I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4837 

To authorize the Space Shuttle to be flown from 2010 through 2015, and 

to authorize appropriations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for this purpose. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 19, 2007 

Mr. WELDON of Florida (for himself and Mr. FEENEY) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Science and Technology 

A BILL 

To authorize the Space Shuttle to be flown from 2010 

through 2015, and to authorize appropriations for the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration for this 

purpose. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Spacefaring Priorities 

5 for America’s Continued Exploration Act’’ or the ‘‘SPACE 

6 Act’’. 

7 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) RUSSIA IS NOT A RELIABLE PARTNER.—(A) 

2 Unless Space Shuttle operations are extended be3 yond 2010, the United States will be heavily reliant 

4 on Russia to supply crew and possibly cargo trans5 port services to the International Space Station dur6 ing the gap period of 2010 through 2015. There will 

7 be no other way to fly our astronauts into space dur8 ing this period. 

9 (B) The United States should not increase its 

10 reliance on Russia to transport American astronauts 

11 into space, given the increasingly divergent views 

12 and posturing from Russia. Russia opposes the 

13 United States plan to base an antimissile radar sys14 tem in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles 

15 in Poland to deal with the threat posed by the Ira16 nian nuclear weapons and missile programs. Russia 

17 also suspended its participation in the Conventional 

18 Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, one of the most sig19 nificant arms control agreements of the Cold War 

20 years. Additionally, Russia continues to arm some of 

21 America’s most hostile adversaries, Iran and Ven22 ezuela. Despite United States objections, Russia sold 

23 billions of dollars worth of weapons to the regime of 

24 Hugo Chavez in 2006. Such meddling is a possible 

25 violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a throwback to 


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1 the Cold War era. Even more troublesome is the 

2 Russian history of weapons trading with Iran. Rus3 sia has supplied advanced conventional arms tech4 nology, missile technology, and nuclear technologies 

5 to this very anti-American regime. 

6 (2) RUSSIA HAS ABUSED PAST NASA COOPERA7 TION AGREEMENTS.—(A) In the late 1990s, Russia 

8 fell short in fulfilling its commitment to the Inter9 national Space Station. 

10 (B) The National Aeronautics and Space Ad11 ministration (in this Act referred to as ‘‘NASA’’) 

12 was forced to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars 

13 to enable the Russians to complete the critical Space 

14 Station service module Zvezda, without which the 

15 International Space Station could not operate. 

16 (C) Russia delayed completion of the Zvezda 

17 service module for several years. Under the Inter18 national Space Station agreement, the Russian gov19 ernment had committed to fund as well as build the 

20 Zvezda service module. Subsequent transfers from 

21 the United States, in order to complete the module, 

22 reflect serious Russian mismanagement in the field 

23 of space. 

24 (D) In 2000, while Russia was failing to meet 

25 its commitment to the International Space Station, 


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1 Russia was diverting financial and human resources 

2 away from fulfilling its International Space Station 

3 commitments in order to keep the Russian’s Mir 

4 Space Station aloft. 

5 (E) Russia’s past shortcomings in fulfilling 

6 commitments to its international space partners 

7 should serve as a warning to the United States as 

8 we consider increased reliance on Russian space 

9 services in the future. It is not prudent for the 

10 United States to depend on Russia for access to 

11 space given our past experience with this relation12 ship. 

13 (3) AMERICAN SPACE SCIENCE SHOULD NOT BE

14 DEPENDENT ON RUSSIAN SUPPORT.—(A) The 

15 United States has already invested billions of dollars 

16 in the International Space Station program since its 

17 inception. 

18 (B) There is much research of great value being 

19 conducted in space, and on the International Space 

20 Station, that may yield tremendous gains. Research 

21 being conducted on the International Space Station 

22 may help scientists back on Earth develop medicines 

23 to treat diseases and help us better understand the 

24 Earth’s climate. Many scientists believe that the 

25 microgravity environment of space will enable the 


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1 development of new drugs, vaccines, and other thera2 pies. Equipment on the International Space Station 

3 will monitor stratospheric gases, and investigate 

4 ozone chemistry. 

5 (4) THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE ASSURED

6 ACCESS TO SPACE.—(A) To ensure that the United 

7 States realizes the dividends from the considerable 

8 investment we have made in the International Space 

9 Station, we need to ensure continued access to space 

10 for our astronauts. However, NASA’s plan for trans11 port of crew to and from the International Space 

12 Station fails to provide necessary redundancies to 

13 provide assured access to space. 

14 (B) NASA anticipates that the Russian Soyuz 

15 spacecraft will be the only vehicle for astronaut crew 

16 rotation to the International Space Station after 

17 2010. From 2011 until the planned operation of 

18 Orion in 2015, NASA likely has no other option for 

19 transporting American astronauts to space other 

20 than on Russian vehicles. 

21 (C) NASA has conceded that without the Space 

22 Shuttle, it will be unable to transport the Alpha 

23 Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) to the International 

24 Space Station. Scientists involved in the development 

25 of the AMS acknowledge that it will enhance sciVerDate Aug 31 2005 02:37 Dec 22, 2007 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4837.IH H4837

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1 entific discoveries. While the AMS has cost over 

2 $1,500,000,000 to develop and build, NASA has 

3 stated that the remaining Space Shuttle manifest 

4 does not allow for transport of the AMS and that it 

5 will not be an option to retrofit another launch vehi6 cle in order to fly it into space. Only by extending 

7 Space Shuttle operations beyond 2010 will NASA be 

8 able to transport the AMS to the International 

9 Space Station. As long as the AMS meets all re10 quired standards to verify its validity and justify its 

11 transport on the Space Shuttle, NASA should fulfill 

12 its obligation to the Department of Energy and our 

13 international partners. 

14 (D) In addition, the Japanese Centrifuge Ac15 commodation Module, which can only fly to the 

16 International Space Station on the Space Shuttle, 

17 will also be unable to reach the Space Station absent 

18 extending Space Shuttle operations. 

19 (5) A BETTER APPROACH.—(A) Due to NASA’s 

20 lack of a backup plan for reliance on the Russians 

21 for transport of American astronauts to space, the 

22 United States needs a better approach. The best ap23 proach is the Space Shuttle, a proven, domestic 

24 source of space transport for assured access to 


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1 space, including the International Space Station, for 

2 crew and cargo transport. 

3 (B) With 2 Shuttle missions per year during 

4 the human spaceflight program flight gap between 

5 Shuttle and Orion, currently scheduled from 2010 

6 through 2015, we can replace our need to rely on 

7 the Russians for crew rotation for the International 

8 Space Station. 

9 (C) Savings from replacing Russian transport 

10 services to the International Space Station with the 

11 Space Shuttle would pay for a portion of the costs 

12 for flying 2 Space Shuttle missions per year. 

13 (D) Only by closing the gap between 2010 and 

14 2015, or until the Orion is operational, will our Na15 tion be able to keep our Nation’s highly skilled and 

16 critically important spaceworkers and engineers 

17 gainfully employed, and mitigate the loss of critical 

18 skills. 

19 (E) By extending Space Shuttle operations, 

20 NASA may realize considerable savings by no longer 

21 having to pay retention bonuses to critical space 

22 workers. But retention bonuses would not be the 

23 only added costs associated with the end of Space 

24 Shuttle operations when critical skilled workers leave 

25 NASA or its contractors. Recruitment incentives for 


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1 new workers and contract cost increases could also 

2 be incurred by NASA since the majority of the Ken3 nedy Space Center’s workforce are contractors. 

4 (F) The success of the Constellation program 

5 will depend on having the most skilled and experi6 enced workforce possible. The workforce gap, as cur7 rently envisioned by NASA, will jeopardize this. 

8 NASA has acknowledged that thousands of critical 

9 space workers will lose their jobs in the transition 

10 from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation pro11 gram. Continued operation of the Space Shuttle, but 

12 on a reduced flight requirement, while also inte13 grating these workers into the Orion program, is the 

14 best way to retain many of these critical workers 

15 and skill sets. 

16 (G) An August 2007 study by the Government 

17 Accountability Office, ‘‘NASA Progress Made on 

18 Strategic Human Capital Management, but Future 

19 Program Challenges Remain,’’ stated that ‘‘the 

20 agency as a whole faces challenges in recruiting and 

21 retaining highly experienced senior-level engineers in 

22 certain specialties. NASA’s principal workforce chal23 lenge will be faced in the transition to the next gen24 eration of human space flight systems.’’. 


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1 (H) This Act authorizes for NASA additional 

2 funding under section 4 to fully restore the appro3 priation shortfalls in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 

4 compared to the funds that were authorized for 

5 NASA. An additional $1,000,000,000 is authorized 

6 in section 4(b) to reimburse NASA for the costs in7 curred by NASA from the Space Shuttle return-to8 flight efforts following the Space Shuttle Columbia 

9 disaster. 

10 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON USE OF RUSSIAN SPACE SERV11 ICES. 

12 NASA shall not rely solely on the Russian govern13 ment for astronaut transport or cargo resupply services. 

14 This prohibition does not apply to the current Soyuz emer15 gency escape services for astronauts on the International 

16 Space Station. 

17 SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR NASA. 

18 (a) ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR

19 2007 SHORTFALL.—There are authorized to be appro20 priated to NASA $1,648,000,000, 41.6 percent of which 

21 shall be for Exploration Systems, and 28.7 percent of 

22 which shall be available for Space Operations. 

23 (b) COLUMBIA RETURN-TO-FLIGHT.—There are au24 thorized to be appropriated to NASA $1,000,000,000 for 

25 emergency funding to reimburse for Columbia return-toVerDate Aug 31 2005 02:37 Dec 22, 2007 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4837.IH H4837

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1 flight costs, of which the Exploration Systems and Space 

2 Operations Accounts shall receive funding at the rate pro3 portional to the amounts used to pay the costs associated 

4 with the Space Shuttle return-to-flight efforts. 

5 (c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR

6 2008 SHORTFALL.—There are authorized to be appro7 priated to NASA $1,064,000,000, 41.7 percent of which 

8 shall be for Exploration Systems. 

9 (d) PRESERVATION OF FUNDING FOR PROGRAMS.— 

10 NASA shall not take any funding from its Exploration 

11 Systems account or the Constellation program in order to 

12 fund the continued operation of the Space Shuttle pro13 gram as required in this Act. 

14 SEC. 5. EXTENDING SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONS. 

15 (a) USE OF SPACE SHUTTLE FOR ACCESS TO

16 SPACE.—NASA shall fly at least 2 Space Shuttle missions 

17 per year for crew transport, instead of Russian crew and 

18 cargo services, for the period of 2010 through 2015, or 

19 until Orion is operational. There are authorized to be ap20 propriated to NASA such sums as may be necessary, in 

21 addition to amounts otherwise authorized, to carry out 

22 this subsection, including for the production of more exter23 nal tanks as may be needed. 

24 (b) INSUFFICIENT FUNDING.—Except as provided 

25 under subsection (c), the requirements of this Act shall 


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1 have effect only to the extent that sufficient funding is 

2 appropriated, as authorized under subsection (a). Suffi3 cient funding is defined as funds required to fully or par4 tially comply with the requirements of this Act. 

5 (c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—NASA shall report to 

6 Congress not later than 90 days after the date of enact7 ment of this Act on the specific costs and actions needed 

8 to extend the operation of the Space Shuttle in accordance 

9 with this Act. 

10 (d) OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES.—As soon as pos11 sible, but no later than March 31, 2011, NASA shall in12 vestigate areas of reduced operations and enhanced cost 

13 savings and implement those that do not impinge the safe 

14 operation of the Space Shuttle program, including the fol15 lowing: 

16 (1) The possible retirement of one Space Shut17 tle orbiter, leaving 2 to remain operational, in a 

18 manner that ensures the safe operation of the Space 

19 Shuttle program. 

20 (2) Significantly reducing changes to the design 

21 of the Space Shuttle orbiters, in a manner that en22 sures the safe operation of the Space Shuttle pro23 gram. This shall include changes to the Space Shut24 tle software systems. 


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1 (3) Significantly reducing Space Shuttle orbiter 

2 configuration operations and payload configuration 

3 operations, in a manner that ensures the safe oper4 ation of the Space Shuttle program. 

5 (4) Maximizing the use of shared personnel be6 tween the continued operation of the Space Shuttle 

7 and Constellation and other NASA programs. 

8 (e) FACILITIES.—If conflicts arise in NASA’s efforts 

9 to allocate facilities, personnel, and other resources in 

10 order to fly the Space Shuttle as well as continue the de11 velopment of Constellation, then NASA shall identify in 

12 a report to Congress in advance such conflicts, along with 

13 recommendations as to how they can be mitigated. 

14 SEC. 6. SHUTTLE RECERTIFICATION. 

15 Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment 

16 of this Act, NASA shall define achievable and attainable 

17 requirements for operation of the Space Shuttle program 

18 beyond 2010, as recommended by the Columbia Accident 

19 Investigation Board. NASA shall transmit these require20 ments to Congress in the form of a report. NASA shall 

21 then immediately begin the process of satisfying these re22 quirements and shall satisfy all requirements no later than 

23 March 31, 2010. 

Æ 


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