Filed 7/3/24 P. v. Veloz CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

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8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HECTOR VELOZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B323616

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA475823)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.

Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury found defendant Hector Veloz (defendant) guilty of 

first degree murder for killing his wife, Sandra Velasco (Sandra).1 

We are asked to decide whether the trial court should have given 

a requested instruction on voluntary intoxication, whether the 

trial court should have stricken testimony from a city attorney 

that Sandra asked for help in modifying a protective order, and 

whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding 

intimate partner battering (IPB) and prior domestic violence 

against two of defendant’s former romantic partners. We also 

consider whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding 

that the murder was premeditated and deliberate.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Indictment

A grand jury indicted defendant on one count of murder. 

The indictment alleged defendant personally used a deadly and 

dangerous weapon (a knife) in the commission of the murder. 

(Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(2).) The trial court dismissed 

financial gain and lying-in-wait special circumstance allegations. 

B. The Evidence at Trial

We summarize the evidence at trial organized into three 

categories: (1) evidence concerning Sandra’s relationship with 

defendant; (2) evidence pertaining to Sandra’s disappearance and 

death in June 2017; and (3) propensity evidence in the form of 

testimony by two of defendant’s former partners.

1 Sandra’s son, Michael Velasco (Michael), testified at 

defendant’s trial. We refer to Sandra and Michael by their first 

names.
3

1. Sandra’s relationship with defendant

Defendant and Sandra started dating in 2015. Defendant

moved in with Sandra and her adult son, Michael, after a few 

months, and they married in 2015. Sandra’s family and friends 

testified the relationship was marred by defendant’s drug use 

and infidelity, as well as multiple instances of domestic violence. 

The first instance of domestic violence established by the 

evidence at trial occurred in April 2016. An argument between 

defendant and Michael concerning the television volume 

escalated into a shoving match between Michael and defendant. 

When Sandra got between them, defendant grabbed her by the 

arms and left bruises. Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor 

battery and a protective order barred him from having any 

contact with Sandra. The protective order was later modified to 

allow for peaceful contact in November 2016. 

The following year, in June, Sandra sent a text message to 

her friend and colleague, Brenda Hernandez (Hernandez), that 

said defendant “got aggressive again . . . .” Two days later, 

Sandra called the police to report defendant put his hands 

around her throat and held a pillow over her face. She was able 

to push him off of her and run into another room, but he grabbed 

her hair, pinned her to a sofa, and tried to “sex her up” and 

convince her not to call for help. Sandra escaped by striking 

defendant in the groin with her knee. Sandra was left with a 

raspy throat and bruising to her neck.2 

2 During trial, defendant played a video recording of 

statements Sandra made when interviewed by Los Angeles Police 

Department (LAPD) Officer Mynor Santizo (Officer Santizo). 

Among other things, Sandra told Officer Santizo there had been 
4

In addition to these incidents, Hernandez testified Sandra 

confided in her that she and defendant “were always fighting” 

and he “would push her[ and] grab her.” There was also 

testimony regarding specific instances of domestic violence that 

occurred on unknown dates—perhaps, but not necessarily, 

referring to the incidents we have already described. For 

example, Sandra told a church acquaintance, Kathy Chidester

(Chidester), that defendant choked her during a fight about three 

weeks before Sandra would later go missing on June 17, 2017. 

Sandra also told a neighborhood prosecutor in the Los Angeles 

City Attorney’s office, Tia Strozier (Strozier), about a time when 

defendant put his hands around her throat and held a pillow over 

her face, as well as an unreported incident occurring within a 

month of Sandra’s disappearance in which defendant had 

grabbed her hair. 

Sandra told others she planned to end her relationship with 

defendant at various times in 2016 and 2017. Her supervisor at 

the United States Postal Service, Baybell Gutierrez (Gutierrez), 

testified Sandra told her sometime in 2016 that she wanted to 

transfer to another state to get away from defendant. Michael 

testified Sandra said she was going to leave defendant several 

times. He and Sandra had even moved out of the home in which 

they first lived with defendant, but Sandra allowed defendant to 

move into their new home. 

“[j]ust one” prior incident of domestic violence, which she 

reported, and she was “not scared of [defendant].” As we shall 

discuss in more detail, the prosecution called psychotherapist 

Patricia Prickett (Prickett) to testify about IPB and (among other 

things) provide context for Sandra’s tone and certain statements 

during the interview with Officer Santizo. 
5

According to the evidence at trial, Sandra took further 

steps to end the relationship in June 2017. About a week before 

her disappearance, Sandra appeared “very upset” at church and 

Chidester and her family helped Sandra change the locks at her 

home. Sandra told Chidester she wanted to divorce defendant 

and she knew how to go about doing so. Sandra told Michael the 

locks were being changed and she was “finally done” with 

defendant. Michael “could tell she was serious and she wanted to 

change.” Sandra also told Hernandez she had changed the locks, 

defendant was “finally gone,” and “[her] nightmare [was] almost 

over.” She told Hernandez she wanted a divorce and had gone to 

see an attorney. 

Just days before her disappearance, Sandra approached 

Strozier (the neighborhood prosecutor) in a courthouse hallway to 

ask about converting the existing protective order into a “full 

stay-away” order. Strozier testified she remembered the 

conversation vividly because this case “permanently affected 

[her], as a prosecutor, as a woman.” Strozier told Sandra that 

defendant would need to be served notice before the protective 

order could be modified and referred her to a colleague in her 

office’s victim assistance program. Sandra met with Strozier’s 

colleague, Emily Janes (Janes), the same day and discussed the 

option of a civil restraining order. 

2. Sandra’s disappearance and death

On June 16, 2017, Sandra told Hernandez she was taking 

care of defendant’s dog at his request. As she was leaving work 

on June 17, 2017, Hernandez saw Sandra sitting in her car “in a 

daze.” Around 4:00 p.m. that day, defendant sent Sandra a text 

message asking her to bring the dog to see him at a dog park. 
6

Sandra responded that she thought he was “in detox” but said 

she would “maybe” meet him after she got off work. Around 6:41 

p.m., Sandra sent defendant the message, “I’m here.” 

Defendant met Sandra at the dog park around 7:20 p.m. 

Defendant recorded video of their conversation, which was played 

at trial. They discussed defendant’s plans to enter a substance 

abuse treatment program, but defendant was evasive when 

Sandra asked him to identify the program. When Sandra said 

she needed to leave, defendant prolonged the conversation by 

asking questions—including, for instance, whether she needed

quarters for laundry. Sandra told defendant she did not need 

anything from him and asked him to “[g]o away.” Defendant 

called Sandra as she was leaving the dog park and asked whether 

he could get his suit for church the next day. 

Shortly after 8:00 p.m., Sandra asked defendant via text 

message and phone call—a recording of which was played at 

trial3—whether he was at a storage facility where they planned to 

meet. Defendant said he was on his way, but Sandra told him 

she needed to leave and she would return by 8:00 a.m. the next 

morning. 

Sandra arrived at a party around 9:00 p.m. Gutierrez (her 

supervisor) was there. Sandra seemed “flustered” and “nervous.” 

She told Gutierrez she thought defendant was following her but 

she “managed to lose him.” Sandra left the party between 11:00 

and 11:30 p.m. and declined Gutierrez’s offer to follow her home. 

Michael arrived home from work between 11:00 p.m. and 

12:30 a.m. and heard Sandra talking to someone in her bedroom 

3 An application on defendant’s phone recorded all of his 

calls. 
7

with the door closed. Michael noticed defendant’s jacket and 

motorcycle helmet in the house. Michael did not hear defendant’s 

voice, but he was upset because he “figured it was probably him” 

and he was worried defendant and Sandra had reconciled. 

Michael did not see Sandra the next morning, and Sandra’s car 

was not outside when he left for work around 8:00 a.m. 

Sandra received five text messages from defendant between 

5:48 a.m. and 5:56 a.m. on June 18, 2017. Around 8:00 a.m., a

surveillance camera captured Sandra’s car entering a Van Nuys 

storage facility where defendant had rented a storage unit.

4

 

Defendant’s unit was located near the end of a corridor shared 

with four other units. About 20 minutes after Sandra arrived, 

defendant backed Sandra’s car up to the exterior door of the 

shared corridor at an angle and opened the trunk. Defendant 

then left the facility on his motorcycle around 9:05 a.m. 

Defendant rode his motorcycle to a Target store across the 

street from the storage facility, parked, and returned to the 

storage facility on foot. Defendant had a recorded phone 

conversation with his sister around the same time. Among other 

things, defendant told his sister he was going to meet Sandra at 

their church. Defendant’s sister noticed he was breathing hard. 

Around 9:12 a.m., defendant drove Sandra’s car from the 

storage facility to the Target parking lot. He parked and moved 

around in the back seat of the car until 9:53 a.m., when he left 

the parking lot on his motorcycle. 

4 The facility’s surveillance cameras recorded only when they 

detected movement, so video from the morning of June 18, 2017, 

is not continuous. 
8

Defendant arrived at the church he and Sandra attended

between 10:10 and 10:20 a.m. and asked to meet with Bishop Eric 

Miele (Miele). Miele testified that defendant seemed “rushed” 

and “anxious.” Miele noticed a scratch on defendant’s face and 

fresh injuries on both of his hands. When defendant left, Miele 

sent two church members to Sandra’s home to check on her. 

They were not able to make contact with her. 

On his way back to the Target parking lot, defendant rode 

his motorcycle into an alley behind a Thrifty gas station, which 

was near the location where Sandra’s body would be discovered 

two days later. Defendant parked his motorcycle near Sandra’s 

car in the Target parking lot around 11:14 a.m. He went into 

Target and bought two bottles of bleach spray at 11:27 a.m. 

Defendant left the Target parking lot in Sandra’s car a few 

minutes later. Shortly after noon, Sandra’s car exited the alley 

near the Thrifty gas station. Defendant drove back to the Target 

parking lot, parked Sandra’s car, and left on his motorcycle. 

Michael and his two adult siblings were concerned about 

Sandra’s welfare and entered her home accompanied by police 

officers on the evening of June 18, 2017. Sandra’s bedroom 

“appeared ransacked.” Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 

Detective Stefani Valdes, who worked in the missing persons 

unit, had a phone conversation with defendant the following day. 

Among other things, defendant said he had no recollection of 

when he last had contact with Sandra. 

The day after that, firefighters responded to a fire burning 

in an overgrown area behind the Thrifty gas station and 

discovered Sandra’s body. Arson investigators were unable to 

determine the cause of the fire, but samples of debris at the scene
9

contained “an ignitable liquid.” Defendant’s cell phone was used 

near the Thrifty gas station around the time the fire started. 

Later the same morning, defendant called his aunt and, 

when discussing the missing person investigation, remarked, 

“[w]ell, if something happens to [Sandra], good, I’ll get her 

benefits.” When his aunt told him he should not “wish that on 

anybody,” defendant said he was kidding. He later checked in to 

a drug rehabilitation center in Lake Arrowhead where he asked 

the intake nurse for bleach to clean his shoes. 

Back at the storage facility, in the corridor outside 

defendant’s unit, investigators found red stains that preliminary 

tests identified as blood. They also found a cigarette and two 

earring backings, one of which was broken. Inside the unit, 

investigators found a knife with a red stain on the blade. They 

also found a pill bottle containing white pills with red stains, a 

bra clasp, hair, and two earrings without backings. 

Sandra’s undergarments—including a bra with a clasp torn 

off and underwear with red stains—were found near a freeway 

offramp. Her purse was found nearby. Among other things, the 

purse contained a protective order against defendant and a 

domestic violence pamphlet. 

Investigators also found red stains that preliminary tests 

identified as blood in Sandra’s car. A red substance on the rear 

seat soaked through the cushion to the metal and plastic below. 

Dr. Odey Ukpo, a medical examiner in the Los Angeles County 

Coroner’s office, testified he would not expect a dead body to 

leave that amount of blood. He opined it was more likely that the 

person was alive with a beating heart “creating pressure that 

would cause blood to leave the body.” 
10

Dr. Ukpo did not perform the original autopsy in this case, 

but reviewed photographs and various reports. He was unable to 

determine the cause of Sandra’s death because of the extensive

burns to her body. He opined that a fracture extending from 

Sandra’s cheek to the base of her skull was caused by severe 

blunt trauma inflicted before she died. Dr. Ukpo stated this blow 

could have caused Sandra’s death, but he could not rule out the 

possibility that she bled to death from a knife wound. 

Defendant was arrested at the Lake Arrowhead 

rehabilitation facility on June 27, 2017. He had Sandra’s 

California identification card and health insurance card in his 

possession. 

3. Propensity evidence

Two of defendant’s former partners, Mayra V. (Mayra) and 

Dolores S. (Dolores), testified at trial.

Mayra married defendant in 2014. They divorced after 

about a year. They had one child, but they were not together 

when their daughter was born. In June 2016, Mayra called the 

police when defendant tried to force his way into her home. 

Defendant had previously “stalk[ed]” Mayra, following her to and 

from work and threatening to hurt her and take their child. On 

the day that Mayra called the police, she testified defendant 

brought up their daughter but he “wanted for [them] to be 

together still.” Mayra did not let him in because she “didn’t want 

to be with him any[ ]more.” 

Mayra also testified that she called the police in January 

2017 when defendant rode his motorcycle on to her driveway and 

“rev[ved]” the engine in a manner that “seemed violent.” 

Defendant was “upset” and “said he wanted to talk and he 
11

wanted to see [their] daughter.” Mayra and her family went 

inside, but defendant tried to force his way through a door and 

“started to hit the window with his fist.” Defendant left before 

the police arrived. 

Dolores and defendant were in an “on-and-off” relationship 

from 2002 until around July 2005. They had two children 

together, but they lived together for only “a very short time.” In 

November 2005,5 defendant called Dolores and they argued about 

visitation with the children. Dolores forgot defendant still had a 

key to her apartment and when she “turned around, . . . he was 

there.” Defendant “threw [Dolores] on the bed, and he choked 

[her]. And every time [she] would pass out, he would wake [her] 

up and choke [her] again until [she] would pass out. It probably 

happened about eight or nine times.” Defendant “was mad about 

[Dolores] leaving him.” “[H]e had this attitude” about Dolores’s 

“audacity . . . to think that [she] could leave him, and that those 

were his children.” Dolores’s daughter called 911, and police 

photographed her injuries. Dolores testified at a subsequent 

trial, the outcome of which was not disclosed during this trial. 

C. Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and 

found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly 

weapon. The trial court sentenced defendant to 26 years to life in 

5

In their briefs, the parties suggest this incident occurred in 

September 2005. At trial, however, the prosecution asked 

whether the incident occurred in November 2005, and Dolores 

agreed that it had. No other evidence concerning the date was 

presented at trial.
12

state prison: 25 years to life for the murder plus one year for his 

personal use of a deadly weapon. 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant presents several arguments for reversal: 

asserted instructional error, asserted error in admitting evidence, 

and an evidence sufficiency challenge to the jury’s finding that 

Sandra’s murder was deliberate and premeditated. None of the

arguments have merit.

Defendant’s claim of instructional error fails because the 

instruction he asked the court to give on voluntary intoxication 

was not supported by substantial evidence. Mere evidence that 

defendant was a habitual user of PCP does not support the 

inference that he was under the influence at the time of the 

murder, and evidence that he was high during prior violent 

episodes does not bear on his conduct under the different

circumstances of a break-up.

Defendant’s claims of evidentiary error also fail. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Prickett’s 

testimony regarding IPB and its effects (the testimony was 

relevant to explain why Sandra continued to associate with 

defendant despite escalating violence and why she did not 

mention all prior acts of domestic violence to Officer Santizo), in

overruling defendant’s objection to Strozier’s testimony that she 

was permanently affected by her conversation with Sandra (it 

was responsive to defendant’s attempt to cast doubt on her 

recollection of details from a brief conversation years earlier), and 

in admitting Mayra and Dolores’s testimony regarding prior acts 

of domestic violence (the probative value of the evidence—

defendant’s propensity for domestic violence when romantic 
13

partners attempted to distance themselves from him—was not 

substantially outweighed by a danger of undue prejudice). 

The jury’s finding that defendant’s murder of Sandra was 

premeditated and deliberate is supported by evidence of 

defendant’s motive, planning, and manner of killing. Regardless 

of whether defendant actually stood to benefit financially from 

Sandra’s death, the jury could reasonably conclude defendant 

acted on his stated belief that it would be “good” if something 

happened to Sandra because he would “get her benefits.” And 

although some of defendant’s actions immediately after the 

murder appear to have been improvised, the jury had reason to 

infer defendant planned to kill Sandra when he arranged to meet 

her in an isolated location armed with a knife. There is also 

substantial evidence for an inference that defendant had time to 

reflect between first incapacitating and then killing Sandra.

A. The Trial Court Properly Declined to Instruct the 

Jury on Voluntary Intoxication

1. Additional background

Defendant asked the trial court to give an instruction based 

on CALCRIM No. 625 that would have told jurors, among other 

things, that they may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication 

when deciding whether defendant acted with an intent to kill or 

acted with deliberation and premeditation.6 

6 CALCRIM No. 625 provides, in full: “You may consider 

evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in 

a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding 

whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill[,] [or] [the 

defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation[,]] [[or] the 

defendant was unconscious when (he/she) acted[,]] [or the 

defendant <insert other specific intent required in a homicide 
14

The trial court asked defendant’s attorney to “[p]oint to the 

evidence that, at the point where [Sandra] was killed, that 

[defendant] was under the influence of drugs.” Defendant’s 

attorney identified (1) the cigarette found in the corridor outside 

defendant’s storage unit, which was his “preferred method of 

ingestion of PCP”; (2) various discussions between defendant and 

others regarding his need to go to a rehabilitation facility; and (3) 

testimony about PCP’s effects on defendant. 

The trial court declined to give the requested instruction, 

reasoning “[t]here’s no evidence at all, direct or circumstantial, 

that [defendant] was under the influence of any type of narcotic”

at the time of the offense. The court further observed, “[w]hether 

or not he was high the night before or two weeks before or a 

month before or afterwards, that’s irrelevant. It’s on—at that 

time, at that date, in that circumstance, was he under the 

influence, and there is nothing in the evidence to support that he 

was.” 

2. Legal framework

“Voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary ingestion, 

injection, or taking by any other means of any intoxicating liquor, 

drug, or other substance.” (Pen. Code, § 29.4, subd. (c).) 

“Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the 

issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required 

charge or other charged offense>.] [¶] A person is voluntarily 

intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using 

any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it 

could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the 

risk of that effect. [¶] You may not consider evidence of the 

defendant’s voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.”
15

specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the 

defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice 

aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 29.4, subd. (b).) 

A trial court is not required to give an instruction on 

voluntary intoxication absent a request by the defendant. (People 

v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 559.) Even then, a defendant is 

not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction unless, as 

pertinent here, there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s

voluntary intoxication. (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 

295.) More specifically, there must be substantial evidence that 

the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the 

offending conduct. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 

848.) In this context, “substantial evidence” refers to evidence 

“‘“sufficient ‘to deserve consideration by the jury’ . . . .”’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 331.) 

3. Analysis

Defendant contends he was entitled to the requested 

instruction based on evidence that he habitually used PCP and 

he had been under the influence of PCP when he was violent 

toward Sandra on prior occasions. 

Evidence that a person is a habitual substance abuser does 

not support the inference that the person was under the influence 

at a specific time. In People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 

Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22, our Supreme Court held that “evidence 

that [the] defendant was a habitual user of marijuana [did not] 

constitute substantial evidence he was intoxicated or under the 

influence at the time of” the offense conduct. (Id. at 716.) 

Although the Court also noted the lack of “evidence of the effect, 
16

if any, such alleged intoxication had on [the] defendant” (id. at 

715), defendant’s suggestion that we ignore Roldan’s holding 

regarding the probative value of habitual use is unpersuasive.

That was the basis of the Court’s ruling. (Id. at 716 [“Because 

the evidence [the] defendant was intoxicated at the time of the 

crime was ‘at most minimal’ . . . , the trial court properly refused 

the defense request to instruct the jury that his alleged voluntary 

intoxication precluded him from forming the specific intent to kill 

or to rob”].)

Defendant contends, however, the facts of this case are 

comparable to those in People v. Humphries (1986) 185 

Cal.App.3d 1315. In that case, the defendant argued the trial 

court erred in excluding evidence of a prosecution witness’s drug 

use that would support the defendant’s theory that the witness 

committed the murder for which he was convicted. (Id. at 1328, 

1336.) The Court of Appeal agreed that evidence indicating the 

witness “had used PCP every day for the two-month period 

ending three days before the murder [would be] sufficient to 

permit a trier of fact to conclude that he was a habitual user, and 

that in conformity to this habit, he had ingested PCP on [the day 

of the murder].” (Id. at 1338, emphasis added.) Our Supreme 

Court’s ruling in Roldan, however, post-dates the Court of 

Appeal’s ruling in Humphries and we therefore do not believe

Humphries articulates governing law. In any case, there is no 

comparable evidence here that defendant used PCP on a daily 

basis.7

7 Other cases cited in defendant’s opening brief are also 

readily distinguishable. In People v. Vasquez (1972) 29 

Cal.App.3d 81, unlike this case, there was extensive evidence the 

defendant was intoxicated around the time of the offense conduct. 
17

Defendant also contends the jury could have inferred he 

was high when he killed Sandra from evidence that he was high 

when he abused her on prior occasions, but this argument fails 

too.

Defendant’s claim that “Michael testified the domestic 

violence occurred when [defendant] was on PCP” misstates 

Michael’s testimony. When asked to explain how “drugs were an 

issue” in Sandra’s relationship with defendant, Michael explained

that he “noticed [defendant] . . . acting strange. Sometimes when 

[Michael] would come home from work, [he] would see 

[defendant] outside in the alleyway by the house. He just seemed 

strange all the time. [¶] And [Michael] soon realized that, like, 

when there used to be, like, domestic violence, that [defendant] 

was using PCP or had a history with that . . . .” Michael did not 

testify regarding any specific acts of domestic violence, and his 

reference to defendant’s “history” with PCP underscores that he 

was not suggesting defendant was high every time he abused 

Sandra. At most, Michael testified that acts of domestic violence 

occurred during periods in which defendant was using drugs.

There were also statements by Sandra that she feared 

defendant only when he was under the influence. Even assuming 

these statements are reliable—and not merely attempts to cover 

for a partner she had not yet resolved to leave—they do not 

(Id. at 88-89.) In People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, our 

Supreme Court held the trial court properly admitted evidence 

that a defendant accused of various late-night crimes had a habit 

of staying out late. (Id. at 490.) The fact that habit evidence may 

be probative of identity has no bearing on what constitutes 

substantial evidence that a defendant was intoxicated at a 

specific point in time.
18

support an inference that defendant was high on PCP when he 

killed her. The circumstances in which defendant killed Sandra 

were different than those in every prior instance of domestic 

violence. Although Sandra had previously discussed ending the 

relationship, several witnesses—Michael, Hernandez, Chidester, 

Strozier, and Janes—discussed new, concrete steps she had taken 

to do so in the week before her death.

Defendant’s argument about what a jury supposedly could 

infer from testimony about prior violent episodes also does not 

reckon with the evidence of defendant’s demeanor and actions at 

and around the time he killed Sandra. Defendant’s back and 

forth trips to Target in an apparent effort to cover up the crime,

and his conversations with his sister and Miele, are inconsistent 

with the evidence admitted at trial about how a person under the 

influence of PCP acts. Combined with the points already 

discussed, this demonstrates the defense of voluntary 

intoxication did not deserve consideration by the jury 

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Expert 

Testimony Regarding Intimate Partner Battering and 

Its Effects

1. Additional background

After defendant opted to play the recording of Officer 

Santizo’s interview of Sandra in June 2017, the prosecution 

advised the trial court it intended to call an expert to testify 

about IPB and its effects. The trial court asked why the 

testimony was relevant, and the prosecution explained, “In 

the . . . video, [Sandra] expresses some minimizing, she says that 

there were no prior domestic violence incidents . . . .” The trial 

court interjected, “Well, she says there was one,” and the 
19

prosecution responded, “True. But that seems to be inconsistent 

with how she’s represented it to family and friends, and she has a 

flat affect that I think [the] defense would argue is inconsistent 

with someone who is a real victim. So I think that there is 

enough that warrants explanation by an expert . . . .” 

Defendant’s trial attorney objected, arguing Sandra did not 

minimize defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence in the 

interview and there was insufficient foundation for testimony 

regarding “certain behaviors.” As to the latter point, defendant’s 

attorney argued the prosecution was likely to ask the witness 

hypothetical questions “about things that they claim to have 

proved, and then have her opine as to those things, but pretend 

as if it has nothing to do with this case so that they can just say, 

in the end, ‘Voila,’ you know, ‘Here’s the expert. She knows all 

this. And she has testified that these exact same behaviors that 

[Sandra] exhibited in this particular case . . . , that they mean 

this.’” 

The trial court ruled, “Based on that objection, . . . I’m 

going to allow it, because that’s exactly what an expert is allowed 

to do.8 

The prosecution’s expert, Prickett, testified that intimate 

partner violence is “a pattern of coercive behaviors that are 

designed to control.” She explained that not all victims are 

8 After Janes (from the City Attorney’s victim assistance 

program) testified, defendant’s trial attorney raised a separate 

objection to the intended expert testimony on the ground it would 

be cumulative of Janes’s testimony regarding the behavior of 

victims of domestic violence. The trial court overruled the 

objection, explaining that Janes’s testimony on that score “came 

out on [defendant’s attorney’s] cross examination.”
20

“meek,” and it is not unusual for the victim to be the breadwinner 

in the relationship. Victims may confide in some people but not 

others, and it is common for them to minimize the severity and 

frequency of abuse. They may appear “numb” when describing 

the same events to multiple police officers. A victim will 

generally leave several times before “they stay gone.” Prickett 

testified abusers are typically most dangerous when the victim 

leaves, and “75 percent of women who get killed get killed when 

they’re leaving or after they’ve left. So there’s a real fear that is 

grounded in fact for people leaving.” 

2. Legal framework

“In a criminal action, expert testimony is 

admissible . . . regarding intimate partner battering and its 

effects, including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or 

mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of 

domestic violence, except when offered against a criminal 

defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse 

which form the basis of the criminal charge.” (Evid. Code, § 1107, 

subd. (a).) “The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of 

this expert testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes 

its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert 

witness. . . .” (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (b).)

The relevance of IPB evidence “is based on the possibility 

that the jurors will doubt that a witness who claims to have been 

abused has indeed acted in the manner to which he or she 

testified, and therefore the jurors might unjustifiably develop a 

negative view of the witness’s credibility. [Citation.] Even if the 

defendant never expressly contests the witness’s credibility along 

these lines, there is nothing preventing the jury from ultimately 
21

finding in its deliberations that the witness was not credible, 

based on misconceptions that could have been dispelled by [IPB]

evidence.” (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 293.) IPB 

evidence may, among other things, help to explain why a victim 

of IPB remained in a relationship with their abuser (id. at 293-

294; People v. Kovacich (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 902) or 

downplayed abuse (see People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 

906 [discussing relevance of IPB evidence under the more general 

expert witness statute, Evidence Code section 801]).

3. Analysis

Defendant contends the IPB testimony was not relevant 

because the jury could have properly evaluated Sandra’s 

statements and conduct without any background “regarding 

intimate partner battering and its effects.”

9

 (Evid. Code, § 1107, 

subd. (a).) Defendant lists various respects in which he believes 

Sandra did not fit the profile of a victim of IPB, e.g., she had 

many friends and confidants, she did not minimize the abuse

when speaking with the police, and she took steps to protect 

herself. 

Defendant’s argument rests on an incomplete accounting of 

the evidence. Although Sandra took some steps to protect herself 

from defendant, a layperson unschooled in IPB and its effects 

9 Defendant also suggests the trial court erred in allowing 

Prickett to testify that 75 percent of IPB victims who are killed 

are killed when they attempt to leave. Although the trial court 

sustained defendant’s objection to a question aiming to have 

Prickett repeat this statistic, there was no objection when 

Prickett first mentioned it. The point is accordingly forfeited. 

(Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)
22

might wonder why she continued to meet with him alone—

including when she was killed. IPB evidence was relevant to 

explain this conduct and to allow jurors to advisedly evaluate 

Sandra’s credibility. (Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 293 [“expert 

[IPB] testimony is relevant to explain that it is common for 

people who have been physically and mentally abused to act in 

ways that may be difficult for a layperson to understand”]; 

Kovacich, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 902 [expert IPB “testimony 

was necessary to disabuse jurors of commonly held 

misconceptions about victims of domestic violence, and to explain 

the psychological reasons for such a victim’s seemingly selfimpeaching behavior”].) 

Additionally, IPB evidence was relevant to explain 

apparent discrepancies between Sandra’s statements during the 

Officer Santizo interview and her statements to other people. In 

the video, Sandra told Officer Santizo there had been one prior 

incident of abuse, which she had reported. Sandra told 

Hernandez, however, that she and defendant “were always 

fighting” and “he would push her, grab her.” Jurors could also 

reasonably have understood the unreported incidents Sandra 

mentioned to Chidester and Strozier to have occurred before the 

prior incident of abuse she mentioned when interviewed.

The trial court accordingly did not abuse its discretion 

(People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 413) in determining

that Prickett’s testimony would help the jury evaluate why 

Sandra continued to meet alone with defendant despite 

escalating physical abuse and why she did not mention any 

unreported instances of abuse to Officer Santizo.
23

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Overruling 

Defendant’s Objection to Strozier’s Testimony that the 

Conversation with Sandra Permanently Affected Her 

1. Additional background

As mentioned earlier, Strozier testified Sandra approached 

her in a courthouse a few days before she was killed, told her 

about two instances of domestic violence, and asked for help 

modifying the protective order. In addition to these basic facts, 

Strozier described Sandra’s demeanor. Strozier stated she 

“immediately noticed that [Sandra] was concerned, that she was 

scared, but that she was still compassionate 

about . . . defendant.” Strozier was “able to assess her state of 

mind from not just how she was speaking . . . but the fact 

that . . . she did appear scared. The way—the things that she 

described, she was fearful of [defendant], but she also had an 

understanding of his behavior and his history, and that came 

through in what she shared . . . .” 

On cross-examination, defendant’s trial attorney asked how 

long the conversation lasted, emphasized that it occurred in a 

courthouse hallway, and asked whether Sandra cried. When 

Strozier affirmed that Sandra cried, defendant’s attorney asked 

her to pinpoint what they were discussing at that time. 

On re-direct, the prosecution asked Strozier why she 

recalled her interaction with Sandra so vividly. Defendant’s 

attorney objected on relevance grounds, the prosecution 

responded that the question went to Strozier’s credibility, and the 

trial court overruled the objection. Strozier answered, “Because 

this doesn’t happen regularly. This case has permanently 

affected me, as a prosecutor, as a woman. And you just don’t 

forget something like this.” Defendant’s attorney objected again 
24

and moved to strike Strozier’s answer. The trial court overruled 

the objection but ordered the prosecution to “move on.” 

2. Analysis

Defendant contends his attorney did not attempt to test 

Strozier’s recollection or credibility on cross-examination, and 

thus, the reason that she remembered the conversation so clearly 

was not relevant. Defendant’s argument lacks merit because 

defendant’s trial attorney probed Strozier’s recollection in at least 

two respects. First, the question reiterating that Strozier spoke 

to Sandra in a courthouse hallway can be construed as an 

attempt to emphasize the conversation occurred only in passing 

or only amid possible distractions. Second, the questions 

regarding whether and precisely when Sandra cried had no 

conceivable purpose other than to test Strozier’s recollection. 

Defendant’s contention that this reading of the cross-examination 

is “specious” because the question regarding when Sandra cried 

was “merely [a] follow[ ]-up to a previous question” fails to 

acknowledge that the “previous question”—whether Sandra 

cried—can also be understood as an effort to challenge credibility 

by seeking to elicit a detailed recollection. 

Although the defense’s efforts to undermine Strozier’s 

recollection of Sandra’s demeanor during a conversation that took 

place nearly five years before trial were not successful, 

defendant’s claim that “the cross-examination was narrowly 

curtailed to elicit additional facts” is not supported by the record. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that 

Strozier’s reasons for remembering the conversation in such vivid 

detail were relevant. 
25

D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Evidence of 

Domestic Violence Against Defendant’s Previous 

Partners

1. Additional background

As summarized earlier, defendant’s former partners Mayra 

and Dolores testified regarding several prior acts of domestic 

violence. Before the women testified, defendant’s trial attorney 

objected that the probative value of Mayra’s testimony would be 

substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice 

because defendant did not physically abuse Mayra and she was 

likely to mention facts unrelated to domestic violence. The trial 

court overruled the objection, emphasizing, among other things, 

that Mayra was “a prior spouse, it is not remote in time, 

and . . . it is relevant.” 

Dolores was originally expected to testify to several 

instances of domestic violence in addition to the single incident 

from November 2005 that was discussed at trial.

10

 The trial 

court, however, ruled that only evidence regarding the November

2005 incident would be admitted and it would be admitted,

despite its remoteness, because both Dolores and Sandra “were 

pulling away from the defendant, and the defendant didn’t seem 

to like that. . . . [T]he similarities are that they were separating, 

10 These included a February 2003 incident in which 

defendant threw a remote control at her face; a series of incidents 

in January 2004 in which defendant kicked Dolores, prevented 

her from escaping a car by grabbing her baby’s leg, repeatedly hit 

her with a bottle, and hit her in the head with a broomstick; and 

an incident in 2004 or 2005 in which defendant put a cigarette 

out on Dolores’s arm. 
26

basically told to stay away, there was anger involved in it, et 

cetera.”11 

Later in the proceedings, defendant’s attorney argued 

Mayra and Dolores’s testimony should be excluded because the 

prosecution chose not to present all evidence of prior domestic 

violence against Sandra, including body-worn video recorded by a 

police officer investigating an incident on April 7, 2016. The trial 

court determined the prosecution’s decision not to introduce 

certain evidence had no impact on its earlier rulings about what 

evidence would be admitted. 

2. Legal framework

As a general matter, “evidence of a person’s character or a 

trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, 

evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or 

her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her 

conduct on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) 

The Legislature has, however, carved out exceptions permitting 

the use of “‘so-called “propensity” or “disposition” evidence’” in 

specific cases.12 (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1089.) 

The exception pertinent here, Evidence Code section 1109 

(Section 1109), provides that “in a criminal action in which the 

defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, 

evidence of the defendant’s commission of other domestic violence 

11 The trial court also excluded testimony by two other former 

partners that defendant abused more than 10 years prior to the 

charged offense. 

12 Defendant does not challenge, on any ground, the statutes 

permitting the use of such propensity evidence.
27

is not made inadmissible by [Evidence Code] Section 1101 if the 

evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code] Section 

352.” (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Evidence is inadmissible under 

Evidence Code section 352 if “its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 

necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial 

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 

misleading the jury.” In this context, courts have read Evidence 

Code section 352 to require the probative value of propensity 

evidence to “‘“be balanced against four factors: (1) the 

inflammatory nature of the uncharged conduct; (2) the possibility 

of confusion of issues; (3) remoteness in time of the uncharged 

offenses; and (4) the amount of time involved in introducing and 

refuting the evidence of uncharged offenses.”’ [Citation.]” (People 

v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630.) “‘“The principal 

factor affecting the probative value of an uncharged act is its 

similarity to the charged offense.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the 

charged offense” is subject to the further requirement that the 

trial court must “determine[ ] that the admission of this evidence 

is in the interest of justice.” (§ 1109, subd. (e).) “Thus, while 

evidence of past domestic violence is presumptively admissible 

under [Section 1109,] subdivision (a)(1), subdivision (e) 

establishes the opposite presumption with respect to acts more 

than 10 years past.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 

520, 537, fn. omitted.) The “more stringent standard of 

admissibility” for evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years 

before the charged offense does not, however, “necessitate[ ] an 

inquiry different in kind from that involved in a determination 

under section 352.” (Id. at 539.) Evidence of such acts is 
28

admissible so long as its “probative value weighs more heavily on 

th[e] same scales” used in the Evidence Code section 352 

analysis. (Ibid.)

We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of 

prior acts under Section 1109 for abuse of discretion. (Johnson, 

supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at 531.)

3. Mayra

Defendant principally contends the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting Mayra’s testimony regarding prior acts 

from 2016 and 2017 because these were not sufficiently similar to 

any of his acts against Sandra. Specifically, defendant asserts

these acts occurred “well after [Mayra] and [defendant] had 

divorced” and “[t]he [January 2017] incident . . . arose because 

[Mayra] was refusing [defendant’s] demand to see his daughter.” 

Contrary to defendant’s argument, the fact that Mayra and 

defendant were divorced at the time of the June 2016 and 

January 2017 incidents strengthens the comparison to this case. 

Sandra had effectively barred defendant from her home by 

changing the locks, she was seeking a no-contact protective order, 

and there was evidence she had consulted an attorney about 

obtaining a divorce. In both Mayra’s case and Sandra’s case, 

defendant was dealing with a former partner who had taken clear 

steps to end their relationship. 

Defendant’s purported desire to see his child when he twice 

attempted to force his way into Mayra’s home is a difference, but 

a superficial one. At least with respect to the first incident in 

June 2016, Mayra testified that defendant had dual motives and 

“wanted for [them] to be together still.” Defendant also employed 

a similar tactic to maintain contact with Sandra in this case even 
29

though they did not have children together. Defendant asked 

Sandra to take care of his dog while he was ostensibly receiving 

substance abuse treatment and then, the night before he killed 

her, asked her to bring the dog to see him at a dog park. In both 

relationships, defendant used his purported desire to see a child 

or a dog as a reason to maintain contact with a former partner.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

defendant’s conduct toward Mayra after their relationship ended 

was sufficiently similar to his conduct toward Sandra and that its 

probative value outweighed countervailing considerations. 

Defendant’s conduct toward Mayra was far less inflammatory 

than the charged offense because he did not inflict any physical 

injury, there was little risk of confusion, the incidents involving 

Mayra occurred less than two years before Sandra was killed,

and Mayra’s testimony was brief, especially seen in context of a 

trial that involved more than 30 witnesses. 

4. Dolores

Because the November 2005 incident described by Dolores 

occurred nearly 12 years before Sandra was killed, the more 

stringent standard set forth in Section 1109, subdivision (e) 

applies. Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in 

determining this standard was met based on the remoteness of 

the November 2005 incident, dissimilarities between that 

incident and the charged offense, the availability of alternative 

propensity evidence, and his inability to cross-examine Dolores 

with a transcript of her testimony in criminal proceedings that

arose from the November 2005 incident. None of these

arguments establishes an abuse of discretion.
30

“Remote prior conduct is, at least theoretically, less 

probative of propensity than more recent misconduct. [Citation.]

This is especially true if the defendant has led a substantially 

blameless life in the interim [citation] . . . .” (Johnson, supra, 185 

Cal.App.4th at 534, fn. omitted.) Here, defendant engaged in 

similar conduct with both Mayra and Sandra in the period 

between the November 2005 incident and Sandra’s death in June 

2017. Moreover, defendant was not so young—he was 34 years 

old in November 2005 and 46 years old in June 2017—that the 

incident with Dolores may be characterized as a youthful 

mistake. Under these circumstances, the remoteness of the 

November 2005 incident did not materially weaken its probative 

value.

Defendant argues the November 2005 incident is dissimilar 

to the charged conduct because it arose from Dolores’s “refus[al] 

to let [defendant] see their children” and “occurred long after the 

parties had separated.” Neither of these statements is wholly 

accurate. The November 2005 incident occurred less than six 

months after Dolores and defendant’s final break-up. And 

Dolores testified that defendant was, at least in part, angry with 

her for having left him. In addition, as we have already 

discussed in connection with Mayra, the fact that defendant’s 

children played a nominal role in defendant’s prior acts of 

domestic violence toward Mayra and Dolores does not

meaningfully distinguish these acts from the charged conduct. 

Defendant’s argument that the trial court should have 

excluded Dolores’s testimony because the prosecution could have 

presented evidence of at least one additional instance in which 

defendant abused Sandra fails to account for the trial court’s 

exclusion of other propensity evidence. (People v. Merchant 
31

(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1193 [“It is significant that the court 

excluded [other] items of prior act evidence”].) Dolores’s 

testimony also had unique probative value. A pattern of conduct 

involving multiple women is more probative of a propensity to 

commit domestic violence than cumulative incidents involving 

the same partner. (Id. at 1194 [“the fact that [the defendant]

engaged in domestic violence against two different women 

strengthens its probative value on propensity”].) And the 

November 2005 choking attack on Dolores was more similar to 

the charged offense—which also occurred after a break-up—than 

an incident that occurred early in defendant’s relationship with 

Sandra.

Courts may consider “‘[t]he degree of certainty’” of a prior 

act’s occurrence in weighing its probative value against the risk 

of undue prejudice. (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 

1096, 1116 [weighing factors with respect to the admissibility of 

evidence of other sexual offenses under Evidence Code section 

1108].) Defendant argues the events Dolores described are highly 

uncertain because defendant’s trial counsel represented to the 

court that charges stemming from the November 2005 incident 

were dismissed in the interest of justice and the transcript of 

Dolores’s testimony was no longer available. But defendant’s 

trial attorney had a copy of a police report from the incident that 

she used when attempting to impeach Dolores on crossexamination. We therefore believe there was no concern about 

the degree of certainty of the Dolores abuse evidence that 

materially affects the Section 1109, subdivision (e) analysis.

The trial court acted within its discretion in ruling the 

Section 1109, subdivision (e) standard for admission of evidence 

was met. Defendant’s conduct just months after his relationship 
32

with Dolores ended has striking similarities to his conduct 

involving Sandra. Although defendant’s abuse of Dolores was

violent, it was less inflammatory than the charged offense and on 

a par with other prior acts of domestic violence against Sandra. 

There was also little risk that the jury would confuse the issues, 

and, though remote, defendant’s conduct in November 2005 was 

part of a recurring pattern. 

E. Cumulative Error

Defendant contends that even if the asserted instructional 

and evidentiary errors are not prejudicial when considered 

individually, the cumulative effect of those errors requires 

reversal of his conviction. Because we have found no error, there 

is no cumulative error. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 

1020.)

F. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding 

that the Murder Was Premeditated and Deliberate

To support a conviction for premeditated and deliberate 

first degree murder, there must be sufficient evidence that the 

murderer thought about his conduct in advance. (People v. Cage

(2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 276.) “‘The true test is not the duration of 

time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may 

follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated 

judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .’ [Citation.] Such 

reflection may be revealed by planning activity, motive, and the 

manner of the killing[ ], among other things. [Citations.]” 

(People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1027.) If these categories 

of evidence are not all present, courts often “‘require either very 

strong evidence of planning, or some evidence of motive in 
33

conjunction with planning or a deliberate manner of killing.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1224; see also 

People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 850 [the planning, motive, 

and manner factors derived from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 

Cal.2d 15 “are not exclusive, nor are they invariably 

determinative”].) All three categories of evidence are present in 

this case.13

As to motive, defendant told his aunt it would be “good” if 

“something happen[ed]” to Sandra because he would “get her 

benefits.” Defendant points out that he already enjoyed some of 

Sandra’s benefits and speculates “he would lose [these] if she 

died.” We do not need to speculate about the availability of 

survivor benefits—or the potential impact of a divorce on 

defendant’s eligibility for benefits—because a motive need not be 

rational. (People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 495.) 

The jury could reasonably infer from defendant’s own statements 

that he was motivated to kill Sandra based on his belief—correct 

or not—that he would benefit financially.

As to planning, it is significant that defendant was armed 

with a knife when he met Sandra at the storage facility. (Potts, 

supra, 6 Cal.5th at 1027 [“The evidence that [the] defendant 

13 Defendant suggests the prosecution conceded there was no 

evidence of planning or motive in its closing argument when it 

emphasized that premeditation and deliberation are not 

synonymous with planning and it need not prove motive. 

Defendant misreads the argument, but the issue is irrelevant in 

any case. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126 [“It is 

elementary . . . that the prosecutor’s argument is not evidence 

and the theories suggested are not the exclusive theories that 

may be considered by the jury”].)
34

arrived at the [victims’] home carrying a weapon suggests that 

the murders were planned”].) Nothing in the record indicates

defendant made a habit of carrying a knife. (Id. at 1027-1028.) 

Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant 

arranged to meet Sandra in an isolated location for the purpose of 

killing her. (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 369 [“the 

murder’s isolated location, selected by [the] defendant, is itself 

evidence of planning”].) The fact that defendant appeared to 

improvise certain elements of the cover-up—buying cleaning 

supplies and scouting a site to dispose of Sandra’s body after 

killing her—does not refute the substantial evidence of planning. 

(People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 970 [“‘If the 

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, 

reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the 

circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 

contrary finding”].) 

Defendant’s efforts to destroy Sandra’s body made the 

precise manner of killing difficult to pin down, but the bloody 

knife in the storage unit and Dr. Ukpo’s testimony that Sandra 

suffered a severe blow to her head before she died supports an

inference that defendant’s attack came in two stages, affording

defendant an opportunity to reflect. (People v. Williams (2018) 23 

Cal.App.5th 396, 410 [evidence of “intentional and deliberate 

manner of killing” included “two neck stabs, with an implied 

interval to reflect, as well as the infliction of blunt force trauma 

in different areas of the victim’s body”]; People v. Streeter (2012) 

54 Cal.4th 205, 244 [manner of killing “demonstrate[d] 

premeditation and deliberation” where the “defendant’s acts 

occurred in stages”], overruled on other grounds as stated in 

People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 834.)
35

Because there is substantial evidence that defendant had a 

motive to kill Sandra, planned in advance to do so, and employed 

a manner of killing that reflects premeditation and deliberation,

there is no basis to disturb the jury’s first degree murder verdict.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM, J.