10-3020-cv

Cooper v. Local 32BJ, SEIU

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER

JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 18 

th

day of May, two thousand eleven.

PRESENT:

RALPH K. WINTER,

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

Circuit Judges.

_______________________________________________

Gary Cooper, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v. No. 10-3020-cv

Local 32BJ, SEIU, Allied International Union,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________________________________

FOR APPELLANT: Gary Cooper, pro se,

Brooklyn, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE LOCAL 32BJ, SEIU: Andrew L. Strom, Office of the

General Counsel for SEIU Local

32BJ, New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ALLIED 

INTERNATIONAL UNION: David A. Mintz, Weissman & Mintz

LLC, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
2

New York (Stein, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Gary Cooper appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his claims alleging violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

(“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 411 et seq., and the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29

U.S.C. § 185 et seq., and denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint. We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

As an initial matter, this Court has held that a litigant’s failure to file objections to a

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, even when that litigant is proceeding pro se,

waives any challenge to the report on appeal. See Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.

2003) (“As a rule, a party’s failure to object to any purported error or omission in a magistrate

judge’s report waives further judicial review of the point.”). A pro se litigant must be given

notice of this rule; notice is sufficient if it informs the litigant that the failure to timely object will

result in the waiver of further judicial review and cites pertinent statutory and civil rules of

authority. See Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 299 (2d Cir. 1992); Small v. Sec’y of Health and

Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (pro se party’s failure to object to report and

recommendation does not waive right to appellate review unless report explicitly states that

failure to object will preclude appellate review and specifically cites 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as

well as Rules 72, 6(a), and former Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 

Here, the magistrate judge gave Cooper adequate notice that he was required to file

objections to the report and recommendation, and specifically informed him that failure to object
3

to any portion of the report would preclude his right to appellate review, citing the pertinent

statutory and civil rules. Accordingly, Cooper has waived his right to appellate review of the

issues discussed in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. In any event, because

Cooper does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claims under § 104 of the LMRDA

as moot, or the dismissal of his construed duty of fair representation claims as untimely, these

claims are abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995)

(holding that claims raised below but not raised on appeal are abandoned, even as to pro se

litigants). 

Nevertheless, following a de novo review of the record, we conclude that the district court

properly adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and correctly granted the

Defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied Cooper’s motion to amend his complaint. We thus

affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons as set forth in the

magistrate judge’s well-reasoned and thorough report and recommendation. We have considered

Cooper’s arguments on appeal, and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk