# Official Journal C 99/2011

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2011.099.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 99 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5431 March 2011 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2011.099.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 99

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5431 March 2011

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Central Bank |
| 2011/C 099/01 | Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2011 on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) and on a proposal for a directive amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor-compensation schemes (CON/2011/12) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Central Bank

2011/C 099/01

Opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2011 on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) and on a proposal for a directive amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor-compensation schemes (CON/2011/12)

1

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2011/C 099/02 | Euro exchange rates | 8 |
| 2011/C 099/03 | Communication from the Commission — Guidance document on the optional application of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC | 9 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2011/C 099/02

Euro exchange rates

8

2011/C 099/03

Communication from the Commission — Guidance document on the optional application of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC

9

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Commission |
| 2011/C 099/04 | Call for applications for researcher grants under the work programme of the joint European Metrology Research Programme (EMRP) | 29 |
| 2011/C 099/05 | Specific call for proposals — EAC/16/11 — Erasmus University Charter 2012 | 30 |
| | European Food Safety Authority |
| 2011/C 099/06 | Call for expressions of interest for scientific experts to be considered for membership of the Scientific Panels and the Scientific Committee of the European Food Safety Authority (Parma, Italy) | 31 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2011/C 099/07 | Notice concerning the anti-dumping measures in force in respect of imports into the Union of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in China extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Korea or not: change of address of a company exempted from the extended measures | 38 |

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Commission

2011/C 099/04

Call for applications for researcher grants under the work programme of the joint European Metrology Research Programme (EMRP)

29

2011/C 099/05

Specific call for proposals — EAC/16/11 — Erasmus University Charter 2012

30

European Food Safety Authority

2011/C 099/06

Call for expressions of interest for scientific experts to be considered for membership of the Scientific Panels and the Scientific Committee of the European Food Safety Authority (Parma, Italy)

31

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

2011/C 099/07

Notice concerning the anti-dumping measures in force in respect of imports into the Union of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in China extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Korea or not: change of address of a company exempted from the extended measures

38

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EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Central Bank

| 31.3.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/1 |
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31.3.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/1

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OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

of 16 February 2011

on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) and on a proposal for a directive amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor-compensation schemes

(CON/2011/12)

2011/C 99/01

Introduction and legal basis

On 22 September 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Council of the European Union for an opinion on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) (1) (hereinafter the ‘proposed recast directive’). On 30 September 2010, the ECB received a request from the Council for an opinion on a proposal for a directive amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor-compensation schemes (2) (hereinafter the ‘proposed amending directive’).

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union since the proposed recast directive and the proposed amending directive contain provisions affecting the European System of Central Banks’ contribution to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the stability of the financial system, as referred to in Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

General observations

| 1. | The ECB welcomes the aim of the proposed recast directive to provide a comprehensive, more harmonised framework for deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs). The ECB appreciates that the proposed recast directive will incorporate many of the recommendations made in: (a) ECB Opinion CON/2008/70 (3) concerning an earlier proposal for amendments to Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit guarantee schemes (4); and (b) the Eurosystem’s contribution to the public consultation of the European Commission on the review of Directive 94/19/EC (5). The ECB appreciates the incorporation in the proposed recast directive of its recommendations to: (a) further harmonise the eligibility criteria and coverage levels for deposit guarantees (6); (b) strengthen the information requirements imposed on credit institutions concerning the scope of deposit protection granted through relevant DGSs (7); and (c) introduce partial ex ante funding arrangements for all DGSs (8). The ECB considers those elements of the DGS regulatory framework as crucial from a financial stability perspective. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The ECB welcomes the aim of the proposed recast directive to provide a comprehensive, more harmonised framework for deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs). The ECB appreciates that the proposed recast directive will incorporate many of the recommendations made in: (a) ECB Opinion CON/2008/70 (3) concerning an earlier proposal for amendments to Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit guarantee schemes (4); and (b) the Eurosystem’s contribution to the public consultation of the European Commission on the review of Directive 94/19/EC (5). The ECB appreciates the incorporation in the proposed recast directive of its recommendations to: (a) further harmonise the eligibility criteria and coverage levels for deposit guarantees (6); (b) strengthen the information requirements imposed on credit institutions concerning the scope of deposit protection granted through relevant DGSs (7); and (c) introduce partial ex ante funding arrangements for all DGSs (8). The ECB considers those elements of the DGS regulatory framework as crucial from a financial stability perspective.

| 2. | The ECB also notes that the Report from the European Commission accompanying the proposed recast directive (9) considers the development of further Union-level arrangements for the coordination of deposit guarantees after the specified target level for their funds is reached. At the same time, the recent Commission Communication on an EU framework for crisis management in the financial sector (10) refers to the synergies which may be explored between DGSs and the newly established resolution funds for financial institutions. The Eurosystem has a strong interest in this area based on its financial stability role and will follow the progress of this work in cooperation with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The ECB also notes that the Report from the European Commission accompanying the proposed recast directive (9) considers the development of further Union-level arrangements for the coordination of deposit guarantees after the specified target level for their funds is reached. At the same time, the recent Commission Communication on an EU framework for crisis management in the financial sector (10) refers to the synergies which may be explored between DGSs and the newly established resolution funds for financial institutions. The Eurosystem has a strong interest in this area based on its financial stability role and will follow the progress of this work in cooperation with the Commission.

| 3. | The ECB acknowledges that the proposed amending directive introducing the update of Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes (11) will enhance harmonisation of investor-compensation schemes in the Union. While the ECB does not provide detailed comments on this legislative instrument, it considers it important that the Union regulatory framework continues to be based on the assumption of different risk profiles of depositors and investors. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The ECB acknowledges that the proposed amending directive introducing the update of Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes (11) will enhance harmonisation of investor-compensation schemes in the Union. While the ECB does not provide detailed comments on this legislative instrument, it considers it important that the Union regulatory framework continues to be based on the assumption of different risk profiles of depositors and investors.

Specific observations on DGSs

Scope of coverage

| 4. | The proposed recast directive will require all credit institutions to become members of DGSs offering deposit guarantees under harmonised conditions (12) and to be funded, in principle, by individual ex ante contributions of DGS members. The ECB considers that such harmonised arrangements are necessary to ensure a level playing field in the context of the Union’s single market for financial services. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) also supports a possibly wide membership of DGSs (13). At the same time, the ECB acknowledges the long-standing successful functioning in some Member States of mutual and voluntary schemes, which achieve deposit protection through arrangements other than pre-defined deposit guarantees, e.g., through mutual bail-out arrangements. The ECB understands that the proposed recast directive is not intended to limit the continuing capacity of the mutual and voluntary schemes to offer protection to their member institutions in a manner characteristic to such schemes, which would be provided in parallel to the deposit guarantees that clients of such member institutions will be offered in accordance with the proposed recast directive. In this context, the ECB welcomes the 10-year phase-in period for achieving the target level of ex ante funding set in the proposed recast directive with a view to alleviating the strain put on credit institutions not previously obliged to pay DGS contributions (14). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The proposed recast directive will require all credit institutions to become members of DGSs offering deposit guarantees under harmonised conditions (12) and to be funded, in principle, by individual ex ante contributions of DGS members. The ECB considers that such harmonised arrangements are necessary to ensure a level playing field in the context of the Union’s single market for financial services. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) also supports a possibly wide membership of DGSs (13). At the same time, the ECB acknowledges the long-standing successful functioning in some Member States of mutual and voluntary schemes, which achieve deposit protection through arrangements other than pre-defined deposit guarantees, e.g., through mutual bail-out arrangements. The ECB understands that the proposed recast directive is not intended to limit the continuing capacity of the mutual and voluntary schemes to offer protection to their member institutions in a manner characteristic to such schemes, which would be provided in parallel to the deposit guarantees that clients of such member institutions will be offered in accordance with the proposed recast directive. In this context, the ECB welcomes the 10-year phase-in period for achieving the target level of ex ante funding set in the proposed recast directive with a view to alleviating the strain put on credit institutions not previously obliged to pay DGS contributions (14).

| 5. | The ECB recommends (15) that the exclusion of deposits held by public authorities from the regime of the proposed recast directive should use the more precise original language of Directive 94/19/EC, and hence should refer to ‘government and central administrative authorities’ and ‘provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities’ (16). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The ECB recommends (15) that the exclusion of deposits held by public authorities from the regime of the proposed recast directive should use the more precise original language of Directive 94/19/EC, and hence should refer to ‘government and central administrative authorities’ and ‘provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities’ (16).

Repayment period

| 6. | The ECB welcomes the principle of further reducing the repayment periods for guaranteed deposits (17). Nevertheless, achieving the proposed reduction to 7 days may prove difficult since it is to be introduced shortly after the original reduction to 20 working days, which was to be implemented by the Member States until the end of 2010 (18). The ECB recommends (19) that the proposed recast directive is amended to the effect that the Commission will (i) prepare a review: on the implementation of the original reduction to 20 working days; and (ii) based on the results of the review, formulate proposals as regards a possible additional reduction or reductions of the repayment period. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The ECB welcomes the principle of further reducing the repayment periods for guaranteed deposits (17). Nevertheless, achieving the proposed reduction to 7 days may prove difficult since it is to be introduced shortly after the original reduction to 20 working days, which was to be implemented by the Member States until the end of 2010 (18). The ECB recommends (19) that the proposed recast directive is amended to the effect that the Commission will (i) prepare a review: on the implementation of the original reduction to 20 working days; and (ii) based on the results of the review, formulate proposals as regards a possible additional reduction or reductions of the repayment period.

Financing

| 7. | According to the proposed recast directive, a DGS must achieve ex ante funding at the level defined as a percentage of eligible deposits within a 10-year phase-in period (20). The ECB welcomes the introduction of a explicit target level of ex ante funding, which considerably enhances financial stability and the level playing field by shifting the burden of DGS financing to the member credit institutions, i.e. to entities controlling the risks that DGSs insure. The ECB understands that the level of ex ante financing is the subject of a debate conducted as part of the Union legislative process. The ECB recommends (21) that such ex ante financing level be defined by reference to ‘covered deposits’, i.e. eligible deposits not exceeding the coverage level (22), considering that covered deposits reflect the level of DGS liabilities more adequately than eligible deposits. |
| --- | --- |

7.

According to the proposed recast directive, a DGS must achieve ex ante funding at the level defined as a percentage of eligible deposits within a 10-year phase-in period (20). The ECB welcomes the introduction of a explicit target level of ex ante funding, which considerably enhances financial stability and the level playing field by shifting the burden of DGS financing to the member credit institutions, i.e. to entities controlling the risks that DGSs insure. The ECB understands that the level of ex ante financing is the subject of a debate conducted as part of the Union legislative process. The ECB recommends (21) that such ex ante financing level be defined by reference to ‘covered deposits’, i.e. eligible deposits not exceeding the coverage level (22), considering that covered deposits reflect the level of DGS liabilities more adequately than eligible deposits.

| 8. | As regards calculating individual contributions of DGS members, the ECB welcomes in principle the proposed model of partial risk-based contributions, with provisions ensuring comparability of various asset classes (23). This model, following recommendations of the Commission’s Joint Research Centre (24), is aimed at keeping the calculation sufficiently simple to allow comparability of individual contributions, while applying a number of relevant core (risk-based) and supplementary (not risk-based) indicators. The ECB recommends (25) that the proposed recast directive provides for detailed elements of the calculation methodology to be further specified through technical standards and guidelines developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA), based on verified empirical data and promoting equal treatment. |
| --- | --- |

8.

As regards calculating individual contributions of DGS members, the ECB welcomes in principle the proposed model of partial risk-based contributions, with provisions ensuring comparability of various asset classes (23). This model, following recommendations of the Commission’s Joint Research Centre (24), is aimed at keeping the calculation sufficiently simple to allow comparability of individual contributions, while applying a number of relevant core (risk-based) and supplementary (not risk-based) indicators. The ECB recommends (25) that the proposed recast directive provides for detailed elements of the calculation methodology to be further specified through technical standards and guidelines developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA), based on verified empirical data and promoting equal treatment.

| 9. | If ex ante funding is insufficient to reimburse depositors, the proposed recast directive sets out three steps for additional ex post funding. The ECB has the following observations in this respect:






  9.1. | As a first step, DGS members will be required to pay extraordinary contributions, of up to 0,5 % of eligible deposits (26). The ECB welcomes this solution, which engages the financial sector itself in meeting extraordinary demands, hence limiting moral hazard incentives inherent in DGS arrangements and providing the grounds for effective peer pressure. |
| --- | --- | --- |

9.

If ex ante funding is insufficient to reimburse depositors, the proposed recast directive sets out three steps for additional ex post funding. The ECB has the following observations in this respect:

9.1.

As a first step, DGS members will be required to pay extraordinary contributions, of up to 0,5 % of eligible deposits (26). The ECB welcomes this solution, which engages the financial sector itself in meeting extraordinary demands, hence limiting moral hazard incentives inherent in DGS arrangements and providing the grounds for effective peer pressure.

| 9.2. | As a second step, a mutual borrowing scheme may be activated, allowing any DGS functioning in a Member State to lend out to another such DGS up to 0,5 % of its eligible deposits and to be repaid with interest within five years (27). The ECB notes that the activation of cross-border borrowing arrangements between DGSs might lead to cases where a lending DGS is later faced with having to cover its own repayment needs or where the borrowing DGS has a wider range of functions than the lending DGS, e.g., where it has the powers to recapitalise or give loans to a failing credit institution in its Member State. Hence, the ECB welcomes the limitations introduced by the proposed recast directive, including the restriction that the borrowed funds may only be used for payment of depositor claims (28). The ECB understands that at the present stage of the legislative discussion on the proposed recast directive, the borrowing arrangements between DGSs would be on a voluntary basis. Further elements that should be considered in the regulation of this issue include: (i) the minimum prerequisites for activating the borrowing arrangements related to the exhaustion of other financing sources by the borrowing DGS; and (ii) the conditions under which the loan may be extended, including repayment safeguards for the lending DGS. At the same time, whether the DGS should use their funds for crisis management purposes, outside the narrow boundaries of reimbursing depositors, is subject to wider debate (29). The ECB considers that this question should be addressed by the legislative work initiated by the Commission Communication on crisis resolution. |
| --- | --- |

9.2.

As a second step, a mutual borrowing scheme may be activated, allowing any DGS functioning in a Member State to lend out to another such DGS up to 0,5 % of its eligible deposits and to be repaid with interest within five years (27). The ECB notes that the activation of cross-border borrowing arrangements between DGSs might lead to cases where a lending DGS is later faced with having to cover its own repayment needs or where the borrowing DGS has a wider range of functions than the lending DGS, e.g., where it has the powers to recapitalise or give loans to a failing credit institution in its Member State. Hence, the ECB welcomes the limitations introduced by the proposed recast directive, including the restriction that the borrowed funds may only be used for payment of depositor claims (28). The ECB understands that at the present stage of the legislative discussion on the proposed recast directive, the borrowing arrangements between DGSs would be on a voluntary basis. Further elements that should be considered in the regulation of this issue include: (i) the minimum prerequisites for activating the borrowing arrangements related to the exhaustion of other financing sources by the borrowing DGS; and (ii) the conditions under which the loan may be extended, including repayment safeguards for the lending DGS. At the same time, whether the DGS should use their funds for crisis management purposes, outside the narrow boundaries of reimbursing depositors, is subject to wider debate (29). The ECB considers that this question should be addressed by the legislative work initiated by the Commission Communication on crisis resolution.

| 9.3. | As a third step, the DGS should have alternative funding arrangements in place as a last resort. However, the ECB notes that as far as potential central bank involvement is concerned, funding arrangements for DGSs must comply with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in the Treaty, and in particular with the prohibition of national central banks providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty, as further defined through the secondary Union legislation and established ECB guidance (30). |
| --- | --- |

9.3.

As a third step, the DGS should have alternative funding arrangements in place as a last resort. However, the ECB notes that as far as potential central bank involvement is concerned, funding arrangements for DGSs must comply with the monetary financing prohibition laid down in the Treaty, and in particular with the prohibition of national central banks providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty, as further defined through the secondary Union legislation and established ECB guidance (30).

| 10. | The ECB understands that it is being considered whether the original proposal to impose limits as regards the accumulated amount of deposits and investments of a DGS related to a single body (31) could be withdrawn. The ECB considers that any such potential investment limits need to be assessed, inter alia, in the context of the impact they may have on markets for the instruments of the specific asset classes. In this respect, specific considerations may apply in relation to DGS investments in instruments issued by the public sector entities of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The ECB understands that it is being considered whether the original proposal to impose limits as regards the accumulated amount of deposits and investments of a DGS related to a single body (31) could be withdrawn. The ECB considers that any such potential investment limits need to be assessed, inter alia, in the context of the impact they may have on markets for the instruments of the specific asset classes. In this respect, specific considerations may apply in relation to DGS investments in instruments issued by the public sector entities of the Member States.

| 11. | Finally, the ECB supports from a financial integration perspective the provision of the proposed recast directive under which credit institutions ceasing to be a member of a scheme and joining another scheme will have their contributions for the last six months reimbursed or transferred to the new scheme (32). This provision may facilitate the reorganisation of cross-border credit institutions. Nevertheless, to avoid any potential abuse, the arrangement should be limited to the transfer of the paid contributions to the new scheme (excluding the possibility of reimbursement) and should not include extraordinary contributions paid to cover the original DGS’s insufficient resources (33). |
| --- | --- |

11.

Finally, the ECB supports from a financial integration perspective the provision of the proposed recast directive under which credit institutions ceasing to be a member of a scheme and joining another scheme will have their contributions for the last six months reimbursed or transferred to the new scheme (32). This provision may facilitate the reorganisation of cross-border credit institutions. Nevertheless, to avoid any potential abuse, the arrangement should be limited to the transfer of the paid contributions to the new scheme (excluding the possibility of reimbursement) and should not include extraordinary contributions paid to cover the original DGS’s insufficient resources (33).

Supervision

| 12. | The ECB welcomes that the supervision of DGSs by Member States will be enhanced by stress tests and that these will be subject to peer reviews executed by the EBA and the European Forum of Deposit Insurers (34). The fact that the EBA will receive information from DGSs and competent authorities, especially as regards the financing of DGSs and cross-border lending between DGSs, may help to ensure a level playing field and address some of the concerns discussed above related to such cross-border borrowing arrangements. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The ECB welcomes that the supervision of DGSs by Member States will be enhanced by stress tests and that these will be subject to peer reviews executed by the EBA and the European Forum of Deposit Insurers (34). The fact that the EBA will receive information from DGSs and competent authorities, especially as regards the financing of DGSs and cross-border lending between DGSs, may help to ensure a level playing field and address some of the concerns discussed above related to such cross-border borrowing arrangements.

Drafting proposals

Where the ECB recommends that the proposed recast directive is amended, specific drafting proposal are set out in the Annex accompanied by explanatory text to this effect.

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 February 2011.

The President of the ECB

Jean-Claude TRICHET

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(1)  COM(2010) 368 final.

1

(2)  COM(2010) 371 final.

2

(3)  ECB Opinion CON/2008/70 on amendments to the Directive on deposit guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payment delay (OJ C 314, 9.12.2008, p. 1).

3

(4)  OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5. The amending proposals commented on in Opinion CON/2008/70 were adopted as Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay (OJ L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3).

4

(5)  See ‘The Eurosystem’s stance on the Commission’s consultation document on the review of Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee schemes’, August 2009 (hereinafter the ‘2009 Eurosystem’s contribution’), available on the ECB’s website at http://www.ecb.europa.eu

5

(6)  See p. 4 of the 2009 Eurosystem’s contribution.

6

(7)  See p. 7 of the 2009 Eurosystem’s contribution.

7

(8)  See p. 12 of the 2009 Eurosystem’s contribution.

8

(9)  See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council ‘Review of Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee schemes’ of 12.7.2010, COM(2010) 369 final, p. 4.

9

(10)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of Regions and the European Central Bank, ‘An EU framework for crisis management in the financial sector’ of 20.10.2010, COM(2010) 579 final (hereinafter the ‘Commission Communication on crisis management’), Section 5.2, p. 15; see also the last sentence of recital 22 of the proposed recast directive and Section 7.4, p. 8 of the explanatory memorandum to the proposed recast directive.

10

(11)  OJ L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22.

11

(12)  See Article 3(1) of the proposed recast directive.

12

(13)  See BCBS, ‘Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems. A proposed methodology for compliance assessment’, consultative document of 25 November 2010 issued for comment by 8 December 2010 (hereinafter, the ‘BCBS Consultative Document’), p. 15 (‘Principle 8 — Compulsory membership’), available at the BCBS’s website at http://www.bis.org

13

(14)  See the second subparagraph of Article 20(1) in connection with the third subparagraph of Article 9(1), and Article 2(1)(h) of the proposed recast directive; see also Section 7.4, p. 7 of the explanatory memorandum to the recast directive; see also recital 16 of the proposed recast directive and Section 7.5, p. 8 of the explanatory memorandum to the proposed recast directive.

14

(15)  See proposed amendment 2 in the Annex to this Opinion.

15

(16)  See points 3 and 4 of Annex I to Directive 94/19/EC.

16

(17)  See the first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of the proposed recast directive.

17

(18)  See Article 10 of Directive 94/19/EC, as amended by Article 1(6)(a) in connection with the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Directive 2009/14/EC.

18

(19)  See proposed amendment 3 in the Annex to this Opinion.

19

(20)  See footnote 14.

20

(21)  See proposed amendment 1 in the Annex to this Opinion.

21

(22)  Article 2(1)(c) of the proposed recast directive.

22

(23)  See Article 11 and Annexes I and II of the proposed recast directive.

23

(24)  European Commission Joint Research Centre (June 2009), ‘Possible Models for risk-based contributions to EU deposit guarantee schemes’.

24

(25)  See proposed amendment 4 in the Annex to this Opinion.

25

(26)  See Article 9(3) of the proposed recast directive.

26

(27)  See Article 10 of the proposed recast directive.

27

(28)  See Article 10(1)(d) of the proposed recast directive.

28

(29)  See the BCBS Consultative Document, p. 33.

29

(30)  See p. 11 of the 2009 Eurosystem’s contribution.

30

(31)  Article 9(2) of the proposed recast directive.

31

(32)  See Article 12(3) of the proposed recast directive.

32

(33)  See proposed amendment 5 in the Annex to this Opinion.

33

(34)  See Article 3(6) of the proposed recast directive.

34

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ANNEX

Drafting proposals

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendments proposed by the ECB (1) |
| --- | --- |
| Proposed ECB amendments to the proposed Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast) |
| Amendment 1 |
| Article 2(1)(h) of the proposed recast directive |
| ‘(h) | “target level” means 1,5 % of eligible deposits for the coverage of which a Deposit Guarantee Scheme is responsible;’ |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendments proposed by the ECB (1)

Proposed ECB amendments to the proposed Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast)

Amendment 1

Article 2(1)(h) of the proposed recast directive

‘(h)

“target level” means 1,5 % of eligible deposits for the coverage of which a Deposit Guarantee Scheme is responsible;’

| ‘(h) | “target level” means 1,5 % of covered deposits for the coverage of which a Deposit Guarantee Scheme is responsible;’ |
| --- | --- |

‘(h)

“target level” means 1,5 % of covered deposits for the coverage of which a Deposit Guarantee Scheme is responsible;’

Explanation

The ex ante financing level should be defined by reference to ‘covered deposits’, i.e. eligible deposits not exceeding the coverage level, considering that covered deposits reflect the level of DGS liabilities more accurately than eligible deposits.

Amendment 2

Article 4(1)(j) of the proposed recast directive

| ‘(j) | deposits by authorities,’ |
| --- | --- |

‘(j)

deposits by authorities,’

| ‘(j) | deposits by government and central administration authorities, and provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities,’ |
| --- | --- |

‘(j)

deposits by government and central administration authorities, and provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities,’

Explanation

The exclusion of the deposits of public authorities should be formulated using the more precise language, originally used in this respect in Directive 94/19/EC.

Amendment 3

Article 7(1) of the proposed recast directive

‘1.   Deposit Guarantee Schemes shall be in a position to repay unavailable deposits within 7 days of the date on which the competent authorities make a determination as referred to in Article 2(1)(e)(i) or a judicial authority makes a ruling as referred to in Article 2(1)(e)(ii).’

‘1.   Deposit Guarantee Schemes shall be in a position to repay unavailable deposits within 20 working days of the date on which the competent authorities make a determination as referred to in Article 2(1)(e)(i) or a judicial authority makes a ruling as referred to in Article 2(1)(e)(ii).

By [1 April 2012], the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report, based on a consultation: (a) reviewing the implementation of the reduction of the repayment period to 20 working days; and (b) based on the results of such review, assessing the feasibility of any additional reduction or reductions of the repayment period.’

Explanation

Explanation

Achieving the proposed reduction to 7 days may prove difficult since it is to be introduced shortly after the original reduction to 20 working days, for which the implementation deadline was the end of 2010. The proposed recast directive should foresee that the Commission will review the implementation of the original reduction to 20 working days and propose the time frame for the additional reduction or reductions of the repayment period, based on the results of such review.

Achieving the proposed reduction to 7 days may prove difficult since it is to be introduced shortly after the original reduction to 20 working days, for which the implementation deadline was the end of 2010. The proposed recast directive should foresee that the Commission will review the implementation of the original reduction to 20 working days and propose the time frame for the additional reduction or reductions of the repayment period, based on the results of such review.

Amendment 4

Amendment 4

Article 11(3) to (5) of the proposed recast directive

‘3.   Paragraph 2 shall not apply to Deposit Guarantee Schemes referred to in Article 1(2).

4.   In order to ensure specify the elements of definitions and methods under Annex II Part A, powers are delegated to the Commission. These draft regulatory standards shall be adopted in accordance with Articles 7 to 7d of [EBA Regulation]. The European Banking Authority may develop draft regulatory standards for submission to the Commission.

5.   By 31 December 2012, the European Banking Authority shall issue guidelines on the application of Annex II Part B pursuant to [Article 8 of the EBA Regulation].’

‘3.   Paragraph 2 shall not apply to Deposit Guarantee Schemes referred to in Article 1(3).

4.   Powers are delegated to the Commission to adopt regulatory technical standards specifying the definitions and methods for the calculation of core risk indicators under Annex II Part A, . These regulatory technical standards shall be adopted in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation(EU) No 1093/2010.

The Commission shall in particular take into account that the calculation methods for the risk-weighted contributions should be based on verified empirical data and should promote equal treatment.

5.   By [31 December 2011
  ] the European Banking Authority (EBA) shall issue guidelines on the application of supplementary risk indicators under Annex II Part B pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’

Explanation

Explanation

The proposed calculation method for risk-weighted contributions to DGS is the subject of a debate. Assigning the EBA with the development of guidelines and technical standards in this respect will allow for an adequate method to be elaborated, based on verified technical data, while promoting equal treatment.

The proposed calculation method for risk-weighted contributions to DGS is the subject of a debate. Assigning the EBA with the development of guidelines and technical standards in this respect will allow for an adequate method to be elaborated, based on verified technical data, while promoting equal treatment.

Amendment 5

Amendment 5

Article 12(3) of the proposed recast directive

‘3.   If a credit institution ceases to be member of a scheme and joins another scheme, the contributions paid during the 6 months preceding the withdrawal of membership shall be reimbursed or transferred to the other scheme. This shall not apply if a credit institution has been excluded from a scheme pursuant to Article 3(3).’

‘3.   If a credit institution ceases to be member of a scheme and joins another scheme, the contributions, excluding any extraordinary contributions referred to in Article 9(3), which were paid by such a credit institution during the 6 months preceding the withdrawal of membership, shall be transferred to the other scheme. This shall not apply if a credit institution has been excluded from a scheme pursuant to Article 3(3).’

Explanation

Explanation

To avoid any potential abuse of this provision, the transfer of the contributions to a new scheme should not relate to extraordinary contributions paid to cover the original DGS’s insufficient resources, while the reimbursement of the paid contributions should be excluded.

To avoid any potential abuse of this provision, the transfer of the contributions to a new scheme should not relate to extraordinary contributions paid to cover the original DGS’s insufficient resources, while the reimbursement of the paid contributions should be excluded.

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(1)  Bold in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes inserting new text. Strikethrough in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes deleting text.

1

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 31.3.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.3.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/8

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Euro exchange rates (1)

30 March 2011

2011/C 99/02

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,4090 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 117,01 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4573 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,87890 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 8,9185 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2993 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 7,8675 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 24,528 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 267,10 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,7093 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 3,9880 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,1035 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,1920 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,3668 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,3674 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,9696 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,8544 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,7782 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 551,03 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 9,6264 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 9,2381 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,3775 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 12 308,75 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,2629 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 61,119 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 40,2462 |
| THB | Thai baht | 42,720 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 2,3128 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 16,7932 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 63,0560 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,4090

JPY

Japanese yen

117,01

DKK

Danish krone

7,4573

GBP

Pound sterling

0,87890

SEK

Swedish krona

8,9185

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2993

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

7,8675

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

24,528

HUF

Hungarian forint

267,10

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,7093

PLN

Polish zloty

3,9880

RON

Romanian leu

4,1035

TRY

Turkish lira

2,1920

AUD

Australian dollar

1,3668

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,3674

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,9696

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,8544

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,7782

KRW

South Korean won

1 551,03

ZAR

South African rand

9,6264

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

9,2381

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,3775

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

12 308,75

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,2629

PHP

Philippine peso

61,119

RUB

Russian rouble

40,2462

THB

Thai baht

42,720

BRL

Brazilian real

2,3128

MXN

Mexican peso

16,7932

INR

Indian rupee

63,0560

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 31.3.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.3.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/9

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION

Guidance document on the optional application of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC

2011/C 99/03

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (1) allows Member States whose electricity systems meet certain criteria to provide for transitional allocation of emission allowances free of charge to installations for electricity production. The criteria relate to the need to modernise the energy system, and Member States deciding to use this option must in parallel undertake action aimed at securing investments in the energy system, such as upgrades of infrastructure, clean technologies etc., of an amount corresponding to the value of the corresponding emission allocations allocated for free. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (1) allows Member States whose electricity systems meet certain criteria to provide for transitional allocation of emission allowances free of charge to installations for electricity production. The criteria relate to the need to modernise the energy system, and Member States deciding to use this option must in parallel undertake action aimed at securing investments in the energy system, such as upgrades of infrastructure, clean technologies etc., of an amount corresponding to the value of the corresponding emission allocations allocated for free.

| (2) | It must be stressed that Member States meeting the criteria are not required to use the option, and may well choose not to in the light of the auctioning revenues that they would forego by doing so. However, those who do apply the option must comply with the provisions of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

It must be stressed that Member States meeting the criteria are not required to use the option, and may well choose not to in the light of the auctioning revenues that they would forego by doing so. However, those who do apply the option must comply with the provisions of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC.

| (3) | A harmonised emission trading system is imperative to best exploit the benefits of emission trading and to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market. In this respect, Directive 2003/87/EC establishes auctioning as the basic principle for allocation of emission allowances, as it is the simplest, and generally considered the most economically efficient system. Auctioning also provides a level playing field for competition on the internal electricity market to further develop. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

A harmonised emission trading system is imperative to best exploit the benefits of emission trading and to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market. In this respect, Directive 2003/87/EC establishes auctioning as the basic principle for allocation of emission allowances, as it is the simplest, and generally considered the most economically efficient system. Auctioning also provides a level playing field for competition on the internal electricity market to further develop.

| (4) | Furthermore, Directive 2003/87/EC explicitly stipulates that full auctioning should be the rule from 2013 onwards for the power sector, taking into account the sector's ability to pass on the opportunity cost of CO2 to consumers in electricity pricing and thus to generate additional profits (‘windfall profits’). Auctioning will eliminate such windfall profits. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Furthermore, Directive 2003/87/EC explicitly stipulates that full auctioning should be the rule from 2013 onwards for the power sector, taking into account the sector's ability to pass on the opportunity cost of CO2 to consumers in electricity pricing and thus to generate additional profits (‘windfall profits’). Auctioning will eliminate such windfall profits.

| (5) | Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC contains provisions derogating from a number of core principles of Directive 2003/87/EC, in particular, the Union-wide fully harmonised approach towards allocation, the introduction of auctioning as the default allocation method and the explicit exclusion of free allocation of emission allowances in respect of electricity production. These principles and rules aim at ensuring the highest possible degree of economic efficiency in the scheme. Accordingly, the implementation of Article 10c should not impair these general rules and objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC contains provisions derogating from a number of core principles of Directive 2003/87/EC, in particular, the Union-wide fully harmonised approach towards allocation, the introduction of auctioning as the default allocation method and the explicit exclusion of free allocation of emission allowances in respect of electricity production. These principles and rules aim at ensuring the highest possible degree of economic efficiency in the scheme. Accordingly, the implementation of Article 10c should not impair these general rules and objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC.

| (6) | Against this background and also bearing in mind the concerns of many Member States with respect to potential distortions of competition accruing from the application of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission considers it necessary to provide guidance on the implementation of Article 10c for the following reasons:






  — | The Directive requires the Commission to assess individual applications by Member States wishing to apply Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. By adopting this guidance document, the Commission lays down a transparent framework for its assessment. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

Against this background and also bearing in mind the concerns of many Member States with respect to potential distortions of competition accruing from the application of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission considers it necessary to provide guidance on the implementation of Article 10c for the following reasons:

—

The Directive requires the Commission to assess individual applications by Member States wishing to apply Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. By adopting this guidance document, the Commission lays down a transparent framework for its assessment.

| — | Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC represents an exemption from core principles of Directive 2003/87/EC. It must be ensured that this exemption is interpreted and applied in a manner that does not undermine the overall objectives that the Directive sets out. |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC represents an exemption from core principles of Directive 2003/87/EC. It must be ensured that this exemption is interpreted and applied in a manner that does not undermine the overall objectives that the Directive sets out.

| — | While Article 10c(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC requires the Commission to provide guidance ‘to ensure that the allocation methodology avoids undue distortions of competition and minimises negative impacts on the incentives to reduce emissions’ by means of a comitology procedure, other elements related to the allocation methodology, such as the maximum amount of free emission allowances defined by Article 10c(2), also necessitate a common understanding. |
| --- | --- |

—

While Article 10c(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC requires the Commission to provide guidance ‘to ensure that the allocation methodology avoids undue distortions of competition and minimises negative impacts on the incentives to reduce emissions’ by means of a comitology procedure, other elements related to the allocation methodology, such as the maximum amount of free emission allowances defined by Article 10c(2), also necessitate a common understanding.

| — | The scope of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC concerns only the electricity generation sector. For this reason, it is necessary to also achieve a common understanding as to which installations are eligible to transitionally receive free emission allowances under this provision. |
| --- | --- |

—

The scope of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC concerns only the electricity generation sector. For this reason, it is necessary to also achieve a common understanding as to which installations are eligible to transitionally receive free emission allowances under this provision.

| — | A number of technical terms introduced by Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC (e.g. gross final national consumption, market value of free emission allowances) are not defined in that Directive. In order to ensure consistent application of these provisions across Member States that may apply Article 10c, clear guidance is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

—

A number of technical terms introduced by Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC (e.g. gross final national consumption, market value of free emission allowances) are not defined in that Directive. In order to ensure consistent application of these provisions across Member States that may apply Article 10c, clear guidance is necessary.

| — | Some provisions of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC result in a degree of discretion for Member States in their implementation. This, in particular, applies to each Member State's national plan and the investments related to it. Other provisions introduce new elements to Directive 2003/87/EC that need to be reconciled with the market-based approach of the scheme. The implementation of Article 10c must neither run counter to the objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC, nor jeopardise a level playing field on the Union internal market. |
| --- | --- |

—

Some provisions of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC result in a degree of discretion for Member States in their implementation. This, in particular, applies to each Member State's national plan and the investments related to it. Other provisions introduce new elements to Directive 2003/87/EC that need to be reconciled with the market-based approach of the scheme. The implementation of Article 10c must neither run counter to the objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC, nor jeopardise a level playing field on the Union internal market.

2.   MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ALLOWANCES TRANSITIONALLY ALLOCATED FOR FREE AT MEMBER STATE LEVEL

2.1.   Determination of maximum number

| (7) | Article 10c(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC determines the maximum number of emission allowances allocated for free that may be allocated to eligible installations in eligible Member States in 2013. Pursuant to this provision, this number must decline in subsequent years and result in no free allocation of emission allowances in 2020. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Article 10c(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC determines the maximum number of emission allowances allocated for free that may be allocated to eligible installations in eligible Member States in 2013. Pursuant to this provision, this number must decline in subsequent years and result in no free allocation of emission allowances in 2020.

| (8) | When assessing an application pursuant to Article 10c(6), the Commission will analyse whether the maximum number of emission allowances made available free of charge under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC in 2013 in a given Member State exceeds the number resulting from the calculation set out in Annex I, which is based on Article 10c(2). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

When assessing an application pursuant to Article 10c(6), the Commission will analyse whether the maximum number of emission allowances made available free of charge under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC in 2013 in a given Member State exceeds the number resulting from the calculation set out in Annex I, which is based on Article 10c(2).

2.2.   Gradual decrease of free allocation

| (9) | Article 10c(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC clearly stipulates that ‘the total transitional free allocation ... shall gradually decrease, resulting in no free allocation in 2020.’ For this reason, a credible and convincing gradual trajectory from the starting point of free allocation of emission allowances in 2013 to the end point of free allocation of emission allowances in 2020 is mandatory. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Article 10c(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC clearly stipulates that ‘the total transitional free allocation ... shall gradually decrease, resulting in no free allocation in 2020.’ For this reason, a credible and convincing gradual trajectory from the starting point of free allocation of emission allowances in 2013 to the end point of free allocation of emission allowances in 2020 is mandatory.

| (10) | In the light of the legal mandate to fully phase out allocation of free emission allowances from a maximum level of 70 % to 0 % within a maximum of seven years, a credible and convincing gradual trajectory towards no allocation of free emission allowances in 2020 encompasses a clear downwards trend reflected in the interim steps between 70 % and 0 %. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

In the light of the legal mandate to fully phase out allocation of free emission allowances from a maximum level of 70 % to 0 % within a maximum of seven years, a credible and convincing gradual trajectory towards no allocation of free emission allowances in 2020 encompasses a clear downwards trend reflected in the interim steps between 70 % and 0 %.

| (11) | When assessing an application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will analyse whether Member States pursue a credible and convincing gradual transition to full auctioning. Excessive back-loading of reductions would result in a higher overall number of emission allowances allocated for free over the entire 2013-2020 period, and would consequently have the effect of causing undue distortions of competition in the Union market. This would not be compatible with Article 10c(5) of the Directive. The Commission considers that Member States have some discretion in setting out an appropriate reduction trajectory. The Commission considers that the condition of a gradual decrease would be fulfilled and that competition would not be unduly distorted where a Member State has provided for either a linear reduction trajectory or a non-linear reduction trajectory wherein the decline in emission allowances allocated for free between any two consecutive years in the period from 2013 to 2020 deviates at most 50 % from the average annual decline necessary in the remaining years to reach 0 % in 2020. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

When assessing an application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will analyse whether Member States pursue a credible and convincing gradual transition to full auctioning. Excessive back-loading of reductions would result in a higher overall number of emission allowances allocated for free over the entire 2013-2020 period, and would consequently have the effect of causing undue distortions of competition in the Union market. This would not be compatible with Article 10c(5) of the Directive. The Commission considers that Member States have some discretion in setting out an appropriate reduction trajectory. The Commission considers that the condition of a gradual decrease would be fulfilled and that competition would not be unduly distorted where a Member State has provided for either a linear reduction trajectory or a non-linear reduction trajectory wherein the decline in emission allowances allocated for free between any two consecutive years in the period from 2013 to 2020 deviates at most 50 % from the average annual decline necessary in the remaining years to reach 0 % in 2020.

3.   ELIGIBLE INSTALLATIONS

3.1.   Cut-off date

| (12) | In order to be eligible and benefit from the free allocation of emission allowances for electricity production, installations should have been put in operation by 31 December 2008. In their application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States should demonstrate that installations in their respective territory considered to be eligible for transitional free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC meet this condition by indicating the verified emissions of these installations for the period 2008-2010 including the permit number and the account holder of the installation concerned, as registered in the CITL. This information should also serve as proof that the installation is still active and has not closed down its operation in the meantime. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In order to be eligible and benefit from the free allocation of emission allowances for electricity production, installations should have been put in operation by 31 December 2008. In their application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States should demonstrate that installations in their respective territory considered to be eligible for transitional free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC meet this condition by indicating the verified emissions of these installations for the period 2008-2010 including the permit number and the account holder of the installation concerned, as registered in the CITL. This information should also serve as proof that the installation is still active and has not closed down its operation in the meantime.

| (13) | Alternatively, installations may also be eligible for transitional free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC if the relevant investment process was ‘physically initiated’ by 31 December 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Alternatively, installations may also be eligible for transitional free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC if the relevant investment process was ‘physically initiated’ by 31 December 2008.

| (14) | This implies that the relevant decisions to build a new power plant should have been taken without being affected by the prospect of receiving free emission allowances for the new plant. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

This implies that the relevant decisions to build a new power plant should have been taken without being affected by the prospect of receiving free emission allowances for the new plant.

| (15) | In the light of the above considerations, an investment process should be considered physically initiated no later than 31 December 2008 if it can be demonstrated that the investment decision was not influenced by the option of receiving free allocation of emission allowances. To this end, Member States could provide substantiated evidence that:






  — | construction work has physically started on-site and was visible by 31 December 2008; or |
| --- | --- | --- |

(15)

In the light of the above considerations, an investment process should be considered physically initiated no later than 31 December 2008 if it can be demonstrated that the investment decision was not influenced by the option of receiving free allocation of emission allowances. To this end, Member States could provide substantiated evidence that:

—

construction work has physically started on-site and was visible by 31 December 2008; or

| — | a contract for the construction of the power plant in question was signed before 31 December 2008 between an investor (often the operator of the plant) and a company that is in charge of the construction work. |
| --- | --- |

—

a contract for the construction of the power plant in question was signed before 31 December 2008 between an investor (often the operator of the plant) and a company that is in charge of the construction work.

The Commission understands that, in the given context, construction work that has physically started could also encompass preparatory work for the construction of the power plant in question, but would always be undertaken on the basis of an explicit approval, if necessary, of the relevant national authority. Member States should submit such relevant authorisation document, which should be of substantive legal status issued in accordance with national or Union law. In the absence of a requirement for an explicit approval for preparatory work, other evidence would be necessary to establish that construction work had been physically started.

The above list should not be considered exhaustive, as Member States may have other means to provide documentary evidence that a certain investment decision was not influenced by the option of receiving free allocation of emission allowances.

| (16) | When carrying out the assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will require clear and substantiated evidence that these conditions have been met. In their application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States should submit all relevant information in this respect. Otherwise the Commission will reject the list of installations covered by the application. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

When carrying out the assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will require clear and substantiated evidence that these conditions have been met. In their application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States should submit all relevant information in this respect. Otherwise the Commission will reject the list of installations covered by the application.

3.2.   Installations for electricity production

| (17) | Pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States may transitionally allocate emission allowances for free to installations for electricity production. The phrase ‘installations for electricity production’ is not defined by Directive 2003/87/EC. As an exception from the general rule of Directive 2003/87/EC that no emission allowances should be allocated for free in respect of electricity production, the phrase must be interpreted so as not to impair the objectives of the Directive. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States may transitionally allocate emission allowances for free to installations for electricity production. The phrase ‘installations for electricity production’ is not defined by Directive 2003/87/EC. As an exception from the general rule of Directive 2003/87/EC that no emission allowances should be allocated for free in respect of electricity production, the phrase must be interpreted so as not to impair the objectives of the Directive.

| (18) | Such an approach is supported by the need to prevent negative impacts accruing from the implementation of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC from affecting the industrial sector of the Member State concerned and the Union-wide market. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Such an approach is supported by the need to prevent negative impacts accruing from the implementation of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC from affecting the industrial sector of the Member State concerned and the Union-wide market.

| (19) | With a view to defining the scope of the term ‘installations for electricity production’, reference is made to the concept of ‘electricity generator’ defined in Article 3(u) of Directive 2003/87/EC and also referred to in Article 10c(2) of this Directive. In accordance with this concept, all installations producing exclusively electricity and installations producing electricity and heat are covered (2). However, installations carrying out another activity listed in Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC in addition to combustion of fuels, i.e. the production of electricity and/or heat, would not be included in this definition. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

With a view to defining the scope of the term ‘installations for electricity production’, reference is made to the concept of ‘electricity generator’ defined in Article 3(u) of Directive 2003/87/EC and also referred to in Article 10c(2) of this Directive. In accordance with this concept, all installations producing exclusively electricity and installations producing electricity and heat are covered (2). However, installations carrying out another activity listed in Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC in addition to combustion of fuels, i.e. the production of electricity and/or heat, would not be included in this definition.

| (20) | In the light of the above considerations, the Commission considers as eligible for free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC:






  (a) | installations that qualify as an electricity generator under Article 3(u) of Directive 2003/87/EC; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(20)

In the light of the above considerations, the Commission considers as eligible for free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC:

(a)

installations that qualify as an electricity generator under Article 3(u) of Directive 2003/87/EC; and

| (b) | in the case of installations producing electricity and heat, installations for which only relevant emissions attributable to electricity production are taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

in the case of installations producing electricity and heat, installations for which only relevant emissions attributable to electricity production are taken into account.

| (21) | In its assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will verify whether evidence necessary to ensure compliance with the above criteria is provided. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In its assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will verify whether evidence necessary to ensure compliance with the above criteria is provided.

| (22) | To determine emissions attributable to electricity for installations that produce both electricity and heat, Member States should ensure compatibility with implementing measures pursuant to Article 10a, and in particular 10a(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC and should make reference to the allocation methodology pursuant to Article 10c(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

To determine emissions attributable to electricity for installations that produce both electricity and heat, Member States should ensure compatibility with implementing measures pursuant to Article 10a, and in particular 10a(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC and should make reference to the allocation methodology pursuant to Article 10c(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC.

4.   REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NATIONAL PLAN

4.1.   Principles for the National Plan

| (23) | Pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Member States concerned shall submit to the Commission a national plan for investments. The Commission recommends that the national plan should be based on a number of common principles designed to best ensure a fair and consistent implementation of the objectives accruing from Directive 2003/87/EC in general and Article 10c in particular:
  Principle 1: The national plan should identify investments, which, directly or indirectly (investments in networks and ancillary services), contribute to decreasing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost effective manner.
  Principle 2: The investments identified in the national plan should be designed to eliminate in the future, to the extent possible the situations referred to in Article 10c(1), letter (a) (3) and (b) (4) and the first condition of (c) (5) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
  Principle 3: The investments should be compatible with each other and other relevant Union legislation. They must neither reinforce dominant positions nor unduly distort competition and trade in the internal market and, where possible, should strengthen competition on the internal market for electricity.
  Principle 4: Investments identified in the national plan should be additional to investments Member States must undertake in order to comply with other objectives or legal requirements accruing from Union law. They should also not concern investments, which would be required to match increasing electricity supply and demand.
  Principle 5: Investments identified in the national plan should contribute to diversification, and reduction in carbon intensity, of the electricity mix and the sources of energy supply for electricity production.
  Principle 6: Investments should be economically viable in absence of the free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, once transitional allocation of such allowances comes to an end, with the exception of specific pre-defined emerging technologies still at the demonstration stage and listed in Annex III. |
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(23)

Pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Member States concerned shall submit to the Commission a national plan for investments. The Commission recommends that the national plan should be based on a number of common principles designed to best ensure a fair and consistent implementation of the objectives accruing from Directive 2003/87/EC in general and Article 10c in particular:

Principle 1: The national plan should identify investments, which, directly or indirectly (investments in networks and ancillary services), contribute to decreasing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost effective manner.

Principle 2: The investments identified in the national plan should be designed to eliminate in the future, to the extent possible the situations referred to in Article 10c(1), letter (a) (3) and (b) (4) and the first condition of (c) (5) of Directive 2003/87/EC.

Principle 3: The investments should be compatible with each other and other relevant Union legislation. They must neither reinforce dominant positions nor unduly distort competition and trade in the internal market and, where possible, should strengthen competition on the internal market for electricity.

Principle 4: Investments identified in the national plan should be additional to investments Member States must undertake in order to comply with other objectives or legal requirements accruing from Union law. They should also not concern investments, which would be required to match increasing electricity supply and demand.

Principle 5: Investments identified in the national plan should contribute to diversification, and reduction in carbon intensity, of the electricity mix and the sources of energy supply for electricity production.

Principle 6: Investments should be economically viable in absence of the free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, once transitional allocation of such allowances comes to an end, with the exception of specific pre-defined emerging technologies still at the demonstration stage and listed in Annex III.

| (24) | The investments identified in the national plan should, to the extent possible, comply with these principles. Where compliance with all principles cannot be ensured for a certain investment, the Member State concerned should provide detailed reasons as to why. In any case, such investments should not run counter to these principles or undermine the underlying objectives. Investments may likewise not undermine objectives laid down in the Treaties or other relevant Union legislation. |
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(24)

The investments identified in the national plan should, to the extent possible, comply with these principles. Where compliance with all principles cannot be ensured for a certain investment, the Member State concerned should provide detailed reasons as to why. In any case, such investments should not run counter to these principles or undermine the underlying objectives. Investments may likewise not undermine objectives laid down in the Treaties or other relevant Union legislation.

| (25) | When assessing the application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will analyse to which extent the investments identified comply with these principles. If the information provided by Member States in their application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC is not sufficiently detailed for the Commission to carry out a comprehensive assessment allowing for a well founded conclusion, the Commission may request additional information. If this additional information cannot be provided in due time, the Commission will reject the corresponding parts of the national plan. The Commission may also consider information and views from other sources to inform its assessment of the application. |
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(25)

When assessing the application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will analyse to which extent the investments identified comply with these principles. If the information provided by Member States in their application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC is not sufficiently detailed for the Commission to carry out a comprehensive assessment allowing for a well founded conclusion, the Commission may request additional information. If this additional information cannot be provided in due time, the Commission will reject the corresponding parts of the national plan. The Commission may also consider information and views from other sources to inform its assessment of the application.

| (26) | On the basis of the provisions of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (6), Member States should verify whether an environmental assessment of the national plan is required. |
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(26)

On the basis of the provisions of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (6), Member States should verify whether an environmental assessment of the national plan is required.

| (27) | The Commission further notes that the free allocation of emission allowances to electricity generators and the financing of corresponding investments required by Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC would in principle involve State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU, Member States must notify measures involving State aid to the Commission. Following notification, Member States may not put proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision by the Commission. The Commission intends to adopt compatibility criteria for assessment of this type of aid in the near future. An application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, and any consequent decision by the Commission, is entirely without prejudice to Member States’ State aid notification obligations pursuant to Article 108 TFEU, and Member States should plan for any required State aid notifications accordingly. When assessing the allocation of free allowances and the national plans under Article 107(3) TFEU, the Commission will ensure that the latter do not result in undue distortions of competition, taking into account the objective of common interest pursued through Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. In particular, where the national plan concentrates aid on a limited number of beneficiaries or where the aid is likely to reinforce the beneficiaries’ market position, Member States should demonstrate that aid will not unduly distort competition beyond what is strictly necessary in the light of the overall objectives of this Directive. |
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(27)

The Commission further notes that the free allocation of emission allowances to electricity generators and the financing of corresponding investments required by Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC would in principle involve State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU, Member States must notify measures involving State aid to the Commission. Following notification, Member States may not put proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision by the Commission. The Commission intends to adopt compatibility criteria for assessment of this type of aid in the near future. An application pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, and any consequent decision by the Commission, is entirely without prejudice to Member States’ State aid notification obligations pursuant to Article 108 TFEU, and Member States should plan for any required State aid notifications accordingly. When assessing the allocation of free allowances and the national plans under Article 107(3) TFEU, the Commission will ensure that the latter do not result in undue distortions of competition, taking into account the objective of common interest pursued through Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. In particular, where the national plan concentrates aid on a limited number of beneficiaries or where the aid is likely to reinforce the beneficiaries’ market position, Member States should demonstrate that aid will not unduly distort competition beyond what is strictly necessary in the light of the overall objectives of this Directive.

4.2.   Eligible investments

| (28) | In view of the title and overall context of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, investments eligible under this provision should concern the electricity sector and are to be undertaken from 25 June 2009. However, as a matter of principle, investments in other energy sectors are not excluded, on condition that they benefit from strong justification on the basis of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. |
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(28)

In view of the title and overall context of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, investments eligible under this provision should concern the electricity sector and are to be undertaken from 25 June 2009. However, as a matter of principle, investments in other energy sectors are not excluded, on condition that they benefit from strong justification on the basis of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC.

| (29) | Member States are well positioned to decide which investments would best contribute to the modernisation of their electricity generation sector, and are responsible for identifying investments that comply with the requirements set out in the Directive. They also have to coordinate reporting on the implementation of investments undertaken under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC at national level (7). |
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(29)

Member States are well positioned to decide which investments would best contribute to the modernisation of their electricity generation sector, and are responsible for identifying investments that comply with the requirements set out in the Directive. They also have to coordinate reporting on the implementation of investments undertaken under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC at national level (7).

| (30) | In their national plans, Member States should set out a list of installations undertaking investments identified in the national plan and specify the list of investments scheduled to result from free allocation of emission allowances. They should also specify to which extent they will be funded by gains from emission allowances allocated free of charge and in which year of the investment cycle this would occur. |
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(30)

In their national plans, Member States should set out a list of installations undertaking investments identified in the national plan and specify the list of investments scheduled to result from free allocation of emission allowances. They should also specify to which extent they will be funded by gains from emission allowances allocated free of charge and in which year of the investment cycle this would occur.

| (31) | Investments funded by gains accruing from free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC might be supplementary to investments partly funded from other Union sources (e.g funds made available from the new entrants reserve pursuant to Article 10a(8) of Directive 2003/87/EC, regional funds, TEN-E, European Economic Recovery Programme, European Energy Programme for Recovery, SET Plan, etc) if compliant with the requirements set out in this document and if compatible with those instruments or sources. In such cases, however, only the part of the investment benefiting from funds accruing from free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC is relevant for the purpose of Article 10c of this Directive on condition that Union rules on overall funding limits are respected. |
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(31)

Investments funded by gains accruing from free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC might be supplementary to investments partly funded from other Union sources (e.g funds made available from the new entrants reserve pursuant to Article 10a(8) of Directive 2003/87/EC, regional funds, TEN-E, European Economic Recovery Programme, European Energy Programme for Recovery, SET Plan, etc) if compliant with the requirements set out in this document and if compatible with those instruments or sources. In such cases, however, only the part of the investment benefiting from funds accruing from free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC is relevant for the purpose of Article 10c of this Directive on condition that Union rules on overall funding limits are respected.

| (32) | Further clarification with respect to the Commission's understanding of the terms ‘infrastructure’, ‘clean technologies’, ‘diversification of energy mix and sources of supply’, as used in Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC is provided in Annex IV. |
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(32)

Further clarification with respect to the Commission's understanding of the terms ‘infrastructure’, ‘clean technologies’, ‘diversification of energy mix and sources of supply’, as used in Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC is provided in Annex IV.

| (33) | A non-exhaustive list of investment types eligible under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC is provided in Annex V. |
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(33)

A non-exhaustive list of investment types eligible under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC is provided in Annex V.

4.3.   Market value

| (34) | Pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the amount of investments identified in the national plan shall be equivalent, to the extent possible, to the market value of the free emission allowances. The market value of emission allowances must be used as a reference point for eligible Member States to determine, in their national plans, the amount to be invested at national level. |
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(34)

Pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the amount of investments identified in the national plan shall be equivalent, to the extent possible, to the market value of the free emission allowances. The market value of emission allowances must be used as a reference point for eligible Member States to determine, in their national plans, the amount to be invested at national level.

| (35) | Since Member States should be able to provide a precise figure of the amount they intend to invest under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC in their national plans, the market value of any emission allowances to be allocated for free pursuant to Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC should be determined in advance and should not be adjusted thereafter (8). |
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(35)

Since Member States should be able to provide a precise figure of the amount they intend to invest under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC in their national plans, the market value of any emission allowances to be allocated for free pursuant to Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC should be determined in advance and should not be adjusted thereafter (8).

| (36) | The Commission recommends that the market value of emission allowances allocated for free should be derived from the model-based projections of European carbon prices as provided by the 2010 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying Commission Communication (2010) 265 final (9). The former provides updated projections taking into account new circumstances in the Union. |
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(36)

The Commission recommends that the market value of emission allowances allocated for free should be derived from the model-based projections of European carbon prices as provided by the 2010 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying Commission Communication (2010) 265 final (9). The former provides updated projections taking into account new circumstances in the Union.

| (37) | Accordingly, the annual values, as set in Annex VI and taking into account current legislation and emission reduction objectives, should be used as reference by Member States in order to determine the annual market value of free allocation of emission allowances applied to their national plans. In the light of relevant State aid rules, Member States may decide to use higher values to determine the amount to invest: the figures given in Annex VI represent only a minimum level to be applied. |
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(37)

Accordingly, the annual values, as set in Annex VI and taking into account current legislation and emission reduction objectives, should be used as reference by Member States in order to determine the annual market value of free allocation of emission allowances applied to their national plans. In the light of relevant State aid rules, Member States may decide to use higher values to determine the amount to invest: the figures given in Annex VI represent only a minimum level to be applied.

| (38) | Except if a Member State can establish that this would be objectively impossible, the value of investments undertaken in the framework of Article 10c of the Directive in a given Member State must correspond to the market value of emission allowances allocated for free under its application. In applications pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States must provide the evidence necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC. |
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(38)

Except if a Member State can establish that this would be objectively impossible, the value of investments undertaken in the framework of Article 10c of the Directive in a given Member State must correspond to the market value of emission allowances allocated for free under its application. In applications pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States must provide the evidence necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC.

4.4.   Mechanism to ensure the balance between amount of investments and free emission allowances

| (39) | Directive 2003/87/EC implicitly acknowledges the fact that free allocation of emission allowances can result in windfall profits, in particular where operators can pass on the financial value of the emission allowances to their customers. This is the case for electricity producers and represents one of the reasons why Directive 2003/87/EC provides for auctioning as the default allocation rule, intended to ‘eliminate windfall profits’ (10). |
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(39)

Directive 2003/87/EC implicitly acknowledges the fact that free allocation of emission allowances can result in windfall profits, in particular where operators can pass on the financial value of the emission allowances to their customers. This is the case for electricity producers and represents one of the reasons why Directive 2003/87/EC provides for auctioning as the default allocation rule, intended to ‘eliminate windfall profits’ (10).

| (40) | By derogating from the principle of auctioning as default allocation method, Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC provides for free allocation of emission allowances to electricity generators, thereby implicitly accepting the appearance of windfall profits. However, Article 10c of this Directive clearly aims for these profits to be used for the modernisation of electricity generation in the Member State concerned. |
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(40)

By derogating from the principle of auctioning as default allocation method, Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC provides for free allocation of emission allowances to electricity generators, thereby implicitly accepting the appearance of windfall profits. However, Article 10c of this Directive clearly aims for these profits to be used for the modernisation of electricity generation in the Member State concerned.

| (41) | A measure of Union law must be interpreted in the light of its objectives. On the basis of the provisions of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC and in view of its underlying objective, it can be concluded that the windfall profits accruing to companies benefiting from free allocation of emission allowances must be used for the modernisation of electricity generation in the Member State concerned. In the same vein, an optimal use of the value of the emission allowances allocated for free would entail that the emission allowances allocated for free are not used to finance investments that companies concerned would have undertaken, in order to comply with other objectives and legal requirements accruing from Union law. Otherwise, they would only constitute additional profits, which Directive 2003/87/EC aims to eliminate and would consequently run counter to the objectives of the Directive. Moreover, this would cause undue distortions of competition incompatible with Article 10c(5) of the Directive. |
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(41)

A measure of Union law must be interpreted in the light of its objectives. On the basis of the provisions of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC and in view of its underlying objective, it can be concluded that the windfall profits accruing to companies benefiting from free allocation of emission allowances must be used for the modernisation of electricity generation in the Member State concerned. In the same vein, an optimal use of the value of the emission allowances allocated for free would entail that the emission allowances allocated for free are not used to finance investments that companies concerned would have undertaken, in order to comply with other objectives and legal requirements accruing from Union law. Otherwise, they would only constitute additional profits, which Directive 2003/87/EC aims to eliminate and would consequently run counter to the objectives of the Directive. Moreover, this would cause undue distortions of competition incompatible with Article 10c(5) of the Directive.

| (42) | For these reasons, a recipient of emission allowances allocated for free under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC would need to use the value of the free emission allowances by means of undertaking an investment identified in the national plan pursuant to Article 10c(1). Where companies receive emission allowances for free without undertaking such an investment or where they receive more emission allowances for free than necessary to undertake the relevant investment(s) identified in the national plan, they must be required to provide the value of the excess allowances to the relevant entity undertaking the investment. |
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(42)

For these reasons, a recipient of emission allowances allocated for free under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC would need to use the value of the free emission allowances by means of undertaking an investment identified in the national plan pursuant to Article 10c(1). Where companies receive emission allowances for free without undertaking such an investment or where they receive more emission allowances for free than necessary to undertake the relevant investment(s) identified in the national plan, they must be required to provide the value of the excess allowances to the relevant entity undertaking the investment.

| (43) | Since the national plan designed to modernise electricity generation in the Member State concerned may contain investments to be undertaken by companies that are not subject to compliance with the Union scheme (11), not all companies designated to undertake investments identified in the national plan would/could receive allowances allocated free of charge. In the light of the provisions of Articles 10c(1) and 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, operators of transmission or distribution systems within the meaning of Article 2(4) and (6) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (12) represent network operators within the meaning of Article 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC. These companies may generally not be involved in the generation or supply of electricity. They would therefore not be able to receive allowances, but may nevertheless be required to undertake investments identified in the national plan. |
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(43)

Since the national plan designed to modernise electricity generation in the Member State concerned may contain investments to be undertaken by companies that are not subject to compliance with the Union scheme (11), not all companies designated to undertake investments identified in the national plan would/could receive allowances allocated free of charge. In the light of the provisions of Articles 10c(1) and 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, operators of transmission or distribution systems within the meaning of Article 2(4) and (6) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (12) represent network operators within the meaning of Article 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC. These companies may generally not be involved in the generation or supply of electricity. They would therefore not be able to receive allowances, but may nevertheless be required to undertake investments identified in the national plan.

| (44) | In accordance with principle 3 of the principles for the national plan and in accordance with paragraph 27 of this guidance document, whenever investments in generation or supply of electricity, which were identified in the national plan pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, would lead to undue distortions of competition or would threat to reinforce dominant position, Member States should consider requiring beneficiaries of the free emission allowances to provide funds for investments in transmission and distribution systems, or for generation or supply of electricity not leading to such distortion. |
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(44)

In accordance with principle 3 of the principles for the national plan and in accordance with paragraph 27 of this guidance document, whenever investments in generation or supply of electricity, which were identified in the national plan pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, would lead to undue distortions of competition or would threat to reinforce dominant position, Member States should consider requiring beneficiaries of the free emission allowances to provide funds for investments in transmission and distribution systems, or for generation or supply of electricity not leading to such distortion.

| (45) | It can also not be excluded that companies are allocated a number of free emission allowances of a value lower than would be required to cover an investment identified in the national plan. In this event, it may be appropriate to enable such companies to carry out the relevant investment identified in the national plan. |
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(45)

It can also not be excluded that companies are allocated a number of free emission allowances of a value lower than would be required to cover an investment identified in the national plan. In this event, it may be appropriate to enable such companies to carry out the relevant investment identified in the national plan.

| (46) | For these reasons, Member States may set up, where necessary and appropriate, a mechanism to account for the relevant transfer of funds in the cases described above. |
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(46)

For these reasons, Member States may set up, where necessary and appropriate, a mechanism to account for the relevant transfer of funds in the cases described above.

| (47) | Such a mechanism should in any case take account of the following requirements:






  (a) | The value of emission allowances allocated for free in the framework of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC has to be mirrored by the investments identified in the national plan and to be undertaken in order to match the amount of investments with the value of free emission allowances. |
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(47)

Such a mechanism should in any case take account of the following requirements:

(a)

The value of emission allowances allocated for free in the framework of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC has to be mirrored by the investments identified in the national plan and to be undertaken in order to match the amount of investments with the value of free emission allowances.

| (b) | The investments included in the national plan and financed through the mechanism have to comply with State aid rules (13). |
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(b)

The investments included in the national plan and financed through the mechanism have to comply with State aid rules (13).

| (c) | Annual adjustments of funds and investments including annual carry over funds or investments to the following year should be allowed as long as the amount to be invested according to the national plan is equal to or exceeds the total market value of free emission allowances over the whole period for which the Member State has applied for derogation under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC (cf. also section 2.2). |
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(c)

Annual adjustments of funds and investments including annual carry over funds or investments to the following year should be allowed as long as the amount to be invested according to the national plan is equal to or exceeds the total market value of free emission allowances over the whole period for which the Member State has applied for derogation under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC (cf. also section 2.2).

| (48) | Using revenues Member States may gain from auctioning (14) or other State revenues, in order to fund investments listed in the national plan will result in windfall profits for power generators receiving free allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. In the light of recitals 15 and 19 of the amending Directive 2009/29/EC as well as Article 10c(5)(e), and the overall approach and objectives of the Directive, which provides for auctioning as the default allocation method, the Commission will reject any application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) that pursues such an approach. |
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(48)

Using revenues Member States may gain from auctioning (14) or other State revenues, in order to fund investments listed in the national plan will result in windfall profits for power generators receiving free allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. In the light of recitals 15 and 19 of the amending Directive 2009/29/EC as well as Article 10c(5)(e), and the overall approach and objectives of the Directive, which provides for auctioning as the default allocation method, the Commission will reject any application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) that pursues such an approach.

5.   NON-TRANSFERABLE ALLOWANCES

| (49) | Member States making use of the option to allocate allowances for free under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC may decide that such allowances can only be used for surrendering by the installation in the year to and for which they had been allocated. A company receiving allowances subject to such conditionality would not be able to sell these allowances on the market, bank them into another year or allow them to be surrendered by another installation (even of the same company). |
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(49)

Member States making use of the option to allocate allowances for free under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC may decide that such allowances can only be used for surrendering by the installation in the year to and for which they had been allocated. A company receiving allowances subject to such conditionality would not be able to sell these allowances on the market, bank them into another year or allow them to be surrendered by another installation (even of the same company).

| (50) | A Member State introducing such conditionality runs the risk of implementing Article 10c in a manner that would not be compatible with the objectives and architecture of the Union scheme, which is designed to achieve overall emission reductions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner. It would not be legal for Member States to implement Directive 2003/87/EC in a manner contrary to its very objectives. |
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(50)

A Member State introducing such conditionality runs the risk of implementing Article 10c in a manner that would not be compatible with the objectives and architecture of the Union scheme, which is designed to achieve overall emission reductions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner. It would not be legal for Member States to implement Directive 2003/87/EC in a manner contrary to its very objectives.

| (51) | Non-transferable allowances would eliminate incentives to take emission abatement measures available to the holder of the non-transferable allowances that are feasible at costs below the prevailing emission allowance price. From the point of view of the holder of non-transferable allowances, carrying out these abatement measures would always appear more expensive than just covering the emissions with non-transferable allowances. |
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(51)

Non-transferable allowances would eliminate incentives to take emission abatement measures available to the holder of the non-transferable allowances that are feasible at costs below the prevailing emission allowance price. From the point of view of the holder of non-transferable allowances, carrying out these abatement measures would always appear more expensive than just covering the emissions with non-transferable allowances.

| (52) | In view of these considerations, the Commission strongly recommends that Member States do not make use of the option to allocate non-transferable emission allowances. However, were Member States nevertheless consider this option necessary, they must demonstrate that this option is only used to an extent that is necessary to achieve an underlying objective reflected in Article 10c and that could not be achieved more effectively by other means. Member States’ reasons should take due account of the incentives created in respect of emission reductions and the potential increase in ETS compliance costs resulting from the choice to make some allowances non-transferable. |
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(52)

In view of these considerations, the Commission strongly recommends that Member States do not make use of the option to allocate non-transferable emission allowances. However, were Member States nevertheless consider this option necessary, they must demonstrate that this option is only used to an extent that is necessary to achieve an underlying objective reflected in Article 10c and that could not be achieved more effectively by other means. Member States’ reasons should take due account of the incentives created in respect of emission reductions and the potential increase in ETS compliance costs resulting from the choice to make some allowances non-transferable.

| (53) | In the light of and without prejudice to the above, the Commission furthermore takes the view that at least the majority of emission allowances allocated for free pursuant to Article 10c of the Directive should be transferable. It recommends restricting the number of any non-transferable allowances to one which does not exceed the total emissions accruing from the supply of electricity to sectors which would not risk introducing distortions of competition into the industrial sector of the Member State concerned or of the Union (e.g. this could be the case for the household sector). Further to Article 10c(5)(e) and 10c(6), the Commission would have to reject an application that would create undue distortions of competition. |
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(53)

In the light of and without prejudice to the above, the Commission furthermore takes the view that at least the majority of emission allowances allocated for free pursuant to Article 10c of the Directive should be transferable. It recommends restricting the number of any non-transferable allowances to one which does not exceed the total emissions accruing from the supply of electricity to sectors which would not risk introducing distortions of competition into the industrial sector of the Member State concerned or of the Union (e.g. this could be the case for the household sector). Further to Article 10c(5)(e) and 10c(6), the Commission would have to reject an application that would create undue distortions of competition.

| (54) | In assessing an application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5), the Commission will examine whether in the light of the objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC in general and the specific objective of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC in particular the number of free emission allowances made non-transferable is justified, i.e. is necessary and proportionate, as well as whether this would create undue distortions of competition. The Commission will reject the application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) if it finds that these conditions are not satisfied. |
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(54)

In assessing an application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5), the Commission will examine whether in the light of the objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC in general and the specific objective of Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC in particular the number of free emission allowances made non-transferable is justified, i.e. is necessary and proportionate, as well as whether this would create undue distortions of competition. The Commission will reject the application submitted pursuant to Article 10c(5) if it finds that these conditions are not satisfied.

6.   MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT

6.1.   Assessment of the application

| (55) | Pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will assess the application taking into account all relevant elements including those listed in Article 10c(5). It will also consider obligations stemming from the Treaties and general principles of Union law. In order to ensure an efficient assessment process, the application should be based on the template provided in Annex VII to this document. The Commission will only initiate its assessment of the application once all relevant information including the necessary evidence to underpin this information is submitted. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will assess the application taking into account all relevant elements including those listed in Article 10c(5). It will also consider obligations stemming from the Treaties and general principles of Union law. In order to ensure an efficient assessment process, the application should be based on the template provided in Annex VII to this document. The Commission will only initiate its assessment of the application once all relevant information including the necessary evidence to underpin this information is submitted.

| (56) | Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC has been introduced to enable the modernisation of electricity generation in eligible Member States. For this reason, the article provides for an exception from an essential principle of the Directive. In accordance with prevailing case-law, this exception must be interpreted and applied in a manner restricted to that which is necessary to achieve the objective established by Article 10c, without jeopardising the overarching objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC has been introduced to enable the modernisation of electricity generation in eligible Member States. For this reason, the article provides for an exception from an essential principle of the Directive. In accordance with prevailing case-law, this exception must be interpreted and applied in a manner restricted to that which is necessary to achieve the objective established by Article 10c, without jeopardising the overarching objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC.

| (57) | With respect to the value of emission allowances allocated free of charge, and their relation to the amount of the investments required by Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, it is important to note that emission allowances allocated for free would result in windfall profits accruing to companies benefiting from emission allowances allocated for free, if the value of these emission allowances were not used for investments or if the value of these emission allowances were used for investments that would have been undertaken, in order to comply with other objectives and legal requirements accruing from Union law. In such a case, there would not be a corresponding contribution to reaching the objective for which the free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c has been accepted. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

With respect to the value of emission allowances allocated free of charge, and their relation to the amount of the investments required by Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC, it is important to note that emission allowances allocated for free would result in windfall profits accruing to companies benefiting from emission allowances allocated for free, if the value of these emission allowances were not used for investments or if the value of these emission allowances were used for investments that would have been undertaken, in order to comply with other objectives and legal requirements accruing from Union law. In such a case, there would not be a corresponding contribution to reaching the objective for which the free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c has been accepted.

| (58) | Furthermore, it is worth noting that the advantages arising from emission allowances allocated free of charge under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC may cause undue distortions of competition inconsistent with Article 10c(5)(e) if they are not used for the purpose for which they are to be allocated. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the advantages arising from emission allowances allocated free of charge under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC may cause undue distortions of competition inconsistent with Article 10c(5)(e) if they are not used for the purpose for which they are to be allocated.

| (59) | For these reasons, the assessment of the Commission will in particular place emphasis on whether the value of free emission allowances granted to eligible installations pursuant to Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC is used for the investments undertaken by these installations, or, where this is not the case, verify that the value of free emission allowances is made available to installations/operators or companies that have not received, or have not received sufficient emission allowances to cover respective investments identified in the national plan. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

For these reasons, the assessment of the Commission will in particular place emphasis on whether the value of free emission allowances granted to eligible installations pursuant to Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC is used for the investments undertaken by these installations, or, where this is not the case, verify that the value of free emission allowances is made available to installations/operators or companies that have not received, or have not received sufficient emission allowances to cover respective investments identified in the national plan.

| (60) | For the sake of transparency and to enable a well founded assessment of the application by the Commission, Member States should publish an application before submitting it to the Commission to enable the Commission to consider information and views from other sources. Any application submitted by a Member State should be considered environmental information and would be subject to the requirements set out in Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (15) and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (16). Member States will also need to verify whether an environmental assessment of their national plan is required, on the basis of the provisions of Directive 2001/42/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

For the sake of transparency and to enable a well founded assessment of the application by the Commission, Member States should publish an application before submitting it to the Commission to enable the Commission to consider information and views from other sources. Any application submitted by a Member State should be considered environmental information and would be subject to the requirements set out in Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (15) and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (16). Member States will also need to verify whether an environmental assessment of their national plan is required, on the basis of the provisions of Directive 2001/42/EC.

6.2.   Monitoring and enforcement provisions pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC

| (61) | Clear and effective monitoring and enforcement provisions with respect to investments foreseen in the national plan must be set up by Member States to ensure proper execution of the investments identified in the national plan. Pursuant to Article 10c(5)(d) of Directive 2003/87/EC, these provisions should be set out in a detailed manner in an application for free allocation of emission allowances. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Clear and effective monitoring and enforcement provisions with respect to investments foreseen in the national plan must be set up by Member States to ensure proper execution of the investments identified in the national plan. Pursuant to Article 10c(5)(d) of Directive 2003/87/EC, these provisions should be set out in a detailed manner in an application for free allocation of emission allowances.

| (62) | It is the Member States’ responsibility to monitor and enforce investments identified in their national plans. When assessing a Member State's application for free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will attach particular importance to whether the Member State provides for clear and effective monitoring and enforcement provisions for the implementation of the national plan, including a mechanism to closely monitor and effectively enforce investments identified in its national plan. To this end, Member States should ensure that they have in force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions that are necessary to subject investments to scrutiny through the competent national authorities clearly identified in the application. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Member States’ responsibility to monitor and enforce investments identified in their national plans. When assessing a Member State's application for free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will attach particular importance to whether the Member State provides for clear and effective monitoring and enforcement provisions for the implementation of the national plan, including a mechanism to closely monitor and effectively enforce investments identified in its national plan. To this end, Member States should ensure that they have in force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions that are necessary to subject investments to scrutiny through the competent national authorities clearly identified in the application.

| (63) | The following elements are important in this respect:






  — | The provisions should define a series of compliance indicators, examples of which are provided by Annex VIII, to be used by competent national authorities to assess progress and compatibility of investments with the requirements laid down in Directive 2003/87/EC and in this guidance document. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(63)

The following elements are important in this respect:

—

The provisions should define a series of compliance indicators, examples of which are provided by Annex VIII, to be used by competent national authorities to assess progress and compatibility of investments with the requirements laid down in Directive 2003/87/EC and in this guidance document.

| — | Field supervision should be foreseen in order to verify implementation of investments on the ground. This should include on-the-spot checks and an annual independent verification by external auditors for each investment. The auditors should issue an official document certifying the nature of each investment and the exact amount spent each year. Such documents should also attest to the veracity of expenditures claimed. |
| --- | --- |

—

Field supervision should be foreseen in order to verify implementation of investments on the ground. This should include on-the-spot checks and an annual independent verification by external auditors for each investment. The auditors should issue an official document certifying the nature of each investment and the exact amount spent each year. Such documents should also attest to the veracity of expenditures claimed.

| — | The provisions should put in place a third-party quantitative and qualitative assessment of investments to provide substantiated and independent evidence that investments comply with Directive 2003/87/EC, this guidance document, and the national plan. |
| --- | --- |

—

The provisions should put in place a third-party quantitative and qualitative assessment of investments to provide substantiated and independent evidence that investments comply with Directive 2003/87/EC, this guidance document, and the national plan.

| — | Where companies do not comply with their obligations to invest (or do not contribute to investments by transferring the value of free emission allowances not invested to the mechanism to ensure balance between the amount of investments and free emission allowances), Member State should establish penalties and corrective measures with a view to recovering the balance between the value of free emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC and the amount of investments identified in the national plan. These measures should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and should include:






  — | An obligation to repay the emission allowances allocated for free (valued in accordance with the market value at the time of repayment) up to the amount of the observed lack of investment. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Where companies do not comply with their obligations to invest (or do not contribute to investments by transferring the value of free emission allowances not invested to the mechanism to ensure balance between the amount of investments and free emission allowances), Member State should establish penalties and corrective measures with a view to recovering the balance between the value of free emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC and the amount of investments identified in the national plan. These measures should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and should include:

—

An obligation to repay the emission allowances allocated for free (valued in accordance with the market value at the time of repayment) up to the amount of the observed lack of investment.

| — | The automatic forfeiture of allowances from companies not complying with their obligations accruing from the respective national plan and this guidance document including re-converting the free emission allowances into allowances to be auctioned by the Member State concerned. |
| --- | --- |

—

The automatic forfeiture of allowances from companies not complying with their obligations accruing from the respective national plan and this guidance document including re-converting the free emission allowances into allowances to be auctioned by the Member State concerned.

| — | Dissuasive financial penalties of a punitive nature. |
| --- | --- |

—

Dissuasive financial penalties of a punitive nature.

| — | A carry-over of part of the investments foreseen for an installation from one year to the following year for an amount equivalent to the lack of investments observed that year should be possible. It is the Member State's responsibility to guarantee that the appropriate amount of funds is invested over the period of application. |
| --- | --- |

—

A carry-over of part of the investments foreseen for an installation from one year to the following year for an amount equivalent to the lack of investments observed that year should be possible. It is the Member State's responsibility to guarantee that the appropriate amount of funds is invested over the period of application.

| (64) | The results of the monitoring and enforcement process, accompanied by substantiated evidence, are to be reported each year in the annual reports to be submitted by Member States to the Commission pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC. In particular, copies of external auditor certification documents (signed with official stamps) accompanied by an official translation into English (if these are not already in English), should be annexed to the reports. Member States may choose to make the relevant operators’ annual reports public. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The results of the monitoring and enforcement process, accompanied by substantiated evidence, are to be reported each year in the annual reports to be submitted by Member States to the Commission pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC. In particular, copies of external auditor certification documents (signed with official stamps) accompanied by an official translation into English (if these are not already in English), should be annexed to the reports. Member States may choose to make the relevant operators’ annual reports public.

6.3.   Annual reports pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC

| (65) | Member States’ annual reports on investments made in modernising electricity generation pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC should be submitted to the Commission by 31 January each year, starting in 2014. They should review the nature and amount of investments undertaken during the previous year (17). |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Member States’ annual reports on investments made in modernising electricity generation pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC should be submitted to the Commission by 31 January each year, starting in 2014. They should review the nature and amount of investments undertaken during the previous year (17).

| (66) | Annual reports should confirm with substantiated evidence that investments are implemented on the ground and comply with the requirements laid down in Directive 2003/87/EC and in this guidance document, and in particular, that they contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Annual reports should confirm with substantiated evidence that investments are implemented on the ground and comply with the requirements laid down in Directive 2003/87/EC and in this guidance document, and in particular, that they contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

| (67) | The reports also need to demonstrate that the annual amount invested is coherent with the total amount of investments foreseen for the whole period of application, as set out in the Member State's national plan in reference to the market value of emission allowances allocated free of charge defined in this guidance document. Investments need not match the determined market value of emission allowances allocated for free on an annual basis. However, any discrepancy between the value of emission allowances allocated for free and the amount of investments should be remedied in the year subsequent to its occurrence to maintain a credible investment path over the period of application, taking into account the declining number of emission allowances that may be allocated for free. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The reports also need to demonstrate that the annual amount invested is coherent with the total amount of investments foreseen for the whole period of application, as set out in the Member State's national plan in reference to the market value of emission allowances allocated free of charge defined in this guidance document. Investments need not match the determined market value of emission allowances allocated for free on an annual basis. However, any discrepancy between the value of emission allowances allocated for free and the amount of investments should be remedied in the year subsequent to its occurrence to maintain a credible investment path over the period of application, taking into account the declining number of emission allowances that may be allocated for free.

| (68) | Pursuant to Article 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, annual reports are to be based on the reports provided every 12 months by operators to Member States on the implementation of their investments set out in the national plan. They should also rely on supplementary sources of information, in particular official data and independently verified data. Sources of data and the references of evidentiary documents should be made available in the reports. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Pursuant to Article 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, annual reports are to be based on the reports provided every 12 months by operators to Member States on the implementation of their investments set out in the national plan. They should also rely on supplementary sources of information, in particular official data and independently verified data. Sources of data and the references of evidentiary documents should be made available in the reports.

| (69) | Member States’ annual reports to the Commission should be made available in a transparent manner. Pursuant to Article 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States’ annual reports to the Commission have to be made public. In any case, the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information should be taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Member States’ annual reports to the Commission should be made available in a transparent manner. Pursuant to Article 10c(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States’ annual reports to the Commission have to be made public. In any case, the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information should be taken into account.

| (70) | In its assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will examine the correctness of the annual reports on the basis of the evidence provided. It may ask for further information if not all relevant evidence is submitted. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

In its assessment pursuant to Article 10c(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, the Commission will examine the correctness of the annual reports on the basis of the evidence provided. It may ask for further information if not all relevant evidence is submitted.

| (71) | Where a Member State does not provide sufficient evidence, by means of its annual reports, that the investments identified in the national plan are carried out in accordance with the schedule and the value of free allocation of emission allowances as laid down in the national plan, and unless:






  — | the Member State concerned is able to present through its annual reports sound justification for the lack of investments in a given year, or |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

Where a Member State does not provide sufficient evidence, by means of its annual reports, that the investments identified in the national plan are carried out in accordance with the schedule and the value of free allocation of emission allowances as laid down in the national plan, and unless:

—

the Member State concerned is able to present through its annual reports sound justification for the lack of investments in a given year, or

| — | the Member State concerned is able to provide evidence that corrective measures, as set out in its application pursuant to Article 10c(5)(d) have been enforced, or |
| --- | --- |

—

the Member State concerned is able to provide evidence that corrective measures, as set out in its application pursuant to Article 10c(5)(d) have been enforced, or

| — | the annual report of the subsequent year provides evidence that the lack of investments observed in the previous year has been remedied, |
| --- | --- |

—

the annual report of the subsequent year provides evidence that the lack of investments observed in the previous year has been remedied,

the Commission takes the view that there is a breach of the conditionality inherently established by Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC with respect to the allocation of free emission allowances and the investments required by Article 10c(1). Since this conditionality is crucial to achieve the underlying objectives of Article 10c, a lack of investment results in additional gains to the company concerned and does not contribute to achieving the underlying objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC or of its Article 10c in particular. Consequently, this may lead to the illegal application of Directive 2003/87/EC contrary to its very objectives. It may also raise significant Commission concerns under State aid rules. If necessary, the Commission would launch an investigation under Article 108(2) TFEU and/or infringement procedures. A procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU may result in the suspension of free allocation under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC of a number of emission allowances corresponding to the amount of the shortfall in investment. If the situation is not remedied, the Member State concerned should ultimately auction the corresponding number of allowances in accordance with the Regulation adopted pursuant to Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.

---

(1)  OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32.

(2)  It is important to stress that also installations which from a purely legal point of view could be considered electricity generators in accordance with Article 3 point u of Directive 2003/87/EC would not be considered eligible for free allocations under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, if they carry out another industrial activity, even if this industrial activity may not fall under the scope of Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC, since it may not be listed in this Annex or may not exceed the threshold for the respective industrial activity as laid down in Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC.

(3)  In 2007, no direct or indirect connection to the former UCTE network.

(4)  In 2007, connection to the former UCTE network through only a single line with a capacity of less than 400 MW.

(5)  In 2006, more than 30 % of electricity was produced from a single fossil fuel.

(6)  OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30.

(7)  See also chapter 6 and Annex VII.

(8)  The determination of the market value of free allowances for the purpose of this Communication is irrespective of market values to be determined under State aid assessments. It is also irrespective of the future evolution of European carbon prices during the third trading period. The Directive provides some flexibility in this respect in stating that the amount of the investment should be equivalent ‘to the extent possible’ to the market value of the free allocation. This means that the determination of the market value of free allowances for the implementation of Article 10c should be based on a credible and persuasive ex ante assumption of the future evolution of carbon prices, but does not have to exactly reflect the daily values of spot, futures and forwards contracts on European carbon markets from 2013 to 2020.

(9)  SEC(2010) 650, Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Analysis of options to move beyond 20 % greenhouse gas emission reductions and the risk of carbon leakage, Background information and analysis, Part II.

(10)  See recital 15 of Directive 2009/29/EC.

(11)  Article 10c(4) explicitly mentions network operators, which in accordance with Union legislation on the internal market for electricity (Directive 2009/72/EC) have to be fully unbundled from the production of electricity. Operators of renewable electricity generation would also not receive allowances, but are covered by the scope of the investments laid down in Article 10c(1).

(12)  OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 55.

(13)  See paragraph 27.

(14)  Article 10(3) only requires at least 50 % of the revenues to be used for climate related purposes, while the other (maximum) 50 % are entirely left to the discretionary of Member States.

(15)  OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 26.

(16)  OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13.

(17)  The first annual report submitted in 2014 may cover investments made from 25 June 2009 to 31 December 2013.

---

ANNEX I

Determination of the maximum number of free allowances

In order to define the quantity for allocation of free emission allowances in 2013 and subsequent years for a Member State eligible to apply under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, the following steps would need to be taken:

| (a) | determine the average annual emissions from 2005-2007 of all eligible installations; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

determine the average annual emissions from 2005-2007 of all eligible installations;

| (b) | determine the ratio of the annual average 2005-2007 of gross final national consumption (GFNC) to the annual average 2005-2007 of total gross electricity production (TGEP). The resulting figure (in percentage) would indicate the share of emissions corresponding to GFNC05-07; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

determine the ratio of the annual average 2005-2007 of gross final national consumption (GFNC) to the annual average 2005-2007 of total gross electricity production (TGEP). The resulting figure (in percentage) would indicate the share of emissions corresponding to GFNC05-07;

| (c) | the average annual emissions from 2005-2007 (see (a)) would need to be multiplied by the share of emissions corresponding to GFNC05-07 (see (b)); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the average annual emissions from 2005-2007 (see (a)) would need to be multiplied by the share of emissions corresponding to GFNC05-07 (see (b));

| (d) | the result would reflect the quantity of allowances to cover 100 % of emissions from the generation of electricity corresponding to the GFNC. It has to be multiplied by a variable, which in 2013 must not exceed 0,7 (70 %), must decline each year after 2013 and must be 0 (0 %) in 2020, to arrive at the maximum of transitional allocation of free emission allowances allowed by Directive 2003/87/EC in 2013 and subsequent years. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the result would reflect the quantity of allowances to cover 100 % of emissions from the generation of electricity corresponding to the GFNC. It has to be multiplied by a variable, which in 2013 must not exceed 0,7 (70 %), must decline each year after 2013 and must be 0 (0 %) in 2020, to arrive at the maximum of transitional allocation of free emission allowances allowed by Directive 2003/87/EC in 2013 and subsequent years.

The following formula would determine the maximum quantity of free emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c(2):

TQFAx = (GFNC05-07/TGEP05-07) × AAQEEI
  05-07 × ax

| Abbreviation | Explanation |
| --- | --- |
| TQFAx | Total quantity for free allocation in year x, with x representing each year from 2013 to 2020 |
| x | Variable representing each year in the period from 2013 to 2020 |
| GFNC05-07 | Annual average 2005-2007 of gross final national consumption |
| TGEP05-07 | Annual average 2005-2007 of total gross electricity production (Eurostat code 107000 under product code 6000‘electricity’) |
| AAQEEI
  05-07 | Annual average quantity of emissions from eligible installations 2005-2007 |
| ax | Variable representing the share of the annual average verified emissions in 2005-2007 corresponding to the gross final national consumption of the Member State concerned. The value of the variable must not exceed 0,7 (70 %) in 2013 (a2013), must decline each year after 2013 and must be 0 (0 %) in 2020. |

Abbreviation

Explanation

TQFAx

Total quantity for free allocation in year x, with x representing each year from 2013 to 2020

x

Variable representing each year in the period from 2013 to 2020

GFNC05-07

Annual average 2005-2007 of gross final national consumption

TGEP05-07

Annual average 2005-2007 of total gross electricity production (Eurostat code 107000 under product code 6000‘electricity’)

AAQEEI
  05-07

Annual average quantity of emissions from eligible installations 2005-2007

ax

Variable representing the share of the annual average verified emissions in 2005-2007 corresponding to the gross final national consumption of the Member State concerned. The value of the variable must not exceed 0,7 (70 %) in 2013 (a2013), must decline each year after 2013 and must be 0 (0 %) in 2020.

In order to execute the calculation, Member States would need to identify the installations eligible for free allocation of emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. As for installations not only producing electricity but also heat, only emissions attributable to the production of electricity must be taken into account.

Further clarification on the concept of gross final national consumption as well as the formula to calculate it is provided in Annex II.

The total quantity of allowances resulting from the formula above would represent the maximum number of free allowances at national level in year x.

---

ANNEX II

Gross final national consumption and the formula to calculate it

The concept of gross final national consumption (GFNC) of electricity is the key for the determination of the maximum number of free emission allowances in accordance with Article 10c(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC. It does, however, not correspond to a statistical term defined or used by Eurostat and therefore, has to be interpreted in the context of Article 10c.

In the light of the relevant provisions of Article 10c of the Directive, gross final national consumption should encompass the amount of electricity supplied to the final consumer’s door, i.e. the total consumption of electricity of all domestic consumers in a given country including the share of total electricity production that is necessary to generate, transport and distribute the electricity finally consumed.

With respect to exports and imports of electricity, only imports exceeding exports (net imports) are considered to matter in terms of GFNC in a given Member State. Since producers of electricity of a Member State should not receive free emission allowances for electricity that is consumed but not generated in this Member State, net imports have to be excluded from the determination of GFNC.

Gross final national consumption only concerns electricity and no other form of energy. For the sake of transparency, it should be based on publicly available data and generally acknowledged statistical concepts, as provided and used by Eurostat. The formula to calculate GFNC is provided below.

GFNC = FEC – MNET + {[(FEC – MNET)/(TGEP + MNET)] × TDL} + {[(FEC – MNET)/TGEP] × CEG}

| | Statistical concepts | Eurostat code under product code 6000‘electrical energy’ |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GFNC | Gross final national consumption of electricity | Not applicable |
| FEC | Final energy consumption (in terms of electricity) | 101700 |
| MNET | Net electricity imports | 100600 |
| TGEP | Total gross electricity production | 107000 |
| TDL | Transmission and distribution losses | 101400 |
| CEG | Electricity consumption of the electricity sector | 101301 |

Statistical concepts

Eurostat code under product code 6000‘electrical energy’

GFNC

Gross final national consumption of electricity

Not applicable

FEC

Final energy consumption (in terms of electricity)

101700

MNET

Net electricity imports

100600

TGEP

Total gross electricity production

107000

TDL

Transmission and distribution losses

101400

CEG

Electricity consumption of the electricity sector

101301

The annual average of 2005-2007 of the concepts indicated in the table represents the appropriate input to the formula. The outcome of the formula represents GFNC05-07 as used in Annex I.

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ANNEX III

Specific pre-defined emerging technologies at the demonstration stage

A.   PROJECT CATEGORIES

I.   CCS demonstration project categories (with minimum capacity thresholds
   (1)
  ):

| — | power generation: pre-combustion 250 MW, |
| --- | --- |

—

power generation: pre-combustion 250 MW,

| — | power generation: post-combustion 250 MW, |
| --- | --- |

—

power generation: post-combustion 250 MW,

| — | power generation: oxyfuel 250 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

power generation: oxyfuel 250 MW.

II.   Innovative RES demonstration project categories (with minimum size thresholds):

| — | Bioenergy project subcategories:






  — | Lignocellulose to intermediate solid, liquid or slurry bioenergy carriers via pyrolysis with capacity 40 kt/y of the final product. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Bioenergy project subcategories:

—

Lignocellulose to intermediate solid, liquid or slurry bioenergy carriers via pyrolysis with capacity 40 kt/y of the final product.

| — | Lignocellulose to intermediate solid, liquid or slurry bioenergy carriers via torrefaction with capacity 40 kt/y of the final product. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lignocellulose to intermediate solid, liquid or slurry bioenergy carriers via torrefaction with capacity 40 kt/y of the final product.

| — | Lignocellulose to Synthetic Natural Gas or synthesis gas and/ or to power via gasification with capacity 40 million normal cubic metres per year (M Nm3/y) of the final product or 100 GWh/y of electricity. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lignocellulose to Synthetic Natural Gas or synthesis gas and/ or to power via gasification with capacity 40 million normal cubic metres per year (M Nm3/y) of the final product or 100 GWh/y of electricity.

| — | Lignocellulose to biofuels or bioliquids and/ or to power including via directly heated gasification with capacity 15 million litres per year (Ml/y) of the final product or 100 GWh/y of electricity. Production of Synthetic Natural Gas is excluded under this sub-category. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lignocellulose to biofuels or bioliquids and/ or to power including via directly heated gasification with capacity 15 million litres per year (Ml/y) of the final product or 100 GWh/y of electricity. Production of Synthetic Natural Gas is excluded under this sub-category.

| — | Lignocellulosic raw material, such as black liquor and/ or products from pyrolysis or torrefaction, via entrained flow gasification to any biofuels with capacity 40 Ml/y of the final product. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lignocellulosic raw material, such as black liquor and/ or products from pyrolysis or torrefaction, via entrained flow gasification to any biofuels with capacity 40 Ml/y of the final product.

| — | Lignocellulose to electricity with 48 % efficiency based on lower heating value (50 % moisture) with capacity 40 MWe or higher. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lignocellulose to electricity with 48 % efficiency based on lower heating value (50 % moisture) with capacity 40 MWe or higher.

| — | Lignocellulose to ethanol and higher alcohols via chemical and biological processes with capacity 40 Ml/y of the final product. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lignocellulose to ethanol and higher alcohols via chemical and biological processes with capacity 40 Ml/y of the final product.

| — | Lignocellulose and/ or household waste to biogas, biofuels or bioliquids via chemical and biological processes with capacity 6 MNm3/y of Methane or 10 Ml/y of the final product. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lignocellulose and/ or household waste to biogas, biofuels or bioliquids via chemical and biological processes with capacity 6 MNm3/y of Methane or 10 Ml/y of the final product.

| — | Algae and/or micro-organisms to biofuels or bioliquids via biological and/or chemical processes with capacity 40 Ml/y of the final product. |
| --- | --- |

—

Algae and/or micro-organisms to biofuels or bioliquids via biological and/or chemical processes with capacity 40 Ml/y of the final product.

Note: Sustainability criteria as provided in Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources must be met for biofuels and bioliquids within the meaning of that Directive.

| — | Concentrated solar power — project subcategories:






  — | Parabolic trough or Fresnel system using molten salts or other environmentally-benign heat transfer fluid with nominal capacity 30 MW. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Concentrated solar power — project subcategories:

—

Parabolic trough or Fresnel system using molten salts or other environmentally-benign heat transfer fluid with nominal capacity 30 MW.

| — | Parabolic trough or Fresnel system based on Direct Steam Generation with nominal capacity 30 MW. Direct steam solar temperature to be above 500 °C. |
| --- | --- |

—

Parabolic trough or Fresnel system based on Direct Steam Generation with nominal capacity 30 MW. Direct steam solar temperature to be above 500 °C.

| — | Tower system using superheated steam cycle (either multi-tower or combination liner collectors — tower) with nominal capacity 50 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Tower system using superheated steam cycle (either multi-tower or combination liner collectors — tower) with nominal capacity 50 MW.

| — | Tower system using pressurised air with temperature above 750 °C and solar hybrid gas turbine with nominal capacity 30 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Tower system using pressurised air with temperature above 750 °C and solar hybrid gas turbine with nominal capacity 30 MW.

| — | Large-scale Stirling dish power plants with solar to electric efficiency of over 20 % and nominal capacity of at least 25 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Large-scale Stirling dish power plants with solar to electric efficiency of over 20 % and nominal capacity of at least 25 MW.

Note: Dry cooling, hybridization and (advanced) heat storage solution should not be included in the demonstration plants.

| — | Photovoltaics — project subcategories:






  — | Large-scale concentrator photovoltaics power plants with nominal capacity 20 MW. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Photovoltaics — project subcategories:

—

Large-scale concentrator photovoltaics power plants with nominal capacity 20 MW.

| — | Large scale multi-junction Si-thin-film photovoltaics power plants with nominal capacity 40 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Large scale multi-junction Si-thin-film photovoltaics power plants with nominal capacity 40 MW.

| — | Large scale Copper indium gallium (di)selenide (CIGS)-based photovoltaics power plants with nominal capacity 40 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Large scale Copper indium gallium (di)selenide (CIGS)-based photovoltaics power plants with nominal capacity 40 MW.

| — | Geothermal — project subcategories:






  — | Enhanced geothermal systems in tensional stress fields with nominal capacity 5 MWe. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Geothermal — project subcategories:

—

Enhanced geothermal systems in tensional stress fields with nominal capacity 5 MWe.

| — | Enhanced geothermal systems in compressional stress fields with nominal capacity 5 MWe. |
| --- | --- |

—

Enhanced geothermal systems in compressional stress fields with nominal capacity 5 MWe.

| — | Enhanced geothermal systems in areas with deep compact sedimentary and granite rocks and other crystalline structures with nominal capacity 5 MWe. |
| --- | --- |

—

Enhanced geothermal systems in areas with deep compact sedimentary and granite rocks and other crystalline structures with nominal capacity 5 MWe.

| — | Enhanced geothermal systems in deep limestone with nominal capacity 5 MWe. |
| --- | --- |

—

Enhanced geothermal systems in deep limestone with nominal capacity 5 MWe.

Note: Combined Heat and Power (CHP) applications with the same electricity thresholds are only eligible with respect to electricity production

| — | Wind — project subcategories:






  — | Off-shore wind (minimum turbines size 6 MW) with nominal capacity 40 MW. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Wind — project subcategories:

—

Off-shore wind (minimum turbines size 6 MW) with nominal capacity 40 MW.

| — | Off-shore wind (minimum turbines size 8 MW) with nominal capacity 40 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Off-shore wind (minimum turbines size 8 MW) with nominal capacity 40 MW.

| — | Off-shore wind (minimum turbines size 10 MW) with nominal capacity 40 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Off-shore wind (minimum turbines size 10 MW) with nominal capacity 40 MW.

| — | Floating off-shore wind systems with nominal capacity 25 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Floating off-shore wind systems with nominal capacity 25 MW.

| — | On-shore wind turbines optimised for complex terrains (such as forested terrains, mountainous areas): with nominal capacity 25 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

On-shore wind turbines optimised for complex terrains (such as forested terrains, mountainous areas): with nominal capacity 25 MW.

| — | On-shore wind turbines optimised for cold climates (compatible with temperature lower than – 30 °C and severe icing conditions) with nominal capacity 25 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

On-shore wind turbines optimised for cold climates (compatible with temperature lower than – 30 °C and severe icing conditions) with nominal capacity 25 MW.

| — | Ocean — project subcategories:






  — | Wave energy devices with nominal capacity 5 MW. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Ocean — project subcategories:

—

Wave energy devices with nominal capacity 5 MW.

| — | Marine/tidal currents energy devices with nominal capacity 5 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Marine/tidal currents energy devices with nominal capacity 5 MW.

| — | Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) with nominal capacity 10 MW. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) with nominal capacity 10 MW.

| — | Hydropower — project subcategories:






  — | Power generation with High Temperature Superconducting Generators: 20 MW. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Hydropower — project subcategories:

—

Power generation with High Temperature Superconducting Generators: 20 MW.

| — | Distributed Renewable Management (smart grids)- project subcategories:






  — | Renewable energy management and optimisation for small and medium scale Distributed Generators in rural environment with predominant solar generation: 20 MW on Low Voltage (LV) network + 50 MW on Medium Voltage (MV) network. |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Distributed Renewable Management (smart grids)- project subcategories:

—

Renewable energy management and optimisation for small and medium scale Distributed Generators in rural environment with predominant solar generation: 20 MW on Low Voltage (LV) network + 50 MW on Medium Voltage (MV) network.

| — | Renewable energy management and optimisation for small and medium scale Distributed Generators in rural environment with predominant wind generation: 20 MW on LV network + 50 MW on MV network. |
| --- | --- |

—

Renewable energy management and optimisation for small and medium scale Distributed Generators in rural environment with predominant wind generation: 20 MW on LV network + 50 MW on MV network.

| — | Renewable energy management and optimisation for small and medium scale Distributed Generators in urban environment: 20 MW on LV network + 50 MW on MV network. |
| --- | --- |

—

Renewable energy management and optimisation for small and medium scale Distributed Generators in urban environment: 20 MW on LV network + 50 MW on MV network.

Note: The use of active loads (electric heaters/heat pumps etc) shall not be excluded.

---

(1)  CCS power thresholds are expressed as gross electrical output before capture.

(2)  OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 16.

---

ANNEX IV

Infrastructure, clean technologies, diversification of energy mix and sources of supply

From the context of how the notion ‘infrastructure’ is used in relevant Union legislation (1), there is a clear indication that the term ‘infrastructure’ includes all network-related facilities required to ensure the transport (transmission and distribution) of electricity. This is notwithstanding the fact that the notion ‘infrastructure’ can also be conceived to cover electricity generation plants.

While there is no applicable definition of ‘clean technologies’, for the purpose of this guidance document, the Commission uses the term to refer to technologies for the production of electricity resulting in relatively lower carbon emissions or a higher level of environmental protection, including energy from renewable sources.

The Commission considers that increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the total primary energy supply and in electricity generation would always contribute to diversification of the energy mix and sources of supply in making the overall energy supply more balanced and less dependent on imports of fossil fuels.

With declining indigenous energy production, dependence on imported energy is set to rise (2). For example, by 2020, Union gas imports are expected to increase to 73 % from 61 % today. While this is thought to represent a reasonable balance at Union level, a number of Member States, also eligible for Article 10c, rely on a single supplier for 100 % of their gas needs. In such cases, investments designed to diversify gas supplies to these Member States might contribute considerably to diversify the energy mix and reinforce security of supply of these Member States. Such investment should be compatible with the aim to reduce the carbon intensity of the energy supply of these Member States, which is also a manner to reinforce security of supply, and at the same time reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

---

(1)  Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 and Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC.

(2)  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Second Strategic Energy Review — An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, COM(2008) 781.

---

ANNEX V

Types of eligible investments

The types of investment eligible under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC are the following:

| Investment types |
| --- |
| A | Retrofitting of infrastructure |
| B | Upgrading of infrastructure |
| C | Clean technologies |
| D | Diversification of energy mix |
| E | Diversification of sources of supply |

Investment types

A

Retrofitting of infrastructure

B

Upgrading of infrastructure

C

Clean technologies

D

Diversification of energy mix

E

Diversification of sources of supply

The following investments represent examples of investments eligible under Article 10c:

| (a) | modernisation of electricity generation with a view to rendering electricity generation more efficient and less CO2 intensive (better relation between gross and net electricity consumption, i.e. increasing the share of net in gross electricity consumption and less CO2 emissions per MWe); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

modernisation of electricity generation with a view to rendering electricity generation more efficient and less CO2 intensive (better relation between gross and net electricity consumption, i.e. increasing the share of net in gross electricity consumption and less CO2 emissions per MWe);

| (b) | reducing CO2 emissions by retrofitting coal power plants (State of the art); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

reducing CO2 emissions by retrofitting coal power plants (State of the art);

| (c) | electricity generation through renewable energy sources (beyond the target laid down in the RES Directive) including corresponding network requirements; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

electricity generation through renewable energy sources (beyond the target laid down in the RES Directive) including corresponding network requirements;

| (d) | replacing more CO2 intensive generation capacity by less CO2 intensive generation capacity; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

replacing more CO2 intensive generation capacity by less CO2 intensive generation capacity;

| (e) | carbon capture and storage; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

carbon capture and storage;

| (f) | smart grids; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

smart grids;

| (g) | CHP including corresponding network requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(g)

CHP including corresponding network requirements.

The list is non-exhaustive. All eligible projects should be assessed for compatibility under State aid rules provided that they involve State aid.

---

ANNEX VI

Model-based projections of carbon prices in the third trading period

| Carbon price projections (annual average in EUR/tonne CO2) | 2010-2014 | 2015-2019 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| in EUR in 2008 | 14,5 | 20,0 |
| in EUR in 2005 | 13,6 | 18,7 |

Carbon price projections (annual average in EUR/tonne CO2)

2010-2014

2015-2019

in EUR in 2008

14,5

20,0

in EUR in 2005

13,6

18,7

These values stem from the baseline scenario defined in the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission ‘Analysis of options to move beyond 20 % greenhouse gas emission reductions and the risk of carbon leakage’, Background information and analysis, Part II, SEC(2010) 650.

---

ANNEX VII

Template for the application pursuant to Article 10c(5)

When submitting their application for transitional free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10c(5) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States should use the following template and specify the following information:

A.   Eligibility of Member State

Evidence that at least one of the conditions laid down in Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC is met.

B.   Eligibility of installations considered to receive transitional allocation of free emission allowances, maximum number of free emission allowances and number of free emission allowances allocated to these installations including non-transferable allowances

| 1. | List of installations deemed to be eligible for transitional allocation of free emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC. |
| --- | --- |

1.

List of installations deemed to be eligible for transitional allocation of free emission allowances under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC.

| 2. | Maximum number of free emission allowances in 2013 and subsequent years. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Maximum number of free emission allowances in 2013 and subsequent years.

| 3. | Installation-based transitional allocation of free emission allowances. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Installation-based transitional allocation of free emission allowances.

| 3.1. | Number of free emission allowances on the basis of verified emissions 2005 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

Number of free emission allowances on the basis of verified emissions 2005 to 2007.

| 3.2. | Number of free emission allowances on the basis of benchmarks. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

Number of free emission allowances on the basis of benchmarks.

| 3.3. | Detailed information on the number of emission allowances made non-transferable and allocated to eligible installations. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

Detailed information on the number of emission allowances made non-transferable and allocated to eligible installations.

C.   National plan and investments listed in the national plan, eligibility of investments in the national plan, balance between market value of emission allowances allocated free of charge and amount of investments

The national plan sets out the strategy of the Member State concerned on how to modernise electricity generation during the period of transitional allocation of free emission allowances. It identifies the investments in this respect as well as the role of the investment types in achieving the objective. The national plan also attributes the execution of each investment in the national plan to a certain year taking into account the decreasing number of free emission allowances during the whole period of transitional free allocation of emission allowances.

For each investment included in the national plan, Member States should specify:

| — | the company undertaking the investment, |
| --- | --- |

—

the company undertaking the investment,

| — | the type of the investment in accordance with Annex V, |
| --- | --- |

—

the type of the investment in accordance with Annex V,

| — | the amount of the investment, |
| --- | --- |

—

the amount of the investment,

| — | the number and market value of emission allowances allocated for free to the company for the investment concerned, and |
| --- | --- |

—

the number and market value of emission allowances allocated for free to the company for the investment concerned, and

| — | the principles with which the investment complies including information necessary to assess compliance with the investment principles. |
| --- | --- |

—

the principles with which the investment complies including information necessary to assess compliance with the investment principles.

Where Member States make use of a mechanism to ensure that the value of free emission allowances granted under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC corresponds to the amount of investments identified in the national plan, Member States should specify the overall approach, the legal base and operational details of this mechanism. They should also provide for legal provisions ensuring that information on the net financial flows under this mechanism will be made available through the reports to be submitted to the Commission pursuant to Article 10c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC.

D.   Monitoring and enforcement provisions with respect to the intended investments pursuant to the national plan

Member States should provide and set out in detail:

| — | a description of monitoring and enforcement provisions established in the Member State concerned including compliance indicators, provisions on on-site visits and independent verification of investments, and |
| --- | --- |

—

a description of monitoring and enforcement provisions established in the Member State concerned including compliance indicators, provisions on on-site visits and independent verification of investments, and

| — | provisions to ensure compliance with the obligation of companies to execute investments identified in the national plan including sanctions in case of non-compliance. |
| --- | --- |

—

provisions to ensure compliance with the obligation of companies to execute investments identified in the national plan including sanctions in case of non-compliance.

E.   Transparency and public consultation

Member States should summarise the process by which the application and the plan has been prepared and how the public has been informed and involved.

---

ANNEX VIII

Examples of compliance indicators

The monitoring and enforcement provisions should contain compliance indicators used to demonstrate that investments comply with the principles laid down in the guidance, in particular with regard to the requirements for national plans.

Examples of compliance indicators are listed below (the list is non-exhaustive):

| (a) | comparison of the emission factor of the technology adopted by each installation due to investments undertaken under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC with the emission factor of the technology used before the retrofitting/upgrading; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

comparison of the emission factor of the technology adopted by each installation due to investments undertaken under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC with the emission factor of the technology used before the retrofitting/upgrading;

| (b) | comparison of the emission factor of the technology adopted by each installation due to investments undertaken under Article 10c with the emission factor of the Union-wide best available technology taking into account the fuel used; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

comparison of the emission factor of the technology adopted by each installation due to investments undertaken under Article 10c with the emission factor of the Union-wide best available technology taking into account the fuel used;

| (c) | expected and implemented decrease in total greenhouse gases emissions generated by national electricity production due to investments undertaken under Article 10c (compared to business as usual scenario); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

expected and implemented decrease in total greenhouse gases emissions generated by national electricity production due to investments undertaken under Article 10c (compared to business as usual scenario);

| (d) | expected and implemented decrease in the share of the dominant fossil fuel in national electricity production due to investments undertaken under Article 10c; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

expected and implemented decrease in the share of the dominant fossil fuel in national electricity production due to investments undertaken under Article 10c;

| (e) | expected and implemented efficiency gains in electricity generation process/distribution networks (in terms of MWh saved) due to investments undertaken under Article 10c and corresponding CO2 emission reductions; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

expected and implemented efficiency gains in electricity generation process/distribution networks (in terms of MWh saved) due to investments undertaken under Article 10c and corresponding CO2 emission reductions;

| (f) | expected and implemented increase of the share of CO2-free and less CO2 intensive fuels in national energy mix due to investments undertaken under Article 10c; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

expected and implemented increase of the share of CO2-free and less CO2 intensive fuels in national energy mix due to investments undertaken under Article 10c;

| (g) | installed capacities (in MW) on stream in December 2008 that will be replaced by new less carbon intensive capacities financed due to investments undertaken under Article 10c; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

installed capacities (in MW) on stream in December 2008 that will be replaced by new less carbon intensive capacities financed due to investments undertaken under Article 10c;

| (h) | share of installed capacities on stream in December 2008 replaced by new less carbon intensive capacities financed due to investments undertaken under Article 10c, compared to total installed capacities in operation in December 2008; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

share of installed capacities on stream in December 2008 replaced by new less carbon intensive capacities financed due to investments undertaken under Article 10c, compared to total installed capacities in operation in December 2008;

| (i) | installed capacities (in MW) of renewable energy expected to be put on stream due to investments undertaken under Article 10c; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

installed capacities (in MW) of renewable energy expected to be put on stream due to investments undertaken under Article 10c;

| (j) | share of funds accruing from Article 10c in total investment project; |
| --- | --- |

(j)

share of funds accruing from Article 10c in total investment project;

| (k) | for investments receiving funds under other Union sources and/or other public and private sources, share of each Union funding source and other public and private funds in total investment project; |
| --- | --- |

(k)

for investments receiving funds under other Union sources and/or other public and private sources, share of each Union funding source and other public and private funds in total investment project;

| (l) | expected financial performance of investments undertaken under Article 10c (i.e. financial rate of return, costs/benefits, etc.). |
| --- | --- |

(l)

expected financial performance of investments undertaken under Article 10c (i.e. financial rate of return, costs/benefits, etc.).

---

V Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Commission

| 31.3.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.3.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/29

---

Call for applications for researcher grants under the work programme of the joint European Metrology Research Programme (EMRP)

2011/C 99/04

Notice is hereby given of the launch of a call for applications for researcher grants under the work programme of the European Metrology Research Programme.

Applications are invited from 31 March 2011 for:

| — | Stage 3 of the call on behalf of the JRP-consortia for researcher excellence grants (REG) and researcher mobility grants (RMG). |
| --- | --- |

—

Stage 3 of the call on behalf of the JRP-consortia for researcher excellence grants (REG) and researcher mobility grants (RMG).

EMRP researcher grant opportunities are linked to joint research projects (JRPs) funded under:

| — | EMRP Call 2009 — Energy, |
| --- | --- |

—

EMRP Call 2009 — Energy,

| — | EMRP Call 2010 — Industry & Environment. |
| --- | --- |

—

EMRP Call 2010 — Industry & Environment.

Closing date is 6 May 2011.

Information on the modalities of the call and call documentation is published on the following website:

http://www.emrponline.eu/adverts

---

| 31.3.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.3.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/30

---

SPECIFIC CALL FOR PROPOSALS — EAC/16/11

Erasmus University Charter 2012

2011/C 99/05

1.   Objectives and description

The Erasmus University Charter provides the general framework for the European cooperation activities a higher education institution (HEI) may carry out within the Erasmus programme as part of the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP). The Erasmus University Charter must be awarded as a prerequisite for HEI to organise student mobility and teaching and other staff mobility, to carry out Erasmus intensive language courses and intensive programmes, and to apply for multilateral projects, networks, accompanying measures and to organise preparatory visits. The Erasmus University Charter is based on the LLP Decision (1) which covers the 2007 to 2013 period. The specific objectives of the LLP are listed in Article 1.3 of the Decision.

2.   Eligible applicants

The Erasmus University Charter applies to all Higher Education Institutions defined in Article 2.10 of the Decision.

Applicants must be established in one of the following countries:

| — | the 27 Member States of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

the 27 Member States of the European Union,

| — | the EFTA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, |
| --- | --- |

—

the EFTA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland,

| — | the candidate countries: Turkey, Croatia. |
| --- | --- |

—

the candidate countries: Turkey, Croatia.

3.   Deadline for the submission of applications

The deadline for submitting applications for the Erasmus University Charter is 25 May 2011.

4.   Full details

The information about the Erasmus programme and the Erasmus University Charter can be found at the following internet address:

http://ec.europa.eu/llp

Applications must be submitted according to the guidelines provided by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency and available at the address:

http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Decision No 1720/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an action programme in the field of lifelong learning. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:327:0045:0068:EN:PDF

---

European Food Safety Authority

| 31.3.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.3.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/31

---

Call for expressions of interest for scientific experts to be considered for membership of the Scientific Panels and the Scientific Committee of the European Food Safety Authority (Parma, Italy)

2011/C 99/06

| — | Panel on animal health and welfare (AHAW) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on animal health and welfare (AHAW)

| — | Panel on food additives and nutrient sources added to food (ANS) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on food additives and nutrient sources added to food (ANS)

| — | Panel on biological hazards (BIOHAZ) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on biological hazards (BIOHAZ)

| — | Panel on food contact materials, flavourings, enzymes and processing aids (CEF) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on food contact materials, flavourings, enzymes and processing aids (CEF)

| — | Panel on contaminants in the food chain (CONTAM) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on contaminants in the food chain (CONTAM)

| — | Panel on feed additives and products or substances used in animal feed (FEEDAP) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on feed additives and products or substances used in animal feed (FEEDAP)

| — | Panel on genetically modified organisms (GMO) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on genetically modified organisms (GMO)

| — | Panel on dietetic products, nutrition and allergies (NDA) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on dietetic products, nutrition and allergies (NDA)

| — | Panel on plant health (PLH) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on plant health (PLH)

| — | Panel on plant protection products and their residues (PPR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Panel on plant protection products and their residues (PPR)

| — | Scientific Committee (SC) |
| --- | --- |

—

Scientific Committee (SC)

Ref.: EFSA/E/2011/001

1.   Subject of the call

This call is addressed to scientists who wish to be considered for membership of the Scientific Committee (SC) of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) or one of EFSA’s Scientific Panels on, namely: animal health and welfare (AHAW), food additives and nutrient sources added to food (ANS), biological hazards (BIOHAZ), food contact materials, enzymes, flavourings and processing aids (CEF), contaminants in the food chain (CONTAM), feed additives and products or substances used in animal feed (FEEDAP), genetically modified organisms (GMO), dietetic products, nutrition and allergies (NDA), plant health (PLH), plant protection products and their residues (PPR).

The current members of the Scientific Committee and of eight of the Scientific Panels (all except ANS and CEF) are serving a three-year term of office which is due to expire in mid-2012. The new members will be appointed for the following three-year term starting mid-2012 and ending mid-2015.

Regarding the members of ANS and CEF Scientific Panels, the three-year term mandate that is starting in mid-2011 is due to expire in mid-2014. New members to fill in vacant posts in these panels may be appointed from the reserve list established as a result of this call. The same reserve list may also serve to appoint new members of the ANS and CEF Scientific Panels for the following three-year term, starting mid-2014 and ending mid-2017.

Experts included in the existing reserve lists, that is, those established as a result of the following calls: EFSA/E/2009/001 (‘the 2009 reserve list’) and both EFSA/E/2010/001 and EFSA/E/2010/002 (‘the 2011 reserve list’), should submit a new application to the new call if they wish to be considered for membership of the Scientific Committee or of the Scientific Panels in 2012 or if they wish to be included in the 2012 reserve list.

The 2009 reserve list and the 2011 reserve list will be closed as soon as the 2012 reserve list is established.

2.   The European Food Safety Authority

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is the keystone of European Union (EU) risk assessment regarding food and feed safety. In close collaboration with national authorities and in open consultation with its stakeholders, EFSA provides independent scientific advice and clear communication on existing and emerging risks grounded in the most up-to-date scientific methodologies and data available. Its scientific advice underpins the policies and decisions of risk managers in the European institutions and EU Member States.

EFSA brings together Europe’s best available experts in risk assessment in the field of food and feed safety, who act in an independent capacity for an autonomous, self-governed organisation to provide the European institutions and the Member States with scientific advice of the highest standard.

The Authority is committed to the core standards of scientific excellence, openness, transparency, independence and responsiveness. By working independently, openly and transparently EFSA delivers the best possible scientific advice and therefore contributes to strengthening the European food and feed safety system.

For more information regarding EFSA, please refer to its Founding Regulation:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002R0178:20090807:EN:PDF

3.   EFSA’s Scientific Panels and Scientific Committee

The Scientific Committee and Scientific Panels are responsible for providing the scientific opinions of the Authority and other advice as appropriate, each within their own spheres of competence. They produce scientific opinions and advice for risk managers. This helps to provide a sound foundation for the formulation of European policies and legislation and this supports risk managers in taking decisions.

The Scientific Panels are normally composed of 21 independent scientific experts. The Scientific Committee is composed of the Chairs of each Scientific Panel and six other scientific experts.

Members of the Scientific Committee and the Scientific Panels are appointed for a three-year term of office that may be renewed twice. members are expected to attend and contribute actively to the meetings of the Scientific Committee or Scientific Panels where opinions, statements or guidance documents are adopted.

These scientific opinions, statements and guidance documents are published in the EFSA Journal, a monthly publication which is indexed in bibliographic databases relevant to EFSA’s work.

Applicants are referred to the Annex I published on EFSA’s website to consult the detailed description of the remit of the Scientific Committee and the Scientific Panels.

Applicants are advised to give careful consideration to Annex I when preparing their applications. In the context of the evaluation on whether they meet the selection requirements (see section 5 below), due consideration will be given to the suitability of the applicants’ profiles in relation to the remit of the Scientific Committee or of the Scientific Panels.

For more information regarding the selection of members of the Scientific Committee and Panels please refer to the ‘Decision of the Executive Director concerning the selection of members of the Scientific Committee, Scientific Panels and external experts’

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/expertselection.pdf

For more information on the establishment and operations of Scientific Panels ant their working groups, please refer to the ‘Decision of the Management Board concerning the establishment and operations of the Scientific Committee, Scientific Panels and of their working groups’.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/paneloperation.pdf

4.   The role of the members of EFSA’s Scientific Panels and Scientific Committee

Members of the Scientific Committee and Scientific Panels are experienced, independent scientists selected and appointed in accordance with EFSA’s rules and EFSA’s Founding Regulation.

During their term in office members of Scientific Committee and Scientific Panels will be asked to perform the following tasks:

| — | contributing to the discussion, the preparation and the adoption of scientific opinions of the Scientific Panel and/or of the Scientific Committee and their working groups, |
| --- | --- |

—

contributing to the discussion, the preparation and the adoption of scientific opinions of the Scientific Panel and/or of the Scientific Committee and their working groups,

| — | provision of scientific advice on matters falling within the remit of the Scientific Panel and/or of the Scientific Committee, |
| --- | --- |

—

provision of scientific advice on matters falling within the remit of the Scientific Panel and/or of the Scientific Committee,

| — | provision of advice on conducting and organising the scientific activities of the Scientific Panel and/or of the Scientific Committee. |
| --- | --- |

—

provision of advice on conducting and organising the scientific activities of the Scientific Panel and/or of the Scientific Committee.

Members of the Scientific Committee and Scientific Panels may be chosen as chairs, vice-chairs and rapporteurs of the Scientific Committee, Scientific Panels and of their working groups in line with the EFSA Management Board Decision (1) concerning the establishment and operations of the Scientific Committee and Panels.

General conditions:

| | Members of a Scientific Panel and of the Scientific Committee will be requested to attend two-day meetings usually held in Parma, Italy. These meetings will take place between six and ten times per year. |
| --- | --- |

Members of a Scientific Panel and of the Scientific Committee will be requested to attend two-day meetings usually held in Parma, Italy. These meetings will take place between six and ten times per year.

| | In addition, members of Scientific Panels and of the Scientific Committee are expected to participate, as appropriate, in some meetings of the working groups that are established either by the Scientific Panels or the Scientific Committee. These meetings usually take place six to thirteen times a year. |
| --- | --- |

In addition, members of Scientific Panels and of the Scientific Committee are expected to participate, as appropriate, in some meetings of the working groups that are established either by the Scientific Panels or the Scientific Committee. These meetings usually take place six to thirteen times a year.

| | Attendance at the meetings of the Scientific Panels, the Scientific Committee or of the working groups requires some degree of preparatory work, including prior reading and drafting of documents. Meetings and most documents are in English. |
| --- | --- |

Attendance at the meetings of the Scientific Panels, the Scientific Committee or of the working groups requires some degree of preparatory work, including prior reading and drafting of documents. Meetings and most documents are in English.

| | Applicants are required to express their commitment that, if appointed, they will participate in the activities of the Scientific Committee or of the Scientific Panels. |
| --- | --- |

Applicants are required to express their commitment that, if appointed, they will participate in the activities of the Scientific Committee or of the Scientific Panels.

| | EFSA will, in accordance with its financial rules, bear the travel costs, daily and accommodation allowance of the members. A special indemnity will be paid for each full day of meeting attendance (2). |
| --- | --- |

EFSA will, in accordance with its financial rules, bear the travel costs, daily and accommodation allowance of the members. A special indemnity will be paid for each full day of meeting attendance (2).

5.   Selection procedure

Applicants are requested to indicate in the application form a maximum of three (3) preferences for those Scientific Panels and/or the Scientific Committee they wish to apply for, in order of preference.

Members who have just completed three consecutive terms of office in the Scientific Committee may apply for membership of a Scientific Panel. Likewise, members who have just completed three consecutive terms of office in a Scientific Panel may apply for membership of the Scientific Committee or of a different Scientific Panel.

The requirements

A.   Eligibility criteria

The following requirements must be met for applicants to be considered eligible:

| (i) | a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies of at least four years attested by a diploma in the following fields: agronomy/agricultural science, animal nutrition, biochemistry, biology, chemistry, ecotoxicology, environmental science, epidemiology, food microbiology, food technology, human medicine, life science, occupational medicine, pharmacology, pharmacy, public health, toxicology, veterinary medicine and related areas; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies of at least four years attested by a diploma in the following fields: agronomy/agricultural science, animal nutrition, biochemistry, biology, chemistry, ecotoxicology, environmental science, epidemiology, food microbiology, food technology, human medicine, life science, occupational medicine, pharmacology, pharmacy, public health, toxicology, veterinary medicine and related areas;

| (ii) | in addition to the above, at least 10 years of professional experience relevant to the remit of the Panel(s) chosen gained after obtaining the requested diploma; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

in addition to the above, at least 10 years of professional experience relevant to the remit of the Panel(s) chosen gained after obtaining the requested diploma;

| (iii) | thorough knowledge of the English language (3); |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

thorough knowledge of the English language (3);

| (iv) | applicants must complete the declaration of interests included in the application in a detailed, accurate and complete manner (4). Please note that failure to fill in this part of the form in a complete manner will result in the rejection of the application (5); |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

applicants must complete the declaration of interests included in the application in a detailed, accurate and complete manner (4). Please note that failure to fill in this part of the form in a complete manner will result in the rejection of the application (5);

| (v) | applicants must be nationals of a Member State of the European Union (EU), or of a country of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or of EU candidate countries. Experts from third countries may also apply but will only be considered for membership of the Scientific Committee or of Scientific Panels, if the required level of expertise cannot be found among nationals of EU, EFTA or EU candidate countries. |
| --- | --- |

(v)

applicants must be nationals of a Member State of the European Union (EU), or of a country of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or of EU candidate countries. Experts from third countries may also apply but will only be considered for membership of the Scientific Committee or of Scientific Panels, if the required level of expertise cannot be found among nationals of EU, EFTA or EU candidate countries.

B.   Selection criteria — Evaluation

Applications meeting the eligibility requirements (see section 5. A) will be admitted to a comparative evaluation carried out by EFSA on the basis of the selection criteria indicated below.

Applicants are strongly encouraged to fill in the application form in all sections with the necessary information and evidence, as this will form the basis for their evaluation.

The evaluation of all applications considered eligible will be carried out by means of a scoring range from zero through to five for each of the selection criteria indicated below. In order to reflect the relative importance of the different selection criteria, a weighting coefficient will be attributed (specific coefficients are established for the Scientific Committee). Each application will obtain a score ranging between zero and 100.

The following selection criteria will be examined:

| — | experience in carrying out scientific risk assessment and/or providing scientific advice in fields related to food and feed safety in the areas of competence and expertise of the Scientific Committee or the Scientific Panel preferred (for the Scientific Panels maximum 25 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 5; for the Scientific Committee maximum 30 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 6) |
| --- | --- |

—

experience in carrying out scientific risk assessment and/or providing scientific advice in fields related to food and feed safety in the areas of competence and expertise of the Scientific Committee or the Scientific Panel preferred (for the Scientific Panels maximum 25 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 5; for the Scientific Committee maximum 30 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 6)

| — | proven scientific excellence in one, or preferably several fields linked to the area covered by the Scientific Committee or the Scientific Panel preferred (for the Scientific Panels maximum 20 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 4; for the Scientific Committee maximum 15 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 3) |
| --- | --- |

—

proven scientific excellence in one, or preferably several fields linked to the area covered by the Scientific Committee or the Scientific Panel preferred (for the Scientific Panels maximum 20 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 4; for the Scientific Committee maximum 15 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 3)

| — | experience in peer reviewing scientific work and publications, in fields related to the area covered by the Scientific Committee or the Scientific Panel preferred (maximum 15 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 3) |
| --- | --- |

—

experience in peer reviewing scientific work and publications, in fields related to the area covered by the Scientific Committee or the Scientific Panel preferred (maximum 15 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 3)

| — | the ability to analyse complex information and dossiers, often from a wide range of scientific disciplines and sources and to prepare draft scientific opinions and reports (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2) |
| --- | --- |

—

the ability to analyse complex information and dossiers, often from a wide range of scientific disciplines and sources and to prepare draft scientific opinions and reports (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2)

| — | professional experience in a multidisciplinary environment, preferably in an international context (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2) |
| --- | --- |

—

professional experience in a multidisciplinary environment, preferably in an international context (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2)

| — | experience in project management related to scientific matters (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2) |
| --- | --- |

—

experience in project management related to scientific matters (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2)

| — | proven communication skills, based on teaching experience, public presentations, active participation in meetings, publications (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2). |
| --- | --- |

—

proven communication skills, based on teaching experience, public presentations, active participation in meetings, publications (maximum 10 points out of 100 — weighting coefficient of 2).

Applicants may only be considered for membership of the Scientific Committee or of a Scientific Panel if their application obtains a score that is above a cut-off score of 66 points (out of 100). EFSA reserves the right to consult third parties on the professional experience of applicants in the context of their application.

In addition to the abovementioned criteria, the Annual Declaration of Interests will be reviewed in accordance with the EFSA Procedure for identifying and handling potential conflicts of interest (6). The extent of any potential conflict of interest will be taken into account in deciding whether an applicant will be further evaluated.

For more information regarding the selection of members of the Scientific Committee and Panels please refer to the ‘Decision of the Executive Director concerning the selection of members of the Scientific Committee, Scientific Panels and external experts’

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/expertselection.pdf

6.   Reserve list and appointment

Applicants who are found to meet the requirements for membership of any of the Scientific Panels or of the Scientific Committee may be appointed as members for a three-year mandate, on the basis of a decision by EFSA Management Board on a proposal by EFSA Executive Director.

Before appointment, EFSA reserves the right to check the application of applicants considered for membership against documents and certificates in order to confirm the accuracy and eligibility of the application.

Applicants who are found to meet the requirements for membership but are not appointed as members may be included in the reserve list.

Applicants may, with their prior consent, be assigned to a Scientific Panel even if they did not specifically apply for membership of that Panel. They may be also invited to contribute as external experts to the activities of a Scientific Panel or the Scientific Committee or of one of the working groups of the Scientific Panels and the Scientific Committee.

Members of the Scientific Committee or of Scientific Panels may be replaced or, according to the circumstances, their number may be increased. Replacing or new members will be selected from the reserve list, and will be proposed by the Executive Director to the Management Board, following consultation with the Chair of the Scientific Committee or Scientific Panel concerned.

7.   Expert database

All eligible candidates will be invited to apply to EFSA’s expert database.

For more information regarding EFSA’s expert database:

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/AboutEfsa/WhoWeAre/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178712806106.htm

8.   Independence and declarations of commitment and interest

The members of the Scientific Committee and of the Scientific Panels are appointed in a personal capacity. Applicants are required to include a declaration that they will undertake to act independently of any outside influence as well as a declaration of interests which may be deemed to be prejudicial to their independence (see eligibility criterion (iv)). Applicants are responsible for the content of the declaration submitted which will be assessed by EFSA according to the EFSA Procedure for identifying and handling potential conflicts of interest.

See below some examples of what is considered a Conflict of Interest:

—   example 1: a member of a given Scientific Panel owns shares in several companies producing or marketing products whose safety is assessed by that very Scientific Panel/Committee,

—   example 2: a member of a given Scientific Panel is hired by an association of producers as independent consultant to provide scientific advice on the very products whose safety is assessed by that very Scientific Panel/Committee.

For more information regarding declarations of interests:

| | EFSA policy on declarations of interests
  http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doipolicy.pdf |
| --- | --- |

EFSA policy on declarations of interests

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doipolicy.pdf

| | Guidance document on declarations of interest
  http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doiguidance.pdf |
| --- | --- |

Guidance document on declarations of interest

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doiguidance.pdf

| | Procedure for identifying and handling potential conflicts of interest
  http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doiconflicts.pdf |
| --- | --- |

Procedure for identifying and handling potential conflicts of interest

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doiconflicts.pdf

9.   Equal opportunities

EFSA takes great care to apply the principles of equal treatment in its procedures.

10.   Submission of applications

Applicants are requested to submit their application together with declaration of interests electronically through the EFSA’s website: http://www.efsa.europa.eu

Applications will be deemed admissible only if a duly completed online application form is submitted. Applications sent by registered mail will be exceptionally accepted, in case of a serious failure in the online IT system.

Applications delivered via electronic mail will not be accepted.

Applicants are kindly invited to fill in their application form in English in order to facilitate the selection procedure.

All applicants will be informed by mail about the outcome of the selection process.

The personal information EFSA requests from applicants will be processed in line with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the EU institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (7).

The purpose of the data processing is to manage applications for membership of the EFSA Scientific Committee or Panels.

11.   Closing date for sending applications

Applications must be submitted no later than 31 May 2011 at midnight (local time, GMT + 1). For those sent by registered mail, the postmark date will serve as a proof.

Please note that, due to the large number of applications we receive, when reaching the deadline for submission of applications, the system may have problems to process the large amounts of data. We therefore advise the applicants to send in their application well ahead of the closing date.

Note:

In the event of inconsistency or discrepancy between the English version and any of the other linguistic versions of this publication, the English language version shall prevail.

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(1)  For more information refer to: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/paneloperation.pdf

(2)  For more information refer to: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/efsa_rep/repository/documents/Experts_compensation_guide.pdf

(3)  ‘Thorough knowledge’ shall be intended as corresponding to level B2 or higher (i.e. levels C1 and C2) as specified in the Council of Europe reference document for the European Language Portfolio (‘Common European Framework of Reference: Learning, Teaching, Assessment’). For more information please refer to http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/Portfolio/?M=/main_pages/levels.html

(4)  For more guidance on how to fill in the declaration, please refer to the Guidance document on declarations of interest, available on EFSA’s website at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doiguidance.pdf

(5)  Please see section 8 of the present call on Independence and declarations of commitment and interest.

(6)  Available on EFSA’s website at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/keydocs/docs/doiconflicts.pdf

(7)  OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.

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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

| 31.3.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.3.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/38

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Notice concerning the anti-dumping measures in force in respect of imports into the Union of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in China extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Korea or not: change of address of a company exempted from the extended measures

2011/C 99/07

The anti-dumping duty in force on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in China imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1858/2005 (1) was extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Korea or not, by Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) No 400/2010 (2) (‘Regulation (EU) No 400/2010’).

Bosung Wire Rope Co. Ltd, a company located in the Republic of Korea, whose exports to the Union of steel ropes and cables were exempted from the extended anti-dumping duty pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 400/2010, has informed the European Commission (‘the Commission’) that on 3 January 2011 it changed its address.

The company has argued that the change of address does not affect its right to benefit from the individual duty rate applied to it under its previous address of:

| 972-5 Songhyun-Ri |
| --- |
| Jinrae-Myeun |
| Kimhae-Si |
| Gyeungsangnam-Do |
| DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA |

972-5 Songhyun-Ri

Jinrae-Myeun

Kimhae-Si

Gyeungsangnam-Do

DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The company submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the change of the address was due to insufficient space in its former location.

The Commission has examined the information provided and has concluded that the change of address in no way affects the findings of Regulation (EU) No 400/2010. Therefore, the reference in Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 400/2010 to:

| Bosung Wire Rope Co. Ltd |
| --- |
| 972-5 Songhyun-Ri |
| Jinrae-Myeun |
| Kimhae-Si |
| Gyeungsangnam-Do |
| DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA |

Bosung Wire Rope Co. Ltd

972-5 Songhyun-Ri

Jinrae-Myeun

Kimhae-Si

Gyeungsangnam-Do

DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA

should be read as:

| Bosung Wire Rope Co. Ltd |
| --- |
| 568 Yongdeok-ri |
| Hallim-myeon |
| Gimhae-si |
| Gyeongsangnam-do |
| 621-872 |
| DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA |

Bosung Wire Rope Co. Ltd

568 Yongdeok-ri

Hallim-myeon

Gimhae-si

Gyeongsangnam-do

621-872

DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The TARIC additional code A969 shall apply to:

| Bosung Wire Rope Co. Ltd |
| --- |
| 568 Yongdeok-ri |
| Hallim-myeon |
| Gimhae-si |
| Gyeongsangnam-do |
| 621-872 |
| DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA |

Bosung Wire Rope Co. Ltd

568 Yongdeok-ri

Hallim-myeon

Gimhae-si

Gyeongsangnam-do

621-872

DAEHANMINGUK/REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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(1)  OJ L 299, 16.11.2005, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 117, 11.5.2010, p. 1.

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