NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-738

MYRTISE KRETSEDEMAS

vs.

IEVGENIIA ZASOBA and another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Myrtise Kretsedemas (Myrtise), appeals from 

a judgment dismissing her first amended complaint, in which she 

raised claims of defamation and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against her former husband, Philip 

Kretsedemas (Philip), and Ievgeniia Zasoba (Zasoba). After a 

hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed Philip's and Zasoba's 

special motions to dismiss filed pursuant to G. L. c. 231, 

§ 59H, the anti-strategic litigation against public 

participation (anti-SLAPP) statute. On appeal, Myrtise claims 

that the judge erred in dismissing the complaint without first 

1 Philip Kretsedemas.
2

requesting the plaintiff to verify her complaint or otherwise 

support it with an affidavit.2 We affirm.

We review the judge's ruling on a special motion to 

dismiss, made pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, "for an abuse of 

discretion or error of law." Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., 

Inc., 483 Mass. 200, 203 (2019) (Blanchard II). "General Laws 

c. 231, § 59H, provides a procedural remedy -- the special 

motion to dismiss -- for early dismissal of SLAPP suits, i.e., 

'lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the 

constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 

redress of grievances.'" Nyberg v. Wheltle, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 

639, 645 (2022), quoting Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., 

Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 147 (2017) (Blanchard I). "The act enables 

the victim to request, through a special motion, quick dismissal 

of a meritless suit and payment of the victim's costs and 

2 Myrtise also vaguely complains that she should have been 

granted discovery to oppose the special motions to dismiss. 

However, the anti-SLAPP statute provides, "All discovery 

proceedings shall be stayed upon the filing of the special 

motion under this section; provided, however, that the court, on 

motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order 

that specified discovery be conducted." G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 

Myrtise did not request that the judge permit her "specified 

discovery." In this posture, the claim is waived. Moreover, 

the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to provide a "quick remedy 

against the time and cost of otherwise protracted litigation" 

(quotation and citation omitted). Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. 

Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 483-484 (2017). Therefore, allowing 

this case to proceed to discovery at this stage, absent good 

cause, would defeat this purpose.
3

attorney's fees." Vittands v. Sudduth, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 

517 (1996).

A special motion to dismiss is evaluated in stages. "At 

the first stage, a special movant must demonstrate that the 

nonmoving party's claims are solely based on its own petitioning 

activities." Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 159. See Duracraft 

Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168 (1998). "At 

the second stage, if the special movant meets [the first stage] 

burden, the burden will shift . . . to the nonmoving party."

Blanchard I, supra. From there, the nonmoving party may prevail 

(1) by "demonstrating that the special movant's petitioning

activities upon which the challenged claim is based lack a 

reasonable basis in fact or law . . . and that the petitioning 

activities at issue caused [her] injury," or (2) "by 

demonstrating . . . that each challenged claim does not give 

rise to a 'SLAPP' suit." Id. at 159-160.

Here, Philip's and Zasoba's special motions to dismiss 

apparently were supported by affidavits and significant other 

evidentiary materials, including police reports, a 911 call log, 

and a public records request and response. The judge relied on 

these materials in deciding the motions. However, none of these 

materials were included in Myrtise's record appendix.3 

3 "[T]he burden is on the appellant . . . to furnish a record 

that supports [her] claims on appeal." Hasouris v. Sorour, 92 
4

Relative to the first stage, the judge held that Philip and 

Zasoba carried their initial burden to demonstrate that 

Myrtise's claims arose out of Philip's and Zasoba's protected 

petitioning activities, i.e., the 911 call and the G. L. c. 209A 

petition. See McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 347 (2000)

(filing for abuse protection orders protected under anti-SLAPP 

statue); Keegan v. Pellerin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 190 (2010)

(reporting suspected criminal activity to police protected 

petitioning activity). Thus, the burden shifted to Myrtise.

At the second stage, judge held that Myrtise failed to 

demonstrate that: (1) Philip or Zasoba were engaged in "sham" 

petitioning activity; or (2) her claims were not brought 

primarily to chill Philip's and Zasoba's protected petitioning 

activities. See Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 159-160. In so 

holding, the judge pointed out that Myrtise not only failed to 

introduce any admissible evidence raising an inference that 

Philip's and Zasoba's showing was in any way inaccurate, but 

also that on the record before the judge, there existed an 

Mass. App. Ct. 607, 610 n.4 (2018), quoting Arch Med. Assocs. v. 

Bartlett Health Enters., Inc., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 406 

(1992). See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 

1637 (2019); Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a) (1) (D), as appearing in 491 

Mass. 1603 (2023). For this reason, we do not have a factual 

basis to conclude that the judge abused her discretion by 

allowing the motions. In any event, Myrtise does not argue on 

appeal that Philip's and Zasoba's claimed actions were not 

protected petitioning activities.
5

overwhelming inference that Myrtise, in fact, intended to chill 

legitimate petitioning activity. 

For example, Myrtise did not present any evidence showing 

that the 911 call (which was made by Philip, not Zasoba, as 

Myrtise asserts in her first amended complaint,) was devoid of 

factual or legal merit. Philip and Zasoba, on the other hand, 

apparently submitted affidavits and primary documents showing 

that the call was warranted, including an email message in which 

Myrtise admitted that she had broken Philip's phone. Also, as 

the judge properly concluded, Myrtise submitted no proof of 

actual injury.

A nonmoving party that cannot demonstrate that the moving 

party engaged in sham petitioning may nonetheless defeat a 

special motion to dismiss by demonstrating that the suit (1) is 

"colorable"; and (2) "was not brought primarily to chill the 

special movant's legitimate exercise of its right to petition, 

i.e., that it was not retaliatory" (quotations and alteration 

omitted). Blanchard II, 483 Mass. at 204, quoting Blanchard I, 

477 Mass. at 159-161.

As the judge held, neither Myrtise's defamation nor her 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is colorable. 

The evidence (which was not made part of the record on appeal) 

apparently suggested that no 911 call in which the alleged 

defamatory comments were made was ever made under Zasoba's name 
6

or phone number. Myrtise produced no countervailing evidence. 

Consequently, the defamation claim against Zasoba is not 

colorable. Regarding Philip, his statements to the 911 operator 

were not false, as Myrtise admits that she broke Philip's phone 

and contends she was not armed during the incident. Because 

Myrtise cannot show that Philip made a false statement, her 

defamation claim against him is not colorable. See Kilnapp 

Enters., Inc. v. Massachusetts State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 89 

Mass. App. Ct. 212, 217-218 (2016).

Relative to the intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claim, Zasoba could not have inflicted emotional 

distress on Myrtise if she did not make the 911 call, and Philip 

making a 911 call to document the incident on December 10, 2020, 

cannot be characterized as "extreme and outrageous," "beyond all 

possible bounds of decency," or "utterly intolerable in a 

civilized community." See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 

140, 144-145 (1976). As the judge properly held, it was 

reasonable for Philip to place a call to the police for help 

during a verbal altercation with his spouse in which she had 

started breaking and smashing things, including his phone. For 

those reasons, Myrtise's intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claim against Philip and Zasoba is not colorable.4

4 Myrtise does not argue that the judge abused her discretion by 

determining that Myrtise's primary motive in bringing her suit 
7

Finally, Zasoba has requested attorney's fees on appeal. 

See G. L. c. 231, § 59H, and Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 

481 Mass. 1654 (2019). The request is allowed. In accordance 

with the procedure specified in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 

10-11 (2004), within fourteen days of the issuance of the 

rescript of this decision, Zasoba may submit an application with 

appropriate supporting materials. Myrtise shall have fourteen 

days thereafter to respond.

Judgment dismissing first 

amended complaint affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, 

Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: November 13, 2023.

was retaliatory and intended to chill Philip's and Zasoba's 

petitioning activity. In any event, the evidence provided to 

the judge apparently demonstrated that Myrtise's motivation for 

the filing of this suit was her anger over the fact that Philip 

called the police while they were engaged in a verbal 

altercation.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.