1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1901

___________

CLARENCE PHIPPEN,

 Appellant

v.

CO FISKE; PA JANAN LOOMIS; DONALD JONES; JOE NISH; 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE; 

RHONDA ELLETT, Unit Manager; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; CO MCHUGH

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00795)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 26, 2012

Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 7, 2013)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM
2

Clarence Phippen, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from 

the District Court’s final order granting summary judgment in favor of the remaining 

defendants in this civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the background of this case 

only briefly here. In 2009, Phippen, then incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution 

at Waymart (“SCI-Waymart”),1

Loomis ultimately removed the case to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441. More than thirty days after she filed her notice of removal, Phippen moved the 

District Court to remand the case back to state court, claiming that the notice of removal 

was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Thereafter, the United States Magistrate Judge 

who was assigned to the case issued an order deeming Phippen’s motion withdrawn 

based on his failure to file an accompanying brief. In a report issued that same day, the 

Magistrate Judge noted that Phippen’s remand motion was untimely as well.

commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Court 

of Common Pleas for Wayne County, Pennsylvania. The complaint named as defendants 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the 

Program Review Committee at SCI-Waymart (“PRC”), several officials at SCI-Waymart, 

and Janan Loomis, a physician’s assistant who worked for a medical provider that served 

prisoners at SCI-Waymart.

 1 Phippen is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Rockview in 

Bellefonte, Pennsylvania.
3

Meanwhile, Loomis moved to dismiss the claims against her pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court granted that motion without 

prejudice to Phippen’s filing an amended complaint. In April 2010, Phippen filed an 

amended complaint as to all of the defendants, enumerating sixty-three causes of action. 

Thereafter, Loomis again moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

The Magistrate Judge subsequently issued a sixty-page report recommending that

the District Court grant Loomis’s pending motion and dismiss the claims against her 

without affording Phippen further leave to amend. In that same report, the Magistrate 

Judge also reviewed the claims against the other defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). The Magistrate Judge recommended that all but eight of those claims be 

dismissed, and concluded that granting further leave to amend would be futile. In 

October 2010, the District Court adopted all of these recommendations. As a result, the 

only causes of action that remained were certain claims against the PRC and four of the 

SCI-Waymart officials.

Several months later, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on 

the eight surviving claims. The Magistrate Judge subsequently issued a forty-page report 

recommending that the District Court grant that motion and close the case. On March 2, 

2012, the District Court adopted that recommendation. This appeal followed.2

 2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We may affirm 

the district court on any ground supported by the record.” Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 

F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
4

II.

We begin our review with Phippen’s claim that the District Court should have 

remanded this case to the state court. “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any 

defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the 

filing of the notice of removal . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). “It is well 

settled that § 1446(b)’s thirty-day time limit for removal is a procedural provision, not a 

jurisdictional one.” Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 114 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, 

Phippen had to file his remand motion within thirty days of the date on which Loomis 

filed her notice of removal. Because he failed to do so, the District Court lacked the 

authority to grant his remand motion. See Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring

We now turn to the District Court’s adjudication of Phippen’s amended complaint. 

We exercise plenary review over both the court’s order dismissing the vast majority of 

Phippen’s claims and its subsequent order granting summary judgment on his remaining 

claims. 

, 351 F.3d 

611, 612 (3d Cir. 2003).

See Gikas v. Wash. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 731, 734 (3d Cir. 2003). For 

substantially the reasons set forth in the two Magistrate Judge reports upon which the 

District Court relied in issuing those orders, we agree with the court’s disposition of 

Phippen’s amended complaint.
5

As for the remaining arguments set forth in Phippen’s briefing, we have 

considered those arguments and conclude that they do not entitle him to relief.3

 3 Phippen’s claim that the District Court exhibited bias against him is baseless. To the 

extent this claim is fueled by his dissatisfaction with the District Court’s resolution of his 

case, that sentiment does not justify granting relief here. See Securacomm Consulting, 

Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated 

that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal 

. . . .”). 

 

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.