IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-41027

Summary Calendar

SHELLY N. SANDERS; KEN PAXTON; S. A. W., a Child,

Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

ROCKEY D. WRIGHT,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:17-CV-131

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Rockey D. Wright, proceeding pro se, challenges the district court’s 

denying his motion for relief following its remanding his child-custody action

to state court after Wright removed it, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443. Wright 

claims the action was removable because he “is denied or cannot enforce” his 

constitutional rights in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 15, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 17-41027

2

Although a remand order in a removed case is ordinarily not appealable, 

such an order is appealable if the action was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1443, which permits removal in cases where constitutional rights cannot be 

enforced in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Robertson v. Ball, 534 F.2d 63, 66 

(5th Cir. 1976). On the other hand, “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a 

civil case is a jurisdictional requirement”. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 

(2007). An appellant has 30 days from “entry of the judgment or order 

appealed from” or the disposition of a timely post-judgment motion to file a 

notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) & (4)(A).

Along that line, Wright filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) 

motion to alter or amend the judgment 31 days after the court entered its 

remand order, past the 28-day motion deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Wright’s 

untimely Rule 59(e) motion became, in substance, a motion for relief under 

Rule 60(b). Harcon Barge Co., Inc. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 

667 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“If . . . the motion asks for some relief other than 

correction of a purely clerical error and is served after the ten-day limit, then 

Rule 60(b) governs its timeliness and effect.”). Wright’s notice of appeal is 

timely, therefore, only as to the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion and not the 

remand order. “We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of 

discretion.” Clark v. Davis, 850 F.3d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 2017).

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief because Wright’s 

challenge to the remand order is frivolous. Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1443 is proper only for cases involving “a limited category of [constitutional] 

rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality”. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 

U.S. 780, 791 (1966) (emphasis added); Robertson, 534 F.2d at 66 & n.5. 

Recognizing this is a child-custody action, Wright concedes none of his 

wide-ranging constitutional claims are based on racial inequality; instead, he 

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asserts the controlling law is, inter alia: “unconstitutionally repugnant . . . 

ridiculously illogical and . . . facially absurd”. Even considering his proceeding 

pro se, Wright’s assertions are irrelevant and fail to present a good-faith 

contention for removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1443. Accordingly, his 

appeal is dismissed as frivolous. Robertson, 534 F.2d at n.5. 

Moreover, in this proceeding, Wright accused state judges and 

administrators of criminal conspiracy, and insulted the federal magistrate 

judge and district judge. “This court simply will not allow liberal pleading 

rules and pro se practice to be a vehicle for abusive documents.” Theriault v. 

Silber, 579 F.2d 302, 303 (5th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, Wright is warned that 

future frivolous filings, or filings containing abusive, disparaging, or 

contemptuous language, could result in the imposition of monetary sanctions 

and limits on his access to the federal courts. Fed. R. App. P. 38; Goodyear Tire 

& Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (“Federal courts possess 

certain inherent powers, [including imposing sanctions,] not conferred by rule 

or statute, to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 

expeditious disposition of cases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

DISMISSED; WARNING ISSUED. 

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