# C_2017139EN.01000601.xml

| 4.5.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 139/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.5.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 139/6

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 8 September 2015

declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement

(Case M.7278 — General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power — Renewable Power & Grid Business))

(notified under document number C(2015) 6179 final)

(only the English version is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2017/C 139/04)

On 8 September 2015 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
   (1), and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

On 8 September 2015 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings

1

and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

I.   THE PARTIES

| (1) | General Electric Company (‘GE’, US) is a global, diversified manufacturing, technology and services company. Three of GE's divisions are directly related to the activities of ALSTOM (Société Anonyme) (‘Alstom’, France):






  (a) | GE Power & Water serves power generation, industrial, and other customers with energy production products and services, including gas/steam turbines, generators and wind turbines; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

General Electric Company (‘GE’, US) is a global, diversified manufacturing, technology and services company. Three of GE's divisions are directly related to the activities of ALSTOM (Société Anonyme) (‘Alstom’, France):

(a)

GE Power & Water serves power generation, industrial, and other customers with energy production products and services, including gas/steam turbines, generators and wind turbines;

| (b) | GE Energy Management designs, manufactures and services a variety of electrical products and systems; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

GE Energy Management designs, manufactures and services a variety of electrical products and systems;

| (c) | GE Transportation supplies locomotives and rolling stock, as well as rail signalling and train control solutions. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

GE Transportation supplies locomotives and rolling stock, as well as rail signalling and train control solutions.

| (2) | Alstom is a global industrial and engineering company, organised in four business divisions:






  (a) | Thermal Power offers power generation solutions, various types of gas and steam turbines, generators, boilers, emission control systems, as well as related services; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2)

Alstom is a global industrial and engineering company, organised in four business divisions:

(a)

Thermal Power offers power generation solutions, various types of gas and steam turbines, generators, boilers, emission control systems, as well as related services;

| (b) | Renewable Power offers turnkey solutions as well as turbines and generators for hydro, wind, geothermal and solar thermal power; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Renewable Power offers turnkey solutions as well as turbines and generators for hydro, wind, geothermal and solar thermal power;

| (c) | Grid offers power transmission and distribution equipment and services, such as transformers and circuit breakers; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Grid offers power transmission and distribution equipment and services, such as transformers and circuit breakers;

| (d) | Transport offers a wide range of rolling stock, rail signalling and transport systems, as well as related services. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Transport offers a wide range of rolling stock, rail signalling and transport systems, as well as related services.

II.   THE OPERATION

| (3) | On 19 January 2015 the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (‘the Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking GE acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the Thermal Power, Renewable Power and Grid businesses of Alstom, by way of purchase of shares. GE is hereinafter referred to as the ‘Notifying Party’ and GE and Alstom are collectively referred to as the ‘Parties’. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 19 January 2015 the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (‘the Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking GE acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the Thermal Power, Renewable Power and Grid businesses of Alstom, by way of purchase of shares. GE is hereinafter referred to as the ‘Notifying Party’ and GE and Alstom are collectively referred to as the ‘Parties’.

III.   PROCEDURE

| (4) | The transaction was notified to the Commission on 19 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The transaction was notified to the Commission on 19 January 2015.

| (5) | By decision dated 23 February 2015, the Commission found that the transaction raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market and initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

By decision dated 23 February 2015, the Commission found that the transaction raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market and initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation.

| (6) | The in-depth investigation confirmed the competition concerns preliminarily identified. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The in-depth investigation confirmed the competition concerns preliminarily identified.

| (7) | The Notifying Party submitted the final commitments on 6 August 2015 (‘Final Commitments’) that render the transaction compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Notifying Party submitted the final commitments on 6 August 2015 (‘Final Commitments’) that render the transaction compatible with the internal market.

IV.   EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

A.   THE PARTIES ACTIVITIES

THE PARTIES ACTIVITIES

| (8) | As regards GE's activities relevant for the assessment of the transaction, through its GE Power & Water unit GE manufactures, supplies and services, among others: gas turbines (GTs), steam turbines (STs) and generators. Through its GE Energy Management unit GE provides products and technology that transmit, distribute and convert electricity and that modernise the grid. A part of GE Energy Management unit, namely Digital Energy unit offers products that protect, monitor, control and automate the grid, and visualisation software that helps optimise the grid. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

As regards GE's activities relevant for the assessment of the transaction, through its GE Power & Water unit GE manufactures, supplies and services, among others: gas turbines (GTs), steam turbines (STs) and generators. Through its GE Energy Management unit GE provides products and technology that transmit, distribute and convert electricity and that modernise the grid. A part of GE Energy Management unit, namely Digital Energy unit offers products that protect, monitor, control and automate the grid, and visualisation software that helps optimise the grid.

| (9) | Alstom's activities relevant for the purpose of assessment of this transaction are as follows: (i) manufacturing and supply of products and services for thermal power generation plants, such as GTs, STs, generators, heat recovery steam generator (‘HRSG’), as well as Engineering, Procurement and Construction (‘EPC’) solutions and service and maintenance; (ii) supply of automation and control solutions for power plants and for individual equipment, (iii) products and services that transmit electricity as well as grid management. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Alstom's activities relevant for the purpose of assessment of this transaction are as follows: (i) manufacturing and supply of products and services for thermal power generation plants, such as GTs, STs, generators, heat recovery steam generator (‘HRSG’), as well as Engineering, Procurement and Construction (‘EPC’) solutions and service and maintenance; (ii) supply of automation and control solutions for power plants and for individual equipment, (iii) products and services that transmit electricity as well as grid management.

B.   THE RELEVANT MARKETS

THE RELEVANT MARKETS

Product market definition

Product market definition

50 Hz Heavy Duty Gas Turbines (HDGTs)

50 Hz Heavy Duty Gas Turbines (HDGTs)

| (10) | The Commission investigation found that HDGTs and industrial gas turbines (‘IGTs’) constitute separate markets. In terms of power output the HDGT market comprises GTs with an output above 90 MW. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The Commission investigation found that HDGTs and industrial gas turbines (‘IGTs’) constitute separate markets. In terms of power output the HDGT market comprises GTs with an output above 90 MW.

| (11) | The Commission considered that demand for services for HDGT arises as a result of the purchase of the respective HDGT. The associated services therefore constitute an aftermarket. In view of the advantages related to the simultaneous purchase of the initial services with the new unit and the purchasing patterns observed, the Commission concluded that the market for the supply of new-built HDGTs encompasses as well the supply of the associated initial services. The Commission also considered that the market for the supply of new-built HDGTs encompasses also the supply of the gas turbine control systems. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Commission considered that demand for services for HDGT arises as a result of the purchase of the respective HDGT. The associated services therefore constitute an aftermarket. In view of the advantages related to the simultaneous purchase of the initial services with the new unit and the purchasing patterns observed, the Commission concluded that the market for the supply of new-built HDGTs encompasses as well the supply of the associated initial services. The Commission also considered that the market for the supply of new-built HDGTs encompasses also the supply of the gas turbine control systems.

| (12) | The Commission found that the markets for 50 Hz HDGTs and for 60 Hz HDGTs constitute separate markets. Since the EEA is a 50 Hz frequency area, the impact of the transaction was assessed only in relation to the 50 Hz HDGT market. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Commission found that the markets for 50 Hz HDGTs and for 60 Hz HDGTs constitute separate markets. Since the EEA is a 50 Hz frequency area, the impact of the transaction was assessed only in relation to the 50 Hz HDGT market.

| (13) | Regarding the segmentation of the overall 50 Hz HDGT market (from 90 MW to currently around 470 MW) by power output classes, the Commission considered that, on the one hand, HDGTs at different ends of the output spectrum do not compete directly against each other. On the other hand, in the overall 50 Hz HDGT market there are no self-evident clear boundaries of separate segments which would clearly suggest separate markets. The Commission concluded that the relevant market is the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs covering the whole output range. The Commission considered however also, that the competitive assessment should also include the analysis of the power output segments of the relevant market where Alstom exercises a competitive constraint. The Commission therefore assessed the impact of the transaction both at the level of the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs and at the level of its possible segments as used by Alstom in the ordinary course of business (Medium, Large and Very Large). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Regarding the segmentation of the overall 50 Hz HDGT market (from 90 MW to currently around 470 MW) by power output classes, the Commission considered that, on the one hand, HDGTs at different ends of the output spectrum do not compete directly against each other. On the other hand, in the overall 50 Hz HDGT market there are no self-evident clear boundaries of separate segments which would clearly suggest separate markets. The Commission concluded that the relevant market is the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs covering the whole output range. The Commission considered however also, that the competitive assessment should also include the analysis of the power output segments of the relevant market where Alstom exercises a competitive constraint. The Commission therefore assessed the impact of the transaction both at the level of the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs and at the level of its possible segments as used by Alstom in the ordinary course of business (Medium, Large and Very Large).

| (14) | The Commission also examined the relevance of a segmentation of the HDGT space by type of power plant configuration, namely HDGTs for combined cycle (‘CC’) and simple cycle (‘SC’) power plants. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Commission also examined the relevance of a segmentation of the HDGT space by type of power plant configuration, namely HDGTs for combined cycle (‘CC’) and simple cycle (‘SC’) power plants.

| (15) | In conclusion, for the purpose of assessing the transaction, the Commission considered that the relevant product market is the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs with an output above 90 MW including the associated initial servicing and the gas turbine control system. The Commission conducted its competitive assessment both at the overall market of 50 Hz HDGTs and at segment levels, on the basis of the different power output classes (Medium, Large and Very Large) and on the basis of plant configuration (CC or SC) when relevant. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In conclusion, for the purpose of assessing the transaction, the Commission considered that the relevant product market is the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs with an output above 90 MW including the associated initial servicing and the gas turbine control system. The Commission conducted its competitive assessment both at the overall market of 50 Hz HDGTs and at segment levels, on the basis of the different power output classes (Medium, Large and Very Large) and on the basis of plant configuration (CC or SC) when relevant.

Generators

Generators

| (16) | The Commission considered that there are two relevant product markets for generators. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Commission considered that there are two relevant product markets for generators.

| (17) | On the one hand, the Commission delineated an overall and highly differentiated market of generators (air-cooled and hydrogen-cooled) above 35 MW. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

On the one hand, the Commission delineated an overall and highly differentiated market of generators (air-cooled and hydrogen-cooled) above 35 MW.

| (18) | On the other hand, the Commission has defined a narrower market specific to generators above 35 MW bundled with a 50 Hz HDGT. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

On the other hand, the Commission has defined a narrower market specific to generators above 35 MW bundled with a 50 Hz HDGT.

Steam turbines

Steam turbines

| (19) | The Commission found that there is one relevant highly differentiated product market for large steam turbines (‘LSTs’) which could be further segmented. The Commission found evidence to exclude from this market LSTs for nuclear application, but did not find enough evidence to further delineate the LSTs market by gas and fossil-fuel power plants. The Commission further found evidence to distinguish between 50 Hz and 60 Hz LSTs. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Commission found that there is one relevant highly differentiated product market for large steam turbines (‘LSTs’) which could be further segmented. The Commission found evidence to exclude from this market LSTs for nuclear application, but did not find enough evidence to further delineate the LSTs market by gas and fossil-fuel power plants. The Commission further found evidence to distinguish between 50 Hz and 60 Hz LSTs.

| (20) | The Commission further delineated a specific narrower market for LSTs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Commission further delineated a specific narrower market for LSTs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs.

HRSG

HRSG

| (21) | The Commission left open any possible segmentation on the market for HRSG given the absence of horizontal overlaps between the Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Commission left open any possible segmentation on the market for HRSG given the absence of horizontal overlaps between the Parties.

Plant control system

Plant control system

| (22) | The market investigation suggests that the market for control systems should be segmented according to whether the control system automates the operation of a specific component or the entire power plant. Thus, while the Commission defined a market for plant control system, the gas turbine control system was included in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs given that it is always sold with the GT. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The market investigation suggests that the market for control systems should be segmented according to whether the control system automates the operation of a specific component or the entire power plant. Thus, while the Commission defined a market for plant control system, the gas turbine control system was included in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs given that it is always sold with the GT.

Servicing of mature GE's 50 Hz HDGTs frames

Servicing of mature GE's 50 Hz HDGTs frames

| (23) | The market investigation suggests that the market for the servicing of GTs should be segmented according to mature and non-mature HDGTs. Moreover, within the scope of services a distinction should be made between the three core services (i.e. (i) field services/on-site interventions, (ii) parts repairs/reconditioning, and (iii) the supply of spare parts and upgrades). Finally, the servicing of each frame of HDGT is a separate market. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The market investigation suggests that the market for the servicing of GTs should be segmented according to mature and non-mature HDGTs. Moreover, within the scope of services a distinction should be made between the three core services (i.e. (i) field services/on-site interventions, (ii) parts repairs/reconditioning, and (iii) the supply of spare parts and upgrades). Finally, the servicing of each frame of HDGT is a separate market.

| (24) | Since GE only provides services for its own HDGTs, the overlaps regarding servicing of mature HDGTs are confined to the markets for the servicing of GE's mature HDGTs, where Alstom's subsidiary, PSM, is active. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Since GE only provides services for its own HDGTs, the overlaps regarding servicing of mature HDGTs are confined to the markets for the servicing of GE's mature HDGTs, where Alstom's subsidiary, PSM, is active.

Servicing of generators

Servicing of generators

| (25) | Generator services range from simple inspection and testing to more advanced services like rewinds and upgrades. However, the issue whether the overall market for servicing of generators should be segmented further is left open. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Generator services range from simple inspection and testing to more advanced services like rewinds and upgrades. However, the issue whether the overall market for servicing of generators should be segmented further is left open.

Servicing of steam turbines

Servicing of steam turbines

| (26) | The overall market for servicing of STs could be segmented according to (i) the type of ST service, (ii) ST output, (iii) OEM technology or (iv) frequency. However, the issue whether the overall market for servicing of ST should be segmented further is left open. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The overall market for servicing of STs could be segmented according to (i) the type of ST service, (ii) ST output, (iii) OEM technology or (iv) frequency. However, the issue whether the overall market for servicing of ST should be segmented further is left open.

Grid products

Grid products

| (27) | The exact scope of the product market for the transmission and distribution products is left open. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The exact scope of the product market for the transmission and distribution products is left open.

Geographic market definitions

Geographic market definitions

| (28) | The market for 50 Hz HDGTs appears to be characterized by low relative transport costs and in principle global patterns in supply and sourcing, with the exception of China (local partnership requirements) and Iran (sanctions) which are characterized by specific market access barriers and accordingly markedly different conditions of competition on the supply side. At the same time, the strong demand differentiation driven by different gas prices both in absolute terms and relative to other energy sources implies that competitive conditions across different regions are not homogeneous. For instance, demand in the EEA region is highly differentiated from other world regions and, thus, observes also different competitive dynamics. At the very least, the investigation points to strong regional differentiations. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The market for 50 Hz HDGTs appears to be characterized by low relative transport costs and in principle global patterns in supply and sourcing, with the exception of China (local partnership requirements) and Iran (sanctions) which are characterized by specific market access barriers and accordingly markedly different conditions of competition on the supply side. At the same time, the strong demand differentiation driven by different gas prices both in absolute terms and relative to other energy sources implies that competitive conditions across different regions are not homogeneous. For instance, demand in the EEA region is highly differentiated from other world regions and, thus, observes also different competitive dynamics. At the very least, the investigation points to strong regional differentiations.

| (29) | For the purpose of assessing the present transaction, the issue whether the relevant geographic market should be considered (1) as worldwide excluding China and Iran or (2) EEA-wide in scope can be left open. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

For the purpose of assessing the present transaction, the issue whether the relevant geographic market should be considered (1) as worldwide excluding China and Iran or (2) EEA-wide in scope can be left open.

| (30) | The Commission also concludes that the relevant geographic markets of generators and STs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs, given that they are driven by the HDGTs supply, should be the same as the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. In the particular case of STs from the worldwide market besides China and Iran, also India and Japan should be excluded since these are not accessible countries for GE's bundle of HDGT and LST. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The Commission also concludes that the relevant geographic markets of generators and STs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs, given that they are driven by the HDGTs supply, should be the same as the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. In the particular case of STs from the worldwide market besides China and Iran, also India and Japan should be excluded since these are not accessible countries for GE's bundle of HDGT and LST.

| (31) | As regards servicing of GE's mature HDGTs, the issue whether the relevant geographic market should be considered as worldwide (excluding China) or EEA-wide in scope can be left open. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

As regards servicing of GE's mature HDGTs, the issue whether the relevant geographic market should be considered as worldwide (excluding China) or EEA-wide in scope can be left open.

| (32) | For the remaining relevant product markets the issue whether the relevant geographic market should be considered as worldwide or EEA-wide in scope can be left open. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

For the remaining relevant product markets the issue whether the relevant geographic market should be considered as worldwide or EEA-wide in scope can be left open.

C.   COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT

COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT

| (33) | The Commission has reached the conclusion that the transaction would lead to a significant impediment of effective competition in:






  (a) | the market for 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China and Iran), in particular in the Large and Very Large segment; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(33)

The Commission has reached the conclusion that the transaction would lead to a significant impediment of effective competition in:

(a)

the market for 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China and Iran), in particular in the Large and Very Large segment;

| (b) | the market for generators bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China and Iran); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the market for generators bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China and Iran);

| (c) | the market for LSTs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China, Iran, India and Japan); and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the market for LSTs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China, Iran, India and Japan); and

| (d) | the market for servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the market for servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China).

| (34) | For the market for 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China and Iran), the Commission's investigation has shown that this is an oligopolistic market, with only four full technology players active (i.e. Alstom, GE, MHPS and Siemens; Ansaldo is less advanced from a technology point of view and focuses on niche product and geographic markets) and with very high barriers to entry. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For the market for 50 Hz HDGTs at a EEA level or worldwide level (excluding China and Iran), the Commission's investigation has shown that this is an oligopolistic market, with only four full technology players active (i.e. Alstom, GE, MHPS and Siemens; Ansaldo is less advanced from a technology point of view and focuses on niche product and geographic markets) and with very high barriers to entry.

| (35) | The transaction would lead to market-leading and often very large market shares in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. The Commission's investigation has shown that pre-merger GE is already the market leader in the worldwide (excluding China and Iran) market for 50 Hz HDGTs, with market shares above 40 %. In the EEA, GE and Siemens have similar positions with Alstom being a close third player. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The transaction would lead to market-leading and often very large market shares in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. The Commission's investigation has shown that pre-merger GE is already the market leader in the worldwide (excluding China and Iran) market for 50 Hz HDGTs, with market shares above 40 %. In the EEA, GE and Siemens have similar positions with Alstom being a close third player.

| (36) | The transaction would add a significant market share from Alstom: around [20-30] percentage points in the EEA and around [10-20] percentage points at the worldwide level. Post-transaction GE would thus have very large shares (above 50 %) both in the EEA and at a worldwide level, with a large difference to the second player, Siemens. MHPS and Ansaldo are much smaller players both at the EEA and worldwide level. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The transaction would add a significant market share from Alstom: around [20-30] percentage points in the EEA and around [10-20] percentage points at the worldwide level. Post-transaction GE would thus have very large shares (above 50 %) both in the EEA and at a worldwide level, with a large difference to the second player, Siemens. MHPS and Ansaldo are much smaller players both at the EEA and worldwide level.

| (37) | The transaction would also eliminate a significant and close competitor of GE in the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs and in particular in the Large and Very Large segments. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The transaction would also eliminate a significant and close competitor of GE in the overall market for 50 Hz HDGTs and in particular in the Large and Very Large segments.

| (38) | GE and Siemens are market leaders in the overall market for 50Hz HDGTs, competing globally and offering a wide range of products delivering strong performance across most technical criteria. Alstom, in particular, (i) is competing on par with GE and Siemens in the EEA; (ii) is also a global player and is a significant challenger to GE and Siemens also in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs outside the EEA; (iii) offers best in class flexibility and pollutant emissions performances, only matched to a certain extent by GE and Siemens, and well suited to meet the requirements of European customers; (iv) benefits from a large installed base of HDGTs worldwide, smaller than that of GE and Siemens, but well ahead of that of MHPS and Ansaldo. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

GE and Siemens are market leaders in the overall market for 50Hz HDGTs, competing globally and offering a wide range of products delivering strong performance across most technical criteria. Alstom, in particular, (i) is competing on par with GE and Siemens in the EEA; (ii) is also a global player and is a significant challenger to GE and Siemens also in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs outside the EEA; (iii) offers best in class flexibility and pollutant emissions performances, only matched to a certain extent by GE and Siemens, and well suited to meet the requirements of European customers; (iv) benefits from a large installed base of HDGTs worldwide, smaller than that of GE and Siemens, but well ahead of that of MHPS and Ansaldo.

| (39) | Alstom and GE are close competitors, inter alia, because both (i) have a large portfolio of HDGTs addressing the same segments; (ii) have a worldwide market presence covering the same regions; (iii) offer in 50 Hz regions HDGTs which are typically regarded as comparably reliable by customers and based on proven technology; (iv) are largely targeting the same profile of customers. In addition, as regards operational flexibility performances, GE developed machines which have become relatively close to Alstom's in terms of part-load efficiency and emissions, in particular in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. [CONFIDENTIAL]. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Alstom and GE are close competitors, inter alia, because both (i) have a large portfolio of HDGTs addressing the same segments; (ii) have a worldwide market presence covering the same regions; (iii) offer in 50 Hz regions HDGTs which are typically regarded as comparably reliable by customers and based on proven technology; (iv) are largely targeting the same profile of customers. In addition, as regards operational flexibility performances, GE developed machines which have become relatively close to Alstom's in terms of part-load efficiency and emissions, in particular in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. [CONFIDENTIAL].

| (40) | The analysis of bidding data for the Large segment indicates that GE and Alstom are close competitors for the following reasons: (i) after Siemens, Alstom is the firm that participates the most often against GE, both at the firm stage and at the shortlist stage of a tender; (ii) MHPS and Ansaldo have more limited competitive interactions with GE than Alstom, both at the firm stage and at the shortlist stage, (iii) GE and Alstom compete against one another in a significant share of competitive tenders ([CONFIDENTIAL]), (iv) tenders where the Parties compete against one another have a concentrated market structure, with a significant proportion of tenders with three participants or fewer, (v) Alstom appears as the second most important competitive constraint on GE's probability of winning a tender (after Siemens), whilst this is less the case for MHPS, and even less the case for Ansaldo, (vi) GE's margins are negatively correlated with Alstom's participations, (vii) GE participates in many tenders against Alstom, and GE's accounts for a significant share of Alstom's losses, suggesting that GE is also a competitive constraint to Alstom. This evidence therefore indicates the presence of significant horizontal unilateral effects from the transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The analysis of bidding data for the Large segment indicates that GE and Alstom are close competitors for the following reasons: (i) after Siemens, Alstom is the firm that participates the most often against GE, both at the firm stage and at the shortlist stage of a tender; (ii) MHPS and Ansaldo have more limited competitive interactions with GE than Alstom, both at the firm stage and at the shortlist stage, (iii) GE and Alstom compete against one another in a significant share of competitive tenders ([CONFIDENTIAL]), (iv) tenders where the Parties compete against one another have a concentrated market structure, with a significant proportion of tenders with three participants or fewer, (v) Alstom appears as the second most important competitive constraint on GE's probability of winning a tender (after Siemens), whilst this is less the case for MHPS, and even less the case for Ansaldo, (vi) GE's margins are negatively correlated with Alstom's participations, (vii) GE participates in many tenders against Alstom, and GE's accounts for a significant share of Alstom's losses, suggesting that GE is also a competitive constraint to Alstom. This evidence therefore indicates the presence of significant horizontal unilateral effects from the transaction.

| (41) | Last, bidding data on firm participations by OEMs indicates that MHPS and Ansaldo have also limited interactions with Alstom, suggesting that these two OEMs are not close competitors to Alstom. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Last, bidding data on firm participations by OEMs indicates that MHPS and Ansaldo have also limited interactions with Alstom, suggesting that these two OEMs are not close competitors to Alstom.

| (42) | The transaction would also eliminate an important competitive force from an innovation and technology point of view in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. The Commission's investigation showed that Alstom's HDGT portfolio offerings are often best in class in terms of operational flexibility, and that Alstom's HDGT portfolio offerings are highly regarded by customers looking for HDGTs characterized by high operational flexibility. Alstom has R & D and technological capabilities on par or almost on par with GE and Siemens. Alstom is a significant competitor in terms of R & D spend, R & D headcount, product pipeline, testing facilities and technological abilities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The transaction would also eliminate an important competitive force from an innovation and technology point of view in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. The Commission's investigation showed that Alstom's HDGT portfolio offerings are often best in class in terms of operational flexibility, and that Alstom's HDGT portfolio offerings are highly regarded by customers looking for HDGTs characterized by high operational flexibility. Alstom has R & D and technological capabilities on par or almost on par with GE and Siemens. Alstom is a significant competitor in terms of R & D spend, R & D headcount, product pipeline, testing facilities and technological abilities.

| (43) | GE post-transaction would have likely eliminated most of Alstom's R & D capabilities related to HDGTs. As such, the ability of the merged entity to pursue the development of Alstom's HDGT technologies and to build on Alstom's past technology path would have disappeared. GE would have also discontinued the sale and development of Alstom's HDGTs in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. GE would post-merger likely have only limited incentives and ability to develop significant new upgrades for the Large HDGT, compared to the incentives and ability that Alstom would have in the absence of the merger. In particular, upgrades that would have been cross-financed by sales from new HDGTs are likely not to be developed. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

GE post-transaction would have likely eliminated most of Alstom's R & D capabilities related to HDGTs. As such, the ability of the merged entity to pursue the development of Alstom's HDGT technologies and to build on Alstom's past technology path would have disappeared. GE would have also discontinued the sale and development of Alstom's HDGTs in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. GE would post-merger likely have only limited incentives and ability to develop significant new upgrades for the Large HDGT, compared to the incentives and ability that Alstom would have in the absence of the merger. In particular, upgrades that would have been cross-financed by sales from new HDGTs are likely not to be developed.

| (44) | The transaction would therefore even further affect negatively prices and the choices available to customers in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. It would have also reduced the overall incentives to invest significantly in innovation, as compared to the standard effects of a merger. Finally, given the very high barriers to entry and the nature of innovation competition in this industry these significant negative effects on innovation would have been long term. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The transaction would therefore even further affect negatively prices and the choices available to customers in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. It would have also reduced the overall incentives to invest significantly in innovation, as compared to the standard effects of a merger. Finally, given the very high barriers to entry and the nature of innovation competition in this industry these significant negative effects on innovation would have been long term.

| (45) | In the particular case of the Medium segment of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs, however, the Commission's investigation revealed that from a technological point of view, Alstom's Medium HDGT closest competitors are Siemens' and Ansaldo's Medium HDGTs. GE's Medium HDGT is more distant from a technological point of view. Even with the recent launch of a new Medium HDGT, GE has become closer to the Alstom's HDGT but only on SC efficiency, while it remains more distant in terms of the other parameters. Thus, the Commission considers that the transaction does not lead to a significant impediment to effective competition in the Medium segment, and in any case, the transaction will bring about efficiencies which are likely to largely outweigh the potential harm. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

In the particular case of the Medium segment of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs, however, the Commission's investigation revealed that from a technological point of view, Alstom's Medium HDGT closest competitors are Siemens' and Ansaldo's Medium HDGTs. GE's Medium HDGT is more distant from a technological point of view. Even with the recent launch of a new Medium HDGT, GE has become closer to the Alstom's HDGT but only on SC efficiency, while it remains more distant in terms of the other parameters. Thus, the Commission considers that the transaction does not lead to a significant impediment to effective competition in the Medium segment, and in any case, the transaction will bring about efficiencies which are likely to largely outweigh the potential harm.

| (46) | In line with its investigation, the Commission considered that the transaction would have had overall significant adverse effects on prices, product choice and innovation in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In line with its investigation, the Commission considered that the transaction would have had overall significant adverse effects on prices, product choice and innovation in the Large and Very Large segments of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs.

| (47) | As for the markets for generators and steam turbines bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs, the Commission's investigation showed that many customers have a preference for sourcing these complements from HDGT suppliers for warranty, servicing, cost and performance optimization reasons. Therefore, for those customers, the effects in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs risk to extend to complements markets. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

As for the markets for generators and steam turbines bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs, the Commission's investigation showed that many customers have a preference for sourcing these complements from HDGT suppliers for warranty, servicing, cost and performance optimization reasons. Therefore, for those customers, the effects in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs risk to extend to complements markets.

| (48) | Finally, the transaction would further strengthen GE's dominant position for the servicing of GE's 9FA HDGTs by eliminating Alstom's PSM which is its strongest potential competitor. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Finally, the transaction would further strengthen GE's dominant position for the servicing of GE's 9FA HDGTs by eliminating Alstom's PSM which is its strongest potential competitor.

| (49) | The Commission's investigation showed that the market of servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs is characterised by a dominant position of GE. Alstom's PSM is currently leveraging its customer relationships and its 60 Hz servicing know-how to enter the market for the servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs where it plans to achieve a significant position. While a few other ISPs are currently also trying to enter the market of servicing the 9FA HDGTs, these entries are based in a much more limited technology basis, in particular as regards spare parts and upgrades. In addition other significant new entries are unlikely in view of high technological barriers and significant investments required. Alstom's PSM is therefore most likely to be the main challenger of GE in the servicing of GE's 9FA HDGTs, both in terms of the three core services and upgrades. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Commission's investigation showed that the market of servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs is characterised by a dominant position of GE. Alstom's PSM is currently leveraging its customer relationships and its 60 Hz servicing know-how to enter the market for the servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs where it plans to achieve a significant position. While a few other ISPs are currently also trying to enter the market of servicing the 9FA HDGTs, these entries are based in a much more limited technology basis, in particular as regards spare parts and upgrades. In addition other significant new entries are unlikely in view of high technological barriers and significant investments required. Alstom's PSM is therefore most likely to be the main challenger of GE in the servicing of GE's 9FA HDGTs, both in terms of the three core services and upgrades.

| (50) | Moreover, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the internal market in: (i) the overall market of generators (air-cooled and hydrogen-cooled) above 35 MW; (ii) the overall market of 50 Hz LSTs (excluding those for nuclear application); (iii) the market for HRSG; (iv) the market for plant control system; (v) the markets for the servicing of GE's 9E frame and lower output HDGTs frames; (vi) the markets for servicing of generators; (vii) the markets for servicing of STs; and (viii) the markets for grid products. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Moreover, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the internal market in: (i) the overall market of generators (air-cooled and hydrogen-cooled) above 35 MW; (ii) the overall market of 50 Hz LSTs (excluding those for nuclear application); (iii) the market for HRSG; (iv) the market for plant control system; (v) the markets for the servicing of GE's 9E frame and lower output HDGTs frames; (vi) the markets for servicing of generators; (vii) the markets for servicing of STs; and (viii) the markets for grid products.

D.   REMEDIES

REMEDIES

| (51) | In order to render the transaction compatible with the internal market in relation to the market for 50 Hz HDGTs, in particular in the Large and Very Large segments, the market for generators bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs, the market for LSTs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs and the market for servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs, the Notifying Party submitted the First set of Commitments on 16 July 2015. The Commission concluded that the First set of Commitments was insufficient to remove the significant impediment to effective competition, did not market test them and informed the Notifying Party accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In order to render the transaction compatible with the internal market in relation to the market for 50 Hz HDGTs, in particular in the Large and Very Large segments, the market for generators bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs, the market for LSTs bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs and the market for servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs, the Notifying Party submitted the First set of Commitments on 16 July 2015. The Commission concluded that the First set of Commitments was insufficient to remove the significant impediment to effective competition, did not market test them and informed the Notifying Party accordingly.

| (52) | The Notifying Party submitted the Second set of Commitments on 21 July 2015. The Commission concluded that the Second set of Commitments of 21 July 2015 was insufficient to remove the significant impediment to effective competition, did not market test them and informed the Notifying Party accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Notifying Party submitted the Second set of Commitments on 21 July 2015. The Commission concluded that the Second set of Commitments of 21 July 2015 was insufficient to remove the significant impediment to effective competition, did not market test them and informed the Notifying Party accordingly.

| (53) | The Notifying Party submitted the Third set of Commitments on 24 July 2015. The Commission did market test the Third set of Commitments. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Notifying Party submitted the Third set of Commitments on 24 July 2015. The Commission did market test the Third set of Commitments.

| (54) | In order to address the issues raised in the market test, the Notifying Party submitted the Final Commitments on 6 August 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

In order to address the issues raised in the market test, the Notifying Party submitted the Final Commitments on 6 August 2015.

| (55) | The Final Commitments submitted by the Notifying Party consists in the divestment to Ansaldo of the Alstom's Gas Business combined with the PSM Business, excluding (i) those areas of Alstom's Gas Business where no competition issues arise, and (ii) elements of Alstom's Gas Business and the PSM Business that are not needed by Ansaldo to replicate Alstom as a viable and competitive force in HDGTs, insofar as Ansaldo's resources and capabilities are taken into account (the ‘Divestment Business’). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Final Commitments submitted by the Notifying Party consists in the divestment to Ansaldo of the Alstom's Gas Business combined with the PSM Business, excluding (i) those areas of Alstom's Gas Business where no competition issues arise, and (ii) elements of Alstom's Gas Business and the PSM Business that are not needed by Ansaldo to replicate Alstom as a viable and competitive force in HDGTs, insofar as Ansaldo's resources and capabilities are taken into account (the ‘Divestment Business’).

| (56) | The Divestment Business includes intangible assets, tangible assets, contracts, agreements, leases, customer, credit and other records, Personnel, Key Personnel, and transitional arrangement to supply Ansaldo with some products or services by GE. In particular, it includes:






  (a) | Alstom's heavy duty gas turbine technology for the GT 26 and GT 36 turbines, existing upgrades and pipeline technology for future upgrades, excluding essentially only the technology for Alstom's older GT 13 model for which the Commission had no competition concerns; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(56)

The Divestment Business includes intangible assets, tangible assets, contracts, agreements, leases, customer, credit and other records, Personnel, Key Personnel, and transitional arrangement to supply Ansaldo with some products or services by GE. In particular, it includes:

(a)

Alstom's heavy duty gas turbine technology for the GT 26 and GT 36 turbines, existing upgrades and pipeline technology for future upgrades, excluding essentially only the technology for Alstom's older GT 13 model for which the Commission had no competition concerns;

| (b) | a large number of Alstom R & D engineers who will continue to develop the Alstom heavy duty gas turbine technology; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

a large number of Alstom R & D engineers who will continue to develop the Alstom heavy duty gas turbine technology;

| (c) | the two test facilities for the GT 26 and GT 36 turbine models in Birr, Switzerland; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the two test facilities for the GT 26 and GT 36 turbine models in Birr, Switzerland;

| (d) | long term servicing agreements for 34 GT 26 turbines already sold in recent years by Alstom; and |
| --- | --- |

(d)

long term servicing agreements for 34 GT 26 turbines already sold in recent years by Alstom; and

| (e) | Alstom's PSM servicing business based in Florida, US. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Alstom's PSM servicing business based in Florida, US.

| (57) | The objective of the Final Commitments is to create a business that is viable, standalone and competitive insofar as Ansaldo's resources and capabilities are taken into account, which will replicate Alstom as a viable and competitive force in HDGTs |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The objective of the Final Commitments is to create a business that is viable, standalone and competitive insofar as Ansaldo's resources and capabilities are taken into account, which will replicate Alstom as a viable and competitive force in HDGTs

| (58) | The commitments submitted by the Notifying Party have elements of both a fix-it-first remedy and an up-front buyer remedy. The commitments structure is a fix-it-first solution in so far as GE has already pre-selected the purchaser, Ansaldo. The current assets of Ansaldo can thus be taken into account in the Commission's assessment about the viability and competitiveness of Ansaldo in operating the assets divested. The commitments structure is also an upfront buyer solution since the implementation of the transaction can only take place after the final approval by the Commission of the purchaser and the purchase agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The commitments submitted by the Notifying Party have elements of both a fix-it-first remedy and an up-front buyer remedy. The commitments structure is a fix-it-first solution in so far as GE has already pre-selected the purchaser, Ansaldo. The current assets of Ansaldo can thus be taken into account in the Commission's assessment about the viability and competitiveness of Ansaldo in operating the assets divested. The commitments structure is also an upfront buyer solution since the implementation of the transaction can only take place after the final approval by the Commission of the purchaser and the purchase agreements.

| (59) | The assets retained by GE (the ‘Retained Business’) consist of the (tangible and intangible) assets and personnel included in Alstom's Gas Business and the PSM Business that will not be included in the Divestment Business, because they (i) are related to areas of Alstom's Gas Business where no competition issues arise, and/or (ii) are not needed by Ansaldo to replicate Alstom as a viable and competitive force in HDGTs, insofar as Ansaldo's resources and capabilities are taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The assets retained by GE (the ‘Retained Business’) consist of the (tangible and intangible) assets and personnel included in Alstom's Gas Business and the PSM Business that will not be included in the Divestment Business, because they (i) are related to areas of Alstom's Gas Business where no competition issues arise, and/or (ii) are not needed by Ansaldo to replicate Alstom as a viable and competitive force in HDGTs, insofar as Ansaldo's resources and capabilities are taken into account.

| (60) | The Commission considers that Ansaldo is, prima facie, a suitable buyer given its experience as a HDGT OEM. Ansaldo will, prima facie, have the incentive and ability to maintain and develop the Divestment Business as a viable and active force in competition with the merged entity, MHPS and Siemens, conditional on the final composition of the assets that it will acquire through the SPA. The Divestment Business broadly includes the resources (namely engineers, Alstom's technology and know-how, and testing facilities) necessary for Ansaldo to operate an advanced HDGT business and to continue on Alstom's innovation path. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The Commission considers that Ansaldo is, prima facie, a suitable buyer given its experience as a HDGT OEM. Ansaldo will, prima facie, have the incentive and ability to maintain and develop the Divestment Business as a viable and active force in competition with the merged entity, MHPS and Siemens, conditional on the final composition of the assets that it will acquire through the SPA. The Divestment Business broadly includes the resources (namely engineers, Alstom's technology and know-how, and testing facilities) necessary for Ansaldo to operate an advanced HDGT business and to continue on Alstom's innovation path.

| (61) | The Commission considers that the Final Commitments would allow Ansaldo to replicate Alstom's competitive constraint in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. In fact, the combination of the Divestment Business assets, including the GT26 2006, the GT26 2011, the GT36 and the relevant Alstom's development programmes (i.e. Alstom's Large and Very Large HDGT frames), with Ansaldo existing assets will allow Ansaldo to become a close and effective competitor of GE, Siemens, and MHPS in the market for 50 Hz HDGT, and in particular in the Large and Very Large segments, thereby replacing Alstom's competitive constraints. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Commission considers that the Final Commitments would allow Ansaldo to replicate Alstom's competitive constraint in the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. In fact, the combination of the Divestment Business assets, including the GT26 2006, the GT26 2011, the GT36 and the relevant Alstom's development programmes (i.e. Alstom's Large and Very Large HDGT frames), with Ansaldo existing assets will allow Ansaldo to become a close and effective competitor of GE, Siemens, and MHPS in the market for 50 Hz HDGT, and in particular in the Large and Very Large segments, thereby replacing Alstom's competitive constraints.

| (62) | GE will divest to Ansaldo all the assets, personnel and technology of Alstom necessary for Ansaldo to further strengthen its position as an OEM in advanced HDGTs. As Ansaldo will have the exclusive right (including vis-à-vis GE) to sell new units of Alstom's Large and Very Large HDGT, the transaction will not strengthen GE's position in the Large and Very Large segment of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. Additionally, the Final Commitments ensure that Ansaldo will have access to the customers, capabilities and information it requires to carry out servicing and innovation on an ongoing basis. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

GE will divest to Ansaldo all the assets, personnel and technology of Alstom necessary for Ansaldo to further strengthen its position as an OEM in advanced HDGTs. As Ansaldo will have the exclusive right (including vis-à-vis GE) to sell new units of Alstom's Large and Very Large HDGT, the transaction will not strengthen GE's position in the Large and Very Large segment of the market for 50 Hz HDGTs. Additionally, the Final Commitments ensure that Ansaldo will have access to the customers, capabilities and information it requires to carry out servicing and innovation on an ongoing basis.

| (63) | The Divestment Business also includes the transfer to Ansaldo of the current servicing agreements for thirty GT26 2006 units located predominantly in the EEA and four GT26 2011 units. The transfer of such agreements, which constitutes around half of the installed base of GT26 2006 and 2011, addresses the concerns with respect to Ansaldo's position and viability as the standalone GT26 2006 and 2011 OEM. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Divestment Business also includes the transfer to Ansaldo of the current servicing agreements for thirty GT26 2006 units located predominantly in the EEA and four GT26 2011 units. The transfer of such agreements, which constitutes around half of the installed base of GT26 2006 and 2011, addresses the concerns with respect to Ansaldo's position and viability as the standalone GT26 2006 and 2011 OEM.

| (64) | The Commission also considers that the Final Commitments would allow Ansaldo to replicate Alstom as an important innovator. In fact, GE will transfer to Ansaldo R & D personnel with an appropriate mix of skills and experience from Alstom's team, all Alstom technology relating to advanced HDGTs including the GT26 2006, GT26 2011 and GT36 and rights in and access to testing facilities. The Final Commitments will therefore ensure that Ansaldo will have the ability and incentives to maintain Alstom's current level of innovation. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Commission also considers that the Final Commitments would allow Ansaldo to replicate Alstom as an important innovator. In fact, GE will transfer to Ansaldo R & D personnel with an appropriate mix of skills and experience from Alstom's team, all Alstom technology relating to advanced HDGTs including the GT26 2006, GT26 2011 and GT36 and rights in and access to testing facilities. The Final Commitments will therefore ensure that Ansaldo will have the ability and incentives to maintain Alstom's current level of innovation.

| (65) | Finally, the Commission considers that the Final Commitments would allow Ansaldo to (i) replicate PSM's competitive constraint in the market for servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs and (ii) Alstom's competitive constraint in the markets for selling and servicing LST bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs and generators bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Finally, the Commission considers that the Final Commitments would allow Ansaldo to (i) replicate PSM's competitive constraint in the market for servicing GE's 9FA HDGTs and (ii) Alstom's competitive constraint in the markets for selling and servicing LST bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs and generators bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs.

| (66) | In light of the above, the scope of the Divestment Business and the identity of the purchaser, and the specific assets and capabilities that Ansaldo already possesses, lead to the conclusion that the Final Commitments are likely to create a viable business capable of competing effectively on a lasting basis in the relevant markets. These commitments therefore are likely to ensure that the transaction will not result in any adverse effect on competition in any relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

In light of the above, the scope of the Divestment Business and the identity of the purchaser, and the specific assets and capabilities that Ansaldo already possesses, lead to the conclusion that the Final Commitments are likely to create a viable business capable of competing effectively on a lasting basis in the relevant markets. These commitments therefore are likely to ensure that the transaction will not result in any adverse effect on competition in any relevant markets.

| (67) | The Commission thus concluded that the Final Commitments are adequate and sufficient to eliminate the significant impediment to effective competition in the market for (i) 50 Hz HDGTs, (ii) servicing of GE's 9FA frame, (iii) generators bundled with 50 HDGTs and (iv) LST bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Commission thus concluded that the Final Commitments are adequate and sufficient to eliminate the significant impediment to effective competition in the market for (i) 50 Hz HDGTs, (ii) servicing of GE's 9FA frame, (iii) generators bundled with 50 HDGTs and (iv) LST bundled with 50 Hz HDGTs.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (68) | For the reasons mentioned above, the decision concludes that the proposed concentration as modified by the commitments submitted on 6 August 2015 will not significantly impede effective competition in the Internal Market or in a substantial part of it. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

For the reasons mentioned above, the decision concludes that the proposed concentration as modified by the commitments submitted on 6 August 2015 will not significantly impede effective competition in the Internal Market or in a substantial part of it.

| (69) | Consequently the concentration should be declared compatible with the Internal Market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Consequently the concentration should be declared compatible with the Internal Market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1-22.

1

---