UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4386

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

WILLIAM MARTIN STANLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (0:05-cr-01249-CMC)

Submitted: September 5, 2007 Decided: November 29, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mario A. Pacella, STROM LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Robert

F. Daley, Jr., C. Todd Hagins, Assistant United States Attorneys,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

William Martin Stanley appeals his conviction and 120-

month sentence for possession of a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), 924(e)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).

He challenges the district court’s decision to allow his attorney

to withdraw, the court’s denial of his request to represent

himself, and the reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. 

On the day after jury selection for Stanley’s trial, the

district court held a status conference to determine the

ramifications of calling newly-identified Government witnesses.

One potential witness was represented by another attorney in the

same federal public defender’s office as Stanley’s attorney.

Stanley’s attorney expressed concern about the conflict of interest

that arose from having clients represented by attorneys in the same

office with opposing interests. Stanley’s attorney informed the

court that it was standard practice in such cases for both

attorneys to withdraw. Following a thorough discussion of the

conflict and possible measures to avoid it, the district court

ruled that there was an “irreconcilable conflict” and it was

necessary to postpone the trial and appoint new counsel to

represent Stanley.

Stanley objected to postponing the trial. He said he

“would rather just continue by [himself] if it’s going to be that

much trouble.” He also said that to avoid a continuance, he would
1This adjustment was based on Stanley’s submission of a false

affidavit and persuading others to submit false affidavits stating

that he was not living at the residence in question when the gun

was found. 

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waive the conflict, or have a new attorney proceed directly to

trial without additional time to prepare. The court held that

Stanley’s request was not a genuine request to proceed pro se, but

rather, an attempt to avoid a continuance by any means. Stanley

expressed his frustration with the amount of his bond, and said

that he would not object to the continuance if the court would

reduce his bond so that he could go home in the interim. He

claimed that he had the ability to represent himself, “if need be.”

The district court ruled that, despite Stanley’s objections, the

case would have to be continued. Approximately six weeks later,

following a two-day trial, Stanley was convicted.

A Presentence Report was prepared prior to sentencing.

The probation officer determined that Stanley’s base offense level

was twenty, which was adjusted upward two levels for obstruction of

justice.1 His total offense level of twenty-two, together with a

criminal history category of VI, yielded an advisory guideline

range of 84 to 105 months. 

The Government filed a motion for an upward departure or

variance. The district court denied the motion for an upward

departure, but granted the motion for a variance. The court ruled

that a two-level variance to a level twenty-four was appropriate,
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with a resulting guideline range of 100 to 125 months. The court

imposed a sentence of 120 months, the statutory maximum for a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

(1) Disqualification of Defense Counsel

When confronted with a potential conflict of interest,

the district court is obligated to independently determine whether

the continued representation by counsel impedes the integrity of

the proceedings and whether the attorney should thus be

disqualified. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161-64 (1988).

For this purpose, the court “must have sufficiently broad

discretion to rule without fear that it is setting itself up for

reversal on appeal either on right-to-counsel grounds if it

disqualifies the defendant’s chosen lawyer, or on ineffective

assistance grounds if it permits conflict-infected representation

of the defendant.” United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1324

(4th Cir. 1996) (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160). 

Stanley claims that the district court’s decision to

allow defense counsel to withdraw was an abuse of discretion

because less drastic measures were available and because the

government did not, in the end, call the witness who was

represented by Stanley’s counsel’s fellow federal public defender.

These arguments are without merit. See Williams, 81 F.3d at 1324-

25 (upholding district court’s decision to disqualify an attorney
2

The Government maintains that the court’s decision to deny

Stanley’s request should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion

because it occurred after “meaningful trial proceedings” had

commenced. See United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th

Cir. 1979) (request to proceed pro se must be made before the

commencement of meaningful trial proceedings; thereafter the

decision is discretionary). However, under either standard, the

district court did not err. 

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who represented other members of a conspiracy); see also United

States v. Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44 (2nd Cir. 2003) (public defender was

entitled to withdraw where prosecution witness was also a client of

public defender’s office). Even if an alternative procedure would

have been within the court’s discretion, Stanley has not

established that it was an abuse of discretion to select

disqualification over another remedy. See Williams, 81 F.3d at

1325 (“[W]hile the use of [auxiliary counsel instead of

disqualification] might have been within the court's discretion,

declining to use it cannot be held an abuse of that discretion.”).

 (2) Denial of Request to Proceed Pro Se

Stanley next claims that the district court erred in

denying his request to proceed pro se. The district court’s denial

of a defendant’s pretrial motion to proceed pro se is reviewed de

novo.2 See United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3

(4th Cir. 1997). Although a defendant has a right to represent

himself, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 & n.15 (1975),

his assertion of the right must be (1) clear and unequivocal; (2)
3

Stanley also asserts that the court committed reversible

error by denying his request without conducting a Faretta colloquy.

However, the purpose of such a colloquy is to ensure that a

defendant does not embark on self-representation without being made

aware of the dangers and disadvantages of doing so. See Faretta,

422 U.S. at 835. Because the district court concluded that

Stanley’s request was a reflection of his disappointment with the

court’s decision to postpone his trial, rather than a genuine

request to proceed pro se, there was no need to engage in such a

discussion.

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knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (3) timely. See United

States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2000). 

In making his request, Stanley indicated that his real

desire was to persuade the district court not to postpone his

trial. He did not express any dissatisfaction about being

represented by counsel, nor any reason, apart from avoiding delay,

for the request. To avoid continuing the trial, Stanley said he

was willing to waive the conflict of interest, to have a new

attorney proceed directly to trial without additional time to

prepare, or to postpone trial and be represented by new counsel if

he could return home to await trial. Because Stanley’s request to

proceed pro se was not unequivocal, the district court did not err

in denying it.3 

(3) Sentence

Finally, Stanley contends that his variance sentence of

120 months, fifteen months above the top end of the advisory
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guideline range, is unreasonable. This court will affirm the

sentence imposed by the district court as long as it is within the

statutorily prescribed range and reasonable. United States v.

Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005). In sentencing a defendant,

the district court must: (1) properly calculate the guideline

range; (2) determine whether a sentence within that range serves

the factors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007);

(3) implement mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) explain its

reasons for selecting the sentence, especially a sentence outside

the advisory range. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). Even if the

sentence exceeds the advisory guideline range, it will generally be

deemed reasonable “if the reasons justifying the variance are tied

to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Moreland, 437

F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). 

The district court considered the factors set forth in

§ 3553(a), and identified § 3553(a)(1), the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of

the defendant, and § 3553(a)(2)(C), the need to protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant, as the most significant

factors supporting a variance. With respect to the nature of the

offense, the court noted that while Stanley was convicted based

only on the firearm found in the search of the house, the evidence

showed that Stanley had persuaded his wife to make a previous
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fraudulent purchase so that he could acquire a gun, demonstrating

a “very similar type of pattern.” The court also remarked on

Stanley’s “significant and sustained prior criminal record” and

noted: 

I see and have observed from Mr. Stanley’s conduct in

this case that he has a very strong view about the

rightness or wrongness of his conduct, and he is not able

to accept responsibility at all for the things he has

been found guilty of and the things he has done in

connection with his involvement in this offense. And

there is a history in his case of [being] unable to

comply with prior court orders and prior sentences in the

past as well. 

Because the district court considered the § 3553(a)

sentencing factors and based its decision on uncontroverted facts

showing a pattern of similar offenses, blame, and disrespect for

the law, Stanley’s sentence is reasonable. 

Accordingly, we affirm Stanley’s conviction and sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

 AFFIRMED