Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1609-DR-2175 | April 27, 2017 Page 1 of 24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Rebecca L. Billick

Billick Mediation & Family Law

Valparaiso, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

R. Cordell Funk

Funk & Wendlinger, LLC

Crown Point, Indiana

I N THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jodee Meyers,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Paul Meyers,

Appellee-Respondent.

April 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A05-1609-DR-2175

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Elizabeth F. 

Tavitas, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45D03-1403-DR-230

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Jodee Meyers (“Mother”) appeals the dissolution court’s order modifying her 

custody over her children born of her marriage to Paul Meyers (“Father”). 
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Mother presents several issues for our review which we consolidate and restate 

as follows:

1. Whether the dissolution court erred when it considered 

various motions despite Father’s alleged noncompliance

with local rules.

2. Whether the dissolution court abused its discretion when it 

made certain evidentiary rulings.

3. Whether the dissolution court’s findings are supported by 

the evidence and whether its conclusions are supported by 

the findings.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father married in May 2004, and two children were born of the 

marriage, J.M. and H.M. (“the Children”). In March 2014, Mother filed a 

petition for dissolution of the marriage. The Parents entered into a stipulated 

provisional order whereby Mother had temporary physical custody of the 

Children, and Father exercised parenting time “as agreed to or, in the absence 

of agreement, pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.” Appellant’s 

App. at 16. 
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[3] Following a final hearing on December 14, 2015, on January 15, 2016,1the 

dissolution court entered a final dissolution decree whereby the court awarded 

the Parents joint legal and physical custody of the Children.2 The dissolution 

court ordered that the Children would spend alternating weeks with each 

parent. In the decree, the dissolution court found in relevant part that 

“[Mother] repeatedly denies parenting time or interferes with [Father]’s 

parenting time.” Id. at 21. The dissolution court also found in relevant part as 

follows:

17. [Mother] admitted that she does not return phone calls 

initiated by [Father] to the children.

18. [Mother] frequently calls the police on [Father] during 

parenting time exchanges. [Father] estimated that [Mother] has 

called the police in excess of 80 times.

19. [Mother] frequently argues with [Father] in the presence of 

the children during parenting time exchanges.

20. [Mother] is engaging in repeated conduct that 

demonstrates [Mother]’s resistance of [sic] [Father]’s time with 

the children that most likely will lead to alienation of the 

father/daughter relationships. This behavior is contrary to the 

best interests of the children. This conduct includes [Mother]’s 

repeated arguments with [Father] in front of the children; 

[Mother] calling the police during parenting time exchanges; 

[Mother] limiting [Father]’s telephone communications between 

 

1

 Following the final hearing, but before the final decree, Mother denied Father’s parenting time on January 

8, 2016, and January 14, 2016.

2

 Father remarried shortly after the final dissolution decree was entered.
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[Father] and the children; [Mother] speaking negatively about 

[Father] to the children; and [Mother] denying [Father] parenting 

time.

Id. at 22.

[4] Father was scheduled to have his first full week of physical custody with the 

Children on January 22, but Mother kept the Children with her that week. 

Accordingly, on January 29, Father filed a verified application for an injunction 

against Mother alleging in relevant part as follows:

1. Compliance with Local Rule 9. Father’s counsel wrote to 

Mother via email on January 19, 2016[,] in an attempt to resolve 

all issues set forth herein. [[S]ee attached Exhibit “A”]. No 

response has been received from Mother as of January 29,

2016[,] and since January 7, 2016. Mother has denied Father his 

parenting time and/or shared custodial time with their minor

children. This application is filed at this time because it is 

apparent that the matters set forth herein will not be resolved 

without Court intervention and Mother is likely to continue 

denying Father his custodial rights as set forth in this Court’s 

Decree of Dissolution of Marriage.

* * *

4. From January 8, 2016[,] (Father’s weekend) through January 

15, 2016, Mother denied Father his parenting time with their 

daughters under the terms of the provisional order then in effect. 

He was denied parenting time on the weekend of January 8, 

2016[,] and weekday parenting on January 14, 2016.

5. Per the shared custody provisions of the Decree entered on 

January 15, 2016, Father was to have the children for a one week 

period beginning at 5:30 p.m. on January 22, 2016[,] and ending 
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at 5:30 p.m. on January 29, 2016. Mother refused to allow him 

to have the children during the specified time period and she has 

not permitted him to see the children or otherwise communicate 

with them.

Id. at 32. Also on January 29, Father filed a verified motion for a rule to show 

cause why Mother should not be held in contempt for violation of the final 

decree. 

[5] At the conclusion of a hearing on Father’s motion for injunction, the 

dissolution court granted the injunction from the bench and stated as follows:

Okay. I will, first of all, tell you that Mother has not complied 

with the requirements of the Local Rules and the Orders of the 

Court to get her parenting time—I’m sorry, her parenting classes 

completed. I’m going to tell you right now, you don’t have the 

proper parenting skills and until you get to that class and you do 

everything necessary, you don’t have the parenting skills that are 

necessary for a divorced parent. You just don’t. I’ve been in this 

business for a long time as well, and I’m not going to continue to 

have this. I will not, and I can tell you what happens in these 

cases. You’re not going to like to hear it, but this is my 

experience. We’ll keep coming back here. You will spend all 

your money doing this, and everyone becomes a loser in this, in 

this experience that I’m seeing. You lose your money. You lose 

any relationship that you have with Father that you will need, I 

guarantee you. You will need his help at some point in these 

children’s lives. You’re, you’re too young and you don’t 

understand that it takes two parents to raise children, especially 

in this day and age. There are things you’re not going to be able 

to handle and you’re going to need his help, so you’re going to 

lose that. You’re going to lose the respect of your children when 

they grow up and they understand what, what is going on and 

you’re going to lose your children’s best mental health. They will 
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be in counseling as adults. Trust me. I’ve seen this over and 

over and over and over again. You may end up losing custody 

totally and that happens in these types of cases. So you’re going 

to lose a lot, and if Father does this behavior that you’re doing, 

he’s going to lose everything, and then you’re just going to have 

messed up children for the rest of your lives and then maybe 

you’ll be supporting them because they can’t work because they 

have depression. I mean it goes on and on and on and on and if 

you don’t believe me, you haven’t taken the classes. You need to 

take the classes and you need to do your homework. There’s all

kinds of books out there on divorce and children and if you don’t 

do it, then you are, you are walking into the situation of having 

your children just fail. There’s nothing wrong with either one of 

you that you can’t be good parents to these children. There’s 

not. It’s your choice, and if you choose not to, then the Court’s 

going to continue to issue Orders that give these children the best 

chance to have a healthy, happy childhood and healthy adult life. 

I’m giving you 30 days to complete those parenting classes, and if 

you don’t, then there are going to be sanctions. I guarantee you 

that there will be sanctions.

I’m granting the injunction. I don’t want to see this type of case 

again between the two of you. My Orders are clear. The local 

library. Local library is Hammond. There is nothing in there 

that says that the children need to go inside. As I indicated 

before, it’s counterintuitive to everything you guys were doing 

before which, like I said, they’re not going to go in the police 

station and play. That’s just you trying to control this, and you 

don’t get to control this. This is Father’s time. I am granting the 

request to have—he can have the children for two weeks. There 

will always be make-up time. Every time you deny, Father gets 

make-up time, and I don’t believe that you can’t encourage an 

eight-year-old, and if you can’t, then you don’t have the right 

parenting skills. An eight-year-old is—they’re at the easiest age 

to encourage. Sometimes it’s the, you know, two-year-olds, there 

are temper tantrums or it’s the twelve-year-olds who’d rather be 
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on their phone or, you know, at home with their friends, 

whatever. This is the easiest age, so I’m just not buying it.

Tr. Vol. II at 55-57.

[6] On February 12, Father filed a verified petition for emergency modification of 

custody and for supervised parenting time and request for emergency hearing. 

In that petition, Father stated in relevant part as follows:

1. Compliance with Local Rule 9. On the early afternoon of 

February 12, 2016, Father’s attorney unsuccessfully attempted to 

reach Mother’s counsel, Rebecca L. Billick, by phone and she left 

a message for counsel requesting a return call due to a matter of 

extreme urgency. She did not receive a return call prior to filing 

this petition. Counsel also sent a facsimile to Mother’s attorney 

on that date with the same request. Events set forth below have

occurred since an injunction was granted against Mother on 

February 9, 2016. These events support the likelihood that the 

emotional development of the parties’ minor children will be 

impaired and they will be alienated from Father if the Court does 

not immediately intervene.

* * *

8. Since the injunction hearing on February 9, 2016, Mother has 

attempted to interfere with Father’s custody/parenting time by 

making statements to the children during phone calls which upset 

the children and make them cry. She repeatedly asks them if 

they are scared and implies that they should be when with 

Father. She tells them how sad she is without them.

9. On February 11, 2016, during Father’s custodial time, Mother 

permitted her mother (maternal grandmother) to go to [H.M.]’s 

school and sit with the child in her classroom. When Father 

went to pick up the child from school on that date, [H.M.] was
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brought to Father’s vehicle crying. The teacher who brought the 

child to the vehicle verified that the child was crying because she 

did not want to leave her grandmother. While sobbing, [H.M.]

reported to Father that maternal grandmother told her that

“mommy” and “grandma” were very sad that the girls were not 

with them and that they missed them very much.

10. The parties’ older child, [J.M.], has informed Father that both 

Mother and maternal grandmother have instructed her to call the 

police (911) if they are left in the care of Father’s wife.

11. Mother simply will not comply with the orders of this Court 

and if not stopped, she will continue to engage in conduct 

designed to alienate the children from their Father.

12. Mother’s conduct is harmful to the children and their 

emotional development.

13. The above and foregoing behavior warrants the immediate 

transfer of full legal and physical custody to Father and the entry 

of an order that Mother be granted supervised parenting time.

Id. at 41-43. Mother filed a motion to strike Father’s emergency petition, which 

the dissolution court denied.

[7] On March 7, Mother moved her personal belongings into an apartment in 

Crown Point leased by her fiancé, Robert Krespo. On March 9, Mother filed a 

notice of relocation stating that she intended to move from Hammond to 

Crown Point “on or before April 5, 2016.” Id. at 66. And on March 11, 

Mother and the Children moved into Krespo’s two-bedroom apartment. 

Krespo has a daughter and two stepdaughters from a previous marriage, and his 
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three children routinely stayed with him in the apartment two or three nights 

per week.

[8] On March 11 and 17, the dissolution court held a hearing on Father’s 

emergency petition for modification of custody. At the conclusion of that 

hearing, the dissolution court took the matter under advisement. In addition, 

Father objected to Mother’s notice of relocation, and the dissolution court set 

that matter for a hearing for May 18.

[9] Following hearings on all pending motions on May 18 and 19, on June 16, the 

dissolution court issued its order modifying custody and found and concluded

in relevant part as follows:

1. The Court issued a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on 

January 15, 2016, granting the parties joint physical and legal 

custody of their two daughters, [J.M.], born August 9,

2007; and [H.G.], born September 26, 2011. Custody was 

contested at that time. Father requested joint physical and legal 

custody and mother requested sole physical custody.

2. At the time of the dissolution of marriage, Mother was 

residing in her deceased grandmother’s home.

3. At the time of the dissolution, Mother and Father had a 

contentious relationship.

4. Mother has a history of denying Father his parenting time 

with the children.

5. Mother has involved the children in drama with Father and 

has thwarted Father’s relationship with the children.
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6. Mother had never testified prior to the dissolution that she 

was planning to move in with her boyfriend.

7. Mother filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on March 

20, 2014, and she has moved the children three times since then. 

Mother moved to her mother’s home, then to her Grandmother’s 

home, and now to her boyfriend’s home.

8. Mother works 20-26 hours per week, earning $10.00 per hour.

9. Mother lives with her boyfriend in a two-bedroom apartment 

leased by her boyfriend. Her boyfriend has one child and two 

former stepchildren who spend one to three nights per week

in the home. Mother is expecting another child with her 

boyfriend.

10. The parties’ daughter [J.M.] is experiencing psychological 

issues and sees a therapist.

11. Mother did not notify Father of her intent to move until after 

she had moved.

12. The Court does not find Mother’s testimony credible 

regarding her statements that she was forced to move and that 

she did not have sufficient time to notify Father. This Court 

finds that Mother had intended to move in with her boyfriend.

13. Father works up to 60 hours per week.

14. Since the dissolution, Father has remarried. His wife does 

not work.

15. Father and Mother continue to have a contentious coparenting relationship that is affecting the children’s 

psychological well-being.
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16. Mother makes choices to move without considering the 

impact on the children.

17. Mother is voluntarily underemployed and has no plans to 

provide stable housing for the children on her own. She has 

relied on family members and now her boyfriend to provide a

home.

18. The children need stability.

19. The children are acting out emotionally at school and at 

Father’s home.

* * *

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1. Mother has not met her burden that the recent change in 

residence was made in good faith and for a legitimate reason.

Mother’s testimony was not credible. Father has met his

burden that relocation of the children is not in the children’s best 

interest.

2. There has been a substantial and continuing change in the 

following: the interaction and relationship between the children 

and Father; the children’s adjustment to their home and 

community; and the mental health of the children and Mother. 

Mother has impeded the relationship of the children and Father. 

Mother has not co-parented with Father. Mother has not kept 

Father informed of matters regarding the children and her plans 

to move. [J.M.] is in counseling. Children at such a tender age 

cannot be expected to adjust to three new homes within two 

years. Mother makes choices that are not in the children’s best 

interest and will continue to do so. Mother shows no respect for 

Father’s concerns or Father’s relationship with the children.
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3. Father has a stable income, a stable home, and stable 

relationship with his new wife. This Court recognizes that this 

change of custody will be difficult on the children; however, this 

will result in the long-term emotional and psychological wellbeing of the children.

4. Mother has demonstrated that she does not respect court 

orders. Mother continues to violate the Court orders regarding 

parenting time. Mother does not respect the children’s need to 

have a stable life free from conflict. Mother does not respect the 

need of her children to have a loving relationship with Father 

free from Mother’s negative influence. Mother simply refuses to 

abide by court orders and to make decisions that are in her 

children’s best interests.

5. It is in the best interest of the children to modify custody to 

grant sole legal and physical custody to Father.

6. Mother needs individual counseling before the Court will 

consider family counseling. Mother’s poor choices are affecting 

the family and Mother needs to address her issues individually 

before the children are brought into family counseling.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED that:

1. The Court GRANTS Father’s Petition to Modify Custody. 

Father is granted sole legal and physical custody of the 

parties’ two minor children.

2. Mother is granted parenting time pursuant to the Indiana 

Parenting Time Guidelines. Due to the high-conflict nature 

of the parents, the parties shall strictly follow the Indiana 

Parenting Time Guidelines.
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3. Father’s objection to Mother’s relocation is moot based upon 

the modification of custody.

4. Mother’s Motion for Family Therapy is DENIED at this 

time.

5. Mother is ordered to attend individual counseling as a 

condition of unsupervised parenting time. Mother shall 

undergo a psychological evaluation and attend individual 

therapy to address the following issues and any issues 

determined by the psychological evaluation: Mother’s poor 

choices for the children; Mother’s disparaging Father in the 

presence of the children; and the drama Mother creates in the 

presence of the children during parenting time exchanges.

Id. at 74-78. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision 

Issue One: Violation of Local Rules

[10] Mother first contends that the dissolution court erred when it considered 

various motions despite Father’s alleged noncompliance with certain local 

rules. In particular, Mother maintains that Father: did not make a “personal or 

telephonic consultation” with Mother in violation of F.L.R. 45-FL00-9

3

(“Rule 

9”) when he filed his application for injunction and motion for rule to show 

 

3

 F.L.R. 45-FL00-9 provides in relevant part as follows:

A. Duties Regarding Consultation. Except in emergencies or when it might create a 

danger or substantial prejudice or is otherwise unreasonable to do so, counsel and pro se 

parties shall make a reasonable attempt to have a personal or telephonic consultation to 

resolve any issue before filing or seeking any other relief through the court. Counsel and 

pro se parties contacted for a consultation shall make themselves reasonably available for 

consultation. The duty of consultation shall be continuing.
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cause and did not contact Mother before he filed his petition for emergency 

modification of custody in violation of “the Lake County Rules of Family 

Law.”4 Appellant’s Br. at 24-25. Mother states that,

[h]ad the trial court followed the Lake County Rules of Family 

Law and dismissed Father’s Verified Application for Injunction 

and Verified Petition for Emergency Modification of Custody 

while granting Mother’s Motion for Court Appointed Therapist, 

or in the alternative a guardian ad litem, days of litigation may 

have been avoided; thousands of dollars would have been saved 

for this family; the transition for the Children to equal (50/50) 

parenting time may have been accomplished with less negative 

impact to the Children; and, in the worst case, had a guardian ad 

litem or family therapist been appointed, the trial court and the 

Children would have then at least had the benefit of trustworthy 

evidence from the therapist or guardian ad litem to better guide 

the trial court’s future decisions for the Children. The trial 

court’s lack of adherence to the Lake County Rules of Family 

Law caused significant harm to Mother (and potentially the 

Children) and is a reversible error.

Id. at 28.

[11] “As a general matter, local rules are procedural and ‘are intended to standardize 

the practice within that court, to facilitate the effective flow of information, and 

to enable the court to rule on the merits of the case.’” Gill v. Evansville Sheet 

Metal Works, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 633, 646 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Meredith v. State, 

 

4

 To the extent Mother attempts to argue that the dissolution court failed to follow its own rules when it 

denied her motion to strike and/or her motion for a court appointed therapist, Mother has not supported that 

contention with cogent argument and it is waived.
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679 N.E.2d 1309, 1310 (Ind. 1997)). Once a trial court promulgates a rule, the 

court and all litigants are generally bound by the rule. Andrews v. Monroe Cty. 

Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re D.A.), 869 N.E.2d 501, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 

Meredith, 679 N.E.2d at 1311. Nevertheless, a trial court may set aside its own 

rule—although it should not be set aside lightly—if the court assures itself that 

it is in the interests of justice to do so, that the substantive rights of the parties 

are not prejudiced, and that the rule is not a mandatory rule. Id. (citing

Buckalew v. Buckalew, 754 N.E.2d 896, 897 (Ind. 2001)).

[12] Here, in each of the challenged pleadings, Father stated that he had attempted 

to contact Mother and/or her attorney prior to filing the pleadings, with no 

response. To the extent Mother contends that Father’s email to Mother prior to 

his motion for injunction did not comply with Rule 9, she is putting form over 

substance, and we reject that contention. And Father attempted to contact 

Mother’s attorney by telephone and facsimile before he filed his petition for 

emergency modification of custody, albeit earlier the same day. In any event, 

Mother has not shown that she was prejudiced by Father’s alleged failure to 

comply with the local rules. As Father points out, “Mother’s counsel did not 

respond prior to filing of each of these motions by Father, but was clearly 

capable of contacting Father’s counsel and attempting to resolve each of them 

prior to the actual litigation of these motions.” Appellee’s Br. at 15. Mother 

has not demonstrated any error on this issue.
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Issue Two: Evidentiary Rulings

[13] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of 

evidence. Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. 

denied. A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be disturbed 

on review only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, 

and circumstances presented. Id.

[14] Mother contends that the “aggregate” of the dissolution court’s evidentiary 

rulings “rise to an abuse of discretion warranting rehearing.” Appellant’s Br. at 

28. In particular, Mother asserts that the dissolution court abused its discretion 

when it: “considered argument of counsel as evidence and also permitted 

argument of counsel to confuse the proceedings”; excluded from evidence real 

estate documents regarding the sale of her grandmother’s house; excluded from 

evidence a videorecording of a phone call between Mother and the Children; 

excluded from evidence J.M.’s therapist’s notes; and excluded from evidence 

various other proffered exhibits and testimony. Id. at 29. We address each 

contention in turn.

Argument of Counsel

[15] We reject Mother’s contention that the dissolution court “considered argument 

of counsel as evidence and also permitted argument of counsel to confuse the 

proceedings.” Id. First, to the extent Mother maintains that the dissolution 

court improperly relied on opposing counsel’s argument and “Father’s 
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impeached testimony” when it found that Mother was not credible, that 

argument finds no support in the record. Id. Second, Mother does not support 

her contentions on this issue with cogent argument but merely lists some of the 

“fourteen occasions” when the dissolution court allegedly “became confused 

due to argument of counsel.” Id. at 31. Mother has not persuaded us that the 

dissolution court improperly considered argument of counsel or was confused 

by said argument.

Real Estate Documents

[16] Next, Mother contends that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it 

excluded from evidence her proffered Exhibit 22, which she describes as “true, 

complete, and authentic copies of the Mutual Release from Purchase 

Agreement and Purchase Agreement along with a standard Business Record 

Affidavit signed and witnessed by a representative of the real estate 

company[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 33. First, Mother does not include these 

documents in her appendix on appeal. Second, Mother does not explain what 

she had intended to prove with the proffered evidence, other than to state that it 

had “profound probative value” and would have “correct[ed] the damage being 

done by opposing counsel’s false representations and to establish the truth of a 
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relevant disputed point[.]” Id. Mother has not presented cogent argument in 

support of her contention on this issue, and, thus, we cannot address it.5

Videorecording

[17] Mother contends that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it 

excluded from evidence a videorecording Mother made of a phone call between 

her and the Children while the Children were staying with Father. Mother 

states that she “recorded herself due to the repeated accusations [that] the 

Children were being harmed in the phone conversations.” Appellant’s Br. at 

35. Citing Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), the 

dissolution court stated that “a parent’s concern for a child’s well-being must be 

the purpose” in recording a child’s telephone conversation. Tr. Vol. II at 205. 

The dissolution court excluded the proffered recording because it found that 

Mother had not shown that that was her reason for making it. But the 

dissolution court went further and stated as follows:

Okay, and I and I will tell you this and I will say it on the record 

because it’s important for me to say this: I find these types of 

recordings and these types of proceedings more damaging, that 

cause more harm than the good for the purpose of making the 

recordings, which I believe it’s a policy behind the recordings 

being allowed in certain limited matters. So, if I were to open the 

 

5

 We can only surmise that Exhibit 22 would have shown that Mother had to move out of her grandmother’s 

house in a rush, but Mother’s brief simply does not clarify either the content or purpose of the proffered 

exhibit.
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door and make it a wider door, it would lead to nothing but 

harmful consequences. So, that’s my ruling.

Id. at 206.

[18] On appeal, Mother maintains that, because Apter involved a recording between 

children and a third party, it is inapposite here and she was not required to 

show that she had made the recording because of her concern for the Children’s 

well-being. But Mother does not address the dissolution court’s ultimate ruling 

that it was excluding the recording because such recordings generally “cause 

more harm than good.” Id. And we question the probative value of the 

proffered recording, given that Mother knew that she was recording it and it 

would not necessarily reflect a typical phone call between Mother and the 

Children. The dissolution court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded 

the videorecording from evidence.

Therapist’s Notes

[19] Mother contends that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it 

excluded evidence “about the frequency and context of [J.M.]’s individual 

therapy as well as the notes of the therapist.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. Mother 

maintains that, because she was not permitted to introduce this evidence, “the 

only negative evidence in the Record about the Children’s mental health is the 

impeachable testimony of Father.” Id.

[20] Once again, Mother has failed to include in her appendix on appeal this 

proffered evidence. And Mother does not describe in any detail what the 
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proffered evidence included or what it would have proved. Thus, we cannot 

say that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it excluded this 

proffered evidence.

Other Exhibits and Testimony

[21] Finally, Mother contends that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it 

excluded from evidence her proffered exhibits 6, 11, 14, 15, and 16. First,

again, Mother has not included any of the proffered exhibits in her appendix on 

appeal. Second, Mother does not describe in any detail the nature or content of 

Exhibits 6, 11, or 14. Mother describes Exhibit 15 as a text from Father asking 

her why there was furniture on the front lawn of her house on April 2. Mother 

maintains that that text was proof that she was “being forced to move under the 

timeline of third parties.” Appellant’s Br. at 38. And Mother describes Exhibit 

16 as “pictures of the home on April 3rd after Mother’s family had removed all 

of her deceased grandmother’s furniture in anticipation of the house being 

sold.” Id.

[22] Taking Mother’s word for the content of Exhibits 15 and 16, we cannot say that 

those exhibits offered probative evidence of the facts Mother was attempting to 

prove. Furniture on a lawn can indicate any number of things, including a yard 

sale. And photographs of the home with the grandmother’s furniture removed 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1609-DR-2175 | April 27, 2017 Page 21 of 24

is likewise ambiguous. Regardless, Mother and Krespo6 both testified that 

Mother was forced to move with very short notice. Mother cannot show that 

the dissolution court abused its discretion when it excluded the proffered 

exhibits. And with respect to the other exhibits, without any explanation of the 

content of those exhibits, we cannot say that the dissolution court abused its 

discretion when it excluded them from evidence.

[23] Mother also asserts that the dissolution court abused its discretion when it 

“refused to permit [H.M.’s] teacher to share relevant observations and lay 

opinions about what she observed of [H.M.], grandmother, and the parties.” 

Id. at 37. But Mother does not set out in her brief what evidence she had sought 

to present through the teacher’s testimony. And, moreover, Mother made no 

offer of proof after the court sustained Father’s objections to Mother’s questions 

to the teacher. Mother has not preserved this issue for our review. See Dowdell 

v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 1999) (holding it is well settled that an 

offer of proof is required to preserve an error in the exclusion of a witness’

testimony).

Issue Three: Findings and Conclusions

[24] Mother contends that twelve of the dissolution court’s twenty findings are not 

supported by the evidence and/or do not support a modification of custody, 

 

6

 Mother also briefly states that the dissolution court did not permit Krespo to testify about the “urgency of 

the move.” Appellant’s Br. at 38. But she does not support that contention with cogent argument. And, in 

any event, Krespo did testify that Mother was forced to move in an urgent manner.
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and she also contends that three of the dissolution court’s conclusions are not 

supported by the evidence.

7

 A modification of custody is a determination that 

rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 1186, 

1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we may 

neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. We 

consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment and all 

reasonable inferences derived from it. Id.

[25] It appears that the dissolution court in this case entered findings of fact and 

conclusions sua sponte. In this scenario, the specific findings control only with 

respect to the issues they cover, while a general judgment standard applies to 

issues outside the court’s findings. Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The trial court’s findings or judgment will be set aside 

only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous 

when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id.

[26] Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-21 (2017) provides in relevant part:

(a) The court may not modify a child custody order unless:

(1) the modification is in the best interests of the 

child; and

 

7

 Mother also challenges three of the dissolution court’s findings it made in the final decree of dissolution. 

But Mother did not appeal from the final decree, and those issues are waived.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1609-DR-2175 | April 27, 2017 Page 23 of 24

(2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of 

the factors that the court may consider under section 

8 . . . of this chapter.

(b) In making its determination, the court shall consider the 

factors listed under section 8 of this chapter.

[27] The relevant factors listed under Section 8 are:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the 

child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child’s parent or parents;

(B) the child’s sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the 

child’s best interests.

(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either 

parent.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1609-DR-2175 | April 27, 2017 Page 24 of 24

Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8. “[A] change in circumstances must be judged in the 

context of the whole environment, and the effect on the child is what renders a 

change substantial or inconsequential.” Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d at 1193 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

[28] Mother’s contentions that the dissolution court’s findings and conclusions are 

not supported by the evidence and/or do not support modification of custody

amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility of 

witnesses, which we will not do. Mother also fails to support several of her 

contentions with cogent argument. The dissolution court heard evidence to 

support each of its findings, and the findings are adequate to support the court’s 

conclusions. Mother has not shown that the dissolution court abused its 

discretion when it modified custody of the Children.

[29] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.