IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

MARY E. NIELSON, an individual,

Appellant,

v.

HOUSEHOLD FINANCE 

CORPORATION III; CALIBER HOME 

LOANS, INC., d/b/a CALIBER LOANS, 

INC., U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION; AND LSF9 MASTER 

PARTICIPATION TRUST,

Respondents.

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No. 35531-4-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

KORSMO, J. — Mary Nielson appeals from the dismissal of her claims against 

Household Finance Corporation III (HFC), contending that the trial court erroneously 

ruled that the statute of limitations had expired on her claims. Concluding that there are 

factual issues to resolve concerning when Ms. Nielson discovered the alleged fraud, we 

reverse.

FACTS

We state the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Nielson.1 Ms. Nielson and 

her then-husband purchased a mobile home with the proceeds of a loan issued by HFC. 

 

1 Didlake v. State, 186 Wn. App. 417, 422, 345 P.3d 43 (2015). 

FILED

MARCH 7, 2019

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35531-4-III

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp., et al

2

The loan was secured solely by the home because the Nielsons did not own any real 

estate. The home subsequently was placed on land owned by Ms. Nielson’s father. 

Sometime thereafter, Ms. Nielson inherited the land from her father, free and clear 

of any debt. The couple refinanced the home loan through HFC in January 2006. They 

drove from Quincy to Yakima to sign the refinancing papers, arriving shortly before the 

end of the business day. Because it was late in the day, there was no time to read the 

paperwork. Told that the refinancing was secured in the same manner as the original 

loan, the couple signed the documents without reading them.2 

In fact, the loan document bears the legend on the first page: “YOU ARE GIVING 

US A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE REAL ESTATE LOCATED AT THE ABOVE 

ADDRESS.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 291. The same notice, but referencing the deed of 

trust, is carried on the second page of the loan agreement. CP at 292. Ms. Nielson avers 

that, even if she had read the document, she would not have understood that the real 

estate was also encumbered. The deed of trust was recorded in Grant County in January 

2006. That document describes the secured property using a metes and bounds 

description without reference to a street address; it also references the tax parcel 

identification numbers assigned to the home and to the land. CP at 177. 

 

2 These facts come from an affidavit filed by Ms. Nielson. Our record does not 

include any evidence from Mr. Nielson. 
No. 35531-4-III

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp., et al

3

Represented by counsel, the couple filed, and subsequently dismissed, bankruptcy 

petitions in 2010, 2011, and 2012. The status of the land, as identified by the couple’s 

filings, is reflected in the schedules filed with the bankruptcy court. In 2010, the 

“Schedule A—Real Property” indicates that the couple owned in fee simple property 

located at 2572 Beverly Burke Road in Quincy. That schedule reflects that a secured 

claim of $47,800 against the property. CP at 723. The Schedule D listing of secured 

creditors recognizes that HFC holds a claim worth $47,800 against the 2572 Beverly 

Burke Road property. CP at 725. Those same documents in the 2011 bankruptcy filing 

report the exact same information. CP at 740, 742. 

The 2012 filing states the information differently. The Schedule A—Real 

Property filing distinguished between mobile home and land, attributing values of 

$100,000 to the former and $10,000 to the latter.3 CP at 248. The Schedule D listing 

recognized a “Home Mortgage 1st” involving a “residence” (described as 1993 Marlette 

Triple Wide) and “location” (2572 Beverly Burke Road S.) with a value of $100,000. CP 

at 251. The creditor is identified as HFC and the claim is valued at $45,928. CP at 251. 

The Nielsons dissolved their marriage by a decree of dissolution entered 

November 8, 2013. Ms. Nielson contends repeatedly in her pleadings that the decree 

awarded the home and land to her, and the trial court stated that Ms. Nielson now held 

 

3 The same distinction was drawn in the Schedule C (exempt property) filing. CP 

at 249. 
No. 35531-4-III

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp., et al

4

the property as her own.4 However, the decree of dissolution provided in our record 

expressly states, on two different pages, that the “Parties will share property at 2572 

Beverly Burke Rd.” CP at 257, 258. 

HFC assigned the loan to Caliber Home Loans in the summer of 2015. Soon 

thereafter, Caliber contacted Ms. Nielson about the loan. In their discussion, Nielson 

learned that HFC and Caliber believed that the security interest attached to both the land 

and the home. Over the next year, her attorney and the companies traded letters on the 

topic. Finally, in September 2016, Ms. Nielson filed an action against HFC5alleging 

fraud, and related claims involving violations of state statutes, over the January 2006 loan 

processing.

The defendants moved to dismiss, citing to the statute of limitations. Ms. Nielson 

argued that she only discovered the fraud in 2015 and filed suit the following year after 

negotiations failed. The trial court, in a thoughtful letter opinion, explained that the 

plaintiff had constructive notice of the security interest due to the recording on file in 

Grant County. After discussing when each of the claims had accrued, and determining 

that all were untimely, the court ordered the action dismissed. Ms. Nielson moved for 

 

4 CP at 397 n.1. 

5 Additional defendants were added, and theories of recovery modified, over three 

subsequent amendments to the complaint. All defendants other than HFC have been 

dismissed from the case and are no longer involved in this litigation. 
No. 35531-4-III

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp., et al

5

reconsideration. Believing itself bound by appellate court authority, the trial court denied 

reconsideration.

Ms. Nielson timely appealed the dismissal of HFC. A panel heard oral argument 

of the case.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue presented is whether this action is barred by the statute of 

limitations. We conclude that there is a factual question concerning when Ms. Nielson 

discovered that the security interest included the land as well as the home. 

As with an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, this court reviews appeals 

from a CR 12(b) dismissal de novo. Tenore v. AT & T Wireless Servs., 136 Wn.2d 322, 

329-330, 962 P.2d 104 (1998). Dismissal “is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts which would justify recovery.” Id. at 330.

Ms. Nielson’s claims alleged violations of the Consumer Loan Act (CLA), ch.

31.04 RCW, the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), ch. 19.86 RCW, fraud, and negligent 

misrepresentation. Violation of the CLA is actionable under the CPA. RCW 31.04.208. 

The statute of limitations for CPA claims is four years after accrual, RCW 19.86.120, 

while the statute of limitations is three years after accrual for the fraud and negligent 

misrepresentation claims. RCW 4.16.080(4). 
No. 35531-4-III

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp., et al

6

This court has recognized that “RCW 4.16.080(4) effectively codifies the 

discovery rule” for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Shepard v. Holmes, 

185 Wn. App. 730, 739, 345 P.3d 786 (2014). That rule also applies to CPA claims. Id. 

at 740. Under the discovery rule, an action does not accrue until the plaintiff has 

discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim. 

RCW 4.16.080(4); Sabey v. Howard Johnson & Co., 101 Wn. App. 575, 593, 5 P.3d 730 

(2000); First Maryland Leasecorp v. Rothstein, 72 Wn. App. 278, 283, 864 P.2d 17 

(1993). 

The trial court relied on the filing of the deed of trust as notice to Ms. Nielson that 

HFC claimed an interest in her real estate. “When an instrument involving real property 

is properly recorded, it becomes notice to all the world of its contents.” Strong v. Clark, 

56 Wn.2d 230, 232, 352 P.2d 183 (1960). “When the facts upon which the fraud is 

predicated are contained in a written instrument which is placed on the public record, 

there is constructive notice of its contents, and the statute of limitations begins to run at 

the date of the recording of the instrument.” Id.; accord Shepard, 185 Wn. App. at 740 

(“One instance in which actual discovery will be inferred is where the facts constituting 

the fraud were a matter of public record.”); W. Wash. Laborers-Emp’rs Health & Sec. Tr. 

Fund v. Harold Jordan Co., 52 Wn. App. 387, 391, 760 P.2d 382 (1988) (“[W]hen the 

facts upon which the fraud is predicated are contained in a written instrument which is 

placed on public record, the aggrieved party receives constructive notice of its contents.
No. 35531-4-III

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp., et al

7

Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the recording of the 

instrument.”). 

Here, Ms. Nielson argues that her claim did not accrue until she was alerted by the 

lenders that the security interest attached to the land. In turn, HFC argues that the deed of 

trust filed in January 2006 constituted notice to Ms. Nielson and the world that there was 

a security interest in the land, leading to an expiration of the statute of limitations in early 

2010. HFC points to Shepard, a relatively recent case from this court, as controlling. We 

think that case, and the others cited above, are distinguishable because they involve 

notice to third parties, where here the party claiming fraud is a signatory to the 

agreement.

Shepard involved a land purchase in Benton County; the purchaser allegedly had 

been misled by a plat map about the ability to subdivide the property and was unaware 

that the former owner had consolidated the four lots. 185 Wn. App. at 734. She sued the 

real estate company and the title company for misrepresentation. Id. at 733. This court 

held that the public filing of the consolidation deed put the plaintiff on notice at the time 

she purchased the property. Since her action accrued at that time, rather than when she 

learned from the county that the property was now only one lot, her action was barred by 

the statute of limitations. Id. at 741-743.
No. 35531-4-III

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8

That situation is different from this one. HFC essentially is asking that we double 

down and conclude that the allegedly fraudulent document has extra notice value to the 

plaintiff because it was filed after she signed it. We think the parties to a contract have 

even less incentive to check the public record about the contents of their agreements than 

they would have at the time of signing, or immediately thereafter when they presumably 

received a copy of the contract. They are not in the same position as third parties who 

otherwise are unaware of the existence of an agreement, lien, etc., and are expected to 

rely on the public record. First parties have no need to rely on the public record for their 

own agreements.

We think that there is a factual question in this case about when Ms. Nielson knew 

about the lien extending to the land. Three facts, in combination, bring us to that 

conclusion: (1) there had been a previous loan, secured only by the home; (2) the 

representation that the agreement was the same as that previous loan, arguably negating 

the need to read the new agreement; and (3) there was insufficient time to read the 

agreement before the end of the business day.6 We think that the CR 12(b)(6) motion 

foundered on these facts, which would justify a trier-of-fact to conclude that Ms. Nielson 

was unaware that the lender’s lien extended to the real estate beneath her mobile home 

 

6 A failure or a refusal to read the contract would not justify relief. 
No. 35531-4-III 

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp., et al 

until foreclosure was threatened. Whether her allegations are credible is a matter for a 

fact-finder to take up. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

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