### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 14, 200 4
DON ALD BR AN CH v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -26612 J. C. M cLin, Ju dge

No. W2003-03042-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Dece m ber 21, 2004

Th e pe tit ion e r, Do na ld B ranc h, app e a ls the de nia l of his pe tit ion fo r po st- c on vic tio n re lie f fr om h is ag g ravated vehicula

r hom icide convictions, arg uing that trial and appellate counse l were ineffe ctive fo r f a ili ng to c ite re po rt e d c ri min a l la w c a se s w he n a rg uin g fo r a

jury ins truc tio n o n p ro xima te c aus a tio n a ndthat app e llate c ou ns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ng to sup ple me nt h is a

pp e llate brie f w ith State v. Fa

rner , 66 S.W .3d 188 (Tenn. 2001) , and for failing to raise a s an issue on direc t appea l the trial judg e’s r efusa l to recuse himself. Whil e the post-conviction appea l w as pending , the petitioner soug ht an d received pe rmission to raise as an a dditional issue the impact of the United States Sup re me Cou rt ’s B lake ly v. Was hin g tonop ini on on the se nte nc ing in h is c a se . H a vin g tho ro ug hly revie wed the r ecor d, we c onclude that the pe titioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either a def iciency in counsel’s repre sentation or resulting prejudice to his case. We further c onclude that B lake ly do e s n ot a

pp ly re tr oa c tiv e ly

to c a se s o n c oll a te ra l app e a l. Ac c or din g ly , we a ff ir m th e po stconviction court’s denial of the petition. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., joined.

L ance R. Chis m, Memphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Donald B ranc h.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vid H. F ind le y , Ass ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Stephanie Johnson, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION
F AC TS The pe titioner was convic ted by a Shelby CountyCriminal Court j ury of two counts of ag g ravated vehicula

r homicide, a

Class A felony , and one c ount of driving while license revoke d,K u e h l’s b lo o d , b y c o n tra st, t e ste d ne g a tive fo r d ru g s a n d a lc o h o l. 1

-2- a Cla ss B mis de me a no r, a ndwa s se nte nc e d, re sp e c tiv e ly , to c on se c uti ve te rm s o f t we nty -f ou r y e ars ; twenty -four

y ear s, six months; and six months, for an e ffe ctive sente nce of forty -nine y ear s in the D e p ar tm e n t o f

Co rr e c ti o n
. St a te v
. D o n a ldW. B r a n c h , N o
. W1 9 9 9

- 0 0 5 0 6

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 2 WL 1558485, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. J an. 4, 2002), perm. to appeal denied (Te nn. May 28, 2002). On direc t appea l, this court affirmed the convic tions but reduced one of the aggra v ated vehicular ho mic ide se nte nc e s by six month s, fo r a tota l ef fe c tiv e se nte nc e of

fo rty -e ig ht y e ars , s ix mon ths in confine ment. I d.
Th e pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio ns ste mme d f ro m hi s Ma y 30 , 19 97 , a lc oh ol- re la te d c oll isi on wi th a g ree n Saturn at the interse ction of Hig hway 64 and Houst o n L ev yand Cana da Roads in Shelby Co u n ty , w h ic h r e s u lt e d inth e d e a th s o f th e o c c u p a n ts o f th e Satu r n , St e p h a n ie Ku e h l an d h e r s ixmonth-old daug hter, Z adie. I d. at *2. At approximately 5:30 p.m. that afternoon, the defe ndant was sp e e din g we stboun d in his ve hic le on fo ur -l a ne Hi g hw a y 64 , h ur rying to a rrive on tim e fo r h is
wee kend service at the penal f arm for a prior DUI conviction, when he struck Kue hl’s vehicle a s she
was c rossing the hig hway from Houston L evy

to Canada Road. I d. at **2-3, *9. Upon his arriva l at the hospital, the petit ioner’s blood alcohol level wa s .22. I d. at *6. I n addition, the testimonyof 1 other motorists who saw the pe titioner’s vehicle just prior to the fatal wre ck established that he wa s driving rec klessly , wea ving in a nd out of traff ic, coming up close behind vehicles, passing in the left turn lane, and trave ling well in excess of the posted 55- mile-per- hour spee d limit , at estimated spee ds rang ing f rom 80 to 100 miles per hour. I d. at **2-4.

Further evidenc e in support of the convictions was provided by a University o f Tennessee Professor of

Civil Eng ineering, who testified the petitioner was driving approximately 80 miles per ho ur a t th e tim e of i mp a c t, andby a n a c c ide nt r e c on str

uc tio nis t e mpl oy e d b y

the Mic hig a n St a te Police, who offe red the following finding s and conclusions summarized in the direc t appea l opinion:

[The petitioner’s] vehicle was trave ling a minimum speed of 76 miles per hour (112 fee t/second) upon impact with the victims’ vehicle; the vic tim s w e re tr a ve lin g a t app ro xima te ly 17 mil e s per ho ur

a t impa c t; no pre- impact skid marks were created by[t he petitioner’ s] vehicle; the intersec tion is vi sible from at lea st 760 feet whe n trave ling westwa rd; if [ the petitioner’s] vehicle ha d been tr aveling at 70 miles per hour , it would have missed impacting the victims’ ve hicle by 57 fee t; if [ t h e p eti tioner] had beg un to apply his brakes at the point when the inter section wa s visible, it would have taken 4.67 se conds to stop; and the angl e o f i m pact with the victims’ vehic le was 107 de g re e s ( in o the r w or ds , [the pe tit ion e r’ s] ve hic le wa s tu rn e d s lig htl y to the rig ht on impact).

I d. at *7.T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 39- 13- 218 pr ov i des i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t “ [ a ] g g r av at ed v eh i cu l ar h omi ci de 2 i s vehi cul ar hom i ci d e, as d ef i ned i n § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 1 3 (a)( 2 ), where .

. . [t ]here was at t he t i m e o f t he o f fense t wenty

- hund redths of on e per ce n t (

. 20% ) , or mor e, by we i g h t of al coh ol i n t h e def en dan t ’ s bl ood an d t h e def en dan t has o ne (1) pr i or co nvi ct i o n fo r .
. . [d]ri vi ng unde r t he i nf l uence of an i nt o xi cant

. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 1 8 (a)( 3 ) ( 1 9 9 7 & 20 0 3 ). V ehi cul ar hom i ci d e i s d ef i ned a s “t he reckl ess ki l l i ng of ano t her by t he o p erat i o n of an aut o m o b i l e .
. . (1) [ a]s t he p roximate re sul t of co nd uct creat i ng a s ub st ant i al ri sk o f de at h or ser i o us b o d i l y i njury t o a pe rs o n; or (2) [a] s t he p ro x im a te re su lt o f t h e d riv e r’s into x ic a tio n
. . . . ” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 9 -1 3 -2 1 3 (a ) (1 9 9 7 & 2 0 0 3 ). -3- The pe titioner’s trial strateg y included an attempt to show that the ac cident re sulted not from his re c kle ss o r i mpair e d d ri vin g , b ut i ns te a d f ro m Kue hl’ s n e g lig e nc e in c ro ssi ng the hig hw a y in front of his onc oming vehicle. I n support, he re lied on the testimony of two witnesses: a driver who was tra veling in the rig ht westbou n d l an e o f Hi g hway 64 and pre paring to turn rig ht onto Canada Road at the time of the w rec k, who testified that Kuehl came to a “r olling stop” at the stop sign on Housto n L e v y b e f

o r e s ta r ti n g a c r o s s th e h ig h w a y , a n d a d r iv e r w h o w a s a d ja c e n t to Ku ehl on Houston L evy

waiting to turn left, who testified he saw the pe t i t i o n er’s vehicle a pproac hing f

rom the ea st “v er y fast” as Kuehl be g an to cr oss the highw ay and uttere d the words, “ Oh no, don’t do that” whe n he saw her c ontinue acr oss. I d. at **3-4. I n acc ordanc e with this st rate g y , trial counsel proposed that a

specia l instruction be g iven in c onjunction w ith the “proximate result” lang uag e of the a g g ra vate d ve hic ula

r hom ic ide statut e , inor de r that th e jury mig ht “ c on sid e r w he the r [Kue hl’ s] behavior constituted a ‘superce ding intervening cause .’” I d. at *15. Specific ally , counsel re quested that th e jury

be ins truc te d th a t it

mus t f indthat th e pe tit ion e r’ s a c tio ns we re the “pro x im a te c aus e of the re sult,” or, in the alternative, that the petitioner’s actions “constituted the proxi mate ca use of the k il li n g ( s )

. ” T h e tria l c o u r t d e n ie d th e r e q u e s t, a n d th e p e ti ti o n e r u n s u c c e s s f u ll y r aised, a s an 2 issue on direc t appea l, the denial to g ive t he requested inst ruction. I d. at **15-16. The trial court had instructed the jury

on a motorist’s duty

to stop at a stop sign be fore proce eding with caution t h r o u g h a n i n t e r s e c t i o n , a n d t o yi e l d t h e r i g h t

- o f

- w a y t o a v e h i c l e tr a v e l i n g o n a

t h r o u g h h i g h w a y. The pe titioner filed a pro s e petition for post-conviction relief on J uly 19, 2002, followed by
se v e r a l a m e n d e d p e t i t i o n s a f t e r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o u n s e l w a s ap p o i n t e d

. I n b o t h h i s pr o s e and
a me nd e d p e tit ion s, the pe tit ion e r a lle g e d n ume ro us ins ta nc e s o f i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l. Howeve r, on appe al to this court he confine s himself to a rg uing that trial and appe llate counse l were ine ff e c tiv e fo r n ot c iti ng re po rt e d c ri min a l la w c a se s w he n a rg uin g fo r the ins truc tio n o n p ro xima te causation; appellate counse l was ineff ective f or not supplementing his appellate brief with State v. Fa rner , 66 S.W .3d 188 (Tenn. 2001) , which wa s relea sed during the pe ndency of the a ppeal; and
app e llate c ou ns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e fo r not raisi ng the iss ue of the tr ia l ju dg e ’s failu re to r e c us e him se lf on direc t appea l. Accor dingly , we will limit our summ ary of the fairly leng thy evidentiary

hearing to the testimonyand ar g uments relating to those three a lleg ations.
Th e pe tit ion e r w a s re pr e se nte d b otha t tria l a ndon app e a l by the She lby

Cou nty Pub lic Def ender ’s Off

ice. Appe llate counse l testified at the September 25, 2003, evidentiary

hearing that he had be en license d to pr actice law since 1978 a nd had bee n prac ticing a s an appe llate attorne y for over twe nty

y ear s. He testified he rea d “eve ry ounce” of the trial transcript, re sear ched e very issue raised in the motion for a

new tria l, and re lied on his ex perie nce as an appe llate attorne y to determine-4-

which issues to raise on appea l. His decision not to raise the rec usal issue was one of strate g y , based on his belief that it did not have any rea l merit. Appellate c ounsel ag ree d that the jury instruction on proxi mate causation was one of the ke y issues at trial and on appea l. He ac knowledg ed he c ited civil case s in his appellate brie f in support of his arg ument on that issue, and he did not cite the reported criminal case s of L etner v. State, 299 S.W . 1049 (Tenn. 1927) ; Copeland v. State, 285 S. W. 565 (Tenn. 1926); State v. Grose, 982 S.W.2d 349 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; or S t at e v
. R uane, 912 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Howeve r, he did not think that those case s, all of which he had read “at one time or a nother,” wer e on point, as they

addre ssed the conce pt of superc eding and intervening cause s in ge nera l homicide
case s and not the spec ifi c issue of whe ther proximate cause was the a ppropriate test to be applied in a vehicula

r homicide c ase. A s for not supplementing his brief with a d i s cu s s i o n of the F arne r opinion, appellate c oun sel testified he a ssumed “the Court of Criminal Appe als ac tually rea d the Sup re me Cou rt

op ini on s a s th e y

c ome ou t.” F urthe rm or e , a lth ou g h h e fo un d the c a se re le va nt i n it s definition of interve ning and superc eding cause s, he did not think it was “ o n all fours with re g ard to whether

Vehicula r Homicide r equire d proxi mate ca usation.”

J unior trial counse l testified he had be en license d for se ven y ear s, had participated in over twenty crim in a l t

r ia ls , a n d h a d h a n d le d “ th o u s a n d s ” o f c r im in a l c a s e s d u r in g h is y e ar s w ith the public defe nder’ s office and in his curr ent private prac tice, which consisted of approximately

95% criminal def

ense w ork. He said he a nd senior trial counsel did not believe the pattern jury instruction on proxi mate r esul t adequately define d “proximate result versus pr ox imate cause” and, for that
rea son, had ar g ued at leng th for an instruc tion tha t “t en d [ ed] more towa rds the civil standar d.” J unior trial counse l testified he thoroug hly rese arc hed the issue, but was simply unable to find much
c a se la w i n s up po rt

of the ir arg ume nt:
What I can r eca ll is that from the be g inning on this ca se, I ’m pretty sure ther e wa sn’t a lot of authority on Ag g ravated Vehicula r Homicide and ve ry

littl e as to this issue on Vehicula r Homicide, the
mor e - - fr a nk ly mor e c omm on c ri me in T e nn e sse e . T he re wa s so me speculation about whether this was the fi rs t Agg ravated Vehic ular Homicide ca se in Tenne ssee that we nt to trial af t er they passed that statut e . We sp ok e wi th - - I kn ow that w e confe rr e d w ith[ap pe llate c ou ns el] fr om the be g inn ing abo ut h ow the c a se la w w or ks on thi s, had done some rese arc h and didn’t find any thing that was clearly on point for this crime and that issue.
And as to those ca ses, I

don’t beli ev e those we re a ll even Ve hic ula r H omi c ide c a se s that y ou c ite d. B ut I ’m no t f a mil iar w ith them word by word. I ’m not g oing to pr etend that I am. But I know that we looked at t h at i s s ue extensively and tried to find something clea rly on point and did not.T h e p e tit io n e r’s first trial e n d e d in a m istria l, a p p a re n tly d u e to a c o m m e n t m a d e b y o n e o f t h e S ta te ’s 3

w i t ne sses. -5- Al tho ug h ju nio r t

ri a l c ou ns e l w a s unsu re ho w ma ny ho ur s h e sp e nt r e se arc hin g the sp e c if ic issue of proximate cause , he testified that the total time he spent on the ca se, which he rec orded on the fil e jacket, eventually cover ed si x , full leg al-sized pag es. He said that both he and senior trial counsel met re g ularly

with the petitioner and ke pt him fullyinformed on the c ase, inc luding the char g es he w as fa cing , the eleme nts of the offe nses, and their defe nse strate g y
. Senior trial counsel testified she was a dmitted to the bar in 1991 and ha d tried “pr obably at le a st 1 00 ” c a se s, wi th 2 0 to 25 be fo re a jury , d uring the e ig ht y ears sh e had worke d inthe Pub lic De fe nd e r’ s O ff

ic e . Jun ior

tr ia l c ou ns e l r e se arc he d th e pr oximate c aus e iss ue , an d the y dis c us se d it wi th a pp e llate c ou ns e l. Th e y c ou ld not fi nd a ny c a se s on p oin t a nd , th e re fo re , b e lie ve d th e ir c a se was one of first impression, prese nting issues that had not been litig ated be fore . Senior trial counse l testified sh e es t abli shed a g ood rapport with the petitioner, whom she desc ribed a s “very cooper ative,” and “one of the ea siest clients that [she] ever worke d with.” She said she a nd junior trial counsel wor

ked dilige ntly

on the ca se, met with the petitioner r eg ularly , and explained, among other thing s, the char g es, the elements of the off ense, the proof a g ainst him, and the punishment he fac ed if c onvicted.
The petitioner testified junior trial counsel failed to ke ep him suff iciently inf

o rm ed ab o ut “[his] trial and a

bout what [he] was fac ing in trial,” claiming he had “[n]ot really ” under stood that he had been indicted for ag g ravated vehicular homicide or the elements of the offe nse. He further claimed that he was not informe d of the potential penalty for the crime. Howeve r, he a cknowledg ed he had r ead the indictment, and he a nd counsel talke d about the elements of t he offense be fore the start of the second trial. I n addition, he testified he had a sentenc ing chart and, there fore , knew what 3 the ra ng e of punishment wa s for a Rang e I offe nder c onvicted of a

Class A felony

. On Dec ember

19, 2003, the post-c o n v i ction court e ntere d an orde r denying the petition, finding that the petitioner ha d not met his burden of proving his alleg ations by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Wit h respe ct to the specific alleg ations rele vant to this appea l, the court found that they involved matters of tria l tactics and tri al s t ra teg y which we re subjec t to counsel’s prof essional jud g me nt. Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt re so lve d a ll iss ue s of c re dib ili ty in f a vo r o f t ri a l a ndapp e llate c ou ns e l.
AN AL YSI S
I. P ost-Conviction Standard of Review The pe titioner has the burde n of proving his a lleg ations of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). When an e videntiary hearing is he ld in the post-conviction setting , the finding s of fa ct made by the court are conclusive on appea l unle ss the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst them. See Tidwe ll v. St ate, 922 S.W.2d 497,-6-

50 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) . Wh e re app e llate re vie w i nv olv e s p ur e ly fa c tua l is su e s, the app e llate c ou rt sh ou ld not rewe igh or

ree valuate the evidenc e. See H enley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). Ho we ve r, re vie w o f a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n o f the la w t o the fa c ts o f the c a se is de novo , with no presumption of cor

rec tness. See Ruff v. State, 978 S

. W

. 2 d 9 5 , 9 6 (Tenn. 1998) . The issues of defic ient perf

ormanc e of c ounsel and possible pre judice to the def

ense a re mixed questions of law and fac t and, thus, subject to de novo revie w by the appellate court. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. II. Inef fective Assistance of Cou nsel
To succe ed on a c l ai m o f i neff ective a ssistance of c ounsel, the petitioner be ars the bur den of showing b o t h t hat his counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient a nd that counsel’s de ficient pe rf orma nc e pr e

jud ic e d th e ou tc ome of the pr oc e e din g , in tha t the re su lt o f h is t ri a l w a s u nr e lia

ble
or the pr oc e e din g s f

un da me nta lly

un fair . Se e Stric klandv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 , 1 04 S. Ct. 20 52 , 20 64 , 80 L

. Ed

. 2d 67 4 (1 98 4) ; se e a lso State v. Tay lor , 96 8 S.W. 2d 90 0, 90 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ) ( no tin g that th e sa me stand ardfo r d e te rm ini ng ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l th a t is applied in fe dera l case s also applies in Tenne ssee)

. The de ficient pe rformance prong of the test is satis fi ed b y showing that “counse l’s acts or omissions wer e so serious as t o fall below an objec tive standard of rea sonablene ss under pre vailing pr of e ssi on a l no rm s. ” Go a d v . St a te , 9 38 S.W. 2d36 3, 36 9 (T e nn
. 19 96 ) (c iti ng Stric kland , 4 66 U. S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, and Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) ). The pr ejudice prong of the test is satisfi ed b y s h o wi n g a “r easona ble proba bility ” that the outcome of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent ha d it not been for c ounsel’s def ici en ci es i n perf

ormanc e. Stri c k lan d , 4 6 6 U

. S. a t 6 9 4 , 1 0 4 S. Ct

. a t 2 0 6 8

. Wh e n a n a ly zi n g a p e ti ti o n e r ’ s a ll e g ations of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the re viewing court must indulge a strong pre sumption t hat the conduct of counsel falls within the rang e of reasona ble profe ssional assistance, se e Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. C t

. at 2066, and may not second-g uess the tac tical and strateg ic choice s made by trial counsel unless those c hoices we re u n i n fo rm ed bec ause of inadequate pre paration. See Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)

. Be cause both prong s of the Strickland test must be satisfied before a petitioner c an succ eed on a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, a failure to show either d ef i ci ent per formanc e or result i n g p re

j u d ice r esults in a failure to establish the claim. See He nley , 960 S.W .2d at 580. Cou rt s, the re fo re , ne e d not ap pr oa c h the te st in a spe c if ic or de r, or

e ve n “ a dd re ss b othc omp on e nts of the inquiry if the defe ndant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickla nd, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct . at 2069; see a lso Goad, 938 S .W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure t o prove e ither def iciency or pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny relief on the ineff

ective a ssistance c laim”).
III. Pe titioner’ s Sp ecific Allegations of I neff ective Assistance
A. F ailure to Cite Report ed Crim inal L aw Cases-7-

Th e pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t bo th t

ri a l a nd app e llate c ou ns e l we re ine ff e c tiv e fo r faili ng to c ite reported criminal law case s when a rg uing f or a jury instruction on pr o x imate cause. He contends that by focusing on the “pro x i m at e re sult” lang uag e of the vehicular homicide statute, counse l “missed the lar g er, more overridin g issue of causation and its role in g ener al homicide ca ses.” Acc ording to the petitioner, had c ounsel ci t ed to the “we alth of re ported [criminal] cases” that dis c us s p ro xima te a ndint e rv e nin g c aus e in th e con te xt of a ho mic ide c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt “ wo uld ha ve ha d tang ibl e , c on tr oll ing c a se -l a w t o r e ly on in g ivi ng a

mor e thorou gh pr oximate c aus e instruction.” I n support, he notes this court’s obse rvation in the direc t appea l opinion that “the leg al
auth ority c ite d inDe fe nd a nt’ s b ri e f t o s up po rt his arg ume nt f

a ils to c on ta in an o pi ni on fr om this Cou rt on thi s sp e c if

ic iss ue ” a nd that “ the ma

jority of the op ini on s c ite d b y De fe nd a nt c on c e rn c ivi l
ma tte rs ,” Do na ld W. B ranc h, 20 02 W L 15 58 48 5, a t *1 6, a s w e ll a s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s state me nt t o defe nse counse l that it would is sue the propose d instruction if counsel c ould find a ca se that said the instruction was the c orre ct one a nd that it should be issued. The State ar g ues, inter a lia , that the po st- c on vic tio n co urt pr op e rl y fo un d th a t c ou ns e l’ s c ho ic e of c a se s to c ite wa s b a se d o n a de qu a te and informe d rese arc h and there fore entitled to de fer ence by the revie wing court. We a g ree with the State.
The re cord establishes that the petitioner wa s repr esente d both at trial and on a ppeal by exper ie n c e d d e f

e n s e a tt o r n e y s w h o e n g a g e d ine xte n s iv e p r e p ar a ti o n f o r th e c a s e , w h ic h in c lu d ed thoroug h rese arc h on the proxim ate c ause issue. B oth junior and senior trial counsel testified that jun ior tr ia l cou ns e l thor ou g hly re se arc he d the iss ue , an d tha t the y bo th c on su lte d e xten siv e ly wi th appellate counsel on the topic. D espite their r esea rch, the y wer e unable to f

ind any reported criminal
c a se s tha t w e r e o n p o i n ta n d , t h e r e f o r e , w e r e f

o r c e d t o r e l y

o n c i v i l c a s e s f

o r t h e i r ar g u me nt. Appellate c ounsel was a lso unable to find any reported criminal law case s in support of his positi on, and believe d that the four reported ca ses cited by post-conviction counse l that addre ssed interve ning
a ndsu pe rc e din g c aus e s in ho mic ide c a se s w e re too g e ne ra l to be he lpf ul o n th e sp e c if

ic iss ue in the ir
c a se . H e e xpla ine d h is r e a so nin g :

So m y ta sk on app e a l wa s to try to co nv inc e the Cou rt that in fac t p ro x i m at e ca

use wa s the test and wa s the meaning behind the statute involved. And ac tually , there wer e no ca ses in Tenne ssee that
a dd re sse d th a t sp e c if

ic iss ue in a Ve hic ula

r Ho mic ide c on te xt, a t le a st not since the e nactment of the statute in the 1989 Criminal Code that
a dd re sse d th a t pa

rt ic ula r c on c e pt.
So .

. . my number one battle was not whe ther interve ning and
su pe rs e din g c aus e s w e re a c on c e pt of the la w app lic able to p ro xima te cause but w hether or not prox imate cause wa s applicable to Vehicular Homicide in t he contex t of t he Vehicular Homicide statute. So there
was no case on that. Actually , the only case on that was a g ainst me,
an unre ported c ase of

t he Court of Criminal Appea ls. So Ifound some desce ndi ng [si c] opinions i n some courts a nd some other arg uments to make on behalf of t he concept that prox imate cause wa sT h e issu e in F a rn e r wa s “w h e the r T e n n e sse e la w re c o g n iz e s a c o -p e rp e tra to r ru le w h ic h b a rs the d e fen d a n t’s 4

co nvi ct i on s for c r i mi n al l y n eg l i g en t h omi ci de on t h e bas i s t h at t h e v i ct i ms w er e co- par t i ci pan t s i n t h e dr ag r ac e. ” 66 S.W

. 3 d at 19 1

. T he co urt co ncl ud ed t hat t here was no such co- p e rp e tra to r ru l e i n T enness ee, but revers ed t he
c o n v ic tio n s a n d re m a n d e d fo r a ne w trial d u e to the trial c o u rt’s failur e to i s s u e a n i n stru c tio n o n p ro x im a te c a u se in (c o n tinu e d ...) -8- the true te st. But as far as explaining what -- if proxi mate ca use wa s the true te st, if I

had proven p o i nt A, point B the c oncept of superse ding and intervening caus es, Icited civil ca ses . . . for that conce pt.
I n addition to failing to show a ny defic iency o n co u n s el ’s part for failing to cite re ported
c rimi nal law op ini on s in su pp ort of the pr op os e d ju ry

ins truc tio n, the pe tit ion e r h a s a lso faile d to show that counsel’ s alleg ed def iciency in t h i s re s p ect prejudiced his ca se. None of the four case s c ite d b y po st- c on vic tio n c ou ns e l a dd re sse s the iss ue of pr oximate c aus e ve rs us pr oximate re su lt i n a n a g g ra vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide c a se ; thu s, the y wo uldno t ha ve satis fi e d th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s re qu e st fo r an o pin ionthat sp e c if

ic a lly su pp orte d c ou ns e l’ s p ro po se d ju ry ins truc tio n in the c on te xt of the ir
case . We further

note this court’s observation that the petitioner’s brie f fa iled to contain an opinion fr om this c ou rt

“ on thi s specific iss ue ” wa s ma de on ly a ft e r w e had ap pli e d th e re a so nin g of State v. Bobby We av e r , N o
. 0 2 C0 1

- 9 3 0 7 -CC-00143, 1995 WL 568420 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 1995), and concluded that the jury instruction issued by

the trial court “suffic iently informed the jury

of the definition of proxim ate r esult as it relate s to vehicular h o m i cide,” including “ the ef fec t of the exis tence o f

a n in d e p e n d e n t, in te r v e n in g c au s e
. ” D o n a ldW. B r a n c h , 2 0 0 2 WL 1 5 5 8 4 8 5 , a t *16 (empha sis added).

B. Failure t o Sup plem ent Appellate Brief wi th F arner Ca se The pe titioner next contends that a ppellate c ounsel was ineffe ctive for failing to supplement his brief w ith St ate v
. F ar n e r , 6 6 S. W. 3 d 1 8 8 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 1 ) , w h ic h w a s f il e d ap p r o xim a te ly

th ree wee ks befor e this court’s dire ct appe al opinion in the instant ca s e wa s re lease d. Although he acknow ledg es that the F arne r court approve d the same instruction on causation that the trial court issue d i n t he instant ca se, he a sserts that the ca se wa s “vital” be cause of its “thoroug h discussion of proxi mate causation,” and arg ues that counsel was ineffe ctive for failing to c ite it f o r t he proposition that causation is an esse ntial element to eve ry homicide.
As wi t h t he pre vious alleg ation, the post-conviction court attributed appe llate counse l’s decision not to supplement his brief with the F arne r ca se as one of strate g y , subject to defe renc e by the re viewing court. Again, the record supports the findi ng s and conclusions of the post-c onviction
c ou rt . A pp e llate c ou ns e l’ s te sti mon y at th e e vid e nti ary he ari ng e sta

bli sh e d th a t he tho ro ug hly
rese arc hed and analy zed the proxi mate ca use issue, re ad the F arne r ca se whe n it was rele ased, and determined from his experience t h at , althoug h rele vant in its definition of superce ding and int e rv e nin g c aus e s, it w a s n ot “ on a ll f ou rs ” wi th t he is su e in his c a se . N otw ith stand ing po stc on vic tio n c ou ns e l’ s ass e rt ion to the c on tr ary , the re is nothin g in the re c or d to ind ic a te that app e llate co u n s el i n co rr ec t l y

re ad t h e F ar n erca s e o r m i s u n d er s t o o d i t s h o l d i n g. 4(

. . . con t i n u ed) 4

conne ct i on wi t h t he i ns t r uct i ons on cri mi nal l y negl i gen t hom i ci de, not i ng t hat t he t r i al co ur t p r ovi ded t he j ur y wi t h a n i ns t r ucti on on pr oxi mat e r es ul t i n c onj un ct i on wi t h t he i ns t r uct i ons on v ehi cul ar homi ci de, but t hat “ no s i mi l ar ins tru c tio n s w e re giv e n a s to c rim ina lly n e g lige n t ho m ic id e , no r wa s the ju ry re fer re d to the instr u c tio n s o n p ro x im a te
re su lt p re v io u sly giv e n .” Id . at 2 0 4 n.1 4

. -9- C. F ailure to Raise Re cusal Issu e on Appeal The pe titioner also contends that appellate c ounsel was inef fec tive for f

ailing to r aise the tria l judge ’s re fusal to recuse hims elf as an is sue on direc t appea l. Trial counsel orig inally filed a moti on fo r r e c us a l ba se d o n th e tr ia l judg e ’s c omm e nts a t the pe tit ion e r’ s bon d h e ari ng . T he se c omm e nts occur red a s defe nse counsel was arg uing for a reduc tion in the petitioner’s bond a nd reminded the trial judg e that the petitioner was “pre sumed innocent” of the char g es. The trial judg e re sponded by statin g that th e de fe nd a nt w a s p re su me d in no c e nt at tria l, bu t he wa s un de r no ob lig a tio n to pr e su me the def endant innoce nt when conside ring his request for a reduc tion in bond. At a later point in the hearing, the trial judg e also stated that if it were his job to ana ly ze the petitioner’s c hara cter at that point, he would say

that he wa s an “out-of

-control dr

unk who ca

res nothing about the law or other people a round him.”
The petitioner arg ues that the trial judge ’s statements “would cause the trial court’s impartiality

to be questioned unde r an o b j ec t i ve standa

rd” and that appellate counsel should have pu rs ue d th e iss ue on app e a l. Ho we ve r, “ [t]he de te rm inatio n o f w hic h is su e s to pr e se nt o n a pp e a l is a matter of counse l’s discretion.” State v. Swa nson, 680 S.W .2d 487, 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). At the evidentiary

hearing, a

ppellate co u n s el fully

and ade quately

explained his reasons for not raisi ng the re c us a l is su e :

We l l , a t t h e t i m e I l o o k e d a t t h a t i s s u e a n d I r e s e ar c h e d it , looked at the odds o f reversal a nd the law a pplicable ther eto, and didn’t rea lly

find it to have any

merit. I did not think Icould succ eed in the Appe l l at e C ourt with claiming that the J udg e should have
re c us e d h ims e lf . So I

did n’ t r a ise that onapp e a l. Appellate c ounsel’s dec ision not to raise the issue of recusal was obviously the re sult of ext ensive experience , prepa

ration, and r esea

rch. In summary , we c onclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating he was denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, either at trial or on appea l.
IV. Im pact of Bl akely on Pe titioner’ s Sentence
Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. _ _, 12 4 S. Ct. 25 31 (2 00 4) , in which the United States Supre me Court, apply ing the rule in Appre ndi v. New J erse y , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L

. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), held that the Six th Amendment prohibits a def endant’ s sen te n c e f

r o m b e in g in c r e a s e d b e y o n d th e p r e s u mp ti v e s tatu to r y maximu m b a s e d o n f a cts which ha ve ne ith e r b e e n f

ou ndby a jury no r a dmi tte d by the de fe nd a nt, app lie s r e tr oa c tiv e ly to i nv a lid a teT h i s op i n i on h a s be e n w i t h dr a w n a n d s u pe r s e de d b y S t a t e v
. Ch e s t e r W a y n e W a l t e r s , No

. M 2 0 0 3

- 0 3 0 1 9

- C CA- 5 R 3

- C D , 20 0 4 W L 2 7 2 6 0 3 4 (T enn. C ri m
. A p p
. N o v. 30 , 20 0 4 ). -10- the enha nced and consec utive sentenc es imposed in his case. N oting that a p an el o f t his court
rec ently concl u d ed that “B lakely

. . . establishes a ne w rule in this state,” State v. Cheste r Way ne Walters, No. M 2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2246196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oc t. 4, 2004), the 5 petitioner ar g ues that, under the test announc ed in Tea g ue v. L ane, 489 U .S. 288, 109 S. C t. 1060, 103 L . Ed. 2d 334 (1 9 8 9 ), Bl ak el y is a new “ water shed rule of criminal proc edure ,” re quiring retroa ctive application. W e re spectfully disag ree
. Under Tea g ue, an e x ception to the g ener al rule a g ain st the retroa ctivity of new proce dural rules applies in c ases whic h involve “watershed r ules o f criminal proc edure ,” or “ those new proce dures without which the likelihood of an acc urate conviction is seriously diminis hed.” 489 U.S. at 311-13, 109 S. Ct. at 1076-77 (Bre nnan, J ., dissenting) (citing Macke y v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 91 S. C t. 1160, 1180, 28 L

. Ed. 2d 404 (1971)) . The Te ag ue Court, re cog nizi ng that the e xce pti on wa s a

na rr ow on e , w ro te :
Be cause we ope rate from the pr emise that such proc edure s would be so ce ntr al t o an accur ate de termination of innoce nce or g uilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due proce ss have y et to emer g e. We ar e also of the view that suc h rules
are “best illustrated by rec alling the classic gr ounds from the issuanc e of a w rit of habe as cor

pus -- that the pr oceedi ng was dominated by mob violence; that the pr osecuto r k nowing ly made use of per

jured testimony ; or t hat the convic tion was based on a confe ssion ex torted from the de fendant by

brutal methods.”

I d., 489 U. S. at 313, 109 S. Ct. at 1077 (quoting Rose v. Lundy , 455 U.S. 509, 544, 102 S. C t. 1198, 1216-1217, 71 L . Ed. 2d 379 (1982) ( Stevens, J . , dissenting) ). The United States Supre me Court has not y et spec ificallyaddre ssed the re troac tive application of B lakely

. Howeve r, i n Schriro v. Summerlin, __ U.S. __, 124 S . Ct. 2519, 2526, 159 L . Ed. 2d 442 (2004), the Court held that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. C t. 2428, 153 L . Ed. 2d 556 (2002), whic h applied the r ule in Appre ndi to require that a jury , rathe r than a trial judg e, find the exist ence o f agg ravators nece ssary to impose the death pe nalty , was not a w ater shed rule of criminal proc edure and there fore did not apply retroa ctively

to case s alrea dy

final on direc t review

. No ting t hat “f

or e ve ry arg ume nt w hy

jurie s a re mor e a c c ur a te fa c tf

ind e rs [tha n ju dg e s], the re is anoth e r w h y th e y a r e le s s a c c u r a te , ” th e Co u r t c o n c lu d e d th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s s imp ly “too
e qu ivo c a l” to su pp ort the c on c lus ion that a tr ia l ju dg e ’s , r a the r tha n a jury ’s , f ind ing of de a th p e na lty
a g g ra vator s se ri ou sly

dim ini sh e d th e a c c ur a c y

of the pr oc e e din g
. Sc hrir o,

__ U. S. a t

__ , 1 24 S. Ct

. at 2525.-11-

Ot he r j u r i s d i c t i o n s w h i c h h a v e a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e h a v e d e c l i n e d t o ap p l y B l ak e ly retroa ctively

to case s that are final on direc t appea l. See I n re D ean, 375 F .3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004) (“B eca

use Blakely , like Ring, is ba sed on an extension of Appre ndi, Dean c annot show that the Supreme Court ha s made that de cision retroa ctive to ca ses alre ady final on direc t review .”); McB ride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. D ist. Ct . App. 2004) (“ We further hold that Blake ly

does
n o t a p p ly r e tr o a c ti v e ly

to c a s e s o n c o ll a te r a l r e v ie w
. ” ) ; St a te v
. Pe ts c h l,

__ N

. W. 2 d

__ , 2 0 0 4 WL 26 63 59 4, a t *7 (M inn . Ct. A pp . 2 00 4) (“ B lake ly ha s th e sa me pr oc e du ra l e ff e c t a s A pp re nd i, incre asing the ac cura cy

of the sente nce but not the c onviction. Because the B lakely rule doe s not imp ro ve the a c c ur a c y

or fair ne ss o f a

tr ia l, w e c on c lud e that it is no t a wate rs he d r

ule su bje c t to retroa ctive application on collatera l review .”).
Th e pe tit ion e r, wh ile a c kn ow le dg ing the ho ldi ng in Sc hrir o, arg ue s that B lake ly sh ou ld a pp ly retroa ctively

to his case be cause unlike in Schriro, wher e the Arizona trial judge was a lrea dy require d to find the exist ence of ag g ravating f actor s bey ond a rea sonable doubt, his trial judge was pe rmitted to find the exist ence of the fac tors used to e nhance his se ntence by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. Howeve r, eve n with the differ ent standards applied, we are still unable to conc lude that the judg e’s fi nd ing of e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s “ se rio us ly dim ini sh e [d] a c c ur a c y .” Sc hrir o,

__ U.S

. a t __ , 1 24 S. Ct. a t 25 25 . T he re fo re , li ke oth e r j urisd ic tio ns , w e de c lin e to f indB lake ly

re tr oa c tiv e ly

app lic able to case s on collatera l appea l.
CO NC LU SION Following our re view, we conclude that the petitioner ha s failed to demonstrate he wa s de nie d th e e ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

tr ia l or app e llate c ou ns e l. We fu rthe r c on c lud e that B lake ly sh ou ld
n o tb e r e tr o a c t i v e l y ap p l i e d t o c a s e s w h i c h h a v e a l r e a d y b e c o m e f i n a l o n d i r e c tap p e a l

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we a ffirm the post-c onviction court’s de nial of the pe tition.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE