36104 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 115 / Wednesday, June 15, 2022 / Notices 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 

A copy of the notification will be 

available for public inspection in the 

‘‘Online FTZ Information System’’ 

section of the Board’s website. 

For further information, contact 

Juanita Chen at juanita.chen@trade.gov. 

Dated: June 9, 2022. 

Andrew McGilvray, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2022–12901 Filed 6–14–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Foreign-Trade Zones Board 

[B–25–2022] 

Foreign-Trade Zone (FTZ) 281—MiamiDade County, Florida; Notification of 

Proposed Production Activity; EUSA 

Global LLC (Medical Equipment); 

Medley, Florida 

EUSA Global LLC submitted a 

notification of proposed production 

activity to the FTZ Board (the Board) for 

its facility in Medley, Florida under FTZ 

281. The notification conforming to the 

requirements of the Board’s regulations 

(15 CFR 400.22) was received on June 7, 

2022. 

Pursuant to 15 CFR 400.14(b), FTZ 

production activity would be limited to 

the specific foreign-status materials/ 

components and specific finished 

products described in the submitted 

notification (summarized below) and 

subsequently authorized by the Board. 

The benefits that may stem from 

conducting production activity under 

FTZ procedures are explained in the 

background section of the Board’s 

website—accessible via www.trade.gov/ 

ftz. 

The proposed finished products 

include: optical heads for colposcope or 

microscope with LED light source; 

optical heads for colposcope or 

microscope with video; optical heads 

for colposcope or microscope with LED 

light source, with video; LED light 

source; LED portable light source; LED 

portable head light source; endoscopes; 

sinuscopes; otoscopes; laryngoscopes; 

and, video cameras for endoscopy (dutyfree). 

The proposed foreign-status materials 

and components include: plastic 

carrying cases for LED lights and 

devices; head band holders; LED light 

sources; plastic 35mm adapters for cmount cameras; metal adapters for 

endoscopes; connector cables; metal 

carrying cases for endoscopes; cooling 

fans; heat sinks; power supplies for 

video cameras; LED drivers; power 

supplies for LED light sources; video 

cameras; camera heads; housings for 

video splitters; metal housings for 

protecting electrical circuits; knobs; 

metal housings for printed circuit 

assemblies; battery chargers/power 

supplies; hemi filters; power sockets; 

hemi protection filters; power switches; 

LED holders; LEDs (high power); power 

cables; video cables; lithium-ion 

rechargeable batteries; optical 

assemblies for endoscopes; optics; 

binoculars; variable focal lenses; fixed 

focal lenses; ‘‘T’’ handpieces for scope 

heads; optical splitters; eye pieces; 

video adapters; video splitters; c-mount 

adapters; colposcope/microscope, 

optical magnification changers; LED 

Illuminators; and, mounted LEDs with 

optics with portable lithium-ion 

batteries (duty rate ranges from dutyfree to 7.6%). The request indicates that 

certain materials/components are 

subject to duties under Section 301 of 

the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301), 

depending on the country of origin. The 

applicable Section 301 decisions require 

subject merchandise to be admitted to 

FTZs in privileged foreign status (19 

CFR 146.41). 

Public comment is invited from 

interested parties. Submissions shall be 

addressed to the Board’s Executive 

Secretary and sent to: ftz@trade.gov. The 

closing period for their receipt is July 

25, 2022. 

A copy of the notification will be 

available for public inspection in the 

‘‘Online FTZ Information System’’ 

section of the Board’s website. 

For further information, contact 

Christopher Wedderburn at 

Chris.Wedderburn@trade.gov. 

Dated: June 9, 2022. 

Andrew McGilvray, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2022–12896 Filed 6–14–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Quicksilver Manufacturing, Inc., 8209 

Market St. #A173, Wilmington, NC 

28411; Rapid Cut LLC, 8209 Market St. 

#A173, Wilmington, NC 28411; U.S. 

Prototype, Inc., 8209 Market St. #A173, 

Wilmington, NC 28411; Order 

Temporarily Denying Export Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations (the 

‘‘Regulations’’ or ‘‘EAR’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of: Quicksilver 

Manufacturing, Inc. (‘‘Quicksilver’’), 

Rapid Cut LLC (‘‘Rapid Cut’’), and U.S. 

Prototype, Inc. (U.S. Prototype). 

OEE’s request and related information 

indicates that these three parties use the 

same rental mailbox located in 

Wilmington, NC, which was opened by 

Quicksilver’s Vice President of 

Operations who was involved in some 

of the conduct described infra. 

Additionally, the investigation reveals 

that another Quicksilver officer is listed 

as the president and registered agent for 

US Prototype and the designated 

representative for Rapid Cut’s corporate 

banking account. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 

766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be 

‘imminent’ either in time or degree of 

likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS 

may show ‘‘either that a violation is 

about to occur, or that the general 

circumstances of the matter under 

investigation or case under criminal or 

administrative charges demonstrate a 

likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As 

to the likelihood of future violations, 

BIS may show that the violation under 

investigation or charge ‘‘is significant, 

deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur 

again, rather than technical or 

negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘[l]ack of information 

establishing the precise time a violation 

may occur does not preclude a finding 

that a violation is imminent, so long as 

there is sufficient reason to believe the 

likelihood of a violation.’’ Id. 

Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 

766.24, a temporary denial order 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 115 / Wednesday, June 15, 2022 / Notices 36105 

2 ‘‘Item’’ means ‘‘commodities, software, and 

technology. 15 CFR 772.1. Further, ‘‘technology’’ 

may be in any tangible or intangible form, such as 

written or oral communications, blueprints, 

drawings, photographs, plans, diagrams, models, 

formulae, tables, engineering designs and 

specifications, computer-aided design files, 

manuals or documentation, electronic media or 

information revealed through visual inspection. Id. 

3ECCN 9E515 covers ‘‘[t]echnology required for 

the ‘‘development’’, ‘‘production’’, operation, 

installation, repair, overhaul, or refurbishing of 

spacecraft and related commodities.’’ 

4 15 CFR 742.4. 

5 ‘‘Technology’’ ‘‘required’’ for the 

‘‘development,’’ ‘‘production,’’ operation, 

installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, or 

refurbishing of commodities controlled by ECCN 

9A604 [commodities related to launch vehicles, 

missiles, and rockets] or 9B604, or ‘‘software’’ 

controlled by ECCN 9D604. 

(‘‘TDO’’) may also be made applicable to 

other persons if BIS has reason to 

believe that they are related to a 

respondent and that applying the order 

to them is necessary to prevent its 

evasion. 15 CFR 766.23(a)–(b) and 

766.24(c). A ‘‘related person’’ is a 

person, either at the time the TDO’s 

issuance or thereafter, who is related to 

a respondent ‘‘by ownership, control, 

position of responsibility, affiliation, or 

other connection in the conduct of trade 

or business.’’ 15 CFR 766.23(a). Related 

persons may be added to a TDO on an 

ex-parte basis in accordance with 

Section 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 15 

CFR 766.23(b). 

II. OEE’S Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order 

As further detailed below, OEE’s 

request is based upon facts indicating 

that Respondents engaged in conduct 

prohibited by the Regulations by 

exporting or causing the export from the 

United States of controlled technology 

to China for 3D printing without the 

required U.S. government authorization. 

‘‘Export’’ is defined in the EAR as an 

‘‘actual shipment or transmission out of 

the United States, including the sending 

or taking of an item out of the United 

States, in any manner.’’ 15 CFR 

734.13(a)(1).2

A. Unlicensed Export of National 

Security Controlled Technology to 

China 

In or about February 2020, OEE was 

alerted by a U.S. aerospace and global 

defense technology company, on behalf 

of its wholly-owned subsidiary, 

(collectively ‘‘U.S. Company 1’’), of an 

export-control violation committed by a 

third-party supplier involving the 

unauthorized export of controlled 

satellite technology to the People’s 

Republic of China (‘‘China’’). OEE’s 

investigation revealed that in or about 

July 2017, satellite parts were ordered 

from Quicksilver in Wilmington, North 

Carolina. Quicksilver markets itself as a 

company that specializes in fabrication 

and metalworking, including 3Dprinting, injection molding, and lasercut sheet metal prototypes, among other 

manufacturing services. 

As part of the transaction, Quicksilver 

was provided approximately a dozen 

technical drawings and 3D graphic/ 

computer aided drawing files, items 

subject to the Regulations, intended to 

be used by Quicksilver to manufacture 

the components to the identified 

specifications. The components would 

then be provided to U.S. Company 1 for 

use in a prototype space-satellite. 

On or about July 6, 2017, a 

Quicksilver employee using an 

@quicksilver-mfg.com email address 

signed a Mutual Non-Disclosure 

Agreement (‘‘NDA’’). The NDA contains, 

in part, the following language related to 

United State export laws and 

regulations: 

EXPORT CONTROL. The Parties 

acknowledge that the Proprietary Information 

and any related materials or information 

provided under this Agreement may be 

subject to United States export laws and 

regulations, including but not limited to the 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations and 

the Export Administration Regulations. The 

Parties agree that all activities under this 

Agreement will be conducted in strict 

compliance with the United States export 

laws and regulations. The Receiving Party 

shall not distribute, transfer, or transmit any 

Proprietary Information and related materials 

or information (even if incorporated into 

other products) except in compliance with 

the United States export laws and 

regulations. The Receiving Party shall first 

obtain the written consent of the Disclosing 

Party prior to submitting any request to any 

governmental entity for authority to export 

any Proprietary Information and related 

materials or information or conducting any 

export or reexport of information or services 

pursuant to the United States export laws 

and regulations. 

On or about July 11, 2017, 

Quicksilver’s Vice President of 

Operations using an @quicksilvermfg.com email address was asked to 

‘‘please quote price and delivery’’ for 

several specified drawings. Technical 

drawings, item subject to the 

Regulations, classified under Export 

Control Classification Number 9E515, 

and controlled for National Security 

reasons were attached to the email.3

These items were subject to a 

presumption of denial licensing policy 

for China.4 Approximately three days 

later, Quicksilver was provided 

purchase orders containing the 

following language regarding export 

requirements: 

The Seller shall comply with all applicable 

U.S. export control laws in receiving, 

utilizing and/or disposing of any articles, 

technical data and/or services provided by 

the Buyer in connection with this order, and 

in transferring or otherwise disposing of any 

articles, technical data and/or services 

developed or produced therefrom by the 

Seller. As provided in the Terms and 

Conditions for this order, no technical data 

or other items provided by the Buyer or 

developed or produced by the Seller may be 

exported, transferred, or disclosed outside 

the United States or to any foreign person, 

unless the Buyer provides written consent 

and the Seller obtains all required export 

licenses and/or other approvals from the 

United States Government. 

Quicksilver fulfilled the order, which 

was received by U.S. Company 1 in or 

around August 2017. The shipping label 

and the pro forma invoice provided 

within the shipment identified 

Quicksilver as having an address in 

China and indicated that the products 

had been shipped from China. No 

export license had been sought or 

obtained for this transaction. 

More recently, in or about July 2021, 

OEE discovered a violation by Rapid 

Cut which, as discussed above, is 

related to Quicksilver by location, 

ownership and operating personnel, 

also involving controlled technology 

exported to China without the required 

BIS export license. In particular, in or 

about May 2021, U.S. Company 2 hired 

Rapid Cut to manufacture specially 

designed parts intended for a rocket 

platform’s ground support and test 

equipment. According to U.S. Company 

2, the technology provided to Rapid Cut 

is classified under ECCN 9E604.a,5

controlled for National Security and 

Missile Technology reason, and has a 

presumption of denial licensing policy 

for China. The technology was 

subsequently transferred on or about 

May 7, 2021, to China without requires 

export licenses. Moreover, the on-going 

investigation revealed that U.S. 

Company 2 provided Rapid Cut a copy 

of its standard terms and conditions, 

which included the need for compliance 

with all applicable international trade 

control laws, and that each page of 

drawings was marked with an Export 

Control Statement, which stated: 

‘‘THIS DOCUMEN CONTAINS U.S. 

EXPORT CONTROLLED INFORMATION 

(ITAR OR EAR). THE EXPORT, RE–EXPORT, 

TRANSFER OR RE–TRANSFER OF THIS 

DOCUMENT TO ANY OTHER COMPANY, 

ENTITY, PERONS OR DESTINATION, OR 

FOR ANY USE OR PURPOSE OTHER THAN 

FOR WHICH THE DOCUMENT WAS 

PROVIDED BY [U.S. Company 2] IS 

PROHIBITED WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM 

[U.S. Company 2] AND AUTHORIZATION 

UNDER APPLICABLE EXPORT CONTROL 

LAWS. THIS DOCUMENT IS 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES1
36106 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 115 / Wednesday, June 15, 2022 / Notices 

6 22 CFR 120.6. 

CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY TO 

[U.S. Company 2].’’ 

B. Unlawful Export to China of 

Controlled Technical Data Subject to 

the International Traffic in Arms 

Regulations 

OEE’s on-going investigation 

produced evidence that Respondents 

clear disregard for export controls 

extends beyond just items subject to the 

EAR but also encompasses the 

unlicensed export of defense articles, 

designated in the ITAR and listed on the 

U.S. Munitions List, to China.6 OEE’s 

investigation identified communications 

between Quicksilver and another one of 

its U.S. customers, an advanced science 

and engineering company with multiple 

U.S. government contracts including 

with various components of the 

Department of Defense (‘‘U.S. Company 

3), which followed the same general 

factual pattern described above. For 

example, Quicksilver signed a 

confidentiality agreement dated 

February 12, 2019, with U.S. Company 

3 agreeing that, among other things, it 

would not export or reexport any 

confidential information ‘‘to any 

country prohibited from obtaining such 

Confidential Information, either directly 

or indirectly . . . which may be in 

violation of United States and/or foreign 

export control laws.’’ 

In addition, on or about March 17, 

2020, in connection with a different 

project, U.S. Company 3 sent 

Quicksilver technical drawings and 

computer aided design files for 3D 

manufacture. Some of the drawing and 

files contained the following export 

control markings: 

EXPORT CONTROLLED—ITAR 

RESTRICTED: THIS DOCUMENT 

CONTAINS TECHNICAL DATA WHOSE 

EXPORT IS RESTRICTED BY THE ARMS 

EXPORT CONTROL ACT (TITLE 22, U.S.C., 

SEC 2751, ET SEQ.) OR THE EXPORT 

ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979, AS 

AMENDED, TITLE 50 U.S.C., APP. 240 ET 

SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THESE EXPORT 

LAWS ARE SUBJECT TO SEVERE 

CRIMINAL PENALTIES. DISSEMINATE IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF DOD 

DIRECTIVE 5230.25. 

A subsequent purchase order sent 

from U.S. Company 3 to Quicksilver for 

its signature further stated in part: 

I reviewed the General Terms and 

Conditions on [U.S. Company 3’s] website 

and noted a section pertaining to compliance 

with all applicable U.S. export control laws 

and regulations, specifically including but 

not limited to the Arms Export Control Act, 

ITAR, and the EAR. 

On or about April 16, 2020, U.S. 

Company 3 received an invoice for the 

controlled items from Quicksilver 

which identified the shipper/exporter as 

Quicksilver MFG in Zhongshan, China. 

The investigation determined that 

technical drawings sent to China were 

defense articles controlled under USML 

Category XX (Submersible Vessels and 

Related Articles), section (d), and 

therefore, U.S. Government 

authorization was required to export the 

technical drawings to China. No such 

authorization was sought or received. 

C. U.S. Prototype as a Related Person to 

Both Quicksilver and Rapid Cut 

OEE’s investigation has established 

that U.S. Prototype uses the same 

Wilmington, NC mailbox address as 

both Quicksilver and Rapid Cut. 

Additionally, publicly available 

documents with the North Carolina 

Secretary of State’s office show that U.S. 

Prototype’s president and registered 

agent is a Quicksilver officer who was 

involved in the transactions described 

above and whose wife is also listed as 

U.S. Prototype’s vice president. 

Moreover, that same Quicksilver officer 

is listed as the designated representative 

for Rapid Cut’s corporate bank account. 

U.S. Prototype’s corporate banking 

account also identifies itself as U.S. 

Prototype, Inc., DBA [doing business as] 

Rapid Cut. 

III. Findings 

I find that the evidence presented by 

BIS demonstrates that a violation of the 

Regulations by the above-captioned 

parties is imminent in degree of 

likelihood. As such, a TDO is needed to 

give notice to persons and companies in 

the United States and abroad that they 

should cease dealing with Quicksilver, 

Rapid Cut, and U.S. Prototype in export 

or reexport transactions involving items, 

including technology or software, 

subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is 

consistent with the public interest to 

preclude future violations of the 

Regulations given the serious national 

security concerns impacted by the 

misconduct and the clear disregard for 

complying with U.S. export control 

laws. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with Section 

766.24 of the Regulations. 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, that Quicksilver Manufacturing, 

Inc., with an address at 8209 Market St. 

#A173, Wilmington, NC 28411; Rapid 

Cut LLC, with an address at 8209 

Market St. #A173, Wilmington, NC 

28411; and U.S. Prototype, Inc., with an 

address at 8209 Market St. #A173, 

Wilmington, NC 28411, and when 

acting for or on their behalf, any 

successors or assigns, agents, or 

employees (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ and 

collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’) may 

not, directly or indirectly, participate in 

any way in any transaction involving 

any commodity, software or technology 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from 

the United States that is subject to the 

EAR, or in any other activity subject to 

the EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, License Exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR, or in any other 

activity subject to the EAR; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or in any 

other activity subject to the EAR. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of a Denied 

Person any item subject to the EAR; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

a Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States, 

including financing or other support 

activities related to a transaction 

whereby a Denied Person acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from a Denied Person of any 

item subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States; 

D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the 

United States any item subject to the 

EAR with knowledge or reason to know 

that the item will be, or is intended to 

be, exported from the United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by a Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by a Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States. For 

purposes of this paragraph, servicing 


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means installation, maintenance, repair, 

modification, or testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for response as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Quicksilver 

Manufacturing or Rapid Cut, by 

affiliation, ownership, control, or 

position of responsibility in the conduct 

of trade or related services may also be 

made subject to the provisions of this 

Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, 

Quicksilver Manufacturing or Rapid 

Cut, may, at any time, appeal this Order 

by filing a full written statement in 

support of the appeal with the Office of 

the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. 

Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 

South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 

21202–4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of 

the EAR, U.S. Prototype may, at any 

time, appeal its inclusion as a related 

person by filing a full written statement 

in support of the appeal with the Office 

of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. 

Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 

South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 

21202–4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. Respondents 

Quicksilver Manufacturing, Rapid Cut, 

or U.S. Prototype, Inc., may oppose a 

request to renew this Order by filing a 

written submission with the Assistant 

Secretary for Export Enforcement, 

which must be received not later than 

seven days before the expiration date of 

the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be served 

on each denied person and shall be 

published in the Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

This document of the Bureau of 

Industry and Security was signed on 

June 7, 2022. That document with the 

original signature and date is 

maintained by the Bureau of Industry 

and Security. This duplicate original 

document was re-signed for 

administrative purposes only, and in 

compliance with publication 

requirements of the Office of the Federal 

Register. This administrative process in 

no way alters the legal effect of this 

document upon publication in the 

Federal Register or of the original June 

7 document. 

Dated: June 7, 2022. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2022–12826 Filed 6–14–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities; Submission to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for 

Review and Approval; Comment 

Request; License Exemptions and 

Exclusions 

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Commerce. 

ACTION: Notice of information collection; 

request for comment. 

SUMMARY: The Department of 

Commerce, in accordance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(PRA), invites the general public and 

other Federal agencies to comment on 

proposed, and continuing information 

collections, which helps us assess the 

impact of our information collection 

requirements and minimize the public’s 

reporting burden. The purpose of this 

notice is to allow for 60 days of public 

comment preceding submission of the 

collection to OMB. 

DATES: To ensure consideration, 

comments regarding this proposed 

information collection must be received 

on or before August 15, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are 

invited to submit comments by email to 

Mark Crace, IC Liaison, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, at mark.crace@

bis.doc.gov or to PRAcomments@

doc.gov). Please reference OMB Control 

Number 0694–0137 in the subject line of 

your comments. Do not submit 

Confidential Business Information or 

otherwise sensitive or protected 

information. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Requests for additional information or 

specific questions related to collection 

activities should be directed to Mark 

Crace, IC Liaison, Bureau of Industry 

and Security, phone 202–482–8093 or 

by email at mark.crace@bis.doc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Abstract 

Over the years, BIS has worked with 

other Government agencies and the 

affected public to identify areas where 

export licensing requirements may be 

relaxed without jeopardizing U.S. 

national security or foreign policy. 

Many of these relaxations have taken 

the form of licensing exceptions and 

exclusions. Some of these license 

exceptions and exclusions have a 

reporting or recordkeeping requirement 

to enable the Government to continue to 

monitor exports of these items. 

Exporters may choose to utilize the 

license exception and accept the 

reporting or recordkeeping burden in 

lieu of submitting a license application. 

These exceptions and exclusions have 

allowed exporters to ship items quickly, 

without having to wait for license 

approval. 

II. Method of Collection 

Electronic. 

III. Data 

OMB Control Number: 0694–0137. 

Form Number(s): None. 

Type of Review: Regular submission, 

extension of a current information 

collection. 

Affected Public: Business or other forprofit organizations. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

19,738. 

Estimated Time per Response: 1.52 

hours. 

Estimated Total Annual Burden 

Hours: 29,998. 

Estimated Total Annual Cost to 

Public: 0. 

Respondent’s Obligation: Voluntary. 

Legal Authority: Export Control 

Reform Act (ECRA) of 2018. 

IV. Request for Comments 

We are soliciting public comments to 

permit the Department/Bureau to: (a) 

Evaluate whether the proposed 

information collection is necessary for 

the proper functions of the Department, 

including whether the information will 

have practical utility; (b) Evaluate the 

accuracy of our estimate of the time and 

cost burden for this proposed collection, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; (c) 

Evaluate ways to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information to 

be collected; and (d) Minimize the 

reporting burden on those who are to 

respond, including the use of automated 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology. 

Comments that you submit in 

response to this notice are a matter of 

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