Mr. Thomas W. Brown, Administrator OPiniOn 140. 6 884 

Texas Board of Private Detectives, 

Private Investigators, Private RC?: Construction of Article 

Patrolmen, Private Guards and 4413 (29bb1, V.C.S. 

Managers with reqard to denial 

509 Sam Houston State Office Bldq. 

Austin, Texas 78701 

of license to a person 

convicted of a felony. 

Dear Mr. Brown: 

In your recent letter you have referred to Artic',le 

4413 (29bb),, Vernon's Civil Statutes 

3(a) and 18 o,f that statute, 

, specifically to Sections 

and reque~sted our opinion as to 

whether your Board can deny a license to an applicant on the 

ground that he or she is a convicted felon reqardles,s of the 

date of the conviction, 

Section 18 provides, in part, as follows: 

"After a hearing the board may deny a license 

unless the applicant makes a sh,awinq satisfactory 

to the board that the applicant, if an individual,, 

has not, or if the applicant is a person other than 

an individual, tha:t its manager and each of its officers, directors , and partners, have not 

'I (11, . . . 

” (2) ., . . 

U (3~) committed, any act resultlnq in conviction 

of a felony or a crime 'involving moral turpitude;" 

We are of the ooinian that this provIsion of the 

statute makes discretionary with the Doard the question of 

whether a license will be denied because af conviction of a 

felony. The applicable rule of sratutory construction is 

stated in 53 Texas Jurisprudence 2d 31-32, Section 16 as follows: 

-4310- 
4 . 

Mr. Thomas W. Brown, paqe 2 (M-884) 

II 

. . . On the other hand, 'may' ordinarily 

connotes discretion or permission, and it will not 

be treated as a word of command unless there is 

something in the context or subject matter of the 

act to indicate that it was used in that sense.” 

In accord, see Attorney General opinion No. V-753 

(1948). 

Section 3(a) of Article 4413 (29bb) reads, in part, 

as follows: 

"(a) A person is entitled to applv for a 

License under this Act who 

"(1) . . . 

"(2) . . . 

"(3) is of good moral character and temperate 

habits, who is not a convicted felon;" 

added.) 

--.-.~- (Emphasis 

Strictly read, Section 3(a) would conflict with Section 

18, but we are of the opinion that the later Section 18 controls 

and modifies Section 3(a) and is, therefore, the controlling 

language with respect to the discretion qiven the Board in the 

matter of a felony conviction. 

This interpretation is given Sec,tion 3(a) under the 

rule of construction stated in 53 Texas Jurisprudence Zd, 

Statutes, Section 160, pase 231, as follows: 

"Each Dart of the statute is to be considered 

in connection with every other part and with the 

entire enactcent, in order to produce a harmonious 

whole and to reach the true lenislative intent. 

. . . It follows that a nrovision will not be 

given a meaning out of harmonv with other provisions and inconsistent with the purpose of,the 

act, thouqh it would be susc~eptible of such construction if standinq alone." 

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. . . , 

. . 

. 

, 

Mr. Thomas W. Drown,,.paqe 3 7 (M-884) 

No reason exists for including in Section 18 a provision that the Board mav refuse a license because~of a felony 

conviction if the LeqiGture had intended to,completely bar 

such person at the application stage. Such inclusion would be 

futile. Section 3(a) of the statute does not have any application 

to those persons whose felony convictions have been pardoned, 

since the operation and effect of a full pardon is to remove all 

penal consequences and legal disabilities incident to the conviction. 44 Tex. Juris. 2d 13, Pardons, 

and cases there cited. 

Reprieve, etc., Sec. 12, 

We hold that the Board may, in its 

discretion under Section 18, grant a license to a,,convicted 

felon who has not received a full pardon. 

Your letter in effect inquires whether the Board may 

consider the time elapsed since a felonv conviction. We are of 

the opinion that the Board may consider this fact, along with 

the letters required of the police department and shoriff',s 

department under Section 34, and that the Board mav weigh all 

the relevant facts called for under the statute in exercising 

its discretionary powers. ,, 

Having considered the elapsed time and all~other 

relevant facts, it is within the legal power of ,the ,Board,to 

grant or deny the license. 

SUMMARY 

Article 4413 (29bb), Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

makes discretionary with the Board of Private 

Detectives, Private Investigators, Private Patrolmen, Private Guards and Managers, the decision as 

to whether a license as a private detective, private 

investigator, private patrolman, or private guard 

will be denied because of conviction of a felony, 

and the Board may consider the lapse of time since 

a conviction alonq with all other matters required 

or authorized by the statute. 

.,./ 

Vef$~trulp yours, 

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Mr. Thomas W. Brown, page 4 

Prepared by James S. Swearingen 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman 

Larry Craddock 

J. C. Davis 

Malcom Smith 

Scott Garrison 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

ALFRED WALKER 

Executive Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

(M-884) 

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