If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

- 1

- 

### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED In re ANDERSON/FERENCE, Minors. December 22, 2022 No. 361080 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2013

- 514281

- NA

In re FERENCE, Minors. No. 361085 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2013

- 514281

- NA

Before: C AVANAGH , P .J., and K. F. K ELLY and G ARRETT , JJ. P ER C URIAM
. In Docket No. 361080, respondent

- mother, B. Bertram, appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to JBA, AAF, and JMF. In Docket No. 361085, respondent

father, M. Ference, appeals the same order as of right to the extent that it terminated his parental rights to his sons, AAF and JMF. 1 The trial co urt terminated the parental rights of both respondents under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j). We affirm

.

1 T he trial court concluded that JBA’s legal father was unknown and unascertainable. On June 19, 2018, the trial court terminated the unknown father’s parental rights.- 2

- I. DOCKET NO. 36108 0 (RESPONDENT

- MOTHER)

A. STATUTORY GROUND S Respondent

- mother first argues that petitioner, the Department of Hea lth and Human Services (DHHS), did not present sufficient evidence to support a statutory ground for termination of her parental rights. We disagree. In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Miller , 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 16 1 (1989). The trial court terminated both respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j), which permit termination of parental rights under the following circumstances:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following: ( i ) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exi st and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. ( ii ) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court ’ s jurisdiction, the parent has received recommen dations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that t he conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age.
* * * (g) The parent, although, in the court ’ s discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonabl e expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age.
* * * (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it terminated r espondent

- mother ’s parental rights under these grounds.- 3

-

The evidence established that in 20 13, DHHS removed JMF from r espondent

- mother ’s care after both she and the newborn child tested positive for heroin. Respondent

- mother was provided with services , and the child was eventually returned to her care in 2014. In 2015, a second child, AAF , tes ted positive for THC at birth. A n investigation by Child Protective Services ( CPS ) ensued, but this child was permitted to remain in r espondent

- mother ’s care. I n January 2018, r espondent

- mother ’s third son was born and he test ed positive for cocaine, opiates, THC, and methadone at birth . At this point, all three children were removed from r espondent

- mother ’s care, the court took jurisdiction, and r espondent

- mother was ordered to participate in services to address her severe subs tance abuse issues and improve her parenting skills. Respondent

- mother ’s treatment plan included random drug screening, individual therapy, and substance abuse counseling. There was also testimony that she voluntarily participated in services offered thr ough a methadone clinic that she had been treating at for several years. T here is no evidence that r espondent

- mother benefited from the se services . The evidence established that r espondent

- mother continued to test positive for cocaine and other illegal s ubstances. I ndeed, documentary evidence confirmed that virtually every drug screen for months was positive for cocaine, among other substances

. Although there were some delays related to COVID

- 19 pandemic restrictions, the trial court still allowed r espo ndent

- mother an inordinate amount of time to benefit from services. During the nearly four years that the children were in nonrelative foster care, the trial court twice denied permanent

- custody petitions, thereby allowing r espondent

- mother additional tim e to work toward reunification and overcome her addiction issues. The evidence demonstrated that r espondent

- mother squandered this opportunity. There was also clear and convincing evidence that r espondent

- mother did not improve her parenting skills. In the 2013 case, r espondent

- mother completed a parenting education class. Although her oldest child at that time was eventually returned to her care, her subsequent conduct confirms that she did not integrate what she had learned into her daily life. D urin g the current case, in lieu of simple parenting classes, respondent

- mother was referred to Infant Mental Health Services to provide her with more intensive hands

- on assistance. Unfortunately, she was early

terminated from this service for noncompliance. Respondent

- mother was also offered weekly visits with her children , but she could not maintain any consistency in this regard. She frequently missed visits, failed to call to confirm, or was a no - show after confirming her attendance earlier in the day. When r espondent

- mother did attend visits, she struggled to control the children and balance her attention between th em . Finally, r espondent

- mother never adequately addressed her substance abuse issues , which likely contributed to her inability to demonstr ate that she could safely parent her children. At the time of termination in 2022, r espondent

- mother was in no better position to parent the children than when they were removed from her care in January 2018. Indeed, she never progressed beyond supervised parenting time and her parenting time was suspended several months before the termination hearing because of her failure to consistently show up for visits, which was taking a toll on the children’s emotional well

- being. Additionally, t he record clearly and convincingly support s the trial court’s finding that r espondent

- mother would not b e able to rectify her substance abuse issues or improve her parenting skills within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. Respondent

- mothe r was either unwilling or unable to put in the effort necessary to overcome her addictions. Her drug- 4

-

screens continued to be positive for illegal substances. H er actions during the proceedings further confirm ed that the circumstances that brought the chi ldren into care were not reasonably likely to be rectified anytime soon. Most significantly, compelling evidence was presented that r espondent

mother offered drug screen results purporting to be from her methadone clinic that had been altered to appear as if she w as not testing positive for anything other than her methadone and a prescribed medication. V erified documents from the methadone clinic later demonstrated that she was in fact consistently screening positive for cocaine and other illegal substanc es. Lastly, the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that the children would be at risk of harm if returned to r espondent

- mother ’s care. The drug screens confirmed that r espondent

- mother was abusing not only cocaine, but several other illegal and dan gerous drugs. Her counselor testified that she was addicted to cocaine and opiates. When asked about r espondent

- mother ’s ability to maintain a home and care for her children, the counselor opined that there was always a concern when a parent had a substa nce abuse problem because “the substance can take over the entire person, everything that they think, feel, do, their responsibilities; their drug of choice becomes number one.” Considering the foregoing record, the trial court did not clearly err when it terminated r espondent

- mother ’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j). T ermination is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) where “the totality of the evidence amply support[ed] that [the respondent] had not accomplished any mean ingful change in the conditions” that led to adjudication. In re Williams , 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). That test has been more than satisfied in this case. Further, r espondent

- mother ’s failure to meaningfully participate in services and benefit from her treatment plan demonstrated that she could not provide proper care and custody and that the children would be at risk of harm in her care. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). A parent ’ s failure to comply with a court

- ordered treatment plan is indicative of neglect and evidence that return of the child to the parent may cause a substantial risk of harm to the child ’ s life, physical health, or mental well

- being. In re Trejo , 462 Mich at 34 6 n 3 , citing MCR 5.973(C)(4)(b) ; In re BZ , 264 Mich App 286, 300; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported the cited statutory grounds for termination of r espondent

- moth er ’s parental rights. B. BEST INTEREST S R espondent

- mother next challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We find no error in this regard. “If the court finds that there are ground s for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of the parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The court may consider several factors when deciding if termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, including the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stab ility, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) . The court may also consider psychological evaluations, the child’s age, continued involvement in domestic violen ce, and a parent’s history. In re Jones , 286 Mich App 1 26 , 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the- 5

-

children’s best interests.” In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In consid ering the child’s best interests, the trial court’s focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013)

. Whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. I d . a t 87. This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best intere sts. In re Jones , 286 Mich App at 129. A preponderance of the evidence established that termination of respondent

- mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Despite being provided with services for four years, after having previously been provided with services in the 2013 child protective proceeding , r espondent

- mother was unable to provide a safe and stable home environment for her children. Respondent

- mother has never demonstrated that she can overcome her addiction and safely pare nt her three children. Moreover, r espondent

- mother’s actions in attempting to deceive the court by offering altered drug screens is an indication that she would conceal her drug use rather than lead a substance

- free lifestyle for the betterment of herself and her children

. By contrast, all three children were in stable foster homes, where the i r needs were being met. Further, all three foster parents had expressed an interest in adopting the child in their care , and the foster parents were present at seve ral hearings , evidencing their dedication to the children. Conversely, r espondent

- mother was absent from several hearing s, even when her parental rights were in jeopardy. When balancing the best

- interest factors, a court may consider the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home and the possibility of adoption. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 41

- 42. It is clearly apparent that the children had been placed in stable homes where they were progressing and that the i r progress could continue beca use the foster parents were willing to provide permanency for the child in their care. At the time of termination, the children had been in care for four years. For the oldest child, JMF, this was the second time his life had been disrupted and upended b ecause of r espondent

- mother’s instability

. The youngest, JBA, had been in foster care his entire life. Indeed, his foster home was the only home he had ever known. There was testimony that the middle child, AAF, was firmly bonded with his foster parents . These children had waited an inordinate amount of time for permanence. Termination was the best avenue by which the children could achieve stability, permanence, and finality. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that termina tion of r espondent

- mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest s .

II. DOCKET NO. 3610 85 (RESPONDENT

- FATHER) For his only issue on appeal, r espondent

- father argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was n ot personally served with the petition and the court failed to make a finding that personal service was impracticable before permitting service by publication. Therefore, r espondent

- father argues, the order terminating his parental rights is void. We rej ect this claim of error. Preliminarily, because r espondent

- father did not raise the issue of ineffective service or lack of personal jurisdiction in the trial court, this issue is unpreserved. We review u npreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines , 460 Mich 750, 763

- 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).- 6

-

“A parent of a child who is the subject of a child protective proceeding is entitled to personal service of a summons and notice of proceedings.” In re SZ , 262 Mich App 560, 564

- 565 ; 686 NW2d 520 (2004). In general, “ failure to provide notice of a termination proceeding hearing by personal serv ice as required by statute, MC L 712A.12

. . . , is a jurisdictional defect that renders all proceedings in th e trial court void. ” In re Atkins , 237 Mich App 249, 250

- 251; 602 NW2d 594 (1999). However, a trial court may permit alternative service, if personal service is impracticable. MCL 712A.13. “ Substituted service is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on th e court. ” In re SZ , 262 Mich App at 565. When determining whether personal service would be impractical, the trial court must determine if reasonable efforts were made to locate a respondent. In re Adair , 191 Mich App 710, 714; 478 NW2d 667 (1991). MCL 712A.13 governs substitute service. In re SZ , 262 Mich App at 566. This statute provide s , in relevant part:

S ervice of summons may be made anywhere in the state personally by the delivery of true copies thereof to the persons summoned: Provided, That i f the judge is satisfied that it is impracticable to serve personally such summons or the notice provided for in the preceding section, he may order service by registered mail addressed to their last known addresses, or by publication thereof, or both, as he may direct. It shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction if (1) personal service is effected at least 72 hours before the date of hearing; (2) registered mail is mailed at least 5 days before the date of hearing if within the state or 14 days if outsi de of the state; (3) publication is made once in some newspaper printed and circulated in the county in which said court is located at least 1 week before the time fixed in the summons or notice for the hearin g. Also relevant to th is issue is MCR 3

. 920(B)(4)(b), which state s :

If the court finds, on the basis of testimony or a motion and affidavit, that personal service of the summons is impracticable or cannot be achieved, the court may by ex parte order direct that it be served in any manner reason ably calculated to give notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, including publication. In this case, CPS received the abuse complaint in January 2018, after JBA tested positive for cocaine and other illegal substances at birth. The CPS worker, L atosha Sayle, testified that a family team meeting was held on January 23, 2018. Respondent

- father was not invited to this meeting because S ayle was unaware of his identity before the meeting. After the meeting, however, S ayle contacted r esponde nt

- father and advised him of the February 8, 2018 preliminary hearing date. During their conversation, r espondent

- father indicated that he would not allow CPS access to his home to assess whether it w as suitable for placement. Respondent

- father did not a ppear at the February 8, 2018 preliminary hearing. However, r espondent

- mother was present and she confirmed that r espondent

- father still lived on Central St reet in Detroit. S ayle also testified regarding her communications with r espondent

- father and his failure to cooperate with the investigation. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the r eferee ordered “personal service, certified mai l , and publication on [respondent

- father] .”- 7

-

On February 13, 2018, a summons, petition, and order to appear on F ebruary 28, 2018 was sent by regular and certified mail to r espondent

- father’s Central St reet address. The certified mail was returned to sender unclaimed on March 6, 2018. There is no indication that the summons sent by regular mail was similarly return ed to sender as undeliverable. On February 16, 2018, personal service of the summons and complaint was attempted on r espondent

- father at the Central St reet address. According to the verification of attempted service, the process server posted a card on t he premises. Sometime later, the process server apparently received a response to that card because he noted in his verification of attempted service: “rec call from father Def. don’t live here.” Respondent

- father did not attend the February 28, 2018 pre trial hearing. During the hearing, counsel for petitioner noted that r espondent

- father was not at the hearing and that the address in the petition was correct. Thereafter, the court granted counsel’s request for “all forms of service on [respondent

- fathe r] .” On March 2, 2018, notice by publication was given of the March 27, 2018 hearing on the petition. In addition, a copy of the summons and petition was sent by certified mail to r espondent

father at his Central St reet address on March 7, 2018. The cer tified mail was deemed undeliverable on April 2, 2018. Moreover, on March 10, 15, and 20, 2018, a court officer attempted to personally serve a summons and complaint on r espondent

- father with no success. Respondent

- father did not appear at the March 27, 2018 bench trial, but the court noted that service by publication was effectuated on March 2, 2018

. On appeal, r espondent

- father simply asserts that the trial court failed to make an explicit finding on the record that personal service was impractical before it authorized service by publication. Of note, he does not argue that personal service was , in fact, practical at the time service by publication was achieved. Indeed, this would be a difficult argument to make because of the verifi ed unsuccessful attempt s at personal service on r espondent

- father. Respondent

- father also does not argue that it would have been unwarranted for the court to find th at personal service was impracticable. Indeed, there is no indication in the record that personal servic e would have been practical at the time publication was made considering that the contacts between r espondent

father, the CPS investigator , and the process server indicated that r espondent

- father had no intention of cooperating with service of process. Th e trial court did not explicitly state that personal service was impractical, but the record supports that it was impractical considering the unsuccessful efforts at personal services, and there is no requirement in MCL 712A.13 that the trial court explici tly state on the record that personal service is impractical before substituted service may be ordered. In any event, even if there were such a requirement, it is apparent from the record that the trial court found personal service to be impractical. The fact that two referees in consecutive hearings authorized substituted service by publication reflects the court’s implicit determination that personal service on r espondent

- father, who did not appear at any hearing for some time, was impracticable. Moreo ver, there was sufficient information made available to the referees at both the February 8, 2018 preliminary hearing and the February 28, 2018 pretrial hearing to warrant such a finding. Finally, to the extent that MCR 3.920(B)(4)(b) could be read to imp ly the necessity of a more explicit finding by the trial court on the record, the statutory language of MCL 712A.13 is controlling. In re SZ , 262 Mich App at 567.- 8

-

In the present case, r espondent

- father has not demonstrated that the trial court erred or t hat the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Under the circumstance, the trial court properly obtained personal jurisdiction over r espondent

- father where he was served notice of the petition by publication. See MCL 712A.13; In re SZ , 262 Mich App at 565. “ Substituted service is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. ” Id. Accordingly, no plain error occurred. Events that transpired later in the case further confirm that r espondent

- father actually received notice of the proceeding , an o pportunity to be heard, and was personally served with a copy of the petition on at least two occasions. Respondent

- father’s adjudication trial went forward on June 19, 2018 in his absence. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found statutory ground s to exercise jurisdiction over AAF and JMF on account of r espondent

- father’s conduct. The court ordered DHHS to prepare a case service plan to facilitate reunification between r espondent

- father and his two children. I n January 2019, r espondent

- father at tended, for the first time, a hearing in this matter. At the January 22, 2019 dispositional hearing, he was present and counsel was available to represent r espondent

- father. The assigned attorney would remain respondent

- father’s appointed counsel throughout the case. The r eferee noted that r espondent

- father’s “adjudication occurred back in June 19 th , 2018 after publication had been effectuated.” The court then noted that because neither r espondent

- mother nor her counsel were pre sent, the dispositional hearing would need to be adjourned

. When asked if anyone objected, r espondent

- father’s counsel stated: “I have no objection and the court has given us a date of March the 5 th at 9:00 a.m. And that works for counsel and my client w ill be back on March the 5 th .” Then, at the conclusion of the January 22, 2019 hearing, r espondent

- father was personally served with a copy of the petition and notice of the proceedings. The court then continued the matter to March 5, 2019

. According to testimony given at a later hearing, following the January 22, 2019 hearing, the caseworker spoke with r espondent

- father about visiting his children and indicated that she would contact him to schedule parenting time. The caseworker called r espondent

- fath er at the telephone number he provided, but he never returned her calls. Respondent

- father did not attend the March 5, 2019 dispositional hearing . At the outset of the hearing, r espondent

- father’s counsel noted that respondent

- father was notified of the date of the hearing at the January 2019 hearing. Counsel also indicated that she had notified r espondent

father by mail of the date. The c aseworker called r espondent

- father after the hearing and explained the services available and that referrals would b e made. Respondent

- father told the caseworker that he did not want to do any services. On July 9, 2019, the first supplemental petition seeking termination of respondents’ parental rights was filed. The petition documented the efforts to locate and enga ge r espondent

father. The petition alleged that r espondent

- father had not maintained contact with the caseworker since January 22, 2019. DHHS conducted searches on Facebook, Bridges, and Department of Corrections’ databases in an effort to locate r espond ent

- father. According to a search of the penal system databases, r espondent

- father was not incarcerated at the time the supplemental petition was filed. DHHS also attempted to contact r espondent

- father by phone, but the call was not returned. DHHS sent letters to r espondent

- father’s last known address, but no response was received. On January 21, 2019, CPS visited r espondent

- father’s last known address , but no one answered.- 9

-

DHHS also spoke with r espondent

- mother in an effort to communicate with r espond ent

- father , but this too was unsuccessful. The summons and supplemental petition was sent by certified mail on August 15, 2019. Personal service was attempted at r espondent

- father’s Central St reet address on August 21, 2019. At the September 6, 2019 pretrial hearing that followed the filing of the July 9, 2019 supplemental petition, the court again authorized all forms of service, including by publication. On August 16, 2019, service was made by publication

. After the July 2019 supplemental petition was denied by the court in September 2019, DHHS filed another supplemental permanent

- custody petition on July 28, 2020. It was this petition that was ultimately heard and culminated in the termination of r espondent

- father’s parental rights. Respondent

- f

ather attended the August 3, 2020 pretrial Zoom hearing that followed in front of the referee. In fact, he was with r espondent

- mother at the time of the hearing. Respondent

father’s counsel indicated that he had not received a copy of the supplemental pe tition. At that point, in response to the trial court’s request, r espondent

- father reported his e

- mail address. The matter then went off the record to permit counsel an opportunity to e

- mail the petition to r espondent

- father. When the hearing resumed, t he court asked r espondent

- father if he had received a copy of the petition, to which respondent replied, “yes.” Then counsel acknowledged that service in this manner constituted sufficient legal service. Further, counsel waived a formal reading of the pe tition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that respondents had both been served electronically with a copy of the supplemental petition. Respondent

- father was also present by Zoom when the pretrial hearing resumed on August 5, 2 020. At that time, respondents asked for an in

- person hearing on the supplemental petition. R espondent

- father’s counsel then requested that the court confirm that r espondent

- father had received the petition that was e

- mailed during the hearing two days e arlier. Respondent

- father was sworn in and testified that he received a copy of th e petition that petitioner sent to respondent

mother . He then indicated that the petition e

- mailed two days earlier “never came to my phone but I went over it.” Respondent

- mother’s counsel then explained that at the earlier hearing, the petition was e

- mailed to both respondents and that r espondent

- mother and r espondent

- father were together at the time the e

- mails were sent during the hearing. Respondent

- father then acknowl edged “for the record” that he had received the petition. From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that r espondent

- father had received and reviewed the supplemental petition. Nonetheless, before the hearing concluded, r espondent

- father’s counsel requested that r espondent

father repeat his e

- mail address because when she e

- mailed the petition to him during the hearing on August 3, 2020, the e

- mail “bounced.” At that point, r espondent

- father indicated that the one he gave was the only e

- mail address he had. When the court asked r espondent

- father to spell out his e

- mail address, r espondent

- father indicated that he had already provided it. Before r espondent

father clarified the confusion over his e

- mail address his counsel stated, “ T hat’s okay, your Honor, let’s move on.” The court did , however , confirm that r espondent

- father continued to reside at the home on Central St reet. The court then scheduled a continued pretrial hearing for November 5, 2020. Not only do the fore going events demonstrate th at r espondent

- father was properly and actually served, th e record confirms that r espondent

- father waived a challenge to the finding of personal jurisdiction. Although r espondent

- father did not appear at many of the hearings , he was present at the January 22, 2019 dispositional hearing, the August 3, 2020 pretrial hearing, and the August 5, 2020 pretrial hearing, and he testified at the November 10, 2021 termination hearing.- 10

-

At all of these hearings, not only was r espondent

- fathe r present, he was represented by counsel. At no time did he raise any objection to the court’s jurisdiction over him, and he did not decline to testify at the termination hearing. In In re Gillespie , 197 Mich App 440, 446

- 447; 496 NW2d 309 (1992), this C ourt held: However, given that a probate court is to consider all hearings, from the initial adjudication or disposition hearing to the termination hearing as a single continuous proceeding , In re LaFlure , 48 Mich App 377, 391; 210 NW2d 482 (1973), given that respondent does not challenge the notice he received with regard to the review hearings or the termination hearing, given that respondent appeared at the termination hearing without claiming a lack of personal service, given the disruption collateral attacks of the nature of the attack raised in this case cause to the placement process, and given a child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, we believe that the general rules governing waiver of objections regarding service of process should a pply in termination proceedings wher e a parent or parents appear at the termination hearing, challenge the petition for termination, and f ail to challenge or raise the issue of lack of service of process arising out of prior proceedings. Applying the foreg oing rational e , r espondent

- father waived the right to appellate review of his jurisdictional claim. Affirmed

.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett