If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

September 29, 2022

v No. 356675

Ingham Circuit Court

JEFFREY KEMPER, LC No. 20-000461-NF

Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and LETICA and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this no-fault action, defendant, Jeffrey Kemper, appeals by right the circuit court’s order 

granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of plaintiff, Wolverine Mutual 

Insurance Company, in its action for declaratory judgment. The trial court concluded that 

defendant is not entitled to additional personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for injuries 

sustained when he fell in September 2019, because those injuries did not arise out of the April 

1987 motor vehicle accident that rendered him a quadriplegic. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Jeffrey Kemper was involved in a motor-vehicle accident in 1987 that rendered him a 

quadriplegic. The parties stipulated that plaintiff insurer was responsible for defendant’s personal 

injury protection (PIP) benefits under the no-fault insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., for 

expenses arising from the 1987 accident. Since 1987, defendant has been wheelchair-bound 

because of his quadriplegia and is entirely dependent on his wheelchair for mobility. However, 

defendant is able to drive himself utilizing a motor vehicle that has been modified with hand 

controls and a steering knob. Further, defendant is able to transfer himself from one seated position 

to another by utilizing a transfer board. 

On September 25, 2019, defendant attempted to transfer himself from the driver’s seat of 

his vehicle to his wheelchair utilizing the transfer board. However, the board fell, causing him to 

fall approximately six to nine inches from the doorjamb of the vehicle and land on his buttocks. 

Defendant waited approximately 15 to 30 minutes before two individuals passing by came to his 
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assistance. Because skin breakdown is a known concern for an individual with quadriplegia, 

defendant’s caregiver checked him for wounds and bruises. Despite their diligence in monitoring 

the area, defendant developed a hematoma that eventually became a stage-three pressure ulcer. 

The pressure ulcer required medical treatment and multiple physician visits. Defendant ultimately 

required 24-hour attendant care services. As a result of his injuries, defendant submitted claims to 

plaintiff for payment of his medical expenses for treatment of the pressure wound and for his 

increased level of attendant care resulting from the ulcer. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether defendant 

is entitled to PIP benefits for expenses resulting from the September 25, 2019 incident. The parties 

filed a stipulation of facts and cross-motions for summary disposition. Plaintiff moved for 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that the stage-three pressure ulcer 

and the resulting treatment did not “arise out of” the use of defendant’s motor vehicle and, 

therefore, was not covered under MCL 500.3105(1). Plaintiff argued that under McPherson v 

McPherson, 493 Mich 294; 831 NW2d 219 (2013), the stage-three pressure ulcer constituted a 

new injury that arose as a result of an intervening act, and not the 1987 accident. The trial court 

agreed and granted plaintiff’s motion. 

II. ANALYSIS

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. 

Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). “Summary disposition is 

appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Zaher v Miotke, 300 Mich App 132, 

139; 832 NW2d 266 (2013) (quotations marks and citations omitted). “In reviewing a motion 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other 

relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to 

determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial.” Id. (quotation marks 

and citations omitted). 

Because there is no dispute regarding the material facts, the only question before this Court 

is whether the stage-three pressure ulcer resulting from defendant’s fall arose out of the 1987 

accident for purposes of MCL 500.3105(1). 

MCL 500.3105(1) provides that “an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily 

injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor 

vehicle.” MCL 500.3105(1). “ ‘It is not any bodily injury that triggers an insurer’s liability under 

the no-fault act. Rather, it is only those injuries that are caused by the insured’s use of a motor 

vehicle.’ ” McPherson, 493 Mich at 297, quoting Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 

Mich 521, 531; 697 NW2d 895 (2005) (emphasis in original). “Regarding the degree 

of causation between the injury and the use of the motor vehicle that must be shown, this Court 

has established that an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle when 

the causal connection between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more 

than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for.’ ” McPherson, 493 Mich at 297 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).
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In McPherson, our Supreme Court analyzed the “arising out of” standard set forth under 

MCL 500.3105(1). McPherson involved a plaintiff who sustained a neurological disorder as a

result of a 2007 motor vehicle accident. McPherson, 493 Mich at 295. In 2008, the plaintiff 

injured his spinal cord when he crashed his motorcycle after experiencing a seizure consistent with 

his existing neurological disorder. Id. The plaintiff “claimed that he was entitled to no-fault 

benefits for the spinal cord injury as a result of the 2007 accident, asserting that the spinal cord 

injury ‘ar[ose] out of’ the 2007 accident for purposes of MCL 500.3105(1).” Id. at 296 (alteration 

and emphasis in original). The McPherson Court addressed whether “the spinal cord injury

plaintiff suffered in the 2008 crash ‘ar[ose] out of’ the 2007 accident for purposes of MCL 

500.3105(1).” Id. (alteration and emphasis in original). The Court concluded that the “causal 

connection between the 2008 spinal cord injury and the 2007 accident [was] insufficient to satisfy 

the ‘arising out of’ requirement of MCL 500.3105(1).” Id. at 297-298. In support of its conclusion, 

the Court reasoned that 

[p]laintiff did not injure his spinal cord while using the vehicle in 2007. Rather, he 

injured it in the 2008 motorcycle crash, which was caused by his seizure, which 

was caused by his neurological disorder, which was caused by his use of a motor 

vehicle as a motor vehicle in 2007. Under these circumstances, we believe that the 

2008 injury is simply too remote and too attenuated from the earlier use of a motor 

vehicle to permit a finding that the causal connection between the 2008 injury and 

the 2007 accident “is more than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for.’ ” [Id. (quotation 

marks and citation omitted).]

Further, the McPherson Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the holding in Scott v 

State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 278 Mich App 578; 751 NW2d 51 (2008), vacated in part on other 

grounds 482 Mich 1074 (2008), applied to his case. McPherson, 493 Mich at 298. Scott addressed 

whether the plaintiff’s hyperlipidemia occurred as a direct result of an injury sustained in an 

automobile accident, or was caused by other factors. Id. In other words, “the issue was whether 

the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the first injury caused the second injury in a 

direct way.” Id. In McPherson, there was no direct causation between the first and second injuries 

because “the first injury directly caused the second accident, which in turn caused the second 

injury.” Id. at 298-299 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court determined that the second 

injury was too attenuated to be directly caused by the first accident. Id. 

Here, defendant asserts that this case should be decided under Scott because his first 

injury—his quadriplegia—directly caused his second injury—the stage-three pressure ulcer. We 

disagree. Considered in a light most favorable to defendant, the evidence shows that he suffered 

an injury in 1987 from using his vehicle as a motor vehicle. However, the injury he now seeks 

benefits for, the stage-three pressure ulcer, was not a result of the 1987 accident. Rather, similarly

to McPherson, his stage-three pressure ulcer was the direct result of an intervening incident, which 

was caused by his quadriplegia. Although defendant was susceptible to falling as a result of 

quadriplegia, his injury was caused by the fall, not by the 1987 accident. More specifically, the 

injury was the result of his transfer board falling during the wheelchair-to-vehicle transfer process. 

Similarly to the intervening car accident in McPherson, defendant’s fall was a distinct and separate 

incident from the 1987 accident. 
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Accordingly, the record reflects that the “first injury directly caused the second accident, 

which in turn caused the second injury.” McPherson, 493 Mich at 298-299. Defendant did not 

develop a stage-three pressure ulcer from the 1987 accident. Rather, he developed the ulcer during 

a fall, which was caused by his quadriplegia, which was caused by his use of a motor vehicle in 

1987. Our Supreme Court explicitly rejected this type of causation as being too remote and too 

attenuated from the automobile accident to permit a finding that the causal connection between the 

accident and the second injury was “more than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for.’ ” Id. at 298, 

quoting Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 659; 391 NW2d 320 (1986).

Affirmed.

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Sima G. Patel