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*********************************************** 
U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, TRUSTEE

v. MELISSA L. MAMUDI ET AL.

(AC 42415)

DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property

owned by the defendant M. The property was transferred several times

via quitclaim deed and was eventually deeded to the defendants W Co.

and P. Following the trial court’s granting of the plaintiff’s motion for

judgment of strict foreclosure and the setting of law days, W Co. twice

filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy

Code (11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.), and both petitions were dismissed by

the Bankruptcy Court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion, to which

W Co. and P did not object, for an order of no bankruptcy stay, alleging

that, pursuant to statute (11 U.S.C. § 362), because W Co. had filed two

bankruptcy proceedings within the previous year, which had both been

dismissed, a stay would not automatically be imposed if W Co. filed a

third petition for bankruptcy. After the trial court granted the plaintiff’s

motion to reset the law days following W Co.’s second bankruptcy filing,

W Co. filed a third petition for bankruptcy four days before the law

days were set to commence. The plaintiff then filed a second motion

for order, to which W Co. and P did not object, seeking to establish

that the law days had commenced and title to the subject property had

vested in the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, pursuant

to state statute (§ 49-15) and federal statute, 11 U.S.C. § 362, there was

no automatic stay provision in effect following the filing of W Co.’s third

petition for bankruptcy. The court granted both of the plaintiff’s motions

for order. Thereafter, the court granted the motion to intervene filed

by the purchasers of the property, A and M, and A and M filed an

application for an execution of ejectment to remove W Co. and P from

the property. Thereafter, W Co. and P filed motions to reargue the court’s

granting of the plaintiff’s motions for order, which the court denied as

untimely, and W Co. and P appealed to this court. Held that there was

no practical relief the trial court could have afforded W Co. and P, as

title to the property had vested absolutely in the plaintiff after the passing

of the law days: W Co. and P failed to redeem before the passing of the

law days and they were not deprived of the right to appeal concerning

the law days, as the twenty day period pursuant to the rules of practice

(§ 11-12) to appeal from the trial court’s granting of the plaintiff’s motions

for order expired before the law days commenced; moreover, W Co.

and P’s motions to reargue were filed approximately eight months after

title in the property had vested in the plaintiff; accordingly, the trial

court should have rendered judgment dismissing W Co. and P’s motions

to reargue as moot rather than denying those motions.

Argued January 14—officially released April 21, 2020

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Danbury, where the court, Mintz, J., granted the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability;

thereafter, the court, Pavia, J., rendered judgment of

strict foreclosure; subsequently, the court, Pavia, J.,

granted the motion to cite in Wellsville Properties, LLC,

as a defendant filed by the defendant Laurie J. Pastor;

thereafter, the court, Russo, J., granted the motions to

be cited in as a defendant and to open and extend the

law days filed by John C. Pastor; subsequently, the
defendant Wellsville Properties, LLC, filed a notice of

bankruptcy, which was dismissed; thereafter, the court,

Russo, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to reset the law

days; subsequently, the defendant Wellsville Properties,

LLC, filed a notice of bankruptcy, which was dismissed;

thereafter, the court, Russo, J., granted the plaintiff’s

motion to reset the law days; subsequently, the defendant Wellsville Properties, LLC, filed a notice of bankruptcy and the plaintiff filed a motion for order of no

bankruptcy stay; thereafter, the court, Russo, J.,

granted the plaintiff’s motions for order; subsequently,

the court, Mintz, J., granted the motion to intervene

filed by Armando Bernado et al.; thereafter, the court,

Russo, J., denied the motions filed by the defendant

Wellsville Properties, LLC, et al. to reargue the court’s

granting of the plaintiff’s motions for order, and the

defendant Wellsville Properties, LLC, et al. appealed to

this court. Improper form of judgment; judgment

directed.

Christopher G. Brown, for the appellants (defendant

Wellsville Properties, LLC, et al.).

Tara L. Trifon, with whom, on the brief, was Melanie

Dykas, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Scott M. Harington, for the appellees (intervenors).
Opinion

NORCOTT, J. In this appeal, which stems from a

fourteen year old foreclosure action, the defendants

Wellsville Properties, LLC (Wellsville), and John C. Pastor (Pastor)1 appeal from the judgment of the trial court

denying, as untimely, their motions to reargue the

court’s decisions granting two motions for orders filed

by the plaintiff, U.S. Bank, National Association, as

Trustee for RASC 2005-AHL1.2 On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the court abused its discretion in

denying their motions to reargue as untimely where, as

here, those motions asserted mistakes of law in the

court’s rulings on the plaintiff’s motions for orders, (2)

the court erred in ruling that the law days were not

‘‘automatically vacated’’ pursuant to General Statutes

§ 49-15 (b) as a result of a bankruptcy petition filed by

Wellsville on February 20, 2018, (3) the court improperly

determined that the bankruptcy stay was eliminated by

11 U.S.C. § 362 (c) (4) (A) (i) (2012),3 and (4) even if

§ 49-15 (b) does not apply, pursuant to federal law, 11

U.S.C § 108 (b) (2012),4 Wellsville’s bankruptcy petition

extended the law days by up to sixty days to April 17,

2018, a date well past the February 20, 2018 date set

forth in the foreclosure judgment. This action resulted

in harm to the defendants in that they lost the right to

move to open the judgment and to further extend the

law days when the court ruled on the motions for orders

on March 12, 2018, before the commencement of the

extended law days on April 17, 2018. We conclude that

there is no practical relief available to the defendants

and, therefore, that the court should have dismissed as

moot, rather than denied, their motions to reargue.

The record reveals the following undisputed relevant

facts and procedural history. In June, 2005, Melissa

L. Mamudi (Mamudi) had executed and delivered to

Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., a note for a loan in the

original principal amount of $880,000. As security for

the note, Mamudi executed a mortgage on certain property she owned that was located at 148 North Lake

Shore Drive in Brookfield (property). The mortgage

subsequently was assigned to the plaintiff. After

Mamudi defaulted on the note, the plaintiff, as the

holder of the mortgage and note, elected to accelerate

the balance due on the note and provided Mamudi with

written notice of the default, which Mamudi neglected

to cure. The plaintiff thereafter commenced the present

action on December 1, 2006, seeking to foreclose the

mortgage on the property. The trial court, Mintz, J.,

granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as

to liability in May, 2007.

Pursuant to a quitclaim deed dated August 21, 2007,

Mamudi deeded the property to SROTSAPNEVES-NLS,

Inc., which, in turn, quitclaimed the property to Laurie

J. Pastor on August 26, 2008. Laurie J. Pastor further

deeded the property to herself and Wellsville via a quit-
claim deed dated June 3, 2011. Thereafter, Laurie J.

Pastor quitclaimed her interest in the property to Pastor, which was recorded on the land records on November 6, 2012. Wellsville and Pastor have since been coowners of the property. The plaintiff amended its complaint to reflect the ownership interests of Wellsville

and Pastor.

On July 9, 2012, the court, Pavia, J., rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure and determined the fair market value of the property to be $833,000, the amount

of the debt as of that date to be $1,456,804.12, and

certain other fees and costs. The court set law days

to commence on November 13, 2012. As a result of

bankruptcies filed by multiple defendants, the law days

were reset multiple times. Relevant to this appeal, in

response to a motion to open and extend the law days

filed by Pastor, the court, Russo, J., on March 14, 2017,

ordered that the law days be extended for the final

time to April 18, 2017. On April 17, 2017, prior to the

commencement of the law days, Wellsville filed a petition under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy

Code; see 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2012); which was

dismissed on August 4, 2017. Also, on July 13, 2017, the

Bankruptcy Court had entered an order granting Pastor

a bankruptcy discharge related to a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition that he had filed. Accordingly, on October 4, 2017, the plaintiff filed another motion to reset

the law days, which the court granted on October 16,

2017. Specifically, the court found that the Bankruptcy

Court had issued an order of discharge on July 13, 2017,

allowing the plaintiff to proceed with the foreclosure.

The court further determined the fair market value of

the property and the amount of the debt, and set new

law days to commence on December 12, 2017. On

December 11, 2017, one day prior to the commencement

of the law days, Wellsville filed a second bankruptcy

petition, which was dismissed on January 2, 2018.

Thereafter, on January 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a

‘‘Motion for Order of No Bankruptcy Stay,’’ in which it

alleged that because Wellsville had filed two bankruptcy

proceedings that were pending within the previous year,

both of which had been dismissed, if and when Wellsville filed a third bankruptcy proceeding, a stay would

not automatically be imposed upon the filing of such

a proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (2012).5

Therefore, the plaintiff alleged that with no automatic

stay imposed, the law days would be permitted to commence as scheduled. On January 22, 2018, the court

granted the plaintiff’s motion to reset the law days following the bankruptcy filing, and made updated findings regarding the fair market value of the property and

the amount of the debt and appraiser fees. It then set the

law days to commence on February 20, 2018. Wellsville

subsequently filed its third bankruptcy petition on February 16, 2018, as of which time the trial court had

not yet acted on the plaintiff’s motion for order. The
plaintiff, in turn, filed a second motion for order on

February 27, 2018, seeking an order that the law days

had commenced and that title had vested in the plaintiff

on February 23, 2018. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged

that (1) the automatic stay provision of § 49-15 (b) did

not apply because Wellsville was not a mortgagor under

§ 49-15 (b), which applies only if a mortgagor files a

bankruptcy petition, and (2) there was no automatic

stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (c) (4) (A) (i) (2012),

where, as here, Wellsville had filed two bankruptcy

proceedings that were pending within the previous year

and had been dismissed. Accordingly, the plaintiff

alleged that because no automatic stay was in effect,

with the passing of the law days title vested absolutely

in the plaintiff. The defendants did not file objections

to either of the plaintiff’s motions for orders.

The Bankruptcy Court entered an order dismissing

Wellsville’s third bankruptcy petition on March 8, 2018,

and notice of that dismissal was filed on March 13,

2018. On March 12, 2018, the trial court granted both

of the plaintiff’s motions for orders with orders that

simply stated, ‘‘Granted.’’ The plaintiff thereafter filed

a proposed execution of ejectment on May 2, 2018, to

which the defendants filed an objection, which was

overruled by the court. The plaintiff subsequently filed

a new application for execution of ejectment on July

5, 2018, to which the defendants again objected, claiming that title had not passed and noting that they had

filed a writ of error6 concerning the trial court’s order

overruling their objection to the execution of ejectment.

The court never ruled on that objection, and an execution of ejectment issued on September 4, 2018. Subsequently, the purchasers of the property, Armando Bernardo and Maria Bernardo,7

filed a motion to intervene

in the action, which the court, Mintz, J., granted on

October 29, 2018. Afterward, the intervenors filed an

application on November 1, 2018, for an execution of

ejectment to remove the defendants from the property,

to which the defendants objected. On December 3, 2018,

the defendants filed two motions to reargue the court’s

March 12, 2018 decisions granting the plaintiff’s motions

for orders. The court, Russo, J., denied as untimely

both motions to reargue on December 6, 2018, and

the defendants appealed to this court challenging the

denials of their motions to reargue.

After this appeal was filed, the plaintiff filed a motion

to dismiss the appeal, claiming that it was frivolous and

that it was moot in that absolute title to the property

had vested in the plaintiff when the defendants failed

to redeem on the passing of the law days that were

scheduled to commence on February 20, 2018. This

court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal without

prejudice and permitted the parties to brief the merits

of the mootness issue in their appellate briefs. In their

brief, the defendants argue that the appeal is not moot

because title never vested in the plaintiff and that, even
if it did, dismissing the appeal as moot would deprive

them of their due process right to appeal the orders

confirming that title vested in the plaintiff. According

to the defendants, ‘‘[s]ince a party cannot be deprived

of the right to appeal a judgment setting law days, it

follows that a party cannot be deprived of the right to

appeal an order confirming that those law days have

already passed.’’ The plaintiff claims that the trial court

lacked jurisdiction to consider the motions to reargue

after title vested absolutely in the plaintiff.

Before turning to the merits of the appeal, we must

first address the mootness issue. ‘‘Our standard of

review regarding mootness is well settled. Mootness is

a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a

case if the court can no longer grant practical relief

to the parties. . . . Mootness presents a circumstance

wherein the issue before the court has been resolved

or had lost its significance because of a change in the

condition of affairs between the parties. . . . [T]he

existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of

appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the

determination of which no practical relief can follow.

. . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question

is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Image Contractors,

LLC v. Village at Mariner’s Point Ltd. Partnership, 86

Conn. App. 692, 698, 862 A.2d 832 (2004). ‘‘Because

courts are established to resolve actual controversies,

before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution

on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability

requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between

or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the

interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the

matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated

by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination

of the controversy will result in practical relief to the

complainant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Friedman v. Gomez, 172 Conn. App. 254, 259, 159 A.3d

703 (2017). Our review of the question of mootness is

plenary. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 320 Conn. 694,

699, 132 A.3d 731 (2016).

A review of the basic legal principles governing mortgages and foreclosures will aid in our discussion of this

issue. ‘‘In Connecticut, a mortgagee has legal title to

the mortgaged property and the mortgagor has equitable title, also called the equity of redemption. . . . The

equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the right to

redeem the legal title previously conveyed by performing whatever conditions are specified in the mortgage, the most important of which is usually the payment of money. . . . Under our law, an action for strict

foreclosure is brought by a mortgagee who, holding
legal title, seeks not to enforce a forfeiture but rather to

foreclose an equity of redemption unless the mortgagor

satisfies the debt on or before his law day. . . . Accordingly, [if] a foreclosure decree has become absolute by

the passing of the law days, the outstanding rights of

redemption have been cut off and the title has become

unconditional in the plaintiff, with a consequent and

accompanying right to possession. The qualified title

which the plaintiff had previously held under his mortgage had become an absolute one. . . . In other words,

if the defendant’s equity of redemption was extinguished by the passing of the law days, we can afford

no practical relief by reviewing the rulings of the trial

court now challenged on appeal, as doing so would

have no practical effect or alter the substantive rights

of the parties.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 178 Conn.

App. 82, 97, 172 A.3d 1263 (2017). ‘‘The question this

court must address, therefore, is whether the law days

have run so as to extinguish the defendant’s equity of

redemption and vest title absolutely in the plaintiff. If

this has occurred, no practical relief [could] follow from

a determination of the merits of this case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barclays Bank of New

York v. Ivler, 20 Conn. App. 163, 167, 565 A.2d 252, cert.

denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 792 (1989).

Generally, pursuant to § 362 (a) of title 11 of the

United States Code, ‘‘the filing of [a] bankruptcy petition

operate[s] as an automatic stay of the plaintiff’s foreclosure action.’’8 U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Works, 160

Conn. App. 49, 52, 124 A.3d 935, cert. denied, 320 Conn.

904, 127 A.3d 188 (2015); see also Bank of New York

v. Savvidis, 174 Conn. App. 843, 846, 165 A.3d 1266

(2017). In Provident Bank v. Lewitt, 84 Conn. App. 204,

208, 852 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 924, 859 A.2d

580 (2004), however, this court held that the filing of

the defendant’s bankruptcy petition did not invoke the

automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (2012)

but, rather, extended the time for her to redeem only by

sixty days from the day the defendant filed her petition,

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108 (b) (2012). A discussion of

this court’s holding in Provident Bank is necessary to

our analysis of this issue.

In Provident Bank, the plaintiff bank brought a foreclosure action that resulted in a judgment of strict foreclosure. Id., 206. After that judgment was opened several times and the law day was set for January 13, 2003,

the defendant filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on

January 9, 2003. Id. ‘‘Although not required to do so by

any rule, the plaintiff filed a notice of the extension of

the law day until March 10, 2003, with the clerk of the

Superior Court in response to the defendant’s filing of

her bankruptcy petition.’’ Id. When the defendant failed

to redeem by that extended law day, title vested in

the plaintiff. Id. The defendant appealed to this court,

claiming that ‘‘the filing of her chapter 7 bankruptcy
prior to her law day indefinitely stayed her redemption

period by invoking the automatic stay provision of 11

U.S.C. § 362 (a).’’ Id. This court disagreed, stating: ‘‘We

recognize that Connecticut courts consistently have

held that the indefinite automatic stay provisions of

§ 362 (a) apply in strict foreclosure cases where a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed after the judgment

but prior to the passing of the final law day. See, e.g.,

Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Mehta, 39 Conn. App. 822,

824, 668 A.2d 729 (1995). We conclude that we no longer

can follow such authority in light of the holding of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

in In re Canney, 284 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2002). In general,

we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving

issues of federal law. . . . [T]he decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is located are entitled

to great weight in the interpretation of a federal statute.

. . . Krondes v. O’Boy, 69 Conn. App. 802, 808, 796

A.2d 625 (2002).9

‘‘In re Canney involved a mortgage foreclosure

brought in Vermont under the Vermont statutes. See 12

Vt. Stat. Ann., c. 163, subchapter 6. In In re Canney,

the Second Circuit determined that the sixty day stay

period set forth in § 108 (b) [of title 11 of the United

States Code] applied to the passing of the law day rather

than the indefinite stay period prescribed in § 362 (a)

[of title 11 of the United States Code] when a petitioner

filed a bankruptcy petition after judgment had entered

but prior to the passing of the law day in a strict foreclosure action. In re Canney, supra, 284 F.3d 370–73.

Agreeing with the United States Courts of Appeal in

the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, the court held

that § 108 (b), which provides for only a sixty day delay

in the running of the law day, is the applicable provision

because the automatic stay provision of § 362 (a) prevents only certain affirmative acts taken by a creditor,

and the running of time is not one of those acts. . . .

‘‘Although In re Canney concerned strict foreclosure

under Vermont’s statutes, our statutory procedures are

similar. Strict foreclosure is the normal method of foreclosure only in Connecticut and Vermont. . . . When

a strict foreclosure rather than a sale is ordered, it

entails a foreclosure judgment in favor of the mortgagee

that results from a proceeding against the debtor and

leaves the mortgagor with a right to redeem within a

specified time frame, ending with the law day. . . .

Because Connecticut and Vermont both allow redemption during a specified time period after which title

automatically passes to the mortgagee, the reasoning

in In re Canney, arising out of the Vermont foreclosure,

applies to this Connecticut foreclosure with equal force.

‘‘We conclude that the defendant’s period of equitable

redemption was not stayed when she filed a chapter 7

bankruptcy petition, although it was extended by sixty

days after the filing of the petition. The defendant’s
bankruptcy petition was filed on January 9, 2003. The

practical effect of § 108 (b) is that the time in which a

trustee (or if the bankruptcy petition is dismissed, the

mortgagor) may cure a default or perform any other

similar act expires at the end of the period settled for

redemption or sixty days after the order for relief. The

commencement of a voluntary bankruptcy case through

the filing of a petition constitutes an order for relief.

11 U.S.C. § 301. In this case, the equity of redemption

was foreclosed on March 10, 2003, when the sixty day

extended period lapsed without redemption by the

defendant. Title became absolute in the plaintiff on

March 13, 2003, the date the certificate of foreclosure

was recorded on the land records. Thus, because the

defendant failed to redeem during this period, she no

longer had any right or interest in the property and title

passed to the plaintiff.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

added and footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Provident Bank v. Lewitt, supra, 84 Conn.

App. 207–209.

Recently, this court addressed a similar issue in Seminole Realty, LLC v. Sekretaev, 192 Conn. App. 405, 415,

218 A.3d 198, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 905, 220 A.3d 35

(2019),10 and rejected a claim that, due to a bankruptcy

filing, § 49-15 (b) operated to automatically open and

indefinitely extend the law days. This court, relying on

Provident Bank v. Lewitt, supra, 84 Conn. App. 204,

concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 108 (b) (2012) operated to

extend the time for redemption by only sixty days and

that, because the defendant had failed to redeem by

the end of the sixty day extension period, absolute title

had vested in the plaintiff. Seminole Realty, LLC v.

Sekretaev, supra, 415, 418–20. Therefore, the defendant’s claims on appeal that were predicated on the

validity of the underlying mortgage were moot given

that title to the property had vested in the plaintiff. Id.,

407 n.2.

In the present case, after the judgment was opened

several times due to numerous bankruptcy filings by

various defendants in this case, a new foreclosure judgment was rendered on January 22, 2018, and the law

days were reset to commence on February 20, 2018. On

February 16, 2018, Wellsville filed its third bankruptcy

petition. Pursuant to Provident Bank and Seminole

Realty, LLC, we conclude that the period of equitable

redemption was not stayed when Wellsville filed its

third bankruptcy petition, although it was extended by

sixty days after the filing of the petition. Accordingly,

the law days commenced on April 17, 2018. The defendants do not dispute that they did nothing during the

sixty day extension to exercise their right of redemption. Because the defendants failed to redeem before

the passing of the law days, they no longer had any

interest in the property and title passed to the plaintiff.

Thus, there was no practical relief that the trial court

could have afforded the defendants with respect to their
motions to reargue.

This court has explained that ‘‘it is not within the

power of appellate courts to resuscitate the mortgagor’s

right of redemption or otherwise to disturb the absolute

title of the redeeming encumbrancer. . . . Simply put,

once title has vested absolutely in the mortgagee, the

mortgagor’s interest in the property is extinguished and

cannot be revived by a reviewing court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Citigroup Global Markets Realty

Corp. v. Christiansen, 163 Conn. App. 635, 641, 137 A.3d

76 (2016). ‘‘[I]f the defendant’s equity of redemption

was extinguished by the passing of the law days, we

can afford no practical relief by reviewing the rulings

of the trial court now challenged on appeal, as doing so

would have no practical effect or alter the substantive

rights of the parties.’’ Sovereign Bank v. Licata, supra,

178 Conn. App. 97. ‘‘[T]he effect of strict foreclosure

is to vest title to the real property absolutely in the

mortgagee and to do so without any sale of the property.

A judgment of strict foreclosure, when it becomes absolute and all rights of redemption are cut off, constitutes

an appropriation of the mortgaged property to satisfy

the mortgage debt. . . . In Barclays Bank of New York

v. Ivler, supra, 20 Conn. App. 163, the defendant mortgagor appealed from the denial of his motion to open

a stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure. . . . In that

case, this court stated: The question this court must

address . . . is whether the law days have run so as

to extinguish the defendant’s equity of redemption and

vest title absolutely in the plaintiff. If this has occurred,

no practical relief [could] follow from a determination

of the merits of this case . . . .’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Charles, 95 Conn. App.

315, 323–24, 898 A.2d 197, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 909,

902 A.2d 1069 (2006); see id., 324 (‘‘because the law

days had run and title had vested absolutely in the

plaintiff, the defendant’s appeal was moot’’). In the present case, because title to the property absolutely had

vested in the plaintiff after the passing of the law days,

the motions to reargue were moot when they were filed

approximately eight months after the vesting of title,

as there was no practical relief that the court could have

afforded the defendants via their motions to reargue at

that time. See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v.

Fritzell, 185 Conn. App. 777, 786, 198 A.3d 642 (2018),

cert. denied, 330 Conn. 963, 199 A.3d 1080 (2019). The

court, therefore, should have dismissed as moot, rather

than denied, the motions to reargue. See id.; see also

Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568,

569–70, 953 A.2d 868 (2008) (after title had vested absolutely in plaintiff, court should have dismissed, rather

than denied, late motion to open); Thompson Gardens

West Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Masto, 140 Conn.

App. 271, 274, 59 A.3d 276 (2013) (although court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to grant
motion to open judgment of strict foreclosure filed

nearly six months after title had vested in plaintiff,

court should have dismissed motion to open instead of

denying motion).

The defendants attempt to distinguish Seminole

Realty, LLC. At oral argument before this court,11 they

claimed that, in Seminole Realty, LLC, the trial court

was correct that the law day had passed, although it

was wrong as to the day on which it passed, as the

court did not account for the sixty day extension in 11

U.S.C. § 108 (b) (2012). Whereas, in the present case,

they claimed that the court was wrong that the law day

had passed and that its decisions of March 12, 2018,

granting the plaintiff’s motions for orders deprived the

defendants of the right to move to open the judgment

and extend the law days.12 They also claimed at oral

argument that because there were errors of law in the

court’s decisions, the court, in ruling on their motions

to reargue, should have revisited those prior rulings. In

their brief, they claim further that ‘‘[t]his court can

correct the rulings on the motions for order because it

is necessary to effect justice.’’ Specifically, they allege

that ‘‘the orders granting the motions for order were

contrary to law at the time they were rendered and still

are. If upheld despite the judicial error, it would deprive

Wellsville and . . . Pastor of their equity of redemption. The circumstances suggest that this court should

go beyond reversing the rulings on the reargument

motions and reverse the rulings on the motions for

order.’’ We are not persuaded by the defendants’ claims.

If the defendants believed that the court’s March 12,

2018 decisions were incorrect, they could have timely

filed their motions to reargue within twenty days of

those decisions as required by Practice Book § 11-12.13

They have not demonstrated how or why they were

prevented from doing so, especially given that they did,

eventually, file such motions approximately nine

months later. Instead, they claim, without authority,

that they were prejudiced by the court’s rulings and

that, with respect to their motions to reargue, it’s a

matter of ‘‘correcting an error of law.’’ We disagree.

Although a trial court has discretion to grant an

untimely motion to reargue; see Torres v. Carrese, 149

Conn. App. 596, 616, 90 A.3d 256, cert. denied, 312 Conn.

912, 93 A.3d 595 (2014); if a defendant could file a

motion to reargue at any time after a judgment is rendered to correct a claimed error of law, there would

be no finality of judgments. ‘‘Generally, courts recognize

a compelling interest in the finality of judgments which

should not lightly be disregarded. Finality of litigation

is essential so that parties may rely on judgments in

ordering their private affairs and so that the moral force

of court judgments will not be undermined. The law

favors finality of judgments . . . . 46 Am. Jur. 2d 543–

44, Judgments § 164 (2017). This court has emphasized

that due consideration of the finality of judgments is
important and that judgments should only be set aside

or opened for a strong and compelling reason. See

Lewis v. Bowden, 166 Conn. App. 400, 403, 141 A.3d

998 (2016); see also Brody v. Brody, 153 Conn. App.

625, 631–32, 103 A.3d 981, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 910,

105 A.3d 901 (2014), and cases cited therein. It is in the

interest of the public as well as that of the parties [that]

there must be fixed a time after the expiration of which

the controversy is to be regarded as settled and the

parties freed of obligation to act further in the matter

by virtue of having been summoned into or having

appeared in the case. . . . Without such a rule, no judgment could be relied on. . . . Bruno v. Bruno, 146

Conn. App. 214, 229, 76 A.3d 725 (2013). [T]he modern

law of civil procedure suggests that even litigation about

subject matter jurisdiction should take into account the

importance of the principle of the finality of judgments

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 180 Conn. App. 818, 828, 184 A.3d

1254 (2018); see also Federal National Mortgage Assn.

v. Farina, 182 Conn. App. 844, 853–54, 191 A.3d 206

(2018). If this court were to accept the defendants’

proposition, it would ‘‘invite uncertainty in our system

of property conveyance.’’ Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland,

131 Conn. App. 653, 665, 27 A.3d 423 (2011), rev’d in part

on other grounds, 310 Conn. 147, 75 A.3d 651 (2013).

Finally, the defendants, in arguing that the appeal is

not moot, claim that ‘‘a foreclosure defendant cannot

be deprived of the right to appeal concerning the law

days’’ and that they would be deprived of due process

if the appeal were found to be moot. In support of

this claim, they rely on Continental Capital Corp. v.

Lazarte, 57 Conn. App. 271, 274, 749 A.2d 646 (2000),

for the proposition that ‘‘[a] party may not effectively

be deprived of the right to appeal within the twenty

days by having the law day pass within that time,

thereby causing a loss of the right of redemption.’’ The

defendants, however, were never deprived of this right,

as the twenty day period to appeal from the court’s

March 12, 2018 decisions expired before the law days

commenced on April 17, 2018. This court’s decision in

Sovereign Bank v. Licata, supra, 178 Conn. App. 82, is

instructive here. In Sovereign Bank, this court held:

‘‘Because no appeal was filed from the judgment of

strict foreclosure in this case, any initial appellate stay

of execution that arose when the judgment was rendered expired after the appeal period for that judgment

had run, which was long before the law days set by the

court passed. . . . Accordingly, because there was no

appellate stay in effect when the law days began to run

. . . absolute title to the property transferred to the

plaintiff as a matter of law after all law days expired.

‘‘It is true that the record reflects some later confusion by the parties, the trial court and this court regarding whether the foreclosure judgment had been subject

to an appellate stay and whether the law days needed
to be reset. Any such misstatements or errors, however,

did nothing to alter the legal reality—law days passed

and title to the property became absolute in the plaintiff. . . . Accordingly, if there was any ambiguity in the

record regarding the status of this foreclosure action,

it has existed with the knowledge and acquiescence of

the defendant. It was not until the plaintiff sought to

sell the property during the pendency of its bankruptcy

action that the defendant claimed any need for clarification.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 100–101. Likewise, in the

present case, it was not until the intervening defendants

sought to gain possession of the property through an

execution of ejectment that the defendants filed their

motions to reargue seeking to correct alleged errors

of law by the court that occurred approximately nine

months prior. Because the motions to reargue were filed

approximately eight months after title in the property

vested in the plaintiff, the claims raised therein were

moot and the court, therefore, should have dismissed

the motions.14

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment

denying the defendants’ motions to reargue is reversed

and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the motions as moot.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The other defendants in this action are Melissa L. Mamudi, Bridgewater

Partners, LLC, Laurie J. Pastor, Mendim Mamudi and SROTSAPNEVES-NLS,

Inc. Because those parties are not involved in this appeal, we refer in

this opinion to Pastor and Wellsville collectively as the defendants and

individually by name where necessary.

2

In the summons, the plaintiff was named as ‘‘U.S. Bank, National Association, as Trustee.’’ In a motion to substitute the plaintiff in this action, which

the plaintiff filed on August 23, 2013, and was granted by the court on

September, 10, 2013, the plaintiff alleged that due to a scrivener’s error, it

was not properly named in the action, and that its proper name was ‘‘U.S.

Bank, National Association, as Trustee, Successor in Interest to Bank of

America, National Association, as Trustee, Successor by Merger to LaSalle

Bank, National Association, as Trustee for Residential Asset Securities Corporation, Home Equity Mortgage.’’ Thereafter, the plaintiff filed another

‘‘Motion to Substitute Plaintiff,’’ alleging that due to a scrivener’s error, it

was not properly named, and that its correct name is U.S. Bank, National

Association, as Trustee for RASC 2005-AHL1. On February 9, 2015, the court,

Russo, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to substitute. Our references in this

opinion to the plaintiff are to U.S. Bank, National Association, as Trustee

for RASC 2005-AHL1.

3 Section 362 (c) of title 11 of the United States Code provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this section

. . . (4) (A) (i) if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who

is an individual under this title, and if 2 or more single or joint cases of the

debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed, other

than a case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal

under section 707 (b), the stay under subsection (a) shall not go into effect

upon the filing of the later case . . . .’’

4 Section 108 (b) of title 11 of the United States Code provides in relevant

part: ‘‘[I]f . . . an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor or an individual protected

under section 1201 or 1301 of this title may file any pleading, demand, notice,

or proof of claim or loss, cure a default, or perform any other similar act,

and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition,

the trustee may only file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the

later of—(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period

occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 60 days after

the order for relief.’’
5 Section 362 (a) of title 11 of the United States Code provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed

under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under

section 5 (a) (3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as

a stay, applicable to all entities, of—(1) the commencement or continuation,

including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could

have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this

title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title . . . .’’

6 The writ of error was rejected pursuant to Practice Book § 72-3 (c) (3)

and (d) for the defendants’ failure to include the signed writ of error and

the signed marshal’s return.

7 The property was purchased by Armando Bernardo and Maria Bernardo

on September 12, 2018.

8 The defendants also claim that the filing of the bankruptcy petition by

Wellsville triggered an automatic stay pursuant to § 49-15 (b). We reject this

claim. Pursuant to § 49-15 (b), ‘‘[u]pon the filing of a bankruptcy petition

by a mortgagor under Title 11 of the United States Code, any judgment

against the mortgagor foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure

shall be opened automatically without action by any party or the court

. . . .’’ The statute does not define the term ‘‘mortgagor.’’ Where a statute

does not define a term, ‘‘[w]e may presume . . . that the legislature intended

[a word] to have its ordinary meaning in the English language, as gleaned

from the context of its use. . . . Under such circumstances, it is appropriate

to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission, 191 Conn. App. 648, 657, 216 A.3d 847, cert. granted on

other grounds, 333 Conn. 926, 217 A.3d 994 (2019). Black’s Law Dictionary

defines mortgagor as ‘‘[o]ne who, having all or some part of title to property,

by written instrument pledges that property for some particular purpose

such as security for a debt. The party who mortgages the property; the

debtor. That party to a mortgage who gives legal title or a lien to the

mortgagee to secure the mortgage loan.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.

1990) p. 1012. The defendants clearly do not meet that definition. The mortgagor in the present case was Mamudi. Accordingly, § 49-15 (b) is not applicable to this case.

9 See also Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 392, 734 A.2d 535 (1999),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S. Ct. 1239, 146 L. Ed. 2d 99 (2000); Knutson

Mortgage Corp. v. Salata, 55 Conn. App. 784, 787, 740 A.2d 918 (1999).

10 On September 10, 2019, after the briefs in this case were filed, this court

released its decision in Seminole Realty, LLC v. Sekretaev, supra, 192 Conn.

App. 405. The parties, thus, did not address Seminole Realty, LLC, in their

briefs but were notified to be prepared to address the impact, if any, of that

decision at oral argument.

11 See footnote 10 of this opinion.

12 We note that, in light of the sixty day extension of 11 U.S.C. § 108 (b)

(2012), there was no need for the law days to be reset. See Seminole Realty,

LLC v. Sekretaev, supra, 192 Conn. App. 418–20; Provident Bank v. Lewitt,

supra, 84 Conn. App. 207–209. Therefore, the defendants’ claim that the

court’s rulings prejudiced them by depriving them of the right to be able

to file a motion to reset the law days fails.

13 ‘‘[T]he purpose of reargument is . . . to demonstrate to the court that

there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used to address alleged inconsistencies

in the trial court’s memorandum of decision as well as claims of law that

the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to

reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite

of the apple or to present additional cases or briefs which could have been

presented at the time of the original argument.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Opoku v. Grant, 63 Conn. App. 686, 692–93, 778

A.2d 981 (2001).

14 In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the merits of the claims

raised on appeal.