In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 15-1935 

WILLIAM BRIDGE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

NEW HOLLAND LOGANSPORT, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. 

No. 3:12 CV 360 — James T. Moody, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 9, 2016 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and 

SHAH, District Judge.*

SHAH, District Judge. William Bridge was fired from his 

job at New Holland Logansport in March 2011, when he was 

61 years old. Bridge sued Logansport under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., which 

 

* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
2 No. 15-1935 

prohibits employers from discharging individuals because of 

their age, id. § 623(a)(1). The statute defines “employer” as 

someone who has twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, in the 

calendar year of (or in the year preceding) the discriminatory 

act. Id. § 630(b). After concluding that New Holland Logansport did not have twenty or more employees, the district court granted Logansport’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 

I 

New Holland Logansport, an Indiana-based company 

that sold farm equipment, was one of several commonlyowned corporations. Another was New Holland Rochester. 

The two companies operated as separate stores, maintained 

separate bank accounts, and generated their own invoices. 

Each company filed its own tax returns (though both used 

on their respective returns New Holland Rochester’s address, and tax records for both companies were kept at that 

location). Store inventories were also maintained individually; however, Rochester employees could view Logansport’s 

inventory (and vice-versa) through a shared computer program. According to Bridge, the two companies also shared 

certain equipment, such as trucks used for hauling, and ordered motor oil together in order to get a discount. Money 

collected at Logansport was delivered each day to the Rochester location, and a Rochester employee would take the 

cash to the bank for deposit. Although each company was 

responsible for its own advertising, both were featured on 

the same website (www.newhollandrochester.com). 

New Holland Rochester and New Holland Logansport 

were, as just noted, commonly owned. Jim Straeter owned 
No. 15-1935 3

all of Rochester’s shares and 87.5% of Logansport’s shares; 

Mike Stephenson, Logansport’s general manager, owned the 

remainder of Logansport’s stock. Stephenson and Straeter, 

along with Straeter’s wife, Melinda, made up the board of 

directors for Logansport. The Straeters (but not Stephenson) 

served as directors for Rochester. There was some overlap in 

personnel, too: Melinda Straeter coordinated payroll for 

Rochester and Logansport; Bob Cannedy did humanresources work for both companies (and stored personnel 

files for employees of both corporations at his office in Rochester); and Stacy Conner did accounting for each. Workers at 

both companies were subject to the same personnel policy 

and enjoyed the same employee benefits, and holiday parties 

were combined (as were monthly sales meetings and informational meetings about changes in health insurance). 

Computer-training sessions for employees of both companies were held at Rochester, and Logansport’s financial records were kept there, as well. Bridge’s paychecks were sent 

to him from the Rochester location. Operations were otherwise managed separately, with Stephenson in charge at Logansport and Cannedy and Jim Straeter at the helm in Rochester. 

Bridge worked at New Holland Logansport from October 

2000 to March 2011, when he was terminated. Stephenson 

fired Bridge, though Stephenson told Bridge that the decision was actually Jim Straeter’s, and that Stephenson—who 

did not want to let Bridge go—was merely following 

Straeter’s instructions. At all times during the year Bridge 

was fired (and in the preceding calendar year), Logansport 

listed on its payroll fewer than 20 individuals. The payroll 

fluctuated between 17 and 18 employees in 2011, and between 16 and 19 employees in 2010. 
4 No. 15-1935 

Bridge sued New Holland Logansport in June 2012, alleging discrimination in violation of the ADEA. The district 

court granted summary judgment to Logansport, concluding 

that Logansport did not have enough employees to qualify 

as an “employer” under the statute. 

II 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, and construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in Bridge’s favor. Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 

248 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is 

proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A 

To qualify as an “employer” under the ADEA , one must 

have twenty or more employees for each working day, in 

each of twenty or more calendar weeks, either in the calendar year of or the year preceding the alleged discrimination. 

29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Bridge was fired in 2011, and the parties 

agree that New Holland Logansport did not have on its payroll twenty or more employees in either 2011 or 2010. Logansport did, however, have at least seventeen formal employees during much of this time, and Bridge contends that 

three individuals employed by New Holland Rochester (Bob 

Cannedy, Stacy Conner, and Melinda Straeter) also maintained employment relationships with Logansport—thus 

bringing the latter within the ADEA’s reach. The district 

court concluded that none of these individuals was employed by New Holland Logansport, and that even if they 

were, still they could not be counted toward the ADEA’s 
No. 15-1935 5

statutory minimum because they were at most part-time 

employees. 

Part-time status does not preclude counting an employee 

toward the twenty-person minimum. Whether an individual 

was “employed” by someone on a particular working day 

depends not on whether (or the extent to which) the individual actually worked that day, but on whether there was 

an employment relationship at that time. See Walters v. Metro. 

Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 206–08 (1997) (describing the 

proper employee-counting method for Title VII cases).1 The 

question here, then, is whether New Holland Logansport 

maintained an employment relationship with Cannedy, 

Conner, or Melinda Straeter in 2010 or 2011 (and if so, 

whether that relationship existed for twenty or more weeks 

in that calendar year). 

Bridge argues that these individuals necessarily maintained employment relationships with New Holland Logansport, because they were not “independent businesspeople”—that is, Cannedy was not formally employed by a human-resources company, Conner was not employed by an 

outside accounting firm, and Melinda Straeter did not work 

for or own a separate payroll company. But the issue is not 

whether these individuals were “independent” from Logansport in the sense that they were self-employed or 

worked for non-New Holland companies: everyone agrees 

that these workers were directly employed by New Holland 

 

1 Title VII defines “employer” in the same way as the ADEA, except that 

the former requires only fifteen employees (in twenty or more calendar 

weeks) while the latter demands twenty. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) 

with 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). 
6 No. 15-1935 

Rochester. The question is whether Cannedy, Conner, or 

Melinda Straeter also had an indirect employment relationship with New Holland Logansport, such that they were 

jointly employed by both corporations. Cf. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1088 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[M]ultiple entities 

may be considered an employee’s ‘employer’ for the purposes of Title VII liability.”) (citation omitted). To determine 

whether there existed an employer-employee relationship 

with Logansport, we look to the economic realities of the 

work situation. See Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 

702 (7th Cir. 2015). Five factors, derived from principles of 

agency law, are useful. They are: (1) the extent of the putative employer’s control and supervision over the putative 

employee; (2) the kind of occupation and nature of skill required; (3) the putative employer’s responsibility for the 

costs of operation; (4) the method and form of payment and 

benefits; and (5) the length of the job commitment. Id. (citing 

Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 378–

79 (7th Cir. 1991)). 

We consider first the most important Knight factor: the 

extent to which the putative employer controlled the alleged 

employee. See Love, 779 F.3d at 702–03. Control depends, to a 

significant degree, on the ability to hire and fire. See id. at 703 

(discussing EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

Logansport’s manager, Mike Stephenson, had the authority 

to hire and fire Logansport employees. Cannedy, Conner, 

and Melinda Straeter, however, were not formally employed 

by New Holland Logansport, and the record is silent as to 

whether Stephenson could have terminated Logansport’s relationship with any of them. Also relevant is whether the putative employer had the right to control and direct an individual’s work, “not only as to the result to be achieved, but 
No. 15-1935 7

also as to the details by which that result is achieved.” Id.

(quoting Alexander v. Rush North Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 

493 (7th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis omitted). But Bridge points to 

no evidence that Stephenson had, with respect to Cannedy, 

Conner, or Melinda Straeter, any authority of this kind. 

There is no suggestion that Stephenson dictated these individuals’ duties, set their schedules, or otherwise supervised 

the performance or execution of their work. Bridge has not 

shown that New Holland Logansport exercised over these 

individuals the kind of control indicative of an employeremployee relationship. 

The second and third Knight factors concern, respectively, 

the type of occupation and nature of skills required for the 

job, and the responsibility for operating costs. If important 

job skills were obtained in the putative employer’s workplace, this suggests an employment relationship. See Love, 

779 F.3d at 704 (citing Knight, 950 F.2d at 378). There is no evidence that Cannedy, Conner, or Melinda Straeter received 

any training or instruction from New Holland Logansport. 

Nor is there any evidence that Logansport provided to these 

persons special equipment or materials for their work. 

Overhead costs, moreover—at least with respect to Conner—appear to have come from Rochester, since, according 

to Jim Straeter, Rochester invoiced Logansport for her services. Bridge questions Straeter’s credibility on this point, 

emphasizing that although Logansport included in its summary-judgment exhibits a number of invoices, none was for 

Conner’s accounting services. The invoices provided at 

summary judgment (which included invoices from both 

New Holland Logansport and New Holland Rochester) were 

offered to show that the two companies billed their customers separately, and maintained separate addresses. The in-
8 No. 15-1935 

voices in the record are therefore irrelevant to whether 

Rochester in fact billed Logansport for Conner’s work, and 

do not dispute Straeter’s competent testimony that the billing occurred as he described. Both the second and third 

Knight factors militate against a finding of employee status. 

The fourth factor considers whether the putative employer was responsible for providing payment or benefits. 

Love, 779 F.3d at 704 (citing Knight, 950 F.2d at 378–79). This 

factor, too, weighs against a finding that Logansport had an 

employment relationship with Conner, Cannedy, or Melinda 

Straeter. There is no evidence that Logansport ever paid any 

of these individuals for their work or withheld taxes from 

their paychecks. See Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 264 (7th Cir. 

2001). And while employees from both companies participated in the same group health-insurance plan, there is no 

indication that Logansport provided any direct benefits to 

the three individuals now at issue. 

The fifth and final Knight factor addresses the length of 

the job commitment and the parties’ expectations as to that 

commitment. See Love, 779 F.3d at 705 (citing Knight, 950 F.2d 

at 379). The parties’ expectations are in this case unclear. It 

could be that the businesses (or, more accurately, those who 

ran them) expected Cannedy, Conner, and Melinda Straeter 

to work at Logansport for only a limited period of time; but 

the evidence reasonably suggests no particular endpoint, 

and, viewing the record in Bridge’s favor, a reasonable juror 

could infer that an ongoing commitment was contemplated. 

This factor therefore supports Bridge’s position. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the circumstances suggest an 

employment relationship with New Holland Logansport. A 

mutual expectation of continued work is not, of itself, indica-
No. 15-1935 9

tive of the kind of extensive control on which a finding of 

employee status is typically based. Logansport did not exercise such control over Cannedy, Conner, or Melinda Straeter, 

and the evidence does not permit the conclusion that any of 

these individuals was a Logansport employee. 

Bridge relies on Karr v. Strong Detective Agency, Inc., 787 

F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that two companies “employ” an individual when they share his services. 

Karr is inapposite. That case turned on a regulation under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act providing that a jointemployment relationship (to determine responsibility for 

minimum wage payments) may exist under the FLSA where, 

for example, there is an arrangement between employers to 

share an employee's services. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b). The regulation in Karr has no counterpart under the ADEA, so its 

construction is irrelevant here. Moreover, we have since explained that regulations of this sort—even where they do 

apply—have limited value in determining whether a jointemployment relationship in fact exists. See Moldenhauer v. 

Tazewell-Pekin Consol. Communications Ctr., 536 F.3d 640, 643–

44 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing a similar regulation promulgated under the Family and Medical Leave Act). The jointemployment analysis turns—as does any assessment of a 

putative employment relationship—on the totality of the circumstances, with a particular focus on the control exercised 

by the alleged employer over a person’s working conditions. 

See id. at 644 (citing Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 

F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 

1088–89 (addressing a multiple-employer issue under Title 

VII); Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty., Wis., 772 F.3d 802, 810 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (“[A]n entity other than the actual employer may 

be considered a ‘joint employer’ only if it exerted significant 
10 No. 15-1935 

control over the employee.” (quoting G. Heileman Brewing Co. 

v. NLRB, 879 F.2d 1526, 1530 (7th Cir. 1989))) (emphasis and 

internal quotation marks omitted). It is this kind of control 

that was absent here.2 

B 

Even if Logansport was not Cannedy’s, Conner’s or 

Melinda Straeter’s joint employer, it is covered by the ADEA 

if, for employee-counting purposes, all of Rochester’s employees are aggregated with Logansport’s employees. The 

aggregation inquiry, which asks whether all of an affiliate’s 

employees should be counted toward the defendant’s statutory minimum, is distinct from the economic-realities analysis, which addresses whether particular individuals should 

count because of an indirect employment relationship with 

the defendant. 

Employee aggregation is an unusual step: corporations—

even if related to a certain extent—are separate entities, and 

are treated accordingly. As we explained in Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999), however, there are 

instances where it is appropriate to disregard this separate-

 

2 Bridge also relies on guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the entity authorized to issue rules and regulations under the ADEA, see 29 U.S.C. § 628), which states in Section 2-

III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b) of its Compliance Manual that all joint employees 

should be counted toward the statutory minimum for each of their joint 

employers. This instruction is of no help to Bridge. Bridge cannot count 

Cannedy, Conner, or Melinda Straeter as New Holland Logansport’s 

“joint” employees unless he has first shown that they were employed—

either directly or indirectly—by that company. Cf. id. (“The term ‘joint 

employer’ refers to two or more employers  that each exercise sufficient 

control of an individual to qualify as his/her employer.”) (emphasis added). 
No. 15-1935 11

ness, and to deem each affiliate as having the number of employees that the enterprise has in total. Such instances arise 

where: (1) the enterprise has purposely divided itself into 

smaller corporations to dodge requirements imposed by the 

anti-discrimination laws; (2) a creditor of one corporation 

could, by piercing the corporate veil, sue its affiliate; or 

(3) the affiliate directed the discriminatory act or practice of 

which the plaintiff complains. See id. at 940–42. 

Bridge does not argue that the New Holland enterprise 

purposely split itself up to avoid the anti-discrimination 

laws. He argues that employee aggregation is proper here 

because New Holland Rochester, through its owner Jim 

Straeter, directed that Bridge be fired from his job at Logansport, and because the conditions for veil-piercing are 

also present. 

Veil-piercing is governed by state law, and in this case we 

look to Indiana law because the New Holland entities were 

incorporated there. See Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Lay-Com, 

Inc., 580 F.3d 602, 610 (7th Cir. 2009).3 The Indiana courts, 

like others, consider many factors in determining whether a 

corporate veil may be pierced, see National Soffit & Escutch-

 

3 Bridge argues that the veil-piercing analysis should be governed by 

federal common law, not state law, as liability is asserted under a federal 

statute. It is true that “a state’s restrictive law of veil piercing is not allowed to undermine the effectiveness of a federal statute.” Illinois Bell 

Tel. Co., Inc. v. Global NAPs Ill., Inc., 551 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2008). But 

Bridge makes no argument—and nor is it otherwise apparent—that Indiana law on veil-piercing is unduly restrictive of the policies underlying 

the ADEA. The principles of state law provide appropriate guideposts 

here. Cf. Worth, 276 F.3d at 260 (applying state-created standards for veilpiercing in determining liability under Title VII). 
12 No. 15-1935 

eons, Inc. v. Superior Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265–66 (7th Cir. 

1996); Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 301–02 (Ind. 2012), but the 

focus is on whether “the corporate form was so ignored, controlled or manipulated that it was merely the instrumentality 

of another and that the misuse of the corporate form would 

constitute a fraud or promote injustice,” Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 

301 (quoting Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 

1994)). 

New Holland Logansport and New Holland Rochester 

did do a fair amount of sharing. They shared similar names; 

they shared directors (Jim and Melinda Straeter were members of both boards); and they shared certain employees’ 

services (Cannedy’s, Conner’s, and Melinda Straeter’s, as 

discussed above). Cannedy conducted performance reviews 

for both companies’ employees—who also received the same 

personnel manual, attended the same holiday party, and accessed the same computer program for tracking inventories. 

Health-insurance benefits were centralized, and the companies used the same address on their tax returns (a curious 

practice, given that the companies otherwise maintained 

separate business addresses). They also shared a website. All 

of this bespeaks a certain degree of integration between the 

two corporations. What it does not suggest is a misuse of 

corporate form. “The corporate veil is pierced, when it is 

pierced, not because the corporate group is integrated, [but] 

because it has neglected forms intended to protect creditors 

from being confused about whom they can look to for the 

payment of their claims.” Papa, 166 F.3d at 943 (citing Phillip 

I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Substantive Law 

§ 20.05, p. 114 (1987)). There was no such confusion here. 

Though board membership overlapped, the two boards were 

otherwise separate. Each company had its own invoices and 
No. 15-1935 13

its own bank account4, and filed its own tax returns. The 

companies operated out of separate locations, maintained 

separate inventories, and were responsible for their own advertising. Operations were also managed individually—by 

Stephenson at Logansport, and by Jim Straeter (and Bob 

Cannedy) at Rochester. Even when viewed in Bridge’s favor, 

these facts fall short of suggesting that Logansport was “so 

organized and controlled and its affairs  so conducted by 

[Rochester] that it [was] a mere instrumentality or adjunct” 

of the latter. Reboy v. Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc., 9 F.3d 1303, 1308 

(7th Cir. 1993); see also Papa, 166 F.3d at 939, 942. 

Bridge points to the company website as evidence that 

the corporations held themselves out to the public as a single 

entity. The website (www.newhollandrochester.com), captioned “New Holland Agriculture,” greeted visitors with the 

following: 

Since our first dealership, New Holland Rochester, was established in 1983, we have been 

working ever since to be a leader in providing 

the equipment, parts, technology, and service 

to help meet our customer’s [sic] needs. 

Here you can find information involving New 

Holland, search our used equipment, and find 

out what is happening at our locations in Roch-

 

4 Bridge suggests that the two corporations may have commingled assets, but there is no evidence of this. Money collected at Logansport was 

taken each day to Rochester, and a Rochester employee would take the 

money to the bank for deposit. There is no indication that funds collected 

by one entity were ever deposited into the other’s (separate) bank account. 
14 No. 15-1935 

ester, Logansport, Rossville, Bluffton, and Centerville in Indiana. 

(emphases added). Viewed in isolation, these statements do 

imply that New Holland—specifically, “New Holland Agriculture”—was a single company with multiple store locations. See Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp., 772 F.3d 502, 503, 507 

(7th Cir. 2014). But a preceding statement makes clear that 

the “locations” corresponded to different corporations: 

Welcome to the website for the following companies: New Holland Rochester, Inc., New Holland Logansport, Inc., Rodkey New Holland 

Inc., New Holland Tri-County, Inc., Ag Technologies, Inc., and New Holland Centerville, 

Inc. 

(emphasis added). A “Locations” webpage also listed a different address for each company. Nothing in this suggests 

that corporate forms were so ignored or manipulated as to 

perpetrate a fraud on the companies’ creditors. Though the 

operations of these two small businesses were in some ways 

combined, their identities were separate enough that piercing the veil between affiliates would be inappropriate here. 

We turn, then, to Bridge’s argument that all New Holland 

Rochester employees should be counted as Logansport employees because it was Rochester, not Logansport, that 

caused Bridge to be fired from his job. Employees of affiliated corporations may be counted in the aggregate for purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) if it was the affiliate, not the plaintiff’s employer, that directed the discriminatory act, practice, 

or policy of which the plaintiff now complains. See Papa, 166 

F.3d at 941. 
No. 15-1935 15

It was Mike Stephenson, operations manager at Logansport, who fired Bridge. Stephenson, however, told 

Bridge that the decision was actually Straeter’s, so for purposes of summary judgment, we assume that Straeter was 

responsible. But in what capacity? Straeter was operations 

manager at Rochester, not Logansport, so Bridge contends 

that Straeter must have been acting on Rochester’s behalf 

when he directed that Bridge be let go. But Straeter was also 

an owner and director—of Rochester and of Logansport. 

Where the same officer or director works for two separate 

but commonly-owned entities, he at times represents one 

corporation and at times represents the other. That is, he 

“changes hats.” See Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 

773, 779 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). There are no facts 

from which it may reasonably be inferred that, when 

Straeter told Stephenson to fire Bridge, Straeter was wearing 

anything but a Logansport hat. Straeter, a Logansport owner 

and director, instructed the Logansport manager (also a coowner and director of that corporation) to fire a Logansport 

employee. What has Rochester to do with it? Bridge emphasizes that Straeter had a Rochester email address, and that 

the meeting between Straeter and Stephenson occurred at 

Rochester; but there is no evidence that Straeter conducted 

only Rochester business at his office (his only office), and 

there is no dispute that Straeter had responsibilities with 

both companies. Neither the email address nor the location 

of the meeting signals anything about the company Straeter 

represented when he directed Bridge’s firing. To defeat 

summary judgment on an issue on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof, Bridge was required to present evidence on which a jury could rely to find in his favor. The 
16 No. 15-1935 

email address and Straeter-Stephenson meeting are insufficient. 

Bridge insists that at least one avenue for aggregating 

employees must be open to him, because he has presented 

evidence enough to satisfy the “integrated enterprise” test—

a four-factor test for determining when separate entities may 

be treated as a single employer under the National Labor Relations Act, see Naperville Ready Mix, Inc. v. NLRB, 242 F.3d 

744, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2001); Papa, 166 F.3d at 942, or, as Bridge 

argues, under the FMLA, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c)(2). In Papa, we explained that the legal principles governing affiliate 

liability “should [not] vary from statute to statute, unless the 

statute, or the particular policy that animates the statute, ordains a particular test.” 166 F.3d at 941. The NLRA calls for 

the integrated-enterprise test, but that is the exception, not 

the rule. Id. at 941–42. And we need not address today 

whether the same exception applies to the FMLA, as Bridge 

asserts no claims under that statute. It has been many years 

since we dispensed with the integrated-enterprise analysis in 

ADEA cases, see id. at 939–43, and to the extent Bridge asks 

us to revisit that holding, we decline the invitation. 

III 

Bridge did not marshal evidence from which a jury could 

find that New Holland Logansport was an “employer” under the ADEA. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant 

was appropriate, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.