THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Petitioner, 

v. 

Christopher Broadnax, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2013-000615 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal From Richland County 

G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27545 

Heard February 4, 2015 – Refiled July 29, 2015 

REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Kenney and 

Assistant Attorney General Mary Shannon Williams, all 

of Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: The State of South Carolina appeals the court of 

appeals' decision reversing Christopher Broadnax's (Respondent) convictions for 
 

 

 

armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. We reverse in part 

and affirm in part the decision of the court of appeals. 

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

At 5:30 p.m. on May 24, 2009, a masked gunman entered Church's Chicken 

on Two Notch Road in Columbia. He held one of the employees at gunpoint while 

the employee emptied the cash registers. Three other employees locked 

themselves in the kitchen. The gunman was wearing a striped shirt, had a 

distinctive "lazy eye," and carried a clear plastic bag. 

After the employee filled the bag with money from the registers, the gunman 

calmly exited the store, climbed into a "gray Dodge old model truck" driven by an 

accomplice, and left the scene. One of the employees chased the gunman outside 

and saw him riding in the passenger seat of the gray truck as the driver pulled out 

of the parking lot onto Two Notch Road. 

Police responded to the scene within approximately three minutes, and based 

on the employees' descriptions of the getaway vehicle, stopped the driver a short 

distance from the Church's Chicken on Two Notch Road.1 When officers 

approached the vehicle, they found Respondent crouched down on the floorboard 

of the passenger side. Officers immediately noticed that Respondent had a "lazy 

eye." The police officers found a gun and a bag full of money (matching the 

employees' descriptions) jammed under the truck's passenger seat, adjacent to 

Respondent. Further, one of the employees identified Respondent as the gunman 

in a "show-up" identification, and testified that he recognized Respondent's 

distinctive facial features, build, and clothing.2 

Respondent was charged with one count of armed robbery and four counts 

of kidnapping. 

After the State rested, Respondent indicated that he would testify in his own 

defense. Consequently, the State moved to admit Respondent's prior criminal 

1

 A testifying officer stated that the truck was distinctive because it was in poor 

condition and "had a number of dents and pings and so forth." 

2

 Several of the employees also made in-court identifications of Respondent as the 

perpetrator of the crimes. Furthermore, Respondent's accomplice testified against 

him at trial. 
 

 

record for purposes of impeachment. The trial court heard arguments and 

conducted an inquiry into which of Respondent's prior convictions should be 

admitted. Pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE, and the court of appeals' opinion in 

State v. Al–Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003), the trial court 

admitted three of Respondent's four prior armed robbery convictions.3 

During his testimony, Respondent denied any involvement in the robbery. 

However, Respondent's counsel elicited testimony regarding Respondent's prior 

convictions for armed robbery.4 The State likewise questioned Respondent about 

his prior convictions. 

The trial judge then instructed the jury: 

You've heard evidence that the defendant was convicted of a crime 

other than the one for which the defendant is now on trial. This 

evidence may be considered by you if you can conclude it is true only 

in deciding whether the defendant's testimony is believable and for no 

other purpose. You must not consider the defendant's prior record as 

any evidence of the defendant's guilt of the charge that we are trying 

here today. 

The jury found Respondent guilty of armed robbery and four counts of 

kidnapping, and the trial judge sentenced Respondent to a mandatory minimum 

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on 

Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions. 

On appeal to the court of appeals, Respondent argued, inter alia, that the 

trial court erred in admitting his prior armed robbery conviction for impeachment 

purposes. See State v. Broadnax, 401 S.C. 238, 241, 736 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ct. 

App. 2013). The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court 

for a new trial. Id. Specifically, the court of appeals found: (1) Respondent's prior 

armed robbery convictions, without more, did not constitute crimes of dishonesty, 

3

 The trial court also admitted Respondent's prior convictions for transaction card 

theft, grand larceny, and petit larceny. 

4

 The trial court permitted Respondent's counsel to elicit the prior conviction 

testimony during his direct examination without waiving his objection to the 

admission of that testimony. 
 

 

and therefore, the trial court should have conducted a balancing test prior to 

admitting testimony regarding Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions; and 

(2) such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 244–48, 736 

S.E.2d at 691–93. 

ISSUES PRESENTED 

I.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that Respondent's 

prior armed robbery convictions were not crimes of dishonesty, 

and were therefore inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE? 

II.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to find any error 

in the admission of Respondent's prior criminal record harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. State 

v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). The admission or 

exclusion of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not 

be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 

557, 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002) (citation omitted); see also State v. Kelly, 319 S.C. 

173, 176, 460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) ("A trial judge has considerable latitude in 

ruling on the admissibility of evidence and his rulings will not be disturbed absent 

a showing of probable prejudice." (citation omitted)). "An abuse of discretion 

occurs where the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or 

are controlled by an error of law." State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540 

S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000) (citation omitted). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

I. Prior Armed Robbery Convictions 

The State argues that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court 

because armed robbery is a "crime of dishonesty or false statement" such that it is 

automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE. We disagree. 

Rule 609(a), SCRE, provides: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted 

of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 

punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 

law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 

accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 

court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 

outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 

(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 

admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 

punishment. 

In State v. Al-Amin, the court of appeals considered the question of whether 

the appellant was entitled to a new trial after the trial court admitted his prior 

armed robbery conviction without first weighing the probative value and 

prejudicial effects of the admission. 353 S.C. at 408–09, 414, 578 S.E.2d at 34, 37. 

Noting that "[t]here is disagreement among federal circuit courts and state courts 

construing Rule 609(a)(2) as to which crimes are included," the court of appeals 

explained that "[t]he disagreement revolves around whether convictions for theft 

crimes, such as larceny, robbery, and shoplifting, should be admitted under the rule 

as involving dishonesty or false statement." Id. at 415, 578 S.E.2d at 37. The 

court of appeals acknowledged that a majority of federal courts has adopted a 

narrow approach to the question, but declined to follow federal precedent, instead 

adopting an expansive approach to determining what constitutes a "crime of 

dishonesty or false statement." Id. at 416, 578 S.E.2d at 38. The court of appeals 

reasoned: 

"An essential element of robbery is that the perpetrator of the offense 

steals the goods and chattels of another or, in the case of an attempt to 

commit robbery, intends to steal the goods or chattels of the person 

assaulted. If this element is not present, the crime is not robbery or an 

attempted robbery. Stealing is defined in law as larceny. Larceny 

involves dishonesty. The fact that the perpetrator of the crime 

manifests or declares his dishonesty by brazenly committing the crime 

does not make him an honest person." 

Id. at 421, 578 S.E.2d at 40–41 (quoting State v. Goad, 692 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tenn. 
 

Crim. App. 1985)). Thus, the court of appeals concluded, "It is the larcenous 

element of taking property of another which makes the action dishonest. Larceny is 

a lesser-included offense of armed robbery." Id. at 425, 578 S.E.2d at 43 (citations 

omitted). The court of appeals, citing several dictionary definitions, found further, 

To restrict the application of Rule 609(a)(2) only to those offenses 

which evidence an element of affirmative misstatement or 

misrepresentation of fact would be to ignore the plain meaning of the 

word "dishonesty." "Dishonesty" is, by definition, a "'disposition to 

lie, cheat, or steal.'" "To be dishonest means to deceive, defraud or 

steal." "'In common human experience[,] acts of deceit, fraud, 

cheating, or stealing . . . are universally regarded as conduct which 

reflects adversely on a man's honesty and integrity.'" 

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

More recently, however, we decided State v. Bryant, in which we held that 

the trial court erroneously admitted the petitioner's prior firearms convictions under 

Rule 609 without weighing the probative value and prejudicial effects of their 

admission because the firearms offenses were not crimes involving dishonesty. 

369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 152, 155–56 (2006). In so holding, we stated: 

Violations of narcotics laws are generally not probative of 

truthfulness. See State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 552 S.E.2d 300 

(2001) (citing State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000)). 

Furthermore, a conviction for robbery, burglary, theft, and drug 

possession, beyond the basic crime itself, is not probative of 

truthfulness. United States v. Smith, 181 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 

2002).[5] Likewise, firearms violations also are not generally probative 

5

 In Smith, the court stated: 

[E]vidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime involving 

dishonesty or false statement is admissible without regard to its 

prejudicial effect. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Smith's forgery conviction 

is admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). However, his convictions for 

robbery, burglary, theft, and drug possession convictions are not, as 

the government has not shown that any of them involved false 

statements or acts of deceit beyond the basic crime itself, and as to the 
 

of truthfulness. Accordingly, Petitioner's prior firearms convictions do 

not involve dishonesty and their probative value should have been 

weighed against their prejudicial effect prior to their admission 

pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1). 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Here, the State argues that because Bryant involved convictions for firearms 

offenses, and not explicitly a prior armed robbery conviction, the above language 

is merely dicta. Therefore, the State relies on earlier precedents from our courts— 

namely Al-Amin—and points to other states' precedents to support its argument that 

armed robbery is a crime of dishonesty, such that no balancing test is required. 

We take this opportunity to overrule Al-Amin, and reaffirm the rule as 

formulated in Bryant that armed robbery is not a crime of dishonesty or false 

statement for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a)(2). While many states 

have adopted a broader interpretation of the Rule, we find the analysis to be more 

nuanced than that undertaken by the Al-Amin court.6 Under Al-Amin's and the 

concurrence's rationale, the exception contained in Rule 609(a)(2), which permits 

the automatic admission of certain prior convictions, swallows the rule contained 

in Rule 609(a)(1), in which discretion regarding the admission of prior convictions 

rests with the trial judge. We think this interpretation is contrary to the intent of 

the Rule. 

theft convictions has not shown that it involved items of significant 

value. 

181 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (internal citations omitted). 

6 See Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of 

Evidence 609(a)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 

1087, 1119 (2000) ("The problem with [a broad reading of the term 'crime of 

dishonesty'] . . . is that it blurs the moral distinction between stealing and lying. A 

person who steals is certainly dishonest; she rejects the idea of making an honest 

living; she cheats; she takes something to which she is not entitled; she disobeys 

the rules. But there is no particular reason to think that she is deceitful. Indeed, 

what little empirical evidence there is indicates that a prior conviction for larceny 

(stealing by stealth) says little or nothing about a witness'[s] propensity to lie." 

(footnote omitted)). 
 

 

Thus, we hold that for impeachment purposes, crimes of "dishonesty or false 

statement" are crimes in the nature of crimen falsi "that bear upon a witness's 

propensity to testify truthfully." Adams v. State, 644 S.E.2d 426, 431–32 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 2007) (footnote omitted) (surveying federal and state treatment of the issue, 

and adopting the more narrow federal definition); see also United States v. Smith, 

551 F.2d 348, 362–63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[I]n its broadest sense, the term 'crimen 

falsi' has encompassed only those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or 

deliberate interference with a court's ascertainment of truth." (emphasis added)). 

Armed robbery, therefore, is not per se probative of truthfulness. 

The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically identify crimena falsi in Rule 

609(a)(2), FRE, as crimes which by their very nature permit the impeachment of a 

witness convicted of a crime of "dishonesty or false statement." Green, supra note 

6, at 1090. In fact, 

[t]he original Conference Report makes the link between Rule 

609(a)(2) and the crimena falsi explicit, defining the phrase "crimes 

involving dishonesty or false statement" as "crimes such as perjury, 

subornation of perjury, false statements, criminal fraud, 

embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of 

crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of 

deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's 

propensity to testify truthfully." 

Id. at 1090–91 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 

93-1037, at 9 (1975)). While the State emphasizes that South Carolina did not 

adopt this explanatory language when it adopted Federal Rule 609, the notion of 

crimen falsi in the evidentiary context is long-established in the common law of 

South Carolina. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 35 S.C. 279, 282, 14 S.E. 617, 618 

(1892) ("The old, well-settled rule was that one who had been convicted of a crime 

belonging to the class known as the 'crimen falsi' was said to be infamous, and 

incompetent to testify."). Thus, the State's argument is unavailing. Cf. Williams v. 

Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 247, 553 S.E.2d 496, 507 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A strong 

presumption . . . exists that the General Assembly does not intend to supplant 

common law principles when enacting legislation." (citations omitted)).7 

7

 While the concurrence criticizes our reliance on the federal interpretation of the 

Rules, we note that we routinely look to the federal interpretation of the Rules of 
 

 

Here, the trial judge felt constrained by Al-Amin to forgo a balancing test, 

even though he noted that Al-Amin was a "significant departure" from what he 

understood the law to be, especially because the State sought to admit three prior 

convictions identical to the one for which Respondent was currently on trial. We 

agree with the trial judge that the prejudicial effect of admitting prior convictions 

for the exact same offense is often very high. See State v. Scriven, 339 S.C. 333, 

343–44, 529 S.E.2d 71, 76–77 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that because the prior 

convictions were "similar or identical to charged offenses, . . . the likelihood of a 

high degree of prejudice to the accused [was] inescapable"). For this reason, a rule 

that places discretion with the trial judge is even more desirable, and unlike the 

concurrence, we think the trial judge is the best arbiter of whether a very 

prejudicial piece of evidence should be admitted in this situation—unless of course 

the prior crime specifically relates to a defendant's penchant to tell the truth on the 

witness stand. Importantly, our holding today does not preclude the admission of 

prior convictions for armed robbery; rather, it merely enables a trial judge to 

conduct a balancing test pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1) when the State seeks prior 

convictions for armed robbery to impeach a criminal defendant's testimony. 

Ultimately, the Rule is designed to help the jury discern the truth. It is not a 

tool for the State to bolster its case against the criminal defendant for the mere fact 

that the defendant has engaged in prior criminal activity. The balance we strike 

today cuts to the heart of our system's conceptions of fair trial and fair play. 

Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' finding that armed robbery is not a 

crime of "dishonesty or false statement," rendering it admissible pursuant to Rule 

609(a)(2), SCRE. 

II. Harmless Error 

Evidence to guide us in our interpretation of our own Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., 

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 405 S.C. 584, 594, 748 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2013) 

("Because our appellate courts have not definitively addressed Rule 60(b)(5), we 

have looked to the federal courts' interpretation as our rule is similar to the federal 

rule."); Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 474 n.10, 674 S.E.2d 154, 162 

n.10 (2009) ("The language of Rule 26(c), SCRCP, mirrors that of federal Rule 

26(c). Because there is no South Carolina precedent construing this rule, federal 

interpretation of Rule 26(c) is persuasive authority." (citation omitted)). 
 

Next, the State argues that any error in admitting the prior armed robbery 

convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. 

While we agree with the court of appeals that in many instances, the 

admission of identical prior convictions for impeachment purposes enhances its 

prejudicial nature, it does not conclusively render the error so prejudicial that it is 

not subject to a harmless error analysis. Rather, 

[w]hether the improper introduction of this evidence is harmless 

requires us to look at the other evidence admitted at trial to determine 

whether the defendant's "guilt is conclusively proven by competent 

evidence, such that no other rational conclusion could be reached." 

State v. Brooks, 341 S.C. 57, 62–63, 533 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2000) (quoting State v. 

Parker, 315 S.C. 230, 234, 433 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1993)). 

Here, the other evidence implicating Respondent in these crimes was 

overwhelming. Respondent was positively identified by several employees who 

recalled Respondent's distinctive facial features and clothing. Furthermore, one of 

the employees watched as Respondent's accomplice drove him away from the 

scene in a dented gray truck, which the police stopped a only a short distance away 

within minutes after the employees reported the robbery. Inside the getaway 

vehicle, police found Respondent crouching in the floorboard area, sitting adjacent 

to a gun and a bag of money matching the employees' descriptions. 

Therefore, in spite of the error in admitting Respondent's prior convictions 

for armed robbery, we find such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and we reverse the part of the court of appeals' decision finding otherwise. See, 

e.g., State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 334, 563 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2002) ("'Harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt' means the reviewing court can conclude the error did 

not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.").8 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is 

8

 The State also contends that the court of appeals erred in refusing to remand the 

case to the trial court, and in conducting the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test itself. 

Our harmless error analysis renders the remand issue moot. 
 

REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. 

KITTREDGE and BEATTY, JJ., concur. HEARN, J., concurring in a 

separate opinion in which PLEICONES, J., concurs. 
JUSTICE HEARN: I concur in the result reached by the majority. 

However, I would reverse the court of appeals' opinion and hold the trial 

court did not err in admitting Broadnax's prior convictions because armed 

robbery is a crime involving dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2) of the South 

Carolina Rules of Evidence. 

I appreciate the majority's discussion of the similar federal rule and its 

accompanying legislative history. As the majority correctly asserts, the 

federal rule has been interpreted to limit the application of Rule 609(a)(2), 

FRE to those prior convictions of crimes whose central elements involve 

crimen falsi. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362–63 (D.C. Cir. 

1976) ("[I]n its broadest sense, the term 'crimen falsi' has encompassed only 

those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or deliberate interference 

with a court's ascertainment of truth."). 

However, the majority's analysis ignores that neither our rule nor its 

commentary, both of which were promulgated by this Court, contain any 

reference to crimen falsi. Cf. Rule 609 note ("Subsection (a) does change the 

law in South Carolina."). Further, I disagree with the majority that the 

common law somehow contains and thus preserves the concept that crimen 

falsi is the operative standard. Curiously, the sole case the majority cites to 

support this proposition, State v. Peterson, 35 S.C. 279, 14 S.E. 617 (1892), 

affirmed the trial court's admission of a prior conviction for the exact crime at 

issue today: robbery. Id. at 281, 14 S.E. at 618. 

Accordingly, this Court's interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE must 

be limited to its plain language. The Rule states: 

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted 

of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 

punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 

law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 

accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 

court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 

outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 

(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
 

admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 

punishment. 

Rule 609(a), SCRE (emphasis added). As our court of appeals succinctly 

noted in State v. Al–Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003), the 

operative word for this analysis is "dishonesty." As elucidated by that court: 

To restrict the application of Rule 609(a)(2) only to those 

offenses which evidence an element of affirmative misstatement 

or misrepresentation of fact would be to ignore the plain meaning 

of the word "dishonesty." "Dishonesty" is, by definition, a 

"'disposition to lie, cheat, or steal.'" "To be dishonest means to 

deceive, defraud or steal." "'In common human experience[,] acts 

of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing . . . are universally regarded 

as conduct which reflects adversely on a man's honesty and 

integrity.'" 

Id. at 425, 578 S.E.2d at 43 (internal citations omitted). Restricting our 

analysis—as we must—to the plain language of 609(a)(2), SCRE there is no 

doubt armed robbery constitutes a crime involving dishonesty. Stealing, even 

more so when done at gunpoint, is essentially the type of behavior reflecting 

adversely on one's character for truthfulness envisioned by Rule 609(a)(2). 

Holding that armed robbery is a crime of dishonesty pursuant to Rule 

609(a)(2) would avoid the perverse result the majority creates, where 

shoplifting is a crime of dishonesty pursuant to State v. Johnson, 334 S.C. 78, 

87, 512 S.E.2d 795, 800 (1999), but armed robbery is not.9 Further, it 

comports with the outcome a majority of states have reached on the same 

issue. See Jane M. Draper, Annotation, What Constitutes Crime Involving 

“Dishonesty or False Statement” Under Rule 609(a)(2) of Uniform Rules of 

9

 I do not believe the result in this case is dictated by stare decisis. As the majority 

points out, the Court's decision in State v. Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 

152, 155–56 (2006), dealt only with the question of whether prior firearm 

convictions involve dishonesty. Thus, the Court was not required to reach the 

same issue that is before us today. See generally State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 19, 

409 S.E.2d 811, 817 (Ct. App. 1991) (Sanders, C.J.) ("[A]ppellate courts in this 

state, like well-behaved children, do not speak unless spoken to and do not answer 

questions they are not asked."). 
Evidence or Similar State Rule—Crimes Involving Violence or Potential for 

Violence, 83 A.L.R. 277 (2000) (compiling decisions from other 

jurisdictions); see, e.g., Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 476 n.18 (Alaska 

1980) ("It is the larceny element of robbery which makes such a conviction 

admissible as impeachment of a witness."). 

Accordingly, I would hold the trial court did not err by allowing in 

evidence of Broadnax's prior convictions pursuant to 609(a)(2) because 

armed robbery is a crime involving dishonesty, and would reverse the 

contrary decision of the court of appeals. 

PLEICONES, J., concurs.