UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4186

ALLEYNE REED WRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-96-173-N)

Submitted: August 28, 1997

Decided: September 18, 1997

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Terry Noland Grinnalds, Hampton, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F.

Fahey, United States Attorney, John P. Corcoran, Special Assistant

United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Alleyne Reed Wright appeals her criminal convictions for obstruction of justice and threatening with intent to retaliate against a witness

in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (West 1984 & Supp. 1997) and 18

U.S.C.A. § 1513(b)(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1997). Those convictions

arose out of threats Wright made to a Government witness involved

in the prosecution of Wright's son. After the witness's testimony,

Wright made several threatening comments to the witness including

threats of physical harm and statements implying that the witness was

unwise to have testified. Wright raises only one issue on appeal. She

contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her conviction under the two statutes.

Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, as we must, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942),

there was sufficient evidence to support both convictions. Wright

addressed the witness loudly and clearly and said,"You dirty bitch,

I ought to kick your ass." She continued, "If it weren't for shame, I

would kick your ass." She also told the witness that she could have

perjured herself and testified that she did not know anything about the

case. When the witness protested that she could be imprisoned for

perjury, Wright responded, "Oh, they just tell you that. Them people

ain't going to lock you up. They just tell you that to scare you." As

Wright left, she turned to the witness one final time and told her, "I

ought to kick your ass." The primary thrust of Wright's appeal is that

because some of her comments were conditional based on her sense

of "shame," they were not threats within the meaning of the statutes.

The elements of a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 are (1) knowing

engagement in conduct (2) either causing, or threatening to cause,

bodily injury to another person (3) with the intent to retaliate for, inter

alia, the attendance or testimony of a witness at an official proceeding. See United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 1993).

Wright does not contest the Government's proof on either the first or

third element. Rather, Wright asks this court to hold that no rational

trier of fact could have found that her comments amounted to threatening to cause bodily injury to the witness. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at

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80. For statutes that prohibit threatening communication, we have

employed an objective, "reasonable person's standard," to determine

whether the defendant communicated a true threat. See, e.g., United

States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (4th Cir. 1994) (prosecuting

under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994)). The witness testified that she

believed Wright's statements to be serious threats. In addition, she

stated that she believed Wright "ran Williamsburg," Virginia, and had

people who could carry out her threats. We have no difficulty holding

that, in light of the witness's knowledge of Wright's alleged involvement in the drug trade, the witness reasonably believed Wright had

communicated a true threat. We do not find that Wright's making her

threat conditional on the nebulous existence of"shame" rendered the

witness's belief in the threat unreasonable. Viewed in the light most

favorable to the Government, this evidence is sufficient to support the

district court's verdict. See Darby, 37 F.3d at 1067.

The same analysis holds for Wright's conviction under 18

U.S.C.A. § 1503. The elements of obstruction of justice under § 1503

are (1) a pending judicial proceeding (2) of which the defendant has

knowledge or notice and (3) action on the part of the defendant

intended to influence, obstruct, or impede the proceeding in its due

administration of justice. See United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426,

437 (4th Cir. 1993). That action may include a "threatening . . . communication." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503. Wright does not contest the existence of the first two elements. She only contends that her comments

were not threatening. However, the witness's belief in this case that

Wright had made a true threat was equally reasonable under § 1503

as it was under § 1513. There was sufficient evidence to support this

conviction as well.

Wright's reliance on Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969),

is unconvincing. In Watts, the Supreme Court faced the difficult task

of interpreting a statute prohibiting threats against the life of the President in the face of the competing interest in the freedom of political

speech. Ultimately reversing the conviction, the Court concluded that

the Government had not proved a real threat had been made. Id. at

708. Here, not only is the competing interest of free speech significantly diminished, but, Wright's threat, made conditional only on the

undefined concept of "shame," was real enough to force the witness

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to seek protection from the Government and flee her home in Williamsburg.

Wright also cites United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir.

1986), as embodying a more real conditional threat that provided sufficient evidence to support a conviction for extortion. Crews threatened to kill President Reagan if he ever traveled to Sheridan,

Wyoming. Id. at 829-30. It appears to this court, however, that construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the conviction,

Wright is more likely to lose her sense of "shame" and make good on

her threats against the witness, than President Reagan was to travel

to Sheridan so that Crews could make good on his. Consequently,

Crews does not advance Wright's cause.*

Wright's contention that there was insufficient evidence to convict

her is without merit. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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*Wright cites three additional cases. None of them alters the conclusion that a reasonable person could have considered Wright's comments

a true threat. See United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1992)

(affirming conviction based on conditional threat where condition could

not be met); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1986)

(holding threat conditioned on President Reagan's failure to resign sufficient to support conviction); United States v. Bozeman, 495 F.2d 508 (5th

Cir. 1974) (upholding conviction on a direct threat to kill).

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