COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

KENNETH NORMAN PRATER 

v. Record No. 2249-96-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

BRISTOL COAL CORPORATION FEBRUARY 11, 1997 

AND 

UNITED AFFILIATES CORPORATION 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Joseph E. Wolfe; Bobby Steve Belcher, Jr.; 

Wolfe & Farmer, on brief), for appellant. 

 (S. T. Mullins; Street, Street, Street, 

Scott & Bowman, on brief), for appellees. 

 Kenneth Prater contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in granting Bristol Coal Corporation's change in 

condition application and terminating his compensation benefits 

effective March 20, 1996 based on the commission's finding that 

Prater's current disability was not causally related to his 

compensable September 26, 1994 injury by accident. Upon 

reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "The 

actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to 

support the finding." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 

684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). "Questions raised by 

conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission." 

Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 

231, 236 (1989). 

 In ruling that employer sustained its burden of proving a 

compensable change in condition, the commission found as follows: 

 The evidence does not establish the 

claimant's depression disorder is causally 

related to his industrial injury. Dr. 

[Steven W.] Morgan and Dr. [Richard G.] 

Salamone do not believe the claimant's 

depression is disabling and Dr. Salamone does 

not believe the depression was caused by the 

industrial accident. 

* * * * * * * 

 We also agree with the Deputy 

Commissioner that the claimant's back 

disability is no longer related to the 

industrial accident. We accept the opinion 

of Dr. [William A.] McIlwain, the treating 

orthopedist, that the only impediment to the 

claimant's return to pre-injury work was his 

unrelated arthritic condition, ankylosing 

spondylitis, and depression, not the 

industrial injury. 

 In its role as fact finder, the commission was entitled to 

weigh the medical evidence and to accept the opinions of Drs. 

Morgan, Salamone, and McIlwain. The commission's rejection of 

Dr. Clinton Sutherland's opinion that Prater's symptoms were 

"suggestive of PTSD" is supported by credible evidence. Dr. 

Salamone, the psychologist, rejected this diagnosis. In 
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addition, the commission was entitled to disregard Dr. David L. 

Forester's opinion that Prater's depression was "perhaps" related 

to chronic back pain. Dr. Forester's opinion was not couched in 

terms of any degree of medical certainty. The opinions of Drs. 

Morgan, Salamone, and McIlwain constitute credible evidence to 

support the commission's decision. "The fact that there is 

contrary evidence in the record is of no consequence . . . 

[because] credible evidence . . . support[s] the commission's 

finding." Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 

407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

Affirmed.