38704 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 29, 2022 / Notices 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Requests for additional information or 

specific questions related to collection 

activities should be directed to Jennifer 

Hunter Childs, Assistant Center Chief, 

Emerging Methods and Applications, 

Center for Behavioral Science Methods, 

(202) 603–4827, jennifer.hunter.childs@

census.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Abstract 

The Census Bureau plans to request 

an extension of the current OMB 

approval to conduct a variety of smallscale questionnaire pretesting activities 

under this generic clearance. A block of 

hours will be dedicated to these 

activities for each of the next three 

years. OMB will be informed in writing 

of the purpose and scope of each of 

these activities, as well as the time 

frame and the number of burden hours 

used. The number of hours used will 

not exceed the number set aside for this 

purpose. 

This research program will be used by 

the Census Bureau and survey sponsors 

to improve questionnaires and 

procedures, reduce respondent burden, 

and ultimately increase the quality of 

data collected in the Census Bureau 

censuses and surveys. The clearance 

will be used to conduct pretesting of 

decennial, demographic, and economic 

census and survey questionnaires prior 

to fielding them. Pretesting activities 

will involve one of the following 

methods for identifying measurement 

problems with the questionnaire or 

survey procedure: cognitive interviews, 

focus groups, respondent debriefing, 

behavior coding of respondent/ 

interviewer interaction, and split panel 

tests. 

II. Method of Collection 

Any of the following methods may be 

used: mail, telephone, face-to-face; 

paper-and-pencil, CATI, CAPI, internet, 

mobile device, or IVR. 

III. Data 

OMB Control Number: 0607–0725. 

Form Number(s): Various. 

Type of Review: Regular submission, 

Request for an Extension, without 

Change, of a Currently Approved 

Collection. 

Affected Public: Individuals or 

households, businesses or other for 

profit, farms. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

5,500 per year. 

Estimated Time per Response: 1 hour. 

Estimated Total Annual Burden 

Hours: 5,500 hours annually. 

Estimated Total Annual Cost to 

Public: There is no cost to the 

respondent other than time to answer 

the information request. 

Respondent’s Obligation: Voluntary. 

Legal Authority: Data collection for 

this project is authorized under the 

authorizing legislation for the 

questionnaire being tested. This may be 

Title 13, Sections 131, 141, 161, 181, 

182, 193, and 301 for Census Bureausponsored surveys, and Title 13 for 

surveys sponsored by other Federal 

agencies. We do not now know what 

other titles will be referenced, since we 

do not know what survey questionnaires 

will be pretested during the course of 

the clearance. 

IV. Request for Comments 

We are soliciting public comments to 

permit the Department/Bureau to: (a) 

Evaluate whether the proposed 

information collection is necessary for 

the proper functions of the Department, 

including whether the information will 

have practical utility; (b) Evaluate the 

accuracy of our estimate of the time and 

cost burden for this proposed collection, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; (c) 

Evaluate ways to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information to 

be collected; and (d) Minimize the 

reporting burden on those who are to 

respond, including the use of automated 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology. 

Comments that you submit in 

response to this notice are a matter of 

public record. We will include, or 

summarize, each comment in our 

request to OMB to approve this ICR. 

Before including your address, phone 

number, email address, or other 

personal identifying information in your 

comment, you should be aware that 

your entire comment—including your 

personal identifying information—may 

be made publicly available at any time. 

While you may ask us in your comment 

to withhold your personal identifying 

information from public review, we 

cannot guarantee that we will be able to 

do so. 

Sheleen Dumas, 

Department PRA Clearance Officer, Office of 

the Chief Information Officer, Commerce 

Department. 

[FR Doc. 2022–13853 Filed 6–28–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–07–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Nordwind Airlines, Leningradskaya 

str., building 25, office 27. 28, Moscow 

region, Khimki city, 141402, Russia; 

Order Temporarily Denying Export 

Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of Russian airline 

Nordwind Airlines (‘‘Nordwind’’). 

OEE’s request and related information 

indicates that Nordwind is 

headquartered in Moscow, Russia. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation 

may be ‘imminent’ either in time or 

degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that 

a violation is about to occur, or that the 

general circumstances of the matter 

under investigation or case under 

criminal or administrative charges 

demonstrate a likelihood of future 

violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of 

future violations, BIS may show that the 

violation under investigation or charge 

‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 

likely to occur again, rather than 

technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of 

information establishing the precise 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 29, 2022 / Notices 38705 

2 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS 

published a final rule effective April 8, 2022, which 

imposed licensing requirements on items controlled 

on the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’) under 

Categories 0–2 that are destined for Russia or 

Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require 

export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses 

if destined for or within Russia or Belarus. 87 FR 

22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). 

3 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022). 

4Section 736.2(b)(10) of the EAR provides: 

General Prohibition Ten—Proceeding with 

transactions with knowledge that a violation has 

occurred or is about to occur (Knowledge Violation 

to Occur). You may not sell, transfer, export, 

reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, 

store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or 

otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item 

subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported 

with knowledge that a violation of the Export 

Administration Regulations, the Export 

Administration Act or any order, license, License 

Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder 

has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to 

occur in connection with the item. Nor may you 

rely upon any license or License Exception after 

notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that 

license or exception. There are no License 

Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 

740 of the EAR. (emphasis in original). 

time a violation may occur does not 

preclude a finding that a violation is 

imminent, so long as there is sufficient 

reason to believe the likelihood of a 

violation.’’ Id. 

II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order (‘‘TDO’’) 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further 

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 

sweeping series of stringent export 

controls that severely restrict Russia’s 

access to technologies and other items 

that it needs to sustain its aggressive 

military capabilities. These controls 

primarily target Russia’s defense, 

aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 

intended to cut off Russia’s access to 

vital technological inputs, atrophy key 

sectors of its industrial base, and 

undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to 

exert influence on the world stage. 

Effective February 24, 2022, BIS 

imposed expansive controls on aviationrelated (e.g., Commerce Control List 

Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, 

including a license requirement for the 

export, reexport or transfer (in-country) 

to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts 

specified in Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 

(Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).2 BIS 

will review any export or reexport 

license applications for such items 

under a policy of denial. See Section 

746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS 

excluded any aircraft registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia from being eligible for license 

exception Aircraft, Vessels, and 

Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the 

EAR).3 Accordingly, any U.S.-origin 

aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes 

more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin 

content, and that is registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia, is subject to a license 

requirement before it can travel to 

Russia. 

OEE’s request is based upon facts 

indicating that Nordwind engaged in 

conduct prohibited by the Regulations 

by operating multiple aircraft subject to 

the EAR and classified under ECCN 

9A991, including but not limited to 

those below, on international flights, 

including from Yerevan, Armenia, 

Istanbul, Turkey, and Sharm el-Sheikh, 

Egypt to Russia after March 2, 2022, 

without the required BIS authorization. 

Pursuant to Section 746.8 of the EAR, 

all of these flights would have required 

export or reexport licenses from BIS. 

Nordwind flights would not be eligible 

to use license exception AVS. No BIS 

authorizations were either sought or 

obtained by Nordwind for these exports 

or reexports to Russia. 

Additionally, Nordwind’s continued 

use of such U.S.-origin aircraft on 

domestic routes within Russia runs 

afoul of General Prohibition 10, which 

(among other restrictions) prohibits the 

continued use of an item that was 

known to have been exported or 

reexported in violation of the EAR. See 

General Prohibition 10 of the EAR at 15 

CFR 736.2(b)(10).4 Specifically, OEE’s 

investigation, including publicly 

available flight tracking information, 

indicates that after March 2, 2022, 

Nordwind continued to operate 

multiple U.S.-origin aircraft following 

their unauthorized export or reexport to 

Russia in violation of the EAR, 

including, but not limited to, those 

identified below, domestically on flights 

into and out of Russian cities, including 

Beslan, Russia; Makhachkala, Russia; 

Moscow, Russia; St. Petersburg, Russia; 

and Sochi, Russia. The information 

about those flights includes the 

following: 

Tail No. Serial No. Aircraft type Departure/arrival cities Dates 

VQ–BJA/RA–73340 ....... 28520 777–212 (ER) (B772) ...................... Samana, DO/Moscow, RU .............. March 7, 2022. 

RA–73340 ..................... 28520 777–212 (ER) (B772) ...................... Moscow, RU/Sochi, RU ................... June 20, 2022. 

RA–73340 ..................... 28520 777–212 (ER) (B772) ...................... Sochi, RU/Moscow, RU ................... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73340 ..................... 28520 777–212 (ER) (B772) ...................... Moscow, RU/Sochi, RU ................... June 23, 2022. 

VP–BSE/RA–73315 ...... 40236 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Sharm el-Sheikh, EG/Moscow, RU March 7, 2022. 

RA–73315 ..................... 40236 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Makhachkala, RU/St. Petersburg, 

RU.

June 20, 2022. 

RA–73315 ..................... 40236 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Makhachkala, RU/St. Petersburg, 

RU.

June 22, 2022. 

RA–73315 ..................... 40236 737–8KN (B738) .............................. St. Petersburg, RU/Moscow, RU .... June 23, 2022. 

VP–BSC/RA–73314 ...... 40233 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Istanbul, TR/Kazan, RU .................. March 7, 2022. 

RA–73314 ..................... 40233 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Sochi, RU/Surgut, RU, RU .............. June 20, 2022. 

RA–73314 ..................... 40233 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Sochi, RU/Ulyanovsk, RU ............... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73314 ..................... 40233 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Sochi, RU/Samara, RU ................... June 23, 2022. 

RA–73314 ..................... 40233 737–8KN (B738) .............................. Samara, RU/Sochi, RU ................... June 23, 2022. 

VP–BSO/RA–73317 ...... 40874 737–82R (B738) .............................. Yerevan, AM/Kazan, RU ................. March 7, 2022. 

RA–73317 ..................... 40874 737–82R (B738) .............................. Moscow, RU/Beslan, RU ................. June 21, 2022. 

RA–73317 ..................... 40874 737–82R (B738) .............................. Orsk, RU/Moscow, RU .................... June 21, 2022. 

RA–73317 ..................... 40874 737–82R (B738) .............................. Moscow, RU/Beslan, RU ................. June 22, 2022. 

RA–73317 ..................... 40874 737–82R (B738) .............................. Orsk, RU/Moscow, RU .................... June 23, 2022. 

Based upon the on-going violations by 

Nordwind, there are heightened 

concerns of future violations of the EAR, 

especially given that any subsequent 

actions taken with regard to any of the 

listed aircraft, or other Nordwind 

aircraft exported or reexported to Russia 

after March 2, 2022, may violate the 

EAR. Such actions include, but are not 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
38706 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 29, 2022 / Notices 

5https://nordwindairlines.ru/en/about-company. 

limited to, refueling, maintenance, 

repair, or the provision of spare parts or 

services. Id. 

Moreover, additional concerns of 

future violations of the Regulations are 

raised by public information on 

Nordwind’s website, available as of the 

date of the signing of this order, 

indicating that Nordwind continues 

operating domestically, suggesting that 

Nordwind intends not only to maintain 

control over the aircraft but also to 

continue operating them in likely 

violation of the EAR. Specifically, 

Nordwind’s website states that its 

worldwide network includes more than 

200 destinations and that the airline 

‘‘fl[ies] to 75 cities in 7 countries’’ and 

‘‘operate[s] 500 flights weekly.’’ 5 Given 

BIS’s review policy of denial under 

Section 746.8(a) of the Regulations for 

exports and reexports to Russia, it is 

foreseeable that Nordwind will attempt 

to evade the Regulations in order to 

obtain new or additional aircraft parts 

for or service its existing aircraft that 

were exported or reexported to Russia in 

violation of Section 746.8 of the 

Regulations. 

III. Findings 

Under the applicable standard set 

forth in Section 766.24 of the 

Regulations and my review of the entire 

record, I find that the evidence 

presented by BIS convincingly 

demonstrates that Nordwind took 

actions in apparent violation of the 

Regulations by operating the aircraft 

cited above, among many others, on 

flights into and within Russia after 

March 2, 2022, without the required BIS 

authorization. Moreover, the continued 

operation of these aircraft by Nordwind, 

even on domestic routes within Russia, 

and the company’s on-going need to 

acquire replacement parts and 

components, many of which are U.S.- 

origin, presents a high likelihood of 

imminent violations warranting 

imposition of a TDO. I further find that 

such apparent violations have been 

‘‘significant, deliberate, covert and/or 

likely to occur again, rather than 

technical or negligent[.]’’ Therefore, 

issuance of the TDO is necessary in the 

public interest to prevent imminent 

violation of the Regulations and to give 

notice to companies and individuals in 

the United States and abroad that they 

should avoid dealing with Nordwind, in 

connection with export and reexport 

transactions involving items subject to 

the Regulations and in connection with 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with Section 

766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 

IV. Order 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, Nordwind Airlines, 

Leningradskaya str., building 25, office 

27. 28, Moscow region, Khimki city, 

141402, Russia, when acting for or on 

their behalf, any successors or assigns, 

agents, or employees may not, directly 

or indirectly, participate in any way in 

any transaction involving any 

commodity, software or technology 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from 

the United States that is subject to the 

EAR, or in any other activity subject to 

the EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license (except directly related to 

safety of flight), license exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations, or engaging in any 

other activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or from any 

other activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of Nordwind 

any item subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

Nordwind of the ownership, possession, 

or control of any item subject to the EAR 

that has been or will be exported from 

the United States, including financing 

or other support activities related to a 

transaction whereby Nordwind acquires 

or attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from Nordwind of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; 

D. Obtain from Nordwind in the 

United States any item subject to the 

EAR with knowledge or reason to know 

that the item will be, or is intended to 

be, exported from the United States 

except directly related to safety of flight 

and authorized by BIS pursuant to 

Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by Nordwind, or 

service any item, of whatever origin, 

that is owned, possessed or controlled 

by Nordwind if such service involves 

the use of any item subject to the EAR 

that has been or will be exported from 

the United States except directly related 

to safety of flight and authorized by BIS 

pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the 

Regulations. For purposes of this 

paragraph, servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification, or 

testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Nordwind by 

ownership, control, position of 

responsibility, affiliation, or other 

connection in the conduct of trade or 

business may also be made subject to 

the provisions of this Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, 

Nordwind may, at any time, appeal this 

Order by filing a full written statement 

in support of the appeal with the Office 

of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. 

Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 

South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 

21202–4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. A renewal 

request may be opposed by Nordwind as 

provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing 

a written submission with the Assistant 

Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement, which must be received 

not later than seven days before the 

expiration date of the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be provided 

to Nordwind and shall be published in 

the Federal Register. 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 29, 2022 / Notices 38707 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 

2Aeroflot is the subject of a Temporary Denial 

Order issued on April 8, 2022. See 87 FR 21611 

(April 12, 2022). 

3 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS 

published a final rule effective April 8, 2022, which 

imposed licensing requirements on items controlled 

on the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’) under 

Categories 0–2 that are destined for Russia or 

Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require 

export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses 

if destined for or within Russia or Belarus. 87 FR 

22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). 

4 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022). 

5Section 736.2(b)(10) of the EAR provides: 

General Prohibition Ten—Proceeding with 

transactions with knowledge that a violation has 

occurred or is about to occur (Knowledge Violation 

to Occur). You may not sell, transfer, export, 

reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, 

store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or 

otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item 

subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported 

with knowledge that a violation of the Export 

Administration Regulations, the Export 

Administration Act or any order, license, License 

Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder 

has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to 

occur in connection with the item. Nor may you 

rely upon any license or License Exception after 

notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that 

license or exception. There are no License 

Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 

740 of the EAR. (emphasis in original). 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Dated: June 24, 2022. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2022–13876 Filed 6–28–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Washington, DC 20230; Pobeda 

Airlines, 108811, Russian Federation, 

Moscow, p. Moskovskiy, Kievskoe 

shosse, 22nd km, 4/1. Moscow, Russia; 

Order Temporarily Denying Export 

Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of Russian airline Pobeda 

Airlines (‘‘Pobeda’’). OEE’s request and 

related information indicates that 

Pobeda is headquartered in Moscow, 

Russia, and Aeroflot Russian Airlines 

JSC, a/k/a PJSC Aeroflot (‘‘Aeroflot’’) is 

Pobeda’s majority shareholder.2 The 

Russian Federal Government is the 

majority owner of Aeroflot, through its 

Federal Agency for State Property 

Management. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation 

may be ‘imminent’ either in time or 

degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that 

a violation is about to occur, or that the 

general circumstances of the matter 

under investigation or case under 

criminal or administrative charges 

demonstrate a likelihood of future 

violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of 

future violations, BIS may show that the 

violation under investigation or charge 

‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 

likely to occur again, rather than 

technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of 

information establishing the precise 

time a violation may occur does not 

preclude a finding that a violation is 

imminent, so long as there is sufficient 

reason to believe the likelihood of a 

violation.’’ Id. 

II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order (‘‘TDO’’) 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further 

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 

sweeping series of stringent export 

controls that severely restrict Russia’s 

access to technologies and other items 

that it needs to sustain its aggressive 

military capabilities. These controls 

primarily target Russia’s defense, 

aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 

intended to cut off Russia’s access to 

vital technological inputs, atrophy key 

sectors of its industrial base, and 

undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to 

exert influence on the world stage. 

Effective February 24, 2022, BIS 

imposed expansive controls on aviationrelated (e.g., Commerce Control List 

Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, 

including a license requirement for the 

export, reexport or transfer (in-country) 

to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts 

specified in Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 

(Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).3 BIS 

will review any export or reexport 

license applications for such items 

under a policy of denial. See Section 

746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS 

excluded any aircraft registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia from being eligible for license 

exception Aircraft, Vessels, and 

Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the 

EAR).4 Accordingly, any U.S.-origin 

aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes 

more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin 

content, and that is registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia, is subject to a license 

requirement before it can travel to 

Russia. 

OEE’s request is based upon facts 

indicating that Pobeda engaged in 

conduct prohibited by the Regulations 

by operating multiple aircraft subject to 

the EAR and classified under ECCN 

9A991, including but not limited to 

those below, on international flights, 

including from Antalya, Gazipasa, and 

Istanbul, Turkey to Russia after March 2, 

2022, without the required BIS 

authorization. Pursuant to Section 746.8 

of the EAR, all of these flights would 

have required export or reexport 

licenses from BIS. Pobeda flights would 

not be eligible to use license exception 

AVS. No BIS authorizations were either 

sought or obtained by Pobeda for these 

exports or reexports to Russia. 

Additionally, Pobeda’s continued use 

of such U.S.-origin aircraft on domestic 

routes within Russia runs afoul of 

General Prohibition 10, which (among 

other restrictions) prohibits the 

continued use of an item that was 

known to have been exported or 

reexported in violation of the EAR. See 

General Prohibition 10 of the EAR at 15 

CFR 736.2(b)(10).5 Specifically, OEE’s 

investigation, including publicly 

available flight tracking information, 

indicates that after March 2, 2022, 

Pobeda operated multiple U.S.-origin 

aircraft, including, but not limited to, 

those identified below, domestically on 

flights into and out of Russian cities, 

including Kazan, Russia; Moscow, 

Russia; Murmansk, Russia; Nalchik, 

Russia; Perm, Russia; St. Petersburg, 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1