If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

LAKYRA LASHAE CARTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

February 1, 2024

v No. 364008

Wayne Circuit Court

PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

LC No. 21-003109-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and MURRAY and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this first-party no-fault action, plaintiff appeals as of right the final order clarifying the 

trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant. Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s 

earlier order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6) (another action initiated 

between same parties involving same claim) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) (genuine issue of material 

fact), to defendant. The trial court found that plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit against her 

insurance company because she had assigned her right to recover to her various medical providers. 

We affirm.

I. FACTS

On November 2, 2020, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision and, as a result, 

suffered injuries requiring medical treatment and services. At the time, plaintiff had a personal 

protection insurance (PIP) policy with defendant. Plaintiff entered into assignments with multiple 

medical providers, including A One Rehab LLC (A One), Michigan Diagnostic Center (Michigan 

Diagnostic), and TJ Medical Supplies LLC (TJ Medical).1 

 

1 Michigan Diagnostic, as an assignee of plaintiff, brought suit against defendant in the 15th 

District Court on December 10, 2020, for unpaid medical bills and breach of contract, Case No. 

20-10207-GC. This case was dismissed on April 7, 2020. Additional lawsuits were filed by other 
-2-

On March 8, 2021, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, claiming defendant unreasonably 

refused to reimburse plaintiff for PIP benefits she was entitled to receive involving payment for 

expenses incurred for her treatment. Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing plaintiff 

lacked standing and was not the real party in interest because she had assigned her right to recover 

to her medical providers. Plaintiff responded to the motion and attached three “revocations of 

assignments”, executed by A One, Michigan Diagnostic, and TJ Medical. The “revocations” were 

signed only by the providers, not the plaintiff. And the only “revocation” that is dated is from 

Michigan Diagnostic, dated June 10, 2022, after the filing of the complaint. 

The trial court granted defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6) and MCR 

2.116(C)(10). The trial court reasoned that because plaintiff entered into assignments with medical 

providers, plaintiff was not the real party in interest and lacked standing to bring the lawsuit at the 

time it was filed. The trial court also found the assignments were irrevocable by their terms, the 

revocations were invalid, and plaintiff’s claims were barred by the one-year-back rule. The trial 

court further held plaintiff was precluded from bringing suit because previous suits were brought 

in district court by her providers based on assignment, and to the extent Michigan Diagnostic filed 

its own suit, summary disposition was warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(6).

Defendant sought clarity on whether all of plaintiff’s claims were barred, and for entry of 

a final judgment. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and entered a final order dismissing 

all of plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff now appeals. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo motions for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” 

Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . tests the factual sufficiency of a 

claim. When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence 

submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no 

genuine issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the 

record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [El-Khalil 

v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (quotation 

marks, citations, and emphasis omitted).]

A trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6) is reviewed 

de novo. Valeo Switches & Detection Sys, Inc v EMCom, Inc, 272 Mich App 309, 311; 725 NW2d 

364 (2006). “Whether a party has standing presents a question of law that this Court reviews de 

novo.” Trademark Props of Mich, LLC v Fed Nat’l Mtg Ass’n, 308 Mich App 132, 136; 863 

NW2d 344 (2014). “Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo.” People v 

Kloosterman, 296 Mich App 636, 639; 823 NW2d 134 (2012). “The existence and interpretation 

of a contract are questions of law reviewed de novo.” Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich 

 

medical providers, who are not involved in this appeal, against defendant involving medical bills 

related to this case.
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App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). “Collateral estoppel and res judicata present questions of 

law reviewed de novo by this Court.” King v Munro, 329 Mich App 594, 599; 944 NW2d 198 

(2019). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting summary disposition because the 

revocations of the assignments were valid, and defendant lacks standing to challenge the validity 

of the revocations. Plaintiff’s statement of the issue mischaracterizes the actual dispute in this 

case. 

“Courts are not bound by the labels that parties attach to their claims.” Pugno v Blue 

Harvest Farms LLC, 326 Mich App 1, 13; 930 NW2d 393 (2018) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “To determine the nature of the claim, we seek its gravamen, and therefore we disregard 

the labels given to the claim and instead read the complaint as a whole.” Meyers v Rieck, 509 

Mich 460, 469; 983 NW2d 747 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant moved 

for summary disposition, arguing plaintiff lacked standing because she assigned her rights to file 

suit to the medical providers. The trial court found, to the extent plaintiff entered into assignments 

with providers, plaintiff lacked standing to pursue those claims. The gravamen of this case is 

whether plaintiff had standing to initiate this action in the first instance, not whether defendant had 

standing to challenge the validity of the revocations. 

Under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., PIP benefits are payable for 

“[a]llowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary 

products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” 

MCL 500.3107(1)(a). “The no-fault act allows injured claimants to pursue recovery of PIP 

benefits themselves or they may assign their right to recovery to their medical providers.” Wallace 

v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) 

(Docket No. 360537); slip op at 2. “In determining whether an assignment has been made, the 

question is one of intent. A written agreement assigning a subject matter must manifest the 

assignor’s intent to transfer the subject matter clearly and unconditionally to the assignee.” 

Burkhardt v Bailey, 260 Mich App 636, 655; 680 NW2d 453 (2004) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “No particular form of words is required for an assignment, but the assignor must 

manifest an intent to transfer and must not retain any control or any power of revocation.” Id. 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

“When an assignment occurs, the assignee of a cause of action becomes the real party in 

interest with respect to that cause of action, inasmuch as the assignment vests in the assignee all 

rights previously held by the assignor.” Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 

___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 358872 and 358884); slip op at 4 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The real party in interest doctrine is a “standing doctrine,” which 

“recognizes that litigation should be begun only by a party having an interest that will assure 

sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Barclae v Zarb, 300 Mich App 455, 483; 834 NW2d 100 (2013) 

(citation omitted). 

However, although the principle of statutory standing overlaps significantly 

with the real-party-in-interest rule, they are distinct concepts. The principle of 
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statutory standing is jurisdictional; if a party lacks statutory standing, then the court 

generally lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding or reach the merits. In 

contrast, the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a 

litigant's ability to raise the legal rights of another. [In re Beatrice Rottenberg 

Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (citations omitted).]

In Farrar we held that upon execution of valid assignment contracts with medical providers, the 

“providers became the real parties in interest with respect to their claims for benefits, and only 

they could sue to recover those benefits.” Farrar, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. Thus, the 

plaintiff in Farrar did not have standing to sue. Id. at ___; slip op at 4.

This case is analogous to Farrar. Plaintiff executed assignments with A One, Michigan 

Diagnostic, and TJ Medical before bringing suit against defendant. When plaintiff executed those 

assignments, A One, Michigan Diagnostic, and TJ Medical became the real parties in interest in 

this matter, and plaintiff lost the ability to pursue claims related to those providers.2 The parties 

do not contest the validity of the assignments, only the validity of the revocations. Because 

plaintiff executed valid assignments to medical providers before filing this case, plaintiff lacked 

standing to sue to recover benefits related to those providers. 

The revocations of assignments do not affect whether plaintiff had standing to bring this 

suit. “[O]ne must be the real party in interest at the time the lawsuit is filed, and a retroactive, or 

nunc pro tunc, revocation may not be used to correct a factual problem that existed when the 

lawsuit was filed.” Wallace, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Plaintiff has provided no evidence to suggest the revocations were effective before the 

date plaintiff filed this suit. Regardless of whether the revocations were validly executed, plaintiff 

lacked standing to initiate this suit due to the assignments being in affect at the time plaintiff filed 

her complaint.

Furthermore, plaintiff may not execute revocations of assignments to avoid application of 

the one-year-back rule. Id. MCL 500.3145(1) provides:

An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this 

chapter for an accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year 

after the date of the accident that caused the injury unless written notice of injury 

as provided in subsection (4) has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the 

accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection 

insurance benefits for the injury. 

“The one-year-back rule is designed to limit the amount of benefits recoverable under the no-fault 

act to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought.” Joseph v Auto 

Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 202; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). Where revocations of assignments 

 

2 The trial court correctly held plaintiff’s claims against additional providers, who are not the 

subject of this appeal, were barred because plaintiff lacked standing and is not the real party in 

interest. Plaintiff did not present revocations of assignments for these providers. 
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are obtained after a provider’s right to collect on their claim has “already been extinguished by the 

one-year-back rule,” there remains “no actionable causes of action to give back to plaintiff.” 

Wallace, __ Mich App at __; slip op at 5. The motor vehicle accident here occurred on November 

2, 2020. Michigan Diagnostic’s revocation is dated June 10, 2022. When plaintiff obtained the 

revocation, Michigan Diagnostic did not have a valid claim, by operation of the one-year-back 

rule. The revocations of assignments for A One and TJ Medical are not dated.3 It is unclear from 

the record whether the one-year-back rule precludes their claims. Regardless, plaintiff is not the 

real party in interest to pursue the claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is not the real party in interest because she assigned her rights to the medical 

providers before filing her complaint. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting defendant 

summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims. We affirm. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Christopher P. Yates

 

3 The assignments to A One spanned November 18, 2020, through March 5, 2021 The assignment 

to TJ Medical was dated June 8, 2021. It is possible the revocations executed for these providers 

may coincide with the June 10, 2022 revocation obtained from Michigan Diagnostic, but the 

current record is inadequate to make this determination.