### FILED COURT OF 

## APPEALS 

## DIVISION II 2015?1AR 10 

## MI 6: 36 STATM 

### fs S TON BY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING

ANNE SPRUTE,

v. ERIC BRADLEY, DIVISION II
Respondent,

Appellant. No. 456. 08 -7 -II

PART PUBLISHED OPINION

MAXA, J. — 

### Eric Bradley appeals the trial court' s orders in a dissolution action relating to his obligations to pay his son's college expenses and his daughter' s child support. Bradley 

### argues thatthe trial court erred by (1) ordering postsecondary educational support for his son even though his former wife Ann Sprute did not file her child support worksheets until after the 

### deadline for filing the request for such support, (2) concluding that Sprute' s Post 9/ 11 GI Bill benefits did not reduce his portion of postsecondary educational support, (

### 3) failing to cap the 

### total amount ofpostsecondary educational support at the amount charged by the University of Washington, Seattle (UW), 

### and (4) using the one -child column ratherthan the two - child column ofthe child support schedule to determine the support for his minor daughter. We hold that (1) Sprute was not required to file her child support worksheets with her request for postsecondary educational support in order to timely request such support, (2) Sprute' s GI Bill benefits could only be applied to reduce her own postsecondary educational support obligations under 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)( 3), ( 3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion 145608 - 7 -I1 

### by failing to cap postsecondary educational support atthe amount charged by UW,and (4) the trial court erred by using the one - child column to calculate child supportfor the parties' minor child because the parties were supporting two children. We consider and reject Bradley' s additional arguments in the unpublished portion ofthis opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order except forthe child support • provision. We reverse on that issue and remand for recalculation of child support for the daughter consistent with this opinion. FACTS 

### When Sprute and Bradley divorced in 2003, the trial court entered an order ofchild support providing for their children Joshua (then age 8) and SB (then age 5). Sprute was an 

### active member ofthe United States Army and remained so until she retired in 2010 after 23 years in the military.

In 2011, the parties agreed to amend their previous child support order to read: 3. 13 Termination of Support 

### Support shall be paid untilthe children reachthe age of 18, oras long asthe children remain(s) enrolled in high school, whichever occurs last, except as otherwise provided below in Paragraph 3. 14. 3. 14 Post Secondary Educational Support 

### The right to request post secondary support is reserved, provided that the right is exercised before support terminates as set forth in paragraph 3. 13. Clerk' s Papers (CP) at 168. 

### In May2013, Sprute filed apetition to modifythe parties' 2011 amended child support 

### agreement, requesting thatthe trial court award postsecondary educational supportforJoshua. The petition was filed before Joshua graduated from high school. However, Sprute did not file

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### child support worksheets with the petition. Sprute eventually filed her child support worksheets, . financial declaration, and sealed financial documents on August 19, after Joshua had graduated. 

### In his response to the petition to modify, Bradley argued that (1) the court did not have authority to rule on the petition based on the parties' 2011 amended child support agreement because Sprute had not timely filed the worksheets supporting the petition, (2) Sprute' s Post 9/ 11 

### GI Bill benefits should be applied to reduce Sprute and Bradley' sjoint obligation forJoshua's educational support, and (3) the court should cap Joshua' s award ofeducational support atthe amount charged by UW. The commissioner (1) found that Sprute had timely filed her petition to modifythe child support order; (

### 2) ordered Bradleyto pay 46 percent ofJoshua' s tuition, room, and board at 

### Colorado State University up to the amount annually paid at UW; and (3) ordered that both parents receive a pro rata deduction in their payments toward Joshua' s educational expenses if Sprute chose to use her GI bill benefits for those expenses. The commissioner also ordered 

### Bradley to pay $1, 501. 44 per month in child support for SB based on the one - child column ofthe economic table ofthe child support schedule.

Sprute filed a motion to revise the commissioner' s order. The trial court revised the commissioner' s order in two respects. First, the trial court ordered that if Sprute chose to use her 

### Post 9/11 GI Bill benefits,those benefits would applytoward her share ofJoshua's educational support only. Second, the trial court ordered that both parents paytheirpro rata shares of Joshua' s total annual expenses at Colorado State University, regardless ofthe cost ofattending UW. Bradley appeals.

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ANALYSIS A. AUTHORITY TO AWARD POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT 

### Bradley argues that the trial court did not have authority to award postsecondary educational support for Joshua because (1) in orderforthe request for postsecondary educational 

### supportto be timely, Sprute had to file both the motion to modify and the child support worksheets before support terminated, and (2) Sprute failed to file child support worksheets until Joshua' s support had terminated. We disagree. The 2011 amended child support order reserved the right ofa party to request 

### postsecondary educational support, provided that the right was exercised before the child's support terminated. Joshua' s child support obligation terminated when he graduated from high 

### school. Sprute filed her petition to modify child support,which included a requestfor 

### postsecondary educational support forJoshua, before Joshua's supportterminated at his graduation. But she did not file child support worksheets supporting the motion until after support had terminated. Bradley relies on RCW 26.09. 175 ( 1), 

### which states that a proceeding forthe modification 

### ofa child support order "shall commence with the filing ofa petition andworksheets." Emphasis added.) 

### He argues that underthis statute, aparty does not exercise a right to request 

### postsecondary educational support until both a petition to modify and child support worksheets are filed. Therefore, the issue is whether " exercising the right" to request postsecondary 

### educational support requires a party onlyto file a petition to modify the child support order, or 

### requires a partyto file both the petition and the child support worksheets as contemplated in RCW 26.09. 175.

445608 - 7 -II The interpretation ofa child support order presents a question of law, which we review de

novo. In re Marriage ofSagner, 159 Wn.App. 741, 749, 247 P. 3d 444 (2011). 

### Similarly,the interpretation ofa statute presents a legal question that we review de novo. Anthis v. Copland, 173 Wn.2d 752, 755, 270 P. 3d 574 (2012). 

### We hold that Sprute exercised her rightto request postsecondary educational support by 

### filing herpetition to modify fortwo reasons. First,the child support order did not statethat a party had to commence a child support modification "proceeding" before support terminated, justthat aparty exercise the rightto requestpostsecondary educational support before support terminated. A party exercises the right to request postsecondary educational support byfiling a petition to modifythe child support order. In re Marriage ofMorris, 176 Wn.App. 893, 902, 309 P.3d 767 (2013). 

### Sprute filed such a petition. We hold that filing a petition to modify, even 

### without also filing child support worksheets, is sufficient to exercise the right to request postsecondary educational support.' Second, Division Three ofthis court in In re Marriage ofPollard held that the effective 

### date ofchild support modification was the date the partyfiled apetition to modify, even when 

### the party did not file child supportworksheets until ayear later. 99 Wn.App.48, 55 -56, 991 P.2d 1201 ( 2000). While acknowledging the language of RCW 26. 09. 175( 1), the court stated,


### 1 In addition,the court in Morris did not require a partyto strictly complywith statutory procedures for the trial court to have authority to award postsecondary educational support. 176 

### Wn.App. at 902 -

04. In Morris, aparty requesting postsecondary child supportfiled amotion for adjustment ofthe child support order instead ofa petition for modification. Id.at 896. Bythe 

### time the party's mistake was discovered, itwas too late to correctbecause the child's support had terminated. Id.at 896 -97. The court ruled that the proper procedure was a motion to modify. Id. 

### at 901 -02. Nevertheless, the court held that filing the motion for adjustment was harmless error and that the trial court had authority to award postsecondary educational support. Id. at 902 - 04.45608 - 7 -II 

### We find no statutory mandate that all required documents must be attached before a motion for
modification is deemed filed." 

### Pollard,99 Wn.App. at 55 -56. We adoptthe same rule in the context ofthe exercise ofthe right to request postsecondary educational support. 

### We hold that under the facts here, Sprute exercised her right to request postsecondary educational support when she filed her petition to modify. This occurred before Joshua's support terminated. As a result,we hold thatthe trial court had authority to award postsecondary educational support for Joshua. B. CREDIT FOR POST 9/ 11 GI BILL BENEFITS 

### Bradley argues thetrial court erred by failing to apply Sprute' s Post 9/11 GI Bill benefits to reduce both parties' joint postsecondary educational obligation for Joshua. Sprute argues that giving Bradley creditfor GI Bill benefits would be an impermissible division ofbenefits under 38 U.S. 0 §3319(f)( 3). As noted above, the interpretation of a statute is a legal issue we review de novo. Anthis, 173 Wn.2d at 755. We agree with Sprute.

1. GI Bill Educational Benefits The Post 9/ 11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, also known as the Post 9/ 11 GI Bill, went into effect in August 2009. See 38 U.S. C. § 

### 3001 et seq.; Neville v. Blitz, 122 So. 3d 70, 73 ( Miss. 2013). Under this act, Sprute is entitled to tuition assistance, a stipend for each 

### semester' s books, and a monthly housing stipend ifshe chooses to pursue an education. 38 U.S. C. § 3313( c)( 1). 

### And the statute authorizes Spruteto transfer up to 36 months ofher benefits to her eligible dependent children. 38 U.S. C. § 3319( c)( 2), ( d). If Sprute chooses to transfer her benefits, the "[ e] ntitlement transferred ... 

### may not be treated as marital property, or

645608 - 7 -II
the asset of a marital estate, subject to division in a divorce or other civil proceeding." 38 U.S. C. 3319(f)(

3). 2. Division of Post 9/ 11 GI Bill Benefits 

### Bradley admits that 38 U.S. C. § 

### 3319(f)( 3) prohibits Sprute' s benefits from being divided 

### as property in any dissolution action. But he disputes the characterization ofSprute' s GI Bill benefits as herproperty. Instead, Bradley argues that ifand when Sprute elects to transfer her benefits to Joshua, those benefits become a gift to Joshuain the form of a payment from a third party or Joshua's own contribution to his education. Bradley claims that gifts to the child orthe child' s own contribution to his educational expenses must reduce pro rata both parents' obligation to pay the remaining expenses. No Washington case has addressed how a service member' s Post 9/ 11 GI Bill benefits 

### should be treated forpurposes ofawarding postsecondary educational support ofa child in light
of 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)( 3). However, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the issue in Neville, 122 So. 3d 70. In Neville, the father transferred Post 9/ 11 GI Bill educational benefits to his daughter. Id. at 71. The trial court ordered the divorced parents to divide their daughter' s college expenses 

### equallyafter deducting the father's GI Bill benefits. Id.at 72. On appeal, the father argued that the trial court' s treatment of his GI Bill benefits violated 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)(3). Id.at 72 -73. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed, stating: 

### While the chancellor did not label the benefits as marital property, his instruction to take the benefits offthe top of [the daughter's] expenses gave [ the mother] a creditthat she otherwise would not have had and resulted in [the father] not getting full credit for all ofthe Post- 9/ 11 GI Bill benefits.

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Id. at 74. The court held that under the language of 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)( 3), the trial 

### court' s orderwas effectively a " division" ofthe father's GI Bill benefits. Id.at 74. Moreover, even though the proceeding was not an original divorce proceeding, the father's petition to modify was a " civil proceeding" pertaining to modification ofthe parent' s divorce decree. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that giving the mother credit for the father' s GI Bill benefits violated 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)( 3). Id.at 74. The court in Neville also addressed the mother' s argument that the father' s GI Bill 

### benefits belonged to the daughter once they were transferred. The court reasoned that because the service member could revoke the benefits at any time under 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)(2), the service member was still in control ofthe transferred benefits and the benefits still belonged to 

### him. Neville, 122 So. 3d at 74. Consequently, the court held that the father should be credited for all of his benefits for the purposes ofthe parents' division oftheir daughter' s educational support, and that none ofthe father' s benefits should be credited to'the mother. Id. 

### We adopt the reasoning in Neville. Allowing Bradleyto get creditfor aportion of 

### Sprute' s GI Bill benefits would have the practical effect ofdividing those benefits, in violation of the plain language of 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)(3). As a result, we hold that if Sprute chooses to 

### transfer her benefits to Joshua, her benefits should be deducted only from her obligation to pay Joshua' s college expenses. 

### Bradley argues that we should notfollow Neville, but instead should adopt the reasoning in In re Marriage ofBoisen, 87 Wn.App. 912, 943 P.2d 682 ( 1997). In Boisen, a divorce decree 

### provided that each spouse would pay halfofthe children' s college expenses. Id.at 914. The
mother remarried. Id. Although the mother and her second husband separated and later45608 - 7 -II 

### divorced,the second husband voluntarily paid in full two ofthe children' s college expenses with his separate property. Id. at 914 -15. The mother sued the father, claiming that he was obligated to reimburse her for half ofthe college expenses that her second husband paid. Id.at 915. 

### We held that although the father was required to pay halfofthe college expenses, a 

### necessary corollary" was that he would get credit for halfofany third - party payment ofthose
expenses. Id. at 921. Because the expenses had been paid in full, the one -half credit eliminated the father' s obligation to pay educational expenses. Id. 

### Boisen is distinguishable from this case. Here,there is no " third party" paying for 

### Joshua's education because the GI Bill benefits belong to Sprute. Sprute currently possesses the right to use her benefits, and should she choose to transfer them to Joshua, the transfer would be 

### from Sprute to Joshua. Moreover, any transfer in this case is unlike the gift in Boisen because Sprute possesses the unqualified right to revoke the transfer at any time. 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(

2)(A) ( " 

### An individual transferring entitlement underthis section may modify or revoke
at any time the transfer of any unused portion of the entitlement so transferred "). These 

### distinguishing features demonstrate that Boisen is inapplicable here.

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Based on 38 U.S. C. § 3319(f)( 3), we affirm the trial court' s conclusion that Sprute' s 

### benefits should only be deducted from her share ofher obligation to pay Joshua's education expenses.2 C. CAPPING EDUCATION EXPENSES Bradley argues that in ordering payment ofpostsecondary educational expenses, the trial 

### court abused its discretion byfailing to cap Joshua's total expenses atthe amount charged by UW. He claims that he should not have to pay extra because ofJoshua's decision to attend an expensive out -

of - state college. We disagree. 

### The trial court has broad discretion to order support for postsecondary education. In re Marriage ofCota, 177 Wn.App. 527, 536, 312 P. 3d 695 ( 2013). A trial court abuses that discretion when its decision is based on untenable grounds or reasons. Id. at 536. RCW 26. 19.090(2) sets forth the criteria that the trial court should consider when making 

### an award for postsecondary educational support. The trial court initially mustfind thatthe child is dependent and " relying upon the parents for the reasonable necessities of life." RCW 26. 19. 090(2). Once that threshold requirement is satisfied, the trial court must also consider the 

### following non -

exhaustive list offactors: Age ofthe child; the child' s needs; the expectations ofthe parties for their children when the parents were together; the child' s prospects, desires, aptitudes, abilities or

2 

### Bradley argues in the alternative thatthe trial court should have considered Sprute's benefits as income on the child support worksheets. In the trial court, Bradley failed to raise the issue of whether the court should treat Sprute' s benefits as income for purposes ofthe calculation ofthe 

### parties' child supportworksheets. Moreover, in Bradley's own calculation ofSprute' s income at the trial court, he failed to include Sprute' s benefits. Because Bradley failed to raise the issue of applying Sprute' s benefits as income on the child support worksheets below, he may not raise the issue on appeal, and under RAP 2.5( a) we do not consider it.
1045608 - 7 -II 

### disabilities; the nature ofthe postsecondary education sought; andthe parents' level ofeducation, standard ofliving, and current and future resources. RCW 26. 19. 090(2). " Also to be considered are the amount and type of support that the child
would have been afforded if the parents had stayed together." RCW 26. 19.090(2). 

### Bradley does not arguethatthe RCW 26. 19.090(2) factors do not supportthe trial court' s postsecondary educational support award, and in fact he does not even cite to the statute. Instead, he argues that it is not fairto make him pay forthe most expensive college alternative, and that he does not have sufficient income to paythe award. However, the parents' current and 

### future resources is only one ofseveral factors the trial court can consider: In the absence of specific arguments,we defer to the trial court's discretion on the amount ofpostsecondary educational support.3 

### Bradley cites to In re Marriage ofShellenberger, 80 Wn.App. 71, 906 P.2d 968 ( 1995), apparently in support ofhis argumentthat he cannot afford to paythe award. In Shellenberger, Division One ofthis court held that atrial court abuses its discretion ifit awards apostsecondary educational support obligation that would force aparent into bankruptcy orwould require liquidating the 

### family home. Id. at 84. The court stated that "[

### t]his is especially true where the parent also supports a minor child, and the postsecondary support obligation prevents the parent from meeting that obligation to the minor child." 

### Id.at 84. However, Bradley produced no 

### evidence that paying Joshua's postsecondary educational supportwould burden him to the point

3 

### Bradley notes thatthetrial courtdid not make any specific findings. RCW 26. 19.090 sets forth no requirement that the trial court explicitly consider the factors on the record. Cota, 177 Wn. 

### App. at 537. And we presume that the court considered all evidence before it in fashioning an order on postsecondary educational expenses. Id.
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### offiling forbankruptcy. See Cota, 177 Wn.App. at 539 (holding thatfatherfailed to demonstrate sufficient financial hardship to negate the trial court's award ofpostsecondary 

### educational support when the father showed onlythat his expenses exceeded his income). Bradley' s other argument is that postsecondary educational support generally must be limited to the cost ofa public school, citing Shellenberger and In re Marriage ofStern, 57 Wn. App. 707, 789 P.2d 807 ( 1990). In Shellenberger, the court held that before a trial court can 

### require aparentto pay for postsecondary educational expenses at a private institution, it must make specific findings as to the cost and availability ofcollege education in the child' s chosen field at publicly funded institutions." 80 Wn. App. at 85. The court reasoned, " A trial court 

### should not require objecting parents ofmodest means to pay for private college where the child

can obtain a degree in his or her chosen field at a publicly subsidized institution." Id.

In Stern, Division One ofthis court held that a trial court abused its discretion when it 

### ordered afatherto pay an income - proportionate share ofhis minor children's private school education expenses. 57 Wn.App. at 717. Because there was no evidence ofthe children' s need for private school or a lack of an available public school, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court' s award. Id. at 719 - 20. However, the court 

### cautioned that its holding was not a " per se prohibition againstthe award ofprivate school tuition for a minor child." Id.at 720. The court further recognized that special circumstances " such as 

### family tradition, religion, and past attendance at a private school, among others, may present legitimate reasons to award private school tuition expenses in favor of the custodial parent." Id. 

### Neither Shellenberger nor Stern compels a cap on postsecondary educational support. Here,thetrial court made specific findingsjustifying Joshua' s selection ofan out - of - state school

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### that had an outstanding program in his chosen field. Moreover, Bradley and Sprute had a history 

### ofsendingtheir childrento private educational institutions and incurring tuition and fees far above what parents would incur ifthey sent their child to apublic school. The trial court here 

### recognizedthatthis familial tradition,which was a special circumstance under Stern, reasonably justified the court' s award ofpostsecondary educational support that was above the amount of tuition at UW. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding postsecondary 

### educational support or by refusing to cap the amount ofsuch support based on the cost of attending UW. D. CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEETS 

### Bradley argues the trial court erred in modifying his support obligation for SB by applying the one -

child column ofthe economic table ofthe child support schedule rather than the two - child column.` We agree. We review child support modifications for a manifest abuse of discretion. In re Parentage ofGoude, 152 Wn.

### App. 784, 790, 219 P. 3d 717 (2009). Atrial court necessarily abuses its discretion if its decision is based on an erroneous view ofthe law. In re Marriage of 

### Choate, 143 Wn.App. 235, 240, 177 P.3d 175 (2008). Chapter 26. 19 RCW directs the trial court to set or modify a basic child support 

### obligation based on the parents' combined monthly net income and the number and ages ofthe
children " for whom support is owed." RCW 26. 19. 011( 1), . 020; In re Marriage ofMcCausland,

4 

### Using the one -

child column resulted in an increasedchild support obligation of $184 per month.
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159 Wn.2d 607, 611, 152 P. 3d 1013 ( 2007). A parent' s support obligation per child is reduced' when there are multiple children in the family. RCW 26. 19.020. 

### Postsecondary educational expenses constitute child support. Cota, 177 Wn.App. at 542. As a result, because ofthe trial court' s award, Joshua is a child for whom support is owed. Therefore, the trial court should have used the two - child column ofthe economic table. See In re Marriage ofDaubert, 124 Wn.App. 483, 502 - 03, 99 P. 3d 401 ( 2004), abrogated on other grounds, In re Marriage ofMcCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007).

Sprute argues that the trial court had discretion to use the one - child column ofthe
economic table because the parties' combined income exceeded $ 12, 000 per month. Ifthe parents' combined monthly income is more than $12, 000, RCW 26. 19.020 gives the trial court discretion to exceed the economic table based on written findings offactjustifying its decision. McCausland, 159 Wn.2d at 620. However, the trial court here made no such written findings 

### justifying its decision to exceed the economictable. Therefore, Sprute' s argument has no merit.

We hold the trial court should have used the two - child column ofthe economic table. 

### We.consider and reject Bradley' s remaining arguments in the unpublished portion ofthis opinion. We affirm the trial court' s order except forthe child support provision relating to the parties' daughter, and remand for recalculation of child support for the daughter consistent with this opinion. 

### A majority ofthe panel having determined that onlythe foregoing portion ofthis opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06.040, it is so ordered.

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### Bradley also argues thatthe trial court erred in (1) finding Sprute had substantially 

### complied with Bradley's discovery requests and subsequently discontinuing discovery, and (2) 

### failing to make specific findingsjustifying its imposition ofanaward ofpostsecondary educational support greater than 45 percent ofBradley' s monthly income. We disagree. We also decline to award attorney fees to either party. A. DISCOVERY REQUESTS 

### Bradley argues thatthe trial court abused its discretion when it held that Sprute had substantially complied with his discovery requests and when it declared its ruling was afinal order cutting offsubsequent discovery. We disagree.

1. Discovery Facts 

### On June 24, 2013, Bradley sent his first set ofinterrogatories and requests for production to Sprute. Sprute responded to the interrogatories and requests for production, but Bradley claimed that some answers to the interrogatories were incomplete. On August 22, Bradley filed 

### a motion to compel Sprute to completely answer his first set ofinterrogatories and to produce
certain documents. Sprute' s counsel emailed her response to Bradley' s counsel addressing each 

### ofBradley's discovery concerns. On August 30, the commissioner held that Sprute had 

### substantially answered the interrogatories, but ordered Sprute to provide additional bank statements and to supplement her financial declaration to explain her extraordinary expense 

### calculation. The commissioner also ordered Sprute to provide Bradley with her dates of employment and income at Microsoft Corporation.

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2. Analysis 

### We review atrial court's discovery order foran abuse ofdiscretion. Clarke v. Office of Att'y Gen., 133 Wn.App. 767, 777, 138 P. 3d 144 ( 2006). A trial court abuses that discretion 

### when its decision is based on untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage ofNewell, 117 Wn. App. 711, 718, 72 P.3d 1130 (2003). 

### First, Bradley argues the trial court abused its discretion because the court' s discovery 

### orders prevented him from determining whether Sprute was underemployed, whether Sprute had accurately reported her military retirement pay, and the extent of Sprute' s military educational 

### benefits that she would use. But Sprute provided Bradley with her declaration outlining her earnings for parts of2010 and 2011, bank statements showing her monthly military retirement payments, and tax returns for 2008 , 2009, 2011 and 2012, , all ofwhich should have given Bradley a clear indication ofSprute' s past, current, and potential earning power. 

### Second, Bradley argues he should have been allowedtimeto request additional discovery on Sprute' sgross military retirement payments. He admits that he received information 

### regarding Sprute' s actual payments from her retirement, but he contends that he had a rightto knowwhether anyallotments or other deductions were being removed from Sprute' s gross 

### retirement pay. Butthere is no clear indication that allotments ortax deductions from Sprute' s gross retirement were relevant or could lead to the discovery ofadmissible evidence regarding Sprute' s net income. CR 26(b). 

### Third, Bradley argues that he should have been allowed to conduct additional discovery to determine whattype and how much ofSprute' s military benefits she would have to use to

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### furtherJoshua's education. Bradley fails to state what type ofinformation additional discovery could have uncovered that would have assisted him in arguing his theory ofthe case. And Bradley easily could have accessed 38 U.S. C. § 3301 et seq., which governs the educational 

### benefits afforded to a qualifying military member ortheir child. Or he could have reviewed Sprute' s military handbook explaining her educational benefits, which the record shows was also 

### provided to Bradley in the discovery process. Based on this record, Bradley already had multiple sources of information to pursue to argue histheory ofthe case. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that based on 

### Bradley's access to this information, any subsequent discovery requests following the final order would have been to pursue irrelevant information for a child support modification or to collect cumulative information on Sprute' s employment and military benefits. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that Sprute had substantially complied with 

### discovery requests or when it held that its ruling was afinal order cutting offsubsequent discovery. B. 45 PERCENT CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT Bradley argues thatthe trial court's order ofpostsecondary educational support violated RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) because it increased his child support obligation to more than 45 percent of his net income. However, Bradley failed to preserve this argument for appeal because he never made it before the commissioner or the trial court.

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### Bradley admits that he failed to raise this argument at the trial court, but argues that we should considerthe issue because it involves a potential statutory violation. However, under RAP 2.5 we generally do not review issues raised forthe first time on appeal unless the party claims: ( 1) lack oftrial courtjurisdiction, (2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be 

### granted, and (3) manifest error affecting aconstitutional right. Bradley does not argue that any one ofthese exceptions apply. Accordingly,we decline to address this argument on appeal. C. ATTORNEY FEES 

### Both Sprute and Bradley request an award ofreasonable attorney fees on appeal. We decline to consider either request.

Sprute requested an award of attorney fees under RAP 18. 1. However, RAP 18. 1 does not provide an independent basis forthe award offees. It allows for an award offees only ifthe requesting party has the right to recover attorney fees based on " applicable law." RAP 18. 1( a). 

### Sprute does not identify any grounds forthe award ofattorneyfees under applicable law. Bradley did not reference attorneyfees in his opening brief,and only requested an award ofattorney fees in his reply brief. A party requesting attorney fees must "devote asection ofits opening brief to the request for the fees or expenses." RAP 18. 1( b); see also Hawkins v. Diel, 166 Wn.App. 1, 13 n.2, 269 P. 3d 1049 (2011) ( fee request must be raised in opening briefunder RAP 18. 1). 

### Accordingly,we decline to consider either parties' requestfor attorney fees on appeal.

1845608 - 7 -II We affirm the trial court' s order except for the child support provision relating to the parties' daughter. We reverse on that issue and remand for recalculation ofchild support for the daughter consistent with this opinion.

We concur:
HANSON, C.J.

Li., E, J.

19