[Cite as State v. Adams, 2014-Ohio-2728.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

STEVEN ADAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-130559 

TRIAL NO. C-13CRB-24244 

 

O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Vacated 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 25, 2014 

Terry Nestor, Interim City Solicitor, and Melanie Reising, Senior Assistant City 

Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

The Law Office of Steven R. Adams and Marguerite Slagle, for DefendantAppellant. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

Per Curiam. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 

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{¶1} Defendant-appellant Steven Adams, a defense attorney, appeals the 

trial court’s judgment finding him in contempt of court under R.C. 2705.01 for his 

conduct at a hearing, and imposing a sentence of 30 days in jail and a $250 fine, 

which Adams could “purge” by apologizing to the court and to the city prosecutor. 

Because the trial court abused its discretion in finding Adams in direct contempt, we 

reverse the trial court’s judgment and vacate the order of contempt. 

The Alleged Contemptuous Conduct and Subsequent Hearing 

{¶2} This contempt case arises from a driving-under-the-influence 

prosecution in the Hamilton County Municipal Court, State v. Amanda Pate, case 

number 12TRC-8709. Adams represented Pate in connection with that prosecution, 

and at a motion-to-suppress hearing on July 31, 2013. At the hearing, Adams, 

Melanie Reising, a prosecutor for the city of Cincinnati, and the trial court engaged in 

a discussion regarding Pate’s driving privileges pending trial. Reising inquired as to 

whether the court intended to suspend Pate’s driving privileges. The following 

exchange then took place: 

MR. ADAMS: There was never a Court suspension here. The 

suspension is under the Administrative License Suspension only, and 

if Ms. Reising knew the law, she would be able to articulate to you, but 

she -- 

THE COURT: Hold on. 

MR. ADAMS: If she wanted to argue for a public safety suspension, 

she could have and should have done it early on. She did not. Now 

we’re over a year later or so, year and a half, and now she’s wanting to 

punish her? I mean, even if she was convicted of a DUI, she most 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 

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likely wouldn’t get more than six months here anyway. So for the 

Court to impose a punishment at this point in time and she’s got a 

valid license and not let her go back to Atlanta, work, travel to and 

from the courthouse is being vindictive and not fair. 

THE COURT: No, she’s not. She’s looking out for the public interest. 

MR. ADAMS: There’s no public interest here. 

THE COURT: There is a public interest. 

MR. ADAMS: If the public interest was six-months to a three-year 

suspension -- and we all know in this courthouse -- there was no 

accident here, there’s nothing egregious about this particular DUI. If 

she pled out, it would be a six-month suspension retroactive from the 

date of the incident. We’re well over a year, over a year and a half. 

There’s no public interest here. It’s punitive and it’s vindictive here. 

THE COURT: Don’t you agree that the -- first of all, we’ll do like we 

did in government, that we don’t attack the motives of either party. 

MR. ADAMS: No, no. Thomas Jefferson said, government is evil. He 

did say that. Government is evil. 

THE COURT: All right. Well, we don’t attack the motives of each 

other. * * * 

The trial court then addressed Pate directly and stated that the court would 

expand her driving privileges, not suspend them. Reising and Adams continued to 

argue with each other, even memorializing on the record that Reising would not give 

Adams “any favors, any plea bargains ever again[,]” to which the trial court 

responded, “All right. That’s enough.” The hearing adjourned. 
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{¶3} On August 6, 2013, the trial court conducted an in-chambers meeting 

with Adams and Reising, on the record, prior to a hearing on the Pate case. The trial 

court admonished Adams: “I thought that you went pretty far afield in terms of your 

behavior towards the City, in terms of [--] the Court asked several times -- actually 

asked you both, but I asked you first not to engage in any kind of personal language 

towards the City and the case.” Adams responded, “I didn’t do that, Judge. I have 

the transcript. I did not do that.” After some further disagreement between the 

court and Adams regarding Adams’s previous conduct, the following occurred: 

THE COURT: * * * We’ll take a look at the transcript and call it back 

for review of the transcript on that issue, all right? 

MR. ADAMS: What is the issue, Judge? 

THE COURT: Well, the issue is disrespectful behavior to counsel and 

to the Court. 

MR. ADAMS: Oh, well, I was not disrespectful to the Court. I was not 

disrespectful to the prosecutor. 

THE COURT: All right. Well, that’s obviously a question for later on 

after I see the transcript. I thought maybe you would have taken the 

opportunity to apologize to the prosecutor and to the Court. 

MR. ADAMS: No, Judge. I didn’t do anything improper. The Court 

on the day that this occurred did not say anything to me that I was 

improper, did not tell me to stop, did not give me any orders, so I 

didn’t do anything improper, Judge, nothing. 

{¶4} The court journalized an entry in the Pate case setting a hearing date 

for August 23, 2013, on the “conduct” of Adams and Reising. Adams filed a motion 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 

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objecting to the “conduct hearing,” arguing that the trial court had no authority to 

hold such a hearing. 

{¶5} The court held the hearing on August 23, 2013, where Adams objected 

again to the court’s authority to hold a “conduct hearing.” The court clarified that it 

was conducting a direct-contempt hearing under R.C. 2705.01. The court then 

addressed Adams as follows: 

My review of your conduct was that it was, in addition to being overly 

aggressive, very loud, aggressive towards the city prosecutor in such a 

way that it stimulated a -- I think what I would call an overreaction [by 

Reising] at the end of the hearing in defense of herself. I was actually 

shocked by your behavior, by how loud and aggressive you were. 

I was here in the courtroom so I could -- I could sense it. It was my 

courtroom. I had the impression that the level of tension was raised 

much, much higher than it ought to have been by you. I believe there 

was a lack of civility on your part, and I didn’t understand it. 

* * * 

I’ve reviewed the transcript. One of the things that the transcript can’t 

capture -- although there are words there, the transcript can’t capture 

the tone, aggressiveness, attitude. 

{¶6} The court then entered an order finding Adams in direct contempt 

under R.C. 2705.01, and imposing a sentence of 30 days in jail and a $250 fine. The 

court determined that Adams could “purge” the contempt by apologizing to the court 

and to Reising by September 23, 2013. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 

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{¶7} Adams now appeals the trial court’s contempt order, which the trial 

court stayed pending appeal. 

Appealability of Contempt Order 

{¶8} R.C. 2705.09 provides for the appealability of contempt orders. Courts 

have held that in order for a contempt order to be final and appealable, it must 

include both a finding of contempt and the imposition of a penalty or sanction. State 

ex rel. Doe v. Tracy, 51 Ohio App.3d 198, 555 N.E.2d 674 (12th Dist.1988); Kahles v. 

Luken, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-780675, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9524, *5 (Dec. 12, 

1979). Thus, as a general matter, where a contempt order gives the contemnor an 

opportunity to purge the contempt, no final, appealable order exists. Carroll Cty. 

Bur. of Support v. Brill, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 05 CA 818, 2005-Ohio-6788, ¶ 22, 

citing Davis v. Davis, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2572, 2004-Ohio-4390, ¶ 6. 

{¶9} Purge conditions in contempt orders generally seek to coerce 

compliance with a court order. See, e.g., McRae v. McRae, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C110743, 2012-Ohio-2463, ¶ 6. In this case, the trial court determined that Adams 

could “purge” his contempt by issuing an apology. The purge condition—the 

apology—did not seek compliance with a court order, but was more akin to a 

punishment. Moreover, Adams can no longer comply with the purge condition 

because it expired on September 23, 2013. Therefore, we determine that the 

contempt order in this instance is a final, appealable order, despite the inclusion of a 

“purge” condition. 

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 

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Direct Criminal Contempt 

{¶10} We turn now to the merits of Adams’s appeal, in which Adams raises 

in a single assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

Adams in direct contempt under R.C. 2705.01. As recognized by Adams’s 

assignment of error, a determination of contempt by a trial court is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. An abuse of discretion requires a finding that the trial 

court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶11} R.C. 2705.01 allows a court to “summarily punish a person guilty of 

misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the 

administration of justice[,]” also known as direct contempt. In re Thomas, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-030429, 2004-Ohio-373, ¶ 4. By contrast, indirect contempt 

involves acts occurring outside the presence of the court. Id. 

{¶12} Two conditions must be met before a court may summarily punish a 

person for contempt: (1) the trial court “must have personal knowledge of the 

disruptive conduct ‘acquired by his own observation of the contemptuous conduct.’ ” 

State v. Stegall, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110767, C-120112 and C-120113, 2012-

Ohio-3792, ¶ 40, quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 

(1948); and (2) “the conduct must pose ‘an open threat to the orderly procedure of 

the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before 

the public’ that, if ‘not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the 

court’s authority will follow.’ ” Stegall at ¶ 40, quoting In re Oliver at 275. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 

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{¶13} In addition to the distinction in contempt proceedings between direct 

and indirect, contempt proceedings can be either civil or criminal, depending on the 

purpose of the sanction. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d at 205, 400 N.E.2d 386. Civil 

contempt proceedings seek to coerce the contemnor into complying with a lawful 

court order; by contrast, criminal contempt proceedings seek to vindicate the court’s 

authority and to punish the contemnor. Id. at 204-205. Generally, a criminal 

contempt sanction consists of an unconditional punishment; however, not every 

conditional sanction is civil. In re Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-030429, 2004-

Ohio-373, at ¶ 5; Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d at 205-206, 400 N.E.2d 386. 

{¶14} Although the trial court conditioned Adams’s jail sentence and fine on 

whether he apologized, the purpose of the sanction was not to coerce Adams to 

comply with a court order, but to punish Adams for prior conduct. Therefore, 

although the trial court stated that Adams could “purge” the contempt by 

apologizing, the contempt proceedings against Adams were criminal in nature. 

Criminal contempt proceedings require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

re Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-030429, 2004-Ohio-373, at ¶ 5, citing Brown v. 

Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 250, 253, 416 N.E.2d 610 (1980). 

{¶15} In his appeal, Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adams’s conduct constituted 

misbehavior that obstructed justice and required immediate punishment. While we 

agree that this conduct does not constitute direct criminal contempt beyond a 

reasonable doubt, this court does not condone uncivil, discourteous behavior. 

{¶16} In this case, Adams did not display exemplary conduct befitting an 

officer of the court; however, Adams’s conduct did not constitute an immediate 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 

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threat to the administration of justice. See In re LoDico, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2003-

CA-00446, 2005-Ohio-172, ¶ 73, quoting State v. Conliff, 61 Ohio App.2d 185, 190, 

401 N.E.2d 469 (10th Dist.1978) (determining that counsel’s “unwise, insolent and 

probably personally insulting” conduct did not rise to the level of direct contempt); 

see also In re Brannon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19619, 2003-Ohio-4423, ¶ 98 

(determining that counsel’s interruption of opposing counsel on two occasions and 

request that the trial judge “hold her voice down” did not amount to contemptuous 

conduct because the remarks “presented no actual or imminent threat to the 

administration of justice.”); State v. Schiewe, 110 Ohio App.3d 170, 673 N.E.2d 941, 

943 (6th Dist.1996). 

{¶17} Therefore, because the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that 

Adams’s conduct constituted direct criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in entering its contempt order 

against Adams. 

Conclusion 

{¶18} In conclusion, we sustain Adams’s assignment of error, and we vacate 

the trial court’s order holding Adams in contempt. 

Judgment vacated. 

HILDEBRANDT, P.J., DINKELACKER andFISCHER, JJ.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.