COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Decker, Malveaux and Senior Judge Clements 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

HOLLY MALONE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 0472-17-2 JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX 

 OCTOBER 31, 2017 

DINWIDDIE DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DINWIDDIE COUNTY 

Dennis M. Martin, Judge 

 

 Linwood T. Wells, III, for appellant. 

 Joan M. O’Donnell (M. Brooke Teefey, Guardian ad litem for the 

minor children; Olde Towne Lawyers, LLP; Teefey Law, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 The Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County (“circuit court”) entered orders terminating the 

residual parental rights of Holly Malone (“mother”) to each of her three children. She appeals 

those orders, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to warrant termination of her residual 

parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B).1

 For the following reasons, we conclude that the 

evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s findings and therefore affirm. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1

 Mother also assigns error to the circuit court’s finding that the evidence was sufficient 

to warrant termination of her residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). “Code 

§ 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2) set forth individual bases upon which a petitioner may seek to 

terminate residual parental rights.” City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 

Va. App. 556, 563, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003). Thus, a conclusion that the termination of 

mother’s parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 was warranted means we need 

not consider whether termination was also appropriate under another subsection. See, e.g., 

Cumbo v. Dickinson Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 62 Va. App. 124, 127 n.2, 742 S.E.2d 885, 886 

n.2 (2013); Butler v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 48 Va. App. 537, 548-49, 663 S.E.2d 

196, 201-02 (2006). Here, because we conclude that the circuit court did not err in terminating 

UNPUBLISHED 
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I. BACKGROUND 

 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Dinwiddie County Department 

of Social Services (“DSS”), the party that prevailed below, affording it all inferences that are 

fairly deducible from the evidence. See Bristol Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Welch, 64 Va. App. 34, 

40, 764 S.E.2d 284, 287 (2014). 

July 2013–March 2014: The initial involvement of DSS 

 In July 2013, DSS received a report alleging neglect of mother’s three children, J.A., 

N.N., and J.I. J.A., a boy, was eight years old at that time, N.N., a girl, was four years old, and 

J.I., a boy, was two years old. DSS staff visited mother’s home, where she lived with her 

children and the children’s father;2 her mother, who was physically impaired; and mother’s two 

adult sisters, one of whom had her own two children living with her. Gloria Browder-Parham, a 

DSS worker who participated in the home visit, testified during the termination proceedings that 

the home was infested with roaches, the floor was very dirty, and there was a hole in the 

bathroom floor. The residents had to use a screwdriver to turn on the water in the bathroom, and 

the children were dirty and had not been bathed. In the kitchen, dishes with dried food on them 

were piled in the sink and on the counter. There was little food, and items in the refrigerator 

were uncovered and stale. Mother shared a single room with all three of her children and the 

children’s father. 

DSS inquired about mother’s financial circumstances and learned that Georgia Moore, 

mother’s maternal aunt, normally handled the family’s money and brought them food as needed. 

Moore was the payee for mother’s Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), which she received 

 

mother’s residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B), we need not review its decision to 

terminate her parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 

2

 Father left the home within one to two months of DSS’ initial visit. His parental rights 

were terminated in separate proceedings. 
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for intellectual disabilities. Mother also received assistance through the Supplemental Nutrition 

Assistance Program (“SNAP”), but her SNAP card was in the possession of the children’s father. 

Moore was responsible for ensuring that rent and utility bills were paid on time, and provided 

mother with spending money each month. 

Later that week, DSS discovered that one of mother’s sons and one of her sister’s 

children suffered from untreated ringworm. A doctor’s visit was arranged for the children, but 

although mother was given ointment to treat the condition, her son’s ringworm got worse and her 

daughter also contracted ringworm. DSS determined that although mother opened the ointment, 

she was unable to administer the medicine at the appropriate times and in the correct doses. 

DSS continued to receive reports that mother’s children were being neglected, including 

accounts of filthy household conditions, excessively soiled diapers, and insufficient food. DSS 

also received reports that the children sometimes physically attacked mother. The agency 

opened a prevention case to monitor the progress of mother and the children’s father in meeting 

the children’s needs and providing for their basic care, but observed little improvement. 

March 2014–March 2015: Service provisions and preliminary protective orders 

 In March 2014, DSS arranged for Open Arms Family Services (“Open Arms”) to provide 

mother with an in-home parent aide and other assistance. Open Arms staff treated the home for 

roaches and removed and cleaned clothing and bedding. The parent aide, who was in the home 

three or four days each week for three to four hours per visit, assisted mother with budgeting, 

managing food and meal planning, hygiene, and maintaining a safe home. Open Arms staff also 

mentored the children. 

 Around June 20, 2014, DSS received a call regarding conditions in mother’s home. 

Browder-Parham visited the home and found that more people were living there, as each of 

mother’s sisters had recently had a child and the father of one of those children had moved in. 
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Browder-Parham observed human feces in the hallway that had been “trampled through.” She 

asked if anyone was going to clean up the feces, but no one took any action. After a few 

minutes, she said that someone needed to clean up the waste. Eventually, one of mother’s sisters 

used a towel or cloth to clean “just that one spot” before setting the waste on the kitchen table. 

Browder-Parham also received a report, prior to or during June 2014, that the older son, 

J.A., was “very aggressive in the home” and had been involved in inappropriate “sexual 

behaviors.” Later reports indicated that J.A. was involved in a sexual incident with a neighbor 

and sexual misconduct with his siblings. During home visits, Browder-Parham also witnessed 

the younger son, J.I., hit his mother when he did not get what he wanted. 

On June 24, 2014, DSS filed petitions alleging abuse or neglect of each child and seeking 

emergency removal orders and protective orders for each. On July 1, the Dinwiddie County 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (“J&DR court”) entered preliminary protective 

orders for all three children. Among other things, the protective orders required mother to: 

ensure that each child received a daily bath and all prescribed medications; prevent each child 

from engaging in physical altercations; provide sufficient food and supervision for each child; 

comply with her service providers’ daily household cleaning schedule and work with them to 

create weekly meal plans and grocery lists; and participate in a psychological evaluation. Those 

orders were extended in August and December 2014. The J&DR court specifically noted in each 

order that the “conditions (feces, lack of supervision, decaying food) in [the] household create 

risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental functions.” 

Although parent aide services were discontinued in September 2014, the family 

continued to receive other in-home services. DSS workers visited the home several times each 

week to ensure that the home was clean and safe and the children’s basic needs were being met. 

Mother made some efforts to attempt to care for the home, and took turns with her sisters 
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preparing meals and performing chores. However, mother was unable to complete many basic, 

daily childcare tasks without direction by DSS or other support staff. During Browder-Parham’s 

frequent home visits, she observed no significant change in mother’s parenting skills. DSS 

ultimately determined that mother remained unable to consistently care for and meet the basic 

needs of her children. Further, due to mother’s cognitive limitations and the special needs of the 

children,3 the children remained at risk for abuse and neglect while they continued to be in 

mother’s care. 

March 2015–December 2015: Foster care service plans and additional service provisions 

 On March 6, 2015, the J&DR court entered adjudicatory orders for all three children, 

finding each was abused or neglected as defined by Code § 16.1-228. The children were placed 

in the custody of DSS. When the children were removed from mother’s home, each was dirty 

and had a foul body odor. The two youngest children were suffering from tooth decay. J.I. 

required dental surgery, and N.N. had to have some of her teeth pulled. On April 28, 2015, the 

J&DR court entered orders approving foster care service plans for each child with an initial goal 

of returning them to mother’s home and a concurrent goal of adoption. 

 At that point, after more than a year of providing mother with services through Open 

Arms, DSS began to provide services through National Counseling Group (“NCG”). 

Browder-Parham testified that DSS decided “to put a different set of eyes on the situation 

because [Open Arms] had been in the home for a while and they felt they had basically 

exhausted the services that they could offer to have any significant change.” Through NCG, 

DSS provided mother with a parenting coach who visited with mother two to three days each 

week for at least two hours a day. These services were provided to mother for three to four 

 3

 Browder-Parham testified that J.I. is “on the autism spectrum” and that N.N. was 

diagnosed with “post[-]traumatic stress mathematics disorder and adjustment disorder with 

mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct.” 
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months. As with Open Arms, one of the goals of NCG was to assist mother with her personal 

hygiene, which continued to be an issue. 

During 2015, mother attended and completed parenting classes through the Virginia 

Cooperative Extension Service. By July, the household—including mother, her two sisters, and 

their disabled mother—had moved to a new house. By November, mother was living in her own 

house which she leased with her aunt, Georgia Moore. When a DSS worker visited the home in 

November 2015, there was trash in small bags in the kitchen and no trash in the trash can, “but 

there was something molding/spoiling in the bottom [of the can], there were roaches, []dishes in 

the kitchen sink that appeared to have been there for a while, and [the] water was turned off for 

the second time since October.” DSS staff also reported trash piled on the floor and back steps 

of the home and that a window in the home could not be closed. 

DSS scheduled two occasions when the children were to visit mother in her new home. 

The first visit took place during the Thanksgiving or Christmas holidays of 2015. 

Browder-Parham, who was present for the visit, testified that the defective window in mother’s 

home had not been repaired and was still open and that mother’s only source of heat at that time 

was an electric heater in the front portion of the house. To provide further heat for the visit, 

mother opened her oven door. Browder-Parham explained to mother the hazard this presented to 

the children. The visit was completed at another location, and the second visit was cancelled due 

to mother’s ongoing lack of adequate heat. 

December 2015: Mother’s psychological evaluation 

 Two clinical psychologists conducted mother’s court-ordered psychological evaluation 

during November and December 2015. In their report, they concluded that mother’s cognitive 

and emotional functioning is significantly impaired. In particular, they determined that her 

adaptive skills are “within the extremely low range indicating moderate to severe intellectual 
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disabilities” and that in the conceptual and social domain, she exhibits a “severe level of 

intellectual disability.” They noted that DSS and NCG records “suggest that the support from 

parenting aids [sic] and coaching provided to [mother] for the past two years resulted in minimal 

improvement to care for the children and the house,” and opined that mother’s “intellectual 

disabilities explain the minimal success after exhaustive efforts of training with parenting 

coaches.” The psychologists also concluded that mother’s “skills at organizing information, 

utilizing working memory, mental flexibility and developing problem-solving strategies are all 

significantly impaired, and they greatly limit her ability to adapt. [She] has limited ability to 

organize schedules and plan meals for the family.” Further, mother has “little understanding of 

written language or concepts involving numbers, quantity, time, and money. She will require 

significant support for problem-solving throughout life.” The psychologists recommended that 

mother “continue to get assistance from her aunt for managing her money and spending” and that 

she be “assisted with supervision of activities of daily living and developing an awareness of 

cleanliness and hygiene. She needs a high level of structure and support to function in any 

environment.” 

Browder-Parham testified that the outcome of mother’s psychological evaluation led DSS 

to file new foster care service plans seeking the children’s adoption. On December 28, 2015, 

DSS filed petitions for permanency planning hearings and new foster care service plans. 

January 2016–2017: Permanency planning orders, new foster care plans, and termination 

 The J&DR court entered permanency planning orders for the children on January 29, 

2016, finding that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of each child and 

approving the goal of adoption. DSS petitioned for involuntary termination of mother’s parental 

rights to her three children, pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C). The J&DR court 

terminated mother’s residual parental rights on August 23, 2016, finding clear and convincing 
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evidence to support termination under Code § 16.1-283(B) and specifically noting the 

applicability of subsection (B)(2)(a). Mother appealed to the circuit court, which heard the 

matter on January 17, 2017. 

At the hearing, Browder-Parham testified as described above. She further testified that 

she had visited mother the previous week and that mother was unemployed at that time. One of 

mother’s sisters was living with her, and mother’s aunt continued to manage her bills. 

Browder-Parham asked mother what her plan would be if her children were returned to her 

home, and “she really did not have a plan. She just said that she would have her sister move out. 

And that was . . . the plan.” Browder-Parham also expressed DSS’ concerns about mother’s 

ability to meet the special needs of some of her children. She stated that both Open Arms and 

NCG had worked with mother and informed DSS that they had exhausted the services that they 

could provide. When asked whether she observed conditions in mother’s home getting worse, 

getting better, or staying the same between summer 2013 and the children’s removal in March 

2015, Browder-Parham replied that they “stay[ed] the same.” 

 Mother testified at the hearing. She stated that the previous summer, she began work as a 

cleaner and worked eight hours per week. However, she had lost her job a few days previously 

after a “run-in” with her boss. Later, mother testified that she could still go back to her job if she 

wanted to, but that she didn’t get along with her boss. She testified that she could not remember 

how much money she made, because “[m]y money was going on the card.” She stated that her 

rent was $400 per month and that she paid her aunt half that amount, which she said was $100. 

When asked how much she received in SSI, mother replied, “I don’t know because my aunt 

handles my check.” When asked if she had made any preparations for the children to return to 

her home, mother replied, “I told my sister that she had to get out.” 
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 In its ruling from the bench, the circuit court quoted language from Code 

§ 16.1-283(B)(2)(a) providing that a severe intellectual disability constitutes prima facie

evidence of the conditions required by subsection (B)(2) for termination of residual parental 

rights. Noting that “there was 15 months plus the services from [DSS] . . . to the parent, services 

to the children before the termination of parental rights was filed,” the circuit court concluded 

that mother “still [is] not taking care of herself. She doesn’t have any idea what her household 

bills are. At some point in time there is no heat in the house.” Further, “[t]he rooming in the 

house is inadequate . . . . [O]ne of her children has been involved in sexual activity that would be 

a danger to both of her [other] kids, yet she was going to put them in [the] same bedroom 

together.” The circuit court found that the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(B) had been 

satisfied, and on March 3, 2017, entered orders terminating mother’s residual parental rights to 

J.A., N.N., and J.I., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

“When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the circuit court 

‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its 

determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 

Va. App. 257, 265-66, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2005) (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005)). The circuit court has “broad 

discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” 

Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “Therefore, in a case 

involving termination of parental rights, ‘[t]he trial court’s judgment, when based on evidence 

heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it.’” Eaton v. Wash. Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 66 Va. App. 317, 324, 785 S.E.2d 231, 

235 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Fields, 46 Va. App. at 7, 614 S.E.2d at 659). 
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 In order to terminate residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B), a court is 

required to make three findings based upon clear and convincing evidence. Butler v. Culpeper 

Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 48 Va. App. 537, 547, 633 S.E.2d 196, 201 (2006); see Code 

§ 16.1-283(B). First, the termination of residual parental rights must be in the child’s best 

interests. Butler, 48 Va. App. at 547, 633 S.E.2d at 201. Second, the child must have suffered 

neglect or abuse that “presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health or 

development.” Code § 16.1-283(B)(1); see also Butler, 48 Va. App. at 547, 633 S.E.2d at 201. 

Third, the court must find that it is “not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in 

such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child's safe 

return to his parent . . . within a reasonable period of time.” Code § 16.1-283(B)(2); see also 

Butler, 48 Va. App. at 547, 633 S.E.2d at 201. 

On appeal, mother argues that the circuit court erred in finding sufficient evidence to 

terminate her residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B). Specifically, she argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to support findings under the second and third prongs described above. 

A. Neglect or Abuse Presenting a Serious and Substantial Threat 

Mother asserts that the evidence was insufficient to find that the neglect or abuse suffered 

by each of her children presented a serious and substantial threat to their life, health, or 

development. See Code § 16.1-283(B)(1). She acknowledges that when DSS first became 

involved with her family, her living conditions at that time constituted a neglectful environment 

that may have harmed her children’s health or development. However, mother argues that 

whatever conditions initially may have existed ceased once she was living in her own home. 

A review of the record reveals abundant evidence that mother’s children suffered neglect 

or abuse presenting a serious and substantial threat to their lives, health, or development 

throughout their time living with mother. When DSS first became involved with mother and her 
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children, they were living in highly unsanitary conditions. Little food was available for the 

children, and their medical and dental problems were untreated. One child later was diagnosed 

with post-traumatic stress disorder, and another was violent toward mother when he did not get 

his way. The oldest child was engaging in inappropriate sexual activity. The children lacked 

adequate living space and were sharing a single bedroom with mother and their father. Further, 

mother was not in control of her own finances and funds for the children were only intermittently 

available. Despite intensive efforts by DSS, Open Arms, and other service providers, DSS saw 

no improvement in conditions during the nearly two years between their first contact with mother 

and the children’s removal from the home. 

Further, contrary to mother’s argument, her move to a home of her own did not mean the 

previous conditions which resulted in neglect or abuse no longer existed. While the new home 

was less crowded, it contained roaches, molding or spoiling waste, improperly disposed of trash, 

a dirty kitchen, inadequate heat, and a water supply which repeatedly was turned off. Moreover, 

even in her new home, mother’s cognitive limitations continued to negatively impact her ability 

to provide a safe and materially adequate environment for her children. Mother still was not in 

control of her finances, or even adequately aware of the financial demands upon her household. 

When DSS arranged a home visit during the holiday season in late 2015, mother tried to heat part 

of her home with an open oven, creating a hazard for her children. The conditions in the new 

home were so problematic that the visit had to be completed at another location and a second 

home visit had to be cancelled. As late as the termination hearing, mother had no plan for how 

to accommodate and care for her children in her new home beyond asking her sister to move out. 

The circuit court conducted an extensive hearing, during which it heard testimony not 

only from DSS but also from mother. The circuit court concluded that there was clear and 

convincing evidence that the children suffered neglect or abuse and that this neglect or abuse 
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presented a serious and substantial threat to their life, health, or development. Here, the 

evidence, viewed in totality, supports the circuit court’s finding. 

B. Substantial Correction or Elimination of Conditions 

Mother also contends that the evidence was insufficient to find that it was not reasonably 

likely that she could substantially correct or eliminate the conditions which resulted in her 

children’s neglect or abuse, so as to allow their safe return to her within a reasonable period of 

time. See Code § 16.1-283(B)(2). Again, mother concedes that during the early period of DSS’ 

involvement with her family, there were neglectful conditions in her home which “either did, or 

if allowed to continue, would have led to neglect or abuse.” However, as above, she then argues 

that “there are two distinct periods in this case”—the period when mother and her children were 

living with their extended family, and the period after the children were placed in foster care 

when mother was living largely by herself. Mother again alleges that the physical conditions 

which brought DSS involvement and assistance ceased to exist after mother moved to her own 

home, and thus the circuit court erred in finding that conditions of abuse or neglect still existed. 

Code § 16.1-283(B)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that 

Proof of any of the following shall constitute prima facie evidence 

of the conditions set forth in subdivision B 2: 

a. The parent or parents have a mental or emotional illness or

intellectual disability of such severity that there is no reasonable 

expectation that such parent will be able to undertake 

responsibility for the care needed by the child in accordance with 

his age and stage of development . . . . 

Here, as noted above, mother’s psychological evaluation indicates that she suffers from moderate 

to severe intellectual disabilities and that her cognitive and emotional functioning and life skills 

are significantly impaired. She has a limited ability to adapt. Also limited by her cognitive 

deficiencies are mother’s conceptual skills and her understanding of written language and 

concepts involving numbers, time, and money. Further, she has a limited ability to organize such 
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aspects of family life as schedules and plans for meals. In the examining psychologists’ 

opinions, mother will require significant support to assist her with problem-solving throughout 

her life. 

 Thus, the record clearly supports that mother’s intellectual disabilities are severe enough 

to constitute prima facie evidence, under Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a), that there is no reasonable 

expectation that she will be able to undertake responsibility for the care needed by her children. 

And mother fails to rebut this evidence. She argues that her living circumstances have improved 

since DSS first became involved with her family. While mother no longer lives in as crowded a 

household, DSS reported that even after her move, mother proved unable to correct major 

deficiencies in her living circumstances. While living in her own home, she has proved unable to 

consistently provide basic necessities, such as running water and adequate heat. Her new home 

was unclean and unhygienic. At the time of the termination hearing, after more than a year in 

her new residence, mother still did not control her own finances or have regular employment. 

Her only preparation for undertaking responsibility for the care of her children, some of whom 

have special needs, consisted of telling her sister that she would have to move out of the home if 

her children were returned to her. Thus, the changes in mother’s physical environment have not 

“substantially corrected or eliminated” the “conditions which resulted in [the] neglect or abuse” 

of her children. Code § 16.1-283(B)(2). Here, the evidence, viewed in totality, clearly supports 

the circuit court’s finding. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The factual findings underlying the circuit court’s order terminating mother’s residual 

parental rights were neither plainly wrong nor without evidence to support them. Thus, we 

affirm the circuit court’s decision terminating mother’s residual parental rights. 

Affirmed.