In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2468

UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,

RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY,

ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE

WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,

AFL-CIO, CLC and LOCAL UNION

193-G,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of District of Illinois.

No. 09-2306 — Harold A. Baker, Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2013 — DECIDED MAY 9, 2014
2 No. 13-2468

Before KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and DURKIN,

District Judge.*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs United Steelworkers and

Local Union 193-G (collectively, “the Union”) and defendant

PPGIndustriesdisagreed about whether PPGtimely presented

bargaining proposalsunder a collective bargaining agreement.

The parties entered into arbitration, and the arbitrator ruled

that some proposals were timely and others were not. The

Union then filed suit to enforce the arbitrator’s award. See 29

U.S.C. § 185(a). According to the Union, PPG violated the

award by implementing certain economic proposals that the

arbitrator had deemed untimely. The district court granted

summary judgment to PPG, concluding that the arbitrator’s

award did not preclude PPG from implementing those

proposals. The Union argues on appeal that the district court

misconstrued the award. But neither the text of the arbitrator’s

decision nor the arbitration record supports the Union’s

desired interpretation of the award. To accept the Union’s

arguments, we would have to substantively alter the award in

the Union’s favor. Because we may not do so, we affirm.

I.

PPG manufactures flat glass at a facility located in Mt. Zion,

Illinois. The Union represents a bargaining unit comprising

production and maintenance employees at the Mt. Zion plant.

The relationship between PPG and the Union has long been

governed by a collective bargaining agreement. 

Of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

*

sitting by designation.
No. 13-2468 3

PPG informed the Union in April 2009 that it wanted to

modify the agreement in an effort to reduce labor costs. Article

XXXIV, Section 2 of the agreement specifies how the parties

can propose modifications to the agreement. A party seeking

to alterthe agreement must provide 30 days’ notice of its intent

to seek changes. The parties are then required to meet in

conference at least 10 days before the agreement expires. Any

proposed changes “shall be presented not later than the first

day of the conference” by the party seeking to modify the

agreement. 

After PPG informed the Union of its intent to modify the

agreement, the parties’ representatives attended an informal

meeting on May 14, 2009. At the meeting PPG explained why

it was seeking to alter the agreement and set forth, in general

terms, its desired changes. According to PPG, its labor costs

exceeded its competitors’ by $10 an hour; to remain competitive it required a reduction in labor costs from $37 to $27 per

hour. One possible method of achieving this reduction in costs,

PPG explained, would be to implement a “two-tier” wage

system, in which “first-tier” wages would be paid to existing

employees and lower “second-tier” compensation would be

paid to new hires and employees recalled from layoff. PPG

intended to buy out some existing employees, thereby reducing the number of workers receiving first-tier compensation.

PPG had recently implemented a similar system at its plant in

Fresno, California.

The Union asked whether it would be possible to achieve

the $10 per hour labor-cost reduction without requiring wage

concessions from existing employees. PPG responded that it

was indifferent about how to achieve the cost reductions, but
4 No. 13-2468

suggested that implementing only the “Fresno pattern”—the

two-tiered system—would not be enough to meet the $10

target. Before the meeting adjourned, the Union requested that

PPG provide the details of the Fresno arrangement. The Union

also asked PPGto calculate the labor-cost reductions that could

be achieved based on the Fresno two-tier model alone, without

concessions from current employees. 

On May 28, 2009, PPG sent an e-mail to the Union that

detailed potential labor cost reductions and followed up on the

May 14 conversation. The e-mail included a chart calculating 1

the estimatedaverage labor costs, including benefits, under the

two-tier system without any concessions from current employees. PPG calculated that, without concessions from current

employees, the company’s total labor costs per hour would be

$30.21, still more than $3 per hour above PPG’s $27 target. The

e-mail explained: “We can save more money by more Tier 1

folks leaving and being replaced at [] Tier II rates for the higher

skill jobs. That would certainly be the best scenario. However,

[we] really think it will be difficult to get to the $27 without

significant concessions from current employees.” 

The Union contends that the version of the chart it received was

1

“garbled” and impossible to understand. We decline to consider this

assertion, which the Union mentioned for the first time in its reply brief,

see Marcatante v. City of Chicago, 657 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2011), and which

the Union did not present in its statement of material facts before the

district court, see Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 476 (7th Cir.

2010). In any event, the Union does not assert that it had any problems

comprehending the body of the e-mail, which explained the chart’s

significance.
No. 13-2468 5

The parties’ official negotiating conference began on June

1, 2009, which was the last day to present new proposals under

the collective bargaining agreement. PPGdelivered anopening

statement in which it reiterated its desire to reduce labor costs

to $27 per hour and implement a two-tiered wage structure.

On that day, PPG did not present particular dollar amounts of

wage or benefit cuts targeted at reaching the $27 per hour goal.

Instead PPG introduced, and the parties discussed, several

non-economic bargaining proposals such as changes to the

drug-testing policy and overtime administration.

During the next two days of the conference, June 2 and 3,

PPG put forward other proposals. Among those proposals was

a two-tier wage system that set forth compensation cuts for

employees on both tiers at specified dollar amounts. The Union

responded that it was not required to bargain about proposals

made on June 2 and 3, because Article XXXIV, Section 2 of the

collective bargaining agreement barred new proposals from

being made after the conference’s first day. PPGdisagreed. The

Union filed a grievance, and the parties arbitrated the following questions: “Did [PPG] violate Article XXXIV, Section 2? If

so, what should be the remedy?”

After taking evidence and considering the parties’ written

and oral submissions, the arbitrator issued an opinion ruling

some proposals timely and others untimely. After recounting

the history of the parties’ dispute, the arbitrator concluded that

by the beginning of the bargaining conference, the Union

“knew or should have know[n] some of [PPG’s] economic

proposals—specifically [PPG’s] labor cost goals as well as the

two-tier wage structure.” The arbitrator determined that PPG
6 No. 13-2468

“has preserved these proposals.” The opinion closed with a

three-sentence “Award”:

The Company’s proposal regarding $10 reduction in

costs is a viable contract proposal as is the two-tiered

system. Also, the Company’s non-economic proposals

made on June 1, 2009 are proper for consideration. The

Company proposals made on June 2 and 3, 2009 are

discretionary items for bargaining.

After the arbitrator issued his opinion, PPG put forward its

final offer, which included a two-tier wage system that cut

existing employees’ compensation. In the wake of the arbitrator’s decision, PPG removed several items from its previous

offer because the items had been proposed after June 1 and

were not directly related to the $10 per hour reduction in labor

costs or the two-tiered system. For example, PPG removed

proposals that would have restrictedcertainseverance benefits

and altered the pension agreement. The Union responded that,

despite the changes, the offer violated the arbitrator’s award,

and it threatened to go to court to “enforce” the award. The

Union did not make any more proposals of its own. Ultimately

PPG determined that the parties were at an impasse and

unilaterally implemented the final offer.

The Union then filed this lawsuit in the Central District of

Illinois under the Labor Management Relations Act, seeking to

“[c]onfirm and enforce” the arbitration award by rescinding

PPG’s unilateral implementation of its final offer and awarding
No. 13-2468 7

back pay and other relief. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (authorizing 2

suits “for violation of contracts between an employer and a

labor organization”). Both parties moved for summary

judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment to

PPG. The court considered the arbitrator’s opinion and the

record before the arbitrator and determinedthat the Union was

aware on or before June 1 that economic concessions from

existing employees were on the table. Recognizing that the

arbitrator had approved as timely PPG’s proposals to cut labor

costs by $10 per hour and implement a two-tier wage system,

the court concluded that the arbitrator’s award did not prohibit

PPG from unilaterally implementing its final offer, including

the economic concessions that the Union opposed. The Union

moved for reconsideration and the court denied the motion.

II.

The Union raises a myriad of arguments on appeal, all

driving home the same basic point: the district court misconstrued the arbitration award. The Union argues that the

arbitrator’s decision was a resounding win for its side; it

believes that the arbitrator rejected as untimely almost all of

PPG’s economic proposals andbarredPPGfrom implementing

these rejected proposals. If the district court had properly 3

Both parties also unsuccessfully pursued unfair labor practice charges 2

before the National Labor Relations Board.

Although the Union at times asserts that aspects of the arbitrator’s 3

opinion are ambiguous, its counsel acknowledged at oral argument that the

Union is “going for broke”; it seeks a federal-court order barring PPG from

implementing the challenged proposals rather than a remand to allow the

(continued...)
8 No. 13-2468

construed the arbitration award, the Union contends, it would

have entered summary judgment in the Union’s favor.

Despite labeling its suit as an action to “enforce” the award,

the Union in substance asks the federal courts to alter it; to

write in the margins of the arbitrator’s decision and add

language favorable to the Union. But the federal courts have an

extremely limitedrole in reviewing an arbitrator’s decision that

interprets a collective bargaining agreement. A court will not

overturn an arbitrator’s award, even if the arbitrator’s decision

is wrong on the law or the facts; an arbitrator’s award is

unenforceable only if he “strays from interpretation and

application of the agreement and effectively dispenses his own

brand of industrial justice.” Major League Baseball Players Ass’n

v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (internal quotation marks

and brackets omitted); see Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman

Controls, Inc., 712 F.3d 1021, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2013); Local 15,

Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782–83

(7th Cir. 2007). A court will enforce the arbitrator’s award as

written and “may not interject itself into the arbitration process

by elaborating on or rewriting an arbitrator’s award.” United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Danly Machine Corp., 852 F.2d 1024, 1027

(7th Cir. 1988); see Brown v. Witco Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 216 (5th

Cir. 2003) (“[A] court is required to enforce an arbitration

award only as written by the arbitrator.”). If the arbitrator’s

decision as written is “too ambiguous to be enforced,” a court

may remand the case to the arbitrator for clarification. Bhd. of

 (...continued) 3

arbitrator to clarify his decision. See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Union Pac.

R.R. Co., 500 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2007).
No. 13-2468 9

Locomotive Eng’rs v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 500 F.3d 591, 592 (7th

Cir. 2007). But such a remand is disfavored, and a court should,

if possible, resolve apparent ambiguities by examining the

arbitrator’s opinion and the record. See id.; Tri-State Business

Machines, Inc. v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 221 F.3d 1015, 1017 (7th

Cir. 2000); Teamsters Local No. 579 v. B & M Transit, Inc., 882

F.2d 274, 278–79 (7th Cir. 1989); Danly Machine Corp., 852 F.2d

at 1027. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Butler Mfg. Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,

336 F.3d 629, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2003). 

The Union argues that the district court should have

recognized that the arbitrator barred PPG from implementing

any proposals that adversely affect existing employees (those

receiving first-tier compensation). The Union concedes that the

arbitrator approvedwage cuts for employees receiving secondtier compensation, but it argues that the arbitrator did not

approve wage cuts for existing employees. Nothing in the text

of the arbitrator’s opinion indicates that he made such a

distinction, so the Union relies instead on the arbitration

record. The Union contends that by June 1 (the deadline for

new proposals), PPG never suggested cuts to existing employees’ wages. Therefore, according to the Union, the arbitrator

could not possibly have approved these cuts as timely. 

As the district court correctly concluded, however, the

record before the arbitrator establishes that by June 1, PPG had

raised the possibility of compensationcuts for existing employees. At the May 14 meeting, PPG explained that implementing

the “Fresno pattern”—the two-tiered system—would not be

sufficient on its own to achieve the desired reduction in labor
10 No. 13-2468

costs. In a May 28 follow-up e-mail, PPG calculated the

estimated savings from implementing the two-tiered system

without concessions from existing employees and determined

that it fell more than $3 per hour short of PPG’s cost-cutting

goals. The e-mail concluded: “[We] really think it will be

difficult to get to the $27 without significant concessions from

current employees.” PPG raised the possibility of compensation cuts for existing employees by June 1, and this court may

not “interject itself into the arbitration process” by reading into

the arbitrator’s opinion a conclusion that proposed wage cuts

for existing employees wereuntimely. See Danly Machine Corp.,

852 F.2d at 1027.

In a similar vein, the Union argues that the district court

should have recognized that the arbitrator barred PPG from

cutting employees’ benefits (as opposed to wages). Although

the arbitrator’s opinion does not distinguish between wages

and benefits, the Union insists that a distinction can be gleaned

from the arbitrator’s reference to a two-tier wage structure.

Relying on the arbitrator’s use of the word “wage” in describing the two-tier proposal, the Union argues “it is clear that . . .

the arbitrator did not mean to approve benefit reductions for

employees in either the lower tier or the higher tier.” 

But it does not follow from the arbitrator’s use of the word

“wage” that he meant to distinguish between wages and

benefits, let alone to rule untimely any proposals cutting

benefits. Nor is the Union’s position supported by the arbitration record. In fact, PPG’s May 28 e-mail, which itemized the

estimated labor costs for different categories of employees

under a possible two-tier system, included a row entitled

“benefits”; according to that chart, the amount of hourly
No. 13-2468 11

benefits for second-tier employees was “$0.00,” a significant

reduction from the “$9.99” for other categories of employees.

In arguing that the district court should have recognized a

distinction between wages and benefits, the Union again seeks

relief that the arbitrator did not grant. 

Finally, the Union contends that, by allowing PPG to

decrease the wages and benefits of existing employees, the

district court erroneously rendered the arbitrator’s award

“meaningless.” We reject this argument, because the Union is

wrong when it asserts that the court “interpreted the award as

imposing no obligation whatsoever on PPG.” It is true, as the

Union points out, that the arbitrator ruled some proposals

untimely and declared that proposals first introduced on June

2 and 3 were “discretionary items for bargaining.” But the

Union overlooks changes that PPG did make to its offer in the

wake of the arbitrator’s decision. PPG removed several

proposals that were introduced after June 1 and did not relate

to hourly labor cost reductions orthe implementation of a twotier employment system. For example,PPG’s final offer excised

proposals that limited severance benefits and altered the

pension agreement. At oral argument, the Union’s attorney

acknowledged these changes but dismissed them as insignificant compared to the wage concessions. But PPG’s changes

made in response to the arbitrator’s award undermine the

Union’s argument that the award, as interpreted by both PPG

and the district court, imposed “no obligation whatsoever on

PPG.” The award may not have been as favorable to the Union

as it wanted, but it was not “meaningless.”
12 No. 13-2468

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.