UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAUNDRA FLANAGAN, et al., :

:

Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 10-1643 (RC)

:

v. : Re Document No.: 29

:

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

This case arises out of the October 12, 2000, terrorist bombing of the U.S.S. Cole (“the 

Cole”) in Yemen, which resulted in the death of seventeen American sailors, including 

Electronic Warfare Technician First Class Kevin Shawn Rux (“Kevin”). First Amended 

Complaint [#18] at 1. The plaintiffs are Kevin’s mother (“Doe Victim A”) and his four brothers 

(“Doe Victim B,” “Doe Victim C,” “Doe Victim D,” and “Doe Victim E”). Id. ¶¶ 4-8. The 

defendants are: 1) the state of Iran and its agencies and instrumentalities, to include a) the 

Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, b) the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,

and c) the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Division (“the Iranian defendants”);

2) the state of Sudan and its agencies and instrumentalities, to include a) the Sudanese Ministry 

of the Interior, b) the Sudanese Ministry of Defense, c) the Security of the Revolution, d) the 

Sudanese Military Intelligence, e) the Sudanese State Security, f) the Sudanese Popular Defense 

Force, and g) the Revolutionary Security Services (“the Sudanese defendants”); and 3) the state 

of Syria and its agencies and instrumentalities, to include a) the Syrian National Security 

Directorate, b) the Syrian Republic Guard, 3) the Syrian Ministry of Interior, 4) the Syrian 
Military Intelligence Service, 5) the Syrian Air Force Intelligence, and 6) the Syrian Special 

Forces (“the Syrian defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 9-15. The plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”) and solatium are brought under section 1605A of the Foreign 

Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.1Id. ¶¶ 2, 138-144. 

On October 31, 2012, defaults were entered against the Iranian and Sudanese defendants. 

See Default [#26] at 1; Default [#27] at 1. According to the plaintiffs, as of March 28, 2013, 

they were unable to effectuate service of process against the Syrian defendants. See Plaintiffs’ 

Status Report [#28] at 1. The plaintiffs decided, therefore, to proceed against the Iranian and 

Sudanese defendants. Id. at 2. Thus, currently pending and ready for resolution is Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for Default Judgment Upon Evidentiary Hearing Against Iranian and Sudanese 

Defendants [#29]. 

An evidentiary hearing on liability and damages was held on August 12, 2014.2 At that 

hearing, the Court took judicial notice of the evidence presented in Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 

495 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2007), another case arising out of the same incident.

3

 See

Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Before the Honorable John Facciola United States 

1 All references to the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations are to electronic versions that appear 

in Westlaw or Lexis.

2 Although now-retired Magistrate Judge Facciola presided over the evidentiary hearing, the current opinion is being 

issued by the undersigned, following the Rule 63 Certification, which was issued on February 19, 2015. See Rule 

63 Certification [#46]. 3 “[W]hen a court has found facts relevant to a FSIA case involving material support to terrorist groups, courts in 

subsequent, related cases may ‘rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation . . . without necessitating the 

formality of having that evidence reproduced.’” Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 

2012) (citation omitted) (taking judicial notice of facts in Rux, which also arose out of the bombing of the Cole). 

But taking judicial notice of facts in these “one-sided” FSIA default judgment proceedings accords the noticed facts 

no “preclusive effect,” and courts must “endeavor to make . . . additional findings in each case” as needed to render 

judgment. Id. (citations omitted). Here, this Court takes judicial notice only of facts in Rux related to the attack 

itself and elsewhere makes its “own independent findings of fact,” based on evidence presented at the evidentiary 

hearing, to support its judgment against the defendants. Id.; see also Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. 

Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining that factual findings in case “decided without the full benefits of 

adversarial litigation . . . lack the absolute certainty with which they might otherwise be afforded”).

 
[Magistrate] Judge [#40] at 11. In addition, the Court accepted evidence in the form of live 

testimony, affidavits, and documentary evidence. 

Finally, the Court also accepted testimony from five qualified experts. As to the 

Sudanese defendants’ relationship with and support for Al-Qaeda, the Court accepted the 

testimony of: 1) Lorenzo Vidino, PhD, a senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies in 

Zurich, Switzerland; 4 and 2) Dale L. Watson, former Assistant Director of Counterterrorism for 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

5

 As to the Iranian defendants’ relationship with and support 

for Al-Qaeda, the Court accepted the testimony of: 1) Patrick Clawson, PhD, Director of 

Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy;6 2) Daniel Byman, PhD, Professor at 

Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service; Research Director, 

Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution;

7 and 3) Dale L. Watson, again. 

Finally, plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of Larry H. Pastor, MD, FAPA, DABAM, a 

psychiatrist who works in the Office of Medical Services at the Central Intelligence Agency, in 

support of their claims for damages.8

 

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda9

1. During the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union, from 1979 to 1989, Osama Bin 

Laden, the son of a Saudi construction magnate, organized and financed the recruitment and 

4 See generally Plaintiffs’ Exhibit (“PEX”) 1: Vidino Affidavit and Exhibits. 5 See generally [#40] at 81:23-130:11. 6 See generally PEX 2: Clawson Affidavit. 7 See generally PEX 3: Byman Affidavit. 8 See generally PEX 4: Pastor Affidavit. 9 The Court will use the spellings “Osama Bin Laden” and “Al-Qaeda” throughout this opinion. Where the spellings 

are different, they reflect the spellings used in the source documents, from which the information was taken.

 
training of Arab nationals to join the Afghan national resistance movement in what was known 

as the anti-Soviet “jihad” or holy war. PEX 910 at 55.11

2. In approximately 1988, Bin Laden founded Al-Qaeda to serve as a base “for future 

jihad.” Id. at 56. Al-Qaeda’s “structure included as its operating arms an intelligence 

component, a military committee, a financial committee, a political committee, and a committee 

in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also had an Advisory Council (Shura) made up of

Bin Ladin’s inner circle.” Id. 

3. Since its inception, Al-Qaeda has executed or inspired acts of terrorism around the world, 

including the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States, which have killed or injured 

thousands of innocent people. Id. at 47-63.

4. Specifically, “Bin Ladin saw himself as called ‘to follow in the footsteps of the 

Messenger and to communicate his message to all nations,’ and to serve as the rallying point and 

organizer of a new kind of war to destroy America and bring the world to Islam.” Id. at 48

(internal citations omitted). Accord PEX 1 at ¶ 11. 

II. The Bombing of the U.S.S. Cole

5. “At approximately 8:30 a.m. on October 12, 2000, the Cole entered the Port of Aden, 

Yemen, to temporarily stop for refueling.” Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 544-45.

6. “The Republic of Yemen is a country of 203,850 square miles located on the southern 

coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Aden is a city of approximately 440,000 located on Yemen’s 

10 PEX 9: Excerpt from The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks upon the United States (2004) (available at http://www.9–11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf). 11 Plaintiffs have not numbered, using a Bates stamp, the pages within individual exhibits. Therefore, except for 

PEX 9, the Court’s reference to a page number within an exhibit is to the order in which the page appears in the 

exhibit. In other words, even if a page has the number 10 printed on it, if it is the second page of an exhibit, the 

Court will identify it as page 2. With respect to PEX 9, because of the length of the exhibit, the Court will identify 

the page by the page number printed on the top right or left corner of the document.

 
south coast. The Port of Aden is a natural harbor with a deep draft in most areas and natural land 

protection on all sides.” Id. at 545.

7. “In February 1999, the Navy began using Aden instead of Djibouti as the primary 

refueling stop for American ships during their 3,000-mile journey to the Arabian Gulf from the 

Mediterranean Sea. Under a contract entered into between the United States and Yemen, U.S. 

Navy vessels could obtain fuel at one of two fueling ‘dolphins’ located near the mouth of the 

harbor without going to the pier.” Id.

8. “The Cole, an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, was the twenty-fifth Navy ship to stop in 

Aden Harbor for refueling over the previous nineteen months. As of October 2000, the ship had 

a crew of twenty-six officers and 270 enlisted personnel. The Cole departed from its home port 

of Norfolk, Virginia, on August 8, 2000, before patrolling the Mediterranean Sea. On October 9, 

2000, the ship transited the Suez Canal and headed for Yemen. At the time that the ship entered 

the Port of Aden on October 12, 2000, the U.S. Department of Defense terrorist threat level in 

Aden was ‘Threat Condition (THREATCON) BRAVO,’ which indicated an ‘increased and more 

predictable threat of terrorist activity.’” Id.

9. “At approximately 8:49 a.m., the Cole moored starboard side to Refueling Dolphin 

Seven, near the mouth of the harbor. The ship began refueling at approximately 10:31 a.m. At 

approximately 11:10 a.m., one of the sailors standing watch over the refueling noticed a small 

boat heading ‘fast and hard’ toward the Cole from the direction of the city. The boat, painted 

white with fire red trim, was about thirty-five feet long and six to seven feet wide and had a 

shallow V-hull. It looked ‘brand new.’ The boat was similar in size and shape to many other 

small vessels in the harbor, including the service craft that had been alongside the Cole. The 

boat was manned by two males, both of whom appeared to be in their early thirties. The two 
men slowed the boat as they approached the Cole, maneuvered it parallel to the ship and came 

down the port side headed aft. As they did so, the two men in the boat were smiling, and waved 

to the crew. Some crew members returned the greeting. Seconds later, the boat exploded.” Id.

10. “The explosion occurred between approximately 11:15 and 11:18 a.m., just as some of 

the crew was sitting down for lunch. The blast ripped a thirty-two- by thirty-six-foot hole in the 

port side. . . . Smoke, dust, and fuel vapors filled the air. The main engine room, auxiliary 

machine room, and the dry provisions storeroom were flooded. Several chambers, including the 

Crew and Chief Petty Officer's Galley, were structurally destroyed. The blast and its aftereffects killed seventeen Navy sailors, all of them American citizens. Forty-two others were 

injured, some of them sustaining serious burns to their faces, hands and arms, as well as 

lacerations and fractures.” Id.

III. The Sudanese Defendants

A. Background

11. In 1989, General Omar Bashir assumed the presidency of Sudan in a military coup that 

overthrew the elected government and converted Sudan into an Islamic Arab state. PEX 712; 

PEX 813. The coup was orchestrated by Hassan al Turabi, head of the Sudanese political party,

the National Islamic Front (“NIF”). PEX 6 at 57. Accord PEX 1014 at 6. Turabi was in power 

from 1989 until his fall in late 1999. PEX 10 at 6. 

12. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Bin Laden briefly returned to 

his home country of Saudi Arabia but had his passport seized by the government due to his 

12 PEX 7: Profile: Sudan’s President Bashir, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2003) (available at 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3273569.stm). 13 PEX 8: Military Coup in Sudan Ousts Civilian Regime, NEW YORK TIMES (Jul. 1, 1989) (available at 

http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/01/world/military-coup-in-sudan-ousts-civilian-regime.html). 14 PEX 10: CIA Report: Al Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths (Mar. 10, 

2003).

 
relationship with extremists in Afghanistan. PEX 1-A15 at 2. At a time when Al-Qaeda found 

itself without a territory from which it could base its terrorist operations, Turabi offered the 

organization refuge in Sudan. PEX 9 at 57; PEX 1 at ¶ 15; PEX 1-A at 2. 

13. Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991, and lived there until 1996, when he was expelled 

from the country under international pressure. PEX 1116 at 11. 

14. Turabi and Bin Laden shared a common extremist ideological and religious outlook. PEX 

9 at 61; PEX 1 at ¶ 43. Turabi envisioned a pan-Islamic force consisting of both Shiites and 

Sunnis to counterbalance Western powers militarily, economically, and politically. PEX 1 at ¶ 

45. Bin Laden agreed to help Turabi in the regime’s ongoing war against African Christian 

separatists in southern Sudan, and also to invest his wealth in the country’s infrastructure. PEX 9 

at 57. In exchange, Sudan provided Bin Laden’s group with a sanctuary within which it could 

freely meet, organize, and train militants for future operations. Id.; PEX 1 at ¶¶ 12-13, 36, 45.

15. Starting in the early 1990s, Turabi and the Sudanese regime convened annual conferences 

in Sudan under the label “the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference.” PEX 10 at 6; PEX 1 at ¶ 

44. At these conferences, Bin Laden and other top leaders and operatives from the Palestinian 

Liberation Organization, Hamas, and Hezbollah, congregated to exchange information and plan 

terrorist activities. Id. 

16. Since 1993, the United States has designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism. See

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).

B. General Support for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

1. Overview

15 PEX 1-A: State Department Fact Sheet: Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier (Aug. 14, 1996) 

(available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB343/osama_bin_laden_file01_transcription.pdf). 16 PEX 11: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997 (Apr. 1998) (available at 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html).

 
17. Each year from 1997 through 2000, Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safe 

haven, and training hub for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Abu Nidal Organization, and Hamas. PEX 11 at 12; PEX 1217 at 10; 

PEX 1418 at 11; PEX 1519 at 10.

18. Sudan’s material support of Al-Qaeda, such as “(1) its provision of sanctuary and safe 

haven from 1991-1996; and (2) [the] technical training and support Sudanese military and 

intelligence forces provided al Qaeda throughout the 1990s; was indispensable for al Qaeda not 

just to survive but also to then develop the expertise, technical knowledge and wide network of 

contacts that allowed it to flourish as a terrorist organization and carry out the USS Cole

bombing.” PEX 1 at ¶ 83. 

19. Al-Qaeda’s time in Sudan from 1991 through 1996 was invaluable to the development of 

the terrorist organization:

Q So, Mr. Watson, as you can tell by the text, the 9/11 

Commission has described how al-Qaeda flourished in 

Sudan. It says, “Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991 and 

set up a large and complex set of intertwined business and 

terrorist enterprises. In time, the former would encompass 

numerous companies and a global network of bank 

accounts and nongovernmental institutions.” Later on in 

the text it says, “Meanwhile, al-Qaeda finance officers and 

top operatives used their position in bin Laden's businesses 

to acquire weapons, explosives and technical equipment for 

terrorist purposes.” And then at 58 it says, “The 

groundwork for a true global terrorist network was being 

laid.” Mr. Watson, do you agree with this assessment laid 

out in the 9/11’s Commission's report?

A I do.

17 PEX 12: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (Apr. 1999) (available at 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/1998index.html). 18 PEX 14: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 (Apr. 2000) (available at 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html). 

19 PEX 15: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000 (Apr. 2001) (available at 

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2000).

 
Q And the type of support that is described in the 9/11 

Commission’s report, what’s the significance of having 

intertwined business and terrorist enterprises, allowing, you 

know, training for weapons, also acquiring weapons and 

explosives technical equipment, et cetera?

A It allowed him to expand the organization, make it better. 

It allowed them to have funds available through legitimate 

businesses. It gave them some credibility. It also allowed 

for the organization to be a safe place, because, at that point 

in time, he had been removed from Saudi Arabia. He had 

no country. And so he was allowed to operate with 

impunity there in Sudan for a number of years . . . .

Q And one of the things you mentioned is that you said it 

gave the organization credibility. What do you mean by 

that?

A The ability to issue statements; the ability to recruit people; 

the ability to set up training camps; the ability to travel in 

and out of places to identify potential targets, in my 

opinion.

Q And would having a safe place to meet, the ability to travel 

safely and freely, would this have allowed Al-Qaeda and 

Osama bin Laden -- would this have given them a way of 

shielding their activities from other law enforcement or 

intelligence agencies?

A Yeah. It’s not like setting up shop in Leesburg, Virginia, 

where, you know, you would come under scrutiny of the 

Bureau or some federal agency. It’s a foreign country, and 

a foreign country that was not the most favored, you know, 

looking toward the United States. So it was very difficult 

to operate in that environment as a U.S. Government 

representative.

Q So bin Laden is in a place where it’s difficult for the U.S. 

Government to keep tabs on him. And in terms of the 

Sudanese government, is it accurate to say that bin Laden 

and al-Qaeda are also in a place where they don’t have to 

worry about the interference of Sudanese authorities with 

their terrorist activities?

A That is correct.
[#40] at 108:6-110:11.

20. Even after Al-Qaeda was expelled from Sudan in 1996, Sudan continued to be a safe 

harbor for the organization, allowing the organization to “plan more freely.” Id. at 112:5-113:12. 

2. Financial Support

21. Bin Laden established several joint business ventures with the Sudanese regime that 

flourished upon his arrival in Khartoum in 1991. PEX 1 at ¶ 19; PEX 1-A at 2-3. He “also 

formed symbiotic business relationships with wealthy NIF members by undertaking civil 

infrastructure development projects on the regime’s behalf.” PEX 1 at ¶ 19. These projects 

included: 

* Al-Hijrah for Construction and Development, Ltd., which 

built the Tahaddi [ ] road linking Khartoum with Port 

Sudan, as well as a modern international airport near Port 

Sudan.

* Taba Investment Company Ltd, an investment company.

* Wadi al-Aqiq Company, Ltd., an import-export firm that, in 

conjunction with Bin Laden’s Taba Investment Company, 

Ltd., secured a near monopoly over Sudan’s agricultural 

exports of gum, corn, sunflower, and sesame products in 

cooperation with prominent NIF members.

* Al-Themar al-Mubarak-ah Agriculture Company, Ltd., 

which grew to encompass large tracts of land near 

Khartoum and in eastern Sudan.

* Khartoum Tannery, a leather company, which was still 

operating as of May 4, 2004.

* Al Themar, a Sudanese agricultural company in which Bin 

Laden had a financial interest.

* The Blessed Fruits Company and al-Ikhlas, two companies 

that were involved in the production of honey, fruits and 

vegetables, and in which Bin Ladin also had a financial 

interest.
* Al Qudurat Transportation.

PEX 1 at ¶ 19; PEX 1-A at 2-3.

22. These businesses “allowed al-Qaeda to funnel money for terrorist activities through 

Sudanese banks and Sudanese-based legitimate businesses, therefore overcoming the difficulties 

in transferring funds the group would have otherwise faced.” PEX 1 at ¶ 35. Accord PEX 1 at ¶¶

21-35. Bin Laden maintained those interests even after his expulsion from Sudan. PEX 620 at 

19-20.

23. In addition, “Bin Ladin and wealthy NIF members [directly] capitalized Al-Shamal 

Islamic Bank in Khartoum” with Bin Laden personally investing $50 million in the bank. PEX 1 

at ¶¶ 22-23, 25; PEX 1-A at 3.

3. Support for Training

24. “[B]y January 1994, Bin Laden had begun financing at least three terrorist training camps 

in northern Sudan—camp residents included Egyptian, Algerian, Tunisian, and Palestinian 

extremists—in cooperation with the NIF.” PEX 1-A at 3. See also PEX 1321 at 34. 

25. Bin Laden’s main training camp in Sudan was “a 20-acre site near Soba, 10 kilometers 

south of Khartoum.” PEX 1 at ¶ 36.

26. In addition, “Bin Laden’s Al-Hijrah for Construction and Development Company 

work[ed] directly with Sudanese military officials to transport and provision terrorists training in 

such camps.” PEX 1-A at 3.

27. While Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were in Sudan, they “were allowed to operate freely.” 

PEX 1 ¶ 36.

20 PEX 6: Sudan and Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign 

Relations, 105th Cong. (1997). 21 PEX 13: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995 (Apr. 1996).

 
4. Facilitation of Travel

28. In 1998, “Al-Zawaheri22 and leaders of Sudanese, Eritrien, Ugandan, Yemeni and 

Egyptian Islamic groups . . . agreed to open Sudan’s doors to international Islamic fundraising 

organizations and to facilitate the movement of extremists by providing them with Sudanese 

diplomatic passports.” PEX 17 at ¶ 26.

29. An individual carrying a diplomatic passport was “immune from [most] laws and 

criminal process.” [#40] at 116:5-6. Furthermore, “diplomatic passports have diplomatic 

pouches which are not authorized to be examined by the host country . . . [allowing its holder to 

transport] materials without government scrutiny or scrutiny at the borders.” Id. at 116:19-21, 

24-25.

30. When Bin Laden moved to Sudan, the Sudanese government provided Al-Qaeda 

members with Sudanese travel documentation, including 200 passports, which facilitated the 

movement of Al-Qaeda operatives in and out of Sudan. PEX 1 at ¶¶ 36, 41-42; PEX 11 at 17; 

PEX 12 at 11.

31. “In addition to providing some al-Qaeda operatives with new passports, Sudanese 

officials also made sure that al-Qaeda members traveling to Sudan with different passports could 

enter and leave the country without having their passports stamped.” PEX 1 at ¶ 42. 

32. “These officials would have been acting with the full knowledge and consent of the 

highest levels of the Sudanese government . . . because a stamp from Sudan (a country known 

for its support of terrorism) would have raised the attention of immigration officials in other 

countries.” Id. 

22 Ayman Al-Zawaheri was the one-time leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad / Al Jihad (“AJ”) a “group [that] 

employs terrorism as a part of a wider campaign to root out Western secular influences and create an Islamic state in 

Egypt by overthrowing the current government.” PEX 17: Canadian Security Intelligence Services Statement: 

Summary of Information Related to Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, a high-ranking member of the Vanguards of 

Conquest, a radical wing of AJ (Federal Court of Canada - June 27, 2000) at ¶¶ 4, 9.

 
33. Significantly, Sudan also exempted Al-Qaeda and its members from paying any taxes or 

import duties, thus permitting it to bring containers into the country without inspection by 

customs officials. PEX 1 at ¶ 20.

C. Specific Involvement in the Attack

34. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda would not have been able to carry out the attack on the Cole 

without the support of the Sudanese defendants:

[T]he Sudan’s material support of al Qaeda including, (1) its 

provision of sanctuary and safe haven from 1991-1996; and (2) 

technical training and support Sudanese military and intelligence

forces provided al Qaeda throughout the 1990s; was indispensable 

for al Qaeda not just to survive but also to then develop the 

expertise, technical knowledge and wide network of contacts that 

allowed it to flourish as a terrorist organization and carry out the 

USS Cole bombing.

PEX 1 at ¶ 81.

IV. The Iranian Defendants

A. Background

35. In approximately 1991, Iran and Sudan wanted to foster coordination between Sunni and 

Shia Islamists, by forming a “tripartite front” against their common enemies, the United States 

and Israel. PEX 1623 at 6-7. “The front would consist of the NIF, Iran, and Usama (Bin Laden)’s 

Islamic Army.” Id. at 6. See also PEX 2 at ¶ 76 (describing the relationship between Iran, 

Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda in the 1990s as one of “quite active cooperation”). 

36. “Eventually an agreement was reached to collaborate politically and militarily.” PEX 16 

at 7. Specifically, the parties agreed that “experience from Hizballah and Iran should be 

transferred to new nations/extremist groups who lack this expertise . . . [in order to] allow 

Islamic Army members to gain the necessary experience in terrorist operations.” Id. at 8.

23 PEX 16: CIA Report: Terrorism: Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Laden, Iran, and 

the NIF (Jan. 31, 1997).

 
37. “At that [same] time, the Iranian government was providing very active assistance to the 

Sudanese government for its fighting in the civil war in the south of the country.” PEX 2 at ¶ 41. 

In addition, “in 1991, the Sudanese government [ ] supported a conference of those resisting the 

Madrid conference launching Israeli-Arab peace talks, and both Iranian representatives and Bin 

Laden were active at this event.” Id.

38. Ultimately, the relationship between Sudan and Iran in the 1990s offered Al-Qaeda the 

opportunity to build ties with Iranian officials, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations 

dedicated to attacking United States personnel, military targets, and citizens in the Middle East. 

See PEX 2724 at 2-7; PEX 1925 at 17-21; PEX 9 at 61.

39. Since 1984, the United States has designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. See

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).

B. General Support for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

1. Overview

40. Iran’s material support of the Al-Qaeda/Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1990s was 

described by a high level Al-Qaeda operative as follows:

I was aware of certain contacts between al-Qaeda and al Jihad 

organization, on one side, and Iran and Hezbollah on the other 

side. I arranged security for a meeting in the Sudan between 

Mughaniyah, Hezbollah’s chief, and Bin Laden. Hezbollah 

provided explosives training for al-Qaeda and al Jihad. Iran 

supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons. Iran also used Hezbollah 

to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks. 

PEX 19 at 19. Accord PEX 3 at ¶ 68 (noting that Iran often used “both its own people and 

facilities” as well as those of “its close ally Hizballah” to support terrorist operations).

24 PEX 27: Trial Transcript: Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, an Al-Qaeda operative, in U.S. v. Usama bin Laden, No. 

98-CR-1023 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001). 25 PEX 19: Trial Transcript: Guilty Plea of Mohammed Ali, an Al-Qaeda operative, in U.S. v. Usama bin Laden, 

No. 98-CR-1023 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2000). 

 
41. Although Iranians are Shias, they nevertheless supported the terrorist activities of Bin 

Laden, a Suni, because of their mutual hatred of “the infidels in the United States.” [#40] at 

121:10-17. See also PEX 2 at ¶ 73 (stating that Iran often support the terrorist activities of 

organizations “with which it ha[d] some profound differences”). 

42. Iranian “[s]upport for militant and terrorist groups [was] almost always done via Iran’s 

Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 

a parallel military force that [was] tasked with protecting Iran’s revolution at home and spreading 

it abroad, among other duties.” PEX 3 at ¶ 71.

43. With respect to the MOIS, “‘Iran has used its intelligence services extensively to 

facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks . . . [and] Intelligence officers have used the diplomatic 

pouch for conveyance of weapons and finances for terrorist groups.’” PEX 2 at ¶ 40 (internal 

citation omitted).

44. In addition, “‘MOIS [ ] facilitated the movement of al Qa’ida operatives in Iran and 

provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports’” and “‘also negotiated 

prisoner releases of AQI operatives.’” PEX 3 at ¶ 75 (internal citations omitted).

45. With respect to the IRGC and the IRGC Qods, they sponsored terrorism in the following 

fashion:

The IRCG was established in the immediate wake of the 1979 

revolution. Its role is built into Iran's constitution as defenders of 

the revolution-- not just defenders of Iran as a country, but 

defenders of the 1979 revolution. The IRGC is one of the major 

organizations through which Iran has historically carried out its 

support for terrorism. 

Among its other tasks, the IRGC is dedicated to the spread of 

fundamentalist Islamist principles throughout the world, and the 

establishments of fundamentalist Islamist governments in nations 

other than Iran. The Qods Force is the branch of the IRGC 

generally charged with “foreign operations.” 
The foreign operations it supports include foreign insurgents and 

terrorists such as those fighting U.S. forces and U.S.-backed 

governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is the principal Iranian 

organization working with the Lebanese Hizbollah organization’s 

armed elements, which carry out terrorist operations worldwide, 

engage in military operations in Syria in support of the Assad 

regime’s battle against insurgents, and prepare for battle against 

Israel. 

While in theory the Qods Force is a component element of the 

IRGC, in practice it operates largely autonomously. It reports 

directly to the Supreme Leader, rather than being subordinate to 

the IRGC command structure. The IRGC defines itself as an agent 

and instrumentality of the Supreme Leader, to which it pledges its 

unflinching loyalty. The IRGC and the Supreme Leader both 

frequently speak about the IRGC as the guardian of the principles 

of the Iranian revolution of 1979. 

* * *

It [ ] has been well-documented for over twenty years that the 

IRGC has historically provided funding and/or training for 

terrorism operations that targeted United States and Israeli citizens. 

Such activities have included support for Hizbollah of Lebanon, 

HAMAS, as well as al-Qaeda, with the character of that support 

being quite different in each case. Hizbollah of Lebanon (or 

Hizbollah for short, though not to be confused with similarly 

named organizations in other countries which have varying degrees 

of ties with Hizbollah of Lebanon) is a Shiite terrorist organization 

established in 1982 by Iran as an extension of the Iranian 

Revolution in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. The 

IRGC’s relationship with Hizbollah is extremely close. . . 

Although they have a long history of cooperating in a common 

anti-American agenda, Iran and al-Qaeda have always had serious 

ideological differences. In providing support to al-Qaeda and 

Hizbollah, the IRGC, including the IRGC Qods division, is acting 

as an official agency whose activities are tightly and carefully 

controlled by the Iranian government through the Supreme Leader 

and his representatives. Iran’s relationship with Al-Qaeda 

continues even in situations where Iran is also supporting those 

fighting Al-Qaeda. For instance, the U.S. Treasury Department's 

February 5, 2014 designation of senior al-Qaeda member Jafar alUzbeki described him as part of an al-Qaeda network which 

"operates there [in Iran] with the knowledge of Iranian authorities." 
The Treasury statement added that this network "uses Iran as a 

transit point for moving funding and foreign fighters through 

Turkey to support al Qaeda-affiliated elements inside Syria." This 

despite the fact that Iran has made a major commitment of men and 

arms to fight Al-Qaeda in Syria. 

In sum, the terrorism training provided to Hizbollah, HAMAS, and 

al-Qaeda by the IRGC is an official policy of the Iranian 

government.

PEX 2 at ¶¶ 26-37.

2. Financial Support

46. Iran supported Al-Qaeda financially:

There is compelling evidence that radical Islamists are receiving 

considerable foreign support and assistance. . . . In Afghanistan, AJ 

[Al Jihad, an Islamist terrorist group controlled by Bin Laden] 

members are trained at the Al-Khalifah or Caliphate camp by 

Iranians and equipped with powerful explosives. AJ leaders AlZawaheri and Muhammad Shauqi Al-Islambouli have received 

large sums of money from Iran and intense secret contacts have 

taken place between top Iranian intelligence officers, Bin Laden 

and Al-Zawaheri. . . . 

* * *

Both Iran and Osama Bin Laden have played a role in efforts to 

once again merge the AJ with the AGAI [Al Gama’a al-Islamiya, 

an Egyptian Islamist terrorist group that had once merged with AJ 

but then the two fell out]. At a September-October 1996 meeting 

with the former Iranian intelligence minister, Ali Fallahian, the AJ 

and the AGAI reportedly endorsed a plan to carry out terrorist 

operations to be financed by Iran and Osama Bin Laden. At 

another meeting in early 1998, the possibility of providing funds 

and improving training and operation activities was offered by Iran 

to the two groups if they agreed to cooperate. The groups agreed 

to focus on efforts to launch attacks on United States and Israeli 

targets outside Egypt, to retain separate leadership, organizational 

and military capacities, and to use a new coalition under the 

leadership of Osama Bin Laden as their base to achieve these aims.

PEX 17 at ¶¶ 25, 30.

3. Support for Training
47. Iran directly trained Al-Qaeda operatives: 

In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al-Qaeda and 

Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in 

providing support – even if only training – for action carried out 

primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long 

afterwards, senior al-Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran 

to receive training in explosives.

 

In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa 

Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in 

intelligence and security. Bin Laden reportedly showed particular 

interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that 

had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship 

between al-Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions 

did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation 

in terrorist operations. . . . al-Qaeda contacts with Iran continued in 

ensuing years.

PEX 9 at 61. Accord PEX 27 at 2-4.

48. Iran also supported Hezbollah, which in turn provided training for Al-Qaeda: 

In many of its operations involving terrorist groups, Iran uses 

Hizballah as a facilitator. Hizballah plays this role for several 

reasons. First, Iran’s involvement in Hizballah’s creation, largescale funding, constant provision of training, and role in

Hizballah’s leadership councils has given Iran an important role in 

the Lebanese organization. Iran trusts Hizballah and Hizballah 

trusts Iran – one of the closest relationships in history between a 

terrorist group and its sponsor. Hizballah has a particularly close 

relationship with the IRGC, with which it has worked since the 

group’s founding in the early 1980s. . . . In the past, however, 

according to some polls, Hizballah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was 

the single most popular individual in the Arab world because of his 

organization’s repeated and successful defiance of Israel. Third, 

Hizballah is highly capable and has a high degree of independence 

in Lebanon. Thus the training offered at Hizballah camps is 

superb, and it can be done without having to hide it from the 

Lebanese government. Finally, working through Hizballah offers 

Iran some degree of deniability if it chooses, as it places one more 

degree of separation between the group in question and Iran.
PEX 3 at ¶ 49. Accord [#40] 122:5-9; 121:21-24 (describing the closeness of the relationship 

between Hezbollah and Iran and thereby affirming Iran’s intent to directly support the activities 

of Al-Qaeda); PEX 3 at ¶ 68 (same). 

49. Ultimately, the training Al-Qaeda received in Iran “was particularly important in the 

organization’s early years, when its operatives had less battle experience and expertise in 

general.” PEX 3 at ¶ 69. Accord [#40] at 122:25-123:11 (explosives training Al-Qaeda received 

from Hezbollah in Iran would have enabled Al-Qaeda to build a bomb like that used in the Cole 

attack). 

4. Facilitation of Travel

50. Finally, Iran has long provided material support to Al-Qaeda in the form of safe passage 

and facilitation of travel:

Importantly, Iran also provided important services to al-Qaeda as a 

transit location through Iran to the outside world once bin Laden 

and his outfit moved to Afghanistan. And this happened before the 

U.S.S. Cole attack. . . . Iran permitted at least some Al-Qaeda

members and leaders to cross Iranian territory, without stamping 

their passports.

It was very useful for al-Qaeda to pass through Iran in order to get 

to the outside world, because if they showed up with Pakistani 

visas on their passports, then the Saudis or United Arab Emirate 

authorities were suspicious. However, if they came through 

without any stamps on their passport, they had a much easier time. 

. . . the transit through Iran begins not long after bin Laden shows 

up in Afghanistan. . . .

PEX 2 at ¶¶ 78-79.

51. “In the mid-1990s, Mustafa Hamid[, a senior Al-Qaeda operative,] reportedly negotiated 

a secret relationship between Usama Bin Laden and Iran, allowing many al Qaida members safe 

transit through Iran to Afghanistan.” PEX 2026 at 1. Accord PEX 3 at ¶ 52 (“Iran had become an 

26 PEX 20: U.S. Treasury Department Press Release: Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operative in Iran (Jan. 16, 2009). 

 
important route [for Al-Qaeda members] into Afghanistan and al-Qa’ida’s training camps 

there.”).

52. In order to facilitate the travel of Al-Qaeda members through Iran, Iran let the 

organization set up guest houses:

Iran let Al-Qaeda establish a series of guest houses for its fighters 

making the long journey through its territory. After Pakistan 

began to tighten up transit routes in the years before 9/11, one of 

al-Qa’ida’s key military commanders, Seif al-Adl, told an 

interviewer that al-Qa’ida began “building good relations with 

some virtuous people in Iran to pave the way [for travel] and 

coordinate issues of mutual interest.” The al-Qa’ida-linked Saudi 

dissident al-Faqih noted that “before 9/11 many Saudis used Iran to 

access Afghanistan” because “the Iranians kept a blind eye to this.”

PEX 3 at ¶ 53 (internal citations omitted). 

53. “Al-Qaeda also deliberately established training camps on the western border of 

Afghanistan to make it easier for recruits to travel through Iran.” Id. at ¶ 53.

54. Ultimately, Iran’s facilitation of travel had a significant impact on Al-Qaeda’s efforts:

Such travel assistance is invaluable for groups like al-Qa’ida. If 

visas had an Iranian stamp or showed a link to Afghanistan, they 

would be far more likely to attract the attention of border security 

officials in Saudi Arabia, the United States, or other countries that 

are hostile to al-Qa’ida. In addition, established lines of transit 

make recruitment and training easier, as individuals can travel to 

and from training camps without fear of interference. This is 

particularly important for facilitating the flow of new recruits, who 

lack training in clandestine travel. Finally, travel facilitation 

enables better communication and coordination among the farflung strands of the global jihad of which al-Qa’ida is a part. Even 

before 9/11, al-Qa’ida and its affiliate groups were aware that the 

United States and other hostile powers monitored phones and other 

forms of communication and recognized that many sensitive 

deliberations are best done face-to-face. Doing so, however, 

requires individuals who can travel freely from one area to another.

PEX 3 at ¶ 58. Accord [#40] at 124:9-127:3. 

C. Specific Involvement in the Attack
55. At the time of the bombing of the Cole, the links between the Iranian defendants and Bin 

Laden and Al-Qaeda were firmly established:

Iran was actively tied to al-Qa’ida in the years when the attack on 

USS Cole was being planned and when it was executed. The 1999 

State Department report on terrorism that year noted Iran’s support 

in training and logistics for extremist groups like al-Qa’ida in the 

Gulf, among other activities. Iran reportedly contributed to 

helping al-Qa’ida set up a network in Yemen: Zawahiri wrote to 

thank the Iranians for their assistance. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, 

identified as one of the USS Cole bombing masterminds, was 

radicalized in Iran after hearing Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded 

the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, speak about jihad there 

(the exact date is unclear). Al-Qa’ida facilitator and financier 

Muhsin al-Fadhli is Iran-based and he helped finance the 2002 

attack on MV Limburg off Yemen—many of those involved in Al 

Qaeda’s [sic] operations in Yemen were also involved in the 

Limburg attack. In addition, initial reports indicated the bomb 

used for the USS Cole attack bears similarities to shaped bombs 

designed by Hizballah, and it is possible that al-Qa’ida learned 

such techniques when training in Lebanon in the early 1990s. 

* * *

. . . Iran supported al-Qa’ida as an organization and made it 

stronger overall, and this made al-Qa’ida better able to carry out 

terrorist attacks such as the USS Cole bombing. This support is not 

consistent or unqualified, but over the years it has helped make alQa’ida a formidable organization. . . . 

PEX 3 at ¶¶ 70, 81 (internal citations omitted).

56. As a result of Iran’s complicity, it is likely that Abd Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al 

Nashiri, one of the masterminds of the attack on the Cole, travelled through Iran when moving 

between Yemen and Afghanistan both before and after the bombing. PEX 2 at ¶¶ 80, 81

(“Certainly, during the late 1990s and through 2000, Iran was the common route that al-Qaeda 

members used when traveling from gulf countries such as Yemen to Afghanistan. Iran was also 

the common route used by al-Qaeda members when returning from Afghanistan to gulf countries 

such as Yemen.”).
V. The Plaintiffs

A. Doe Victim A

57. Doe Victim A is Kevin’s mother. [#40] at 15:5-6. 

58. Doe Victim A had a troubled childhood and an abusive father, who was an alcoholic. 

PEX 4 at ¶ 4. Her husband, the father of her children, was also an alcoholic. Id. They were 

married in 1964 and divorced in 1990 or 1992. Id.

59. Doe Victim A enjoyed an especially close relationship with her son. [#40] at 19:2-6. He 

also helped financially support his mother. Id. at 19:7-8.

60. After Kevin died, Doe Victim A stated: “I couldn’t function. . . . I just wanted to sleep, 

and I mostly laid in my bed in a fetal position.” Id. at 26:4-7. It took her months to return to her 

job. Id. at 26:11-18.

61. Describing the impact of Kevin’s death, Doe Victim A stated: 

It’s had an intense effect on my life, on me. I’ve been on Prozac 

and they’ve had to raise it. Started out on 20, and they have it 

raised to 40. Sometimes, I take two a day. October is just a 

nightmare. So many times I’ve said I wish they could just take 

October off the calendar because that’s the month he was born, it’s 

the month he was married.

There’s so many times that I can’t . . . think straight. And this past 

winter, I spent a lot of time in bed sleeping and just not caring 

about anything.

Id. at 27:23-28:7. She also stated that she had seen a grief counselor on several occasions. Id. at 

28:11-14.

62. Dr. Larry Pastor, a clinical psychiatrist, described Doe Victim A’s condition as follows: 

[She] experienced a catastrophic loss upon the death of her son 

Kevin Rux in October 2000. Due to the sudden, violent nature of 

the incident, Doe Victim A experienced psychological trauma in 

addition to massive psychological loss. The trauma involved 

particular qualities that were additive to the loss itself, including 
suddenness, violence, evil intent, gruesomeness and disfigurement, 

and inability to anticipate the incident. . . . It is my medical 

opinion that the examinee suffers from traumatic grief (a condition 

that has been conceptualized under various names including

traumatic grief, complicated grief, unresolved grief, prolonged 

grief, pathological grief, and in the current edition of the DSM, 

“persistent complex bereavement-related disorder.”). Findings 

elicited in examination included yearning for the deceased, intense 

pangs of grief associated with triggering stimuli, prolonged and 

intense grief, a dramatically altered view of one’s world and one’s 

future, anhedonia, feeling worse when reminded of the deceased, 

and doing things to please the deceased (examinee stated that she 

wants to change her name back to Rux, because Kevin didn’t like 

that his last name was different from hers, but at present she 

doesn’t have the $200 in court fees that a name change would 

cost). Doe Victim A continues to exist in a chronic, heightened 

state of mourning, recurrently upset by horrific, intrusive images of 

the bombing, pre-occupied with sorrow and other negative 

emotions related to her son’s death (anger, bitterness, sense of 

injustice), and trouble getting through her day and carrying out 

normal life routines. Contemplation of the mangled and 

dismembered remains of her son and 16 others is a trigger for 

intense, raw feelings of horror and distress. In contrast to the 

course of normal (“uncomplicated”, or non-traumatic) grief, the 

passage of years does not diminish the pain of loss. Indeed, the 

passage of time can serve to heighten the pain of loss, as the 

sufferer cannot resolve the feeling of a loved one unjustly taken 

away, and the ongoing inability to restore a sense of fairness or 

justice to the world. . . . There is also marked social withdrawal 

and diminished interest in social interaction and meeting new 

people, which cannot definitively be attributed to the traumatic loss 

of her son but I believe is most likely due to this trauma, because 

diminished social interaction is routinely associated with 

prolonged grief, sadness, and negative emotions associated with 

traumatic grief (and seen in this examinee) such as anger and 

survivor’s guilt. Social withdrawal, or avoidance, a form of 

emotional self-protection, is a feature of PTSD,27 traumatic grief, 

and other trauma-related disorders. It is a defense mechanism used 

by individuals with these syndromes, including the examinee, in an 

effort to avoid triggering painful emotional states and it results in 

an impoverishment of interpersonal relationships. Examinee also 

meets the diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder related to stress 

and trauma in the DSM-V, 309.89. As the most successful, highly 

functioning of the five children and in the absence of a father, 

Kevin served as a crucial support person for Doe Victim A and the 

27 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. PEX 4 at ¶ 9 n.2.

 
other four sons (I am reminded of, but hesitate to use, the cliché 

“father figure”). It is my opinion that the death of Kevin Rux is 

the direct cause of the pain, suffering, and functional impairment 

evidenced in the examination of Doe Victim A.

PEX 4 at ¶ 9. 

B. Doe Victim B

63. Doe Victim B is Kevin’s youngest brother. [#40] at 68:15-18.

64. Doe Victim B stated that Kevin was his “best friend” and also “like a father figure” to 

him. Id. at 68:21-24. He further stated that when their parents separated, when Doe Victim B 

was eleven, Kevin “took [him] under his wing and took care of [him].” Id. at 68:25-69:5. Doe 

Victim B also stated that Kevin disciplined him on several occasions. Id. at 72:4-8.

65. After his parents got divorced, Doe Victim B “got into trouble” and “spent 19 months in 

prison for arson.” PEX 4 at ¶ 14.

66. Doe Victim B described his brother Kevin as “the glue that held [the family] together.”

[#40] at 70:7-10. He stated that the moment he learned that Kevin had been killed was “the 

worst moment in [his] entire life.” Id. at 75:1-4.

67. Since Kevin’s death, Doe Victim B has become withdrawn, has suffered from debilitating 

depression, and has had difficulty holding down a job. Id. at 76:18-77:13. 

68. Doe Victim B’s wife stated: 

[Doe Victim B is] backward, he don’t want to speak to anybody,

he won't go into the store now, he won’t -- I have to beg him to go 

anywhere with me. And so I’m pretty much have to do everything 

myself, pretty much raised the kids myself, because he won't do 

anything. I feel that my kids have lost their father of what he could 

have been, you know.”

Id. at 139:1-6.

69. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim B’s condition as follows:
[F]indings from the examination of [Doe Victim B] meet the 

criteria for traumatic grief and Persistent Complex Bereavement 

Disorder, coded as the DSM-5 diagnosis 309.89, Other Specified 

Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder (Persistent Complex 

Bereavement Disorder). Findings include yearning or longing for 

the deceased, difficulty accepting the loss, bitterness or anger, 

prolonged sadness, feelings of horror and pain from contemplating 

the manner of death, and difficulty trusting others. Doe Victim B 

continues an internal, mental relationship with Kevin in his mind 

that is evidence of a close relationship with Kevin, whom he 

looked up to as a significant support person and role model. 

Finding a co-worker who looks “exactly like” and reminds him of 

his deceased brother is considered a result of yearning or longing 

for the deceased. To date Doe Victim B continues to experience 

intense sadness and emotional pain related to the death of his 

brother.

PEX 4 at ¶ 17. 

C. Doe Victim C

70. Doe Victim C is Kevin’s second youngest brother. [#40] at 56:4-13.

71. Doe Victim C was close with Kevin growing up. Id. at 57:10-11. As adults, the brothers

spoke once a week, even though they lived in different states. Id. at 58:1-6; 60:24-25. Kevin was 

a figure of stability and a role model for Doe Victim C. Id. at 58:21-25.

72. Doe Victim C testified that he was in prison when Kevin was killed. Id. at 58:6-7.

73. After Kevin was killed, Doe Victim C began to experience nightmares of Kevin’s death 

and became severely depressed. Id. at 64:11-65:3. As a result, Doe Victim C has not been able 

to work and is on disability for his depression. Id. at 65:4-14.

74. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim C’s condition as follows:

It is my medical opinion that Doe Victim C is severely impaired 

and merits the diagnosis of PTSD, with nightmares, 

hypervigilance, re-experiencing, avoidance, chronic insomnia, 

stress-intolerance and reduced role functioning. The PTSDinducing stressor was the sudden loss of his brother Kevin. There 

is an implication of cognitive distortion as a defense mechanism in 

order to block out what would be an even more painful reality; i.e., 
despite evidence for an overwhelmingly lethal blast that mangled 

bodies and encased sailors in between massively twisted metal 

hulls, examinee finds solace in the improbable case that his brother 

was able to remain conscious and experience a peaceful, thoughtful 

last few moments before death. 

PEX 4 at ¶ 25. 

D. Doe Victim D

75. Doe Victim D is one of Kevin’s older brothers. [#40] at 47:7-9. 

76. Doe Victim D has struggled with depression his entire life and attempted suicide prior to 

Kevin’s death. PEX 4 at ¶ 18. While he was in high school, his father kicked him out of the 

house. Id. He later “spent three years in prison on a charge of probation violation/drug 

possession.” Id.

77. Doe Victim D and Kevin were very close. [#40] at 47:18-22. Doe Victim D thought of 

Kevin as his “best friend.” Id. at 48:16. 

78. Doe Victim D also joined the Navy and they were both stationed in Charleston, South 

Carolina. Id. at 47:23-48:4. 

79. After Kevin died, Doe Victim D began experiencing nightmares on a daily basis, and 

began using recreational drugs to cope with his depression. PEX 4 at ¶ 20. Doe Victim D has 

struggled with depression both before and after Kevin’s death and has been prescribed a variety 

of psychotropic medications. Id. at ¶ 18.

80. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim D’s condition as follows:

[Doe Victim D suffers from] chronic, debilitating emotional pain 

related to the sudden death of Kevin Rux. Symptoms include 

feelings of sadness, loss, helplessness, avoidance behaviors, 

sudden grief intruding into otherwise enjoyable moments, and 

impaired self-care. Doe Victim D meets the DSM criteria for 

Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder with significant 

personal distress and functional impairment in ability to work and 

health-related behavior: according to the DSM-5, “Persistent 
complex bereavement disorder is associated with deficits in work 

and social functioning and with harmful health behaviors, such as 

increased tobacco . . . use.” (p.792) Examinee also reports a 

history of prior depression. Recovery from depression is 

negatively impacted by stressful life events and it is my opinion 

that Doe Victim D also merits a psychiatric diagnosis of residual 

depression (depressive disorder, in partial remission, DSM code 

296.25) with lack of full remission resulting from the stressor of 

Kevin’s sudden and violent death.

Id. at ¶ 21. 

E. Doe Victim E

81. Doe Victim E is Kevin’s oldest brother. [#40] at 33:3-14. 

82. Doe Victim E and Kevin had a very close relationship. Id. at 33:15-22. 

83. Doe Victim E testified that they moved around a lot as a family because their father was 

in the Navy. Id. at 34:21.

84. After Kevin died, Doe Victim E fell into a deep depression and cried regularly in the five 

years following his brother’s death. PEX 4 at ¶ 21. He is constantly preoccupied by images of 

his brother’s death, and imagines him suffering. Id. His pain is just as intense today as it was the 

day he learned that Kevin was killed. Id.

85. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim E’s condition as follows:

It is my medical opinion that Doe Victim E had a close and loving 

relationship with his brother Kevin Rux and suffered severe 

sadness, anger, and grief following Kevin’s death, including years 

of significant emotional distress and depression. Ken meets the 

criteria for the diagnosis of DSM 309.89, Other Trauma and 

Stress-Related Disorder (persistent complex bereavement 

disorder). Doe Victim E’s feelings of loss and emotional pain 

continue to the present day. He may be at risk of using alcohol 

from time to time to deaden the emotional pain. 

PEX 4 at ¶ 28.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Standing

In order to have standing in an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, either “the claimant or 

the victim [must be] a national of the United States” at the time of the terrorist act. 28 U.S.C. § 

1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Pursuant to the United States Code, a “national of the United States” is 

defined as “(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the 

United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22). In this 

case, each of the five plaintiffs is a United States citizen, and therefore each has standing to bring 

suit under the FSIA. See [#18] ¶¶ 4-8. 

II. Jurisdiction

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. Legal Standard

The FSIA provides generally as follows: 

Subject to existing international agreements to which the United 

States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state 

shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 

States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 

1607 of this chapter.

28 U.S.C. § 1604. See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 

434-35 (1989) (holding that the FSIA provides the sole basis for a district court to assert 

jurisdiction over a foreign state).

Under section 1605A, no foreign sovereign immunity exists where:

money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal 

injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial 

killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of 

material support or resources for such an act if such act or 

provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an 

official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting 

within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). 

Under the FSIA, the term “extrajudicial killing” is defined as “a deliberated killing not 

authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the 

judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Torture Victim 

Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992); § 1605A(h)(7). 

The term “material support or resources” is defined as “any property, tangible or intangible, or 

service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 

lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 

communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and 

transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(3) (citing 18 

U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)). See also Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67-68 

(D.D.C. 2008) (providing examples of material support).

2. Analysis

In this case, the Court may assert jurisdiction over the subject matter because money 

damages are sought for an extrajudicial killing that was caused by the provision of material 

support or resources (financial support, support for training, and facilitation of travel) to Bin 

Laden and Al-Qaeda by the Sudanese and Iranian defendants, acting within the scope of their 

official employment. See generally [#18].

B. Personal Jurisdiction

1. Legal Standard

Under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists if the defendants have been properly served 

pursuant to section 1608. Subsection (a) governs service upon a foreign state or political 

subdivision of a foreign state, while subsection (b) provides for service upon an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) and (b); I.T. Consultants Inc. v. 

Republic of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

In determining whether a foreign entity is to be treated as the state itself or as an agency 

or instrumentality, courts employ the “core functions” test articulated in Roeder v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Pursuant to this “categorical approach,” if the 

core functions of the entity are governmental, it is considered to be a foreign state but if its core 

functions are commercial, it is considered to be an agency or instrumentality of that state. Id. at 

234.

2. Analysis

Sudan and Iran are clearly foreign states. With respect to the seven remaining Sudanese 

defendants, because they are each subdivisions of the Sudanese government and perform 

governmental functions, they will be treated as the foreign state of Sudan. See [#18] ¶¶ 12, 15; 

Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2005) (treating Sudan’s Ministry 

of the Interior as a foreign state). With respect to the three remaining Iranian defendants, 

because they too are each subdivisions of the Iranian government, they will be treated as the 

foreign state of Iran. See [#18] ¶¶ 9, 10; Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 471 F. Supp. 2d 53, 

59 (D.D.C. 2007) (treating Iran’s MOIS and the Revolutionary Guards as foreign states). Having 

determined that each of the Sudanese and Iranian defendants is, under the FSIA, a foreign state, 

the next issue is whether service of process was perfected. 

With respect to the Sudanese defendants, service was perfected on January 30, 2011, 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), through courier delivery of the summonses, complaints and 

attachments to Ahmed Ali Karti, the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Khartoum, Sudan. 

See Return of Service [#15]. With respect to the Iranian defendants, because the United States 
does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran, service was perfected on February 15, 2010, 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4), through delivery of the summonses, complaints and notices of suit 

to the Foreign Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran, for conveyance to the 

Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See April 19, 2011 and April 20, 2011 letters from William 

Fritzlen, Attorney Advisor at the State Department’s Office of Policy Review and Interagency 

Liaison, to Angela Caesar, Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

[#16]. Because plaintiffs properly served the Sudanese and Iranian defendants, this Court may 

assert subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b); TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property 

Fund, 411 F.3d 296, 327 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

III. Default Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen a party against whom a 

judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure 

is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(a). After the party’s default is entered, plaintiffs must move the court for the entry of a 

default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). 

Before plaintiffs can be awarded any relief, however, plaintiffs must establish their 

claims by “evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). See also Taylor v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2011); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 

F.Supp.2d 140, 159 (D.D.C. 2002). This requirement “imposes a duty on FSIA courts to not 

simply accept a complaint’s unsupported allegations as true, and obligates courts to ‘inquire 

further before entering judgment’ against parties in default.” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
In evaluating plaintiffs’ proofs, a court may “accept as true plaintiffs’ uncontroverted 

evidence, which may take the form of sworn affidavits or prior transcripts.” Estate of Botvin v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 510 F. Supp. 2d 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2007). Such evidence may also 

include judicial notice of the evidence presented in related proceedings. Id.

B. Analysis

There are five elements of liability under the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exception: 

“(1) ‘an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or provision of 

material support or resources for such an act’ where (2) the act was committed, or the provision 

provided, by the foreign state or agent of the foreign state, and the act (3) ‘caused’ (4) ‘personal 

injury or death’ (5) ‘for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under 

this section for money damages.’” Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F. Supp. 2d 93, 101

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1605A(1), (c)). In order to satisfy the third and fourth 

elements, plaintiffs must “prove a theory of liability under which defendants cause the requisite 

injury or death.” Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 73 (D.D.C. 2010). “In 

other words, plaintiffs in § 1605A actions—whether seeking solely punitive damages or pursuing 

compensatory relief as well—must articulate the justification for such recovery, generally 

through the lens of civil tort liability.” Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76.

In this case, it has been established, with evidence satisfactory to the Court, that the 

defendants, through the provision of material support and resources (the financial support, 

support for training, and facilitation of travel) to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, facilitated the 

planning and execution of the attack on the Cole, which resulted in the extrajudicial killing of 

Kevin Rux. See Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 17-34 (Sudanese defendants); ¶¶ 40-55 (Iranian 
defendants). The next issue, therefore, is whether plaintiffs have proven an appropriate theory of 

liability.

Plaintiffs claim that the defendants are liable upon a theory of IIED and solatium. See

[#18] ¶¶ 138-144. Under the Restatement of Torts, a defendant shall be liable for IIED to family 

members of an injured person if the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct which 

1) was directed at persons other than plaintiffs and 2) intentionally or recklessly caused severe 

emotional distress, but not necessarily bodily harm, to such persons’ immediate family members, 

who were present at the time such conduct occurred. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1)-

(2)(a) (1965). “Acts of terrorism are by their very definition extreme and outrageous and 

intended to cause the highest degree of emotional distress.” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 

78, 89 (D.D.C. 2002)). Notably, in terrorism actions brought pursuant to section 1605A of the 

FSIA, the requirement of presence at the time of the incident is waived. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d 

at 80 (“One [ ] need not be present at the time of a terrorist attack upon a third person to recover 

for severe emotional injuries suffered as a result.”). 

Under the FSIA, a claim for solatium is nearly indistinguishable from a claim for IIED. 

Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 12-CIV-42, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2014 WL 5141429, 

at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2014) (citing Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85). “A claim of solatium is a 

claim for the mental anguish, bereavement and grief that those with a close personal relationship 

to a decedent experience as the result of the decedent’s death, as well as the harm caused by the 

loss of the decedent, society and comfort.” Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (citing Dammarell v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 196–97 (D.D.C. 2003); Elahi v. Islamic Republic 

of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2000)). However, because plaintiffs can only recover 
once for their claims of IIED and solatium and “[b]ecause section 1605A explicitly makes 

damages for solatium available, the Court will proceed [solely] under this theory of recovery.” 

Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 22.

In this case, it has been established, with evidence satisfactory to the Court, that the 

defendants enabled Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to perpetrate the attack on the Cole, thereby 

causing Kevin’s death and the resulting mental anguish, bereavement, and grief of his immediate 

family members, the plaintiffs. See Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 57-85 (detailing injury caused to 

Kevin’s mother and brothers as a result of his death).

IV. Damages

In any action brought under section 1605A of the FSIA, “damages may include economic 

damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). In this 

case, plaintiffs seek both compensatory and punitive damages, and the Court will consider each 

in turn after a preliminary discussion of joint and several liability.

A. Joint and Several Liability

1. Legal Standard

In section 1605A actions against foreign states or their instrumentalities, the court may 

assess damages jointly and severally against defendants that conspired to provide material 

support for terrorist activity. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30, 34 

(D.D.C. 2012) (making Iranian and Syrian defendants jointly and severally liable for all 

damages, where Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”) received “substantial logistical, financial, and 

technical support” from and “act[ed] as agents for” the defendants); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 59 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 

Iranian Ministry of Information and Security jointly and severally liable for all damages).

28

2. Analysis

Because the record supports a finding that the Iranian and Sudanese defendants conspired 

to support Al-Qaeda, which in turn carried out the bombing of the Cole, the Court concludes that 

all defendants shall be jointly and severally liable for all damages. This conspiracy can be traced 

back at least to 1991, when Iran and Sudan decided to form a “tripartite front” against the United 

States and Israel, agreeing to collaborate both “politically and militarily.” PEX 16 at 6–7. 

Iran took primary responsibility for transferring, via Lebanese Hizballah, extensive 

technical expertise to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. See id. at 8; PEX 27 at 2–7; 

PEX 9 at 61. In the 1990s, Al-Qaeda was able to deepen relationships with Iranian officials and 

Hizballah. See PEX 27 at 2–7; PEX 9 at 61. Al-Qaeda also used Iran as a “transit point” for 

moving money and fighters. PEX 2 at ¶ 36; cf. Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (“[T]he Iranian 

Defendants funneled money through the Syrian Defendants to the PIJ in order for the PIJ to carry 

out terrorist attacks.”). In the years leading up to the Cole bombing, Iran was directly involved 

in establishing Al-Qaeda’s Yemen network and supported training and logistics for Al-Qaeda in 

the Gulf region. See PEX 3 at ¶ 70. Throughout, Iran used Lebanese Hizballah, long-trusted yet 

easily distanced in public, as its primary “facilitator” for providing training and communications 

support. PEX 3 at ¶ 49. 

28 Cf. Blue v. Rose, 786 F.2d 349, 352–53 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[W]here an award of punitive damages is based upon 

actions by one or more partners acting within the scope of authority and in further[a]nce of the partnership business, 

. . . under the general principles of agency and partnership law, all the partners could be held jointly liable for the 

punitive damages, and a single sum verdict is warranted.”). As an alternative to joint and several liability, the 

majority of U.S. jurisdictions allow courts to apportion punitive damages according to the culpability of individual 

defendants. See 2 John J. Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive Damages: Law and Practice §§ 16:8–16:9 

(2014) (reviewing cases). Here, however, the record provides no clear rationale for apportionment, and the plaintiffs 

do not request such a remedy. See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Redacted [#44] at 

55 (seeking final judgment against defendants “jointly and severally”).

 
For its part, Sudan served as a meeting place, safe haven, and training ground for AlQaeda and others, including Lebanese Hizballah in the 1990s and into 2000. See PEX 12 at 10; 

PEX 15 at 10; cf. Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 35(“[T]he safe haven, advice, encouragement, 

assistance, and facilities provided by Syrian Defendants substantially contributed to the PIJ’s 

ability to train suicide bombers.”). In exchange, Bin Laden agreed to support Turabi, head of 

Sudan’s NIF, in his war against Christian separatists in southern Sudan. See PEX 9 at 57.

Additionally, Bin Laden established business ventures with the NIF elite that facilitated the 

transfer of funds for terrorist activities. See PEX 1 at ¶¶ 19, 35. In sum, Sudan’s support was 

“indispensable” in enabling Al-Qaeda to acquire expertise and contacts for carrying out the Cole 

bombing. PEX 1 at ¶ 81. 

Lastly, there is ample evidence that Al-Qaeda carried out the final act of bombing the 

Cole and proximately causing the injury suffered by the plaintiffs. See PEX 3 at ¶¶ 70, 81. In 

light of the evidence of the Iranian and Sudanese defendants’ conspiracy to support the terrorist 

activities of Al-Qaeda, which ultimately executed the Cole bombing, joint and several liability 

for all damages is appropriate.

B. Compensatory Damages

1. Legal Standard

In determining the appropriate amount of compensatory damages, courts may look to 

prior decisions awarding damages for pain and suffering, and to those awarding damages for 

solatium. See Acosta v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2008) 

(citing Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71 (D.D.C. 2006)). In Estate of 

Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006), the court, following an 

extensive survey of other decisions of the District Court for the District of Columbia, noted that 
“courts typically award between $8 million and $12 million for pain and suffering resulting from 

the death of a spouse[,] approximately $5 million to a parent whose child was killed[,] and 

approximately $2.5 million to a plaintiff whose sibling was killed.” Id. at 269. It is also true, 

however, that courts “award greater amounts in cases with ‘with aggravating circumstances,’ . . . 

indicated by such things as ‘[t]estimony which describes a general feeling of permanent loss or 

change caused by decedent's absence’ or ‘[m]edical treatment for depression and related 

affective disorders,’” Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85-86 (internal citations omitted). With respect 

to such enhancements, the court in Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16

(D.D.C. 2011), noted the following:

Factors pertinent to the determination of damage enhancements are 

largely derived from common sense, and generally fall into one of 

three categories: evidence establishing an especially close 

relationship between the plaintiff and decedent, particularly in 

comparison to the normal interactions to be expected given the 

familial relationship; medical proof of severe pain, grief or 

suffering on behalf of the claimant; and circumstances surrounding 

the terrorist attack which made the suffering particularly more 

acute or agonizing.

Id. at 26-27. Accord Spencer, 2014 WL 5141429, at *3. 

2. Analysis

In this case, the evidence demonstrates that Kevin was the center of his family. See

Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 57-85. His unexpected death was devastating to his mother and 

brothers. Id. Furthermore, the violent nature in which he died further exacerbated their grief and 

mental suffering, with several of his family members tortured by the fact that he may have 

suffered before he died. See generally PEX 4. Finally, the medical evidence shows that each 

plaintiff experienced extraordinarily severe pain and suffering following Kevin’s death. Id. at ¶¶ 

9-12 (concluding that Plaintiff A suffers from “traumatic grief” or “persistent complex 
bereavement-related disorder”); Id. at ¶ 17 (concluding that Plaintiff B suffers from “traumatic 

grief” or “persistent complex bereavement-related disorder”); Id. at ¶ 25 (concluding that 

Plaintiff C suffers from PTSD); Id. at ¶ 21 (concluding that Plaintiff D suffers from “traumatic 

grief” or “persistent complex bereavement-related disorder”); Id. at ¶ 28 (concluding that 

Plaintiff E suffers from “traumatic grief” or “persistent complex bereavement-related disorder”).

Under these circumstances an upward departure of 25%29 of the baseline is warranted. 

Accordingly, each plaintiff shall be awarded the following damages for solatium:

Plaintiff Relationship 

to Kevin

Baseline 

Award

25% 

Enhancement

Total Solatium 

Damages

1. Plaintiff A Mother $5,000,000 $1,250,000 $6,250,000

2. Plaintiff B Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000

3. Plaintiff C Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000

4. Plaintiff D Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000

5. Plaintiff E Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000

C. Punitive Damages

1. Legal Standard

“[T]he purpose of punitive damages is ‘to punish’ a defendant for ‘outrageous conduct,’ 

and ‘to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.’” Baker, 775 F. Supp. 

2d at 84 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977)). In calculating an award of 

punitive damages under section 1605A of the FSIA,

30 courts evaluate four factors: “‘(1) the 

character of the defendant’s act, (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that defendants 

29 Although plaintiffs seek an upward departure of 50%, the Court finds this to be excessive. In this case, although 

each family member appears to have had an extremely close relationship with Kevin, the Court notes that not all of 

the emotional harm and dysfunction currently being experienced by the plaintiffs is necessarily attributable to the 

attack. As noted above, Kevin’s mother’s father was an alcoholic and she married an alcoholic. See Findings of 

Fact supra ¶¶ 57-85. After her divorce from him, she raised five boys on her own. Id. Of those five boys, two of 

them served time in prison prior to the attack and one of them was in prison at the time of the attack. Id. Thus, 

without diminishing the pain and anguish felt by the plaintiffs, the Court simply notes that an enhancement of 25% 

is more appropriate in this instance. See Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 

83 (D.D.C. 2011) (approving an upward departure of 25% from the baseline for solatium damages); Valore, 700 F. 

Supp. 2d at 86 (same).

30 Punitive damages against state sponsors of terrorism first became available in 2008. See Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d 

at 87.

 
caused or intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.’” 

Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (internal citations omitted). Courts have found these factors to be 

satisfied when a defendant has provided material support to a terrorist organization in carrying 

out an act of terrorism. See, e.g., Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (finding that an award of punitive 

damages was warranted where “defendants supported, protected, harbored, aided, abetted, 

enabled, sponsored, conspired with, and subsidized a known terrorist organization whose modus 

operandi included the targeting, brutalization, and murder of American citizens and others”); 

Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 235 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that an 

award of punitive damages was warranted where “[t]he defendant organized, trained, and funded 

[terrorist organizations] so that [they] could torture and take individuals like the plaintiff 

hostage”).

2. Analysis

In this case, punitive damages are clearly warranted. First, when the Cole was bombed, it 

was manned by 26 officers and 270 enlisted personnel. See Findings of Fact supra ¶ 8. The 

result of the bombing was the death of 17 American sailors and the injury of 42 others. Id. ¶ 10. 

This was, without a doubt, a heinous act. The defendants’ provision of material support to the 

perpetrators of that bombing was no less heinous. See Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (finding 

that “[w]hile Sudan’s support of Al Qaeda [in the bombing of the Cole] does not rise to level of 

direct involvement in the attacks, it was nonetheless intentional, material and, as a result, 

reprehensible”).

Second, in supporting Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, the defendants’ intention was clearly to 

further their own Anti-Western, Anti-American agenda. See Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 11-16 

(Sudanese defendants); ¶¶ 35-39 (Iranian defendants).
Third, numerous courts have acknowledged that the need to deter these defendants from 

committing future terrorist acts is great. See, e.g., Onsongo v. Republic of Sudan, No. 08-CIV1380, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, ---, 2014 WL 3702875, at *5 (D.D.C. July 25, 2014) (awarding punitive 

damages against Sudan following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, 

upon a finding that the need for deterrence was great); Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42

(awarding punitive damages against Iran following the suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv restaurant, 

upon an implicit finding that the need for deterrence was great); Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 50-

51 (awarding punitive damages against Sudan following the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, upon a 

finding that the need for deterrence was great); Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 784 F. Supp. 

2d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2011) (awarding punitive damages against Iran following the suicide 

bombing of an Israeli bus, upon an implicit finding that the need for deterrence was great).

Furthermore, it appears as though Iran is acutely aware of these U.S. lawsuits: 

Iranian leaders pay close attention to civil suits about terrorism. In 

2000/01, the issue was a major controversy in Iran. . . . Former 

Iranian President, now chairman of the powerful Expediency 

Council (charged with resolving disputes among the various organs 

of government), Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani complained at 

length about the suits, as did numerous members of Iran’s 

Parliament. Of particular concern was the large punitive damage 

awards assessed against Iran, which they acknowledged exceeded 

a billion dollars. . . . 

* * *

While Iranian leaders do pay close attention to the court judgments 

against Iran for its material support of terrorism, the effort to 

dissuade Iran from providing financial support for terrorism 

against Americans encountered several significant obstacles until 

recently. First, from 2005-2013, the president of Iran was 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, [ ] a right-wing extremist who enjoyed 

attacking the United States and mocking its power. Second, Iran’s 

much higher oil income after 2005 because of higher oil prices 

made it easier for Iran to allocate more funds for the support of 

terrorism during the years until the additional U.S. and European 
Union sanctions of 2013 sharply reduced Iran’s oil [income]. 

Third, the perceived success of major terrorist groups that receive 

material support from Iran, namely, Hizbollah’s performance in its 

2006 confrontation with Israel, followed up by its 2009-2010 

success in keeping a role in the Lebanese government despite 

doing poorly in the elections, and HAMAS’ 2006 takeover of Gaza 

(though that has been tarnished by its poor showing in the 2008-

2009 confrontation with Israel). Fourth, the perception in recent 

years has been that the United States has been unable to exercise 

power in the Middle East: it was tied down by Iraqi and Afghan 

insurgents until it decided to scale back or end its military role, it 

announced that it would pivot to Asia with an implicit reduced role 

in the Middle East, and it was unable to put into effect President 

Barak Obama’s 2012 call for Syrian President Assad to leave 

office. Iranian leaders have often proclaimed these developments 

as evidence that Islamist resistance movements and their terrorist 

activities can defeat the United States. In consideration of these 

factors, the financial pressure to abandon terrorism against U.S. 

citizens and entities as a result of past court judgments was not 

sufficient[ ] to induce Iran to change course.

But that pressure, in my opinion, certainly remains, and should not 

be underestimated as an element in Iran’s calculation about 

whether and how to support terrorism against Americans. For one 

thing, Iran is less confident in 2014 than it was some years ago, in 

no small part because of the U.S. success since 2012 in persuading 

other countries to join in tougher sanctions against Iran. A factor 

which could make court judgments more effective at leading Iran 

to reconsider its policy of terrorism against Americans is Iran’s 

active pursuit of a nuclear accord with the United States. In the 

2013 Iranian presidential elections, all of the candidates except the 

one most associated with hardliners argued that Iran must 

compromise with the international community in order to secure 

relief from international sanctions. Indeed, the heart of winning 

candidate Hussein Rouhani’s campaign was that the only way to 

improve Iran’s dreadful economic situation was to obtain sanctions 

relief and that required compromising with the United States about 

the nuclear program. To the extent that the Iranian government is 

focused on how to obtain sanctions relief, that government will be 

more sensitive to pressure related to Iran’s support for terrorism 

against Americans. To be sure, Supreme Leader Khamenei is 

skeptical about the nuclear negotiations and counsels adopting an 

“economy of resistance” which does not rely on sanctions relief. 

Yet the issue of how to improve the economy and how much to 

compromise with the West is in my expert opinion a matter being 

vigorously debated in Iran, and court judgments which highlight 
the cost for terrorism support could be an important element in that 

debate. 

That is especially the case since recent legal actions suggest that 

substantial Iranian assets could be at risk. While I am not at liberty 

to discuss a number of actions in which I am an expert witness and 

where the proceedings are under seal, I can note that the Wall 

Street Journal has reported that in one case, more than one billion 

dollars is at stake. In 2013, a federal court ordered the surrender of 

the assets of the Alavi Foundation of New York – worth in excess 

of $600 million -- on the grounds that the Foundation was 

controlled by the Iranian government. Furthermore, Canada 

revised its laws in [ ] to allow seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy 

court judgments against Iran. In March 2014, a Canadian court 

ordered the seizure of more than $7 million in Iranian assets under 

the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act to satisfy court judgments 

in the United States. Iranian media have extensively reported on 

this case. The prospect that Iran must contemplate is that 

additional countries may permit seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy 

the U.S. court judgments, which could considerably complicate 

Iranian trade and put at risk substantial Iranian assets abroad.

Iran has recently been taking a more active stance on terrorismrelated lawsuits brought against it. Although Iran has had a long 

history of failing to appear in these lawsuits, Iran has entered 

several recent suits. For instance, as I mentioned earlier, in 2004, 

plaintiffs holding judgments against Iran filed a property claim for 

ancient Iranian tablets held by the University of Chicago’s Oriental 

Institute. The suit was initially ignored by Iran. However, in 2009, 

after the district court finally ruled that the case could proceed, Iran 

intervened in the case. Indeed, Iran has vigorously defended a 

Canadian wrongful death suit against it, Estate of the Late Zahra 

(Ziba) Kazemi, and Stephan (Salman) Hashemi v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 500-17-031760-062 (Sup. Ct. 

Montreal), since suit was filed in 2009. And since 2011, the Alavi 

Foundation of New York has vigorously but so far unsuccessfully 

contested in federal court the U.S. seizure of its assets.

. . . Here, Iran has not decreased its support for terrorism, but 

instead has dramatically increased and widened its support for 

terrorists, terrorist organizations, and terrorist activities throughout 

the world. Punishment can be measured, in large part, by assessing 

significant financial damages for Iran’s continued and wideranging worldwide support for terrorism, both directly and through 

its governmental arms (MOIS, IRGC, and IRGC Qods) and 

through Hizbollah. Iran is blatant in its support of terrorism. As 
to deterrence, there [are] two factors to consider: deterring similar 

conduct by others and making further efforts to deter Iran in its 

bold and increasing support for terrorism, which Iran uses to 

expand its influence, its reach, and its force by terrorist means. 

It is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that Iranian 

officials pay extremely close attention to what the outside world 

has to say about the Iranian government and its policies, and they 

generally assume that whatever is written about Iran – whether by 

judges, by independent newspapers, by non-governmental 

organizations, or by foreign ministries – is a direct product of a 

unified policy by the government of the country from which the 

comment originates. Further, as I noted earlier, the Iranians have 

shown themselves to be sensitive to punitive damages levied 

against them, and they are well aware that such damages have been 

a common feature in actions against Iran for its support of 

terrorism against Americans. Were this Court not to impose 

punitive damages for what was a spectacular terrorist act, this 

would be read by Iranian government officials as indicating a 

significant weakening of U.S. pressure on Iran to end its support 

for terrorism against Americans. On the other hand, were this 

Court to impose substantial punitive damages, this would be read 

by Iranian officials as indicating that U.S. policy remains firmly 

opposed to Iranian support for terrorism against Americans. 

PEX 2 at ¶¶ 92-99.

The degree to which Sudan is concerned about these U.S. lawsuits is unclear, as none of 

plaintiffs’ experts addressed this issue. However, the state has, on occasion, participated in 

litigation brought in U.S. courts. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (full participation); Kumar v. Republic of Sudan, No. 2:10-CIV-171, 2011 WL 4369122 

(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2011) (limited participation); Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 672 F. Supp. 2d 726 

(E.D. Va. 2009) (limited participation). 

Finally, the wealth of Sudan and Iran supports an award of punitive damages. In 2014, 

Sudan’s GDP was estimated at $85.3 billion. See http://www.heritage.org/index/country/sudan

(last visited Jan.26, 2015). Iran’s GDP in 2014 was estimated at $999.2 billion. See
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/iran (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). In light of the foregoing 

analysis, the Court concludes that an award of punitive damages is warranted.

The next step, then, is to quantify punitive damages. Courts have adopted two primary 

approaches to calculating punitive damages against foreign states under section 1605A of the 

FSIA, but both approaches seem ill-suited to this case. 

Many courts apply the Flatow method, multiplying the defendant state’s annual 

expenditures on terrorism (the multiplicand) by a factor usually ranging from three to five (the 

multiplier). See, e.g., Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 789 F. Supp. 2d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(using multiplier of three); Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (using multiplier of five); Flatow v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 32–34 (D.D.C. 1998) (articulating punitive damages’

dual purposes of retribution and deterrence, and applying multiplier of three). Applying the 

Flatow method here could send a strong message of deterrence, but strikes this Court as 

potentially excessive. Iran’s support for terrorism was estimated in 2008 to amount to $200 

million. See PEX 2 at ¶ 91 (citing 2008 Patterns of Global Terrorism report).

31 Plaintiffs ask 

this Court to multiply this sum by a multiplier of five (5), render a total punitive award of $1 

billion, and allocate this amount to each plaintiff according to his or her share of compensatory 

damages.

32 See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Redacted [#44] at 

31 In applying the Flatow method, courts disagree on whether terrorism spending should reflect, on the one hand, 

spending at the time of the attack at issue (or at least in years immediately prior to the attack) or, on the other, annual 

spending at the time of litigation. Compare Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 11-cv-1377 (RCL), 2015 WL 

349208, at *18 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2015) (using Iran’s “annual material support to Hamas during the 1990s” as Flatow

multiplicand for damages in case arising from 2001 terror attack), with Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 

F. Supp. 2d 27, 44, 53 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding that Iran “currently spends approximately $100 million per year or 

more on terrorist activities,” in calculating damages in connection with captivity spanning from 1985 to 1991). 

Additionally, some courts focus on spending directed at the terrorist organization that perpetrated the attack at issue, 

rather than total support of terrorism. Compare Roth, 2015 WL 349208, at *18 (isolating support to Hamas); 

Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (isolating support to Hizballah), with Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (using “annual 

support for international terrorism” as Flatow multiplicand). 32 Tellingly, in asking the Court to apply a $200 million multiplicand, the plaintiffs decline to adopt their own 

expert’s “highly conservative estimate” of Iran’s annual terrorism support as ranging from $300 to $500 million. 

See PEX 2 at ¶ 91. Additionally, the plaintiffs justify the use of the higher multiplier of five with cursory references 

 
55. But under this approach, each of the five plaintiffs in this case would receive punitive 

damages amounting to approximately fifty-three (53) times his or her compensatory damages.33

Under the second approach, some courts impose a fixed $300 million punitive award. 

This approach is based on courts’ perception that punitive awards are converging toward this 

figure, and on the theory that consistent, foreseeable punishment serves as a better deterrent for 

the rational bad actor. See, e.g., Bodoff, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (awarding $300 million in 

punitive damages and explaining that a punitive damage award should be “reasonably 

predictable in its severity” so that a “bad man can look ahead with some ability to know what the 

stakes are in choosing one course of action or another” (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 

554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008))); Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (same). But this approach, even more 

so than the Flatow method, limits courts’ discretion to tailor a punitive award appropriate for the 

magnitude of the underlying injury. Compare Bodoff, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (awarding $300 

million in punitive damages to five plaintiffs whose compensatory damages totaled 

approximately $17 million), with Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (awarding $300 million in 

punitive damages to one plaintiff whose compensatory damages totaled $7.5 million); see also

Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (considering “the character of the defendant’s act” and “the nature 

to “new terrorist threats such as Bokom Haram [sic] and ISIS,” without explaining any purported linkages between 

these groups and the Iranian or Sudanese defendants. See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 

Law Redacted [#44] at 55. 33 By way of further illustration, plugging into the Flatow formula (with a multiplier of 3) an annual terrorism 

spending figure of $400 million would yield a total punitive award of $1.2 billion and a per-plaintiff punitivecompensatory ratio of sixty-four (64), and spending of $500 million would correspond with a total punitive award of 

$1.5 billion and a punitive-compensatory ratio of eighty (80). If the Due Process Clause governed these proceedings 

(which it does not, see infra note 37), ratios of 53, 64, and 80, might all be unconstitutional. See State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due 

process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 

to 1 or, in this case, of 145 to 1.” (internal citation omitted)). 

 
and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that defendants caused or intended to cause,” among other 

factors, in calculating punitive damages (internal quotation marks omitted)).34

Most crucially, both approaches fail to account for a relatively unique feature of this case: 

This Court has already rendered a punitive award against the Republic of Sudan in connection 

with the very same bombing of the Cole. See Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23 

(D.D.C. 2012). The Harrison court applied the Flatow method, but explained that in light of the 

absence of “evidence relating to Sudan’s actual expenditures on terrorist activities,” it would 

“use the compensatory damages value as the multiplicand.” Id. at 50. The court then used a 

multiplier of three, in the absence of any “exceptional circumstances” justifying an upward 

adjustment. Id.35 The eighteen plaintiffs, who are not in this case, were awarded punitive 

damages in the amount of $236,029,422. Id. at 51.

34 See also 2 John J. Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive Damages: Law and Practice § 18:8 (2014) 

(reviewing cases and explaining that courts calculating punitive damages consider the “‘nature and enormity of the 

wrong,’ the ‘magnitude and flagrancy’ of the offense, [and] the ‘blameworthiness and harmfulness’ of the 

misconduct” (internal citations omitted)); Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 

Mich. L. Rev. 33, 36–37 (2012) (“[P]unitive damages should equal the harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the 

injurer’s chance of being found liable for wrongful activities.” (emphasis added)).

Other courts prefer a fixed punitive award for each immediate victim harmed directly by the terrorist act 

(i.e., those whom the terrorists killed, tortured, kidnapped, etc.). See, e.g., Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (awarding 

$150,000,000 in punitive damages against Syria for each of three Americans shot in execution-style by terrorist 

hijackers, for a total punitive award of $450,000,000); Gates, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (awarding $150,000,000 in 

punitive damages against Syria for each of two civilian contractors beheaded by Al-Qaeda in Iraq operatives, for a 

total punitive award of $300,000,000). But this immediate-victim approach cannot fully account for the foreseeable 

effects of terrorism on secondary victims such as family members or other potential claimants. The more numerous 

these secondary victims, the greater the likelihood that the immediate-victim methodology could under-punish and 

under-deter the perpetrator, relative to the actual magnitude of resultant harm. A further complication is that, insofar 

as duplicative punishment is to be avoided, courts instating immediate-victim punitive awards assume that all 

potential plaintiffs are before the court and that no other secondary victims have brought or will bring claims related 

to the same immediate victim. See Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (awarding punitive damages to “each of the victims 

of the hijacking and their families”); Gates, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (awarding punitive damages to estates of two 

victims). But this case illustrates the limits of such an assumption: Kevin’s wife is not in this case and, in fact, was 

unable to obtain punitive damages in the earlier Rux case. See infra note 35. 35 As already discussed, see supra note 2, Rux arose out of the same attack on the Cole (and even involves the same 

decedent, though not the same plaintiffs as this case). But because the Rux court awarded only compensatory and 

not punitive damages, that case does not present the problem of duplicative punitive damages. The newly enacted 

section 1605A authorizing punitive damages had no retroactive application to the Rux plaintiffs’ suit, and the district 

court denied their motion to amend their complaint to request punitive and other damages under that section. See

Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 566–67 (describing compensatory damages); Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 672 F. Supp. 2d 

 
This Court’s prior assessment in Harrison of punitive damages against Sudan for the 

same attack on the Cole presents two additional challenges. First, the Court should avoid 

imposing a duplicative punishment against the Sudanese defendants for the same conduct, given 

that they are jointly and severally liable for all damages in this case. See supra Part IV.A.

36 

Second, the Court is concerned for consistency on an individual plaintiff level; a punitive award 

should minimize any disparities between the Harrison plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in this case, 

whose injuries are similar in “nature and extent” and thus warrant comparable levels of 

punishment and deterrence. See Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 30.

Fortunately, the shortcomings of the Flatow and fixed-award approaches and the 

duplication and consistency challenges presented by Harrison’s prior punitive award all find a 

reasonably elegant solution in Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C.

2010). In Murphy, the plaintiffs’ injuries arose from the 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marine Corps 

barracks in Lebanon. Id. at 55. In calculating the punitive award, the court acknowledged a 

“quandary”: It had already awarded punitive damages against Iran in Valore for precisely the 

same bombing. See id. at 81. “Recurrent awards in case after case arising out of the same 

facts,” the Court reasoned, “can financially cripple a defendant, over-punishing the same conduct 

through repeated awards with little additional deterrent effect, and awards . . . can differ, creating 

anomalous results.” Id. 

726, 730–34, 738 (E.D. Va. 2009) (explaining section 1605A’s lack of automatic retroactive effect and denying 

motion for leave to supplement complaint).

36 Here, various Sudanese ministries and agencies are defendants alongside the Republic of Sudan, whereas in 

Harrison, the Republic of Sudan was the sole defendant. But this formal distinction does not alleviate the Court’s 

concerns about duplicative punishment: Because both Harrison and this case arise out of the bombing of the Cole, 

any Sudanese government officials or entities that must be punished and deterred are ultimately identical.

 
Following the Supreme Court’s teaching that punitive damages are “personal” to injured 

plaintiffs in a specific case,

37 the Murphy Court concluded that “[w]here there is more than one 

case arising out of the same facts, an analysis of the amount of punitive damages awarded 

compared with the amount of compensatory damages awarded [in the prior case] can be used to 

gauge the amount of punishment and deterrence the Court considered necessary based on the 

injuries plaintiffs to that case suffered.” Id. at 81–82. Because Valore’s punitive-tocompensatory-damages ratio was 3.44-to-1, the Murphy court applied this same ratio to calculate 

punitive damages with respect to each individual plaintiff. Id. at 82–83; see also Estate of Brown 

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 872 F. Supp. 2d 37, 44–45 (D.D.C. 2012) (following Murphy and 

applying 3.44-to-1 ratio from Valore in case arising out of same bombing); Davis v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) (same); Estate of Bland v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 831 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Goldberg-Botvin v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 938 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2013) (following Murphy and applying

punitive damages-compensatory damages ratio from Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003), which arose out of same bombing).

Here, following Murphy, this Court finds guidance in the ratio between the punitive and 

compensatory awards rendered in Harrison, which arose out of the same bombing of the Cole. 

The Harrison court awarded $236,029,422 in punitive damages and $78,676,474 in 

compensatory damages. See Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 51. Accordingly, Harrison’s ratio of 

37 In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction not 

expressly limiting a punitive award to the plaintiffs in the case, thereby permitting jurors to consider harm done to 

other individuals not before the court, constituted an unconstitutional taking without due process, in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 349. Here, this Court, like the Murphy court, is mindful that the Due Process 

Clause (of the Fifth Amendment) does not apply to foreign states and their instrumentalities. See Price v. Socialist 

People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68; see 

also Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (“Due Process principles play no role in limiting punitive damages in terrorismrelated FSIA suits . . . .”). Nonetheless, like the Murphy court, this Court finds the due process principles articulated 

in Philip Morris instructive, insofar as they embody general concerns for fairness and consistency.

 
punitive damages to compensatory damages is 3-to-1, and in this case, the Court shall apply the 

same ratio to derive punitive damages.

Plaintiffs contend that “Harrison’s calculation of punitive damages is not appropriate 

here” because “plaintiffs there did not provide evidence relating to Sudan’s actual expenditures 

on terrorist activities . . . [whereas] here, plaintiffs have established evidence regarding Iran’s 

actual expenditures on terrorism, and that much of the terrorism sponsored was done in 

conjunction with the Sudan.” Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 

Redacted [#44] at 53 n.16 (internal citations and quotations omitted). But this argument misses 

the mark. At issue is not whether Harrison is correct, but rather, whether Murphy provides a 

sound methodology for calculating punitive damages. In opting to follow Murphy, this Court 

relies on Harrison only insofar as that case arises from the same incident and similar injuries (the 

bombing of the Cole), and supplies a ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. As a 

doctrinal matter, therefore, this case is governed not by Harrison, but by Murphy.

38

Accordingly, the Court will award punitive damages to each plaintiff in this case in an 

amount three times greater than his or her respective compensatory damages:

Plaintiff Relationship 

to Kevin

Total 

Solatium 

Damages 

Punitive-toCompensatoryDamages Ratio Total Punitive 

Damages

1. Plaintiff A Mother $6,250,000 3 : 1 $18,750,000

2. Plaintiff B Brother $3,125,000 3 : 1 $9,375,000

3. Plaintiff C Brother $3,125,000 3 : 1 $9,375,000

4. Plaintiff D Brother $3,125,000 3 : 1 $9,375,000

38 Here, directly adopting Harrison’s calculation would yield the same punitive award as following Murphy’s 

extrapolation of ratios, because it just so happens that the Harrison court, lacking data on Sudan’s terrorism 

spending, opted simply to multiply compensatory damages by a factor of three (3) in calculating punitive damages. 

See Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 50–51. But this is mere happenstance: Even if the Harrison court had applied the 

Flatow method by multiplying Sudan’s terrorism spending by a multiplier, Murphy would still instruct this Court to 

extrapolate the punitive-compensatory ratio from the resulting figures. In fact, the Murphy court did precisely this 

vis-à-vis Valore. The Valore court had multiplied Iran’s terrorism spending ($200 million) by a multiplier of five 

(5) to calculate a total punitive award of $1 billion, which the Murphy court then divided by total compensatory 

damages to obtain the average punitive-compensatory ratio of 3.44. See Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 82–83; Valore, 

700 F. Supp. 2d at 89.

 
5. Plaintiff E Brother $3,125,000 3 : 1 $9,375,000

V. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment Upon Evidentiary 

Hearing Against Iranian and Sudanese Defendants [#29] will be granted. Furthermore, final 

judgment will be entered against the defendants, jointly and severally, in the amounts set forth 

above, along with post-judgment interest at the statutory rate, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).39

Dated: March 31, 2015 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge

39 See Lanny J. Davis & Associates LLC v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2013) 

(allowing post-judgment interest against a foreign sovereign under the FSIA).