# C_2019228EN.01008901.xml

| 5.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 228/89 |
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5.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 228/89

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Action Plan against Disinformation’

(JOIN(2018) 36 final)

(2019/C 228/13)

Rapporteur: Ulrich SAMM

Co-rapporteur: Giulia BARBUCCI

| Referral | European Commission, 12.3.2019 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 5.3.2019 |
| Adopted at plenary | 20.3.2019 |
| Plenary session No | 542 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 142/2/1 |

Referral

European Commission, 12.3.2019

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

5.3.2019

Adopted at plenary

20.3.2019

Plenary session No

542

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

142/2/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC takes careful note of the initiative’s definition of disinformation as verifiably false or misleading information that is a threat to democracy and does public harm. Spreading disinformation has become a part of a hybrid war with a clear political aim. However, it also emphasises that, in addition to false information, highly selective information, defamation, scare-mongering and inciting hatred attack citizens’ fundamental rights (freedoms) and minority rights. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The most effective disinformation always contains some truth. Therefore, multiple actions from all stakeholders are needed to provide quality information and raise awareness. To this end, the EESC welcomes the initiative for coordinated action to protect the EU, its institutions and its citizens against disinformation. The EESC emphasises the urgency of such measures but is also concerned, however, that the impact of this action plan might be limited given that the May 2019 European elections are not far off. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC recognises that disinformation primarily comes from three sources: from the Russian Federation (well documented by the European External Action Service), economic subjects and media from other third countries (including China and the United States) and from internal sources — various media operating in countries of the Union itself and from politically extreme movements and organisations. The EESC urges the Commission to widen its monitoring and take countermeasures accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC emphasises that it is urgent that Member States take the steps needed to preserve the integrity of their electoral systems and infrastructure and test them during all phases of the European elections. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC shares the Commission’s view that a comprehensive response to disinformation also requires active participation by civil society organisations. The EESC is pro-active in supporting the joint efforts against disinformation, for example through its opinions, hearings, going local events and numerous press activities by its professional Communication Group. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | Building resilience means involving all sectors of society and, in particular, improving citizens’ media literacy. Awareness-raising and critical thinking start at school but also require a continuous lifelong refresher. These activities require allocation of proper funding — right now and in the new Multiannual Financial Framework. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | Joint efforts have to be supported by as many actors as possible at EU level, in Member States and also within the southern and eastern partnership involving public and private organisations. Independent fact-checkers and quality journalism play a key role and need proper funding to be able to operate almost in real time. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC welcomes, in particular, the research funding allocated in Horizon 2020 and in Horizon Europe to achieve a better understanding of the sources of disinformation and the intentions, tools and objectives behind disinformation. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The strengthening of the Strategic Communication Task Forces is overdue. The EESC therefore welcomes the plan to provide additional staff and new tools. In view of the considerable resources provided in certain countries for the generation of disinformation, it appears that the EU needs an adequate response. Therefore the anticipated increase of resources for the Strategic Communications Task Forces can thus only be seen as a first step towards further growth in the years to come. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC agrees that the other two Strategic Communications Task Forces (Western Balkans and South) should be reviewed, and urges the Member States to contribute to the work of the Strategic Communications Task Forces by sending national experts. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC welcomes the Code of Practice as a voluntary commitment for social media platforms and advertisers to fight disinformation, but at the same time has doubts about the effectiveness of such voluntary actions. The Commission is urged to propose further actions, including actions of a regulatory nature like penalties, should the implementation of the Code of Practice continue to be unsatisfactory. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC urgently appeals to private businesses to start seeing the placing of advertisements on online platforms contributing to spreading disinformation as unethical and irresponsible, and urges them to take steps to prevent this behaviour. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

2.   Introduction — Disinformation as a threat for the Union’s democratic systems

| 2.1. | Within the context of this initiative disinformation is understood as verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, causing public harm and threatening democracy. Often, rights are attacked by defamation, scare-mongering and inciting hatred. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Those who distribute disinformation do so sometimes by claiming freedom of expression. The right to information and press freedom are indeed fundamental rights of the European Union, but we need to fight any abuse of this right when disinformation is intentionally used to cause harm to society. |
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2.2.

| 2.3. | Digital techniques make it easier to generate and distribute disinformation. Such techniques include:






  — | troll attacks on social media profiles; |
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2.3.

—

troll attacks on social media profiles;

| — | the use of internet automated software (bots); |
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—

the use of internet automated software (bots);

| — | falsification of documents; |
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—

falsification of documents;

| — | video manipulation (deep-fakes); |
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—

video manipulation (deep-fakes);

| — | fake social media profiles. |
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—

fake social media profiles.

| 2.4. | Social media have become important means of spreading disinformation, including in some cases, like Cambridge Analytica, to target the delivery of disinformation content to specific users, who are identified by the unauthorised access and use of personal data, with the ultimate goal of influencing the election results and thereby threatening democracy.
  Besides social media, more traditional methods such as television, newspapers, websites, chain emails and messages also continue to play an important role in many regions. The tools and techniques used are changing fast. |
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2.4.

Besides social media, more traditional methods such as television, newspapers, websites, chain emails and messages also continue to play an important role in many regions. The tools and techniques used are changing fast.

| 2.5. | The actors behind disinformation may be internal, within Member States, or external, including state (or government sponsored) and non-state actors. According to reports, more than 30 countries are using disinformation and influencing activities in different forms, including in their own countries. |
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2.5.

| 2.6. | According to the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, established in 2016 within the European External Action Service, disinformation by the Russian Federation poses the greatest external threat to the EU. Disinformation produced and/or spread by Russian sources has been reported in the context of several elections and referenda in the EU. Disinformation campaigns related to the war in Syria, to the downing of the MH-17 aircraft in the East of Ukraine and to the use of chemical weapons in the Salisbury attack have been well documented. Other third countries, however, also play an important role in disinformation and numerous actors within the EU provide false information as well. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | In 2018 the EU put forward a number of initiatives against disinformation, illegal content and for data protection:






  — | Joint Communication on bolstering resilience against hybrid threats (JOIN(2018)16); |
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2.7.

—

Joint Communication on bolstering resilience against hybrid threats (JOIN(2018)16);

| — | Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (C(2018) 1177); |
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—

Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (C(2018) 1177);

| — | Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM(2018) 640); |
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—

Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online (COM(2018) 640);

| — | Regulation as regards a verification procedure related to infringements of rules on the protection of personal data in the context of elections to the European Parliament (COM(2018) 636) (1); |
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—

Regulation as regards a verification procedure related to infringements of rules on the protection of personal data in the context of elections to the European Parliament (COM(2018) 636) (1);

| — | Revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (EU) 2018/1808; |
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—

Revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (EU) 2018/1808;

| — | Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online – Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms (COM(2017) 555) (2); |
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—

Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online – Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms (COM(2017) 555) (2);

| — | Regulation for establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (COM(2018) 630) (3); |
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—

Regulation for establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (COM(2018) 630) (3);

| — | Communication on Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach (COM(2018) 236) (4) and a report on its implementation (COM(2018) 794); |
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—

Communication on Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach (COM(2018) 236) (4) and a report on its implementation (COM(2018) 794);

| — | Communication to secure free and fair European elections (COM(2018) 637), presented on 19-20 September 2018 to the EU leaders’ meeting in Salzburg. |
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—

Communication to secure free and fair European elections (COM(2018) 637), presented on 19-20 September 2018 to the EU leaders’ meeting in Salzburg.

| 2.8. | In view of the 2019 European Parliament elections and more than 50 presidential, national or local/regional elections being held in Member States by 2020, this calls for urgent and immediate coordinated action to protect the Union, its institutions and its citizens against disinformation. |
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2.8.

3.   Gist of the Action Plan against Disinformation

| 3.1. | This Action Plan JOIN(2018) 36 by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union answers the European Council’s call for measures to ‘protect the Union’s democratic systems and combat disinformation’. The coordinated response to disinformation is based on four pillars: |
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3.1.

| 3.2. | Improving the capabilities of Union institutions to detect, analyse and expose disinformation.






  — | Strengthening of the Strategic Communication Task Forces and Union Delegations through additional staff and new tools; |
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3.2.

—

Strengthening of the Strategic Communication Task Forces and Union Delegations through additional staff and new tools;

| — | Reviewing the mandates of the Strategic Communications Task Forces for Western Balkans and South. |
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—

Reviewing the mandates of the Strategic Communications Task Forces for Western Balkans and South.

| 3.3. | Strengthening coordinated and joint responses to disinformation.






  — | By March 2019, establishment of a Rapid Alert System for addressing disinformation campaigns, working closely with existing networks, the European Parliament as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism; |
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3.3.

—

By March 2019, establishment of a Rapid Alert System for addressing disinformation campaigns, working closely with existing networks, the European Parliament as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism;

| — | step up communication efforts on Union values and policies; |
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—

step up communication efforts on Union values and policies;

| — | strengthen strategic communications in the Union’s neighbourhood. |
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—

strengthen strategic communications in the Union’s neighbourhood.

| 3.4. | Mobilising the private sector to tackle disinformation.






  — | A Code of Practice for online platforms, advertisers and the advertising industry on Disinformation was published on 26 September 2018 The Commission will ensure close and continuous monitoring of its implementation. |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.4.

—

A Code of Practice for online platforms, advertisers and the advertising industry on Disinformation was published on 26 September 2018 The Commission will ensure close and continuous monitoring of its implementation.

| 3.5. | Raising awareness and improving societal resilience.






  — | targeted campaigns for the public and training events for media and public opinion shapers in the Union and its neighbourhood to raise awareness of the negative effects of disinformation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.5.

—

targeted campaigns for the public and training events for media and public opinion shapers in the Union and its neighbourhood to raise awareness of the negative effects of disinformation;

| — | efforts to support the work of independent media and quality journalism as well as the research into disinformation will be continued; |
| --- | --- |

—

efforts to support the work of independent media and quality journalism as well as the research into disinformation will be continued;

| — | Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, should support the creation of teams of multi-disciplinary independent fact-checkers and researchers with specific knowledge of local information environments to detect and expose disinformation campaigns across different social networks and digital media; |
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—

Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, should support the creation of teams of multi-disciplinary independent fact-checkers and researchers with specific knowledge of local information environments to detect and expose disinformation campaigns across different social networks and digital media;

| — | As part of the Media Literacy Week in March 2019, in cooperation with the Member States, the Commission will support cross-border cooperation amongst media literacy practitioners; |
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—

As part of the Media Literacy Week in March 2019, in cooperation with the Member States, the Commission will support cross-border cooperation amongst media literacy practitioners;

| — | Member States should rapidly implement the provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, which deal with media literacy; |
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—

Member States should rapidly implement the provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, which deal with media literacy;

| — | The Commission will closely monitor how the Elections Package is implemented and, where appropriate, provide relevant support and advice. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Commission will closely monitor how the Elections Package is implemented and, where appropriate, provide relevant support and advice.

4.   General comments

| 4.1. | The EESC takes careful note of the initiative’s definition of disinformation as verifiably false or misleading information that is a threat to democracy and does public harm. However, it emphasises that, in addition to false information, highly selective information, defamation, scare-mongering and inciting hatred attack fundamental citizens’ rights (freedoms) and minority rights. The most effective disinformation always contains some truth Therefore, multiple actions from all stakeholders are needed to provide quality information and raise awareness. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Spreading disinformation has become part of a hybrid war with a clear political aim. The EESC, therefore welcomes this initiative for coordinated action to protect the EU, its institutions and its citizens against disinformation. The EESC emphasises the urgency of such measures but is also concerned, however, that the impact of this action plan might be limited given that the May 2019 European elections are not far off. However, there is no doubt that in the long run these joint efforts against disinformation will be key in protecting the EU’s democratic systems. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EESC recognises that disinformation primarily comes from three sources: from the Russian Federation (well documented by the European External Action Service), economic subjects and media from other third countries (including China and the United States) and from internal sources — various media operating in countries of the Union itself and from politically extreme movements and organisations. The EESC urges the Commission to widen its monitoring and take countermeasures accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC emphasises that it is urgent that Member States take the steps needed to preserve the integrity of their electoral systems and infrastructure and test them ahead of the European elections, but also during and after the electoral process. It is crucial that the European Commission supports them in this task. Exchange of best practices, such as the Swedish example from 2018, should serve as a model for this. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s view that a comprehensive response to disinformation also requires active participation by civil society organisations. Building resilience requires involving all sectors of society and, in particular, improving citizens’ media literacy to understand how to spot and fend off disinformation. Awareness-raising and critical thinking start at school but also require a continuous life-long refresher. However, these activities require allocation of proper funding — right now and in the new Multiannual Financial Framework. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The EESC is pro-active in supporting the joint efforts against disinformation, for example through its opinions, hearings, going local events and numerous press activities by its professional Communication Group. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | Joint efforts have to be supported by as many actors as possible at EU level, in Member States and also within the southern and eastern partnership involving public and private organisations. Independent fact-checkers and quality journalism play a key role and need proper funding to be able to operate almost in real time. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | In the long term, proper media literacy is the key to the future of democracy in Europe. The EESC supports the efforts to achieve a better understanding of the sources of disinformation, the intentions, tools and objectives behind disinformation and how and why citizens, and sometimes entire communities, are drawn to disinformation narratives and become part of the mechanisms disseminating fake news. The EESC welcomes, in particular, the funding allocated for this objective in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

5.   Specific comments and recommendations

| 5.1. | The strengthening of the Strategic Communications Task Forces is overdue, as already expressed in former opinions (5). The EESC therefore welcomes the plan to provide additional staff and new tools and signs up to the request to the Member States to upgrade, where appropriate, their national capacity in this area as well. In view of the considerable resources provided in certain countries for the generation of disinformation, it appears that the EU needs an adequate response; the anticipated increase of resources for the Strategic Communications Task Forces can thus only be seen as a first step towards further growth in the years to come. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | The EESC agrees that the mandate of the East Strategic Communication Task Force should be maintained and that of the other two Strategic Communications Task Forces (Western Balkans and South) should be reviewed in the light of the growing scale and importance of disinformation activities in those regions. The EESC urges the Member States to contribute to the work of the Strategic Communications Task Forces by sending national experts. Only then can the Rapid Alert System be truly efficient. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | The EESC also welcomes the urgently needed measures to secure free and fair European elections and the recommended use of sanctions where appropriate, including for the illegal use of personal data to influence the outcome of the elections. It also welcomes the good cooperation with the US, NATO and Norway and demands that the important role of the UK be preserved whether or not Brexit takes place. The fight against disinformation has to be fought in in solidarity between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | The Action Plan is accompanied by a progress report (6) on the various actions, notably regarding the Code of Practice as a voluntary commitment for social media platforms and advertisers. Under the Code of Practice, internet firms are obliged to reduce revenue for accounts and websites misrepresenting information, clamp down on fake accounts and bots, give prominence to reliable sources of news and improve the transparency of funding for political advertising. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | The EESC welcomes the Code of Practice, but at the same time has doubts regarding the effectiveness of such voluntary actions, doubts which were also expressed recently by the Commission at the presentation of the first report given by Google, Facebook, Twitter and Mozilla on 29 January. The Commission is urged to propose further actions, including actions of a regulatory nature, like imposing penalties in case countermeasures against fake accounts aren’t implemented fast enough or the execution of other parts of the Code of Practice continues to be unsatisfactory. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

| 5.6. | The EESC urgently appeals to private businesses to start seeing the placing of advertisements on online platforms contributing to spreading disinformation as unethical and irresponsible, and urges them to take steps to prevent this behaviour. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

Brussels, 20 March 2019.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Luca JAHIER

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(1)  EESC opinion on Protection of personal data in the context of EP elections (not yet published in the Official Journal).

1

(2)  OJ C 237, 6.7.2018, p. 19.

2

(3)  EESC opinion on European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (not yet published in the Official Journal).

3

(4)  OJ C 440, 6.12.2018, p. 183.

4

(5)  OJ C 440, 6.12.2018, p. 183.

5

(6)  COM(2018) 794.

6

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