FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT NOV 17 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

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N o. 06- 1094 9 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- D. C. Docket N o. 05-00236-CR-CG UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us HA ROL D S COT T B AKER , D ef en dant- Appe llant.

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the Southern D istrict of Ala bam a

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- (N ove m be r 17, 200 6) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, D U BIN A a nd H U L L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: De fendant-Appellant H arold Scott Baker appeals his convi ction after a j ury tr ia l f or pos se ssi on o f fi re ar

m s by a n un law fu l us er

of ac ontro lle d su

bst an ce , 18 U
. S
. C
. § 9 2 2 ( g ) ( 3 )
. N o r e v e r s i b l e e rr o r h a s b e e n s h o w n ; w e a f

f i rm.2

D ur ing ase ar chof

Bake r’ s ho use , pol ic e of fi ce rs dis co ve re d it em s in cl udi ng ei gh t fi rear m s (s om e o f whi ch were l oa de d wi th am m un it io n) , a m ari

juan a p ip e, a
m ar ij uanagr ind er , r oll ing pa pe rs , sc al es , asm al l am ount of m ar ij uana , a nd
m ar ij uanaste m s and s ee ds. B ak er f ir st arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in de nyin g h is m ot io n t o s up pr es s ev id en ce s ei zedby offi cers fro m hi s h om e. He
as se rt s th at

he did not c onse nt v oluntari ly

to the se ar chof

his hom e be ca

use ( 1) of fi ce rs tol d hi m

that the y w er e not loo kin g f or “ sm al l st uf f” a nd w oul d be “ on the ir w ay ” if the y did not f ind am etha m

phe tam ine la

b or m ar ij uanaplants a nd ( 2) of fi ce rs thr eate ne d to obt ai n ase ar chw ar rant i f he did

not c onse nt t o th e se ar chof his ho m e. W e re vie wadis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of ade fe ndant’ s m oti on t o su ppr es s unde r a m ixe d st an dard

of r ev ie w , r ev ie w ing the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s of

f ac t f or cl ear er ro r an d it s a

ppl ic at ionof

lawto tho se f

ac ts d e novo . S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. G il, 204 F
. 3d 1 347, 135 0 ( 11th C ir
. 200 0)
. A nd w e co nstru e the f ac ts i n th e lig ht
m ost f av or ab le to the party

pr ev ai lin g inthe dis tr ic t c ourt, in thi s c as e the go ve rn m en t. Un it edSta te s v . San ta , 23 6 F .3d 66 2, 6 68 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ). A w ar rantl es s se ar chm ay

be c ondu ct ed

in the abse nc e of

pr oba ble c au se or reasonable suspicion when voluntary consent is ob tained. U nited States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795 , 798 (11th Cir. 1989). “ The question of volu ntariness is on e of fa ctTo the e xtent th at B ake r a rgue s th at of

fi c e rs la c ke d a

uth or ity to a pp ro a c h h is h ou se and

a sk him 1 fo r c on se nt t o e nte r, we de te rm ine that th is a rgume nt i s w ith out me ri t. 3 t o b e d et er m i n ed fr o m

t h e t o t al i t y o f t h e c i rc u m s t an ce s , a n dt h e t ri al co u rt ’s vol unt ar ine ss d et er

m ina tio n m

ust not be r ev er se d onappe al unl es s c le ar ly
er ro ne ous. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ram ir ez -C hil el , 289 F
. 3d 7 44, 752 ( 11th C ir
. 200 2) (quotation and em

phasis o m itted). T o determ ine whether consent was given volu ntarily , w e consider (1) w hether the defendant w as fre e to leave; (2) whether
co er ci v e p o l i ce p ro ce du re s we re u s ed ; (3 ) t h e e x t en to f t h e d ef en d an t ’s
co ope ratio n or

a w ar en es s of

ar igh t t o r ef

use c onse nt; ( 4) w he the r the de fe ndant
co uld r ef use to co nse nt; ( 5) the e xte nt o f the de fe ndant’ s e duc at iona nd int el lig en ce ; and ( 6) the de fe ndant’ s be lie f tha t no inc ri m ina tin g e vid en ce w oul d be fou nd . Id. A ft er ac ar ef ul r ev ie wof

the r ec or d, w e co nc lud e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt di d not clearly

err in determ ining that Baker’ s consent to searc h his ho m e w as vol unt ar y . B ak er c onse nte d to the se ar chof his hom e unde r non- thr eate nin g 1 ci rc um stanc es a nd a ft er

c onsu lti ng w ithhis w if

e. H e w as not

de ta ine d by

the police when he consented to the search. Baker provided v erbal consent to officers
m or e than on ce ; and h e al so s ign ed ac onse nt f

orm . W e ar e not

pe rs ua de d by Bake r’ s arg um en t tha t of fi ce rs m isl ed

him int o c onse nti ng t o th e se ar chba se d onIndeed the discovery of marijuana , drugpara

pherna lia, and sever al wea pons, some of which we re 2 loa de d w ithammunit ion , w ou ld n ot r e a so na bly be c on sid e re d in signif

ic ant. At the suppression hea

ring , Offic er Patric k Donnelly testified that, af

ter B aker pointed out a bag 3 in h is h ou se c on ta ini ngmari jua na , O ff ic e r D onne lly

tol d B ake r t

hat O ff ic e r D onne lly cou ld g o to a jud g e and

atte mpt to ob ta in a se arc h wa rr ant. Of fi c e r B e nja

min B ur ke , who a lso pa

rt ic ipate d in the sear ch of Ba

ker’ s house, testified that office rs told B aker that they could g o talk to a judg e about obtai ning a

sear ch wa

rra nt. But B aker ’s wife testified that offic ers told B aker that, if he did not c on se nt t o a se arc h, the of fi c e rs wo uld ob ta in a

se arc h w arr ant. B e c a

us e we mus t c on sid e r t

he fa c ts i n the light most favor able to the g overnme nt, see Santa, 236 F .3d at 668, we ha ve re lied on the office rs’ testimony

in this i nstance . 4 his be lie f tha t of

fi ce rs w oul d arr es t hi m

onl y if the y dis co ve re d m ar ij uanaplants or
a m et ha m ph et am in e o pe rat io n b ecau se th ey were n ot lo ok in g fo r “ sm al l s tu ff.” 2 And Baker ’ s consent to searc h was not vitiated because officer s told h im that they could attem

pt to ob tain a searc h war

rant if he did not consent to the search. See 3 United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 361 (11t h Cir. 1989 ) (c onclud ing th at
co nse nt w as giv envol unt ar ily w he n of fi ce rs tol d de fe ndant tha t i f he r ef use d to
co ns en t t o a ful l s earc h, t he off ic ers wou ld att em

pt to ob ta in a warra nt ). Ther efore, we aff

irm the denial of Baker ’ s m otion to supp ress evidence. Sect io n 9 22 (g )(3 ) pr ov id es th at“ [i]t s ha ll be un la wfu l fo r an y pe rs on . . . w ho i s an un law fu l us er

of or a ddi ct ed to an y c ontro lle d su

bst an ce . . . to poss es s in or affe cting comm erce . . . any firearm .” Baker

contends th at the evidence presented at trial w as insufficient to prove that he was an “ unlawful user” of a controlled su bstance under section 92 2(g)(3) beca use no evid ence w as presented th athe was u si ng m ari

juan a in an on go in g m an ne r.In r e vie wi ng c ha lle ng e s to se nte nc ing e nh anc e me nts un de r U. S.S. G. § 2 K2 .1 , whic h p ro vid e s, 4 amongother thing s, for a

n enhanc ed off

ense le vel if a defenda

nt was a “prohibited per son,” we have explained -- usinglanguag e fr om section 922(g )(3) -- that a “prohibited person” includes a per son “who is an unla

wful user of or addicted to a

ny controlled substance.” United States v. Edmonds, 348 F.3d 950, 953 ( 11th Cir. 2003). An unlawful use r of mar ijuana includes a person whose mar ijuana use wa s “re g ular, ong oing, a nd contempora

neous with his firea

rm possession.” I d. at 953-54; see also United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135, 138-39 (3d Cir. 2004) ( defining “u n l awf ul user” pursuant to section 922(g) (3) as a regular user of a controlled subst ance for tim e “prox imate t o or contempora

neous with the possession of a f irea rm”). 5 W e re vie wc ha lle nge s to the suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce de nov o, r es olv ing all rea sonable inferences fr om the evidence in favor of the j ury ’ s verdict. See United States v. Rudisill, 187 F.3d 126 0, 1267 (11th Cir. 1999 ). W e m ust affirm Baker’ s convictio n “ unless, under no reasonable constructio n of the evidence, could th e j ury

have found [him ] guiltybey ond a reasonable doub t.” United State s v. G arcia , 405 F. 3d 12 60, 1269 (11t h Cir. 2005 ). He re, sufficient evidence w as presented at Baker’ s trial that he w as an unl aw fu l us er

of m ar ij uanac ont em

por an eo usl y

w ithhis pos se ssi on o f fi re ar m s. 4 A t B ak er ’ s ho m e, of

fi ce rs dis co ve re d m ar ij uana , m ar ij uanase ed s and s te m s,
se ve ra l i te m s of

dr ug p ar ap he rn al ia- - inc lud ing pip es , r oll ing pa pe rs , sc al es , a nd a grinder -- and m any

firearm s. D uring Baker’ s trial, Investigator Clint Cadenhead t es t i fi ed t h at t h e q u an t i t y o f mar i ju an a s ee d s an ds t ems d i s co v er ed at Ba k er ’s hous e pr oba

bly w oul d y ie ld o ve r 100 m ar ij uanac igare tte s. B ak er a dm itt ed to of fi ce rs dur ing the se ar chof his hou se that he use d m ar ij uanato se lf -m ed ic at e; a nd6

he tol d f ed er al a ge nt R obe rt

T olb er t tha t he ha d be ensm oki ng m ar ij uanaa ro und the tim e that office rs searc hed his ho m e. In addition, Baker’ s wife testified that Baker sm oked m arij uana because of stress r esulting from a fr iend’ s death that
o cc u rr ed ju s tm o n t h s b ef

o re t h e s ea rc h o f h i s h o u s e. We co n cl u d e t h at Ba k er ’s convictio n was supported by sufficient evidence. Baker next asserts that 18 U.S .C. § 922(g)(3) is uncon stitut ionallyvague as ap pli ed to him be ca use the statut e fa ile d to put him on n oti ce that the m an ne r an d
ex t en tt o wh i ch h e u s ed m ar i ju an a q u al i fi ed h i m

as an “ u n l aw fu l u s er .” We
re vie wde nov o w he the r a sta tut e is unc onst itu tio na lly va gue . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bi ro , 143 F
. 3d 1 421, 142 6 ( 11th C ir
. 199 8)
. “ [T ] he voi d- fo r- va gue ne ss d oc tr ine
re qui re s th at

ape na l st at

ute de fi ne the c ri m ina l of fe nse w ithsuf

fi ci en t de fi nit en es s that ordinary

people can understand what conduct is p rohibited and in a m anner tha t do es not

e nc our ag e ar

bitrary a nd d isc ri m ina tor

y e nf or ce m en t. ” K ole nde r v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 , 1858 (1983). As w e have discussed, the evidence in this case -- which indicated that Baker used m arij uana on an ong oing basis, including around the tim e of the sear ch
o f h i s h o m e, an dp o s s es s ed s ev er al fi re arm s -- wa s s u ff i ci en tt o s u s t ai n Ba k er ’s
co nvi ct ion
. W e re

j ec t B ak er ’ s c ont en tio n th at he w as not

on n oti ce that hi s
m arij uana use and firear

m s poss ession v iolated section 9 22(g)(3). AFFIR MED.