1

Filed 4/4/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN TH E COURT OF APPEAL OF TH E STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

DANGER PANDA, LLC etc., Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. NANCY ANN LAUNIU et al., Defendants and Respondents. A149062
(San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CUD

- 15

- 652161)

I. INTRODUCTION Danger Panda, LLC (plaintiff) filed th is unlawful detainer action against Nancy Launiu, Nancy ‘ s adult son Donn
, and Donn ‘ s wife Olga (collectively, defendants). 1 Plaintiff alleged th e defendants have refused to vacate a unit in a building th at plaintiff
wi th drew from residential rental use pursuant th e Ellis Act

. ( Gov . Code
, § 7060 et seq

. )
Th e trial court granted defendants ‘ motion to quash th e unlawful detainer complaint, finding th at plaintiff failed to tender a relocation payment to Donn and Olga ‘ s minor son
David
, as required by section 37.9 A , subdivision (e) (s ection 37.9A(e)) of th e San
Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitra tion Ordinance
, S an Francisco Administrative Code, chapter 37 ( th e Rent Ordinance )

. 2

Th e appellate division of th e superior court affirmed th e trial court ‘ s order
, but
th en certified th e matter for transfer to th e Court of A ppeal to settle th e following question of law: ― whe th er a minor displaced by an Ellis Act eviction is a  ̳ tenant ‘ under
th e San Francisco Rent Ordinance and, th erefore, entitled to a relocation payment

1 We will use given names to distinguish between members of the Launiu family.

2 All subsequent unspecified section references are to the Rent Ordinance.2

pursuant to section 37.9A(e) (3)(A) of th e San Francisco Rent Ordinance. ‖ We accepted
transfer of th is case and now hold th at a minor is not a tenant under th e Rent Ordinance provisions th at pertain to Ellis Act evictions

. II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW A. Two Statutory Schemes In 1979, th e San Francisco Board of Supervisors enacted th e Rent Ordinance

―  ̳ because th e lack of affordable rental housing in San Francisco was creating hardships on senior citizens, pe rsons on fixed incomes, and low

- and moderate

- income households. [ ¶] When adopting th e Rent Ordinance, th e Supervisors created a five

- member Rent Board charged wi th safeguarding tenants from excessive rent increases, while also assuring landlords fair and adequate rents consistent wi th federal anti

- inflation guidelines.

. . . Th e Supervisors conferred on th e Rent Board a range of powers and duties, including th e power to ― Promulgate policies, rules and regulations to effectuate
th e purpos es of th is Chapter. ‖ (Rent [Ordinance], § 37.6, subd. (a).) Th e purposes of th e Rent Ordinance included, among o th ers, th e limitation of rent increases for tenants in occupancy (Rent [Ordinance] , § 37.3), th e arbitration of rental increase adjustments (Rent [Ordinance] , §§ 37.8

- 37.8B), and th e restriction of th e grounds on which landlords could
evict tenants fr om th eir rental units (Rent [Ordinance] , §§ 37.9

– 37.9B). ‘ [Citation.] ‖ ( Foster v. Britton (2015) 242 Cal.App.4 th 920, 925.) To achieve th is last purpose, th e Rent Ordinance delineates discrete circumstances under which a landlord may ― endeavor to recover possession of a rental un it. ‖ (R ent Ordinance, § 37.9 , subd. (a).) In 1985, th e California Legislature passed th e Ellis Act, which provides th at no public entity may ― compel th e owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in th e property for rent or lease, except for [certain] guestrooms or efficiency units wi th in a residential hotel

. . . .‖ ( Gov. Code, § 7060,
subd. (a).)

― Th e Legislature enacted th e Ellis Act following th e California Supreme Court ‘ s opinion in Nash v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 37 Cal.3d 97

. . . , upholding a city
ordinance th at required owners of residential rental property to obtain a permit before3

th ey could remove property from th e rental market. [Citation.]  ̳ [T]he Act was intended
to overrule th e Nash decision so as to permit landlords th e unfettered right to remove all
residential rental units from th e market, consistent, of course, wi th guidelines as set for th
in th e Act and adopted by local governments in accordance th ereto. ‘ [Citations.] ‖ ( Johnso n v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4 th 7, 12

- 13 ( Johnson ).) In May 1986, following th e passage of th e Ellis Act, th e Rent Ordinance was
amended to add section 37.9 , subdivision (a) , sub section (13) (s ection 37.9(a)(13)) , which recognizes a landlord ‘ s right to wi th draw a residential unit from th e rental market. (Ord.
No. 193

- 86, F ile No. 10986 3 ( May 19, 1986) , p

. 8 .) In its current form, s ection 37.9(a)( 13) states in pertinent part: ― (a) A landlord shall not endeavor to recover possessio n of a rental unit unless: [¶]

. . . (13) Th e landlord wishes to wi th draw from rent
or lease all rental units wi th in any detached physical structure and, in addition, in th e case of any detached physical structure containing th ree or fewe r rental units, any o th er rental
units on th e same lot, and complies in full wi th Section 3 7 .9A wi th respect to each such unit, provided, however
, th at guestrooms or efficiency units wi th in a residential hotel ‖ are subject to different rules. 3 (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9(a) (13). )
Section 37.9A of th e Rent Ordinance was enacted at th e same time as s ection 37.9(a)(13) in order to confer rights on certain tenants displaced by th e Ellis Act. (Ord.
No. 193

- 86, File No. 109863, supra , p p

. 10

- 19.) In its curr ent form, s ection 3 7.9A(e) requires owners of residential rental properties who seek to wi th draw from th e rental market pursuant to th e Ellis Act to provide monetary relocatio n assistance to th eir

tenants. Th ere is no dispute in th is case th at th e board o f s upervisors has th e au th ority to require landlords to provide financial relocation assistance to tenants displaced by an
Ellis Act eviction under Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (c)
, which states:

― Notwi th standing Section 7060, no th ing in th i s chapter does any of th e following:

. . .

3 This case does not involve a residential hotel.4

(c) Diminishes or enhances any power in any public entity to mitigate any adverse impact on persons displaced by reason of th e wi th drawal from rent or lease of any
accommodations. ‖ (See generally Pieri v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4 th 886 ( Pieri ).) Th e present appeal arises out of a dispute about who is entitled
to receive a relocation assistance payment under Rent Ordinance, s ection 37.9A(e)

. B. Relocation Assistance for Ellis Act E victions
Th e nature and scope of th e r elocation assistance benefit conferred by s ection
37.9A has evolved over time pursuant to multiple Rent Ordinance amendments
, of which we highlight only a few. As originally enacted, subdivision (f) of section 37.9A (former section 37.9A(f)) provided th at th e ― tenants of any rental unit ‖ who were evicted under

s ection 37.9(a)(13) were entitled to payment of a fixed sum before th ey vacated th e unit. (Ord. No. 193

- 86, File No. 109863
, supra , p. 14 .) Th e amount of th e payment th e landlord was required to make depended on th e size of th e rental unit, al th ough units wi th elderly or disabled renters were entitled to a higher payment. ( Ibid .) In September 1994, the board of supervisors approved an amendment to former
section 37 .9A(f) t hat limited ― payment of relocation assistance to tenants in lower income
households. ‖ (Ord. No. 320

- 94, File No. 97941 3 ( Sept. 7, 1994), p. 1 , capitalization
omitted .) Payments under th is version of former section 37.9A(f) were expressl y referred

to as ― relocation payments ‖ and were expressly limited to ― tenants who are members of lower income households, who are elderly, or who are disabled

. . . . ‖ ( Id . at p. 5.) An

e lderly or disabled tena nt was entitled to a higher fixed payment. Payments th at were due
for a unit th at was occupied by more th an one tenant were to ― be divided equally amo n g all th e occupying tenants, excluding th ose tenants ‖ who were entitled to separate payments due to th eir elderly or disabled status. ( Id . at pp. 6

- 7.) In December 1999, th e board of supervisors passed an ordinance that increased

― th e amount of relocation payments made by landlords to low

- income tenants evicted pursuant to th e Ellis Act

. . . . ‖ (Ord. No. 5

- 00, File No. 992236 (Dec. 20, 1999), p. 1 , capitalization omitted.) Pertinent provisions were amended to provide that ―Tenants who
are members of low er income households .

. . and who receive a notice to quit based upon5

Section 37.9(a)(13), in addition to all rights under any other provisions of law, shall be entitled to receive $4,500 before vacating the premises.‖ ( Id . at p. 5.) As before, landlords were required to make separate fixed payments to elderly or disabled tenants. This version of the relocation assistance benefit required that pa yments due ―for any unit which is occupied by more than one tenant shall be divided equally among all the occupying tenants excluding those tenants‖ who were separately entitled to payments because of their elderly or disabled status. ( Id . at p. 5.) 4

In D ecember 2004, the board of supervisors amended section 39.9A to eliminate the limitation restricting payment of relocation assistance to low income, elderly and disabled tenants. (Ord. No. 21

- 05, File No. 041151 (Dec. 14, 2004), p. 15.) 5 For Ellis
Act ev ictions commenced after the effective date of these amendments (February 20, 2005), relocation payments were required to be paid in accordance with se ction 37.9A(e) subsection (3) (s ection 37.9A(e)(3)), the terms of which are at issue in this appeal. ( Id. at
p. 17; see also Rent Ordinance, § 37.9A(e)(3).) Under section 37.9A(e)(3), ―each tenant shall be entitled to receive $4,500.00,

one

- half of which shall be paid at the time of the service of the notice of termination of tenancy, and one

- half of which s hall be paid when the tenant vacates the unit.‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9A(e)(3)(A).) However, if there are ―more than three tenants in a unit,

4 Th e December 1999 amendment increasing th e amount of th e relocation payments was accompanied by a set of findings , which inclu ded the following: (1) tenants evicted under th e Ellis Act are ― forced to incur substantial costs to relocate th emselves and th eir families to new housing ‖ ; (2) costs incurred to relocate often include payment for temporary housing and lost work time to se ek new housing; (3) anticipated costs of th e household include new apartment move in costs, th e actual cost of a mover, and re establishing various utilities; and (4) tenants wi th out funds to move face a severe risk of homelessness. (Ord. 5

- 00, File No. 99 2236, pp. 9

- 10.)

5 In Pieri , supra , 137 Cal.App.4 th 886, th is court rejected the contention th at Government Code section 7060.1 of th e Ellis Act restricts th e au th ority of public entities to require mitigation only for low income residents, and co ncluded that provisions of the Rent O rdinance requiring relocation assistance regardless of income did not offend th e purposes of th e Ellis Act by ―  ̳ prevent[ing] all but th e weal th iest landlords from going out of th e rental business. ‘ ‖ ( Pieri , at p. 889.)6

the total relocation payment shall be $13,500.00, which shall be divided equally by the
number of tenants in the unit.‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9A(e)(3)(B).) Tenants over the age of 62 or who are disabled ―shall be entitled to receive an additional payment of $3,000, $1,500.00 of which shall be paid within fifteen (15) calendar days of the landlord‘s receipt of writ ten notice from the tenant of entitlement to the relocation payment, and $1,500 of which shall be paid when the tenant vacates the unit.‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9A(e)(3)(C).) The amounts of the relocation payments specified in these provisions are adjuste d annually to comport with the ―Consumer Price Index (CPI) for
All Urban Consumers in the San Francisco

- Oakland

- San Jose Region for the preceding calendar year.‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9A(e)(3)(D).) 6

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Th e Complaint In April 2015, plaintiff filed a wrongful detainer complaint against defendants in which it alleged the following facts: Plaintiff owns a building on Bartlett Street which includes ―Unit 308A,‖ a
residential unit. Defendants and Donn and Olga‘ s minor son David occupy Unit 308A pursuant to a 1971 rental agreement between Nancy and plaintiff‘s predecessor

- in

interest. On March 26, 2014, plaintiff served defendants and David with a ―Notice of Termination of Tenancy‖ advising them of plaintiff‘s i ntention to withdraw the Bartlett building from residential rent al use under the Ellis Act and s ection 37.9(a)(13) of the Rent Ordinance. Plaintiff also sent each defendant a check for $2,632.55, which was
characterized as the first half of their ―statuto rily required relocation assistance‖

6 For Ellis Act evictions commenced after June 1, 2014, s ection 37.9A(e)(3)(E) establishes an alternative formula for calculating relocation payments
, which is based on

a ― Rental Payment Differential ,‖ and fur th er provides th at th e tenant is entitled to a pa yment under whichever formula provides a greater amount. (Re nt Ordinance, § 37.9A(e)(3)(E). ) Neither party contends that s ection 37.9A(e)(3)(E) applies in this

case.7

payment. 7 On March 27, plaintiff submitted a ―Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market‖ to the Rent Board, and it subsequently served defendants with copies of that notice. In a letter dat ed April 4, 2014, Nancy informed plaintiff that
she was entitled to a one

- year extension of the withdrawal of Unit 308A from the rental
market due to her senior status. 8 On April 10, plaintiff sent letters to Nancy and the Rent Board recognizing that Nanc y‘s extension claim was valid and stating that Unit 308A would not be withdrawn from the rental market until March 27, 2015. Plaintiff also sent Nancy a check for $1,755.03, as payment of the first half of the additional relocation payment Nancy was owed due to her senior status. However, on March 27, 2015, and thereafter, defendants and David failed to vacate Unit 308A. Relying on th ese general allegations, plaintiff alleged th at it complied wi th all lawful provisions of th e Ellis Act and th e Rent Ordin ance , and was th erefore entitled to recover possession of its property from defendants and to damages for th e fair market
rental value of th e premises. After plaintiff made multiple attempts to serve defendants personally wi th th e summons and unlawful det ainer complaint, th e court au th orized service by posting and mailing.
B. Th e Motion t o Quash On May 20, 2015, defendants filed a motion to quash service of th e summons and wrongful detainer complaint. Among o th er th ings, defendants argued th at plaintiff did

not comply wi th s ection 37.9A(e)(3) of th e Rent Ordinance because it failed to provide

7 If th ese th ree payments are added toge th er and multiplied by two, th e total amount exceeds th e $13,500 cap establi shed by Rent Ordinance, s ection 37.9A(e)(3)(B). It appears th at th e additional amount is consistent wi th th e CPI adjustment au thorized under s ection 37.9A(e)(3)(D).

8 For Ellis Act evictions commenced on or a fter January 1, 2000, the date of withdrawal from the rental market is 120 days from delivery of the landlord‘s notice of intent to withdraw. (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9A , subd. (f)(4).) However, upon proper notice, the date of the withdrawal shall be extend ed for an additional year ―if the tenant or lessee is at least 62 years of age or disabled .

. . .‖ ( Ibid .) The notice requirements attendant to Ellis Act evictions are not at issue in this appeal.8

David wi th a separate relocation payment, notwi th standing th e fact th at he was a ― tenant ‖
under th e Rent Ordinance. 9 Opposing th e motion to quash, plai ntiff argued th at it met its relocation payment obligations to th e tenants in Unit 308A by paying th e maximum payment required by th e Rent Ordinance and dividing th at amount among th e th ree adult occupants of Unit 308A. Plaintiff explained th at David ― was not issued his own personal check as he is not an
adult able to contract wi th Plaintiff to occupy th e Premise. ‖ Th us, plaintiff took th e view
th at David was not a ― tenant ‖ under th e Rent Ordinance. Plaintiff fur th er argued th at if it had provided David his own separate payment, th e amount s paid t o Nancy ( th e non

parent) and Donn and Olga ― would have been unlawfully and improperly decreased, as
th ey would not have received th eir proper pro rata shares. ‖ Th us, plaintiff maintained
th at it complied wi th se ction 37.9A(e)(3) of th e Rent Ordinance by ― pay ing th e full amount of relocation [payment] to th e tenants, ‖ and once ― th e family ‖ received th at maximum payment
, th ey were free to divide th e funds as th ey saw fit

. C. Superior Court Orders On June 1, 2015, th e trial court granted defe ndants ‘ motion to quash service of th e summons and unlawful detainer complaint. In a brief order filed th at day
, th e court found: ― Plaintiff failed to tender a statutory relocation payment to defendants ‘ minor child David Launiu pursuant to Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(e)(3)(A), who was named in th e Notice of Termination of Tenancy and has a right to occupy th e premises wi th his parents/grandmo th er. Th is lowered th e sum parents & minor child would have received
in to tal. ‖ On July 15, 2016, th e appellate division of th e superior court filed an order affirming th e superior court ‘ s ruling

. Th e court clarified th at th e dispute was not about
whe th er plaintiff paid th e correct total amount under th e Ellis Act, but ra th er whe th er th e

9 ―A tenant facing an unlawful detainer action under t h e Ellis Act may assert as a defense th at his or her landlord failed to comply wi th th e provisions of th e Act or any statutes, ordinances, or regulations adopted pursuant to th e Act. ( [Gov. Code,] § 7060.6.) ‖ ( Johnson
, supra , 137 Cal.App.4 th at p. 13.)9

amount was properly allocated among th e tenants. Th e court found th at th e amount was not properly alloca ted for th e following reasons: (1) David wa s a tenant because he wa s

― entitled to occupy th e premises ‖ ; (2) David ‘ s status as a minor did n ot preclude him from receiving a check ; and (3) if plaintiff had ― properly divided th e relocation payments
in to [ sic ] four checks, David and his parents would have received an additional $650. ‖ 10

Th e appellate panel rejected plaintiff ‘ s contention th at , e ven if th e payments were not properly allocated, plaintiff substantially complied wi th th e Ellis Act. According to th e court, ― since th e relocation payments and th e definition of a tenant ow ed th ose payments are expressly stated in th e Ellis A ct, th e section mu st be strictly complied wi th

. ‖
Th e appellate panel also rejected plaintiff ‘ s contention th at th e motion to quash was barred by equitable estoppel

. Plaintiff had argued th at defendants were estopped to

contest th e allocation of th e relocation pa yment because th ey accepted plaintiff ‘ s checks
wi th out objection
, and if th e y had informed plaintiff of th e issue regarding David ‘ s status, plaintiff could have sent new checks long before th e unlawful detainer complaint was
filed. In rejecting th is equit able claim, th e appellate panel found th at th e Ellis Act does not impose any obligation on defendants to raise th is issue wi th plaintiff , and th at th ere was insufficient evidence th at defendants ― deposited th e checks and intentionally
remained silent as to th e relocation payments. ‖
IV . DISCUSSION
A. Issue Presented
Th e question presented to th is court is whe th er a minor displaced by an Ellis Act
eviction is a tenant entitled to a relocation payment under s ection 37.9A(e)(3 ) of th e Rent
Ordinance. ― [ O ] ur task  ̳ ― is to determine th e intent of th e enacting body so th at th e law

10 Apparently th e appellate panel below assumed th at Donn, Olga and David are a single family unit th at is easily distinguishable from Nancy. Th us, th e court reasoned th at if th e total relocation payment was divided among all four occupants of th e unit ra th er th an th e th ree adults, th e total payment to th e family would have been $650 higher , and the net payment to Nancy concomitantly lower . Plaintiff and amicus curie, San Francisco Apartment Association, point out th e logistical problems of requiring land lords to make th is type of assumption about th e composition of a family unit.10

may receive th e interpretation th at best effectuates th at intent. [Citation.] ‖ ‘ [Citation.] We begin by examining th e wor ds of th e statute because th e  ̳ ―  ̳ language is generally th e most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] ‘ ‖ ‘ [Citation.] Th e statutory language is not read in isolation, however. Ra th er, we consider its terms  ̳ in th e context of th e statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to
harmonize th e various parts of th e enactment. If th e language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd

consequences th e Legislature did not i ntend. ‘ [Citation.] ‖ ( Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. v. Garcia (2013) 58 Cal.4 th 175, 186 ; see also Danekas v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd . (2001) 95 Cal.App.4 th 638, 645.) As noted above, th e appellate panel concluded th at ― since th e relocation payments
and th e definition of a tenant owed th ose payments are expressly stated in th e Ellis Act,
th e section must be strictly complied wi th

. ‖ Th e premise of th is statement is erroneous. 11

Th e Ellis Act does not expressly address relocation payments or define th e term ― tenant. ‖ However, as noted above, th e Ellis Act does recognize a public entity ‘ s au th ority to mitigate th e adverse impact on ― persons ‖ displaced by an Ellis Act eviction. ( Gov . Code, § 7060.1 , subd. (c).) Th us, we turn to th e Rent Ordinance provisions to determine what

persons displaced by an Ellis Act eviction are entitled to a relocation payment benefit

. B

. Th e Rent Ordinance Definition of a Tenant
As reflected in our sta tutory overview, section 37.9A(e)(3) provides th at ― each

tenant ‖ displaced under s ection 37.9(a)(13) ― shall be entitled ‖ to a relocation payment.
Al th ough th e Rent Ordinance contains a set of definitions to be used for ― purposes ‖ of apply ing s ection 37.9A
, th e term ― tenant ‖ is not defined th ere. (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9A(e)(3)(E)(vi).) However, th e general ― Definitions ‖ section of th e Rent Ordinance contains th e following definition : ― Tenant . A person entitled by written or oral agreement, sub

-

11 The parties seek review of the appellate panel‘s conclusion that strict compliance with the Ellis Act is required. But that issue is outside the scope of the transfer order.11

tenancy app roved by th e landlord, or by sufferance, to occup y a residential dwelling unit

to th e exclusion of o th ers. ‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 37.2, subd. (t) ( s ection 37.2(t)) , original
bold face .) Th is definition has remained unchanged since 1980 (Ord. No. 197

- 80, File
No

. 109801.2 ( May 5, 1980), p. 4), al th ough its alphabetical subdivision designation has changed several times.
Th e parties disagree about whe th er David fits wi th in th e Rent Ordinance ‘ s general
definition of a tenant

. Construing s ection 37.2(t) according to its plain language, a tenant
is a person who is entitled to occupy a residential unit (1) to th e exclusion of all o th ers and (2) pursuant to a written agreement ; oral agreement ; sub tenancy approved by th e landlord ; or sufferance.
Th e first o f th ese requirements, th e right to occupy to th e exclusion of o th ers , is a key characteristic of a leasehold
, which distinguishes a tenancy from a mere license. ( Spinks v. Equity Residential B r iarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App. 4 th 1004, 1040.) Paymen t of rent is th e consideration for th is right to exclusive possession. ( Avalon Pacific

— Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4 th 1183, 1190 [ ― A lease is bo th a conveyance of an estate in real property and a
contract between th e lessor and th e lessee for th e possession and use of th e property in
consideration of rent

. ‖ ]; see also 12 Witkin Summary of Cal. Law (10 th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 517, p. 593.) Th us, an occupant of a rental unit who does not have th e right to exclusive possession and th e concomitant obligation to pay rent does not meet th e generally accepted common law definition of a tenant. Nor does he or she fall wi th in th e section 37.2(t) definition of a tenant quoted above

. In th e present case , th e complaint alleged th at Unit 308A is occupied pursuant to a
written lease agreement. Th at agreement, which was incorporated in to th e complaint, was executed between plaintiff ‘ s predecessor in interest and Nancy and her husband.
Th er efore, Nancy is a tenant under s ection 37.2(t). Fur th ermore, by alleging th at Donn and Olga are also tenants of Unit 308A, plaintiff appears to have conceded th at th ese defendants acquired an independent right to occupy th e premises to th e exclusion of

o th ers , pursuant to ei th er a written lease, oral contract, sub tenancy or suffrage.12

However, David is a minor wi th out capacity to enter into a rental contract or to incur an independent obligation to pay rent. ( Fam. Code § 6701 [ ― A minor cannot do any
of th e following:

. . . (b) Make a contract relating to real property or any interest
th erein. ‖ ]

. ) Th us, he could not have acquired a legally cognizable right to occupy Unit
308A to th e exclusion of o th ers pursuant to any of th e me th ods set for th in section 37.2(t). Th is does not mean th at David is not a lawful occupant, but only th at his right to occupy is derivative of th e rights of his parents. (See , e.g. , Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4 th 1540, 1551 [minor child of tenant has th e ― right to enjoyment of
th e premises as a member of th e tenant [ ‘ s ] family ‖ ].) Defendants argue th at th e complaint allegation acknowledgin g th at David occupies Unit 308A pursuant to Nancy ‘ s written lease agreement establishes th at David

― is a tenant under th e Rent Ordinance because he is a lawful occupant of th e premises. ‖
Th e lower courts reached similar conclusions. Wi th out discussion, th e trial court found
th at David is entitled to a relocation payment because he ― has a right to occupy th e premises wi th his parents/grandmo th er. ‖ Th e appellate panel also found th at ― th e definition in section 37.2(t) clearly states th at a person is a tenant so long as th ey are entitled to occupy th e premises. ‖ In fact, th ough, s ection 37.2(t) does not state th at every law ful occupant of th e premises is a tenant, but ra th er th at a tenant is a lawful occupant who acquired th e right to exclusive occupancy in one of th e specifie d ways. Considering th e Rent Ordinance as a whole reinforces th e conclusion th at ― lawful occupant ‖ and ― tenant ‖ are not interchangeable terms. According to plaintiff ‘ s calculations, th e Rent Ordinance uses th e word ― occupants ‖ about 40 times and th e word

― tenant ‖ hundreds of times. For our purposes, we focus on th ree examples

. First, as previously n oted, section 37.9 (a) restricts th e grounds for evicting a tenant by specifying when a landlord may endeavor to recover a rental unit. One proper ground for pursuing an eviction is when th e tenant has violated a lawful obligation or covenant of
th e tenanc y. ( Re nt Ordinance, § 37.9(a)(2).) However, th ere are several qualifications for pursuing th is type of eviction , depending on th e nature of th e covenant at issue. For example, when a rental agreement ― limits th e number of occupants or limits or prohibit s13

subletting or assignment, ‖ section 37.9(a)(2)(B) provides th at ― a landlord shall not
endeavor to reco ver possession of a rental unit as a result of th e addition to th e unit of a

tenant ‘ s child, parent, grandchild, grandparent, bro th er or sister, or th e spouse or domestic partner

. . . of such relatives, or as a result of th e addition of th e spouse or d ome stic partner of a tenant, so long as th e maximum number of occupants [au th orized by th e Rent Ordinance] is not exceeded, if th e landlord has unreasona bly refused a written request by th e tenant to add such occupant(s) to th e unit. ‖ Section 37.9(a)(2)(B)
fur th er provides th at ― [a] landlord ‘ s reasonable refusal of th e tenant ‘ s written re q ues t may not be based on th e proposed additional occupant ‘ s lack of creditwor th iness, if th at person will not be legally obligated to pay some or all of th e rent to th e landlord.

. . . ‖
Th us, s ection 37.9(a)(2)(B) prohibits a landlord from unreasonably refusing to add family members as ― occupants , ‖ and also acknowledg es th at a person who will not be legally obligated to pay rent may never th eless lawfully occupy th e unit. By using th e word occupant in th ese contexts, th e Rent Ordinance affords protections to inhabitants
whe th er or not th ey fall wi th in th e formal definitio n of a tenant set for th in s ection 37.2(t). A second example th at th e Rent Ordinance distinguishes between legal occupants and tenants is found in section 37.3, which regulates rent increases. Section 37.3
, subdivision (a)(11)(A) provides th at, wi th exce ptions, ― a landlord may not impose increases solely because a tenant has added an additional occupant to an existing tenancy, including, but not limited to, a newborn child or family member as defined in Section 401
of th e Ho u sing Code. Th e prohibition on increases mandated by th is Subsection (A) shall apply notwi th standing a rental agreement or lease th at specifically permits a rent increase [f]or additional occupants. ‖ By describing new born children and new family members of th e tenant as occupants ra th er th an tenants in th eir own right, section 37.3 , subdivision (a)(11)(A) is

ano th er example of th e fact th at, while th e Rent Ordinance provides protections to all legal occupants of a rental unit, all such occupants are not tenants as th at term is defined
in s ection 37.2(t).14

Our final example of th e fact th at th e Rent Ordinance distinguishes between a lawful occupant and a tenant is found in section 37.9C, which was added in 2006 to provide relocation assistance to tenants displaced by so

- called ― No

- Fault ‖ evictions th at are not based on th e Ellis Act. (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9C.) A set of definitions applicable only for purposes of determining entitlement to th e section 37.9C benefit includ es th e fo llowing definition of an Eligible Tenant: ― For purposes of th is section 37.9C, an Eligible Tenant shall mean any au th orized occupant of a rental unit, regardless of age,
who has resided in th e unit for 12 or more mon th s. ‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 37.9C , subd. (a)(2).)
Section 37.9C , subdivision (b) provides th at ― Eac h Eligible Tenant who received a
Covered No

- Fault Eviction Notice, in addition to all rights under any o th er provision of law, shall be entitled to receive relocation expenses from th e landlord, in th e amounts specified in section 37.9C(e). ‖ Under section 37.9C , subdivision (e)(1) each Eligible Tenant shall receive a payment of $4,500.00, wi th th e caveat th at th e landlord shall not be required to pay more th an $13,500.00 to Eligible Tenants in th e same unit. Under section
37.9C , subdivision (e) (2) , th e landlord must make an addition al payment to each E ligible
T enant who is over 60 or disabled and to ― each household wi th at le ast one Eligible
Tenant and at l [ e ]ast one child under th e age of 18 years. ‖
S ection 37.9C is relevant to our analysis in two mate rial ways. First, as noted, th is part of th e Rent Ordinance utilizes a special definition of an ― Eligible Tenant ‖ th at includes all au th orized occupants ― regardless of age. ‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 3 7.9C
subd. (a)(2).) Th is specially defined term would be su perfluous if , as th e lower courts found, s ection 37.2(t) include s wi th in th e definition of ― tenant ‖ all lawful occupants, even
th ose wi th out th e right to exclusive occupancy and th e concomitant obligation to pay

rent , and th ose who lack th e capacity to incur an obligation to pay rent because they are
minors. Second, in contrast to section 37.9C, section 37.9A does not contain a special
definition of a tenant who is entitled to an Ellis Act relocation benefit. As our statutory
overview ref

lects, th is part of th e Rent Ordinance has been amended several times,15

sometimes to limit th e scope of th e benefit and o th er times to expand it

. Th ere are clear indications of a legislative goal to assist not just th e displaced tenant, but th e tenant ‘ s fa mily or household

. For example
, th e December 1999 amendment increas ed th e amount of th e relocation payments in recognition th at tenants evicted under th e Ellis Act are

― forced to incur substantial costs to relocate th emselves and th eir families to new housing

. . . . ‖ (Ord. No. 5

- 00, File No. 992236 (Dec. 20, 1999), p. 9 , italics added .) However, we find no evidence of an intent to require a landlord to parse a relocation payment among individual members of such a household or to make a separa te payment to a

tenant ‘ s minor child. Th us, th e history of section 37.9A is indicative of a legislative determination not to expand th e scope of eligible recipients of an Ellis Act relocation benefit under section 37.9A beyond th ose tenants who fit th e tr aditional common law
definition of that term.
Fur th ermore, because section 37.9A does not contain a special definition of a
tenant who is entitled to an Ellis Act relocation benefit , in order to qualify for th at benefit
, th e occupant must be a tenant as d efined in s ection 37.2(t)
, th e more general
section of th e Rent Ordinance, which essentially means th at he or she must be a tenant for all purposes for which th e term tenant is employed th roughout th e Rent Ordinance. Characterizing a minor like David as a tenant for all purposes could lead to absurd results
because th e Rent Ordinance confers benefits and obligations on a tenant th at should not
and sometimes cannot be assumed by a child , not th e least of which is th e obligation to pay rent. C

. Case Law
Defendants contend th at th e common law ―i s not determinative of th is appeal,
because th e Rent Ordinance has specifically defined th ose who are tenants under th e Ordinance in Section 37.2(t). ‖ But defe ndants ignore language in s ection 37.2(t) that, as disc ussed above, is consistent wi th th e traditional definition of a tenant. Instead, defendants maintain th at California courts have ― repeatedly ‖ interpreted
th e Rent Ordinance definition of a tenant to include ― all lawful occupants of a dwelling. ‖
Th e cases defendants cite fall into two general categories, one addressing lawful16

occupancy and th e o th er address ing th e rights of a minor child. As discussed below,
th ese cases are not directly on point
, and, to th e extent th ey are relevant, th ey reinforce
th e conclusions outlined above.

1. Lawful Occupancy
Defendants posit th at th e fact David cannot be a party to a lease agreement does not preclude him from qualifying as a tenant under th e Rent Ordinance because case law
establishes th at a lawf

ul occupant of a San Francisco r ental unit can be a tenant entitled to Rent Ordinance protection even absent an agreement to pay rent. (Citing Parkmerced Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd

. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 490 ( Parkmerced )).)
In Parkmerce d
, supra , 215 Cal.App.3d 490, Clarence Honey rented a San Francisco apartment pursuant to a 1976 lease agreement. In 1981, Honey ‘ s sister, Margot
Abenheim
, moved into th e apartment wi th Honey. From 1981 until 1985, Honey renewed his lease annually and li sted Abenheim ‘ s name on th e renewal. During th is entire period, Abenheim used her own personal check to pay mon th ly rent for th e apartment. Th en, in 1985, Honey moved out. Th e landlord issued a new lease in
Abenheim ‘ s name, informing her th at she could remain in th e apartment only if she agreed to a rent increase th at was higher th an th e maximum amount of allowable rent th e landlord could charge a continuing tenant protected by th e Rent Ordinance. ( Id. at
p. 492.) Th e Rent Board found Aben heim was a tenant under th e Ordinance ‘ s genera l
definition of th at term, and th at th e proposed rent increase was not au th orized because it
exceeded th e lawful limits imposed by pertinent rent control provisions of th e Ordinance.
Th e superior court disagre ed wi th th e Rent Board, finding th at th e new rental rate was

au th orized because Abenheim first became a tenant when she incurred th e obligation to pay rent by signing her own lease agreement after Honey vacated th e apartment. ( Id . at
p. 494.) However, th e judgment was reversed on appeal.
Th e Parkmerced appellate court found th at Abenheim was a lready a tenant protected by th e rent increase limitations of th e Ordinance when th e landlord generated a new lease agreement purporting to raise Abenheim ‘ s rent after H oney moved out of th e17

apartment, explaining : ― Since 1981 Parkmerced was aware of, and by its silence agreed to, Abenheim living in th e apartment wi th her bro th er. Each year Honey submitted to Parkmerced an application for lease rental which listed Abenheim as an occupant of th e apartment; pursuant to paragraph 25 of Parkmerced ‘ s lease th ese applications were incorporated into Honey ‘ s leases. Th us, because Abenheim was entitled to occupy th e unit pursuant to a written agreement

— Honey ‘ s leases

— she f alls squarely wi th in th e purview of section 37.2(r). ‖ 12 ( Parkmerced
, supra , 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 494 , italics
omitted .) In reaching its conclusion, th e Parkmerced court faulted th e trial court for

― ignor[ing] th e fact th at th e ordinance protects th ose who legally occupy a rental unit, regardless of th e basis of th e person ‘ s obligation to pay rent. ‖ ( Parkmerced
, supra , 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 494.) Th e Parkmerced court also disagreed wi th th e lower court ‘ s summary conclusion th at Abenheim had no oblig ation to pay rent until she signed her own rental agreement in 1985. ( Id. at p. 495.) Citing au th ority recognizing th at an obligation to pay rent can arise by operation of law based on occupancy accompanied by
th e owner ‘ s consent, th e Parkmerced court re jected th e notion th at wi th out a written lease, Abenheim could not have had an obligation to pay rent. ( Ibid .) Finally, th e Parkmerced court found th at ― interpreting th e Rent Ordinance to extend protection to tenants based on legitimate occupancy is in k eeping wi th th e purpose of th e legislation. ‖ ( Ibid

. ) Th e court reasoned th at a ― clear objective ‖ of th e Rent Ordinance was to extend

―  ̳ some measure of protection to tenants in residence ‘ [citation] ‖ and th at th ere was

― absolutely no indication th at th is protection was intended to be limited to th ose tenants who sign formal lease agreements. ‖ ( Ibid

. . italics omitted. ) As defendants contend, Parkmerced
, supra , 215 Cal.App.3d 490, demonstrates
th at an occupant of a San Francisco rental unit can qualify as a tenant wi th out having a

12 In the version of the Rent Ordinance that was in effect when the Parkmerced rent increase was litigated, the definition of a tenant was contained in s ection 37.2, subdivision (r) of the Rent Ordinance. (Ord. 438

- 83, F ile No. 109863 (Aug. 29, 1983), p

. 5.) As noted previously, the definition itself was the same as it is today.18

written lease agreement. Indeed, th at fact is reflected in s ection 37.2(t)
, which states th at a tenant can obtain th e right to exclusive possession via a written agreement, oral agreement, sub tenancy approved by th e landlord or suffrage. (Rent Ordinance, § 37.2(t).) However, Parkmerced does not support defendants ‘ very different contention
th at David is a tenant notwi th standing th e fact th at he is a minor. In Parkmerced
, th e original tenant ‘ s sister was an adult. Th erefore, th e case did not consider th e question we
address here. Fur th ermore, th e Parkmerced court found th at Abenheim became a tenant in her own right because she was named in lease ― applications ‖ th at were incorporated
into th e written leases
, and becau se she incurred an independent obligation to pay rent by operation of law based on her occupancy accompanied by th e landlord ‘ s consent. ( Parkmerced
, at pp. 494

- 495

. ) Th ose findings cannot be made wi th respect to David
because he is a minor wi th no indepe ndent obligation to pay rent.
Aside from Parkmerced , defendants contend th at a ― long and uncontroverted line
of appellate au th ority ‖ establishes th at th e Rent Ordinance definition of a tenant ― includes
all lawf ul occupants of th e dwelling. ‖ But th e cases th ey cite do not support th is claim. For example, defendants rely on Aguierre v. Lee (1993) 20 Cal

. App.4 th 1646 , 1653 ( Aguierre ) , for th e proposition th at ― [t]he Ordinance focuses on occupancy as th e factor
th at triggers rent control protection. [ Citation.] ‖ In th at case, a San Francisco tenant was displaced temporarily from her leased residential unit due to ear th quake damage. After making th e necessary repairs
, th e landlord leased th e unit to a th ird party in violation of
th e rights of th e tenant. In th e landlord ‘ s appeal from a jury verdict in favor of th e tenant, th e Aguierre court rejected th e argument th at th e displaced tenant was not protected by
th e Rent Ordinance because th e ordinance only protect s tenants in occupancy . No th ing
th e court said supports defendants ‘ contention in th is case th at all lawful occupants of a rental unit are by definition tenants under s ection 37.2(t) of th e Rent Ordinance.
Defendants contend Cobb v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization &
Arbitrati on Bd. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4 th 345 ( Cobb ) , illustrates th at th e Rent Ordinance
definition of a tenant includes ― occupancies created by consent and acceptance of rent. ‖ It is not clear why defendants believe th is proposition is relevant, particularly in ligh t of19

th e fact th at s ection 37.2(t) states th at a tenant can acquire th e right to exclusive position by means of an oral agreement. Fur th ermore, Cobb is factually and legally inapposite . In
th at case, Richard Passalacqua was an adult when he went to live wi th his mo th er in a
San Francisco apartment she rented. Th e landlord did not give his permission but knew
th at Passalacqua was living in th e unit. Almost two years later, in May 1998, Passalacqua ‘ s mo th er moved out of th e apartment and th e landlord acce p ted rent directly from Passalacqua for more th an a year , and during th at period he even negotiated a rent increase directly wi th Passalacqua. Th e Cobb court found th ese facts substantially supported a finding by th e Rent Board th at th e landlord accepted Passalacqua as his sole
tenant as of June 1998. ( Cobb
, at p. 352.) Defendants fail to explain how Cobb supports th eir contention th at all lawful occupants of a rental unit qualify as tenants under section 37.2(t). Indeed, th ey do not identify any au th ority supportive of th is broad claim. 13

2. A Minor ’

s Occupancy Pursuant to a Written Lease Insisting th at a ― tenant ‘ s child may be a tenant protected under th e Rent Ordinance, ‖ defendants direct our attention to Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent
St abilization & Arbitration Bd. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4 th 505 ( Mosser Companies ) and T & A Drolapas & Sons, LP v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration
Bd. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4 th 646 ( Drolapas )

. Mosser Companies , supra , 233 Cal.App.4 th 505, was a dispute regarding a rent increase at a San Francisco apartment . In 2003, th e Govender family moved into th e apartment pursuant to a written lease agreement . Al th ough Mr. and Mrs. Govender were th e only ― tenants ‖ identified in th e lease, it wa s undisputed th at th e landlord approve d th e

13 The two other cases defendants cite addressed different rent control ordinances. ( Getz v. City of West Hollywood (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 625 ( Getz ); DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28 ( DeZer e ga ). Furthermore, the issue in Getz , at p age 629, was not whe th er a lawful occupant was a tenant, but whe th er a tenancy was created despite th e absence of a written agreement based on evidence of th e landlord ‘ s consent and acceptance of rent. DeZer e ga , supra , 83 Cal.App.4th 28 is also irrelevant as the issue in that case was whether the roommate of a tenant who signed the lease was a tenant or a subtenant.20

occupancy of th e th ree Govender children who were all minors at th e time th e lease was signed

. ( Id . at p. 509

. ) Nine years later, th e Govender parents decided to move. By th at time, two of th e children had left home, but 23

- year

- old Brian continued living in th e apartment. After th e G ovender parents moved out, th e landlord served notice th at it was raising Brian ‘ s rent , which triggered a dispute about whe th er th e increase was au th orized by Civil Code, s ection 1954.53, subdivision (d)(2) ( Civ il Code section 1954.53(d)(2)), a vacancy decontrol provision of th e Costa

- Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, §§ 1950 et seq. ; Costa

- Hawkins Act ) , which provides: ― If th e original occupant or occupants who took po ssession of th e dwelling or unit pursuant to th e rental agreement
wi th th e owner no longer permanently reside th ere, an owner may increase th e rent by any amount allowed by th is section to a lawful sublessee or assignee who did not reside

at th e dwelling o r unit prior to January 1, 1996. ‖
Th e Govenders objected th at th e rent increase was unlawful because
, even th ough
th e parents were no longer living in th e apartment , Brian ― was an original occupant
entitled to continued rent control. ‖ ( Mosser Companies , supra , 233 Cal.App.4 th at
p. 509.) However, th e landlord claimed th at th e statutory phrase ― took possession ‖ in
Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2) was a term of art
, which required th at th e person claiming original occupancy had to have acquired a legal rig ht of possession by being a party to th e lease agreement. Wi th out th is qualification
, th e landlord argued, a minor
could ― inherit ‖ his parent ‘ s tenancy and th ereby acquire ― rights wi th out obligations. ‖ ( Id. at p. 515.) Affirming a judgment precluding th e landlord from increasing Brian ‘ s rent , th e Mosser Companies court concluded th at ― [t]he plain meaning of an  ̳ original occupant

. . . who took possession of th e dwelling or unit pursuant to th e rental agreement ‘ (§ 1954.53, subd. (d)(2)) is an individual who has resided in th e dwelling from th e start of th e tenancy wi th th e landlord ‘ s permission. ‖ (233 Cal.App.4 th at p. 512.) In reaching th is conclusion, th e court rejected th e landlord ‘ s objection th at Brian should not be allowed to

―  ̳ inherit ‘ his paren t ‘ s tenancy , ‖ finding th at Brian had ― his own personal right of21

occupancy , ‖ and th at ― Brian ‘ s rights ha [d] concomitant obligations. ‖ ( Id . at p. 516.) As
th e court explained, ― [w] hen Brian ‘ s parents vacated th e apartment and Brian, as an adult, chose to remain in occupancy, he became a tenant obligated to pay rent . Tenancies in property need not be created by written leases. [Citation.] One may become a tenant by occupancy wi th consent. [Citation.]  ̳ ― Such tenancies carry wi th th em th e relationship
of landlord and tenant. Th e tenant is liable by operation of law. ‖ [Citation s .] ‘ [Citation.] ‖ ( Ibid .) Drolapas
, supra , 238 Cal.App.4 th 646 , was ano th er case addressing whe th er a rent increase was au th orized by Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2) of th e Costa

- Hawkins Act. In 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Lara executed a written rental agreement and moved into th e apartment wi th th eir children, inc luding six

- year

- old Borjas. In 2000, appellant purchased th e apartmen t building and th e Lara parents signed a statement identifying
th emselves as th e tenants , but also stating th at th e unit was occupied by two adults and four children, which was th e number of ― allowable tenants. ‖ ( Id . at p. 649.) In 2010, th e Lara parents bought a home th ey began to use as th eir primary residence, but th ey continued to pay rent on th e apartment. Meanwhile, Borjas continuously lived in th e apartment and paid rent to hi s parents when he was able. ( Ibid .) Applying Mosser Companies , th is court first concluded th at ― Borjas was an

 ̳ original occupant ‘ wi th in th e meaning of sect ion 1954.53, subdivision (d)(2) ‖ when he
moved into th e apartment as a six

- year

- old child

. ( Drolapas
, supra , 238 Cal.App.4 th at
p p

. 65 2

- 65 3.) Second, we concluded th at Borjas ― took possession ‖ of th e apartment pursuant to th e rental agreement even th ou gh he was a minor at th e time . As support for
th is conclusion, we relied on th e following reasoning in Mosser Companies :

―  ̳ ― Possession ‖ is a commonly understood term normally referring to physical possession.

. . . [L]imiting th e term to parties to a legal agreement is inconsistent bo th
wi th th is common understanding and wi th th e terms used in th e sta tute. Th e statute refers

to an ― occu pant ‖ ra th er th an a ― tenant, ‖ ― lessee, ‖ or ― party. ‖ Th ese terms have distinct
and well

- established meanings, making it unlikely th e Legislature used th e term

― occupant ‖ when it meant party to a rental agreement. Th at th e Legislature ‘ s use of th e22

term ― oc cupant ‖ was deliberate and intended to signify some th ing distinct from a party to
th e lease is confirmed when th e statute is read as a whole. ‘ [Citation.] ‖ ( Drolapas
, supra , 238 Cal.App.4 th at p. 653 , quoting Mosser Companies , supra , 233 Cal.App.4 th at
p. 513 .) Defendants mistakenly rely on Mosser Companies and Drolapas

. Th e primary
issue in bo th of th ese cases was how to interpret statutory language in th e Costa

- Hawkins Act, specifically, th e words ― occupant ‖ and ― possession ‖ in Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2). ( Mosser Companies , supra , 233 Cal.App.4 th at pp. 512

- 513; Drolapas
, supra , 238 Cal.App. 4 th at p p

. 652

- 653.) Th e present case does not involve a proposed
rent increase under th e Costa

- Hawkins Act

. 14 Beyond th at, th e question we address is not whe th er David is an occupant or in possession of Unit 308A

. Th e issue here is whe th er David ‘ s status as a minor precludes him from be ing a ― tenant ‖ for all purposes under

s ection 37.2(t) of th e Rent Ordinance. Mosser Companies and Drolapas do not add ress th is discre te issue. To be sure, th e occupants in possession of th e rental units in th ose case were tenants wi th in th e meaning of s ection 37.2(t) when th e ir respective landlord s attempted to increase th e ir rent , but by th at time bo th were adults. Indeed, as th e Mosser Companies court explicitly stated, after Brian ‘ s parents ― vacated th e apartment and Brian as an adult, chose to re main in occupancy, he be came a tenant obligated to pay rent. ‖ (233 Cal.App. 4 th at p. 516 .)
To summarize our conclusion s, th e general definition of a tenant set for th in section 37.2(t) of th e Rent Ordinance does not embrace a minor child who legally occupies a rental unit. Rent Ordinance
, section 37.9A(e)(3)(A) require s th e landlord to
make a relocation payment to ― each tenant , ‖ but th is part of th e Ordinance does not include a special definition of a tenant that broadens or alters th e scope of s ection 37.2(t),

or any o th er provision directing a landlord to pay a separate relocation benefit to th e child
of a tenant . T ake n toge th er, th ese facts compel us to reverse th e judgment in th is case.

14 Cobb
, supra , 98 Cal.App.4th 345, which we have already discussed , also involved an issue under the Costa

- Hawkins Act that does not impact our conclusions here.23

We emphasi ze th at th e question before us is not whe th er th e San Francisco Board of Supervisors has th e au th ority under th e Ellis Act to confer a s ection 37.9A(e)
relocation benefit on a child. Ra th er, we hold only th at a minor is not a tenant entitled to

a separate relocation payment under Rent Ordinance, s ection 37.9A(e) , as currently
written

. V. DISPOSITION
Th e July 15, 2016 order by th e appell ate panel is reversed and th is case is
remanded for fur th er proceedings consistent wi th th is decision.24 _________________________ RUVOLO, P. J.

We concur:

_________________________ REARDON, J.

_________________________ RIVERA, J.

A149062, Danger Panda LLC v. Launiu25

Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Ronald E. Quidachay
Counsel for Appellant: Law Office of Paul J. Katz and Paul J. Katz
Zacks & Freedman, Andrew Zacks

Counsel for Amicus Curiae San Francisco Dowling & Marquez, Apartment Association on behalf of Curtis F. Dowling Appellant:
Counsel for Respondents: Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., Stephen L. Collier , Raquel Fox

A149062, Danger Panda LLC v. Launiu