FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH CARVER, 

No. 06-35176 Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. CV-04-05570-RBL

JOSEPH LEHMAN; KIMBERLY ACKER; 

ORDER AND VICTORIA ROBERTS; SIX TO BE AMENDED NAMED DEFENDANTS,

OPINION Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 17, 2007—San Francisco, California

Filed December 22, 2008

Amended March 3, 2009

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Richard C. Tallman, and

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;

Concurrence by Judge Reinhardt

2491
COUNSEL

Tyler A. Baker, Todd Gregorian, and Heather N. Mewes, Fenwick & West, LLP, Mountain View, California, for the

plaintiff-appellant. 

Rob McKenna, Sara J. Olson, and Gregory J. Rosen, Office

of the Washington Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, Olympia, Washington, for the defendants-appellees. 

ORDER

The opinion and concurrence filed on December 22, 2008,

and appearing at 550 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2008) are hereby

2494 CARVER v. LEHMAN
amended. The amended opinion and concurrence are filed

concurrently with this order. 

The petition for rehearing en banc filed January 20, 2009,

remains pending. 

No further petitions for rehearing or for rehearing en banc

may be filed. 

OPINION

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge: 

This case presents the question whether a Washington state

law providing for convicted sex offenders’ early release into

community custody creates a liberty interest that is protected

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We hold that it does not. We therefore affirm the decision of

the district court denying Carver relief in this civil rights

action.

Factual and Procedural Background

In August 1999, Joseph Dale Carver, then 20 years old,

pled guilty to child molestation in the third degree. This conviction followed two prior convictions for child molestation

in the first degree and a conviction for third-degree assault.

Carver committed his first sex offense at age 14. He was sentenced to fifty-four months of confinement in the custody of

the Washington State Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for

his 1999 conviction. The brief record on appeal indicates Carver committed fifteen disciplinary infractions while incarcerated, including sexual harassment of a prison staff member. 

Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.728(1)(b)(ii)(B)(I) prohibits early release for those convicted of sex offenses. HowCARVER v. LEHMAN 2495
ever, section 9.94A.728(2)(a) provides that sex offenders may

become eligible for transfer to community custody in lieu of

early release.1 Carver was sentenced to a consecutive thirtysix month period of community custody to begin on his

adjusted release date.2 Carver’s behavior as a prisoner resulted

in an adjusted release date of January 13, 2003. 

Before an inmate is eligible for transfer to community custody, he must submit an acceptable “release plan.” WASH.

REV. CODE § 9.94A.728(2)(c). Carver submitted his proposed

plan in March 2002. It was denied in April 2002, pursuant to

a DOC policy then in effect which provided for the categorical denial of release plans of offenders, like Carver, whom the

DOC determined “appear[ed] to meet the definition of a sexually violent predator and [who had] been referred for Civil

Commitment . . . .” DOC Policy Directive 350.200 (May 4,

2001).3 As a result of the denial of his proposed release plan,

Carver served his full term of confinement. 

1

“Community custody is the intense monitoring of an offender in the

community for a period of at least one year after release or transfer from

confinement. Although it has other purposes, community custody continues in the nature of punishment, and is not equivalent to general release.”

In re Crowder, 985 P.2d 944, 945 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (footnote omitted). Offenders in community custody live in a residence pre-approved by

the DOC and are subject to mandatory and discretionary conditions

imposed by either the DOC or the sentencing court. See, e.g., WASH. REV.

CODE §§ 9.94A.710(2)-(3), 9.94A.700(4)-(5) (listing mandatory and discretionary conditions imposed on offenders subject to community custody

including reporting requirements, payment of supervision fees, and prohibitions against possession of controlled substances and consumption of

alcohol). 

2When an inmate is first transferred to the DOC, the DOC calculates

three possible release dates for the inmate. First, the maximum release

date is the date the inmate would finish serving the entire sentence

imposed. Second, the earned early release date is the date the inmate

would be released if he earned all available sentence reductions and does

not lose time for misbehavior. Third, the adjusted release date is the projected date on which the inmate would be released if he loses no further

good time or earned time credits. 

3As we explain infra, this policy was subsequently struck down by the

Washington Court of Appeals in In re Dutcher, 60 P.3d 635, 640 (Wash.

Ct. App. 2002) (holding that “DOC Policy 350.200 . . . violates the governing statutes”). 

2496 CARVER v. LEHMAN
In September 2004, Carver filed a civil rights suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that DOC officials denied him early

release into community custody without affording him due

process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The district

court, adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, granted the DOC officials’ motion for summary

judgment on two principal grounds: first, that Washington law

does not create a liberty interest in early release into community custody and, therefore, Carver did not have a due process

right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and second,

that even if such a right existed, Defendant Lehman was entitled to qualified immunity. Carver timely appealed. 

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo

its grant of summary judgment and finding of qualified immunity. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep’t of Pub. Soc.

Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001); Galen v. County

of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Discussion

[1] The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law. . . .” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1. Our analysis of due process claims proceeds

4Carver’s original complaint named as a defendant only Joseph Lehman, secretary of the DOC at the time that Carver’s release plan was

denied. In his amended complaint, Carver named two additional defendants, Kimberley Acker and Victoria Roberts, both DOC officials

involved in making end of sentence review determinations. The district

court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that Acker and Roberts were

entitled to summary judgment because Carver failed to show that “these

defendants played any part in enacting the policy that precluded [Carver]

from being considered for release.” Carver does not appeal this portion of

the judgment below. 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2497
in two steps. “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or

property interest which has been interfered with by the State;

the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon

that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of

Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citation omitted). 

[2] “A liberty interest may arise from either of two sources:

the due process clause itself or state law.” Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 1986). Carver concedes that the Due Process Clause does not create a liberty

interest in an inmate’s “conditional[ ] release[ ] before the

expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of the

Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Rather,

he argues that Washington’s statutory scheme governing early

release into community custody “uses mandatory language,

‘creat[ing] a presumption that . . . release will be granted’ . . .

unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives

rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Greenholtz,

442 U.S. at 12; citing Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369,

377-78 (1987)). As in prior cases, our task here is to apply the

well-established mandatory language rule governing statecreated liberty interests set forth by the Supreme Court in

Greenholtz and Allen to the Washington sex offender statutory scheme at issue.5

See, e.g., Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison

5

In his response brief, Lehman argued that Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.

472 (1995), should control our liberty interest inquiry. In Sandin, the

Supreme Court considered a challenge to a prison regulation imposing

disciplinary segregation for misconduct. Id. at 475-77. In holding that the

regulation did not create a liberty interest, the Court did not apply the

“mandatory language” framework of Greenholtz and Allen. Id. at 481-86.

Instead, it focused on whether the challenged restraint arising from the

regulation “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-24 (2005) (applying Sandin to determine whether Ohio inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding placement

in a “supermax” prison). As Lehman properly conceded in his supplemen2498 CARVER v. LEHMAN
Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that

California law creates a liberty interest in parole); Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901-902 (same); Bermudez v. Duenas, 936

F.2d 1064, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Guam law

creates a liberty interest in parole); Baumann v. Ariz. Dep’t of

Corr., 754 F.2d 841, 843-45 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Arizona law does not create a liberty interest in custodial

release); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 469-

70 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Idaho law does not create a

liberty interest in parole). 

[3] Washington law mandates that an individual convicted

of a sex offense be sentenced to a term of community custody

that “shall begin either upon completion of the term of confinement or at such time as the offender is transferred to community custody in lieu of earned release.” WASH. REV. CODE

§ 9.94A.710(1). Unlike other inmates, then, a convicted sex

offender who accrues “earned release time . . . for good

behavior and good performance” is not entitled to early

release; rather, he is eligible for discretionary transfer into

community custody at an earlier date if his proposed placement is appropriate. Id. § 9.94A.728(1), (2)(a). The law

requires the DOC to develop a suitable program to effectuate

the transfer to community custody of such inmates. See id.

§ 9.94A.728(1). As part of that program, the DOC must “require the offender to propose a release plan that includes an

tal submissions to the court, we have since held that Sandin’s holding was

limited to “the separate but related question of when due process liberty

interests are created by internal prison regulations.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d

at 902-03 (emphasis added). See also Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127 n.3 (explaining that this court has “consistently rejected th[e] argument” that Sandin

eliminated the “ ‘mandatory language’ approach of Greenholtz and

Allen”). Accordingly, we continue to apply the “mandatory language” rule

set forth in Greenholtz and Allen in order to determine whether Washington’s statutory scheme creates a liberty interest in early release into community custody. 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2499
approved residence and living arrangement.” Id.

§ 9.94A.728(2)(c). The law then describes how the DOC, in

exercising its broad discretion, should evaluate such release

plans:

The department may deny transfer to community

custody status in lieu of earned release time pursuant

to subsection (1) of this section if the department

determines an offender’s release plan, including proposed residence location and living arrangements,

[1] may violate the conditions of the sentence or

conditions of supervision, [2] place the offender at

risk to violate the conditions of the sentence, [3]

place the offender at risk to reoffend, or [4] present

a risk to victim safety or community safety. The

department’s authority under this section is independent of any court-ordered condition of sentence or

statutory provision regarding conditions for community custody or community placement . . . . 

Id. § 9.94A.728(2)(d) (emphasis added). 

[4] In order to comply with the statute, the DOC promulgated Policy Directive 350.200. Under the version of this policy in force when Carver submitted his release plan, the DOC

instructed that release plans of sex offenders be assessed to

determine “the degree of risk for victims and potential victims

of similar age or circumstances” and to ensure that, subject to

certain exceptions, “[s]ex offenders will not return to a residence where minor victim(s) or other children of similar age

are present in the residence.” DOC Policy Directive 350.200

(May 4, 2001). This Policy Directive specified that a residence proposed by an offender within a release plan could be

denied if the proposed location would place the offender in

violation of court-imposed conditions; at the likely risk to reoffend; or in close proximity to the minor victim(s), schools,

child care centers, playgrounds, or other facilities where children of similar age and circumstances surrounding the convic2500 CARVER v. LEHMAN
tion are present and who may be put at substantial risk of

harm by the offender residing at that location.6 The DOC’s

policy also provided for the categorical denial of release plans

“if the End of Sentence Review Committee has determined

that the offender appears to meet the definition of a sexually

violent predator and s/he has been referred for Civil Commitment . . . .”

7

 This final provision, under which Carver’s

release plan was denied, was subsequently eliminated after

the Washington Court of Appeals held that it violated the statutory requirement that all sex offenders “may become eligible” for community custody. See Dutcher, 60 P.3d at 638-40.

Carver argues that this statutory scheme creates a protected

liberty interest because it requires the DOC to transfer an

inmate to community custody in lieu of earned release “unless

any one of the . . . specifically designated reasons are

6The last criterion derives from section 72.09.340(3)(a), which provides

that the DOC is “authorized to reject a residence location if the proposed

residence is within close proximity to schools, child care centers, playgrounds, or other grounds or facilities where children of similar age or circumstance as a previous victim are present who the department determines

may be put at substantial risk of harm by the sex offender’s residence at

that location.” WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.340(3)(a) (2006). 

7Washington law defines “sexually violent predator” as “any person

who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and

who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which

makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if

not confined in a secure facility.” WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(16)

(2006). An offender determined to be a sexually violent predator may be

subject to civil commitment after his term of confinement. WASH. REV.

CODE § 71.09.010 (2006). Carver’s criminal record and poor behavior

while incarcerated provide sufficient basis on which the DOC could reasonably determine that Carver appeared to meet the definition of a sexually violent predator and that it would be appropriate to refer him to be

civilly committed for further custodial treatment after he completed his

criminal sentence. The legislature of the State of Washington has enacted

a civil commitment custodial treatment program run by the Department of

Social & Health Services in which dangerous sexual predators may be

safely held while efforts are made to treat their condition. See WASH. REV.

CODE § 71.09.010. 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2501
found[,]” thereby “creat[ing] a presumption that . . . release

[into community custody] will be granted, and that this in turn

creates a legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite

finding that one of the justifications for [denial] exists.”

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12; see also Allen, 482 U.S. at

377-78. We disagree. In order to create a constitutionally protected liberty interest, a statute must contain “ ‘explicitly mandatory language,’ i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker

that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a

particular outcome must follow.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463

(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). There

is no “explicitly mandatory language” in section 9.94A.728(2)

creating a substantive right to transfer to community custody.

The statute, using classically permissive language, states that

a “person convicted of a sex offense . . . may become eligible,

in accordance with a program developed by the department,

for transfer to community custody status in lieu of earned

release time.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.728(2)(a). The only

“explicitly mandatory language” in section 9.94A.728(2) concerns a procedural right to an individualized determination

based on the merits of a proposed release plan.8 That language

cannot create a “liberty interest” within the meaning of the

Fourteenth Amendment because “expectation of receiving

process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the

Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment. Olim v.

8Subsection (2)(c) reads: “The department shall, as a part of its program

for release to the community in lieu of earned release, require the offender

to propose a release plan that includes an approved residence and living

arrangement.” As the Washington Court of Appeals in In re Dutcher held,

this language, combined with language in subsection (2)(d), mandates that

the DOC make an individualized determination “based on the merits of a

release plan.” 60 P.3d at 638. The DOC’s failure to provide such an evaluation rendered unlawful its further detention of sex offenders without an

individualized determination, a statutory wrong for which the Washington

Rules of Appellate Procedure provide relief. See Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(a),

(c)(2) (providing that “the appellate court will grant appropriate relief to

a petitioner if . . . the petitioner’s restraint is unlawful.”). Thus, Dutcher

stands for the proposition that release plans may not be categorically

denied. It does not require that release plans be categorically approved. 

2502 CARVER v. LEHMAN
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 n.12 (1983); see also In

re Cashaw, 866 P.2d 8, 12 (Wash. 1994) (“The United States

Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have clearly held that

procedural laws do not create liberty interests; only substantive laws can create these interests.”).9

[5] Pursuant to that procedural mandate, the DOC has no

“discretion to decide whether or when to consider an offender

for transfer to community custody,” In re Liptrap, 60 P.3d

1227, 1232 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). But

Washington law places no substantive limitation on how the

DOC is to make that determination. As noted above, section

9.94A.728(2)(d) enumerates four criteria for evaluating the

transfer plan. The statute instructs that the DOC “may deny

transfer to community custody if” one or more of those

criteria are met. Id. (emphasis added). Far from setting forth

“substantive predicates” under which the DOC must grant

transfer, the statute is silent regarding even precatory criteria

for granting transfer to community custody, specifying only

when the DOC “may”—but need not10 — “deny.” 

No particular words are necessary to create a liberty interest.11

If the section 9.94A.728(2)(d) criteria for denying transfer

constituted an exhaustive list of reasons for denial, the language would be effectively mandatory, giving rise to a presumption of transfer. Nothing in the statute, however,

9Cashaw, like Dutcher, instead grounded the inmate’s right to challenge

his restraint because of procedural error in Washington Rule of Appellate

Procedure 16.4. Id. at 13-14. 

10Section 72.09.340(3) contains two narrower circumstances under

which “the department shall not approve a residence location”: if the proposed residence includes a minor child who might be put at risk, or if it

is close in proximity to the current residence of the prisoner’s minor victim. 

11In Allen, the Supreme Court “reject[ed] the argument that a statute that

mandates release ‘unless’ certain findings are made is different from a

statute that mandates release ‘if,’ ‘when,’ or ‘subject to’ such findings

being made.” 482 U.S. 369, 378 (1987). 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2503
indicates that those four criteria are the sole reasons for which

the DOC may deny transfer.12 To the contrary: immediately

following the enumeration, the statute goes on to state that the

DOC’s “authority under this section is independent of any

court-ordered condition of sentence or statutory provision

regarding conditions for community custody or community

placement.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.728(2)(d). The statute’s manifest purpose, therefore, is to preserve to the DOC

the discretion to deny transfer in the event that it makes one

of the four determinations, notwithstanding what other legal

sources might otherwise require. 

To convert this non obstante permissive clause, meant to

preserve discretion in certain cases, into an expressio unius

provision that would limit discretion to all but those cases

would be to invert the very purpose for which this statute was

drafted.13 These statutes were enacted to protect the commu12If, for example, the statute stated that DOC “may” deny transfer “only

if” certain criteria are met or “unless” they are not, that might sufficiently

limit the discretion of the DOC to the point it creates an expectation of

release. The distinction between “if” and “only if,” however, is not a mere

quibble over vocabulary—it goes right to the heart of whether the criteria

of section 9.94A.728(2)(d) are necessary or sufficient conditions for transfer, and therefore whether transfer is mandatory or entirely discretionary.

“May . . . only if” would be effectively identical to “shall . . . unless”;

“may . . . if” is not. 

13The canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius stands

for the proposition that, when the legislature provides a list of related

items, it impliedly means to exclude other items not listed. See Norman

J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:23 (7th

ed. 2007). Such a result will obtain, however, only in the absence of evidence to the contrary. “The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is

an aid to construction, not a rule of law. It can never override clear and

contrary evidences of [legislative] intent.” Neuberger v. Comm’r, 311 U.S.

83, 88 (1940); see also Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 65 P.3d 1203,

1209 (Wash. 2003) (“[T]he rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius

d[oes] not necessarily apply without considering other factors which may

persuade the court that legislative intent was the opposite of what the statutory construction rule would require.”). In this case, the statement that

sex offenders only “may” receive transfer, combined with the final sentence of the paragraph, make clear the permissive intent of the statute. 

2504 CARVER v. LEHMAN
nity from recidivist offenders whose proclivity to sexually

abuse children is well-documented and whose anti-social tendencies are notoriously difficult to remedy through traditional

penological methods. Carver’s record would cause any reasonably cautious state official to pause before authorizing

even closely supervised release to the community. On the

basis of his prior record alone—even before this latest

conviction—a Washington superior court found probable

cause that Carver was a sexually violent predator. A forensic

psychological examination had concluded that Carver was, in

his own words, “a civil commitment case”—that is, he was

found to meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator. Section 9.94A.728(2)(d) reserves discretion for DOC officials

precisely so they may deny release plans of prisoners like

Carver who remain threats to the community. 

[6] Our reading of section 9.94A.728(2)(d) is consistent

with the case law of the Washington state courts construing

it.14 In the text of In re Liptrap, the Washington Court of

Appeals noted that the statute “stat[es] reasons why the

department may deny a release plan,” 111 P.3d at 1232, but

kept those “reasons” in the indefinite: they are just “reasons”

—not the reasons, let alone the only reasons—for denial. Similarly, In re Dutcher held simply that “the statute . . . requires

DOC to base its community custody eligibility decisions on

the merits of the release plan,” 60 P.3d at 638, which is hardly

to imply that section 9.94A.728(2)(d) provides the sole rubric

by which those “merits” are to be evaluated. 

[7] It is true that the cases cited above refer to a “limited

liberty interest” held by prisoners in transfer to community

custody. Liptrap, 111 P.3d at 1231; see also Dutcher, 60 P.3d

at 636 (describing a “limited but protected liberty interest” in

14“Whether a state statute provides such a protectable entitlement

depends on the structure and language of the statute, as well as the state

courts’ interpretation of the scope of the interest.” Bergen v. Spaulding,

881 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis added). 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2505
transfer); Crowder, 985 P.2d at 945 (“The statutory right to

earned early release creates a limited liberty interest requiring

minimal due process.”). We must not be confused, however,

by those decisions’ use of a Fourteenth Amendment term of

art: those cases concerned only the procedural right to compliance with individualized consideration on the merits of

prisoners’ release plans, secured by Washington Rule of

Appellate Procedure 16.4(a). Liptrap, 111 P.3d at 1234; Dutcher, 60 P.3d at 638. To the extent they contain dicta using

the same term, “liberty interest,” to refer to both a substantive

right to transfer and a procedural right to consideration on the

merits, the most logical reading is that both derive from

Washington law, and are hence of the same sub-constitutional

nature. Regardless, those dicta provide no justification for disregarding the plain language of the statute. 

Washington appellate courts have been careful to distinguish between the state habeas relief available through personal restraint petitions for violations of state law, and

personal restraint petitions to redress violations of a constitutional magnitude. The decisions in Dutcher, Crowder, and

Cashaw are examples of the former. In Cashaw, the Washington State Supreme Court explicitly rejected the lower court’s

holding that the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board’s failure to follow mandatory parole procedures constituted an

infringement of Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 866 P.2d at

12. Though it concluded that “the Board had violated its own

procedural rules for parolability hearings,” it specifically held

it was error to conclude “this violation was of constitutional

magnitude.” Id. at 13. The cases that refer to a “limited liberty

interest” do not support Judge Reinhardt’s conclusion that

state law regarding community custody creates a liberty interest arising under the Constitution. 

Washington courts have implied only one limit on the substance of the DOC’s exercise of discretion: its reasons for

denial must be “legitimate.” Liptrap, 111 P.3d at 1234; Crowder, 985 P.2d at 946. But there is no indication that a reason

2506 CARVER v. LEHMAN
may acquire “legitimacy” only by its enumeration in section

9.94A.728(2)(d). Indeed, every indication is to the contrary:

In re Crowder, the first case to imply a requirement of “legitimate reasons” for denial of transfer to community custody,

specified the petitioner’s “own withdrawal of a suggested

placement plan” as one of the “legitimate reasons” for denying him transfer, 985 P.2d at 946—a reason which certainly

seems legitimate, but appears nowhere in section

9.94A.728(2)(d).15 No Washington case has provided a general definition for what makes a reason “legitimate,” which

could be as broad as “any reason having a rational basis,” or

even “any reason not otherwise proscribed by law.” This illdefined “right” to transfer only in the absence of some “legitimate” reason to deny is hardly a sufficient “substantive predicate” to produce the “legitimate expectation of release”

required of a protected liberty interest under Greenholtz. 442

U.S. at 12. 

[8] The analysis employed by the Washington courts in

parole and community release cases confirms our conclusion

that section 9.94A.728(2)(d) does not create a liberty interest.

DOC officials had legitimate concern that Carver, based on

his multiple sex convictions and behavior in prison, had not

presented an acceptable release plan to alleviate the concern

for public safety. The Constitution requires no more. 

Response to Preamble of Concurrence

We readily acknowledge the self-evident truth of Judge

Reinhardt’s observation that in our judicial system the outcome of important appellate cases can vary based on the composition of the judicial body or panel deciding those cases. It

has been so ever since the founding of the Republic. We

15In re Crowder predated the enactment of section 9.94A.728(2)(d) by

three years. There is no indication in subsequent case law, however, that

codification of certain reasons in section 9.94A.728(2)(d) has somehow

narrowed the range of “legitimacy.” 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2507
respectfully disagree, however, with much of the balance of

our concurring colleague’s preambular observations about the

processing of this case, and we feel a response is required. 

Our colleague states that the “Constitution did not change

between the time of the original panel’s decision and the time

of the new majority’s opinion. All that changed is the composition of the three-judge panel.” Concurrence at 2511. This

implies that the previous panel majority unearthed an unalloyed constitutional nugget waiting to be discovered within

the primordial crust of the Fourteenth Amendment, but which

must now be reinterred and disregarded as a result of the passing of one of our colleagues. This implication ignores Judge

Reinhardt’s candid admission that “[t]he constitutional question is a close one, and substantial arguments can be made for

either position.” Concurrence at 2512. It further disregards

both the rules of our court and the vicissitudes of life. 

The respective corpora of the opinion and concurrence in

this case discuss the disputed nature of the constitutional

question. But whatever the merits of each side’s constitutional

analysis, we respectfully disagree with Judge Reinhardt’s contention that the prior majority’s opinion actually became a

binding construction of the Constitution before Judge Ferguson’s death, and that it is somehow unseemly to amend a published opinion when the reason for the change is the death of

a member of the prior majority. No opinion of this circuit

becomes final until the mandate issues, and the opinion issued

by the prior majority was only part way through its finalization process.16 Until the mandate has issued, opinions can be,

16 United States v. Ruiz, 935 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) clarifies that “no

expectation of finality can attach during the period in which either party

may petition for rehearing.” Id. at 1037 (quoting United States v. Fourmai,

910 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1990)). Thus, until the mandate issues, an

opinion is not fixed as “settled Ninth Circuit law,” and reliance on the

opinion is a “gamble.” Id. Moreover, in recognition of the human condition, our rules provide that “[i]f a member of a three-judge panel becomes

unavailable by reason of death, disability, or departure from the court and

the case is under submission, the Clerk shall draw a replacement by lot.”

Ninth Circuit General Orders 3.2g. 

2508 CARVER v. LEHMAN
and regularly are, amended or withdrawn, by the merits panel

at the request of the parties pursuant to a petition for panel

rehearing, in response to an internal memorandum from

another member of the court who believes that some part of

the published opinion is in error, or sua sponte by the panel

itself. For example, in the ninety days between July 11, 2008,

and October 9, 2008, at least ten published opinions were withdrawn17 and at least ten opinions were amended18 in our circuit. Thus, the prior majority’s holding in this case may or

may not have survived until the mandate issued, but it was

certainly not yet enshrined as a binding construction of the

Constitution when Judge Ferguson died. Even when an opinion deals with a constitutional issue, the referenced collaborative process strengthens, not weakens, the final quality of

those opinions, thereby better enabling them to stand the test

17Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey, No. 03-73030, 2008 WL 4478019

(9th Cir. Oct. 07, 2008); Al-Mousa v. Mukasey, No. 06-70638, 2008 WL

4330339 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 2008); U.S. v. Gianelli, No. 07-10233, 2008

WL 4225460, (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2008); Nguyen v. Mukasey, No. 04-

75315, 2008 WL 4180007 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2008); Amin v. Mukasey, No.

04-74693, 2008 WL 4148531 (9th Cir. Sept. 04, 2008); Carver v. Lehman,

540 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008); Center for Biological Diversity v. National

Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008); U.S. v.

Marcos-Mora, No. 07-30171, 2008 WL 3890415 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008);

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir.

2008); Metzler Inv. GmbH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 534 F.3d 1068

(9th Cir. 2008). 

18Center for Public Analysis on Trade and Health v. Office of U.S.

Trade Representative, No. 06-16682, 2008 WL 4490366 (9th Cir. Oct. 08,

2008); Lopez-Gutierrez v. Mukasey, No. 06-75836, 2008 WL 4472973

(9th Cir. Oct. 06, 2008); Hernandez v. Lamarque, No. 07-15921, 2008 WL

4430670 (9th Cir. Oct. 01, 2008); U.S. v. Grubbs, No. 03-10311, 2008 WL

4279988 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2008); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008); Bull v. City and County of San

Francisco, 539 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008); Marceau v. Blackfeet Housing

Authority, 540 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2008); Walter v. Drayson, 538 F.3d 1244

(9th Cir. 2008); Smith v. County of Riverside, No. 06-56848, 2008 WL

2872623, (9th Cir. July 24, 2008); U.S. v. Lopez, 2008 WL 2745948, No.

07-35389, (9th Cir. July 16, 2008). 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2509
of time, and engender the respect of thoughtful citizens for

both the opinion, and the court that produced it.

Judge Reinhardt also suggests that the only appropriate way

to have changed the previous panel’s decision was to initiate

an en banc process. En banc review is appropriate under our

rules only when a panel decision (a) conflicts with decisions

from another circuit, (b) conflicts with prior decisions of our

own circuit, or (c) “substantially affects a rule of national

application in which there is an overriding need for national

uniformity.” 9th Cir. R. 35-1; see also Fed. R. App. P.

35(a)(1). As our colleague well knows, the previous panel’s

majority opinion does not technically qualify for en banc

review under our rules,19 and it is very difficult to obtain en

banc review of a case in our court. 20 Had we accepted his recommendation, the original opinion would undoubtedly have

remained unchanged, the very result preferred by our colleague. 

Conclusion

[9] Because Washington law does not create a liberty interest in transfer to community custody, we need not address the

sufficiency of the procedures given (or denied) Carver. The

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

19The prior concurrence did not note, and there are no, conflicts with

other circuits, nor direct conflicts with Supreme Court rulings. As discussed in this opinion, this is an issue of first impression for the Ninth Circuit. Finally, as discussed in the substance of this opinion, the issue in this

case is one concerning Washington’s statutory scheme governing early

release into community custody. This is not an issue affecting national

uniformity, only one specific to Washington state. 

20Of the 1097 Petitions for Rehearing En Banc that were filed in 2007,

nineteen cases were taken en banc (1.7%). 

2510 CARVER v. LEHMAN
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment

only: 

Six months ago, the original panel in this case filed a

majority opinion holding that Washington state law creates a

liberty interest in an inmate’s early release into community

custody. We held that the prisoner’s liberty interest is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment and that, accordingly, when an inmate becomes

eligible for a transfer to community custody, the prison

authorities may deny his request for a transfer only for one of

the reasons specified in the Washington statute — and only if

he is afforded a minimal opportunity to present his side of the

story before they do so. In short, we held that Washington

prison authorities must follow Washington law and abide by

the United States Constitution. Joining me in that opinion was

Judge Warren J. Ferguson, who died before we could deny the

petition for rehearing; dissenting was Judge Milan Smith. As

a result of Judge Ferguson’s death, it was necessary to replace

him on this case with another member of this court drawn at

random. There were no intervening decisions that changed the

law between the time Judge Ferguson and I issued our opinion

holding that a liberty interest exists that protects the prisoners’

rights at issue and the time that Judge Smith, joined by our

colleague who replaced Judge Ferguson, issued a substitute

opinion holding that no such liberty interest exists. 

As stated above, it is indisputable that the law did not

change and the Constitution did not change between the time

of the original panel’s decision and the time of the new majority’s opinion. All that changed is the composition of the threejudge panel. To those who question whether the results in

constitutional and other cases depend on the membership of

the panel, or whether the replacement of even a single

Supreme Court justice can change the fundamental nature of

the rights of all Americans with respect to matters as basic as

affirmative action, a woman’s right of choice, and the nature

of religious liberty, the result in the case currently before our

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2511
panel is merely a minor illustration of how the judicial system

currently operates. Solely because of fortuity, I am compelled

to write in strong disagreement with the majority’s constitutional analysis instead of simply reaffirming an opinion vindicating the constitutional rights of the petitioner and his fellow

prisoners in the state of Washington.1

In the case before us, it is not necessary for the new majority to undo the original majority’s constitutional ruling, even

if it disagrees with it. The constitutional question is a close

one, and substantial arguments can be made for either position. Under these circumstances, the more important consideration, in my view, is maintaining the stability and legitimacy

of the court’s decisions. We have a procedure for correcting

decisions that a majority of the court believes warrant reconsideration. That process is known as a en banc rehearing. It

can be invoked if any single judge on the court, including

either member of the majority, elects to make a call. Relying

on this process would, in my view, be in the better interests

of the court and the judicial system; increasing the extent to

which judicial decisions depend on chance and subjectivity is

not a wise alternative. 

Let me make it clear that I have not suggested, nor do I

believe, that Judge Smith and Judge Tallman do not have the

authority to withdraw the opinion filed by the initial panel and

published as the opinion of the court. Of course, they do.2 Nor

1For the benefit of my colleagues in the majority, I should state that I,

of course, do not believe that the original panel majority unearthed a “constitutional nugget,” Maj. Op. at 2508, alloyed or otherwise. This is simply

a case in which Judge Ferguson and I tried our best to do our job, including the mundane task of seeing that prisoners, like all other persons, are

afforded the rights to which they are entitled under the law. I recognize

that these days there are many who do not share the view that prisoners’

rights deserve judicial protection, but neither Judge Ferguson nor I was

aware of any constitutional or statutory provision to that effect, except perhaps for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2241 et seq. 

2All would agree that an opinion may be properly withdrawn or

amended when the panel is persuaded by a party or a colleague, or

2512 CARVER v. LEHMAN
have I suggested that the opinion was “final”: I merely stated

what I strongly believe — that it is unwise for a court, once

it has published an opinion on a constitutional question, to

change its mind for so fortuitous and subjective a reason.

Rather, I suggested that a procedure exists under which we

could reach a different result through a more objective process in which the merits, not the composition of the panel,

would provide the basis for our action. Proceeding in the latter manner would help to secure the legitimacy of court decisions and, necessarily, to maintain public confidence in the

judicial system. 

I. Liberty Interest

As Judge Ferguson and I previously held, Washington’s

statutory scheme creates a protected liberty interest because it

requires the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to transfer

becomes aware on its own, of a “point of law or fact that . . . the court

has overlooked or misapprehended . . . .” Fed. R. App. P. 40. I must note,

however, that this practice of withdrawing published opinions is employed

far more sparingly than Judge Smith suggests. Of the ten cases which he

cites as “published opinions [that] were withdrawn,” Maj. Op. at 2509,

only five other than the one before us fit that description. In two of those

five, the panel remanded to an administrative agency in its revised decisions but ordered similar or broader relief than in the initial opinions. See

Al-Mousa v. Mukasey, 2008 WL 4372965, at *2 (9th Cir. Sep. 22, 2008);

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538

F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). In a third, the panel dismissed a petition rather

than remanding to an administrative agency after the government submitted the full record in place of the incomplete record it initially provided

to the panel. Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir.

2008). In a fourth case, the panel changed its reason for allowing the government to pursue a restitution order, preferring to rely on federal preemption. United States v. Gianelli, 543 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2008). In only one

case did the panel reverse a basic position it had taken. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2008). In none of these cases

was a constitutional question at issue, and in none was the withdrawal

prompted by a matter unrelated to the law, such as the reconstitution of

the panel. 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2513
an inmate to community custody in lieu of earned release “unless any one of the . . . specifically designated reasons are

found[,]” thereby “creat[ing] a presumption that . . . release

[into community custody] will be granted, and . . . in turn

creat[ing] a legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite finding that one of the justifications for [denial] exists.”

Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979). See also Bd. of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987). The majority rejects this

argument, finding no “ ‘explicitly mandatory language’ . . .

creating a substantive right to transfer to community custody”

under Washington law. Maj. Op. at 2502 (emphasis omitted).

For the reasons set forth in our prior majority opinion and

reiterated below, I believe that the current majority’s reading

is flawed. 

The Washington statutory scheme uses language that effectively mandates the transfer to community custody of those

inmates who have earned release time and who have not been

found to meet one of the statutory reasons for denial of a

release plan set forth in Washington Revised Code

§ 9.94A.728(2)(d). Section 9.94A.710(1) requires that sex

offenders be sentenced to a term of community custody to

begin either when the offender’s term of confinement is complete or when he is transferred as a result of earned release

time. Section 9.94A.728(1) likewise requires the DOC to

develop and promulgate procedures by which a sex offender

may become eligible for transfer to community custody in

lieu of earned release time. The same section then sets forth

the limited circumstances under which the Department “may

deny” an inmate’s proposed plan for transfer to community

custody. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.728(2)(d) (listing as legitimate reasons for denial, a DOC determination that the release

plan may violate the conditions of the sentence or conditions

of supervision, place the offender at risk to violate the conditions of the sentence, place the offender at risk to reoffend, or

present a risk to victim or community safety). By placing substantive limitations on DOC’s discretion to deny release plans

2514 CARVER v. LEHMAN
and, in particular, by requiring that denial of such plans be

based on the limited criteria contained in section

9.94A.728(2)(d), Washington has created a liberty interest in

early release into community custody that is protected by the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3See

Allen, 482 U.S. at 375-76 (clarifying that a state may grant

“significant discretion to the decisionmaker” to apply “general or broad release criteria” without “depriv[ing] the prisoner of the liberty interest in parole[,]” so long as “release is

3At oral argument, Lehman urged that the presence of more specific

criteria for denial of proposed residence locations in section

72.09.340(3)(a) undermines Carver’s contention that the four criteria listed

in section 9.94A.728(2)(d) provide the exclusive legitimate bases for

denial of a release plan. Lehman is incorrect: the bases for denial of proposed residence locations contained in section 72.09.340(3)(a) are, in

effect, specific variations of the same more general formulations set forth

for denial of release plans in section 9.94A.728(2)(d). Section

72.09.340(3)(a) provides: 

[T]he department shall not approve a residence location if the

proposed residence: (I) Includes a minor victim or child of similar age or circumstance (as a previous victim who the department

determines may be put at substantial risk of harm by the offender’s residence in the household; or (ii) is within close proximity

of the current residence of a minor victim, unless the whereabouts of the minor victim cannot be determined or unless such

a restriction would impede family reunification efforts ordered by

the court or directed by the department of social and health services. The department is further authorized to reject a residence

location if the proposed residence is within close proximity to

schools, child care centers, playgrounds, or other grounds or

facilities where children of similar age or circumstance as a previous victim are present who the department determines may be

put at substantial risk of harm by the sex offender’s residence at

that location. 

These bases for denial of a proposed residence, which take into account

whether the residence includes or is near a past or potential victim, are

simply more specific examples of the final two criteria that serve as legitimate bases for denial under § 9.94A.728(2)(d), whether the “proposed residence location and living arrangements . . . place the offender at risk to

reoffend, or present a risk to victim safety or community safety.” WASH.

REV. CODE § 72.09.340(3)(a). 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2515
required after the [decisionmaker] determines (in its broad

discretion) that the necessary prerequisites exist”). See also

Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844 (noting that “[a] state may create

a constitutionally protected liberty interest by establishing

regulatory measures that impose substantive limitations on the

exercise of official discretion”); Bergen v. Spaulding, 881

F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A board charged with deciding a prisoner’s early release may be delegated significant discretion in making its decision, and yet be constrained by legal

standards in exercising that discretion . . . . that scheme may

give rise to a liberty interest in early release.”) (internal citation omitted). 

That the Washington statute governing transfer to community custody does not use the more traditional mandatory language formula used in other early release statutes, i.e. stating

that the DOC “shall” grant release “unless” certain findings

are made, does not require a contrary result. See Allen, 482

U.S. at 378 (rejecting the argument that a statute must contain

the “shall/unless” formula in order to create a liberty interest).

Although we have accorded significance to the use of the term

“shall” in assessing whether early release statutes create a liberty interest, we have never held that use of this term is

required in order to satisfy the mandatory language rule set

forth in Greenholtz and Allen. Nor does the majority so hold

today. Maj. Op. at 2503-04. Despite the absence of the word

“shall,” I conclude, as the prior majority did, that the language

of section 9.94A.728(2)(d) is mandatory. Section

9.94A.728(2)(d) provides that the department “may deny

transfer to community custody . . . if” any one of four criteria

is met. By establishing criteria under which release may be

denied, section 9.94A.728(2)(d) creates the presumption that,

absent the existence of one those criteria, release will be

granted. The repetition of the criteria, albeit in more specific

form, in section 72.09.340(3)(a) and in Policy Directive

350.200 confirms this understanding of the mandatory nature

of the statute. 

2516 CARVER v. LEHMAN
The “may deny . . . if” formula operates in precisely the

same manner and has precisely the same effect as a “shall

grant . . . unless” clause. Under the “may deny . . . if” formula, the provision sets forth the conditions under which the

agency may deny release. Otherwise, it must grant it. This is

distinguishable from state statutes that provide that a decisionmaker “may grant . . . if” certain criteria are met. Under the

“may grant . . . if” formula, the agency may only grant release

if the relevant criteria are met, but it is not required to do so.4

Therefore, under the “may deny . . . if” formula, as under a

“shall grant . . . unless” clause, there is an expectation that

release will be granted unless one of the specified conditions

exists. 

Judge Smith, who separately concurred in the original

majority opinion, remains unconvinced that the language of

the statutory scheme is mandatory. My colleague who

replaced Judge Ferguson agrees with him. But my reading is

supported by that of the Washington state courts. In interpreting the statutory scheme governing early release into community custody, the state Court of Appeals has on two occasions

discussed the mandatory nature of the law. First, in In re Dutcher, an inmate similarly situated to Carver challenged the

4For this reason, courts have routinely held that the “may grant . . . if”

formulation does not create a liberty interest. See, e.g., Barna v. Travis,

239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001) (New York parole statute); Dace v.

Mickelson, 797 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1986) (South Dakota parole statute); Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) (Missouri parole

statute); Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653, 656-657 (8th Cir. 1984)

(Arkansas parole statute); Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d 1287, 1288 (10th Cir.

1984) (Utah parole statute); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th

Cir. 1984) (Mississippi parole statute); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d

868, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981) (New Mexico parole statute); Williams v.

Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1981) (Texas parole statute);

Schuemann v. Colo. State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172, 174 n.2 (10th

Cir. 1980); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979) (New

York parole statute); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805, 806-07 (10th Cir.

1979) (Oklahoma parole statute); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866, 867

(6th Cir. 1979) (Ohio parole statute). 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2517
DOC’s failure to review his plan for release into community

custody pursuant to the Department’s policy of categorically

denying the plans of those offenders who appeared to be sexually violent predators and who were referred for civil commitment. 60 P.3d 635, 635-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). The court

held that the DOC’s policy violated the statutory mandate,

explaining that “the statute compels DOC to require offenders

to develop a release plan, and requires DOC to base its community custody eligibility decisions on the merits of the

release plan.” Id. at 638 (emphasis added). 

Second, my conclusion that requiring a decision on the

merits of a release plan permits the Department to deny such

a plan only if it finds one of the statutory criteria listed in section 9.94A.728(2)(d) is bolstered by the state court’s interpretation of the statute in In re Liptrap. In Liptrap, inmates

challenged the DOC’s policy of refusing to review release

plans of sex offenders until a forensic psychological evaluation had been completed. 111 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Wash. Ct.

App. 2005). In finding that the Department’s policy violated

inmates’ due process rights, the court explained that “[t]he

provisions in subsections [9.94A.728(2)] (c) and (d), spell[ ]

out what is required in a release plan and stat[e] reasons why

the department may deny a release[.]” Id. at 1232 (emphasis

added). Accordingly, the Liptrap court found that “the department [does not have] unlimited discretion to decide whether

and when to consider an offender for transfer to community

custody.” Id. Rather, the DOC’s failure to “state[ ] a legitimate reason” for the denial of a release plan, the court concluded, “deprived [the inmates] of earned early release credits

in violation of due process.” Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).5

5The Liptrap court specifically noted section 72.09.340’s provision for

denial of a release plan because the proposed residence is near young children as a “legitimate statutory reason for disapproving a release plan for

a sex offender.” In re Liptrap, 111 P.3d at 1233 & n.6 (citing WASH. REV.

CODE § 72.09.340(3)). For the reasons set forth in footnote 3, supra, this

provision is simply a specific example of the more general bases for denial

set forth in section 9.94A.728(2)(d). 

2518 CARVER v. LEHMAN
This holding is consistent with my conclusion that Washington law requires that the DOC’s denial of a release plan be

based on a “legitimate reason,” and that such reasons are enumerated in section 9.94A.728(2)(d).6

I conclude, then, as did the original panel majority, that the

language of the Washington statutory scheme, as supported

by Washington case law, mandates the transfer to community

custody of those inmates who have earned release time and

who have not been found to meet one of the statutory reasons

for denial of a release, thereby creating a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in the transfer. This conclusion is

further supported by Washington state court decisions finding

a limited liberty interest in transfer to community custody in

lieu of early release. The Washington Court of Appeals has

consistently found a “limited liberty interest in early release

into a community custody program . . . .” In re Crowder, 985

P.2d 944, 944-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding inmate had

liberty interest in grant or denial of community custody placement upon earning of early release, but that the minimum

level of due process required to protect this interest was provided). See also In re Dutcher, 60 P.3d at 636 (“An inmate’s

6This provision goes on to state that “[t]he department’s authority under

this section is independent of any court-ordered condition of sentence or

statutory provision regarding conditions for community custody or community placement.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.728(2)(d). The majority

argues that this sentence makes it clear that the function of section

9.94A.728(2)(d) is “to preserve to the DOC the discretion to deny transfer

in the event that it makes one of the four determinations, notwithstanding

what other legal sources might otherwise require.” Maj. Op. at 2504. I do

not disagree. The fact that the provision permits the DOC to deny release

even where other legal sources would allow for it is irrelevant, however,

to the question at hand: regardless of other legal sources, does the statute

itself place substantive limits on the DOC’s exercise of discretion? As I

explained supra, the provision’s preservation to the DOC of discretion to

deny transfer only “in the event that it makes one of the four determinations[,]” is precisely the type of substantive limitation that gives rise to the

liberty interest asserted here. 

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2519
interest in his earned early release credits is a limited, but protected, liberty interest.”); In re Liptrap, 111 P.3d at 1231(same).7

In sum, I would hold once again that the Washington statutory scheme governing transfer to community custody of

those inmates who have earned early release time creates a

liberty interest that is protected under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. Having found this liberty

interest, I would, like the original panel, go a step beyond the

current majority and consider “whether the procedures attendant upon th[e] deprivation [of Carver’s liberty interest] were

constitutionally sufficient[.]” Kentucky Dept. of Corrections

7The majority contends that I read too much into the use of the word

“liberty interest” in these cases. It first argues that the liberty interest recognized by the Washington Court of Appeals is merely procedural, rather

than substantive, in nature. Maj. Op. at 2506 (“[T]hose cases concerned

only the procedural right to compliance with individualized consideration

on the merits of prisoners’ release plans . . . .”). To the contrary, the Washington court explained: “An inmate’s interest in his earned early release

credits is a limited, but protected, liberty interest. Likewise, the department’s compliance with requirements of statutes affecting his release is a

protected liberty interest.” See In re Liptrap, 111 P.3d at 1231 (quoting In

re Dutcher, 60 P.3d at 636) (emphasis added). As this language makes

clear, the Washington court recognizes a liberty interest in both the substantive right to earned early release (here, in the form of transfer to community custody) and the distinct procedural right to have the DOC comply

with the requirements of the statutes governing such release. 

The majority next suggests that “To the extent [the Washington decisions] contain dicta using the same term, ‘liberty interest,’ to refer to both

a substantive right to transfer and a procedural right to consideration on

the merits, the most logical reading is that both derive from Washington

law, and are hence of the same sub-constitutional nature.” Maj. Op. at

2506. That the Washington court had the federal Due Process Clause—

and not a sub-constitutional right—in mind when analyzing section

9.94A.728(2) is, again, evidenced by the plain language of its decision in

Liptrap, where the court framed its discussion of the interest at stake in

the familiar terms of federal due process jurisprudence. See In re Liptrap,

111 P.3d at 1231 (explaining that “[d]ue process protects against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property” and finding that “[a]n inmate’s interest

in his earned early release credits is a limited, but protected, liberty interest”). 

2520 CARVER v. LEHMAN
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Carver’s release plan

was denied under a categorical policy that provided him with

no process at all; it simply rejected all plans of offenders who,

like Carver, appeared to fall under the definition of a sexually

violent predator and who were referred for civil commitment.

Accordingly, the complete absence of procedures deprived

Carver of his liberty interest in transfer to community custody

without due process of law. 

Finally, I would note that the majority’s analysis of whether

Carver presents a danger to the community is entirely beside

the point. That is not a question for this court. Whether the

prison officials followed the law is. Equally important, the

fact that the statute creates a liberty interest does not mean

that it does not also serve the purpose of protecting the community. The majority states that the purpose of the statute is

to provide “discretion for DOC officials precisely so they may

deny release plans of prisoners like Carver who remain threats

to the community.” Maj. Op. at 2505. But in establishing a

liberty interest, the Washington statute did not ignore legitimate concerns about the safety of the community. Indeed,

among the four permissible reasons for denying transfer into

community custody are whether such transfer would “place

the offender at risk to reoffend, or present a risk to victim

safety or community safety.” WASH. REV. CODE

§ 9.94A.728(2)(d). This threat to the community, however,

must be established through a proper procedure in order to

justify the deprivation of the inmate’s liberty interest; it is not

simply left to the unbridled discretion of the DOC. The point,

then, is that inmates have a constitutionally-protected liberty

interest in release to community custody such that when the

DOC denies release, it must do so for one of the statutorilyenumerated reasons, and it must do so pursuant to proper procedures. Here, neither requirement was met. The prison officials simply ignored the statutory requirements and

categorically denied all prisoners like Carver the release to

which they may have been entitled. Thus, Carver and others

were denied their due process rights. Let me make it absoCARVER v. LEHMAN 2521
lutely clear, I do not contend that Carver was entitled to

release. He may well not have been. On this record, however,

we cannot know. Had the DOC followed the procedures provided by statute, and had it found that Carver’s release “present[ed] a risk to community safety,” the prison authorities

could well have retained him in custody. Following the law

is not that difficult, and we are entitled to expect no less from

our officials, prison or otherwise. 

II. Qualified Immunity

Although unlike the current majority I conclude that Carver

was deprived of a liberty interest, I would as did the original

majority affirm the district court’s finding of qualified immunity and therefore concur in the current majority’s judgment.

Qualified immunity protects “government officials . . .

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The qualified immunity

analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we consider whether

“the facts alleged show that [Lehman’s] conduct violated a

constitutional right[.]” Galen, 477 F.3d at 658-59 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02 (2001)). For the reasons

discussed above, I would answer this question in the affirmative. Second, we ask if “the right [Lehman is] alleged to have

violated [was] clearly established such that a reasonable [official] would have understood that he was violating that

right[.]” Id. I conclude that the answer to this question is no.

In determining whether the right alleged to have been violated was clearly established, we must consider the right “in

light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition[.]” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “ ‘The contours of

the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483

2522 CARVER v. LEHMAN
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Here, because section 9.94A.728(2)(d)

does not use the more common mandatory term “shall,” a reasonable correctional official might not have understood that

the Washington statutory scheme created a liberty interest in

early release into community custody. Certainly, the question

was highly debatable at the time that Lehman was required to

act. Carver’s plan was denied before the Washington Court of

Appeals had issued its decisions in Dutcher and Liptrap,

which clarified that not only does a limited liberty interest

exist under state law, but that the DOC’s discretion to deny

release into community custody is limited to rejection of a

plan on the basis of the legitimate statutory criteria set forth

in section 9.94A.728(2)(d). 

Because I conclude, as did the original majority, that the

right at issue here was not sufficiently clear at the time of the

facts giving rise to this case such that a reasonable official

would understand that denying a release plan without providing a legitimate statutory reason for that denial would violate

due process, I would once again affirm the district court’s

grant of qualified immunity. 

III. Conclusion

Washington state law creates a liberty interest in an

inmate’s early release into community custody that is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Carver was denied his due process right by the

state officials’ refusal to approve his release plan without

reviewing it on its merits. At the time, however, the due process right arising from the existence of his liberty interest was

not sufficiently clearly established to meet the Saucier standard. Because I would affirm the district court’s determination that Lehman is entitled to qualified immunity, I therefore

concur in the majority’s judgment, but I respectfully disagree

with its reasoning.

CARVER v. LEHMAN 2523