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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint 

of

DAVID HALL,

 Petitioner.

 No. 83667-6-I

 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

COBURN, J. — Petitioner David Hall seeks review of a disciplinary order finding 

statements he made to a Department of Corrections (DOC) officer threatening and 

intimidating. He contends that no evidence supports the findings because he did not 

make true threats and was merely expressing his frustration having his work as a porter 

criticized. However, it is relevant only that the speaker intentionally and knowingly 

communicated the threat, not that he intended or was able to carry out the threat. We 

deny his personal restraint petition.

FACTS

In October 2021, prison inmate Hall had a job as a porter in the medical unit. 

While Hall was working, corrections officer Rojo-Dominguez spoke to Hall regarding 

some concerns about Hall completing his daily porter duties. During the exchange, 
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according to Hall, the officer said “things like, ‘Well, I’ll just put you in handcuffs,’ ‘Well, 

I’ll just throw you in the hole.’” Hall told the officer, “I’ve been down for a long-time man, 

I’m tired of being judged when there’s nothing to judge.” He continued, “I’m a highranking gang member man, well was a high-ranking gang member like I demand and 

get the respect that’s why when I come in the unit they say was up. People think that 

little orange button is going to protect them trust and believe I’ll be faster than that

button if needed to.”1 

The officer informed Hall that he understood Hall’s frustration, but how Hall 

responded was “no manner of dealing with his anger.” The officer reported that Hall 

understood and replied, “I just don’t like being accused of something that’s not 

happening, but I’m cool.” 

The officer alleged Hall committed two serious infractions: (1) “Threatening 

another with bodily harm or with any offense against any person or property” under 

WAC 137-25-030(1) (Category B, Level 3, 506) (Violation 506); and (2) “Using physical 

force, intimidation, or coercion against any person” under WAC 137-25-030 (Category 

C, Level 1, 663) (Violation 663). 

At Hall’s disciplinary hearing, he explained the officer understood Hall spoke out 

of frustration. The hearing officer asked Hall, “So are you saying that you did make 

those statements [that Rojo-Dominguez reported]?” Hall responded, 

Well, I did make those statements. But that people think that the little 

orange button is going – I didn’t say that. But the gist of bringing the 

orange button up, it was made in to [Rojo-Dominguez’s] response, but it 

was just empty frustration, not directed towards or not directed against any 

person.

 1 Because the hearing officer relied on the officer’s infraction report and not the officer’s 

live testimony, we rely on the direct quotes from the officer’s report rather than the transcription 

of the hearing officer reading Hall’s report. 
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Hall said he used a poor choice of words, but that it was never his motive or intention to 

threaten or use intimidation toward anyone. Hall said he was explaining to the officer 

how Hall gives respect and how “being falsely accused is like provoking.” The officer 

did not testify at the hearing.

The hearing officer found Hall guilty of both infractions and sanctioned Hall with

30 days cell confinement, two months’ loss of monthly packages, and 40 hours of extra 

duty. Hall appealed the decision to the superintendent, who affirmed the decision. Hall 

then filed this personal restraint petition. 

DISCUSSION

We will only reverse prison discipline decisions when petitioners show that they 

are being unlawfully restrained. RAP 16.4(a)-(c); In re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168 

Wn.2d 204, 212-13, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). Under RAP 16.4, a prisoner is under 

“restraint” if the petitioner is confined, and the “restraint” is unlawful only if the conditions 

or manner of the “restraint” violated the Constitution or the laws of Washington, or other 

grounds exist to challenge the legality of the restraint. RAP 16.4(b); RAP 16.4(c)(6)-(7). 

Hall is under restraint because he was given 30 days confinement.

Petitioners seeking relief from prison discipline where no prior judicial review has 

been afforded are not required to show actual and substantial prejudice or a miscarriage 

of justice. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 214. We will reverse a prison disciplinary decision 

only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary and capricious as to deny the petitioner a 

fundamentally fair proceeding. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 215 (citing In re Pers. Restraint

of Reismiller, 101 Wn.2d 291, 294, 678 P.2d 323 (1984)). This is a heightened 

standard based on the particular type of executive action we are asked to review. 
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Prison discipline cases are significantly different from other administrative proceedings 

that can result in the loss of liberty. Id. Arbitrary and capricious actions have been 

defined as willful and unreasoning actions, without consideration and in disregard of 

facts and circumstances. “Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary 

and capricious even though one may believe an erroneous conclusion has been 

reached.” Reismiller, 101 Wn.2d at 296. Prisoners are entitled to minimum due 

process protections. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 215. There has to be at least “some 

evidence” to affirm the discipline. Id. at 216 (citing Reismiller, 101 Wn.2d at 295). 

Hall asserts that both infractions implicate his First Amendment right to free 

speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I. A prisoner retains those First Amendment rights that 

are consistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives 

of the corrections system. In re Pers. Restraint of Parmelee, 115 Wn. App. 273, 281, 63 

P.3d 800 (2003) (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Lab. Union Inc., 433 U.S. 

119, 129, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977)). Hall does not claim that Violations

506 and 663 themselves violate the First Amendment. Instead, he argues his 

statements were not true threats. 

True threats are not protected by the First Amendment. Parmelee, 115 Wn. App. 

at 288. True threats are “statement[s] made in a context or under such circumstances 

in which a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as 

a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm upon, or to take the life of 

another.”2 Id. (citing State v. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. 367, 373, 957 P.2d 797 (1998)). “It 

 2 Hall also cites DOC’s definition of the term “threatening behavior” in its policy 

handbook: “[i]ncludes, but is not limited to, direct or implied behavior which a reasonable person 

under the circumstances would perceive as a possible threat to bodily harm or was threatening 

in fact to that person.” Policy Glossary: Terms Starting with T, DOC, 
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is relevant only that the speaker intentionally and knowingly communicated the threat, 

not that he intended or was able to carry out the threat.” Id. Thus, Hall’s argument that 

he was not motivated or intended to threaten anyone is of no matter. He did not dispute 

that he said the words reported by the officer constituting the threatening and 

intimidating statements.

Hall also contends that because the officer understood that Hall spoke out of

frustration, the circumstances were such that a reasonable person could not foresee 

that Hall’s statements would be understood as serious expression of intention to inflict 

bodily harm. However, understanding why Hall made the statements after the 

statements were made does not change the lens with which the statements were 

viewed. Hall makes multiple arguments: (1) he did not direct his statements at anyone; 

(2) nothing in the record explains what the orange button is; and (3) he is being 

punished for simply identifying himself as a high-ranking gang member. 

The hearing officer found Hall’s statements were intimidating and threatened 

bodily harm. “It is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer. 

Indeed, ‘a detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers.’” 

Parmelee, 115 Wn. App. at 288-89 (quoting State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 425, 623 

P.2d 1172 (1981)). Hall did not simply speak about his history of being a high-ranking 

gang member.

3 He did so while explaining he still commands much respect in prison 

 

https://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/glossary.aspx?show=T [https://perma.cc/9FKB9LNQ].

3 Hall also suggests that the officer, the hearing examiner, and the assistant 

superintendent who rejected Hall’s appeal may have unconsciously judged his statements 

because of stereotypes about gang members and Black people. Hall cites to a news article 

reporting that 20 percent of people imprisoned in Washington are gang members. John McCoy, 

Washington State’s Prison Policies Serve No One, CROSSCUT (Apr. 15, 2019), 
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and the officer should know that “[p]eople think that little orange button is going to 

protect them trust and believe [he will] be faster than that button if [he] needed to.” This 

statement was in the context of the officer threatening to handcuff or put Hall in “the 

hole.” Though the record does not include an explicit explanation of the “orange 

button,” neither the officer, Hall, or the hearing officer expressed any confusion as to 

Hall’s reference to the orange button. Moreover, Hall’s reference to the orange button 

as something people rely on “to protect them” suggests it is a method to call for help. 

Viewed in the prison context, a reasonable person would foresee that the statements 

would be taken as a serious expression of an implied threat. In fact, it is evident RojoDominguez construed them as such because he charged Hall with making a threat and 

intimidation. See Parmelee, 115 Wn. App. at 288-89 (observing that by charging an 

inmate, the corrections officer construed an inmate’s statement as an implied threat

despite the inmate’s later alternative explanation). Hall explaining that he made the 

statements out of frustration or that he was “cool” after he made the statements does 

not explain away the objectively perceived threat at the time the relevant statements 

were made.

Hall additionally argues that both infractions required him to direct his statements 

“against any person,” which he did not do. But Hall himself explained that the 

statements were made in the context of a conversation between himself and the officer. 

Hall’s statements were not protected by the First Amendment. DOC did present 

 

https://crosscut.com/2019/04/washington-states-prison-policies-serve-no-one 

[https://perma.cc/K5JP-M3W2]. He argues that “[i]f mentioning gang membership is a threat all 

by itself, a large number of people can hardly talk about their lives without making threatening 

statements.” We need not consider a circumstance where someone was disciplined for only 

mentioning gang membership because that is not what happened here.
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some evidence supporting the infractions. Thus, Hall has failed to demonstrate that his 

discipline was so arbitrary and capricious as to deny a fundamentally fair proceeding. 

Accordingly, we deny his personal restraint petition.

WE CONCUR: