IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RYAN PEREZ, § § No. 239, 2019 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § § Court Below: Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Cr. ID No. 1704019609 (N) Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. § Submitted: December 4, 2019 Decided: December 18, 2019

Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA , and VAUGHN , Justices.

ORDER

This 18 th day of December, 2019, having consid ered the briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that: (1) In November 2017, police arrested Ryan Perez and charged him with numerous drug and firearm-related crimes. Several days before trial, Perez pled guilty to two of the charges. Six weeks later, Perez moved to withdraw his plea

because he claimed his former counsel fa iled to investigate the admissibility of important evidence and discuss it with Per ez. The Superior Court held a hearing,

heard from Perez’s former couns el, and denied the motion.2 (2) On appeal, Perez argues that the Supe rior Court’s denial does not offer adequate reasoning to review whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying the motion. Perez seeks a remand for the Court to explain its decision. We find, however, that the Superior Court’s reasons appear obvious from the record and it provided some basis for its decision. Thus, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. (3) A police officer stopped Perez while driving and learned that Perez had a suspended license. He also had multiple outstanding capiases. Perez denied having any contraband in his car and consented to a sear ch of the car. The police found heroin, gave Perez a Mi randa warning, and Perez agre ed to speak. Perez told

the officer that the heroin was his and ex plained the details of his recent purchase. 1 The police towed his car and later found a stolen gun inside. Police took Perez to the police station, and the parties dispute whether he was re-Mir andized. After the disputed re-Miranda rights were given, Perez confessed to the possession of the firearm. A grand jury indicted Pere z for multiple drug and firearm charges. 2 (4) Several days before his scheduled trial, Perez pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a person prohibited and ca rrying a concealed deadly weapon. In

1 App. to Opening Br. at A017. 2 The charges were Drug Dealing, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Pr ohibited, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Ca rrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Driving with a Susp ended License, and Disr egarding a Red Light.3 return, the State dropped the remaining charges. 3 Perez knew that the firearm offense carried a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. 4 Perez’s trial attorney stated at the sentencing hearing that he had a significant discussion with Perez about the plea agreement and reviewed the Trut h-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form with

him. 5 The court questioned Perez extensively about his mental state, whether he was coerced, whether he discussed his right s with counsel, and whether he understood what he was doing by pleading guilty. 6 Perez answered in the affirmative to each of the questions including that he was satis fied with his counsel’s representation. 7 (5) Six weeks later, Perez moved to withdraw his guilty plea , pro se , claiming that his counsel did not adequately investigate the facts of the arrest and did not explain to him that police illegall y seized evidence, which would not be admissible against him at trial. Perez argue d that his consent to a vehicle search was involuntary because the officer threatened to arrest his girlfriend. Perez’s counsel moved to withdraw and the Superior C ourt appointed new counsel. The parties submitted briefs and the Superi or Court held a hearing. (6) At the hearing, the parties ar gued the admissibility of Perez’s incriminating statements and whether Pe rez’s former counsel had sufficiently

3 The State also agreed to not pursue habitual offender sentencing. 4 App. to Opening Br. at A025. 5 Id. at A025-26, A035. 6 Id. at A027-32. 7 Id.4 considered their admissibility before advising Perez to take the plea offer. 8 The court requested that Perez’ s trial attorney complete a questionnaire regarding his representation of Perez. In response, Perez’ s trial attorney stated that he considered the consequences of filing a motion to su ppress evidence and discussed the decision

with Perez. 9 But, ultimately, trial counsel dete rmined that it was in Perez’s best interest not to present them to the court. 10 (7) The Superior Court denied the moti on after it “reviewed [Perez’s trial counsel’s] answers to the Court’s questi ons,” and found “tha t the defendant has

failed to meet his burden of demonstrating any ‘fair a nd just reason’ to warrant

withdrawal.” 11 On appeal, Perez argues that he cannot determine whether the Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion because the court did not provide adequate reasoning and failed to “refer to any factual evidence in the record or any legal principles.” 12 We review a decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea on appe al for abuse of discretion. 13

8 Id . at A060-96. 9 Id. at A101-03. 10 Id. Trial counsel admittedly missed the possibl e argument that Perez’s invocation of Miranda rights at some point inva lidated prior warnings. Id. at A102. But, he believ ed that “all the evidence necessary for conviction was obtained prior to [Per ez’s] statement, so suppressing the statement would have had no real effect.” Id. 11 Opening Br. Ex. C (quoting Patterson v. State , 684 A.2d 1234 (Del. 1996)). 12 Id. at 13. 13 Anderson v. State , 99 A.3d 226, 2014 WL 3511717, at *2 (Del. July 14, 2014) (TABLE).5 (8) Generally, the Superior Court must make “factual determinations and supply a legal rationale for a judici al decision as a matter of law.” 14 The “[f]ailure to do so may be an abuse of discretion.” 15 But, this Court “can affirm the decision as being within the fact finding or disc retionary power of the trial judge, if, upon a reading of the record in relation to the order, the reasons appear obvious.” 16 (9) Here, the Superior Court order states that the court reviewed the record and the supplements (trial counsel’s respons es), and it determined that Perez failed to meet the proper standard under Patterson v. State

. 17 Although a more detailed explanation would provide a better understandi ng of the court’s analysis, the lack of a more detailed reasoning does not require reversal in this appeal because the reasons for denial appear obvious. Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) provides that if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made after the court has accepted the plea but prior to imposition of sentencing, “the cour t may permit the withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.” 18 The court should grant a plea withdrawal in this situation if the plea was involuntary or the defendant

14 Holden v. State , 23 A.3d 843, 846 (Del. 2011). 15 Id. 16 Husband M v. Wife D , 399 A.2d 847, 848 (Del. 1979); see also Johnson v. Taylor , 901 A.2d 120, 2006 WL 1650802, at *1 (Del. June 13, 2006). 17 684 A.2d 1234 (Del. 1996). 18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(d).6 entered the plea because of a misc onception of the defendant’s rights. 19 The factors

that the court uses to determine whether a plea withdrawal will be granted are:

i. Whether there was a procedural defect in taking the plea; ii. Whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the plea agreement; iii. Whether the defendant has an ad equate basis to assert his legal innocence; iv. Whether the defendant had ade quate legal couns el throughout the proceedings; and v. Whether granting the motion will prejudice the State or unduly inconvenience the trial court. 20 (10) Even though Perez does not directly claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion, he does explain the reasons underlying the motion to

withdraw. 21 Perez argued that his trial counsel did not adequately investigate the

factual circumstances of his arrest and did not explain that police had illegally seized

the evidence that would be used against him at trial. 22 Perez also argued that he invoked his Miranda rights be fore making incriminating statements, but his trial

counsel never discussed th e possibility of challenging the admissibility of his

confessions. 23

19 Anderson , 2014 WL at *2. 20 Patterson , 684 A.2d at 1238 (holding that the factors “ do not lend themselves to a balancing act,” but “[c]ertain of the factors, standing alone, will themselves justify relief”). 21 These are the same reasons considered at the hearing below. 22 Opening Br. at 4. Perez argued that his consen t to search the vehicl e was involuntary because police threatened to arrest his gi rlfriend if he di d not consent. 23 Id. at 5.7 (11) Considering the first factor, ther e was no procedural defect in administering Perez’s plea. The State and Perez’s trial counsel discussed a sentencing agreement recommendation, ac knowledging that it was not binding on

the court. 24 The court questioned Perez thorou ghly to determine whether his plea was knowing and voluntary. 25 The court specifically que stioned Perez whether he discussed his rights with his attorney an d whether he was voluntarily waiving those rights. 26 The court went through each charge and its possible sentence, and then questioned Perez as to his understanding of the charges and sentence requirements. 27

Perez stated that he understood all of the rights and was voluntarily waiving them. 28 Perez also signed a Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. 29 (12) Perez only claimed, essen tially, that he was ine ffectively represented, not that he had a basis to assert his legal innocence. 30 Perez argued that his trial counsel did not protect his constitutional rights because counsel did not investigate the facts or file a motion to suppress. 31 Perez, however, stated that he was satisfied with his trial counsel’s representation during the proceeding. 32 In the questionnaire

24 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e). 25 App. to Opening Br. at A027-32. 26 Id. at A029. 27 Id. at A029-32. 28 Id. at A027-32. 29 Id . at A035. 30 Opening Br. at 5. 31 App. to Opening Br. at A038-41. 32 Id. at A031-32.8 returned to the court, Perez’s trial coun sel stated that he discussed with Perez whether to file a motion to suppress rega rding the search, but counsel thought that filing such a motion was a ri sk to a favorable plea. 33 Trial counsel made the strategic decision not to seek suppression. 34 Although trial counsel di d not discuss with Perez the legal issues surrounding Perez’s Miranda rights, trial counsel thought that, even

if some statements were made after Perez invoked his Miranda rights, Perez had already admitted to possession of narcotics before invoking his rights. 35 (13) As to the final factor, the Stat e does not claim that it would be prejudiced or inconvenienced should the c ourt grant Perez’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, so this factor is neutral. 36 (14) Based on these findings, the Superior Court carefully and thoroughly questioned Perez regarding his plea 37 and took the extra step of requesting answers from Perez’s former attorney about his re presentation of Perez and the tactical

decisions he made. 38 While the Superior Court’s or der provided a minimal basis for its decision, it does not require reversal when the court’s reasons appear obvious. Thus, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw a plea.

33 Id. at A101-02. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Answering Br. at 16. 37 App. to Opening Br. at A027-32. 38 Id. at A100-03.9 NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice