*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-30805

Summary Calendar

_____________________

DAVID SINGLETON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BURL CAIN, Warden; JOHNNY BUTLER, Warden;

UNKNOWN BRIGGS, Captain; UNKNOWN SKINNER,

Captain; MERIDITH, Major,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CV-123

_________________________________________________________________

November 25, 1997

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Singleton, Louisiana state prisoner #81080, appeals the

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to comply with

a court order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Singleton argues that

he misunderstood the district court’s order directing him to

specify by number the administrative remedy procedures that he had

exhausted.

A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure

to prosecute or to comply with any court order. McCullough v.
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Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988). Although the

district court dismissed Singleton’s complaint without prejudice,

the dismissal operates as a dismissal with prejudice because

Singleton would be barred by the applicable prescriptive period

from filing a new complaint. See Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975

F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992). Thus, the dismissal is properly

analyzed as one with prejudice. Id.

This court reviews a dismissal with prejudice for failure to

prosecute for abuse of discretion. Id. Ordinarily, this court

will affirm a dismissal with prejudice only “(1) upon a showing of

`a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff’

and (2) when `lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests

of justice.’” Sturgeon v. Airborne Freight Corp., 778 F.2d 1154,

1159 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis original) (citations omitted).

Dismissal with prejudice is “[t]he ultimate sanction for the

litigant,” and “should be imposed only after full consideration of

the likely effectiveness of less-stringent measures.” Hornbuckle

v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 732 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1984).

The record does not clearly evince delay or contumacious

conduct on the part of Singleton, even though he failed to respond

adequately to the court’s order. See Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191-92

n.6. (“Generally, where a plaintiff has failed only to comply with

a few court orders or rules, we have held that the district court

abused its discretion in dismissing the suit with prejudice.”)

Moreover, because there was no showing that the district court
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considered or employed lesser sanctions, the district court abused

its discretion by effectively dismissing Singleton’s case with

prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).

Hornbuckle, 732 F.2d at 1237.

In the light of the foregoing, we VACATE and REMAND.

VACATED and REMANDED.