NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONGFANG WANG, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-72237 

Agency No. A099-896-713 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 11, 2020**

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, COOK,***and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.

Rongfang Wang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, 

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision 

affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Deborah L. Cook, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 24 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. We have 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

determination. We uphold an adverse credibility determination so long as at least 

one ground is supported by substantial evidence. Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 

1087 (9th Cir. 2011). The agency must “provide specific and cogent reasons in 

support of an adverse credibility determination” and must consider “the 

petitioner’s explanation” along with “other record evidence that sheds light on 

whether there is in fact an inconsistency at all.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 

1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 917 (9th 

Cir. 2009)). 

Wang testified that she feared for her safety if she returned to China because 

she had been targeted by the police for organizing protests against the government 

after her home was demolished. But the BIA properly noted a meaningful 

inconsistency between Wang’s testimony and her supporting documentation: many 

of the documents she submitted, including her household registration and ID card, 

identified her old home as her address even after the date she claims her home was 

demolished. This discrepancy is not trivial but instead goes to the heart of Wang’s 

asylum claim. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1046–47 (explaining that inconsistency at 

the heart of a claim carries great weight). Wang was given an opportunity to 
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explain this inconsistency, see Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2014), 

and attempted to do so by testifying that the nature and costs of the household 

registration system prevented her address from being changed within the system

unless she took certain actions, such as purchasing property or paying to get the 

address changed. Because Wang’s explanation was unsupported by the record, the 

IJ requested additional corroboration, such as background evidence or laws 

regarding the registration system. See Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (explaining that the IJ is not required to accept even “plausible”

explanations unless the record compels otherwise).

The evidence Wang provided to corroborate her story does not compel the 

conclusion that Wang’s testimony was credible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

Wang did not submit any expert testimony, regulations, or other authority to 

support her description of the registration system. Instead, she offered a letter from

her husband, which simply repeated Wang’s story; copies of National ID cards for 

her husband and son that still listed the demolished address eight years later; and 

photos depicting either other homes or a new building with a similar but distinct 

address on the street where Wang’s home once existed. While some photos may 

depict a large building that encompasses Wang’s former address, no evidence in 

the record affirmatively corroborates that possibility. The agency considered this 

evidence, see Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044, and properly concluded that it did not
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compel the conclusion that Wang’s testimony was credible.

The BIA also properly relied on Wang’s omission from her asylum 

application of a serious injury she alleges was caused by persecution. Wang’s 

asylum application claims that she was kicked by police and fell to the ground, was 

arrested and tortured in detention, and describes her injuries in some detail. But at 

her asylum hearing, Wang testified to a serious injury omitted from her

application: that when she was knocked to the ground by police, she lost her front 

teeth and bled profusely. When asked to explain her omission, Wang said only 

that she had not been asked about that injury. Injuries from persecution are not 

mere details, and “[i]t was not unreasonable for the [agency] to be suspicious as to 

why” Wang only mentioned this injury for the first time at her hearing. Zamanov, 

649 F.3d at 974. Again, “the record does not compel the finding that the 

[agency’s] unwillingness to believe this explanation, in light of the importance of 

the omitted incident[] to [her] asylum claim, was erroneous.” Id.

Because Wang was the only witness in support of her asylum and 

withholding claims, her claims depended on her credibility. Because we conclude 

that the adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, 

the BIA properly dismissed her claims for asylum and denial of withholding of 

removal.

2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Wang’s CAT 
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claim. Wang’s CAT claim was based on the same testimony that the agency 

properly found not credible, and no other evidence in the record compels the 

conclusion that it is more likely than not that Wang would be tortured if she were 

removed to China. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048–49.

PETITION DENIED.