020 IL App (1st) 161666-U

No. 1-16-1666 

Second Division 

November 17, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

__________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

PRINCE JOHNSON,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 07 CR 18499 

Honorable 

Angela Munari Petrone 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s judgment is reversed where it abused its discretion in admitting 

other-crimes evidence at trial and this error was not harmless. We remand for a new 

trial without the other-crimes evidence.

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Prince Johnson, was found guilty of first-degree murder

(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2014)) related to the shooting death of Ryan Cooper. The trial court 

sentenced him to 60 years’ imprisonment, which included a 15-year firearm enhancement (730 

ILCS 5/5-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2014)). Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) 
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admitting other crimes evidence and (2) imposing an excessive sentence. For the following 

reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Around 6:30 p.m. on May 19, 2003, Ryan Cooper was shot and killed on the 123rd block 

of South LaSalle Street in Chicago. In August 2007, the State charged Kenyatta Brown and 

defendant with first-degree murder in connection with Cooper’s death. Brown and defendant were 

also charged at the same time in the shooting death of Albert Stevenson, which also occurred on 

May 19, 2003. Defendant and Brown were tried separately.

¶ 5 A. Motion to Admit Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 6 Prior to defendant’s trial, the State filed a motion to admit other-crimes evidence. 

Specifically, the State sought to introduce evidence of the Stevenson shooting, which occurred

after the Cooper shooting, “as proof of defendants’ identities as the murderers of Ryan Cooper and 

their possession of the weapon used to commit that murder.” The State asserted that the probative 

value of the Stevenson shooting evidence outweighed the potential of unfair prejudice to defendant 

at trial for Cooper’s murder. Defendant filed a motion in limine to bar evidence from the Stevenson 

shooting case. 

¶ 7 The trial court granted the State’s motion and denied defendant’s motion. In its written 

ruling, the trial court noted the similarities between the two murders, along with the close 

proximity in time and place. The court found that the probative value of the other-crimes evidence 

outweighed any prejudicial effect. Finally, the court held that the other-crimes evidence could be 

admitted to “show identities of both defendants and possession of the weapon used to kill Ryan 

Cooper.” 
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¶ 8 Defendant requested that the court reconsider its ruling, arguing that the other-crimes 

evidence was highly prejudicial and that presenting evidence on the Stevenson shooting would 

create a trial-within-a-trial. Following arguments, the court denied the motion to reconsider. In its 

ruling, the court stated that the involvement of both defendant and Brown in the Stevenson 

shooting made the other-crimes evidence relevant and probative. The court also concluded that the 

other-crimes evidence constituted evidence of a “continuing narrative.” The court recognized 

defendant’s concerns of creating a trial-within-a-trial and, to that extent, held that the State was 

not allowed to introduce evidence “that Stevenson’s body was found the next morning or that an 

autopsy showed Stevenson died of gunshot wounds.” Lastly, the court stated that it would give a 

limiting instruction to the jury regarding the other-crimes evidence.

¶ 9 The State then filed a motion to allow additional witnesses to testify regarding the othercrimes evidence. In particular, the State moved to present DNA evidence establishing that 

Stevenson’s blood was found on Brown’s clothing. Defendant filed a response. The court denied 

the State’s motion, finding that such evidence would create a “mini-trial within a trial” and would 

be “more prejudicial than probative.” The case proceeded to jury trial. 

¶ 10 B. Jury Trial

¶ 11 The State presented the following evidence related to the Cooper shooting.

¶ 12 Sherrie Alston testified that on May 19, 2003, she was living in a house near the intersection 

of 123rd Street and South Yale Avenue. Around 7 p.m. that evening, she was sitting on her porch 

when she noticed a red van that she had never seen before parked directly across the street, facing 

south on Yale. She observed a driver in the van. She then saw Cooper, who she knew from the 

neighborhood, driving a car northbound on Yale. He stopped the car to speak with a friend on the 

street and then continued driving north. She testified that as he passed the van, shots were fired at 
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Cooper from the driver’s side window. She and her children ran into her house, and she heard more 

gunshots. She stated that the van left the area and she saw Cooper’s car crashed into a gate. She 

further testified that she knew Cooper to be part of the “Four Corner Hustlers” gang. On crossexamination, Alston confirmed that she did not know who fired the shots from the van, only that 

the shots came from the driver’s side window. 

¶ 13 Chicago police officer Allison Kuciver-Price testified that on May 19, 2003, she and her 

partner received a dispatch call regarding a car accident at the intersection of 123rd and Yale. At 

the location, she observed a blue Chevy Lumina crashed into a fence. Upon inspection, she 

observed an unconscious Cooper in the driver’s seat, and it appeared that he had been shot. On 

cross-examination, she confirmed that she observed an evidence technician recover a .380 caliber 

firearm from the driver’s side floor of the Lumina. 

¶ 14 Chicago police detective Kevin Scott testified that he was assigned to investigate Cooper’s 

shooting. When he arrived at the scene, Officer Scott observed Cooper’s vehicle crashed into a 

fence. He stated that Cooper had already been transferred to the hospital. Down the street from the 

car, he found a shell casing. Officer Scott later learned that Cooper died as a result of gunshot 

wounds. 

¶ 15 Douglas Martell Owenstestified that on May 19, 2003, he was in the red van with defendant 

and Brown, who were in the driver’s seat and the front passenger’s seat, respectively. All three of 

them at the time were members of the “Black Disciples” gang. As they parked southbound on 

Yale, another car pulled up alongside the van and Brown exchanged words with the driver of the 

car. Owens then saw Brown pull out a semi-automatic handgun, reach over defendant, and shoot 

three times out of the driver’s side window of the van. He stated that he did not see defendant with 

a gun. After Brown fired the three shots, Owens told defendant to drive away and he exited the 
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van at the intersection of 118th and Lafayette Street. He spoke with detectives on September 4, 

2003, but denied having any knowledge of “some kind of crime.” With his lawyer present, Owens 

again spoke with detectives on August 20, 2007, regarding the Cooper shooting, and then he 

testified before a grand jury. On cross-examination, Owens stated that he did not know that Brown 

was going to pull out a gun and shoot someone and that they did not have any conversation prior 

to Cooper’s shooting about Brown’s intentions. 

¶ 16 Brady Tucker testified that he knew defendant and Brown. He stated that he did not know 

where he was on May 19, 2003 because he was drinking large quantities of alcohol at the time. He 

denied seeing defendant and Brown at “Moosie’s” studio that day. Tucker continued to respond to 

most questions with “I don’t remember” or “I wasn’t with them.” He did testify that he, defendant, 

Brown, and Owens were all members of the Black Disciples at the time of Cooper’s shooting but 

he did not recall there being a gang dispute between the Black Disciples and the Four Corner 

Hustlers at the time. Tucker also denied talking to a prosecutor or signing a written statement in 

this case. When presented with the statement, Tucker testified that he recognized his signature on 

the statement but did not know what he was signing because he was intoxicated. Tucker testified 

that he recalled meeting with detectives but did not recall testifying before a grand jury.

¶ 17 On April 13, 2004, Detective Scott met with Tucker at the police station and interviewed 

him in relation to this case. He testified that Tucker did not have any trouble speaking with him 

and he did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. During that interview, Tucker

told Detective Scott that he was with Brown, defendant, a man named Bey (Emanuel Owens), and 

Dwight Thomas at Moosie’s recording studio before Cooper’s shooting. Tucker told Detective 

Scott that he, Brown, and defendant left the studio in Brown’s van. Brown stopped the van and 

spoke with a man named Paul, telling him that “they were going to ride around to see if they could 
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catch someone sleeping.” Tucker saw Brown with a black semi-automatic handgun. Tucker asked 

them to pull the van over and he left in a car with his friend, Quentin Paxton. On cross-examination, 

Detective Scott testified that Tucker told him that Brown was driving the van during the events 

involved, and to his knowledge, Tucker was not an eyewitness to Cooper’s shooting. 

¶ 18 Chicago police detective Daniel Stover testified that in 2007, he and his partner Chicago 

police detective Timothy Murphy were assigned to the homicide cases of Cooper and Stevenson, 

which were considered cold cases at the time. On July 22, 2007, Detective Stover and his partner 

picked up Tucker and took him to the police station. Detective Stover testified that Tucker gave 

appropriate answers to the questions and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or 

alcohol. After interviewing him, Detective Stover called ASA Robertson, who then spoke with 

Tucker. That interview was memorialized in a handwritten statement, the substantive contents of 

which are summarized below.

¶ 19 Cook County Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) William Bruce and Rob Robertson, who at 

the time was a trial supervisor in the State’s Attorney’s Felony Review Unit, both testified that 

they spoke with Tucker in July 2007 and confirmed that Tucker gave appropriate answers to 

questions and did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. 

¶ 20 Tucker’s 2004 and 2007 statements to detectives were admitted as prior inconsistent 

statements at trial. Tucker stated that he was at Moosie’s recording studio with Brown, Dwight, 

Bey, and defendant. He left the studio with Brown and defendant and drove into rival Four Corner 

Hustler territory. He stated that at some point they stopped and Brown spoke with an individual 

named Paul. Brown told Paul that they were riding around looking for “them” and defendant 

nodded in agreement. Tucker understood “them” to mean rival gang members, so he asked to be 

dropped off because he was not “with it.” Before he was dropped off with his friend, Paxton, 
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Tucker saw Brown with a semi-automatic handgun. Tucker later heard several gunshots and then 

Brown called him. These statements were also consistent with his grand jury testimony, the 

transcript of which was also entered into the record at trial. Tucker testified that he did not recall 

making the statements and denied the content of them. 

¶ 21 The parties stipulated that if Dr. Ronald J. Knoblock, a deputy medical examiner with the 

Cook County Medical Examiner’s office, was called, he would testify that he conducted an autopsy 

of Cooper on May 20, 2003. Dr. Knoblock found gunshot wounds on Cooper’s neck, left shoulder, 

and right forearm, along with a grazed gunshot wound on his left forearm. He recovered a bullet 

in Cooper’s spinal cord, a bullet fragment in his right arm, and a metal fragment in the right thigh, 

which were tendered to a Chicago Police Department forensic investigator. Finally, he determined 

that Cooper’s cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was homicide.

¶ 22 The State presented the following evidence as related to the Stevenson shooting.

¶ 23 Chicago police officer Thurston Daniels testified that on May 19, 2003, he was working 

with his partner, Officer Donald Carson. Around 10 p.m. that evening, they were located near 

119th Street and LaSalle when they heard “a loud noise or bang[.]” Soon after, Officer Daniels 

observed a shirtless individual running and behind him was a man with a gun. He later learned that 

these individuals were Stevenson and Brown, respectively. He observed Brown shoot at Stevenson 

and attempt to shoot a second time but the gun did not fire. The officers pulled their car up to 

Brown, and Officer Daniels observed Brown put the gun in his waistband. Brown ran away and 

Officer Daniels chased him on foot. Brown attempted to hand the gun off to defendant but 

defendant put his hands up and jumped back from Brown. The gun fell to the ground. Officer 

Daniels recovered the gun and continued to chase Brown on foot. He saw Officer Carson also 

chasing Brown in the police cruiser. When Officer Daniels saw Brown again, Officer Carson had 
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him in handcuffs. He handed the gun to Officer Carson, who unjammed it and ejected the 

magazine, which contained five bullets. The gun, magazine, and bullets were later inventoried at 

the station. On cross-examination, Officer Daniels confirmed that none of his reports contained 

information that Brown tried to hand off the gun to defendant. 

¶ 24 Kevetta McPhan testified that on May 19, 2003, around 9:30 p.m., she and defendant were

sitting on top of a car in Shanoki Powell’s driveway, located near the Whites’ house on South 

LaSalle. At some point, she spoke to Stevenson from his car when he drove past. A few minutes 

later, defendant walked away and made a phone call and she heard him say: “You know the 

motherf*** out here.” She then observed a burgundy car park in front of the Whites’ house and 

three people, including Brown, exit the car. An unidentified man from the car handed Brown a gun 

and Brown ran into the Whites’ house. Soon after, a fight broke out on the porch involving a group 

of people, including Brown and Stevenson. As Brown and Stevenson fought, McPhan saw Owens 

help Stevenson up and then Stevenson run away. Brown pulled a gun out of his back pocket and 

defendant told Brown not to shoot Stevenson because there were too many people around. McPhan 

also yelled at Brown to not shoot. Brown, however, ran after Stevenson and fired one shot in his

direction. At that point, the police arrived and Brown threw the gun and ran away. She only became 

aware of defendant’s presence after the fight when she heard defendant speaking on the phone to 

someone. She testified that when detectives interviewed her two days later, she did not tell the 

police that she saw defendant hand Brown the gun or that Stevenson showed her a large wad of 

money on the day of the shooting. 

¶ 25 On cross-examination, McPhan conceded that she told the detectives that defendant handed 

the gun to Brown, but she stated this was because they were “grilling” her, and when she responded 

that she did not know who the unidentified male with Brown was, they kept repeating, “You sure 
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it wasn’t Prince?”. She testified that the detectives also told her that she could get 12 years’ 

imprisonment for withholding information or that she could be charged as an accessory to the 

crime. She stated that she was interviewed for “hours” and she was six months pregnant at that 

time. She eventually implicated defendant in the shooting because she wanted to go home and she 

did not want to go to jail. She testified that she did not see defendant involved in the fight at the 

Whites’ house until he arrived at the end of it. She further testified that the detective who 

interviewed her in 2003 made several attempts to date her and showed up at her house on multiple 

occasions.

¶ 26 Retired Chicago police detective Steven Brownfield testified that on May 22, 2003, he 

interviewed McPhan at the police station in relation to the Stevenson shooting. He confirmed that 

on that day, McPhan told him that she saw defendant hand Brown a gun and saw defendant slam 

Stevenson to the ground and repeatedly ask him where the money was. She told Brownfield that 

defendant yelled at Brown to shoot Stevenson. Brownfield denied showing up to her house and 

asking her out on dates. 

¶ 27 Detective Stover testified that on July 31, 2007, he and his partner met with McPhan in the 

courthouse. Detective Stover denied that they threatened McPhan with any criminal charges during 

the interview. He testified that he offered McPhan coffee and water and showed her where the 

restroom was located. He confirmed that she told him that she saw defendant hand Brown a 

handgun after they exited the burgundy car outside of the Whites’ house; that she saw defendant 

slam Stevenson to the ground and repeatedly ask him about money; that she heard defendant tell 

Brown to “shoot him”; and that she saw defendant make two phone calls after Brown shot at 

Stevenson and ran away. She also told him that she had seen Stevenson earlier that day and he had 
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shown her a big wad of money. Finally, he testified that she never told him that it was an individual 

other than defendant who handed Brown the handgun. 

¶ 28 On cross-examination, Detective Stover testified that he may have gone to McPhan’s house 

to serve her a subpoena but he did not ever attempt to date her. He had no idea whether McPhan 

was pregnant at the time of her grand jury testimony, and he denied telling McPhan during her 

interview that defendant handed the gun to Brown, not the unidentified man.

¶ 29 ASA Bruce testified that he spoke with McPhan on July 31, 2007. He testified that she 

arrived that day pursuant to a subpoena. He confirmed that she did not say anything to him that 

caused him any concern over her treatment that day. He stated that he did not have any knowledge 

as to whether she was pregnant that day and she did not give him any indication that she was in 

distress.

¶ 30 Owens, who testified on behalf of the State regarding the Cooper shooting, also testified 

regarding the Stevenson shooting. According to his testimony, on the same day of the Cooper 

shooting he saw Brown and Stevenson fighting and tried to stop the fight. At one point, he helped 

Stevenson up and Stevenson ran away from Brown. Owens then saw Brown wrap a jersey around 

a handgun and fire it at Stevenson. According to Owens, defendant was not near Brown at this 

point. When the police arrived, Brown threw the gun at Owens and fled. Owens stated that he 

stepped away from the gun and the police picked it up. He saw the police chase Brown through a 

vacant lot and into an alley. He did not speak to any police officers that day. On cross-examination, 

Owens testified that he did not see defendant hand Brown the gun and he did not hear defendant 

tell Brown to shoot Stevenson 
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¶ 31 During the presentation of evidence related to the Stevenson shooting, the trial court twice 

admonished the jury as to the limited purpose of the evidence. The court’s second limiting 

instruction, which was substantially similar to the first, was as follows:

“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, evidence has been received from numerous 

witnesses that the defendant, Prince Johnson, has been involved in an offense other than 

that charged in the indictment. That is a matter involving Albert Earl Stevenson. This 

evidence has been received on the issue of the defendant, Prince Johnson’s, identity and 

possession of the weapon and may be considered by you only for those limited purposes. 

It is for you to determine whether the defendant, Prince Johnson, was involved in 

that matter involving Albert Earl Stevenson and, if so, what weight should be given to this 

evidence on the issue of identity and possession of a weapon.” 

¶ 32 Illinois State Police forensic scientist Marc Pomerance testified as an expert in firearms 

identification. Pomerance concluded that the casing found at the Cooper shooting and the bullet 

found at the Stevenson shooting were both fired from the same firearm, which was the one 

recovered from the Stevenson shooting. He further testified that neither the casing nor the bullet 

was fired from the gun found on the floorboard of Cooper’s car. 

¶ 33 After the State rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict arguing that the State failed 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed first-degree murder by virtue of 

accountability for Brown’s actions. The court denied the motion. 

¶ 34 The defense presented the following evidence.

¶ 35 Shanoki Powell testified that in May 2003 she was living near the intersection of 119th 

Street and South LaSalle, which was three or four houses away from the Whites. She testified that 

on May 19, 2003, she was outside with her sister and McPhan when she heard a commotion down 
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the block, which she later discovered was a fight as it began to move closer to her house. She 

recognized Stevenson and Brown. She stated that she saw defendant that night too but he was not 

involved in the fight. She observed Brown slam Stevenson to the ground. As they continued 

fighting, she saw Stevenson lose his t-shirt and run away. She then saw Brown pull out a gun and 

shoot one time at Stevenson. She testified that Brown ran away but the police grabbed him and put 

him in the police car. She stated that she never heard defendant yell anything to Brown and he did 

not join in the fight at any point. She also never saw defendant hand Brown a gun. 

¶ 36 On cross-examination, Powell testified that she did not know how the fight began and that 

she saw defendant near her backyard during the fight. She stated that the fight never went into the 

Whites’ house or on the porch. Powell stated that she did not see Brown drop the gun and she did 

not see the police recover the gun. She stated that she did not see defendant again after Stevenson 

was shot. She did not talk to the police that night. The first time she spoke of her knowledge of the 

shooting was when defendant’s investigator, Rosa Silva, came to speak with her in 2007. She also 

stated that she was still friends with defendant. 

¶ 37 Tracey White testified that on May 19, 2003, she was 16 or 17 years old and living on 

South LaSalle. On that day, she was sitting on her couch when Stevenson came into the house to 

speak with one of her cousins. Stevenson then left the house but quickly ran back inside followed 

by a group of men. White saw the men grab Stevenson and she told them to get out of her house. 

She then watched from a window as the men began hitting Stevenson in front of her house. She 

testified that defendant was not one of the individuals involved in the fight but that she saw him 

watching the fight. She never heard defendant yell anything. White stated that at some point she 

could no longer see the fight but she heard a gunshot. She spoke to detectives about the incident 

the next day but never testified before a grand jury. 
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¶ 38 On cross-examination, White stated that at that time she considered defendant to be a 

friend. She testified that while the men were beating up Stevenson, defendant was standing on the 

porch. She confirmed that she told the police officers the same information as in her current 

testimony. She stated that she was subpoenaed and came to the courthouse. She stated that at the 

time of her first interview, the detectives were not interested in defendant’s role in Stevenson’s 

shooting and she would only have mentioned his name if they asked specifically about him. 

¶ 39 The defense rested. The State offered in rebuttal stipulated testimony that if recalled, 

Detective Brownfield would testify that on May 20, 2003 he interviewed White and she did not 

mention defendant’s name. The State also offered the stipulation that if recalled, Detective Stover 

would testify that he and his partner interviewed White on July 30, 2007 and she did not mention 

defendant’s name. The State rested in rebuttal. 

¶ 40 Following closing arguments, the court instructed the jurors as follows:

“Any evidence that was received for a limited purpose should not be considered by 

you for any other purpose. 

*** 

Evidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in an offense other 

than that charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received on the issue of the 

defendant’s identification and possession of a weapon, and it may be considered by you 

only for those limited purposes. 

It is for you to determine whether the defendant was involved in that offense and, 

if so, with [sic] weight should be given to this evidence. And the issues of defendant’s 

identification and possession of the weapon.” 

¶ 41 The jury was also instructed as to the following definition of “legally responsible”: 
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“A person is legally responsible for the conduct of another person when, either 

before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate 

the commission of the offense, he knowingly solicits, aids, abets, agrees to aid, or attempts 

to aid the other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” I.P.I Criminal No. 

5.03. 

For the charges levied against defendant, the court instructed the jury as to the elements of the 

offenses and that the jury must find that either defendant or “one for whose conduct he is legally 

responsible” committed the requisite acts.

¶ 42 The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and that he was armed with a 

firearm. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, raising several issues including error in allowing 

the State to introduce other-crimes evidence. The motion was denied. 

¶ 43 C. Sentencing

¶ 44 At sentencing, the State argued for a 55-year sentence, plus the additional mandatory 15 

years for the firearm enhancement. The State contended that the case involved “an obviously 

violent act that was carried out with premeditation and purpose.” The State acknowledged that 

defendant did not personally cause the death of Cooper but that the jury found him accountable, 

or legally responsible, based on “his relationship with and the actions that he took along with the 

gunman in this case, Kenyatta Brown.” The State also referenced defendant’s criminal history

contained in the presentence investigation report, which included a 1999 battery, a 2000 

aggravated assault of a police officer, and two misdemeanors in 2001 for criminal trespass of a 

vehicle.
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¶ 45 Defense counsel argued for the minimum sentence. In mitigation, defendant’s mother, 

Tamika Johnson, testified that defendant was a positive influence on his siblings and that he made 

a conscious decision to change his lifestyle when his girlfriend became pregnant. 

¶ 46 Defense counsel began his sentencing argument by stating: “Judge, what I would like to 

point out to [Y]our [H]onor is that the decisions that we make at 17 and 18 are usually not the 

same decisions and choices we would make at 25 or at 33, as [defendant] sits here today.” Counsel 

emphasized that defendant was convicted based on a theory of accountability; defendant did not 

shoot Cooper himself; defendant’s criminal history was not in fact so extensive with only one 

felony on his record; defendant was employed and was supporting his children prior to his arrest; 

and since being in custody he has obtained his GED and has worked as a barber.

¶ 47 The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to 45 years for first-degree murder and 15 

years for the firearm enhancement, for a total of 60 years’ imprisonment. In so ruling, the court 

noted that defendant was 20 years old at the time of the murder, not a teenager as argued by defense 

counsel. The court stated that the murder was motivated by a gang rivalry and was “calculated, 

premeditated, and cold-blooded” and that defendant’s sentence was “necessary to deter others, 

particularly other members of gangs who might be tempted to go onto the street and shoot other 

individuals because of some rivalry.” In mitigation, the court acknowledged defendant’s minimal 

criminal history, that defendant was not actually the shooter, and that defendant’s upbringing was 

loving and supportive. 

¶ 48 Defendant filed a motion to reduce the sentence, arguing that it was excessive in light of 

his young age and lack of violent criminal background. This motion was denied and this appeal 

followed. 

¶ 49 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 50 A. Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 51 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence 

related to the Stevenson shooting, which occurred about three hours after the shooting of Cooper. 

Specifically, defendant asserts that the other-crimes evidence introduced was highly prejudicial

and irrelevant and did not serve as identity evidence. Accordingly, defendant requests that we 

reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial without the other-crimes evidence. For the 

reasons that follow, we find that the other-crimes evidence was improperly admitted at trial and 

remand for a new trial. 

¶ 52 We review the admission of other-crimes evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. 

Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 136 (2005). Abuse of discretion is found where the trial court’s decision 

is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the trial court’s 

view.” People v. Fleming, 2014 IL App (1st) 113004, ¶ 38.

¶ 53 Pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Illinois Rules of Evidence (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), “[e]vidence 

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 

show action in conformity therewith[.]” It may, however, be admissible for purposes other than 

propensity, such as to show modus operandi, intent, motive, identity, or absence of mistake. People 

v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 11. Even so, courts generally prohibit the admission of other-crimes 

evidence to protect against the jury convicting a defendant because he or she is a bad person 

deserving punishment. People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 213-214 (1998). A defendant is entitled 

to have his guilt or innocence evaluated solely on the basis of the charged offense. People v. 

Lampkin, 98 Ill. 2d 418, 430 (1983). Thus, the trial court must weigh the probative value of the 

evidence against its prejudicial effect and exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially 

outweighs its probative value. People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 385 (1998).
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¶ 54 To be admissible, other crimes evidence must also have “some threshold similarity to the 

charged offense.” People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 184 (2003). As factual similarities increase, 

so does the relevance or probative value of the other crimes evidence. People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 

294, 310 (1983) (“It is this similarity which increases the relevance of the evidence and ensures 

that it is not being used solely to establish the defendant’s criminal propensities.”). However, 

unless the evidence is offered to prove modus operandi, “mere general areas of similarity will be 

sufficient to allow the evidence to be admitted[.]” People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 141 (2005).

¶ 55 The crux of defendant’s argument on appeal is that “an offense that occurred after the 

charged offense has no relevance to a defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the charged 

offense” under this court’s decision in People v. Rosado, 2017 IL App (1st) 143741. In Rosado, 

the defendant was arrested and charged for a series of drug deliveries that occurred on March 18, 

March 23, and March 29 of 2011. Id. ¶ 3. The State elected to first try the case related to the March 

29 transaction and sought to introduce the March 18 and March 23 transactions as other-crimes 

evidence. Id. ¶ 4.The trial court denied the motion, finding that the other-crimes evidence was 

more prejudicial than probative. Id. After trial, the defendant was acquitted. Id. 

¶ 56 The State then proceeded to try the case involving the March 23 delivery by introducing 

the March 29 transaction as other-crimes evidence to prove identity. Id. ¶ 5. The court admitted 

the evidence and denied the defendant’s request that the jury be informed that he was acquitted as

to March 29 transaction charge. Id. The court admonished the jury as to the other-crimes evidence 

with a limiting instruction. Id. ¶ 16. The jury found the defendant guilty of the March 23 drug 

offense. Id. ¶ 17. 

¶ 57 On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

other-crimes evidence because it could not bolster identification, had no other relevance, and was 
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more prejudicial than probative. Id. ¶ 26. Specifically, the court pointed to the officers’ testimony 

in stating: “[T]he officers did not explain how their ability to recognize [the defendant] on March 

23, both in person and in the photo array that same day, was somehow increased based on what 

they saw six days later on March 29.” Id. ¶ 25. 

¶ 58 We do not read Rosado as standing for the general proposition that evidence of other crimes 

which occur after the charged offense are per se inadmissible. Thus, to the extent that defendant 

argues for such a rule, we disagree. We note in particular our supreme court’s decision in Bartall, 

which the parties appear to have overlooked. Issued decades prior to Rosado, the court in Bartall, 

explicitly rejected a categorical rule that other-crimes evidence may not consist of subsequent acts. 

98 Ill. 2d at 312-313. Instead, the Bartall court held that other-crimes evidence of a shooting that 

occurred 20 hours after the charged shooting was admissible and “proper to show the defendant’s 

intent in the prior shooting.” Id. at 309. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited to multiple 

cases from Illinois and other states where courts admitted “evidence of conduct subsequent to the 

criminal act charged for other purposes.” Id. at 313-14 (“There is no valid reason for limiting the 

availability of subsequent-crimes evidence in cases where it is used to show ‘intent’ but not in 

cases where it is used to show ‘modus operandi.’ ”). The court ultimately concluded that the 

primary test for admitting other-crimes evidence is its relevance to the crime charged. Id. at 313. 

¶ 59 Subsequent to the submission of briefs in this case, this court decided People v. Johnson, 

2020 IL App (1st) 162332. In Johnson, the defendant was charged with various crimes related to 

a kidnapping and sexual assault. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the State 

to present other-crimes evidence regarding the defendant’s involvement in a similar sexual assault 

two weeks after the one for which defendant was being tried. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. On appeal, the defendant 

argued, inter alia, that such evidence was inadmissible under Rosado because it occurred later than 
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the crime at bar. Id. ¶ 38. We rejected that argument, stating “there is no requirement that the other 

incident being offered in the other-crimes evidence occur prior to the charged offense.” Id. ¶ 48 

(citing People v. Wilson, 2015 IL App (4th) 130512, ¶ 79); see also People v. Spyres, 359 Ill. App. 

3d 1108, 1112 (2005). 

¶ 60 Clear from Bartall, the primary considerations in admitting other-crimes evidence are

whether the evidence is relevant for a purpose other than propensity and is more probative than 

prejudicial. See People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). With these principles in mind, we 

turn our attention to the facts in this particular case, and the purported bases on which the othercrimes evidence was offered: defendant’s identity and possession of the weapon. 

¶ 61 The use of other-crimes evidence to show identity serves to, of course, identify the 

defendant as the perpetrator of the charged offense. People v. Quintero, 394 Ill. App. 3d 716, 726 

(2009). “Identity is at issue whenever the defendant denies he was the offender.” People v. Boyd, 

366 Ill. App. 3d 84, 92 (2006). Defendant argues that the evidence of the Stevenson shooting was 

irrelevant because his identity as being present at the Cooper shooting was not at issue, thus the 

other-crimes evidence “served only to paint [him] as a violence-prone menace.” In fact, it was 

undisputed at trial that defendant was in the van when Brown shot Cooper. Owens testified to that 

fact. Defendant never claimed otherwise or put forward any evidence to suggest that he was not in 

the van. Nonetheless, the State presented evidence of the Stevenson shooting and the court 

informed the jury on multiple occasions that the purpose of that evidence was to prove defendant’s 

identity. That evidence, however, was irrelevant where defendant’s identity was not at issue and, 

in light of Owens’ unrefuted testimony, was not necessary to prove that defendant was in the van 

during the Cooper shooting. See People v. Boand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 106, 124 (2005) (finding that 

the court should not have instructed the jury to consider other-crimes evidence for the purpose of 
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identity where identity was not at issue at trial). Further, based on our review of the evidence at 

trial, we fail to see how evidence of the Stevenson shooting would prove defendant’s identity at 

the Cooper shooting even if defendant’s identity had been disputed. 

¶ 62 The State contends in its brief that “the reason defendant’s identity was not contested was 

because he was seen with the murder weapon shortly after it happened.” Having reviewed all of 

the testimony presented by the State, as well as by defendant, regarding both the Cooper and the 

Stevenson shootings, we disagree with the State’s contention. Defendant’s identity as at the scene 

and driving the van when Cooper was shot was based on Owens’ uncontroverted testimony that 

defendant was present. Moreover, even if we could agree with the State’s posture, that would not 

alter the fact that defendant’s identity in the Cooper shooting was not a fact in dispute. 

Accordingly, not only do we not find any probative value in the other-crimes evidence as it relates 

to defendant’s identity, as his identity was not in dispute, we find that it has no relevance.

¶ 63 We believe that the other basis on which the other crimes evidence was admitted, proof of 

defendant’s possession of the weapon, was also admitted in error. Moreover, even if we could find 

that this evidence was properly admitted, it would not serve to prove defendant’s possession of the 

weapon in the Cooper shooting. 

¶ 64 The State presented several witnesses on the Stevenson shooting. It was Owens’ testimony 

that defendant did not have the gun at either Cooper’s or Stevenson’s shooting. In fact, Owens 

testified that after the Stevenson shooting, Brown tossed the weapon at him, not at defendant. 

McPhan testified that defendant did not have the weapon at the Stevenson shooting and that she 

only inculpated him in that regard out of threats made to her by police officers. Officer Thurston 

testified that Brown attempted to hand the gun off to defendant but defendant did not receive it. 

On cross examination, Officer Thurston confirmed that this fact was not among those included in 
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his incident reports. Other than McPhan, only retired detective Brownfield and Detective Stover 

testified that Brown gave the gun to defendant. Their testimony was based on a statement allegedly 

made to them by McPhan during questioning, a statement which she disavowed during her 

testimony at trial. Witnesses on behalf of defendant, who admitted a friendship with defendant,

testified that defendant was not involved in the fight with Stevenson and they never saw Brown 

hand the weapon to defendant or vice versa. Their testimony was corroborated by Owens, the 

State’s witness. Clearly, any evidence to support a conclusion that defendant possessed the gun at 

the Stevenson shooting was conflicted, to say the least, and absolutely refuted by the State’s own 

witness, Owens.

¶ 65 We also point out that the other-crimes evidence lacks sufficient similarity to the Cooper 

shooting. “When other-crimes evidence is offered for such a relevant purpose, it is admissible only 

when the other crime has a threshold similarity to the charged crime.” Quintero, 394 Ill. App. 3d 

at 725 (citing People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 348-49 (1994). “This threshold requirement serves 

to increase the relevancy of the evidence and ensures that the evidence is not being used solely to 

establish a defendant’s criminal propensities.” Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 349. Other than Brown and 

defendant both being identified as being at the location of the shooting, the two crimes here bear 

little resemblance to one another in any significant way. Most significantly, the crimes appear to 

have different motives. The State conceded at oral argument, and the testimony of both Tucker 

and Owens bear out, that the Cooper shooting was gang-related. The Stevenson shooting, on the 

other hand, appeared to be motivated by money, where there was some testimony that Stevenson 

showed McPhan a large wad of money just prior to the incident. Additionally, in the Cooper 

shooting, Brown and defendant were together in a van parked on a street and Brown shot at Cooper 

who was also in a car. In the Stevenson shooting, a fight broke out at a neighbor’s house and once 
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it moved outside, Brown shot at Stevenson as he tried to run away. There is conflicting testimony 

as to whether defendant arrived with Brown in the car at the Stevenson shooting or was already in

the area. At trial, McPhan testified that prior to the shooting, she and defendant were sitting on top 

of a car in Powell’s driveway. Detective Stover testified that McPhan told him that she saw 

defendant hand Brown a handgun after exiting the car outside of the White’s house. Owens 

testified, however, that he did not see Brown hand defendant a gun. The only similarity, about 

which there is no dispute, is the use of the same firearm, of which there is no evidence that 

defendant had control or possession during the Cooper shooting and the evidence of his connection 

to it in the Stevenson shooting is largely conflicting. We find that this lack of similarity strengthens 

our determination that evidence of the Stevenson shooting had no probative value on the issue of 

defendant’s possession of the gun in the Cooper shooting. 

¶ 66 Additionally, the prejudicial impact of this evidence cannot be ignored. “Evidence has been 

defined as being unduly or unfairly prejudicial when it has ‘an undue tendency to suggest a 

decision on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, such as sympathy, hatred, contempt, 

or horror.’ ” People v. Hale, 2012 IL App (1st) 103537, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 

2d 201, 237 (1993)). Here, in the face of evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation and deadly 

shooting of Cooper, the jury heard evidence that placed defendant at the scene of a second deadly 

shooting, within hours of the first. They also heard evidence, albeit conflicting, that defendant was 

engaged in a fight with Stevenson and that he not only urged Brown to shoot him, but that he 

handed the gun to Brown to complete the act. Regardless of defendant’s guilt or lack thereof as to 

the Stevenson shooting, the evidence insinuated defendant’s association with another murder on 

the same day. It is hard to imagine that this did not engender a prejudicial impact on the jury, 

particularly in light of the extensiveness of the evidence presented on the Stevenson shooting. See 
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People v. Lindgren 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137 (1980) (“Such evidence overpersuades the jury, which might 

convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment.”). 

¶ 67 The extensiveness of the Stevenson shooting evidence further increased the likelihood of 

prejudicial impact. Other-crimes evidence “must not become a focal point of the trial.” People v. 

Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926, 938 (2001). Here, in addition to Owens, the State presented McPhan 

as its other eyewitness to the Stevenson shooting. The State then presented testimony from several 

law enforcement officers and a prosecutor to partially impeach, not only McPhan’s testimony 

concerning the handoff of the gun, but also that of their other witness, Owens. Defendant then 

presented two witnesses to rebut the State’s witnesses. Although some of the witnesses were 

common to both shootings, the volume of testimony received regarding the Stevenson shooting 

was fairly extensive, especially where it necessitated defendant calling witnesses to rebut the 

evidence presented as to the Stevenson shooting. See id. at 940-41 (stating that the detail and 

repetition of the other-crimes evidence “served no purpose other than to inflame the jury”).

¶ 68 The jury was also required to resolve additional conflicts and make more credibility 

determinations as a result of the Stevenson shooting evidence. As such, what occurred in this case 

was precisely that which the trial judge, during her careful deliberations on the State’s motion,

clearly sought to avoid at the outset, an impermissible “trial within a trial.” Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 

315; see also People v. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d 427, 432 (1995) (holding that when admitting 

other-crimes evidence, the trial court should be careful to avoid a “mini-trial” of the other offense). 

Even if the other-crimes evidence were relevant to defendant’s possession of the weapon, the 

evidence presented was not remotely limited to the evidence that a witness observed defendant 

holding the weapon some hours after the Cooper shooting. See People v. Diaz, 78 Ill. App. 3d 277, 

280 (1979) (finding the other-crimes evidence prejudicial where it was not limited to the 
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defendant’s possession of the stolen weapon and the circumstances of his arrest but instead was 

comprised of the complete details of the other crime). 

¶ 69 Finally, we believe that the prejudicial impact of the other-crimes evidence admitted here 

could not be remedied by the issuance of limiting instructions. People v. Boyd, 366 Ill. App. 3d 

84, 94 (2006) (“When the unfair prejudice is excessive, a limiting instruction will not save 

admissibility of the evidence.”). Moreover, the trial court’s limiting instructions, which generally

serve the important purpose of reducing any prejudicial effect, were not curative because they 

directed the jury to an irrelevant purpose. As such, we must conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting the other-crimes evidence to prove defendant’s identity as there was no 

probative value on that ground and the evidence was highly prejudicial.

¶ 70 As a final note, we acknowledge the potentiality of other permissible purposes for the 

other-crimes evidence. Though there is clear and extensive caselaw regarding the effects of an 

overbroad limiting instruction for other-crimes evidence (see People v. Carter, 38 Ill. 2d 496, 504 

(1967) (“Evidence admissible for one purpose is not affected by inadmissibility for another.”)), 

there is little regarding the opposite situation: where none of the purposes set forth in the limiting 

instructions were proper, but other purposes could have been valid reasons for admitting the 

evidence. Our research has revealed a single published case on this point, People v. Lenley, where 

the court determined that none of the four purposes included in the limiting instruction were 

applicable and at issue at trial but that modus operandi could have been a permissible purpose had 

it been argued on appeal and submitted to the jury. 345 Ill. App. 3d 399 (2003). We find the Lenley

court’s observations on the effects of an other-crimes limiting instruction instructive. There, the 

court stated as follows:
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 “[S]ince we presume that jurors take direction from limiting instructions and 

consider evidence only in a manner in which they are told to consider it, the instruction on 

the use of other-crimes evidence, if given, needs to be accurate. When jurors are told to

consider this kind of evidence for intent, motive, design, and lack of mistake and the 

evidence has no bearing on those matters, jurors have no way to use the evidence in an 

appropriate limited manner. When evidence that harbors such a potential for misuse has 

been admitted and jurors have been told to consider it for the wrong reasons, we cannot 

presume that jurors used the evidence for a limited valid reason about which they were not 

informed.” Lenley, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 411-12. 

The State does not make any other permissible use argument here on appeal, and we express no 

opinion on the matter. Here, improper purposes were put to the jury and, for the same reasons as 

explained in Lenley, we decline to infer or seek out a permissible purpose that was not put to the 

jury. 

 Following hearing on the State’s motion, the trial court determined that the other-crimes 

evidence as proposed by the State was more probative than prejudicial and specifically found that 

its prejudicial effect was minimized due to the court’s limitation of the evidence to be presented 

and the limiting instructions to the jury. However, after reviewing the evidence as presented at 

trial, we must disagree. The evidence actually presented was neither relevant nor probative 

particularly as to the undisputed identification of defendant in the Cooper shooting. See People v. 

Lenley, 345 Ill. App. 3d 399, 412 (2003) (where the purposes were inapplicable to the issues at 

trial, “the balancing process by which the evidence was allowed to be heard is inherently flawed”).

As such, we find the court’s admission of this evidence to have been an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 71 B. Harmless Error
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¶ 72 We must now determine whether the court’s error in admitting the other-crimes evidence 

was harmless. “The erroneous admission of evidence of other crimes carries a high risk of 

prejudice and ordinarily calls for reversal.” Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d at 140. However, admission of 

other crimes evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “when a defendant is neither 

prejudiced nor denied a fair trial based upon its admission.” People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 530 

(2000). It is the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been 

the same without the improperly admitted evidence. Quintero, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 728. 

¶ 73 The evidence of defendant’s guilt in the Cooper shooting, namely his accountability or 

legal responsibility for the actions of Brown, was not overwhelming. The only evidence of 

defendant’s accountability was that he was the driver of the van when the shooting took place and 

Tucker’s implicating statements. Specifically, Tucker stated in interviews to law enforcement that

while in the van, Brown stated that they were going to look for rival gang members and defendant 

nodded in agreement and Brown revealed the firearm in the van prior to the Cooper shooting. 

Tucker’s statements, however, suffer from credibility issues where his statements were largely 

disavowed at trial and he claimed to have an alcohol dependence problem. Thus, without the 

Stevenson shooting evidence, there is some evidence of defendant’s accountability but it is not so 

strong as to conclude that the verdict would be the same without the other-crimes evidence. See 

People v. Hogan, 388 Ill. App. 3d 885, 894 (finding that evidence was sufficient to support 

conviction but was not so overwhelming for the harmless error analysis). 

¶ 74 Additionally, as we have stated, the other-crimes evidence was highly prejudicial, 

especially as the degree of defendant’s involvement in the Stevenson shooting was, at best,

uncertain and was the subject of conflicting testimony by multiple witnesses. The other-crimes 

evidence presented at trial was also extensive; several witnesses testified as to what occurred 
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during the Stevenson shooting and the defendant was forced to present witnesses to rebut the 

State’s evidence.

¶ 75 As a reviewing court, we recognize that we owe some deference to the trial court’s ability 

to evaluate the impact of evidence on the jury. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). 

Reflecting on the State’s comment at oral argument that testimony at trial may sometimes differ 

from that which is anticipated, as a reviewing court we are also cognizant that, unlike the trial 

court, we have the benefit of hindsight. However, based on the record, now fully developed and 

before us, we simply cannot find it “unlikely that the error influenced the jury.” Boyd, 366 Ill. App. 

3d at 95. Because the State has failed to carry its burden of persuasion to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the result would have been the same without the other-crimes evidence, the admission 

of the other-crimes evidence was not harmless. Thus, we remand for a new trial without the othercrimes evidence.

¶ 76 C. Double Jeopardy 

¶ 77 Finally, because we are remanding for a new trial, we must determine whether another trial 

on the matter would violate the double jeopardy clause. People v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 50. 

“The double jeopardy clause forbids a second, or successive, trial for the purpose of affording the 

prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence it failed to muster in the first proceeding.” 

People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995). “Double jeopardy does not preclude retrial of a 

defendant whose conviction is supported by sufficient evidence but set aside because of errors in 

the trial process.” People v. Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d 320, 331 (2006) (citing Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d at 

393). “Retrial is the proper remedy if the evidence presented at the initial trial, including any 

improperly admitted evidence, was sufficient to sustain the conviction.” People v. Drake, 2019 IL 

123734, ¶ 21. 
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¶ 78 In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 367 

(2008). Based on the evidence presented at trial, there was sufficient evidence from which a 

rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the offense of first degree 

murder via legal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, no double jeopardy violation 

is implicated upon retrial. This conclusion does not, however, imply that we have made a finding 

as to defendant’s guilt on retrial. See People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 391 (1998). Because we 

have found defendant’s first argument meritorious and we remand for a new trial, it is unnecessary 

to address defendant’s arguments regarding his sentence.

¶ 79 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 80 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and 

remand for a new trial not inconsistent with this order. 

¶ 81 Reversed and remanded.