RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2734-22

IN THE MATTER OF P.D.B.,1 

an alleged incapacitated person. 

 

Argued September 11, 2024 – Decided October 8, 2024 

Before Judges Currier, Marczyk and TorregrossaO'Connor. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No. 

P-20-01811. 

Kelly M. McGuire argued the cause for appellant 

P.D.B. (Disability Rights New Jersey, attorneys; 

Melissa Zeidler and Kelly M. McGuire, on the briefs). 

Gomperts McDermott & Von Ellen, LLC and Manes & 

Weinberg, LLC, attorneys for respondent Margaret 

Marran (Marisa Lepore Hovanec and Beth C. Manes, of

counsel and on the brief). 

Weiss Law, LLC and Thomas F. Coleman (Spectrum 

Institute) of the California bar, admitted pro hac vice, 

attorneys for amici curiae Spectrum Institute, 

1

 Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(e), we use initials to protect the confidentiality of the 

individuals in this guardianship proceeding. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2734-22

Easterseals New Jersey, The Arc of New Jersey, 

American Academy of Developmental Medicine and 

Dentistry, Quality Trust for Individuals with 

Disabilities, Inc., Mental Health Advocacy Services, 

New Jersey State Office of the Public Defender, 

Autistic Self Advocacy Network, Center for Estate 

Administration Reform, and Alternatives to 

Guardianship Project (Thomas F. Coleman and Nina E. 

Weiss, on the brief). 

Elyla Huertas argued the cause for amici curiae 

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, 

American Civil Liberties Union, and Community 

Health Law Project (American Civil Liberties Union of 

New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Elyla Huertas, 

Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

 P.D.B. appeals from the February 9, 2023 order that, despite dismissing

the guardianship complaint, nevertheless imposed continuing conditions upon 

him. Because there was no finding of incapacity under N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2 prior to 

the dismissal of the complaint, the Chancery Division no longer retained 

jurisdiction over P.D.B. Therefore, we reverse the February 9, 2023 order and 

subsequent April 24, 2023 order denying reconsideration. 

 P.D.B. turned eighteen on December 17, 2020. On December 10, 2020, 

P.D.B.'s mother, M.M., filed a verified petition to be appointed as P.D.B.'s 

guardian and to allow her to "engage in Medicaid planning" on P.D.B.'s behalf. 
3 A-2734-22

The complaint included two certifications from medical professionals. In his 

answer, P.D.B. requested a jury trial. 

 The Chancery Division issued an order on January 19, 2021 appointing a 

guardian ad litem (GAL) for P.D.B. and granting the GAL access to P.D.B.'s 

medical records. The order further required P.D.B. to continue attending his 

weekly psychiatrist appointments as well as twice-a-week Zoom sessions with 

M.M. and compelled the parties to discuss reunification therapy. The judge also 

permitted M.M. to communicate with P.D.B.'s psychiatrist and ordered P.D.B.

to cooperate with any evaluator retained by M.M. 

The court subsequently granted the GAL authority to make P.D.B.'s 

educational decisions, including attending a high school IEP meeting, sharing 

the parents' positions at the meeting, and obtaining a recording of the meeting 

afterwards. 

The GAL submitted a report to the court in October 2021. The GAL 

concluded that P.D.B. did not need a general guardian because he could make 

certain decisions himself. However, he recommended a limited guardian be 

appointed to make medical, financial, and educational decisions. The GAL 

advised that P.D.B. could participate in the decision making, but the final 

decisions in those areas should be made by a limited guardian. 
4 A-2734-22

In January 2023, the GAL submitted an updated report. He explained he 

had limited interactions with P.D.B. in the previous year and had recently visited 

the home where he lived with his father.2 The GAL found P.D.B., who was then 

twenty years old, was appropriately dressed, and in the time between reports, 

did not have any law enforcement interactions, medical conditions, issues with 

substance abuse, attendance problems at school, or violent behavior or mental 

breakdowns. The GAL noted P.D.B. was "staunchly opposed" to the

appointment of a guardian and having any contact with M.M. 

The GAL noted P.D.B. had graduated from high school and was taking 

advanced psychology and English classes at the community college. P.D.B. told 

the GAL he had made friends at school, joined a club, and was improving his 

social awareness. The GAL observed P.D.B.'s communication and conversation 

skills had improved in the time he had known him. The GAL described P.D.B. 

as "direct, focused and articulate." 

The GAL stated P.D.B. was "consumed" by the litigation, which was 

causing him "tremendous anxiety and stress." P.D.B. described difficulty with 

sleeping and told the GAL "he lives in fear of being found to be incompetent." 

2

 P.D.B.'s parents were divorced prior to the guardianship proceedings. 
5 A-2734-22

He also expressed concern that M.M. or a guardian may try "to have him 

committed to a mental institution." 

Although the GAL noted P.D.B. had functioned well in his daily activities 

without a guardian for the prior two years and was accepting guidance from his 

father and others he trusted, nevertheless he thought P.D.B. had "psychiatric 

vulnerabilities" that could expose him to exploitation. The GAL left the issue 

of P.D.B.'s capacity and his need for a general guardian to a jury. 

On January 30, 2023, M.M. withdrew her complaint. In her letter to the 

court, she stated that because of P.D.B.'s non-cooperation with her and the 

difficulty gathering information about his current level of functioning, she had 

"substantial concerns that she w[ould] not be able to meet her burden of proof." 

In addition, after reviewing the GAL's updated report and the psychiatrist's 

records, she believed the litigation was having a deleterious effect on P.D.B. and 

wanted to end the case. 

Thereafter, the GAL advised the court there was no longer a plaintiff in 

the matter but acknowledged the conflicting experts' reports about P.D.B.'s 

competency. The GAL explained that in certain instances involving an alleged 

incompetent, a special guardian could be appointed to continue pursuing the 
6 A-2734-22

guardianship, such as in In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168 (Ch. Div. 1977), 

where the court relied on its parens patriae jurisdiction. 

However, the GAL did not recommend the court appoint a special 

guardian and did not believe P.D.B. was "in imminent danger or that he would 

be a threat to society without the appointment of a [g]uardian." He 

recommended the court dismiss the case with any stipulations it determined 

appropriate. 

The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice in an oral decision 

on February 7, 2023, and a memorializing February 9, 2023 order. In the order, 

the court imposed the following conditions for an additional two-year period: 

the GAL would meet with P.D.B. once every six months and provide a report to 

the court and P.D.B.'s parents regarding P.D.B.'s "school work (if any), social 

activities and medical circumstances, inclusive of his continued therapy"; the 

parents would equally pay for the GAL's future fees; the GAL would continue 

to have HIPPA authorization to communicate with P.D.B.'s therapist; P.D.B. 

would participate in the meetings with the GAL; and P.D.B. would continue 

attending therapy. 

P.D.B. moved for reconsideration to eliminate the conditions imposed in 

the February 9 order. He contended the trial court exceeded its authority and 
7 A-2734-22

violated his constitutional rights in imposing any conditions without a finding 

of incapacity and after the dismissal of the complaint. P.D.B. provided the court 

with executed documents appointing his father as power of attorney if P.D.B. 

became disabled, incapacitated, confined or detained by a foreign power, or 

disappeared, and designating his father, uncle, and father's friend as P.D.B.'s 

supporters to assist him in making decisions. 

In a written decision issued April 24, 2023, and an accompanying order, 

the court denied the motion for reconsideration, but modified the order to require 

the GAL to submit his reports only to P.D.B.'s parents and not to the court. 

The court explained it relied on Dr. Jonathan Mack's updated report in 

dismissing the case. Dr. Mack, Psy.D., was appointed by the court after the 

parties presented conflicting expert reports regarding the issue of P.D.B.'s 

capacity. Dr. Mack concluded that P.D.B. did not have capacity but 

acknowledged his cognitive skills had improved since the time of the expert's 

first report. 

The court also explained that Rule 4:37-1(b) permitted the imposition of 

conditions. The court stated this was an unusual case because there was 

sufficient information from P.D.B.'s mother and treating doctors to commence 

litigation for a guardianship. In addition, Dr. Mack found, in two reports, that 
8 A-2734-22

P.D.B. did not have capacity. The court expressed concern about P.D.B.'s future 

mental health, but also noted the anxiety the litigation was causing him. 

The court relied on its parens patriae authority to impose the conditions, 

stating the meetings with the GAL were intended to check on P.D.B.'s mental 

health and it was not appropriate to completely dismiss the case considering Dr. 

Mack's reports. Therefore, after revising the order as stated, the court denied 

reconsideration. 

On July 14, 2023, the Chancery Division granted P.D.B.'s motion to stay 

enforcement of the February 9, 2023 order pending appeal. 

On appeal, P.D.B. contends the imposition of conditions violates the New 

Jersey and United States Constitutions as well as applicable New Jersey law, 

and the court abused its discretion in requiring P.D.B. to comply with certain 

conditions after dismissing the complaint. 

We granted leave to the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, 

the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Community Health Law Project to 

appear as amicus curiae. They contend the court violated P.D.B.'s due process 

rights because he did not have notice or an opportunity to argue the conditions 

were inappropriate. They also contend the conditions were compelled speech 

contrary to P.D.B.'s First Amendment rights and violated his right to choose 
9 A-2734-22

whether to receive medical care or not, in addition to violating the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. 

We also granted leave to Spectrum Institute, Easterseals New Jersey, The 

Arc of New Jersey, American Academy of Developmental Medicine and 

Dentistry, Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc., Mental Health 

Advocacy Services, New Jersey State Office of the Public Defender, Autistic 

Self Advocacy Network, Center for Estate Administration Reform, and 

Alternatives to Guardianship Project to appear as amici. The entities raised 

similar contentions and supported P.D.B.'s position. 

In response, M.M. states she "takes no position" regarding the "legality of 

including conditions in orders of dismissal in a guardianship action." She defers 

to this court's determination but if the conditions are permitted, M.M. contends 

they were "reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances." 

The issue before this court then is whether the trial court misapplied Rule 

4:37-1(b) to support its authority in imposing conditions despite dismissing the 

complaint. "[W]e review the meaning or scope of a court rule de novo, applying 

'ordinary principles of statutory construction to interpret the court rules.'" 

DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 228 (2023) (quoting State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 

44, 67 (2017)). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal 
10 A-2734-22

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special 

deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 

366, 378 (1995). 

N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24 provides that a proceeding to determine capacity or for 

the appointment of a guardian can be conducted without a jury, unless a jury 

trial is demanded by the individual alleged to lack capacity or an individual on 

their behalf. Here, P.D.B. requested a jury trial to determine his incapacity. 

N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24.1(a) explains a general guardian can be appointed if 

the individual meets the definition of N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2 and does not have the 

"capacity to govern [them]self or manage [their] affairs." N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2 

defines an "[i]ncapacitated individual" as "an individual who is impaired by 

reason of mental illness or intellectual disability to the extent that the individual 

lacks sufficient capacity to govern himself and manage the individual's affairs." 

N.J.S.A. 3B:12-25 authorizes the Superior Court to appoint a guardian for an 

individual found to be incapacitated. The statute explains the court can consider 

"surrogate decision-makers" that were chosen by the incapacitated individual 

before they became incapacitated, such as through a durable power of attorney, 

health care proxy, or advance directive. Ibid. 
11 A-2734-22

Rule 4:86 also details the process of appointing a guardian and includes 

additional information, such as the requirements of a guardianship complaint 

and other accompanying documents and the rights of an incapacitated 

individual. According to Rule 4:86-4(d), a GAL may be appointed at any time 

before the entry of judgment when the court becomes aware of special 

circumstances. The GAL's role is to "evaluate the best interests of the alleged 

incapacitated person and to present that evaluation to the court." Ibid. The 

GAL's function is to be "'the eyes of the court' furthering the best interests of 

the [individual alleged to lack capacity]." S.T. v. 1515 Broad St., LLC, 241 N.J. 

257, 278 (2020) (quoting In re Mason, 305 N.J. Super. 120, 127 (Ch. Div. 

1997)). 

Rule 4:37-1(b) permits the voluntary dismissal of an action "at the 

plaintiff's instance . . . by leave of court and upon such terms and conditions as 

the court deems appropriate." This court has explained that "[w]hether to 

dismiss with or without prejudice, whether to impose terms, and the crafting of 

terms that are fair and just in the circumstances, are all matters that lie within 

the court's sound discretion." Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 97 (App. 

Div. 2006). However, "in exercising that discretion, the court is chiefly required 
12 A-2734-22

to protect 'the rights of the defendant.'" Ibid. (quoting Burke v. Cent. R.R. Co. 

of N.J., 42 N.J. Super. 387, 397-98 (App. Div. 1956)). 

The court's discretion regarding the terms of the dismissal extends to 

whether it is with or without prejudice and whether to award counsel fees. See 

Mack Auto Imports, Inc. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 244 N.J. Super. 254, 258 (App. 

Div. 1990). As we have stated, "the obvious purport of our rule is to protect a 

litigant where a termination of the proceedings without prejudice will place him 

in the probable position of having to defend, at additional expense, another 

action based upon similar charges at another time." Shulas, 385 N.J. Super. at 

97; see also Burns v. Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Bd., 429 N.J. 

Super. 435, 446 (App. Div. 2013) (explaining that "[d]espite the relatively scant 

judicial treatment of the contours of Rule 4:37-1, it is clear the purpose served 

by the rule is the prevention of 'intolerable manipulation of the [c]ourt's calendar 

and the defendants' resources.'") (quoting Shulas, 385 N.J. Super. at 101). 

In its oral decision dismissing the complaint but imposing conditions, the 

trial court explained, after reviewing the GAL's recent report, Dr. Mack's 

updated report, and M.M.'s letter, it was not necessary to appoint a guardian to 

continue prosecuting the guardianship after M.M. withdrew her complaint. It 

reasoned Dr. Mack's report did not find P.D.B. to be cognitively incapacitated, 
13 A-2734-22

but also opined P.D.B. should not be allowed to govern his affairs. The court 

also noted the GAL's conclusion that P.D.B. would not be in danger or a threat 

to society without the appointment of a guardian. Nevertheless, the court relied 

on Rule 4:37-1(b) to impose the stated conditions. 

In its written decision denying reconsideration, the court acknowledged 

the purpose of Rule 4:37-1(b) as expressed in caselaw but reasoned "the plain 

language of the [Rule] does not limit the conditions to those circumstances." It 

reiterated the unusual nature of the case and that there was sufficient information 

presented to initiate the guardianship action. The court again noted Dr. Mack's

two reports opining that P.D.B. lacked capacity. While "reluctantly willing to 

dismiss the matter," the trial court relied on its parens patriae authority to impose 

the conditions because "it believed strongly that some follow up is necessary." 

After a careful review, we are satisfied the Chancery Division's order 

contravenes the purpose of Rule 4:37-1(b) because the imposed conditions did 

not serve to avoid duplicative litigation or to preserve judicial efficiency or 

efficiency of resources. Shulas, 385 N.J. Super. at 97; Burns, 429 N.J. Super. at 

445-46. Rather, the court imposed the conditions because of its concern for 

P.D.B. 
14 A-2734-22

Well-meaning as that may have been, the court misapplied its discretion 

in compelling P.D.B. to continue to comply with certain conditions. As our 

Supreme Court has stated, "The parens patriae power of our courts derives from 

the inherent equitable authority of the sovereign to protect those persons within 

the state who cannot protect themselves because of an innate legal disability." 

In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 259 (1981). Here, there was no finding of incapacity 

as the scheduled trial had not occurred. Therefore, the court mistakenly 

exercised its parens patriae power. Under these circumstances, the court had no 

authority to impose intrusive, onerous conditions. 

Once M.M. withdrew her complaint for guardianship, and the court 

declined to appoint a special guardian, there was no authority to continue the 

GAL's appointment. Although the court is authorized to appoint a temporary 

GAL pending a hearing on a guardianship petition, see N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24.1(c), 

a general or limited guardian can be appointed only after a finding of incapacity. 

N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24.1(a) to (b). 

Furthermore, the imposed conditions violated P.D.B.'s right to selfdetermination as established implicitly under the New Jersey Constitution, 

Article I, Paragraph 1. The Supreme Court has long recognized this right and 

the clear public policy respecting the rights of all people, including the
15 A-2734-22

developmentally disabled. See In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 169-70 (1994). The 

conditions in the order of dismissal impermissibly usurped P.D.B.'s decisionmaking. 

For similar reasons, the conditions infringed upon P.D.B.'s right to 

medical confidentiality, see Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 77-78 (1995), the 

protections afforded under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 

Act, Pub. L. 1996, ch. 104-91, and his right to due process, U.S. Const. amend. 

XIV, § 1; N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 1. When a court acts under its parens patriae 

authority, its actions are still "bounded by constitutional procedural guarantees." 

In re Commitment of J.M.B., 197 N.J. 563, 598 (2009) (quoting In re 

Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 125-26 (2002)).

Reversed and remanded for the court to vacate its stay and enter a 

dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. We do not retain jurisdiction.