J-S24041-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DANIELLE MARIE FALCON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1730 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 11, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002450-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 15, 2017

Appellant Danielle Marie Falcon appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County after a jury 

convicted Appellant of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and recklessly 

endangering another person. Appellant contends that there was insufficient 

evidence to support her attempted murder conviction and argues that the 

trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to admit into evidence a 

comment that Appellant made on social media. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses after she 

attempted to run over Kaitlin Ruby (“the victim”) with her car. The trial 

court aptly summarized the relevant factual background as follows:

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On June 18, 2013, [the victim] had plans with Erick Adams 

(hereinafter “Mr. Adams”) and their children. [The victim] stated 

that when they returned to Mr. Adams’ house and saw 

[Appellant] in the driveway, Mr. Adams drove [the victim] to the 

tanning salon instead. [FN1] [The victim] attempted to call Mr. 

Adams to pick her up but when he didn’t answer, she decided to 

walk to his residence. As [the victim] was turning on Buckeye 

Tram Road, she observed Appellant drive past her and then 

complete a U-turn in the middle of the road. At this point, 

Randy Gowton (hereinafter “Mr. Gowton”) offered [the victim] a 

ride, and dropped her off in front of Mr. Adams’ residence. [The 

victim] then observed Appellant’s vehicle directly behind Mr. 

Gowton’s truck. [The victim] recalls hearing Appellant gas her 

vehicle, and as [the victim] looked back, she saw Appellant’s 

vehicle, coming towards her, and then striking her. [The victim] 

remembers being under the vehicle and then lying in the grass 

while attempting to move. As [the victim] watched Appellant’s 

vehicle turn around, she remembers yelling “please stop, don’t 

do this.” At this point, Appellant exited her vehicle, and told 

[the victim] she was going to take her to the hospital. Appellant 

attempted to pick up [the victim] and place her in the vehicle. 

Mr. Gowton returned and stayed with [the victim] until the 

ambulance arrived. [The victim] was then flown by Life Flight to 

a hospital where she stayed for approximately one month.

[FN1] [The victim] stated that she met Appellant on 

a previous occasion when she went to visit her 

children at Mr. Adams’ residence.

[The victim] described several injuries that she sustained 

as follows: two deep cuts in both legs, tendon and joint damage 

in her right leg, either tendon or joint damage in her left leg, 

pelvic fractures, a hematoma on her head and on her abdominal, 

a laceration to her right elbow, a laceration on her back, a brush 

burn on her left ankle, and separation of [the victim’s] spinal 

cord from her pelvis. The injuries required two surgeries. For 

the entire hospital stay, [the victim] was confined to a bed and 

was not able to walk. After her hospital discharge, she was 

transferred to a skilled nursing facility, where she completed 

physical therapy and occupational therapy. Later on, when [the 

victim] gave birth to her current husband’s child, she was 

required to have an emergency C-section because her pelvis 

would not entirely expand. [The victim] stated that she 
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currently has a lot of pain and side effects from the injuries, and 

still requires screws in her pelvis to connect her spine.

Mr. Gowton corroborated [the victim’s] testimony 

regarding the incident on June 18, 2013. Mr. Gowton testified 

that he was driving down Buckeye Tram Road, saw a woman 

whom he knew to be associated with his neighbor, Mr. Adams, 

and offered her a ride because it started to rain. The woman, 

later identified as [the victim], accepted the ride. While Mr. 

Gowton was driving [the victim] to Mr. Adams’ house, he noticed 

a maroon SUV behind him. When Mr. Gowton approached the 

residence, he pulled over so the SUV could pass, but instead it 

stopped. After [the victim] exited the vehicle and as Mr. Gowton 

was driving away, he looked in his driver side vehicle and 

observed the vehicle driving through the driveway and striking 

[the victim]. [FN2] Mr. Gowton then parked his vehicle, saw his 

neighbor Alex, and ordered him to call 911. When Mr. Gowton 

approached the area of the incident, he observed Appellant 

attempting to place [the victim] into her vehicle. Mr. Gowton 

then pulled [the victim] out of the vehicle, laid her on the 

ground, and stayed with her until the firemen and ambulance 

arrived.

[FN2] Mr. Gowton testified that the center front part 

of the vehicle struck [the victim].

[Mr. Adams testified that] [e]arlier on the same date, as 

[he] was returning to his residence on Buckeye Tram Road with 

[the victim] and their two children, he saw Appellant at his 

house and continued to drive past his house, and [took the 

victim] to Sun Kissed Tanning, approximately one-mile from his 

residence. [FN3] Mr. Adams returned home where Appellant was 

waiting, and Appellant collected her belongings that were still at 

the residence. When he left with the children to pick up [the 

victim], he was not able to find [the victim]. Mr. Adams then 

returned home within minutes after receiving a call from his 

neighbor about the incident at his residence. When he returned 

home, he saw [the victim] lying on the ground and Appellant’s 

vehicle in the yard. [FN4] Emergency personnel arrived shortly 

thereafter.

[FN3] Mr. Adams, Appellant’s ex-boyfriend and 

owner of the residence 271 Buckeye [Tram] Road, 

testified to his previous relationship with Appellant, 
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which commenced a few months prior to the incident 

and ended around June 1, 2013. Mr. Adams stated 

that he told Appellant the he was ending their 

relationship because he still had feelings for [the 

victim]...

[FN4] Mr. Adams testified that he had video 

surveillance outside of his residence and provided a 

copy of the home surveillance video, which was 

admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 9. The video 

was played for the jury with a time stamp 

commencing at 5:43 p.m.

***

Casandra Rowe (hereinafter “Ms. Rowe”) testified as to her 

relationship with [the victim] prior to and at the time of the 

incident. She stated that, around May and June of 2013, [the 

victim] lived with Ms. Rowe. At that time, [the victim] did not 

have her own cellular phone. However, Ms. Rowe did, in fact, 

possess a cellular phone in which [the victim’s] Facebook 

account was added. Ms. Rowe stated that she observed private 

messages on [the victim’s] Facebook account from Appellant. 

Ms. Rowe admitted the she was the one who responded to the 

Facebook messages from Appellant, not [the victim]. [FN5] 

Specifically, Ms. Rowe explained that the initial message was 

sent from Appellant on June 15th and two days later, Ms. Rowe 

sent her last text message at approximately 1:00 a.m. on June 

18, 2013. Appellant then sent [the victim] a message at 8:35 

a.m. on June 18, 2013, the date of the incident, which stated, 

“[y]ou look like a beatup China rag doll bitch I will ‘F’ you up I 

dare you to step to me I F-in dare you bring it.” [FN6]

[FN5] [The victim] conceded that she was aware that 

Ms. Rowe was sending Facebook messages to 

Appellant but was unaware of the content of those 

messages.

[FN6] Ms. Rowe also read two messages she sent to 

Appellant, which stated “[O]nce again u need to 

check urself nd realize ur position fall back sideline 

before u find out how quick I can put your ‘A’ there.” 

“But since u are so bold over the Internet, make sure 

you have the same walk when I see u cuz I’m not 
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like ur kind I’ll beat ur trashy frail skeleton body in 

with no second thoughts.”

Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/16, at 1-4 (citations and some footnotes 

omitted). 

After the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant on all 

charges. On October 11, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to seven 

and half to fifteen years’ imprisonment on the attempted murder charge. 

The remaining charges merged with the attempted murder charge for 

sentencing purposes. Appellant filed a timely appeal and complied with the 

trial court’s directions to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).

Appellant raises two issues for our review on appeal:

1. Whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in determining the 

jury’s guilty verdict for Criminal Attempt – Homicide was 

supported by sufficient evidence.

2. Whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in allowing the 

Commonwealth to present vulgar and unduly prejudicial 

evidence regarding [Appellant’s] Facebook messages with 

Casandra Rowe, who pretended to be the victim in this 

matter, in an attempt to provoke conflict with [Appellant].

Appellant’s Brief, at 2 (issues reordered).

First, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

her conviction for attempted murder. Our standard of review is as follows:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it 

establishes each material element of the crime charged and the 
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commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the 

evidence establishing a defendant's participation in a crime is 

circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence 

coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 

overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may 

not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so 

long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective 

elements of a defendant's crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, 

the appellant's convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 886–87 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted).

Section 901(a) of the Crimes Code provides that an individual can be 

convicted of criminal attempt if that person “with intent to commit a specific 

crime, ... does any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the 

commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). More specifically, with 

respect to attempted murder, this Court has provided the following:

“For a defendant to be found guilty of attempted murder, the 

Commonwealth must establish specific intent to kill.” 

Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa.Super. 

2004). Therefore, “[i]f a person takes a substantial step toward 

the commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind to 

commit such an act, he may be convicted of attempted murder.” 

In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 678 (Pa.Super. 2012). “The 

Commonwealth may establish the mens rea required for firstdegree murder, specific intent to kill, solely from circumstantial 

evidence.” Id. Further, our Supreme Court has repeatedly 

determined that “[t]he use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of 
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the body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill.” 

Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1009 

(2007); see also Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 928 

A.2d 1025, 1034 (2007) (“a specific intent to kill may be inferred 

from the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's 

body”).

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa.Super. 2016).

Appellant limits her sufficiency challenge to claim the Commonwealth 

failed to prove she intended to kill the victim. While Appellant characterizes 

her behavior as “making contact with the victim,” she argues that her 

attempt to render aid to the victim after running her over with her vehicle 

demonstrates that she did not have intent to kill. Appellant’s Brief at 7. In 

addition, she claims her attempt to take the victim to the hospital “would 

have been successful, save for the intervention of Randy Gowton, who 

removed the victim from the Appellant’s vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

This argument is disingenuous. Appellant did not merely “make 

contact” with the victim; she mowed the victim down in a forceful collision 

with her large SUV. The Commonwealth admitted into evidence surveillance 

video footage, taken from three different angles, that shows how Appellant 

violently struck the victim with her Ford Explorer and caused the victim’s 

body to become trapped under the vehicle. Yet even after the impact, 

Appellant continued to drive, dragging the victim’s body under her vehicle, 

seemingly without applying any brake. There is no doubt that Appellant 

employed her SUV as a deadly weapon on a part of the victim’s body, as the 

victim’s entire body was crushed under the weight of the vehicle. 

Appellant’s attempt to take the victim to the hospital by picking her up and 
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laying her in the driver seat did not show that Appellant lacked intent to kill; 

it was more indicative of Appellant’s consciousness of guilt. Accordingly, we 

find Appellant’s sufficiency challenge to be meritless.

 Second, Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to allow the 

Commonwealth to admit into evidence messages Appellant sent to the 

victim’s Facebook account that were answered by the victim’s friend, 

Cassandra Rowe. In reviewing a challenge to the admission of certain 

evidence, our standard of review is as follows:

[q]uestions regarding the admission of evidence are left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and we, as an appellate court, will not 

disturb the trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence 

absent an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment; rather, discretion is abused when the law 

is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as 

shown by the evidence or the record....

Commonwealth v. Richard, 150 A.3d 504, 512 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted).

Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

in admitting the following inflammatory statement she sent to the victim’s 

Facebook account: “You look like a beatup (sic) China rag doll bitch I will 

fuck you up I dare you step into me I Fuckin dare you to bring it.” N.T. 

Trial, 5/2/16 - 5/4/16, at 127. Appellant argues that the admission of this 

statement did not have sufficient probative value, was unduly prejudicial to 

her defense, and was solely a response to Ms. Rowe, who Appellant claims 

incited the conflict.
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Our rules of evidence provide that a trial court “may exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of ... unfair 

prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 403. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that this 

message was highly probative of Appellant’s intent, motive, and absence of 

mistake in causing the accident just hours after she sent these threatening 

messages. The admission of this statement would refute Appellant’s claim 

that she accidentally ran over the victim. 

While Appellant is correct that this statement is prejudicial to the 

defense, she has not shown that the statements were unduly prejudicial. 

This Court has emphasized that “evidence will not be prohibited merely 

because it is harmful to the defendant. This court ... is not required to 

sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury's 

consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand.” 

Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Pa.Super. 2009). See 

Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 891 (Pa.Super. 2012) (exclusion of 

evidence on grounds that is prejudicial “is limited to evidence so prejudicial 

that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based upon something 

other than the legal propositions relevant to the case”). As Appellant has 

not established that the statement in question was so prejudicial as to cause 

the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, we find no abuse of 

discretion in admitting this statement into evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/15/2017