2 9 6 Ga . 3 81

F INAL COP Y

S 1 4 A1 3 4 7 . THE S TATE v . COLVARD.

HINES , P re sid in g Ju stic e

.

Th is is a n a p p e a l b y th e S ta te fro m a n o rd e r of th e su p e rio r c o urt g ra n tin g

d e fe n d a n t An to nio Co lv a r d ’ s w ritte n m otio n to su p p re ss c e rta in p h y sic a l

e v id e n c e a n d h is o ra l m o tio n to su p p re ss h is re su ltin g c o n fe ssio n , to b e u se d in

h is p ro se c u tio n fo r m

urd e r a n d o th e r c rim e s. F o r th e re a so n s th a t fo llo w, we

a ffirm

.

On Ap ril 2 7

, 2 0 1 2

, a F u l to n C o u n ty g ra n d ju ry re tu rn e d a 1 3 -c o u n t

in d ic tm e n t a g a in st Co lv a rd

, c h a rg in g h im with m u rd e r a n d th e re la te d c rim e s o f

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, t h e f

t

, c o n c e a lm e nt o f a d e a th

, a nd d ru g a n d fire a rm s

p o sse ssio n in c o n n e c tio n with th e Ja n u a ry 2 4

, 2 0 1 2 fa ta l sh o o tin g o f Ro b e rt

Da v is. On Ma rc h 7

, 2 0 1 3

, C o lv a rd file d a m o t i o n to su p p re ss c e rta in p h y sic a l

e v id e n c e re su ltin g fro m wh a t in itia lly wa s a wa rra n tle ss se a rc h o f th e be d ro o m

h e use d in h is u n c le ’s (“ Un c le ” ) a p a rtm e nt. Th e re wa s a su p pre ssio n h e a rin g o n

Ju ly 3 0

, 2 01 3

, a t w h ic h Un c le a n d two p o lic e o ffic e rs in v o lv e d in th e se arc h

te s t i f ie d

. At th e h e a rin g, C o lv a rd m a d e a n o ra l m o tio n to su p p re ss h isc o n fe ssio n re su ltin g fro m th e a lle g e d ille g a l se a rc h

. 1 F o llo win g th e h e a rin g , o n

A u g u s t 7

, 2 0 1 3

, th e su p e rio r c o u rt e nte re d its o rd e r su p p re ssin g th e o b t a i n e d

p h y sic a l e v id e n c e a s se iz e d p u rsu a n t to an u n la wfu l se arc h a n d C o lv a rd ’s

c o n fe ssio n a s “ fru it o f th e p oiso n o u s tre e .” 2

1

. Th e S ta te c o n te n d s th a t th e su pe rio r c o urt e r r e d in g ra n tin g th e

su p p re ssio n o f th e o b ta i n e d p h y sic a l e v id e n c e , a lle g in g th a t th e e rro r re su lte d

fro m th e c o u rt im

p ro pe rly a

p p ly in g th e la w to th e u n c o n tro v e rte d fa c ts.

Th e su pe ri o r c o u rt su p p re sse d th e o bta in e d p h y sic a l e v id e n c e a fte r

fin d in g : Un c le te stifie d th a t Co lv a rd liv e d w ith h im in an a p artm e n t in Atla n ta ;

Un c le c o n se n te d to a se a rc h o f th e c o m m o n are a s of th e u n it ; with in th e

a p a rtm e nt w a s a lo c k e d b e d ro o m u se d e x c lu siv e ly b y Co lv a rd ; th e d o o r h a d

b e e n lo c k e d b y Co lv a rd a n d Un c le d id n o t h a v e a ke y ; Un c le c o u ld n o t g o in to

th e b e dro o m wh e n th e d o o r wa s lo c k e d; te stim o ny wa s c o n flic tin g a s to wh e th e r

1 The superior court found that the written motion to suppress phy sical e vidence was heard just prior to b e gi n n i n g voir dire; that after the court announced its r uling on this motion, Colvard
made the oral motion to suppress his confession; that the State announced it would appeal the court’s ruling o n the motion to suppress phy sical evidence and the parties requested that the court rule on

t h e o r a l motion as w ell; that the parties then submitted briefs on this issue for the cou r t ’ s consi d er a t i o n ; t h at the State did not challeng e the oral motion as procedurally defective, and any issue reg arding the p rocedural propriety of the motion was w aived; a nd that the State acquiesced to the court ruling o n

the oral motion without entertaining further testimony

.

2 After finding the evidence at issue, the police stopped the warrantless search and applied f or and obtained a search warrant.

2Un c le to ld th e p o lic e o ffic e r th a t th e o ffic e r c o u ld e n te r th e b e d ro om ; it d id n o t

a p p e a r th a t th e b e dro o m do or wa s se c u r e l y f a ste ne d ; a p o lic e o ffic e r g a in e d

e n try to th e b e d ro om b y p la c in g a k n ife b e twe e n th e d o o r lo c k a n d its fra m e

c a u sin g th e d o o r t o p o p o p e n ; a n d po lic e o ffic e rs e n te re d th e b e d ro o m a n d

d isc o v e re d fire a

rm s in a b a g in a c lo se t, o ne of wh ic h a p pa re ntly wa s th e m

u rd e r

we a p on

. Th e su p e rio r c o u rt th e n d e te rm in e d th a t th e i s su e to b e re so lv e d wa s

th ird p a rty c o n se n t to a wa rra n tle ss se a rc h ; it c ite d a s in stru c tiv e S ta te v

.

Pa rrish , 3 02 Ga . Ap p

. 8 3 8 (6 9 1 S E2 d 8 8 8 ) (2 0 1 0 ), 3 a n d c o n c lu d e d th a t Un c le

d id n o t h a ve th e a

u th ority to c o n se n t to th e se arc h

.

In re v ie win g th e su p e rio r c o u rt’s ru lin g on th e m o tio n s to su p p re ss, th is

Co u rt m u st be gu id e d b y th re e fu n da m e n ta l p re c e pts: first, wh e n a m o tio n to

su p p re ss is h e a rd b y th e tria l ju d g e sittin g a s th e trie r o f fa c t, th e ju d g e h e a rs th e

e v id e n c e a n d th e ju d g e ’s fin d in g s o n c o nflic tin g e v id e n c e a r e a n a lo g o u s to a

ju ry v e rd ic t, a n d c o n se q u e n tly

, sh o u ld no t b e d istu rb e d b y th e a p p e lla te c o u rt if

3 Defendant Parrish was charg ed with possession o f a firearm by a convicted felon, and the

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s g rant o f Parrish’s motion to suppress firearm evidence,
after concluding that the p o l i c e could not have reasonably believed that the third party

, Parrish’s wife, had common a

uthority to g r ant police consent to a warrantless search of Parrish’s g un cabinet.

3th e re is a n y e v i d e n c e to su p p o rt th e m ; se c o n d, th e tria l c o u rt' s de c isio n s o n

q u e stio n s o f fa c t a nd c re d ib ility a re to b e a c c e p te d u n le ss th e y a re c le a rly

e rro n e ou s; a nd th ird

, th e a p p e lla te c ou rt m

u st c o n stru e th e e vid e n c e m o st

fa v o ra bly to th e u p h o ld in g o f th e tria l c o u rt' s fin d in g s a n d ju d g m e n t. Bro wn v

.

S ta te

, 2 93 Ga

. 7 8 7

, 80 2-8 0 3 (3 ) (b ) (2 ) (7 5 0 SE2 d 14 8) (2 0 1 3 ); Mille r v

. S ta te

,

2 8 8 Ga

. 2 8 6 (7 0 2 S E2 d 8 8 8 ) (2 0 1 0 ). S u c h p re c e p ts a r e e q ua lly a p p lic a b le

w h e t h e r t h e tria l c o u rt ru le s in fa v o r o f th e S ta te o r th e d e fe n d a n t. Bro wn v

.

S ta te

, su p ra a t 8 0 3 (3 ) (b ) (2 ); Mille r v . S ta te

, su p ra a t 2 8 6 -2 8 7.

Ce rta in ly

, th e S ta te m a y sh o w th a t a wa rra n tle ss se a rc h wa s ju stifie d b a se d

u p o n a th ird p a rty g iv in g p e rm issio n to se a rc h ; h o we ve r, th e th ird p arty m u st

h a v e “ c o m m o n a

u th o rity o v e r o r o th e r su ffic ie n t re la tio nsh ip to th e p re m ise s o r

e ffe c ts so u g ht to b e in sp e c t e d ” o r i t mu st b e sh o wn th a t th e p o lic e c o u ld h a v e

r e a s o n a b ly b e lie v e d th a t th e th ird p a rty did h a v e su c h a u th o rity

. T

id we l l v

.

S ta te

, 2 8 5 Ga

. 10 3

, 1 0 5 -1 06 (1 ) (6 7 4 S E2 d 2 7 2 ) (2 00 9), qu o tin g U n ite d S ta tes

v

. Ma tlo c k

, 41 5 U. S

. 1 64

, 1 7 1 (II) (9 4 S Ct 9 8 8

, 3 9 LE2 d 2 4 2 ) (1 9 7 4 ). Se e a lso

Illin o is v

. Ro d

rig u e z , 49 7 U. S

. 1 7 7

, 1 8 3 -1 8 9 (III) (B) (1 1 0 S Ct 2 7 9 3

, 1 1 1 LE2 d

1 4 8 ) (1 99 0 ). S u c h c o m m on a u th o rity is d e riv e d fro m

m u tu a l use o f th e p ro p e rty b y p e rso n s g e n e ra lly h a v in g jo in t a c c e ss

4o r c on tro l fo r m ost p u rp o se s, so th a t it is re a so n a ble to re c o gn iz e th a t a n y o f th e c o -in h a

b ita nts h a s th e rig h t to p e rm it th e in sp e c tio n in h is o wn rig h t a

n d th a t th e o th e rs ha v e a ssu m e d th e risk th a t o n e

o f th e ir n u m

b e r m ig h t p e rm it th e c o m m o n a re a to b e se a rc he d

.

T id we ll v

. Sta te

, su p ra a t 1 0 6 (1 ), q u o tin g Un ite d S ta te s v

. Ma tlo c k

, su p ra a t 1 7 1

(II), n . 7

.

Th e S ta te c ite s e x c e rp ts o f te stim o ny a t th e su p p re ssio n h e a rin g by Un c le

a n d th e p o lic e offic e rs wh ic h it m a in ta in s sh o w t h a t U n c le h a d c o m m o n

a u th ority to gra n t th e p o lic e a c c e ss to m a k e t h e w ar r a n t le ss se a rc h o f th e

b e d ro o m a t issu e

. 4 Ho w e ve r, th e c irc u m sta n c e s a s fo un d b y th e su p e rio r c o u rt,

sittin g a s th e fin d e r o f fa c t, d o n o t p e rm it th e c o n c lu sio ns th a t Un c le h a d su c h

a u th ority o r th a t th e p o lic e c o u ld h a v e re a so n a b ly b e lie v e d th a t h e d id

. T id we ll

v

. S ta te

, su p ra a t 1 0 6 (1 ). Ev e n if th e e x c e rp ts o f te stim o n y c ite d b y th e S ta te a re

d e e m e d to c o n flic t with o th e r p o rtio n s o f te st i mo n y b y Un c le a n d th e p o lic e

4 The State cite s , i n t e r alia, police testimony that Uncle stated that Colvard lived in the
apartment only intermittently ; that Uncle stated that if h is nephew was involved, the cops “need to
do what they need to do”; that Colvard had a bedroom in Uncle’s apartment, but he was not on the
apartment lease ag reement and did not pay rent; that Colvard wanted the b edroom door kept locked;

that even thoug h Uncle did not have a key to the bedroom, h e sometimes went into the bedroom; that
Uncle never attempted to limit the scope of the search; and that after the officers asked Uncle f or consent to look around the apartment, he ag reed and sig ned a consent to search form.

5o ffic e rs, it wa s fo r th e su p e rio r c ou rt, a s th e fa c tfin d e r, to a sse ss th e c re d ib ility

o f th e witn e sse s a n d th e te stim o n y ; th e re is pla in ly e v id e n c e o f re c o rd to su p p ort

th e su p e rio r c o u rt’s fa c tu a l fin d in g s, a n d th e y c a n n o t b e fo un d to b e c le a rly

e rro n e ou s. Bro wn v

. Sta te

, su p ra a t 8 0 3

. In d e e d

, th e su p e rio r c o u rt we ig h e d a ll

th e e v id e n c e a n d c o n c lu d e d th a t th e p o lic e c o u ld no t h a v e o bje c tiv e ly b e lie v e d

th a t a t th e tim e o f th e se a rc h th e y h a d o b ta in e d v a lid a u th o riz a tio n to e n te r th e

lo c k e d b e d ro om

. 5 A n d

, th e su p e rio r c o u rt’s j u d g me n t in th a t re g ard m u st b e

u p h e ld

. Bro wn v . S

ta te , su p ra a t 8 0 2 -8 0 3 (3 ) (b ) (2 ).

2

. Th e Sta t e f

u rth e r c o n te n d s th a t th e su pe rio r c ou rt e rre d in g ra n tin g

Co lv a rd ’s o ra l m o tio n to su p p re ss h is c o n fe ssio n b e c a u se it m a in ta in s th a t th e

c o n fe ssio n w a s n o t a c q u ire d a s a re su lt o f an u n la wfu l se a r c h in a sm u c h a s

“ b a se d o n a to ta lity o f [Un c le ’s] re sp o n se s a nd a c tio n s d u rin g h is i n t e ra c tio n

with th e p o lic e , th e p o lic e re a so n a bly a n d o b

je c tiv e ly b e lie v e d th a t [Un c le ] h a d

5 I n its order, the superior court spec i f i c ally q uestioned the reasonableness of the investig ating
officer believing that Uncle had the authority to p er m i t the p olice to enter the locked bedroom in lig ht of the fact that Uncle h imself c ould not enter when it was locked. The superior c ourt then cited
Uncle’s testimony that a f

ter one o f the police officers asked h im for permission to “look around the house,”
And I said – can he walk throug h the house, and I told him, y es. So when he came

– when he came to the bedroom where

– knock o n the door, he said, can I g o in that
bedroom r ig ht there. I said don’t g ot no k ey to that bedroom. I said

- then he asked

me, he said, if I g e t in that b edroom, can I g o in. I said, y ou ain’t g o ing to be able to

g et in that d oor. So the cop picked the lock and w ent in the

– h e didn’t have no search warrant, period.

6th e a

u th o rity to c o n se n t to th e se a rc h

, m a k in g th e se a rc h v a lid .” Ho we v e r, we

h a v e c o n c lu d e d th a t th e su p e rio r c o u rt’s ju d g m e n t to th e c o n tra ry wa s n o t e rro r,

i.e

., th a t th e wa rra n tle ss se a rc h wa s n o t la wfu l b e c a u se th e re wa s no v a lid th ird

p a rty c on se n t. S e e Div isio n 1

, su p ra

. Th e S ta te fa ils to p ro v id e a n y b a sis u p o n

wh ic h to fin d e rro r in th e su p e rio r c o u rt’s re su ltin g d e te rm in a tio n th a t C o lv a rd ’s

c o n fe ssio n a n d oth e r in fo rm a tio n c o nta in e d in h is sta te m e n ts c o n stitu te “ fru it o f

th e p o iso n o u s tre e ,” a n d c o n se q u e n tly , m u st b e su p p re sse d

. 6

Ju d g m e n t a ffirm e d . All th e Ju stic e s c o n c u r.

6 The question in e x amining the admissibility of e vidence that is c ontended to b e “ fruit of the poisonous tree,” is whether such evidence has been obtained by ex p loitat i o n o f that illeg ality or instead by means sufficiently disting uishable to be purg ed of the primary taint. Teal v. State

, 282 Ga. 319, 3 2 3 (2) ( 647 SE2d 15) ( 2007), quoting W ong Sun v. United S

tates

, 371 U. S. 471, 488 (83 SCt 407, 9 L E2d 441) (1963).There are two functionally similar ex ceptions to the ex clusionary rule: the independent source doctrine and t h e u l t i mate or inevitable discovery doctrine; the independent

source doctrine p ermi t s e v i dence that was discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional v iolation, while the ultimate or inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of
evidence discovered as a result of police er r o r o r m i s c onduct if the State can prove b y a preponderance of the evidence that such information would have ul t i m a t el y or inevitably been
discovered by lawful means, without any connection to the police error or misconduct. Teal v. State

, supra at 323-324 ( 2). T he superior court concluded that neither ex ception applied in this case, and the State makes no arg

u ment with reg ard to applicability of such ex ceptions.

7De c id e d Ja n u a ry 2 0 , 2 0 1 5

.

Mu rd e r. F u lto n S u p e rio r Co u rt. Be fo re Ju d g e Ma rk le

.

P a u l L. Ho wa rd

, Jr., Distric t Atto rn e y , Le n n y I. K ric k

, Assista n t Distric t

Atto rn e y , fo r a

p p e lla nt.

A n d re M. Jo hn so n , Je sse N. Ba c o n, Jim m o niq u e R. S

. Ro d g e rs, fo r

a p p e lle e

.

8