NUMBER 13-11-097-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

EX PARTE JAIME ENRIQUE GARCIA

 

On appeal from the 206th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Vela, and Perkes 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela

The grand jury of Gwinnett County, Georgia, indicted applicant, Jaime Enrique 

Garcia, for the offense of trafficking in cocaine. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-33 (2010). 

On demand by the Governor of Georgia, the Governor of Texas issued a governor's 
2

warrant, ordering Texas law-enforcement officials to arrest Garcia, who lived in Hidalgo 

County, Texas, and deliver him into the custody of Georgia authorities. Seeking to avoid 

extradition to Georgia, Garcia filed an application for writ of habeas corpus.1 Following a 

hearing on the writ, the trial court denied the requested relief. On appeal, Garcia raises 

four issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the governor's 

warrant into evidence; (2) whether the trial court failed to consider whether the extradition 

documents were facially in order; (3) whether Garcia is the person named in the demand 

for extradition; and (4) whether Garcia is a fugitive. We affirm the trial court's order.

I. APPLICABLE LAW

The language of the Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution2"is 'clear 

and explicit'" and "creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand. . 

. ." Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 226 (1987) (citing Michigan v. Doran, 439 

U.S. 282, 286 (1978)). The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA)3"establishes 

procedures for the interstate transfer of persons against whom criminal charges are 

outstanding. . . . [and] applies to persons at liberty as well as to persons in prison." 

Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 436 n.1 (1981). Following the language of the 

Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution, the UCEA speaks in terms of a 

 

1

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 10 (West 2006) (stating, in relevant part, that "if the 

prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of such 

court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of habeas 

corpus. . . .").

2

The Extradition Clause art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution reads: "A Person 

charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in 

another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, 

to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."

3

The UCEA is codified in Texas at article 51.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (West 

2006).
3

demand by the executive of a state placed on the executive of another state for delivery of 

a fugitive from justice. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 2 (West 2006). 

Within the bounds of the constitution and applicable law, the UCEA requires the governor 

of a sending state to have a fugitive arrested and delivered to the executive authority of 

the receiving state. Id.

A habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition is "intended to be limited in 

scope in order to facilitate a swift and efficient transfer of custody to the demanding state." 

Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Once the governor has 

granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than 

decide: (1) "whether the extradition documents on their face are in order"; (2) "whether 

the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state"; (3) "whether the 

petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition"; and (4) "whether the 

petitioner is a fugitive." Id. (citing Doran, 439 U.S. at 289).

"An appellate court reviewing a trial court's ruling on a habeas claim must review 

the record evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and must uphold 

that ruling absent an abuse of discretion." Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006) (citing Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)); 

see Ex parte McWilliams, 272 S.W.2d 531, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954). The applicant 

bears the burden to prove he or she is entitled to the relief sought by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. 
4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of the Governor's Warrant

In issue one, Garcia contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

governor's warrant into evidence because the State did not lay the proper foundation for 

its admission. During the habeas corpus hearing, the State offered the original 

governor's warrant along with its attached documents into evidence. Defense counsel 

objected on the basis that the State did not "lay the foundation for the record as to the 

authenticity of this document. . . ." The State responded that "under Rule 902, it's a 

document under seal from the Governor's office. . . ." The trial court overruled the 

objection and admitted the governor's warrant and the attached documents into evidence 

as State's exhibit 1.4

A trial court=s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002). AThe trial court abuses its discretion when the decision lies outside the zone of 

reasonable disagreement.@ McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2008). A[I]f the trial court=s evidentiary ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to 

that ruling, it will not be disturbed even if the trial judge gave the wrong reason for his right 

ruling.@ De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Texas Rule of Evidence 901 provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he requirement of 

authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by 

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 

 

4

State's exhibit 1 is part of the appellate record.
5

claims." TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). However, rule 902 provides, in relevant part:

Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to 

admissibility is not required with respect to the following:

(1) Domestic Public Documents Under Seal. A document 

bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any State, 

district, Commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the 

Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a 

political subdivision, department, officer, or agency, thereof, and a 

signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.

TEX. R. EVID. 902(1).

Here, the governor's warrant on its face included the seal of the State of Texas as 

well as the following language: "IN TESTIMONY WHEREFORE, I have hereunto signed 

my name and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of State, at Austin, . . . ." The 

signatures of Texas Governor Rick Perry and the Texas Secretary of State, Esperanza 

"Hope" Andrade, appear beneath this attestation. Accordingly, the governor's warrant 

constituted a domestic public document under seal, and the State was not required to 

present extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility. See

TEX. R. EVID. 902(1). We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

governor's warrant and the documents attached thereto into evidence. Issue one is 

overruled.

B. Whether the Extradition Documents Were Facially in Order

In issue two, Garcia contends the extradition documents were not facially in order. 

We decide this issue by comparing the extradition documents to the requirements of the 

UCEA. See Rayburn v. State, 748 S.W.2d 285, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1988, no 
6

pet.).5

Section 3 of the UCEA states in relevant part:

No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another 

State shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing, alleging, . . . 

that the accused was present in the demanding State at the time of the 

commission of the alleged crime, and that thereafter he fled from the State, 

and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by information 

supported by affidavit in the State having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a 

copy of an affidavit before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any 

warrant which issued thereupon; or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or 

of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by 

the Executive Authority of the demanding State that the person claimed has 

escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or 

parole. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the 

magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having 

committed a crime under the law of the State; and the copy of indictment, 

information, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be 

authenticated by the Executive Authority making the demand; . . . .

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 3.

In this case, the governor's warrant, which included the requisition demand from 

the Governor of Georgia, recites that Garcia was charged with the offense of trafficking in 

cocaine, that he was present in Georgia when the alleged crime was committed, that he 

thereafter fled from the justice of Georgia, and that he is now in Texas. The requisition 

demand is supported by (1) a certified copy of the bench warrant, (2) a certified copy of 

the felony indictment substantially charging Garcia with the crime of trafficking in cocaine, 

which is a violation of the laws of Georgia, (3) the affidavit of an assistant district attorney 

for Gwinnett County, Georgia, (4) Garcia's fingerprint cards, and (5) the district attorney's 

application for requisition.

 

5

See Ex parte Molina-Neave, No. 04-06-00648-CR, 2007 WL 1268819, at *3 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio May 2, 2007, pet. dism'd) (mem. op., not designated for pub.). 
7

By this same issue, Garcia argues he has not been charged with a crime in the 

demanding state. The extradition documents referred to in the requisition demand 

reflect Garcia was charged with trafficking in cocaine, alleged to have occurred in the 

State of Georgia on or about November 1, 2007, and that he fled the State. A bench 

warrant for failure to appear, listing the pending charge against Garcia, was issued on 

September 5, 2008. Because Garcia has not been convicted, the requisition demand 

recites Garcia is a fugitive from justice and contains all the other allegations required by 

section 3 of article 51.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See id. We hold 

that the extradition documents are facially in order. Issue two is overruled.

C. Whether Garcia is the Person Named in the Demand for Extradition

In issue three, Garcia contends he is not the person named in the demand for 

extradition.

1. Background

During the State's case-in-chief at the habeas hearing, the trial court admitted the 

governor's warrant into evidence as State's exhibit 1, which included a set of fingerprint 

cards. Eduardo Aleman, a crime-scene specialist with the Hidalgo County Sheriff's 

Office, testified he had been conducting fingerprint comparisons for about seventeen 

years. Prior to this habeas hearing, Aleman fingerprinted Garcia and compared Garcia's 

known fingerprints to the fingerprints attached to the governor's warrant. He testified 

that Garcia's known fingerprints "were identified as the same" as those fingerprints 

included with the governor's warrant.
8

Garcia testified he had been in Gwinnett County, Georgia and that the case 

against him in that county had been dismissed. He left Georgia in September 2008 and 

returned to Hidalgo County. He was unaware that he was "a felon fleeing from justice[.]" 

On cross-examination, when the prosecutor asked Garcia, "And you would admit that 

you're the same person that's named in the governor's warrant, correct?", he said, "Yes, 

sir." 

2. Analysis

"In order to challenge 'identity', the accused must raise the issue of his identity as 

the fugitive named in the Governor's Warrant." Ex parte Scarbrough, 604 S.W.2d 170, 

174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Here, Garcia testified during the habeas hearing that he is 

the person named in the governor's warrant. Moreover, the State, by comparing 

Garcia's known fingerprints to the fingerprint cards included in the governor's warrant, 

established that Garcia was the person named in the warrant. Accordingly, we hold that 

the State showed that Garcia was the person named in the governor's warrant. Issue 

three is overruled.

D. Status as a Fugitive

In issue four, Garcia contends he is not a fugitive from justice. "A governor's grant 

of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements 

have been met." Doran, 439 U.S. at 288–89. Garcia contends this showing was 

overcome with regard to his status as a fugitive because the charges against him in 

Gwinnett County, Georgia were dismissed.
9

The UCEA does not formally define "fugitive." See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 

art. 51.13, § 1. However, in Ex parte Robertson, the applicant contended he was not a 

fugitive from justice. 151 Tex. Crim. 635, 636–37, 210 S.W.2d 593, 594 (1948). In 

explaining the term "fugitive," the court of criminal appeals stated:

[I]f a person was present in the demanding state at the time it is alleged an 

offense was committed and leaves that state thereafter for any reason, 

whether connected with the alleged offense or not, and is found in the 

sending state, he is a fugitive from justice and subject as such to extradition.

Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 2 (stating, in relevant part, that "it is the 

duty of the Governor of this State to have arrested and delivered up to the Executive 

Authority of any other State of the United States any person charged in that State with 

treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this State") 

(emphasis added). 

During the habeas hearing, the prosecutor asked Garcia, "[Y]ou would agree that 

according to the governor's warrant, there are charges pending against you in Gwinnett 

County, Georgia, correct?", he replied, "Yes, sir." Even though Garcia testified that the 

case against him in Gwinnett County had been dismissed, when the prosecutor asked 

him, "And so you would agree that the indictment [i.e., the indictment attached to the 

governor's warrant] comes after the dismissal, . . . that you were speaking of, correct?", 

he said, "Yes, sir." In addition, the documentation attached to the governor's warrant 

showed that Garcia was present in the demanding state (Georgia) at the time it was 

alleged an offense was committed, that he committed the offense, that he left that state 

thereafter, and that he is currently in the sending state (Texas). Therefore, Garcia is a 

fugitive from justice and subject as such to extradition. See Ex parte Robertson, 151 
10

Tex. Crim. at 636–37, 210 S.W.2d at 594. Issue four is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding the governor's warrant for the extradition of Garcia to Georgia is valid. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying habeas corpus relief. 

ROSE VELA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 

29th day of September, 2011.