#29691-r-JMK

2022 S.D. 39

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

CATHERINE DAVIS, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

RICHARD OTTEN, Defendant,

and

MEEMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

THE HONORABLE MICHELLE K. COMER

Judge

* * * *

EARL G. GREENE, III

SUSAN B. MEYER of

Gordon & Rees, LLP

Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant

and appellant.

DEAN FAUST of

Moore-Faust Law Group

Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff

and appellee.

* * * *

ARGUED

APRIL 27, 2022

OPINION FILED 07/13/22
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KERN, Justice

[¶1.] Meemic Insurance Company (Meemic) appeals from the circuit court’s 

order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Meemic 

contends that it lacked the necessary minimum contacts with South Dakota to 

enable the court to exercise personal jurisdiction under South Dakota’s long arm 

statute, SDCL 15-7-2, or under the principles of federal due process. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] On July 28, 2019, at approximately 6:18 p.m., Catherine Davis was 

riding as a passenger on William Laeder’s 2009 Harley Davidson motorcycle. Davis 

and Laeder, both residents of Michigan, were traveling eastbound on US Highway 

14A near Sturgis in Lawrence County. At the same time, Richard Otten, a resident 

of Sturgis, was traveling westbound on US Highway 14A on his 2012 Harley 

Davison motorcycle. Otten was driving at an excessive speed, which other 

motorcycle riders who witnessed the accident estimated to be around 55 miles per 

hour on a curve with a suggested maximum speed of 35 miles per hour. Otten failed 

to negotiate a turn and crossed into the oncoming traffic lane, colliding head on with 

Davis and Laeder. Davis, Laeder, and Otten sustained incapacitating injuries. 

Laeder and Otten were transported to Sturgis Regional Hospital while Davis was 

transported to Rapid City Regional Hospital. Davis suffered serious life altering 

injuries resulting in alleged medical expenses and damages exceeding $330,000. 

Davis alleges she has been unable to work following the accident.

[¶3.] Prior to the accident, Meemic, a property and casualty insurance 

company organized under the laws of Michigan, had issued an insurance policy to 
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Davis.1 The policy was issued in Michigan and provided Davis coverage for 

uninsured and underinsured motorist claims, subject to the policy’s terms and 

conditions. Meemic’s policies are offered in compliance with Michigan law with 

respect to personal injury protection, property protection, residual liability 

coverage, and uninsured/underinsured coverage. Meemic is not authorized to write 

insurance policies in South Dakota. The policy was in effect at the time of the 

accident.

[¶4.] Otten was insured through a State Farm policy with liability limits of 

$25,000. State Farm offered the full amount of the $25,000 policy limits as 

settlement to Davis on September 20, 2019. On October 9, 2019, Davis sent a letter 

to Meemic discussing the $25,000 settlement offer provided by State Farm and 

identifying medical costs for Davis in excess of $231,000 and the need for continued 

treatment. The letter made claim under any and all coverages available under 

Davis’s insurance policy, including underinsured coverage. On July 24, 2020, 

Meemic issued a letter denying coverage, noting that the terms and conditions of 

Davis’s policy do not provide coverage for accidents involving motorcycles.

[¶5.] On November 23, 2020, a Meemic representative contacted counsel for 

Davis via email and voicemail offering to settle the claim for $75,000. Counsel did 

not respond. Meemic repeated the offer by voicemail again on December 2, 2020, to 

which counsel again did not respond. Meemic called a third time on January 20, 

1. The insurance policy was not admitted into evidence and is not included in 

the record.
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2021, this time speaking with a receptionist at Davis’s attorney’s firm and 

requesting a return call.

[¶6.] On March 4, 2021, Davis filed a complaint against Otten and Meemic. 

Davis alleged that Meemic breached its insurance contract with Davis by 

neglecting, refusing, or failing to compensate Davis under the underinsured 

motorist coverage and no-fault insurance terms of her policy.

[¶7.] On April 9, 2021, Meemic filed a motion to dismiss for want of personal 

jurisdiction pursuant to SDCL 15-6-12(b)(2) and failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted pursuant to SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5). In its brief in support of the 

motion to dismiss, Meemic claimed it was not subject to jurisdiction under South 

Dakota’s long arm statute because it did not engage in any acts enumerated in the 

statute that would subject it to jurisdiction. Meemic further claimed that even if 

South Dakota’s long arm statute applied, under a due process analysis, Meemic did 

not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state to support a finding that 

Meemic purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 

the state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of South Dakota’s laws.

[¶8.] A hearing was held on Meemic’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction on May 18, 2021. During the hearing, Davis’s attorney first asserted 

that the motion to dismiss need not be decided because “the underinsured motorist 

claim” had been settled, noting that on May 5, 2021, he sent a letter on his client’s 

behalf to Meemic accepting Meemic’s November 3, 2020 settlement offer of $75,000. 

In response, Meemic contended that no settlement occurred because Davis’s 

initiation of the lawsuit operated either as a rejection of or counteroffer to its 
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previous settlement offer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied 

Meemic’s motion to dismiss. It did not address the question whether the claim had 

been settled. After the circuit court entered its order denying the motion to dismiss, 

Meemic filed a petition for intermediate appeal, which we granted on August 6, 

2021.

Standard of Review

[¶9.] “A motion to dismiss under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(2) ‘is a challenge to the 

court’s jurisdiction over the person and is a question of law that we review de novo.’” 

Zhi Gang Zhang v. Rasmus, 2019 S.D. 46, ¶ 17, 932 N.W.2d 153, 159 (quoting 

Kustom Cycles, Inc. v. Bowyer, 2014 S.D. 87, ¶ 8, 857 N.W.2d 401, 405). “We review 

a [circuit] court’s determination regarding personal jurisdiction based on written 

submissions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Marschke v. 

Wratislaw, 2007 S.D. 125, ¶ 9, 743 N.W.2d 402, 405 (citation omitted).

Analysis and Decision

[¶10.] Meemic contends that it did not engage in any of the acts enumerated 

in SDCL 15-7-2, South Dakota’s long arm statute, in order to support the circuit 

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. Meemic argues that none of the underlying 

facts support personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute and that its only 

involvement in the litigation in South Dakota was filing a motion to dismiss. 

Further, Meemic asserts that the subject matter of Davis’s claim against Meemic 

springs from a contract, not a tort, and involves an issue between two Michigan 

residents, falling within the purview of Michigan law. Turning to a due process 

analysis, Meemic points to International Shoe Co. v. Washington to support its view 
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that even if South Dakota’s long arm statute applies, the necessary “traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice” prong for constitutional personal 

jurisdiction cannot be met. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) 

(cleaned up). Meemic asserts that as the defendant, it did not engage in continuous 

contacts with South Dakota sufficient to purposefully avail itself to the privilege of 

conducting activities within the state.

[¶11.] Davis responds, first, regarding South Dakota’s long arm statute, that 

while Meemic may not sell insurance policies in South Dakota, it is aware that 

policyholders will travel in all states and at times be involved in collisions in states 

other than where Meemic sells policies. Next, Davis argues that personal 

jurisdiction is proper under the long arm statute because her claims arose from the 

commission of a tort in South Dakota, making South Dakota the best forum for 

determining damages. Additionally, Davis asserts that the risk of an insured being 

involved in a collision with an underinsured motorist while in South Dakota was 

foreseeable to Meemic at the time of contracting, bringing Meemic within the court’s 

jurisdiction. Davis also contends that the requirements of federal due process are 

met in this case, specifically asserting that Meemic purposefully availed itself of the 

privilege of acting in South Dakota and to the benefits and protections of its laws by 

selling insurance policies effective in all states, including South Dakota. 

Furthermore, Davis claims that Meemic satisfies the requirement of having 
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directed activities at South Dakota by selling policies that cover insureds that may 

drive within the state.2

[¶12.] For South Dakota to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 

party, two conditions must be satisfied. Kustom Cycles, Inc., 2014 S.D. 87, ¶ 9, 857 

N.W.2d at 406. First, the court must determine that “the legislature granted the 

court jurisdiction pursuant to South Dakota’s [l]ong [a]rm [s]tatute, SDCL 15-7-2.” 

Id. (citation omitted). The court must then determine that the exercise of 

jurisdiction “comport[s] with federal due process requirements.” Id. (citation 

omitted). “[T]he party seeking to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant . . . has the burden of showing a prima facie case of jurisdiction[.]” Id.

¶ 8, 857 N.W.2d at 405.3

2. In addition, Davis contends that Meemic had an open settlement offer, which 

Davis accepted, resolving the claim and all issues with Meemic. Davis 

requests the Court to uphold the alleged acceptance of the settlement offer, 

which would render Meemic’s appeal moot. However, in light of our 

determination that South Dakota lacks personal jurisdiction over Meemic in 

this case, neither this Court nor the circuit court can properly reach a 

conclusion on Davis’s alleged settlement issue.

3. In the South Dakota case State v. Grand River Enterprises, Inc., we 

distinguished a decision by the Ohio Court of Appeals that described a rule 

under which the burden of proof regarding the question of personal 

jurisdiction shifts to the defendant after the party seeking to establish 

personal jurisdiction makes a prima facie case of jurisdiction. 2008 S.D. 98, 

¶ 30, 757 N.W.2d 305, 316 (“the evidence, considered ‘in a light most 

favorable to finding jurisdiction,’ established a prima facie case sufficient to 

shift the burden to the defendant.” (quoting State v. Bulgartabac Holding 

Grp., 2007 WL 4395514, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007))). To clarify, however, this 

rule does not reflect the state of the law in South Dakota where it is well 

settled that “[t]he party asserting personal jurisdiction has the burden of 

establishing a prima facie case, and the burden does not shift to the party 

challenging jurisdiction.” Burke v. Roughrider, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 

1042 (D.S.D. 2007) (citations omitted). Thus, the correct analysis is that 

(continued . . .)
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[¶13.] South Dakota’s long arm statute, SDCL 15-7-2, is to be construed 

broadly when evaluating jurisdiction. Rothluebbers v. Obee, 2003 S.D. 95, ¶ 24, 668 

N.W.2d 313, 322 (citation omitted). Davis argues that four subsections of South 

Dakota’s long arm statute in SDCL 15-7-2 apply to Meemic’s actions:

Any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 

state as to any cause of action arising from the doing personally, 

through any employee, through an agent or through a 

subsidiary, of any of the following acts:

(1) The transaction of any business within the state;

(2) The commission of any act which results in accrual 

within this state of a tort action;

. . .

(4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk 

located within this state at the time of contracting;

. . .

(11) Commencing or participating in negotiations, 

mediation, arbitration, or litigation involving subject 

matter located in whole or in part within the state[.]

[¶14.] Here, Meemic is not subject to personal jurisdiction in South Dakota 

courts under the above subsections of SDCL 15-7-2 cited by Davis. Regarding 

subsection (1), Meemic has not transacted any business within South Dakota, and 

the policy with Davis was written in Michigan to Davis, a Michigan resident. As 

other courts have explained, the “mere unilateral act” of an insured driving into 

another state is not alone sufficient to permit a court’s exercise of the state’s long 

arm statute over that insured’s out-of-state automobile insurer in a contract action. 

Eagle Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez-Guzman, 21 A.D.3d 489, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (a car 

accident in New York involving an out-of-state resident insured by an out-of-state 

________________________

(. . . continued)

included in Kustom Cycles, as expressed above, in which the burden of proof 

does not shift to the defendant at any point.
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insurer did not provide the New York courts personal jurisdiction over a contract 

claim by the insured against the insurer).4

[¶15.] As to subsection (2), Meemic did not commit any act that resulted in 

the accrual of a tort action in South Dakota for two reasons. First, Meemic did not 

commit any acts in South Dakota resulting in a tort against Davis. See State ex rel. 

Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Koehr, 834 S.W.2d 233, 234–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) 

(when a car accident occurred in Missouri, plaintiffs’ claim that their out-of-state 

insurer had committed a tort in Missouri was “a glaring non-sequitor [sic]” as the 

insurer had not participated in the tortious car accident). Second, Davis’s claims 

against Meemic sound in contract, not tort. When an “insured is suing its regional 

insurer in a foreign state for breach of contract . . . the place of the accident is 

immaterial for purposes of jurisdiction, as the action is one to enforce a contract.” 

Carter v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 109 P.3d 735, 741–42 (Mont. 

2005).

[¶16.] Considering subsection (4), although Meemic contracted to insure the 

risk that its insured, Davis, could be involved in an automobile accident with an 

underinsured motorist in another state, including South Dakota, the underlying 

4. See also Johns v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 2022 WL 796178 at *1 (9th Cir. 

2022) (Montana court had no personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 

insurer, despite the car accident at issue occurring in Montana, when the outof-state “plaintiffs bought insurance policies from insurers that did no 

business in Montana and sought to insure vehicles that were not located in 

Montana at the time of contracting.”); Unser v. Prepared Ins. Co., 2017 WL 

1347701 at *4 (W.Va. 2017) (“personal jurisdiction . . . within the 

contemplation of our long-arm statute does not rise or fall with the terms of 

the policies [the insurer] issues; rather, it arises only upon the purposeful 

actions of the [insurer] as enumerated in the statute”).
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coverage dispute here has nothing to do with the accident having occurred in South 

Dakota. As one court explained, “It is important to differentiate between a case in 

which a company’s insured is sued as a result of a car accident in a foreign state, 

and the case at hand, where the insured is suing its regional insurer in a foreign 

state for breach of contract.” Carter, 109 P.3d at 741; see also 16A Couch on Ins. 

§ 228:34 (3d ed.) (“The fact that an insurer or insurance underwriting association is 

obligated to cover losses relating to an event occurring in another state is not 

sufficient to support a finding of either general or specific personal jurisdiction.”).

[¶17.] Moreover, SDCL 15-7-2 requires conduct on the part of the foreign 

defendant in the forum state, and the fact that an accident occurred in South 

Dakota is not conduct by Meemic in South Dakota. As noted above, the policy was 

written in Michigan, covering Davis, a Michigan resident, in accordance with 

Michigan law. And “an insurance contract between a foreign insured and a foreign 

insurer is not a contract within the forum state[.]” 16A Couch on Ins. § 228:30 (3d 

ed.); see also Carter, 109 P.3d at 740 (“While a promise to provide coverage 

throughout the United States may establish that an insurer has agreed to submit to 

jurisdiction in any forum that has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against its 

insured, this agreement to defend and indemnify its insured in any state does not 

imply an agreement to allow its insured to bring suit against it in any state”); Dix v. 

Peters, 374 F. Supp. 3d 213, 226 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (“While the accident triggering 

this dispute did occur in [the forum state], the minimum contacts must arise from 

action by the defendant himself, which create a substantial connection to the forum 
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state” (cleaned up)). Subsection (4), therefore, does not convey jurisdiction over 

Meemic under the long arm statute.

[¶18.] Finally, regarding subsection (11), Meemic has not commenced or 

participated in mediation or arbitration. Although subsection (11) also includes 

negotiations and Meemic made a few phone calls and sent emails attempting to 

negotiate with Davis regarding her underinsured motorist tort claim, there is no 

evidence in the record that Meemic’s conduct involved “subject matter located in 

whole or in part within [South Dakota.]” See SDCL 15-7-2(11) (emphasis added). 

Rather, the subject matter of the negotiations here is the entitlement to uninsured 

motorist benefits pursuant to an insurance contract entered into by Davis and 

Meemic in Michigan; thus, the subject matter involved is located in whole in 

Michigan, not South Dakota. Finally, Meemic has not participated in litigation on 

the merits of Davis’s claim in South Dakota, only filing a motion to dismiss for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. Accord Met Life Auto and Home Ins. Co. v. Lester, 2006 

S.D. 62, ¶ 11, 719 N.W.2d 385, 387 (“A person may waive a lack of personal 

jurisdiction by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court and pleading on the 

merits” (emphasis added)).

[¶19.] Meemic’s contacts with South Dakota are insufficient to subject 

Meemic to personal jurisdiction under South Dakota’s long arm statute, SDCL 15-7-

2. Further, even if Meemic’s actions had satisfied a provision of the long arm 

statute, Meemic has not had sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota to 

comport with federal due process requirements for the circuit court to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over Meemic.
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[¶20.] We apply a three-step analysis for this federal due process inquiry as 

articulated in Kustom Cycles:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the 

privilege of acting in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits 

and protections of its laws. Second, the cause of action must 

arise from [the] defendant’s activities directed at the forum 

state. Finally, the acts of [the] defendant must have substantial 

connection with the forum state to make the exercise of 

jurisdiction over [the] defendant a reasonable one.

2014 S.D. 87, ¶ 10, 857 N.W.2d at 407 (citations omitted).

[¶21.] This constitutional analysis stems from International Shoe, in which 

the United States Supreme Court expanded the ability of states to exercise 

jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, conditioned on meeting the requirements 

of federal due process. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). Eschewing 

a rigid requirement centered on the defendant’s presence in the state, the Court 

emphasized an analysis of the “quality and nature” of contacts with the forum state. 

Id. at 319, 66 S. Ct. at 160. Where “minimum contacts” allow a defendant to enjoy 

the “benefits and protection[s]” of the laws of a forum state, and where “traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice” are upheld, a court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction. Id. at 316–19, 66 S. Ct. at 158–60 (citations omitted). These 

contacts must be substantial enough to cause a non-resident defendant to 

“reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980) (citations 

omitted). The contacts cannot be random, isolated, or fortuitous and must arise 

from the defendant’s activities. Marschke, 2007 S.D. 125, ¶ 12, 743 N.W.2d at 405–

06.
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[¶22.] Where a court seeks to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party not 

based within the forum state, the party must have purposefully availed itself to the 

privileges and contacts within the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). Jurisdiction 

cannot be exercised on the basis of “unilateral activity of another party or a third 

person,” but rather is proper:

where the defendant “deliberately” has engaged in significant 

activities within a State, or has created “continuing obligations” 

between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has 

availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and 

because his activities are shielded by “the benefits and 

protections” of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not 

unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of 

litigation in that forum as well.

Id. at 475–76, 105 S. Ct. at 2183–84 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has 

“consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat 

personal jurisdiction” so long as the defendant’s “efforts are purposefully directed 

toward residents of another State[.]” Id. at 476, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (cleaned up). In 

analyzing whether a foreign insurer has engaged in “minimum contacts” necessary 

to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a foreign state, the court must 

consider whether the insurer’s contacts were “compelled by the unilateral actions of 

the insured, or were created by circumstances over which the insurer had no 

control.” 16A Couch on Ins. § 228:33 (3d ed.).

[¶23.] While this Court has, under certain conditions, found the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over foreign insurers proper, the facts and circumstances in 

each case are readily distinguishable from the present matter. In State v. American 

Bankers Ins. Co., the State brought an action to collect premium taxes from 
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American Bankers Insurance Company, a Texas-based corporation that had bought 

an insurance company that was providing insurance to South Dakota residents. 

374 N.W.2d 609, 611 (S.D. 1985). American Bankers was never licensed to transact 

business in South Dakota, but it did not cancel the pre-existing insurance policies 

issued to South Dakota residents. Id. American Bankers challenged the court’s 

ability to exercise personal jurisdiction, contending that it did not have sufficient 

minimum contacts with South Dakota. Id. The Court found that the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over American Bankers comported with requirements of 

federal due process, noting:

[t]he subject matter of this action directly flows from the 

economic consequences of American Bankers’ ongoing 

commercial activities with residents of South Dakota. Inasmuch 

as the insurance policies themselves are the object of the tax, we 

hold that American Bankers could reasonably have foreseen 

being haled into court in South Dakota to account for its 

economic activity here.

Id. at 613 (emphasis added). Thus, in American Bankers, the foreign insurer held 

policies of South Dakota residents, establishing minimum contacts sufficient for a 

finding of personal jurisdiction. Conversely, in the instant case, Meemic, a 

Michigan insurer, provided an insurance policy for Davis, a Michigan resident. It is 

by virtue of Davis’s unilateral acts that Meemic was compelled to have contact with 

South Dakota—a circumstance over which Meemic had no control.

[¶24.] In Rothluebbers v. Obee, the Rothluebbers, German residents, brought 

action against a German tour company, Agrar, and a German tour director, Obee, in 

Pennington County, South Dakota, for injuries and damages sustained in a onevehicle accident in Pennington County. 2003 S.D. 95, ¶¶ 2–4, 668 N.W.2d at 315–
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16. Obee, the driver of the Agrar van, had allegedly committed the tort in South 

Dakota that gave rise to the wrongful death and personal injury actions. Id. This 

Court reasoned that because Obee and Agrar were experienced tour operators who 

purposefully chose to conduct tours in South Dakota, the possibility of being “hauled 

into court” in South Dakota was foreseeable. Id. ¶ 29, 668 N.W.2d at 323. To that 

end, the defendants had purposefully availed themselves to the privilege of 

conducting activities within the state. Conversely, in the present matter, Meemic 

was not directly engaged in conduct in South Dakota. Furthermore, Meemic bore 

no involvement in or responsibility for the accident that took place in South Dakota 

that gave rise to Davis’s tort injuries and damages.

[¶25.] In Klenz v. AVI International, the mother of a German foreign 

exchange student residing with a South Dakota host family brought an action 

against the student’s foreign insurance broker, AVI International, to recover legal 

expenses incurred in a wrongful death suit. 2002 S.D. 72, ¶¶ 1–5, 647 N.W.2d 734, 

735–36. AVI filed a motion to dismiss, asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction, 

which the circuit court denied. Id. ¶ 5, 647 N.W.2d at 735–36. On appeal, AVI 

contended that it lacked sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota to warrant 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 11, 647 N.W.2d at 736. Further, AVI 

asserted that because it was merely an insurance broker, it could not have 

anticipated being haled into court in South Dakota. Id. This Court noted that 

“[w]hile AVI may not [have been] the primary insurer, it did issue a ‘Security 

Pass’Port’” to the exchange student, which operated as an insurance policy. Id. ¶ 

13, 647 N.W.2d at 737. This Court concluded that because the student, on exchange 
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with a host family in South Dakota, had been covered by the provisions of AVI’s 

“Security Pass’Port” when he was killed in an accident that occurred in South 

Dakota, AVI could have foreseen being haled into court in South Dakota. Id. ¶ 15, 

647 N.W.2d at 737. As such, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over AVI 

comported with federal due process considerations.

[¶26.] As in Klenz, the accident giving rise to Davis’s claims in this case 

occurred in South Dakota and was caused by a South Dakota resident. However, in 

Klenz, AVI knowingly issued a policy to a student temporarily residing in the state 

with a South Dakota host family. The insurer thus knew that the policy was 

intended to provide continuous coverage in South Dakota—far from a random, 

isolated, or fortuitous event or act. In the present matter, Davis’s unilateral actions 

compelled Meemic’s alleged contact with South Dakota. Therefore, the minimum 

contacts required to warrant a finding of jurisdiction are not met.

Conclusion

[¶27.] A South Dakota court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Meemic 

under these circumstances is improper under SDCL 15-7-2. Moreover, a court faced 

with the facts presented here cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident insurer on the basis of a breach of contract claim between a non-resident 

insured and non-resident insurer who has not engaged in significant activities 

within the state. As such, the minimum contacts necessary to support the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction in accordance with due process requirements are not 

satisfied. We reverse the circuit court’s denial of Meemic’s motion to dismiss and 
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remand to the circuit court for entry of an order dismissing Davis’s claim against 

Meemic for lack of personal jurisdiction.

[¶28.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN, 

Justices, concur.