FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCTOBER 4, 2004

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 03-13810

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 02-00408-CV-4-WS

FLORIDA PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP 

CITIZEN LOBBY, INC., 

SAVE OUR SUWANNEE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

MIKE LEAVITT, Administrator, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,

Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

_________________________

 (OCTOBER 4, 2004)
 Honorable Melvin Brunetti, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by *

designation, participated in the oral argument of this case. Judge Brunetti, however, did not

participate in the disposition of this case, which we decide by quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

 The plaintiffs are The Florida Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc.

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(“FPIRG”), Save Our Suwanee, Inc. (“SOS”), Friends of Saint Sebastian River, an

unincorporated association (“FSSR”), the Sierra Club, Inc. (“Sierra Club”), and Linda Young, a

Florida resident, outdoor water-sports enthusiast, and employee of the Clean Water Network.

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Before BIRCH, MARCUS and BRUNETTI , Circuit Judges. *

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s order granting summary 1

judgment in favor of the defendants, the United States Environmental Protection

Agency and its administrators (collectively, “the EPA”), and the Florida

Department of Environmental Protection (“the FDEP”). After thorough review of

the record and careful consideration of the briefs and oral argument, we conclude

that this case is justiciable and that unresolved factual issues remain. Accordingly,

we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

A.

Two basic issues are raised on appeal: first, whether the case is justiciable,

both because the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to review

a state administrative rule affecting Florida’s water quality standards, and because

the controversy remains alive; and second, whether the Florida Department of
3

Environmental Protection, by establishing a new rule, changed or added to the

state’s existing water quality standards. Inasmuch as a clear understanding of how

the federal and state governments share responsibilities to regulate water pollution

is essential to the resolution of this case, we set forth in some detail the relevant

facts and the overall regulatory and statutory scheme embodied in the Clean Water

Act.

Since 1972, the federal and state governments have worked together to

restore and maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters, in a partnership governed

by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water

Act, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.) (“Clean Water

Act”). See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054, 117

L. Ed. 2d 239 (1992) (describing partnership). Many duties to monitor and

regulate pollution of the nation’s waters are divided between the federal and state

governments. 

Among other things, state governments are responsible for establishing

water quality standards for all of their waterbodies. Water quality standards are

designed to do two things: first, they designate the use or uses to be made of the

water, such as fishing or swimming; and, second, they set the basic criteria that

must be satisfied in order to safely permit those uses. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2. The
4

second aspect of water quality standards, the water quality criteria, can be

expressed in narrative form or in a numeric form, e.g. specific pollutant

concentrations. Id. at § 131.3(b). We have described the second aspect of a water

quality standard as setting the “level of water quality needed to safely allow[ the

waterbody’s designated] use.” Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1025

(11th Cir. 2002) This level may be described as “constituent concentrations,

levels, or narrative statements, representing a quality of water that supports a

particular use.” 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b).

While states are primarily responsible for establishing these water quality

standards, the EPA, in turn, is required to undertake a review of any new or

revised water quality standards adopted by the states. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). 

Among other things, this review involves a determination of the following:

Whether the state has adopted criteria that protect the designated

water uses; [w]hether the State has followed its legal procedures for

revising or adopting standards; [and w]hether the State standards

which do not include the uses specified in section 101(a)(2) of the

Act are based upon appropriate technical and scientific data and

analyses . . . . 

40 C.F.R. § 131.5. Moreover, under the Clean Water Act, the state’s water quality

standards may only be revised if the change complies with the anti-degradation

policy which EPA regulations mandate each state to adopt. 33 U.S.C. §
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1313(d)(4)(B); see 40 C.F.R. § 131.12. Thus, any change must, at the very least,

maintain the existing quality of each waterbody, preventing any further

“degradation” of the waterbody’s integrity. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and

City of Tacoma v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704, 114 S. Ct. 1900,

1905-06, 128 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1994) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B)).

If the state’s new or revised standards meet the requirements of the Clean

Water Act, the EPA must approve the standards within sixty days. 33 U.S.C. §

1313(c)(3); see also Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 101, 112 S. Ct. at 1054. If, however,

the EPA identifies violations of the Clean Water Act, the EPA is required to take

appropriate measures to ensure that these problems are fixed. In fact, it must

notify the state within ninety days and specify the changes needed to comply with

the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3). The EPA also must propose new

regulations that satisfy the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Id. at §

1313(c)(4). And if the state does not adopt EPA’s proposed changes within ninety

days of publication, the EPA itself must promulgate those standards. Id. Any

existing water quality standard “remains the applicable standard until [the] EPA

approves a change, deletion, or addition to that water quality standard, or until

[the] EPA promulgates a more stringent water quality standard.” 40 C.F.R. §

131.21(e). 
 The state prepares a management program identifying “best management practices and 2

measures” to reduce pollution, which, in turn, the EPA must approve and may provide grants to

implement. Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1026. Moreover, the state prepares a “continuing planning

process” which “is essentially a plan for how the state is going to clean up pollution.” Id.

(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(1)). The EPA is then required to approve or disapprove the

continuing planning process and, after approval, to occasionally determine its consistency with

the Clean Water Act. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2)). 

6

Water quality standards play an important role in maintaining and

improving the cleanliness and safety of the nation’s waterbodies, because they are

designed to determine which waterbodies are safe enough to support their

designated uses. Thus, each state must compile a list identifying those bodies of

water that are impaired, i.e. not safe enough to use as designated. 33 U.S.C. §

1313(d)(1)(A). This list (known as the “Impaired Waters List” or “303(d) list”) is

then sent to the EPA for approval. Id. at §§ 1313(d)(1)(A), (d)(2). If the EPA

disapproves of the state’s proposed Impaired Waters List, it must issue its own list.

Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1025-26 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2)). 

When a waterbody does not satisfy a water quality standard, both the state

and the federal government are required to act to control and remedy the pollution

of the waterbody. See Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1025. The state and federal

governments are directed to adjust the amounts of pollution that are permitted by

individual, identifiable sources, and to implement more generalized programs to

reduce the amount of pollution. Id. at 1025-26 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 2
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1313(e)(1),(2); 1329(b), (h)). However, this important clean-up process does not

begin unless and until the waterbody is identified on the Impaired Waters List.

The Florida Department of Environmental Protection created Florida’s

water quality standards when it promulgated chapter 62-302 of the Florida

Administrative Code, setting forth the state’s “Surface Water Quality Standards”

(“Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards”). See Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-

302.200-.800. The Florida State Legislature instructed the FDEP to adopt a

methodology to identify impaired waters, taking into account “the variability

occurring in nature” and recognizing “the statistical variability inherent in

sampling and testing procedures that are used to express water quality standards.” 

Fla. Stat. § 403.021(11). 

Two sentences found in Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards are

relevant to this case. First, the state regulation, in providing the maximum levels

of pollutants that each waterbody may contain without becoming unsafe for use,

explains that “[u]nless otherwise stated, all criteria express the maximum not to be

exceeded at any time.” Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-302.530. Second, in setting

out the nutrient levels that waterbodies could safely contain, the regulation says

that “[i]n no case shall nutrient concentrations of a body of water be altered so as
 The Impaired Waters Rule became effective on June 10, 2002. The FDEP’s 3

promulgation of the Impaired Waters Rule was authorized by the Florida Legislature, through the

enactment in 1999 of the Florida Watershed Restoration Act, codified at Fla. Stat. § 403.067. 

This act directed the FDEP to develop and “adopt by rule a methodology for determining those

waters which are impaired” and which, therefore, must be included on the Impaired Waters List. 

Fla. Stat. § 403.067(3)(b). The Florida State Legislature’s action was in response to a consent

decree approved by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida in Florida

Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. Browner, No. 4:98CV356-WS (N.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1999). In that case,

several environmental groups sought to compel the EPA to establish maximum levels of

allowable pollutants for waters on Florida’s 1998 Impaired Waters List. Under the consent

decree, if the state failed to establish these maximums for waters on Florida’s 1998 Impaired

Waters List, the EPA was required to do so.

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to cause an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic flora or fauna.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

The present dispute arose when, on April 26, 2001, the FDEP adopted

chapter 62-303 of the Florida Administrative Code, the so-called “Impaired

Waters Rule.” Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-303.100-.700. The stated purpose of 3

the Impaired Waters Rule was to “interpret existing water quality criteria and

evaluate attainment of established designated uses.” Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-

303.100(3). The Impaired Waters Rule provided that “[i]t is not the intent of this

chapter to establish new water quality criteria or standards, or to determine the

applicability of existing criteria under other provisions of Florida law.” Id. 

 Despite this language, the plaintiffs contend, the Impaired Waters Rule has

effectively changed Florida’s water quality standards. First, they say, while the

original water quality standards required their criteria “not to be exceeded at any
Based on binomial statistical methodology, the Impaired Waters Rule provides a chart 4

setting how many exceedances must be found in a sample set to be an accurate measure of the

total waterbody’s quality. Fla. Admin. Code. Ann. r. 62-303.320. Separate from this chart, the

Impaired Waters Rule mandates that two samples exceeding the maximum concentration for

toxic pollutants must be found before placing a waterbody on the Impaired Waters List. Fla.

Admin. Code. Ann. r. 62-303.340. Also distinct from the general chart of minimum sample

sizes, the Impaired Waters Rule requires that a waterbody have a minimum of two failed

bioassessments -- not just one -- before being placed on the Impaired Waters List. Fla. Admin.

Code. Ann. r. 62-303.430.

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time,” the Impaired Waters Rule allows multiple exceedances to occur without

triggering classification of a waterbody as impaired. In practical effect, the

plaintiffs argue, this results in a more forgiving, looser water quality standard,

since the Impaired Waters Rule requires more than a single sample taken from a

waterbody to exceed the maximum concentration of pollutants before that

waterbody is deemed impaired, Fla. Admin. Code. Ann. r. 62-303.320, .340, .430, 4

while a single exceedance would have sufficed under the pre-existing standards.

Second, the plaintiffs allege, the Impaired Waters Rule changes or adds to

the narrative nutrient standard provided by Florida’s Surface Water Quality

Standards. Florida’s narrative nutrient standards provides that “in no case shall

nutrient concentration of a body of water be altered so as to cause an imbalance in

natural populations of aquatic flora and fauna.” Fla. Admin. Code. Ann. r. 62-

302.530(48)(b). The Impaired Waters Rule adopts specific nutrient concentrations

to be used as the primary means for assessing nutrient impairment; these means
 The relevant Impaired Waters Rule provisions are these:

5

(1) Trophic state indices (TSIs) and annual mean chlorophyll a values shall be the

primary means for assessing whether a water should be assessed further for nutrient

impairment. Other information indicating an imbalance in flora or fauna due to

nutrient enrichment, including, but not limited to, algal blooms, excessive

macrophyte growth, decrease in the distribution (either in density or areal coverage)

of seagrasses or other submerged aquatic vegetation, changes in algal species

richness, and excessive diel oxygen swings, shall also be considered.

(2) To be used to determine whether a water should be assessed further for nutrient

enrichment,

(a) Data must meet the requirements of subsections (2), (4), (6), and (7) in rule 62-

303.320, F.A.C.

(b) At least one sample from each season shall be required in any given year to

calculate a Trophic State Index (TSI) or an annual mean chlorophyll a value for that

year, and 

(c) There must be annual means from at least four years when evaluating the change

in TSI over time pursuant to subsection 62-303.352(3), F.A.C.

(3) When comparing changes in chlorophyll a or TSI values to historical levels,

historical levels shall be based on the lowest five-year average for the period of

record. To calculate a five-year average, there must be annual means from at least

three years of the five-year period.

Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-303.350.

Nutrients in Streams. A stream or stream segment shall be included on the planning

list for nutrients if the following biological imbalances are observed:

(1) Algal mats are present in sufficient quantities to pose a nuisance or hinder

reproduction of a threatened or endangered species, or

(2) Annual mean chlorophyll a concentrations are greater than 20 ug/l or if data

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are not included in the pre-existing, approved water quality standards. In addition,

the Impaired Waters Rule provides specific numeric criteria for nutrient

concentrations which do not exist within Florida’s Surface Water Quality

Standards. Thus, the plaintiffs contend, the Impaired Waters Rule has the effect of

modifying the existing water quality standards.5
indicate annual mean chlorophyll a values have increased by more than 50% over

historical values for at least two consecutive years.

Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-303.351.

Nutrients in Estuaries. Estuaries or estuary segments shall be included on the

planning list for nutrients if their annual mean chlorophyll a for any year is greater

than 11 ug/l or if data indicate annual mean chlorophyll a values have increased by

more than 50% over historical values for at least two consecutive years.

Fla. Admin. Code. Ann. r. 62-303.353.

 During an initial review of an early draft of the Impaired Waters Rule, the EPA noted 6

that “[a]lthough ultimately it may not be a problem, a number of the provisions in the draft rule

are likely to be considered to be revisions to the State’s water quality standards, and as such, will

require review and approval by [the] EPA.” Letter from Beverly H. Banister, Acting Director of

EPA’s Water Management Division, to Jerry Brooks, Assistant Director of FDEP’s Division of

Water Facilities of 9/5/2000, at 2. 

The letter elaborated that the “most troubling aspect of the State’s draft rule are the

numerous provisions that would allow the State to remove from their current section 303(d) list

[of impaired waters] many waters for what the State defines as insufficient data or for other

reasons.” Id. The EPA’s position at this time was that “these provisions are inconsistent with

the CWA and regulations, and would lead to EPA’s disapproval of the a [sic] section 303(d) list

that was based on this methodology.” Id. Mainly, the EPA was concerned with apparent

revisions to the “not to be exceeded” requirement of Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards.

Resolution of Comments by the USEPA on the Florida Draft Rule, at 4 (summarizing earlier

EPA comment letters of 9/5/2000 and 9/22/2000). Specifically, the EPA pointed out the

Impaired Waters Rule’s use of the minimum sample sizes and exclusions of data collected during

certain events or periods. Id.

The EPA also noted the potential revision contained in sections 62-303.340 and 62-

303.440, which required the examination of two samples indicating toxicity before a water was

classified as impaired. The EPA found that “these provisions appear to modify the State’s

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The EPA provided substantial guidance to the Florida Department of

Environmental Protection during the early drafting of the Impaired Waters Rule. 

Indeed, it even pointed out that the Impaired Waters Rule appeared to make

several revisions to Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards. Notably, 6
narrative [water quality standards] criteria for toxicity, and as such, would be revisions [to] the

State’s water quality standards requiring EPA’s review and approval.” Detailed Comments on

the Florida Draft Rule, at 5. The EPA’s stated view was that“[i]t would be appropriate to

conduct a second toxicity test to verify the toxicity determination, but in the absence of such a

second sampling, the water must be considered impaired.” Id. at 6.

Likewise, the EPA objected to the rule requiring two, rather than one, failed

bioassessment before a waterbody is deemed impaired. Id. at 5. The EPA’s stated position was

that “[o]ne biological sampling should be sufficient unless one is unsure of the result and then

one should resample relatively quickly.” Id. The EPA concluded that the provisions providing

biological methods “appear to modify the State’s narrative . . . criteria for biological health, and

as such, would be a revision to the State’s water quality standards requiring EPA review and

approval.” Id.

In addition to the apparent change to the “not to be exceeded at any time” provision of

Florida’s water quality standards, the EPA found in its early reviews that portions of the

proposed Impaired Waters Rule “appear to establish an implementation methodology for the

State’s narrative criteria for nutrients, and, as such, appear to be revisions to Florida’s [water

quality standards] requiring [the] EPA’s review and approval.” Id. at 6. After the FDEP made

several revisions to the IWR, the EPA modified its view of the Impaired Waters Rule. The EPA

explained in a letter to the FDEP that it believed “the [Impaired Waters Rule], as it is now

drafted, has resolved almost all of [the] EPA’s earlier concerns.” Letter from Banister to Brooks

of 4/26/2001, at 1. For example, the EPA’s prior questions about the requirement of two

exceedances for toxic pollutants were answered to the EPA’s satisfaction, by the Impaired

Waters Rule’s new requirement that the FDEP collect a second sample testing for toxic

pollutants when only one sample was available. Resolution of Comments by the USEPA on the

Florida Draft Rule, at 8. The EPA’s concern that certain provisions of the Impaired Waters Rule

could be viewed as a change to Florida’s water quality standards was assuaged by the

regulation’s clarification that “the [Impaired Waters Rule] expresses how the State implements

its [water quality standards] for Section 303(d) listing purposes only, and does not change any

existing [water quality standards].” Letter from Banister to Brooks of 4/26/2001, at 3.

However, in spite of this caveat, the provisions initially questioned by the EPA were left

largely unchanged in substantive terms. Although the revised Impaired Waters Rule stated that it

only provided a methodology for assessing compliance with existing standards, those provisions

the EPA had initially concluded would be viewed as revisions to the existing standards were left

largely the same. 

12

however, the EPA did not conduct an official, thorough review and approval of

the final version of the Impaired Waters Rule, as was required under the Clean
 Because Florida has so many waterbodies, the FDEP divided the fifty-two water basins 7

of the state into five distinct basin groups, with each group representing approximately 20% of

the State’s waters. The update conducted in 2002 (“Group One Update”) only examined data for

the 1600 waterbodies in the first group. 

 Florida later amended the list on May 12, 2003. 8

 At the time when the district court entered final summary judgment, on May 29, 2003, 9

the results of the EPA’s review had not yet been released. 

13

Water Act if, in fact, the Impaired Waters Rule created new or revised water

quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3).

On August 28, 2002, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection

first updated its Impaired Waters List by applying the Impaired Waters Rule. This

update used the Impaired Waters Rule to re-examine about twenty percent of

Florida’s waterbodies. On October 1, 2002, Florida submitted its Group One 7

Update to the 1998 Impaired Waters List (“Group One Update”) to the EPA for

review as required by the Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2); 40 8

C.F.R. § 130.7(d). 

In accordance with EPA regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d), the EPA

reviewed the Group One Update to Florida’s Impaired Waters List and published

the results of its review on June 11, 2003. The EPA explained in its Decision 9

Document that, because parts of the Impaired Waters Rule had “not been used

before and [were] not part of the State’s water quality standards,” the EPA would
 Thus, for example, the EPA’s final position on the added numeric criteria for nutrient 10

concentrations was that the Impaired Waters Rule’s use of chlorophyll a levels and use of TSI to

determine attainment of water quality standards for nutrients was a reasonable method of

applying the State’s approved narrative water quality standard for nutrients. EPA Decision

Document at 34-35. The EPA did not specifically address whether the numeric criteria were

revised or new criteria, although it concluded that “the narrative criteria application set out in

Florida’s listing methodology is consistent with Florida’s approved water quality standard for

nutrients.” Id. at 35. It therefore approved without further review all of the FDEP’s listing

decisions for nutrients in lakes based on that methodology. Id. Similarly, the EPA found the

FDEP’s exclusion of data older than 7.5 years to be “reasonable,” and accordingly adopted the

14

first determine whether application of the Impaired Waters Rule was a

“reasonable” approach to identifying impaired waters. Region 4, Water

Management Division, EPA, Decision Document Regarding Department of

Environmental Protection’s §303(d) List Amendment Submitted on October 1,

2002 and Subsequently Amended on May 12, 2003 at 12 (June 11, 2003) (“EPA

Decision Document”). 

In this review, the EPA did not make a threshold determination whether the

Impaired Waters Rule complied with the requirements of the Clean Water Act,

including its anti-degradation policy. Rather, it first subjected each methodology

adopted by the State to a more general “reasonableness” review. When it

concluded that a particular methodology was reasonable, the EPA approved

without further review all waterbodies placed on the Impaired Waters List under

that methodology -- but, notably, the EPA did not re-examine the data for

waterbodies that were delisted because of the change in methodology. EPA 10
same time frame in its own review. Id. at 23.

 The EPA had concerns about the data excluded by the FDEP. In accordance with the 11

Impaired Waters Rule, waterbodies that did not meet the data sufficiency requirements of the

regulation were not included on the State’s Impaired Waters List. EPA Decision Document at

24. The FDEP thus included the waterbody on either a list of waterbodies with insufficient data

for assessment, called Category 3b, or the list of waterbodies that are potentially impaired, called

Category 3c. Id. The EPA found that the Impaired Waters Rule contradicted an EPA regulation

which required each state to “assemble and evaluate all existing and readily available water

quality-related data and information to develop the list required by §§ 130.7(b)(1) and

130.7(b)(2).” Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(5) (emphasis added)). To determine whether the

Impaired Waters Rule overly restricted data analysis and, therefore, failed to identify limited

segments, the EPA reviewed a random sample of waterbodies listed in Category 3b. Id. Based

on its review, the EPA determined that the data guidelines used by the FDEP “did not result in

the failure to identify any water quality limited segments.” Id.

 The EPA looked closely at the data for each waterbody included in Category 3c, which 12

were the waters that did not meet the data sufficiency requirements of the Impaired Waters Rule. 

As a result, the EPA added some waterbodies onto the Impaired Waters List. Id. at 27, 37. 

While accounting for variability inherent in nature and in sampling and testing procedures, the

15

Decision Document at 34-35. Where the EPA had doubts about an Impaired

Waters Rule methodology, such as the exclusion of waterbodies that did not meet

the sample size and other data requirements, the EPA examined the data of a

random sample of the delisted waterbodies to determine whether the methodology

failed to reasonably identify impaired waters. EPA Decision Document at 24. If

the random sample seemed to establish the reasonableness of a methodology, the

EPA did not further review whether the methodology accurately identified all

impaired waters in that category. In still other cases, the EPA looked more 11

closely at individual sample data and added waterbodies to the Impaired Waters

List based on its independent review. Id. at 27, 37. 

12
EPA reviewed data for trends, levels during critical conditions, and other more site specific data

considerations such as waterbody type. Id. at 37.

 In one case, the EPA completely rejected one provision of the Impaired Waters Rule

13

and added all waterbodies delisted based on that provision. EPA Decision Document at 27. The

statute authorizing the FDEP to develop the Impaired Waters Rule did not permit the FDEP to

add any waterbodies to the Impaired Waters List unless the FDEP identified the pollutant causing

the impairment. Fla. Stat. § 403.067(4). The EPA’s position was that Section 303(d) of the

Clean Water Act required states to list waterbodies that are impaired even when the specific

pollutant was unknown, unless the state could demonstrate that non-pollutant stressors cause the

impairment. EPA Decision Document at 27. As a result, the EPA added all waterbodies which

had been identified by Florida as impaired but were delisted because the pollutant was not

known. Id. 

However, in most cases, the EPA simply conducted an independent review of the

waterbodies affected by a new methodology rejected by the EPA. Thus, for example, the EPA

disapproved of the Impaired Waters Rule’s requirement of at least two samples demonstrating

exceedances of toxic pollutants. It noted that concentrations of toxic and non-conventional

pollutants generally do not vary widely under natural conditions, so that one sample showing an

exceedance probably meant the entire waterbody was over-polluted. Id. at 29. Therefore, the

EPA looked carefully at waterbodies with data related to toxic and non-conventional pollutants,

and added two waterbodies that the FDEP had failed to include on their Impaired Waters List. 

However, the EPA did not require Florida to change its policy in future updates. Likewise, the

EPA took the position that, in some circumstances, a single recent bioassessment could provide

enough evidence that a waterbody is impaired. Id. at 31. Rather than requiring Florida to change

the Impaired Waters Rule, the EPA itself independently reviewed the data for affected

waterbodies to determine if there were any waterbodies which should have been listed based on

existing bioassessment data. Id. at 31-32. As a result of its investigation, the EPA added one

waterbody to the Impaired Waters List that the FDEP had not included in their submission to the

EPA.

16

In no case did the EPA require Florida to change its Impaired Waters Rule. 

Even where it disagreed entirely with a methodology of the new set of regulations,

the EPA simply conducted its own independent review of waterbodies, repeating

rather than simply reviewing the work that Florida was required to do. In its

13

Group One Update, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection removed
 During oral argument, the plaintiffs said that after the EPA re-listed eighty-two 14

waterbodies, there still were one hundred sixty-one waterbodies delisted, but they did not cite to

anything contained in the record to support this assertion. The EPA Decision Document

suggested that a different number of waterbodies were left delisted. This is an issue of fact that

may be resolved in the district court upon remand, but for the purpose of this appeal, it is

sufficient for us to observe that over one hundred waterbodies were delisted by Florida which the

EPA did not put back on the Impaired Waters List.

17

more than one hundred waterbodies from the Impaired Waters List. After review

of the Group One Update, the EPA disagreed with many of these delistings, and

added waterbodies back to the Impaired Waters List. Federal Appellees’ Br. at 2. 

However, even after the EPA’s review of the Group One Update, over one

hundred waterbodies that had previously been considered impaired were now

removed from the Impaired Waters List and were no longer subject to the

procedures used to clean up impaired waters.14

B.

After the effective date of the Impaired Waters Rule, but prior to the EPA’s

release of its review of the Group One Update, the plaintiffs brought this suit

against the EPA under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, to enforce

the unambiguous requirement that the EPA review any new or revised water

quality standards for compliance with the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2). Under

this provision, citizens may sue the EPA and its administrators for failing “to

perform any act or duty under [the Act] which is not discretionary with the
 In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that the Impaired Waters Rule is a policy that 15

implemented Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards, which the EPA is required to approve

or disapprove, see 40 C.F.R. § 131.13, and that the EPA unlawfully withheld or unreasonably

delayed that action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The

APA gives the federal district courts the power to compel such agency action, provided that

“there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. In this case, the district court

concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the APA claim, for the same

reasons it rejected the Clean Water Act citizen suit claim. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that,

even if the district court was correct in concluding that the EPA was not required to review the

Impaired Waters Rule, under 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c), thus barring a citizen suit under 33 U.S.C. §

1965, the EPA still unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed its action to approve policies

that implement a state’s water quality standards, which the APA forbids. However, section

131.13 merely states that states may establish “policies generally affecting their application and

implementation,” which are “subject to EPA review and approval.” 40 C.F.R. § 131.13. This

language does not create a mandatory duty subject to APA regulation, and “the only agency

action that can be compelled under the APA is action legally required.” Norton v. Southern Utah

Wilderness Alliance, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2373, 2379 & n. 1, 159 L. Ed. 137 (2004). Of

course, if the Impaired Waters Rule created new or revised water quality standards, then the EPA

plainly would have a mandatory duty to review the regulation, but in that case, the plaintiffs

would then have a valid claim under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, and thus

would have another “adequate remedy in court” which, in any event, would bar its APA claim.

18

Administrator.” Id. The EPA’s obligation to review any new or revised state

water quality standards is one such mandatory duty. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians

of Fla. v. United States, 105 F.3d 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs

claimed that the effect of the Impaired Waters Rule was to revise Florida’s Surface

Water Quality Standards, and, therefore, that the Impaired Waters Rule was

subject to nondiscretionary review by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c); 40 C.F.R. § 15

131.5.

The FDEP moved to intervene as a defendant and the district court granted

their application. In time, the plaintiffs, the EPA, and the FDEP all filed cross-
19

motions for summary judgment. On May 29, 2003, the district court granted

summary judgment to the EPA. Florida Public Interest Research Group Citizen

Lobby, Inc. v. EPA, No. 4:02cv00408, slip. op. at 12 (N.D. Fla. May 29, 2003)

(“Opinion”). The district court explained its reasoning this way:

To modify or amend Florida’s water quality standards, FDEP must

comply with the rule-making procedures set forth in Florida’s

Administrative Procedure Act. Fla. Stat. ch. 120.54. FDEP has

engaged in no such rule-making process to modify or amend Florida’s

water quality standards, and the EPA has approved no modifications

or amendments to [Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards.] As a

matter of law, therefore, the water quality standards set forth in

chapter 62-302 remain the water quality standards for the State of

Florida notwithstanding FDEP’s adoption of the [Impaired Waters

Rule].

By its own terms, the [Impaired Waters Rule] was and is intended to

provide a methodology for identifying bodies of water that are not

attaining the State of Florida’s approved water quality standards and

that, therefore, must be included on the State’s [Impaired Waters

List]. Under the CWA, the EPA must review and approve Florida’s

[Impaired Waters List] before it becomes the applicable [Impaired

Waters List] for purposes of the CWA . . . . If Florida’s listing

methodology has resulted in an [Impaired Waters List] which is

inconsistent with the state’s existing, EPA-approved water quality

standards codified in chapter 62-302, the EPA would be required to

disapprove the list, in whole or in part, and make its own listing

decisions as appropriate. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(2). The listing

methodology set forth in the [Impaired Waters Rule], in other words,

cannot possibly have the effect of revising Florida’s water quality

standards or policies affecting those standards, provided that the EPA

complies -- as it must -- with the requirements of the CWA.
20

In sum, the EPA and the FDEP persuasively argue, and this court

finds, that the State of Florida, through the [Impaired Waters Rule],

has neither formally, nor in effect, established new or modified

existing water quality standards or policies generally affecting those

water quality standards. 

Opinion at 12-13 (emphasis added). 

The district court thus relied heavily on three major conclusions: (1) the

FDEP had not followed the proper procedures to amend Florida’s water quality

stadards; (2) the EPA had not formally approved any amendments to Florida’s

water quality standards; and (3) the EPA’s subsequent review of the final list of

impaired waters meant that the Impaired Waters Rule could not have the effect of

revising Florida’s water quality standards. The district court, therefore, concluded

that the EPA had no nondiscretionary duty to review the Impaired Waters Rule,

and accordingly, that the court lacked jurisdiction to compel the EPA to review the

Rule, under the provisions of either Title 33 U.S.C. § 1313 or 40 C.F.R. § 131.13. 

It then granted final summary judgment to the defendants.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by failing to

specifically determine the effect of the Impaired Waters Rule on Florida’s Surface

Water Quality Standards. Had the district court done so, the plaintiffs say, it

would have concluded that the effect of the Impaired Waters Rule was actually to

revise Florida’s “not to be exceeded at any time” standard and Florida’s narrative
21

nutrient standard. The plaintiffs urge this Court to declare that as a matter of law

the Impaired Waters Rule is either a revision to Florida’s water quality standards,

or, in the alternative, to remand the case to the district court to determine the effect

of the Impaired Waters Rule on Florida’s water quality standards.

The state appellee, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection,

responds that the district court properly concluded the Impaired Waters Rule could

have no effect on Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards. Moreover, even if

the district court had looked more closely at the Impaired Waters Rule, the FDEP

claims, it would have found that the Impaired Waters Rule simply clarified (and

did not change) existing water quality standards. The federal appellee, the EPA,

argues alternatively that we should affirm because the case is not justiciable: first,

because the plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this suit; and second, because

the EPA’s subsequent independent review of the Group One Update rendered

moot any claim resulting from the EPA’s failure to review the Impaired Waters

Rule.

II.

After thorough review, we conclude that (1) the plaintiffs have standing; (2)

their claim has not been mooted by the EPA’s review of the Impaired Waters List; 

and (3) the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that the Impaired
22

Waters Rule did not establish new or revised water quality standards. The district

court should not have relied on the FDEP’s failure to follow its own procedures to

amend the water quality standards, nor on the EPA’s subsequent review of the

Impaired Waters List. Rather, the district court was required to determine how

Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards had previously been applied, and

whether the Impaired Waters Rule, as applied, actually changed the water quality

standards. Accordingly, we vacate the entry of final summary judgment, and

remand for further proceedings to determine what effect, if any, the Impaired

Waters Rule had on Florida’s water quality standards.

A.

We review questions of standing and mootness de novo. See London v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003); 31 Foster Children

v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). An order of summary judgment is

also subject to de novo review; we apply the same legal standards that bound the

district court. See, e.g., Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Fortune Constr. Co., 320

F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment should be granted when

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
23

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106

S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v.

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569

(1968)). In making this assessment, we “must view all the evidence and all factual

inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party,” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d

1278, 1285 (11th Cir.1997), and “resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in

favor of the non-movant.” United of Omaha Life Ins. v. Sun Life Ins. Co., 894

F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir.1990); see also Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.

Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1271 n. 9 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Rosen v. Bezner,

996 F.2d 1527, 1530 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[B]ecause summary judgment may only

be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact, any purported ‘factual

findings’ of the trial court cannot be ‘factual findings’ . . . but rather are

conclusions as a matter of law . . . .”)).

B.

Before addressing the plaintiffs’ substantive arguments, we are required to

answer whether this case is justiciable. First, the EPA suggests that the plaintiffs
24

have not met the basic requirements of standing. Although the district court did

not rely on standing, the EPA says that the lack of standing affords an alternative

basis to affirm the dismissal. 

It is surely true that “[t]he federal courts are under an independent

obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the most

important of the jurisdictional doctrines.” Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber

Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 807 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). It is also by now well established that to have

standing, and therefore a justiciable “case or controversy,” the plaintiffs must

satisfy three constitutional requirements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d. 351 (1992). They must

establish that: (1) they have suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and

particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) it is likely that the injury

may be redressed by judicial action. Region 8, 993 F.2d at 805.

Moreover, “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

proving standing.” Bischoff v. Osceola County, 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir.

2000); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. “[E]ach element of

standing ‘must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
25

plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence

required at the successive stages of the litigation.’” Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 878

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct. at 2136). Therefore, when standing is

raised on a motion to dismiss, it may be sufficient to provide “general factual

allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct.” Id. “However,

when standing is raised at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff can no longer

rest on ‘mere allegations.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at

2137). Rather, “the plaintiff must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific

facts which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be

true.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). And the court must construe

the disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Id. 

The injury alleged in this case is the plaintiffs’ loss of enjoyment of

Florida’s waters because they are over-polluted. According to the plaintiffs,

Florida is using the Impaired Waters Rule both to remove waterbodies from its

Impaired Waters List and to avoid including waterbodies on the list in the first

place. When a waterbody is not included on the Impaired Waters List, plaintiffs

say, that waterbody is not subject to pollution controls. As a consequence,

pollution continues, degrading the waterbodies and conferring harm on the

plaintiffs. 
26

When Congress “has authorized public officials to perform certain functions

according to law, and has provided by statute for judicial review of those actions

under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standing must begin with a

determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of

the plaintiff.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 1364-65,

31 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1972). The creation of water quality standards by the states, and

the review by the EPA, are plainly intended to “protect the public health or

welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such

standards shall be established taking into consideration their use and value for

public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreation [and other

purposes.]” PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 704-05, 114 S. Ct. at 1905-06 (quoting 33 U.

S. C. § 1313(c)(2)(A)) (alteration in original). Congress has authorized suit by

anyone having an interest that may be adversely affected by agency inaction. See

33 U.S.C. § 1365. The alleged injury may be felt concretely and actually by those

who use the affected waters and “for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of

the area will be lessened” by the degradation of water quality. Morton, 405 U.S. at

735, 92 S. Ct. at 1366. 

The plaintiffs have provided detailed affidavits averring how they are

particularly injured by the EPA’s failure to review the Impaired Waters Rule. R6-
27

2. Thus, for example, Plaintiff Linda Young, a resident of Florida, is an avid

canoeist and enjoys sailing, swimming, fishing, and other water activities. R 6-2

at 1. She uses numerous waterbodies in the state of Florida, including the

Ichetucknee River, Sante Fe River, Suwannee River, Blackwater River, Coldwater

Creek, Santa Rosa Sound, Juniper Creek, Wakulla River, St. Mark’s River, Aucilla

River, and numerous lakes and sinkholes in Leon County. Id. at 1. Her

enjoyment of Florida’s waters, she claims, has been “severely limited” by the

EPA’s failure to review the Impaired Waters Rule. Id. For example, the

Fenholloway River, located south of Tallahassee, she says, used to be “beautiful

and clean.” Id. This waterbody had previously been declared impaired, and the

state was required to take steps to monitor and clean the waterbody. However,

because the Impaired Waters Rule caused this waterbody to be delisted from the

Impaired Waters List, and because the EPA failed to review the Impaired Waters

Rule, at the time suit was filed this “polluted river” was no longer subject to the

appropriate clean-up procedures. According to Young, “the very polluted river

remains unfit for fishing or swimming.” Id. at 2. Thus, plaintiff Young’s use of

the river has allegedly been impaired because it is polluted and she can not canoe

in it, purportedly because of the EPA’s inaction. 
Plaintiff Linda Young and Sierra Club member Kathleen Cantwell are just two of the 16

numerous individuals who have submitted detailed declarations in support of the plaintiffs’

claims. In the interest of brevity, we have not detailed the claims of all the individuals who

buttress the plaintiffs’ position on standing. We do note, however, that in addition to those of

Young and Cantwell, the plaintiffs have submitted additional declarations from FPIRG members

Holly Binns and Mark Ferrulo, SOS members Loye Barnard, Tommy Brunjes, and Layne

Redmond, FSSR member Russell Herrmann, and Sierra Club members Dwight Adams, Linda

Pollini, Julia Reiskind, Julia Thaler, Susan Wright, as well as Gladys Lane, a resident of

Gainesville, Florida. The allegations contained within these additional declarations echo, in

material terms, those made by Young and Cantwell.

For a voluntary membership organization like FPIRG, SOS, FSSR or Sierra Club to have

standing, it must meet certain requirements. The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]n

28

Likewise, Sierra Club member Kathleen Cantwell canoes, swims, and fishes

in many of Florida’s waterbodies, including the Ichetucknee River, the Santa Fe

River, and the Suwannee River as well as the springs connected to these rivers. 

R6-2 at 1. She avers that she uses waterbodies that were delisted from the

Impaired Waters List, or were excluded from the list in the first place, as a result

of the Impaired Waters Rule, allowing pollution of the waterbodies to continue. 

Id. As a result, she too claims that the EPA’s failure to review the Impaired

Waters Rule has adversely affected her enjoyment of the waterbodies. Id. at 2. 

In addition, she claims that she used to eat the bass that she caught in the Sante Fe

and Suwanee Rivers, but does not do so now because of concerns about

heightened levels of mercury. Id. Because Florida delisted sections of those water

bodies, Cantwell says that the mercury problem is not being resolved by Florida or

the federal government, further diminishing her enjoyment of the waters.16
association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would

otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the

organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528

U.S. 167, 181, 120 S. Ct. 693, 704, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple

Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977)). The

Supreme Court explained the rationale behind these organizational standing requirements by

observing that, “[i]f in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other

form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to

the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

515, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2213, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). Those individual members of FPIRG, SOS,

FSSR, and Sierra Club who have submitted detailed declarations have standing to pursue claims

in their own names. Moreover, the interests this lawsuit seeks to protect are tied to the

organizational missions of these groups, and the prospective relief sought, if awarded, would

inure to the benefit of their members, making individual participation unnecessary. FPIRG, SOS,

FSSR and Sierra Club have established the requirements of standing.

29

The harm that these individuals claim to have suffered -- the pollution of

waterbodies that they use and whose integrity the Clean Water Act is intended to

protect -- is of a type the courts have recognized as an “injury in fact.” See, e.g.,

Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 984-986 (9th Cir. 1994)

(concluding plaintiffs had standing under Clean Water Act to challenge the EPA’s

failure to establish maximum pollutant levels for waterbodies in the state of

Alaska); see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Amer. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221,

230, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2866, 92 L. Ed. 2d. 166 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs

alleged a sufficient “injury in fact” in that their members’ whale-watching and

studying would be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting, and this type

of injury was within “zone of interests” protected by statute); Biodiversity Legal
30

Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that

environmental groups had standing to complain of exclusion of species from list

of endangered species).

Moreover, there seems to be little dispute that the plaintiffs have satisfied

the other prongs of the standing inquiry. The purported injury -- caused by the

continued pollution of the state’s waterbodies -- is fairly traceable to the EPA’s

failure to review the Impaired Waters Rule, since use of the Rule could result in

polluted waterbodies being left off the Impaired Waters List and not being

cleaned. Finally, the claimed injury may be redressed by requiring the EPA to

review the state’s Impaired Waters Rule. Thus, we conclude that the plaintiffs

have standing to sue.

We turn, then, to the second aspect of the justiciability inquiry: whether the

case has become moot. On this point, the EPA contends that the plaintiffs’ claims

are no longer justiciable because of the EPA’s subsequent review of the Group

One Update. As with standing, the district court did not grant summary judgment

based on mootness, but “[l]ike the requirement of standing, mootness is a

justiciability doctrine that must be satisfied before we may decide a case.” Granite

State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 2003). 

“The doctrine of mootness derives directly from the case-or-controversy limitation
31

because an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or

controversy. A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,

273 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Or, put another way, “a case is moot when it no longer

presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful

relief. If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal

deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief,

then the case is moot and must be dismissed.” Id. Indeed, because mootness is

jurisdictional, dismissal is mandated. Id. “Any decision on the merits of a moot

case or issue would be an impermissible advisory opinion.” Id.

The EPA argues that this case is now moot because, even if the plaintiffs

initially had standing, the EPA’s subsequent review of the Impaired Waters List

nullifies any harm that may have resulted from the EPA’s failure to review the

Impaired Waters Rule itself. According to the EPA, even if the Impaired Waters

Rule changed Florida’s water quality standards, the EPA has reversed, and always

will reverse, the effect of any change by reviewing the Impaired Waters List

(which the Impaired Waters Rule is used to compile). In essence, the EPA says

that no harm to the plaintiffs has resulted -- nor could it ever materialize -- from
As we apprehend it, the EPA’s arguments on mootness and standing are intimately 17

related. The EPA appears to argue, first, that its review of the Impaired Waters List prevents any

injury-in-fact from accruing, thus defeating standing. In a similar but alternative formulation, the

EPA suggests that its review of the Impaired Waters List has the practical effect of reversing any

injury that its failure to review the Impaired Waters Rule could have caused, thus rendering the

plaintiffs’ claims moot. While the EPA advances variations of this argument to attack standing

and assert mootness, we believe this contention is more properly understood as asserting that no

“live” controversy exists, and we therefore address this argument in terms of mootness.

Of course, the EPA had not yet reviewed the Group One Update when the plaintiffs 18

filed their complaint. And “[t]he existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts

as they exist when the complaint is filed.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4, 112 S. Ct. at 2141 n.4

(emphasis in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). At the time the plaintiffs filed suit,

the EPA had not yet conducted its Group One Update review and it was entirely unclear whether

its review would adequately address the alleged infirmities of the state’s Impaired Waters Rule.

32

the EPA’s failure to review the Impaired Waters Rule, “so long as [the] EPA

properly discharges its responsibility to independently assess which waters should

be listed based on Florida’s underlying water quality standards.” Federal 17

Appellees’ Br. at 29. However, we believe that the EPA’s review of the Group

One Update cannot vitiate the plaintiffs’ citizen suit, which is based precisely on

the EPA’s failure to review the Impaired Waters Rule.18

In the first place, the EPA’s review of the Group One Update has several

notable differences from the kind of review required by section 303(c) of the

statute. Section 303(c) requires a rigorous examination of many factors, including,

inter alia, (1) whether the state’s criteria protect the designated water uses; (2)

whether the state followed its own legal procedures for revising or adopting

standards; (3) whether the state standards are based on appropriate technical and
33

scientific data and analyses; and (4) whether the revision is consistent with the

state’s antidegradation policy. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B), 40 C.F.R. § 131.5. 

It is plain from the EPA Decision Document that the EPA’s review of the

Group One Update was not as comprehensive as the review mandated by section

303(c) for new or revised water quality standards. In the Group One Update, the

EPA never determined whether Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards were

properly amended according to Florida’s own legal requirements, and the EPA

simply assumed that the Impaired Waters Rule was not a change in water quality

standards. Having thus assumed as a given the answer to the very question at

issue here, the EPA merely examined the Impaired Waters Rule for

“reasonableness,” rather than subjecting it to the searching review mandated by

section 303(c).

The EPA’s review of Florida’s Impaired Waters List not only involved the

application of a more forgiving standard than the proper review of the Impaired

Waters Rule under section 303(c), but it occurred at a later stage in Florida’s

process of identifying impaired waterbodies. As a result, the EPA’s subsequent

review of Florida’s Impaired Waters List would not eradicate any harm the

waterbodies sustained in the interim period, after Florida left the waterbodies off

the Impaired Waters List, but before the EPA reviewed the updated list. 
34

Moreover, notably, the injuries alleged by plaintiffs go beyond those caused

by Florida’s listing decisions in the Group One Update. The injuries may recur

each time the Impaired Waters List is updated, as Florida re-examines data for the

remaining four water basin groups (and submits updates for Groups Two through

Five). Thus, going forward, the potential for real and concrete injury continues,

and injunctive relief may be appropriate. Simply put, the controversy has not been

mooted by the EPA’s review of the Group One Update.

In addition, Florida’s reliance on the EPA’s review of its Impaired Waters

List is inappropriate because it eliminates one layer of protection envisioned by

the Clean Water Act. Under the Act, states are charged, in the first instance, with

identifying those waters that are impaired, or are over-polluted according to the

states’ water quality standards. If Florida could rely on the EPA’s review of its

Impaired Waters List to ensure that the methods in the Impaired Waters Rule

correctly reflected the existing water quality standards, then, for all practical

purposes, the power to enforce compliance would reside solely with the federal

agency. Yet the Clean Water Act plainly envisions a joint effort between the

federal and state governments to enforce pollution controls. See Arkansas, 503

U.S. at 101, 112 S. Ct. at 1054.
35

In spite of these concerns, the EPA says that this case is moot because the

relief the plaintiffs seek -- review of the Impaired Waters Rule by the EPA for

consistency with the Clean Water Act -- is no longer meaningful, and cannot

redress any legally cognizable injury. According to the EPA, once it decided on

June 11, 2003 to approve Florida’s Group One Update in part, disapprove it in

part, and add certain waterbodies to the list, “any consequence that the Florida

[Impaired Waters Rule] may have had to the interests of any member of the public,

such as the plaintiffs, merged into the question of the propriety of EPA’s action

ultimately placing certain Florida waters on the [Impaired Waters List.]” Federal

Appellees’ Br. at 31-32.

Again, we remain unpersuaded. First, as we have already noted, the EPA’s

review of the Group One Update was not as comprehensive as a mandated section

303(c) review of the Impaired Waters Rule would be. Second, there is no

guarantee that the EPA will conduct thorough reviews of future updates. Finally,

we can find no precedent suggesting that the EPA may satisfy a specific duty

under one section of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)-(4)) simply by

following the mandate of another section of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §

1313(d)(2)). Indeed, our case law suggests that, at least for the purpose of

evaluating mootness, the only way in which the EPA can satisfy a mandatory duty
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth 19

Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir.1981) (en banc).

36

is by actually discharging that obligation in the manner specifically required by the

statute. See Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1977). Likewise, 19

in this case, we conclude that the “reasonableness” review of the Group One

Update conducted by the EPA did not satisfy the duty, if it exists, to review the

Impaired Waters Rule in the first instance to determine whether the Rule complies

with the requirements of the Clean Water Act. 

Quite simply, the controversy between the parties remains alive, the

plaintiffs still have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, and meaningful

relief may still be awarded to them. As we see it, the plaintiffs’ claims were not

mooted by the EPA’s review of the Impaired Waters List.

C.

We turn then to the plaintiffs’ argument on the merits -- that the district

court erroneously granted summary judgment based on the conclusion that the

Impaired Waters Rule did not create new or revised water quality standards. The

plaintiffs say, first, that the district court failed to conduct the proper review of the

Impaired Waters Rule to determine whether it had the effect of modifying

Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards. The plaintiffs also claim that, had the
37

district court done so, it would have determined that the Impaired Waters Rule

actually changed Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards in at least two

principal ways. According to the plaintiffs, the Impaired Waters Rule modified

the existing standards by creating numeric nutrient standards where none had

previously existed, and by requiring more than one exceedance before waterbodies

are classified as impaired, while a single exceedance sufficed under the previous

standards. 

We agree with the plaintiffs that the district court erred by failing to conduct

a thorough review of the effect of the Impaired Waters Rule on the water quality

standards of Florida. The district court should have determined whether the

practical impact of the Impaired Waters Rule was to revise Florida’s Surface

Water Quality Standards. In order to do so, the district court was required to look

beyond the Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s characterization of

the Impaired Waters Rule as a methodology or “screening measure” that did not

change the standards. Because the district court did not conduct a full analysis, we

are constrained to vacate its order of summary judgment and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In Miccosukee, we considered a similar situation, where Florida had failed

to submit the Everglades Forever Act (“EFA”), Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.4592 (1994), 
38

to the EPA for review and approval. The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians sued,

alleging -- like the plaintiffs did in this case -- that the EPA was required to review

the newly enacted statute because it changed Florida’s water quality standards. 

Miccosukee, 105 F.3d at 601. In Miccosukee, the district court initially held that

“Florida did not consider the EFA as a change in state water quality standards,

made no submission to the Administrator and did not trigger the Administrator’s

duty to evaluate the EFA.” Id. As a result, the district court in Miccosukee

concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case and dismissed it, just as the

district court did in this case.

We held that the district court in Miccosukee erred because it

“inappropriately relied on Florida’s representations that the EFA did not change

Florida’s water quality standards.” Id. at 602. As we explained, “[e]ven if a state

fails to submit new or revised standards, a change in state water quality standards

could invoke the mandatory duty imposed on the [EPA] to review new or revised

standards.” Id at 602. Therefore, we concluded that “[i]n the absence of action by

the [EPA] . . . the district court should have conducted its own factual findings.” 

Id. at 603. Because jurisdiction depended on whether the EFA constituted new or

revised water quality standards, thereby invoking the EPA’s mandatory duty, “the

district court had to decide independently the effect of the EFA on existing state
39

standards.” Id. In other words, “[t]he district court could not simply accept

Florida’s representations,” id., but had to undertake its own inquiry into the actual

effect of the EFA. Because an issue of fact remained as to “whether the EFA

changed Florida’s water quality standards,” id., and because the district court

failed to make any determination on the issue, we reversed and remanded for the

district court to undertake the proper inquiry.

As we see it, in this case the district court made the same kind of error as

the district court did in Miccosukee. Essentially, it accepted at face value the

language in the Impaired Waters Rule saying that the regulation did not change

Florida’s water quality standards. But Miccosukee requires more of the district

court; rather than simply taking Florida’s word for it, the court was required to

conduct an independent inquiry into the actual effect of the Impaired Waters Rule. 

Florida’s decision not to describe its own regulations as new or revised water

quality standards simply cannot “circumvent the purposes of the Clean Water

Act,” if in effect the Impaired Waters Rule established new or revised standards. 

Id. at 602. If it could, Florida could radically modify its water quality standards,

simply disavow that a change had taken place, and the EPA could rely on Florida’s

disavowal to avoid its mandatory review of the modified standards.
40

Nor was it proper for the district court, in concluding that the Impaired

Waters Rule did not change the existing standards, to rely on the fact that Florida

did not follow the mandated procedures to amend its water quality standards. 

Indeed, the very fact that Florida failed to properly amend Florida’s Surface Water

Quality Standards is one factor the EPA would be required to consider in a section

303(c) review of the Impaired Waters Rule. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.5 (requiring the

EPA to determine “[w]hether the State has followed its legal procedures for

revising or adopting standards”). In short, the district court was obliged to “decide

independently the effect” that the Impaired Waters Rule had on “existing state

standards.” Id. at 603. 

The record establishes that both the FDEP and the EPA applied the

Impaired Waters Rule when they created and approved the Group One Update’s

changes to Florida’s Impaired Waters List. Thus, if waterbodies that under preexisting testing methodologies would have been included on the list were left off

the list because of the Impaired Waters Rule, then in effect the Rule would have

created new or revised water quality standards, even if the language of the

regulation said otherwise. 

This is the crux of the matter. The plaintiffs maintain that, regardless of

how the defendants characterize the Impaired Waters Rule, the Rule has the
While the context of the observation is different, we are reminded of the words of 20

Ferdinand Lassalle, who wrote:

Show us not the aim without the way.

For ends and means on earth are so entangled

That changing one, you change the other too;

Each different path brings other ends in view.

Ferdinand Lassalle, Franz von Sickingen (quoted in Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon 241

(Daphne Hardy trans., MacMillan Publ’g Co. 1987) (1941)).

41

practical impact of altering Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards. This is

true, the plaintiffs suggest, because waterbodies that were considered impaired

under the existing standards are not classified as impaired under the Impaired

Waters Rule, even when the overall levels of pollution are unchanged. Thus,

plaintiffs say, the Rule has the effect of loosening Florida’s water quality

standards. Even if the Impaired Waters Rule was designed simply as a means to

measure which waterbodies met water quality standards and which did not, the

plaintiffs maintain that the practical impact of these means necessarily changes the

ends, as well. That is, if changing the means used to measure compliance with

standards also alters the list of waters deemed compliant, the change in means

effectively causes a change in standards, as well.20

The defendants respond that the Impaired Waters Rule is properly

understood as a methodology, or as a tool, which is used to assess what

waterbodies meet the applicable standards. According to the defendants, Florida’s
42

Surface Water Quality Standards remain unchanged by the Impaired Waters Rule,

which merely prescribes specific techniques for measuring whether waterbodies

comply with the appropriate standards, or whether they are over-polluted.

In this case, the district court was obliged to determine whether the

Impaired Waters Rule had the practical effect of loosening Florida’s water quality

standards. To undertake that analysis in a meaningful way, it is necessary to

examine whether there were waterbodies that were equally polluted both before

and after the Impaired Waters Rule took effect, but that were classified differently

depending on whether or not the Rule was used. 

It is undisputed that numerous waterbodies included on the 1998 Impaired

Waters List were de-listed in the Group One Update, following the application of

the Impaired Waters Rule. And while the EPA’s review of the Group One Update

restored a portion of these waterbodies to Florida’s Impaired Waters List, several

of the de-listed waterbodies were not restored to the list. If the pollution in these

waterbodies was in fact reduced prior to the Group One Update, then their delisting may not indicate a loosening of the water quality standards. It is also

possible, however, that these waterbodies remained equally polluted, but were delisted because the data indicating that fact was insufficient to meet the statistical

requirements of the Impaired Waters Rule. If this is correct, then the plaintiffs’
43

claims may be meritorious: the practical effect of the Impaired Waters Rule may

indeed have been to loosen Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards.

On this spare and incomplete record, however, it is simply impossible for us

to determine, with any confidence, whether the de-listing of these waterbodies

resulted from the application of more rigorous statistical methods contained in the

Impaired Waters Rule, or whether these waterbodies were removed from the

Impaired Waters List because their pollution levels really did drop. What we do

think is clear, however, is that the brief consideration the district court gave to the

impact of the Impaired Waters Rule was insufficient to satisfy the mandate

imposed by Miccosukee for the district court to conduct an independent review. 

The court unduly relied upon Florida’s declarations that there were no

modifications to the existing standards, and inappropriately accepted the EPA’s

assurances that its later review of changes to the Impaired Waters List meant that

the Impaired Waters Rule could not “possibly have the effect of revising Florida’s

water quality standards or policies affecting those standards[.]” Opinion at 12.

Accordingly, we remand so that the district court may determine whether the

Impaired Waters Rule, as applied, was an effective change to the Florida’s existing

water quality standards, as applied. 
44

Ultimately, whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’

suit depends on whether the Impaired Waters Rule had the effect of revising or

adding to Florida’s Surface Water Quality Standards. In answering that question

in the negative, the district court did not fully examine the practical impact the

Impaired Waters Rule may have had on the state’s existing water quality standards

-- an examination necessary to the proper resolution of the jurisdictional question. 

We are, therefore, constrained to vacate the final order of summary judgment and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.