NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0853n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 14, 2007 No. 06-4227 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
KEL L Y REYNOL DS and L I NDA HE I

NE, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. EXTEND I CARE HEAL TH SERVS., I NC., and MI L FORD CARE L L C d/b/a ARBORS OF MI L FORD, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

____________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B EF OR E: B AT CH EL DE R, C OL E, and GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Plaintiffs Kelly

Rey nolds and L inda Heine broug ht suit aga inst t h ei r fo rm er e mploy er
c la imi ngthe y

we re re ta liate d a g a inst for re po rt ingse pa rate a c ts o f o ff

e ns ive be havio r. Th e ir

su it alleg es violations of Title VI Iand Ohio common law. F or the re asons that foll o w, we a ffirm the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or de fe nd ants
. I. P l a i n t i f f s o r i g i n a l l y f

i l e d t h i s m a t t e r

i nt h e C o u rto f

C o m m o n P l e a s i nC l e r

m o n tC o u n t y, Ohio, but defe ndants remove d the ca se to the United States Dist rict C ourt for the Southern District of Ohio pursua

nt to 28 U.S.C . §§ 1441 and 1446. The district court had jurisdiction pursua nt to 28No. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

During the t ime that Rey

nolds worked at the Arbors, Jennifer E iswerth wa s known by her 1 ma ide n n a me , Jennif

e r F e hn . B y

the tim e of

he r d e po sit ion

sh e ha d ma

rr ie d. Th rou gh ou t th is opinion we will refe r to her by her ma rried na me of Eiswe rth. - 2 - U.S.C. § 1332. This court has jurisdiction to revie w t he final judgme nt of t he district cour t pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. Plaintiffs Kelly

Rey n o l d s an d L inda Heine are reg istered nur ses who we re e mploy ed by defe ndants Ext endica

re H ea l t h S ervic es, L L C and Milford Care L L C d/b/a Arbors of Milford. Exte nd ic are is the pa

re nt c omp any

of Mil fo rd Care L L C, w hic h o pe ra

te d a he a lth care faci li ty

in Clermont County , Ohio, called the Arbors of Milford. A. Rey nolds was hired as the Assi stant Direc tor of Nursing at the Arbors on J une 12, 2003. She
rec eived a

n Employ ee H andbook that stated that her employ ment was at-will and that the handbook was not an e mploy

ment contra ct. Rey

nolds signed a

n acknow ledgm en t s tating that she rea d the Handbook a

nd understood that “[t]hi s handbook and the policies contained he rein do not in any way constitute, and should not be construed as, a contra ct of e mploy

ment betwee n the employ er a nd the employ ee, or

a promise of

continued employ

ment.” Rey

nolds served u n d er Norma N ag el, the Direc tor of Nur sing, w ho repor ted to J ennife r Eiswer

th, the Arbor s Administrator. 1 The Ar bors g ave Re y

nolds her first written performanc e evaluation on October 3, 2003. She
rec eived a

rating of 74 out of a possible 100 points. Rey nolds w as not satisfied by the results of the repor t; she viewed it a s being so neg ative that it “broke [her] heart to look at it.” The re port listedNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 3 - five spec ific comments under the hea ding “ [a] rea s where i m p roveme nt is needed” : (1) think and
rea ct as a

“mana g er,” (2) lea

rn to separ ate f

rom clinical vs. mana g er dutie s and from other depar tments, (3) ac ceptingdirec tion, (4) takes thing s too personally , and (5) needs to stop “g ossip.” Following the per formanc e evaluation, the Arbor s provided Rey nolds with a written detailed descr iption of the Assistant Director of Nursing position. R ey

n o l d s signe d it, and the Arbor s
coac hed Rey

nolds reg ardinghow to better pe rfor m her job. I n J anuar y 2004, Eiswerth a sked Rey nolds to develo p a wr i t t en li st of g oals, both for he r profe ssional development and f or her depar tment. I n Marc h, Bonnie J ones took over a s Direc tor of Nursing , making her Rey nolds’ immediate superior. J ones believed that Rey nolds was continuing to e xh ib it th e b e h a v io r n o te d in h e r p r e v io u s p e r f o r ma n c e e v a lu ati o n . Jo n e s d is c u s s e d th e matter with Eiswerth, and t h ey decide d to present their conce rns to Rey

nolds in the form of a 30- day Perfor mance I mprovement Plan (“ PI P”). The PI P contained a list of area s in which J ones and Eiswerth be lieved Rey

nolds neede d to improve. J ones dra fted this list on April 26, 2004. On May 5, 2004, Rey

nolds and others attende d a mee ting with a State of Ohio survey or reg arding the Arbors’ facility acc reditation survey
. Rey nolds discussed an issue w ith the survey or afte r the mee ting, a

nd the surveyor g ave he r his business car d. Caroly n Puckett, one of Extendicar e’s r eg ional consultants, observe d this conversation and
a sk e d a no the r e mpl oy e e , V a le ri e Da y , “ wh y the he ll d oe s sh e need a

bu sin e ss c ard

fo r?” Pu c ke tt then made a

sexual hand g esture simul ating masturbation. Both Day and R ey nolds saw Pucke tt’sNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 4 - g e sture . In h e r d e po sit ion , D ay state d th a t “ [t] he on ly

int e rp re ta tio n th a t c ou ld b e ma de fr om t his was [Rey nolds] was jer

king this man off

.” Ex tendicar e has a

n Offe nsive Be havior Policy as par t of its Employ ee H andbook. The policy dir e c ts emp lo y ees to re po rt vio la tio ns of

the po lic y

and state s th a t th e c omp any

wi ll n ot t ole rate reta liation ag ainst those who re port such violations. Rey nolds reporte d the g esture to E iswerth on May 6, 2004; Day

repor ted the g esture later that da y . E isw e rt

h o bta ine d w ri tte n s ta te me nts fr om b oth Re y no lds and Da y , a nd on May 10 th, Re y no lds , Day , and Eiswer

th p articipated in a telephone confe renc e with J ason Hohlef elder , Ex tendicar e’s Reg ional Direc tor. Hohlefe lder a pologized for Puckett’s behavior and said that Puckett would be disciplined and would not return to the Arbors fac ility . Puckett’s employ ment ended, a lthough the
rec ord does not conta in any details surroundingher se paration from the company
. On May 12 , 2 00 4, Ei sw e rt

h an d J on e s hel d a mee tin g wi th R e y no lds and pr e se nte d h e r w ith the PI P. The terms of the P I P require d Rey nolds to meet with J ones and/or E iswerth we ekly , or as
ne e de d to re view h er pro gre ss. Th e PI P a lso state d th a t Re y no lds ’ f a ilure to m e e t it s g oa ls c ou ld result in disciplinary

action, including termination of employ ment. J ones and Eiswe rth continued to be unsatisfied with Rey nolds’ perf

ormanc e. On M ay

28, 2004, they

met with Rey

nolds and g ave her a nother document that specific ally descr ibed t heir concer ns about her perf

ormanc e. J ones and Ei sw e rt h r e v i e w e d R e y

n o l d s ’ p r o p o s e d p l an f

o r i mp l e m e n t i n g t h e P I P b u t r e j e c t e d i t b e c a

us e it sh if te d to o mu c h r e sp on sib ili ty fr om R e y no lds to Jon e s. Jone s and Ei sw e rt h to ld R e y no lds to r e vis e her pla n and pre sent them with a new one the following morning . She did not meet this deadline.No. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

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- 5 - On J une 4, 2004, the three of them met ag ain. J ones and Eiswe rth explained that Rey nolds had not made significa

nt prog ress towa

rd the g oals outlined in the PI P and had not provided the m with an ade quate a ction plan to show how she planned to me et these g oals. Rey nolds a sked if she would be able to a chieve the PI P g oals within the 30-day period, a nd Eiswerth re sponded that she did not think i t was possible to do so beca use Rey nolds ha d not ma de signific ant prog ress duringthe last few w eeks. Eiswe rth then terminate d Rey nolds’ employ

ment. I n h i s d e p o s i t i o n , H o h l e f e l d e r s a i d t h a ti tw a s u n u s u a l t o f i r e ane mp l o y e e a s t h e f ir st disciplinary measure in the absenc e of g ross misconduct. He a lso stated that it was unusual to fire
so me on e fo r n ot m e e tin g the g oa ls o f a PI P be fo re the PI P pe ri od ha d e xpir e d. He sa id t hat E isw e rt

h and Jones fired Rey

nolds beca

use she ha d become a “disruption.”

B. L inda Heine beg an work at t he Arbors as a Unit Nurse Ma nag er on F ebrua

ry 6, 2003. Her fi rs t pe rf or manc e re vie w wa s g e ne ra lly po sit ive , b ut t

wo ite ms w e re lis te d a s n e e din g imp ro ve me nt: 1. Re me mbe r t o r e ma in c a lm und e r s tr e ss – e a sil y e xcit a ble 2. Re fr a in f

ro m g os sip ingor

[co mpl a int s o ff

e re d] in pu bli c are a s. Heine w as plac ed on a 30- day PI P on April 26, 2004, beca use Arbor s ma n ageme nt believed she neede d t o i m prove he r attitude and r efr ain from makingneg ative comments a bout her fe llow
e mpl oy e e s. She su c c e ssf ull y c omp le te d th e PI P bu t w a s to ld that the re wo uld be c on se qu e nc e s if sh e re ve rt e d to havin g a ne g a tiv e a tti tud e or ma de fu rt he r ne g a tiv e c omm e nts a

bo ut he r c oll e a g ue s.No. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 6 - Debbie Ma

rtin, a nurse aide who repor ted to H eine, told He ine on J une 18, 2004, that John J ones , a ma le n u r s e , g r a

b b e d h e r b u tt o c k s an d ma d e a v u lg ar g e s tu r e s y mb o li zi n g o r a l se x . J ohn J ones is marri ed t o Bonnie J ones, the Dire ctor of N ursing . Martin aske d Heine not to re port the incident, but Heine inf

ormed he r that she wa s require d t o d o s o by the Employ ee H andbook. Eiswerth wa s on vacation at the time, so Heine repor ted the matter to Bonnie Jones. J ones re fer red the matter to Assistant Dire ctor of N ursing Rodney Br adfor d and Hohlef

elder
. Heine states that upon retur ning f rom vac ation, Eiswerth told her that “ther e’s no love for y ou he re any mor e .” He ine state d f

ur the r t hat Jone s ma de He ine le a ve a tr a ini ng se ssi on

fo r n ur se s, excluded her f

rom other tra ining oppor

tunities, and review ed her floor with g reater scr

utiny
. On Augu st 1 7, 20 04 , H e ine ha d a dis c us sio n d

ur inga br e a k w ithRand a ll G or do n, a nurs e and new employ ee. H eine war

ned Gordon about being seen with he r, “if you want to stay around here very long, don’ t come and take lunch and brea ks with me. They

don’t like me. They ’ve ma de it c lear and told people to stay

awa y from me. So if y ou want to survive, don’ t come hangaround me.” Gor don asked H eine wh y s h e did not apply for the A ssistant Director of Nursing position. Heine r eplied that mana g ement did not like her be cause she re ported a situation between a

n aide a nd
a nurse who was related t o a director. Heine insists t hat she did not use name s, but admits that she discussed the e vent with enoug h specific ity to identify

the people involved. Gordon repor

ted the conve rsation to Eiswerth. He acc used He ine of disclosing confide ntial information, as we ll as making derog atory rema rks about men in gene ral. Gordon stated that He ine told him, “I never

met a smart man be fore , until I met y ou.” Gordon wrote that Heine told him thatNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 7 - s h e “ s h o w e d

u p h e r e to w o r

k to ma k e th e ma n a g e me n ts [s ic ] li f

e a ‘ p a in
. ’ ” G o r d o n s tate d th a t “ [i ]t also made me fee l very

uncomforta

ble for a unit manag er to think of men a s being idiots and morons . . . .” Eiswer

th had a conver sation with Heine and asked her why she was “bad- mouthing” Jones and why she told Gordon about Ma rtin’s complaint. Following this conversa

ti o n , E is w e r

th d ecide d to terminate He ine’s employ ment beca use she had pre viously

been w arned about g ossiping. F urthermor e, the disclosure of conf idential information was listed in the Employ ee Handbook a s a Class I I Ioffe nse that justified termination. Heine took the ne x t few da y s off wor

k, so Eiswerth did not g et the opportunit y t o t er m i n at e her
e mpl oy me nt u nti l Mo nd ay , A ugus t 23 rd
. Duri ng he r time of f, He ine c a lle d E xten dic are ’s c or po rate hotline and complained that she was being reta liated ag ainst for re porting the Martin incident. On Aug ust 23, 2004, Eiswerth g ave H eine a written termination notice. C. Pla int if fs fi le d su it in the Cou

rt of Com mon

Ple a s in Cle rm on t Co un ty , O hio . T he ir complaint had four counts: (1) defe ndants brea ched an implied contrac t cre ated by their Off ensive Be havior Policy

in violation of Ohio common law, (2) de fenda nts’ actions constituted a “ violation of the do c tr ine of

pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l in

vio la tio n o f O hio c omm on law, ” (3 ) de fe nd ants ill e g a lly reta liated aga inst plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and O HI O R EV . C ODE §§ 4112.09 and 4112.99, and (4) “wr ong ful termination in violation of the public policy of the state of

Ohio.” Def endants re moved t he case to t he United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Def

endants then f

iled two motions for summary judgme nt, one eac h for Rey nolds and Heine
.No. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 8 - Th e distr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or de fe nd ants on

a ll c ounts . Pl a int if

fs tim e ly appea led. III
. We r eview the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt de novo. W

ill iam so n v . A e tna Life Ins. Co. , 4 81 F .3 d 3 69 , 3 74 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) . Summa ry ju dgmen t is pr op e r “ if the ple a din g s, d e p o s i t i o n s , an s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , an d

a d m i s s i o n s o nf

i l e , t o g e t h e r

w i t h t h e a f

f i d a v i t s , i f an y, show that there is no g enuine issue as to a ny materia l f

act and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter

of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c)
. The moving party has the burde n of proving the abse nce of

any g enuine issues of material fa ct. Ce lot e xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S
. 3 1 7 , 323 (198 6 ). On ce the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party must present “sig nificant probative e vidence ” to de monstrate that “the re is [more than] some metaphy sical doubt as to the materia l fac ts.” Moore v . Philip Morris Cos ., 8 F.3d 335, 339- 40 (6th Cir. 1993). When deter mining whe ther the n o n m o v an t has met this burden, we must view the evidenc e in the lig ht
mos t f a vo ra ble to t he no nmo vin g pa

rt y , a nd that pa rt y mus t be g iven

the be ne fi t of

a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces. Sm ith W

ho le sa le Co. , I

nc . v . R .J . R e y no lds Tob acco Co ., 477 F.3d 854, 861 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I V. I n order to e stablish a

prima fa cie c ase of

Title VI Ireta liation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) sh e e ng a g e d in

a c tiv ity pr ote c te d b y

Ti tle VI I ; ( 2) he r e xer c ise of pr ote c te d r ight s was kn ow n to defe ndants; (3) de fenda

nts took adver se employ

ment action ag ainst the plaintiff; and (4) there wasNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 9 - a ca usal conne ction betwee n the protec ted ac tivity and the a dverse employ

ment action. Morris v. Ol dh am Cou nty

Fi sc al C ou rt , 201 F .3 d 784 , 792 (6 th Cir . 200 0)
. I f t he pla int if

f e sta bli sh e s a pr ima fac ie ca se, then the bur den shi fts to the employ er to show that it had a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory
rea son for the a dverse employ ment action. Virts v . Consol. Freightw ays Corp. , 285 F.3d 508, 521 (6th Cir. 2002). Once the employ er pr esents such a rea son, t h e b u rd en t hen shifts bac k to the plaintiff to show that the employ er’ s proffe red r eason is a pr etext for discrimination. Id
. Def endants conce ded the first three elements of the prima fa cie c ase be fore the district court but arg ued that Rey

nolds had not established a c ausal c onnection betwe en prot ec t ed activit y and termination of her

employ ment. The di s t ri ct court ag ree d and g rante d summary judgme nt for defe ndants on this claim beca use i t found t hat “Rey

nolds cannot make the conne ction betwee n her termination and the r eport of of fensive be havior that she f iled.” To e sta bli shthe c a

us a l c on ne c tio n e le me nt, “ a pla int if f m us t pr of fe r e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o raise the infere nce that her pr otected a ctivity was the likely

rea son for the a dverse action.” Dixon v. Gonzales , 481 F.3d 324, 333 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation m arks a nd citation omitted). Rey nolds’ primary

argument is that the t empora l proxi mity betwee n her pr otected c onduct and the adver se employ

ment action is leg ally

sufficie nt to establish causation. She notes that she wa s place d
onth e PI P tw o d ay s a f

te r r e p o rti n g th e o f

f e n s iv e g e s tu

r e an d th a t s h e w a s te r

mi n a te d thr e e wee ks la te r. She the n c ite s Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Bree den , 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001), DiCarlo v. Potter , 358 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir. 2004), and Singfield v. Akron Metro Housing Auth. , 389 F.3d 555, 563No. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 10 - (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) fo r t

he pr op os iti on

that “ [w]he re the te mpo ra l pr oximi ty be tw e e n a p ro te c te d a c tiv ity and an a dverse action is ‘ver y close,’ it is alone suf

ficient to establish ca

usation.” Our e xami natio n o f t

he se c a se s r e ve a ls that th e y do no t su

pp or t Re y no ld s’ argume nt. Breede n involved a retaliation claim brought by a school district employ ee. The plaintiff a rg ued that she wa s punished by

being transfe rre d afte r re porting hara ssing conduct. Breede n , 532 U.S. at 271- 72. The school district pre sented e vidence that the transf er had bee n planned pr ior to plaintiff’s protec ted activity , and the Supreme Court r efuse d to a llow the transfe r to be used to e stablish t he require d causa l c onnection. Id
. at 272. The Supreme Court held that “[e]mpl oy ers ne ed not suspend pr e vio us ly pl ann ed tra

ns fe rs up on

dis c ov e ri ngthat a

Ti tle VI Isu it h a s b e e n f ile d, and the ir proce eding along lines previously contemplated, thoug h not y et definitively deter mined, is no evidenc e whatever

of ca usality .” Id
. I n the pre sent ca se, the district c ourt used a simil ar r ationale f or g ranting summary

judgme nt for de fenda

nts. The cour

t note d t h at defe ndants submitted unrebutted evide nce show ing that Eiswerth a

nd J ones intended to plac e Rey nolds on the PI P approxi mately one we ek bef

ore she repor ted the Puckett g esture. A pply ing the Breede n rationale , it is not appropr iate to view plac ing Rey nolds on the PI P as being causa lly related to her f

iling of the complaint beca use the PI P decision had bee n made pr ior to the protec ted ac tion. I n Di Car lo , 3 5 8 F
. 3 d a t 4 2 1 , w e f o u n d t h a t “ i n ce r t a i n distinct cases wher e the tempor al proxi mity betwee n the protected activity and the a dverse employ

ment action is ac utely

near in time, that c los e pr oximi ty

is de e me d in dir e c t e vid e nc e su c h a s to pe rm it a n in fe re nc e of

re ta liatio n toNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 11 - arise.” Id . (empha si s ad d ed ). In Di Car lo , the plaintiff wa s a postal employ ee w ho filed an EE O complaint ag ainst the Postal Service. Id
. T h e d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p l a i n t i f

f c a m e t h i rt e e n d a ys afte r he f iled his complaint, and he wa s terminated twe nty -one da y s afte r he f

iled the complaint. Id
. Be cause the dec ision to t erminate and the actua l te rmination both ha ppened shortly

afte r the plaintiff
en g a g e d in p r o te c te d a c ti v it y , th e c o u rt a ll o w e d th is f a c t to s e r v e a s in d ir e c t e v id e n c e o f a causal
connec tion. Id
. The pre sent ca se involves a diff ere nt timi ng of eve nts. Here , defe ndants had decided to pl ace Rey nolds on the P I P befor e she e ng ag ed in protec ted ac tivity . We have r ece ntly reiter ated the g ener al rule that “tempora l pr ox imity itself is insuff icient to f ind a causa l c onnection . . . .” Michae l v. C aterpillar Financial Serv. Corp. , 4 9 6 F. 3 d 5 8 4 , 5 9 6 (q u o t i n g Ra nd

olp h v . O hio De

p’ t of Y ou th Se rv s. , 453 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2006)). We noted t hat, althoug h temporal proximit y alone is not sufficie nt to establish a causa l connec tion, “a tempora l connec tion coupled wit h other indicia of reta liatory

conduct may

be suff icient to support a finding of a c ausal c onnection.” Id
. Rey nolds attempts to meet this standa rd by offe ring two fac ts that she alleg es would allow
a re asonab le jury

to infer a

causa l connec tion: (1) Ex tendicar e testified that Rey nolds was fire d

“ be c a us e Ms. Jone s c ou ld n ot w or k w ithhe r a

ny mor e and be c a us e sh e ha d b e c ome a

dis ru pti on ;”
and (2 ) D ay “ wa s als o subjected to r etaliatory treatment f rom Ms. J ones and Ms. Eiswe rth afte r the complaint.” Reg ardingthe first fa ct, Rey nolds arg ues that the district cour t ignor ed the r ecor d which
e sta bli sh e d th a t Jone s to ld R e y no lds tha t sh e wa s im

pr ov ingon

the da y sh e wa s f ir e d, bu t w ou ld s til lNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 12 - be fired beca

use J ones could not w ork with he r any more. Rey

nolds a lso notes t h at Ho h lefe lder testified t hat R ey

nolds was terminated because she had become a “disruption.” B ut Rey nolds does nothing more than sug g est that these f acts somehow c reate a c ausal c onnection. She does not d e v e lo p th e ar g u me n t an d d oes not show ho w these fa cts establish the ca usal eleme nt of her reta liation claim. Furthe rmore, the portion of t he re cord that Rey nolds cites for the pr oposition t hat J ones said she wa s improving doe s not support her asse rtion. Rey nolds claims that J ones told her she wa s improving. But the conver sation that she cites in the record involves Jones telling Rey nolds that her attempts to develop an action plan in response to the P I P are improving – J ones di d not say that Rey nolds’ overa ll job performa nce w as improving
. He r s e c on d f

a c tua l c la im is that Da

y wa s a lso re ta liate d a g a ins t, p re su ma bly fo r h e r r ole in repor ting t h e P uckett g esture. D ay appar ently

had to suffe r the followingacts of r etaliation: (1) Eiswerth be g an tre ating her “unfavor ably ” at de partment mee tings, (2) Eiswerth spoke to he r in an

“ un ple a sant” ton e , ( 3) Ei sw e rt h r oll e d h e r e y e s “ so a s to g ive Ms. Day th e im pre ssi on that Ms
. Eiswerth did not like her,” and (4) Eiswerth g ave D ay a “low e valuation which Ms. Da y felt wa s
unwar rante d . . . .” Da

y was a ppare ntly so disturbed by

thes e ev en t s t h at she complaine d to the Ex tendicar e cor

porate hotline. We need not dec ide whethe r these ac t i ons constitute retaliation
a g a in s t D ay b e c a

u s e s h e is n o t a p arty to th is c a s e . B u t e v e n if th e s e a c ts o f rudene ss qualify

as
re ta liatio n a g a ins t Da

y , pla int if fs fa il to sh ow ho w the se fa c ts c on sti tut e re ta lia tio n a g a ins t Re y

no lds
. Rey nolds arg ues that the district cour t erre d by considering defe ndants’ non-discr iminatory
rea son while eva luating th e m er i t s of the prima f acie case . Our a

naly sis of the district court’sNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 13 - op ini on sh ow s th a t it s a c tio ns we re e nti re ly wa rr ante d. Th e dis tr ic t court re vie we d Re y no lds ’ p ri ma fac ie c a s e , f

o u n d th a t s h e c o u ld n o t e s ta b li s h th e c a

u s a ti o n r e qu ir e me n t, an d th e n r uled in the alternative that even if

she could e stablish it, s he could not show that defe ndants’ non-discr iminatory
rea son was pre text ual. This was not er ror by the district court. Finally , Rey

nolds asserts t h at a r easona ble jury could find that def

endants’ pr offe red explanation was simply

a pre text for discr imination. The district court re jected this a rgum ent by noting the unr ebutted testi mony descr ibing Rey nolds’ below-a

vera g e job performanc e. The failure to establish a ca

usal conne ction is disposi tive. Be cause we hold that Rey nolds cannot establish a p r im a f a c ie c a s e , w e n e e d n o t de te r mi n e w h e th e r s h e c o u ld c ar r y th e b u r d e n o f p r o v in g p r e te xt. We
a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t court ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n d e fe nd ants ’ f a vo r r e g ard ingRe y

no lds ’ reta liation claim. V. The district cour

t foun d that Heine ha d established a pr ima fac ie ca se of r etaliation. Def endants c onceded t h e fi rst three elements of r etaliation, and the district c ourt found that ther e
wer e enoug h fac ts in the recor d from which it could infe r ca usation. Neve rtheless, the district c ourt g rante d summary

judgme nt for defenda

nts reg arding Heine’ s reta liation claim bec ause it dete rmined that Heine w as unable to show that defe ndants’ leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for firing he r was pre text . This is the basis for He ine’s appe al.No. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 14 - I n order to establish that an employ er’ s proff ere d rea son was pretext, a plainti ff must show that: (1) the r eason ha d no basis in fac t, (2) the state d rea son was not the ac tual rea son, or (3) the stated re ason wa s insufficient to explain the defe ndant’s ac tion. Vi rts , 285 F.3d at 521. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

no te d th a t th e c on ve rs a tio n th a t H e ine ha d w ithGo rd on inv olv e d th e same
so rt of be havio r t

hat H e ine ’s su

pe ri or s h a d wa

rn e d he r a g a ins t in the pa st. De fe nd ants ha d b e e n s o
conce rned about Heine’ s g ossiping, neg ative attitude, and neg ative comments that they war ned her
a b o u tt h i s b e h a v i o r o ns e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s p r i o r t o h e r p r o t e c t e d c o n d u c tan d e v e np l a c e d

h e r o na P IP to attempt to corr ect her behavior. The dist rict court viewed H eine’ s conver sation with Gordon as “the same sort of be havior that the r ecor d shows her supe rvisors h ad s o u gh t to corre ct on many
occa sions.” Heine bases her appea l on three arguments: (1) a rea sonable jury could find that she did not disclose confide ntial inf

ormation, (2) her discussion w ith Gor don was insuffic ient to terminate he r
e mpl oy me nt, and (3 ) a re a so na

ble jur y c ou ld f ind that th e Go rd on

inc ide nt d id n ot a c tua lly

mot ivate her te rmination. Heine a rg ues that a r easona

ble jury cou l d fi nd that she did not disclose confide ntial information i n her discussion with Gordon. She argues that the district cour t erre d by resolving two issues of fa ct ag ainst her. She c laims that she did not disclose any of the spec ifics of he r complaint wi th G or do n a

nd tha t, e ve n if s he did

dis c los e the de ta ils of

he r c omp la int , it

is n ot a g a ins t Ex tendicar e policy

to do so. This arg ument is rebutted by Heine’ s own testimony
.No. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 15 - Acc ording to Heine’ s deposition testim ony , Gordon a sked her why she di d not apply

for the Assistant Director

of Nursingposition. S he re plied, [W]ell , ma

na g e me nt d oe sn ’t

lik e me ve ry

muc h a ny wa y . A nd Isai d the f

a c t th a t I re po rt e d a sit uatio n be tw e e n an a ide and a nurs e . An d I sa id, un fo rt un a te ly the nurs e was re lated to the dire ctor. The y rea lly don’t like me. I

did not give na

mes. Idid not g ive pa rt ic ula rs on an in c ide nt. When asked if she identified the dire ctor by name, He ine replied “I ’m sure I didn’t g ive any

body ’s names. The re w ould have be en no reason to g ive names.” There would have be en no re ason to g ive names be cause Bonnie J ones wa s the Direc tor of Nur sing a nd she is the only

direc tor that Gordon would have know n. Heine a rg ues that there is “no Ex tendicar e poli cy or procedure [t hat] specifica lly prec ludes an employ ee f

rom discussing a

complaint of off

ensive be havior or ide nti fi es i t as ‘conf idential.’” The Extendica

r e h a n d b ook desig nates the a ct of “ disclosing a ny confide ntial information conce rning other e mploy ees, r esidents/patients, or the fac i l i t y ” as a Class I I Ioffe nse. In the Employ ee Handbook, the se ction descr ibing Class I I I offe nses is introduc ed with the following war ning: “ An employ ee w ill be dis char g ed if an investi g ation reve als they have c ommitt ed a Class I I Iinfrac tion.” Given the una

mbiguous langua g e in the handbook, H eine c annot re asonably claim that it is not
a g a ins t c omp any

po lic y to d isc lo se c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a tio n. Th e ha nd bo ok do e s n ot s pe c if

ic a lly de fi ne a lle g a tio ns of se xua l ha ra ssm e nt a s c on fi de nti a l, bu t we have no pr ob le m c on c lud ingthat th is is a matter of

common sense. He ine ’s argume nt d oe s no t he lp he r c a us e . At be st, sh e wa s e ng a g ingin t he so rt of g os sip and neg ative stateme nts that she had previously been w arne d ag ainst making , and, at wor st, she wasNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 16 - improperly

disclosing c onfidential information. Neither of t hese possibi lities supports her a rg ument that the proffere d rea son was in fa ct a pr etext and she was a ctually fired in r etaliation for he r having filed the sexual hara ssment acc usation. Heine’ s final ar g ument is that her discussion with Gord o n was insuffic ient to justi fy her te rm inatio n. She argue s th a t Exte nd ic are ha s a “ pr og re ssi ve dis c ipl ine po lic y” wh os e purp os e is t o “cor rec t improper employ ee be havior by the use of t h e lea st severe penalty possible.” She acknow ledg es that th e E mp l o y ee Ha n d b o o k cl as s i fi es o ff

en s es b y s ev er i t y , b u t

ar gu es (w i t h o u tci ting to the rec ord) tha t E i s we rth and Jones “tailored Ms. He ine’s ‘c rime’ to ac hieve their intended punishment.” Th e Em ploy ee Ha

nd bo ok do e s e mpl oy

a pr og re ssi ve dis c ipl ine po lic y fo r s ome of

fe ns e s. For example, the first violation of a Categ ory I offe nse is met with a “f irst notice.” The second a nd t h i rdv i o l at i o n s ar e m et wi t h s ec o n d an d t h i rdn o t i ce s , t h e f

o u rt h v i o l at i o n l e a d s t o a d i s ch ar ge
war ning, a nd the fifth violation leads to a discharg e. Categ ory I I offe nses follow a similar sche me, except that it only takes three Categ ory I I violations to g ener ate a discharg e. I n contra st, Categ ory I I Ioffe nses are not prog ressive. The Employ ee Handbook allows for discharg e for a sing le Categ ory I I Iviolation. But eve n if Heine had simply been g ossiping, rat h er than reve aling confide ntial information, she ha d been w arne d ag ainst such behavior numerous times. T h er e i s am p le support for de fenda nts’ decision to terminate H eine, a nd the district court
corr ectly conclude d that she was unable to e stablish a g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to whetherNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 17 - the explanation for her

termination was prete x tual. For this reason, we aff

irm the g rant of summar

y judgme nt for def

endants re g ardingHeine’ s retaliation cla im. V I. Re y no lds and He ine have a

pp e a le d the dis tr ic t cou

rt ’s g ra nt of su mma

ry jud g me nt on t

he ir
commo n la

w p r o mi s s o r

y e s to p p e l c la im
. O h io a d o p te d th e e le me n ts o f p r o mi s s o r y e s toppe l as descr ibed in the R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F C O N T RA CT S § 90. See The Limited Stores, Inc . v. Pan American W

orld Airways, Inc. , 6 00 N. E. 2d 10 27 , 1 03 1 ( Oh io 1 99 2) ; R.P. Carbone Constr. Co. v. N. Coast Concrete, I

nc ., 624 N.E.2d 3 2 6 , 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). The Re statement def ines pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l a s: A promi se which the promisor should rea sonably expect to induce ac tion or forbe ara nce on the part of the promisee or a third pe rson and whic h does induce such action or forbea

ranc e is binding if injusti ce can be avoided only by enfor ceme nt of the promise. R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F C ON TR AC TS § 90(1). Plaintiffs’ rele vant ar g ument is that the Employ ee H andbook promises that they would not be re taliated ag ainst for re porting offe nsive conduc t. I n order to succe ed on this clai m , plaintiffs need to e stablish that defenda nts retaliated a g ainst them in violation of this promise. Their br ief
rec og nizes thi s limi tation and arg ues t hat, “to the ex tent this Court reverse s the district court’s r uling
on Ms. Re y

nolds a nd Ms. Heine’ s retaliations cla ims, it simil arly should rever se the Court’s g rant of summary

judgme nt on their claim of pr omissory estoppel.” Def endants c ite sever al ca ses holding that provisions of an employ ee h an d b o o k do not constitute specific promises for the purposes of pr omissory estoppel. De fenda

nts’ arguments areNo. 06-4227

Rey nolds v. Extendic are He alth Servs., Inc

.

- 18 - persua sive, but we do not nee d to rea ch them. Even if plaintiffs could have rea sonably relied upon the state me nts in t

he Em plo y e e Ha nd bo ok , the y c ann ot pr e va il w iththe ir pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l c la im without showing that they wer e retaliated ag ainst, and for the re asons explained above, the y cannot
succe ed with such a

n argument. We affir

m the district court’s g ra n t of summary judgme nt for de fe nd ants re g ard ingpla int if fs ’ p ro mis so ry

e sto pp e l c la ims
. VI I
. F or the re a so ns state d h e re in, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.