* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-10057

Summary Calendar

DAVID PATT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SWEETHEART CUP,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(3:99-CV-2443-X)

July 17, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

David Patt appeals the distr ict court’s grant of Sweetheart

Cup’s motion for summary judgment on his Title VII claims. Patt

alleges that Swee theart Cup, his former employer, discriminated

against him on the basis of race in connection with his termination

from his position as a clamp truck driver. We affirm.

Patt was terminated after a confrontation with Chris Gray, a1 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973).

2 Price v. Federal Exp. Corp. , 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir.

2002).

2 fellow African-American employee. Because Gray’s forklift was

blocking Patt’s access through a part of the warehouse, he seized

control of Gray’s forklift and began to move materials that were

blocking his path. Gray alleged that Patt threatened him with

physical violence. Gray complained to his supervisor, w ho asked

Patt to describe in writing his version of the incident. Patt was

suspended later that day, and was discharged two days later. He

then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that

his discharge was discriminatory. The EEOC dismissed Patt’s charge

and issued a right to sue letter. Patt then filed this suit. The

district court granted Sweetheart Cup’s motion for summary judgment

on all of his claims.

Claims of racial discrimination based only on circumstantial

evidence are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework set

forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

. 1 Un der this three-part

scheme, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination by showing: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2)

he was qualified for the position sought; (3) he suffered an

a dverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by some one

outside the protected class. 2 The district court correctly held

that Patt failed to provide any summary judgment evidence that3 Id

.

4 Id

.

5 Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic

, 286 F.3d 790, 795

(5th Cir. 2002).

6 Id

.

3 establishes that the position remained open or that he was replaced

by someone outside of the protected class.

Moreover, the incident wit h Gray was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Patt’s discharge. Patt admits that he was

involved in a verbal altercation with G ray, and Sweetheart Cup’s

determination that he was the aggressor is reasonable. Even if Patt

had established a prima facie case, he could not demonstrate that

Sweethe art Cup's stated reason for his dismissal is merely a

pretext for intentional discrimination. 3 Pat t must provide some

evidence demonstrating that discrimination lay at the heart of

Sweetheart Cup's decision, 4 and has provided none.

Patt points to other incident s assertedly of disparate

treatment that allegedly occurred during his employment at

Sweetheart Cup, incidents that were not complained of in his EEOC

charge. While Pat t is not required to assert all legal claims in

the EEOC charge, 5 he must at least assert the facts that ar e the

b a sis for those legal claims. 6 The scope of a Title VII complaint

is limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can

rea sonably be expected to grow out of the charge of7 Thomas v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice

, 220 F.3d 389, 395

(5th Cir. 2000).

4 discrimination. 7 Given that Patt alleged in the EEOC charge tha t

the earliest date of discrimination occurred on July 21, 1999–two

days before he was discharged–he is not permitted to complain of

persistent discrimination that existed throughout his employment at

Sweetheart Cup. His retaliation claim, which was also not made in

the EEOC charge, relies upon these same allegations and is not

permitted. The district court properly concluded that these claims

were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in

granting summary judgment. AFFIRMED.