2017 UT App 99

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF A.B. AND A.R.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

L.E.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20170213-CA

Filed June 15, 2017

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Kimberly K. Hornak

No. 1133027

Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., STEPHEN L. ROTH, and 

DAVID N. MORTENSEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 L.E. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to 

terminate a person’s parental rights], the result must be against 

the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with 

a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” In 

re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We “review the juvenile court’s 
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factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous standard.” In 

re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding of fact is 

clearly erroneous only when, in light of the evidence supporting 

the finding, it is against the clear weight of the evidence. See id.

Further, we give the juvenile court a “wide latitude of discretion 

as to the judgments arrived at based upon not only the court’s 

opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the 

juvenile court judges’ special training, experience and interest in 

this field.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s decision exists in 

the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing 

of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.

¶3 Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

demonstrate grounds supporting termination of her parental 

rights. The juvenile court based its termination decision on 

several grounds, including abuse and neglect. See Utah Code 

Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2012). The evidence in the 

record supports the juvenile court’s findings and determination 

that Mother abused and neglected the children.1 Mother struck 

the children with a belt leaving marks. Further, the oldest child 

described how Mother also whipped her with a charging cable 

and wrapped a “belt around her neck, choked her, and punched 

her in the face.” The oldest child also had a burn mark on her 

arm consistent with a cigarette burn. Mother was arrested for the 

incident in August of 2016. Mother eventually pled guilty to one 

count of attempted child abuse and two counts of endangerment 

of a child, all third degree felonies, and has been incarcerated

 

1. Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-6-507, the finding of any 

single ground for termination is sufficient to warrant 

termination of parental rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

507(1) (LexisNexis 2012); In re F.C. III, 2003 UT App 397, ¶ 6, 81 

P.3d 790 (noting that any single ground is sufficient to terminate 

parental rights). As a result, if there is sufficient evidence to 

support any of the grounds for termination found by the juvenile 

court, the termination of Mother’s rights is appropriate.
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20170213-CA 3 2017 UT App 99

since the initial arrest. No relatives were able to care for the 

children so they were placed in foster care. At trial Mother was

unaware of when she may be released from her incarceration. 

The evidence at trial demonstrated not only that Mother abused 

the children, but that she also neglected the children because she 

was “incarcerated as a result of a conviction of a felony, and the 

sentence is of such length that the [children] will be deprived of 

a normal home for more than one year.” Id. § 78A-6-508(2)(e)

(LexisNexis Supp. 2016). Thus, the evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s decision that Mother abused and neglected the 

children.

¶4 Mother next argues that it was not in the best interests of 

the children to terminate her parental rights. As set forth above, 

Mother not only abused her children, but is currently 

incarcerated and may remain so for an indeterminate amount of 

time. Further, there was no evidence presented at trial that any 

family members were available to care for the children during 

that time. Thus, neither Mother nor anyone in her family could 

currently care for the children. Conversely, the children have 

bonded with their foster family, who provide for their physical 

and emotional needs. The children wished to be adopted by the 

foster parents and the foster parents wished to adopt the 

children. Accordingly, evidence in the record supports the 

juvenile court’s determination that it was in the best interests of 

the children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

¶5 Finally, Mother argues that the “juvenile court erred in 

engaging in an inadequate colloquy before requiring [Mother] to 

proceed pro se.” “We review waiver of a statutory right to 

counsel for correctness, ‘but grant the trial court a reasonable 

measure of discretion when applying the law to the facts.’” In re 

A.E., 2001 UT App 202, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 31 (quoting State v. Byington, 

936 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Utah Ct. App.1997)). Termination of 

parental rights proceedings involves a statutory right to counsel, 

not a constitutional right to counsel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A6-1111(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). Accordingly, “waiver of a 

statutory right to counsel is proper as long as the record as a 
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whole reflects the [parent’s] reasonable understanding of the 

proceedings and awareness of the right to counsel.” In re A.E.,

2001 UT App 202, ¶ 12. 

¶6 Here, the record as a whole demonstrates that Mother had 

a reasonable understanding of the proceedings and an 

awareness of the statutory right to counsel. First, Mother 

understood her right to counsel. Mother was provided counsel at 

the initiation of the case. Also, this was the second time Mother 

requested new counsel. Earlier in the case Mother requested and 

was granted new counsel. Thus, at the time of trial, Mother had 

already been through two hearings in which her right to counsel 

was discussed. Further, counsel had been provided each time. 

Based on these facts and the conversation the court had with 

Mother, it is clear that Mother understood her right to counsel. 

Next, the record demonstrates that Mother had a reasonable 

understanding of the proceedings. After hearing Mother’s and 

her counsel’s accounts of the alleged breakdown in their 

relationship, the court specifically made Mother aware that the 

trial involved the termination of her parental rights. Further, the 

juvenile court informed Mother that because she had already 

had a change of counsel, the court would not continue the trial in 

order to appoint new counsel. Despite this knowledge Mother 

indicated that she wished to represent herself and proceed to 

trial. Based on the totality of circumstances, the record reflects 

that Mother had a reasonable understanding of the proceedings 

when she decided to represent herself at the termination 

proceeding, thereby making the waiver of Mother’s right to 

counsel proper.

¶7 Affirmed.