Gulf War Veterans Health Statutes

Section 1604 o f the Persian G ulf W ar Veterans Act of 1998 is constitutionally invalid insofar as 

it purports to nullify prospectively certain described legislation that might be enacted in the future.

Overlapping provisions o f the Veterans Programs Enhancement Act o f 1998 and the Persian G ulf 

W ar Veterans Act of 1998, although redundant and burdensom e in some respects if both statutes 

are given effect, are not inherently conflicting or mutually exclusive and therefore both provisions 

must be treated as valid and given effect.

March 12, 1999

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e G e n e r a l C o u n s e l

D e p a r t m e n t o f V e t e r a n s A f f a ir s

This responds to your letter of December 8, 1998, requesting our legal opinion 

on questions raised by two conflicting or overlapping statutes, passed by Congress 

on the same day, responding to the health risks associated with military service 

in the Persian Gulf War (“ Gulf War” ).1 The statutes in question are the Veterans 

Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, 112 Stat. 3315 

( “ VPEA” ), and the Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998, passed as Title XVI 

of Division C of the Act Making Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681- 

742 (“ GWVA” ). We conclude that: (1) section 1604 of the GWVA is constitutionally invalid and ineffective insofar as it purports to nullify certain described 

legislation (including section 101 of the VPEA) that might be enacted in the 

future; (2) under governing principles of statutory interpretation, every effort must 

be made to reconcile the provisions of two statutes enacted under the circumstances presented here before resorting to rules of construction giving one 

primacy over the other; and (3) the respective provisions of the two laws that 

you have asked us to analyze, although redundant and burdensome in some 

respects if both laws are given effect, are not inherently conflicting or mutually 

exclusive, and therefore the provisions of both laws must be treated as valid and 

effective.

I.

The statutes in question here were both introduced in response to the October

1997 recommendation of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Persian Gulf 

War Illnesses that Congress enact a permanent statutory program for providing

1 Letter for Randolph M oss, A cting A ssistant A ttorney G eneral, O ffice o f Legal Counsel, from Leigh A B radley, 

General Counsel, D epartm ent o f V eterans A ffairs (Dec 8, 1998) ( “ VA Letter” ) In considering this m atter, we 

also received and considered the view s o f the G eneral Counsel o f the O ffice o f M anagem ent and Budget. S ee Letter 

for Randolph M oss, A cting A ssistant Attorney G eneral, O ffice o f Legal C ounsel, from Robert G Damus, G eneral 

Counsel, O ffice o f M anagem ent and B udget (Jan. 25, 1999)

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Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 23

compensation and benefits to veterans suffering illnesses as a result of their Gulf 

War service. The VPEA was originally introduced as H.R. 4110 in the 105th 

Congress. H.R. 4110 was unanimously passed by the House of Representatives 

on October 10, 1998. It was subsequently passed by the Senate on October 21,

1998 — several hours after final congressional passage of the GWVA as part of 

the Omnibus Appropriations Act. It was signed into law by the President on 

November 11, 1998.

The provisions enacted as the GWVA were largely drawn from S. 2358, a bill 

originally introduced in the 105th Congress by Senators Byrd, Rockefeller, and 

Specter. See 144 Cong. Rec. S12,832 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. 

Byrd). S. 2358 was passed by the Senate on October 8, 1998, but was never 

taken up as such by the House. The key provisions of S. 2358 were then attached 

in the form of the GWVA as an amendment to the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 

at the behest of Senator Byrd, and passed by both the House and Senate on 

October 21, 1998 — several hours before final congressional passage of the VPEA. 

The Omnibus Appropriations Act was also signed by the President on October 

21, 1998.

In summary, although final congressional passage of both laws occurred on the 

same day, the VPEA was both passed by the Congress and signed into law by 

the President after the GWVA. Thus, the VPEA constitutes the later enacted of 

the two statutes.

Both laws require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“ Secretary” ) to seek to 

enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences (“ NAS” ) to study 

and report upon the relationship between service in the Gulf War, certain factors 

and conditions (such as use of particular vaccines and exposure to specified substances) associated with such service, and illnesses experienced by Gulf War veterans. Although the respective NAS studies required by the two statutes overlap 

in substantial respects, there are a number of differences between them. The study 

required under the VPEA, for example, requires an assessment of latency periods 

that is not required under the GWVA. The GWVA, on the other hand, contains 

a requirement to include Uranium among the synthetic chemical compounds to 

be considered as a potential source of illness, whereas the VPEA omits that particular requirement. Additionally, the statutory deadlines for completion of the 

respective NAS studies are different, in that the GWVA provisions establish a 

considerably shorter timetable. The study authorized by the GWVA must be completed no later than 18 months after that bill’s date of enactment (i.e., October 

21, 1998), whereas the study authorized by the VPEA is not due until two years 

after the date the Department of Veterans Affairs (“ VA” ) enters into a contract 

with the NAS. The most significant variation between the two bills is that the 

GWVA requires the VA Secretary to make an administrative determination 

whether the covered illnesses warrant a presumption of service connection, which 

would substantially enhance the ability of Gulf War veterans to establish claims

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Gulf War Veterans Health Statutes

for disability entitlements under 38 U.S.C. §1110 (1994), whereas the VPEA 

merely requires the Secretary to submit to designated congressional committees 

a report with non-binding recommendations as to whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a presumption of service connection for the occurrence of the 

specified illnesses and conditions found in Gulf War veterans.

In light of the differing provisions and requirements of the two statutes, you 

have requested our legal opinion on a number of questions. Initially, you seek 

our opinion whether section 1604 of the GWVA, which purports to nullify 

prospectively later enacted legislation (and section 101 of the VPEA in particular) 

respecting authorization of a Gulf War study and related issues, is constitutional 

and effective. In the event we conclude section 1604 does not effectively nullify 

the provisions of the VPEA, you seek our guidance as to whether the various 

provisions of the respective bills may be reconciled and, insofar as they cannot 

be reconciled, which of the two statutes is to be given controlling effect.

n .

A.

The first issue that must be resolved in determining the relationship between 

these two statutes is whether section 1604 of the GWVA effectively nullifies the 

Gulf War health study provisions contained in section 101 of the VPEA. Section 

1604 provides:

In the event of enactment, before, on, or after the date of the 

enactment of this Act, of section 101 of the Veterans Programs 

Enhancement Act of 1998, or any similar provision of law enacted 

during the second session of the 105th Congress requiring an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences regarding an evaluation of health consequences of service in Southwest Asia during 

the Persian Gulf War, such section 101 (or other provision of law) 

shall be treated as if never enacted, and shall have no force or 

effect.

As relevant here, section 1604 would prospectively nullify the ability of Congress and the President to enact effective legislation on a designated subject during 

the remainder of the 105th Congress. Such a measure is incompatible with the 

provisions for the enactment of laws set forth in Article I, section 7 of the Constitution because it purports to invalidate by statute subsequent legislation duly 

enacted through valid constitutional processes. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 

473, 487 (1905) (“ a general law . . . may be repealed, amended or disregarded 

by the legislature which enacted it,” and “ is not binding upon any subsequent

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legislature” ); United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1172 (1st Cir. 1987) 

(Torruella, J., concurring) (“ under well-established constitutional precedent, as an 

act of Congress it does not bind future Congresses” ), cert, denied, 486 U.S. 1034 

(1988); Community-Service Broadcasting o f Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 

1102, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“ To be sure, Congress is generally free to change 

its mind; in amending legislation Congress is not bound by the intent of an earlier 

body.” ).2 Accordingly, we conclude that section 1604 does not nullify or abrogate 

the later-enacted provisions of section 101 of the VPEA.

B.

Although section 1604 of the GWVA cannot constitutionally nullify the subsequent enactment of section 101 of the VPEA, it remains to be considered what 

effect, if any, should be given to section 1604 as evidence of congressional intent 

in construing the effect and relationship of the two statutes. Specifically, does 

the enactment of section 1604 establish that Congress intended the provisions of 

the GWVA to be controlling to the extent that they would conflict with the laterenacted provisions of section 101 of the VPEA? In this regard, it is to be noted 

that section 1604 directly confronts the possibility of conflict between the two 

provisions, whereas the VPEA does not address that subject at all. It might be 

argued, therefore, that section 1604 is to that extent a more specific provision 

that should control over the provisions of the VPEA insofar as there is irreconcilable conflict. See, e.g., Watson v. Fraternal Order o f Eagles, 915 F.2d 235, 240 

(6th Cir. 1990) (where two statutes conflict, regardless of priority of enactment, 

the more specific statute ordinarily controls the more general).

We conclude that section 1604 does not establish the primacy of the provisions 

of the GWVA in relation to those of the VPEA insofar as the two provisions 

conflict. The Gulf War study provisions of the GWVA are not more specific than 

those of section 101 of the VPEA in the sense in which the specific/general 

dichotomy is used in this context; rather, the two provisions are at the same order 

of specificity. The mere fact that section 1604 of the GWVA ineffectually purports 

to nullify the later-enacted provisions of section 101 of the VPEA, moreover, does 

not render the former statute more specific than the latter in the sense intended 

by the rule of construction. Further, section 1604 does not actually address the 

issue of reconciling the two provisions; its sole stated objective is to nullify com2 In holding that an act of Congress cannot bind “ future Congresses,” Lopez Andino and other cases using such 

phrasing do not implicitly suggest that an act of Congress can bind the same Congress when that Congress subsequently undertakes to enact legislation contrary to the earlier enactment. In either circumstance, the controlling general 

principle is that an act of Congress (as distinguished, for example, from an amendment to the Constitution) cannot 

prohibit the enactment of subsequent contrary legislation through valid constitutional processes This is not to say 

that earlier adopted legislation, such as the Dictionary Act, see 1 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. Ill 1997), cannot influence 

the interpretation or meaning of later adopted legislauon. Such earlter legislation may influence the meaning of 

terms in a subsequent enactment, to the extent consistent with that enactment. But Congress always retains the 

authority, subject to constitutional limitations such as due process, to override the earlier enactment through duly 

enacted subsequent legislation

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pletely any enactment of the provisions of section 101, which is not constitutionally permissible.

Notwithstanding the prior passage of section 1604 as part of the Omnibus 

Appropriations Act, the Senate proceeded to pass the VPEA hours later — 

including without alteration, let alone any indication of repeal, the targeted provisions of section 101. Such action is difficult to reconcile with a genuine congressional intent to nullify section 101. The Senate debate on final passage of the 

VPEA, moreover, does not support the odd view that the Senate intended that 

the very provisions of section 101 that it was enacting without amendment (let 

alone removal) would have no effect. In comments upon the VPEA — comments 

made after Congress had already passed section 1604 of the GWVA — Senator 

Rockefeller (ranking member of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs and 

an original co-sponsor of S. 2358, the bill that was later essentially enacted as 

the GWVA) made the following observations touching on the relationship between 

the two bills:

[T]his bill [the VPEA] directs the Secretary of Veterans Affairs 

to enter into agreements with the NAS to conduct studies and provide recommendations for research that may be needed to better 

understand the possible health effects of exposures to toxic agents 

or environmental or wartime hazards associated with Gulf War 

service. The NAS will also provide recommendations to VA on 

the development of continuing medical education programs on the 

treatment of war-related illnesses and the assessment of new treatments to alleviate the effects of these illnesses.

144 Cong. Rec. at S12,933 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998). Referring to what he perceived as shortcomings in the provisions of section 101 of the VPEA (i.e., H.R. 

4110), Senator Rockefeller observed:

However, I was disappointed that we were unable to move 

beyond the initial steps contained in H.R. 4110 in negotiations with 

the House and Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committees. H.R. 4110 

only provides for VA to contract with NAS to perform the scientific 

review to identify potential exposures and illnesses associated with 

those exposures, but excluded the critical directive and guidance 

to VA to make determinations about compensation and presumption 

of battlefield exposures. Nonetheless, I felt that it was important 

that we accomplish what we could in this Congress to begin the 

process, although I realized this would still leave more for us to 

accomplish in the 106th Congress.

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We would have been left with only this initial step were it not 

for the senior Senator from West Virginia, Senator Byrd. Senator 

Byrd successfully negotiated the inclusion of the compensation and 

presumption provisions of S. 2358 in the Omnibus Appropriations 

bill.

Id. at S 12,933 (emphasis added).

Senator Rockefeller’s statement does not support the view that the VPEA was 

passed with a tacit understanding that it would be subordinate to, or nullified 

by, section 1604 of the GWVA. Especially in light of the fact that Senator 

Rockefeller was a proponent of the legislation that became the GWVA, his statement indicates instead that the two provisions were viewed as cumulative, rather 

than conflicting and mutually exclusive. Thus, Senator Rockefeller described section 101 of the VPEA as an “ initial step,” with the provisions of the GWVA 

addressing the perceived shortcomings of the former statute by additionally providing for compensation and presumption of service connection.

A conclusion that section 1604 of the GWVA wholly superseded the laterenacted provisions of the VPEA would require a presupposition that the Senate 

proceeded to enact the VPEA recognizing all the while that its extensive and 

detailed Gulf War study provisions were meaningless and inoperative. Apart from 

the text of section 1604 itself— which we have already concluded is ineffective 

insofar as pertinent here — we find no evidence of that understanding on the part 

of the Senate as it passed the VPEA, and substantial evidence to the contrary 

in the statement of Senator Rockefeller.

C.

Having concluded that section 1604 of the GWVA does not effectively nullify 

the provisions of section 101 of the VPEA, we now consider how these two overlapping enactments should be interpreted and applied. An early opinion of the 

Attorney General sets forth the key legal principles that were employed to resolve 

a strikingly similar statutory dilemma:

By old and well-established canons of construction it is settled 

that every effort should be made — in the absence of express words 

of repeal — to harmonize seemingly conflicting provisions in statutes in pari materia passed at the same time, or approximately the 

same time, even though one of the acts contains language which, 

in ordinary circumstances and except for the element of contemporaneity, would be deemed to displace the other. The presumption 

that in such cases the legislature did not intend any inconsistency, 

no doubt has special force in the case of statutes passed on the

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Gulf War Veterans Health Statutes

same day, and it is entirely clear that such statutes ought, if possible, to be so construed as to allow both of them to stand, for, 

as was said by the Supreme Court of Maine in Stuart v. Chapman,

104 Me. 17, 23, in discussing a situation similar to the one here 

presented —

“ It avoids the absurdity of holding that the legislature, 

whose proceedings are presumed to be conducted with 

wisdom and deliberation, enacted and repealed a statute 

upon the same day; or that the house and senate gravely 

and solemnly passed through all their several stages two 

inconsistent acts, either one of which would repeal the other, 

and sent them at the same time to the governor, intending 

that, and that alone, should become a law of the land to 

which he happened last to affix his signature.”

War-Risk Insurance Act — Repeal of Gratuity Laws, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 205, 208 

(1918) (“ AG Opinion” ).

Here, too, we confront statutes in pari materia passed on the same day, but 

with one of the acts containing language — i.e., section 1604 of the GWVA — 

that could (setting aside the temporal sequence of enactment) be deemed to displace the other. Accordingly, we find that the Attorney General’s above-quoted 

formulation provides the appropriate framework for interpreting the two provisions 

in question here — that is, every effort should be made to harmonize or reconcile 

their apparent conflicts, without distorting their plain meaning. See also Morton

v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“ In the absence of some affirmative 

showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal 

by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.” ); United

States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 92 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 1996) (“ to the extent 

that statutes can be harmonized, they should be, but in case of an irreconcilable 

inconsistency between them the later and more specific statute usually controls 

the earlier and more general one” ), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). Moreover, 

apart from the canon of statutory construction favoring harmonization, with respect 

to these two statutes there is relevant evidence from the legislative history 

weighing in favor of harmonization: Senator Rockefeller stated that the VPEA 

represented the “ initial step” and that the GWVA moved beyond that step. See

144 Cong. Rec. at S I2,933.3 Given the canon of construction and this legislative 

history, the case for harmonization is compelling.

3 Nothing in the debate or floor statements accompanying final passage of the VPEA indicates that it was considered irreconcilable with the provisions of the GWVA. However, Representative Stump (Chairman of the House 

Veterans’ Affairs Committee), in connection with the insertion of the GWVA provisions into the Omnibus Appropriations Act, expressed the view that aspects of the GWVA were irreconcilable with those of the VPEA. See 144

Continued

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Opinions of the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 23

D.

We now consider whether the Gulf War health study provisions of the VPEA 

and the GWVA may both be given effect through reconciliation, or whether they 

are in such irreconcilable conflict that one provision must be given primacy under 

controlling principles of construction. In doing so, we apply the standard of 

irreconcilability employed by the Attorney General in his 1918 opinion: “ To obey 

one provision is to ignore the other; to disobey one is to give effect to the other.” 

AG Opinion at 209. We conclude that, for all material and significant purposes, 

the two statutes are not irreconcilable.4 Although there is considerable overlap 

and some disparity between the two provisions — for example, they require the 

preparation of predominantly similar reports on Gulf War service-related illnesses 

by the NAS, but the reports differ in some notable respects and are subject to 

different submission deadlines — compliance with either of the statutes does not 

appear to render compliance with the other impossible or compel disobedience 

to it.

Probably the most significant difference between the two statutes is their respective approaches to a “ presumption of service connection” for illnesses associated 

with Gulf War service. GWVA, 112 Stat. at 2681-743. Under section 1602 of 

the GWVA, which would enact a new 38 U.S.C. § 1118, the Secretary must determine, based on the NAS report, whether the covered illnesses warrant a presumption of service connection by reason of certain associations described in the 

GWVA. That determination would be formally promulgated in regulations and 

then come into play in the disposition of claims for compensation for serviceconnected disabilities under 38 U.S.C. § 1110. The VPEA, in contrast, does not 

direct or authorize the Secretary to make such a determination. Rather, section 

10l(i)(2) thereof merely requires the Secretary to submit to designated congressional committees a report with recommendations as to whether there is sufficient 

evidence to warrant a presumption of service connection for the occurrence of 

specified conditions in Gulf W ar veterans, based upon the NAS report and the 

comments of government agencies in response to that report.

We conclude that these two provisions are not mutually exclusive and that, 

accordingly, the VA must attempt to comply in good faith with both provisions.

Cong. Rec HI 1,656-57 (daily ed. Oct 20, 1998). Specifically, Representative Stump contended that the GW VA’s 

provision for a binding Secretarial determination on the presumption of service connection left Congress with “ no 

role in deciding the future compensation policy for veterans,” whereas the VPEA provided for the VA Secretary 

to make non-binding recommendations to Congress with respect to that issue Id. at HI 1,657. While we agree that 

the two statutes take different approaches to this issue, those approaches do not appear to be mutually exclusive 

or irreconcilable, as we discuss in SecUon 11.D infra As indicated in the text, moreover, it has long been established 

that roughly contemporaneous statutes should be harmonized where possible Nonetheless, Representative Stump’s 

statement indicates that Senator Rockefeller’s view was not universally shared

4 Given the detailed and technical nature o f the two statutes’ specifications for the NAS studies and the Secretary’s 

response thereto, our opinion does not purport to determine that there are no irreconcilable discrepancies whatsoever 

between any provisions of the two bills The VA would have superior expertise to identify any such irreconcilable 

discrepancies at a factual level, but it has not called to our attention, nor have we identified, any of that nature

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G ulf War Veterans Health Statutes

Compliance with the GWVA’s requirement for an administrative determination 

on the presumption of service connection does not require the Secretary to 

“ ignore” or “ disobey,” see A.G. Opinion at 209, the VPEA’s distinct requirement for submitting a recommendation respecting that same issue to the congressional committees. Although it may seem burdensome or redundant, we are unable 

to find a convincing reason why the Secretary cannot do both. The chief argument 

supporting the view that the two measures are mutually exclusive might rest on 

the premise that the later submission of a recommendation to the congressional 

committees pursuant to the VPEA would amount to a futile or ineffectual gesture 

inasmuch as the Secretary would already have made an effective administrative 

determination that the presumption of service connection is warranted or not warranted pursuant to the GWVA. Such a premise would not be valid, however, 

because the provision of the Secretary’s recommendations to the congressional 

committees would still provide Congress with pertinent information enabling it 

to consider and possibly to enact legislation reflecting a distinct congressional 

resolution of the presumption-of-service-connection issue. Compliance with both 

of these provisions, moreover, would not appear to be inordinately burdensome, 

inasmuch as the assessment and analysis underlying both the VPEA recommendation and the GWVA determination would involve substantial overlap.

What we have said with respect to the differing provisions of the two statutes 

on resolving the presumption-of-service-connection issue applies as well to the 

other possible disparities identified in your submission to this Office.

One set of possible disparities that you have identified is that the two statutes 

have a number of differences in their provisions for the review of scientific evidence to be conducted by the NAS. See VA Letter at 4—6. Under section 

101(c)(1)(B) of the VPEA, for example, the NAS would be required to identify 

illnesses “ associated with the agents, hazards, or medicines or vaccines” 

described in that statute, whereas under the GWVA the requirement calls for the 

identification of the illnesses (including diagnosed and undiagnosed illnesses) that 

are “ manifest” in Gulf War veterans. GWVA § 1603(c)(1)(B). While these 

requirements are not identical or co-extensive — there may, for example, be some 

illnesses “ manifest” in Gulf War veterans that are not actually associated with 

the specific potential causes listed in the VPEA — they clearly entail substantial 

overlap.

Additionally, there are particular items required in the NAS study described 

in one of the statutes that are not required in the other. The VPEA, for example, 

requires the NAS study to assess latency periods between service or exposure 

to the risk factors and manifestation of the illness, id. § 101(c)(3), whereas the 

GWVA study does not expressly contain such a requirement. On the other hand, 

section 1603(f) of the GWVA requires the NAS to review separately, for various 

categories of illnesses, the available scientific data in order to identify empirically 

valid models of treatment for such illnesses, whereas the VPEA does not contain

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such a requirement. Rather, section 101(f) of the VPEA merely calls on the NAS 

to make any recommendation it considers appropriate for additional scientific 

studies including, among others, “ studies relating to treatment models.” Additionally, although the lists of agents, hazards, and compounds to be covered in the 

initial NAS review in the two statutes are nearly identical, only the GWVA 

includes Uranium in the listing. Id. § 1603(d)(1)(F).

The foregoing disparities, however, clearly do not render the study requirements 

mutually exclusive or even radically divergent. Indeed, it appears that the identical 

or overlapping requirements of the studies called for by the respective bills may 

exceed their differences and that the respective study contracts could be drafted 

so that NAS’s performance of one contract satisfies all the identical or overlapping 

requirements of the other contract.

You have also identified as a potential problem the statutory provisions concerning timing and submission of reports by the NAS. See VA Letter at 6-7. 

For example, the GWVA requires NAS to submit the first of its reports to the 

Secretaries of VA and Defense and to designated Senate and House Committees 

no later than 18 months after the date of enactment of that act (i.e., by April 

21, 2000, which is 18 months after October 21, 1998), whereas the VPEA does 

not require the submission of the first of its required reports (to the VA Secretary 

and a different set of congressional committees) until two years after the Secretary 

and the NAS enter into the required agreement, a considerably later deadline. 

Again, the more accelerated timetable for submission of the report required by 

the GWVA presents no irreconcilable conflict between the two laws. It merely 

means that the portions of the VPEA study that overlap with those of the GWVA 

study must be completed by the latter’s earlier deadline in order to comply with 

that statute. In that respect, the shorter GWVA deadlines may actually accelerate, 

rather than preclude, compliance with some requirements of the VPEA.

A final potential disparity that you have noted is the difference in the “ sunset” 

provisions of the two laws: whereas section 101 (j) of the VPEA provides for the 

termination of its provisions eleven years after the end of the fiscal year in which 

the VA enters into the agreement with the NAS, section 1603(j) of the GWVA 

provides for termination of its provisions ten years after the end of the fiscal 

year in which the NAS submits its first report. See VA Letter at 7. As in the 

case of the differing provisions for report submission deadlines, we do not believe 

these variations create any irreconcilable conflict between the statutes. For 

example, insofar as the two statutes impose overlapping or identical obligations 

or tasks that might be performed close to the “ sunset” date of the earlier expiring 

statute, the existence of the differing sunset provisions does not appear to create 

a genuine or irreconcilable conflict. It merely means that if the VA is unable 

to complete such an overlapping task before the sunset of the statute with the 

shorter life it would still have authority to complete the task under the provisions 

of the statute with the longer duration. In that respect, the dual sunset provisions

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may prove to supply an added element of flexibility in the completion of overlapping tasks authorized by both laws, rather than rendering any obligation under 

either statute impossible to perform.

Conclusion

We conclude that section 1604 of the GWVA does not effectively nullify the 

later-enacted provisions of section 101 of the VPEA and that the Gulf War study 

and related provisions of the two statutes that the VA has asked us to analyze 

are not irreconcilable and are therefore valid and effective.

WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

5 9