[Cite as Columbus v. Kotevski, 2018-Ohio-5105.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

City of Columbus, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 18AP-203 

 (M.C. No. 2017 TRB 201357) 

v. : 

 (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

Jovan M. Kotevski, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 18, 2018 

 

On brief: Zachary M. Klein, City Attorney, Lara N. Baker, 

Melanie R. Tobias, and Orly Ahroni, for appellee. Argued: 

Orly Ahroni. 

On brief: Jovan M. Kotevski, pro se. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court 

BROWN, P.J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Jovan M. Kotevski, from a 

judgment entered by the Franklin County Municipal Court following a bench trial in 

which the court found appellant guilty of making a prohibited U-turn. 

{¶ 2} On December 22, 2017, appellant was charged with making a prohibited Uturn in violation of Columbus City Code ("C.C.C.") 2131.12(a). Appellant entered a plea of 

not guilty, and the matter came before the court for a bench trial on February 22, 2018. 

{¶ 3} On December 22, 2017, Columbus Police Officer Ryan Kaethow was on 

patrol in a cruiser. The officer was stopped at a red light at the intersection of East 11th 

Avenue and High Street, when he observed a vehicle "parked in the parking spot on the 
No. 18AP-203 2 

eastern side of High Street facing north." (Tr. at 13.) Officer Kaethow subsequently 

observed the vehicle make "a U-turn from the parking spot and then proceeded to go 

south on High Street." (Tr. at 13.) The officer initiated a traffic stop and cited appellant 

for a prohibited U-turn. 

{¶ 4} During the bench trial, appellant challenged the constitutionality of C.C.C. 

2131.12. Following presentation of the evidence, the trial court rejected appellant's 

constitutional challenge and found him guilty of violating C.C.C. 2131.12(a). 

{¶ 5} On appeal, appellant, pro se, asserts the following assignment of error for 

this court's review: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED A 

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR A VIOLATION OF THE 

U-TURN ORDINANCE UNDER SECTION 2131.12 OF THE 

COLUMBUS CITY CODE. 

{¶ 6} Under his single assignment of error, appellant challenges the 

constitutionality of C.C.C. 2131.12, asserting that it conflicts with state law. Specifically, 

appellant argues that U-turns are "generally lawful" under Ohio law, subject to several 

exceptions set forth in R.C. 4511.37(A) and (B). Appellant further argues that, pursuant to 

R.C. 4511.06, state law prohibits local authorities from enacting or enforcing laws that are 

not uniform. 

{¶ 7} As noted, appellant was convicted of a violation of C.C.C. 2131.12(a), which 

states: "No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction upon any 

street or highway. Turns commonly known as 'U' turns are hereby prohibited." 

{¶ 8} R.C. 4511.37(A) states as follows: 

Except as provided in section 4511.13 of the Revised Code and 

division (B) of this section, no vehicle shall be turned so as to 

proceed in the opposite direction upon any curve, or upon the 

approach to or near the crest of a grade, if the vehicle cannot 

be seen within five hundred feet by the driver of any other 

vehicle approaching from either direction. 

{¶ 9} R.C. 4511.06 states: 

Sections 4511.01 to 4511.78, 4511.99, and 4513.01 to 4513.37 of 

the Revised Code shall be applicable and uniform throughout 

this state and in all political subdivisions and municipal 

corporations of this state. No local authority shall enact or 
No. 18AP-203 3 

enforce any rule in conflict with such sections, except that this 

section does not prevent local authorities from exercising the 

rights granted them by Chapter 4521. of the Revised Code and 

does not limit the effect or application of the provisions of that 

chapter. 

{¶ 10} Article XVIII, Section 3, of the Ohio Constitution, also known as the Home 

Rule Amendment, provides that "[m]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all 

powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local 

police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." 

{¶ 11} In Dayton v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 168, 2017-Ohio-6909, ¶ 13, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio held in part: 

The Home Rule Amendment provides independent authority 

to Ohio's municipalities with regard to local police 

regulations. * * * Nevertheless, a municipal ordinance must 

yield to a state statute if "(1) the ordinance is an exercise of the 

police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the 

statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict 

with the statute." Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 

2008-Ohio-270, ¶ 17. 

{¶ 12} Under Ohio law, "[i]t has long been established that '[i]n determining 

whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance 

permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.' " 

Cincinnati v. Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-Ohio-6422, ¶ 19, quoting Struthers v. 

Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263 (1923), paragraph two of the syllabus. Or, stated "[i]n other 

words, '[n]o real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be right 

which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa.' " Id., quoting Sokol at 268. 

{¶ 13} In response to appellant's constitutional challenge, plaintiff-appellee, City of 

Columbus, argues this court has already decided the issue raised by appellant, and found 

no conflict exists between C.C.C. 2131.12, the city's U-turn ordinance, and R.C. 4511.37. 

We agree. 

{¶ 14} In Columbus v. Knoff, 10th Dist. No. 86AP-285 (Sept. 25, 1986), the 

defendant was charged with a violation of C.C.C. 2131.12. The defendant lived outside of 

Columbus and "apparently was unaware of the Columbus City Code Section prohibiting 

all U-turns, as opposed to the Ohio Revised Code, which prohibits U-turns in certain 
No. 18AP-203 4 

circumstances." Id. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the city had 

"transgressed Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution," and further arguing the city 

ordinance was in violation of Article II, Section 26, of the Ohio Constitution (the 

Uniformity Clause). Id. 

{¶ 15} In Knoff, this court rejected the defendant's arguments, holding C.C.C. 

2131.12 "completely barring U-turns within the Columbus city limits does not come in 

conflict with either the above constitutional provisions." In reaching that determination, 

this court held in part: 

Over sixty years ago the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth 

standards for determining when such a conflict exists in the 

second paragraph of the syllabus of Village of Struthers v. 

Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263: 

"In determining whether an ordinance is in 'conflict' with 

general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or 

licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice 

versa." 

Clearly the state statute forbids U-turns in limited situations. 

The city ordinance forbids such turns generally. R.C. 4511.37 

does not, however, expressly permit or command U-turns in 

other situations, but remains silent as to the other situations. 

Thus no conflict with "general laws" exists under a strict 

construction of the test set forth in Village of Struthers v. 

Sokol * * *. 

Further the distinction between the situation presented in an 

unincorporated area and a metropolitan area is completely 

reasonable. Making a U-turn where traffic is sparse 

present[s] no serious risk to the driver or other drivers on the 

road. Allowing U-turns to be made on city streets in areas 

such as Columbus or Cleveland would soon finish the task of 

clogging main arteries and make streets almost impassable for 

significant portions of the day, especially around "rush hours." 

Nor can a major metropolitan area be expected to post signs 

in all locations where a U-turn could be made. The result 

would be to fill the space between double yellow lines with 

signs saying "no U-Turns." 

{¶ 16} We note that, in addition to this court's decision in Knoff, at least one other 

Ohio court has made a similar pronouncement. Cleveland Heights v. Siegel, 8th Dist. No. 
No. 18AP-203 5 

65399 (Dec. 16, 1993) (finding no conflict between R.C. 4511.37 and municipal ordinance 

prohibiting U-turns; ordinance "does not allow anything that is prohibited by R.C. 

4511.37, or conversely, [municipal ordinance] does not prohibit anything which is 

specifically permitted by R.C. 4511.37"). 

{¶ 17} Based on this court's precedent in Knoff, the trial court did not err in 

rejecting appellant's constitutional challenge to C.C.C. 2131.12. Accordingly, appellant's 

assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled. 

{¶ 18} Having overruled appellant's single assignment of error, the judgment of 

the Franklin County Municipal Court is hereby affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

DORRIAN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur. 

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