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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee, UNPUBLISHED January 8, 2019

v No. 339550
Macomb Circuit Court EDWARDIAN DION DAVIDSON, LC No. 2016

- 000927

- FH

Defendant

- Appellant.

Before: G LEICHER

, P .J., and B ORRELLO and B ECKERING , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

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Defendant , Edwardian Dion Davidson, appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of three counts of unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530, one count of assault and battery, MCL 750.81,
and one count of attempted first

- degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2)(a). The trial court
sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment
for the three unarm ed r obbery convictions, 93 days in jail for the assault and battery conviction, and 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the attempted first

- degree home invasion conviction. We
affirm.

This case arises out of a series of r obberies that took place between October 26, 2015, and October 29, 2015, in Warren. Defendant stole a pu rse from the first victim just after she and her husband had arrived home from dinner one evening. The victim entered her house, closed the front storm door, and was attempting to lock it when d efendant ran up to the house, grabbed
the door handle, and the two engaged in a “tug

- of

- war” with the door. Defendant eventually

succee ded in “yanking” the victim onto her porch, where he was able to pull her purse off her
shoulder after a br ief str uggle and run away

. The second victim was an elderly woman who whose daughter had just driven her home after having dinner together . A fter the victim and her daughter pulled into the driveway and parked

, defendant ran up to the car

, open ed the passenger side door, and punched the victim twice in the face

. She tried fending him of f by kicking at him

. Witnessing this from the driver’s seat, t he victim’s daughter got out of the car and ran around to the passenger side to protect her mother. Defendant and the daughter met “face to face” outside the car, and then d efendant punche d the daughter in the mouth

. She punched him back, but defendant had the victim’s purse and ran away. The third victim encountered defendant in her garage after she had returned home from picking up carry

- out food for dinner. As she was grabbing a can of soda from a box in the garage , she heard a noise and walked back toward her car, where she saw defen dant standing with his hand raised as if he was about to strike her. She- 2

- swor e at him and he ran away, after which point she discovered that her purse was missing from
her car.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF T HE EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any of the crimes for w hich the jury convicted him . We disagree. This Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial de novo. People v Gaines , 306 Mich App 289, 296; 856 NW2d 222 (2014). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

p rosecution, to determine whether the trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id

. We resolve all conflicts in the evidence
in favor of the prosecution, and “ circumstantial evidence an d all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom can constitute satisfactory proof of the crime. ” People v Solloway , 316 Mich App 174,

180

- 181; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). This Court will not interfere with the jury’s determinations regarding “the weight of the evid ence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v Stevens , 306 Mich App 620, 628; 858 NW2d 98 (2014).

Defendant argues that the prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to identify him as the perpetrator of the charged crimes. He contends that the eyewitness testimony given by the
victims was unreliable because none of the women positively identified him in a photographic lineup or at trial. “[I]dentity is an element of every offense.” People v Yost , 278 Mich App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 ( 2008).

T he first victim testified at trial that she was unable to positively identify anyone in the
first photographic lineup that was shown to her by police the day after the incident

. But a week
or two later she was shown another photographic lineup

, and she identified defendant. 1 She told police she was 75 to 80 percent sure defendant was the assailant, based on his eyes . She agreed
that she had also considered another person’s photograph

. The victim testified that at the preliminary examination, defendant looked different than he did at the time of the incident, but she was “probably 80 percent sure that it was the same gentleman.” At trial, she positively
identified defendant.

The second victim’s daughter viewed a photographic lineup about a week after the
incident. She identified defendant a nd was “pretty conclusive” about it, although when asked to clarify what she meant by that, she indicated she was 60 percent certain , and she agreed she had told the police she was 50 or 60 percent cert ain defendant was the perpetrator , with the only thing being different from her memory of the attacker was that the nose in the photograph looked
a little wider

. She testified that she was similarly certain at defendant’s preliminary

1 Defense counsel cross

- examined th e victim regarding when she had seen an implicating newspaper article containing defendant’s photograph, and she testified that the article, which she had in her purse at trial, had not been published until a couple of weeks after she viewed the second pho tograph ic lineup, where she had identified defendant

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- examination. 2 A lthou gh the perpetrator’s head was covered by the hood of his black sweatshirt during the incident , his eyes stood out to her. She agreed at trial that she could not be 100 percent certain defendant was the perpetrator.

The second victim was not able to conc lusively identify defendant during the phot o graphic lineup, but she testified at trial that she did specifically point him out among the photos , as his eyes looked familiar

. At defendant’s preliminary examination, she again pointed

at defendant’s photo wh en shown the photographic lineup, again noting the person’s eyes, but she could not say with certainty that it was the perpetrator, although she did point at defendant in the courtroom and identify him as the perpetrator. At trial, she again identif ied de fendant’s eyes
to be the s ame eyes she identified during the photo graphic lineup

.

The third victim identified the perpetrator’s general height

, but she was not able to identify the perpetrator in photo graphic lineups or at the preliminary exam, and she h ad passed away before trial.

Since all of the witnesses did not conclusively identify defendant, he contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction s

. However, defendant disregards the fact that the first victim positively identifie d him as the perpetrator at trial and the second victim positively identified him at the preliminary examination

. See People v Davis , 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000) (indicating that p ositive identification by a witness

may provide sufficient support for a defendant’s convictio n). “T he credibility of identification testimony is a question for the trier of fact that we do not resolve anew

. ” Id

. Even if all of the witnesses that testify regarding a defendant’s identity are u nable to agree conclusively that the defendant committed the crimes, and inconsistencies exist in their testimony, a jury is
nevertheless free to conclude that the witnesses are credible. See People v Fletcher , 260 Mich App 531, 561; 679 NW2d 127 (2004 ). The jury clearly believed that the witnesses who testified
herein gave credible testimony about the robberies. Witness credibility i s a matter for the jury to decide, and this Court “will not interfere with the jury’s determinations regarding the . . .

c redibility of the witnesses.” People v Unger , 278 Mich App 210, 222; 749 NW2d 272 (2008)

.

Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to produce physical evidence, such as DNA or fingerprint evidence, to link him to the crime s . Defendant contends that the lack of direct or physical evidence connecting him to the crime s means that the prosecution never
established his identity as the perpetrator of the crime s

. However, physical evidence is not required to prove that defendant commit ted the crimes; circumstantial evidence, as well as the
reasonable inferences a fact

- finder can draw from the evidence, can constitute sufficient proof of
the elements of a crime. Fletcher , 260 Mich App at 560. In this case, police officers traced purchases made on a Se ars’s credit card that had been in the second victim ’s purse when it was stolen. The individual who fraudulently used the credit card purchased Apple products online. The shipping address for the Apple products was to a house directly next door to a hous e where defendant lived and to a person named “Trey Scott.” The police determined that no one named

2 Both the second victim and her daughter testified that they had not seen any news articles about
defendant until after the photographic lineup

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- “ Trey Scott ” had ever lived at the shipping address, thus allowing the jury to infer that it likely
was a false name. Further, during the execution of a s earch warrant at defendant’s house

, items belonging to all three of the victims were found in garbage can s located in the backyard

. Namely, they found prescription bottles, two packages of hearing aid batteries , an empty rosary case, and a distinctive card that had been in the first victim’s purse, a VFW Lifetime membership auxiliary card from the second victim’s purse, and a checkbook from the third victim’s purse.

From t his circumstantial evidence, a rational trier of fact could have inferred that de fendant made fraudulent purchases with the second victim’ s credit card and threw items from all of the
victims’ purses into a garbage can on the property.

The discovery of items belonging to the victims on defendant’s property supports a
reasonable infere nce that defendant was the perpetrator of the crime s . However, defendant argues that he cannot be linked directly to the items because there is no proof that he had
exclusive control over the real property where the items were found. A jury may infer tha t a defendant committed theft or robbery if the defendant possesses recently stolen property. People v Hayden , 132 Mich App 273, 283 n 4; 348 NW2d 672 (1984) . D efendant asserts , however, that the jury may only make this inference if the prosecution can d emonstrate that defendant had exclusive control over the property where the stolen items were located. D efendant cites no caselaw that directly supports his argument, and this Court found no ca selaw specifically stating that, in order for a jury to make a reasonable inference that a defendant committed a theft or robbery, the prosecution is required to introduce evidence that the defendant had exclusive control or dominion over the property where stolen items were discovered. Moreover, this Court has prev iously determined that a defendant’s possession and subsequent disposal of stolen items supported an inference that the defendant was a thief and intended to commit the crime of larceny. See People v Hughey , 186 Mich App 585, 592; 464 NW2d 914 (1990) ( ind icating that evidence that the defendant possessed and disposed of recently stolen property supported a finding that the defendant intended to commit larceny)

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Ultimately, “ ‘ [i]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what
infere nces may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded to
those inferences. ’ ” People v Henry , 315 Mich App 130, 135; 889 NW2d 1 (2016) , quoting People v Hardiman , 466 Mich 417, 421; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). When examined in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that defendant was the perpetrator of the charged crimes and, therefore, to support defendant’s convictions.

II. HABITUAL OFFENDER NOTICE

Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the prosecution failed to file a proof of service of the habitual offender notice, under which the prosecution sought to enhance
his sentence as a fourth habitual offend er, MCL 769.12. We disagree.- 5

- Whether defendant was properly served with notice of the prosecution’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on defendant’s status as a fourth habitual offender is a question that “is reviewed de novo as a question of law because it involves the interp retation and application of statutory provisions and court rules.” People v Head , 323 Mich App 526

, 542; 917 NW2d 752 (2018).

Sentence enhancements based on a defendant’s prior felonies are governed by MCL 769.13, which provides in relevant part :

(1) In a criminal action, the prosecuting attorney may seek to enhance the sentence of the defendant as provided under [MCL 769.10, MCL 769.11, or MCL 769.12], by filing a written notice of his or her intent to do so within 21 days after the defendant's arraignme nt on the information charging the underlying offense or, if arraignment is waived, within 21 days after the filing of the information charging the underlying offense.

(2) A notice of intent to seek an enhanced sentence filed under subsection (1)
shall lis t the prior conviction or convictions that will or may be relied upon for purposes of sentence enhancement. The notice shall be filed with the court and served upon the defendant or his or her attorney within the time provided in subsection (1). The noti ce may be personally served upon the defendant or his or her attorney at the arraignment on the information charging the underlying offense, or may be served in the manner provided by law or court rule for service of written pleadings. The prosecuting att orney shall file a written proof of servi ce with the clerk of the court.

The record shows that the prosecution filed a notice of intent to enhance defendant’s sentence based on his status as a fourth habitual offender on March 16, 2016, along with the felo ny information and the prosecution’s witness list. Defendant does not dispute that the prosecution
filed the notice within the 21

- day window for filing because the prosecution filed it at the same time as the felony information, but he correctly argues th at the prosecution filed no proof of service in the lower court. However, if the record shows that defendant had actual notice of the prosecution’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence, and defendant cannot demonstrate that he
suffered prejudice by the fai lure to file a proof of service for the habitual offender notice, we deem the error harmless. See People v Walker , 234 Mich App 299, 314

- 315; 593 NW2d 673 (1999).

At a pretrial hearing, defendant acknowledged through his attorney that he received copies of the documents filed with the felony information, including the witness list and habitual
offender notice

. At a second pretrial hearing, the prosecution mentioned on the record that defendant faced a maximum of life imprisonment for the unarmed robbery charges, and specifically stated that they were “life offenses by the fact that they’re habitual fourth” offenses

. Given that the habitual offender notice was filed with the felony information and was discussed on the record at a pretrial hearing, defenda nt clearly had actual notice of the prosecution’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence under MCL 769.12, and he cannot properly demonstrate that he was prejudiced or prevented from responding to the habitual offender notice. Thus, the- 6

- prosecution’s failure to file a proof of service constitutes harmless erro r. Accordingly, defendant
is not entitled to resen tencing

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Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher /s/ Stephen L. Borrello /s/ Jane M. Beckering