2024 IL App (4th) 240583-U 

NOS. 4-24-0583, 4-24-0584, 4-24-0590, 4-24-0591 cons.

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re A.S., Ab.S., Ar.S., and I.S., Minors

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v. 

Jessica M., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Knox County 

Nos. 19JA35 

 21JA37 

 21JA38 

 21JA39 

Honorable 

Curtis S. Lane, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed 

the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 2 Respondent Jessica M. appeals from the trial court’s judgment finding her unfit and 

terminating her parental rights as to her four minor children: Ar.S. (born in 2019), I.S. (born in 

2016), A.S. (born in 2015), and Ab.S. (born in 2014). The father, Eric S., surrendered his parental 

rights to all four minors in February 2023 and is not a party to this appeal.

¶ 3 Respondent’s appointed counsel seeks leave to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In the supporting memorandum of law filed in each of these four 

consolidated cases, appellate counsel contends this appeal presents no potentially meritorious 

FILED

August 14, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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issues for review. Notice of the motion to withdraw was provided to respondent. She did not file 

a response. We grant the motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. Neglect Petitions, Adjudications, and Dispositions

¶ 6 1. A.S., Ab.S., and I.S.

¶ 7 In November 2017, the State filed separate petitions for adjudication of wardship 

of A.S., Ab.S., and I.S. in Warren County. Specifically, the State alleged A.S. and Ab.S. were 

abused (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2016)) and neglected (id. § 2-3(1)(b)) in that both minors 

were found to have bruising all over their bodies caused by other than accidental means. The State 

further alleged I.S. was neglected due to being in an environment injurious to his welfare (id.) 

based on the alleged abuse of his siblings. The trial court held a hearing and granted temporary 

custody of the minors to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶ 8 In January 2018, the trial court adjudicated A.S., Ab.S., and I.S. neglected. In 

March 2018, the court entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit and made the minors 

wards of the court. In June 2020, the cases were transferred to Fulton County. In September 2021, 

the cases were transferred to Knox County.

¶ 9 2. Ar.S.

¶ 10 In October 2019, the State filed a juvenile petition in Knox County alleging that 

Ar.S. was neglected due to being in an environment injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-

3(1)(b) (West 2018)), in that the minor presented at an emergency room with multiple burns and 

was later found to have a minimally compressed skull fracture. The trial court held a hearing and 

granted temporary custody of Ar.S. to DCFS.
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¶ 11 In February 2020, the trial court adjudicated Ar.S. neglected. Thereafter, the court 

entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit and making Ar.S. a ward of the court.

¶ 12 B. Petitions for Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 13 In March 2023, the State filed separate petitions to terminate the parental rights of 

respondent as to A.S., Ab.S., Ar.S., and I.S. The State alleged respondent was unfit based on her 

failure to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal 

of the minors within the relevant nine-month periods (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2022)) (count 

I), (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors within the relevant nine-month 

periods (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)) (count II), and (3) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or 

responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (id. § 1(D)(b)) (count III). The relevant nine-month periods 

for counts I and II were October 20, 2020, to July 20, 2021; July 20, 2021, to April 20, 2022; and 

May 7, 2022, to February 7, 2023. 

¶ 14 C. Fitness Hearing

¶ 15 In December 2023, the matter proceeded to a fitness hearing. Respondent was not 

present. 

¶ 16 Brooke Matykiewicz, a DCFS child welfare specialist, testified she was the 

caseworker from December 2020 to November 2022. Under the service plan, respondent was 

required to maintain housing and employment, cooperate with DCFS, and complete mental health 

services, parenting education, drug testing, and domestic violence treatment. The only service 

respondent completed was the domestic violence treatment. In her interactions with DCFS, 

Matykiewicz described respondent as “extremely argumentative” and “combative.” Respondent 

refused to speak with Matykiewicz without an attorney present and otherwise only communicated

via text message. She also failed to provide Matykiewicz with information concerning her finances 
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and housing. Respondent did not sign releases with her mental health provider, so Matykiewicz 

could not confirm if she cooperated with her mental health services. Respondent also failed to 

submit to any drug testing during the relevant period. Visitation with the children was suspended 

in January 2022 after respondent threatened the children and the visitation specialist.

¶ 17 Jessica Flora, a DCFS supervisor, testified she was assigned to the minors’ cases 

from February 2022 to June 2023. Flora was present for two “child and family” team meetings 

with Matykiewicz and respondent. During those meetings, Flora described respondent as 

“combative” and becoming upset when given information “that she doesn’t like to hear or that she 

feels is wrong.” Flora decided not to restart respondent’s visitation following the suspension, as 

the children had experienced “extensive trauma” by respondent, which caused “reactive 

behaviors” in the children following visits.

¶ 18 Nicolette Fox, a DCFS child welfare specialist, testified she had been the 

caseworker since November 2022. After she took over the case, Fox tried to contact respondent, 

who did not respond to Fox until January 2023. During the relevant period, Fox was unable to 

verify if respondent had stable housing or income. Further, respondent did not complete any 

services, nor did she send any gifts, cards, or letters to the children. Respondent self-referred for 

mental health services rather than going through a DCFS referral, so Fox was denied access to 

respondent’s therapy notes and could not assess her progress. 

¶ 19 Following argument by the parties, the trial court found respondent unfit as to 

counts I and II of the petitions. 

¶ 20 D. Best Interest Hearing

¶ 21 In January 2024, the matter proceeded to a best interest hearing, with respondent in 

attendance.
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¶ 22 Fox testified the children were originally placed in the same foster home, but due 

to behavioral issues, Ab.S. was moved to another foster home. Her behavioral issues improved 

considerably after the move. Ab.S. continued to attend the same school district as the other 

children. Fox described Ab.S. as “very bonded” to her new foster parents and their extended 

family. Ab.S. informed Fox that she wanted to be adopted by her foster parents and now used her 

foster parents’ last name. Fox stated that Ab.S. felt loved and secure in her foster home, and the 

home would be a “good” and “stable” placement for the child. Thereafter, due to time constraints, 

the trial court continued the best interest hearing to a later date.

¶ 23 The best interest hearing resumed in March 2024. The trial court admitted the best 

interest report filed December 21, 2023, and a status alert filed March 12, 2024. The status alert 

contained visitation recommendations from the children’s therapists. The therapists recommended 

no further contact between respondent and the children, as their prior visits were “emotionally 

traumatizing” and created “intense fear and anxiety” for the children.

¶ 24 The State recalled Fox, who testified that all four children had bonded with their 

respective foster parents and were well adjusted and felt loved in their foster homes. The foster 

parents provided for the children’s needs and regularly took the children to counseling and medical

appointments. Fox stated the minors had been in care since 2017, a period of approximately six 

and a half years.

¶ 25 Jodi W. testified that she was the foster mother of A.S., Ar.S., and I.S. Jodi 

indicated the children enjoyed their school and had good relationships with her extended family.

All three children refer to Jodi as “Mom.” Jodi stated she would facilitate a relationship between 

Ab.S. and her siblings. Jodi expressed her willingness to adopt the children.
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¶ 26 Respondent testified that the last time she visited with the children was in January 

2022. She indicated that the children told her they were being abused in their foster home.

Respondent claimed her visitation was revoked after she reported this to the caseworker. Although 

respondent asked about reinstating visitation, she was told it could not resume until a judge lifted 

a no-contact order that was issued against her.

¶ 27 The trial court stated it reviewed the best interest report, the Court Appointed 

Special Advocates reports, and the status alert. At the time of the hearing, Ab.S., A.S., and I.S. had 

been in care for over 2200 days, and Ar.S. had been in care for over 1500 days. The court noted 

the last contact respondent had with the children was in January 2022, when visitation was 

suspended. The court also noted that the children’s counselors recommended no more contact with 

respondent to prevent further trauma. The court also found that the children were attached to their 

foster families. The court further found that the foster parents provided the children with security, 

familiarity, and affection, development of their identities, and integration into their communities.

The children expressed their wishes to be adopted, and their foster families were willing to adopt 

them. 

¶ 28 The trial court found it was in the children’s best interest to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights. The court entered separate orders terminating respondent’s parental rights with 

respect to each child. Thereafter, respondent filed separate notices of appeal in each of the cases. 

On our own motion, we consolidated the appeals for review.

¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 30 Appellate counsel moves for leave to withdraw pursuant to Anders from 

respondent’s appeals with respect to each child. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86 (2000) 

(holding Anders applies to termination of parental rights cases and providing the proper procedure
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to be followed by appellate counsel). Counsel supports his motion with a memorandum, which 

states he considered raising the following issues: whether the trial court erred when it found 

(1) respondent failed to make reasonable progress towards the return of the minors during the 

relevant nine-month period, (2) respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the 

conditions that brought the minors into care during the relevant nine-month period, and (3) the 

best interest of the children favored termination of respondent’s parental rights. Counsel ultimately 

determined that any argument challenging the court’s fitness and best interest findings would be 

frivolous and without merit. We agree with counsel, grant his motion to withdraw, and affirm the 

court’s judgment.

¶ 31 A. Unfitness

¶ 32 The involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process pursuant 

to section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022)). The 

State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is unfit. In re C.M., 

305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 163 (1999).

¶ 33 The trial court in this case found respondent unfit for failing to (1) make reasonable 

efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal of the minors during the relevant 

nine-month period (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2022)) and (2) make reasonable progress 

towards the return of the minors during the relevant nine-month period (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).

However, “[a] parent’s rights may be terminated if a single alleged ground for unfitness is

supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 296 (2004). As such, we 

only address appellate counsel’s contention that it would be frivolous to argue the court erred in 

finding respondent failed to make reasonable progress towards the return of the children during 

the relevant nine-month period.
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¶ 34 Reasonable progress, which is assessed under an objective standard, exists when a 

parent’s compliance with the service plan and the trial court’s directives “is sufficiently 

demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child 

returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991). 

“Failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor includes the parent’s failure 

to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that 

brought the child into care.” In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17 (citing 750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(m) (West 2014); In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 217 (2001)).

¶ 35 We will not reverse a trial court’s finding of unfitness unless it is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 163. A court’s finding is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence where the facts clearly demonstrate the court should have reached 

the opposite conclusion. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208. 

¶ 36 Respondent in this case almost entirely failed to comply with the objectives under 

the service plan. During the period of May 7, 2022, to February 7, 2023, she did not complete any 

drug tests or parenting education. Her caseworkers could not verify her mental health progress, as 

respondent sought treatment on her own rather than through a DCFS referral. Respondent also 

failed to provide any information regarding her housing or employment. Although she inquired 

about reinstating visitation on a few occasions, it remained suspended during the entire relevant

period and was still suspended at the time of the fitness hearing. Further, respondent refused to 

cooperate with her DCFS caseworkers. Both Matykiewicz and Flora described respondent as 

combative and unwilling to work with them. After Fox took over the case in November 2022, 

respondent did not contact her until January 2023. Thereafter, Fox had only a few phone calls with 

respondent, and she would message Fox “probably once every six weeks at the most.”
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¶ 37 Based on the foregoing, the trial court was no closer to returning the children to 

respondent’s care by the end of the nine-month period. See L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461. 

Therefore, we cannot say the court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

¶ 38 Having reviewed the record, we agree with appellate counsel that there is no 

nonfrivolous argument that could be presented on appeal to challenge the trial court’s unfitness 

determination.

¶ 39 B. Best Interest

¶ 40 If the parent is found to be unfit, the State must then prove terminating parental 

rights is in the minor’s best interest. In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 31. At this step, the 

focus shifts from the parent to the child. See In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004) (“[A]t a bestinterests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the 

child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.”). As such, the burden on the State is lessened to a 

preponderance of the evidence at the best interest hearing. Id. at 366.

¶ 41 In reaching a best interest determination, the trial court must consider, within the 

context of the child’s age and developmental needs, the following factors: 

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s 

identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; 

(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity 

of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes 

and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for 

permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with 

parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the 
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risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to 

care for the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 

190537, ¶ 32 (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)). 

¶ 42 The trial court’s best interest determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. We afford 

great deference to the court’s determination, as it is in the best position to view the witnesses and 

judge their credibility. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. 

¶ 43 At the time of the hearing, Ab.S., A.S., and I.S. had been in care for about six years, 

and Ar.S. had been in care for about four years. Further, the children had not seen respondent in 

over two years. Visitation with respondent was never restarted, as prior visits resulted in emotional 

trauma to the children. The evidence demonstrated the foster parents provided for the children’s 

needs, including their physical safety and welfare; development of their identities; community ties; 

and security, familiarity, and affection. The children expressed a desire to stay with their foster 

families, and the foster parents expressed a willingness to adopt the children. Based on the 

foregoing, we cannot say the trial court’s best interest determination was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.

¶ 44 After reviewing the record, we agree with appellate counsel that any argument 

challenging the trial court’s best interest determination would be without merit.

¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 47 Affirmed.