Filed 4/19/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAMON ARMIJO,

Defendant and Appellant. B266687

(Los Angele s County Super. Ct. No. TA132994)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Reverse d conditionally
and remanded with directions. James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defe ndant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra , Attorney s General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews

, Analee J. Brodie and Lindsay Boyd , Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Ramon Armijo appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered following his negotiated plea of no contest to attempted
murder and admission to sentencing enhancement allegations.
Prior to his plea, Armijo sent two letters to the trial court expressing concern that the public defenders assigned to represent him had provided ineffective assistance

. Armijo requested in the letters that the court discharge those attorneys

a nd appoint replacement counsel. Armijo contends that his plea
and conviction should be vacated because the trial court
committed reversible error under People v. Marsden (1970) 2
Cal.3d 118 ( Marsden ) by failing to hold a hearing on his request s

. We agree with Armijo that Marsden error occurred here. Armijo’s request i n his first letter became moot when, through no action of the trial court itself, the attorneys about whom Armijo complained in that letter were replaced by another court

appointed counsel . However, the trial court later erred in failing
to hold a Marsden hearing on Armijo’ s second letter, which requested the discharge of the replacement counsel and the
substitution of another counsel. On the record bef ore us, this

error was not harmless beyon d a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,

we conditionally r everse the judgment and remand with
directions to the trial court to hold a Marsden hearing a nd to appoint new counsel for Armijo if the court concludes that the
assistance re ndered by his previous attorney was inad e quate

. We direct the court to reinstate the judgment, however, if it concludes otherwise following the Marsden hearing and thus declines to appoint new counsel, or if it appoints new counsel and that counsel either declines to file a motion to vacate Armijo’s plea or the court denies any such m otion that is filed

.3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Charge and Special Allegations Against Armijo This case arises out of an April 11, 2014 incident in which Armijo allegedly stabbed a man with a “bayonet type knife. ” Following a preliminary hearing on July 29 and 30, 2014, the People filed an information charging Armijo with attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code

, 1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)

, and special ly alleg ing he had personally used a deadly weapon ( § 12022, subd. (b)(2))

. The information also specially alleged Armijo had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)

- (j), 1170.12) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Armijo pleaded not guilt y and denied the special allegations at
h is August 13, 2014 arraignment. Deputy Public Defender Delia Metoyer represented Armijo at his preliminary hearing and arraignment, and then at nine pretrial conferences from September 4, 2014 through January 13,
2 015. On January 5, 2015, Metoyer filed on Armijo’s behalf a
motion to set aside the information under section 995. A
different deputy p ublic d efender, however, Diana Alexander, represented Armijo at a January 2 2, 2015 pretrial conference;
Alexander infor med the trial court that the case had been reassigned to her. The court granted Alexander’s oral motion
made on Armijo’s behalf to continue the ca se to March 9, 2015

.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references herein are to the Penal Code.4

B. Armijo’s Letter to the Trial Court Regarding Metoyer and
Alexander
After Alexander replaced Metoyer, Armijo sent a letter dated February 2 , 2015 to the trial court. In the letter, Armijo expressed concerns about Metoyer’s past ha ndling of his defense and the prospect of being represented going forward by
Alexander

. To begin with, Armi jo stated that following the preliminary hearing, he asked Metoyer “several questions about the direction of my case,” but that Metoyer “seemed to have difficulty making time to answer my questions or provide reasonable explanations in person or over the p hone if she accepted my collect calls.” Armijo further stated that during one phone conversation he asked Metoyer “about the progress being made by her investigator and she admitted she had not been in contact with him.” Armijo described Metoyer as “inex perienced and overwhelmed by her caseload and schedule demands.” He also said that Metoyer had told him that she “had a family emergency involving her grandparents” and, as a result, she did not have
time in December 2014 to file his section 995 motion. Armijo additionally complained that, after the motion was filed, Metoyer
“never bothered to di scuss it with me.” Armijo also said in the letter that he learned on January 22, 2015 that “Metoyer was no longer able to represent
me and that my case would be continued for another 45 days” to March 9, 2015. Referring to Alexander, Armijo stated that he
was concerned that his case had been re assigned from Metoyer to “another overwhelmed and inexperienced pub lic defender. ” He
thus requested that the court order a different state

- appointed5

attorney to be assigned to his case to replace Metoyer and
Alexander

. The clerk’s office in the trial court received Armijo’s letter and file stamped it on February 17, 2015. Armijo’ s next court date following the court’s rec eipt of his
letter was the Marc h 9, 2015 pretrial conference that the court had set at Alexander’s request. But a t that conference, Deputy Public Defender Francine Logan , not Alexander, appeared on Armijo’s behalf. Logan informed the court that she “ha[d ] just been assigned [ to the ] case.” She described the discovery as “voluminous” and moved to con tinue the case to April 9, 2015

. In granting that motion, the trial court told Armijo that he had been “extremely patient,” but that because Logan was newly assigned to the case, she “need[ed] additional time .

. . to prepare for [the]
trial.” There is no indication in the record that Logan was assigned to the case to replace Metoyer and /or Alexander as a
result of any action that the trial court took in resp onse to Ar mijo’s February 2, 2015 letter requesting appointment of new
counsel. The court did not a hold a hearing on the request or make any mention of it at the March 9 , 2015 conference.

C. Armijo’s Letter to the Trial Court Regarding Logan On April 9, 2015, a different d eputy p ublic d efender stood in for Logan to represent Armijo that day and requested that the

ca se be trailed to April 15, 2015; the trial court granted that request. On April 15, yet another d eputy p ublic d efender stood in for Logan and requested that the case b e trailed to April 21, 2015; the court granted that request as well

. It is not clear from the record precisely why Logan was absent at the April 9 and 15 pretrial conferences.6 On the heels of the April 15 pretrial conference, Armijo sent a second letter, dated April 16, 2015, to the trial court . In
this letter, Armijo expressed concerns about L ogan’s handling of
his defense. Armijo began by voicing his frustration over Logan’s absences at the April 9 and 15 pretrial conferen ces and the resulting rescheduling of the conference. 2 Next, Armijo catalogue d complaints about Logan’s representation of him dating back to the March 9, 2015 conference at which she first appeared on his behalf. In particular, Armijo stated that Logan
h ad “assured” him on that date that “ she had 17 years [of] experience and that she would remain in contact with me before my next court date. In fact, she indicated she would visit me in
the county jail so that we could review my case. She never
visited m e , nor did she accept the numerous collect calls I made
to the number on her business card. I also wrote her a letter reminding her that I was still waiting to meet with her at her convenience.” Armijo added that he was concerned that the pending section 995 motion was deficient because it “focus [ ed ] on technicalities never mentioning the actual [preliminary hearing] testimony,” and that he wanted to discuss t he motion with Logan

, but she was unavailable for that

. Armijo further noted that , since the inc eption of the case, he had been assigned “ [ thr ee ] different public defenders ” ; he opined that “not one of them has been reliable, dependable, or able to provide the quality legal representation required to be

2 Armijo indicated in the letter that he was told that Logan missed the April 9 conference du e to illness. The letter offered no explanation for her absence from the April 15 conference.7

successful in my case.” Armijo also stated tha t he was frustrated by the “pattern of unwanted continuances ” that he thought would stop after Logan was assigned to his case, but that had persisted. Armijo concluded the letter by stating, “It is rather obvious that the public defender’s [ sic ], for what ever reason s , has not been able to adequately represent me, and for these reasons I am requesting that you assign my case to a state

- appointed attorney.” The clerk’s office in the trial court received Armijo’s second letter and file stamped it on April 24 , 2015. The court did not
hold a hearing on Armijo’s request in the letter for the discharge and replacement of Logan

. The court made no mention of the letter in any of the subsequent proceedings in the case.

D. Proceedings Subsequent to t he Second Lett er 1. The Denial of Armijo’s Section 995 Motion and the Filing of an Amended Information On April 21, 2015, which was in between the date of Armijo’s second l etter and the date the clerk’s office received it,
the trial court held a pre trial conference. Logan represented Armijo. At the conference, the court set May 7, 2015 as the hearing date on Armijo’s section 995 motion. Armijo failed to appear in court on May 7, however, and so the hearing was trailed to May 12. Armijo appeared at the hearing on May 12. Logan represented him and argued the section 995 motion , which the
trial court denied. On June 3, 2015, the People filed an amended information

, which was identical in all respects to the initial information, except that it added an allegation th at Armijo had inflicted great8

bodily injury in committing the offense with which he was charged. ( § 12022.7, subd. (a)

. ) Armijo again pleaded not guilty to the charge and denied the special allegations.

2

. Armijo’s Negotiated Plea a nd Resulting Convict ion
On June 23, 2015, Armijo appeared in the trial court with Logan. He entered a negotiated plea of no contest to attempted murder and admitted the great bodily injury and prior strike allegations. In accordanc e with the plea agreement that Armijo

reac hed with the People , the court sentenced him to 13 years in state prison and dismissed the remaining special allegations. The court awarded Armijo presentence custody credit s of 514 days and imposed statutory fines, fees

, and assessments.

3. Armijo’s N

o tice of Appeal and Request for a Certificate of Probable Cause T o Appeal On August 5, 2015, Armijo filed a timely notice of appeal in
which he stated that he intended to challenge the validity of his plea. Armijo also filed a request for a certificate of probable

cause allowing him to make that challenge

. I n his request
, he referred to the two letters he sent to the trial court complaining
about the assistance he received from his public defenders and seeking the appointment of substitute counsel. Ci ting Marsden

, Armijo indicated that the trial court had not afforded him the opportunity to explain the reasons for his request. He also listed

num erous grievances against Logan. Among other things, he
stated that she failed to discuss the section 995 mo tion with him ; improperly induced him to accept the plea deal rather than
consider ing possible trial strategies ; and “ failed to clearly and9

thoroughly explain [ the ] guilty plea. ” The trial court granted Armijo’s request for a certificate of probable cause

.

DISCUSSION

Armijo’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
committed reversible error under Marsden by failing to hold a hearing in response to his letters requesting the discharge of his public defenders and the appointment of replacement counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that A rmijo is

correct as to the second letter and therefore reverse the judgment
of conviction.

A. Governing Law
In Marsden , the California Supreme Court held that the constitutional right of crimin al defendants to the assistance of

court

- appointed counsel if they cannot afford private counsel encompasses the right to have their court

- appointed counsel discharged and replaced by another one when the “ ‘“ failure to do so would substantially impair or d eny the right ”’ ” to assistance of counsel. ( Marsden

, supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) “ ‘ A defendant is entitled to [this] relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendan t and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations] .’ [Citations.]” ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 204.)

“ [ A ] proper and formal ” Marsden motion is not required

— t he defendant need only clearly indicate to t he trial court “in some manner” that he or she is requesting the discharge and10

replacement of the appointed counsel. ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281 & f

n. 8; see People v. Reed (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1146 [defendant must “put the trial court on notice” of a
desire to replace appointed counsel].) Direct correspondence with
the trial court is an acceptable manner for the defendant to make the request . (See

, e.g. , People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App. 4th 724,
7 29

- 73 0 .) The defendant’s right under Marsden to seek the discharge and replacement of court

- appointed counsel applies at all stages of a criminal proceeding

. The request thus may be made before

or after a defendant is convicted. ( People v. Smi th (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 694.) Most critically for purposes of Armijo’s case , once the defendant clearly indicates to the trial court a request for the discharge and replacement of appointed counsel, the court must hold a hearing to allow the defendant to explain the basis for the request. ( People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89

- 90 ( Sanchez ) ; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 156

- 157; People v. Lloyd

, supra , 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 731. ) This hearing requirement stems from Marsden itself, which ga ve rise to the term of art “ ‘ Marsden hearing ’ ” to describe the proceeding at which such requests are to be resolved. ( See Sanchez

, at pp. 89

- 90 .) In elucidating the hearing requirement , the Supreme Court
in Marsden began by noting that “the decision whet her to permit a defendant to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney .

. . is within the discretion of the trial court,
and a defendant has no absolute right to more than one appointed attorney.” ( Marsden

, supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 123 .) The

c ourt admonished, however, “ that the trial court cannot11

thoughtfully exercise its discretion .

. . withou t listening to [the defendant’s] reasons for requesting a change of attorneys. A trial judge is unable to intelligently deal with a defendant’ s request for substitution of attorneys unless he is cognizant of the grounds which prompted the request. The defendant may have knowledge of conduct and events relevant to the diligence and competence of his attorney which are not apparent to the trial j udge from observations within the four corners of the

courtroo m.” ( Ibid .) The c ourt stated that to ensure that the right to discharge and replace appointed counsel is meaningful , the defendant must “be given ample opportunity to explain and if possible t o document the basis of his contention [beyond the] bare complaint[s] ” that counsel is not providing adequate assistance. ( Id . at p. 125.) Denial of that opportunity, the c ourt held, is legal error that compels reversal of the defendant’s conviction unle ss the record shows be yond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. ( Id

. at p. 1 26; see Sanchez

, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 92.)

B. The Trial Court Erred b y Failing To Hold a Marsden Hearing i n Response to Armijo’s Request in His Second
Letter f or th e Discharge and Replacement of His Court

a ppointed Attorney Armijo’s two letters to the trial court triggered his right to

a Marsden hearing. Although his letters were not formal
Marsden motions, Armijo clearly indicate d in them that he sought the discha rge of the public defenders who were representing him and their replacement by another court

appointed counsel. Technically, Armijo’s request in his first letter was rendered moot when Logan replaced Metoyer and Alexander as12

Armijo’s attorney . Although t he record does not indicate that
this switch came about as the result of any action by the trial court, Armijo got what he wanted in the first letter: a new lawyer

. That still leaves the second letter, however. And in it, Armijo asked the trial court to replace Logan with another court

appointed counsel. The trial court failed to hold a hearing on that request. Perhap s Armijo would have been unable to show (as Marsden requires) that Logan had provided inadequate representation or that he had become embr oiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict with Logan that ineffective representation was likely to result. But Armijo was entitled to the opportunity

to try to make that showing at a Marsden hearing. The tr ial court erred in denying Armijo that opportunit y

. 3 The People’s counter

- arguments are unavailing. First, citing People v. Lovings (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1305 and People v. Lobaugh (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 780, the People assert that Armijo forfeited his Marsden right s by entering a no contest plea.
Lov ings and Lobaugh are inapposite. In both of those cases, the
defendants were given the opportunity to present Marsden
motions at Marsden hearings . Following the hearings, the trial courts denied the motions; subsequently, the defendants entered guilty pl eas and were convicted

. ( Lovings , at p p . 1307

- 1309; Lobaugh , at p. 783.) T he appellate courts held that the

3 It is unclear from the record whether the trial court judge personally saw Armijo’s letters. Even if the judge did not see them, this would “not justify the court’s failure to conduct [a Marsden ] hearing” because it was incumbent on the clerk’s office, which file

- stamped the letters, to bring them to the judge’s attention. ( People v. Lloyd

, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 731 & fn. 7.)13

defendants’ pleas waived their right to challenge the denial of
their Marsden motions. ( Lovings , at p. 1311; Lobaugh , at p. 786.) Here, by contr ast, Armijo had no Marsden hearing in the first place. U nlike the defendants in Lovings and Lobaugh

, Armijo is not challenging a pre

- plea denial of a Marsden motion ; he is challenging a pre

- plea denial of a Marsden hearing. Armijo’s case is thus akin to Sanchez

, supra , 53 Cal.4th 80. The
defendant there entered a guilty plea. At his sentencing hearing a month later, however, the defendant sought to vacate his plea
and requested, through an i nformal Marsden motion, the discharge of his court

- appointed at torney and replacement by another on the ground that the attorney had provided ineffective assistance in connection with the plea. ( Sanchez , at pp. 84

- 85.)
The trial court declined to conduct a Marsden hearing. The Supreme Court held that the failure to do so was reversible error

. ( Sanchez

, at pp. 84, 92.) There was no suggestion in Sanchez that the defendant’s plea forfeited his right to a Marsden hearing

. Armijo’s plea did not forfeit his right to a Marsden hearing
either. 4 Second, the People cont e nd that Armijo’s second letter “did not make a clear request for substitute counsel” and thus “no
Marsden inquiry by the trial court was required.” This is

4 People v. Eastman (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 688 is in the same vein as Sanchez . The Court of Appeal in Eastman held the trial court erred in failing to hold a Marsden hearing upon receipt at the sentencing hearing of the defendant’s request to withdraw his plea and discharge and rep lace his court

- appointed attorney who had advised him to enter the plea . ( Eastman

, at pp. 695

- 696.) As in Sanchez , there was no hint in Eastman that the defendant’s plea forfeited his right to a Marsden hearing.14

incorrect . Armijo stated unequivocally in the second letter, “I am requesting that you assign my c ase to a state

- appointed attorney.” We are not sure what more the People believe Armijo should have said to trigger his right to a Marsden hearing. 5 Third, citing People v. Freeman (199 4 ) 8 Cal.4th 450 and People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, the Peop le contend that if Armijo’s second letter is deemed a request for substitute counsel, it obviated the need for a Marsden hearing because the letter set forth the basis of his dissatisfaction with Logan in

“‘ sufficient detail. ’ ” Freeman and Wharton have no bearing here. In both of those cases, the trial courts duly considered the defendants’ detailed recitation of complaints about their court

appointed attorneys and, based on that review, denied the defendants’ requests for the ap pointment of substitute co unsel without holding a “ ‘ full

- blown [ Marsden ] hearing. ’ ” ( Freeman , at

p. 481; Wharton , at p. 580.) Here, by contrast, there is no

5 Seizing on Armijo’s statement in the se cond letter that he was “still without an attorney,” the People assert that Armijo apparently was of the view that Logan no longer was representing him as of the date of the letter and, therefore, the letter did not trigger a right to a Marsden hearing on the replacement of an existing court

- appointed attorney with another . The People read too much into Armijo’s statement. Taken as a whole, the letter indicates that Armijo was aware that Logan still was representing him and that the new attorney whose app ointment he was seeking would replace Logan. Armijo’s statement that he was “still without an attorney ” may simply have been a rhetorical device to call the court’s attention to his frustration stemming from Logan’s absences at the April 9, 2015 hearing, and then again at the April 15, 2015 hearing, which was the day before he transmitted the second letter.15

evidence in the record that the trial court ever consi dered Armijo’s complaints about Logan in the second letter or that th e court even looked at the letter

. Thus, whether Armijo’s letter

was sufficiently detailed within the meaning of Freeman and
Wharton to excuse the need for a Marsden hearing is irrelevant

. Equally misplaced is the People’s assertion that Armijo’s
tactical disagreements with Logan that he outlined in the second letter are not grounds for replacement of court

- appointed counsel
under Marsden

. In cases that so hold, the trial courts held
Marsden hearings and considered the defendants’ complaints
about their c o u ns e l

. (E.g., People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 228

- 231. ) That did not happen here. In any event, Armijo’s objections went beyond tactical disagreements with Logan ; he also charged that Logan was unavailable and failed to keep in
touch with him

. F inally, we are not persuaded by the People’s argument that Armijo abandoned his Marsden request because he fail ed to assert it at the April 21, 2015 pretrial conference, five days after
he transmitted the second letter. Abandonment of a Marsden

reques t has been found where the defend ant affirmatively
withdrew it ( People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 927, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998 ) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1), and where the defendant failed to take advantage of the opportuni ty to present additional reasons for his request
for new counsel at a second Marsden hearing after being afforded the opportunity to explain his request at an initial Marsden hearing ( People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 976

- 977, 981

- 9 8 2 )

. Nothing l ike that happened here: Armijo never withdrew
his Marsden request
, and he never had the opportunity to explain the request at a second Marsden hearing, let alone a first.16 In People v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal. App.4th 35 5
, 362
, the Fourth District Court of Ap peal held that the defendant
abandoned his Marsden request after he s ought or stipulated to
several continuances for a Marsden hearing but then proceeded to trial without reminding the trial court of the pending Marsden request. Nothing like that happened here either ; no Marsden hearing ever was scheduled and then continued. In finding abandonment in Jones

, the Court of Appeal
invoked the principle that a criminal defendant may be deemed
to have abandoned a right by failing to press for a hearing on
that right or by acquiescing in the trial court’s inadvertent failure to hold a hearing. ( People v. Jones

, supra , 210 Cal.App.4th at

p. 361 , citing People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813

- 814 .) Here, Armijo did not press for a Marsden hearing at the Apri l 21

pre trial conference (or at subsequent proceedings) and , from the record, it appears that the trial court’s failure to hold the hearing
was inadvertent. Nevertheless, for two reasons, we decline to apply the principle on which Jones relied. For one, in Jones , the defendant’s counsel was fully aware of the Marsden request. Indeed, counsel sought a number of the continuances of the
Marsden hearing that the trial court granted. The failure to press for the Marsden hearing or remind the court about it t hus lies largely with the defendant’s counsel. Here, by contrast, there
is no indication from the record that Logan knew that Armijo had written to the trial court about her and was seeking substitute
counsel

. Additionally, it seems quite possible that A rmijo did not
raise the Marsden issue at the April 21, 2015 pretrial conference
out of a mistaken belief that the c ourt already had received his second letter (it was not received until April 24) and denied the request he made therein to discharge Logan, w hich may have17

suggested to Armijo that it would have been futile to ask the

court at that point to appoint new counsel. ( See People v.
Abbaszadeh (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 642

, 64 8 [discussing futility exception to abandonment rule].) Under these circumstan ces, we do not believe that the fault for the trial court’s failure to hold a Marsden hearing should rest with Armijo. Therefore, we decline to find that Armijo abandoned his Marsden request through a failure to press for a hearing on the request or acqui escence to the court’s failure to hold a hearing

.

C. The Trial Court’s Error in Failing T o Hold a Marsden Hearing Was Not Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Based on our review of the record, it is possible that Armijo

may not have been able to show at a Marsden hearing either the inadequacy of representation by Logan or an irreconcilable
conflict with her

. However, because the rec ord largely is limited

to Armijo’s complaint l etters , we do not know what other
evidence Armijo could have offered had he be en afforded a
Marsden hearing. It is conceivable that he could have provided at the hearing “knowledge of conduct and events relevant to the diligence and competence of his attorney[s] which are not apparent” from the “bare complaint[s] ” and that would ha ve tipped the balance in favor of appointment of substitute counsel. ( Marsden

, supra , 2 Cal.3d at p p. 123, 125.) Under these circumstances, we “ cannot speculate upon the basis of a silent record that the trial court, after listening to defendant ’ s reasons , would decide the appointment of new counsel was unnecessary.” ( People v. Winbush ( 1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 987, 991.) Thus, the trial court’s error in failing to hold a Marsden hearing in response18

to Armijo’ s letter about Logan cannot be treated as harmles s beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because of the potential that Armijo could demonstrate inadequate representation or an irreconcilable conflict at a
Marsden hearing, we conditionally reve rse the judgment and
remand to the trial court with instructions to hold a Marsden hearing

. If the trial court finds after the hearing that Armijo
demonstrated ineffective assistance or an irreconcilable conflict,
the c ourt shall appoint new counsel to assist Armijo in filing a motion to withdraw his plea or any other such mo tions newly appointed counsel may deem appropriate. However, the trial court shall reinstate the judgment if ( 1 ) the court finds after the
Marsden hearing that Armijo failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance or an irreconcilable conflict; or ( 2 ) the c ourt grants Armijo’s request for substitute appointed counsel, but either
substitute counsel declines to file a motion to withdraw the plea or other appropriate motion, or the court denies any such
motion. 6

6 Our instructions to the trial court on remand are drawn from Sanchez

, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p age 92. That case delineates what is to happen on reman d following a reversal of a plea

- based conviction on account of the trial court’s failure to hold a Marsden hearing. Consistent with Sanchez , our instructions reflect a “conditional reversal” that contemplates the possible reinstatement of the judgment a nd conviction. ( People v. Eastman

, supra , 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 691.)19 DISPOSITION

The judgment is conditionally rever sed and the case is
remanded with directions to the trial court to hold a Marsden hearing, and

, if Armijo’s request for substitute appointed counsel
is granted, to appoint new counsel to assist Armijo and to entertain such motions as newly appointed counse l may file. The court shall reinstate the judgment if: (1) Armijo’s request is denied, or (2) the request is granted but substitute counsel declines to file a motion to withdraw the pl ea or other appropriate motion, or the court denies any such motion.

SMALL, J. *

We concur:

ZELON, Actin g P. J.

SEGAL, J.

* J udge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.