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No. 117,989

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

LINUS BAKER,

Appellant,

v.

CALVIN HAYDEN, et al.

Defendants,

and

KATHERINE STOCKS, in her capacity as Official Custodian of Records

for the TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

Appellee.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

Although Kansas appellate courts generally do not decide moot questions or 

render advisory opinions, an exception can be made where a moot issue is capable of

repetition and raises concerns of public importance. 

2.

The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the 

Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The principles of statutory 

construction also apply to construction of Kansas Supreme Court rules. 

3.

Subject to certain exceptions, the Kansas Open Records Act requires all public 

records to be open for inspection. Court records are generally open public records. A 

court record includes an electronic recording documenting a court proceeding. 
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4. 

One exception to the Kansas Open Records Act disclosure requirement is public 

records, the disclosure of which is specifically prohibited or restricted by Kansas 

Supreme Court rules. 

5.

There is no language in Kansas Supreme Court Rule 362 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 

407) that could be construed as specifically prohibiting or restricting access to audio 

recordings of open court proceedings, which is required by the Kansas Open Records Act

to qualify as an exception to disclosure. 

6.

There is no language in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-219(a) that could be construed as 

specifically prohibiting or restricting access to audio recordings of open court 

proceedings, which is required by the Kansas Open Records Act to qualify as an 

exception to disclosure. 

7.

There is no language in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-221(a)(20) that could be construed 

as specifically prohibiting or restricting access to audio recordings of open court 

proceedings, which is required by the Kansas Open Records Act to qualify as an 

exception to disclosure. 

8.

The court shall award costs and a reasonable sum as attorney fees for services 

rendered in a Kansas Open Records Act action, including proceedings on appeal, if the 

court finds that the agency's denial of access to the public record was not in good faith 

and without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
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Appeal from Johnson District Court; ROBERT W. FAIRCHILD, judge. Opinion filed April 6, 2018. 

Reversed.

Linus L. Baker, appellant pro se. 

Stephen Phillips, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Stephen Douglas Bonney and Nolan Wright, legal intern, of ACLU Foundation of Kansas, of 

Overland Park, for amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of Kansas.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., STANDRIDGE and BRUNS, JJ.

STANDRIDGE, J.: Attorney Linus Baker filed a request under the Kansas Open 

Records Act (KORA), K.S.A. 45-215 et seq., with Katherine Stocks, the Court 

Administrator for the Tenth Judicial District, asking to inspect and copy digital audio 

recordings from court proceedings in a case in which he was neither a party nor counsel 

for a party. After the request was denied, Baker brought an action against Stocks, alleging 

that she had violated the KORA as well as his common-law and constitutional rights to 

access the audio recordings. The district court granted Stocks' motion to dismiss, holding 

that the recordings were exempt from disclosure under the KORA and specifically under 

Kansas Supreme Court Rule 362 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 407). But neither the KORA nor 

Rule 362 specifically prohibit or restrict the disclosure of audio recordings of open court 

proceedings; thus, the digital audio recordings requested by Baker were open public 

records under the KORA. Accordingly, we find the district court erred by shielding the 

audio recordings from disclosure.

FACTS

On September 2, 2015, Johnson County Sheriff's Department officials went to 

Baker's residence to serve a temporary order of protection from abuse (PFA) on Baker's 
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adult daughter. When the officials arrived at the scene, one of the sheriffs picked up 

Baker's granddaughter after mistakenly assuming that she was a child referenced in the 

custody portion of the PFA order.

On September 30, 2015, Baker faxed an open records request to the Johnson 

County District Court, asking to inspect and copy audio files from two open court 

hearings that had occurred in the PFA case on September 4, 2015, and September 8, 

2015. Baker was neither a party in the PFA case nor counsel for a party in the PFA case. 

After making his request, Baker exchanged a series of phone calls with Stocks, who 

informed Baker on multiple occasions that audio recordings were exempt from disclosure 

under the KORA but written transcripts were not; thus, Stocks advised Baker to submit a 

request for a court reporter to transcribe the audio recordings of the two hearings. When 

Baker continued to insist that he was entitled to the audio recordings, Chief Judge Kevin 

P. Moriarty denied Baker's request. Baker e-mailed Stocks to ask for reconsideration of 

his request, and they exchanged several e-mails, which once again resulted in Stocks 

informing Baker that the audio recordings were exempt from disclosure under the KORA 

but written transcripts were not; therefore, Baker should request written transcripts of the 

proceedings.

On January 3, 2017, Baker filed a pro se petition against various Johnson County 

officials, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2016) and state law claims of trespass, 

false arrest and imprisonment, assault, and battery based on the September 2, 2015 

incident at his residence. Relevant to this appeal, Baker also named Stocks as a 

defendant, alleging that her refusal to provide him with the requested audio recordings 

violated: (1) the KORA, (2) Baker's common-law right to judicial records, and (3) his 

constitutional right to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and his right to access public information under the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Baker requested declaratory and injunctive 

relief, compensatory damages, attorney fees, and costs.
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In response, Stocks filed a motion to dismiss. Stocks argued, in relevant part, that 

(1) audio recordings of court hearings were not subject to disclosure under the KORA or 

Supreme Court rules, (2) Baker had no common-law or constitutional right to access the 

audio recordings, (3) Baker's request to access the audio recordings was moot because 

counsel already had provided the recordings to Baker in response to a discovery request, 

and (4) Baker was not entitled to attorney fees.

The district court granted Stocks' motion to dismiss. The court found the audio 

recordings were exempt from disclosure under the KORA and Kansas Supreme Court 

Rule 362. The court further found that Baker had no constitutional or common-law right 

to listen to the audio recordings, that Baker's claims were moot because Stocks already 

had provided Baker with a copy of the requested recordings, and that Baker was not 

entitled to attorney fees because Stocks' decision to deny Baker's KORA request was 

made in good faith and therefore was proper. The district court certified its ruling as a 

final judgment under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-254(b). 

Baker timely appeals. This court permitted the American Civil Liberties Union 

(ACLU) to file a brief as amicus curiae.

ANALYSIS

1. Mootness

The district court held that Baker's claims were moot because Stocks already had 

provided Baker with the requested audio recordings. A case is moot when the controversy 

between the parties has ended and any judgment of the court would be ineffective. State 

ex rel. Slusher v. City of Leavenworth, 285 Kan. 438, 454, 172 P.3d 1154 (2007). As a 

general rule, Kansas appellate courts do not decide moot questions or render advisory 

opinions. Skillett v. Sierra, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1041, 1046, 53 P.3d 1234 (2002). Because 
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the mootness doctrine is a court-made doctrine and is not jurisdictionally based, it is 

amenable to exceptions. State v. Montgomery, 295 Kan. 837, Syl. ¶ 2, 286 P.3d 866 

(2012). One commonly applied exception is the circumstance where a moot issue is 

capable of repetition and raises concerns of public importance. Because mootness is a 

doctrine of court policy, our review of the issue is unlimited. State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 

845, 849, 286 P.3d 871 (2012). 

The parties agree that after Baker filed the present action, Stocks provided him with 

the requested audio recordings. We find, however, that this fact alone does not render the 

case moot because the issue here is one that is both capable of repetition and involves 

public importance. Voluntary cessation of illegal activity may moot litigation if "'(1) it can 

be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation 

will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the 

effects of the alleged violation.'" See Stano v. Pryor, 52 Kan. App. 2d 679, 683, 372 P.3d 

427 (2016). Although Stocks ultimately provided Baker with the audio recordings he 

sought, it appears she only did so pursuant to the rules of discovery. Stocks continues to 

advance the argument that Baker was not entitled to the recordings under the KORA. 

Thus, the question of whether audio recordings of open court proceedings are available to 

the public under the KORA is an issue capable of repetition. In addition to being capable 

of repetition, this issue involves public importance, meaning "'something more than that 

the individual members of the public are interested in the decision of the appeal from 

motives of curiosity or because it may bear upon their individual rights or serve as a guide 

for their future conduct as individuals.'" Hilton, 295 Kan. at 851. The right of the public to 

obtain audio recordings of court proceedings clearly involves a matter of public 

importance. For both of these reasons, we find Baker's claims are not moot.
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2. Motion to dismiss

Baker argues the district court erred by granting Stocks' motion to dismiss. 

Specifically, Baker claims that the district court improperly relied on Supreme Court 

Rule 362 in holding that the recordings were exempt under the KORA and that the court's 

ruling otherwise violated his common-law and constitutional rights of access to court 

records. Baker also maintains that he is entitled to attorney fees as a result of Stocks' 

unlawful denial of access to the recordings. In its amicus curiae brief, the ACLU argues 

that the public and the press have a common-law right to inspect and obtain copies of 

electronic recordings of court proceedings.

a. Standard of review

We review a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss independently, 

with no required deference to the district court. Platt v. Kansas State University, 305 Kan. 

122, 126, 379 P.3d 362 (2016). We view the well-pleaded facts in a light most favorable 

to the plaintiff and assume as true those facts and any inferences reasonably drawn from 

them; if those facts and inferences state any claim upon which relief can be granted, then 

the dismissal was improper. Cohen v. Battaglia, 296 Kan. 542, 545-46, 293 P.3d 752 

(2013). 

The issues presented to the court require us to construe statutes enacted by the 

Kansas Legislature and rules adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court. The most 

fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature governs if 

that intent can be ascertained. State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of Wichita, 303 Kan. 650, 659, 

367 P.3d 282 (2016). An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent 

through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. 

When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about 

the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading 
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something into the statute that is not readily found in its words. Ullery v. Othick, 304 

Kan. 405, 409, 372 P.3d 1135 (2016). The principles of statutory construction also apply 

to construction of Supreme Court rules. If the language of a Supreme Court rule is clear, 

courts are bound by the rule's language. Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 287 Kan. 450, 

460, 196 P.3d 1162 (2008). 

Determining whether the district court correctly applied the KORA and a 

particular KORA exception to disclosure is a question of law involving interpretation of 

statute. Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Simmons, 274 Kan. 194, Syl. ¶¶ 3, 14, 

50 P.3d 66 (2002); Cypress Media, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 268 Kan. 407, 416, 997 

P.2d 681 (2000). The KORA's exceptions to disclosure are to be narrowly interpreted, 

and the burden is on the public agency opposing disclosure. Telegram Publishing Co. v. 

Kansas Dept. of Transportation, 275 Kan. 779, 785, 69 P.3d 578 (2003); Wichita Eagle 

& Beacon Publishing Co., 274 Kan. 194, Syl. ¶ 3. 

b. The Kansas Open Records Act

The KORA, K.S.A. 45-215 et seq., was passed by the Legislature "to ensure 

public confidence in government by increasing the access of the public to government 

and its decision-making processes." Data Tree v. Meek, 279 Kan. 445, 454, 109 P.3d 

1226 (2005). The Legislature has declared it to be "the public policy of the state that 

public records shall be open for inspection by any person unless otherwise provided by 

this act." K.S.A. 45-216(a). The Legislature also directed that the KORA "shall be 

liberally construed and applied to promote such policy." K.S.A. 45-216(a). 

To that end, K.S.A. 45-218(a) provides: "All public records shall be open for 

inspection by any person, except as otherwise provided by this act." The right to inspect 

also generally includes a right to copy. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-219(a) ("Any person 

may make abstracts or obtain copies of any public record to which such person has access 
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under this act."). K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-221(a), which contains the statutory exceptions to 

disclosure, sets out in detail 55 categories of records that public agencies are not required 

to disclose. Significantly, the KORA does not prohibit disclosure of records contained 

within these exceptions but instead makes their release discretionary with the agency's 

official records custodian. Harris Enterprises, Inc. v. Moore, 241 Kan. 59, 63-64, 734 

P.2d 1083 (1987). 

In denying Baker access to the audio recordings he sought, the district court relied 

on K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-221(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that a public agency 

is not required to disclose "[r]ecords the disclosure of which is specifically prohibited or 

restricted by federal law, state statute or rule of the Kansas supreme court." (Emphasis 

added.) The district court held that Stocks was not required to disclose the recordings 

sought by Baker because the recordings were prohibited or restricted from disclosure by 

Supreme Court Rule 362. Rule 362 provides:

"Written transcripts of electronic recordings shall be prepared by court personnel 

under the direction of the clerk of the district court. The person making the transcript 

shall certify under seal of the court that the transcript is a correct transcript of the 

specified proceedings as recorded. Upon request of counsel, the clerk of the district court 

shall make arrangements for counsel to review the electronic recordings of the case 

involved. The clerk may correct a transcript of recorded proceedings upon stipulation by 

counsel or upon order of the court." 2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 407.

The district court construed the language in Supreme Court Rule 362 as restrictive 

in nature, limiting access to any electronic recording of a court proceeding to only (1) 

counsel of record (2) for the sole purpose of determining the accuracy of a transcript 

prepared by a court reporter based on the electronic recording:

"[Supreme Court Rule 362] provides that the counsel of record in the recorded 

proceeding may ask the court clerk to permit counsel to review the electronic recording 
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of the case involved. The purpose of this review is to allow counsel to determine the 

accuracy of the prepared transcript and to permit the person certifying the transcript to 

correct any errors that the parties or court determine exist in the transcript.

"Neither the court rules nor the statutes provide for any other situation under 

which an individual can obtain access to the original electronic recording of the 

proceedings. A person may obtain a transcript of the proceedings by following the 

procedure set out in the Supreme Court Rules, including payment of the cost of 

preparation of the transcript.

. . . .

"The Kansas Supreme Court rules provide a reasonable procedure for access to 

the record of court proceedings. Those rules are an exception to the KORA. The court 

finds that the KORA exempts the recording Baker seeks from disclosure other than [b]y 

using the procedure for requesting a transcript described in the court rules."

Stocks asks us to affirm the district court. But to do so, we would have to find that 

the Kansas Supreme Court intended the use of electronic recordings in courtrooms to be 

limited to helping the court reporter prepare a transcript and assisting counsel to correct 

any transcription error. Construing Rule 362 in the manner suggested by Stocks is not 

only contrary to the clear and unambiguous language used by the Supreme Court in the 

rule, but also is incompatible with the framework within which the Supreme Court 

categorized the rule.

Because this section of our opinion involves application of the KORA and then, in 

turn, a Supreme Court rule, we find it helpful to undertake a step-by-step analysis. We 

begin with the KORA. Subject to certain exceptions, the KORA requires all public 

records to be open for inspection. See K.S.A. 45-218(a). Court records are generally open 

public records. See Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 227 Kan. 676, 686-88, 608 P.2d 972 (1980). 

A court record includes: 

"(1) all original papers and exhibits filed in the district court;

"(2) the court reporter's notes and transcripts of all proceedings;
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"(3) any other court authorized record of the proceedings, including an 

electronic recording; and 

"(4) the entries on the appearance docket in the district court clerk's office." 

(Emphasis added.) Kansas Supreme Court Rule 3.01(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. 

R. 19).

Public agencies are not required to disclose "[r]ecords the disclosure of which is 

specifically prohibited or restricted by . . . rule of the Kansas supreme court." (Emphasis 

added.) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-221(a)(1). In turn, Rule 362 provides that "[u]pon request 

of counsel, the clerk of the district court shall make arrangements for counsel to review 

the electronic recordings of the case involved. The clerk may correct a transcript of 

recorded proceedings upon stipulation by counsel or upon order of the court." (2018 Kan. 

S. Ct. R. 407.) Although there is language in this rule that could be construed as 

compulsory ("shall make arrangements"), there is no language in the rule that could be 

construed as prohibitory or restrictive, as required by the KORA to qualify as an 

exception to disclosure. In sum, we find no indication from the plain and unambiguous 

language used in the rule from which we can conclude that our Supreme Court intended 

to prohibit or restrict public access to electronically recorded hearings of open court 

proceedings. 

Our finding in this regard is supported by the Supreme Court's decision not to 

mention or refer to the KORA in Rule 362. This decision is notable given that the KORA 

is specifically referenced in other Supreme Court rules. See Supreme Court Rule 1.03(h) 

(2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 2) (governing administration of KORA for public records 

maintained by district and appellate courts); Supreme Court Rule 106(d)(4) (2018 Kan. S. 

Ct. R. 167) (Subject to certain exceptions, "marriage licensing documents in the custody 

of a district court are confidential and are not subject to disclosure under the Kansas 

Open Records Act, K.S.A. 45-215 et seq. . . . Marriage licensing documents created 

before October 1, 2015, may be closed in whole or in part by redaction at the discretion 

of the chief judge of a judicial district or in accordance with an applicable exception to 
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the Kansas Open Records Act."); Supreme Court Rule 167 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 216) ("A 

juror questionnaire is not a public record under the Kansas Open Records Act."); 

Supreme Court Rule 196(a)(10) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 229) (defining the term "'Records 

officer'" as "the person responsible for safeguarding the access under the Kansas Open 

Records Act . . . to records held by a court"); Supreme Court Rule 1102(b) (2018 Kan. S. 

Ct. R. 571-72) ("For purposes of complying with the Kansas Open Records Act, K.S.A. 

45-215 et seq., the public information director for the Kansas Supreme Court is the 

official custodian of all district judicial nominating commission records, and the clerk of 

the Kansas appellate courts is the official custodian of all Supreme Court nominating 

commission records."). 

As noted above, construing Rule 362 as an across-the-board restriction and 

prohibition against the public accessing electronic recordings of open court proceedings

also is incompatible with the framework within which the Supreme Court categorized the 

rule. The Kansas Supreme Court has authority to adopt administrative rules and policies 

for all courts of this state. K.S.A. 20-101 (citing section 1 of article 3 of the Kansas 

Constitution). The Kansas Supreme Court has organized the rules it adopted into the 

following categories: 

 Rules Relating to Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Appellate Practice

 Rules Relating to District Courts

 Rules Relating to Discipline of Attorneys

 Rules Relating to the State Board of Examiners of Court Reporters 

 Required Continuing Judicial Education

 Rules Relating to Judicial Conduct

 Rules Relating to Admission of Attorneys

 Rules Relating to Continuing Legal Education

 Rules Relating to Mediation

 Media Coverage of Judicial Proceedings

 Rules Relating to Judicial Nominating Commission

 Rules Relating to Certification and Education (Municipal Court Judges)

 Rule Relating to the Child Support Guidelines Advisory Committee
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 Rule Relating to Access to Justice Committee

 Rule Relating to Alternative Dispute Resolution Council

 Rule Relating to Supreme Court Task Force on Permanency Planning

 Rules Relating to Language Access

Significantly, Rule 362, which the district court found to be a specific restriction 

and prohibition against disclosure of electronic recordings of open court proceedings, is 

not categorized as a general rule relating to the district courts but instead is categorized as 

a subsection within the Rules Relating to the State Board of Examiners of Court 

Reporters:

 Rules Relating to the State Board of Examiners of Court Reporters 

o Rule 301 State Board of Examiners of Court Reporters

o Rule 302 Membership—Appointment

o Rule 303 Organization—Quorum

o Rule 304 Duties and Powers; Immunity

o Rule 305 Meetings

o Rule 306 Rules

o Rule 307 Application—Examination Fee

o Rule 308 Examination

o Rule 309 Issuance of Certificates 

o Rule 310 Title and Right to Its Use; Annual Renewal of Certificate

o Rule 311 Suspension or Revocation 

o Rule 312 Temporary Certificate

o Rule 313 Fund—Expenses

o Rules 350-359 Official Court Reporters

o Rules 360-366 Electronic Recording—Transcripts

 Rule 360 Recording Equipment

 Rule 361 Identification of Transcripts

 Rule 362 Corrections of Transcripts

 Rule 363 Electronic Transcript

 Rule 364 Clerk of the Court Duties

 Rule 365 Orders for Transcripts

That Rule 362 is categorized as one adopted by the State Board of Examiners of Court 

Reporters is further support for our finding that the Supreme Court did not intend Rule 

362 to constitute a sweeping prohibition and restriction of public access to electronically 
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recorded hearings of open court proceedings. Rather than prohibiting or restricting 

access to electronic recordings created, Rule 362 provides a framework for counsel to 

access electronic recordings after a court reporter has transcribed the hearing. A rule 

relating to court reporters that permits counsel to access electronic recordings to 

determine the accuracy of the prepared transcript stands in stark contrast to a broad rule 

enacted by the Kansas Supreme Court that specifically prohibits and restricts public 

access to all electronic recordings of proceedings under the KORA. 

Although not discussed by the district court, Stocks and the ACLU both suggest 

that the recordings sought by Baker were exempt under another KORA provision, K.S.A. 

2017 Supp. 45-219(a). This statute provides, in relevant part:

"A public agency shall not be required to provide copies of radio or recording tapes or 

discs, video tapes or films, pictures, slides, graphics, illustrations or similar audio or 

visual items or devices, unless such items or devices were shown or played to a public 

meeting of the governing body thereof." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-219(a).

But a plain and unambiguous reading of the statute indicates that the audio-visual items 

referenced in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-219(a) are akin to items that might be introduced or 

admitted as exhibits in a court proceeding. In that context, a court would only be required 

to provide copies of these items if they were shown or played in a public court 

proceeding. The language in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-219(a) referencing "similar audio or 

visual items or devices" cannot be read to include an audio recording of the court 

proceeding itself. See Ullery, 304 Kan. at 409 (when statute is plain and unambiguous, 

appellate court should refrain from reading something into statute that is not readily 

found in its words). In any event, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-219(a) only refers to the public's 

right to copy the listed items and does not in any way prohibit the public's ability to 

inspect them. 
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Finally, Stocks alleges that the audio recordings were not subject to mandatory 

disclosure under the KORA because they are considered part of the court reporter's notes. 

See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-221(a)(20) (exempting notes from disclosure). This argument 

is unpersuasive because this case does not involve a recording by a court reporter to be 

used as notes to assist in preparation of a transcript of the proceedings. Again, a court 

reporter may use an electronic recording of a court proceeding to assist in the preparation 

of a transcript. But an audio recording of open court proceedings—as we are dealing with 

in this case—does not fall into the category of court reporter's notes. See Supreme Court 

Rule 3.01(a)(2) and (3) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 19). 

In short, there is no Kansas statute or Supreme Court rule that specifically 

prohibits or restricts the disclosure of audio recordings of open court proceedings. See 

K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-221(a)(1). The district court's reliance on Supreme Court Rule 362 

was erroneous and did not promote the public policy of opening public records for 

inspection as determined by the Legislature. See K.S.A. 45-216(a). 

3. Attorney fees

The only remaining argument we need to address is Baker's request for attorney 

fees. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-222(d) provides: 

"In any action hereunder, the court shall award costs and a reasonable sum as an 

attorney's fee for services rendered in such action, including proceedings on appeal, to be 

recovered and collected as part of the costs to the plaintiff if the court finds that the 

agency's denial of access to the public record was not in good faith and without a 

reasonable basis in fact or law. The award shall be assessed against the public agency that 

the court determines to be responsible for the violation."

Overlooking the fact that Baker has appeared pro se during all relevant proceedings 

below and continues to do so on appeal, in order for attorney fees to be awarded under 
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K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 45-222(d), an agency's action must be both "not in good faith" and 

"without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The district court decided this issue on a 

motion to dismiss and without a factual or evidentiary hearing. As a result, there is 

simply no evidence in the record before us to show that Stocks' actions in responding to 

Baker's request were not made in good faith. In addition, whether audio recordings of 

open court proceedings are exempt from disclosure under the KORA is a question of first 

impression for Kansas courts. Thus, it cannot be said that Stocks' actions were necessarily 

without a reasonable basis in fact or law at the time she denied Baker's request. See Data 

Tree, 279 Kan. at 468. Baker is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 

The district court's decision finding the audio recordings were exempt from 

disclosure under the KORA and Supreme Court Rule 362 is reversed. Because Baker's 

claims against Stocks are moot with respect to the specific audio recordings at issue in 

this case, however, remand to the district court in this particular case appears 

unnecessary. Baker's request for attorney fees is denied. 

Reversed.