UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4322

ANTHONY LEMUEL JONES, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Robert E. Payne, District Judge.

(CR-97-343)

Submitted: February 23, 1999

Decided: March 23, 1999

Before WIDENER and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Robert L. Flax, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey,

United States Attorney, John S. Davis, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Lemuel Jones, Jr. appeals his jury convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 841(a), 846

(1994), and his resulting seventy-one month sentence. We affirm.

Jones was indicted for drug offenses along with co-defendants Don

Knox and Larell Thomas. Testimony at trial disclosed that Thomas

and Knox sold crack cocaine in the Richmond area along with

Michael Loiseau. Loiseau drove to Jones's house in Richmond to pick

up Thomas there several times in 1997 and also at times picked up

both Thomas and Knox there. Loiseau recalled being inside Jones's

house and seeing him sell drugs and seeing him at the kitchen table

with a razor in his hand.

In October 1997, Loiseau, Thomas, and Knox agreed to combine

their money to purchase two kilograms of cocaine; Loiseau was to

purchase one kilogram for himself and one for Thomas and Knox.

Loiseau picked up Thomas and Knox on October 22, 1997, and they

gave him funds to use for the drug purchase. Loiseau was arrested

that night and immediately agreed to cooperate with law enforcement

officials. Loiseau spoke with Thomas and Knox in a series of

recorded conversations over the next few days. On October 25,

Loiseau (acting under the control of DEA agents) brought fake

cocaine to Thomas and Knox, and the two were arrested.

On the same day, DEA agents executed a search warrant at Jones's

Richmond house. Jones was present during the search, during which

officers recovered a brown leather pouch containing 1.7 grams of

crack cocaine on a nightstand in the master bedroom. The drugs were

packaged in seventeen small baggies, each containing approximately

.1 gram of "rock" crack cocaine. A Richmond detective testified that

possession of that amount so packaged was consistent with conduct

of a "street level" dealer. Officers also recovered a crack pipe, a notebook apparently used as a drug ledger, a small metal scale, a driver's

license in Jones's name, a plastic bag containing numerous small

glassine baggies, and a razor blade from the bedroom. In the kitchen

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of the home, officers found a brown lunch bag containing baggies and

a single-edged razor blade and two boxes of baking soda (often used

in "cooking" crack cocaine). In a front bedroom, officers found luggage containing documents addressed to Thomas. Upon arresting

Jones, officers recovered two pagers and approximately $300 cash

from his person.

Three officers were involved in interviewing Jones after his arrest.

Jones waived his Miranda rights after being advised of them and

signing a DEA form. Jones acknowledged that Knox and another person had stayed at his house in the front bedroom and that they had

"cooked" crack cocaine in his home several times. Jones also admitted

that he used crack cocaine, that Knox and his companion gave him

small amounts of crack in exchange for use of the house, that he had

purchased drugs from Knox's companion, and that Knox and the

other person helped him pay bills for the house. Jones also stated that

he received some crack for personal use and small amounts for distribution. In addition, he stated that people frequently came to the house

for Knox and the other person and that he had seen the two with

weapons.

At trial, Jones testified he had no idea who owned the leather

pouch, small baggies, or the pipe found on the nightstand. He also testified that he invoked his right to remain silent in his interview with

the police officers and specifically denied making any of the statements to the officers. Jones also stated he did not use drugs at any

time during the year preceding his arrest.

At sidebar during Jones's testimony, trial court raised the issue of

the voluntariness of Jones's statements to the officers. The prosecution asserted Jones waived any suppression issue but the jury was to

assess the voluntariness of the statements. Defense counsel responded

"that the statement didn't occur, that what [the DEA agent] is relating

he didn't say." The court responded, "Well, he also said they didn't

read him his rights, and he asked for a lawyer, and then they questioned him." Defense counsel then stated, "Frankly, that is the first

time I heard that." The court then found the statements voluntary.

On cross-examination, Jones admitted he had known Thomas since

1995. He also testified that he permitted Thomas and Knox to wash

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their clothes at his house as a favor; that he did not know what

Thomas did to earn a living; and that he had both Thomas's and

Knox's pager numbers. Jones explained that he used the scales, the

notebook, and the razor blade for personal purposes unrelated to drug

distribution.

As for the pre-trial statements, Jones denied waiving his Miranda

rights and stated he signed the waiver form only to acknowledge that

the agents read him his rights. He admitted telling the agents that he

knew Thomas and Knox and that he recognized Loiseau, but stated

he made none of the other statements attributed to him.

Jones asserts that the Government failed to notify defense counsel

of the inculpatory statements he allegedly made to the three officers

after his arrest in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).* He continues that

the result of the trial would have been different had defense counsel

known of the statements. The trial record discloses that defense counsel possessed a typed report concerning the post-arrest interview with

Jones and at least one DEA agent's handwritten notes concerning the

interview. Therefore, we find no error in regard to disclosure of information related to Jones's post-arrest, pre-trial interview with law

enforcement officers.

Jones also asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel at

trial because of the alleged discovery violation discussed above. Generally, allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are more

suitable for collateral review rather than direct appeal. See United

States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 1991). We may entertain

such a claim only when the ineffectiveness of counsel is apparent

from the trial record and evidentiary hearings are not required. See id.

at 380 (citing United States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1156-67

(4th Cir. 1986)). For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be

considered on direct appeal, it must conclusively appear in the trial

record itself that the defendant was not provided with effective representation. See United States v. Hanley, 974 F.2d 14, 16 n.2 (4th Cir.

1992) (citing United States v. Mandello, 426 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir.

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*Jones's defense counsel withdrew on appeal, and a new attorney was

appointed to represent him in this Court.

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1970)). Because we find no such attorney error in this record, we conclude that any allegations of ineffective assistance would be more

properly addressed in a habeas corpus motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).

For these reasons, we affirm Jones's convictions and sentence. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

of the parties are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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