IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2016 WY 59

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2016

June 10, 2016

TAYLOR WOFFORD,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF LARAMIE,

Respondent.

S-15-0226

KARA WALTERS,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF LARAMIE,

Respondent.

S-15-0227

Original Proceedings

Petitions for Writ of Review

District Court of Albany County

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Petitioners:

R. Michael Vang of R. Michael Vang, P.C., Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Respondent:

Holli Austin-Belaski of City of Laramie Attorney Office, Laramie Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be 

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

FOX, Justice.

[¶1] The City of Laramie’s Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H) created a class of 

aggravated offenders for those convicted of driving while under the influence with an 

alcohol concentration of 0.15% or more. Taylor Wofford and Kara Walters were both 

convicted of driving while under the influence and sentenced to the mandatory minimum 

pursuant to the aggravated offender ordinance for alcohol concentrations above 0.15%. 

Their convictions were upheld on appeal to the Albany County District Court. Mr. 

Wofford and Ms. Walters then filed separate petitions for writ of review. The cases were 

consolidated, and the petitions were granted as to the issues set forth below. We find that

Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H) flouts the uniformly applicable statutes 

governing traffic regulations, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

ISSUES

[¶2] This Court accepted the following issues for review: 

Wofford v. City of Laramie -- No. S-15-0226:

1. Is the Defendant’s BAC level an element of an 

“aggravated offender” DWUI charge pursuant to LMO

§ 10.24.030(H), which must be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt?

2. Can the City of Laramie create a minimum 

mandatory jail sentence for BAC results of 0.15% or more, 

which exceed the punishment allowed for the same BAC 

level under Wyoming law?

Walters v. City of Laramie -- No. S-15-0227:

3. Did the trial court violate Ms. Walters’ due 

process rights, where the jury was instructed to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Defendant’s BAC result was eight 

one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more, however, the 

Defendant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory thirty (30) 

day jail sentence for allegedly having a BAC result of fifteen 

one-hundredths of one percent (0.15%) or more in violation 

of the City of Laramie’s “aggravated offender” DUI charge?
2

Because the second issue presented by Mr. Wofford is determinative in this case, we will 

address it first and refrain from resolving the other issues presented.1

FACTS

[¶3] In 2010, the City of Laramie adopted Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H), 

which imposed enhanced penalties for driving while under the influence if the offender’s 

alcohol concentration (BAC) was “fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more, as 

measured within two hours after the time of driving following a lawful arrest resulting 

from a valid traffic stop.” Under the ordinance, a driver with a BAC over 0.15% is 

subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of seven days in jail for a first offense, and 

thirty days for a second offense. The state statute governing driving while under the 

influence does not include a mandatory minimum sentence for a first-time offender, and 

requires a seven-day mandatory minimum sentence for a second offense. Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 31-5-233(e) (LexisNexis 2015). It provides only that a first-time offender may be 

punished by “imprisonment for not more than six (6) months.” Id. Furthermore, the state 

statute considers a BAC of 0.15% or more for first-time offenders only for purposes of 

requiring them to drive vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock device. Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 31-5-233(f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2015). Thus, while the Laramie ordinance’s 

mandatory minimum sentence is within the range of imprisonment provided for in state 

statute, it gives the finding of an elevated BAC a different consequence than the state 

statute does, by increasing the mandatory minimum penalties.

[¶4] Petitioner Kara Walters was arrested and charged with driving while under the 

influence in violation of Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.010. At trial, the 

prosecution presented evidence that Ms. Walters’ BAC was 0.18% within two hours of 

her arrest. (The elements instruction, however, only required that the jury determine 

whether Ms. Walters’ BAC was 0.08% or more.) The jury convicted Ms. Walters. At 

sentencing, the municipal court relied on the aggravated offender ordinance to sentence 

Ms. Walters to a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty days in jail for her second 

offense in accordance with Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H).2

 

1

The City concedes that under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne v. United States, 133 

S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), the Laramie Municipal Court erred when it determined that the BAC 

of the Petitioners was not required to be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. Because the 

Petitioners’ high BAC subjected them to a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Laramie Municipal 

Code 10.24.030(H), it was an element of the crime required to be proven by the prosecution beyond a 

reasonable doubt. “Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be 

submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the 

penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ 

that must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 2155 (internal citation omitted).

2 The ordinance provides:

Any person convicted of violating this chapter shall be sentenced as an 

aggravated offender if the person has an alcohol concentration of fifteen 
3

[¶5] Petitioner Taylor Wofford was arrested and charged with driving while under the 

influence in violation of Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.010. Mr. Wofford 

proceeded to trial where the prosecution presented evidence that his BAC was 0.17%

within two hours of his arrest. (Again, the jury was instructed that they needed only to 

determine that Mr. Wofford’s BAC was 0.08% or more to convict.) The jury convicted 

Mr. Wofford. At sentencing, the prosecutor argued that the municipal court should treat 

Mr. Wofford as an aggravated offender pursuant to Laramie Municipal Ordinance 

10.24.030(H). The court agreed, and sentenced Mr. Wofford to the mandatory minimum 

sentence of seven days in jail for a first-time offender, with two days credit for time 

served.

[¶6] The Petitioners both appealed to the Albany County District Court, where their 

convictions and sentences were affirmed. Petitioners filed separate Petitions for Writ of 

Review in this Court, which we consolidated and granted in part.

DISCUSSION

Can the City of Laramie create a minimum mandatory jail sentence for BAC results of 

0.15% or more, which exceed the minimum punishment for the same BAC level under 

Wyoming law?

[¶7] The issue of whether the City of Laramie possessed the authority to adopt Laramie 

Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H) requires us to interpret the relevant statutory 

provisions. Our review is therefore de novo. MF v. State, 2013 WY 104, ¶ 6, 308 P.3d 

854, 857 (Wyo. 2013). The City of Laramie characterizes this issue as one of

preemption, citing Gueke v. Board of County Commissioners for Teton County, 728 P.2d 

167, 168 (Wyo. 1986), overruled by Dunnegan v. Laramie County Commissioners, 852 

P.2d 1138 (Wyo. 1993), for the proposition that “local governments ‘may pass laws 

which go beyond a state statute governing the same subject as long as the local law is not 

in direct conflict with the statute and the legislature has not preempted the regulation of 

the field.’” Id. at 168.

 

one-hundredths of one percent or more, as measured within two hours 

after the time of driving following a lawful arrest resulting from a valid 

traffic stop. For a first offense, the offender shall be guilty of a 

misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not less than seven days 

nor more than six months . . . . For a second or subsequent offense, the 

offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment 

for not less than thirty days nor more than six months.

Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H).
4

[¶8] In Gueke, this Court found that Teton County had the authority to impose greater 

restrictions on fireworks than those under state statute. 728 P.2d at 171. But there, the 

act governing use of fireworks specifically authorized municipalities to enact further 

restrictions upon the sale and use of fireworks within city limits:

“This act [§§ 35-10-201 to 35-10-207] shall not be construed 

to prohibit the imposition by municipal ordinance of further 

regulations or prohibitions upon the sale, use and possession 

of fireworks within the corporate limits of any city or town, 

but no such city or town shall permit or authorize the sale, 

use, or possession of any fireworks in violation of this act.” 

§ 35-10-205, W.S.1977.

Id. at 168. (In Dunnegan, this Court emphasized the importance of this provision when it 

held that it applied only to municipalities, and not counties, and it therefore found that 

counties were not authorized to enact more restrictive laws governing fireworks. 852 

P.2d at 1141.) The statutes governing driving while under the influence contain no such 

broad authorization to municipalities. Instead, the statutes regulating traffic demonstrate 

that the legislature has “preempted the field.” Gueke, 728 P.2d at 168.

[¶9] “In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 

legislature’s intent. All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining 

the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same 

general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. 

Dep’t of Revenue, State of Wyo., 2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 2005) 

(quoting Loberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 

88 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo. 2004)). Moreover, “it is a fundamental rule of statutory 

interpretation that . . . every word, clause, and sentence must be construed so that no part 

is inoperative or superfluous.” Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker’s Comp. Div., 750 

P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶10] The Wyoming DWUI statutes are part of the “Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on 

Highways” (the Act). Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-101 through 31-5-1701 (LexisNexis 

2015). Section 31-5-108 of the Act declares: 

The provisions of this act shall be applicable and 

uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions 

and municipalities therein. Local authorities may, however,

adopt by ordinance, traffic regulations for all streets within 

their city limits and highways under their corporate 

jurisdiction and shall have the express authority to enforce the 

traffic regulations so adopted, by action in their respective 

local municipal courts.
5

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-108. The legislature’s intent in adopting this language is clear. 

Traffic regulations, including those regulating driving while under the influence, are to be 

“identical or consistent”3throughout the state. See Wyo. Game & Fish Comm’n v. 

Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo. 1993) (“When the language in a statute is plain 

and unambiguous, the words are to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning unless 

there is found some manifestation of a legislative intent that they not be accorded that 

plain and ordinary meaning.”). We read the second sentence of § 31-5-108 in pari 

materia with the first sentence, and in a manner that avoids rendering one part of the 

statute inoperative or superfluous. The first sentence must therefore modify the second. 

The first sentence of the statute expressly states the legislature’s intent that the Act be 

applied uniformly. The second sentence authorizes political subdivisions and 

municipalities to adopt and enforce traffic regulations within that uniform state scheme.4

[¶11] Section § 31-5-109 supports our reading of the language of § 31-5-108. It 

authorizes local authorities to regulate twenty specific traffic issues (for example, 

“[r]egulating or prohibiting stopping, standing or parking” (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-

109(a)(i), and also authorizes them to adopt “such other traffic regulations as are 

specifically authorized by this act” (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-109(a)(xx)). “For purposes 

of determining uniformity . . . we examine not only the individual state statute at issue. 

We look at whether the entire enactment of which the statute is a part is uniformly 

applicable.” Farha v. City of Wichita, 161 P.3d 717, 725-26 (Kan. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

[¶12] The uniformity of traffic regulations is a concern unique to the state. Uniformity 

“is a rule of necessity based upon the need to prevent dual regulation which would result 

in uncertainty and confusion[.]” Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Greeley 

Cty., 643 P.2d 188, 192 (Kan. 1982) (citations omitted). The Wyoming legislature 

 

3

“Uniform” means “identical or consistent, as from example to example, place to place, or moment to 

moment.” Dictionary.com, at http://www.dictionary.com/browse/uniform?s=t (last visited June 7, 2016).

4 This “uniform” language of the statute tracks the language of Wyo. Const. art. 13, §1(b), the “home rule 

amendment,” which states:

All cities and towns are hereby empowered to determine their local 

affairs and government as established by ordinance passed by the 

governing body, subject to referendum when prescribed by the 

legislature, and further subject only to statutes uniformly applicable to all 

cities and towns[.]

See Thomas S. Smith, No Home on the Range for Home Rule, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 791, 803 (1996). 

Although constitutional questions may be implicated, we will not further discuss them for two reasons: 

First, “we will not address constitutional issues if we are able to resolve the case on other grounds.” 

Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Teton, 2007 WY 42, ¶ 14, 153 P.3d 917, 922 (Wyo. 2007). 

Second, we are reluctant to frame the issues for litigants when they have not raised them or “supported 

[them] by cogent argument or authoritative citation.” State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 90, 

¶ 35, 32 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2001). 
6

enacted a comprehensive act governing traffic. It clearly instructed that the Act’s 

provisions should be “applicable and uniform throughout this state,” although it 

authorized local governments to enact local ordinances consistent with the Act’s 

provisions. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-108. It granted specific and clearly delineated 

powers to local authorities within the larger regulatory scheme. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-

109, 110. It set forth the range of penalties for a DWUI first offender, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 31-5-233(e), including requiring an ignition interlock device for those convicted of 

driving with a BAC of 0.15% or more, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(f)(ii), and imposing a 

mandatory minimum sentence for second offenders of seven days, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-

5-233(e). It is clear the legislature intended traffic regulations, including those related to 

driving while under the influence, be uniformly applied throughout the state. The state 

statutes governing DWUI offenders do not include enhanced sentences for an aggravated 

offender category, nor do they require a mandatory minimum jail sentence based on the 

BAC of a first-time offender. The enhanced penalties in Laramie Municipal Ordinance 

10.24.030(H) disrupt the uniformity of the statutory scheme. When this occurs, the 

municipal ordinance must fail because it is not consistent with “uniform [regulation] 

throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein.” Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 31-5-108. Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H) is therefore void.

[¶13] We must now determine whether Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H) can 

be severed without invalidating the entire ordinance.

5

 An invalid provision is severable

“if, and only if, it is grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable” from the 

remainder. 6 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 20:72 (3d ed. 

updated April 2016). “[A] local ordinance is ‘grammatically separable’ . . . if it is distinct 

and separate and, hence, can be removed as a whole without affecting the wording of any 

of the measure’s other provisions[.]” Id. “For . . . a local ordinance to be ‘functionally 

separable,’ the remainder after separation of the invalid part must be complete in itself 

and capable of independent application and the invalid portion must not have been 

necessary to the measure’s operation and purpose.” Id. Subsection (H) of Laramie 

Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030 is clearly both grammatically and functionally separable 

from the remainder of the ordinance. Because the entirety of the offending portion is 

encompassed within a subsection, the invalid subsection can easily be separated without 

doing violence to either the grammar or functionality of the remainder. “The 

‘volitionally separable’ requirement is satisfied if the remainder is complete in itself and 

would have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial 

invalidation of the statute[.]” Id. The offending subsection of the ordinance was not 

adopted until after the remainder was in place. See Code Comparative Table and 

Disposition List, available at https://www2.municode.com/library/wy/laramie/codes/

code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COCOTADILI (last visited June 7, 2016) (Ordinance No. 

 

5 The Laramie Municipal Code does not contain a severability clause applicable to its DWUI regulations; 

however, “[a] severability clause is not necessary to maintain the partial validity of an ordinance.” 

Eugene McQuillin, 6 Law of Municipal Corporations § 20:72 (3d ed. updated April 2016).
7

1592 enacted on December 21, 2010, stating that subsection (H) was added at that time to 

Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030).

6

 As a result, the Laramie City Council clearly 

contemplated the remainder of the statute operating without the invalid subsection prior 

to its enactment, and can do so again after it is removed. Laramie Municipal Ordinance 

10.24.030(H) is therefore severed from the remainder of the ordinance.

[¶14] Unlike Mr. Wofford, Ms. Walters did not raise the validity of Laramie Municipal 

Ordinance 10.24.030(H) as an issue in her Petition for Writ of Review. Nevertheless, our 

invalidation of Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H) is dispositive as to both 

Petitioners in this action.

When a writ of review is granted, the reviewing court “may

set forth the particular issue or point of law which will be 

considered.” W.R.A.P. 13.07 (emphasis added). The 

reviewing court’s review is not limited to only an issue 

defined by the respondent. Instead the reviewing court may 

“reverse, vacate, remand or modify the decision for errors 

appearing on the record.” W.R.A.P. 13.08 (emphasis added).

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Sublette Cty. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶ 21, 55 P.3d 

714, 721 (Wyo. 2002). Both Petitioners’ sentences are therefore vacated.

CONCLUSION

[¶15] Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.030(H) violates the statutory requirement that 

the provisions of the “Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways” be applicable and 

uniform throughout this State, and is therefore void. This matter is remanded to the 

district court to proceed in accordance with this decision.

 

6 The Court takes judicial notice of the City of Laramie’s Code Comparative Table and Disposition List in 

accordance with W.R.E. 201, as it is “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” W.R.E. 201(b). “[I]f an ordinance is available, is 

reliable and is known to the court, it should be judicially noticed.” 2 Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie 

Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 39:1, at 186 (7th ed. 2009 New Edition).