NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0186n.06 F iled: Marc h 9, 2007 No. 05-6849 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , v. GREGORY T. KERRENT, Ap pe lla nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

B e fo re : K EN

NE DY , M AR TI

N a nd SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s.
PER C URI AM. Gre g ory Ker rent pleade d g uilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a fi re arm , and the district cour t im p o s ed an 84-month sentence . Be cause the sentenc e wa s
re a so na ble , w e a ff

ir m.
I. On Aug ust 17, 2005, a g rand jury indicted Ker

rent with two cou n t s of beinga fe lon-inpossession. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). Ke rre nt pleaded g uilty to both counts.
I n sentenc ing K err ent, the district c ourt used the 2004 ver sion of the g uidelines and g rouped his offense s under § 3D1.2( d). The f elon-in-possession g uideline, U.S.S.G
. § 2 K2
. 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) , in s tr ucted the district court to start with a base level of 24. A fter a dding 2 le vels bec ause one of the off ensesNo. 05-6849

United States v. Kerrent

- 2 - inv olv e d a

sto le n h and g un

and su btr a c tin g 3 le ve ls b e c a

us e he a c c e pte d r e sp on sib ili ty fo r t he c ri me s, the district court set Ke rre nt’s offe nse leve l a t 23. T he district cour

t calculated Ker

rent’s c riminal history , which included four controlled-substanc e convic tions, as a categ ory I V. Once combined, his offense l ev el and criminal history g ave him a guidelines rang e of 70–87 months. The district court imposed an 84- month sentence
. II.
We reviewcriminal sentenc es af ter Bo ok e r for “ proce dural” and “substantive”
rea sonablene ss. Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 458 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2006). I n this instance K err ent challeng es his sentenc e only for procedur al reasonablene ss, which gaug es whether the dist rict cour t appre ciated the advisory

nature of the guidelines, ca lcu l at ed the guidelines r ang e cor rec tly and
c on sid e re d th e § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s in e xer c isi ngits ind e pe nd e nt j ud g me nt a bo ut w hat se nte nc e to impose. United States v. Mc Bride , 434 F.3d 470, 476 ( 6th Cir. 2006).
The district c ourt satisfied these require ments. Ker rent does not claim that the district cour t failed to a pprec iate the advisory nature of the g uidelines rang e, as indeed he could not on this rec ord. See SentencingTr. at 13 ( observingthat “the guidelines are only advisory , the court’s not re quired to follow them”). Ke rre nt c oncede d below, and does not a rg ue otherwise on appea l, that the district court c orre ctly

calc ulated his g uidelines rang e. SeeSentencing Tr. at 6 ( Ker rent’s c ounsel conc eding that “[w]e understand what [ the g uidelines rang e] is . . . [ a]nd it’s corre ctly calc ulated”)
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- 3 - Nor ha s Kerr ent identified a ny § 3553(a) fac tor th at t h e district cour t failed to consider

or fa ile d to g ive a

pp ro pr ia te we ig ht. I n poin t of fa c t, the re c or d sho ws that th e dis tr ic t c ourt tho ro ug hly considere d the re levant §3553(a ) fa ctors. Contemplating t he “nature a nd circ umstances of

the offe nse and the history

and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt,” 1 8 U. S .C. § 3553(a)( 1), the district
co u rt n oted that Ker

rent wa s “at the top of [his] criminal history cate g ory ,” Sentenc ing T r. at 14, expressed conc ern over “t h e fa ct that [Kerre nt had] three prior c onvictions for controlled substances,” id ., and

ob se rv e d th a t “ pe op le wi th m ult ipl e dr ugfe lon ie s” wh o p os se ss f ir e arm s p os e even g reater da

ng er tha n, say , an “e mbezz ler or a w hite-collar criminal” w ho possesses fire arms, id
. a t 15 . Co ns ide ri ngthe ne e d “ to p ro mot e re sp e c t f or the law, ” 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a )( 2) (A ), and “ to aff ord adequate deterr ence to criminal conduc t,” id
. § 35 53 (a )( 2) (B ), the dis tr ic t c ourt state d th a t it wanted to show “ other fe lons who possess firea rms” that “it’s ag ainst the law, and you g et punished if y ou do it,” SentencingTr. at 15. See king “t o p ro t ec t t h e public fr om further crimes of

the defe ndant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2)( C), and “to provide the defe ndant wit h neede d
. . . medical c are in the most effe ctive manne r,” id
. § 3553(a) (2)( D), the district court rec ommended that Ke rre nt serve his tim e “at an institut ion where [he] [could] g et long -term dr ug treatment” t o corr ect his “substance abuse pr oblem,” Sentenc ing T r. at 17. Weig hing the various “kinds of se ntence s available ,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) , the district court c oncluded that a defe ndant “with a record a s long a s [Ke rr e nt’ s] re qu ir e [d] a se nte nc e of imp ri so nme nt” and po int e d ou t that “ the op tio n of pr ob a tio n is
rea lly not an option in this case ,” Sentenc ing T r. at 16.No. 05-6849

United States v. Kerrent

- 4 - I n the end, the di strict court considered a ll of the fac tors—save f or § 3553(a )(6) (unwa

rra nted sentenc ing disparities), which did not apply beca use Ke rre nt never

argued that his within-g uidelines sentenc e would cr eate sentenc ing dispa rities, and save for § 3553( a)( 7) (re stitut ion), which did not apply to this sentenc e. Ker

rent thus c annot show that the district cour t failed a dequate ly

to consider the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. See U nited States v. Christopher , 415 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2005) (“ Nor ha s [defendant] offe red any explanation on appea l as t o what factors li sted in § 3553(a) the district court should have co n s i d ered, or how these fac tors would have ma de a dif fer ence in the sentenc e he
rec eived.” ).
Even if a ll of this is true, Ker rent maintains that the district court c ommitt ed re versible e rror be c a us e it mis a

pp re he nd e d its ro le and tho ug ht its job wa s to imp os e a “ re a so na ble ” se nte nc e . Wh ile
we a g ree with the leg al pre mise of Ker rent’s a rg ument, we do not ag ree with the fac tual premise of it or with its conclusion. “Reasonable ness,” it i s by now well esta

blished, is the ap

pe lla te standard of re view, not the standa

rd b y wh i ch dis trict courts impose sente nces, the latter of w hich re quires district courts to apply

the § 3553(a ) fa ctors and impose a sentenc e “suf

ficient but not g reater than
nece ssary to comply

with the pu rp o s es o f sentenc ing in se ction 3553(a) (2).” United States v. Foreman , 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Ye t th e re are a t le a st two pr ob le ms w ithKe rr e nt p re ssi ngthi s argume nt h e re . In th e fi rs t place , the fa ctual pre dicate f or making the ar g ument d o es n ot exi st. The district court ne ver employ ed the term “reasona ble” in descr ibing the sentenc e it imposed. Cf. United States v. Jac kson , 46 6 F. 3d 53 7, 53 9 (6t

h Ci r. 20 06 ). To the c on tr ary , th e on ly me nti on of the te rm a t se nte nc ingc a meNo. 05-6849

United States v. Kerrent

- 5 - from Ke rre nt’s counsel. See, e .g. , SentencingTr. at 11 ( “And so it’s our position that Your Honor , ob vio us ly , is re qu ir e d to f a sh ion a re a so na ble se nte nc e . . . . ” ); id
. (opining that a sente nce be tween 46 –4 8 mo nth s “ c e rt a inl y is a re a so na ble se nte nc e ” ); id . (askingthe district court “ to consider [46–48 months] as a more rea sonable sente nce” ).
I n th e se c on d p la c e , K e rr e nt h a s not s ho wn ho w a ny su c h e rr or , e ve n if

it h a d o c c ur

re d, wo uld establish reve rsible er

ror he re. We ha

ve conside red se vera l case s in which the district court mistook its j o b a s im

p o s in g a “ r e a s o n a b le ” s e n te n c e r a th e r

th ana s e n te n c e c o n s is te n t w it

h th e p ar s imony provision, and as a

g ener al rule w e have held such e rror s to be harmless. S ee Un ited States v. Ga sk in , 2007 WL 508332, at *5 (6th Cir. F eb. 20, 2007) (“We have never held, howeve r, that the dis tr ic t c ourt mus t inc ant or c ite
. . . 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ). ” ); see, e .g. , United States v. Cruz , 461 F.3d 752, 755–56 (6th Cir. 2006) (a cknowledg ing that the district court er red w hen i t s tated that the
se le c te d s e nte nc e wa s r e a so na ble , b ut f ind ingsu c h e rr or

to be ha rm le ss) ; Un ite d S

tat es v . G ale , 468 F.3d 929, 933–34 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 6) (same); Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 458 F.3d 505, 509–11 ( 6th Cir. 20 06 ) ( same ); see also, e.g. , United States v. Robinson , N o. 05 -6 90 4, 20 07 WL50 78 75 , at *6 –7 (6 th Cir . F e b. 16 , 2 00 7) (s a me ); United States v. Pe nnington , N o. 06 -5 00 3, 20 07 WL 32 86 81 , a t *4 (6 th Cir . J an. 31 , 2 00 7) (s a me ); Un ite d Sta te s v . M e rre ll , No. 05-6577, 2007 WL 64237, at *6–7 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 20 07 ) ( same ). B e c a us e Ke rr e nt of

fe rs no e xplanatio n w hy

we sh ou ld d e c lin e to f

oll owthi s path h e re , h e mus t a c c e pt t he ru lin g on thi s argume nt that we g e ne ra lly ha ve ma de wi th r e sp e c t to oth e r d e fe nd ants
. I I I
.No. 05-6849

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ir m.