IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

LOUIS JACKSON #915652 §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:24cv016

MABLE SWEAT, et al. §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Louis Jackson, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The case was referred to the undersigned for 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case. 

I. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that on March 3, 2023, his name was forged on a sign-in sheet for a

urinalysis drug test ostensibly administered by Defendants Sweat and Osibajo. (Dkt. #1 at 3–4.) 

Plaintiff says he was falsely charged with failing the drug test, which he did not even take. (Id. at 

4–5.) At a later hearing, the warden agreed with Plaintiff that the signature on the sign-in sheet 

looked more like Defendant Sweat’s handwriting than his own. (Dkt. #1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff 

succeeded in having the disciplinary conviction overturned no later than September 7, 2023. (Dkt. 

#1 at 5; Dkt. #1-1 at 2.) But, he says, “[y]et in still forgery of my name on legal documents is a 

criminal act in Texas[.]” (Dkt. #1 at 5.) He seeks damages of $2,400. (Id. at 4.)

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II. Legal Standards and Preliminary Screening

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a 

governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 

(5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding as a pauper, his pleading is also subject to 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Both statutes provide for sua sponte dismissal of 

a complaint—or any portion thereof—if the Court finds it frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 

F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint lacks an arguable basis 

in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which 

a complaint relies is indisputably meritless.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 

(5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, during the initial screening 

under section 1915A, a court may determine that a prisoner’s complaint is frivolous if it rests upon 

delusional scenarios or baseless facts—and dismiss the complaint. See Henry v. Kerr County, 

Texas, 2016 WL 2344231 *3 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) (“A court may dismiss a claim as factually 

frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, delusional, or otherwise 

rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, regardless of whether there are judicially 

noticeable facts available to contradict them.”) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 

(1992)). 

Moreover, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does 

not allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and thus 

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does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground 

Packaging Sys. Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows 

the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See 

Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a probability standard; rather, 

the plausibility standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis supplied). 

All well-pleaded facts are taken as true, but the district court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Whatley v. Coffin, 

496 F. App’x 414 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 

(5th Cir. 2005)). Crucially, while the federal pleading rules do not require “detailed factual 

allegations,” the rule does “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does a complaint 

which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. 

Particularly with regard to any claim that defendants have conspired to harm him, a plaintiff must 

plead specific, non-conclusory facts that establish that there was an agreement among the 

defendants to violate his federal civil rights. Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th 

Cir. 2004); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs asserting 

conspiracy claims under Section 1983 must plead the operative facts on which their claim is based; 

bald allegations that a conspiracy existed are insufficient). 

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III. Discussion and Analysis 

To the extent Plaintiff believes he is constitutionally entitled to have either or both 

Defendants investigated, punished, or prosecuted for any alleged crime in connection with his 

disciplinary charge, no such constitutional right exists. Citizens do not have any constitutional 

right to have another individual disciplined or prosecuted, even when the parties involved are 

inmates and correctional officers. Oliver v. Jackson Corr. Ctr., No. 3:12-CV-2660, 2013 WL 

596155, at *3 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-2660, 

2013 WL 596153 (W.D. La. Feb. 15, 2013) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 

(1973), and United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979)); see also Williams v. 

Washington, No. 96 C 0704, 1997 WL 201579, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 1997) (“Williams had no 

legal right to have the correctional officers punished, or to have an investigation conducted.”).

Nor does Plaintiff allege any facts that would establish a violation of his right to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prisoners only have a Fourteenth Amendment right to 

procedural due process before the imposition of restrictions that “impose[] atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Plaintiff here does not even describe the punishment he received as a result 

of the disciplinary charge. But any amendment to add that information would be futile, because 

Plaintiff acknowledges that his conviction was overturned in a matter of months, thereby obviating 

any lasting punishment. Even if Plaintiff had spent the intervening months in segregation with 

heightened restrictions, that would not be enough to give rise to a right to due process in the prison 

setting. See Perry v. Allemand, 687 F. App’x 352, 353 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that restrictive 

confinement and additional restrictions for six months “do not impose the type of atypical and 

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significant hardship that would give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause”

and dismissing appeal as frivolous).

Furthermore, the fact that the disciplinary case was later overturned does not itself show a 

constitutional violation through denial of due process. The Fifth Circuit has held that there is no 

due process violation if a prisoner is falsely accused of charges where the prisoner is given an 

adequate state procedural remedy to challenge the accusations. Grant v. Thomas, 37 F.3d 632, 

1994 WL 558835 (5th Cir. September 23, 1994), citing Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248, 253-54 (5th 

Cir. 1984); see also Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986) (prisoner has no 

constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which 

may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest). 

Plaintiff does not allege, much less show, that he did not have adequate procedural 

remedies to challenge the accusations. On the contrary, he was able to use the available procedural 

remedies to successfully overturn his disciplinary conviction. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, 

the Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested; if it did, Section 1983 

would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted and every suspect released. Smith 

v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly, the Constitution does not provide a 

cause of action for every inmate whose disciplinary case is overturned on appeal. See Romero v. 

Lann, No. 5:06cv82, 2007 WL 2010748 (E.D. Tex., July 6, 2007) (citing Smith in noting that the 

fact that a disciplinary conviction was overturned did not itself show that the case had been brought 

with retaliatory intent).

Even if the disciplinary hearing officer erred by believing the charging officer rather than 

Plaintiff, this does not show a constitutional violation. The Fifth Circuit has held that in the context 

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of prison disciplinary proceedings, the Constitution requires due process, not error-free decisionmaking. McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 1983).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief 

can be granted. Traditionally, district courts permit a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 

complaint or claim before dismissing the case. However, giving a plaintiff an opportunity to amend 

is not necessary if he has pleaded his “best case,” such that an amended claim would still fail. See 

Norman v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, 582 F. App’x 430, 431 (Mem) (5th Cir. 2014) 

(unpublished); Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s claim here is 

clear, and there is no plausible amendment that would render it viable. Accordingly, judicial 

economy dictates against inviting a futile amendment in this case.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff=s lawsuit be dismissed with 

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B).

Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and 

recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy 

shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and 

recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to 

factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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So ORDERED and SIGNED this 22nd day of January, 2024.

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