COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton 

KAREN ATKINS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record Nos. 3398—02-2 and PER CURIAM 

 3399-02-2 MAY 27, 2003 

RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF 

 SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Randall G. Johnson, Judge 

 (Richard G. White, Jr., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 (Shunda T. Giles; Richmond City Attorney's 

Office, on briefs) for appellee. 

 Karen Atkins appeals decisions terminating her parental 

rights to her daughters pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). On 

appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to 

support the termination. We disagree, and summarily affirm the 

decisions of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't 

of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
So viewed, the evidence established the children were born 

August 30, 1995, and February 15, 2000, and lived with Atkins 

and her husband, Timothy Atkins. On November 3, 2000, the 

younger child was admitted to the hospital for injuries she 

sustained while in the care of Atkins and her husband. Laurie 

Coleman, a Child Protective Services employee, investigated the 

incident. Her investigation revealed that the child sustained 

her injuries while with her caretakers, that they were not 

accidental, and could not have been caused from falling from her 

crib as alleged by Atkins and her husband. Coleman met with 

Atkins to discuss a plan to keep both children safe while in her 

care. Atkins refused to provide Coleman with any information 

regarding her husband. The Richmond Department of Social 

Services removed the child from Atkins's home and placed her in 

foster care. 

 On December 18, 2000, the Department received a complaint 

alleging the older child was being abused and neglected by 

Atkins and her husband. Atkins reported she and her husband 

were arguing while her husband was driving. He removed his 

hands from the steering wheel and began hitting Atkins. The car 

collided with other vehicles. The Department sought the child's 

removal from Atkins's home. On December 29, 2000, the juvenile 

court denied the Department's request for emergency removal and 

the child was returned to mother with a protective order 

directing that Atkins's husband have no contact with the child. 

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 Atkins later allowed her husband to return to their home 

and sent the child to live with her husband's mother. In 

February 2001, fire destroyed Atkins's residence. Atkins said 

her husband smashed items in the house with a sledgehammer after 

an argument and then burned the residence. Atkins's husband 

blamed her for the fire. He moved in with his mother, where he 

had contact with the older child. The Department removed the 

child on March 2, 2001, citing the violation of the protective 

order and Atkins's neglect. The Department could not determine 

Atkins's whereabouts at the time of the removal. 

 On March 5, 2001, Coleman met with Atkins to discuss 

efforts she needed to make to regain custody of her two 

children. Coleman advised Atkins to secure adequate housing, 

attend parenting classes, and maintain contact with the foster 

care worker. Atkins was ordered to obtain a substance abuse 

assessment, to follow all treatment recommendations, and to 

cooperate with domestic violence counseling. 

 The juvenile court disapproved the initial foster care plan 

with the goal of returning home. The Department submitted a new 

plan with the goal of adoption. From November 2000 through 

January 2002, Atkins failed to attend parenting classes, to have 

a psychological evaluation, to obtain substance abuse 

assessment, and to attend the domestic violence program. She 

continued to have contact with her husband, and lost custody of 

her newborn baby because of continued domestic violence from her 

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husband. Atkins maintained monthly visitation with the 

children. Atkins failed, however, to maintain stable 

employment. 

 On January 29, 2002, following a court hearing, Kimberly 

McClintic, the foster care social worker to whom the case had 

been reassigned, met with Atkins. McClintic informed Atkins she 

needed to attend parenting classes and domestic violence 

classes, have a substance abuse evaluation, and secure stable 

housing and employment in order to regain custody of her 

children. Although Atkins attended only six parenting classes, 

she completed the substance abuse evaluation and mental health 

assessment. Atkins never complied with the domestic violence 

program as ordered by the court, repeatedly refused housing 

referrals, and failed to secure stable, consistent housing or 

provide verification of the housing she claimed she had. For 

three months during the summer of 2002, Atkins failed to 

maintain contact with the Department. She admitted past drug 

use and involvement in large scale cocaine distribution. 

Analysis

 The statute permits termination of parental rights if the 

trial judge finds by clear and convincing evidence, (i) that the 

termination is in the best interests of the child, (ii) that 

"reasonable and appropriate" services have been offered to help 

the parent "substantially remedy the conditions which led to or 

required continuation of the child's foster care placement," and 

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(iii) that, despite those services, the parent has failed, 

"without good cause," to remedy those conditions "within a 

reasonable amount of time not to exceed twelve months from the 

date the child was placed in foster care." Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2). We are mindful of the principle that "[t]he 

termination of residual parental rights is a grave, drastic and 

irreversible action," Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human 

Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991), but on 

review of a termination order we "'presume[] [the trial judge 

has] thoroughly weighed all the evidence [and] considered the 

statutory requirements,'" Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human 

Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (quoting 

Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 

(1990)). The judge is not required to state his or her findings 

of fact and conclusions of law with specificity as long as the 

record contains evidence to support the decision. 

 The evidence we have recited was sufficient to prove, by 

clear and convincing evidence, both (1) that the Department made 

"reasonable and appropriate efforts" to help Atkins remedy the 

conditions "which led to or required continuation of the child's 

foster care placement" and (2) that Atkins, without good cause, 

failed "to substantially remedy" those conditions within a 

reasonable period of time. In reaching this conclusion, the 

judge was required by Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) to "take into 

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consideration the prior efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate 

the parent." 

Remedial Efforts

 In her briefs, Atkins asserts she largely complied with the 

Department's requirements for remedying the conditions which led 

to foster care. The evidence established, however, that she 

repeatedly failed to attend parenting classes, to complete a 

domestic violence program, to obtain stable housing and 

employment, and to submit to a substance abuse and mental health 

assessment. The evidence proved Atkins continued to have 

substantial contact with her abusive husband and failed to 

protect the child by violating the court order prohibiting all 

contact with him. 

Evidence of Neglect of Other Children

 Atkins also argues the trial judge impermissibly considered 

evidence pertaining to the removal of her newborn son after the 

daughters were placed in foster care. 

 "The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be 

disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." 

Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 

(1988). As we held in Logan, evidence of Atkins's 

neglect of her other children demonstrates 

she has a pattern of neglect, which is of 

definite probative value when coupled with 

her unwillingness to correct her 

deficiencies in her care of [her daughters]. 

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Mindful of the court's primary goal of 

ensuring [the children's] best interest, we 

cannot say the court abused its discretion 

by considering evidence of [mother's] 

neglect of her other children. 

13 Va. App. at 132-33, 409 S.E.2d at 465. 

Relatives

 Finally, Atkins contends the Department failed to produce 

sufficient evidence that there were no relatives willing and 

suitable to take custody of the children as required under Code 

§ 16.1-283(A). "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was 

stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the 

ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of 

Appeals to attain the ends of justice." Rule 5A:18. Atkins did 

not present this argument to the trial court. Accordingly, Rule 

5A:18 bars our consideration of this question on appeal. 

Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the 

good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18 

 For these reasons, we summarily affirm the decisions of the 

trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.

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