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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

TOLAS OIL & GAS EXPLORATION CO.,

PETRO J. TOLAS, GEORGE J. TOLAS,

TOLAS BROTHERS, INC., DOUGLAS 

DARNELL, WILLIAM WERNER,

ROBERT WERNER, JOHN A. ERITANO,

PETER S. WILES, SANDY T. WILES, and

PAUL F. PATRICK,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

August 22, 2017

v Nos. 333075, 333942

Montcalm Circuit Court

BACH SERVICES & MANUFACTURING LLC,

BACH ENERGY SYSTEMS LLC, BACH 

OILFIELD SERVICES LLC, D&J

EXPLORATION LLC, R CUBED LLC,

ROBIN BACH, RICK BACH, DAVID VERWEY,

DAN VERWEY, ANDY VERWEY, KENNETH 

RUSSELL, and DAVID BIEGANOWSKI,

LC No. 2015-020942-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and SWARTZLE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs appeal by leave granted in both docket numbers the 

trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to change venue and subsequent order granting 

attorney fees and costs to defendants. This matter arises out of an oil and gas well physically 

located in Eaton County. Plaintiffs and at least some defendants hold ownership interests in the 

well, and many of them have a variety of shared interests in other wells in other counties. The 

general allegations are that defendants fraudulently deceived investors into approving a 

procedure intended to increase the well’s oil production but that actually resulted in diminished 

production and eventual closure of the well. Defendants profited from performing the procedure. 

Relevant to the instant appeal, defendants contended that venue was improper in Montcalm 

County and was instead proper in Eaton County, and plaintiffs were obligated to pay costs and 

fees associated with transferring the matter. The trial court agreed. We reverse and remand for 

further proceedings in Montcalm County. 
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As an initial matter, the trial court determined that all of plaintiffs’ allegations sounded in 

tort. Because plaintiffs do not dispute this finding on appeal, we will neither consider nor revisit 

that determination; rather, we will simply accept it without making our own determination. We 

review for clear error a trial court’s ruling on a motion to change improper venue. Massey v 

Mandell, 462 Mich 375, 379; 614 NW2d 70 (2000). Venue is governed by statute. Dimmitt & 

Owens Fin, Inc v Deloitte & Touche (ISC), LLC, 481 Mich 618, 624; 752 NW2d 37 (2008). The 

trial court’s interpretation of underlying statutes is reviewed de novo. Shiroka v Farm Bureau 

Gen Ins Co of Mich, 276 Mich App 98, 102; 740 NW2d 316 (2007). Plaintiffs must establish the 

propriety of their chosen venue, but “[b]attles over venue that endure for years and are a great 

expense should be discouraged and avoided when there are convenient and fair locations for trial

that fulfill the venue requirements of Michigan statutes and court rules.” Gross v Gen Motors 

Corp, 448 Mich 147, 155-156; 528 NW2d 707 (1995). 

Because this is presumed to be a tort action, venue analysis begins with MCL 600.1629, 

which addresses “an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal 

injury, property damage, or wrongful death.” Under MCL 600.1629(2), a party may seek a 

change of venue “based on hardship or inconvenience,” which is inapplicable because 

defendants did not do so. The parties agree that none of the enumerated conditions under MCL 

600.1629(1)(a) through (c) are satisfied because those three subsections explicitly depend on a 

single county in which a single injury occurred, or a single plaintiff or defendant. We agree. See 

Massey, 462 Mich at 382 n 5. Therefore, venue must be determined pursuant to MCL 

600.1629(1)(d), which provides that venue is therefore proper in “a county that satisfies the 

criteria under [MCL 600.1621] or [MCL 600.1627].” 

MCL 600.1621 provides: 

Except for actions provided for in sections 1605, 1611, 1615, and 1629, 

venue is determined as follows: 

(a) The county in which a defendant resides, has a place of business, or 

conducts business, or in which the registered office of a defendant corporation is 

located, is a proper county in which to commence and try an action. 

(b) If none of the defendants meet 1 or more of the criteria in subdivision 

(a), the county in which a plaintiff resides or has a place of business, or in which 

the registered office of a plaintiff corporation is located, is a proper county in 

which to commence and try an action. 

(c) An action against a fiduciary appointed by court order shall be 

commenced in the county in which the fiduciary was appointed. 

MCL 600.1627 provides: 

Except for actions founded on contract and actions provided for in 

sections 1605, 1611, 1615, and 1629, the county in which all or a part of the cause 

of action arose is a proper county in which to commence and try the action. Suits 

against the surety of a public officer or his or her appointees are not excepted 

from the application of this section. 
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This Court has referred to both MCL 600.1621 and MCL 600.1627 as “general venue statutes.” 

Colucci v McMillin, 256 Mich App 88, 97, 100; 662 NW2d 87 (2003). Both statutes provide 

exceptions for “actions provided for in sections 1605, 1611, 1615, and 1629,” the first three of 

which are inapplicable and the last of which, as discussed, simply points back to §§ 1621 or 

1627. Although MCL 600.1621 is applicable to actions sounding in contract, nothing in the 

plain language thereof restricts it to such actions, and indeed, our Supreme Court has clearly 

applied it in other circumstances. See Massey, 462 Mich at 377, 384-385. 

Notably, other than MCL 600.1621(c), both statutes use “a” instead of “the,” with the 

obvious implication that venue might be proper in more than one county. Furthermore, the plain 

language of MCL 600.1629(1)(d) uses “or,” equally clearly establishing that venue might be 

proper in any county proper under either §§ 1621 or 1627. In a forum non conveniens context, a 

plaintiff’s selection of a particular venue is given deference. Anderson v Great Lakes Dredge & 

Dock Co, 411 Mich 619, 628-629; 309 NW2d 539 (1981); Duyck v Intl Playtex, Inc, 144 Mich 

App 595, 599; 375 NW2d 769 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Russell v Chrysler Corp, 

443 Mich 617; 505 NW2d 263 (1993). Although not directly applicable, the principle that a 

plaintiff is entitled to choose among any of several available proper venues is applicable, and 

moreover there is no statutory priority between MCL 600.1627 and MCL 600.1621. Dawley v 

Hall, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 331800, issued May 9, 2017) (slip op 

at p 5). Consequently, plaintiffs are entitled to commence suit in any county that would be 

deemed proper under either MCL 600.1621 or MCL 600.1627. 

Here, venue is proper under MCL 600.1621(a) in a county “in which a defendant resides, 

has a place of business, or conducts business, or in which the registered office of a defendant 

corporation is located.” No party disputed plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint that some of 

the defendants conducted business in Montcalm County. The arguments in the trial court 

centered primarily on legal questions involving the application of the various venue statutes. 

Plaintiffs therefore carried their burden of proving a proper venue under MCL 600.1629(1)(d). 

MCL 600.1621(a); Gross, 448 Mich at 155-156. The trial court unambiguously erred in 

concluding that venue had been improper in Montcalm County. 

Although strictly speaking it is therefore irrelevant whether venue might have also been 

proper in Eaton County, some of the defendants make that argument. We disagree. As noted, “a 

defendant” has a different meaning from “the defendant.” Massey, 462 Mich at 382-383, 382 n 5 

and n 7. Use of “the” is proper where there is a single defendant. Shiroka, 276 Mich App at 

106. Obviously, both MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i) and (b)(i) are inapplicable in the instant case 

involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants. Although MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii) are 

satisfied if, respectively, “a defendant” or “a plaintiff” has its corporate registered office in that 

county, there are no claims by any party in the instant case that any plaintiff or defendant has a 

corporate registered office in Eaton County. Consequently, venue cannot be established under 

Subdivisions 1629(1)(a) or 1629(1)(b). Therefore, the trial court’s venue ruling cannot be 

supported on this alternative ground where there are multiple plaintiffs and defendants. Massey, 

462 Mich at 382 n 5; Shiroka, 276 Mich App at 106. 

Additionally, MCL 600.1629(1)(a) or MCL 600.1629(1)(b) both provide that venue is 

proper in “[t]he county in which the original injury occurred,” which “clearly and 

unambiguously limits venue to the situs of the original injury when either the defendant or the 
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plaintiff resides, does business, or has a corporate office there.” Dimmitt, 481 Mich at 628. 

Significantly, the “original injury” is not the original breach of the standard of care, and the two 

might be located in different counties. Id. at 630. In that case, the Court determined that the 

injury was where the plaintiffs felt the effects of the defendants’ breach, and because the injury 

was the plaintiffs’ parent company’s inability to satisfy its financial obligations and subsequent 

forced liquidation, it occurred in the county of the plaintiffs’ principal places of business. Id. at 

632. 

The first injury suffered here was diminished financial returns from the diminished 

productivity of the well, which therefore was felt at their principal places of business (for 

plaintiffs that are companies) and at their places of residence (for the individual plaintiffs). None 

of the principal places of business or residences were argued to be in Eaton County, so the 

original injury did not occur there; furthermore, because plaintiffs are located in various different 

counties, the requirement of “the county” in which the original injury occurred cannot be 

satisfied in any event. Defendant Russell’s reliance on Schroeder v Terra Energy, Ltd, 223 Mich 

App 176, 179, 180, 181, 188-189; 565 NW2d 887 (1997), for the proposition that plaintiffs 

suffered their economic damage at the wellhead is misplaced because Schroeder was a breach of 

contract action where the issue on appeal involved the interpretation of language in a lease 

agreement; venue and the location of the original injury for purposes of MCL 600.1629 were not 

at issue in that case. Defendants do not argue that MCL 600.1692(1)(c) applies, and neither §

1629(1)(a) nor § 1629(1)(b) apply. Although MCR 8.111(D) discusses when a case should be 

assigned to a particular judge based on a prior connection to an action arising out of the same 

transaction or occurrence, MCR 8.111 is only directed at case assignment to judges within a 

particular court; it is not a venue rule. MCR 8.111(A); MCR 8.110(A). 

The trial court clearly erred in ruling that venue was improper in Montcalm County. The 

trial court’s order so holding is reversed. Because the trial court’s order granting costs, fees, and 

expenses was based on MCR 2.223(B)(1) and MCL 600.1653, which are predicated on a motion 

to change venue being properly granted, that order must likewise be reversed. See Smith v 

Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 526, 526; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). Accordingly, the trial court’s orders 

under appeal are reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Montcalm Circuit Court for further 

proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle