NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

KARINEH HEROYAN-HAMAYAK, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

ARAM I. HAMAYAK, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0211 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2015-090349

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Karineh Heroyan-Hamayak, Glendale, CA

Petitioner/Appellee

David Alan Dick and Associates, Chandler

By David A. Dick

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
HEROYAN-HAMAYAK v. HAMAYAK

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2

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Aram Hamayak (Father) appeals the family court’s order

dissolving his marriage to Karineh Heroyon-Hamayak (Mother). For the 

following reasons, we vacate the court’s orders allocating debt and assets 

and limiting Father’s award of attorneys’ fees, and remand for 

reconsideration of these issues consistent with this decision. The decree is 

affirmed in all other respects. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Mother married in 1997 and have one minor child

(Child), born in 2002. Mother petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in 

January 2015. Based upon the parties’ financial information, the family

court entered temporary orders in April 2015 awarding Father spousal 

maintenance of $1,000 per month and Mother child support of $265 per 

month. Mother was also ordered to pay $3,000 toward Father’s attorneys’

fees. Within a week of its entry, the court modified the order to require 

supervised parenting time for Father after Mother alleged he sexually 

assaulted Child. 

¶3 In June 2015, the marital residence was sold. Mother

immediately retracted her request for supervised parenting time claiming 

she now believed Father merely exercised “poor judgment” and did not 

intend to harm Child. In light of the parties’ agreement, the family court 

removed the supervision requirement so Mother could move to California 

and Child could live with Father. 

¶4 In February 2016, after a one-day bench trial, the family court

entered a decree of dissolution that awarded the parties joint legal decisionmaking and granted Mother’s request to permit Child to relocate to

California. The court attributed to Father an income of $2,296.67, ordered 

him to pay $238.72 a month in child support, and denied his request for 

spousal maintenance after finding he was underemployed by choice. The 

decree also divided the community property and debts and awarded Father

the portion of his attorneys’ fees and costs resulting from the allegation he 

acted inappropriately toward Child. Father filed a timely notice of appeal, 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the decree. 

Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 5 (App. 1998).
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and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) 

sections 12-120.21(A)(1)2 and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 On appeal, Father argues the trial court erred by: (1) awarding 

Mother primary physical custody of Child and permitting Child to relocate 

to California; (2) attributing him income, for purposes of calculating child 

support and spousal maintenance, in excess of his reported earnings; 

(3) determining he did not qualify for spousal maintenance; (4) failing to 

equitably allocate community property and debt; (5) not properly 

addressing Mother’s failure to provide appropriate discovery; and 

(6) declining to award him additional attorneys’ fees. We address each 

argument in turn.

I. Custody, Parenting Time, and Relocation 

A. Best Interests 

¶6 Father argues the family court’s decision to award Mother 

primary physical custody of Child is not supported by the evidence. In a 

contested custody case, the court “shall determine legal decision-making 

and parenting time . . . in accordance with the best interests of the child” 

after making specific findings on the record with regard to the factors listed 

in A.R.S. § 25-403(A). Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 (App. 2009). We 

review a custody determination for an abuse of discretion. See Owen v. 

Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶ 7 (App. 2003) (citing In re Marriage of Diezsi, 

201 Ariz. 524, 526, ¶ 3 (App. 2002)). But we do not reweigh evidence on 

appeal; rather, we defer to the court’s factual findings, both express and 

implied, unless they are clearly erroneous, Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 

406, ¶ 13 (App. 2001) (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a), and In re Marriage of Yuro, 

192 Ariz. 568, 570, ¶ 3 (App. 1998)), and we will affirm the custody order if 

there is any reasonable evidence to support it, Borg v. Borg, 3 Ariz. App. 274, 

277 (1966) (quoting Fought v. Fought, 94 Ariz. 187, 188 (1963)).

¶7 Father argues substantial evidence does not support the 

family court’s findings that: (1) there was no credible evidence that “either 

parent was convicted of an act of false reporting of child abuse or neglect,” 

A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(11); (2) both parties were “likely to allow the child 

frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with the other parent,” A.R.S. 

§ 25-403(A)(6); and (3) there was no credible evidence either parent 

 

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version. 
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“intentionally misled the court to cause an unnecessary delay, to increase 

the cost of litigation or to persuade the court to give a legal decision-making 

or parenting time preference to that parent,” A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(7). Father 

bases these arguments on Mother’s unfounded allegation of inappropriate 

conduct and her testimony that she did not correct Father’s mistaken belief 

that an order of protection prevented him from contacting Child. The court 

did find Mother’s allegations of inappropriate contact were 

unsubstantiated and “lodged solely to obtain an advantage in the 

litigation” and sanctioned her for the conduct. However, Father did not 

present any evidence that Mother was convicted of any crime in connection 

with those allegations or that Mother’s unsubstantiated allegations in April 

2015, retracted in June 2015, caused unnecessary delay or continued to 

frustrate frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with Father by the 

time of the February 2016 trial. And, contrary to Father’s contention 

otherwise, Mother’s conduct does not create any presumption against joint 

custody or decision-making authority. See A.R.S. § 25-403.01(B) (directing 

the court to consider a variety of factors in determining what is in a child’s 

best interests). Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court’s 

findings are clearly erroneous or that the court failed to consider relevant 

evidence.

3 

¶8 Father argues the family court ignored evidence regarding 

Child’s “interaction and interrelationship . . . with . . . any other person who 

may significantly affect the child’s best interests.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(2). 

With regard to this factor, the court expressly noted that Child has friends 

in Arizona, but found “Father did not provide any information regarding

any relationships between the Child and other persons that may 

significantly interact with the Child.” Father argues evidence showed 

Child did have relationships with Arizona relatives. However, the 

evidence suggests Father’s relatives did not have a close relationship with 

Child, supporting the court’s implicit conclusion that these relatives did not 

“significantly interact” with Child, warranting further consideration under 

A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(2). 

¶9 Father next argues the family court erred by failing to

consider the “psychological harm” caused to Child when Mother’s 

boyfriend moved into the marital home shortly after Father left. But Father 

did not present any evidence Child was harmed by these circumstances. 

 

3 Father also argues substantial evidence does not support a finding 

that Child wanted to move to California with Mother. However, the family 

court’s order does not contain any finding regarding Child’s preferences, 

noting instead that Mother wanted Child to relocate. 
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See Higgins v. Higgins, 194 Ariz. 266, 271, ¶ 21 (App. 1999) (holding the party 

claiming a child is harmed by a parent’s adulterous cohabitation bears the 

burden of proving it with competent evidence). 

¶10 We find no error in the disputed findings and conclusions and 

will not second-guess the family court’s determination of the weight to be 

afforded each factor. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 

334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004) (noting the trier of fact “is in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and 

resolve disputed facts”) (citing Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280 (App. 2002)). Substantial evidence supports the award of custody 

to Mother and therefore the court did not abuse its discretion. See Pridgeon 

v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 179 (1982) (holding a trial court abuses its 

discretion where there is “a clear absence of evidence to support its 

actions”) (citing Smith v. Smith, 117 Ariz. 249, 253 (App. 1977), and Bailey v. 

Bailey, 3 Ariz. App. 138, 141 (1966)). 

B. Relocation 

¶11 Father contends the family court erred in granting Mother’s 

relocation request because he did not have notice that the issue would be 

litigated at trial. This argument is not supported by the record. Father was 

aware Mother relocated to California in June 2015 when the matter was 

discussed in open court and the parties agreed to modify the temporary 

orders to designate Father as Child’s primary physical custodian. Father 

was likewise aware Mother sought an order allowing Child to relocate to 

California; the “[r]elocation of [Child] to the State of California” was 

specifically listed in the parties’ September 2015 joint pretrial statement as 

a contested issue to be resolved at trial. Father was clearly aware of 

Mother’s desire to relocate Child at least five months prior to trial, and

cannot rightfully claim he was surprised when the issue was actually

litigated.4 

¶12 Father also argues the family court abused its discretion in 

concluding it was in Child’s best interests to move to California. Father 

argues the court’s finding that Mother’s motivation in relocating was in 

Child’s best interests is not supported by the evidence because, he contends, 

 

4 Although Father contends Mother did not comply, procedurally,

with Arizona law in advancing her request to relocate Child, the specific 

notice provisions of A.R.S. § 25-408 apply, by the statute’s plain terms, only 

when “both parents reside in the state.” A.R.S. § 25-408(A); cf. Buencamino 

v. Noftsinger, 223 Ariz. 162, 163 (App. 2009).
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Mother in fact moved to be with her boyfriend. However, the record 

reflects Mother lost her job in Arizona in May 2015, and, when the marital 

residence sold in June 2015, Mother had nowhere to live and moved in with 

relatives in California. She has since procured employment in California

that allows her to work from home so she can spend more time with Child. 

Therefore, the court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.

¶13 Additionally, Father does not dispute the family court’s 

findings that Mother had a stronger bond with Child and was more 

involved in Child’s education and daily activities than Father, who relied 

on Child and Mother to report concerns; nor does Father address the court’s 

concerns that he does not have the necessary parenting skills to ensure 

Child’s success in school. Moreover, the record reflects the court 

considered the factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-408(I) and could have reasonably

concluded relocation was in Child’s best interests. Although Father 

presented some conflicting evidence, we defer to the court’s ability to 

resolve factual disputes and appropriately weigh each circumstance. We 

find no abuse of discretion. 

II. Calculation of the Parties’ Incomes

¶14 Father argues the family court erred in attributing him

income of $2,296.67 per month for purposes of calculating support 

obligations because he testified he was unable to work a more physically 

demanding job. We review the court’s decision to attribute a party

additional income for an abuse of discretion. See Pullen v. Pullen, 223 Ariz. 

293, 295, ¶ 9 (App. 2009) (citing Megremis v. Megremis, 633 S.E.2d 117, 123 

(N.C. App. 2006), and Chen v. Warner, 695 N.W.2d 758, 570, ¶ 43 (Wis.

2005)).

¶15 The family court found Father was capable of working fulltime and attributed him income as if he earned the same wage but worked 

forty hours per week year-round. Father presented evidence he had been

injured and could not return to his previous work as a retail shift 

supervisor, but other evidence, including records from the Social Security 

Administration, indicated Father did not qualify for disability benefits and 

could “adjust to other work.” Indeed, Father had acquired “other work” as 

a bus driver, earning $13.25 per hour, and working thirty-two hours per 

week for nine months of the year, and Father testified he had also 

considered working as a home inspector but had failed to complete the 

training. Father further argued his lack of education precluded more 

lucrative employment and presented evidence he was unable to obtain a 

GED because he worked odd hours. He did not provide any explanation 
HEROYAN-HAMAYAK v. HAMAYAK

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as to why he did not complete that task during the summer months when 

he was not driving a bus and therefore not working odd hours; nor did he 

present any evidence that he initiated efforts to further his education or seek 

additional training during the ten-month period he was awarded 

temporary spousal support, despite knowing Mother disputed his need for 

support. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶16 Father contends the family court should have attributed a 

higher income to Mother because she had been earning more before she 

relocated to California. The court implicitly concluded Mother’s reduction 

in income was reasonable under the circumstances. See A.R.S. § 25-320 app. 

§ 5(E) (Guidelines) (authorizing the court to consider the reasons a parent 

is working below full earning capacity before attributing increased income). 

This conclusion is supported by the evidence, which indicated Mother was 

terminated from her higher-paying job in Arizona, originally secured a 

comparable but temporary job in California, but then was able to obtain a 

permanent position that, while paying less, allowed her to work from home 

and devote more time to Child. Father has not shown any error.

¶17 Father also argues the family court erred by excluding 

“mineral and farm rents” from its calculation of Mother’s income. Rents 

and royalties are considered income for purposes of calculating support 

obligations and should have been included. See Guidelines § 5(A), (C); 

Milinovich v. Womack, 236 Ariz. 612, 616, ¶ 15 (App. 2015) (explaining the 

Guidelines’ definition of “gross income” is broad and should be interpreted 

in accordance with the best interests of the child) (citations omitted). 

However, even assuming error, a $75 increase in Mother’s monthly income 

decreases Father’s child support obligation by only $3.20. The difference is 

de minimis and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

III. Spousal Maintenance 

¶18 Father argues the family court erred in concluding he did not 

qualify for spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A). As relevant here, 

a party may be entitled to spousal maintenance if he:

1. Lacks sufficient property, including property apportioned 

to the spouse, to provide for that spouse’s reasonable needs.

2. Is unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate 

employment or . . . lacks earning ability in the labor market 

adequate to be self-sufficient.

. . . [or]
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4. Had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may 

preclude the possibility of gaining employment adequate to 

be self-sufficient.

A.R.S. § 25-319(A). We review rulings on spousal maintenance for an abuse 

of discretion. Boyle v. Boyle, 231 Ariz. 63, 65, ¶ 8 (App. 2012) (citing Gutierrez, 

193 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 14).

¶19 Here, the family court concluded Father was not entitled to 

spousal maintenance because he was capable of obtaining full-time 

employment at a wage that would enable him to meet his reasonable needs. 

This finding is supported by reasonable evidence, see supra ¶ 15, and 

precludes an award of spousal maintenance.5 We find no abuse of 

discretion.6 

IV. Property and Debt Allocation

¶20 The family court is required to “divide the community, joint 

tenancy and other property held in common equitably, though not 

necessarily in kind.” A.R.S. § 25-318(A). However, separate property and 

debts must be assigned to the proper spouse. See In re Marriage of Flower, 

223 Ariz. 531, 535, ¶ 12 (App. 2010). Father contends the property and debt 

allocation in the decree is not supported by substantial evidence. We 

review the court’s allocation for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 14 (citing 

Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007)).

¶21 First, Father contends the family court failed to allocate to 

Mother $17,000 withdrawn from a community account to pay for her 

father’s funeral. See A.R.S. § 25-318(C) (permitting the court to consider 

“excessive or abnormal expenditures” in determining an equitable 

division). The record reflects, however, that Mother withdrew those funds 

in December 2014, before the petition was filed. There was no evidence 

 

5 Father argues the family court’s finding that the parties’ seventeenyear marriage was not “of long duration” is clearly erroneous. While we 

tend to agree with this assessment, it is irrelevant in light of Father’s ability 

to “gain[] employment adequate to be self-sufficient.” A.R.S. § 25-

319(A)(4).

6 Because Father is not eligible for an award of spousal maintenance, 

we need not and do not address his arguments regarding the amount and 

duration of a maintenance award. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 15 (citing 

Thomas v. Thomas, 142 Ariz. 386, 390 (App. 1984)).
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Father was unaware of the expense or objected to it as wasteful, and Mother 

testified she repaid the money to the community account. Therefore, the 

court did not err in rejecting this claim.

¶22 Father also argues the family court erred in ordering the 

parties to split an $11,000 personal loan from Discover because, he 

contends, it was not a community debt. Because the loan was acquired

before the petition for dissolution was filed, it is presumed to be a 

community obligation. See A.R.S. § 25-211(A) (“All property acquired 

during marriage is presumed to be community property, except property a 

spouse acquires by gift, devise, or descent.”); Flower, 223 Ariz. at 535, ¶ 12 

(applying same principal to debt incurred during a marriage) (citation 

omitted). In fact, Mother testified the loan represented a consolidation of 

their community debt. Father has not shown otherwise, and the court did 

not abuse its discretion in determining that the parties were equally 

responsible to repay it.

¶23 Father next argues he was entitled to a greater share of the 

proceeds from the sale of the marital residence because Mother had 

exclusive use of the home and, he contends, was several months behind on 

the mortgage at the time it sold. Mother disputed Father’s claim, and Father 

did not provide any documentary evidence to support his testimony that 

the closing statement contained additional charges for unpaid mortgage 

payments. Deferring to the family court’s resolution of conflicting 

testimony, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶24 Father also contends the family court abused its discretion in

failing to award him a portion of rental income he claims Mother withheld. 

However, Mother testified the two rental properties made no profits after 

she paid the mortgage, home equity line of credit, taxes, home warranty, 

and homeowners’ association fees. Father disputed the travel expenses 

Mother related to the properties, but, even without these costs, the expenses 

exceeded the income. On these facts, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

court’s determination that Mother had no rental income.

¶25 Father argues the family court erred by ordering him to pay 

$3,000 owed on an Amazon credit card and Mother to pay $4,000 owed on 

a Southwest credit card, instead of allocating the entirety of those debts to 

Mother, because, he contends, the cards were used to pay Mother’s 

attorneys’ fees. In March 2015, shortly after petitioning for dissolution, 

Mother averred within her Affidavit of Financial Information that the 

Amazon credit card balance was $298.95 and the Southwest credit card 

balance was $4,038.61. At this point, she had not paid any attorneys’ fees. 
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¶26 Two months later, Mother averred she had paid $21,000 in 

attorneys’ fees, using her credit cards. The credit card balances increased 

to $9,615.61 and $5,250.64 respectively.7 Father did not have access to either 

account, and although Father asked Mother to clarify how much of her 

attorneys’ fees were paid with these credit cards, Mother offered only 

October 2015 statements for the accounts. Because Mother failed to disclose 

the relevant information solely within her control, Father was unable to 

establish the amount of the increase attributable to Mother’s attorneys’ fees. 

Nor did Mother provide evidence that any of the post-petition charges on 

these accounts were for community expenses. Accordingly, the court’s 

determination that the Amazon and Southwest credit card debt are 

community obligations is not supported by the record and its orders 

allocating these debts among the parties is vacated. 

¶27 On remand, the family court may, in its discretion, reopen the 

evidence to permit the parties to establish what portion, if any, of these 

debts constitutes a community obligation prior to making an equitable 

division. And although we have affirmed the court’s rulings on the 

property and debt issues identified herein, the court has discretion to 

reconsider those rulings and reallocate property and debt to achieve an 

equitable division.

V. Discovery Issues

¶28 Father argues the family court erred in its handling of 

Mother’s failure to provide adequate discovery. The court has broad 

discretion over discovery matters, and we will not disturb its rulings on 

those matters absent an abuse of that discretion and resulting prejudice. 

Zimmerman v. Shakman, 204 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 10 (App. 2003) (quoting Brown 

v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85, 88, ¶ 7 (App. 1998)); see also State v. 

Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 186 (1996) (“Denial of a sanction is generally not an 

abuse of discretion if the trial court believes the defendant will not be 

prejudiced.”) (citing State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 246 (1984)). Prejudice 

must appear from the record and will not be presumed. United Cal. Bank 

v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Ariz., 140 Ariz. 238, 295 (App. 1983) (citing State 

v. Whitman, 91 Ariz. 120, 127 (1962), Phx. W. Holding Corp. v. Gleeson, 18 Ariz. 

App. 60, 65 (1972), and Kerley Chem. Corp. v. Producers Cotton Oil Co., 2 Ariz. 

App. 56, 58 (1965)). 

 

7 Other credit card debt had also increased, but those debts were 

assigned to Mother as her separate obligations. 

 
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¶29 In October 2015, the family court granted Father’s motion to 

compel and request to continue the trial and ordered both parties to provide 

specific information regarding income and property within their respective 

control. Ultimately, Mother did not provide statements for her Amazon 

and Southwest credit cards as required by Arizona Rule of Family Law 

Procedure 49(F)(2). These failures are addressed in ¶¶ 25-26, supra. 

Although Father argues other disclosures were lacking, he has failed to 

establish any prejudice from the circumstances. Thus, the court did not 

ignore its prior findings regarding Mother’s misconduct and delay, but 

rather fashioned its remedy — permitting Mother to testify but allowing 

Father to argue the weight to be given that evidence in light of the lack of 

disclosure — in proportion to the resulting harm. See State v. Payne, 233

Ariz. 484, 518, ¶ 155 (2013) (“[A]ny [discovery] sanction must be 

proportional to the violation and must have ‘a minimal effect on the 

evidence and merits.’”) (quoting Towery, 186 Ariz. at 186). We find no abuse 

of discretion.8

VI. Attorneys’ Fees 

¶30 Father argues the family court erred in limiting its award of 

attorneys’ fees in his favor to those associated with Mother’s unfounded 

allegations that Father abused Child, and failing to award fees related to his 

motions: (1) seeking to hold Mother in contempt for failing to pay child 

support and spousal maintenance; (2) to compel discovery; and (3) to 

preclude evidence not timely disclosed. A party’s entitlement to fees 

presents a question of law we review de novo. Barrow v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 

158 Ariz. 71, 80 (App. 1988) (citation omitted). The court’s discretionary 

decision to award fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 

at 351, ¶ 32 (citing Thomas, 142 Ariz. at 393).

¶31 The family court has discretion to award attorneys’ fees as a 

sanction for failure to make support payments. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 

92(E)(2). The record reflects Mother had been unemployed for several 

months during the time she was not making support payments. The court’s 

implicit denial of fees for this contempt was not an abuse of discretion. 

 

8 We find no merit in Father’s arguments that the family court failed 

to rule on his motions. The decree specifically “den[ies] any affirmative 

relief . . . not expressly granted.” 
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¶32 Father also requested an award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction 

for Mother’s failure to provide mandatory disclosure and abide by the 

court’s discovery orders. Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law 

Procedure 65(A)(4)(a): 

If the motion [for an order compelling disclosure or 

discovery] is granted . . . the court shall, after affording an 

opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose 

conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney 

advising such conduct or both of them to pay the moving 

party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, 

including attorneys’ fees, unless the court finds that the 

motion was filed without the movant’s first making a good 

faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court

action, or that the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, 

or objection was substantially justified or that other 

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 

(Emphasis added). 

¶33 The family court did not make any findings which would 

exempt Mother from the mandatory fee-shifting set forth in Rule 

65(A)(4)(a). Therefore, we vacate the ruling limiting Father’s fee award, and 

direct the court on remand to award Father his reasonable attorneys’ fees 

and expenses incurred in advancing his successful discovery motions.

CONCLUSION

¶34 The orders allocating the Southwest and Amazon credit card 

debt and limiting Father’s attorneys’ fees to those associated with Mother’s 

false allegations of misconduct are vacated. The case is remanded for 

reconsideration of the proper allocation of property and assets and for entry 

of an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses in Father’s favor related to his 

successful discovery motions. The decree is affirmed in all other respects.

¶35 Neither party requests attorneys’ fees on appeal, and because 

we find neither party entirely successful, we decline to award costs 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.