SUMMARY

July 11, 2019

2019COA107

No. 18CA1087, Franklin Credit Management Corporation v. 

Galvan — Creditors and Debtors — Judgment Liens — Writs of 

Execution; Civil Procedure — Execution and Proceedings 

Subsequent to Judgment; Courts and Court Procedure —

Property Subject to Execution

In this dispute over the plaintiff’s efforts to execute on a 

judgment, a division of the court of appeals considers whether a 

valid judgment lien is a prerequisite to obtaining a writ of execution

on real property. Applying the plain language of the Colorado Rules 

of Civil Procedure and section 13-52-102, C.R.S. 2018, the division 

concludes that a valid judgment lien is not required to obtain a writ 

of execution and reverses the district court’s order setting aside the 

writ of execution.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
The division also concludes that the district court abused its 

discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs for the frivolous 

opposition to the motion to set aside the writ of execution.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA107

Court of Appeals No. 18CA1087

Adams County District Court No. 07CV226

Honorable Edward C. Moss, Judge

Franklin Credit Management Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Raul Galvan,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDERS REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE DUNN

Navarro and Berger, JJ., concur

Announced July 11, 2019

Janeway Law Firm P.C., Lynn M. Janeway, Elizabeth S. Marcus, David R. 

Doughty, Alison L. Berry, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Sweetbaum Sands Anderson PC, Geoffrey P. Anderson, Reagan Larkin, Denver, 

Colorado; Navaro & Associates LLC, Steven Navaro, Castle Rock, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellee
1

¶ 1 In this dispute over the efforts of plaintiff, Franklin Credit 

Management Corporation,1 to execute on its judgment against 

defendant, Raul Galvan, we are asked to consider whether a valid 

judgment lien is a prerequisite to obtaining a writ of execution. 

Because we conclude it is not, we reverse the district court’s order 

setting aside Franklin Credit’s writ of execution as well as the 

related order awarding attorney fees and costs to Mr. Galvan, and 

we remand for further proceedings.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶ 2 The undisputed facts, as alleged in the pleadings, show that 

Franklin Credit obtained a $43,037 default judgment against Mr. 

Galvan in 2007. Franklin Credit then recorded a transcript of the 

default judgment with the Adams County Clerk and Recorder, 

creating a judgment lien on Mr. Galvan’s nonexempt real property 

in Adams County. Franklin Credit, however, didn’t execute on the 

 1 Franklin Credit assigned its rights in the judgment to Deutsche 

Bank National Trust Company, as Certificate Trustee on Behalf of 

Bosco Credit II Trust Series 2010-1 in 2017. Deutsche Bank, 

however, was not substituted as a party in this case, and Franklin 

Credit properly continued it. See C.R.C.P. 25(c).
2

judgment, and the judgment lien expired in 2013. All agree that 

Franklin Credit did not continue (or revive)2 the judgment lien. 

¶ 3 In 2016, Franklin Credit re-recorded the transcript of 

judgment with the Adams County Clerk and Recorder but did not 

revive its judgment. Two years after that, Franklin Credit obtained 

a writ of execution and delivered it to the Adams County Sheriff. As 

required, the sheriff recorded a certificate of levy with the Adams 

County Clerk and Recorder and then personally served Mr. Galvan 

with the notice of levy and the writ of execution.

¶ 4 Mr. Galvan moved to set aside the writ of execution, arguing 

that because the judgment lien had expired in 2013 and had not 

been revived, Franklin Credit’s writ of execution was “improper.” 

Franklin Credit responded that, even though the judgment lien had 

expired, the judgment was “still valid,” and it had the right to 

execute on the judgment by certificate of levy.

¶ 5 The district court granted Mr. Galvan’s motion and entered an 

order setting aside the writ of execution. In doing so, it agreed that 

 2 While the statute provides for the continuation of a judgment lien, 

§ 13-52-102(1), C.R.S. 2018, the process also has been described as 

judgment lien revival, see Sec. Credit Servs., LLC v. Hulterstrom, 

2019 COA 7, ¶ 17 n.4.
3

Franklin Credit’s judgment lien had expired and had not been 

revived. The court did not consider, however, Franklin Credit’s 

argument that a judgment lien was not required and that it could 

execute on its judgment by writ of execution and certificate of levy.3

¶ 6 Mr. Galvan then requested his attorney fees and costs, arguing 

Franklin Credit’s position was substantially frivolous and 

groundless. The district court agreed and granted Mr. Galvan’s 

request, finding frivolous Franklin Credit’s opposition to Mr. 

Galvan’s motion to set aside the writ of execution.

II. Judgment Liens

¶ 7 Franklin Credit contends that because a judgment lien is not a 

“necessary prerequisite to a writ of execution,” the district court 

erred in setting the writ aside based on the expired judgment lien.

We agree and therefore reverse the district court’s order setting 

aside the writ of execution.

 3 In fairness to the district court, these arguments were not clearly 

presented. But Mr. Galvan doesn’t dispute that they were raised 

and preserved. 
4

A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 We review de novo an issue of statutory interpretation. Sec. 

Credit Servs., LLC v. Hulterstrom, 2019 COA 7, ¶ 8. In doing so, we 

seek to effectuate the legislature’s intent and purpose. Perfect 

Place, LLC v. Semler, 2018 CO 74, ¶ 40. We begin by looking to the 

statutory language, giving the words and phrases their plain and 

ordinary meanings. Sec. Credit Servs., ¶ 8. When this language is 

clear, we go no further. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Kopfman, 

226 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Colo. 2010). The same rules apply to the 

interpretation of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Sec. Credit 

Servs., ¶ 8.

¶ 9 Applying these principles, we turn to the relevant rules and 

statutes that govern the execution of judgments. 

B. Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure

¶ 10 The “process to enforce a final money judgment shall be by 

writ of execution,” unless otherwise provided by law. C.R.C.P. 

69(a); see First Nat’l Bank of Denver v. Dist. Court, 652 P.2d 613, 

617 (Colo. 1982). “[N]o execution shall issue upon a judgment” or 

any action taken to enforce it until fourteen days have passed since 

entry of the judgment (absent a court-ordered stay of execution). 
5

C.R.C.P. 62(a). Satisfaction “of a money judgment may be entered 

in the judgment record” when an “execution” is returned satisfying 

the judgment in whole or in part. C.R.C.P. 58(b).

¶ 11 While these rules plainly contemplate execution on a final 

money judgment, none contemplates or requires a judgment lien to 

obtain a writ of execution and certificate of levy or execute on the 

judgment.4 And Mr. Galvan doesn’t direct us to anything in the 

Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure that says otherwise. 

C. Section 13-52-102

¶ 12 “All goods and chattels, lands, tenements, and real estate of 

every person against whom any judgment is obtained . . . are liable 

to be sold on execution to be issued upon such judgment.” 

§ 13-52-102(1), C.R.S. 2018. A certified copy of the transcript of 

the judgment “may be recorded in any county,” and if recorded, “the 

judgment shall become a lien upon” all the judgment debtor’s 

nonexempt real property owned or later acquired in that county. 

 4 Although his briefing suggests differently, Mr. Galvan conceded at 

oral argument that he is not contending a judgment lien is required 

to execute on every judgment, but only where a creditor seeks a writ 

of execution to execute on real property. See generally C.R.C.P. 

102, 103.
6

Id.; see Wells Fargo, 226 P.3d at 1071-72 (outlining judgment lien 

process).

¶ 13 If obtained, a judgment lien expires six years after entry of the 

judgment. § 13-52-102(1). But expiration of “the judgment lien . . .

does not extinguish the debt.” Mortg. Invs. Corp. v. Battle Mountain 

Corp., 70 P.3d 1176, 1186 (Colo. 2003); see also Ryan v. Duffield, 

899 P.2d 378, 380-81 (Colo. App. 1995) (expiration of a judgment 

lien did not prevent enforcing unexpired judgment through 

garnishment). Rather, “execution may issue on any judgment . . .

within twenty years” from the entry of the judgment. 

§ 13-52-102(2)(a); see Baum v. Baum, 820 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Colo. 

App. 1991); see also Floyd v. Sellers, 7 Colo. App. 498, 505, 44 P. 

373, 376 (1896) (recognizing that even though the judgment 

creditor did not obtain a judgment lien, he could satisfy the 

judgment through other legal means), aff’d, 24 Colo. 484, 52 P. 674

(1898).

¶ 14 As with the civil rules, we see nothing in the plain language of 

section 13-52-102 that requires a judgment creditor to get a 

judgment lien before a writ of execution. Indeed, a lien itself is not 

a method to execute on a judgment; rather, it secures the judgment 
7

creditor’s right to collect on its judgment from the equity in a 

judgment debtor’s real property. See Robison v. Gumaer, 43 Colo. 

310, 313, 95 P. 935, 935 (1908) (recognizing that a lien allows a

creditor to seek relief on property).

¶ 15 So while a judgment creditor may get a judgment lien, nothing 

in the statute requires one. Instead, a transcript of judgment “may 

be recorded in any county” to obtain a judgment lien. 

§ 13-52-102(1). Giving these words their plain meaning, the statute

creates a permissive procedure to obtain a lien on real property and 

nothing more. Sinclair Mktg. Inc. v. City of Commerce City, 226 P.3d 

1239, 1246 (Colo. App. 2009) (“A statute using ‘may’ generally 

connotes permissive rather than mandatory action.”).

¶ 16 We are not persuaded otherwise by Mr. Galvan’s reliance on 

the statutory language that real estate may be “sold on execution.” 

§ 13-52-102(1). Contrary to Mr. Galvan’s contention, that real 

estate is subject to execution doesn’t “clearly contemplate[]” that a 

judgment lien is required to execute on the property. The statute 

provides only that “execution . . . be issued upon [the] judgment.”

§ 13-52-102(1). Thus, it requires a judgment to execute, not a 

judgment lien; and we won’t read a requirement into the statute 
8

that isn’t there. See Rook v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 111 P.3d 

549, 552 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 17 Nor do the cases Mr. Galvan relies on say anything different. 

These cases by and large discuss judgment liens, Baum, 820 P.2d 

at 1123, the expiration of judgment liens, Mortg. Invs. Corp., 70 

P.3d at 1186, and the requirements to revive judgment liens, Wells 

Fargo, 226 P.3d at 1071-72. None of them, however, considers

whether a judgment lien is required to obtain a writ of execution, let 

alone concludes that it is. 

¶ 18 This is also true of Great Western Exchange, Inc. v. Walters, 

819 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1991). While that case broadly states

that “writs of execution or certificates of levy, regardless of when 

acquired, merely serve as means to enforce the [judgment] lien,” it 

did not consider the issue presented here — whether a judgment 

lien is a prerequisite to a writ of execution. Id. at 1095. Rather, 

that case dealt with the extension of a judgment lien and concluded 

only that obtaining a writ of execution and filing a certificate of levy 

does not “extend[] the term of the judgment lien beyond its 

statutory period.” Id. And the cases that the division cited in 

support of its statement that “writs of execution or certificates of 
9

levy” are “means to enforce” a judgment lien don’t support that 

statement. Id. Those cases simply recognize that executing on the 

judgment does not extend the life of the judgment lien. See 

Ingraham v. Forman, 63 P.2d 998, 998-99 (Ariz. 1937); Hyman v. 

Jones, 171 S.E. 103, 103 (N.C. 1933). In any event, assuming 

Great Western concluded that a judgment lien is required to execute 

on a judgment and obtain a writ of execution, we don’t agree. See 

Dig. Landscape Inc. v. Media Kings LLC, 2018 COA 142, ¶ 68 (one 

division of the court of appeals is not bound by the decision of 

another division).

¶ 19 For these reasons, we see nothing in section 13-52-102 (or 

case law) that requires a judgment creditor to get a valid judgment 

lien as a prerequisite to obtaining a writ of execution. See 

§ 13-52-102; see also Jong Ik Won v. Fernandez, 324 S.W.3d 833, 

835 (Tex. App. 2010) (concluding that, under Texas law, “a 

judgment lien is not a prerequisite to an execution sale to satisfy a 

judgment”). And consistent with this interpretation, the writ of 

execution issued here makes no reference to a judgment lien; it 

refers only to Franklin Credit’s judgment.
10

¶ 20 The district court thus erred in setting aside the writ of 

execution because Franklin Credit’s judgment lien had expired. 

D. Execution Lien

¶ 21 Franklin Credit also contends that the district court erred in 

setting aside the writ of execution because (1) Colorado recognizes 

an execution lien independent of a judgment lien and (2) it had a 

valid execution lien. We agree with the former contention, but don’t 

reach the latter. 

¶ 22 True, an execution lien allows a judgment creditor to levy on 

real estate. §§ 13-56-101, -103, C.R.S. 2018. Though a judgment 

creditor may obtain a judgment lien and an execution lien, they are 

independent statutory liens. See Routt Cty. Mining Co. v. Stutheit, 

101 Colo. 254, 257, 72 P.2d 692, 693 (1937) (“Until they filed their 

transcript or made a levy, they had no lien on the real estate.”); 

Baker v. Allen, 34 Colo. App. 363, 367, 528 P.2d 922, 924-25 (1974) 

(recognizing that the judgment creditor obtained a judgment lien 

through filing a transcript of judgment and obtained a lien upon the 

real estate when the certificate of levy was filed); see also Robison, 

43 Colo. at 313, 95 P. at 935 (explaining that a lien can be created 

for executing on a judgment by levy of an execution, recording a 
11

transcript of judgment, or attachment); 1C Stephen A. Hess, 

Colorado Practice Series: Methods of Practice §§ 40:3, 40:5, Westlaw 

(7th ed. database updated May 2019).

¶ 23 But for three reasons we decline to address whether Franklin 

Credit obtained a valid execution lien under sections 13-56-101 and 

-103 and whether this execution lien independently supports its 

writ of execution and certificate of levy. First, the district court set 

aside the writ of execution only on the basis that Franklin Credit’s 

judgment lien had expired. And as already discussed, we conclude 

that the district court erred in doing so. Second, whether a valid 

execution lien exists under sections 13-56-101 and -103 was 

neither addressed by the district court nor adequately developed in 

the record. Third, the district court also did not address Mr. 

Galvan’s claim for homestead exemption under section 38-41-201, 

C.R.S. 2018. So, for us to consider these issues now is premature. 

See Softrock Geological Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 

2012 COA 97, ¶ 6, aff’d, 2014 CO 30.

¶ 24 To sum up, a judgment lien is not a prerequisite to obtaining a 

writ of execution. Although Franklin Credit’s judgment lien expired,

its judgment has not. Franklin Credit represents that it obtained 
12

an execution lien, but the district court has not yet addressed the 

validity of that lien. And for his part, Mr. Galvan filed a claim for 

homestead exemption, which the district court also didn’t consider. 

We therefore must reverse the order setting aside the writ of 

execution and remand for further proceedings.

III. Re-Recording the Transcript of Judgment

¶ 25 Franklin Credit alternatively contends that by re-recording the 

transcript of the default judgment in 2016, it created a judgment 

lien that also supports the writ of execution. Given our conclusion 

that the district court erred in setting aside the writ of execution, 

we need not address this argument other than to point out that 

another division of this court recently rejected it. See Sec. Credit 

Servs., ¶ 16 (“[T]he recordation of a transcript of judgment, without 

more, after the expiration of the [judgment lien’s] six-year period, 

accomplishes nothing[.]”).

IV. Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 26 Franklin Credit next contends the district court erred in 

awarding attorney fees and costs to Mr. Galvan. We agree.

¶ 27 We review a district court’s award of attorney fees and costs 

for an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163,
13

¶ 15. The court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law, 

see Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454, 

458 (Colo. App. 2003); its decision is manifestly arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or unfair, see Shimizu, ¶ 15; or its findings are so 

against the weight of the evidence as to compel a contrary result, 

see Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for Am. Dream, 187 

P.3d 1207, 1220 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 28 The district court may assess reasonable attorney fees against 

a party who files a “frivolous opposition to a motion.” C.R.C.P. 121, 

§ 1-15(7). A defense is frivolous if the proponent can present no 

rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of that 

defense. Liebowitz v. Aimexco Inc., 701 P.2d 140, 142 (Colo. App. 

1985); accord Double Oak Constr., L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Dev. Int’l, 

L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140, 151 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 29 Concluding the law was well settled that a judgment lien 

expires six years after entry of the judgment, the district court 

found that Franklin Credit’s opposition to the motion to set aside 

the writ of execution was frivolous. But as discussed, Franklin 

Credit argued — and we agree — that a valid judgment lien is not 

required to obtain a writ of execution. The district court therefore
14

abused its discretion in concluding that Franklin Credit presented 

no rational argument in opposing the motion to set aside the writ of 

execution, and we must reverse the district court’s order awarding 

attorney fees and costs.

V. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 30 Because we reverse the district court’s order setting aside the 

writ of execution, we necessarily reject Mr. Galvan’s request for 

appellate attorney fees.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 31 We reverse the district court’s orders setting aside the writ of 

execution and awarding attorney fees and costs. The case is 

remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE BERGER concur.