Filed 8/10/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SANTA RITA UNION SCHOOL 

DISTRICT et al., 

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CITY OF SALINAS,

Defendant; 

REXFORD TITLE, INC., et al.,

 H049854

(Monterey County 

 Super. Ct. No. 20CV000242) 

 Real Parties in Interest and 

 Appellants.

This appeal arises under the California Environmental Quality Act 

(CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; further unspecified statutory 

references are to this code) and its implementing regulations (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 14, § 15000 et seq. (Guidelines)). At issue is whether the Final 

Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the West Area Specific Plan (Specific 

Plan or Project), as certified by the City of Salinas as lead agency, was 

inadequate. The Draft EIR did not discuss or analyze any potential off-site 

impacts flowing from an assumption that the construction of new schools as 

contemplated by the Project would never be built. The Santa Rita Union School 
2

District (SRUSD) and the Salinas Union High School District (SUHSD; 

collectively, the Districts) contended that they would never receive sufficient 

funding for these new facilities, and would therefore have to instead 

accommodate new students from residential development resulting from the 

Specific Plan at existing school sites or by other means. The Project identified 

locations for new schools and the EIR addressed anticipated off-site impacts of

development at those sites. The City also imposed developer impact fees for the 

Project as set by the Districts under Education Code section 17620 and capped 

under Government Code sections 65995 and 65996, deemed full and complete 

mitigation under CEQA for adverse impacts of a project on local school 

facilities. 

Leading up to the approval of the Specific Plan by the City and its 

certification of the Final EIR, the Districts objected to the EIR’s adequacy. They 

contended that because of present insufficient school-facilities funding 

sources—a scenario they assumed would persist over the 20-30 year expected 

build-out of the Specific Plan—the new schools contemplated by the Project to 

accommodate increased enrollment would likely never be built, and that 

discussion in the Final EIR of indirect, off-site environmental impacts related to 

the Districts alternatively accommodating new students by other means was 

required under CEQA. 

The City responded to the Districts’ concerns by explaining that the 

purpose for its having identified sites for new schools within the Project site 

was to ensure there was adequate land set aside for the development of new 

schools, and that the EIR had sufficiently analyzed potentially significant and 

reasonably foreseeable impacts related to new-school construction, as 

contemplated by the Project. At bottom, the City maintained that the 

information relayed by the Districts—all premised on the assumption that 
3

sufficient funding to build new schools as contemplated by the Specific Plan 

would not become available over the next 20-30 years—amounted to no more 

than speculation and uncertainty not requiring further environmental review or 

response. The City further posited that no meaningful review or analysis of 

suggested indirect and off-site impacts from the Districts alternatively 

accommodating new students at existing sites or in other ways could be 

conducted in any event based on the type of vague, uncertain, and generalized 

information on alternatives the Districts had provided. The City also responded 

that, for various specified other reasons, CEQA did not require further review 

or analysis of potential impacts from the Districts’ suggested alternatives for 

accommodating increased enrollment. 

After the City approved the Project and certified the Final EIR, the 

Districts petitioned the trial court for relief in mandate, raising the same 

challenges to the adequacy of the Final EIR as were asserted in their prior 

letters and public comments. The trial court, applying independent review,

determined that the Final EIR was insufficient because it “failed to include 

discussion of potential off-site environmental impacts resulting from the 

[Specific Plan] due to [the Districts’] presented concerns that [they] will lack 

funding to build the proposed new school sites identified.” The court further 

determined that the Final EIR “failed to adequately respond to comments made 

by [the Districts] with regard to potential off-site impacts.” Thus, the court 

determined, the City had failed to proceed in the manner required by CEQA, 

and it granted narrow writ relief. The court did not set aside prior Project 

approvals, instead imposing severance under section 21168.9 and requiring the 

City to “prepare additional discussion of potential off-site environmental 

impacts” and to “provide more detailed responses to [the Districts’] comments” 
4

about the “potential off-site impacts” before granting any further development 

entitlements within the Specific Plan. 

The City chose to voluntarily comply with the trial court’s judgment and 

writ in an attempt to cure the narrow defects in the Specific Plan EIR as 

identified by the trial court, and it did not appeal. But real parties in interest 

Rexford Title, Inc., et al.,1 appealed from the judgment, defending the City’s 

actions as compliant with CEQA as against potential claims for attorney fees 

based on the Districts having prevailed in the trial court. 

We conclude that the Final EIR for the Specific Plan complied with CEQA 

with respect to the Districts’ challenges. The EIR and its accompanying 

analysis of environmental impacts properly assumed that the contemplated new 

schools would be built as part of the Specific Plan and Project. Further, the City 

imposed developer impact fees as full and complete mitigation for impacts of the 

Project on school facilities. And it provided mitigation measures to the extent 

feasible for potentially significant off-site impacts related to the development of 

the new schools, recognizing that the Districts themselves would need to later 

address any project-specific impacts. The City was not required to analyze any 

potentially significant off-site impacts of ill-defined, uncertain, generalized, and 

speculative alternatives to new-school construction, as offered by the Districts. 

1 Real parties in interest are apparently landowner applicants for the 

Specific Plan approvals. They are not identified in briefing but they are, as far 

as we can tell, Rexford Title, Inc.; Patricia Jane Bondesen; Diane M. Vorwerck, 

as Trustee of The Diane M. Vorwerck Irrevocable Trust; Nancy Lyn Kelley, as 

Trustee of the Nancy Lyn Kelley Irrevocable Trust; Kaylene M. Mortensen, as 

Trustee of The G & K Mortensen Revocable Trust; Krista L. Vannest; Brian S. 

Mortensen; Marc D. Mortensen; Alvin C. Mortensen and Karen Rae Mortensen, 

as Trustees of the Mortensen Family Trust; Ray M. Harrod, Jr., dba Harrod 

Construction Company; RCS—Salinas Investment I, LLC; and Ann Aaroe, 

Individually and as Successor Trustee. We refer to these parties collectively as 

real parties. 
5

These what-if alternatives were all premised on the mere assumption of

insufficient funding over the next several decades that would preclude the new 

schools contemplated by the Specific Plan from ever being built. The Districts’ 

expressed concerns about a perennial lack of sufficient school-facilities funding 

without providing more detailed information or identifying a more specific 

alternative plan to address this possibility—for which they, and not the City,

would be responsible—amounted to no more than speculation and uncertainty.

Therefore, no further environmental review or response from the City, beyond

its existing responses to the Districts’ comments and this conclusion of 

speculation as provided under Guidelines section 15145, was required in the 

Final EIR. We accordingly reverse. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Relevant Factual Background 

A. Project Overview

The City approved the Specific Plan, some 20 years in the making, in 

December 2019. It is based on the City’s General Plan and covers an 

approximate 797-acre site (Site), which consists of 13 parcels in the northern 

portion of the City. The Specific Plan was prepared to establish the overall landuse concept and development framework for the Site. Contemplated 

development within the Specific Plan included 4,340 new residential dwelling 

units affordable to people of various income levels, with up to 15,928 residents 

at full build-out—some 20-30 years away—helping to meet a state goal of 

resolving the current housing-supply and affordability crisis. The provision of 

housing to accommodate Salinas’s local critical need was likewise one of the 

principal objectives of the Specific Plan. In addition to housing, the Specific 

Plan included development within the Site of mixed-commercial uses, parks and 
6

open space, and—as relevant here—schools, to address projected increases in 

student population resulting from the new residential housing units. 

As noted in the Draft EIR, “the Specific Plan provides a very high level of 

design detail for certain components of the project. To the extent that sufficient 

detail is available in the Specific Plan, a full project-level analysis is provided in 

this EIR. Examples of a full project level analysis would include topics that are 

related to the physical acreage affected (i.e., the project footprint), as opposed to 

the number of units, land uses/zoning, or other design parameters. . . .

Additionally, the Specific Plan includes a substantial level of detailed 

information that allows for a project-level analysis of topics such as Air Quality, 

Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change, Noise, Population and Housing, 

Transportation and Circulation, and Utilities. The analysis for these topics is 

driven by the number of units and square footage of development, which is 

detailed in the land use and design projections. In some cases, there may be 

specific commercial uses that have design details developed at a later date that 

cannot reasonably be analyzed at a project-level at this time. Additionally, the 

design of school facilities and other public facilities are not known at this time, 

so they are not able to be analyzed at a project-level. [¶] . . . Subsequent 

individual development that requires further discretionary approvals will be 

examined in light of this EIR to determine whether additional environmental 

documentation must be prepared.” (Italics added.) 

B. Schools Within the Specific Plan

At the outset, the Specific Plan included three elementary schools, one 

already operational, and one middle school, all located within the SRUSD, along 

with one high school, already planned and under construction, within the 

SUHSD. The Specific Plan notes that the “[r]esponsibility for development of 

public schools lies with the [Districts]” and that school facilities within the 
7

Specific Plan are to be built “based on the projections of the need” in a phased 

approach as “determine[d] and control[led]” by the Districts. 

While observing that Government Code sections 65995 and 65996 provide 

that school-related impacts are fully mitigated under CEQA through payment 

of developer-impact fees set by local school districts under Education Code 

section 17620, the EIR also concluded that anticipated construction of new 

schools within the Site would contribute to significant and unavoidable 

environmental impacts related to air quality, biological resources, greenhouse 

gases, noise, and transportation and traffic circulation. The EIR provided 

certain mitigation measures for these impacts based on the site footprints and 

using industry models. The EIR also noted, citing section 21151.8 and 

Guidelines section 15186, that future site-specific environmental review would 

be required for each new school from the responsible school district as lead 

agency before approval of as yet unknown designs for each facility. This review 

would consider any impacts or other circumstances not known when the City 

prepared the Specific Plan EIR, which it viewed in many respects as a programlevel EIR2 from which later projects could tier off when seeking approvals, and 

2 A “ ‘program EIR’ evaluates the broad policy direction of a planning 

document, such as a general plan, but does not examine the potential sitespecific impacts of the many individual projects that may be proposed in the 

future consistent with the plan. (§§ 21068.5, 21093; Guidelines, §§ 15168, 

15385.)” (Citizens for a Sustainable Treasure Island v. City and County of San 

Francisco (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1047 (Treasure Island).) But the same 

legal standards apply to all EIR’s, and the question is not whether a particular 

project calls for a program or a project EIR. It is instead “whether the EIR 

addressed the environmental impacts of this [p]roject to a ‘degree of specificity’ 

consistent with the underlying activity being approved through the EIR. 

(Guidelines, § 15146; see § 15168, subd. (c)(5).)” (Id. at p. 1052.) In reviewing a 

challenge to an EIR, “it is unconstructive to ask whether the EIR provided 

‘project-level’ as opposed to ‘program-level’ detail and analysis. Instead, we 

focus on whether the EIR provided ‘decision makers with sufficient analysis to 
8

that each school, if constructed, would be subject to the relevant mitigation 

measures in the Final EIR. 

C. Specific Plan EIR Process and the Districts’ Public Comments

The CEQA Initial Study for the Specific Plan was circulated for public 

review and comment in October 2015. Of the identified five schools within the 

Site, by then one elementary school (McKinnon Elementary) was already 

operational and the high school (Rancho San Juan) had already been planned. 

The Initial Study noted potentially significant impacts for schools, and it 

represented that a “detailed analysis with adequate mitigation measures will be 

prepared in the EIR,” including the “examination of public facilities impact 

fees.” 

In response to the Initial Study, SUHSD wrote a letter to the City in 

November 2015. The letter pointed out the lack of assurance that all students 

anticipated within the Specific Plan area could be served by the new high 

school, then projected to be open in the fall of 2018. 

In January 2016, SRUSD likewise sent a comment letter to the City. This 

letter pointed out that student generation from the Specific Plan would fill two 

elementary schools and one middle school, but that the responsibility for 

constructing the schools would be borne by SRUSD alone and that 

“development fees are generally insufficient to cover all the costs associated 

with the necessary infrastructure around schools and other impacts to schools 

caused by the development, let alone construction[,] of additional schools 

themselves.” The letter added that SRUSD did not have room for growth at its 

existing schools. And it emphasized that the payment of developer impact fees 

would not excuse the City from reviewing environmental impacts other than 

intelligently consider the environmental consequences of [the] project.’ 

[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
9

direct impacts on school facilities, and because the Project alone would cause 

these sorts of impacts, the City could not properly defer environmental analysis 

until after Specific Plan approval. The thrust of SRUSD’s letter was focused not 

so much on environmental impacts but on its objection to the “lack of clear 

funding called for in the Specific Plan” and the need to “include additional 

mechanisms to ensure funding for construction of the three needed school 

facilities, necessary infrastructure around the schools, and other costs for 

school-related impacts caused by the project.” 

The City circulated the Specific Plan Draft EIR for public comment from 

February 17, 2019, to April 15, 2019. The document specifically addressed 

impacts related to the construction of new schools in Section 3.9 (Public 

Services). The Draft EIR noted that the Specific Plan was expected to generate 

between approximately 1,927 and 2,354 additional students for the Districts, 

with a maximum of 1,623 for the SRUSD, and that the Districts’ existing 

schools were already at or near full capacity with shortages already being 

experienced at the elementary and middle school levels.3 The new high school 

was expected to be at or near full capacity by the fall of 2019. The Draft EIR 

observed that besides the one new elementary school that had already been 

constructed and the new high school then under construction, the Specific Plan 

“may result in the need for the construction of [three] new schools, which has 

the potential to cause substantial adverse physical environmental impacts.” 

And locations for the new schools were identified. 

The general topics of environmental impacts addressed in the Draft EIR 

related to air quality (Section 3.1), biological resources (Section 3.2), cultural 

3 Based on information received from SRUSD on these projected 

enrollment numbers as being too low, the City adjusted its analysis in an 

Errata to incorporate the higher figures provided. 
10

resources (Section 3.3), greenhouse gas emissions and climate change 

(Section 3.4), hazards and hazardous materials (Section 3.5), hydrology and 

water quality (Section 3.6), noise (Section 3.7), population (Section 3.8), public 

services (Section 3.9), transportation (Section 3.10), and utilities (Section 3.11). 

The Draft EIR adopted mitigation measures for all these categories. Along with 

addressing related impacts for new schools among these various categories of 

impacts, the specific mitigation measures included for public schools the 

implementation of a requirement for payment of development impact fees by 

the applicant of a residential building permit before a permit could be issued. 

The Draft EIR further noted that such developer impact fees are 

considered as full and complete mitigation under CEQA for the construction of 

new schools, and that public schools within the Specific Plan “will be 

constructed based on projections of the need for these facilities” with the 

Districts determining “the appropriate phasing of [their] facilities” as driven by 

increased demand and enrollment. The Project was “designed such that each 

current institutional or individual owner may develop their property 

independent of development by other property owners.” The Draft EIR further 

noted that future site-specific environmental review would be required for each 

new school by the responsible school district before approval of a design for a 

specific facility, and this review would consider environmental impacts not 

known when the Project EIR was prepared. And each future school, if 

constructed, would be subject to the relevant mitigation measures in the EIR. 

The City received comment letters from the Districts, as well as from 

Alisal Union School District, during the comment period for the Draft EIR. 

These letters all raised the same concerns, some in verbatim language. They 

asserted that as a result of “the realities of school facilities funding,” sufficient 

funding “may not be available” for the construction of new school sites, yet the 
11

Draft EIR did not consider this “possibility” and contained no environmental 

evaluation of impacts related to the alternative of the Districts having to 

accommodate the new students at existing sites or by other means. The 

alternatives identified in the letters, with no further specification, included “any 

or all of” the following: installing portable classrooms at existing sites, 

expansion of or new facilities at existing sites, altering attendance boundaries, 

bussing, and inter-district transfers. The indirect and off-site environmental 

impacts flowing from these alternatives to accommodate new students were 

generally identified by the Districts, in conclusory terms, as including 

“increased traffic, air quality, noise, and other reasonably foreseeable impacts.” 

The Districts both expressed that financing new schools with developer fees was 

“woefully optimistic,” because that source of funds alone would still leave large 

shortfalls, even if additional efforts by the Districts to obtain more statefacilities school funding—an item in a “perpetual state of flux” and not certain 

to occur—were successful. 

The City addressed these comments and letters from the Districts, along 

with the one from Alisal Union School District, in the Final EIR. As the 

comments had all been similar, if not exact, the responses were likewise 

repetitive. The City asserted that for several reasons, inadequate funding to 

school districts for the construction of new schools was not a matter required to 

be addressed in an EIR under CEQA, and that any need to expand existing 

facilities as a result of funding shortfalls for any new construction amounted to 

“economic or social effects” from a project that likewise did not require CEQA 

analysis. The City further contended that it could do no more under the law to 

mitigate school impacts because developer fees, which are set not by the City 

but by the school districts, “are deemed to be ‘full and complete school facilities 

mitigation’ for impacts caused by new development.” The City further observed 
12

that “[u]ltimately, the Education Code tasks the [s]chool [d]istrict with the 

responsibility for design and construction of their own schools” and it pledged 

support to the Districts “with the provision of infrastructure and land to 

facilitate school facility development, as well as the collection of school impact 

fees to fund new school development.” 

The City ultimately rested in the Final EIR on its inability to respond 

further to the Districts’ expressed concerns and the potential environmental 

impacts they claimed to be related to their identified alternatives for

accommodating new students at existing sites, because the City viewed the 

information as too speculative, uncertain, and vague. The City responded that 

“[t]he potential [alternative] scenarios . . . are too speculative to give rise to 

meaningful environmental assessment, particularly since, if they occur, they 

will occur over an extended period of time (perhaps 20 to 30 years), consistent 

with buildout of the Specific Plan area. Just as the number of students living in 

the Specific Plan Area will gradually ramp up over time, so too will the District 

have the ability to make decisions as to where such students will attend schools, 

if no on-site school facilities are yet in place. The specific decisions the District 

will have to make cannot be predicted with any level of certainty at present, 

and, in any event, are beyond the City’s control. In particular, the City has no 

way at present to predict boundary changes the District might impose in future 

years. Although such decisions could affect traffic and other environmental 

resources, any details of such impacts cannot be predicted at present. The same 

is true of options such as student transfers, the construction of other . . .

currently unplanned schools at other sites, or changes in patterns of school 

bussing. To the extent that the District contemplates the installation of 

additional portable classrooms at existing school facilities, the City notes that 

CEQA provides a categorical exemption (Class 14) for ‘minor additions’ to 
13

existing schools within existing school grounds where the addition does not 

increase original student capacity by more than 25% or ten classrooms, 

whichever is less.” 

D. The District’s Further Comments and Project Approval

On December 4, 2019, the Project came before the City’s Planning 

Commission in a public hearing. The Project approvals under consideration 

were the Specific Plan, the Final EIR, a rezoning ordinance, and a development 

agreement. The Districts provided public comments at this hearing, 

emphasizing the purely economic point made in prior comment letters that 

school-facilities funding for the new schools identified in the Specific Plan was 

likely to be insufficient based on present scenarios. At the close of the hearing, 

the Planning Commission unanimously recommended approval of the Project to 

the City Council, including certification of the Final EIR and adoption of CEQA 

findings and a statement of overriding considerations.

On December 16, 2019, the Districts submitted another letter to the City, 

this time urging that the Final EIR did not adequately address environmental 

impacts resulting from the “phasing” of the Project, in that it did not include 

any information about the sequencing or scheduling of development or impose 

any restrictions on its timing. The Districts emphasized that the Final EIR 

provided no basis to assume that development of the Site would occur gradually 

and incrementally over the time expected for full build-out, and the Final EIR 

did not evaluate the possibility that a significant amount of development of the 

Specific Plan could occur simultaneously or all at once because of market 

conditions. 

On December 17, 2019, the Districts submitted a final letter to the City.

This letter further commented about the asserted inadequacies of the Final EIR 

as it concerned new school facilities and funding therefor. Specifically, it
14

described the “three-legged-stool” (state-bond-fund grants, developer fees, and 

local funding) for school funding under the law as adopted by the Legislature in 

1998 in Senate Bill 50 (Ed. Code, § 17070.10 et seq., Stats. 1998, ch. 407, § 4, 

Leroy F. Greene School Facilities Act of 1998, (Sen. Bill 50)) and contended that 

due to what they considered a high improbability (or at least uncertainty) of 

ever obtaining sufficient state and local funding for new school-facilities 

development, SRUSD would likely not be able to construct the three new 

schools contemplated by the Specific Plan and assumed by the Final EIR, which 

would result in numerous indirect environmental impacts “on” existing 

facilities.4 The letter also represented that SRUSD was not financially able to 

absorb these impacts perceived to be caused by the Project and that the 

payment of maximized developer impact fees would be insufficient to offset 

them. The letter urged the City “not to certify the EIR until the Project 

proponents have proposed additional, adequate mitigation to offset the 

anticipated impacts of the Project,” none of which were specified in the letter 

that, again, emphasized the likelihood of a perpetual shortage of schoolfacilities funding.

The City Council’s hearing for the Project’s approvals took place on 

December 17, 2019. SRUSD’s Board President spoke at the hearing and 

explained to the City Council that developer impact fees imposed as part of the 

4 The letter also pointed out that all three sources of funds of the “threelegged stool” would be altered, negatively so from the Districts’ perspective, if 

Proposition 13 on the March 2020 ballot, a state bond measure (Voter 

Information Guide, Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (Mar. 3, 2020) text of Prop. 13, 

pp. 26–46) were to pass—yet another uncertainty affecting school-facilities 

funding at the time the Final EIR was certified. Proposition 13 was ultimately 

rejected by the voters.
15

Project would pay only about one-third of the costs for anticipated new schools,

so the schools would thus not likely ever be built. 

The City Council nonetheless unanimously approved the Project in its 

entirety, including certification of the Final EIR, and adoption of CEQA 

findings and a Statement of Overriding Considerations for the Specific Plan. 

II. Procedural Background 

The Districts timely filed their petition for writ of mandate. As relevant 

here, the petition sought in its first cause of action for violation of CEQA5 a 

peremptory writ of mandate setting aside the City’s certification of the Specific 

Plan Final EIR and related project approvals.6 The factual basis for the cause of 

action was the Final EIR’s contemplated “construction of 4,340 new homes, 

which will generate approximately 2,000 new elementary and middle school 

students, as well as many high school students” and its “fail[ure] to properly 

address the probability that funding will not be available to fund new school 

facilities,” coupled with the “probab[ility] that environmental impacts will 

result from construction activities at existing sites rather than the construction 

of new sites.” Thus, the Final EIR was alleged to be deficient in that it made 

5 The Districts labeled the cause of action as having been brought under 

both traditional and administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure 

sections 1085 and 1094.5, respectively, and CEQA, specifically sections 21167, 

21168, and 21168.5. 

6 The first cause of action under CEQA was related to what was labeled in 

the Districts’ fifth cause of action for injunctive relief, which is not a cause of 

action but a remedy. (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 

719, 734 [permanent injunction is a remedy, not a cause of action, and it may 

not be issued if the underlying cause of action is not established].) The trial 

court here ruled and entered judgment in the Districts’ favor on the fifth cause 

of action as though it were a separate cause of action. We will treat that ruling 

not as one on an independent cause of action but, rather, as the trial court 

having issued injunctive relief in the judgment as a remedy tethered to the 

CEQA violations it found in the first cause of action. 
16

“the unsupported assumption that all environmental impacts associated with 

schools will come from the construction of new schools on new sites” and “did 

not evaluate what the Specific Plan’s impact on the environment will be when

existing sites inevitably have to house the new students [as contemplated by 

the Project], including construction and traffic[-]related impacts.” 

The cause of action further alleged that “there is nothing in the record 

demonstrating there will be enough funding from enough sources to construct 

new schools”; “developer fees most often do not cover impacts caused by [school] 

development”; “it is undisputed in the record that [the Districts] cannot meet 

the demands for new school construction caused by the anticipated influx of 

students” as a result of the Specific Plan; state funding, developer fees, and 

local bond funds, each for separate reasons, are likely to be insufficient for the 

Districts to build the new schools contemplated by the Specific Plan and the 

Final EIR fails to acknowledge the inadequacies of these funding sources; and 

“there are foreseeable environmental impacts connected with adding or 

modifying school facilities at existing school sites” to alternatively accommodate 

the new students brought by development under the Specific Plan but the Final 

EIR “does not evaluate” them. 

The second component of the Districts’ alleged CEQA violations was the 

assertion that the City as lead agency did not comply with Guidelines section 

15088, subdivision (c), in that it “failed to provide adequate responses to [the 

Districts’] contentions” made before certification of the Final EIR about the 

“lack of adequate funding for new schools and unanalyzed environmental 

impacts on existing facilities.” Instead of providing responsive “good faith, 

reasoned analysis,” the City first responded that Government Code section 

65996, subdivision (a) “ ‘obviated the need to analyze and mitigate a 

development’s direct impacts on existing school facilities in an EIR because 
17

[the] Education Code sets forth the “exclusive methods” for consideration and 

mitigation of such impacts’ ” under CEQA. Next, as alleged by the petition, the 

City contended that the “scenarios described by [the Districts] are somehow ‘too 

speculative to give rise to meaningful environmental assessment, particularly 

since, if they occur, they will occur over an extended period of time (perhaps 

20 to 30 years), consistent with buildout of the Specific Plan Area.’ ” Both 

positions were alleged by the Districts to be an inadequate response under 

CEQA, and the City provided “no justification for failing to analyze the more 

probable environmental impacts related to school facilities in the [Final EIR. 

The City] is not entitled to analyze a scenario that has little chance of occurring 

(construction of new schools), and then claim that even though there is a far 

more likely scenario, the impacts that would arise do not need to be analyzed at 

this time.” 

The pleadings were joined in the trial court and the matter briefed for 

hearing, which occurred on April 19, 2021.

7 The Districts’ briefing with respect 

7 The second cause of action was also in mandate, challenging the Project 

for violations of the planning and zoning law concerning consistency with the 

City’s General Plan (Gov. Code, § 65000 et seq.), and the third alleged violations 

of the Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950, et seq.) in connection with the Specific 

Plan’s approvals by the City’s Planning Commission. The fourth cause of action 

merely restated the first three but sought declaratory relief, and the fifth, as 

noted, sought injunctive relief resting on the previously alleged law violations. 

The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings against the Districts on the 

third and fourth causes of action before reaching the merits of the rest. In later 

addressing the merits, the court ruled against the Districts on the second cause 

of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The scope of the 

real parties’ appeal is limited to their challenges to the trial court’s ruling in 

favor of the Districts on the first cause of action for CEQA violations and the 

injunctive relief provided for those violations to the extent captured in what is 

labeled the fifth cause of action. We therefore do not address the trial court’s 

rulings beyond these. 
18

to the alleged CEQA violations likewise argued, as they maintain on appeal,

that the Draft and Final EIRs evaluated environmental impacts related to 

schools only on the erroneous assumption that new schools would be 

constructed and failed to “adequately inform the public that due to the high 

probability of a lack of sufficient funding to build new schools, there will be 

significant environmental impacts, including impacts related to traffic, utilities, 

and public services, due to the inevitable need to modify the Districts’ [existing] 

facilities to accommodate the influx of new students.” The Districts’ briefing 

further emphasized that in responding to comments on the Draft EIR, the City 

had failed to provide a justification for not analyzing significant environmental 

impacts relating to existing school facilities or a good faith, reasoned analysis 

for not doing so. 

In pressing their arguments, the Districts urged that their claims were 

predominantly those of “ ‘improper procedure’ ” under CEQA by the City having 

omitted essential information from the EIR or having failed to address a 

necessary issue, warranting de novo judicial review under Banning Ranch 

Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.5th 918, 935 (Banning 

Ranch) and Vineyard Area Citizens for responsible Growth v. City of Rancho 

Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435 (Vineyard).

For their part, the real parties’ briefing below, filed jointly with the City,

framed the CEQA issues before the court as factual conclusions and quasilegislative decisions by the City as lead agency subject to deferential substantial 

evidence review specific to CEQA (§ 21080, subd. (d); Guidelines, § 15384), and 

as distinct from administrative mandamus review of a quasi-adjudicative 

decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The issue as so framed 

was argued to be whether the EIR’s discussion of the potentially significant 

school impacts was adequate, generally a mixed question of law and fact, but 
19

here urged to be predominating with factual questions, such as which 

methodologies the City chose to employ for analyzing school-related 

environmental impacts. (See, e.g., South of Market Community Action Network 

v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 331, citing 

Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 516 (Sierra Club).) 

At core, real parties’ arguments were, and remain, premised on the 

characterization of the Districts’ assertions about future insufficient funding for 

new-school construction as contemplated by the Specific Plan, and related offsite impacts because of asserted necessary alternative accommodations at 

existing facilities over a 20-30-year span, as purely speculative and uncertain 

and not reasonably foreseeable under CEQA. According to real parties, such 

speculation and uncertainty did not give rise to a legal duty for the City to 

either evaluate these vague and generalized impacts or to provide further 

response to such comments. (See e.g., Guidelines, § 15145.) Real parties further 

contended that the Final EIR, a program-level document in certain aspects (see 

Guidelines, § 15168), was adequate under CEQA, and for several reasons, the 

City was not required to provide analysis on uncertain and only generalized 

alternatives based on speculation about insufficient funding for new school 

construction well into the future. These reasons included that analysis of and 

mitigation for impacts to schools is limited by CEQA and other law (see Gov. 

Code, § 65996, subd. (a) [exclusive methods of considering and mitigating 

impacts on school facilities resulting from planning or development project]; Ed. 

Code, § 17620 [development of school impact fees by district levy]). And because 

the Districts had provided no specificity or plans as to which alternative 

accommodations as to which existing school sites might be made, and any such 

plans were solely within the Districts’ control, generalized environmental 

review by the City of those impacts based on the vague information the 
20

Districts had provided would not be meaningful. Further, the identified 

alternatives to construction of new schools within the Specific Plan would either 

independently require later site-specific CEQA review by the Districts or would 

be exempt. 

As to the charge that the City had not in the Final EIR adequately 

responded to the Districts’ comments, real parties contended the City’s 

responses were sufficient in that a lead agency may conclude that information 

about potential environmental impacts is speculative, in which case the agency 

must so conclude and then terminate discussion of those impacts. (Guidelines, 

§ 15145.) Further, the City observed that the level of detail required in a 

response may correspond to the level of detail in the comment (see Guidelines, 

§ 15088, subd. (c)) and that the dispute about the City’s level of response to 

comments rested not on its avoidance of a response but on a legal disagreement 

about whether the City was required to conduct an analysis based on 

speculation and uncertainty that would not lead to meaningful analysis or 

information. 

The trial court held the merits hearing on April 19, 2021.8 On the 

Districts’ CEQA claim, the court at the outset characterized the issue as 

“whether the [EIR] omits material necessary to [reasonable] decision[-]making 

and informed public participation as required by CEQA.” The court further 

queried whether “[n]otwithstanding the lack of precision or specificity around 

the specific school[-]expansion scenario such as portables or reorganization of 

boundary lines or bus[s]ing, . . . was the City nonetheless required to discuss at 

8 The court’s written ruling after the hearing did not itself contain lengthy 

discussion or analysis, but it incorporated by reference and attached the full 

hearing transcript containing the parties’ arguments and the court’s expressed 

reasoning. 
21

least in general terms the potential environmental impacts of a scenario in 

which existing school facilities would have to accommodate new students due to 

the lack of funding or any other foreseeable problems to construct[ing]” new 

schools. And “does the record sufficiently explain why the City chose to analyze 

the impacts of constructing new schools and not the impacts of existing facilities 

absorbing new students when it seem[s] there is arguably evidence in the record 

to suggest that the latter was possible and more likely than the former?” 

As to the applicable standard of judicial review, the court questioned the 

existence of any relevant factual determinations by the City that might lead to 

deferential review for substantial evidence. The court asked whether the “City 

[had] made a factual determination, such as an agency’s decision to use a 

particular methodology,” in omitting discussion of the Districts’ alternative 

scenarios as opposed to constructing the new school facilities as contemplated 

by the Specific Plan. 

In the end, the trial court concluded from the administrative record that 

“it was reasonably foreseeable that existing school facilities would need to be 

expanded or adjusted in some way to accommodate the influx of new students 

from the” Specific Plan and that the EIR failed to fulfill its informational 

“purpose because it did not disclose all potential school-related environmental 

impacts that could result.” This was because the Final EIR “only addressed 

impacts from the construction of new schools and failed to include potential 

impacts arising from the expansion of existing school facilities, and those 

impacts are external to the facility, not on the facility.” The court also concluded 

that the EIR “failed to adequately respond to [the Districts’] comments.”

The court was careful to delineate the indirect, off-site impacts that, in its 

view, required further environmental review and comment, recognizing the 

distinction drawn by Chawanakee Unified School District v. County of Madera
22

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1026–1028 (Chawanakee) between indirect 

impacts more broadly related to modification of existing school facilities and

impacts on those facilities, with only the latter considered fully mitigated under 

Government Code sections 65995 and 65996. The court indicated it would grant 

the writ as to the CEQA cause of action because the City had failed to proceed 

in the manner required by law, and would order that “no further entitlements 

be granted until the City complies with the writ of mandate.” (Capitalization 

omitted.) The court directed the Districts’ counsel to prepare a proposed order 

after hearing.

On June 23, 2021, the court entered its written order ruling on the merits 

of the various causes of action alleged in the Districts’ petition, including the 

third and fourth as to which the court had previously granted judgment on the 

pleadings against the Districts. The order granted the petition on the CEQA

cause of action, concluding that the Final EIR “was insufficient because [it] 

failed to include discussion of potential off-site environmental impacts resulting 

from the [Specific Plan] due to [the Districts’] presented concerns that [they] 

will lack sufficient funding to build the proposed new school sites identified 

within the [Specific Plan]. The [Final EIR] also failed to adequately respond to 

comments made by [the Districts] with regard to potential off-site impacts. As 

such, [the City] failed to proceed in accordance with the law under CEQA.” The 

order also generally granted related injunctive relief as pleaded by the fifth 

cause of action, “enjoining [the City] from approving any further development 

entitlements within the [Specific Plan] until such time that [the City] complies 

with the peremptory writ of mandate to be issued by the Court” (capitalization 

omitted) in relation to the CEQA cause of action. The order denied relief on the 

second cause of action and finally directed the Districts’ counsel to prepare a 
23

proposed judgment and peremptory writ of mandate “for the court’s 

consideration.” 

Two months later, on August 24, 2021, the trial court entered a stipulated 

order “regarding stay of entry of judgment . . . to allow [the] parties time to 

discuss settlement.” (Capitalization omitted.) The order referenced the deadline

for appeal from the prior merits order, and assumed that any appeal here would 

be from a later judgment and not the merits ruling entered on June 23, 2021.

The stipulated stay order expressly contemplated the court’s later entry of 

judgment and issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate incorporating the prior 

merits rulings should the parties be unable to reach a settlement for a different 

disposition. 

After the expiration of the stipulated stay of entry of judgment, on 

December 27, 2021, the court noticed a hearing re “[c]larification of judgment 

and orders” to occur the next day. (Capitalization omitted.) During the hearing, 

the court acknowledged having received a proposed judgment and other related 

submissions from the parties. The clarification the court provided, seemingly 

prompted by a dispute among the parties, was the narrow scope of the 

injunctive relief to be ordered—no further Specific Plan approvals or 

entitlements to be granted until the City complies with the court’s directive to 

provide a generalized discussion and further responses to comments in the 

Final EIR about the alternative off-site impacts of the Districts’ accommodation 

of new students in existing facilities as opposed to the construction of new 

schools. The court made explicit that it was not directing the set-aside or 

vacation of prior Project approvals. Because of this narrow focus, the court 

directed modifications to the Districts’ proposed judgment and writ of mandate, 

including specific language under section 21168.9 for severance of portions of a 

project and the court’s retention of jurisdiction, as jointly proposed by the City 
24

and real parties. The judgment entered three weeks later on January 18, 2022, 

reflected those remedial and severance provisions under section 21168.9 and 

clarified that the court was not suspending or setting aside prior Project 

approvals but rather employing severance and enjoining the City’s approvals of 

any further development entitlements within the Specific Plan until such time 

that the City complied with the court’s “limited relief” in the judgment and writ. 

The separate peremptory writ of mandate likewise reflected this narrow relief. 

Notice of entry of judgment was served the next day, on January 19, 2022.

The real parties filed their notice of appeal from the judgment on February 8, 

2022. 

DISCUSSION

I. Appealability

As addressed by real parties in their opening brief, the City as lead 

agency and respondent in the writ action below did not appeal from the 

judgment and has chosen to voluntarily comply with the trial court’s judgment 

and writ, effectively waiving the right to appeal. (Save Our Residential 

Environment v. City of West Hollywood (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1750–1751 

(Save Our Residential), citing Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 671.) 

Voluntary compliance with a writ of mandate by the City would likely moot its

right to appeal in any event. (Save Our Residential, at pp. 1750–1751.) But such 

compliance by the City as lead agency does not eliminate or waive a real party 

in interest’s independent right to appeal, where that party is exposed to an 

award of attorney fees as a result of the trial court’s action, as real parties

represent they are here.9 (Ibid. [agency may voluntarily comply with trial court 

writ while real party in interest defends on appeal agency action giving rise to 

9 The parties here have stipulated to defer the issue of attorney fees until 

after this appeal is resolved. 
25

the writ]; Protect Niles v. City of Fremont (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1129, 1140 

(Niles) [appeal by real party in interest not moot when lead agency’s prior 

approval of project would be restored if real party’s appeal is successful].) The 

City here has recognized that if real parties prevail on appeal, then the City’s 

December 2019 certification of the EIR will stand, even though the City is 

preparing a supplemental EIR in the meantime in compliance with the trial 

court’s judgment and writ. The appeal is therefore not moot notwithstanding 

agency compliance with the writ because its prior 2019 certification of the Final 

EIR may be restored should the real parties prevail on appeal and an award of 

fees depends on the propriety of the trial court’s determination. (Save Our 

Residential, at pp. 1750–1751; Niles, at p. 1140.) 

Accordingly, real parties’ appeal from the judgment here is ripe for review

and not moot even though the City did not also appeal and has chosen to 

voluntarily comply with the trial court’s judgment and writ, pending resolution 

of the appeal.

A separate issue relating to the timeliness of the notice of appeal is also 

present here.10 As noted, the trial court issued its order ruling on the merits of 

the Districts’ mandate petition on June 23, 2021, with notice of its entry served 

that day. But the court did not enter judgment—granting relief in mandate on 

the Districts’ CEQA cause of action with related remedies and denying relief on 

three other causes of action—until seven months later, on January 18, 2022, 

after noticing and conducting a hearing to clarify the scope and contents of the 

judgment, including the statutory CEQA remedies under section 21168.9 the 

court had in mind, given its prior rulings. Although the June 2021 merits order 

10 We previously issued an order to show cause to appellants on this 

appealability issue and have reviewed their response. The order to show cause 

was previously discharged by separate order.
26

directed the Districts to submit a proposed judgment and peremptory writ of 

mandate, the certain statutory CEQA remedies contained in the later judgment 

as clarified by the court at the hearing in the interim were omitted from its 

prior merits order. A separate writ document was issued by the court clerk the

same day judgment was entered. 

And as noted in the judgment, some three months after the trial court 

entered its order ruling on the merits, the court signed a stipulated order 

“regarding stay of entry of judgment” (capitalization omitted) to allow the 

parties time to discuss settlement and the possibility of an agreeable stipulated 

judgment given the court’s merits ruling. This pre-judgment stipulated order 

provided that “ ‘[t]he time period for the parties to submit either a proposed 

peremptory writ of mandate or a proposed judgment for the court’s 

consideration, as contemplated by the [prior merits] order, is extended for a 

period of 75 days.’ ” (Capitalization omitted.) The 75-day period passed, but 

judgment was not entered until January 18, 2022, some two and a half months

later and after the hearing at which the court clarified the scope and content of 

the narrow remedies to be ordered. Real parties filed their notice of appeal from 

the judgment on February 8, 2022, which is timely from the judgment but not 

from the court’s prior order ruling on the merits if that is the trial court’s 

appealable determination in this case. 

In Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 43, review 

granted June 15, 2022, S274147 (Meinhardt), our colleagues in Division One of 

the Fourth Appellate District held that a ruling denominated an “ ‘order’ ” in a 

mandate case was an appealable final judgment even though a separate 

document styled a “ ‘judgment,’ ” which “merely restated the prior” order, 

followed. (Id. at p. 51.) The Meinhardt court dismissed the appeal as the notice 
27

of appeal, while timely filed from the later “judgment,” was not timely filed from 

the prior order denying the petition. (Id. at pp. 50–51.)

Relying on Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1113 

(Dhillon), the court in Meinhardt reiterated that “ ‘ “ ‘[a]s a general test, which 

must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, . . . 

where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or 

noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where 

anything further in the nature of judicial action . . . is essential to a final 

determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.’ ” ’ ” 

(Meinhardt, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 49, review granted, quoting Dhillon, at 

p. 1115.) Applying this test, as stated, the court in Meinhardt concluded that 

the initial order there was a final judgment subject to appeal regardless of its 

title or form and notwithstanding entry of a later “judgment,” because the order 

effectively denied the mandate petition in its entirety and did not contemplate 

any further action in the case. (Meinhardt, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 63; see also 

Public Defenders’ Organization v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 

1403, 1409; City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 190 [order 

denying mandate petition disposing of all claims between the parties is an 

immediately appealable final judgment]; Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School 

Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 583 [same]; Valero Refining Co.-California v. 

California Bay Area Quality Management Dist. Hearing Bd. (2020) 49 

Cal.App.5th 618, 633, fn. 10 [“the appealable judgment was the court’s order 

granting writ of mandate, not a ‘judgment’ it subsequently entered”].) 

The denial order in Meinhardt disposed of all issues between the parties 

and did not address further action, including the preparation of another order 

or judgment; it was therefore treated as a final and appealable judgment and 

the period to appeal was not restarted by the later entry of a document styled a 
28

“judgment” that simply reiterated the rulings in the prior order. (Meinhardt, 

supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 63, review granted; Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 1115 [order granting or denying petition for writ of mandate in its entirety, 

when such order contemplates no further action in the case, concludes the 

special proceeding of a civil nature].) As stated in Natomas Unified School 

District (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1027 (Natomas), what the Supreme Court 

precisely said in Dhillon (2 Cal.5th at pp. 1113–1114, with italics added) was 

that a “ ‘trial court’s judgment granting administrative mandamus, and 

ordering the substantive relief sought by the petitioner, is a final judgment.’ ” 

Applying these principles here to confirm our appellate jurisdiction, we 

conclude that the trial court’s order ruling on the merits of the petition in 

June 2021 was not the appealable determination, and that the real parties’ 

notice of appeal from the later judgment was timely filed. First, the earlier 

merits order itself contemplates and directs the later preparation of a judgment

and a separate writ document. But more than that, and as real parties point 

out, in the merits order, the trial court did not articulate the specific and 

narrow statutory CEQA remedies it would direct as a consequence of its rulings 

granting the mandate petition, and the court noticed and held a hearing before 

judgment was entered to clarify and address the specific remedies to be 

included in the judgment. Thus, the prior order did not finally determine the 

rights of the parties by specifying the statutory relief the Districts would 

receive, which led to disputes over the appropriate terms of the judgment and 

writ that were resolved by the court at later hearing. (See Natomas, supra, 86 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1026–1027 [post-order disputes about terms of judgment 

that required a hearing on scope and terms of relief to be granted support 

appealability of later judgment].) And while the judgment here simply restates 

the prior order’s merits rulings on the various causes of action, it substantively 
29

does more in its specification of specific statutory CEQA remedies. Further,

although the separate order entered between the merits order and the judgment 

“staying” the entry of judgment could not have affected the appealability of the 

merits order had that order effectively been the final judgment, and further 

could not have extended the time for appeal, because the judgment entered in 

January 2022 is the court’s final and appealable determination, the terms of the 

interim stay order are irrelevant to the timeliness of the appeal. 

We thus conclude that here, unlike in Meinhardt, it is the later judgment 

(entered in January 2022) and not the prior merits order that is the “final 

determination of the rights of the parties” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1064) and which 

finally terminated the litigation between them on the merits of the case. 

(Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115 [“a judgment is final, and therefore 

appealable, ‘ “ ‘ “when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the 

merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution 

what has been determined” ’ ” ’ ”]; see also Natomas, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1026–1027.) As the real parties timely appealed from the later final 

judgment, we have jurisdiction to review the appeal. 

II. The EIR in CEQA Overview

We begin with a general overview of the CEQA statutory scheme, at the 

heart of which is the EIR. 

CEQA “and the regulations implementing it ([Guidelines]) embody 

California’s strong public policy of protecting the environment. ‘The basic 

purposes of CEQA are to: [¶] (1) Inform governmental decision makers and the 

public about the potential, significant environmental effects of proposed 

activities. [¶] (2) Identify ways that environmental damage can be avoided or 

significantly reduced. [¶] (3) Prevent significant, avoidable damage to the 

environment by requiring changes in projects through the use of alternatives or 
30

mitigation measures when the governmental agency finds the changes to be 

feasible. [¶] (4) Disclose to the public the reasons why a governmental agency 

approved the project in the manner the agency chose if significant 

environmental effects are involved.’ ” (Tomlinson v. County of Alameda (2012) 

54 Cal.4th 281, 285–286 (Tomlinson), quoting Guidelines, § 15002.) 

“To achieve these goals, CEQA and the implementing regulations provide 

for a three-step process. In the first step, the public agency must determine 

whether the proposed development is a ‘project,’ that is, ‘an activity which may 

cause either a direct physical change in the environment’ undertaken, 

supported, or approved by a public agency. (§ 21065.)” (Tomlinson, supra, 54 

Cal.4th at p. 286.) If the proposed activity is a “ ‘project,’ ” the second step 

requires the public agency to decide whether it is exempt from compliance with 

CEQA under narrow circumstances. (Ibid., citing §§ 21080, 21084, subd. (a); 

Guidelines, § 15300.) “If a project does not fall within a CEQA exemption, the 

lead agency conducts an initial study to determine whether the project may 

have a significant impact on the environment. (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano 

County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380 [(Muzzy Ranch)]; 

[Guidelines, §§ 15063, subd. (a), 15002, subd. (k)(2).]” (Ocean Street Extension 

Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Cruz (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 985, 1002.) “If 

the administrative record before the agency contains substantial evidence that 

the project may have a significant effect on the environment ... it must go to the 

third stage of the CEQA process: preparation and certification of an EIR. 

(§§ 21100, 21151; Guidelines, §§ 15002, subd. (k)(3), 15063, subd. (b)(1), 15064, 

subds. (a)(1), (g)(1), 15362.)” (Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 

1359, 1372.) 

“As a general proposition, CEQA depends on the EIR. ‘An environmental 

impact report is an informational document,’ the purpose of which ‘is to provide 
31

public agencies and the public in general with detailed information about the 

effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list the 

ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and 

to indicate alternatives to such a project.’ (. . . § 21061.) According to our 

Supreme Court: ‘The purpose of an EIR is to give the public and government 

agencies the information needed to make informed decisions, thus protecting 

“ ‘not only the environment but also informed self-government.’ ” [Citation.] The 

EIR is the heart of CEQA, . . .’ [Citation.]” (Tiburon Open Space Committee v. 

County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 700, 724–725, fn. omitted (Tiburon).) 

“ ‘A public agency must prepare an EIR or cause an EIR to be prepared 

for any project that it proposes to carry out or approve that may have a 

significant effect on the environment. (. . . §§ 21100, subd. (a), 21151, subd. (a); 

Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (a)(1).) The EIR must describe the proposed project 

and its environmental setting, state the objectives sought to be achieved, 

identify and analyze the significant effects on the environment, state how those 

impacts can be mitigated or avoided, and identify alternatives to the project, 

among other requirements. (. . . §§ 21100, subd. (b), 21151; Guidelines, 

§§ 15124, 15125.)’ ” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 725.) The relevant 

geographic area for CEQA evaluation of a project’s environmental impacts is 

not limited to the project boundaries and is “ ‘the area which will be affected by

a proposed project.’ ” (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 387, citing 

§ 21060.5.)

“ ‘The agency must notify the public of the draft EIR, make the draft EIR 

and all documents referenced in it available for public review, and respond to 

comments that raise significant environmental issues. (. . . §§ 21091, subds. (a), 

(d), 21092; Guidelines, §§ 15087, 15088.) The agency must also consult with and 

obtain comments from other agencies affected by the project and respond to 
32

their comments. (. . . §§ 21092.5, 21104, 21153; Guidelines, § 15086.) It must 

prepare a final EIR including any revisions to the draft EIR, the comments 

received from the public and other agencies, and responses to comments. 

(Guidelines, §§ 15089, subd. (a), 15132.)’ ” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 725.)

“ ‘An agency may not approve a project that will have significant 

environmental effects if there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation 

measures that would substantially lessen those effects. (. . . §§ 21002, 21002.1, 

subd. (b); Guidelines, § 15021, subd. (a)(2); [Citation].) An agency may find, 

however, that particular economic, social, or other considerations make the 

alternatives and mitigation measures infeasible and that particular project 

benefits outweigh the adverse environmental effects. (. . . § 21081, subds. (a)(3), 

(b); Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(3).) Specifically, an agency cannot approve a 

project that will have significant environmental effects unless it finds as to each 

significant effect, based on substantial evidence in the administrative record, 

that (1) mitigation measures required in or incorporated into the project will 

avoid or substantially lessen the significant effect; (2) those measures are 

within the jurisdiction of another agency and have been adopted, or can and 

should be adopted, by that agency; or (3) specific economic, legal, social, 

technological, or other benefits outweigh the significant environmental effects. 

(. . . §§ 21081, 21081.5; Guidelines, § 15091, subds. (a), (b).) A finding that 

specific overriding project benefits outweigh the significant environmental 

effects (. . . § 21091, subd. (b)) is known as a statement of overriding 

considerations. (Guidelines, § 15093.)” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at 

pp.725–726.)

“ ‘Thus, a public agency is not required to favor environmental protection 

over other considerations, but it must disclose and carefully consider the 
33

environmental consequences of its actions, mitigate adverse environmental 

effects if feasible, explain the reasons for its actions, and afford the public and 

other affected agencies an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the 

environmental review process. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure 

that public officials and the public are aware of the environmental consequences 

of decisions before they are made.’ [Citation.]” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 726.)

At the same time, “[t]oo much should not be expected of an EIR. It is not 

to have the exhaustive scope of scientific textbook. ‘An EIR should be prepared 

with a sufficient degree of analysis to provide decisionmakers with information 

which enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of 

environmental consequences. An evaluation of the environmental effects of a 

proposed project need not be exhaustive, but the sufficiency of an EIR is to be 

reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible. Disagreement among 

experts does not make an EIR inadequate, but the EIR should summarize the 

main points of disagreement among the experts. The courts have looked not for 

perfection but for adequacy, completeness, and a good faith effort at full 

disclosure.’ (Guidelines, § 15151.)” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 726.)

“Much of what goes into an EIR is left to the discretion of the agency 

preparing it. The leading treatise summarizes: ‘The lead agency has discretion 

to design the EIR and need not conduct every recommended test or perform all 

required research. [Citations.] An EIR is not required to address all of the 

variations of the issues presented. [Citations.] An analysis of every permutation 

of the data is not required.’ (1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the California 

Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2022) § 11.28, pp. 11-19–11-20 

[(Kostka & Zischke)]; see Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of 

University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 415 (Laurel Heights) [‘A project 
34

opponent . . . can always imagine some additional study or analysis that might 

provide helpful information. It is not for them to design the EIR. That further 

study . . . might be helpful does not make it necessary’].) [¶] . . . ‘Drafting an 

EIR or preparing a negative declaration necessarily involves some degree of 

forecasting. While foreseeing the unforeseeable is not possible, an agency must 

use its best efforts to find out and disclose all that it reasonably can.’ 

(Guidelines, § 15144.)” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 726–727.)

Thus, “ ‘[t]he fact that precision may not be possible ... does not mean 

that no analysis is required.’ ” (Banning Ranch, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 938, 

citing Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 399.) Still, an “EIR is not required 

to engage in speculative analysis. (Guidelines, § 15145.) Indeed, this core 

principal is well[-]established in the Guidelines and case law. While a lead 

agency must use its ‘best efforts’ to evaluate environmental effects, including 

the use of reasonable forecasting, ‘foreseeing the unforeseeable’ is not required, 

nor is predicting the unpredictable or quantifying the unquantifiable. 

(Guidelines, § 15964, subd. (d)(3) [‘A change which is speculative or unlikely to 

occur is not reasonably foreseeable’]; Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle (2000) 83 

Cal.App.4th 74, 108 [‘ “agency is required to forecast only to the extent that an 

activity could be reasonably expected under the circumstances” ’].) [¶] This rule 

rests on both economic and practical considerations. It has long been recognized 

that premature attempts to evaluate effects that are uncertain to occur or 

whose severity cannot reliably be measured is ‘a needlessly wasteful drain of 

the public fisc. [Citation.]’ ([Citation]; see, e.g., Save Round Valley Alliance v. 

County of Inyo (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1450–1451 [an EIR for a

subdivision of single-family residences was not deficient in failing to consider 

the possibility that the future lot owners might build a second dwelling on their 

lot pursuant to a local ordinance allowing such dwellings, because possibility 
35

was remote and speculative].)” (Treasure Island, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1060–1061.)

CEQA review is thus not triggered where there is not yet an identifiable 

impact as until that point, the review process could not be meaningful in the 

sense that it allows consideration of alternatives that could mitigate the impact. 

(Friends of the Sierra Railroad v. Tuolomne Park & Recreation District (2007) 

147 Cal.App.4th 643, 657–659 [reasonably foreseeable likelihood of some 

development plus possibility that the development could impact historical 

resource did not require EIR that could only speculate on future environmental 

consequences]; see also Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 396 [premature 

environmental analysis before a particular use or proposal is reasonably 

foreseeable may be deferred as it may be meaningless and financially 

wasteful].) 

“The judicial attitude to EIRs is deferential. . . . It follows that courts ‘do 

not require technical perfection or scientific certainty.’ (Sierra Club[, supra, 6 

Cal.5th at p. 515].)” (Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 727.) As noted, 

reviewing courts “ ‘ “ ‘have looked not for an exhaustive analysis but for 

adequacy, completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” 

(Sierra Club, at p. 515; see Guidelines, § 15151 [sufficiency of EIR viewed in 

light of what is reasonably feasible].)

III. The Standard of Review

On appeal, the parties reprise their respective positions taken in the trial 

court, as outlined above, on the adequacy of the Final EIR. 

“ ‘ “ ‘ “An EIR is presumed adequate,” ’ ” ’ ” and the party challenging its 

adequacy “ ‘ “ ‘ “has the burden of proving otherwise” ’ ” ’ ” by establishing a 

“ ‘ “prejudicial abuse of discretion.” ’ ” (South of Market Community Action 

Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 329 
36

(South of Market); see Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line 

Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 463.) 

“In evaluating the adequacy of an EIR, the appellate court reviews the 

agency’s actions, not the trial court’s decision. [Citations.] ‘The standard of 

review in a CEQA case, as provided in sections 21168.5 and 21005, is abuse of 

discretion.’ (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512.) ‘Abuse of discretion is 

established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if 

the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.’ (§ 

21168.5.)” (Preservation Action Council v. City of San Jose (2023) 91 

Cal.App.5th 517, 532 (Preservation).)

“ ‘ “A prejudicial abuse of discretion occurs if the failure to include 

relevant information precludes informed decisionmaking and informed public 

participation, thereby thwarting the statutory goals of the EIR process.” ’ ” 

(South of Market, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 331; see also Vineyard, supra, 40 

Cal.4th at p. 428 [absence of information in an EIR may be a failure to proceed 

in a manner required by law under § 21061].) “But, failing to include 

information ‘normally will rise to the level of a failure to proceed in the manner 

required by law only if the analysis in the EIR is clearly inadequate or 

unsupported. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Treasure Island, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1046.) “A challenger . . . asserting inadequacies in an EIR must show the 

omitted information ‘is both required by CEQA and necessary to informed 

discussion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1046–1047.) “ ‘Only if the manner 

in which an agency failed to follow the law is shown to be prejudicial, or is 

presumptively prejudicial, as when the [lead agency] fails to comply with 

mandatory procedures, must the decision be set aside . . . .’ [Citation.]” 

(Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Department of 

Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 485 (Environmental 
37

Protection).) The failure to comply with mandatory procedures gives rise to 

presumptive prejudice when the result is a subversion of CEQA’s purposes; for 

example, if the absence of information frustrated public comment or made 

meaningful assessment of potentially significant environmental impacts 

impossible. (Id. at pp. 485–486.)

Judicial review for a claimed failure to proceed in the manner required by 

CEQA, on the one hand, or for reaching factual conclusions unsupported by 

substantial evidence, on the other hand, “differs significantly: [w]hile we 

determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, 

‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements’ 

[citation], we accord greater deference to the agency’s substantive factual 

conclusions.” (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) “These differences require 

the ‘reviewing court [to] adjust its scrutiny to the nature of the alleged defect, 

depending on whether the claim is predominantly one of improper procedure or 

a dispute over the facts.’ (Ibid.; accord, Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512 

[recognizing ‘a procedural issues/factual issues dichotomy’ with respect to the 

CEQA standard of review].) Consistent[ly] with the differentiated standards 

stated above, we independently review the administrative record for ‘ “any legal 

error” by the agency and deferentially consider[] whether the record “contains 

substantial evidence to support [the agency’s] factual determinations.” ’ 

(Protecting Our Water [& Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus

(2020) 10 Cal.5th 479,] 495; see Sierra Club, [supra, 6 Cal.5th] at p. 512.)” 

(Preservation, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 532.) Under CEQA, “[s]substantial 

evidence shall include facts, reasonable assumptions predicated on facts, and 

expert opinion supported by facts.” (§ 21082.2, subd. (c); see also Guidelines, § 

15064, subd. (f)(5).) It does not include “argument, speculation, unsubstantiated 

opinion or narrative, evidence which is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, or 
38

evidence of social or economic impacts which do not contribute to, or are not 

caused by, physical impacts on the environment.” (Ibid.) 

But “the distinction between de novo and substantial evidence review ‘is 

not always so clear.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court acknowledged this difficulty 

in Sierra Club. It explained that while ‘there are instances where the agency’s 

discussion of significant project impacts may implicate a factual question that 

makes substantial evidence review appropriate’ ([Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th] 

at p. 514), courts ‘have consistently recognized that adequacy of discussion 

claims are not typically amenable to substantial evidence review.’ (Id. at p. 15.) 

That is, ‘[t]he determination whether a discussion is sufficient is not solely a 

matter of discerning whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

agency’s factual conclusions.’ (Id. at p. 516.) Rather, ‘[t]he ultimate inquiry . . .is 

whether the EIR includes enough detail “to enable those who did not participate 

in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised 

by the proposed project.” ’ (Ibid.) That inquiry, which presents a mixed question 

of law and fact, ‘is generally subject to independent review.’ (Ibid.)” 

(Preservation, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 532–533, citing Sierra Club, at 

p. 516.) Still, “underlying factual determinations—including, for example, an 

agency’s decision as to which methodologies to employ for analyzing an 

environmental effect—may warrant deference. [Citations.] Thus, to the extent a 

mixed question requires a determination whether statutory criteria were 

satisfied, de novo review is appropriate; but to the extent factual questions 

predominate, a more deferential standard is warranted. [Citation.]” (Sierra 

Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516.)

Here, the central issue is whether the Final EIR for the Specific Plan was 

adequate under CEQA notwithstanding that it did not discuss the possibility 

that sufficient funding would never become available to build the contemplated 
39

new schools within the Site and, in that event, the Districts might be required 

to absorb increased student enrollment through alternatives. These included 

modifications to existing school facilities, some located outside the Project Site. 

And some of the possible alternatives potentially would present off-site and 

indirect environmental impacts. The parties dispute the standard of review to 

be applied, the Districts urging independent review and the real parties 

emphasizing the factual nature of the City’s determination of the Districts’ 

information as speculative. 

We view the question presented ultimately as whether the Final EIR 

complied with CEQA, that is whether it fulfilled statutory and regulatory 

mandates and whether the identified omission impaired the EIR’s “purpose as 

an informational document” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516), which 

purpose, as noted, is “ ‘to enable those who did not participate in its preparation 

to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed 

project.’ ” (Id. at p. 516; see Guidelines, § 15151 [EIR should be prepared with a 

sufficient degree of analysis to provide decisionmakers with information that 

enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of 

environmental consequences].) The question of the EIR’s sufficiency here does 

not necessarily turn on underlying factual determinations, although the City’s

assessment of the information provided by the Districts as uncertain and 

speculative is a factual question. (Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson

(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1186 (Anderson) [substantial evidence supported 

agency’s factual conclusion that asserted environmental impact of urban decay 

was speculative and not reasonably foreseeable].) Review here is thus not solely 

a matter of discerning whether there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support such factual conclusions. (See Sierra Club, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516.) It is 

rather a “mixed question [of law and fact] requir[ing] a determination whether 
40

statutory criteria were satisfied” to which we will apply independent review 

while affording deference to any relevant underlying factual determinations by 

the City. (Ibid.; Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield

(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1198 [substantial evidence standard applies to the 

reliability or accuracy of the data upon which EIR relied].)

As to the Districts’ claim that the City failed to respond or did not 

adequately respond to their public comments, such a claim is likewise one for 

the failure to proceed in a manner required by CEQA and is reviewed for 

prejudicial abuse of discretion.11 (Environmental Protection, supra, 44 Cal.4th 

at p. 487.) 

IV. School Facilities and Funding as Treated Under CEQA 

 Both sides to this appeal appear to contend that Chawanakee and its 

construction of Government Code section 65996 support their respective 

positions. While we view the case as relevant to the issues here, it is not 

dispositive, given the narrow way in which the trial court found the Final EIR 

and the City’s responses to the Districts’ public comments to be inadequate—by 

failing to generally discuss and respond to comments about off-site, indirect 

impacts of the Districts’ accommodating additional students at existing school 

sites or by other means—and the equally narrow writ relief the trial court 

ordered. We therefore provide some discussion of this case and the law on school 

facilities and funding as treated under CEQA.

11 On this record in which the City did respond to the Districts’ comments

in the Final EIR, albeit not in a manner or to the degree that the Districts 

contend was required, we do not view the claim as one for the failure by the 

City to have considered comments altogether. (Environmental Protection, supra, 

44 Cal.4th at p. 487, fn. 9 [drawing distinction between a claim of failure to 

consider public comments versus a failure to adequately respond].) 
41

We first observe that before the legislative changes on school-facilities 

funding addressed in Chawanakee, the court of appeal in Goleta Union School 

District v. Regents of University of California (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1025 

(Goleta) held that the UC Regents, as lead agency for a long-range development 

plan for university projects that would increase enrollment in a local 

elementary school district, had no obligation to propose or commit funds for 

methods to alleviate overcrowding in local public schools expected to result from 

the project. (Id. at pp. 1028, 1033–1034.) The basis for the court’s holding was 

that CEQA requires consideration only of “physical change[s]” in the 

environment (§ 21065; cf. § 21060.5), and that the “[e]conomic or social effects of 

a project shall not be treated as significant effects on the environment”

(Guidelines, § 15131, subd. (a)). (Goleta, at pp. 1030–1033.) 

The supplemental EIR in Goleta, ordered after the trial court had found a 

CEQA violation and granted a writ of mandate, described impacts of the 

proposed development plan, and proposed various options for schools that 

included building classrooms to accommodate additional students, 

redistributing students to other facilities, starting year-round schools, adding 

portable classrooms, and building new classrooms. (Goleta, supra, 37 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1029.) The supplemental EIR noted that mitigation of the 

physical environmental impacts associated with these options was the 

responsibility of the school district, but the Regents offered to contribute “a fair 

share.” (Ibid.) The court recognized that in some cases, “socio-economic effects 

may cause physical changes that significantly affect the environment under . . . 

CEQA” (id. at p. 1032) but that “classroom overcrowding, per se, does not 

constitute a significant effect on the environment.” (Ibid.) Still, a project 

ultimately requiring physical changes in the environment “such as construction 

of new school facilities, new bus schedules and changed traffic patterns” would 
42

require an EIR to address these impacts. (Ibid.; see also Fullerton Joint High 

School District v. State Board of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 794, criticized 

on other grounds in Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com.

(1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 917–919; El Dorado Union High School District v. City of 

Placerville (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 123, 131 (El Dorado) [although increased 

student enrollment and potential for overcrowding might not implicate CEQA 

per se, evidence of present overcrowding and projections of increasing 

enrollment that would likely necessitate constructing a new school, changing 

bus routes, and altering traffic patterns is sufficient to require an EIR].)

The Goleta court found that the projected increases in school enrollment 

there, which were not considered to be sizable, did not themselves constitute a 

significant effect on the environment, so the supplemental EIR was not required 

to show that the development plan alleviated the increased enrollment. 

Further, the Regents had no responsibility to “tell the [d]istrict what it should 

do to increase capacity.” (Goleta, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033, citing 

§ 21080, subd. (b).) The supplemental EIR sufficiently provided information 

about potential physical impacts that may result from implementing the 

development plan and it discussed a wide variety of mitigation measures for 

these possible impacts. (Ibid.) It was not required to do more, including 

committing the Regents to provide funding to build classrooms. (Id. at pp. 1028, 

1034.)

As discussed in Chawanakee, Sen. Bill 50 concerning school-facilities 

funding, was enacted in 1998. Among its provisions were changes to

Government Code section 65996, subdivision (a), which is a “restriction on the 

‘methods of considering and mitigating impacts on school facilities’ caused by a 
43

development project.”12 (Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021.) The 

initial enactment of this statute in 1986 (stats. 1986, ch. 887, § 11) followed 

questions in the years after CEQA’s initial enactment about its “application to 

development projects that caused an increase in student enrollment and 

overcrowding in schools” (Chawanakee, at p. 1021) and case law to the effect 

that the impact of increased school enrollment was cognizable under CEQA. 

(Ibid.; see El Dorado, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at pp. 126, 131–132.) In 1986, the 

Legislature enacted “a complex statutory scheme to govern the imposition of

school facilities fees on those seeking the government approvals needed to 

develop real estate. [Citation.] The school facilities legislation (1) allowed school 

districts to levy a charge against new developments to fund construction of 

school facilities but capped the amount that could be charged and (2) limited the 

types of mitigation requirements local government could impose against a 

development project to alleviate the project’s impacts on school facilities. 

[Citation.] Stated generally, the capped school facilities fees became the sole 

measure for mitigating the impacts of increased enrollment.” (Chawanakee, 

supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021; see also Corona-Norco Unified School 

District v. City of Corona (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1581–1583 (Corona) 

[affirmed sustaining of demurrer against allegations of CEQA violations and 

inadequacy of EIR based on entitlement approvals where schools were 

overcrowded, proposed developments would exacerbate overcrowding, and 

statutorily authorized fee was insufficient to fund construction of new facilities 

to alleviate overcrowding].)

12 The two methods are the generation of developer impact fees under 

Education Code section 17620 and the interim school-facilities provisions in 

Government Code section 65970 et seq. (Gov. Code, § 65996, subd. (a).)
44

Sen. Bill 50 then came in 1998 after court decisions had “narrowed the 

application of the limits on mitigation contained in the [earlier 1986] school 

facilities legislation and thereby expanded the reach of CEQA.” (Chawanakee, 

supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022; see, e.g., Mira Development Corp v. City of 

San Diego (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1201, 1218 [restrictions in Gov. Code, § 65996 

not applicable to legislative actions such as rezoning]; Murrieta Valley Unified 

School District v. County of Riverside (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1234 [county 

could impose nonfee mitigation measures to ameliorate adverse effects of 

development on school facilities by reducing density of residential development 

and imposing controlled phasing in areas of project with inadequate school 

facilities].) Sen. Bill 50 was the legislative response to these CEQA-expanding 

judicial decisions. It used “ ‘three primary means to preempt the field of 

development fees and mitigation measures related to school facilities and to 

overturn [this case law]. First, [Sen. Bill 50] provides for a cap on the amount of 

fees, charges, dedications or other requirements which can be levied against new 

construction to fund construction or reconstruction of school facilities. Second, 

[Sen. Bill 50] removes denial authority from local agencies by prohibiting 

refusals to approve legislative or adjudicative acts based on a developer’s 

refusal to provide school facilities mitigation exceeding the capped amounts, or 

based on the inadequacy of school facilities. Third, it limits mitigation measures 

which can be required, under [CEQA] or otherwise, to payment of the 

statutorily capped fee amounts and deems payment of these amounts to provide 

full and complete school facilities mitigation[.]’ [Citation.]” (Chawanakee, supra, 

196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1023–1024.) Sen. Bill 50 amended Government Code 

section 65996, among other provisions, to effect these changes. (Chawanakee, 

supra, at p. 1024.) 
45

In Chawanakee, as relevant here, the court specifically considered some of 

the changes in language to Government Code section 65996, subdivision (a) 

brought by Sen. Bill 50. First, the court concluded that the provision’s change in 

phrase from “ ‘exclusive methods of mitigating’ ” to “ ‘exclusive methods of 

considering and mitigating’ ” limits not only the mitigation that may be 

required for school impacts but also the scope of impact review and the findings 

for those impacts. (Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1026–1027.) 

Because of Sen. Bill 50, the provision now “obviates the need for an EIR to 

contain a description and analysis of a development’s impacts on school 

facilities,” including “any analysis of the environmental consequences for the 

existing school facilities that will be forced to accommodate” increased student 

enrollment resulting from a project. (Id. at pp. 1027–1028.) 

As for Sen. Bill 50’s change from “related to school facilities” to “on school 

facilities” in Government Code section 65996, subdivision (a) when describing 

the impacts that might occur as a result of project approval, the court viewed 

this amendment as a “narrowing of the statute” in its protective effect. The 

“phrase ‘impacts on school facilities’ . . . does not cover all possible 

environmental impacts that have any type of connection or relationship to 

schools. . . . [T]he prepositional phrase ‘on school facilities’ limits the type of 

impacts that are excused from discussion or mitigation to the adverse physical 

changes to the school grounds and school buildings, and ‘any school-related 

consideration relating to a school district’s ability to accommodate enrollment.’ 

(Govt. Code, § 65996, subd. (c).) Therefore, the project’s indirect impacts on parts 

of the physical environment that are not school facilities are not excused from 

being considered and mitigated.” (Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1028, italics added.)
46

The Chawanakee court concluded that traffic impacts in that case near 

and related to getting students to and from a school facility is not an impact 

“ ‘on school facilities’ ” exempt from consideration and mitigation under CEQA 

for purposes of Government Code section 65996, subdivision (a). (Chawanakee, 

supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029, italics added.) The court then held that, 

notwithstanding a “causal connection between the overcrowding created by the 

project’s students,” which itself need not be considered or mitigated, “and the 

construction to alleviate the overcrowding,” the development of additional 

school facilities at an existing site to accommodate increased enrollment might

have “reasonably foreseeable” impacts, such as “dust that degrades air quality 

and noise caused by the construction activity,” on the “non-school physical 

environment.” (Ibid.) “These types of impacts to the nonschool physical 

environment are caused indirectly by the project and should be considered in 

the EIR.” (Ibid., citing Guidelines, § 15358, subd. (a)(2) [indirect effects caused 

by the project].) 

Thus, Chawanakee held that a project’s indirect impacts on parts of the 

physical environment that are not school facilities are not excused under 

Government Code section 65996 from being considered and mitigated in an 

EIR. (Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.Appl.4th at p. 1028.) It identified impacts in 

that case—traffic beyond school grounds related to getting students to and from 

a school facility, and the reasonably foreseeable impacts on the non[-]school 

physical environment of construction at an existing school site to accommodate 

increased enrollment resulting from a project—as impacts indirectly caused by 

the project that are not subject to the limitations of Government Code section 

65996, subdivision (a). Such impacts therefore must be considered in an EIR. 

(Id. at p. 1029.)
47

As noted, the trial court here was careful in its order and judgment to 

delineate and provide narrow writ relief only as to “potential off-site 

environmental impacts resulting from the [Specific Plan] due to [the Districts’] 

presented concerns that [they] will lack sufficient funding to build the proposed 

new school sites identified within the [Specific Plan]. The [Final EIR] also failed 

to adequately respond to comments made by [the Districts] with regard to 

potential off-site impacts.” This followed from the court’s comments at the 

merits hearing that the relief it was granting, under the holding of 

Chawanakee, was “focused on those impacts that are external to school 

facilities” “when existing facilities may be changed or augmented” as 

alternative to the construction of new schools as contemplated by the Project to 

accommodate increased student enrollment. The court’s decision thus complied 

with Chawanakee in its distinct treatment under Government Code section 

65996 of only indirect environmental impacts on parts of the physical 

environment that are not school facilities and providing writ relief to only this

extent. Chawanakee is therefore not dispositive authority for the finding of any 

error here, because the court’s ruling was in line with the distinction in its 

holding between impacts “on” school facilities and those more broadly “related 

to” school facilities in the application of Government Code section 65996. But as 

recognized in Chawanakee, and as the trial court here observed, the impacts at 

issue still must be “reasonably foreseeable” under CEQA to be the basis of a 

CEQA violation and to be subject to judicially mandated additional 

consideration, mitigation, and response in the Specific Plan EIR. 

 
48

V. The City’s Final EIR Complied With CEQA

A. The EIR Properly Assumed Schools Within the Project Would be 

Built, and Considered and Analyzed Reasonably Foreseeable 

Impacts on the Physical Environment From That Assumption

In drafting an EIR, a lead agency is required to assume that all phases of 

a project will eventually be built. (Environmental Council of Sacramento v. 

County of Sacramento (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1030, 1032 [project 

description and analysis of impacts for a planned community with a university 

was sufficient because EIR not required to address speculation that the 

university might not be built or analyze impacts on that assumption], citing 

Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431 [but reference to the entire project being 

built specific to water supply].) The City here made that assumption, and 

identified and set aside new school sites within the Specific Plan to 

accommodate increased enrollment caused by the Project. It also provided 

project-level mitigation measures for non-school physical impacts from 

construction of these facilities where possible, including to address air quality, 

traffic, noise, and other such issues, observing that site-specific environmental 

review and mitigation by the Districts as lead agencies for each respective 

school site would come later as plans for these new schools developed. (See also 

§ 21151.8 & Guidelines, § 15186 [special requirements for districts to address 

health impacts in EIR for school facilities].) And the City imposed developer 

impact fees under Government Code section 65996 in full and complete 

mitigation for school impacts. In these ways, the City complied with CEQA, and 

the Districts do not argue otherwise.

The Districts do complain that the Specific Plan and EIR don’t require, 

provide for, or address phasing of the project build-out over time, instead 

leaving the pace of proposed development to individual landowners and market 
49

conditions. But there is no authority requiring an EIR to phase a decades-long 

project such as a land-use plan and CEQA does not require analysis of 

individual phases of projects, instead requiring analysis of the whole, including 

with less detail when the sequence and pace of construction are largely 

unknown at the time the EIR is prepared. (Sierra Watch v. County of Placer

(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 105 (Sierra Watch) [lead agency need not speculate 

about as yet unknown details of project impacts and may discuss potential 

impacts at a level of specificity determined by the nature of the project and the 

rule of reason]; see Guidelines, § 15146 [degree of specificity required in EIR].) 

Further, the Districts did not offer or cite to substantial evidence in the record 

that build-out of the entire Project over the estimated 20 to 30 years would not 

occur gradually or would not naturally ramp up over time based on market or 

other conditions affecting development prospects. 

Further, as argued by real parties, the required analysis of a proposed 

development’s impacts on increased demand for public services such as schools 

is limited. If a proposed development would create an increased demand for 

public services, as the City acknowledged may happen here with respect to 

schools, then an EIR must inquire as to whether new or expanded physical 

facilities may be required to provide such service and address them if so. The 

impacts that must be addressed under CEQA are the physical effects of 

providing the increased service, not any possible failure to provide adequate 

service under applicable standards because of insufficient public funding for 

which the lead agency is not even responsible. (See City of Hayward v. Board of 

Trustees of the California State University (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 833, 843 

[lead agency not required to address need for additional fire-protection services, 

which itself is not an environmental impact that CEQA requires a project 

proponent to mitigate]; Guidelines, § 15382 [an economic or social change by 
50

itself is not considered a significant effect on the environment but a social or 

economic change related to a physical change may be considered in determining 

whether the physical change is significant]; see also Goleta, supra, 37 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1031–1034; Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1027–1028.) 

The City was thus not required under CEQA to provide for, ensure, or 

guarantee additional school-funding mechanisms to build the contemplated new 

schools beyond what the Specific Plan already provided, as the Districts’ early 

comment letters appear to have suggested. Nor was the City required to assume 

or resolve a failure in the provision of schools as a public service by insufficient 

funding or otherwise. Nor was it required to view or analyze the Districts’ 

suggested possible scenarios at existing school sites resulting from the 

assumption of perpetual insufficiencies in school-facilities funding as 

alternatives to the proposed Project as a whole. Under CEQA, a lead agency 

must describe a reasonable range of alternatives to the project or the location of 

a project, and this includes a “no project” alternative and those having the 

potential to feasibly achieve the project objectives while avoiding or 

substantially lessening project impacts. (Guidelines, § 15126.6.) The EIR here 

included discussion of such alternatives. But while alternatives to the proposed 

project must be discussed in an EIR, “that requirement is ‘applicable only to the 

project as a whole, not to the various facets thereof,’ ” such as new schools 

within the context of the entire Specific Plan. (California Native Plant Society v. 

City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 993.)

 These principles set some contours for assessing whether the Final EIR 

here complied with CEQA with respect to the Districts’ claimed omissions and 

inadequacies in the EIR as an informational document. 
51

B. The Information Provided by the Districts Did Not Identify 

Reasonably Foreseeable Impacts and Was Too General, 

Uncertain, and Speculative to Require Further Analysis or 

Response Under CEQA 

The extent of the information conveyed and reiterated by totality of the 

Districts’ letters and comments about the inadequacy of the Specific Plan EIR 

can be summarized as: 1) based on current funding scenarios, sufficient funding 

over the next two to three decades for construction of the new schools 

contemplated by the Project was uncertain or unlikely; 2) if this assumption 

holds true, the Districts may ultimately need to instead accommodate the 

additional students resulting from the Project through one or more alternative

means such as installing portable classrooms at unspecified existing sites, 

expanding unspecified existing facilities or constructing new facilities at those 

sites, providing for an undetermined number of inter-district transfers, 

changing unspecified attendance boundaries, bussing unidentified numbers of 

students to other districts, and allowing an unidentified number of students to 

transfer to other districts;13 and 3) these possible alternative and varied means 

of accommodating additional students, a responsibility of the Districts, will 

cause impacts affecting traffic and noise levels, air quality, loss of greenspace or 

play areas, and other unspecified impacts at unspecified existing school or other 

district sites, for an undetermined duration of time, whether within or without 

13 The Districts contend in their respondents’ brief that existing school 

sites “are well established, as are the areas around them.” But this does not 

elucidate or clarify which of the existing sites would be used or modified in 

which way to alternatively accommodate increased enrollment for purposes of 

assessing potential environmental impacts. Nor does this even suggest which 

existing sites might be used first or might best lend themselves to any of the 

identified alternatives. 
52

the boundaries of the Specific Plan but unspecified as to which. In assessing 

this information, we note that with “respect to the production of evidence, a 

party, here the Districts, that makes assertions based on actions it claims it will 

take in the future”—such as various alternative measures to building new 

schools to accommodate increased enrollment—“is in the best position to 

present evidence that shows its plans for that future action. [Citation.]” (WalMart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, 288 (WalMart).)

The most specific of the information provided by the Districts concerned 

the manner in which school-facilities funding is currently generated or sourced

and the fact that funding is now insufficient for them to build new schools. The

range of one or more possible alternative means by which the Districts might

accommodate students at unspecified existing sites or in other districts was 

given based on the assumption of a perpetual state of insufficient facilities 

funding for decades into the future. But the information was not provided with 

any site specificity, preferences or priorities among the alternatives given, the 

expected tolerances of each option, their timing, or any other details. These 

options that the Districts might take at some future unidentified point or points 

were predicted to generally result in several indirect impacts to the physical 

environment outside existing facilities, whether within or without the Specific 

Plan boundaries. 

Real parties characterize the information provided by the Districts as 

pure speculation based on uncertainty and vague generalities not requiring 

further consideration or response by the City under CEQA, other than the 

conclusion of speculation with an explanation as to why, as the City did provide 

in the Final EIR in its response to the Districts’ public comments. Real parties

urge that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise and ordering further 
53

generalized discussion and response by the City based on the Districts’ 

expressed concerns, which discussion could only be less than meaningful, given 

the type and quality of the information the Districts provided. We conclude that 

this position has merit.

We have already noted that under CEQA, evidence of environmental 

impacts must be founded on facts, reasonable assumptions based on facts, and 

expert opinion supported by facts; it cannot be based on speculation, argument, 

or unsubstantiated opinion or narrative. (Guidelines, § 15384.) “If, after 

thorough investigation, a lead agency finds that a particular impact is too 

speculative for evaluation, the agency should note its conclusion and terminate 

discussion of the impact.” (Guidelines, § 15145.) Subdivision (d) of Guidelines 

section 15064 provides that “[i]n evaluating the significance of an 

environmental effect of a project, the lead agency shall consider” both “direct 

physical changes” and “reasonably foreseeable indirect physical changes” in “the 

environment that may be caused by the project.” (Italics added.) Subdivision 

(d)(3) of Guidelines section 15064 adds that an “indirect physical change is to be 

considered only if that change is a reasonably foreseeable impact which may be 

caused by the project. A change which is speculative or unlikely to occur is not 

reasonably foreseeable.” (Italics added.)

There are many examples in case law of courts finding adequacy of an 

EIR when information conveyed about omitted impacts or complained 

inadequate treatment of impacts is of the type and quality that the Districts 

offered here. The Districts provided long-term projections about insufficient 

funding premised only on current scenarios, which is not itself an 

environmental impact. These projections led to a general range of one or more 

options that might be taken by the Districts sometime in the future to 

accommodate increased enrollment (also itself not an environmental impact) at 
54

one or more existing school sites, either within or beyond the Project area, 

leading to vaguely described environmental impacts on the non-school 

environment, whether somewhere inside or outside the Project Site. “When the 

environmental impact from a particular project feature cannot be reliably 

ascertained and estimated, it is properly characterized as speculative.” (East 

Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226, 1250

(East Oakland).)

For example, the court in East Oakland rejected a challenge to an EIR to 

the extent it had found the impacts of truck-parking relocation from a project 

(but outside of it) were speculative, given the difficulty of predicting how 

current users of a terminal that would be eliminated would respond to their 

displacement. The EIR found that the lack of specific and reliable information 

as to where relocation would occur necessarily made any assumptions about

relocation speculative. The EIR thus disregarded air quality or emissions 

impacts beyond the project site, finding that without specific and reliable 

information on relocation, such analysis would likewise be speculative. (East 

Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1249–1250.) The project challengers 

disputed the agency finding of speculation and contended that the EIR should 

have addressed emissions impacts of parking relocation because “longer 

distances traveled by relocated truckers might generate greater emissions.” (Id. 

at p. 1250.) The trial and appellate courts both rejected the challenge, 

concluding that the EIR’s finding of speculation—because “the extent and 

character of relocation could not be reliably determined at this time and any 

attempt to estimate the extent of relocation was, therefore, speculative”—

supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. (Id. at p. 1251.)

The East Oakland court cited Rodeo Citizens Assn. v. County of Contra 

Costa (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 214 (Rodeo Citizens) in support of its conclusion 
55

about the EIR’s finding of speculation and consequent lack of need for further 

analysis of the air quality or emissions impacts. (East Oakland, supra, 89 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1250–1251.) In Rodeo Citizens, as explained by the East 

Oakland court, “a refinery sought approval to install equipment that would 

permit the refinery to capture and sell butane and propane as a byproduct of its 

operations. ([Rodeo Citizens] at pp. 217–218.) The petitioner contended that the 

EIR prepared in connection with the permit approval was inadequate because it 

failed ‘to quantify the greenhouse gas emissions from the downstream uses of 

the recovered propane and butane.’ (Id. at p. 226.) The court held that the 

agency properly declined to analyze these emissions as speculative. (Id. at 

pp. 226–227.) As the [Rodeo Citizens] court explained, it could not be assumed 

that the propane and butane would be burned because these chemicals have 

significant nonfuel uses. (Id. at p. 227.) Further, because of changing market 

conditions, ‘ “historical market data would be an unreliable predictor of the 

future” ’ regarding the manner in which the butane and propane would be used. 

(Ibid.) As a result, the court held, ‘the lead agency responsibly determined that 

further analysis of the potential impacts was impractical and not required.’ (Id.

at p. 228.)” (East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1250–1251.)

In Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 105–106, the court of appeal 

declined to find the EIR inadequate for its failure to estimate the duration of 

construction noise at a location involving most of the project. “The EIR 

sufficiently demonstrated why specific detail about the duration of construction 

noise at each specific location . . . was not possible. The project would be 

constructed over 25 years. It included no specific plan on where buildings would 

be located . . . . It included no ‘specific construction schedule’ because the 

‘sequence and pace for constructing various land uses and facilities would be 

market driven.’ And it emphasized the potentially sporadic pace of 
56

development, noting that some years may have no construction and other years, 

in contrast, may involve simultaneous construction of several ‘elements’ of the 

project. For these types of reasons, the EIR explained, ‘it would not be practical, 

and would require a great deal of speculation, to identify specific noise levels for 

every single receptor.” (Id. at p. 105.) 

The Sierra Watch court noted that the lead agency there “could have 

speculated how long construction noise would occur over the next 25 years at 

each specific location” and “could have presumed where buildings would 

ultimately be located” and then “assumed that all buildings in any [particular 

location] would be constructed at the same time—resulting in a shorter period 

of construction noise. Or perhaps it could have assumed something else 

altogether. But any estimate . . . would entail a fair bit of speculation. . . . So 

while [the petitioner] may have preferred detailed estimates about construction 

duration in each specific location . . . , the EIR was not required to supply 

speculative estimates. A lead agency, after all, need not speculate about project 

impacts (see CEQA Guidelines, § 15145) and instead may discuss potential 

project impacts at a ‘level of specificity . . . determined by the nature of the 

project and the rule of reason [citations].” (Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 105; see also Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 388 [level of detail 

required in EIR in any particular case necessarily depends on multitude of 

factors, including the nature of the project, the directness or indirectness of the 

contemplated impact, the ability to forecast the actual effects the project will 

have on the physical environment, whether future effects will themselves 

require CEQA analysis, and that the effects will be felt outside the project area; 

less detail is required where effects are more indirect than effects felt within 

project area or where it would be difficult to predict them with any accuracy]; 

Wal-Mart, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 291–294 [petitioner’s assertions about 
57

the inevitability of development of a multitenant shopping center at particular 

location as a result of project approval were vague, uncertain, and contingent 

and thus amounted to speculation]; Marin Municipal Water Dist. v. Kg Land 

Cal. Corp (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1652, 1662–1663 (Marin) [when nature of 

future development is nonspecific and uncertain, EIR need not engage in “sheer 

speculation” as to future environmental consequences]; Save the El Dorado 

Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation District (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 239, 263 

[possibility that a property owner might deliberately fill a ditch at some point in 

future rather than maintain their property to minimize flood risk is not a 

reasonably foreseeable indirect impact of project, which included abandonment 

of the ditch]; Citizens’ Committee to Complete the Refuge v. City of Newark

(2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 460, 479 (Newark) [city did not need to evaluate its 

potential responses to rising sea levels 50 to 80 years into the future, in part 

because “the range of projections for sea levels by that time are wide and sea 

levels at different ends of those projections could warrant significantly different 

responses”]; No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 77, fn. 5 [“an 

impact statement prepared before reliable information is available would ‘tend 

toward uninformative generalities’ ”].) 

In the City’s responses to the Districts’ comments contained in the Final 

EIR, the City included the comment letters and responded to each. The City 

noted that impacts associated with schools were analyzed in the EIR with 

Public Services, among other general topics of impacts, and that the City’s

policies were to work with local districts to identify and set aside new school 

sites and consider impacts to ensure public services and maintain publicfacilities standards. The City identified the five new school sites within the 

Project, and noted that the Education Code tasks the Districts with the 

responsibility for constructing their own schools. The City also noted that the 
58

Specific Plan imposed developer impact fees to fund new school development in 

full mitigation under Government Code section 65996, set according to law by 

the Districts, and that the City would aid in collecting those fees. The City 

expressed its belief that it had sufficiently addressed, “at least in general 

terms,” the physical impacts of constructing new schools within the Specific 

Plan area, and that the “footprint-related impacts of the schools are subsumed 

within the analysis of the footprint of the entire Specific Plan,” including 

mitigation.

The City also noted its perception of legal limitations on analyzing 

impacts from new or expanded facilities involving the provision of public 

services and that the social and economic effects of a project—like increased 

enrollment—are not themselves treated as significant effects on the 

environment. The City further noted that with the construction of new schools, 

there would be site-specific environmental review conducted by the responsible 

school district for impacts not yet known, as the City did not have specific 

designs from the Districts for the three as yet undesigned new schools. Thus, 

the EIR “does not speculate beyond the material facts that are available for 

each site” at the time the Specific Plan was being considered. 

The City also noted the holding of Chawanakee, and that it “obviated the 

need to analyze and mitigate a development’s direct impacts on existing school 

facilities.” (Italics added.) The City acknowledged the Districts’ concerns about 

accommodating increased student enrollment and raised the estimate of new 

students from the Specific Plan based on information on current enrollment 

provided by the Districts. The City further observed that the Specific Plan and 

EIR maximized the developer fees that could be collected for schools and that 

the City could not legally impose greater fees for new-school facilities, with the 

Districts as lead agencies responsible for construction of their own new schools. 
59

As to the District’s proffered range of alternative options for 

accommodating new students at existing sites—by using portables, expanding

or modifying existing sites, adjusting attendance boundaries, and allowing 

inter-district transfers—with the vaguely identified and non-site-specific 

impacts on “noise-levels, air quality, loss of greenspace or other play areas” 

(italics omitted), the City specifically responded that the “potential scenarios” 

offered by the Districts “are too speculative to give rise to meaningful 

environmental assessment.” In support of this conclusion, the City noted that if 

the cited scenarios were to occur, that would only happen over 20 to 30 years as 

number of students living in the site gradually increased. The Districts would 

have the ability over that time “to make decisions as to where such students 

should attend schools, if no on-site facilities are yet in place. The specific 

decisions the District will have to make cannot be predicted with any level of 

certainty at present, and, in any event, are beyond the City’s control. In 

particular, the City has no way at present to try to predict boundary changes 

the District might impose in future years. Although such decisions could affect 

traffic and other environmental resources, any details of such impacts cannot be 

predicted at present. The same is true of options such as student transfers, the 

construction of other, currently unplanned schools at other sites, or changes in 

current patterns of school bussing. To the extent that the District contemplates 

the installation of portable classrooms at existing school facilities, the City 

notes that CEQA provides a categorical exemption (Class 14) for ‘minor 

additions to existing schools within existing school grounds where the addition 

does not increase original student capacity by more than 25% or ten classrooms, 

whichever is less.’ ” 

The City’s determination of the Districts’ proffered information as 

speculation not capable of leading to meaningful analysis or requiring further 
60

response in the EIR is a factual conclusion entitled to deference. (Anderson, 

supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 [substantial evidence supported agency’s 

factual conclusion that asserted environmental impact of urban decay was 

speculative and not reasonably foreseeable]; County of Butte v. Department of 

Water Resources (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 147, 164 (Butte); see id. at p. 161, 

[treating lead agency’s “finding of uncertainty” about impacts of climate change 

as factually supported in the record]; Tiburon, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 728 

[legal error in failing to comply with CEQA is reviewed independently but all 

factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence, including the 

methodology used for studying an impact, the scope of an EIR’s analysis of a 

topic, and the reliability or accuracy of the data upon which EIR relied]; Ebbetts

Pass Forest Watch v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 

43 Cal.4th 936, 955 [determination of future uncertainties and unpredictability 

as leading to less detailed and specific analysis was predominantly factual 

question].)

Beyond that, we conclude that based on the non-specific, uncertain, and 

vague nature and quality of the information provided by the Districts, in the 

context of a land-use and long-range planning document like the Specific Plan, 

the Final EIR for the Specific Plan and the City’s responses to the Districts’ 

comments were adequate under CEQA. This is especially true when the 

generally identified potential indirect and off-site impacts related to existing 

school facilities were impacts that might flow and could be identified only from 

later decisions by the Districts themselves, which impacts may call for later 

project-level environmental review by the Districts, not the City. The City was 

not required to “dimly guess” about potential impacts based on uncertain and 

non-specific information and many unknowns. (Newark, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 479.) To the extent the City reached the conclusion that the Districts’ 
61

comments were speculative, noted the conclusion, and terminated the 

discussion, the City complied with Guidelines section 15145 concerning 

speculation and section 15088 on responses to comments. (See, Guidelines, § 

15088, subds. (a) & (c) [lead agency must respond to comments on “significant 

environmental issues” in good faith, giving detailed reasons why specific 

comments and suggestions were not accepted but level of detail may correspond 

with level of detail provided in comment; responses to general comments may 

be general].) Given the non-specificity of the comments and the extent to which 

information about decisions the Districts might make in the future to 

accommodate additional students if new schools were not built, and any related 

environmental impacts resulting from those future decisions, was not yet 

known, additional discussion, analysis, or response by the City could not 

possibly be meaningful in the sense CEQA intends and requires to serve its 

informational and decision-making purposes.

On this record, and based on our independent review while deferring to 

the City’s factual determination of speculation in the Districts’ comments, “we 

are satisfied that the EIR ‘ “include[d] detail sufficient to enable those who did 

not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully 

the issues raised by the [Specific Plan]” ’ [Citation.] That was enough.” (Butte, 

supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 164; Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 520–521; 

Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 405.) As an informational document, the 

Final EIR was required to study and analyze only the reasonably foreseeable 

consequences of the Specific Plan. (See High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of 

Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 125–126.) It was not required to engage in 

“ ‘sheer speculation’ ” based on non-specific and uncertain information about 

events or development that might occur in the future. (Marin, supra, 235 

Cal.App.3d at p. 1662.) Further, the Districts’ comments and the City’s 
62

responses reflect the Districts’ concerns and disagreement with the adequacy of 

the EIR as it concerns school funding and facilities. This content serves CEQA’s 

informational function to apprise the public of these issues and to enable those 

who did not participate in the EIR’s preparation to consider the issues to the 

extent currently possible, given the present unknowns. (See e.g. Banning

Ranch, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 940; Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San 

Diego Assn. of Governments (2017) 3 Cal.5th 497, 516–517 [discussion in section 

for responses to comments in EIR may satisfy informational purposes of the 

document under CEQA]; City of Irvine v. County of Orange (2015) 238 

Cal.App.4th 526, 550, 553 [responses to comments are part of EIR itself and 

their sufficiency must be viewed in light of reasonable feasibility].) The record 

reflects that the City used its best efforts to ascertain and disclose all that it 

reasonably, feasibly, and currently could under the circumstances, addressing 

identified reasonably foreseeable impacts as required and avoiding what could 

only be speculative analysis or uninformed generalities based on the type and 

quality of the information the Districts provided. Finally, the Districts’ “general 

comments [could] be met with general responses,” which here are adequate. 

(Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 268.)

Having concluded that the City’s Final EIR complied with CEQA, we 

reverse the judgment determining otherwise. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to 

(1) vacate its order granting the Districts’ mandate petition as to the first and 

fifth causes of action; (2) enter a new order and judgment denying the petition 

in full; and (3) recall the writ of mandate. Appellants are entitled to their costs 

on appeal by operation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) and (2). 
____________________________

WILLIAMS, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________

DANNER, ACTING P.J.

_____________________________

WILSON, J.

Santa Rita Union School District, et al., v. City of Salinas, et al.

H049854

 Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Trial Court: Monterey County Superior Court

Superior Court No.: 20CV000242

Trial Judge: The Honorable Marla O. Anderson

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Lozano Smith

Respondents Santa Rita Union

School District et al. Sloan R. Simmons

Michael R. Linden

Junaid Halani

Attorneys for Real Parties in Pioneer Law Group, LLP

Interest and Appellants Rexford

Title, Inc., et al. Andrea A. Matarazzo

Kathryn L. Patterson

Teresa L. Zuber

Santa Rita Union School District, et al., v. City of Salinas, et al.

H049854