IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JAMES TERRY, 

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0114 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2019-006036

The Honorable Christopher A. Coury, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Fredenberg Beams, Phoenix

By Daniel E. Fredenberg

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Kelly & Lyons, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Jason M. Kelly, Richard Lyons

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix

By Eric B. Johnson 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 3-31-2022
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Maurice Portley1 joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 In April 2017, plaintiff James Terry acted strangely at a sales 

meeting, prompting his co-workers to file fitness-for-duty reports 

expressing concerns. Terry’s employer, defendant United Parcel Services, 

Inc. (UPS), asked him to drug test. Terry did so and he tested positive for a

marijuana metabolite and amphetamine. At that time, use or possession of

marijuana was a criminal offense in Arizona. After UPS fired Terry, he 

sued, claiming wrongful termination and defamation. Terry challenges the 

grant of summary judgment against him on both counts. Because Terry has 

shown no error, the rulings are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On the morning of his first day back from vacation, Terry, a 

UPS Sales Director, met with sales managers who reported to him. As 

described by some of those managers, Terry acted strangely during the 

meeting. Terry made a statement about “a scorpion climbing up a wall.” He 

later testified to saying, “I think I saw a scorpion run across the table” and 

asking the group, “Did anyone see that scorpion back there?” Terry later 

stated that he said a shadow was a scorpion because he wanted to see if 

anyone was paying attention. However, there was no scorpion.

¶3 Others at the meeting said Terry’s speech was slurred, he was

incoherent and was “asking [the] same questions over and over, losing [his] 

train of thought.” They reported Terry had heavy eyelids, red eyes and was 

talking excessively. Three co-workers filed “Reasonable Cause/Fitness-forDuty Medical Evaluation” forms, one during the meeting, providing details 

1 The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals, 

Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article 

6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

3

about Terry’s behavior, noting “abnormal actions, appearance or conduct 

which requires a fitness-for-duty evaluation.” 

¶4 In response, UPS directed Terry to provide a urine sample for 

drug testing, and he complied. Terry did not, at that time, tell UPS that he 

had a medical marijuana card under Arizona’s Medical Marijuana Act 

(AMMA), A.R.S. §§ 36-2801, et seq. (2022),

2 or that he had a prescription for 

Adderall. 

¶5 Terry’s sample tested positive for carboxy-THC, a nonimpairing metabolite of marijuana, and amphetamine, which he later 

attributed to prescription Adderall. When a medical review officer told him 

of the positive drug test, Terry admitted using marijuana while on vacation,

taking oxycodone and acetaminophen painkillers daily and using 

amphetamine. Terry then told the medical review officer that he had a 

medical marijuana card, but denied that he was impaired at work. UPS then 

fired Terry. The UPS representatives who decided to fire Terry later 

testified that they did not know that he was a medical marijuana 

cardholder. 

¶6 Terry sued in federal court, alleging among other things that 

UPS fired him because his drug test showed a non-impairing marijuana 

metabolite. After dismissing that case, Terry filed this case in superior court, 

alleging unlawful discrimination in violation of the AMMA and 

defamation. The parties asked the superior court to resolve various motions 

they had filed in federal court. In a September 2019 ruling, the superior 

court found Terry had no private cause of action under the AMMA, a ruling 

Terry does not challenge here. The September 2019 ruling also found 

disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on Terry’s 

defamation claim and that there were disputed facts about whether UPS 

violated the AMMA.

¶7 Terry then amended his complaint to allege: (1) wrongful 

termination in violation of the Arizona Employment Protection Act 

(AEPA), A.R.S. §§ 23-1501, et seq., and (2) defamation. After the close of 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. In November 2020, 

Arizona voters passed Proposition 207, decriminalizing possession and use 

of certain amounts of marijuana. See A.R.S. §§ 36-2850 to -2865. In April 

2017, however, possession and use of marijuana were illegal unless 

authorized by the AMMA.
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

4

discovery, UPS moved for summary judgment, arguing termination was 

proper and that Terry’s claims failed, relying in part on Arizona’s Drug 

Testing of Employees Act (DTEA). See A.R.S. §§ 23-493, et seq. In September 

2020, the court granted summary judgment for UPS on both of Terry’s 

claims. After entry of a final judgment, Terry moved for a new trial, which 

the court denied. This court has jurisdiction over Terry’s timely appeal, 

challenging the grant of summary judgment and the denial of his motion 

for new trial, pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution 

and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶8 This court reviews the entry of summary judgment de novo, 

“viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 

to the party opposing the motion,” Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 12 

(2003), to determine “whether any genuine issues of material fact exist,” 

Brookover v. Roberts Enters., Inc., 215 Ariz. 52, 55 ¶ 8 (App. 2007). This court 

will affirm the entry of summary judgment if it is correct for any reason.

Hawkins v. State, 183 Ariz. 100, 103 (App. 1995).

I. The September 2019 Ruling Did Not Preclude the Grant of 

Summary Judgment in the September 2020 Ruling.

¶9 Terry argues that the disputed issues of material fact noted in 

the September 2019 ruling precluded the grant of summary judgment in the 

September 2020 ruling. It is unclear why the September 2019 ruling 

addressed the merits of Terry’s AMMA claim after finding he had no 

private cause of action under the AMMA. Regardless, the September 2020 

ruling addressed Terry’s AEPA claim added after the September 2019 

ruling. In addition, although the defamation claim was largely unchanged, 

UPS’ legal argument about why that claim failed differed from the

argument addressed in the September 2019 ruling.

¶10 Among other things, after the September 2019 ruling, Terry 

amended his complaint, the parties conducted discovery and UPS made 

different arguments in seeking summary judgment on a different record. 

Terry has not shown how the September 2019 ruling, addressing a different 

claim on a different record, precluded summary judgment on the new 

AEPA claim or based on different legal arguments on his defamation claim.

Cf. Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 & nn. 10-11 (1990) (discussing 

importance of discovery being closed when addressing summary judgment

and noting discretion in denying — but not granting — summary 

judgment) (citing authority). In addition, the same judge issued both 
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

5

rulings with no intervening appeal, further negating any argument that the 

September 2019 ruling precluded the court from making the September 

2020 ruling challenged here. See, e.g., Chung v. Choulet, 248 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 

16 (App. 2020) (“A court does not lack the power to change a ruling simply 

because it ruled on the questions at an earlier stage.”) (citations omitted).

II. The Superior Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment for UPS 

on Terry’s Wrongful Termination Claim Under the AEPA.

¶11 Terry’s amended complaint first alleged wrongful 

termination in violation of the AEPA. Subject to three exceptions, the AEPA

states that “[t]he employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of 

either the employee or the employer.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). As Terry 

acknowledges, this statutory employment-at-will rule tracks Arizona case 

law predating the AEPA. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 147 Ariz. 

370, 378 (1985) (“We hold that an employer may fire for good cause or for 

no cause. [An employer] may not fire for bad cause — that which violates 

public policy.”). As a result, unless UPS fired Terry for a “bad cause,” his 

wrongful termination claim fails.

¶12 Terry asserts that his termination “as a result of the urinalysis 

showing only carboxy is unlawful discrimination in violation of the 

AMMA.” UPS counters that it fired Terry based on his observed behaviors 

at work, which evidenced workplace impairment, and “for violat[ing] 

UPS’s drug and alcohol policy.” Because Terry was an at-will employee, 

absent bad cause, UPS could fire him for any cause or no cause at all. A.R.S. 

§ 23-1501(A)(2). Thus, UPS properly could fire Terry based on observed

behaviors at work, even if those behaviors were disputed, unless doing so 

constituted bad cause. Id.

¶13 The three exceptions to employment at-will under the AEPA, 

which can constitute “bad cause,” are when an employee is fired: (1) “in 

breach of an employment contract;” (2) “in violation of a statute of this 

state” or (3) “in retaliation” for exercising specified rights. A.R.S. §§ 23-

1501(A)(3)(a)-(c). Terry does not allege that his firing breached a contract or 

was retaliatory. Terry does, however, allege that he was fired in violation 

of the AMMA, “a statute of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b).

¶14 In addressing a claim for being fired in violation of “a statute 

of this state,” the AEPA distinguishes between statutes that provide a 

remedy and statutes that do not. “If the statute provides a remedy to an 

employee for a violation of the statute,” those remedies “are the exclusive 

remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy set forth in or 
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

6

arising out of the statute.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). “If the statute does not 

provide a remedy to an employee for the violation of the statute, the 

employee shall have the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination 

in violation of the public policy set forth in the statute.” Id. Because Terry 

does not challenge the ruling that he had no private cause of action under 

the AMMA, his wrongful termination claim under the AEPA required him 

to show that his firing was in “violation of the public policy set forth in” the 

AMMA. 

A. Terry’s Firing Did Not Violate the Public Policy Set Forth in 

the AMMA.

¶15 The AMMA states that an employer cannot fire an employee 

holding a medical marijuana card based on the employee’s “status as a 

cardholder” or on a “positive drug test for marijuana or components or 

metabolites” unless (1) the employee “used, possessed or was impaired by 

marijuana” at or during work or (2) the employer would lose benefits if the 

employee was not terminated. A.R.S. § 36-2813(B)(2). Citing this statute, 

Terry argues the “AMMA identifies two — and only two — circumstances 

under which an employer may take adverse employment action against an 

employee with a medical marijuana card.” That argument ignores the 

AEPA and misapplies the AMMA.

¶16 The AEPA provides that an employer may fire an employee 

(including a medical marijuana cardholder) for good cause or no cause at 

all. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2). The AEPA does not, as Terry suggests, limit 

when an employer may fire an employee who is a medical marijuana 

cardholder.

¶17 The AMMA, in turn, provides that an employee holding a 

medical marijuana card “shall not be considered to be under the influence 

of marijuana solely because of” a positive drug test showing an 

“insufficient concentration to cause impairment.” A.R.S. § 36-2814(A)(3) 

(emphasis added). But “[n]othing in” the AMMA “requires . . . [a]n 

employer to allow . . . any employee to work while under the influence of 

marijuana.” A.R.S. § 36-2814(A)(3). To the contrary, the AMMA allows the 

firing of a medical marijuana cardholder employee for “working while 

under the influence of marijuana.” A.R.S. § 36-2814(B). Thus, the AMMA 

does not restrict an employer’s right to fire an employee for good cause 

(such as workplace behavior) or no cause. Similarly, under the AMMA, an 

employee holding a medical marijuana card who tests positive may be fired 

for workplace impairment, except that impairment cannot be based 

“solely” on a drug test showing “the presence of metabolites or components 
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

7

of marijuana that appear in insufficient concentration to cause 

impairment.” A.R.S. § 36-2814(B).

¶18 As applied, Terry was not fired solely because of a test 

showing the presence of a marijuana metabolite. Instead, UPS fired Terry 

based on his observed behaviors at work and “for violat[ing] UPS’s drug 

and alcohol policy.” Thus, Terry has not shown that his firing violated the 

AMMA’s public policy.

¶19 Terry argues that he (not UPS) was entitled to summary 

judgment on liability because, under the AMMA, “a medical marijuana 

cardholder cannot be fired for a positive drug screen of marijuana 

metabolites or components insufficient to cause impairment.” If the sole 

reason for an employee’s firing was a drug test showing only the presence 

of a non-impairing metabolite of marijuana, such an argument might be 

more persuasive. But that is not what Terry’s drug test revealed.3 Moreover, 

Terry’s observable behaviors provided a basis for his firing.4 Terry’s 

argument overstates the protections of the AMMA and does not reflect 

what happened here. 

¶20 Terry’s arguments also overlook that the AMMA is not selfeffectuating. An individual wishing to claim the protection of the AMMA 

must timely invoke and then “’plead and prove,’ by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that his or her actions fall within the range of immune action.”

State v. Fields ex rel. Cnty. of Pima, 232 Ariz. 265, 269 ¶ 15 (App. 2013). When

confronted with reports of his odd behavior and a request that he drug test, 

Terry did not invoke the AMMA. Instead, while knowing he had recently 

used marijuana, Terry agreed to test without telling UPS he was a medical 

marijuana cardholder. Terry then submitted a sample for testing and 

learned he tested positive for carboxy-THC and amphetamine. Only then

did Terry seek to invoke the AMMA. In now claiming wrongful 

3 Even under Terry’s view, his positive test for amphetamine would not be 

subject to protection under the AMMA.

4 As a result, Terry’s argument that the “substantial motivating factor” test 

mentioned in Murcott v. Best W. Int’l should apply here is misplaced. 198 

Ariz. 349, 360 ¶ 58 (App. 2000). Murcott involved a defense that the 

plaintiff’s “whistle-blowing motivated his termination.” Id. Terry cites no 

other Arizona case using such a test in any context, let alone outside the 

whistle-blowing context, and this court has found none. Murcott was also

decided long before the enactment of the AMMA and, as a result, did not 

address the issues raised here. 
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

8

termination, Terry seeks to use the positive carboxy-THC test to assert the 

AMMA prevented him from being fired. 

¶21 No one knows what UPS may have done if Terry had invoked 

the AMMA when directed to test. UPS may have chosen to forgo testing for 

marijuana. However, by waiting to invoke the AMMA until after learning 

he tested positive, Terry failed to timely invoke the immunities of the 

AMMA to claim he could not be fired. To conclude otherwise would allow 

an employee who was an AMMA cardholder to submit to drug testing, 

knowing the test results would show use of an illegal drug absent 

application of the AMMA, and then claim immunity from being fired by 

invoking the AMMA. Terry’s AMMA argument is unavailing.

B. The Public Policy of the Drug Testing of Employees Act 

Cannot Provide the Basis for an AEPA Claim.

¶22 The parties assert various arguments about the applicability 

of the Drug Testing of Employees Act (DTEA), with Terry arguing the Act

unconstitutionally modified the AMMA, a voter-initiative, and UPS 

arguing the DTEA precludes Terry’s claims. The DTEA expressly provides

for causes of action for its violation. See A.R.S. §§ 23-493.07 (“Causes of 

action based on test results”); -493.08 (“Limits to causes of action”). Because 

the DTEA provides remedies for its breach, the public policy of the DTEA 

cannot provide the basis for an AEPA claim. A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). Thus, 

the only way for Terry to enforce the DTEA would have been to assert a 

cause of action under that statute. Because Terry asserted no DTEA claim, 

this court need not address the parties’ competing arguments under the 

DTEA, including whether the application of protections for an employer 

acting in good faith must be resolved by a jury. See A.R.S. § 23-493.06 

(“Employer protection from litigation”).5

III. The Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Terry’s 

Defamation Claim.

¶23 Terry asserted a defamation per se claim, alleging UPS 

“communicated false and defamatory statements” about him, “including 

5 Terry also argues the record contains disputed issues of material facts 

precluding summary judgment on UPS’ affirmative defenses. The 

dispositive issue, however, is whether the record created a disputed issue 

of material fact about whether Terry was fired for “bad cause.” Because it 

did not, the court properly granted summary judgment against him on his 

wrongful termination claim.
TERRY v. UPS

Opinion of the Court

9

statements that [he] violated UPS’s drug and alcohol policy and that [he]

was impaired at work.” The DTEA sets forth specific requirements that 

must be met for any defamation claim “against an employer who has 

established a program of drug testing or alcohol impairment testing.”

A.R.S. § 23-493.08. Along with alleging the elements of a defamation claim 

generally, see Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406, 417 ¶ 35 (App. 2007) (citations 

omitted), Terry had to plead and prove that “[t]he information disclosed 

was a false positive test result” and “[t]he false positive test result was 

disclosed negligently,” A.R.S. § 23-493.08(A). Terry failed to do so.

¶24 Terry did not claim his positive drug test was false. Instead, 

he admitted to testing positive, an admission the superior court found 

barred his defamation claim. Although he argues on appeal “the 

defamation occurred based on a false positive,” he waived that assertion, 

which also contradicts his admission to the superior court. Odom v. Farmers 

Ins. Co. of Ariz., 216 Ariz. 530, 535 ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (“[A]rguments raised for 

the first time on appeal are untimely and deemed waived.”); In re Marriage 

of Thorn, 235 Ariz. 216, 222 ¶ 27 (App 2014) (judicial estoppel prevents a 

party from taking different factual positions in different phases of 

litigation). And Terry’s drug test showed 60 nanograms per milliliter of 

carboxy-THC, a level confirmed by a subsequent test. Nor has Terry

supported his novel argument that “UPS falsely reported that he was 

positive for impairment” as a basis for his DTEA-based defamation claim. 

Because the record contains no evidence that Terry had a “false positive test 

result” as used in the DTEA, his defamation claim fails. A.R.S. § 23-493.08. 

CONCLUSION

¶25 Because Terry has not shown a genuine dispute of any 

material fact, the judgment is affirmed. UPS is awarded its taxable costs 

incurred on appeal contingent on its compliance with ARCAP 21.