This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-34739 4 MARC ANTHONY TAPIA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Jacqueline Flores, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Rozan Cruz & Associates, P.C. 13 Rozan Cruz 14 Corrales, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 SUTIN, Judge. 181 There is a second speedy trial demand dated August 30, 2012 in the record. 16 That demand was filed by an attorney who di d not enter an appear ance in this case and 17 who did not represent Defendant. We do not consider the August 30, 2012 demand as 18 a speedy trial demand made by Defendant. 19 2 {1} Defendant Marc Anthony Tapia was c onvicted of promoting prostitution in 1 violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-4 (1981), accepting the earnings of a prostitute 2 in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-9- 4.1 (1981), possession of a stolen vehicle 3 in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30- 16D-4(A) (2009), possession of a controlled 4 substance in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(E) (2011), and aggravated 5 fleeing a law enforcement officer in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1.1 6 (2003). On appeal, Defendant argues that th e district court erre d in: (1) denying his 7 motion to dismiss for violation of his sp eedy trial right; (2) denying his motion for a 8 more definite statement, which violated his due process and protection against double 9 jeopardy rights; and (3) admitting hearsay evidence in violation of his right to 10 confront his accuser. We affirm. 11 BACKGROUND 12
{2} Defendant was arrested on April 11, 2012 and on June 12, 2012 and was 13 indicted on July 26, 2012 for prostitution-re lated charges and for charges connected 14 to Defendant’s alleged posse ssion of a stolen vehicle and a controlled substance. On 15 August 7, 2012, Defendant f iled a notice of assertion of his speedy trial right, 1 and on 163 November 14, 2012, the first notice of jury trial was filed, indicating that trial was to 1 begin on March 4, 2013. 2
{3} One month before trial wa s set to begin, Defendant filed a motion for a more 3 definite statement in which he alleged th at the indictment was not specific enough for 4 Defendant to appropriately defend himself. Defendant argued that the indictment, 5 which referenced events that occurre d sometime between “January 2012 and June 6 2012” did not provide proper notice. In response to Defendant’s motion, the State 7 argued that the only charges in the indictment that included a date range spanning five 8 months were the human trafficking, promoting prostitution, and accepting earnings 9 of a prostitute charges, which were all offenses that implicated a continuing course of 10 conduct rather than isolated incidents. The State also referenced pretrial interviews 11 and pointed to specific items provided as discovery that would support the charges 12 and that gave Defendant proper noti ce in order to prepare his defense. 13
{4} Following Defendant’s motion for a more de finite statement, the State filed a 14 motion for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoi ng on February 22, 2013, after the State 15 had been unable to schedule aninterview with M.L., who wa s to be a witness for the 16 prosecution, and was also Defendant’s then -girlfriend and alleged victim to the 17 prostitution-related charges. In its motion, the State alleged thatDefendant engaged 18 in wrongdoing that was intended to and likel y did procure the unavailability of M.L., 194 who had demonstrated an unwillingness to partic ipate in a pretrial interview. The State 1 asserted that it intended to secure M.L.’s av ailability at trial, but requested that if it 2 was unable to do so, the State be permitte d to admit M.L.’s testimonial and non3 testimonial statements at trial regardle ss of whether they fell within a hearsay 4 exception. A hearing on the State’s motion was set for April 25, 2013. 5
{5} The parties filed a number of additional motions, including Defendant’s motion 6 to suppress, Defendant’s motion in limine, and the State’s motion to amend the grand 7 jury indictment to expand the time frame for the prostitution-related charges. 8
{6} The hearing on the State’s motion for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing was 9 not completed on April 25, 2013, and a s econd hearing was set for May 6, 2013, at 10 which time the district court planned to continue hearing arguments on the forfeiture 11 motion and to hear Defendant’s motion in limine and motion to suppress. A hearing 12 on these matters and on Defendant’s motion fo r a more definite statement was re-set 13 for June 4, 2013. At the hearing, the distri ct court granted the parties four weeks to 14 submit proposed findings of fact and conclu sions of law regarding the motion for a 15 finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The parties submitted their proposals on July 9, 16 2013. 17
{7} All other pending motions that had not b een resolved to date were set to be 18 heard on October 9, 2013. During the heari ng on that date, Defendant withdrew his 195 motion to suppress, and the district court granted the State’s motion to amend the 1 grand jury indictment, effectively denyi ng Defendant’s motion for a more definite 2 statement. Trial was set for February 17, 2014. On Novemb er 14, 2013, the State filed 3 its notice of withdrawal of its moti on for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing 4 because it was no longer concerned that M.L. would fail to appear to testify at trial. 5 The indictment was amended on December 3, 2013. 6
{8} One month before trial was to begin, th e State filed a motion to remove defense 7 counsel and a motion to seal the pleadings regarding the motion to remove. The 8 district court held a hearing on the mo tion on March 13, 2014 and entered an order 9 denying the motion on April 29, 2014. Meanwhile , the court re-set Defendant’s trial 10 for May 19, 2014. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial 11 right and supporting memorandum on May 8, 2014. The motion was denied, and the 12 district court entered the following general findings in support of its order: (1) “[o]n 13 balance[,] the delay in this matter has not been unduly long[,]” (2) “[d]elays were the 14 result of discovery and ongoing matters demonstrating that the case was not prepared 15 for trial[,]” and (3) “Defendant’s spee dy trial rights have not been violated.” 16
{9} Trial commenced on May 19, 2014. At trial, testimony was elicited from eight 17 witnesses, including, in rele vant part to this appeal, testimony from Damian Lujan, an 18 officer with the Albuquerque Police Departme nt. Officer Lujan testified that on April 196 2, 2012 he was dispatched after a woman named Margaret Hill reported that her 1 vehicle had been stolen. He testified that the stolen vehicle was a beige Toyota Avalon 2 and testified as to its license plate and VIN numbers. The State also elicited testimony 3 from Detective Gonterman, also with the Albuquerque Police Department, who 4 testified that she came into contact with M.L. and Defendant in June 2012 when she 5 was running license plates at hotels th at were known to have crime problems. 6 According to Detective Gonterman, in th e process of running plate numbers, she ran 7 the plate number of a beige Toyota, and the plate came back as not being registered 8 with the Motor Vehicle Division. She testif ied that when she ran the vehicle’s VIN 9 number through the National Crime Information Center and the Motor Vehicle 10 Division, she discovered that the vehicl e belonged to Margaret Hill and had been 11 reported stolen. She also testified that th e VIN number of the Toyota she investigated 12 matched the VIN number listed on OfficerLujan’s report. She identified the 13 individual driving the at-issue vehicle on th e date of her investigation as Defendant 14 and testified that M.L. was a passenger in the vehicle. 15
{10} The jury found Defendant guilty of promoting prostitution, accepting earnings 16 of a prostitute, possession of a stolen vehi cle, possession of a controlled substance, 17 and aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer. After the conclusion of the jury 18 trial, but before sentencing, the district c ourt judge assigned to the case left the bench. 197 The case was twice reassigned and sentencing was set for September 11, 2014. 1 Sentencing was re-set a number of times, including at least once at the request of 2 Defendant, and the judgment, sentence, and order partially suspending sentence was 3 entered April 30, 2015. 4
{11} Defendant timely appealed on May 11, 2015. This Court reviewed the record 5 and Defendant’s arguments on appeal and noted that the district court’s order denying 6 Defendant’s motion to dismiss for violati on of his right to a speedy trial did not 7 include the requisite specific findings neededin order for this Court to meaningfully 8 review the merits of Defendant’s appeal. We therefore remanded the case for entry of 9 written findings and conclusions on the various speedy trial factors. On remand, the 10 district court entered an order with thorough findings of fact and conclusions of law. 11 DISCUSSION 12 I. Speedy Trial 13
{12} “The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the 14 states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provide s that in all criminal prosecutions, the 15 accused shall enjoy the right toa speedy and public trial.” State v. Brown , 2017- 16 NMCA-046, ¶ 12, 396 P.3d 171 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation 17 omitted), cert. denied , 2017-NMCERT-___ (No. S-1-SC-36385, Apr. 26, 2017). In 18 evaluating whether there has been a violati on of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, 198 our Supreme Court has adopted the United States Supreme Court’s balancing test 1 articulated in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). See State v. Garza , 2009- 2 NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. The four factors to analyze are: (1) 3 the length of delay, (2) the reasons for de lay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his 4 speedy trial right, and (4) the actual prej udice to the defendant caused by the delay. 5 Id. “Each of these factors is weighed either in favor of or against the [prosecution] or 6 the defendant, and then balanced to determin e if a defendant’s right to a speedy trial 7 was violated.” State v. Spearman , 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 17, 283 P.3d 272. “In our 8 review of a speedy trial ruling, this Court mu st give deference to the district court’s 9 factual findings, but we review th e weighing and balancing of the Barker factors de 10 novo.” Brown , 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11
{13} On appeal, Defendant argues, per the Barker factors, that his speedy trial right 12 was violated because: (1) the delay was 25 to 36 months, th at his case was simple, and 13 that this delay is presumptively prejudicial; (2) “[t]he State, including the court, is 14 responsible for all the delay in this case[ ,]” although he argues that certain periods of 15 time weigh more heavily against the State th an others; (3) he de manded a speedy trial 16 three times—on August 7, 2012, on Augus t 30, 2012, and on May 8, 2014—and that 17 he made several attempts to move his cas e forward as evidenced by his requests for 18 interviews, motion for a more definite st atement, discovery demand, and motion in 199 limine; and (4) he was prejudiced because heremained incarceratedfor 23 months and 1 seven days before the commencement of his trial, his child was placed in the custody 2 of the Children, Youth & Families Department (CYFD) while he was in jail, and the 3 delay impacted other cases in which he wa s involved. Defendant also argues that he 4 was prejudiced by his sentencing delay, whic h did not occur for 11 months after the 5 verdict. 6
{14} In response, the State argues that (1) th e case was of intermediate complexity, 7 and that although the length of delay of 25 months exceeded the 15-month 8 presumptively prejudicial threshold, the delay was not extensive; (2) the record 9 supports the district court’s conclusion thatapproximately 24 months of the pretrial 10 period weigh neutrally, and one month weighs slightly against the State as 11 administrative delay; (3) the August 7, 2012 assertion was pro forma and should be 12 afforded little weight, the August 30, 2012 a ssertion was invalid because it was filed 13 by an attorney that was later found to havenot entered an appearance in the case and 14 did not represent Defendant, and the May 8, 2014 assertion wa s late and should not 15 weigh significantly in Defendant’s favor; and (4) Defendant failed to prove some 16 actual evidence of prejudice and failed to prove how any anxiety suffered by 17 Defendant was undue. The State argues that th e balance of the factors does not support 18 dismissal. Additionally, the State argues that the sentencing delays did not violate his 192The focus of the inquiry in Lopezwas whether the defendant’s due process 17 rights were violated as a result of se ntencing delays. 2017-NMCA-___, ¶¶ 1, 14-16. 18 That issue was not raised in the present appeal. 19 10 speedy trial right because the delays wei ghed neutrally, Defendant did not prove that 1 he was prejudiced, and because “the United States Supreme Court recently held that 2 a defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment does not extend 3 beyond the time of conviction.” State v. Lopez , 2017-NMCA-___, ¶ 12, __ P.3d __ 4 (No. A-1-CA-34615, July 28, 2017). 2 5
{15} Here, the district court entered, in re levant part, the following findings of fact 6 in support of its order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss: (1) the case was one 7 of intermediate complexity, the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial, and 8 the length of the delay therefore weighed agai nst the State; (2) 24 months of the delay 9 weighed neutrally, and one month weighe d lightly against the State; (3) while 10 Defendant asserted his speedy trial right on August 7, 2012 and May 8, 2014, the first 11 was a pro forma assertion, which weighed only slightly in Defendant’s favor; and 12 (4) “Defendant failed to provide some actual evidence of prejudi ce, and as a result, 13 this factor does not weigh in his favor.” The district court concluded that because 14 “[t]he length of delay and a ssertion of the right weigh[ed ] only lightly in Defendant’s 15 favor, the reasons for delay [did] not we igh in his favor, and the prejudice prong 16 weigh[ed] against Defendant[, there was] no violation of the right to a speedy trial.” 1711 {16} We address each Barker factor in turn. 1 A. Length of Delay 2
{17} “The length of the delay is a two-fold inquiry. Initially, we determine whether 3 the delay is presumptively prejudicial. If it is presumptively prejudicial, we balance 4 the length of the delay against the remain ing three factors to assess whether the 5 constitution has been violated.” State v. Laney , 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 648, 6 81 P.3d 591. A delay is presumptively prejudi cial if the delay ex ceeds “one year for 7 a simple case, 15 months for a case of intermediate complexity, and 18 months for a 8 complex case.” State v. Serros , 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 22, 366 P.3d 1121. “In terms of 9 the weight given to the length of the delay, the greater th e delay, the more heavily it 10 will potentially weigh against the prosecution.” State v. Steinmetz , 2014-NMCA-070, 11 ¶ 6, 327 P.3d 1145 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 12
{18} As indicated earlier, the parties dispute the actual length of delay. Defendant 13 argues there was a 25- to 36-month delay, while the State argues there was a 25-month 14 delay. It appears from Defendant’s argument that he calculates a 36-month delay by 15 including the time between trial and sentenci ng. However, the United States Supreme 16 Court has held and this Court has recognized that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial 17 under the Sixth Amendment does not ex tend beyond the time of conviction. See 18 Betterman v. Montana , ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2016) (“We hold that the 1912 [Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial] guarantee protects the accused from arrest or 1 indictment through trial, but does not a pply once a defendant has been found guilty 2 at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.”); Lopez , 2017-NMCA-___, ¶ 12. 3 Because Defendant was first arrested for th e crimes charged in this case on April 11, 4 2012 and his trial began on May 19, 2014, the time between his arrest and trial was 5 approximately 25 months. 6
{19} The parties also dispute the level of complexity in this case. Defendant urges 7 this Court to depart from the district c ourt’s finding that the case was intermediately 8 complex, arguing that the case is simple because the evidence consisted of testimony 9 from four officers and three civilian witne sses, and the evidence was in the form of 10 testimony that had been available for some time. Defendant also a sserts that we should 11 not defer to the district court’s finding as to complexity because the district court 12 judge that entered the order on limited remand was a different judge than the judge 13 that initially denied the motion. 14
{20} We see no reason to depart from the district court’s finding that this case was 15 intermediately complex. First, “[w]e give due deference to the district court’s findings 16 as to the level of complexity[,]” State v. Plouse , 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 42, 133 N.M. 17 495, 64 P.3d 522, abrogated on other grounds by Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48, 18 and in this case deference is due because, as noted by the district court, this case 1913 involved several pretrial motions, an ame nded indictment, and the trial took seven 1 days to complete. Second, Defendant offers no support for his proposition that 2 findings of fact as to th e complexity of a case are not supported by substantial 3 evidence when the district court judge that enters findings of fact is a different judge 4 than the district court judge who presided over the trial. See State v. Vigil-Giron , 5 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60, 327 P.3d 1129 (“[A]ppellate courts will not consider an issue 6 if no authority is cited in support of th e issue and that, given no cited authority, we 7 assume no such authority exists[.]”); see also State v. Clifford , 1994-NMSC-048, ¶ 19, 8 117 N.M. 508, 873 P.2d 254 (reminding counsel th at the appellate courts “are not 9 required to do their research” and holding that “conclusory statement[s] will not 10 suffice and [are] in violation of our [R]ule s of [A]ppellate [P]rocedure”). Absent such 11 support, we are not convinced that we shoul d depart from the district court’s finding 12 that the case is intermediately complex. 13
{21} In sum, the 25-month delay is beyond the 15-month presumptively prejudicial 14 threshold for intermediately complex cases. This delay weighs moderately against the 15 State. See State v. Suskiewich , 2016-NMCA-004, ¶¶ 6-8, 363 P.3d 1247 (holding that 16 a 24-month delay in a case of intermediatecomplexity weighed moderately against 17 the prosecution). 18 B. Reasons for Delay 1914 {22} “Closely related to the length of delay is the reason the government assigns to 1 justify the delay.” State v. Castro , 2017-NMSC-027, ¶ 22, __ P.3d. __ (No. S-1-SC2 36062, Aug. 24, 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “These reasons 3 may either less[e]n or increase the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.” 4 Brown , 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 18. Our Supreme C ourt has “recognized three types of 5 delay that may be attributed to the [pros ecution] and weighted against it at varying 6 levels[: (1)] a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense 7 should be weighted heavily against the govern ment[; (2)] negligent or administrative 8 delay . . . should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since 9 the ultimate responsibility for such circum stances must rest with the government 10 rather than with the defendant . . . [; and (3)] appropriate delay, justified for a valid 11 reason, such as a missing witness, is neutral and does not weigh against the 12 [prosecution].” Serros , 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 29 (first omi ssion in original) (alteration, 13 internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). When a case “progresse[s] with 14 customary promptness” the delay is weighed neutrally. State v. Parrish , 2011-NMCA15 033, ¶ 25, 149 N.M. 506, 252 P.3d 730. 16
{23} Defendant argues that all the delay in this case is attributable to the State, but 17 focuses on the period from November 2, 2012 to January 6, 2014, arguing that during 18 this 13-month period, the State intenti onally delayed and filed frivolous motions, 1915 weighing heavily against the State. Conversel y, the State mirrors the analysis in the 1 district court’s order, arguing that the case proceeded normally and with customary 2 promptness for the entirety of the case, w ith the exception of February 2014 to March 3 2014, which the State concedes was an admini strative delay that weighs lightly against 4 the State. We address each time period in turn. 5 1. April 11, 2012 to February 4, 2013 6
{24} Between April 11, 2012 and February4, 2013, the case proceeded with 7 customary promptness. During this time, Defendant was arraigned, the court set 8 scheduling and pretrial conferences, and trial was set for March 4, 2013. Although 9 Defendant alleges that the State caused delay, there is nothi ng in the record to indicate 10 that either party delayed during this 10-month period. We therefore weigh this delay 11 neutrally. 12 2. February 4, 2013 to October 16, 2013 13
{25} Between February 4, 2013 and October 16, 2013, the parties were litigating 14 various motions, including a motion for a moredefinite statement filed by Defendant, 15 a motion for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing filed by the State, a motion to 16 suppress filed by Defendant, a motion in limine filed by Defendant, and a motion to 17 amend the grand jury indictment filed by the State. Evidentiary hearings were required 18 that had to be continue d over several months. Both parties submitted proposed 1916 findings of fact and conclusions of law on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing issue. 1 Although Defendant argues that the State’ s motion for a finding of forfeiture by 2 wrongdoing was frivolous, we see nothing inthe record supporting Defendant’s 3 position, and instead, we view that motion, along with the other motions filed in this 4 period, as demonstrating th at both parties were movi ng forward with customary 5 promptness. See State v. Valencia , 2010-NMCA-005, ¶ 18, 147 N.M. 432, 224 P.3d 6 659 (“[P]eriods of time considered inevitable and periods during which the case is 7 moved toward trial with customary promptness are not to be weighed against the 8 [prosecution].” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Trial did not occur on March 4, 9 2013, and a new trial date of February 17, 2014 was set on October 16, 2013. There 10 is nothing in the record to indicate that either party caused delay during this eight11 month period. 12 3. October 16, 2013 to January 17, 2014 13
{26} Between October 16, 2013 and January 17, 2014, the case was again proceeding 14 with customary promptness. During this period, the State withdrew its motion for a 15 finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing because it was apparently no longer concerned 16 that its witness, M.L., would be unavailabl e, the indictment was amended, and the 17 case was moving forward. This three-month period weighs neutrally. See id. 18 4. January 17, 2014 to March 13, 2014 1917 {27} On January 17, 2014, one month before the case was set fo r trial, the State filed 1 a motion to remove defense counsel. The district court held a hearing on that motion 2 on March 13, 2014 and that sameday re-set the trial fo r May 19, 2014. Although trial 3 did not occur on February 17, 2014, presumably because the State’s motion needed 4 to be addressed prior to trial and the court did not set the March 13 hearing until 5 March 4, 2014, this two-month delay, at most, constitutes administrative delay that 6 weighs slightly against the State. See Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 26 (“ ‘[A] more 7 neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less 8 heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for 9 such circumstances must rest with the govern ment rather than with the defendant.’ ” 10 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531)). 11 5. March 13, 2014 to May 19, 2014 12
{28} Once the trial was re-set, from March 13, 2014 to May 19, 2014, the case 13 proceeded with customary promptness. Th is two-month period weighs neutrally. 14 6. Overall Reasons for Delay 15
{29} We conclude that of the approximate 25- month delay in this case, all but two 16 months of the delay weigh neutrally. Ho wever, we acknowledge that those two 17 months weigh slightly against the State as administrative delay. Overall, the reasons 18 for delay weigh only slightly against the State. 1918 C. Assertion of the Right 1
{30} When considering whether Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, we 2 “accord weight to the frequency and force of [a] defendant’s objections to the delay[] 3 and . . . analyze [a] defendant’s ac tions with regardto the delay.” Serros , 2016- 4 NMSC-008, ¶ 76 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he timeliness 5 and vigor with which the right is assertedmay be considered as an indication of 6 whether a defendant was denied needed access to [a] speedy trial over his objection 7 or whether the issue was rais ed on appeal as afterthought.” Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, 8 ¶ 32. “[P]ro forma motions are generally afforded relatively little weight in this 9 analysis.” State v. Maddox , 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 29, 145 N.M. 242, 195 P.3d 1254 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Garza , 11 2009-NMSC-038 ¶¶ 47-48. Additionally, asserti ons that are made in “the eleventh 12 hour” are weighed only slightly in a defendant’s favor. Id. ¶ 31 (internal quotation 13 marks and citation omitted); see State v. Ortiz-Burciaga , 1999-NMCA-146, ¶ 35, 128 14 N.M. 382, 993 P.2d 96 (“[The d]ef endant invoked his speedy trial right[] just prior to 15 trial. Consequently, wedo not give [the d]efendant much weight for this assertion 16 because most of the delay had already passe d and he move d for dismissal rather than 17 for a prompt trial.”). 1819 {31} Here, Defendant asserted his right pro forma on August 7, 2012 and again in 1 a motion to dismiss filed on May 8, 2014. Th ese assertions weigh against the State but 2 only slightly because the first demand was pro forma, and the motion to dismiss was 3 filed less than two weeks before the start of trial. Under these circumstances, 4 Defendant’s assertion was not particularly timely or forceful, and thus this factor 5 weighs only slightly in Defendant’s favor. 6 D. Prejudice 7
{32} There are three interests under which we analyze prejudice to Defendant: “(i) to 8 prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; ( ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the 9 accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Garza , 10 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “As to the first 11 two types of prejudice, some degree of oppression and anxiety is inherent for every 12 defendant who is jaile d while awaiting trial[,]” and therefore “we weigh this factor in 13 the defendant’s favor only where the pretrial incarceration or the anxiety suffered is 14 undue.” Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[W]ithout 15 a particularized showing of prejudice, we will not speculate as to th e impact of pretrial 16 incarceration on a defendant or the degree of anxiety a defendant suffers[,]” and 17 Defendant bears the burden of showing particularized prejudice. Id. ; State v. Urban , 18 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 18, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061 (holding that “[a]lthough the 1920 [prosecution] bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, [the d]efendant does bear the 1 burden of production [as to prejudice], and his failure to do so greatly reduces the 2 [prosecution’s] burden”). “However, if th e length of delay and the reasons for the 3 delay weigh heavily in the de fendant’s favor and the defe ndant has asserted his right 4 and not acquiesced to the delay, then th e defendant need not show prejudice for a 5 court to conclude thatthe defendant’s right has been violated.” Brown , 2017-NMCA6 046, ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7
{33} Defendant argues on appeal that he was prejudiced as a result of his pretrial 8 incarceration and asserts that he suffered anxiety, concern, stigma, and economic 9 hardship as a result of being arrested and charged. He argues that while he was 10 incarcerated, his child wa s removed from the child’s mother’s care by CYFD, and 11 Defendant was unable to see his family members. He asserts that, based on the 12 circumstances, this Court may presume prejudice. 13
{34} We begin by rejec ting Defendant’s argument that we can presume prejudice. 14 “To find a speedy trial violation where [thed]efendant has failed to show actual 15 prejudice, . . . the three other Barker factors must weigh heavily against the 16 [prosecution].” Castro , 2017-NMSC-027, ¶ 32 (omission in original) (alterations, 17 internal quotation marks, and citati on omitted). Because none of the other Barker 18 factors weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, we cannot presume prejudice. We 1921 therefore must consider whether Defendant demonstrated that he was actually 1 prejudiced by the delay. Defendant fails to demonstrate actual prejudice for two 2

reasons. 3
{35} First, his assertions of prejudice are not supported by any citations to the record. 4 Without citations to the record, we presume that those arguments were not made to the 5 district court and thus not preserved, and we do not consider unpreserved arguments. 6 See Rule 12-321(A) NMRA (“To preserve an i ssue for review, it must appear that a 7 ruling or decision by the trial court was fairly invoked.”); State v. Leon , 8 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 33, 292 P.3d 493 (“We generally do not c onsider issues on appeal 9 that are not preserved below.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 10 Indeed, as noted by the district court, Defe ndant did not request an evidentiary hearing 11 at which he could present evidence rega rding the prejudice he allegedly suffered. 12 Without proof of such prejudice, Defendant ’s assertions amount to mere argument of 13 counsel, and we are left to speculate as to the impact of pretrial incarceration on 14 Defendant and on the degree of anxiety De fendant suffered, wh ich we will not do. See 15 Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 35. 16
{36} Second, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that if he did suffer prejudice, that 17 prejudice was undue. See Brown , 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 33 (“Because some degree of 18 oppression and anxiety is inherent for every defendant who is jaile d awaiting trial, the 193 We note that the Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Ochoa , No. S-1- 15 SC-34360, 2017 WL 361661, ____-NMSC-___, ¶ 54, ___ P.3d ___ (Oct. 23, 2017), 16 just days before we filed this memo randum opinion. Although our Supreme Court in 17 Ochoapresumed that two years of pretrialincarceration was prejudicial, the Court 18 ultimately held that the prejudice did not re sult in a speedy trial violation because (1) 19 based on the record, the Court could onl y speculate as to particularized, undue 20 prejudice; and (2) the remaining Barker factors did not weigh in Defendant’s favor. 21 Id. ¶¶ 57, 60-66. In our view, although our an alysis here differs slightly from the 22 analysis in Ochoa , the holdings are congruous. 23 22 defendant bears the burden to establish thatthe pretrial incarceration or the anxiety 1 suffered by the defendant is undue.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 2 omitted)). Because Defendant failed to demonstrate particularized, undue prejudice, 3 this factor does not weigh in his favor. 3 4 E. Balancing the Barker Factors 5
{37} The length of delay, reasons for delay, and assertion of the right to speedy trial 6 factors weigh against the State but not heavily. The length of delay weighed 7 moderately against the State, while the reasons for delay and assertions of the right to 8 speedy trial weigh only slightly agains t the State. Because Defendant failed to 9 demonstrate particularized prejudice and the other factors do not weigh heavily in 10 Defendant’s favor, we hold that there was no violation of Defe ndant’s right to a 11 speedy trial. See Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 40. 12 II. Motion for a More Definite Statement 1323 {38} Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that the district court erred in 1 denying his motion for a more definite statement. Defendant’s argument is based on 2 the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clause s and thus poses constitutional questions 3 that we review de novo. See Los Chavez Cmty. A ss’n v. Valencia Cty. , 2012-NMCA4 044, ¶ 12, 277 P.3d 475 (“Wereview questions of constitutional law and 5 constitutional rights, such as due proce ss protections, de novo.” (internal quotation 6 marks and citation omitted)); State v. Andazola , 2003-NMCA-146, ¶ 14, 134 N.M. 7 710, 82 P.3d 77 (“[O]ur reviewof [the defendant’s] double jeopardy claim is de 8 novo.”). 9
{39} Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 10 “[f]ailure to charge [a] defendant with a specific act or specific acts violates his right 11 to be informed of the ch arges against him and denies him due process of law.” State 12 v. Foster , 1974-NMCA-150, ¶ 8, 87 N.M. 155, 530 P.2d 949; seeU.S. Const. amends. 13 VI, XIV. Additionally, the Fifth Amendmen t to the United States Constitution and 14 “[p]rocedural due process . . . requires that criminal charges provide criminal 15 defendants with the ability to protect themselves from double jeopardy.” State v. 16 Dominguez , 2008-NMCA-029, ¶ 5, 143 N.M. 549, 178 P.3d 834 (internal quotation 17 marks and citation omitted); seeU.S. Const. amend. V. 1824 {40} Defendant argues that the charging document in this case alleged four incidents 1 occurring over a five- to six-month period without providing needed detail. Defendant 2 notes that he requested that the dates be narrowed to allow adequate investigation for 3 his defense, but instead, the district court allowed the time frame to be expanded in 4 an amended indictment. Defendant argues that in addition to impacting his due 5 process rights, the vagueness in the indictment does not protect Defendant against 6 double jeopardy. 7
{41} Although Defendant asserts that the delay violated his rights under the Fifth, 8 Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Defendant’s 9 arguments on appeal are legally and factually undeveloped and amount to little more 10 than assertions of counsel that Defendant’s rights were violated. See Muse v. Muse , 11 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 51, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104 (“It is not our practice to rely 12 on assertions of counsel unaccompanied by s upport in the record. The mere assertions 13 and arguments of counsel are not evidence.”); see also State v. Ortiz , 2009-NMCA14 092, ¶ 32, 146 N.M. 873, 215 P.3d 811 (reasoni ng that “[a] party cannot throw out 15 legal theories without connecting them to any elements and any factual support for the 16 elements” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Defendant does not 17 analyze or provide any evidentiary support for his reasonable-notice argument under 18 the two-part test that this Court has adopted for determining whether a charging period 1925 is overly broad, i.e. “(1) whether the [p rosecution] could reasonably have provided 1 greater specificity of the times of the alleged offenses and (2 ) if so, whether the 2 [prosecution’s] failure to do so prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Ervin , 2002- 3 NMCA-012, ¶ 6, 131 N.M. 640, 41 P.3d 908. And Defendant makes no real double 4 jeopardy argument outside of his due proce ss argument. We are not inclined to make 5 Defendant’s arguments for him. See State v. Fuentes , 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29, 147 6 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (noting that we will not review arguments that “require us 7 to guess at what [a party’s] arguments might be”). 8
{42} That said, to the extent Defendant does assert that he was prejudiced, we note 9 that Defendant failed to prove, as he wa s required, that any prejudice suffered was 10 “both actual, not based on pure conjecture, and substantial in its impact on the 11 defense.” Ervin , 2002-NMCA-012, ¶ 17. “[W]ithout prejudice, there is no reversible 12 error.” Id . And, as stated in our case law, “a long charging period does not itself 13 constitute prejudice.” State v. Tafoya , 2010-NMCA-010, ¶ 17, 147 N.M. 602, 227 14 P.3d 92. 15 III. Hearsay and Confrontation Clause 16
{43} Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that the district court erred in 17 permitting hearsay evidence in violation of his right to confront his accuser. 18 Defendant’s argument is base d on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 1926 “Questions of admissibility under the Con frontation Clause are questions of law, 1 which [the appellate c ourts] review de novo.” State v. Aragon , 2010-NMSC-008, ¶ 6, 2 147 N.M. 474, 225 P.3d 1280, overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo , 2012- 3 NMSC-008, 275 P.3d 110. We revi ew the district court’s decision to admit evidence 4 for abuse of discretion. See State v. Romero , 2006-NMCA-045, ¶ 12, 139 N.M. 386, 5 133 P.3d 842. 6
{44} The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 7 accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con fronted with the witn esses against him[.]” 8 U.S. Const. amend. VI. In New Mexico, “the Confrontation Clause permits admission 9 of a non-available declarant’ s hearsay statement if it falls within a firmly rooted 10 exception to the hearsay rule. If the disputed statement does not fall within a firmly 11 rooted hearsay exception, then there must be particularized guarantees of 12 trustworthiness equivalent to those asso ciated with a firmly rooted exception.” State 13 v. Lopez , 2000-NMSC-003, ¶ 15, 128 N.M. 410, 993 P.2d 727 (internal quotation 14 marks and citation omitted). Even when te stimony runs afoul of the Confrontation 15 Clause, however, a defendant’s conviction may not be reversible on that basis if the 16 prosecution demonstrates “that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State 17 v. Moncayo , 2012-NMCA-066, ¶ 15, 284 P.3d 423 (alteration, internal quotation 18 marks, and citation omitted). “A review ing court should only conclude that a 1927 constitutional error is harmless when there is no reasonable probability that it affected 1 the verdict.” Id

. 2
{45} Here, Officer Lujan testified that hewas dispatched after a woman named 3 Margaret Hill reported that her vehicle had been stolen. He tes tified that the stolen 4 vehicle was a beige Toyota Avalon and tes tified as to its license plate and VIN 5 numbers. Defendant argues on appeal that this testimony violated his rights under the 6 Confrontation Clause because Ms. Hill was available, Officer Lujan’s testimony was 7 testimonial, and Defendant di d not have an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Hill. In 8 response, the State essentially argues harmle ss error. Specifically, the State argues that 9 there was other testimony and documentaryevidence that was offered, without 10 objection, that was cumulative of OfficerLujan’s testimony. The State cites to 11 testimony from Detective Gonterman and another officer who was working with 12 Detective Gonterman, both of whom testif ied that the car in Defendant’s possession 13 had been reported stolen. The State also notes that documents showing that the car 14 was sold and registered to Ms. Hill were admitted without objection. 15
{46} Assuming without deciding that Officer Lujan’s testimony was violative of the 16 Confrontation Clause, we ne vertheless hold that Defendant ’s convictions need not be 17 reversed because the admission of his testimony constituted harmless error. In 18 conducting a harmless error analysis, we are guided by the following factors: “(1) the 1928 importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the 1 testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 2 contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of 3 cross-examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the 4 prosecution’s case.” State v. Zamarripa , 2009-NMSC-001, ¶ 53, 145 N.M. 402, 199 5 P.3d 846. Here, Officer Lujan’s testimony was brief and was simply cumulative of the 6 testimony and documentary evidence already presented. There was no evidence 7 contradicting Officer Lujan’s testimony that the vehicle was stolen. And given the 8 other evidence provided, his testimony as tothis topic was not important to the 9 prosecution’s case. In light of these factors, we conclude that there is no reasonable 10 probability that his testimony affected the verdict, and therefore, we conclude that any 11 error in admitting Officer Lujan’s testimony was harmless. 12 CONCLUSION 13
{47} For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm. 14
{48} IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

__________________________________ 16 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 17 WE CONCUR: 1829 _______________________________ 1 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 2

_______________________________ 3 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 4