[ J - 30 - 2022 ] [MO: Donohue, J. ] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

MARIE SCOTT, NORMITA JACKSON, MARSHA SCAGGS, REID EVANS, WYATT EVANS, TYREEM RIVERS

v.

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE

APPEAL OF: MARIE SCOTT, NORMITA JACKSON, MARSHA SCAGGS, TYREEM RIVERS : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 16 WAP 2021 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered May 28, 2021 at No. 397 MD 2020.
ARGU ED: April 13, 2022

DISSENTING O PINION

JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: OCTOBER 19, 2022 The Appellants here are challenging the constitutionality of the Prisons and Parole Code ( “ Parole Code ” ). 1 Because Appellants ’ underlying judgments of sentence do not prohibit parole consideration , their constitutional challenges to the Parole Code do not threaten to disturb their judgment s of sentence

. Thus , this is not an action “ for a writ of habeas corpus or post

- conviction relief

. ” 2 T he Commonwealth Court therefore had original jurisdiction over Appellants ’ petition for review

.

“ A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a

1 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 101

- 7301.

2 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i).[ J

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felony. ” 3 A person convicted of second

- degree murder “ shall be sentenced to a term of lif e imprisonment

. ” 4 T he C rimes C ode does not specify whether “ life imprisonment ” in this context means life with or without parole. That contrasts with other crimes , for which the General Assembly explicitly provided for a punishment of life imprisonment w ithout parole

. 5 Until this case, t he General Assembly ’ s lack of specificity in the homicide sentencing statute has been of little importance because, while that statute is silent regarding parole eligibility, the Parole Code gives the Parole Board the authority to grant parole “ except [to] an offender condemned to deat h or serving life imprisonment[.] ” 6 I n addition , because those convicted of second

- degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment do not have a minimum sentence, the Board lacks the pow er to parole them for that reason alone

. 7 Thus , a defendant convicted of second

- degree murder is destined

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § § 3301(b) (1) (providing that a person convicted of a second

- degree murder involving arson “ shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without right to parole ” ) ; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2) (stating that a trial court may sentence a three

- strikes violent offender to “ life imp risonment without parole ” if a minimum sentence of 25 years ’ imprisonment would not sufficiently protect the public).

6 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1) (providing that the Board “ may release on parole any offender to whom the power to parole is granted to the boa rd by this chapter, except an offender condemned to death or serving life imprisonment ” ).

7 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(3) ( “ The power to parole granted under this section to the [B]oard may not be exercised in the [B]oard ’ s discretion at any time before, but on ly after, the expiration of the minimum term of imprisonment fixed by the court in its sentence or by the Board of Pardons in a sentence which has been reduced by commutation. ” ).[ J

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to serve life without parole

. But the “ without parole ” part comes not from the sentencing
statute or the defendant ’ s judgment of sentence, but from the Parole Code

. 8 I cannot explain why the General Assembly created such an unusual sentencing scheme for this small group of defendants

. 9 But , because it did, Appellants are in a unique situation . They are now able to pr esent constitutional challenge s to the Parole Code that could ( if they succeed) make them eligible for parole consideration without disturbing their underlying judgments of sentence. That ’ s because Appellants are seeking to invalidate Parole Code Subsections 6137(a)(1) (the no

- parole

- for

- lifers provision) and 6137(a)(3) (the minimum

- sentence requirement ) as applied to persons who did not personally take a life or intend to take a life. 10 T h ose two statutory provisions are the only thing standing between Appellants and parole eligibility , because their judgments of sentence do not prohibit parole . This means that the relief Appellants seek

8 Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 204 A.3d 392, 400 ( Pa. 2019) (Wecht, J., concurring) ( “ The General Assembly ’ s use of the term ‘ life imprisonment ’ in both [the sentencing statute and the Parole Code] indicates, plainly and unambiguously, that it intended to ensure that those convicted of second

- degree murder are nev er to be released on parole. ” ).

9 The statutes implicated here contain many instances of careless draft smanship

. To give just one example that our Court has called “ somewhat confounding, ” Hudson , 204 A.3d at 398, the Sentencing Code states that courts ma y impose a sentence of imprisonment without parole only in certain specified circumstances , but a life sentence for second

- degree murder is not one of the allowed circumstances , even though trial judges are required by statute to sentence second

- degree mur der er s to life imprisonment with no specified minimum sentence

. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9756 (c)

- (c.1)

. 10 Brief for Appellan ts at 15 ( “ B y virtue of the Board ’ s enforcement of § 6137(a)(1), Appellants are denied a meaningful opportunity for release from prison. Appellants claim that this denial violates the cruel punishments clause at Article I, § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution for individuals, like Appellants, who did not take a life or intend to take a life. ” ); id. at 34 (arguing that, if Subsection 6137(a ) is found to be unconstitutional, “ the statutory provision requiring that an incarcerated person not be considered for parole until their minimum sentence is served, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(3), would also have to be nullified in relation to everyone serving life sentences because of an identical constitutional analysis ” ).[ J

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is not “ in the nature of [an] application[ n ] for a w rit of habeas corpus or post

- conviction relief

. ” 11 T he Commonwealth Court therefore had original jurisdiction over Appellants ’ petition for review. This s t ate of affairs could perhaps fairly be called a loophole

. B ut it is the natural consequence of the unambiguous statutory scheme that the General Assembly chose to
enact

. The General Assembly could have instructed courts to sentence all persons convicted of second

- degree murder to life without parole

. B ut it did not do so

. Instead, it created two distinct punishments: life imprisonment and life imprisonment without parole. Those sentenced to life imprisonment without parole are ineligible for parole (obviously) because their judgments of sentence expressly precl ude it. Persons sentenced to life imprisonment are also ineligible for parole, but only because the Board lacks the statutory authority to parole them, not because their judgments of sentence prohibit them from serving some portion of their life sentence on parole

. Purporting to evaluate this case as “ a matter of statutory interpretation , ” my learned colleagues in the Majority somehow conclude that Appellants ’ judgments of sentence prohibit parole

. This is not what the Crimes Code says. 12 Under S ubs ection 1102(b), “life imprisonment” was the only sentence that Appellants’ sentencing judges were allowed to impose

. 13 Apparently undeterred by the unambiguous text of the sentencing statute , the

11 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) ( providing that the Commonwealth Court does not have original jurisdiction over “ actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post

- conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the court ” ).

12 C ompare Majority Opinion at 2 6 (stating that “ parole ineligibility [is] a part of the sentence itself ” for second

- degree murder convictions), with 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b) (stating that “ a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree .

. . shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment , ” with no menti on at all of parole eligibility or ineligibility).

13 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b)

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Majority simply calls it “absurd” and then refuses to enforce it. 14 As an interpretive matter, the Majority’s conclusion that Appellants are serving sentences of life without parole is groundless . Indeed, t he Majority itself admit s that it is imposing today’s holding

“ regardless of the statutory language contained within the underlying crime or other sentencing statutes

. ” 15 This is a startling admission indeed, and not one that we encounter often in a judicial opinion. 16
Besides ignoring clear statutory language, the Majority al so mudd ies the very definition of a sentence. While readers of today’s opinion likely underst and a judgment of sentence to mean an order issued by a sentencing court imposing a specific sentence pursuant to a specific sentencing statute, the Majority ’s un derstanding of a “sentence” is something far more nebulous. 17 In the Majority’s telling, provisions of the Parole Code that govern the powers of the Parole Board are somehow “best described as part of the judgment of sentence

. ” 18 T his is a remarkable innovation , one at which th e Majority arrives only by mischaracterizing our holding in Hudson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 204 A.3d 392 (Pa. 2019)

.

14 Majority Opinion at 23. The Majority even speculates in a footnote that it might be unconstitutional for the General Assembly to provide for a sentence of “life imprisonment” for some offenses while also providing for a sentence of “ life imprisonment with out right to parole” for others. The Majority does not explain which constitutional provision (or which Constitution) even arguably prevents the General Assembly from imposing different punishments for different crimes. Id. at 23 n.9.

15 Id. at 2 3 ( emphasis added; footnote omitted)

. 16 S ee 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”).

17 Sentencing Order , B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTI ONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “sentencing order” to mean “[a] judicial order that identifies the issuing court, the offender, the offense underlying a conviction, the sentence imposed, and any special conditions or options that affect the sentence.

— Also termed judgment of sentence; judgment

- of

- sentence order”).

18 Majority Opinion at 22.[ J

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The appellant in Hudson was a pro se prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment for second

- degree murder. Before our Court, Hudson offered a fairly strained statutory interpretation argument . He claimed that trial courts sentencing second

- degree murder er s to life imprisonment are requ ired by Subsection 9756(b)(1) of the Sentencing Code 19 to impose a minimum sentence , and that the trial court ’ s failure to impose a minimum sentence in his case meant that he should be presumed to have a minimum sentence of only one day. Unsurprisingly, we rejected that argument. We explained that, “ [u] nder [a] ppellant ’ s theory, in the case of second

- degree murder [,] sentencing courts should impose a minimum sentence no greater than one

- half of the mandated life sentence. This, however, would be ‘ impossib le of execution ’ because a sentencing court cannot know, at the time of sentencing, the number of years the defendant will continue to live. ” 20 We also rejected the argument that a minimum sentence of one day should be presumed, noting that “ life sentences are reserved for the most serious crimes , ” and that, elsewhere in the Crimes Code, the General Assembly manifested its ability and intent explicitl y to pair minimum sentences with maximum sentences of life imprisonment. 21 Emphasizing that our opinion in H udson “ c oncluded that the General Assembly did not intend for a trial judge to impose a minimum sentence when imposing a sentence of life imprisonment , ” the Majority suggests that “ [t] his represents a holding that the General Assembly intended that for all offenders who are sentenced to life imprisonment,

19 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b)(1) (providing that trial courts “ shall impose a minimum sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one

- half of the maximum sentence imposed ” ).

20 Hudson , 204 A.3d at 397.

21 Id. (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(a)(1) , which provides for a sentence of “ 35 years to life ” )

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ineligibility for parole is a part of their sentence. ” 22 That ’ s simply not the case . While we concluded that Hudson was ineligible for parole, we never said that he was ineligible because of his judgment of sentence. Indeed, as the Majority admits, the jurisdictional question of whether Hudson ’ s parole ineligibility was part of his judgment of sentence

— and thus subject to challenge only under the Post Conviction Relief Act

— was neither raised n or decided i n Hudson

. 23 Furthermore, our analysis in Hudson went well beyond the homicide sentencing statute and Hudson ’ s judgment of sentence. We also noted that the Parole Code prohibits the Board from paroling prisoner s before their minimum sentence s ha ve expired, and that the Board is also prohibited from paroling a prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment

. 24 Hence, our bottom

- line conclusion in Hudson was not, as the Majority seems to suggest, that Hudson ’ s judgment of sentence rendered him ineli gible for parole. Rather, we concluded that “ the Board lacks the power to release on parole an inmate serving a mandatory life sentence for second

- degree murder , ” and that Subsection 9756(b)(1) of the Sentencing Code “ was never intended specifically to cr eate a personal right to be reviewed for pa role

. ” 25 I agree with the Majority on one thing: the General Assembly plainly did inten d to prevent those serving sentences of life imprisonment from being released on parole

. But the Majority ignor es the means that the legislatu re chose to accomplish that outcome

.

22 Majority Opinion at 21.

23 See id. at 16 ( “ In retrospect, a discussion of jurisdiction in Hudson would have been useful [.] ” ).

24 Hudson , 204 A.3d at 398 (discussing Castle v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 554 A.2d 625, 628

- 29 (Pa. C mwlth . 1989) ).

25 Id. at 399 (footnote omitted).[ J

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The General Assembly did not mak e the sentence for second

- degree murder life imprisonment without parole , as the Majority pretend s

. Instead, p arole consideration for those serving a sentence of “ life imprisonment ” is a function of the Parole Code, completely divorced from the defendant’s underlying judgment of sentence. 26 So e ven if Appellants ’ constitutional challenges succeeded , their judgments of sentence would remain intact and they unquestionably would remain in the custody of the Department of Corrections until their death s

. 27 It is a mystery to me how Appellants’ claims could be

26 As I explained in my concurrence in Hudson , to conclude that the General Assembly intended to prohibit parole for those serving life imprisonment, one must look both at the sentencing statute and at the Parole Code : Our Crimes Code mandates that any person convicted of second

- degree murder be sentenced “ to a term of life imprisonment. ” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b). Subsection 6137(a) affords the parole board the discretion to release any inmate on parole “ except an inmate condemned to death or serving life imprisonment. ” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1). The General Assembly ’ s use of the term “ life imprisonment ” in both of these provisions indicates, plainly and unambiguously, that it intended to ensure that those convicted of second

degree murder are never to be released on parole. Hudson , 204 A.3d at 400 (Wecht, J., concurring).

27 As we explaine d in a case upholding the constitutionality of the modern parole system , “[parole] is not an act of clemency, but a penological measure fo r the disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls. It does not set aside or affect the sentence ; the convict remains in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its agents, subject at any time, for breach of condition, to be returned to the penal institution. Com. ex rel. Banks v. Cain , 28 A.2d 897, 899 ( Pa. 1942) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Brittingham , 275 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. 1971) ( “ The prisoner on parole is still in the legal custody of the state through the warden of the institution from which he was paroled, and is under the control of the warden and of other agents of the Commonwealth until expiration of the term of his sentence. ” ); Com. ex rel. Sparks v. Russell , 169 A.2d 88 4, 885 (Pa. 1961) ( “ [Parole] does not set aside or affect the sentence and the convict remains in the legal custo dy of the state. . . . A prisoner on parole is still in the legal custody of the warden of the institution from which he was paroled and he is under the control of the warden until the expiration of the term of his sentence. ” ).[ J

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deemed legality of sentence challenges when Appellants do not even seek vacatur of their judgments of sentence. Every year, Pennsylvania courts receive hundreds of petitions seeking to obtain collateral relief beyond and notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction of the Post Conviction Relief Act

. As a result, it is unsurprising that a judicial instinct to police the PCRA ’ s jurisdictional bounds rigorously can develop. No doubt acting on that impulse, the Majority and the Commonwealth Court dismiss Appellants ’ argument s as creative lawyering gone too far. 28 But Appellants are merely offering a natural reading of th e

s trange statutory scheme that the General Assembly (for whatever reason) chose to
enact. It is t he Majority ’ s argument

— which ignores the statutory text and treats Appellants ’ constitutional challenges to the P arole C ode as collateral attacks on their judgm ents of sentence

— that is the creative one

. T hose who might otherwise be inclined to favor today’s expansion of the PCRA’s jurisdiction on policy grounds would be wise to pause to first consider the unintended consequences that the Majority’s flawed legal reasoning likely will have. M any vexing policy issues surround Pennsylvania’s treatment of second

- degree murderers

. T he Majority’s blurring of the distinction between a judgment of sentence and the Parole C ode will make any attempt to address those issue s much harder for the policymaking branches in the years to come

. The following brief history of life sentences in Pennsylvania will show just how short

- sighted t oday’s decision is.

28 Majority Opinion at 20 ( calling the Appellants ’ argument “ creative ” ); id. at 30 n.12 ( “ [T]he General Assembly did not intend to permit an end

- run around the [PCRA’s] time

bar through creative pleading. ” ); Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 256 A.3d 483, 492 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (s tating that the court “ will not countenance ” the Appellants ’ “ thinly veiled attempt to forum shop through pleading ” ); see also Majority O pinion at 17 ( expressing concerns about “ creative plaintiffs ” and “ artful pleading ” ).[ J

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Even after the creation of Pennsylvania’s first parole system in the early 1900s, the Governor and his Board of Pardons “ retained power to reduce minimum sentences and release prisoners at any time. ” 29 This power proved especially useful and was often exercised in cases involving “ long or life sentences .” 30 After a 1939 rep ort commission ed by the Governor recommended “f ormally separating pardons from parole , ” 31 t he General Assembly took t hat advice and passed the Parole Act of 1941 . Th is legislation created an independent Parole Board with authority over prisoners, but it al so precluded that body from paroling “convicts condemned to death or serving life imprisonment

. ” 32 Thus, the legislation created a clear division of labor, with the Governor

— rather than the Parole Board

— possessing the “ exclusive responsibility to decide on commutation for life

sentenced prisoners. ” 33 Ultimately, the question of which body had the power to exercise clemency in second

- degree murder cases made little difference to those serving “ life imprisonment , ” since Pennsylvania’s various governors all u sed their commutation power s liberally throughout the middle part of the twentieth century

. 34 To quote one legislator who described the state of affairs in this era : “ In the year 1954, life imprisonment in Pennsylvania meant that a prisoner had to serve 19.6 years in the penitentiary

. . . in

29 Christopher Seeds, Governors and Prisoners: The Death of Clemency and the Making of Life Sentences without Release in Pennsylvania , Vol. 46 S OCIAL J USTICE No. 4 , at 86 (2019).

30 Id. at 86

- 87.

31 Id. at 87.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 88

34 Id. at 87 (s tating that “[c] ommutation for lifers was regular ” from the 1930s through the 1970s).[ J

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1958, it meant that he had to serve 17.2.

. . . This is what life imprisonment means.” 35
Liberal use of the comm ut ation power continued well into the 1970s, with one legislator declaring in 1 973 that “ a sentence of life imprisonment ” in Pennsylvania is “ not necessarily a sentence of life imprisonment.” 36 Indeed, “[h] earings show that lawmakers anticipated that prisoners convicted of second

- degree murder would have [their] sentences commuted an d would be released after a period of roughly 20 years. ” 37

“ In light of Pennsylvania’s historicall y active clemency practice, the absence of parole was not, initially, a substantial concern. ” 38 By the 1980s, however, clemency fell into disuse. Governor Thornburgh , who took office in 1979, approved fewer than 10 percent of the recommendations for commutation that he received [.]” 39 This trend continued until commutations became vanishingly rare. Between 1990 and 1993 , only eleven prisoners had their sente nces commuted in Pennsylvania , while the S tate of Texas , for instance, granted nearly 500 commutations during that same three

- year period. 40

35 Id. at 88 ( quoting Leg. Journal, Gen. Assemb. 38

- 70, 145th Sess., at 2694 (Pa. 1961)).

36 Id. at 93 (quoting Leg. Journal, Gen. Assemb. 1

- 30, 157th Sess., at 775 (Pa. 1973)) ; id. at 89 (quoting a letter from the Superintendent of the Western State Penitentiary to Governor Shapp sta ting that “the average lifer serves approximat ely 18 years before his sentence is commuted and he is paroled to the community”).

37 Id.

38 Id. at 94.

39 Id. (“ B etween 1979 and 1986, [Governor] Thornburgh granted fewer commutations than [Governor] Shapp ever granted in a single year”).

40 Id. at 96. Legal scholars cite several possible causes for this decrease in commutations , including “ increased political influence [on] commutation decisions ,” id. at 94, “[h] igh

- profile events and political debate in the 1990s ,” id. at 95, “ aggressive restructuring of the board of pardons ,” id. , and “ an amendment to the state Constitution[ J

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As commutations evaporated, and life imprisonment actually started to mean life imprisonment, legislative efforts be gan to shift toward making lifers parole

- eligible

. Such a legislative change is possible only because, as I have explained, parole ineligibility for those serving a sentence of life imprisonment comes not from the defendant’s judgment of sentence, but fro m the Parole Code. And the General Assembly can modify the Parole Code by passing legislation that make s those serving life sentences eligible for parole after a set number of years. 41
In fact , there have been many legislative proposals to do just that over the years. One bill introduced in 1992 (HB 1382) would have made inmates serving life sentences eligible for parole. 42 Alt hough that measure never became law , similar legislation is being

c onsidered in the Senate today

. Two different bipartisan bill s (SB 835 and SB 135 ) would amend the Parole Code to allow the Board to parole some second

- degree murderer s who ha ve served at least twenty

- five years i n prison. 43 And those proposals are essentially modified versions of similar bills from the prior legislative session

. 44 Consider this: It is

concerning the membership and decision

- making of the board [, which ] structurally altered the way clemency was issued. ” Id.

41 The Majority ignores this key detail when it incorrectly surmises from the Parole Code a “legislative intent to forever bar parole eligibility for all individuals convicted of se cond

- degree murder

. ” Majority Opinion at 22 (emphasis added).

42 Seeds, supra , note 9 , at 96.

43 S.B. 835, Printer ’ s No. 1029, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 20 21 ) ; S.B. 135, Printer ’ s No. 250, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 20 21 ) ; See Peter Hall, Former ‘lifers’ call on lawmakers to end ‘death by incarceration’

, P ENN

. C APITAL - S TAR (Sept. 20, 2022), https://www.penncapital

star.com/civil

- rights

- social

- justice/former

- lifers

- call

- on - lawmakers

- to

- end

- death

- by

incarceration ; see also Ryan Deto , Bipartisan bill aims to allow Pa. lifers a ch ance at parole , P ENN

. C APITAL - S TAR (N ov

. 15, 2021) , https://www.penncapital

- star.com/civil

rights

- social

- justice/bipartisan

- bill

- aims

- to

- allow

- pa - lifers

- a - chance

- at

- parole

. 44 S.B. 942, Printer ’ s No. 1366 , Reg. Sess. (Pa. 201 9); H .B. 135 , Printer ’ s No. 1708 , Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019 )

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highly questionable

— at best

— whether such bills would have any legal e ffect following the Majority’s decision today. The policy considerations that ou r sister branches will have to weigh in this arena
are many. For one thing, life imprisonment means something very different than it did
many decades ago, when commutations were frequent and parole eligibility was not even

a concern. Another consideration is that the share of prisoners serving life sentences in Pennsylvania has ballooned to the point where “[l] ifers now account for roughly 10 percent of Pennsylvania ’ s prison population, the highest rate in the country. ” 45 O f those inmates,

rou ghly 1,100 of them are second

- degree murder convicts , many of who m did not intentionally kill anyone. 46 Plus, policymakers likely will need to consider the high costs associated with caring for an increasingly geriatric prison population, 47 and must no doub t weigh an y potential cost savings from expand ed parole availability against any increased risk to public safety. (Keeping in mind, of course, that the risk of recidivism generally decreases with the age of the offender.) It is not for me or for this Court to decide whether statutory changes should be made in this complex area of law. What I do know, though, is that any future legislative reforms will now be hamstrung by the Majority’s newly invented legal fiction that those serving sentences of life imprisonment are precluded from receiving parole because of their judgments of sentence

. By folding parole ineligibility into the judgment of sentence

45 Brief for the Defender Association of Philadelphia at 22.

46 Brief for the Sentencing Project at 2.

47 Id. at 27 (explaining that almost half of Pennsylvania’s inmates serving life sentences for second

- degree murder “are 50 or older” and “nearly 60 percent have already served over 20 years” in prison); see Deto , supra , note 44 (“[T] he Department of Corrections has estimated the cost for personal care is nearly $500 per day per person, and that most individuals under personal care are incapacitated and not threatening to society at all. ”).[ J

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itself

— where the General Assembly did not put it

— the Majority seemingly eliminates the General Asse mbly’s ability to expand parole eligibility to lifers with a simple change to the Parole Code , at least without formal resentencing or some other form of judicial involvement. My point here is that t oday’s decision unapologetically ignoring the text of the governing statutes is not simply harmless jurisdictional gatekeeping

. The Majority ’s decision will also have very real and regrettable consequences for future policy reform s that have been brewing for decades. I respectfully dissent.