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Filed 1/20/23 P. v. Mazyck CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WALTER RONALD MAZYCK, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

C096391

(Super. Ct. No. 62173879)

A jury found defendant Walter Ronald Mazyck, Jr., guilty on two counts of 

possessing identifying information with the intent to defraud. (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. 

(c)(2).)

1

 Defendant admitted being previously convicted of the same offense and the trial 

court found true four circumstances in aggravation. The court subsequently sentenced 

defendant to a split sentence: 16 months in county jail and 20 months on mandatory 

supervision.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his 

possession of four debit cards that did not form the basis of either offense with which he 

was charged. He also claims his trial counsel was ineffective and the cumulative errors 

were prejudicial. We will affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

On July 26, 2020, at approximately 3:00 a.m., defendant was driving to a casino in 

Placer County. Along the way, in a semirural area, Placer County Sheriff’s Deputy 

Stanislav Semenuk initiated a traffic stop of the car defendant was driving. During the 

stop, defendant gave Deputy Semenuk his identification, and Semenuk conducted a 

lawful search of the car.

In the back of the car, inside a gray bag, Deputy Semenuk found a wallet

containing identification, credit cards, and bank cards, all belonging to Jesus Salazar. He 

also found a blank check and social security card, both of which belonged to Gaylene

Quintana. At the front of the car, in the visor area between the front seats, Semenuk 

found more credit cards and bank cards.2 The face of each card listed a different name.

The People later charged defendant with two counts of possessing identifying 

information with the intent to defraud (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2)), identifying the victims as 

Salazar and Quintana and alleging defendant was previously convicted of the same 

offense. The People also alleged nine circumstances in aggravation and that defendant 

was ineligible for parole unless the court found unusual circumstances. (§ 1203, subd. 

(e)(4).)

Defendant pled not guilty.

2 Both in the trial court and on appeal, the parties refer to “four” bank and credit cards. 

The exhibits submitted, however, show five cards.
3

Motions In Limine

Prior to trial defendant filed, among other motions, a motion to preclude 

“improper opinion testimony going to the ultimate issue.” Specifically, defendant moved 

to “preclude any testimony respecting any witness’ belief that the Defendant violated or 

possibly violated such statute.” He wanted the prosecution’s witnesses to be “limited to 

testifying about their direct observations.” When questioned about that motion at the 

hearing on motions in limine, defendant replied, “[t]hat was a typo on my part, your 

Honor. We can withdraw this one.”

The court also considered the prosecutor’s motion to introduce “the additional 

cards found in the defendant’s possession” as uncharged criminal conduct under 

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The prosecutor argued the cards were

evidence of intent and the absence of mistake. Defendant did not offer a written 

opposition to the motion, but at the hearing on the motions in limine, defendant argued 

the cards should be excluded because they were not previously turned over to the defense 

and they were hearsay evidence. 

The prosecutor established the cards had indeed been given to the defense; the 

court found the hearsay argument unavailing. The court ruled as follows: “[T]he Court 

does find that this evidence is specifically relevant and admissible under [Evidence Code 

section] 1101[, subdivision] (b) to show intent, to show absence of mistake, as identified 

in the [People’s] brief. I don’t find this evidence is substantially outweighed by any 

prejudicial effect in this case, so that evidence will be allowed.”

Salazar’s Testimony

Salazar testified at trial. He did not know defendant and had never seen him 

before. He identified the wallet found in defendant’s car as his wallet, and indicated he 

never gave anyone permission to use his wallet. He testified he had not seen his wallet 

since the end of 2019. Salazar initially thought he dropped it somewhere until he found a 

“strange charge” on his credit card at a smoke shop in North Highlands. Once that 
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happened, he reported to work and the DMV that his wallet was stolen. He canceled all 

his credit cards and executed a cancelation statement for his military identification.

Quintana’s Testimony

At trial, Quintana testified that in March 2020 she was renting a room from 

defendant’s sister. Quintana and defendant were dating and, for about a month, shared 

that room. In their room, Quintana kept her checkbook and her social security card with 

other legal documents in a dark, plastic container, about the size of a shoe box, on the left 

side of the bed she shared with defendant. Defendant stored his things on the other side 

of the bed.

Quintana never gave defendant permission to have any of her checking account 

information, use her debit card, or possess her social security card. Quintana testified 

that she never took these things out of the container in defendant’s presence, and she 

never left loose checks laying around. Normally, she kept her checkbook and social 

security card in storage; they were in the box in their room because she recently applied 

for a job.

In April 2020, when Quintana asked defendant to contribute to the rent, he moved

out. Quintana remained. She could not remember defendant coming back to the house 

after he moved out and she did not know where he was living. During that time, 

however, Quintana was exposed to COVID-19 and remained out of the house for four 

days.

On May 1, 2020, Quintana moved out. She took everything with her, leaving 

behind only a can of paint. In July, when defendant was found in possession of her blank 

check, Quintana still had her checkbook; she did not realize a check was missing. She 

also did not realize her social security card was missing. She testified there were no 

fraudulent bank charges.
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Verdict and Sentence

Following the submission of evidence and argument, the jury found defendant 

guilty on both counts of possessing identifying information with the intent to defraud; 

however, they found not true four of the alleged aggravating circumstances. Defendant 

admitted to being previously convicted of possessing identifying information with the 

intent to defraud, and the court found true four aggravating circumstances. The court 

sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of three years but ordered the sentence split: 

defendant would serve 16 months in county jail, the remaining 20 months would be 

suspended and defendant would be released on mandatory supervision.

DISCUSSION

I

Additional Bank and Credit Cards

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting four bank and 

credit cards found in the front of defendant’s car. Relying on Evidence Code section 352,

defendant argues the cards were “not substantially probative” on the issue of intent

because the prosecutor did not prove the cards belonged to actual people. If the cards 

were probative, he contends, they were cumulative and unduly prejudicial. Defendant 

forfeited this claim by failing to raise an Evidence Code section 352 objection in the trial 

court.

“To preserve a claim that a trial court abused its discretion in not excluding 

evidence under Evidence Code section 352, ‘a party must make a timely and specific 

objection when the evidence is offered.’ ” (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 

230-231; see also People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 138-139; People v. Alexander

(2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 905.) “Under . . . section 353, subdivision (a), a reviewing court 

cannot grant relief on a claim that evidence was erroneously admitted unless a timely 

objection was made ‘and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or 

motion.’ ‘ “What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well as 
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the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party 

believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond 

appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.” ’ ” (People v. Hajek and 

Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1214.)

During motions in limine, the prosecutor moved to admit the additional bank and 

credit cards found in defendant’s car to show intent and absence of mistake pursuant to 

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Defense counsel objected. He raised only 

two objections: lack of production and hearsay. He did not challenge the evidence on 

the grounds he raises on appeal. Accordingly, the claim is forfeited.

II

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant raises two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He first contends 

he received ineffective assistance when defense counsel failed to object when Deputy 

Semenuk testified that, in his opinion, defendant possessed identifying information of 

Salazar and Quintana, with the intent to defraud them. He contends that he again 

received ineffective assistance when defense counsel failed to object to Deputy 

Semenuk’s testimony that the area where he stopped defendant was a high crime area. 

Assuming the testimony was inadmissible, we find defense counsel may have had a 

sound tactical reason for not raising these objections and thus find no ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

A. Legal Principles

The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant. 

(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) To establish constitutionally 

inadequate representation, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was 

deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. (Ibid.)

We defer to trial counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions to examine a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925.) On 
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direct appeal, “competency is presumed unless the record affirmatively excludes a 

rational basis for the trial attorney’s choice.” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 

1216, 1260, italics omitted.) “If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted 

or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to 

provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Gray

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 207.) Mere speculation is insufficient to support a finding of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 933.) 

Failure to object rarely constitutes deficient counsel performance. (Gray, at p. 207.)

B. Deputy Semenuk’s Testimony on Defendant’s Intent

Defendant argues Deputy Semenuk’s opinion that defendant possessed Quintana’s

and Salazar’s identifying information with the intent to defraud them was inadmissible; 

trial counsel should have objected. Counsel’s failure to object, he argues, rendered his 

assistance ineffective. We disagree.

1. Additional Background

During Deputy Semenuk’s testimony, the following exchange took place between 

the deputy and the prosecutor:

“Q[:] Now, we previously spoke about some of the hallmarks of identity theft that 

you look for. Now, based on all your training and experience when it comes to identity 

theft, do you have an opinion in this case as to whether or not the defendant possessed the 

personal identifying information of Jesus Salazar and Gaylene Quintana with the intent to 

defraud?

“A[:] Yes.

“Q[:] What is that opinion?

“A[:] My opinion, based on nearly a decade of proactive policing and 

investigations pertaining to the subject matter, is that the defendant did possess these 

items for an unlawful reason. He possessed them unlawfully, but he also possessed them 
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with an unlawful reason. And that opinion is based on, once again, hundreds, if not 

thousands, of these investigations. And this is how it starts. You start with just being in 

possession of someone’s name, their date of birth, and even better than that their Social 

Security number.

“And once you have that trifecta, you can continue on with the fraudulent process 

of ruining people’s lives and taking money from them in their name. So that, to me, 

substantiated the bare minimum of identity theft. And from here on forward, who knows 

how bad it could potentially get.

“Q[:] Now, your opinion, is that based on their being more than one personal 

identifying information in the car?

“A[:] Yes.”

On cross-examination, defense counsel engaged Deputy Semenuk as follows: 

“Q[:] At the police academy, you learned intent is a critical consideration; 

correct?

“A[:] It is.

“Q[:] Okay. So possession plus intent is what is needed; correct?

“A[:] In some cases.

“Q[:] You are not currently on any type of ID theft task force or specialized 

agency; correct?

“A[:] No.

“Q[:] And it’s my understanding that you current work as a K-9 officer?

“A[:] Correct.”

2. Analysis

Assuming this testimony was inadmissible, we can discern a tactical decision to 

forego making an objection. Rather than objecting to Deputy Semenuk’s opinion, 

counsel used cross-examination to minimize the deputy’s experience and knowledge of 

identity theft crimes. Counsel was able to get Semenuk to admit he had no specialized 
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training in identity theft crimes. Semenuk also testified that he worked as a standard 

patrol deputy, operating with a dog, and not as part of an identity task force or similarly

specialized unit of the sheriff’s department. Moreover, Deputy Semenuk’s only training 

on the specific question of intent was in the police academy. It was reasonable for 

counsel to address the issue in cross-examination rather than lodging an objection, which 

would only serve to draw attention to that part of the testimony. Furthermore, had 

defense counsel objected to the testimony the prosecutor could have articulated a line of

hypothetical questions that mirrored the evidence already admitted in the trial to elicit the 

same opinion testimony. Testimony admitted in response to hypothetical questions 

would also have drawn additional attention to the opinion testimony. Thus, there was yet 

another reasonable tactical reason to forego making an objection. (People v. Mai (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) Defense counsel’s performance was not deficient.

C. Deputy Semenuk’s Testimony About the Area Where He Stopped Defendant’s Car

Defendant also contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when 

Deputy Semenuk testified “in a manner which portrayed [defendant] as an opportunistic 

criminal, seeking to victimize the citizens of Placer County, based merely upon the area 

and time of night where his vehicle was stopped.” We disagree.

1. Additional Background

After the victim witnesses testified, the prosecutor recalled Deputy Semenuk to the 

witness stand. Semenuk testified that when he initiated the stop of defendant’s vehicle, 

defendant was driving on a road that directly connects Sacramento to a major casino in 

Placer County. The prosecutor asked if the night shift was different from the day shift; 

Semenuk said that “at night what typically happens is the calls are far fewer in frequency, 

but when the calls do come in, they are usually a lot more intense . . . . The calls are 

more severe when they do come in.”

When calls were not coming in, Deputy Semenuk described his job as “proactive 

policing, so I try to locate criminal activity and investigate making sure our citizens 
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aren’t being victimized by people looking to break in cars or break in houses, stealing 

things, stuff like that.” He told the prosecutor that, at 3:00 a.m., he also is “more aware”

of the cars that pass by. At that time of night, he explained, there are “a lot of drunk 

drivers and a lot of people engaging in criminal activity. [¶] So as a proactive police 

officer, that’s the time of night where we find most of the more heinous things we would 

come across. We try to stop cars, pursuits get initiated, all -- like, just a plethora of bad 

things happen and it’s usually around this time of night.”

Deputy Semenuk also testified that the area where he stopped defendant’s car was 

a “high crime” area. “[The casino] attracts a tremendous amount of criminal[] [activity] 

from all over Northern California. Just my personal experience, some of my most --

some of the worst things that have happened in my career have revolved around the area 

around [the casino], meaning those are the worst of the worst I have encountered that 

have fought us, have had guns on them, all kinds of bad things happen to and from that 

casino.”

On cross-examination, Deputy Semenuk described a phenomenon he referred to as 

“criminal tourism.” “People from other places come into Placer County and victimize 

our citizens. Because our citizens aren’t used to criminal activity, a lot of our folks keep 

their cars unlocked, front doors unlocked to the houses, so there’s a lot of complacency 

that takes place in Placer County. That’s a major attractant for criminals up from 

Sacramento and the Bay Area. They come into our county to victimize our citizens.”

2. Analysis

Again, assuming this testimony was inadmissible, we find counsel could have 

made a tactical decision not to object. Counsel could have allowed the testimony to 

remain because it reflected the witness’s own biases against visitors to the casino such as 

defendant. Alternatively, counsel could have determined through his interaction with and 

observation of the jurors that they did not find the deputy’s testimony regarding this 

stretch of road to be persuasive or compelling. Counsel also could have reasonably 
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perceived that the jury was receiving the testimony only as reflecting Deputy Semenuk’s 

state of mind at the time of the vehicle stop, rather than characterizing defendant himself 

in a manner that was necessarily negative. Whatever the basis for the decision, it was not 

clearly unreasonable for counsel to leave the testimony unobjected to and uncontradicted. 

We do not find trial counsel’s performance deficient.

Further, a petition for habeas corpus is the more appropriate mechanism to raise 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where it was not clearly unreasonable for

defense counsel not to object to the challenged testimony but it is not clear why counsel 

made the decision that they did. Where the record does not establish that defense 

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard and is otherwise silent as to the 

basis for the challenged inaction, a habeas corpus petition is the more appropriate means 

to establish a claim of ineffective assistance. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 

overruled on another ground in People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10.)

III

Cumulative Error

Defendant contends the accumulation of errors he argues on appeal rendered his 

trial fundamentally unfair. Having found no error, we can find no cumulative error.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 /s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

I concur:

 /s/

DUARTE, J.

I concur in the result:

 /s/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.