SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5482-18T4

SATNAM SINGH and

SANTOSH KUMAR,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LONELL CHESTNUT, JR.,

and AAA INSURANCE,

Defendants,

and

PENN NATIONAL INSURANCE,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________

Submitted October 6, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-2105-18.

Devlin, Cittadino & Shaw, PC, attorneys for appellants 

(John G. Devlin, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 20, 2020
2

A-5482-18T4

Margolis Edelstein, attorneys for respondent (Robert 

M. Kaplan and Lawrence J. Bunis, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs Satnam Singh and Santosh Kumar appeal from orders entered 

by the Law Division on July 12, 2019, which granted summary judgment in 

favor of defendant Penn National Insurance (Penn National) and denied 

plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 

On October 26, 2016, Lonell Chestnut, Jr. was getting gas for his car at a 

station on Route 206 in Bordentown. At the time, Singh was working as an 

attendant at the gas station. Chestnut drove away from the gas pump while the 

nozzle and hose were still attached to his vehicle. The nozzle struck Singh in 

the face, causing him to sustain certain injures. 

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Chestnut and New Jersey 

Manufacturers Insurance Company (NJM), which provided workers'

compensation coverage to his employer, APCO Petroleum Corporation 

(APCO).

1 Chestnut's vehicle was insured under a policy issued by GEICO, 

which had bodily injury liability limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per 

1 Kumar is Singh's spouse. She asserted a claim based on the loss of Singh's 

support, society, services, and consortium. 
3

A-5482-18T4

occurrence. To resolve the claims against Chestnut, GEICO tendered the 

$15,000 per person coverage provided under its policy to plaintiffs.

Believing Singh's damages exceeded $15,000, plaintiffs filed an amended

complaint asserting claims for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage against 

AAA Insurance (AAA) and Penn National. Singh did not own an automobile, 

and the AAA policy insured a vehicle owned by his son with whom he was 

residing. Because the AAA policy had limits equal to those under Chestnut's

GEICO policy, plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their claims against AAA. 

The Penn National policy was a commercial automobile insurance policy 

issued to APCO. It provided $1,000,000 in UIM coverage. Penn National 

denied Singh's request for UIM coverage because he was not a named insured 

under the policy and, at the time of the accident, he was not occupying a vehicle 

covered under the policy. 

Penn National filed a motion for summary judgment and argued Singh was 

not entitled to UIM coverage under its policy. Plaintiffs opposed the motion 

and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue. The 

parties waived oral argument. 

On July 12, 2019, the motion judge filed orders, which granted Penn 

National's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion. 
4

A-5482-18T4

The judge determined the Penn National policy did not provide Singh with UIM 

coverage because he did not meet the requirements for such coverage under the 

policy. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court's orders must be reversed. 

They contend the trial court's decision is contrary to N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f), 

which elevates Singh to the status of "named insured" under the Penn National 

policy. 

When reviewing an order granting or denying summary judgment, we 

apply the standard set forth in Rule 4:46-2(c). Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 

N.J. 469, 479 (2016) (citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)). 

Summary judgment shall be granted when the evidence before the court on the 

motion "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged 

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."

R. 4:46-2(c).

Here, the facts material to the coverage determination are not in dispute. 

The interpretation of an insurance contract is an issue of law, subject to our de 

novo review. Sealed Air Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 363, 375 

(App. Div. 2008) (citing Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309 N.J. 

Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998)). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and 
5

A-5482-18T4

the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any 

special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 

N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (citations omitted). 

The declarations page of Penn National's policy identifies APCO and 

Atlantic Management Company (AMC) as the named insureds. The policy 

includes an endorsement for uninsured motorist (UM) and UIM coverage, which 

states in relevant part:

A. Coverage

1. We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally entitled

to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or 

driver of an "uninsured motor vehicle" or "underinsured 

motor vehicle." The damages must result from "bodily 

injury" sustained by the "insured", or "property 

damage" caused by an "accident". The owner's or 

driver's liability for these damages must result from the 

ownership, maintenance or use of an "uninsured motor 

vehicle" or an "underinsured motor vehicle".

B. Who Is An Insured

If the Named Insured is designated in the Schedule or 

Declarations as:

1. An individual, then the following are "insureds":

a. The Named Insured and any "family members".

b. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" or a 

temporary substitute for a covered "auto".
6

A-5482-18T4

c. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover 

because of "bodily injury" sustained by another 

"insured".

2. A partnership, limited liability company, corporation

or any other form of organization, then the following 

are "insureds":

a. Anyone "occupying" a covered "auto" or a temporary 

substitute for a covered "auto".

b. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover 

because of "bodily injury" sustained by another 

"insured".

c. The Named Insured for "property damage" only.

The policy defines "occupying" as "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off."

For UIM coverage, "autos" are those "you own that because of the law in the 

state where they are licensed or principally garaged are required to have and 

cannot reject [UM] Coverage." The term "you" refers to the "named insured"

listed in the declarations page. 

The motion judge correctly found that Singh was not an "insured" under 

the Penn National policy. He is not identified on the declarations page as a 

"named insured." Moreover, at the time of the accident, Singh was working as 

a gas station attendant as APCO's employee. It is undisputed that Singh was not 

"occupying" an automobile covered under the policy at the time he was injured. 
7

A-5482-18T4

When determining if a person was "occupying" a covered vehicle, the 

court must consider the facts related to the accident and the use of the vehicle. 

Thompson v. James, 400 N.J. Super. 286, 292 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Torres 

v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147, 149 (2007)). To trigger UIM coverage, 

the claimant must show "a substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and the 

injury sustained." Id. at 293 (citing Torres, 171 N.J. at 149). Here, plaintiffs 

have not shown a "substantial nexus" between an insured vehicle and Singh's 

injuries. 

Plaintiffs argue, however, that because Singh was working for APCO at 

the time of the accident, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f) gives him the status of "named 

insured" under the Penn National policy. The statute provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of this section or any 

other law to the contrary, a motor vehicle liability 

policy or renewal of such policy of insurance, insuring 

against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for 

bodily injury or death, sustained by any person arising 

out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor 

vehicle, issued in this State to a corporate or business 

entity with respect to any motor vehicle registered or 

principally garaged in this State, shall not provide less 

uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for an 

individual employed by the corporate or business entity 

than the coverage provided to the named insured under 

the policy. A policy that names a corporate or business 

entity as a named insured shall be deemed to provide 

the maximum uninsured or underinsured motorist 

coverage available under the policy to an individual 
8

A-5482-18T4

employed by the corporate or business entity, 

regardless of whether the individual is an additional 

named insured under that policy or is a named insured 

or is covered under any other policy providing 

uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

[Ibid.]

When interpreting a statute, our "paramount goal" is discerning the 

Legislature's intent and "the best indicator of that intent is the statutory 

language." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v. 

Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 (2003)). "We ascribe to the statutory words their 

ordinary meaning and significance." Ibid. (citing Lane v. Holderman, 23 N.J. 

304, 313 (1957)). If the statutory language is ambiguous and subject "to more 

than one plausible interpretation," the court may consider extrinsic evidence, 

including legislative history. Id. at 492-93 (citing Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. 

Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004)). 

In James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J 552, 565 (2014), the Court noted 

that N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f) was enacted in response to the decision in Pinto v. 

N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 183 N.J. 405, 412 (2005). In Pinto, the court upheld the 

validity of "step-down" clauses which cap the amount of UM or UIM coverage 

available to the employee of a corporate entity at the limits available under their 

personal automobile insurance coverage. Pinto, 183 N.J. at 407. 
9

A-5482-18T4

The Court in James stated that N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f) prohibits the use of 

step-down provisions to provide less UM/UIM coverage to employees than the 

coverage provided to "named insureds" on the policy. James, 216 N.J. at 555-

56. The Court also stated that if the policy only lists the employer as the "named 

insured," its employees are "deemed" eligible for the maximum available 

coverage. Id. at 556. 

We are convinced that N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f) was intended to address the 

amount of UM or UIM coverage available to a business entity's employees who 

are entitled to coverage under the entity's commercial liability policy. The 

statute does not apply where, as in this case, the employee was not entitled to 

such coverage under the policy. 

The UM/UIM endorsement of the Penn National policy identifies APCO 

as the named insured. It further provides that the term "insured" includes 

individuals identified as an insured in the policy's schedule or declaration, and 

any family members, as well as any other person "occupying" a covered vehicle 

or a temporary substitute for such a vehicle. 

Singh was not identified as a named insured under the policy. Therefore, 

he would be entitled to UM or UIM coverage only if he was injured while 

occupying an auto covered under the policy, or a temporary substitute for a 
10 A-5482-18T4

covered vehicle. As stated above, it is undisputed that Singh was not occupying 

a covered auto when he was injured. Thus, Singh is not entitled to UM or UIM 

coverage under the Penn National policy and N.J.S.A. 17:29-1(f) does not confer 

insured status upon him. 

Further, the legislative Committee's statement that accompanied the 

enactment of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1(f) supports our conclusion that the statute was 

intended to address the amount of UM or UIM coverage available to certain

employees of business entities under commercial policies. The Committee 

stated: 

This bill is in response to the New Jersey Supreme 

Court's decision in [Pinto]. In [Pinto], the court held 

that as to a motor vehicle liability policy that names a 

corporate or business entity as a named insured, stepdown provisions which limit uninsured or underinsured 

motorist coverage for employees of that entity that are 

not individuals named on the policy are valid and 

enforceable. Thus, the court's ruling, which upholds 

earlier case law on the subject, allows an employee's 

coverage under an employer's business motor vehicle 

insurance policy to be limited to the lower limits of 

uninsured or under insured motorist coverage contained 

in the employee's individual motor vehicle liability 

policy, even in situations in which the employee is 

injured in a covered vehicle in a work-related accident, 

if the employer's policy so provides. This bill reverses 

the effect of the [Pinto] decision by prohibiting stepdown provisions in these policies. Further, the bill 

expressly provides that a policy that names a corporate 

or business entity as a named insured shall be deemed 
11 A-5482-18T4

to provide the maximum uninsured or underinsured 

motorist coverage available under the policy to any 

individual employed by the corporate or business 

entity, regardless of whether the individual is an 

additional named insured under that policy, or is a 

named insured or is covered under any other policy 

providing uninsured or underinsured motorist 

coverage.

[Assemb. Fin. Institutions and Ins. Comm. Statement to 

S. 1666 (May 10, 2007).]

As indicated in the Committee's statement, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f) was 

intended to bar the enforcement of the step-down provision in the policy of a 

corporate or business entity that limits the UM or UIM coverage available to the 

entity's employees. The statute also provides that, under certain circumstances, 

employees of a corporate or business entity would be entitled to the maximum 

amount of UM or UIM coverage under the entity's commercial policy. The 

statute was not, however, intended to confer insured status upon employees who 

are not entitled to UM or UIM coverage under the policy.

Plaintiffs further argue that Penn National's policy creates two tiers of 

UM/UIM coverage: one for certain family members of the owner of APCO, and 

the other for other potential insureds under the policy. Plaintiffs argue these 

family members would be entitled to the maximum available coverage under the 

policy, while Singh is not. 
12 A-5482-18T4

This contention is entirely without merit. These family members of 

APCO's owner are not identified as named insureds in the declaration page or 

the UM/UIM endorsement. The only named insureds are APCO and AMC. 

Family members of the person who owns APCO would not be entitled to UM or 

UIM coverage unless they were occupying a covered auto or a temporary 

substitute for a covered auto. Therefore, the criteria for UM and UIM coverage 

under the Penn National policy is the same for Singh and the family members 

of APCO's owner. 

Affirmed.