PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 11/6/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

SYLVIA MARTINEZ, MICHELLE ARCHULETA, CHRISTINA ARCHULETA, YVONNE LOVATO, ROBERTA AMAYA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v. BENJAMIN J. ROSCOE, GERALDINE M. ROSCOE, owners of Valle Del Norte Apartments,

Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 95-2186 & 96-2020

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO (D.C. No. CIV-93-1156-LH)

Submitted on the briefs: Karen J. Meyers and Angelica Anaya-Allen, Legal AidSociety of Albuquerque, Inc., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appel lees. Benjamin J. Roscoe and Geraldine M. Roscoe, pro se.
Before PORFILIO, LOGAN, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered submitted without o ral argument.

-2- LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

Defendants Benjamin J. Roscoe and Geraldine M. Rosc oe appeal from the district court’s order permanently enjoining them f rom specified actions relative to an apartment building they own in New Mexico. 1 Plaintiffs are current or former tenants of the apartments. The mortgage on the apartments is insured and subsidized by the United States Department of Housi ng and Urban Development (HUD), upon certain conditions pertaining to the us e and management of the property. On October 8, 1993, the district court p ermanently enjoined defendants from engaging in various activities pertaining to the apartments. In 1995, plaintiffs sought to enforce the 1993 permanent inj unction as the result of defendant Benjamin J. Roscoe’s attempts to evict th em and collect monetary damages. Following a hearing, the district court found that defendants had violated the 1993 permanent injunction, referred the questio n of defendants’ contempt of court to the United States Attorney, and again perm anently enjoined defendants-3-

from interfering with the management of the apartme nts. The district court also entered an award of attorney fees against defendant s as a sanction for bad-faith conduct and willful disobedience of court orders. Appeal No. 95-2186 In case No. 95-2186, defendants challenge the 1995 permanent injunction on the ground that it was based, in part, on a find ing that defendants violated a Regulatory Agreement between defendants and HUD. D efendants claim the Regulatory Agreement is void because neither defend ant signed a mortgagor’s oath, as required by 12 U.S.C. § 1713(b), and there fore, it cannot support the 1995 permanent injunction. In the prior proceeding culminating in the 1993 permanent injunction, defendants raised the issue o f whether the Regulatory Agreement could form a basis for enjoining them. I R. doc. 11. The district court denied relief on that basis, id. at doc.14, and defendants did not appeal. Under the doctrine of law of the case, “a legal dec ision made at one stage of litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity to do so existed, becomes the law of the case for future sta ges of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time.” Capps v. Sullivan , 13 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). The issue of whether the Regulatory Agre ement can support a permanent injunction was resolved by the district c ourt in 1993; that decision was-4-

not challenged by appeal. Accordingly, defendants are barred by the doctrine of law of the case from raising the issue in this appe al. Defendants also assert that plaintiffs are not prop er parties, arguing that plaintiffs have no rights as tenants under either f ederal laws or any contract between defendants and HUD. Defendants’ argument d oes not implicate this court’s jurisdiction; rather, it raises the issue o f whether plaintiffs are real parties in interest with a right to bring the cause of acti on. See FDIC v. Bachman , 894 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 1990). The district court’s determination that plaintiffs were entitled to maintain this action wa s integral to the 1993 permanent injunction. Defendants did not appeal that order. Accordingly, defendants now are barred by the doctrines of waiver, see id. at 1236, and law of the case, see Capps , 13 F.3d at 353, from challenging plaintiffs’ abil ity to maintain this action. The district court’s 1995 permanent injunction is, therefore, affirmed. Defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ brief or f or an extension of time is denied. Appeal No. 96-2020 In case No. 96-2020, defendants appeal the districtcourt’s order requiring them to pay plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees as a sanct ion for their bad-faith conduct and willful disobedience of the court’s orders. Th ey challenge the district court’s finding that they acted in bad faith and assert that any punishment for improper actions is appropriate only in a contempt action br ought by the government in a-5-

separate proceeding. Defendants further argue thatthe amount of attorney’s fees awarded is excessive. Finally, they maintain that attorney’s fees were not warranted because legal services were provided at n o cost to plaintiffs by a publicly funded legal aid program. “We review a court’s imposition of sanctions under its inherent power for abuse of discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). We review the district court’s determination whether the parties have complied with its orders under the clearly erroneous standard, mi ndful that the district court is in the best position to make that determination. See Gottlieb v. Wiles , 11 F.3d 1004, 1013 (10th Cir. 1993). The district court awarded plaintiffs attorney’s fe es under an exception to the American Rule which allows a court to “assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or f or oppressive reasons.” Chambers , 501 U.S. at 45-46 (quotations omitted). Defendants allege that their actions were not taken in bad faith, and were not v exatious, wanton, or oppressive. We have considered defendants’ stateme nt of their reasons for their actions. We cannot say that the district court’s f indings are clearly erroneous, particularly given the specific findings made by th e district court on defendants’ bad faith and disobedience of its orders. See Sterling Energy, Ltd. v. Friendly Nat’l Bank , 744 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1984) (trial courtmust “make a-6-

finding of bad intent or improper motive by the gui lty party before awarding attorneys fees.”). We are not impressed with defen dants’ argument that they may be punished in a separate contempt proceeding for the same conduct punished here. This claim of some possible future unspecifi ed detriment is too speculative for our consideration. Cf. Whitmore v. Arkansas , 495 U.S. 149, 150 (1990) (speculative theory of possible future injury insuf ficient to establish Art. III injury in fact). Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ attorneys seek fe es in this action for the same work for which they were awarded attorney’s fe es in a different landlord/tenant action in the Metropolitan Court. The district court found, “[t]here is no evidence before the Court as to whet her any fees were awarded against Defendants in the Metropolitan Court procee ding.” II R. doc. 52 at 11. Defendants have not brought to this court’s attenti on information to the contrary. Therefore, we will not disturb the district court’s finding. Defendants also claim that the fees awarded were un reasonable; however, they made only generalized objections to the amountof the fees awarded, without any “evidence challenging the accuracy and reasonab leness of the hours charged.” Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 892 n.5 (1984). Therefore, they have waived their right to challenge the determination that the fees awarded were reasonable.-7-

Finally, defendants argue that because plaintiffs’ legal services were provided by a publicly funded legal aid program, de fendants should not be required to pay them. Courts have upheld attorney’ s fee awards to publicly funded legal services providers when attorney’s fee s were authorized by statute. Rodriguez v. Taylor , 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d Cir. 1977) (attorney’ s fees in ADEA case paid to nonprofit, federally funded legal services provider), cert. denied , 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Torres v. Sachs , 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1976) (federal statute provided for fees in voting rights case; no congressional limitation on amount payable to publicly funded organizations) ; see also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey , 447 U.S. 54, 70 n.9 (1980) (attorney’s fees in Ti tle VII case paid to public interest legal services provider); B lum , 465 U.S. at 894-95 (attorney’s fees paid to private nonprofit legal se rvices organization pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988). We perceive no reason to distinguish between attorn eys who are paid by a party and attorneys who are paid with public funds. Further, the purpose of the award of attorney’s fees in this case was to sancti on defendants; requiring defendants to pay plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees will serve that purpose. See , e.g. , Rodriguez , 569 F.2d at 1245 (“[A]ssessing fees against defen dants in all circumstances [including those in which plaintiffs were represented by publicly funded legal providers] may deter wrongdoing in the first place.”). Accordingly,-8-

we conclude that the district court did not abuse i ts discretion in awarding attorney’s fees against defendants.
AFFIRMED.