J-S57015-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANI IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYREE LAMAR JACKSON

Appellant No. 921 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 26, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007006-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2017

Appellant, Tyree Jackson was charged with, among others, attempted 

murder, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, conspiracy, and possession 

of an instrument of crime, based upon allegations that he and a codefendant, Tyrik Lark,1

robbed and shot Luther Wilkinson inside his own 

home. A jury found Jackson guilty only of aggravated assault, robbery, 

burglary, and the possessory crimes. In this appeal, Jackson argues that the 

mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the court was illegal. After careful 

review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Lark’s appeal is docketed at 3039 EDA 2015.
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As Jackson’s two issues both challenge the court’s imposition of a 

mandatory minimum sentence, we need not set forth a detailed summary of 

trial testimony. Instead, we will focus on the sentence imposed.

At the sentencing hearing, the court found Jackson had a previous 

conviction for attempted murder when he was 18 years old. Thus, the court 

concluded that this was Jackson’s “second strike”, and imposed a mandatory 

minimum sentence of 10 years of imprisonment pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9714.

On appeal, Jackson raises two distinct challenges to the imposition of 

the mandatory sentence. First, he contends the court’s imposition of a 

mandatory minimum sentence based upon its own fact finding, and not the 

jury’s, violated the dictates of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 

(2013) (holding judicial fact finding that leads to the imposition of a 

mandatory minimum sentence is unconstitutional).

Jackson concedes his arguments are contrary to precedent that 

controls our decision. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13; see also 

Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328 (Pa. Super. 2016). However, he 

asserts that his is “a good faith argument for a change in existing law.” Id. 

He notes that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the petition for 

allowance of appeal in Bragg to review the issue of the constitutionality of § 

9714. See id., at 13-14. Specifically, the Supreme Court defined the issue 

before it as: “Should the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the trial 
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court under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 be vacated, and this matter remanded for a 

new sentencing hearing, due to the fact that § 9714 is unconstitutional as 

currently drafted?” Bragg, 143 A.3d 890 (Pa. 2016).

However, during the pendency of this appeal, our Supreme Court 

summarily affirmed this Court’s decision in Bragg. See --- A.3d ---, 2017 

WL 3596177 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam order). While we appreciate Jackson’s 

good faith and transparent advocacy for a change in existing law, we are 

bound by controlling precedent. Specifically, this Court in Bragg recognized 

that the Supreme Court of the United States has held judicial fact finding 

regarding the existence of prior convictions is not prohibited. See 133 A.3d 

332-333.

As this Court has held that § 9714 is not unconstitutional, neither of 

Jackson’s issues on appeal have merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/8/2017