IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

In re E.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

S260839

Second Appellate District, Division Two

B295755 and B297079

Los Angeles County Superior Court

PJ53161

April 19, 2021

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 

Kruger, Groban and Jenkins concurred.
1

In re E.F.

S260839

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

When a minor is the subject of a juvenile wardship 

petition, the juvenile court may, “upon application in the 

manner provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure,”

issue ex parte orders enjoining the minor from “contacting, 

threatening, stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the 

court finds to be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with 

whom association would be detrimental to the child.” (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (b); all undesignated statutory

references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) The 

Courts of Appeal have divided on whether the juvenile court 

may issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) pursuant to this 

statute without advance notice to the minor.

We hold that section 213.5, subdivision (b) incorporates 

the notice requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 

section 527, subdivision (c). By the terms of that provision, “[n]o 

temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (c)) to the minor unless the 

prosecutor (1) shows that “great or irreparable injury will 

result” before the matter can be heard with proper notice (id., 

subd. (c)(1)) and (2) previously informed the minor of the time 

and place that the application will be made, made a good faith 

attempt but was unable to so inform the minor, or provides

specific reasons why the prosecutor should not be required to so 

inform the minor (id., subd. (c)(2)). Where the prosecutor has 

not given advance notice and has not made an adequate showing 

to justify the lack of notice, the court must give sufficient time 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

2

for counsel and the minor to prepare and respond to the 

application before any order is issued.

I.

In December 2018, E.F. and L.S. were ninth graders 

enrolled in the same high school art class. At school on 

December 7, E.F. offered L.S. a microwaved cup of noodles. 

When L.S. went to drink the broth, he smelled bleach and threw

the cup out. One week later, a school official contacted officers 

from the Los Angeles School Police Department and recounted

a report of the incident from an anonymous student. E.F. was 

arrested but not detained. In late January 2019, the district 

attorney filed a delinquency petition under section 602 alleging 

that E.F. had committed the crime of poisoning, a felony. (Pen. 

Code, § 347, subd. (a).) E.F. had no prior history of arrest or 

involvement with the juvenile court. 

In February 2019, E.F. made her first appearance in 

juvenile court. Appearing with counsel for arraignment, E.F. 

denied the allegations. The prosecutor asked the court to issue 

a TRO enjoining E.F. from having any contact with L.S. E.F. 

objected on the ground that the application did not meet the

procedural requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 

section 527. Specifically, she asserted that the application was 

not filed with advance notice to her, nor was it accompanied by

an affidavit or verified complaint to establish that great or 

irreparable injury will result to the applicant before the matter 

could be heard with notice. The prosecutor acknowledged that 

no notice was provided before the hearing and explained that he

did not know who was assigned to defend E.F. before the case 

was called. He added that “any allegation that [the prosecutor] 

didn’t inform [counsel for E.F.] in time” was due in part to the 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

3

deputy public defender’s failure to check in with the prosecutor 

sooner. The prosecutor did not have a copy of the application to 

share with E.F. or her counsel at the hearing, and the court 

called a recess to allow time to make copies. Nor did the 

prosecutor provide an affidavit or verified complaint in support 

of the TRO request; he instead referred to the police report 

attached to the petition to recount the facts of the December 

2018 incident. The juvenile court overruled E.F.’s objection, 

finding “substantial compliance,” and issued a TRO prohibiting 

E.F. from contacting L.S. and requiring her to stay at least 100 

yards from him. 

E.F. appealed the TRO. While that appeal was pending, 

the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the 

prosecutor’s application for a three-year restraining order on the 

same basis and terms as the TRO. E.F. filed a second notice of 

appeal, this time challenging the three-year restraining order. 

The two appeals were consolidated, with E.F. arguing, as 

relevant here, that the TRO was procedurally defective and thus 

invalid. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that section 

213.5, subdivision (b) provides for the issuance of an ex parte 

TRO and that section 213.5, subdivision (c) expressly provides 

for a TRO effective up to 21 or 25 days to be “ ‘granted without 

notice,’ ” notwithstanding the notice requirements of Code of 

Civil Procedure section 527. (In re E.F. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 

216, 220.) The Court of Appeal disagreed with In re L.W. (2020) 

44 Cal.App.5th 44, 49–51, which held that a TRO application 

under section 213.5, subdivision (b) must comply with the notice 

requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.

We granted review to resolve this conflict. Although E.F.’s 

appeal of the TRO was rendered moot by the juvenile court’s 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

4

subsequent order granting a three-year restraining order, the 

limited duration of a TRO in this context calls for the exercise of 

our discretion to resolve an issue that is “ ‘ “capable of repetition, 

yet evading review.” ’ ” (United Farm Workers v. Superior Court 

of Santa Cruz County (1975) 14 Cal.3d 902, 907.) 

II.

The question presented is one of statutory interpretation

and is thus subject to de novo review. (Christensen v. 

Lightbourne (2019) 7 Cal.5th 761, 771.)

Section 213.5, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part: 

“After a petition has been filed pursuant to Section 601 or 602 

to declare a child a ward of the juvenile court, and until the time 

that the petition is dismissed or wardship is terminated, upon 

application in the manner provided by Section 527 of the Code 

of Civil Procedure . . . , the juvenile court may issue ex parte 

orders . . . enjoining the child from contacting, threatening, 

stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the court finds to 

be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with whom 

association would be detrimental to the child.”

Section 213.5 goes on to provide a process that applies 

when a TRO is issued without notice: “If a temporary 

restraining order is granted without notice, the matter shall be 

made returnable on an order requiring cause to be shown why 

the order should not be granted, on the earliest day that the 

business of the court will permit, but not later than 21 days or, 

if good cause appears to the court, 25 days from the date the 

temporary restraining order is granted. The court may, on the 

motion of the person seeking the restraining order, or on its own 

motion, shorten the time for the service of the order to show 

cause on the person to be restrained.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) In the 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

5

alternative, or following the expiration of a TRO granted 

without notice, the juvenile court may, upon notice and hearing, 

issue a restraining order that may “remain in effect, in the 

discretion of the court, no more than three years, unless 

otherwise terminated by the court, extended by mutual consent 

of all parties to the restraining order, or extended by further 

order of the court on the motion of any party to the restraining 

order.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)

By its terms, section 213.5, subdivision (b) says that a 

court may issue an ex parte order for injunctive relief “upon 

application in the manner provided by Section 527 of the Code 

of Civil Procedure.” Code of Civil Procedure section 527 states 

in relevant part: “No temporary restraining order shall be 

granted without notice to the opposing party, unless both of the 

following requirements are satisfied: [¶] (1) It appears from 

facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that great 

or irreparable injury will result to the applicant before the 

matter can be heard on notice. [¶] (2) The applicant or the 

applicant’s attorney certifies one of the following to the court 

under oath: [¶] (A) That within a reasonable time prior to the 

application the applicant informed the opposing party or the 

opposing party’s attorney at what time and where the 

application would be made. [¶] (B) That the applicant in good 

faith attempted but was unable to inform the opposing party 

and the opposing party’s attorney, specifying the efforts made to 

contact them. [¶] (C) That for reasons specified the applicant 

should not be required to so inform the opposing party or the 

opposing party’s attorney.” (Id., subd. (c).)

The district attorney contends, as the Court of Appeal held 

below, that section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1)’s reference to a TRO 

“granted without notice” suggests that notice and a hearing are 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

6

required only for a restraining order extending beyond the 21 or

25 days provided for in that subdivision. According to the 

district attorney, it is the absence of notice and a formal hearing 

that differentiates the process for issuing a 21- or 25-day TRO 

from the process for issuing a restraining order of longer 

duration. Echoing the Court of Appeal, the district attorney 

reads section 213.5 as distinguishing between a TRO “granted 

without notice” (§ 213.5, subd. (c)(1)) and a longer-term 

restraining order granted “upon notice and a hearing” (id., 

subd. (d)(1)).

But this reading confuses the process for obtaining a TRO, 

which is set forth in subdivision (b) of section 213.5, with the 

process set forth in subdivision (c) that follows “[i]f a temporary 

restraining order is granted without notice” (id., subd. (c)(1)). In 

specifying what happens if a TRO is granted without notice, 

subdivision (c) says nothing about what procedures must be 

followed before a TRO may be granted without notice. That 

issue is addressed by subdivision (b), which says the court may 

issue an ex parte order “upon application in the manner 

provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

The district attorney, like the court below, contends that 

requiring the applicant to comply with the notice requirements 

of Code of Civil Procedure section 527 would conflict with or 

render superfluous section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1)’s language

that TROs may be “ ‘granted without notice.’ ” (See In re E.F., 

supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.) But section 213.5, subdivision 

(c)(1)’s recognition that TROs may be “granted without notice” 

is not itself an authorization for courts to grant TROs without 

notice. Section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1) sets forth the procedure 

to be followed in the event that a court grants a TRO without 

notice, whereas section 213.5, subdivision (b) makes clear that 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

7

an application for a TRO must proceed “in the manner provided 

by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” which authorizes 

a TRO without notice only under certain conditions (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 527, subd. (c)(1), (2)). There is no conflict or surplusage.

The district attorney further argues that even if notice is 

required, courtroom notice — in other words, notice first 

provided at the hearing itself — suffices to satisfy the relevant 

statutes. Courts have rejected this position, explaining that 

“[w]hile the specific amount of time necessary to satisfy the 

‘notice’ requirement is not delineated in section 213.5, more 

than courtroom notice is required.” (In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 

Cal.App.5th 236, 245; see In re L.W. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 44, 

51; cf. Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948, 

965 [requiring notice in advance of hearing for criminal 

protective order]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1203(a) [“A party 

seeking an ex parte order must notify all parties no later than 

10:00 a.m. the court day before the ex parte appearance, absent 

a showing of exceptional circumstances that justify a shorter 

time for notice.”].) We agree with these courts that under the 

statutory scheme, courtroom notice is not enough to avoid the 

affidavit requirement specified by Code of Civil Procedure 

section 527, subdivision (c).

The Court of Appeal suggested that “TROs do not need 

advance notice because they are typically issued under more 

emergency circumstances, while longer lasting restraining 

orders do need advance notice because they are typically issued 

under less pressing circumstances (usually because a TRO is 

already in place).” (In re E.F., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.) 

But Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (c) makes 

clear that advance notice or a showing of justification for lack of 

such notice is required for issuance of a TRO. The limited 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

8

duration of a TRO under section 213.5, subdivision (c)(1)

provides no reason to infer — contrary to section 213.5, 

subdivision (b)’s express incorporation of the notice 

requirements in Code of Civil Procedure section 527 — that the 

Legislature intended no advance notice be given to the juvenile, 

especially when a TRO in this context may have serious 

consequences for the juvenile who is restrained.

A willful and knowing violation of a restraining order 

issued under section 213.5 is a misdemeanor and may subject a 

juvenile to a new delinquency proceeding. (§ 213.5, subd. (h); 

see Pen. Code, § 273.65.) Section 213.5 orders can be entered 

into the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications 

System (CLETS) database system. (§ 213.5, subd. (g).) And the 

issuance of an order enjoining a juvenile’s contact with a fellow 

student or other member of the school community, even for just 

a few weeks, creates additional difficulties for the juvenile. 

These potential consequences of a TRO counsel against an 

inference that the Legislature intended to eliminate the 

standard notice requirement that affords the juvenile an 

adequate opportunity to contest an application for a TRO.

We see nothing in the legislative history that casts doubt 

on our straightforward reading of the statutes. The Legislature 

enacted section 213.5 in 1989 to provide a means by which a 

juvenile court could enter TROs and protective orders in 

connection with a dependency petition, similar to the injunctive 

powers of the family law courts. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1409, § 2, 

p. 6203; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading 

analysis of Sen. Bill No. 221 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended

Sept. 11, 1989, p. 3.) The primary purpose of the legislation was 

to provide a tool by which a person committing abuse, rather 

than the child suffering the abuse, could be removed from the 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

9

home in situations of domestic violence. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. 

of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 221 

(1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 11, 1989, p. 2.) Section 

213.5 was amended in 1998 to extend the same authority in 

connection with delinquency petitions. (Stats. 1998, ch. 390, § 1, 

p. 2909.) According to the bill sponsor, “it is common in 

delinquency cases to encounter a family situation in which a 

member of the household either poses a threat to a child or is 

contributing to the anti-social behavior of the child.” (Sen. Com. 

on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2017 (1997–1998 Reg. 

Sess.) as introduced Feb. 20, 1998, p. 3.) The same amendment 

also authorized the juvenile court to enjoin the minor subject to 

the delinquency petition “from contacting, threatening, 

stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the court finds to 

be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with whom 

association would be detrimental to the child.” (Stats. 1998, 

ch. 390, § 1, p. 2909.) The Judicial Council, which sponsored the 

bill, explained that “expressly authorizing the juvenile court to 

issue restraining orders would increase efficiency and expedite 

the resolution of many cases” — for example, by enabling 

“victims of juvenile crime . . . to seek protection from the juvenile 

court, rather than having to pursue a civil harassment 

protection order in a separate forum.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2017 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as 

introduced Feb. 20, 1998, p. 3.)

Although efficiency was a guiding purpose of the 

legislation, the Legislature chose a specific means of achieving 

that end: providing a single forum for resolving a delinquency 

petition along with any associated restraining or protective 

orders instead of requiring two separate proceedings. Toward

that end, the Legislature largely imported rather than amended 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

10

the procedures and standards for obtaining preliminary relief 

set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivisions (a) 

and (c). Section 213.5 does authorize the juvenile court to take 

a number of steps to protect the safety of the minor and the 

public, including issuing orders regarding custody, parental 

rights, and the minor’s freedom of movement and access to 

school. The Legislature recognized that such steps may be 

necessary, sometimes with little or no notice, to ensure the 

safety of the minor and the public. But the Legislature did not 

do away with notice in all instances. Instead, it authorized 

issuance of a TRO without notice when the applicant shows a 

need to avoid “great or irreparable injury” and otherwise 

complies with applicable procedures. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, 

subd. (c)(1).)

Finally, the district attorney cites rule 5.630 of the 

California Rules of Court — which provides that an application 

for a restraining order in a delinquency case “may be submitted 

without notice, and the court may grant the petition and issue a 

temporary order” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(d)) — as 

confirmation that a TRO in a juvenile proceeding may be issued 

without notice. The question, however, is not simply whether a 

TRO application may be submitted and granted without notice, 

but under what circumstances this may occur.

California Rules of Court, rule 5.630(a) explains: “After a 

petition has been filed under section 300, 601, or 602, and until 

the petition is dismissed or dependency or wardship is 

terminated, or the ward is no longer on probation, the court may 

issue restraining orders as provided in section 213.5.” The 

phrase “as provided in section 213.5” necessarily incorporates 

the procedural requirements set forth in section 527. Further, 

although California Rules of Court, rule 5.360(d)(1) provides 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

11

that “[i]n determining whether or not to issue the temporary 

restraining order without notice, the court must consider all 

documents submitted with the application and may review the 

contents of the juvenile court file regarding the child,” nothing 

in the rule specifies under what circumstances it is permissible 

for a court to issue a TRO without notice. Code of Civil 

Procedure section 527 makes clear that the court must find that 

“great or irreparable injury will result to the applicant before 

the matter can be heard on notice” (id., subd. (c)(1)) and that the 

applicant has made efforts or has given reasons why no effort 

need be made, to inform the opposing party when and where the 

application would be made (id., subd. (c)(2)). To the extent the 

district attorney claims there is tension or inconsistency 

between what California Rules of Court, rule 5.630 authorizes 

and what section 213.5 or Code of Civil Procedure section 527 

says, it is settled that “ ‘[r]ules promulgated by the Judicial 

Council may not conflict with governing statutes’ ” and that 

“ ‘[i]f a rule is inconsistent with a statute, the statute controls.’ ” 

(People v. Guerra (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 961, 966.)

In sum, we hold that a TRO application under section 

213.5 must satisfy the procedural requirements of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 527. This means that an applicant who seeks 

the issuance of a TRO without notice must show “great or 

irreparable injury” justifying the absence of notice (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 527, subd. (c)(1)), as well as a good faith effort to inform, 

or reasons why no effort need be made to inform, the opposing 

party when and where the application would be made (id., subd. 

(c)(2). In light of our holding, we need not decide whether notice

in this context is required as a matter of due process. Where the 

prosecutor neither provides notice nor makes a showing of 

justification for lack of notice, the juvenile court must provide 
In re E.F.

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

12

counsel and the minor with sufficient time to prepare and 

respond before any TRO may issue. How much time is required 

will depend on the totality of the circumstances, including the 

complexity of the incident that gave rise to the juvenile petition, 

the number of witnesses relevant to the matter, and the scope 

and type of restrictions requested in the TRO application.

In this matter, the district attorney concedes that no 

notice was provided before the hearing, and no attempt was 

made to show “great or irreparable injury” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 527, subd. (c)(1)) or otherwise to comply with Code of Civil 

Procedure section 527, subdivision (c). The juvenile court’s 

issuance of the TRO thus exceeded its authority under section 

213.5. We express no view on the Court of Appeal’s 

determination that substantial evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s issuance of the restraining order in this case.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment affirming the

issuance of the temporary restraining order.

LIU, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J.

CORRIGAN, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re E.F.

__________________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 45 Cal.App.5th 216

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S260839

Date Filed: April 19, 2021

__________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior 

County: Los Angeles 

Judge: Morton Rochman 

__________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, John Pomeroy, Phyllis Asayama and 

Grace Shin, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

Courtney M. Selan

Attorney at Law

11664 National Blvd., Suite 258

Los Angeles, CA 90064

(310) 452-6870

Grace Shin

Deputy District Attorney

320 West Temple St., Room 540

Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 974-5911