### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 12, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 01- 1713 3

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D.C. Dock etNo. 9 9- 08 12 5- CR-DTKH UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us RAPHAEL R. LEVY D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the So uth er n D istri ct of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (July 12, 200 5) ON REMAND FROM THE S UPREME COURT

OF THE U NITE D S TAT ES Be fo re A N D E RS O N , H U L L and P RY O R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: This case is before this Court for the third tim e. W e previously aff irm edOn Dec ember 3, 2004, this Court also denied L evy ’s petition for en ba nc re hear ing. 1 United States v. L evy , 391 F.3d 1327 ( 2004). 2 L ev y ’ s se nte nc es in U nit ed S ta te s v. L ev y , 374 F . 3d 1 023 (1 1 Ci r. 200 4) , and th de nie d L ev y ’ s pe tit ionf

or r eh eari ng i n U nit ed

S ta te s v. L ev y , 379 F . 3d 1 241 (1 1 th Ci r. 200 4)
. O n June 6, 200 5, the S upr em e Co urt va cate d our j udgm en t and

1
re m an de d L ev y ’ s c as e to u s f or f urthe r co nsi de ratio n inli ght of U nit ed S ta te s v. Bo o k er , 1 2 5 S. Ct . 7 3 8 (2 0 0 5 ). Se e L ev y v . Un i t edSt at es , –S. Ct . – , 2 0 0 5 WL 54 06 92 (U.S. Ju ne 6, 2 00 5)
. Ha v i n g n o w c o n s i d er edLe v y’ s ca s e i n l i g h to f B o o k er , we af fi rm Lev y’ s se nte nc es not

onl y f or the r ea sons state d inour pr ior opi nio ns b ut a lso f

or tho se ex pl ai ne d b el ow. I. BACKG ROUND A ft er thi s C ourt a ff

irm ed L ev y ’ s se nte nc es in U nit ed S ta te s v. L ev y , 374 F. 3d 1 023 (1 1 Ci r. 200 4) , the S upr em e Co urt de ci de d B lake ly v. W as hin gto n, th 124 S. Ct
. 253 1 ( 2004 ), w hic h e xte nde d th e co nst itu tio na l r ule announc ed

in Appr en di v
. N ewJe rs ey , 530 U . S. 466 , 120 S
. Ct
. 234 8 ( 2000 ), to the W as hin gto n St at e Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s. A s w e al l are aw ar e, the S upr em e Co urt a ga in extended Apprendi to the United States Sentencing Guidelines in Booker. A ft er Bl ak el y , but

be fo re Bo oke r, L ev y

f ile d ape tit ionf

or r eh eari ng i n th isSub se qu e ntl y , th is C ourt ha s a pp lie d th is p ru de nti a l r

ule in o the r c a se s whe re de fe nd ants 2 untimely raised B lakely , now B ooker, c laims. See, e.g ., United States v. Pipkins, – F.3d –, 2005 WL1421449, at *2 (11 Cir. J une 20, 2005); United States v. Sea rs, –F.3d –, 2005 WL

1334892, th at *1 (11 Cir. J une 8, 2005); United States v. Ve rbitskaya, 406 F .3d 1324, 1339-40 (11 Cir.

th th 2 0 0 5 ) ; U n i t e d

S t at e s v . D ay, 4 0 5 F . 3 d

1 2 9 3 , 1 2 9 4 n . 1 ( 1 1 C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ; U n i t e d S t at e s v . D o c k e r

y, th 401 F.3d 1261, 1262- 63 (11 Cir. 2005). th 3 Co urt a sse rt ing , f

or the f ir st t im e, that he ha d a

r igh t t o aj ur

y tr ia l r eg ar din g hi s federa l sentencing enh ancem ents. I n his petit ion for rehear ing, Le vy conceded that at no ti m e pr ior

to his pe tit ionf

or r eh ea ri ng – not in the dis tr ic t c ourt and n ot in h is b ri ef

s onappe al – di d he r ai se any arg um en t r eg ar din g th e co nst itu tio na lity of the se nte nc ing gui de lin es or any r igh t t o aj ur

y tr ia l onhis se nte nc ing
enhanc em en ts o r any

arg um en ts g ro unde d inAppr en di . O n Augus t 3, 200 4, thi s C ourt de nie d L ev y ’ s pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng b as ed

on thi s C ourt’ s lo ng- standi ng p ru de nti al r ule of de cl ini ng t o e nte rt ai n is sue s no t
ra ise d inan a

ppe llant’ s in iti al br ie f on a ppe al but r ai se d f or the f ir st t im e in a pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng. S ee , e . g. , L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 42- 45; U nit ed S ta te s v. Ar dley , 273 F. 3d 99 1, 991-95 (11 Cir. 2001 ) (C arnes, J., concurring in the denial th of r eh eari ng e n banc ) (c oll ec tin g c as es ); U nit ed S ta te s v. N ea ly , 232 F . 3d 8 25, 830-31 (11 Cir. 2000 ).

th 2 L e v y t h e n f

i l e dap e t i t i o n f

o r c e rt i o r a r i i n th e S up r e me C o u rt . T h e S up r e me Co urt gr an te d c er

tio rari , va cate d our j udgm en t, and r em an de d L ev y ’ s c as e fo r co nsi de ratio n inli ght

of Bo oke r, statin g a s f

oll ow s:4

Mot ionof

pe tit ion er

f or le av e to p ro ce ed in f

orm a pa upe ris and pe tit ionf or w ri t of c er tio rari gr an te d. Jud gm en t va cate d and c as e re m an de d to the U nit ed

S ta te s C ourt of

Appe al s f

or the E le ve nth Circuit for f

urther consideration in lig ht of United States v. B ooker , 543 U.S . __ (2005). Le vy v. United States, – S . C t. –, 2005 W L 540692 (U. S. June 6, 2005). Be fore
co nsi de ri ng L ev y ’ s c as e in l igh t of Bo oke r, w e fi rs t e xpl ai n our pr ude nti al r ule that i ssu es not

r ai se d inaparty ’ s in iti al br ie f ar e de em ed abandon ed

and g en er al ly
w ill not be c onsi de re d by

thi s C ourt. W e the n c onsi de r L ev y ’ s c as e in l igh t of Bo oke r, e xpl ai n w hy

und er Bo oke r our

e sta bli she d pr

ude nti al r ule sti ll ap pli es , an d thus why

und er Bo oke r de fe ndant L ev y

is not e nti tle d to ane wse nte nc ing
. II. TH IS CO UR T’S PRUD ENT IAL RULE In Ne aly , this Court sum

m arize d our prudenti al rule of dec linin g to consi der iss ue s no t t im el y

r ai se d inaparty ’ s in iti al br ie f, a s f oll ow s: Parties m ust su bm it all issues on appeal i n their i nitial briefs. When new au tho ri ty ari se s af te r a bri ef is fi le d, thi s cir cu it pe rm its part ie s to sub m it supp le m enta l au th or it y

on “ in te rv en in g d eci si on s o r ne w dev el op m en ts” re gard ing iss ue s al re ady pr ope rl y ra ise d in the ini tia l br ie fs . A lso , part ie s c anse ek

pe rm iss ionof

the c ourt t o f

ile supplem en ta l br ie fs on this new a u t h o rit y . But parties cannot properly raise newissues at supp le m en ta l br ie fi ng, ev en if the iss ue s ar ise ba se d on the int er ve nin g d e c i s i o n s o r

n e wd e v e l o p men t s c i t e di n th e s up p l e men t a l au t h o r i t y. N ea ly , 232 F . 3d at 83 0 ( int er na l c itatio ns o m itt ed ). T his Co urt’ s pr ude nti al r ule is
we ll establish ed, and thu s we repeate dly have declined to consid er issues raisedIn addition, before a dec ision on the merits of a dire ct appe al, this Court repeatedly has 3 denied motions to file supplemental brief s that seek to ra ise new issues not cove red in a n appellant’ s initi al brief

on appea l. See, e.g ., Wil kerson v. Gr innell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11 Cir. 2001); United States v. Ardley , 242 F.3d 989, 990 ( 11 Cir. 2001); United States v. th th Nea ly , 232 F.3d 825, 830- 31 (11 Cir. 2000); McGinnis v. Ing ram Equip. Co., 918 F.2d 1491, th 1495-97 (11 Cir. 1990) (en ba nc); see also Fe d. Sav. And L oan Ins. Corp. v. Hara lson, 813 F.2d th 370, 373 n.3 (11 Cir. 1987). th As fo r r e ply

br ie fs , th is C ourt

a lso de c lin e s to c on sid e r i ssu e s r a ise d f or the fi rs t ti me in an appe llant’s reply

brief. See , e.g ., KMS Rest. Corp. v. W endy ’s Int’l, Inc., 361 F .3d 1321, 1328 n.4 (11 Cir. 2004) (quotingTallaha ssee Me m’l Reg ’l Med. Ctr. v. B owen, 815 F .2d 1435,

th 1446 n.16 (11 Cir. 1987)); United States v. Whitesell, 314 F.3d 1251 1256 (11 Cir. 2002);

th th United States v. Dicter , 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 ( 11 Cir. 1999); United States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d th 371, 377 n.6 (11 Cir. 1996); J ackson v. United States, 976 F.2d 679, 680 n.1 (11 Cir. 1992); th th United States v. Oakle y , 744 F.2d 1553, 1556 ( 11 Cir. 1984); United States v. Be nz, 740 F.2d th 903, 916 (11 Cir. 1984).

th In Nea ly , this Court not ed that “[p]arties must submi t all issues on appea l in their initi al 4 briefs.” 232 F.3d at 830 (citingFe d. R. App. P. 28(a)(5) ). The N ealy Court expl ained that supplemental brief

s will be authorized, pursuant to 11 Cir. R. 28-1, I .O.P.5, only when th interveningdecisions or ne w deve lopments arise a fter the moving pa rty ’s brief has bee n filed and only when that ne w authority

rela tes to an issue or issues a lrea dy proper ly raised in the pa

rty ’s i n i t i a l b r i e f

. Id
. The Court expressly conclude d that “par

ties cannot prope rly

raise ne w issues at supplemental brief

ing, e ven if the [new] issues arise ba sed on the interve ning de cisions or new de ve lop me nts c ite d in

the su pp le me nta l a

uth or ity .” I d. Th e ne w i nd ic tme nt i ssu e we re fu se d to 5 for the fir st tim e in a petition for rehear ing. See , e .g. , United States v. Martinez, 96 F
. 3d 4 73, 475 ( 11 Ci r. 199 6) ; S co tt v. S ing le tary , 38 F
. 3d 1 547, 155 2 n. 7 ( 11 th th Cir. 1994 ); U nited States v. F iallo-Jacom e, 874 F.2d 1479 , 1481 (11 Cir. 1989 ); th D unki ns v . T hig pe n, 854 F . 2d 3 94, 399 n. 9 ( 11 Ci r. 198 8) ; H oll ey v. S em ino le th CountySch. Dist. , 763 F. 2d 39 9, 400-01 (11 Cir. 1985 ). th 3 T o a llo wane wiss ue to be r ai se d inape tit ionf or r eh eari ng c ir cum

ve nts Fe d er al Ru l e o f A p p el l at e P ro ce du re 2 8 (a )( 5 ), wh i ch re qu i re s th at an ap p el l an t ’s in it ia l b rie f m

us t co nt ai n “ a st at em en t o f th e is su es pre se nt edforrev ie w.” 4hear

in Nealy was Appr endi-ba sed. I d. Importantly , this rule applies with equa l force , reg ardle ss of whethe r it is the 5 g ov e rnme nt, c ri min a l de fe nd ant, or any oth e r p art

y to l iti g atio n who ha s f

a ile d to ra ise an is su e in their openingbrief. 6 Furthe r, the r

ule r equir ing that i ssu es be r ai se d inope nin g br ie fs “ se rv es va lua ble pur pose s, a s do a ll of

the pr oc ed

ur al de fa ult r ule s, w hic h is w hy

w e re gul ar ly ap ply the m . S ee ge ne ra lly

P re sne ll v. K em

p, 835 F . 2d 1 567, 157 3- 74 ( 11 th Ci r. 1988 ). ” A rd le y , 273 F . 3d at 99 1 ( Carn es , J. , c onc ur ri ng i n th e de nia l of
re he ar ing e n banc ). T w o of tho se va lua

ble pur pose s are j udi ci al e co nom y and 5 finality
. Indeed, both purpos es are im plicated in this case a s Le vy concedes that he did not r ai se any c onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s to the se nte nc ing gui de lin es or his
se nte nc e or

any Appr en di- ty

pe arg um en t until a ft er

thi s C ourt ha d a lr ea dy

he ld
or al arg um en t an d i ss ue d apu bl is he d o pi ni on affi rm in g h is sen te nc es . A cc or din gly , ba se d onour pr ude nti al r ule , thi s C ourt de nie d L ev y ’ s pe tit ion for re hearing, based on his failure to raise any Apprendi-ty

pe issue in hi s initial br ie f on a ppe al
. L ev y , 379 F . 3d at 12 45. III. C ONS IDER

ATION IN L IGHT OF BOOKE R Be ca u s e o f t h e S up re m e C o u rt re m an d , we n o w f u rt h erco n s i d erLe v y’ s sentences in ligh t of Booker. W e re cognize that in Book er, the Suprem e Court ins tr uc te d c ourts t o “ ap ply

tod ay ’ s ho ldi ngs – bo th the S ixth A m en dm en t ho ldi ng7

and our rem edial interpretation of the Sentencing Act – to all ca ses on direct review .” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. H owever , the B ooker Court itself em phasized that e ve n th oughBo oke r w as to be appl ie d to c as es on d ir ec t r ev ie wit did not
m ean “ that every

sentence gives rise to a Sixth Am endm ent violatio n [or] that
e v e ry ap p e a l w i l l l e a dt o an e ws e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g . ” I d
. I n f a c t , th e S up r e me Court in Booker also directed courts to “ apply ordinary prudential do ctrines [in cl ud in g], forex am

pl e, whe th er t he is su e was rai se d b el ow . . . .” Id. Moreover, this princip le rec ogni zed in Booker – that retroac tivityis subject to ordinary

prudential do ctrines – is also explicitl y rec ogni zed in two other Su pr em e Co urt c as es . S ee S he a v. L oui siana , 470 U . S. 51, 58 n
. 4, 105 S
. Ct
. 1065 , 106 9 n. 4 ( 1985 ); P as quanti no v . U nit ed S ta te s, 125 S
. Ct
. 176 6, 178 1 n. 14 (2005). For exam ple, in Shea

v. L ouisi ana, the Suprem e Court concluded that “ if a
ca se w as pe ndi ng o n di re ct r ev ie wa t the ti m e E dw ar ds [ v. A ri zo na , 451 U . S. 477 , 101 S. Ct
. 188 0 ( 1981 )] w as de ci de d, the appe llate c ourt m ust giv e re tr oa ct ive ef fe ct to E dw ar ds, sub

j ec t, of c our se , to es ta

bli she d pr inc ipl es of

w ai ve r, harm le ss er ro r, and the li ke
. ” S he a, 470 U . S. a t 58 n. 4, 105 S
. Ct
. a t 10 69 n
. 4. A cc or din g to Sh ea , c ourts o f ap pe al m

ust sub j ec t the r etro ac tiv e ef

fe ct of ne wc as es to established p rudential rules. I d. A s noted abo ve, this Court’ s prudential rule that8

iss ue s no t r ai se d inaparty ’ s in iti al br ie f w ill not be c onsi de re d is c er

ta inl y w el lestablished. Thus, as dictated in Shea, the retroac tive effe ct of Booker is subjec t to o ur e sta bli she d pr

ude nti al r ule s. Fu rth er, i n P as qu an ti no v. Un it edSta te s, t he Supr em e Co ur t ap pl ie d i ts own pr ude nti al r ule s to f or ec los e the abil ity

of de fe ndants to ra ise unt im el y Bl ak el y claim s. I n Pasquantino v. United States, issued after Booker, the petition ers arg ue d “ in a fo ot no te th atth ei r se nt en ces sh ou ldbe va cat edin li gh t o f Bl ak el y . . .

. ” P as quanti no, 125 S
. Ct
. a t 17 81 n
. 14. H ow ev er , “ Pe tit ion er s di d no t r ai se thi s cl ai m be fo re t he Co ur t o f App eal s o r in th ei r pe ti ti on forcert io rari .” Id
. A lth oughthe pe tit ion er s f ai le d to pr ev iou sly

r ai se the iss ue , the dis se nt em pha siz ed that “ [t ] his om iss ionw as no f au lt of the de fe ndants , . . . a s th e pe tit ion in th is cas e was fil edan d g ran te d wel l b efo re t he Co ur t d eci de d B la ke ly. Pe tit ion er s thus r ai se d B lake ly a t the e ar lie st p oss ibl e poi nt: in the ir m er its br ie fi ng. ” P as quanti no, 125 S
. Ct
. a t 17 83 n
. 5 ( G ins bur g, J. , dis se nti ng)
. D es pit e the f ac t tha t the pe tit ion er s r ai se d th ei r Bl ak el y c la im a t the e ar lie st p oss ibl e m om ent after

that decision was rele ased, the S uprem e Court applied its prudent ial pr oc ed ur al r ule s and d ec lin ed

to ad dr es s th e iss ue . P as quanti no, 125 S
. Ct
. a t 17 81
n. 14. It se em s r el at ive ly

obv iou s th at

if the S upr em e Co urt m ay

appl y it sTh e Gr if fi th C ourt did no t r e qu ir e that a

dis sim ila rl y sit uate d d e fe nd ant –

on e wh o d id 6 not preser ve his objection below or on appea l – would nece ssarily benef it from the new constitutional rule. Instead, the G riffith holdingis nece ssary to “treat[ ] si milarly

situated de fe nd ants the same .” Gr if fi th, 47 9 U .S. at 32 3, 10 7 S. Ct. at 71 3. Part ie s who fa il t o r a ise timely claims of er

ror a re not similarly

situated to those who prope rly prese rved the ir claims. Af te r a ll, that is the ve ry

ba sis of pla in- e rr or

re vie w. L ike wi se , th os e pa rt ie s th at ti me ly

ra ise iss ue s in the ir ini tia l a pp e llate br ie fs are no t si mil arl y sit uate d to tho se wh o f

a il t o ti me ly

ra ise issues in their initial appellate brie f. 9 p r u d e n t i a l r u l e s t o f o r e c l o s e ad e f

e n d a n t ’s u n t i me l y B l a k e l y, n o wB o o k e r , c l a i m, the re is no r ea son w hy

thi s C ourt sh oul d be pow er le ss t o a ppl y it s pr ude nti al r ule t o f o r e c l o s e d e f

e n d a n tL e v y’ s u n t i me l y B l a k e l y, n o wB o o k e r , c l a i m. W e al so p oin t ou t why

G ri ff ithv. K entuc ky , 479 U . S. 314 , 107 S
. Ct
. 708 (1 987) , is fu lly

c onsi ste nt w ithour

e sta bli she d pr

ude nti al r ule
. I n G ri ff

ith , the Suprem e Court concluded that “ a newrule for the conduct of crim inal prosecution s is to be appli ed retroac tively to all cases .
. . pending on d irect r eview
or not y et f ina l .
. . . ” I d. a t 32 8, 107 S
. Ct
. a t 71 6. H ow ev er , G ri ff itha ddr es se d a situatio n in which the defendant tim ely raised the er

ror in issue in bo th the dist rict
co ur t an d t he co ur t o f ap pe al s. As we ha ve st at ed , “ [t]he Griff it h h ol di ng . . . ap pli es onl y

to de fe ndants w ho p re se rv ed the ir obj ec tio ns thr ough out

the tr ia l and appeals process.” Ve rbitskay a, 406 F.3d at 1340 n .18 (citing Gr iffith, 479 U. S. at 316-20 , 107 S. Ct. at 709-11). 6 T hus, the re are tw o di sti nc t and i nde pe nde nt r ule s: ( 1) r etro ac tiv ity ; and ( 2) this Court’s prudential rule that issues not raised in the opening brief are10

ab an done d. A lth oughe ac h r ule play s an e qua lly

im portant r ole in the or de rl y adm ini str at ionof

j ust ic e, the y

answ er dif fe re nt que sti ons. A s e xpl ai ne d by Jud ge C a rn e s i n Ar d l e y, [r] etroactivity

doct rin e answe rs the question of w hich cases a new de ci sio n a ppl ie s to , a ssum ing that the iss ue inv olv ing that ne wde ci sio n has been tim ely raised and preserved. Proce dural bar doctrine answe rs the que sti on of whe the r aniss ue w as ti m el y r ai se d and p re se rv ed , and i f n o t , wh e t h e r

i ts h o u l db e d e c i d e dan ywa y. Ar dley , 273 F. 3d at 992 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). Re qui ri ng a ll part ie s to r ai se iss ue s inthe ir ini tia l br ie fs is not

und uly hars h
or ove rl y bur de nsom e. T his is part ic ularl y tr ue about c onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s to the f ed er al se nte nc ing gui de lin es , w hic h have c ont inu ed to be r ai se d f

or m any y ears de spi te a dve rs e pr ec ed en t. Mo re ove r, w he n Appr en di w as de ci de d in200 0,
cr im ina l de fe nse a tto rn ey s w er e w el l aw ar e of Appr en di’ s po te nti al im

pa ct on the
se nte nc ing gui de lin es w el l be fo re the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio ns i n B lake ly and Booker. For exam

ple, in num erous cases before our Court, def ense counsel, afte r Apprendi and before B lakely , a sserted that their clients’ rights to a jury trial w ere violated when the district court enhanced their sentences with extra- verdict enhancem ents not p roved to a j ury bey ond a reasonable doub t. S ee, e. g., United St at es v. Re es e, 382 F . 3d 1 308, 130 9 ( 11 Ci r. 200 4) , va cate d by 125 S
. Ct
. 108 9 thFor example, Reese’ s initi al brief was filed on January

20, 2004, befor e B lakely was 7 decide d on J une 24, 2004. In his init ial brief on a ppeal, Ree se made an Appr endi-ba sed argument about a se ntencingenhanc ement he r ece ived. Reese , 382 F.2d 1308, 1310 n.1. Th e re is a g oo d e xamp le of

the c ontin

ue d ava ila

bil ity of pr e vio us ly

fo re c los e d a

rgume nts 8 in the Appre ndi line of ca ses. Compare Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 11 (2 005) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. P etri e, 302 F . 3d 1 280, 128 9- 90 ( 11 Ci r. 200 2) , c er t. 7 th de nie d, 538 U . S. 971 , 123 S
. Ct
. 177 5 ( 2003 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. S ny de r, 291 F . 3d 1291 , 129 4 n. 3 ( 11 Ci r. 200 2) ; and Unit ed S ta te s v. Ro dr igu ez , 279 F . 3d 9 47, th 949-50 , 950 n.2 (11 Cir. 2002 ). T hese Apprendi-ty pe argum ents about federal th
se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts w er e m ad e in those c as es not onl y be fo re Bl ak el y

but al so d es pit e adve rs e pr ec ed en t i n U nit ed S ta te s v. S an ch ez , 269 F . 3d 1 250 (1 1 th Ci r. 20 01 ). A lth oughit

m ay be tr ue that m ost

a tto rn ey s c oul d no t have pr ed ic te d th e Suprem e Court’ s precise re solut ion of the sentencing issues in Boo ker, the general
a r g u men tth a tth e f

e d e r a l s e n t e n c i n g g u i d e l i n e s ar e u n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l o r th a taju ry, not aj udge , m

ust de ci de the f

ac ts s uppo rt ing e xtr a- ve rd ic t se nte nc ing enhancem ents was available to counsel long b efore Blakely and Booker. S ee Mc G inn is, 918 F . 2d at 14 96 ( statin g th at a lth oughno o ne c oul d have pr ed ic te d th e Suprem e Court’ s resolution of a c ase re solvi ng the scop e of § 1981, the general
ar gum en t tha t § 1981 did not appl y to ap pe llant’ s c ondu ct

w as a va ila

ble , and appellant waived its argum ent by not raising it in its ini tial brief). 830 54 -5 5, 11 1 L .E d. 51 1 ( 19 90 ), wi th R ingv. Ar izon a , 5 36 U. S. 5 84 , 5 88 -8 9, 59 5, 12 2 S. Ct.

2428, 2432, 2436 (2002) ( overr uling Walton). The de fenda nt in Ri ngprese rved his ar gument about Arizona’s c apital sentenc ing sc heme e ven thoug h that argument appea red f orec losed by Walton. 12 Moreover, althoug h this Cou rt does not cons ider Blakely , nowBooker, issues no t raised in any

wa y in a party ’ s initial brief, w e have liberally construed
w ha t i t m eans t o r ai se aBl ak el y -ty pe or Bo oke r- ty

pe iss ue . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Dow ling, 403 F.3d 1242 , 1246 (11 Cir. 2005 ) (e valuating whether a th Bl ak el y /B ooke r cl ai m

w as m ad e by

r ev ie w ing w he the r a de fe ndant: ( 1) r ef er re d to the S ixth A m en dm en t; (2 ) re fe rr ed to Appr en di o r an oth er

r el at ed c as e; ( 3)
as se rt ed his r igh t t o have the j ur

y de ci de the dis put ed

f ac t; or ( 4) r ai se d ac ha lle nge to the r ole of

the j udge a s f

ac tf ind er w ithr es pe ct

to se nte nc ing f

ac tor s)
. L ev y co nc ed es he m ad e n o s uc h c la im in an y m an ne r un ti l h is pe ti ti on forreh eari ng . Th u s , t h e ap p l i ca t i o n o f t h i s Co u rt ’s p ru d en t i al ru l e t o fo re cl o s e d ef en d an tLe v y’ s untim ely Blakely , nowBooker, claim does not result in m anifest injustice. IV. THE EF FE CT OF SU PREME CO UR T REMA ND S ON THE AP PL ICA TION OF THIS C OUR T’S PRUD ENT IAL RULE S Finally , w e discuss the sp ecific rem and order in Le vy ’ s case. Since B ooker, the S upr em e Co urt ha s r em an de d ov er ahun dr ed

of our Ci rc uit ’ s c as es w iththi s standard or de r or som ethin g si m ilar: “ T he m oti on o f pe tit ion er f or le av e to pr oc ee d in fo rma paup er is and the pe tit ionf or w ri t of c er tio rari is gr an te d. T heIn other c ases whe re a defe ndant timely

raised a Six th Amendment or Appr endi or 9 Blakely issue in the openingbrief, a s many defe ndants did prior to Booke r, this Court has considere d the merits of those c laims. See, e.g ., United States v. Bur g e, 407 F .3d 1183 (11 Cir. th 2005); United States v. Martinez, 407 F.3d 1170 ( 11 Cir. 2005); United States v. Orduno- th Mireles, 405 F .3d 960 (11 Cir. 2005); United States v. Camacho- I barque n, 404 F.3d 1283 ( 11 th th Cir. 2005), opinion vacated and supe rce ded by – F.3d –, 2005 WL1297236 (11th Cir. J une 2, 2005); United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325 (11 Cir. 2005). th 13 j udgm en t i s va cate d and the c as e is r em an de d to the U nit ed S ta te s C ourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circ uit for further c onsid eration in light of U nited States
v. Bo oke r, 543 U . S. ___

( 2005 ). ” A s no te d a

bove , thi s sam e or de r w as use d in Le vy ’ s rem and. O bvio usly , som e of these r em ands, including Le vy , involved cases in which this Court applied its p rudential rules and refused to consider de fe ndant’ s be la te d e ff

orts t o r ai se Bl ak el y

/B ooke r cl ai m s. S ee , e . g. , L ev y v. United States, – S. Ct. –, 2005 W L 540692 (U. S. June 6, 2005) (No. 04-8942 ); Sear s v. U nited States, 125 S. Ct. 1348 (2005); Dockery v. United States, 125 S. Ct
. 110 1 ( 2005 ). A s no te d a bove , Bo oke r its el f re co gni ze d th at r etro ac tiv ity

is 9 subj ec t t o or din ar

y pr ude nti al r ule s, and thus nothin g inBo oke r unde rm ine s or af fe ct s our pr

ude nti al r ule s; i f anythi ng, Bo oke r co nte m plate s th at

the y sho uld be ap pli ed in Bo oke r- re m an d c as es . Further, in a concurring opini on in Ardley , Judge Car nes explained anot her
re as on why

thi s ty pe of ge ne ra l r em an d do es not ne ce ssari ly

im pin ge on this Co urt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

it s pr ude nti al r ule s, a s f oll ow s:14

Whe ne ve r the S upr em e Co urt de ci de s an im por tant i ssu e of

law , it r o u t i n e l y t a k e s e v e ry c a s e i n w h i c h th e c o u rto f ap p e a l s d e c i s i o n c a me out before the new decision w as announ ced and in which the certiorari pe tit ion er c la im s th at

ne w de ci sio n m igh t ap ply , an d tr eats a ll of tho se ca se s the sam e. T he uni fo rm tr eatm en t give n all suc h cas es is to v ac at e the court of appeals j udgm ent and rem an d t h e case f or further consideration in l ight o f the newdecision. T hose boi lerplate orders com e out in bush el b askets full. Ther e is no im plication in the standard langua ge of

tho se or de rs that the c ourt of appe al s is to do anythi ng except rec onsid er the c ase n o w t hat there is a newSuprem e Court de ci sio n th at m ay , or

m ay not , a ff ec t the r es ult
. W e have ne ve r fe lt co nstra ine d t o re ad

anythi ng i nto suc h r out ine r em an ds o the r than th e direction that we tak e an other look at the case because of the new de ci sio n. Ard le y , 27 3 F .3dat 9 94 (Carne s, J ., con cu rri ng in th e d en ia l o f reh eari ng en ba nc ). As this Court has now consistentl y concluded, the Suprem e Court’ s general
re m an d inthe se ty

pe s of c as es doe s no t m an da te any part ic ular out co m e as to the defendant’ s sentence, nor do they preclude this Court from apply ing its prudential
ru le s inauni fo rm

and c onsi ste nt m anne r. S ee P ipk ins , 200 5 W L 142 1449 , a t *2 ; Se ar s, 200 5 W L 133 4892 , a t *1 ; D oc ke ry , 401 F . 3d at12 62- 63; A rd le y , 273 F . 3d at 995 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). In ste ad , w ha t i s r equir ed

is that w e take anothe r loo k a t this c as e an d
co nsi de r it in l igh t of

Bo oke r. W e have don e so, and, c onsi ste nt w ithBo oke r an d
our c as e law , w e af

fi rm L ev y ’ s se nte nc es f

or the r ea sons out lin ed

he re in and i n our p ri o r o p i n i o n s . We a l s o re i n s t at e o u r p ri o r p an el o p i n i o n af fi rmin g Le v y’ s15

se nte nc es in U nit ed

S tate s v. L ev y , 374 F . 3d 1 023 (1 1 Ci r. 200 4) , and, to the th
ex te nt n ec es sary , our

opi nio n de ny ing L ev y ’ s pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng b y

the pane l i n United States v. Le vy , 379 F. 3d 12 41 (11 Cir. 2004 ). th AFFIR MED an d P RIOR OPI NIONS REINSTATED.