[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 21-10541

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-04856-WMR

AIESHA CALLAHAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

EMORY HEALTHCARE, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(September 29, 2021)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JORDAN and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Aiesha Callahan appeals pro se the summary judgment in favor of Emory 

Healthcare Inc., and against her amended complaint that Emory violated the 

Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12203(a). Callahan complained 

that Emory violated the Leave Act by interfering with her use of medical leave and 

by retaliating against her for taking leave when it delayed reassigning her to a 

comparable position and that Emory violated the Disabilities Act by discriminating 

against her in her reassignment and by retaliating against her for requesting an 

accommodation. The district court ruled that Callahan abandoned her claims under 

the Leave Act and that she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 

or of retaliation under the Disabilities Act. We affirm.

We review de novo a summary judgment, and we view the record in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 

1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The district court correctly treated as abandoned Callahan’s claims of 

interference and retaliation under the Leave Act. “[G]rounds alleged in the 

complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”

Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting

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Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 598 (11th Cir. 1995)). 

Callahan moved for summary judgment based only on her claims under the 

Disabilities Act. And after Emory moved for summary judgment, it became 

“incumbent upon [Callahan] to respond by, at the very least, raising in [her]

opposition papers any and all arguments or defenses [she] felt precluded judgment 

in [its] favor.” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). But Callahan failed to respond

with any argument that Emory violated the Leave Act.

The district court did not err by entering summary judgment against 

Callahan’s complaint that Emory violated the Disabilities Act. Callahan failed to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination by failing to prove that Emory 

refused to reasonably accommodate her disabilities, and she failed to establish a 

prima facie case of retaliation by failing to prove that Emory took an adverse 

action against her. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255, 1260

(11th Cir. 2001). Emory accommodated Callahan’s anxiety and post-traumatic 

stress disorders. After Callahan took medical leave and requested a transfer from 

her position as a patient liaison in the emergency department to a “less stressful 

environment,” Emory assigned Callahan an in-house recruiter and retained her as 

an employee so she could exhaust her accrued leave with pay and compete with 

other internal applicants for job openings. A human resources officer invited 

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Callahan to interview for a comparable job, which she rejected, and within a 

couple of weeks found her a comparable position as a visitor and outpatient liaison 

with identical pay, which she accepted. Callahan’s supervisors also granted her 

request for a mentor and advised her how to interact with coworkers, including a 

security officer she disliked. After Callahan disparaged the officer and 

inappropriately advised clinicians how to care for their patients, her supervisors 

gave her a written warning, but it had no “tangible, negative effect on [her]

employment” because another company officer later rescinded the warning. See id.

at 1261. The warning too was unrelated to Callahan’s medical conditions. 

Callahan’s supervisors testified and she conceded that they were unaware of her 

medical conditions and disciplined her for her misconduct with coworkers.

Callahan argues that Emory “discriminated against her by failing to hire her 

for all [the] jobs she applied for,” but Callahan alleged in her complaint that Emory 

violated the Disabilities Act by delaying her return to work. We cannot consider a 

failure-to-hire claim that Callahan failed to develop in the district court. See Access 

Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court 

has repeatedly held that an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the 

first time in an appeal will not be considered by this court.”). And Callahan could 

not amend her complaint to add a claim by alluding to “forty-two counts of failure 

to hire” in her opposition to Emory’s motion for summary judgment. See Gilmour 

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v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff 

may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary 

judgment.”).

We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Emory Healthcare.

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