THEATTORNEYGENERAL 

OF-TEXAS 

AUSTIN. TZMAS 76711 

JOaN L EIXL 

A-- o-A& 

August 23, 1974 

The Honorable Jim Clark, Chairman 

House Committee on Labor 

House of Representatives 

P. 0. Box 2910 

Austin, Texas 78767 

Dear Representative Clark: 

Opinion No. H- 379 

Re: Qualifications of signers 

of a petition under the 

Fire and Police Employee 

Relations Act, Article 

5154c-1, Sec. 5(b), V. T.C.S. 

You have requested the opinion of this office on the following question: 

Is a person who is a qualified voter of the city, town 

or other political subdivision in which a local option 

petition under Article 5154c-1 is circulated eligible to 

sign the petition, without regard to whether the per son 

voted in the last preceding general election in that 

political subdivision? 

Article 5154c-1, Sec. 5(b), V. T. C.S. (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 81. 

p. 151) reads in relevant part: 

Upon receiving a petition signed by the lesser of five 

percent or 20,000 of the gualified voters voting in 

the last preceding general election in such city, town, 

or political subdivision, the,gq.verning body of such 

city, town or political subdivision shall hold an election within 60 days after said petition has been filed 

with such governing body. (Emphasis added) 

The underlined language is ambiguous in that it is subject to two possible 

interpretations: (1) that a qualified voter must have voted in the last preceding general election in order to be eligible to sign such petition; or (2) that 

the petition must be signed by a number of qualified voters equal to the lesser 

of 20,000 or five percent of the number of votes cast in the past preceding 

general election. 

p. 1777 
The Honorable Jim Clark, page 2 (H-379) 

Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, construction becomes 

necessary. Koy v. Schneider, 221 S. W. 880 (Tex. 1920). 

The fundamental rule controlling the construction 

of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature expressed therein. That intention should be 

ascertained from the entire act, and not from isolated 

portions thereof. 

City of Mason v. West Texas Utilities Co., 237 S. W. 2d 273. 278 

(Tex. 1951). 

Thus, in order to determine the correct.interpretation of Sec. 5(b) of 

Article 5154c-1, the entire statute must be considered and discussed 

in light of the aims and purposes of the Legislature with respect to 

collective bargaining rights for firefighters and policemen in Texas. 

Section Z(b)(l) of Article 5154c-1 states: 

(1) It is also the policy of the State of Texas that 

firefighters and policemen, like employees in the 

private sector, should have the right to organize 

for purposes of collective bargaining, for collective bargaining is deemed to be a fair and practical 

method for determining wages and other conditions 

of employment for the employees who comprise the 

paid fire and police departments of the cities, towns, 

and other political subdivisions within this state. A 

denial to such employees of the right to organize 

and bargain collectively would lead to strife and unrest, with consequent injury to the health, safety 

and welfare of the public. The protection of the 

health, safety, and welfare of the public, however 

demands that strikes, lockouts, work stoppages 

and sl.owdowns of firefi.ghters and policemen be prohibited; therefore, it ins the obligation of the state 

to make available reasonable alternatives to strikes 

by employees in these protective services. 

p- 1778 
, 

The Honorable Jim Clark, page,3 ~(H-379) 

. . . 

(3) With the right to strike prohibited, it is requisite 

to the high morale of firefighters and policemen, and 

to the efficient operation of the departments which they 

serve, that alternative procedures be expeditious, 

effective, and binding. To that end, the provisions of 

this Act should be liberally construed. 

In construing the statute, .the court must look to the object to be 

accomplished and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction which 

will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. 82 C. J, S. 

593, Statutes, Sec. 323. An act should be given a practical and reasonable rather than a literal construction so as to accomplish as nearly as 

possible the intent of the Legislature. Brown & Root-v. Durland, 84 S. W. 2d 

1073 (Tex. 1935). 

It is clear from the language of Article 5154c-1 that the Legislature 

intended to provide reasonable collective bargaining rights for policemen and firefighters on a local option basis. It is also clear that the 

Legislature sought to prescribe the method by which such local option 

election could be called by providing for submission of a petition to the 

local governing body. To interpret the language in question to mean that 

a person signing such peti,tion must have actually voted in the last preceding general election would only serve to fnntmte the clear public 

policy established by the Legislature. One seeking to comply with the 

requirements set forth to call an election would be faced with an undue 

burden of determining not only a potential signee’s present qualification 

to vote but whether or not such person actually voted in the last preceding general electi.on. Such a result would lead to harsh consequences 

not intended by the Legi,slature. 

Furthermore, were we to construe the statute that persons who did 

not vote in the last gen,eral election were ineligible to sign a petition, 

serious constituti.onal questions would be presented. 

It is therefore our opinion that 

the lesser of five percent or 20,000 of the qualified 

voters voting in the last preceding general election 

. . . 

p. 1779 
. . 

The Honorable Jim Clark, page 4 (H-379) 

states a formula for determining the requisite number of qualified voters 

who must sign a petition calling a local option election under this statute. 

SUMMARY 

Section 5(b) of Article 5451c-1, V. T. C. S., The 

Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, requires 

that a petition for an election be signed by 5% of 

the number of qualified voters who voted in the last 

preceding general election or 20.000. whichever is 

less, and not that those signing must have themselves 

voted in that previous election. 

Very truly yours, 

APP’R$j ED: .,P 

Attorney General of Texas 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 1780