NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFFERY HAUSAUER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CITY OF MESA; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-15418 

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01796-ROS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 19, 2019**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 

Jeffrey Hausauer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment 

in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in connection 

with his arrest for theft. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review 

de novo a district court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 27 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-15418 

Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). 

We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco 

Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 587 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm. 

Summary judgment was proper on Hausauer’s unlawful arrest claim against 

defendant Woods because Woods was entitled to qualified immunity. See Ashcroft 

v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (discussing qualified immunity and noting 

that a right is clearly established only if “every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Summary judgment was proper on Hausauer’s deliberate indifference claim

against defendants Woods and Murua because Hausauer failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether Woods or Murua was deliberately indifferent

to a serious medical need. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-

25 (9th Cir. 2018) (a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim 

must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard; setting forth 

elements).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hausauer’s state 

law claims against defendants Woods and Murua because Hausauer failed to 

establish that he served the notice of claim on Woods and Murua as required by 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01(A). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01(A) (“Persons 
3 18-15418 

who have claims against a public employee shall file claims with the person or 

persons authorized to accept service for the . . . public employee as set forth in the 

Arizona rules of civil procedure . . . .”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d) (service on an 

individual); see also Slaughter v. Maricopa County, 258 P.3d 141, 143 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 2011) (“The failure to timely file a notice bars the claim and is not excused 

by actual notice or substantial compliance.” (citations omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hausauer’s motion 

for reconsideration of the order dismissing the claims against defendant Nevin 

because Hausauer did not present a proper basis for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. 

No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(setting forth standard of review and bases for reconsideration). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hausauer’s motion 

for recusal because Hausauer failed to establish any basis for recusal. See United 

States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of 

review and objective test for determining whether recusal is required). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hausauer’s various

discovery-related motions because Hausauer failed to show “actual and substantial 

prejudice” as a result of the denied discovery. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 

F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review). To the 

extent Hausauer’s motions may be construed as requests to take discovery in order 
4 18-15418 

to oppose summary judgment, Hausauer failed to comply with the requirements of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Tatum v. City & 

County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (a party seeking 

additional time for discovery is required to “identify by affidavit the specific facts 

that further discovery would reveal, and explain why those facts would preclude 

summary judgment”). 

We reject as meritless Hausauer’s contentions that the district court erred by 

failing to hold a discovery hearing before ruling on summary judgment or 

prohibited him from amending the complaint.

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, or matters 

not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett 

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Hausauer’s requests for a new trial, a new trial judge, and appointment of 

counsel, set forth in the opening and reply briefs, are denied. 

AFFIRMED.