If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 25, 2021

v Nos. 349797; 349798

Wayne Circuit Court

TONY DAVID KINGSLEY, LC Nos. 18-007549-01-FH; 

18-007675-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and STEPHENS and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 349797, defendant Tony David Kingsley appeals his jury trial convictions 

for carrying a concealed weapon (“CCW”), MCL 750.227, and resisting or obstructing a police 

officer, MCL 750.81d(1).1 In Docket No. 349798, Kingsley appeals his jury trial convictions2for 

carjacking, MCL 750.529a, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, kidnapping, MCL 750.349, torture, 

MCL 750.85, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC-I”), MCL 750.520b, two 

counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC-III”), MCL 750.520d(1)(b), and eight 

counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“felony-firearm”), MCL 

750.227b.3 We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

 

1 Kingsley was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 23 months to 5 years for the CCW 

conviction and one to two years for the resisting or obstructing a police officer conviction, to also 

be served concurrent to his sentences in Docket No. 349798.

2

In Case No. 18-007675-01-FC, Kingsley was also charged with fourth-degree arson, MCL 

750.75, but was acquitted of this offense.

3 Kingsley was sentenced to prison terms of 30 to 60 years for the carjacking, armed robbery, 

kidnapping, torture, and for each CSC-I conviction. Kingsley was sentenced to 7 to 15 years for 

each CSC-III conviction and to two years for each felony-firearm conviction. The felony-firearm 
-2-

I. BASIC FACTS

These cases arise from the carjacking, kidnapping, torture, and sexual assault of the victim 

by Kingsley and his subsequent flight from the police. One evening in August 2018, the victim 

attended an art event with friends in Detroit, but she drove separately from them. After the event, 

the victim and her friends planned to gather at a bar located in Hamtramck. At about 10:40 p.m., 

the victim drove alone to the bar and parked her vehicle. She opened her driver’s side door and 

reached over to her passenger seat to retrieve her bag. When the victim turned, she found that 

Kingsley stood between her and the open car door, preventing her from exiting the vehicle. 

Kingsley pointed a firearm at the victim and said, “Give me your wallet and your keys.” When 

the victim “froze” and did not immediately respond, Kingsley directed her to slide over to the 

passenger seat. Kingsley demanded the victim’s car keys, which she gave to him. Kingsley started 

the vehicle and drove out of the parking lot.

As Kingsley drove away, the victim told Kingsley that he could take her wallet and camera 

out of her bag. In response to the victim’s requests to be released, Kingsley said, “I’ll let you go 

as soon as I get to where I’m going.” Kingsley drove on the freeway at a high rate of speed and 

instructed the victim to put her head down while he was driving. Eventually, Kingsley turned off 

the roadway, drove across a field in a park, and parked the victim’s vehicle next to a dark wooded 

area. Throughout this process, Kingsley kept his firearm aimed at the victim’s abdomen.

Kingsley told the victim to get out of the car. He then grabbed the victim by her hair, 

pulled her into the woods, and told her to undress. Once the victim removed her clothing, Kingsley 

told her to put her arms around a nearby tree. Kingsley tied the victim’s wrists together with a 

rope, tore the victim’s skirt, and then tied the strips of fabric around the victim’s wrists. In an 

attempt to humanize herself and make it less likely she was hurt, the victim told Kingsley about 

her family and her desire to live. The victim testified, “I was afraid I wasn’t going to leave the 

woods.” 

However, Kingsley ignored the victim’s attempt to elicit empathy. Kingsley went back to 

the vehicle and, upon his return, the victim attempted to negotiate a sexual act in exchange for her 

freedom because she thought it would “be a better alternative than whatever else” could happen. 

Kingsley picked up the victim’s dress from the ground and tied it around her neck and mouth. The 

victim felt helpless because she no longer could try to talk herself out of the situation. Kingsley 

left the woods once again, and, upon returning, untied the victim’s gag and the rope from around 

her wrists. The victim was allowed to put her dress back on, and Kingsley unbuckled his pants. 

 

convictions are concurrent with each other and are consecutive to and preceding the sentences for 

carjacking, armed robbery, kidnapping, torture, CSC-I, and CSC-III, respectively. The carjacking 

sentence is consecutive to and preceding the sentence for Count 5, the first CSC-I conviction, while 

the sentence for Count 5 is consecutive to and preceding Count 6, the second CSC-I conviction. 

Count 6 is concurrent with the sentences for armed robbery, kidnapping, torture, and both counts 

of CSC-III. Additionally, all of Kingsley’s sentences in Docket No. 349798 are concurrent with 

the sentences in Docket No. 349797.
-3-

In response, the victim asked, “How do I know if I do this [perform oral sex] that you’ll let me 

go?” Kingsley stated, “I promise.”

Kingsley “pushed [the victim’s] head into him” and later removed his penis from her mouth 

and ejaculated into the woods. Kingsley told the victim to put her hands on a nearby tree, and then 

he digitally penetrated her vagina. Kingsley then attempted to insert his penis into the victim’s 

vagina. Although Kingsley was unsuccessful, the victim still felt Kingsley press his penis against 

her inner labia. Kingsley asked the victim if she was going to report him. The victim promised 

Kingsley she would not report him and indicated that she “just want[ed] [her] life.” Before leaving 

the victim in the woods, Kingsley told the victim he had her identification and that he knew where 

she lived, stating, “Don’t make me regret this.” When the victim could no longer see the headlights 

of her vehicle, she left the woods and proceeded to a gas station where she telephoned her friends. 

The victim’s friends had to persuade her to call the police because she was so scared of Kingsley. 

After calling the police and her friends, the victim was taken to the hospital where DNA 

evidence was collected. The victim’s vehicle was found burned and abandoned. Security footage 

from local businesses near the time of the victim’s kidnapping captured images of Kingsley, and 

the police learned Kingsley’s identity from community sources. The police discovered that 

Kingsley stayed with a local friend and interviewed the friend’s mother. When packing Kingsley’s 

belongings, the friend’s mother found the victim’s driver’s license and returned it to the police. 

The police were actively looking for the Kingsley when he was seen walking down a 

Hamtramck street late one evening. Kingsley disregarded the officers’ commands and fled the 

area. When his escape was thwarted by a locked fenced area, Kingsley tossed an object and 

resisted apprehension. Ultimately, the police had to use a taser to secure Kingsley and arrest him. 

A gun was recovered from the area where Kingsley had tossed the object.

Within three days of the assaults, the victim was shown an array of photographs and 

identified Kingsley as her assailant. Additionally, the DNA test results corroborated the victim’s 

identification of Kingsley. The police investigation also revealed that Kingsley was the perpetrator 

of a strikingly similar sexual assault that had occurred three weeks earlier in July 2018.4 MV, who 

was the victim of that assault, testified that she was with her boyfriend in a car when Kingsley 

opened the door, displayed a gun, beat her boyfriend, and forced him to leave. Kingsley took MV 

into the woods, forced her to undress, tied her to a tree, and sexually assaulted her. Kingsley 

advised MV that after the sexual act, he would let her go. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE–TORTURE

Kingsley only alleges there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of torture. 

Specifically, Kingsley asserts that the prosecution failed to establish that he intended to cause the 

victim cruel or extreme mental pain or suffering, or that the mental pain or suffering she 

experienced was caused by the threat of imminent death. We disagree.

 

4 Kingsley apparently pleaded guilty to felonious assault, MCL 750.82, CSC-I, and kidnapping 

arising from this incident. 
-4-

This Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by 

examining the “record evidence de novo in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the 

essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” This 

Court must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution. [People 

v McFarlane, 325 Mich App 507, 513; 926 NW2d 339 (2018) (citations omitted).]

“This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of the evidence 

or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 

(2008). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can 

constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 

597 NW2d 130 (1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is for the trier of fact, not the 

appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to 

determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 

646 NW2d 158 (2002).

Torture is defined in MCL 750.85, which states, in relevant part:

(1) A person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme physical or 

mental pain and suffering, inflicts great bodily injury or severe mental pain or 

suffering upon another person within his or her custody or physical control commits 

torture and is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of 

years.

(2) As used in this section:

(a) “Cruel” means brutal, inhuman, sadistic, or that which torments.

(b) “Custody or physical control” means the forcible restriction of a 

person’s movement or forcible confinement of the person so as to interfere with 

that person’s liberty, without that person’s consent or without lawful authority.

* * *

(d) “Severe mental pain or suffering” means a mental injury that results in 

a substantial alteration of mental functioning that is manifested in a visibly 

demonstrable manner caused by or resulting from any of the following:

* * *

(iii) The threat of imminent death.

* * *

(3) Proof that a victim suffered pain is not an element of the crime under 

this section. [See also People v Schaw, 288 Mich App 231, 233-234; 791 NW2d 

743 (2010), quoting MCL 750.85.]
-5-

Therefore, to establish torture, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that (1) defendant intended to cause cruel or extreme physical or mental pain and suffering, 

(2) defendant inflicted great bodily injury or severe mental pain or suffering, and (3) the victim 

was within defendant’s custody and control. MCL 750.85; see also Schaw, 288 Mich App at 233-

234. 

Kingsley asserts that he never verbally threatened to kill or injure the victim and that he 

did not perform an assaultive act that threatened imminent death. Although Kingsley may not 

have verbally threatened to kill or injure the victim, his collective actions satisfied the statutory 

requirements. The victim repeatedly testified that Kingsley pointed his firearm at her abdomen as 

he drove her vehicle on the freeway. Once they arrived at the woods, Kingsley pulled the victim 

by her hair, told the victim to take off her clothes, tied her to a tree, and tied her own dress around 

her neck and mouth. The victim testified that she told Kingsley about her family and that she 

wanted to live because she “was afraid [she] wasn’t going to leave the woods.” In response, 

Kingsley did not display any empathy or release the victim despite taking her car and her purse. 

A reasonable jury could infer that the victim was under the threat of imminent death by virtue of 

Kingsley’s actions. 

After the assault, the victim called her friends, and her friends had to persuade her to call 

the police because the victim was afraid of Kingsley. Over defense counsel’s objections, the victim 

then testified that between the time of the assault and Kingsley’s arrest, she was “extremely 

anxious,” did not sleep well or want to be alone, and was afraid that Kingsley would find her. The 

victim also testified that, after the assault, she continued to feel anxious, especially when “going 

to and from” her vehicle. The victim also did not go anywhere at night on her own and sought 

counseling. Further, testimony at trial disclosed the victim’s intimate relationship with her 

boyfriend was negatively affected because of the sexual assault. Therefore, we conclude that the 

prosecutor presented sufficient evidence that the victim was under the threat of imminent death 

throughout the events leading up to her sexual assault, and that threat of imminent death caused 

severe mental pain and suffering to the victim.

Kingsley also asserts there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that he intended to 

cause the victim cruel or extreme mental pain and suffering. The record belies Kingsley’s 

assertions. “[M]inimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant’s state of 

mind, which can be inferred from all the evidence presented.” Kanaan, 278 Mich App at 622. In 

this case, a jury could infer that Kingsley intended to cause extreme mental pain or suffering when 

he kidnapped the victim at gunpoint, drove her to a secluded area, bound her to a tree, gagged her, 

and sexually assaulted her. After the sexual assault, Kingsley impliedly threatened the victim by 

advising that he knew where she lived from her driver’s license, and told the victim not to make 

him “regret this” before leaving her in the woods. In light of Kingsley’s actions throughout the 

evening of the sexual assault, a jury could reasonably infer that Kingsley intended to cause the 

victim extreme mental pain and suffering. There was sufficient evidence to convict Kingsley of 

torture.
-6-

III. SENTENCING

A. UPWARD DEPARTURE SENTENCE

Kingsley submits that the trial court’s upward sentencing departure was unreasonable and 

violated the principle of proportionality, and that the trial court did not provide an adequate 

explanation for its departure. We disagree.

This Court reviews a departure from the sentencing guidelines range for reasonableness, 

People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), determining “whether the trial 

court abused its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality. . . .” People v Steanhouse, 

500 Mich 453, 477; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the trial court’s 

decision was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Norfleet, 317 

Mich App 649, 654; 897 NW2d 195 (2016).

In Lockridge, 498 Mich 364-365, our Supreme Court held that the sentencing guidelines 

were advisory rather than mandatory, struck down the requirement that sentencing courts provide 

a substantial and compelling reason in support of a sentence that departs from the applicable 

guidelines range, and held that departure sentences would be reviewed on appeal for 

reasonableness. “[T]he proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, is whether 

the trial court abused its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ set forth in People 

v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), ‘which requires sentences imposed by the 

trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and 

the offender.’ ” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 459-460.

[D]epartures are appropriate where the guidelines do not adequately account for 

important factors legitimately considered at sentencing . . . . [T]rial judges may 

continue to depart from the guidelines when, in their judgment, the recommended 

range under the guidelines is disproportionate, in either direction, to the seriousness 

of the crime. [Milbourn, 435 Mich at 657.]

“Even where some departure appears to be appropriate, the extent of the departure (rather than the 

fact of the departure itself) may embody a violation of the principle of proportionality.” Id. at 660. 

There are several factors for a trial court to consider under the principle of proportionality, 

including:

(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by 

the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the 

relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct 

while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s 

potential for rehabilitation. [People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 126; 933 NW2d 

314 (2019) (citation omitted).]

If a trial court chooses to depart from the sentencing guidelines, it is required to justify the 

departure on the record “explaining why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense 

and the offender than a different sentence would have been.” People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 

315; 933 NW2d 719 (2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
-7-

Kingsley’s total offense variable (“OV”) score was 195 and his total prior record variable 

score was 27. This placed Kingsley in the D-VI cell of the Class A sentencing grid, which 

recommends a minimum sentence of 171 to 285 months’ imprisonment. MCL 777.62. However, 

the trial court went above the recommended minimum sentence range when it sentenced Kingsley 

to 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment on his carjacking, kidnapping, armed robbery, torture, and 

CSC-I convictions. In support of the upward departures, the trial court stated that it “pored over” 

the presentence investigation report (“PSIR”), the sentencing guidelines, and the prosecutor’s 

sentencing memorandum, and recalled the facts and testimony at trial. The trial court considered 

not only Kingsley’s actions against the victim in this case, but also his actions against MV, who 

was similarly sexually assaulted by Kingsley in a wooded area just three weeks before the assault 

of this victim. The trial court thought that it was “apparent” that Kingsley was on his “way to 

becoming a serial rapist.” Furthermore, the trial court considered that what the victim went 

through was “every woman’s nightmare” and that Kingsley’s lack of remorse and 

acknowledgment, despite the evidence at trial, was concerning. 

Additionally, the trial court noted that although Kingsley’s OVs for his carjacking, armed 

robbery, kidnapping, and torture convictions “level[ed] out at 195 points,” they were “capped at 

100 points.” And regarding Kingsley’s CSC convictions, the trial court noted that although his 

total OV score was reduced by 50 points “because OV 11 can’t be scored,” his total OV score for 

those convictions was “still well above the 100 points.” Moreover, the trial court stated it could 

not contemplate sentencing Kingsley at the bottom of the sentencing guidelines range and, instead, 

found that there were “compelling and substantial reasons to go above guidelines,” which, the trial 

court pointed out, “are only advisory.” The trial court noted that even if it “went one grid further 

down, where the top of the guidelines would be 375 months, which is 31 years and 3 months, 

because those OVs are so much higher than what they get capped off at,” it believed that sentencing 

Kingsley to 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment on the carjacking conviction was “a proportionate 

sentence.” After noting the carjacking sentence would be preceding and consecutive to the 

sentence for Kingsley’s first CSC-I conviction, the trial court sentenced Kingsley to 30 to 60 years’ 

imprisonment for the first CSC-I conviction, 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment for the other CSC-I 

conviction, and 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery, kidnapping, and torture 

convictions.

On appeal, Kingsley asserts that the trial court’s reliance on the seriousness of the offenses 

in justifying the upward departure was inappropriate because the seriousness of the offenses was 

fully contemplated by the sentencing guidelines. Kingsley submits that the OVs were scored to 

address the seriousness of the offense, including OV 4, which considers serious psychological 

injury, OV 7, which considers aggravated physical abuse, and OV 10, which considers exploitation 

of a vulnerable victim. Moreover, Kingsley noted that OVs 1 and 2 were assessed points for the 

use of a weapon, and OV 8 was assessed points for asportation or captivity.

Kingsley declined to speak at sentencing, and defense counsel argued that Kingsley had 

the potential to be a better person upon his release from prison and that consecutive sentencing 

would not be proportionate. Nonetheless, the trial court found the 30- to 60-year sentences to be 

proportionate to the offense and offender. In doing so, the trial court explained that the guidelines 

did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Kingsley’s crimes and behavior, emphasizing his 

commission of a similar crime weeks earlier, the contents of the PSIR, the sentencing 

memorandum, and the testimony at trial. 
-8-

It has long been recognized that a “trial court is not required to use any formulaic or ‘magic’ 

words” to justify a departure in sentencing. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 259 n 13; 666 NW2d 

231 (2003). We conclude that the trial court explained the reasons for imposing the upward 

departure sentence and why the sentence imposed was more proportionate to the offense and 

offender than a different sentence would have been. See Odom, 327 Mich App at 315. As a result, 

the trial court adequately explained its decision to impose an upward departure sentence. 

Additionally, the trial court’s statements adequately explained its reasoning for the extent of the 

departure sentence imposed. See Milbourn, 435 Mich at 659 (explaining that the extent of a 

departure sentence can violate the principle of proportionality). Therefore, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in imposing an upward departure sentence. 

B. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

Kingsley also contends that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences 

without articulating its justification for doing so.5 We agree.

“The purpose of consecutive sentencing is to ‘enhance the punishment imposed upon those 

who have been found guilty of more serious crimes and who repeatedly engage in criminal acts.’ ” 

People v Chambers, 430 Mich 217, 229; 421 NW2d 903 (1988) (citation omitted). 

The “[i]mposition of a consecutive sentence is strong medicine. It may well 

be warranted in some cases. But it should be used only after awareness of a 

sentence already imposed so that the punitive effect of the consecutive sentence is 

carefully considered at the time of its imposition.” [Chambers, 430 Mich at 231, 

quoting Salley v United States, 786 F2d 546, 548 (CA 2, 1986).]

“Review of a discretionary decision requires that the trial court set forth the reasons 

underlying its decision.” Norfleet, 317 Mich App at 664. “The decision regarding each 

consecutive sentence is its own discretionary act and must be separately justified on the record.” 

Id. at 665. Imposition of more than one consecutive sentence may be justified in an extraordinary 

case, but the trial court must articulate its rationale to facilitate appellate review. Id. 

We conclude that the trial failed to adequately articulate its rationale for imposing three 

consecutive sentences. As previously noted, the trial court exceeded the recommended minimum 

sentence range and properly identified its reasons for doing so. The horrific nature of Kingsley’s 

crimes certainly warranted it. But the trial court was also required to articulate its rationale for 

imposing a consecutive sentence, and to provide a separate justification for each of the three 

consecutive sentences imposed. See Norfleet, 317 Mich App at 666. This was not done. Instead, 

the trial court’s only explanation concerning its imposition of three consecutive sentences was:

That sentence [carjacking] will be served consecutive to and preceding the sentence 

on Count 5, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. And on that charge, you 

will receive another sentence of 30 years to 60 years. And on that, they're stacked. 

 

5 Kingsley does not take issue with the trial court’s statutory authority to impose the consecutive 

sentences, and therefore, we do not address it.
-9-

And that will be served consecutive to and preceding the sentence on Count 6 for 

criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, where you'll receive another 30 years to 

60 years in the Michigan Department of Corrections.

The sentencing recitation is not an articulation of the trial court’s rationale underlying each of the 

three consecutive sentences imposed. This Court is therefore left to speculate concerning the trial 

court’s rationale, which impairs our ability to evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Id. at 664-665. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court so that the court can comply with Norfleet

and fully articulate its rationale underlying the imposition of each consecutive sentence, or for 

resentencing if the court determines on remand that one or more of the consecutive sentences is 

not warranted. 

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron