The Honor able Richa rd Mills, United St ates District Judge f or the Centra l District of * I llinois , sitti ng by

desig nation. -1- NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0835n.06 F iled: Novem ber 15, 2006 No. 04-4146 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DA NAG OIN S, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. M ARK SAU ND ER S, W ar de n, Respondent-Appellee.

___________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DI STRIC T OF OHI O

BEF ORE: BO GGS, Chief J udg e; DAUG HTREY, C ircuit J udg e; and MI L L S, District J udg e. * PER C URI AM. This case is about the importanc e of f inality and, more particula

rly , about the s trict limit s on the ava ilability of re lief fr om a judg ment under F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 60(b). A one -y ear

statute of l im it a

ti o n s applies to petitions for habe as cor pus collatera lly

challeng ing state convic tions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)( 1). Almost two y ear s after his state conviction and se ntence beca me final, Da

na Goins filed a pro se pe tit ion fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s p ur su ant t o 28 U .S. C. § 2254. The district cour t denied the pe tition as ti me-ba rre d and re fused to gra n t a cer tificate ofNo. 04-4146

Goins v. Saunders

The district cour

t stated the filing date a s Marc h 26, 2001, one of thre e date s stamped on 1 the petition. (The other

two dates a

re F ebrua ry 8 and F ebrua

ry 28.) In Houston v. Lack, howeve r, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner ’s notice of appea l ge nera lly

should be c on sid e re d f

ile d o n th e date it i s g ive n to pr iso n a uth or iti e s to ma il, ra

the r t ha n th e date it i s re c e ive d b y

the c ourt . 4 87 U. S. 2 66 , 2 74 (1 98 8) ; se e als o Fe e nin v . M y e rs , 110 F. App’ x 669, 671 (6th Cir. 2004) (a

pply ing the “prison mailbox” rule to the filing of a pro se habea s petition). As a re sult, we treat the petition as filed on the date Goins signe d it, Febr uary 5, 2001.

-- 2

-- appea lability . Goins then filed a motion for relief from the judgme nt unde r Rule 60(b), a rguing that
an intervening chang e in the law rende red his pe tition timely . The district cour t denied the motion, but grante d a cer

tificate of appea lability
. Goins, now repr esente d by counsel, appea ls. The district
c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe Rul e 60 (b ) m oti on , a nd the re fo re we a ff

ir m. I On Marc h 29, 1999, an Ohio state c ourt sentenc ed Goins to fi ft een y ear s of imprisonment
a ft e r h e ple d guil ty

to o ne c ount e a c h o f b ri be ry , c omp e lli ngpr os tit uti on , il le g a l us e of

a min or in nudity -oriente d materia l, and corruption of a minor. His rig ht to appeal wa s expl ained both on the g uil ty ple a fo rm

that he sig ne d a

nd by the se nte nc ingjud g e . G oin s a lle g e s th a t he a sk e d h is c ourt
appointed counsel to f

ile an appea l, but no direc t a ppeal ever was filed. Goins’s convicti o n and sentenc e bec ame f

inal on April 28, 1999, the last day on which he c ould have f iled a timely

direc t
a pp e a l. O hio Re v. Cod e § 2 50 5. 07 (“ Af te r t he e ntr y of a fi na l or de r . . . , the pe ri od of tim e wi thi n which the a

ppeal sha ll be perf

ecte d, unless otherwise pr ovided by law, is thirty

day s.”). Six hundred a

nd fifty -nine da

y s later, on F ebrua ry

5, 2001, Goins filed his fede ral ha beas corpu s p et i t i o n . He r aised six claims, i ncluding claims that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel a nd was de nied hi s rig ht to an appeal. Be fore the di strict court, he argued that, for various 1No. 04-4146

Goins v. Saunders

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-- rea sons, 509 of the 659 day s should not count toward the limitations period. The district cour t reje cted many of his a

rguments and dismiss ed his pe tition as untimely
. Both the district c ourt and t h i s c o u rtd e n i e d

G o i n s a c e rt i f i c a t e o f a p p e a l a b i l i ty. I n the di strict court, Goins filed what he called a “ motion for reope ning of petition for habe as corpus.” He argued that int erve ning de cisions by this court and by

the United States District Court fo r the Southe rn Di str ic t of Oh io c ha ng e d the law g ov e rn ing the tim e lin e ss of his pe tit ion and wo uld compel a f

inding that the petit ion was ti mely filed. The dist rict court treated t he motion as a motion for r elief f rom the judg ment under Rule 60( b). (On a ppeal, Goins ag ree s that it was corre ct t o do so.) T h e d i s trict court de nied the motion, but gr anted a cer tificate of appea lability

“with re spect to the denial of the petitioner’s motion to reope n the case , specific ally with r espec t to pe titioner’s first and fifth claims for

relief ” ( i.e. , the claims for

ineffe ctive assistanc e and de nial of the rig ht to appeal)
. II We reviewthe denial of

a motion filed und er Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion. Hood v. Hood , 5 9 F .3 d 4 0, 42 (6 th C ir . 1 99 5) . Ru le 60 (b ) s ay s: On motion and upon such terms a s are just, the court may relieve a par

ty or a pa rty ’s leg al re prese ntative from a final judg ment, order , or proc ee d i n g fo r the following re a so ns : (1 ) m ist ake , in a dv e rt e nc e , s ur pr ise , o r e xcu sa

ble ne g le c t; (2) ne wly

discovere d evidenc e which by due dilige nce co u l d n o t have be en dis c ov e re d in

tim e to m ov e fo r a

ne w tri a l un de r R

ule 59 (b ); (3) fra ud (whe ther here tofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsi c), misre prese ntation, or oth e r m isc on du c t of

an a dv e rs e pa

rt y ; (4 ) t he jud g me nt i s v oid ; (5) the judg ment has bee n satisfied, rele ased, or dischar g ed, or a prior judg ment upon wh ic h it is ba se d ha s bee n re ve rs e d or o the rw ise va c a te d, or it i s n o lo ng e r e qu ita

ble that the judg ment should have prospe ctive application; orNo. 04-4146

Goins v. Saunders

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-- (6 ) a ny oth e r r e a so n ju sti fy

ingre lie f f

ro m th e op e ra

tio n o f t he jud g me nt. Be cause Goins’s motion does not f it within any

of the fir st five categ ories, he must re ly on the catchall cate g ory

of Rule 60(b)( 6). A ha

beas pe titioner seekingrelief under Rule 60( b)(6) m u s t “show ‘extraordinar

y circ umstances’ ju s t i fy i n g t he re openingof a f inal judgme nt.” Gonzalez v. Crosby , 5 4 5 U. S
. 5 2 4 , 1 2 5 S
. C t
. 2 6 4 1 , 2 6 4 9 (2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Ack ermann v . United States , 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950))
. I nterve ning c hang es of law g ener ally do not qualify

as “extraordinar

y circ umstances.” Ib id
. I n Gonzalez , the S upreme Court aff irmed t he denial of a Rule 60( b)(6) motion in a procedur al setting almost identical to this one. Ba sed on its view that a st ate petition dismiss ed as procedur ally barr ed could not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations, t he district court in Go nz ale z dismiss ed the pe tit ion e r’ s h a

be a s p e tit ion

a s unti mel y . Th e S upre me Court the n h e ld i n a

dif fe re nt c a se that a p ro ce d u ra l l y b arre d s t at e f i l i n g could toll the statute of limit ations as l ong as t he proc edura l bar at issue was a

restric tion on obtaining relief rather than a r estriction on filing
. Se e Ar tuz v . B e nn e tt , 531 U.S. 4, 10 (2000). The petitioner filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the judg ment, arguing the district court would not have dismiss ed his orig inal petition if it had applied the rule a nnounced in Artuz . The district cour t denied the motion, and the Supre me Court aff irmed. Th e Court a ssume d that the pe tit ion e r wa s cor re c t that the dis tr ic t court ’s or ig ina l ti me lin e ss holding wa s incorre ct under Artuz
. Gonzalez , 125 S. Ct . at 2650. I t never theless conclude d that the petitioner wa s not entitled to prevail on his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. “I t is hardly extraordinary ,” theNo. 04-4146

Goins v. Saunders

I f any thing, they

are less extraordinary , since it appe ars to us that none of the four 2 decisions Goins cites – Di Ce nz i v . R os e , 419 F.3d 493 ( 6th Cir. 2005), Gran ge r v . H ur t , 8 4 F. App’x 500 (6th Ci r. 2004), Colwell v. Tanner , 79 F. App’ x 89 (6th Cir. 2003), and W olfe v. Ra nd le , 267 F. Supp. 2d 743 (S.D. Ohio 2003) – would c ompel the district court to conc lude that his petition was timely

even if any of these de cisions were applied to his case
.

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-- Court expl ained, “ that subsequently , afte r petitioner’ s case was no longe r pending , this Court ar rived at a diff ere nt interpretation.” Ib id
. Goins offe rs us no rea son to be lieve that the intervening decisions he c ites are somehow more extraordinary than t he int erve ning chang e in law in Gonzalez
. Ins te a d, he a tte mpt s to dis tin g uis h 2 Gonzalez by arguing that, unlike in Gonzalez , the cert if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity iss ue d in thi s c a se permits us to review the underlying de termination that the petition was time-ba rre d as w el l as the de nia l of the Rul e 60 (b ) mot ion
. We do ub t that the langua g e us e d in t he c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity supports this broad rea ding, but we need not deter mine whether it does. In an appeal taken from the denial of a

Rule 60(b) motion, our jurisdiction is li mited to review of the district c ourt’s denia l of the motion for re lief fr om the judgme nt. We have no jurisdi ct i o n t o re view the mer its of the underlying c laims, reg ardle ss of what the c ertificate of a ppeala bility say s. See B rowder v. Dir., De p’ t of Cor r. , 434 U. S. 257 , 263 n. 7 ( 19 78 ); Smith v. Anderson , 402 F.3d 718, 727 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Consequently , Gonzalez controls: even if we we re to a ssume, arguendo , th a t th e a lle g e d c ha ng e in law could be nefi t Go i n s i f it were applied to his case , he has not de monstrated the “ extraordinary circ umstances” require d for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The dist rict court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. I ts judgment is AF FI RMED.