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IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,
v. CHRISTOPHER ALEX ZUMWALT, Appellant. No. 69898-2-1 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: April 29, 2013 Leach, C.J.

— Christopher Zumwalt appeals his conviction for child 

### molestation in the firstdegree. He claims that the trial court erred when it denied 

### his motion to depose a witness under CrR 4.6(a). He also challenges three of the community custody conditions that the court imposed as part of hissentence. Because we accept the State's concession that the term "pornography" as used 

### in the judgment and sentence is unconstitutionally vague, we remand for the limited purpose ofstriking that term. Because Zumwalt fails to show that the witness was not willing to discuss the case with defense counsel and that the other challenged community custody conditions were unlawful, we otherwise
affirm.No. 69898-2-1 / 2 Background The State charged Zumwalt with sexually assaulting B.J.S. in Port Orchard on or between January 1, 1997, and December 15, 2002. At the time, she was less than 12 years old. After B.J.S. reported the incident, Detective Ray Stroble from the Kitsap County Sheriff's Office spoke with Zumwalt aboutthe allegations. The State then charged Zumwalt withone count of child molestation inthe firstdegree. Before trial, Zumwalt moved to depose Stroble under CrR 4.6(a). Zumwalt indicated that Stroble would not agree to be interviewed by defense counsel ifthe defense investigator, Jim Harris, attended the interview. Zumwalt argued that by refusing to allow Harris to participate, Stroble effectively refused
to be interviewed. In response, the State explained that Harris previously worked for the Kitsap County Sheriffs Office and had been Stroble's supervisor. During that 

### time, the county disciplined Harris for mistreating Stroble. The State noted that Stroble advised the prosecutor's office that he was willing to discuss the case with defense counsel and any defense investigator other than Harris. 

### Additionally, Stroble indicated that he did not object to recording the interview. At a hearing on the motion, Zumwalt told the court that he had other 

### investigators he could use. In denyingZumwalt's motion, the court stated, "[l]t's hardly a refusal to be interviewed. He'll interview with anybody on the face of the 

### planet exceptMr. Harris because oftheir personalhistory." The court also stated

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that it would "accept Detective Stroble's agreement that any interview with anybody else of your choosing will be recorded." A jury convicted Zumwalt as charged. The court imposed a standard range sentence, including 17 community custody conditions. Zumwaltappeals. Analysis Zumwalt alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to depose Detective Stroble. He also contends that three of the community custody conditions the court imposed as part of his sentence were unlawful. We reject these arguments. Zumwalt claims that the trial court should have ordered a deposition under 

### CrR 4.6(a). He argues, "[T]he trial court interfered with the Sixth Amendment 

### rightof the defendanttochoose counsel of his own choice, the DueProcess right of the defense to control its own case preparation, and the Sixth Amendment right to controlwitnesses and compel process." 

### Wereviewdenovo aninterpretation of acourtrule.1 Acriminal defendant 

### does not have arightto depose prospective witnesses beforetrial.2 UnderCrR 4.6(a), upon a party's motion, a court may order a deposition when "a witness refuses to discuss the case with either counsel and the witness' testimony is 

### material and necessary."3 Zumwalt describes the issue in this case as "whether 1State v. Mankin, 158 Wn. App. 111, 121-22, 241 P.3d 421 (2010) (citing Statev. Robinson. 153 Wn.2d 689, 693, 107 P.3d 90 (2005K. review denied. 171 Wn.2d. 1003, 249 P.3d 182 (2011). 

### 2Mankin. 158 Wn. App. at 121-22 (citing State v. Gonzalez. 110 Wn.2d 738, 744, 757 P.2d 925 (1988)). 

### 3CrR 4.6(a)(2).
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the refusal to discuss the case with Mr. Harris in the room falls within the meaning of the rule's requirement that the witness refuse to discuss the case with either counsel." 

### In State v. Mankin,4 the court concluded that the "plain language" of CrR 4.6(a) "does not address instances in which the witness will speak to counsel only under certain circumstances." In Mankin, the witness was willing to discuss 

### the case with counsel but refused to allow counsel to record the interview.5 The court agreed with the defendant that "the ability of counsel to obtain evidence 

### and to impeach witnesses effectively is part ofhis rightto afairtrial."6 But, the court explained, "[E]ven though the right to adequate trial preparation includes 

### the right to interview witnesses in advance of trial, '[t]he right to interview a 

### witness doesnot mean thatthere is arighttohave asuccessful interview,'"7 and 

### "a witness may refuse togive aninterview."8 As such, the court held that "it is logical to conclude that a witness may also choose under whatconditions he or 

## sheiswillingtogivean interview, includingwhetheritshouldberecorded."9 Zumwalt acknowledges the court's holding in Mankin but argues, "The 

### time has come to reanalyze the doctrine of the 'right' ofwitnesses to refuse to be
4158 Wn.App. 111, 123, 241 P.3d 421 (2010). review denied. 171 Wn.2d 1003, 249 P.3d 182 (2011). 

### 5Mankin. 158 Wn. App. at 115. 6Mankin. 158 Wn. App. at 123. 7Mankin. 158 Wn. App. at 123-24 (second alteration inoriginal) (citations 

### omitted^ (quoting Statev. Clark. 53Wn. App. 120, 124, 765 P.2d 916(1988)). 8 Mankin. 158 Wn. App. at 124 (citing State v. Hofstetter, 75 Wn. App. 390, 397, 402, 878 P.2d 474 (1994)). 

### 9Mankin. 158 Wn. App. at 124.

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### interviewed. There is no legaljustification for the doctrine and it interferes with 

### the right of the defendant to prepare his or her case." But the courtin Mankin rejected a similar argument, and Zumwalt offers no authority to support a different result.10 Zumwalt further asserts, "It is not proper for the State or the State's witnesses to dictate who the defense uses as its expertwitnesses," and "[fjorcing defense counsel to interview the detective without the assistance of its chosen 

### expert witness was error." Zumwalt offers no evidence that the State dictated whom he used as an expert witness; rather, Stroble exerted his right to choose the conditions underwhich he was willing to give an interview. 

### The courtproperly deniedZumwalt's motion because it lacked authority to order a deposition underCrR4.6(a). Stroblewas willing to discuss thecasewith defense counsel and with an alternate investigator and was willing to have the 

### interview recorded. Additionally, the record indicates that Zumwalt interviewed Stroble on June 21, 2011, and that the interviewwas recorded and transcribed. 

### Zumwalt also challenges three community custody conditions that the 

### court imposed as part ofhis sentence. In Washington, a sentencing court must 

### impose certain community custody conditions in specified circumstances and may impose others.11 The discretionary conditions include requiring theoffender to "[participate in rehabilitative programs or otherwise perform affirmative
10 See Mankin. 158 Wn. App. at 123. 

### 11 See RCW 9.94A.703; State v. Bahl. 164 Wn.2d 739, 744, 193 P.3d 678 (2008).
-5-No. 69898-2-1/6


### conduct reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense, the offender's risk of reoffending, or the safety ofthe community," and to "[c]omply with any 

### crime-related prohibitions."12 We review imposed community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion.13 A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is "'manifestly 

### unreasonable, orexercised on untenable grounds, orfor untenable reasons.'"14 

### Imposing an unconstitutional conditionismanifestlyunreasonable.15 Apartymay raise a challenge tocommunity custody conditions for thefirsttime on appeal. Zumwalt alleges that the court erred by requiring him to "[sjubmit to 

### periodic polygraph examinations at own expense at the request of the 

## Community Corrections Officer or treatment provider." In State v. Riles.17 the defendants contended that the trial court lacked authority to require polygraph 

### testing as a condition ofcommunity custodybecausethe SentencingReform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, did not specifically authorize or require such 

### testing. Our Supreme Court agreed that no provision explicitly authorized or required polygraph testing butconcluded, "A trial court has authority to impose 

### monitoring conditions such as polygraph testing. Although the results of 12RCW9.94A.703(3)(d), (f). 13 State v.Sanchez Valencia. 169 Wn.2d 782, 793, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at753). ^Hii re Estate of Black. 153 Wn.2d 152, 172, 102 P.3d 796 (2004) 

### (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Downing. 151 Wn.2d 265, 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004)). 15 SanchezValencia, 169 Wn.2d at 792 (citing BaM, 164 Wn.2d at 753). 16 Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 744-45. 

### 17 135 Wn.2d 326, 340, 957 P.2d 655 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Sanchez Valencia. 169 Wn.2d at 792.
-6-No. 69898-2-1 / 7 polygraph tests are generally not admissible in a trial, this Court has 

### acknowledged theirvalidity as aninvestigativetool."18 Thus, polygraph testing is lawfultomonitoranoffender's compliancewith crime-related prohibitions.19 Zumwalt argues that our Supreme Court overruled Riles in In re Detention 

### ofHawkins20 and State v. Sanchez Valencia.21 These cases, however, did not address the court's holding in Riles that recognized polygraph testing as a valid community custody condition. The issue inHawkins, which did not discuss Riles,
was whether RCW 71.09.040(4) authorized the State to compel respondents in sexually violent predator commitment proceedings to submit to polygraph 

### examinations as part of the pretrial evaluation.22 The State does not allege that Zumwalt is a sexually violent predator and is not searching for evidence to prove such an allegation. Sanchez Valencia argued that an imposed community custody condition 

### wasunconstitutionally vague.23 SanchezValencia discussed Riles onlytoclarify

18 Riles. 135 Wn.2d at 342 (citing State v. Sutherland. 94 Wn.2d 527, 528, 617 P.2d 1010 (1980)). 

### 19 See Riles. 135 Wn.2d at 343 (legislative amendments suggest intent"to confirm the practice of allowing testing, such as polygraphs, for monitoring compliance with sentencing conditions"). 

### 20 169 Wn.2d 796, 238 P.3d 1175 (2010). 21 169 Wn.2d 782, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). 22 Hawkins. 169 Wn.2d at 800-01. 23 SanchezValencia, 169 Wn.2d at 785. The challenged condition stated, "'Defendant shall not possess or use any paraphernalia that can be used for the 

### ingestion or processing ofcontrolled substances or that can be used tofacilitate the sale or transfer of controlled substances including scales, pagers, police scanners, and hand held electronic scheduling and data storage devices.'"

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### that thecourtwill notpresumecommunitycustody conditions are constitutional.24 That case did not concern polygraph examinations, and Zumwalt does not raise
a vagueness challenge to the polygraph examination condition. Because Riles authorizes a court to order polygraph examinations as a condition of community custody and Zumwalt points to no authority overruling this holding, we reject his claim. Zumwalt also asserts that two of the imposed community custody conditions are unconstitutionally vague. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington State 

### Constitution require that citizens have fair warning ofproscribed conduct.25 "A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it'(1).
. . does notdefine the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2).
. . does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect 

### against arbitrary enforcement.'"26 Acondition thatfails to meeteither of these requirements isunconstitutionallyvague.27 Indetermining whether a term is unconstitutionally vague, we considerthe term in the context in which it is used.28 When a statute does not define a term,


### 24 Sanchez Valencia. 169 Wn.2d at 792 ("While Riles indicated a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a community custody condition, this was error."). 

### 25 Bahl. 164 Wn.2d at 752 (citing City ofSpokane v. Douglass, 115Wn.2d 171,178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)). 

### 26 Bahl. 164 Wn.2d at 752-53 (alterations in original) (quoting Douglass. 115Wn.2dat178). 27 Bahl. 164Wn.2dat753. 

### 28 Bahl. 164 Wn.2d at 754 (citing Douglass. 115Wn.2d at 180).
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we may consider the plain and ordinary meaning as set forth in a standard 

### dictionary.29 Acondition ofcommunitycustody issufficientlydefinite ifpersons of ordinary intelligence can understand what it proscribes, "'notwithstanding some 

### possible areas ofdisagreement.'"30 Zumwalt contends that the court erred when it ordered him not to "loiter or frequent places where children congregate, including but not limited to shopping malls, schools, playground[s] or video arcades." He argues that the term "shopping malls" is unconstitutionally vague. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(b) permits a court, as a condition of community custody, to order an offender to "[rjefrain from direct or indirect contact with the victim ofthe crime or a specified class ofindividuals." In Riles, the court rejected
a vagueness challenge to the imposed condition, "[Do] notfrequent places where 

### minors are known to congregate."31 The court reasoned that the condition 

### applied "toplaceswhere children commonlyassembleorcongregate."32 Here, within the context ofthe entire condition, the term "shopping malls" is not unconstitutionally vague. Persons of common intelligence would understand the condition to prohibit Zumwalt from going to places where children 

### commonly assemble, and the examples create a more precise prohibition than



### 29 Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754 (citing State v. Sullivan. 143 Wn.2d 162, 184- 85, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001)). 

### 30 Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754 (quoting Douglass, 115Wn.2d at 179). 31 Riles 135 Wn.2d at 349. 

### 32 Riles 135 Wn.2d at 349 (citing former RCW 9.94A.120(9)(c)(ii) (1997), the statute ineffect at the time ofthe charging period).
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the prohibition upheld in Riles. Therefore, we hold that this condition is not impermissibly vague. Zumwalt also challenges the imposed condition ordering him "[n]ot to possess or access any sexually explicit material or frequent adult bookstores, arcades or places where sexual entertainment is provided and shall not access pornography
... via the computer." He argues that our Supreme Courtfound the 

### term"sexuallyexplicit material" unconstitutional in Statev. Bahl.33 In Bahl. the defendant argued thatthe term "sexually explicit material" was unconstitutional as used in the condition prohibiting him from frequenting "'establishments whose primary business pertains to sexually explicit or erotic 

### material.'"34 In fact, contrarytoZumwalt's assertion, thecourt held that theterm was "sufficiently clear."35 The court stated, "Implementing the dictionary definition, the phrase
... is 'clearly expressed sexual' materials or materials that 

### are unequivocally sexual in nature."36 Additionally, the court noted that "'[ijmpossible standards of specificity' are not required since language always 

### involves some degree ofvagueness."37 Based on thisanalysis, wehold that the term "sexually explicit materials" is not unconstitutionally vague. Although Zumwalt does not assign error to the term "pornography" as used in this condition, the State concedes that the court in Bahl found this term 

### 33 164Wn.2d 739, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). 34 Bahl, 164Wn.2d at758-59. 35 Bahl. 164Wn.2dat759. 36 Bahl. 164Wn.2dat759. 

### 37 Bahl. 164 Wn.2d at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.Halstien. 122 Wn.2d 109, 118, 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).
-10-No. 69898-2-1/11 

### unconstitutionally vague.38 We grantthe State's requesttostrike this term from thejudgment and sentence. Conclusion Because the witness was willing to discuss the case withdefense counsel, 

### the trial court properly declined Zumwalt's motion to depose him. Although the 

### term "pornography" is unconstitutionally vague, the imposed community custody conditions are otherwise lawful. For these reasons, we remand for the limited 

### purpose ofstriking the term "pornography" from the judgment and sentence and
otherwise affirm.

WE CONCUR:



# -. o. a

38 See Bahl. 164 Wn.2d at 758 ("We conclude that the restriction on 

### accessing orpossessing pornographicmaterials is unconstitutionallyvague.").

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