[Cite as Kingston Care Ctr. of Perrysburg v. Carstensen , 2020-Ohio-1238.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY

Kingston Care Center of Perrysburg Court of Appeals No. WD-18 -084 Appellee Trial Court No. CVF 1701213

v. Robert Carstensen, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellees Decided: March 31, 2020

* * * * * Stephen E. Cottrell, for appellant. David S. Brown, for appellees.

* * * * * OSOWIK, J. {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a June 10, 2019 collection judgment of t he Perrysburg Municipal Court, granting appellee judgment against appellants in an amount of $4,020, plus accrued interest of $1,333.53, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees, with the total judgment equaling $13,814.03.2. {¶ 2} This collection judgment arises from appellants’ unpaid expense s incurred for skilled nursing services, supplies, and related costs durin g Robert Carstensen’s 2016 inpatient stay at the Kingston Care Center of Perrysburg medica l treatment facility. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court. {¶ 3} Appellants, Robert and Carol Carstensen, set forth the followin g four assignments of error: I. Trial court erred in allowing appellee to abuse [the] disco very

process. II. Trial court erred in awarding attorney[s’] fees pursuant t o a contract that is against public policy. III. Trial court erred in granting interest above that permitt ed by

law. IV. Trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight of t he

evidence. {¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On November 14, 2016, appellant Robert Carstensen executed an admission agr eement with appellee to be housed on an inpatient basis in appellee’s skilled nursing f acility located in Perrysburg, Ohio. Carstensen’s stay in the facility was necess itated after appellant underwent a laminectomy, a form of orthopedic surgery, to addre ss ambulatory issues. {¶ 5} On January 10, 2017, appellant was discharged from appellee’s f acility, following approximately seven weeks of inpatient residency and treatment. This case3. centers upon Carstensen’s refusal to pay the $4,020 balance owe d to appellee for services

rendered. {¶ 6} Appellant’s legal obligation to pay appellee for monies owed, b ut not paid to appellee by Medicare or a secondary insurer source on appellant ’s behalf, was contractually established in the written admission agreement ex ecuted by appellant. {¶ 7} As a Medicare patient, the admission agreement language pertine nt to this case states in pertinent part, “You are required to pay Kingsto n at the private-pay rate for all charges incurred by the Resident in the event that Medicare coverage is denied or if the Resident’s eligibility for Medicare coverage expires.” {¶ 8} Medicare did not cover expenses of $4,020 of the total amount i ncurred during Carstensen’s final ten-day stay at Kingston as appellant himself elected to extend his stay the additional ten days. Appellants refused to pay th e balance owed and the

instant case ensued. {¶ 9} On September 18, 2017, appellee filed a collection complaint ag ainst appellants for the monies owed. On February 27, 2018, appellee served appellants with standard written discovery requests. The record reflects that the discovery requests were

unremarkable and within the limits set forth in the rules of ci vil procedure. {¶ 10} After initially filing a pro se answer to the collection compla int, appellants retained legal counsel and filed a motion for a protective orde r regarding the outstanding discovery requests.4. {¶ 11} On July 30, 2018, the trial court denied appellants’ request fo r a protective order. Appellants nevertheless continued to refuse to furnish answers to the discovery requests. {¶ 12} On September 5, 2018, the day before trial, given the discovery impasse triggered by appellants in this collection case, appellee filed a notice of admissions for trial purposes as the requests were not objected to, or answere d, by appellants or their counsel. The requests for admissions were deemed admitted. {¶ 13} The record reflects that the admissions were straightforward an d not burdensome, including items such as noting that Robert Carstens en’s stay at the facility was voluntary, that medically necessary services and supplies w ere provided, that the charges were not questioned or challenged prior to this litigat ion, and that the parties were married to one another at the time the expenses were incur red. {¶ 14} On September 6, 2018, the matter proceeded to a bench trial. T he transcripts of the trial clearly reflect that appellants focuse d their claim at not owing the monies in dispute upon misleading allegations that appellee fai led to provide a medically necessary lift chair to appellant upon discharge. {¶ 15} Conversely, the record of evidence contrarily reflects that whe n the original vendor for the lift chair was unable to provide it in a timely manner, it was appellants themselves who refused to secure the lift chair through an alte rnative provider furnished by appellee. {¶ 16} The record shows that appellants declined to obtain the needed equipment through the backup source provided and, instead, elected to vol untarily extend Robert5. Carstensen’s stay in the facility for an additional ten days. It is the costs incurred during the voluntary extended stay that Medicare declined to cover. {¶ 17} On September 6, 2018, the trial court granted a collection judg ment in favor of appellee in the amount of $4,020, plus accrued interes t of $1,333.53, and attorneys’ fees. This appeal ensued. {¶ 18} For clarity, we note that appellants’ brief in support of this appeal is conclusory and conspicuous in the absence of supporting legal a uthority. {¶ 19} In the first assignment of error, appellants asserts that the t rial court permitted appellee to abuse the discovery process, and thereby also abused its discretion.

We do not concur. {¶ 20} While appellants generically complain that appellee’s counsel, “[C]ertainly knew that such discovery would be so burdensome on these people that they simply could not afford to respond and would likely give up,” the record ref lects that appellants never attempted to cooperate in discovery and obtained private counse l in an effort to block the discovery process. {¶ 21} In addition, the record contains no objective evidence, and app ellants cite none, in support of the notion that the discovery requests issu ed to appellants were unduly burdensome or in any way improper. {¶ 22} The essence of appellants’ first assignment of error appears to be centered upon the trial court having ultimately deemed as accepted, for trial purposes, appellee’s notice of admissions based upon appellants’ refusal to furnish answers or objections to properly submitted requests for admissions.6. {¶ 23} As established by Civ.R. 36(A)(1), with respect to requests for admissions in civil litigation, “The matter is [deemed] admitted unless, w ithin a period designated in the request, not less than twenty-eight days after service * * * the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admiss ion a written answer or objection.” {¶ 24} As applied to the instant case, the record shows that the reque sts for admissions were served upon appellants on or about February 27, 2018. The record further reflects that appellants continuously refused to answer or object, even after the trial court’s denial of the motion for a protective order. The refusal to cooperate in discovery continued right up to the September 6, 2018 trial, ap proximately five months after the Civ.R. 36(A)(1) deadline for answering or objecting h ad expired. {¶ 25} Accordingly, the trial court properly deemed the matters to be admitted by appellants by operation of law pursuant to Civ.R. 36(A)(1). Th e record reflects no abuse of discretion by the trial court in connection to discovery. W e find appellants’ first assignment of error not well-taken. {¶ 26} In appellants’ second assignment of error, appellants summarily conclude that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees, while s imultaneously conceding that the admissions agreement executed by Robert Carstensen, explici tly provided for the granting of attorneys’ fees. {¶ 27} Nevertheless, appellants summarily conclude that awarding the f ees is, “patently against public policy.” Again, no legal authority in support of this position was furnished by appellants.7. {¶ 28} Appellants generically maintain that the patient admission agre ement, “encourages unscrupulous attorneys to pursue frivolous discover y to accumulate enormous fees in small cases.” Again, the record is devoid of evidence of discovery abuses, as pertains to appellee. {¶ 29} It is well-established that, “When considering an award of atto rney fees, Ohio follows the American Rule * * * [A]ttorney fees may be allowed if : (1) a statute creates a duty; (2) an enforceable contract provision provides for an award of attorney fees; or (3) the losing party has acted in bad faith.” (Emphas is added). Wilson Concrete Products, Inc. v. Baughman , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20069, 2004-Ohio-4696, at ¶ 8. {¶ 30} As applied to the instant case, the award of attorney fees is p roper as it clearly falls within the second exception to the American Rule. Appellants have furnished no evidence of unenforceability of the admission agre ement. We find appellants’ second assignment of error not well-taken. {¶ 31} In the third assignment of error, appellants contend that the i nterest awarded in the subject judgment was an abuse of discretion. We do not concur. {¶ 32} In support of the third assignment, appellants place mistaken r eliance upon R.C. 1343.01(A). Appellants assert that the 8 percent interest rate cap set forth in R.C. 1343.01(A) applies to the instant case, thereby rendering the 1 8 percent rate in the subject contract unlawful. Appellants’ position is not based upon the correct statutory provision and is, therefore, misguided.8. {¶ 33} We note that the application of R.C. 1343.01(A) is expressly re stricted to bonds, bills, promissory notes, or similar loan installment con tracts. By contrast, the document at issue in this case is a nursing care facility admis sion agreement. {¶ 34} R.C. 1343.03(A) governs this case. R.C. 1343.03(A) establishes that in cases involving instruments such as the patient admission agree ment in the instant case, the applicable interest rate may be either the, “[R]ate per ann um determined pursuant to section 5703.47 of the Revised Code, unless a written contract provides a different rate of interest in relation to the money that becomes due and payable, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate provided in that contract.” {¶ 35} We find that the interest rate provision reflected in the subje ct admission agreement comports with R.C. 1343.03(A) and is not unlawful. W herefore, we find appellants’ third assignment of error not well-taken. {¶ 36} In appellants’ fourth assignment of error, appellants maintain that the trial court judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We do not concur. {¶ 37} Appellants provide no legal authority or analysis in support of the fourth assignment of error. Rather, appellants unilaterally, subjecti vely conclude, “Beginning with the obvious abuse of discretion by appellee, continuing to the failure of the trial court to allow appellants to present their defense and finally with the trial court awarding outrageous attorney fees * * * the decision cannot stand.” {¶ 38} With respect to manifest weight of the evidence assertions on a ppeal, it is well-established that, “[J]udgments supported by some competent , credible evidence9. going to all the essential elements of the case will not be rev ersed by the reviewing

court.” Krzystan v. Bauer , 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-15-039, 2017-Ohio-858, ¶ 12. {¶ 39} The record reflects that the subject charges, interest, and att orney fees, all comport with the patient admission agreement executed by appell ant. The record is devoid of any evidence of impropriety or illegality in connecti on to any portion of the collection judgment rendered against appellants, or the admissi on agreement from which the judgment arises. We find appellant’s fourth assignment of error not well-taken. {¶ 40} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Perrysburg Munici pal Court is hereby affirmed. Appellants are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Arlene Singer, J. _________________

______________ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J.

_______________________________ Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.