alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| **Re:** | **Amendment                No. 1 (“Amendment No. 1) to the Stock Purchase and Termination Agreement,                dated October 5, 2007, by and between Xethanol Corporation, H2Diesel                Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”) and H2Diesel, Inc. (“H2Diesel”), a wholly                owned subsidiary of Holdings, (as amended, the “Termination                Agreement”)** |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                         |                                                                  |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| By:                                | /s/ David                A.                Gillespie   |
| David                  A. GillespiePresident |
|                                         |

| /s/                David Ames   |
|-------------------------------------------|
| David                Ames                 |

----
Independent Auditors' Report


To the Shareholders and Board of Directors of
the Smith Barney Allocation Series Inc.:

In planning and performing our audits of the financial
statements of Smith Barney Allocation Series Inc.  (the
Funds) consisting of Global Portfolio, High Growth
Portfolio, Growth Portfolio, Balanced Portfolio,
Conservative Portfolio and Income Portfolio for the year
ended January 31, 2002, we considered its internal control,
including control activities for safeguarding securities, in
order to determine our auditing procedures for the purpose
of expressing our opinion on the financial statements and to
comply with the requirements of Form N-SAR, not to provide
assurance on the internal control.

The management of the Funds is responsible for establishing
and maintaining internal control.  In fulfilling this
responsibility, estimates and judgments by management are
required to assess the expected benefits and related costs
of controls.  Generally, controls that are relevant to an
audit pertain to the entity's objective of preparing
financial statements for external purposes that are fairly
presented in conformity with accounting principles generally
accepted in the United States of America. Those controls
include the safeguarding of assets against unauthorized
acquisition, use, or disposition.

Because of inherent limitations in internal control, error
or fraud may occur and not be detected.  Also, projection of
any evaluation of internal control to future periods is
subject to the risk that it may become inadequate because of
changes in conditions or that the effectiveness of the
design and operation may deteriorate.

Our consideration of the internal control would not
necessarily disclose all matters in the internal control
that might be material weaknesses under standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.  A material weakness is a condition in which
the design or operation of one or more of the internal
control components does not reduce to a relatively low level
the risk that misstatements caused by error or fraud in
amounts that would be material in relation to the financial
statements being audited may occur and not be detected
within a timely period by employees in the normal course of
performing their assigned functions.  However, we noted no
matters involving the internal control and its operation,
including controls for safeguarding securities that we
consider to be material weaknesses as defined above as of
January 31, 2002.

This report is intended solely for the information and use
of management, the Board of Directors of the Funds, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission and is not intended to be
and should not be used by anyone other than these specified
parties.



New York, New York
March 15, 2002
Dirk GREINEDER, Petitioner, v. Sean MEDEIROS, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk.

No. 19-7946.

Supreme Court of the United States.

April 20, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied.
Exhibit 10.24
<PAGE>

                            JUNIOR SUBORDINATED NOTE

$ 43,000.00                       Woodbury, N.Y.                  Dated: 9/25/96
 ----------                                                              -------

         FOR VALUE RECEIVED, STANDARD FUNDING CORP. ("Company), a domestic
corporation, with its principal place of business at 335 Crossways Park Drive,
Woodbury, New York 11797, promises to pay to the order of Kathleen Belz, 23 Neel
Court, Sayville, N.Y. 11782 at the office of the Company, on the Thirtieth day
of September 2001 and pay interest on the unpaid principal of the Note at Eleven
& One Quarter (11 1/4) percent per annum, based on 365-day year, semi-annually
with the first interest payment being due on the 31st day of December 1996.

         Maker shall have the right to prepay the indebtedness evidenced by this
Note, in whole or in part, without penalty, charge or notice.

         The payment of the principal and interest on this Note is expressly
subordinated in the right of payment, subject and junior to any and all
indebtedness of the Company by virtue of funds borrowed by the Company ("Senior
Indebtedness"). Upon any receivership, insolvency proceedings, bankruptcy,
assignment for the benefit of creditors, reorganization, dissolution or
liquidation, no amount shall be paid in respect to this Note unless and until
the Senior Indebtedness shall have been paid in full, together with interest
thereon and all other amounts in respect of such Senior Indebtedness.

         This Subordinated Note has been issued by the Company and is on a
parity and equality in all respects with other Junior Subordinated Notes issued
and hereafter issued, except with respect to maturity and rate of interest of
such Junior Subordinated Notes. The holder of this Note by accepting the same,
agrees that while any Senior Indebtedness, including Senior Subordinated Notes
is outstanding, he will not make any demands for payment of the principal of the
debt evidenced hereby, or bring or maintain any action to enforce payment of the
principal of this Note. However, nothing contained herein shall prevent the
Company from paying the principal on the Note at maturity hereto, provided the
Company is not in default in payment of Senior Indebtedness.


                                  STANDARD FUNDING CORP.


                                  By /s/ Alan J. Karp
                                     -----------------------


                                  By /s/ [ILLEGIBLE]
                                     -----------------------
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN ALFRED PANZER I,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND

URBAN DEVELOPMENT; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 15

- 16993

D.C. No. 3:15

- cv

- 04033

- MEJ

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Maria

- Elena James, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **

Submitted July 11, 2017 ***

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

John Alfred Panzer I appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing

his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** Panzer consented to proceed bef ore a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c).

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUL 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 16993

U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to

comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

, McHenry v. Renne , 84 F.3d 1172,

1177 (9th Cir. 1996), and w e affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Panzer’s action

for failure to comply with Rule 8, because the complaint does not contain “a short

and plain statement of the claims showing that [Panzer] is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2), (d)(1); McHenry , 84 F.3d at 1174 (affirming dismissal under

Rule 8, and recognizing that “[p]rolix, confusing complaints . . . impose unfair

burdens on litigants and judges”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Panzer’ s

complaint without leave to amend because further amendment would be futile. See

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)

(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to

amend is proper when amendment would be futile)

.

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.b



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of BCTC V Assignor Corp. (the "registrant") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marc N. Teal, Principal Financial Officer of the registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge, after due inquiry:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                  
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                        
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.



|               |  |                            
|-------------- |  | ---------------------------
|Date:          |  |                            
|March 10, 2005 |  | /s/ Marc N. Teal           
|               |  |                            
|               |  | Marc N. Teal               
|               |  | Principal Financial Officer
|               |  |                            
|               |  |                            

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other

document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the registrant and will be retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed April 17, 2024.

________________

No. 3D24-344

Lower Tribunal No. 24-30525 CC

________________

Roberto Somoza,

Appellant,

vs.

Ramon Lavado Martinez,

Appellee.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the County Court for MiamiDade County, Lissette De La Rosa, Judge.

Wolfe Law Miami, P.A., and Richard C. Wolfe, for appellant.

Legal Armor the People’s Law Firm, and Alian M. Perez, for appellee.

Before EMAS, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ. 

GORDO, J.

ON CONFESSION OF ERROR
2

Roberto Somoza (“Somoza”) appeals an order granting Ramon 

Lavado Martinez’s (“Martinez”) verified emergency motion for temporary 

injunction. Based on Martinez’s commendable and appropriate confession 

of error, we reverse the defective order under review, which lacks the 

requisite findings to justify entry of a temporary injunction, and remand for 

further proceedings. See Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, 223 So. 3d 1040, 

1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“To grant a temporary injunction, the moving 

party must plead and establish: (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm and the 

unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (2) a substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits; (3) that the threatened injury to the petitioner 

outweighs any possible harm to the respondent; and (4) that the granting of 

a temporary injunction will not disserve the public interest.”); Angelino v. 

Santa Barbara Enters., LLC, 2 So. 3d 1100, 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“The 

entry of a temporary injunction, however, will not stand unless the trial 

courts makes specific findings in support of each and every element 

required for the entry of the injunction. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 

1.610 sets forth the form and scope requirements for the entry of a 

temporary injunction. Every temporary injunction must specify the reasons 

for its entry, and it must describe in reasonable detail the act or acts to be 

restrained.”). 
3

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Robert Earl ROBINSON, Petitioner v. ARIZONA, et al.

No. 19-5821

Supreme Court of the United States.

November 4, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arizona denied.
Brian Keith WAUGH, Petitioner, v. MEDSTAR GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL.

No. 19-5477

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 15, 2019

*402Petition for writ of certiorari to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied.
Mark Anthony HEAD, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-9538

Supreme Court of the United States.

November 18, 2019

Petition for rehearing denied.
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NOVEMBER 2, 2007

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-11578

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 04-00063-CR-FTM-29DNF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

HUBERT B. FARQUHARSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

 (November 2, 2007)

Before BIRCH, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Hubert Farquharson appeals his conviction, after a guilty plea to knowingly

and wilfully possessing with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of
2

marijuana, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vii). On appeal,

Farquharson raises two claims: (1) that the district court erred by denying his

motion to suppress, and (2) that the district court erred by accepting his guilty plea

under a theory of deliberate ignorance. We affirm.

As for Farquharson’s first argument, because he entered an unconditional

guilty plea, thus waiving all nonjurisdictional defects, including any challenge to

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, we will not consider the claim.

United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, a

voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the

proceedings.”); United States v. Wai-Keung, 115 F.3d 874, 877 (11th Cir. 1997)

(holding that we will not consider a defendant’s challenge to the district court’s

denial of a motion to suppress if that issue is not preserved in a conditional plea

entered under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11).

And we will not consider his second argument, based on his failure to

preserve it below. “[I]t is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not

challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party. The

doctrine of invited error is implicated when a party induces or invites the district

court into making an error. Where invited error exists, it precludes a court from

invoking the plain error rule and reversing.” United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d
3

1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citations omitted). With respect to

Farquharson’s challenge to the district court’s use of the deliberate ignorance

theory, Farquharson repeatedly invited the district court to accept his plea based on

that very theory. Thus, under the invited error doctrine, we do not consider this

issue. 

AFFIRMED.
Justin James THRASHER, Petitioner v. ARIZONA

No. 19-5485

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 15, 2019

*427Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One denied.
Sherif Sayed MAHMOUD, Petitioner v. TEXAS.

No. 19-6450

Supreme Court of the United States.

December 9, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District denied.
# var% Douglas

Cherry Gibbons

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

VICTORIA-JOY GODWIN, Appellant, No. 69646

vs. DRISS SBAI; AND BTISSAM GHALMI,



# Respondents. 

# SLED
FEB 0 1 2016

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL This is an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss appellant's complaint. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kerry Louise Earley, Judge.

Our review of the documents submitted to this court pursuant to NRAP 3(g) reveals a jurisdictional defect. Specifically, the notice of appeal appears to be untimely filed under NRAP 4(a) because it appears that it was prematurely filed, before the entry of a final written judgment, and is therefore of no effect. 

### See NRAP 4(a)(1); 

### Rust v. Clark ety. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 747 P.2d 1380 (1987). Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction, and we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

(0) 1947A ongii.cc: Hon. Kerry Louise Earley, District Judge Victoria-Joy Godwin Btissam Ghalmi Driss Sbai Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Project No. 3133-033]

                    On June 3, 2022, Brookfield White Pine Hydro, LLC and Errol Hydro Co., LLC submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) evidence of its application for a Clean Water Act section 401(a)(1) water quality certification filed with New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, in conjunction with the above captioned project. Pursuant to section 401 of the Clean Water Act [1]                                          and section [4.34(b)(5), 5.23(b), 153.4, or 157.22] of the Commission's regulations,[2]                                          a state certifying agency is deemed to have waived its certifying authority if it fails or refuses to act on a certification request within a reasonable period of time, which is one year after the date the certification request was received. Accordingly, we hereby notify the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services of the following:                

Date that New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services Received the Certification Request: June 1, 2022.

If New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services fails or refuses to act on the water quality certification request on or before June 1, 2023, then the agency certifying authority is deemed waived pursuant to section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1).

Dated: June 8, 2022.

Kimberly D. Bose,

Secretary.

# Footnotes

1.                             33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1).                    
        Back to Citation      

2.                             18 CFR [4.34(b)(5)/5.23(b)/153.4/157.22].                    
        Back to Citation      

[FR Doc. 2022-12767 Filed 6-13-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 115 / Wednesday, June 15, 2022 / Presidential Documents 36047 

Notice of June 13, 2022 

Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to 

Belarus 

On June 16, 2006, by Executive Order 13405, the President declared a 

national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary 

threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of certain members of the Government 

of Belarus and other persons to undermine Belarus’s democratic processes 

or institutions, manifested in the fundamentally undemocratic March 2006 

elections; to commit human rights abuses related to political repression, 

including detentions and disappearances; and to engage in public corruption, 

including by diverting or misusing Belarusian public assets or by misusing 

public authority. 

On August 9, 2021, by Executive Order 14038, I expanded the scope of 

the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13405, finding that 

the Belarusian regime’s harmful activities and long-standing abuses aimed 

at suppressing democracy and the exercise of human rights and fundamental 

freedoms in Belarus—including illicit and oppressive activities stemming 

from the August 9, 2020, fraudulent Belarusian presidential election and 

its aftermath, such as the elimination of political opposition and civil society 

organizations and the regime’s disruption and endangering of international 

civil air travel—constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. 

The actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Belarus 

and other persons, and the Belarusian regime’s harmful activities and longstanding abuses, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to 

the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, 

the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13405, which was expanded in scope in Executive Order 14038, must continue in effect beyond 

June 16, 2022. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National 

Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national 

emergency declared in Executive Order 13405. 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PREZ DOC 1
36048 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 115 / Wednesday, June 15, 2022 / Presidential Documents 

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to 

the Congress. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

June 13, 2022. [FR Doc. 2022–13034 

Filed 6–14–22; 8:45 am] 

Billing code 3395–F2–P 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with PREZ DOC 1BIDEN.EPS</GPH>