05 -56 44 -cr

U.S. v. T ran 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E S EC ON D C IR C U IT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ August Term, 2006 (Argued: May

1, 2007 Dec ided: Marc h 10, 2008)

Docke t No. 05-5644-c r

_____________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appellee ,

- v. - DUONG -CAM TRAN,

Defendant-

Appellant
.

_______________________ BEF ORE: SACK, S OTOMAYO R, HAL L , Circuit Judges
.

_______________________ Appea l from a judg ment of convic tion in the United States District Court for the Western District of Ne w York ( Arc ara , C.J .) of knowing ly importing into the United States 500 g rams or more of a mix ture or substanc e conta ining methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) , 960(b)( 1)(H) , and knowing ly

possessing w ith the intent to dis tribute a mix ture c ontaining me thamphetamine, id. § 841(a) (1), with a r esulting se ntence principally consisting of

235 months’ imprisonment. AFF I RMED.

_______________________2 Br uce R. B ry an, B ryan L aw F irm, Sy rac use, Ne w York for

De fe nd an tAppellant (James P. Harring ton, Harr ington & Mahoney , Buf falo, Ne w York, on the brief

). J oseph Ka

raszewski, Assistant United States Attorney , Buf falo, New Y ork for Appellee (Stephan J. Bac zy nski, Assistant United States Attorney , and Te rra nce P. F ly nn, United States Attorney , on the brief ).

_______________________ HAL L , Circuit Judge : Def endant- Appellant Duong -Cam Tra n appea ls a final judg ment of convic tion in the Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the Wes te rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k ( Ar c ara , C. J.) o f k

no wi ng ly importing into the United States 500 g rams or more of a mixture or substance c ontaining methamphetamine, 21 U .S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b) (1)( H), a nd knowing ly

possessing w ith the intent to distribute a mix ture c ontaining me thamphetamine, id. § 841(a) (1). The district court sentenc ed Tra

n principally

to 235 months’ imprisonm ent. For the followingrea sons, we AFF I RM the conviction and sente nce.

BACK GR OUND I. The Offen se Def endant- Appellant Duong -Cam Tra n is a Canadian c itiz en and r esident of Tor onto, Canada . Bor

n in 1958 in North Vietnam of Chinese a ncestry , Tran spe nt many y ear s in refug ee
c amps in H on gKo ngand Chi na and sp e aks “ so me En g lis h” wi th a n a c c e nt. He owns a

sma ll
m at tr e s s m anu f

a c tur i n gc o mp an y.3

On Octobe r 1, 2003, Tra

n telephoned a

n office of Thrifty

Car Rental in Toronto a

nd inq uir e d into r e nti nga

ve hic le fo r a

pla nn e d tr ip t o a

c a sin o in up state Ne w Y or

k. Ac c or din gto Tran, his own c ar w as in disrepa ir. The r ental ag ent sug g ested a Chry sler Pacif

ica. Tr an hesitated be cause he disliked Chry sler vehic les, but the ag ent pre vailed upon him to visitthe renta l ag ency

and inspec t the car . The ne x t day , sometime betwee n noon and 2 p.m., Tra n
arr ived at Thrif

ty Car Rental to inspect the Chry sler Pacif ica. He approve d of the ve hicle and signe d a re ntal ag ree ment, but he did not immediately assume possession of the ve hicle. Instead, Tran r eturne d to his factory for the a fternoon. Me anwhile, the Chry sler Pacif ica r emained unattended in the T hrifty

Car Rental pa

rkinglot, secure d by

its door locks and a stee ringwhee l lock. At approximately

5 p.m., Tran r eturne d to Thrifty Car Rental a

nd assumed possession of the re ntal vehicle. H e drove to a shoppingmall, and he then dr ove to a ba r, whe re he ate a

nd drank until midnight. Afte r leaving the bar, Tr an ag ain re turned to his fac tory . Although he planned to slee p for only

a fe w hours, he instea d slept until approx imately 9 a.m. In prepa

ration for his trip, he then pa cked a T-shirt, a jac ket, and a

brush, as we ll as $1,000 (USD) a nd $300 (Canadia n). Althoug h Tran ha d no idea whe re the Seneca Niag ara Casino was located, he took no direc tions with hi m. He also a ppare ntly had no spec ific plans for returninghome other tha n he expected to stay

“one da y” or, luc k permitting, “ longe r.” Tran le ft Toronto for

the Peac e B ridg e borde r cr ossing, dr iving a lone in the re ntal car
. Whe n T ra

n r e a c he d th e Pe a c e B ri dg e , a Un ite d St ate s Cu sto ms o ff ic e r i ns pe c te d h is c iti zen sh ip
car d and aske d him about his destination. The office r later testified that, when a sked whe re he was he aded, T ran “ beca

me somewhat nervous. . . . [H]e beg an swe ating , he g ripped the stee ring4

whee l. He bec ame a

littl e fidg ety

in the vehicle a s in somewhat moving a round, looking around.” The off

icer ref err ed Tra n to the seconda

ry inspection are a. At the se c on da

ry ins pe c tio n a

re a , tw o o the r o ff

ic e rs a sk e d T ra

n to c omp le te a

c us tom s decla ration for m while they

sear ched his c ar. D uringthe inspection, the off icer s found a
scre wdriver

and a g as ca

n in the vehicle. Me anwhile, one of the off icer s rec alled an intellig ence repor t that sugg ested “ there [could be] hi dden compa rtments on the . . . Pacific a.” A fter
c on fi rm ingthe su

bs tanc e of

thi s inte lli g e nc e re po rt

wi th a sp e c ia l a g e nt, the of

fi c e r p hy sic a lly inspected the vehicle’ s headliner , or interior r oof lining, w ith his hands. Upon discoveringthat the hea dliner “f

elt very inconsistent with what a hea dliner should fee l like,” the off icer then tested the de nsity

of the he adliner usinga density -mea suringdevice known as a “buster.” The device confirme d that the hea dliner density was unusual. At that point, the off icer beg an removingthe hea dliner, which, a s he later testified “c ame down ve ry easily .” As the liner loosene d, a bagslipped out from the spac e betwe en the liner and the r oof. The ba gcontained f

our smaller va cuum-sea led bag s, eac h of which he ld severa l even smaller bag g ies. These smaller bag g ies containe d what appe are d to be pink and g ree n pills. W hen Tra n saw the ba g s emerg ing f

rom the hea dliner, he yelled somethingto the eff ect of “what’s g oing on” or “what’s happe ning.” The off icer s seized the bag s of pills as evidence , arr ested Tr an, and be g an to qu e sti on

him . T ra n r e pe ate dly

de nie d k no wl e dg e of

the ba g s o r t

he pil ls w ith in t

he m.

II. DE A H andl ing and A nalys is o f the P ill s Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, DE A a g e nts arr ive d at th e Pe a c e B ri dg e to t ake c us tod y of the pil ls, which the Customs office rs had se aled in evide nce ba g s. The ag ents remove d the pills from the5

four ba g s and sepa

rate d them into evidence bag s by color. The sorting pr oduced a bagof pink pil ls a nd tw o b a g s o f gre e n p ill s. Whil e so rt ingthe pil ls, the a g e nts did no t tr a c k whic h p ill s
came from ea ch of the orig inal four ba g s (or, for that matter, whic h came from ea ch of the smaller bag g ies there in). The thre e evide nce ba g s were sent to a laboratory for c hemical a

naly sis. There, the chemist first counted the pills, finding a total of 40,790 pills weig hing 10.243 kilog rams: 16,278 pink pills in one bag , 14,342 g ree n pills i n another , and 10,170 g ree n pills i n the last. He the n
re mov e d tw e nty-n ine pil ls f ro m e a c h o f t

he thr e e ba g s. Init ia l sc re e nin gsh ow e d th at th e pil ls i n
eac h g roup conta ined either methylenedioxy

methamphetamine ( “MDMA,” commonly known as

“ e c sta c y” ) o r m e tha

mph e tamin e . A ft e r gri nd ingup e a c h o f t he thr e e pil e s o f t

we nty-n ine pil ls int o thre e c or

re sp on din gpil e s o f p ow de r, the c he mis t pe rf or me d f ur the r t e sts . A c c or din gto those tests, the first pile containe d 28% MDMA a nd 5.6% d-methamphetamine; the sec ond 15% MDMA and 6.9% d-methamphe tamine; and the third 28% MD MA and 5.9% dme tha mph e tamin e . A t tr ia l, t

he c he mis t te sti fi e d th at in his op ini on , th e re su lts of the se te sts perf ormed on the sa

mples of pills accur ately

ref lected the amount and per centa g e of MDMAand d-methamphe tamine in all of the pills that had bee n seized.

III. Tran’s Trial F oll ow ingTr an’ s arr e st, a g ra nd jur y in t he Wes te rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k c ha rg e d h im with knowingly

importing into the United States 500 g rams or more of a mixture or substance containingmethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) , 960(b)( 1)(H) . The grand jury6

also cha rg ed Tra n with knowingly

possessing w ith intent to di stribute a mix ture c ontaining methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). At trial, Tra

n maintained his innocenc e and te stified, inter alia, that he was a n unwitting courie r with no knowledg e that his renta l vehicle c ontained drug s. In its jury instructions, the district court explained what the jury must consider in dec iding whe ther Tr an had know ledg e of the drug s in the car : I t is obviousl y

impossibl e to prove directly the oper ation of the De fenda nt’s mind. But a wise and intellig ent consider ation of all the fa cts and c ircumst an ce s . . . may enable y ou to infer what the Def endant’ s state of mind was. . . . For example, if a De

fe nd an t wa s a so leoc c up an t of an ap ar tm e nt, it’

s re as on ab leto conclude the Defe ndant knew about the items in the apartment
. The De fenda nt’s behavior may also indicate know ledg e. Ne rv ou sn ess i n th e pr ese nc e of d ru gs or fli gh t from thesite at which the authoriti es identified drugs may indicate that the Defendant kne w that the ma te ria ls i n q ue

sti on we rena rc oti cs. (Sept. 29, 2004 Trial Tr . at 90:83–84 (empha ses adde d).) With the exception of this passag e, the district court’s instructions to the jury larg ely comported w ith the model jury instructions. See L eonar d B. Sand e t al., Modern Fe deral Jury I nstructions: Criminal

§ 3 -5 6. 01 . A t no po int

did the dis tr ic t c ourt

ins tr uc t th e jur

y that it c ou ld i nf e r k no wl e dg e fr om t

he de fe nd ant’ s so le occupa ncy of the ve hicle. The jury convicted T ran on both c ounts. I n September 2005, the district court ac cepte d the Gu ide lin e s c a lc ulatio n o f t he Pr ob atio n O ff

ic e and se nte nc e d T ra

n to 23 5 mo nth s’ inc arc e ratio n, wh ic h w a s at th e bo tto m of the a pp lic a ble Gu ide lin e s r ang e , a s w e ll a s f ive y e ars ’ supervised r elea se and a

specia l assessment of $200.7 DI SCU SSIO N Tran a ppeals his conviction and se ntence on sever al g rounds. Fir st, he cha lleng es two of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur

y ins tr uc tio ns . Se c on d, he argue s th at th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o support the jury

verdic t. Third, he cla ims that his s entenc e wa s unrea sonable.

I. The Jur y I nst r uc ti ons Tran c halleng es two of the district c ourt’s instructions to the jury : (1) an instruc tion relating to the r easona

ble infer ence s that can be drawn from a de fenda nt’s sole occ upancy

of a vehicle; a nd (2) a n instruction on the rele vance of a de fenda nt’s nervousne ss to the element of knowledg e.

A. Sol e Oc c upanc y o f a V e hic le In his brief, Tr an states that the district c ourt instructed the jury that “if the de fenda

nt was the sole occ upant of a

. . . a [sic] vehicle, it is rea sonable to conc lude that the def endant kne w about items in the vehicle .” (App. B r. 26 (e llipsi s in origina l) (empha ses re moved).) T ran observe s that the pills at issue here w ere hidden bene ath a ve hicle’s he adliner a nd argues that the district court’s jury

instruction was there fore err oneous. F or support, he c ites to the doctrine,
a do pte d b y

the se ve ra l c ir c uit s and

the mod e l jury

ins tr uc tio ns , th at w he n c ontr a ba nd is f ound in
a v e h ic le ’ s h id d e nc o mp artm e n ts , “ [p ]o s s e s s io no f o r c o n tr o l o v e r

[th e ] v e h ic le [c an n o t] , standingalone, suff

ice to prove guilty

knowledg e.” United States v. Anc hondo-Sandoval , 910 F .2 d 1 23 4, 12 36 (5 th C ir . 1 99 0) ; se e als o United States v. J ackson , 55 F.3d 1219, 1226 ( 6th Cir. 1995) (“ In ‘hidden c ompartment’ c ases, c ourts have g ener ally require d additional evidenc eThe e rrone ously quoted jury

instruction was not the only materia l misreprese ntation of 1 the re cord c ontained in Tra n’s brief ; Tran’ s attorney s also inacc urate ly stated that some of the seized pills bore an “R” log o while others did not. Such “ove rsig hts” are inconsistent with the dutie s th at T ra

n’ s atto rn e y

ow e s to bo th T ra

n a nd thi s Co ur t. Thoug h responsibility

for these misrepre sentations lies with Tran’s attorney s, we a re c o n s tr a in e d

to n o te th at t

h e G o v e r n me n t f a il e d to n o ti c e an d

p o int o ut t

h e s e s ame e r

r o r s . We remind both parties that vigor ous testing of an adve rsar

y ’s position not onl y

streng thens one’s own c la ims but a lso fa c ili tate s o ur re vie w o f t

he iss ue s. 8 indicatingknowledg e—‘c ircumstance s evidenc ing a consciousness of

guilt on the part of the d ef en d an t . ’” (qu o t i n g United States v. Diaz-Carreon , 915 F.2d 951, 954 ( 5th Cir. 1990)) (e mph a sis omi tte d) ); United States v. Stanley , 24 F.3d 1314, 1319–20 ( 11th Cir. 1994) (same) ; Diaz-Carreon , 915 F.2d at 954 (“[C] ontrol of the vehic le . . . does not support an infe renc e of guilty knowledg e; it is at least a fa ir assumption that a third party might have conce aled the
c ontr oll e d s ub sta

nc e s in the ve hic le wi th t

he int e nt t o u se the unwi tti ngde fe nd ant a s th e c arr ie r i n a smug g ling e nterprise .”); Sand, Modern Fe deral Jury I nstructions: Criminal

F or m 56 -8 c mt. (“ In [hi dd e n c omp artme nt] c a se s, mos t c ourt s w ill re qu ir e fu rt he r e vid e nc e [be y on d s ole occupa ncy].”). This challeng e fa ils, however, be cause it is based on a ser ious misreprese ntation of the
re c or d: T he dis tr ic t c ourt did no t, i n f a c t, g ive the ins tr

uc tio n a bo ut whic h T ra

n c omp la ins
. 1 B e c a us e Tr an d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the ins tr uc tio ns a c tua lly

g ive n to the jur

y , w e fi nd no re ve rs ibl e
err or.

B. Ne r vo usne ss Tr an c onte nd s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt c omm itt e d e rr or

by ins tr uc tin gthat “ [n]e rv ou sn e ss i n the pre sence of drug s . . . may indicate that the D efe ndant knew that the materia ls in question9

wer e nar cotics.” Tr an ar gues that this instruction assumes that the “mate rials in question” ar e visible to the occupa

nt of the vehic le and that this assumption does not obtain in hidden
c omp artme nt c a se s. The a rgument is unpersuasive. E ven whe re dr ug s are hidden and ther efor e not immediately

visible to the occupa

nt or others, the possibility of discover

y may cause an individual with knowledge of the drug s to respond with nervousne ss to a law enf orce ment office r’s pre sence . As sever al Circuits have r ecognized, “nervousne ss” is one ty pe of e vidence that, when c onsidered a longside the def endant’ s sole occupa

ncy of a ve hicle, ca

n support an infere nce that the defe ndant knew a bout the drug s in the hidden compar tment. E.g. , United States v. Palomino , 100 F.3d 446, 451 ( 6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a jury could have inferr ed defe ndant’s knowledg e of dr ug s in a hidden compa

rtment as a r esult of def

endant’ s “control a

nd possession of the vehic le” in addition to other fa ctors including“his nervousne ss”) ; D iaz
Carreon , 915 F.2d at 954 (noting, in a hidden compar

tment case , that “[n] ervous be havior at an inspection station freque ntly constitutes persuasive evidenc e of guilty knowledg e”)
. Tran w ould have a

strong er c laim of err or had the district court instructed the jury that
nervousne ss alone wa s a suffic ient basis for f inding knowle dg e, bec ause “ [i ]n t he abse nce of fac ts which sug g est that the def endant’ s nervousne ss or anxiety derive s from an unde rlying consciousness of

criminal beha

vior, evidenc e of ne rvousness is insufficient to support a f inding of guilty knowledg e.” Diaz-Carreon , 915 F.2d at 954. A revie w of the r ecor d, howeve r, shows that the district court’s instruc tion did not convey such a me ssag e. Rea d in full, the district court ins tr uc te d th e jur

y that:10

The De fenda

nt’s behavior

may also indicate know ledg e. Ne rvousness in the pre sence of drug s or flig ht from the site at whic h the authorities identified dr ug s may indicate that the Def endant kne w that the mater ials in question were narc otics. Also, the possession of a larg e qu anti ty

of dr ug s ma y ind ic ate that th e De fe nd ant k ne w what he ha d in

his possession. These e x amples ar e neither exhaustive nor are they

conclusive. It is up to y ou, based upon all the evidenc e, to deter mine whether

the Def endant kne w that he possesse d na rc oti c dr ug s. (Sept. 29, 2004 Trial Tr . at 90:84.) These instructions do not sugg est that the jury could find kn ow le dg e ba se d o n n e rv ou sn e ss a lon e . Ins te a d, the y a c c ur ate ly

inf or m th e jur y that ne rv ou sn e ss is one ty pe of be havior, among othe rs, that is releva nt to determiningwhether Tran kne w about the drug s. The instructions that wer e g iven ade quately conveyed the law

to the jury
. United Sta te s v . S c hu ltz , 333 F.3d 393, 413- 14 (2d Cir. 2003) (“ [N] o jury instruction is ever pe rfe ct. . . . [W ]e review the court’s instruc tions to determine whethe r consider ed as a whole, the instructions
a de qu ate ly

c omm un ic ate d th e e sse nti a l id e a s to the jur y .” (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s a nd br a c ke ts omitted)). Ther e wa s no err or.

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence Tran a rgues that the Gove rnment pre sented insuffic ient evidenc e to support conviction. In particula

r, Tra n contends that the jury

could not have f

ound fac ts sufficient to establish (1) that Tran kne w about the pills, and (2) that the substance contained a sufficie nt amount of methamphetamine to support Tr an’s c onviction for an of fense requiringproof of

“500 g rams or
mor e of a mixture or

su bs tanc e c onta ini nga

de te c ta ble amou nt o f m e tha

mph e tamin e ,” 21 U. S.C. § 960(b)( 1)(H)
.11

A. Stand ard of Review Inra i s i n g “a n

ap p el l at e c h al l en ge t o th e s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e e v i d en ce s u

p p o rt i n g a conviction,” the de fenda

nt “fa ces a

heavy burden, be cause we must revie w the evide nce in the light most favor able to the g overnme nt, drawingall rea sonable infe renc es in its favor.” United Sta te s v . G as k in , 364 F.3d 438, 459 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (interna l quotation marks omitted). “Rever sal is warr anted only

if no rational f

actf inder c ould have f

ound the cr imes char g ed prove d beyond a
rea sonable doubt.” Id. at 459–60.

B. Tran’s Knowledge We a g re e wi th t

he oth e r c ourt s to have a dd re sse d th e iss ue that a

de fe nd ant’ s so le
oc c up anc y

of a ve hic le c ann ot a lon e su ff ic e to p ro ve kn ow le dg e of c ontr a ba nd fo un d h idd e n in the vehicle ; corrobor atingevidenc e, such a s nervousne ss, a fa lse statement, or suspicious circ umstances, is nec essar y to prove this element. Anchondo-Sandov al , 9 10 F .2 d at 12 36 (F if th Circuit) (“Possession of or c ontrol over [the] vehicle [cannot], st andingalone, suff ice to prove guil ty kn ow le dg e .” ); Jack

son , 55 F.3d at 1226 (Six th Circuit) (same) ; Stanley , 24 F.3d at 13 19 –2 0 ( El e ve nth

Cir c uit ) ( same ). He re , th e Go ve rnme nt i ntr od uc e d e vid e nc e of

ne rv ou sn e ss and suspicious circ umstances. On the question of ner vousness, the off

icer who first interc epted Tran te stified that when he asked Tr an about his destination, Tra n “beg an swe ating ” and “ g ripped the steer ing wheel.” Tran “ beca me a little fidg ety

in the vehicle” and beg an “movingaround, looking a round.” A lthough Tr an points out, and the off icer acknow ledg ed, that it is not unusual for individuals to become nervous at a borde r cr ossing, the jur y rea sonably

could have found that Tran’ s nervousne ss surpassed that leve l and thus ref lected c onsciousness of guilt rather than12

or din ary anxie ty up on int e ra c tin gwi th l aw e nf

or c e me nt. In a dd iti on

to e vid e nc e of

ne rv ou sn e ss,
moreove r, the Gove rnment introduce d evidenc e of suspicious cir cumstance s. For e x ample, Tra n said that he ha d never

visited Seneca

Niag ara Casino and ra

rely trave led to Buf

falo, but he ha d no direc tions for g etting to the c asino. And while Tr an intended to stay for a day or long er, he did not bring a

chang e of c lothing or a

ny toiletries other than a

brush. Fur thermore , Tran lost “his rig ht to have suff iciency assessed on the basis of the g overnme nt’s prese ntation alone” when he te stified on his own behalf. United States v. Aulicino , 44 F .3 d 1 10 2, 11 14 (2 d Ci r. 19 95 ). Al tho ugh “ a ve rd ic t of

guil ty c ann ot p ro pe rl y

be ba se d s ole ly on the def endant’ s denial of the c harg es,” id. at 11 14 –1 5, be c a us e the jur

y is e nti tle d to disbelieve the de fenda

nt’s attempts at exculpatory explanation, United States v. Stanley , 928 F.2d 575, 577 (2d Cir. 1991), a te stifying de fenda nt might inadver

tently “add w eig ht to the g overnme nt’s case ,” Aulicino , 44 F.3d at 1114 (collec ting c ases) . When Tran testified at trial and state d th at he did

no t kn owa

bo ut t he c ontr a ba nd in t he ve hic le , h e pla c e d h is o wn c re dib ili ty

in iss ue . Are a so na

ble jur y c ou ld h ave fo un d T ra

n’ s e xplanatio n in c re dib le , a s th is j ur y ob vio us ly did. That findingwould have be en a r eleva nt fac tor in the jury ’s deter mination of whether

Tran kn e w that he wa s tr ans po rt ingc ontr oll e d s ub sta nc e s. Be cause , in addition to Tran’s occ upancy of the ve hicle, the Gove rnment introduce d
corr oboratingevidenc e of ne rvousness and suspicious c ircumstance s, and bec ause the jury considere d and re

jected T ran’ s own testimony denying know ledg e of the drug s that were found, sufficie nt evidence supports the jury ’s findingthat Tran kne w that those drug s were in the vehicle.13

C. Dr ug A m ount Tran a lso argues that insufficie nt evidence supports the findingthat he possessed “ 500 g rams or more of methamphe tamine,” a s require d to prove a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 96 0( b) (1 )( H) . H e c onte nd s th at th e c he mis t’ s u se of sampl ingle ft

the jur y wi tho ut a

le g iti mate ba sis fr om whic h it

c ou ld i nf e r t hat each of

the 40 ,7 90 pil ls— and

no t ju st some—contained
me tha mph e tamin e . T ra

n c la ims that be c a

us e the c he mis t tr e ate d in dis c ri min ate ly pil ls “conta ined in numerous bag s, some g ree n and other s pink, some bear ing the ‘R’ log o and other s not,” the powde r mix tures bec ame tainted. ( App. B r. 18–19.) As a result, there rema ins the possibili ty

that some of the pills contained only MDMA, and that other s, amounting to a total of le ss t ha n 5 00 g ra ms, c onta ine d me tha

mph e tamin e . O n th is b a sis , T ra n urg e s th at w e re ve rs e his
c onvic tio n o r at le a st r e mand fo r r e se nte nc ingon

the mor e le nie nt a ssumpt ion that e a c h p ill contained only

MDMA, not methamphetamine. As with Tran’ s inacc urate challeng e to the jury instructions, part of this challeng e re sts on
a mate ri a l mi sr e pr e se ntatio n o f t he re c or d. Tr an c la ims that so me of the pil ls w e re mark e d w ith the “R” log o and other s were not, but the DEA che mist ex plicitly testified that eve ry

pill bore the log o. Tr an id e nti fi e s n o o the r w ay s in wh ic h th e pil ls s ho uld

have be e n d if

fe re nti ate d. B e c a

us e
e a c h p ow de r m ixtur e te ste d b y the DE A c he mis t w a s thus fo rm e d f ro m pi lls that w e re ne arl y identical in appe ara

nce, the chemist was simply employing a

sampling te chnique to dete rmine the ch em i ca l m ak eup o f a l l o f t h e p i l l s . Al th o u ghth e G o v ern m en tmu s tp ro v e t h e qu an t i ty o f d ru gs throug h “spec ific evide nce,” such as “ drugrec ords, admissions or live testimony ,” United States v. Shonubi , 998 F.2d 84, 89 ( 2d Cir. 1993), sampling is a permissible method of proof , United States v. Mac eo , 873 F.2d 1, 6–7 ( 1st Cir. 1989) (holding that sufficient e vidence supported the14

findingof drugquantity

wher e a D EA che mist t ested 16 of 227 ide ntical vials, then extrapolated fr om t ho se re su lts to d e te rm ine the tot a l amou nt o f c ra c k c oc a ine c onta ine d in a ll the via ls toge ther). B ased on the evidenc e about the sa mpling tec hnique that was introduc ed at tria l, as
we ll a s th e c he mis t’ s o pin ion that a ll o f t

he pil ls c onta ine d th e same su bs tanc e s in

a pp ro ximate ly the same pr oportions, a re asonable jury could find that at lea st 500 gr ams of the total 10.2 k i l o gra m s o f p i l l s fo un d

i nT ra n ’s re n t al v eh i cl e w er e a“m i x ture o r s u b s t an ce co n t ai n i n g a detec table amount of me thamphetamine,” 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)( H).
III. Sentencing Chal lenges Tran a rgues his sentenc e is unrea sonable be cause (1) his status as a V ietnam War re fug ee
and his la c k o f e du c atio n me ri t le nie nc y , ( 2) he pr e se nts a low ri sk of re c idi vis m be c a

us e of his ag e, (3) incar cer ation will impos e a se vere hardship on his family , and (4) no evidenc e of a ny oth e r c ri min a l c on du c t w a s intr od uc e d, makin ghis of

fe ns e a be rr atio na l. We reviewsentenc ing de cisions for re asonable ness using“an a buse-of -discre tion standard.” Gall v. United States , 1 28 S. Ct . 5 86 , 5 97 (2 00 7) ; se e als o United States v. Fernandez , 443 F.3d 19, 27 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (def ining r easona

bleness re view as a sking “ whether the se nte nc ingjud g e e xce e de d th e bo un ds of a llo wa ble dis c re tio n, c omm itt e d a n e rr or of law i n the cour se of e x erc ising discr etion, or made a cle arly err oneous findingof fa ct” ( alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)) . Under this standard, Tra

n’s cha lleng e to his sentence fails. Although T ran points to sever al fa ctors identified in his submissions t o the district court that he believes justified a

lower se ntence , he has not shown that the district c ourt neg lected to c onsider any of them in rea chingits decision. I n fac t, the district court informe d Tran that it had15

“conside red the fac tors that [he] ha[d] set forth” as we ll as “the fa ctors set for th in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) .” The court, ne verthe less, ruled that it would not g ive a shorte r sentenc e bec ause “ the sentenc e imposed is nece ssary and re asonable and appr opriate to a ddress the nature of a nd the seriousness of the offe nse[,] [t ]he criminal history and the c hara cter istics of the defe ndant[, and] to serve the overa ll objective of punishment, g ener al deter renc e, inca

pacitation and reha bilitation.” The re cord makes cle ar that the district court consider ed all of Tr an’s a rguments, the applicable Guidelines ra

ng e, and the fac tors enumer ated in § 3553(a ). Tra n has fa iled to identify any way in which the district cour t “exceede d the bounds of allowa ble discre tion, committ ed an
err or of law

in the course of exercisingdiscretion, or ma de a c lear ly err oneous findingof fa ct.” Fernandez , 4 43 F .3 d at 27 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ) ( a lte ra tio ns and int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . H is sentenc e is there fore aff

irmed.

CO NC LU SION For the re asons stated, the judg ment of convic tion and sentenc e ar e her eby AFF I RMED.