NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-4249

___________

JOSEPH SERFESS,

Appellant

v.

EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION SERVICE, LLC; 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.N.J. No. 1-13-cv-00406)

District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 3, 2017

Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 6, 2017)

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OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Joseph Serfess appeals, pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court’s order 

denying his motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. We will affirm. 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Serfess filed suit against Equifax Credit Information Services, LLC, and its 

corporate parent, Bank of America N.A., in 2013, alleging violations of the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act. The District Court granted Bank of America, N.A.’s motion for summary 

judgment, denied Serfess’s motion to strike, and closed the case by order entered on 

August 24, 2016. Serfess filed a notice of appeal on September 26, 2016.1 After being 

informed by our Clerk that his notice of appeal appeared untimely on October 17, 2016, 

Serfess moved for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, arguing that he had a 

day job and “does not have the time to check up on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

or Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure on a daily basis.” The District Court denied the 

motion to extend on November 4, 2016, finding a lack of good cause or excusable 

neglect. Serfess timely appealed that order. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the District Court’s 

decision for abuse of discretion. Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 

322 (3d Cir. 2012). 

Serfess fails to make any argument concerning good cause or excusable neglect in 

any of his filings before this Court. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); Joseph v. Hess Oil 

Virgin Islands Corp., 651 F.3d 348, 355-56 (3d Cir. 2011). His initial brief contends only 

that the District Court erroneously calculated the timeline to file a notice of appeal, and 

 

1 Serfess mailed his notice of appeal the day after it was due, and we dismissed his appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction due to untimely filing. See Serfess v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 

et al., C.A. No. 16-3742 (Feb. 6, 2017).
3

asserts that his notice of appeal was thus timely filed. This has no bearing on whether the 

District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for an extension of time to file 

a notice of appeal.2 Because he did not address this issue in his opening brief, any further 

arguments on this point are waived. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 

1993). 

Even if they were not waived, we agree with the District Court that Serfess has 

shown neither good cause nor excusable neglect. Serfess argued he had good cause to 

file an untimely notice of appeal because the courthouse was closed on Saturday, 

September 24. However, the appeal was due the previous day, so the courthouse being 

closed on Saturday had no effect on Serfess’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal, and 

thus cannot demonstrate good cause. See Joseph, 651 F.3d at 355-56. And, Serfess’s 

failure to correctly calculate the appropriate timeframe for filing an appeal is insufficient 

to show excusable neglect. See Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 

507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993) (“inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing 

the rules do not usually constitute excusable neglect”) (internal quotations omitted). 

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

 

2 Serfess is wrong in any event. He says that the District Court improperly counted 

August 24, 2016 – the date that the District Court granted Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment – in calculating his time to appeal. Thus, he asserts that his notice of 

appeal, which was mailed on September 24, 2016, and received on September Monday, 

September 26, 2016, was timely filed. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C). But the District 

Court properly determined that, after entering its final order on August 24, the thirty-day 

time period to appeal began the next day. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 26(a)(1). 

Thus, the final day to appeal was Friday, September 23, 2016, and Serfess’s notice of 

appeal was untimely filed on September 26, 2016.