*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-20496

_____________________

MITZIE L. CRADDOCK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS and CRAIG HUGHES,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-94-3709)

_________________________________________________________________

March 28, 1997

Before REAVLEY, KING and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mitzie L. Craddock appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to defendants Deputy Constable Craig A.

Hughes and Harris County on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and the

court’s granting of summary judgment to Hughes on Mrs. Craddock’s

various state law claims. Finding no error, we affirm.

I. Background
 

1Hughes reported that there were approximately 200 youths,

while witnesses for the Craddocks provide varying numbers as low

as 20.

2

As this is a review of a summary judgment, we will state the

relevant facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. Craddock, the

nonmovant.

On October 19, 1991, Harris County Deputy Constable Hughes

responded to a complaint about a loud party at the Craddocks’

home in a residential area of Kingwood. Hughes observed a number

of youths in and around the Craddocks’ residence1 and several

cars parked along the street. Mrs. Craddock and her husband were

preparing to go to bed when one of the youths informed them that

a policeman was outside preparing to tow cars. Mrs. Craddock

went outside to investigate. She saw Hughes standing by his

patrol car apparently ticketing one of the youths. Mrs. Craddock

asked Hughes why he was planning to tow the cars. After some

discussion, Hughes asked Mrs. Craddock for identification. She

replied that she did not have any. Hughes then told Mrs.

Craddock to place her hands on his car. She did so, but Hughes

apparently did not like the way she placed them and he physically

repositioned her hands. Mrs. Craddock, believing Hughes was

about to frisk her, told him that he had no right to do so and

that she would not allow it. At that point, Mrs. Craddock’s

teenage son, Patrick, confronted Hughes about Hughes’s treatment

of Mrs. Craddock. After several verbal exchanges, Hughes chased

Patrick up the driveway. During the chase Mrs. Craddock went

back into her house.
3

A short time later, other deputy constables, including

Hughes’s supervisor, arrived at the Craddocks’ residence. The

supervisor told Mr. Craddock that he wanted to get Mrs.

Craddock’s and Patrick’s versions of the evening’s events. Mr.

Craddock did not want his wife and son to leave the house to

speak with the constables. The supervisor assured the Craddocks

that he only wanted to talk and did not plan to arrest anyone. 

The Craddocks then relayed their versions of what happened. 

Hughes promised to get a warrant and to return to arrest Mrs.

Craddock. After conducting a search of the exterior of the

Craddocks’ residence, the constables left.

Hughes and two other deputy constables returned to the

Craddocks’ residence on October 21 near midnight. They served a

warrant for Mrs. Craddock’s arrest for the offense of evading

arrest. She was taken to the Harris County jail and booked at

approximately 2:00 a.m. Mrs. Craddock was released on bond at

11:30 a.m.

Mrs. Craddock was tried for evading arrest in a Harris

County Criminal Court-at-Law on February 19, 1992. The trial

judge granted an instructed verdict of not guilty at the close of

evidence.

Mrs. Craddock filed a state court civil action against

Hughes and Harris County on July 23, 1993. She alleged state

law claims for false arrest, invasion of privacy, negligence,

conspiracy to falsely obtain an arrest warrant, and malicious

prosecution. On October 14, 1994, the court granted summary
 

2Harris County and Hughes argue that Mrs. Craddock’s § 1983

claims do not relate back to the date the original petition was

filed and, therefore, are barred by the two-year statute of

limitations. Due to our disposition of other issues on this

appeal, we do not reach this question.

4

judgment in favor of Harris County on all pending claims, but

allowed the claims asserted against Hughes to continue. On

October 17, 1994, Mrs. Craddock amended her petition to allege

federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Harris

County and Hughes.2 Relying on this newly-presented federal

question, defendants removed this lawsuit to federal district

court on October 31, 1994.

The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor

of both defendants on April 23, 1996. The summary judgment in

favor of Harris County on the § 1983 claim against the County was

based on Mrs. Craddock’s failure to allege facts or submit proof

indicating that her alleged deprivation of constitutionally

protected rights was a result of a Harris County policy or

custom. Summary judgment in favor of Hughes was granted based on

qualified immunity and disposed of all pending claims, which

consisted of the § 1983 claims as well as the various state law

claims.

Mrs. Craddock timely filed a notice of appeal. On appeal,

Mrs. Craddock argues that several fact issues are present,

precluding the granting of summary judgment. Mrs. Craddock

alleges that the October 21 arrest was illegal and

unconstitutional because it was based on an invalid warrant. She

relies on events from the October 19 incident to attempt to
5

establish the illegality of the arrest warrant and as evidence of

an official Harris County policy or custom that led to a

constitutional deprivation.

II. Standard of Review

This court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same criteria used by the district court in the

first instance. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th

Cir. 1994). First, the court consults the applicable law to

ascertain the material factual issues. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d

653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1992). The court then reviews the evidence

bearing on those issues, viewing the facts and inferences to be

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th

Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

III. Claims Against Hughes

A. Section 1983 Claims

Hughes obtained an arrest warrant before arresting Mrs.

Craddock. Therefore, in order to recover from Hughes under

§ 1983 for any damages arising from the arrest, Mrs. Craddock

must make a showing that Hughes, in his arrest warrant affidavit,

intentionally misrepresented material facts, stated material
 

3Hughes’s affidavit stated in full as follows:

Affiant, C.A. Hughes, is a credible and reliable person

who is reputably employed as a peace officer with

Harris County Constable’s Office. Affiant believes and

has reason to believe that Defendant, Mitzie Craddock,

committed the offense of evading arrest on October 19,

1991, in Harris County, Texas. Affiant spoke with the

Defendant regarding a party at her house where people

under the age of 21 were drinking alcoholic beverages. 

The Defendant stated that it was under her residence. 

Affiant learned from her son, who is 18 YOA that he was

having a party. Affiant saw that alcoholic beverages

were provided. Affiant, who was in uniform, attempted

to arrest the Defendant when she turned away from him

and ran into her residence evading arrest. The

Defendant knew the Affiant was a police officer and

knew that Affiant was attempting to arrest her.

6

facts in reckless disregard for the truth, or omitted material

facts. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, we find that no issue of material fact exists as to

whether Hughes violated the Franks v. Delaware standard. 

Undoubtedly, there is substantial disagreement as to what

actually happened between Mrs. Craddock and Hughes on the night

of the party. However, Mrs. Craddock’s version of the events

simply does not call into question whether Hughes intentionally

or recklessly included or omitted false information in the

affidavit.3

Mrs. Craddock attempts to attack Hughes’s affidavit by

questioning the evidentiary support for several representations

contained therein. Most notably, she disputes whether minors

were drinking alcohol, whether alcohol was provided, whether

Hughes was attempting to arrest her, and whether she knew Hughes
 

4The district court granted summary judgment on Mrs.

Craddock’s § 1983 claims against Hughes based on Hughes’s

qualified immunity. However, we find that the summary judgment

evidence raised no issue of material fact as to whether Hughes

violated Mrs. Craddock’s constitutional rights. Qualified

immunity need not be inquired into, as no constitutional right

has been violated. Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1124 (5th

Cir. 1981).

7

was attempting to arrest her when she fled into the house. Under

the undisputed facts, there were minors at the party, there was

alcohol at the party, and Hughes, even from Mrs. Craddock’s point

of view, was attempting to detain her when Patrick interfered

with Hughes’s actions and Mrs. Craddock went back into her house. 

We note that the offense with which Mrs. Craddock was charged

actually encompassed evading arrest or evading detention. See

TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04 (Vernon 1994). That Hughes stated in his

affidavit he was attempting to “arrest” Mrs. Craddock and also

stated that Mrs. Craddock knew she was being “arrested” when she

fled into her house, rather than using the word “detained”, does

not cause Hughes’s arrest warrant affidavit to fail the Franks v.

Delaware standard. We do not require law enforcement officers to

be grammarians. Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.

1982).4

B. State Law Claims

The district court found that Hughes was protected by 

qualified immunity from further litigation of Mrs. Craddock’s

state law claims. Texas allows qualified immunity as an

affirmative defense by a governmental employee if three tests are

met: (1) the employee was performing discretionary duties, (2)
8

the employee was acting in good faith, and (3) the employee was

acting within the scope of his authority. Wyse v. Department of

Pub. Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. App.--Waco 1986, writ

ref’d).

The only element that seems to be in dispute in this case is

whether Hughes was acting in good faith. The Texas standard for

determining whether a law enforcement officer acted in good

faith, which is derived from the federal standard for § 1983

actions, measures whether a reasonably prudent law enforcement

officer could have believed that the defendant officer’s acts

were justified under the same or similar circumstances. See City

of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.

1994)(establishing the good faith standard for pursuit cases).

Mrs. Craddock has not raised a fact issue as to whether

Hughes’s actions on the night of the party and his actions in

executing the warrant meet the Texas standard for qualified

immunity. The district court correctly concluded that Hughes was

entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity

on all of Mrs. Craddock’s state law claims.

IV. Harris County

In order to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal policy or custom

caused a constitutional deprivation. Monell v. New York City

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978); Rhyne v.

Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992). Although

Mrs. Craddock has attempted to raise several “customs or
9

policies” of Harris County, we find that she has not raised a

material fact issue as to whether any Harris County custom or

policy actually caused any injuries she may have suffered.

AFFIRMED.