J-A08045-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

MARY HUSTON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

ALLEN L. SUMMERHILL AND LORI H. 

SUMMERHILL 

 Appellees No. 1174 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered on September 9, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County 

Civil Division at No.: 2010-1790-Civil 

MARY HUSTON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ALLEN L. SUMMERHILL AND LORI H. 

SUMMERHILL 

 Appellants No. 1183 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered on September 9, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County 

Civil Division at No.: 2010-1790-Civil 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2014 

 In this quiet title action, Mary Huston appealed the trial court’s entry 

of judgment and Allen and Lori Summerhill (collectively, “the Summerhills”) 

filed a separate appeal of the same judgment. In the underlying matter, the 
J-A08045-14 

- 2 - 

trial court rejected the Summerhills’ effort to establish that a putative 

“lease-purchase” agreement granted them title to the farm at issue. 

Instead, the trial court granted Huston sole possession of the title of the 

farm. The court found that no documentation existed to satisfy the Statute 

of Frauds (the “Statute”), which governs such transactions. However, the 

court awarded the Summerhills damages equal to their improvements to the 

farmstead, which they made over at least eleven years that they possessed 

the land. We affirm. 

 In its dispositive Adjudication and Order, the trial court made the 

following findings of fact. 

1. Mary Huston resides at 230 Huston Road, Ford City, 

Pennsylvania. 

2. The Summerhills reside at 1052 Main Street, Ford City, 

Pennsylvania. 

3. Defendant Lori Summerhill is the daughter of Edward 

Huston. Defendant Alan Summerhill is Edward Huston’s son-inlaw. 

4. Plaintiff Mary Huston married Edward Huston in October 

1998 after a long relationship. 

5. At the time of the marriage of Edward Huston and Mary 

Huston, Edward Huston was the owner of a[n 82-acre] tract of 

land [“the Property”] situate in Manor Township, Armstrong 

County, Pennsylvania . . . . 

* * * * 

6. The Property had been conveyed to Edward Huston by

deed recorded on October 25, 1995 . . . . As of that time, the 

Property was used primarily as a dairy farm. 

7. Edward Huston at certain times leased the Property, for 

dairy farming purposes, for approximately $9,600 per year. 
J-A08045-14 

- 3 - 

8. On or about November 12, 1998, Edward Huston conveyed 

the Property to himself and Mary Huston, as tenants by the 

entireties, by deed record on November 17, 1998 . . . . 

9. The Deed does not contain any exceptions or reservations 

regarding a life estate, any oral or written agreements of sale, or 

any leasehold interests, other than an exception and reservation 

of the lower Kittanning seam of coal. 

10. Mary Huston continues to reside on the Property. 

11. Edward Huston died on or about June 18, 2005. 

12. Commencing in 1998, the Summerhills began to make

cash payments to Edward Huston and/or Mary Huston. 

13. The [forty-four] cash payments were made by checks 

drawn on a “Farm Account” that were signed by Defendant Alan 

L. Summerhill[, some of which were endorsed by Edward

Huston, others of which were endorsed by Edward and Mary 

Huston jointly or Mary Huston individually, and the balance of 

which were not endorsed.] 

* * * * 

15. Only some of these checks were endorsed by Ed Huston. 

His signature on the checks made them available for cashing, 

and not necessarily to ratify or create any written agreement of 

sale between himself and [the Summerhills]. 

16. The checks made payable to Mary Huston did not create a 

written agreement of sale between the Summerhills and either 

Edward Huston or Plaintiff Mary Huston. 

17. Mary Huston maintained, for a period of time, a “ledger” 

that documented the payments made by the Summerhills to 

herself and/or Edward Huston. The payments span a period 

from 1998 up to and through August 25, 2010. 

18. On September 15, 2010, counsel for the Summerhills sent 

a letter to Consol Energy Inc. and EXCO Resources (PA), LLC in 

anticipation of those entities’ development of the Marcellus gas 

resources underlying the Property. In the letter, counsel advised 

Consol and EXCO that the Summerhills were equitable owners of 

the Property and that the developers should take the 

Summerhills’ equitable interests into consideration before 

proceeding with drilling. 
J-A08045-14 

- 4 - 

19. Although Mary Huston had limited correspondence with 

certain oil and gas companies in the area, she did not establish 

any present or prospective contractual or business relationships 

with any of these companies. Nor were any such prospective or 

business relationships interfered with in any way by the 

Summerhills. 

20. The annual fair rental value of the Property during the 

period from 1997 through 2012 was approximately $800-$1000 

per month, or $9,600-$10,000 [sic] per year. 

21. Mary Huston has not suffered any economic or other loss 

as a result of the Summerhills’ action in corresponding with gas 

drilling companies that may have been interested in the 

Property. 

22. During the term of their leasehold interest, the 

Summerhills made several improvements to the Property, which 

included repairs and upgrades to farm buildings, equipment, and 

the physical integrity of the Property. 

23. Mary Huston had actual or implied knowledge of the 

repairs that the Summerhills were making to the Property 

because she was aware of the Property’s condition and of the 

Summerhills’ use of the Property as a farm. 

24. The value of improvements made by the Summerhills to 

the Property during the period of their leasehold interest equals 

$55,634.51. 

25. The value of the Property was substantially increased due 

to the improvements made by [the Summerhills]. 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 12/17/2012, at 1-10 (nomenclature modified 

for consistency). 

 The trial court made these findings following a bench trial on the 

parties’ respective claims, which was held on September 19, 2012. Based 

upon the above findings, on December 17, 2012, the trial court issued a 

verdict resolving all of the parties’ claims. Therein, the trial court rendered a 

verdict in favor of Mary Huston on her claims to quiet title, and awarded 
J-A08045-14 

- 5 - 

Mary Huston fee simple absolute title to the Property free and clear from any 

claims that had been or might be asserted by the Summerhills. The court 

also dismissed Mary Huston’s claim for tortious interference with her 

prospective contractual relations with any gas producer. 

In the same order, the trial court dismissed the Summerhills’ claims 

for declaratory judgment and to quiet title, specific performance, and breach 

of contract. However, the trial court found in favor of the Summerhills on 

counts V and VI of their complaint, respectively quantum meruit and unjust 

enrichment, and awarded the Summerhills $55,634.51 in damages. Finally 

the court expressly rejected Mary Huston’s statute of limitations and laches 

affirmative defenses. The parties timely filed post-trial motions. On June 

24, 2013, after hearing argument, the trial court denied all post-trial 

motions. 

On July 18, 2013, Mary Huston filed a timely notice of appeal, and, on 

July 19, 2013, the Summerhills also filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial 

court then directed the parties to file concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Each party timely 

complied, and, on July 29, 2013, the trial court entered an opinion pursuant 

to Rule 1925(a). Therein, the trial court primarily incorporated by reference 
J-A08045-14 

- 6 - 

the reasoning explicated in its December 17, 2012 adjudication and order. 

This case now is ripe for our consideration.1

At the root of this appeal lie the dueling quiet title actions, which were 

resolved in Mary Huston’s favor. Consequently, we begin by reviewing the 

issues raised by the Summerhills. The Summerhills’ own statement of the 

questions involved is too prolix to warrant verbatim reproduction. Brief for 

the Summerhills at 5-6. In their first four issues, the Summerhills raise 

various challenges to the trial court’s ruling that the Statute of Frauds 

operated to invalidate any purported agreement by Edward and/or Mary 

Huston to transfer the Property to the Summerhills, subject only to a life 

estate in either Edward or Mary Huston. In issues five through seven, the 

Summerhills challenge the trial court’s determination that the amounts they 

remitted to the Hustons on an annual basis reflected a fair rental value for 

the Property such that the Hustons were not unjustly enriched. We consider 

these two overarching arguments in turn. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 In an August 20, 2013 rule to show cause, this Court raised concerns 

regarding the purported absence of a final judgment from the record, which 

is necessary to this Court’s jurisdiction over the instant appeals. See Ryan 

v. GAF Corp., 665 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 1995). However, after receiving 

the parties’ responses to the rule, on September 17, 2013, this Court issued 

an order discharging the rule. The record appears to confirm the entry of 

judgment. Moreover, in prior cases where it was clear that judgment either 

was intended to be entered or should have been entered, we have opted to 

“regard as done that which ought to have been done.” Mackall v. Fleegle, 

801 A.2d 577, 580-81 (Pa. Super. 2002). Consequently, we find that we 

have jurisdiction and may consider the merits of these appeals, which this 

Court consolidated sua sponte on September 19, 2013. 
J-A08045-14 

- 7 - 

We begin by reviewing the requirements imposed by the Statute of 

Frauds and related case law upon the execution of a binding transaction 

involving the transfer of an interest in land. The trial court provided the 

following apt review of the applicable standards: 

Because [the Summerhills] assert that a written agreement of 

sale existed before the execution of the Deed, they must prove 

the agreement with writings sufficient to satisfy the 

requirements of the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds. They also 

must prove that the purported agreement supersedes the plain 

language of the Deed. 

The Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds, also known as the 

Pennsylvania Uniform Written Obligations Act, 33 P.S. §§ 1-8, 

provides as follows with regard to the writings required to effect 

the sale of a parcel of real property: 

From and after April 10, 1772, all leases, estates, interests 

of freehold or term of years, or any uncertain interest of, 

in, or out of any messuages,[2

] manors, lands, tenements 

or hereditaments, made or created by livery and seisin 

only, or by parol, and not put in writing, and signed by the 

parties so making or creating the same, . . . shall have the 

force and effect of leases or estates at will only, and shall 

not, either in law or equity, be deemed or taken to have 

any other or greater force or effect . . . . 

33 P.S. § 1. Leases of real property not exceeding three-year 

terms are excluded from the Statute, but all leases with terms 

exceeding three years are subject to a separate Statute of 

Frauds which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 

Real property, including any personal property thereon, 

may be leased for a term of more than three years by a 

landlord to a tenant or by their respective agents [lawfully 

authorized in writing]. Any such lease must be in writing 

____________________________________________ 

2

 A messuage is “[a] dwelling house together with the curtilage, 

including any outbuildings.” Blacks Law Dictionary 1004 (Deluxe 7th ed.). 
J-A08045-14 

- 8 - 

and signed by the parties making or creating the same, 

otherwise it shall have the force and effect of a lease at 

will only and shall not be given any greater force or effect 

either in law or equity, . . . unless the tenancy has

continued for more than one year and the landlord and 

tenant have recognized its rightful existence by claiming 

and admitting liability for the rent, in which case the 

tenancy shall become one from year to year. 

68 P.S. § 250.202. 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has concisely summarized the 

nature, purpose, and practical operation of the Statute Of Frauds 

as follows: 

The statute of frauds directs that agreements for the sale 

of real estate shall not be enforced unless they are in 

writing and signed by the seller. The purpose of the 

statute is to prevent perjury and fraudulent claims. The 

Statute of Frauds does not void those oral contracts 

relating to land which fail to comply with the Statute’s 

formal requirements. It is to be used as a shield and not 

as a sword, as it was designed to prevent frauds, not to 

encourage them. Therefore, even though an oral contract 

for the sale of real estate may not be specifically enforced, 

it may form the basis for an action to recover damages.1

Empire Props., Inc. v. Equireal, Inc., 674 A.2d 297, 302 

(Pa. Super. 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

“[The Statute of Frauds] is not a mere rule of evidence, but a 

declaration of public policy. In the absence of equities sufficient 

of themselves to take the case out of the statute, it operates as 

a limitation upon judicial authority to afford a remedy unless 

renounced or waived by the party entitled to claim its 

protection.” Kurland v. Stolker, 533 A.2d 1370, 1372 

(Pa. 1987) (citing Haskell v. Heathcote, 69 A.2d 71 

(Pa. 1949)). 

__________________________ 

1

 “Under the interpretation that has been given to our 

statute of frauds a recovery of damages may be had for 

non-performance of a parol agreement for the sale of land, 

the measure of such damages being the money that was 

paid on account of the purchase and the expenses incurred 

on the faith of the contract.” Empire Props., Inc., 674 
J-A08045-14 

- 9 - 

A.2d at 302 (citing Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154 (Pa. 

1955))). 

A writing sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must include 

an adequate description of the property,2

 a recital of the 

consideration and the signature of the party to be charged.3

 

Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990, 994 (Pa. Super. 1989) 

(citation omitted). All of the essential terms and conditions of 

the agreement must be stated in the writing with such certainty 

so as to disclose an intention of the parties to be bound by the 

agreement. Target Sportswear, Inc. v. The Clearfield 

Found., 474 A.2d 1142, 1148 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citations 

omitted). “A memorandum which omits or incompletely states 

the essential terms or which merely refers to a contract without 

stating its terms is insufficient.” Id.; see also Restatement of 

Contracts § 207 (sufficient writing must be signed by the party 

to be charged and must state with reasonable certainty the 

parties to the contract, the land to which the contract relates, 

and the terms and conditions of all promises constituting the 

contract). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has admonished 

that trial courts “should always be satisfied with [‘]some note or 

memorandum[’] that is adequate [* * *] to convince the court 

that there is no serious possibility of consummating fraud by 

enforcement.” Beeruk Estate, 241 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. 1968). 

__________________________ 

2

 An adequate description of the property is “that which

would enable a competent surveyor to find the land in

question from the agreement or from the references made 

in it.” Prager v. McAdam, 161 A.2d 39, 40 (Pa. 1960)[, 

abrogated on other grounds by Brown v. Hahn, 213 A.2d 

342 (Pa. 1965)]. Parol evidence may be used to show that 

a written description existing elsewhere applies to the 

agreement at issue, but may not be used to provide the

description itself. Id.

3

 The signature of the party to be charged need not be in 

any particular form. Instead, “the focus has been on 

whether there is some reliable indication that the person to 

be charged with performing under the writing intended to 

authenticate it.” Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990, 

993 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations omitted). 
J-A08045-14 

- 10 - 

Several writings together can satisfy the Statute of Frauds if the 

requirements of section 208 of the Restatement of Contracts are 

met. Section 208 provides as follows: 

The memorandum may consist of several writings, 

(a) if each writing is signed by the party to be 

charged and the writings indicate that they relate to the 

same transaction, or 

(b) though one writing only is signed if 

i. the signed writing is physically annexed to the 

other writing by the party to be charged, or 

ii. the signed writing refers to the unsigned 

writing, or 

iii. it appears from examination of all the writings 

that the signed writing was signed with reference to 

the unsigned writings. 

Target Sportswear, 474 A.2d at 1147 (citing Restatement, 

Contracts § 208);4

see also Fleming v. Strayer, 63 A.2d 122, 

123 (Pa. Super. 1949) (the inter-relatedness of several writings 

alleged to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must be self-correlating 

and cannot be connected by parol or extrinsic evidence.). 

__________________________ 

4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 132 slightly 

modifies and liberalizes the standard for using several 

writings together to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Section 

132 provides that “[t]he memorandum may consist of 

several writings if one of the writings is signed and the 

writings in the circumstances clearly indicate that they 

relate to the same transaction.” This section of the Second 

Restatement has not been adopted in Pennsylvania.[3

] 

____________________________________________ 

3

 Although our Supreme Court has never adopted section 132, this 

Court has on at least one occasion cited it as a supplementary source in a 

case addressing the adequacy of a signature to signify an intent to 

authenticate a writing. See Hessenthaler, 564 A.2d at 993. 
J-A08045-14 

- 11 - 

T.C.O., 12 17/2012, at 11-15 (citations modified). 

 Against this backdrop, we consider the Summerhills’ first argument, 

that the trial court had before it sufficient documentary evidence of either or 

both of the Hustons’ intents to be bound to the “lease-purchase” agreement. 

Brief for the Summerhills at 23-47.4

 The Summerhills cite just one of the 

dozens of endorsed and unendorsed checks that were introduced at trial as 

sufficient by itself to establish Mary Huston’s intent to be bound. 

Specifically, they refer to an August 25, 2010 check bearing the memo “3rd

Qtr. Lease Purchase 82 Ac. Bal Due $22,800.00,” which was “endorsed, 

negotiated and cashed by [Mary Huston] only after she had apparently 

carefully reviewed the memo and insisted that the error with regard to the 

‘balance due’ be corrected to reflect ‘$22,800.00’, as opposed to 

‘$12,800.00.’” Id. at 29-30. They contend that this check taken alone 

suffices to establish “that there is no serious possibility of consummating 

fraud by enforcement.” Id. at 30; see Beeruk Estate, supra. In effect, 

____________________________________________ 

4

 There is a great deal to be said for concision in appellate briefing. This 

portion of the Summerhills’ argument is at least twice as long as is 

necessary fully to articulate its substance, just as the Summerhills’ brief in 

its entirety, which is at best barely compliant with the 14,000-word 

restriction set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 2135 (and is not compliant inasmuch as it 

does not contain the mandatory certification by counsel that the brief 

conforms to the word limit), is longer than many informative, persuasive 

briefs developing more complicated and numerous appellate issues. Given 

our crowded docket, this Court appreciates succinct discussions that do not 

repeat the same premises and conclusions several times over, especially 

when they contain so few references to on-point legal authority. 
J-A08045-14 

- 12 - 

the Summerhills would have us rely upon the use of the words “Lease 

Purchase” to establish the nature of the transaction; the description “82 Ac.” 

to identify the Property (which undisputedly consists of 82 acres); “Bal. Due” 

to establish “both the consideration remaining to be paid, as well as the total 

consideration paid for the purchase of said property in the amount of 

$150,000.00”; and Mary Huston’s correction of the balance due and 

endorsement and cashing of the check without any amendment to the 

language of the memo line to satisfy the criteria of a memorandum 

establishing the intention of the parties sufficiently clearly to survive a 

statute of frauds defense. Brief for the Summerhills at 31. 

The Summerhills also note that Mary Huston’s maintenance of a 

“ledger” recording each payment under the agreement as well as a running 

balance is more consistent with a finite lease-purchase arrangement. Were 

the relationship just a continuing lease, they suggest, it would be 

unnecessary to tally all moneys received. They further argue that the 

above-mentioned check was not the only endorsed check that suggested an 

ongoing arrangement distinct from a conventional lease: 

[A] minimum of 38 checks were issued from [the Summerhills] 

to [Edward Huston and/or Mary Huston], as his successor in 

interest, referencing this transaction, all of which are tied 

together by virtue of the payments represented by said checks 

being referenced on said ledger. All such checks were cashed or 

negoitiated and at least 30 of said checks were in fact 

signed/endorsed by [Edward Huston] during his lifetime, and/or 

[Mary Huston] as his successor in interest after his death. Of 

said 38 checks, 37 of them note the term “Lease Purchase” (or 

some abbreviation thereof), 26 actually note the word
J-A08045-14 

- 13 - 

“Purchase” of which at least 3 or 4 indicate the ‘Farm’, the ‘82 Ac 

Farm’ or ‘82 acres’ identifying the property that is the subject of 

said agreement. The evidence clearly indicates that said “Farm”, 

the “82 Ac Farm” or “82 acres” is the only parcel of real property 

that [the Hustons] owned, and said acreage is precisely the 

same acreage noted on [the Hustons’] deeds introduced in

evidence. 

Id. at 33. 

 The trial court was unpersuaded: 

We find that [the Summerhills] have not proved that such an 

agreement existed. First, although the checks written by [the 

Summerhills] and cashed by either Edward or Mary Huston 

contain evidence of a “lease” or “purchase” of the 82-acre 

Property and indicate that $10,000 was due each year, we find 

that they do not prove the essential terms of an agreement of 

sale by which both Edward Huston and [the Summerhills]

intended to be bound. The documents are equivocal, at best. 

Moreover, . . . there are no documents of record that indicate 

any term of the purported agreement that reserved to Edward 

and Mary Huston a life estate in the residence and immediate 

c[u]rtilage of the Property. This essential term would have to be 

implied or assumed by the [trial c]ourt, and that we cannot do. 

The Deed from Edward Huston [to] himself and Mary Huston is 

clear, valid, and plainly evidences Edward Huston’s intent to 

transfer fee simple title. 

Second, we note that several of the checks on which [the

Summerhills] rely are not signed by Edward Huston. Mary 

Huston’s ledger is unsigned and the several checks issued after 

2004 were signed and negotiated by Mary Huston only, who is 

not alleged to have been a party to the purported agreement. 

Most importantly, no description of the property appears on any 

of the checks until March 6, 2006, long after Edward Huston’s 

death. Edward Huston cannot, therefore, be deemed to have 

made or ratified any agreement that would satisfy the Statute of 

Frauds because there are no documents in the record indicating 

or even suggesting his assent to such an agreement that 

includes a description of the [P]roperty, which the Statute of 

Frauds requires. 
J-A08045-14 

- 14 - 

Third, we find that . . . Mary Huston did not intend to “ratify” the 

purported agreement or any of its terms. Section 208 of the 

Restatement of Contracts requires that each writing used to 

satisfy the Statute of Frauds be either signed by the seller or 

sufficiently connected to the signed writing(s). It has not been 

alleged that any of the checks endorsed by Mary Huston were 

“annexed” to or referred to by those signed by Edward Huston. 

Nor is there any indication that the checks signed by Edward 

Huston in any way “referenced” the later checks. In short, we 

reject [the Summerhills’] argument that . . . Mary Huston did or 

could have “ratified” the purported prior agreement between 

Edward Huston and [the Summerhills]. No such agreement ever 

existed, and the related documents in the record at most 

together indicate that Mary Huston intended to ratify and 

continue in effect a lease with [the Summerhills]. 

Indeed, we find that the documents that [the Summerhills] have 

proffered prove the existence of, and are entirely consistent 

with, a lease of the Property for a term of years. 

T.C.O., 12/17/2012, at 18-20 (citation omitted). 

 In reviewing a challenged trial court ruling quieting title, we are bound 

solely to determine whether the findings of fact are supported by competent 

evidence, whether an error of law has been committed, and whether there 

has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Regions Mortg., Inc., v. 

Muthler, 889 A.2d 39, 41 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Vernon Twp. Vol. Fire 

Dep’t, Inc., v. Connor, 855 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2004)). We conclude that 

the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and that the 

trial court neither erred as a matter of law nor abused its discretion. 

First, the trial court properly focused upon the absence of sufficient 

evidence of any purchase agreement that was executed between the 

Summerhills and Edward Huston, the sole title holder to the Property at the 

time the Summerhills insist that the putative agreement commenced. This 
J-A08045-14 

- 15 - 

is reinforced by the absence of an acknowledgment of any such agreement 

associated with Edward Huston’s transfer of the property to himself and 

Mary Huston as tenants by the entireties. 

 Mary Huston’s correction to the “balance” at a later date, and the fact 

that her calculations implied a total sum of payments of $150,000 spanning 

the life of the agreement, do make this a closer case than the trial court has 

allowed. But the post-agreement death of Edward Huston, which preceded 

by years Mary Huston’s alleged ratification, seriously undermines this 

inference. The agreement, of whatever nature, was Edward Huston’s at the 

time of its making, not Mary Huston’s, to whom he was not married at the 

time and who held no interest in the Property.5

 Before Edward Huston’s 

death, the signed writings detailed by the trial court, see T.C.O., 

12/17/2012, at 3-8 (detailing the checks entered into evidence), consisting 

solely of negotiated checks, contained no language as specific as that 

employed in later transactions with Mary Huston, which post-dated Edward 

Huston’s death by years. More specifically, not one of the checks reviewed 

by the trial court or alluded to by the Summerhills that was tendered during 

Edward Huston’s lifetime specified in any way the size, nature, or metes and 

____________________________________________ 

5

 The record reflects that Edward and Mary Huston did not marry until 

October 1998. See T.C.O. at 2. However, the Summerhills had possession 

of the property and had begun making improvements as early as October 2, 

1997, at least a year earlier. Indeed, in enumerating their damages, the 

Summerhills note no fewer than five improvements that were completed 

before the Huston nuptial. See Responsive Brief for the Summerhills at 6. 
J-A08045-14 

- 16 - 

bounds of a specific property.6 Rather, at their most clear, they specified a 

particular time span, for example “2nd QTR 02,” and the description “Lease 

Purch,” saying nothing to identify or describe the property such that a 

surveyor could locate it based upon that description alone. 

 The Summerhills provide no authority suggesting that, even if we 

accepted at face value their analysis of the import of their later transactions 

with Mary Huston, it would be appropriate to import that analysis into less 

specific dealings with Edward Huston at a time nearer to the alleged 

inception of the agreement, when Edward Huston was the sole title-holder to 

the Property. While it is true that, under certain narrow circumstances, we 

____________________________________________ 

6

 Had those checks contained notations alluding to the eighty-two-acre 

parcel, especially in the years before Edward Huston deeded the Property 

jointly to himself and Mary Huston, even just in the abbreviated fashion 

characteristic of numerous posthumous checks, the adequacy of these 

memos to satisfy the property description factor would be a closer question. 

Compare Sawert v. Lunt, 62 A.2d 34, 34 (Pa. 1948) (holding, where a 

receipt of payment cited a street address, that it was sufficient that “all that 

need[ed] to be done [was] to translate the general designation of the 

property into a precise description . . . [that] can be readily done under the 

facts of this case”), and Cohen v. Jones, 118 A. 362 (Pa. 1922) (citing 

Shaw v. Cornman, 114 A. 632 (Pa. 1921)) (noting that “the statute of 

frauds requires land conveyed to be described with such certainty and 

definiteness as to avoid the necessity of resorting to parol proof to 

determine the property the parties intended should be transferred,” and 

finding sufficient a description that located the property on a certain road 

with certain characteristics but did not specify a full street address, when 

viewed in tandem with the owner’s admission that she owned “but one piece 

of land in the particular locality”), with Prager v. McAdam, 161 A.2d 39 

(Pa. 1960) (holding that even an otherwise adequate description of the land 

was insufficient to identify the parcel to be sold where the seller reserved 

two acres of the sixty-three acres to herself, but did not specify which two 

acres). 
J-A08045-14 

- 17 - 

have deemed it appropriate to infer the property implicated by an 

insufficient description, when admissible evidence leaves no practical doubt 

as to the land in question, see supra n.7, we find insufficient evidence to do 

so as of November 1998, when Edward Huston deeded the property jointly 

to himself and Mary Huston, or as of Edward Huston’s death in 2005. This is 

fatal to the Summerhills’ argument, because it is the period preceding 

Edward Huston’s death that is most critical to our inquiry into the existence 

of the lease-purchase agreement alleged by the Summerhills; Mary Huston 

could not ratify a contract that does not exist. Thus, the trial court did not 

err or abuse its discretion in rejecting the Summerhills’ contention that the 

evidence of record satisfied the Statute in this case. 

 The Summerhills next challenge the trial court’s rulings declining to 

apply certain recognized exceptions to the Statute. The Summerhills argue 

that, if we share the trial court’s view that the above-discussed writings did 

not satisfy the terms of the Statute, we must still rule in their favor on the 

basis of the “partial performance” or “admission” exception to the Statute. 

Brief for the Summerhills at 47-55. We address these in turn. 

 The partial performance exception applies under narrow circumstances 

“to take an oral contract for real estate out of the [S]tatute.” Kurland v. 

Stolker, 533 A.2d 1370, 1373 (Pa. 1987): 

Our case law is very explicit as to the requirements [that] must 

be met to take an oral contract for real estate out of the statute. 

The terms of the contract must be shown by full, complete, and 

satisfactory proof. The evidence must define the boundaries and 

indicate the quantity of the land. It must fix the amount of 
J-A08045-14 

- 18 - 

consideration. It must establish the fact that possession was 

taken in pursuance of the contract, and, at or immediately after 

the time it was made, the fact that the change of possession was 

notorious, and the fact that it has been exclusive, continuous 

and maintained. And it must show performance or part 

performance by the vendee which could not be compensated in 

damages, and such as would make rescission inequitable and 

unjust. 

* * * * 

The “indubitable proof” a claimant is required to proffer is 

evidence that should not only be found credible, but of such 

weight and directness as to make out the facts alleged beyond a 

doubt. . . . [I]t may be proven by the acts and declarations of 

the parties, either together or separately. The acts and 

declarations relied upon[] must not, however, be of an equivocal 

character; they must have such clearness and directness as will 

leave no doubt as to their meaning and purpose. 

Id. (emphasis in original). 

The Summerhills assert uncontroversially that they satisfy the 

possessory and notorious factors. They next point to the various payments 

recited in support of their argument under the Statute, noting that, as of 

August 25, 2010, their payments to-date totaled $127,200, leaving a 

“balance” of $22,800, as allegedly confirmed by Mary Huston; the round 

sum of $150,000, they assert, reflected the terms of the putative purchase 

component of their lease purchase agreement with Edward Huston. The 

Summerhills contend that their payments “are obviously substantial . . . and 

far exceed the fair rental value of the farm property.” Brief for the 

Summerhills at 49. The Summerhills hasten to express their satisfaction 

with the trial court’s award in compensation of their tangible improvements 

to the property, but contend that those damages fail to compensate 
J-A08045-14 

- 19 - 

intangible costs such as labor, and further argue that “the actual benefit to 

the [P]roperty well exceeds said award and is not readily capable of being 

calculated or remedied with a damage award.” Id. at 50. They note that 

many of their undisputed improvements will improve the farm’s condition 

and profitability long after the lease expires. Id. at 50-51. 

 The trial court rejected this argument, as well. The court emphasized 

that “[t]aking an agreement to transfer real property out of the Statute of 

Frauds is difficult, and the cases permitting it have dwindled over time.” 

T.C.O., 12/17/2012, at 22 (citing Firetree, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 

978 A.2d 1067, 1074-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)). The trial court noted that, in 

Kurland, our Supreme Court held that merely “[r]epairing and improving a 

dwelling house or outbuildings are such improvements as any tenant for a 

term of years might make, but are not of a character to take a cause out of 

the statute.” Id. at 23 (quoting Kurland, 533 A.2d at 1375). Furthermore, 

if such improvements are calculable and may be remedied with an award of 

damages, a court should not grant specific performance. Id. (citing 

Klingensmith v. Klingensmith, 100 A.2d 76, 79-80 (Pa. 1953)). 

Applying this standard in the instant case, the trial court observed that 

the improvements to the land made by the Summerhills were, in fact, 

readily quantified, and fairly compensated by the court’s award of 

considerable damages corresponding directly to the amount of damages 

proved at trial by the Summerhills. Id. at 28-29; see also Rule 1925(a) 

Memorandum, 8/29/2013 (“Rule 1925(a) Memo.”), at 4 (unnumbered) (“The 
J-A08045-14 

- 20 - 

[trial court’s] award of damages was based exclusively on [the Summerhills’] 

unjust enrichment/quantum meruit theory, and the [trial court] utilized the 

measure of damages suggested by [the Summerhills], which the [c]ourt 

finds to have been accurate and reasonable in the circumstances.”). 

Moreover, because the court found that $10,000 per year rent was marketappropriate for the Property, the Summerhills could not maintain that their 

payments in that regard were not calculable, or even constituted a basis for 

damages in the first instance, the payments being consistent with and 

appropriate to the lease for a term of years. 

 Because we find that the trial court’s observations regarding the 

uncertainty of the descriptions of the Property are supported by the 

evidence, the Summerhills’ reliance on the partial performance exception to 

the Statute must fail: To invoke the exception successfully, the available 

evidence must describe the property in question with “such clearness and 

directness as will leave no doubt as to their meaning and purpose.” 

Kurland, 533 A.2d at 1373. For the reasons set forth in connection with our 

analysis of the Summerhills’ argument that the available evidence satisfied 

the Statute, we also find that the evidence failed to meet such a stringent 

standard. 

 The Summerhills’ final argument in support of their challenge to the 

trial court’s ruling under the Statute is based upon the “admissions” 

exception to the Statute. Pursuant thereto, a failure to conform to the 

Statute may be overlooked when the party against whom the contract would 
J-A08045-14 

- 21 - 

be enforced has admitted the existence of the contract in its pleadings, 

during discovery, or at trial. See Lehner v. Montgomery, 119 A.2d 626, 

628 (Pa. Super. 1956). The Summerhills concede that Mary Huston “was 

understandably careful not to openly admit the existence of the agreement 

itself for the sale” of the Property, but they maintain “that a careful 

evaluation of the cumulative evidence in this matter effectively operates to 

provide an ‘admission’ as to the essential terms necessary for the formation 

and existence of said agreement for the sale through a ‘lease purchase’ of 

the [Property].” Brief for the Summerhills at 52-53. Their argument in this 

regard simply reiterates the evidence and inferences highlighted in support 

of their prior arguments. To the extent their argument recites evidence not 

mentioned in connection with their previously analyzed issues, the factors 

submitted fall well outside the bounds of what the trial court or we have the 

discretion to consider in assessing the fact and nature of the agreement 

between the parties. 

Most importantly, the Summerhills cite no on-point authority for the 

proposition that an admission may be cobbled together from bits and pieces 

in the absence of any sign of clear acquiescence to the truth of the 

proposition that allegedly has been admitted. Rule 2119(a) requires that the 

party cite in its argument “such . . . citations of authorities as are deemed 

pertinent.” The Summerhills identify nowhere in the pleadings, discovery, or 

at trial that Mary Huston acceded to the proposition that the agreement in 

question, if any, reflected a lease-purchase arrangement. However, Rule 
J-A08045-14 

- 22 - 

2119(c) requires parties before this Court to identify by citation or other 

reference where in the record this Court might find substantiation of a given 

claim regarding the evidence in question. We will not scour the record for 

evidence not clearly identified or located by the party reciting it and it is not 

our function to advocate for a party who has not set forth a legal basis for 

the relief sought. See Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155, 161 

(Pa. Super. 2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). Accordingly, we must reject the 

Summerhills’ appeal to this exception to the statute of frauds and deny 

relief. 

In their last argument, the Summerhills attempt to rebut the trial 

court’s finding that Edward Huston’s transfer of title to the Property jointly to 

himself and Mary Huston, in a deed that made no reference to the putative 

lease purchase agreement, indicated that Edward Huston did not intend to 

enter into a binding lease purchase agreement that Mary Huston could ratify. 

Brief for the Summerhills at 55-57. Once again, in violation of Rule 2119(a), 

the Summerhills provide no citations to authority, on-point or otherwise. 

Instead, the Summerhills recite (again, without citations to the certified 

record, in violation of Rule 2119(c)) various claims regarding extrinsic 

factors to argue that the absence of such a notation on the deed did not 

contradict Edward Huston’s intention that the alleged purchase agreement 

should survive the transfer. Given the lack of supporting legal authority and 

our uncertainty that we may even consider these factors absent confirmation 
J-A08045-14 

- 23 - 

that these assertions are substantiated in the certified record, we are 

constrained to reject this argument. 

Having concluded that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion 

in rejecting the Summerhills’ assertion that the parties had entered into a 

binding purchase agreement of any nature, we now must review the parties’ 

dueling issues regarding the fairness of the trial court’s damage award to the 

Summerhills. The Summerhills argue that the trial court failed to weigh 

properly the Summerhills’ evidence concerning the fair rental value of the 

Property. See Brief for the Summerhills at 59-60. This evidence included 

testimony, supplemented by documentary evidence, that the per-acre rental 

rates paid by the Summerhills for various farm properties in the immediately 

surrounding area were consistent with an annual rental of approximately 

$1,300 per year rather than the $10,000 per year that they paid for the 

Property for the duration of their possession thereof. Additionally, the 

Summerhills submitted evidence regarding the fair market (purchase) value 

of farmland statewide, establishing a per-acre price resulting in a valuation 

of approximately $215,000 for an 82-acre farm property. See id. at 62-64. 

Based upon this, they argue that it is far more likely than not that Edward 

Huston, and Mary Huston thereafter, intended the agreement to be one that 

ultimately would lead to transfer of the title to the Summerhills at the 

conclusion of the alleged contract’s term. 

The latter argument is readily rejected. The trial court determined 

that the parties’ agreement constituted an annual lease rather than a 
J-A08045-14 

- 24 - 

purchase contract. Thus, anything couched in terms of a breach of contract 

that simply seeks to relitigate the parties’ intentions in effectuating that 

agreement requires no review. This analysis applies equally to the 

Summerhills’ later argument that the trial court erred in excluding evidence 

of comparable farm sales. See Brief for the Summerhills at 63-64. Aside 

from the fact that the trial court indicated that it did consider this evidence, 

see Rule 1925(a) Memo. at 2-4, it is immaterial to the only salient question, 

which concerns the fairness of the trial court’s determination that the rental 

rate of $10,000 per year was appropriate. Thus this argument, too, 

warrants no relief. 

With respect to the former argument concerning comparable rental 

rates, we will defer to the trial court’s fact-finding, especially given that the 

Summerhills principally rely upon their own testimony regarding fair rental 

rates for similar properties in the immediate area. In tension with the 

Summerhills’ argument was the evidence that a tenant who immediately 

preceded the Summerhills on the Property paid a rental of $9,600 per year 

for the Property. This finding was supported by the record; indeed it is 

undisputed. Thus, it was within the trial court’s discretion to credit this fact 

in assessing the market fairness of a $10,000 per year rental over the 

Summerhills’ contrary testimony. It is not this Court’s province to invade 

the trial court’s fact-finding. See generally In re Donna W., 472 A.2d 

635, 639 (Pa. Super. 1984). Moreover, once again the Summerhills offer no 
J-A08045-14 

- 25 - 

legal authority in support of their argument, on-point or otherwise. 

Consequently, we find this argument unavailing. 

This brings us to the issues raised by Mary Huston: 

I. Did [the trial court] commit an error of law by applying an 

exception to the well-established doctrine of accretion that 

applies only to residential landlord/tenant case law and which is 

based upon the implied warranty of habitability in this 

commercial case? 

II. Did [the trial court] commit an error of law by finding that 

the tenant had established unjust enrichment where there was 

utterly no evidence that the leased premises had increased in 

value? 

Brief for Mary Huston at 4. 

In her first issue, Mary Huston contends that the trial court improperly 

relied on Chesney v. Stevens, 644 A.2d 1240, 1244 (Pa. Super. 1994). 

Brief for Mary Huston at 7-8. She contends that Chesney concerned a 

residential rather than a commercial lease, and involved unjust enrichment 

arising from the tenant’s improvements to a residential property, where the 

property did not satisfy the warrant of habitability, and the owner had failed 

to make due efforts to rectify the situation. She also argues that the longterm lease requirement cited in Chesney, see infra, was not satisfied in this 

case, where the trial court found that the parties were engaged in a year-toyear lease. 

The trial court relied upon the following analysis: 

Generally, under Pennsylvania law, where a lessor makes 

improvements to the leased premises, the improvements 

become property of the lessor, who is not under any obligation 
J-A08045-14 

- 26 - 

to reimburse the lessee for the value of the improvements. 

See 8 Summ. Pa. Jur.3d Property § 26.58 (citing DeLeone v. 

Azad, Inc., 52 Pa. D.&C.2d 727 (Phila. Cty. 1971); Graham 

Aviation Co. v. City of Johnstown, 69 Pa. D. & C. 609 

(Cambria Cty. 1950)). However, there are exceptions to this 

general rule. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has set forth one 

of the exceptions applicable to this case as follows: 

[I]f a tenant, with a reasonable and good faith expectation 

of long-term occupancy or ownership, makes substantial 

and obvious improvements to the real estate of another, 

the tenant is entitled to compensation for the 

improvements when they have been accomplished with the

actual or implied knowledge and consent of the owner. It 

is a reasonable corollary of the implied promise to furnish 

a habitable leasehold rule . . . to imply a promise by the 

owner to reimburse a tenant for improvements reasonably 

made when there is a basis for concluding that there has 

been consent by the owners to the improvements. 

Chesney, 644 A.2d at 1244. In such cases, where the recovery 

by the lessee is based on an unjust enrichment or quantum 

meruit theory, the value of damages recoverable by the lessee is 

the amount of the benefit conferred on the lessor. Id. at 1244-

45; see also Styer v. Hugo, 619 A.2d 347, 350 

(Pa. Super. 1993), aff’d, 637 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1994) (“The law 

implies a contract between the parties . . . . This contract 

requires that the defendant pay the plaintiff the value of the 

benefits conferred, i.e., that the defendant make restitution to 

the plaintiff in quantum meruit. 

Here, [the Summerhills] made significant improvements to the 

Property [that] undoubtedly increased its value both as a 

residence and as a working farm. Although [the Summerhills] 

have not included in the record any evidence of the difference 

between the value of the Property in 1998 and its current value, 

we find the evidence of the costs of the improvements to be 

credible and uncontroverted. Because we find that retention by 

[Mary Huston] of these benefits without compensating [the 

Summerhills] for them would be unjust, we will award [the 

Summerhills] the amount of $55,634.51 in damages . . . . 

T.C.O., 12/17/2012, at 27-28 (citations modified). 
J-A08045-14 

- 27 - 

 In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we are guided by the following 

standard: 

Unjust enrichment is essentially an equitable doctrine. Where 

unjust enrichment is found, the law implies a contract, which 

requires the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the value of the 

benefit conferred. The elements necessary to prove unjust 

enrichment are: 

(1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation 

of such benefits by defendant; and (3) acceptance and retention 

of such benefits under such circumstances that it would be 

inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment 

of value. The application of the doctrine depends on the 

particular factual circumstances of the case at issue. In 

determining if the doctrine applies, our focus is not on the 

intention of the parties, but rather on whether the defendant has 

been unjustly enriched. 

Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted; formatting modified). 

Appellate review of equity matters is limited to a determination 

of whether the [trial court] committed an error of law or abused 

[its] discretion. The scope of review of a final decree in equity is 

limited and [the trial court’s decision] will not be disturbed 

unless it is unsupported by the evidence or demonstrably 

capricious. The test employed is not whether the appellate court 

would have reached the same result as the trial [court], which 

heard and saw the evidence, but whether a judicial mind, on due 

consideration of the evidence, could have reached the conclusion 

of the trial [court]. 

Robbins v. Kristofic, 643 A.2d 1079, 1082 (Pa. Super. 1994) (quoting 

Purdy v. Zaver, 580 A.2d 1127, 1130-31 (Pa. Super. 1990)). 

 It is true that Chesney concerned a residential lease and involved 

habitability issues. However, as the Summerhills aptly point out, various 
J-A08045-14 

- 28 - 

courts have applied Chesney for the proposition for which the trial court 

uses it in the context of commercial leases. Responsive Brief for the 

Summerhills at 12-14; see Cambria-Stoltz Enterps., v. TNT 

Investments, 747 A.2d 947, 953 (Pa. Super. 2000); 421 Willow Corp. v. 

Callowhill Assoc., No. 1848 MAY.TERM 2001, et al., 2003 WL 21361362, at 

*7 (Phila. Cty. May 23, 2003); see also Drysdale v. Woerth, 153 

F.Supp.2d 678, 687-89 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Thus, Mary Huston’s argument, 

which hinges entirely on the proposition that the principles articulated in 

Chesney simply do not apply to commercial leases, is confounded by the 

cited cases and, in the absence of further argument, warrants no relief. 

 Mary Huston’s second issue is based upon her contention that the trial 

court’s damage award, which was based on a theory of unjust enrichment, 

was predicated on the flawed conclusion that Mary Huston appreciated any 

benefits from the improvements to the land made by the Summerhills. Her 

argument effectively is stated in one sentence: “In other words, there might 

have been an increase in value, the value of which was not established by 

the party with the burden of proof, but there is no means by which any 

increase in value to her is in any means unjust.” Brief for Mary Huston at 8-

9. Mary Huston does not dispute that the Summerhills presented detailed 

records of the improvements to the land that they made during their 

tenancy, which were recited in detail by the trial court. Moreover, she does 

not cite any authority that might preclude the trial court’s reliance upon this 

to determine that it would be unjust not to compensate the Summerhills for 
J-A08045-14 

- 29 - 

their improvements. This conclusory attempt to establish trial court error is 

insufficiently developed to satisfy the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

Consequently, we find that this issue is waived. 

Judgment affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/03/2014