UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TRINA MARLENE YATES, 

Administratix of the Estate of

Thomas Yates,

Plaintiff-Appellee,  No. 01-1938

v.

MOTIVATION INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

LIMITED,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

H. Brent McKnight, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-99-337-3-MCK)

Argued: January 22, 2002

Decided: June 20, 2002

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and

GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Chief

Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Paul Christopher Lawrence, HEDRICK, EATMAN,

GARDNER & KINCHELOE, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for

Appellant. John Joseph Korzen, ANDERSON, KORZEN & ASSO-
CIATES, P.C., Kernersville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Terry L. Wallace, HEDRICK, EATMAN, GARDNER &

KINCHELOE, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Charles McB. Sasser, COX, GAGE & SASSER, Charlotte, North

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Motivation Industrial Equipment, Ltd. (Motivation), a Canadian

corporation, appeals the district court’s order denying its motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the record does not

establish that Motivation had the necessary minimum contacts with

North Carolina so as to comport with the requirements of due process,

we reverse. 

I.

Thomas Yates, an employee of Polar Plastics Inc. (Polar), located

in Mooresville, North Carolina, was fatally injured on July 18, 1997,

when a gantry crane manufactured by Motivation collapsed and fell

on him.1 Trina Yates, as administratrix of her husband’s estate, filed

a wrongful death action against Motivation in North Carolina Superior Court on July 14, 1999, alleging negligence and breach of war1Motivation sold the crane to Metric Storage Systems (Metric), a

Canadian corporation, knowing that Metric, in turn, would sell the crane

to Polar, also a Canadian corporation. Sometime after the crane arrived

at Polar’s Canadian plant, Polar shipped the crane to North Carolina.

However, Motivation had no knowledge that the crane was being

shipped to North Carolina, and the record is void of any evidence indicating Motivation was even aware that Polar had a North Carolina plant.

2 YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP.
ranties. Motivation, a corporation with its principal place of business

in Canada, removed the case to federal district court in North Carolina

on the basis of diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and

moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), for

lack of personal jurisdiction. After allowing Yates additional time to

conduct jurisdictional discovery, the magistrate judge, presiding by

consent of the parties, found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction

in this case was appropriate and denied Motivation’s motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. 

II.

Yates contends, and the magistrate judge found, that Motivation is

subject to the personal jurisdiction of the district court. We disagree.

For the reasons that follow, we find that the district court’s exercise

of personal jurisdiction over Motivation exceeds the limits of due process and is therefore constitutionally impermissible. 

Whether Motivation’s contacts with North Carolina were sufficient

to support the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is a

question of law which we review de novo. Christian Science Board

of Directors of the First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215

(4th Cir. 2001). It is well established that, in order for a district court

to validly assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant,

two conditions must be satisfied. Id. First, the exercise of jurisdiction

must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and

second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must not "overstep the

bounds" of Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. Anita’s

New Mexico Style Mexican Food, Inc. v. Anita’s Mexican Foods

Corp., 201 F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000). Motivation does not separately contest that it is subject to North Carolina’s long-arm statute,

which has been construed to extend to the outer limits allowed by the

Due Process Clause.2See Hiwassee Stables, Inc. v. Cunningham, 135

2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4) states in part, 

Local Injury; Foreign Act. — In any action for wrongful death

occurring within this State or in any action claiming injury to

person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that

at or about the time of the injury either: 

YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP. 3
N.C. App. 24, 27, 519 S. E. 2d 317, 230 (1999). Thus, the scope of

our inquiry is simply whether North Carolina may, consistent with

due process, exercise personal jurisdiction over Motivation. In other

words, we must decide whether Motivation has "certain minimum

contacts" with the forum, such that "maintenance of the suit does not

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations

omitted). 

We view the two species of personal jurisdiction, general and specific, through distinct lenses. See generally ESAB Group v. Centricut,

126 F. 3d 617, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1997). When a cause of action arises

out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum, a court may seek to

exercise specific jurisdiction over that defendant if it purposefully

directs activities toward the forum state and the litigation results from

alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414

(1984). However, when the cause of action does not arise out of the

defendant’s contacts with the forum, general jurisdiction may be exercised upon a showing that the defendant’s contacts are of a "continuous and systematic" nature. Id. at 416. 

Yates has never claimed that Motivation’s contacts with North Carolina are sufficiently continuous and systematic to subject Motivation

to general personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. Here, as the district

court duly observed, Motivation clearly was not engaged in "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" activities in North Carolina such

as to subject it to general jurisdiction in the state. Thus, we need only

determine whether Motivation’s contacts were sufficient to subject it

to specific personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. 

III.

This circuit has applied a three part test when evaluating the propriety of exercising specific jurisdiction: 1) whether and to what extent

b. Products, materials or thing processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed, within this

State in the ordinary course of trade. 

4 YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP.
the defendant "purposely availed" itself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum state, and thus invoked the benefits and

protections of its laws, 2) whether the plaintiff’s claim arises out of

those forum-related activities, and 3) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutionally "reasonable." Nolan, 259 F.3d at 215-16 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16, and Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 476-77 (1985)). For the reasons discussed below, Yates cannot satisfy this test. 

A.

1.

Yates contends that the agency relationship between The Shannon

Group, Inc. (Shannon) and Motivation proves that Motivation purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of North Carolina law. In 1994, Shannon, located in Goodlettsville, Tennessee,

agreed to represent Motivation as its agent in Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida.3

 The agreement

was for an initial term of one year and would be automatically

renewed for successive one year terms, unless either party gave notice

to the other party two months prior to the expiration of the original

term. 

Robert Shannon, President of Shannon and the North Carolina

sales agent for Motivation, stated in an affidavit that as part of the

agreement with Motivation, the Shannon Group retained the right to

represent other manufacturers. Shannon was not, nor has ever been an

exclusive agent for Motivation. Furthermore, prior to July 18, 1997,

the day of Thomas Yates’ death, Shannon made no sales and received

no revenue on behalf of Motivation from any entity in North Carolina.

Yates offered no evidence to contradict Robert Shannon’s representations.4

 There is no evidence in the record that Shannon took Motivation’s brochures, products or sales materials to North Carolina. There

3

In 1995, the contract was amended to exclude Florida and include

Mississippi. 

4Yates had over one year and ten months, the period of time between

Motivation filing its motion to dismiss and the magistrate judge ruling

on the motion, to depose Robert Shannon, but did not. 

YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP. 5
is also no evidence that Shannon made any solicitations in person or

otherwise on behalf of Motivation in North Carolina. Yates offered

no evidence that Shannon, as Motivation’s agent, conducted any

activities whatsoever in North Carolina. Motivation’s agreement with

Shannon therefore does not satisfy the first prong of the test for specific jurisdiction. 

Our dissenting colleague suggests that hiring a sales representative

for the forum state as part of a strategy of targeting this country and

the particular state for increased sales would amount to purposeful

availment, even if, as here, the agent was not an exclusive agent and

no actions were taken by that agent on behalf of the company. We

believe more is needed. However, even if we were to assume that the

agency relationship in this case amounted to purposeful availment,

because Thomas Yates’ death did not arise from, or relate to in any

way, Motivation’s agency relationship with Shannon, the second

prong of the test is not met.5 Even if Yates had offered evidence that

5The district court found that Motivation conceded that Yates’ claim

arose out of or related to Motivation’s activities in North Carolina. (J.A.

508). This finding was erroneous. Motivation merely conceded that the

injury to Yates’ decedent occurred in North Carolina. 

In Motivation’s supplemental brief in support of its motion to dismiss,

Motivation stated: 

[I]n Honeycutt, this Court discussed the two tests set forth by the

Supreme Court in determining whether defendant’s contact satisfied the requirements of due process for the Court to assert jurisdiction and for the Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of

jurisdiction. If a cause of action did not arise in or is unrelated

to the defendant’s activity in the forum state, then the appropriate standard is the continuous and systematic test set forth in

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (i.e., general jurisdiction). If the cause of action either arose in or is related to the

defendant’s activities in the forum state, the lesser burden of

showing the defendant purposely [sic] directed its activities

toward the forum state applies. See Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 528 (1985).

(i.e., specific jurisdiction). 

In this case, since the injury to the Plaintiff’s Decedent

occurred in North Carolina, the prima facie burden the Plaintiff

6 YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP.
Shannon took some actions on behalf of Motivation in North Carolina

before Thomas Yates’ death, there was no evidence presented that

Shannon, or any other sales representative in the United States, was

involved in the sale of the crane in any capacity. The sale of the crane

had nothing to do with sales efforts in North Carolina, or sales efforts

in the United States for that matter. The crane was sold in Canada, by

one Canadian corporation to another Canadian corporation.6

needs to establish is that the Defendant purposely [sic] directed

its activities toward the forum state. (emphasis added). 

Defendant’s Supp. Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 6. 

As evidenced above, Motivation relied on Honeycutt v. Tour Carriage,

Inc., 997 F. Supp. 694, 704 (W.D.N.C. 1996). Unfortunately, Honeycutt

misstates Helicopteros. In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court explained

that a state exercises specific jurisdiction in a suit "arising out of or

related to the defendant’s contacts with a forum." 466 U.S. at 414, n.8.

(emphasis added). It did not state that specific jurisdiction is conferred

in cases simply because an injury occurs in that state, which is perhaps

how Honeycutt could be read. 

After citing Honeycutt, Motivation merely stated that because Thomas

Yates’ injury occurred in North Carolina, Yates needed to establish purposeful availment, i.e., specific jurisdictional analysis was proper. It

never conceded that the cause of action arose out of its contacts with

North Carolina. Whether the district court found a concession because it

misread Motivation’s statement, or because it accepted Motivation’s (and

Honeycutt’s) misapplication of the law, we are not bound by the misreading or the misapplication. 

6

In determining whether a claim arises out of forum-related activities,

circuits have applied different tests. For example, the Ninth Circuit

applies a "but for" test, where courts consider whether a plaintiff’s claims

would have arisen but for the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.

See Doe I. v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001). On the

other hand, the Sixth Circuit does not require that "the cause of action

formally ‘arise from’ defendant’s contacts with the forum; rather, this

criterion requires only ‘that the cause of action, of whatever type, have

a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-state activities.’" Bird v.

Parsons, 2002 WL 1012175, *7 (6th Cir. 2002). Even if we employ the

less stringent Sixth Circuit test, the evidence before us establishes no

substantial connection between the cause of action and any of Motivation’s alleged in-state activities. 

YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP. 7
Yates also contends that Motivation purposely availed itself to

North Carolina when it made two sales to North Carolina entities in

1998. Even if we were to find that these sales showed purposeful

availment, Thomas Yates’ death in 1997 simply could not arise from

or relate to sales made in 1998, after his death. 

2.

Motivation’s general solicitation activities, separately or taken as

a whole, likewise do not establish purposeful availment.7 Its advertisements in the Thomas Register are not sufficient contacts. This circuit has held that a listing in the Thomas Register, a nationally

distributed trade journal, is not enough to confer personal jurisdiction

in a particular state. Federal Insurance Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886

F. 2d 654, 659 (4th Cir. 1989). While Motivation placed advertisements in the Thomas Register, there is no evidence in the record that

the advertisements were directed toward North Carolina residents,

that North Carolina residents responded to them, or that Motivation

sent any products to North Carolina as a result of them. Like the

advertisements in the Thomas Register, Motivation’s advertisement in

Crane Magazine also does not show purposeful availment to North

Carolina. There is no evidence in the record that the advertisement in

Crane Magazine was directed toward North Carolina residents, or that

inquiries or sales were generated from the advertisement. See Cancun

Adventure Tours, Inc. v. Underwater Designer Co., 862 F.2d 1044,

1046 (4th Cir. 1989). 

The fact that Motivation operates a website likewise does not prove

purposeful availment here. There is no evidence in the record to suggest, nor has Yates argued at any point, that the website is anything

7Motivation had a liability insurance policy with Commercial Union

Assurance Company of Canada at the time of Thomas Yates’ death. The

policy covered Motivation if a liability suit was brought against it in the

United States. Yates argues that Motivation is subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina because it owned an insurance policy that covered claims throughout the United States. We find this argument

unpersuasive. Motivation neither directed activity toward North Carolina

nor purposefully availed itself to North Carolina by merely purchasing

this broad, nationwide insurance policy. 

8 YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP.
more than a "passive" website, where general information about Motivation is posted. See Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,

418 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot

Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). There is also no evidence in the record that any North Carolina entity purchased products

from the website or purchased products because of the website. 

Again, even if we were to assume that the advertisements or the

website established Motivation’s purposeful availment to North Carolina, it would strain credulity for us to find that Yates’ claim somehow arose out of these contacts. Yates has offered no evidence that

would establish even a tenuous link between the advertisements or the

website and the death of her husband. 

B.

Yates contends that the district court could exercise specific jurisdiction over Motivation simply because Motivation manufactured the

crane and did not limit its distribution of the crane so as to exclude

North Carolina. We disagree. A "stream of commerce" theory of

personal jurisdiction will not save Yates’ case. See World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Motivation

manufactured the crane in Canada and sold it to a Canadian sales representative, who in turn sold it to Polar, a Canadian corporation. The

crane was initially delivered to Polar in Brampton, Ontario. There is

simply no evidence in the record that Motivation was aware that the

gantry crane at issue might be sent to or used in North Carolina.

Polar, fortuitously, transported the crane to its North Carolina plant.

The Supreme Court has rejected the application of a stream of commerce theory when, as here, the defendant delivers the product into

the stream of commerce without any expectation that it would be purchased or used by a consumer in the forum state. See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 943 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98). We find no evidence

in the record to indicate that Motivation should have "reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court" in North Carolina when it placed the

crane into the stream of commerce in Canada. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 

YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP. 9
C.

Because Yates cannot show that Motivation "purposely availed"

itself of the privileges of conducting activities in North Carolina or

that her claims arise out of Motivation’s North Carolina-related activities, we need not consider the third prong of the test for specific

jurisdiction—whether jurisdiction would be reasonable.8See Phillips

Exeter Academy v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc. 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st

Cir. 1999) (explaining that because an affirmative finding on each of

the three elements is required to support a finding of specific jurisdiction, only "if the proponent’s case clears the first two hurdles" must

the court then analyze the overall reasonableness of an exercise of

jurisdiction); see also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th

Cir. 2001) (stating that the court need not reach the third prong of the

specific jurisdiction test when plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to

establish either purposeful availment or that the cause of action arises

out of defendant’s contacts with the forum). 

IV.

On the facts and record set before us, Yates did not establish personal jurisdiction over Motivation in North Carolina. As such, we

reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

WILKINSON, Chief Judge, dissenting: 

Trina Yates brought a wrongful death action after a Gantry crane

manufactured by Motivation Industrial Equipment Limited collapsed

on her husband and killed him. The question is whether a foreign cor8The overall reasonableness of whether jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, depends on several

factors—1) the burden on the defendant, 2) the interests of the forum

state, 3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief in the forum, 4) the efficient resolution of controversies as between states, and 5) the shared

interests of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social

policies. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 946. 

10 YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP.
poration that purposefully avails itself of an American forum can be

required to defend there. In my view, the majority’s answer is mistaken. 

My good colleagues find no purposeful availment.* However, at

the time of the accident, Motivation had: (1) initiated a company policy to sell its products in the United States; (2) represented to American citizens that it had an address here; (3) hired a sales representative

to oversee sales and service in a number of states, including North

Carolina; (4) purchased liability insurance to protect itself in the event

of an accident in the United States, including North Carolina; (5) and

*The district court explicitly found that Motivation had "concede[d]"

the issue of whether Yates’ claim arose out of or was related to the company’s activities in the forum state. Notwithstanding the concession, the

majority determines that the arising-out-of prong of the specificjurisdiction test has not been met. But such concessions by litigants are

binding in general, and the requirement of personal jurisdiction can be

waived. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456

U.S. 694, 703 (1982). Motivation is therefore bound by this concession.

It never appealed the district court’s finding of a concession, and it never

even filed a reply brief before this court to contest Yates’ contention that

it had made the concession. What we have here, therefore, is a double

problem from Motivation’s standpoint — namely, a concession followed

by a waiver. 

The majority goes to great lengths to excuse Motivation’s litigation

conduct. It asserts that the district court erred in attributing this concession to Motivation, remarking that the court below either misread Motivation’s brief or accepted the company’s misapplication of the law. The

majority further states that we are not bound by this misreading or misapplication. Ante at 7 n.5. But there was no misreading in view of the

majority’s own concession that Motivation misunderstood the governing

law. And there is no doubt that the company is bound by its legal error

because we are dealing with a waivable form of jurisdiction. Even if the

majority is correct that Motivation did not concede that Yates’ claim

arose out of or was related to Motivation’s activities in North Carolina,

the company certainly conceded the issue of whether the plaintiff’s claim

had so arisen when it stated that "the prima facie burden the Plaintiff

needs to establish is that the Defendant purposely directed its activities

toward the forum state." Defendant’s Supp. Brief in Support of Motion

to Dismiss at 6. It is on this primary issue that I primarily take exception

with the majority’s view. 

YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP. 11
advertised its products in nationally distributed trade journals and

magazines. 

It is not sufficient to analyze these facts piecemeal. And taken

together, there is no doubt that Motivation has purposefully availed

itself of the benefits and protections of North Carolina law. The

majority is correct to note that merely placing a product in the stream

of interstate commerce will not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 658 (4th

Cir. 1989). Here, however, we have more. See id. at 659 (distinguishing "cases where a manufacturer employs an intermediary or distributor in the forum state"). Indeed, I am not aware of any case in which

a court found no personal jurisdiction where a foreign company continuously rehired a sales representative for the forum state, all as part

of a strategy of targeting this country and that state for increased

sales. 

The specifics of the Sales Agent Contract entered into by Motivation and its North Carolina sales agent are worthy of consideration.

On March 21, 1994, the parties entered into an agreement, renewable

each year, in which the company "appoint[ed] [Shannon] as its exclusive and sole agent for the sale of [Motivation’s] manufactured products in the territory . . . set out herein." Motivation assigned Shannon

the area of the United States encompassing Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. In April 1995,

Florida was removed from Shannon’s sales area and Mississippi was

added. This territorial change is reflected in a hand-written amendment to the contract. But North Carolina has remained a part of Shannon’s assigned territory since the contract was first formed. Indeed,

Shannon continues to represent Motivation in North Carolina to this

day. 

The majority makes much of how little Shannon accomplished on

behalf of Motivation in North Carolina. But whether or not Shannon

was an effective sales representative is of no consequence. Motivation

asserts that it has enjoyed limited success in obtaining business in the

United States in general and North Carolina in particular. However,

it is clear that the company did purposefully direct its sales efforts to

that end. 

12 YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP.
As a consequence, the exercise of federal jurisdiction in North Carolina would not violate Motivation’s "liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which [it] has

established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’" Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Similarly, the exercise

of jurisdiction would not interfere with the company’s ability "to

structure [its] primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to

where that conduct will and will not render [it] liable to suit." WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 

Having found that the first two prongs of the specific jurisdiction

inquiry are satisfied, I proceed to consider the final element of the

test. This prong concerns the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction

— that is, whether the exercise of jurisdiction would offend "‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’" Int’l Shoe, 326

U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

Though the majority finds it unnecessary to reach this issue in view

of its decision on the first two prongs, the majority nevertheless

chooses to consider the second element of the test despite its dispositive handling of the first. Indeed, the majority’s silence on the question of reasonableness is instructive because it is this component of

the inquiry that most dramatically reveals the injustice of preventing

Yates from bringing suit in North Carolina. 

The reasonableness inquiry requires a court to consider several factors, including "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum

State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief" in the forum. A

court "must also weigh in its determination ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering

fundamental substantive social policies.’" Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.

Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292); see also Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945-46 (4th Cir. 1994). As the

district court held, these considerations compel the conclusion that the

exercise of jurisdiction in this case comports with due process. 

To begin with, though the burden on Motivation of defending itself

in a foreign forum is not trivial, see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114, that burYATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP. 13
den is far from unfair in view of Motivation’s decision to do business

in North Carolina. Indeed, it may be cost effective for the company

to conduct discovery and try the case in North Carolina because the

accident site, the witnesses, and the crane itself are all located there.

In addition, the interests of both Yates and North Carolina in the

exercise of jurisdiction over Motivation are compelling. The accident

took place in North Carolina, and the company’s alleged negligence

caused the death of a North Carolina citizen. Further, the decedent left

behind three children and a spouse who is also a North Carolina citizen. There can be no doubt that the state has a strong interest in rectifying wrongs allegedly committed within its territory against its

citizens. And the state has an equally strong interest in protecting its

consumers by requiring foreign manufacturers to comply with its

safety standards, and by ensuring "the recovery by one of its citizens

of appropriate compensation, if there is a substantive cause of action."

Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir. 1973).

Finally, in view of Motivation’s claim that it is not subject to suit

in any state, Yates may not be able to sue the company in any jurisdiction in the United States. It is not right to let Motivation do business in this country while at the same time relieving it of the

obligation to defend here when the death of an American citizen is

allegedly caused by one of its products. And it is just as unfair to

require this North Carolina widow to go to Canada to find out if her

husband’s life was negligently taken. 

I respectfully dissent. 

14 YATES v. MOTIVATION INDUS. EQUIP.