J-S10006-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM V. CHIKONYERA,

Appellant No. 3830 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 24, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001033-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SOLANO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 01, 2017

Appellant, William V. Chikonyera, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of 4 years’ probation, imposed after he was convicted, following a 

non-jury trial, of retail theft, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3929(a)(1), and criminal 

conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). On appeal, Appellant solely challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. We affirm.

Briefly, Appellant was arrested and charged with the above-stated 

offenses based on his and a cohort’s theft of two computer monitors from a 

Walmart store located in Philadelphia. Appellant proceeded to a non-jury 

trial and was ultimately convicted of retail theft and criminal conspiracy. On 

November 24, 2015, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 4 years’ 

probation. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he also timely 

complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

The court filed a responsive opinion on March 21, 2016. Herein, Appellant 
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presents one issue for our review, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

to sustain his convictions. See Appellant’s Brief at 3.

To begin, we note that:

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 

133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Again, Appellant was convicted of retail theft and criminal conspiracy. 

Retail theft is defined in the Crimes Code, as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of a retail theft if he:

(1) takes possession of, carries away, transfers or causes 

to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise 

displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or 

other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of 

depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of 

such merchandise without paying the full retail value 

thereof;

18 Pa.C.S. § 3929(a)(1). Additionally, criminal conspiracy is defined as:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy 

with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the 

intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or 

one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or
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(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1)-(2).

In this case, Appellant presents a very cursory argument in 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. 

Essentially, he maintains that the evidence demonstrated only that he was 

present at the scene while his cohort committed the retail theft. After 

reviewing the record, we disagree. The evidence presented at Appellant’s 

trial, as summarized by the trial court below, was clearly sufficient to prove 

that he committed both retail theft and criminal conspiracy:

Omar Santos (“Mr. Santos”) testified that on May 12[], 

2014, at 11:20 [a.m.], he worked as a security officer at the 

Walmart located at One Franklin Mills Boulevard in the city and 

county of Philadelphia. From the store security cameras, Mr. 

Santos observed a male named Mr. Markeece (“Markeece”) place 

two computer monitors into a shopping cart. Markeece then left 

the shopping cart with [] Appellant who proceeded to rip the 

security devices off [] the two computer monitors. Accordingly, 

once Mr. Santos saw the security devices being ripped off the 

monitors he contacted the police. Shortly after, Mr. Santos 

watched Markeece and [] Appellant exit the store. Markeece 

pushed the shopping cart, while [] Appellant walked along side 

[sic] of the shopping cart. [] Appellant and Markeece passed all 

points of sale, made no attempt to purchase the computer 

monitors, and no receipts were provided for the items.

Mr. Santos approached both suspects outside on the 

sidewalk and identified himself as a security officer. In 

response, Appellant started quickly walking to his car, while 

Markeece talked to Mr. Santos. As Mr. Santos spoke to 

Markeece, the police arrived on scene. Markeece abandoned the 

computer monitors in the shopping cart on the sidewalk, and 

took off running.
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Officer Jared Attewell, of the Philadelphia Police 

Department, arrived to the Walmart in response to Mr. 

Santos’[s] phone call. Upon his arrival, Officer Attewell observed 

Mr. Santos[’s] pointing to Markeece, who [the officer] observed 

run and attempt to get into the already moving vehicle being 

driven by [] Appellant. Officer Attewell then stopped the vehicle 

and placed both [] Appellant and Markeece under arrest. Mr. 

Santos identified Markeece and [] Appellant as the two 

individuals that took the shopping cart out of the store without 

paying.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/16, at 1-2 (citations to the record omitted).

This evidence clearly belies Appellant’s argument that he was merely 

present at the scene when Markeece stole the computer monitors. Appellant 

and Markeece obviously intended to steal the monitors, agreed to do so 

together, and both men committed overt acts in furtherance of that 

conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (“A conspiracy conviction requires proof of (1) an intent to 

commit or aid in an unlawful act, (2) an agreement with a co-conspirator 

and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.”) (citation omitted). 

Specifically, Markeece put the monitors into the cart, and Appellant removed 

their security tags, thus suggesting an intent to steal those items. The two 

men then walked out of the store together, with the cart containing the 

monitors. Neither Appellant nor Markeece attempted to pay for the 

monitors, further demonstrating their intent to steal them. Finally, when 

confronted by Mr. Santos outside the store, Appellant quickly walked away, 

and then subsequently assisted Markeece in fleeing from Officer Attewell by 

driving the get-away car. Appellant’s and Markeece’s flight indicated their 
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consciousness of guilt, and the court was free to consider it, along with the 

other evidence produced by the Commonwealth, in finding Appellant guilty. 

See Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 745 A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(citations omitted). Therefore, the evidence was more than sufficient to 

prove that Appellant committed retail theft and criminal conspiracy.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/1/2017