NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
R. BAEZA; et al.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v. LEROY D. BACA,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 15

- 55391
D.C. No. 2:07

- cv - 03109

- DDP

- SH

MEMORANDUM *

CHRISTOPHER CORRAL; et al.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v. LEROY D. BACA,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 15

- 55398
D.C. No. 2:07

- cv - 05749

- DDP

- SH

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 7, 2017 Pasadena, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

JUL 28 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

Before: LIPEZ, ** BEA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. R. Baeza and C. Corral (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s
dismissal s of their ac tions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background, we repeat only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal.
1. Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its discretion when it
vacated their motions for summary adjudication, for class certification, and to
consolidate their actions. E very court has the power “to co n trol the disposition of
the ca u ses on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself , for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Defendant requested vacation of the motions because pending motions in a nother case before
the court , Thomas v. Baca , No. 2: 04

- cv - 08448

- DDP

- SH (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2004) , involved the same defendant , the same p laintiffs ’ attorney , and virtually identical
claims

. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it vacated P lainti ffs’
motion s because of the ongoing , related litigation in Thomas

. 1

** The Honorable Kermit V

. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the First Circuit, sitting by designation.

1 The dist rict court initially certified the class in Thomas , but decertified the class after the Supreme Court ’s d ecision in Wal

- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , 564 U.S. 338 (2011)

.3

2. Plaintiffs also contend that the district court abused its discretion when it
dismissed their actions for failure to prosecute. In reviewing a dismissal for failure
to prosecute, we consider “(1) the public’ s interest in expeditious resoluti on of litigation; (2) the court’ s need to manage its docket; (3 ) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availabili ty of less drastic alternatives.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier , 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hernandez v. City of El Monte , 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998))

. But , “[o] ur cases have tended to focus on the factors of prejudice and delay , ” and a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute an action diligently can
be “sufficient by itself to justify a dismissal.” Nealey v. Transp ortacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A. , 662 F.2d 1275, 1279

– 80 (9th Cir. 1980). We have affirmed a
dismissal for failure to prosecute after the plaintiff failed to take action for nine
months. See Alexander v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n , 434 F.2d 281, 283

– 84 (9th Cir. 1970). Nothing of substance happened in Plaintiffs’ actions for over five years.
Plaintiffs allowed the scheduled trial dates to lapse without comment. Some of this delay can be attributed to the ongoing litigation and settlement discussions in
Thomas . However, there was an eighteen

- month period of inactivity between this
Cou rt’s denial of a petition for rehearing of the denial of the petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the decertification order in Thomas in September
2012 and the Plaintiffs’ attempt to reactivate their action s in March 2014

.4

Plaintiff s ’ lead counsel claim s that she was unable to work during this eighteen

month period because she was recovering from surgery. But counsel performed at
least some work in Thomas during this time period

. More importantly , Plaintiffs provide no explanation why co - counsel, a former magistrate judge, could not have prosecuted the actions during lead counsel’s disability , or why the district court was not asked to stay the actions during counsel’s disability

. The district court did

not a buse its discretion in concluding that the delay prejudiced Defendant because the memories of jail employees, who would be witnesses in these actions, faded
over time.
3. Plaintiffs contend that the district court abuse d its discretion when it
denied th eir motions to reactivate the ir actions after granting Defendant ’ s Rule 41(b) motions to dismiss . Once the district court dismissed the actions for failure
to prosecute, however, the motions to reactivate became moot and t here was no
need to set a discove ry cutoff date , or new pretrial dates, or trial dates.
AFFIRMED
.