[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-15915

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cr-00180-MMH-JBT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AL LEROGUE JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(August 13, 2014)

Before TJOFLAT, HULL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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After pleading guilty, Al Lerogue Jones appeals his 155-month sentence for 

being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). On appeal, Jones argues that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. After review, we affirm.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion using 

a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). 

We look first at whether the district court committed any significant procedural 

error and then at whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. Id.

1

 We will 

vacate a sentence only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district 

court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by 

arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by 

the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The party who challenges the sentence bears 

the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and 

the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.

2010).

Jones has not met his burden to show his 155-month sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. Jones’s sentence is at the lower end of the advisory 

 

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Jones does not argue that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable or point to any 

procedural error at his sentencing.

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guidelines range of 151 to 188 months and well below the statutory maximum life 

sentence, both indications that the sentence is reasonable. See United States v. 

Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. McKinley, 732 F.3d 

1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013).

In sentencing Jones, the district court emphasized the serious circumstances 

of Jones’s current offense, which involved a civilian calling 911 to report that 

Jones was waving a gun around in a parking lot and then police discovering Jones 

with a revolver and two rounds of ammunition, as well as a crack pipe containing 

cocaine residue. Although Jones claimed he was not actually waving the firearm 

around, but instead was trying to barter the firearm for drugs, either one of these 

was a dangerous activity that, in the words of the district court, “put[ ] other 

individuals significantly at risk.” The district court stressed that Jones’s current 

offense was even more serious in light of his prior criminal history, especially his 

2007 convictions for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, which involved Jones shooting a coworker.

The district court’s concern over Jones’s criminal history is supported by the 

record, which demonstrates that Jones has a lengthy history of at least 18 prior 

convictions dating back to 1993, only four of which resulted in criminal history 

points. Many of Jones’s prior crimes were drug-related and some involved theft or 

violence. In addition, Jones had five prior convictions for driving on a suspended 

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or revoked license. Based on his criminal history, Jones received the highest 

criminal history category of VI and qualified as an armed career criminal under 

both the Sentencing Guidelines and the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). 

Not only had Jones already been convicted of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm once before, but during that offense Jones fought with a coworker, was 

instructed by his employer to leave the work site, and then returned 45 minutes 

later and shot his coworker in the buttocks. As the district court stated, given the 

circumstances of Jones’s prior firearm offense, Jones “had no business having [a 

loaded firearm] anywhere near [him].”

The district court also stated that Jones showed a lack of respect for the law, 

citing in particular the fact that Jones “[took] the law into [his] own hands” by 

shooting his coworker rather than allowing the law to prosecute his coworker for 

the altercation. In addition, Jones’s extensive criminal history and some of Jones’s 

statements at the sentencing hearing minimizing some of his offenses showed a 

lack of respect for the law.

The fact that Jones provided substantial assistance after his arrest does not 

undermine the district court’s finding that Jones showed a lack of respect for the 

law. Rather, the district court took into account Jones’s assistance to authorities 

when it granted the government’s U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) 

motions—permitting a sentence below the mandatory minimum 15-year sentence 

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and reducing his advisory guidelines range from 180 to 210 months to 151 to 188 

months—and then sentenced Jones to 155-months, at the lower end of the new 

range.

The record belies Jones’s claim that the district court failed to consider his 

status as a small-time drug dealer who was in need of substance abuse treatment. 

Jones’s counsel argued these facts in mitigation, and, in response, the district court 

recommended that Jones be allowed to participate in drug treatment programs and 

vocational training in prison.

Jones also argues that the district court failed to adequately consider the 

unfairness of applying the ACCA enhancement when one of Jones’s three 

predicate offenses involved the sale of only 0.1 gram of cocaine. Jones’s counsel 

raised this argument in the district court and also conceded that the cocaine offense 

technically qualified as a predicate offense. The district court heard this argument 

and was not required to address it explicitly, so long as it acknowledged that it had

considered the parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, which it did. See

United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court 

went further, however, and explicitly considered Jones’s criminal history as a 

whole to be an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor. Although Jones 

disagrees with the district court’s assessment of his criminal history, after 

reviewing the record, we cannot say that the district court committed a clear error 

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in judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors or that Jones’s 155-month sentence 

is unreasonable.

AFFIRMED.

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