1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

___________________________________

)

DENNIS JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action

) No. 15-1851(EGS)

v. ) 

) 

PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC., et al., )

) 

Defendants. ) 

___________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Dennis Johnson, a retired law enforcement 

officer, claims that he was improperly detained and harassed 

after he entered an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 

facility with a handgun. He has sued the private security 

contractors — MVM, Inc. (“MVM”) and Paragon Systems, 

Inc.(“Paragon”) — allegedly responsible for security at that ICE 

facility, along with Federal Protective Services (“FPS”) and one 

of its employees, Christopher Addams (collectively, “Federal 

Defendants”). Pending before the Court are MVM and the Federal 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint. For the 

reasons articulated below, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions 

and dismisses Mr. Johnson’s complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

On October 31, 2012, Mr. Johnson arrived at an ICE facility 

and entered the building with a loaded handgun in his briefcase. 
2

Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 10.1 As a retired federal law 

enforcement officer, Mr. Johnson asserts that he is entitled to 

carry a firearm on federal property at any time. Id. ¶ 10.

Nonetheless — perhaps because Mr. Johnson inadvertently 

entered the ICE facility through the visitors' entrance and not 

the employees' entrance — Mr. Johnson was immediately detained 

by security guards allegedly employed or supervised by 

defendants. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. According to Mr. Johnson, even though 

he promptly displayed his law-enforcement badge to the security 

guards, and even though the security guards were allegedly 

notified that Mr. Johnson was entitled to bring his weapon into 

the building, the security guards "handcuffed Plaintiff for over 

two hours." Id. ¶¶ 13-15.

Mr. Johnson further alleges that Christopher Addams — a FPS 

employee who supposedly supervised "either a Paragon Systems 

employee or MVM employee" — threatened to initiate criminal 

proceedings against Mr. Johnson for his conduct. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.

Mr. Addams purportedly continued to threaten Mr. Johnson with 

legal action for a period of over two months after the incident, 

through December 2012. Id. 

 1 When citing electronic filings in this opinion, the Court 

cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the filed 

document.
3

Based on these allegations, Mr. Johnson filed suit on 

October 31, 2015 against Paragon. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In that 

complaint, Mr. Johnson asserted four causes of action: (1) a 

"Civil Rights Violation" pursuant to section 1983; (2) assault 

and battery; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

and (4) common-law negligence. Id. ¶¶ 18-35.

On July 1, 2016, the Court granted Paragon's partial motion 

to dismiss, dismissing Mr. Johnson's claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress after concluding that Mr. 

Johnson had failed to sufficiently allege that his injury 

resulted from "extreme and outrageous conduct." See Johnson v. 

Paragon Sys., Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2016).

Almost a year after initially filing suit, on October 21, 

2016, Mr. Johnson filed an amended complaint that omitted his 

previously-dismissed claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress and added MVM, FPS, and Mr. Addams as codefendants. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12. On September 27, 2017, 

the Court granted Paragon summary judgment after finding that 

Mr. Johnson had failed to adduce evidence suggesting that 

Paragon took any action that caused Mr. Johnson’s alleged 

injuries. See Johnson v. Paragon Systems Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 1 

(D.D.C. 2017).

Both MVM and the Federal Defendants now move to dismiss Mr. 

Johnson’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
4

Procedure 12. Specifically, MVM argues that the amended 

complaint should be dismissed for insufficient service of 

process, because Mr. Johnson’s claims are barred by the relevant 

statutes of limitations, and because Mr. Johnson fails to state 

a claim for negligence. See MVM Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 

(“MVM Mot.”), ECF No. 22-1 at 5-13. The Federal Defendants move 

to dismiss Mr. Johnson’s complaint for insufficient service of 

process, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, qualified 

immunity, lack of personal jurisdiction, and for failure to 

state a claim. See Fed. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Fed. Mot.”), ECF No. 23-1 at 6-18. For the following reasons, 

the Court GRANTS those motions and dismisses Mr. Johnson’s 

amended complaint.2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1) – Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

"A federal district court may only hear a claim over which 

[it] has subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court's 

jurisdiction." Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C. 

 2 The Court does not address defendants’ compelling serviceof-process arguments because “the interest of judicial economy 

is served by reaching the merits of [plaintiff’s] claims against 

[defendants] at this time, rather than delaying the inevitable 

by allowing [plaintiff] to file another lawsuit against those 

Defendants containing the same meritless claims.” McManus v. 

District of Columbia, 530 F. Supp. 2d 46, 68 (D.D.C. 2007). 
5

2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To 

survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing that the court has jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a 

court's ability to hear a particular claim, "the court must 

scrutinize the plaintiff's allegations more closely when 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than 

it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)."

Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 

(D.D.C. 2011). In so doing, the court must accept as true all of 

the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but the court need not 

"accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal 

conclusions that are cast as factual allegations." Rann v. Chao, 

154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001). 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 

the court "may consider such materials outside the pleadings as 

it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it has 

jurisdiction to hear the case." Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections 

& Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome 

Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food and Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 

1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), a court should first consider the 
6

Rule 12(b)(1) motion because "[o]nce a court determines that it 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further." 

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 

(D.D.C. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A 

complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give 

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss [pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint." Atherton v. 

D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court must 

give the plaintiff the "benefit of all inferences that can be 

derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 

F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion 

to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
7

on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is 

facially plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow 

the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The standard does not 

amount to a "probability requirement," but it does require more 

than a "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against MVM Are Time-Barred. 

MVM moves to dismiss all the claims asserted against it on 

the grounds that they are barred by the relevant statutes of 

limitations. See MVM Mot., ECF No. 22-1 at 6-9. The Court agrees 

that Mr. Johnson’s claims against MVM are time barred. 

An affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations 

“may be raised by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b).” SmithHaynie v. Dist. of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

Because statute-of-limitations issues often depend on contested 

questions of fact, “a defendant is entitled to succeed on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss brought on statutes of limitations 

grounds only if the facts that give rise to this affirmative 

defense are clear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint.” 

Lattisaw v. Dist. of Columbia, 118 F. Supp.3d 142, 153 (D.D.C. 

2015).
8

“When deciding state-law claims under diversity or 

supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts apply the choice-oflaw rules of the jurisdiction in which they sit.” Ideal Elec. 

Sec. Co. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 148 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). “Because the District of Columbia treats the statute of 

limitations as a procedural issue rather than a substantive one, 

the law of the forum state applies, as it does with respect to 

all procedural matters.” Gaudreau v. Am. Promotional Events, 

Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Accordingly, District of Columbia law provides 

the limitations periods for Mr. Johnson’s claims. 

Under District of Columbia law, Mr. Johnson’s section 1983 

claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations period. 

See Earle v. D.C., 707 F.3d 299, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“We apply 

the three-year residual statute of limitations to a section 1983 

claim.”). Likewise, Mr. Johnson’s negligence claim is subject to 

the District of Columbia’s three-year residual statute of 

limitations. See D.C. Code § 12—301(8); Griggs v. Washington 

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 232 F.3d 917, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(claim sounding in negligence subject to a three-year statute of 

limitations). Finally, a one-year statute of limitations period 

applies to Mr. Johnson’s claim for assault and battery. See D.C. 

Code § 12—301(4) (one-year limitations period applies to assault 

and battery claims); King v. Barbour, 240 F. Supp. 3d 136, 139 
9

(D.D.C. 2017) (“The statute of limitations for civil assault 

claims in the District of Columbia is one year.”). 

The statutory period begins to run “from the time the right 

to maintain the action accrues.” D.C. Code § 12–301. The cause 

of action accrues “when the plaintiff knows or through the 

exercise of due diligence should have known of the injury.” See 

Dist. of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C. 1995) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); Munoz v. Bd. of Trs. of the 

Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 427 Fed. Appx. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (section 1983 claim accrued when the alleged wrongful 

conduct occurred).

Here, the alleged wrongful conduct that forms the basis of 

Mr. Johnson’s claims occurred on or about October 31, 2012 and 

continued through December 31, 2012. Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶

10-11, 16.3 Mr. Johnson did not file his complaint against MVM 

until October 21, 2016, almost four years after his claims 

against MVM accrued and well past the expiration of the relevant 

statutes of limitations. 

 3 Mr. Johnson’s Amended Complaint alleges that the incident 

underlying his claims occurred, alternatively, “on or about 

October 24, 2012” and “on or about October 31, 2012.” See Am. 

Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 10, 11. Mr. Johnson’s original complaint 

refers only to the October 31, 2012 date. See Compl., ECF No. 1 

¶¶ 9, 10, 16. Whether the incident occurred on October 24 or 

October 31 does not change the result, however, because, as 

explained more fully below, Mr. Johnson filed his lawsuit 

against MVM more than a year after the latest limitations period 

had expired. 
10

Mr. Johnson makes two arguments in support of his 

contention that his claims against MVM should be deemed timely. 

Neither argument saves his case. 

First, Mr. Johnson asserts that his claim for a “Civil 

Rights violation” against MVM is not time-barred because that 

claim appeared in the original complaint, which was filed on 

October 31, 2015, and therefore falls within the three-year 

statute of limitations for section 1983 claims. Pl.’s Opp. to

MVM Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s MVM Opp.”), ECF No. 28 at 6.4 Under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), an amended complaint 

adding a new defendant “relates back” to the original complaint 

only when, inter alia, the newly added defendant received notice 

of the action “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for 

serving the summons and complaint” and “knew or should have 

known that the action would have been brought against it, but 

for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” In other 

words, “relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the 

party to be added knew or should have known.” Krupski v. Costa 

Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). Consistent with the 

rule, “[a] potential defendant who has not been named in a 

 4 Although Mr. Johnson does not appear to make this same 

argument with respect to his negligence claim – which is also 

subject to a three-year statute of limitations period and which 

was also alleged in his original complaint – the same analysis 

applies. 
11

lawsuit by the time the statute of limitations has run is 

entitled to repose – unless it is or should be apparent to that 

person that he is the beneficiary of a mere slip of the pen, as 

it were.” Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997).

Mr. Johnson offers no argument in support of the contention 

that MVM knew or should have known of the claims asserted in the 

original complaint. Nor is there any indication that Mr. Johnson 

merely made “a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity” 

in its original complaint. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 554 (holding 

that district court erred in denying relation back under Rule 

15(c)(1)(C)(ii) where newly-added corporate defendant was a 

closely-related entity represented by the same counsel and had 

“constructive notice” of plaintiff’s complaint within the Rule 

4(m) time period). For example, Mr. Johnson does not allege that 

the defendant named in the original complaint, Paragon, is 

related to MVM in any way. Accordingly, Mr. Johnson cannot rely 

on the relation back doctrine to save his negligence or section 

1983 claims.5 

 5 Moreover, even if Mr. Johnson’s section 1983 claim was not 

barred by the statute of limitations, dismissal of that claim

would still be required because MVM does not act under the color 

of state law and thus a section 1983 claim cannot be maintained 

against it. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 5, 7, 19 (alleging 

that MVM is a contractor with the federal government); MVM Mot., 

ECF No. 22-1 at 9; see also Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 

412, 414-16 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
12

Second, Mr. Johnson argues that his tort claims are not 

time-barred because “[t]he extent of the injury wasn’t 

discovered until later when plaintiff continued to experience 

pain and was referred to a specialist who diagnosed the extent 

of the injuries.” Pl.’s MVM Opp., ECF No. 28 at 5.6 The law is 

well-settled, however, that a “tort cause of action accrues, and 

the statute of limitations commences to run, when the wrongful 

act or omission results in damages. The cause of action accrues 

even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or 

predictable.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). 

“Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run only after a 

plaintiff became satisfied that he had been harmed enough, 

placing the supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the 

party seeking relief.” Id.; see also, e.g., Baker v. A.H. Robins 

Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 994, 996 (D.D.C. 1985) (fact that 

plaintiff did not “comprehend the full extent of all possible 

sequalae does not matter, for the law of limitations requires 

 6 In his opposition brief, Mr. Johnson points to pages in an 

exhibit that purportedly support this argument. See Pl.’s MVM 

Opp., ECF No. 28 at 6. Mr. Johnson did not, however, file an 

exhibit with his opposition, and the Court could not locate any 

relevant exhibit elsewhere on the docket. In any event, because 

the amended complaint makes clear that Mr. Johnson knew of his 

injuries by the end of 2012, the additional information would 

not change the Court’s result.
13

only that she have inquiry notice of the existence of a cause of 

action for personal injury”) (emphasis in original). 

Mr. Johnson alleges that he endured “physical pain and 

humiliation” at the time he was detained on October 31, 2012, 

and that defendants’ actions continued to cause him “undue 

stress” until December 2012. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 10-

11, 15-16. His assault-and-battery and negligence claims are 

both premised on those injuries. See id. ¶ 27 (alleging that 

defendants assaulted or aided in the “assault and battery of 

plaintiff, intending to threaten or cause harm to Plaintiff and 

to cause apprehension of imminent harm or frivolous criminal 

charges from on or about October 31, 2012 and continuously 

through December 31, 2012”); id. ¶ 34 (“Defendants [sic]

employees breached the duty of care to Plaintiff by keeping 

Plaintiff handcuffed for over 2 hours after determining 

Plaintiff was legally entitled to bring a handgun into the ICE 

facility and then threatening to start criminal proceedings 

against Plaintiff for over 2 months after the event[.]”).

Accordingly, his claims accrued, at the latest, on December 31, 

2012, rendering his tort claims untimely. 

In sum, because all of the claims asserted against MVM are 

barred on statute-of-limitations grounds, the Court GRANTS MVM’s

motion to dismiss. 
14

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the Federal Defendants Also 

Fail. 

1. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 

Over Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claim Against 

the Federal Defendants.

Mr. Johnson purports to assert a claim against both FPS and 

Mr. Addams in his official capacity for a “Civil Rights 

Violation” based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment 

rights. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 18-25. The Court agrees 

with the Federal Defendants that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over this claim. 

Sovereign immunity bars lawsuits for damages against the 

United States, its agencies, and its employees sued in their 

official capacities absent a waiver. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign 

immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from 

suit.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“an 

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to 

be treated as a suit against the entity” of which the officer is 

an agent). A waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally 

expressed in statutory text” and “will be strictly construed, in 

terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Pena, 

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). 

Here, Mr. Johnson’s amended complaint seeks damages from 

FPS and Mr. Addams acting in his official capacity for their 
15

“deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the 

Plaintiff.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 20. Mr. Johnson does not 

point to any statute waiving the sovereign immunity of FPS or 

Mr. Addams in his official capacity for such a claim. Indeed, 

“[s]ection 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under 

color of federal law.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 

1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Moreover, although federal 

constitutional claims are cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971), those claims only run against individual government 

officials in their personal capacity — not agencies or their 

agents in their official capacities. See Loumiet v. United 

States, 828 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

It is not clear whether Mr. Johnson alleges a Bivens claim 

against Mr. Addams in his individual capacity in his amended 

complaint. Compare Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 (making no mention of 

Bivens or of claims asserted against Mr. Addams in his 

individual capacity), with Pl.’s Opp. to Fed. Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss (“Pl.’s Fed. Opp.”), ECF No. 29 at 2 (stating that the 

claims are alleged against Mr. Addams “in his individual and 

official capacity”). In any event, such a claim would fail. For 

one, it is well-settled that “[g]overnment officials may not be 

held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. 
16

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Therefore, “a plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the primary

allegation that pertains to Mr. Addams’ role in any purported 

constitutional violation indicates that Mr. Addams “supervised 

either a Paragon Systems employee or MVM employee at all 

relevant times.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 17. Accordingly, Mr.

Johnson may not move forward on his claim for damages for an 

alleged violation of his constitutional rights.7

2. Plaintiff’s Tort Claims Must Be Dismissed 

Because He Failed to Exhaust His Administrative 

Remedies. 

Mr. Johnson also alleges claims for negligence and assault 

and battery against the Federal Defendants. The Court construes 

these tort claims as ones brought against the United States 

under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which is the 

“exclusive remedy for persons seeking recovery for damages for 

any ‘negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 

 7 To the extent Mr. Johnson seeks “declaratory” and 

“injunctive relief,” see Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 35, the 

amended complaint does not specify the form of declaratory or 

injunctive relief sought, and Mr. Johnson does not offer any 

further description of what he seeks in his opposition brief. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the amended complaint fails to 

meet the specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(3) with respect to any claims for specific 

relief. See Ward v. Kennard, 133 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 

2000). 
17

the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 

employment.’” Tripp v. Executive Office of the President, 200 

F.R.D. 140, 147 (D.D.C. 2001).

The FTCA waives sovereign immunity in limited 

circumstances, permitting a plaintiff to sue the United States 

for torts in situations in which “the United States, if a 

private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance 

with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Sloan v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 

236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Before filing suit under the 

FTCA, a plaintiff must first present his alleged claims “to the 

appropriate Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is a mandatory, jurisdictional 

prerequisite to filing such a lawsuit in federal court. See 

Jones v. United States, 296 Fed. Appx. 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 

Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 370–71 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

To exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, a 

plaintiff must have presented the agency with “(1) a written 

statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the 

agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain 

damages claim.” GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 905

(D.C. Cir. 1987). Further, the agency must have either denied 

the claim in writing or failed to provide a final disposition 

within six months of the filing of the claim. Id. Importantly, 
18

an individual submitting an administrative claim to an agency 

must do so within two years of discovery of “both his injury and 

its cause.” Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629, 633 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 

119(1979)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

Mr. Johnson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

with respect to his tort claims. The amended complaint makes no 

mention of submission of Mr. Johnson’s claims to FPS, and Mr. 

Johnson’s opposition brief does not even address the Federal 

Defendants’ exhaustion-related arguments. See Pl.’s Fed. Opp., 

ECF No. 29. Moreover, because it is undisputed that Mr. Johnson 

knew of his alleged injuries by December 2012, see supra, he was 

required to present his claim to the agency by December 2014. 

Accordingly, Mr. Johnson will be unable to exhaust his 

administrative remedies because his claims are time-barred.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court grants MVM and 

the Federal Defendants motions to dismiss Mr. Johnson’s amended 

complaint. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

March 29, 2018