IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Circleville Road Partners, LP, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Zoning Hearing Board of the Township :

of Ferguson :

: No. 1717 C.D. 2019

v. :

: Argued: October 15, 2020

Township of Ferguson :

:

v. :

:

Residential Housing Land, LLC and :

Residential Housing Development, LLC :

:

v. :

:

Pine Hall Development Company f/k/a :

Pine Hall Development Corporation :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: December 31, 2020 

Circleville Road Partners, L.P. (CRP) appeals from the October 21, 2019 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court) affirming the 

decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Ferguson (ZHB), which 
2

denied CRP’s substantive validity challenge to an amendment to the section of the 

Ferguson Township’s zoning ordinance that comprises the Traditional Town 

Development (TTD) District (TTD Amendment). 

At the center of this dispute lies the fact that the TTD zoning district 

essentially encompasses only two parcels of property that are owned by two 

developers. Although the TTD Amendment equally affords both developers with 

more relaxed developmental standards and an enhanced opportunity for increased 

development, the TTD Amendment, as applied to the facts and circumstances of this 

case, could conceivably provide one developer with a more advantageous chance for 

economic gain. However, this can be said of all legislation that is economic and 

developmental in nature, i.e., some businesses will be able to capitalize from the 

legislation to a greater degree or extent than others, but this fact, alone, does not 

render a law unconstitutional. Because we conclude that the TTD Amendment does 

not violate substantive due process, does not constitute illegal spot zoning or 

unlawful special legislation, and is not void for vagueness, we affirm the trial court’s 

order. 

Background

In its decision, the ZHB set forth the procedural and factual background 

of this case as follows:

1. The [a]pplicant is [CRP] of 125 Lyndhurst Circle, 

Wexford, Pennsylvania.

2. The [i]ntervenors are Residential Housing Land, LLC 

and Residential Housing Development, LLC (hereinafter 

jointly “RHD”).
3

3. CRP is the owner of a certain parcel of real estate 

located at the intersection of Blue Course Drive and 

Circleville Road[,] hereinafter referred to as the “Turnberry 

Tract.”

4. RHD is the equitable owner of that certain parcel of 

real estate, containing approximately 90 acres, at the 

intersection of Blue Course Drive and Old Gatesburg Road, 

hereinafter referred to as the “Pine Hall Tract.”

5. The Turnberry Tract and the Pine Hall Tract are 

adjoining properties that share a common boundary line.

6. The Turnberry Tract and the Pine Hall Tract are both 

zoned “TTD[.]” 

7. In 2010, Ferguson Township approved a master plan 

known as the “Pine Hall Master Plan” for the Pine Hall 

Tract, subject to certain conditions and modifications.

8. Subsequent to 2010, two phases of the Pine Hall 

Tract were submitted and approved by the Ferguson 

Township Board of Supervisors.

9. The remainder of the Pine Hall Tract has not been 

developed due to a downturn in economic conditions.

10. In December 2011, the Township Board of 

Supervisors approved CRP’s General Master Plan for the 

Turnberry Tract, subject to certain conditions and 

modifications.

11. CRP has expended financial resources to develop a 

portion of the Turnberry Tract in accordance with its 

General Master Plan.

12. At the present time the Turnberry Tract is 

approximately 50% developed.

13. CRP has since sold portions of the Turnberry Tract to 

third parties.
4

14. Beginning in 2015, RHD met with the township staff 

to discuss modifications of the Pine Hall Master Plan so that 

its stalled development could move forward.

15. On February 2, 2017, the Township held a Charette 

that was duly noticed and open to the public for the purpose 

of discussing the Pine Hall Master Plan.

16. On March 16, 2017, RHD applied to Ferguson 

Township for a text amendment . . . to [s]ection 27-701 of 

the zoning ordinance[, i.e., the TTD Amendment].

17. On March 8, 2017, the Ferguson Township Planning 

Commission held a meeting at which counsel for RHD 

made a presentation in favor of the adoption of the TTD 

Amendment.

18. At the June 26, 2017 Planning Commission meeting,

a presentation was made on behalf of RHD by a landscape 

architect.

19. On September 5, 2017, the Township Board of 

Supervisors held a public hearing on the TTD Amendment.

20. On September 18, 2017, the Board of Supervisors 

conducted the public hearing, and at its conclusion the 

Board approved the TTD Amendment (Ordinance Number 

1034-2017), to [s]ection 27-701 of the zoning ordinance.

21. [The TTD Amendment] made the following 

modifications to the section of the zoning ordinance 

involving “Traditional Town Developments”:

A. Increased the number of unrelated persons from 3 to 

4 who may inhabit a single[-]family attached, detached and 

semi-detached residential unit under certain circumstances;

B. Provided a process whereby a developer may request 

modifications to design standards where specific physical 

conditions on the property justify such modifications;

C. Reduce[d] from 100% to 50% the number of 

townhouse units that must be accessed by rear garages, and 

allows that other 50% to be accessed by front garages;
5

D. Reduce[d] from 100% to 25% the number of 

commercial buildings that must have second story 

residential or office uses;

E. Increase[d] from 5 stories to 8 stories the maximum 

permitted height of multi-family buildings;

F. Reduce[d] from 15% to 5% the minimum percentage 

of permissible single[-]family detached dwellings;

G. Increase[d] from 30% to 50% the maximum 

percentage of permissible multi-family dwellings;

H. Reduce[d] from 200 feet to 150 feet the minimum 

block depth/width size;

I. Increase[d] from 4 to 6 the maximum number of 

townhome dwellings on a single lot;

J. Eliminate[d] the mandatory mix of single family and 

townhome[] unit[s] within a block;

K. Reduce[d] the permissible size of lots for single[-

]family detached dwellings, single[-]family attached 

dwellings and multi-family dwellings;

L. Increase[d] the permissible size of lots for 

commercial uses;

M. Increase[d] the permissible size of commercial 

buildings and retail buildings;

N. Increase[d] the permissible size of anchor retail units;

O. Eliminate[d] any maximum limitation of residential 

units in a single structure;

P. Increase[d] the maximum impervious lot coverage to 

85%;

Q. Reduced from 40 feet to 10 feet the front yard 

setback for garages;

R. Reduce[d] from 5 feet to 0 the rear yard setback;

S. Eliminate[d] the 50% transparency requirement for 

first floors of certain retail uses;

T. Increase[d] from 60% to 90% the off-street parking 

requirements, and hence the capacity of parking 

compounds;

U. Eliminate[d] the maximum required on-site parking 

spaces;

V. Allow[ed] stormwater management facilities to be 

include[ed] in areas designated for open or public spaces;

[and]

W. Remove[d] the prohibition of drive[-]through 

services.
6

22. On October 13, 2017, [] CRP filed with [the ZHB] a 

timely substantive validity challenge to [the TTD 

Amendment].

(Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 1-22.)

In its substantive validity challenge, CRP contended that the TTD 

Amendment is unconstitutionally vague, not substantially related to a legitimate 

government interest, and constitutes illegal spot zoning and/or illegal special 

legislation. The primary argument underlying CRP’s challenges was that the TTD 

Amendment was enacted at the request of RHD and was designed specifically to 

benefit RHD and its development of the Pine Hall Tract. CRP also asserted that the 

TTD Amendment created unclear and inconsistent standards for the grant of 

modifications, thus rending it void for vagueness. 

In rejecting these claims, the ZHB generally concluded that the Board of 

Supervisors of Ferguson Township “acted within its authority in making the 

amendments to fashion the TTD ordinance as it best saw fit the needs of the 

[T]ownship.” (ZHB’s decision at 14.) The ZHB acknowledged that the “TTD 

Amendment covered two large tracts, one that was subsequently purchased and has 

now been partially developed by [CRP], and the second which has been partially 

developed, and the residue of which is now under contract to [RHD].” Id. at 15. 

Nonetheless, the ZHB concluded that “[t]he [A]mendment is not directed at one 

particular property, but applies to the TTD zoning district as a whole[,] . . . including 

undeveloped lands still owned by [CRP] and the undeveloped lands under contract to 

[RHD].” Id. The ZHB further concluded that the TTD Amendment “is not 

confiscatory” in that it “does not eliminate any rights that [CRP] previously had in its 

property”; CRP “can proceed to develop the remainder of the property in the exact 

fashion it had originally intended”; and the TTD Amendment “does not increase the 

restrictions of the zoning ordinance, but rather loosens them.” Id. at 15-16. 
7

 Moreover, the ZHB noted that, under section 107 of the Pennsylvania 

Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),

1

a “[t]raditional [t]own [d]evelopment” district 

contains mixed uses and is configured to integrate residential units and commercial 

uses in a single district. The ZHB found that “[t]he stated purpose of the Ferguson 

Township TTD ordinance closely follows the language of the MPC.” Id. at 13. The 

ZHB further commented: 

While it is clear that [CRP] strongly disagrees with the 

direction in which the [TTD Amendment] takes the TTD 

ordinance, it is the legislative function of the Board of 

Supervisors to enact zoning ordinances and to amend them. 

The challenge raised by [CRP] with respect to the design 

features of the TTD Amendment boil down to matters of 

degree. While the TTD Amendment may arguably create a 

Traditional Town Development [district] that is off the 

mark of what the legislature ideally intended, this Board[, 

i.e., the ZHB] cannot say that the amended ordinance is an 

invalid exercise of the authority of the Board of 

Supervisors. 

Id. at 14. 

Finally, the ZHB provided a comprehensive discussion of the 

modification provisions in section 3 of the TTD Amendment in relation to the 

modification provisions of the original TTD ordinance. The ZHB concluded that the 

portions of the TTD Amendment in this respect were clear and unambiguous and, 

therefore, were not void for vagueness. (ZHB’s decision at 9-11.)

For these reasons, the ZHB denied CRP’s substantive validity challenge 

to the TTD Amendment. 

CRP then filed a land use appeal with the trial court. Without receiving 

additional evidence, the trial court affirmed the decision of the ZHB. In so doing, the 

1 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §10107.
8

trial court noted that a “TTD is a mixed-use zoning district” and agreed with the 

ZHB’s factual findings and legal conclusion that the purpose of the TTD Amendment 

was consistent with the definition of a “Traditional Neighborhood Development” in 

the MPC. (Trial court op. at 4-5.) The trial court reiterated the stated purpose of the 

TTD district, quoting the ordinance’s overall intent in creating the TTD district “to 

produce sustainable, long term development which enhances the quality of life . . . to 

ensure the highest possible economic and social benefits for all residents . . . [and] to 

encourage innovation and promote flexibility, economy, and ingenuity in 

development and to be consistent with the goals and objectives enumerated by the 

provisions of Article VII -A of the [MPC].” (Trial court op. at 5, quoting Ordinance, 

§27-701(1)(A)-(B)).2 See Circleville Road Partners, L.P. v. Township of Ferguson, 

2 Section 702-A(1)(ii) of the MPC “permit[s] the creation of a traditional neighborhood 

development in any part of the municipality or in one or more specified zoning districts.” 53 P.S. 

§10702-A(1)(ii). Article VII-A of the MPC, added by the Act of June 23, 2000, P.L. 495. Section 

107 of the MPC, in turn, defines “Traditional Neighborhood Development” as

an area of land typically developed for a compatible mixture of 

residential units for various income levels and nonresidential 

commercial and workplace uses, including some structures that 

provide for a mix of uses within the same building. Residences, 

shops, offices, workplaces, public buildings and parks are interwoven 

within the neighborhood so that all are within relatively close 

proximity to each other. Traditional neighborhood development is 

relatively compact and oriented toward pedestrian activity. It has an 

identifiable center and a discernible edge. The center of the 

neighborhood is in the form of a public park, commons, plaza, square 

or prominent intersection of two or more major streets. Generally, 

there is a hierarchy of streets laid out with an interconnected network 

of streets and blocks that provides multiple routes from origins to 

destinations and are appropriately designed to serve the needs of 

pedestrians and vehicles equally.

53 P.S. §10107.
9

209 A.3d 1125, 1137 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (concluding that the TTD Amendment 

constituted a zoning map change, rather than a text amendment, and that the TTD 

Amendment “did not change the nature of the TTD as a mixed[-]use district nor did 

[it] create a new land use category”).

Next, the trial court stated that it 

has gleaned from the ZHB’s findings of fact that the 

catalyst for the TTD Amendment was a need to finish 

developing the Pine Hall Tract which was frustrated by the 

TTD ordinance as it was previously enacted. Despite this 

singular goal, the TTD Amendment, on its face and within 

the context of the entire TTD ordinance, is not arbitrary, 

unreasonable, and bears a substantial relationship to the 

public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. The 

TTD Amendment is not unduly restrictive or exclusionary 

[because] it actually expands the uses in a TTD zoning 

district. Also, [CRP] did not receive disparate treatment 

with the enactment of the TTD Amendment simply because 

it went through modification procedures provided in the 

previously enacted TTD ordinance to request the 

modifications to [greater] develop its land, as opposed to 

RHD proposing a text amendment to achieve the same 

goals. 

(Trial court op. at 6.) 

In making this determination, the trial court cited case law from this 

Court holding that the state of mind of a legislative body in amending a zoning 

ordinance is not relevant to determining its validity and that the strenuous lobbying 

by a supporter does not itself render the amendment unlawful special legislation. 

(Trial court op. at 5.) Moreover, the trial court concluded that “the TTD Amendment 

does not constitute spot zoning or special legislation because the Pine Hall Tract was 

not singularly rezoned, and the TTD Amendment does not prevent [CRP], or any 

other landowner, from a lawful use of [its] land.” (Trial court op. at 8.) Ultimately, 

the trial court agreed “with the findings of the ZHB that the TTD Amendment is 
10

applicable to the TTD zoning district in its entirety, and is not directed toward only 

the Pine Hall Tract.” Id. 

Finally, the trial court determined that the modification provisions of the 

TTD Amendment, when compared to or considered in light of the modification 

provisions of the prior TTD ordinance, were “not inconsistent and would not cause a 

person of common intelligence to guess at their meaning.” (Trial court op. at 6.) In 

so deciding, the trial court noted that section 13 of the TTD Amendment repealed the 

existing modification provisions within the original TTD ordinance to the extent they 

were irreconcilable. Id. 

CRP then filed an appeal with this Court.3

Discussion

 First off, CRP contends that the trial court committed an error of law in 

failing to declare the TTD Amendment unconstitutional because it was enacted with 

no express public purpose but, instead, was passed only to implement RHD’s specific 

development plans. CRP states that the TTD Amendment does not contain any 

recitals addressing a purpose related to the promotion of public health, safety, and 

welfare and cites an excerpt from the trial court’s opinion, wherein the trial court 

“gleaned from the ZHB’s findings of fact that the catalyst for” and the “singular goal” 

of “the TTD Amendment was a need to finish developing the Pine Hall [T]ract which 

was frustrated by the TTD ordinance as it was previously enacted.” (CRP Br. at 36; 

Trial court op. at 6.) On this note, CRP asserts that the TTD Amendment does not 

3 This Court’s scope of review in a zoning case where, as here, the trial court did not take 

additional evidence is limited to reviewing whether the trial court committed an error of law or 

abused its discretion. Shaw v. Township of Upper St. Clair, 71 A.3d 1103, 1107 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013).
11

bear a substantial relationship to any legitimate public purpose and, therefore, 

violates substantive due process.

“A zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid. Therefore, one 

challenging the zoning ordinance has the heavy burden of establishing its invalidity. 

Where the validity of the zoning ordinance is debatable, the legislative judgment of 

the governing body must control.” Woll v. Monaghan Township, 948 A.2d 933, 938 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “In Pennsylvania, the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is 

reviewed under a substantive due process analysis.” Plaxton v. Lycoming County 

Zoning Hearing Board, 986 A.2d 199, 204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). “Under such 

analysis, the party challenging the validity of provisions of the zoning ordinance must 

establish that they are arbitrary and unreasonable and have no substantial relationship 

to promoting the public health, safety, and welfare.” Id.

Further, “the exercise of judgment in regard to zoning regulations will 

not be interfered with except where there is obviously no relation to health, safety, 

morals or general welfare.” Ethan-Michael, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Union 

Township, 918 A.2d 203, 210 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). If there is any reasonably 

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the zoning law, the 

challenged law will be upheld. Corteal v. Department of Transportation, 821 A.2d 

173, 177 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Importantly, a legislative body need not articulate its 

reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made, and a legislative choice may 

be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. See 

Adams Outdoor Advertising, LP v. Zoning Hearing Board of Smithfield Township, 

909 A.2d 469, 478 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); Corteal, 821 A.2d at 177. Because the courts 

do not require a legislative body to articulate its reasons for enacting a law, it is 

entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the 
12

challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. In Takacs v. Indian Lake 

Borough Zoning Hearing Board, 11 A.3d 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), this Court 

recounted:

The fact that rezoning is done at the request of a landowner 

does not, in and of itself, invalidate a rezoning. Schubach v. 

Silver, 336 A.2d 328, 337 (Pa. 1975). Indeed, in Plaxton[,

986 A.2d at 210], this [C]ourt stated that: (1) the state of 

mind of a legislative body in amending a zoning ordinance 

is not relevant to determining its validity; (2) the 

amendment must stand or fall on its own terms; and (3) 

even the strenuous lobbying by supporters does not itself 

render the amendment special legislation. 

Takacs, 11 A.3d at 594.

Here, we discern from text of the TTD Amendment that it was enacted 

to encourage greater economic development, which is a legitimate state interest. See 

Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 954 (Pa. 2013). The TTD 

Amendment accomplishes this goal by reducing the developmental restrictions in the 

original TTD ordinance and by allowing for increased dimensional standards. See 

F.F. No. 21A.-W. Because the measures employed by the Board of Supervisors in 

the TTD Amendment clearly advance the goal of obtaining greater development and 

economic prosperity, we conclude that there is a substantial relationship between 

what the Amendment permits and endorses with the object that it seeks to obtain. 

Although RHD initiated and requested the Board of Supervisors to enact the TTD 

Amendment, as stated above, this does not negate or otherwise alter the fact that the 

TTD Amendment, on its face, substantially furthers a legitimate governmental

interest. Therefore, we conclude that CRP’s substantive due process claim fails. 

Second, CRP asserts that the TTD Amendment constitutes illegal spotzoning and special legislation because it was enacted “for no reason or purpose other 
13

than to favor the private interests of [RHD] while disregarding a community[-]wide 

perspective.” (CRP Br. at 49.) CRP further contends that CRP’s “[p]roperty was the 

only property assembled to be developable as a TTD other than Turnberry in the TTD 

[z]oning [d]istrict, and as Turnberry is being developed pursuant to the [original] 

TTD [o]rdinance, the TTD Amendment effectively applies only to [RHD’s] 

[p]roperty.” Id. at 50. As such, CRP argues that the TTD Amendment is 

discriminatory and confiscatory in nature. 

Under Pennsylvania law, spot zoning is the unreasonable or arbitrary 

zoning classification of a small parcel of land, dissected or set apart from surrounding 

properties, with no reasonable basis for the differential zoning. Penn Street, L.P. v.

East Lampeter Township Zoning Hearing Board, 84 A.3d 1114, 1120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014). “The most determinative factor in an analysis of a spot zoning question is 

whether the parcel in question is being treated unjustifiably different from similar 

surrounding land, thus creating an ‘island’ having no relevant differences from its 

neighbors.” Id. at 1121 (citation omitted). Somewhat similarly, “[s]pecial legislation 

is described as an ordinance that is unjustly discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, 

and confiscatory in its application, in that it [is] aimed at [a] particular piece of 

property. The most important inquiry then, is whether a particular piece of property 

is subject to discriminatory treatment.” Plaxton, 986 A.2d at 210 (internal citations 

omitted). However, “[a]n amendatory zoning ordinance constitutes special 

legislation only where it is enacted to prevent a lawful use of land permitted under the 

existing ordinance.” Id. at 210-11 (internal citation omitted).

Here, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “the TTD 

Amendment does not constitute spot zoning or special legislation because the Pine 

Hall Tract was not singularly rezoned, and the TTD Amendment does not prevent 
14

[CRP], or any other landowner, from a lawful use of [its] land.” (Trial court op. at 8.) 

We further note the ZHB’s uncontested finding that, at the time of the zoning 

proceedings, CRP only developed approximately 50% of the Turnberry Tract, (F.F. 

No. 12); consequently, the remaining portion of the land can theoretically be 

developed under the standards enunciated in the TTD Amendment. Moreover, as the 

trial court and ZHB concluded, “[t]he TTD Amendment is not unduly restrictive or 

exclusionary [because] it actually expands the uses in a TTD zoning district,” (Trial 

court op. at 6); the TTD Amendment “is not confiscatory” in that it “does not 

eliminate any rights that [CRP] previously had in its property”; CRP “can proceed to 

develop the remainder of the property in the exact fashion it had originally intended”; 

and the TTD Amendment “does not increase the restrictions of the zoning ordinance, 

but rather loosens them.” (ZHB’s decision at 15-16.) See Circleville Road Partners, 

L.P., 209 A.3d at 1137 (concluding that “the amendments imposed by [the TTD 

Amendment] apply to [RHD’s] property, [CRP’s] property and any other property 

within a TTD in a mixed[-]use district and, therefore, do not make a substantial 

change to the manner in which one tract of land is zoned as compared to other 

properties similarly zoned”).

Based on these determinations, and the undisputed findings of fact that 

support them, we conclude that CRP’s spot zoning and special legislation claims lack 

merit. See Plaxton, 986 A.2d at 210-211 (rejecting claims of illegal spot zoning and 

special legislation where the amendatory ordinance had no confiscatory application 

and was not enacted to prevent any lawful use of the property; instead, the property at 

issue was not rezoned at all by the amendatory ordinance, and the amendatory 

ordinance merely permitted a new use in a zoning district); Klein v. Council of City of 

Pittsburgh, 643 A.2d 1107, 1118 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (rejecting claims of illegal spot 
15

zoning and special legislation where an ordinance permitted “medical private use 

helistops in conjunction with hospitals as a conditional use in six different zoning 

districts”; the ordinance “d[id] not rezone [Shadyside Hospital’s] property nor single 

it out for preferential treatment among other area hospitals; and, “[i]n fact, [the 

ordinance] confer[red] no benefit on Shadyside Hospital that [was] not similarly 

bestowed on any other city hospital”). We retain this conclusion despite the 

possibility that RHD, as a practical matter, may be committed to certain 

developmental projects that were designed and blueprinted under the prior version of 

the TTD ordinance and that it may be economically unfeasible for RHD to change 

course and redesign those developmental projects under the relaxed standards of the 

TTD Amendment. 

In so deciding, this Court reiterates that the fact that a zoning change is 

done at the request of a landowner does not, in and of itself, invalidate an amendment 

to a zoning ordinance. See Takacs, 11 A.3d at 594. Further, “an ordinance will not 

be found unconstitutional merely because it deprives the owner of the most lucrative 

and profitable uses; as long as the property in question may be reasonably used for 

the purposes permitted under the ordinance, the owner may not legally complain.” 

KS Development Company, L.P. v. Lower Nazareth Township, 149 A.3d 105, 116 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).4 As previously stated by this Court, “[i]f the validity of a zoning 

ordinance is debatable, it must be permitted to stand.” Takacs, 11 A.3d at 594. We 

conclude that this is the situation here. 

4 Perhaps notably, CRP does not advance a claim that the TTD Amendment was the 

byproduct of unlawful contract zoning, see Knight v. Lynn Township Zoning Hearing Board, 568 

A.2d 1372, 1375-77 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990); Lake v. Zoning Hearth Board of Warrington Township 

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1061 C.D. 2013, filed March 18, 2014) (unreported), slip op. at 13-14, nor does it

assert a de facto exclusionary claim. See KS Development Company, L.P., 149 A.3d at 113-17.
16

Third and last, CRP asserts that section 3 of the TTD Amendment is 

void for vagueness because it is “inconsistent with the thoughtful, goal[-]oriented 

modification provisions in the original ordinance” and “results in unclear . . . and 

irrational standards for the grant of modifications.” (CRP Br. at 54.) 

“A law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons of common 

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”

Fabio v. Civil Service Commission of City of Philadelphia, 414 A.2d 82, 84 (Pa. 

1980) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The void for vagueness doctrine 

incorporates the due process notions of fair notice or warning.” Id. at 85

Here, section 3 of the TTD Amendment provides as follows:

SECTION 3. Section 27-701.2 of the Zoning Ordinance is 

hereby amended to add the following to the end of that 

section:

The Board of Supervisors may allow for modification of the 

design standards applicable to a [TTD] provided for in this 

Section[,] 27-701, including, but not limited to 

compactness, pedestrian orientation, street geometry or 

other related design features, in accordance with the 

standards applicable to the grant of modifications under 

Chapter 22, Subdivision and Land Development, §22-105.

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 729a.)

Section 22-105 of the Ordinance provides for modifications, in part, as 

follows:

An applicant may request the Board of Supervisors to grant 

a modification of the requirements of one or more 

provisions of this Chapter if the literal enforcement will 

exact undue hardship because of peculiar conditions to the 

land in question; provided, that such modification will not 

be contrary to the public interest and that the purpose of the 

intent of this Chapter is observed . . . .
17

(R.R. at 363a.)

While it is difficult for us to discern the exact manner in which CRP 

asserts that section 3 of the TTD Amendment is vague, based on the plain language of 

that provision, it is apparent that the Board of Supervisors may grant a modification 

for the design features applicable to the TTD zoning district. And, in referencing 

section 22-105 of the Ordinance, section 3 of the TTD Amendment simply 

incorporates the governing legal standards used to grant such a modification. 

Although the provisions of original ordinance pertaining to TTD zoning district set 

forth 12 different “design standards,” including but not limited to, on-street parking, 

public space, and natural building techniques, (R.R. at 384a-85a), these subjects, in 

general, are technically still available for modification under section 3 of the TTD 

Amendment. However, to the extent that these subjects are inconsistent with the 

TTD Amendment, section 13 of the TTD Amendment states that “[a]ny ordinances or 

parts of ordinances inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.” (R.R. at 734a.) An 

ordinance is not void for vagueness merely because the reader may have to crossreference and compare different sections or parts of that ordinance. See Halfacre v. 

Kelley, 594 S.W.3d 36, 39 (Ark. 2020) (“With respect to [the defendant’s] claim that 

the reference to robbery in the aggravated-robbery statute rendered the statute

‘vague,’ the fact that one statute referenced the other did not prevent a person of 

ordinary intelligence from having fair warning of what was prohibited.”). Therefore, 

we find no merit in CRP’s contention that the TTD Amendment is unconstitutionally 

vague. 
18

Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court’s 

order denying CRP’s land use appeal from the ZHB’s decision denying CRP’s 

substantive validity challenges to the TTD Amendment. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Circleville Road Partners, LP, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Zoning Hearing Board of the Township :

of Ferguson :

: No. 1717 C.D. 2019

v. :

:

Township of Ferguson :

:

v. :

:

Residential Housing Land, LLC and :

Residential Housing Development, LLC :

:

v. :

:

Pine Hall Development Company f/k/a :

Pine Hall Development Corporation :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 31st day of December, 2020, the October 21, 2019 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County is hereby affirmed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge