### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A PR IL23, 200 9 S es sio n ANDREA S. MARTIN v . PATRICI A L. WI LLI AMS, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-002629-07 Kar en R. Williams, Jud ge

No. W2008-01509-C OA-R3-C V - Filed July 30, 2009

The c entra l issue in this case is which of two insuranc e compa nies is r equire d to provide uninsured moto ri s t cover ag e to the Plaintiff, who wa s injured in an automobile ac cident. The trial court g rante d summary

judgme nt to the company throug h which P laintiff had a utomobile insurance, finding that the company

insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passeng er held the primary policy . We reve rse a

nd rema nd.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded
A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R
. F ARMER , J., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined. Stephen C. Barton, Memphis, TN, for A ppellant, Shelter Insur anceCompany
Gl e nn K. Vi ne s, Jr ., Laur a M. Ow ing s, Me mph is, TN , f or Ap pe lle e , A nd re a

S. M art in
Da rryl D . G re sh a m, He a the r W. Fle tc he r, Me mph is, TN , for Ap pe lle e , Met ro po lit a n Gr ou p Pr op e rty and Casualty Insur anceCompany

OP IN IONPl ai nt i f f ’ s a l l ege d i nj ur i es i ncl ude “m ul t i pl e, s er i ous , and di s abl i ng i nj ur i es t o her body a s a w hol e, i ncl udi ng, 1 but not l i m i t ed t o he r l ef t l eg, r i ght ki dney, r i ght e ye, f ac e, ne ck, a nd di s fi gur em ent a nd s ca r r i ng[ ; ] ” pas t a nd pr es ent pai n; m edi ca l e xpens es ; l os s of e ar ni ngs a nd/ or l os s of e ar ni ng ca pac i t y; l os s of enj oym ent of l i f e; and m ent al a ngui s h.
Ch ana Bri t t m on w as t he nam ed i nsur ed on t he Shel t er P ol i cy. I t i s u ncl ear w het her M auri ce B r i t t m on w as 2 listed a s a n a d d iti o n a l i n su re d

.

T he s er vi ce of p r oces s b y w hi ch Shel t er an d M et L i f e w er e m ade p ar t i es t o t he s ui t w as purs uant t o T enness ee 3 C o d e A n n o t ated sec t i o n 5 6 -7 -1 2 0 6 (a), w h i ch p ro v i d es: A ny i ns ur ed i nt endi ng t o r el y on t he cove r age r equi r ed by [ t he uni ns ur ed m ot or i s t ve hi cl e cove r age s t at ut es ] shal l , i f

an y act i on i s i nst i t ut ed agai nst t he ow ner and o pera t or of an uni nsur ed m ot or vehi cl e, s er ve a c op y of t he proces s u po n t he i nsur ance c om pany i s s ui ng t he po l i cy i n t he m anner pr es cr i bed b y law , as th o u g h su c h in su ra n c e c o m p a n y w e re a p a rty d e fe n d a n t. -2- I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY On May 17, 2007, And re a Martin (“Plaintiff”) f iled a Complaint for per sonal injuries alleg edly sustained in a J une 7, 2006 automobile acc ident. At the t ime of t he accident, Pl aintiff wa s 1
a seve nteen year -old passeng er in a vehicle be ing dr iven by

Maurice Br ittmon, and co-owne d by Ma ur ice and Cha

na B ri ttm on (“ B ri ttm on

ve hic le ” ). Th e B ri ttm on ve hic le c oll ide d w itha

ve hic le be ingdr ive n b y

Patr ic ia Willi ams. Wil liams is unins ured. The Br ittmon vehicle is insured b y S h el t er Insuranc e Company (“Shelter ”). Plaintiff has an a utomobile liabili ty

policy with Metropolitan Group Proper ty and 2 Ca su a lty Ins ur anc e Com

pa ny (“ Me tL if e ” ), wh ic h p ro vid e s unin sure d mo tor ist (“ UM ” ) c ov e ra g e to Plaintiff as a pa sseng er in the B rittmon vehicle.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff named Patricia Wil liams, Maurice Br ittmon and Chana Br ittmon a s d e fe nd ants , a

nd a lle g e d th at bo th Wi lli ams a nd Ma ur ic e B ri ttm on neglig e ntl y op e rate d th e ir vehicles. Plaintiff a lso served Me tL ife a nd Shelter under

the UM provisions of their r espec tive po lic ie s. 3
O nJ u l y 2 3 , 2 0 0 7 , M a

ur i c e a n d C h an a

B r i t t m o nf

i l e d anA n s w e r

d e n yi n gl i a

b i l i ty. There afte r, on August 6, 2007, Shelter, as the i nsurer of t he B rittmon vehicle, answe red Plaintiff’s Com pla int and sp e c if ic a lly de nie d th at th e po licy issue d to Cha na B ri ttm on pr ov ide d c ov e ra g e to Pla int if f. On Au g us t 30 , 2 00 7, Me tL if e fi le d a n A ns we r, a dmi tti ngthat it i ssu e d a n a uto mob ile liability insurance policy to Plaintiff’ s pare nts, which was in for ce at the time of the ac cident, and which conta ined a provision providing UM cove rag e “to its insured a nd others who met the policy definition of an insure d and/or c overe d person.” Plaintiff was listed as an insure d household driver under the MetL ife policy

. She lte r f ile d a Mo tio n f or Summar y

Judg me nt o n Se pte mbe r 1 0, 20 07 , c la imi ngthat it s p o l i cy did not require it to provide U M cover ag e to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Par tial S u m m ary J u d gm en to nJ an u ary

1 5 , 2 0 0 8 , as k i n g th e t ri al co urtt o fi n d th atM et L i fe ’s UM co v er age was primar

y . MetL ife, then, f

iled a Mot ion for Sum mary J udg ment on Fe bruar y 18, 2008, askingT h is O rd e r w a s m a d e fin a l p u rs u a n t t o T e n n e sse e R u le o f C iv il P ro c e d u re 5 4 .0 2

. 4
-3- th e c o urt t o af

fi rm at i v el y ru l e th at S h el t er wa s re qu i re d t o p ro v i d e UM co v er age an d th ati t s co v er age was primar

y
. The motions were argued on F ebrua ry 21, 2008. On J une 27, 2008, the tria l court ente red an Or der g rantingMetL ife’s Motion for Summary J udg ment, finding that Shelter’s UM policy was 4 primary , and deny

ing Shelt er’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment. Specifica lly , the cour t found as fo llo ws : Plaintiff, Andrea

S. Ma rtin, was a passeng er in a car driven by

Def endant, Ma

urice Br itt m o n, upon which Shelter Insuranc e issued a policy that included uninsured motorist covera g e. Fur

ther, said policy provides, at pa g e 15, that a pa sseng er in the insured v eh i cle is an insure d for pur poses of medic al and de ntal cover ag e. Additionally , this case is controlled by Tenne ssee C o d e Annotate d, Section 56-7- 1201(b)( 3). Even in the e vent that Shelter Insuranc e’s policy did not by

its wording c ov e r P la int if

f, An dr e a S. M art in, a s a

pa sse ng e r i n th e c ov e re d v e hic le , th e statut e w o u l d o v e r r i d e th e p o l i c y.
I t is from this Order whic h Shelter now a ppeals.
II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED Shelte r h a s ti me ly f

il e d it s n o ti c e o f a

p p e a l an d p r e s e n ts th e f

o ll o w in g is s u e f

o r revie w, summa ri zed a s f oll ow s:
1. Whether, for the following rea sons, the trial court e rre d in holding that Shelter’ s policy is the primary policy to provide UM cove rag e to Plaintiff, and in re fusingto enforc e the pr ovision of the She lte r p oli c y

wh ic h e xclu de d Pl a int if

f f ro m c ov e ra g e :

a . Ins ur anc e po lic ie s sh ou ld b e c on str ue d a nd e nf or c e d li ke oth e r c on tr a c ts;
b. Plaintiff is not entit led to U M cover ag e under the clea r, unambig uous terms of the Shelter p o l i c y; c. Shelter’ s policy

complies with Tennesse e’s UM Statute; and
d

. S h e l t e r ’ s p o l i c y d o e s n o tv i o l at e T e n n e s s e e p u b l i c p o l i c y.

Additiona l l y , Plaintiff timely filed a notice of appe al and pr esents the f ollowing issue f

or revie w:The ge ner al “ D ef i ni t i ons ” s ec t i on pr ovi des t hi s e xpl ana t i on: 5

I n t hi s pol i cy, t he w or ds s how n i n bol d t yp e h av e t he m ea ni ngs s t at ed bel ow unl es s a di f f er ent m eani ng i s s t at ed i n a par t i cul ar covera ge or e nd ors em ent

. W ords i n bo l d t yp e w hi ch ar e der i ved f r o m a d e fi n e d wo r d h a v e t h e s a me r o o t me a n i n g
. T h e p l u r a l v e r s i o n o f a d e fi n e d w o r d h a s t h e s a me m e a n in g a s th e sin g u la r i f i t is a lso b o ld e d

. If a n y o f t h e se sa m e w o rd s a re u se d b u t n o t p r in te d in b o ld ty p e , t h e y h a v e th e ir c o m m o n d ic tio n a ry m e a n in g
. -4- 2. Whether under

the Tenne ssee UM Statute, a n automobile is being “used” by an individual who is travelingin it, reg ardle ss of whethe r it is being ope rate d by him or her or

another

. F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e re ve rs e the de c isi on of the c ir c uit

c ourt

. III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW
In the instant case , we a

re a sked to revie w the trial c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt to a defe ndant. Summary

judgme nt is appropriate when “ there is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and . . . the movingparty

is entitled to judgment as a matter of la w.” Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04. Ruling on a motion for summary judgme nt does not involve disputed issues of fac t, but only questions of law. Owner-Operator Indep. Drive rs Ass’n v. Con cord EFS, In c. , 59 S.W .3d 63, 68 (Tenn. 2001)

. Thus , our sta

nd ard fo r re vie wi ng a g ra nt of summa

ry jud g me nt i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss as to the trial cour t’s finding s. Se e W

e b b e r v . St a te Fa r m M ut . Auto. Ins. C

o. , 49 S.W .3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001) . The e v i d en ce must be viewed “ in the light most favor able to the nonmoving pa

rty ,” and a ll reasona

ble infer ence s must be draw n i n t h e non-movingparty ’s favor. Sta ple s v . CB L & Ass oc

s. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)

.

IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. Is Plain tiff Covere d Under the Sh elter Policy?

1. P olicy’s P lain L anguage On appe al, S helter argues t hat t he trial court erre d in finding that its policy provided primar y UM co v er age t o P l ai n t i ff

, b ec au s e S h el t er

co n t en d s th at“[ P ] l ai n t i ff

i s n o ten t i t l edt o [ UM ] co v er age under the clea

r, unambiguous t erms of the S helter policy .” Thus, we beg in by looking at the policy at issue. The Shelter policy

beg ins with a g en er al “D efinitions” sec tion, followed by five “ Parts.” 5 Eac h of the five Parts list “additional definitions” as used in ea ch re spective Par t. Part I V g overns Un ins ur e d M oto ri sts , a

nd pr ov ide s c ov e ra g e a s f

oll ow s:
I f an insu red su sta ins bodi ly inju ryas a r esult of an ac c ide ntinvolving the use of a m ot orve hic le , and is entitled to dam ages f r o man y person as a r esult of thatU nd er t he po l i cy’s “gener al ” d efi ni t i on s , “us e” i s defi ned as “opera t i on and m ai nt enance. ” “ O p e ra te ” is 6 fur t her de fi ned as “ p hys i ca l l y c ont r ol l i ng, ha vi ng phys i ca l l y c ont r ol l ed, or a t t em pt i ng t o phys i ca l l y c ont r ol , t he
m oveme n t s o f a v e h i c l e
. ” “ M a i n t e n a n c e ” i s d e fi n e d a s “ t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f s e r v i c e s whi c h a r e n e c e s s a r y t o k e ep a m o to r v e h ic le i n w or ki ng or der or t o r es t or e i t t o w or ki ng or der

. It d o es not i ncl ude t he i ns t al l at i on or s er vi ci ng of equi pm ent w hi ch i s not us ual and i nci dent al t o t he ope rat i on of a n a uto

. -5- bodi ly inju ry , we , will pay the uncom pensated damage s subject t o the limit of our liability stated in this Coverag e.
Part I V also provides a

n “additional def

inition[ ] [ as] used in Part I V[,] ” for the term “ insured”:
Insu red me ans : (a) You ; ( b ) an y relat ive ; and ( c ) an y ind ividu al listed as an “a dditional lis ted insured” in th e Dec larations, but on ly wi th r e sp e c t to that indiv idua l’ s us e of the described auto ; (d) a ny other person usin g the described auto with perm ission

. Ho we ve r, the lim it of our liability

for indiv idua ls who bec ome insu r e ds so le ly becaus e of thi s s u b p ar agr ap h , wi l l b e t h e m i n i mu ml i m i t s o f un i n s ure d m o t o ri s t i n s ura n ce co v er age specifie d by

the un in s ur e d m o t o r is tla w or fi na nc ia l r e s po ns ib il ity la w a pp lic a ble to the ac c ide nt , r e g ard le ss o f t he lim it s tate d in

the De c laratio ns
.

Shelter cla ims that be cause Plaintiff doe s not f it unde r the cate g ories of “you,” a “ relative,” an “a dditional lis ted insured,” or “per son using the descr ibed auto,” Shelter is not obli g ated to extend UM cove rag e to her . On the date of the a ccide nt, Plainti ff wa s not list ed as a named insured or a s an a dd iti on a l in sure d un de r the She lte r po lic y , no r wa s sh e a re lativ e of a name d in sure d. She a lso was not “usingthe desc ribed a uto with permission” as def ined in the pol icy

. Thus, we f ind that the 6 Shelter policy

clea rly and unambiguously define s an “insured” for UM cover ag e, and Plaintiff doe s not meet that def

inition. However, our

inquiry does not end he re.
2. Tennessee’s Uninsured Motorist Stat ute
a. Tennessee Code Annotate d 56-7-1201(a)
MetL ife a rgues that althoug h Plaintiff does not meet Part I V’ s d ef i nition of an “insure d,” Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 56-7-1201, e t s eq. (s o metimes here inafter “UM Statute”) , nonetheless mandates cove rag e.

Part I Iof the Shelter Policy , conce rning“Auto Medic al P ayments” (“ Medpay”), de fines “insured” as used within Part I I

. Be cause “occ upants” are “insured” for pur poses of Part I I , Plaintiff me e ts the de fi nit ion

of an “ ins ur e d” un de r P art

I I . M e tL if

e argues th at “[ t]hi s in c lus ion

. . . isI nt er es t i ng l y, w e not e t hat th e S h elt er p ol i cy i s t i t l ed “A ut om ob i l e I nsur ance Pol i cy, ” r at her t han 7 “A ut om ob i l e Li abi l i t y Ins urance Pol i cy. ” -6- s u f f i c i e n tt o qu a l i f

y P l a i n t i f f a s ani n s ur e d

‘ un d e r ’ S h e l t e r ’ s ‘ a

u t o m o b i l e l i a

b i l i ty i n s ur an c e p o l i c y’ fo r p ur po se s o f T .C. A. § 5 6- 7- 12 01 (a )[, ]” whic h p ro vid e s: Every automobile liability

insurance policy

delivere d, issued for delivery or re newe d in this state, cover ing liability arisingout of the owne rship, maintenanc e, or use of an y m o t or vehic le desig ned for use primar ily

on public roads a

nd reg istered or principally

g ara g ed in this state, shall include uninsured motorist coverage , subject to provisions filed with and approve d by the commissioner, for the protection of p e r s o n s in s u r e d

u n d e r th e p olicy wh o are leg ally entitled to rec over c ompensatory dama ges fr om o wn e rs or

op e rator s o f u

nin sure d mo tor

ve hic le s b e c a

us e of bo dil y injury , sickness o r

d is ease , including de ath, re sulting fr om injury , sickness or disea se.
Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 56-7-1201(a) (2008) (empha s i s ad d ed). Esse ntially , MetL ife a rgues that be c a us e Pla int if

f is a “pe rs on [] ins ur e d und e r the po lic y ” –a lbe it und e r the Me dp ay pr ov isi on

–th at, pursuant, to Tenne ssee Code Annotated 5 6 -7 -1201(a ), Shelter must extend UM cover ag e to her

. MetL ife states that “[t] he term ‘automobile liability insurance policy ’ [as use d in Tennesse e Code Annotated section 56-7-1201( a)] clea rly ref ers to an e ntire policy

of automobile insuranc e, including its li ability

provisions, uninsured motorist provisions, m edica l pay m en t p ro v isions, and any other provisions contained there in.” In support of its a rgument, MetL ife c ites Tennesse e Code Annotated section 56-7- 1301(a) (2), whic h define s “private passeng er a utomobile liabili ty

insurance policy ” as a “policy delivere d or issued for delivery in this state, insuringa natur al per son as named insure d, or one (1) or more related indivi duals resident of the same house hold[ .]” MetL ife fur ther c ites Part 7 (c ) of se c t i o n5 6

- 7

- 1 3 0 1 w h i c hs t at e s : “ T h i s p ar ta p p l i e s o n l y

t o th atp o rt i o no f

ana u t o m o b ile lia bil ity po lic y ins ur inga g a ins t bo dil y inj ur y and pr op e rt y dama g e lia

bil ity and to t he pr ov isi on s in the policy , if any , relating to medica l pay ments and/or uninsured motorist cove rag e.” Te nn. C ode Ann. § 56-7-1301(c) (2008) . This lang uag e, MetL ife c ontends, “leaves no doubt that the leg islature inte n d ed t h e term ‘a

utomobile liabili ty

insurance policy ’ to ref

er to the whole policy , including provisions in the policy

related to medical pa

y ments.”
Shelter, however, interprets Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 56-7-1201( a) to re quire UM protec tion only

for those p ersons who a re insure d under the policy ’s liability provision. Shelter points out t hat the fa ce of the statute expressly

states that “Eve ry

automobile lia bil ity

in s u ra n ce policy . . . shall include uninsured motorist cove rag e . . . for the protec tion of persons insured thereunde r .” Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 56-7 -1 2 0 1 (a) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Sh e lte r a lso argue s th at it s int e rp re tatio n is re inf

or c e d b y Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 5 6- 7- 12 01 (a )(1), whic h s tate s,

“ T h e l i m i t s o f

th e un i n s ur e d

m o t o r i s tc o v e r a g e s h a l l b e e qu a l t o th e b o d i l y i n j ur y liabili ty lim its stated in the policy .” F urthermor e, Shelter claims that the purpose of the UM Statute is to provide liability cover ag e, while Me dp ay b en efits, in constrast, a re pr ovided irre spective of fault. The

“ Autom ob ile L ia

bil ity” po rt ion

of the She lte r P oli c y , Pa

rt I , d e fi ne s “ ins ur e d” a s f

oll ow s:-7-

As used in this Part, insu red me ans :
(1) You , with respec t to yo ur owne r ship or use of the described auto and yo ur use of a non-ow ned auto ; ( 2 ) an y relat ive , with respec t to his or her use of the described auto or a non-ow ned auto ; ( 3 ) an y ind ividu al wh o is : (a) related to you by

blood, marriag e, or a doption, who is primarily a re sident of, and a ctually

living in, yo ur h o u s e h o l d , i n cl u d i n g yo ur unmarrie d and unemanc ipated child aw ay at school; or (b) a foster c hild in yo ur l e g a l c u s t o dy f o r m o r e th an n i n e ty c o n s e c u t i v e d ays immediately

prior to the ac c ide nt ; but onl y wi th r e sp e c t to that ind ividu al’s use of the described auto ; ( 4 ) an y ind ividu al listed in the Dec l ar at i o ns as an “ additional listed insured,” but on ly wi th r e sp e c t to that ind ividu al’s use of the described auto ; and ( 5 ) an y ind ividu al wh o h a s perm ission or ge ne r al c ons e ntto use the described auto . Howeve r, the limits of ourliability for i n d i vid ual s who bec ome insu r e ds solely beca use of this subpar ag raph, will be the minimum limit s of liability insurance cover ag e spec ified by

the fi nancial respon sibi lity law a p p li c a b le to the ac c ide nt , re g ard le ss o f t

he lim its state d in

the De c laratio ns
.
Th e “ Ge ne ra l” de fi nit ion s p or tio n o f t he She lte r p oli c y

de fi ne s “ ins ur e d” a s:

the person de fi ne d a s insu red in, or with ref ere nce to, the sp ec i fi c cove rag e or endorse ment under which the cove rag e is soug ht.
Thus, Shelter maintains that bec ause Plaintiff is not “insured” as def ined by t h e S h el t er policy ’s liability provision, Part I , Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201(a ) does not re quire Shelter to ext end UM c overa g e to her

.

F ir st, we re

je c t Me tL if

e ’s c on te nti on

that th e UM Statut e re qu ir e s th at a ll a uto mob ile lia

bil ity ins ur anc e po lic ie s p ro vid e UM c ov e ra g e . In a rguin gthat U M c ov e ra g e is m and ate d in a ll automobil e l iability

policies, MetL ife c ites a portion of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 56-7- 1201, b u t fa i l s t o include the r eleva nt lang uag e that “a

ny named insure d may

reje ct in writing the uninsured motorist cove rag e completely or selec t lowe r limits of the covera g e[.] ” Te nn. C ode Ann
. § 56-7-1201( a)(2)

. Ba sed on the i nsured’ s ability to decline UM c overa g e, the UM Statute mandates only that UM cove rag e be offered r ath e r than i n cl u ded

in ever y policy

. See Renfro v. D oe , 979-8-

S.W .2d 311, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted) (“Te nnessee ’s uninsured motor i s t law require s the i n surer

to offer uninsured motorist cover ag e at lea st equal to the limit carrie d by the named insure d for g ener al liability cover ag e.”)

.

We also reje ct MetL ife’s a rgument that qualifying a s an “insure d” under any provision of an automobile insurance policy require s that such “i n s ured” be af forde d cover ag e under

the policy ’s UM provi s io n
. A s c it e d

b y Sh e lt e r a b o v e , th e p la in

la n g u a g e o f th e U M St atute d o e s n o t s u pport such an inter

pretation. Further

more, we find that Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 56-7-1301’ s re fe re nc e to m e dic a l pa

y me nts do e s n ot e vide nc e a le g isl ativ e int e nt t

hat “ a uto mob ile lia

bil ity insurance policy ” re fer

to “the whole policy .” Rather, the refe renc e to medica l pay ments is provided only to state that portions of automo bile liability policies relating to medica l pay ments are not excluded from Part 13, c oncer ning policy

canc ellation. See Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 56-7-1301

.
Both Shelter and Me tL ife re ly upon Chri

stenberry v. Tipton , 160 S.W .3d 487 (Tenn. 1995) to support their respective positi ons conce rning the s cope of Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 56- 7-1201. Thus, we f

eel inclined to discuss the c ase. I n Chr iste nb e rry , the plaintiff wa s injured when the vehicle in which s h e wa s a passe ng er w as for ced of f the roa d by

an unidentified motorist. Id. at 488. The plaintiff sue d for UM be nefits under an insuranc e policy

issued to her e x -husband a nd his company

. Id. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt to the insurance company , finding that the plaintiff was not insured under the policy

. Id. at 488-89. On appeal, the plaintiff c ontended that summary judgme nt was inappropr iate, as a question of fac t e x isted as to whether her inc lusion on a list of “drivers” within the policy entitled her to liability

cover ag e under

the policy , and ther efor e, to UM cover ag e pursua

nt to t he UM Statute. Id. at 493. The Court of A ppeals a ffirme d the trial court’s g r an t o f

s u mm ar y ju d g me n t, b u t t

h e Su p r e me Co urt r e v e r s e d , f

in d in gth at a

g e nu in e issue of m ater ial fac t exis ted as to whether those persons listed as “ drivers” wer e “na med insureds.” Id. at 495. In so finding , the Court stated “as we c onstrue the sc ope of se ction 56-7-1201, the pla intiff’s argument[–t hat bec ause s h e i s “insured” for liability purposes, she must also be pr ovided UM cover ag e–]stil l nece ssarily rests upon the pre mise that she was insure d under the liabili ty portion of the policy at the time of the a ccide nt.” Id. at 493. (empha sis added)

. Ba sed on t his lang uag e, Shelter insists that UM cove rag e is trig g ere d u n d er the UM Statute only when the pla intiff is insured for lia bil ity purposes unde r the policy

. Howeve r, MetL ife points to the Court’s statement that “be fore the plaintiff ca

n asser t any statutory

rig ht to uninsured motorist covera g e, she must have been insure d under the State Auto policy at the time of the a ccide nt[ ,]” Id., to suppor t its contention that a plaintiff need not be insured under a policy ’s l iability provision in order to qualify for UM c overa g e pursua

nt to the UM Statut e . We fi nd that Chr iste nb e rry

provides no guidance on the issue at hand. I nstead, we f ind that the afor ementioned statements evidenc e only the Court’s belief

that summary

judgme nt was inappr o p ri at e, as t h e plaintiff ha d not y et shown that she wa s insured under the policy

–the liability provision or otherwise

– s u ch that the UM Statute could extend UM cover ag e. Thus, a discussion of whether the UM Statute compelled UM cover ag e when a plaintiff wa s cover ed under a provision other tha

n liability , was pre mature.-9-

Al tho ug h w e fi nd no c a se s d ir e c tly a dd re ssi ngthe iss ue at ha

nd , w e fi nd

ins tr uc tiv e the c a se of Y ounger v. Reliance Ins. C o. , 884 S.W .2d 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). In Y ounger , the plaintiff broug ht an ac tion for the wrong ful death of her husband ag ainst both an uninsured motorist and the UM ca rrier for the de cede nt’s employ er, Relianc e Insuranc e Company (“Relianc e”)

. Id. at 453. The trial court grante d summary judgme nt to Reliance , holding that the dece dent was not “insure d” under the po l icy ’s UM provision. Id. This Court ag ree d that the dec edent wa s not covere d by the UM provision, itself, beca

use the de cede nt was not “oc cupying” a cover ed automobile at the time of the acc ident, as def

ined in the UM provision. Id. at 455- 5 6

. However, we then consider ed whe ther Reliance violated Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 56-7-1201(a ) by defining“ins ured” more narr owly for UM c overa g e, than f

or liability

cover ag e. Id. at 456. We stated that it f oll ow s th at on c e a

pe rs on is i ns ur e d und e r t

he liab ili ty

po lic y , th at pe rs on

mus t also be insure d un d er t h e insured motorist portion of the policy when the da

mag es arise out of

“the owne rship, maintenanc e, or use ” of the insured vehic le.

Id. (q uo tin gTe nn . Co de Ann. § 5 6- 7- 12 01 (a )) . B e c a us e we de e me d sy

no ny mou s th e te rm s u se d to define “insured” in both the U M and liability provisions, w e found in our ana ly sis that decede nt was not “insured” under the UM provision sufficie nt to answer in the ne g ative the que stion of whether the dec edent wa s “insured” under the liability provision. Id. at 457.
We also note our Supreme Court’s languag e in Mu l l ins v. Miller , 683 S.W .2d 669, 670 (Tenn. 1984) supersede d by statute on other grounds , Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 56-7-1201 et seq. (1986), as re c og

niz e d in Car

r v . F or d , 883 S.W .2d 68, 69 (Tenn. 1992) , in construingthe UM Statute: [I ]t se e ms t o u s th at th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y ha s e xpre sse d it s inte nti on th at a ll damag es which c an leg ally be re cover ed under

a liability p o l icy

shall also be r e c o v e r a b l e un d e r anun i n s ur e d

m o t o r i s tp o l i c y.

We further

note t his Court’s descr iption of t he UM Statute as “basically liability insurance for a

third party –the uninsured motorist[.] ” Dupree v . Doe , 772 S.W .2d 910, 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) ( citing Glover v. Tenn. Farme rs Mut. Ins. Co. , 225 Tenn. 306, 313, 468 S.W.2d 727, 730 (1971)) (“ intent and purpose of statute is to provide prote ction ‘by makingthe i nsuranc e carrie r st and as the insurer of the uninsure d motorist’”).

Ba sed on t he foreg oing arguments and authorities, we find that Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 56

- 7

- 1 2 0 1 ( a ) ’ s ref ere nce to “ persons insure d under the policy [,] ” includes only those insured for pur poses of liability . Acc ording ly , beca use Plaintiff did not qualify as an “ insured” unde r the She lte r P oli c y ’s “ Part

I– Auto L ia

bil ity” pr ov isi on , s he is n ot e nti tle d U M c ov e ra g e purs ua nt t o Tenne ssee Code Annotated 56-7- 1201(a)

.-10- b. Tenn essee Code Annotated sec tion 56-7-1201(b)(3)

Alternatively , M e tL if

e c la im s th a

t S h elter is re quired to provide Plaintiff UM c overa g e base d on Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 5 6- 7- 12 01 (b )( 3) , whic h p ro vid e s in pa rt :

Wit h respe ct to bodily

injury to an ins ured while occupy ing a n automobile not owned b y th e i n s ure d , th e f

o l l o wi n g p ri o ri t i es o f r ec o v ery un d er uninsured motoristco v er age a p p l y:
(A) T he uninsured motorist cove ra ge o n the vehicle in which the insured w as an occupa nt shall be the primar

y uninsured motorist cover ag e[.]

MetL ife maintains that bec ause “ Shelter has the uninsured motorist cover ag e on the ve hicle in which Plaintiff Ma

rtin was an occupa

nt at the time of the ac cident. . . . it is clear that Shelter must provide the primary

uni n s ured motorist cove rag e to Plaintiff Martin, who is an uninsure d under Shelter ’s policy and an oc cupant o[f] the vehicle c overe d by Shelter.”

MetL ife a lso argues that eve n if Plaintiff is not “ insured” under the Shelter policy , Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 56-7-1201( b)(3) ’s use of “ the word ‘ shall’ indicates that the leg is l ature intended to mandate that Shelter and othe r insurer s who insure ve hicles i n t h e s t at e of Tennessee provide uninsure d motorist covera g e to occ upants of the ve hicle and that this coverag e be pr imary .” Thus, beca

use the Shelter policy

conflicts with sec tion 56-7 -1 201(b)( 3) and the intent of the UM Statut e

– t o p r o t e c t t h o s e i n j u r e d b y u n i n s u r e d m o tor ist s–Me tL if

e c on te nd s th at “ the statut or y mand ate mu s t p r e v a il , an d

Sh e lt e r mu s t a f f o r d p r im ar y un in s ur e d

mo to r is t c o v e r a g e to Pl a inti f f [. ]”
Finally , MetL ife c ontends that eve n if Plaintiff is not “insured” unde r Shelter’s policy and section 56-7-1201( b)(3) does not ma ndate UM cove rag e, Shelter is nonethe less require d to ext end UM cover ag e to Plaintiff, as P laintiff i s insured under Me tLif e ’s policy . MetL ife states “ nowher e in s e c tio n ( b) (3 ) o r ( b) (3 )( A) do e s it state that th e un ins ur e d mo tor ist c ov e ra g e on

the ve hic le in which the oc cupant wa s injured will be the primar y cover ag e onl y if

the occ upant is cover ed as an ‘insured’ by the vehicle’s policy .”

She lte r c ou

nte rs by arguin gthatE very aut om ob i l e i nsur ance pol i cy i s s ued i n T enness ee m ust b e revi ew ed and approved by t he C om m i s s i on er 8

o f C o m m e rc e a n d In su ra n c e
. See Tenn. C ode A nn. §§ 56- 5- 305, 56- 7- 1201( a)

. -11- th e p ur p o s e o f [T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 5 6

- 7

- 1 2 0 1 ( b ) ( 3 ) ] is to p r io r it iz e betwee n available UM cove rag es with respe ct to injured passe ng ers. The statute’s applicability

presuppose s more than one available policy

. In such a case, it follows T e n n e s s e e ’ s b a s i c s c h e m e , w h i c hi s th atth e c o v e r a g e o nth e v e h i c l e i s p r i m ar y
. If th e r e is o n ly

o n e a p p li c a b le p o li c y , a s is th e c a s e h e r e , th e r e is n o th in g to p r io r it iz e be tw e e n, and

the pr ov isi on

ha s n o a pp lic a bil ity or e ff e c t.
(interna l citation omitt ed).

We f ind that Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 5 6- 7- 12 01 (b )( 3) is i na pp lic a ble to t he c a se at hand, a s its plain langua g e evide nces its purpose only to prio ri t i z e betwee n available UM cover ag es, rather than to c reate UM cove rag e.

3. P ubl ic P olicy

Both Plaintiff and Me tL ife state that the purpose of the UM Statut e is to protect per sons injured by uninsured motorists. MetL ife states that “it is the i ntent of the leg islature that the innoce nt passeng er of

a cove red ve hicle would at a ll tim es be e ntitled t o u n i nsured motorist cover ag e.” Shelter’s na

rrow de finition of an “insure d,” Plaintiff and Me tL ife c lai m , conflicts with the leg islature’s pr otective intent and violate s public policy . MetL ife maintains that “if Shelter’s policy and argume nts are up he ld, it is only a matte r o f t ime be fo re a ll i ns ur anc e c omp anie s r e -wri te the ir policies in such a wa

y that occupa

nts or passeng ers of an insured vehic le ar e not provided uninsure d motorist covera g e by

the vehicle ’s insuranc e ca rrier .”

To support its argument that its policy does not violate publ ic pol icy , Shelte r p oints to the policy ’s appr o v al by

the Commiss ioner of Commerc e and I nsuranc e. Although Shelter

8 acknow ledg es that such a pproval is not “conc lusive,” it notes that it is a “fa ctor

. . . in determining the validity

of policy provisions.” Hill v. Nationwide Mut. I ns. Co. , 535 S.W .2d 327, 331 (Tenn. 1976)

. F urth e r

mo r e , Sh e lt e r s tate s th at b e c a u s e an in s ur e d ma

y s e le c t e it

h e r le s s e r or no UM cover ag e, it is ill og ical to ar g ue that it “is impermissible, and vi olative of public policy , for the policy to in c lu d e U M c o v e r a g e b u t n o t p r o v id e c o v e r a g e f o r e v e r y p o te n ti a l r e c ip ie n t[

. ]”

As stated by

our Supreme Court, the “ purpose [of the UM Statute] is t o provide, within fixed l i m i t s , s o m e r ec o mp en s e t o i n n o ce n tp er s o n s wh o re ce i v e b o d i l y i n j ury o r p ro p erty

d am age th ro u gh the conduc t o f an u ninsured motorist who cannot r espond in damag es.” Shof fn e r v . St ate Far m M ut . Au to Ins. C

o. , 494 S.W .2d 756, 758 (Tenn. 1972) rev’d on other grounds , 519 S.W .2d 773-12-

(Tenn. 1975) . “The intent and purpose of the Un i n s u re d M o t o rist Act is to provide protec tion by makingthe insuranc e ca

rrier stand as the insure r of the uninsure d motorist.” Stall cup v. Duncan , 6 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d

6 4 3 , 6 4 6 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 4 ) ( ci t i n g Glover , 468 S.W .2d 727). “Thus, the insured is a llowed to pur chase uninsured motorist covera g e for the protec tion that he would have ha d if the alleg ed tortfe asor had assumed his own financial responsibility by purcha sing liability

insurance .” Id.

W e f

i n d th atth e dra ft i n g o f th e S h el t er p o l i cy s o as t o ex cl u d e P l ai n t i ff fr o mUM co v er age do e s n ot v iol ate the pu bl ic po li cy of this S tate . A s w e se e it, the purp os e of the UM Statut e is t o protec t those who purcha se liability insurance from thos e who do not. I t require s insurance car riers to o ff e r U M c ov e ra g e to i ts i ns ur e ds , b ut do e s no t ma nd ate that U M c ov e ra g e be e xten de d to tho se who have not purcha sed such a benef it.
B. Occupant as “User” Finally , Plaintiff asks t his Court to deter mine “[w]hether under Tennessee common law and the Tenne ssee Uninsure d Motorist S tatute . . . an automobile is being‘used’ by an individual who is travelingin it, reg ardle ss of whethe r it is being ope rate d by him or her or

by another .”
At oral argume nt, a ft e r b e inga sk e d “ why it m atte rs to your c lie nt whic h U M c ov e ra g e is utiliz ed[,] ” Plaintiff’s counse l conce ded that the outcome of the afor ementioned issue did not a ffe ct her c lient. I nstead, Plaintiff’s c ouns el acknow ledg ed that she w as mere ly seekingan advisory opinion for us e in future liti g ation. In Shealy v. Policy Studies, Inc. , No. E2005-01124- COA-R3- CV, 2006 WL2482984, at *12 (Te nn. Ct

. Ap p
. Aug . 29, 2006), the e astern se ction of this Court state d th at “ ‘a

pa rt y ’s de sir e fo r an op ini on to be us e d in futur e c a se s is no t, b y

its e lf , s uf fi c ie nt t o re n d er a c au s e j u s t i ci ab l e. T en n es s ee ’s co urt s d o n o t re n d er ad v i s o ry o p i n i o n s
. ’” (qu o t i n g Ro dge rs v . R od ge rs , No. M2004-02046-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL1358394, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 17, 2006)). The ref

ore, w e dec line to addre ss Plainti ff’ s issue.

V. C ONCL US I ON
For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we re verse the dec ision of the circ uit court and re mand for entry of an or der grantingShelter’s motion for summ ary judgme nt. All issues not herein addr essed-13-

are prete rmitted. Costs of thi s appea l are taxed to the Appellees, Andre a S

. Martin and Me tropolitan G r o u p P r o p e rty an d

C a s u a l ty In s ur an c e C o mp an y, f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AL ANE. HI GH ERS , P. J. , W .S.