97-080

 No. 97-080

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

TRACI THOMPSON,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

CITY OF BOZEMAN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Gallatin,

 The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 William M. Brooke; Moore, O'Connell & Refling,

 Bozeman, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Daniel P. Buckley; Berg, Lilly, Andriolo & Tollefsen,

 Bozeman, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 12, 1997

 Decided: September 15, 1997 

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 The City of Bozeman (City) appeals from the order of the Eighteenth Judicial

District Court, Gallatin County, granting, in part, the motion for a new trial on 

the issue

of damages filed by Traci Thompson (Thompson). We affirm.

 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in concluding that

insufficient evidence supported the jury's zero damage award for pain and suffering 

and,

on that basis, in granting Thompson's motion for a new trial on that issue.

 BACKGROUND

 Thompson filed an action against the City alleging that she suffered damages as

a result of an accident in which a City police officer in a police cruiser collided 

with the

rear of her vehicle at an intersection in Bozeman, Montana. The City subsequently

admitted that the conduct of its employee, the police officer, was negligent and 

that the

negligence caused the accident at issue. The action proceeded to a jury trial on 

the issues

of whether the accident caused Thompson injury and, if so, the amount of Thompson's

damages. The jury returned a verdict in Thompson's favor on the causation issue and

awarded her damages in the amount of $2,000 for medical and chiropractic expenses and

$800 for lost wages. The jury awarded zero damages for pain and suffering, loss of

ability to pursue occupation, loss of future wages, loss of ability to pursue 

established

course of life, and future medical and chiropractic expenses.

 Thompson timely moved for a new trial on the issue of damages, asserting that

there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's zero damage awards. The 

District

Court granted her motion for a new trial on the issue of damages for pain and 

suffering,

concluding that the City did not present evidence controverting Thompson's evidence 

that

she experienced pain and suffering from the injuries sustained in the accident. It 

denied

her motion as to the other zero damage awards. The City appeals from the order

granting a new trial on the issue of pain and suffering damages.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 A district court may vacate a jury's verdict and grant a new trial when the

evidence presented is insufficient to justify the verdict. Section 25-11-102(6), 

MCA. 

Conversely, where substantial evidence supports a verdict, the verdict generally 

cannot

be overturned or vacated. Thayer v. Hicks (1990), 243 Mont. 138, 156, 793 P.2d 784,

795. The decision of a district court to grant or deny a motion for a new trial 

will not

be reversed absent a manifest abuse of the court's discretion. Maurer v. Clausen

Distributing Co. (1996), 275 Mont. 229, 234, 912 P.2d 195, 198 (citation omitted). 

If

there is conflicting evidence on an issue, it is an abuse of the district court's 

discretion

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to grant a new trial. Gass v. Hilson (1990), 240 Mont. 459, 462, 784 P.2d 931, 933

(citations omitted).

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court err in concluding that insufficient evidence supported 

the

jury's zero damage award for pain and suffering and, on that basis, in granting

Thompson's motion for a new trial on that issue?

 The City argues that the record contains conflicting evidence on the issue of

Thompson's pain and suffering and, as a result, there is substantial evidence to 

support

the jury's zero damage award. Thus, according to the City, the District Court 

abused its

discretion in granting a new trial on the issue of pain and suffering damages. We 

address

the City's arguments in turn.

 a. Sufficiency of evidence to support jury's zero damage

 award for pain and suffering

 It is undisputed that Thompson presented substantial evidence to support an 

award

of damages for pain and suffering. Summarized briefly, that evidence included

Thompson's testimony that, on the day after the accident, she began to feel pain in 

her

back during the latter part of her housekeeping shift at the Super 8 Motel (Motel) 

and,

by the end of her evening shift as a cashier at WalMart, she could hardly move. A 

few

days later, she began treatment with Dr. Ronald Hecht, a chiropractor. Dr. Hecht 

treated

Thompson for back and neck pain approximately 53 times in the four months following

the accident. Thompson testified that her symptoms included numbness and tingling in

her right arm, headaches at the base of her skull, and pain in her lower back and 

neck. 

The chiropractic treatments relieved her pain for several hours, but she needed a

treatment each morning in order to be able to work a full shift at the Motel and she 

also

needed to wear a lower back brace for a month following the accident. Thompson's job

duties at the Motel were modified because the repeated bending and lifting required 

in

cleaning rooms intensified the pain in her neck and lower back. 

 Dr. Hecht diagnosed Thompson as having loss of lordotic curve of the cervical

spine, radiculitis (numbness and tingling in her arm) due to intervertebral disc 

syndrome

in the neck, thoracic lumbar sprain/strain, and subluxation of vertebrae. His 

objective

examination and diagnosis paralleled Thompson's subjective descriptions of her 

symptoms

and, in his opinion, Thompson suffered a real injury in the accident which was 

painful

and uncomfortable for her.

 Lisa Jeffers (Jeffers), Thompson's supervisor at the Motel, testified that she

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noticed visible signs of pain in Thompson following the vehicle accident when 

Thompson

attempted to do any work involving bending or heavy lifting. As a result, she 

modified

Thompson's job duties to remove tasks which involved bending, twisting and lifting. 

She

testified that Thompson gradually resumed normal job duties over the course of 

several

months.

 The referenced testimony from Thompson, Dr. Hecht and Jeffers clearly would

support an award for pain and suffering damages. Indeed, although it is within the 

jury's province to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, a jury is not free 

to

disregard uncontradicted, credible, nonopinion evidence. Brockie v. Omo Construction

(1994), 268 Mont. 519, 522, 887 P.2d 167, 169 (citing Putnam v. Pollei (1969), 153

Mont. 406, 413, 457 P.2d 776, 780). The City contends, however, that testimony from

three witnesses controverts Thompson's evidence regarding her pain and suffering,

creates conflicting evidence on the issue and supports the jury's award of zero 

damages

for pain and suffering. We disagree.

 First, the City asserts that the testimony of its expert witness, Dr. Mark 

Irion,

directly controverts Dr. Hecht's testimony regarding Thompson's injury. It is true 

that

Dr. Irion's interpretation of Thompson's spine x-rays differed from Dr. Hecht's and 

that,

in Dr. Irion's opinion, Thompson did not suffer an injury as a result of the 

accident. 

However, Dr. Irion's testimony related to whether the accident was the cause of 

injury

to Thompson. In short, Dr. Irion was a causation witness who opined that the City's

admitted negligence did not cause Thompson injury; he was not a damages witness. 

Thus, Dr. Irion's testimony does not controvert, or conflict with, that of Thompson, 

Dr.

Hecht and Jeffers on the issue of Thompson's pain and suffering.

 The City also argues that the jury's zero damage award for pain and suffering 

is

supported by the testimony of Dr. Denman Lee, an accident reconstructionist, which

indicated that the forces exerted on Thompson as a result of the very low speed 

impact

of the vehicles were minimal. Like Dr. Irion's testimony, Dr. Lee's testimony 

relates

to whether the vehicle accident caused Thompson injury. Because Dr. Lee's testimony

did not relate to whether Thompson experienced pain and suffering after the 

accident, it

does not controvert, or conflict with, the evidence presented by Thompson on that 

issue.

 Next, the City asserts that Jeffers' testimony provides a basis for the jury's 

zero

damage award for pain and suffering because she stated that Thompson did not exhibit

pain when doing modified job duties and did not exhibit pain during the entirety of 

the

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four months following the accident during which she continued to work at the Motel. 

Contrary to the City's assertion, however, Jeffers' testimony does not controvert

Thompson's testimony that she experienced pain and suffering. As discussed above,

Jeffers testified that she witnessed Thompson exhibit signs of pain when performing

certain job tasks during at least the first month or two after the accident; indeed, 

she

modified Thompson's job duties as a result of the pain Thompson was experiencing. 

Thus, while the Jeffers testimony on which the City relies is relevant to the extent 

of

Thompson's pain and suffering, it does not controvert, or conflict with, Thompson's

evidence regarding the existence of pain and suffering resulting from the vehicle 

accident.

 The City also points out that, on cross-examination, Thompson testified that

notwithstanding her claims of significant pain, she did not ask for prescription pain

medication or seek medical attention other than from a chiropractor; to the extent 

she

took medication, it was two aspirin on an irregular basis. This testimony, however, 

does

not controvert the existence of Thompson's pain and suffering; it relates only to 

the extent

of that pain and suffering.

 Finally, the City argues that the jury's zero damage award for pain and 

suffering

could have reflected a finding that any pain Thompson was still experiencing at the 

time

of trial was attributable to a work-related injury she suffered four months after the

accident and that evidence of the later injury supports the zero damage award for 

pain and

suffering. The City's argument in this regard, however, does not account for or 

relate

to the evidence presented of Thompson's pain and suffering during the four months

between the vehicle accident and the work-related injury. The evidence of Thompson's

work-related injury merely goes to the extent and allocation of her pain and 

suffering

rather than to the existence of pain and suffering resulting from the vehicle 

accident.

 We previously have addressed partial zero damage awards in light of

uncontroverted evidence supporting the particular damage award at issue. In Brockie,

the personal representative of an estate brought wrongful death and survivorship 

actions

against a construction company. The jury made a substantial damage award in the

wrongful death action, but awarded none of the damages for funeral and medical 

expenses

and loss of future earning capacity requested in the survivorship action. Brockie, 

887

P.2d at 168. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a partial new 

trial on

survivorship damages and the plaintiff appealed. Brockie, 887 P.2d at 168-69. The

record established that all of the plaintiff's evidence regarding survivorship 

damages was

either stipulated to, or uncontradicted by, the defendant. Brockie, 887 P.2d at 

170. 

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Under such circumstances, we held that the jury did not have the choice of whether to

believe one party over the other and, as a result, the jury's verdict on survivorship

damages was "impossible" because no substantial evidence supported the jury's failure

to award survivorship damages. Brockie, 887 P.2d at 170 (citation omitted). 

Similarly,

in a case where a jury found that the defendants committed wrongful acts which caused

injury to the plaintiffs, but awarded no damages for pain and suffering, we held 

that it

was the jury's duty to award pain and suffering damages when the evidence clearly

established that the plaintiffs suffered painful injury and the defendants presented 

no

evidence to the contrary. Gehnert v. Cullinan (1984), 211 Mont. 435, 439, 685 P.2d

352, 354. 

 Notwithstanding these cases, the City relies on Maykuth v. Eaton (1984), 212

Mont. 370, 687 P.2d 726, in arguing that the District Court in this case 

impermissibly

substituted its judgment for the judgment of the jury on the issue of pain and 

suffering

damages. We disagree. 

 In Maykuth, the plaintiff testified to severe injuries and substantial pain 

resulting

from a vehicle accident. The defendant presented evidence that most of the 

plaintiff's

injuries and associated pain had preexisted, and were not aggravated by, the 

accident and

that some of his physical problems and associated pain resulted from factors other 

than

the accident. Maykuth, 687 P.2d at 726. The district court concluded that a jury 

award

of $700 for the plaintiff's pain and suffering was unjust and inadequate as a matter 

of law

based on the plaintiff's testimony at trial. Maykuth, 687 P.2d at 727. We held on 

appeal

that, in light of the conflicting evidence presented, the jury was not compelled to 

believe

the plaintiff's testimony and, therefore, it was error for the district court to 

substitute its

judgment for that of the jury regarding the adequacy or extent of pain and suffering

damages. Maykuth, 687 P.2d at 727.

 Maykuth illustrates the standard which applies to the issue of the adequacy of 

the

amount of damages actually awarded by a jury as opposed to the Brockie standard which

applies to whether the evidence supports an award of no damages at all. When a jury

awards at least some damages based on its assessment of conflicting evidence and

weighing of witness credibility, a court may not substitute its judgment as to the 

proper

amount of damages for that of the jury simply because the jury chose to believe one 

party

over another. Maykuth, 687 P.2d at 727; Barnes v. United Industry, Inc. (1996), 275

Mont. 25, 34, 909 P.2d 700, 705. However, where a jury fails to award any damages

when the only evidence of record supports an award, that verdict is not supported by

substantial evidence and may be set aside. Brockie, 887 P.2d at 170.

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 Here, Thompson presented evidence that the City's negligence caused her injury

and the City presented conflicting evidence through its causation witnesses. The 

jury

found in Thompson's favor on that issue. Thompson also presented substantial 

evidence

that she experienced pain and suffering for at least several months as a result of 

being

injured in the vehicle accident. The City did not controvert her evidence on pain 

and

suffering. Because no substantial evidence supports the jury's failure to award 

damages

for pain and suffering, the jury's verdict in this regard was "impossible." See 

Brockie,

887 P.2d at 170. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

jury's

award of zero damages for Thompson's pain and suffering.

 b. District Court's grant of new trial on pain and suffering

 damages

 When the evidence presented to a jury is insufficient to justify the jury's 

verdict,

a district court may vacate the verdict and grant a new trial. Section 25-11-102(6),

MCA. This Court will not overturn a district court's grant of a new trial absent a

manifest abuse of discretion. Maurer, 912 P.2d at 198. 

 We concluded above that the evidence of record in this case is insufficient to

support the jury's award of zero damages for Thompson's pain and suffering. As a

result, we also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

granting

Thompson's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages for pain and suffering. 

 Affirmed.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

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