J-S31001-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDRE LEMONT CROMWELL

Appellant No. 481 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 7, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0001535-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MAY 25, 2017

Appellant, Andre Lemont Cromwell, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered after he pled guilty to robbery1and recklessly endangering 

another person (“REAP”).2 Cromwell contends that the trial court erred in 

refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing. Further, 

Cromwell alleges that he involuntarily entered the guilty plea due to trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness. After careful review, we affirm. 

On May 23, 2013, Cromwell robbed Ruth Blackmon at gunpoint. As a 

result, Cromwell was charged with robbery and REAP. The court appointed 

Thomas Agrafiotis, Esquire to represent Cromwell.

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
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Between the appointment of counsel and start of trial, Cromwell filed 

multiple petitions, including a pro se motion for new counsel and a petition 

under Rule 600 seeking nominal bail. The trial court denied Cromwell’s 

motion for new counsel, but granted his petition for nominal bail on February 

3, 2014. On February 6, 2014, the morning of trial, Cromwell presented an 

emergency motion for continuance, citing the defense’s inability to 

adequately prepare for trial. The trial court denied Cromwell’s motion, and 

the Commonwealth presented its case. The next morning, Cromwell entered 

a negotiated guilty plea to the above-mentioned charges and was 

immediately sentenced to an aggregate period of five to ten years’ 

imprisonment. 

On February 18,2014, Cromwell filed a petition to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Through his petition, Cromwell claimed that he felt pressure into 

pleading guilty, and, therefore, his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, 

or voluntary. The trial court denied Cromwell’s petition, but appointed him 

new counsel. Cromwell appealed.3

On appeal, Cromwell raises the following issues: 

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. 

CROMWELL’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA TO 

5 TO 10 YEARS’ INCARCERATION WHERE THE TOTALITY OF 

____________________________________________

3 Cromwell’s appeal was initially remanded to the trial court after his second 

court-appointed counsel failed to file a statement pursuant to Rule 1925(b). 

Upon remand, the trial court appointed current counsel, who timely filled a 

Rule 1925(b) statement. 
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THE CIRCUMSTANCES REVEAL THE PLEA WAS ENTERED 

INVOLUNTARILY DUE TO THE COERCIVE ATMOSPHERE 

CREATED BY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE POSSIBLE SENTENCE 

MR. CROMWELL FACED – i.e., UP TO 20 YEARS IN JAIL – AND 

COUNSEL’S CONSTANT AND ADMITTED LACK OF 

PREPARATION FOR TRIAL?

2. WHETHER PLEA COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE TO MR. CROMWELL WHERE COUNSEL’S LACK 

OF ADVOCACY AND PREPARATION CAUSED MR. CROMWELL 

TO ENTER AN INVOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA TO 5 TO 10 YEARS’ 

IMPRISONMENT RATHER THAN FACE A POSSIBLE SENTENCE 

OF 10 TO 20 YEARS’ INCARCERATION?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5. 

We address Cromwell’s second claim of error first. See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 29-38. Specifically, Cromwell alleges that trial counsel’s poor 

performance caused Cromwell to enter into an involuntary guilty plea. See 

id., at 30. However, we decline to reach the merits of this argument as it is 

premature. 

Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be deferred 

until collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 

(Pa. 2013). However, our Supreme Court in Holmes set forth two 

exceptions to the general rule: (1) where the trial court determines that the 

ineffectiveness claim is “both meritorious and apparent from the record so 

that immediate consideration and relief is warranted[;] or (2) where the trial 

court finds “good cause” for review and the defendant makes a “knowing 

and express waiver of his entitlement to seek PCRA review from his 

conviction and sentence, including an express recognition that the waiver 
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subjects further collateral review to the time and serial petition restrictions 

of the PCRA.” 79 A.3d at 564, 577. 

The trial court did not find that Cromwell’s ineffectiveness claim was 

readily apparent from the record. Further, there is no indication in the record 

that Cromwell made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his entitlement to 

seek PCRA review. Thus, neither exception is applicable. Accordingly, we 

dismiss Cromwell’s ineffectiveness claims as premature without prejudice to 

him raising them in a timely collateral proceeding. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 787 (Pa. Super. 2015) (finding 

ineffectiveness claims raised on direct appeal were premature pursuant to 

Holmes). 

Next, Cromwell challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to 

withdraw his guilty plea. See Appellant’s Brief, at 5, 16-28. Specifically, 

Cromwell contends that the coercive atmosphere surrounding his guilty plea, 

created by “counsel’s poor performance, counsel’s lack of advocacy 

throughout the case, counsel’s failure to prepare for trial, and the reality 

that [] Cromwell faced a sentence that could be twice the amount to which 

he pled guilty,” rendered the plea involuntary. See id., at 28. Due to these 

circumstances, Cromwell alleges that the trial court erred by failing to allow 

Cromwell to withdraw the plea. See id., 

”We begin with the principle that a defendant has no absolute right to 

withdraw a guilty plea; rather, the decision to grant such a motion lies within 

the sound discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 
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794 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). There are two 

different standards for reviewing requests to withdraw a guilty plea, one for 

a request to withdraw filed prior to sentencing, and one for a request to 

withdraw filed after sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Flick, 802 A.2d 

620, 623 (Pa. Super. 2002). Here, Cromwell sought to withdraw his guilty 

plea after sentencing. 

Once a court has imposed a sentence, a defendant may withdraw his 

guilty plea “only where necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” 

Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered 

into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Muhammad, 794 A.2d 

at 383 (citation omitted). A defendant’s disappointment in the sentence 

imposed does not rise to the level of “manifest injustice.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty 

plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant 

understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. This 

determination is to be made by examining the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. A plea of guilty 

will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the 

entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full 

understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and 

that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea. 

Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation 

and brackets omitted). “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a 
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guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving 

otherwise.” Id. (citation omitted). 

In addressing Cromwell’s claim, the trial court provided the following 

analysis: 

There is no evidence in the record suggesting that [Cromwell] 

entered his plea involuntarily. On the contrary, the record 

provides overwhelming evidence supporting the conclusion that 

[Cromwell] entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, and that he admitted to committing the offenses and 

took responsibility for his actions. The court explained 

[Cromwell’s] rights to him, and made certain that there was a 

factual basis for the plea (Victim’s testimony, including crossexamination) and that [Cromwell] understood the nature of the 

charges and the possible sentences he could receive, as is shown 

in [Cromwell’s] extensive verbal and written colloquies. 

Therefore, as [Cromwell] did not enter his plea involuntarily, the 

“manifest injustice” required for a post-sentence withdrawal of a 

guilty plea does not exist in this case, and the trial court thus did 

not err in denying [Cromwell’s] petition to withdraw his plea. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/16, at 8-9 (internal citations to the record 

omitted). 

After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion. Cromwell was advised of his rights and clearly understood the 

consequences of his guilty plea. Further, the record belies Cromwell’s claims 

that trial counsel’s poor performance led to an involuntary guilty plea. 

Cromwell clearly indicated that he was voluntarily entering into the guilty 

plea and that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance. The totality of 

the circumstances indicates that Cromwell knowingly, intelligently, and 
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voluntarily entered into the plea. See Rush, 90 A.2d at 808. Thus, Cromwell 

failed to carry his burden of showing “manifest injustice” 

Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/25/2017