Supreme Court of Louisiana

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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #036

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 29th day of June, 2017, are as follows:

BY HUGHES, J.: 

2016-CC-2078 JAMES E. BOREN v. EARL B. TAYLOR (Parish of St. Landry) 

Retired Judge Freddie Pitcher, Jr. participated in this decision 

as Justice Ad Hoc, sitting for Genovese, J., recused in this 

case.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the appellate court decision, 

upholding the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s petition 

for writ of mandamus, and we remand this matter to the district 

court with instructions to issue a writ of mandamus to the St. 

Landry Parish District Attorney, ordering compliance with La. 

R.S. 44:31 and La. R.S. 44:32, without regard to the provisions 

of La. R.S. 44:31.1, as to the public records request of 

plaintiff James E. Boren. We further instruct the district court 

to assess and award to plaintiff James E. Boren attorney fees, 

costs, and damages, as appropriate under La. R.S. 44:35.

REVERSED; REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
*

Retired Judge Freddie Pitcher, Jr. participated in this decision as Justice Ad Hoc, sitting for 

Genovese, J., recused in this case.

06/29/2017

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2016-CC-2078

JAMES E. BOREN

VERSUS

EARL B. TAYLOR

ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL 

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ST. LANDRY

HUGHES, J.*

This case presents the res nova issue of whether an attorney, representing an 

incarcerated felon, is subject to the provisions of La. R.S. 44:31.1, when making a 

public records request to obtain information relative to a potential post-conviction 

relief application. Both the district court and the appellate court ruled in the 

affirmative. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Attorney James E. Boren was retained by Stephan M. Bergeron to review his 

2013 rape convictions to determine if there were any valid bases for postconviction relief.1

 Mr. Boren forwarded a written request on June 30, 2015 to the 

St. Landry District Attorney’s office, seeking to review and copy records related to 

Mr. Bergeron’s conviction under the Louisiana Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1 

et seq. Assistant District Attorney Donald J. Richard replied to the request, in a

July 14, 2015 letter, requesting Mr. Boren disclose the nature of his relationship 

 1 See State v. Bergeron, 14-608 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 523, 526 (wherein the 

defendant’s four convictions for rape of his former wife during their four-year marriage were 

affirmed). 
2

with Mr. Bergeron, i.e., whether Mr. Boren was “acting in any capacity in 

representing him in any post-conviction proceedings” and, if so, asking Mr. Boren

to “set forth the grounds for post-conviction relief,” along with his “personal 

representation that none of those grounds were raised on appeal.” Mr. Boren 

responded by letter dated July 21, 2015, disclosing that he was retained by Mr. 

Bergeron to investigate his 2013 rape convictions to determine if there were any 

valid claims for post-conviction relief and that he was seeking access to files of the 

St. Landry Parish District Attorney’s Office regarding that prosecution. Mr. Boren 

was thereafter notified by Mr. Richard’s July 24, 2015 letter that his “response 

does not meet the requirements previously cited in our response letter dated July 

14, 2015. Therefore, your request is DENIED.” (Emphasis original.)

Mr. Boren then filed a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Review” on 

August 10, 2015, in the Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, pursuant to La. 

Const. Art. XII, § 3, La. C.C.P. arts. 3862-63, and La. R.S. 44:35. Mr. Boren also 

sought to collect from the defendant/custodian attorney fees, costs, and damages, 

under La. R.S. 44:35, for their failure to comply with his public records request.

Following an August 31, 2015 hearing, the district court denied Mr. Boren’s 

petition for a writ of mandamus. A subsequent writ application to the appellate 

court was denied. Boren v. Taylor, 15-0911 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/18/15) 

(unpublished). On Mr. Boren’s application to this court, we granted the writ and 

remanded to the appellate court for briefing, argument, and full opinion. Boren v. 

Taylor, 15-2322 (La. 3/14/16) (unpublished writ action). On remand, the appellate 

court affirmed the district court ruling. Boren v. Taylor, 15-0911 (La. App. 3 Cir. 

10/26/16), 206 So.3d 892. Thereafter, this court granted the plaintiff’s writ 

application. Boren v. Taylor, 16-2078 (La. 1/23/17), 215 So.3d 262.

Mr. Boren asks this court to reverse the appellate court decision, contending, 

in essence: that the provisions of La. R.S. 44:31.1 apply only to an incarcerated 
3

individual, not to an attorney; that La. R.S. 44:31.1 should be strictly construed so 

as not to diminish his right of access to public records because of his attorneyclient relationship with an incarcerated individual; that the public records custodian 

(here, the district attorney) exceeded his authority to question a person seeking 

public records access beyond that allowed by La. R.S. 44:32(A); and that he is 

entitled to an award of attorney fees, costs, and damages, pursuant to La. R.S. 

44:35.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The public’s right to access public records is granted by Louisiana 

Constitution, Article XII, Section 3, which provides: “No person shall be denied 

the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies and examine public 

documents, except in cases established by law.”

The legislature, by enacting the Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq., 

sought to guarantee, in the most expansive and unrestricted way possible, the right 

of the public to inspect and reproduce those records that the law deems public. See

Landis v. Moreau, 00-1157, p. 4 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 691, 694-95; Title 

Research Corporation v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933, 937 (La. 1984). In 

implementation of this right, La. R.S. 44:31(A) states, “Providing access to public 

records is a responsibility and duty of the appointive or elective office of a 

custodian and his employees.” Further, “any person of the age of majority may 

inspect, copy, or reproduce any public record,” except “as otherwise specifically 

provided by law.” La. R.S. 44:31(B). A public records custodian must “present 

any public record to any person of the age of majority who so requests,” and the 

custodian “shall make no inquiry of any person who applies for a public record, 

except an inquiry as to the age and identification of the person . . . .” La. R.S. 

44:32(A).

The legislature has further recognized that “it is essential to the operation of 
4

a democratic government that the people be made aware of all exceptions, 

exemptions, and limitations to the laws pertaining to public records.” La. R.S. 

44:4.1(A). In order to foster the people’s awareness, the legislature declared that 

“all exceptions, exemptions, and limitations to the laws pertaining to public records 

shall be provided for in [the Public Records Law] or the Constitution of 

Louisiana.” Id. Any exception, exemption, and limitation to the laws pertaining to 

public records not provided for in the Public Records Law or in the Constitution of 

Louisiana has no effect. Id.

Thus, the Public Records Law must be construed liberally in favor of free 

and unrestricted access to public documents, and access to public records can be 

denied only when a law specifically and unequivocally provides otherwise. Title 

Research Corporation v. Rausch, 450 So.2d at 937. See also DeSalvo v. State, 

624 So.2d 897, 902 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1117, 114 S.Ct. 1067, 127 

L.Ed.2d 386 (1994); Landis v. Moreau, 779 So.2d at 695. Whenever there is 

doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt 

must be resolved in favor of the public’s right to see; to allow otherwise would be 

an improper and arbitrary restriction on the public’s constitutional rights. In re 

Matter Under Investigation, 07-1853, p. 25 (La. 7/1/09), 15 So.3d 972, 989; 

Capital City Press v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 96-1979, 

p. 4 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 562, 564; Title Research Corporation v. Rausch, 

450 So.2d at 936. 

In this case, Mr. Boren’s public records request was denied by the 

defendant/custodian on the basis of the exception set forth in La. R.S. 44:31.1, 

which provides:

For the purposes of this Chapter, person does not include an 

individual in custody after sentence following a felony conviction

who has exhausted his appellate remedies when the request for public 

records is not limited to grounds upon which the individual could file 

for post conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 
5

930.3. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in R.S. 44:32, the 

custodian may make an inquiry of any individual who applies for a 

public record to determine if such individual is in custody after 

sentence following a felony conviction who has exhausted his 

appellate remedies and the custodian may make any inquiry necessary 

to determine if the request of any such individual in custody for a 

felony conviction is limited to grounds upon which such individual 

may file for post conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure 

Article 930.3. [Emphasis added.]

Both the district court and the appellate court in this case held that the 

provisions of La. R.S. 44:31.1 were applicable to the public records request of Mr. 

Boren, reasoning, in essence, that Mr. Boren stood in the shoes of his client, 

Stephan Bergeron, an incarcerated felon who had exhausted his appellate remedies. 

Therefore, the lower courts ruled that Mr. Boren was required to satisfy the

necessary inquiries of the custodian (here, the St. Landry Parish District Attorney) 

to ascertain “if the request of any such individual in custody for a felony 

conviction is limited to grounds upon which such individual may file for post 

conviction relief under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.3,” as provided by

La. R.S. 44:31.1.

As we noted hereinabove, however, La. Const. Art. XII, § 3 establishes a 

fundamental right in a “person” to “examine public documents,” and this right may 

only be denied “in cases established by law.” The plain language of La. R.S. 

44:31.1 only restricts the right of “an individual in custody after sentence following 

a felony conviction” to examine public documents. Mr. Boren is not an individual 

in custody after sentence following a felony conviction. Neither La. R.S. 44:31.1 

nor any other law cited to, or discoverable by, this court restricts the right of a 

“person” on the basis of that person’s status as an attorney representing a client.

2

 

Having found that La. R.S. 44:31.1 clearly and unambiguously applies only to “an 

individual in custody after sentence following a felony conviction,” we find it 

 2 When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, 

the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the 

intent of the legislature. La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4. 
6

unnecessary to delve further into the intent of the legislature in enacting this 

statute.3

Mr. Boren’s rights under the Public Records Law have not been 

“specifically and unequivocally” limited by any law.

4

 See Title Research 

Corporation v. Rausch, 450 So.2d at 937. Therefore, his public records request 

to the defendant/custodian should have been evaluated under La. R.S. 44:31 and 

La. R.S. 44:32, allowing the custodian to inquire only as to the “identification of 

the person” seeking access to public records and whether he or she is “of the age of 

majority.”

We note the defendant/custodian’s argument in favor of the application of 

La. R.S. 44:31.1 to Mr. Boren’s public records request, asserting that Mr. Boren 

was not acting as an “ordinary citizen” in making the request since he was 

“operating in a legally representative capacity” and that to allow Mr. Boren, under 

these circumstances, to avoid the application of La. R.S. 44:31.1 would give Mr. 

Boren’s incarcerated client, Stephan Bergeron, “greater rights than he would have 

had without an attorney” and “more rights than all those other defendants 

incarcerated without attorneys.” The plaintiff and amicus curiae5 counter that

applying the restrictions contained in La. R.S. 44:31.1 to an attorney representing 

 3 “The text of a law is the best evidence of legislative intent.” La. R.S. 24:177(B)(1). It is only 

“[w]hen the meaning of a law cannot be ascertained by the application of the provisions of 

Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Louisiana Civil Code and Chapter 1 of Title 1 of the 

Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950,” that “the court shall consider the intent of the legislature.” 

La. R.S. 24:177(A) (footnotes omitted). 

4 The extensive exceptions to the Public Records Law promulgated by the legislature 

demonstrate the recognition of the legislature of the need to expressly provide for such 

exceptions by a specific and express law when it deems appropriate. See, e.g., La. R.S. 

44:1(A)(2)(b), (B); La. R.S. 44:2; La. R.S. 44:3; La. R.S. 44:3.1; La. R.S. 44:3.2; La. R.S. 

44:3.3; La. R.S. 44:3.4; La. R.S. 44:4; La. R.S. 44:4.1(B), (C); La. R.S. 44:5; La. R.S. 44:10; La. 

R.S. 44:11; La. R.S. 44:12; La. R.S. 44:13; La. R.S. 44:14; La. R.S. 44:15; La. R.S. 44:16; La. 

R.S. 44:17; La. R.S. 44:18; La. R.S. 44:19; La. R.S. 44:20; La. R.S. 44:21; La. R.S. 44:21.1; La. 

R.S. 44:22; La. R.S. 44:23; La. R.S. 44:23.1.

5 This court granted the motions of The Louisiana Press Association and the Innocence Project of 

New Orleans to file amicus curiae briefs in this case, in opposition to the position of the 

defendant/custodian.
7

an incarcerated felon would produce an absurd result, in that any other nonincarcerated person (such as other attorneys, court personnel, journalists, friends or 

relatives of the incarcerated felon, etc.) would have unfettered access (excepting 

the custodian’s inquiry as to age and identity) to the public records sought while 

the rights of Mr. Boren would be diminished simply because he is representing Mr. 

Bergeron. The Innocence Project of New Orleans also asserts, in its brief to this 

court, that in most cases grounds for post-conviction relief6 are not knowable,

citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1),7 until public records are reviewed for error by 

an attorney,8 such as when a prosecutor has impermissibly excluded jurors on the 

basis of racial bias, as discussed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 

1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1985),9 or when a prosecutor has failed to turn over 

 6 See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3 (“If the petitioner is in custody after sentence for conviction for an 

offense, relief shall be granted only on the following grounds: (1) The conviction was obtained 

in violation of the constitution of the United States or the state of Louisiana; (2) The court 

exceeded its jurisdiction; (3) The conviction or sentence subjected him to double jeopardy; (4) 

The limitations on the institution of prosecution had expired; (5) The statute creating the offense 

for which he was convicted and sentenced is unconstitutional; . . . (6) The conviction or sentence 

constitute the ex post facto application of law in violation of the constitution of the United States 

or the state of Louisiana[;] (7) The results of DNA testing performed pursuant to an application 

granted under Article 926.1 proves by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is 

factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.”).

7 Article 930.8(A)(1) provides: “No application for post-conviction relief, including applications 

which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the 

judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 

922, unless any of the following apply: (1) The application alleges, and the petitioner proves or 

the state admits, that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the 

petitioner or his prior attorneys.” (Emphasis added.) The Innocence Project asserts that the 

provisions of Article 930.8(A)(1) illustrate the necessity of access to a prosecutor’s file prior to 

the formulation of potential grounds for post-conviction relief, i.e., since the defendant and his 

attorney(s) only have knowledge, post-trial, of the contents of the trial record and trial attorney’s 

file, new facts can only come from the prosecutor’s file.

8 See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 926(B)(5) (requiring that, in an application for post conviction relief, 

the plaintiff is required to allege, in his written petition, “[a]ll errors known or discoverable by 

the exercise of due diligence”).

9 In the lone dissent to the appellate court decision in this case, the dissenting judge cites as a 

compelling reason not to “blindly embrace the District Attorney’s position” the circumstances 

underlying the decision in Foster v. Chatman, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 

(2016). Boren v. Taylor, 206 So.3d at 901 (dissenting opinion). In Foster v. Chatman, the 

defendant had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. However, by means of 

his attorney’s post-trial efforts, evidence obtained under the state’s public records law from the 

prosecutor’s records revealed pervasive racial bias in the jury selection process and 

“demonstrate[d] a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.” See Foster v. 

Chatman, 136 S.Ct. at 1755.
8

exculpatory material to the defense, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

Because the defendant/custodian denied Mr. Boren’s public records request 

in this case on the basis of La. R.S. 44:31.1, for his failure to answer an inquiry as 

to “the grounds for post-conviction relief” to be put forth on behalf of Mr. Boren’s 

client, Stephan Bergeron, the denial was improper. Therefore, Mr. Boren was 

entitled to the relief he sought in the district court, pursuant to La. R.S. 44:35, 

which authorizes “proceedings for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, injunctive 

or declaratory relief” when a person has been denied the right to inspect public 

records, stating:

A. Any person who has been denied the right to inspect, copy, 

reproduce, or obtain a copy or reproduction of a record under the 

provisions of this Chapter, either by a determination of the custodian 

or by the passage of five days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and 

legal public holidays, from the date of his in-person, written, or 

electronic request without receiving a determination in writing by the 

custodian or an estimate of the time reasonably necessary for 

collection, segregation, redaction, examination, or review of a records 

request, may institute proceedings for the issuance of a writ of 

mandamus, injunctive or declaratory relief, together with attorney 

fees, costs and damages as provided for by this Section, in the district 

court for the parish in which the office of the custodian is located.

B. In any suit filed under Subsection A above, the court has 

jurisdiction to enjoin the custodian from withholding records or to 

issue a writ of mandamus ordering the production of any records 

improperly withheld from the person seeking disclosure. The court 

shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the custodian 

to sustain his action. The court may view the documents in 

controversy in camera before reaching a decision. Any noncompliance 

with the order of the court may be punished as contempt of court.

C. Any suit brought in any court of original jurisdiction to 

enforce the provisions of this Chapter shall be tried by preference and 

in a summary manner. Any appellate courts to which the suit is 

brought shall place it on its preferential docket and shall hear it 

without delay, rendering a decision as soon as practicable.

D. If a person seeking the right to inspect, copy, or reproduce a 

record or to receive or obtain a copy or reproduction of a public 

record prevails in such suit, he shall be awarded reasonable attorney 

fees and other costs of litigation. If such person prevails in part, the 

court may in its discretion award him reasonable attorney fees or an 

appropriate portion thereof.

E. (1) If the court finds that the custodian arbitrarily or 

capriciously withheld the requested record or unreasonably or 
9

arbitrarily failed to respond to the request as required by R.S. 44:32, it 

may award the requester any actual damages proven by him to have 

resulted from the actions of the custodian except as hereinafter 

provided. In addition, if the court finds that the custodian 

unreasonably or arbitrarily failed to respond to the request as required 

by R.S. 44:32 it may award the requester civil penalties not to exceed 

one hundred dollars per day, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and 

legal public holidays for each such day of such failure to give 

notification.

(2) The custodian shall be personally liable for the payment of 

any such damages, and shall be liable in solido with the public body 

for the payment of the requester’s attorney fees and other costs of 

litigation, except where the custodian has withheld or denied 

production of the requested record or records on advice of the legal 

counsel representing the public body in which the office of such 

custodian is located, and in the event the custodian retains private 

legal counsel for his defense or for bringing suit against the requester 

in connection with the request for records, the court may award 

attorney fees to the custodian.

F. An award for attorney fees in any suit brought under the 

provisions of this Chapter shall not exceed the amounts approved by 

the attorney general for the employment of outside counsel.

Additionally, a plaintiff who prevails in a suit to enforce the right to view 

public records is entitled to collect attorney fees, costs, and damages, as set forth in 

La. R.S. 44:35. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Mr. Boren’s claim 

for attorney fees, costs, and damages under La. R.S. 44:35.

DECREE

For the reasons stated, we reverse the appellate court decision, upholding the 

district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus, and we 

remand this matter to the district court with instructions to issue a writ of 

mandamus to the St. Landry Parish District Attorney, ordering compliance with 

La. R.S. 44:31 and La. R.S. 44:32, without regard to the provisions of La. R.S. 

44:31.1, as to the public records request of plaintiff James E. Boren. We further 

instruct the district court to assess and award to plaintiff James E. Boren attorney 

fees, costs, and damages, as appropriate under La. R.S. 44:35.

REVERSED; REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS.