### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00317- CR

Brandon Christopher Head, Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F CALDWELL CO UNTY, 421 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 200 7-1 07, H ONO RAB LE TO DD A. B LOM ERTH, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n 2007, appellant Br andon Christopher Hea d pleade d g uilty to the offe nse o f burg lary of a habitation. Punishm ent wa s assessed at eig ht y ear s’ imprisonment, but the district court suspended impos ition of t he sentence and place d Hea d on community supervision for e ight y ear s.
I n 2009, the district court revoke d Hea d’s community supervision and imposed the sentenc e that had previously been suspended. Hea d later filed a motion for shock probation, which the district court
g rante d, placing Hea d back on community supervision. Whil e Hea d was still o n co m m unity 1

s upervision for the 2007 offe nse, he was convicted in Hay s County of three subsequent o ff en s es committed in 2011—ag g rava ted robber y , unlawful use of a motor vehicle, and evading arr est. Ba sed

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 6(a) (“B efor e the expiration of 180 day s from 1 the d ate the execution of the sentenc e actua lly beg ins, the judge of the court that imposed such sentenc e may
. . . suspend further execution of the sentenc e and place the defe ndant on community supervision . . . .”).in part on Hea d’s comm i s s i o n o f those offe nses, the State filed a motion to revoke Hea d’s

community supervision for the 2007 offe nse. Follo wi n g a hear ing, the district court g rante d the
State’s motion and ag ain rev o k ed He ad ’s community supervision. Over Hea d’s objection, the
district court orde red tha t Head’ s sentence for the 2007 offe nse be serve d consec utively following
Hea d’s sentenc e for the 2011 offe nse o f agg rava ted robber y
. I n a single point of err or on appea l,
Hea d argue s that the district court err ed by cumulating his previously suspended sentenc e for the
2007 offe nse with his curr ent sentenc e for the 2011 offe nse. Under controlli n g prec edent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, we a g ree
. 2

We revie w a trial court’s decision to cumulate, or “st ac k , ” sentenc es for abuse of
discretion. I n this contex t, we will find an a buse of discr etion only

if the trial court: (1) imposes 3

consec utive sentenc es wher e the law require s c o n c u r r e n t s e n te n c e s ; ( 2 ) im

p o s e s c o n c urre nt sentenc es wher e the law require s consec utive ones; or (3) otherwise fails to observe the statutory require ments

I n its brief, the State conce des err or on this point and acknow ledg es the Court of Criminal 2 Appea ls prec edent but “urg es this Honora ble Court to rec onsider the prec edent.” Howeve r, “as an intermediate appellate court, we must follow the binding prec edent of t h e C o u rt of Criminal Appea ls.” Gonzales v. State , 190 S.W .3 d 1 2 5 , 1 30 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref ’d); see also State v. Steve nson , 993 S.W .2d 857, 867 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1999, no pet.) (“ Be cause a decision of the court of criminal appea ls is binding prec edent, we are compelle d t o comply with its di ctates.” ).
See Banks v. State , 503 S.W .2d 582, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 7 4 ); S t r ahan v. State , 3 306 S.W .3d 342, 351 (Tex. App.—For t W o rt h 2010, pet. ref

’d); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.08(a) (“Except as provided by Sections (b) and (c) of this article , in the discretion of the court, the judgme nt in the second and subsequent convictions may either be that the sentenc e imposed or suspended shall beg in when the judgme nt and the sentenc e imposed or suspended in the prec eding conviction has cea sed to opera te, or that the sentenc e imposed or suspended shall run concur rently with the other c ase . . . .” ).
2perta ining to sentenc ing. “I n short, so long as the law authoriz es the imposit ion of cumulative 4

sentenc es, a tria l judge has absolute discr etion to stack sentenc es.” 5

As a g ener al rule, a

trial court may

stack a defe ndant’s sente nces e ven if one of the

sentenc es wa s previously probate d or sus pended. Howeve r, there is a well-e stablished exception 6

to this rule. T h e C o u rt of Criminal Appea ls has repe atedly held that a trial court may not stack a previously suspended sentenc e when the defe ndant has alre ady s er v ed a portion of that sentenc e, beca use to d o s o wo u l d violate the defe ndant’s constitutional protec tion ag ainst being punished
twice for the same offe nse. This exception applies when the defe ndant is g rante d shock probation, 7
beca use in such a case , the defe ndant must actua lly serve a portion o f h is sentenc e befor e being place d on community supervision. An attempted cumulation order in such a case “is null and void 8
and of no le g al ef

fec t.” 9
That is what occur

red here

. The rec ord ref

lects that Hea d was on shock probation and
had alre ady serve d a portion of his sentenc e for the 2007 offe nse when the district court order ed that

Rev els v. State , 334 S.W .3d 46, 54 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Nicholas v . State , 4 56 S.W .3d 760, 765 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. re f’d) ; see also Barrow v. State , 207 S.W .3d 377, 380-81 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006) (explaining discr etionary nature of dec ision). Nicholas , 56 S.W .3d at 765. 5
See P ettigrew v. State , 48 S.W .3d 769, 772-73 (Te x . Crim. App. 2001). 6
See Ex parte Townsend , 137 S.W .3d 79, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 0 4 ); Ex parte Barley , 7 842 S.W .2d 694, 6 9 5 (T ex
. Crim. App. 1992); O’Hara v. State , 626 S.W .2d 32, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Ex parte Brown , 477 S.W .2d 552, 5 5 4 (T ex
. C ri m. App. 1972); Ex parte Rey nolds , 462 S.W .2d 605, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
See O ’Hara , 626 S.W .2d at 35. 8
Id

. 9
3Hea d’s sentenc e for that offe nse be serve d consec utively following his sentenc e for the subsequent

offe nse. Ba sed on the prec edent summarized above, the district court had no authority to enter such

an order in this case
. There fore , on this rec ord, we must conclude that the district court abused its 1 0
discretion in enter ing the cumulation order . We sustain Head’ s sole point of err or.

We modify the judgme nt revoking He ad ’s community supervision by deleting the
order cumulatin g Hea d’s sentenc es and providing instead that the sentenc es shall be serve d

concur rently

. As modified, we a ffirm the district c ourt’s judg ment.

1 1

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice
Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Rose Modified and, a s Modified, Aff irmed Filed: Apr il 4, 2014
Do Not Publish

Id

. 1 0
See Moore v. State , 371 S.W

. 3 d 2 2 1 , 2 2 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Robbins v. State , 1 1 9 1 4 S

. W

. 2 d 582, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Bee dy v. State , 194 S.W .3d 595, 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006), aff’d , 250 S.W .3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
4