UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OFCO LU M BIA P HILL IP S. WOODRUF F , ) ) P laintif f, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 06-0688 (RBW)

) NEIL MCP HIE, Chai rm an, ) U.S. Mer it System s P rote ction Board, ) ) Defendan t. )

___________________________________ )
Mem orandum Opini on Phill ip S. W oodruff

(“the plaintiff”) brought this pro se lawsuit ag ainst the Chairman (“ the def

endant” ) of the United States Merit Sy stems Protection Boa rd’s (the “B oard” ) Off

ice of Equal Employ

ment Opportunity

(“EE O Off

ice” ) cla iming that the EE O O ff ic e imp ro pe rl y

dis mis se d h is a dmi nis tr ativ e c omp la int on ve nu e gro un ds and

his employ ment status. Compl aint (“Compl.”) ¶ ¶ 1-2. The defe ndant now see ks dismis sal of thi s a c tio n p ur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Pr oc e dure12 (b )( 6) , D e fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Dismiss (“Def

.’s Mot.”), whic h is challeng ed by the plaintiff. Opposition to Defe ndant’s Mo tio n to Di smi ss a

nd Mo tio n to Di smi ss D e fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss a s Unti me ly F ile d ( “ Pl. ’s Op p’ n” ). Up on c on sid e ratio n o f t

he pa rt ie s’ su bmi ssi on s, theCourt

wi ll gra nt t he de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s. I. Bac kgr ound The plaintiff w as for

merly employed by

the Depa rtment of Tra

nsportation’s (“D epar tment”) F eder al Aviation Administration as a Supervisory Public Affair sFor e as e of r ef er en ce , t h e Cour t w i l l i den t i f y t h e ex h i bi t s a t t ac h ed t o t h e M emor an du m i n Su ppor t of 1 D e fen d a n t’s M o tio n to D ism iss b y the na m e s the d o c k e ting c le rk a ssig n e d to the m . 2 Specialist. Def.’ s Mot., Ex hibit (“Ex.”) 1 (“B oard A ppeal” ) at 1. His employ ment was 1 terminated on June 30, 2005. I d. at 2. Followingthe plaintiff’s ter mination, he filed an administrative appe al with the B oard’ s Washington Reg ional Offic e alleg ing a g e and disability discrimination and re taliation by the Depa rtment. I d. On September 22, 2005, the plaintiff and the Depa rtment enter ed into a settlement a gree ment resolvingthe pla int if f’ s B oa rd a pp e a l. I d. , E x. 2 ( “ B oa

rd ’s Init ia l D e c isi on ” ) at 1. Ho we ve r, sh or tly there afte r, the plaintiff f

iled a Petition for Review ( “Petition”) with the B oard r equesting that the Initial Decision settling his administrative a ppeal be vacated bec ause the administrative law judg e over seeingthe settlement had: (1) denied his re quest for
a c c omm od atio ns fo r h is d isa bil iti e s; ( 2) fa ile d to ru le on pe nd ingmot ion s; ( 3) e ng a g e d in ex parte communications; (4) improperly considere d curr ent EEO law s and the Olde r Workers B enef

it Protection Act (the “ OW Act”); a nd (5) c oerc ed him into signingthe settlement agree ment without givinghim adequate time to review it. I d., Ex . 3 (“B oard Petition”) at 1-2; Compl. at 1. The B oard subse quently denied the pla intiff’s Petition, concluding , inter alia, that the administrative law judg e “ma de no er ror in law or regulation that affe c[ted] the outcome”of the c ase. D ef.’ s Mot., Ex . 4 (“B oard’ s Final Or de r” ) at 1- 2. On

Ap ri l 14 , 2 00 6, thepla int if f f ile d a pe tit ion fo r j ud ic ia l r e vie w w ith the United States Court of Appe als for the Fe dera l Circuit; however, the plaintiff wi th drewth at app eal onAugus t 2 4, 20 06 . S ee W oo dru ff v . De p’tof T rans p. , 1 97 F. App’x 929, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
.3 Whil e the plaintiff’ s Petiti on was still pending be fore the B oard, the plaintiff contac ted the def

endant’ s EEO off

ice a nd filed a f

ormal complaint of discrimination ag ainst the administrative law judg e citingthe same reasons se t forth in his Petit ion. De f. ’s Mo t., Ex. 5 (“ F or

ma l E EO Com

pla int ” ). Th e B oa

rd ’s EE O o ff

ic e su bs e qu e ntl y issued a dec ision dism issing the plaintiff’ s formal EEO complaint for f ailure to state a
c la im an d f o r anim p r o p e r c o ll ate r a l att a c k

o nth e B o ar d ’ s a d

ju d ic ato r y p r o c e s s . I d
. , E x. 6 (“D ismiss al of F ormal EEO Complaint”) at 1. Ultimately , on April 14, 2006, the plaintiff filed his judicial complaint with this Court aga inst the Board’s Chairman f or failingto reviewand investig ate the pla intiff’s discrimination alleg ations ag ainst the Boa rd’s a dministrative la

w judg e. The defe ndant has now move d for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (6), f or fa ilure to state a claim upon which r elief ma y be grante d. II. Stand ard of Review Dismissal under Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (6) is prope r if a pla intiff’s
c omp la int do e s n ot “ state a

c la im u po n whic h r e lie f c an b e gra nte d. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 12(b)( 6). Under

this rule, a plaintiff ne ed not alleg e spec ific deta ils that prove the
vera city of a c laim; rather, a

properly pleade d complaint only

need c ontain a cle ar a

nd concise statement of the c laim sufficient to plac e a de fenda nt on “notice of

what the plaintiff’s cla im is and the grounds upon which it re sts.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1 95 7) . H ow e ve r, “ a

pla int if f’ s o bli g atio n to pr ov idethegro un ds of his e nti tle me nt t o
re lie f [i n h is c omp la int ] re qu ir e s mo retha n la be ls a nd c on c lus ion s, and

a fo rm ula ic
rec itation of the eleme nts of a ca use of a ction will not do . . . .” Be ll Atl. C orp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, ___,127 S. C t. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) ( internal quotation marks4

and bra ckets omitted). In evaluating a motion to di smiss, the Court “must ac cept a s true
a ll o f t he fa c tua l a lle g atio ns c onta ine d in thec omp la int ,” Eric ks on v. Pard us , 5 51 U. S. 89, ___, 127 S. Ct . 2197, 2200 (2007) (per c uriam) ( citations omitt ed), a nd “grant [the] plaintiff the bene fit of all re asonable infere nces f rom the fa cts alleg ed . . . .” T rudea u v. Fe d. TradeComm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (c itation omit ted). On the other ha nd , th e Court

ne e d n ot a c c e pt i nf

e re nc e s th at areun su

pp or te d b y thefa c ts s e t f

or th i n the complaint or “ leg al conc lusion[ s] couched as . . . f actua l alleg ation[s] . . . .” I d. (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s and c itatio ns omi tte d) . H ow e ve r, “ [a] c ourt may dis mis s a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief c ould be grante d under a ny set of fa cts that
c ou ld b e pr ov e d c on sis te nt w iththea lle g atio ns .” Swi e rkie wi c z v. Sor e ma N. A. , 5 34 U. S. 5 0 6 , 5 1 4 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n gH i s h o nv . K i n g& S p a l d i n g , 4 6 7 U
. S
. 6 9 , 7 3 ( 1 9 8 4 ) )
. F i n a l l y, for the pur

poses of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider only

the fa cts alleg ed in the complaint, any

documents attac hed as e x hibits, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice . EEOC v. St. Franc is Xavier Par ochial Sch., 117 F .3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). (c itations omi tted). III . Le ga l A nalys is A. Th e Pla int if

f’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss As an initial matter, the Court must addre ss the plaintiff’s argument that the de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s mu st b e de nie d a s unti me ly . T he pla int if f c onte nd s in

his motion to di smiss that the def endant’ s first reque st for an e x tension of time, filed on Au gus t 21 , 2 00 6, wa s unti me ly a s it wa s f ile d 6 1 d ay s a ft e r t

he fi lin gof

thec omp la int
. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. Additionally , the plaintiff ra ises conce rns that he wa s not contacte d by thede fe nd ant b e fo rethefi rs t r e qu e st f or an e xten sio n o f t ime wa s f ile d, that hi sP u rs u a n t t o R u le 1 2 (a )( 4 ) o f t h e F e d e ra l R u le s o f C ivil P ro c e d u re , o n c e a m o tio n to d ism iss u n d e r R u le 2 1 2 (b )( 6 ) is fil e d a d e fen d a n t ne e d no t f ile its an sw e r u n til 1 0 d a ys fo llo w ing the d e n ia l o f t h e m o tio n to d i smi ss . T heref

o re, t he d ef

end ant ’ s answer cannot b e co nsi d ered unt i m el y as t he C o urt i s no w jus t rul i ng o n the d e fen d a n t’s m o tio n to d ism iss. 5 opposition t o the first extension was not dockete d in a timely fashion, and that he was
never g iven the opportunity

to respond to the def

endant’ s second r equest for an extension of time. I d. at 1-2. The defe ndant has not re sponded to this moti on. Under the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, a “ United States offic er or employee
s u e d o n l y i nano f

f i c i a l c a p a c i ty mu s ts e r

v e anan s w e r

t o a c o mp l a i nt. . . w i th i n6 0 d ays afte r ser vice on the United States attorney .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2). When, a s here , the last day of this period fa lls on a Sunday , “the pe riod runs until the end of the ne x t day that is no t a

Saturda y , Sund ay , le g a l ho lid ay , o r d ay wh e n th e c le rk ’s of

fi c e is ina c c e ssible .” F e d. R. C iv. P. 6 (a)( 3) . T hu s, thede fe nd ant’ s r e sp on se wa s n ot d ue until Monday , August 21, 2006. Acc ording ly , the plaintiff’s a rgument that the def

endant’ s 2 motion for extension of tim e wa s untimely filed is without merit. The plaintiff’ s remainingarguments in his mot ion to dism iss center around the defe ndant’s purpor

ted fa ilure to follow the g ener al re quirements that an attempt be made to contact opposingcounsel (or an opposingparty

) bef ore r equestingfrom the Court an extension of tim e to file a responsive motion to the plaintiff’s c omplaint. Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedur e 6(b) (1) a ddresse s the extension of filing re quirements, stating“the c ourt may , for g ood cause , extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the cour t
a c ts, or if a re qu e st i s ma de , b e fo retheorig ina l ti me or its e xten sio n e xpir e s. ” F e d. R. Civ. P . 6(b)( 1). The Court ther efor e has discr etion to gr ant timely reque sts for extensions and did so hereby

entering a

minute order grantingthe def endant’ s timely

reque sts for6

tw o e xten sio ns of

tim e . A c c or din g ly , th e Court wi ll d e ny thepla int if

f’ s mo tio n to dismiss the def

endant’ s dismis sal motion on the gr ound that it was filed untimely
. B . T he De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss (1 ) I s th e pla int if

f p re c lud e d f

ro m in iti atin ga c tio n a g a ins t th e B oa rd un de r T itl e VI Iand theOW A c t? The de fenda

nt argues that Title VI Iand the OW Act only allow employees to sue their employers, a

nd there fore as a non- employee of the B oard, the plaintiff ca nnot bring suit ag ainst the defe ndant. Def .’s Mot. at 4-5. The plaintiff argues in response that notwithstanding his non-e mploy ee status, he was infor med by members of

the B oard’ s EEO off ice that it was a

proper venue f or the filingof his administrative complaint ag ainst the administrative law judg e. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4-5. Ev e n if thepla int if

f i s c or re c t a bo ut what hewa s to ld, thec ri tic a l qu e sti on is wh e the r t he Court c a n p ro vid e there lie f t

he pla int if

f s e e ks “ un de r T itl e VI Iof theCiv il R i ght s A c t , th e [ O WA c t ] an d o th e r a p p l i c a b l e l aw s . ” S e e C o mp l
. at1
. “ T i t l e V II provides a f

ormer e mploy ee w ith a reme dy only ag ainst his or her e mploy er a nd does not
c re ate an in depe nd e nt c a

us e of a c tio n a g a ins t th e EE OC [Eq ua l E mpl oy

me nt O pp or

tun ity Co mm is si on ] for

it s i nv est igat io n an d p roce ss in g of a ch arge.” P acker v. Garre tt , 7 35 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D.D.C. 1990) (inter nal quotation marks omitted) (e mphasis in origina l); Youngv. Sulli van, 733 F . Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1990); see a lso McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F .2 d 3 50 , 3 51 (7 th C ir . 1 98 4) ; Ward v. EE OC , 7 19 F .2 d 3 11 , 3 13 (9 th C ir . 1 98 3) , c e rt . denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984) ; Fra ncis-Sobel v. Univ. of Maine , 597 F.2d 15 ( 1st Cir. 19 79 ), c e rt . d e nie d, 44 4 U .S. 94 9 ( 19 79 ); Ge or ator Cor p. V. EE OC , 5 92 F .2 d 7 65 (4 th Cir . 1 97 9) ; G ibs on

v. Mis so uri Pa c . R. Co. , 5 79 F .2 d 8 90 , 8 91 (5 th C ir . 1 97 8) , c e rt .7

denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979) . The Ag e Discrimination in Employ ment Act (“ AD EA ” )—

wh ic h w a s ame nd e d b y

theOW A c t—h a s b e e n c on str ue d to c re ate on ly rights ag ainst an alleg ed employer discriminator and not the bodies who investig ate the alleg ations of employ

ment discrimination. See Svenson v. Thomas, 607 F . Supp. 1004, 1006 (D.D.C. 1985) ( dismiss ing disc rimination claim of non-e mploy ee a g ainst EEOC under Rule 12(b)(6) for f ailure to state a

claim). Her e, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was ne ver e mploy ed by either the Boa

rd’s EEO off ice or the B oard itself. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Accordingly , the Court conclude s that neither Title VI Inor the OW Act provide the plaintiff a ba sis for re lief ag ainst the Boa rd. The plaintiff' s sole reme dy under Title VI Iand ADE A lies ag ainst the hea d of the
e mpl oyinga g e nc y

that a lle g e dly

pe rp e tr ate d th e dis c ri min atio n, and the re fo rethe se claims ca nnot be maintained a g ainst the defe ndant. See Svenson, 607 F . Supp. at 1004. (2) Do a g ency

regulations preclude a collate ral attack on the a djudication of a B oa rd a pp e a l? The de fenda

nt also argues that this action ca nnot be maintained be cause “the EEO [admini strative] complaint process is unava ilable to challeng e the a ctions of an administrative [law] j udg e in the adjudication of a B oard a ppeal.” Def

.’s Mot. at 6. The plaintiff re sponds that his claims ag ainst the Boa rd’s EEO officehad not pre viously been
a dju dic ate d b y

theB oa rd , a nd fu rt he r c ha ra c te ri zes his c la ims a s “ de a l[in g ] spe c if ic a lly with the appar ent fa lse information” pr ovided by the B oard’ s EEO off

ice pe rsonnel. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. Howeve r, all of the issues pr esente d by the plaintiff re late to the B oard’ s failure to reviewor prope rly addre ss his claims. I d. at 3-4. The reme dies sought by the pla int if f a refo r t he Court to r e ve rs e theB oa

rd ’s EE O o ff

ic e ’s de c isi on

and c omp e l it toT h e d e fen d a n t f u rth e r a sse rts th a t t h e p la intiff’s cla im s a re a lso b a rr e d a s re s ju d ic a ta si nce t he B o ard 3 d eni ed t he p l ai nt i f

f ’ s P et i t i o n and t he p l ai nt i f f had t he o p p o rt uni t y f

o r j ud i ci al revi ew o f

t hat de ni al be f

o re t he Federa l Ci r cui t . D ef
. ’ s M ot . at 8. I n r es po ns e, t he pl ai nt i f f cont ends t hat hi s cl ai ms a r e n ar r owl y pl ed aga i ns t t he B oard’ s E E O of f i ce, ch ar act er i zi ng t hem as i nca pabl e of pri or a dju di cat i on an d t hu s not bar r ed by r es j u di ca t a. Pl
. ’ s O pp’ n a t 6. H owe v er , t h er e i s n o n ee d t o r ea ch t h e i s s u e of r es j u di ca t a, a s n on e of t he p l ainti f

f ’ s claim s p ro vid e a l eg al b asis f o r t he reli ef he se ek s. A n O rd e r c o n siste n t with this M e m o ra n d u m O p inio n w a s issu e d o n M a rc h 2 8 , 2 0 0 8
. 4 8 investigate the plaintiff’ s underlying c laims. Compl . at 3. Howe ver, the EEOC has conclude d that individuals may not use the EEO c omplaint process to lodg e collate ral attacks on othe r proc eeding s, see, e .g ., Gryder v. Me rit Sy s. Prot. Bd., EEOC Appe al No. 01997117 (January

19, 2001) (inter

preting29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a) (1) a s only allowing EEO complaints to be brought by employees a

nd applicants for

employ ment and
rea ffirmingthat non-employee c omplaints constitut e impermissible collater al attac ks on Boa rd proc eeding s), a position with which the Court agree s. Moreove r, bec ause the Fe dera l Circuit Court of Appeals has “ exclusive jurisdiction of an appea l from a f inal
or de rs or fi na l de c isi on

of theMSPB [the B oa

rd ],” 28 U. S.C. § 1 29 5( a )( 9) ; se e 5 U .S. C. § 7703(a) ,(b), a

ny other judicial body

is preclude d from re viewingfinal dec isions of the B oa rd . T he re fo re , th is C ourt

c ann ot gra

nt t he pla int if

f’ s r e qu e ste d r e lie f b e c a

us e it i s without authority

to compel the B oard’ s EEO off ice to take the ac tion requested. 3 IV. Conclusion F or thea fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , th e Court wi ll GR ANT the Def

endant’ s Motion to Dismiss , and DENY thePla int if f’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss t

he De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss. 4 SO ORDERED this 23 day of January , 2009. rd REGGI E B. WAL TON Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge