IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2014-CP-00042-COA IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FRED DAVID FORREST, SR., DECEASED: DIANE FORREST APPELLANT

v. FRED DAVID FORREST, JR., JOHN EDWARD FORREST, ERIC CLAYTON FORREST AND TIMOTHY DANIEL FORREST APPELLEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/06/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GEORGE W ARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: ADAMS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DIANE FORREST (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JOHN EDW ARD FORREST (PRO SE) ERIC CLAYTON FORREST (PRO SE) TIMOTHY DANIEL FORREST (PRO SE) FRED DAVID FORREST JR. (PRO SE) NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - W ILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DIVIDED ESTATE ASSETS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/02/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. D i a ne Forrest appeals pro se challenging an order i ssued by th e A d a ms C o u n t y Chancery Court regarding the closing of her late husband’s estate. Due to D iane’s f ailure to cite any authority i n her appeal, we are f aced with a procedural bar. Theref ore, we af f irm the chancery court’s order. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¶2. Fred Forrest and Diane were m arried on July 1, 1995. Fred had been m arried twice bef ore and had f

our sons: F red Forrest Jr.; John Forrest; Eric Forrest; and Tim othy Forrest (collectively “Fred’s sons”). During his m arriage to Diane, Fred was em ploy ed as a service technician with Coca-Cola Inc. On Decem ber 19, 1995, he sustained a w ork-related injury , which l ed to paraly sis. His injury caused him to lo s e h i s j o b i n J anuary 1997, and he died

une x p e c t e d l y f

rom sepsis on N ovem

ber 10, 2010. At the tim e o f his death, Fred owned a hom e and an em

pty lot with h is wif

e, a handicap-accessible van, and l i m i ted personal
p r o p e r t y . I n addition, p rior to his death, Fred h ad settled a c laim with the W orkers ’ Com pensation Com m ission in the am ount of $30,000. From

that $30,000, legal f

ees were paid in the am ount of $5,000, leaving a balance of $25,000, which i s currently in a clienttrust account with attorney W illiam Carl McGehee. ¶3. Following Fred’s death, there was a disagreem e n t between Diane a n d F r e d ’ s s ons regarding the distribution o f Fred’s assets. Specif ically , Fred’s sons were angry t hat Diane sold Fred’s van and d id not include that mo n e y a s part of t he estate. Diane, on the other hand, thought s h e w a s e n t i tled to be reim bursed f or various expenses that she had paid. Diane f i led a petition t o close t he estate, and a h e a r i n g was held in the chancery court on Decem ber 18, 2013. ¶4. Af ter hearing f

rom a ll parties, the chancellor had a discussion in his cham b ers of f the record with all parties present. Upon returning to the courtroom , the chancellor announced that the parties had reached an a greem ent. The a g reem ent allowed f or Fred’s sons to split Fred’s $25,000 settlem e nt, and f rom that m oney they were t o pay f or Fred’s headstone and

2attorney ’s f ees. Diane, on the other hand, was allowed t o keep the m oney she r eceived f rom the sale o f Fred’s van. I n addition, the chancellor stated t hat, as part of t he agreem ent, Fred’s

sons would not p ursue any f urther claim against Diane f or the sale of the vehicle, and Diane would not pursue any

f urther claim

f or reim bursem ent of previous expenses. ¶5. Af te r reading the agreem ent into the record, the chancellor asked the p arties if they understood and assented to t he agreem e nt as dictated i nto t he record. All parties r esponded af f irm atively . Diane then f

iled this appeal.

DISCUSSION I. Motion to Strike Reply Brief ¶6. W e f

irst a ddress Fred’s sons’ pending pro s e letter/m otion to strike D iane’s reply brief because it was f

i led bey ond t he f

ourteen d ay s set f

orth i n Mississippi Rule o f A ppellate Procedure 31. In addition, Fred’s sons com p lain t hat Diane’s rep l y brief cites t o m atters outside of the record. This Court o riginally considered the m otion on O ctober 10, 2 014, and decided it should be considered w ith the m erits of the appeal. Given o ur ultim ate af f irm ation of the chancery court’s ruling, Fred’s sons’ m otion is hereby dism issed as m oot. II. Failure to Cite Authority ¶7. Diane f

i led her appellant’s brief pro se. In h er brief , Diane f ailed to cite any authority in support of h er claim s. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule o f A ppellate P rocedure 2 8(a)(6), an appellant’s brief m

ust “contain the contentions of appellant w ith respect t o t h e issues presented, and the reasons f or those contentions, with citations to the authorities, s t a t u tes, and parts of the record relied on.” It is well settled under Mississippi caselaw that “f ailure to cite

3any authority is a p rocedural bar, and a reviewing court is under no obligation to consider the

a s s i g n me nt.” Norwood v. M iss. D ep’t of E

mp’t Sec. , 105 So. 3d 408, 410 (¶5) (Mi s s . C t

. App. 2012) (citation om itted). ¶8. Although Diane has chosen to appeal this m atter w ithout t he assistance of counsel, the Mississippi Suprem e Court has c onsistently held t hat “[ a] pro se litigant shall be held to the

sam e standard as an attorney .” Bailey v. W heatley Estates C

o r p
. , 829 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (¶11) ( Miss. Ct. A pp. 2002). As such, we decline to address Diane’s assignm e nts of error because she f

a iled to cite any

authority in her brief

s. ¶9. T H I S A P P E A L I S D I S M I S S E D . A LL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL A R E ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C .J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ROBERTS, M AX WELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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