FILED

COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION I1

2015 MAR 10 AM 8 35

STATE" OF SW ' P1

BY

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

DIVISION II

Respondent, 

v. 

PATRICK JOSEPH MULLEN, 

Appellant. 

No. 45013 -5 -II

PART PUBLISHED OPINION

JOHANSON, C.J. — Patrick Joseph Mullen appeals his jury convictions for felony driving

under the influence (DUI) and second degree driving while license suspended or revoked (DWLS). 

Mullen argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it declined to give his

proposed jury instruction requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that alcohol or

drugs were involved in his prior conviction for reckless driving. In the published portion of this

opinion, we agree with Mullen. Mullen' s remaining arguments are addressed in the unpublished

portion of this opinion. We reverse Mullen' s felony DUI conviction, remand to the trial court to

enter a misdemeanor DUI conviction, and affirm his second degree DWLS conviction. 
No. 45013 -5 -II

FACTS

In March 2013, State Trooper Cliff Roberts arrested Mullen after he observed Mullen' s

erratic driving and suspected that he was under the influence. The State charged Mullen with

felony DUI' —based in part on a prior 2008 conviction for reckless

driving2 —

and with second

degree DWLS.3

Mullen filed a motion to ,exclude the 2008 reckless driving conviction as a qualifying prior

offense for felony DUI because there was no proofbeyond a reasonable doubt that alcohol or drugs

were involved in the 2008 offense. The trial court denied this motion. 

Mullen proposed the following jury instruction, defining a " prior offense" for felony DUI: 

A "prior offense" means any of the following: 

1) A conviction for a violation of RCW 46.61. 502 ( Driving Under the

Influence) or an equivalent local ordinance; 

2) A conviction for a violation of RCW 46.61. 504 (Physical Control) or an

equivalent local ordinance; 

3) A conviction for a violation of RCW 46. 61. 5249 ( Negligent Driving in

the First Degree), RCW 46.61. 500 ( Reckless Driving), or RCW 9A.36.050

Reckless Endangerment) or an equivalent local ordinance, if the conviction is the

result of a charge that was originally filed as a violation ofRCW 46. 61. 502 (Driving

Under the Influence) or RCW 46. 61. 504 ( Physical Control) and the State has

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior incident was alcohol or drug

related. 

Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 77 ( emphasis added). The trial court declined to give his proposed

instruction. 

1 RCW 46.61. 502( 6)( a). 

2 Former RCW 46. 61. 500 ( 1990). 

3 RCW 46.20.342( 1)( b). 

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The jury convicted Mullen of felony DUI and second degree DWLS. Mullen appeals both

convictions. 

ANALYSIS

This case presents an issue of first impression: whether the State must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that a prior conviction for reckless driving involved alcohol or drugs in order to

use' that conviction as a prior offense to elevate a misdemeanor DUI to a

felony. Mullen argues

that after our Supreme Court' s decision in City of Walla Walla v. Greene, 154 Wn.2d 722, 116

P.3d 1008 ( 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1174 ( 2006), the involvement of alcohol or drugs in a

prior conviction for reckless driving is an essential element when the State seeks to use that

conviction to elevate misdemeanor DUI to a

felony. Because it is an essential element, Mullen

argues that due process requires it be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and to a jury and that the

trial court violated his due process rights when it refused to give his proposed jury instruction. The

State argues that whether alcohol or drugs was involved in the prior conviction is a threshold legal

question for the trial court to decide. We agree with Mullen. 

A. THRESHOLD ISSUES: INVITED ERROR AND WAIVER

1. INVITED ERROR

The State argues that invited error applies because Mullen' s " Motion to Exclude Prior

Offense" created the circumstance in which the trial court determined, as a matter of law, whether

the reckless driving conviction qualified as a prior offense. We disagree. 

I]nvited error doctrine is a strict rule that precludes a criminal defendant from seeking

appellate review of an error he helped create, even when the alleged error involves constitutional

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No. 45013 -5 -II

rights." State v. Carson, 179 Wn. App. 961, 973, 320 P. 3d 185, review granted, 181 Wn.2d 1001

2014). 

The State argues that Mullen invited error here because he improperly framed the issue in

his motion as a request for the court to determine whether his reckless driving should be excluded

as a prior offense. But the State misunderstands Mullen' s motion. Mullen' s motion requested a

finding that, in light of Greene, and as a matter of law, the State could not prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that drugs and alcohol were involved in the prior conviction. Mullen did not ask

the court to determine a solely legal question; instead, he asked it to consider the facts that the

State intended to establish and to find that the State could not prove an essential element beyond a

reasonable doubt. We, therefore, reject the State' s invited error argument. 

2. WAIVER

The State next argues that Mullen waived his right to argue for the first time on appeal that

a jury should determine whether alcohol or drugs were involved in the prior offense because he

did not move for reconsideration ofthe trial court' s denial of his motion to exclude. We disagree. 

We generally decline to review claims that are raised for the first time on appeal. RAP

2. 5( a). We will, however, review an argument for the first time if it concerns a " manifest error

affecting a constitutional right." RAP 2. 5( a)( 3). An error affecting a constitutional right is

manifest if the appellant can show actual prejudice. State v. Gordon, 172 Wn.2d 671, 676, 260

P. 3d 884 ( 2011). 

We disagree that Mullen waived his due process argument by failing to move for

reconsideration for three reasons. First, Mullen' s motion to exclude anticipated a question of fact

for jury determination. CP at 7 ( " There remains an unproven question of fact as to whether the

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No. 45013 -5 -II

prior incident involved alcohol or drugs. "). Second, the State points us to no case law to support

the proposition that preserving this argument for appeal required a motion for reconsideration. 

And third, Mullen preserved this argument when he proposed a jury instruction that required proof

beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior incident was alcohol or drug related." CP at 77. It was

squarely within the trial court' s authority to give Mullen' s proposed jury instruction and it

declined. During discussion about jury instructions, Mullen stated, 

I just want to formally object. I don' t think that the State' s proffered instruction of

a prior offense is a correct statement ofthe law. It would violate due process, In re

Winship[, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 ( 1970)], allowing him to

potentially be found guilty for an offense that was not proven beyond a reasonable

doubt to be a qualifying offense. 

Report of Proceedings ( RP) ( June 14, 2013) at 106. Mullen did not waive his due process

argument. 

Because the State' s invited error argument fails and the proposed jury instruction preserved

Mullen' s argument for appeal, we continue to the merits of Mullen' s argument. 

B. WHETHER A PRIOR CONVICTION INVOLVED ALCOHOL OR DRUGS

IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF FELONY DUI

Mullen argues that, after Greene, the involvement of alcohol or drugs in the prior

conviction is an essential element of felony DUI that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt

and to a

jury. The State argues that whether the reckless driving conviction qualifies as a prior

offense is a threshold legal question for the trial court to decide. We agree with Mullen that the

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior reckless driving conviction involved

alcohol or drugs in order to elevate the misdemeanor DUI to a felony DUI. 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RELEVANT LAW

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant' s

right to have elements determined by a

jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Alleyne v. United States, 

U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 ( 2013); State v. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d 186, 

192, 196 P.3d 705 ( 2008); State v. Oster, 147 Wn.2d 141, 146, 52 P.3d 26 ( 2002). Due process

requires the State to prove each essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. 

CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; Oster, 147 Wn.2d

at 146. Whether an issue presents a question of law or fact and, thus, whether the trial court has

the authority to decide it, is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Chambers, 157 Wn. 

App. 465, 474, 237 P. 3d 352 ( 2010), review denied, 170 Wn.2d 1031 ( 2011); State v. Miller, 156

Wn.2d 23, 27, 123 P. 3d 827 (2005). Therefore, in order to determine whether a fact must be found

by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, this court must first determine whether the fact is an

element" of the offense charged. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158. 

Aperson is guilty offelony DUI ifhe ( 1) " drives a vehicle within this state," ( 2) has " within

two hours after driving, an alcohol concentration of 0. 08 or higher," and ( 3) " has four or more

prior offenses within ten years as defined in RCW 46.61. 5055." RCW 46.61. 502( 1)( a), ( 6)( a). 

Reckless driving may qualify as a prior offense " ifthe conviction is the result of a charge that was

originally filed as a violation of RCW 46.61. 502 [ DUI]." RCW 46.61. 5055( 14)( a)( x). " Any

person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property

is guilty ofreckless driving." RCW 46.61. 500( 1). 

In Greene, our Supreme Court held that " due process is satisfied for the purposes of this

mandatory enhancement ifthe prior conviction exists and the [State] can establish that intoxicating

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No. 45013 -5 -II

liquor or drugs were involved in that prior offense." 154 Wn.2d at 728 ( applied to a prior

conviction for first degree negligent driving). Therefore, the issue here is whether the involvement

of alcohol or drugs is an essential element of a felony DUI or a threshold legal question for the

trial court to determine. We hold that because the legislature' s intent was to charge defendants

who are guilty of prior alcohol- or drug - related offenses with felony DUI, the involvement of

alcohol or drugs in prior convictions is an essential element that must be proven to a jury where it

was not an essential element of the prior conviction itself. 

2. DISCUSSION

a. WHAT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A CRIME

The United States Supreme Court has recently decided several cases that provide guidance

in determining what facts are essential elements that must be proven to a

jury. In Alleyne, the

Supreme Court held that whether the defendant had brandished his weapon was a fact and must be

tried to a

jury because "[ b] ut for a finding of brandishing, the penalty is five years to life in prison; 

with a

finding of brandishing, the penalty becomes seven years to life." 133 S. Ct. at 2160. 

Although unlike Alleyne this case does not involve sentencing, the issue is similar where but for a

finding that the reckless driving conviction involved alcohol or drugs, the penalty is one year for

a misdemeanor DUI, and with a finding that alcohol or drugs were involved, Mullen' s standard

range sentence is 22 to 29 months for a felony DUI. Mullen' s case is even stronger than Alleyne

because without a finding that alcohol or drugs were involved in his reckless driving conviction, 

Mullen is guilty of an entirely different offense, misdemeanor DUI. 

Applying the same principle to upward deviations in sentencing in Blakely v. Washington, 

542 U.S. 296, 303 -05, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L Ed. 2d 403 ( 2004), the Supreme Court held that

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No. 45013 -5 -II

when a defendant is sentenced to more than the statutory maximum standard range, he is entitled

to a

jury determination of any facts that justified the upward deviation. The Court held that the

defendant was entitled to a jury determination of any factor that could increase his standard range

sentence. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 -04. Although Blakely involved an upward deviation from the

standard sentencing range and Mullen received a standard range sentence, Alleyne' s and Blakely' s

reasoning is relevant to Mullen because it supports a requirement that facts thatjustify an increased

penalty be tried to a jury. 

In Washington, similar reasoning has been applied to offenses that rely on past convictions

to elevate a crime from a misdemeanor to a felony. See, e. g., Roswell, 165 Wn.2d at 192 -93; Oster, 

147 Wn.2d at 145 -47. Although neither Oster nor Roswell are directly on point, their reasoning is

persuasive. In Oster, the defendant was charged with felony violation of a domestic violence nocontact order. 147 Wn.2d at 143. The charge was elevated to a felony because he had two or more

prior convictions for violating a no- contact order. Oster, 147 Wn.2d at 143 -44. Our Supreme

Court held that "[ ajs set forth in the statute, the prior convictions function as an element of the

felony violation of a no contact order." Oster, 147 Wn.2d at 146. Because the trial court properly

instructed the jury on finding prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, however, our Supreme

Court affirmed Oster' s felony conviction. Oster, 147 Wn.2d at 145 -47. 

Similarly, in Roswell, the defendant was charged with communication with a minor for

immoral purposes, a gross misdemeanor that would be elevated to a felony if he had been

previously convicted of a felony sexual offense. 165 Wn.2d at 190. Our Supreme Court stated, 

For example, here, if Roswell had had no prior felony sex offense convictions, he could not have

been charged or convicted offelony communication with a minor for immoral purposes." Roswell, 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

165 Wn.2d at 192. Although it was not the central issue in that case, the court held that Roswell' s

prior convictions were elements of the felony charge because he could never be convicted of a

felony absent the prior convictions. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d at 194. As in Oster, the mere existence

ofthe prior convictions was sufficient to elevate the current offense to a felony. 

Although helpful, neither Oster nor Roswell are precisely on point because in those cases

the mere existence of the prior conviction was sufficient to elevate the offense to a felony. Here, 

Mullen argues that the mere existence of the prior reckless driving conviction is insufficient to

elevate the current DUI to a felony DUI because the involvement of alcohol or drugs is not an

essential element of reckless driving. See Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 727 -28. Mullen argues that

Greene interpreted the legislature' s intent in defining which past convictions could serve as " prior

offenses" to elevate a misdemeanor DUI to a felony. His position is that, post - Greene, the State

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior reckless driving conviction was alcohol or

drug related in order to elevate the misdemeanor DUI to felony DUI. 

b. CITY OF WALLA WALLA V. GREENE

It is undisputed that the existence of Mullen' s prior conviction for reckless driving must be

proven to a

jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State asserts that Greene stands for the

proposition that, unlike the existence of the prior conviction itself, involvement of drugs and

alcohol is a threshold question oflaw that the trial court had the authority to decide. Mullen asserts, 

however, that Greene establishes the involvement of alcohol or drugs as part ofthe definition of a

prior offense, that it is an element of the crime, and that it must be found by a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. We agree with Mullen because, after Greene, unless alcohol or drugs were

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No. 45013 -5 -II

involved in his reckless driving conviction, Mullen could not have been charged with felony DUI

and, therefore, it is an essential element ofthe offense of felony DUI. 

In Greene, the State charged the defendant with misdemeanor DUI, but she pleaded guilty

to first degree negligent driving, an offense that requires proof of driving under the influence of

alcohol or drugs.4 154 Wn.2d at 724. She was later convicted of an additional DUI, and the City

sought to use the negligent driving conviction as a prior offense because it was originally charged

as a DUI. Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 724 -25. She successfully argued to the trial court that under

State v. Shaffer, 113 Wn. App. 812, 55 P.3d 668 ( 2002), overruled by Greene, 154 Wn.2d 722, the

sentence enhancement violated due process because it was based on an unproven prior offense. 

Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 725. The City of Walla Walla appealed.. 

Our Supreme Court reversed the trial court and overruled Shaffer. Greene, 154 Wn.2d at

725. In rejecting Shaffer, the Supreme Court held that

the statute requires the State to establish that a prior driving conviction involved

use of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Thus, due process is satisfied for the purposes

of this mandatory enhancement if the prior conviction exists and the prosecution

can establish that intoxicating liquor or drugs were involved in that prior offense. - 

Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 727 -28 ( footnote omitted). Because the legislature intended only to impose

enhanced penalties on those who repeatedly commit alcohol- or drug- related driving offenses, the

definition of a " prior offense," as interpreted by Greene, requires the State to prove both that the

prior conviction exists and that it was alcohol or drug related. See 154 Wn.2d at 728. Since the

4 " A person is guilty of negligent driving in the first degree if he or she operates a motor vehicle

in a manner that is both negligent and endangers or is likely to endanger any person or property, 

and exhibits the effects of having consumed liquor or marijuana or any drug." RCW

46.61. 5249( 1)( a) ( emphasis added). 

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parties agree that due process requires the State to prove the existence of the prior conviction

beyond a reasonable doubt, it is logical, based on the language of Greene, to apply that same

standard to the requirement that the State " establish that intoxicating liquor or drugs were

involved." 154 Wn.2d at 728. 

Because involvement of alcohol or drugs is an essential element of first degree negligent

driving, the State in Greene needed to prove only the existence ofthe prior offense. 154 Wn.2d at

728. But because the involvement of alcohol or drugs was not an essential element in Mullen' s

prior reckless driving conviction, Mullen argues that the State must prove both the existence ofthe

prior offense and the fact of alcohol or drug involvement. 

C. APPLICATION

Because Mullen' s reckless driving conviction was originally charged as a DUI, it may be

a qualifying prior offense to elevate misdemeanor DUI to a felony. RCW 46.61. 5055( 14)( a)( x). 

But a person is guilty ofreckless driving when he " drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard

for the safety of persons or property." RCW 46.61. 500( 1). Therefore, a person may be guilty of

reckless driving even ifhe is not engaged in an activity that involves alcohol or drugs. In contrast, 

a person is guilty of first degree negligent driving, the prior offense at issue in Greene, when " he

or she operates a motor vehicle in a manner that is both negligent and endangers or is likely to

endanger any person or property, and exhibits the effects of having consumed liquor or marijuana

or any drug." RCW 46.61. 5249( 1)( a). A person may not be guilty offirst degree negligent driving

unless he is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 

As in Greene, the State must prove that Mullen' s reckless driving conviction involved

alcohol or drugs in order to satisfy his due process rights. See 154 Wn.2d at 728. The difference

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in Mullen' s case is that the State cannot prove that alcohol or drugs were involved merely by virtue

of his conviction for reckless driving. The Greene court was clear when it held that the legislature

intended only for prior offenses that involved alcohol or drugs to be used to support a felony DUI

conviction. See 154 Wn.2d at 727. In Mullen' s case, however, the trial court ignored this

legislative intent. Instead, Mullen' s reckless driving conviction was used to elevate misdemeanor

DUI to a felony without a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that alcohol or drugs were

involved. Because Mullen could not be charged with felony DUI unless his prior conviction

involved alcohol or drugs, it is an essential element that must be proven to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d at 194. 

d. THE STATE' S ARGUMENTS

We now turn to the State' s arguments to the contrary. The State argues that the statute and

Greene only require it to produce the docket sheet confirming that Mullen was originally charged

with a DUI and that he pleaded guilty to reckless driving. The State also argues that the docket

and the entry in the docket for " Motion to Suppress [ blood/breath alcohol concentration] BAC "5

are sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that the prior offense was alcohol or drug

related under its reading of Greene. We disagree. 

This argument is misplaced for three reasons. First, it ignores the Greene court' s reasoning

in overruling Shaffer. The court overruled Shaffer because it disagreed that the felony DUI statute

required the State to prove the underlying DUI. Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 727. The court held that

the legislature sought to apply felony DUI only to those defendants who were convicted ofmultiple

5 " BAC" refers to a test for blood alcohol content. In this case, this was a breath test. 

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alcohol- or drug - related offenses. Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 727 -28. The way to accomplish this is

to prove that alcohol or drugs were involved in the prior offense and does not require the State to

reprove the offense. 

Second, the State' s argument is misguided because if the Greene court sought merely to

require the State to prove that ( 1) the prior conviction existed and ( 2) the prior conviction was

originally charged as a DUI, the Greene court could have relied solely on the language of the

statute. See RCW 46.61. 5055( 14)( a)( x). Instead Greene states that due process requires the State

to " establish" that alcohol or drugs were involved. 154 Wn.2d at 728. 

Finally, the State' s argument ignores the fact that the defendant in Greene pleaded guilty

to first degree negligent driving and that alcohol or drugs are an essential element of that offense. 

RCW 46. 61. 5249; see also 154 Wn.2d at 728. This is an important difference from Mullen' s case

because Greene was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of an alcohol- or drug- related offense. 

Mullen, in contrast, pleaded guilty to a nonalcohol- or drug - related prior offense, reckless driving, 

which the State now seeks to use to convict him of a more serious alcohol- or drug- related offense. 

The State also relies on Chambers. But we distinguish Chambers from this case because

in Chambers the defendant argued that a California DUI conviction was not " equivalent" to a

Washington DUI conviction and, thus, should not qualify as a prior offense. 157 Wn. App. at 474- 

77. 

In Chambers, Division One ofthis court held that while it is for the jury to decide whether

the prior offenses happened, whether two statutes were equivalent is a " threshold question of law" 

and not a question of fact for the jury. 157 Wn. App. at 477. It is well settled that whether two

similar statutes are legally comparable is for the trial court to determine and, in part, requires the

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court to decide whether the elements of the offenses at issue are " substantially similar." See, e.g., 

State v. Farnsworth, 133 Wn. App. 1, 17 -18, 130 P.3d 389 ( 2006), remanded, 159 Wn.2d 1004

2007); In re Pers. Restraint ofLavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 255, 111 P.3d 837 (2005); State v. Morley, 

134 Wn.2d 588, 606, 952 P.2d 167 ( 1998).. Whether alcohol or drugs was involved in Mullen' s

prior offense is distinguishable from a comparison between the elements of a California and

Washington DUI. Here, we are not comparing elements oftwo offenses. But instead determining

whether a fact that is used to elevate a crime from a misdemeanor to a felony, and thereby

increasing the penalty, is an essential element of the felony crime. This is a factual determination

more like the existence of a prior offense and not a legal question. Therefore, Chambers is

inapplicable. 6

C. CONCLUSION

In sum, in order to elevate a misdemeanor DUI to a felony DUI, the State must prove the

existence of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and to satisfy due process, it must

also establish that alcohol or drugs were involved in that prior conviction. Where the involvement

of alcohol or drugs is not an essential element of the qualifying prior offense, like in reckless

driving, the State has the burden to establish that alcohol or drugs were involved because the

6 The State and the dissent also rely on State v. Chandler, 158 Wn. App. 1, 6 -8, 240 P. 3d 159

2010), where we held that if the judgment and sentence are not available, the docket sheets are

sufficient to prove the existence of the conviction. This case is not relevant. Mullen does not

argue that the docket sheets are insufficient to prove the existence of the conviction. He argues

only that the docket sheets here are insufficient to prove the prior offense was alcohol- or drug - 

related as a matter of law. We agree with Mullen that the docket sheet is sufficient to prove the

existence of a prior conviction, but it is insufficient to prove the conviction was alcohol or drug

related. 

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legislature intended only for alcohol- or drug- related convictions to be used to elevate

misdemeanor DUI to a felony. See Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 728. 

Because we hold that the involvement of alcohol or drugs in the prior offense is an essential

element of felony DUI, due process requires that it be tried to a jury and proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court violated Mullen' s due process

rights when it declined to give the jury Mullen' s proposed instruction. We, therefore, reverse

Mullen' s conviction for felony DUI and remand to the trial court for entry of a misdemeanor DUI

conviction. 

A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion

will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public

record in accordance with RCW 2. 06.040, it is so ordered. 

ADDITIONAL FACTS

At trial, Trooper Roberts and Joseph Templeton, a supervisor at the Washington State

Department of Licensing ( DOL), testified for the State. Trooper Roberts testified that he had

conducted a records check during Mullen' s arrest and that he had learned from a dispatcher that

Mullen' s driver' s license was " in a revoked status, revoked second degree." RP ( June 13, 2013) 

at 15. The trial court overruled Mullen' s hearsay objection to this testimony. During Templeton' s

testimony, the State offered Mullen' s abstract of complete driving record (ACDR) as exhibit. 9. 

Templeton testified that based on the ACDR, Mullen' s driver' s license was in a second degree

revoked status in March 2013. 

As evidence of the felony DUI, the State offered copies of the judgment and sentence for

three of Mullen' s prior offenses. Because the Chelan County District Court had destroyed its

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records of Mullen' s 2008 reckless driving conviction, the State offered a docket as the only

documentary evidence ofthat prior offense. This docket states that Mullen was originally charged

with DUI and that he was found guilty ofreckless driving. It also noted that Mullen filed a " Motion

to Suppress BAC." CP at 18. 

Mullen did not call any witnesses. In closing argument, Mullen argued that he was

entitled to the benefit of the doubt in this case." RP ( June 17, 2013) at 133. In an attempt to

clarify the law in rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, " Counsel stated the benefit of the doubt to Mr. 

Mullen. It' s reasonable doubt. It' s not the benefit ofthe doubt. You are to apply the law and the

instructions as given to you. A reasonable doubt, as it states in the instructions, is a doubt for

which a reason exists." RP ( June 17, 2013) at 146. Mullen did not object contemporaneous with

this explanation of the burden of proof. After closing arguments, however, Mullen moved for a

mistrial because of "cumulative issues" including the prosecutor' s comment which he claimed

misstated the burden ofproof. The prosecutor conceded that his comment may have been improper

and suggested a curative instruction, but the trial court declined to give further instructions and

denied the mistrial motion. 

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Mullen argues that his confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial court

admitted ( 1) a certified ACDR and ( 2) Trooper Roberts' s testimony regarding a records check on

the night of Mullen' s arrest. Even assuming a confrontation clause violation, any error is harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that Mullen' s confrontation clause argument fails and affirm

his second degree DWLS conviction. 

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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF LAW

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, criminal defendants have

the right to confront or cross - examine those who offer testimony against them. U.S. CONST. 

amend. VI; State v. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d 96, 109, 271 P. 3d 876 ( 2012). The right to confrontation

means that the defendant must have the opportunity to confront those who ' bear testimony. "' 

Jasper, 174 Wn.2d at 109 ( internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 

541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed 2d 177 ( 2004)). We review an alleged confrontation

clause violation de novo. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d at 108. Where there is a confrontation clause

violation, we review for harmless error. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d at 108. This puts the burden on the

State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Jasper, 

174 Wn.2d at 117. 

B. DISCUSSION

Here, the State' s evidence to support Mullen' s conviction for DWLS was based on

Templeton' s testimony, supported by the ACDR, and Trooper Roberts' s brief testimony that the

dispatcher told him Mullen' s driving status was suspended or revoked. Mullen' s ACDR includes

the " Status" of his driver' s license on the day that the ACDR was printed, but it was not

accompanied by an opinion as to the status of his license on the day he was arrested. The State, 

here, relied on Templeton' s interpretation ofthe ACDR for that information. 

At trial, the State asked Templeton, " Sir, can you tell me whether you know what Mr. 

Patrick Joseph Mullen' s driver' s license status was on March 2, 2013 [ the day of his arrest ?]" RP

June 13, 2013) at 48. Templeton replied that "[ h]e was revoked in the second degree, as I read

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this ... due to an Admin Per Se." RP ( June 13, 2013) at 49. Mullen had ample opportunity to

cross - examine Templeton and took full advantage of that opportunity. 

In a recent decision, Division One of this court upheld a defendant' s conviction for first

degree DWLS. State v. Mecham, 181 Wn. App. 932, 948 -51, 331 P.3d 80, review granted, 337

P. 3d 325 ( 2014). At trial, a DOL employee testified about the defendant' s revocation and that he

was a habitual offender. Mecham, 181 Wn. App. at 940. As in Mecham, the ACDR here did not

provide the essential fact to be proven at trial —that Mullen' s license was suspended or revoked

on March 2, 2013. In order to be guilty of second degree DWLS, a person must be ( 1) driving his

car while ( 2) his license is suspended or revoked and not eligible for reinstatement. RCW

46.20.342( 1)( b). Trooper Roberts' s testimony established that Mullen was driving his car, and

Templeton' s testimony interpreting the ACDR, not the ACDR itself, established that Mullen' s

license was revoked on the day of his arrest. 

Even if the trial court erred when it admitted Trooper Roberts' s testimony regarding the

dispatcher' s records check, Mullen' s claim does not survive a harmless error analysis. See Jasper, 

174 Wn.2d at 108. It is clear from the State' s closing argument that it rested its argument for the

DWLS charge on the ACDR and on Templeton' s

testimony. Trooper Roberts' s testimony

regarding the records check was brief and merely cumulative to Templeton' s testimony. 

Because Templeton' s testimony established Mullen' s driver' s license status on the day he

was arrested for DUI, any error in admitting the ACDR or Trooper Roberts' s brieftestimony was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Mullen' s confrontation clause argument fails, and we

affirm his conviction for second degree DWLS. 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Mullen next argues that the State committed prejudicial misconduct that requires reversal

when it argued that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not mean that Mullen should get

the benefit ofthe doubt" and that the trial court should have attempted to cure with an instruction. 

Even if we assume without deciding that the comments were improper, Mullen must show there

was a substantial likelihood that the State' s comments affected the verdict. State v. Emery, 174

Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 ( 2012). Because Mullen fails to demonstrate a substantial

likelihood that the comment affected the verdict, his prosecutorial misconduct claim fails. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF LAW

In order to prevail on a claim ofprosecutorial misconduct, the defendant carries the burden

of demonstrating that the prosecutor' s comments were improper and that the comments were

prejudicial. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760. We review a prosecutor' s allegedly improper comments

in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence presented, and the

instructions given. State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 774, 168 P.3d 359 ( 2007), cert. denied, 554

U.S. 922 ( 2008); State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 85 -86, 882 P.2d 747 ( 1994), cert. denied, 514

U.S. 1129 ( 1995). If the comments were improper and the defendant objected, we must consider

whether there was a substantial likelihood that the statements affected the jury' s verdict. Emery, 

174 Wn.2d at 760. If the defendant failed to object during the closing argument, he must show

that the comment was so flagrant or ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the

prejudice. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 760 -61. 

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B. DISCUSSION

Here, Mullen did not immediately object to the State' s comment about the reasonable doubt

standard during closing argument but waited to make a motion for a new trial based on cumulative

error, including the prosecutor' s arguably improper reasonable doubt comment. The trial court

denied his motion for a mistrial and declined to give a curative instruction regarding reasonable

doubt. Because the court declined to give a curative instruction, it is reasonable that we apply the

less onerous " substantial likelihood that the statements affected the jury" standard. 

Mullen contends that because our Supreme Court in State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 28, 

195 P. 3d 940 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1192 ( 2009), was prepared to reverse based on similar

comments if a curative instruction had not been given, reversal is appropriate here where the trial

court declined to give further instructions. We hold that Mullen has failed to prove the required

prejudice. 

In Warren, the court held that the prosecutor' s comments were flagrant because she made

the same misstatement multiple times. 165 Wn.2d at 27. Despite the defendant' s objection after

the first misstatement, the prosecutor misstated the burden ofproof again, and after the defendant' s

second objection, the trial court orally instructed the jury on the appropriate standard and directed

it to review the packet of jury instructions. Warren, 165 Wn.2d at 24 -25. The facts here are

distinguishable from the facts in Warren because Mullen did not object during rebuttal and the

prosecutor did not make multiple misstatements over Mullen' s objection. Unlike in Warren, the

prosecutor here did not attempt to undermine the State' s burden of proof. In Warren, the court

held that the prosecutor' s repeated misstatements ofthe burden of proof was flagrant misconduct, 

a holding that the facts here do not support. 165 Wn.2d at 27. 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

Mullen' s argument also ignores the appropriate standard ofreview: we are to review this

comment in the context of the total argument, the evidence, and the facts. Warren, 165 Wn.2d at

28 ( citing Yates, 161 Wn.2d at 774). The context here demonstrates that the prosecutor did not

attempt to undermine the State' s burden of proof or to mislead the jury. Immediately after his

misstatement ofthe burden ofproof, the prosecutor stated that "[ y] ou are to apply the law and the

instructions as given to you. A reasonable doubt, as it states in the instructions, is a doubt for

which a reason exists." RP ( June 17, 2013) at 146. Based on the prosecutor' s argument both

before and after his misstatement, Mullen has not carried his burden to prove a substantial

likelihood that the statements affected the jury. The prosecutor made just one arguably, improper

statement, and Mullen has failed to provide any argument or citations to the record apart from

conclusory statements that suggest that, in the context of the total argument, there is a " substantial

likelihood that the statements affected" the verdict here. Thus, Mullen' s prosecutorial misconduct

argument fails. 

III. STATEMENTS OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

THE OTHER PATRICK MULLEN AND BAIL

In his first and second SAG issues, Mullen argues that because of another pending case

against a different Patrick Mullen, he did not get a fair trial and unconstitutional bail was ordered. 

At trial, Mullen asked Templeton several questions to see if Mullen' s driving records were

confused with another Patrick Mullen. But apart from his suggestions, Mullen provides no

evidence to demonstrate that a second Patrick Mullen actually existed or was charged with

vehicular homicide. Nor does he argue why the trial was unfair to him. On this record, we hold

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No. 45013 -5 -II

that Mullen suffered no unfairness from any confusion about a different Patrick Mullen and deny

this claim. 

Mullen next argues that the trial court ordered an unreasonable bail at his arraignment. But

a bail order is not a final order subject to review by this court. RAP 2.2( a)( 1). 

Mullen' s third and fourth SAG issues concern the number of prior offenses to support the

felony DUI conviction. Because we reverse the felony DUI conviction, we need not reach his

concern about the prior offenses. Moreover, sufficient evidence exists on the record to establish

the existence of his four prior offenses: a judgment and sentence for three and the docket for the

reckless driving conviction. Each of these was presented to the jury. The docket is sufficient to

establish the existence of a prior conviction where the judgment and sentence is unavailable. State

v. Chandler, 158 Wn. App. 1, 6 -8, 240 P. 3d 159 ( 2010): 

Accordingly, we reverse Mullen' s felony DUI conviction, remand for the trial court to

enter a misdemeanor DUI conviction, and affirm his second degree DWLS conviction. 

I concur: 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

MELNICK, J. ( Concurring in part, Dissenting in part) — I, like the majority, would affirm

Patrick Joseph Mullen' s conviction for driving while license suspended or revoked in the second

degree. However, I respectfully dissent with the majority' s result reversing Mullen' s conviction

for felony driving under the influence ( DUI). I would affirm this conviction. I agree with the

majority' s determination that proof of a prior conviction is an element of the crime that must be

proven beyond a reasonable doubt when it alters the crime charged from a misdemeanor or gross

misdemeanor to a

felony. See State v. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d 186, 192, 196 P. 3d 705 ( 2008). 

However, I disagree with the majority' s conclusion that the determination of whether Mullen' s

prior reckless driving conviction involved alcohol is a question of fact for the jury to decide. 

I. PRIOR CONVICTION DETERMINED BY JUDGE

The penalties for the crime of DUI may be increased if the defendant has certain prior

offenses. Here, the State' s allegation that Mullen had four or more prior offenses within ten years

elevated his DUI to a felony. At issue here is Mullen' s 2008 conviction for reckless driving.8

This crime had originally been filed as a DUI. Because the original charging document, judgment

and sentence, plea of guilty, and other documents had been destroyed, the State presented proof of

the conviction through a certified court docket sheet. The docket sheet showed entries for both a

motion to suppress a " breath test" and a motion to suppress the conditions of Mullen' s sentence

relating to alcohol. These conditions included the installation of

7 RCW 46.61. 502( 6)( a). 

8 RCW 46.61. 500. The legislature amended RCW 46.61. 500 in 2011 and 2012. LAws OF 2011, 

ch. 96 § 34; LAWS OF 2012, ch. 183 § 11. The amendments did not alter the statute in any way

relevant to this case; accordingly, we cite the current version ofthe statute. 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

an ignition interlock device, a prohibition on using alcohol or drugs, attendance at a DUI victim' s

panel, and completion of an alcohol assessment. The State argued that because the reckless driving

conviction had originally been charged as a DUI and there were other indicia of alcohol use, the

reckless driving must have involved intoxicating liquor or drugs. The trial court agreed. 

As applicable to this case, "' prior offense' means ... A conviction for a violation ofRCW

46. 61. 500, ... ifthe conviction is the result of a charge that was originally filed as a violation

ofRCW 46.61. 502." RCW 46.61. 5055( 14)( a), ( x). 

In City of Walla Walla v. Greene, 154 Wn.2d 722, 116 P. 3d 1008 ( 2005), the court

interpreted "prior offense" for purposes of determining mandatory minimum sentences. I believe

the same analysis applies here where the same statute defining "prior offense" elevates Mullen' s

crime to a felony. Our Supreme Court held that it is not enough that the original charge, prior to

amendment, was DUI. Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 727. "[ T]he statute requires the State to establish

that a prior driving conviction involved use of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Thus, due process is

satisfied for the purposes of this mandatory enhancement if the prior conviction exists and the

prosecution can establish that intoxicating liquor or drugs were involved in that prior offense." 

Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 727 -28. It reasoned that this interpretation rendered the statute

constitutional because, " all elements of that offense are established by virtue of the conviction

itself." Greene, 154 Wn.2d at 728. 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

The State asserts that involvement of drugs and alcohol is a threshold question of law and

that the trial court had the authority to decide it. I agree and believe the trial court should determine

the admissibility of the proffered prior conviction as a question of law. It is not an issue of fact

for the jury to decide. The jury should then determine whether the State has proven the predicate

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

While the fact that a person has four prior DUI offenses is an essential element ofthe crime

of felony DUI under RCW 46.61. 502( 6), that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable

doubt, whether a prior offense meets the statutory definition in RCW 46. 61. 5055( 13) is not an

essential element ofthe crime. Rather, the question of whether a prior offense meets the statutory

definition is a threshold question of law to be decided by the trial court before admitting a prior

offense into evidence at trial. State v. Chambers, 157 Wn. App. 465, 468, 237 P. 3d 352 ( 2010). 

Division I of this court reaffirmed the proposition that " whether a prior conviction qualifies as a

predicate offense is a threshold question of law for the court, and not an essential element of the

crime of felony DUI" in State v. Cochrane, 160 Wn. App. 18, 27, 253 P. 3d 95 ( 2011). 

Based on the foregoing, I would hold that whether Mullen' s reckless driving conviction

involved alcohol and thus qualified as a predicate offense is for the judge to decide as a matter of

law. Whether the conviction has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt is for a jury to decide. 

In other words, the jury would decide whether the prior offenses happened.9

9

Assuming that the majority' s analysis is correct, its remedy is contrary to its reasoning. If a

jury is to determine as a matter of fact whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense, 

this case should be remanded for a new trial on this issue. 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

II. SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTION

We review the trial court' s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Demery, 144 Wn.2d 753, 758, 30 P. 3d 1278 ( 2001). A trial court is given considerable discretion

to determine the admissibility of evidence. Demery, 144 Wn.2d at 758. However, an abuse of

discretion occurs if evidence is admitted contrary to law. State v. Neal, 144 Wn.2d 600, 609, 30

P.3d 1255 ( 2001). The admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. ER 104. 

The proof ofMullen' s 2008 conviction was sufficiently proven by the State. Generally a

certified copy of the judgment and sentence is the best evidence of a conviction. State v. Lopez, 

147 Wn.2d 515, 519, 55 P.3d 609 (2002). However, ifthe State shows why a certified copy ofthe

judgment and sentence is not available, other comparable evidence may be used. Lopez, 147

Wn.2d at 519. The State then must show the sentencing court that the comparable evidence bears

some minimal indicium ofreliability beyond mere allegation.'" State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d

913, 920, 205 P.3d 113 ( 2009) ( quoting State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 481, 973 P.2d 452 ( 1999)) 

emphasis in original). The use of court dockets to prove a defendant has been previously

convicted is proper. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 120, 59 P. 3d 58 ( 2002); State v. Blunt, 118

Wn. App. 1, 8 -9, 71 P. 3d 657 (2003). In State v. Chandler, 158 Wn. App. 1, 240 P. 3d 159 ( 2010), 

the State provided certified copies of docket sheets from various district and municipal courts in

Washington. We found these sheets were reliable. I do not believe the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting the prior conviction. 

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No. 45013 -5 -II

Because I disagree with the majority' s conclusion that the determination of whether

Mullen' s prior reckless driving conviction involved alcohol and, thus, qualifies as a predicate

offense, as opposed to whether the prior, conviction occurred, is a question of fact for the jury to

decide, the constitutional issue is removed from consideration. I believe the decision whether to

admit prior convictions for the jury to consider is within the province of the trial court and it is for

the jury to determine ifthe prior convictions have been proven. 

For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. 

27