DA 07-0266 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2008 MT 37 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

PRESTON A. MADPLUME, 

 Defendant and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Lake, Cause No. DC-2004-108 

Honorable C. B. McNeil, Presiding Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, John Paulson, Assistant 

Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Mitchell A. Young, Lake County Attorney, Polson, Montana 

For Appellee: 

Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, David Avery, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: January 4, 2008 

 Decided: February 5, 2008 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 In October 2004 Preston A. Madplume (Madplume) was charged with the offense 

of sexual intercourse without consent after DNA evidence revealed the presence of the 

accuser’s DNA on Madplume’s finger. An omnibus hearing was scheduled but was 

continued seventeen times at Madplume’s request. During this time Madplume signed a 

waiver of his right to a speedy trial. In September 2005 Madplume moved to suppress 

the DNA evidence on the ground that it was obtained without a warrant and therefore 

resulted from an unlawful search of his person. The District Court granted his motion. 

The State appealed and in January 2007 we reversed and remanded for further 

proceedings. Madplume’s omnibus hearing was ultimately held on March 14, 2007. On 

that date, he filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial. The 

District Court granted the motion without a hearing and the State appeals. We reverse 

and remand.

ISSUE 

¶2 The question presented is whether the District Court properly granted Madplume’s 

motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶3 The factual background of this case was presented in State v. Madplume, 2007 MT 

11, 335 Mont. 290, 150 P.3d 956, and is not relevant to the issue before us; therefore, it 

will not be repeated here. This appeal concerns the procedural background of 

Madplume’s case only. 

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¶4 It is undisputed that 894 days had elapsed from the time Madplume was charged 

and the date on which he filed his motion to dismiss. Madplume argued to the District 

Court and to this Court on appeal that this passage of time resulted in a violation of his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial. 

¶5 The District Court granted Madplume’s motion to dismiss. The State appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶6 A criminal defendant’s claimed violation of the right to a speedy trial presents a 

question of constitutional law. We review a trial court’s resolution of such questions for 

correctness and will not disturb findings underlying a district court’s speedy trial ruling 

unless the findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Spang, 2007 MT 54, ¶ 7, 336 Mont. 

184, ¶ 7, 153 P.3d 646, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

¶7 Issue: Did the District Court properly grant Madplume’s motion to dismiss for 

violation of the right to a speedy trial?

¶8 Madplume moved the District Court to dismiss the charges against him, asserting 

the State had violated his right to a speedy trial. The District Court granted his motion 

finding that he had been prejudiced by the lengthy delay and that the State had not met its 

burden of disproving prejudice. The State contends the District Court’s conclusion is 

erroneous. 

¶9 We note that this case proceeded through the District Court and to this Court on 

appeal before we issued our decision in State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, 338 Mont. 442, 

167 P.3d 815, in which we announced a comprehensively-revised speedy trial test that 

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“more closely tracks the balancing approach envisioned by the [U.S.] Supreme Court in 

Barker1

, Doggett2, and other post-Barker cases.” Ariegwe, ¶ 106. As a result, the parties 

argued to the District Court and that court ruled based on analysis of the standards set 

forth in City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866, overruled 

in part by Ariegwe. Thus, the District Court did not have the opportunity to analyze the 

speedy trial issue under the new Ariegwe framework. 

¶10 On appeal, the State filed its opening brief before Ariegwe was issued; however, 

Ariegwe’s new test was published before Madplume responded or the State replied. 

Neither party, however, analyzed the speedy trial issue under the newly-announced test 

but continued to rely upon a Bruce analysis. Since the timing of Ariegwe’s publication 

precluded the court and the parties from analyzing the speedy trial issue under this new 

framework, and as we recently did in State v. Smith, 2008 MT 7, ¶¶ 23-24, 341 Mont. 82, 

¶¶ 23-24, ___ P.3d ___, ¶¶ 23-24, we deem it appropriate to remand this matter to the 

District Court without prejudice to a timely appeal thereafter by either party, with 

instruction that the District Court apply the Ariegwe analysis in resolving the speedy trial 

issues herein presented. 

CONCLUSION 

¶11 We reverse the District Court’s dismissal of Madplume’s case and remand for 

analysis under Ariegwe. 

 

1 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972). 

2 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992). 

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/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

 

We Concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JOHN WARNER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JIM RICE 

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