alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### LOSINGER v. BANNAN.

No. 11953.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

June 17, 1953.

*677This cause was not argued orally but presented on petition by appellant.

Before SIMONS, Chief Judge, and ALLEN, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the D istrict Court dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner pleaded guilty on May 10, 1945, in the Michigan state court to an information charging him with setting fire to and burning a dwelling house located in Montcalm County, Michigan. He was sentenced in accordance with Michigan statute to a minimum of five years and a maximum of twenty years imprisonment. § 72, Penal Code, C.L.1948, § 750.72, Stat.Ann. § 28.267.

The judgment of conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the judgment. People v. Losinger, 331 Mich. 490, 50 N.W.2d 137. The case was heard by the entire bench and the opinion reflects the fact, as stated therein, that the record was examined with “meticulous care.” Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States, 1952, 343 U.S. 911, 72 S.Ct. 644, 96 L.Ed. 1327.

In the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the District Court the same grounds were urged for issuance of the writ as were raised before the Michigan Supreme Court. The District. Court dismissed the petition for the reason that the petitioner had made no application to the state court for a writ of habeas corpus as required by Title 28 U.S.C., § 2254.

As held by this court in Whalen v. Frisbee, 185 F.2d 607, certiorari denied 341 U.S. 911, 71 S.Ct. 619, 95 L.Ed. 1348, the corrective processes, of Michigan law for the remedy of illegal conviction are adequate. No circumstances are described which render these processes ineffective to protect the rights of the petitioner. Hence the mandate of Section 2254 squarely applies and requires dismissal.

Many objections dealing with questions of fact arising in the trial of the case in the state court were raised before the Supreme Court of Michigan and are discussed in People 'v. Losinger, supra. The evidence upon these questions was conflicting and as to them the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction. Cf. U. S. v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 562.

The appeal is dismissed.
STATE v. CANNON.

No. COA04-937.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed July 5, 2005.

Certification Date July 25, 2005.

Appeal from the Mecklenburg (94CRS60232).

Case without published opinion. Appeal dismissed.
# CE2004065EN.01008801.xml

| 13.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 65/88 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 65/88

---

(2004/C 65 E/099)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1684/03

by Jens-Peter Bonde (EDD) to the Commission

(20 May 2003)

Subject:   Definition of ‘contracts with the Commission’

Subject:

Further to the Commission's answer of 11 February to my question, E-2968/02 (1), concerning the recruitment competition, I should like a more detailed definition of the term ‘contracts with the Commission’.

1

The answer reads as follows: ‘x candidates were called to the oral test exam. Of these, x had or have had contracts with the Commission’.

x

Will the Commission say whether the term ‘young national expert’ falls within the definition of ‘contracts with the Commission’?

Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission

(20 June 2003)

(20 June 2003)

In the Commission's response of 11 February 2003, the reference to candidates having or having had ‘contracts with the Commission’ meant that those candidates had or have had ‘permanent’, ‘temporary’ or ‘auxiliary’ contracts with the Commission, under the provisions of Article 1 (18) and Article 2 (18) of Title I — General provisions of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Communities.

‘Seconded national expert’ contracts are not encoded in the Commission's database, nor is this information requested from those taking part in competitions.

---

(1)  OJ C 192 E, 14.8.2003, p. 88.

1

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21 -0649 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TYLER FREDERICK ERICKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including November 21, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 13 2022

10/13/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0649
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and in connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Paladin Realty Income Properties, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), the undersigned, the President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Board of Directors of the Company, certifies that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                                                            
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ James R. Worms                                                                          
|James R. Worms President, Chief Executive Officer and Director (Principal Executive Officer)



November 14, 2005
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT W YLM INA ELIZAB E TH HETTINGA,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt, v. TIM OTHY P. LOUM ENA; e t a l.,

De fe nda n ts-Appe lle e s. No. 14-17135 D.C . No. 5:13-c v-02217-R M W M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia R ona ld M . Whyte , Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

Nove m b e r 16, 2016 ** B e fore : LEAVY, B ER ZON, a nd M UR GUIA, C irc uit Judge s. Wy lm ina Eliz a be th He ttinga

a ppe a l s pro se from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt dismissing he r 42 U.S.C . § 1983 a c t ion a lle g ing c o nstitutiona l viola tions arising from

he r stat e c ourt divorc e proc e e d ings. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 

# FIL ED N OV 23 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2). Ac c o rdingly , He ttinga ’ s re que s ts for ora l a

rgum e n t se t forth in he r ope ning brie f and re ply are de nie d.U.S.C . § 1291. W e re v ie w de novo a dism issa l unde r the Rook e r-Fe l dman doc trine . N oe l v . Hall , 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th C ir. 2003). W e a ffirm . W e a ffirm

the distric t c ourt’ s dism issa l be c a use He ttinga fa ile d to ra ise any argum e nt in he r ope ning brie f c onc e rning the distric t c ourt’ s ground for dism issa l, and ha s the re fore wa ive d

he r a ppe a l of the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt. Se e Smith v . Marsh , 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th C ir. 1999) (“ [A] rgum e n ts not ra ise d by a pa rty in its ope ning brie f are de e m e d wa ive d.” ). W e do not c onside r argum e nts ra ise d for the first tim e on a ppe a l. Se e Padge tt v . W

right , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th C ir. 2009). AFFIRM E D.

1 4 - 1 7 1 3 5 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMES EDWARD MITCHELL,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 393 WAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMES EDWARD MITCHELL,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 394 WAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 21st day of April, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in connection with the filing of the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the “Report”) by China
Fire & Security Group, Inc. (the “Registrant”), I, Brian Lin, hereby certify
that:





1. To the
best of my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. To the
best of my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Registrant.




Dated:
      August 10, 2009
                        By:
                        /s/
      Brian LinName: Brian
      LinTitle:  
      Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 10.1


 


Chain
Cloud Mall System


 


Exclusive
Operation and Use Rights Authorization Letter


 


We
hereby authorize Chain Cloud Mall E-commerce (Tianjin) Co., Ltd, to exclusive operate and use the Chain Cloud Mall System and
the authorization period of this letter is the same as the term of the EXCLUSIVE TECHNOLOGY CONSULTING AND SERVICE AGREEMENT entered
into by and between Chain Cloud Mall Network and Technology (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. and Chain Cloud Mall E-commerce (Tianjin) Co.,
Ltd. dated July 31, 2019. Chain Cloud Mall Network and Technology (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. has the right to unilaterally terminate
this authorization at any time by providing a 30 day prior notice to Chain Cloud Mall E-commerce (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. This authorization
is only for Chain Cloud Mall E-commerce (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. and Chain Cloud Mall E-commerce (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. shall not re-authorize
or assign such rights to any third party.


 


Chain
Cloud Mall Network and Technology (Tianjin) Co., Ltd.


 


July
31, 2019
EXHIBIT 32.1

|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                               |   |                          |
|------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|
|                               |   |                          |   |
| Date:       December 15, 2008 | By:    | /s/ Eugene      M. Weiss |   |
|                               |   | Eugene      M. Weiss          |   |
|                               |   | Chief      Executive Officer  |   |
|                               |   | Chief      Financial Officer  |   |
SKWERER v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF REVENUE.

No. COA04-674.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed March 15, 2005.

Certification Date April 4, 2005.

Appeal from the Wake (03CVS012609).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
Exhibit
32.2









CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Energy Holdings
International, Inc. (the “Company”) for the quarter ended September 30, 2009, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, John Adair, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer  of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge:




(i)The Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and




(ii)The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:
      November 23, 2009
            
            /s/    Jalal
      AlghaniJalal
      AlghaniChief
      Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer




This certification accompanies this
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed
filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). Such certification will not be deemed
to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company
specifically incorporates it by reference.
Sara E. PARKER v. DUKE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; Durham Regional Hospitals; Nurse Jane Doe; M.D. John Doe; and Susan Page.

No. 356P04.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 6, 2004.

Sara E. Parker, Pro Se.

Michael J. Byrne, Durham, for Duke Hospital Med. Center et al.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Plaintiff on the 16th day of July 2004 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 6th day of October 2004."
----

Order of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 1 June 2006 — Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

(Case C-324/05 P) (1)

(Appeal - Community trade mark - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 - Likelihood of confusion - Application for mixed word and figurative mark containing the verbal element ‘Turkish Power’ - Opposition by the holder of the earlier word mark POWER - Rejection of the opposition - Appeal manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded)

(2006/C 224/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH (represented by: B. Piepenbrink, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: G. Schneider, Agent)

Re:

Appeal brought against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) of 22 June 2005 in Case T-34/04 Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v OHIM by which the Court of First Instance rejected the application for annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM rejecting the appeal brought by the appellant, proprietor of the trade mark ‘POWER’, against the decision of the Opposition Division rejecting the opposition filed against the application for registration of the figurative mark ‘TURKISH POWER’ — Likelihood of confusion between trade marks

Operative part of the order

----

(1)OJ C 296, 26.11.2005.

----
EXHIBIT
32.2


CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in connection with the filing of the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the “Report”) by China
Fire & Security Group, Inc. (the “Registrant”), I, Robert Yuan, hereby
certify that:





1. To the
best of my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. To the
best of my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Registrant.


Dated:
      August 10, 2009
                  By:
                  /s/
      Robert YuanName: Robert
      YuanTitle:  
      Principal Accounting Officer
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 99.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Viisage Technology, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
William Aulet, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
   the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
   respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
   as of December 31, 2002 (the last date of the period covered by the Report).

Date: March 27, 2003



    /s/ William Aulet
-------------------------
Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with  the  quarterly  report  of PortaltoChina.com, Inc. on Form
10-QSB  for the quarter ended November 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  on  the  date  hereof  (the "Report"), I, Paul Fong, Chief
Executive  Officer,  President,  and  Chief  Financial  Officer  of the Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  that:

(1)     The  Report  fully  complies  with  the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934,  as  amended;  and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.



Date:  January  9,  2007     By: /s/ Paul Fong
                             Paul  Fong
                             President, Chief Executive Officer
                             &  Chief  Financial  Officer
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

156 

KA 07-02678 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, SCONIERS, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JASON CURRY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PHILIP ROTHSCHILD OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (BRENTON P. DADEY

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (William D.

Walsh, J.), rendered September 26, 2007. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon

in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him,

upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the

second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to defendant’s

contention, County Court properly refused to suppress the handgun

found on his person by a police officer inasmuch as the officer had

reasonable suspicion to detain and subsequently frisk him (see

generally People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223). According to the

transcript of the suppression hearing, while investigating a reported

fight between two black males with handguns, the officer was informed

by three witnesses that the men involved in the fight had “just walked

in” a nearby market. The officer responded to the market immediately

and, upon opening the door to the market, he observed defendant in the

doorway. Defendant “stepped into” and attempted to “push past” the

officer, at which point the officer ordered defendant to stop. Based

on the information known to the officer and defendant’s furtive

behavior upon encountering the officer in the doorway, the officer had

reasonable suspicion to detain defendant (see id.; see generally

People v May, 81 NY2d 725, 728). The officer was also authorized to

frisk defendant once defendant moved his hand quickly toward his

waistband as the officer pulled him aside for questioning. “A

corollary of the statutory right to temporarily detain for questioning

is the authority to frisk if the officer reasonably suspects that he

[or she] is in danger of physical injury by virtue of the detainee

being armed” (De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223). It is well settled that a
-2- 156 

KA 07-02678 

police officer need not “await the glint of steel before [the officer]

can act to preserve his [or her] safety” (People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d

267, 271).

Entered: February 10, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court