Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Trujillo, 2018 IL App (1st) 172927

Appellate Court 

Caption

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, as Subrogee of Joanna Potepa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

JUAN TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division

Docket No. 1-17-2927

Filed June 28, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-M1-014547; 

the Hon. Deborah J. Gubin, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

William H. Ransom and Raphael D. Strzelecki, of Newman Ransom 

LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

James M. O’Dea, of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Burke and Justice McBride concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 The instant appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile 

Insurance Company, as subrogee of Joanna Potepa, against defendant, Juan Trujillo, for 

damages resulting from an automobile collision. The matter was submitted for mandatory 

arbitration, and while defendant was represented by counsel at the arbitration, defendant 

himself was not present during the arbitration. The arbitrators entered an award in favor of 

plaintiff, and defendant rejected the award. Plaintiff filed a motion to bar defendant from 

rejecting the award as a sanction for his absence from the arbitration, which was granted. 

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Defendant now appeals, 

arguing that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion and in denying his motion to 

reconsider. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On October 4, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging negligence with 

respect to an automobile collision that occurred on June 29, 2015, and seeking $12,365.74 in 

damages. On November 7, 2016, defendant, through counsel, filed an appearance and answer. 

¶ 4 On November 28, 2016, plaintiff filed a “Notice to Produce at Trial and Arbitration” 

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(e) (eff. Jan. 1, 2007), Rule 237 (eff. July 1, 2005), 

and Rule 90(f), (g) (eff. July 1, 2008), in which plaintiff requested, inter alia, that defendant 

produce himself “at the commencement of the case in chief of Plaintiff at the arbitration and 

trial of this matter.”

¶ 5 On December 5, 2016, the trial court assigned the case to mandatory arbitration. On March 

1, 2017, the case was set for an arbitration hearing on May 15, 2017. The notice setting the case 

for arbitration noted that “failure to appear shall constitute a waiver of the right to reject the 

award pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 91.” Defendant never notified the trial court or counsel 

concerning defendant’s unavailability to appear at the arbitration hearing.

¶ 6 The arbitration occurred on May 15, 2017, and the arbitration panel found in favor of 

plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $8656.02. The arbitration award noted that 

“[a]ll parties participated in good faith,” but also included a finding that “a 237 was filed as [to] 

[defendant], who was only represented by [his] attorney.” On June 13, 2017, defendant filed a 

notice of rejection of the arbitration award and requested a trial. 

¶ 7 On June 21, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion to bar defendant from rejecting the arbitration 

award, claiming that defendant did not appear at the arbitration after having been called as a 

witness by plaintiff and having been served a notice to produce himself at the arbitration. 

Plaintiff argued that barring the rejection of the award was an appropriate sanction for 

defendant’s failure to appear.

¶ 8 On July 27, 2017, defendant filed a response to the motion to bar rejection of the award, in 

which he argued that the court had discretion over whether to debar a party from rejecting the 

award and may instead order another arbitration or set a trial date. Defendant argued that 

plaintiff’s motion made no reference to prejudice suffered and that, in fact, plaintiff had not 

suffered any prejudice given that an arbitration award was entered in its favor. Defendant 

further argued that all parties involved were represented by an attorney and actively 

participated “as evidenced by the arbitration award in favor of Plaintiff.” Defendant also 
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claimed that “[p]laintiff has presented no evidence of any willful violation or showing of a 

deliberate disregard for the arbitration process[;] in fact, Defendants’ [sic] counsel appeared 

and fully participated in the hearing of May 15, 2017.” (Emphases in original.) Accordingly, 

defendant requested that plaintiff’s motion be denied and that defendant be permitted to reject 

the arbitration award. We note that defendant did not provide the reason for his absence in his 

response. 

¶ 9 On August 14, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting plaintiff’s motion to bar. On 

the same day, the trial court entered judgment on the arbitration award. 

¶ 10 On September 13, 2017, defendant filed a motion to reconsider. In support of his motion, 

defendant claimed, in relevant part: 

“1. This matter was scheduled to proceed to mandatory arbitration on May 15, 

2017. 

 2. That prior to that time, Attorneys for the Defendant made the following 

reasonable attempts to secure Defendant, Juan Trujillo’s, participation at the 

arbitration: had an investigator run a search to determine Mr. Trujillo’s current address, 

called all known telephone numbers for Defendant, left several messages for Defendant 

at said telephone numbers, and sent letters to Mr. Trujillo’s current address and also his 

last known address notifying him that he must appear at the arbitration. [Citation.] 

 3. Although Defendant, Juan Trujillo, did not appear at the March 15, 2017 

arbitration Mr. Trujillo did appear through his attorney, Lauren A. Rozich. 

[4.] Furthermore, for Defendant’s case-in-chief Ms. Rozich presented testimony 

from Plaintiff’s insured, Joanna Potepa, as an adverse witness to dispute liability.”

Defendant further claimed that “on August 14, 2017, following a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Bar, the Court found that the Defendant failed to participate in good faith and a reasonable 

manner at the arbitration.”

¶ 11 Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its previous application of existing law 

because it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to find that defendant failed to participate 

in the arbitration in good faith and in a meaningful manner solely on the ground that defendant 

did not appear at the arbitration hearing. 

¶ 12 Attached to the motion to reconsider were two letters from defendant’s law firm to 

defendant, notifying him that he was required to appear at the arbitration hearing; the letters 

were both dated March 3, 2017, but were addressed to defendant at two different addresses. 

¶ 13 On October 26, 2017, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion to 

reconsider. In a section entitled “History of the Case” the trial court found that on August 14, 

2017, there was a hearing on plaintiff’s motion to bar the rejection of the arbitration award at 

which no court reporter was present. The court found that “[a]t the hearing Defense counsel 

failed to explain Defendant’s absence; did not present any affidavits; failed to state what if any 

steps had been taken to have Defendant at the Arbitration; or if any steps had been taken to 

inquire as to the reason for his absence.” The trial court further found that, on September 13, 

2017, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which “attaches two letters sent to the Defendant 

informing him of the arbitration and his need to appear; no affidavit is attached as to actual 

contact with Defendant; no affidavit or statement is attached as to what actions were taken 

since the arbitration to contact Defendant; in addition, the motion includes a misstatement as to 

the basis for the Court’s finding Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar.”
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¶ 14 In its analysis, the court noted: 

“Defendant’s initial response to the motion argued Plaintiff had failed to show 

prejudice or that there was a willful violation. Neither is required. It should be noted 

Plaintiff [sic] has never presented this Court with any information as to why the 

Defendant was absent. There has never been any showing that counsel for the 

Defendant has made contact with the Defendant after the arbitration to obtain 

information or even if any attempts were made to contact the Defendant. No affidavits 

have been filed. 

 After reading the submitted materials and hearing argument this Court granted 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Rejection. The basis for the motion was a violation of 

Supreme Court Rule 237 and that was the only basis of the ruling. This was indicated 

by the Court though not in the written order.”

¶ 15 The court found the arguments made by defendant in his motion to reconsider to be 

unpersuasive, finding: 

“The only argument presented to the Court is Defendant’s assertion there was a finding 

of ‘bad faith’ and whether such finding was appropriate. It should be noted this Court 

did not make any such finding of ‘bad faith’. As previously stated the basis of the ruling 

was a violation of Rule 237. Therefore, the motion fails to present any evidence that the 

court erred in application of existing law. The Defendant has not presented any 

evidence there has been a change in the law since the ruling. Therefore, *** the motion 

fails as to any changes in the law. Defendant is attempting to argue the attached letters 

and statement of phone contact with the Defendant’s mother[1]

 is newly discovered 

evidence. This is information that was available when Defendant filed their initial 

Response to the Motion to Bar. It is also lacking an appropriate affidavit. There is no 

information concerning attempts to explain why the Defendant was not present. 

Therefore the Court cannot and will not treat this as newly discovered evidence. The 

Motion fails to present any newly discovered evidence.”

Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 16 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal follows. 

¶ 17 ANALYSIS 

¶ 18 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to bar 

defendant from rejecting the arbitration award and further erred in denying defendant’s motion 

to reconsider. We consider each argument in turn. 

¶ 19 I. Bar to Rejecting Award 

¶ 20 We first discuss defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to 

bar. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 237 provides that the appearance of a party at trial or another 

evidentiary hearing may be required by serving the party with a notice designating the person 

 

1The record on appeal does not include any allegation that there was phone contact with 

defendant’s mother. However, there is also no report of proceedings or bystander’s report of the hearing 

on the motion to reconsider, so it is unclear what arguments or representations were made during that 

hearing. 
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who is required to appear. Ill. S. Ct. R. 237(b) (eff. July 1, 2005). Rule 90(g) makes clear that 

such a notice is applicable to an arbitration hearing, providing: 

“The provisions of Rule 237, herein, shall be equally applicable to arbitration hearings 

as they are to trials. The presence of a party may be waived by stipulation or excused by 

court order for good cause shown not less than seven days prior to the hearing. 

Remedies upon a party’s failure to comply with notice pursuant to Rule 237(b) may 

include an order debarring that party from rejecting the award.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 90(g) (eff. 

July 1, 2008). 

In the case at bar, plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 90(g) to bar defendant from rejecting 

the arbitration award due to his failure to comply with Rule 237 by virtue of his absence from 

the arbitration hearing. Defendant argues that his absence from the hearing did not justify the 

sanction of barring him from rejecting the award because defendant’s attorney was present at 

the hearing and participated in the arbitration. We do not find this argument persuasive. 

¶ 21 “Absent an abuse of discretion, the court’s imposition of a sanction will not be disturbed on 

review.” Bachmann v. Kent, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1081 (1997). “An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the court’s ruling is arbitrary or exceeds the bounds of reason.” Kellett v. Roberts, 

281 Ill. App. 3d 461, 466 (1996). “The burden is on the offending party to show that its 

noncompliance was reasonable or the result of extenuating circumstances.” Johnson v. Saenz, 

311 Ill. App. 3d 693, 697 (2000). Here, we cannot find that the trial court’s barring defendant 

from rejecting the arbitration award was an abuse of discretion. Debarring a party from 

rejecting an arbitration award is expressly permitted under Rule 90(g) as a sanction for failure 

to comply with Rule 237(b). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 90(g) (eff. July 1, 2008). As a result, numerous 

courts have upheld the imposition of such a sanction based solely on a party’s absence from an 

arbitration hearing in violation of Rule 237. See, e.g., Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1083; 

State Farm Insurance Co. v. Gebbie, 288 Ill. App. 3d 640, 643-44 (1997); Kellett, 281 Ill. App. 

3d at 466. We cannot find the trial court’s decision to do so in this case was in any way 

impermissible. 

¶ 22 Additionally, defendant provides no evidence that his noncompliance “was reasonable or 

the result of extenuating circumstances.” Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 697. His response to 

plaintiff’s motion to bar did not explain the reason for his absence. The record on appeal does 

not contain a report of proceedings or bystander’s report of the hearing on the motion to bar 

but, in its order denying defendant’s motion to reconsider, the trial court expressly found that at 

that hearing, “Defense counsel failed to explain Defendant’s absence; did not present any 

affidavits; failed to state what if any steps had been taken to have Defendant at the Arbitration; 

or if any steps had been taken to inquire as to the reason for his absence.” Thus, defendant 

provided no excuse whatsoever for his absence from the hearing. In his motion to reconsider, 

defendant attached two letters from counsel notifying defendant of the hearing and claimed 

that counsel had attempted to contact defendant by telephone, but as the trial court found, there 

were no affidavits supporting these claims. In short, as the trial court found, defendant “has 

never presented this Court with any information as to why the Defendant was absent. There has 

never been any showing that counsel for the Defendant has made contact with the Defendant 

after the arbitration to obtain information or even if any attempts were made to contact the 

Defendant. No affidavits have been filed.” This situation is thus entirely distinguishable from 

that present in Johnson, where confusion and miscommunication resulted in the defendant 

appearing in the wrong location. See Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 699 (reversing sanctions 
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where defendant spoke little English and appeared at the courthouse instead of the arbitration 

center, where she was told to wait in a courtroom instead of being directed to the correct 

location). Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in debarring 

defendant from rejecting the award. 

¶ 23 We are unpersuaded by defendant’s suggestion that the presence of counsel at the 

arbitration hearing somehow cures any violation. “The attendance of counsel at an arbitration 

hearing preserves the right to reject an arbitration award. [Citation.] However, the attendance 

of counsel does not preclude the trial court from entering an order debarring a party from 

rejecting the award as a sanction. [Citations.] Under Supreme Court Rule 90(g), it is within the 

trial court’s authority to bar a party from rejecting an award as a sanction for failing to comply 

with a notice to appear under Rule 237(b). [Citations.]” Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 

1081-82. 

¶ 24 Additionally, defendant’s focus on his counsel’s presence conflates sanctions under Rule 

90(g) with sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 91(b) (eff. June 1, 1993). “A party’s 

failure to participate in an arbitration hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner 

provides a separate basis for barring him from rejecting an arbitration award.” Gebbie, 288 Ill. 

App. 3d at 642;. see also United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Buckley, 2011 IL App (1st) 

103666, ¶¶ 40-44 (analyzing imposition of sanction barring rejection of award under Rule 

90(g) and Rule 91(b) separately); Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1087 (distinguishing between 

a sanction based on violation of Rule 237 and one based on violation of Rule 91(b)); Kellett, 

281 Ill. App. 3d at 466 (noting that debarring a party from rejecting an arbitration award was a 

permissible sanction under both Rule 90(g) and Rule 91(b)). In the case at bar, plaintiff 

requested that defendant be barred from rejecting the award pursuant to Rule 90(g), not Rule 

91(b). Accordingly, defendant’s Rule 91(b) arguments are irrelevant to the question of whether 

Rule 90(g) sanctions were properly imposed. Defendant’s focus on cases in which Rule 91(b) 

was analyzed are thus unpersuasive to the issue present in the case at bar. 

¶ 25 II. Motion to Reconsider 

¶ 26 We also find unpersuasive defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to reconsider. “The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court’s attention newly 

discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the original hearing, changes in 

existing law, or errors in the court’s application of the law.” Evanston Insurance Co. v. 

Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 36. “A ruling on a motion to reconsider is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.” 

Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 347 (2002). 

¶ 27 In the case at bar, defendant’s only claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding 

unpersuasive defendant’s reliance on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kogut, 354 Ill. App. 

3d 1 (2004). First, we note that defendant’s citation of this case came in the context of the sole 

basis for his motion to reconsider—that “[t]he trial court’s finding that Defendant, Juan 

Trujillo, failed to participate in the arbitration in good faith and in a meaningful manner solely 

on the ground that Defendant did not appear at the hearing was an abuse of discretion.” As the 

trial court expressly stated in its order denying the motion to reconsider, the trial court never 

made such a finding, which is required only when considering violations of Rule 91(b). See Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 91(b) (eff. June 1, 1993) (“All parties to the arbitration hearing must participate in the 

hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner.”). 
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¶ 28 Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that Kogut is entirely distinguishable from the 

instant case. Not only was Kogut a case concerning Rule 91(b) sanctions, which itself renders 

the case inapplicable to the instant litigation, but it also involved a situation in which both 

parties were present at the arbitration hearing—the absent party was the plaintiff’s insured. 

The plaintiff in that case also made efforts to secure the attendance of its insured, which it 

attested to in an affidavit. Kogut, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 2. Here, by contrast, Rule 90(g) sanctions 

are at issue, the absent individual was one of the parties, and efforts to secure defendant’s 

attendance were not attested to by affidavit. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 29 CONCLUSION 

¶ 30 For the reasons set forth above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in debarring 

defendant from rejecting the arbitration award and did not abuse its discretion in denying 

defendant’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 31 Affirmed.