42670 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 136 / Monday, July 18, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

NSAs’’ and would ‘‘eliminate the 

impact of sampling error and GBS 

approximations,’’ and would be 

expected ‘‘to have equal or improved 

country-level data quality.’’ Id. at 5–6. 

The Postal Service states that its 

proposal would not directly affect ‘‘the 

national totals of outbound international 

contract mail pieces reported in RPW.’’ 

Id. at 5. However, the Postal Service 

expects that the proposed methodology 

‘‘would change the level of census 

weight for individual countries . . . .’’ 

Id. at 6. As a result, the Postal Service 

states that the national totals for 

products that contain non-census 

weight (primarily FCMI and FCPIS 

Retail) would be indirectly affected 

‘‘because all census and sample data are 

controlled to GBS Dispatch weight for 

each expansion stratum.’’ Id. 

The Postal Service details these 

indirect effects in a version of the 

international outbound portion of the 

FY 2022 Q2 YTD RPW report showing 

data resulting from use of the proposed 

methodology compared to data resulting 

from use of the current methodology. 

See Petition, Attachment A at 1; 

Proposal Three at 6–7. According to the 

Postal Service, ‘‘[t]he indirect effects of 

the proposal would cause small changes 

to Outbound First-Class Mail 

International (1.6 percent decrease in 

revenue and 2.2 percent decrease in 

volume) and First-Class Package 

International Service Retail (0.5 percent 

increase in revenue and 0.6 percent 

increase in volume).’’ Proposal Three at 

7 (emphasis in original). The Postal 

Service also states that ‘‘[o]ther 

international categories would have 

smaller indirect effects: US. [sic] Postal 

Service Mail, Free Mail, and 

International Ancillary Services.’’ Id. 

(emphasis in original). Finally, the 

Postal Service states that ‘‘[o]verall, 

outbound international revenue and 

volume for Quarters 1 and 2 of FY 2022 

would be reduced by 0.2 percent and 

1.3 percent, respectively.’’ Id. (footnote 

omitted). 

III. Notice and Comment 

The Commission establishes Docket 

No. RM2022–9 for consideration of 

matters raised by the Petition. More 

information on the Petition may be 

accessed via the Commission’s website 

at https://www.prc.gov. Interested 

persons may submit comments on the 

Petition and Proposal Three no later 

than August 12, 2022. Pursuant to 39 

U.S.C. 505, Jennaca D. Upperman is 

designated as an officer of the 

Commission (Public Representative) to 

represent the interests of the general 

public in this proceeding. 

IV. Ordering Paragraphs 

It is ordered: 

1. The Commission establishes Docket 

No. RM2022–9 for consideration of the 

matters raised by the Petition of the 

United States Postal Service for the 

Initiation of a Proceeding to Consider 

Proposed Changes in Analytical 

Principles (Proposal Three), filed July 8, 

2022. 

2. Comments by interested persons in 

this proceeding are due no later than 

August 12, 2022. 

3. Pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 505, the 

Commission appoints Jennaca D. 

Upperman to serve as an officer of the 

Commission (Public Representative) to 

represent the interests of the general 

public in this docket. 

4. The Secretary shall arrange for 

publication of this order in the Federal 

Register. 

By the Commission. 

Erica A. Barker, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2022–15228 Filed 7–15–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7710–FW–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 64 

[CG Docket No. 17–59, WC Docket No. 17– 

97; FCC 22–37; FR ID 92926] 

Advanced Methods To Target and 

Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call 

Authentication Trust Anchor 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal 

Communications Commission 

(Commission or FCC) proposes and 

seeks comment on a number of actions 

aimed protecting consumers from illegal 

calls. The document proposes and seeks 

comment on a number of steps to 

protect American consumers from all 

illegal calls, whether they originate 

domestically or abroad. Specifically, 

this document proposes to require 

domestic intermediate providers that are 

not gateway providers in the call path 

to apply STIR/SHAKEN caller ID 

authentication to calls. It also seeks 

comment on a number of robocall 

mitigation requirements, enhancements 

to enforcement, clarifications on certain 

aspects of STIR/SHAKEN, and 

limitations on the use of U.S. North 

American Numbering Plan (NANP) 

numbers for foreign-originated calls and 

indirect number access. 

DATES: Comments are due on or before 

August 17, 2022, and reply comments 

are due on or before September 16, 

2022. Written comments on the 

Paperwork Reduction Act proposed 

information collection requirements 

must be submitted by the public, Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB), and 

other interested parties on or before 

September 16, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Pursuant to §§ 1.415 and 

1.419 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 

1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file 

comments and reply comments on or 

before the dates indicated in this 

document. Comments and reply 

comments may be filed using the 

Commission’s Electronic Comment 

Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic 

Filing of Documents in Rulemaking 

Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998). 

Interested parties may file comments or 

reply comments, identified by CG 

Docket No. 17–59 and WC Docket No. 

17–97 by any of the following methods: 

• Electronic Filers: Comments may be 

filed electronically using the internet by 

accessing ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ 

ecfs/. 

• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to 

file by paper must file an original and 

one copy of each filing. 

• Filings can be sent by commercial 

overnight courier, or by first-class or 

overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All 

filings must be addressed to the 

Commission’s Secretary, Office of the 

Secretary, Federal Communications 

Commission. 

• Commercial overnight mail (other 

than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail 

and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 

Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 

20701. 

• U.S. Postal Service first-class, 

Express, and Priority mail must be 

addressed to 45 L Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20554. 

• Effective March 19, 2020, and until 

further notice, the Commission no 

longer accepts any hand or messenger 

delivered filings. This is a temporary 

measure taken to help protect the health 

and safety of individuals, and to 

mitigate the transmission of COVID–19. 

See FCC Announces Closure of FCC 

Headquarters Open Window and 

Change in Hand-Delivery Policy, Public 

Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2788 (March 19, 

2020), https://www.fcc.gov/document/ 

fcc-closes-headquarters-open-windowand-changes-hand-delivery-policy. 

• People with Disabilities: Contact the 

FCC to request reasonable 

accommodations (accessible format 

documents, sign language interpreters, 

CART, etc.) by email: FCC504@fcc.gov 

or phone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 202– 

418–0432. 


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For detailed instructions for 

submitting comments and additional 

information on the rulemaking process, 

see the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

section of this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

further information, please contact 

either Jonathan Lechter, Attorney 

Advisor, Competition Policy Division, 

Wireline Competition Bureau, at 

Jonathan.lechter@fcc.gov or at (202) 

418–0984, or Jerusha Burnett, Attorney 

Advisor, Consumer Policy Division, 

Consumer and Governmental Affairs 

Bureau, at jerusha.burnett@fcc.gov or at 

(202) 418–0526. For additional 

information concerning the Paperwork 

Reduction Act proposed information 

collection requirements contained in 

this document, send an email to PRA@

fcc.gov or contact Cathy Williams at 

(202) 418–2918. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: You may 

submit comments, identified by the 

Commission’s Seventh Further Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking in CG Docket No. 

17–59 and Fifth Further Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking in WC Docket No. 

17–97, FCC 22–37, adopted on May 19, 

2022, and released on May 20, 2022. 

The full text of this document is 

available for public inspection at the 

following internet address: https://

docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC22-37A1.pdf. To request materials in 

accessible formats for people with 

disabilities (e.g., Braille, large print, 

electronic files, audio format, etc.), send 

an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the 

Consumer & Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice), or 

(202) 418–0432 (TTY). 

In addition to filing comments with 

the Secretary, a copy of any comments 

on the Paperwork Reduction Act 

proposed information collection 

requirements contained herein should 

be submitted to the Federal 

Communications Commission via email 

to PRA@fcc.gov and to Cathy Williams, 

FCC, via email to Cathy.Williams@

fcc.gov. 

Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995 Analysis 

This document contains proposed 

information collection requirements. 

The Commission, as part of its 

continuing effort to reduce paperwork 

burdens, invites the general public to 

comment on the information collection 

requirements contained in this 

document, as required by the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104– 

13. Public and agency comments are 

due September 16, 2022. 

Comments should address: (a) 

whether the proposed collection of 

information is necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

Commission, including whether the 

information shall have practical utility; 

(b) the accuracy of the Commission’s 

burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance 

the quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information collected; (d) ways to 

minimize the burden of the collection of 

information on the respondents, 

including the use of automated 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology; and (e) way to 

further reduce the information 

collection burden on small business 

concerns with fewer than 25 employees. 

In addition, pursuant to the Small 

Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 

Public Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 

3506(c)(4), the Commission seeks 

specific comment on how it might 

further reduce the information 

collection burden for small business 

concerns with fewer than 25 employees. 

Synopsis 

Seventh Further Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking and Fifth Further Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking 

1. In the final rule regarding gateway 

providers (Gateway Provider Order) 

(FCC 22–37), published elsewhere in 

this issue of the Federal Register, the 

Commission takes steps to protect 

American consumers from foreignoriginated illegal calls by adopting a 

number of rules that focus on gateway 

providers as the entry point onto the 

U.S. network. In this further notice of 

proposed rulemaking (FNPRM), the 

Commission further proposes and seeks 

comment on expanding some of these 

rules to cover other providers in the call 

path, along with additional steps to 

protect American consumers from all 

illegal calls, whether they originate 

domestically or abroad. 

2. First, the Commission proposes to 

extend its caller ID authentication 

requirement to cover domestic 

intermediate providers that are not 

gateway providers in the call path. 

Second, the Commission seeks comment 

on extending some, but not all, of the 

robocall mitigation duties the 

Commission adopts in the Gateway 

Provider Order to all domestic providers 

in the call path. These mitigation duties 

include: expanding and modifying its 

existing affirmative obligations; 

requiring downstream providers to 

block calls from non-gateway providers 

when those providers fail to comply; the 

general mitigation standard; and filing a 

mitigation plan in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database regardless of STIR/ 

SHAKEN implementation status. The 

Commission also seeks comment on 

additional measures to address illegal 

robocalls, including: ways to enhance 

the enforcement of its rules; clarifying 

certain aspects of its STIR/SHAKEN 

regime; and placing limitations on the 

use of U.S. NANP numbers for foreignoriginated calls and indirect number 

access. 

3. Because the TRACED Act defines 

‘‘voice service’’ in a manner that 

excludes intermediate providers, our 

authentication and Robocall Mitigation 

Database rules use ‘‘voice service 

provider’’ in this manner. Our call 

blocking rules, many of which the 

Commission adopted prior to adoption 

of the TRACED Act, use a definition of 

‘‘voice service provider’’ that includes 

intermediate providers. In that context, 

use of the TRACED Act definition of 

‘‘voice service’’ would create 

inconsistency with our existing rules. 

To avoid confusion, for purposes of this 

item, we use the term ‘‘voice service 

provider’’ consistent with the TRACED 

Act definition and where discussing 

caller ID authentication or the Robocall 

Mitigation Database. In all other 

instances, we use ‘‘provider’’ and 

specify the type of provider as 

appropriate. Unless otherwise specified, 

we mean any provider, regardless of its 

position in the call path. 

4. The Commission anticipates that 

the impact of its proposals will account 

for another large share of the annual 

$13.5 billion minimum benefit the 

Commission originally estimated in the 

First Caller ID Authentication Report 

and Order, 85 FR 22029 (April 21, 

2020), and FNPRM, 85 FR 22099 (April 

21, 2022), for eliminating unlawful 

robocalls, in addition to the collective 

impact of the rules the Commission 

adopts in the Gateway Provider Order 

and the rules adopted earlier in these 

proceedings. While each of the 

proposed requirements on their own 

may not fully accomplish that goal, 

viewed collectively, the Commission 

expects that they will achieve a large 

share of the annual $13.5 billion 

minimum benefit. The Commission also 

expects that this share of benefits will 

far exceed the costs imposed on 

providers. The Commission seeks 

comment on this analysis and on the 

possible benefits of the requirements the 

Commission proposes. 

Extending Authentication Requirement 

to All Intermediate Providers 

5. To further combat illegal robocalls 

consistent with the rules the 

Commission adopts in the Gateway 

Provider Order, the Commission 

proposes to require that all U.S. 

intermediate providers authenticate 

caller ID information consistent with 


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STIR/SHAKEN for Session Initiation 

Protocol (SIP) calls that are carrying a 

U.S. number in the caller ID field and 

to require all providers to comply with 

the most recent version of the standards 

as they are released. The Commission 

seeks comment on these proposals. 

6. As the Commission has previously 

explained, application of caller ID 

authentication by intermediate 

providers ‘‘will provide significant 

benefits in facilitating analytics, 

blocking, and traceback by offering all 

parties in the call ecosystem more 

information.’’ At the time the 

Commission reached this conclusion, 

given the concerns that an 

authentication requirement on all 

intermediate providers ‘‘was unduly 

burdensome in some cases,’’ the 

Commission established that instead of 

authenticating unauthenticated calls, 

intermediate providers could ‘‘register 

and participate with the industry 

traceback consortium as an alternative 

means of complying with [its] rules.’’ 

7. Since the Commission established 

those requirements in the Second Caller 

ID Authentication Report and Order, 85 

FR 73360 (Nov. 17, 2020), in the Fourth 

Call Blocking Order, 86 FR 17726 (April 

6, 2021), the Commission subsequently 

required all providers in the call path— 

including gateway providers and other 

intermediate providers—to respond 

fully and in a timely manner to 

traceback requests. This rule has 

effectively mooted the choice given to 

intermediate providers in the earlier 

Second Caller ID Authentication Report 

and Order to authenticate calls or 

cooperate with traceback requests. 

Evidence shows that robocalls are a 

significant and increasing problem. To 

further strengthen the STIR/SHAKEN 

regime and protect consumers and the 

integrity of the U.S. telephone network, 

the Commission proposes that all 

intermediate providers should be 

required to authenticate 

unauthenticated SIP calls that they 

receive. The Commission seeks 

comment on this proposal. 

8. Intermediate providers could play a 

crucial role in further promoting 

effective, network-wide caller ID 

authentication. Requiring all 

intermediate providers to authenticate 

caller ID information for all 

unauthenticated SIP calls will provide 

information to downstream providers 

that will facilitate analytics and promote 

traceback efforts. SHAKEN verification, 

even ‘‘C-level’’ attestation, provides 

relevant and helpful information to 

downstream providers, particularly as 

the STIR/SHAKEN regime becomes 

even more ubiquitous. Adopting this 

proposal would bring all U.S. providers 

within the STIR/SHAKEN regime and 

prevent gaming by providers, allowing 

‘‘for more robust abilities to either trust 

the caller or perform traceback because 

an illegal caller can be more easily 

identified.’’ Indeed, STIR/SHAKEN 

becomes more useful the more providers 

there are that employ it. 

9. The Commission believes this 

proposal is in line with commenter 

assertions that expanding call 

authentication requirements will have a 

‘‘significant impact in curtailing illegal 

robocalls’’ and that imposing these 

obligations ‘‘on more providers will 

promote fewer spoofed calls overall.’’ 

The Commission anticipates that its 

expansion of the STIR/SHAKEN regime 

may spur other countries and regulators 

to develop and adopt STIR/SHAKEN, 

further increasing the standards’ benefit. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

analysis and on the possible benefits of 

the requirement the Commission 

proposes. Are there reasons the 

Commission should not require all 

intermediate providers to implement 

STIR/SHAKEN for SIP calls? Should the 

Commission specifically target 

providers that are most responsible for 

illegal robocalls? Are there any 

downsides to only targeting specific 

providers? 

10. The Commission also seeks 

comment on the proposal’s 

implementation costs and burdens. 

Acknowledging that many intermediate 

providers are also gateway providers to 

some degree and are now required to 

implement STIR/SHAKEN per the 

Gateway Provider Order, do the benefits 

of an intermediate provider 

authentication requirement outweigh 

the costs and burdens? Certain 

commenters assert that gateway 

providers are in a unique position to 

‘‘arrest the flow of harmful scam calls 

and illegal robocalls.’’ Would it be a 

greater burden to impose this obligation 

on non-gateway intermediate providers? 

Indeed, a majority of commenters 

oppose expanding authentication 

requirements, even to gateway 

providers, saying that the 

implementation costs would be 

significant without additional benefits. 

While the Commission previously 

acknowledged these claims and ‘‘thus 

offer[ed] an alternative method of 

compliance,’’ it further noted that 

‘‘[p]roviding this option . . . further 

allows for continued evaluation of the 

role intermediate providers play in 

authenticating the caller ID information 

of the unauthenticated calls that they 

receive amid the continued deployment 

of the STIR/SHAKEN framework.’’ Has 

the intervening experience with the 

entirety of the Commission’s caller ID 

authentication requirements and illegal 

robocalls shed further light on the role 

of intermediate providers in preventing 

these calls from reaching consumers? 

11. The Commission does not 

anticipate that its proposal to expand 

this requirement to the remaining 

intermediate providers will be 

unusually costly or unduly burdensome 

compared to gateway providers and 

voice service providers that are already 

required to authenticate 

unauthenticated SIP calls as 

commenters have not provided detailed 

support for assertions that such a 

requirement will cost significant time 

and resources to implement. Further, 

many of the remaining intermediate 

providers are also gateway providers 

that will have already implemented 

STIR/SHAKEN in at least some portion 

of their networks, likely lowering their 

compliance costs to meet the 

requirement the Commission proposes. 

Does this fact undercut the argument 

that expanding the authentication 

requirement would impose an undue 

burden on those providers? In the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order, 

the Commission finds that the benefits 

of a gateway authentication requirement 

outweigh the burdens. Should the 

Commission’s rationale differ regarding 

the remaining intermediate providers? 

The Commission reiterates that as more 

and more providers implement STIR/ 

SHAKEN, the Commission anticipates 

that technology and solutions will be 

more widely available and less costly to 

implement. The Commission seeks 

comment on this analysis. Is there any 

reason to believe that authentication is 

more costly for the remaining 

intermediate providers as compared to 

other providers or that the benefit of 

lower-level attestations would be 

limited? 

12. Requirement. The Commission 

proposes that to comply with the 

requirement to authenticate calls, all 

intermediate providers must 

authenticate caller ID information for all 

SIP calls they receive with U.S. numbers 

in the caller ID field for which the caller 

ID information has not been 

authenticated and which they will 

exchange with another provider as a SIP 

call. This would replace the existing 

rule under which intermediate 

providers have the option to 

authenticate rather than cooperate with 

traceback efforts and supplement the 

rule for gateway providers the 

Commission adopts in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

approach, as well as on whether and 

how to modify this proposal. 


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13. Consistent with the Commission’s 

existing intermediate provider 

authentication obligation where such a 

provider chose the authentication route, 

and the rule adopted for gateway 

providers in the accompanying Gateway 

Provider Order, the Commission 

proposes that an intermediate provider 

satisfies its authentication requirement 

if it adheres to the three Alliance for 

Telecommunications Industry Solutions 

(ATIS) standards that are the foundation 

of STIR/SHAKEN—ATIS–1000074, 

ATIS–1000080, and ATIS–1000084— 

and all documents referenced therein. 

The Commission also proposes that 

compliance with the most current 

versions of these standards as of the 

compliance deadline set in the Gateway 

Provider Order released concurrently 

with this FNPRM, including any errata 

as of that date or earlier, represents the 

minimum requirement to satisfy its 

rules. 

14. Compliance Deadline. The 

Commission seeks comment on when 

the Commission should require all 

intermediate providers’ authentication 

obligation to become effective, 

balancing the public interest of prompt 

implementation by these providers with 

the need for these providers to have 

sufficient time to implement the 

proposed obligations. The Commission 

notes that voice service providers were 

previously able to meet the 18-month 

deadline to authenticate all 

unauthenticated SIP calls carrying U.S. 

NANP numbers, but the Commission 

found a shorter deadline to be 

reasonable for gateway providers in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order. 

The Commission’s rules adopted 

pursuant to the TRACED Act grant 

certain providers exemptions and 

extensions from this deadline. Should 

the Commission require all intermediate 

providers to authenticate all 

unauthenticated SIP calls carrying U.S. 

NANP numbers within six months after 

the Commission adopts an order 

released pursuant to this FNPRM? Given 

that there is only a small group of 

remaining providers that have not 

already been required to implement 

STIR/SHAKEN, can implementation be 

accomplished in six months? Is a 

shorter deadline reasonable because the 

industry has much more experience 

with implementation than when the 

Commission originally required voice 

service providers to implement STIR/ 

SHAKEN, and there is evidence that 

STIR/SHAKEN implementation costs 

have dropped since the Commission 

first adopted the requirement for voice 

service providers? Would imposing a 

shorter deadline on all intermediate 

providers unnecessarily impose greater 

costs and burdens that would not be 

fully offset by associated benefits? Are 

there any reasons to impose a longer 

deadline? 

15. The Commission also anticipates 

that the current token access policy will 

not present a material barrier to 

intermediate providers meeting their 

authentication obligation and that the 

Secure Telephone Identity Governance 

Authority (STI–GA) can address any 

concerns before these providers are 

required to authenticate calls. Do 

commenters agree? Additionally, to 

ensure that these providers are not 

unfairly penalized and are eligible for 

the same relief, in line with the 

Commission’s current rules for voice 

service providers, and now gateway 

providers, the Commission proposes to 

provide a STIR/SHAKEN extension to 

intermediate providers that are unable 

to obtain a token due to the STI–GA 

token access policy. Does this extension 

alleviate implementation concerns? 

16. The Commission also proposes, 

consistent with its requirement for voice 

service providers and gateway 

providers, that all intermediate 

providers have the flexibility to assign 

the level of attestation appropriate to the 

call based on the applicable version of 

the standards and the available call 

information. As discussed in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order, 

there are significant benefits to be 

gained from higher attestation levels. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

proposal. Should the Commission 

modify this proposal? If so, how should 

the Commission change it and what 

would be the impacts on costs and 

benefits? 

17. Authentication Obligations for All 

Providers. The Commission also seeks 

comment on requiring all providers to 

comply with the current version of the 

STIR/SHAKEN standards (ATIS– 

1000074, ATIS–1000080, and ATIS– 

1000084) and any other internet 

Protocol (IP) authentication standards 

adopted as of the compliance deadline. 

The Commission concludes that 

mandating a single version of the 

standards across providers will promote 

uniformity and ensure that providers are 

using the most up-to-date caller ID 

authentication tools. The Commission 

seeks comment on this conclusion. Is 

there any reason the Commission 

should not require providers to comply 

with updated versions of the standards? 

The Commission also seeks comment on 

a streamlined mechanism for the 

Wireline Competition Bureau or other 

appropriate Bureau to require providers 

to comply with future versions of the 

STIR/SHAKEN standard as they are 

developed and made available. Should 

the Commission delegate to the Wireline 

Competition Bureau authority to require 

all providers to implement a newly 

available updated standard through 

notice and opportunity to comment? 

Should the Commission incorporate the 

most recent STIR/SHAKEN standards 

and any updates the Commission 

requires in its rules? What are the pros 

and cons of these approaches? 

18. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether it should require all 

providers to adopt a non-IP caller ID 

authentication solution. A number of 

commenters filed specific proposals in 

the record for authentication on non-IP 

networks for gateway providers as well 

as voice service providers, and some of 

these solutions work on both IP and 

non-IP networks. Should the 

Commission adopt any of these 

proposals as set forth in the comments 

or in some modified form? What are the 

respective benefits and burdens of these 

specific proposals? Should the 

Commission adopt any of the time 

division multiplex (TDM) call 

authentication solutions developed by 

ATIS? Are there any other alternative 

proposals that the Commission should 

consider for all domestic providers in 

the call path? Should the Commission 

require compliance with the most recent 

version of a non-IP standard available at 

the time an order is released pursuant 

to this FNPRM? Should the Commission 

delegate authority to the Wireline 

Competition Bureau or other Bureau to 

require compliance with newly 

available versions of the adopted 

standard through notice and comment 

and incorporate by reference that 

standard in its rules? Voice service 

providers and gateway providers 

currently have a choice whether to 

implement a non-IP caller ID 

authentication solution or, in the 

alternative, participate with a working 

group, standards group, or consortium 

to develop a solution. In the event the 

Commission moves forward with 

requiring a non-IP solution for all 

providers, the Commission seeks 

comment on eliminating this alternative 

obligation as moot because the selected 

standard would have been developed 

and its implementation required. 

Extending Certain Mitigation Duties to 

All Domestic Providers 

19. The Commission seeks comment 

on broadening the classes of providers 

subject to certain mitigation obligations, 

including some of the obligations it 

adopts in the accompanying Gateway 

Provider Order for gateway providers. 

The Commission’s existing rules, 

including the ‘‘reasonable steps’’ 


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robocall mitigation duty, the Robocall 

Mitigation Database certification and 

mitigation program adoption and 

submission requirements, and the 

affirmative obligations for providers, do 

not currently apply to all domestic 

providers, with the exception of the 

requirement to respond to traceback. 

Prior to the adoption of the Gateway 

Provider Order, the ‘‘reasonable steps’’ 

mitigation duty and the requirement to 

adopt and submit a mitigation plan and 

certification applied only to originating 

providers, and the mitigation duty and 

plan submission requirements only 

applied to the extent that those 

providers had not yet fully implemented 

STIR/SHAKEN. Similarly, the rules that 

require effective mitigation or blocking 

following Commission notification 

require any provider that receives such 

a notification to investigate and respond 

to the Commission, but only requires 

originating and gateway providers to 

take specific action to prevent illegal 

traffic. 

20. In the accompanying Gateway 

Provider Order, the Commission adopts 

several new or enhanced robocall 

mitigation obligations for gateway 

providers, as well as one for providers 

immediately downstream in the call 

path from the gateway provider. The 

Commission also extends the robocall 

mitigation program and certification 

requirements to gateway providers, 

regardless of whether they have 

implemented STIR/SHAKEN. Once 

these rules become effective, some 

providers will remain outside the scope 

of these requirements. To close this 

loophole, the Commission seeks 

comment on requiring all domestic 

providers, regardless of whether they 

have implemented STIR/SHAKEN, to 

comply with certain robocall mitigation 

requirements. 

Enhancing the Existing Affirmative 

Obligations for All Domestic Providers 

21. In the prior Fourth Call Blocking 

Order, the Commission adopted three 

affirmative obligations for providers to 

better protect consumers from illegal 

calls. In the Gateway Provider Order, the 

Commission enhanced two of these 

obligations for gateway providers and 

adopted a related know-your-upstreamprovider requirement. Here, the 

Commission seeks comment on 

expanding two of those enhanced 

obligations, as well as enhancing the 

existing requirement for a provider to 

take affirmative, effective measures to 

prevent new and renewing customers 

from using its network to originate 

illegal calls. 

22. 24-hour Traceback Requirement. 

The Commission seeks comment on 

extending the requirement to respond to 

traceback requests from the 

Commission, civil and criminal law 

enforcement, and the industry traceback 

consortium within 24 hours of receipt of 

the request to all U.S.-based providers 

in the call path. In the Gateway Provider 

Order the Commission requires gateway 

providers to respond to traceback 

requests within 24 hours due to the 

need for quick responses when foreign 

providers are also involved. Would 

requiring all domestic providers to 

respond within 24 hours provide 

additional benefit? Are there alternative 

reasons to require a 24-hour response 

when calls are wholly domestic? 

23. If the Commission extends this 

requirement to cover all U.S-based 

providers in the call path, how should 

it address situations where providers 

may not be able to respond within 24 

hours? The Commission recognizes that 

providers that do not receive many 

requests may be less familiar with the 

process, and that smaller providers in 

particular may struggle to respond 

quickly. Are there alternative 

approaches to the Commission’s 

standard waiver process that would 

better address the needs of providers 

that cannot reliably respond within 24 

hours? 

24. In particular, the Commission 

seeks comment on whether it should 

adopt an approach to traceback based on 

volume of requests received, rather than 

position in the call path or size of 

provider. For example, should the 

Commission adopt a tiered approach 

that: requires providers with fewer than 

10 traceback requests a month to 

respond ‘‘fully and in a timely manner,’’ 

without the need to respond within 24 

hours; requires providers that receive 

from 10 to 99 traceback requests a 

month to maintain an average 24-hour 

response time; and requires providers 

with 100 or more traceback requests a 

month to always respond within 24 

hours, barring exceptional 

circumstances that warrant relief 

through a waiver under the ‘‘good 

cause’’ standard of § 1.3 of the 

Commission’s rules? These 

circumstances could include sudden 

unforeseen circumstances that prevent 

compliance for a limited period or for a 

limited number of calls. The 

Commission cautions that any applicant 

for waiver ‘‘faces a high hurdle even at 

the starting gate.’’ Would different 

thresholds be more appropriate for the 

tiers? Should the thresholds be based on 

the prior six months’ average number of 

traceback requests or some other metric? 

25. The Commission believes that, at 

least with regard to smaller providers, 

the number of requests received is 

indicative of whether a particular 

provider contributes significantly to the 

illegal call problem. The Commission 

seeks comment on this belief. Are there 

instances where a smaller provider 

might receive a high volume of 

traceback requests despite that provider 

being a good actor in the calling 

ecosystem? The Commission 

acknowledges that adopting requestsper-month thresholds will likely mean 

that larger providers will be required to 

respond within 24 hours even when 

those providers are good actors. 

However, the Commission believes that 

larger providers are well positioned to 

meet a 24-hour response requirement 

and, in fact, already generally do so. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

belief. Are there any substantial cost 

issues or other issues the Commission 

should consider in adopting such a 

requirement? 

26. Blocking Following Commission 

Notification. The Commission seeks 

comment on requiring all domestic 

providers in the call path to block, 

rather than simply effectively mitigate, 

illegal traffic when notified of such 

traffic by the Commission, regardless of 

whether that traffic originates abroad or 

domestically. The Commission believes 

that having a single, uniform rule may 

provide additional benefits and reduce 

the overall burden. The Commission 

seeks comment on this belief. Are there 

benefits to having a single, uniform 

requirement for all domestic providers? 

Alternatively, are there benefits to 

maintaining the Commission’s existing 

approach and allowing non-gateway 

providers to effectively mitigate, rather 

than block, such traffic? 

27. If the Commission extends this 

requirement and require non-gateway 

providers to block, should it consider 

any modifications to the rule? The 

Commission’s effective mitigation rule 

requires a different response if the 

provider is an originating provider than 

if the provider is an intermediate or 

terminating provider. Specifically, the 

originating provider must effectively 

mitigate the traffic, while an 

intermediate or terminating provider 

must only notify the Commission of the 

source of the traffic and then, if 

possible, take steps to mitigate the 

traffic. As a result, there are four 

possible ways in which the Commission 

could enhance this rule: (1) it could 

require all providers, regardless of 

position in the call path, to block illegal 

traffic when notified of such traffic by 

the Commission; (2) it could requiring 

originating providers to block traffic 

when notified by the Commission, but 

only require intermediate and 

terminating providers to effectively 


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mitigate that traffic; (3) it could require 

originating providers to block illegal 

traffic when notified, but only require 

intermediate and terminating providers 

to identify the source of the traffic and, 

if possible, block; or (4) it could require 

originating providers to effectively 

mitigate illegal traffic, and require 

intermediate and terminating providers 

to block. In all of these cases, gateway 

providers would be required to block 

consistent with the rule the Commission 

adopted in the Gateway Provider Order. 

Are there particular benefits to any of 

these approaches? Are there any other 

approaches the Commission could take? 

Are there any cost difficulties or other 

issues the Commission should consider? 

28. Effective Measures to Prevent New 

and Renewing Customers from 

Originating Illegal Calls. The 

Commission seeks comment on 

whether, and if so how, it should further 

clarify its rule requiring providers to 

take affirmative, effective measures to 

prevent new and renewing customers 

from using their network to originate 

illegal calls. In the Fourth Call Blocking 

Order, the Commission allowed 

providers flexibility to determine how 

best to comply with this requirement. 

Should the Commission now modify 

this approach? If so, what steps should 

the Commission require providers to 

take with regard to their customers? If 

the Commission should maintain its 

flexible approach, is there value in 

providing further guidance as to how 

providers can best comply? If so, what 

might this guidance include? Should the 

Commission extend a similar 

requirement to all providers in the call 

path, in place of or in addition to its 

existing requirement. 

29. The Commission seeks comment 

on requiring originating providers to 

ensure that customers originating nonconversational traffic only seek to 

originate lawful calls. For example, 

should the Commission require 

originating providers to investigate such 

customers prior to allowing them access 

to high-volume origination services? If 

so, should the Commission require 

originating providers to take certain, 

defined steps as part of this 

investigation, or allow flexibility? 

Should the Commission require 

originating providers to certify, either in 

the Robocall Mitigation Database or 

through some other means, that they 

have conducted these investigations and 

determined that their customers are 

originating illegal calls? If a customer 

nonetheless uses an originating 

provider’s network to place illegal calls, 

should the Commission adopt a strict 

liability standard, or allow the provider 

to terminate or otherwise modify its 

relationship with the customer and 

prevent future illegal traffic? 

30. ZipDX states that ‘‘nonconversational traffic’’ is ‘‘traffic that 

has an average call duration of less than 

two minutes.’’ The Commission seeks 

comment on this proposed definition. 

While some illegal calls are 

‘‘conversational,’’ many are not; the 

Commission believes that stopping nonconversational illegal calls would 

significantly reduce the number of 

illegal calls consumers receive. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

belief. Is a focus on non-conversational 

traffic appropriate, or should the 

Commission maintain its broader focus 

on illegal calls generally? Alternatively, 

could the Commission focus on both: 

maintaining its existing requirement as 

to illegal calls generally, but adding 

enhanced obligations for nonconversational traffic? 

31. The Commission believes that 

originating providers, as the providers 

with a direct relationship to callers, are 

in the best position to know what traffic 

a caller seeks to originate. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

belief. Is the Commission’s focus on 

originating providers correct, or should 

it include other providers, such as 

intermediate providers, as ZipDX 

suggests? If the Commission includes 

intermediate or terminating providers, 

should the requirement be the same, or 

modified? The Commission notes that 

there is wanted, and even important, 

non-conversational traffic. The 

Commission does not want emergency 

alerts, post-release follow up calls by 

hospitals, credit card fraud alerts, or 

similar important communication to be 

prevented by an intermediate or 

terminating provider that is not 

comfortable with potential liability for 

carrying non-conversational traffic. How 

could the Commission tailor its rules to 

allow this traffic to continue while still 

preventing illegal non-conversational 

traffic? Finally, the Commission seeks 

comment on alternative approaches. 

Should the Commission adopt all or 

some of ZipDX’s specific proposals, 

which would impose obligations across 

the network, including requiring 

providers that choose to accept nonconversational traffic to meet certain 

obligations such as requiring A-level 

attestation for such calls, limiting of 

transit routes for these calls, and 

Robocall Mitigation Database 

certification? Are there any other 

approaches the Commission should 

consider? 

Downstream Provider Blocking 

32. The Commission seeks comment 

on requiring intermediate and 

terminating providers to block traffic 

from bad-actor providers, regardless of 

whether or not the bad actor is a 

gateway provider, pursuant to the 

Commission notification process it 

adopt in the Gateway Provider Order for 

providers downstream from the 

gateway. As discussed above, the 

Commission does not currently require 

any providers other than gateway or 

originating providers to block or 

effectively mitigate illegal traffic when 

notified by the Commission. In the 

Gateway Provider Order the 

Commission further requires the 

intermediate or terminating provider 

immediately downstream to block all 

traffic from the identified provider 

when notified by the Commission that 

the gateway provider failed to block. 

There is also an existing safe harbor for 

any provider to block traffic from a badactor provider. The Commission is 

concerned that the lack of consistency 

across all provider types could allow for 

unintended loopholes and it believes 

that having a single, uniform rule may 

provide additional benefits and reduce 

the overall burden. The Commission 

seeks comment on this belief. Are there 

any situations where the Commission 

should not require downstream 

providers to block all traffic from a badactor provider that has failed to meet its 

obligation to block or effectively 

mitigate? For example, if the 

Commission requires originating 

providers to block calls upon 

Commission notification, but only 

require intermediate and terminating 

providers to effectively mitigate such 

traffic, should its downstream provider 

blocking rule treat the originating 

provider for that traffic differently from 

an intermediate provider? If so, how? 

Are there risks to expanding this 

requirement to cover all domestic 

providers? If so, do the benefits justify 

these risks and their associated costs? If 

not, should the Commission take 

another approach to ensure that badactor providers cannot continue to send 

illegal traffic to American consumers? If 

the Commission extends the 

requirement, should it use the process 

described in the Gateway Provider 

Order or modify that process in some 

way? Are there any other issues the 

Commission should consider? 

General Mitigation Standard 

33. In line with the rule for voice 

service providers that have not 

implemented STIR/SHAKEN due to an 

extension or exemption and the general 

mitigation standard the Commission 

adopts in the Gateway Provider Order 

for gateway providers, in addition to 

specific mitigation requirements for 


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which the Commission seeks comment 

above, the Commission proposes to 

extend a general mitigation standard to 

voice service providers that have 

implemented STIR/SHAKEN in the IP 

portions of their networks and to all 

intermediate providers. This standard 

would be the general duty to take 

‘‘reasonable steps’’ to avoid originating 

or terminating (for voice service 

providers) or carrying or processing (for 

intermediate providers) illegal robocall 

traffic. This obligation would include 

filing a mitigation plan along with a 

certification in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database. In line with the Commission’s 

rules for voice service providers and the 

rules it adopts for gateway providers in 

the accompanying Gateway Provider 

Order, the Commission proposes that 

such a plan is ‘‘sufficient if it includes 

detailed practices that can reasonably be 

expected to substantially reduce the 

origination [or carrying or processing] of 

illegal robocalls.’’ The Commission also 

proposes that a program is insufficient 

if a provider ‘‘knowingly or through 

negligence’’ serves as the originator or 

carries or processes calls for an illegal 

robocall campaign. Similar to the 

Commission’s reasoning related to 

gateway providers, the Commission 

anticipates that a general mitigation 

obligation on all domestic providers 

would serve as ‘‘an effective backstop to 

ensure robocallers cannot evade any 

granular requirements [the Commission] 

adopt[s].’’ Are there reasons the 

Commission should not extend to all 

domestic providers the same general 

mitigation standard it adopts in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order? 

To the extent providers’ networks are 

non-IP based, the Commission 

recognizes that they do not currently 

have an obligation to implement STIR/ 

SHAKEN and thus already have an 

existing mitigation requirement. Should 

the Commission alter the general 

mitigation standard for all remaining 

providers in any way? If so, what should 

those modifications be? 

34. The Commission anticipates that 

extending these requirements to all 

domestic providers would ease 

administration because U.S.-based 

providers would then be subject to the 

same obligations for all calls, regardless 

of the providers’ respective roles in the 

call path. Regulatory symmetry would 

obviate the need for a carrier to engage 

in a call-by-call analysis to determine 

the role the provider plays for any given 

call—e.g., an intermediate provider may 

serve as a gateway provider for some 

calls but not for others—and ‘‘ensure the 

accountability of all providers that 

touch calls to U.S. consumers, 

regardless of whether they originate, 

serve as the gateway provider, or simply 

[carry or process] illegal robocalls.’’ 

Some commenters have asserted this is 

very difficult and burdensome. Are 

there additional benefits of imposing 

these requirements on all domestic 

providers? Are there any significant 

burdens if the Commission imposes 

these requirements on all domestic 

providers? 

35. For the same reasons the 

Commission describes in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order, 

the Commission proposes adopting the 

‘‘reasonable steps’’ standard for 

providers that have implemented STIR/ 

SHAKEN in the IP portions of their 

networks rather than a standard 

building upon the obligation for 

providers to mitigate traffic by taking 

‘‘affirmative, effective measures to 

prevent new and renewing customers 

from using their network to originate 

illegal calls’’ adopted in the Fourth Call 

Blocking Order. The Commission 

reiterates that the ‘‘affirmative, effective 

measures’’ standard does not apply to 

existing customers and focuses on call 

origination. Regardless, under the 

current rules and the rules the 

Commission adopts in the Gateway 

Provider Order, providers must still 

comply with the requirements to know 

the upstream provider or to take 

affirmative, effective measures to 

prevent new and renewing customers 

from using the network to originate 

illegal calls, as applicable, and steps a 

provider takes to meet one standard 

could meet the other, and vice versa. 

36. Strengthening the Definition of 

‘‘Reasonable Steps.’’ Rather than 

encouraging providers to regularly 

consider whether their current measures 

are effective and make adjustments 

accordingly to comply with the 

‘‘reasonable steps’’ standard, the 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

it should instead define ‘‘reasonable 

steps’’ to require all domestic providers 

to take specific mitigation actions. What 

would such a definition look like? Is the 

Commission’s standards-based approach 

sufficient? If not, what, if any, are 

specific ‘‘reasonable steps’’ the 

Commission can prescribe to avoid 

origination, carrying, and processing of 

illegal robocall traffic other than 

prohibiting providers from accepting 

traffic from providers that have not 

submitted a certification in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database or have been delisted from the Robocall Mitigation 

Database pursuant to enforcement 

action? 

37. Certain commenters assert that 

more prescriptive rules will ensure that 

providers take reasonable steps to stop 

illegal robocalls. For example, should 

the Commission require traffic 

monitoring for upstream service or any 

other specific type of traffic monitoring? 

Should any particular traffic monitoring 

metrics be used? Should providers be 

required to take any other specific 

actions to show compliance with their 

robocall mitigation plan to meet this 

standard? Should there be a higher 

burden for voice over internet protocol 

(VoIP) providers to meet the ‘‘reasonable 

steps’’ standard? If so, what would such 

a higher burden look like? Are other 

specific modifications to the 

‘‘reasonable steps’’ standard 

appropriate? 

38. The Commission believes it is 

important to close any existing 

loopholes and ensure that all domestic 

providers are subject to the same 

requirements regardless of their place in 

the call path, even though the 

Commission previously declined to 

follow a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach to 

mitigation. The Commission believes 

the benefits of such an approach would 

outweigh any burdens on providers. Are 

these expectations correct? What are the 

benefits of clarifying and expanding the 

Commission’s requirements to all 

domestic providers? What are the costs 

or burdens associated with doing so? 

39. Compliance Deadline. The 

Commission seeks comment on an 

appropriate deadline for all domestic 

providers not covered by the existing 

requirements for voice service providers 

or the requirements it adopts in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order 

for gateway providers to comply with 

the proposed ‘‘reasonable steps’’ 

standard. Would 30 or 60 days after the 

effective date of any order the 

Commission may adopt imposing this 

requirement on these providers be 

sufficient? Are there any reasons the 

Commission should subject any 

remaining providers to a longer or 

shorter deadline? The Commission 

seeks comment on an appropriate 

deadline that is consistent with the time 

and effort necessary to implement the 

standard, balanced against the public 

benefit that will result in rapid 

implementation of the standard. What, 

if any, are the benefits and drawbacks of 

a shorter deadline? What, if any, are the 

benefits and drawbacks of a longer 

deadline? 

Robocall Mitigation Database 

40. Robocall Mitigation Database 

Filing Obligation. In line with the 

requirement the Commission adopts in 

the Gateway Provider Order for gateway 

providers, it proposes to require all 

intermediate providers to submit a 

certification to the Robocall Mitigation 


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Database describing their robocall 

mitigation practices and stating that 

they are adhering to those practices, 

regardless of whether they have fully 

implemented STIR/SHAKEN. The 

Commission notes that all intermediate 

providers previously were imported into 

the Robocall Mitigation Database from 

the rural call completion database’s 

Intermediate Provider Registry. The 

Commission now proposes to have these 

imported intermediate providers 

affirmatively file in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database. The Commission 

also proposes to require voice service 

providers that have already filed a 

certification to submit a robocall 

mitigation plan to the extent they 

previously were not required to do so 

due to fully implementing STIR/ 

SHAKEN. 

41. The Commission proposes to 

conclude that certification, operating in 

conjunction with the previous rules and 

new robocall mitigation obligations it 

adopts in the Gateway Provider Order, 

would encourage compliance and 

facilitate enforcement efforts and 

industry cooperation to address 

problems. A number of commenters 

recommended this proposal. Similar to 

the Commission’s findings for gateway 

providers above, the Commission does 

not anticipate that a filing requirement 

would be more costly for other 

providers than it is for voice service 

providers that already have an 

obligation to file in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database. Are there reasons 

that all intermediate providers should 

not be required to submit a certification? 

Do the remaining providers face 

additional costs as compared to 

providers already subject to this 

requirement under the Commission’s 

existing rules and the rule it adopts in 

the Gateway Provider Order that the 

Commission should consider? Are there 

other possible filing obligations that the 

Commission should impose instead of 

the requirement to file a certification in 

the Robocall Mitigation Database? 

42. The Commission also proposes 

that all intermediate providers submit 

the same information that voice service 

providers, and now gateway providers, 

are required to submit under the 

Commission’s rules. Specifically, the 

Commission proposes that all 

intermediate providers must certify to 

the status of STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation and robocall mitigation 

on their networks; submit contact 

information for a person responsible for 

addressing robocall mitigation-related 

issues; and describe in detail their 

robocall mitigation practices. The 

Commission proposes that voice service 

providers that were not previously 

required to submit a robocall mitigation 

plan describe in detail their robocall 

mitigation practices. Should these 

providers be subject to the additional 

obligation that the Commission adopts 

for gateway providers in the Gateway 

Provider Order, i.e., should the 

Commission require all domestic 

providers to explain what steps they are 

taking to ensure that the immediate 

upstream provider is not using their 

network to transmit illegal calls? Is it 

useful for all remaining providers to 

include this information? Should the 

Commission modify the identifying 

information that all domestic providers 

must file (both providers with a current 

certification obligation and those 

without)? The Commission anticipates 

that the burden is limited if it does not 

adopt a requirement for how detailed 

this explanation must be. Are there any 

reasons the Commission should require 

a more detailed explanation of the steps 

a provider has taken to meet their 

robocall mitigation obligations? Again, 

the Commission anticipates the 

Commission and public will benefit 

from understanding how these 

providers choose to comply with this 

specific duty because compliance is 

critical to stopping the carrying or 

processing of illegal robocalls. 

43. In line with the new rules 

applicable to gateway providers, the 

Commission proposes to delegate to the 

Wireline Competition Bureau the 

authority to specify the form and format 

of any submissions. The Commission 

further proposes that this would include 

whether providers with more than one 

role in the call path may either submit 

a separate certification and plan or 

amend their current certification and 

any plan and that providers amending 

their current plan to cover different 

roles in the call path explain the 

mitigation steps they undertake as one 

type of provider and what mitigation 

steps they undertake as a different type 

of provider, to the extent they are 

different. 

44. The Commission also proposes to 

extend to all domestic providers the 

duty to update their certification within 

10 business days of ‘‘any change in the 

information’’ submitted, ensuring that 

the information is kept up to date, in 

line with the existing and new 

requirements for voice service providers 

and gateway providers, respectively. Is 

another time period appropriate for 

some or all of the information the 

Commission requires? Should the 

Commission establish a materiality 

threshold for circumstances in which an 

update is necessary for remaining 

providers, and, if so, what threshold 

should it set? In the Gateway Provider 

FNPRM, 86 FR 59084 (Oct. 26, 2021), 

the Commission sought comment 

regarding whether it should require 

gateway providers to inform the 

Commission through an update to the 

Robocall Mitigation Database filing if 

the provider is subject to a Commission, 

law enforcement, or regulatory agency 

action, investigation, or inquiry due to 

its robocall mitigation plan being 

deemed insufficient or problematic, or 

due to suspected unlawful robocalling 

or spoofing activity. In the Gateway 

Provider Order, the Commission 

declines to adopt this proposal so that 

it may more broadly ask the question 

regarding all domestic providers. Thus, 

the Commission now seeks comment on 

this proposal for all domestic providers. 

45. Compliance Deadline. The 

Commission also seeks comment on an 

appropriate deadline for all domestic 

providers to submit a certification and 

mitigation plan to the Robocall 

Mitigation Database attesting to 

compliance with the proposed 

‘‘reasonable steps’’ standard. Is 30 days 

following publication in the Federal 

Register of notice of approval by OMB 

of any associated Paperwork Reduction 

Act (PRA) obligations sufficient, as 

many intermediate providers are already 

required to mitigate call traffic? What 

are the benefits and drawbacks of a 

longer deadline? The Commission seeks 

comment on an appropriate deadline 

that is consistent with the time and 

effort necessary to implement this 

requirement, balanced against the 

public benefit that will result in rapid 

implementation of the requirement. If 

the Commission adopts an earlier 

deadline than the requirement to 

implement STIR/SHAKEN, should it 

require that, if a provider has not yet 

implemented STIR/SHAKEN at that 

time, the provider must file its 

certification by the deadline and 

indicate that it has not yet fully 

implemented STIR/SHAKEN and that it 

then update the filing within 10 

business days of STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation, in line with its existing 

rule for updating such a filing? Are 

there any other filing deadline issues 

the Commission should consider? The 

Commission seeks comment on any 

modifications it should make to the 

filing process for these remaining 

providers. 

46. Additional Identifying 

Information. While the Commission 

sought comment in the Gateway 

Provider FNPRM on whether all 

Robocall Mitigation Database filers 

should submit additional identifying 

information, the Commission does not 

act on this issue in the accompanying 

Gateway Provider Order so that it may 


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both develop a more fulsome record at 

the same time it considers imposing 

other obligations on all domestic 

providers, including the obligation for 

all intermediate providers to file a 

certification in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database. The Commission thus seeks 

further comment on requiring all filers 

to include additional identifying 

information. While the Commission 

sought comment in the Gateway 

Provider FNPRM on including 

information such as a Carrier 

Identification Code, Operating Company 

Number, and/or Access Customer Name 

Abbreviation, is this information still 

relevant given that the September 2021 

blocking deadline has now passed? Is 

there other additional information the 

Commission should require? For 

example, the Commission proposes to 

require filers to add information 

regarding principals, known affiliates, 

subsidiaries, and parent companies. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

proposal. Will such information help 

identify bad actors and further the 

Commission’s enforcement efforts, such 

as by identifying bad actors previously 

removed from the Robocall Mitigation 

Database that continue to be affiliated 

with other entities filing in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database? Will such 

information ease and enhance 

compliance by facilitating searches 

within the Robocall Mitigation Database 

and cross-checking information within 

the Robocall Mitigation Database against 

other sources? If the Commission 

requires all domestic providers to 

submit additional identifying 

information, how long should providers 

already in the database have to update 

information, or should such a 

requirement be applied on a 

prospective-only basis? Does the benefit 

of additional information outweigh the 

burden of asking a high number of 

providers to refile? What are the benefits 

of a prospective-only approach? Would 

this approach still be beneficial if only 

some filers submitted this information? 

Are there any categories of filer, such as 

foreign voice service providers that use 

NANP resources that pertain to the 

United States in the caller ID field, that 

are unlikely to have this identifying 

information? If so, how should any new 

requirements address these filers? 

Should the Commission require 

providers to submit information 

demonstrating that they are foreign or 

domestic, and should the Commission 

modify its provider definitions to 

address this issue? Alternatively, should 

the Commission consider making the 

submission of this additional 

information voluntary to avoid a refiling 

requirement and account for filers that 

do not possess the information? Or 

would submission on a voluntary basis 

provide little benefit? If the Commission 

requires submission of additional 

information by some or all filers, what 

deadline for filing should it set? 

47. The Commission also seeks 

comment on any potential changes it 

should make to the Robocall Mitigation 

Database to make the filing process 

easier for providers and to facilitate 

searches by the Commission. For 

example, should the Commission allow 

providers who indicate they are ‘‘fully 

compliant with STIR/SHAKEN’’ to still 

submit additional information regarding 

their compliance (e.g., if they obtained 

their own token or if they are relying on 

another arrangement)? Should the 

database allow for any other 

explanations or voluntary information 

submissions? What other changes to the 

database or filing process would make 

compliance easier or more efficient for 

providers? If revising a filing is 

burdensome, what steps can the 

Commission take to reduce that burden? 

Is the burden of requiring revisions 

outweighed by the benefits to be 

obtained from the additional 

information? 

48. Specific Areas to Be Described in 

Robocall Mitigation Plan. The 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

a robocall mitigation program should be 

considered sufficient if it only ‘‘includes 

detailed practices that can reasonably be 

expected to significantly reduce the 

origination of illegal robocalls. Does this 

requirement need to be further 

articulated? The Commission seeks 

comment on specific areas or topics to 

be described in the mitigation plan 

submitted to the Robocall Mitigation 

Database. What, if any, specific types of 

mitigation must be described in plans 

submitted to the database? For example, 

should providers be required to 

‘‘describe with particularity’’ in their 

robocall mitigation plans the processes 

providers follow ‘‘to know the identities 

of the upstream service providers they 

accept traffic from and to monitor those 

service providers for illegal robocall 

traffic’’? That is, should the Commission 

require all domestic providers to 

describe their ‘‘know-your-upstream 

provider’’ processes? Should providers 

indicate whether they use analytics 

providers and/or describe the analytics 

they use? Should all domestic providers 

describe any contractual requirements 

for upstream providers? Should all 

domestic providers include ‘‘the process 

and the actions’’ they take when they 

‘‘become aware of it, including when 

alerted of such traffic by the 

Commission or the traceback 

consortium’’ regarding illegal traffic on 

their network, as suggested by 

USTelecom? Would taking any or all of 

these actions better protect U.S. 

consumers from illegal robocalls? 

49. Certifications and Data from 

Intermediate Providers Previously 

Imported into the Robocall Mitigation 

Database. The Commission proposes to 

delegate decisions regarding the 

certifications and data of intermediate 

providers previously imported into the 

Robocall Mitigation Database to the 

Wireline Competition Bureau, as the 

Commission does for gateway providers 

that were previously imported into the 

database as intermediate providers in 

the accompanying Gateway Provider 

Order. If the Commission takes this 

approach, should it provide any 

additional guidance to the Wireline 

Competition Bureau and what would 

such additional guidance look like? 

Some commenters indicate that 

intermediate providers previously 

imported into the Robocall Mitigation 

Database should only have to 

‘‘supplement their [Robocall Mitigation 

Database] entry by submitting a 

mitigation plan without having to 

completely refile,’’ while others assert 

that intermediate providers’ imported 

data should be deleted from the 

database. Should the Commission 

instead adopt one of these proposals 

and direct the Wireline Competition 

Bureau to remove or update these 

imported certifications and data from 

the database? What are the benefits and 

burdens of allowing these providers to 

update their data versus having them 

completely refile? 

50. Intermediate Provider Blocking 

Obligation. The Commission proposes 

to require downstream providers to 

block traffic received directly from all 

intermediate providers that are not 

listed and have not affirmatively filed a 

certification in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database or have been removed through 

enforcement action. Doing so will close 

a loophole in the Commission’s rules by 

ensuring that any provider’s traffic will 

be blocked if its certification does not 

appear in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database. It will also obviate any 

concerns regarding how downstream 

providers can determine if an upstream 

provider is a voice service provider, 

gateway provider, or other domestic 

intermediate provider. There was record 

support for this approach, which will 

equalize treatment of all domestic 

providers. The Commission seeks 

comment on doing so. What, if any, are 

the unique costs and benefits to 

applying this rule to domestic 

intermediate providers’ traffic? Are 

there any modifications the Commission 


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should make when applying this rule to 

intermediate providers other than 

gateway providers? In the Order, the 

Commission requires downstream 

providers to block traffic from an 

immediate upstream provider where the 

upstream provider had not affirmatively 

filed in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database and they had a reasonable 

basis to believe that the immediate 

upstream provider was either a voice 

service provider or a gateway provider 

for some calls. The Commission 

proposes to eliminate this requirement 

as moot if it adopts the proposed 

requirement for downstream providers 

to block traffic from domestic 

intermediate providers that have not 

affirmatively filed in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database; downstream 

providers will no longer need to 

determine the upstream provider type 

before making a blocking determination. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

approach. 

51. The Commission proposes that 

downstream providers be required to 

block traffic from non-gateway 

intermediate providers that have not 

submitted a certification in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database 90 days following 

the deadline for intermediate providers 

to file a certification. This proposed 

deadline is consistent with both the rule 

the Commission adopted in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order 

and the rule for voice service providers. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

proposal and whether an alternative 

deadline is appropriate. 

Enforcement 

52. The Commission’s rules are only 

as effective as its enforcement. To that 

end, the Commission proposes to: (1) 

impose forfeitures for failures to block 

calls on a per-call basis and establish a 

maximum forfeiture amount for such 

violations; (2) impose the highest 

available forfeiture for failures to 

appropriately certify in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database; (3) establish 

additional bases for removal from the 

Robocall Mitigation Database, including 

by establishing a ‘‘red light’’ feature to 

notify the Commission when a newlyfiled certification lists a known bad 

actor as a principal, parent company, 

subsidiary, or affiliate; and (4) subject 

repeat offenders to proceedings to 

revoke their section 214 operating 

authority and to ban offending 

companies and/or their individual 

company owners, directors, officers, and 

principals from future significant 

association with entities regulated by 

the Commission. 

53. Failure to Block Calls. Mandatory 

blocking is an important tool for 

protecting American consumers from 

illegal robocalls. Penalties for failure to 

comply with the Commission’s existing 

or newly adopted mandatory blocking 

requirements must be sufficient to 

ensure that entities subject to its 

mandatory blocking requirements suffer 

a demonstrable economic impact. Given 

that bad actors profit from illegal 

robocalls, the Commission tentatively 

concludes that it should impose 

forfeitures for failure to block after 

Commission notice on a per-call basis. 

For example, if ABC Provider fails to 

block 100 calls, it will be subject to the 

maximum forfeiture amount for each of 

those 100 calls. The Commission seeks 

comment on this proposal. What are the 

pros and cons of the Commission’s 

proposal? If adopted, should it be 

applicable to all domestic providers? 

Should the Commission exclude certain 

types of mandatory blocking from this 

approach? For example, should the 

Commission take a different approach 

for blocking based on a reasonable donot-originate (DNO) list? Is there any 

reason why this last approach would be 

impracticable or unreasonable? 

54. The Commission proposes to 

authorize that forfeitures for violations 

of its mandatory blocking rules be 

imposed on a per-call basis, with a 

maximum forfeiture amount for each 

violation of the proposed mandatory 

blocking requirements of $22,021 per 

violation. This is the maximum 

forfeiture amount the Commission’s 

rules permit it to impose on noncommon carriers. While common 

carriers may be assessed a maximum 

forfeiture of $220,213 for each violation, 

the Commission proposes to find that it 

should not impose a greater penalty on 

one class of providers than another for 

purposes of the mandatory blocking 

requirements. The Commission seeks 

comment on this proposal. Is there any 

reason to permit a higher maximum 

forfeiture for violation of the blocking 

requirements by providers that the 

Commission has determined to qualify 

as common carriers? Is one class of 

providers more likely than another to 

violate these rules? If so, is that a basis 

for imposing different forfeiture 

amounts? Are there particular 

aggravating or mitigating factors the 

Commission should take into 

consideration when determining the 

amount of a forfeiture penalty? Are the 

aggravating and mitigating factors set 

forth in the Commission’s rules 

sufficient? Should failure to block calls 

to emergency services providers or 

public safety answering points (PSAPs) 

or to numbers on a reasonable DNO list 

constitute aggravating factors to be 

considered in calculating a forfeiture 

amount? 

55. Provider Removal from the 

Robocall Mitigation Database. The 

Commission’s voice service provider 

rules provide that if the Commission 

‘‘finds a certification is deficient in 

some way, such as if the certification 

describes a robocall mitigation program 

that is ineffective’’ or ‘‘that a provider 

nonetheless knowingly or negligently 

originates illegal robocall campaigns,’’ 

the Commission ‘‘may take enforcement 

action as appropriate.’’ These 

enforcement actions may include, 

among others, removing a defective 

certification from the database after 

providing notice to the voice service 

provider and an opportunity to cure the 

filing. The Commission may, of course, 

impose a forfeiture in addition to 

removing the provider from the 

Robocall Mitigation Database. The 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

intermediate providers (other than 

gateway providers), in addition to voice 

service providers and gateway 

providers, should be subject to the 

removal of provider certifications from 

the Robocall Mitigation Database. Are 

there any other reasons the Commission 

should de-list or exclude providers from 

the Robocall Mitigation Database? The 

Commission proposes to expand its 

delegation of authority to the 

Enforcement Bureau codified in the 

Gateway Provider Order to de-list or 

exclude a provider from the Robocall 

Mitigation Database so that it applies to 

all providers. The Commission seeks 

comment on this proposal. Should the 

Commission automatically exclude 

providers or start an enforcement action 

for providers that look suspicious due to 

multiple traceback requests? Should the 

Commission automatically remove a 

provider from the database for its prior 

illegal or bad actions related to and/or 

unrelated to robocalling? Should the 

Commission automatically remove a 

provider from the database for bad 

actions by an affiliate provider related 

or unrelated to robocalling? What other 

provider actions would warrant removal 

from the Robocall Mitigation Database? 

Under the Commission’s current rules, 

when a voice service provider is 

removed from the Robocall Mitigation 

Database, downstream providers must 

block that provider’s traffic. Should the 

Commission deviate from this 

approach? 

56. Continued violations. The 

Commission proposes to find that 

individuals and entities that engage in 

continued violations of its robocall 

mitigation rules raise substantial 

questions regarding their basic 

qualifications to engage in the provision 


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of interstate common carrier services. 

The Commission thus proposes that 

such entities be subject to possible 

revocation of their section 214 operating 

authority, where applicable, and that 

any principals (either individuals or 

entities) of the bad actor entity be 

banned from serving, either directly or 

indirectly, as an attributable principal or 

as an officer or director in any entity 

that applies for or already holds any 

FCC license or instrument of 

authorization for the provision of a 

regulated service subject to Title II of 

the Communications Act of 1934 (the 

Act) or of any entity otherwise engaged 

in the provision of voice service for a 

period of time to be determined. For 

purposes of any such revocation, the 

Commission proposes to define 

‘‘attributable principal’’ as: (1) in the 

case of a corporation, a party holding 

5% or more of stock, whether voting or 

nonvoting, common or preferred; (2) in 

the case of a limited partnership, a 

limited partner whose interest is 5% or 

greater (as calculated according to the 

percentage of equity paid in or the 

percentage of distribution of profits and 

losses); (3) in the case of a general 

partnership, a general partner; and (4) in 

the case of a limited liability company, 

a member whose interest is 5% or 

greater. The Commission seeks 

comment on these proposals and on any 

alternative proposals or attribution 

criteria. For purposes of the definition 

of ‘‘attributable principal,’’ is 5% stock 

ownership or interest an appropriate 

threshold? For purposes of determining 

foreign ownership limits under section 

310(b)(4) of the Act (regarding common 

carrier wireless licenses or media 

licenses), an applicant must disclose 

any individual foreign investor or group 

acquiring a greater than 5% voting or 

equity interest in the licensee. This 

reflects ‘‘the Commission’s longstanding 

determination, in both the broadcast 

and common carrier contexts, that a 

shareholder with a less than five percent 

interest does not have the ability to 

influence or control core decisions of 

the licensee.’’ Would 10% stock 

ownership or interest or some lesser or 

higher threshold be more appropriate? 

57. Many of the providers that would 

come within the purview of this 

proposed rule may not be classified as 

common carriers and thus may not 

operate subject to the blanket section 

214 authority applicable to domestic 

interstate common carriers under 

§ 63.01 of the Commission’s rules. 

Interconnected VoIP providers are 

required to file applications to 

discontinue service under section 214 of 

the Act and § 63.71 of the Commission’s 

rules. Providers not classified as 

common carriers may hold other 

Commission-issued authorizations or 

certifications. The Commission 

proposes to find that such carriers that 

have an international section 214 

authorization, have applied for and 

received authorization for direct access 

to numbering resources, or are 

designated as eligible 

telecommunications carriers under 

section 214(e) of the Act in order to 

receive federal universal service support 

hold a Commission authorization 

sufficient to subject them to the 

Commission’s jurisdiction for purposes 

of enforcing its rules pertaining to 

preventing illegal robocalls. Finally, The 

Commission proposes to find that 

providers not classified as common 

carriers registered in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database hold a Commission 

certification such that they are subject to 

the Commission’s jurisdiction. The 

Commission seeks comment on these 

proposed findings and whether they 

serve as sufficient legal authority for the 

Commission to seek either revocation of 

an individual or entity’s section 214 

operating authority or to impose a ban 

on an individual or entity from 

operating in the telecommunications 

space as described above. Are there any 

other bases for jurisdiction or legal 

authority for the Commission to take 

such action? 

Obligations for Providers Unable To 

Implement STIR/SHAKEN 

58. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether additional clarity is needed 

regarding the Commission’s rules 

applicable to certain providers lacking 

facilities necessary to implement STIR/ 

SHAKEN. The Commission has 

previously clarified that the STIR/ 

SHAKEN implementation requirement 

‘‘do[es] not apply to providers that lack 

control of the network infrastructure 

necessary to implement STIR/ 

SHAKEN.’’ The Commission notes that 

it accelerated the STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation deadline for another 

class of providers (i.e., non-facilitiesbased small voice service providers). A 

provider is non-facilities-based if it 

‘‘offers voice service to end-users solely 

using connections that are not sold by 

the provider or its affiliates.’’ The 

Commission clarifies that some ‘‘nonfacilities-based’’ small providers may 

also meet the definition of a provider 

that does not have control of the 

necessary infrastructure to implement 

STIR/SHAKEN. If so, that provider does 

not have a STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation obligation. The Small 

Provider Order, 87 FR 3684 (Jan. 25, 

2022), did not expand or contract the 

universe of providers required to 

implement STIR/SHAKEN on the IP 

portions of their network; it only 

accelerated the implementation 

deadline for a subset of providers 

already subject to an implementation 

obligation. In the time since, however, 

the Commission has granted certain 

providers extensions, as well as 

established the Robocall Mitigation 

Database filing requirement. Should the 

Commission further clarify to whom the 

STIR/SHAKEN implementation 

requirement does not apply? 

59. Given that providers must block 

traffic from originating providers not 

listed in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database, some providers, including 

resellers, have filed, irrespective of any 

obligation to do so. The Commission 

observes that the Robocall Mitigation 

Database portal does not prevent these 

providers from filing. To address this 

issue, should the Commission amend its 

rules to deem providers that lack control 

of the necessary infrastructure to 

implement STIR/SHAKEN as instead 

having a continuing extension? The 

Commission’s rules require that voice 

service providers granted an extension 

perform robocall mitigation. Should the 

providers identified above be required 

to perform robocall mitigation, at least 

to the extent that they are able despite 

their lack of control over network 

infrastructure? If not, why not? 

60. These providers may possess 

information about their customers that 

the underlying provider (in the case of 

resellers) may not be aware of or privy 

to. Should the Commission impose a 

know-your-customer obligation on these 

providers, even though they do not have 

an obligation to implement STIR/ 

SHAKEN, or are its existing 

requirements outside of the STIR/ 

SHAKEN context sufficient? Is the 

Commission’s existing flexible approach 

sufficient, or should the Commission 

impose more specific requirements? 

Should such providers be required to 

communicate relevant information 

about their customers to underlying 

providers, and to what extent? 

Satellite Providers 

61. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether the TRACED Act applies to 

satellite providers, and, if so, whether it 

should grant such providers an 

extension for implementing STIR/ 

SHAKEN. The Commission’s rules, 

consistent with the TRACED Act, 

provide that a ‘‘voice service’’ is ‘‘any 

service that . . . furnishes voice 

communications to an end user using 

resources from the North American 

Numbering Plan.’’ The Satellite Industry 

Association (SIA) argues that the 


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Commission’s STIR/SHAKEN rules 

should not apply to satellite providers 

because their voice services do not 

satisfy the definition set out in its rules 

and in the TRACED Act. SIA asserts that 

their services ‘‘rely on non-NANP 

resources for their originating numbers’’ 

and that they use U.S. NANP resources 

only ‘‘to forward calls to a small satellite 

[provider] subscriber’s non-NANP 

number, or direct assignment of NANP 

numbers to a very small subset of small 

satellite customers.’’ Does the 

Commission’s authority under the 

TRACED Act extend to satellite 

providers that do not use NANP 

resources? Does the Commission’s 

authority to require satellite providers to 

implement STIR/SHAKEN apply to all 

satellite providers regardless of the 

scope of the TRACED Act? What about 

to the extent any satellite providers use 

NANP numbers for the limited purposes 

described by SIA? Does use of NANP 

resources for forwarding calls to nonNANP numbers render that service a 

‘‘voice service’’ within the TRACED 

Act’s? Do a de minimis number of 

satellite provider subscribers use NANP 

resources only as SIA describes above, 

or are there ways these subscribers use 

NANP resources that SIA does not 

describe? Should there be a de minimis 

exception to the Commission’s rules? If 

so, how should the Commission define 

de minimis for this purpose? 

62. In addition to satellite providers’ 

apparently limited use of U.S. NANP 

resources that SIA argues is generally 

outside the scope of the TRACED Act, 

SIA contends that requiring 

implementation of STIR/SHAKEN 

would pose an undue hardship due to 

unique economic and technological 

challenges the industry faces. Would 

requiring satellite providers, 

irrespective of their use of U.S. NANP 

resources, to implement STIR/SHAKEN 

pose an undue hardship? Is it 

technically feasible for satellite 

providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN? 

To what extent are satellite providers 

the source of illegal robocalls? Do they 

account for enough of the $13.5 billion 

cost to American consumers to 

outweigh the burden on them posed by 

having to implement STIR/SHAKEN? 

The Commission has previously 

provided small voice services providers, 

including satellite providers, an 

extension from STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation until June 30, 2023. 

When the Wireline Competition Bureau 

reevaluated this extension in 2021, it 

declined to grant a request from SIA for 

an indefinite extension and stated that 

it would seek further comment on SIA’s 

request before the June 30, 2023 

extension expires. The TRACED Act 

requires that the Commission, 12 

months after the date of the TRACED 

Act’s enactment, and thereafter ‘‘as 

appropriate,’’ assess burdens or barriers 

to implementation of STIR/SHAKEN. 

The TRACED Act further provides the 

Commission discretion to extend 

compliance with the implementation 

mandate ‘‘upon a public finding of 

undue hardship.’’ Not less than 

annually thereafter, the Commission 

must consider revising or extending any 

delay of compliance previously granted 

and issue a public notice regarding 

whether such delay of compliance 

remains necessary. The Commission 

directed the Wireline Competition 

Bureau to make these annual 

assessments and to reevaluate the 

Commission’s granted extensions and 

revise or extend them as necessary. The 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

it should grant SIA’s request for an 

indefinite extension for satellite 

providers. In the alternative, should 

satellite providers be granted a 

continuing extension? If so, how long 

should such an extension be? 

Restrictions on Number Usage and 

Indirect Access 

63. The Commission seeks comment 

on possible changes to its numbering 

rules to prevent the misuse of 

numbering resources to originate illegal 

robocalls, particularly calls originating 

abroad. In the Direct Access FNPRM, 86 

FR 51081 (Sept. 14, 2021), the 

Commission sought comment placing 

limitations on interconnected VoIP 

providers’ use of numbering resources 

obtained pursuant to direct access 

authorizations the Commission grants. 

The Commission now seeks comment 

on whether it should implement broader 

limitations in order to prevent illegal 

robocalls and whether other countries’ 

regulations may provide a useful 

roadmap for its own. 

64. Restrictions on Use of U.S. NANP 

Numbers for Foreign-Originated Calls. 

The Commission seeks comment on 

whether it should adopt restrictions on 

the use of domestic numbering 

resources for calls that originate outside 

of the United States for termination in 

the United States. The Commission 

notes that, according to providers and 

foreign regulators, other countries, such 

as Singapore and South Korea, have 

placed limitations on the use of 

domestic numbering resources for 

foreign-originated calls that terminate 

domestically. The Infocomm Media 

Development Authority of Singapore 

(IMDA) has required operators to add a 

‘‘+’’ prefix to international incoming 

calls, and IMDA is working with 

operators to block known numbers with 

the new prefix used for scams, 

especially +65 (Singapore’s country 

code). Australia has a similar rule. 

Should the Commission adopt a similar 

restriction? Should the Commission, as 

YouMail argues, establish a specific area 

code for foreign-originated calls? If so, 

should the Commission require 

providers block or otherwise restrict 

calls from all other area codes or place 

heightened due diligence or mitigation 

obligations on gateway providers 

receiving calls from such an area code? 

Is assignment of a valuable numbering 

resource—an area code—an efficient use 

of such resource? The Commission 

seeks comment on the approach taken 

in Germany, where if a call originating 

outside of Germany carries a German 

number, the number must not be 

displayed to a German end user unless 

the call is an international mobile 

roaming call. According to providers, 

Japan has similar restrictions. Would 

this or a similar mandated call-labelling 

approach be appropriate for some or all 

foreign-originated calls carrying U.S. 

numbers? 

65. Should the Commission only 

impose restrictions in those cases where 

the call is not authenticated? For 

example, France requires that operators 

block calls with a French number in the 

caller ID from an operator outside of 

France unless the operator assigning, 

depositing, or receiving the number is 

able to guarantee the authenticity of the 

caller ID or the call is an international 

mobile roaming call of a French 

operator’s end user. Under a similar 

approach, any calls carrying a U.S. 

NANP number that arrive in the United 

States with a STIR/SHAKEN 

authentication would not be 

automatically blocked. The Commission 

seeks comment on such an approach. 

66. The Commission seeks comment 

on the effect that any of these 

restrictions or limitations would have 

on foreign call centers of U.S. 

corporations that make foreignoriginated calls to U.S. customers. In 

particular, how do call centers operate 

when calling into countries that bar the 

foreign origination of calls into the 

domestic market carrying domestic 

caller ID information? The Commission 

seeks comment on the burden that these 

restrictions may have on providers and 

other entities such as call centers as 

well as the benefit that would result 

from bright-line restrictions on the use 

of U.S. NANP numbers for foreignoriginated calls. 

67. Indirect Access Restrictions. The 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

it should impose any restrictions on 

indirect access to U.S. NANP numbers 


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to prevent their use by foreign or 

domestic robocallers. In the Direct 

Access FNPRM, the Commission sought 

comment on steps it could take to 

ensure that VoIP providers obtaining 

direct access to numbers did not use 

those numbers to facilitate illegal 

robocalls. It also asked whether the 

Commission should require applicants 

for direct access to numbers to certify 

that the numbers they apply for will 

only be used to provide interconnected 

VoIP services and whether 

interconnected VoIP providers that 

receive direct access to numbers must 

use those numbers for interconnected 

VoIP services. Some commenters in that 

proceeding noted that indirect access is 

common and that unscrupulous 

providers may be doing so for nefarious 

purposes, including illegal robocalling. 

The Commission notes that some illegal 

robocallers do not spoof numbers but 

instead obtain numbers from providers 

that themselves either obtained the 

number directly from the North 

American Numbering Plan 

Administrator (NANPA) or from another 

provider. 

68. While the Commission does not 

prejudge the outcome of the Direct 

Access FNPRM, it seeks comment here 

on a broader bar on indirect access. 

Should the Commission adopt any 

restrictions on indirect access to 

numbers by interconnected VoIP 

providers and carriers or specifically for 

use in foreign-originated calls to reduce 

the ability of robocallers to do so? If so, 

what should those restrictions be? 

Should they be modeled after 

limitations other countries have put in 

place? The Commission notes that some 

countries limit the number of times a 

number can be transferred after it is 

obtained directly from the numbering 

administrator or completely bar number 

sub-assignment (indirect access). Would 

a similar rule be appropriate here? Does 

a less restrictive approach make sense? 

For example, in Portugal, further subassignment is permitted, but only if the 

provider that obtained the initial subassignment has allocated 60% of the 

numbers received to its end users. 

Instead of or in addition to limiting 

indirect access, could the Commission 

hold providers that obtain numbers 

directly from NANPA strictly liable for 

illegal robocalling undertaken by any 

entity that obtains the number through 

indirect access? Would such an 

approach be enforceable and, if so, how 

would the Commission enforce it? Does 

direct access to numbers by VoIP 

providers reduce or eliminate the need 

for numbers to be readily available 

through indirect access? Should the 

Commission, on its own or in concert 

with NANPA, instead establish a system 

for tracking the number of times that a 

number has been transferred via indirect 

access, to whom, and who has the right 

to use a number at a particular time? 

The Commission seeks comment on the 

costs and administrative hurdles of 

establishing such a system, as well as 

the benefits and burdens. Could such a 

tracking system also assist in the 

enforcement of the Commission’s 

robocall rules generally? For example, 

like STIR/SHAKEN, it would allow a 

downstream provider to determine 

whether the originating party (or at least 

the upstream provider) was authorized 

to use a number. How could providers 

use that information, particularly in 

concert with STIR/SHAKEN data? 

STIR/SHAKEN by Third Parties 

69. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether certain of its rules regarding 

caller ID authentication and attestation 

in the Robocall Mitigation Database 

require clarification. The Commission’s 

rules require that a voice service 

provider ‘‘[a]uthenticate caller 

identification information for all SIP 

calls it originates and . . . transmit that 

call with authenticated caller 

identification information to the next 

voice service provider or intermediate 

provider in the call path.’’ TransNexus 

asserts that some originating providers 

have had underlying (in the case of 

resellers) or downstream providers 

authenticate calls on the originating 

provider’s behalf. Should the 

Commission allow a third party to 

authenticate caller identification 

information to satisfy the originating 

provider’s obligation? Conversely, 

should the Commission amend its rules 

regarding filing in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database to require 

attestation of STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation by the originating 

provider itself—i.e., require all domestic 

providers to have their own token from 

the STI–GA for purposes of 

authentication? As to both questions, 

why or why not? Is third-party 

authentication proper in certain 

circumstances but improper in others? 

Is third-party authentication consistent 

with the standards underlying the STIR/ 

SHAKEN framework? And does 

authentication by someone other than 

the originating provider undercut STIR/ 

SHAKEN? The Commission seeks 

comment on whether the Commission 

needs to amend its current rules in 

order to account for this practice, 

whether to prohibit or allow it. 

Differential Treatment of 

Conversational Traffic 

70. The Commission seeks comment 

on stakeholders’ argument that certain 

traffic is unlikely to carry illegal 

robocalls and thus should be treated 

differently under its rules from other 

voice traffic. Specifically, the 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

cellular roaming traffic (i.e., traffic 

originated abroad from U.S. mobile 

subscribers carrying U.S. NANP 

numbers terminated in the U.S.) should 

be treated with a lighter touch. The 

Commission does not adopt a rule in the 

Gateway Provider Order regarding this 

traffic because the record is not 

sufficiently developed on this point. Are 

these commenters’ concerns valid? Is 

cellular roaming traffic unlikely to carry 

illegal robocalls? What percentage of 

cellular roaming traffic is signed? What 

percentage of unsigned cellular roaming 

traffic consists of illegal calls? If the 

Commission treats cellular roaming 

differently, could robocallers disguise 

traffic as cellular roaming traffic in 

order to take advantage of any ‘‘lighter 

touch’’ regulatory regime the 

Commission adopts? Is it technically 

feasible for the gateway provider or 

downstream providers to clearly 

identify legitimate cellular roaming 

traffic for compliance purposes? Several 

commenters suggest that they are able to 

do so, but is that true for all domestic 

providers in the call path and is it 

realistic for them to do so? For example, 

ZipDX implies that roaming traffic 

would need to be placed on separate 

trunks for it to be practically subject to 

a different set of rules from other traffic 

and that segregation currently does not 

occur in all cases. The Commission 

seeks comment on this assertion and 

cellular roaming routing practices in 

general. Should the Commission modify 

its rules applicable to some or all 

domestic providers to take these 

differences in traffic into account? 

What, if any, regulatory carve-outs for 

the Commission’s robocalling rules 

would be appropriate for any traffic that 

falls within this category? What would 

be the costs of distinguishing legitimate 

roaming traffic from illegal robocalls 

subject to the Commission’s robocall 

protection requirements? Should the 

Commission treat calls originated from 

domestic cellular customers carrying 

U.S. NANP numbers with a similarly 

light touch? Are there other categories of 

traffic that should be subject to greater 

or lesser scrutiny than other voice traffic 

under the Commission’s rules? If so, 

what are those categories of traffic and 

what rules should apply? 


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Legal Authority 

71. The Commission proposes to 

adopt any of the foregoing obligations 

largely pursuant to the legal authority it 

relied upon in prior caller ID 

authentication and call blocking orders, 

including authority it relied upon in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

approach. 

72. Caller ID Authentication. Gateway 

providers are a subset of intermediate 

providers. In the Gateway Provider 

Order, the Commission relies upon 

251(e) of the Act and the Truth in Caller 

ID Act to require gateway providers to 

authenticate unauthenticated calls. In 

the Second Caller ID Authentication 

Report and Order, the Commission 

relied on this authority when requiring 

intermediate providers to either 

authenticate unauthenticated calls or 

cooperate with the industry traceback 

consortium and respond to traceback 

requests. The Commission therefore 

proposes to rely upon the same 

authority to require all intermediate 

providers to authenticate 

unauthenticated calls. The Commission 

seeks comment on this approach; is 

there any reason it may not rely on the 

same authority here? The Commission 

also seeks comment on whether there 

are alternative sources of authority it 

should rely on. 

73. Robocall Mitigation and Call 

Blocking. In adopting the Commission’s 

robocall mitigation and call blocking 

rules for gateway providers in the 

accompanying Gateway Provider Order, 

the Commission relied upon sections 

201(b), 202(a), 251(e); the Truth in 

Caller ID Act; and its ancillary 

authority. The Commission proposes to 

rely on this same authority in adopting 

additional robocall mitigation and call 

blocking requirements for all domestic 

providers, as described above. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

approach and whether there are other 

sources of authority it should consider. 

74. The Commission seeks specific 

comment on its ancillary authority. The 

Commission anticipates that the 

proposed regulations applicable to all 

domestic providers are ‘‘reasonably 

ancillary to the Commission’s effective 

performance of its . . . 

responsibilities.’’ Providers not 

classified as common carriers 

interconnect with the public switched 

telephone network and exchange IP 

traffic, which clearly constitutes 

‘‘communication by wire and radio.’’ 

The Commission believes that requiring 

these providers to comply with its 

proposed rules is reasonably ancillary to 

the Commission’s effective performance 

of its statutory responsibilities under 

sections 201(b), 202(a), 251(e), and the 

Truth in Caller ID Act as described 

above. With respect to sections 201(b) 

and 202(a), absent application of the 

Commission’s proposed rules to 

providers not classified as common 

carriers, originators of robocalls could 

circumvent the Commission’s proposed 

regulatory scheme by sending calls only 

to providers not classified as common 

carriers to reach their destination. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

analysis and any other basis of its 

ancillary authority here. 

75. Enforcement. The Commission 

also proposes to adopt its additional 

enforcement rules above pursuant to 

sections 501, 502, and 503 of the Act. 

These provisions allow the Commission 

to take enforcement action against 

common carriers as well as providers 

not classified as common carriers 

following a citation. The Commission 

also proposes to rely on the existing 

authority in § 1.80 of its rules regarding 

forfeiture amounts. The Commission 

seeks comment on this proposed 

authority and any other sources of its 

enforcement authority. 

76. Numbering Restrictions. To adopt 

any of the foregoing numbering 

restrictions, the Commission proposes 

to rely on section 251(e) and its grant to 

the Commission of authority over 

numbering resources as well as sections 

201 and 251(b). The Commission has 

repeatedly relied on these sections in 

adopting its numbering rules. The 

Commission also proposes to rely on its 

ancillary authority. The Commission 

believes that placing restrictions on 

numbering access for providers not 

classified as common carriers would be 

reasonably ancillary to the 

Commissions’ performance under these 

three sections. Access to numbers is 

necessary to ensure a level playing field 

and foster competition by eliminating 

barriers to, and incenting development 

of, innovative IP services. The 

Commission thus proposes to conclude 

that, for these or other reasons, 

imposing numbering restrictions on 

providers not classified as common 

carriers is reasonably ancillary to the 

Commission’s responsibilities to ensure 

that numbers are made available on an 

‘‘equitable’’ basis, to advance the 

number-portability requirements of 

section 251(b), or to help ensure just 

and reasonable rates and practices for 

telecommunications services regulated 

under section 201. The Commission also 

seeks comment on other possible bases 

for the Commission to exercise ancillary 

authority here. 

Digital Equity and Inclusion 

77. The Commission, as part of its 

continuing effort to advance digital 

equity for all, including people of color 

and others who have been historically 

underserved, marginalized, and 

adversely affected by persistent poverty 

and inequality, invites comment on any 

equity-related considerations and 

benefits (if any) that may be associated 

with the proposals and issues discussed 

herein. The Commission defines the 

term ‘‘equity’’ consistent with Executive 

Order 13985 as the consistent and 

systematic fair, just, and impartial 

treatment of all individuals, including 

individuals who belong to underserved 

communities that have been denied 

such treatment, such as Black, Latino, 

and Indigenous and Native American 

persons, Asian Americans and Pacific 

Islanders and other persons of color; 

members of religious minorities; 

lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 

queer (LGBTQ+) persons; persons with 

disabilities; persons who live in rural 

areas; and persons otherwise adversely 

affected by persistent poverty or 

inequality. Specifically, the Commission 

seeks comment on how its proposals 

may promote or inhibit advances in 

diversity, equity, inclusion, and 

accessibility. 

78. Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis as required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA), the Commission has prepared 

this Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis (IRFA) of the possible 

significant economic impact on small 

entities by the policies and rules 

proposed in this FNPRM. The 

Commission requests written public 

comments on this IRFA. Comments 

must be identified as responses to the 

IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines 

for comments provided in the DATES

section of the FNPRM. The Commission 

will send a copy of the FNPRM, 

including this IRFA, to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration (SBA). In 

addition, the FNPRM and IRFA (or 

summaries thereof) will be published in 

the Federal Register. 

Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Proposed Rules 

79. In order to continue the 

Commission’s work of protecting 

American consumers from illegal calls, 

regardless of their provenance, the 

FNPRM proposes to expand some of the 

Commission’s existing rules to cover 

other providers in the call path and 

provides additional options to further 

protect American consumers, regardless 

of whether illegal calls originate 


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domestically or abroad. Specifically, the 

FNPRM proposes to extend the 

Commission’s STIR/SHAKEN 

authentication requirement to cover all 

domestic providers in the call path. The 

FNPRM also seeks comment on 

extending some of the robocall 

mitigation duties the Commission 

adopts in the Gateway Provider Order to 

all domestic providers in the call path. 

These mitigation duties include: 

expanding and modifying the 

Commission’s existing affirmative 

obligations; requiring downstream 

providers to block calls from nongateway providers when those providers 

fail to comply; the general mitigation 

standard; and filing a mitigation plan in 

the Robocall Mitigation Database 

regardless of STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation status. The FNPRM also 

seeks comment on additional measures 

to address illegal robocalls, including: 

ways to enhance the enforcement of the 

Commission’s rules; clarifying certain 

aspects of its STIR/SHAKEN regime; 

placing limitations on the use of U.S. 

NANP numbers for foreign-originated 

calls and indirect number access, and 

treating cellular roaming traffic 

differently. 

Legal Basis 

80. The FNPRM proposes to find 

authority largely under those provisions 

through which it has previously 

adopted rules to stem the tide of 

robocalls. Specifically, the FNPRM 

proposes to find authority under 

sections 201(b), 202(a), 251(b) and (e), 

501, 502, and 503 of the Act, § 1.80 of 

the Commission’s rules regarding 

forfeiture amounts, the Truth in Caller 

ID Act, and, where appropriate, 

ancillary authority. The FNPRM solicits 

comment on these proposals. 

Description and Estimate of the Number 

of Small Entities to Which the Proposed 

Rules Will Apply 

81. The RFA directs agencies to 

provide a description of and, where 

feasible, an estimate of the number of 

small entities that may be affected by 

the proposed rules and by the rule 

revisions on which the FNPRM seeks 

comment, if adopted. The RFA generally 

defines the term ‘‘small entity’’ as 

having the same meaning as the terms 

‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small organization,’’ 

and ‘‘small governmental jurisdiction.’’ 

In addition, the term ‘‘small business’’ 

has the same meaning as the term 

‘‘small-business concern’’ under the 

Small Business Act. A ‘‘small-business 

concern’’ is one which: (1) is 

independently owned and operated; (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation; 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA. 

82. Small Businesses, Small 

Organizations, Small Governmental 

Jurisdictions. The Commission’s actions, 

over time, may affect small entities that 

are not easily categorized at present. 

The Commission therefore describes 

here, at the outset, three broad groups of 

small entities that could be directly 

affected herein. First, while there are 

industry specific size standards for 

small businesses that are used in the 

regulatory flexibility analysis, according 

to data from the Small Business 

Administration’s (SBA) Office of 

Advocacy, in general a small business is 

an independent business having fewer 

than 500 employees. These types of 

small businesses represent 99.9% of all 

businesses in the United States, which 

translates to 32.5 million businesses. 

83. Next, the type of small entity 

described as a ‘‘small organization’’ is 

generally ‘‘any not-for-profit enterprise 

which is independently owned and 

operated and is not dominant in its 

field.’’ The Internal Revenue Service 

(IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of 

$50,000 or less to delineate its annual 

electronic filing requirements for small 

exempt organizations. Nationwide, for 

tax year 2020, there were approximately 

447,689 small exempt organizations in 

the U.S. reporting revenues of $50,000 

or less according to the registration and 

tax data for exempt organizations 

available from the IRS. 

84. Finally, the small entity described 

as a ‘‘small governmental jurisdiction’’ 

is defined generally as ‘‘governments of 

cities, counties, towns, townships, 

villages, school districts, or special 

districts, with a population of less than 

fifty thousand.’’ U.S. Census Bureau 

data from the 2017 Census of 

Governments indicate that there were 

90,075 local governmental jurisdictions 

consisting of general purpose 

governments and special purpose 

governments in the United States. Of 

this number there were 36,931 general 

purpose governments (county, 

municipal and town or township) with 

populations of less than 50,000 and 

12,040 special purpose governments— 

independent school districts with 

enrollment populations of less than 

50,000. Accordingly, based on the 2017 

U.S. Census of Governments data, the 

Commission estimates that at least 

48,971 entities fall into the category of 

‘‘small governmental jurisdictions.’’ 

Wireline Carriers 

85. Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau 

defines this industry as establishments 

primarily engaged in operating and/or 

providing access to transmission 

facilities and infrastructure that they 

own and/or lease for the transmission of 

voice, data, text, sound, and video using 

wired communications networks. 

Transmission facilities may be based on 

a single technology or a combination of 

technologies. Establishments in this 

industry use the wired 

telecommunications network facilities 

that they operate to provide a variety of 

services, such as wired telephony 

services, including VoIP services, wired 

(cable) audio and video programming 

distribution, and wired broadband 

internet services. By exception, 

establishments providing satellite 

television distribution services using 

facilities and infrastructure that they 

operate are included in this industry. 

Wired Telecommunications Carriers are 

also referred to as wireline carriers or 

fixed local service providers. 

86. The SBA small business size 

standard for Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or 

fewer employees as small. U.S. Census 

Bureau data for 2017 show that there 

were 3,054 firms that operated in this 

industry for the entire year. Of this 

number, 2,964 firms operated with 

fewer than 250 employees. 

Additionally, based on Commission 

data in the 2021 Universal Service 

Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 

2020, there were 5,183 providers that 

reported they were engaged in the 

provision of fixed local services. Of 

these providers, the Commission 

estimates that 4,737 providers have 

1,500 or fewer employees. 

Consequently, using the SBA’s small 

business size standard, most of these 

providers can be considered small 

entities 

87. Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). 

Neither the Commission nor the SBA 

has developed a size standard for small 

businesses specifically applicable to 

local exchange services. Providers of 

these services include both incumbent 

and competitive local exchange service 

providers. Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers is the closest industry with an 

SBA small business size standard. 

Wired Telecommunications Carriers are 

also referred to as wireline carriers or 

fixed local service providers. The SBA 

small business size standard for Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers classifies 

firms having 1,500 or fewer employees 

as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 

2017 show that there were 3,054 firms 

that operated in this industry for the 

entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms 

operated with fewer than 250 

employees. Additionally, based on 

Commission data in the 2021 Universal 

Service Monitoring Report, as of 


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December 31, 2020, there were 5,183 

providers that reported they were fixed 

local exchange service providers. Of 

these providers, the Commission 

estimates that 4,737 providers have 

1,500 or fewer employees. 

Consequently, using the SBA’s small 

business size standard, most of these 

providers can be considered small 

entities. 

88. Incumbent Local Exchange 

Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the 

Commission nor the SBA have 

developed a small business size 

standard specifically for incumbent 

local exchange carriers. Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers is the 

closest industry with an SBA small 

business size standard. The SBA small 

business size standard for Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers classifies 

firms having 1,500 or fewer employees 

as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 

2017 show that there were 3,054 firms 

in this industry that operated for the 

entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms 

operated with fewer than 250 

employees. Additionally, based on 

Commission data in the 2021 Universal 

Service Monitoring Report, as of 

December 31, 2020, there were 1,227 

providers that reported they were 

incumbent local exchange service 

providers. Of these providers, the 

Commission estimates that 929 

providers have 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Consequently, using the 

SBA’s small business size standard, the 

Commission estimates that the majority 

of incumbent local exchange carriers 

can be considered small entities. 

89. Competitive Local Exchange 

Carriers (Competitive LECs). Neither the 

Commission nor the SBA has developed 

a size standard for small businesses 

specifically applicable to local exchange 

services. Providers of these services 

include several types of competitive 

local exchange service providers. Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers is the 

closest industry with an SBA small 

business size standard. The SBA small 

business size standard for Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers classifies 

firms having 1,500 or fewer employees 

as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 

2017 show that there were 3,054 firms 

that operated in this industry for the 

entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms 

operated with fewer than 250 

employees. Additionally, based on 

Commission data in the 2021 Universal 

Service Monitoring Report, as of 

December 31, 2020, there were 3,956 

providers that reported they were 

competitive local exchange service 

providers. Of these providers, the 

Commission estimates that 3,808 

providers have 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Consequently, using the 

SBA’s small business size standard, 

most of these providers can be 

considered small entities. 

90. The Commission has included 

small incumbent LECs in this present 

RFA analysis. As noted above, a ‘‘small 

business’’ under the RFA is one that, 

inter alia, meets the pertinent smallbusiness size standard (e.g., a telephone 

communications business having 1,500 

or fewer employees) and ‘‘is not 

dominant in its field of operation.’’ The 

SBA’s Office of Advocacy contends that, 

for RFA purposes, small incumbent 

LECs are not dominant in their field of 

operation because any such dominance 

is not ‘‘national’’ in scope. The 

Commission has therefore included 

small incumbent LECs in this RFA 

analysis, although it emphasizes that 

this RFA action has no effect on 

Commission analyses and 

determinations in other, non-RFA 

contexts. 

91. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). 

Neither the Commission nor the SBA 

have developed a small business size 

standard specifically for Interexchange 

Carriers. Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers is the closest industry with an 

SBA small business size standard. The 

SBA small business size standard for 

Wired Telecommunications Carriers 

classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 

employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau 

data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 

firms that operated in this industry for 

the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 

firms operated with fewer than 250 

employees. Additionally, based on 

Commission data in the 2021 Universal 

Service Monitoring Report, as of 

December 31, 2020, there were 151 

providers that reported they were 

engaged in the provision of 

interexchange services. Of these 

providers, the Commission estimates 

that 131 providers have 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Consequently, using the 

SBA’s small business size standard, the 

Commission estimates that the majority 

of providers in this industry can be 

considered small entities. 

92. Cable System Operators (Telecom 

Act Standard). The Communications 

Act of 1934, as amended, contains a size 

standard for small cable system 

operators, which classifies ‘‘a cable 

operator that, directly or through an 

affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer 

than one percent of all subscribers in 

the United States and is not affiliated 

with any entity or entities whose gross 

annual revenues in the aggregate exceed 

$250,000,000,’’ as small. As of 

December 2020, there were 

approximately 45,308,192 basic cable 

video subscribers in the top Cable 

multiple system operators (MSOs) in the 

United States. Accordingly, an operator 

serving fewer than 453,082 subscribers 

shall be deemed a small operator if its 

annual revenues, when combined with 

the total annual revenues of all its 

affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in 

the aggregate. Based on available data, 

all but five of the cable operators in the 

Top Cable MSOs have less than 453,082 

subscribers and can be considered small 

entities under this size standard. The 

Commission notes however, that the 

Commission neither requests nor 

collects information on whether cable 

system operators are affiliated with 

entities whose gross annual revenues 

exceed $250 million. Therefore, the 

Commission is unable at this time to 

estimate with greater precision the 

number of cable system operators that 

would qualify as small cable operators 

under the definition in the 

Communications Act. 

93. Other Toll Carriers. Neither the 

Commission nor the SBA has developed 

a definition for small businesses 

specifically applicable to Other Toll 

Carriers. This category includes toll 

carriers that do not fall within the 

categories of interexchange carriers, 

operator service providers, prepaid 

calling card providers, satellite service 

carriers, or toll resellers. Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers is the 

closest industry with an SBA small 

business size standard. The SBA small 

business size standard for Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers classifies 

firms having 1,500 or fewer employees 

as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 

2017 show that there were 3,054 firms 

in this industry that operated for the 

entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms 

operated with fewer than 250 

employees. Additionally, based on 

Commission data in the 2021 Universal 

Service Monitoring Report, as of 

December 31, 2020, there were 115 

providers that reported they were 

engaged in the provision of other toll 

services. Of these providers, the 

Commission estimates that 113 

providers have 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Consequently, using the 

SBA’s small business size standard, 

most of these providers can be 

considered small entities. 

Wireless Carriers 

94. Wireless Telecommunications 

Carriers (except Satellite). This industry 

comprises establishments engaged in 

operating and maintaining switching 

and transmission facilities to provide 

communications via the airwaves. 

Establishments in this industry have 

spectrum licenses and provide services 

using that spectrum, such as cellular 


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services, paging services, wireless 

internet access, and wireless video 

services. The SBA size standard for this 

industry classifies a business as small if 

it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. 

Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 

there were 2,893 firms in this industry 

that operated for the entire year. Of that 

number, 2,837 firms employed fewer 

than 250 employees. Additionally, 

based on Commission data in the 2021 

Universal Service Monitoring Report, as 

of December 31, 2020, there were 797 

providers that reported they were 

engaged in the provision of wireless 

services. Of these providers, the 

Commission estimates that 715 

providers have 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Consequently, using the 

SBA’s small business size standard, 

most of these providers can be 

considered small entities. 

95. Satellite Telecommunications. 

This industry comprises firms 

‘‘primarily engaged in providing 

telecommunications services to other 

establishments in the 

telecommunications and broadcasting 

industries by forwarding and receiving 

communications signals via a system of 

satellites or reselling satellite 

telecommunications.’’ Satellite 

telecommunications service providers 

include satellite and earth station 

operators. The SBA small business size 

standard for this industry classifies a 

business with $35 million or less in 

annual receipts as small. U.S. Census 

Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 

firms in this industry operated for the 

entire year. Of this number, 242 firms 

had revenue of less than $25 million. 

Additionally, based on Commission 

data in the 2021 Universal Service 

Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 

2020, there were 71 providers that 

reported they were engaged in the 

provision of satellite 

telecommunications services. Of these 

providers, the Commission estimates 

that approximately 48 providers have 

1,500 or fewer employees. 

Consequently, using the SBA’s small 

business size standard, a little more 

than of these providers can be 

considered small entities. 

Resellers 

96. Local Resellers. Neither the 

Commission nor the SBA have 

developed a small business size 

standard specifically for Local Resellers. 

Telecommunications Resellers is the 

closest industry with an SBA small 

business size standard. The 

Telecommunications Resellers industry 

comprises establishments engaged in 

purchasing access and network capacity 

from owners and operators of 

telecommunications networks and 

reselling wired and wireless 

telecommunications services (except 

satellite) to businesses and households. 

Establishments in this industry resell 

telecommunications; they do not 

operate transmission facilities and 

infrastructure. Mobile virtual network 

operators (MVNOs) are included in this 

industry. The SBA small business size 

standard for Telecommunications 

Resellers classifies a business as small if 

it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. 

Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 

1,386 firms in this industry provided 

resale services for the entire year. Of 

that number, 1,375 firms operated with 

fewer than 250 employees. 

Additionally, based on Commission 

data in the 2021 Universal Service 

Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 

2020, there were 293 providers that 

reported they were engaged in the 

provision of local resale services. Of 

these providers, the Commission 

estimates that 289 providers have 1,500 

or fewer employees. Consequently, 

using the SBA’s small business size 

standard, most of these providers can be 

considered small entities. 

97. Toll Resellers. Neither the 

Commission nor the SBA have 

developed a small business size 

standard specifically for Toll Resellers. 

Telecommunications Resellers is the 

closest industry with an SBA small 

business size standard. The 

Telecommunications Resellers industry 

comprises establishments engaged in 

purchasing access and network capacity 

from owners and operators of 

telecommunications networks and 

reselling wired and wireless 

telecommunications services (except 

satellite) to businesses and households. 

Establishments in this industry resell 

telecommunications; they do not 

operate transmission facilities and 

infrastructure. Mobile virtual network 

operators (MVNOs) are included in this 

industry. The SBA small business size 

standard for Telecommunications 

Resellers classifies a business as small if 

it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. 

Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 

1,386 firms in this industry provided 

resale services for the entire year. Of 

that number, 1,375 firms operated with 

fewer than 250 employees. 

Additionally, based on Commission 

data in the 2021 Universal Service 

Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 

2020, there were 518 providers that 

reported they were engaged in the 

provision of toll services. Of these 

providers, the Commission estimates 

that 495 providers have 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Consequently, using the 

SBA’s small business size standard, 

most of these providers can be 

considered small entities. 

98. Prepaid Calling Card Providers. 

Neither the Commission nor the SBA 

has developed a small business size 

standard specifically for prepaid calling 

card providers. Telecommunications 

Resellers is the closest industry with an 

SBA small business size standard. The 

Telecommunications Resellers industry 

comprises establishments engaged in 

purchasing access and network capacity 

from owners and operators of 

telecommunications networks and 

reselling wired and wireless 

telecommunications services (except 

satellite) to businesses and households. 

Establishments in this industry resell 

telecommunications; they do not 

operate transmission facilities and 

infrastructure. Mobile virtual network 

operators (MVNOs) are included in this 

industry. The SBA small business size 

standard for Telecommunications 

Resellers classifies a business as small if 

it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. 

Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 

1,386 firms in this industry provided 

resale services for the entire year. Of 

that number, 1,375 firms operated with 

fewer than 250 employees. 

Additionally, based on Commission 

data in the 2021 Universal Service 

Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 

2020, there were 58 providers that 

reported they were engaged in the 

provision of payphone services. Of these 

providers, the Commission estimates 

that 57 providers have 1,500 or fewer 

employees. Consequently, using the 

SBA’s small business size standard, 

most of these providers can be 

considered small entities. 

Other Entities 

99. All Other Telecommunications. 

This industry is comprised of 

establishments primarily engaged in 

providing specialized 

telecommunications services, such as 

satellite tracking, communications 

telemetry, and radar station operation. 

This industry also includes 

establishments primarily engaged in 

providing satellite terminal stations and 

associated facilities connected with one 

or more terrestrial systems and capable 

of transmitting telecommunications to, 

and receiving telecommunications from, 

satellite systems. Providers of internet 

services (e.g. dial-up internet service 

providers (ISPs)) or voice over internet 

protocol (VoIP) services, via clientsupplied telecommunications 

connections are also included in this 

industry. The SBA small business size 

standard for this industry classifies 

firms with annual receipts of $35 


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million or less as small. U.S. Census 

Bureau data for 2017 show that there 

were 1,079 firms in this industry that 

operated for the entire year. Of those 

firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than 

$25 million. Based on this data, the 

Commission estimates that the majority 

of ‘‘All Other Telecommunications’’ 

firms can be considered small. 

Description of Projected Reporting, 

Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 

Requirements for Small Entities 

100. The FNPRM proposes to impose 

several obligations on various providers, 

many of whom may be small entities. 

Specifically, the FNPRM proposes to 

require all U.S. intermediate providers 

to authenticate caller ID information 

consistent with STIR/SHAKEN for SIP 

calls that are carrying a U.S. number in 

the caller ID field and to require all 

providers to comply with the most 

recent version of the standards as they 

are released. The FNPRM also seeks 

comment on extending certain 

mitigation duties to all domestic 

providers, including: (1) extending the 

requirement to respond to traceback 

requests from the Commission, civil and 

criminal law enforcement, and the 

industry traceback consortium within 

24 hours of receipt of the request to all 

U.S.-based providers in the call path; (2) 

requiring all domestic providers in the 

call path to block, rather than simply 

effectively mitigate, illegal traffic when 

notified of such traffic by the 

Commission; and (3) requiring the 

intermediate provider or terminating 

provider immediately downstream from 

an upstream provider that fails to block, 

or effectively mitigate if the Commission 

declines to extend the blocking 

requirement further, illegal traffic when 

notified by the Commission. It also 

seeks comment on whether and how to 

clarify the Commission’s rule requiring 

providers to take affirmative, effective 

measures to prevent new and renewing 

customers from using their network to 

originate illegal calls. The FNPRM also 

proposes to extend a general mitigation 

standard to voice service providers that 

have implemented STIR/SHAKEN in 

the IP portions of their networks and to 

all domestic intermediate providers. 

The FNPRM also proposes to require all 

domestic intermediate providers to 

submit a certification to the Robocall 

Mitigation Database describing their 

robocall mitigation practices and stating 

that they are adhering to those practices, 

regardless of whether they have fully 

implemented STIR/SHAKEN. 

101. With regard to the Commission’s 

enforcement of these proposed rules, the 

FNPRM proposes to: (1) impose 

forfeitures for failures to block calls on 

a per-call basis and establish a 

maximum forfeiture amount for such 

violations; (2) impose the highest 

available forfeiture for failures to 

appropriately certify in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database; (3) establish 

additional bases for removal from the 

Robocall Mitigation Database, including 

by establishing a ‘‘red light’’ feature to 

notify the Commission when a newlyfiled certification lists a known bad 

actor as a principal, parent company, 

subsidiary, or affiliate; and (4) subject 

repeat offenders to proceedings to 

revoke their section 214 operating 

authority and to ban offending 

companies and/or their individual 

company owners, directors, officers, and 

principals from future significant 

association with entities regulated by 

the Commission. 

102. The FNPRM seeks comment on 

whether certain of the Commission’s 

rules regarding caller ID authentication 

and attestation in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database require 

clarification, specifically whether the 

Commission should allow a third party 

to authenticate caller identification 

information to satisfy the originating 

provider’s obligation, and whether the 

Commission’s rules regarding filing in 

the Robocall Mitigation Database should 

be amended to require attestation of 

STIR/SHAKEN implementation by the 

originating provider itself. The FNPRM 

also seeks comment on whether 

additional clarity is needed regarding 

the Commission’s rules about certain 

providers lacking facilities to implement 

STIR/SHAKEN. 

103. The FNPRM also seeks comment 

on whether the TRACED Act applies to 

satellite providers, and, if so, whether 

the Commission should grant such 

providers an extension for 

implementing STIR/SHAKEN. 

104. The FNPRM seeks comment on 

possible changes to the Commission’s 

numbering rules to prevent the misuse 

of numbering resources to originate 

illegal robocalls, particularly those 

originating abroad, including: (1) 

whether the Commission should adopt 

restrictions on the use of domestic 

numbering resources for calls that 

originate outside of the United States for 

termination in the United States; and (2) 

whether the Commission should impose 

any restrictions on indirect access to 

U.S. NANP numbers to prevent their use 

by foreign or domestic robocallers. 

105. Lastly, the FNPRM seeks 

comment on stakeholders’ argument 

that cellular roaming traffic (i.e., traffic 

originated abroad from U.S. mobile 

subscribers carrying U.S. NANP 

numbers terminated in the U.S.) should 

be treated with a ‘‘lighter touch’’ 

because it is unlikely to carry illegal 

robocalls. 

Steps Taken To Minimize the 

Significant Economic Impact on Small 

Entities, and Significant Alternatives 

Considered 

106. The RFA requires an agency to 

describe any significant alternatives that 

it has considered in reaching its 

proposed approach, which may include 

the following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) the establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance and reporting requirements 

under the rules for such small entities; 

(3) the use of performance rather than 

design standards; and (4) an exemption 

from coverage of the rule, or any part 

thereof, for such small entities. 

107. The FNPRM seeks comment on 

the particular impacts that the proposed 

rules may have on small entities. In 

particular, it seeks comment on the 

impact on small providers of extending 

the requirement to respond to traceback 

requests from the Commission, civil and 

criminal law enforcement, and the 

industry traceback consortium within 

24 hours of receipt of the request to all 

U.S.-based providers in the call path. 

The FNPRM recognizes that providers 

that do not receive many requests may 

be less familiar with the process, and 

that smaller providers in particular may 

struggle to respond quickly, and it seeks 

comment on whether the waiver process 

established in the Gateway Provider 

Order is sufficient to address the needs 

of all providers, or whether it should be 

modified to allow greater flexibility. In 

particular, the FNPRM seeks comment 

on whether the Commission should 

adopt an approach to traceback based on 

volume of requests received, rather than 

position in the call path or size of 

provider. For example, the FNPRM asks 

whether the Commission should adopt 

a tiered approach that requires 

providers with fewer than 10 traceback 

requests a month to respond ‘‘fully and 

timely,’’ without the need to maintain 

an average response time of 24 hours; 

requires providers that receive from 10 

to 99 traceback requests a month to 

respond within 24 hours or request a 

waiver and maintain an average 

response time of 24 hours; and requires 

providers with 100 or more traceback 

requests a month to always respond 

within 24 hours, barring exceptional 

circumstances. The FNPRM also seeks 

comment on whether the TRACED Act 

applies to satellite providers and, if so, 

whether the Commission should grant 


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such providers an extension for 

implementing STIR/SHAKEN. The 

FNPRM seeks comment on whether a de 

minimis number of satellite provider 

subscribers use NANP resources, and 

whether there should thus be a de 

minimis exception to the Commission’s 

rules. The FNPRM notes that the 

Commission has previously provided 

small voice services providers, 

including satellite providers, an 

extension from STIR/SHAKEN 

implementation until June 30, 2023, and 

seeks comment on whether the 

Commission should grant an indefinite 

extension for satellite providers or, in 

the alternative, a defined continuing 

extension. 

Federal Rules That May Duplicate, 

Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed 

Rules 

108. None. 

Procedural Matters 

109. Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis. As required by the RFA, the 

Commission has prepared an IRFA of 

the possible significant economic 

impact on small entities of the policies 

and rules addressed in this FNPRM. The 

IRFA is set forth above. Written public 

comments are requested on the IRFA. 

Comments must be filed by the 

deadlines for comments on the FNPRM 

indicated on the first page of this 

document and must have a separate and 

distinct heading designating them as 

responses to the IRFA. The 

Commission’s Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 

Information Center, will send a copy of 

this FNPRM, including the IRFA, to the 

Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA. 

110. Paperwork Reduction Act. The 

FNPRM contains proposed new and 

revised information collection 

requirements. The Commission, as part 

of its continuing effort to reduce 

paperwork burdens, invites the general 

public and OMB to comment on the 

information collection requirements 

contained in this document, as required 

by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995, Public Law 104–13. In addition, 

pursuant to the Small Business 

Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public 

Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C 3506(c)(4), 

the Commission seeks specific comment 

on how it might further reduce the 

information collection burden for small 

business concerns with fewer than 25 

employees. 

111. Ex Parte Presentations—PermitBut-Disclose. The proceeding this 

FNPRM initiates shall be treated as a 

‘‘permit-but-disclose’’ proceeding in 

accordance with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. Persons making ex parte 

presentations must file a copy of any 

written presentation or a memorandum 

summarizing any oral presentation 

within two business days after the 

presentation (unless a different deadline 

applicable to the Sunshine period 

applies). Persons making oral ex parte 

presentations are reminded that 

memoranda summarizing the 

presentation must (1) list all persons 

attending or otherwise participating in 

the meeting at which the ex parte 

presentation was made, and (2) 

summarize all data presented and 

arguments made during the 

presentation. If the presentation 

consisted in whole or in part of the 

presentation of data or arguments 

already reflected in the presenter’s 

written comments, memoranda or other 

filings in the proceeding, the presenter 

may provide citations to such data or 

arguments in his or her prior comments, 

memoranda, or other filings (specifying 

the relevant page and/or paragraph 

numbers where such data or arguments 

can be found) in lieu of summarizing 

them in the memorandum. Documents 

shown or given to Commission staff 

during ex parte meetings are deemed to 

be written ex parte presentations and 

must be filed consistent with § 1.1206(b) 

of the Commission’s rules. In 

proceedings governed by § 1.49(f) of the 

Commission’s rules or for which the 

Commission has made available a 

method of electronic filing, written ex 

parte presentations and memoranda 

summarizing oral ex parte 

presentations, and all attachments 

thereto, must be filed through the 

electronic comment filing system 

available for that proceeding, and must 

be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, 

.xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants 

in this proceeding should familiarize 

themselves with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. 

Ordering Clauses 

112. Accordingly, it is ordered, 

pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 202, 

217, 227, 227b, 251(b), 251(e), 303(r), 

501, 502, and 503 of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 154(j), 201, 

202, 217, 227, 227b, 251(b) 251(e), 

303(r), 501, 502, and 503, this FNPRM 

is adopted. 

113. It is further ordered that the 

Commission’s Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 

information Center, shall send a copy of 

this FNPRM, including the Initial 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA), 

to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 

Small Business Administration. 

List of Subjects 

47 CFR Part 0 

Authority delegations (Government 

agencies), Communications, 

Communications common carriers, 

Classified information, Freedom of 

information, Government publications, 

Infants and children, Organization and 

functions (Government agencies), Postal 

Service, Privacy, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Sunshine 

Act, Telecommunications. 

47 CFR Part 1 

Administrative practice and 

Procedure, Civil rights, Claims, 

Communications, Communications 

common carriers, Communications 

equipment, Cuba, Drug abuse, 

Environmental impact statements, Equal 

access to justice, Equal employment 

opportunity, Federal buildings and 

facilities, Government employees, 

Historic preservation, Income taxes, 

Indemnity payments, Individuals with 

disabilities, internet, Investigations, 

Lawyers, Metric system, Penalties, 

Radio, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Satellites, Security 

measures, Telecommunications, 

Telephone, Television, Wages. 

47 CFR Part 64 

Carrier equipment, Communications 

common carriers, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, 

Telecommunications, Telephone. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary. 

Proposed Rules 

The Federal Communications 

Commission proposes to amend parts 0, 

1, and 64 of title 47 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 0—COMMISSION 

ORGANIZATION 

Subpart A—Organization 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 0, 

subpart A, continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 

155, 225, and 409, unless otherwise noted. 

■ 2. Amend § 0.111 by revising 

paragraph (a)(28) to read as follows: 

§ 0.111 Functions of the Bureau. 

(a) * * * 

(28) Take enforcement action, 

including de-listing from the Robocall 

Mitigation Database, against any 

provider: 

(i) Whose certification described in 

§ 64.6305(c) through (e) of this chapter 

is deficient after giving that provider 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 136 / Monday, July 18, 2022 / Proposed Rules 42689 

notice and an opportunity to cure the 

deficiency; or 

(ii) Who accepts calls directly from a 

domestic voice service provider, 

domestic intermediate provider, 

gateway provider, or foreign provider 

not listed in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database in violation of § 64.6305(f) of 

this chapter. 

* * * * * 

PART 1—PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE 

■ 3. The authority citation for part 1 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. chs. 2, 5, 9, 13; 28 

U.S.C. 2461 note, unless otherwise noted. 

Subpart A—General Rules of Practice 

and Procedure 

■ 4. Amend § 1.80 by: 

■ a. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(9) 

through (11) as paragraphs (b)(10) 

through (12); 

■ b. Adding a new paragraph (b)(9); 

■ c. In newly redesignated paragraph 

(b)(10), removing ‘‘paragraphs (b)(1) 

through (8) of this section’’ and adding 

‘‘paragraphs (b)(1) through (9) of this 

section’’ in its place; 

■ d. In newly redesignated paragraph 

(b)(11): 

■ i. Redesignating tables 1 through 4 to 

paragraph (b)(10) as tables 1 through 4 

to paragraph (b)(11); 

■ ii. In footnote 1 of newly redesignated 

table 4 to paragraph (b)(11), removing 

‘‘paragraph (b)(10)’’ and adding 

‘‘paragraph (b)(11)’’ in its place; 

■ iii. Redesignating note 2 to paragraph 

(b)(10) as note 2 to paragraph (b)(11); 

and 

■ iv. In newly redesignated note 2 to 

paragraph (b)(11), removing ‘‘this 

paragraph (b)(10)’’ everywhere it 

appears and adding ‘‘this paragraph 

(b)(11)’’ in its place and removing 

‘‘paragraph (b)(11)’’ and adding 

‘‘paragraph (b)(12)’’ in its place; and 

■ e. In newly redesignated paragraph 

(b)(12), redesignating table 5 to 

paragraph (b)(11)(ii) as table 5 to 

paragraph (b)(12)(ii) and note 3 to 

paragraph (b)(11) as note 3 to paragraph 

(b)(12). 

The addition reads as follows: 

§ 1.80 Forfeiture proceedings. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(9) Forfeiture penalty for a failure to 

block. Any person determined to have 

failed to block illegal robocalls pursuant 

to § 64.6305(e) of this chapter shall be 

liable to the United States for a 

forfeiture penalty of no more than 

$22,021 for each violation, to be 

assessed on a per-call basis. In addition 

to the mitigating and aggravating factors 

set forth in table 1 to paragraph (b)(11) 

of this section, other factors to be 

considered in calculating a forfeiture 

amount under this paragraph shall 

include whether the violation includes 

failure to block calls to emergency 

services providers or public safety 

answering points or to numbers on a 

reasonable do-not-originate list. 

* * * * * 

PART 64—MISCELLANEOUS RULES 

RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS 

■ 5. The authority citation for part 64 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154, 201, 

202, 217, 218, 220, 222, 225, 226, 227, 227b, 

228, 251(a), 251(e), 254(k), 255, 262, 276, 

403(b)(2)(B), (c), 616, 620, 716, 1401–1473, 

unless otherwise noted; Pub. L. 115–141, Div. 

P, sec. 503, 132 Stat. 348, 1091. 

Subpart HH—Caller ID Authentication 

■ 6. Amend § 64.6302 by revising 

paragraph (b) to read as follows: 

§ 64.6302 Caller ID authentication by 

intermediate providers. 

* * * * * 

(b) Authenticate caller identification 

information for all calls it receives that 

use North American Numbering Plan 

resources that pertain to the United 

States in the caller ID field and for 

which the caller identification 

information has not been authenticated 

and which it will exchange with another 

provider as a SIP call. 

■ 7. Amend § 64.6304 by revising 

paragraph (b) to read as follows: 

§ 64.6304 Extension of implementation 

deadline. 

* * * * * 

(b) Voice service providers and 

intermediate providers that cannot 

obtain an SPC token. Voice service 

providers that are incapable of obtaining 

an SPC token due to Governance 

Authority policy are exempt from the 

requirements of § 64.6301 until they are 

capable of obtaining a SPC token. 

Intermediate providers, including 

gateway providers, that are incapable of 

obtaining an SPC token due to 

Governance Authority policy are 

exempt from the requirements of 

§ 64.6302(b) regarding call 

authentication. 

* * * * * 

■ 8. Amend § 64.6305 by: 

■ a. Revising the heading of paragraph 

(a) and paragraphs (a)(1) and (c)(2) 

introductory text; 

■ b. Redesignating paragraphs (c)(4)(iv) 

and (v) as paragraphs (c)(4)(v) and (vi); 

■ c. Adding a new paragraph (c)(4)(iv); 

■ d. Redesignating paragraphs (d)(4)(iv) 

and (v) as paragraphs (d)(4)(v) and (vi); 

■ e. Adding a new paragraph (d)(4)(iv); 

■ f. Redesignating paragraph (e) as 

paragraph (f); 

■ g. Adding a new paragraph (e); and 

■ h. Revising newly redesignated 

paragraph (f). 

The revisions and additions read as 

follows: 

§ 64.6305 Robocall mitigation and 

certification. 

(a) Robocall mitigation program 

requirements for voice service providers 

and intermediate providers (other than 

gateway providers). (1) Except those 

subject to an extension granted under 

§ 64.6304(b), any voice service provider 

and intermediate provider, not 

including gateway providers, shall 

implement an appropriate robocall 

mitigation program with respect to calls 

that use North American Numbering 

Plan resources that pertain to the United 

States in the caller ID field. 

* * * * * 

(c) * * * 

(2) A voice service provider shall 

include a robocall mitigation program 

consistent with paragraph (a) of this 

section and shall include the following 

information in its certification in 

English or with a certified English 

translation: 

* * * * * 

(4) * * * 

(iv) All known principals, affiliates, 

subsidiaries, and parent companies of 

the intermediate provider; 

* * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(4) * * * 

(iv) All known principals, affiliates, 

subsidiaries, and parent companies of 

the intermediate provider; 

* * * * * 

(e) Certification by intermediate 

providers (other than gateway providers) 

in the Robocall Mitigation Database. (1) 

An intermediate provider shall certify to 

one of the following: 

(i) It has fully implemented the STIR/ 

SHAKEN authentication framework 

across its entire network and all calls it 

carries or processes are compliant with 

§ 64.6302(b); 

(ii) It has implemented the STIR/ 

SHAKEN authentication framework on a 

portion of its network and calls it carries 

or processes on that portion of its 

network are compliant with 

§ 64.6302(b); or 

(iii) It has not implemented the STIR/ 

SHAKEN authentication framework on 

any portion of its network for carrying 

or processing calls. 

(2) An intermediate provider shall 

include the following information in its 


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42690 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 136 / Monday, July 18, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

certification, in English or with a 

certified English translation: 

(i) The specific reasonable steps the

intermediate provider has taken to avoid 

carrying or processing illegal robocall 

traffic as part of its robocall mitigation 

program, including a description of how 

it has complied with the know-yourupstream provider requirement in 

§ 64.1200(n)(4).

(ii) A statement of the intermediate

provider’s commitment to respond fully 

and in a timely manner to all traceback 

requests from the Commission, law 

enforcement, and the industry traceback 

consortium, and to cooperate with such 

entities in investigating and stopping 

any illegal robocallers that use its 

service to carry or process calls. 

(3) All certifications made pursuant to

paragraph (e)(1) of this section shall: 

(i) Be filed in the appropriate portal

on the Commission’s website; and 

(ii) Be signed by an officer in

conformity with 47 CFR 1.16. 

(4) An intermediate provider filing a

certification shall submit the following 

information in the appropriate portal on 

the Commission’s website: 

(i) The intermediate provider’s

business name(s) and primary address; 

(ii) Other business names in use by

the intermediate provider; 

(iii) All business names previously

used by the intermediate provider; 

(iv) All known principals, affiliates,

subsidiaries, and parent companies of 

the intermediate provider; 

(v) Whether the intermediate provider

or any affiliate is also a foreign voice 

service provider; and 

(vi) The name, title, department,

business address, telephone number, 

and email address of one person within 

the company responsible for addressing 

robocall mitigation-related issues. 

(5) An intermediate provider shall

update its filings within 10 business 

days of any change to the information it 

must provide pursuant to paragraphs 

(e)(1) through (4) of this section, subject 

to the conditions set forth in paragraphs 

(c)(5)(i) and (ii) of this section. 

(f) Intermediate provider and voice

service provider obligations—(1) 

Accepting traffic from domestic voice 

service providers. Intermediate 

providers and voice service providers 

shall accept calls directly from a 

domestic voice service provider only if 

that provider’s filing appears in the 

Robocall Mitigation Database in 

accordance with paragraphs (c) of this 

section and that filing has not been delisted pursuant to an enforcement 

action. 

(2) Accepting traffic from foreign

providers. Beginning 90 days after the 

deadline for filing certifications 

pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this 

section, intermediate providers and 

voice service providers shall accept 

calls directly from a foreign voice 

service provider or foreign intermediate 

provider that uses North American 

Numbering Plan resources that pertain 

to the United States in the caller ID field 

to send voice traffic to residential or 

business subscribers in the United 

States, only if that foreign provider’s 

filing appears in the Robocall Mitigation 

Database in accordance with paragraph 

(c) of this section and that filing has not

been de-listed pursuant to an

enforcement action.

(3) Accepting traffic from domestic

intermediate providers. Intermediate 

providers and voice service providers 

shall accept calls directly from: 

(i) A gateway provider, only if that

provider’s filing appears in the Robocall 

Mitigation Database in accordance with 

paragraph (d) of this section, showing 

that the gateway provider has 

affirmatively submitted the filing, and 

that the filing has not been de-listed 

pursuant to an enforcement action. 

(ii) Beginning 90 days after the

deadline for filing certifications 

pursuant to paragraph (e) of this section, 

a domestic intermediate provider, only 

if that provider’s filing appears in the 

Robocall Mitigation Database in 

accordance with paragraph (e) of this 

section, showing that the intermediate 

provider has affirmatively submitted the 

filing, and that the filing has not been 

de-listed pursuant to an enforcement 

action. 

[FR Doc. 2022–13878 Filed 7–15–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 622 

[Docket No. 220712–0154] 

RIN 0648–BL19 

Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of 

Mexico, and South Atlantic; Coastal 

Migratory Pelagics Resources in the 

Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Region; 

Amendment 32 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: NMFS proposes regulations to 

implement management measures 

described in Amendment 32 to the 

Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for the 

Coastal Migratory Pelagic (CMP) 

Resources of the Gulf of Mexico and 

Atlantic Region (CMP FMP), as prepared 

and submitted by the Gulf of Mexico 

Fishery Management Council and the 

South Atlantic Fishery Management 

Council (Councils). This proposed rule 

and Amendment 32 would revise the 

Gulf of Mexico (Gulf) migratory group of 

cobia (Gulf group cobia) catch limits, 

possession limit and minimum size 

limits, establish a Gulf group cobia 

commercial trip limit and recreational 

vessel limit, and revise the CMP FMP 

framework procedures. The proposed 

rule would also clarify the Gulf group 

cobia sale and purchase restrictions. 

The purpose of this proposed rule and 

Amendment 32 is to end overfishing of 

Gulf group cobia, update catch limits to 

be consistent with the best scientific 

information available, and revise 

management measures to help constrain 

landings to the catch limits. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received on or before August 17, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

on the proposed rule, identified by 

‘‘NOAA–NMFS–2022–0030,’’ by either 

of the following methods: 

• Electronic Submission: Submit all

electronic public comments via the 

Federal e-Rulemaking Portal. Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and enter 

‘‘NOAA–NMFS–2022–0030’’, in the 

Search box. Click the ‘‘Comment’’ icon, 

complete the required fields, and enter 

or attach your comments. 

• Mail: Submit written comments to

Kelli O’Donnell, Southeast Regional 

Office, NMFS, 263 13th Avenue South, 

St. Petersburg, FL 33701. 

Instructions: Comments sent by any 

other method, to any other address or 

individual, or received after the end of 

the comment period, may not be 

considered by NMFS. All comments 

received are a part of the public record 

and will generally be posted for public 

viewing on www.regulations.gov 

without change. All personal identifying 

information (e.g., name, address), 

confidential business information, or 

otherwise sensitive information 

submitted voluntarily by the sender will 

be publicly accessible. NMFS will 

accept anonymous comments (enter ‘‘N/ 

A’’ in the required fields if you wish to 

remain anonymous). 

Electronic copies of Amendment 32, 

which includes a fishery impact 

statement and a regulatory impact 

review, may be obtained from the 

Southeast Regional Office website at 

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/action/ 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with PROPOSALS