39414 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

five years and covers years ending in 2 

and 7. BEA will describe the proposed 

information collection in a public notice 

and will solicit comments accounting to 

the requirements of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501–3520). 

All legal authorities, provisions, 

definitions, and requirements contained 

in §§ 801.1 through 801.2 and §§ 801.4 

through 801.6 are applicable to this 

survey. Specific additional rules and 

regulations for the BE–12 survey are 

given in paragraphs (a) through (e) of 

this section. More detailed instructions 

are given on the report forms and 

instructions. 

(a) Response required. A response is 

required from persons subject to the 

reporting requirements of the BE–12, 

Benchmark Survey of Foreign Direct 

Investment in the United States, 

contained in this section, whether or not 

they are contacted by BEA. Also, a 

person, or their agent, contacted by BEA 

about reporting in this survey, either by 

sending them a report form or by 

written inquiry, must respond in writing 

pursuant this section. This may be 

accomplished by filing a properly 

completed BE–12 report (BE–12A, BE– 

12B, BE–12C, or BE–12 Claim for Not 

Filing); 

(b) Who must report. A BE–12 report 

is required for each U.S. affiliate (except 

certain private funds as described 

below), that is, for each U.S. business 

enterprise in which a foreign person 

(foreign parent) owned or controlled, 

directly or indirectly, 10 percent or 

more of the voting securities in an 

incorporated U.S. business enterprise, 

or an equivalent interest in an 

unincorporated U.S. business 

enterprise, at the end of the business 

enterprise’s fiscal year that ended in the 

calendar year covered by the survey. 

Certain private funds are exempt from 

reporting on the BE–12 survey. If a U.S. 

business meets ALL of the following 3 

criteria, it is not required to file any BE– 

12 form except to indicate exemption 

from the survey if contacted by BEA: (1) 

The U.S. business enterprise is a private 

fund; (2) the private fund does not own, 

directly or indirectly through another 

business enterprise, an ‘‘operating 

company’’—i.e., a business enterprise 

that is not a private fund or a holding 

company—in which the foreign parent 

owns at least 10 percent of the voting 

interest; AND (3) if the foreign parent 

owns the private fund indirectly 

(through one or more other U.S. 

business enterprises), there are no U.S. 

‘‘operating companies’’ between the 

foreign parent and the indirectly-owned 

private fund. 

(c) Forms to be filed. (1) Form BE–12A 

must be completed by a U.S. affiliate 

that was majority-owned by one or more 

foreign parents (for purposes of this 

survey, a ‘‘majority-owned’’ U.S. 

affiliate is one in which the combined 

direct and indirect ownership interest of 

all foreign parents of the U.S. affiliate 

exceeds 50 percent) if, on a fully 

consolidated basis, or, in the case of real 

estate investment, on an aggregated 

basis, if any one of the following three 

items for the U.S. affiliate (not just the 

foreign parent’s share) was greater than 

$300 million (positive or negative) at the 

end of, or for, its fiscal year that ended 

in the calendar year covered by the 

survey: 

(i) Total assets (do not net out 

liabilities); 

(ii) Sales or gross operating revenues, 

excluding sales taxes; or 

(iii) Net income after provision for 

U.S. income taxes. 

(2) Form BE–12B must be completed 

by: 

(i) A majority-owned U.S. affiliate if, 

on a fully consolidated basis, or, in the 

case of real estate investment, on an 

aggregated basis, any one of the three 

items listed in paragraph (c)(1) of this 

section (not just the foreign parent’s 

share), was greater than $60 million 

(positive or negative) but none of these 

items was greater than $300 million 

(positive or negative) at the end of, or 

for, its fiscal year that ended in the 

calendar year covered by the survey. 

(ii) A minority-owned U.S. affiliate 

(for purposes of this survey, a 

‘‘minority-owned’’ U.S. affiliate is one 

in which the combined direct and 

indirect ownership interest of all foreign 

parents of the U.S. affiliate is 50 percent 

or less) if, on a fully consolidated basis, 

or, in the case of real estate investment, 

on an aggregated basis, any one of the 

three items listed in paragraph (c)(1) of 

this section (not just the foreign parent’s 

share), was greater than $60 million 

(positive or negative) at the end of, or 

for, its fiscal year that ended in the 

calendar year covered by the survey. 

(3) Form BE–12C must be completed 

by a U.S. affiliate if, on a fully 

consolidated basis, or, in the case of real 

estate investment, on an aggregated 

basis, none of the three items listed in 

paragraph (c)(1) of this section for a U.S. 

affiliate (not just the foreign parent’s 

share), was greater than $60 million 

(positive or negative) at the end of, or 

for, its fiscal year that ended in the 

calendar year covered by the survey. 

(4) Any U.S. person that is contacted 

by BEA concerning the BE–12 survey, 

but is not subject to the reporting 

requirements, must file a BE–12 Claim 

for Not Filing. This requirement is 

necessary to ensure compliance with 

reporting requirements and efficient 

administration of the Act by eliminating 

unnecessary follow-up contact. 

(d) Aggregation of real estate 

investments. All real estate investments 

of a foreign person must be aggregated 

for the purpose of applying the 

reporting criteria. A single report form 

must be filed to report the aggregate 

holdings, unless written permission has 

been received from BEA to do 

otherwise. Those holdings not 

aggregated must be reported separately 

on the same type of report that would 

have been required if the real estate 

holdings were aggregated. 

(e) Due date. A fully completed and 

certified Form BE–12A, BE–12B, BE– 

12C, or BE–12 Claim for Not Filing is 

due to be filed with BEA not later than 

May 31 of the year after the year covered 

by the survey (or by June 30 for 

reporting companies that use BEA’s 

eFile system). 

[FR Doc. 2022–14100 Filed 6–30–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

18 CFR Part 141 

[Docket Nos. RM22–16–000 and AD21–13– 

000] 

One-Time Informational Reports on 

Extreme Weather Vulnerability 

Assessments; Climate Change, 

Extreme Weather, and Electric System 

Reliability 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission is initiating this 

rulemaking to propose to direct 

transmission providers to submit onetime informational reports describing 

their current or planned policies and 

processes for conducting extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments. The 

Commission proposes to define extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments as 

analyses that identify where and under 

what conditions jurisdictional 

transmission assets and operations are 

at risk from the impacts of extreme 

weather events, how those risks will 

manifest themselves, and what the 

consequences will be for system 

operations. Specifically, the 

Commission proposes to require 

transmission providers to submit a onetime informational report on how they 

establish a scope for their extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2022 / Proposed Rules 39415 

1 In this NOPR, unless otherwise noted, we use 

the term ‘‘transmission provider’’ to mean any 

public utility that owns, controls, or operates 

facilities used for the transmission of electric energy 

in interstate commerce. See 16 U.S.C. 824(e); 18 

CFR 35.28. To be clear, this term encompasses 

public utility transmission owners that are members 

of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and 

Independent System Operators (ISO). Accordingly, 

the reports we are proposing herein would be filed 

by the public utility members of RTOs/ISOs, as well 

as by the RTOs/ISOs themselves and other public 

utility transmission providers. 

2 16 U.S.C. 825c. Section 304 of the FPA provides 

that ‘‘every public utility shall file with the 

Commission such annual and other periodic or 

special reports as the Commission may by rules and 

regulations or order prescribe as necessary or 

appropriate to assist the Commission in the proper 

administration of’’ the FPA. Id. 3National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Centers for Environmental 

Information ‘‘U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and 

Climate Disasters’’ (2022), https://

www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/. 

4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 

Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and 

Vulnerability (2022); Nat’l Academies of Sciences, 

Engineering, and Medicine, Attribution of Extreme 

Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change 

(2016); Herring, S.C., N. Christidis, A. Hoell, M.P. 

Hoerling, and P.A. Stott, Eds. Explaining Extreme 

Events of 2020 from a Climate Perspective. 103 

Bulletin Am. Meteor. Soc’y 3 (2022). 

develop inputs, identify vulnerabilities 

and determine exposure to extreme 

weather hazards, estimate the costs of 

impacts, and develop mitigation 

measures to address extreme weather 

risks. 

DATES: Initial comments are due August 

30, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by 

docket number, may be filed in the 

following ways. Electronic filing 

through http://www.ferc.gov, is 

preferred. 

• Electronic Filing: Documents must 

be filed in acceptable native 

applications and print-to-PDF, but not 

in scanned or picture format. 

• For those unable to file 

electronically, comments may be filed 

by USPS mail or by hand (including 

courier) delivery. 

Æ Mail via U.S. Postal Service Only: 

Addressed to: Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the 

Commission, 888 First Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20426. 

Æ Hand (including courier) delivery: 

Deliver to: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 12225 Wilkins Avenue, 

Rockville, MD 20852. 

The Comment Procedures Section of 

this document contains more detailed 

filing procedures. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Neal Anderson (Legal Information), 

Office of the General Counsel, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street NE, Washington, DC 

20426, (202) 502–8760, 

Neal.Anderson@ferc.gov 

Alyssa Meyer (Technical Information), 

Office of Energy Policy and 

Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 888 First Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502– 

6835, Alyssa.Meyer@ferc.gov 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Paragraph 

Nos. 

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

II. Background ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 

A. Procedural History ....................................................................................................................................................................... 11 

B. Need for Reports ........................................................................................................................................................................... 13 

III. Discussion ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 

A. Scope ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 25 

1. Background ............................................................................................................................................................................. 25 

2. Proposal .................................................................................................................................................................................. 28 

B. Inputs ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 29 

1. Background ............................................................................................................................................................................. 29 

2. Proposal .................................................................................................................................................................................. 34 

C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards ...................................................................................................... 35 

1. Background ............................................................................................................................................................................. 35 

2. Proposal .................................................................................................................................................................................. 39 

D. Costs of Impacts ............................................................................................................................................................................ 40 

1. Background ............................................................................................................................................................................. 40 

2. Proposal .................................................................................................................................................................................. 43 

E. Risk Mitigation .............................................................................................................................................................................. 44 

1. Background ............................................................................................................................................................................. 44 

2. Proposal .................................................................................................................................................................................. 48 

IV. Information Collection Statement ...................................................................................................................................................... 49 

V. Environmental Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................................... 56 

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act .................................................................................................................................................................. 57 

VII. Comment Procedures ........................................................................................................................................................................ 62 

VIII. Document Availability ..................................................................................................................................................................... 65 

I. Introduction 

1. In this Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (NOPR), the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (Commission) 

proposes to require each transmission 

provider 1 to file a one-time 

informational report pursuant to § 304 

of the Federal Power Act (FPA).2 In the 

one-time reports, transmission providers 

would describe their current or planned 

policies and processes for conducting 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessments. The Commission believes 

that these reports will assist in its 

administration of the FPA. 

2. The reliability of the electric grid is 

increasingly threatened by extreme 

weather events and climate change. 

While extreme weather has impacted 

the electric grid throughout its history, 

the severity and frequency of extreme 

weather events is increasing.3 A robust 

and growing body of scientific evidence 

attributes this trend to climate change 

and indicates that the tendency toward 

more frequent and more severe weather 

events will persist.4 In light of this 

trend, we believe it is increasingly 

important to understand how the risks 

of extreme weather to the electric grid 

are evaluated and mitigated. 

3. Reliable electric service is vital to 

the nation’s economy, national security, 

and public health and safety, and 

prolonged power outages can have 

significant humanitarian consequences, 

as the nation witnessed in Texas and the 

South-Central United States in February 

2021 during Winter Storm Uri. More 


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39416 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

5 FERC–NERC-Regional Entity Staff Report: The 

February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and 

the South Central United States 9 (Nov. 16, 2021), 

https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-coldweather-outages-texas-and-south-central-unitedstates-ferc-nerc-and. 

6See Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Review 

of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event 22 

(2021), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/03/ 

03/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-25-2021.pdf 

(average system wide pricing during event greater 

than $6000/MWh compared to $18–20/MWh in 

more typical conditions); Southwest Power Pool, 

Inc, A Comprehensive Review of SPP’s Response to 

the February 2021 Winter Storm 72 (2021), https:// 

spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive

%20review%20of%20spp’s%20response%20to

%20the%20feb.%202021%20winter%20storm

%202021%2007%2019.pdf (‘‘SPP experienced 

historically high market settlements for the 

impacted operating days’’); Midcontinent 

Independent System Operator, The February Artic 

Event: Event Details, Lessons Learned, and 

Implications for MISO’s Reliability Imperative 45 

(2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/ 

2021%20Arctic%20Event%20Report554429.pdf 

(Independent Market Monitor reports average 

energy prices rose 226 percent in February because 

of the Artic Event in February). 

7 Indeed, the North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC) found that all but one of the 

days in 2020 with the highest severity risk index, 

a quantitative measure of the relative severity of 

risks to the bulk power system, was attributed to 

some type of weather occurrence. NERC, 2021 State 

of Reliability Report 42 (2021). 

8See California Independent System Operator 

Corporation, Final Root Cause Analysis: MidAugust 2020 Extreme Heat Wave 35 (Jan. 13, 2021), 

http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Final-RootCause-Analysis-Mid-August-2020-Extreme-HeatWave.pdf. 

9U.S. Energy Information Administration, 

Hurricane Ida Caused At Least 1.2 Million 

Customers to Lose Power (accessed June 1, 2022), 

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 

detail.php?id=49556. 

10See S. Van Voorhis, Transmission Tower 

Destroyed by Ida Likely to Complicate Power 

Restoration in New Orleans, Experts Say (Aug. 31, 

2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ 

transmission-tower-destroyed-by-ida-likely-tocomplicate-power-restoration/605826/. 

11U.S. Department of Energy, Hurricanes Ida and 

Nicholas Update # 20 (Sept. 23, 2021), https://

www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-09/TLPWHITE_DOE%20Situation%20Update_

Hurricane%20Ida_20.pdf. 

12See California Independent System Operator 

Corporation, California ISO Issues Flex Alert for 

Monday, July 12 Due to Wildfires, Heat (July 11, 

2021), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/ 

California-ISO-Issues-Flex-Alert-for-Monday-July12-due-to-Wildfires-Heat.pdf. 

13See e.g., Dale et al., Assessing the Impact of 

Wildfires on the California Electricity Grid: A report 

for California’s Fourth Climate Assessment 16–18 

(Aug. 2018), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/ 

default/files/2019-12/Forests_CCCA4-CEC-2018- 

002_ada.pdf (estimating multi-million dollar costs 

increases per event due to disruption of 

transmission paths caused by wildfires). 

14NERC, 2022 Summer Reliability Assessment at 

4, 7 (May 2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ 

ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_

2022.pdf. 

15 Id. at 4. 

16 Id. at 6, 8. 

17NERC, 2021 Long-term Reliability Assessment 

at 5–6 (Dec. 2021), https://www.nerc.com/pa/ 

RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/ 

NERC_LTRA_2021.pdf. 

18 Id. at 23–26. 

19 GAO, Electricity Grid Resilience: Climate 

Change Is Expected to Have Far-Reaching Effects 

and DOE and FERC Should Take Actions (Mar. 

2021), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-423t 

(GAO Report). 

than four and half million people in 

Texas alone lost power during the 

extreme weather event, and in some 

cases the outages contributed to a tragic 

loss of life.5 Additionally, this extreme 

weather event had a significant impact 

to consumers as energy prices rose to 

historic levels in the wholesale markets 

serving Texas and the South-Central 

region during the event.6

4. Winter Storm Uri is but one tragic 

example of the threat extreme weather 

is posing across the entire country. In 

the last two years alone,7 region-wide 

heat waves, hurricanes, and wildfires 

have resulted in outages or other 

significant reliability impacts, often 

while contributing to substantial 

consumer costs. In August 2020, 

California experienced rolling blackouts 

during a West-wide extreme heat event 

that impacted nearly a half million 

customers.8 Hurricane Ida resulted in 

outages for more than a million 

customers across eight states in August 

2021,9 with the most severe impacts in 

Louisiana due to the collapse of a 

transmission tower and outage of more 

than 2,000 miles of transmission lines 

outside of New Orleans. 10 Some 

customers continued to lack electricity 

nearly a month after Ida’s landfall.11 In 

July 2021, wildfires in Oregon impacted 

crucial transmission capacity, limiting 

the ability to import electricity into 

California as temperatures soared above 

100 degrees, ultimately triggering 

emergency actions to avoid reliability 

impacts.12 At the same time, 

constrained conditions on the electric 

grid that result from such extreme 

weather events can increase electricity 

prices.13

5. Looking forward, the threats of 

extreme weather and climate change are 

expected to continue to challenge the 

reliability of our electric grid. This 

upcoming summer, NERC expects 

extreme drought conditions and aboveaverage temperatures across wide areas 

of North America, resulting in 

heightened reliability risk.14 Drought 

increases reliability risk because it can 

reduce availability of generation during 

periods of high peak demand. Drought 

may impact energy output from hydro 

generators as well as generators that 

depend upon once-through cooling as 

low water levels trigger conservation 

measures.15 Above-average 

temperatures exacerbate reliability risk 

by contributing to prolonged periods of 

high electricity demand and to higher 

forced outage rates for generation and 

other elements of the bulk power 

system. NERC also projects abovenormal fire risk across U.S. South 

Central states, Northern California, 

Oregon, and Canada this summer, 

which poses the risk of impacts to the 

transmission system, potentially 

reducing output of solar PV generation 

due to smoke.16

6. NERC also evaluated these risks 

over the long-term in its December 2021 

Long Term Reliability Assessment and 

identified extreme weather among the 

top risks that stakeholders and 

policymakers need to focus on over the 

next ten years.17 NERC concluded in 

particular that wide-area and long 

duration extreme weather events driven 

by climate change threaten reliability 

over the long-term. NERC identified a 

combination of factors that make such 

extreme weather events a threat to 

reliability. Changes in climatology and 

the electrical system can increase the 

volatility and uncertainty of electricity 

demand and thus the risk that grid 

operators are unprepared for the peak 

demands that accompany extreme 

weather. Further, when extreme 

temperatures extend over a wide area 

for a long duration, resources can be 

strained across multiple regions 

simultaneously, increasing the risk of 

shortfalls. At the same time, 

transmission networks can become 

stressed by wide-area events such as 

storms, wildfires, or heat waves, 

limiting imports of electricity that could 

relieve shortfalls. Both weatherdependent variable energy resources 

and thermal generation face risks of 

reduced output or increased outages due 

to extreme weather events (e.g., frozen 

equipment, poor hydrological 

conditions).18 While the nature of 

extreme weather and the extent of 

transmission impairments will vary 

across different regions of the United 

States, no region will be unaffected. 

7. The Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) issued a report in May 

2021 stating that climate change is 

expected to have far-reaching effects on 

the electricity grid that could cost 

billions and could affect the ability of 

grid operators to transmit electricity.19

GAO identified potential impacts of 

climate change-driven extreme weather 

to the grid in every region of the United 

States, and discussed the risk that, 

absent measures to increase resilience, 

more frequent and severe weather 

associated with climate change may 

increase outages, imposing billions of 

dollars in additional costs to utility 


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20 Id. at 18–19, 47. 

21See supra notes 14, 17 & 19. 

22 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824o. 

23See infra P 20. 

24March 5, 2021 Notice of Technical Conference, 

Docket No. AD21–13–000. 

25March 15, 2021 Supplemental Notice of 

Technical Conference Inviting Comments, Docket 

No. AD21–13–000. 

26August 11, 2021 Notice Inviting Post-Technical 

Conference Comments, Docket No. AD21–13–000. 

27See, e.g., June 2, 2021 Tr. 127 (Wayland), 129– 

130 (Howard); Columbia/EDF Pre-Conference 

Comments at 2; PJM Pre-Conference Comments at 

6–9; East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. PreConference Comments at 6–8; CPUC Pre-Conference 

Comments at 19; Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich PreConference Comments at 11–12, 20; Exelon PreConference Comments at 23–24. 

28See, e.g., June 2, 2021 Tr. 127 (Wayland), 127– 

128 (Scripps), 129–130 (Howard), 132 (Terry); 

Exelon Pre-Conference Comments at 34; NARUC 

Pre-Conference Comments at 5–6. 

29NERC’s reports on both short-term and longterm weather issues discussed above highlight our 

concern regarding the impact of extreme weather on 

system reliability, as well as our concern that such 

events are likely to increase in severity of 

frequency. 

30Based on the record developed during the 

technical conference, this practice does not appear 

to be widespread among transmission providers. 

For example, of the six jurisdictional RTOs/ISOs, 

only New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 

appears to have conducted such an assessment. 

Therefore, we believe that the proposed one-time 

informational reporting requirement will provide 

the necessary information for the Commission to 

understand the extent to which transmission 

providers are performing these assessments. 

customers. GAO recommended that the 

Commission take steps to identify or 

assess climate change risks to the grid 

in order to ensure it is well-positioned 

to determine the actions needed to 

enhance resilience to those risks.20

8. In light of recent extreme weather 

events which demonstrate their 

potential to substantially impact the 

reliability of the bulk power system and 

jurisdictional rates, as well as the series 

of assessments 21 concluding that 

climate change and extreme weather are 

expected to pose an ongoing and 

increasing threat to the electricity grid, 

we believe that a greater understanding 

of actions to assess the vulnerabilities of 

jurisdictional transmission assets and 

operations to extreme weather events is 

necessary to carry out our 

responsibilities under the FPA.22

Therefore, we propose to direct 

transmission providers to submit onetime informational reports describing 

their current or planned policies and 

processes for conducting extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments and 

developing solutions for mitigating 

identified extreme weather risks. 

9. Requiring transmission providers to 

submit a one-time informational report 

on their current or planned efforts to 

assess the vulnerabilities of their 

jurisdictional transmission assets and 

operations to extreme weather events is 

necessary for ensuring just and 

reasonable rates. Requiring one-time 

reports on this information will also 

enhance transparency as well as provide 

opportunities for sharing best practices 

among transmission providers. 

Therefore, we propose to direct 

transmission providers to submit onetime informational reports describing 

their current or planned policies and 

processes for conducting extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments. 

10. For the purposes of this 

rulemaking, we propose to define an 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment as any analysis that 

identifies where and under what 

conditions jurisdictional transmission 

assets and operations are at risk from 

the impacts of extreme weather events, 

how those risks will manifest 

themselves, and what the consequences 

will be for transmission system 

operations.23 We propose to require that 

these one-time informational reports be 

filed 90 days after the publication of any 

final rule in this proceeding in the 

Federal Register. We also propose to 

seek public comment on the reports 30 

days after they are filed. 

II. Background 

A. Procedural History 

11. On March 5, 2021, the 

Commission issued an initial Notice of 

Technical Conference stating that 

Commission staff would convene a 

technical conference to discuss issues 

surrounding the threat to electric system 

reliability posed by climate change and 

extreme weather events.24 On March 15, 

2021, the Commission issued a 

Supplemental Notice inviting pretechnical conference comments.25

12. During the technical conference, 

held on June 1 and 2, 2021, the 

Commission heard from utility 

executives, RTOs/ISOs and market 

monitor executives, state regulators and 

energy officials, and energy policy and 

reliability experts, as well as 

climatologists. Subsequently, a Notice 

Inviting Post-Technical Conference 

Comments was issued on August 11, 

2021.26 Panelists and commenters 

agreed that electric system planning 

processes need adjustment to 

adequately address the threat posed by 

climate change and extreme weather. 

Although individual utilities and states 

facing these threats can and do adjust 

their planning, operations, and 

restoration practices in response to 

climate change, there was widespread 

agreement that regular and ongoing 

information sharing and coordination 

across jurisdictions will be critical.27

Panelists also recommended that such 

sharing not be limited to lessons 

learned, insofar as ongoing information 

sharing could also benefit entities 

developing climate models (e.g., the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA)) that may not 

always know what information is 

relevant to electric system planners and 

their stakeholders. Finally, there was 

agreement that the Commission should 

play a role in facilitating information 

sharing among industry stakeholders 

and government agencies.28

B. Need for Reports 

13. Extreme weather events place the 

reliability of electric service at risk. As 

discussed above, the United States has 

witnessed several instances over just the 

past few years of how extreme weather 

has severely impacted several regions of 

the nation. The consequences to the 

electric system have included rolling 

blackouts, more extensive service 

disruptions, limited transmission 

capacity, and damaged electric 

infrastructure. These types of impacts 

not only harm system reliability and 

strain the grid, but they also affect 

Commission-jurisdictional rates. 

Moreover, the frequency and severity of 

extreme weather has been increasing— 

and is likely to continue to increase— 

and we are concerned that system 

reliability could be further jeopardized 

and that jurisdictional rates could be 

further affected.29 Accordingly, we 

believe that, to assist in our 

administration of the FPA, it is critically 

important for the Commission to 

understand how transmission providers 

assess their vulnerabilities to extreme 

weather events. As we explain below, 

requiring transmission providers to 

submit a one-time report providing the 

information sought in this NOPR will 

enhance the Commission’s ability to 

fulfill its obligations under the FPA. 

14. Although the technical conference 

and technical conference comments 

underscored the importance of planning 

appropriately for extreme weather, the 

record to date does not provide the 

Commission with a clear understanding 

of whether and to what extent 

transmission providers are currently 

conducting, or planning to conduct, 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessments, the method(s) used to 

conduct those assessments, and what is 

done with the information from those 

assessments.30 Moreover, it is unclear 

the extent to which transmission 

providers regularly assess their 

vulnerabilities to extreme weather 


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31We recognize that transmission providers may 

be undertaking such vulnerability assessments. See, 

e.g., Entergy Corporation (Entergy) Post-Conference 

Reply Comments at 1. But we nonetheless do not 

have much visibility into whether and how each 

transmission provider undertakes such assessments, 

and we propose to remedy that concern here. 

32 16 U.S.C. 825c. 

33 Id. 824o. 

34 Id. 824d, 824e. 

35 During Winter Storm Uri, both the 

Midcontinent Independent System Operator and 

the Southwest Power Pool experienced prices 

exceeding the $2,000/MWh cap on incremental 

energy offers. FERC Staff, 2021 State of the Markets 

Report, p. 30 (issued Apr. 21, 2022). 

36F. Shafroth, Climate Change and Credit Ratings 

(Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.governing.com/ 

archive/gov-climate-change-credit-ratings.html. 

37See, e.g., Oregon Public Utility Commission 

Pre-Conference Comments at 6–7, National 

Association of Mutual Insurance Companies PreConference Comments at 1–3. 

38See June 2, 2021 Tr. 102–103 (Moskowitz); 

Columbia/EDF Pre-Conference Comments at 2; PJM 

Pre-Conference Comments at 6–9. 

39R.M. Webb, M. Panfil, and S. Ladin, Climate 

Risk in the Electric Sector: Legal Obligations to 

Advance Climate Resilience Planning by Electric 

Utilities 10 (Dec. 2020), https://perma.cc/V25AKBNP. 

40Similarly, while we propose that transmission 

providers may describe what they ‘‘plan’’ to do with 

respect to various issues, this is meant only to 

events.31 But given the severe impacts 

resulting from extreme weather, as 

discussed above, we believe the 

Commission needs a better 

understanding of what transmission 

providers are doing—or not doing—with 

respect to assessing and mitigating 

extreme weather risks. 

15. We are issuing this NOPR under 

§ 304 of the FPA, which allows the 

Commission to order reports as the 

Commission may prescribe as 

‘‘necessary or appropriate to assist the 

Commission in the proper 

administration of’’ the FPA.32 We 

believe that our proposal here does 

precisely that because it will help 

ensure that the Commission fulfills its 

statutory obligations with respect to 

system reliability and just and 

reasonable rates. Under the FPA, the 

Commission is responsible for 

overseeing the development and 

enforcement of reliability standards for 

the Bulk-power System.33 The 

Commission must also ensure that the 

rates, terms, and conditions of 

Commission-jurisdictional services are 

just and reasonable and not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential.34 The 

reports we propose to require will 

enhance the Commission’s 

understanding of whether, and if so, 

how transmission providers are 

assessing risks to transmission assets 

and operations as a result of extreme 

weather events. As noted above, we 

believe it is important for the 

Commission to understand whether and 

to what extent such assessments are 

being conducted to assist the 

Commission in the proper 

administration of the FPA. 

16. For example, the failure to assess 

and mitigate the risks of extreme 

weather could increase the frequency of 

loss of load events and also impact 

consumers who could not only 

experience increased frequency of 

power outages but would also 

ultimately bear the financial burden to 

regularly rebuild damaged infrastructure 

or to pay for solutions that may be more 

costly than solutions that could have 

been identified through a more 

proactive, forward-looking process. 

Extreme weather events can also lead to 

extreme prices for wholesale 

electricity.35 Notwithstanding these 

potentially severe impacts, the record in 

this proceeding does not indicate that 

most transmission providers have robust 

policies and processes for assessing and 

mitigating extreme weather 

vulnerabilities. 

17. Additionally, transmission 

providers may face adverse impacts to 

their credit ratings and increased 

insurance costs, which could ultimately 

flow through into transmission rates. 

For example, credit rating agencies like 

Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s have 

added ‘‘resiliency’’ as a component of 

their rating criteria, indicating the 

relevance of extreme weather risk for 

creditworthiness.36 Similarly, 

transmission providers could 

increasingly seek access to a higher 

level of insurance to cope with potential 

damage from more frequent and 

destructive weather-related events.37

Finally, we believe that the one-time 

informational reports proposed in this 

NOPR will facilitate the sharing of best 

practices among transmission providers 

and their stakeholders for conducting 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessments. At the technical 

conference, several commenters and 

panelists noted the importance of 

coordination and information sharing 

between entities in order to better assess 

and plan for extreme weather risks.38

The information in these reports could 

serve as the basis for further information 

sharing and coordination, which could 

lead to improved or more robust 

assessments and thereby better avoid 

the adverse rate impacts discussed 

above. 

18. Extreme weather events are 

occurring more frequently than ever 

before, and those events bring increased 

threats to system reliability and impacts 

on jurisdictional rates. Consistent with 

the GAO’s recommendation noted 

above, the Commission needs to be 

well-positioned to take appropriate 

action consistent with its FPA 

obligations, if necessary. We believe that 

the reports we are proposing to require 

in this NOPR will help provide us with 

information necessary to assist us in 

administering the FPA. 

III. Discussion 

19. We propose to require 

transmission providers to submit onetime informational reports describing 

their current or planned policies and 

processes for conducting extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments and 

mitigating identified extreme weather 

risks within 90 days of the publication 

of any final rule in this proceeding in 

the Federal Register. We propose to 

seek public comment on the reports 30 

days after they are filed. 

20. For the purposes of this proposed 

rulemaking, we propose to define an 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment as any analysis that 

identifies where and under what 

conditions jurisdictional transmission 

assets and operations are at risk from 

the impacts of extreme weather events, 

how those risks will manifest 

themselves, and what the consequences 

will be for transmission system 

operations. Such assessments can take 

different forms: they may be qualitative 

or quantitative; they may be performed 

on a periodic or ad hoc basis; and they 

may cover a narrower or broader range 

of extreme weather threats. The extreme 

weather threats analyzed by these 

reports may include those extreme 

weather events exacerbated by climate 

change (e.g., extended heat waves or 

storm surge due to sea level rise). 

21. Transmission providers may then 

use such extreme weather vulnerability 

assessments to develop mitigation in the 

form of extreme weather resilience 

plans, which outline measures to reduce 

the risk to vulnerable assets and 

operations. Extreme weather resilience 

efforts can take many forms, but 

generally involve both measures to 

prevent or minimize damage to 

vulnerable assets (e.g., investments in 

asset hardening or relocation) and to 

manage the consequences of such 

damage when it occurs (e.g., 

investments in system recoverability).39

22. To be clear, we do not intend in 

this NOPR to require transmission 

providers to conduct extreme weather 

vulnerability assessments where they do 

not do so already, or to require 

transmission providers to change how 

they conduct or plan to do such 

assessments.40 Instead, the goal of this 


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capture plans that have been made, but not yet been 

implemented; transmission providers are not 

required to speculate on how they would conduct 

extreme weather vulnerability analysis where they 

have no plans to do so. 41 18 CFR 388.112–113. Section 388.112 of the 

Commission’s regulations specifies that any person 

submitting a document to the Commission may 

request privileged treatment for some or all of the 

information contained in a particular document that 

it claims is exempt from the mandatory public 

disclosure requirements of the Freedom of 

Information Act, and that should be withheld from 

public disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. 552. Section 388.113 

of the Commission’s regulations governs the 

procedures for submitting, designating, handling, 

sharing, and disseminating Critical Energy/Electric 

Infrastructure Information submitted to or generated 

by the Commission. 

42 Department of Energy, Office of Energy Policy 

and Systems Analysis, Climate Change and the 

Electricity Sector: Guide for Climate Resilience 

Planning (Sept. 2016), https://toolkit.climate.gov/

sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20and

%20the%20Electricity%20Sector%20Guide%20for

%20Climate%20Change%20Resilience

%20Planning%20September%202016_0.pdf (DOE 

Guide); CPUC, Climate Adaptation in the Electric 

Sector: Vulnerability Assessments & Resiliency 

Plans (Jan 2016), https://perma.cc/R6NW-F6GV 

(CPUC Guide); J. Gundlach and R. Webb, Climate 

Change Impacts on the Bulk Power System: 

Assessing Vulnerabilities and Planning for 

Resilience (Feb 2018), http://columbia

climatelaw.com/files/2018/02/Gundlach-Webb2018-02-CC-Bulk-Power-System.pdf. 

43ConEd, Climate Change Vulnerability Study 4 

(Dec. 2019), https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/

coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energyprojects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climatechange-vulnerability-study.pdf. 44National Grid and Dominion Energy Virginia, 

for example, have focused specifically on substation 

flooding risk resulting from sea level rise and severe 

storms because of the relatively higher impact of 

substation loss compared to other assets like 

individual distribution lines. DOE Office of Energy 

Policy and Systems Analysis, A Review of Climate 

Change Vulnerability Assessment: Current Practices 

and Lessons Learned from DOE’s Partnership for 

Energy Sector Climate Resilience 8 (May 2016), 

https://toolkit.climate.gov/sites/default/files/A

%20Review%20of%20Climate%20Change

%20Vulnerability%20Assessments%20Current

%20Practices%20and%20Lessons%20Learned

%20from%20DOEs%20Partnership%20for

%20Energy%20Sector%20Climate

%20Resilience.pdf (DOE Vulnerability Assessment 

Review). 

45PG&E, Climate Change Vulnerability 

Assessment and Resilience Strategies 18 (Nov. 

2016), https://www.pgecurrents.com/wp-content/ 

uploads/2016/12/PGE_climate_resilience_

report.pdf. 

46Entergy, Building a Resilient Gulf Coast: 

Executive Report (2010), https://www.entergy.com/ 

userfiles/content/our_community/environment/

GulfCoastAdaptation/Building_a_Resilient_Gulf_

Coast.pdf. 

47 DOE Guide at 8–15. 

proceeding is to gather information, not 

to establish new requirements. In 

addition, we do not propose that 

transmission providers submit the 

results of their extreme weather 

vulnerability assessments or include 

lists of affected assets and operations, 

specific vulnerabilities, or asset- or 

operation-specific mitigations in the 

informational reports proposed by this 

NOPR. Rather, we propose that the onetime informational reports focus on 

describing the current or planned 

policies and processes that respondents 

have in place, or plan to implement, to 

assess and mitigate extreme weather 

risks. We believe that this focus of the 

proposed one-time informational reports 

should avoid the need for respondents 

to file Critical Energy/Electric 

Infrastructure Information. However, to 

the extent transmission providers 

believe that information they will 

submit warrants protections, they may 

make a request for such treatment 

pursuant to §§ 388.112 and 388.113 of 

the Commission’s regulations.41

23. Although commenters in Docket 

No. AD21–13–000 have referenced 

previously published guidance on 

conducting vulnerability assessments,42

insufficient data exists to establish best 

practices. Therefore, we seek comments 

on our approach in directing such onetime informational reports, the proposed 

topics and questions discussed below, 

and the burden associated with 

submitting these reports. As further 

described below, we propose the onetime reports to address: (1) Scope; (2) 

Inputs; (3) Vulnerabilities and Exposure 

to Extreme Weather Hazards; (4) Costs 

of Impacts; and (5) Risk Mitigation. 

24. While not all extreme weather 

vulnerability assessments must follow 

the same processes or include the same 

analyses, we understand the 

aforementioned topics to reflect typical 

practices and considerations in the 

development of extreme weather 

vulnerability assessments. Therefore, 

should respondents’ processes and 

policies for developing their own 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessments differ from those we 

describe below, we propose to require 

that transmission providers still 

describe in their one-time reports the 

processes and policies which most 

closely align with the intent or aim of 

the topics discussed below. 

A. Scope 

1. Background 

25. Determining the scope of an 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment depends on the breadth of 

assets, operations, and extreme weather 

hazards that a transmission provider 

faces in its specific area. A narrower 

scope (i.e., examining a subset of assets 

and operations, extreme weather 

hazards, or geographic regions in greater 

depth) can produce important insights 

related to specific facilities, systems, or 

regions, whereas a broader scope is 

more likely to identify system- and 

company-wide risks. For example, 

although Hurricane Sandy in 2012 

initially motivated Consolidated Edison, 

Inc. (ConEd) to conduct its 2019 climate 

change vulnerability assessment, ConEd 

sought in its study to understand the 

broader impact of a changing climate on 

its service area and identified additional 

climate vulnerabilities including sea 

level rise, inland flooding due to 

increased precipitation, and extreme 

heat events.43

26. As part of scoping the extreme 

weather vulnerability assessment, 

transmission providers have the 

flexibility to choose the assets and 

operations to examine for their 

assessment. For example, some 

transmission providers focus their 

analyses on assets and operations 

related to critical electric infrastructure 

and/or assets and operations that meet 

or exceed some MW or other 

threshold.44 Furthermore, transmission 

providers may use discretion to 

determine what extreme weather 

hazards and geographic scope to 

consider in their vulnerability 

assessment. Transmission providers 

could also consider external 

vulnerabilities in their assessment, such 

as those related to consumers, 

interconnected utilities, and supply 

chains. For example, with respect to 

external vulnerabilities, PG&E examined 

not only its own assets, but upstream 

interdependencies, including regional 

bulk electric and natural gas systems, 

water availability, telecommunication 

utilities, and supply chains, as well as 

downstream interdependencies like 

community- and customer-level 

resiliency.45 With respect to geographic 

scope, although Entergy’s service 

territory and assets extend across 

multiple states, its assessment, 

conducted with partners, focused 

exclusively on the 77 counties bordering 

the Gulf of Mexico. This specific 

geographic scope allowed Entergy and 

its partners to study the hazards unique 

to the Gulf region, driven by sea level 

rise, land subsidence, and increasing 

hurricane intensity.46 A wider 

geographic scope may consider widearea and long duration extreme weather 

events, such as the August 2020 Westwide extreme heat event described 

above. 

27. Finally, a transmission provider 

may engage a broad set of stakeholders 

early in the scoping process to identify 

particularly susceptible regions in their 

footprint and increase support for any 

resilience actions that result from the 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment.47 The Oregon Department 

of Energy, for example, engaged 

stakeholders from vulnerable and 

underserved communities in its climate 


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48Oregon Department of Energy, 2020 Biennial 

Energy Report 28 (Nov. 2020), https://

www.oregon.gov/energy/Data-and-Reports/

Documents/2020-Biennial-Energy-Report.pdf. 49 DOE Vulnerability Assessment Review at 14. 

50For example, in their internal climate 

vulnerability assessments, Entergy studied the 

following 45 years while Seattle City Light studied 

years 2030 and 2050. Id. at 6. 

51William Pizer and Richard Newell, Discounting 

the Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation: How 

Much Do Uncertain Rates Increase Valuations? 2 

(Dec. 2001), https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/ 

uploads/2001/12/econ_discounting.pdf. 

vulnerability assessment in order to 

incorporate equity concerns and 

examine the extent to which 

underserved and vulnerable groups are 

disproportionately impacted by these 

risks.48

2. Proposal 

28. As a threshold matter, we propose 

that each transmission provider state 

whether it conducts extreme weather 

vulnerability analyses. Further, we 

propose to require each transmission 

provider to provide the following 

information on the policies and 

processes they employ, or plan to 

employ, for determining the scope of 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessments: 

(Q1) A description of the types of 

extreme weather events for which the 

transmission provider conducts, or 

plans to conduct, extreme weather 

vulnerability assessments, if any. For 

transmission providers that conduct, or 

plan to conduct, such assessments, a 

description of how the transmission 

provider determined which extreme 

weather hazards to include in the 

assessment (e.g., extreme storms such as 

hurricanes and the associated flooding 

and high winds, wildfires, extreme 

prolonged heat or cold, or drought 

conditions); 

(Q2) A description of how the 

transmission provider selects, or plans 

to select, the set of assets and operations 

that will be examined; 

(Q3) A description of how the 

transmission provider determines, or 

plans to determine, the geographic or 

regional scope of the analysis; 

(Q4) A description of whether and to 

what extent the transmission provider 

considers, or plans to consider, external 

interdependencies, such as 

interconnected utilities, other critical 

infrastructure sectors (e.g., water, 

telecommunications) and supply chainrelated vulnerabilities, in the 

assessment; 

(Q5) A description of whether and to 

what extent the transmission provider 

coordinates, or plans to coordinate, with 

neighboring utilities and/or entities in 

other sectors that could potentially be 

relevant to the assessment; 

(Q6) A description of whether and to 

what extent the transmission provider 

engages, or plans to engage, with 

stakeholders in the scoping phase of the 

assessment, including the processes 

used to identify and engage relevant 

stakeholder groups and incorporate 

stakeholder feedback into the extreme 

weather vulnerability assessment, 

especially with regard to disadvantaged 

or vulnerable communities. 

B. Inputs 

1. Background 

29. As noted above, the processes for 

conducting extreme weather 

vulnerability assessments may vary; 

however, there are several types of key 

inputs that are likely to be part of such 

assessments. First, most assessments 

require meteorological data that support 

and describe how the extreme weather 

hazards selected for study during the 

scoping phase may specifically manifest 

in the study region (e.g., local storm 

surge projections for the next 50 years, 

historical drought data, projected 

temperature data). In some cases, such 

data may be readily available, or in 

cases where existing extreme weather 

projections are inadequate to support a 

transmission provider’s vulnerability 

assessment, new projections may be 

generated by consulting a modeling 

group (typically academic institutions 

or consulting firms). 

30. Second, transmission providers 

can elect to use scenario analyses to 

explore how the set of potentially 

vulnerable assets and operations may 

vary across a range of assumed extreme 

weather hazards and other modeling 

inputs. Transmission providers may opt 

to study a single scenario or multiple 

scenarios based on previous modeling 

efforts; for example, in its internal 

climate vulnerability assessment, San 

Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) 

compiled multiple projections for 

temperature, rainfall patterns, drought, 

and sea level rise in its service territory 

to explore potential impacts in 2050 and 

2100.49 Alternatively, transmission 

providers may take a probabilistic 

approach whereby probability 

distributions are developed and forecast 

for each parameter (e.g., precipitation, 

windspeed). This approach is more 

computationally advanced but can help 

produce granular, quantitative risk 

assessments that capture a wider range 

of potential variation and outcomes. 

31. Third, the relevant attributes of 

the assets and operations that will be 

studied are additional key inputs into 

an extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment that may affect whether, and 

to what extent, these assets and 

operations exhibit vulnerabilities under 

the conditions being studied. For 

example, the potential vulnerability of a 

transmission tower to extreme wind 

may vary based on its height, age, and 

other known or foreseeable parameters. 

Example asset attributes could include, 

among others, age, design lifetime, 

location, elevation, and replacement 

costs, while example operations 

attributes could include type and 

number of staff, locations of critical staff 

and facilities, and maintenance 

schedules. 

32. Fourth, transmission providers 

have the flexibility to decide the 

timeframe(s) to be considered by the 

vulnerability assessment (e.g., the next 

10 years, or a sampling of specific oneyear periods).50 The selected 

timeframe(s) may affect or be affected by 

the transmission provider’s choices with 

other study inputs (e.g., relevant 

datasets may not be available for a study 

of potential vulnerabilities 100 years 

into the future). 

33. Lastly, if transmission providers 

analyze the potential financial 

implications of extreme weather 

impacts, they could use a discount rate 

that will convert the costs of potential 

impacts on identified vulnerable assets 

and operations at different points in 

time into equivalent values in a base 

year (i.e., present dollars).51 Discount 

rates could also inform transmission 

provider efforts to compare the costs of 

extreme weather events to the benefits 

of mitigation actions over time. 

2. Proposal 

34. We propose to direct each 

transmission provider to provide the 

following information about the inputs 

it uses, or plans to use, for any extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments. 

(Q9) A description of methods and 

processes the transmission provider 

uses, or plans to use, to determine the 

meteorological data needed for its 

assessment. In particular, how the 

transmission provider determines 

whether it can rely on existing extreme 

weather projections, and if so, whether 

such projections are adequately robust; 

(Q10) A description of how the 

transmission provider determines 

whether to use scenario analysis, and if 

so, whether to do so with multiple 

scenarios; 

(Q11) The extent to which it reviews 

neighboring transmission providers’ 

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessments, if available, to evaluate the 

consistency of extreme weather 


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52CPUC Guide at 15. 

53 DOE Guide at 39. 

54NERC Post-Conference Comments at 6. 

55 GAO Report at 19; Deloitte, The Turning Point: 

A New Economic Climate in the United States 15 

(Jan. 2022), ahttps://www2.deloitte.com/content/ 

dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/about-deloitte/us-theturning-point-a-new-economic-climate-in-theunited-states-january-2022.pdf. 

56 DOE Guide at 43. 

57 Id. at 44. 

58Relatedly, transmission providers may also 

consider induced costs that do not directly affect 

their ratepayers, such as increased prices for 

consumer goods and effects on interdependent 

sectors like water and transportation. However, we 

assume that induced costs would likely be beyond 

the scope of most transmission providers’ extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments because they do 

not directly affect ratepayers or the prudence of 

transmission provider investments. Id. at 45. 

59 Id. at 45–46. 

60See, e.g., Wholesale Competition in Regions 

with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 

FR 64100 (Oct. 28, 2008), 125 FERC ¶ 61,071, at P 

208 (2008) (describing the Commission’s 

contemplated reforms ‘‘to ensure that the market 

price for energy accurately reflects the value of such 

energy during an operating reserve shortage’’). 

projections between transmission 

providers; 

(Q12) The timeframe(s) and discount 

rate(s) selected for the extreme weather 

vulnerability assessment; 

(Q13) A description of the methods 

and processes the transmission provider 

uses, or plans to use, to create an 

inventory of potentially vulnerable 

assets and operations. 

C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to

Extreme Weather Hazards

1. Background

35. Extreme weather vulnerability

assessments can include an analysis of 

the assets or operations exposed to the 

types of extreme weather hazards 

established in the assessment’s scope 

(e.g., hurricanes and associated 

flooding, and high winds, wildfires, 

extreme prolonged heat or cold, drought 

conditions), the sensitivities of 

transmission assets and operations to 

extreme weather events, and the 

magnitude of any impacts to the 

transmission system caused by extreme 

weather events. In assessing the 

exposure to extreme weather events, 

transmission providers may estimate the 

likelihood and extent of damage or 

disruption to their transmission assets 

and operations if various extreme 

weather events occur. 

36. In extreme weather vulnerability

assessments, transmission providers 

generally use probability distributions 

or other quantitative estimates to 

examine how a particular asset or 

operation would be affected under a 

specific extreme weather event or 

combination of events.52 The sensitivity 

of an asset or operation to a specific 

extreme weather event depends on both 

the type and severity of the event (e.g., 

the force of a wave during a hurricane 

or temperature during a heat wave) and 

the type, configuration, or attributes of 

the asset or operation itself (e.g., the 

physical resilience of a transmission 

tower to increased wind speeds or wave 

force).53 In cases where it is difficult to 

estimate the likelihood or severity of 

damage or disruption given the 

occurrence of an extreme weather 

impact, transmission providers may 

provide a best estimate. 

37. Rather than attempting to analyze

the likelihood of damage, disruption or 

failure for all transmission assets and 

operations, transmission providers may 

instead use a screening analysis to 

identify critical thresholds at which 

extreme weather hazard(s) would likely 

render an asset or operation vulnerable 

based on the relevant attributes 

determined in the sensitivity analysis. If 

a screening analysis identifies potential 

vulnerabilities among assets and 

operations considered especially 

significant or critical, transmission 

providers conducting vulnerability 

assessments could supplement their 

analysis with a more detailed review of 

the specific assets and operations. 

38. Once these vulnerabilities are

identified, transmission providers may 

estimate the magnitude of the impacts 

that would cause damage or disruption 

to assets or operations triggered by 

various extreme weather hazards. For 

example, NERC acknowledges that 

various conditions could lead to loss of 

resources, including extreme cold 

temperatures and wind that can cause 

wellhead, processing plant, or 

compressor station freezing or ambient 

temperature conditions that are outside 

the operating temperatures for the 

asset.54

2. Proposal

39. We propose to direct each

transmission provider to provide the 

following information about the 

methods or processes it uses, or plans to 

use, in its extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment to assess the vulnerability of 

its transmission assets and operations to 

extreme weather events. 

(Q14) A description of how the 

transmission provider identifies the 

transmission assets or operations 

vulnerable to the extreme weather 

events for which it conducts 

assessments; 

(Q15) A description of how the 

transmission provider uses, or plans to 

use, screening analyses to test for 

potential vulnerabilities, as well as how 

the transmission provider examines, or 

plans to examine, the sensitivities of the 

transmission assets and operations 

being studied to types and magnitudes 

of extreme weather events. 

D. Costs of Impacts

1. Background

40. The aggregate economic effects of

climate change and extreme weather on 

energy infrastructure could be trillions 

of dollars over the next few decades, 

including the costs of power outages to 

utility customers and costs to rebuild 

from storm damage, among others.55

These costs are a function of the 

estimated exposure of the impacted 

assets, their geographical locations, the 

severity of associated extreme weather 

impacts, other potential locationspecific factors, and the study’s 

timeframe and assumed discount rate 

(used for converting costs to net present 

value). These costs may be further 

broken up into direct and indirect costs. 

41. In this proceeding, we define

direct costs as the economic losses 

borne by the transmission provider. 

Direct costs may include expenditures 

and administrative and labor costs 

associated with responding to and 

resolving extreme weather impacts, 

such as the costs of repairing, replacing, 

or relocating an asset. Direct costs may 

also include the transmission provider’s 

opportunity costs of lost sales during an 

outage.56 Transmission providers may 

arrive at a rough estimate of direct costs 

by assuming that impacted vulnerable 

assets would be damaged beyond repair 

and calculating their associated 

replacement costs. Alternatively, a more 

detailed analysis could examine how 

costs vary as a function of impact 

severity for specific assets and 

operations.57

42. Depending on the scope of the

extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment, transmission providers may 

also consider indirect costs, which we 

define in this proceeding as costs 

associated with loss of service to utility 

customers.58 For example, relevant 

indirect costs may include equipment 

damage, spoilage, and health and safety 

effects.59 Value of lost load calculations, 

which estimate the value that customers 

place on reliable electricity service, are 

a common method for quantitatively 

estimating indirect costs.60

2. Proposal

43. We propose to direct each

transmission provider to provide the 

following information on how it 

estimates, or plans to estimate, the costs 

associated with extreme weather 


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61 DOE Guide at 43–46. 

62CPUC Guide at 15–16. 

63 DOE Vulnerability Assessment Review at 16– 

17. 

64 Id. 

65 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). 

66 5 CFR 1320.11 (2021). 

impacts in its extreme weather 

vulnerability assessments: 

(Q16) A description of the 

methodology or process, if any, the 

transmission provider uses, or plans to 

use, to estimate the potential costs of 

extreme weather impacts on identified 

vulnerable assets and operations; 

(Q17) If the transmission provider 

estimates such potential costs, a 

description of the types of: (a) direct 

costs, such as replacements or repair 

costs, restoration costs, associated labor 

costs, or opportunity costs of lost sales, 

and (b) indirect costs, such as costs 

associated with loss of service to electric 

customers and other utilities that 

purchase power from the transmission 

provider, including equipment damage, 

spoilage, and health and safety effects,61

in calculating the costs of extreme 

weather impacts. 

E. Risk Mitigation 

1. Background 

44. In general, the overall 

vulnerability of the transmission system 

is a function of the estimated exposure 

of vulnerable assets and operations to 

extreme weather threats and the 

estimated impact of those threats. For 

example, the failure of an asset that is 

highly exposed to a particular extreme 

weather risk may not materially increase 

the overall vulnerability of the system if 

there are other redundant assets that 

perform similar system functions. 

Conversely, the failure of a pivotal asset 

(i.e., not backed by redundant assets) 

with relatively low exposure to a 

particular extreme weather risk may 

nonetheless pose significant operational 

challenges if such failure were to occur. 

45. Some transmission providers 

consider the potential degradation or 

failure of key assets and operations due 

to various extreme weather threats by 

using likelihood-consequence matrices 

to categorize vulnerable assets and 

operations based on: (1) the likelihood 

that the asset or operation is impacted 

by an extreme weather event or change 

in climatic parameter (e.g., severe 

storms and flooding, ambient heat 

increase, sea-level rise); and (2) the 

estimated associated consequences for 

overall system performance. This 

approach can reveal the need to replace 

certain assets, deficiencies in current 

asset and operational performance 

standards, or the potential for stranded 

assets.62

46. Under this approach, transmission 

providers may further define illustrative 

anchors for these categories to foster a 

consistent interpretation under this 

approach. For example, Public Service 

Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) chose 

to map vulnerabilities onto a likelihoodconsequence matrix composed of six 

likelihood categories—with its highest 

likelihood category as those events 

expected to occur more than once per 

year, and its lowest likelihood category 

as those which are expected to never 

occur—and six consequence categories 

(‘inconsequential,’ ‘minimal,’ ‘minor,’ 

‘moderate,’ ‘considerable,’ and 

‘severe’).63 PSE&G then assigned 

numeric ratings to each likelihood and 

consequence category and scored each 

extreme weather vulnerability by 

multiplying the two ratings together. 

This approach enabled PSE&G to rank 

the severity of extreme weather and 

climate risks to its assets and further 

prioritize actions to mitigate these 

risks.64

47. After assessing the relative risks to 

assets and operations, the transmission 

provider can then determine 

appropriate mitigation. Example 

solutions for mitigating risks to 

vulnerable assets may include 

hardening or relocating, while example 

solutions for mitigating risks to 

vulnerable operations may include 

improved load management practices 

that reduce outages and expedite 

restoration. 

2. Proposal 

48. We propose to direct each 

transmission provider to provide the 

following information on the processes 

and policies it uses, or plans to use, to 

determine and implement appropriate 

measures for mitigating extreme weather 

risks identified in its extreme weather 

vulnerability assessment: 

(Q18) A description of how the 

transmission provider uses, or plans to 

use, the results of its assessment to 

develop measures to mitigate extreme 

weather risks, including: 

i. How the transmission provider 

determines which risks should be 

mitigated and the appropriate time 

horizon for mitigation; 

ii. How the transmission provider 

determines appropriate extreme weather 

risk mitigation measures, including any 

analyses used to determine the lowestcost or most impactful portfolio of 

measures; 

(Q19) A description of how the 

transmission provider informs, or plans 

to inform, relevant stakeholders—such 

as neighboring transmission providers, 

RTOs/ISOs of which the transmission 

provider is a member, electric 

customers, affected and frontline 

communities, shareholders and 

investors, emergency management 

agencies, local and state 

administrations, and state utility 

regulators—of identified extreme 

weather risks and selected mitigation 

measures; 

(Q20) A description of the extent to 

which the transmission provider 

incorporates, or plans to incorporate, 

identified extreme weather risks and 

mitigation measures into local and 

regional transmission planning 

processes; 

(Q21) A description of how the 

transmission provider measures, or 

plans to measure, the progress and 

success of extreme weather risk 

mitigation measures (e.g., through 

reduced outages) and how it 

incorporates these observations into 

ongoing and future extreme risk 

mitigation actions. 

IV. Information Collection Statement 

49. The information collection 

requirements contained in this NOPR 

are subject to review by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) under 

section 3507(d) of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995.65 OMB’s 

regulations require approval of certain 

information collection requirements 

imposed by agency rules.66 Upon 

approval of a collection of information, 

OMB will assign an OMB control 

number and an expiration date. 

Respondents subject to the filing 

requirements of a rule will not be 

penalized for failing to respond to the 

collection of information unless the 

collection of information displays a 

valid OMB control number. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2022 / Proposed Rules 39423 

67As noted above, in this NOPR, unless otherwise 

noted, we use the term ‘‘transmission provider’’ to 

mean any public utility that owns, controls, or 

operates facilities used for the transmission of 

electric energy in interstate commerce. See 16 

U.S.C. 824(e); 18 CFR 35.28. To be clear, this term 

encompasses public utility transmission owners 

that are members of RTOs/ISOs. Accordingly, the 

reports we are proposing herein would be filed by 

the public utility members of RTOs/ISOs, as well 

as by the RTOs/ISOs themselves and other public 

utility transmission providers. 

68The transmission service provider (TSP) 

function is a NERC registration function which is 

similar to the transmission provider that is 

referenced in the pro forma Open Access 

Transmission Tariff. The TSP function is being used 

as a proxy to estimate the number of transmission 

providers that are impacted by this proposed 

rulemaking. 

69The number of entities listed from the NERC 

Compliance Registry reflects the omission of the 

Texas RE registered entities. 

70 ‘‘Burden’’ is the total time, effort, or financial 

resources expended by persons to generate, 

maintain, retain, or disclose or provide information 

to or for a Federal agency. For further explanation 

of what is included in the information collection 

burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3. 

71Commission staff estimates that respondents’ 

hourly wages plus benefits are comparable to those 

of FERC employees. Therefore, the hourly cost used 

in this analysis is $87.00 (or $180,703 per year). 

72The number of entities listed from the NERC 

Compliance Registry reflects the omission of the 

Texas RE registered entities. 

73Reguls. Implementing the Nat’l Env’tal Pol’y 

Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47,897 (Dec. 17, 1987), 

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987) (crossreferenced at 41 FERC ¶ 61,284). 

74See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii), 380.4(a)(5), 

380.4(a)(27). 

50. This NOPR would, pursuant to 

§ 304 of the FPA, require transmission 

providers 67 to file one-time reports on 

their extreme weather vulnerability 

assessment practices. The Commission 

believes requiring transmission 

providers to submit a one-time 

informational report on their current or 

planned efforts to assess the 

vulnerabilities of their jurisdictional 

transmission assets and operations to 

extreme weather events will assist in the 

proper administration of the FPA. 

Title: One-Time Informational Reports 

on Extreme Weather Vulnerability 

Assessments. 

Action: Proposed FERC–1004 

collection of information in accordance 

with Docket Nos. RM22–16–000 and 

AD21–13–000. 

OMB Control No.: 1902–TBD. 

Respondents: Transmission providers 

(including public utility transmission 

owners that are members of RTOs/ISOs 

and the RTOs/ISOs themselves). 

Frequency of Information Collection: 

One time. 

Necessity of Information: The 

Commission seeks to address the 

increasing risks of extreme weather to 

bulk electric system reliability and 

jurisdictional rates, and to better 

understand how transmission providers 

assess and mitigate those risks. The 

Commission believes the informational 

reports directed by this Proposed 

Rulemaking will allow it to determine 

whether additional action on extreme 

weather vulnerability assessments is 

needed and assist the Commission in 

the proper administration of the FPA. 

Internal Review: The Commission has 

reviewed the reporting requirement and 

has determined that such a requirement 

is necessary. These requirements 

conform to the Commission’s need for 

efficient information collection, 

communication, and management 

within the energy industry. The 

Commission has specific, objective 

support for the burden estimates 

associated with the information 

collection requirements. Interested 

persons may obtain information on the 

reporting requirements by contacting 

Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive 

Director, Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 888 First Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20426 via email 

(DataClearance@ferc.gov) or telephone 

((202) 502–8663). 

51. The Commission solicits 

comments on its need for this 

information; whether the information 

will have practical utility; the accuracy 

of the burden estimates; ways to 

enhance the quality, utility, and clarity 

of the information to be collected or 

retained; and any suggested methods for 

minimizing respondents’ burden, 

including the use of automated 

information techniques. 

52. Please send comments concerning 

the collection of information and the 

associated burden estimate to the Office 

of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Office of Management and Budget, 

through www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAMain, Attention: Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission Desk Officer. 

Please identify FERC–1004 and OMB 

Control Number 1902–TBD in the 

subject line of your comments. 

Comments should be sent within 60 

days of publication of this notice in the 

Federal Register. 

53. Please submit a copy of your 

comments on the information collection 

to the Commission via the eFiling link 

on the Commission’s website at http:// 

www.ferc.gov. Comments on the 

information collection that are sent to 

FERC should refer to Docket Nos. 

RM22–16–000 and AD21–13–000. 

54. Public Reporting Burden: Our 

estimates are based on the NERC 

Compliance Registry as of May 6, 2022 

and each RTO/ISO’s list of participating 

transmission owners per their websites, 

which indicates that there are 49 

transmission providers 68 (including the 

six RTOs/ISOs) and 83 transmission 

owners that are registered with NERC 

within the United States and are subject 

to this proposed rulemaking.69

55. The Commission estimates that 

the burden 70 and cost of the proposed 

FERC–1004 are as follows: 

FERC–1004, AS PROPOSED IN NOPR IN DOCKET NOS. RM22–16–000 AND AD21–13 

A. 

Area of modification 

B. 

Annual number of 

respondents 

C. 

Annual 

estimated 

number of 

responses 

(1 per 

respondent) 

D. 

Average burden hours & cost 71

per response 

E. 

Total estimated burden hours & 

total estimated cost 

(Column C × Column D) 

Report on Extreme Weather Vulnerability 

Assessment (one-time).

132 (49 TPs 72 and 

83 TOs).

132 Year 1: 99 hours; $8,613.00 ..................

Subsequent Years: 0 hours per year; 

$0..

Year 1: 13,068 hours; $1,136,916 

Subsequent Years: 0 hours per year; 

$0. 

V. Environmental Analysis 

56. The Commission is required to 

prepare an Environmental Assessment 

or an Environmental Impact Statement 

for any action that may have a 

significant adverse effect on the human 

environment.73 The actions proposed to 

be taken here fall within categorical 

exclusions in the Commission’s 

regulations for rules regarding 

information gathering, analysis, and 

dissemination, and for rules regarding 

sales, exchange, and transportation of 

natural gas that require no construction 

of facilities.74 Therefore, an 

environmental review is unnecessary 

and has not been prepared in this 

rulemaking. 


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75 5 U.S.C. 601–612. 

76 Id. 603(c). 

77 13 CFR 121.201. 

78The North American Industry Classification 

System (NAICS) is an industry classification system 

that Federal statistical agencies use to categorize 

businesses for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, 

and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. 

economy. United States Census Bureau, North 

American Industry Classification System, https://

www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/. 

79The threshold for the number of employees 

indicates the maximum allowed for a concern and 

its affiliates to be considered small. 13 CFR 121.201. 

80U.S. Small Business Administration, A Guide 

for Government Agencies How to Comply with the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 18 (August 2017), https:// 

cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/ 

06/21110349/How-to-Comply-with-the-RFA.pdf. 

81 16 U.S.C. 605(b). 

1One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme 

Weather Vulnerability Assessments, 179 FERC 

¶ 61,196 (2022) (NOPR). 

2Chairman Glick says that I am ‘‘prone to 

hyperbole’’ when I warn that blackouts are the 

likely outcome of the majority’s misguided policies 

to prop up renewables at the expense of competitive 

markets and existing fossil resources. Rich Heidorn 

Jr., Summer Forecasts Spark Warnings of 

‘Reliability Crisis’ at FERC, RTO Insider (May 19, 

2022), https://www.rtoinsider.com/articles/30170- 

summer-forecasts-spark-warnings-reliability-crisisferc. Chairman Glick appears to be confusing 

‘‘hyperbole’’ with ‘‘reality.’’ California and Texas 

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

57. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 

1980 (RFA) 75 generally requires a 

description and analysis of proposed 

rules that will have significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. The RFA 

mandates consideration of regulatory 

alternatives that accomplish the stated 

objectives of a proposed rule and 

minimize any significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities.76 The Small Business 

Administration (SBA) sets the threshold 

for what constitutes a small business. 

Under SBA’s size standards,77

transmission providers (including 

RTOs/ISOs) and transmission owners 

fall under the category of Electric Bulk 

Power Transmission and Control 

(NAICS code 221121),78 with a size 

threshold of 500 employees (including 

the entity and its associates).79

58. We estimate that there are 132 

total transmission providers and owners 

that (not including the six RTOs/ISOs) 

are affected by the NOPR. 

59. The six RTOs/ISOs (SPP, MISO, 

PJM, ISO–NE, NYISO, and CAISO) each 

employ more than 500 employees and 

are not considered small entities. 

60. Using the list of transmission 

service providers from the NERC 

Registry (dated May 6, 2022), we 

estimate that approximately 30% of 

those entities are small entities. We 

estimate an additional average one-time 

cost of $8,613.00 for each of the 132 

entities affected by the NOPR. 

61. According to SBA guidance, the 

determination of significance of impact 

‘‘should be seen as relative to the size 

of the business, the size of the 

competitor’s business, and the impact 

the regulation has on larger 

competitors.’’ 80 We do not consider the 

estimated cost to be a significant 

economic impact. As a result, pursuant 

to section 605(b) of the RFA,81 the 

Commission certifies that the proposals 

in this NOPR will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. 

VII. Comment Procedures 

62. The Commission invites interested 

persons to submit comments on the 

matters and issues proposed in this 

notice to be adopted, including any 

related matters or alternative proposals 

that commenters may wish to discuss. 

Comments are due August 30, 2022. 

Comments must refer to Docket Nos. 

RM22–16–000 and AD21–13–000, and 

must include the commenter’s name, 

the organization they represent, if 

applicable, and their address in their 

comments. All comments will be placed 

in the Commission’s public files and 

may be viewed, printed, or downloaded 

remotely as described in the Document 

Availability section below. Commenters 

on this proposal are not required to 

serve copies of their comments on other 

commenters. 

63. The Commission encourages 

comments to be filed electronically via 

the eFiling link on the Commission’s 

website at http://www.ferc.gov. The 

Commission accepts most standard 

word processing formats. Documents 

created electronically using word 

processing software must be filed in 

native applications or print-to-PDF 

format and not in a scanned format. 

Commenters filing electronically do not 

need to make a paper filing. 

64. Commenters that are not able to 

file comments electronically may file an 

original of their comment by USPS mail 

or by courier-or other delivery services. 

For submission sent via USPS only, 

filings should be mailed to: Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, Office 

of the Secretary, 888 First Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20426. Submission of 

filings other than by USPS should be 

delivered to: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 12225 Wilkins Avenue, 

Rockville, MD 20852. 

VIII. Document Availability 

65. In addition to publishing the full 

text of this document in the Federal 

Register, the Commission provides all 

interested persons an opportunity to 

view and/or print the contents of this 

document via the internet through the 

Commission’s Home Page (http://

www.ferc.gov). At this time, the 

Commission has suspended access to 

the Commission’s Public Reference 

Room due to the President’s March 13, 

2020 proclamation declaring a National 

Emergency concerning the Novel 

Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19). 

66. From the Commission’s Home 

Page on the internet, this information is 

available on eLibrary. The full text of 

this document is available on eLibrary 

in PDF and Microsoft Word format for 

viewing, printing, and/or downloading. 

To access this document in eLibrary, 

type the docket number excluding the 

last three digits of this document in the 

docket number field. 

67. User assistance is available for 

eLibrary and the Commission’s website 

during normal business hours from the 

Commission’s Online Support at (202) 

502–6652 (toll free at 1–866–208–3676) 

or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, 

or the Public Reference Room at (202) 

502–8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. Email 

the Public Reference Room at 

public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. 

By direction of the Commission. 

Commissioner Danly is concurring with a 

separate statement attached. 

Issued: June 16, 2022. 

Debbie-Anne A. Reese, 

Deputy Secretary. 

United States of America 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

One-Time Informational Reports on 

Extreme Weather Vulnerability 

Assessments; Climate Change, Extreme 

Weather, and Electric System Reliability 

Docket Nos. RM22–16–000, AD21–13– 

000 

(Issued June 16, 2022) 

DANLY, Commissioner, concurring: 

1. I concur in today’s notice of 

proposed rulemaking directing 

transmission providers to submit onetime informational reports describing 

their current or planned policies and 

processes for conducting weather 

assessments to identify where and 

under what conditions jurisdictional 

transmission assets and operations are 

at risk from weather-related events, how 

those risks manifest, and their 

consequences for transmission system 

operations.1

2. It will take over six months, at a 

minimum, from this NOPR to the filing 

of the informational reports. These 

informational reports will be filed long 

after this summer is over and will not, 

and indeed cannot, timely address the 

projected risk of widespread blackouts 

this summer.2 It is doubtful they will be 


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have already experienced blackouts. Over twothirds of the nation faces ‘‘elevated [reliability] 

risk’’ this summer. Ethan Howland, FERC 

commissioners respond to elevated power outage 

risks across two-thirds of US, Utility Dive (May 20, 

2022), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-nercpower-outage-risks-summer-drought/624111/ (‘‘At 

its monthly meeting Thursday, Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission members dissected the 

North American Electric Reliability Corp.’s warning 

that roughly two-thirds of the United States faces 

[sic] heightened risks of power outages this 

summer.’’). 

3The NOPR is clear that we do not intend in this 

NOPR to require transmission providers to conduct 

extreme weather vulnerability assessments where 

they do not do so already, or to require transmission 

providers to change how they conduct or plan to 

do such assessments. See NOPR, 179 FERC ¶ 61,196 

at P 22; id. P 22 n.40 (‘‘Similarly, while we propose 

that transmission providers may describe what they 

‘plan’ to do with respect to various issues, this is 

meant only to capture plans that have been made, 

but not yet been implemented; transmission 

providers are not required to speculate on how they 

would conduct extreme weather vulnerability 

analysis where they have no plans to do so.’’). 

4See 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e. 

5See Chairman Glick (@RichGlickFERC), Twitter 

(May 19, 2022, 11:13 a.m.), https://twitter.com/

RichGlickFERC/status/1527306459263881223?

s=20&t=3a4C-1cac3nmFkjZyvoUDA (‘‘Extreme 

weather may be the single most important factor 

impacting #grid #reliability & the impacts of 

expected heat, drought, wildfires, hurricanes, & 

other events—all pose a big threat. Keeping eye on 

West, ERCOT, & parts of MISO this summer.’’); 

Benjamin Mullin, Climate Change is Straining 

California’s Energy System, Officials Say, N.Y. 

Times (May 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/

2022/05/06/business/energy-environment/

california-electricity-shortage.html. 

6See generally North American Electric 

Reliability Corp., 2022 Summer Reliability 

Assessment (May 2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/ 

RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/

NERC_SRA_2022.pdf. In addition, NERC has 

warned that system operators in areas of significant 

amounts of solar photovoltaic (PV) resources should 

be aware of the potential for resource loss events 

during grid disturbances. Id. at 6. NERC has further 

warned that ‘‘[i]ndustry experience with 

unexpected tripping of [Bulk-Power System]- 

connected solar PV generation units can be traced 

back to the 2016 Blue Cut fire in California, and 

similar events have occurred as recently as Summer 

2021. A common thread with these events is the 

lack of inverter-based resource (IBR) ride-through 

capability causing a minor system disturbance to 

become a major disturbance. The latest disturbance 

report reinforces that improvements to NERC 

Reliability Standards are needed to address 

systemic issues with IBRs.’’ Id. NERC also explains 

that ‘‘because the electrical output of variable 

energy resources (e.g., wind, solar) depends on 

weather conditions, on-peak capacity contributions 

are less than nameplate capacity.’’ Id. at 45. 

7See, e.g., California Independent System 

Operator Corp., 2022 Summer Loads and Resources 

Assessment (May 18, 2022), http://www.caiso.com/ 

Documents/2022-Summer-Loads-and-ResourcesAssessment.pdf; Midcontinent Independent System 

Operator (MISO), Lack of Firm generation may 

necessitate increased reliance on imports and use 

of emergency procedures to maintain reliability 

(Apr. 28, 2022), https://www.misoenergy.org/about/ 

media-center/miso-projects-risk-of-insufficient-firmgeneration-resources-to-cover-peak-load-insummer-months/; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 

(PJM), Energy Transition in PJM: Frameworks for 

Analysis (Dec. 15, 2021), https://pjm.com/-/media/ 

committees-groups/committees/mrc/2021/

20211215/20211215-item-09-energy-transition-inpjm-whitepaper.ashx (addressing renewable 

integration). 

8See FERC Staff Presentation on 2022 Summer 

Energy Market and Reliability Assessment (AD06– 

3–000), FERC, at slide 9 (May 19, 2022), https:// 

www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/presentationreport-2022-summer-energy-market-and-reliabilityassessment (identifying the Western U.S., Texas, 

MISO and Southwest Power Pool as ‘‘[p]arts of 

North America are at elevated or high risk of energy 

shortfalls during peak summer conditions’’) 

(emphasis in original); id. at slide 10 (In MISO, 

‘‘[g]eneration capacity declined 2.3% since 2021 

resulting in [a] lower reserve margin’’ and the 

‘‘[n]orth and central areas [are] at risk of reserve 

shortfall in extreme temperatures, high generation 

outages, or low wind’’ with ‘‘[s]ome risk of 

insufficient operating reserves at normal peak 

demand.’’). 

9U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. 

nuclear electricity generation continues to decline 

as more reactors retire (Apr. 8, 2022), https://

www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51978. 

10Ethan Howland, Coal plant owners seek to shut 

3.2 GW in PJM in face of economic, regulatory and 

market pressures, Utility Dive (Mar. 22, 2022), 

https://www.utilitydive.com/news/coal-plantowners-seek-to-retire-power-in-pjm/620781/. 

11See Certification of New Interstate Nat. Gas 

Facilities, 178 FERC ¶ 61,107 (2022) (Danly and 

Christie, Comm’rs, dissenting); Consideration of 

Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Nat. Gas 

Infrastructure Project Revs., 178 FERC ¶ 61,108 

(2022) (Danly and Christie, Comm’rs, dissenting); 

see also Certification of New Interstate Nat. Gas 

Facilities, 178 FERC ¶ 61,197, at P 2 (2022) 

(converting the two policy statements to ‘‘draft 

policy statements’’). It is worth noting that PJM and 

MISO filed comments on the draft policy 

statements. PJM and MISO May 25, 2022 Limited 

Reply Comments, Docket Nos. PL18–1–001 and 

PL21–3–001, at 4 (‘‘[A]ny future Commission 

pipeline policy should consider the importance of 

ensuring that needed pipeline infrastructure can be 

timely sited, and ensure that the need for 

infrastructure to meet electric system reliability is 

affirmatively considered and not lost in the debate 

over the scope of environmental reviews to be 

undertaken by the Commission.’’). 

12See, e.g., Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, 

174 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2021) (Danly and Christie, 

Comm’rs, dissenting). 

13Matt Egan, Energy crisis will set off social 

unrest, private-equity billionaire warns, CNN 

Business (Oct. 26, 2021), https://edition.cnn.com/ 

2021/10/26/business/gas-prices-energy-crisisschwarzman/index.html (‘‘Part of the problem, 

[Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman] said, is that 

it’s getting harder and harder for fossil fuel 

companies to borrow money to fund their expensive 

production activities, especially in the United 

States. And without new production, supply won’t 

keep up.’’). 

filed in time to take action, if gaps are 

identified, for the winter of 2022–2023 

either. Nonetheless, I agree that there is 

some value in understanding the extent 

to which, if any,3 transmission 

providers currently assess and mitigate 

the risks posed by weather-related 

events. I also agree that the 

informational reports may help us 

identify opportunities to avoid adverse 

rate impacts stemming from weather 

events, which is consistent with our 

obligations under the Federal Power 

Act.4

3. The NOPR makes use of, indeed 

bases our action upon, an ever-growing 

narrative: reliability challenges arise 

primarily from weather-related events.5

But even if one were to grant that 

certain parts of the United States were 

experiencing statistically unusual 

weather when compared to historical 

baselines, that has absolutely nothing to 

do with whether the markets and 

regulated utilities are procuring 

sufficient generation of the correct type 

to ensure resource adequacy and system 

reliability. We cannot blame our 

problems on the weather. The problem 

is federal and state policies which, by 

mandate or subsidy, spur the 

development of weather dependent 

generation resources at the expense of 

the dispatchable resources needed for 

system stability and resource adequacy. 

This is seen in particularly stark terms 

in our markets in which subsidies, 

combined with failed market design, 

warp price signals. This destroys the 

incentives required to ensure the 

orderly entry, exit, and retention of the 

necessary quantities of the necessary 

types of generation. The thinner and 

thinner margins that result render the 

Bulk-Power System more and more 

susceptible to the caprices of weather. 

We have been warned by credible 

sources on the matter: NERC,6 the 

RTOs,7 and Commission staff.8

4. As more nuclear 9 and coal 

plants 10—with their high capacity 

factors and onsite fuel—announce early 

retirements, the dispatchable resources 

that remain are predominantly natural 

gas generators. Backstopping weatherdependent resources with gas 

generators, largely dependent on just-intime delivery of gas, raises its own set 

of reliability concerns, particularly in 

areas—like New England—with 

inadequate pipeline infrastructure. On 

top of this, the Commission has delayed 

the processing of pipeline certificates 

and cast a chill over the pipeline 

industry with its ‘‘draft policy 

statements’’ 11 and orders throwing the 

finality of fully litigated certificates into 

doubt.12 Under pressure to reduce 

emissions at all costs, pipelines have 

moved to electrify compressor stations, 

furthering an unhealthy co-dependency 

between the gas and electric systems. 

And the efforts of politically motivated 

financial institutions to cut fossil fuel 

producers’ access to capital has added 

to the current supply crunch.13 Yet, we 

are led to believe that extreme weather 

is supposed to be the culprit for the 

nation’s looming reliability woes. Not 

so. 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with PROPOSALS
39426 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

1Section 318(a) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1318(a)) 

gives the Secretary of the Treasury authority, on a 

temporary basis, to take certain actions to respond 

immediately where the President declares the 

existence of an emergency. This authority, insofar 

as it encompasses antidumping and countervailing 

duties, was delegated to the Secretary of Commerce 

in 1979, to be exercised in consultation with the 

Secretary of Treasury. Section 5(a)(1)(e) of the 

Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979. Consistent with the 

Reorganization Plan, we have consulted with the 

Department of Treasury. Consistent with the 

Proclamation, we have consulted with the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

5. The question of whether the 

weather is getting worse is a red herring. 

The much more relevant question is 

whether current system operations and 

tariff and market design are adequate to 

maintain reliability. The present high 

risk of reliability failures proves that 

they are not. That the policies of the 

Commission and other government 

bodies are undermining reliability is far 

more obvious than the question of 

whether, and how, the weather is 

getting worse and what specific effects 

that worsening weather might have on 

the stability of the electric system. That 

question of the weather’s effect on 

reliability is a subject that doubtless 

merits study and planning, but 

misguided government policies are the 

root cause of the alarming reliability 

issues facing the nation, not the 

weather. 

For these reasons, I respectfully 

concur. 

lllllllllllllllllllll

James P. Danly, 

Commissioner. 

[FR Doc. 2022–13469 Filed 6–30–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

International Trade Administration 

19 CFR Part 362 

[Docket No. 220629–0144] 

RIN 0625–AB21 

Procedures Covering Suspension of 

Liquidation, Duties and Estimated 

Duties in Accord With Presidential 

Proclamation 10414 

AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, 

International Trade Administration, 

Department of Commerce. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: On June 6, 2022, the President 

signed Presidential Proclamation 10414 

(Proclamation). The Proclamation 

declares an emergency to exist and 

states that immediate action is needed 

to ensure access to a sufficient supply 

of solar cells and modules to assist in 

meeting the United States’ electricity 

generation needs. Accordingly, the 

Proclamation authorizes the Secretary of 

Commerce (Secretary) to exercise 

authority under section 318(a) of the 

Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act), 

to extend during the course of such 

emergency the time to perform any act. 

The Proclamation also authorizes the 

Secretary to allow the importation of 

certain solar cells and modules from 

certain Southeast Asian countries free of 

the collection of duties and estimated 

duties under the antidumping and 

countervailing duty laws until 24 

months after the date of the 

Proclamation, or until the emergency is 

declared terminated, whichever occurs 

first. In accordance with the 

Proclamation and the authority granted 

to the Department of Commerce 

(Commerce), Commerce is issuing a 

proposed rule to postpone and waive 

the application of certain regulations, if 

otherwise applicable, to solar cells and 

modules, exported from the identified 

Southeast Asian countries, that are 

subject to certain circumvention 

inquiries currently before Commerce. 

This proposed rule would provide that, 

in the event of an affirmative 

preliminary or final determination in 

the circumvention inquiries, Commerce 

would not instruct U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) to suspend 

liquidation of entries of these cells and 

modules, collect cash deposits on those 

entries, or apply antidumping or 

countervailing duties to those entries, so 

long as the entries of the cells or 

modules were entered, or withdrawn 

from warehouse, for consumption before 

June 6, 2024 or before the date the 

emergency has terminated, whichever 

occurs first (in either case, the Date of 

Termination). 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received by August 1, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments through 

the Federal eRulemaking Portal at 

http://www.Regulations.gov, Docket No. 

ITA–2022–0006. Comments may also be 

submitted by mail or hand delivery/ 

courier, addressed to Lisa W. Wang, 

Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and 

Compliance, Room 1870, Department of 

Commerce, 1401 Constitution Ave. NW, 

Washington, DC 20230. 

Commerce will consider all comments 

received before the close of the 

comment period. All comments 

responding to this document will be a 

matter of public record and will 

generally be available on the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal at http://

www.Regulations.gov. Commerce will 

not accept comments accompanied by a 

request that part or all of the material be 

treated confidentially because of its 

business proprietary nature or for any 

other reason. Therefore, do not submit 

confidential business information or 

otherwise sensitive or protected 

information. 

Any questions concerning the process 

for submitting comments should be 

submitted to Enforcement & Compliance 

(E&C) Communications office at (202) 

482–0063 or ECCOMMS@trade.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Dana Moreland, Enforcement & 

Compliance (E&C) Communications 

office at (202) 482–0063 or ECCOMMS@

trade.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Presidential Proclamation 10414 

On June 6, 2022, President Joseph R. 

Biden signed Proclamation 10414, 

‘‘Declaration of Emergency and 

Authorization for Temporary Extensions 

of Time and Duty-Free Importation of 

Solar Cells and Modules from Southeast 

Asia’’ (87 FR 35067) (the Proclamation). 

As part of the Proclamation, the 

President declared an emergency to 

exist for purposes of section 318(a) of 

the Act (19 U.S.C. 1318(a)) and made 

that section’s authority available to the 

Secretary according to the section’s 

terms. The Proclamation directs the 

Secretary to ‘‘consider taking 

appropriate action under section 1318(a) 

of title 19, United States Code, to 

permit, until 24 months after the date of 

this proclamation or until the 

emergency declared herein has 

terminated, whichever occurs first, 

under such regulations and under such 

conditions as the Secretary may 

prescribe, the importation, free of the 

collection of duties and estimated 

duties, if applicable, under sections’’ 

701, 731, 751 and 781 of the Act (19 

U.S.C. 1671, 1673, 1675, 1677j) with 

respect to certain solar cells and 

modules exported from the Kingdom of 

Cambodia (Cambodia), Malaysia, the 

Kingdom of Thailand (Thailand), and 

the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 

(Vietnam), and that are not already 

subject to an antidumping or 

countervailing duty order as of the date 

of the Proclamation. Further, the 

Proclamation directs the Secretary to 

consider taking action to ‘‘temporarily 

extend during the course of the 

emergency the time therein prescribed 

for the performance of any act related to 

such imports.’’ 1

As the Proclamation states, electricity 

is an essential part of modern life that 

powers homes, business, and industry. 

It is critical to the function of hospitals, 

schools, public transportation, and the 


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