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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

JOHN EARLE SULLIVAN, 

Defendant.

Crim. Action No. 21-78 (EGS)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant John Sullivan (“Mr. Sullivan”) is charged in a 

multi-count Superseding Indictment arising from his alleged 

participation in the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 

2021. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 56.1 Pending before the 

Court is Mr. Sullivan’s Motion for Reconsideration of the 

Court’s December 6, 2021 Denial of Motion to Release Seizure 

Order and Supplement to Motion to Release Seizure Order. Def.’s 

Mot., ECF No. 61. 

Upon careful consideration of the motion and opposition 

thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the 

Court hereby DENIES Mr. Sullivan’s motion for reconsideration.

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum 

Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page 

number of the filed document.
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I. Background

As described in the Court’s December 6, 2021 Memorandum 

Opinion, on April 28, 2021, a magistrate judge approved two 

sealed warrants authorizing the government’s seizure of $89,875 

in Mr. Sullivan’s bank account ending in 7715 and $1,000 in the 

Venmo account linked to Mr. Sullivan’s bank account. See Mem. 

Op., ECF No. 60 at 2-3; Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 29 at 10. The 

magistrate judge found probable cause to believe that the assets 

were forfeitable based on the supporting affidavit stating that 

the “funds Sullivan obtained by filming and selling footage of 

the January 6, 2021 Capitol riots . . . would not have existed 

but for Sullivan’s illegal participation in and encouragement of 

the riots, property destruction, and violence inside the U.S. 

Capitol in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).” Mem. Op., ECF No. 

60 at 2-3; Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 29 at 10. The warrants were 

served on April 29, 2021, and the government seized a balance of 

$62,813.76 from the bank account ending in 7715. Mem. Op., ECF 

No. 60 at 2-3; Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 29 at 10. 

On May 7, 2021, Mr. Sullivan filed a motion to release the

seizure order related to his bank account in Utah and to forbid

seizures of other accounts. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 25. Mr. 

Sullivan requested that the Court issue an order “discharging 

the seizure of his bank account in Utah and to prevent any 

further seizures of other bank accounts belonging to defendant.” 
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Id. at 1. In conjunction with the motion, Mr. Sullivan also 

requested a “post-deprivation, pretrial hearing” to challenge 

the sufficiency of the government’s evidence supporting the 

seizure of assets. Id. at 4. The government filed its opposition 

on May 21, 2021, see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 29; and Mr. Sullivan 

filed his reply brief on June 2, 2021, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 

31.

On December 6, 2021, the Court denied Mr. Sullivan’s 

motion. First, the Court held that a pretrial hearing was not 

warranted in this case because Mr. Sullivan had not made the 

threshold showing that he could not pay for rent or other 

household necessities without access to the seized assets.2 See 

Mem. Op., ECF No. 60 at 10. Second, the Court held that, even if

Mr. Sullivan had met the threshold showing and the Court 

proceeded to “ascertaining the requirements of the due process 

2 In so holding, the Court assumed without deciding that the 

reasoning in United States v. Bikundi, 125 F. Supp. 3d 178 

(D.D.C. 2015), applied in this case. In Bikundi, the district 

court found that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 did not 

“preclude[] an indicted defendant from invoking his due process 

rights before trial to test the sufficiency of probable cause 

for the forfeitability of seized property.” 125 F. Supp. 3d at 

187-88. Though the defendant’s request was based upon the 

alleged need to access seized funds to pay for household 

necessities, and not the alleged need to obtain counsel, the 

court weighed the Mathews v. Eldridge factors and found that due 

process required it to provide “pretrial judicial review of the 

challenged seizure warrants,” even though the defendant raised 

“no Sixth Amendment claim that the seizure of the Disputed Funds 

implicates his right to counsel.” Id. at 183, 191. 
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clause by looking to the Supreme Court’s declarations in Mathews 

v. Eldridge,” the Mathews factors would not weigh in his favor. 

Mem. Op., ECF No. 60 at 14 (cleaned up). The Mathews factors 

require a court to weigh “(1) the burdens that a requested 

procedure would impose on the Government against (2) the private 

interest at stake, as viewed alongside (3) the risk of an 

erroneous deprivation of that interest without the procedure and 

the probable value, if any, of the additional procedural 

safeguard.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 323, 333 (2014)

(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) 

(internal quotations and alterations omitted). The Court found 

that the first Mathews factor weighed against Mr. Sullivan 

because, though courts have found that the government’s

interests may be “outweighed by a criminal defendant’s interest 

in obtaining the counsel of his or her choice,” Sunrise Academy 

v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 2d 200, 207 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing 

United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 

2008)), here, Mr. Sullivan’s interest in acquiring access to the 

seized funds for rent and household necessities was “obviously 

far less pressing” than a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth 

Amendment right, see id. The Court also found that the second 

factor weighed against Mr. Sullivan because he had not “provided 

any evidence demonstrating that he [was] unable to pay for rent 

or other household necessities without the seized assets.” Mem. 
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Op., ECF No. 60 at 15. And finally, the Court found that the 

third factor did not weigh in Mr. Sullivan’s favor because 

“[w]hile there may inevitably be ‘some risk’ that the ‘probable 

cause finding reached in a non-adversarial context by a 

magistrate judge’ is erroneous, Sunrise Academy, 791 F. Supp. 2d 

at 206; Mr. Sullivan’s conclusory allegation that the proceeds 

of the seized bank account are not the product of the criminal 

activity alleged in the indictment carries little weight.” Mem. 

Op., ECF No. 60 at 15. Indeed, Mr. Sullivan had “acknowledge[d] 

that some of [his] assets were obtained from the sale of 

videotape from January 6, 2021.” Id. at 16.

Mr. Sullivan filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

Court’s Order and a “supplement” to his initial motion on 

December 17, 2021. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 61. The government 

filed its opposition on January 3, 2022. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF 

No. 63. The motion is ripe for adjudication.

II. Legal Standard

“Although the Federal Rules do not specifically provide for 

motions for reconsideration in criminal cases, the Supreme Court 

has recognized, in dicta, the utility of such motions.” United 

States v. Ferguson, 574 F. Supp. 2d 111, 113 (D.D.C. 2008) 

(citing United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976)). Courts 

in this District have “adopted such a philosophy by regularly 

entertaining motions for reconsideration in a criminal context, 
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applying the analogous Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” In re 

Extradition of Liuksila, 133 F. Supp. 3d 249, 255 (D.D.C. 2016); 

see also United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 

2009) (listing criminal cases applying standards from Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure in reconsideration context).

Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders may be 

granted at any time before the entry of a final judgment “as 

justice requires.” Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25 (D.C. Cir. 

2015). This “abstract phrase” is generally interpreted 

“narrowly” to permit reconsideration “only when the movant 

demonstrates: (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the 

discovery of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a 

clear error in the first order.” King & Spalding LLP v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 116, 119–20 

(D.D.C. 2019); see also United States v. Sutton, No. 21-598 

(PLF), 2021 WL 5999407, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021) (“In 

evaluating what ‘justice requires,’ the Court considers ‘whether 

it patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside 

the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, 

has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or 

[whether] a controlling or significant change in the law or 

facts [has occurred] since the submission of the issue to the 

Court.’”). Further, “for justice to require reconsideration, 

logically, it must be the case that[] some sort of ‘injustice’ 
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will result if reconsideration is refused. That is, the movant 

must demonstrate that some harm . . . would flow from a denial 

of reconsideration.” Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 540 

(D.D.C. 2005). 

“Beyond these circumstances, a motion for reconsideration 

should not be used as a vehicle for relitigating issues on which 

the court already ruled because the party disagrees.” United 

States v. Worrell, No. 21-cr-292-RCL, 2021 WL 2366934, at *10 

(D.D.C. June 9, 2021). Moreover, “[a]rguments that could have 

been, but were not, raised previously and arguments that the 

court has already rejected are not appropriately raised in a 

motion for reconsideration.” United States v. Booker, 613 F. 

Supp. 2d 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2009).

III. Analysis

Mr. Sullivan does not argue that the Court’s December 6, 

2021 ruling included legal error or that there has been an 

intervening change in the law. Instead, he offers for the 

Court’s consideration additional facts regarding his financial 

situation and financial outlook. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 61. 

Specifically, Mr. Sullivan’s motion for reconsideration includes 

further details regarding the vehicles he owns; the salary he 

earned while working for his father in 2021; his monthly rent; 

the approximate amount of money his parents give him to assist 

in paying his expenses; the approximate amount of money he has 
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in his bank accounts; and the current status of his car 

insurance and health insurance. Id. at 3-4, 15-17. In addition, 

he provided the Court with a notice of eviction he received on 

November 17, 2021; credit score reports; credit card statements; 

a declaration from his father including information about Mr. 

Sullivan’s salary and the extent to which he and his wife assist 

Mr. Sullivan with additional resources; and a declaration from 

Mr. Sullivan summarizing his monthly expenses. Id. at 8-17. 

Mr. Sullivan, however, offers no explanation for why he 

could not have presented these additional facts to the Court 

prior to the entry of judgment. See Miller v. Rosenker, No. 05-

2478 (GK), 2008 WL 11403193, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2008) (“A 

fact is not ‘new’ simply because the [party] has neglected to 

use it as the basis for an argument in a previous filing. 

Rather, to be considered ‘new,’ a previously unavailable fact 

must become available.”); Hentif v. Obama, 883 F. Supp. 2d 97, 

100 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ if a 

party had the ability to present it to the finder of fact prior 

to entry of judgment.”). Nor does Mr. Sullivan assert that the 

additional information he wishes the Court to consider was 

previously unavailable despite the exercise of due diligence. 

See Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. FCC, 515 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 n.1 

(D.D.C. 2007) (“Plaintiff’s failure to investigate a possible 

argument prior to the judgment does not make the results of its 
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research ‘new evidence’ . . . .”). Because it is wellestablished that a party may not use a motion for 

reconsideration to introduce additional facts not raised prior 

to the entry of judgment—and because there is no argument that 

the Court committed error or that there has been a significant 

change in the law—Mr. Sullivan’s arguments are not appropriately 

before the Court in a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g.,

Carter v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 503 F.3d 143, 145 n.2 

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum 

for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters 

that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous 

motion.” (quoting Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI 

Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Moreover, even if the Court accepted that the additional 

details constituted new evidence not previously available, Mr. 

Sullivan’s arguments would still fail. 

As the government points out, there are multiple 

inconsistencies or unexplained gaps in the financial information 

provided. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 63 at 3. For example, it is 

unclear why Mr. Sullivan reported his monthly expenses to be 

“$2,000-$2,250” on January 14, 2021, but in his most recent 

motion for reconsideration, he reports that his monthly 

household expenses have increased substantially to “$6,018.44.” 

See id. (noting that Mr. Sullivan’s current expenses are “over 
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three times what he reported upon arrest”); see also Def.’s 

Mot., ECF No. 61 at 16. In addition, Mr. Sullivan’s motion for 

reconsideration excludes, without explanation, sources of income 

that he had previously reported, such as his Google ad deposits, 

401K deposits, and freight broker contracts. See Def.’s Mot., 

ECF No. 61 at 3 (claiming that Mr. Sullivan “has no other 

sources of income” other than the money he earns while working 

with his father and the money he borrows from his family); 

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 63 at 4 (noting the sources of income 

that have been “dropped” from the motion for reconsideration).

And even assuming that the new information Mr. Sullivan 

provides in his motion is credible and meets the threshold 

showing of financial need, thereby addressing the Court’s first 

holding in its December 6, 2021 Memorandum Opinion, the motion 

for reconsideration still fails address the Court’s alternative

holding that the Mathews balancing test3 does not weigh in Mr. 

Sullivan’s favor. At most, the details in Mr. Sullivan’s motion 

would impact the Court’s analysis of the second Mathews factor, 

which concerns the private interest at stake. However, Mr. 

3 As stated in Section II, the Mathews factors require a court to 

weigh “(1) the burdens that a requested procedure would impose 

on the Government against (2) the private interest at stake, as 

viewed alongside (3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 

that interest without the procedure and the probable value, if 

any, of the additional procedural safeguard.” Kaley, 571 U.S. at

333 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335) (internal quotations and 

alterations omitted).
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Sullivan has not provided any arguments or case law casting 

doubt on the Court’s finding that the first and third Mathews

factors—the burden on the government and the risk of erroneous 

deprivation, respectively—weigh against him. Thus, the new 

information provided in the motion for reconsideration would not 

change the result of the balancing inquiry. 

In view of the above, the Court shall deny Mr. Sullivan’s 

request for a post-deprivation, pretrial hearing to challenge 

the seizure of his assets. In line with the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, Mr. Sullivan’s arguments shall therefore be 

addressed at a post-trial or post-plea hearing. See United 

States Bikundi, 125 F. Supp. 3d 178, 184 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Once 

the government has obtained a seizure warrant pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. § 853(f), the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide 

for no further inquiry into the property’s forfeitability until

disposition of the criminal charges on which the forfeiture is

predicated.” (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A))).
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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Mr. 

Sullivan’s motion for reconsideration. An appropriate Order 

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

August 1, 2022