UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ELEDRIA J. BRADLEY, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 14-3011 

 (D.C. No. 6:13-CR-10058-MLB-1) 

(D. Kan.) 

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HARTZ, O'BRIEN, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

 Eledria J. Bradley, a member of the Kansas Air National Guard, was convicted by 

a jury of wire fraud: she falsely claimed her “Home of Record” changed from Wichita, 

Kansas, to her father’s address in Chandler, Arizona. The change, accepted as true by the 

Air Force, resulted in her receiving higher housing benefits (Basic Allowance for 

 

*

 This order and judgment is an unpublished decision, not binding precedent. 10th 

Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1. 

It is appropriate as it relates to law of the case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion. 

Unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

Citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical 

notation B (unpublished). Id. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 4, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
- 2 - 

Housing) and benefits she would not have otherwise received (lodging and per diem) for 

approximately two years. The questions presented here are whether the district judge 

erred in refusing to give a proposed entrapment-by-estoppel instruction and whether the 

government presented sufficient evidence of her intent to defraud the United States. 

Because the proposed instruction misstated the law and was not supported by the 

evidence, it was properly refused. The evidence was sufficient. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Bradley lived in Arizona (presumably with her father) until she graduated from 

high school in 2002. She then moved to Wichita, Kansas, to reside with her 

grandparents. In 2004, she enlisted in the Kansas Air National Guard. Four years later, 

in November 2008, she married Gary Bradley, an active duty serviceman with the United 

States Air Force stationed at McConnell Air Force Base in Wichita. The two lived in an 

apartment in Wichita. 

 In February 2009, Bradley received orders (Title 32 orders) from the Kansas Air 

National Guard to report to her Security Forces squadron1

 at McConnell Air Force Base 

in Wichita for annual training from April 6-10, 2009. She also received orders from the 

United States Air Force (Title 10 orders)2

 to report to active duty on April 11, 2009, for a 

 

1

 The Security Forces squadron provides law enforcement services to the military 

base to which it is assigned. 

2

 “Since 1933 all persons who have enlisted in a State National Guard unit have 

simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the United States,” “a reserve 

component of the national armed forces.” See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 

345, 347 n.19 (1990). When state guard members are called to active duty by the United 

(Continued . . . ) 
- 3 - 

one-year deployment to Saudi Arabia. Her Title 10 orders required her to first report to 

Fort Bliss, Texas, for desert training before leaving for Saudi Arabia. At the time she 

received her Title 10 and 32 orders, Bradley’s military personnel file reflected her Home 

of Record as the apartment she shared with her husband in Wichita.3

 On April 10, 2009, while serving her Title 32 orders but aware of her Title 10 

orders, Bradley accessed her military personnel file via a website called Virtual Military 

Personnel Flight (VMPF)4

 and changed her Home of Record to her father’s address in 

Chandler, Arizona.5

 In order to justify a guard member changing her Home of Record, 

she must physically move her belongings to the new address; intent to move to a new 

address in the future is not enough. Although Bradley told investigators she had moved 

 

States, they lose their status as members of the State militia and serve the federal military. 

Id. at 346-47. “At all other times, [however, they] serve solely as members of the State 

militia under the command of a state governor.” Clark v. United States, 322 F.3d 1358, 

1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In this case, Bradley was under federal Title 10 orders when she 

received the benefits to which she was not entitled; the United States was defrauded, not 

the State of Kansas. 

3

 Although this case involves a fraudulent change of address, the trial transcript 

provided for this appeal unexplainably redacts addresses throughout. We were able to 

discern from context the addresses to which the witnesses were testifying but the 

redactions made our review more burdensome. 

4

 In order to access VMPF, an individual needs a military identification card, a 

password and a pin number. The server for VMPF is located at Randolph Air Force Base 

in San Antonio, Texas. Thus, when Bradley changed her address on the system in 

Wichita, Kansas, it had to travel to Texas via the Internet, thus establishing the “use of 

interstate wire communications” element of the offense. See United States v. Porter, 745 

F.3d 1035, 1051 (10th Cir. 2014). 

5

 The government’s brief says the change occurred on April 9, 2009. But the 

evidence at trial showed that although Bradley changed her Home of Record on a 

computer program called My Pay on April 9, 2009, the change on VMPF occurred on 

April 10, 2009. 
- 4 - 

some of her belongings to a friend’s house in Phoenix, Arizona, in February 2009, she 

did not list her friend’s house as her Home of Record. Instead, she listed the address of 

her father, whose testimony was unequivocal: she had not moved any belongings to his 

residence and he did not recall her telling him she would be changing her Home of 

Record to his address. Bradley admitted to investigators she changed her Home of 

Record in order to obtain a higher Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) while she was 

deployed. BAH is money guard members receive, in addition to their salary, to “help 

sustain their household[s] while they’re on active duty orders.” (R. Vol. 3 at 122.) The 

amount of BAH is based on the member’s Home of Record. During the relevant time 

period (April 2009 to April 2011), the BAH for Chandler, Arizona, was greater than that 

for Wichita, Kansas.6

 By changing her Home of Record from Wichita to her father’s 

address in Chandler, Bradley increased the amount of BAH she would receive while 

under Title 10 orders. 

 On April 11, 2009, Bradley reported to Fort Bliss for desert training as ordered. 

Soon thereafter, she was injured during a training exercise. Due to her injury, she was 

not deployed to Saudi Arabia but instead was required to return to McConnell Air Force 

Base in Wichita. She was placed on a “medical hold,” which required her to stay in the 

 

6

 At trial the government presented evidence that in 2009 through 2011, the BAH 

for a guard member ranked E3 without dependents for Wichita, Kansas, was $648, $669 

and $663, respectively. The BAH for Phoenix, Arizona, the area applicable to Chandler, 

Arizona, was $909 in 2009 and 2010; $873 in 2011. As applied to Bradley, however, the 

numbers were somewhat distorted because her rank was E4, not E3—a mistake first 

recognized during trial. 
- 5 - 

Wichita area until a medical review board cleared her to leave. (R. Vol. 3 at 92, 228.) 

While on medical hold, Bradley continued to receive the increased BAH payments. She 

also began receiving lodging and per diem because her Home of Record—Chandler, 

Arizona—was outside the commuting distance for McConnell Air Force Base. Had her 

Home of Record remained Wichita, Kansas, she would not have been eligible for these 

additional benefits. 

 Upon her return to McConnell Air Force Base, Bradley was assigned a desk job in 

the Comptroller Unit (finance). In June 2009, Shellie Armstrong, the head of the 

Comptroller Unit and Bradley’s supervisor, asked Bradley why her personnel file showed 

Chandler, Arizona, as her Home of Record. Bradley told her she had earlier moved her 

belongings to Arizona. Armstrong accepted Bradley’s explanation.7

 Bradley remained on a medical hold until April 23, 2011, when she was medically 

retired from the military. During the medical hold (April 2009 to April 2011), she 

continued to receive BAH payments based on her Home of Record being Chandler, 

Arizona. She also submitted monthly vouchers to the Comptroller Unit to be paid 

lodging and per diem. Those vouchers were reviewed, audited, and approved by multiple 

members of the Comptroller Unit. In the end, Bradley received over $6,000 more in 

BAH payments for the Chandler address than she would have received had her Home of 

 

7

 Bradley may have only expressly told Armstrong that she moved belongings to 

Arizona, but the address given as her Home of Record in her personnel file was her 

father’s home in Chandler. Armstrong could reasonably assume the move was to the 

listed address, not elsewhere. For that reason we refer to the Arizona move as a move to 

her father’s house. 
- 6 - 

Record remained Wichita. She also received over $54,000 in lodging and per diem—

benefits she would not have received had she not falsely claimed her father’s Chandler, 

Arizona, address as her Home of Record. 

 In June 2012, the Air Force instigated an investigation. In speaking with the 

investigators, Bradley initially denied she was the one who changed her Home of Record 

but eventually admitted to doing so. She also gave conflicting information as to her 

proper Home of Record. She initially claimed her Home of Record should be Virginia 

because she had completed some military duty there and had left property there with an 

ex-boyfriend.8

 She continued with this story after being confronted with the fact she had 

since married a serviceman stationed at McConnell Air Force Base. She also claimed her 

Home of Record should be her father’s address in Chandler, Arizona, because that is 

where she resided prior to joining the military and where she had intended to move after 

her deployment. She claimed to have told her father she was going to list his address as 

her Home of Record. She also told the investigators she had moved a trunk-load of 

property to a friend’s house in Phoenix, Arizona, in February 2009. Finally, as stated 

previously, she admitted the reason she changed her Home of Record to her father’s 

address was so she would receive a higher BAH while she was deployed. 

 Bradley was indicted with one count of wire fraud. The indictment alleged her 

changed Home of Record from Wichita to Chandler resulted in her “receiv[ing] lodging 

 

8

 The trial testimony indicated Bradley had served at Langley Air Force Base in 

Virginia but the dates of her service were unclear. The PSR states she was stationed 

there from December 2007 to July 2008. 
- 7 - 

and per diem benefits to which she was not entitled, from approximately April 11, 2009, 

until April 23, 2011, in the approximate amount of $54,992.80.” (R. Vol. 1 at 8 

(emphasis added).) Notably, the indictment did not mention the increased BAH 

payments she also received as a result of the change. The jury was instructed 

accordingly: in addition to other elements,9

 it was required to find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that she “devised or intended to devise a scheme to obtain money by means of false 

or fraudulent presentences, or representations; that is, she falsely reported her address via 

. . . [V]MPF in order to obtain lodging expenses and per diem from the United States.” 

(R. Vol. 1 at 23 (emphasis added).) No mention was made of the BAH payments. 

 At the close of the evidence, Bradley requested a jury instruction on entrapmentby-estoppel and submitted a proposed instruction. The proposed instruction required 

Bradley to show, inter alia, “that an agent or agents of the government affirmatively 

assent[ed] or by their acquiescence” misled her. (R. Vol. 1 at 14.) The district judge 

denied the request because the proposed instruction misstated the law and “there’s no 

evidence in the case that [Bradley] actually went to anyone in authority and presented this 

scenario, . . . I want to change my address to Arizona because I think even though I’m 

going to be deployed . . . I can get more BAH . . . and that the person said that’s okay, 

 

9

 The jury was also required to find Bradley “acted with specific intent to obtain 

money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, or representations,” “used interstate 

wire communication facilities for the purpose of carrying out the scheme,” and “the 

scheme employed false or fraudulent pretenses, or representations that were material.” 

(R. Vol. 1 at 23.) 
- 8 - 

you can do that.” (R. Vol. 3 at 301-02.) The jury found Bradley guilty. She was 

sentenced to three years of probation.10

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Entrapment-by-Estoppel Instruction 

 Bradley claims government agents misled her into believing the change of her 

Home of Record was proper. After all, she says, her monthly vouchers for lodging and 

per diem were continuously reviewed and approved by multiple employees of the 

Comptroller Unit. Moreover, Armstrong knew her Home of Record was Chandler, 

Arizona, yet did nothing to correct it.11

 

10 This sentence was a downward variance from the guideline range of 12 to 18 

months. We know the variance was based on the judge’s consideration of the factors set 

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a). We do not know, however, the specific reasons for the 

variance because the sentencing transcript was not provided. 

11 Bradley violated a military regulation by changing her Home of Record while 

under orders. At trial, Armstrong erroneously testified that the pertinent military 

regulation did not go into effect until 2011. On re-direct examination (after a noon 

recess) she corrected herself, saying the regulation was in effect when Bradley changed 

her Home of Record in April 2009. Bradley attempts to capitalize on Armstrong’s 

temporary memory lapse, arguing “[that] the person overseeing the very office in charge 

of such matters believed the regulation didn’t go into effect until much later is evidence 

that shows the procedures followed by Ms. Bradley were not just allowed, but were the 

standard operating procedures . . . . As such, Ms. Bradley should have been allowed her 

theory of defense instruction of entrapment by estoppel.” (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 16.) 

Bradley reads too much into Armstrong’s testimony. That Armstrong could not recall at 

trial, four years after the fact, the effective date of the regulation does not mean she or the 

Comptroller Unit waived the regulation at the time. In any event, assuming, arguendo, 

that the regulation was not followed in April 2009, a physical move of belongings was 

required in order to justify a change of address and the evidence clearly demonstrated 

Bradley’s knowledge of the requirement. Bradley does not argue Armstrong actively 

misled her as to the physical move requirement—something Bradley did not satisfy when 

she changed her Home of Record. 
- 9 - 

 “A defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which 

there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in her favor.” United States 

v. Rampton, 762 F.3d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014). Ordinarily, we review for abuse of 

discretion a district court’s refusal to give a requested theory-of-defense instruction. Id. 

However, where, as here, the district judge concludes there was insufficient evidence to 

justify the instruction, our review is de novo. Id.

 “The defense of entrapment by estoppel is implicated where an agent of the 

government affirmatively misleads a party as to the state of the law and that party 

proceeds to act on the misrepresentation so that criminal prosecution of the actor 

implicates due process concerns under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” United 

States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Rampton, 762 F.3d at 

1157 (“A claim of entrapment by estoppel is at heart a due process challenge. To convict 

a person for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to 

him would be to dispense with the basic requirement that citizens receive fair warning of 

what actions are criminal.”) (citation and quotations omitted). “To establish [the] 

defense, a defendant must show (1) an active misleading by a government agent who is 

responsible for interpreting, administering, or enforcing the law defining the offense; and 

(2) actual reliance by the defendant, which is reasonable in light of the identity of the 

agent, the point of law misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation.” 

Rampton, 762 F.3d at 1157 (quotations omitted). 

 In this case, Bradley claims to have requested and proposed an entrapment-byestoppel instruction. Not exactly. As defense counsel admitted to the district judge, the 
- 10 - 

proposed instruction modified the first element of the defense. While our case law 

requires an active misleading by the government agent, the proposed instruction merely 

required an “affirmative[] assent” or “acquiescence.” (R. Vol. 1 at 14.) Bradley could 

not then, nor does she now, point to any case law supporting such modification and we 

have found none. For that reason alone, the district judge properly denied her proposed 

instruction. See United States v. McKinney, 822 F.2d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(“[R]equested instructions that are misstatements of the law . . . are correctly refused.”). 

Assuming, arguendo, she had proposed a proper instruction, the district judge 

correctly concluded there was insufficient evidence to support its submission to the jury. 

That is because the evidence did not establish either (1) an “active misleading” by a 

government agent or (2) reasonable reliance. 

We have yet to define the exact contours of the “active misleading” element of the 

defense. But we do know that inaction alone is insufficient. See United States v. 

Westover, 107 F. App’x 840, 844 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).12 The Supreme Court 

cases from which the defense originated involved government agents explicitly 

misadvising defendants as to the law. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39 (1959) 

(convictions for failure to answer questions of a state commission violated due process 

because chairman of commission informed defendants they could decline to answer by 

invoking their Fifth Amendment rights); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 570-71 

 

12 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. App. P. 32.1(A). 

We mention Westover because of its persuasive and reasoned analysis. 
- 11 - 

(1965) (reversing conviction of a protestor for demonstrating “near” a courthouse 

because police had advised the protestor where he could demonstrate but then arrested 

him for demonstrating in that area). 

This case does not come close to meeting the demanding elements of the asserted 

defense. See United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 1999) 

(“We have held that the courts invoke the doctrine of estoppel against the government 

with great reluctance.”) (quotations omitted). Neither Armstrong nor the employees of 

the Comptroller Unit explicitly informed Bradley she could change her Home of Record 

without a physical move of her belongings in order to receive increased benefits. There 

was no active misleading as to the law. Armstrong’s conduct amounts to nothing more 

than inaction—she inquired about the Home of Record and accepted Bradley’s 

explanation that she had moved her belongings to her father’s home in Arizona.13 

Armstrong’s misplaced trust hardly amounts to active misleading. 

And there is another compelling reason why the evidence did not support an 

entrapment-by-estoppel instruction—any reliance by Bradley on the “approval” of her 

Home of Record by Armstrong or others in the Comptroller Unit was not reasonable. 

“[A] defendant’s reliance [is] unreasonable if the defendant obtained the government’s 

inaccurate guidance by providing false information or omitting relevant information.” 

Rampton, 762 F.3d at 1157. For instance, in Rampton, the defendant claimed she 

reasonably believed her conduct concerning the filing of certain tax forms was lawful 

 

13 See supra n.7. 
- 12 - 

because the Internal Revenue Service sent her a refund check. Id. at 1158. We 

concluded such reliance was unreasonable because the forms she filed falsely reported 

certain income had been withheld. Id. “Obviously the government took the [tax] forms 

as true, and no one could reasonably infer that the government’s response implied that 

she was entitled to a refund even if the information reported on the . . . forms was false.” 

Id. Similarly, in Gutierrez-Gonzalez, the defendant argued a clerk with the Immigration 

and Nationalization Service affirmatively misled him into believing he was lawfully in 

the United States by issuing him a work authorization permit even though he told her he 

was in the country illegally. 184 F.3d at 1168. We concluded his reliance on the 

issuance of the work permit was unreasonable because it was based on his “fraudulent 

application that affirmatively stated that he had never been deported.” Id. at 1168-69. 

Here, any “approval” by Armstrong was based on Bradley falsely informing her 

that she had moved her belongings to her father’s address in Chandler, Arizona. As 

Armstrong testified, she did not question Bradley further because “when [a guard 

member] tells me they’re going to live somewhere, the core values of the Air Force are 

integrity first, service before self and excellence in all we do. I shouldn’t have to 

question an E4’s integrity.”14 (R. Vol. 3 at 214.) Likewise, the approval of her vouchers 

by various employees of the Comptroller Unit was based on the same false premise that 

her Home of Record was her father’s address in Chandler, Arizona, as Bradley had 

 

14 Again, Bradley’s rank was E4. See supra n.6. 
- 13 - 

reported. Bradley cannot now claim she reasonably relied on the “approval” of these 

government agents when that “approval” was based on her lies. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

“Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction is 

a legal question we review de novo.” United States v. Hernandez, 509 F.3d 1290, 1295 

(10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). “[W]e view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” United 

States v. Espinoza, 338 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 2003). “We will reverse the 

verdict only if no rational jury could have found [the] [d]efendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1147. 

“To convict a defendant of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the government 

must show (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property by means of false or 

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, (2) an intent to defraud, and (3) use of 

interstate wire communications to execute the scheme.” United States v. Porter, 745 

F.3d 1035, 1051 (10th Cir. 2014). Bradley focuses on the intent to defraud element of the 

indictment, viz., defrauding the United States of lodging and per diem by changing her 

Home of Record before her deployment. But, as the argument goes, she could not have 

intended to receive those benefits at the time she changed her Home of Record on April 

10, 2009. That is because, at the critical time, she did not expect to receive those benefits 

because she was being deployed to Saudi Arabia. She actually received those benefits 
- 14 - 

only after she was unexpectedly injured, returned to McConnell, and forced to stay there 

on a medical hold.15

 This is superficially a thorny issue. Without doubt, the government presented 

sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Bradley intended to defraud the United States 

of increased BAH payments. Indeed, the jury heard from one of the investigators who 

related Bradley’s admission of having changed her Home of Record in order to obtain a 

higher BAH. Ordinarily, that would be enough to sustain her conviction because the type 

of property intended to be obtained by the fraud is not an element of wire fraud. See 18 

U.S.C. § 1343 (referring simply to “money or property”); see also Porter, 745 F.3d at 

1051. 

But the indictment narrowed its scope by needlessly specifying the type of 

property obtained by the fraud—lodging and per diem. And the jury instructions 

specifically told the jury that to convict Bradley it had to find she “devised or intended to 

devise a scheme to obtain money by means of false or fraudulent presentences, or 

representations; that is, she falsely reported her address via . . . [V]MPF in order to obtain 

lodging expenses and per diem from the United States.” (R. Vol. 1 at 23 (emphasis 

added)). Consequently, while the statute does not require proof of the type of property 

 

15 Bradley challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to her intent to defraud of 

lodging and per diem (as opposed to BAH) in the district court in her motion for 

judgment of acquittal. Although she did not raise a variance argument, the district judge 

first addressed the issue in that context, concluding that even if there was a variance 

between the indictment and the trial evidence, Bradley had not shown her substantial 

rights had been affected by it. He then decided the evidence was sufficient to support the 

jury’s verdict. 
- 15 - 

intended to be obtained, both the indictment and the jury instructions did. “It is settled 

law in this circuit, as elsewhere, that the language employed by the government in its 

indictments becomes an essential and delimiting part of the charge itself, such that if an 

indictment charges particulars, the jury instructions and evidence introduced at trial must 

comport with those particulars.” United States v. Farr, 536 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 

2008) (collecting cases) (quotations omitted);16 but see United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 

130, 136 (1985) (“A part of the indictment unnecessary to and independent of the 

allegations of the offense proved may normally be treated as a useless averment that may 

be ignored.”) (quotations omitted). Thus, we consider whether there was sufficient 

evidence at trial to show Bradley intended to defraud the United States of lodging and per 

diem. 

No evidence suggested an intent to defraud (as to lodging and per diem) on 

April 10, 2009, when she changed her Home of Record. As she argues, at that time she 

 

16 Farr is a constructive amendment case—the indictment charged Farr with 

evading payment of the quarterly employment tax but the evidence and jury instructions 

at trial allowed the jury to convict her for evading payment of the trust fund recovery 

penalty. 536 F.3d at 1181-84; see also United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1297-

98 (10th Cir. 2006) (“An indictment is constructively amended if the evidence presented 

at trial, together with the jury instructions, raises the possibility that the defendant was 

convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.”) (quotations omitted). 

There was no constructive amendment of the indictment in this case—both the indictment 

and the jury instructions referred to lodging and per diem. 

Nor does Bradley raise a variance argument on appeal. See United States v. 

Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (“A variance arises when the evidence 

adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in the indictment, and 

denigrates the Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 

accusation.”) (quotations omitted). Thus she has waived it. Garcia v. Lemaster, 439 

F.3d 1215, 1216 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006). 
- 16 - 

did not know she would be injured and required to return to Wichita rather than deploy 

with her unit to Saudi Arabia. Her return to Wichita triggered her receipt of lodging and 

per diem; she would not have received these benefits had she deployed to Saudi Arabia.17 

But that does not end the matter. The indictment charged her with a scheme to defraud 

“[b]eginning on or about April 10, 2009, and continuing until approximately April 23, 

2011.” (R. Vol. 1 at 8.) This temporal period permitted the jury to find Bradley had the 

intent to defraud the United States—initially by an increased BHA and later by obtaining 

improper lodging and per diem payments. 

 Armstrong correctly testified that a physical move of belongings was required in 

order to justify a guard member’s change of her Home of Record. Bradley obviously 

knew this—she initially told one of the investigators that her Home of Record should be 

Virginia because she left property there with an ex-boyfriend and, when confronted by 

Armstrong regarding her Home of Record being Chandler, Bradley explained she had 

moved her belongings to Arizona. Moreover, Bradley worked (twice) in the Comptroller 

Unit which handles the payment of benefits.18 Therefore, a permissible (and logical) 

inference is that she was aware of the requirements for changing her Home of Record.

 

17 There was no direct evidence at trial that Bradley would not have received 

lodging and per diem had she deployed to Saudi Arabia as planned. However, there was 

evidence that lodging and per diem are paid to guard members who are not provided 

housing at their respective base. A logical inference is that Bradley would have been 

provided housing while deployed in Saudi Arabia and thus would not have been paid 

these benefits. Bradley drew on this inference in her motion for judgment of acquittal. 

18 Bradley admitted to investigators that her work in the finance department “gave 

her a better understanding of the finance regulations regarding travel pay and pay of 

(Continued . . . ) 
- 17 - 

Similarly, Bradley knew her Home of Record affected the amount and type of 

benefits to which she would be entitled. She had worked in the Comptroller’s Unit, but, 

more importantly, she admitted to changing her Home of Record in order to receive an 

increased BAH while deployed. A reasonable jury could infer Bradley also knew her 

later receipt of the lodging and per diem benefits was based on her Home of Record being 

Chandler. And because her Home of Record was falsely reported, she was entitled to no 

benefits. Nevertheless, she made no effort to change her Home of Record back to 

Wichita once she was returned to McConnell Air Force Base after her injury. That is a 

sufficient showing of an intent to defraud the United States of lodging and per diem. See 

United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Intent to defraud may be 

inferred from the defendant’s misrepresentations [or] knowledge of a false statement.”) 

(quotations omitted).

Service members are responsible for keeping the personal information contained 

in their personnel files, including their Home of Record, current. Bradley claims, 

however, that she could not have changed her Home of Record back to Wichita once she 

was injured and returned to McConnell Air Force Base because military regulations at 

that time would not allow a guard member to change her Home of Record while under 

active orders. See supra n.10. And, according to her, she had to remain under active 

orders not only because she was placed on a medical hold but also to remain eligible for 

health insurance. Her “any port in a storm” argument is unavailing. Nothing of record 

 

entitlements in general.” (R. Vol. 3 at 53.) 
- 18 - 

supports this argument, made for the first time on appeal. In any event, she changed her 

Home of Record from Wichita to Chandler while under active orders; she was 

unconcerned at that time as to whether the change was prohibited by military regulations. 

For her to now claim she could not have corrected an obvious fraud because military 

regulations prohibited her from doing so is disingenuous. If nothing else, Bradley could 

have alerted Armstrong or other employees in the Comptroller’s Unit of her change in 

circumstance and asked that her Home of Record be corrected. Her failure to do so, 

while at the same time pocketing the money, is telling.19 

Bradley also claims that after her injury she could not move to Chandler, Arizona, 

because she was placed on a medical hold which required her to remain at McConnell Air 

Force Base until she was cleared medically by a review board and that did not occur until 

April 23, 2011. We fail to see the relevance of this argument. While Bradley may have 

been required to remain at McConnell Air Force Base until her injuries were resolved, 

she was not required to falsely change her Home of Record to Chandler, Arizona, in the 

 

19 There were references throughout trial to military regulations and whether 

Bradley violated them. While certainly a violation of an agency regulation can provide 

proof of the elements of an offense, for instance, fraudulent intent, Bradley was not on 

trial for violating military regulations. See United States v. Ransom, 642 F.3d 1285, 

1291-92 (10th Cir. 2011) (although the rules and regulations of the government agency 

helped establish the underlying facts necessary to prove the crimes of wire fraud and theft 

of public money, defendant was not being held criminally liable for violating the rules 

and regulations). As the district judge aptly stated: “We’re talking about fraud here, not 

some sort of violation of Air Force regulations.” (R. Vol. 3 at 292.) “[T]he issue before 

the jury was whether the address listed by [Bradley—her father’s address—] was a false 

and material statement and was made in furtherance of a scheme to obtain money from 

the government using false [or fraudulent] pretenses.” (R. Vol. 1 at 103 n.2.) The jury 

said yes and there was sufficient evidence to support its verdict. 
- 19 - 

first place or to perpetuate the fraud by not correcting the “misunderstanding” once she 

was returned to Wichita after her injury. See supra pp. 9-11 (reasonable reliance 

discussion). 

Finally, she claims it was entirely reasonable for her to change her Home of 

Record from her apartment in Wichita to her father’s address in Chandler because at the 

same time she received her orders, her husband also learned he was going to be deployed 

overseas.20 According to her, and acknowledged by Armstrong at trial, “[s]ince [Bradley 

and her husband] were both deploying, there’s no sense of leaving a house open if you’re 

both [going to] be gone.” (R. Vol. 3 at 164.) Thus, on April 1, 2009, Bradley’s husband 

gave the apartment manager the required sixty-day notice to cancel the apartment’s lease; 

the apartment was vacated on June 27, 2009. Consequently, Bradley argues, when she 

changed her Home of Record on April 10, she knew she would not be returning to the 

Wichita apartment. 

But, once again, a physical move of belongings is required in order to justify a 

change in a guard member’s Home of Record and Bradley knew this. Yet, at the time 

Bradley changed her Home of Record on April 10, she was still living in the apartment in 

Wichita. Although she claimed to have moved belongings to a friend’s address in 

Phoenix, Arizona, in February 2009, the evidence supporting her claim was equivocal. 

Other evidence was not. She did not list her friend’s address as her Home of Record. 

 

20 His deployment was later changed to a Permanent Change in Duty Station to 

Turkey. 
- 20 - 

Instead, she listed her father’s Chandler address and, as her father testified, she had 

moved no belongings to his address.21 Moreover, and tellingly, her grandfather testified 

to having helped her move her belongings to a storage unit in Wichita in May 2009. 

And, of course, we have Bradley’s admission that she changed her Home of Record in 

order to receive increased benefits while deployed and her failure to change her Home of 

Record back to Wichita once she was required to return there after her injury. The jury 

could, and apparently did, conclude that her claimed move of belongings to Arizona did 

not occur. 

 AFFIRMED. 

Entered by the Court: 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

United States Circuit Judge 

 

21 Her father testified about it. According to him, Bradley and her husband drove 

to his house in Chandler, Arizona, for a visit in February 2009. Although they brought a 

number of items with them, he believed they left with everything they had brought. But 

he could not say for sure because he did not know exactly what they had brought to 

Arizona. He also said Bradley and her husband had visited friends during their stay in 

Arizona; those friends included Alicia Young, the friend Bradley had referenced in her 

interview with investigators. While this testimony could support a number of inferences, 

a plausible one is that Bradley left no items with Young. In any event, her father stated 

unequivocally she had not left any belongings at his address, the address she listed as her 

Home of Record.