[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Foreman, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3409.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-3409

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE v. FOREMAN, APPELLANT. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Foreman, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3409.] 

Criminal law—Venue—R.C. 2901.12—Sufficiency of the evidence—Possession of 

drugs—Mere presence of drug metabolites in defendant’s body, without 

more, is insufficient evidence to establish venue in the charging county for 

drug-possession offense—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and 

conviction vacated.

(No. 2020-0866—Submitted May 12, 2021—Decided September 30, 2021.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Seneca County, No. 13-19-01, 

2020-Ohio-3145. 

_____________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider a question of venue: whether appellee, the 

state of Ohio, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, Kelly A. Foreman, 

committed the offense of possession of cocaine or any element of that offense 
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within Seneca County. Because we conclude that it did not, we reverse the 

judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals and vacate Foreman’s conviction 

for possession of cocaine. 

I. Relevant Background 

{¶ 2} After a bench trial in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas,

Foreman was convicted of one count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(a), a fifth-degree felony. The charge stemmed from the 

results of drug testing that was performed soon after Foreman gave birth to her son, 

J.B., at Tiffin Mercy Hospital, which is in Seneca County, Ohio. After Foreman 

gave birth to J.B., he exhibited symptoms of drug withdrawal and was tested for 

illegal substances. The test results showed the presence of cocaine metabolites (the 

compounds that are produced when the body metabolizes cocaine) in the umbilicalcord tissue and in J.B.’s urine and meconium. 

{¶ 3} At trial, Dr. Christian Meade, a pediatrician with Tiffin Mercy

Hospital, testified regarding his treatment of J.B. and the tests that were performed. 

He explained that the meconium accumulates “for several months” and generally 

reflects “what the baby has been exposed to in the second or third trimester.” 

Notably, Dr. Meade did not testify as to the amount of time that cocaine metabolites 

remain in the umbilical-cord tissue or a newborn’s urine after the mother’s 

ingestion of cocaine. Nor did the state introduce any other evidence on that subject. 

{¶ 4} Because J.B. tested positive for illegal substances, Megan Steyer, who 

was a protective-services caseworker with the Seneca County Department of Job 

and Family Services, interviewed Foreman. Steyer testified that Foreman admitted 

to using cocaine 6 to 12 times while she was pregnant, with the most recent use 

having been about two weeks before J.B.’s birth. Foreman informed Steyer, 

however, that she never used cocaine in front of her children, that her fiancé did not 

know about her cocaine use because she used it while he was at work, and that she 

did not use it at her residence in Seneca County. 
January Term, 2021 

3

{¶ 5} At trial, Foreman did not dispute any of the evidence presented and 

even acknowledged during closing arguments that the state offered circumstantial 

evidence that “at some point in the past * * * [she] had somewhere and sometime 

possessed cocaine.” Rather, Foreman argued that the state failed to prove venue in 

Seneca County beyond a reasonable doubt and moved for acquittal pursuant to 

Crim.R. 29 on that basis. Foreman insisted that once a controlled substance 

assimilates into a person’s body, the person no longer has control over it and does 

not possess it. Thus, Foreman asserted that she may have possessed cocaine when 

she ingested it but that the state presented no evidence proving that she possessed 

cocaine in Seneca County. 

{¶ 6} In response, the state argued that it proved “beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Ms. Foreman did possess cocaine in Seneca County, as it was in her body at 

the time she gave birth to her son.” The trial court ultimately agreed with the state, 

denied Foreman’s Crim.R. 29 motion, found Foreman guilty of possession of 

cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(a), and sentenced her to a threeyear period of community control. 

{¶ 7} On appeal, Foreman maintained that the state failed to establish venue 

in Seneca County. In a split decision, the court of appeals disagreed with Foreman 

and affirmed her conviction for possession of cocaine. 2020-Ohio-3145, 155 

N.E.3d 168, ¶ 16, 18. In doing so, the majority reasoned that for purposes of 

establishing that a defendant possessed a controlled substance in a particular 

county, “it is of no consequence whether the controlled substance [was] discovered 

in [the] defendant’s pocket or in any cellular matter expelled by his or her body.” 

Id. at ¶ 16. It concluded that the state presented sufficient evidence that Foreman 

possessed cocaine in Seneca County based on the “cocaine discovered in J.B.’s 

umbilical cord, urine, and meconium, which were collected after his birth at Tiffin 

Mercy Hospital.” Id. 
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{¶ 8} We accepted Foreman’s discretionary appeal to address the following 

proposition of law: “Because a conviction for drug possession requires the state to 

prove that an offender ‘ha[d] control over a thing or substance,’ the mere presence 

of drug metabolites in a defendant’s body, without more, does not suffice to 

establish venue in the charging county.” 160 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2020-Ohio-4574, 

153 N.E.3d 106, quoting R.C. 2925.01(K). 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 9} At the heart of the parties’ dispute is the question whether a defendant 

may possess cocaine within the meaning of R.C. 2925.11(A) by having cocaine 

metabolites in his or her body. The court of appeals held that a defendant may do 

so and that the state proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt because “Foreman 

possessed the cocaine discovered in J.B.’s umbilical cord, urine, and meconium, 

which were collected after his birth at Tiffin Mercy Hospital.” 2020-Ohio-3145 at 

¶ 16. Stated differently, the court of appeals determined that Foreman committed 

the element of “possession” in Seneca County at the time that she gave birth; the 

presence of cocaine in her body at that moment (as evidenced by the positive drugtest results), in and of itself established possession within the meaning of R.C. 

2925.11. See id. And because the birth occurred at a hospital in Seneca County, 

venue was sufficiently established. Id. at ¶ 16-17. 

{¶ 10} The state and amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association 

maintain that theory here. However, the state also asserts that when all the facts 

and circumstances are viewed together—including the positive drug-test results and 

the evidence showing that Foreman resided in Seneca County during her 

pregnancy, gave birth to J.B. there, and admitted to using cocaine on multiple 

occasions while pregnant—it is clear that venue in Seneca County was proved. 

{¶ 11} Foreman disagrees, arguing that a person cannot possess a controlled 

substance that has already been assimilated into that person’s body. At that point, 

Foreman asserts, the person no longer “ha[s] control over” the substance. And 
January Term, 2021 

5

therefore, Foreman contends, the state failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable 

doubt because it submitted no evidence at trial showing that she possessed cocaine 

in Seneca County. 

A. Applicable law 

{¶ 12} Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution affords the accused the 

right to “a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense 

is alleged to have been committed.” That provision accordingly “fixes venue, or 

the proper place to try a criminal matter * * *.” State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 

477, 453 N.E.2d 716 (1983). Additionally, R.C. 2901.12 contains “the statutory 

foundation for venue,” State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343 

(1981), and provides that “[t]he trial of a criminal case in this state shall be held in 

a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, and * * * in the territory of which 

the offense or any element of the offense was committed.” R.C. 2901.12(A). 

{¶ 13} “Under Article I, Section 10 and R.C. 2901.12, evidence of proper 

venue must be presented in order to sustain a conviction for an offense.” State v. 

Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 20. Although 

venue is not a material element of any criminal offense, Draggo at 90, it is a fact 

that must be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, unless it has been waived 

by the defendant, Headley at 477, citing State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 

969 (1907), paragraph one of the syllabus. Therefore, a “conviction may not be 

had” if the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

committed the alleged offense or an element of the offense in the charging county. 

State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 N.E.2d 258 (1947), paragraph three of the 

syllabus; see also Hampton at ¶ 19. The state need not prove venue “in express 

terms,” provided that “all the facts and circumstances in the case” establish it. 

Headley at 477, citing Dickerson at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 14} Here, the state charged Foreman with possession of cocaine in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). That statute provides, “No person shall knowingly 
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obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance,” R.C. 2925.11(A), and R.C. 

2925.11(C) establishes separate offenses based on the identity of the controlled 

substance involved. See State v. Eafford, 132 Ohio St.3d 159, 2012-Ohio-2224, 

970 N.E.2d 891, ¶ 13. Relevant here, R.C. 2925.11(C)(4) prescribes the offense of 

“possession of cocaine.” And R.C. 2925.01(K) defines the terms “possess” and 

“possession” as “having control over a thing or substance.” 

B. Foreman did not have control over the cocaine at the time that she gave birth 

{¶ 15} To establish venue in this case, the state had to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Foreman committed the offense of possession of cocaine or 

an element of that offense within Seneca County. Because the parties dispute 

whether the “possession” element of the offense occurred in Seneca County, we 

focus our analysis on that issue. As noted above, Foreman and the state disagree 

regarding whether Foreman possessed cocaine in Seneca County at the time that 

she gave birth to J.B. at Tiffin Mercy Hospital, where toxicology reports revealed 

that cocaine metabolites were present in the umbilical cord and J.B.’s urine and 

meconium. 

{¶ 16} The first question that we must consider is whether, at the time of 

J.B.’s birth, Foreman possessed, i.e., had control over, the assimilated cocaine that 

was subsequently discovered in the umbilical cord and J.B.’s urine and meconium. 

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this court has never addressed the element of “possession” 

in that context. Other courts have considered similar issues, however, and the great 

majority of them have held that the mere presence of a controlled substance in a 

person’s blood or urine does not establish that the person possessed the controlled 

substance. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 220 Wis.2d 371, 381, 584 N.W.2d 127 (1998) 

(holding that “the presence of drugs in [the defendant’s] urine and blood stream, 

without more, is insufficient evidence on which to base a possession conviction”); 

State v. Harris, 361 N.C. 400, 403-404, 646 S.E.2d 526 (2007) (concluding that a 

positive urinalysis indicating the presence of marijuana metabolites alone is 
January Term, 2021 

7

insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant possessed marijuana); State v. 

Montaño, 136 N.M. 144, 2004-NMCA-094, 95 P.3d 1059, ¶ 9 (holding similarly). 

{¶ 17} The reasoning underlying those conclusions is that when a controlled 

substance is assimilated into a person’s body, the person loses the ability to control 

or possess the substance. See, e.g., State v. Hornaday, 105 Wash.2d 120, 126-127, 

713 P.2d 71 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. 

Ortega, 177 Wash.2d 116, 126, 297 P.3d 57 (2013); State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 

941, 943 (Ala.App.1991). The Kansas Supreme Court articulated it well in State v. 

Flinchpaugh, 232 Kan. 831, 834, 659 P.2d 208 (1983): 

Once a controlled substance is within a person’s system, the 

power of the person to control, possess, use, [or] dispose of * * * [it] 

is at an end. The drug is assimilated by the body. The ability to 

control the drug is beyond human capabilities. The essential 

element of control is absent. Evidence of a controlled substance 

after it is assimilated in a person’s blood does not establish 

possession or control of that substance. 

{¶ 18} By way of contrast, when a person ingests a drug that has been 

placed in a small plastic bag or another type of container to conceal it within the 

person’s body, the person may still exercise control over the drug. See State v. 

Rudd, 70 Wash.App. 871, 873, 856 P.2d 699 (1993); People v. Spann, 187 

Cal.App.3d 400, 403-404, 232 Cal.Rptr. 31 (1986); see also United States v. Shuler, 

373 Fed.Appx. 949, 952-953 (11th Cir.2010). Once the drug is retrieved or 

expelled from the person’s body, the person may choose what to do with it. Stated 

differently, possession of the drug does not cease in that situation, see Rudd at 873, 

because the person ingested the drug in a way that prevented it from assimilating 

into the person’s body. 
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{¶ 19} We find this reasoning persuasive and accordingly reject the state’s 

argument that Foreman possessed cocaine at the time that she gave birth to J.B. in 

Seneca County. As noted above, the statutory definition of the word “possession” 

requires having control over a substance or thing. See R.C. 2925.01(K). Foreman, 

by her own admission, ingested cocaine several times during her pregnancy. 

However, once she ingested the cocaine and it assimilated into her body, she no 

longer had control over it. 

{¶ 20} Consequently, at the time of J.B.’s birth, Foreman was unable to 

exercise restraint, direct influence, or exert power over the cocaine that she had 

previously ingested. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 496 (2002) 

(defining the word “control” as “to exercise restraining or directing influence over” 

or “to have power over”). There was no longer an array of actions available to 

Foreman by which she could do with the cocaine whatever she wanted—whether 

that be to dispose of it, retrieve it, or destroy it. Because Foreman did not “hav[e] 

control over” the cocaine at any point during her time at the hospital, she did not 

possess it. See R.C. 2925.01(K). We therefore conclude that evidence of the mere 

presence of cocaine metabolites in Foreman’s body at the time that she gave birth 

to J.B. at Tiffin Mercy Hospital was insufficient to prove that she possessed cocaine 

in Seneca County. 

{¶ 21} Further, we find the state’s position to the contrary rather troubling. 

As noted above, the state maintains that “to simply establish venue the connection 

between Foreman’s possession of cocaine was made when the hospital tested the 

umbilical cord affirming that yes, she still had possession of cocaine in that 

moment, in Seneca County, Ohio.” Under that theory, a person could be charged 

with the offense of possession of a controlled substance in every single Ohio county 

in which the person tests positive for a controlled substance, regardless of where or 

when the person ingested it. 
January Term, 2021 

9

{¶ 22} For instance, consider a person who ingests cocaine in Ashtabula 

County and then drives sober to Hamilton County a few days later. By the state’s 

reasoning, that person could be charged with possession of cocaine in each and 

every county through which that person traveled, based on the sole fact that some 

assimilated form of cocaine remained in his system. The only evidence that the 

state would need to present to prove the offense in the charging county would be 

the person’s positive drug test. 

{¶ 23} Or imagine if that same person ingested cocaine in a country where 

possession of cocaine in small amounts for personal use is legal, see Tony Dunnell, 

Drugs in Peru: The Laws of Legal and Illegal Possession, New Peruvian (May 23, 

2018), http://www.newperuvian.com/drugs-in-peru-legal-and-illegal/ (accessed 

Sept. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DK5B-4LZY], and then traveled to Ohio. 

Because cocaine metabolites can generally be detected in urine for days and in some 

cases for over a week after ingestion, see Joyce Nickley et al., A sensitive assay for 

urinary cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine shows more positive results and 

longer half-lives than those using traditional cut-offs, 9 Drug Testing & Analysis 

1214-1216 (2017), available at https://analyticalsciencejournals.onlinelibrary. 

wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/dta.2153 (accessed Sept. 23, 2021) 

[https://perma.cc/JQN3-A3UA], that person could be prosecuted for cocaine 

possession in any Ohio county that he enters—even though he ingested it in a 

country where its use is legal over a week before he entered Ohio. 

{¶ 24} This court could go on with scenarios illustrating the expansiveness 

of the state’s position. But we will stop here and note that adopting the state’s 

position—i.e., that a person commits the element of “possession” in the charging 

county merely when the assimilated controlled substance is in the person’s body—

seems dangerously similar to the criminalization of the “status” of having 

previously used or ingested a controlled substance. See Robinson v. California, 

370 U.S. 666-667, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (holding that a California 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, as applied, because it made “the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a 

criminal offense for which the offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he 

reforms,’ * * * even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State 

or been guilty of any irregular behavior there”); State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, 

254 P.3d 183, ¶ 31 (“simply having the metabolite of a controlled substance in the 

body is similar to a ‘status’ of having previously ingested the controlled 

substance”). We need not reach that issue today, however, in light of our 

conclusion that the mere presence of cocaine metabolites in Foreman’s body was 

insufficient evidence to prove that she possessed cocaine in Seneca County. 

C. There was insufficient circumstantial evidence presented establishing venue in 

Seneca County 

{¶ 25} We also conclude that there was insufficient circumstantial evidence 

presented to establish venue in Seneca County. As noted above, the state contends 

that the positive drug-test results, in conjunction with the fact that Foreman resided 

in Seneca County during her pregnancy, gave birth to J.B. there, and admitted to 

using cocaine on multiple occasions while she was pregnant established venue in 

Seneca County. The state emphasizes that venue need not be proved in express 

terms but may be established by all the facts and circumstances in the case. 

{¶ 26} It is true that the presence of assimilated drugs in a person’s system 

may be circumstantial evidence of the person’s prior possession of the drug. See 

Griffin, 220 Wis.2d at 381, 584 N.W.2d 127 (“Although the presence of drugs in 

someone’s system, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conviction for 

possession, the presence of drugs is circumstantial evidence of prior possession”); 

Flinchpaugh, 232 Kan. at 835, 659 P.2d 208 (same). Based on a positive drug-test 

result, a fact-finder may deduce that the defendant ingested the drug and likely 

possessed it but is left to speculate as to where that prior possession occurred. Thus, 

for purposes of proving venue under R.C. 2901.12(A), sufficient corroborating 
January Term, 2021 

11 

evidence is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

possessed the drug within the charging county. See Logan v. Cox, 89 Ohio App.3d 

349, 354, 624 N.E.2d 751 (4th Dist.1993); Griffin at 381; Flinchpaugh at 835-836. 

{¶ 27} Here, there was no such corroborating evidence presented at trial 

“tending to prove” that Foreman possessed the cocaine at a prior time in Seneca 

County. See State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 155, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988). The 

fact that Foreman lived in Seneca County when she was pregnant with J.B. does 

not establish that she possessed cocaine there. And in fact, evidence presented at 

trial suggested otherwise—the protective-services caseworker testified that 

Foreman stated that she never used cocaine in front of her children, that her fiancé 

did not know about her cocaine use, and that she did not use it at her home in Seneca 

County. Nor does the fact that Foreman gave birth to J.B. in Seneca County 

establish that Foreman possessed cocaine there. 

{¶ 28} The state repeatedly emphasizes in its merit brief that Foreman

admitted to using cocaine while she was pregnant with J.B. and estimated that she 

used cocaine within two weeks before J.B.’s birth. It maintains that this suggests 

that Foreman knowingly possessed cocaine within Seneca County. But again, that 

evidence does not prove venue in Seneca County beyond a reasonable doubt. It 

merely establishes that Foreman possessed cocaine somewhere at some time, not 

that Foreman possessed cocaine in Seneca County. 

{¶ 29} The record before us does not reflect that Foreman ever informed the 

caseworker of where she ingested the cocaine, let alone that she did so in Seneca 

County. See State v. Barno, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2000-P-0100, 2001 WL 

1116908, *5-6 (Sept. 21, 2001) (noting that the underage defendant admitted that 

she had been drinking alcoholic beverages at a hotel located within the charging 

county). Nor did the state present evidence that Foreman had been in Seneca 

County during the two-week timeframe in which she admitted to using cocaine 

prior to J.B.’s birth. The state offered no evidence concerning the amount of time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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that cocaine metabolites remain in a person’s system after ingesting it or evidence 

demonstrating Foreman’s whereabouts during such a timeframe. See State v. Scott, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63234, 1994 WL 173716, *2-3 (May 5, 1994) (reasoning 

that a toxicologist’s testimony regarding how long cocaine metabolites remain in a 

person’s system after ingestion and evidence that the defendant was working in the 

charging county during that timeframe was sufficient to establish that the defendant 

possessed cocaine in the charging county); see also State v. McGowan, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 63491, 1993 WL 311372, *1-2 (Aug. 12, 1993). 

{¶ 30} Further, we do not find the cases on which the state and amicus

curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association rely persuasive, because in those 

cases there was evidence corroborating positive drug-test results and establishing 

that the defendants obtained, used, or possessed a controlled substance in the 

charging county. See, e.g., State v. Napper, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-91-11, 1991 WL 

256521, *3 (Nov. 27, 1991) (holding that evidence that the police discovered 

cocaine and drug paraphernalia at the defendant’s residence and testimony 

regarding the period of time that cocaine metabolites remain in urine was sufficient 

evidence to establish venue in the charging county); State v. Moyar, 3d Dist. 

Auglaize No. 2-06-10, 2006-Ohio-5974, ¶ 14-18 (police found cocaine in 

defendant’s bedroom and drug paraphernalia on his person); McGowan at *2-3 

(toxicologist testified that defendant’s positive urine screen implicated recent use 

within two to four hours, and defendant was located within the charging county 

during that time). No such corroborating evidence was presented in this case, 

however; there was no evidence that drugs or drug paraphernalia were discovered 

at Foreman’s residence or on her person, and there was no eyewitness testimony 

that Foreman purchased cocaine in Seneca County. The evidence demonstrated 

only that Foreman ingested cocaine several times while she was pregnant with J.B. 

There was no other evidence offered that tended to prove that she possessed the 
January Term, 2021 

13 

cocaine at a prior time in Seneca County. See Logan, 89 Ohio App.3d at 354, 624 

N.E.2d 751. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 31} There is no doubt that the underlying events in this case are 

unfortunate. But the state had the burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, at ¶ 19. 

And it failed to meet that burden, neglecting to develop its case to sufficiently 

establish venue. As a result, based on the record before us, we conclude that the 

state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Foreman committed the offense 

of possession of cocaine in Seneca County. Because venue must be proved to 

sustain a conviction for an offense, Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at 477, 453 N.E.2d 716, 

citing Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d at 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343, Foreman’s conviction for 

possession of cocaine may not stand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 

Third District Court of Appeals holding otherwise and vacate Foreman’s conviction 

for possession of cocaine, R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4). 

Judgment reversed 

and conviction vacated. 

KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., 

concur. 

_________________ 

Derek W. DeVine, Seneca County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rebeka

Beresh, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Craig M. Jaquith, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellant. 

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. Harold, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 

Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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David J. Carey, Elena Thompson, and Freda J. Levenson, urging reversal 

for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation. 

_________________