1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### MASS AC HUSE TTS ET AL


### . v . ENV I RONME N TAL P R O

TECTI O N AGE N CY ET AL


### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRI CT OF COLUM B IA CIRCU IT No. 05–1 12 0. Ar g u ed November29, 200 6—D e c i ded Apr il 2, 2007 Based on respected scientific opin ion t h a tawell-doc u ment ed ris e in

g l obal temper atu r e s an d att en dan tc lima t o log i c a l an d e n v i r o n m en tal cha nges have res u lt ed from as i gnifica n tincrea s e in t h e a t m os pheric conce nt ra t i on of “ g reenhous e ga s e s , ” agroup of priva t e orga niza t i on s petition ed th e En v i r o n m en tal Pr otec tionAg en cy(EPA) to beg i nr e gu la t i ng t h e emis s i ons of four s uch ga s e s , in cluding ca rb o ndioxide, un

der§202(a)( 1 ) of th e CleanAirAc t, w h i c hr e qu ir es th at th e EPA “sh a ll byr e g u lationpr esc r ibe .

. . stan dar d s applic a b le to th e emi s sionof an yairpollu tan t fr o man yc l ass . . . of n e wmotorv e h i c l es . . . which in [t heEPA Adminis t ra t o r’s ] j u dg mentca us e[s ], or cont rib

u t e[s] to, air pollu tion

. . . r e ason ably

. . . an tic i pated to en dan g er pu blich e alth orw e lfar e,”42 U. S. C. §7521(a)( 1 ). Th e Ac t def i n e s “ a i r polluta nt” t o include “ a ny a i r po llution agent .

. . , including an y physical, che mical .

. . sub s tance .
. . emitted in to .
. . th e ambien t air

. ” §7602(g)

. EPA u l timatelyden i ed the petition , r e ason in gth at (1) th e Ac t do es n o t au th or i z e it to is su e man d ator yr e g u lation s t o address global climate change, and (2 ) ev en if it had the authority to s e tgreenho us e ga s emis s i ons t a n da rds , it would have b e en un wis e t o do so at th at time bec a u s e a c a u s al lin k betw eeng r een h o u s e g a ses a n d t h e incre a s e in glob a ls urfa c e a i r t e mpera t ures wa s notun equ iv o c a llyestabl ish e d. Th e ag en c yfu r th e rch ar ac ter i zed an yEPA regulation of motor-vehicle emission s as apiec emealap pr oac hto c li

ma t e cha nge tha twould conflictwit ht h e Pres ident ’ s comprehens ive a pproa ch invo lving a ddit i ona ls u pportfor t e chnologi ca l innova t i on, t h e crea t i on of nonre gula t o ry progra ms t o encou r a g e vo lunt a r y pri

va t e-s ect o r reduct ions in gr eenhous e ga s emis sions , a n d furt her re s e a rch on cli m a t e cha nge, a n d mightha mper t h e Pres ident ’ s ab i lity2 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Sy llabu s t o pers ua de key developingn a t i ons t o reduce emis s i ons .

Pet i t i oners , now j o ined b yint e rveno r Ma s s a chus et ts a n d ot her s t at e a n d local gover n ment s , s o ught revie win t h e D

. C. Circuit

. Al

though each o f the thr ee ju dg es onth e pan e l w r o te separ ately , tw o of th em ag r eed t h at th e EPA Admin i s t ratorproperly ex erc i sed h i s di s cret i on in den y ing t h e rulema k ing pet i t i on. One j u dge co ncluded t h a t th e Admin i str ator ’ s ex er c i se of “ju d g m en t” as to w h e th er a pollu tan t c o u l d “r eason ablybe an tic i pated to en da n g er pu blichealthorw e l

fa re,” §7 5 2 1 ( a) (1 ), could b e b a s ed on s c ientific unce rt a i nt y a s well a s ot her fa ct ors , including t h e c o ncer nt h a tunila t e ra l U. S

. regula t i on of mot o r-vehicle emis sions could wea k en effort s t o reduce ot her coun

tries’ greenho use gas emissions. The second judge opined that peti

tion er s h a d fa iled to de mon s tr ate th e par t ic u l ar ized in j u r yto th em that i s necessary to est abl ish standing under Ar ticle III, but accepte d t h e cont ra ry vi ew a s t h e law of t h e ca s e a n d j o ined t h e j u dgmenton th e mer i ts as t h e c l osest to th at w h i c hh e pr efer r e d. The c o ur t th er e fore denied re view. Held: 1. Petition er s h av e stan din gto c h a llen g e th e EPA’s den i al of th eir r u l emakin gpetition

. Pp. 12– 23. (a) This case suffers from no ne of the defects that would preclude it from being a just iciable Article III “Co n trovers[y] .” See, e.g . , Lu

ther v. Borden , 7 How. 1

. M o reover , t h e p r oper co ns t ruc t i on of acon g r ession al s t a t u t e is ane m i n en tlysu itab l e qu estionforfeder a l-c o u r t r e solu tion , an d Con g r e ss h a s au th or ized pr ec iselyth is ty pe of c h a l

len g e to EPA ac tion , see 4 2 U. S. C. §760 7(b)(1). Con t r a r yto EPA’ s a r gument , s t a n ding do ct rin e pres ent s noins u perab l e j uris d ict i onal obst ac le h e r e . To demon s tr ate stan din g , a litig an t mu s tsh owth at it has suffered a concrete and particular izedinjury that is either actual orimmin e n t , t h at th e in ju r yis fa ir lytr ac eable to th e def e n d an t, an d that a favorab l e decision will lik ely redres s that injury. See Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U. S. 555, 56 0 –56 1. How e v e r , a litig an t to whom Congre s s ha s “a ccorded aprocedur a lrightt o pro t ecthis con c r e te in ter e sts , ” id. , at 57 3, n . 7—h e r e , the r i gh t to c h a llen g e ag en cy ac tionu n l aw fu llyw i th h e ld, §7607(b)(1)— “c anasser tth at r i gh t w i th

out meeting al l the normal s tanda rds for r e dressab ility and imme di

ac y , ” ibid. On lyon e petiti on ern e eds to h av e stan din gto au th or ize review. S e e Rumsfeldv. Forum for Academi can d Insti t utio nal Rights, Inc. , 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2. Ma ssachusetts has a special posi

tionan d in ter e st h e r e . It is a sov e r e ig nState an d n o t, as in Lujan , a pr iv ate in div i du al, an d it ac tu allyow n s a g r eat deal of th e ter r i tory alleged to be affected. The sovereign pre r o g atives to force reductions ing r een h o u s e g a s e m is sion s , to n e g o tiate emiss i on s tr ea ties w i thde

veloping cou n t r ies , a n d (in some ci rcums t ances ) t o exerci s e t h e police3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s power t o redu ce mot o r-vehi c l e emis s i on s a r e no w lodgedin t h eFed

era lGovernment

. Beca us e congres s ha s ordered EPA t o prot ectMa s s a chus et t s (among ot hers ) b ypres crib i ng a pplicab l e s t a n da rds , §7 5 2 1 ( a)(1 ), and ha s given Ma s s a chus et ts aconcomit a ntprocedura l r i gh t to ch allen g e th e r ejec t ionof its r u l emakin gpetitionas arbi tr ar y an d c a pr ic iou s , §7607(b)(1), petition er s’ su bmis sion s as t h eyper tain t o Ma s s a chus et t s have s a t i s f ied t h e mos tdema nding s t anda rds of t h e adv e r s ar ial pr oc ess. EPA’s steadf as t r efu sal to r e g u lat e g r een h o u s e ga s emiss i ons pres ent s arisk of ha rm t o Ma s s a chus et ts t h a t is b o th “ac tu al” an d “ i mmin e n t ,” Luj a n , 504 U. S., at 560, an d th er e is a “subs tanti al li kelihood that the judi cial re lief requested” will promp t EPA to take s t eps to r e du c e th at r i sk, Duk e Power Co. v. Carolina Environmen ta l StudyGro up, Inc. , 438 U. S. 59, 79. Pp. 12–17. (b ) The ha rms a s s o ciat ed wit hclima t e cha nge a r e s e ri ous a n d well recognize d

. The Gover n ment ’s own obj e ct ive as s e ss mentof t h e releva nts c ien c e a n d as t rong cons ens u s a m ong q u a lified expert s in

dic ate th at g l o bal w a r m in gt h r e aten s , inter alia, a precipita t e rise in s e alevels , s e vere a n d ir reve rs ib le cha nges t o na t ura l ec os ys t e ms , a s i gnifica n treduct ion in wi nt er s n owpa c kwit hdirect a n d import a n t economic co ns eq uences , a n dincrea s es in t h e s p rea dof dis e as e a n d the ferocity of weather event s . Th at th ese c h a n g es ar e widelysh ar ed does n o t min i mize M a ssac h u s etts’ in ter e s tinth e ou tc o m e of th i s li ti

g ation

. SeeFede ral Electio n Comm’nv. Ak ins , 524 U. S. 11, 2 4

. Ac

cording t o pet i t i oners ’ unco nt es t e d a f fidavit s , glob a l s e alevels ros e betw een10 a n d 20 c e n t imeter s ov erth e 20thc e n t u r y as a r e su lt of glob a lwa rmin g a n d have a l rea d y b e gun t o s w a llow Mas s a chus et ts ’ coa s t a l la nd. Remediat ion cos t s a l one, moreover , co uld rea ch h un dr eds of millio n s of dollar s . Pp. 17–1 9. (c) Give n EPA’s fa ilure t o dis p ut e t h e exist e nce of aca us a lcon nect ion b e t w een ma n-ma de green h ou se g a s emis sion s an d g l oba l wa rming, it s r efus a l t o regul a t e s uch emis s i ons , a taminimum, “ c on tributes” to Massachusetts ’ injuries. EPA overstates its case in argu

in gth at its d e c i sionn o t to r e g u late c o n t ribu tes so in si g n ific an tlyto pet i t i oners ’ inj uries t h a titca nnotb e ha l e d int o federa l court , a n d t h a tt h ere is no rea lis tic poss ib ilit y t h att h e relief s o ughtwould mit i

g ate g l obal c l imate c h a n g e an d r e medy petition er s’ in ju r i es, espe cia lly s i nce predict e d increa s es in emis sions from China , India , a n d ot her developing na t i ons will likely offs et a n y ma rgina l domes t ic de

crea s e EPA regula t i on could b r ing ab o ut
. Agencies , like legis l at ures , do notgenera lly res o lve ma ss ive problems in one fell swo o p, see Wil

liamsonv. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. , 348 U. S. 483, 48 9 , bu t in stead whit t l e a w a yover t i me, r efining t h eir a pproa ch a s circums t a nces cha nge a n d t h ey develop a more nua ncedunders t a n ding of ho w b e s t to proceed, cf. SEC v. Chene ry Corp. , 332 U. S. 194, 202 –20 3. Th at a4 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Sy llabu s fir s t step migh t be ten tat iv e does n o t byits e lf n e g ate feder a l-c o u r tju

ris d ict i on. And redu cing domes t ic automobile em is si ons is hardly ten tativ e . Leav in gaside th e oth e r g r eenh ou se g a ses, th e r e c o r di n di

c ates th a tth e U. S. tr an spor tationsec t ore m its anen or mou s qu an tity of c a rb ondiox i d e in to th e atmosph er e. Pp. 20–21. (d) While regu la t i ng mot o r-vehicle emis s i ons ma y notb yit s e lf r e v erseglob a l wa rming, itdoes notfollow t h a tt h e Courtla cks j uris

dic t ionto dec i de w h e th erE PA h a s a du tyto take steps to slow or re duc eit. See L a rsonv. Valen t e , 456 U. S. 228, 24 3, n

. 15. Bec a u s e of t h e enormous pot e nt ia l conseq uences , t h e fa ctt h a taremedy’s effec

tiv e n e ss migh t be delay e d du r i n gth e (r elativ e lysh or t) time it t a kes for anew mot o r-vehicle flee tt o repla c e a nolder one is es s e nt ia lly ir

releva nt
. Nor is itdis p os it ive t h a tdeveloping count riesa r e pois ed t o s u b s ta nt ially increa s e gree n h ous e ga s emis s i ons : A reduct ion in do

mes t ic emis s i ons would s l ow t h e pa ce of glob a lemis s i ons increa s es , n o matterw h at h a ppen s el s e w h e r e . Th e Cou r tattac h e s c o n s ider able sig n ific an c e to EPA’s e s pou s ed belief th at g l obal c l i m ate c h a n g e mu st be addr essed. Pp. 21–2 3.

2. The scope of the Court’s r e view of the merits of the statutory is

s u es is na rrow. Alt h ougha na g enc y ’s ref u s a l t o initia t e enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily su bjec t to j u dic i al r e v i ew , Heck le rv. Chaney , 470 U. S. 821, there are key differences between nonen

for c e men tan d den i als of r u l emakin gpetit i on s th at ar e, as inth e pr e s e ntcircums t a nces , expres s l y a u t h orized. EPA con c lu ded a l t e rna tiv e lyinits petitionden i al t h at it lac k ed au th or ityun der§7521(a)(1 ) t o regula t e new vehicle emis s i ons b e ca use ca rb on dioxide is nota n “airpollu tan t” u n d er§7602, an d th at, ev enif it posses s e d au th or ity , itwould decline t o exercis e itb e ca us e reg u la t i on would conflictwit h ot her a d minist ra t i on priorit i es . Beca us e t h e Actexpre s s l y permits r e v i ewof su c hanac tion , §7 607(b)(1), th i s Cou r t“m ayr e v e r s e [it if i t fin d s it to be] arbitr ar y , c a pr ic iou s , anab u s e of disc r e tion , oroth e r w i se n o t inac cor d an c e w i thl a w , ” §7607( d)(9). Pp. 24–25.

3

. Beca us e gr eenhous e ga s e s fitwell wit h in t h e Act ’ s ca pa cious defin i tionof “ a irpollu tan t,” EPA h a s s t a t u tor yau th or ityto r e g u late emis sion of s uch ga s e s from new mo t o r vehicles

. T h a tdefinit i on— which in clude s “ anya i r pollut ion a g ent
. . . , in cluding anyphysical, chemical,

. . . substance

. . . emitted into

. . . the ambient air .

. . ,” §760 2(g) (emph asis a dded) —embr a ces all a i rb orne c o mpounds of wha t e ver s t ripe. Mo reove r , ca rb ondioxide a n d ot her gr eenho us e ga s e s a r e undoub t e dly “ p h y s i ca l [a nd] chemica l .

. . s u b s t a nce[s ]. ” Ibid. EPA’s r e lian c e onpos t en ac tmen t c o n g r e ssion al ac tion s an d de

liber at ion s it v i ew s as tan t a mou n tto a c o mman dto r e fr ainfr om regulating greenhouse gasemission s i s unavailing. Even if pos

t e na ct mentlegis l a t ive his t ory co uld s h ed lighton t h e mea n ing of a n5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s ot herwis e-una mb iguous s t a t ut e, EPA ident i fies not h in g s u gges t ing th at Con g r e ss mean t to c u r tail EPA’s p o w e rto tr eatg r eenh ou se gases as air pollutants. The Courthas no difficulty reconciling Con

gress’ various efforts to pr omote interag e ncy collaboration and re

s e a rch t o b e t t e r u n ders t a n d clima t e cha nge wit ht h ea g enc y ’s pre ex istin gman d ate to r e g u lat e “an yairpoll u tan t” th at m a yen dan g er the public welfare. FDAv. Brown & Will iamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U. S. 120, 133 , distin g u ish e d. Al so u n p ersu asiv e is EPA’s ar g u men t th at its r e g u lationof motor

- v e h i c l e ca rb on dioxide emis s i ons would r e qu ir e it to tigh tenmileag e stan dar d s, a j o b (ac c o r d in g to EPA) th a t Con g r e ss h a s as sig n ed to t h e D e par t me n tof Tr an spo r tation

. Th e fac tth at D O T ’s man d ate to pr omote en er gyeffic i enc yby settin g milea g e s t a n da rds ma y overla p wit hEPA’ s environment a lres p onsi

bili ties inn o w a ylic en ses EPA to sh ir k i t s du tyto pr ot ec t th e pu blic “h ealth” an d “ w elfar e ,” §752 1(a)(1). Pp. 25–30.

4. EPA’s al ter n ativ e ba sis fo rits dec i sion—th at ev enif it h a s st atu

t o ry a u t h orit y t o regula t e greenhous e ga s e s , itwould b e unwis e t o do so at th is ti me —r ests onr e ason in gdiv o r c ed fr om th e st atu tor ytex t
. Wh ile th e stat u t e c o n d ition s EPA ac tiononits for matio nof a “ju d g men t ,” th at j u dg men tmu st r e late to w h e th eran airpollu tan t
“ c a u s e[s ], or c o nt rib u t e[s ] t o , a i r pollut ion which ma y rea s onab ly be an tic i pate d to en dan g erpu blich e althorw e lfar e.” § 760 1 ( a)(1). Un der t h e Act ’ s clea r t e rms , EPA c a n av oid promulga t i ng regu la t i ons only if it deter m in es th at g r eenh o u s e g a ses do n o t c o n t r ibu te to c limat e change or if it provides so me reas on a b l e ex plan ationas to w h yit cannot or will not exercise i t s d i scretion t o determine w h ether they do. Itha s ref u s e d t o do s o , offering ins t ea d ala undry lis tof rea s ons nott o regula t e , includingt h e exis t e nc e of volunt a r y Execut ive Bra nch progr a ms providing ares p ons e to glob a lwa r m ing a n d im

pairment of the President’s ability tonegotiate with developing na tion s to r e du c eemission s. T h ese polic yju dg men t s h av e noth in gto do wit hwhet h er green hous e ga s emis si ons cont rib u t e t o clima t e cha nge an d do n o t am ou n tto a r e as on ed ju stific at ionfordec lin in gto for m a s c ient ific j u dg ment
. Norca n EPA av oid its st atu tor yoblig ationb y not i ng t h e u ncert a i nt y s u rrou n di ng va rious fea t ures of climat e cha nge a n d co ncludingt h a titwould t h ere f ore b e b e t t e r nott o regu la t e att h is t i me. If t h e s c ient ific unce rt a i nt y is s o pr ofound t h a tit precludes EPA from makin ga reason edju dg men t , it mu st sayso. Th e statu tor yqu estionis w h eth e rsu ffic i en t in for m ationex ists for i t t o ma ke a nenda ngermentfinding. Ins t ea d, EPA rej e c t ed t h e rulemakin gpetit i onbased oni m per m is sible c o n s ider ation s . Its ac t i on was therefore “arbitrary, capricious, or ot herwise not in accordance wit hla w,” §7 60 7 ( d)(9 ). On rema nd, EPA mus tground it s rea s ons for ac tionorin ac t i oninth e statu te. Pp. 30–32.6 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Sy llabu s 415 F. 3d 50, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

S TEVENS , J ., delivered t h e o p inion of t h e Court , in whi ch K ENNEDY , S OUTER , G IN S B U R G , and B REYER , JJ., joined. R OBERTS , C. J., filed a dis

senting opinion, in which S CALI A , T HOMAS , an d ALI TO , JJ., join ed. S CALI A , J., filed a di ssenti n g opinion, i nwhich R OBERTS , C. J., a n d T HOMAS an d ALITO , JJ., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 12 0 

### MASS AC HUSE TTS, ET AL 

### ., PETI TIONE R S v. ENVIR O N

MENTALP R OT ECTI O N AGEN CY ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE DISTR I CT OF COLUM B IA CIRCU IT [Apr il 2, 200 7] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### delivered the opi n ion of the Court. A well-documented rise in glob al temperatures has coincided w i th a significant inc r ease in the concentratio n of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related. For when carbon diox

ide is rel e a s ed into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceilin g of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding t h e escape of reflected heat. It is therefore a species—the most important species—of a “greenhouse gas. ” Calling global warming “the m o st pressing environ

mental challenge of our time,” 1 

### a group of States, 2 

### local government s, 3

### and private organizations, 4

### alleged in a

——————

1 Pet. for Cer t
. 22. 2 California , Connecticut, Illinois, M aine, Massachusetts, New Jersey , New M exic o , New York , Or egon , Rho de Island, Vermont, and Washington.

3 Dis trict of Colu mb ia , Americ an S a mo a, N ew YorkC ity , an d B alti m or e. 4 Center for Biological Diversity, Center f o r Food Safety, Conserva

t i on La w Founda t i on, Environment a lAdvoca t e s , Environmen t a l Defense, Friends of the Earth, Green pea c e, International Center fo r Technology As s e s s m ent , Na t i onal Environment a lTrus t , Na t ura l Res o urces Def e ns e Council, S i erraClub , Union of Conce r n ed S c ient is t s , a n d U. S

. Pub lic Int e res tRes e a rch G r oup.2 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### petition forcertiorari that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has abdicated its responsibi lity under th e Clean Air Act to regulate the emi s sions of fou rgreenhouse gases, inclu d ing carbon dioxide. Specifically, petitioners asked us to answer two questions concerning the meanin g of §202(a)( 1 ) of the Act: whether EPA has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles; and if so, whether its statedreasons for refusing to do so are consistent with the statut e. In response, EPA, supported by 10 intervening States 5 

### and six tra de associati o ns, 6

### correc t ly argued t hat we may not address those two questions unless at least one peti

tioner has standing to invoke ourjurisdictio nunder Ar ti

cle III of t h e Constitution. Notwithstanding the serious character of that jurisdictio nal argument and the absence of any conflicting decisions con s truing §202(a)(1), the unusual importance of the underl ying issue persuaded us to grant the writ. 548 U. S. __ (2006). I S e c t i o n20 2( a) (1 ) of th e C l ea n Ai r Ac t , a s ad dedby Pub. L. 8 9–2 72, §101(8), 79 Stat. 9 92, a n d a s a m en ded b y , in te r ali a , 84 Sta t . 169 0 an d 91 Sta t . 791 , 42 U. S. C. §7521(a) (1), pro vi d es: “The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation pre

scribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applica

ble to the emission of a n y air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehi cles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollu tion which may reasonably be anticipated

——————

5 Ala s ka , Ida h o, Ka ns a s , Michiga n, Neb r a s ka , Nort h Da kot a , Ohio, Sou t hD a kota, Tex a s, an d Utah

.

6 Alliance of Automobi le M a nufacturers , National Automo bile Dealers As s o ciat ion, Engine Ma n u fa ct urersAs s o cia t i on, Truck Ma nufa c t ure r s As s o ciat ion, CO 2 Litigation Group, and Ut ility Air Regulatory Group.3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### to endanger public health or welfare . . . .” 7 

### The Act de fines “air pollutant” to include “any air pollu

tion agent or combination of such agents, i n cluding a n y physical, ch emical, biol ogical, radioactive .

. . substance or matter whi c h is emitted into or otherwise enters the am

bient air.” §7602(g). “Welfare” is also defi ned broadly: among other things, it includes “effects on .

. . weather .

. . and climate.” §7602(h). When Congress enacted these provisions, the study o f climate change was in its infancy. 8

### In 1959, s h ortly after the U. S. W e ather Bureau began monitoring atmospheri c carbon dioxide levels, an obse rvatory in Mau na Loa, Ha

waii, recorded a mean l e vel of 316 parts per m illion. This was well above the highest carbon dioxide concentration— no more than 300 p a rts per million—revealed in the 420,000-year-old ice-core record. 9

### Bythe ti me Congre ss

——————

7 Th e 1970 v e r s ionof § 202( a)(1) u s ed th e ph r a se “w h i c hen dan g er s th e pu blich e althorw e lfar e” r ath erth a nth e mor e -protec t iv e “w h i c h mayr e ason a b l ybe an t i c i pa ted to en dan g erpu blich e al thorw e lfar e.” See §6(a) of t h e CleanAir Amen d men t s of 1970, 84 St at. 169 0. Con

g r ess amen de d §20 2 (a)(1) in19 77 to g iv e i t s appr ov al to th e dec i sionin Ethyl Corp. v. EPA , 541 F. 2d 1, 25 (CAD C 197 6) (enba n c ) , w h i chh e l d t h a tt h e Clean Air Act“ a nd common s e ns e . . . dema nd regula t o ry ac tionto pr ev en t h a r m , ev enif th e r e g u latori s le ss th anc e r tainth a t h a r mis oth e rw ise in ev itabl e.” See §401(d)(1) of th e CleanAirAc t Amen d men t s of 19 77, 9 1 S tat. 791; se e also H. R. Re p. No. 95 –2 94 , p. 49 (197 7).

8 The Counc il onE nviron m ental Qu ality h a d issu ed a r e portin1970 c o nc luding th at “[m]anmay be c h angin g his w e ather.” Environ m ental Quality : Th e Firs tAnnual Re port9 3

. Co ns i d erab l e u n c e rt ainty remain e d in those early years, and the issu e wentla rgely unment i oned in t h e c o n gr e ssion al debate ov erth e en ac tmen t o f th e Cle a nAi rAc t. Bu tse e 116 Con g . Re c . 3291 4 ( 1 9 7 0 ) (s tate men tof Sen

. Bog g s r e fer r i n gt o Cou n c il’s c o n c lu sionth at “[a]irpollu tionalter s th e c limate an d ma y produce glob a lcha n g es in t e mpera t ure” )

.

9 See In ter g ov er n m en tal Pan e l onClimate Ch an g e , Climate Ch an g e 200 1: Synthesis Report, pp. 202 –2 03 (20 0 1 )

. By dr illing through thick An tar c t icic e sh eets an d ex tr ac tin g“c or es,” sc ien t is ts c a nex amin e ic e4 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### drafted §2 02(a)(1) in 1970, carbon dioxide levels had reached 325 parts per million. 10 

### In the late 1970’s, the Federal Go vernment b e gan devot

ing serious attention to the possibility that ca rbon dioxide emissions associated with human activity co uld provoke climate change. In 19 78, Congress enacted the National Climate Program Act, 92 Stat. 6 01, which required the President to establish a program to “assist the Nation andthe world to understand and respond to natural and maninduced cli m ate proce sses and th eir implications,” id., §3. President Carter, in turn, askedthe National Resear ch Council, th e workin g arm of the National Academyof Sciences, to investigate the subject. The Council’s re

sponse was unequivocal: “If carb on dioxide continues to increase, the study group finds no reason to doubt th at climate changes will result and n o reason to believe that these changes willbe n e gligible.

. . . A wait-and-see pol i cy may mean waiting until it is too la te.” 11 

### Congress n e xt addressed the issue in 1987, when i t enacted the Global Climate Protec tion Act, Ti tle XI of Pub. L. 100–204, 101 Stat. 1407, not e fol l owing 15 U. S. C. §2901. Finding that “manmade pollution—th e release of carbon dioxide, chlorofluoro carbons, methane, and other trace gases into the atmosphere—may be producing a

—————— fr om lon gag o an d ex tr ac t s m all s a mp les of an c i en t air

. Th at airc a n th enbe an aly z ed, y i eldin ges tima tes of c a rb ondiox ide lev e ls. Ibid

.

10 A mor e dr am aticr i se w a s y e t to c o me: In 200 6, c a rb on diox ide lev

els r e ac h e d 382 par t s permillion , see D e pt. of Comm er c e , Nation al Ocea n ic & At mos p heric Adminis t rat i on, Ma unaLoaCO 2 Mont hl y M e a n Data , www.esrl.noa a . gov/g m d/ccgg/tr ends/c o2 _mm_mlo.dat(all Internet mater i a l s as v i sited M a r . 2 9 , 20 07, an d av aila ble inC l er k of Cou r t ’s ca s e file), alevel t h ough tt oexceedt h e co ncent ra t i on of ca rb on dioxid e in the atmosp h ere at any point over the past 2 0 -mi llio n years. See Int e rgove rnm ent a lPa nel on Clima t e Cha n ge, Techni c a l S u mma ry of Wor k in g G r o up I Repor t39 (200 1).

11 Clima t e Res e a rch Boa r d, Ca rb on Dioxide a n d Clima t e : A S c ient ific Asse ssmen t, p
. v ii (1979).5 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### long-term and substantial in crease in the average te m perature o nEarth, ” §1102(1), 101 Stat. 14 08, Congre ss directed E PA to propose to Congress a “coordinated na

tional polic y on global climate change,” §1103(b), an d ordered the Secretar y of State to work “thro ugh the cha n nels of multilateral diplomacy” a n d coordina te diplomatic efforts to combat global wa rming, §1103(c). Congress emphasized that “ongoing po llution and deforestation ma y be contributing now to an irre versible proces s” and that “[n]ecessary actions must be iden tified and i m plemente d in time to protect the cl imate.” §1102(4). Meanwhile, the scientific understanding o f climate change progressed. In1990, the Intergovern m ental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a mu ltinational sc ientific body organized under the auspices of the United Nations, pub

lished its first comp rehensive report on the t o pic. D r aw ing on expert opinions from across the globe, the IPCC concluded that “emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentra

tions of .

. . greenhouse gases [w hich] willenhance the greenhouse effect, res u lting on a v erage in a nadditional warming of the Earth’s surface.” 12 

### Responding to the IPCC report, the United Nation s convened the “Earth Summit” in1992 in Rio de Janeir o. The first President Bush attended and signed the Unite d Nations Framework Convention on Cli m ate Change (UNF CCC), a nonbinding agreement among 1 54 nations to reduce atm o spheric concentrations of carbon dioxide an d other greenhouse gase s for the purpose of “prevent[ing] dangerous anthropogenic [ i.e. , human-induced] interfer

ence with t h e [Earth’s] climate sy stem.” 13

### S. Treaty Doc.

——————

12 IPCC, Clim at e Change: The IPCC Scie n t ificAsse ss me n t , p. x i(J. Hou gh t on, G. Jen k in s, & J. Eph r a u m s eds

. 1991).

13 The indus t ria lized count ries list e d in Ann e x I t o t h e UNFCCC un

der t ook to r e du c e th eir emission s of g r eenh ou se g a ses to 1990 lev e l s b y th e y e ar2000. No im media t e r e str i c t ion s w e r e imposedondev e lopin g6 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### No. 102–38 , Art. 2, p. 5 (1992). T h e Senate unanimousl y ratified the treaty. Some five years later

— after the IPCC issu ed a second comprehensive report i n1995 con c luding that “[t]he bal

ance of evidence suggests there is a discernible human influence on global cli m ate” 14

### —the UNFCCC signatories met in Kyoto, Japan, and adopted a protocol that assigne d mandatorytar g ets fo r industria lized nations to redu ce greenhousegas emissi ons. Because those ta rgets did not apply to developing an d heavily polluting nat ions sucha s China and I n dia, the Se nate unanimously passed a resolu

tion expressing its sense that the United States should not e n t e r i n t o t h e Kyoto Protocol. See S. Res. 98 , 105th Cong. , 1st Sess. ( July 25, 199 7) (as pass ed)

. P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n d i d not submit the protocol to the Senate for ratific a tion. II On October 20, 1999, a group of 19 private organiza

tions 15

### filed a rulemaking petitiona s king E PA to regulate “greenhouse gas emiss i ons from n e w motor vehicles und er §202 of the Clean Air Act.” App. 5. Petitioners mai n tained that 1998 was the “warme s t year on record”; that carbon dioxide, metha n e, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluoro

carbons are “heat trapping greenhouse gases”; that green

-

—————— count ries , in cl uding China a n d India

. T h ey could cho os e t o b e come Annex I cou n t r ies when s u f f i cient l y develo ped. 14 IPCC, Clima t e Ch an g e 1995 , Th e Sc ienc e of Clima t e Ch an g e , p. 4. 15 Alliance for Sustainable Co mmuniti es; Applied Power Technologies , Inc.; Bio Fuels America; The Califo rnia S o la r Energy Ind u s t ries As s n .; Clements En vironmental Corp.; En vi ro nment a lAdvoca t e s ; Enviro n men tal an d E n er gyStu d yIn stitu t e; Friends of t h e Eart h; Full Circle Energy Project, Inc.; The Green Party of Rhode Island; Greenpea ce US A; Int e rnat i ona lCent erfor Technolo gy As s e s s ment ; Net w ork for Environment a la n d Economic Res p ons ib ilit yof t h e Unit ed Churchof Chris t ; New Jers ey Environ m ent a l Wa t ch; New MexicoS o la r Energy As s n .; OregonEnvironment a lCouncil; Pub lic Citizen; S o la r Energy Industries Ass n .; The SUN DAY Campa i gn. See App. 7–1 1.7 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### house gas emissions h ave significantly accelerated climate change; and that the IPCC’s 1995 report warned th a t “carbon dioxide remains the most important c o ntributor t o [man-made] forcing of climate change.” Id., at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). The petition further alleged that climate change will have s e rious adverse effects on human hea l th and the environment. Id., at 22–35. As to EPA’s sta t utory authority, the petition observ ed that th e agency itsel f had alrea d y confirme d that it ha d the power to regulate carbon dioxide. See id. , at 18, n. 2 1

. In 199 8, Jonathan Z. Cannon, then EPA’s General Counsel, pre

pared a legal opinion concluding that “CO 2 

### emissions are within the scope of EPA’s authori ty to re gulate,” even as he recognized that EPA had so far declined to exercise that authority. Id., at 54 (memorandum to Carol M. Browner, Administrator (Apr. 10, 1998) (hereinafter Can

non memor andum)). Cannon’s successor, Gary S. Guzy, reiterated t hat opinion before a congressional committee just two w eeks before the rule making petition was filed. See id., at 61. Fifteen months after the petition’s submission, EPA requested public comment on “all the issues ra ised in [the] petition,” adding a “p articu lar” r e quest for comments on “any scienti f ic, technica l, lega l, economic or other aspect of these issues that may be relevan tto EPA’s consideration of this petition.” 66 Fed. Reg. 7 486, 7487 (2001). EPA received more than 50,000 comments over the next five months. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52924 (2003). Before the close of the comment period, the White House sought “ass istance in identifying the areas in the science of climate change where there are the greatest certainties and uncertainties” from the Nati onal Res e a rch Council , asking for aresponse “as soon as p o ssibl e.” App. 213. Th e result was a 2001 report titled Climate Change: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (NRC Re port), which, drawing heav

ily on the 1 995 IPCC report, conclu ded that “ [ g] r e e n h o u s e8 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a resul t of human activities, ca using surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising.” NR C Report 1. On Septem ber 8, 20 03, EPA en tere d an order denyin g th e rulem a kin g peti tion

. 68Fed. Re g. 5 2922. T h e a g e n c y g a v e two reasons for its decision: (1) that contrar yto the opin

ions of its former general counsels, the Clean Air Act does not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate change, see id., at 52925–52929; and (2) tha teven if th e agency h a d the aut hority to se t greenhouse gas emission standards, it would be unwise to do so at this time, id., at 52929–52931. In concluding that it lack ed statutory authority over greenhouse gases, EPA observed that Con gress “was well aware of the global c limate cha n ge issue when it la st comprehensively amended the [Cl e an Air Act] in 1990,” yet it declined to adopt a proposed amendment establish

ing binding emission s li mitations. Id., at 5292 6. Congress instead chose to authorize furtherinvestigati o n into cli

mate change. Ibid. (citing §§103(g) and 602(e) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19 90, 104 Stat. 2652, 2703, 42 U. S. C. §§7403(g)(1) and 7671 a(e)). EPA further re a soned that Congress’ “speciallytailored solutions to global atmospheric issues,” 6 8Fed. Reg. 52926—in particular, its 1990 enactment of a comprehensive scheme to regulate pollutants that depleted the ozonelayer, see Title VI, 10 4 Stat. 2649, 42 U. S. C. §§7671–7 671q—counseled again s t reading the general authorization of §202(a)(1 ) to confer regulatory authority over greenhouse gases. EPA statedthat it was “urged on in this view” by thi s Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown& William s on Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 (2000). In that case, re lying on “to

bacco[’s] un ique politic al history,” id., at 159 , we invali

dated the F ood and Dr ug Adminis tration’s rel i ance on its general authority to re gulate drugs as a basis for asserting9 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### jurisdiction over an “i ndustryco nstituting a significant portion of the American economy,” ibid

. EPA reason ed that cli m ate change had its own “politica l history”: Co ngress designed the original Clea n Air Act to address local air pollutants rathe rthan a substance that “is fairly consistent i nits concentration throughout the world’s a t mosphere,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52927 (emphasis added); decl ined in 1990 to enact proposed amendments to force EPA to set carbon dioxide emission st andards for motor vehicles, ibid. (citing H. R. 5966, 101st Cong., 2 d Sess. (1990)); and addressed global climate change in other legisl ation, 68 Fed. Reg. 52927. Because of thi s political hi story, and becaus e imposing emi ssion limit a tions on greenhous e gases would have even greater eco

nomic and political repercussi ons than regulating tobacco, EPA was p e rsuaded th at it lac k edthe power to do so. Id., at 52928. In essence, EPA concluded that climate change was so imp o rtant that unles s Congress spoke with exact

ing specificity, it could not have meant the agency to address it. Having reached that conclusion, EPA believed it fol

lowed that greenhouse gases ca nnot be “ai rpollutants” within the meaning of the Act. Se e ibid. (“It follows from this conclusion, that [greenhouse gases], as such, are no t air pollutants under the [Clean Air Act’s] regulatory pro

visions .

. .” ). The agency bolstered this conclusion by explaining that if carbon dioxide were an air pollutant, the only feasibl e method of reducing tailpipe emi ssions woul d be to improve fuel economy. But because Congress has already cre ated detailed mandatory fuel economy stan

dards subj ect to Dep a rtment of Transport ation (DO T) administrat i on, the agency conclud e d that EPA regulation would either conflict w i th those standards or be superflu

ous. Id., at 52929. Even ass u min g th at it ha d authority ove rgree nhouse gases , E PA expl aine d in detai lwh y it wo uld refuse to exe r -10 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### cise t h a tau tho rit y. T h e agen c y began b y re co gni z in g th a t the con c en tra tion o f greenho use gases has drama t i c all y i n cr ea s e dasa r e s u ltof h u m anact ivi t i es , a n dack n ow l e d g e d the at ten d a n t i n c r ea se in gl obalsu rfa c e air te mpe r a t u r es. Id., a t5 2 9 30. EPA n e ver the less gave con t r o lling impo r tan c e to th e N R C Re p o rt ’s st ate m entt h a t a c a usalli nk between the two “ ‘can not be une quivo c a lly estab l ishe d.’ ” Ibid. (q uoti ng NRC Re port 17). Given tha tre sidua lunce r tain ty, EPA con c lu de d tha tregulati n g gre e nhouse ga s emissions would be un wise. 6 8 Fed. Re g. 5293 0. Th e ag ency f u rth e r m ore c h ar act e ri z e dany EPA r e gu l a tion of mo to r-vehicle em issions as a “pie ceme al approa ch” to c l i m at e c h an g e , id ., a t 52931 , a n d sta t ed tha t such re gula

t i on w o uld c o nflictwithth e President’ s “compr e hensiv e app r oa ch” t o the pro b l e m, id ., a t 52932

. Th at a p proa ch involv es a d ditio n al su p p or t fo r tec h nologi cal in nova tion , th e cre atio n of nonre gu l ato ry pro gram sto encou r age vol u n t a ry priv a t e - sector redu ctio ns in green house gas e m issions , a n d fur the r rese ar ch on cli m ate ch an g e—no t a c t u al re gul a tio n . Id., a t529 32–52 933

. Acco rdi n g to EPA, un ilate r al EPA regu la tion o f moto r- vehi cle greenho use gas emissions migh t also h a m p e rthe Presi d en t’s ab ility to pe rsua de ke y de ve l

opin g coun t ries to re du ce greenho use gas e m issions. Id., at 52931

. III Petitioners, now joined by interv enor States and local governments, sought re view of EPA’ s order in the United States Court of Appea l s for the District of Columbia Cir

cuit. 16 

### Although each of the thre e judges o nthe pane l wrote a sep a rate opinion, two judg es agreed “t hat the E PA

——————

16 See 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1) (“A petitionforr e v i ewof ac tionof th e Admin i s t r atorinpr omu l g atin gan y. . . s t anda rd under s e ct ion 7 5 2 1 of th is t i tle .

. . orfin a l ac tio ntaken , byt h e Admin i s t r atoru n d erth is chapter may b e filed only in the Un ited States Court of Appeals for th e Dis t rictof Columb ia” )

.11 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### Administra tor properl yexercisedhis discretion under §202(a)(1) i ndenying the petition for rule ma king.” 415 F. 3d 50, 58 (2005). The court therefore denied the petition for review. In his opini o n announc ing the court’s judgment, Judge Randolph avoided a definitive ruling as to petitioners’ standing, id., at 56, reasoning that it was permissible t o proceed to the merits because the standing and the merit s inquiries “overlap[ped],” ibid

. Assuming with out deciding that the st atute auth o rized the EPA A d ministrator t o regulate greenhous e g a s emis sion s that “in h i s judgment” may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1), Judge Ra ndolph con

cluded that the exerci se of that judgment need not b e based solel yon scientific evidence, but may also be in

formed by the sort of policy judgments that motiv a te congressional action. 415 F. 3d, at 58. Given that frame

work, it w a s reasonable for EPA to base i t s decision on scientific uncertainty as well as on other factors, including the concer n that uni lateral reg u lation of U. S. moto rvehicle emi ssions cou l d weak enefforts to reduce green

house gas emissions from other countries. Ibid

. Judge Sentelle wrote sepa rately because he believed petitioners failed to “demonstrat[e] the element of injury necessary to establish standing under Articl e III.” Id., at 59 (opiniondissenting in part and concurring in judg

ment). In his view, they had alleged that gl obal warming is “harmful to humani ty at large, ” but could not allege “particulari zed injuries” to themselves. Id ., a t 60 (citing Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife , 50 4 U. S. 555, 562 (1992)). While h e di ssented on standing, however, he accepted th e contrar yvi ew as the law of the case and joined Judge Randolph’s judgment o nthe merit s as the clo s est to that which he preferred. 415 F. 3d, at 60–61. Judge Tatel dissented. Emphasizing that EPA nowhere challenged the factual basis of petitioners’ affidavits, id.,12 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### at 66, he concluded that at least Massachusetts had “satis

fied each e l ement of Article III standing—injury, causa

tion, and redressability,” id., at 64. In Judge Tatel’s view, the “ ‘substantial probability,’ ” id. , at 66, th at projected rises in sea level would lead to serious l o ss of coastal propertyw a s a “far c r y” from the kind of gen e ralized harm insufficientto ground Article III j u risdiction. Id., at 65

. He found th at petitioners’ affidavi ts more than adequately supported t h e conclusion that EPA’s failure t o curb gree n house gas emissions contributed to the sea level change s that threat ened Massachusetts’ co astal property. Ibid

. As to redressability, he observed that one of petitioner s’ experts, aformer EPA clim atologist, stated that
“ ‘ [ a]chievable reductions in emis sions of C O 2 

### and oth e r [greenhouse gases] from U. S. motor vehicles would .

. . delay and moderate many of the a dverse imp a cts of glob al warming.’ ” Ibid . (qu o ting decla r ation of Michael MacCracken, former Execu t ive Directo r, U. S. Global Change Research P r ogram ¶5( e ) (hereinafter MacC ra cken Decl.), available in2 Petition ers’ Standi n g Appendix in No. 03– 1361, etc., ( CADC), p. 209 (Stdg. App.)). He further noted that the one-time director of E PA’s motor-vehicle pollution control efforts stated i nan affidavit that enf o rceable emis

sion standards would lead to the development of new technologies that “ ‘wo u ld gradual ly be mandated by oth e r countries around the world.’ ” 4 15 F. 3d, a t66 (quoti ng declaration of Michael Walsh ¶¶7–8, 10, Stdg. App. 309

– 310, 311). On the merits, Judge Tatel explained at length why he believed the text of th e statute provided EPA with authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and why its policy concerns did not justify its refusal to exercise that authority. 415 F. 3d, at 67–82. IV Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court juris

diction to “Cases” and “Contro ver s ies.” Those two word s13 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### confine “th e business of federal c o urts to qu estions pre

sented in a nadversary context a n d in a for m historically viewed as capable of resolution t h rough the judicial proc

ess.” Flastv. Cohen , 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968). It is there

fore famili ar learning that no justiciable “controversy” exists when parties seekadjudication of a political qu es tion, Luther v. Borden , 7 How. 1 (1 849), when they ask fo r an advisory opinion , Hayburn’s Case , 2 Dall. 409 (1792) , see al so Clintonv. Jon e s , 520 U. S. 681, 700, n. 33 (1997) , or when th e question sought to b e adjudicated has been mooted by subsequen tdevelopments, Calif ornia v. Sa n Pablo & T u lare R. Co. , 149 U. S. 308 (1893). This cas e suffers from none of t h ese defects

. T h e parties’ dispute turns onthe proper construction of a con gression al sta t u t e, a ques tio neminently suitable to resolu tion i nfede ral co urt. Con gress has mo reover a u tho r ized this type of challe nge toEPA action

. Se e 42 U. S. C. §7607 (b)(1). T h a ta u t h o r i z a t i o ni s o f c r i t i c a li m p o r t a n c e t o the standin g inquiry: “Congress h a s the power to defin e injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or contr o versy where noneexi s ted before.” Lujan , 504 U. S., at 58 0 (K E NNED Y 

### , J., concurring in pa rt and concur ring in judgment). “In exercising this power, however, C o ngress must at the veryleast identify t h e injury it se eks to vind icate and r e late the injury to th e class of per s ons entitled to bring suit.” Ibid. We will n o t, therefore, “entertain citizen su its to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.” Id. , at 581. EPA maintains that because greenhouse gas emissi ons inflict widespread har m, the doct rine of standing presen ts an insuperable jurisdictional obstacle. We do not agree

. At bottom, “the gist of the que stionof standing” is whether petitioners have “such a personal stak e in the outcome of the controv e rsy as to assure thatconcrete a dverseness which sharpens the presentation of issue s up on which the14 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### court so largely depends for illumination.” Bakerv. Ca rr , 369 U. S. 1 86, 204 (19 62). As J US TICE 

### K ENN E DY 

### explained in his Luja nconcurren c e: “While it does not matter how many pers ons have been injured by the ch allenged action, the party bring

ing suit m u st show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way. This requiremen tis not just an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the adversa r ial process by assuring both that the par

ties before the court have an actual, as oppos e d to pro

fessed, stake in the outcome, and that the legal ques

tions presented .

. . will be resolved, not in th e rarified atmosphere of a debating so ciety, but in ac o ncrete factual cont ext conduci v e to a realistic apprec iation of the consequ e nces of judicial action.” 504 U. S., at 581 (internal quotation marks omitted). To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, Lujan holds that alitigant mu st demo nstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particu larized in jury tha tis either actual or imminent, that th e injuryis fairly trac e able to the defendant, and that it is likel y that a favorable decision will redress that injury. See id. , at 560–561. However, a litigant to whom Congress has “accorded a procedural right to pro t ect his concrete intere sts,” id. , at 572, n. 7 — here, the right to c hallenge agency actio nunlawfully withheld, §7607(b)(1)—“can ass e rt that right witho u t meeting allthe norma lstandards for redressability and immediacy,” ibid. When a litigant is vested with a proce

dural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injurycausing party to reco nsider the decision t hat allegedly harmed the litigant. Ibid.; see a l so Sugar Ca ne Gro wer s Cooperat i ve of Fla. v. Veneman , 289 F. 3 d89, 94–95 (CADC 2002) (“A [litigant] who alleges a dep r ivation of a procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to15 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### prove that if he had receiv ed the procedure the substan

tive result would have beenaltered. All that is necess ary is to show that the pr ocedural st ep was connected to t h e substantive result”). Only one o f the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us t oconsider t h e petition f o r revie w . See Rumsfeld v. Foru m for Aca demi cand Insti t utiona l Righ ts, In c. , 5 47 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006 ). We stress here, as di d Judge Ta tel below, the special position and interest of M a ssachuset t s . It is of considerable re levance that the party seek ing re

view here i s a sovereig n Sta t e andnot, as it was in Lujan , a pri v ate in dividu al. Well before the creation of the modern administrativ e state, we recognized that St ates are not nor m al litigan ts for the purposes of invok i ng fede ral jurisdiction. As Jus

tice Holmes explained in Georgia v. Tenness ee Copper Co. , 206 U. S. 2 30, 237 (1907), a case in which Georgia sought to protect it s citizens from air pollution originating outsid e its borders: “The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private parties; but it is not. The very elements th at would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a gr ound for equitable relief are wanting he re. The St ate owns ve ry little of t h e terri

tory allegedto be affect ed, and the damage to i tcapa ble of esti mate in money, possibl y, at least, is small. This is asu it by a State for an injury to it in its capac

ity of quasi- sovereign. In that ca pacity the State has an interest independen t of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air w i thin its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.” Just as Georgia’s “independent interest .

. . in all the earth and air within its domain” su pported federal jurisdiction a16 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sove reign territory toda y. Cf. Alden v. Maine , 5 27 U. S. 70 6, 715 (1999) (observing that in th e federal system, the States “are not relegated to the role of mere provi n ces or pol i tical corpo r ations, but retain th e dignity, th ough not the full aut hority, of sovereignty” ). That Massachusetts does in fact own a grea t deal of the “territor ya lleged to be affe cted” only reinforces the con

clusion tha tits stake i nthe ou tcome of this case is suffi

ciently conc rete to war r ant the ex ercise of federal judici al power. When a St ate enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogative s . Massa chusetts cannot invade Rhode Isla nd to force reductions in greenhouse gas emis

sions, it ca nnot negoti ate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumsta nces the exercise of its police powers to reduc e in-s tate motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puer to Rico ex re l. Barez , 4 58 U. S. 592, 607 (198 2) (“One helpf u l indication in deter m ining wh ether an a l

leged injury to the health and w e lfare of its citizens suf

fices to give the State standing t o sue parens patria eis whether th e injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely atte mpt to a ddr ess throughits sovereig n lawmakin g powers”). These sove reign pre r ogatives are now lodged in the Federal Go vernmen t , and Congre ss has ordered EPA t o prote ct Mas s achuset ts ( a mong othe rs) by prescribing stan

dar d s appli c able to the “emission of any air po llutant f r om any class orclasses of new motor v e hicle engines, which in [the Admini stra tor ’ s] ju dgmen tcau s e, or cont ribute to, ai r pollution w h ich may re asonably be anticipa tedto endange r public health or welfa r e.” 42 U. S. C. §7521 (a)(1). Con

gress has moreover recognizeda c o n c omit an tpr oc ed u r a l righ t to c h allenge the reje ctiono f its rulem a kin g petiti on as arbitrary and capri c ious. §7607(b)(1). Gi ven tha tpro -17 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### cedur a l righ t and Ma ssachuset ts’ stake in p r otec ting i t s quasi-sover e ign interes t s, the Com m onwealth is entitled t o special solicitude in ou r standin ga n alysis. 17

——————

17 T HE C HI EF J US TI CE a ccus es t h e Courtof mis r ea ding Geor g iav. T en nes se e Copper Co. , 206 U. S. 23 0 (1 907), see post , at 3–4 ( d is sen t in g opinion), an d “dev is[in g] a n e wdoc t r i n e of state stan d i n g ,” id., at 15. Butno les s a na u t h orit y t h a nHa rt& Wechs ler’s The Federa l Court s an d th e Federal Sy stem u n d er stan ds Tennes se e Copper as a stan din g decis i on. R. F a llon, D. Melt zer, & D

. S h a p iro, Ha rt& Wechs ler’s Th e Feder a l Cou r t s an d th e Fed e r a l Sy ste m2 90 (5 thed. 20 03). In deed, i t devot e s a nen t i re s e ct ion t o chroniclin g t h e long developmentof ca s e s per m ittin gSt ates “to l i tig ate a s parens patriaeto pr otec t qu asis o vereign int e res t s
— i.e. , pub lic or gove rn ment a lint e res t s t h a tconce rn th e state a s aw h o le.” Id., at 28 9; see, e. g. , Mis s ou riv. Illinoi s , 180 U. S. 208, 240 –24 1 (1 90 1) (f in din gfeder al ju r i sdic tiona ppr opr i ate n o t only “in cases involving boundaries an d ju r i sdic tionov erlan d s an d th eirin h abita n t s, an d inc a ses dir e c t ly affec t in gth e pr oper tyr i gh t s an d in ter e sts of a state,” bu t also w h e nthe “su b st an tia limpair men tof th e h e althan d pr osper i tyof th e tow n s an d c i ties of th e state ” ar e a t stake). Dra wing on M assach us ettsv. Mellon , 262 U. S. 447 ( 1 9 2 3 ), an d Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Pu e r to Rico ex re l. Barez , 458 U. S. 592 ( 1 9 8 2 ) (citing Misso u r iv. Illinois , 1 8 0 U. S

. 20 8 (1 90 1 )), T HE C HI EF J US TI CE claims that we “overloo[k] the fact that o ur cases cast significant doubt ona S t a t e’s s tan din gto as ser taqu a s i-s o v e r e ig nin terest .
. . ag ain s t th e Feder a l Gov e r n m en t.” Post , at 5. Not so. Mellonitself dis avowed a n y s uch b r oa d rea d ing whe n itnot e d t h a t th e Cou r th a d been“c alled u p onto adju dic ate, n o t r i gh ts of per s onorpr oper ty, n o t r i gh ts of dominion over physical do main, [and] not q u asi soverei gn righ ts act u ally invaded o rthreat ened .”262 U. S., at 484–4 85 (e mph a si s adde d). In any event, we held in Georgiav. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 324 U. S. 43 9, 447 (1 94 5), th at th er e is a c r i tic a l differ e n c e betw eenallow i n ga State “to pr otec t h e r c i tizen s fr om th e oper ation of feder a l stat u t es” (w h i c hi s w h at Mello n pr oh ibits) an dallow i n ga State to as ser tits r i gh ts u n d er federa lla w (which itha s s t anding t o do). Ma s s a chus et ts does nothere dispu t e th at t h e CleanAirAc t applies to its c i tizen s ; it r ath erseeks to a s s e rt it s right s under t h e Act

. S e e als o Ne br as kav. Wyoming , 515 U. S. 1, 20 ( 1 9 95) (h oldin gt h at Wy omin gh a d st an din gto br in ga c r o ss c l aim ag ain s tth e Un ited Sta t es to v i n d ic ate it s “ ‘ quasi-sov ereign ’ int e res t s which a r e ‘indepe n dentof a n d b e hind t h e t i t l es of it s cit i zens , inallth e e a r t han d airw i th inits dom a in ’ ” (qu o tin g Tennes se e Copper, 206 U. S., at 2 37)).18 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### With that in mind, it is clear that petitioners’ submis

sions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied t h e most demanding stan dards of the adversarial process. EPA’s stea dfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emis

sions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that i s both “actua l” and “imminent.” Lujan , 504 U. S., at 560 (internal qu otation mark s omitted). There i s , moreover, a “substantial likelih oodthat the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to ta ke step s to reduce that risk. Duk e PowerCo. v. Ca rolinaEnvironme n tal S t udy Group, Inc. , 438 U. S. 59, 79 (1978). The Injury The harms associated with clima t e change are serious and well recognized. Indeed, t h e NRC R e port itself— which EPA regards as an “objective and independent assessmentof the relevant science,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52930

— identifies anumber of environmental changes that have already inflicted significant harms , including “the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate o f rise of sea levels during the 20 th century rel a tive to the past few thousand years

. . . .” NRC Report 16. Petitioners allege that this onlyhints at t h e environ

mental damage yet to come. According to the climat e scientist Michael MacCracken, “qu a lified scien t ific experts involved in climate change research” ha ve reached a “strong con s ensus” that global wa rming thre atens (among other things) a precipitate rise insea l e vels by the end of the century, MacCracken Decl. ¶1 5, Stdg. App. 207, “se

vere and irreversible changes to n a tural ecosystems,” id. , ¶5(d), at 209, a “signifi cant reduction in water storage i n winter snowpac kin mountainous regions with direct an d important economic consequences, ” ibid. , and an increase in the spre ad of disease, id., ¶28, at 218–21 9. He also19 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### observes that rising ocean te mperatures may contribute to the ferocity of hurricanes. Id ., ¶¶2 3–25, at 216–217. 18 

### That these climate-change risks are “widely shared” does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation. See Fe de ral Elec t i on Comm’ nv. Akin s , 524 U. S. 11, 24 (19 98) (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury i n fact’ ”). Ac c o rding to p e titioners’ unchallenged affidavit s , global seal e vels rose s o mewhere between 10 and 20 cen

timeters over the 20th century as a result of global warm

ing. MacCracken Decl. ¶5(c), Stdg. App. 208. These risin g seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. Id., at 196 (declaration of Paul H. Kirshen ¶5), 216 (MacCracken Decl. ¶23). Because t h e Common

wealth “ow n s a substantial portion of the state’s coast a l property,” id., at 171 ( d eclaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom ¶4), 19

### it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity

——————

18 Inth is r e g a r d , M a c C r a c k en ’s 200 4 affid av i t—dr afted m o r e th ana yea rin a dva n c e of Hu rrica n e Ka t r ina

—wa s eerily pres cient

. Immedi

atelyaf terdi sc u ssin gth e “par tic u l arc o n c e rn” th at c lima t e c h a n g e mightca us e a n“ i ncrea s e in t h e wind s p ee d a n d pea kra t e of precipit a tion of major tropical cyclo n es (i .e., h u r r ic an es an d typh oon s ),” M a cCra c ken not e d t h a t“ [ s ]oil compa c t i on, s e alevel ris e a n d rec urre nt stor ms ar e destr o y i n gappr ox imately2 0

– 30 s q u a r e mil e s of Lou isian a w e tlan ds eac hy e ar . Th ese w e tlan ds serv e as a ‘sh o ck absorber ’ for s t orm s urges t h a tcould inun da t e New Orlea ns , s i gnifica n t l y enha ncin g th e r i sk to a majoru rbanpopu lation .” ¶¶24–2 5, Stdg . App. 217.

19 “ F or exa m ple, t h e [Ma s s a chus et t s Depa rtmentof Cons erva t i on a n d Rec r e ation ] ow n s , oper ates an d m a in ta i n s appr ox ima t ely53 c o as t a l s t at e pa rks , b e a ches , res e rv a t i ons , a n d wildlife s a nct uaries

. [It] a l s o owns, operates and maint a i ns sporti ng and recreational facilitie s i n coa s t a l a r ea s , including nu merous po ols , s k a t i ng rinks , pla yground s , playing fields, former coastal fortif icat io ns, public sta g es, museums , bike tr ails, te n n i s c o ur ts, boath ou ses an d boat r a mp s an d lan d in g s . Associa t ed wi th these coast a l proper ties and facilitie s is a significant a m ountof infra s t ruct ure, w h ich t h e Com m onwea l t ha l s o owns , oper a t e s a n d maint a i ns , including roa d s , pa rkwa ys , s t ormwa t e r pump stations, pier[s], sea wal[l] revetm ents and dams.” Hoogeboom Decl. ¶4, at 171.20 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### as a landowner. The severity o f that inju ry will only increase over the course of the ne xt century: If sea level s continue to rise as pr edicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a signific ant fraction of coastal property will be “e ith e r p e rma n ently lost throughinund ati o n or t e mp orar ily lo st thro ugh peri odicstormsur ge and fl o o ding eve nts. ” Id. , ¶ 6 , at 1 72. 20

### Re medi ati o n c o st s al on e, p e titi on ers all e ge , coul d run w e lli nto th e hundr e ds of milli ons of doll ar s. Id. , ¶7, at 172 ; s e e al s oK irs henDecl

. ¶1 2, at 1 98. 21 

### Causation EPA does not dispute the existenc e of acausal connec

tion between man-made greenhouse gas emissions a n d global warming. At aminimum, therefore, EPA’ s refusal to regulate such emissions “contributes” to Massachusetts’ injuries. EPA nevertheless ma intains that its decision not to regulate greenhous e gas emission s from new motor vehi

cles contributes so insignificant lyto petitioners’ injuries that the a g ency canno t be haled i n to federal court to an swer for them. For the same reason, EPA does not believe

——————

20 See also id. , at 1 79 (dec l a r ationof Ch r i sti a nJac qz) (disc u ssin g pos s i b l e los s of roughly 1 4acres of la nd per miles of coast line b y 2 1 0 0 ) ; Kirs hen Decl. ¶1 0 , at1 98 ( a l l eg in gth at “[ w ] h e nsu cha r i se insealev e l oc c u r s , a 10-y e arflood w ill h av e th e magn itu d e of th e pr esen t 100-y e ar flood and a 10 0-year flood w ill have the m a gnitude of th e present 5 00

- year flood”).

21 In dissent, T HE C HI EF J US TI CE di smi sse s p e tition er s’ su b m iss i on s a s “ c onclus ory , ” pres umab l y beca us e t h ey do notq u a n t i fy Ma s s a chus et ts ’ lan dloss w i thth e ex ac titu de h e w o u l d prefer

. Post , at 8. He th er efor e a s s e rts t h at the Commonwea l t h ’s inj ury is “ c onj e ct ur[ a l].” S e e ib i d

. Yett h e likelihood t h a tMa ssa chus et t s ’ coas t line will recede ha s not h in g to do w i thw h e th erpetition er s h av e deter m in ed th e pr ec ise metes an d bounds of their soon-to-be-flooded land

. P e titioners maintain that the seas are risin gand will co ntinue to rise, and have alleged that such a rise will le ad to the loss of Massachus etts’ sovereign territory. No one, s ave perha ps t h e diss ent e rs , dis p ut es thos e a llegat i ons . Our ca s e s req u ire not h in g more.21 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### that any re alistic possibility exists that the relief petition

ers seek wo uld mitigate global climate change and reme dy their injuries. That is especiallyso because predicted increases i ngreenhou s e gas emi ssions fromdeveloping nations, particularly China and India, are li kely to offset any margin al domestic decrease. But EPA o v erstates its case. Its argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a s m all incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a fe d

eral judicial forum. Yet accepting that pr emise would doom most challenges to regulatory action. Agencies, lik e legislatures , do not gen e rally resolv e massive problems in one fe ll regu latory swoop. See Williamsonv. Lee Op tica l of Okla., Inc. , 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[A] reform may tak e one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase o f the problem which seems mostacute to the legislativ e mind”). They instead whittle away at the m over time, refining their preferred approacha s circumsta nces change and as they develop a more- nuanced understa n ding of how best to proceed. Cf. SEC v. Ch en ery Corp. , 3 32 U. S. 194, 202 (1947) (“Some prin ciples must await thei r own devel

opment, wh ile others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeab l e situation s ”). That a first step might be tentative d oes not by itself support the notion that federa l courts lack jurisdiction to deter m ine whether that step conforms to law. And reducing domestic automobileemissions i s hardly a tentative step. Even leavin g aside the other greenhouse gases, the United States transportation sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide into the atmos

phere—acco rding to th e MacCrac k en affidav i t, more than 1.7 billion metric tons in 1999 alone. ¶30, Stdg. App. 21 9. That accou n ts for more than 6% of worldwide carbon dioxide emi ssions. Id., at 232 (Oppenheimer Decl. ¶3); see also MacCracken Decl. ¶31, at 220. To put this in per

spective: C o nsidering just emissions from the transporta

-22 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### tion sector, which represent less than one-third of th is country ’s total carbon dioxide emissions, the United State s would still rank as the third-la rgest emitter of carbo n dioxide in the world, o u tpaced only by the European Union and China. 22 

### Judged by any standa r d, U. S. m o tor-vehicle emission s make a meaningful contribution to greenhou s e gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, to global warming. The Rem e dy While it may be tr ue that re gulating m o tor-vehicle emission s will not by its e lf reverse global warming, it b yno means foll ows that we lack ju risdi ction to decide whethe r EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduc e it. See a l s o Larsonv. Valente , 456 U. S. 228, 244, n. 15 (1982) (“[A] plaintiff satisfies the r e dressabilit y requirement when he shows that a favorabl e decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need n o t show that a favorable decision will relieve his everyinjury”). Bec ause of the enormity of the potential conseq uences ass o ciated with man-made climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the (relatively short) time it takes for a new motor- vehicle fleet t o replace an older one is essentia lly irrelevant. 23

### Nor is it dispositive

——————

22 See UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inve ntory Data for the Perio d 1990–2004 an d Statu s of Rep orting 14 (2006) (h er ein after Inve ntory D ata) (reflecting emissions from Annex I countries); UNFCCC, Sixth Compilation an d Synth e sis of Initial Nation al Commu nic ation s from Parties not In

clu ded in A

nn ex I to th e Convention 7–8 (2005) (r eflectin g emission s from non-A nnex I co untries); s ee al s oDe pt. of Energy, Ener gy Inf ormation Admin., I nternational Energy Annual 2004, H.1co2 World Carbon Dioxide Emission s from th e Con s u mption an d Flarin g of Fossil Fu els, 1980–200 4 (Table), http://www .eia.doe.gov /pub/intern ation al/iealf/tableh 1c o2.xls. 23 See also Mountain Stat esL e gal Fou ndati on v. Gli c k m an , 92 F. 3d 122 8, 123 4 (C AD C 199 6) (“T h e mor e dr asticth e in ju rythat g o v e r n m en t action make s more likely, the lesse r the increment in probability to esta bli s hst an din g”); Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans , 997 F. 2d 328, 329 (CA 7 199 3) (“[ E ]v ena sm all pr obabi lityof in j u r yis su ffic i en t23 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that developing countries such as China an d India are poised to in crease greenhouse gas emission s s u bstantially over the next century: A redu ction in domesti cemissions would slow the pace of global e m issions in creases, no matter wha thappens elsewhere. We moreover attachconsiderable significance to EPA’s “agree[ment] with the President that ‘ w e must address the issue of global climate change,’ ” 6 8Fed. Reg. 52929 (quot

ing remarks announcing Clear Skies and Gl obal Climate Initiatives, 2002 Public Papers of George W. Bush, Vol. 1, Feb. 14, p. 227 (2004)), and to EPA’s ardent support for various voluntary emi ssion-r eduction programs, 68 Fed. Reg. 52932. As Judge Tatel ob s e rved in di ssent bel o w, “EPA would presumably not both erwith such efforts if it thought emissions reductions would have no discernable impact on future global warming.” 415 F. 3d, at 66. In sum—at least according to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits—t he rise insea levels associated with global warming h a s already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of cat a strophic h a rm, though remote, is nevertheless real. Tha trisk woul d be reduce d to some extent if petitioners re ceived the relief they seek. We therefo r e hold tha tpetitioners have stan ding to chal

lenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking peti tion. 24

—————— to c r e ate a c a s e orc o n t r o v e rsy
—to take a su it ou t of th e c ateg o r yof the hypot h et ica l—provided of c o urs e t h a tt h e relief s o u ghtwo uld, if g r an ted, r e du ce th e pr obabili ty”).

24 Inh i s dissen t , T HE C HI EF J U S TI CE ex pr esses dis a g r eemen tw i thth e Court’s holding in United Statesv. St ude nts Challen g i n g Regu latory Age ncy Pro ced ure s (SCRAP) , 41 2 U. S. 6 6 9 , 68 7–6 88 (1 973). He doe s not , howe ver, dis avow t h is port ion of J u s t ice S t ewa r t ’ s opinion for t h e Court : 

### “ Unlike the s p ecific and ge ographically limited fed er al ac tionof w h i ch the petitioner complained in Sier ra Clu b [v. Mo rton, 405 U. S. 72 7 (197 2)], th e c h a llen g ed ag en c yac tionin th is c a se is applic a b le t o subst a ntia lly all of the N a t i on’s ra ilroads, and thus all e gedly has an a dvers e envir o nment a limpa cton a l l t h e na t ura l resources of t h e24 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### V The scope of our revi ew of the merits of t h e statutory issues is na rrow. As we have repeated time a n d again, an agency has broad discr e tion to choose how best to marsha l its limited resources and pers onnel to carry out its dele

gated respo n sibiliti e s. See Chevr o n U. S. A. Inc. v. Na tu

ral Resour c es D e fen se Council, Inc

. , 467 U. S. 837, 842–845 (1984). That discretion is at its height when the agency decides not to bring an enforcement action. Therefore, in Heckl e rv. Chaney , 47 0 U. S. 821 (1985), we held that an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proce e dings is not ordinarily subject to judicial review. Som e debate re

mains, however, as to the rigor w i th which we review an agency’s de nial of a pet i tion for rulemaking. There are key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcemen taction. See America n Horse Pro t ec tion As sn ., Inc. v. Lyng , 812 F. 2d 1, 3–4 (CADC 1987). In contrast to nonenforcement decisions, ag en cy refusals to initiate rulemaking“are less frequent, more apt to inv o lve legal as opposed to f a ctual analysis, and subject to special formali

-

—————— count r y . Ra ther t h a nalimit e d group of pers ons who us ed a pict ur esque valley i nCalifornia, all pers ons who utilize the scenic resource s of t h e count ry , a n d indeed a ll who b r eathe it s a i r, could cla i m ha rm simi larto th atalleg e d byth e en v i r o n m en tal g r ou ps h e r e . Bu t w eh av e alr e adymade it c l earth at s tan din gis n o t to be den i ed simplybec a u s e many people suffer the same injury. Indee dsome of the cases on which we relied in SierraClub demon s tr atedt h e paten tfac tth a tper s on s across the Nation could be advers ely affected by major gove rnmental ac tion s. To d eny stan din g

to person s wh o are in fact injure d simply b ecaus e many others are alsoinjured, woul d mean that the most injuri

ous an d wi de s p read Gove rn ment actio ns c o uld b eq u esti o ned by nob o d y . We ca nnota cceptt h atconclus ion.” Ibid. ( c itation s omi t t e d an d em ph a sis adde d). It is mor eov erqu ite w r o ng to an alog ize th e leg a l c l ai m adv a n c e d by Ma s s a chus et ts a n d t h e ot her pub lic a n d priva t e ent i t i es who c h a lleng e EPA’s pa rs imonious cons t r uct ion of t h e Clea n Air Act t o amere “ l aw yer’s ga me.” S ee post , at 14.25 Cite as: 54 9 U

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### ties, includi n g a public explanation.” Id. , at 4; see also 5 U. S. C. §555(e). They moreover arise out of denials of petitions for rulemaking which ( a t least in the circu m stances here) the affected party h a d an undo ubted proce

dural right to file in the first instance. Refusals to prom

ulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is “ext remely limited” and “hi ghly deferen

tial.” Nati onal Custo m s Brokers & Forwa r d ers As sn of Americ a, Inc. v. United States , 883 F. 2d 93, 96 (CA D C 1989). EPA conclu ded in its denial of the petition for rulemak

ing that it lacked auth o rity under 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1) to regulate new vehicle emissions because carbon dioxide is not an “a ir pollutant” as that term is defin e d in §7602

. In the alternative, it conclu ded that even if it possessed authority, it would decline to do so because regulation would confl i ct with ot her administration pri o rities. As discussed earlier, the Clean AirAct e x pre ssly permits review of s u ch an action. §7607(b)(1). We therefore “may reverse anysuch ac tion found to be .

. . arbitrar y , cap r i

cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor

dance with law.” §7607(d)(9). VI On the mer i ts, the firstquestion is whether §2 02(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regula te greenhouse gas emissio n s from new motor ve hicles in the event that it forms a “judgment” t hat such emissions c o ntribute to climate change. We have little trouble concl u ding that it does. In relevant part, §202( a)(1) provides that EPA “shall by regulation prescribe .

. . standards appli c able to the emissionof any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new moto r vehicle engines, which in [the Admin i strator’s] j u dgment ca use, or contribute to, ai r pollution w h ich may reasonably b e anticipated to endan

ger public health or welfare. ” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1 ).26 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Because EPA believes that Congress did not intend it to regulate substances that contribute to climate change, the agency maintains that carbon dioxide is not an “air pollut

ant” within the meaning of the provision. The statutory text fore closes EPA’ s reading. The Clean Air Act ’ s sweeping definition of “air pollutant” includes
“ anyair pollution agent or combination of such agents, including anyphysical, chemical .

. . substance or matte r which is emitted into or ot herwise enters the ambient air

. . . .” §7602(g) (emphasis added). On its face, th e definition embraces all airborne compounds of whateve r stripe, and underscores that intent through t h e repeated use of the word “an y .” 25

### Carbon di oxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt “ph y si

cal [and] chemical .

. . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . the ambient air.” The statute is unambiguous. 26 

### Rather tha nrelying on statutory text, EPA invoke s

——————

25 See Departme n t of Housing and Urban Developmentv. Ruck er , 535 U. S

. 125 , 131 (2002 ) (ob servi n g th at “ ‘ a n y’

. . . has an expan s iv e mean ing, th at is, on e or so me in discrimi n a te ly of whatever k i n d” (some in ter

nal quo t ation mar k s omitted)).

26 In dissent, J US TI CE S CALI A main tain s t h at bec a u s e g r eenh ou se g a ses per m ea t e th e w o r l d’s atmosph er e r a t h erth ana lim ited ar ea n e ar t h e ea rt h’s s urfa c e, EPA’s exclus ionof gree nhous e ga s e s from t h e c ateg o r yof airpollu tion “ag en t[s]” i s en ti t l ed to defer e n c e u n d er Chev

ron U. S. A. I nc. v. Natu ral Resour ces De f ens e Council, Inc. 467 U. S

. 837 ( 1 9 84). S ee post , at 11 –13. EPA’s d i stin c t ion , h o w e v e r, fin d s n o su ppor tinth e tex tof th e st atu te, w h i c hu s es th e ph r a se “th e am bie n t a i r” wit h outdis t inguis hing b e t w een a t m ospheric la yers . Moreove r , iti s apla i nly unrea s onab l e rea d ing of as w eeping s t a t ut ory pro v is ion designed to c a pture “ anyp h y s ic al, c h e mic a l .

. . su bsta n c e ormatter w h i c his emitt e d in to orother w i se en ter s th e ambien t a i r . ” 42 U. S. C. §760 2(g)

. J USTI CE S CALI A does not(a nd c a nnot) expla i n whyCongres s would define “ a i r pollut a n t” s o ca refully a n d s o b r oa dly, yetconfe ron EPA th e au th or ityto n a r r o wth at defin i t i onw h e n e v e r ex pedien t by asser t in gth ata par t ic u l ars u bstan c e is n o t an“ag en t.” At an yr ate, n o pa rt y t o t h is dis p ut e cont est s t h atgreen hous e ga s e s bot h“ e nt e[r] t h e ambien tair” an d ten dto w a r mth e at mosph e r e . Th eyar e th er efor e u n q u e stion abl y“ag en t[s]” of airpollu tion

.27 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### postenactment congressional a ctions and deliberations it views as tantamount to a co ngres s ional command to re

frain from regulating greenhouse gas emiss i ons. Even if such postenactment legislative history could shed light on the meanin gof an otherwise-unambiguous s t atute, EPA never ident i fies any ac tion remotely suggesti n g tha tCo n gress meant to curtail its powe r to treat greenhouse gases as air pollu tants. Tha tsubsequent Congres s es have es

chewed enacting binding emissions limitations to comb at global warming tells us nothin g about what Congre ss meant whe nit amended §202(a)(1) in 1970 and 1977. 27 

### And unlike EPA, we have no difficulty reco nciling Con

gress’ va rious efforts to prom ote interagency collaboration and research to better understand climate change 28

### with the agency’s pre-existing mandate to regulate “any air pollutant” that may endanger th e public welfare. See 4 2 U. S. C. §7 601(a)(1). Collaboration and research do not

——————

27 See United St atesv. Pri c e , 361 U. S. 30 4, 313 (1 96 0) (h oldin gth at
“ t h e views of as u b s eq uent Congres s formaha za rdous b a s is for infer

ring the intent of an earlier one”); see also Cobell v. Norton , 428 F. 3d 107 0, 1 075 (C AD C 2 005) (“[ P ]ost-en ac tme n t leg i sl ativ e h i stor yis n o t on lyoxy m or onicbu t in h e r e ntlyen titled to little w e igh t”).

28 See, e.g. , N at i on a lC li m at e Pr ogr a m Ac t, §5, 92 S t a t
. 60 1, 1 5U. S. C. §2 9 01 et seq
. (calling for the est abli s hm ent of aN ationalCli m a t e Progra m a n d for a ddit i ona lclima t e cha nge res e a rch) ; Glob a lClima t e Pr otec tionAc t of 1987, § 110 3, 101 Sta t . 1 408–1 409 (d ir ec tin gEPA an d th e Sec r e tar yof Sta t e to “jo i n t ly” dev e lop a “c oor d in atedn ation al polic y on glob a lclima t e cha nge” a n d reportt o Congres s ) ; Glob a lCha n ge Research Act of 1990, Tit. I , 104 S tat. 3097, 15 U. S. C. §§2921–2938 (establishing for the “develo p ment a n d coo r dina t i on of a comprehens iv e a n d int e gra t e d Unit ed S tat es res e a rch progra m” t o a i d in “ under

s t a n d[ing] .

. . huma n -ind uced a n d na t ura l proces s e s of climate c h a n g e”); G l obal Cl ima t e Ch an g e Pr ev en tionAc t of 199 0, 104 S t at
. 405 8, 7 U. S. C. §67 01 et seq
. (direct i ng t h e Dept . of Agricult ure t o study the effects of climate change on fores t ry and agriculture); Energy Polic yAc t of 199 2, §§160 1– 160 9, 106 S t a t . 2999, 42 U. S. C. §§13381

– 133 88 (r equ i r i n gth e Sec r e tar yof En er gyto r e por tonin for m ation pert a i ning t o c limat e cha nge)

.28 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### conflict wit hany thoughtful regu latory effort; they com

plement it. 29 

### EPA’s reliance on Brown & Willi amson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U. S. 120, is similarly misplaced. In holding that tobacco pro d ucts are not “drugs ” or “devices” subject t o Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation pursuant to the Food, Dru g and CosmeticAct (FDCA), see 529 U. S., at 133, we found critical at least two considerations tha t have no counterpart in this case. First, we th ought it unlikely that C o ngress meant to ban tobacco pro d ucts, whic h the F D C A would h a ve required had such p r oducts been classified as “dru gs” or “devices .” Id., at 135–137. Here, in contrast, EPA jurisdiction woul d lead to no s u ch extreme measures. EPA would only regu late emissions, and even then, it would have to delay a n y action “to p e rmit the d e velopmentand applic ation of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance,” §7521(a)(2). Howe ver much a ban on tobacco produc ts clashed wi th the “co mmon sense” intuition that Congre ss neve r meant to remove those products fr om circulati on, Brown & Williamson , 529 U. S., at 133 , ther e is nothingcounterintuitive to the notion tha t EPA can curtail the emission of substances that are pu t

ting the global climate out of k ilter. Se cond , in Bro w n & Will iam s on we pointe d toan unb ro k e n serie s of congressional enactments that made sense only i f a d op ted “a ga ins tthe back drop of the FDA’s co nsis

ten t a n d re pea t ed state m ents th atitlack ed authority unde r the F D CA t ore gul a tet o bac co. ” Id. , at14 4

. We c a n p o i n t to no suc hen ac tmen ts h e re: E PA h a s not i d en tifie dan y c o n gre ssion al a c tio nth at c o nfli cts in a ny wa y wi t hthe re gul a -

——————

29 We ar e mor eov erpu zzled byEPA’s r o u n dabou tar g u m e n tth at be

ca us e la t e r Congres s e s chos e t o a ddres s s t r a t o s p heric ozone pollut i on in a specific legislat ive provis ion, its o mehow follows t h a tgreenho us e g a ses c a n n o t be airpollu tan t s w i th inth e mean in gof th e CleanAirAc t.29 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### tion of gree nhousegases fromne w moto r ve hicles. Eve nif it ha d, Con gre ss co uld not have a c ted a g ains t a re gula to ry “ba c kdro p ”of dis c lai m e r s of re gul a tory au tho ri ty . Prio r to the o r der that pro vo k ed this liti g a t ion, EPA h a d ne ver disavo wed t h e aut h or it y to re gula t egree nhous e gases , an d in 199 8 it i nfa ct affi rmed tha ti t had s u c ha u th o ri t y . S e e App. 5 4(Ca nnon memo ran du m). There is no reason, m u ch less aco mpelling re aso n , to a c cept EPA’s invi tationto rea d ambi gui t y i n to a clea r s t a t u t e. EPA finally argues that it cannot regulate carbon diox

ide emissi o n s from motor vehicles because doing so would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job (according to EPA) tha t Congress has assigned to DOT. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52929. But that DOT sets mileage sta n dards in n o way licenses EPA to s h irk its environmental responsibili

ties. EPA has been charged wit hprotectin gthe public’s “health” and “welfare,” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1), a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’ s mandate to pro

mote energy efficiency. See Energy Policy and Conserva

tion Act, §2(5), 89 Stat. 874, 42 U. S. C. §6201(5). The two obligations may overlap, but there is n o rea s on to think the two age n cies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avo i d inconsist e ncy. While the Congresses that drafted §202(a)(1) might not have appreciated the possibility t hat burning fossilfuel s could lead to global warmin g, th ey did understand th at without regulatory flexibility, changing circum stances and scientific development s would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language of §202(a) (1) reflects an intentionaleffort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corre ctions v. Ye skey , 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]h e fact that astatute can be a pplied in situati o ns not ex

pressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demons trates breadth” (internal quotation marks omit ted)). Beca use greenhouse gases fit well withi n30 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the Clean Air Ac t’s capacious definition of “air pollutant, ” we hold that EPA has the statuto r y authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor ve hicles. VII The alternative basis for EPA’s de cision—that even if i t does have statutory authority to regula te greenhouse gases, it w o uld be unwise to do so at this time—rests on reasoning divorced fr om the statutory text. While the statute does condition the exe rcise of EPA’s authority on its formation of a “judgment,” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1), that judgment must relate to whether an air pollutant “cause[s], or contribu t e [s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to en danger pub lic health or welfare,” ibid. Put another way, t h e use of the word “jud g ment” is not a roving license to ignore the st atutory tex t
. It is but a direction to exerci se discretion wit h in defined statutory li mits. If EPA ma kes a finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the agency to regulat e emissions of the dele

terious pollutant from new motor vehicles. Ibid. (stating that “[EPA] shallby regulation prescribe .

. . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from an y class of new motor ve hicles”). EPA no doubt has signifi

cant latitude as to the manner, timing, conte n t, and coor dination of its regulations with those of other agencies. But once E PA has res p onded to apetition for rulemaking, its reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute. Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Ac t, E PA can a v oid taking further ac tion only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonab le explana

tion as to why it can n ot or w ill not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. Ibi d

. To the extent tha t this constrains agency discretionto pursue other priorities of the Admi nistrator orthe Presid ent, this is the congres

sional des i gn.31 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### EPA has r e fused to comply withthis clear statutor y command. Instead, it has offered a laundry list of reasons not to regul a te. For ex ample, EPA said tha ta number of voluntary executive branch pr ograms already provide an effective response to the threatof global warming, 68 Fed. Reg. 52932, that regul a ting greenhouse gases might im

pair the President’s ability to nego tiate with“key de velop

ing nations” to reduce emissions, id. , at 52931, and tha t curtailing motor-vehicle emis sion s would reflect “an ineffi

cient, piecemeal approach to address the cli m ate change issue,” ibid. Although w e have neither the expertise nor t h e author

ity to evaluate these policy judgments, it is evident they have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emi s sions contribute to climate chan ge. Still less do they amount to a reasoned justific ation for declining to form a scientific judgment. In particular, while the President has broad authority in foreign affa irs, that auth o rity does not extend to t h e refusal to execute domestic laws. In the Global Climate Prote ction Act of 1987, Con gress autho r ized the State De partm e nt—no tEPA—t oformulat e U n it ed St ate sfo rei gn poli cy w i th refe ren c e to envi ron m ent a l ma t

ters rela tin g to clim ate
. See §1 103 (c), 1 01 Sta t
. 140 9. EPA has ma de n oshowi n g that i tissue dthe rulin g in questio n here af terc o nsul ta tion wi th t h e S t a t e De pa rt ment
. Con

gre ss di d di rec tE PA toconsul t wi t hothe r age n cies in the form ula t ion of i t s poli ci es an d rule s, bu t theS t a t e De pa rt

ment is ab s e nt fro m th at li st. §1 10 3(b). Nor ca n EPA avoi d its sta t u t o ry o b liga t ion by notin g th e unce r tain t ysurro un din g va rio u s fe atu r es of cl i m ate chan g e a n d c o n c ludi ng th atit w o u l d therefo r e be better no t to regula te at this ti me. See 68Fe d. Reg. 529 30– 5 2931. I f t h e scientific uncertainty i s so pr ofou nd that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether green

house gases contribute to global warming, E PA must say so. That EPA would prefer not to regulate greenhouse32 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### gases because of some residual uncertainty—which, co n trar yto J U S TICE 

### S CAL IA

### ’s appa rent belief, post , at 5–8, i s in fact all t hat it said, see 68Fed. Reg. 52929 (“We do n o t believe .

. . that it would be either effective or appropriate for EPA to establish [g reenhouse gas] standar ds for motor vehiclesatthis time” (emphasis added))—i s irrelevant. The statutory question is whether sufficient i n formation exists to make an endangerment finding. In short, EPA has offered no rea s oned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore “arbitrary, capricious,

. . . orotherwise not in accordan ce with law.” 42 U. S. C. §7607(d)(9)(A). We need not and do not reach the question whether on reman dEPA mu st make an endangerment finding, or whether policy con

cerns can i n form EPA’ s actions in the event t hat it make s such a finding. Cf. Ch evron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natu ral Re

sources Def ense Counc il, Inc. , 46 7 U. S. 837, 843–84 4 (1984). We hold only that EPA must groun dits reasons for action or inaction in the statut e. VIII The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 12 0 

### MASS AC HUSE TTS, ET AL 

### ., PETI TIONE R S v. ENVIR O N

MENTALP R OT ECTI O N AGEN CY ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE DISTR I CT OF COLUM B IA CIRCU IT [Apr il 2, 200 7] 

### C HIEF 

### J US TICE 

### R OBERTS 

### , with whom J UST I CE 

### S CALIA 

### , J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### , and J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### join, dissenting. Global warming may be a “crisis,” even “the most press

ing environmental problem of ourtime.” Pet. for Cert. 2 6 , 22. Indeed, it may ul timately affect nearly everyone on the planet i nsome potentially adv e rse way, a n d it ma y b e that go vern ments have done too little to address it. It is not a problem, however, that has escaped the attention of policymake r s in the Executive and Legislative Branches of our Government, who continue to consider regulatory , legislative, and treaty-based mea n s of addressing globa l climate change. Apparently dissatisfied with the pace of progress on this issue inthe elected branches, petitioners have come to the courts claiming broad

- ranging in jury, and a ttempting t o tie that injury to the Gove rnment’s alleged failure to comply wit ha rather narrow stat utory pro vision. I would reject these challenges as nonjusticiable. Such a conclu

sion involv es no judgment on whether global warming exists, what causes it, or the extent of the pr oblem. No r does it render petitioners withoutrecourse. This Court’ s standing ju risprudence simply rec o gnizes that redress of grievances of the sort at issue here “is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive, ” not the federal courts. Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife , 50 4 U. S. 555, 576 (1992). I2 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### would vaca te the judg ment below and remand for dis

missal of the petitions for review. I Article III, §2, of theConstitution limits t h e federal judicial power to the adjudicatio nof “Cases” and “ C ont r o versies.” “I f a dispute is not a pro p er case or controversy , the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.” Daimle rChr ysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 5). “Standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to m a ke a justic iable case,” Steel Co. v. Citizen sfor Better Envi ronment , 523 U. S. 83, 102 (19 98), and h a s been described as “an e ssential an d unchangi n g part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, ” Def enders of Wildlife , supra , at 56 0. Our modern framework for addressing standing is famil

iar: “A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly trace

able to the defendant’s allegedlyunlawful conduct an d likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” DaimlerChrysle r , supra , at __ _ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Allenv. Wri ght , 46 8 U. S. 737, 751 (19 84) (internal quotation marks omit ted)). Appl ying tha tst andard her e , petitioners bear the burden of alleging an injury tha tis fairly trace

able to theEnvironmental Protection Agency’ s failure to promulgate new motor vehicle gr eenhouse gas emissi on standards, and that is likely to b e redressed by the p r o spective issuance of su ch standards. Before determining w h ether petitioners can meet this familiar tes t , however, the Court changes the rules. It asserts that “S tates ar e not normal litigants for the pu r poses of invoking federal jurisdiction,” andthatgive n “Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to speci al soli ci

tudein our standing analysis.” Ante , at 15, 17 (emphasis added).3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### Relaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries are pressed by a State, however, has no basis in our jurispru dence, and su pport fora n y such “sp e cial solicitude” is conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion. The general judicial review provision cited by the Court, 42 U. S. C. §7 607(b)(1), affords States no special rights or s t atus. The Court sta t es that “Congress has ordered EPA to p r otect Massa ch usetts (among others) ” through th e statutory provisio n at issue, §7521(a)(1), and that “Congress has . . . reco gnize da concom itant proce

dural rightto challenge the rejection of its rulemakin g petition as arbitrary and capricio us.” Ante , at 16. The reader might think from this un fortunate phrasing tha t Congress said something about the rights of States in this particular provision of the st atute. Congres s knows how to do that when it wa nts to, see, e.g., §7426 (b) (affordi n g States the right to pet i tion EPA t o directly r e gulate cer

tain sources of pollution), but it has done nothing of t h e sort here. Under the law on whic h petitioners rely, Con

gress treated public and priv ate litigants exactly the same. Nor does the case law cited by the Court provide an y support for the notion that Article III someh o w implicitly treats public and priva t e litig ants differently. The Court has to go b a ck a full century in an attempt to justify its novel standing rule, bu t even there it comes up short. The Court’s ana lysis hinges on Geor g iav. Tenn e sseeCopp er Co. , 206 U. S. 230 (1907)—a case that did indeed draw a distinction between a State an d priva t e litigants, b u t solely with respect to avail ableremedies. The case h a d nothing to do with Ar t i cle III standing. In Tennes s ee Copp er , the State of Georgia sought to enjoin copp er companies inneighb oring Tennesseefro m discharging pollutants that were inflicting “a wholesal e destructionof forests, orchards and crops” in bordering Georgia counties. Id. , at 236. Alt h ough the State owne d very lit tle of the terri tory allegedly affecte d, the Cou r t4 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### reasoned that Georgi a—in its capacitya s a “ quasi

sovereign”—“has an interest independent of and behi nd the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and a i r within it s domain.” Id. , at 237. The Court explained that whi l e “[t]he very elements that woul d be reli ed u p on in as u it between fel l ow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief [were] wan t ing,” aS t a t e “is not li ghtly to be required t o give up quasi -sovereign rights for pay.” Ibid. Thus while a complaini n g private litigant wou l d have to make do with a legal remedy—one “for pay”—th e State was entitled t o equitable re lief. See id. , at 237–238. In contrast to the p r esent case, the r e was no q u estion in Tenne sse e Copper abo ut Article III injury. Seeid. , at 238– 239. There was certainly no su ggestion that the State could show standing where the private parties could n o t; there was no dispute, after all, that the pri v ate landown

ers had “anaction atlaw.” Id. , at 238. Tenn esse e Coppe r has since stood for nothing more th an a State ’ s right, in an original jurisdiction action, to s u e in a re presentativ e capacity as parens patriae

. See, e.g . , Marylandv. Louisi

ana , 451 U. S. 725, 73 7 (1981). Nothing ab out a Sta t e’s ability to s u e in that capacity dilutes the bedrock require

ment of showing injury, causatio n, and redressability to satisfy Article III. A claim of paren s patriae standing is distinc tfrom an allegation of direct injury. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma , 502 U. S. 437, 448–449, 45 1 (1992). Far from bei n g a substi

tute for Art i cle III injury, parens patri aeacti ons raise an additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a “quasi-sovereign interest” “ apa rtfrom the interests of particularp r ivate pa rti es.” Alfred L. Snap p & Son, Inc. v. Puer to Rico ex rel. Bar ez , 458 U. S. 592, 607 (1982) (em

phasis added) (cited ant e , a t16). Just as a nassociation suing on behalf of its members must show not only that it represents the members but that at least one satisfies Article III requiremen t s, so too a State asse rting quasi

-5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### sovereign interests as paren s p a tr iaemust still show that its citizens satisfy Article III. Focusing on Massachu

setts’s interests as q uasi- sovereign makes the required showing here harder, not easier. The Cou rt, in effec t , takes wha t has always been regard ed as a nece ssarycondi

tion for pare nspatr iae standing— a quasi-sovereign inter

est—and co nverts it in to a suffici e ntshowing for purposes of Article III. What is more, the Court’s reasoning falters on its own terms. Th e Court ass e rts thatM a ssachusetts is entitled to “special solicitude” due to its “quasi-sovereign inter

ests,” ante , at 17, but then applies our Article III standing test to the asserted injury of th e State’s loss of coastal property. See ante , at 19 (conclu d ing that Massachusetts “has alleged a particu larized injury in its capaci t y as a landowner” (emphasis added)). In the context of paren s patri aes t a n ding, however, we h a ve characterized state ownership of land as a“nonsovereign interes[t]” because a State “is likely to ha v e the same interests a s other simi

larly situated proprietors.” AlfredL. Snapp & Son , sup ra , at 601. On top of e v erything e l se, the Co urt overlook s the fact that our cases cast sign ificantdoubt on a State’s standing to assert a quasi-sovereign inte res t—as opposed to a direct injury—a gainst the Federal Government. As a general rule, we have held that while a State might assert a quasi

sovereign right as parens patriae “for the protection of its citizens, it is no partof its dut yorpower to e n force their rights in respect of the i r re lations with the F e deral Gov

ernment. In that field it is the Un ited States, and not th e State, which represents them.” Massa chuse tts v. Mello n , 262 U. S. 4 47, 485–486 (1923) (citation omitted); see al so Alfred L. S n app & Son , supra , at 6 10, n. 16. All of this presumably explains why petitio n ers never cited T e nne sseeCopp er in their bri e fs before this Court o r the D. C. Circuit. It presumably explains why not one of6 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### the legion of amicisupporting pe titioners ev er cited the case. And it presumably explains why not one of the three judges writi ng below ever cited the case either. Given that one purpose of the standing requirement is “ ‘to assu re that concrete adversen ess which sharpens the presenta

tion of i ssu es upon wh ich th e court so largely depends for illumination,’ ” an te , at 13–14 (quoting Bakerv. Carr , 36 9 U. S. 186, 204 (1962)), it is ironi cthat the Court toda y adopts a new theory of Article III standing for States without the benefit of briefing or argument on the point. 1 

### II It is not at all clear how the Cour t’s “special solicitude” for Massachusetts plays out in the standing analysis, except as a nimplicit conce ssion that petitio n ers cannot establish st anding on traditional terms. But the status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for petition

ers’ failure to demonstrate injur yin fact, ca usation, and redressability. When the Court ac tu ally applies the three- part test, it focuses, as did the dissent below, see 415 F. 3d 50, 64

——————

1 The Courts eems t o t h ink we do notrecog n ize t h a t Tenness ee Copper is a c a se a b ou t parens patri ae stan din g , ante , at 17, n

. 1 7 , bu t w e h av e n o dou bt abou tth at. Th e po in t is th at n o t h in ginourc a ses (orHar t& Wec h s ler) su gg ests th a tth e pr u d en tial r e qu ir emen ts for parens pat riae stan din g , see Repub lic of V e nez uelav. Phi lip Morri s In c. , 287 F. 3d 1 9 2 , 199, n

. (CAD C 200 2) (ob serv in gth at “ parens patriaeis merely a specie s of pr u d en tial stan din g” (i n t er n a l qu otationmar k s omitted)), c a n s o mehow s u b s t i t u t e for, or alt e r t h e cont entof, t h e “irreducib l e cons t i

tu tion al min i mu m” r e qu ir emen ts of in ju r yinfac t , c a u s ation , an d redressabil i tyunde rArticl e III. Lu ja nv. Defenders of Wildlif e , 504 U. S. 555, 560 (199 2). Geor g iav. Pennsylva n ia R. Co. , 32 4 U. S

. 439 (19 45), i s n o t to th e c o n t r a r y . As t h e c a ptionma kes c l earen ou gh , th e fac tth at aS tate ma y a s s e rtright s under afedera l s t at ut e a s par ens patriaein no wa y refut e s ou r c l earru lingth at “[a] Sta t e does n o t h av e stan din gas paren s pat riae to br in ganac t i onag ain s t th e Feder a l G o v e r n m en t.” Alf red L. Sn app & Son, In c. v. Pu erto Ri co ex re l

. Barez , 458 U. S. 592, 610, n

. 16 (198 2).7 Cite as: 54 9 U

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R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### (CADC 2005) (opinion of Tatel, J.) , on the State’s asserted loss of coast a l land as t h e injury in fact. If pet i tioners rely on loss of land as the Article III injury, however, the y must grou nd the rest of the s t anding ana lysis in th at specific injury. That al leged injurymust be “c oncrete and particulariz e d,” Defend ers of Wild life , 504 U. S., at 560, and “distinct and palpable,” Allen , 468 U. S., at 751 (in

ternal quotation marks omitted)

. Central to this conce p t of “particul a rized” injury is the requirement that a plain

tiff be affec t ed in a “personal and i n dividual way,” Def end

ers of Wildl ife , 504 U. S., at 560, n. 1, and seek relief th at “directly an d tangibly benefits hi m” in a ma nner distinct from its im pact on “th e public at large,” id. , at 573–574. Without “p articularized injury, th ere can be no confidence of ‘ areal need to exercise the power of judicial review’ or that relief can be framed ‘no broader than required by the precise fact s to whi c h t h e court’s r u ling wouldbe applied.’ ” War t hv. Seldin , 422 U. S. 490, 508 (19 75) (quoting Schlesin ge rv. Rese rvis ts Comm. to Stop th e W a r , 418 U. S. 208, 221–22 2 (1974)). The veryco ncept of global warmin g seems inconsistent with this p a rticulariza tion requirement. Global warming is a phenomenon “harmful to humanity at large,” 415 F. 3d, at 60 (Sentelle, J ., dissentin g in part and concurrin g in judgment), and the redress petitioners seek is focused no more onthem than on the public generall y—it is liter

ally to change the atmosphere around the world. If petitioners’ particul a rize d injury is loss of coastal land, it is also that injury that m u st be “actual or immi

nent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” Defend ers of Wild

life, supra , at 560 (internal quotation marks omitte d), “real and i mmediate,” Los An gelesv. Lyons , 461 U. S. 9 5 , 102 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitte d), and “ce r tainly impending,” Wh itmorev. A rkansas , 495 U. S. 149, 158 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to “actu al” injury, t h e Co urt observes that “global sea8 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### levels rose s o mewhere between10 and 20 centi m eters over the 20th century as a result of gl obal warming” and th at “[t]hese rising seas have already b e gun to swallow Massa

chusetts’ co astal land.” Ante , at 1 9

. But none of petition

ers’ declara t ions supports that connection. One declar a tion states that “a rise in se a level due to climate change is occurringon the coast of Massachusetts, in t h e metropoli

tan Boston area,” but there is no e l aboration. Petitioners’ Standing Appendix in No. 03–1361, etc. (CADC), p. 1 96 (Std g. App.)

. And the declarant g oes on to identify a “sig

nifican[t]” non -global-warming cau s e of Boston’s rising sea level: land subsidence. Id. , at 19 7; see also id. , at 216

. Thus, aside from a single conc lusory statement, there is nothing in petitioners’ 43 standi n g declarations and a c companying exhibits to support an inference of actual loss of Massachusetts coastal land from 20th century global sea level in creases. It is pure conjecture. The Court’s attempts to identify “imminent” or “cer

tainly impending” loss of Massachusetts coastal land fares no better. See ante , a t19–20. One of petitioners’ decla

rants predicts global warming will cause sea level to ri se by 20 to 70 centimeters by the year 2100

. Stdg. App. 216

. Another uses a computer modeling program to map the Commonwealth’s coastal land an d its curre nt elevation, and calcula t es that the high-end e s timate of sea level rise would result in the loss of significant state-owned coastal land. Id. , at 179. B u t the computer modeling progra m has a conceded average error of about 30 centimeters and a maximum observed error of 70 centimeters. Id. , at 177– 178. As aninitial mat t er, if it is possible that the model underrepre s ents the el evation of c o astal land to an extent equal to orin excess of the projected sea level rise, it is difficult to put muchstock in the predictedloss of land. But even placing that problem t o the s i de, accepting a century-lon gtime horizon and a series of compounded estimates renders requirements of imminen c e and im me -9 Cite as: 54 9 U

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R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### diacy utterly toothless. See Defenders of Wil d life , supra , at 565, n. 2 (while the concept of “ ‘imminence’ ” in s t and

ing doctrin e is “somewhat elastic,” it can be “stretch ed beyond the breaking point”). “Allegations of possibl e future injury do not satisfy the requirements o f Art. III. A threatened injury must be certain l y impending to consti

tute injuryin fact.” Whitmor e , supra , at15 8

. (i n t er na l quotation marks omit ted; emphasis added). III Petitioners’ reliance on Massachusetts’s loss of coastal land as their injury in fact for st anding pur p oses creates insurmountable problems for the m withrespect to cau s a tion and redressability. To establi s h standing, petitioner s must show a causal connection between that specific injury and the lack of new motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission st andards, and that the promulgation of such standards would likely red r ess th at injur y . As is often the case, the questions of c ausation an d redressability overlap. See Allen , 468 U. S., at 753, n. 19 (observing that the two requirements were “initially a rticulated by this Court as two facets of a single causation requirement” (intern a l quotation marks omi tted)). An d importan t ly, when a partyis ch allenging the Gove rnment’s allegedly unlawfu l regulation, or lack of r e gulation, of a third pa rty, satisf y ing the ca usation and redressability requirements be

comes “substantially more difficult.” Defenders of Wildlif e , supra , at 5 62 (internalquotation marks omitted); see a l s o War t h , sup r a , at 504–505. Petitioners view the re lationship between their injuries and EPA’s f a ilure to pr omulgate new motor v e hicle green

house gas emission standards as simple an d direct: Do

mestic motor vehicles emit carbon dioxide and othe r greenhousegases. W o rldwide emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to global warmin g and therefore also to petitioners’ alleged injuries

. Without the new vehicle10 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### standards, greenhou s e gas e m issions—a n d therefore global warming and its atten d ant harm s —have been higher than they otherwise would have been; once E PA changes course, the trend will be reversed. The Court ignores the comple xities of global warming, and does so by now disregarding the “particularized” injury it relied on in step one, andusing the dire nature o f global warming itself as a bootstrap for findi n g causation and redress ability. First, it is important to re cognize the extent of the emissi o n s at issue here. Because loca l greenhouse gas emis si ons dispers e throughout the atmos

phere and remain there for anywhere from 50 to 200 years, it is global emis sions data that are relevant. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A–73. Acco rding to one of petition

ers’ declarations, domestic mo tor vehicles cont ribute about 6 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions an d 4 percent of global greenhous e gas emissi on s. Stdg. App. 232. The amount of global emis sions atiss u e here is smaller stil l; §202(a)(1) of the Clea n Air Act covers only new motor vehicles an d new mot o r vehicle engines, so petitioners’ desired emission standards might reduce only a fraction of 4 percent of global emis sions. This gets us only to th e relevant greenhouse gas emis

sions; linking them to global war m ing and ultimately to petitioners’ alleged injuries next requires cons ideration of further complexities. As EPA explained inits denial of petitioners’ request for rulemaking , “predictin gfuture climate change necessarily involves a complex web of economic and physical factors in

cluding: ou r ability to predict futu re global anthropo

genic emissions of [greenhous e gases] and aerosols; the fate of these emiss i ons once they enter the atmos

phere (e.g., what percentage are absorbed by vegeta

tion or are tak e n up by the oceans); the impact o f those emissions that remain in the atmosphere on the11 Cite as: 54 9 U

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R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### radiative properties of the atmos p here; changes in critically im portant cli m ate feedbacks (e.g., changes in cloud cover and oceancirculation); changes in tem

perature c haracteristi c s (e.g., a v erage temp eratures, shifts in da ytime and evening temperatures); changes in other climatic para meters (e.g., shifts in precipita

tion, storms); and ultimately t h e impact of such changes on human hea l th and welfare (e.g., i n creases or decreases in agri cultural productivity, human health impacts).” Ap p . to Pet. for Cert. A–83 through A–84. Petitioners are never able to trace their alleg e d injuries back through this comp lex web to the fractional amount of global emis sions that might have been limit ed with EPA standards. In light of the bit-part domestic new motor vehicle greenhouse ga s emission s have played in what petitioners describe as a 150-year global phenomenon, an d the myriad additional factors bearing on petitioners’ al

leged injury—the loss of Massachusetts coastal land—the connection i s far too speculative to establish ca usation. IV Redressability is even more problematic. To the tenu

ous linkbe tween petitioners’alle ged injury and the inde

terminate fractional domestic emis sions at is s u e here, ad d the fact tha tpetitioners cannot meaningfully predict wha t will come of the 80 percent of globa lgreenhous e gas emis

sions that originate outside the United States. As the Court ack n owledges, “developing countries such as China and India a r e poised toincrease greenhous e gas emissi on s substantiall y over the next century,” an te, at 23, so the domestic emissions at issue here may become an increas

ingly margi nal portion of global emission s, and any de

creases produced by petition ers’ desired standards are lik ely to be overwhelmed many times over by emissions increases elsewhere in the world.12 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### Petitioners offer declarations attempting to a ddress this uncertainty , contending that“[i]f the U. S. ta kes steps t o reduce mot o r vehicle emission s, other countr ies are very likely to ta ke similar actions reg a rding thei r own moto r vehicles using technology deve loped in response to t h e U. S. program.” Stdg. App. 220; see als o id. , at 311–312. In other words, do not worr y th at other co untries will contribute far more to globalw a rming tha nwill U. S. automobileemission s; someone i s bound to invent some

thing, and places lik e the People’ s Republic of China or India will surely require use of the new technology, re

gardless of cost. The Court previ o usly has explained that when the e x istence of an elem ent of standing “depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors no t before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legiti

mate discretion the courts cannot presume either to con

trol or to p r edict,” ap a rty mus t present fac t s supporti ng an assertion that the actor will proceed in such a mann er. Defend ers of Wildlife , 5 04 U. S., at 562 (quoti ng ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish , 490 U. S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of K ENN E DY 

### , J.); internal quotation marks om itted). Th e declarations’ conclusory (not to say fanciful) statements do not even come close. No matter, the Court r e asons, because anydecrease in domestic emissions will “slow the pace of glo bal emissions increases, no matter what hap p e ns elsewhere.” Ante , at 23. Every little bit helps, so Massachusetts can sue over any little bit. The Court’s sleight-of-hand is in failing to link up the different elements of the three-part standin gtest. Wha t must be likelyto be redressed is the particular injury i n fact. The i n jury the C o urt looks t o is the asserted loss of land. The Court conte n ds that re gulating do mestic motor vehicle emi ssions will reduce carb on dioxide i nthe atmos

phere, and ther efore redress Massachusetts’s injury. Bu t even if regulation doesreduce e m issions—t o some inde

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R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### terminate degree, given events e l sewhere inthe world— the Court n e ver explains why that makes it li kelythat th e injury in fact—the loss of land—will be redres sed. School

children kn ow that a kingdom m i ght be lost “all for th e want of a horseshoe nail,” but “likely” redre ssability is a different m a tter. The realities make it pu re conjecture t o suppose that EPA regulation of ne w automobile emiss i on s will likely prevent the loss of Mass achusetts coastal land. V Petitioners’ difficulty in demonstrating causation and redressability is not surprising g i ven the evident mis

match bet w een the source of their alleged injury

— catastrophi cglobal w a rming—an d the nar row subjec t matter of t h e Clean Air Ac t pro vision at issue in this suit. The mismatch suggest s that petit i oners’ true goal for this litigation may be more symbolic than anything else. T h e constitutional role of the co urts, however, is to decide concrete ca ses—not to serve as a convenient forum for policy debates. See Valley Forge Ch ristia n Collegev. Americ a ns United forSepa ratio nof Churc hand Sta t e, Inc. , 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982) (“[Standing] tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debatin g society, but in a concrete factu al context conducive t o a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action”). When dealing wi th leg a l do ctrine phrased i nterms o f what is “fairly” traceab le or “ likely” to be redressed, it is perhaps not surprisingthat the m a tter is subject to some debate. B u t in consi d ering ho w loosely or rigorously to define those adverbs, it is vital to keep in mind the pur

pose of the inquiry. Th e limitationof the judicial power to cases and controversies “is cru c i al in maintaining t h e tripartite allocation of power se t fo rth in the C o nstitution.” DaimlerChrysler , 547 U. S., at __ _ (slip op., at 5) (internal14 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### quotation marks omit ted). In m yview, the Court today

— addressing Article III’s “core component of standing,” Defend ers of Wildlife , supra , at 560—fails to take this limitation s e riously. To be fair, it is not the firs t time t h e Court h a s done so. Today’ s decision recall s the previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements, United S t a t esv. Studen t s Challen g in g Regulato ry AgencyProcedures ( S CRAP) , 4 12 U. S. 669 (1973). SC RAP involved “[p]roba bly the most attenuated injury confe rring Art. I II standing” and “surely went to the very outer limit of the law”—until today. Whitmor e , 495 U. S., at 158–159; see also Lujanv. Na

tional Wil d life F e deration , 497 U. S. 871 , 889 (1990) ( SCRAP “h as never since been emulated by this Court”). In SCRAP, the Court based an environmental group’s standing to challenge a railroad f r eight ra te surcharge o n the group’s allegation that incre ases in railroad rates would caus e an increase in the use of nonrecyclable goods, resulting in the increased need for natural resources to produce such goods. According to the group, s o me of thes e resources might be taken from the Washington area, resulting in increased refuse that might find its way int o area parks, harming the grou p’s members. 412 U. S., at 688. Over time, SCRAP became emble m atic not o f the loose

ness of Article III st anding requirements, but of h o w utterly ma nipulable they are if not taken s e riously as a matter of judicial self-restraint. SCRAP ma de standing seem alawyer’s game, rather than a fundamental limita

tion ensuring tha tco urts func tion as court s and not i n trude on the political ly accounta b le branches. Today’s decision is SCRAP for a new generation. 2

——————

2 The difficulty with SCRAP, an d th e r e asonit h a s n o t beenfollow e d, is not t h e portion cit e d b y t h e Court

. S e e ante , at 23 –24 , n . 24. R ath e r , it is the attenuatedn atu re of th e i n ju ryth er e, an d h e r e , th at is so15 Cite as: 54 9 U

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R OBERTS , C. J., dissen t in g 

### Perhaps th e Court re cognizes as much. H o w else to explain its need to devise a new doctrine of state standin g to support its result? The good news is that the Court’s “special solicitude” for Massa chusetts limits the future applicability of the dil u ted standi n g requirements applied in this case. The bad news is that the Court’s selfprofessed relaxation of thos e Article III requirements has caused us to transgre ss “th e pro p er—and properly lim

ited—role of the courts in a democratic society.” Allen , 4 68 U. S., at 75 0 (internal quotation marks omitted). I respectfully dissent.

—————— troubling. E v en in SCRAP, t h e Court no t e d t h a twha t wa s req u ired wa s “ s omet hing moret h a na nin genio u s a c a d emic exercis e in t h e c o n c e iv able,” 412 U. S., at688, an d w e h av e sin c e u n d er stood th e alleg ationth e r e to h av e been“th at th e str i n gof occ u r r e nc es alleg e d would ha ppen immediately ,” Whitmorev. Ark a nsas , 495 U. S. 14 9, 1 5 9 (199 0) (emph a s is adde d). That is h a r d lyth e c a se h e r e .

The Courts a y s it is “q uit e w r ong” t o compa r e pet i t i oners ’ cha llenging
“ E PA’s pa rs imonious cons t ruct ion of t h e Clea nAir Actt o a mer e ‘la w yer’s ga me.’ ” A n t e , a t2 4 , n. 2 4

. Of cours e itis no tt h e lega l cha l

len g e th at is mer e ly“anin g e n i ou s ac ademicex er c i se inth e c o nc eiv

able,” SCRAP, sup ra , at 68 8, bu t th e as ser t ion s ma de insu ppor tof stan din g ._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–1 12 0 

### MASS AC HUSE TTS, ET AL 

### ., PETI TIONE R S v. ENVIR O N

MENTALP R OT ECTI O N AGEN CY ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE DISTR I CT OF COLUM B IA CIRCU IT [Apr il 2, 200 7] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### , wit h whom T HE 

### C HIEF 

### J USTICE 

### , J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### , and J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### join, dissenting. I joinT HE 

### C HIEF 

### J US TI C E 

### ’s opinion in ful l , a n d would hold that this Court h a s no juri sdiction to decide this ca se because petitioners lack s t anding. The Court havin g decided oth e rwise, it i s appropria t e for me to note my dissent on the merits. I A The provision of lawat the heart of this case is §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), whi c h provides tha t the Administrator of th e Environmental Protection Agenc y (EPA) “shal l by regulation prescribe .

. . standards appli

cable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motorvehicles or new mot o r vehicle en

gines, which in his judgment cau s e, or contribute to, air pollution w h ich may reasonably b e anticipated to endan

ger public health or welfare.” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1) (emphasis added). As the Court recognizes, the statute “condition[s] the exercise of EPA’s authority on its forma

tion of a ‘ j udgment.’ ” Ante , a t30. There is no dispute tha t the Administrator has made no such judg ment in this case. See ant e, a t32 (“We need not and do not reachthe question whether on remand EPA must ma ke an endan

-2 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### germent fi nding”); 68 Fed. 5292 9 (2003) (“[N]o Admini s trator has made a finding under any of the CAA’s regu la

tory provisi o ns that CO 2 

### meets the applicab le statutory criteria for regulation”). The questi o n thus arises: Does anything requireth e Administra tor to make a “jud gment” whenev er a petition for rulemaking is filed? Without citation of the statute or any other a u thority, th e Court sa y s yes. Whyis thatso? When Congress wish es to make priva t e ac tion force an agency’s hand, it knows how to do so. See, e. g., Brockv. Pierc e County , 476 U. S. 253, 25 4–255 (1986) (discussin g the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 92 Stat. 1926, 29 U. S. C. §816(b) (19 76 ed., Supp. V), whi c h “ p rovide[d] t hat the Secretar yof Labor ‘shal l’ issue afin a l determi nation as t o the mi su se of CETA funds by a grant recipi ent wi thin 120 days after receivin g a complaint alleging such misuse”). Where does the CAA say thatth e EPA Ad ministrato r is required to come to a decision on this question whenever a rulemaking petitio n is filed? The Court points to no such provision becaus e none exists. Instead, the Court invents a multiple-choi c e question that the EPA Administ rator must answer whe na petition for rulemaking is filed. Th e Administrator must exercise his judgme nt in one of three ways: (a) by concluding that the pollutant doescause, or contribute to, air pollution that endangers public welfare (i n which case EPA is re quired to regulate); (b) by conclu ding that the pollutant does notcause, or cont ribute to, a i r pollutionthat endan

gers public welfare (in which case EPA is notrequired to regulate); or (c) by “p rovid[ ing] some reasonab le explana

tion as to why it can n ot or w ill not exercise its discretion to determine whether” greenhouse gases enda nger publi c welfare, ante , at 30, (inwhich case EPA is not required t o regulate). I am willing to assum e , for the s a ke of argu ment, that3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### the Admini strator’s dis cretion int h is regardis not entire ly unbounded—that if he has no reasonable bas is for defer

ring judgm e nt he must grasp th e nettle at once. The Court, how e ver, with no basis in text or p r ec edent, rejects all of EPA’s stated “policy ju dgme nts” as not “amount[ing] to a reason ed justification,” ante , at 31, effectively narrow

ing the universe of potential reasonable bases to a single one: Judgment can be delayed onlyif the Administrator concludes t hat “the s c ientific uncertaintyis [too] pro

found.” Ibid

. The Ad ministrator is preclud e d from co n cluding for other r e aso n s “that i t would .

. . be better not to regulate at this time.” Ibid. 1 

### Such otherreasons— perfectly v a lid reasons—were set forth in the agency’s statement. “We do not believe .

. . that itwoul d be either effective or appropri ate for EPA to establish [greenhouse gas] standards f o r motor v e hicles at this time. As de

scribed in detail below, the President has laid out a comprehensive approach to climate change that calls for near-term voluntary actions a n d incentives along with pro gra ms aimed at reducingscientific uncertain

ties and encouraging tec hnologi cal develop m ent so that the go vernment may effectively and ef ficiently address the climate change issue over the long term.

. . . . . “[E]stablishing [greenhouse gas] emission sta n dards for U. S. motor vehicles at this time would .

. . result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the climate change is sue. Th e U. S. motor vehicle fleet is on e of many so urces of [greenhous e g a s] emis

sions both here and abroad, and different [greenhouse

——————

1 The Court ’s w a y of put t i ng itis , of cours e, notq u it e a ccura t e . The issu e is w h e th erit w o u l d be better to defe r the dec isionab out w het her to exer cis eju dg ment. This has the effect of deferring regulation but is quite a different determination.4 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### gas] emissi on sources face different technological and financial challenges in reducing e m issions. A sensible regulatory scheme would re quire that all significant sources and sinks of [greenhouse gas] emissions b e considered i ndeciding how best to achieve any needed emissionre ductions. “Unilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle [green

house gas] emission s c o uld also weaken U. S. efforts to persuad e developing count r ies to red u ce the [greenhouse gas] inte nsity of th eir econom i e s. Con

sidering the large populations an d growing e c onomies of some developing countries, increases in their [greenhouse gas] emissions couldquick ly overwhelm the effects of [greenho use gas] re duction measures in developed countries. Any potential benef i t of EPA regulation c o uld be lost to the ex tent other na tions de

cided to let their emissions signif icantly increase in view of U. S. emission s reductions. Unavoidably, cli

mate change raises i m portant foreign poli cy issues, and it is th e President’ s prer ogative to addres s them.” 68 Fed. Reg. 52929–529 31 (footnote omitted). The Court dismisses this analysis as “rest[i ng] on rea

soning divorced from the statutory text.” Ante, at 3 0

. “While the statute does condition the exercise of EPA’ s authority o nits forma t ion of a ‘judgment,’ .

. . that judg

ment must relate to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution whi c h may re asonably b e anticipated to endanger p ublic h e alth or welfare.’ ” Ibid

. True but i rrelevant. When the Administrator makes a judgment whether to regula te greenhouse gases, that judgment must relate to whether theyare air pollutant s that “ c ause, or contri bute to, air pollution which ma y reasonably be anticipated to en danger pub lic health or welfare.” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1). But the statute sa ys nothing a t all about th e reasons for which the Administra

-5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### tor may defer making a judgment—the permissible rea

sons for deciding not to grapple with the issue at the present time. Thus, t h e various “policy” rati onales, ante, at 31, that the Court criticizes are not “divo r ced from the statutory text,” ante, at 30, except in the sense that the statutory text is silen t , as texts are often silent abou t permissible reasons for the exe rci se of agency discretion

. The reason s the EPA gave are surely considerations e x ecutive age n cies regul arlyta ke into account ( and ought to take into account) w h en deciding whethe r to consider entering a new field: t h e impact such entry w o uld have on other Executive Branch pro gra m s and on foreign policy. There is no basis in lawfor the Court’s imposed limitation

. EPA’s inter p retation of the discretion conferred by the statutory r e ference to “its judgm e nt” is notonly reason

able, it i s t h e most nat ural reading of the text. The Cou r t nowhere explains why this inte rpr e tation is incorrect, let alone why it is not entitled to deference under Chevro n U. S. A. Inc. v. Natura l Resources Defens eCo uncil, Inc. , 467 U. S. 837 (1984). As the Administrator acted with in the law in declining to make a “judgment” f o r the policy reasons ab ove set for t h, I would uphold the decision to deny the ru lemaking petition on t hat ground alone. B Even on the Court’s own terms, however, the same conclusion follows. As ment ioned above, the Court give s EPA the option of determining that the science is too uncertain t o allow it to form a “j udgment” a s to whether greenhouse gases end anger public welfare. Attached to this option (on what b a sis is unclear) is an essay require

ment: “If,” the Court says, “the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from mak i ng a reasoned judgment a s to wheth e r greenhouse gases contribute t o global warming, EPA must say so.” Ante , at 31

. But EPA hassaid precisely that—and at great length, based on6 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### informationcontained in a 2001 report by the National Research Council (NRC) entitled Climate Ch ange Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions: “As the NR C noted in its report, concentrati ons of [greenhouse gases (GHGs)] a r e increasing in the at

mosphere a s a result of human activities (pp. 9–12). It also noted that ‘[a] dive rse array of evidence points to a wa rming of globa lsurface air temperat ures’ (p

. 16). The report goes on to sta t e, however, tha t ‘[b]ecause of the large and still uncertainlevel of natural variability inh e rent in the climate record an d the uncertainties in the time histories of the various forcing a g ents (and p a rticularly aerosols), a [causal] linkage between the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the observed climate changes during the 20th century cannot be unequivocally es

tablished. The fact that the magnitude of the ob

served warming is large in comparison to natural variability as simulated in climat e model s is sugges tive of sucha linkage, but it does not constitu te proof of one beca use the model simulations could be defi

cient in nat ural variability on the decadal to century time scale’ (p. 17). “The NRC also obs e rved that ‘the re is consid erable uncertaintyin currentunderstan ding of how the cli

mate system varies naturally and reacts to emissions of [GHGs] a n d aerosols’(p. 1). As a result of t hat un

certainty, t h e NRC cau t ioned that ‘cur rent est i mate of the magnitude of future warmingshould be regarde d as tentative and subject to future adjustments (either upwardor downwar d). ’ Id. It further advised that ‘[r]educing the wide range of uncertainty inh e rent in current mo del predictions of glob al climate change will require major advances in understanding and modeling of both (1) the factors that determine at

-7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### mospheric concentrations of [GHGs] and aerosols and (2) the so-c alled “feedbacks” tha tdetermine the sensi

tivity of the climate system to a prescribed increase in [GHGs].’ Id. “The science of climat e change is extraordi narily complex and still evolving. Althou gh there have been substantial advances i nc limate change science, there continue to be important uncertai n ties in ou r under

standing of the factors that mayaffect future climate change and how it should be addressed. As the NRC explained, predicting future climate change n e cessar ily involves a complex web of economic and physical factors incl uding: Ou r ability to predict futu re global anthropogenic emissio n s of GHGs and aerosols; the fate of the s e emissi on s once they enter the atmos

phere ( e.g., what percentage are absorbed b yvegeta

tion or are tak e n up by the oceans); the impact o f those emissions that remain in the atmosphere on the radiative properties of the atmos p here; changes in critically important cli m ate feedbacks ( e. g., changes in cloud cover and oceancirculation); changes in tem

perature c haracteristi c s ( e.g., average temperatures, shifts in da ytime and evening temperatures); changes in other climatic para meters ( e.g. , shifts in p r ecipita

tion, storms); and ultimately t h e impact of such changes on human health and wel f are ( e.g., i n creases or decreases in agri cultural productivity, human health impacts). The NRC noted, in particul a r, that
‘ [ t]he understanding of the rel a tionships between weather/climate and human health is in its infancy and therefore the he alth consequences of climate change are poorly understood ’ (p. 20). Substantial scientific uncertainties limit our ab ility to ass e ss each of these fac t ors and to separate ou t those changes re

sulting from natural variability from those that are directly th e result of increases in anthropogenic8 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### GH Gs. “Reducing the wide range of uncertainty inherent in current mo del predictions will req u ire major advances in understanding and modeling of the factors that de

termine atmospheric concentrati ons of greenhouse gases and aerosols, an d the processes that determine the sensitivity of the climate system.” 68 Fed. Reg. 52930. I simply cannot conceive of what else the Court would like EPA to say. II A Even before reaching its discussion of the word “judg

ment,” the Court make s another significant error when i t concludes that “§202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act au thori zes EPA to re gulate greenhouse gas emissions fro m new motor vehicles in the event that it forms a ‘judgment’ that suc h emission s c o ntribute to climate change.” Ante , at 25 (em

phasis added). For suc hauthorization, the Court relies on what itcalls “the Clea n Air Act ’ s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’ ” An te, at 30. “Air pollutant” is defined by the Act as “any air pollution agent or co mbination of such agents, including any ph ysi

cal, chemical, .

. . substance or matter whi c h is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42 U. S. C

. §7602(g). The Court is correct that “[c]a rbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydro f luorocarbons,” ante , a t 26, fit with in the second half of that definition: They are “physical, c h emical, .

. . substance[s] or matter which [are] emitted into or otherwise ente [r] the ambient air.” But th e Court mistakenly believes this to be the end of the analy

sis. In order to be an “air pollutant” under t h e Act’s def i

nition, the “substance or matter [b eing] emitted into .

. . the ambient air” must also meet the firsthalf of the defini

tion—namely, it must be an “air pollution agent or combi

-9 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### nation of such agents.” The Court simply pretends this half of the d e finition do es not exist. The Court’s analysis faithfully follows the argument advanced b ypetitioners, which focuses on the word “in

cluding” in the statutory definition of “air pollutant.” See Brief for Pe titioners 13–14. As th at argumen tgoes, any thing that followsthe word “including” must necessarily be a subset of whateve r pr eced esi t
. Thus, if greenhouse gases qualify underthe phrase following the word “includ

ing,” they must quali f y under the phrase preceding it. Since greenhouse gases come wi thin the capacious phrase “any ph ysical, chemical, .

. . substance or matter whi c h is emitted into or otherwise en ters the ambient air,” they must also be “air poll ution agent[s] or combination[s] of such agents,” and the r efore meet the definition of “air pollutant[s].” That is certainly one possible interpretati on of the statutory definition. The word “including” can indeed indicate that what fol l ows will be an “illust rative” sam

pling of the general category th at precede s the word

. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co. , 314 U. S. 9 5 , 100 (1941). Often, however, the examples standing alone are broader than the general category, a n d must be viewed as limited in light of that category. Th e Government provides a helpful ( and unanswered) exa m ple: “The phrase ‘any American a u tomobile, i n cluding an y truc kor minivan,’ would not naturally be construed t o encompass a foreign- manufactured [truck or] minivan.” Brief for Federal Res p ondent 34. The gen e ral principle enunciated—that the speaker is talking abo ut American automobiles—carries forward to the illustrative examples (trucks and minivans), and limits them accordingly, even though in i s olation they are broader. Congress often us es the word “including” in this manner. In 28 U. S. C. §1782(a), for example, it refers to “a proceeding in a for

eign or international tribunal, incl uding crimi nal investi

-10 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### gations conducted before form al accusation.” Certainly this provision would not encompass criminal investiga

tions underway in a d o mestictrib unal. See also, e.g. , 2 U. S. C. §54(a) (“The Clerkof the House of Rep r esentatives shall, at th e request o f a Memb er of theHouse of Repre

sentatives, furnish to the Member, for official use only, one set of a privately pu blished an notated version of the United States Code, i n cluding supplements and pock et parts”); 22 U. S. C. §2 304(b)(1) (“the relevant findings of appropriate international organizations, in cluding non

governmental organizations”). In short, t h e word “including” does not r e quire the Court’s (or the petitioners’) resu lt. It is perfectly reason

able to viewthe definition of “air p o llutant” in its entirety : An air pollutant canb e “any ph ysical, chemical, .

. . sub

stance or matter whichis emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air,” but only if it retains the general charac

teristic of being an “air pollution agent or combination of such agents.” This is precisel y the conclusion EPA reached: “[A] substance does not meet the CAA definition of ‘air pollutant’ simply because it is a ‘physical, chemical,

. . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air

. ’ It must also b e an‘air pollution agent.’ ” 68 Fed. Reg. 52929, n. 3. See also id

. , at 52928 (“The root of the definition indicates that for a substanc e to be an ‘ai rpollutant,’ it must be an ‘agent’ of ‘air pollu

tion’ ”). On ce again, in the face of textual ambiguity, the Court’s application of Chevronde ference to EPA’s inter

pretation of the word “ i ncluding” is nowhere to be found. 2

——————

2 Not on lyis EPA’s in ter p r e tationr e ason a b le, it is f a rmor e plau sibl e th anth e Cou r t’s alter n a t iv e . As th e Co u r tc o r r e c t lypoin ts ou t, “a ll a i rb orne compounds of wha t e ver s t ripe,” ante , at 26, w o u l d qu alifyas “ph y sic a l, c h e mic a l, . . . su b s tan c e [s] or m atterw h i c h[a r e ] emittedin t o oroth e r w i se en te[r] th e ambien t air , ” 4 2 U. S. C. §7602 (g)

. I tf o l l o w s th at everythi n g airb or n e , from Fr isbees t o flatu len c e , qu alifie s as a n “airpollu tan t. ” Th is r e adin g of th e statu te defies c o mmonsen s e.11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### Evidently, the Court defers only to those reasonable inter

pretations that it favors. B Using (as we ought to) EPA’s int e rpretation of the defi

nition of “air pollutant,” we must next deter m ine whether greenhouse gases are “agent[s]” o f “air pollution.” If so, the statute would authorize regulation; if not, EPA woul d lack authority. Unlike “airpollutants,” the term “air pollution” is not itself defined by the CAA; thus, once again we must accept EPA’s in ter p retation of that ambig u ous term, provided its interpretati on is a “permissible construction of the sta t

ute.” Ch evron , 467 U. S., at 843. In this case, the petition for rulemaking asked EPA for “regulation of [greenhouse gas] emissions from motor vehicles to reduce the risk of global climate change.” 68 Fed. Reg. 52925. Thus, i n deciding whether it h a d authority to regulate, EPA had to deter m i n e wheth e r t h e c o nc entra t io n of gr e e nho us e g a s e s assert edly responsible for “g l o ba lclimate ch ange” q u a l i

fi es as “ a ir pol l ut i o n.” EPA bega n with th e c o mmons en se ob servat i o nthat th e “ [ p]robl ems ass o c i at ed with atmos

pher ic conc entrat i o ns of CO 2 

### ,” id. , at 52 92 7 , bear l i ttl e resemblanc e to whatwould natu r a l l ybe te rm e d“a i r po ll u t io n ” : “EPA’s prio r use of the CAA’s general regulatory provisions provides an impo rtant context. Since the inception of the Act, EPA has used these provisions to address air pollution problems thatoccur prim arily at ground level or near the surface of the earth. For ex

ample, national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) e s tablished under CAA section 10 9 address concentrati ons of substances in the ambient air and the related public healt hand welfare problems

. This has meant setting NA AQS for con c entrations of ozone, carbon monoxide, particula te matter and other sub

-12 MA SSACH US ETTS v. EPA S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### stances in the air near the surface of the earth, no t higher in the atmosphere. . . . CO 2 

### , by con trast, is fairly cons istent in concentrati on throughout the world’s at mosphere up to appr oximately the lower stratospher e .” Id., at 5 2926–52927. In other w o rds, regulating the b u ildup of CO 2 

### and oth e r greenhouse gases in the upper reaches of the atmosphere, which is alleged to be causing global climate change, is not akin to reg u lating the concentrat i on of some substance that is polluting the ai r . We need look no furth er than the dictionary for confir

mation that this interpretation of “air pollution” is emi

nently reasonable. Th e definitionof “pollute,” of course, is “[t]o make or render impure or u n clean.” Webster’s Ne w International Dictionary 1910 (2d ed. 1949). And the first three definitions of “air” are as follows: (1) “[t] he invisible, odorless, a n d tasteless mixture of gases which surrounds the earth”; (2) “[t]he body of the earth’s atmosphere; esp., the part of it near the earth, as distinguished from the upper raref i ed part”; (3) “[a] portion of air or of the air considered with respec t to ph ysic al characte ristics or a s affecting the senses.” Id. , at 54. EPA’s conception of “air pollution”—focusing on impurities in the “ambient air” “a t ground level or near the surface of the earth”—is perfectly consistent with the natural meaning of that term. In the end, EPA concl u ded that since “CAA authoriza

tion to regulate is generally based on a findin g that an ai r pollutant causes or contributes to air pollution,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52928, the concentrations of CO 2 

### and other green

house gases allegedly affecting the global climate are beyond the scope of CAA’s aut horization to regulate. “[T]he term ‘air pollution’ as used in the regulatory pro vi

sions cannot be interpreted to encompass global climat e change.” Ibid

. Once again, the Court utt e rly fails t o explain why this interpretationis incorrect, let alone so13 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALI A , J., dissenting 

### unreasonab le as to be u n worthy of Chevrondef e rence. * * * The Court’s alarm over global warming may o rmay no t be justified , but it ought not distort the outcome of this litigation. This is a straightforward admini strative-law case, in wh ich Congre ss has passed a malleable statute giving broa d discretion, not to us but to an executive agency. N o matter how important the underlying polic y issues at stake, this Court has no business substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency.