1The Honorable John F. Nangle, Senior United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 00-2780

___________

Contract Freighters, Inc., *

*

Petitioner, *

*

v. *

* Petition for Review of an

Secretary of United States * Order of the Bureau of

Department of Transportation, * Transportation Statistics

United States Department of * 

Transportation, Bureau of *

Transportation Statistics, *

*

Respondents. *

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Submitted: April 13, 2001

Filed: August 10, 2001

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Before BYE and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,1 District Judge.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Contract Freighters, Inc., (CFI) petitions for review of an order of the Bureau of

Transportation Statistics (BTS). The parties have different views about what standard
2Congress transferred some functions of the ICC to the DOT, including the

administration of the motor carrier financial data reporting program. The DOT, in turn,

assigned the reporting program to the BTS. 

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a motor carrier must satisfy to exempt from public disclosure certain financial data

submitted to the Department of Transportation (DOT). CFI contends that the BTS

should have granted an exemption upon CFI's showing that it treats financial data as

confidential information. The BTS denied CFI's exemption request, concluding that

CFI had to show that substantial competitive harm was likely to result from disclosure.

We affirm the order. 

For many years, motor carriers were required to disclose certain financial

information to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), subjecting the information

to public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

When Congress abolished the ICC by passing the Interstate Commerce Commission

Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA), Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803, some

members of Congress wanted to abolish the concomitant financial data reporting

requirements. As a compromise, Congress included within the ICCTA the provisions

found at 49 U.S.C. § 14123. The statute requires reporting, but allows motor carriers

to request that the financial information reported to the DOT2 be exempt from public

disclosure under certain circumstances.

Twenty motor carriers, including CFI, filed exemption requests after the passage

of the ICCTA. CFI supported its exemption request with evidence showing that it

treated its financial data as confidential information. CFI also described various

competitive harms that would result from public disclosure, but failed to demonstrate

that disclosure would cause substantial competitive harm. Relying on a regulation

adopted after notice and comment, wherein it concluded that § 14123 requires a motor

carrier to demonstrate substantial competitive harm before an exemption will be
3CFI also claims that BTS's failure to act upon its exemption request in a timely

manner should be deemed an approval of the request. See 49 U.S.C. § 14123(c)(2)(B)

(requiring the Secretary to act upon exemption requests within 90 days). We disagree.

When Congress requires an agency to act within a certain period but does not state the

consequences of failing to do so, the time period is ordinarily construed to be directory

rather than mandatory, such that an agency still has power to act after the time period

has run. See, e.g., Kinion v. United States, 8 F.3d 639, 644 (8th Cir. 1993). "[T]he

proper recourse for a party aggrieved by delay that violates a statutory deadline is to

apply for a court order compelling agency action." Gottlieb v. Peña, 41 F.3d 730, 734

(D.C. Cir. 1994). Section 14123 sets forth no consequences for BTS's failure to act

within 90 days. Therefore, CFI's remedy for dilatory conduct was a court order

compelling agency action, not a default exemption.

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allowed, the BTS ultimately denied the majority of the exemption requests, including

CFI's. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2342(3)(A), CFI asks us to review that conclusion.3

The agency's interpretation of its governing statutes presents, of course,

a question of law, and courts normally review questions of law de novo,

but that rule does not apply in the present context. Congress has specially

assigned to the Department of Transportation the responsibility of

interpreting and administering the statute[] in question, [49 U.S.C. §

14123]. The Supreme Court has many times made clear that this sort of

question of law is for the agency to decide, so long as its interpretation of

the statute is reasonable.

City of St. Louis v. Dep't of Transp., 936 F.2d 1528, 1533 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984)).

With that standard of review in mind, we turn our attention to the language of the

statute.

The statute provides that an exemption from public disclosure shall be granted

"if the Secretary finds that the exemption requested is necessary to avoid competitive

harm and to avoid the disclosure of information that qualifies as a trade secret or
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privileged or confidential information under section 552(b)(4) of title 5." 49 U.S.C.

§ 14123(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, a motor carrier must show that (1) an

exemption is necessary to avoid competitive harm, and (2) the financial information

qualifies as a trade secret or privileged or confidential information under Exemption 4

of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). The parties' dispute centers on the statute's

incorporation by reference of the test for satisfying Exemption 4. 

Exemption 4 of the FOIA forbids public disclosure of "trade secrets and

commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or

confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). In 1974, the D.C. Circuit adopted a test for

interpreting this terse reference to confidential information. The court said that a

commercial or financial matter is confidential when "disclosure of the information is

likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to

obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the

competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained." Nat'l

Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 

This test, known as the National Parks test, has been widely recognized and

applied by the circuit courts when construing Exemption 4. See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc.

v. United States Dep't of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 162 n.24, 167-68 (3rd Cir. 2000); GC

Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1994);

Anderson v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 907 F.2d 936, 947 (10th Cir. 1990);

Hercules, Inc. v. Marsh, 839 F.2d 1027, 1029 (4th Cir. 1988); Gen. Elec. Co. v. United

States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1403 (7th Cir. 1984); 9 to 5 Org.

for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 8

(1st Cir. 1983); Cont'l Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. S.E.C., 566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d

Cir. 1977); Cont'l Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1975).

Significantly, the D.C. Circuit has observed that "the National Parks test became

known to and acquiesced in by Congress" when Congress looked to FOIA and the
4The legislative history provides that 

Some Members of the Committee were in favor of eliminating the

reporting requirement altogether while others were in favor retaining it.

The provision included in new section 14123 is a compromise which

directs that the Secretary shall require financial reporting for Class I

carriers and may require financial reporting for Class II carriers. Since

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National Parks test for a parallel confidential information exemption for the open

meeting rules at 5 U.S.C. § 552b. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1153

n.146 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Presumably, then, Congress also knew about, and acquiesced

in, the National Parks test when it expressly incorporated Exemption 4 into the ICCTA

in 1995. See Downer v. United States, 97 F.3d 999, 1003 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996)

("Congress is presumed to know the legal background in which it is legislating."). 

After the ICCTA was enacted, the BTS announced that it "will follow FOIA law

on the standard that must be met [under 49 U.S.C. § 14123]. Information is

confidential under Exemption Four if disclosure would be likely to cause substantial

harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained

or would impair a protectable government interest." 64 Fed. Reg. 13916, 13920 (Mar.

23, 1999). Following public notice and comment, the BTS adopted a regulation

implementing 49 U.S.C. § 14123, which provides that "[i]nformation is considered to

be confidential when . . . [d]isclosure of the information in the carrier's report would be

likely to cause substantial harm to the carrier's competitive position." 49 C.F.R. §

1420.9(b)(1). 

Essentially, then, the second part of § 14123's test (incorporating Exemption 4)

requires a motor carrier to show "substantial competitive harm," whereas the first part

of the test requires a motor carrier to show only "competitive harm." Supra at 3-4. CFI

seizes upon this arguable redundancy, and a passage from the statute's legislative

history,4

 to contend that Congress meant for the BTS to grant an exemption whenever
many companies have raised concerns regarding the administrative burden

in collecting and filing the information, the Secretary has discretion in

requiring smaller carriers to file. Recognizing the legitimate concerns of

privately-held companies about preserving the confidentiality of certain

business information, upon request, the Secretary can exempt

privately-held companies from the public release of their reports if it is

necessary to avoid competitive harm and the disclosure of information

that qualifies as a trade secret or privileged or confidential information

under section 552(b)(4) of title 5. The Committee expects that the

Secretary will review requests for exemptions from publication in a fair,

reasonable manner. For example, the Secretary should allow an

exemption where the filer has demonstrated a history of its treatment of

the reports as trade secrets or privileged or confidential information,

which history may include filing of such reports under a claim of

confidentiality, litigation to prevent their release to the public, or release

of such reports by the filer to third parties under confidentiality

agreements or understanding. 

H.R. Rep. 104-311, at 118 (Nov. 6, 1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 830

(emphasis added).

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a motor carrier showed that it treated financial information as confidential, rather than

requiring the motor carrier to prove substantial competitive harm. CFI contends that

Congress did not mean to incorporate the stringent National Parks standard into §

14123, but rather the less-demanding standard developed in Critical Mass Energy

Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

In Critical Mass, the D.C. Circuit distinguished between information submitted

to the government under compulsion, and information provided to the government

voluntarily. The court reaffirmed the National Parks test for information submitted

under compulsion, but held that "financial or commercial information provided to the

Government on a voluntary basis is 'confidential' for the purpose of Exemption 4 if it
5Even if the statute were ambiguous, our standard of review obligates us to defer

to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute. See United Transp. Union v.

Slater, 149 F.3d 851, 853-54 (8th Cir. 1998). Given the statute's direct reference to

FOIA Exemption 4, and the compulsory nature of the disclosure involved, we would

be hard-pressed to conclude that the Secretary unreasonably adopted the "substantial"

harm test.

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is of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from

whom it was obtained." Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879. 

TheCritical Mass standard clearly does not apply here, however, because motor

carriers do not voluntarily disclose financial reports to the DOT, they must do so. See

49 U.S.C. § 14123(a)(1) ("The Secretary shall require . . . motor carriers to file with

the Secretary annual financial and safety reports.") (emphasis added). Therefore, we

must view § 14123's reference to Exemption 4 as incorporating the more stringent

National Parks standard, despite the arguably inconsistent legislative history. When

a statute is plain and unambiguous, as this one is, the courts cannot resort to legislative

history to interpret it. E.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) ("Given

the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative

history.").5 

CFI also relies upon statements about the statute's meaning, made by three

members of Congress in support of certain motor carrriers' exemption requests. "But

post-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the

legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act's passage. Such statements

represent only the personal views of these legislators since the statements were made

after the passage of the Act." Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132

(1974) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

CFI contends that use of the substantial competitive harm test eviscerates the

exemption provisions of § 14123. We sympathize with CFI's position. We agree that
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motor carriers will have great difficulty obtaining exemptions under the current version

of the statute, and, if we were to consider the statute's legislative history, would

conclude that the statute fails to accomplish the compromise Congress sought. But we

decline to rewrite the statute, and therefore have no choice but to affirm the order of the

BTS. If Congress did not mean what it explicitly said, CFI must seek a legislative

solution rather than a judicial one.

Finally, CFI contends that the BTS improperly read a "unique circumstances"

requirement into the standard for granting an exemption. In a section of its order

entitled "General Discussion of the Requests," the BTS stated that it "must deny

requests that do not present unique circumstances. If a carrier does not present unique

circumstances and is granted confidentiality, then all carriers would qualify because

they are similarly situated and the statutory intent would be frustrated." CFI urges us

to remand this case for reconsideration because the BTS erroneously incorporated a

showing of uniqueness into the legal standard used to consider exemption requests.

 

We believe that the order's reference to unique circumstances was merely an

inartful description of a motor carrier's duty to make a particularized showing of the

substantial competitive harm necessary to satisfy the statutory standard. In other

words, generalized allegations cannot establish that disclosure of the financial reports

would cause substantial competitive harm. Our review of the entire order satisfies us

that the BTS clearly understood that, while a motor carrier must make a particularized

showing of substantial competitive harm, it need not show "unique circumstances" to

qualify for an exemption.

We affirm the order of the BTS, and deny the relief requested by CFI in its

petition for review. 
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.