### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 5, 200 8 S es sio n
BOA RD OF PR OFE SSION AL RES PON SIBILITY v. JA MES T. AL LISON

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-07-1059- 3 Allen W. Wallace, Senior Judge

No. W2008-00338-SC- R3-CV - F iled May 14, 2009

This is a direct appeal of a trial c ourt judg ment that modified a he aringpanel’ s order suspending an attorney from the pr actice o f l aw fo r six ty day s. The trial c ourt did not disagr ee w ith the hear ing panel’ s findings r eg ardingthe attorne y ’s misconduct but determined that the punishment was too harsh a nd, instead, orde red a

public censur e. Af

ter a n independe nt review

of the re cord, w e conc lude that th e he ari ng pa

ne l’ s fin din g s th a t th e a tto rn e y c omm ing le d h is p e rs on a l f un ds wi th c lie nt f

un ds , paid per sonal bills out of his trust a ccount, f ailed to maintain prope r trust ac count re cords, a nd failed to timely respond to Board inquirie s were supported by substantial and mater ial evidenc e and that this conduct v i o lated the Rules of Prof essional Conduct. These violations, coupled with the ag g ravating factor that in 1998, the attorney was publicly

repr imanded for

comminglinghis personal funds with trust acc ount funds and for paying pe rsonal expenses fr om his trust acc ount, warr ant the
sa n c ti o n s im

p o s e d b y th e h e ar in g p an e l w h ic h r e qu ir e th a t th e a tt o r n e y b e s u s p e n d e d f

r o m the prac tice of law for six ty day s, that his trust acc ount be monitored for a period of one y ear

following reinstateme nt of his law l icense , that he submit trust account ba nk statements and ledg er she ets eve ry thirty day s during this one-y ear period, a nd that he pay

all costs of the proc eeding . Acc ording ly , we reve rse the tr ial court’s judgment to the ex tent that it modifies the sanctions imposed by the hea ring pa ne l.

Tenn. S up. Ct. R. 9 § 1.3 Direc t Appeal; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in Par t and Reverse d in P art

S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., C O R N E LIA A. C LARK , G AR Y R. W ADE , and W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J J ., joined.

R an d a l l J

. S p i v e y, N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e a p p e l l an t , B o ar d

o f P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y.
Robert L . Gre en, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, James T. Allison.T enn. Sup. Ct . R 8., RPC 1.15. Sa f

ek ee ping Proper

ty 1
(a ) A

la w y er s hal l hol d prope rty

and funds of cl ie nts or thir d pe rs ons that a re in a la w y er ’s poss es si on in conne ct ion w ith a re pre se ntation se par at e f rom the la w y er ’s ow n prope rty

and f unds. A law y er in poss es si on of cl ie nts ’ or third per sons ’ pr oper ty and f unds inc ide nta l t o re pre se ntation sha ll hold s ai d prope rty and f unds se par at e f

rom the la w y er ’s ow n prope rty and fund s.

Te nn . Sup . Ct. R. 8, RP C 8.4 , pro vides th at “[ i] t is p rofes sion al misc on du ct for a lawy er to . . . (d) engag e in cond uct 2 that i s pre judic ia l t o the a dm inis tra tion of jus tic e. ”

Te nn . Sup . Ct. R. 8, RP C 1.3 . Diligence. 3

A

la w y er s hal l a ct w ith re as onabl e dili g enc e and prom ptne ss in re pre se ntinga

c lie nt.

T enn. Sup. Ct . R . 8, RPC 1.4. Com m unic at ion. 4
(a ) A

la w y er s hal l k ee p a

c lie nt r ea sona

bly inf orm ed about the st at

us of a m atte r a

nd c om ply
2 OP IN ION

F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

Jame s T . A lli so n h a s b e e n li c e ns e d to pr a c tic e law i n T e nn e sse e sin c e 19 63 and , a t th e tim e of the matter s descr ibed her ein, was e ng ag ed in a solo prac tice, shar ing of fice space with another attorney in Memphis. The present appeal i nvolves two petitions for discipline filed by the B oard of Professional Responsibility (“the Boa

rd”) ag ainst Allison.

This case beg an on Apr il 21, 2003, when Allison self-r eporte d to the Boa rd that a c heck he
wr o t e t o the I nterna l Revenue Ser vice on his trust ac count at Reg ions Bank ha d been r eturne d for insufficient funds. Subseque nt investigation by the Boa rd reve aled that Allison ha d written seve ral chec ks on the trust acc ount in pay ment of var ious personal oblig ations. On September

22, 2003, the Board filed a petiti on for discipline (doc ket number 2003- 1394- 9- SG) , c ha

rg ingAl lis on

wi th v iol a tio n of Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court Rul e 8, RPC 1. 15 (a ) and RPC 1 8.4 (d ), and alleg ing that he wrote a che ck to the Interna l Revenue Ser vice that wa s returne d for 2 ins uf fi c ie nt f un ds , pa id pe rs on a l bills fr om his tr us t ac c ount, and c omm ing le d pe rs on a l fun ds wi th trust acc ount funds. A supplemental pe tition for discipline added alleg ations that there had bee n an additional overdr aft on the trust a ccount f or a c heck to a

court re porter a

nd that a che ck h ad been written on the trust ac count pay able to ca sh and desig nated “ into J TA che cking ” with no client or
case ref ere nce r efle cted.

Nea rly three y ear s later, on Marc h 27, 2006, the Boa rd filed a second pe tition for discipline (docke t number 2 0 0 6-1585-9- SG), cha rg ing A llison wit h violation of Tennesse e Supreme Court Rul e 8, RPC 1.3 , 1. 4, 1. 5, 1. 16 , 8. 1, and 8. 4, in h is r e pr e se ntatio n o f c lie nt R ic ky Aa ro n. Th is 3 4 5 6 7 8w ith reasonab le requests f or in f orma tion w ithi n a rea sonab le tim e. (b) A la w y er s hal l e xpla in a m atte r to t he ex te nt r ea sona

bly ne ce ss ar y to per m it the c lie nt t o

m ak e inf orm ed dec is ions re g ar ding the re pre se ntation.

T enn. Sup. Ct . R . 8, RPC 1.5. Fe es

. A s per tine nt to this ca se , se ct ion (a ) of thi s Rul e prov ide s that “ [a] la w y er ’s f ee and 5 cha rg es f or e xpens es s hal l be re as onabl e” and s et s f orth v ar ious f

ac tors to be cons ide re d in that r eg ar d.

T enn. Sup. Ct . R . 8, RPC 1.16. De cl iningand Te rm inating Repr es ent at ion. A s per

tine nt to this ca se , s ec tion (d) of thi s 6 Rul e prov ide s that “ [u] pon te rmination of the re pre se ntation of

a clie nt, a law

y er shal l tak e st eps to the e x te nt r ea sona bly pra ct ic abl e to pr ote ct a c lie nt’s int er es ts , i ncl uding : .

. . (5) prom ptly re f unding any

a dv anc e pay

m ent f or f ee s that ha

v e not be en ea

rne d.”

Te nn

. Sup

. Ct. R. 8, RPC 8.1. Bar A dm ission and Discipli nary Matters. A s pertinent to thi s ca se, this Rule pro vides that 7 “a l awy er

. . . in c o nnec tion w ith a dis ci plina ry m atte r, sha ll not.

. . (b)

. . . k now ing ly f ai l t o re spond to a

la w f ul de m and f

or inf orm at ion f

rom [a] . . . di sc ipli nar

y a uthori ty

. . . .”

Se e A ppendi x 1. 8

3 pe tit ion a lle g e s th a t A aro n, wh ile i n c a r c e r a t e d i n t h e s t a te pe nit e nti ary

a t T ipt on vil le , T e nn e sse e , p a id Al lis on $1 ,7 50 to r e pr e se nt h im i n a fe de ra l c ivi l r ig hts c a se , b ut, the reafter, Al lis on fa ile d to fi le Aar on’s complaint, failed to re spond to his telephone ca lls and letters, fa iled to keep him informed, and neg lected his c ase. A dditionally , this second petition alleg es that af ter filing a complaint on be ha lf of ano the r cl ie nt, Dw ay

ne Kn ig ht, Al lis on

ne g le c te d K

nig ht’ s c a se and

fa ile d to re sp on d to his request for

information and ke ep him informed. The second petition further a lleg es that Allison failed to respond to reque sts for information by the B oard’ s disciplinary

counsel. The petition seeks an incr ease d deg ree of discipline bec ause of Allison’s substantial experience in the prac tice of la w, his previous public ce nsure f or disciplinary

rule violations, and his “pattern of misconduc t and multipl e off

enses.” The two pe titions for discipline we re he ar d b y t h e Boa rd’s he aringcommittee pane l (“the Panel”) on November

27, 2006, and on May

1, 2 0 0 7 , t h e P anel e ntere d a judg ment order ing that Allison be suspended fr om the prac tice of law for six ty day s, that his trust acc ount be monitored for
a pe ri od of on e y e ar f

oll ow ing re ins ta te me nt of his law lic e ns e , tha t he be re qu ir e d to su bmi t tr us t
acc ount bank statements and le dg er sheets ever y thirty day s during this one -y ear period, a nd that he pay all costs of the proc eeding . The judg ment i n cl u d es the following finding s with respec t to the violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct unde r Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 8:

The Pane l finds tha t i n case 2003-1394-9- SG the Respondent commingle d persona l funds with trust funds, paid persona l expenses dir e c tly fr om h is tr us t a c c ount, fa ile d to ma int a in r e qu ir e d tr us t
acc ounting r ecor ds and by his a ctions has violated Rule 1.15(a ) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f P ro fe ssi on a l Co nd uc t.
The Pane l finds that in cas e 2 006-1585-9- SG (Ricky Aar on) the Respondent fa iled to c ommunicate with his c lient and by his actionsPrior t o thi s am endm ent , R ule 9, s ect io n 1.3 pr ov ide d that t he tri al c ourt’ s re v ie w

“ sha ll be on the tr ans cr ipt of the 9

ev ide nce be f

ore the he ar ing c om

m itt ee , its fi nding and judg m ent and upon such ot her proo f as either party may desire to intro du ce .” T enn. Sup. Ct . R . 9, § 1.3 ( 2005) ( em phas is a dded)

. 4 violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, and 8.4 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Pr of e ssi on a l Co nd

uc t.
The Pane l finds that in case 2006- 1585-9-SG (Dway ne Knig ht) the Boa rd fa iled to pr ove that the Respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1. 15 , a nd 8. 4 o f t he Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f P ro fe ssi on a l Co nd uc t.
The Pane l fi nds that in case 2006- 1585-9-SG (D way ne Knig ht) the Re sp on de nt fa ile d to tim e ly re sp on d to the B oa rd inq uir ie s a nd by his act io n s v io late d Ru le s 8

. 1 ( b ) an d 8

. 4 o f th e T e n n e s s e e Ru le s of Professional Conduct. Upon Allison’s petition for ce rtiorar i, a h ea ri n g wa s conducte d by the Chance ry

Court for Shelby County on November

27, 2007. By

order enter ed J anuar

y 30, 2008, the trial cour

t modified the hea ring panel’ s judgme nt and o rd er ed that Alli son rec eive a public censur e rather than the
sanc tio n im

po se d b y the Pane l, s ta tin g that “ the ru lin g of the B oa rd of Pr of e ssi on a l Re sp on sib ili ty suspending the Respondent’s lice nse for six ty day s is too harsh for a

lawy er w h o h as p ra cti ced a s lo n g a s h e h a s , a lt

h o u g h th e c o u rt a c kn o w le d g e s h e v io late d s o me o f th e r u le s o f the Code of Pr of e ssi on a l Re sp on sib ili ty .” Th e re a ft e r, the B oa rd fi le d a dir e c t app e a l to thi s Cour t pu rs ua nt t o Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 9, section 1.3.

Ana lys is

Th e so ur c e of

a uth or ity of the B oa

rd of Pr of e ssi on a l Re sp on sib ili ty and its fu nc tio ns lie s in th e Su p r e me Co u rt. N e v in v

. B d

. o f Pr o f ’ l Re s p o n s ib il it

y , 2 7 1 S. W. 3 d 6 4 8 , 6 5 5 (Tenn. 2008) ; B ro wn v. B d. of Pr of ’l Re sp on sib ili ty , 2 9 S. W.3 d 44 5, 44 9 (T e nn

. 20 00 ). I nc lud e d in our d uty to regulate the pr actice of law in this state is the ultimate disciplinary responsibility for violations of the rules g overning the leg al profe ssion. See Doe v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility , 104 S.W .3d 465, 469-70 (Te nn. 2003). Thus, we revie w judg ments i n l ight of our “inhe rent powe r . . . [and] fundame ntal ri gh t t o p resc ribe a nd administer rules pe rtaining to the licensing and admission of attorney s.” In re B urson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Tenn. 1995).

Tenne sse e Su

p r e me Co u rt R

u le 9 , s e c ti o n1

. 3 , p r e s e n ts th e tr ia l c o u rt w it h g u id e li n e s for
re vie wi nga

de c isi on of a dis c ipl ina

ry he ari ngpa

ne l. T he ru le a s ame nd e d July 1, 20 06 , no w r e str ic ts

9 the trial court’ s review

to the transcript of the evidenc e before the hearing panel unless“allegations of irregularit ies in the procedurebefore the pane l are made. ” Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 9, § 1.3 (2007) (empha sis added); see also Bd. of Prof’l R esponsibility v. L ove, 256 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tenn. 2008).

After a re view of the transcr ipt and any additional nece ssary

evidenc e, the t rial cour

t has5

sever al o p tions. The trial court may aff irm the dec ision of the panel, r emand the c ase f or fur ther proce eding s, or re verse or modify the decision. A reve rsal or modifica tion of the pane l’s decision
may be ma de on ly if the tr ia l c ourt fi nd s th a t th e ri g hts of the pe tit ion e r h a ve be e n p re jud ic e d b e c a

us e the pane l’s finding s, infere nces, c onclusions, or decisions are : (1) in viol ation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in e x cess of the panel’ s jurisdiction; (3) made upon unlaw ful proce dure; (4) arbitra ry or ca pricious o r cha

rac terized by

abuse of discretion or c lear ly

unwar rante d exercise of discretion; or (5) unsupported by evidenc e which is both substantial and mate rial in light of the entire
rec ord. Althoug h the trial cour t may aff irm, remand, r ever se, o r modify a hea ring panel de cision, the trial cour

t may not substit ute its judgment for that of the pa

nel as to the weig ht of the evide nce on questions of fac t. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R . 9, § 1.3.

Our re vie w of a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on in a dis c ipl ina ry ma tte r is g overne d b y th e same sta nd ard a pp lic a ble to o ur re vie w o f a

n a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc y ’s fi nal dec isi on in a c on te ste d c a se under the Uniform Administrative Proce dures Act. L ove, 256 S .W.3d at 653. This st andar d, as set fo rt h in pe rt ine nt p art

a t T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 4 -5 -3 22 , p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:
Th e c ourt may a ff ir m the de c isi on of the a g e nc y or re mand the c a se for f urther pr ocee dings. The court may reve rse or

modify the de c isi on if the ri g hts of

the pe tit ion e r have be e n p re jud ic e d b e c a

us e the administrative finding s, infere nces, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statu t o ry pr ov isi on s; ( 2 ) In e x c e s s o f t h e s t a tu t o r y a u t h o r i t y o f

t h e a g e n c y; (3) Ma de upon unlawf

ul proce dure; (4 ) A rb itr ary

or c a pr ic iou s o r c ha

ra c te ri zed by

a bu se of discret i o n or cle arly unwar rante d exercise of discretion; or (5 )( A) Un su

pp or te d b y e vid e nc e tha

t is bo th substantial and mater ial in the light of th e entire
rec ord.

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4-5 -322 (h )( 1) -( 5) (A ) ( 20 05 ). Thus , in a c a se su c h a s th e on e no w b e fo re us , wher e the g rounds for r ever sal under subsections (1), ( 2) & (3) a re not pre sent, we must uphold the hear ing pa

nel’s decision “unless the decision was either arbitra ry or capr icious, ‘cha

rac terized by

an abuse, or clea rly unwar rante d exercise, of

discretion’ or

lackingin support by

su b s t an t ial and materia l evidence .” Hug hes v. B d. of Prof’l Responsibility , 259 S. W

. 3 d 6 3 1 , 641 (Tenn. 2008)

. This Court has rec og niz ed t hat a de cision not supported by substantial and mater ial evidenc e qualifies as arbitra

ry and capricious. I n applying the substantial and material evidenc e test, it is our duty to determine whether the “dec ision is supported by ‘such rele vant evidenc e as a r ational mind mig ht a c c e pt t o s up po rt

a ra tio na l con c lus ion .’

. . . T he e vid e nc e wi ll b e su ff ic ie nt i f i t f

ur nis he s a rea sonably

sound fac tual basis for the de cision being revie wed.” City of Memphis v. Civil S erv. Comm’n of Memphis, 216 S.W .3d 311, 316-17 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting J ackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W .2d 106, 1 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)) . The “ substantial and6

materia l evidence ” standa rd has a lso been de scribed a s requiring“something l es s than a prep o n d er ance of the e vidence . . . but more than a scintilla or g limmer.” Jones v. Bure au of TennCar e, 94 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Gluck v. Civil S er v

. Comm’n, 15 S.W .3d 486, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). We are constraine d, as i s the t rial court, from substituting
our j ud g me nt f

or that of th e hear in g pane l a s to the we ig ht o f t he e vid e nc e on

qu e sti on s o f f

a c t. L ove, 256 S.W.3d at 653.

I n revie wing this case, the tr ial court fa iled to a dhere to the standard of revie w provided by Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 9, section 1.3. Fir st, in reviewingthe judgme nt of the Panel, the tria l court a llowed the admission of evide nce that was not befor e the Pane l even tho u gh t h er e we re no alleg ations of proc edura l irregularities. Howe ver, s in c e no objection was ma de, the e rror was wa ived
and is n ot a n is su e in t

his a pp e a l.

The trial court further err ed by modify ing A llison’s punishm ent without concluding that the Pane l’ s de c isi on inv olv e d any of the fi ve c ir c ums tanc e s pr e re qu isi te to a mod if ic a tio n o r r e ve rs a l. I nstead, the tria l court’s r u l i ng indicates that a lthough Allison did violate some of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the sanctions imposed by the Panel wer e too se vere , and that t h e P an el’s decision should be modified for that rea son. First, the trial court’s order stated in pe rtinent part a s fo llo ws : The Responde nt committed a technica l vi o l ation of the B oard of

Professional Responsibility trust acc ount rules by

writing chec ks for persona l expenses. H oweve r, his own funds we re use d, and no client f u n d s w e r e i n v o l v e d

an d n o c l i e n tl o s tan y m o n e y. That the Responde nt h as a practice that serve s a ce rtain seg ment of
our s oc ie ty

in n e e d o f h is k ind of le g a l se rv ic e s. Th e Court thi nk s th is sp e a ks we ll o f h im.

Th a t the ruli ngof

the B oa

rd of Pr of e ssi on a l Re sp on sib ili ty suspending the Respondent’s license for six ty day s is too harsh for a lawy er w ho has pra cticed a s long a s h e h as, although the c ourt acknow ledg es he violate d som e of the rules of the Code of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y.
S i m i l ar l y , t h e t ri al co u rt s t at edas fo l l o ws i ni t s o ra l ru l i n g:
Wel l, I ’v e ha d the se c a se s be fo re , a nd us ua lly the y ’r e no t to o d if

fi c ult

. Th e bo ard s th a t c ho os e thi s c a se , the y do a he c k o f a g oo d jo b mo st of the tim e . A nd , th e y

did in th is c a se . T his c a se g ive s me so me pr ob le ms. No c lie nt h a s lo st a ny mon e y . [A lli so n] ’s be e n c and id wi th t he Court . H e did

n’ t of fe r a re a so n f or wh a t he wa s d oin g . B ut, he didn’t off

er a ny ex cu s e either

for not handlingthat trust acc ount7 rig ht. And, nobody

would argue this case

. But, dog g onit [ sic] I can’ t g et it out of my

mind that he’s just one of these lawy ers that’ s available to a ce rtain s egm en t o f our society that Ido not fee l now the y have lawy e rs . A nd , th a t bo the rs me . I t sp e a ks we ll o f h im.

Ijus t c an’ t su sp e nd

a lic e ns e in t

his c a se

. He do ne [sic ] w ro ng . B ut, Ijust cannot, Ith i n kthe punishment is just too harsh to suspend a lawy e r t hat’ s b e e n la

wy e ri nga s lo nga s h e ha s to s us pe nd his lic e ns e in this case. I

think a public repr imand is, it may be a lig ht that [ the Boa rd’s attorney ] say s that didn’t work the last time. B ut, Mr. Allison is s mart enoug h to know that hi s t i m es are running out. I think that is, i t may

not be suffic ient in this case , but I ’m g oing to do it. I just thi nk suspension of his license is just too harsh. That’s the judgme nt of the Court.

I t is appare nt that the trial court failed to f ind the prese nce of

any of the five circ umstances
nece ssary for modification under Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 9, sect i o n 1.3, but rather , impermissibly

substitut ed its own judgme nt for that of the Panel. We will review e ach of the Panel’s finding s in turn.

The Trust Account
First, we revie w the Panel’s finding s that Allison c ommingled his personal funds w ith client fu nd s in his tr us t a c c ount, pa id h is p e rs on a l e xpe ns e s dir e c tly fr om t he tr us t a c c ount, and

fa ile d to
ma int a in r e qu ir e d tr

us t a c c ounti ngre c or ds

. We beg in by

consideringAllison’s arg ume nt that the trial court’ s finding that he comming led persona l f unds with c lient f

unds in his trust a ccount wa s err oneous bec ause “ at all re levant times the only money in the trust acc ount belong ed s o l el y and entire ly to [ him] .” De scribing his banking prac tices with respe ct to his trust account, Allison states t h at when he rec eived c ase se ttlement monies, he would write a chec k on t h e t rust acc ount for the c lient’s share of the settlement a nd immediately

acc ompany

the client to the bank whe re he and the c lient would endorse the settlement
c he c k a nd it w ou ld b e de po sit e d in

the tr us t ac c ount. Al lis on a sse rt s tha t at tha t sam e tim e , u po n h is reque st, the bank would ca sh the che ck to t h e cl i en t an d “[t] he re sult was the client’s pa rt of the
se ttl e me nt ne ve r re a lly g ot int o the tr us t a c c ount b e c a

us e he /sh e re c e ive d c a shsimult ane ou sly wi th the deposit of the c heck.”

Al lis on ’s a sse rt ion

tha t th e c lie nt’ s p art of the c he c k “ ne ve r re a lly g ot i nto the tr us t a c c ount”
c on tr a dic ts h is s imu lta

ne ou s a sse rt ion

that th e se ttl e me nt c he c k wa s de po sit e d in the tr us t a c c ount. Allison’s conce ssion that all of the settlement monies wer e deposited in the trust a ccount a nd then the bank c ashed the chec k repr esenting the client’s por tion of the settlement shows that during the pe ri od of tim e be tw e e n th e ini tia l de po sit and the mom e nt fu nd s we re re mov e d f

ro m th e a c c ount t o pay the clie n t ’s portion of the settlement, the c lient’s funds and Allison’s per sonal funds we re8

commingle d. Fur

ther, i t appea

rs from the f

ollowing testimony

that Allison admitt ed that he
c omm ing le d f

un ds be lon g ingto h ims e lf wi th c lie nt f

un ds : Q. Mr . A lli so n, y ou

te sti fi e d th a t y ou did no t c omm ing le fu nd s in y our t ru st a c c ount; is that c or

re c t?

A. I don’t think that I said I did not. I said to my

knowledg e I

never kn ow ing ly

did it.
Q. B ut d idn ’t

y ou kn ow ing ly

make c lie nt d e po sit s in to t hat a c c ount?

A. I ’m sorry . What do y ou mean? Q. Didn’t y ou make c lient deposits into that trust acc ount while y our mon e y wa s a lso in t

hat a c c ount?

A. Yes.

I t is our d e te rm inatio n th a t th e Pane l’ s f ind ingthat A lli so n co mmi ng le d pe rs on a l fun ds wi th client funds was supported by substantial a nd materia l e vidence

. Allison’s commingling of per sonal fu nd s w ithc lie nt f

un ds in h is tru st ac c ount wa s a viol a tio n of Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court Rul e 8, RPC 1.15(a) , which re quires a la wy er to hold the prope rty and funds of clients separate from the law y er’ s ow n p ro pe rt

y and fu nd s. Next, Alli son does not deny , and his t es t i m o n y b efor e the Pane l confirmed, that on many
occa sions, he paid per sonal expenses from funds held in his trust account. Dur ing the time Allison was pa y ing the se per sonal expenses, the only funds the ac count c ontained re prese nted attorne y ’s fe es belong ing sole ly

to Allison, and there is no proof that, in paying suc h p er s o n al ex p enses, Allison misappropriate d any

cli en t fu n d s or eng ag ed in any acts of dishone sty , fra ud, dece it, or mis re pr e se ntatio n. Ne ve rt he le ss, Al lis on ’s us e of

his tr us t ac c ount to pay

pe rs on a l e xpe ns e s c le a rl y c on sti tut e d a

vio la tio n o f T e nn e sse e Sup re me Court Rul e 8, RPC 1. 15 (a )( 1) , w hic h, in p e rt ine nt p a rt , state s th a t “ [a] la

wy e r m ay de po sit the lawy e r’ s ow n fu nd s in [the tr us t a c c ount] f

or the so le purp os e of pay ing ba nk service char g es on that acc ount, but only in an amount rea sonably nece ssary for that purpose.” This Rule eff

ectively prohibits an attorney

from depositing his or her ow n monies in the trust acc ount in order to use the acc ount as a pe rsonal che cking acc ount as was done by Allison.

As to t he Pane l’ s f

ind in g tha t A lli so n f

a ile d to ma int a in r e qu ir e d tr us t a c c ounti ngre c or ds , Allison admitt ed that during2003, an d fo r a portion of 2004, he did not maintain a trust ac count
re c e ipt bo ok , tr us t a c c ount d isb ur se me nt r e c or ds , o r c lie nt l e dg e r s he e ts an d f a ile d to re c on c ile his trust acc ount bank statements. Requirements related to the maintenanc e of trust a ccount r ecor ds are
a dd re sse d b y Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court Rul e 9, se c tio n 2 9( A) (2 ), a s f oll ow s:
Ev e ry lawy e r e ng a g e d in

the pr act ic e of

law i n T e nn e sse e sh a llThe on e-w ay driving distance betw een Mem ph is and Tipton ville is appro xim ately 125 m iles. 10

9 main t ai n

. . . the re cords of the [trust] acc ounts, including
c he c kb oo ks , c anc e le d c he c ks , c he ck stubs , v ou c he rs , le dg e rs , journals, closing statements, ac counting or other sta t ements of dis burs e me nts re nd e re d to c lie nts or oth e r p art ie s w ithre g ard

to t ru st funds or similar equiv al en t rec ords clea rly and expressly

ref lecting t h e d a t e , amou nt, so ur c e and

e xplanatio n f

or a ll r e c e ipt s, wi thd

ra wa ls, de liv e ri e s and

dis burs e me nts of

the fu nd s o r oth e r pr op e rt

y of a c lie nt.

The Pane l’s finding that Allison fai l ed to maintain re quired trust ac count re cords wa s supported by substantial and mater ial evidenc e, and this conduc t violated Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 9, section 29(A) (2).

Communication with C lient

Ne xt, w e a d dr e s s t h e qu e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e P an e l ’ s f i n d i n g t h a t A l l i s o n f

a i l e d to communicate w ith a cl i en t was supported by adequate evidenc e. As noted a bove, Te nnessee Sup re me Court

Rul e 8, RPC 1 .4 , s pe c if

ic a lly a dd re sse s th e lawy e r’ s duty to co mmunic a te wi th h is or her client, and r eq u i res that the la wy er “ keep a

client re asonably

informed a

bout the status of a
ma tte r a nd c omp ly wi th re a so na

ble re qu e sts fo r inf

or ma tio n wi thi n a

re a so na ble tim e ” and

“ e xpla in a matter to the extent rea sonably nece ssary to permit the client to make informe d decisions re g arding the re prese ntation.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RP C 1.4. Our review of the re cord be fore the Panel does
no t re ve a l su

bs tanti a l and ma te ri a l e vid e nc e that Al lis on fa ile d to m e e t e ith e r o f t he se re qu ir e me nts

.
I t is unclear f

rom the Panel’s judg ment exactly what evide nce the Panel re lied upon in f inding that Allison fa iled to c ommunicate with A aron. The Boa rd contends that this finding wa s supported by Allison’s admission t hat, in a letter to Boa rd employ ee Be verly Sharpe dated June 22, 2005, he state d, int e r a lia , a s f

oll ow s:

Ishould not have take n a ca se that fa r from Memphis at a time I was 10 stretche d so thin. I rec eived $1,750.00 and spent 280, leaving$1,470. Ire a d th e c a se s th a t Mr . A aro n r e se arc he d a nd we dis c us se d h is c a se tho ro ug hly . A n e sti ma tio n o f the tim e Isp e nt o n M r. Aa ro n’ s c a se is ten hours. I

apolog ized to him an d h i s family for not following throug h with it. I f so much had not be en g oing on in my life during this ti me I

probably would have g iven him better re prese ntation.
At most, thi s lang u age am o u n t s to an admission by Allison that he would have be tter
re pr e se nte d A aro n und e r d if fe re nt c ir c ums tanc e s. Whil e Al lis on ’s state me nt t hat he a po log ize d to Aa ro n a nd his fa mil y “ fo r no t fo llo wi ng thr ou g h wi th it” may ind ic a te Al lis on ’s a sse ssm e nt t hat hi s service to Aaron w as def icient in some sense, this statement doe s n o t co n s t i tute an admission by10

Al lis on that he fa ile d to a de qu a te ly c omm un ic a te wi th Aar on

and a c on str uc tio n to tha

t e ff e c t is contra indicated by

the pre cedingsentenc e whe rein Allis o n s t at es t h at he “ rea d the ca ses that Mr. Aar on rese arc hed and we discussed his c ase thoroug hly .” The only other e vidence befor e the Pane l that the Boa

rd ref ere nces in suppor

t of the Panel’s finding of failure to c ommuni ca t e i s Al l i s on’s t e s t i m o n y t h a th e f

a i l e d t o f i l e s u i to nA ar o n ’ s b e h a l f an d f a i l e d t o v i s i tA ar o n i nt h e p e n i t e n t i a r y. Ho we ve r, ne ith e r o f t

he se a dmi ssi on s is suffi cie nt to supp or t th e Pane l’ s f

ind ingof a fa ilure to communicate.

As to Allison’s failure to file suit on beha lf of Aa ron, we note unre futed e vid ence in the
rec ord indicating that Aar on was a n unusually

prec ocio u s cl ient and that he e ng ag ed in extensive leg al re sear ch re lative to his case a nd voluntarily

filed plea dings himself. I n any event, the f ailure to file suit on behalf of a

client does not of its elf constitut e a f ailure to c ommunicate. As to Allison’s fa ilure to v isi t A aro n in

pr iso n, Al lis on

wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to me e t w ithAa ro n in pe rs on in o rd e r t o satisfy his obligations under

Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 8, RPC 1.4 , an d Al l ison testified without disput e that throug h prior ar rang ement with penitentiary officia ls, he and Aa ron had le ng thy telephone disc ussions and discussed his case thoroug hly

.
I n short, none of the Panel’s findings as rec ounted above war rants the c onclusion that Allison failed to c ommunicate with Aar on in violation of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 1.4. Timely Response to Board Inquiries
Next, we addre ss the Panel’s finding that Allison failed to timely respond to Board inquirie s concern i n g h is repre sentation of Dwa y ne Knig ht and there by

violated Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 8, RPC 8.1(b). The proof befor e the Pane l included three letters to Allison from Boa rd disciplinary

counsel Sandy Gar rett. The f

irst of these letter s, dated Oc tober 31, 2005, re q u es ted that Allison provide “information reg ardingMr. Tre y J ordan’ s involvement with Mr. Knig ht’s case .” The second le tter, dated Nove mber 17, 2005, re minded Allison that he had not responde d to the letter of October 31, 2005, reque sted a wr itten response within ten day s, and stated that “your continued f ailure to re spond will be viewed by

this office as a violation of the Tenne ssee Rules of Professional Conduct.” The third letter, date d Dec ember 1, 2005, reminded A l l i s o n that he had still not responded to the information re quests set forth in the preceding letters of October 31, 2005 and November 17, 2005 and, inter alia, that his c ontinued failure to r espond “will be deeme d to c onstitu t e a dditional violations of y our prof

essional re sponsibili ty .”

We fin d that these letter s constitute releva nt evidence from which the Panel could have rationally concluded t h at All ison failed to timely respond to B oard inquire s betwee n October 31, 2005 and De cembe r 1, 2005 and the reby violated Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 8, RPC 8.1(b). The Pane l’s finding that Allison viol ated Rule 8, RPC 8.1(b) was s u p p orted by substantial and materia l evidence

.It is c le ar f rom the re cor d be f

ore this Cour

t that both the hearingpane l’s D ec em ber 18, 1997 judg m ent

im posi ng publi c 11

ce nsur e and the doc um ent e nte re d by

the Board on Marc h 13, 1998, announc ing the publ ic c ens ure and inc orpor at ing the judg m ent of D ec em ber 18 w er e ent er ed as Exhi bit 13 at the Nov em ber 27, 2006 P ane l hea

ring

. How ev er , the De ce m ber 18, 1997 judg m ent
w as e rr oneous ly

om itt ed f rom the re cor d prov ide d to this Cour t a nd is not inc lude d in Ex hibit 13.
11 Sanctions Finally , we a ddress the pr opriety of the sanctions that the Panel imposed in this matter. The Panel orde red a

six ty -day suspension from the practice of l aw f or Allison. Furthe rmore, the Panel order ed that Allison’s trust acc ount be moni tored for a pe riod of one y ear following the re instatement of his law license , that he be r equire d to submit trust acc ount bank stateme nts and ledg er she ets eve ry thirty day s during this one-y ear period, a nd that he pay all costs of the proc eeding . The trial c ourt felt t h es e s an cti ons to be excessively harsh a nd held that Allison should rece ive a public c ensure instead.

I n decidingan appr opriate sa nction when a

n attorney

is found to have br eac hed the r ules g overninghis or her pr ofession, we are require d to reviewall of t he cir cumstance s of the par ticular
case and also, for

the sake of uni fo rm i t y , sanctions imposed in other ca ses pre senting simil ar circ umstances. B d. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Maddux, 148 S.W .3d 37, 40 (Tenn. 2004) . We are also g uided in our dec ision by the Amer ican B ar A ssoci at i o n ’s S tandar ds for Imposing L awy er Sanctions, which have been a dopted by the B oard f

or disciplinary

matters. See id. We beg in by

noting that the sa

nctions imposed by

the Panel we re ba sed upon its findings that Al lis on vio la te d the Rul e s of Pr of e ssi on a l Co nd

uc t by c omm ing lin g pe rs on a l f

un ds wi th f

un ds in h is trust acc ount, paying pe rsonal expenses fr om funds in his trust a ccount, f ailing to maintain r equire d tr us t a c c ount r e c or ds , f

a ili ngto t ime ly

re sp on d to B oa

rd inq uir ie s, and

fa ili ngto c omm

un ic a te wi th
a c l i en t

. Ot h er

t h an t h e f i n d i n g t h at Al l i s o n fa i l ed t o co m m u n i ca t e wi t h a c l i en t , al l o f t h es e f i n d i n gs wer e supported by

substantial and mater ial evidenc e. As to mitigating f actor s, we a cknowledg e that evidenc e wa s prese nted showing that Allison is an attorne y of g ood reputation, and it was not proven that his conduct had a

selfish or dishonest m otive. Howeve r, in addition to these fa ctors in Allison’s favor , we are also compelled to note c erta in ag g ravating f actor s in this case. Allison has substantial experience in the prac tice of la w and his violations are char acte rized by multipl e off

enses a nd display a patter n of conduct. Most dist urbing is the fac t that in 1998 Allis on was found guilty of, and pu bli c ly re pri man ded fo r, the same vio la tio ns wi th w hic h h e is n owc ha rg e d, c omm ing lin g his persona l funds with funds in his trust account and pa y ing p ersonal expenses from that ac count as A l l i s o n a d m i t t e d i nt h e f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y: Q. Mr. Allison, isn’t it t rue that in 1998 y ou wer e publicly censur ed by the S upreme Court afte r a hear ing panel found in their judg ment 11 that y ou had over draw n y our trust a ccount, commingle d persona l and operating f

unds and paid persona l and oper ating expenses from y our12 tr us t a c c ount?

A. Ye s.
Al tho ug h Al lis on ins ist s, in a c c or da nc e wi th the jud g me nt of the tr ia l c ourt, t hat pu bl ic
c e ns ur e is t

he a pp ro pr ia te sanc tio n un de r the c ir c ums tanc e s of thi s c a se , we do no t a g re e , a nd it i s our conclusion that the proof supports the sanctions imposed by the Panel, including the six ty -day suspension of Allison’s license. Althoug h no Tenne ssee c ase ha s addre ssed the question of whe ther
su sp e ns ion

is an a pp ro pr ia te sanc tio n for the sp e c if ic c omb inatio n of vio la tio ns that we re fo un d in this case, the A merica

n Ba r Association’s Standards for Imposing Sanc tions p ro vides at Section 4. 12 that “ [s]up e ns ion

is g e ne ra lly

a pp ro pr ia te wh e n a

lawy er kn ow s o r s ho uld kn owthat he is dealing improperly with c lient pr operty and cause s injury or potential i njury to the client” a nd further provides at Sec tion 8.2 that “[s] uspension is ge nera lly appropr iate whe n a lawy er ha s been repr imanded for the same or simil ar misconduct and eng ag es in furthe r similar ac ts of misconduct that cause injury

or potential injury

to a client, the public, the le g al sy stem, or the prof ession.”

I n light of the e v id e n c e s upporting the Panel’s f indings of Rule violations as discussed he rein, and t h e fac t that some of these a re violations for w hich Allison has previously been r eprimande d, the sanc tions im posed by the Panel ar e appr opriate. A ccor dingly , to the extent that it modifies the sanctions imposed by

the Panel, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed.

Conclusion

For the re asons stated he rein and in a ccor dance with the controlling standard of re view which requir e s th a t a

h e ar in gp an e l’ s d e c is io nmu s t b e u p h e ld if s u p p o rte d b y s u b s ta n ti a l a n d mate r ia l evidenc e, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt to the ex tent that it holds that Allison vi olated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rec ord supports finding s that Allison commingled his per sonal fu nd s w ithc lie nt f

un ds in h is l awy e r t

ru st a c c ount, pa id p e rs on a l e xpe ns e s o ut o f h is tru st a c c ount, failed to maintain prope r records on his lawy er trust a ccount, a nd failed to timely

respond to B oard inquiries. The ju d gm en t o f t he trial c ourt is reve rsed to the e x tent that it modifies the sanctions impo s e d b y th e Pa n e l. Co s ts o f

a p p e a l t o th is Co u rt a

r e taxe d to Ja me s T

. A ll is o n , f

o r w h ic h execution may

issue if nec essar

y

.

_________________________________________

SHA RO N G . L EE , JUST I CE13 A p p e n d ix 1

Te nn . Su p. Ct. R. 8 , RPC 8. 4. Mis c on du c t.

I t is professional misconduct for a lawy er to: (a) violate or attempt to viol ate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowing ly assist or induce another to do so, or do so throug h the ac ts of another ; (b ) c omm it a c ri min a l a c t that re fl e c ts a dv e rs e ly on the lawy e r’ s h on e sty , tr

us tw or thi ne ss, or

fi tne ss a s a lawy e r i n o the r r e sp e c ts; (c) eng ag e in conduc t involving dishonesty , fra ud, dece it, or misreprese ntation; (d) e ng ag e in conduc t that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (e) attempt to, or state or imply an ability to influence a tribunal or a g overnme ntal ag ency or off icial on g rounds unre lated to the mer its of, or t he proc edure s g overning , the matter unde r consider ation; (f) kno w in g ly

a s s is t a ju d g e o r ju d ic ia l o f

f ic e r in c o n d u c t t h a t i s a v io lati o no f

a p p li c a b le r u le s of judicial conduct or

other law ; or (g ) knowing ly

fail to comply

with a final c ourt order

enter ed in a pr ocee ding in whic h the lawy er is a pa rt y , unle ss t

he lawy e r i s una

ble to c omp ly

wi th t he or de r o r i s se e kin g in g oo d f a ithto deter mine the validity , scope, me aning , or application of the law upon whic h the orde r is based.14 A p p e n d ix 2

Rule 9 of the Amer ican B ar A ssociation’s Standards f or I mposing L awyer Sanc tions provides in part
a s f oll ow s:
9.0 AGGRAVA TI ON AND MI TI GATI ON

9. 1 G e ne ra lly

After misconduct has bee n established, ag g ravatinga n d mi ti g ating circ umstances may be conside red in deciding what sanc tion to im pose. 9.2 Ag g rava

tion

9.21 Def inition. Agg ravation or ag g ravating c ircumstance s ar e an y considerations or fac tors that may justify an incr ease in the deg ree of discipline to be imposed.

9.22 Fa ctors which ma

y be conside red in a g g ravation.
Ag g rava ting f actor s include: (a ) p ri or dis c ipl ina

ry of fe ns e s; (b) dishonest or se lfish motive; (c ) a patte rn of mis c on du c t; (d ) m ult ipl e of fe ns e s; (e) bad fa ith obstruction of the disciplinary proce eding by intentionally

failing to comply

with rules
o r o r d e r s o f t h e d i s c i p l i n ar

y a g e n c y; (f) submissi on of fa lse evidenc e, fa lse statements, or other dece ptive prac tices duringthe d is c iplinar y pr oc e ss; (g ) r e fu sa l to a c kn ow le dg e wr on g fu l natur e of c on du c t; (h ) vuln e ra

bil ity of vic tim ; (i) substantial experienc e in the pra ctice of law; (j) indiffe renc e to making restitution15

(k ) i lle g a l c on du c t, i nc lud ingthat in vo lvi ngthe us e of c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e s. 9.3 Mitigation

9.31 Def inition. Mitigation or

mitigating circ umstances a re a ny considerations or fac tors that may justify a re duction in the deg ree of discipline to be imposed.

9.32 Fa ctors which ma

y be conside red in mitigation. Mitigating fac tors include: (a) absenc e of a

prior disciplinary

rec ord; (b) a bsence of a dishonest or se lfish motive; (c ) p e rs on a l or

e mot ion a l pr ob le ms; (d ) t ime ly g oo d f a ithe ff or t to make re sti tut ion

or to r e c tif y c on se qu e nc e s o f m isc on du c t; (e ) f ull and fr e e dis c los ur e to d isc ipl ina ry bo ard or c oo pe ra tiv e a tti tud e tow ard

pr oc e e din g s; (f) inexperience in the prac tice of la w; (g ) cha rac ter or r eputation; ( h ) p h ys i c a l d i s a

b i l i t y; (i) mental disability

or che mical depe ndency

including a lcoholism or drug abuse w hen: (1 ) t he re is m edi cal e vid e nc e that th e re sp on de nt i s aff ected by a che mical depe ndency or mental d i s a b i l i t y; (2 ) t he c he mic a l de pe nd e nc y or me nta l di sab ility
c a us e d th e mis c on du c t; (3) the r espondent’s r ecovery from the c hemical d e p e n d e n c y o r m e n t a l d i s a b i l i t y i s d e m o n s t r a t e d

b y a meaning ful and sustained pe riod of su cce ssful reha bilitation; and (4) the r ecove ry

arr est ed the misconduc t and
r e c u r r e n c e o f t h a tm i s c o n d

u c ti s un l i k e l y; (j ) d e lay in d isc ipl ina

ry pr oc e e din g s;16

(k ) i mpo sit ion

of oth e r p e na lti e s o r s anc tio ns ; (l) re morse; (m ) r e mot e ne ss o f p ri or

of fe ns e s.