IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 8, 2022 Session

TIMOTHY WILSON V. TAWANA WILSON ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County 

No. 20C669 Amanda J. McClendon, Judge

No. M2021-01307-COA-R3-CV

In this appeal, we review the trial court’s dismissal of the action upon its finding that it was 

an “abusive civil action,” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, and res 

judicata. The appellee also seeks her attorney’s fees for this appeal. Discerning no error in 

the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the dismissal of the suit as to the former wife and 

award her the attorney’s fees she incurred defending this appeal. We remand for further 

proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; 

Case Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,

JR., P.J., M.S., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.

Nicholas Morgan Daseler and Samuel Blink, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Timothy Wilson.

Lorraine Wade, Smyrna, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tawana Wilson.

Michael K. Atkins, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Laurie Damewood and 

Compass Land Title, LLC.

OPINION

In this appeal, we are called upon to apply the Tennessee Abusive Civil Action 

Statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, which were enacted in 2018 and have not 

yet been interpreted or applied by the appellate courts of this State. A former husband, 

Timothy Wilson, brought a lawsuit against his former wife, Tawana Wilson, for 

conversion, based on her alleged forgery of his signature on a deed that conveyed real estate 

07/27/2022
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she had owned since before their marriage. Ms. Wilson moved for dismissal pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, where an “abusive civil action” is defined as: 

a civil action filed by a plaintiff against a defendant with whom the plaintiff 

shares a civil action party relationship[1] primarily to harass or maliciously 

injure the defendant and at least one (1) of the following factors are 

applicable:

(A) Claims, allegations, and other legal contentions made in the civil 

action are not warranted by existing law or by a reasonable argument 

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or the 

establishment of new law;

(B) Allegations and other factual contentions made in the civil action 

are without the existence of evidentiary support; or

(C) Issue or issues that are the basis of the civil action have previously 

been filed in one (1) or more other courts or jurisdictions by the same, 

and the actions have been litigated and disposed of unfavorably to the 

plaintiff[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(1). The motion to dismiss was largely premised on the fact 

that Mr. Wilson had already unsuccessfully attempted to litigate the same matters in the 

parties’ prior divorce.

Pertinent to the issues in this lawsuit are some key facts from the parties’ divorce 

proceedings, which were recently affirmed by this Court in Wilson v. Wilson, No. M2019-

01275-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 516980 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2021). In the divorce, Mr. 

Wilson did not answer the complaint filed by Ms. Wilson, nor did he retain counsel or 

participate in the divorce proceedings until after the final decree was entered. Id. at *1. 

Only then did he file a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial on the basis that 

Ms. Wilson allegedly withheld his mail and forged his name on a warranty deed to transfer 

real property shortly before she filed the complaint for divorce. Id. at *1, *3. The divorce

court heard that motion and denied it. Id. at *2. Mr. Wilson unsuccessfully appealed that 

denial. Id. at *3. This Court also affirmed the classification, valuation, and division of 

marital assets and the award of alimony. Id. at *1, *4-6.

While the appeal of the divorce proceedings was pending, Mr. Wilson filed the 

complaint in this action on March 17, 2020, naming as defendants Ms. Wilson, as well as 

Laurie Damewood, the notary public who notarized the deed, and Ms. Damewood’s 

employer, Compass Land Title, LLC (“Compass”). He alleged causes of action for 

conversion against Ms. Wilson, civil conspiracy against Ms. Wilson and Ms. Damewood, 

negligence against Ms. Damewood, and vicarious liability against Compass based on 

 

 

1 A “civil action party relationship” exists when the parties are in a current or former marital, cohabiting, 

dating, sexual, familial, or adoptive relationship with each other. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(5)(A)-(E).
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allegations that Ms. Wilson forged Mr. Wilson’s signature on a warranty deed, in 

conspiracy with the notary public. That deed, which was executed approximately a month 

before Ms. Wilson filed for divorce, transferred her interest in a piece of real estate located 

at 2727 Old Matthews Road in Nashville (“the property”) that she acquired prior to the 

marriage and that remained titled in only her name. Mr. Wilson’s complaint alleged that 

he had “substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the property”

during the course of the marriage, such that he had an interest in the property’s increase in 

value over the course of the marriage and the proceeds resulting from its sale. He contended 

that the defendants’ actions “prevented him from receiving his equitable share in the 

Property or the proceeds of the sale of the Property during the divorce proceedings.” 

Ms. Wilson answered the complaint, denying liability, and asserted numerous 

affirmative defenses including waiver, estoppel, laches, unclean hands, res judicata and 

collateral estoppel, and the statute of limitations. Her answer sought dismissal of the action 

pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 for failure to state a claim because “this action . . . has no 

merit as Defendant should have made these claims in the divorce” and Tenn. R. Civ P. 11 

sanctions for Mr. Wilson’s action of “fil[ing] a frivolous lawsuit . . . as these claims were 

raised in a prior proceeding that is currently up on Appeal in the divorce action.” Ms. 

Damewood and Compass filed a joint answer as well, denying liability and asserting 

numerous affirmative defenses, including that “Plaintiff’s signature was not required to be 

on the warranty deed in order for Defendant Tawana Wilson to convey the property since 

the property was in her name only as the sole owner.”

Ms. Wilson sought a stay of the action until a decision was rendered by this Court

in the appeal of their divorce, arguing that “the issues presented in that appeal are directly 

related to the issues in this case as it relates to Mr. Wilson’s right to have an interest in the 

real property in question.” The trial court granted the stay. After this Court affirmed the 

divorce proceedings in all respects, the stay was lifted pursuant to an agreed order. 

Ms. Wilson then filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Wilson’s complaint pursuant to Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, contending that it was an abusive civil action and also 

that the doctrine of res judicata warranted its dismissal. With her motion, she filed 

numerous exhibits consisting of the pleadings and filings from the parties’ divorce, as well 

as her own sworn affidavit in which she detailed Mr. Wilson’s harassing actions before and 

since the entry of the divorce decree. 

Mr. Wilson responded in opposition and filed his own declaration, in which he 

asserted that he “did not find out that [his] signature had been forged on the deed to 2727 

Old Mat[t]hews Road until after Tawana Wilson handed [him] the final decree of divorce 

on June 11, 2019.” He also stated that he had “never hit Tawana Wilson” or abused her or 

threatened to put her in jail, though he did tell her “that everyone who is involved [with the 

alleged forgery] will be prosecuted.”
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The trial court set the matter for a hearing and subsequently entered a memorandum 

opinion and separate order, in which it granted Ms. Wilson’s motion to dismiss Mr. 

Wilson’s civil action against her “pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 et seq.” and 

the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court held that “Mr. Wilson had the opportunity in 

the divorce proceedings to factually demonstrate his entitlement to the increased value of 

the Property and its proceeds and any fraudulent conveyance he believes occurred,” so the 

trial court “would not offer [him] another opportunity” to do so.” The court also awarded 

Ms. Wilson her requested attorney’s fees and costs.

Mr. Wilson filed a motion to revise the order, arguing that the action should not be 

dismissed, as it “does not qualify as an abusive civil action and because there are disputed 

material facts regarding the application of res judicata.” To the motion to revise, he attached

Ms. Damewood’s interrogatory responses, in which she stated that Mr. Wilson’s signature 

was required by the title insurance underwriter. In his accompanying memorandum of law, 

Mr. Wilson argued that the issues in the present lawsuit were not part of the divorce action, 

and therefore could not support a finding that they had been previously litigated, as required 

by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(1)(C) or the doctrine of res judicata. Mr. Wilson also 

argued that because the suit did not fit the definition of an abusive civil action, it could 

only be otherwise subject to dismissal on the basis of a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings or a motion for summary judgment, and, in light of his allegation “that he did 

not find out about the forgery until after the divorce,” a question of material fact had been 

presented as to whether res judicata applied, preventing dismissal. Mr. Wilson alternatively

sought to have the court revise its order to direct entry of a final judgment as to Ms. Wilson 

only and also to grant him permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the court’s order.

The trial court denied Mr. Wilson’s motion, concluding that “there was no error made” 

in its prior order and certifying that the order was final as to Tawana Wilson pursuant to 

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Mr. Wilson has appealed.

I. ISSUES PRESENTED

Mr. Wilson raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in finding that Appellant is not entitled to equitable 

division of proceeds from the sale of marital property?

2. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant liable for Appellee Tawana 

Wilson’s attorney’s fees for abusi[ve] civil action pursuant to [Tenn.

Code Ann. §] 29-41-106?

In the posture of Appellee, Ms. Wilson raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Should the doctrine of unclean hands be applied against Mr. Wilson in 

this case? 
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2. Should the Appellant’s brief be dismissed due to his failure to comply 

with TRAP 27(a) in that the statement of facts does not cite to the record 

and contains facts that are not in the record? 

3. Should this court make Mr. Wilson pay for Ms. Wilson’s attorney’s fees 

for this appeal pursuant to T.C.A. 27-1-122 et. seq. and caselaw?

II. ANALYSIS

A. Appellant’s Brief

As an initial matter, we address the second issue Ms. Wilson raises, whether we

should dismiss the appeal for Mr. Wilson’s failure to comply with Rule 27(a) of the 

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Rule 27(a) requires that the appellant’s brief contain a statement of facts, “setting 

forth the facts relevant to the issues presented for review with appropriate references to the 

record” and an argument, which sets forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to 

the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions 

require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the 

record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on.” TENN. R. APP. P. 27(a)(6), (7)(A); see 

also R. TENN. CT. APP. 6(b) (“No assertion of fact will be considered on appeal unless the 

argument contains a reference to the page or pages of the record where evidence of such 

fact is recorded.”).

Mr. Wilson’s brief contains no citations to the record in either the statement of the 

facts or in the argument section of his brief. For example, in arguing that his lawsuit did 

not constitute an abusive civil action as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(1)(A), 

he relies on the following “facts”: 

It is not certain that participation in the divorce proceeding would have 

revealed the forgery in the alienation of the Property. Merely having the 

opportunity to discover a hidden injury through participation in the divorce 

proceedings should not be a bar to later recovery when discovery of that 

injury, in fact, did not take place.

(Emphasis added). These statements are not supported by citation, in violation of Tenn. R. 

App. P. 27(a)(6), (7)(A) and R. Tenn. Ct. App. 6(b). And they are not supported by the
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record itself, as they are false2and are contradicted by Mr. Wilson’s own pleadings in the 

instant case.3

As an additional example, in explaining how Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(1)(B)

is inapplicable to this case, Mr. Wilson’s sole argument is that he had retained a 

handwriting expert to illustrate discrepancies between the forged signature and an authentic 

signature, but that Ms. Wilson’s motion to dismiss was granted before he had the 

opportunity to present such evidence of forgery. Again, he fails to cite to the record where 

proof, by way of an affidavit, notice of deposition, disclosure of an expert, or otherwise, 

can be found to substantiate his claim that he retained such an expert or that he had called

it to the attention of the court. 

When a party fails to include references to the record to substantiate their view of 

the facts, “[t]his Court is under no duty to verify unsupported allegations in a party’s brief, 

or for that matter consider issues raised but not argued in their brief.” Bean v. Bean, 40 

S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); see also Mabry v. Mabry, No. 03A01-9106CH207, 

1992 WL 24995, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1992) (“It is not incumbent upon this Court 

to sift through the record in order to find proof to substantiate the factual allegations of the 

parties.”); Coleman v. Coleman, No. W2011-00585-COA-R3CV, 2015 WL 479830, at *9 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2015) (“‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in 

briefs.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)). Mr. Wilson “cannot 

expect this [C]ourt to do [his] work for [him].” Bean, 40 S.W.3d at 56. While we decline 

to dismiss the appeal outright on the basis of Mr. Wilson’s violations of Tenn. R. App. P.

27, the deficiencies of his brief impede our review of the issues he attempts to raise.

B. Equitable Division of Property

The first issue Mr. Wilson raises on appeal—whether he had an equitable interest 

in the property—is nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the classification and division 

of the parties’ assets in the prior divorce proceedings, as the legal authority he relies on to 

support his position is the statute governing the division of marital assets, i.e., Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-4-121. 

That statute defines “separate property” to include “[a]ll real and personal property 

owned by a spouse before marriage” as well as “[i]ncome from and appreciation of property 

 

 

2 As the evidence in the record clearly demonstrates, Mr. Wilson became aware of the purported forgery 

and brought it to the divorce court’s attention in his motion to alter or amend the final decree. He even 

attached the allegedly forged deed to that motion as an exhibit. 

 

3 For example, in the “Reply in Support of Motion to Revise Order” he filed in this case, Mr. Wilson 

stated that his motion to set aside the final decree of divorce, which had been filed in the divorce action on 

June 24, 2019, “was the first time that Mr. Wilson raised the issue of the forged deed in the divorce 

proceedings.”
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owned by a spouse before marriage” unless each party substantially contributed to its 

preservation and appreciation, in which case the income and appreciation in value is treated 

as marital property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A), (C); (b)(1)(B)(i). These statutes 

make clear that “income from or appreciation of premarital separate property is presumed 

to be separate unless it meets any of the criteria of subsection (b)(1) or another statutory or 

common law provision.” Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tenn. 2009).

Thus, an increase in the value of separate property that occurs during the marriage may be 

deemed marital property “if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and 

appreciation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i). It is the function of the court 

adjudicating a divorce to classify property as separate versus marital and to hear and assess 

evidence of the substantial contributions of a spouse to the preservation and appreciation 

of an asset that is the other spouse’s separate property. Id. § 36-4-121(a)(1). This is not a 

divorce action. It is a tort action, and Mr. Wilson’s attempts to invoke the domestic relations 

statutes to support his claim for conversion are misguided. 

While Mr. Wilson’s brief contains statements that he “helped manage” the property 

during the marriage “to preserve the investment,” which “contributed to the Property’s 

upkeep and appreciation in value,” those statements are, unsurprisingly, not supported by 

citation to the record. Our own review of the record reveals no substantive proof that could 

support them or the assertion in his complaint that he had “substantially contributed to the 

preservation and appreciation of the property” during the course of the marriage.

What the record does makes clear is that, in the divorce proceedings, he raised the 

issue of the purported forgery of the deed to the property, stating in his motion to set aside 

the default judgment that he had “recently discovered that his name had been forged to a 

Warranty Deed for a property that the parties had previously resided in.” He attached the 

allegedly fraudulent deed, which identified the property as being titled in only Ms. 

Wilson’s name, but failed to put forth proof of the increase in value of the property or what 

significant contributions he may have made to the property’s upkeep and maintenance so 

as to demonstrate his entitlement to a share of the increase in value. The divorce court noted 

that Mr. Wilson had “failed to meet his burden” and thus denied the motion, a decision this

Court affirmed. The trial court in this case determined that Mr. Wilson has already had the 

opportunity to litigate the classification and division of marital assets in the divorce 

proceeding, and we agree. He is not permitted another bite at the apple. We deem the first 

issue Mr. Wilson raises—whether the trial court erred in finding that he was not entitled to 

equitable division of the proceeds from the sale of the property—to be without merit.

C. Abusive Civil Action

The trial court dismissed Mr. Wilson’s complaint against Ms. Wilson on the basis 

that it was an abusive civil action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107. Our 

review of that decision requires us to apply a statute to the facts, presenting a mixed 

question of law and fact, and is thus reviewed de novo, with no presumption of correctness 
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accorded to the trial court’s decision. Lance v. York, 359 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2011). In this type of review, appellate courts have “‘great latitude to determine whether

findings as to mixed questions of fact and law made by the trial court are sustained by

probative evidence on appeal.’” Id. (quoting Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn.

1995)).

As we have previously stated in this opinion, an “abusive civil action” is defined as:

a civil action filed by a plaintiff against a defendant with whom the plaintiff 

shares a civil action party relationship primarily to harass or maliciously 

injure[4]the defendant and at least one (1) of the following factors are 

applicable:

(A) Claims, allegations, and other legal contentions made in the civil

action are not warranted by existing law or by a reasonable argument 

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or the 

establishment of new law;

(B) Allegations and other factual contentions made in the civil action 

are without the existence of evidentiary support; or

(C) Issue or issues that are the basis of the civil action have previously 

been filed in one (1) or more other courts or jurisdictions by the same, 

and the actions have been litigated and disposed of unfavorably to the 

plaintiff[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(1). The defendant in such an action may then assert, by 

either answer or motion, that the action constitutes an abusive civil action, which then 

requires the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the merit of the defendant’s 

allegations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-104. At that hearing, the court must hear all relevant 

testimony and may require affidavits, documentary evidence, or other records the court 

deems necessary. Id. Evidence that “the same or substantially similar issues between the 

same or substantially similar civil action parties” have been litigated within the past five 

years in another court and dismissed on the merits or with prejudice against the civil action 

plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption that the action is an abusive civil action. Id. § 29-

41-105(1).

5 Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the action is an abusive 

 

 

4 There are numerous ways to “harass or maliciously injure” the defendant; pertinent to this case, that 

term is defined as being “filed with the intent or [] primarily designed to . . . [e]xhaust, deplete, impair, or 

adversely impact the civil action defendant’s financial resources[, or to] . . . [f]orce, coerce, or attempt to 

force or coerce the civil action defendant to agree to or make adverse concessions concerning financial . . . 

or other issues when the issues in question have been previously litigated and decided in favor of the civil 

action defendant[, or to i]mpair, or attempt to impair[,] the health or well-being of the civil action 

defendant.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(6)(A), (C), (E).

 

5 The civil action defendant can also put forth evidence that the plaintiff has filed a complaint against the 

defendant based on the same issues before a regulatory or licensing board and that the complaint was 

dismissed after a hearing; that the plaintiff has been sanctioned under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 or a similar law 
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civil action, the action shall be dismissed, and the plaintiff shall have to pay costs and 

attorney’s fees and be subjected to prefiling restrictions. Id. § 29-41-106(a)-(b).

Tracking the language of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-105(1)6and 29-41-101(1)(C), 

Ms. Wilson argued in her motion to dismiss that “the same or substantially similar issues 

between the same or substantially similar civil action parties that are the subject of the 

alleged abusive civil action have been litigated against the civil action defendant within the 

past five (5) years in another court.” She then discussed the divorce litigation in which Mr. 

Wilson alleged that his name was forged on a warranty deed for the property at issue. She 

attached as exhibits to her motion the pertinent portions of the record in the divorce 

proceedings as well as her affidavit, which she swore to under penalty of perjury. In that 

affidavit, she described Mr. Wilson’s physically abusive behavior prior to the divorce and 

his threatening and intimidating behavior since then, including “yell[ing] at [her] and 

threaten[ing] that if [she] did not give him back his properties, he was going to put [her] in 

jail” and telling her that she was “going to jail for forging his signature.” She also stated 

that she “told him that [she] did not forge his signature.”

In response, Mr. Wilson filed his own sworn declaration, in which he asserted that 

he “did not find out that [his] signature had been forged on the deed to 2727 Old Mat[t]hews 

Road until after Tawana Wilson handed [him] the final decree of divorce on June 11, 

2019.” He also stated that he had “never hit Tawana Wilson” or abused her or threatened 

to put her in jail, though he did tell her “that everyone who is involved [with the alleged 

forgery] will be prosecuted.” He argued that dismissal was unmerited because the property 

“was never part of the marital estate and was never part of the divorce action” and therefore, 

he did not have the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the allegedly fraudulent transfer 

of the property. The trial court disagreed with Mr. Wilson and dismissed the action as to 

Ms. Wilson. 

In determining whether the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Wilson from Mr. 

Wilson’s lawsuit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, we note that the trial 

court did not state which specific portion of the civil abuse action statute warranted 

 

for filing frivolous, vexatious, or abusive civil action(s) against the same defendant involving the same or

substantially similar issues in the past ten years; or that a court of record in another judicial district has 

determined that a civil action filed against the defendant was an abusive civil action and is under or has 

been under prefiling restrictions in that judicial district. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-105(2)-(4).

 

6 Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-41-105(1) reads: 

The same or substantially similar issues between the same or substantially similar civil 

action parties that are the subject of the alleged abusive civil action have been litigated 

against the civil action defendant within the past five (5) years in another court within the 

judicial district or another judicial district and the actions were dismissed on the merits or 

with prejudice against the civil action plaintiff[.]
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dismissal, nor did the court make clear whether evidentiary proof in the form of testimony 

or otherwise was received at the hearing it held on the motion to dismiss. Mr. Wilson has 

not included a transcript or statement of the evidence of any proof adduced at that hearing. 

Therefore, we conclusively presume that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court 

to support its judgment. Scarbrough v. Scarbrough, 752 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1988) (“When the trial court hears the evidence, but the evidence is not included in the 

record on appeal, it is presumed that the evidence supports the ruling of the trial court.”) 

(citing Turner v. Turner, 739 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)); see also McKinney 

v. Educator & Exec. Insurers, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). We 

observe that neither party challenges the factual findings of the court, and upon our review 

of the record, specifically the proof filed by the parties that was before the court at the time 

it rendered its decision, we conclude that they are supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence.

The evidence is undisputed that the parties are former spouses; thus, they have a 

“civil action party relationship.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(5)(A).7 Ms. Wilson’s proof 

supporting her motion to dismiss included many pleadings and materials from the divorce

proceedings, which demonstrate that in both the divorce action and the present one, Mr. 

Wilson raised the issue of the forged deed, though he has couched it as a cause of action 

for “conversion” in this suit. The proof set forth by Ms. Wilson also makes clear that Mr. 

Wilson and Ms. Wilson were both parties to the divorce litigation and to this litigation. The 

2019 divorce decree and Mr. Wilson’s post-trial motion and the divorce court’s ruling on 

that motion show that the matter has been litigated within the past five years in the Fourth 

Circuit Court of Davidson County, a different court than the one in which Mr. Wilson filed 

the present action. The divorce court dismissed Mr. Wilson’s motion to alter or amend and 

declined to alter the divorce decree when Mr. Wilson raised the issue of the allegedly 

forged deed, and the divorce court’s judgment was affirmed by this Court on appeal and is 

now final. Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates that the four requirements of Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 29-41-105(1) are met, in that: (1) the same or substantially similar issues (2) 

between the same or substantially similar parties (3) have been litigated within the past five 

years in another court and (4) were dismissed on the merits or with prejudice against the 

civil action plaintiff. Thus, Ms. Wilson created a rebuttable presumption that the action 

was an abusive civil action and should be dismissed. 

 

 

7 Ms. Damewood and Compass do not share a civil party relationship with Mr. Wilson, as that term is

defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(5). Accordingly, the action cannot constitute an “abusive civil 

action” as to them, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-102, and cannot be dismissed on that basis. Indeed, the order 

being reviewed does not adjudicate the causes of action against Ms. Damewood and Compass at all, and 

our review is limited to whether the trial court properly dismissed the complaint as to Ms. Wilson. While 

Ms. Damewood and Compass have filed a brief on appeal stating that they wish to join in Ms. Wilson’s 

brief and also seek their attorney’s fees, we decline to consider their requests, as there are still causes of 

action pending against them in the trial court. 
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We now examine the proof Mr. Wilson put forth that would rebut that presumption. 

He submitted his own one-page affidavit in which he stated that he “did not find out that 

[his] signature had been forged on the deed to 2727 Old Mat[t]hews Road until after 

Tawana Wilson handed me the final decree of divorce on June 11, 2019”; that he had

“never hit” and “never abused” Ms. Wilson; that he had never threatened to put Ms. Wilson 

in jail; and that “[a]fter [he] learned of the forgery, [he] told [Ms. Wilson] that everyone 

who is involved will be prosecuted.” This evidence fails to overcome the presumption; his 

affidavit does not provide evidentiary support for his argument that the alleged forgery was

not litigated in the divorce decree. His affidavit only establishes when he learned of it but

does not address the fact that he raised the purported forgery to the divorce court in his 

motion to set aside the default judgment. Even the interrogatory response of the notary 

public that he subsequently filed (as an exhibit to his motion to revise the court’s order 

dismissing the lawsuit against Ms. Wilson) does not assist him. His motion to revise fails 

to explain why the notary public’s interrogatory response is relevant. But, buried in his

accompanying memorandum of law was the following explanation:

In addition to the legal issues above, the Court was also mistaken 

when it found that the Property was not subject to Mr. Wilson’s consent for 

sale. Mr. Wilson alleged in his Complaint that “[t]he transfer of the Property 

would not have been completed but for the forged signature on the warranty 

deed and the notarization of Defendant Damewood.” This fact was confirmed 

by Ms. Damewood in her interrogatory responses when she stated that the 

title insurance underwriter required Mr. Wilson’s signature on the deed

transferring the Property. Ms. Damewood further stated that “[i]n the case of

conveyance of property where there is a non-vested spouse, signature of nonvested spouse is required in order to convey any potential homestead/marital 

interest the non-vested spouse may have in the subject property.” Because 

Ms. Wilson could not have transferred the Property without Mr. Wilson’s 

consent, the Property would have remained in her name had she not forged 

Mr. Wilson’s signature, and the Property would have been subject to 

equitable distribution in the divorce. Ms. Wilson’s actions therefore 

constitute an intentional tort, and Mr. Wilson should be compensated for that 

wrongful action.

(Citations omitted.) 

Respectfully, Mr. Wilson’s argument that “Ms. Wilson could not have transferred 

the Property without Mr. Wilson’s consent” is flawed. The notary public’s interrogatory 

states that Mr. Wilson’s signature was required by the title insurance underwriter to 

“convey any potential homestead, marital interest the non-vested spouse may have in the 

subject property.” (Emphasis added.) While certainly a reasonable requirement by the title 

insurance underwriter to foreclose any potential issues with the chain of title in the future, 

Ms. Wilson remained the sole title holder of the property, and she alone possessed the 
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power to convey it. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 31 (2022) (“The primary incidents or 

elements of ownership [of property] include . . . the right to alienate the property at will.”). 

Even if he had proven his interest in the increase in the value of the property, there was 

still no need for Mr. Wilson to consent to the sale in order for it to be effective. See id. § 

43 (“As a matter of general property law, one who does not hold title to property or is not 

acting within his or her scope as an agent for the owner cannot pass or transfer title to that 

property.”); see also Smith v. Taylor, 79 Tenn. 738, 742 (Tenn. 1883) (observing that one 

cannot convey to another “any other title or interest than he himself had” in a piece of real 

property). Even had the property not been conveyed prior to the divorce, any increase in 

value of the property would have been presumed to be Ms. Wilson’s separate property as 

well, unless and until Mr. Wilson put forth proof of his specific substantial contributions 

to the maintenance and upkeep of the property that resulted in an increase in its value. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A), (C); (b)(1)(B)(i); Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 247. 

Mr. Wilson put up no such proof in the divorce court. And in this action, he made only two 

bald assertions in his complaint that he “substantially contributed to the preservation and 

appreciation of the Property” through “his actions to improve the Property during the 

marriage.” Ms. Damewood’s interrogatory response does not overcome the fact that Mr. 

Wilson brought up this alleged forgery to the divorce court but failed to put forth any proof 

of his contributions to the preservation and appreciation of the property that would 

demonstrate his entitlement to a share of the increase in value of this separate property. 

This matter has been litigated and resolved in favor of Ms. Wilson.

We conclude that Ms. Wilson established a rebuttable presumption that this action 

was an abusive civil action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-105(1) and that Mr. 

Wilson’s proof did not overcome that presumption. On the basis of the record before us, 

we conclude that Mr. Wilson’s actions in attempting to relitigate the transfer of the property 

at 2727 Old Matthews Road were taken to harass or maliciously injure Ms. Wilson. The 

trial court did not make a finding in this regard, but Mr. Wilson’s affidavit demonstrates 

his desire to “prosecute” Ms. Wilson, which resulted in an adverse impact to her financial 

resources by requiring her to litigate this matter, which had already been settled by the 

divorce proceedings. Ms. Wilson stated in her affidavit that Mr. Wilson attempted to

interact with her on the pretense of discussing their daughter and that he continued to 

threaten Ms. Wilson with jail time, all of which negatively impacted her well-being. 

We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the lawsuit as an abusive civil 

action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101(1)(C) and properly awarded Ms. Wilson 

her fees and costs, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-106(a) and (b). We affirm the trial 

court’s judgment in this regard.

D. Res Judicata 

Ms. Wilson also argued that the doctrine of res judicata applied, and the trial court 

agreed and dismissed the action on that basis. That doctrine, which is “also referred to as 
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claim preclusion, bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same 

cause of action with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated in the 

former suit.” Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tenn. 2009). Res judicata 

prevents plaintiffs “from fragmenting their accrued claims by litigating part of them to a 

final judgment and then filing a second suit against the same defendant on alternate claims 

or theories.” Lowe v. First City Bank of Rutherford Cty., No. 01-A-01-9305-CV00205, 

1994 WL 570082, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1994). “It is a ‘rule of rest’” that

“promotes finality in litigation, prevents inconsistent or contradictory judgments, 

conserves judicial resources, and protects litigants from the cost and vexation of multiple 

lawsuits.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Moulton v. Ford 

Motor Co., 533 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 1976) (other citations omitted)). The defense must 

be pled in the answer. Id. (citing TENN. R. CIV. P. 8.03). The party asserting this defense

must demonstrate: “(1) that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent 

jurisdiction, (2) that the same parties or their privies were involved in both suits, (3) that 

the same claim or cause of action was asserted in both suits, and (4) that the underlying 

judgment was final and on the merits.” Id. (citing Lien v. Couch, 993 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1998)). We review a trial court’s decision regarding the application of res judicata 

de novo without a presumption of correctness, as it presents a question of law. Napolitano 

v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp., 535 S.W.3d 481, 496 (Tenn. 2017).

The elements of res judicata are substantially similar to the requirements of Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 29-41-105(1), which Ms. Wilson invoked in this case. There is no dispute that 

the first and second elements of res judicata are met. The evidence Ms. Wilson filed 

included the final decree, which demonstrates on its face that it was rendered by the circuit 

court, a court with competent jurisdiction in domestic relations matters. Mr. Wilson and 

Ms. Wilson were both parties to the divorce litigation and to this litigation. Mr. Wilson 

attempts to refute that the third and fourth elements are met by arguing the property “was 

never part of the marital estate and was never part of the divorce action” and therefore, he 

did not have the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the allegedly fraudulent transfer of 

the property. However, the fact that the divorce decree was in essence a default judgment 

due to Mr. Wilson’s failure to appear or participate does not preclude the operation of the 

doctrine of res judicata in this case. See Lawhorn v. Wellford, 168 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tenn. 

1943) (“A judgment taken by default is conclusive by way of estoppel in respect to all such 

matters and facts as are well pleaded and properly raised, and material to the case made by 

declaration or other pleadings, and such issues cannot be relitigated in any subsequent 

action between the parties or their privies.”) (quoting Taylor v. Sledge, 75 S.W. 1074, 1075 

(Tenn. 1903)). As discussed above, Mr. Wilson raised the issue of the forgery of the deed 

to the divorce court in his post-trial motion but failed to substantiate his claim. In this 

action, he has asserted a cause of action against Ms. Wilson for conversion due to the 

alleged forgery. So, in both actions, Mr. Wilson has asserted forgery. The divorce decree 

was affirmed by this Court on appeal and is now final. Accordingly, all four elements of 

the doctrine of res judicata are met. Mr. Wilson has failed to put forth sufficient proof to 
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the contrary, and we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the action on this 

alternative ground as well.

E. Unclean Hands

Ms. Wilson asks that Mr. Wilson’s appeal be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of 

unclean hands. The doctrine of unclean hands is “based on the principles that he who seeks 

equity must do equity and that he who has done inequity cannot have equity”; when it 

applies, “it provides the court with a basis to decline to grant relief to parties who have 

willfully engaged in unconscionable, inequitable, immoral, or illegal acts with regard to 

the subject matter of their claims.” In re Estate of Boote, 265 S.W.3d 402, 417 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2007) (citations and footnote omitted). While Ms. Wilson asserted in her answer the 

defense of unclean hands among several other equitable defenses, she concedes that Mr. 

Wilson’s “actions in this case do not amount to unclean hands.” Nevertheless, she wishes 

us to decline his request for relief on appeal based on his actions in the prior divorce 

proceeding. The trial court did not rule upon this defense, as Ms. Wilson did not raise it in 

her motion to dismiss. Accordingly, there is nothing for us to review, and we decline to 

address this issue.

F. Attorney’s Fees 

Ms. Wilson seeks her attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. The American Rule 

provides that “a party in a civil action may recover attorney fees only if: (1) a contractual 

or statutory provision creates a right to recover attorney fees; or (2) some other recognized 

exception to the American Rule applies, allowing for recovery of such fees in a particular 

case.” Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 308 (Tenn. 

2009) (citing Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tenn. 2005)). Ms. Wilson argues that 

she is entitled to recover her attorney’s fees on the basis of the frivolous appeals statute, 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122.

8 Such an award is within our discretion. Banks v. St. Francis 

Hosp., 697 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tenn. 1985). The near-total lack of legal authority or citation 

to the record in Mr. Wilson’s brief has certainly yielded an appeal with no reasonable 

chance of success. Therefore, we grant Ms. Wilson’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant 

to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. 

We also construe the abusive civil action statute itself to provide a basis for an award 

of Ms. Wilson’s attorney’s fees in this appeal. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-41-

 

 

8 Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122 reads:

When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court of record was 

frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may, either upon motion of a party or of its 

own motion, award just damages against the appellant, which may include, but need not be 

limited to, costs, interest on the judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result 

of the appeal.
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106 provides that when a trial court concludes that an action is an abusive civil action, the 

court shall dismiss the action and “[a]ward the civil action defendant reasonable attorney 

fees and all reasonable costs of defending the abusive civil action.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-

41-106(a), (b)(2). Although section 29-41-106 does not expressly provide for attorney’s 

fees incurred on appeal, our Supreme Court has explained that “legislative provisions for 

an award of reasonable attorney’s fees need not make a specific reference to appellate work 

to support such an award where the legislation has broad remedial aims.” Killingsworth v. 

Ted Russell Ford, 205 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Forbes v. Wilson Cty.

Emergency Dist. 911 Bd., 966 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1998)). 

Though the civil abuse action statutes do not include a statement of purpose or 

intent, we conclude that they have broad remedial aims because they are designed to give

those suffering “‘a litigious form of domestic assault’” a way to end the litigation and curb 

future filings by the abusive civil action plaintiff. Sheila Burke, New State Law Seeks to 

Stop ‘Stalking By Way of Courts,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (June 25, 2018), 

https://apnews.com/article/0249e6d67b1d419b9787cb6adb297cb7 [https://perma.cc/T4

3A-GRJC]. We conclude that the Tennessee Abusive Civil Action statutes allow for an 

award of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal when the court dismisses an action 

pursuant to a motion or petition filed under this chapter and that such fees are requested in 

an appellate pleading. Because we conclude that Mr. Wilson’s action was properly 

dismissed against Ms. Wilson pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-106, and because Ms. 

Wilson has requested her appellate fees in this case, she is entitled to her attorney’s fees on 

this alternative basis as well. We remand this matter to the trial court to determine the 

proper amount of reasonable fees incurred by Ms. Wilson on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the 

appellant, Timothy Wilson, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_/s/ Andy D. Bennett_______________

 ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE