UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-2286

ANNETTE REDDICK; TASHA REDDICK; ARLENE CARTER; TIESE 

MITCHELL; CRYSTAL LEWIS; J.M., Infant, by his next friend 

Tiese Mitchell; J.M., Infant, by her next friend Tiese 

Mitchell; J.J., Infant, by his next friend Crystal Lewis; 

R.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter; Z.C., 

Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

WILLIAM A. WHITE,

Respondent – Appellee,

and

JOHN CROCKETT HENRY, a/k/a John Crockett Henry, Jr., a/k/a 

James Crockett Henry, a/k/a J.C. Henry; HENRY LLC OF 

VIRGINIA BEACH,

Defendants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff.

------------------------------

NEAL LAWRENCE WALTERS,

Amicus Supporting Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:07-cv-00342-RBS-FBS)
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Submitted: October 17, 2011 Decided: December 1, 2011

Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and William L. OSTEEN, 

Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of 

North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony F. Troy, William H. Hurd, Stephen C. Piepgrass, Robert 

M. Luck, III, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellants. Neal L. Walters, Joshua M. Friedman, Third Year Law 

Student, F. Daphne Li, Third Year Law Student, UNIVERSITY OF 

VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate Litigation Clinic, 

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amicus Supporting Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

After William A. White made internet postings about leadcounsel for the plaintiffs (the Tenants) in a Fair Housing Act

case, the Tenants moved for sanctions against White. The 

district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who 

held an evidentiary hearing and entered an order denying the 

Tenants’ motion. Applying clear error review, the district 

court affirmed. Because the district court was required to 

perform a de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636, we vacate and 

remand for further proceedings. 

I.

The Tenants, as plaintiff-intervenors, were part of a Fair 

Housing Act proceeding brought against an apartment complex 

owner in Virginia Beach. In May 2007, White — who was not a 

party to the action — mailed letters to the Tenants using 

racially abusive language. The Tenants responded by issuing 

subpoenas to White, seeking to determine if he had some 

connection to the apartment complex owner. In February 2008, 

White moved to quash the subpoenas. However, prior to the 

hearing on that motion, White posted publicly available 

information about the Tenants’ counsel on an internet message 

board coupled with a warning that “no one” was to contact or 

disturb the attorney or his wife during the litigation. (J.A. 
4

333). The posting also stated that “[a]fter we are done with 

our legal dispute, they are open game, but while we are involved 

in this legal dispute, there is to be nothing done.” 

The Tenants responded to White’s posting by filing a motion 

for sanctions against him, citing the district court’s inherent 

power to sanction bad-faith behavior. 

Id.

See Chambers v. NASCO, 

Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). The district court referred the 

matter to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing.* During 

the pendency of this motion, the Tenants settled the underlying 

Fair Housing Act litigation. Eventually, the magistrate judge 

issued a lengthy order denying the motion for sanctions. The 

Tenants filed objections to the magistrate judge’s ruling and 

specifically requested a de novo review by the district court. 

Reviewing the Tenants’ objections “under the clearly erroneous 

standard here applicable,” the district court affirmed the 

magistrate judge’s order. (J.A. 724).

II.

On appeal, the Tenants argue that the district court erred 

in applying a clearly erroneous standard instead of a de novo

 * The docket sheet notes the magistrate judge was to enter a 

“report and recommendation.” (J.A. 14-15). 

standard in reviewing the magistrate judge’s ruling. We agree. 
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A magistrate judge’s power is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 636, 

which provides two general types of referrals by a district 

court. Section 636(b)(1)(A) provides that a district court may 

“designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial 

matter pending before the court,” except for a non-exhaustive 

list of motions detailed in the statute. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(A). Under this section, a district court reviews a 

magistrate judge’s order to determine if it is “clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(a). In contrast, § 636(b)(1)(B) provides that, with regard 

to the motions excepted from subsection (A), a district court 

may “designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including 

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge . . . proposed 

findings of fact and recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B). Further, this section authorizes a district 

court to issue appropriate “additional duties” to a magistrate 

judge so long as they are consistent with the Constitution. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Because a magistrate judge is only 

empowered under this section to make recommendations, a district 

court’s review is de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The 

Supreme Court has summarized these grants of authority to mean 

that “nondispositive” pretrial matters are governed by § 636(a) 

and “dispositive” matters are covered by § 636(b). Gomez v. 

United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1989). Rule 72, which 
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implements § 636, likewise requires a de novo

On appeal, the Tenants contend that the magistrate judge’s 

ruling on sanctions in this case is “dispositive” within the 

meaning of § 636 and Rule 72, and the district court was thus 

statutorily required to perform 

review for 

“pretrial matter[s]” that are “dispositive of a claim or 

defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). 

de novo review. We agree that 

the sanctions ruling in this case — issued pursuant to a 

district court’s inherent authority and after the underlying 

litigation had ended — was “dispositive” and required de novo

Sanctions are authorized by rule in several instances, 

including Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16, and 37. In 

review. 

Chambers, the Court recognized that federal courts also have an 

“inherent” power under Article III to award attorney’s fees when 

a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 

oppressive reasons. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-46. This inherent 

power is “governed not by rule or statute but by the control 

necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as 

to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 

Id.

A motion for sanctions under the district court’s 

“inherent” power is not a pretrial matter under §636(B)(1)(a). 

Magistrate judges have no inherent Article III powers — they 

at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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have only those powers vested in them by Congress. See N.L.R.B. 

v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(noting magistrate judges are “creatures of statute, and so is 

their jurisdiction. [Courts] cannot augment it”). Congress has 

not created statutory authorization for magistrate judges to 

exercise inherent Article III powers. Cf. In re Rainbow 

Magazine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278, 283-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting 

bankruptcy judges have inherent power to sanction because 

Congress created specific statutory authorization). Assuming a 

district court can delegate its inherent powers under § 636(b)’s 

“additional duties” clause, de novo review of the exercise of 

those powers is required. See United States v. Osborne, 345 

F.3d 281, 289-90 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that “additional 

duties” clause permitted district court to authorize a 

magistrate judge to conduct a plea colloquy, but that such 

authorization is consistent with Article III only if de novo

In addition, the sanctions order in this case addressed a 

non-party and was issued after the conclusion of the underlying 

litigation. The magistrate judge’s ruling was thus “dispositive 

of a claim,” that is, a claim for sanctions against White. In 

fact, as the Tenants note, the sanctions motion was the only 

“claim” against White in the case.

review by an Article III court is available upon request).
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In sum, the motion for sanctions in this case — requested 

under the district court’s “inherent” power and issued after the 

conclusion of the underlying case — was not a nondispostive 

pretrial matter under §636(B)(1)(a), and the magistrate was 

permitted only to enter a Report and Recommendation subject to 

the district court’s de novo review. The district court’s 

failure to apply the proper de novo standard of review is 

reversible error. ALCOA v. EPA

III.

, 663 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir. 

1981). 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we vacate the 

district court’s order and remand the case for the district 

court to perform a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s 

order denying sanctions. We express no opinion on the merits of 

the Tenants’ motion for sanctions. 

VACATED AND REMANDED