J-S02021-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DEVIN BRAMHALL 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1485 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 30, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000576-2019.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: Filed: May 20, 2021

Devin Bramhall appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

following his guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm.

On October 25, 2018, in Honey Brook Borough, Chester County, 

Pennsylvania, Bramhall had an A.R.-15 assault rifle in his possession and 

transferred it to another person for $700 cash. Because of a prior conviction 

for an offense enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105, Bramhall was prohibited 

from possessing or transferring a firearm. He was arrested and charged.

On October 30, 2019, Bramhall pled guilty to one (1) count of 

possession of firearm prohibited in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A.§ 6105(a)(1). As 

a result, the Commonwealth agreed not to pursue convictions for other related 

offenses. That same day, the trial court sentenced Bramhall to the agreed 
J-S02021-21

- 2 -

upon sentence of four (4) to eight (8) years of incarceration. During the plea 

agreement and sentencing, Bramhall was represented by counsel. 

On November 7, 2019, Bramhall filed a counseled post-sentence motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea and for the appointment of conflict counsel (the 

"counseled post-sentence motion"). Therein, Bramhall merely asserted that 

he was innocent and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. A 

month later, Bramhall filed a similar, untimely, pro se post-sentence motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea and requested the appointment of conflict counsel 

(the "pro se post-sentence motion"). Bramhall reiterated the claims stated in 

his prior motion and additionally claimed that he was coerced into entering his 

guilty plea, because defense counsel failed to investigate an alibi and was 

unprepared for trial. He further claimed that counsel told him he probably 

would be convicted at trial and receive a harsher sentence. As a result, he 

pled guilty.

On December 16, 2020, conflict counsel was appointed. After a hearing 

on Bramhall’s counseled post-sentence motion, the court denied his request

to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Bramhall filed this timey appeal. The trial court and Bramhall complied 

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

On appeal, Bramhall raises a single issue for our consideration:

1. Whether the [c]ourt erred in denying the [m]otion to 

[w]ithdraw [g]uilty plea erroneously concluding that [Bramhall] 

was not coerced into pleading guilty, due to the lack of trial 

readiness and ineffectiveness of his trial/plea counsel?
J-S02021-21

- 3 -

Bramhall’s Brief at 7.

 We review this issue with the following in mind. It is well-settled that 

the decision of whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Unangst, 

71 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation omitted); see

Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124, 128 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting 

that we review a trial court's order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 

for an abuse of discretion), appeal denied, 992 A.2d 885 (2010). 

Although no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea exists in 

Pennsylvania, the standard applied differs depending on whether the 

defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or after sentencing. When a 

defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing, he “must demonstrate 

prejudice on the order of manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 

24 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011). In Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 

A.2d 337, 352 (Pa. Super. 2014), impliedly overruled on other grounds by

Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 2015), we explained 

that a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing “only where 

necessary to correct manifest injustice.” Prendes, 97 A.3d at 352 (citation 

omitted). Thus, “post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher 

scrutiny since the courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as 

sentence-testing devices.” Commonwealth v. Flick, 802 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. 

Super. 2002).
J-S02021-21

- 4 -

“Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered knowingly, 

intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly.” Commonwealth v. Kpou, 

153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). In determining 

whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the totality of circumstances 

surrounding the plea. Id. “Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who 

entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant 

bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Id.

Bramhall claims that the trial court erred in denying his request to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, he argues that he was coerced into 

taking a guilty plea because his counsel was not prepared for the impending 

trial. Bramhall’s Brief at 9. According to Bramhall, counsel failed to 

investigate evidence of an alibi prior to trial and did not request a continuance. 

Id. at 10-12. Consequently, Bramhall was afraid he would lose at trial and 

receive a much longer sentence than that offered under the plea. Id. at 12. 

Bramhall felt he had no choice but to enter the plea. Id.

Essentially, Bramhall claims he involuntarily entered into his guilty plea 

due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.1 A plea that was allegedly entered 

into unknowingly or involuntarily due to counsel’s lack of trial readiness, 

____________________________________________

1 We observe that this issue was not raised specifically in his counseled motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea, upon which the trial court ruled. However, because 

it was raised in his pro se motion and addressed during the hearing, we decline 

to find waiver. Notwithstanding this, as we discuss herein, consideration of 

plea counsel’s ineffectiveness would be premature at this juncture. 
J-S02021-21

- 5 -

including counsel’s failure to investigate a potential alibi, sounds in 

ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 535 (Pa. 

2009). Thus, this question must be raised via an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim on collateral review, not on direct appeal from the judgment of 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 760 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (concluding that whether defendant’s choice to enter guilty plea was 

knowing and voluntary given counsel’s deficient advice must be raised as an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 

Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he general rule of deferral to PCRA 

review remains the pertinent law on the appropriate timing for review of 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . . ” Commonwealth v. 

Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563 (Pa. 2013). This rule precludes the trial court from 

considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis of ineffectiveness 

of counsel. It further precludes this Court’s ability to review such a decision 

on direct appeal. See Kehr, 180 A.3d at 760. In light of this, we conclude 

that the trial court appropriately considered Bramhall’s motion strictly on the 

basis of whether Bramhall entered into his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently, without considering whether plea counsel was ineffective. 

Here, the trial court found that Bramhall entered into his plea 

knowlingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The trial court explained: 

[A]n examination of the October 30, 2019 sentencing transcript 

and the written plea agreement clearly demonstrates that 

[Bramhall] entered into a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea. 

He admitted his guilt under oath, admitted to facts sufficient to 

support the plea, understood the potential range of sentences for 
J-S02021-21

- 6 -

the crime of person not to possess a firearm as a felony of the 

second degree, that he was forfeiting his right to a jury trial and 

further to require the Commonwealth to prove his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that he forfeited the right to confront witnesses 

that the Commonwealth would call to present evidence against 

him and that he was striping himself of the presumption of 

innocence. 

[Bramhall] further stated that no one forced him or threatened 

him in any manner to get him to plead guilty to this offense and 

he is pleading guilty because he is guilty. [Bramhall] was further 

informed that by entering into the guilty plea he waived and 

abandoned all motions and all other rulings made by the Court. 

[Bramhall] further acknowledged that he reviewed the guilty plea 

colloquy with counsel and initialed and signed the document 

indicating the rights he was giving up by entering into the guilty

plea. He testified that he had enough time to review the document 

and was satisfied with the legal representation he received. As 

such, [Bramhall] does not meet the manifest injustice standard as 

set forth in Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754 (Pa. Super. 

2018). He is bound by the written and oral statements provided 

to the [c]ourt during the entry of his negotiated plea. 

Consequently, [Bramhall’s] boilerplate assertion to the contrary is 

[belied] by the record.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/28/20, at 4-5. 

Based upon our review of the record and the trial court’s explanation, 

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Bramhall’s post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record 

demonstrates that Bramhall’s plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently.2

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

2 Bramhall may raise his ineffectiveness claims on collateral review by filing 

a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S02021-21

- 7 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/20/21