Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 213

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV

No. CR-22-535

JAMES DANIEL KOONCE

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered April 12, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE POPE

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 58CR-20-1089]

HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

James Daniel Koonce appeals a Pope County Circuit Court order amending his 

original sentencing order to include a sex-offender-registration requirement. He asserts that 

because he was not subject to a revocation hearing, the trial court lacked the authority to 

alter his sentence. We disagree and affirm. 

In September 2021, James Koonce entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to 

one count of video voyeurism,1a Class D felony, and one count of possession of a controlled 

substance, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to four years’ probation. At the time 

of his plea, video voyeurism was a qualifying sex offense subject to the requirements of the 

 

1The video-voyeurism charge arose out of an allegation that Koonce secretly recorded 

a sexual encounter in the shower of his dorm room.
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Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997 (SORA).

2 Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-903(13)(i)(y). 

However, neither the sentencing order nor the conditions of probation specified that 

Koonce was required under the SORA to register as a sex offender. In fact, the sex-offenderregistration provision of the sentencing order was actually marked no, indicating Koonce 

was not required to register as a sex offender.

Approximately two months later, on November 30, 2021, the State filed a petition to 

amend Koonce’s sentencing order to include the sex-offender-registration requirement. The 

State asserted that the crime for which Koonce pled guilty required registration and that the 

sentencing order incorrectly noted that it did not. The State admitted in its petition that 

neither party had discussed the registration requirement at the plea hearing but claimed that 

Arkansas law requires registration and that the sentencing order should be amended to 

comply with Arkansas law. 

Koonce responded, admitting that video voyeurism is an enumerated offense in the 

SORA but denied that the sentencing order should be amended to require registration. He 

asserted that modification of the order was prohibited because his sentence had already been 

placed into execution and that his sentence could not be altered absent a revocation. 

Essentially, Koonce argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to amend the order.

 

2Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-12-901 et seq. (Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2021).
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Without a hearing, the court amended the sentencing order on June 15, 2022. The 

amended order requires Koonce to register as a sex offender and orders him to complete the 

sex-offender-registration forms. Koonce timely appealed. 

On appeal, Koonce argues, as he did below, that the circuit court lacked authority to 

amend the sentencing order due to the limitations contained in Arkansas Code Annotated 

section 5-4-301 (Supp. 2021).

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Section 5-4-301(d) provides:

(2) The entry of a judgment of conviction does not preclude:

(A) The modification of the original order suspending the imposition of 

sentence on a defendant or placing a defendant on probation following a 

revocation hearing held pursuant to § 16-93-307; and

(B) A modification set within the limits of §§ 16-93-309 and 16-93-312.

Because the statute employs the conjunctive “and” between the two subdivisions, Koonce 

contends that, pursuant to our rules of statutory construction, both subsections must be 

satisfied before the court may entertain a modification. Because no revocation hearing was 

held, the court lacked the statutory authority to modify the sentence. 

He further argues that, even if the subdivisions in § 5-4-301(d)(2) are viewed as 

separate provisions, neither allows the circuit court to amend the sentencing order as it did 

here. In short, Koonce argues that section 5-4-301(d)(2)(A) and section 16-93-309 are only 

 

3

In making this argument, he also notes that prior caselaw made it clear that a court 

lost subject-matter jurisdiction to modify or amend an original sentence once the sentence 

was placed into execution and that Act 1569 of 1999 (Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-

4-301) modified the rule only to the extent it allowed modification or amendment of an 

original sentence after revocation.
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implicated following a revocation hearing and that section 16-93-312 is inapplicable on these 

facts. 

While Koonce may well be correct in his analysis of section 5-4-301(d), his argument 

is misplaced. Koonce was charged and pled no contest to the crime of video voyeurism. 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-12-905(a)(1) requires that a person adjudicated guilty 

of a qualifying sex offense after August 1, 1997, register as a sex offender. Video voyeurism 

is a qualifying sex offense subject to the Act’s reporting requirements. Ark. Code Ann. 

section 12-12-903(13)(i)(y). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, Arkansas Code 

Annotated section 12-12-905(a)(1) mandates Koonce’s registration as a sex offender separate 

and apart from the trial court’s authority to modify a sentence pursuant to Arkansas Code 

Annotated section 5-4-301(d). Therefore, it makes no difference that Koonce’s original 

sentencing order did not require him to register; the SORA mandated it. As a matter of fact, 

a person is subject to the requirements of the SORA regardless of whether it was reflected 

on the original judgment. See Justus v. State, 2012 Ark. 91; Guyton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 

273, 601 S.W.3d 440. 

Koonce also attempts to characterize the court’s authority to amend the sentencing 

order as one of subject-matter jurisdiction. Again, his characterization is misplaced. The 

registration and notification components of the SORA are regulatory in nature and not a 

form of punishment. Justus, supra. Because sex-offender registration is not a form of

punishment, it is not a criminal sentence. See Sullivan v. State, 2012 Ark. 74, 386 S.W.3d 

507. Once Koonce was adjudicated guilty of an offense covered by the SORA, the SORA 
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mandated that the circuit court note on his sentencing order that he was required to register 

as a sex offender. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-906(a). Since the registration requirement was 

not part of his sentence, the trial court was entitled to correct its error in omitting the SORA 

requirements from the original sentencing order. Justus v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 149 (per curiam). 

A court can correct what amounts to a clerical error at any time. See Misenheimer v. Hobbs,

2012 Ark. 343 (per curiam).

Koonce also argues, correctly, that the circuit court can dispense with the registration 

requirement required by the SORA if it finds that there was no evidence of force, 

compulsion, threat, or intimidation in the commission of the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-

12-906(a)(1)(A)(iii)(b). However, Koonce did not raise this argument before the circuit court

either at the plea hearing or in his response to the motion to amend the sentencing order. 

As such, he has failed to preserve this argument for our review. A party must raise issues to 

the trial court to preserve them for appeal. Kennedy v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 413, 635 S.W.3d

524; Lane v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 672.

Affirmed.

ABRAMSON and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.

Tim Cullen, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.