[Cite as State v. Moore, 2017-Ohio-8328.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 17AP-108 

 (C.P.C. No. 16CR-1434) 

Harold S. Moore, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 17AP-109 

 (C.P.C. No. 16CR-1479) 

Harold S. Moore, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on October 26, 2017 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Laura R. 

Swisher, for appellee. 

On brief: Yeura Venters, Public Defender, and Timothy E. 

Pierce, for appellant. Argued: Timothy E. Pierce. 

 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

TYACK, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Harold S. Moore is appealing from his convictions following guilty pleas and 

the sentences ordered. He assigns four errors for our consideration: 

[I.] The trial court erred by entering judgments of conviction 

based upon guilty pleas that were not knowing, intelligent, 
Nos. 17AP-108 and 17AP-109 2 

and voluntary in violation of Rule 11 of the Ohio Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. 

[II.] The trial court erred and violated R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) as 

well as Appellant's right to due process of law under the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio 

Constitution when it failed to conduct a hearing on 

restitution after Appellant disputed the restitution amount. 

[III.] The trial court's order that Appellant remit restitution 

was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and thus 

was contrary to law inasmuch as the case for which 

restitution was ordered had been dismissed. Its actions 

therefore violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 

the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of 

the Ohio Constitution, R.C. 2929.18, R.C. 2953.08(A)(4), and 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). 

[IV.] Inasmuch as the defense's purported agreement to pay 

the restitution amount in case no. 16CR-1479 was not 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered the trial 

court erred in imposing the same in violation of the 

Appellant's right to due process of law under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 

Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution, and 

pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(4). 

 

{¶ 2} Under the first assignment of error, Moore's counsel argues that the trial 

court judge did not adequately comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). That rule reads: 

In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 

or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or 

no contest without first addressing the defendant personally 

and doing all of the following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 

voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges 

and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, 

that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the 

imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing 

hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the 

defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no 

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may 

proceed with judgment and sentence. 
Nos. 17AP-108 and 17AP-109 3 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the 

defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is 

waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against 

him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to 

prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a 

trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify 

against himself or herself. 

{¶ 3} Appellate counsel argues that the trial court did not inform Moore of all the 

rights he was giving up as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), specifically the right to 

confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses. 

{¶ 4} The state of Ohio does not disagree that the in-court dialog was not in 

compliance with Crim.R. 11, but asserts that the noncompliance should be overlooked 

because Moore and his trial counsel did not object at the time of the plea. The state seems 

to want to import the plain error doctrine into Crim.R. 11 even though the rule clearly bars 

a trial court judge from accepting a guilty plea where full compliance has not occurred. 

{¶ 5} The Supreme Court of Ohio has mandated strict compliance with Crim.R. 11 

and has held that when a trial court fails to strictly comply, the defendant's guilty plea is 

invalid. See State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200. We are not permitted 

to fail to follow binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Ohio. The first assignment 

of error must be and is sustained. 

{¶ 6} Since the underlying convictions are vacated due to the trial court's failure 

to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11, there are no valid sentences to be reviewed. The 

second, third, and fourth assignments of error are therefore rendered moot. 

{¶ 7} As a result of the foregoing, Harold S. Moore's convictions are vacated and 

the cases are remanded for further appropriate proceedings. 

Convictions vacated; cases remanded 

for further appropriate proceedings. 

DORRIAN and HORTON, JJ., concur.