IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01059-COA C.S.H. APPELLANT

v. LOWNDES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/13/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BEVERLEY MITCHELL FRANKLIN COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LOW NDES COUNTY COUNTY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GARY GOODW IN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KURT STEVEN SAUL JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 05/01/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The Lowndes County County Court t erm inated CSH’s parental rights to her two sons, Leo and Quinn. 1 On appeal, CSH raises several issues, which we restate a s f ollows: (1) whether t he county court f ailed to a pply the statutory p rerequis i t e s f or parental-rights

term ination; (2) whether the county court erroneously f o und the statutory prerequisites were

m et by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) whether the county court e rroneously f

ound

1 A lth o u g h th e co u n ty co u rt also term in ated th e p aren tal rig h ts o f t h e c h ild ren ’s u n k n o w n p u tativ e f

ath er, th at p o r

tio n o f th e j u d g m en t is n o t b ef o re th i s C o u rt f

o r rev iew

. T o p ro tect th e p riv a cy an d an o n y m ity o f th e m in o r ch ild ren in v o lv e d in th is case, w e ref er to th e A p p ellan t b y h e r in itials, a n d w e u se f ictitio u s n a m es f

o r th e ch ild ren an d th eir f o ster p aren ts.the statutory g r o u n ds f or parental-rights t erm ination w ere m et by clear and convincing evidence. ¶2. Finding no error, we af f irm the county

court’s judgm ent. FACTS ¶3. CSH is the biological m other of Le o , b o r n J uly 2007, and Quinn, born June 2008. Following a June 11, 2008 hearing, the Lowndes County Y o u t h C o urt f ound CSH had “neglected a nd/ o r abandoned” eleven-m onth-old Leo. That sam e day , w ith the goal of eventually being reunited with Leo, CSH entered into an i ndividualized s ervice plan with the Lowndes County Departm ent of Hum an Services (DHS). See Miss. C ode An n . § 43-15- 13(4) (Rev. 2015). By signing the service agreem ent, CSH agreed t o (1) obtain h ousing and

m aintain utilities; (2) obtain em ploy m e n t ; ( 3 ) s u b m it to random drug tests; (4) enroll i n a drug-treatm e nt program and attend Alcoholics Anony m o us (AA) m eetings; and ( 5) request

m onthly visi t s w i t h L e o. The f ollowing day , on June 12, 2008, the y outh court e ntered an order that placed Leo i n DHS’s custody and provided f or a six-m onth r eview of the m atter. ¶4. Two m onths later, on August 12, 2008, the y o uth c ourt f ound CSH had also neglected her y ounger son, Quinn. T he y outh court ordered three-m onth-old Quinn t o also be placed into DHS’s custody , and the c ourt s cheduled a six-m onth review. Unlike Leo’s hearing, CSH f ailed to attend Quin n ’ s A u gust 1 2, 2008 h earing. Although the y outh court’s August 12,
2008 order m ade no m ention o f CSH entering i nto a s e cond s erv i c e a g r e em ent, the record ref lects t hat, on Novem

ber 3, 2008, CSH and her caseworker reinitialed the previous service
agreem ent f

rom June 11, 2008.

2¶5. On June 3, 2009, t he y outh court held Leo’s perm anency -review hearing, which CSH

attended. By order entered August 5, 2009, the y o uth court determ ined t hat L eo was doing well with his f

oster parents and th a t C S H h ad f ailed to c om

plete t he t erm s of her service
agreem e n t

. T h e y o uth court ordered that Leo rem ain in DHS custody , with reunif ication designated a s h i s p e r ma n ent p lan and a doption designated as his alternate plan. Although th e y o uth court f

ound that term ination o f parental rights was not currently in Leo’s best interest, the court decided t o revisit the issue af ter granting CSH an additional s ix m onths to

m ake progress on her service a greem ent. T he y outh court ordered that CSH be a dm itted to

an inpatient drug-treatm ent progr a m a n d that she com plete her service-agreem ent requirem ents. The court f urther ordered DHS to help CSH f ind an inpatient drug-treatm ent f acility

. ¶6. O n t h e s a me d a y a s t h e A u g u st 5, 2009 order f or Leo, the y outh court h e l d a
perm anency -review hearing f or CSH’s y ounger son, Quinn. Unlike Leo’s hearing, CSH was
not in a ttendance f

or Quinn’s August 5, 2009 perm anency -review hearing. In its August 5, 2009 order related to Quinn’s perm anency -review h e a r i n g, the y o uth court noted the f ollowing: Quinn had cocaine in his sy stem when he was born, which prom pted DHS to

rem ove h im f

r om CSH’s c ustody ; Q uinn was c urrently doing well with his f oster parents; and
CSH had f

ai l e d t o com

p l ete the term s of her service agreem ent. Af ter reviewing the evidence and determ ining that parental-rights term ination served Quinn’s best interest, the
y outh court changed Quinn’s perm anent plan f r om reunif ication to adoption. ¶7. On Decem

ber 2, 2009, t he y o u t h c o u r t c o n d ucted an annual review of L e o’s case.

3Barbara W illiam s, t he social worker assigned to both Leo’s a nd Quinn’s cases, t estif ied that
Leo had b een in DHS’s custody since about May 2008. W illiam s stated that CSH had been scheduling visits with her sons and that the children had appeared to warm u p to CSH during the last t wo visits. W illiam s also testif ied, though, that CSH had not c om pleted a ny part of her service a greem e nt and had tested positive f or cocaine in both June and July 2009. Af ter the two f a iled drug tests, the drug-rehabilitation p rogram working with CSH recom m ended that she enroll in an inpatient drug-treatm ent program . W illiam s adm itted, h owe v er, that CSH, who was unem

ploy ed and received no f

e deral assistance, lacked the m eans to pay f or the inpatient treatm ent. A f ter t e s tif y ing that Leo n eeded perm a nence, W illiam s

recom m ended that the y outh court term inate CSH’s parental rights. ¶8. Af ter reviewi n g L e o ’ s c a s e , t h e y outh court entered a new perm anency order on Septem ber 23, 2 010, ef

f ective f r o m the tim e of the Decem ber 2, 2009 hearing. The y outh

court concluded that parental-rights term ination served Leo’s best interest “ [ d ]ue to [ CSH’s] f ailure to com

plete t he term s of her s ervice agreem e nt[ ,] and due to the y oung age of [ Leo] and the length of tim e [ h e] h a s b e e n i n f o ster care[ .]” The y outh court theref ore changed
Leo’s perm anent p lan to a d o p t ion and ordered DHS to proceed with parental-rights

term ination. ¶9. On May 13, 2 011, DHS f i led a petition to term inate CSH’s parental rights t o both Leo and Quinn. Alm ost f

our y e a r s l ater, af ter num erous continuances, t he county court c onducted

a hearing on March 9 , 2015. During the f our-y ear delay , CSH s u c c e s s f u l ly com pleted an inpatient drug-treatm ent program , got m arried, and gave birth t o a daughter, who was about

4f

our y ears old. ¶10. At the term ination hearing, W illiam s testif ied that she becam e involved with the case in May 2 008 when DHS received a 911 report about Leo. Upon investigatin g , William s discovered that CSH had lef t Le o with a non-relative f or a b out f our m onths. The nonrelative could no longer care f or Leo, and CSH’s whereabout s w e r e unknown. DHS took
Le o t o a doctor, w ho adm i tted him to the hospital f or an abscess n ear his groin and upper respiratory issues. The f ollowing m onth, i n J une 2008, C S H g a v e b irth to Quinn. Af ter Quinn tested positive f

or cocaine, D H S t ook custody of h im a t the hospital. W illiam s conf irm ed that Leo and Quinn had rem ained in DHS’s custody since they

entered in 2008. ¶11. According to W illiam s, CSH partially c o m p l i e d w i t h h e r J u n e 2 0 0 8 s e r

v i c e a greem ent. W i lliam s e xplained that CSH had six m onths to m ake p rogress on her service agreem ent and that the y outh court even granted her an additional six m onths to com plete t he requirem ents. Starting around Novem

ber 2008, CSH b egan to schedule and a ttend visits with her children. She also obtained housing whe n s h e ma r ried her husband, but she never obtained

em ploy m ent or attended AA m eetings. Although CSH e v entually com pleted an inpatient drug-treatm e nt p rogram , W illiam s testif ied that s h e d i d so outside the allotted tim e f ram e. W i lliam s s tated that, between N ovem ber 2008 and January 2010, CSH continued to struggle

w i t h d r u g u se. Then, in January 2010, CSH e ntered an i npatient drug-treatm ent program . Despite CSH’s e ventual com pletion of the program around M ay 2 010, W illiam s testif ied that she no l o n g e r t r i ed to r eunif y CSH with her children because the y outh court had already changed t he children’s perm a nent plan to adoption. However, W illiam s acknowledged that,

5af

ter CSH had com

p l eted the i npatient program in 2 010, she had passed all her subsequent random drug tests and done every thing s h e could to satisf y the service-agreem ent requirem ents t o regain custody o f her children. W i lliam s also testif ied s he was satisf

ied that
CSH presented no danger of neglect or abuse t o her alm ost f o ur-y ear-old daughter, who lived with CSH and her husband. ¶12. Having observed CSH’s v isits w ith Leo and Quinn, W illiam s t estif ied there had been substantial erosion of the m other-child relationship due to CSH’s absence during the f irst f ew

m onths o f the b o y s’ lives. By contrast, W illiam s stated that Leo and Quinn had bonded with their f oster f am ily , who took care of all t he boy s ’ needs. W illiam s averred that DHS had done all it could t o help CSH tim ely com plete her service-agreem e nt requirem ents f or reunif ication. W illiam s also stated that, in her prof essional opinion, term ination o f CSH’s parental rights served Leo’s and Quinn’s best interest. ¶13. The children’s pediatrician n e x t t e s t i f i e d t h a t both b oy s were relatively healthy , although L eo experienced occasional wheezing a n d eczem a and Quinn had been diagnosed with ADD/ADHD. The p ediatrician stated that Quin n n e e d ed to rem ain on his current ADD/ADHD m edications f or the f oreseeable f

uture b ut could hopef

ully learn to m anage the condition on his own. The pediatrician also testif ied that, while all children benef it f rom a stable and consistent e nvironm ent, children with ADD/ADHD especial l y need such an environm e nt. Based on h er observations of Leo’s and Quinn’s interactions with their f oster parents, the pediatrician testif ied that the boy s had bonded with their f oster f am i ly

. ¶14. Leah Headings, a p rivate

- p r a c t i c e c l i n i c a l social worker, n ext testif ied that DHS

6ref

erred Leo and Quinn to her in Decem ber 2012 t o assess the boy s’ adjustm ent to their f o s t er hom e and t he ef

f ects of their m onthly visits with C SH. Headings f orm ed her

assessm en t a f

t er com pleting twenty -f

our individual sessions with each child. Headings

c o n c l uded the children were t hriving in their f oster placem ent and considered their f oster parents to be their m other and f ather. Headings testif

ied Leo eventually s eem ed to grasp that, along with his f

oster m other, CSH was also his m other. However, Headings stated she never

saw any indication t hat Quinn understood CSH’s relationship t o him

. In H eadings’s opinion,

rem oving the b oy s f

rom their current f

oster-care placem e nt “would be t o t ally devastating[ and] conf using and would have lif

elong im plications” on the children. She f urther testif

ied that she believed it was in the boy s’ best interest to rem ain with their f oster parents. ¶15. Mary R eese, a DHS adoption specialist, n ext t e s t i f i e d a bout the visits s h e observed between CSH and the boy s . Ree s e t e s t i f i e d t hat Leo and Quinn appeared t o lack a strong bond with CSH. Reese stated the b oy s n ever ran up a n d greeted CSH at the b eginning of the visits, nor did they appear disappointed when the visits ended. According to R eese, CSH had

to i nitiate m ost of the interaction with the boy s. By c ontrast, Reese said that Leo and Quinn possessed a s t rong bond w ith their f oster parents, whom they identif ied as their actual parents. R eese testif

i ed she believed rem aining with their f o ster parents served the children’s best interest because that was the only hom e the boy s had ever really known. ¶16. Leo and Quinn’s f oster parents, the S m iths, also testif i ed that they had a strong bond with the boy s and that the boy s c onsidered the S m iths to be their parents. The Sm iths stated they had observed no sim ilar attachm ent between the boy s and CSH. If t he court term inated

7C S H ’ s p arental rights, t he S m i ths expressed their desire to adopt the boy s. The Sm it h s

f urther testif

ied t h a t t h e y believed rem oving Leo and Quinn f rom t heir hom e would negatively

af f ect the children. ¶17. CSH next testif

i ed about the children’s rem oval f rom her custody and her attem pts at reunif ication. CSH f

irst began using drugs when she was f o urteen. Although she was not

on drugs at the tim e of Leo’s birth in 2007, CSH testif i ed t hat she subsequently relapsed. She lef t Leo with a f

riend, and then DHS took custody of him

. CSH m anaged to stop using drugs again f o r a short tim e but suf

f ered a relapse whil e p regnant with Quinn. Because Quinn

t e s t e d p o s i tive f

or cocaine as a newborn, DHS took c ustody of h im at t he hospital. I n January 2010, w hile p r e g n a n t w i t h h e r d a u g h t e r, CSH entered an inpatient drug-rehabilitation
program . CSH com

pleted the p rogram in May 2010. In August 2010, CSH got m arried, and she testif ied that she had rem a ined drug f ree since t hen. CSH stated that the m onthlyonehour visits with Leo and Q u i n n f ailed t o provide s uf

f icient tim e to bond. Although she adm itted that Leo and Quinn viewed t he Smi t h s a s t h eir p arents, CSH thought she could establish a s trong bond with h er children if the court returned t hem to her custo d y . CSH f urther stated that she and h e r h u sband possessed suf f icient r esources to f

inancially support Leo and Quinn if

the court returned them

to her. ¶18. The guardian ad litem (GAL) testif ied that, although CSH appeared to b e a f it parent
to h er daughter, he noticed a s tark dif f erence in CSH’s inter a c t i o n s with her daughter and with Leo an d Quinn. W hile the daughter clearly viewed CSH as her m other, the GAL testif i ed that Leo a nd Q uinn obviously did n ot. The GAL s t ated that C SH had even adm itted

8to him t hat her relationship with her sons had eroded and that t hey v iewed the Sm iths as their

p a r e n t s . Based on his observations and case-f ile review, the GAL recom m ended that

rem aining with the Sm iths would serve the children’s best interest. ¶19. O n M ay 1 4, 2015, t he county court entered a ju d g me n t f i n d i n g t h a t c l e a r a n d convincing evidence supported m u l t iple statutory grounds f or the term ination of CSH’s parental rights. The county court f ound as f ollows: First, CSH f

ailed to exercise r easonable available visitation with the c hildren. See Miss. C ode Ann. § 93-15-103(3)(d)(i) (Rev.
2 0 1 3 )

. 2 Second, CSH f

ailed to im

plem ent h er agreed-upon s ervice plan, w hich prevente d
DHS f rom returning the children to her. S ee id. § 93-15-103(3)(d)(ii). Third, she “exhibit[ ed] ongoing behavior [ that] w ould m a ke i t i m p o s s i ble to r eturn [ t he children] to [ her] care and custody because [ she] has a diagnosable condition, drug addiction, u n l i kely

to change within a reasonable tim e, w hich

. . . m akes [ h er] unable to a s s u me mi nim ally [ ] acceptable c are of [ t he children.]” See id. § 93-15-10 3(3)(e)(i). Fourth, she “f ailed to elim inate ongoing behavior, identif ied to [ h er] by [ DHS],” despite DHS’s diligent ef f orts to assist her. See id. § 93-15-103(3)(e)(ii). Fif th, there had b een substantial e r osion of CSH’s relationship with the c hildren, caused in part by her “prolonged a nd u nreasonable absence” and “unreasonable f

ailure to visit or com m

unicate[

. ]” See id. § 9 3-15-103(3)(f ). S ixth, the
y outh court, “a court of com petent jurisdiction[ ,]” had previously determ ined t h a t reunif ication with CSH was not in the children’s best interest. See id. § 93-15-103(3)(h).

2 A lth o u g h th e co u n ty co u rt cited th e 2 0 0 2 S u p p l em e n t to M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated sectio n 9 3

- 1 5 -1 0 3 i n its j u d g m en t, th is C o u r t cites t o a n d a

p p lies th e 2 0 1 3 v ersio n o f th e s tatu te sin c e it w as in ef f ect at th e tim e C S H ’s p aren tal rig h t s w ere term in ated

. 9¶20. Aggrieved by the term i nation of

her parental rights, CSH appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶21. The county court’s “f indings of f

act concerning the term ination of parental rights are viewed u nder the m anif

est error/substantial credible evidence s tandard of review.” W .A.S.

v. A.L.G. , 949 So. 2d 31, 34 (¶7) (Miss. 2007). Upon review, t his Court m ust determ ine whether credible proof supports the county court’s f a c tual f indings by c lear and convincing evidence. In r e K.D.G. I I , 68 S o. 3d 748, 751 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). However, “questions of l a w s u c h a s s tatutory construction are s ubject to d e novo review, and if a [ court] m isapprehends the controlling rules o f l aw or acts pursuant to a substant i ally

erroneous view of the law, reversal is proper.” Chism v. Bright , 152 So. 3d 3 18, 322 (¶12) (Miss. 2014).
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory Prerequisites for Parental-Rights Term i nation ¶22. CSH contends the county court f ailed to apply t he s tatutory prerequisites for parentalrights term ination. Alternatively , she asserts that, even if t he county court properly applied the prerequisites, it e rred by f inding the p rerequisites were m e t b y clear a nd convincing evidence. W e address these two argum ents together. ¶23. During the tim e relevant to this appeal, Mississippi C ode Annotated sections 93-15-
101 t o - 111 (Rev. 2013) governed term ination-of -parental-rights p roceedings. Section 93-
1 5

- 1 0 3 ( 1 ) established prerequisites f or a c o urt to consider bef ore invoking any specif

ic

1 0statutory grounds f or t erm ination. Chism , 152 So. 3 d at 322-23 (¶15). 3 Section 93-15-103(1) provided:
W h en a c hild has b een rem oved f rom the hom e of its natural parent s a n d cannot be returned to the hom e of his natural parents within a r easonable length of tim e because returning to the hom e would be d am aging t o t he child or the parent is unable or unwillin g t o c a r e f or the child, relatives a re not appropriate o r are unavailable, and w hen adoption is i n the best interest of the child, taking i nto a c count whether the adoption i s needed to secure a stable p lacem ent f

or the child and the strength of the child’s bonds to his na t u r a l parents and t he ef

f e ct o f f u ture contacts b etween them , the grounds listed in subsections ( 2) and ( 3 ) of this section shall be considered as grounds f or the term ination of parental rights. The grounds m ay ap p l y s i ngly or in com bination in any

given case. ¶24. In recently discussing section 93-15-103(1), this Court adopted a “two[ -]alternatives interpretation” of the statute. In re B.A.H. , 225 So. 3d 1220, 1239-40 (¶63) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). In so doing, we stated: [ W ]e sho u l d interpret [ section 93-15-103(1)] as directing the y outh court to consider w hether there are grounds f or term ination of parental rights if either [ 1] the “child h as been rem oved f rom t he hom e o f its natural parent s and cannot be returned to the hom e of his natural parents within a r easonable length of tim e because returning to the hom e would be d am aging t o t he child or [ 2a] t he parent is unable or unwilling to care f or the child, [ 2b] r elatives are not appropriate or are unavailable, and [ 2c] adoption is in the best interest of the child.” Id. at 1238 (¶59) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-103(1)). ¶25. Upon review, we f ind the record contains substantial credible e vidence f rom which

3 A f ter C S H f iled h e r ap p eal, th e M ississip p i L eg i slatu re a m en d ed th e statu te so t h at th e p rereq u i sites are n o lo n g er ap p licab le. S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § § 9 3

- 1 5

- 1 0 1 to -1 3 3 (S u p p . 2 0 1 6 ). H o w ev er, th e am en d e d statu te d o es n o t ap p ly retro activ ely

. M iss. L aw s ch

. 4 3 1 , § 2 4 (H .B

. 1 2 4 0 ). We th eref o re ap p l y th e v e r sio n o f th e statu te in ef f e c t a t t h e t i me C S H ’s p a ren tal r ig h ts w ere t erm in ated

. S ee M l a d in i ch v. K

o h n , 1 8 6 S o . 2 d 4 8 1 , 4 8 3 (M iss. 1 9 6 6 ) (“A statu te w ill n o t b e g iv en retro activ e ef f ect u n less i t is m an if

est f ro m th e lan g u ag e th at th e leg islatu re in ten d e d it to so o p erate.”). 1 1a r ational trier of f act could c onclude that, af ter Leo and Quinn’s rem oval f rom CSH, DHS could not achieve reunif

ication within a reasonable a m ount of tim e b ecause doing so would be dam aging to t he children. Id. DHS took custody of ten-m onth-old Leo in May 2008 af ter CSH lef t h im f or several m onths with a non-relative who could no longer care f or h im

. CSH adm itted that she w as using drugs at the tim e she a bandoned Leo. The f

o llowing m onth, in
June 2008, DHS obtained custody of two-day -old Quinn a f ter he tested positive f

or cocaine.
T h e y o uth court f

ound CSH had “neglected a nd/or abandoned” Leo and that sh e h a d neglected Quinn. In Novem ber 2008, af

ter Leo and Quinn had been in DHS’s custody f or about six and f

i ve m o nths, respectively , CSH began to schedule visits with her children. ¶26. The next y ear, in June 2009, the y outh court reviewe d L e o ’ s c a s e. The evidence showed that CSH continued to struggle with d rug use, and by its August 5 , 2009 order, the
y outh court f

ound that CSH had f

ailed to com

plete the term s of her service agreem ent. Despite t h e s e f

indings, t he y outh court granted CSH an additional six m onths to m ake progress on her service-agreem ent requirem ents. ¶27. Also on A u g u st 5, 2009, the y outh c ourt reviewed and entered an order in Quinn’s

case. As with Leo’s case, the y outh court f ound that CSH had f

a i led to com

plete her serviceagreem ent requirem ents to regain custody of Quinn. However, u nlike w ith Leo’s case, the
y outh court determ ined that t e r mi n ation of CSH’s parental rights served Quinn’s best interest. ¶28. Follo w i n g a n annual review of Leo’s case i n Decem ber 2009, the y o uth court also

1 2ordered the term ination of CSH’s parental rights as to h im

. 4 In its subsequent related order,

the y outh court f

ound that CSH’s f

ailure to com

plete her service-agreem ent requirem ents, coupled w ith Leo’s age and am ount of tim e in f oster care, warranted the term ination of
CSH’s parental rights. In May 2010, alm ost two y ears af ter losing custody

of her children and entering i n to her s ervice ag r e em ent with DHS, CSH com pleted a drug-rehabilitation
program . ¶29. W e f

ind that CSH’s continued drug use b etween May 2008 ( when Leo entered D HS custody ) and January

2010 (when CSH entered the drug-rehabilitation program ) presented an ongoing danger to her children that prevented DHS f rom returning them

to her within a

r e a s o n a ble period of tim e. S ee Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-103(1); In r e B.A.H. , 225 So. 3 d

at 1241 ( ¶65). W e f

urther a cknowledge that “state law requires DHS to f ile a [ t erm inationof -parental-rights] petition f or any neglected child who h as been in f oster care f

or f if teen of the prior twenty -two m onths.” In re B.A.H. , 225 So. 3d at 1241 (¶65) ( citing M iss. Code
Ann. § 43-15-13(3) (Rev. 2 015)). Although Quinn had only been in DHS c ustody f or about

a y ear when the y outh court ordered the term ination of CSH’s p arental rights as to him , Leo had been in DHS custody f or m ore than f

if teen consecutive m onths by the tim e of the y outh court’s order (ef

f ective Decem

ber 2, 2009) term inating CSH’s parental rights as to him

. ¶30. Upon review, we f ind the record shows t h e c o u n t y c o u r t properly considered and applied the statutory prerequisites bef ore determ i ning whether to term inate CSH’s parental

4 A lth o u g h th e y o u th co u rt w aited u n til S ep tem b e r 2 3 , 2 0 1 0 , to en ter th e o rd er term in atin g C S H ’s p a ren tal rig h ts as t o L eo , th e y o u t h c o u rt m ad e th e o rd er ef f e ctiv e f ro m th e d ate o f

th e D ecem

b er 2 , 2 0 0 9 h earin g . 1 3r i g h t s . W e likewise f ind suf f icient record support f

or the county court’s f

inding that clear and c onvincing evidence satisf ied the statutory prerequisites f or parental-rights term ination. As a result, we f

ind these assignm ents of

error lack m erit.
II. Statutory Grounds for Parental-Rights Term ination ¶31. CSH next challenges the county court’s f inding that clear a nd convincing evidence satisf i ed the statutory grounds f or parental-rights term ination. C SH contends the county court’s term ination of her paren t al rights was clearly erroneous in light o f relevant Mississippi caselaw. ¶32. As previously discussed, the count y c ourt f ound by clear and c onvincing evidence that
CSH’s ongoing drug use prevented re u n i f ication with Leo and Quinn within a r easonable period o f tim e af

t er DHS rem oved the m f

r o m h er custody

. See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15- 103(1). In continuing its analy s i s, the county court next f ound th a t c lear a nd convincing evidence supported six dif f e rent statutory grounds f

or the te r mi n a t i o n o f C S H’s parental rights. ¶33. Relevant to the statutory g r o u n d s u p o n w hich the county court b ased its decision, section 93-15-103(3) provides: Grounds f or term i nation o f parental rights shall be based on one or m ore of the f ollowing f

actors:

. . . . (d) W hen t h e child has b een in the care and custody of a licensed child[ -]caring agency or [ DHS] f or at least one (1) y ear, that agency o r the departm ent has m ade diligent e f f orts to d e velop and im

plem ent a plan f

or r eturn of t he child to its parents, and:

1 4(i) The parent has f a i l ed to exercise reasonable available visitation with the child; or (ii) The parent, having agreed to a plan to ef f ect placem e nt of t he chi l d with the parent, f ails to im plem e n t the plan so t hat the child[ -]carin g agency is unable to return the child to said parent; or (e) The parent exhibits ongoing b ehavior which w ould m ake it im possible t o return the child to the parent’s care and custody : (i) Because the parent has a diagnosable condition unlikely t o change within a reasonable tim e such a s alc ohol or drug a d diction, s evere m ental def iciencies o r m e ntal illne s s, or extrem e phy sical incapacitation, which condition m a k es the parent unable to assum e m inim al l y , acceptable care of

the child; or (ii) Because the parent f a i ls to e lim inate behavior, identif

ied by the c h ild[ -]caring agency or the court, which preven ts placem ent of said child with the pa r ent in spite of diligent ef

f orts of the child[

- ]caring agency

to assist the parent; or (f ) W h e n there is an e xtrem e and d eep-seated a ntipathy by the child t o w a r d t h e parent or when there is som e other substantial erosion of the relationship between t he p arent and c hild which was caused a t l e a st in part by the parent’s serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable f ailur e to visit or com m unicate, or prolonged im

prisonm ent; or

. . . . (h) The child has been adjudicated to h ave been abused or negle c t ed and c ustody has been transf erred f rom the

1 5chi l d ’ s parent(s) f or p lacem e nt p ursuant to Section 4 3- 15-13, and a court of com pe t ent jurisdiction h as determ in e d t h at reunif

ication shall n ot be i n the c hild’s best interest. ¶34. I n a n o t h e r r e c e n t a p p e a l involving t he term ination of p arental rights, this Cour t explained:
W h ile section 93-15-103(1) provides t hat the grounds f or [ term i nation of parental rights] m ay be considered in com bination, only one statutory ground is n ecessary to justif

y term ination. Once the clear and c o nvincing burden h as been m et, the best i nterest of the child is to be considered. Parental rights s h o u l d b e term inated only if the court determ ines that term ination is in th e child’s best interest.
In re B.A.H. , 225 So. 3d at 1241 (¶64) (internal citations and quotation m arks om itted). ¶35. Upon re v i e w , w e f i n d t h e record contains credible evidence to support the county
court’s f inding that at least one s t a t u t o r y g r ound existed f o r t he term ination of CSH’s parental rights. W illiam s testif ied that DHS took c ustody of L eo af ter learning CSH had lef

t him with a non-relative who could no longer c are f or him

. No one knew CSH’s whereabouts

at t h e t i me , and CSH herself testif ied that she had suf

f ered a relapse when she abandoned
Leo. Testim ony ref

lected that D HS soon took Quinn into custody as well b ecause he was born with cocaine in his sy stem

. To be reu n i f i e d w i t h h e r sons, CSH signed a service
agreem ent. W ith the aim of helping CSH becom e drug f r ee, the service agreem ent required her to s ubm i t to random drug tests and to enroll in a drug-treatm ent program . However, f or alm ost a y ear and a half af ter s i g ning her J une 2008 service agreem e nt, C SH suf f ered relapses. According to CSH’s o wn testim ony , she d id n ot truly becom e drug f

ree until she entered a drug-treatm ent program in January 2010 , w hich she subsequently com pleted in

1 6May 2 010.

¶36. Based on these f

acts, we f ind credible evidence supports the county court’s f indings

as to the f

ollo w ing three statutory grounds: First, CSH f ailed to com

ply with her service
agreem ent, which prevented the children f rom being returned to her af

t er m ore than a y ear in D HS custody

. See Miss. Code Ann. § 9 3-15-103(3)(d)(ii). Second, CSH’s ongoing drug

u s e prevented reunif

ication “[ b]ecause [ she] h a[ d] a diagnosable conditi o n u n l i k e l y t o c h a

n g e within a reasonable tim e . . . , which [ m ade her] unable t o assum e m inim ally , acceptable care of the child[ ren.]” S

ee id. § 9 3-15-103(3)(e)(i). Third, C SH’s f ail u r e t o elim inate the identif ied harm f ul behavior p revented reunif ication, despite DHS’s diligent ef f orts to assist her. See id. § 93-15-103(3)(e)(ii). ¶37. W e f

urther f ind suf f i cient credible evidence in the r ecord that, due l argely to CSH’s

own actions, h er m other-child relationship with Leo and Quinn substantially eroded. See id. § 93-15-103(3)(f

). “A f inding of substantial erosion of the parent/child r e l ationship necessarily involves a consideration of the relationship as it existed when the t e r m ination proceedings were initiated. ” I n re K.D.G. I

I , 6 8 S o. 3d 748, 752-53 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citation o m itted). At the tim e DHS initiated term ination proceedings, Leo and Quinn had b een in f

o ster care f

o r about three y ears. Following the boy s’ entry i nto DHS custody , CSH’s own actions (her ongoing drug use) prevented her f rom regaining custody o f the boy s within a reasonable a m o unt of t im e . Over tim e, t hese c ircum stances eroded t he m other-child relationship. In f

act, by the tim e C SH began to schedule and attend regular v isits with the children, the undisputed t estim ony showed that Leo and Quinn had bonded w ith their f oster

1 7f

am ily and considered their f o s t e r p arents to be their real parents. I n contrast, m ultiple witnesses testif

ied that no s i mi l a r a t t a chm ent existed between CSH and the boy s. CSH herself even adm i tted that her relationship with L eo and Quinn h ad substantially eroded and that the c h ildren viewed t he Sm iths as their real parents. A ccordingly , w e f ind credible evidence supports the county court’s f inding on this issue. ¶38. Finally , t he y outh court, a court o f c o mp e tent jurisdiction, f ound that both children

were neglected and/or abused and that reunif ication did not serve their best in t e r e s t s . See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-103(3)(h). As d iscussed, DHS took custody of Leo because CSH abandoned h im with a f

riend, and the agency t h e n o b tained custody of Q u inn af ter he was born w ith cocaine in his sy stem

. M ultiple witnesses t estif ied that L e o a nd Quinn w ere well adjusted in their f

o ster placem e nt, had f

orm ed strong a t tachm ents to their f oster f a m ily , and considered their f

oster parents t o b e their real p arents. Multiple witnesses also testif ied that reunif ication w ould not serve Leo’s and Quinn’s best interest because rem oving them f rom the care of their f

oster parents, who had raised the bo y s f o r mo s t o f their lives, would

s e verely a nd negatively im pact them

. As a result, w e f ind that suf

f icient credib l e p r o o f established this statutory ground by clear a n d convincing evidence. 5 W e f urther f ind suf f i cient proof supported t he c ounty c ourt’s f inding that term ination of C SH’s parental rights served Leo’s and Quinn’s best interest.
CONCLUSION

5 B ecau se w e f

i n d th at at least o n e o th e r s tatu to ry g r o u n d ex ists f o r th e term in atio n o f C S H ’s p aren t al rig h ts, w e n eed n o t ad d r e s s th e co u n ty co u rt’s f in d in g th at C S H f

ailed to ex ercise reaso n ab le av ailab le v isitatio n w i t h L eo an d Q u in n u n d er sectio n 9 3 -1 5

- 1 0 3 (3 )(d )(i). 1 8¶39. W e ackn o w l e d g e t hat m uch of what the dissent r aises in its argum ents is f actually correct. The unf

ortunate f our-y ear delay in this case was largely attributable to the State’s actions and has c reated prolonged uncertainty and unnecessary burden f or CSH, the Sm iths, and the m inor children a s they have awaited resolution. W hile we struggle with t he outcom e of t his c a se, we f

ind our caselaw and statutory law require the result reached. Even with the extended d eadline g ranted by the county c ourt, C SH f ailed t o m ake progress on the term s of her service agreem e nt w ithin the tim e f ram e provi d e d b y t h e statute. As a result, we f ind substantial credible proof supported the county court’s d eterm ination t h a t c l e a r and convincing evidence established all the statutory prerequisites a nd require me nts f or
term ination of CSH’s parental rights and that the term inat ion of her parental r ights served Leo’s and Quinn’s best interests. W e theref ore af f irm the county

court’s judgm ent. ¶40. AFFIRMED. LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, CA R L T O N, FAIR, WILSON AND GREENLEE, J J., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., DI S SENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY IRVING, P.J. WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTING: ¶41. I r e s p e c t f

u l l y d i s sent f

rom the m ajority

. At the h earing o n March 9, 2 0 1 5 , i n evaluating whether the statutory p rerequisites f or parental-rights term i nation were m et, the county court and m ajority looked only at t h e b e h aviors of CSH d uring May 2008 through
Decem ber 2009

. A f

t e r entering an inpatient drug-rehabilitation p rogram in January 2010, CSH m ade substantial pr o g r e ss toward com pleting her service-agreem e nt requirem ents. Additionally , CSH experienced m any continuances f or a hea r i n g , mo s t due to no f ault or

1 9request of her own. I believe t hose actions should have been taken into consideration at the

2015 hearing as well. ¶42. The United S tates Suprem e Court, as well as t he Suprem e Court of Mississippi, has held a l ong standing tradition of protecting parental rights a s f undam ental rights. The United
States Suprem e Court h eld that “[ t]he f undam ental liberty

interest of

natural parents in the

care, custody , and m anagem e nt o f their child is p rotected by the Fourteenth Am e n dm ent, and does not evaporate sim

ply because they have not been m odel parents or have lost tem porary custody of their child to the State.” Santosky v. Kramer , 4 55 U.S. 745, 745 ( 1982). Stating

even f u rther that, “[ a ] pa

r e n t a l r ights term ination proceeding interf eres with that f

undam ental liberty interest.” Id. The Mississippi Suprem e Court stated i n sim ilar f ashion that “[ b]ecause parental rights are so im portant, w e s harply lim it the circum s tances under which can be

term inated by

the governm ent.” Gunter v. Gray , 876 So. 2d 315, 317 (¶3) (Miss. 2004). ¶43. The m ajority holds t hat the county court w as proper in f inding three statutory

grounds f or the term ination supported by clear and convincing evidence. I disagree. ¶44. First, the m ajority states t hat CSH f ailed to com

ply with her s ervice a greem ent, which prevented the children f

r om being retur n e d t o h er af ter m o re than a y ear i n DHS custody , according to Mississippi Code Annotated s ection 93-15-103 ( 3)(d)(ii) (Rev. 2013). W hile that is correct, CSH did com plete her service agreem ent bef o re the hearing. The children’s

s o c i a l worker, Barbara W illiam s, testif ied in accordance with t hat f act, agreeing that f

r o m 2010 go i n g f

orward CSH d id every

thing to satisf

y her agreem ent to get her children back, including going to treatm ent, f inding housing, and h aving the f inancial m e a ns to provide f or

2 0the children.

¶45. Second, the m a

jority states that CSH’s ongoing drug use prevented reunif ication. See id

. § 93-15-103(3)(e)(i). However, CSH com pleted her treatm ent at Born F ree in Jackson, Mississippi in May 2010 and passed each s ubsequent d rug test b etween then and the hearing, negating that her drug use was ongoing af ter treatm ent. ¶46. T h i r d , t h e ma

j o r ity states that CSH’s f a i lure to elim inate t he identif ie d h a r mf u l behavior prevented reunif i cation. See id

. § 93-1 5

- 1 0 3 ( 3 ) (e)(ii). H owever, as stated, CSH elim inated her drug use and m ade substantial strides toward com pleting the serviceagreem ent bef

o r e the hearing to ensure reunif ication. ¶47. Additionally , the m ajority states that t h e m o t h e r - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p with Leo and Quinn had substantially eroded. S ee i d

. § 93-15-103(3)(f

). I agree. Prior to 2015, the county court and DHS only provided C SH one hour a m o nth with her children, totaling t welve hours a
y ear. Twelve hours a y ear is hardly enough tim e t o bui l d s t r ong bonds, and erosion of the relationship would be a natural result. However, CSH should not have been penalized, as the

court and DHS aided in the erosion b y not providing her m ore visitation. Scott Colom , the guardian ad litem in t he case, testif ied that “.

. . of course y ou can have c hildren regain bonds with p a rents but this i s a unique situation in t hat they ’ve already got bonds with parents and
y ou expect them to be able to create new bonds with dif f erent p arents, i t’s going to be hard, especially cons i d e r i n g the circum stances.” Although dif f icult with additional tim e, the

m other-child relationships am ong CSH, Leo, and Quinn could be m ended. ¶48. Furtherm ore, to address t he other statutory grounds f ound by the county court: CSH

2 1showed u

p f or every visitation available to her. S ee id. § 9 3

- 1 5

- 1 0 3 ( 3)(d)(i). W illiam s testif i ed that CSH alway s took advantage of her visitations, even r escheduling when needed. Lastly , the county court should have re-evaluated C S H ’ s b e haviors af ter 2010 and the lim itations p laced on her b y t he court in her attem pts t o reunif

y with her children. See id

. § 93-15-103(3)(h). ¶49. I f ind t hat when c om

prehensively l ooking a t t h e entire p eriod o f tim e the children have been in DHS custody , the s tatutory grounds set f o rth b y section 93-15-103(3) were not

m et. Theref

ore, CHS’s parental rights should not have been term inated. ¶50. I respectf

ully dissent. IRVING, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

2 2