NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

CLINTON MACK REID,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-50015

D.C. No. 

3:15-cr-01349-BAS-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 9, 2017

Pasadena, California

Before: LIPEZ,** BEA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Clinton Reid was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after a search of his vehicle by San Diego police 

officers revealed a loaded handgun. The district court granted Reid’s motion to 

suppress the handgun, and the government appealed that order. We have jurisdiction 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the 

First Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 22 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

over that interlocutory appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. We reverse and remand.

1. Officers were dispatched to a park after receiving two separate reports of 

fighting and drug use. Members of a violent street gang had congregated in the park 

to celebrate a gang holiday, and criminal activity had occurred in the park on 

previous holidays. When uniformed officers entered the park, Reid, wearing gang 

colors, “quickly” walked away and “seemed to be the most nervous of everybody.” 

Reid went to a nearby parked car, sat in the backseat for five to seven seconds, and 

appeared to place something in the car before walking away. Officers stopped Reid 

on his way back to the park. An officer testified at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress that based on his background, training, and experience, Reid was likely 

“dumping” illegal contraband in the car. Officers had found illegal narcotics and 

firearms on attendees of this event in the past. Given the totality of the 

circumstances, there was “particularized and objective basis for suspecting” that 

Reid had put contraband in his car. United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 

1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted). The stop was therefore supported 

by reasonable suspicion, which, as we have observed, “is not a particularly high 

threshold to reach.” Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).

2. Officers learned that Reid was a convicted felon during the Terry stop.

From outside the car where Reid had been sitting, officers observed a bulge in the 

shape of a handgun in a pouch behind the driver’s seat. With limited exceptions, a 
3 

convicted felon may not possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Cal. Penal 

Code § 29800. These “facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge” 

were “sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that” Reid was a prohibited possessor 

of a handgun, and the officers therefore had probable cause to search the car. See 

United States v. Noster, 590 F.3d 624, 633 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

1

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

 

1 Reid did not contend below that the search was deficient for failure to obtain 

a search warrant.