COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

TYRONE DRUMGOOLE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1055-97-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MARCH 24, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 

Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 

 Andrew E. Weaver (Traylor, Morris & Wornom, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Tyrone Drumgoole (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial 

of robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58. On appeal, he 

contends the trial court erred in allowing questioning on 

cross-examination that was beyond the scope of the direct 

examination. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 I. 

 On June 29, 1996, David Anderson, the victim, went to pick 

up his daughter at her mother's apartment. When he arrived at 

the apartment several people were present, including the 

daughter's grandmother, Clifton Bailey, Mario Smith, Tyrone Pair, 

and appellant. Bailey repeatedly asked Anderson for money to buy 

beer and later to speak with him outside the apartment. During 

the conversation outside, Anderson noticed Pair, Smith, and 
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appellant approach. Anderson was hit from behind and knocked 

unconscious. He did not see his attacker. When he awoke he 

discovered $20 to $30 was missing from his right front pocket. A 

grand jury indicted appellant on charges of malicious wounding in 

violation of Code § 18.2-51 and robbery in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-58. 

 At trial, Tawanda Hollomond, a convicted felon, testified 

for the Commonwealth. Hollomond stated that she knew both 

appellant and the victim, was present at the time of the attack, 

and saw the victim conversing with appellant and the others. She 

heard a "slapping noise" and saw Anderson on the ground. 

Hollomond stated that she observed appellant go through the 

victim's pockets and remove something from the right front 

pocket. On cross-examination, Hollomond admitted that twelve 

years earlier she had argued with appellant regarding overdue 

video tapes, but denied any more recent conflict. 

 On direct examination, appellant limited his testimony to 

the video dispute with Hollomond and added that he and Hollomond 

had two past disputes. He described the argument mentioned by 

Hollomond which occurred twelve years earlier and also described 

an argument as recent as one or two years earlier in which 

Hollomond said "she was going to get him." His relationship with 

Hollomond was the only issue covered on appellant's direct 

examination. 

 On cross-examination, the Commonwealth questioned appellant 
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about the Hollomond disputes. Additionally, and over defense 

objection, the prosecutor also asked appellant about the night 

Anderson was attacked. The trial court overruled the defense 

objection, stating, "[h]e may make him his witness, but I don't 

believe the defense takes the stand on any qualified immunity. I 

believe the Commonwealth can explore other issues to include the 

events of that evening." 

 The jury acquitted appellant of malicious wounding but found 

him guilty of robbery. He was sentenced to serve five years 

imprisonment. 

 II. 

 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to cross-examine 

appellant beyond the scope of matters raised on direct 

examination. Appellant contends the Commonwealth could only 

question him regarding his relationship with Tawanda Hollomond 

and nothing further. This argument is without merit. 

 "In any case of felony or misdemeanor, the accused may be 

sworn and examined in his own behalf, and if so sworn and 

examined, he shall be deemed to have waived his privilege of not 

giving evidence against himself, and shall be subject to 

cross-examination as any other witness . . . ." Code § 19.2-268 

(emphasis added). "Cross-examination . . . entitles the 

Commonwealth to bring out . . . facts relating to the guilt or 

innocence of the accused . . . ." Thaniel v. Commonwealth, 132 
 4 

Va. 795, 806, 111 S.E. 259, 262 (1922). 

 [W]hen the accused voluntarily takes the 

stand he "loses his character as a party, 

becomes a mere witness, and may be examined 

as fully as any other witness. He may be 

examined and must answer concerning all 

matters which are relevant to the case, 

whether testified to on the direct 

examination or not." 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 585, 598, 30 S.E.2d 26, 31 (1944) 

(citation omitted). 

 [T]o confine the cross-examination of the 

accused to such matters as have been brought 

out on direct examination is "palpably unfair 

to the prosecution," for since it can not 

call him as a witness or compel him to 

testify on direct examination, unless it 

could develop relevant facts on his 

cross-examination it might be deprived of all 

means of proving them, and this, too, 

although the accused, by voluntarily taking 

the stand, had waived the privilege of 

self-incrimination. 

Id. at 600-01, 30 S.E.2d at 32. 

 In the instant case, appellant testified on direct 

examination about his adversarial relationship with Hollomond in 

an effort to discredit her testimony concerning the circumstances 

of the robbery. Under the rationale of Smith and Thaniel, once 

appellant testified in this manner, the Commonwealth could 

explore additional matters relating to the facts of the case on 

cross-examination. 

 Appellant also argues that even if the Commonwealth was 

permitted to expand the areas covered on cross-examination beyond 

the scope of direct, such questioning must be reserved for 
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rebuttal. A trial judge has great latitude in admitting 

testimony during cross-examination. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 

18 Va. App. 692, 693-94, 446 S.E.2d 619, 619 (1994). The trial 

court possesses broad discretion regarding the order of proof and 

examination of witnesses and its decisions thereon can be 

overturned only for an abuse of discretion. See Satcher v. 

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 252, 421 S.E.2d 821, 840 (1992), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993). "[I]t is now universally held that 

the order in which the evidence is introduced is a matter which 

rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless 

abused the exercise of such discretion is not ground for 

reversal." Smith, 182 Va. at 600, 30 S.E.2d at 32. We find no 

abuse of discretion, and for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 Affirmed.