### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 3, 200 9
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. AN GELO A LLEN

Direc t Appeal from the Cr iminal Cou rt f or Shelby Coun ty No. 07-05518 Jame s C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

No. W2008-00955-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed September 23, 2009

The de fenda

nt, Ang elo Allen, wa s convicted of possession of coc aine a

nd two counts of possession
o f m ar i j u an a , a l l C l a s s A m i s d e m e an o r s

. T h e d e f e n d an tw a s s e n t e n c e d

t o e l e v e nm o n t h s an d

t w e n t ynine day s for eac h conviction. The court order ed that the marijuana convictions be mer g ed and that the rema ining two c onvictions run concur rently , for a

total effe ctive sente nce of eleve n months and twenty -nine day s. The defenda nt raises four i ssues on appea l: (1) the trial court imprope rly denied his moti on to suppress; (2) count two of hi s indictment should have be en dismissed; (3) venue was not e stablished at trial; and (4) he was sentenc ed improperly

. After car eful revie w, we c onclude that the motion to suppress was proper ly denied, count two was proper , and venue w as es t ab lished. Ho we ve r, we re mand

fo r a ff ixinga pe rc e nta g e of

the se nte nc e to b e se rv e d b y the de fe nd ant. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Cr iminal Cou rt A ffirm ed in Part and Remanded

J OHN E V ER ET T W I L L I AMS , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. G LE NN and C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , JJ., joined.

Michae l J. Gatlin, Memphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Angelo Allen.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr ., At torne y G e ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; La c y W ilb e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; William L

. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Byron B. W insett, I II, Assistan t Di s t rict Attorney Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I n this case , a Memphis police off icer observe d the def

endant in possession of drug s in front of the de fenda

nt’s residenc e. Upon the of fice r’s a pproac h, the def

endant attempted to enter the residenc e. The officer a

pprehe nded him in the open doorw ay , and the de fenda nt then threw a “bag g ie” into the re sidence

. The “bag g ie,” which conta ined drug s, was seized by the offic er, a s were other drug s found in the living r oom of the re sidence

.
He ari ngon

the Mo tio n to Sup pr e ss-2-

The de fenda

nt filed a motion to suppress the evidenc e seized during and immediately afte r his arre st. Following a hear i n g o n the motion to suppress, the trial court c oncluded that both the plain view and hot pursuit exceptions to the warr ant re quirement a pplied to the fac ts of the ca se. The office r obser

ved the de fenda

nt holding a “ bag g ie” of d ru gs i n “p lain view” a s he rode past the defe ndant. The tria l co u rt furthe r found that the a dditional evidence was a dmissibl e bec ause the defe ndant fled, c ausing the offic er to c has e h i m i n to the doorwa y of the re sidence , and thre w the dr ug s in sid e , g ivi ngthe of

fi c e r t he ri g ht t o p e rf

or m a c ur so ry se arc h o f t

he ro om.
At Trial

Of fi c e r Joh n Co op e r, a

Me mph is p oli c e off

ice r sta tio ne d w iththe No rt

h Pr e c inc t bi c y c le patrol, testified that he was on duty on J uly 29, 2005, when he observe d the def endant a nd another
m ano nt h e f

r o n tp o r c h o f

a d u p l e x i nM e mp h i s

. T h e o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e w a s t w e n t y t o t w e n t yfive y ards a

way from the de fenda

nt when he sa

w a plastic “ bag g ie” in the de fe n d an t ’s h ands. He said that he saw

“white r ocks” in the pla stic bag that he believe d to be cr ack c ocaine . When the defe ndant s aw th e o f

f ic e r , h e p u ll e d

th e b a g u p in to h is h an d s

. T h e o f

f ic e r s a id th a t h e c o n tinue d ri d i n g p as tt h e du

p l ex as i f h e h adn o ts ee nan y t h i n g.
The off icer called other office rs to me et him. He opined that it took fiftee n minutes f or the other off icer s to arrive and for

mulate a plan. One office r drove past the duplex as a diversion, and the other of

fice rs appr oache d the def endant’ s residenc e fr om the rea r and side. The defe ndant and the ot her man on the porch watche d the officer drive past the residence. Offic er Cooper approa ched the re sid e nc e on

his bik e wh ile the de fe nd ant w a s w a tc hin g the patr ol c ar. Th e of fi c e r te sti fi e d th a t, beca use the de fenda

nt attempted to run into the reside nce w hen he sa w the police, he jumped on the po rc h to pr e ve nt t

he de fe nd ant f

ro m e nte ri ngthe re sid e nc e . T he de fe nd ant t hr e w two c le ar p la sti c “bag g ies” int o the hous e and started shouti ng , “shut the door, shut the door” to a woman inside the house. The of

fice r stuck his foot in the doorwa y to pr event the woman inside the house from closing the door. As the officer strugg led wit h the defendant, a second of fice r handc uffe d the def

endant.

Offic er Cooper

said that he e ntere d the re sidence and saw the two “ bag g ies” lying on the floor, just inside the door. The b ags we re d etermined to contain marijuana . The off icer also saw “numer ous rocks of c rac k coca ine” on a coff ee ta ble inside t h e house near the front door. Additionally , he sawa set of dig ital scales a nd s an d wich bag s normally used to pac kag e cr ack
coca ine.

Offic er A nthony

Russell of the Memphis Police Depa rtment corr oborate d Offic er Cooper ’s testimony . He testified that he rode past the re sidence as a diversion. He said it was not nece ssary to o pe n th e fr on t do or

to s e e the dr

ug s ins ide the re sid e nc e be c a us e Of fi c e r C oo pe r u se d h is f

oo t to hold the door open.

A Tenne ssee B urea

u of Investig ation ag ent in the drugchemistry section test i fi ed t h at she tested the substanc es found in the “bag g ies” seized by the office rs. She said the marijuana weig hed 1.9 g rams and the cra ck coc aine we ighe d 2.9 g rams.-3-

An employ ee of Memphis L ight Gas and Water ( ML GW) testified that he ke pt the rec ords from ML GW’s database . He said the defe ndant reque sted service at 1497 Fa irfax Stre et on J une 10, 2005, and re ceive d his first bill on J une 29, 2005, and his fina l bill on April 11, 2006.

Th e de fe nd ant a lso te sti fi e d at tr ia l. H e state d h e ha d a do g le a shor

pla sti c do g toy

in h is ha nd wh e n th e of

fi c e r ro de by on his bic y c le

. He te sti fi e d that the of fi c e r e nte re d his y ard

and tol d him that he had a w arr ant ag ainst the defe ndant for dome stic violence. The de fenda nt said he g ot up fr om t he po rc h a

nd c a lle d to his g ir lf

ri e nd , w ho wa s in

the ho us e . T he def

e nd ant s a id h is g irlfriend c ame to the door , and he a sked her to shut the door beca

use he did not want his children to see what was g oing on outside.

The defenda

nt moved t o dismiss the case at the close of proof a nd argued that the State f

ailed to e s t a b l i s h v e n u e

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y , t h e d e f

e n d an tar g u e d

t h a tn o w i t n e s s t e s t i f

i e d t h a tt h e e ve nts
occur red in “ Memphis, Shelby

County , Tenne ssee.” The trial c ourt responde d that Offic er Cooper had testified that he arr ested the de fenda nt at “ 1 4 9 7 F a ir f

ax in M emphis, Shelby

County , Tenne ssee.” The trial c ourt furthe r found that Of fice r Russell had testified t h at 1497 Fairfa x is located in the North pre cinct of Memphis in Shelby County , Tenne ssee. The court conclude d, “So, I think that has been c overe d.”

At the conc lusion of the trial, the def endant was convicted of possession of coc aine a nd two counts of possession of mar ijuana, all Class A misdemeanor s. SentencingHea

ring

Duri ngthe se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e State ma de the de fe nd ant’ s p re se nte nc e re po rt an e xhibi t. The de fenda

nt had five prior felony convictions including assault with the intent to commit m urder , ag g ravated assault, two convic tions for rec kless endang erme nt involving a de adly wea pon, and attempted voluntary

man s l au g hter. The defe ndant also had thirtee n prior misdemea nors which included two drugconvictions.

The trial court found t hat the def endant ha d an extensive history of cr iminal convictions and criminal beha

vior dating b ac kfiftee n y ear s. After merg ing the two convictions for ma rijuana possession, the court sentenc ed the defe ndant to e leven months and twe nty -nine da y s for e ach of

the
rema ining two c onvictions, with the s entenc es t o run concurre ntly . The trial c ourt specif ically stated that the def

endant wa s not a proper

candidate for pr obation.

An a ly sis
First, the de fenda

nt argues that the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing his motion to suppress the evidenc e seized following his arre st. The findings of fac t made by the trial cour

t at the hea

ring on a motion to suppress are binding upo n t h is court unless the evide nce c ontained in the re cord preponde rate s ag ainst them. Sta te v . R os s , 49 S.W .3d 833, 839 (Tenn. 2001). The tria l court, as the trier of fac t, is able to assess the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s, determine the weig ht and value to be-4-

aff orded the evidenc e, and resolve any conflicts in the evidenc e. State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . The pre vailing party is e ntitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable infe renc es dr awn from that evidenc e. State v. Hick s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001). Howe ver, this cour t is not bound by

the trial court’s conclusions of law. State v. Randolph , 74 S

. W

. 3d 330, 333 (Tenn. 2002) . The a pplication of the law

to the fac ts found by

the trial cour

t
ar e qu e s t i o n s o f

l aw t h a tt h i s c o u rtr e v i e ws de novo

. State v. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000). The de fenda

nt has the b u rd en of establishing that the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord preponde rate s ag ainst the finding s of fac t ma de by the trial court. Braz ie l v . S tat e , 529 S.W .2d 501, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)

. The de fenda

nt contends that the arr est was c ompleted and it was not ne cessa ry for the of fice rs to e nte r t h e r e s i d e n c e

. F u rt h e r , h e ar g u e s t h at t h e o f f i c e r ’ s o b s e r

v a t i o n w a s a t b e s t s u f

f i c ie nt t o justify his arre st but not t o war

rant an entry into the re sidence . The trial c ourt found that exceptions to the war rant re quirement applied to justify the s ear ch of the residence that resulted in the discove ry of the drug s.

Her e, the tria l court found that the hot pur suit e xc e p ti o n w as applica

ble bec ause the defe ndant
a t t e mp t e d t o r u n f r o m t h e o f

f i c e r

. T h e o f

f i c e r c a u g h t t h e d e f

e n d an t i n t h e t h r e s h o l d

o f h i s d o o r w a y. The que stion of whether

circ umstances we re suf

ficient to ju s tify

a wa rra ntless searc h is a mix ed qu e sti on of law a

nd fa c t. R e vie w o f m ixed

qu e sti on s o f l aw a

nd fa c t is de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. State v. Me eks , 262 S.W .3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008)

.
T h e F o u rt h Am en dm en to f t h e U n i t edS t at es C o n s t i tu t i o ns t at es t h e f o l l o wi n g:
Th e ri g ht o f t

he pe op le to be s ecu

re in t he ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs , a nd e ff e c ts,
a g a ins t unre a so na

ble se arc he s and

se izur e s, sh a ll n ot b e vio la te d, and no wa rr ants shall issue, b u t upon probable cause , supported by oath or a ffirmation, and particula rly descr ibing the pla ce to be sear ched, a nd the per sons or things to be seized.

Fur ther, Ar ticle I , Section 7 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provides
[t]hat th e pe op le sh a ll b e se c ur e in t he ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs and po sse ssi on s, from unre asonable sear ches a n d seizures; and that g ener al war rants, whe reby

an office r may

be commande d to searc h suspected pla ces, w ithout evidence of the fa ct committed, or to seize any perso n o r persons not name d, whose off enses a re not particula rly descr ibed and supporte d by evidenc e, ar e dang erous to liberty and oug ht not to be g rante d. Th e purp os e and int e nt of Ar tic le I , Se c tio n 7 is ide nti c a l to that of the F ourt h A me ndme nt, which is to “‘sa fe gu ar d the privac y and sec urity

of individuals ag ainst the arbitra ry invasions of g overnme nt officials.’” State v. Randolph , 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d 3 3 0 , 3 3 4 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Camara v. Mu nic ipa l Co ur t , 3 87 U. S. 5 23 , 5 28 , 8 7 S. Ct. 17 27 , 1 73 0 ( 19 67 )) ; State v. Gonzalez , 52 S.W .3d 90, 95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

.-5-

A warrant les s s earch is pres um ed u nrea so nab le u nd er bo th th e fed eral andst ate con st itutio ns , and e vid e nc e se ize d f

ro m th e wa

rr antl e ss s e arc h is su

bje c t to su pp ressio n unle ss t he State demonstrates by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the sear ch was “conduc ted pursuant to one of the nar rowly define d exceptions to the warr ant re quirement.” State v. Simpson , 968 S.W .2d 776, 780 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; see Coo lid

ge v . Ne w H

am ps hir e , 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971). The main e x ceptions to the re quirement for a sea rch w arr ant ar e: (1) c onsent to sear ch; (2) a sear ch incident to a lawf

ul arre st; (3) probable cause to searc h with exi g ent circ umstances ; (4 ) i n hot pursuit; (5) a stop and f

risk situation; a n d (6 ) p l ain vi ew. State v. Bartram , 925 S.W .2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996)

. The United States Supre me C ourt has re cog nized “that a wa rra ntless entry

by criminal law enfor ceme nt may be lega l when there is compelling need f or off icial ac tion and no time to secure a war rant.” Michigan v. Tyle r , 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct . 1492 (1978). Exige nt circumstanc es ar e one compe lling nee d and ar e limited to three situations: (1) whe n office rs ar e in hot p ursuit of a flee ing suspe ct; (2) when t he suspect repr esents an immediate threat to the arre sting off icer s or the public; and (3) when im mediate police action is nec essar y to preve nt the destruction of vital e vidence or thwar t the esca pe of know n criminals. J on e s v . Le wis , 874 F .2 d 112 5, 11 30 (6 th C ir . 1 98 9) ; see also State v . Stacy N. Moone yhan , N o

. M 2 0 0 6

- 0 1 3 3 0

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 2 0 0 7 T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. LE X IS 861, at **18-19 (T enn. Crim. App. at Na shville, Oct. 30, 2007), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).

The State be ars the bur den of de monstr at i n g that exigent cir cumstance s overc ome the presumption of unre asonable ness that attache s to all warr antless home entr ies. W e lsh v . W isc on sin , 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S. C t. 2091 (1984). An obj ec t i v e st andar d is used to determine the
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f

t h e o f f i c e r ’ s b e l i e f

t h a tane m e r g e n c y s i tu a t i o ne x i s t e d a tt h e m o m e n to f

e n t r y. Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). I n deter mining whe ther the of

fice r ac ted
rea sonably , this court must consider the totality of the c ircumstance s, including the persona l observations of the trained police office r and the rational infe renc es and de ductions theref rom. See Sta te v . W

atk ins , 827 S.W .2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)

.
Her e, the tria l c ourt deter

mined that both the plain view and the hot pursuit ex ceptions to the
wa rr ant r e qu ir e me nt w e re a

pp lic a ble . T he tr ia l c ourt fou nd that the of fi c e r o bs e rv e d th e dr

ug s in plain view duringthe i n itial pass by the def endant’ s residenc e. The court then c oncluded that the
o f f i c e r g a v e c h a s e i nh o tp u r s u i to f t h e d e f e n d an tan d

r e a c h e d h i m a tt h e t h r e s h o l d

o f t h e d o o r w a y. The c ourt deter

mined that b ec au s e t h e o ffice r had a rig ht to perfor

m a cur sory

sear ch bec ause he pursued the de fenda

nt to the living room doorwa y and appr ehende d him just inside the reside nce.

The trial c ourt cited United States v. Santana , 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976), to support its conclusion that the sear ch wa s valid. I n Santana , the police ha d probable ca u s e t o b el ieve a
woman standing on her front porch had committed a crime. When she noticed la w e n fo rce ment office rs appr oachingher, she ran into the house. A n office r testified that the de fenda nt was standing dir e c tly in t he do or wa y ; on e ste p f

or wa rd wo uld have pu t he r o uts ide and

on e ste p b a c kw ard

wo uld-6-

have put he r in the vestibule of he r re sidence

. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40, 96 S. Ct

. at 2408 n.1. The United States Supr em e C o u rt conclude d that the offic ers’ war rantless e ntry

into the house was justified under the hot pursuit ex ception to the warrant requireme nt. The Court specif ically noted that a hot pur suit doe s not ne ed to be an extended hue and cry in a nd about the public streets. Id. at 42 -43

. Th at th e pu rsuit e nd e d a lmo st a s so on a s it be g an d id n ot r e nd e r i t any le ss a ho t pu rs uit sufficie nt to just ify

the war rantless e ntry

into Santana’s house. Id. at 43.

The fa cts of the unde rly ing c ase a re similar to those in Santana . The offi ce r wa s in hot pursuit of the def

endant just as he attempted to go inside his re sidence . The c ourt found that the office r re ache d the def

endant at the threshold of the re sidence . The off icer saw the de fenda

nt throw a “ba g g ie” into the fr ont room of the residenc e. The State argues, and w e ag ree , that, beca use the office r wa s in hot pursuit of the defe ndant and a pprehen d ed him at the doorw ay and bec ause the defe ndant threwthe suspecte d drug s into the residenc e, it was pe rmissible f or the offic er to re trieve the drug s that were discarde d as he attempted to arre st the defe ndant.

Withre g ard

to t he c oc a ine , the of

fi c e r wa s lawf

ull y in the de fe nd ant’ s r e sid e nc e . T he pla in view exception t o the war rant re quirement a

pplied to the drug s discovere d beside the f ront door and
on the c of fe e ta ble . T his c ourt

has st ate d that th e pla in v ie w d oc tr ine a pp lie s w he n ( 1) the ite ms seized were in plain view; (2) the viewer had the rig ht to be in the pos ition to view the items; and (3) the incriminating nature of the items was immediate ly appar ent. State v. Cothran , 115 S.W .3d 513, 525 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) . Her e, the of fice r wa s lawfully in the residence beca use he saw the def endant throwthe “ba g g ies” into the residence

. The other drug s observe d by the offic er w ere in p la in v ie w in the liv ing ro om wh e re he re tr ie ve d th e “ ba g g ie s” that ha d b e e n thro wn int o th e ro om. Th e tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y de nie d th e mot ion

to s up pr e ss. Next, the defenda

nt a rg ues that the State fa iled to establish venue a nd contends that, during the pr o s e c u ti o n o f th e c a s e , n o me n ti o n w a s ma d e o f th e in c id e n t o c c u r r in g in M e mp h is, Shelby County , Tenne ssee. Howeve r, t he record refle cts that two witnesses for the State testified that the incident occ urre d at 1497 Fa irfax in Memphis, S helby County , Tenne ssee.
A na c c u s e d

is e n ti tl e d

to a tr ia l i nth e c o u n ty

w h e r e th e o f

f e n s e was committed. State v. Ma rb ur y , 9 08 S.W. 2d 40 5, 40 7 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); State v. Bloodsaw , 746 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The burden i s on the S tate to prove that the offense was committed in the county specifie d in the indictment. Ma rb ur y , 9 08 S.W. 2d

a t 40 7; Bloodsaw , 7 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d at 724. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 39-11-201( e) (2006) provides that the S tate must prove ve nue

“ by a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e .” Th is me ans the re mus t be su ff ic ie nt f a c tua l in fo rm a tio n to
cause the fac t f

inder to be lieve an alleg ation is pr obably true, i.e., it must have the g reater c onvincing eff ect in the f

act f inder’s be lief. Ma rb ur

y , 908 S.W .2d at 408.

Ve nu e is no t an e le me nt of the of fe ns e wh ic h mu st b e pr ov e d b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t; i t is a jurisdictional fac t which must be proved by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. S

ta tev. Hutcherson , 7 90 S.W. 2d

53 2, 53 3, 53 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) ; Sta te v . S mi th , 926 S.W .2d 267, 269 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); see T.C.A. § 39-11 -2 0 1 (e ). Venue may be shown by

either dire ct or-7-

circ umstantial evidence

. Hutcherson , 7 90 S.W. 2d a t 53 3; Sm ith , 9 26 S.W. 2d a t 26 9. A j ury

is entitled to draw a reasonable infere nce from prove n fac ts as to the issue of venue

. State v. Re ed, 845 S.W .2d 234, 238 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.
Dur in g the State ’s pr oo f, the of fi c e rs te sti fi e d o n th e re c or d th a t th e inc ide nts oc c ur re d in Memphis, Shelby

County , Tenne ssee. This evide nce is suff icient to establish venue.
Next, the defenda

nt argues that there was a materia l va rianc e betwee n the indictment and the evidenc e pre sented at trial. Specifica lly , he arg ues t hat t he S tate failed to prove the felony amount of m arijuana

and, conse quently , was una ble to g o forwa

rd with the indictment. The de fenda nt was ini tia lly ind ic te d f

or the of fe ns e of po sse ssi on of on e -h a lf ounc e (1 4. 17 5 g ra ms) of mari jua na wi th the intent to sell or deliver. The evidence at trial showed that the marijuana weig hed 1.9 g rams. The State acknow ledg ed, at t h e conclusion of their case , that it did not appear the proven a mount of marijuana was suff icient to establish the indicted cr ime and aske d the cour t to c harg e on the lesser included o ff

en s e o f possession of marijuana . The trial c ourt ag ree d, direc ted a ve rdict as to the char g es of possession with intent to se ll or deliver, and stated it would allow the jury to consider the lesser inc luded offe nse of simple possession of mar ijuana.

At the close of t he defenda nt’s proof, the court held a jury -out hear ing on the i ssue of jury ins tr uc tio ns . T he de fe nd ant a

rgue d th a t th e c ha

rg e of sim ple po sse ssi on

sh ou ld no t be pr e se nte d to the jur y be c a us e the ind ic te d c ha

rg e ha d b e e n d ism iss e d. B e fo re a va ri anc e wi ll b e he ld f

a ta l, i t mu st be dee med to be mater ial and pre judicial. A var iance b et we en an indictment a nd the proof in a criminal ca se is not material wher e the a lleg ations and proof substantially

corr espond; the var iance is not of a cha

rac ter whic h could have misled the defe ndant at trial a nd is not such as to deprive the
acc used of his rig ht to be protec ted ag ainst another pr osecution for the s ame of

fense

. Sta te v . M

os s , 662 S.W .2d 590 (Tenn. 1984) . The va rianc e is not fata l in the instant c ase. The de fenda nt was on notice that he w as cha

rg ed with possession of marijuana . Any varia nce with r espec t to the a

mount of marijuana

was immateria l. The def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

Ne xt, the de fe nd ant ar g ue s tha t he wa s im pr op e rl y de nie d a se nte nc e of

pr ob a tio n. B e c a

us e of the de fe nd ant’ s “ e xten siv e re c or d, ” the tr ia l c ourt de te rm ine d that he wa s no t a pr op e r c and idate for pro b at i o n

. At the time of sentenc ing, the defe ndant had se vera l prior convictions, including ag g ravated assault, attempted voluntar y manslaug hter, two va

ndalism charg es, t wo counts of drug possession, two c ounts of rec kless endang erme nt w ith a deadly wea pon, three assault cha

rg es, and six counts of driving while his license wa s suspended or r evoked. I n deter mining if inca

rce ration is a ppropriate , a trial court may consider the need to pr otect society by restra ining a

defe ndant having a long history

of cr iminal conduct. T.C.A. § 40-35-103( 1)(A) (2006). We ag ree that the def endant’ s rec ord supports the trial c ourt’s denia l of probation.

T h e d e f e n d an tw a s s e n t e n c e d t o c o n c u r r e n ts e n t e n c e s o f

e l e v e nm o n t h s an d

t w e n t y- n i n e d a ys for his convic tions. He was convicted of two Class A misdemeanors. A tr ial court is allowed g reater flexibi lity in setting misdemea

nor sentenc es than fe lony

sentenc es. Statev. Johnson , 15 S.W .3d 515, 51 8 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). No se pa rate se nte nc inghe ari ngis r e qu ir e d, thoug h th e c ourt mus t-8-

g ive the def

endant a rea sonable opportunity to be hea rd re g ardingthe leng th and manner of ser vice of the sente nce. T .C.A. § 40-35-302( a) ( 2006). Ther e is no presumption of a minimum sentence

. State v. Humphre

ys , 70 S.W .3d 752, 768 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

. The sente nce must be specific and in a ccor dance with the principles, purposes, and g oals of the Se nte nc ingAc t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -3 02 (b ) ( 20 06 ); State v. Palme r , 902 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1995). A d eter

minate sentenc e should be set with a pe rce ntag e of not g reater than se venty -five perc ent to be serve d in c onfinement. T.C.A. § 40-35-302( d). The trial court should co n s i d er the
e nh anc e me nt a

nd mit ig a tin g fa c tor s w he n c a lc ulatin g the pe rc e nta g e of the se nte nc e to be se rv e d in confine ment. Id.; State v . Troutman , 9 79 S.W. 2d 27 1, 27 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) . T he tr ia l cou rt is authorized to place the misdemeana nt on p ro b ati on either immediate ly or af ter a term of confine ment. T.C.A. § 40-35-302( e).

I n imposing a misdemea

nor sentenc e, the c ourt shall fix a per centa g e of the sentenc e to be
serve d by the def endant. Af

ter ser vice of such a pe rce ntag e of the sentenc e, the de fenda nt shall be eli g ib le f o r c o n s id e r a ti o nf

o r w o r k r e le a s e , f

u r lo u g h , tr

u s ty s tatu s , an d

r e late d r e h a b ilitative pr og ra ms. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 30 2. I n th e ins tant c a se , no pe rc e nta g e is se t on the jud g me nt, bu t it is clea r fr om the rec ord that the trial c ourt did not intend for the pe rc entag e of se rvice to be zero perc ent. Ther efor e, we re m and to t he trial c ourt so that the cour t may aff ix a per centa g e of the sentenc e to be serve d by the defe ndant. I n deter mining the perc entag e of the sentenc e to be serve d in actual c onfinement, the c ourt shall consid er t h e p u rposes of this cha pter, the pr inciples of sentenc ing, a

nd the enha

nceme nt and mitigatingfac t o rs set for th in this chapte r, and it shall not i mp o s e s u c h p e r c e n t a g e s ar b i t r ar i l y.
Conclusion

Ba sed on the for eg oing a nd the re cord a s a whole, we af firm the judg ments from the trial court with re g ard to a ll issues not related to sentenc ing. We r emand the issue of sentenc ing to the tr ia l c ourt fo r a ff ixinga pe rc e nta g e of

the se nte nc e to b e se rv e d b y the de fe nd ant.

___________________________________ JOHN EVE RETT WILL IAMS, JUDGE