MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2017 ME	166

Docket: Pen-16-536

Argued: June	15,	2017

Decided: July	25,	2017

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN, JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

RICHARDIE	KELLEY

v.

NORTH	EAST	INSURANCE	COMPANY

GORMAN,	J.

[¶1]		Richardie	Kelley appeals	from the entry	of	a	summary	judgment	in	

the	 Superior	 Court	 (Penobscot	 County,	 Anderson,	 J.)	 in	 favor	 of	 North	 East	

Insurance	 Company	 on	the reach	 and	 apply	 action	 she	 brought	 pursuant	 to	

24-A	M.R.S.	§ 2904	(2016).	 The	court	concluded	that	the	damages	awarded	to	

Kelley	in	the	underlying	action,	see 7	M.R.S.	§	3961(2)	(2016),	were	based	on	a	

claim that	 was not	 covered	 by	 the North	 East	 automobile	 insurance	 policy.	

We	agree	and	affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 undisputed.	 Teresa	 Snyder	 held	 an	

automobile	insurance	policy	 from	North	East	pursuant	 to	which	she	was	 the	

“named	insured”	and	her	1999	Ford	Mustang was	the	“covered	auto.” Snyder	
2

and	 Tim	McCann	were	 the	 unmarried	 co-owners	 of	 a	 dog.	 On	 February	 21,	

2009,	McCann	drove one	 of	 his	employer’s	 cars	to	Frankfort	 to	meet	Kelley,	

who	had	purchased an	old	pickup	truck	from	McCann’s	son.	 McCann brought	

the	dog with	him	in	the	car.	 During	the	transfer	of	the	pickup	truck,	someone1

opened	 the	 door	 to	 the	 car	 containing the	dog, and the	 dog,	without	leaving	

the	car,	bit	Kelley	in	the	face. Snyder	was	not	present	during	this	incident	and	

was	not	a	driver,	passenger,	or	owner	of	the	car	that	the	dog was	in	when	it bit	

Kelley.	 Kelley	filed	a	lawsuit	against	Snyder	and	McCann,	for	which	North	East	

declined	 to	defend	or	indemnify	Snyder.		See 7 M.R.S.	§ 3961(2).	 The	parties	

to	that	suit	stipulated	to	a	judgment	of	$100,000.		

[¶3]		On	December	4,	2015,	Kelley	filed	a	complaint	against	North	East	

pursuant	 to	 24-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 2904, seeking	 to	 satisfy	 her	 judgment	 against	

Snyder	through Snyder’s	auto	insurance	policy.2 After	discovery,	 the	parties	

filed	cross-motions	for	summary	judgment.	 On	November	16,	2016,	the	court	

granted	North	East’s	motion	for	the	entry	of	a	summary	judgment	and	denied	

Kelley’s.	 The	 court	 concluded	 that,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 definition	 in	 the	 policy,	

 1		The	parties	dispute	whether	McCann	or	Kelley	opened	the	door	to	the	car,	an	issue	that	is	not	

material	 to	 our	 resolution	 of	 this	 case.	 	 See Strong	 v.	 Brakeley,	 2016	 ME	 60,	 ¶	 4,	 137	 A.3d	 1007

(“[A]n	issue	is	material	if	it	could	potentially	affect	 the	 outcome	of	 the	matter.”	 (quotation	marks	

omitted)).		

2 Neither	 Snyder	 nor	 McCann had a homeowner’s	 insurance policy. The	 record	 contains	 no	

information	about	any	insurance	policy	covering	the	vehicle	McCann	was	driving.
3

Snyder	was	not	an	“insured”	for	the	purposes	of	Kelley’s	suit	and	that	Kelley’s	

bodily	injury	did	not	arise	 from an	“auto	accident”	as	required	by	 the	policy.	

Kelley	timely	appealed.

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶4]		We	review	de novo	both	a	court’s	grant	of	summary	judgment	and	

its	 interpretation	 of	 an	 insurance	 policy.	 	 Cox	 v.	 Commonwealth	 Land	 Title	

Ins. Co.,	2013	ME	8,	¶ 8,	59	A.3d	1280.		Where,	as	here,	the	material	 facts	are	

not	 in	 dispute,	 we	 limit	 our	 review	 to	 whether	 the	 prevailing	 party	 was	

entitled	to	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law.	 Langevin	v.	Allstate	Ins.	Co.,	2013	ME	

55,	¶	7,	66 A.3d	585;	see M.R.	Civ.	P.	56.

[¶5]		The	review	of	a	judgment	in	a	reach	and	apply	action	requires	us	

to	 first “identify	 the	 basis	 of	 liability	 and	 damages	 from	 the	 underlying	

complaint	 and	 judgment”	 and	 then	 to	 “review	 the	 .	 .	 .	 insurance	 policy	 to	

determine	 if	 any	 of	 the	 damages	 awarded	 in	 the	 underlying	 judgment	 are	

based	 on	 claims	 that	 would	 be	 recoverable	 pursuant	 to	 the	 .	 .	 .	 policy.”		

Langevin,	 2013	 ME	 55,	 ¶	 8,	 66	 A.3d	 585 (quotation	 marks	 omitted);	

see 24-A M.R.S.	§	2904.		If	the	language	of	an	insurance	policy	is	unambiguous,	

we	 interpret	 it	 in	 accordance	 with its	 plain	 meaning, but	 we	 “construe	

ambiguous	 policy	 language strictly	 against	 the	 insurance	 company	 and	
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liberally	in	 favor	 of	 the	 policyholder.”3	 	 Langevin,	 2013	ME	 55,	 ¶	 9,	 66	 A.3d	

585 (quotation	marks	omitted).		Further,	we	view	 the	language	of	 the	policy	

“from	the	perspective	of	an	average	person	untrained	in	either	the	law	or	the	

insurance	field	in	light	of	what	a	more	than	casual	reading	of	the	policy	would	

reveal	 to	 an	 ordinarily	 intelligent	 insured.”	 	 Union	 Mut.	 Fire	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	

Commercial	 Union Ins.	 Co.,	 521	 A.2d	 308,	 310	 (Me. 1987) (quotation	 marks	

omitted).

[¶6]	 	 Kelley	 bears	 the	 burden	 of	 showing	 that	 the	 damages	 she	 was	

awarded in	 the	 underlying	 action	 are	 based	 on	 a	 claim	 that	falls within	 the	

scope	 of	 Snyder’s	 policy	 with	 North	 East.	 	 See	 Langevin,	 2013	 ME	 55,	 ¶	 8,	

66 A.3d	585.		The	policy	obligated North	East	to	indemnify	Snyder	for	“‘bodily	

injury’	 . . .	 for	which	any	‘insured’ becomes	legally	 responsible	 because	 of	an	

auto	 accident.”	 The	 policy	 did	 not	 define	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident.”	 Kelley	

urges	us to	conclude	that	the term is	broad	enough	to include	a	dog	bite	that	

occurred	in	or	near	a	car	because,	she	contends,	the	bite	arose	out	of	the	use	

 3 One	of	Kelley’s	arguments	is	that we	must construe	all	policy	language	in	favor	of	the	insured.	

To the	extent	that	we	have	been	less	than	clear on	this	point in	the	past,	we	clarify	that	we	construe	

insurance	 policy	 language	 “strictly	 against	 the	 insurance	 company	 and	 liberally	 in	 favor	 of	 the	

policyholder” only	where	that	language	is	ambiguous.		Langevin	v.	Allstate	Ins.	Co., 2013 ME	55,	¶	9,	

66 A.3d	585 (quotation	marks	omitted).		As	with	any	contract,	where	the	language	of	an	insurance	

policy	is	clear	and	unambiguous,	we	interpret	it	in	accordance	with	its	plain	meaning.		See Cookson	

v.	Liberty	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co.,	2012	ME	7, ¶	8,	34	A.3d	1156	(“Unambiguous	language	in	an	insurance	

contract	must	be	interpreted	according	 to	its	plain	and	commonly	accepted	meaning.”	 (quotation	

marks	omitted));	see	also Richardson	v.	Winthrop	Sch.	Dep’t,	2009	ME	109,	¶	9,	983	A.2d	400.
5

of	 a	 vehicle.	 Interpreting	 “auto	 accident”	 in	 accordance	 with its	“plain and

commonly	accepted meaning,” Cookson	v.	Liberty	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co.,	2012	ME	7,	

¶	8,	34	A.3d	1156 (quotation	marks	omitted),	we	conclude otherwise.

[¶7] “Accident,”	 which	 is	 also	 undefined	 in	 the	 policy,	 is	 commonly	

understood to	mean	“[a]n	event	that	is	without	apparent	cause	or	unexpected;	

an	 unfortunate	event,	 [especially] one	 causing	injury	 or	 damage.”	 	1	Shorter	

Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 14 (6th	 ed.	 2007); see Patrick v. J. B. Ham Co.,	

119 Me.	 510,	 517,	 111	 A.	 912	(1921) (“[A]n accident is	 a	 befalling;	 an	 event	

that	 takes	 place	 without	 one’s	 forethought	 or	 expectation;	 an	 undesigned,	

sudden,	 and	 unexpected	 event.	 Its	 synonyms	 include	 mishap,	 mischance,	

misfortune[,] disaster,	calamity,	catastrophe.”).		We	 therefore	interpret “auto	

accident”—an	 unambiguous	 term—to	 mean an	 unintended	 and	 unforeseen	

injurious	occurrence	involving	an	automobile. “[V]iewed	from	the	perspective	

of	 an	 average	 person,” Union	 Mut.	 Fire	 Ins.	 Co.,	 521 A.2d at	 310,	 the	 plain

meaning	of	“auto	accident”—although	broader	than	a	collision	or	car	crash—

does not	 stretch	 so	 far	 as	 to	 encompass	 bodily	 injury	 from	 a	 dog	 bite	 that	

occurred	in a	 car that	had	absolutely	no	causal	 connection	 to	 the	injury and	

that	was	not	even	in	operation.

4

 4	 	 Our	 conclusion	 that	 this dog	 bite	 injury	 does	 not	 fit	 within	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident”	 is	

bolstered	by	the	current	definition	of	that	term	in	legal	dictionaries,	which	would	support	an	even	
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[¶8]		Kelley	contends	 that	 our	decision	in	Union	Mutual	 Fire	 Insurance	

Company	v.	 Commercial	Union	 Insurance	 Company, 521 A.2d	 308	 (Me.	 1987),

obliges	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	 her damages	 are	 recoverable	 pursuant	 to the	

policy	 because	 her	 bodily	 injury	 arose	 from	 the	 “use” of	 an	 automobile.

Although	 the	 auto	 insurance	 policy	 in	 that	 case	 contained language	 nearly	

identical	 to	the	 language we	 consider	 today,	 our holding in	Union	 Mutual is	

inapposite	here.

5		See id. at	309.		There,	we	accepted	two	certified	questions	of

state	law	from	the	United	States	District	Court	for	the	District of Maine.		Id.	at	

310.		Those	questions asked us	to	determine	whether	a	particular	injury	arose	

from	the	“use”	of	a	vehicle—language	contained	in	one	clause	of	the	policy.		Id.

Constrained	 by	 the	 questions	 presented,	 we	 did	 not	 consider	 whether	 that	

injury	 resulted	 from an	 “auto	 accident”—language	 contained	 in	 another	

clause. See id. at	309-11.		Consequently, Union	Mutual is	not	controlling	in	this

case,	in	which	our	de	novo	 review	is	not	limited	 to	 the	interpretation	 of	the	

“use”	clause	of the	policy.

 more	restrictive	interpretation.		See,	e.g., Black’s	Law	Dictionary	18	(10th	ed.	2014) (defining	“car	

accident”	as	“[a]n	accident	in	which	a	motor	vehicle	collides	with	another	vehicle	or	with	a	person,	

animal,	or	object,	[usually]	causing	damage	or injury.	— Also	termed	automobile	accident .	.	.	.”).

5	 	The	auto	insurance	policy	in	Union	Mutual obligated	 the	insurer	 to “pay	damages	 for	bodily	

injury	.	.	. for	which	any	covered	person	becomes	legally	responsible	because	of	an	auto	accident,”

cf.	 supra ¶	6, and defined	 “covered	 person”	as	 “the	 named	insured	 or	any	 family	member	 for	 the	

ownership,	maintenance	or	use	of	any	auto	or	trailer.”		Union	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co. v.	Commercial	Union	

Ins.	Co., 521 A.2d 308, 309 (Me.	1987)	(quotation	marks	omitted).
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[¶9]		Because	we	conclude	that	Kelley’s	claim	in	the	underlying	action	is	

not	 covered	 by the	 North	 East	 policy, she	 has	 failed	 to	 carry	 her	 burden,

see 24-A	M.R.S.	§	2904;	Langevin,	2013	ME	55,	¶ 8,	66 A.3d	585,	and	we	affirm	

the	judgment.6

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Arthur	 J.	 Greif,	 Esq. (orally),	 Gilbert	 &	 Greif,	 P.A.,	 Bangor,	 for	 appellant	

Richardie	Kelley

John	 S.	 Whitman,	 Esq. (orally),	 Richardson,	 Whitman,	 Large	 &	 Badger,	

Portland,	for	appellee	North	East	Insurance	Company

Penobscot	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2015-236

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY

 6	 	 We	 find	 Kelley’s	 contention	 that	 Snyder	 was	 an	 “insured”	 for	 this	 accident	 wholly	

unpersuasive	and	decline	to	address	it.