### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-41187

BRADLEY KOENNING; BRIAN MARTIN; MORGAN RYALS, Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. KYLE JANEK, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Defendant - Appellant.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas U SDC No. 6:11–CV–6

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The events that led Bradley Koenning, Brian Martin, and Morgan Ryals (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) to file this lawsuit are familiar t o the parties and we need n ot review them here. O ur disposition of this appeal t urns on e vents that occurred after the district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. In a September 2012 memorandum o pinion and order, the district court conclude d t h a t f

ederal l aw preempts a Texas Medicaid policy that excludes
power wheelchai r s with integrated standing features (commonly k nown as U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Aug ust 20, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-41187 Document: 00512348481 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/20/2013No. 12-41187

“mobile standers”) from c overage. The district court’s opinion also enjoined the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“THHSC”) from continuing to enforce the exclusion policy and remanded the case to the Texas Medicaid and H ealthcare Partnership (“TMHP”) for a determination regarding Plaintiffs ’ medical need f

o r a m o b i l e stander. Shortly after filing its opinion, the district court entered a judgment, stating that “the decisions of [TMHP] a nd [THHSC] are REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to [TMHP] for further action.” About six months after the district court entered its judgment, K oenning and Ryals received the mobile standers they s ought. Both parties c oncede that Koenning a nd Ryals’s receipt of the mobile standers renders t heir claims moot. Although the parties contend otherwise, w e also conclude that M a r t i n ’s claims a re moot. In J uly 2013, TMHP (actin g o n behalf of THHSC) denied Martin’s request for a mobile stander. TM HP observed that “[t]he papers [Martin] sent in did not s how why a [mobile s t ander] was medically n eeded for [him]” and explained that M artin could submit additional documents to further support his r equest. Martin has a right to chall e n g e t h i s d e nial through the state’s administrative process, including, if nece s s a ry, a n appeal t o the state courts. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 531.019; 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 3 57.703(c). Based

on these developments, Martin’s claims, which presume a medica l n e ed for a mobile stander, no longer present a live case or controversy against THHSC. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. P rod. Co. , 704 F.3d 4 13, 425 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Mootness applies when intervening circumstance s r e n d er the court no longer capable o f providing meaningful relief to the plaintiff.” (citations omitted)); see also Ctr. for Individual F reedom v. Carmouche , 449 F.3d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A]ny set of circumstances that eliminates actual controversy

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after the commencement of a lawsuit renders that action m oot.”). Accordingly,

we DISMISS all o f P l a i n t iffs’ claims as moot. See Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas , 529 F.3d 519, 5 2 5 ( 5 t h C i r . 2008) (“If a case h as been r endered moot, a federal court has no constituti o n a l authority to resolve the issues that it presents.” (citing In re Scruggs, 392 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2004)). We also VACATE the district court’s opinion and judgment. This is not a

case in which the p arty that lost i n the district court is attempting to evade the district court’s decision by using i ts voluntary ac t i o n s t o moot the prevailing parties’ claims. Cf. U

.S. B ancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship , 5 13 U.S. 18, 24 (1994) (“The principal condition to which [courts] l ook[] [in d e ciding whether to vacate] i s w h e ther the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the m o o tness by voluntary action.”). To t he contrary, THHSC maintains t h a t Martin’s claims a r e not moot and continues to urge u s to reach t h e merits. Moreover, as both parties acknowledge, t he district court ’ s o p i n i o n a n d j u d g m ent contain meaningful errors. For e xample, the d istrict court opin i on incorrectly states that Texas law does not provide for state cou r t r e view of adverse administrative hearing decisions. 1 The district court opinion and judgment also purport to “remand” the case to a non-state, non-party entity (namely, THMP); however, the parties agree that such a remand is improper. Finally, although the district court opinion orders declaratory and injunctive relief, its judgment

1 Com p a re Ko e nni ng v . Suehs , 897 F. Sup p . 2d 528, 555 ( S. D

. Tex. 2012) ( “In Texas

. . . there is no s tatutory p roced ure f or jud icial revie w o f i n d i v id ual M ed icaid eligibility d ecis ions

. ”) , w i th 1 Tex. Ad m in. Cod e § 357. 703( c) ( “If th e . . . f inal d ecis ion in the ad m inis trative review is ad vers e to the ap p ellant, j ud icial review m ay be obtained by f iling f or review w ith a d is trict court in Travis County

. . . . ”)

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does not. Thus, uncertainty exists about the r e lief that is in effect. 2 For these
reasons, we conclude that the public interest supports vacating the district court’s opinion a nd judgment. See id. at 27 (recognizing that a court generally should not v acate a judicial precedent “unless [it] concludes that the public interest would b e served b y a v acatur” (quoting Izumi Seimitsu K ogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp. , 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). VACATED and DISMISSED AS MOOT.

2 Cf

. Ba tes v . Johnson , 901 F. 2d 1 4 2 4, 1428 ( 7th Cir. 1990) ( “When a jud ge d oes not record an injunction or declaratory jud g ment on a s ep arate d ocum ent, the d ef end ant is und er no jud icial com p uls ion.

. . . [ I ] f the op inion contains language aw ard ing declaratory relief [ or an injunction] , but the jud g m ent d oes not, the op inion has been red uced to d ictum ; only the jud gm ent need be obeyed

. ” ( s econd alteration in original) ( internal quotation m ark s om itted ))

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