[Cite as State v. Sloan, 2022-Ohio-1930.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LAWRENCE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 20CA06

v. :

MARCUS SLOAN, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Defendant-Appellant. :

_________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Brian M. Cremeans, Ironton, Ohio, for appellant.1 

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, 

Ohio, for appellee.2

___________________________________________________________________

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DATE JOURNALIZED:5-31-22

ABELE, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas 

Court judgment of conviction and sentence. Marcus Sloan, defendant 

below and appellant herein, pleaded guilty to one count of 

receiving stolen property, one count of improperly handling a 

1 Different counsel represented appellant during the trial 

court proceedings. 

2 Appellee did not file a brief or enter an appearance in this 

appeal. Pursuant to App.R. 18(C), as a consequence of the failure 

of an appellee to file a brief, an appellate court may accept the

appellant’s statement of facts and issues as correct and reverse 

the trial court’s judgment.
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firearm in a motor vehicle and one count of obstructing justice. 

Appellant assigns two errors for review: 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“APPELLANT MARCUS SLOAN RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED 

TO OBJECT AND PROCEEDED TO GO FORWARD WITH THE 

BURDEN OF PROOF THAT IS CLEARLY DESIGNATED TO 

THE STATE OF OHIO IN SUPPRESSION HEARINGS.” 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“APPELLANT MARCUS SLOAN RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY ALLOWED 

HIM TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY, INSTEAD OF A NO 

CONTEST PLEA, TO THE CHARGES, WHEN HIS ATTORNEY 

HAD SPOKEN WITH THE APPELLANT AND APPELLANT HAD 

INDICATED HIS INTENT TO APPEAL THE TRIAL 

COURT’S RULING ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.” 

{¶2} On February 27, 2019, in Case Number 19CR73 a Lawrence 

County Grand Jury returned an indictment that charged appellant 

with one count of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 

2913.51(A)(C) and one count of improper handling of a firearm in a 

motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), both fourth-degree 

felonies. On December 17, 2019, in Case Number 19CR510 a Lawrence 

County Grand Jury returned an indictment that charged appellant 

with one count of obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 

2921.32(A)(2)(4)(5), a third-degree felony. 

{¶3} Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence in both 

cases and challenged the basis for the traffic stop. At the 
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suppression hearing, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Bransen Barr 

testified that on January 25, 2019, he assisted a drug interdiction 

effort and observed appellant make an exaggerated left turn that 

constituted a marked lane violation. Barr then followed appellant 

and noticed “a couple other * * * lane violations.” Barr 

subsequently stopped appellant’s vehicle. 

{¶4} After extensive testimony and Trooper Barr’s dashcam 

video, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. The 

court concluded that two marked lane violations occurred, and one 

violated the “wide turn statute,” R.C. 4511.36(A)(2). The court 

further concluded that probable cause justified the stop based on 

appellant’s failure to square into the turn in violation of R.C. 

4511.36 and State v. Petty, 2019-Ohio-4241, 134 N.E.3d 222 (4th 

Dist.). 

{¶5} On March 11, 2020, appellant agreed to plead guilty to 

receiving stolen property, improperly handling a firearm in a motor 

vehicle, and obstructing justice. At the change of plea hearing, 

the trial court noted that the state, defense counsel and appellant 

negotiated the plea, including the recommended sentence. The court 

further asked appellant if he understood that a guilty plea waived 

his right to a jury trial, right not to testify against himself, 

right to confront witnesses, right to compulsory process, and right 
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to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Appellant responded affirmatively. The court then reviewed the 

maximum penalties and informed appellant that (1) the third-degree 

felony is subject to a 36-month prison term and a $10,000 fine, and 

(2) fourth-degree felonies are subject to an 18-month prison term 

and a $5,000 fine. The court also addressed post-release control. 

{¶6} Consequently, in Case No. 19CR73 the trial court 

sentenced appellant to serve (1) 18 months in prison on the 

receiving stolen property charge, (2) 18 months in prison on the 

improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle charge, to be 

served concurrently, and (3) a three-year post-release control 

term. The court further ordered appellant to pay costs and return 

the firearm to its rightful owner. In 19CR10, the trial court 

sentenced appellant to serve (1) three-years in prison, 

concurrently with the sentence in 19CR73 [for a total three-year 

term], and (2) a three year post-release control term. The court 

further ordered appellant to pay costs. Important to note, 

however, is that during the trial court’s exchange with the 

parties, appellant’s counsel indicated that “even though this is a 

negotiated plea, we do * * * wish to pursue some appellate issues.” 

This appeal followed.

{¶7} For ease of discussion, we first address appellant’s 
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second assignment of error. Appellant contends that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney allowed him to 

enter a guilty plea when counsel and the court had become aware 

that appellant indicated his desire to appeal the trial court’s 

ruling on his motion to suppress evidence. The Sixth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the 

Ohio Constitution, provide that defendants in all criminal 

proceedings shall have the assistance of counsel for their defense. 

The United States Supreme Court has generally interpreted this 

provision to mean that a criminal defendant is entitled to the 

“reasonably effective assistance” of counsel. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 

defendant must show (1) counsel's deficient performance, and (2) 

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense and deprived the 

defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 687. Courts need not analyze 

both Strickland test prongs if a claim can be resolved under one 

prong. See State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 

52 (2000).

{¶8} “ ‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the

plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea 
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unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the 

Ohio Constitution.’ ” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-

Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio 

St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996); accord State v. Montgomery, 

148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 40; State v.

Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9. 

“It is the trial court's duty, therefore, to ensure that a 

defendant ‘has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and 

of its consequence.’ ” Montgomery at ¶ 40, quoting Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969);

State v. Conley, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1091, 2019-Ohio-4172, ¶ 

34; State v. Lindsey, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 20CA26, 20CA27, 

20CA28, & 20CA29, 2021-Ohio-2613, ¶ 10. “In determining whether a

guilty * * * plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, an appellate court examines the totality of the 

circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that 

the trial court complied with constitutional and procedural 

safeguards.” State v. Willison, 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA18, 2019-

Ohio-220, ¶ 11. 

{¶9} In general, a guilty plea is a complete admission of a 

defendant’s guilt. Crim. R. 11(B)(1); State v. Shafer, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 17CA1047, 2018-Ohio-214, ¶ 21; State v. Lask, 4th Dist. 
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Adams No. 18CA1081, 2019-Ohio-2753, ¶ 10. Thus, when a defendant 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea with 

the assistance of counsel, the defendant “may not thereafter raise 

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional 

rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” State 

v. Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 98, ¶ 

44. In accordance with the foregoing, this court has held that a 

defendant’s guilty plea waives the right to appeal the denial of a 

motion to suppress evidence. State v. Woods, 4th Dist. Lawrence 

No. 18CA10, 2018-Ohio-5460, ¶ 12-14; State v. Spangler, 4th Dist. 

Lawrence No. 16CA1, 2016-Ohio-8583, ¶ 17; State v. Johnson, 4th 

Dist. Hocking No. 14CA16, 2015-Ohio-854, ¶ 4-6; Lask at ¶ 11. See 

also State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 

474, ¶ 15 (A “valid guilty plea by a counseled defendant, however, 

generally waives the right to appeal all prior nonjurisdictional 

defects, including the denial of a motion to suppress”). However, 

because a no contest plea does not preclude a defendant from 

appealing a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion, see Crim.R. 

12(I), and because in the case sub judice appellant expressed his 

desire to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, appellant 

contends that trial counsel should have instructed appellant to 

enter a no contest plea rather than a guilty plea. We agree. 
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{¶10} In State v. Lask, supra, this court held that a defendant 

did not enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea because the 

defendant received incorrect information about his right to appeal 

the trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress. Lask at ¶ 2. 

“Ohio courts, including the Supreme Court of Ohio, ‘have held that 

a plea is not entered knowingly and intelligently where it is 

premised on the mistaken impression that a trial court’s decision 

is appealable.’ ” Id. at ¶ 9 State v. Felts, 4th Dist. Ross No. 

13CA3407, 2014-Ohio-2378, ¶ 19 (plea predicated on erroneous belief 

could appeal trial court’s denial of motion in limine), citing 

Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d at 527-528, 660 N.E.2d 450; Buggs at ¶ 10; 

State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25103, 2010-Ohio-3387, ¶ 8, 

and State v. Lewis, 164 Ohio App.3d 318, 2005-Ohio-5921, 842 N.E.2d

113, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). 

{¶11} Recently, in State v. Buggs, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

20CA3913, 2021-Ohio-39, the record showed that the defendant 

believed he could plead guilty and appeal speedy trial issues. 

This Court concluded, “Buggs entered a guilty plea rather than a no 

contest plea, so contrary to the statements of the trial court and 

the intent of Buggs, he forfeited his right to appeal the denial of 

his motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds.” Id. at ¶ 9. 

{¶12} Like the defendants in Lask and Buggs, appellant in the 
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case sub judice entered his guilty plea with the belief that he 

could nevertheless pursue an appeal. The sentencing hearing 

transcript reveals:

COURT: You have the right to appeal this decision. * * * 

So, at this time, I’m gonna ask that you consult with 

[defense counsel] and he will let the Court know if you 

wish to exercise your right of appeal in this case.

DEFENSE: Your Honor, uh, I’ve already talked to my client, 

we would wish to uh, even though this is a negotiated plea, 

uh, we do wish to pursue some appellate issues.

Because appellant did desire to appeal the trial court’s 

denial of his suppression motion, appellant should have entered a 

no contest plea rather than a guilty plea. Thus, as in Lask and 

Buggs, we conclude that appellant did not knowingly or 

intelligently enter his guilty plea.

{¶13} Therefore, based upon the foregoing reasons, we sustain 

appellant’s assignment of error, reverse the trial court’s judgment 

and remand this matter to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty 

plea. The court may conduct further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. Because this decision renders moot the remaining 

assignment of error, we will not address it. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

Furthermore, our ruling should not be considered in any manner 

whatsoever as a comment on the merits of the underlying motion to 

suppress evidence.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND THIS CAUSE 
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REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS 

CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. 
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JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and this cause 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Appellant shall recover of appellee the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court

directing the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this 

judgment into execution.

If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has 

been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is 

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the 

bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to 

allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an 

application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in 

that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will 

terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or 

the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the 

Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule 

II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. 

Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal 

prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the 

date of such dismissal. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate 

pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:_____________________________ 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a 

final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal 
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commences from the date of filing with the clerk.