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GREGORIA CAMPOS, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE

OF JOSE MAURICIO CAMPOS), ET AL. v.

ROBERT E. COLEMAN ET AL.

(SC 19195)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Robinson, Js.
Argued October 21, 2014—officially released October 6, 2015

John W. Mills, for the appellants (plaintiff Mauricio

Campos et al.).

Kenneth H. Naide, with whom, on the brief, was John

A. Kiernan, pro hac vice, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

PALMER, J. In Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246

Conn. 456, 461, 495–96, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998), this court

declined to recognize a derivative cause of action for

loss of parental consortium by a minor child.1 The primary issue presented by this case is whether we should

overrule this holding in Mendillo. We conclude that

we should.

The named plaintiff, Gregoria Campos, in her individual capacity and in her capacity as administratrix of

the estate of her late husband, Jose Mauricio Campos

(decedent), and the Campos’ three children, Mauricio

Campos, Jose Ernesto Campos and Jose Eduardo

Campos (Campos children), brought this action against

the defendants, Robert E. Coleman and LQ Management, LLC (LQ Management).2 The plaintiffs alleged in

their complaint that Coleman negligently had caused

the decedent’s death and included claims for the

Campos children’s loss of parental consortium.3 The

defendants filed a motion to strike the loss of parental

consortium claims in accordance with Mendillo, which

the trial court granted. Thereafter, a jury returned a

verdict for the decedent’s estate on the wrongful death

claim and for Gregoria Campos on her loss of spousal

consortium claim, and the trial courtrendered judgment

in accordance with the verdict. The Campos children

then filed this appeal, contending that we should overrule Mendillo and allow them to pursue their claims for

loss of parental consortium. We agree with the Campos

children that we should recognize a cause of action by

a minor child for loss of parental consortium resulting

from an injury to a parent, subject to certain limitations.

The facts underlying this case are tragic but straightforward. On September 15, 2008, the decedent was

riding a bicycle on Westfield Street in the town of West

Haven when he was struck by a motor vehicle that was

owned by LQ Management and operated by Coleman.

The decedent suffered severe injuries, resulting in his

death three days later, on September 18, 2008.

Thereafter, Gregoria Campos and the Campos children filed an eight count complaint alleging, inter alia,

that (1) Coleman had negligently caused the decedent’s

death, thereby entitling the decedent’s estate to damages under the wrongful death statute, General Statutes

§ 52-555, (2) LQ Management also was liable for Coleman’s negligence because it owned the motor vehicle

thatColeman was driving andColeman had been driving

it with LQ Management’s permission, (3) Gregoria

Campos was entitled to damages for loss of spousal

consortium, and (4) the Campos children were entitled

to damages for loss of parental consortium. The defendants filed a motion to strike the claims for loss of

parental consortium, as well as other claims not relevant to this appeal, and the trial court granted the
motion as to the loss of parental consortium claims. The

complaint was amended in accordance with that ruling.

The jury ultimately returned a verdict for the decedent’s estate on the wrongful death claim and awarded

damages in the amount of $2,948,000. In addition, the

jury found that Gregoria Campos was entitled to damages for loss of spousal consortium in the amount of

$1 million. The jury also found that the decedent had

been 42 percent contributorily negligent and, accordingly,reduced the damages forthe wrongful death claim

to $1,709,840 and the damages for the loss of spousal

consortium claim to $580,000. The trial court rendered

judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and rendered judgment thereon.

This appeal by the Campos children followed.4 They

claim that, although the trial court correctly determined

that, in light of this court’s decision in Mendillo, the

defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of

law on their claims for loss of parental consortium,

Mendillo was incorrectly decided, and we therefore

should overrule it.5 We are persuaded by this claim.

In Mendillo, a majority of this court ultimately

declined to recognize a minor child’s claim for loss of

parental consortium resulting from a tortfeasor’s conduct. Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn.

461, 495–96. At the outset of our analysis of this issue

in Mendillo, however, we candidly acknowledged that

‘‘many of [the arguments in support of recognizing such

a claim] have considerable appeal . . . .’’ Id., 480. In

particular, we recognized that a minor child who, by

virtue of a tortfeasor’s conduct, has been deprived of

the love and companionship of a parent ‘‘has suffered

a genuine injury, and a serious one.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 478. Underscoring this point, we

explained that ‘‘we [had] recently reaffirmed that it is

our state’s public policy to promote the welfare of the

family, and that the interest of children in not being

dislocated from the emotional attachments that derive

from the intimacy of daily association . . . with the

parent has constitutional significance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting Pamela B. v. Ment,

244 Conn. 296, 310, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).

We also acknowledged the argument made by the

plaintiffs in Mendillo that ‘‘permitting compensation for

loss of parental consortium will enable the emotionally

injured child to secure the therapy that will, in turn,

help to heal the wounds caused by his or her loss. . . .

[N]ot only will the minor child benefit, but society will

also benefit if the child is able to function without

emotional handicap. This may well offset any increase

in insurance premiums.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246

Conn. 479.

As we further observed in Mendillo, another argu-
ment favoring the recognition of a derivative cause of

action for parental consortium is the fact that this court

already had recognized analogous causes of action for

loss of spousal consortium; Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 493, 408 A.2d 260 (1979); and

bystander emotional distress. Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237

Conn. 31, 49, 675 A.2d 852 (1996). With respect to the

former, we acknowledged the view, as expressed by

the Supreme Court of Washington, that ‘‘permitting a

husband or wife but not children to recover for loss of

consortium erroneously suggests that an adult is more

likely to suffer emotional injury than a child’’; (internal

quotation marks omitted) Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. 480, quoting Ueland v. Pengo

Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wn. 2d 131, 134, 691 P.2d 190

(1984); and noted the contention of the plaintiffs in

Mendillo that, following our recognition of a derivative

cause of action for spousal consortium in Hopson, the

‘‘logical [next step] from . . . Hopson[’s] protect[ion

of] the emotional or sentimental aspects of the husbandwife relationship [is the] protection of the similar

aspects of the parent-child relationship.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. Board of Education,

supra, 479. With respect to our decision in Clohessy,

‘‘in which we recognized, for the first time and subject

to certain limitations, that a parent and a sibling can

recover damages for the emotional anguish they had

[suffered] by witnessing the parent’s other young child

being fatally injured by the defendant’s negligence’’; id.;

we noted the argument of the plaintiffs in Mendillo that

the ‘‘[a]pplication of this court’s logic in Clohessy to

the question of whether a tortfeasor’s liability should

exend to . . . loss of [parental] consortium properly

instructs that the time is similarly ripe to recognize

such cause of action in this state.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id.

Finally, we observed what the plaintiffs in Mendillo

had ‘‘characterize[d] as the emerging national trend recognizing . . . [a] cause of action [for loss of parental

consortium] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 479–80. We further observed that, in support

of this argument, the plaintiffs in Mendillo had ‘‘cite[d]

to a number of jurisdictions that have, since 1980,recognized a cause of action for loss of parental consortium.’’

Id., 480.

Notwithstanding the conceded force of these arguments, we ultimately declined to recognize a cause of

action for parental consortium, ‘‘primarily on the basis

of: [1] the fact that recognition of the cause of action

would require arbitrary limitations; [2] the additional

economic burden that recognition would impose on

the general public; [3] the uncertainty that recognition

would yield significant social benefits; [4] the substantialrisk of double recovery; and [5] the weight of judicial

authority.’’ Id., 485. Justice Berdon issued a concurring

and dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Katz, in which
he disputed these points in maintaining that the court

should adopt this cause of action because its benefits

outweighed its costs. See id., 514 (Berdon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Upon reconsideration of the relevant considerations,

including the five factors that this court found determinative in Mendillo, we now agree with the concurring

and dissenting opinion in Mendillo that the public policy

factors favoring recognition of a cause of action for

loss of parental consortium outweigh those factors disfavoring recognition. More specifically, we agree that

the unique emotional attachment between parents and

children, the importance of ensuring the continuity of

the critically important services that parents provide

to their children, society’s interest in the continued

development of children as contributing members of

society, and the public policies in favor of compensating

innocent parties and deterring wrongdoing provide

compelling reasons to recognize such a cause of action.

With respect to the countervailing policy considerations

on which we relied in Mendillo, we now are persuaded

for the following reasons that our concerns were overstated.

We first address our determination in Mendillo that

recognizing such a cause of action would require the

court ‘‘to impose arbitrary limitations on the scope of

the cause of action in order to avoid the creation of a

practically unlimited class of potential plaintiffs.’’ Id.,

485. In Mendillo, we reasoned that ‘‘there are other

formally recognized relationships . . . [such as] siblings, grandparent and grandchild, and aunt or uncle

and nephew or niece . . . that could well, depending

on the case, present equally strong claims of loss of

consortium. Similarly, there is nothing in the underlying

rationale for recognition of the claim to confine it to

minor children. . . . There undoubtedly are adult children who suffer a genuine loss of consortium by virtue

of their parent’s injury.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in

original; footnote omitted.) Id., 485–86.

Although we acknowledge that strong emotional

attachments frequently arise in all of these relationships, we do not agree that the relationships ‘‘present

equally strong claims of loss of consortium’’ as those

arising from the relationship between a minor child and

a parent. Id., 485. Almost by definition, the familial

relationships referred to in Mendillo are more attenuated and derivative than the parent-child relationship

because the relationship between siblings, between a

grandparent and a grandchild, and between an uncle

or an aunt and a niece or a nephew arises through the

parent-child relationship. Indeed, ‘‘[t]he parent-child

relationship is . . . the wellspring from which other

family relationships derive . . . .’’6

(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 500 (Berdon, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part), quoting Villareal v. Dept. of
Transportation, 160 Ariz. 474, 478, 774 P.2d 213 (1989);

see also Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 500

(Berdon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(‘‘the parent-child relationship . . . is the earliest and

most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]), quoting Nulle v. GilletteCampbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, 797 P.2d

1171, 1173 (Wyo. 1990). Moreover, the relationship

between a parent and a minor child is the only one of

these relationships that gives rise to legally enforceable

rights. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No.

9489), 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981) (‘‘ ‘[t]he

commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: [1] express love

and affection forthe child; [2] express personal concern

over the health, education and general well-being of

the child; [3] the duty to supply the necessary food,

clothing, and medical care; [4] the duty to provide an

adequate domicile; and [5] the duty to furnish social

and religious guidance,’ ’’ and failure to meet these obligations may result in termination of parental rights).

We also disagree with the court’s conclusion in Mendillo that the distinction between minor children and

adult children is arbitrary. Although we recognize that

many adults continue to receive affection and guidance

from their parents well past the age of majority, adults

do not have the same legal entitlements with respect

to their parents as minor children; see id.; and are presumptively fully autonomous and responsible for their

own well-being. See, e.g., Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay

Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1987) (loss of

parental consortium claims are limited to minor children); Theama v. Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 527, 344

N.W.2d 513 (1984) (‘‘[w]e . . . limit recovery under [a]

cause of action [for loss of parental consortium] to

[minor children] . . . because the minor is [the] one

whose relationship is most likely to be severely affected

by a negligent injury to the parent’’); Nulle v. GilletteCampbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, supra, 797

P.2d 1176 (loss of parental consortium claims are limited to minor children).

We further disagree with the suggestion of the court

in Mendillo that adopting a cause of action for loss of

parental consortium would require the court to arbitrarily exclude such claims by, for example, stepchildren. See Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra,

246 Conn. 485. For purposes of the present case, we

need not decide whether a stepchild who has not been

legally adopted by the injured stepparent should be

permitted to bring a claim for loss of consortium. We

recognize, however, that, in modern society, many children have parental-type relationships with adults who

are neither their biological parents nor their adoptive

parents. We further recognize that children who are

deprived of such relationships are likely to suffer harm

no less severe than the harm suffered by biological
and adoptive children in similar circumstances. As we

indicated, because the question of whether such children may bring a loss of consortium claim is not presented by this appeal, we leave it for another day. We

are not persuaded, however, that this issue, however

it ultimately may be resolved, warrants denying all children the right of recovery for loss of parental consortium.7

For the foregoing reasons, our recognition of a cause

of action by minor children for the loss of parental

consortium does not require the imposition of arbitrary

limitations on such a cause of action. The child-parent

relationship is unique in its emotional closeness, in its

value to society and in its generation of enforceable

legal rights and obligations. By limiting loss of familial

consortium claims to cases involving the impairment of

that relationship, we are merely recognizing the natural

distinction between that relationship and other familial

relationships. See id., 513 (Berdon, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) (‘‘[t]he distinction between

the interests of children and those of other relatives is

rational and easily applied’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]).

We next address our determination in Mendillo that

recognizing a cause of action forloss of parental consortium by minor children would impose undue societal

costs and would not yield significant social benefits.

Id., 487. We observed in Mendillo that, unlike loss of

spousal consortium claims, loss of parental consortium

claims may be raised by multiple children, and the

resulting costs will be borne by society as a whole

through increased insurance premiums. Id., 487–88. We

further stated that ‘‘the proposed offsetting value

asserted by the minor plaintiffs—namely, that recovery

will give the injured minor child the wherewithal to

heal [his or] her wounds, thereby helping both [the

child] and society at large—is too conjectural . . . .’’

Id., 488.

We did not explain in Mendillo, however, why damages from loss of parental consortium claims are any

more conjecturalthan othertypes of noneconomic damages, such as damages for pain and suffering and loss of

spousal consortium. See Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital,

supra, 176 Conn. 494 (rejecting argument that damages

forloss of spousal consortium are too remote orindirect

to be recognized because ‘‘[t]he task of computing damages for . . . loss of consortium is no more difficult

for a judge or jury than arriving at an award for pain and

suffering’’). Rather, it appears that this determination in

Mendillo was based on the premise that a minor child’s

loss of parental consortium is not essentially different,

or more worthy of compensation, from the loss suffered

by other family members, or the losses suffered by

plaintiffs in other cases involving third-party liability,

which involve ‘‘the far reaches of foreseeability.’’ Men-
dillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. 493; see

id. (discussing cases in which this court previously has

rejected claims of third-party liability and concluding

that, ‘‘if the presence of a genuine injury were legally

sufficient to impose [third-party] liability, the only limitations on such liability would be the far reaches of

foreseeability’’). On the contrary, the parent-child relationship is essentially different from other familial relationships, and the inability of a parent who has suffered

a physical or mental injury to provide the ‘‘love, care,

companionship and guidance’’ to minor children that

he or she otherwise would have provided; (internal

quotation marks omitted) id., 478; is an eminently foreseeable and uniquely harmful consequence of such an

injury. See id., 484 (‘‘as a general matter, it is foreseeable

that causing serious injury to a parent may have deleterious effects on the parent’s minor children’’); see also

id., 499 (Berdon, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part) (‘‘[i]t is common knowledge that a parent who

suffers serious physical or mental injury is unable to

give his minor children the parental care, training, love

and companionship in the same degree as he might have

but for the injury’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]),

quoting Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 168, 368 P.2d

57 (1962). ‘‘Although a monetary award may be a poor

substitute for the loss of a parent’s society and companionship, itis the only workable way that ourlegal system

has found to ease the injured party’s tragic loss.’’

Theama v. Kenosha, supra, 117 Wis. 2d 523; see also

id. (damages for loss of parental consortium may be

used to procure domestic services and psychiatric help

for child). We further note that, if no compensation

is available, the harm caused by the loss of parental

consortium may not be limited to the child and may

have wider societal implications. See Mendillo v. Board

of Education, supra, 511 (Berdon, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part) (‘‘development of a child’s character, disposition, and abilities [has] a corresponding

impact on society’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

We acknowledge that recognizing this cause of action

will impose societal costs, as does the recognition of

virtually any cause of action, but we now believe that

the benefits of recognizing a cause of action for loss

of parental consortium are not conjectural and outweigh the costs.

With respect to the court’s concern in Mendillo that

a cause of action forloss of parental consortium ‘‘would

entail adding as many companion claims as the injured

parent had minor children, each such claim entitled

to separate appraisal and award’’; (internal quotation

marks omitted) id., 487; this concern would be adequately addressed by allowing the tortfeasor to argue

that loss of parental consortium damages ordinarily will

be smaller per child the greater number of siblings a

child has. This is because, in large families, older children frequently take on parental responsibilities for
their younger siblings, and parents ordinarily have less

time per child to provide training and companionship.8

Cf. Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1990)

(in determining amount of damages, fact finder may

consider whether other ‘‘consortium giving relationships are available to the child’’), modified on other

grounds, Texas Supreme Court, Docket No. C-9548

(Tex. March 6, 1991). Although the total award for loss

of parental consortium damages may be larger when

an injured parent has numerous children, this merely

reflects the fact that, overall, the scope of the injury

is greater.

Finally, we address our conclusion in Mendillo that

recognizing a cause of action forloss of parental consortium ‘‘would create a significant risk of double recovery.’’ Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn.

489. In support of this conclusion, we explained that

the injured parent ‘‘would be entitled, as part of [his

or] her own damages forloss of life’s ordinary activities,

to recover for [the] inability to care for [his or] her

minor children.’’ Id. Although a parent might be able

to recover for damages for the loss of the ability to

provide services to his or her children in a case in which

a loss of parental consortium claim has not been raised,

this court held in Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, supra,

176 Conn. 485, that loss of spousal consortium encompasses ‘‘both loss of services [to the other spouse, the

value of which the injured spouse could recover in his

or her own name] and loss of conjugal affection . . . .’’

Id.; see also id. (services provided by spouse and loss of

conjugal affection both constitute spousal consortium,

and ‘‘courts commit error when they attempt to distinguish between the different elements of [this] conceptualistic unity’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Similarly, parental consortium consists of both a parent’s services to his or her children, such as cooking,

driving or housekeeping, as well as such intangibles as

the parent’s ‘‘love, care, companionship and guidance

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo

v. Board of Education, supra, 478. To prevent double

recovery under this approach, it would be sufficient to

require the parent’s claim and the child’s claim to be

joined in the same proceeding and to require the trial

court to instruct the jury that damages for loss of the

injured parent’s services are recoverable only by the

minor child pursuant to the child’s loss of parental

consortium claim.

Next, we consider the court’s assessment of the

weight of authority on the question of whether to recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium.

This court stated in Mendillo that ‘‘the overwhelming

weight of authority in the nation is against recognition

of a cause of action for loss of parental consortium.’’

Id., 490. Our research reveals, however, that, of the

forty-nine other states and the District of Columbia, the

vast majority of states have recognized the cause of
action, either for cases arising from a parent’s injury,

or for cases arising from a parent’s death, or both.

Twenty jurisdictions have recognized, in some form, a

cause of action for loss of parental consortium arising

from a parent’s injury,9

twenty-six jurisdictions have

declined to recognize such a cause of action,10 and four

jurisdictions are either unclear on the issue or have

not addressed it.11 Of the courts that have declined to

recognize claims for loss of parental consortium arising

from a parent’s injury, seven have done so in divided

opinions.12 More significantly, thirty-four jurisdictions

have recognized, either judicially or, more commonly,

legislatively, a cause of action for loss of parental consortium arising from the wrongful death of a parent.13

Only five jurisdictions, including this state, have

declined to recognize loss of parental consortium

claims arising from either an injury to or the death of

a parent.14 Thus, courts in otherjurisdictions are divided

on the question of whether to recognize a cause of

action for loss of parental consortium arising from an

injury to the parent, with only a small majority—twentysix out of fifty—declining to do so, whereas a large

majority of states have adopted such a cause of action

arising out of the death of a parent, thereby recognizing

that ‘‘children have a legal entitlement to their parent’s

society.’’ Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1137 (Okla.

1990)(‘‘[i]n enacting [a wrongful death statute providing

for damages forloss of parental consortium], the [l]egislature has acknowledged that children have a legal entitlement to their parent’s society’’ [footnote omitted]).

Accordingly, we no longer can conclude that the weight

of authority supports our holding in Mendillo, much

less that it does so overwhelmingly.15

Because we no longer agree with this court’s

weighing of the relevant public policy factors in Mendillo, we now overrule our holding in that case and

conclude that we should recognize a cause of action

for loss of parental consortium. To decide otherwise

would be inconsistent with the ‘‘the fundamental policy

purposes of the tort compensation system—compensation of innocent parties, shifting the loss to responsible

parties or distributing it among appropriate entities,

and deterrence of wrongful conduct . . . .’’16 Mendillo

v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. 482. Consistent

with the foregoing analysis, however, we impose the

following restrictions on loss of parental consortium

claims. First, loss of parental consortium claims must

be joined with the parent’s negligence claim whenever

possible, and the jury must be instructed that only the

child raising the claim can recover the pecuniary value

of the parent’s services.17 Cf. Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. 494 (loss of spousal consortium

claim should be joined in one action with injured

spouse’s claim and tried before single trier of fact to

minimize possibility of inconsistent verdicts). Second,

and relatedly, because a loss of parental consortium
action ‘‘is derivative of the injured [parent’s] cause of

action, the consortium claim would be barred when

the [action] brought by the injured [parent] has been

terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment

on the merits.’’ Id. Third, a loss of parental consortium

claim may be raised only by a person who was a minor

on the date that the parent was injured, and damages

may be awarded only for the period between the date

of the parent’s injury and the date that the child reaches

the age of majority.18

The defendants also contend that, if we recognize a

cause of action for loss of parental consortium, we

should limit liability to damages arising from injury to

the parent during the parent’s life and thereby preclude

damages arising from the parent’s death. For the reasons set forth in our decision in Ladd v. Douglas, 203

Conn. 187, 523 A.2d 1301 (1987), we agree with the

restriction advocated by the defendants. In Ladd, we

considered whether the plaintiff, Catherine Ladd,

whose husband had been killed in a motor vehicle accident, was entitled to damages for the loss of spousal

consortium during the ten days that her husband lived

following the accident and forthe period after his death,

pursuant to § 52-555. Id., 189. The defendants, the

driver, the lessee and the lessor of the vehicle that

struck the decedent, conceded that the plaintiff could

recover for loss of consortium for the period between

the accident and her husband’s death. Id. The defendants contended, however, that Ladd was not entitled

to damages for loss of spousal consortium resulting

from her husband’s death because, under the common

law, there is no ‘‘right of recovery for the wrongful

death of a victim on the part of either his estate or

members of his family.’’ Id., 191. We agreed, observing

that ‘‘our wrongful death statute has been regarded as

the exclusive means by which damages resulting from

death are recoverable.’’ Id., 195. We further observed

that, under the wrongful death statute, a decedent’s

estate may ‘‘recover the value to the decedent of his

nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary services to others’’;

id., 197; but the decedent’s family members are not

authorized to recover damages in their own right. See

id. Accordingly, we concluded that a spouse may not

recover damages for postmortem loss of spousal consortium under Connecticut statutory or common law.

Id. Our reasoning in Ladd applies equally to loss of

parental consortium claims.19 We therefore conclude

that loss of parental consortium claims are limited to

claims resulting from a parent’s injury during the parent’s life.

In addition to adopting the foregoing limitations on

liability, the fact finder necessarily must consider

whether the parent’s injuries were insignificant or serious, and whether they were temporary or permanent.

We decline, however, to impose the limitation adopted

by a number of courts that damages are recoverable
only when the parent has suffered a ‘‘serious, permanent and disabling mental or physical injury’’ that is

‘‘so overwhelming and severe that it causes the parentchild relationship to be destroyed or [to be] nearly

destroyed.’’ Keele v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care

Center, 258 Mont. 158, 162, 852 P.2d 574 (1993); accord

Villareal v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 160 Ariz.

480. Rather, ‘‘the severity of the injury to the parent

and its actual effect [on] the parent-child relationship

. . . the nature of the child’s relationship with the parent, the child’s emotional and physical characteristics,

and whether other consortium giving relationships are

available to the child’’; Reagan v. Vaughn, supra, 804

S.W.2d 467; are factors to be considered by the fact

finder on a case-by-case basis in determining the

amount of damages.20

Finally, we address the defendants’ contention that,

if we recognize a cause of action for loss of parental

consortium, we should not make it available to the

parties in the present case but should apply it prospectively only. In support of their claim, the defendants

rely on Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 703 A.2d

117 (1997), in which this court applied ‘‘the three-part

test set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,

92 S. Ct. 349, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971), for determining

whether a decision must be applied prospectively only.

A common-law decision will be applied nonretroactively only if: (1) it establishes a new principle of law,

either by overruling past precedent on which litigants

have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed

. . . (2) given its prior history, purpose and effect, retrospective application ofthe rule would retard its operation; and (3) retroactive application would produce

substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Ostrowski v. Avery, supra, 378 n.18. The defendants

contend that, because we have created a new rule that

would impose a substantial burden on them, they have

met this test. The defendants also refer to this court’s

holding in Hopson that the newly adopted cause of

action for loss of spousal consortium would not be

available when ‘‘a spouse’s claims for . . . injuries has

been concluded by judgment or settlement or the running of [the] limitations [period] prior to’’ the issuance

of that decision. Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, supra,

176 Conn. 496. The defendants acknowledge that the

new cause of action was available to the plaintiffs in

Hopson, but they contend that this was because the

appeal in that case was interlocutory. Because the present case has gone to judgment on the merits, they

contend that our holding cannot apply retroactively

under Hopson.

We are not persuaded by the defendants’ argument.

The general rule is that judicial decisions apply retroactively to pending cases; e.g., Avoletta v. State, 152 Conn.
App. 177, 186 n.2, 98 A.3d 839, cert. denied, 314 Conn.

944, 102 A.3d 1116 (2014); and this court’s decision in

Ostrowski sets forth the conditions under which the

courts will recognize an exception to that general rule.

See Ostrowski v. Avery, supra, 243 Conn. 378 n.18; see

also Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1, 10, 707 A.2d 725

(1998)(‘‘judgments that are not by theirterms limited to

prospective application are presumed to apply retroactively’’); Clohessy v. Bachelor, supra, 237 Conn. 57

(‘‘[t]raditionally . . . in cases of civil tort liability in

which new causes of action are recognized, the new

theory of liability is applied to the parties in the case’’).

The defendants in the present case have pointed to

no exceptional circumstances that would render the

retroactive application of our decision in the present

case inequitable or unduly harsh, and they cannot seriously contend that they relied to their detriment on the

rule enunciated in Mendillo.

21 See Hopson v. St. Mary’s

Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. 495–96 (‘‘[o]ur decision . . .

[adopting a cause of action for loss of spousal consortium] does not drastically or radically change existing

law, for in no serious way will an existing interest be

impaired or an expectation be disappointed or a reliance be defeated’’); see also Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn.

631, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (newly adopted cause of

action for loss of consortium by person who would

have married victim of tortious conduct if she had not

been prevented by law that violated public policy was

available to parties to appeal when defendants could

not have relied on previous rule to their detriment);

Clohessy v. Bachelor, supra, 57 n.15 (newly adopted

cause of action for bystander emotional distress was

available to parties to appeal because existence of rule

could have ‘‘had no influence on the defendant’s alleged

negligent conduct’’); Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital,

supra, 496 n.5 (courts are more willing to abandon old

rule and to apply new rule to parties in case ‘‘when the

rule to be discarded may not be reasonably supposed

to have determined the conduct of the litigants’’).

Moreover, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the

appeal in Hopson was not interlocutory but was ‘‘[f]rom

the judgment of the [trial] court rendered on the demurrers [to the plaintiff husband’s loss of consortium claim,

which the trial court had] sustained . . . .’’ (Footnote

omitted.) Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, supra, 176

Conn. 486. Thus, when we stated in Hopson that the

holding of that case would not apply to cases that had

‘‘been concluded by judgment’’; id., 496; we clearly were

referring to cases in which there was no appeal pending.

See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 118 Conn. App. 140, 154,

983 A.2d 20 (2009) (prior judicial decision applied to

case in which judgment had been rendered and in which

appeal from judgment was pending), cert. denied, 294

Conn. 932, 986 A.2d 1057 (2010); cf. Marone v. Waterbury, supra, 244 Conn. 13 (for purposes of determining

whether judicial decision applies retroactively to work-
ers’ compensation award, award was final and decision

did not apply ‘‘when . . . the parties fail[ed] to appeal

[from the award] within the statutory time period’’);

see also Marone v. Waterbury, supra, 11 n.10 (presumption of retroactivity of judicial decisions is limited to

‘‘pending cases’’ because application ofjudicial decision

to case in which no appeal is pending and trial court

would be required to open and modify judgment would

violate principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel). We therefore conclude that our holding recognizing a cause of action for loss of parental consortium

applies to the present case and to other pending cases.

No action for loss of parental consortium will be

allowed, however, when a parent’s ‘‘claim for . . .

injuries has been concluded by judgment or settlement

or the running of [the] limitations [period] prior to the

[issuance] of this opinion . . . .’’ Hopson v. St. Mary’s

Hospital, supra, 496.

The judgment is reversed with respect to the claims

for loss of parental consortium and the case is

remanded with direction to deny the defendants’ motion

to strike those claims and for further proceedings in

accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and EVELEIGH and

McDONALD, Js., concurred.

1 A cause of action for loss of parental consortium arises when a tortfeasor

causes injuries to the parent of a minor child, and those injuries result in

‘‘the loss [to the child] of [the] parent’s love, care, companionship and

guidance . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. Board of

Education, supra, 246 Conn. 478.

2 La Quinta Inn and Suites was named as a defendant in the plaintiffs’

original complaint, but the trial court ultimately granted the defendants’

motion to strike the claims against that defendant, which is not a party to

this appeal. We hereinafterrefertoColeman and LQ Management collectively

as the defendants.

3 The Campos children were all over the age of majority when this action

was filed.

4 The Campos children appealed to theAppellate Court, and we transferred

the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice

Book § 65-2.

5

Justice Zarella contends in his dissenting opinion that ‘‘[i]t is not the

duty of this court to make law. That is a task properly left to the legislature.’’

It is black letter law, however, that ‘‘[t]he issue of whether to recognize a

common-law cause of action . . . is a matter of policy for the court to

determine based on the changing attitudes and needs of society.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631, 650, 95 A.3d

1011 (2014). Moreover, the weighing of public policies in the present case

is no different in kind than the weighing that this court has conducted in

numerous cases. See, e.g., id., 649–58 (recognizing as matter of public policy

that member of same-sex couple who would have been married but for legal

bar on such marriages can bring loss of consortium claim); Craig v. Driscoll,

262 Conn. 312, 338–40, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003) (recognizing that purveyor who

negligently serves liquor to adult patron who, as result of his intoxication,

injures another, can be proximate cause of such injuries); Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 412, 696 A.2d 332 (1997) (‘‘[A]s a matter of policy, it is

appropriate to adopt a standard of care imposing on the defendant, a participant in a team contact sport, a legal duty to refrain from reckless or intentional conduct. Proof of mere negligence is insufficient to create liability.’’);

Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 49, 675 A.2d 852 (1996) (‘‘[w]e . . .

conclude, on the basis of sound public policy and principles of reasonable

foreseeability, that a plaintiff should be allowed to recover, within certain

limitations, for emotional distress as a result of harm done to a third party’’);

Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 493, 408 A.2d 260 (1979)
(recognizing cause of action for loss of spousal consortium). Indeed, we

already have engaged in the very same weighing process in Mendillo v.

Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. 480–90, 495–96. We merely reach a

different conclusion in the present case. If the legislature disagrees with

our conclusion, it may, of course, legislatively abrogate our decision or,

alternatively, modify our decision as it deems appropriate.

6 Of course, we do not suggest that the mere fact that a child’s biological

or adoptive parent has been injured automatically results in a compensable

injury to the child. When the injured parent provided no affection, care,

concern, guidance or services to the child prior to the injury, the child

cannot establish that he or she was harmed by the injury, which is a required

element of any tort claim.

7 Moreover, we reiterate that the legislature is free to take whatever action

it might wish to take with respect to this and all other issues concerning

the recognition and scope of the cause of action for loss of parental consortium. See footnote 5 of this opinion.

8 We do not suggest that all children necessarily receive the same amount

of care and companionship from their parents. For example, some of an

injured parent’s children may have a parental relationship with another

person who fills many of the child’s needs, while others do not, or one of

the children may have special needs that require more care and attention

from a parent. Consequently, there may be circumstances in which some

children will be entitled to a greater award of damages for loss of parental

consortium than other children.

9 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.0415 (West 2011); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-41 (b)

(2012); Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., supra, 734 P.2d 997; Villareal v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 160 Ariz. 477; Higley v. Kramer,

581 So. 2d 273, 282–83 (La. App.), cert. denied, 583 So. 2d 483 (La. 1991);

Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 516, 413 N.E.2d

690 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 13, 17, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981);

Pence v. Fox, 248 Mont. 521, 527, 813 P.2d 429 (1991); Gallimore v. Children’s

Hospital Medical Center, 67 Ohio St. 3d 244, 255, 617 N.E.2d 1052 (1993);

Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1138 (Okla. 1990); Reagan v. Vaughn,

supra, 804 S.W.2d 467; Hay v. Medical Center Hospital, 145 Vt. 533, 545,

496 A.2d 939 (1985); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., supra, 103 Wn. 2d

140; Belcher v. Goins, 184 W. Va. 395, 406, 400 S.E.2d 830 (1990); Theama

v. Kenosha, supra, 117 Wis. 2d 527; Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint

Powers Fire Board, supra, 797 P.2d 1176; see also Audubon-Exira Ready

Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 335 N.W.2d 148, 151–52

(Iowa 1983) (damages for loss of parental consortium may be recovered by

injured parent on child’s behalf and are child’s property); Brenneman v.

Board of Regents, 135 N.M. 68, 72, 84 P.3d 685 (App.) (‘‘[parental] loss of

consortium is exactly the type of damage based [on] the traditional tort

concepts of duty that the [l]egislature intended to include’’ as damages under

New Mexico’s Tort Claims Act), cert. denied, 135 N.M. 51, 84 P.3d 668 (2003).

Some states have adopted an unusual or limited form of the cause of action

for loss of parental consortium. See Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc.,

567 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. App. 1997) (child cannot recover for loss of

parental consortium but can recover pecuniary damages for ‘‘the loss of

aid, advice, comfort, and protection’’ under Minnesota’s dram shop law

when person in parental role has been injured), aff’d, 581 N.W.2d 855 (Minn.

1998); Zoss v. Dakota Truck Underwriters, 590 N.W.2d 911, 914 (S.D. 1999)

(child cannot recover for loss of parental consortium in wrongful death

action but can recover pecuniary value of loss of ‘‘the decedent’s society

and companionship, which includes such things as protection, guidance,

advice and assistance,’’ because pecuniary injury ‘‘need not exist only

between the time of injury and the time of death’’).

We note that Mendillo incorrectly identified Florida and Iowa as jurisdictions that do not recognize loss of parental consortium claims. Mendillo v.

Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. 490, citing Zorzos v. Rosen ex rel.

Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985), and Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v.

Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., supra, 335 N.W.2d 148. Although the

court in Zorzos had declined to adopt a cause of action for loss of parental

consortium; see Zorzos v. Rosen ex rel. Rosen, supra, 307; that case was

legislatively abrogated in 1988; see 1988 Fla. Laws 973, 974 (c. 88-173, § 1),

codified at Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.0415 (West 2011); and the Iowa Supreme

Court had rejected a common-law cause of action forloss of parental consortium only for claims arising from the death of the parent. See AudubonExira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., supra, 151

(child’s common-law loss of parental consortium action arising from death
was not recognized because value of ‘‘ ‘services decedents might and would

have rendered in training and educating their children’ ’’ is recoverable by

parent’s estate pursuant to wrongful death statute). The court in Mendillo

also failed to recognize that loss of parental consortium claims arising from

a parent’s injury had been authorized by statute in Rhode Island since 1984.

See 1984 R.I. Pub. Laws 140 (c. 64, § 1), codified as amended at R.I. Gen.

Laws § 9-1-41 (b)(2012). Finally, one of the cases recognizing loss of parental

consortium claims was decided after this court issued its decision in Mendillo. See Brenneman v. Board of Regents, supra, 135 N.M. 72.

10 Johnson v. United States, United States District Court, Docket Nos.

1:14cv220-MHT, 1:14cv221-MHT, 1:14cv222-MHT (M.D. Ala. December 3,

2014); Lewis v. Rowland, 287 Ark. 474, 478–79, 701 S.W.2d 122 (1985); Borer

v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 453, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal.

Rptr. 302 (1977); Lee v. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 233–34 (Colo. 1986);

Pleasant ex rel. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471,

473 (D.C. Cir. 1958); W.J. Bremer Co. v. Graham, 169 Ga. App. 115, 116–17,

312 S.E.2d 806 (1983), cert. denied, 252 Ga. 36, 312 S.E.2d 787 (1984); Green

v. A. B. Hagglund & Soner, 634 F. Supp. 790, 796–97 (D. Idaho 1986);

Karagiannakos v. Gruber, 274 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158, 653 N.E.2d 932, appeal

denied, 164 Ill. 2d 565, 660 N.E.2d 1271 (1995); Dearborn Fabricating &

Engineering Corp. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ind. 1990); Klaus

v. Fox Valley Systems, Inc., 259 Kan. 522, 531, 912 P.2d 703 (1996); Lambert

v. Franklin Real Estate Co., 37 S.W.3d 770, 780 (Ky. App. 2000); Durepo v.

Fishman, 533 A.2d 264, 264–66 (Me. 1987); Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17,

32–33, 557 A.2d 210 (1989); Thompson v. Love, 661 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (Miss.

1995); Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184, 191 (Mo. 1992);

Guenther ex rel. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 421, 495 N.W.2d 286

(1993); General Electric Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 368, 498 P.2d 366 (1972);

Harrington v. Brooks Drugs, Inc., 148 N.H. 101, 104, 808 A.2d 532 (2002);

Russell v. Salem Transportation Co., 61 N.J. 502, 504, 506, 295 A.2d 862

(1972); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 84 App. Div. 2d 17, 27, 445

N.Y.S.2d 188 (1981), aff’d, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626

(1983); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 324 N.C. 108, 111, 376 S.E.2d 236 (1989); Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337-Fraternal Order of Eagles, 246 N.W.2d

747, 753 (N.D. 1976); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital,

293 Or. 543, 563, 567, 652 P.2d 318 (1982); Steiner ex rel. Steiner v. Bell

Telephone Co., 358 Pa. Super. 505, 522, 517 A.2d 1348 (1986), aff’d, 518 Pa.

57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988); Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 222, 479 S.E.2d

35 (1996); Taylor v. Beard, 104 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tenn. 2003).

11 We have found no cases addressing the issue in the states of Delaware,

Utah and Virginia. The law in Hawaii is unclear. The Supreme Court of

Hawaii declined to recognize a cause of action forloss of parental consortium

in Halberg v. Young, 41 Haw. 634, 646 (1957), but the United States District

Court for the District of Hawaii noted in 1992 that, in light of intervening

cases, the Supreme Court of Hawaii would overrule Halberg and recognize

the cause of action. Marquardt v. United Airlines, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1487,

1492 (D. Haw. 1992). The Supreme Court of Hawaii has not addressed the

issue since the District Court issued its decision in Marquardt.

12 See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 460, 563 P.2d 838,

138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (contending that court should

recognize cause of action for loss of parental consortium); Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264, 266 (Me. 1987) (Nichols and Glassman, Js., dissenting)

(same); Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 33, 557 A.2d 210 (1989) (Adkins, J.,

dissenting) (same); Thompson v. Love, 661 So. 2d 1131, 1137 (Miss. 1995)

(McRae, Sullivan and Banks, Js., dissenting) (same); Guenther ex rel.

Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 421, 495 N.W.2d 286 (1993) (White,

J., dissenting) (same); Guenther ex rel. Guenther v. Stollberg, supra, 426

(Shanahan, J., dissenting) (same); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity

Hospital, 293 Or. 543, 574, 652 P.2d 318 (1982) (Lent, C. J., dissenting)

(same); Steiner ex rel. Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co., 358 Pa. Super. 505,

524, 517 A.2d 1348 (1986) (Brosky, J., dissenting) (same), aff’d, 518 Pa. 57,

540 A.2d 266 (1988).

Four courts that have recognized a cause of action for loss of parental

consortium have done so in divided opinions. See Reagan v. Vaughn, supra,

804 S.W.2d 469 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that court

should not recognize cause of action for loss of parental consortium arising

from injury); Hay v. Medical Center Hospital, 145 Vt. 533, 546, 496 A.2d

939 (1985) (Larrow and Peck, Js., dissenting) (contending that child of

injured parent was limited to recovering damages authorized by wrongful

death statute because, under that statute, person who is permanently comatose is deemed dead); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., supra, 103 Wn.

2d 141–43 (Dore, J., dissenting) (contending that court should not recognize
cause of action for loss of parental consortium); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell

County Joint Powers Fire Board, supra, 797 P.2d 1176–78 (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) (same). In another case, certain justices did not agree with the

court’s decision to recognize a cause of action forloss of parental consortium

but contended that the injured parent could be allowed to recover for the

cost of ‘‘services or companionship that the parent would normally have

provided.’’ Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 18, 48–49, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981)

(Levin and Ryan, Js., and Coleman, C. J., dissenting).

13 The following statutes allow for a cause of action for the loss of parental

consortium arising out of the wrongful death of a parent: Colo. Rev. Stat.

Ann. §§ 13-21-201 (1) and 13-21-203 (1) (a) (2014) (wrongful death action

may be brought for benefit of decedent’s children, and recovery may include

damages for loss of companionship); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-3 (b) (5) (Supp.

2014) (award in wrongful death action may include damages for ‘‘[l]oss of

parental care, training, guidance, or education’’); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1904

(a) (5) (1994) (award in wrongful death action may include damages for

‘‘loss of parental care, training, guidance or education’’); La. Civ. Code Ann.

arts. 2315 (B), 2315.2 (A) (1) (2008) (wrongful death action may be brought

for benefit of decedent’s children, and recovery may include damages for

‘‘loss of consortium, service, and society’’); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, § 2-

804 (b) (West 2012) (wrongful death action may be brought for benefit of

decedent’s children, and recovery may include damages for ‘‘the loss of

comfort, society and companionship of the deceased’’); Md. Code Ann.,

Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904 (d) (LexisNexis 2013) (award in wrongful death

action may include damages for ‘‘loss of society, companionship, comfort,

protection . . . parental care . . . attention, advice, counsel, training,

guidance, or education . . . for the death of . . . [3] [a] parent of a minor

child’’); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 229, § 2 (LexisNexis 2009)(wrongful death action

may be brought for benefit of decedent’s children, and recovery may include

damages for ‘‘care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance,

counsel, and advice of the decedent’’); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 600.2922

(3) (a) and (6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) (wrongful death action may be

brought for benefit of decedent’s children, and award may include damages

for ‘‘the loss of the society and companionship of the deceased’’); Mo. Ann.

Stat. §§ 537.080 and 537.090 (2008) (wrongful death action may be brought

for benefit of decedent’s children, and recovery may include damages for

‘‘the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, comfort,

instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support’’ that decedent would

have provided); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.085 (2) and (4) (2013) (wrongful death

action may be brought for benefit of decedent’s children, and recovery may

include damages for loss of decedent’s ‘‘companionship, society, comfort

and consortium’’); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556:12 (III) (2007) (when decedent

is parent of minor children, trier of fact may award damages to children

for ‘‘the loss of the comfort, society, affection, guidance, and companionship

of the deceased,’’ limited to $50,000 per child); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-2 (b)

(4) (2013) (wrongful death action may be brought for benefit of decedent’s

children, and recovery may include damages for loss of ‘‘[s]ociety, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent’’);

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2125.02 (B) (3) (West 2014) (award in wrongful death

action may include damages for ‘‘[l]oss of the society of the decedent,

including loss of companionship, consortium, care, assistance, attention,

protection, advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, and education,

suffered by the surviving . . . dependent children’’); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.

12, § 1053 (B) (West 2015) (award in wrongful death action may include

damages for ‘‘loss of companionship of the children . . . of the decedent’’);

Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (2) (2013) (in wrongful death action, ‘‘damages may

be awarded in an amount which . . . [d] [j]ustly, fairly and reasonably

compensates the decedent’s . . . children . . . for loss of the society, companionship and services of the decedent’’); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8301

(a) and (b) (West 2007) (wrongful death action may be brought for benefit

of decedent’s children); W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7-6 (b) and (c)(1) (LexisNexis

2008) (wrongful death action may be brought for benefit of decedent’s

children, and recovery may include damages for loss of ‘‘society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent’’); Wis.

Stat. Ann. § 895.04 (4)(West Supp. 2014)(in wrongful death action, ‘‘damages

not to exceed . . . $350,000 per occurrence in the case of a deceased adult,

for loss of society and companionship may be awarded to the . . . children

. . . of the deceased’’); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102 (b) and (c) (2013) (wrongful death action may be brought for benefit of decedent’s children, and

recovery may include damages for ‘‘loss of probable future companionship,

society and comfort’’).

The following cases have recognized a cause of action for the loss of

parental consortium arising out of the wrongful death of a parent: Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., supra, 734 P.2d 994 (under Alaska’s
wrongful death statute, action may be brought for benefit of decedent’s

child, and recovery may include damages for loss of consortium); MerrittChapman & Scott Corp. v. Frazier, 289 F.2d 849, 858 (9th Cir.) (under

Arizona’s wrongful death statute, jury was permitted to award decedent’s

children damages for loss of companionship, comfort and guidance), cert.

denied, 368 U.S. 835, 82 S. Ct. 60, 7 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1961); Consolidated

Freightways Corp. v. Futrell, 201 Ga. App. 233, 233, 410 S.E.2d 751 (1991)

(award in wrongful death action may include damages for loss of ‘‘a parent’s

society, advice, example and counsel’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]),

cert. denied, Georgia Supreme Court, Docket No. S92C0070 (Ga. November

1, 1991); Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 237, 141 P.3d 1099 (2006)

(‘‘general damages, such as loss of society and companionship, will be

presumed upon death when the plaintiff is the . . . child . . . of the decedent’’); TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. v. Moore, 936 N.E.2d 201, 222 (Ind.

2010)(underIndiana’s wrongful death statute, ‘‘[a] decedent’s minor children

may recover for loss of parental training and guidance as well as for the

loss of their parent’s care’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Drews v.

Gobel Freight Lines, Inc., 197 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1058, 557 N.E.2d 303 (1990)

(damages that decedent’s children may recover in wrongful death action

include ‘‘all of those intangible benefits encompassed by the terms ‘loss of

society’ or ‘loss of consortium’ ’’), aff’d, 144 Ill. 2d 84, 578 N.E.2d 970 (1991);

Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 323 (Ky. 1997) (recognizing commonlaw action for loss of parental consortium arising from wrongful death);

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Luebbers, 138 N.M. 289, 300, 119

P.3d 169 (App. 2005) (damages for loss of parental consortium may be

recovered under wrongful death statute and in independent common-law

action), cert. quashed, 140 N.M. 675, 146 P.3d 810 (2006); Mease v. Commonwealth, 145 Pa. Commw. 407, 412, 603 A.2d 679 (1992) (beneficiary in wrongful death action is entitled to pecuniary value of services, society and comfort

that decedent would have provided); Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 319, 188

S.E.2d 470 (1972) (decedent’s children may recover for ‘‘loss of companionship, and . . . deprivation of the use and comfort of the [decedent’s] society’’ in wrongful death action); Taylor v. Beard, 104 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tenn.

2003) (under wrongful death statute, ‘‘ ‘pecuniary value’ ’’ includes damages

for loss of parental consortium); Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d

630, 635 (Tex. 1986) (decedent’s children may recover damages for loss of

companionship and society); Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835,

841 (D. Utah 1971) (under Utah’s wrongful death statute, children may

recover damages for‘‘loss of society, companionship, happiness and association with their . . . [parents]’’), amended on other grounds, 463 F.2d 208

(10th Cir. 1972); Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 119–20, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955)

(damages in wrongful death action, which may be brought for benefit of

decedent’s children, may include ‘‘loss of deceased’s care, attention and

society’’); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., supra, 103 Wn. 2d 134 (‘‘[a]

child . . . can bring an action for wrongful death . . . where loss of consortium is an element of the recovery’’).

14 The other states are Arkansas, New Jersey, New York and North Dakota.

15 Justice Zarella contends in his dissenting opinion that we should not

rely on the states in which the legislature has provided a statutory cause

of action for loss of parental consortium arising from nonfatal injuries or

death in support of our conclusion that most states have concluded that

the public policies favoring the recognition of such a cause of action outweigh those disfavoring it. Presumably, however, the legislatures in these

states performed the same balancing of public policy interests that we

have performed and came to the conclusion that the policies in favor of

compensating children for the loss of parental consortium outweigh the

policies against it. We see no reason why we should be required to ignore

these legislative policy assessments.

16 In overruling Mendillo, we are mindful of the important role that the

doctrine of stare decisis plays in our jurisprudence and that we should

overrule a prior decision only when logic dictates such a result. See, e.g.,

Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 351 n.22, 948 A.2d 955 (2008). Like

Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. 485, in which we overruled

our earlier precedent declining to recognize a claim for loss of spousal

consortium; see id., 494–96 (overruling Marri v. Stamford Street Railroad

Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 [1911], and recognizing cause of action for loss

of spousal consortium); this is such a case.

17 In the unusual case in which those actions cannot be joined, the injured

parent may recover damages arising out of the parent’s inability to care for

his or her minor child only if the child has not already recovered for the

loss of the parent’s society and companionship. This limitation will eliminate

any risk of a double recovery in the rare case in which joinder of the two

claims is impossible or highly impracticable.
18 For purposes of this opinion, a minor child is a person under the age

of eighteen years who has not been legally emancipated. See General Statutes

§ 46b-120 (1) (‘‘‘[c]hild’ means any person under eighteen years of age who

has not been legally emancipated’’). The record reveals that Jose Eduardo

Campos was the only one of the Campos children who was a minor when

the decedent was injured on September 15, 2008.

Because the issue is not before us, we express no opinion as to whether

a physically or mentally disabled person who is dependent on parental

care, but who is over the age of eighteen, may raise a loss of parental

consortium claim.

19 After our decision in Ladd, the legislature enacted General Statutes

§ 52-555a, which authorizes a cause of action for loss of spousal consortium

arising from the death of a spouse separate and independent from a wrongful

death action. See Public Acts 1989, No. 89-148, § 1, codified at General

Statutes § 52-555a. The legislature, however, has not authorized a cause of

action for loss of parental consortium arising from the death of a parent.

20 The Campos children contend that they should be entitled ‘‘to seek

compensation for the serious harm they sustained watching their father

suffer for three days in the hospital before he succumbed to [his] injuries

. . . .’’ Under our case law, however, such injuries are compensable in

actions for bystander emotional distress, subject to the limitations on that

cause of action. See Clohessy v. Bachelor, supra, 237 Conn. 52–53 (close

family member of victim may recoverfor emotional injury caused by contemporaneous sensory perception of event that caused victim’s injury or by

viewing victim immediately after event if no material change has occurred

with respect to victim’s location and condition, but family member may not

recover for such injury if he or she was not at scene where injury occurred

or did not arrive shortly after injury causing event). The plaintiffs have cited

no authority for the proposition that the type of emotional injury caused

by witnessing a parent’s suffering, as distinct from the injury caused by

the loss of a parent’s love, care, companionship and guidance, should be

recoverable in an action for the loss of parental consortium.

21 The defendants contended at oral argument before this court that,

because the jury’s award of damages for the wrongful death claim might

well have been different if the Campos children had been permitted to

present their loss of parental consortium claim to the jury at trial, allowing

the Campos children to bring a claim at this point could result in double

recovery. The defendants have cited to nothing in the record, however, that

would support a conclusion that the jury’s award of damages included

amounts that would be recoverable in an action for loss of parental consortium. In any event, under the limitations that we have placed on loss of

parental consortium claims in the present case, Jose Eduardo Campos is

the only plaintiff who will be able to assert a loss of parental consortium

claim; see footnote 18 of this opinion; and he will be entitled to seek damages

only for the three days that the decedent survived after he was injured. Any

potential overlap in damages is therefore de minimis.