### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 20

- 00088

- CV

Barbara Burgess , Appellant

v.
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company , Appellee

FROM THE 368TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 19

- 0925

- C368 , THE HONORABLE RICK J. K E NNON , JUDGE PRESIDING

O P I N I O N

Appellan t Barbara Burgess s ued her un insured / underinsured moto rist ( UIM )

insurer, Allstate Fire and Ca sualty Insurance Company
, for common law bad faith and violations

of the Insurance Cod e arising from Allstate ’ s ha ndling of her claim for U IM benef its

. Allstate
moved for summary judgment
, asserting that it could not be liable on Burgess ’ s extracontractual

cl aims as a matter of law because it promptl y paid UI M ben e fits after Burgess ob tained a
judgmen t est ablishi ng t hat A llstate was contractually ob ligated to pay

. After the trial court
granted Allstat e ’ s summary judgment and dismissed Burgess ’ s claims, she appealed to this

Court. Because Al lsta te ’ s co mpliance wit h its contr actu al o bligation to pay UIM b enefits d oe s
not preclude Burgess from maintainting her extrac ontractual claims and b ecause Burgess has
sufficiently alleged a n in jury for which she could , if proven, recover da mages , we reverse the

trial court ’ s gr ant of summa ry judgment and remand for further proce ed ings.2 B A CKGROUND

An insurance policy i s a contract that est ablishes the respective rights and
obligations to which an insurer and its insure d have mutually agreed. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v.

Menchaca
, 54 5 S.W.3d 479, 488 (Tex. 2018) (citin g RSUI Indem

. Co. v

. The Lynd Co

. ,
466 S.W.3d 113, 118 ( Tex. 2 015) )

. To protect responsible motori sts from financial loss caused

b y uninsured and underinsured drivers
, Texas law requires automobile insurers to include UIM
coverage in their policies unless their insured reje ct s that c o verage in writing. Tex. I n s

. Co de

§ 195 2.101

. A UIM insurance contract provides policy benefits to the insu r ed for amounts that

he or she is legally entitled to r e cover as damages from owners an d o p erators of un insured or

un derinsured mot or ve hi cles be c ause of bodily inju ry or pr operty damage

. See id. § 1952. 1 06

.

“ [A] UIM contr act is unli ke many first

- par t y insurance contracts bec a u se ,

a c c o r d i n g t o i t s t e r m s , b en efi ts are condi tion ed upon the insure d ’ s legal en titlement to rec eive
damag es f

r om a t h ird party. ” In re A merican Nat ’ l Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.
, 38 4 S.W.3d 429, 437

(Tex. A pp.

— Austin 2012 , orig. pro ceeding)

. Th erefore, t o establ is h an i n s ure r ’ s contr actual
obligation to pay UI M b enefits
, the insured mus t obtai n legal determination s as t o the t hi rd

- pa rty ’ s

li a bility an d un deri nsured status

. 1 B rainard v. Trinity Univ ersal Life I n s

. Co.
, 216 S.W.3d 809
,
81 8 (Tex. 2006 )

.

In a ddition to an in su rer ’ s contrac tual obligatio ns , the common law and the Texas

I nsurance Code im pos e extr acont ract u a l du ti es on insu rers related to the ha ndling and proce ssing

of insuranc e cl aims. Under the common law, an insurance company owes a duty of good faith

1 For cla rit y, thr ough o ut this o p ini o n , we wi ll som etimes re fer to a suit to est abli s h a UIM insurer ’ s co ntractua l oblig ation to pay policy ben efits , i.e

. , t o obtain lega l determina t ion s as to the thi r d

- party ’ s li a bilit y an d u n der insured sta tus , as a “ cover age suit ” an d to t he re sulting j u dgm e n t as a “ c ove rage ju d gment ” or a “ judgment est abl is hing cove rage

. ”3

and fai r dea ling to its insur ed in its ha ndling and processing of a c laim for b enefi ts. Arnol d v.

Nati o nal Cnt

y. Mut. Fire In s. Co. , 725 S.W.2 d 165, 1 67 (Tex. 1987 )

. Similarly, an insurer may

be liab le to its insured for unfair settlement practices under Chapter 541 of th e I nsurance Code

.
S ee Tex

. Ins. Code § 5 41. 060 (p r ohibiting insur ers from engagin g i n unfair settlement pr a ctices)

.
As rele vant here
, a n insurer violates Chapter 541 by (1) misr eprese nting a ma terial fact or p olicy
provision rela ting t o coverage at issue; ( 2 ) failing to atte mpt in g ood faith to effect uate a prompt,

fai r , and equ itable s e ttl ement of a cla im with respect t o wh ic h the insur er ’ s liability has become
reasonably clear; ( 3 ) re fu si ng to pay a claim wit h out c ondu cting a reaso nable investigation w ith

r e spect to the cla im ; and ( 4 ) faili ng to promptly prov ide a reasonable e x plana ti on of th e basis in

the policy, in r elat ion to the facts or applica ble law, for the insurer ’ s denial of a claim or offer

of a c omp romise settl ement of a claim. See i d. § 5 41. 060
, ( a)(1)
, (2) (A)
, (3), (7) ; se e also

id. § § 541

. 151 , .15 2 (private rig ht of act ion f o r dam ages ); Tex. Bus. & Com C ode § 17 .50

( providing that consumer may maintain DTPA action for act or practice violating of
Chapter 54 1, Insurance Code).

In August 2014
, Burgess was i njur ed when her a utom o bile was str uck by another

driv er. Burgess la te r f

iled a coverage suit against All state , seeking a declaration as to her l e ga l

entitle ment to her UIM policy benefits

. Se e Allstate I n s. Co . v. Ir

win , 6 27 S .W

. 3d 263, 265 (Tex.

2021 ) ( “ If not otherwise dete rmined , however
, a j udg ment e sta blis hing th ese p rer eq u isit es to
[UIM] coverage may be obt ained i n a direct action agains t the i nsurance carri er

. ” )

. While that

suit was pen ding
, Burgess settled her claim w ith the othe r driver for his $10 0 ,000 poli c y limit4

and the n, in S eptember 201 8, demanded t ha t All st at e pay her UIM po licy l i mi t of $50,000

.
Allstate refused Burgess ’ s d emand without making a counter offer

. 2

In March 201 9, Burg e ss ’ s co v erage suit against A lls tate p roc e eded to a jury trial

.
At the conclusion
, the j u ry retu rned a v er dict f inding that the ot h e r driver wa s a t fau lt for the

ac cident and that Burge ss was entitled to $386,008 in compensat ory damages

. S pecifically, th e
jury a warded B urg ess $7 5,000 for pas t p h ysical pain and $311,00 9 f or future m e dic al

- care

expenses

. On March 27, 20 19, con s iste nt with the ju ry ’ s ver dict, the trial court sig ned a final
judgmen t decla r ing that Burgess was entitl e d to UIM bene fits in the amo un t of $50,000. After

t he jur y ’ s verdict but be f ore the trial court signed the judgment
, Allst ate pai d Burgess her
$50,0 0 0 UI M policy limit plus acc rued inter est.

In June 2019
, Bu rges s f i led the suit underlying this appea l . In her pe tition,
Burgess asser ts a va riety o f extracontractual cla im s stemm i ng from Allstate ’ s denia l o f her claim

and wi thholding of UI M benef its un t i l t he trial court signed the judgment establishing coverag e.
Specifically, Burgess claims that All state breach ed the common

- law duty of good fait h a n d f air
dealing and engaged in certain u nf air settlement practices set forth in Cha pter 54 1. I n Burgess ’ s

view , if Allsta te had properly handled her clai m , in good faith and in com pl iance with Chapter

541
, it would have settled her UIM claim for polic y limits without th e nec essit y of a tri a l

.

A llst a t e fi l ed a t raditional m otion for summary judgment
, in whic h it asserted th at

it was n ot liable on Bu rgess ’ s clai ms as a m atter of law

. Specifically, Al lstate argued that

because it timely paid the UIM bene fits a ft er Burge ss o btained a co verage j udg ment , “ t he re has

be en no b re ach of con t ract as a m at ter of la w an d, as a r es ult, th ere are no fac ts t o support

2 A llstate ’ s s ummary

-

ju dgment evidence shows that in August 2017, it offered Bur gess $500 to settle her claim for UIM benefits

. The re is no dispute, however, that i t r efus ed Bur gess ’ s S ept ember 2018 d e mand.5

liab il ity for any extra

- contractu al claims

. ” Allstate also argue d that its l iability did not b e come

“ reason ably clear ” until the t rial cou r t si g n e d the c ov erage j udgment and that it “ did not re fu se to

pay [Bur gess ’ s] pol icy benefits without con ducting a reas onable inves tig ation because the trial of
Burg ess ’ s UIM claim a t wh ich it w as legal l y d ete rmined who was at fault and the a mount of

dama g e s w a s the invest iga tion. ”

The trial court g ranted Allstat e ’ s mot i on for summ ary judgment and d ismissed al l

of Burge ss ’ s c laims with pre judice . This appeal followed.

ST AN DARD OF REVIEW
To prevail on a traditio n al su mmar y

- jud g ment m o tion, the movan t m us t

d emonstrate that ther e are no genuine i ss ues of material f act a nd t hat it is entitled to judgment

a s a ma t t er of law. Te x . R. Civ. P. 166 a ( c) ; Provident Life & Acc ide nt Ins. Co. v. K nott ,
128 S.W.3d 211, 215

- 1 6 (Te x. 2 00 3). W hen t he mo v ant satis fi e s thi s initial s ummary

- ju dgment

burden, the b urden shifts to t he nonm o vant to pr odu ce eviden ce raising an i ssu e of fa ct. S ee Tex.

R. C iv. P. 166a(c). We review a trial court ’ s ru l ing on a motion for summary judg men t de nov o.

Ta rr v. Timberwood Park O wn ers Ass ’ n , 556 S. W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018).

D ISCUSS ION

The primary l egal ques tio n presented by Allst ate ’ s motion for sum m ary j udgmen t ,
and no w befo r e this Court o n appeal, is whe ther a n insured can main tain extracont ra ctual cla i m s

for comm on

- l a w bad f

a ith and for un fai r settlem ent practices unde r Chap ter 541 when those

c la ims a re b ased on an insure r ’ s with holding of UIM bene fits until the insure d obtains a6

judgment esta blishing coverage

. 3 Allstate c o nt ends tha t the Tex as Su pr eme Co ur t ’s d ec isio n in

B raina rd v. Trinity Universal Insuranc e C o. , 2 16 S.W.3 d at 8 16

- 18, i s dis po sitiv e o f this issue

a n d establ ishes tha t such claims cannot
, as a matter of law
, b e m aintai ned.

In Br aina rd , the Texas Supreme Co urt cons idered wh ether the insur ed
, w ho ha d

succ e ssful ly established h is rig h t to UIM benefits in a covera ge s uit , could r e c over atto rney ’ s

fe es a g ainst his insurer under Ch apter 38 of the T exas Civil Pra ctice and R emedies Code. Id.

at 817 ; s ee Tex. Ci v

. Prac . & R em. Code § § 3 8 .00 1

- .00 2

. Th e cour t ’ s re solut ion of th at is su e

turn ed on whether th e in sured, B ra inard, had “ p res en ted ” his claim for UI M benefits , as r equired

3 In her f

irst amended pe tition
, B urgess c l aim ed that Al lst ate vi olat e d prompt

- p ay ment provisions in Ch apter 54 2 of t he I nsurance Code by ( 1 ) fail ing to no ti f y her of it s ac c ep t a nce o r rejection of her cla im within fift een days and (2) delay ing pay men t of her claim for more t han sixty days. See Te x. Ins. Code § § 54 2.0 5 6 (notice of ac ce ptance o r rejection o f cla im), .0 58 ( delay in pa yment of c laim)

. In her ap p ellate brie f ing
, h o w ever, B urgess does not dis cus s her Chapte r 542 claims
, alt hough she sp eci fica lly asserts that she is entitled to ma in tain her extraco n trac tual claims brought under C hapter 54 1 and t he c ommon

- la w dut y of good f aith and fa ir de aling

. Moreover
, Bu rge s s concedes in her brief that unlik e Chapter 5 41, the “ Prompt Pay Act [Chapter 542] a l lows a n in sur er to with hold payment of ben e fits unt il l egal en titlement has been est ablished. ” S ee Sta t e Far m M ut . Au to Ass ’ n v . Co ok
, 591 S.W.3d 677
, 684 (Tex. App.

— Sa n A n toni o 20 19, no pet. ) ( “ When an insu rer promp t l y pays a UM/UIM c laim after t h e d ate the tr ial court ent ers such a ju dgment [es tabli shin g the l ia bility and uninsured status o f the o ther moto ris t], the insurer does not vi olate the [Insurance] Cod e ’ s prom pt payment provision s. ” ) (citing Mid

- Century Ins. C o. v. Daniel
, 22 3 S.W.3d 586, 589

- 90 (Tex

. App

. — Amarillo 2 007, pet. d enied ) ) ; M

e nix v . Al lstate Indem. Co. , 83 S.W.3d 8 77, 885 ( T ex. A pp.

— Eastl and 2002, pet. den ied)

.
Alth ough an appe llant ma y r ai s e a n iss ue that generally contends that t he t rial court er red in rendering summary judg me nt, t he ap pe llan t must present arg ument a nd suppo rtin g autho rities in support of t hat issue

. See T ex. R . A pp. P. 38.1( i). W e can not co nclude that Burgess ’ s appellat e brie fin g “ fairly include [ s] ” a challenge to the trial cou rt ’ s dismissal of her Chapter 5 42

c l a ims

. See id. R. 38 .1(f) ( requi ring cou rts to trea t th e statement of iss ue “ as co v er ing ev ery sub sid iary question t hat i s fair ly included ” ). Consequen tly, Burg ess has waived any arg ument tha t the trial court erred in g rant ing summary j udgme nt a s t o cla im s bro ug ht u nder Chap ter 5 4 2

. See Ross v. St. Luke ’ s E

piscop al Hosp ., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015) ( “ Failure to provide citations or argument and analysis as to an appellate issue may waive it. ” )

.7

by Chapter 38

. 4 Brainard
, 216 S.W. 3d at 818. I n concluding that Brainard had n ot pre s ented his

claim, t he S u pr e me C ourt explaine d t hat a UI M in s u rer is c o nt ractually obl iga ted to p ay onl y

tho s e damages which t he i n sur e d is “ legal ly entitled to recover ” a nd t hat, consequently
, an

insur er ’ s cont r actual duty to pay U IM be n efit s does not arise “ unt i l the insur ed o b t ai n s a
judgm ent esta bli shi ng li abil it y and un d erinsured statu s of t he o t h er mo t oris t

. ” Id

. “ Ne ith er

requ esti ng UIM benefits nor filing s uit against the insur er triggers a contr actual duty to pay. ” Id

.
Thus , f or p urposes of rec o ve rin g attor ne y ’ s f e es under Chapter 38, a claim fo r U IM benef i ts i s

“ no t pres e n ted until the trial c o urt signs a judgment e sta b lish ing the neglige nce and underinsur ed

s tatus of the othe r m ot orist. ” Id

. Because his UI M insur er had timely paid benefits after the

tria l cour t si gned the judgment establis hi n g cov erage , B r aina rd w a s not e nti tled to recov er his

attorney ’ s fees unde r C h apte r 3 8. Id. at 819.

Allstate argu es that under the Texas Supreme Co urt ’s holding i n B rai nard
, it was

under no contra ctu al ob ligation t o p a y B ur gess any benefits befo r e sh e obtained a ju dg ment

es ta blis h i ng t h e l ia b i lity and u nde rinsured statu s of the other mot orist ; that once Bu rgess

obtained this coverage judgme nt , it promp t ly paid U IM policy limits ; and con sequently
, that

“ there is no brea ch of cont ra c t ” and , by exte n s i on , Burgess “ c annot maintai n common law o r

sta t u tory bad faith claim s based o n [Al lstat e ’ s] f ailure to pay benefit s ear lie r than it d id

. ” In

other words, Allstate contends tha t Burgess ’ s cla ims fail as a matter of law because
, in its vi e w,

4 Chap ter 3 8 perm i ts an insured to r e cover attorn e y ’ s f e es in a su c c es sf

ul brea ch

- o f

c ont ract s u it again st t he insu rer “ unless attorney ’ s fees are ot he r w ise a v ai l abl e

. ” Grapevi ne Excav a ti on , Inc. v. Ma rylan d Lloyds , 35 S.W.3 d 1 , 5 (Te x . 20 0 0) ; Tex. Civ. Pra c. & Rem

. Code § 3 8.00 1 ( “ A pe rson may re cover r e a so n a bl e attorn e y ’ s f ees fro m an in div idual o r corp or at io n, in

a ddi tion to the amou nt of a vali d c la im and c os t s, i f the claim i s for

. . . .(8) an ora l or written contract

. ” )

. To re cover attorney ’ s fees un der Chapt er 38
, th e cl a imant m ust s how th at he w as
r e p re s ented b y co unse l and pre s ent ed the cl ai m and th e “ just amount owed ” was not p aid w ithi n t hirt y day s of pr esent ment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 3 8

. 00 2.8

it had no duty to i nvesti gat e or att empt t o s ettle her UIM claim until she obtained a covera ge
ju dgmen t , and because it immediately paid the judgment

. Th us, Alls tat e ’ s reli ance on Braina rd

is ba sed on its assumptio n t h a t a UIM carri e r ’ s ex tra contractua l ob ligations to its ins ure d

attach when
, but no t be fore, its contr actual obl igat ion to p ay the in su red i s es tablished

. That
assumption , however, c on flicts with the Te xas Supreme Court ’s pri o r op inion in Arn o l d v.

N ation a l C o u nty Mu t u al Fire Ins ur a nce Co

. , 725 S.W.2 d at 167

- 68 , a case with a pr oc edural

posture similar to t hat presented here

.

In A rnold , th e insured made a deman d fo r p a ym ent from his UIM ins urer for
policy li mits aft er he was in jured on his m otor cy cl e by an uninsured mo t orist

. Id. at 166

.
Altho ugh t he uni n sur ed motori st had ad mit te d his fault and an ind ependent ins uran c e a dju s ti n g

firm had r ecom men ded tha t t he in surer p ay the entire policy limit , t he insu rer d enied A rnold ’ s

clai m for UIM ben ef

its

. Id. Arnol d subs equ entl y sued and ob taine d a ju d gmen t ag ainst b ot h the

u ni nsu red m oto rist and his insurer for $17, 9 75

. Id

. T h e insu r er then pa id Arn o ld the $10,000

UIM po li cy limit

. Id.

A rnold f ile d suit a g a inst h is UI M i ns ura nce carri er for fail ing to handle his UIM

cla im in goo d fa ith. I

d. After t he tr i al co u rt gra nted sum m ary judgm en t i n favor of the insurer
, Arnold appeal ed

. Id. at 1 68. On review, the Texas Su p r eme Co u rt r e ver sed the tri a l co ur t ’ s

summary judgm en t , recog nizing that

[i ] n the insu rance c ontext a spec ial relationship a rises ou t o f the p arties ’ uneq u al ba r ga i n ing po w er a nd the n a tu re of i nsurance contracts whi ch would a l low

un sc r u p ulo us i nsure r s to take ad va nt a g e of their ins ur eds ’ m is for tunes in b arg aining f

or settleme n t or resoluti on of c laims. In a ddition , without s u ch a
cause o f acti on insu rers c an ar b it r a rily de n y c overage a nd de lay p ayment of a claim wit h no more p enal ty th a n in ter e st on the amount owed

.

Id

. at 167. The c ou rt hel d :9

A cause of action fo r b reach of th e d uty of good faith and fair de aling is state d when it is alle ged tha t the re is no reasona b l e b as i s for den ia l o f a c laim or d elay in payment o r a fai lure on t h e p art of th e insu rer to de term in e whether th ere is a ny
reas onab le b asi s for th e den ial o r de la y

.

I d

.
In short, t he Texas S up re me Cour t in Arnold recognize d the ex istence of

e xtra co ntr a ct ual dut ies of goo d faith and fai r dealing a r i si ng from an i nsu rer ’ s h andling of a U IM

cl aim

— a claim that had been de nied by the insu rer before the i nsured ob t ai n e d a judgment

es tablishing coverage. See i d. at 166. Subsequen tly, in Bra inard , t he Tex as S uprem e Court

clarified that an insure d ’ s contra c t ual obliga t ion to pa y UIM benefits does not arise until t he

insured o bta ins a judgmen t establishing c ove rag e

. 21 6 S.W.3d at 818. The court in Br ainard

d id no t, ho weve r, ho l d that an insu r er ’ s ex tra co n t ra ctu al d u t ie s arise whe n, but not before
, the

in sure r ’ s contr a c tual d uty to pa y a rises

. See id. at 817

- 1 9. I n fa ct , the Brainar d c ou r t did not

mention A rnold no r dis cus s the impa ct of its dec is ion on Brai n ard ’ s e xtr a co ntr actua l claim s ,
wh ich h ad be e n se vered fro m his cov e ra ge suit and rema ine d p ending

. S ee id. at 8 11, 817

- 1 9. I n

the context of insu rance dispute s , it is well esta blished that e xtracontra ctual cl a i ms , wh ich soun d

in tort, ar e by their nat ure dist i nct a nd i n dep end e nt from c ove rage claims, which establish the

insured ’ s contractual liability

. Men ch ac a , 5 45 S.W. 3 d at 4 8 9 ( “ A n insured ’ s claim for breach o f

an insura nc e co ntract is ‘ distinct ’ a nd ‘ inde p e nden t ’ from claims that the in surer violated its

extra

- contractual common

- law and st atutory d uties. ” ) ( citi n g Li berty Nat ’ l Fi re In s . Co. v. Ak in
,
927 S. W. 2 d 62 7, 62 9 (Tex. 1996) ( “ In surance coverage cl aim s and bad fai th c la i ms ar e by their

natur e inde p e n d ent

. ” ) ) ; In re A ll s tat e Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.
, 447 S.W.3 d 497
, 50 0 (Tex. App.

—

H ouston [ 1st Dis t.] 2014, orig. proc eeding) ( “ Uninsured mot orist clai ms an d bad fait h cl a i ms
have been recognized as sepa rate an d d ist inct cau ses of actio n which mig ht ea ch const i t ute a10

complete laws ui t wi thin it self. ” ); In re America n Nat ’ l C n ty. M ut. In s

. Co.
, 3 84 S.W

. 3d at 433

( “ [I]t is well establish e d that extra

- contra ctual cla i m s, s uch a s b ad faith claims, and contract

cla ims relate d t o insura nce co verage are by their na ture, in d e pe nd en t claims that a re s u bject to

se verance. ” )

. Consequently
, we do not construe the court ’ s holding in B r ain ard a s expr essly or
implicit ly a broga t in g Arn old w ith respect to w he ther extraco ntr actua l d uties in UIM cla ims
handling may attach prio r to the in sur ed ’ s obtaining a co verag e judgment

. Allsta t e ’ s relian ce on

Brainard is m isplaced.

I n add ition, Allstate ’ s position that extracontrac tual duties canno t att a ch bef ore a

co ver a ge jud gment is ob t ained is incon s ist ent with op inions from th e Tex as S up reme Cou rt, this

Co urt , a nd ot h er cour ts of a p pe al s, recogni z ing that i n the co ntext of UIM d i sputes , tri al court s

s houl d ge nerally sever and a bate extrac o ntrac tual c laims pen d i ng re s o lution of an insu r ed ’ s

co ve ra ge c lai m

. See In re State F a rm Mut

. Auto. I

n s. Co.
, 629 S.W.3d 866
, 877

– 78 (Tex. 2021)
(orig. p roceeding) ( d irecting trial court to order bi furcate d trial s o n issues of cov er age and

statuto ry claim s ) ; I

n re A mer ican N

at ’ l C n t y. Mut. I n s

. Co.
, 3 8 4 S.W.3d at 4 38 ( directin g trial

cou rt to se ver and abate insured ’ s ext r acontractual c l aims pendi ng determination on coverage ) ;

see also In re Alls tate F ir e & Ca s

. I n s. Co

. , No. 12

- 17

- 0 0266

- CV, 2017 Te x. App. L EX I S

1042 8, a t *4 (Tex. App.

— Tyl e r No v. 8, 2 017, orig

. proc eedi ng) ( mem. op.) ( concluding that

“ e xtra

- contr actu al claims mu st be sev e r ed a nd a bated un ti l th e [UIM ] breach of contract claim is

determin ed ” ) ; In re Pro gre s s ive Cn t y

. Mut

. I n s. Co. , 43 9 S.W.3 d 42 2 , 426 (Tex

. Ap p.

— Hou ston

[ 1st Dist.] 2015 , orig. pr oceed ing) (same)

. Th e rationale for the se de cisions , at le as t i n par t, i s

t hat a n i nsurer general ly ca n n ot b e lia bl e on bad faith claims aris ing f rom its denial o r failure to

inve stigate c lai ms that i t h as no d uty to pay , a nd that, a s a res ult, an insure d ’ s ext ra co ntra ct u al

clai ms “ may b e ren dered moo t by a det er min a t ion of underlying [ non

- ] li a bili t y ” on the cove rage11

claim

. In re St ate F

a rm Mut. Au to

. Ins

. Co.
, 629 S.W.3d at 87 6 ( qu otin g In re Allst a te Fire &

Ca s . I ns. C o. , 2 017 T ex

. App. LEXI S 10 428, at *4 ) ; I n re Ame r ican N

at ’ l C n t y

. Mut. I n s. C o. ,
38 4 S.W.3d at 438 ( explaining that insured ’ s extracontractual claims c oul d be ren d ered moot

upon d eterm ination t hat insurer was not contractually obliga t e d to pay UI M c laim )

. I n o t he r

wo rd s, a l eg al d e ter min a tion that a n i nsured is no t con tractu ally entitled to UIM policy benefits

g enerally bars the i nsured from p roceeding o n any extraco ntractual claims. T h erefo re , as a
procedural matter, a sever ance an d abat e men t of t he e x traco ntrac tual c laims p rotects the i n surer

from h a v i ng to “ un d e rgo t he exp en se of litiga ting and conducting dis cover y that u lt imately may

be unn e cessary

. ” In re State F a rm Mut. Au t o

. Ins

. Co.
, 629 S.W .3d at 877 (q uoting In re

Col onial Cnt

y . Mut. I ns

. Co

. , No

. 01

- 1 9

- 0 03 9 1

- CV, 2019 Tex. App

. LEXIS 9649
, a t * 12 (T ex.

A pp.

— H ouston [ 1st Dist.] Nov. 5 , 2019, orig. proceedin g) ( mem. o p.) ) ; see a lso In r e Ge rmania

Ins. Co.
, No. 13

- 18

- 00102

- CV , 2018 T ex . App. LEX IS 2834, at * 11 (Tex. Ap p.

— Corpu s

Christ i

- E d inbur g Apr. 23
, 2018
, o rig . p roceedin g) (mem. op.) ( requiri n g t rial court t o s e ver an d

a b ate extracontractual claims and explaining that “ [i ]f the c auses were not sever ed, Ger ma nia
would be requ ired to pu t forth t he e ffort an d expense [o f litiga t ing] bad f aith a nd other e xtra

co ntr act ual claim s that could be re nde r e d m oot by the p o r t i on of t he trial relating to breach of

contract for [UIM ] bene fits ” ).

Con t rar y to Alls ta t e ’ s su ggestion, t hese sev erance

- and

- abate ment ca ses do no t
stand for the pr oposition that a UIM insu re d ca n not , a s a matte r of law, maintain ex t rac o nt ractual

c l aim s b as ed o n conduct in the handling of a UIM claim that occurs before the insured obtains a

cove rage judgment

. In fact
, the se c ases re cognize that once the insure d esta blishes that t he UIM

insu rer is co ntr a ctua l l y ob l igated to p ay b en ef its
, the i nsur ed m ay then proc eed to li tiga t e her

e xtra contractual c l aim s

. In re State F a rm Mut. Au to

. Ins

. Co.
, 629 S.W.3d at 87 0 ( “A plai ntiff12

w ho su cce eds in [the ] first phase of the c as e may then proc ee d to litig a t e it s I ns u r ance Code

c laim s in ligh t of the resu lts o f the initial t rial. ” ) ; se e al so I n re State F

arm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co.
, 6 14 S. W.3d 316, 329 (Tex. Ap p.

— Fort Wo rth 2020, orig. proceeding) (explaini ng that

“ [ i] mpl icit in the se [ severance and a batement] d ecisi ons

. . . is a r easonabl e inference that th e

ins ure r ’ s han dling a nd adjustment o f a claim for U M/U IM bene fit s may, in fact
, be com e

actionable , and such discovery permissible, if th e insured obtains a j ud gm ent es tablishing the

l iabi lity of t he unins ur e d or under in sure d m o torist and damages resulti ng th er eby in the
underlying direct ac t ion ” )

. In con t rast, u nder A l lstate ’ s vi e w , there would b e no ext ra c o ntractual

c laim s to sever and abate in these cas es becau se , at that poin t in the litigati o n , the issu e of

c overage has not been legally determined.

In su ppo rt of its argument , Allstate a lso cites a fe deral case, W ei r v. Twi n Ci ty

Fire I n s urance Co

. , for the p roposition that it cannot be liable for failing to conduct a reason able

investi gatio n or to effe c tu ate a sett lement b ecause “ it would be impossible to as se ss l iability
without the jury ’ s input

. ” 622 F. Supp .2d 483, 486 (S.D. Tex. 2009). In Weir
, the federal

district court re lied on Brainard to hold th at the UI M insurer could not be “ gui lt y of not

p e r form ing a p r oper in vestigation of [ Weir ’ s] UIM claim be ca use it is the trial o f the UIM claim
,
at which it will be dete r mined who was at faul t and th e amount of damages, t hat constitutes the

investi gation. ” I

d. Si m ilarly, t h e court held tha t the UIM in s urer could n ot be li able “ for b ad

faith claim handling b ecause it denied or post poned paying Wei r ’ s clai m ” because “ until

th e c onditions prec edent to the exi stence of the duty to pay for coverage, there is no d uty to

pay. ” Id

. The court ’ s de ci sion in We i r is based o n a n int erpr etation and extension of the cou rt ’ s

hold ing in Brainard that
, as we have explain ed, is n ot supported by the relevant case law and

co n flicts with th e Texas Supreme C ourt ’ s decision in A r nold

. Consequen tly, we decl ine t o fo l low13

Wei r and similar cases t hat fail to recognize that a UIM carri e r ’ s ex tra contra ctua l ob ligations to

its i ns ure d may a ttach before its contr actual obl igat ion to p ay ben efits is es tablished

. 5

I nste ad, w e join those Texas co urts of app eals and feder al court s th a t ha v e

r e je c t e d the a rgument s advanced by Allstat e in this appeal. See , e. g. , Hamb urg er v. S t at e Fa rm

Mut. Auto Ins. Co ., 361 F.3d 875, 880

- 81 ( 5th Cir. 2004) ; Valdez v. Al lst ate Fi r e & Ca s. Ins. Co
.,
No. SA

- 2 1

- CV

- 00494

- X R, 2 021 U .S. Dist. L E XI S 181777, a t *14

- 15 (W. D. T ex. S e pt. 22,

2021) (order) ; James v. Allsta te Fire & Ca s. I n s. Co.
, 475 F. S upp. 3d 578, 585 (N.D. Tex

. 2020) ;

Accar do v. American First Lloyds Ins. Co. , No. H

- 11

- 0 008, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXI S 621 81,

at * 14 ( S.D. Tex

. M ay 3, 2012 ) ; In re Sta t e F ar m Mut. Auto. I

n s. Co. , 614 S. W.3d at 362 ; Sta te

Farm Mu t . Au to As s ’ n v. Coo k
, 591 S.W. 3d 67 7
, 683 (Tex. App

. — San Ant o nio 20 1 9, no. pet. ).

In Ham bu r

ger v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.
, the insur er a rgu ed that “ cove rage of

Ham burger ’ s UIM claim was n ot rea s on ably clear until the jury dete rmined th e extent of

Hamb urger ’ s damages caused by the ot her dr i ver ” and that
, as a result, “ no bad fait h li a bi l i ty

coul d attach for [the insurance carrier ’ s ] failure to s e ttle the c laim prior to [th a t determi na tion]. ”

361 F

. 3d at 880

- 8 1. The Fifth C ircu it reject ed this argument

. Id . at 881. The co urt obs erv ed t ha t

under Texas l aw , o n ce the j udgment agai nst t he i ns u rer i s signed, there are no longer any duties

of good f aith
, and th e le gal re lat ions hip between the in sured a n d insurer b e come s one of judgm ent

deb tor and creditor

. Id. at 880

- 81 (citin g Mid

- C ent ury I n s

. Co. v. Boyte
, 80 S.W.3d 546, 549

( T ex. 200 2 ) )

. T h e co u rt reasoned that if S tate F arm ’ s interpretation of “ rea sona b ly clear ” were
adopt ed
, “ insure d s such as Ham burger could never successfully assert a bad faith claim against

5 In Bryant v. Progress ive County Mutual Ins urance Co. , No. 0 5

- 17

- 01023

- CV, 2 0 18 Tex. App. LEXIS 10258, at * 14

- 21 (Tex. Ap p.

— Dallas Dec. 12, 2018
, no pet. ) (m em. o p.)
, our sister court relied on Brainard and Weir to conclu de that the insurer did not breach any obligation to ma ke a reasonable offer or to conduct a r easonable invest i gation becau se it h ad no dut y to do so until coverage was legally est ablished.14

his insu re r for failing to attempt a fair settlement of a UIM claim. ” Id. at 881

. As a res ult, t h e

c ourt d e clined to adop t that interpretation
, “ [ a ] bsen t a m or e cle a r indicatio n from Texas c ou rts

that liabi lity cannot be r easonabl y cl ear . . . until the i nsured is fo und in a le gal proceeding t o

be entitled t o rec over

. ” Id

. ; see also Woo d s v. Argon aut M idwes t I

n s. Co
., No. 6 : 1 5

- C V

- 13 9
,
2016 U.S. Dis t. LEXIS 192371, at *11 ( E.D. Tex. M ar . 1 8, 2016) (order) ( explaining that

Brainard does not cal l i nto questi on Hamburg er ’ s hol di ng be caus e Brainar d addresses “ legally

entitled to rec ov e r ” phr a se where a s Ham burge r focuses on “ re a sona bly c l e a r ” p hras e); see also

James

. , 475 F. Supp. 3d at 585 (expla ining tha t “ Brainard does not negate th e F if th Circuit ’ s

anal y sis in Hamb urger ” ). A lt hough Hamburger and other federal cases on this issue are no t

b i n d ing o n t hi s Court, we find their r eason ing persu asi v e

. See C oo k , 591 S.W.3d a t 6 83

(concl uding t hat Ham burger and subsequent federal cases provide “ the bet ter reason ed a nalysis ”

(citi ng Davenport v. Garcia , 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992) ( “ Texas should b orr ow fro m well

reasoned and persuas ive feder a l procedu ral and s ub s tantive preced ent when thi s is de emed

h e lpful

. . . . ” ) ) )

. We agree that if we were to adopt Allsta te ’ s v iew of Brain ard an d its

in t erpretat i on of the phrase “ re as o nabl y clear
, ” we would eff ec tively e l imin ate claims for

common

- law and statutory bad fai th for insur eds
, lik e Burgess
, who o btain a coverage judgment
against the ir insurer after the ir insure r denie s their claim fo r benefits.

The Texas Supreme Court has long r ec ognized t hat the re “ is a disparity o f
bargain ing power inherent in the insurer

- in sured relationshi p , ” Bo yte , 8 0 S .W .3 d at 54 8 , and that

“ insureds who encounter losses they believe to be cove red will often be particula r ly vulnerable to

an insurer ’ s arbit rary or unsc rupulou s conduct
, ” Univers a l Life I n s. Co. v. Giles , 950 S.W.2 d 48
, 53 ( Tex. 1997)

. As a re sult, w he n an in sure r u nreasonably or arbitrarily d enies a UIM claim
,
the insured may be inclined to drop o r settle the claim for much less than what sh e believes i s15

cover ed
, “ rather than suffer t he emotional a nd financ ial burden of lit igat [ing] ” the is sue of

cover age

. S ee id. To gu ard against t h e potential for abuse created by this dynamic
, w e ho ld that

an i nsurer ma y b e liab le for common

- law b ad faith and f or unfa i r s e t t l ement practices under

C h apter 541 of the Insurance Code whe n it d ela y s p ayment o n a claim fo r UIM b enefits until the

insured has ob t ained l e gal determinations a s to the lia bility a nd underin s ured s ta tus of the t h ir d

party motor ists. S ee A rnold , 7 25 S. W .2d a t 167

.

In reach ing this conclusion
, however, w e are not sug gesting that ever y den ial of a

claim prior to a determi nation of UIM co verage is tortious and actionable

. Prov iden t Am. Ins.

Co . v. C astaned a , 988 S.W.2d 189, 197 (Tex. 1 998 ) ( “ B ut not e v ery e rroneous denial of a c laim
subj e cts an insure r t o l iabilit y .

. . . ” ). “ Evidenc e that merel y shows a bon a fide dispute about the

insurer ’ s liabil ity on the contra ct does not ris e to the l eve l of b ad fait h. ” Transp ortation Ins. Co.

v . M oriel , 879 S. W .2 d

. 10, 18 (Tex. 1994). On the other hand, w hen a r e as o nable inves tiga tion

revea ls t hat a n ins u rer ’ s l iabilit y is reasonably clea r, an insure r may act in b ad faith by denyin g
or delayi ng the UIM claim and ins is ting tha t th e ins ured obtain a l egal d et erm inat io n as to

cov er ag e. In re Stat e F a r m Mut. Auto. I

n s. Co. , 61 4 S. W.3d at 3 62 (conc l uding that insure r

breach es duty of good faith and fair dealing by de nying or delaying UIM claim “ until aft er

rendition of a binding jud gment of liability and damages when it s liability was reasona bly cl ear

before the fi ling of the insure d ’ s direct actio n ” ) ; Accar do
, 2012 U .S. Dis t. LEXI S 62181, at * 14
(i nsurer may act in bad faith by “ delaying payment and insi s t ing that the insured litiga te liability
and damages before paying b enefits on a claim ” ) ; s ee also G iles , 950 S.W.2d at 56 (expla i ning

that wh ether l ia bility i s “reas o nably cle a r ” is generally question o f fact) ; Arnold , 725 S.W.2d

at 167 ( concluding that insur ed met summar y

- judgmen t bu rde n t o show that insurer “ h ad no

rea s onab l e basis f

o r its refus al to pay his [ UIM ] c laim an d with a ctual knowle dge o f th at, forc ed16

him t o a tr ial on the a ccident before it would pay th e claim ” )

. The t rial court erred t o the ex te nt it

concluded othe rwis e and granted sum mary judg me nt in favor of Al lstate on th is ground

.

In dependent I

n j ur y

O n appeal, A llstate also argu es that the r e is an additi o nal ground upon which we
may uphold the trial cou rt ’ s s ummary jud g ment

. See K n ott , 1 28 S.W.3d at 21 6 ( explai ning that
when trial court does not sp ec ify g ro un d s for gran ting s ummary judgme nt, appellate court must

affirm summary j udg ment “if any of the the ories presented to the trial cou rt and preserved for
appellate rev iew are me ritoriou s ” ). Allsta t e contends th at un der the facts presented in this c as e ,
B u rg e s s ’ s cl a ims fail a s a m a tter of l aw becau se she d id not lo se any policy benefits
, Al lstat e
having pro m ptly paid policy limit s once she obtained a coverage jud gment, an d be cau se Burgess

h as not “ ass e rt e d a cla im for an injury inde pendent o f her r ig ht to re ce ive p o l i c y bene fits. ”
Liberally cons t rued, Allstate ar g ues that B urges s ’ s claim s fa il a s a matter of law be cause she has
not alleged a n injury for which she may recov er dam a ges as a re sul t of Allst a te ’ s alle ge d failure

to pay benefits e ar lier th an it did

. I n re s p o n se, Burg e ss asserts that this iss ue has not been
adequa te ly p reserved for appell at e rev iew because Allstate did not r aise th is “ novel a rgum ent

at the tr ial court level o r i n its pre

- submis s i o n bri efin g , ” a nd that even if the issu e has b ee n
preserved
, Burges s has suf ficiently al leged that she has suf fered a reco ve ra b le injury

.
Summar y judgm ent s may only b e gr anted upon grounds ex pressly a sserted in the

summary

- judgme nt moti on

. G & H Towing C o

. v. Magee , 347 S.W.3d 293 , 297 (Tex. 20 1 1 ) ; se e

Tex. R. Civ . P. 1 66a (c )

. Consequently , we cannot affirm a summary judgmen t on grounds n ot

expr essly s et out in the su mmary

- j udgment motion. Henk el v. Norman , 441 S.W.3d 249, 2 51 n .1

(T e x. 2 014) (per curiam )

. H ere, Al lsta te e mphasiz es in its m ot i o n for summar y j udg m e nt t hat i t17

paid policy benefits prom ptly after Burgess obtain e d a judgment establi shing c overage

. Alls ta te

d oes not , however, discus s the conce pt of “ independent inju ry ” o r as sert that Burg e ss h a s faile d

to allege an in

jury f or which sh e coul d reco ver on h er ext rac on trac tual claims

. In other w o r d s ,
Allst ate ’ s m otio n for summar y judgme nt does not sp ecifically r aise t he issue of damages or the

l egal effect of its payme nt of th e cove rage judgment
, ot her than to su g gest that its paym e n t

a ffi rmativ ely de monstr a te s co mpl iance with any extraco ntr act u al d u t y that arose pos t judgment

.
Ne verthel ess , e v en a ssuming without deciding that t his alt ernative ground for gra nting summa r y
judgm en t was adeq uatel y p r ese rved b y Allstate in t h e trial c o ur t , we could not af firm th e tr ia l

cour t ’ s summary jud gment on th is gro u n d

.

In Menc h ac a , the Texa s S upreme Court r ec ognized two paths an in sured may tak e

to es tablish damages caused by an ins ur er ’ s vi o lation o f the In suran ce Code . In re S t ate Farm

Mut. A uto

. I

n s. Co
., 629 S.W.3d at 872

– 73 (discussing M enchaca
, 545 S.W.3d at 495

- 500)

. The

in su red mu st e sta blis h eit her (1 ) “ a rig ht to re c ei ve benefits u nder t h e policy ” or (2) “ an inju r y

i nd epend ent of a ri ght to benefi ts. ” Id. ( quoting Mench a ca , 545 S.W.3d at 500 )

. Un der th e first

p a th, if an insured “ es tablis h e s a right to receive benefit s un der the in su r ance pol icy
, [h e] can

recover thos e bene fi ts as ac t u al damag es under t he I nsu ranc e Code if the ins u re r ’ s s t atutory

vi o lat i on causes the loss of benefits. ” Id

. (quoting Mench a ca , 545 S.W.3d at 495)

. Under t he
second p a th
, “ i f an insurer ’ s s t a t utory vio lation caus es an i nju ry in depende nt of t he insure d ’ s

r ig ht to recover policy benef it s, the i n s ur ed may r ecove r d amage s f or that injury even if the

po licy do es not entitle the in sured to rec e ive benefits. ” Id

. (quoting Mench aca , 545 S.W.3d

at 4 99 )

. Becaus e these are the on ly pa th s to establishing damages
, “ [a] n insured cannot recover

any damages bas ed on an insurer ’ s st atut ory violation if the insured had no righ t to receive18

ben e fits und e r t h e policy and sustai ned no inju ry ind ependent of a rig ht to benefi ts. ” I d. (quoting

Mench a ca , 545 S.W.3d at 489 )

.

As to whether Burgess may proceed under the first p at h
, there is no dispute that

Bur gess h ad a “ right to receive b en efits under the policy ”

— t he coverag e judgm en t legally

esta b l ished th a t s he di d

. Thus, th e issu e is whe the r Bu rgess ha s received all the p olicy benef its

to whi ch s he was entitle d and thus no ben efits r emain t o be recovered. See O rtiz v . St ate F a rm

Llo yds , 589 S.W.3 d 12 7, 134 (T ex. 2019) (d iscus si ng Me nchaca and co ncludin g that e ve n if

insured had “ r ight to be n efi ts, ” onl y d amages sought wer e for polic y benefits
, “ and those benefits

have alrea dy b een pa id ” ) ; s ee also Park Bd. Ltd

. v. State Auto . Mut. I n s . Co. , N o . 4:1 8

- CV

- 38 2,

20 19 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135674 , at * 11 (E .D. Tex. A ug. 1 2, 2 01 9) ( e xpl aining that insure d ’ s

“ extra

- contractual cl aims are moot to the extent they seek damages for policy b e nefits tha t State
Auto paid following the apprais al pr ocess ( citing Ortiz , 589 S.W.3d at 134) )

. If no unpaid

benefits remain
, the n to prev a il o n her extr acontra c tual cla im s , Burgess must allege and then

prov e some injury independent of a righ t to benefits

. S ee also Mench aca , 545 S.W.3d at 500

( “ The second aspect of the independent

- injury rule is that an insurer ’ s statu tory vio lation does

not p er mit the in sured t o recover a ny damage s beyond policy benefits un less the violat ion causes
an injur y tha t is inde pe ndent fro m the loss of the benefits. ” )

An indepen dent injury is an inj ury or loss “ ca u sed b y ” t he in sure r ’ s c onduct th at
results in damag es that “ ar e separa te f rom and

. . . dif

fer f r om b en efits under the contr act. ” Id.

at 4 99

. “ If such dam ages result from an i n dependent inju r y ‘ caused b y ’ t he insurer ’ s statutory

violation, t h e insured can reco ver those damages, j ust as i ns ure d s h ave alwa ys bee n able t o

rec over ‘ co m p e n s a tory damages for t he tort of bad f aith ’ under the commo n law. ” Id. ( quo ting

M ori e l , 879 S.W. 2 d at 17 ). “ Thus, an insu r ed c an re cover act ual damages caused by the19

insurer ’ s bad

- fa ith conduct if th e dam ages ‘ are se p a rate fr om and . .

. diff er fr om be ne f

it s under

the contract. ’ ” I

d. (quot ing Twi n City Fire Ins . Co. v. Davis , 904 S.W.2d 663
, 6 66 (Tex. 1995)
(identifying ment a l a nguish dama ges a s ex ample of recoverable actual damages )).

Here, Bur gess argues that she has al le g ed an “ ind e pe n d ent injury ” be cause she

s eeks to r e co v e r for ment al angui s h sustaine d as a result of Allstate ’ s tortiou s conduc t in

del aying payment o n her cla im

. The T exas Su preme Court has reco gnized t hat men tal a ng u i s h

d a mage s ma y be r ecover ed for su cc es s ful commo n law a nd statut or y bad

- faith claims. 6 Se e

Twi n City Fir e I

n s. Co.
, 90 4 S.W. 2d at 665 ( noting th at “ ex e mpl ary d a mages and m ent al a nguish

da ma ges are reco v erabl e f o r a br eac h of the duty of goo d fai th and fair dealing under the

sam e p r inc iple s al lowi ng re cover y of thos e da ma g es in othe r to r t ac tions ” ( quoting Arnold
,
725 S.W.2d at 168 ) ) ; Giles
, 950 S .W.2d at 54 ( “ In t he con t ex t o f ba d f ait h actions, ment al

a n guish damages will be limited to th ose cases in wh ich the denial or de lay in payment o f a

claim has seriou sly disru p t ed the in s ure d ’ s l ife. ” )

. More over , a s our si ster court in Housto n has
recently recognized
, “ Me nc ha c a did not for e cl o se t he poss i bility of recover y of mental

- anguish
damages as an i ndependent injury. ” S tate Farm Lloyds v. F u entes , 597 S .W.3 d 9 25, 9 41 (T e x.
App.

— Hou s to n [1 4th Dist

. ] 20 20, n o pet.). Beca u se Burgess alleges that she has suffered mental

6 Allstate e mphasi zes that , i n Mench a ca , the Te xas Su p reme Cou rt expl ained that a

s u ccessf ul indep e nde n t

- injury claim wou l d b e rare and that the court ha s “ yet to encounter

on e

. ” USAA Tex

. Lloy ds Co. v. Menc hac a , 54 5 S.W.3d 479, 500 (Tex. 2018) (cit ing Republi c Ins. Co. v

. Stoker
, 903 S.W. 2 d 338, 341 (Tex. 1 995 ) )

. That statemen t , how ever, c once r n s th e availab i lity of c lai m s fo r ind ependent in j ury w hen there is no coverage f or t he underlyin g loss

. S ee Pro gressiv e C

nty Mut. I

ns. C o. v. Boyd
, 177 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. 2005) ( explaining that insured ’ s extracontra ctual cla i m s “ we re negate d b y determination in t h e b r each of contract claim th a t there was no coverage ” a nd that although co urt had pr evi ousl y “ l eft op en th e possibility [in Stoker ] t h at an insurer ’ s denial of a claim it was not obliged to pay might nevertheless be in b a d faith i f its con duct w as extreme and pro duced dama g es unrelated to and in dep endent of th e policy claim
, ” in sured h ad not m ad e su ch alle gati on s )

. Here, it was legally established that Burgess ’ s UIM claim was covered by her policy with Allstate.20

an guish a s a resul t o f All state ’ s conduct in handling her UIM clai m , w e agree t hat s he has
sufficiently allege d an inj ury i nd e p endent o f h e r r ight to r ecover policy b enefi ts. Ac cordingly,

even if Bur g ess ha s recovered al l policy b enefits to whi ch she is en titl ed, s he has suffi cie n tl y

a lleged an inde pendent inju r y fo r whi ch she may, if p roven, recover damages. As suming th at

th i s issue was ra i sed be low
, we con clude that th e trial cour t erred to the extent th at it gr a n ted

summar y j udg ment in favor of All state on this ground.

CONCLUS ION

We reverse and remand those portio ns of the trial court ’s order gran tin g summa ry
judgment on Bu rgess ’s clai ms that Alls tate b reached i ts d uty of good faith and fair dealing a nd

that it violated Cha pter 541 of the Insuran ce C ode.

__________ _______________________ _________ Chari L. Ke l ly
, J us t i ce

Be fo re Justices Goodw i n , Baker , a nd K e l ly

Rev ersed and R emanded

Fi led : November 24, 2021