### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 7, 200 4 S es sio n MIC HAE L WA YN E HOWEL L v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -14334 Hon. Otis Hi ggs, Jr., Judge

No. W2003-01056-SC- R11-PD - F iled Novem ber 16, 2004

This case comes before us on a mot ion to reope n a petiti on for post-conviction relief . The petitioner alleg es that he is mentally reta rded a s defined in Te nnessee Code Ann o ta ted sec tion 39-13- 203(a) (2003), and there fore ineligible f or the death penalty under St ate v. Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) and Atkins v. Virg inia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The trial court de nied the motion, finding that the petitioner failed to make a prima fac ie showing of mental re tardation sufficient to support re op e nin g his po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g , andtheCou rt of Crimi na l App e a ls af

fi rm e d th e de nia l. We reve rse the Court of

Criminal Appeals, holding that under the specific fac ts of this case, in which a petiti oner is able, for t he first ti me in his moti on to reope n his petition for post-conviction relief , to claim ineligibility

for the de ath pena lty

due to mental re tardation under Van Tran or Atkins, the motion shoul d be conside red unde r the “ colora ble claim” e videntiary

standard r ather

than the “c lear and convinc ing” standard. We a lso hold that Tennessee Code Annot at ed s ection 39-13- 203(a) (2003) clea

rly and unambig uously require s the defe ndant to have an I .Q. of seve nty or below to be c on sid e re d me ntally

re tard e d. We c on c lud e that th e pe tit ion e r’ s mo tion to reopenhis po stc on vic tio n h e ari ng se t ou t a c olo ra blec la im, thu s e nti tli ng him to an ev ide nti ary he ari ng , w ith ou t a jury , on the issue of menta l retar dation.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 P e r m iss ion to App e al; Judg m e nt of t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als is Reve rsed and Rem anded
W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J

. , d el i v er ed t he opinion of the c ourt, in which E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J r., JJ ., joined. F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., eac h fi le d c on c ur

ri ng a nddis se nti ng op ini on s.
Paul R . B ott e i and Ke lle y

J. He nry , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, Mic ha e l Wa y ne Ho we ll.
P au l G

. S u m m e r s , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l & R e p o rt e r ; M i c h a e l E

. M o o r e , S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l ; J e n n i f

e r L. Smit h, Senior Counsel, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION
Bac kgr ound
The petitioner, Michae l Wayne Howell, wa s convicted of g rand la rce ny and fe lony

murder, and on September

26, 1989, was sente nced to de ath. We aff irmed the c onviction and sentenc e of death, State v. How ell, 868 S.W .2d 238 (Tenn. 1993) , and the United States Supre me Court denied his petition for writ of ce rtiorari, Howell v. Tenne ssee, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994)

. Petitioner timelyfiled a petition for post-c onviction relief , which wa s denied by

the trial court, and the Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d that denial. H o w e llv
. St ate , N o
. 02C01-9706-CR-00200, 1997 WL 746438 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec

. 3, 1997). Petitioner filed his f irst motion to r eopen the petition f or post-convic tion re lie f o n July

9, 19 99 , c ha lle ng ing thede fi nitionof re a so na bledo ub t in str

uc tio n, th ec o n sti tution a lit y of us ing a n a ft e r- oc c ur

ri ng c on vic tio n a s a n a g g ravatin g c ir c ums ta nc e , a nd the e ff e c tiv e ne ss of

his c ou ns e l. T he tria l c ou rt de nie d themotion , th e Cou rt of Crimi na l A pp e a ls a ff

irme d th e tria l c ou rt , and this Court denied the pe titioner’s application for permission t o appeal. Petitioner filed this second motion to reopen h i s p et i tion for post-conviction re lief on De c e mbe r 3 , 200 2, arg uin g that bec aus e he is me ntally re tard e d his de a th se nte nc e vio late s th e state and fe dera l constituti ons under State v. V an Tran, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) , and Atkins v. Virg inia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). He asserts that the trial court e rre d in finding that he had not made a prima f acie showing that he is mentally reta rded and in applying an incorr ect standa rd of r eview.

I n support of his motion to reopen, t h e petitioner filed the a ffidavit of D r. Daniel Gra nt, a licensed psy cholog ist and board certified c linical neuropsy cholog ist who evaluate d the petitioner. Dr. Gr ant testified by

aff idavit that he conduc ted a c linical i n t er v i ew an d administered a series of t es t s an dp ro ce d u re s t o as s es s t h e pe t i t i o n er ’s l ev el o f i n t el l i gen ce , ad ap t i v e f u n ct i o n i n g, l an gu age skill s , a n dme mo ry

f u n c ti o n in g
. H e a ls o r e v ie w e dn u me r o u s r e c o r d s p e rtain in g to th e p etitioner. Dr. Gr ant testified that, bec ause an I .Q. scoreis ge nera lly thought to involve an er

ror of measure ment o f ap p r o x i m a t e l y f

i v e p o i n t s , a n I. Q

. o f s e v e n t y i s c o n s i d e r e dt o r e p r e s e n ta b a n do r z o n e o f s i x t yfive to seve nty -five. D r. Grant stated that on the Wechsler A dult I ntellige nce Scale - Third Edition ( “ W A IS

- II I” ) , t h e p e t i t i o n e r o b t a i n e d a v e r b a l I. Q

. o f

s e v e n t y- f i v e , a p e r f o r m a n c e I. Q

. o f

s e v e n t yfive, and a full scale I .Q. of seventy -three ; on the S tanford- Bine t Intellige nce Test - F ourth Edition, he ac hieved a

composite scoreof six ty -two; and on the Compreh en s i v e Te st of Nonver bal In t e l l i g e n c e ( “ C T O N I” ) , h e h a d a n o n v e r b a l I. Q

. o f s i x t y- s e v e n , a

p i c t o r i a l n o n v e r

b a l I. Q

. o f s e v e n t y, and a g eo me tric n o n v e r

b a l I

. Q

. o f s ixty - e ig h t. D r
. G r a n t s tate d th a t it w a s h is o p in io n , to a rea sonable de g reeof psy cholog ical ce rtainty , that the petitioner’s le vel of intellec tual functioning is with inth e r e ta

r d e dr a n g e o f

in te ll ig e n c e
. D r
. G r a n t f u rth e r s a idth a t th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s me ntal reta rdation manife sted within the developmenta l pe riod and also that the petitioner ha s signific antI nt er es t i ng l y , howev er , dur i ng bot h t he po s t

- convi ct i on hear i ng and t he s ent enc i ng p has e of hi s t r i al 1 the p e tit io n e r p re se n te d the tes tim o n y o f D r. P h ill ip J . M u rp h y, a c linic a l p syc h o lo g ist, sta ting tha t t h e p e tit io n e r’s full
s cal e I

. Q

. was ni net y - one. H owel l v. St at e, N o. 02C 01

- 97 06

- C R

- 00 20 0, 199 7 W L 74 64 38 , at * 7 (T enn
. Cri m. A pp
. D ec. 3 , 1 9 9 7 ).

W i t h a l l due r es pect t o t he t r i al cour t an d C hi ef Ju s t i ce D r owo t a’ s di s s ent , t he af f i davi t of D r
. G r ant , f

i l ed 2

a lo n g w ith the p e tit io n to re o p e n p o st-co n v ic tio n p ro c e e d ing s, c le a rly sta te d , i n p e rtine n t p a rt:

M r. H o well i s m ent al l y ret arde d as i nd i cat ed by hi s Full Sca l e IQ of 7 3 o n t he W A IS- II I, hi s Stanfo rd B i net

- Fourt h Ed i t i on Co mp o si t e (s t andar d s core ) of 62, an d hi s Co mp r ehe ns i ve T es t of N onver bal I nt e l l i g e n c e I W of

67

. Al l of

t h e s e s c or e s me e t t h e c r i t e r i a for s i g n i f i c a n t l y s u ba v e r a g e g e n e r al i nt el l ect ual f

unct i o ni ng as evi d enced by an i nt el l i gence q uo t i ent (IQ ) o f 7 3 or b el o w when t he st and ard
e rr o r o f m e a su re m e n t i s c o n sid e re d

. (A ff id a v it o f D r.G ra n t., a t ¶ 2 2 .)

M r
. H owel l ha s s i gn i f

i can t de f i ci t s i n a dapt i ve behav i or. For exa mp l e, comm un i cat i on s ki l l s meas ur ed b y O ral and W ri t t en Langua ge Sc al es pl aced hi s l i st eni ng C o m p rehensi o n s ki l l s at a s t and ard sco re of 69 ( s e c on d pe r c e n t i l e ) , O r a l Ex pr e s s i on s t a n da r d s c or e 68 ( s e c on d pe r c e n t i l e ) a n d a n O r al C o m p o site s ta n d a rd sc o re o f 6 6 (first p e rc e n til e ) a re sign ifi c a n tly im p a ire d . (A ff id a v it o f D r. G ra n t, at ¶23 ).

H is p e rfo rm a n c e o n the M a n a g ing M o n e y su b te st o f t h e In d e p e n d e n t L ivin g S c a le p la c e d his a b ili ty t o manag e money , do m onet ar y ca l cul at i ons , pay bi l l s an d t ake pre cau t i ons wi t h money at a s t and ard
score o f 55

. M r. H o well ’ s p erfo rma nce o n t hese t est s i nd i cat e hi s funct i o nal acad em i c ski l l s are (c o n tinu e d ...) -3- defic its in adaptive beha vior. 1
Wit hout holdin g an evide ntiary hearing, the trial court de nied the petitioner’ s motion, finding that, even taking the petitioner’s a lleg ations as true, hedid not meet the statutory criteria for me ntal reta rdation. The trial court he ld:
T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed § 3 9 -1 3 -2 0 3 (a )( 1 ) s p ec i fi ca l l y s t at es t h ats u b av er age intellectual functioning is e vidence d by a functional intelligenc e I .Q. of seventy (70) or be low

. Th is statut e do e s no t in a ny way se t fo rth that a nd [sic ] I .Q

. of se ve nty is c on sid e re d to re pr e se nt a bandor z on e of

65 to 7 5. T. C.A . § 3[9]- 13 -2 03 (a )( 1) is clea r and unambiguous and there is no need to debate any further interpre tation. (citing State v. Delling er, 79 S.W .3d 458 (Tenn. 2002); J ackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tenn. 2001) ). The t ri al co u rt found that all threeof the pe titioner’s I .Q. score s on the WAI S-I I I wer e hig her than the scoreof seve nty or below r equire d to prove menta l retar dation. The trial court he ld: [T] he Petitioner has failed to me et the statutory require ments set forth in Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 39- 13-203, adopte d by the Court in Van Tran. He does not have a n I

. Q

. o f

7 0 o r b e lo w , h e h a s n o t m a n if e s te dth e r e q u is it e d e f

ic it s ina d ap tive behavior , nor has he put forth proof that mental re tardation manifested itself bef ore the ag e of 18. The Petitioner has f ailed to make a

p ri m a facie ca se that he w as 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2 si gni f i cant l y i m p ai red. (A f

f i d avi t of D r. G rant , at ¶ 2 4 ).

H i s p erfo rma nce o n t he Indep end ent Livi ng Skil l s t est placed hi s ad ap t i ve ski l l s at a St and ard sco re o f 61 (. 9 pe rcent i l e) whi ch i s cl earl y wi t hi n t he ret arde d range f o r adap t i ve b ehavi o r and m eet s t he cri t eri a as s et fo rt h by t he A A M R

. ( A f f i d avi t of D r. G rant , at ¶ 2 5 ).

M r
. H owe l l ’ s me n t al r et ar dat i on ma n i fes t ed wi t h i n t h e dev el opmen t al pe r i od a s n ot ed i n h i s s ch ool
reco rds and d evel o p m ent al hi st o ry where t here are numero us i nd i cat i o ns o f m ent al ret arda t i o n. M r. H o well f ai l ed and repea t ed t he f i rs t grad e. In t he second grade, M r. H o well was passed t o t he t hi rd gr ade i n s pi t e of

r ece i vi ng t hr ee D ’ s an d t hr ee F’ s
. B y t he four t h gr ade, M r
. H owel l ’ s gr ades i ncl uded six F ’s an d e igh t D ’s. H e re c e ive d a “so c ia l p ro m o tio n ” to the fi fth g ra d e . H e c o n tinu e d to stru g g le thr o u g h s c h o o l u n til h e a rr ive d a t h igh s c h o o l. M r. H o w e ll faile d a n d r e p e a te d th e nin th g ra d e , o n ly to fail a se c o n d ti m e . R a the r tha n a ttem p t g ra d e n ine a th ird tim e , M r. H o w e ll d id n o t re tur n to sc h o o l. At t h e en d of

h i s s ec on d a t t empt a t g r ade n i n e, M r
. H owe l l was ranked 1 0 5 i n a c l as s of 106. th (A f f i d avi t of D r. G rant , at ¶ 2 1 ).

H is [M r. H o w e ll’ s] sc h o o l re c o rd s a n d his d e v e lo p m e n ta l histo ry c le a rly ind ic a te he w a s m e n ta lly ret arde d be fo re t he age o f 18

. ( A f f i d avi t of D r. G rant , at ¶ 2 6 ).

-4- mentally reta rded at the time he committed the offe nses for which he wa s convicted. Hedo e s n ot qualif

y a s a men ta lly re tard e d de fe nd a nt in a c c or danc e wi th the c ri te ri a se t f orth i n T e nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d § 39 -1 3- 20 3, a nda s su c h, his de a th p e na lty is not unc onstitut ional. This Motion to Re -Ope n Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is without m erit and should be dismissed without the bene fit of a he aring

. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirme d the trial co u rt , an d we g rante d the petitioner pe rm iss ionto a

pp e a l.
Ana lys is
I n 1990, the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly enacted leg islation prohibiti ng the execution of mentally reta rded individuals. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 ( 2003). In 2001 this Court held that the statute wa s not intended by the Gene ral Asse mbly

to be g iven re troac tive application. Van Tr an v. State, 6 S.W .3d 790, 798-799 (Tenn. 2001) . There fore , as the pe titioner in Van Tran had bee n convicted prior to the ena ctment of the statute, hecould not rely upon the st at u t e fo r re l i ef. I d. at 799. Howeve r, we also held i n Van Tran that the ex ecution of mentally reta rded individuals violated c on sti tution a l pr oh ibi tio ns a g a ins t c ru e l a ndun us ua l pu nis hme nt. I d. a t 81 1. I n a dd iti on , w hil e rec og nizi ng that the statute did not protect those pe rsons convicte d prior to its enac tment, this C ourt held that t h i s newly

rec og nized constitut ional rig ht “war rants re troac tive application to ca ses on collater al re view.” 66 S.W.3d at 811. Subsequent to our dec ision i n Van Tr an, the United States Supreme Court similarly

held in Atkins v. V irg inia that the execution of mentally reta rded pe rsons is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eig hth A mendment. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).Chi ef Jus t i ce D r owo t a’ s d i s s ent ass er t s t hat t he t r i al cour t “ s cr upul ous l y ” f ol l owed t he mandat es of V an T r an 3

a n d Te n n e s s e e Cod e An n ot a t e d s e c t i on 39- 13

- 20 3 i n r e a c h i n g i t s co n c l u s i on t h a t t h e pe t i t i on e r h a d n ot ma de a pr i ma fac ie sh o w ing o f m e n ta l re ta rd a tio n
. T h is d isse n t co n c lud e s tha t t h e trial c o u rt d id n o t a b u s e i ts d isc re tio n w h e n it di s mi s s ed t he pet i t i on t o re op en. W e n ot e, howev er , t hat a t r i al co ur t ab us es i t s d i s cr et i on i f i t ap pl i es “a n i ncor r ect l ega l sta n d a rd , o r re a c h e [s ] a d e c isio n w h ic h is a g a ins t lo g ic o r re a so n ing tha t [c a u se s] a n inj u stice to the p a rty c o m p la inin g .” Spi cer v. St at e, 12 S. W

. 3d 43 8, 44 3 (T enn
. 200 0)( ci t at i ons om i t t ed). I n t hi s ca s e, t he t r i al cour t ne ver i ndi cat ed wha t l ega l s t andar d i t ha d app l i ed i n mak i ng i t s det er mi nat i on t hat t he af f i davi t s s ubmi t t ed i n s uppo r t of t he pet i t i on t o re op en p o st-co n v ic tio n p ro c e e d ing s h a d faile d to se t fo rth a p rim a fac ie sh o w ing o f m e n ta l re ta rd a tio n . T h e re fo re , w e fi n d it i m p o ss i b l e t o de t erm i ne whet her t he t ri al co urt ab used i t s d i scr et i o n wi t ho ut know i ng whet her i t ap p l i ed t he “ cl ear and
c o n v inc ing e v id e n c e ” sta n d a rd o r th e “c o lo ra b le c la im ” sta n d a rd in e v a lua ting the p e tit io n
. -5- Van Tr an, just as the case before us today , involved a petiti oner who had been convicte d prior to e na c tme nt o f the statut e , bu t wh o wa s no w se e kin g po st- c on vic tio n re lie f b a se d u po n h is c la im of mental re tardation and our holding that executing me ntally reta rded i n dividuals was unconstitutional. W e re cog nized t h at , under the statutory scheme for obtaining post-conviction relief , reope ning a

petition for post-conviction re lief wa s permissible if the claim “is based upon the ruling of an a

ppellate c ourt establishing a constitutional rig ht that was not rec og nized at the time of trial, if re trospective a

pplication of that ri gh t i s re quired.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-117(a )(1) (2003); Van Tran 6 S.W.3d at 811-812. Ther efor e, in Van Tran, we direc ted the trial c ourt to “hea r the petitioner’s motion to reope n and make a dete rmination as to the petitioner’s a lleg ed mental re tard a tio n. ” 66 S.W. 3da t 81 2. We c on c lud e d th a t a lth ou gh se c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 03 didno t app ly re t ro ac t i vely

to the petitioner’s c ase, the appropriate criteria for evaluating his claim of mental reta rdation wer e those set forth within the statute. Van Tr an, 6 S.W.3d at 812. However , an issue wedidno t a ddre ss i n V a n T ran w a s the app ro priate stand ard by wh ic h thetria l c ou rt wo ulde va luate the petitioner’s claim under those criteria t o determine if he had pled a prima facie case. That is the issue we must now addr ess in the p re s en t case in order to de termine whe ther the pe titioner has alleg ed a prima fac ie case of mental retardation to support reope ning his petition for post-conviction relief

. Respectf

ully , in our vi ew, neither of the di ssenting opinions comes to g rips with this i ssue. 3 Petitioner prese nts severa l arg uments in this reg ard, and we will addre ss eac h in turn. The thrust of these a

rg uments can besummarized as focusing on two main points: 1) The definition of me ntal re tard a tio n app lie d to c apit a l de fe nd a nts ha s b e e n in te rp re te d to o rig idl y by thelow e r c ou rt s; and 2) Thestatutory

dictates of the Post-Convi ction Procedur es Ac t have ope rate d to deprive the pe tit ion e r o f a fair op po rtun ity to lit ig a te his c la im that he is ine lig ibl e fo r the de a th p e na lty du e to mental re tardation. Petitioner arg u es t h at t he re quirement of an I .Q. of seve nty or below, a s contained in the de fi nition of me ntal re tard a tio n in Ten ne sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 03 (a ) ( 20 03 ), sh ou ld not be interpre ted as a

“brig ht-line” rule , but rather should be co n s t ru ed t o make a llowance for standard e rror s of measur ement in the testing proce ss so that a person w ith an I .Q. scoreabove seventy could, in some circ umstances, still be consider ed menta l ly reta rded. A dditionally , the pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t hepr e se nte d a prima fa c ie sh ow ing of

me ntal r e tard a tio n inhis motionto reope n post-conviction proc eeding s, but that the trial court a pplied an incor

rec t standard of revie w and subseque ntly

denied the motion without benef i t o f an evide ntiary

hearing. H e conte nds by-6-

applyin g a “c lear

and convinc ing e vidence ” standa rd in revie wing his moti on, rathe r than the “col o rable claim” standa

rd found in Te nnessee Supreme Court Rule 28 sec tion 6(B) (6), the trial court de nied him due proc ess.
I n response , the State ar g ues that the de finition of mental reta rdation found in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-203( a) c learly an d u n ambi g uously

require s an I .Q. of seve nty or below. The ref

ore, the statute should not be interpre ted to ma ke allowanc e for any

standard e rror

of measure ment or other c ircumstances wh er eb y a person with an I .Q. above seventy could be considere d mentally

reta rded.
The State further a

rg ues that a diff

ere nt standard a

pplies when e valu ati ng a motion to reopen po st- c on vic tio n p roceedi ng s r a the r than an o ri g inal pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f. Th e State asserts that the “cle ar and convincing evidenc e” standard, se t forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-30-117( a)( 4) is the corr ect standard in this instance and was appropriately applied by the tria l c ou rt

. Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-203(a) and th e De

finiti on of Mental R etardation We turn first to petitioner’s ar g ument that the def inition of mental retar dation, as contained in the applicable portion of the Te nnessee Code, has bee n misi n t er prete d by the lower

courts. As it a pp lie s to a

de fe nd a nt i n a

c apit a l pr os e c uti on , th e te rm me ntal re tard a tio n is de fi ne d b y thestate le g isl a tur e a s f

oll ow s: ( 1 ) S i g n i f

i c a n t l y s u b a v e r a g e g e n e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l f u n c t i o n i n g a s e v i d e n c e db y a functional intellig encequotient (I .Q.) of se venty or below; and (2) De ficits in adaptive be havior; and (3) Thement al retardation must have be en manife sted during the deve lopmental period , or by

eig hteen ( 18) y ear s of ag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-203(a ) (2003)

. This definition sets out a three- prong test to be utiliz ed by a court in de termining whether a capital de fendant is mentallyreta rded and, there fore , ineligible f or the de ath pena lty . The pe titioner arg ue s th a t the statut e ’s inc lus ionof a n I .Q . s c or e of

se ve nty a s a “ brig ht- lin e ” c uto ff

sc or e is contra ry to the prevai ling view s of mental re tardation in the field of psy cholog y . The pe titioner’s witness, D r
. G r a n t, s tate d in h is a f f a d a v it th a t a n I

. Q

. s c o r e w il l in v o lv e a n e rr o r me a s u r e me nt of approximately

five points a nd, there fore , the require ment of an I .Q. of seventy or below, a s contained in the Tenne ssee statute, should be inter prete d as re prese nting a

rang e of sc ores be tween sixty -five and seve nty -five or

below.
Wit hout question, mental retar dation is a difficult condition to acc urate ly define . The United State s Su pr e me Cou rt , inAtkin s v . V ir gini a, adm it ted as muc h, statin g : “ [t]o th e e xten t th e reisSe e A t ki ns, 5 3 6 U

. S. at n. 3 (20 0 2 ) ( q uo t i ng bo t h t he A m eri can A ss o ci at i o n on M ent al R et arda t i o n and t he 4 A m eri can P sy chi at ri c A ss o ci at i o n de f i ni t i o n of m ent al ret arda t i o n. ).

-7- serious disag ree ment about the execution of menta lly reta rded offe nders, it is in determining which of fe nd e rs arein f

a c t r e tard e d. ” 53 6 U. S. a t 31 7. Ge ne rally a c c e pte d d e fi nition s w ith in the sc ie nti fi c community

will no doubt be refine d as our knowle dg e in this area advanc es. At pre sent howeve r, themos t w ide ly

re c og nize d d e fi nitio ns of men ta l r e tard a tio n in c lud e tw o b a sic c ha ra c te ri sti c s: signific antly

subaver ag e int ellectua l functioning acc ompanied by related limitations in two or more adapt i ve skill area s (such a s self-c are , communication, or socia l skill s), and manif estation of the condition beforeag e 18. 4
Th e qu e sti o n b e c o m e s h o w t o p r o v i d e v a l i dg u i d e l i n e s t o b e u s e db y t h e c o u rt s in determining whe n a def

endant’ s intellectual func tioning is “subave rag e.” In At k i n s , t h e United States Supreme Court left it to the individual states to adopt appropriate d ef i n itions of mental re tard a tio n. Th e Cou rt

state d th a t “ [n]ot

a ll p e op le wh o c la im t o b e me ntally re tard e d w ill be so impaired a s to fall within the rang e of me ntally reta rded of fenders about whom ther e is a national consensus.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. There fore , the Court left “to the State[s] t he task of de veloping appropriate way s to enforc e the c onstitut ional re s triction upon [t heir] execution of sentence s.” I d. (quoting For d v. Wainwrig ht, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (U.S. 1986)).
Whil e the pe titioner arg ues t hat t he score of seventy should be interpr eted, unde r our statute, to include a r ang e of sc ores be tween sixty -five and seventy -five, w e disag ree
. A basic principle of statutory construction is that if the lang uag e of the statute is clear and unambig uous, then a court shall apply its plain meaning

. See Boarman v. J aynes, 109 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tenn. 2003) ; L avin v. J ordan, 16 S.W .3d 362, 365 (Tenn. 2000). I n the prese nt c ase, we f ind the lang uag e of the statute perfec tly clea r and unambiguous – to be c onsidered me ntally reta rded, a defe ndant must have an I .Q. of seventy or below. The statute makes no ref ere nce to a standard e rror of mea surement in the test scor es nor c onsideration of any ra n ge of scores a

bove the sc ore of seventy . There fore , we de cline to “r ead in” such provisi ons, as the pe titioner would have us to do, in order to e x tend the cove rag e of the statute. See J ackson v. Gene ral Motors Corp., 60 S.W .3d 800, 804 (Tenn. 2001) (“L eg islative intent or purpose is t o be asc ertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meani n g o f t h e lang uag e used, w ithout forced or subtle construction that would limit or e xten d th e me a nin g of

thela ng ua g e .” ) ( qu oti ng Hambl e n Co un ty Ed uc . A ss’ n v
. Hambl e n Co un ty Bd. of Educ., 892 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). The leg islature, if it had desired, was fre e to include provisions establishing a rang e of I .Q. score s that wou l d take into ac count measur ement er rors in the testing proce ss. I t could also have c ho se n to e xclu de a ny

re fe re nc e to s pe c if

ic sc or e s a lto g e the r. Ho we ve r, i t didne ith e r. I ns te a d, it e na c te d th e c ur

re nt s tatut e wh ic h p ro vid e s a c le ar a nd ob

je c tiv e g uid e lin e to b e fo llo we d b y c ou rt s when a pply ing the three -prong test as set out in Tennesse e Code Annotated 39-13-203( a) ( 2003).
Further e vidence that the leg islature intended to cr eate such a bright line r ule may be foundSe e, e
. g
. , Cal

. Pen al Code § 1376 (a) (W est 2 0 04) ( def i n i n g me n t al r et ar dat i on a s “ t h e con di t i on of 5 si gni f i cant l y s ub average general i nt el l ect ual f unct i o ni ng exi st i ng co ncurrent l y wi t h de f i ci t s i n ad ap t i ve b ehavi o r)

.
Se e, e. g
. , K y
. Rev

. St at

. An n
. § 532. 130( 2) ( 2004) ( r equ i r i n g “ an i n t el l i g en ce qu ot i en t ( I

. . Q

. ) of s ev en t y ( 70) 6

o r bel o w” t o be co nsi d ered m ent al l y ret arde d ); M urphy v. Stat e, 54 P

. 3 d 5 5 6 , 56 8 (O kl a. C ri m
. A p p
. 20 0 2 ) ( requir i ng d e fen d a n t c la im ing m e n ta l r e ta rd a tio n to s h o w a n I .Q . o f se v e n ty o r b e lo w “a s re flec te d b y a t l e a st o n e ” sc ie n tif ic a lly
reco gni zed t est ). -8- by e xami nin g the statut ory de fi nition of me ntal r e tard a tio n a s a pp lie d intheso c ia l se rv ic e s c on te xt. Th is d e fi nition , a

pp lic ableto i nd ivi du a ls s e e kin g so c ia l se rv ic e s o r d isa bil ity be ne fi ts, is se t ou t in Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 3 3- 1- 10 1 ( 17 ) andpr ov ide s:

“ Me ntal r e tard a tio n” me a ns su bs ta nti a l li mit a tio ns in f un c tio nin g : (A ) A s sh ow n b y

sig nif ic a ntl y su b- a ve ra g e int e lle c tual f un c tio nin g that e xists concur re n t l y wi th relate d imitations in two (2) or moreof the following adaptive skill areas: c ommunication, self-c are , home living, soc ial skills, commun it y u s e, selfdirec tion, health and saf

ety , functional a cade mics, leisure, and work; and (B ) That a

re manifested be fore eig hteen ( 18) y ear s of ag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 33- 1-101(17) (2003 Supp.)
As is e vid e nt, thi s st a tut e c on ta ins no re fe re nc e to nu me ri c a l I .Q

. sc or e s a ndis the re fo rele ss restric ti v eth anT e n n e s s e eCo d eA n n otated sec tion 39-13-203(a ). Additionally , section 33-1- 101(17) wa s ine xiste nc e a t th e tim e thele g isl a tur e e na c te d s e c ti on 39 -1 3- 20 3( a ). Th e re fo re , w e mus t presume the leg islature wa s awa re of section 33-1-101( 17), y et purposely chose to a dopt a diffe rent de fi nitionof

me ntal r e tard a tio n to be applie d inthec ri min a l c on te xt. T hat th e tw o s tatut e s b oth touch upon the same subject matter, y et contain dissimi lar provisions, is indicative of a le g islative intent to have a differ ent, more restric tive, standard apply to defe ndants in a ca

pital prosecution. The le g isl a tur e ’s de c isi on to d e marc a te a n I .Q . s c or e of se ve nty or be low in titl e 39 , y e t no t to do so in title 33, clearly

evidenc es this differing le g islative intent with respe ct t o the t wo sec tions of the code. See State v. L ewis, 958 S.W .2d 736, 739 (1997) (stating that “[w]hen one statute contains a g iven provision, the omission of the same provision from a simil ar statute is sig nificant to show a dif fer ent intent exi sted.”) ( citing State v. D avis, 654 S.W .2d 688, 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) ).
Whil e so me state s h a ve a do pte d d e fi nition s o f m e ntal r e tard a tio n th a t do no t in c lud e sp e c if ic nu me ri c a l I .Q . s c or e s, oth e r s tate s e mpl oy de fi nition s th a t, s imi lar t o T e nn e ssee, incl ud e sp e c if ic 5 I .Q. score s as a de terminative fa ctor. T h er ef o re , while thereappea

rs to be no g ener al national 6
consensus re g arding the use of nume rica l I .Q. s core s as a fac tor in determining mental r etar dation, the use of suc h score s to establish a brig ht-line cutoff point for making this dete rm ination is not contrary t o ei t h er the Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins v. Virginia or with those definitions of mental reta

rdation adopted by sever al other states. The Tenne ssee leg islature has se en fit to adopt a scor e of se venty

or below a s a dete rminative fa ctor in finding a pe rson mentally reta rded f or purposes of c arry ing out a capital se ntence . Ba sed upon our analy sis, we see no rea son to question the validity

of such an approa ch.-9-

Th e pe tit ion e r also arg ue s th a t th e tr ial cou rt a ndtheCou rt of Crimi na l A pp e a ls e rr e d in relying sole ly

upon the results of the WAI S-I I I I .Q. test in making their dete rminations, while failing to even mention the other two I .Q. tests which he w as administere d.
The statute does not pr ovide a clea r direc tive reg arding which particula r tes t o r t esting method is to be used. The WAI S-I I I test has bee n called “ the standar d instrumen t i n the United Sta t es fo r assessing intellec tual functioning .” Atkins, 536 U.S. at n.5. Howe ver, the re is nothing in the rec ord to indicate that other tests, such as the Stanford- Bine t I ntellige nce T est - F ourth Edition, or the CTO NI are no t als o ac c ur a te I .Q . tes ts. A co urt may c e rt a inl y g ive mor e we ig ht t o o ne te st, bu t sh ou ld d o s o o nly

a ft e r f ull y a na ly zing a ndc on sid e ri ng a ll e vid e nc e pr e sen ted . As w e wi ll ex p l ai n m o re f

ully here in, under the pa

rticular f acts of the prese nt case , we hold the pe titioner’s motion shoul d be re viewed a pply ing the colora

ble claim standa

rd, see Tenn. Sup. Ct . R. 28 § 2(H), wh ic h e ntails de te rm ini ng wh e the r the c la im, if take n a s tr

ue , v ie we d inthelig ht m os t f a vo ra bleto petitioner, would entit le hi m to relief

. A review under this standard would nec essarily include g iving full and fair consider ation to all tests administ ere d to the petitioner.

App ro pr iat e Sta nda rd

of Re v ie w and

Due Pr oc e ss Under the Post-Conviction Procedures Act
We n ow a ddre ss pet it ion e r’ s se c on d main p oin t - that th e statut ory dic tate s o f the Pos tCon vic tio n Pr oc e du re s A ct w or k to de privehim , b e c aus e of his un iqu e c ir c ums ta nc e s, of a fair opportu n i t y to liti g ate his claim that he is mentally reta rded and there fore ineligible f or ca pital pu nis hme nt.
The United States Supreme Court rec ommended, in Case v. Ne braska , 381 U.S. 336 (1965), that the states createpos t -c o n v i ct i o n p ro ce d u re s fo r a d d re s s i n g al l ege dco n s t i t utional error s occur ring durin g th e c o n v ic ti o n p r o c e s s ino r d e r to s u p p le me n t h ab e a s c o rp u s r e me d ie s
. T h e G e n e ral Assembly of Tenne ssee responde d to that rec ommendation in 1967 by enac ting the Post-Conviction Procedur es Ac t. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30- 101 et seq. (2003) ; see a lso Burf ord v. State, 845 S.W .2d 204, 206 (Tenn. 1992)

. Under the Act, a prisoner may file a petition for post conviction relief with the cler

k of the court whe re the conviction occ urre d, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-104(a ) (2003) , and “[ r]elief shall be g rante d when the conviction or sentenc e is void or voidable beca use of the abridgme nt in any way of a n y ri gh t gu ar antee d by the constitution of this st ate or the Constitut ion of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 (2003). In order for a hearing to be g rante d, the petition must assert a “ c olo ra ble c la im. ” Se e B urne tt v. State , 92 S.W. 3d 40 3, 40 6 (T e nn
. 20 02 ). As previou sly dis c us se d, a

c olo ra blec la im i s de fi ne d a s “ ‘a c la im that, i f t ake n a s tr

ue , inthelig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the petitioner, would entitle petitioner to re lief under the Post-Convic tion Procedure Act.’” I d. (quoting Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(H)). I f a pe titioner makes this initi al colora ble claim to re lief, an evidentiary

hearing is he ld at which the pe titioner must prove the alleg ations by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) (2003).-10-

Af te r a po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g ha s b e e n c omp le te d a nd re lie f ha s be e n de nie d, a s in this case , a petitioner may

move to reope n his petition for post-conviction relief under the limi ted circ umstances se t out in Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-30-117 (2003). This statute provides on ly thr e e g ro un ds fo r re op e nin g po st- c on vic tio n pro c e e din g s: 1) a ne w c on sti tution a l rig ht that is g iven re troac tive application, 2) new scientific e vidence of ac tual innocenc e, and 3) evidenc e of an improperly

enhanc ed sente nce. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-117(a )(1) -(3) (2003); Harris v. S tate, 10 2 S. W.3 d 5 87 , 59 1 (T e nn
. 20 03 ). Ad dition a lly , the statut e re qu ir e s that “ [i]t app e ar[] that th e fa c ts un de rl y ing thec la im, if

true , w ou ld e sta

bli sh by c le ar a nd c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that th e pe tit ion e r i s entitle d t o h av e t he convic tion set aside or the se ntence reduc ed.” T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30- 117(a) (4) ( 2003).
As can be s een, defe ndants petitioning for post-conviction re lief ar e held to more stringe nt stand ard s a s th e y

pr oc e e d f urthe r alon g in thi s pr oc e ss. Th e y mus t pr e se nt o nly

a “ c olo ra blec la im” to r e lie f i n an o ri g inal pe tit ion , b ut i n a motionto r e op en a po st -co nv ic tio n p ro c e e din g the y mus t pr e se nt f a c ts w hic h “ wo ulde sta

bli shby c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nce” th at the y aree nti tle d to relief . I d. These prog ressively highe r standards attempt to balance the State’s interest in maintaining the finality

of judg ments with a petitioner’s int er es t in attacking a possibly unconstitutional conviction or sente nce.
I n the present case , the petit ioner has moved t o reope n his post-conviction proce eding s on the g ro un d that he ha s a ne w c on sti tution a l ri g ht - the ri g ht o f a me ntally re tard e d in div idu a l no t to be executed - and that this rig ht was given retroa ctive application. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 203(a) (2003); State v. Van Tran, 66 S.W .2d 790 (Tenn. 2001). I n support of his motion to reope n, he fi le d th e a ff

idavit of Dr . D a nie l G rant, wh o s tate d th a t the pe tit ion e r’ s sco re s o n v ari ou s I .Q . te sts ra n ged b et we en a l o w o f s i x t y -t wo o n t h e S t an fo rd Bi n etI n t el l i gen ce T es t- Fo u rt h E d i t i o n , t o a h i gh of se ve nty -f iveon theWec hs le r A du lt Inte lli g e nc e Sc a le - T hir d E dition . T he se sc or e s, a lon g wi th other fa ctors, led Dr . Grant to opine that the petitioner wa s mentally reta rded.
Neve rtheless, the tria l court held that the petitioner had failed to make a prima fac ie showing that he wa s mentally reta

rded and denied him an e videntiary hearing. Petitioner a

rg ues that the trial c ou rt c omm itt e d a c on sti tution a l er ro r by app lying the “ c le ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e ” stand ardin e va luatin g his motionto reopenhis po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ionins te a d o f the “ c olo ra blec la im” standard. Petitioner asserts that, beca use a person who now raises the i ssue of mental re tardation for the first time in a petition for post-c onviction re l i ef is, under Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 28 section 6(B )(6) , held only to a “c olorable c laim” s tandar d, he has been de nied due pr ocess by being require d to present “ clea

r and c onvincing evidence” o f m ental re tardation, when he ha d no notice prior to V a n T ran andAtkin s th a t a men tal ly re tard e d p e rs on wa s c on sti tution a lly ine lig ibl e to re c e ivec apit a l pu nis hme nt. We have p r e v iously

rec og nized that the State has no duty to enac t post-conviction proce dures and that the opportunity

to collatera lly

attack c onstitu t i onal violations occurring in the c onviction proce ss is not a fundamental right. See Seals v. State, 23 S.W .3d 272, 277 (Tenn. 2000) ; Burf ord, 845 S.W .2d at 2 0 7. The fundamental rig ht of due proc ess is, howeve r, an ove r-a rching issue that-11-

has bee n rec og nized as a conce rn in post-c onviction proce eding s. See B urfor d, 845 S.W .2d at 207. What ex actly

is require d in order to c omply with due proc ess in any g iven situatio n is often a dif fi c ult qu e sti on . Se e Se a ls v . St a te , 2 3 S. W.3 d 2 72 , 2 77 (T e nn
. 20 00 ) (s tatin g that “ Du e pr oc e ss is flexi ble and c alls for such proce dural protections as the pa rticular situation demands.”)( quoting Phill ips v. St ate B d. of Reg ents, 863 S.W .2d 45, 50 (Tenn. 1993)). We have rec og nized that due proce ss require s a def

endant ha ve “‘ an opportu n i t y to be hea

rd at a meaning ful time and in a meaning ful manner ,” House v. State, 911 S.W .2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995) (quot ing Mathews v. Eldridg e, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)) . Also, and perhaps mos t importantly , we recog nize that due proce ss “embodies the c oncept of fundame ntal fairne ss.” Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 277.
Th is C ou rt

ha s p re vio us ly

c arv e d out exc e pti on s to the te c hn ic a l r e qu ir e me nts of thePos tConviction P roce dures Ac t in order to prote ct petitioners’ rights to due p ro ce s s . I n Burford, we re c og nize d t hat ide nti fi c a tio n o f the pr e c isedic tate s o f d ue pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s c on sid e ratio n o f b oth the g overnme ntal interests involved and the private interes t s aff ecte d by the offic ial action. 845 S.W .2d at 207 (c iting Fusari v. Steinberg , 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975)). We he ld that the petitioner’s interest in attac king his c onviction and sentenc ing on c onstitut ional g rounds was g reater than the state’s intere st in preventing litigation of stale or fra udulent claims wher e the pe titioner was for ced to wa i t to bring his post-conviction claim until underlying c onvictions were decla red inva lid, at which time the thre e-y ear

statute of l imitations for bringing post-conviction claims had already run. I d. at 209. See also Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 812 (holding that considerations of “fundamental fairne ss” re quired that the pe titioner have a meaning ful opportunity to raise his substantive constitutiona l claim despite being contra ry to the “tec hnical” mandates of the Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t and Sup re m e C ourt Rule 28 g overning waiver of issues); Will iams v. State, 44 S.W .3d 464 (T en n
. 2 001) (holding that attorney misrepre sentation may

toll the post-conviction statute of li mitations despite t he presence of st atutory lang uag e st ating that the statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any rea son); Seals v. State, 23 S.W .3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) (mental incompe tency may toll st atute of limitations despite anti-tolling lang uag e).
I n these prior case s, we have balanced the State’s intere st ag ainst the private inter est at stake. I n Seals we obse rved that in determining what proc edura l due proc ess p ro t ections a particular situation demands we should consider : 1) the private intere st involved; 2) the risk of er roneous depr i v at i o n o f t he intere st; and 3) the g overnme nt’s interests, including fiscal or administrative burdens. Sea ls, 23 S.W .3d at 277. I n this case , the State has a leg itimate and strong interest in the finality of judg ments, particularly at t his point in the pos t-conviction process. See, e.g., Wrig ht v. State, 987 S.W .2d 26, 29 (Tenn. 1999) ; State ex rel. S tewart v. McWherter, 857 S.W.2d 875, 876-77 (T e nn . Crim . A pp . 1 99 2) . H ow e ve r, thepe tit ion e r’ s in te re st i s e ve n s tr on g e r - his int e re st i n protec ting his ve ry

li f e
. A s inB u r f

o r d , Wi ll iams , a n dSe a ls , th e p e ti ti o n e r inth is c a s e h a s b e en confr onted with circ umstances be y ond his control which pre vented him from pr eviously challeng ing his conviction and sentenc e on constitutional g rounds. For these rea sons, we find the pe titioner’s individual interests to outweig h those of the state under the specific fac ts of this capital ca se.

The State c orre ctly

points out t hat a de fendant has no fundame ntal rig ht to collatera lly attack-12-

a conviction on constitutional grounds. SeeSeals, 23 S.W .3d at 277. Further, the State a sserts that

“ un le ss a fu nd a me ntal rig ht i s in vo lve d, thete st f or det erm ini ng wh e the r a

sta tut e c omp orts w ith substantive due proc ess is whether the leg islation be ars a re asonable relation to a proper le g islative purpose and is neither ar

bitrary o r d i s cr i m i natory .” Ne wton v. Cox , 878 S.W .2d 105, 110 (Tenn. 1994). The State contends that the statute at issue complies with substantive due proce ss as it is not arbitra ry or discriminatory

in its t reatment of post-conviction petitioners - the y all must meet the

“ c le ar a nd c on vin c ing ” thr e sh old re qu ir e me nt to re op e n po st- c on vic tio n pr oc e e din g s. Ho we ve r, thi s arg ume nt m iss e s th e po int . T he c e ntr a l is su e be fo reus tod a y is n ot w he the r the pe ti ti on er ha s a fu nd a me ntal rig ht t o atta c k th e c on vic tio n, bu t is ins te a d w he the r h e ha s b e en affo rded a f a ir opportunity

to prove he is mentally

reta rded and there fore assert his right not to be executed.
I n Van Tr an we h el d that executing me ntally reta rded individuals violated prohibitions ag ainst crue l and unusual punishment as contained in the Ei g hth Amendment to the Unit ed States Constit ution and also Article I , § 16 of the Te nnessee Constit ution. See Atkins, 66 S.W .3d at 809. We h a d p re vio us ly

e xpou nd e d u po n o ur Ei ghth Am e nd me nt andArtic le I , § 16 jurisp ru de nc e in Burford, in which w e dete rmined that applying a statute of limitations t o bar a post-conviction attac k wo uldde ny

thepe tit ion e r o f a

fu nd a me ntal rig ht. We s tate d inB ur fo rd :
“I f consider ation of the pe tition i s barr ed, [this petit ioner] will be forced to serve a persistent o f

f e n d e r s e n te n c e that wa s enhanc ed by previous convic tions that no longer stand. As a result, [he] will be forc ed to se rve an excessive sentenc e in violation of his rights unde r the Eig hth Amendment to the U.S. Constit ution, and Article I , § 16 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution, whic h, by definition, are fundame ntal rig hts entitled to heig htened pr otection.”
Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 209.
I f an e x cessively

leng thy sentenc e implicates a

fundame ntal rig ht, as in Burford, then c e rtain ly a d e a ths e n te n c e w o u lda s w e ll

. T h e r e f o r e , c o n tr ary

to th e St a te ’ s a n a ly s is , w e f in dthe casebefor e us today

does involve a f

undamental right. We re

ject the State’ s attempt to frame the question as one of

a rig ht to attack a conviction rathe r than a rig ht to be fre e fr om unconstituti onal punishment. Also, while there is me rit to the arg ument that proce dural due proce ss and substantive due proce ss a

re conce ptually differ ent, we find that both encompass the c entra l idea of f undamental fairnes s. I f the pe tit ion e r i n th e pr e se nt c a se is f ou ndto b e me ntally

re tard e d, the n h e ha s a fu nd a me ntal rig ht n ot to be e xec ute d. Du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s h e be g ive n a fair op po rtun ity

to l iti g a te this claim in order to protec t this right.
Th e re fo re , we ho ld that un de r the se sp e c if ic a nd na rr ow c ir c ums ta nc e s in whi ch a post

conviction petitioner files f or re lief for

the first tim e u n d er Van Tran or Atkins, requiring the pe tit ion e r t o ple a d me ntal r e tard a tio n b y c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e in h is m oti on to r e op e n h is pet it ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f w ou ld b e fu nd a me ntally un fair a nda vio latio n o f d ue pr oc e ss. B e c aus e thepe tit ion e r was no t abl e to p re vio us ly a dv a nc e his c la im o f m e ntal r e tard a tio n a s a challeng e to his elig ibilit y to r ece ive the death penalty , we find that he should be held to the lower-13-

“color able c laim” standar d instead of requiring him to plead fac ts to show his me ntal reta rdation by “cle ar and convincing evidenc e.”

Evidentiary Hearing to determi ne Mental Retardation
As e xpla ine d a

bo ve , the pe tit ion e r is en tit le d to a hea ri ng if his motionse ts f

orth a “ c olo ra ble claim” of mental reta

rdation. Testing of the petitioner by experts ha s y ielded a w ide rang e of I .Q. score s. Dr. Murphy testified during t he petiti oner’ s sentenc ing and during t he first post-conviction proce eding that the petitioner’s I .Q. was nine ty -one, w hich was “ not significantly below norma l.” As discussed previously , in support of the sec ond motion to reopen post-convic tion procee dings the pe tit ion e r p ro du c e d an af

fi da vit fr om Dr . Gr a nt statin g that his I .Q . sco re s ra ng e d f ro m si xty -t wo to seventy -three . Dr. Gr ant also testified in t h e af fi d avitthat the petitioner’s me ntal reta rdation manifested w ithin the developme n ta l p e rio d an d th a t the petitioner has sig nificant de ficits in adaptive be ha vio r. Whil e wea g re e wi th the State that the pe tit ion e r ha s no t sh ow n in h is m oti on that heis me ntally re tard e d b y

“ c le ar and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e ,” we c on c lud e that, vie wi ng thee vid e nc e in the light most favor able to pe titioner, he has set forth a “color able c laim” that he is mentally reta rded an di s en t i t l ed t o an ev i d en t i ar y h eari n g.
Tenne ssee Code A n n o t at ed sec tion 40-30-110(f) provides that, at a post-conviction evidentiary

hearing, the petitioner “shall have the burden of proving the alleg ations of fa ct by clea r a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e .” Th is b ur de n a pp li es to pet iti on e rs makin g a n in iti a l c la im f or po stconviction re lief or to those who have reope ned post-conviction proc eeding s. Howeve r, under the curr ent law, a defe ndant who now raises the issue of mental reta rdation at trial has only

to prove the c la im b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of

thee vid e nc e . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 03 (c ) ( 20 03 ). Th is d i s p ar i t y b et we en t h e b u rd en p l ac ed o n d ef en d an t s attri al an dt h o s e n o w i n t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n s t age raises dueproce ss conce rns. All petitioners who are now, throug h post-conviction proceeding s, claiming exemption from capital punishment due to menta l retar dation under A tkins or Van Tran have onefac t in common - they wer e not af

forde d an opportunity

to raise theseclaims at trial, y et t h e ri gh t to do so has been applied to them re troac tively

. See Van Tran 66 S.W .3d at 811. This includes def endants filing an initial petiti on for post-c onviction relief a s well as those, such a s the petitioner in the pre sent ca se, wh o h a ve c on c lud e d p os t- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s b ut n ow a tte mpt to re op e n th e m ba se d o n th is ne wl y re c og nize d c on sti tution a l ri g ht. To app ly thi s ri g ht re tr oa c tiv e ly , y e t a t the sam e ti me h old po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion e rs to a hig he r b ur de n o f p ro of

than d e fe ndant s at tria l is fu nd a me nta lly unfair. T here fore , we hold that applying the “cle ar and convincing ” burden of proof to petitioners who ar e now f

or the first time, in either an initial petition for post-conviction relief or in a motion to reope n post-co n v i ct i on proce eding s, able to raise a c laim of mental re tardation to avoid capital pu nis hme nt v iol a te s th e du e pr oc e ss rig hts of thepo st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion e rs
. The issue of pr oper bur den of pr oof wa s addre ssed in Cooper v. O k l ah o m a, in which the United States Supreme Court stated: Th e fu nc tio n o f a

stand ardof pr oo f, a s tha t c on c e pt i s e mbo die d intheDu e Pr oc e ss-14-

Clause and in the r ealm of f actf inding, is to ‘instruct the f actfi n d er co n cerning the deg reeof confidence our society thinks he shoul d have in the corre ctness of f actua l conclusions for a

particula r ty pe of a djudication.’ Cooper v. Oklahoma , 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996)( quoting I n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)).
At iss ue in C oo pe r w a s w he the r a de fe nd a nt c ou ld be requ ire d to pr ov e inc omp e te nc e to standtria l by

c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e
. I d. a t 350. Al tho ug h the de fe nd a nt c ou ld n ot p ro ve his claim clea

rly and convinc ingly , the Court found that he ha d shown he wa s more likely than not incompetent to stand trial. I d. at 355. The Court analy zed both the traditional manner in whic h burdens of

proof a re a llocated a long w ith the State’s interest in the ca se at ba r. The Court state d:
The de ep roots and f

undamental chara cter of the de fendant’s rig ht not to st and trial when it is more likely

than not that he lacks the capa city to unde rstand the nature of thepr oc e e din g s a g a ins t hi m or to c ommun ic a te e ffecti vely wi th c ou ns e l mand a te constitutional protection. Cooper, 5 1 7 U. S . at 368. Finding that executing a defe ndant who wa s more likely than not incompetent would violate due proce ss, the Court held that the defendant must be allowed to prove incompetenc y

by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. I d. at 369. As previously noted, executing the mentally reta rded ha s been f

ound by both the Tenne ssee Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court to violate constitu tional protections. A ma jority of thi s Court, in Va n Tr a n, he ld that e vo lvi ng stand ard s o f d e c e nc y in s oc ie ty arg ue d a g a ins t executing me ntally

reta rded de fendan t s
. 66 S.W .3d at 801. We rec og nized that the Tennesse e Gene ral Asse mbly

had ena cted leg islation prohibiti ng such ex ecutions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 203 (2003), and we view ed this as a va lid ref lection of society ’s views on this issue. Van Tr an, 66 S.W .3d at 805. We also noted the par allel conc erns r aised re g arding incompetenc y to stand trial and mental re tardation. I d. at 806-807. W e point out that the s tatute t o which we ref er allows a ca

pital defe ndant to prove me ntal reta rdation by

a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-203(c ) (2003)

. As e vid e nc e di n b o t h s t a t u t o ry a n dc a s e l a w , s o c i e t y

d o e s n o tw i s h t o e xe c u t e m e n t a lly reta rded individuals. There fore , as a burden of proof should r efle ct the deg ree of confide nce o ur society thinks mostappropriate in making a determination, see Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362, then mental reta rdation should be determined by preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, as se t forth in Tenne ssee Code A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 3 ( c )

. J u s ta s t h e S u p r e m e C o u rth e l di n C o o p e r r e g ar d i n g i n c o m p e t e n c y, we c onclude that it would violate due proce ss to ex ecute a def endant who is more likely than not mentally reta rded.
As Van Tr an and A tkins make clea r, mentally

reta rded individuals have a c onstitut ional rig htSe e V an T r an , 66 S. W

. 3d a t 792; At k i n s , 536 U

. S. a t 321. 7

530 U. S. 466 ( 2000)
. 8

53 6 U

. S. 58 4 (20 0 2 ). 9

T he Sup rem e C o urt hel d i n A p p rendi t hat al l f act ual i ss ues us ed t o enhance a cri m i nal s ent ence b eyond t he 10
sta tuto ry m a x im u m m u s t b e f o u n d b y a ju ry. 5 3 0 U .S . at 4 9 1 -9 2 . T h is re a so n ing w a s e x te n d e d in R ing to a p p ly t o c a p ital se n te n c ing p ro c e e d ing s. 5 3 6 U .S . at 5 8 9

. W e a lso n o te th a t, a ltho u g h n o t c ited b y th e p e tit io n e r, the la te st in this l i ne o f cases i s B l akel y v. W ashi ngt o n, N o
. 0 2

- 1 6 3 2 , 2 0 0 4 W L 14 0 2 6 9 7 , (U

. S. June 24 , 20 0 4 ). I n B l akel y , t he C o urt he l d t ha t t he st atuto ry m ax i m u m s e n te n ce , as e xp resse d i n A p p ren d i , i s “t he m ax i m um senten ce a ju d ge m ay i m p o se
s ol el y on t h e bas i s of

t h e f ac t s r ef

l ec t ed i n t h e j u r y v er di ct or a dmi t t ed by t h e def en dan t

. ” I d. a t * 6. -15- no t to be ex ecut ed. W e re c og nizethat ou r h old ing tod a y is at od ds wi th the stand ardse t ou t in 7 Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-30-117. Howeve r, wer e we to apply the statute’s “ clea

r and convincing ” standa

rd in light of the newly decla red constituti onal rig ht ag ainst the execution of the mentally reta rded, the statute would be unc onstitut ional in its application. There fore , in light of the fac t that the petitioner could not havelitigated his c laim at any earlier proc eeding , we hold that at an evidentiary hearing, he will have the opportunityto prove menta l retar dation by preponde ranc e of the e vidence

. We a remin df ul that ho ldi ng thepe tit ion e r t o a pr e po nd e ranc e of

thee vid e nc e stand arda t th is hearing may

incre ase the burden upon the State in defe nding a g ainst the claim. In the pre sent ca se, ho we ve r, theri sk

to the pe tit ion e r o f an e rr on e ou s o utc omeis di re, a s h e wo uldfa c e thede a th penalty , while th e risk to the State is compar atively modest. See Cooper, 517 U .S. at 364-365 (compa ri n g t h e risk of incompetent defe ndant standing trial versus State’ s risk of incorr ect co m p et en cy determination). The balance, unde r these c ircumstance s, weig hs in favor of the petitioner and justifies applying a preponde ranc e of e vidence standard at the hearing.
De mand f

or a J ury Tr ial unde r Ap

pre ndi and

Ring
Petitioner nextarg ues that he is en t i t l ed to have a jury , rathe r than the tria l court judg e, de te rm inewh e the r h e is m e ntally re tard e d. Th e pe tit ion e r wo uld a lso pla c e thebu rd e n o n th e State to prove his lack of

mental r et ar d ation. Petitioner bases this arg ument upon the Supreme Court’s ho ldi ng in A pp re nd i v. Ne w Jerse y , and Ri ng v. Arizon a
. B othAp pr e nd i a ndRin g e sse nti a lly 8 9 held that a jury

must determine any

ag g ravating f

actor s used t o enhanc e a criminal sentenc e bey ond the statutory

maxi mum. The pe titioner asserts that a defendant’s lack of mental re tardation is t he 10 f u n c ti o n a l e q u iv a le n t o f

a n a g g r a v a ti n g c ir c u ms tan c e a n dth e r e f o r e mu s t b e f

o u n db y a ju ry
. We disag ree
. Un de r T e nn e sse e ’s c apit a l se nte nc ing sc he me , a jury de te rm ine s g uil t a nda lso , ina se pa rate proce eding , determines whether to impose the death pen al t y
. S ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204 (2003). This sente ncing scheme is qualitatively differ ent from the Ariz ona st atute in Ring. Unde rAr i z. Rev

. St at

. An n
. § 13- 1105( c) ( W es t 2001) ; Se e al s o, Ri n g , 536 U

. S. a t 592. 11

Ar i z. Rev

. St at

. An n
. § 13- 703 ( W es t 2001) ; Se e al s o, Ri n g , 536 U

. S. a t 592- 593. 12
-16- theArizon a

la w at is su e in R ing , th e ma ximum pe na lty fo r mur de r w a s d e a th; ho we ve r, thi s 11
se nte nc e c ou ld o nly

be imp os e d i f th e ju dge, no t th e jury , f ou nda g g ravatin g fa c tor s p re se nt t o s u p p o rtt h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. 12
In c o n tr a s t , u n d e r

T e n n e s s e e ’ s c ap i t a l s e n t e n c i n g s c h e m e , i ti s t h e j u ry, t h e v e ry s a m e j u r y, in fac t, that found the def endant g uilty , that decide s whether to impose the death p en al t y
. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204 (2003). In its deliberations, the jury is instructed to consider “any evidenc e te nd ing to es ta

bli shor rebu t th e a g g ravatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s .
. . a nda ny e vid e nc e te nd ing to e sta

bli sh or re but any

mitigating circ umstances.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(c ) (2003) . Diminished mental ca pacity is among the m itigating fac tors that may by weig hed ag ainst ag g ravating f actor s by the jury

. See Te nn. Code Ann. sec tion 39-13-204(j). How ever , mental re tardation is now a thr e sh oldiss ue th at det erm ine s w he the r a de fe nd a nt i s e lig ibl e fo r c apit a l pu nis hme nt at a ll. Following Van Tr an and A tkins, mental retar dation completely exempts a defendant from ca pital punishment, rather

th ans im p ly b e in g among the mitigating fac tors to be weig hed ag ainst ag g ravating f a c t o r s b y t h e j u ry. The United St at es Supreme Court, in Atkins, pointedly expressed that mental re tardation sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d a

pa rt fr om miti g a tin g fa c tor s. Th e Cou rt state d “me ntally re tard e d d e fe nd a nts [are less able ] t o make a

persua sive showing of m i t i gat i on in the fac e of ...a g g ravating f actor s.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. The Court went o n t o s t at e that the de meanor of mentally

reta rded de fe nd a nts may

g ivethefalseimp re ssi on of la c k o f r e mor se . I d. a t 32 1. Th is re a so nin g wa s a lso evident in Van T ran, in whic h we f ound that “the limitations and im pairments associated with m ental re tard a tio n w arr a nt m or e c on sid e ratio n than simply a llo wi ng the e vid e nc e to b e we ig he d inthemix of ag g ravating and mitigating circ umstances.” 66 S.W .3d at 810. The Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly appar ently

ag ree s, as evidenc ed by its placing the prohibition on executing me ntally

reta rded individuals in Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 r ather than placin g i t am o ng the mitigating fac tors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( j). Acc ording ly , the petit ioner’s r elianceupon Ring is misplaced, a s the issue is not one of ag g ravating or enhancing fac tors, but of elig ibilit y for the se ntence imposed by a jury

. Further, the lack of mental reta rdation does not ope rate as “the functional e quivalent of a n element of

a g reater off

ense” that subjects the def endant to a g reater pe nalty and which must be proved by the State bey ond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n.4. Both Appr endi and Ring dealt with ca s es i n wh i ch the court made fa ctual finding s to increa se the de fendant’s se nte nc e be y on d w hat w a s a vaila ble ba se d so le ly up on the jury ’s ve rd ic t. Se e Ap pr e nd i, 5 30 U. S. a t 48 2- 48 3; R ing , 536 U. S. at 609

. I n fa c t, Ap pr e nd i c are fu lly dis tin g uis he d b e tw e e n f

a c ts u se d to e nh a nc e a se nte nc e a ndtho se us e d to le sse n a se nte nc e :
I f fa cts found by

a jury support a g uilty verdic t of m urder , the judg e is authorized by that jury verdic t to sentenc e the defe ndant t o the m axim um sentenceprovided by the-17-

murder statute. I f t he defendant can esca pe the statutory

maxi mum by

showing , for e xamp le , th a t heis a

wa r v e te ran, the n a jud g e that fi nd s the fa c t of ve te ran s tatus is neither e x posing the defe ndant to a deprivation of liberty g reater than that authorized by the ver dict acc ording to the s tatute, nor is the judg e imposing upon the defe ndant a gre ater stigma than that acc ompanying the jury verdic t alone. Core c oncerns animating the jury

and burde n -of- proof r equire ments are thus absent from such a scheme

. Appre ndi, 530 U.S. at 490, n.16.
Tenne ssee’ s capital sente ncing proc ed u re is just s uch a sc heme a s discussed by the Court in A pp re nd i. U nd e r this pr oc e du re , me ntal ret ard a tio n w or ks to r e du c e thema ximum po ssi ble sentenc e, base d upon the ju ry ’s v erdic t, from death to life imprisonment. Theref ore, it is not an element of

the offe nse and is not re quired to be pr oven by the State nor found by

a jury

. We a lso po int ou t that ou r ho ldi ng tod a y is in lin e wi th an e ve r- g ro wi ng nu mbe r o f c ou rt s to have c onsidered the issue and held likewise . See He adric k v. True, 2004 WL 594989 at *25 (W .D. Va. Ma rch 24, 2004) (mental ret ardation is notthe equivale nt of an e lement of the of fense ); I n re J ohnson, 334 F3d 403, 405 C.A. 5 ( T ex .) 2003 (a bsenceof mental re tardation is notelement of offe nse); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 148 (Miss. 2004) (Ring has no a pplication to Atkins determination); St ate v. F lores, 93 P3d 1264, 1267 (N.M. 2004) ( Ring not applica ble to mental reta rdation dete rmination); Hea d v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619 (Ga

. 2003) (Ri ng and Atkins do not requirejury

trial on issue of m ental retardation); State v. L ott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002) ( me n tal r e ta

r d a ti o n d o e s n o t r e p r e sent a jury que s ti o n ) ; E x p arteB r is e n o , 1 3 5 S. W. 3 d1 , 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2004) (lac k of mental re tardation is notimplied element of c apital murder ).
Th e re fo re , w e ho ld that th e de te rm inatio n of me ntal re tard a tio n is mor e app ro priate ly le ft to the trial court judg e, as contemplated under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-203(c ) which state s “ [t]he de te rm inatio n of wh e the r the de fe nd a nt wa s me ntally re tard e d a t the tim e of theof fe ns e of first-de g reemurder sha ll b e made bythe c ou rt .” (Empha sis added). Further, the burden of persua sion in thi s respe ct is upon the defe ndant rather than the State. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 203(c) (2003).
CO NC LU SION
I n sum, we find that re quiring a petitioner, w ho for the f irst time is able t o ra ise a c laim of mental re tardation under Atkins or Va n Tran, to pr ove his claim by clea r and convincing evidenc e is f un dame ntally

un fair a ndinf ri ng e s upo n the pe tit ion e r’ s due pr oc e ss rig hts . T he re fo re , w e ho ld that un de r the se ve ry

lim ite d f a c tual c ir c ums ta nc e s in wh ic h a petiti on e r is n ow fo r the fi rs t ti me able to r a isethi s c la im, if

a n in iti a l pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on victio n rel ie f o r a pe tit ionto r e op e n p os tconvictio n p r o c e e d in g s p r e s e n ts a c o lo r ab lec laim

to r e li e f th e p e ti ti o n e r

s h a ll b e e n ti tl e dto an evidentiary

hearing o n t h e i ssue of menta l retar dation. At this hearing , petitioner will have the opportuni t yto prove menta l retar dation, as def ined in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13- 203(a) , by

a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e.-18-

The c osts of this appeal ar e taxed to the State of Tenne ssee.

_____________________________ WILL I AM M. B AR KE R, JUS TI CE