### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE N ove m be r 15, 200 5 S es sio n
DEBO RAH JAI ME v . AMERICAN WATE R HEATE R COMPANY

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Washin gton County No. 23095 Thomas J. See ley, Jr., Judge

No. E2005-00907-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JANUARY 24, 2006

The plaintiff br oug ht this ac tion ag ainst her f ormer e mploy er, a lleg ing that the defe ndant terminate d her e mploy ment in retaliation for her pur suit of a claim for worke rs’ c om p en s at i o n b enef its. The trial court g rante d the def endant summ ary judgme nt, holding that the plaintiff f ailed to establish a prima facie case of re taliatory discharg e and that she also failed to r ebut the def endant’ s proffe red leg itimate rea son for termination. The plaintiff appe als. We aff irm.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.

Howar d R. Dunbar, Johnson C ity , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Debor ah Jaime.

S t e v e n H

. T r e n t , J o h n s o n C i t y, T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l e e , A m e r i c a n W a t e r H e a t e r C o m p a n y.

OP IN ION

I

. The plaintiff w as employ ed by the def endant f rom J anuary

18, 200 0 , throug h J anuary 7, 2003. Eac h employ ee of

the def endant is r equire d to c omplete a pr e-pla ceme nt medical asse ssment form. This document, whic h the def endant state s is used to de termine if the employ ee is c apable of perf orming his or her job duties, re quires the e mp l o y ee ’s disclosure of a ll previous injuries and illnesses. The employ ee’ s signature on the doc ument certifies that all i nformation is true. The do c ume nt s ta t e s t h a t , i f a n y o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s f

o u n d t o b e u n tru e , t h e e m p l o y e e i s s u b j e c t to imm e diate te rm inatio n. Th e defend a nt a lso e mpl oy s a “ stric t” writt e n p oli c y

that pr oh ibi ts employ ees f

rom “making false statement [sic] , making alterations, or f al s i fy ing any

employ ee or
c omp a ny re c or ds .” Whe n v iol ati on s o f this po lic y are fo un d, the e mpl oy e e is i mme diate ly terminated.T he pl ai nt i f f l at er t es t i f

i ed t hat sh e had di s l ocat ed her l ef t knee i n 19 96 , and t hat an o r t hopedi c phy s i ci an had 1

p re sc rib e d the us e o f a k n e e b ra c e

. -2- The plaintiff, like a ll other employ ees of the def endant, c ompleted and sig ned a pr eplace ment medical assessment form prior to beg inning her employ ment. The plaintiff listed seve ral previous medica l conditions on her a s s e s s me n t f

o rm, in c lu d in g , but not lim ited to, “Fr actur es/Br oken Bone s” and “ Severe Cuts.” On or ab o u t Dec ember 17, 2002, the plaintiff visited the def endant’ s Safety Offic e complaining of a w ork-r elated injury to her lef t knee. The plaintiff, whil e re ceiving treatment for her left knee, told the attending nurse that she had fallen a nd injured one of her kne es five or six y ear s ear lier. Upon re view of the plaintiff’s medica l assessment form, whic h revie w the 1 defe ndant s tates is routine af ter a n employ ee sustains a work-r elated injury , the def endant discove red that th e plaint if

f h a d f a ile d to dis c los e he r pr e vio us kn e e inj ury , notw ith sta nd ing the fo rm ’s sp e c if ic questions asking if the employ ee ha d ever experience d “L o ck i n g Knee J oint,” “Swollen/Painful J oints,” “Dislocation,” or “Other I njury .” On or

about Dec ember

27, 200 2, members of

the de fe nd a nt’ s man a g e me nt sta ff , af te r dis c us sin g the omi ssi on by the plaint if f, de c ide d to te rm inate the plaintiff af

ter the holiday s.

On J anuary

6, 2003, the plaintiff re turned to the Safe ty Offic e, this time with a lace ration to her lef t index fing er. The attending nur se administere d first aid to the fing er a nd determined that no further

medical a s s i s t ance was ne cessa ry at the time. On January 7, 2003, the def

endant’ s manag ement staff

held a mee ting with the plaint iff at whic h time the defe ndant terminate d her employ ment. The mana g ement staff ’s stated re ason for the pl aintiff’s termination was the omiss ion from the medical assessment form, the ty pe of omission which – ac cording to the defe ndant – had been c o n s i s t en t l y h eld to be a “ falsified” document under its written policy . After leaving the

me e ti n g , th e p lain ti f

f r e q u e s te d a d d it io n a l m e d ic a l t r e a tm e n t f

o r h e r la c e r a te d f

in g e r . T h e n e xt
mornin g , th e plaintif

f w a s e xami ne d b y

a ph y sic ia n, pr ov ide d b y

the de fe nd a nt, a ndre le a se d w ith no restric tions.
On April 30, 2003, the plaintiff f iled suit, pursuing he r cla i m fo r worke rs’ c ompensation benef it s a s r e late d to th e D e c e mb e r , 2 0 0 2 , k n e e in ju r y a n d th e Ja n u ar y , 2 0 0 3 , f in g e r in ju r y

. The plaintiff subsequently

filed this retaliatory action, alleg ing that her pur suit of worker s’ compensation b enefits, i.e. , the me dic a l tr e a tme nt so ug ht in re sp on se to he r wo rk -r e la te d inj urie s, wa s a “substantial and motivating fac tor in her discha rg e.” A fter ta

k i n g t h e plaintiff’s deposition, the defe ndant moved for

summary judgme n t , ar gu i ng that the plaintiff had f ailed to set forth a prima facie case of re taliatory

discharg e. The trial court held a hea ring on the def

endant’ s motion and ruled that the def

endant wa s entitled to summary judgme nt in light of the plaintiff’ s failure to establish that her c laim for wor

kers’ compensa tion benefits was a “substant i al fa ct or” in the de fenda nt’s motivation to t erminate her e mploy ment. The trial c ourt also noted that the plaintiff fa iled to offer proof sug g esting that the def endant’ s proffe red le g itimate rea son fo r the dischar g e, i.e., the defe ndant’s written policy providing for the te rmination o f employ ees f ound to have f

alsified documents, wa s pretextual.-3- II.

Th e plaint if

f r a ise s a sin g le iss ue on app e a l, w hic h, a s ta ke n f ro m he r b ri e f, is a s f

oll ow s:

Did the Trial Court er r by g ranting Summary

J udg ment and dismiss ing [ the pl aintiff’s] claim of Retaliatory Dischar g e for

making

a c la im f or Wor ke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts?

III

.
Sin c e su mma

ry jud g me nt p re se nts a

pu re qu e sti on of

la w, ou r re vie w i s de novo on the re cord of the pr oc e e din g s b e low wi th n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss as to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s le g a l ju dg me nts

. Gonzales v. A l

m a n Co n s t

r. Co. , 857 S.W .2d 42, 44-45 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1993). We must decide

a ne w “ if the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, a ns we rs to i nte rr og a torie s, a nd a dmi ssi on s o n f ile , to g e the r w ith the af fidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a ju d gm en t as a matter of law .” Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04. We must vi ew the materia l in the rec ord in the lig ht most favorable to the opponent of the motion, here the plaintiff, and af ford to her

all rea sonable inferenc es fr om the fac ts before us. By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210-11 (Te nn. 1993). I n light of this def ere ntial review , we note that the opponent of the motion

ma y no t r e st u po n me re a lle g a tio ns or de nia ls a s se t fo rth in the pa rt y ’s ple a din g s, bu t “ mus t se t f orth sp e c ifi c fac ts sh ow ing that th e re is a g e nu ine iss ue fo r t

ri a l.” Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 6 ( e mph a sis added)

.
I V.

The Te nnessee Workers’ Compensation L aw, specifica lly Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114( a) (2005), provides that “[n]o contract or a g ree ment, written or implied, or rule , reg ulation or other device ” can operate to relieveany employ er of

its obli g ations u n d er the worker s’ compensation scheme . The Supreme Court has stated that this statute implicitl y cre ates a cause of action for

re ta liatory

dis c ha rg e wh e n a n e mpl oy e e is t e rm inate d fo r e xer c isi ng his or he r rig hts un de r the Ac t. Clan ton v. Cain -Sloan C o. , 677 S.W .2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984) (“In our opinion, a cause of a ction for r etaliatory

discharg e, althoug h not expl icitly cre ated b y t h e s t atut e, is nec essary to enforc e the duty of the e mploy er, to sec ure the rig hts of the employ ee and to car ry out the i n tention of the leg islature.”)

. To establish a retaliatory discharg e cause of action, a plaintiff must prove the following four el e me n ts : ( 1 ) th e p lain ti f

f w a s th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s e mp lo y e e a t th e ti me o f th e in ju r y ; ( 2 ) the plaintiff made a claim ag ain st the defe ndant for w orker s’ compensation benefits; (3) the de fenda nt terminated the plaint if

f’ s e mpl oyme nt; a nd(4 ) the plaint if f’ s c la im fo r wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts w a s a substantial fac to r i n the def endant’ s motivation t o terminate the plaintiff. Ande rso n v . St and ar d Register Co. , 857 S.W .2d 555, 558 (Tenn. 1993) . To prove the fourth ele ment – the “substantial fac tor ” e le me n t

– th e p lain ti f f mu s t p r e s e n t “ d ir e c t e v id e n c e o f th e n e c e s s ar y c a u s a l li n k o r

. . . compelling circ umstantial evidence of such a link.” Reed v . Alam o Rent-A-Car, Inc. , 4 S.W .3d 677,-4-

68 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 199 9) ; see Anderson , 857 S.W .2d at 558-59 ( “ Proof of discha rg e without evidenc e of a causa l relationship betwee n the claim for benef its and the dischar g e does not pre sent
a n iss ue fo r the jury .” ). On c e the plaint if f h a s e sta bli sh e d th e se fo ur

e le me nts , th e bu rd e n s hif ts t o the def endant e mploy er to show a “leg itimate, non- prete x tual rea son for the employ ee’ s discharg e.” Anderson , 857 S.W .2d at 559.

T h e pl ai n t i ff h as d em o n s tra t ed t h e fi rs t , s ec o n d , an d t h i rd el em en t s o f are t al i at o ryd i s ch ar ge
cause of ac tion – (1) she wa s the defe ndant’s employ ee at the t ime of the wor k-re lated injuries; (2) she made a cla im for worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits by seeking medical tre atm en t for he r workrelated injuries; and (3) the defe ndant terminate d her e mploy ment. Howeve r, the plaintiff ha s pr od uc e d n o f

a c ts t o s up po rt

a c a us a l c on ne c tio n b e tw e e n h e r t e rm inatio n a ndhe r f ili ng fo r w or

ke rs ’ compensation benefits.
The plaintiff attempts to arg ue that the de fenda nt’s stated rea son for he r termination, which was provide d by the defendant at the meeting of January 7, 2003, cre ates a

g enuine issue of

materia l fac t as to the causal conne ction betwee n her pur suit of m ed i ca l t re atm ent for he r work- related injuries and her

termination. She points to her deposition testimonyas evide nce of a conne ction:
Q: Okay . Tell me exactly what the state ment [during the termination meeting ] was then.

A: “ Due to your m ost recent v isits to the Safety Office it has come – it has cause d us to review y our rec ords and f ound that y ou falsified a d o cument.” A nd she pointed it out, told m e I neede d to fill out paper work, sig n this, sign that and then I could leave

.
* * *
Q: No , I ’m as k i n g ab o u twh at t h ey t o l d y o u i n t h at m ee t i n g?
A: They told me due to my – the – due to the most rece nt v isits t o the S a fe tyO ffice, i t has caused us to revie w y our re cords a nd we ha ve found that y ou falsified a

document. And then she proce eded to show me that I had lied saying a

bout the swelling and aching joints and that’s why

she terminate d me.
(Emphasis adde d). The pla intiff asserts th at t he first c lause of the defe ndant’s prof fer ed re ason – “due to the most re cent visits to the Safety Offic e” – pr o v es that the def endant terminated the plaintiff’s employ ment beca use she visited the Safe ty Offic e in r esponse to wor k-re lated injuries, a termination which is clea rly prohibited under Ten n

. C o d e Ann. § 50- 6-114. The pla intiff’s interpre tation of this statement is skewed, ig noring the context of the entire statement and the re ason actua lly expressed by

the s tatement. The defenda nt’s manag ement st aff did not tell the plaintiff, as she sug g ests, that they

wer e terminating he r bec ause of her rece nt visits t o the Safe ty Offic e. The y-5-

told her that her

rec ent vi sits to the S afe ty Offic e had compelled them, as was routine, t o revie w her pre- place ment medical a ssessment form. Upon r eviewing the form, they discovere d her omission, wh ic h, un de r the com pan y ’s po lic ie s, e qu a te d to a fa lsi fi e d d oc ume nt w arr a nti ng imm e diate termination.
The plaintiff’ s proof, i.e., the above -quoted testimony , s i m p l y d o es not prove that the defe nd ant t e rm inate d h e r e mpl oyme nt b e c a us e sh e wa s p ur su ing a wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n c la im. F urthe rm or e , the plaint if f failed to pres ent any other e vidence establishing that her c laim for worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits was a f actor in her termination; thus , the plaintiff fa iled to present
a prima facie case of re taliatory discharg e.

V.
The major i t y o f the plaintiff’s brief a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt because of the e x istence o f the following two g enuine issues of “ ma te ri a l” fac t: (1) wh e th e r th e plaint if

f a c tua lly “ fa lsi fi e d” the me dic a l a sse ssm e nt f orm; a nd(2 ) w he the r the app lic able Union contra ct prohibited the defe ndant from terminating the pla intiff based on the pre- place ment medical a ssessment form. We find no merit, or import, in either arg ument.

The plaintiff’s contention that an issue still remains to be dete rmined by the trier of

fac t as to whether

she “f alsified” the form has absolutely no bear ing on this re taliatory discharg e case . Even if we a ssume that the plaintiff inadve rtently omitted, as opposed to intentionally falsi fied, the exis tence of her

previous knee injury , such a de termination does nothi n g t o as sist the plaintiff’s

assertion that her termination wa s cause d by her pur suit of worker s’ compensation benefits, i.e., the de te rm inatio n is no t materialto the issue of whe ther the pla intiff established a prima facie case

. The plaintiff ne x t arg ues that an issue r emains as to whe ther the Union contra ct in effe ct at the time of the plaintiff’s termination prohibited the defe ndant’s prof fer ed re ason for

termination. Th e plaint if

f c ite s th e fo llo wi ng Un ion c on tr a c t pr ov isi on in s up po rt of thi s c on te nti on :

Data in a n employ ee’ s personne l rec ord that is more than twelve ( 12) months old will not be used as a rea son for discipline or a s evidenc e in any g ri e va nc e or

arb itr a tio n p ro c e e di ng e xce pt w he rethe data involves conduct whic h is a violation of fede ral, state or local law.

A d e te rm inatio n a s to this is su e is als o c omp le te ly ir re le va nt t o th e ma tte r at hand . A s su c c inc tly state d b y the tr ia l c ou rt ,
I know that the contr act state d that y ou cannot use information that’s more than twelve months old . . . as a ba sis for discipline, but that’s a diffe rent ke ttle of fish than a r etaliatory discharg e ca se. And it may be that [the defe ndant] shouldn’t have d i s ch arg ed [the plaintiff] for-6- something that’s more than twelve months old, I don’t know, but that doesn’t make it a reta liatory discharg e ca se in this Court’s opinion.
The only question befor e thi s Court is whether there is a g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to whether the plaint if

f’ s pur su it of wo rk e rs ’ co mpe ns a tio n be ne fi ts wa s a subs ta nti a l and mot ivatin g fa c tor in the def endant’ s termination of t he plainti ff’ s employ ment. The plaintiff ha s failed to provide such

e v id e n c e

. B e c a u s e th e p lain ti f f f a il e d to p r e s e n t a p r i ma f acie ca s e, t h e “ ‘b u rd en s h i ft i n g’ complexit ies” related to the defe ndant’s proff ere d “leg itimate non- prete x tual rea son” never occur

. See Morris v. Colu m bia Con str. Co. , 109 S.W .3d 314, 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

V I.
The judg ment o f t h e trial court is af firmed. This ca se is rema nded to the trial c ourt for collection of c o s t s as s es s ed below, pursua nt to applicable law . Costs on appeal ar e taxed to the appellant, De borah Jaime.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE