J-A15044-23

2023 PA Super 224

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JACQUAY T. HALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 718 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at CP-02-CR-0004956-2021

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: November 3, 2023

Jacquay T. Hall (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his jury conviction of fleeing or attempting to elude a police 

officer, accidents involving death or personal injury, accidents involving 

damage to an attended vehicle or property, and false reports by reporting an 

offense that did not occur.1 After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence.

Relevant to this appeal, the facts established at the suppression hearing

are not in dispute. On April 26, 2021, at around 4:00 a.m., Pittsburgh Police

Officer Phillip Szalla and his partner, Officer Zachary Swarrow, observed a 

2014 Nissan Altima exceeding the speed limit in a residential area. When the 

officers initiated a traffic stop, the Nissan pulled to the side of the road with 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3733(a), 3742(a), 3743(a); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4906(b)(1). 
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its brake lights engaged. However, the vehicle was not placed in “park.” As 

the officers exited their vehicle, the Nissan fled the scene. The officers issued 

a radio alert about the incident and began canvassing the area. 

Minutes later, Officers Szalla and Swarrow received an emergency call 

about a nearby motor vehicle accident. Arriving at the scene, they found an 

accident involving the Nissan Altima that fled their traffic stop. The Nissan 

had collided, head-on, with a sport utility vehicle (SUV). The two occupants 

of the SUV stood outside their vehicle. After speaking with the SUV’s 

occupants, the officers approached the Nissan to check for injured passengers. 

Upon opening the driver’s door, Officer Szalla saw, in plain view, a firearm on 

the driver’s floorboard; a cell phone on the driver’s seat;

2 and a small amount 

of marijuana near the gearshift. Because the Nissan was disabled and 

obstructing traffic, the officers arranged to have the vehicle towed. For safety 

reasons, the officers seized the firearm prior to towing. 

The officers subsequently discovered the Nissan was registered to 

Appellant. Officers went to Appellant’s house between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. 

that morning, but no one answered the door. At about 9:00 a.m., Appellant 

called police and reported that his Nissan had been stolen. Appellant also told

police that his cell phone was in the Nissan. According to Appellant, only he 

knew the passcode to unlock the cell phone.

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2 The cell phone was receiving text messages and phone calls. 
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Police applied for a search warrant for the contents of Appellant’s cell 

phone. The warrant application, submitted by Officer Swarrow, identified the 

following material as the items to be searched:

All data with time stamps including personal communications in 

the form of text, writings, phone numbers, contacts, call history, 

SMS messages, images or videos contained in the devices as well 

as information stored, and/or attached to the body of the phone 

associated with Gray iPhone with black and blue case.

Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 10/14/2021, Exh. B at 1.

Officer Swarrow’s affidavit of probable cause, attached to the warrant 

application, detailed the scope of the requested search of the cell phone:

I am respectfully requesting a search warrant for the Gray iPhone 

with black and blue case recovered from the driver’s seat of the 

vehicle during the incident on 04/26/2021. I am requesting to 

search any texts, calls or other media[-]related application that 

have time stamped messages and information to assist with my 

investigation to find out the driver of the vehicle. Based on this 

warrant, I am requesting a search of Gray iPhone with black and 

blue case for all and any time stamped information or data stored 

within the body of the cell phone[], to include [SIM] card and 

phone memory, including any contacts, phone numbers, 

messages instant or text, all pictures and all video stored. 

Incoming and outgoing calls, carrier IP Number and voice 

messages and missed calls. Along with any data which is related 

to the distribution, sale or arrangement of drug transactions 

contained within the cell phone[].

Id. at 3.

Upon approval of the search warrant, police extracted data from the cell 

phone implicating Appellant in the head-on collision and flight from the prior 

traffic stop. Officers learned from the phone’s data that several outgoing calls 

were made after the Nissan was purportedly stolen. One call lasted 35 

minutes and was made to a one of the phone’s saved contacts. Extracted cell 
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phone data rebutted Appellant’s claim that his vehicle had been stolen and 

driven by someone else at the time of the traffic stop and collision. 

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered 

from his cell phone and Nissan. Suppression Motion, 10/14/21. Appellant 

claimed officers lacked probable cause or exigent circumstances to seize the 

items from his vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. According to Appellant, the items were 

not in plain view, as officers had no lawful right to open the vehicle’s door and 

look inside. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. Appellant further claimed police had no basis to 

search the contents of his phone, and the search warrant was 

unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. ¶¶ 27-31. 

The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on October 28, 2021. 

Following the hearing, the suppression court denied Appellant’s motion. See 

N.T. (Findings and Conclusions), 11/18/2021, at 9. The court found the 

Nissan’s driver had fled the scene and “the car was left abandon[ed], thus 

relinquishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.” Id. at 7. 

The suppression court further found officers had opened the Nissan’s door “to 

ensure there was no one inside or injured in the vehicle”; “observed in plain 

view the firearm in question laying on the driver’s side floor board”; and 

“observed the marijuana on or near the center console, and the cell phone, 

which was on the driver’s side seat.” Id. The suppression court explained,

the car was properly towed and the search warrant applied for. 

The police were authorized to [tow the vehicle] by the City of 

Pittsburgh Police policy, as well as Title 75 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 

3352(c)(5) and 3352(b) to tow an abandoned vehicle obstructing 

traffic, and also a danger to the flow of traffic. 
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Id. at 7-8.

The suppression court further found the seizure of the firearm was

supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id. at 8. 

Additionally, the suppression court found any illegality related to the seizure

would have been cured by the firearm’s inevitable discovery pursuant to an 

inventory search. See id.

As to the search of the cell phone’s data, the court found

the cell phone was found abandoned in the vehicle and likely 

contained evidence of the owner or user of that phone at or around 

the time of the crimes in question.

Id. at 9. The suppression court ruled the search warrant was not overbroad. 

Id.

The case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Appellant of the above

offenses, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate prison term 

of one to two years, followed by one year of probation. Appellant timely filed 

the instant appeal. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for review:

I. Whether the suppression court erred in denying 

[Appellant’s] omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the gun 

and cell phone, where the police searched his vehicle 

without a warrant and there were no exigent circumstances?

II. Whether the suppression court erred in denying 

[Appellant’s] omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the cell 

phone, where the search warrant failed to establish probable 

cause and the warrant was impermissibly broad?
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Appellant’s Brief at 6 (capitalization modified).

Appellant first argues the suppression improperly denied suppression of 

the firearm, cell phone and marijuana police found inside the Nissan. Id. at 

15. Appellant claims “police did not have exigent circumstances to justify their 

warrantless entry and search of” the Nissan. Id. Appellant disputes the 

finding that officers opened the vehicle’s door “to ensure there were no injured 

occupants inside.” Id. at 16. Appellant relies on Officer Szalla’s testimony 

that, looking through the Nissan’s windows, he saw no one inside. Id. 

Additionally, Appellant claims the occupants of the SUV involved in the crash

informed police that the Nissan’s driver had fled. Id. Appellant asserts,

[b]ased on the above facts, the officers clearly knew prior to the 

opening of the Nissan’s door that the vehicle contained only one 

occupant, the driver, and that he was no longer inside but had left 

the area. As such, there [were] no exigent circumstances 

justifying the officers’ immediate warrantless entry and search of 

the Nissan.

Id. Appellant contends officers “did not have specific and articulable facts 

from which to believe [Appellant] needed aid.” Id. at 18. 

Appellant also claims the suppression court improperly applied the 

inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. Appellant argues the doctrine does not 

apply where the search warrant was premised, “even in part, on information 

obtained from an unlawful search.” Id. Appellant points out Officer Swarrow’s 

admission that he did not conduct an inventory search of the Nissan. Id. at 

19.
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When reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, our standard of

review is well settled:

[W]e are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings that

are supported by the record[,] but we review its legal

conclusions de novo. Our scope of review is limited to the record

developed at the suppression hearing, considering the evidence

presented by the Commonwealth as the prevailing party and any

uncontradicted evidence presented by [the defendant]. 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 329 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

It is the suppression court’s sole province, as factfinder, “to pass on 

the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” 

Commonwealth v. Dutrieville, 932 A.2d 240, 242 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citation omitted)). “If the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, 

those findings bind us and we may reverse only if the suppression court drew 

erroneous legal conclusions from the evidence.” Dutrieville, 932 A.2d at 242 

(citation omitted). 

As this Court has explained, 

[b]oth the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect 

individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by police in 

areas where individuals have a reasonable expectation of 

privacy. An expectation of privacy exists if a person has a

subjective expectation of privacy that society is willing to

recognize as legitimate and reasonable. Where there exists a

reasonable expectation of privacy, Article I, Section 8 and the

Fourth Amendment generally require police to obtain a warrant,

issued by a neutral and detached magistrate and founded upon

probable cause, prior to conducting a search or seizure of a person
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and/or a person’s property, unless one of the few well delineated

exceptions apply.

Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 173 A.3d 733, 741 (Pa. 2017) (citations

omitted). “In determining whether a person’s expectation of privacy is 

legitimate or reasonable, we must consider the totality of the circumstances[,]

and the determination ultimately rests upon a balancing of the societal 

interests involved.” Kane, 210 A.3d at 330 (citation omitted).

To prevail on a suppression motion, 

a defendant must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy

in the area searched or effects seized, and such expectation

cannot be established where a defendant has meaningfully

abdicated his control, ownership[,] or possessory

interest. Simply put, no one has standing to complain of a

search or seizure of property that he has voluntarily

abandoned. 

Id. (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Byrd, 987 A.2d 786,

790 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“It is axiomatic that a defendant has no standing to

contest the search and seizure of items which he has voluntarily abandoned.”

(citation omitted)). 

Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be 

inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts. 

All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged 

abandonment should be considered. The issue is not

abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the

person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left

behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in

question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable

expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.

Byrd, 987 A.2d at 790 (emphasis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Shoatz, 366 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Pa. 1976)).
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Instantly, the suppression court found that following the collision, the

Nissan’s driver “fled the scene, and the car was left abandon[ed], thus 

relinquishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.” N.T., 

11/18/21, at 7. The suppression court’s finding is supported by the evidence. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Szalla testified that on April 26, 

2021, at around 4:00 a.m., he and his partner observed a 2014 Nissan Altima 

speeding through a residential area. N.T. (Suppression Hearing), 10/28/22, 

at 4. Officer Szalla pulled his police cruiser behind the Nissan and initiated a 

traffic stop. Id. at 5. Although the Nissan pulled over with its brake lights 

activated, the vehicle was not placed in “park.” Id. As Officer Szalla 

approached, the Nissan fled at a high rate of speed. Id. at 5. After issuing a 

radio alert, Officer Szalla and his partner, Officer Swarrow, began canvasing 

the area. Id. at 5-6. 

Two minutes later, the officers received an emergency call reporting a

vehicle accident. Id. at 6. At the accident scene, Officer Szalla found the

Nissan had collided, head-on, with an SUV. Id. Officer Szalla found two 

women standing near the SUV. Id. at 6-7. After making certain the women 

were not injured, Officer Szalla asked if they “observed the driver. And they 

repeated several times, get him, get him.” Id. at 8. The women indicated 

the Nissan had “wrecked into them.” Id. 

The Nissan was approximately 50 yards from the SUV and stopped in 

the middle of Lemington Avenue in Pittsburgh. Id. at 8, 10. Officer Szalla 

recognized the Nissan as the same vehicle that had fled their traffic stop. Id.
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at 8. As the officers approached the Nissan, they saw “disabling damage to 

the front end consistent with a head-on collision.” Id. at 9. Officer Szalla 

opened the Nissan’s driver’s side door to see if there were injured occupants 

inside. Id. He explained, “I was making sure that the driver was not injured, 

or that he would not be underneath the steering wheel, or anything like that.” 

Id. at 13. 

After opening the door, Officer Szalla saw the Nissan’s driver-side airbag 

was deployed. Id. at 19, 41. In plain view, he observed “a firearm on the 

driver floorboard and a small amount of marijuana near the gearshift[.]” Id.

at 9. Officers also found a cell phone, on the driver’s seat, in plain view. Id. 

Upon checking the Nissan’s license plate, officers learned the vehicle was 

registered to Appellant. Id. at 16. 

Officer Swarrow secured the firearm for safety reasons: “I observed the 

firearm, it looked in good operable shape. I could not tell if the safety was on 

the firearm or not.” Id. at 28. According to Officer Swarrow, he seized the 

firearm so “it will not discharge or anything during the tow.” Id. In addition, 

Officer Swarrow stated:

There was a cell phone on the driver’s seat of the vehicle. And 

the cell phone was receiving incoming text messages and calls at 

the time.

....

... We seized the cell phone for evidence because we observed it 

had a low battery and in our training and knowledge, once the 

phone reaches a certain low battery percentage or it dies, there’s 

a lot of data that’s lost.
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Id. at 18. Appellant later confirmed that he, alone, had the passcode to unlock 

the phone. Id. at 37. 

The officers had the vehicle towed to the police station pending their 

application for a search warrant. Id. at 18. According to Officer Swarrow, 

the vehicle was towed because it was inoperable and obstructing traffic. Id.

at 32. 

Officers went to Appellant’s house between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. that 

morning, but no one answered the door. Id. at 35. At about 9:00 a.m. that 

same day, Appellant reported to police that his Nissan Altima was stolen. Id.

at 36. Appellant told police his cell phone was inside of the vehicle. Id. at 

37. Appellant confirmed that he, alone, knew the cell phone’s unique 

passcode. Id. at 47. 

Based on the foregoing, the record supports the suppression court’s 

finding that Appellant had abandoned the vehicle following the collision. 

Consequently, Appellant lacked standing to “contest the search and seizure of

items which he has voluntarily abandoned.” Byrd, 987 A.2d at 790 (citation

omitted).

However, even if Appellant had not abandoned the vehicle and its

contents, we would affirm the suppression court’s ruling. One exception to 

the warrant requirement is the “emergency aid exception,” which our Supreme 

Court has characterized as belonging to a broader group of exceptions justified 

by the “community caretaking doctrine.” Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 

174 A.3d 609, 627 (Pa. 2017). Under the community caretaking doctrine, 
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certain warrantless actions of police officers do not offend constitutional 

principles, because police are motivated by a “desire to render aid or 

assistance, rather than the investigation of criminal activity.” Id. at 627. 

The Fourth Amendment does not prevent police officers from conducting 

a warrantless entry and search when they reasonably believe a person needs

immediate aid. Commonwealth v. Edgin, 273 A.3d 573, 584 (Pa. Super.

2022). 

The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the

fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving. Additionally, it is a matter of common sense that

a combination of events[,] each of which is mundane when viewed

in isolation[,] may paint an alarming picture.

Commonwealth v. Coughlin, 199 A.3d 401, 407 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc) (citation omitted). The intrusion “must be commensurate with, and 

limited to, the perceived need to provide immediate assistance[.]”

Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 571 (Pa. 2018). 

In addition, the “plain view doctrine” permits a valid warrantless seizure

of an item where: (1) the police have not violated the Fourth Amendment in

arriving at the location from which the item could be viewed; (2) the item is

in plain view; (3) the incriminating character of the item is immediately

apparent; and (4) the police have a lawful right of access to the item

itself. Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation omitted). Significantly, “[p]olice may seize any evidence that is in 
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plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.” Mincey 

v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).

Instantly, officers found the Nissan Altima at the accident scene with

significant damage indicative of a head-on collision. N.T. (Suppression

Hearing), 10/28/22, at 9. Officer Szalla opened the Nissan’s driver door to 

check for injured occupants. Id. at 9, 13. As Officer Szalla explained, “I was 

making sure that the driver was not injured, or that he would not be 

underneath the steering wheel, or anything like that.” Id. at 13. 

The suppression court found the officers entered the vehicle because of 

the potential for injured occupants who would need aid. See N.T. (Findings 

and Conclusions), 11/18/22, at 8. Further, the officers observed the firearm, 

marijuana and cell phone, in plain view, while performing these legitimate 

emergency duties. See id. Thus, the suppression court’s findings are 

supported by the evidence discussed above. Even if Appellant had not

abandoned the vehicle and its contents, suppression of the firearm,

marijuana, and cell phone was not warranted. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; 

Livingstone, 174 A.2d at 627. Appellant’s first issue merits no relief. 

Appellant next argues the trial court improperly denied suppression of

evidence resulting from the search of his cell phone. Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

Appellant claims the search warrant for the phone was unconstitutionally

overbroad, and police lacked probable cause to support the search. Id. 

Appellant contends that after he had reported the Nissan and cell phone

stolen,
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police had no reason to search the cell phone for the purpose of

discovering its owner, as they were already in possession of such

information – it was [Appellant]. Besides, the warrant was not

supported by probable cause to believe that [Appellant’s] cell

phone contained evidence of criminal activity.

Id. at 21. 

Appellant argues, even if probable cause exists, the search warrant was

overbroad. Id. at 22. Appellant asserts there was no justification to search

every call, communication, photo, video, or data on the phone’s SIM card. Id.

at 24-25. According to Appellant, “The broad search authorized by the

warrant impermissibly revealed a large number of items unrelated to the

criminal investigation.” Id. at 25. Appellant argues, “there was an

unreasonable discrepancy between the limited reason for probable cause and

searching practically all the phone’s data.” Id.

The suppression court rejected this claim:

As to the issue of the search warrant for the cell phone, the 

[suppression c]ourt finds that based on the totality of the 

circumstances, the cell phone was found abandoned in the 

vehicle and likely contained evidence of the owner or user of that 

phone at or around the time of the crimes in question.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added). The trial court reiterated, “The cell phone was 

clearly abandoned and likely contained evidence of the owner or user of the 

phone at or around the time of the crimes.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/22, at 

11. The suppression court’s finding of abandonment is supported by the 

evidence. Because the phone was abandoned, Appellant lacked standing to 
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contest its search and seizure.3 See Kane, 210 A.3d at 330. Accordingly,

Appellant’s second issue does not merit relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge McLaughin joins the opinion.

Judge Pellegrini files a dissenting opinion.

 11/3/2023

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3 Given this disposition, we need not address whether the search warrant was 

unconstitutionally overbroad.