* P ursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances

set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 95-11038

Summary Calendar

_______________

In the Matter of: JOHN RICHARD SULLIVAN,

Debtor.

A. M. MANCUSO, Trustee,

Appellant,

VERSUS

SULLIVAN PLAN COMMITTEE; TCCP CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Assignee and Successor in Interest to the RTC as Receiver of Sandia

Federal Savings Association,

Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:95 CV 1254 T)

_________________________ July 22, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: *

A.M. Mancuso, the trustee in this chapter 11 bankruptcy

proceeding, appeals a judgment affirming both the ban kruptcy

court’s denial of his motion to strike certain objections to his2

compensation by the FDIC and the RTC and its order requiring him to

disgorge a po rtion of his compensation. For essentially the

reasons contained in the district court’s opinion, we affirm.

I.

This appeal arises out of the chapter 11 bankruptcy of John

Sullivan. The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan of reorganization

in March 1992 and appointed Mancuso as trustee. The plan provided

for Mancuso’s compensation; it also provided that the Sullivan Plan

Committee (“the committee”) would represent the interests of

class 5 c reditors under the plan. TCCP California Limited

Partn ership (“TCCP”) is a class 5 creditor, as were the FDIC and

the RTC.

Section 6.6 of the plan governed Mancuso’s compensation:

The [bankruptcy] Court shall have continuing

jurisdiction over the determination of the amount of

compensation paid to the Trustee. Compensation shall be

paid to the Trustee at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The

Trustee shall be reimbursed for expenses in curred in

connection with this case including travel, lodging and

meal expenses.

The Trustee shall submit monthly invoices for such

compensation and reimbursement of expense s to the Plan

Committee. If, after the expiration of ten (10) days

from the date such invoice is sent, no objection thereto

is voiced by the Committee, the invoice shall be paid

from the Estate. If the Plan Committee has any objection, it shall present such objection to the Trustee. If

the objection cannot otherwise be resolved, the Trustee

shall file an appropriate pleading seeking resolution of

the dispute by the Court. The Trustee shall also be

permitted to retain professionals, including without

l imitation, attorneys and accountants to assist him in

his duties, under the same terms and conditions as

professionals employed by the Plan Committee.

Pursuant to § 6.6, Mancuso began submitting invoices for3

compensation to the committee in April 1992. Through December

1994, Mancuso submitted invoices totaling $451,011.77. In January

1993, the committee began s ubmitting objections to portions of

Mancuso’s invoices, which led Mancuso to withhold $24,767.01 of his

compensation. In June 1994, the RTC and the FDIC also began to

file objections to Mancuso’s compensation with the bankruptcy court

independently of the committee, although § 6.6 did not explicitly

authorize them to do so.

Mancuso moved to strike the objections of the RTC and the

FDIC, contending that they lacked standing to assert objections

independently of the committee under § 6.6. The bankruptcy court

denied the motion, ruling that § 6.6 vested it with continuing

jurisdiction over Mancuso’s compensation and that it could

therefore consider objections raised by any plan beneficiary. The

court then held a hearing on Mancuso’s compensation, determined

that it was excessive, and ordered him to disgorge $67,382.29 of

the compensation he had received. Mancuso appealed to the district

court, which affirmed.

II.

Mancuso raises four arg uments on appeal. He contends that

(1) the bankruptcy court erroneously interpreted § 6.6 to vest it

with jurisdiction to consider any objection to Mancuso’s compensation, even if the objection was not properly raised by the

committee; (2) the bankruptcy court denied h im due process by

d eparting from the procedures prescribed by the plan to consi der4

objections to his compensation not raised by the committee; (3) the

bankruptcy court erred by denying his motion to strike the

o bjections of the FDIC and the RTC; and (4) the bankruptcy court

erred by finding his claimed compensation to be excessive.

The crux of this appeal is the proper interpretation of § 6.6.

Mancuso urges that under that section, only the committee may raise

objections to his compensation. The committee and TCCP, on the

other hand, focus on that part of § 6.6 that confers on the

bankruptcy court “continuing jurisdiction over the determination of

the amount of compensation paid to the Trustee.” They argue that

the bankruptcy court is thereby entitled to consider any objection

to Mancuso’s compensation, regardless of whether the committee

properly raises it.

Although both interpretations are plausible, the committee’s

interpretation is the better one. It is not necessary to set forth

our reasoning in detail; the district court’s opinion is thorough

and well-reasoned, and its reasoning is essentially the same as our

own. Because Mancuso’s first three objections either focus on the

proper interpretation of § 6.6 or assume the validity of his

interpretation, we need not consider them further.

Mancuso also contends that even if th e bankruptcy court was

entitled to consider objections to his compensation not raised by

the committee, it should not have determined his compensation to be

excessive. Although Mancuso raises a number of objections to the

bankruptcy court’s finding, the district court’s opinion responds

to each of these objections comprehensively. We therefore AFFIRM5

for essentially the reasons contained in that opinion.