[Cite as DeSantis v. Estate of DeSantis, 2023-Ohio-518.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

LILIANA R. DeSANTIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ESTATE OF JOSEPH J. DeSANTIS, DECEASED, AMY M. DeSANTIS, 

ADMINISTRATOR,

Defendant-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTIAN DeSANTIS,

Third-Party Defendant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 21 MA 0103

Civil Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 2021 CI 00017

BEFORE:

David A. D’Apolito, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.
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Case No. 21 MA 0103

Atty. Ronald E. Knickerbocker, 725 Boardman-Canfield Road, Unit M-3, P.O. Box 3202, 

Youngstown, Ohio 44513, for Plaintiff-Appellant and

Atty. Frank L. Cassese and Atty. Corey J. Grimm, Ingram, Cassese & Grimm, LLP, 

7330 Market Street, Youngstown, Ohio 44512, for Defendant-Appellee.

Dated: February 15, 2023

D’Apolito, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, Liliana R. DeSantis (“Liliana”), appeals from the October 19, 

2021 judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, sua 

sponte dismissing her action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3) for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. On appeal, Liliana asserts the probate court should have transferred her 

case to the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, instead of sua 

sponte dismissing her action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, thereby leaving her 

without a remedy. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} Liliana claims to be the majority stockholder of an Ohio corporation known 

as Quints Auto Body, Inc. (“Quints”), an auto body repair shop with a principal place of 

business located at 4280 Lake Park Road, Youngstown, Mahoning County, Ohio 44512 

(“the Property”). (5/27/2021 Complaint, p. 1-2; 6/4/2021 First Amended Complaint, p. 1-

2). The Articles of Incorporation filed with the Ohio Secretary of State, however, reveal 

that the only two shareholders of Quints are “Joe DeSantis” and “Chris DeSantis.” 

(Appellee’s Exhibit A). Joseph J. DeSantis (“the decedent”) passed away on May 11, 

2017. (6/4/2021 First Amended Complaint, p. 3). The decedent was the son of Liliana 

and her late husband, Quintino DeSantis (“Quintino”). (5/27/2021 Complaint, p. 2; 

6/4/2021 First Amended Complaint, p. 2). Third-Party Defendant, Christian DeSantis 

(“Christian”), was the brother of the decedent and is the son of Liliana. (Id. at p. 3). On 

March 3, 2021, the probate court appointed Amy M. DeSantis, the surviving spouse and 

next of kin, as Administrator of the Estate of Joseph J. DeSantis. 
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Case No. 21 MA 0103

{¶3} Liliana filed a complaint on May 27, 2021 and a first amended complaint on 

June 4, 2021, both in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, 

against Appellee, Estate of Joseph J. DeSantis, Deceased, Amy M. DeSantis, 

Administrator (“the Estate”), claiming a breach of a promissory note and unjust 

enrichment. In her complaints, Liliana alleges, inter alia, the following: the decedent was 

a business manager for Quints; the decedent prohibited Liliana, Quintino, and Christian 

from inspecting and/or participating in the preparation or filing of any of the business 

records, accounts receivables, real estate tax payments, mortgage payments, etc.; the 

decedent diverted the gross proceeds from the business for his own use and embezzled 

substantial sums of money; as a direct and proximate result of the decedent’s diversion 

of the business funds from the business and subsequent failure to pay the mortgage on 

the Property, PNC Bank filed a foreclosure in 2010, Case No. 2010 CV 3089 (against 

Liliana and Quintino), as a result of which Liliana and Quintino had to pay attorney fees 

and costs in an amount exceeding $138,000; the decedent failed to pay the real estate 

taxes on the Property (between 2014 through 2015) which resulted in Daniel Yemma, 

Treasurer of Mahoning County, filing an action, Case No. 2015 CV 1479 (against Liliana, 

Quintino, the decedent, and Christian) in an amount exceeding $13,370; in order to 

resolve the money issues between the parties, the decedent and Christian executed a 

promissory note in which they agreed to pay $152,000 to Liliana and Quintino; and that 

the Estate is now in default of said payment. (5/27/2021 Complaint, p. 2-3; 6/4/2021 First 

Amended Complaint, p. 2-3). 

{¶4} On July 27, 2021, the Estate filed an answer, counterclaim, and third-party 

complaint against Christian. In its counterclaim, the Estate alleges the following: Liliana 

is not in compliance with R.C. 2117.06(B) because she failed to present any claim within 

the six-month period after the decedent’s death; Liliana failed to provide any 

documentation that would demonstrate that she is in compliance with R.C. 1309.203(3)(b) 

and (c); Liliana failed to provide any documentation to demonstrate that she perfected her 

interest pursuant to R.C. 1309.313; and Liliana’s claim is subject to discharge as an 

unsecured debt presented past the time allotted under R.C. 2117.06(B). In its third-party 

complaint against Christian, the Estate alleges the following: the Estate should be held 

harmless and indemnified by Christian from and against all sums, if any as may be 
– 4 –

Case No. 21 MA 0103

adjudicated against it in favor of Liliana; and in the alternative, to the extent the Estate is 

found liable to Liliana, then it should be entitled to contribution from Christian. (7/27/2021 

Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, p. 4-5). 

{¶5} On September 30, 2021, Liliana filed a reply to the Estate’s counterclaim

and Christian filed an answer to the third-party complaint against him. 

{¶6} On October 19, 2021, the probate court sua sponte dismissed Liliana’s 

action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

{¶7} Liliana filed a timely appeal and raises one assignment of error.1

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE MAHONING COUNTY PROBATE COURT, A DIVISION OF THE 

MAHONING COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, ERRED AS A 

MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS IN THIS 

CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHERE, AS HERE, THE 

PROBATE COURT COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE TRANSFERRED 

SAID CLAIMS TO THE GENERAL JURISDICTION COURT OF THE 

MAHONING COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT WHICH DOES HAVE 

JURISDICTION, RATHER THAN LEAVING THE 

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT WITHOUT A REMEDY.

{¶8} In her sole assignment of error, Liliana argues the probate court erred in 

sua sponte dismissing her action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction instead of 

transferring her case to the general division. 

{¶9} “A trial court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

raises questions of law; thus, an appellate court reviews the decision de novo.” In re Britt, 

7th Dist. Columbiana No. 14 CO 20, 2015-Ohio-1605, ¶ 19, citing Morway v. Durkin, 181 

Ohio App.3d 195, 2009-Ohio-932, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.). 

{¶10} In support of her position that the probate court should have transferred her 

case to the general division instead of sua sponte dismissing it, Liliana relies on Civ.R. 

1 Christian also filed a notice of appeal with this court, Case No. 21 MA 0104. Christian raises the identical 

assignment of error as Liliana. 
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Case No. 21 MA 0103

73(B) which states, in part: “Venue. * * * Proceedings that are improperly venued shall be 

transferred to a proper venue provided by law and division (B) of this rule, and the court 

may assess costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the time of transfer against the 

party who commenced the action in an improper venue.” Liliana also cites to two cases 

from our Sister Courts: one from 44 years ago, Siebenthal v. Summers, 56 Ohio App.2d 

168 (10th Dist.1978), and another from 38 years ago, Mid-Ohio Liquid Fertilizers, Inc. v. 

Lowe, 14 Ohio App.3d 36 (12th Dist.1984), for the proposition that a transfer was 

warranted pursuant to Civ.R. 73(B).

{¶11} It appears Liliana is focusing on venue rather than jurisdiction. 

“[J]urisdiction and venue are distinct legal concepts.” In the Matter of B.M., 4th Dist. 

Hocking No. 16CA12, 2017-Ohio-7878, ¶ 8, citing In re Z.R., 144 Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-

Ohio-3306, ¶ 16. “Venue is a ‘procedural matter,’ and it refers not to the power to hear a 

case but to the geographical location where a given case should be heard.” In the Matter 

of B.M., supra, at ¶ 8, citing Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87-88 (1972). If an 

action does not appear to be one of the “‘(p)roceedings under Chapters 2101. through 

2131. of the Revised Code[,]’” then “Civ.R. 73(B) is inapplicable.” U.S. Bank, N.A. v. 

Webb, 139 Ohio Misc.2d 54, 2006-Ohio-5462, ¶ 8. 

{¶12} “Venue” is defined as: “1. The proper or a possible place for a lawsuit to 

proceed * * *. 2. The territory, such as a country or other political subdivision, over which 

a trial court has jurisdiction.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019). “‘Venue must be 

carefully distinguished from jurisdiction. Jurisdiction deals with the power of a court to 

hear and dispose of a given case.’” (Id. at 3, quoting Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil 

Procedure 2.1, at 10 (2d Ed.1993). 

{¶13} “Jurisdiction” is defined as: “1. A government’s general power to exercise 

authority over all persons and things within its territory * * *. 2. A court’s power to decide 

a case or issue a decree.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019). 

{¶14} At issue in the case at bar is subject-matter jurisdiction. “Subject-matter 

jurisdiction is defined as a court’s power to hear and decide cases.” Fifth Third Bank, 

N.A. v. Maple Leaf Expansion, Inc., 188 Ohio App.3d 27, 2010-Ohio-1537, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), 

citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. Subject-matter 

jurisdiction “‘connotes the power of the court to hear and decide a case upon its merits.’” 
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(Emphasis sic). Fifth Third Bank, supra, at ¶ 17, quoting Morrison, supra, at 87. “When 

determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, a court does not determine 

which forum should hear and decide the case[.]” Fifth Third Bank at ¶ 17. 

{¶15} As stated, Liliana filed her complaints in the Mahoning County Court of 

Common Pleas, Probate Division. “The probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction and 

thus cannot exercise authority other than that specifically granted by statute or the 

constitution.” Estate of Dombroski v. Dombroski, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 14 HA 3, 2014-

Ohio-5827, ¶ 12, citing Corron v. Corron, 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1988); R.C. 2101.24, 

“Jurisdiction of probate court.” “[T]he probate division has no jurisdiction over claims for 

money damages arising from allegations of fraud.” Schucker v. Metcalf, 22 Ohio St.3d 

33, 35 (1986); Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 68 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1994) (Because the 

plaintiff’s primary aim was recovery of money damages from alleged fraud, then the 

issues raised were solely within the jurisdiction of the general division); Sosnoswsky v. 

Koscianski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106147, 2018-Ohio-3045, ¶ 12. 

{¶16} Civ.R. 12(H)(3) states: “Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties 

or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction on the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 

the action.” (Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 12(H)(3) does not require notice before dismissal. 

In re Britt, supra, at ¶ 31. A probate court may sua sponte dismiss an action under Civ.R. 

12(H)(3). Id. at ¶ 32. 

{¶17} Upon review, the allegations raised in Liliana’s complaints, filed in the 

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, do not fall under the purview 

of R.C. 2101.24. Rather, Liliana stressed that the decedent diverted gross proceeds from 

the business and embezzled substantial sums of money for his personal use. (5/27/2021 

Complaint, p. 2; 6/4/2021 First Amended Complaint, p. 2). Thus, Liliana apparently raised 

claims for money damages arising from allegations of fraud. (Id.). However, “the probate 

division has no jurisdiction over claims for money damages arising from allegations of 

fraud.” Schucker, supra, at 35. Accordingly, the probate court did not err in sua sponte 

dismissing Liliana’s action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3) for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. 
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Case No. 21 MA 0103

CONCLUSION

{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, Liliana’s sole assignment of error is not welltaken. The October 19, 2021 judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, 

Probate Division, sua sponte dismissing Liliana’s action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3) for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.
[Cite as DeSantis v. Estate of DeSantis, 2023-Ohio-518.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error 

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

Costs to be taxed against the Appellant.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.