If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

June 20, 2019

v No. 340032

Wayne Circuit Court

MYAH MAREA BATTS, LC No. 17-002265-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, C.J., and STEPHENS and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant appeals as of right her jury trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 

750.317, operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) causing death, MCL 257.625(4), 

driving a motor vehicle without a valid license (DWLS) causing death, MCL 257.904(4), and 

reckless driving causing death, MCL 257.626(4). She was sentenced to 27 to 50 years’ 

imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, and 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for 

each of the remaining convictions. We affirm.

This case arises out of the traffic death of Rodrick Motley. At approximately 2:00 p.m. 

on February 7, 2017, US Customs and Border Protection Officer Bryan Matthew Piche was on 

Gratiot in Detroit when a Ford Fusion driven by defendant collided with the rear passenger side 

of his Ford Escape. 

Rather than pull over to exchange information, defendant turned in the opposite direction 

and proceeded onto eastbound I-94. Officer Piche followed, and stayed 5 to 10 car lengths 

behind until he was able to pull alongside the Fusion to display his badge. It was raining at the 

time, and defendant had a female passenger in her vehicle.

Eventually, defendant exited I-94 toward Newport Street, with Officer Piche still behind, 

accelerated to almost 70 miles per hour in the 25-mph residential zone, ignored a stop sign, and 

pumped her brakes slightly before colliding with the FedEx van driven by Motley. He was 

ejected from the van and pinned underneath before dying from his extensive injuries.
-2-

Defendant’s blood was tested at the hospital later that afternoon, and her blood alcohol 

content (BAC) was 0.159%, almost twice the legal limit of 0.08%. She also had 11-carboxytetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in her system, and no valid driver’s license.

After trial, defendant filed a motion asserting entitlement to a new trial or, in the 

alternative, a Ginther1 hearing, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ultimately, the 

trial court denied both defendant’s motion for a new trial and request for a Ginther hearing, 

reasoning that she failed to demonstrate that resolution of her arguments required additional 

development of the record, or that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.

II. ANALYSIS

A. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S BRIEF ON APPEAL

1. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion 

for a new trial or that, at the very least, she is entitled to remand for a Ginther hearing. 

Specifically, defendant asserts that defense counsel performed ineffectively when he failed to 

call as a witness “the passenger” of her vehicle, obtain call logs to demonstrate that she called 

911 while being followed by Officer Piche, produce a certified copy of a US Customs Directive 

for admission into evidence, and adequately prepare for trial.

 To preserve an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, a defendant must file a 

motion for a new trial or Ginther hearing in the trial court to establish evidence supporting the 

argument. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 

(2000). Although defendant preserved this issue by raising the above ineffective assistance 

arguments in her motion for a new trial, the trial court denied the motion. Thus, our review is 

limited to the appellate record. Id.

“Whether defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed 

question of fact and constitutional law.” People v Muhammad, 326 Mich App 40, 63; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2018). “A trial court’s findings of fact, if any, are reviewed for clear error, while 

constitutional issues are reviewed de novo.” Id. On the other hand, a trial court’s decision to 

deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Rao, 491 Mich 

271, 279; 815 NW2d 105 (2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court renders a 

decision falling outside the range of principled decisions.” Id.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion for a new 

trial. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel 

rendered assistance that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-3-

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Muhammad, 326 

Mich App at 63 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). “Furthermore, because the 

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice, the 

defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim,” id.

(quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted), and must “overcome the presumption that 

counsel employed effective trial strategy,” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 

714 (2009).

Defendant failed to do either. In support of her argument that defense counsel performed 

ineffectively by not calling the passenger as a witness at trial, she presented only her own 

speculative affidavit, which failed to even identify the passenger’s name, and provided no further 

offer of proof as to what, specifically, “the passenger” would have testified. Nor did she indicate 

whether defense counsel spoke with the passenger but declined to produce her as a witness, or 

did not speak with her at all. Accordingly, defendant failed to overcome the presumption that 

defense counsel employed effective strategy by not calling the passenger as a witness, and is not

entitled to a new trial on that basis.

The same is true with regard to her assertions that defense counsel performed 

ineffectively by failing to obtain her cell phone and 911 call records, and to adequately prepare 

for trial. In her affidavit—again, her only offer of proof—she did identify what witnesses or 

evidence defense counsel should or would have discovered with proper preparation, or how each 

would have contributed to her defense, how his allegedly inadequate representation prejudiced 

her case, or whether she would have changed her decision to waive her right to testify had 

defense counsel provided additional direction.2 Further, beyond the general assertions in the 

affidavit, she made no offer of proof regarding what she may have said during her 911 calls or 

that she even made those calls. Therefore, defendant failed to establish the factual predicate for 

her argument or overcome the presumption that defense counsel made the decisions he did as a 

matter of trial strategy.

Finally, defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present a 

certified copy of the US Customs Directive, which supposedly prohibits an officer of Piche’s 

nature from conducting a traffic pursuit, lacks merit. Officer Piche testified as to what the 

document said, confirmed that he was not trained in traffic pursuits, and admitted that he was 

told by the 911 operator he spoke with to cease following defendant. In other words, the jury 

was presented with the information defense counsel hoped to illicit from presentation of the 

Directive, and still convicted defendant of second-degree murder. Accordingly, on this basis, 

defendant failed to demonstrate either that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness or that, but for any error, there is a reasonable probability that the 

result of her trial would have been different.

 2 Furthermore, defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to testify at trial after 

extensive questioning by the trial court.
-4-

Moreover, defendant has not established entitlement to remand for a Ginther hearing. 

For the same reasons discussed above, she has failed to demonstrate that further development of 

the factual record is required before this Court fully considers her arguments. People v Williams, 

275 Mich App 194, 200; 737 NW2d 797 (2007); MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a).

2. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant next argues that the trial court presented insufficient evidence of malice to 

support her conviction of second-degree murder, an issue we review de novo. People v 

Harrison, 283 Mich App 374, 377; 768 NW2d 98 (2009). The evidence must be viewed in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution to “determine whether a rational trier of fact could find 

that the essential elements of the crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 377-

378.

“The elements of second-degree murder are ‘(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the 

defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.’ ” People v Werner, 254 

Mich App 528, 531; 659 NW2d 688 (2002), quoting People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464; 

579 NW2d 868 (1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Malice includes “the intent to 

kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, [and] the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful 

disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great 

bodily harm.” Werner, 254 Mich App at 531 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the 

prosecution need not prove that a defendant actually intended to kill or to harm someone. 

“Instead, the prosecution must prove the intent to do an act that is in obvious disregard of lifeendangering consequences.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[B]ecause it can be 

difficult to prove a defendant’s state of mind on issues such as knowledge and intent, minimal 

circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant’s state of mind, which can be 

inferred from all the evidence presented.” People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 16; 871 NW2d 307 

(2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

In Goecke, 457 Mich at 471-472, which involved three cases consolidated for appeal, the 

Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence of malice existed to support one of the defendants’ 

convictions for second-degree murder where “[t]estimony established that the defendant lived 

within one mile of the scene of the accident, had a [BAC] of 0.18 percent, drove well in excess 

of the speed limit, ran a red stoplight, drove through an intersection at a time when he could have 

seen at least three vehicles properly traveling through the intersection, narrowly missed hitting 

two cars before hitting the victims’ car, and killed two people.” Further, the Court reasoned that 

from evidence a heavily-intoxicated defendant caused minor collisions just prior to a fatal 

collision, it could be inferred that the defendant was on notice he or she should not be driving. 

Id. at 472.

Similarly, from the evidence produced at trial that defendant, with a BAC nearly twice 

the legal limit and THC in her system, caused a minor accident from which she fled before 

driving almost 70 mph through a residential intersection in the rain, ignoring a stop sign, and 

hitting Motley’s FedEx van, a reasonable jury could infer that she possessed the intent “to do an 

act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is 

to cause death or great bodily harm.” Werner, 254 Mich App at 531. Thus, viewing the 
-5-

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the prosecution presented sufficient 

evidence of malice for a reasonable jury to convict defendant of second-degree murder.

3. EVIDENTIARY ERROR

Third, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the 

prosecution’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude evidence that Motley was not wearing a seat 

belt at the time of the collision. 

“This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.” People 

v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 195; 817 NW2d 599 (2011). A court abuses its discretion when it 

“reaches a result that is outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id. 

If an error is found, defendant has the burden of establishing that, more probably 

than not, a miscarriage of justice occurred because of the error. No reversal is 

required for a preserved, nonconstitutional error unless after an examination of the 

entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the 

error was outcome determinative. [People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378; 624 

NW2d 227 (2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

In Werner, 254 Mich App at 541-543, this Court held that “evidence of [a] decedent’s 

failure to use a seat belt would be relevant [in a second-degree murder case] only where the 

defendant could show that the failure was the sole cause of harm to the decedent.” In so doing, it 

distinguished People v Moore, 246 Mich App 172; 631 NW2d 799 (2001), in which “this Court 

held that a defendant in a negligent homicide case could introduce evidence that the decedent 

was not using a seat belt at the time of the accident, provided the evidence was used only for the 

issue of causation, and not as a defense to criminal conduct.” Werner, 254 Mich App at 541. 

The Werner Court reasoned that the holding in Moore was inapplicable to the circumstances at 

issue because the decedent’s death in Moore was remote from the defendant’s conduct, and in 

contrast to negligent homicide, second-degree murder does not require proof that the defendant’s 

conduct was a substantial cause of the victim’s death. Id. at 542-543.

The holding in Werner applies here. Motley’s death was not at all remote from 

defendant’s conduct. Again, she drove at high speeds through a residential zone, in wet 

conditions, while intoxicated, and struck Motley’s FedEx van, resulting in his death. Further, 

defendant has offered no evidence that Motley’s failure to wear a seat belt was the sole cause of 

his death. Instead, defendant asserts only that such evidence would have been relevant to the 

court’s instruction regarding involuntary manslaughter, and provides no actual argument at all as 

to how, had seat belt evidence been admitted at trial, she would likely have been convicted of 

involuntary manslaughter rather than second-degree murder. Accordingly, we decline to 

consider the argument and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the 

prosecution’s motion in limine. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it 

to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, nor may [she] give only 

cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Payne, 285 Mich App at 195

(quotation marks and citation omitted).
-6-

B. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF

1. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

We now address the arguments raised in defendant’s Standard 4 brief. First, defendant 

asserts that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for directed verdict because the 

prosecution presented insufficient evidence of malice to support a conviction of second-degree 

murder.

For the same reasons described above, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of 

malice for a reasonable jury to convict defendant of second-degree murder. Thus, the trial court 

did not err when it denied her motion for directed verdict. People v Schrauben, 314 Mich App 

181, 198; 886 NW2d 173 (2016).

2. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – JURY INSTRUCTIONS

We likewise reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request a jury instruction regarding intervening and superseding causation for the offenses of 

OWI causing death, DWLS causing death, and reckless driving causing death. Specifically, she 

argues that Officer Piche’s actions amounted to gross negligence and superseded her conduct as 

the proximate cause of Motley’s death.

It is clear from defense counsel’s closing argument that his trial strategy was to 

acknowledge defendant’s wrongdoing by admitting guilt for the three driving offenses listed 

above, in an effort to emphasize that she lacked the malice necessary to be convicted of seconddegree murder. And both the law and the evidence support that strategy.3

 

“A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence 

against him.” People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 124; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). Jury instructions must 

include not only the elements of the offenses charged but also “any material issues, defenses, and 

theories that are supported by the evidence.” People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 265; 677 

NW2d 66 (2004). “Even if the instructions are somewhat imperfect, reversal is not required if 

the instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried and were sufficient to protect the rights of 

the defendant.” Id.

Defendant asserts that beyond instructing the jury regarding factual and proximate cause, 

which the trial court did, it should have provided an instruction regarding intervening and 

superseding cause because the chase by Officer Piche broke the causal link between her conduct 

 3 “[W]here the evidence obviously points to defendant's guilt, it can be better tactically to admit 

guilt and assert a defense or to admit guilt on some charges but maintain innocence on others.” 

People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 60-61; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). Further, “[t]his Court does 

not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor does it assess counsel’s competence 

with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Foster, 319 Mich App 365, 391; 901 NW2d 127 (2017), 

(quotation marks and citation omitted).
-7-

and Motley’s death.4 Causation is an issue for the trier of fact. See People v Feezel, 486 Mich 

184, 200-201; 783 NW2d 67 (2010). “In criminal jurisprudence, the causation element of an 

offense is generally comprised of two components: factual cause and proximate cause.” People 

v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 435; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). Conduct is a factual cause of an injury 

if, but for that conduct, the injury would not have occurred. Id. at 435-436. 

For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the 

victim’s injury must be a direct and natural result of the defendant’s actions. In 

making this determination, it is necessary to examine whether there was an 

intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal 

link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken. [Id. at 

436-437 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

The record contains no evidence, beyond Officer Piche’s testimony that he followed 

defendant after she collided with his Ford Escape, that defendant drove the way she did because 

she felt she was being chased and was in danger. Instead, the evidence demonstrates that, while 

heavily intoxicated, she caused an accident from which she fled, exited I-94 at an excessive rate 

of speed into a 25-mph residential zone in inclement weather, disregarded a stop sign, and hit 

Motley’s FedEx van. Further, Officer Piche testified that with the exception of pulling up next to 

her vehicle to display his badge, he remained 5 to 10 car lengths behind and did not unholster his 

weapon until after the fatal collision. Thus, the evidence did not support an instruction regarding 

intervening and superseding cause as, on the basis of the evidence presented, Motley’s death was 

a direct and natural result of defendant’s actions.

Moreover, Officer Piche’s conduct cannot be considered an intervening and superseding

cause of Motley’s death. Rather than pull over and exchange information after her initial 

collision with Officer Piche, defendant fled the scene and engaged in the conduct described 

above. These extremely reckless actions occurred immediately following that first accident, and 

continued for a significant length of time after Officer Piche began following her. In other 

words, defendant had substantial time to consider her actions, even if fearful of Officer Piche, 

and chose to act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of 

such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Werner, 254 Mich App at 531. 

Accordingly, we hold that Officer Piche’s conduct—following defendant—did not break the 

causal link between defendant’s actions and Motley’s death.

3. SENTENCING ERROR

Third, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced her beyond her 

sentencing guidelines range, and that the sentence is disproportionate. Defendant is, however, 

mistaken.

 4 Defendant does not cite to a specific instruction or provide the language she would have liked 

the trial court to use.
-8-

“A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an 

appellate court for reasonableness.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 520; 909 NW2d 

458 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant question when reviewing a 

sentence for reasonableness is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by 

violating the principle of proportionality. Id.

Defendant’s recommended sentencing guidelines range was 225 to 375 months’ 

imprisonment, and her minimum sentence of 27 years for second-degree murder fell within this 

recommended range. Thus, defendant mistakenly asserts that her sentence is an upward 

departure from the sentencing guidelines range. “When a trial court does not depart from the 

recommended minimum sentencing range, the minimum sentence must be affirmed unless there 

was an error in scoring or the trial court relied on inaccurate information.” Schrauben, 314 Mich 

App at 196. Defendant alleges no scoring error, and does not challenge the accuracy of her 

sentencing guidelines range. Accordingly, her argument fails.

4. INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR

Finally, defendant’s argument that she was denied due process because the trial court 

failed to instruct the jury in detail on factual and proximate cause lacks merit. Defense counsel 

explicitly approved of the jury instructions as given by the trial court, waiving the issue for 

appellate review. See People v Henderson, 306 Mich App 1, 8; 854 NW2d 234 (2014). And as 

defendant admits in her brief, the trial court did instruct the jury regarding factual and proximate 

cause for each of the driving offenses charged. 

Furthermore, defendant’s additional arguments, both unrelated to the assertion of 

instructional error raised in the question presented, fail. As discussed above, Officer Piche’s 

conduct was not an intervening cause in Motley’s death, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it granted the prosecution’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that Motley 

was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the collision.

Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro