Filed 1/25/24 P. v. Garcia CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PETER IGNACIO GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B325388

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA381662)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, David R. Fields, Judge. Affirmed.

Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Peter Garcia appeals from an order denying his petition for 

resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate 

counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 

216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed a supplemental brief. We 

review the contentions appellant raises in his supplemental brief 

and affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2012, appellant was charged in an amended information 

with murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count one), evading an officer with 

willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count two), and 

possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 

three). As relevant here, the information further alleged in count 

one that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a 

firearm, causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subds. 

(b), (c), and (d)). 

The underlying facts presented at trial are discussed in 

detail in this court’s prior nonpublished opinion, People v. Garcia

(June 18, 2015, B250582). We briefly discuss them here to 

provide context for the trial court’s ruling. We otherwise do not 

rely on this factual background in resolving the issues presented 

in this appeal. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) It was undisputed at 

trial that appellant shot the victim as she ran across the street, 

hitting her in the back and fatally wounding her. It was also 

undisputed that at some point earlier in the day, the victim shot 

appellant’s sister in the leg, but the precise timing and location of 

that shooting were subject to conflicting evidence at trial. The 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

prosecution’s case therefore focused on proving that appellant 

chased and shot the victim with the malice required for murder, 

while appellant argued that he acted in self-defense or defense of 

others.

In October 2012, a jury acquitted appellant of murder on 

count one, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of 

voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and found true the 

applicable enhancement that appellant personally used a firearm 

(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury also convicted appellant on counts 

two and three. Appellant admitted the allegations regarding his

prior serious felony convictions. The court sentenced him to 40 

years to life. A different panel of this court affirmed appellant’s 

conviction. (People v. Garcia, supra, B223214).

In January 2022, appellant filed a form petition for 

resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.

2

The court appointed counsel for appellant. The People opposed 

the petition, arguing that appellant was ineligible for relief as a 

matter of law because his jury was not instructed on the theories 

of natural and probable consequences or felony murder. Instead,

the People asserted that the “sole theory of liability pursued by 

the People at trial was that the petitioner harbored an intent to 

kill when he personally used a firearm to shoot” the victim. The 

People attached as exhibits this court’s opinion from appellant’s 

direct appeal, the verdict forms, and the jury instructions from 

the trial. Appellant did not file a reply brief. 

The superior court denied the motion on the grounds that 

appellant failed to demonstrate prima facie entitlement to relief. 

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was 

renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 

2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
4

At the hearing on the petition, the court noted that no jury 

instructions were given regarding natural and probable 

consequences, felony murder, or aiding and abetting. The court 

concluded that appellant was the “direct perpetrator” and 

therefore that he failed to make the requisite prima facie showing 

for relief under section 1172.6. 

Appellant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Appellant’s appointed attorney filed a brief raising no 

issues and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to 

Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court advised appellant of 

his right to file a supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14 

Cal.5th at pp. 231-232), and appellant did so. We evaluate the 

arguments set forth in that supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232 

[“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or 

letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific 

arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written 

opinion”].)

Appellant argues that the trial court improperly engaged in 

fact finding when concluding that he was not entitled to relief at 

the prima facie stage. He does not elaborate on this contention, 

apart from citing the general principles set forth in People v. 

Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). We find no error. The trial 

court expressly relied on the record, including the jury 

instructions and verdict forms, to find that appellant was the 

actual shooter and that the prosecution had not proceeded under 

either a natural and probable consequences or a felony murder 

theory. This was proper at the prima facie stage. (See Lewis, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [“[I]f the record, including the court’s 

own documents, ‘“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in 
5

the petition,”’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility 

determination adverse to the petitioner,’” at the prima facie 

stage.].) 

Appellant also contends that the jury was instructed under 

a natural and probable consequences theory. He attaches a copy 

of CALCRIM No. 520, which identifies the elements of “First or 

Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought.” The 

instruction includes language that the defendant acted with 

implied malice if “1. He intentionally committed an act; 2. The 

natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to 

human life; 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was 

dangerous to human life; AND 4. He deliberately acted with 

conscious disregard for human life.”

Although the instructions for implied malice murder 

include the words “natural and probable consequences,” implied 

malice and the natural and probable consequences theory are 

distinct concepts. “Whereas implied malice is based on ‘the 

“natural and probable consequences” of a defendant’s own act,’ 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine [abrogated by 

Senate Bill 1437] was ‘a theory of vicarious liability under which 

“[a]n aider and abettor [was] guilty not only of the intended, or 

target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the target 

crime actually commit[ted] (the nontarget crime)”’—including 

murder— ““that [was] a natural and probable consequence of the 

target crime.”’ [Citation.] ‘Because a nontarget murder “‘[was] 

unintended, the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to 

that offense [was] irrelevant and culpability [was] imposed 

simply because a reasonable person could have foreseen the 

commission of the [murder].”’’” [Citation.] (People v. Rivera

(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 231–232, fn. omitted (Rivera), 
6

abrogated on another ground in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.) 

Senate Bill 1437 “‘abolished the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine’ as a theory of vicarious liability, [but] ‘it 

maintained the viability of murder convictions based on implied 

malice, and the definition of implied malice remains unchanged.’” 

(Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 232.)

As such, although the jury here was instructed on the 

elements of murder, including implied malice, the trial court did 

not instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine. Similarly, the prosecution did not advance any theory 

of accomplice liability, but argued only that appellant was

directly liable as the actual shooter. Nothing in the record 

suggests appellant was charged or convicted under the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine or any other theory in which 

malice was imputed to him. For these reasons, the trial court 

was correct in concluding appellant was ineligible for relief under 

section 1172.6 as a matter of law.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J. MORI, J.