J-A30027-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

GLENN R. NOBLIT AND MARILYN M. 

NOBLIT,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

RANDY L. WOLFE AND JANET A. 

GREENE,

Appellees No. 606 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered March 10, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Civil Division at No(s): 2015-CV-04168-CV

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2017

Appellants, Glenn R. Noblit and Marilyn M. Noblit, appeal from the 

order entered on March 10, 2016, which sustained the preliminary objections 

filed by Randy L. Wolfe (hereinafter “Defendant Wolfe”) and Janet A. Greene 

(hereinafter “Defendant Greene”) (hereinafter, collectively “the 

Defendants”), and dismissed Appellants’ complaint with prejudice. We 

vacate and remand.

Appellants instituted the current action on May 28, 2015, by filing a 

complaint for a permanent injunction against the Defendants. Specifically, 

Appellants requested that the trial court issue a permanent injunction 

against the Defendants and enjoin the Defendants from interfering with 
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Appellants’ ownership interest in a private road (hereinafter “the Private 

Road”). Appellants’ Complaint, 5/28/15, at 1.

Within the complaint, Appellants averred that they own the Private 

Road. Id. at ¶ 5. Moreover, Appellants alleged that, for over two years, the 

Defendants have engaged in a course of conduct that has interfered with 

Appellants’ quiet use and enjoyment of the Private Road. According to 

Appellants, this course of conduct has included harassing, intimidating, and 

offensive actions, made by the Defendants and directed towards Appellants, 

Appellants’ relatives, and Appellants’ invitees. See id. at 1-9. As Appellants 

averred, these actions included:

(1) “On or about the week before Thanksgiving 2012, the 

invitees of [Appellants], their son and grandchildren, were 

to place ‘No Trespassing’ signs regarding hunters, 

whereupon they were stopped by [the Defendants] and 

were told they were not allowed on the very ‘Private Road’ 

they had full legal right to”;

(2) “On or about the week after Thanksgiving, 2013, while 

[Appellants’] son[] was traveling on [Appellants’] Private 

Road, Defendant Greene came screaming out and [] 

attempted to stop [Appellants’ son] from proceeding”;

(3) In 2015, the Defendants “continued to call and harass” 

Appellants’ surveyor, Anthony Trost [(hereinafter “Surveyor 

Trost”)], regarding the placement of “flags and markings 

[on] the [Private Road] in order to determine areas of the 

on-going trespass of Defendant Wolfe’s trees, limbs[,] and 

branches”;

(4) “On or about April 3, 2015, [Appellant Glenn Noblit and 

Appellants’] grandchildren[] were on the Private Road 

[when] . . . Defendant Greene accosted them, screaming 

they are not allowed to walk on [Appellants’] Private Road”; 
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(5) “Additionally, on April 3, 2015, . . . while [Appellant 

Glenn Noblit] had his tools to connect the markers of 

Surveyor Trost, and [was] . . . using a chalk line string to 

connect the stakes to show what trees [were] to be 

removed, [the] Defendants approached the grandchildren, 

yelling and screaming, ‘You [can’t] f___ing do this.’ ‘That 

you don’t have a license to do this.’ When son Austin[] put 

a string on a pin, Defendant Wolfe accused him of running 

away from what he destroyed and Defendant Greene got 

into [Appellant Glenn Noblit’s] face and yelling, ‘You son of 

bitch, you are not allowed to touch the stakes’”;

(6) “Also on or about April 3, 2015 . . . , Defendant Greene 

. . . called [Appellant Glenn Noblit] a ‘son of a bitch,’ ‘f___ 

you’[,] tore down the string, tangled it and threw it across 

the right-of-way. . . . [Defendant] Greene said to 

[Appellant Glenn Noblit], ‘I will spit all over you, if I f___in 

want to.’ At this point, Defendant Wolfe turned his backside 

toward [Appellant Glenn Noblit], yelling ‘I use you to wipe 

my God damn ass.’ . . . The grandchildren stepped back 

from him and [one grandchild] hid behind the car door 

stating ‘he was scared.’ A State Policeman appeared, stated 

this was a civil matter and had to go to another call. As the 

officer left, [Defendant Greene said to Appellant Glenn 

Noblit] ‘You are going to take all the paint off the trees you 

marked on the right of way. You are going to scrub the 

paint off these trees’”;

(7) “On or about . . . April 29, 2015, [Appellant Glenn 

Noblit] and a [Pennsylvania Power and Light (hereinafter 

“PPL”)] serviceman [were] discussing connecting electricity 

[when] Defendant Wolfe [told Appellant Glenn Noblit] ‘To 

get back in his vehicle and not to walk on the right-of-way 

because he was not allowed to be out of his vehicle on the 

right-of-way[’]. . . . Additionally, Defendant Wolfe told the 

PPL serviceman, “I am not going to tell you one more time, 

to get in your vehicle and get out of here.’ At this point, 

Defendant Greene came out of the house yelling[,] ‘You are 

not allowed to stand on the right-of-way and you are not 

allowed here.’”

Id. at ¶ 6 (some internal capitalization omitted).
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Although Appellants’ complaint is not a perfect pleading and does not 

rise to the pinnacle of clarity, Appellants requested in the complaint that the 

trial court “abate this on-going conduct by the Defendants” and “issu[e] a 

permanent injunction against [the] Defendants from barring and preventing, 

in any manner, the blocking, obstructing[,] or intimidating harassment by 

any means against [Appellants’] ownership of [the] Private Road.” Id. at 1 

and “Wherefore” Clause.

On June 22, 2015, the Defendants filed preliminary objections in the 

nature of a demurrer to Appellants’ complaint. Within the Defendants’ 

preliminary objections, the Defendants claimed that, as a matter of law, 

Appellants were not entitled to a permanent injunction because “[a]ll of the 

harms described in the complaint can be compensated by damages, and are 

therefore not appropriate grounds for injunctive relief.” The Defendants’ 

Preliminary Objections, 6/22/15, at ¶ 3.

On March 10, 2016, the trial court sustained the Defendants’ 

preliminary objections and dismissed Appellants’ complaint with prejudice. 

Trial Court Order, 3/10/16, at 1. Within the trial court’s later-filed opinion, 

the trial court explained the reasoning behind its order:

In their complaint, Appellants allege three specific instances 

which they submit warrant issuance of an injunction. The 

first describes an instance in 2012 in which invitees of 

Appellants, as well [as] Appellants’ son and grandchildren, 

were told by [the Defendants] that they were not allowed 

on the [Private Road]. Second, in 2013, Appellants’ son 

was traveling on the [Private Road] when [Defendant] 

Greene “came screaming out” and attempted to stop him 
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from proceeding down the road. Finally, in 2014, 

[Defendant] Wolfe filed a motion to terminate Appellants’ 

rights in the [Private Road].

As we held in [the] March 10, 2016 order, and as we hold 

now, none of these incidents warrant the issuance of an 

injunction. Appellants fail to demonstrate how the harm 

alleged cannot be compensated by monetary damages. 

Should [the Defendants] be found civilly or criminally liable 

for their interference with Appellants’ ownership of the road, 

such liability could be accurately measured and awarded to 

Appellants.

Similarly, Appellants’ [claim that the trial court erred when 

it dismissed their complaint without granting them leave to 

amend] is without merit. Where a trial court sustains 

preliminary objections on their merits, it is generally an 

abuse of discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to 

amend. However, leave to amend is not required where it 

is clear that amendment is impossible or where granting 

leave to amend would be futile. Such is the case here. 

Assuming Appellants were granted leave to amend their 

complaint, it would not have altered the outcome. The only 

remedy sought by Appellants was issuance of an injunction. 

Even an amended complaint would not have justified such 

relief.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/15, at 2-3 (internal citations and some internal 

capitalization omitted).

Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal and now raise two claims on 

appeal:

1. Whether the [trial] court erred by sustaining [the 

Defendants’] preliminary objections in the nature of a 

demurrer, where [Appellants] properly and sufficiently 

pleaded unlawful interference with their right to use and 

enjoy their private road and requested an injunction to 

enjoin the interference?

2. Whether the [trial] court erred and abused its discretion 

by dismissing [Appellants’] complaint with prejudice and 
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without leave to amend, where the complaint sought 

injunctive relief that is expressly permitted by Pennsylvania 

law, and where the [trial] court recognized the availability 

of a remedy for the conduct described in the complaint?

Appellants’ Brief at 4 (some internal capitalization omitted).

We have stated:

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is 

properly [sustained] where the contested pleading is legally 

insufficient. Preliminary objections in the nature of a 

demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on 

the basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence 

outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose of 

the legal issues presented by the demurrer. All material 

facts set forth in the pleading and all inferences reasonably 

deducible therefrom must be admitted as true.

In determining whether the trial court properly sustained 

preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine 

the averments in the complaint, together with the 

documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to 

evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus 

of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the 

complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery 

if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial court’s 

decision regarding preliminary objections only where there 

has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. When 

sustaining the [preliminary objections] will result in the 

denial of claim or a dismissal of suit, [the preliminary 

objections may be sustained] only where the case [is] free 

and clear of doubt.

Lugo v. Farmers Pride, Inc., 967 A.2d 963, 966 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(internal citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).

“In order to obtain permanent injunctive relief, a party must establish 

the following elements relative to their claims: (1) the right to relief is clear, 

(2) the injunction is necessary to avoid an injury that cannot be 

compensated by damages, and (3) that greater injury will result if the court 
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does not grant the injunction than if it does.” Mazin v. Bureau of Prof’l & 

Occupational Affairs, 950 A.2d 382, 389 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); Kuznik v. 

Westmoreland Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 902 A.2d 476, 489 (Pa. 2006). 

“Unlike a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction does not require 

proof of immediate irreparable harm.” Liberty Place Retail Assocs., L.P. 

v. Israelite Sch. of Universal Practical Knowledge, 102 A.3d 501, 506 

(Pa. Super. 2014). Moreover, with respect to property interests, our 

Supreme Court has held: 

Injury to property, with reference to its reasonable and 

ordinary use, by continuous hurtful acts, constitutes a 

nuisance undoubtedly, and may properly be the subject of 

equity jurisdiction, not only to redress the injured party by 

restraining the injurious acts, but in some cases by 

compelling the wrongdoer to make amends for the injury 

done. . . . It is well settled that a series of acts although 

criminal will not prevent equity from restraining them if the 

remedy at law is inadequate.

Ashinsky v. Levenson, 100 A. 491, 492 (Pa. 1917) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court held that Appellants’ complaint does not 

state a claim for permanent injunctive relief because an award of monetary 

damages can compensate Appellants for all of their harm. Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/27/15, at 2-3. On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court’s 

conclusion is erroneous because the law does not provide an adequate 

remedy for the Defendants’ continued harassment and interference with 

Appellants’ use and enjoyment of their private property. Appellants note 
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that they seek “to enjoin the pattern of obstruction and harassment [and] to 

preserve [Appellants’] right to use and enjoy the private road.” Appellants’ 

Brief at 10-11. We agree with Appellants. We thus respectfully vacate the 

trial court’s order. 

Read fairly, Appellants’ complaint avers that the Defendants have 

engaged in a continuous and continuing course of conduct that has

prevented and is preventing Appellants from the use and enjoyment of 

their Private Road. Further, Appellants have averred that the Defendants’ 

years’ long scheme has included harassing, intimidating, and offensive 

actions against Appellants, Appellants’ relatives, and Appellants’ invitees. 

Monetary relief simply cannot adequately compensate Appellants for these 

injuries or for the deprivation of the use and enjoyment of their property. 

To paraphrase the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:

Unless a [court] protects [Appellants], it is clear that 

[Appellants] will be deprived of the use and enjoyment of 

[their] property. In such case, there is no adequate remedy 

[in] law for the unlawful acts of the [Defendants] which 

have been constantly recurring and threatening to continue, 

and equity clearly has jurisdiction . . . [to] enter such 

decree as will effectively protect [Appellants] in the use and 

enjoyment of [their] property.

See Ashinsky, 100 A. at 492.

Therefore, we conclude that Appellants properly pleaded that “the 

injunction is necessary to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated by 

damages.” Mazin, 950 A.2d at 389. We respectfully conclude that the trial 
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court erred when it sustained the Defendants’ preliminary objection in the 

nature of a demurrer.1

Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2017

____________________________________________

1 As a result of our disposition, Appellants’ second claim on appeal is moot.