[J-93-2017]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

DR. SUSAN KEGERISE,

Appellee

v.

KATHY L. DELGRANDE, JOHN F. 

DIETRICH, CLIFTON D. EDWARDS, 

CAROL L. KARL, JESSE RAWLS, SR., 

DR. PETER J. SAKOL, HELEN D. 

SPENCE, AND MARK Y. SUSSMAN, IN 

THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,

Appellants

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No. 22 MAP 2017

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated September 

13, 2016, reconsideration denied 

November 9, 2016, at No. 232 CD 2015 

Affirming the Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Civil 

Division, dated November 5, 2014 at 

No. 2014-CV-3793-CV.

ARGUED: November 29, 2017

OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: April 26, 2018

In this mandamus action involving the law of constructive discharge and 

Pennsylvania’s Public School Code,

1 Dr. Susan Kegerise seeks reinstatement as 

superintendent of the Susquehanna Township School District, as well as back pay and 

benefits. Kegerise prevailed in the trial court, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. 

For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 

 

1 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, No. 14, codified as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101, 

et seq.
[J-93-2017] - 2

In January 2010, Kegerise was appointed superintendent of the Susquehanna 

Township School District. On May 7, 2013, that District’s Board of Directors2 extended 

Kegerise’s contract for a three-year term after agreeing, at Kegerise’s request, to 

include the following provision at Section 8.03:

RESIGNATION. In the event that Superintendent seeks to resign or 

separate her employment with Board for any reason other than death, 

illness, or disability, Superintendent shall give at least sixty (60) days’ 

written notice . . . . No notice whatsoever shall be required by the 

Superintendent should her resignation be caused by the Board’s breach of 

this AGREEMENT or caused by constructive termination by the Board or 

any of its members.

Joint Stipulations of Fact (“J.S.F.”) Ex. A § 8.03, May 2, 2014 (Contract for Employment 

of District Superintendent).

3

 Kegerise has alleged that this new resignation clause was 

necessary to protect her interests in light of several Board members’ inappropriate 

behavior. See Brief for Kegerise at 6. Kegerise further alleged that, this clause 

notwithstanding, and in an effort to force her resignation, several Board members 

persisted in hostile actions including, inter alia, physical intimidation and verbal abuse, 

even after the contract was executed. Id. at 6-7.

On March 25, 2014, Kegerise informed the Board that she was receiving medical 

care and would be unable to return to work until April 21, 2014. While Kegerise was on 

medical leave, the Board received several letters from Kegerise’s counsel asserting that 

 

2

In their official capacities, the individual members of the Board of Directors of 

Susquehanna Township School District appeal the Commonwealth Court’s decision. 

We refer to these parties hereinafter, collectively, as the “Board.”

3 Legal counsel assisted Kegerise in negotiating her new contract. Fed. Compl. ¶ 

40, Apr. 17, 2014, Kegerise v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 1:14-CV-00747 

(M.D. Pa. 2015) (hereinafter “Fed. Compl.”).
[J-93-2017] - 3

Kegerise had been constructively discharged. By letter dated April 16, 2014, the Board 

responded as follows:

Dr. Kegerise is and remains the Superintendent of Schools at 

Susquehanna Township School District pursuant to the contract between 

she and the Board. Her recent absence from work was based on a 

physician’s note received from Dr. Kegerise. Her time away from the 

District since that day has been recorded as sick leave derived from Dr. 

Kegerise’s pre-existing sick leave accumulation.

* * * *

Finally, the District understands that Dr. Kegerise’s current physician’s 

note indicates that she is precluded from working until April 21, 2014. If 

she is cleared to return to work, then the District hopes and expects her to 

return to her duties as Superintendent. If she is not, the District will 

continue to debit her sick leave time and continue to process her 

workers[’] compensation claim.

J.S.F. at Ex. B.

The next day, April 17, 2014, Kegerise filed a complaint in the United States 

District Court, alleging, inter alia, that the Board had constructively discharged her.4 

Kegerise asserted that, “although no formal termination has taken place, [she] cannot 

perform the job duties of Superintendent,” due to the Board’s behavior toward her. Fed. 

Compl. ¶ 86.

5

 Kegerise sought damages in excess of six million dollars, including, inter 

alia, compensatory and economic damages “for loss of contractual salary and other 

emoluments of employment” and consequential damages for “damage to professional 

reputation and loss of future salary as an educational administrator.” Id. at 20. 

 

4

In her federal complaint, Kegerise asserted a “constructive termination” claim. 

For purposes of consistency, we refer to the claim as “constructive discharge” 

throughout this opinion.

5 The federal court dismissed Kegerise’s constructive discharge claim, citing a 

failure to allege conduct that rose to the level of intolerable working conditions. Jan. 7, 

2015 Mem. at 18-22, Kegerise v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 1:14-CV00747 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
[J-93-2017] - 4

Kegerise also signed a verification of her federal complaint, affirming under penalty of 

perjury that the statements contained within the complaint were true. See Verification to

Fed. Compl.

On April 21, 2014, Kegerise’s physician sent a letter to the Board, advising that 

Kegerise would be “off of work until further notice due to work related medical issues.” 

Pl.’s Oct. 16, 2014 Evid. Hr’g Ex. 9b. That same day, during a regularly-scheduled 

meeting, the Board amended its agenda to address Kegerise’s federal suit, and passed 

a motion to “[a]ccept the resignation of Dr. Kegerise as superintendent that is implicit 

with the term ‘constructive discharge,[’] effective April 17, 2014.” J.S.F. Ex. E, at 130. 

In a letter dated April 22, 2014, the Board advised Kegerise that, in light of her federal 

complaint alleging constructive discharge, a majority of the Board had voted to accept 

her resignation. Id. at Ex. F.

On May 16, 2014, Kegerise filed the operative Amended Complaint in mandamus 

with the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County (hereinafter, the “trial court”), 

seeking reinstatement and compensation. In response, the Board alleged that Kegerise

failed to state a claim upon which relief in mandamus could be granted. The Board 

argued that Kegerise was estopped from asserting that she did not resign, inasmuch as

she had submitted a signed verification with her federal constructive discharge claim, 

affirming that the statements in her complaint were true and correct to the best of her 

knowledge, information, and belief. See Verification to Fed. Compl. The Board 

maintained that, because resignation is a requirement of a constructive discharge claim, 

Kegerise’s resignation was manifest. 

On October 16, 2014, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether Kegerise had intended to resign when she filed her federal complaint. At the 

hearing, the Board demonstrated that Kegerise’s counsel had negotiated the resignation 
[J-93-2017] - 5

provision in Section 8.03 of Kegerise’s employment contract, which used the term

“constructive termination.” Kegerise Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/16/2014, at 80-81. 

Kegerise testified that she understood “constructive termination” to occur when the 

Board’s actions made her working conditions so intolerable that she would be forced to 

resign. Id. at 81-84. Kegerise further testified that her understanding of the term 

“constructive termination,” as used in both her employment contract and her federal 

complaint, was the same. Id. at 89.

On November 5, 2014, the trial court issued an order directing the Board to 

reinstate Kegerise and restore all back pay and benefits, finding, inter alia, that Kegerise 

had never resigned. The Board appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

Before the Commonwealth Court, the Board again argued that mandamus was 

inappropriate because Kegerise had failed to establish a clear legal right to 

reinstatement and a corresponding duty in the Board to reverse its acceptance of her 

resignation. Kegerise asserted that her right to reinstatement arose from the Board’s 

failure to adhere to the removal procedure set forth in Section 1080 of Pennsylvania’s 

Public School Code. That provision states, in relevant part:

District superintendents and assistant district superintendents may be 

removed from office and have their contracts terminated, after hearing, by 

a majority vote of the board of school directors of the district, for neglect of 

duty, incompetency, intemperance, or immorality, of which hearing notice 

of at least one week has been sent by mail to the accused, as well as to 

each member of the board of school directors.

24 P.S. § 10-1080(a).

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of mandamus. 

Kegerise v. Delgrande, 147 A.3d 930 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). The Commonwealth Court 

characterized the requirements of a constructive discharge claim as follows:

On its face, the constructive discharge standard contemplates termination 

without a plaintiff’s actual resignation, as long as a reasonable person 
[J-93-2017] - 6

would have felt compelled to resign, even if the plaintiff did not actually 

resign. The test is whether a hypothetical, reasonable employee would 

have resigned, not the employee alleging constructive discharge.

Id. at 934-35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis added). Without confronting precedent 

requiring actual resignation to sustain a constructive discharge claim,

6

the 

Commonwealth Court opined that constructive discharge does not require such 

resignation, and found “unpersuasive” the Board’s view that Kegerise’s filing of a federal 

complaint alleging constructive discharge constituted such a resignation. Id. at 935. 

Turning to the elements of a mandamus claim, the Commonwealth Court

determined that, because the Public School Code imposed statutorily-mandated duties 

upon Kegerise as a superintendent elected by the Board, Kegerise had a clear legal 

right to perform those duties. Id. at 938 (citing 24 P.S. § 10-1081, which sets forth the 

duties of superintendents). The Court further opined that the Board had a 

corresponding duty to reinstate and compensate Kegerise unless and until the Board 

followed the required procedure to remove her. Id. 

While it acknowledged that the Public School Code does not expressly state that 

a school board must provide notice and a hearing prior to accepting a superintendent’s 

resignation, the Commonwealth Court nevertheless posited that the General Assembly 

intended Section 1080 to function as the exclusive mechanism by which 

superintendents may be removed. Id. at 940 n. 11. Even if Kegerise had resigned, the 

court concluded, the Board’s failure to follow the removal procedure in accepting her 

resignation established her clear legal right to reinstatement for mandamus purposes. 

Id. at 939.

 

6 See infra text accompanying notes 9-10.
[J-93-2017] - 7

Senior Judge Dante Pellegrini authored a dissenting opinion. Judge Pellegrini 

first observed that both the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have 

held that a claim for constructive discharge depends upon the employee’s actual 

resignation.7 Id. at 942-43 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting). Judge Pellegrini opined that “no 

reasonable person could find that [Kegerise] did not effectively resign,” pointing to the 

fact that Kegerise had exercised her unilateral right to resign without notice to the 

Board, pursuant to Section 8.03 of her contract with the Board. Id. at 943-44. Judge 

Pellegrini further maintained that, because nothing in the Public School Code limits the 

method by which a superintendent may resign, Kegerise’s legal rights related to 

resignation existed solely by virtue of her employment contract. Id. at 944. Therefore, 

even if Kegerise had not resigned, mandamus would not lie because the underlying 

issue was contractual in nature. Id. (citing Kaelin v. Univ. of Pitt., 218 A.2d 798, 801

(Pa. 1966) (“[T]he use of mandamus is limited to the enforcement of rights and duties 

imposed by law, and, if the right or duty rests wholly on contract, the writ will not issue to 

enforce it.”)). 

The Board filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal, which we granted in order to 

consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the removal 

procedure set forth in Section 1080 of the Public School Code applies in these 

circumstances, such that Kegerise had a clear legal right to reinstatement.

8

 

 

7 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004) (“A constructive discharge 

involves both an employee’s decision to leave and precipitating conduct . . . .”); see 

McCarthy v. Darman, 372 Fed.Appx. 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that an 

employee’s constructive discharge claim failed because it involved a suspension, not an 

actual resignation); McWilliams v. W. Pa. Hosp., 717 F.Supp. 351, 355-56 (W.D. Pa. 

1989) (finding that “there must be at least some relation between the occurrence of the 

discriminatory conduct and the employee’s resignation”).

8

In particular, the Board raised the following issues on appeal for our resolution:

(continued...)
[J-93-2017] - 8

Before addressing the merits of Kegerise’s request for mandamus relief, we 

clarify the requirements of a constructive discharge claim. The Commonwealth Court’s 

account notwithstanding, actual resignation always has been a necessary element of a 

constructive discharge claim.9 Indeed, Kegerise herself agrees. See Brief for Kegerise 

at 28 (“[T]he cases cited by [the Board] certainly hold that resignation is one of the 

necessary elements of constructive discharge. Indeed, they insist on it.”). This Court 

first adopted the doctrine in 1964, stating that, “[a] constructive discharge occurs only 

 

(...continued)

1. Whether the Commonwealth Court majority’s holding that a claim of 

constructive discharge does not require actual resignation conflicts with 

the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Green v. Brennan, 136 

S.Ct. 1769 (2016) and Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S.Ct. 

2342 (2004)?

2. Whether the Commonwealth Court majority’s holding that a claim of 

constructive discharge does not require actual resignation conflicts with 

this Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Sand’s Rest. 

Corp., 240 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1968) or the Superior Court’s decisions in Kroen 

v. Bedway Sec. Agency, Inc., 633 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. 1993) and its 

progeny?

3. Whether the Commonwealth Court majority erred as a matter of law 

and so abused its discretion as to call for this Court’s review in concluding 

that Kegerise had a clear right to relief in mandamus pursuant to Section 

1080 of the Public School Code, even though Section 1080 is silent as to 

the [Board’s] obligations in the face of a superintendent's resignation?

Brief for the Board at 4.

9

In the early twentieth century, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) 

developed the doctrine of constructive discharge to protect employees who resigned

after their employers retaliated against them for engaging in, or refusing to engage in, 

collective bargaining activities. See Roslyn Corenzwit Lieb, Constructive Discharge 

under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Study in Undue Concern 

over Motives, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 143, 145-55 (1985). Professor Lieb notes that the 

NLRB first applied the concept of constructive discharge in 1936, and began using the 

term as early as 1938. Id. at 146-47 (citing Canvas Glove Mfg. Works, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 

519 (1936); and Sterling Corset Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 858 (1938)).
[J-93-2017] - 9

where the employer makes working conditions so intolerable that the employee is 

forced to resign.” PLRB v. Sand’s Rest. Corp., 240 A.2d 801, 803-04 (citing NLRB v. 

Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1953); and NLRB v. Chi. Apparatus 

Co., 116 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1940)) (emphasis added). 

Although this Court has not had occasion to review the constructive discharge

standard since our opinion in Sand’s, the Supreme Court of the United States recently 

reaffirmed the actual resignation requirement in the context of its review of a Title VII 

action:

A claim of constructive discharge . . . has two basic elements. A plaintiff 

must prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the 

point where a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled 

to resign. But he must also show that he actually resigned. In other 

words, an employee cannot bring a constructive-discharge claim until he is 

constructively discharged. Only after both elements are satisfied can he 

file suit to obtain relief.

Green v. Brennan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016) (internal citations 

omitted) (emphasis added); see Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).

10

 We 

 

10 The Suders Court distinguished an action for constructive discharge from a 

hostile work environment claim, emphasizing that an employee alleging constructive 

discharge must have actually resigned:

A . . . constructive discharge claim entails something more [than 

allegations of an abusive working environment]: A plaintiff who advances 

such a compound claim must show working conditions so intolerable that 

a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. See, e.g., 

Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1160 (8th Cir. 1999) 

(“[A]lthough there may be evidence from which a jury could find sexual 

harassment, ... the facts alleged [for constructive discharge must be] ... so 

intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to quit.”); Perry v. 

Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless 

conditions are beyond ‘ordinary’ discrimination, a complaining employee is 

expected to remain on the job while seeking redress.”).

Suders, 542 U.S. at 147.
[J-93-2017] - 10

see no reason to depart from this time-honored requirement. In order to maintain a 

claim of constructive discharge, an employee first must demonstrate that he or she 

actually resigned.

Turning to the mandamus question, our standard of review is limited to 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or 

whether sufficient evidence exists to support its findings.11 Our scope of review of a trial 

court’s grant of mandamus is de novo and plenary. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of 

Labor and Indus., Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 22 A.3d 189, 194 (Pa. 2011).

The standard by which a grant of mandamus relief must be evaluated is wellsettled:

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that will only lie to compel official 

performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear 

legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and want 

of any other appropriate or adequate remedy. It may be used to compel 

performance of a ministerial duty, or to compel action in a matter involving 

judgment or discretion. However, it may not be used to direct the exercise 

of judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to direct the retraction or 

reversal of an action already taken.

Chanceford Aviation Props., L.L.P. v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 923 A.2d 

1099, 1107-08 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). The petitioner’s right to performance of a 

mandatory duty must be well-defined, clear, and specific; where any doubt exists, 

mandamus relief will not lie. Equitable Gas Co. v. City of Pitt., 488 A.2d 270, 272-73 

(Pa. 1985). 

To address whether mandamus lies in the instant case, we first must determine 

whether the Board was required to follow the procedure set forth in Section 1080 of the 

 

11 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Borough of Clifton Heights, 661 A.2d 909, 

911 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1996). 
[J-93-2017] - 11

Public School Code. As our inquiry requires interpretation of the Public School Code, 

our standard of review is de novo and the scope of our review is plenary. Discovery 

Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 166 A.3d 304, 316 (Pa. 2017) (citing Johnson v. 

Lansdale Borough, 146 A.3d 696, 709 (Pa. 2016)). As with all questions of statutory 

interpretation, we must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly, 

giving effect to all of the statute’s provisions if possible. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When the 

words of the statute clearly and unambiguously set forth the legislative intent, we need

not look beyond those words to ascertain the statute’s meaning. See id., § 1921(b); 

Trust Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1155 (Pa. 2017). 

To prevent what it perceived as the Board’s attempt to circumvent the removal 

procedure, the Commonwealth Court held that school boards must apply the Section 

1080 removal procedure even when accepting a superintendent’s resignation. 

Kegerise, 147 A.3d at 939. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we must not 

“add, by interpretation, a requirement not included by the General Assembly.” 

Commonwealth v. Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1268 (Pa. 2016). The clear language of 

Section 1080 limits application of the notice and hearing procedure for removal and 

termination to situations in which a superintendent has displayed “neglect of duty, 

incompetency, intemperance, or immorality” (i.e., removal for cause). 24 P.S. § 10-

1080.12 In such cases, the superintendent may be removed for cause only after a 

 

12 Agreeing with Kegerise that Section 1080 “bears relevance to constructive 

discharge scenarios,” Chief Justice Saylor urges that “the statute should still be read as 

proscribing illegal forced removals.” Concurring Op. at 2 n.1. As we note above, the 

General Assembly specified four instances in which a school board must follow the 

notice and hearing procedure for removal and termination (“neglect of duty, 

incompetency, intemperance, or immorality”). 24 P.S. § 10-1080. We must presume 

that, if the legislature had intended for Section 1080 to encompass scenarios of alleged 

constructive discharge, such as Kegerise’s, it would have done so expressly. See 

Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1223 (Pa. 2002) (“[U]nder the 

doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of a specific matter in a 

(continued...)
[J-93-2017] - 12

hearing, notice of which must be “sent by mail to the accused.” Id. Section 1080 does 

not speak of “resignation,” nor does it require that the removal procedure apply to 

circumstances where a school board accepts a superintendent’s resignation. We 

cannot impose a duty upon the Board to provide notice and a hearing to a resigning 

superintendent absent any language in the statute that directs us to do so. Moreover,

we observe that the General Assembly’s demonstrative use of “the accused” suggests 

that Section 1080 hearings are adversarial and are intended to give the superintendent 

an opportunity to respond to allegations of wrongdoing. Such a process is wholly 

unnecessary and indeed irrelevant when a superintendent severs her own employment, 

as in the case of resignation.

While the Commonwealth Court correctly observed that the General Assembly 

restricted removal of superintendents to the four specific reasons set forth in Section 

1080, that court failed to recognize that the General Assembly also granted 

superintendents the freedom to negotiate their own terms of resignation. See Kegerise, 

147 A.3d at 936. Section 1073 of the Public School Code requires that a 

superintendent’s contract must “contain the mutual and complete agreement” between 

the superintendent and the board with respect to terms and conditions of employment. 

 

(...continued)

statute implies the exclusion of other matters.”). Although Chief Justice Saylor 

advocates for a broader interpretation of Section 1080, he nonetheless concludes that, 

“in light of the substantial public interest at stake,” the School Board may view a 

constructive discharge claim “as embodying a resignation and accept it.” Concurring 

Op. at 2 n.1. As we discuss infra, the General Assembly granted superintendents 

ample latitude to negotiate terms that address resignations, as Kegerise did here. As 

Chief Justice Saylor notes, superintendents also may avail themselves of legal and 

equitable remedies through litigation. See id. It may well be that, finding those 

mechanisms adequate to address situations such as those that appear in the case at 

bar, the General Assembly intended to omit resignations, forced or voluntary, from the 

scope of Section 1080 altogether.
[J-93-2017] - 13

24 P.S. § 10-1073(e)(2). The employment contract must specify any termination, 

severance, and buyout provisions that the parties negotiated. See id. § 10-

1073(e)(2)(v). The parties are free to negotiate the terms by which the superintendent 

may resign, provided that the resignation provision does not allow for payment of 

severance.

13

 Hence, the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that Section 1080’s

 

13 The General Assembly placed only one restriction upon the parties’ ability to 

negotiate severance provisions:

No agreement between the board of school directors and a district 

superintendent or assistant district superintendent for a negotiated 

severance of employment prior to the end of the specified contract term

shall provide for severance compensation to the district superintendent or 

assistant district superintendent . . . .

Id. § 10-1073(e)(3) (emphasis added). The General Assembly’s intent to afford

superintendents the right to negotiate severance provisions also is evident when 

Section 1073 is compared to Section 1121 of the Public School Code, which dictates 

the procedure that professional employees (such as principals and teachers) must 

follow when they resign:

Contracts under subsection (b) shall contain only the following:

* * * *

“AND IT IS FURTHER AGREED by the parties hereto that none of the 

provisions of this act may be waived either orally or in writing, and that this 

contract shall continue in force year after year, with the right of the board 

of school directors (or board of public education) to increase the 

compensation over the compensation herein stated, from time to time, as 

may be provided under the provisions and proper operation of the 

established salary schedule, if any, for the school district, subject to the 

provisions of law, without invalidating any other provision of this contract, 

unless terminated by the professional employe by written resignation 

presented sixty (60) days before resignation becomes effective, or by the 

board of school directors (or board of public education) by official written 

notice presented to the professional employe: Provided, That the said 

notice shall designate the cause for the termination and shall state that an 

opportunity to be heard shall be granted if the said professional employe, 

within ten (10) days after receipt of the termination notice, presents a 

written request for such hearing.”

(continued...)
[J-93-2017] - 14

removal procedure, rather than the resignation procedure for which the parties contract,

applies when a superintendent resigns is inconsistent with Section 1073.

We presume that the General Assembly intended the entire Public School Code

to be effective. We must not construe statutory provisions in a manner in which one 

section operates to nullify another, unless the statute expressly directs us to do so. 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1922(2); see Trust Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1157. We also

must presume that the General Assembly did not intend an absurd or unreasonable 

result. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).

The Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 1080 would nullify Section 

1073’s provisions concerning negotiation of severance, and would produce 

unreasonable results. If Section 1080 is the sole means by which a superintendent’s 

employment may be terminated prior to the end of the contractual employment term, as 

the Commonwealth Court suggests, Subsection 1073(e) is meaningless. It would be an 

exercise in futility for school districts and superintendents to negotiate severance 

provisions pursuant to Section 1073(e)(3) if the Section 1080 procedure applies in any 

event. Under such a scheme, even if faced with an unequivocal letter of resignation, a 

school board statutorily would be required to indulge the empty formality of sending 

notice to “the accused” superintendent and to hold a Section 1080 hearing before 

accepting the resignation—all, presumably, against the will of the resigning 

superintendent herself. See 24 P.S. § 10-1080. Such an absurdity cannot be what the 

General Assembly intended. The Section 1080 removal procedure is inapplicable 

where a superintendent resigns.

 

(...continued)

24 P.S. § 11-1121(c) (emphasis added). Unlike superintendents, professional 

employees may not negotiate their own resignation provision.
[J-93-2017] - 15

For mandamus to lie, Kegerise must demonstrate that she has a “well-defined, 

clear, and specific” right to reinstatement under Section 1080 by showing that she did 

not resign from her position, but rather that she was removed for cause. Equitable Gas 

Co., 488 A.2d at 272. In support of her assertion that she was removed, Kegerise 

stresses that she did not provide notice to the board that she intended to sever her 

employment (i.e., by proffering a letter of resignation), and that she did not specifically 

plead that she had resigned in her federal complaint. Brief for Kegerise at 20-21. 

Kegerise also contends that the Board knew that she did not intend to resign, and that it 

held the meeting to accept her putative resignation in order to “foreclose any opportunity 

for her to clarify her intentions.” Id. at 13.

With the assistance of legal counsel, Kegerise exercised her power under 

Section 1073 to negotiate for the inclusion of a resignation provision in her employment 

contract. By her own design, that provision gave Kegerise the express contractual right 

to resign from her position without notice if her resignation was “caused by constructive 

termination by the Board or any of its members.” J.S.F. Ex. A § 8.03. Kegerise’s failure 

to submit a letter of resignation to the Board cannot be considered evidence of removal 

where she negotiated in advance specifically to free herself of the duty to provide notice 

in the event of her resignation.14

It is significant as well that Kegerise instructed her legal counsel (the same 

attorney who negotiated her resignation provision) to send letters to the Board claiming 

that it had constructively discharged her. One day after the Board informed her that she 

 

14 Furthermore, to the extent that Kegerise’s rights arise from her employment 

contract, she would not have an action in mandamus. See Kaelin, 218 A.2d at 801 

(holding that the use of mandamus is “limited to the enforcement of rights and duties 

imposed by law,” and, “if the right or duty rests wholly on contract, the writ will not issue 

to enforce it.”). 
[J-93-2017] - 16

was still employed, Kegerise filed a verified federal complaint alleging constructive 

termination, a necessary element of which is actual resignation. Kegerise testified 

under oath that she understood “constructive termination” to involve a forced 

resignation. Moreover, Kegerise sought damages for the loss of her salary and future 

salary, which necessarily would imply that Kegerise considered her employment

terminated before the meeting at which the Board voted to accept her resignation—prior 

to which the Board’s position remained that Kegerise was still employed.

Upon review of the uncontested facts in the record, we find that the trial court 

erred in concluding that Kegerise was entitled to mandamus relief. See Bell Atl. Mobile 

Sys., Inc., 661 A.2d at 911 n.5. Kegerise has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to 

reinstatement pursuant to Section 1080.

Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court reinstating Kegerise as 

superintendent with back pay and benefits is reversed.

Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.

Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion.