2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-14-2015

USA v. Earl Crayton

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"USA v. Earl Crayton" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 732.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 14-3115

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EARL J. CRAYTON,

 Appellant

____________

On Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(W.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cr-00138-001)

District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 28, 2015

Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 14, 2015)

____________

OPINION*

____________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Earl J. Crayton appeals his final judgment of sentence, arguing that the District 

Court committed procedural error by failing to meaningfully consider arguments he made 

in favor of a reduced sentence. We will affirm.

I.

We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 

legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 

to our analysis.

On September 23, 2013, Crayton pled guilty to a charge of possession of material 

depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). 

Before sentencing, the Probation Office issued a Presentence Investigation Report 

(“PSR”), which calculated Crayton’s total offense level as 28 with a criminal history 

category I, yielding an advisory Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. 

Rather than objecting to the Probation Office’s Guidelines calculation, Crayton instead 

argued for a downward variance for several policy-based reasons. Of most relevance to 

this appeal, Crayton challenged the application of three enhancements to his Guidelines 

calculations: (1) a two-level enhancement for use of a computer under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2(b)(6), (2) a five-level enhancement because the offense involved 600 or more 

images under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D), and (3) a four-level enhancement because the 

offense involved materials that portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct or other 
3

depictions of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). Crayton argued that these 

enhancements either applied in every child pornography case and resulted in double 

counting or otherwise lacked empirical support because they did not reasonably 

approximate the seriousness of the offense. 

Crayton also sought a non-incarceration sentence by referencing instances where 

courts in the Western District of Pennsylvania and across the country had imposed nonincarceration sentences or otherwise varied substantially downward in child pornography 

cases. Given these other cases, Crayton contended that a downward variance was 

necessary to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 

At sentencing, the District Court rejected all but one of Crayton’s arguments. The 

District Court agreed with Crayton that the two-level computer enhancement was 

unreasonable because it applied in almost every child pornography case. Without the 

two-level computer enhancement, the District Court noted that Crayton’s Guidelines 

range would be 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment. The District Court then sentenced 

Crayton to 78 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. Crayton filed 

this timely appeal.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review a sentence’s procedural and 
4

substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion.1In reviewing a sentence’s procedural 

reasonableness, we ensure that the district court (1) correctly calculated the defendant’s 

Guidelines range, (2) considered and ruled on motions for departure under the 

Guidelines, and (3) exercised its discretion by meaningfully considering the sentencing 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), regardless of whether the court actually varies 

from the Guidelines sentence.2 The third step requires district courts to “acknowledge and 

respond to any properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit 

and a factual basis.”3If a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then review it for 

substantive reasonableness, reversing “only where no reasonable sentencing court would 

have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 

court provided.”4

III.

Crayton argues on appeal that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because 

the District Court failed to meaningfully consider both his argument for a variance to 

avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities in child pornography cases and his policy

arguments against application of the aforementioned sentencing enhancements. As 

explained below, Crayton’s arguments are unpersuasive. 

 

1 United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 335 (3d Cir. 2014).

2 United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).

3

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

4 Freeman, 763 F.3d at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5

A.

Crayton first contends that the District Court failed to meaningfully consider his 

argument that a significant downward variance was necessary in this case to avoid 

unwarranted sentencing disparities. In his sentencing memorandum, Crayton cited a 

series of cases from the Western District of Pennsylvania and across the country where 

district courts imposed non-incarceration sentences or otherwise varied significantly 

downward in child pornography possession cases. According to Crayton, the District 

Court failed to consider this argument because its only express reference to disparities 

related to a different argument about Crayton’s need to care for his infirm parents.

This argument is belied by the record. At a general level, the District Court 

recognized Crayton’s policy-based arguments, which included his argument that the 

Guidelines were unduly harsh in child pornography possession cases, but concluded they 

were “generally unpersuasive.”5 The District Court also specifically addressed the 

substance of Crayton’s sentencing-disparities argument, stating:

[E]ven if I were to disregard the [G]uideline[s] range for this offense, as some 

courts have done, I believe the 78-month sentence imposed here is sufficient but 

not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of [§] 3553 and that this 

sentence accounts for all the information contained in the record and reflects the 

very serious nature of Defendant’s conduct and the needs for just punishment, 

public protection, deterrence, and rehabilitation.6

 

5 App. 189.

6 App. 190 (emphasis added).
6

In other words, the District Court acknowledged Crayton’s argument for disregarding the 

Guidelines range entirely and imposing a non-incarceration or significantly reduced 

sentence and noted that other courts in other cases have followed this approach. The 

District Court simply rejected the argument based on the facts of Crayton’s case and its 

assessment of the other § 3553(a) factors. 

Additionally, by correctly calculating and reviewing the Guidelines range, the 

District Court “necessarily gave significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid 

unwarranted disparities.”

7 Although the District Court might have said more, its 

conclusion that a within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate here despite examples of 

below-Guidelines sentences in other cases was legally sufficient.8

Finally, Crayton provided minimal information about the other cases he relied on 

in making his disparities argument. He merely included the defendants’ convictions of 

child pornography crimes, their Guidelines ranges, and their sentences. In so doing, 

Crayton did not provide enough information to allow the District Court to conclude that 

these other defendants’ offenses and histories were sufficiently similar to Crayton’s 

offense and history to warrant a downward variance under § 3553(a)(6). For example, 

none of the cases Crayton cited appear to involve a defendant like himself who either 

accessed and produced child pornography or engaged in conduct “so dangerously close to 

 

7 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007).

8 See United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A] reviewing 

court’s concern about unwarranted disparities is at a minimum when a sentence is within 

the Guidelines range.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
7

the line” while on bond,9 but still received a below-Guidelines sentence. It is therefore 

unsurprising that the District Court’s discussion of this argument was brief. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court meaningfully considered

Crayton’s sentencing disparity argument and did not abuse its discretion by rejecting it. 

B.

Crayton next argues that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable 

sentence because it failed to meaningfully consider his policy-based attacks on the fivelevel enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) for an offense involving over 600 

images and the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) for an offense 

involving materials portraying sadistic, masochistic, or violent conduct. 

Crayton’s argument misses the mark again. There is no doubt the District Court 

recognized its authority to vary downward based on a policy disagreement with the 

Guidelines—the Court rejected the two-level computer enhancement for this reason. For 

the other enhancements, however, the District Court found Crayton’s policy-based 

attacks “generally unpersuasive” and, because there was no factual dispute regarding 

whether the enhancement applied, incorporated the enhancements into the Guidelines 

calculation. Nothing more was required of the District Court to justify its decision to 

adhere to the policy decisions underlying the enhancements that are incorporated into the 

Guidelines. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion on this ground.

 

9 App. 186.
8

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 

sentence.