### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0823- 22 C.C., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. M.Z., Defendant-Appellant.

_______________ _________

Submitted February 13, 2024

– Decided April 3, 202 4 Before Judges Mayer and Enright. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FV- 07

- 1983 -22. Cobos Law Firm, attorneys for appellant (Franz Cobo s, on the brief). Ambrosio & Associates, Attorneys at Law, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Francois D. Prophete and Elisa C. Ambrosio-Farias, on the brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0823

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Defendant M.Z. 1 appeals from the October 4, 2022 order granting pl aintiff C.C. a final restraining order (FRO) under the Prevent ion of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 17 t o - 35. We vacate the FRO and remand for further proceedings.
I. The parties liv ed together between 2014 and 2022 and share a three-yearold son . On January 12, 2022 , plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant, alleging he harassed and assaulted her during a n argument on January 11, 2022. Defendant's attorney entered his appearance in the case on January 28, 2022.
On February 18, 2022, the trial court entered a conti nuance order. The order stated "all restraints previously ordered in the [TRO]" from January 12,
2022 , "continue[d] in full force and effect " pending the final hearing on March 22, 2022. The court entered another continuance order on March 18, 2022 , and
conducted a telephonic conference three days later to advise the parties the March 22, 2022 trial date would be adjourned due to the unavailability of a

1 We use initials for the parties to protect their pr ivacy. See R. 1:38 -3(d)(9) and (10).3 A- 0823

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Spanish interpreter. Because plaintiff could not be reached by phone tha t day, the judge left her a message about the adjournment. However, defendant and his attorney participated in the conference call. Defendant's attorney told the judge he was aware the trial was scheduled for Marc h 22, 2022; he also stated he was available to try the case the following mont h on the date selected by the

court. Before the conference call concluded, the judge als o advised defendant that if he "violate[d] any restraining order[ ,] . . . [he could] be arrested and charged with contempt" and that such a charge "carr ie[d] up to a maximum of [eighteen] months in state prison." Defendant stat ed he understood. On May 5, plaintiff amended her TRO to allege a his tory of domestic violence between the parties that included terroris tic threats, false imprisonment, sexual assault, and criminal sexual c ontact, N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 19(a)(3), (6), (7), and (8). She also amended the TRO to include the predicate act of contempt of a domestic violence order, N.J.S .A. 2C:25- 19 (a)(17). Later that day, the trial court conducted a telephonic co nference call with the parties' attorneys. Because defendant's attorney confirmed he had not yet received the amended complaint and "need[ed] time to defend or r espond to [plaintiff's] new allegation," the judge again postponed the trial da te.4 A- 0823

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On June 8, 2022, a judge newly assigned to the matt er conducted a status conference with counsel and rescheduled the trial t o commence i n August

. During the conference, the judge confirmed the tria l would proceed on plaintiff's alleged predicate acts of "assault [N.J.S.A. 2C:12- 1], harassment, [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4], and contempt of a [domestic violence] ord er." The parties and their counsel appeared for trial o n August 25, 2022. Before any testimony was elicited, the judge confir med the TRO initially included allegations "for assault and harassment" b ut was amended to include a prior history of domestic violence and the predicat e act of contempt. Defendant's counsel asked, "[j] ust for housekeeping purposes, when [wa]s the date of service . . . of the [original] restraining order?" Plaintiff's counsel answered he "believe[d] the date [wa]s January 31[, 2022]." The judge asked defendant's attorney, "[i] s [the service date] in dispute?" Defendant's attorn ey answered, "[w]ell, . . . there[ is] an allegation o f contempt . . . . That's why I just want to make sure I get the date clear. . . . I don't think he was served until either the end of January, or early February." The judge stated, "[w]e need to check that, for sure," and defense counsel replied, "[ y] eah." Plaintiff's attorney stated his copy of the TRO sho wed "service was made on January 31[, 2022,] " and "there should be no dispute that [defendant] wa s5 A- 0823

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served on January 31." After he provided a copy of the TRO to the judge reflecting the service date, the judge noted the co py showed defendant was "[s]erved personally [by] Essex County Family Court on January 31[]." She also clarified the date of service was "only an iss ue with respect to the contempt" allegation. Next, the judge heard testimony from both parties. Plaintiff testified that

on January 11, 2022 , defendant was driving her and the parties' then t wo-year old son when defendant directed plaintiff to "fix t he child's car seat," believing "the baby was not properly strapped into his car se at. " Plaintiff testified the child was asleep in the back of the car with her, s o she told defendant she could not adjust the car seat "because [she] would have t o let the seatbelts loose." According to plaintiff, h er response angered defendant. When defendant stopped the car at a red light, he exited the vehicle, "pulled [her] out of the car" by her shoulder, " punc h[ed her] in the back of the head ," and "pushed [her] to drive." Plaintiff stated that she drove for the rest of the trip and "during that whole transition[,] . . . [defendant] was saying of fensive words to [her]." Next, plaintiff described the parties' history of d omestic violence, stating defendant was "violent with [her]" "on many occasio ns." She testified that during one incident in 2013, defendant was angry th at she was "laughing with6 A- 0823

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[another] man" at a party they attended , and as they drove home, defendant "grabbed [her] by the hair, and . . . hit [her]," causing her to suffer a bruised lip.
Plaintiff also recalled another incident from 2015 when she "was in bed laying down" and defendant "got home drunk. " Plaintiff stated defendant "started insulting [her]," and a lthough she "ignored him," he "grabbed [her] by [her] feet, . . . threw [her] on the floor," and "h it [her]." Plaintiff also stated he "pulled [her] hair" and "kick[ed her] . . . in the stomach." Next, plaintiff testified defendant was repeatedly sexually violent with her during the relationship. She stated, "on one occas ion[,] he tore my dress and . . .
forced me to have [sexual] relations with him," adding, "[i] t was always like that, he would force me because if I didn't want to, he would get angry." Further, plaintiff testified, "if I didn't accept and have r elations with him, it was worse the next day." She recalled "the last time this happened was . . . December 24[,] of 2021 ." Plaintiff stated on that date, defendant "got h ome drunk from work," and although she "said no" to his sexual advances, "he forced [her] to be with him, and then . . . just fell asleep there all drun k." When asked if

defendant contacted her after she obtained the TRO , plaintiff testified defendant sent her text message s "[t]hrough social media" so she "block[ed] him." Further, she stated she "rece ived text messages from7 A- 0823

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[defendant] after January 31, 2022," the date defen dant was served. Additionally, plaintiff testified that on March 5, 2022, she rece ived a letter from
defendant in a bag full of personal items he dropped off for he r at his sister- in

law's home. Plaintiff read the letter into the record, which st ated, in part:

Hello, [C.C.], I hope that you're well. I hope . . . t hat at the court we will be able to speak and we will be a ble to fix everything. I miss you and . . . [our son].

. . . I miss him a lot. . . . I've been going to church constantly. . . . And I've sworn not to drink for seven years. I hope that one day you will forgive me for not understanding. . . . I hope to change, and that Go d would return you back to me. . . . I love you, tak e care of yourself a lot, and I['ll] see you on the 22nd. I hope th at everything is over, and that we are good parents towards [our son]. Alt hough the letter was not dated or signed, plaintiff testified it was in defendant's handwriting. She also explained why she sought an FRO against defendant, stating:

I don't feel safe without that order. On several occasions previously[,] he's come close to my job, he's waited for me, [and has been] out looking for me. Now, even more so, I just never want to go through that again. I don't want to have any physical or verbal contact with him. He's just a violent man . . . . During defendant's testimony, he denied committing a ny acts of domestic violence against plaintiff. However, he admitted sending the letter plaintiff referenced in her testimony. On cross-examination, defendant stated he sent the8 A- 0823

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letter "in January" 2022. Plaintiff's attorney ask ed what defendant meant when he referred in the letter to "seeing [plaintiff] on the 22nd." Defendant answered, "[b]ecause I thought that all of this would end on the first court date." Th is answer led to the following exchange:

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: And when was the first court date? [DEFENDANT]: On the 22nd. [PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: 22nd of what month? [DEFENDANT]: I am not sure what month. [PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: If I were to tell you that you had a court hearing on March 20, 2022, would th at be accurate? [DEFENDANT]: No. No, I don't remember because the court date . . . varied plenty of times. [PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. THE COURT: Yeah. . . . [L]et me just put somethin g on the record right now.

. . . . This case initiated with [another judge]. We'd have to . . . get all these dates correct, the date [the T RO] was filed, the date it was served, [and] the very first court date that [the prior judge] had . . . .

. . . .9 A- 0823

- 22 I'm trying to leaf through all this information to see what th[e parties'] court dates actually were. If you want to get this right, which I think is important that you do, I think we need to look at that. [DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY]: Right. So[,] the letter references the 22nd. It has no month. And counsel just asked a question about March 20th. So[,] I wasn't even involved in this case at any point in time. [2] [PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Neither was I. [DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY]: So

— okay. THE COURT: Yeah. Neither was I, so

— [DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY]: But, I mean, we don't even have consistency on the 22nd or the 20th [regarding] the dates that we're asking about now. After plaintiff's counsel noted defendant's letter was "being proffered to show . . . [defendant] actually reached out to . . . pla intiff after there was a TRO," the judge acknowledged the parties' court dates were "pretty important." She stated, "[w]e need to know what . . . the dates wer e, and . . . I should pull up the file right now." Plaintiff's counsel immediately responded, stating, "I'm going to ask the court to take . . . judicial

— ." The judge interjected, "I can only take

2 Contrary to defense counsel's statement, the record shows he personally participated in the March 21, 2022 telephonic confe rence with the court and expressly represented during the conference that he was aware of the March 22, 2022 trial date.10 A- 0823

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judicial notice o[f] what is actually [in] the record. . . . I' m going to do it right

now in front of

everybody. Let me just pull up the history of th [e] case. . . . This is really the only way to do it." Without objection from either attorney and while she remai ned on the record, the judge promptly accessed the court's reco rds, taking judicial notice of the following:

[The] TRO was . . . issued on January 12 [,] . . . 2022

. . . . That first appearance was initially scheduled for January 19, 2022. It . . . must have been an indefinite TRO, and . . . it was served on Janua ry 31 [] , 2022. Then[,] . . . on the 19th [of January], there was an indefinite [TRO] entered because . . . defendant ha d not yet been served. And then it looks like . . . plai ntiff again appeared on February 18, 2022. But I don't think . . . defendant . . . appeared. [On] March 18, 2022, I don't know what [the previous judge] was doing because I can't tell if t he parties both appeared or not. These are all continuance orders. No appearance [was made] by either party [ on] March 24, 2022.

. . . . . . . [W]e're not clear on which day we're talking about.11 A- 0823

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Plaintiff's attorney added that he had "a continuance o rder dated February 18, 2022, setting a hearing for March 20, [20]22," 3 to which defendant's counsel replied, "[r]ight. And the letter says 22[nd]." As counsel continued arguing, the judge interceded and stated, "all I know from [defe ndant's letter] . . . is that he said[,] [ ' ] see you on the 22nd. [ ' ] This matter was continued numerous times." Notwithstanding his prior admission to another judge during the Mar ch 21, 2022 telephonic conference, defendant's attorney told th e trial judge, "[b]ut it was never continued to the 22nd. " In response, the judge advised counsel she would "have to go through every single order to see if th ere were any other[ orders]," and in the interim, counsel could "make whatever ar guments [they] want[ed] to make." Following closing arguments, the judge reserved dec ision on whether to grant plaintiff an FRO . She told counsel , "I'm going to relisten to this entire trial again . . . . because there's a lot of inform ation here. . . . I need to . . . . listen to it again and compare my notes to the test imony [to] make sure I got it all right."

3 However, the February 18, 2022 continuance order sp ecifically directed the parties to "appear for a hearing on [March 22, 20 22 ] at 1:00 p.m."12 A- 0823

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On October 4, 2022, the judge entered an order grantin g the FRO. In her accompanying oral opinion, the judge stated she "ha [d] some issues with respect to the credibility of both parties." She found "bo th parties[] . . . indicate[d] there was an argument while they were in the car" on Janu ary 11, 2022, but their "stor[ies] differ[ed] . . . as to the critical fact s." Additionally, the judge stated she "believe[d] . . . plaintiff had enough of what she perceived as . . . defendant's abuse" and "[t]here [wa]s enough in this record for [the judge] to acknowledge that something was wrong between the parties that b othered . . . plaintiff." But the judge stated she was "just not sure specificall y what that was," considering "[p]laintiff's allegations were broad" and "[s]he spok e of years of abuse without pinpointing actual dates." Next, the judge found "defendant's testimony was eq ually devoid of specifics," so the parties' proofs were "in equipoi se." Accordingly, the judge concluded plaintiff failed to prove defendant assau lted or harassed her on January 11, 2022. Similarly, the judge concluded there was "no persua sive evidence in the record to prove" defendant committed the pr ior acts of domestic violence alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint.13 A- 0823

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Nonetheless, the judge concluded she "ha[d] . . . p laintiff's testimony, . . . defendant's limited testimony, [and] . . . addition al evidence in the record to support plaintiff's allegations . . . . on the cont empt charge. " The judge found:

On or about March 5[], 2022, plaintiff picked up an item she needed for work and a toy for the couple's son at the home of [defendant's] sister- in -law . . . . The pickup [was] prearranged. On that day, with those items, . . . plaintiff also picked up an unsigned, und ated letter in . . . defendant's handwriting. . . . [D]efendant acknowledged he wrote it, although his testimony is that he wrote it in Janua ry before the first court date in this matter. In the body of the letter, he told . . . plaintiff he missed her a nd his son. He had been to church and had seen a priest, that h e hoped God would bring them together, and that he loved her, in addition to other statements, and concluded with, "I'll see you on the 22nd." Next, the judge stated: [T]his case was transferred to me, and I went back and I checked the entire history of this case on the TR O. . . . But I had to focus on the beginning of the case. A nd what I found was the following: [t]hat the TRO was filed on January 12[], 2022. . . . [O]ur records indicate . . . defendant was served on January 31[] , 2022. I . . . suspect that is incorrect because [h is attorney] filed a notice of appearance on January 2 8[]. That means . . . defendant acknowledged or was serv ed with the TRO before January 28[]. [A f]irst appearance [was] scheduled for January 19[]. Only . . . plaintiff appeared because . . . defendant had not yet apparently been served. There was a14 A- 0823

- 22 continuance order. [The s]econd appearance[ was] February 18[]. [The t]hird appearance[ was on] Mar ch 18[]; it was a remote hearing. [4] [The trial] was rescheduled because a Spanish interpreter was neede d. And then there is a date in the TRO of March 22[], 2022. I even went back and listened to [the judge previously assigned to this case] on the record . .

. just to confirm and hear the audio of what happened at t h[at] prior proceeding. And it was very clear to me that

. . . . [t]he trial was scheduled for March 22 [] , 2022, by virtue of what the judge stated on the record. Although . . . defendant stated he wrote the letter in January before the court date of the 22nd, there was no court date in January, on January 22nd. . . . . . . [P]laintiff picked up the letter on March 5[ ], the one that was written by . . . defendant that re ferred to the 22nd. It had to have referred to the 22nd o f March. Just logically, it makes sense. There is n o conclusion other than . . . defendant [being] the o ne who left the letter and the other items for . . . plain tiff, whom he knew was going to pick them up. They are his wo rds [in the letter]. There was an apology. By communicating with her[,] when he knew he was prohibited from doing the same[,] is a direct violation of the [TRO] entered in this matter. Accordingly, I find . . . plaintiff . . . met her b urden of proof with respect to [the] predicate act of contem pt.

4 A lthough a continuance order was entered on March 18, 2022, the "remote hearing" addressing the need to reschedule the part ies' March 22, 2022 trial date occurred on March 21, 2022, and defendant, as well as his trial attorney, participated in the March 21 telephonic conference.15 A- 0823

- 22 And therefore, the first prong of Silver v. Silver [5] has been met. Next, the judge stated she "ha[d] to examine the s econd [Silver ] prong [and] its factors." 6 In considering whether the parties had a "previous h istory of domestic violence," the judge noted she had not "ma de any specific findings as to . . . prior acts," but found "plaintiff . . . made some non-specific alle gations of a history of abuse." Th us , although the judge concluded " the proof[s were] in equipoise with respect to the testimony of both parties, " she "account[ed] for the fact that . . . plaintiff [made] . . . allegati ons" of a history of domestic violence.

5 387 N.J. Super. 112, 114 (App. Div. 2006).

6 By statute, the factors a court should consider whe n determining whether to grant an FRO include, but are not limited to: (1) The previous history of domestic violence betwe en the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment[,] and phy sical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff an d defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time the p rotection of the victim's safety; and (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protecti on from another jurisdiction. [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]16 A- 0823

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Turning to whether defendant posed a risk of "immed iate danger" to plaintiff, the judge stated , "[c]ounsel's closing arguments indicate that . . . plaintiff needs to be free from the relationship, d oes not want to see . . . defendant, [and] fears . . . defendant does not tak e the [TRO] seriously." (Emphasis added). Further, the judge found plainti ff raised "allegations . . . defendant . . . continued to try to contact her." Accordingly, the judge concluded: The heart of a finding of contempt is that a defend ant feels comfortable enough to ignore even an order of the court, and that the possibility is great . . . defe ndant will continue to contact . . . plaintiff[,] showing no f ear of the court or the consequences that c ould be imposed by the court. A named victim in a [TRO,] or one who alleges domestic abuse has a basic right to be left alone and not be contacted. Finally, in addressing the remaining applicable sta tutory factors, the judge found: From looking at the amended [TRO], the parties alre ady

have worked out a parenting arrangement and a financial arrangement for support. There is simply no reason for . . . defendant to have had to contact .

. . plaintiff, in light of the court's order. And thus , for . .

. plaintiff's continued protection a[ nd] to prevent her from the continuance of unwanted advances or contact, the granting of a[n FRO] is in her best interest to protect her from further contact and abuse, based on my rev iew of the evidence and the finding [] of a predicate act.17 A- 0823

- 22 . . . I find . . . plaintiff has met her burden by a preponderance of the evidence in establishing the necessity for a[n FRO] . . . .
II. On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred in entering an FRO against
him based on the predicate act of contempt because: ( 1) he did not commit a predicate act of domestic violence; and (2) she fa iled to consider the second Silver prong. Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limite d. Cesare v. Cesare , 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We owe substantial deference to the Famil y Part's findings of fact because of its special expertise i n family matters. Id. at 413. Deference is especially appropriate in bench trials when the evidence is "largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (199 7) ). A trial judge who observes witnesses and listens to their testimony i s in the best position "to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesse s who appear on the stand." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). As such, we will not disturb a trial court's factua l findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent wi th the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the i nterests of justice." Cesare ,18 A- 0823

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154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord s uch deference to legal conclusions and review such conclusions de novo. T hieme v. Aucoin-Thieme , 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims o f domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provi de." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v . Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic viol ence," J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting S tate v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally construe[ the PDVA] to achieve its salutary purposes," Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400. When considering whether the entry of an FRO is app ropriate, a trial court must first "determine whether the plaintiff has pro ven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the pred icate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Silver, 387 N.J. Supe r. at 125. One such predicate act is "contempt of a domestic violence order." N. J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(17). 7

7 An act of "contempt" under N.J.S.A. 2C: 25 -19(a)(17) occurs when a person:19 A- 0823

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If the court finds the defendant committed a predic ate act of domestic violence, then the second inquiry "is whether the c ourt should enter a restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Si lver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126. While the second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation

(1) . . . purposely or knowingly violates any provi sion in an order entered under the provisions of the [PDVA] or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of ano ther state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a c rime or a disorderly persons offense.

. . . . (2) In all other cases a person is guilty of a dis orderly persons offense if that person knowingly violates a n order entered under the provisions of the [PDVA] or an order entered under the provision of a substantiall y similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States. [N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1) and (2). ] The right of a plaintiff to seek an FRO, based upon a defendant's knowing violation of a TRO, exists independently of whether the defendant's violation is, or can be, the subject of a separate contempt proce eding in an action for violating a restraining order under the court's "FO" docket, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 30 and N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 9.20 A- 0823

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of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)]( 1) to - 29[(a)](6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent furth er abuse." Id. at 127. "Under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4) , the [trial] court may, and if proper application pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201(d) is made[,] must, judici ally notice the records of the court in which the action is pending . . . ." Biunno , Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 12 on N.J.R.E. 201(b)( 4) (2024). "The purpose of judicial notice is to save time and promote judicia l economy by precluding the necessity of proving facts that cannot seriously be disputed . . . ." State v. Silva , 394 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 2007). Further, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201 (e), "[o]n timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking jud icial notice and the nature of the matter noticed. If the court takes judicial no tice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard." This Rule is consistent with the well-settled principle that "[t]he minimum requirem ents of due process . . . are notice and the opportunity to be heard." Doe v. Po ritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995). Guided by these standards, we are constrained to v acate the FRO and remand for further proceedings. The reasons for th e remand are two-fold. We first address the need for a remand based on the judge's post-trial decision to take judicial notice of the Family Part records in the domestic21 A- 0823

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violence ac tion

. W e reiterate that the judge initially took judicial no tice of certain Family Part's records during defendant's cr oss-examination. She did so on notice to the parties, and at the request of pla intiff's counsel that the judge resolve the attorneys' dis pute about whether the parties were previously scheduled for trial on March 22, 2022. Defendant's attorney lodged no objection to the judge taking such judicial notice of the cou rt's own records. Instead, he erroneously advised the court that the parties were not previously scheduled to try the case on March 22, 2022. Under these circumstances, and considering the parties and their counsel were present at trial whe n the judge took judicial notice of the court's records, we are persuaded she proper ly exercised her authority under Rule 201(c) and (d) in that instance. However, we part company with the judge's subsequen t decision to take judicial notice of statements made by another judge during the March 21, 2022 conference

— relative to the March 22, 2022 trial date

— because she took judicial notice of this record without advising counsel in advance, and then failing to afford counsel an opportunity to be heard on what s he discovered before granting the FRO. Accordingly, we are compelled to reman d this matter for the limited purpose of allowing counsel to be heard reg arding "the propriety of [the22 A- 0823

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judge] taking [such] judicial notice and the nature of the matter noticed."
N.J.R.E. 201( f ). The trial judge would not have needed to take judicial notice of t he trial court's prior proceedings if counsel correctly apprised the judge of previously scheduled trial dates. Similarly, defense counsel failed to inform the jud ge that he participated in a telephonic conference with the prior judge handling the

matter on March 21, 2022, and explicitly acknowledged on the record that day that he knew the parties were scheduled to proceed to trial on March 22, 2022. Finally, we are constrained to remand this matter f or the judge to re visit her findings under the second Silver prong. In fin ding defendant posed "an immediate danger" to plaintiff, the judge reference d the "closing argument[]" of plaintiff's counsel , and that her counsel "indicate[d] . . . plaintiff n eed[ed] to be free from the relationship, d[id] not want to see . . . defendant, [and] fear[ed] . .

. defendant d[id] not take the [TRO] seriously." Although the record contains testimony from plaintiff supporting counsel's closi ng remarks, her attorney's
summation is not evidence in the case. Accordingly, we remand this matter for the judge to reconsider her analysis under the seco nd prong of Silver , without reference to the closing remarks of plaintiff's cou nsel, and to allow her to more fully evaluate the factors listed under N.J.S.A. 2C :25-29(a)(1) to (6). In the23 A- 0823

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interim, the restraints set forth in the FRO are va cated and the TRO is reinstated. We offer no opinion on the outcome of the remand he aring. To the extent we have not addressed defendant's rem aining contentions, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 -3 (e)(1)(E). Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdicti on.