cloud on 

title.

A party can seek appellate review of an order discharging a notice of lis 

pendens within thirty days of its rendition. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c)(1);

9.130(b); Cooper Vill., Inc. v. Moretti, 383 So. 2d 705, 705–06 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1980) (reviewing order denying motion to discharge notice of lis pendens 

by certiorari); Angler’s Reef Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Guirm Inv. LLC, 196 

So. 3d 507, 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reviewing order discharging notice of 

lis pendens as a non-final appealable order). Because the order in this 

case was subject to review by notice of appeal or petition for certiorari filed 

within thirty days, the order did not immediately remove the cloud on the 

title. Cf. Gold v. Wolkowitz, 430 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (appeal of 

foreclosure judgment was a cloud on title which should have been revealed 

to purchaser). Just as temporary injunctions and motions to dissolve 

them are subject to appeal and could be reversed, so too availability of 

appellate review of an order discharging a notice of lis pendens would 

continue to be a cloud on the title to the property until the expiration of 

the period of time for appeal.
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That the order of discharge continued to be a cloud on title until the 

appeal period ran was also the position of the title insurer in this case. In 

his deposition, the attorney for the underwriter testified that the order of 

discharge was appealable and that the company could not rely on the order 

of discharge as final on the issue until the appeal time had run. A

provision of the contract required a title insurance policy to be issued with 

only particular exceptions, none of which would allow for an exception for 

the tenant’s notice of lis pendens in this case.

Thus, the order of discharge would be considered a cloud on the title 

until the appeal time ran. Even without the “drop dead” date of the 

contract, the title would not have been cured by June 8, and buyers would 

have had the option of terminating the contract for failure to obtain 

marketable, insurable title under the contract terms.

Conclusion

The trial court correctly ruled that buyers properly terminated the sales 

contract after the transaction did not close on the final closing date set 

forth in the contract. Further, even without the “drop dead” closing date, 

a cloud remained on the title which was not cleared by the date claimed

by seller to be the closing date. The order discharging the lis pendens was 

subject to review in the appellate court as the time for appeal had not run. 

Thus, the lis pendens continued to constitute a cloud on the title of the 

property, also allowing buyers to terminate the contract. For these 

reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Affirmed.

MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.