COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JIMMY RICKS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0929-97-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 JUNE 2, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Donald W. Lemons, Judge 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Jimmy Ricks was convicted of carrying a knife "about his 

person, hidden from common observation" in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-308. He contends the trial judge erred in finding the 

knife to be one of the weapons proscribed by the statute. For 

the reasons that follow, we reverse the conviction. 

 I. 

 The evidence proved that State Police Trooper John Rehme 

stopped Ricks for driving erratically and arrested him for 

driving while intoxicated. During a search of Ricks' vehicle, 

the officer found a knife beneath the driver's seat, a pack of 

beer, a shirt, boots, a cooler, and other trash. Ricks told the 

officer the knife was his fishing knife. The officer testified 

that he found no fishing gear in the vehicle. 

 The Commonwealth introduced the knife as Commonwealth's 
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Exhibit 2. The knife has a flexible blade that is four and 

one-half inches long and one-half inch wide at its widest point; 

it has a plastic handle. Observing the knife, the trial judge 

initially stated that "[t]he question is whether or not the knife 

[which] has an appearance of being a common kitchen steak knife 

is a weapon that is illegal under [Code §] 18.2-308 when carried 

in a concealed capacity." After considering the arguments of 

counsel, the trial judge concluded the knife was "not something 

that was being carried for ordinary purposes." The judge 

convicted Ricks of violating Code § 18.2-308 by carrying the 

knife concealed under the seat of his truck. 

 II. 

 In accordance with generally accepted principles, "penal 

statutes must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth and 

applied only to those cases clearly falling within the language 

of the statute." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 

419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). Code § 18.2-308(A), a penal statute, 

provides in pertinent part as follows: 

 If any person carries about his person, 

hidden from common observation, . . . any 

dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, 

ballistic knife, razor, slingshot, spring 

stick, metal knucks, or blackjack . . . or 

 . . . any weapon of like kind as those 

enumerated in this subsection, he shall be 

guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 

 The statute does not prohibit generally the carrying of 

knives hidden from common observation. It designates specific 

types of knives, see Code § 18.2-308(A)(ii), and knives "of like 
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kind as those enumerated." Code § 18.2-308(A)(v). The knives 

specified in Code § 18.2-308(A)(ii) are defined by statute or 

have been described by this Court to have their usual meanings. 

See Code § 18.2-308(N) (defining "ballistic knife" as "any knife 

with a detachable blade that is propelled by a spring-operated 

mechanism"); Richards v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 242, 245, 246 

n.2, 443 S.E.2d 177, 179, 179 n.2 (1994) (defining "switchblade 

knife" as "a knife with a blade that opens automatically by 

operation of inertia, gravity, or both upon the release of a 

spring mechanism"; defining "'dirk' or weapon of like kind" as 

"any stabbing weapon having two sharp edges and a point"; and 

defining "'bowie knife' or weapon of like kind" as "any stabbing 

weapon having a single sharp edge, a dull or serrated flat edge 

and a point"). The Court in Richards also noted that the 

legislature "intend[ed] to exclude from [the] concealed weapons 

statutes innocuous household and industrial knives." 18 Va. App. 

at 246 n.2, 433 S.E.2d at 179 n.2. 

 After finding that the knife had "an appearance of being a 

common kitchen steak knife," the trial judge convicted Ricks 

because the knife was "not . . . being carried for ordinary 

purposes." The trial judge erroneously relied on the purported 

purpose of Ricks' possession of the knife to convict Ricks of the 

offense. Unless a claim is made that a circumstance specified in 

Code § 18.2-308(B) (listing exclusions from coverage) or (C) 

(exempting certain individuals from coverage) is applicable, the 
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language of the statute does not provide that the purpose for 

carrying the knife is relevant. Rather, the physical 

characteristics of the knife determine whether the knife is a 

weapon contemplated by the statute. Therefore, even if the trial 

judge believed Ricks did not use the knife for fishing and 

believed Ricks was not carrying it "for ordinary purposes," the 

knife did not have the physical characteristics of the weapons 

specified in Code § 18.2-308(A)(ii) and, thus, could not be 

deemed a "weapon of like kind as those enumerated." Code 

§ 18.2-308(A)(v). 

 The trial judge observed the knife and found that it 

appeared to be an ordinary kitchen steak knife. The knife, which 

was introduced into evidence, in fact has the appearance and 

characteristics of an ordinary household steak knife. We hold, 

therefore, that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss 

the charge. 

 Reversed and dismissed.