Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 29, 2022 / Notices 38707 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 

2Aeroflot is the subject of a Temporary Denial 

Order issued on April 8, 2022. See 87 FR 21611 

(April 12, 2022). 

3 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS 

published a final rule effective April 8, 2022, which 

imposed licensing requirements on items controlled 

on the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’) under 

Categories 0–2 that are destined for Russia or 

Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require 

export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses 

if destined for or within Russia or Belarus. 87 FR 

22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). 

4 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022). 

5Section 736.2(b)(10) of the EAR provides: 

General Prohibition Ten—Proceeding with 

transactions with knowledge that a violation has 

occurred or is about to occur (Knowledge Violation 

to Occur). You may not sell, transfer, export, 

reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, 

store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or 

otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item 

subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported 

with knowledge that a violation of the Export 

Administration Regulations, the Export 

Administration Act or any order, license, License 

Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder 

has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to 

occur in connection with the item. Nor may you 

rely upon any license or License Exception after 

notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that 

license or exception. There are no License 

Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 

740 of the EAR. (emphasis in original). 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Dated: June 24, 2022. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2022–13876 Filed 6–28–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Washington, DC 20230; Pobeda 

Airlines, 108811, Russian Federation, 

Moscow, p. Moskovskiy, Kievskoe 

shosse, 22nd km, 4/1. Moscow, Russia; 

Order Temporarily Denying Export 

Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of Russian airline Pobeda 

Airlines (‘‘Pobeda’’). OEE’s request and 

related information indicates that 

Pobeda is headquartered in Moscow, 

Russia, and Aeroflot Russian Airlines 

JSC, a/k/a PJSC Aeroflot (‘‘Aeroflot’’) is 

Pobeda’s majority shareholder.2 The 

Russian Federal Government is the 

majority owner of Aeroflot, through its 

Federal Agency for State Property 

Management. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation 

may be ‘imminent’ either in time or 

degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that 

a violation is about to occur, or that the 

general circumstances of the matter 

under investigation or case under 

criminal or administrative charges 

demonstrate a likelihood of future 

violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of 

future violations, BIS may show that the 

violation under investigation or charge 

‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 

likely to occur again, rather than 

technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of 

information establishing the precise 

time a violation may occur does not 

preclude a finding that a violation is 

imminent, so long as there is sufficient 

reason to believe the likelihood of a 

violation.’’ Id. 

II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order (‘‘TDO’’) 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further 

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 

sweeping series of stringent export 

controls that severely restrict Russia’s 

access to technologies and other items 

that it needs to sustain its aggressive 

military capabilities. These controls 

primarily target Russia’s defense, 

aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 

intended to cut off Russia’s access to 

vital technological inputs, atrophy key 

sectors of its industrial base, and 

undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to 

exert influence on the world stage. 

Effective February 24, 2022, BIS 

imposed expansive controls on aviationrelated (e.g., Commerce Control List 

Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, 

including a license requirement for the 

export, reexport or transfer (in-country) 

to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts 

specified in Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 

(Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).3 BIS 

will review any export or reexport 

license applications for such items 

under a policy of denial. See Section 

746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS 

excluded any aircraft registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia from being eligible for license 

exception Aircraft, Vessels, and 

Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the 

EAR).4 Accordingly, any U.S.-origin 

aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes 

more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin 

content, and that is registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia, is subject to a license 

requirement before it can travel to 

Russia. 

OEE’s request is based upon facts 

indicating that Pobeda engaged in 

conduct prohibited by the Regulations 

by operating multiple aircraft subject to 

the EAR and classified under ECCN 

9A991, including but not limited to 

those below, on international flights, 

including from Antalya, Gazipasa, and 

Istanbul, Turkey to Russia after March 2, 

2022, without the required BIS 

authorization. Pursuant to Section 746.8 

of the EAR, all of these flights would 

have required export or reexport 

licenses from BIS. Pobeda flights would 

not be eligible to use license exception 

AVS. No BIS authorizations were either 

sought or obtained by Pobeda for these 

exports or reexports to Russia. 

Additionally, Pobeda’s continued use 

of such U.S.-origin aircraft on domestic 

routes within Russia runs afoul of 

General Prohibition 10, which (among 

other restrictions) prohibits the 

continued use of an item that was 

known to have been exported or 

reexported in violation of the EAR. See 

General Prohibition 10 of the EAR at 15 

CFR 736.2(b)(10).5 Specifically, OEE’s 

investigation, including publicly 

available flight tracking information, 

indicates that after March 2, 2022, 

Pobeda operated multiple U.S.-origin 

aircraft, including, but not limited to, 

those identified below, domestically on 

flights into and out of Russian cities, 

including Kazan, Russia; Moscow, 

Russia; Murmansk, Russia; Nalchik, 

Russia; Perm, Russia; St. Petersburg, 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
38708 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 29, 2022 / Notices 

6https://www.pobeda.aero/en/. 

Russia; and Surgut, Russia. The information about those flights includes 

the following: 

Tail No. Serial No. Aircraft type Departure/arrival cities Dates 

VQ–BQB/RA–73225 .. 64862 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU ........... March 6, 2022. 

RA–73225 .................. 64862 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Kazan, RU/St. Petersburg, RU .. June 20, 2022. 

RA–73225 .................. 64862 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Moscow, RU/Nalchik, RU .......... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73225 .................. 64862 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Moscow, RU/Murmansk, RU ..... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73225 .................. 64862 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Moscow, RU/Nalchik, RU .......... June 22, 2022. 

VQ–BQC/RA–73226 .. 64863 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Gazipasa, TR/Moscow, RU ....... March 7, 2022. 

RA–73226 .................. 64863 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Nalchik, RU/Moscow, RU .......... June 20, 2022. 

RA–73226 .................. 64863 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Saratov, RU/Moscow, RU .......... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73226 .................. 64863 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Moscow, RU/Saratov, RU .......... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73226 .................. 64863 737–8MC (B738) ........................ St. Petersburg, RU/Perm, RU .... June 22, 2022. 

VP–BQE/RA–73227 ... 64864 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Istanbul, TR/Mineralnye Vody, 

RU.

March 6, 2022. 

RA–73227 .................. 64864 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Minsk, BY/St. Petersburg, RU ... June 17, 2022. 

RA–73227 .................. 64864 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Moscow, RU/Perm, RU .............. June 20, 2022. 

RA–73227 .................. 64864 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Perm, RU/St. Petersburg, RU .... June 20, 2022. 

RA–73227 .................. 64864 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Perm, RU/St. Petersburg, RU .... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73227 .................. 64864 737–8MC (B738) ........................ St. Petersburg, RU/Mineralnye 

Vody, RU.

June 22, 2022. 

VP–BQQ/RA–73232 .. 64869 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Istanbul, TR/Moscow, RU .......... March 7, 2022. 

RA–73232 .................. 64869 737–8MC (B738) ........................ St. Petersburg, RU/Mineralnye 

Vody, RU.

June 20, 2022. 

RA–73232 .................. 64869 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Mineralnye Vody, RU/Moscow, 

RU.

June 20, 2022. 

RA–73232 .................. 64869 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Surgut, RU/Moscow, RU ............ June 21, 2022. 

RA–73232 .................. 64869 737–8MC (B738) ........................ Moscow, RU/Perm, RU .............. June 22, 2022. 

Based upon the on-going violations by 

Pobeda, there are heightened concerns 

of future violations of the EAR, 

especially given that any subsequent 

actions taken with regard to any of the 

listed aircraft, or other Pobeda aircraft 

exported or reexported to Russia after 

March 2, 2022, may violate the EAR. 

Such actions include, but are not 

limited to, refueling, maintenance, 

repair, or the provision of spare parts or 

services. Id. 

Moreover, additional concerns of 

future violations of the Regulations are 

raised by public information on 

Pobeda’s website, available as of the 

date of this order, indicating that 

Pobeda intends to continue its domestic 

flight routes. Specifically, Pobeda’s 

website continues to advertise flights 

from Moscow, Russia to other Russian 

cities, including Kaliningrad, St. 

Petersburg, and Kazan.6 Given BIS’s 

review policy of denial under Section 

746.8(a) of the Regulations for exports 

and reexports to Russia, it is foreseeable 

that Pobeda will attempt to evade the 

Regulations in order to obtain new or 

additional aircraft parts for or service its 

existing aircraft that were exported or 

reexported to Russia in violation of 

Section 746.8 of the Regulations. 

III. Findings 

Under the applicable standard set 

forth in Section 766.24 of the 

Regulations and my review of the entire 

record, I find that the evidence 

presented by BIS convincingly 

demonstrates that Pobeda took actions 

in apparent violation of the Regulations 

by operating the aircraft cited above, 

among many others, on flights into and 

within Russia after March 2, 2022, 

without the required BIS authorization. 

Moreover, the continued operation of 

these aircraft by Pobeda, even on 

domestic routes within Russia, and the 

company’s on-going need to acquire 

replacement parts and components, 

many of which are U.S.-origin, presents 

a high likelihood of imminent violations 

warranting imposition of a TDO. 

Additionally, given that Pobeda and its 

majority shareholder Aeroflot both own 

and operate a number of similar models 

of U.S-origin aircraft requiring the same 

spare parts, I find it necessary to issue 

this Order not only to prevent further 

violations involving Pobeda’s aircraft 

but also to prevent evasion of the 

Aeroflot TDO that I issued on April 8, 

2022. I further find that such apparent 

violations have been ‘‘significant, 

deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur 

again, rather than technical or 

negligent[.]’’ Therefore, issuance of the 

TDO is necessary in the public interest 

to prevent imminent violation of the 

Regulations and to give notice to 

companies and individuals in the 

United States and abroad that they 

should avoid dealing with Pobeda, in 

connection with export and reexport 

transactions involving items subject to 

the Regulations and in connection with 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with Section 

766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 

IV. Order 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, Pobeda Airlines, 108811, 

Russian Federation, Moscow, p. 

Moskovskiy, Kievskoe shosse, 22nd km, 

4≠1. Moscow, Russia, when acting for or 

on their behalf, any successors or 

assigns, agents, or employees may not, 

directly or indirectly, participate in any 

way in any transaction involving any 

commodity, software or technology 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from 

the United States that is subject to the 

EAR, or in any other activity subject to 

the EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license (except directly related to 

safety of flight), license exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 29, 2022 / Notices 38709 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 

the Regulations, or engaging in any 

other activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or from any 

other activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of Pobeda any 

item subject to the EAR except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

Pobeda of the ownership, possession, or 

control of any item subject to the EAR 

that has been or will be exported from 

the United States, including financing 

or other support activities related to a 

transaction whereby Pobeda acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from Pobeda of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; 

D. Obtain from Pobeda in the United 

States any item subject to the EAR with 

knowledge or reason to know that the 

item will be, or is intended to be, 

exported from the United States except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by Pobeda, or 

service any item, of whatever origin, 

that is owned, possessed or controlled 

by Pobeda if such service involves the 

use of any item subject to the EAR that 

has been or will be exported from the 

United States except directly related to 

safety of flight and authorized by BIS 

pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the 

Regulations. For purposes of this 

paragraph, servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification, or 

testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Pobeda by 

ownership, control, position of 

responsibility, affiliation, or other 

connection in the conduct of trade or 

business may also be made subject to 

the provisions of this Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Pobeda 

may, at any time, appeal this Order by 

filing a full written statement in support 

of the appeal with the Office of the 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 

Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South 

Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 

4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. A renewal 

request may be opposed by Pobeda as 

provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing 

a written submission with the Assistant 

Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement, which must be received 

not later than seven days before the 

expiration date of the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be provided 

to Pobeda and shall be published in the 

Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Dated: June 24, 2022. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2022–13875 Filed 6–28–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines 

633104, Novosibirskaya obl., g. Ob, 

prospekt Mozzherina, d. 10 ofis 201; 

Order Temporarily Denying Export 

Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of Russian airline Siberian 

Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines (‘‘Siberian’’). 

OEE’s request and related information 

indicates that Siberian is headquartered 

in Moscow, Russia. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation 

may be ‘imminent’ either in time or 

degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that 

a violation is about to occur, or that the 

general circumstances of the matter 

under investigation or case under 

criminal or administrative charges 

demonstrate a likelihood of future 

violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of 

future violations, BIS may show that the 

violation under investigation or charge 

‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 

likely to occur again, rather than 

technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of 

information establishing the precise 

time a violation may occur does not 

preclude a finding that a violation is 

imminent, so long as there is sufficient 

reason to believe the likelihood of a 

violation.’’ Id. 

II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order (‘‘TDO’’) 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further 

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 

sweeping series of stringent export 

controls that severely restrict Russia’s 

access to technologies and other items 

that it needs to sustain its aggressive 

military capabilities. These controls 

primarily target Russia’s defense, 

aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 

intended to cut off Russia’s access to 

vital technological inputs, atrophy key 

sectors of its industrial base, and 

undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to 

exert influence on the world stage. 

Effective February 24, 2022, BIS 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1