UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5094

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

EMMANUEL THAD EREME, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:02-cr-00478-PJM-2) 

Submitted: July 13, 2009 Decided: July 31, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Michael E. Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, 

for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, 

Deborah Johnston, Bryan E. Foreman, Christen A. Sproule, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Emmanuel Thad Ereme is serving 144 months in prison 

for conspiracy to dispense, distribute and possess with intent 

to distribute Schedule II controlled substances, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), as well as several counts of unlawfully 

dispensing various Schedule II controlled substances, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). On direct appeal, 

this court affirmed Ereme’s conviction and sentence, but 

dismissed his appeal of the district court’s preliminary 

forfeiture order. See United States v. Ereme, 2007 WL 1046887, 

*1 n.1 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2007) (Nos. 05-4263, 05-4327, 06-4575). 

 In this present appeal, Ereme challenges the district 

court’s order denying his motion to vacate the district court’s 

preliminary forfeiture order against him or, in the alternative, 

for an evidentiary hearing on the Government’s motion for a 

final forfeiture order. Ereme asserts that the district court 

erred when it relied on the mandate rule to deny his motion to 

vacate the preliminary forfeiture order because he contends that 

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter 

the order after final judgment was entered and, accordingly, his 

post-appeal challenge to the validity of that order was not 

foreclosed by the mandate rule. Because the preliminary 

forfeiture order was purportedly invalid, Ereme asserts that the 

district court’s final forfeiture order is also invalid. Ereme 

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also asserts that the district court erred when it ordered 

forfeiture of Ereme’s home without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing to determine what amounts, if any, were collected toward 

satisfying the forfeiture amount from his “co-defendants.” 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

 First, the district court correctly refrained from 

considering the validity of its preliminary forfeiture order on 

Ereme’s motion to vacate because Ereme had an opportunity to 

challenge that order on his direct appeal to this court, but 

waived any challenges he may have had. See United States v. 

Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the mandate 

rule “forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly 

decided by the appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by 

the district court but foregone on appeal.”). 

 “[T]he doctrine [of the law of the case] posits that 

when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should 

continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the 

same case.” United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th 

Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The 

law of the case must be applied: 

“in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in 

the trial court or on a later appeal . . . unless: 

(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially 

different evidence, (2) controlling authority has 

since made a contrary decision of law applicable to 

the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly 

erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” 

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Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Doe v. 

Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 464-66 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing mandate 

rule and its exceptions). Because Ereme’s claims do not fall 

within any of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine, he 

was foreclosed by his prior, unsuccessful appeal from litigating 

the validity of the preliminary forfeiture order on his 

subsequent motion to vacate. 

 We reject Ereme’s suggestion that the district court’s 

failure to strictly follow Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 divested it of 

subject matter jurisdiction to issue the preliminary forfeiture 

order after entering final judgment. Ereme does not allege that 

he was unaware at the time he was sentenced that a forfeiture 

order would be filed against him. To the contrary, the 

Government’s indictment explicitly included forfeiture 

allegations and referenced Ereme’s home as a possible substitute 

asset. Moreover, a bifurcated jury proceeding was held on the 

forfeiture issue and the jury returned a verdict specifically 

assessing the forfeiture amount. It was Ereme’s own objection 

to the Government’s proposed entry of a preliminary forfeiture 

order that caused the district court to forego including the 

jury’s forfeiture verdict in its final judgment. Accordingly, 

we find that the district court’s entry of its preliminary 

forfeiture order, only ten days after entry of judgment, was not 

jurisdictionally flawed. Rather, it constituted merely a brief 

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technical delay, brought about by and insisted upon by Ereme 

himself. See United States v. Koch, 491 F.3d 929, 931-32 (8th 

Cir. 2007) United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 13-15 (1st 

Cir. 2005); United States v. Loe, 248 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 

2001). 

 We also find that the district court did not err in 

denying Ereme’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the 

Government’s motion for a final forfeiture order to determine 

what amounts, if any, had been collected from his “codefendants” toward satisfaction of the forfeiture amount. Ereme 

was the sole defendant named in the indictment and the 

preliminary forfeiture order was entered only against him. 

Since no other order exists declaring that any other individual 

was in any way responsible for payment of the forfeiture amount, 

Ereme is solely and individually responsible for the entire 

settlement of that order.∗

 The cases relied upon by Ereme to 

support his argument are not to the contrary. See United 

States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 765 (3d Cir. 1999) (interpreting 

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006)’s forfeiture requirement as 

 ∗

 No forfeiture orders were filed in any of Ereme’s coconspirators’ separate actions. See United States v. Wheatley, 

8:02-cr-478-PJM-1 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2005); United States v.

Jackson, 8:02-cr-478-PJM-3 (D. Md. May 25, 2006); and United 

States v. Jackson, 8:02-cr-478-PJM-4 (D. Md. March 29, 2005). 

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imposing a rule of joint and several liability and applying it 

to two individuals who “were both convicted as coconspirators”) 

(emphasis added); United States v. Saccoccia, 62 F. Supp. 2d 

539, 542 (D.R.I. 1999) (holding that the amount the defendant 

must forfeit “must be reduced by amounts already forfeited by 

his co-defendants pursuant to the forfeiture judgments entered 

against them in this case”) (emphasis added). 

 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

orders. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED