No. 85-109 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

KAY HUNT, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsHAROLD RALPH HUNT, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

A. L. Craddock, Red Lod-gel Montana 

For Respondent: 

James P. Murphy, Billings, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 22, 1985 

Decided: December 18, 1385 

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Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The Yellowstone County District Court held that Harold 

Ralph Hunt (husband) owed Kay Hunt (wife) $24,064.03, which 

arose out of an obligation under a. property settlement 

agreement and divorce decree entered in 1981. Husband 

appeals. We affirm. 

The issues are: 

1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

original debt of $10,000 in connection with the motel 

purchase was not satisfied by the transfer of the house by 

the husband to the McCartys? 

2. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

payment of $15,000 by the wife to the McCartys was reasonable 

and that the payment of $15,000 was legally owed by the 

husband? 

3. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

second mortgage on the house was the husband's obligation, 

and that the wife paid $11,255.63 to satisfy that obligation? 

4. Did the District Court err in granting the wife a 

credit for material and labor for remodeling the house? 

5. Did the District Court err in awarding the wife 

$24,064.03? 

Kay and Ralph Hunt were divorced in October 1981. 

During their marriage, the parties purchased a house subject 

to a purchase money trust indenture. They also purchased by 

separate contracts for deed a motel property and a rural 

building lot (Fox property). IJnder the motel contract for 

deed, a payment of $10,000 was due to the McCartys, the 

sellers of the motel. Under the divorce property settlement 

agreement, the wife was awarded the motel property and the 
husband was awarded the house and the Fox property. The 

parties receiving the properties were to assume the 

outstanding debts, with the exception that the $10,000 due to 

the McCartvs on the motel property was to be paid by the 

husband. When he was unable to pay the $10,000 due, he 

quitclaimed to the McCartys his interest in the house. 

McCartys reserved the right to a deficiency judgment should 

the house sell for less than the debt. The husband testified 

that he considered the obligation due McCartys to have been 

satisfied in full by the transfer. 

In October 1983, the wife sold the motel property. 

Prior to the sale, she was required to obtain the McCartys' 

consent to the sale. She testified the McCartys would not 

give their consent to the sale of the motel property without 

payment in cash. The wife asked the husband to pay the 

amount demanded by the McCartys. He did not do so because 

he claimed the original obligation was satisfied. As a 

result, the wife negotiated an arrangement with McCartys to 

pay them $15,000 in two installments from the proceeds of the 

motel sale. Their agreement specified that the payment of 

$15,000 represented the balance due under the original 

contract for deed of $10,000 plus interest and costs. 

As a part of the settlement, McCartys deeded the house 

to the wife. After completion of the motel sale, the wife 

moved into the house and improved the house to make it more 

marketable. In February 1984, the wife sold the house. Prior 

to the sale, Kay Hunt paid Household Finance $563. From the 

proceeds of the sale, she paid the second mortgage on the 

house in the sum of $10,692.53. The second mortgage was 

originally made in connection with the purchase of the Fox 

property. 
The District Court concluded that the husband was 

obligated to pay the $10,000 plus interest under the property 

settlement agreement; that the debt was not satisfied by his 

transfer of the house to the McCartys; that the wife's 

payment of $15,000 to the McCartys was a reasonable sum and 

that that payment was legally owed by the husband; that 

because the house was Ralph's, the second mortgage was the 

obligation of the husband; and that the wife's payment of the 

second mortgage was the payment of an obligation owed by the 

husband. The court concluded that the husband owed the wife 

$24,064.03. The husband appeals. 

Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

original debt of $10,000 in connection with the motel 

purchase was not satisfied by the transfer of the house by 

the husband to the McCartys? 

Both parties agreed that the husband originally owed 

the McCartys $10,000. When Ralph was unable to pay that 

obligation, he agreed to quitclaim the house to the McCartys. 

He also agreed that if a deficiency resulted from the sale, 

the McCartys could proceed against him for a deficiency 

judgment. 

The husband argues that the transfer of the house 

amounted to an accord and satisfaction. He cites Hale v. 

Belgrade Co. (1925), 75 Mont. 99, 242 P. 425. In Hale, the 

Court concluded that the conveyance of the real property was 

full consideration for the antecedent debt and was 

unconditionally accepted as a full satisfaction of the debt 

with nothing remaining to be done. That case is clearly 

distinguishable from the present case because the husba-nd 

agreed with the McCartys in writing that if there was a 
deficiency after the house sale, he remained responsible for 

the deficiency. It is clear that the agreement did not 

constitute an accord as defined in S 28-1-1401, MCA. 

We conclude there is substantial evidence to support 

the factual determination by the court that the original debt 

owing to the McCartys was not satisfied by the husband's 

transfer of the house to them. 

I1 

Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

payment of $15,000 by the wife to the McCartys was reasonable 

a.nd that the payment of $15,000 was legally owed by the 

husband? 

The husband attempts to argue that the wife's payment 

of $15,000 to the McCartys was not a reasonable sum. There 

is substantial evidence in the record to support the District 

Court's conclusion that the $15,000 was a reasonable sum in 

settlement of the total balance due. 

The husband attempts to reargue that the $1.5,000 was 

not actually his obligation because the transfer of the house 

was in full satisfaction of his obligation owing to the 

McCartys. There is substantial evidence in the record to 

support the District Court's conclusion that the $15,000 was 

an obligation legally owed by the husband. 

We affirm these conclusions of the District Court. 

111 

Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

second mortgage on the house was the husband's obligation and 

that the wife in fact paid $11,255.63 to satisfy that 

obligation? 

Ralph argues that under the terms of the dissolution 

decree, the house became his and all interest on the part of 
the wife terminated. He further argues that when he conveyed 

the house to the McCartys, it then became the McCartys' house 

and his interest and obligations were terminated. In turn, 

when the wife accepted a deed from the McCartys, he no longer 

had any legal interest in the house and therefore should not 

be required to make any payments in connection with the 

house. 

The District Court found that the wife asked the 

husband to pay the debt owing to the McCartys, but he did not 

do so because he considered the obligation to have been 

satisfied. The District Court further found that the 

McCartys did not want the house and transferred it to the 

wife in connection with the settlement of the amount due to 

them. The District Court correctly concluded that the house 

was the husband's property under the divorce and property 

settlement agreement, and that the obligation owing on the 

second mortqase was the husband's obligation. 

The husband then argues that the wife did not pay the 

second mortgage but only allowed it to be paid through the 

sale proceeds. Again the District Court correctly concluded 

that the effect of the sale was to pay $11,255.63 to satisfy 

the second mortgage, which was an obligation owed by the 

husband under terms of the dissolution decree. We affirm the 

determination of the District Court in this regard. 

IV 

Did the District Court err in granting the wife a 

credit for material and labor for remodeling the house? 

The record contains substantial evidence to support the 

conclusion by the District Court that the wife should receive 

credit for the amount of material and labor which she 
expended for the remodeling of the house. We affirm the 

conclusion of the District Court. 

Did the District Court err in awarding the wife 

In arguing against the judgment, the husband restates 

the same arguments previously considered. The record 

contains substantial evidence to support the District Court. 

The wife concedes there was one error in computation. The 

District Court improperly includ.ed $328.97 in the $24,064.03 

judgment. We therefore instruct the District Court to reduce 

the judgment by $328.97. 

The case is remanded to the District Court with 

instructions to enter an amended judgment for the wife in the 

amount of $23,735.06. 

We concur: 

hie£ Justice