IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0562

Filed March 4, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RUBEN DEASES,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Bethany J. Currie, 

Judge.

Ruben Deases, initially sentenced as a minor for first-degree murder, 

appeals his re-sentencing of life in prison with the possibility of parole after serving 

a minimum of forty years in prison. AFFIRMED.

John L. Dirks of Dirks Law Firm, Ames, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

A jury found Ruben Deases guilty of first-degree murder in connection with 

the 1989 death of his brother’s girlfriend. Deases “was seventeen when the 

murder occurred.” See State v. Deases, 476 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). 

Under then-existing law, Deases was committed to life in prison without parole.

This court affirmed his judgment and sentence. Id. at 98. The sentencing laws for 

juveniles convicted of first-degree murder evolved over time, and Deases was 

eventually re-sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after forty years. On 

appeal, Deases contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing a term 

of years prior to parole eligibility rather than granting him immediate parole 

eligibility as he requested. 

I. Background Law and Proceedings

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held “the Eighth Amendment 

forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of 

parole for juvenile offenders.” See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).

The court did not consider whether “the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical 

ban on life without parole for juveniles” but stated the court was required “to take 

into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against 

irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. In response, Iowa’s 

governor commuted Deases’ sentence to life in prison with the possibility of parole 

after sixty years. 

Deases filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. He alleged the 

commuted sentence also was unconstitutional. The district court stayed the 

proceedings until the issue could be resolved by the Iowa Supreme Court in 
3

pending appeals. The supreme court held the commuted sentence 

unconstitutional. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he

unconstitutional imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence is not fixed 

by substituting it with a sentence with parole that is the practical equivalent of a life 

sentence without parole.”). The court later held life without parole for juveniles 

categorically unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution. See State v. Sweet, 

879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016) (“[W]e adopt a categorical rule that juvenile 

offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under article 

I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.”).

Then came State v. Lyle 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014), as amended

(Sept. 30, 2014). The court there held “all mandatory minimum sentences of 

imprisonment for youthful offenders . . . unconstitutional under the cruel and 

unusual punishment clause in article I, section 17 of our constitution.” Id. The 

court enumerated several factors “to be used by the district court . . . on 

resentencing”: 

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such 

as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences”; (2) the particular “family and home environment”

that surround the youth; (3) the circumstances of the particular crime 

and all circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role 

in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful 

offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and (5) the 

possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.

Id. at 404 n.10 (citations omitted). The court emphasized that they were “all 

mitigating factors, and they cannot be used to justify a harsher sentence.” Id. at 

402 n.8; see also State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 144 (Iowa 2017) (“First, the 

factors generally serve to mitigate punishment, not aggravate punishment.”); State 
4

v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 556 (Iowa 2015), holding modified by State v. Roby,

897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017) (“The sentencing judge should consider these family 

and home environment vulnerabilities together with the juvenile’s lack of maturity, 

underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and vulnerability to peer pressure as 

mitigating, not aggravating, factors.”); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 75 (Iowa 2013) 

(“[T]he typical characteristics of youth, which include immaturity, impetuosity, and 

poor risk assessment, are to be regarded as mitigating, not aggravating factors.”).

The legislature subsequently enacted Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)

(2019), prescribing the following sentences for juvenile defendants convicted of 

first-degree murder:

(1) Commitment to the director of the department of 

corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life with no possibility of 

parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term of 

years.

(2) Commitment to the custody of the director of the 

department of corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life with the

possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of confinement as 

determined by the court.

(3) Commitment to the custody of the director of the 

department of corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life with the 

possibility of parole.

The supreme court held the first option unconstitutional. See State v. Zarate, 908 

N.W.2d 831, 843 (Iowa 2018) (“[W]e hold that Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a)(1), 

which allows the sentencing court to sentence a juvenile offender to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional.”). The court 

found “the rest of Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a) . . . constitutional,” reasoning that 

the second and third options “allow[] sentencing courts to craft individualized 

sentences for each juvenile offender so long as the juvenile offender is first 

sentenced to life imprisonment with some option for parole eligibility.” Id. at 844–
5

46. The court also upheld the constitutionality of legislatively-prescribed 

sentencing factors. Id. at 849; see Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v).1 However, 

 

1 The provision states:

(2) In determining which sentence to impose, the court shall 

consider all circumstances including but not limited to the following:

(a) The impact of the offense on each victim, as defined 

in section 915.10, through the use of a victim impact 

statement, as defined in section 915.10, under any format 

permitted by section 915.13. The victim impact statement 

may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.

(b) The impact of the offense on the community.

(c) The threat to the safety of the public or any 

individual posed by the defendant.

(d) The degree of participation in the murder by the 

defendant.

(e) The nature of the offense.

(f) The defendant’s remorse.

(g) The defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.

(h) The severity of the offense, including any of the 

following:

(i) The commission of the murder while 

participating in another felony.

(ii) The number of victims.

(iii) The heinous, brutal, cruel manner of the 

murder, including whether the murder was the result of 

torture.

(i) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 

criminality of the conduct.

(j) Whether the ability to conform the defendant’s 

conduct with the requirements of the law was substantially 

impaired.

(k) The level of maturity of the defendant.

(l) The intellectual and mental capacity of the 

defendant.

(m) The nature and extent of any prior juvenile 

delinquency or criminal history of the defendant, including the 

success or failure of previous attempts at rehabilitation.

(n) The mental health history of the defendant.

(o) The level of compulsion, duress, or influence 

exerted upon the defendant, but not to such an extent as to 

constitute a defense.

(p) The likelihood of the commission of further offenses 

by the defendant.
6

the court agreed with the defendant that “the district court’s consideration of any 

potential aggravating factors set forth in section 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v) shall align 

with our juvenile sentencing jurisprudence so as not to overwhelm the mitigating 

factors associated with youth, especially the five factors of youth set forth in Lyle.”

Zarate, 908 N.W.2d at 849. 

At the end of 2018, Deases contacted the district court to determine the 

status of his previously stayed resentencing request. The court scheduled and 

held an evidentiary hearing at which the State and defense each called an expert 

 

(q) The chronological age of the defendant and the 

features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and 

failure to appreciate risks and consequences.

(r) The family and home environment that surrounded 

the defendant.

(s) The circumstances of the murder including the 

extent of the defendant’s participation in the conduct and the 

way familial and peer pressure may have affected the 

defendant.

(t) The competencies associated with youth, including 

but not limited to the defendant’s inability to deal with peace 

officers or the prosecution or the defendant’s incapacity to 

assist the defendant’s attorney in the defendant’s defense.

(u) The possibility of rehabilitation.

(v) Any other information considered relevant by the 

sentencing court.

Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a)–(v). Section 902.1(3)(a) further provides:

3. a. Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2, a defendant convicted of 

a class “A” felony, other than murder in the first degree in violation of 

section 707.2, and who was under the age of eighteen at the time 

the offense was committed shall receive one of the following 

sentences:

(1) Commitment to the custody of the director of the 

department of corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life with the 

possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of confinement as 

determined by the court.

(2) Commitment to the custody of the director of the 

department of corrections for the rest of the defendant’s life with the 

possibility of parole.

Id. § 902.1(3)(a)(1)–(2).
7

witness. Deases also testified briefly. As noted, the court resentenced him to life 

in prison “with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum of forty years in 

prison.” 

II. Analysis

Deases asserts “the court placed undue weight on the nature of the crime 

and did not adequately balance that with all of the evidence of [his] rehabilitation.”

Our review of the court’s ruling is for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Crooks, 

911 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Iowa 2018). 

The district court considered the Lyle factors as well as the twenty-two 

factors prescribed by subsection 902.1(2)(b)(2)(a) through (v) and delineated the 

factors deemed to be mitigating or aggravating. The court began by 

acknowledging Deases’ age was a mitigating factor notwithstanding his 

chronological proximity to adulthood. See Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 145 (“[A]ge is not 

a sliding scale that necessarily weighs against mitigation the closer the offender is 

to turning eighteen years old at the time of the crime.”). The court next addressed 

Deases’ “[i]mmaturity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” After 

summarizing the trial testimony concerning Deases’ plan to have a juvenile commit 

the crime to avoid the severity of an adult sentence, the court stated,

The fact the brothers had a conversation about the risks and 

consequences and decided that a brother under age 18 should do it 

certainly appears to the Court that [Deases] did appreciate the 

consequences of his actions, although he may not have known 

specifically what sentence he faced. The Supreme Court has 

directed sentencing courts to consider this as a mitigating factor. The 

Court has trouble considering it in mitigation of the offense but will 

not consider it as an aggravating factor when deciding an appropriate 

sentence.
8

The court also considered Deases’ intellectual and mental capacity “as mitigating 

circumstances in this case.” As for “[d]uress, influence, familial, and peer 

pressure,” the court stated, 

The Supreme Court has again directed sentencing judges to 

consider duress, influence, familial, or peer pressure as a mitigating 

factor, but the Court has serious difficulty in finding this to be a 

mitigating factor under the specific circumstances of this particular 

case. Essentially, the Court would have to take [Deases’] selfserving trial testimony at face value, which the jury clearly did not and 

which the Court does not, having read the transcript. However, the 

Court will not consider it as an aggravating factor when deciding an 

appropriate sentence.

Turning to “[f]amily and home environment, including abuse, neglect, drug or 

alcohol abuse, exposure to violence, lack of supervision, lack of appropriate 

education, and mental health history,” the court found “plenty of mitigating

circumstances under this factor.”

The court proceeded to the “[t]he circumstances of the crime, nature and 

severity of the offense, the extent of Mr. Deases’ participation, the heinous, brutal, 

or cruel manner of the murder.” After describing the “incredibly horrific” nature of 

the crime, the court stated, 

The Supreme Court has directed sentencing courts to not allow the 

aggravating circumstances of the murder overwhelm the mitigating

factors associated with youth. However, the Supreme Court has also 

held that nothing prevents me from considering additional or 

aggravating factors relevant to the particular case. The Court finds 

it appropriate to consider the sequence of events immediately after 

the murder as aggravating circumstances. [Deases] sexually 

abused [the woman’s] body after she was dead. Although 

[another brother] cut off [the woman’s] head, [Deases] helped clean 

up by placing her head into the garbage bags, going with [the brother] 

to dispose of the head, driving over it, and throwing it into a ditch near

a gravel road. He also accompanied [the brother] and helped get a

TV box from a friend to hold the rest of [the woman’s] body, helped 

[his brother] tie her up, wrap her body in garbage bags, tie those 

bags with more ropes, and went with [his brother] to dump [the 
9

woman’s] body in a lake. The head was found and remained 

unidentified for several days before the body was located.

The court also addressed “[t]he possibility of rehabilitation, previous efforts

at rehabilitation, the extent of a juvenile delinquency history, and the likelihood that 

[he would] commit further offenses.” The court catalogued the evidence on this 

factor including the opinion of the State’s expert that “that Mr. Deases’ behaviors 

are consistent with psychopathy which cannot be rehabilitated” and the opinion of 

the defense expert that “antisocial personality traits tend to abate in a person’s 

40s.” However, the court did not make a credibility finding as to either expert.

Finally, the court examined, Deases’ “demonstration of remorse and 

acceptance of responsibility.” The court stated, 

At the trial, Mr. Deases denied and minimized his involvement. At 

the original sentencing hearing, Mr. Deases again said he had not 

killed or intended to kill [the woman]. He denied responsibility and 

pointed his finger at his brother . . . as the sole person responsible 

for the murder. Mr. Deases has had nearly 30 years to reflect on his 

conduct and his participation. He has had enough time while 

incarcerated to improve himself and he has apparently chosen not to 

do so. Since the U.S. Supreme Court announced the change in the 

law in 2012 or at least since 2013 when the Iowa Supreme Court 

announced that all the juveniles sentenced under the previous 

version of the Code would be resentenced, Mr. Deases has known 

this day was coming, and he could have put himself in the best 

position for the Court’s consideration. The Court can find nothing in 

Mr. Deases’ actions or statements to be a mitigating factor.

Specifically, he again today denies that he was involved and that he 

was only present and that he was there after the fact. There is no 

remorse in that statement. He stated, I’m the one doing everything 

in a cell, unquote, which shows the Court that he’s sorry that he got 

caught, not that he’s sorry he committed this murder.

Deases argues the district court’s focus on “the circumstances immediately 

following the offense rather than those a few minutes or hours earlier” did not 

lessen the concerns expressed by the United States and Iowa Supreme Court in 

Roper and Null that the heinous nature of a crime could cause courts to overlook 
10

the factors of youth. He notes that “all of the Lyle factors serve to mitigate [his] 

proper punishment.” 

We agree Lyle’s direction to treat “the circumstances of the crime” as 

mitigating was broad enough to encompass the circumstances immediately 

following commission of the crime. Applying these factors in Roby, the court 

stressed that the circumstances of the crime “do not necessarily weigh against 

mitigation when the crime caused grave harm or involved especially brutal 

circumstances.” 897 N.W.2d at 146. The court admonished “judges [not to] 

necessarily use the seriousness of a criminal act, such as murder, to conclude the 

juvenile falls within the minority of juveniles who will be future offenders or are not 

amenable to reform.” Id. The court noted “delinquency is normally transient, and 

most juveniles will grow out of it by the time brain development is complete.” Id.

at 147. 

Recently, however, the court applied the circumstances of the crime and 

the prospects of rehabilitation as aggravating factors. In Goodwin v. Iowa District

Court for Davis County, 936 N.W.2d 634, 647 (Iowa 2019), the court stated, “Our 

sentencing courts can and should consider the heinous nature of the crime in 

evaluating whether to impose a mandatory minimum sentence.” With respect to 

the prospects of rehabilitation, the court cited an expert opinion that the juvenile 

would benefit from rehabilitative programs available in a prison setting. Id.

We are left with a legal landscape that requires resentencing courts to treat 

the Lyle factors, including the circumstances of the crime and the prospect of 

rehabilitation, as mitigating, yet allows courts to treat the identical statutory factors 

as aggravating. See Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(b)(2)(h), (u). The district court carefully 
11

navigated this fraught landscape in addressing the circumstances of the crime. 

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating this factor.

Deases next takes issue with the opinion of the State’s expert. He notes 

that “[h]er entire opinion of him was based upon her review of the transcripts of his 

trial, which occurred more than 30 years ago,” and “much of her testimony is called 

into question by scientific evidence recently cited by the Iowa Supreme Court.” 

Deases’ critique of the expert’s reliance on the trial transcript is well taken.

See Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 145 (noting age and features of youthful behavior “is 

most meaningfully applied when based on qualified professional assessments of 

the offender’s decisional capacity” and citing the use of “validated assessment 

methods” and “an expert’s ‘developmental and clinical knowledge and experience 

to integrate [the] information’”) (citing Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing 

Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 675, 696–97(2016)). The 

expert, in no uncertain terms, based her opinion on the trial evidence. She stated, 

I did not personally evaluate [Deases], therefore, I cannot provide 

any definitive diagnosis. What I am saying is that the behavior that 

was described at the trial, the behavior described in the trial 

testimony for which he was found guilty by a jury of his peers is very 

consistent with what we see and think about in psychopathy.

She also stated, 

It is my opinion that the severity of the crime and the demonstrated 

lack of remorse and empathy not only for the victim but for other 

people involved in the crime are much more consistent with a 

psychopathic presentation as opposed to . . . an adolescent who is 

at this unbalanced stage of brain development and makes a bad 

choice in the moment.
12

Despite not having performed “standardized tests” on Deases, she said her opinion 

“would have been the same” had she performed those tests, “given the severity of 

the behaviors.” 

The expert’s focus on the crime as established in the trial transcript appears 

at odds with precedent, including the recent case of Bonilla v. Iowa Board of 

Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 772 (Iowa 2019). There, the court stated, “The focus of 

Graham-Miller is on the dynamic evolving character of the juvenile offender, not 

on the static characteristic of the offense.” Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 772 (citing Miller 

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–73 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–69

(2010)). The court further stated, “[T]he focus of the decision whether to release 

a juvenile offender on parole under Graham-Miller cannot be the heinousness of 

the underlying offense.” Id. Although Bonilla addressed the role of the parole 

board rather than the district court on resentencing, the court cited sentencing 

precedent, stating, “[F]rom the beginning of the development of its recent 

application of cruel and unusual punishment concepts to juveniles, the Supreme 

Court has emphasized that ‘[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or 

cold blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments 

based on youth.’” Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 

While we question the propriety of the State’s expert opinion, we note that 

the district court did not rely on her testimony to the exclusion of other record 

evidence. The court merely summarized her testimony and that of the defense 

expert without finding one or the other more credible. And the court independently 

weighed the Lyle and statutory factors. Cf. State v. Majors, 897 N.W.2d 124, 127 

(Iowa 2017) (noting court misapplied the factors). Under these circumstances, we 
13

conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in considering the opinions of the 

State expert.

In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s thorough ruling. 

See State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 173 (Iowa 2018) (“The record reveals the 

sentencing court addressed a variety of factors in response to the evidence and 

argument presented by Crooks, including those Miller/Lyle factors identified by 

Crooks. We find no abuse of discretion.”). We affirm Deases’ sentence of life with 

the possibility of parole after forty years. 

AFFIRMED.

Doyle, J., concurs; May, J. concurs specially.
14

MAY, Judge. (concurring specially)

As the majority explains in its detailed and thoughtful opinion, the district 

court’s sentence was supported by the record and consistent with existing 

precedent. I wholeheartedly agree there was no abuse of discretion and we should 

affirm. 

Still, I respectfully submit we should not question the propriety of the State’s 

expert, Dr. Jill Kelderman. Deases criticizes Dr. Kelderman’s methodology 

because, although she reviewed the transcript from Deases’s trial and gained 

additional information concerning Deases’s performance in confinement, 

Dr. Kelderman did not meet with Deases personally. Yet it is beyond dispute that 

Dr. Kelderman is a highly-qualified pediatric neuropsychologist. In her testimony, 

Dr. Kelderman was open about her methods and what conclusions those methods 

could—or could not—support. For example, on cross-examination, she conceded: 

“I did not personally evaluate him, therefore, I cannot provide any definitive 

diagnosis.” Still, based on her expertise and the information available to her, she 

was able to opine that Deases’s behavior had been “very consistent with what we 

see and think about in psychopathy.” And, she explained, her opinions were “not 

significantly” affected by the fact she had not conducted a personalized 

assessment:

Q. Did you perform any standardized tests on Mr. Deases? A. 

I did not. I did not have the opportunity to do that. 

Q. Do you think that that affects your opinion in this case? A. 

Not significantly. I think it might have fine tuned, maybe refined some

ideas about his level of intellectual functioning and other aspects of 

cognition. I think at the end of the day—because I did think about 

this issue of not being able to conduct an assessment. I think at the 

end of the day given the severity of the behaviors, multiple 

behaviors—it was pretty profound evidence in my opinion of what we 
15

just talked about in terms of evidence of psychopathy, and so for that 

reason—you know, while the standardized assessment in this 

particular situation may provide a few more refined—more refined 

information about his cognitive profile, at the end of the day I think 

the general opinion would have been the same. 

I have no reservations about the sentencing judge’s ability to analyze this 

kind of testimony and determine what weight—if any—it should receive. State v. 

Guise, No. 17-0589, 2018 WL 2084846, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) 

(McDonald, J., dissenting) (noting “[t]he sentencing court acts within its core

competency in receiving the evidence, determining the appropriate inferences, if 

any, to be drawn from the evidence, and determining the weight of the evidence”), 

majority decision vacated, 921 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 2018). And I have found no case 

that prescribes any particular methods—such as in-person assessments—

pediatric neuropsychologists must employ before they can testify at a sentencing 

hearing. Nor have I found any case that prohibits the use of certain methods—

such as the review of trial transcripts—by testifying pediatric neuropsychologists. 

While it is true that State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 146–48 (Iowa 2017),

emphasized the value of “expert testimony” in sentencing and, indeed, made 

reference to some tools available to experts (e.g., “social maturity scales”), I do not 

believe Roby or any other case has dictated what methods a pediatric 

neuropsychologist must or must not employ when forming expert opinions. 

Likewise, I have found no case that dictates what opinions a pediatric 

neuropsychologist may reach or present in a sentencing hearing. In any event, I 

am not concerned by the fact that Dr. Kelderman’s opinions focused substantially 

on Deases’s criminal actions. As Goodwin v. Iowa District Court made clear, 

“sentencing courts can and should consider the heinous nature of the crime.” 936 
16

N.W.2d 634, 647 (Iowa 2019). And I have no fear that evidence of a defendant’s

crime—however heinous—will improperly “overpower mitigating arguments based 

on youth,” as the Roper v. Simmons court put it. 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). The 

Roper court’s concerns were about jurors in death-penalty cases. 543 U.S at 573. 

In my view, those concerns have considerably less relevance to our judges. 

Iowa’s sentencing judges are regularly called upon to consider all kinds of terrible 

circumstances, including the heinous details of defendants’ crimes. And they are 

regularly called upon to balance those troubling details against all of the other 

evidence and arguments presented—mitigating or otherwise—as they determine 

what sentence will “provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the 

defendant” as well as “protection of the community from further offenses by the 

defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5 (2019). These are, indeed, central 

duties for a sentencing judge. See id. We can and should rely on our judges to 

perform these duties properly as they “administer justice according to the law.” Id.

§ 63.6.

I will end where I should have begun—with the Iowa Constitution itself. As 

Justice McDonald recently noted, “There is nothing in the text of the Iowa 

Constitution, as originally understood, that prohibits the imposition of a minimum 

sentence on a juvenile offender.” Goodwin, 936 N.W.2d at 649 (McDonald, J., 

specially concurring). Likewise, nothing in the text of the Iowa Constitution, as 

originally understood, casts doubt on the propriety of Dr. Kelderman’s testimony. 

Nor should we.