In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-13-00430-CR 

SHERI DIANE JONES, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 100th District Court 

Childress County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 5537, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding 

 

May 28, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Appellant Sheri Diane Jones challenges the trial court’s judgment adjudicating 

her guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in 

a drug-free zone, revoking her community supervision, and imposing a sentence of 

twenty-five years of imprisonment. Through one issue, appellant contends her 

punishment is grossly disproportionate because she effectively is being punished for her 

drug addiction. We will affirm.
2

Background

In June 2013, appellant plead guilty to the first degree felony offense of 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone. The trial 

court placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of 

ten years. She was then twenty-four years old.

In September 2013, the State filed a Motion to Adjudicate alleging that appellant 

had violated her community supervision by committing a new offense; failing to notify 

the community supervision officer within 48 hours of arrest; consuming 

methamphetamines on or about August 9, 2013; failing to notify the community 

supervision officer within 48 hours of a change of address; failing to report; failing to pay 

monthly community supervision fees; and failing to pay court-ordered fees. 

In November 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Motion to 

Adjudicate. Appellant pleaded “true” to each of the violations. Her community 

supervision officer also testified to each of the violations. The State presented 

appellant’s signed admission of use of methamphetamines. Following presentation of 

the evidence, the trial court found appellant had violated each of the terms alleged by 

the State. The trial court then adjudicated appellant guilty of possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver and made an affirmative finding that it occurred in a 

drug-free zone. The trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at twenty-five years of 

confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. Appellant 

filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed. 
3

Analysis

We review a trial court's decision to adjudicate guilt in the same manner as we 

review a trial court's revocation of community supervision. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West 2012). We apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial 

court's order revoking community supervision. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Moore v. State, 11 S.W.3d 495, 498 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2000, no pet.). The State's burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1993). Proof of any one of the alleged violations is sufficient to support a revocation of 

probation. Moore, 11 S.W.3d at 498.

When deferred adjudication community supervision is revoked, the trial court 

may impose any punishment authorized by statute. Von Schounmacher v. State, 5 

S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (per curiam). Appellant’s offense was a first 

degree felony, with a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years' incarceration. Tex. 

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(c) (West 2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32

(West 2009)) (first degree felony punishment range). 

Punishment assessed within the statutory limits is generally not considered cruel 

and unusual. Samuel v. State, 477 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Baldridge 

v. State, 77 S.W.3d 890, 893-94 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). A 

narrow exception to this rule was announced by the United States Supreme Court in 

Solem v. Helm, which held that sentences must be proportionate to the crime and that 

even a sentence within the statutorily prescribed range may violate the Eighth 
4

Amendment. 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Punishment 

may be grossly disproportionate to a crime only when an objective comparison of the 

gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence shows the sentence to be 

extreme. Baldridge, 77 S.W.3d at 893 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 

111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (plurality op.) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). If 

we determine that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense, we must then 

consider the remaining factors of the Solem test and compare the sentence received to 

(1) sentences for similar crimes in this jurisdiction, and (2) sentences for the same crime 

in other jurisdictions. Id; McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992). See 

also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) 

(Stevens, J., concurring) (listing factors to consider as (1) whether there is a national 

consensus against imposing the punishment for the offense; (2) the moral culpability of 

the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics; (3) the severity of the 

punishment; and (4) whether the punishment serves legitimate penological goals of 

retribution, incapacitation, deterrence and rehabilitation).

On appeal, appellant contends her sentence is grossly disproportionate because 

her relapse into drug use was foreseeable, and she effectively was subjected to 

revocation and incarceration because of her drug addiction.

1

 She cites us no authority 

agreeing with her contention that incarceration of an offender whose violations of 

community supervision may have been influenced by drug use is inherently cruel and 

unusual. We cannot agree her twenty-five-year sentence is constitutionally grossly 

 

1

Appellant summarizes her position by stating, “Drug use relapse as a basis for revocation of 

probation and sentencing is cruel and unusual punishment.”
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disproportionate to her offense, for the reason of her asserted addiction2or for any other 

reason presented by this record. Her offense was serious, a first degree felony 

involving possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, committed within 

1000 feet of the premises of a public youth center. As both the State and the trial court 

noted, “[t]his is not just simply a possession case. This is a possession with intent to 

deliver in a drug free zone case.” Her sentence of twenty-five years is not near the high 

end of the statutory range of punishment. Objectively comparing the gravity of her

offense with the severity of the sentence, we cannot conclude the sentence is extreme. 

See Baldridge, 77 S.W.3d at 893; Speckman v. State, Nos. 07-13-00232-CR, 07-13-

00233-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5615 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 23, 2014, no pet. h.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar analysis). Accordingly, we must also 

conclude she has not been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. 

We resolve appellant’s issue against her, and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

James T. Campbell

 Justice

Do not publish. 

 

2

A community supervision officer testified appellant told her in late August 2013 that “she felt that 

she didn’t have an addiction, and she felt that it was something she could control.”