NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

BOUDEWYN RONALD HANSS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0244

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201301164

The Honorable Steven F. Conn, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Adele G. Ponce

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Advocate’s Office, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. HANSS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Boudewyn Ronald Hanss appeals his conviction 

and resulting sentence for burglary in the third degree, a class four felony. 

Hanss argues that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of 

acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support 

his burglary conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 10, 2013, the owner of All American Towing 

discovered that someone had broken into the yard of his towing company 

and taken a green Chevrolet Blazer from a portion of the yard that was 

leased to S.M. S.M. was lawfully holding the truck for the Kingman Police 

Department on a thirty-day impound.

¶3 When Hanss was notified that his Blazer was missing, he told 

Officer Clancy that he believed the Blazer was at the tow yard, but if it was 

not there, “he did not know where it was.” Two of his neighbors, however,

flagged down and told Officer Clancy that Hanss had asked each of them 

for a ride to the towing company “to break out his vehicle.” They also 

suggested the truck might be at the intersection of Sage and Calumet, 

“where [Hanss] always went and hung out at.”

¶4 Officer Clancy continued his investigation and found the 

truck near Sage and Calumet, and the steering column was intact. The key 

S.M. had for the Blazer was still in a safe at his home. The Blazer was 

returned to S.M. and locked in the yard.

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the conviction. 

State v. Lowery, 230 Ariz. 536, 538, ¶ 2, 287 P.3d 830, 832 (App. 2012) (citation 

omitted). 
STATE v. HANSS

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Subsequently, one of the neighbors showed Officer Clancy a 

video of a recorded conversation with Hanss. The video showed “[Hanss] 

indicating how he had travelled to the area of All American Towing, cut the 

locks to the gate . . . and proceeded in to remove his vehicle; and then . . . 

both cutters were placed in a bush on the property.”2 After reviewing the 

video, Hanss was arrested.

¶6 Hanss was indicted for burglary in the third degree, false 

reporting to a law enforcement officer, and criminal damage. The case went 

to trial and, after the State rested, Hanss made a Rule 20 motion for 

judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion.

¶7 The jury subsequently convicted Hanss as charged, and he 

was later sentenced to six years in prison and given 190 days of presentence 

incarceration credit. Hanss filed a timely notice of appeal.

3 We have 

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -4033(A)(1).4

DISCUSSION

¶8 Hanss contends that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion for judgment of acquittal. We review the court’s ruling de novo. 

See State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011). 

¶9 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(a) provides that on a 

defendant’s motion or its own initiative, a trial court “shall enter a 

judgment of acquittal” before the verdict “if there is no substantial evidence 

to warrant a conviction.” Id. at 561, ¶ 6, 250 P.3d at 1190 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “such proof that reasonable 

persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 562, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d at

1191 (internal quotation marks omitted). In order for this court to “set aside 

a jury verdict for insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no 

hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion 

reached by the jury.” State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 

(1987).

 

2 The police did not copy the video and did not take the phone. The video

was later erased when the phone’s owner upgraded its software.

3 Hanss did not appeal his convictions or sentences for false reporting or 

criminal damage, both misdemeanors.

4 We cite to the current version of the statute unless otherwise noted. 
STATE v. HANSS

Decision of the Court

4

¶10 Hanss claims that the State failed to establish he intended to 

commit theft, a necessary factor for burglary, because the towing company 

operator did not have a property interest in the Blazer and he did not 

deprive that operator or business of any interest. We disagree.

¶11 Under Arizona law, a person commits a burglary in the third 

degree if they enter into a fenced commercial yard of another without 

permission and with the intent to commit any theft or any other felony. 

A.R.S. § 13-1506; see State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, 509-10, ¶ 7, 233 P.3d 621, 

622-23 (App. 2010). A theft is committed if “without lawful authority, the 

person knowingly . . . [c]ontrols property of another with the intent to 

deprive the other person of such property[.]” A.R.S. § 13–1802(A)(1). And 

the theft statute applies to “property in which any person other than the 

defendant has an interest on which the defendant is not privileged to 

infringe, including property in which the defendant also has an interest.” A.R.S. 

§ 13–1801(13) (emphasis added); see State v. Schaefer, 163 Ariz. 626, 629-30, 

790 P.2d 281, 284-85 (App. 1990) (noting that the statutory phrase 

“including property in which the defendant also has an interest” undercuts 

any defense that allows a defendant to use unlawful means to take their 

property); see also State v. Hobbs, 64 P.3d 1218, 1222-23, ¶ 23 (Utah App. 2003) 

(collecting cases). 

¶12 Here, the parties stipulated that “on the date of the incident 

. . . [Hanss’s] Chevrolet Blazer was subject to a lawful impound at All 

American Towing.” The State also presented evidence that without 

permission of the business owner to enter the locked commercial yard or 

take the Blazer, Hanss broke into the tow yard by cutting off the lock with 

his bolt cutters, and took the Blazer by driving it away using a key. 

Moreover, the State presented evidence that Hanss had not paid any of the 

fees required for him to regain lawful possession of the Blazer. See A.R.S. § 

28–3512(C) (he needed to pay “all immobilization, towing and [impound] 

storage charges”). 

¶13 Because the towing company had, under Arizona law, a 

possessory interest in the lawfully-impounded truck, Hanss could not use 

self-help by cutting off the lock of the locked commercial yard to attempt to 

regain possession, even though he was the owner of the Blazer, without 

paying all the required fees. See A.R.S. §§ 13–1801, 28–3512(C), –4838, and

-4842(A); see also Schaefer, 163 Ariz. at 630, 790 P.2d at 285. As a result, the 

State had presented sufficient evidence to submit the burglary claim to the 

jury. Therefore, the court did not err by denying the Rule 20 motion. 
STATE v. HANSS

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hanss’s conviction and 

resulting sentence.