[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11261

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

RANDOLPH CLAY COOPER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHAWN LUCAS LISTER, 

AARON GLASS, 

ZACH KUIKEN, 

TOWN OF LOXLEY, ALABAMA, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00324-C

____________________

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Randolph Clay Cooper sued Officer Shawn Lister, Sergeant 

Aaron Glass, and Lieutenant Zach Kuiken for violating his constitutional rights following an alleged false arrest, as well as the Town 

of Loxley for its alleged deliberate indifference to deficiencies in officer training. Mr. Cooper now appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment as to all claims in favor of the officers and the 

Town of Loxley. After careful review, we affirm.

I

This case stems from a contentious dispute among siblings 

over a family farm in Baldwin County, Alabama. In 2011, Carol 

Cooper, Mr. Cooper’s mother, conveyed a 10.1-acre parcel to her 

daughter and son-in-law, Rebecca and David Bonner, through a 

quitclaim deed. Following his mother’s death in April of 2012, Mr. 

Cooper persistently filed lawsuits against his siblings claiming a

property interest in the farm based on alleged improper transfers

from their father’s estate. As the Alabama Supreme Court explained, Mr. Cooper failed to assert ownership in successive lawsuits brought in 2012 and 2015. See Cooper v. Cooper, 279 So. 3d 561 

(Ala. 2018), reh’g denied (Ala. Jan. 4, 2019).

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On August 23, 2019, Mr. Cooper’s brother, Terry Cooper,

filed a complaint with the Loxley Police Department alleging that 

Mr. Cooper had stolen hay bales from the farm. Lt. Kuiken initiated

an investigation to ascertain ownership of the property. In an interview, the Bonners claimed ownership and presented a copy of their 

2011 quitclaim deed. Ms. Bonner also emailed Lt. Kuiken a copy of 

the 2018 Alabama Supreme Court decision in Cooper. Lt. Kuiken

interpreted the Court’s affirmance of summary judgment in favor 

of the Bonners as validating their ownership of the property. 

On September 13, 2019, Mr. Cooper executed and recorded 

a deed to transfer the farm to himself and his siblings. In October 

of 2019, the siblings filed a quiet title/slander of title action against 

Mr. Cooper regarding this deed. In April of 2020, the siblings’ attorney sent a letter to the Loxley Police Chief, which included the 

first amended complaint in the quiet title action, the final orders

from the 2012 and 2015 lawsuits, the 2011 quitclaim deed to the 

Bonners, and a statement that Mr. Cooper was not permitted on 

the farm. Lt. Kuiken understood this letter to indicate that the 

courts had ruled in favor of the Bonners multiple times, further

confirming that Mr. Cooper was not an owner of the property. 

On May 27, 2020, Mr. Bonner spotted Mr. Cooper’s truck 

and trailer parked on the farm and saw him raking hay aboard a 

tractor. After Mr. Bonner called the Loxley Police Department to 

report that Mr. Cooper was trespassing, Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass, 

and Lt. Kuiken responded and arrived at the scene. On his way 

there, Officer Lister spoke to Lt. Anthony Lovell in the

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investigation division, who advised him that Mr. Cooper had no 

right to be on the premises and was therefore trespassing.

At the farm, Mr. Cooper defied the officers’ numerous commands to leave the property and continued to drive the tractor

away from them. Finally, Mr. Cooper complied and was handcuffed on the ground. He was charged with criminal trespass in the 

second degree and with attempting to elude law enforcement. In 

August of 2020, he filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges, 

arguing that the arrest occurred outside of Loxley’s police jurisdiction. A month later, the charges were dismissed by the municipal 

court for the Town of Loxley. 

In September of 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment 

for Mr. Cooper’s theft of the hay bales, and on May 24, 2021, he 

was arrested. In November of 2021, the Baldwin County circuit 

court granted a motion to dismiss the criminal proceedings contingent upon Mr. Cooper’s payment of restitution. Separately, in the 

2019 quiet title action filed by the siblings, Mr. Cooper filed a counterclaim. The siblings moved for summary judgment on Mr. 

Cooper’s claims––for declaratory judgment and to remove an alleged cloud on title. The circuit court granted this motion in December of 2021. 

In January of 2020, Mr. Cooper filed a malicious prosecution 

and false imprisonment action against the Bonners arising out of 

his September 2019 arrest for trespass, and the complaint was later 

amended to include the arrest in May of 2020. The Bonners moved 

for summary judgment, arguing that probable cause existed

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because Mr. Cooper did not have a property interest where the arrests occurred. The circuit court granted this motion and dismissed 

the action in August of 2022. Most recently, on June 14, 2024, the 

Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s final order 

granting summary judgment to the siblings in the 2019 quiet title 

action. 

II

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. See Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 

F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper if

“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Once the movant adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show 

that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial.” Dietz v. 

Smithkline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010). “Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s 

Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving 

party “must show more than the existence of a ‘metaphysical 

doubt’ regarding the material facts.” Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 

1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

III

Mr. Cooper argues that Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass, and Lt. 

Kuiken exceeded their discretionary authority and violated his 

Fourth Amendment right not to be arrested without probable 

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cause. He also argues that the district court erred in determining 

that the officers have no liability based on his alleged malicious 

prosecution claim for the hay-theft arrest. Finally, he argues that 

the district court erred in concluding that the Town of Loxley is 

not liable.

A

Under Alabama law, local police officers are authorized to 

make an arrest inside the county that contains their police jurisdiction––even if they are outside their immediate municipality:

An arrest may be made, under a warrant or without 

a warrant, by any sheriff or other officer acting as 

sheriff or his deputy, or by any constable, acting 

within their respective counties, or by any marshal, 

deputy marshal or policeman of any incorporated city or 

town within the limits of the county.

Ala. Code 1975, § 15-10-1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Alabama 

courts have repeatedly upheld the lawfulness of arrests occurring 

outside of a specific police jurisdiction when the arrest at issue occurred inside the county where the police jurisdiction lay. See e.g.,

Ex parte Pettway, 594 So. 2d 1196, 1201 n.5 (Ala. 1991); Brooks v. 

State, 471 So. 2d 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). Further, we must ask 

“whether the act complained of . . . would be within, or reasonably 

related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties. 

The scope of immunity ‘should be determined by the relation of 

the [injury] complained of to the duties entrusted to the officer.’” 

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Harbert Intern., Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(internal quotation omitted). 

Here, the arresting officers acted within their discretionary 

authority when they arrested Mr. Cooper in Baldwin County, 

which encompasses the Town of Loxley. Further, they acted

within the perimeter of their duties, as Lt. Lovell instructed Officer

Lister that Mr. Cooper had no right to be on the property and was

therefore trespassing. 

On appeal, Mr. Cooper argues that the officers exceeded 

their authority by refusing to defer to the jurisdiction of the municipal court to ascertain title to the property in the pending quiet title 

action. But this claim is irrelevant to our analysis because, as the 

district court noted, preventing officers from making arrests for 

trespass solely because of pending civil actions over title would hinder law enforcement’s efforts and enable Mr. Cooper to trespass 

indefinitely so long as he continued to file lawsuits. Therefore, because Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass, and Lt. Kuiken were acting within 

their discretionary authority, Mr. Cooper now must show that the 

arrest itself was unconstitutional under clearly established law. See 

Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2003). We are unpersuaded on this point. 

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the

Fourth Amendment, “an arrest is a ‘seizure’ of the person.” Case v. 

Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009). Whether a seizure is reasonable hinges on the presence of probable cause. See id. 

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at 1326. Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have sufficient

“facts and circumstances within their collective knowledge” to 

cause a reasonable person to “believe that an offense has been or is 

being committed.” United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1324 (11th 

Cir. 1983). Probable cause “is not a high bar.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 

F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 

(2018)). Rather, it is a “flexible and fluid concept” that focuses on 

the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1286. 

In deciding whether probable cause exists, arresting officers 

“are not required to sift through conflicting evidence.” Id. (quoting 

Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002)). Law enforcement officers are not lawyers, and therefore “we do not expect 

them to resolve legal questions or to weigh the viability of most 

affirmative defenses.” Id. at 1286 (citing Williams v. City of Albany, 

936 F.2d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 1991)). “[T]he presence of some conflicting evidence or a possible defense will not vitiate a finding of 

probable cause. The touchstone remains the reasonableness of the 

officer’s conduct.” Id. at 1287. Further, “[w]hile an officer who arrests an individual without probable cause violates the Fourth 

Amendment, this does not inevitably remove the shield of qualified 

immunity.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th 

Cir. 2007). 

Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil liability

if their conduct does not violate clearly established law “of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 

F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). To 

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receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that 

he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority. See 

Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1041 (11th Cir. 2017). This standard 

is satisfied if the officer’s actions were “undertaken pursuant to the 

performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.”

Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted). Once discretionary authority is established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is improper. The plaintiff can meet this standard by establishing that (1) 

the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the 

right at issue was “clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2019).

Even if probable cause is absent, a court may grant qualified 

immunity to an officer who had “arguable probable cause” to make 

an arrest. See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Scarbrough v. Myles, 

245 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2021)). “In the false arrest context, 

arguable probable cause exists if ‘a reasonable officer, looking at 

the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests.’” Edger v. McCabe, 84 

F.4th 1230, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Garcia v. Casey 75 F.4th 

1186, 1187 (11th Cir. 2023)). “An officer lacks arguable probable 

cause only if ‘the law on the date of the alleged misconduct makes 

it obvious that the [officer’s] acts violated the plaintiff’s rights in the 

specific set of circumstances at issue.’” Casey, 75 F.4th at 1186 (internal citation omitted). Thus, “the dispositive question” is 

whether, at the time of the arrest, the law clearly established that 

an objective officer could not have reasonably concluded that 

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probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Cooper under the circumstances. See id. (quoting Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1303 (11th 

Cir. 2018)). 

Moreover, “the arguable probable cause inquiry in a false arrest case is no different from the clearly established law inquiry.” 

Edger, 84 F.4th at 1236 (citing Casey, 75 F.4th at 1187). If we determine “that the officers had arguable probable cause then we conclude that their violation of the law was not clearly established.” Id.

“Clearly established” means that the law is sufficiently clear 

such that a reasonable officer would understand that their conduct 

is unlawful. See Helm v. Rainbow City, Ala., 989 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th 

Cir. 2021) (citing Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63). This standard is not defined 

at a high level of generality, see Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64, and the inquiry instead “must be undertaken in light of the specific context 

of the case.” Edger, 84 F.4th at 1237. In the Fourth Amendment setting, the Supreme Court has “stressed the need to ‘identify a case 

where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to 

have violated the Fourth Amendment.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (internal citation omitted). There need not be “a case directly on 

point,” but “existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the 

particular arrest ‘beyond debate.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

Here, the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. 

Cooper for criminal trespass on May 27, 2020, because a reasonable 

officer, armed with their “collective knowledge,” could believe that 

Mr. Cooper was trespassing on the property. See Blasco, 702 F.2d at 

1324. During his investigation, Lt. Kuiken received the Bonners’ 

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deed as proof that they were record title holders and a letter from 

their lawyer that noted the repeated rejections of Mr. Cooper’s

ownership claim by the Alabama courts. The letter also informed 

the Loxley Police Department that Mr. Cooper did not have permission to be on the property. Further, Lt. Kuiken reviewed the 

published November 2018 opinion from the Alabama Supreme 

Court, which he reasonably understood to represent that Mr. 

Cooper was not an owner. On the day of the arrest, the Loxley Police Department was once again informed that Mr. Cooper was 

trespassing, and Mr. Bonner, a record title owner, demanded his 

removal. As the district court concluded, the officers’ duty was not 

to “resolve [the] legal question[ ]” of whether Mr. Cooper indeed 

owned a one-third interest in the land. See Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286. 

In fact, Lt. Kuiken had reason to believe that Mr. Cooper was not 

an owner because the Baldwin County circuit court and the Alabama Supreme Court had already rejected his claim to the farm. 

Thus, no constitutional violation occurred because the officers had 

probable cause for Mr. Cooper’s arrest on May 27, 2020.

At a minimum, arguable probable cause existed for the arrest. “[L]ooking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrest[ ], [Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass, and Lt. Kuiken] could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrest[ ].” Edger, 84th at 1236–37. 

We have upheld qualified immunity for arrests involving trespass 

even when legal documentation showed that the arrestee had colorable title to the land. See Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531 (11th 

Cir. 1990).

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In Strickland, the Huttons conveyed a ranch property to the 

Laws under a land sale contract and sought repossession after the 

Laws defaulted, allowing the Huttons to record a deed transferring 

the property back to themselves. See id. at 1533. The investigating 

officer and local sheriff were informed that the Huttons’ deed gave 

them a colorable claim to title. Id at 1534. The Huttons then attempted to retake the ranch by cutting the chain lock on the front 

gate and driving past a “No Trespassing” sign. See id. The Huttons 

were arrested and subsequently sued the sheriff for false arrest. See 

id. at 1535.

We reversed the district court’s denial of the sheriff’s motion 

for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. The apparent evidence of the Huttons’ trespass at the time of the officers’ 

arrival at the ranch––a cut lock, a pair of bolt cutters, a rifle, combined with the sheriff’s instruction to arrest––sufficed to show that 

the officers had not violated clearly established law. See id. at 1539. 

“The Huttons’ beliefs concerning the legality of their entry onto 

the ranch property are irrelevant to qualified immunity analysis, 

which examines the conduct of the subject government officials 

only.” Id. at 1540. Ownership of the property was a disputed issue 

when the Huttons were arrested, yet we refused to hold the sheriff 

or the arresting officers “to knowledge of property law in determining probable cause.” See id. at 1542. We thus concluded that the 

sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity. See id. 

Here, the law in this circuit was not so “clearly established” 

in May of 2020 such that a reasonable officer would have viewed 

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Mr. Cooper’s arrest as unlawful. As an initial matter, Alabama 

courts had rejected Mr. Cooper’s claim to the farm long before his 

arrest was effected. But even if we give Mr. Cooper the benefit of 

the doubt, his claim still fails. As previously discussed, under our 

precedent, officers may have probable cause to arrest for trespass 

even when an arrestee is authorized to be on the property. See

Strickland, 919 F.2d at 1541. This is because “what counts for qualified immunity purposes relating to probable cause to arrest is the 

information known to the defendant officers . . . at the time of their conduct, not the facts known to the plaintiff then or those known to a 

court later.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999)

(emphasis added). And what the officers knew at the time of the

arrest here––as evidenced by the previous court decisions, the attorney’s letter, the 2011 quitclaim deed, and the phone call from 

Mr. Bonner urging officers to remove Mr. Cooper from his farm—

was enough for the officers to believe that Mr. Cooper was trespassing. The fact that Mr. Cooper sought to gain ownership 

through a pending appeal does not negate the existence of probable 

cause. 

Even if neither probable cause nor arguable probable cause 

existed for the trespass arrest, the officers would still face no liability. We have said that “[p]robable cause for an arrest may be found 

if there is probable cause to believe any crime was committed.”

Manners v. Canella, 891 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis 

added). Here, such probable cause, and at a minimum arguable 

probable cause, existed for officers to infer that Mr. Cooper had 

committed a crime under Alabama law when he intentionally fled

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from them. Mr. Cooper knew the officers were trying to arrest him 

but defied their commands and continued to drive the tractor

away. Although Mr. Cooper argues that he was initially unaware 

that the officers intended to arrest him, the relevant inquiry asks

what an “objectively reasonable officer in [the] [d]efendants’ position could have believed” at the time of the arrest. See Gates, 884 

F.3d at 1300 (“[W]e have never pronounced a rigid requirement 

that an arresting officer must have specific evidence of the subjective intent and knowledge of a subject beyond the subject’s conduct that otherwise gives rise to probable cause to arrest.”). “It is 

not [Mr. Cooper’s] post-hoc explanation of his actions that count. 

What matters [for arguable probable cause] is what a reasonable 

police officer under the circumstances could infer from those actions.” Id at 1302. Based on the record before us, a reasonable officer could have interpreted Mr. Cooper’s actions as an attempt to

flee—providing, at a minimum, arguable probable cause for the arrest.

B

To prove a Fourth Amendment violation due to malicious 

prosecution, the plaintiff must prove both (1) a violation of the constitutional right and (2) the elements of the common law tort. See 

Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Paez, 

915 F.3d at 1285). Under the common law elements of malicious 

prosecution, Mr. Cooper “must prove that the officers ‘instituted 

or continued’ a criminal prosecution against him, ‘with malice and 

without probable cause,’ that terminated in his favor and caused 

damage to him.” Id. (quoting Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285). If the conduct 

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alleged does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the officers are 

entitled to qualified immunity. See Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285. 

The district court correctly concluded that the officers face

no liability on Mr. Cooper’s claim for malicious prosecution arising 

out of the presentation of the hay-theft case to a grand jury. None 

of the officers involved in the trespass arrest on May 27, 2020, were

involved in Mr. Cooper’s subsequent hay theft arrest on May 24, 

2021. 

Mr. Cooper agreed to restitution in exchange for a dismissal

of charges, and he is therefore barred from disputing the existence 

of probable cause. Terminations due to “settlements in which the 

defendant admitted guilt” are generally “fatal to a plaintiff’s ability 

to establish the absence of probable cause.” Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 

1278, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (“[A] plaintiff who 

settled a prosecution by paying part of the amount his accuser demanded was estopped from contesting the absence of probable 

cause.”). As the district court determined here, there is no evidence 

to suggest that Mr. Cooper agreed to restitution under protest or 

under a declaration of innocence. This prevents Mr. Cooper from 

disputing the existence of probable cause as to the hay-theft arrest.

C

We have determined that the evidence is insufficient to 

show a constitutional violation stemming from Mr. Cooper’s arrests in May of 2020 and May of 2021. As a result, we need not considerliability for the Town of Loxley. See Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 

1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that when there is no 

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constitutional violation, it is unnecessary to consider the county’s

liability); Vineyard v. Cnty. of Murray, Ga., 990 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th 

Cir. 1993) (“Only when it is clear that a violation of specific rights 

has occurred can the question of § 1983 municipal liability for the 

injury arise.”). 

Even if we determined that there was evidence of a constitutional violation, Mr. Cooper’s claims against the Town of Loxley

fail because he has not shown that “the municipality had an official 

policy that was ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”

Vineyard, 990 F.2d at 1211 (citations omitted). Although “there are 

limited circumstances in which an allegation of a ‘failure to train’ 

can be the basis for liability under § 1983,” Mr. Cooper did not offer

such evidence here and he has abandoned that contention. See City 

of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). He grounds his 

claims against the Town of Loxley on alleged actions taken by the 

Loxley Police Chief as “the primary policy maker,” but this particular theory fails. As the district court noted, it was not alleged in 

the complaint and “[a] plaintiff may not amend [his] complaint 

through argument in a brief opposing summary judgement.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004). 

In any event, no evidence supports this new theory. Proof of a custom or policy usually requires a history of widespread abuse, yet

Mr. Cooper failed to show any history of similar issues regarding 

probable cause determinations. See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 

1346, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 1998). Further, Mr. Cooper’s personal recollection of events that day alone is insufficient to reveal a policy 

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or custom so widespread as to impose independent liability on the 

Town of Loxley. 

IV

The district court’s grant of summary judgment as to all of 

Mr. Cooper’s claims is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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