FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-4006

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FRANK LAMAR JENNINGS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.

Paul S. Bryan, Judge.

September 12, 2019

B.L. THOMAS, J.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

withdraw plea. He argued that his sentence of fourteen years 

followed by sixteen years’ probation violated his plea agreement. 

Facts

Appellant was charged with fleeing a law-enforcement officer, 

resisting an officer without violence, driving while license 

suspended or revoked, multiple counts of possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to sell or deliver, and possession of a 

controlled substance within 1000 feet of a place of worship. 

Appellant’s Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet provided for a 

maximum sentence of 360 years in prison.

The plea agreement stipulated that in exchange for 

Appellant’s open guilty plea, the State would recommend a 
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sentence of no more than fifteen years in prison and would not seek

an additional probation term. Appellant would be allowed to argue 

for a downward departure from the fifteen-year prison sentence. 

Before accepting the plea, the court conducted an extensive 

colloquy, during which Appellant confirmed the voluntariness of 

his plea, his understanding of the plea agreement, and his 

understanding of what the sentence could be given the scoresheet.

During the colloquy, the court, having established that another 

judge would be presiding over sentencing, discussed the State’s 

recommendation of a fifteen-year prison sentence and asked the 

Appellant, “You understand nobody's offering you any assurances 

other than it will not be in excess of fifteen years?,” to which 

Appellant replied “Yes, sir.” The plea agreement was then accepted 

by the court.

At the sentencing hearing, the State upheld the agreement, 

recommending to the court a fifteen-year prison sentence. The 

court sentenced the Appellant to fourteen years in prison to be 

followed by sixteen years of drug-offender probation.

Appellant filed a motion to withdraw plea alleging that the 

Appellant was not told of the possibility of additional probation,

and that the thirty-year split sentence violated the plea 

agreement. The court denied the motion, stating that the court had 

been lenient with the Appellant by reducing his original 360-year 

potential incarceration sentence to a fourteen-year incarceration 

sentence with a “lengthy probation” period to follow, which was

less than the State’s recommendation of fifteen years of 

incarceration.

Analysis

The denial of a motion to withdraw plea is reviewed under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. State, 249 So. 2d 1284, 1286 

(Fla 1st DCA 2018) (citing Woodly v. State, 937 So. 2d 193, 196 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). 

Generally, when a trial court expressly informs a defendant of 

the sentence it will impose under a plea agreement, the trial court 

must make it clear to the defendant whether it intends to impose 

a probationary period in excess of that sentence. Jefferson v. State, 

515 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that the court 

violated the plea agreement because it did not inform the 
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defendant that an additional probationary period would be 

imposed). However, in Perras v. State, 550 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1989), this court distinguished Jefferson, holding that there is a 

key difference between the court stating that it will sentence a 

defendant within a certain range under an agreement and the 

State agreeing to seek a sentence within a specified range.

The supreme court stated in State v. Adams that the “only 

bargain was that the state attorney would make a 

recommendation to the court. This was done. When the sentence 

was imposed, the judge was not bound by the recommendation of 

the state attorney or any negotiations which occurred between the 

state attorney and the defense counsel.” 342 So. 2d 818, 820 (Fla 

1977). As is the case here, “if the agreement only calls for the state 

to recommend a particular sentence and it is clear that the trial 

judge may impose a greater sentence, the defendant cannot 

withdraw the plea if a greater sentence is imposed so long as the 

state carries out its promise.” Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 

1996). 

Here, the State adhered to the plea agreement and sought a 

fifteen-year prison sentence, allowing the Appellant to argue for a 

lesser sentence. Appellant previously asserted that he understood 

the agreement, which left the maximum term within the discretion 

of the sentencing judge. The sentencing court did not violate the 

agreement by imposing a fourteen-year prison sentence followed 

by sixteen years of probation.* Appellant’s plea was voluntary, and 

the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

Appellant’s motion to withdraw plea.

AFFIRMED. 

WINOKUR and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

 

* Additionally, because the State termed its offer as a “cap” of 

fifteen years, a sentence including fourteen years of incarceration 

likely would not violate the agreement regardless of the added 

probationary term. Rollman v. State, 855 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2003) (Padovano, J., concurring) (noting that, regarding plea 

agreements, “the term ‘cap’ is generally understood to signify only 

the incarcerative portion of the sentence”). 
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Jasmine Quintera Russell, 

Assistant Public Defender, Christopher L. Craun, Tallahassee, for

Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Barbara Debelius, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.