Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed January 5, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

___________________

NO. 14-10-01213-CV

___________________

ARCADIO D. RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

V.

MARK T. WOMACK, Appellee

On Appeal from the 129th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2008-54135

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In this legal-malpractice case, we hold that for the purposes of res judicata, a 

judgment does not have preclusive effect if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction over 

the amount in controversy. 

Mark T. Womack won summary judgment against Arcadio D. Rodriguez on res 

judicata grounds in district court after a small claims court dismissed Rodriguez’s claims 

with prejudice. Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment because Womack failed to conclusively show that the dismissal with prejudice 

was a ―final determination on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction‖ as required to 
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establish res judicata. Because we agree that Womack failed to establish that the small

claims court was one of competent jurisdiction over the amount in controversy, we reverse 

and remand for a new trial without addressing Rodriguez’s remaining issues. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Womack, an attorney, represented Rodriguez as plaintiff in a wrongful-termination 

suit between 2003 and 2005. That suit ended when Womack withdrew as Rodriguez’s 

counsel and Rodriguez voluntarily dismissed his claims. On May 22, 2008, Womack 

sued Rodriguez in a Harris County small claims court to recover $1,086.40 in legal fees; 

$639.19 in expenses; interest on the legal fees; and court costs. Trial was set for 

September 2, 2008. On August 29, 2008, four days before the small claims court trial, 

Rodriguez sued Womack in the 129th District Court of Harris County for legal 

malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract, all arising from 

Womack’s 2003–05 representation. Citing the common issues underlying the two 

lawsuits and the fact that the amount of damages Rodriguez sought in district court was too 

great to be pursued in small claims court, Rodriguez asked the small claims court to 

―consolidate‖ Womack’s suit for unpaid legal fees with Rodriguez’s suit for legal 

malpractice so that both could be tried in district court. Along with his motion to 

consolidate, Rodriguez filed ―compulsory counterclaims‖ in Womack’s small claims court 

suit that were identical to the claims Rodriguez asserted against Womack in district court. 

The small claims court denied Rodriguez’s motion to consolidate; rendered judgment for 

Womack in the amount of $711.40, plus interest and court costs; and severed Rodriguez’s 

counterclaims into a new small claims court suit. 

Womack then asked the small claims court to dismiss Rodriguez’s severed 

counterclaims with prejudice for want of prosecution and as a sanction for filing the 

counterclaims in the small claims court without intending to prosecute them there. 

Womack alleged, inter alia, that Rodriguez knew that the small claims court lacked 

authority to consolidate the two cases; that Rodriguez had filed his counterclaims to 
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improperly seek the transfer of the claims to the district court and with the ―improper 

purpose of ousting [the small claims court] of its jurisdiction to decide such claims‖; and 

that Rodriguez had filed the counterclaims as ―fictitious pleadings,‖ in bad faith, and for 

the purpose of harassment. Although Rodriguez filed a notice of nonsuit at the hearing on 

Womack’s motion, the small claims court granted Womack’s motion and signed an order 

dismissing Rodriguez’s claims with prejudice. Both parties agree that the dismissal was 

intended as a sanction against Rodriguez, but neither party requested findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. 

On November 6, 2008, within the ten-day statutory deadline for appealing the 

dismissal, Rodriguez filed a notice of appeal with the small claims court, but there is no 

evidence that he paid an appeal bond within the ten-day deadline as required to perfect his 

appeal. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 571–73 (requiring appellant from justice court to file appeal 

bond or affidavit of inability to pay); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 28.052 (West 2004) 

(appeal from small claims court is governed by same law as appeal from justice court). 

Rodriguez spent the next year in an unsuccessful effort to challenge the judgment, but the 

small claims court would not process his appeal because—in addition to his failure to 

timely pay an appeal bond—he had failed to pay a filing fee when he filed his 

counterclaims in Womack’s small claims court suit. Rodriguez also filed a petition for 

writ of mandamus with this court asking us, inter alia, to order the small claims court to 

vacate the dismissal order and render judgment dismissing Rodriguez claims in accordance 

with his notice of nonsuit. We dismissed Rodriguez’s petition on October 13, 2009, citing 

our lack of jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against a small claims court. 

On June 5, 2009, Womack successfully moved for summary judgment in 

Rodriguez’s district court suit based on res judicata and the collateral-estoppel effects of 

the small claims court’s dismissal with prejudice. Rodriguez timely appealed.
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED

In four issues, Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment because (1) Womack did not conclusively show that the small claims court

adjudicated Rodriguez’s claims on the merits, as required to establish res judicata; 

(2) Womack did not conclusively show that the small claims court’s dismissal with 

prejudice was a ―final determination,‖ as required to establish res judicata, because the 

dismissal with prejudice was void for failure to be rendered in open court; (3) Womack did 

not conclusively show that the small claims court’s dismissal was with prejudice and 

therefore a ―final determination,‖ as required to establish res judicata, because a 

contradictory docket order created a ―fact issue‖ about whether the dismissal was with 

prejudice; and (4) Womack did not conclusively show that the small claims court was a 

court of competent jurisdiction to render the judgment, as required to give its judgment res 

judicata effect.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s grant of a summary judgment de novo. Provident Life 

& Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 198 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). We consider all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the 

nonmovant if a reasonable factfinder could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a 

reasonable factfinder could not. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 

(Tex. 2006). We must affirm the summary judgment if any of the movant’s theories 

presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. Provident 

Life, 128 S.W.3d at 216.

The movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there 

is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 

S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A defendant who moves for traditional summary judgment 

must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of 
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action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Frost Nat’l Bank 

v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010). Evidence is conclusive only if 

reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 

S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). Once the defendant establishes its right to summary 

judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a 

genuine issue of material fact. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 

1995). The nonmovant has no burden to respond to a summary-judgment motion unless 

the movant conclusively establishes each element of its cause of action as a matter of law. 

Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222–23 (Tex. 1999).

IV. ANALYSIS

Res judicata precludes relitigation of claims that are finally adjudicated, or that arise 

out of the same subject matter and that could have been litigated in the prior action. Barr 

v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). A party relying on res 

judicata as an affirmative defense must prove (1) a prior final determination on the merits 

by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them,

and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were or could have been raised in the 

first action. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). 

A claim is not barred by res judicata unless the court rendering judgment in the 

initial suit properly maintained subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. Harrison v. 

Gemdrill Int’l, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. 

denied). This principle is a corollary of the fact that a judgment rendered by a court 

lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void, not merely voidable. See Browning v. Placke, 

698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 

(―The question of whether Travelers established its res judicata defense turns on the issue 

of whether the [first court’s] erroneous order was void, or merely voidable.‖). Where the

amount in controversy exceeds a court’s jurisdictional limits, the court has no 

subject-matter jurisdiction and its judgments are void. Tejas Toyota, Inc. v. Griffin, 587 
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S.W.2d 775, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Williams v. Steele, 

101 Tex. 382, 108 S.W. 155, 157 (1908)). 

A small claims court has subject-matter jurisdiction over claims in which the 

amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 28.003 (West 

Supp. 2011). To determine the amount in controversy, we look to the face of the 

pleadings. Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996). 

Counterclaims are judged on their own merits and must independently comport with a 

court’s jurisdiction. Color Tile, Inc. v. Ramsey, 905 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ). The amount requested is dispositive unless 

the defendant specifically alleges that the amount was pleaded merely as a sham for the 

purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 

547, 554 (Tex. 2000). 

To support his position that the small claims court had subject-matter jurisdiction 

over Rodriguez’s claims, Womack argued that Rodriguez ―clearly invoked the small

claims court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.‖ As summary-judgment evidence, Womack 

cited boilerplate language from the ―jurisdiction‖ section of Rodriguez’s counterclaims in 

which Rodriguez recited that the small claims court had jurisdiction over the controversy 

because the damages he claimed were within the court’s jurisdictional limits. In the

section of his counterclaims in which he requested damages for professional negligence, 

however, Rodriguez specifically stated that he sought damages for ―mental anguish and the 

attorney’s fees he paid to Womack in the amount of $18,000.00,‖ in addition to exemplary 

damages. Although this amount clearly exceeds the small claims court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction, Womack argued that Rodriguez contradicted this statement later in the same 

pleading by requesting a ―monetary amount to be determined during discovery in this 

case.‖ Womack also pointed to another part of the pleading in which Rodriguez requested 

―unliquidated damages within the jurisdictional limits of [the small claims c]ourt.‖ 

According to Womack, these contradictions made Rodriguez’s pleading ambiguous, and 
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ambiguous pleadings must be resolved in favor of jurisdiction. See Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 

at 449 (where the pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate an absence of jurisdiction, a 

liberal construction in favor of jurisdiction is appropriate) (citing Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co. 

of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1989)); Hudson v. Norwood, 147 S.W.2d 826, 

830 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1941, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.) (a collateral attack on a 

judgment must overcome the presumption that the judgment is valid). 

Rodriguez’s counterclaims, however, do affirmatively demonstrate an absence of 

jurisdiction. He requested $18,000 in actual damages for negligence alone, an amount 

beyond the small claims court’s jurisdiction, aside from what he requested for his 

remaining claims and as exemplary damages. It is the specific amount in damages that 

Rodriguez sought, not the generic language he recited to establish jurisdiction, that 

determines the amount in controversy. See Richardson v. First Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 419 

S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tex. 1989) (because the plaintiff specifically pleaded an amount under 

the minimum jurisdiction of the district court, he could not rely on his more general 

allegations to sustain jurisdiction). Further, there was no contradiction between the 

damage requests. The request for $18,000 expressly pertained only to mental anguish and 

the amount Rodriguez paid Womack in attorney’s fees, while the request for an ―amount to 

be determined during discovery‖ concerned only the amount that Rodriguez would have 

obtained in his wrongful-termination suit. And while both of these requests appeared in 

the section in which Rodriguez sought damages for negligence, the request for 

―unliquidated damages within the jurisdictional limits‖ of the small claims court appeared

in the section of Rodriguez’s counterclaims in which he sought damages for breach of 

contract. 

We sustain Rodriguez’s fourth issue. 
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IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that Womack failed to meet his burden of proving every element of res 

judicata. Because this issue is dispositive, we reverse the judgment and remand the case 

to the district court without addressing the remaining issues presented.

/s/ Tracy Christopher

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Brown and Christopher.