FILED

October 17, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

LARRY D. TURNLEY, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

) Davidson Chancery

) No. 94-3602-II

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9601-CH-00015

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTION, )

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE, CHANCELLOR

For the Plaintiff/Appellant: For the Defendant/Appellee:

Larry D. Turnley, Pro Se Charles W. Burson

Attorney General and Reporter

Darian B. Taylor

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Justice Division

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
1Mr. Turnley later filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging the plea bargain

agreement because of the manner in which the Department of Correction was calculating these

sentences. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the summary dismissal of this petition and

remanded the case with directions to appoint counsel for Mr. Turnley and to conduct a hearing on

his petition for post-conviction relief. See Turnley v. State, App. No. 01C01-9407-CR-00243, 1995

WL 544001 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 1995). The record contains no evidence concerning the

outcome or status of this proceeding.

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O P I N I O N

This appeal involves a dispute over a state prisoner’s release eligibility date.

After the Tennessee Department of Correction did not respond to his request for a

declaratory ruling, the prisoner filed a declaratory judgment action in the Chancery

Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration that his release eligibility date was

September 2000. The Department filed a motion for summary judgment supported

by an affidavit setting out its release eligibility date calculations. After the trial court

dismissed his petition, the prisoner perfected this appeal. We agree with the trial

court’s conclusion that the material facts are not in dispute and, accordingly, affirm

the summary judgment. 

I.

Larry D. Turnley is currently incarcerated in the Morgan County Regional

Correctional Facility following a lengthy criminal career. In March 1975 he received

a 16 to 30-year prison sentence after being convicted of grand larceny, second degree

burglary, robbery, and four counts of armed robbery. Mr. Turnley was paroled in

April 1982 but was returned to custody seven months later after committing another

armed robbery. He was convicted of this offense and received another 35-year

sentence to be served consecutively with his earlier sentences.

Mr. Turnley escaped from custody in September 1983. Before he was captured

in Virginia, he committed an aggravated robbery in Tennessee and other crimes in

Virginia. While still in Virginia’s custody, he agreed to plead guilty to the Tennessee

aggravated robbery and escape charges and received 8-year and 1-year sentences to

be served concurrently with each other and consecutively with his earlier Tennessee

sentences.

1

 He was eventually released to Tennessee’s custody and returned to the

Davidson County Jail on April 14, 1992. As a result of his later convictions for
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armed robbery, escape, and aggravated robbery, Mr. Turnley is now serving a 16 to

73-year sentence.

After being informed that he would not be eligible to be considered for release

until 2007, Mr. Turnley sought a declaratory ruling from the Department of

Correction concerning its calculation of his sentence eligibility date. When the

Department declined to issue a ruling, Mr. Turnley filed a petition for declaratory

judgment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 (Supp. 1997) (formerly Tenn. Code

Ann. § 4-5-224) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Department

responded with a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit of the

manager of Sentence Information Services detailing the Department’s calculations of

Mr. Turnley’s release eligibility date. Mr. Turnley responded by taking issue with the

Department’s calculations. The trial court granted the Department’s motion after

determining that there were no genuine disputes concerning the material facts and that

the Department was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

II.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the Department was entitled to a

judgment in its favor as a matter of law based on the evidence submitted in support

of and in opposition to its motion for summary judgment. As we understand Mr.

Turnley’s pro se brief and pleadings, he insists that the Department was not entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law because the record contains material factual disputes

with regard to the percentage of his later armed robbery, aggravated robbery, and

escape sentences he must serve before being eligible for release classification status

and to the calculation of his sentence credits.

The party seeking a summary judgment has the initial burden of satisfying the

trial court that there are no genuine disputed factual issues for trial and that it is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Wyatt v. A-Best, Co., 910 S.W.2d 851,

854 (Tenn. 1995). Once the moving party has filed a properly supported motion, the

burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate by affidavits or other

appropriate evidentiary materials that there is a genuine, material factual dispute
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warranting a trial on the merits. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993).

Non-moving parties should not take a motion for summary judgment lightly, see

Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. 1978), and should

not rely on the denials or allegations in their pleadings to establish a material factual

dispute that will be sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. See Tenn. R.

Civ. P. 56.06. 

Mr. Turnley’s response to the Department’s motion for summary judgment

does not set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Rather,

it is simply a restatement of the allegations in his earlier pleadings and other papers

filed with the trial court. His assertions about the circumstances of his incarceration

in Virginia and the terms and conditions of his sentences for aggravated robbery and

escape are completely unsupported and unsubstantiated. Likewise, his assertions

relating to the calculation of his sentence credits appear to overlook the fact that he

is not entitled to these credits until he earns them and that he is not entitled to

sentence credits during the “dead time” when he had escaped. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 41-21-236(a)(3) (1997). 

III.

We affirm the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Turnley’s petition and

remand the case to the trial court for whatever further proceedings are required. We

tax the costs of this appeal to Larry D. Turnley for which execution, if necessary, may

issue.

____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

__________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE

MIDDLE SECTION
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__________________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE