IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TEXARKANA DIVISION

ZACHERY EASTER § 

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24cv19-RWS-JBB 

BOWIE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL § 

CENTER

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The PlaintiffZacheryEaster, an inmate oftheBowieCounty CorrectionalCenter proceeding 

pro se, filed this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 complaining of alleged violations of his 

constitutional rights. The lawsuit was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and (3) and Local Rule CV-72 of the Local Rules of Court for the 

Eastern District of Texas. The sole named Defendant is the Bowie County Correctional Center.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states that on January 11, 2024, around 12:30 p.m., he 

was standing by the bars in Pod B-3 in Annex 2 of the jail talking to two fellow inmates. A large 

piece of sheetrock fell from the ceiling and hit him in the head. He states that he is suing the Bowie 

County Correctional Center for negligence and the injury to his head.

The Magistrate Judge ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partialfiling fee of $6.00, asrequired 

by 29 U.S.C. §1915(b). To date, Plaintiff has not complied with this order. His lawsuit is subject 

to dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey an order of the Court. 

However, Plaintiff’slawsuitsuffersfrom more significantflaws. The sole named Defendant 

in his lawsuit is the Bowie County Correctional Center, which is a sub-unit of Bowie County and 

has no separate jural existence apart from the county. Rowe v. Bowie County Correctional Center, 

civil action no. 5:13cv78, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151165 at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2013). As such, the 

Bowie County Correctional Center cannot be sued in its own name. Darby v. Pasadena Police 

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Department, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff does not allege, much less show, that the 

true political entity, Bowie County, has taken explicit steps to grant the Bowie County Correctional 

Center jural authority, meaning that the correctional center cannot engage in any litigation except 

in concert with the county itself. Id.; see also Barrie v. Nueces County District Attorney’s Office, 

753 F.App’x 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018); Goodnight v. Rains County Sheriff’s Department, civil action 

no. 6:13cv96, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80946 at *2, 2013 WL 2551879 (E.D.Tex. 2013). Because

the Bowie County Correctional Center has no separate jural existence and is not a suable entity, 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the sole named 

Defendant. 

Even if Plaintiff had named a suable entity for violating his constitutional rights, this claim

would still fail. Here, Plaintiff characterizes his claim as one of negligence. See, e.g., Million v. 

Grounds, civil action no. 5:14cv11, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125020 at *11-12 (E.D.Tex., August 19, 

2015), Report adopted at 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124184, 2015 WL 5521989 (E.D.Tex., September

17, 2015), aff’d 690 F.App’x 163 (5th Cir. 2017) (claim that an overhead exhaust system fell on the 

prisoner in the shower at the Telford Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice was one of 

negligence); Franco–Calzada v. United States, 375 F.App'x 217, 220 (3rd Cir. 2010) (allegation of 

failure to inspect and fix faulty ladder attached to prison bunk bed was claim of negligence). 

However, a showing of mere negligent indifference is not enough for a constitutional claim.

Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). 

Prison officials have a constitutional obligation not to be deliberately indifferent to the health or

safety of the prisoners. Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). In defining deliberate 

indifference, the Supreme Court has explained as follows: 

[A] prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying

an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

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serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference...But an official's failure to

alleviate a significant risk which he should have perceived, but did not, while no cause for 

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The Fifth 

Circuit has explained that deliberate indifference is “an extremely high standard tomeet” and cannot 

be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of 

serious harm. Torres v. Livingston, 972 F.3d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 2020). 

Even had he sued any individual officials at the Bowie County Correctional Center, which 

he did not, Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating that any such official knew of and disregarded 

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Tripp v. Livingston, civil action no. 6:14cv742, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79032 (E.D. Tex., February 29, 2016), Report adopted at U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

78773 (E.D. Tex., June 16, 2016) (allegation that table in prison dining hall broke loose from the 

bottom and fell on the plaintiff was claim of negligence rather than deliberate indifference and thus 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); Bouknight v. Roesler, civil action no. 

3:13cv451, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42326 at *8, 2017 WL 1102695 (S.D. Tex., March 22, 2017) 

(table in dining hall which broke and fell on plaintiff was claim of negligence). Any purported 

failure to conduct safety inspections likewise does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 

Million, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125020 at *12. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts indicating 

deliberate indifference and thus has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Conclusion 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires that as soon as practicable, district courts must review 

complaints wherein prisoners seek redress from governmental entities or their employees and 

identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof if the complaint is 

frivolous, malicious, failsto state a claim upon which relief may be granted, orseeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does not allege

sufficient facts that, taken as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face and thus does not raise 

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a right to relief above the speculative level. Montoya v. FedEx Ground Packaging System Inc., 614 

F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a

probability requirement, but asksfor more than a possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the claim must contain more than “an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-meaccusation.”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at677-78. Apleading 

offering “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will 

not suffice, nor does a complaint which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further 

factual enhancement. Id. at 678. 

A complaint may be dismissed if a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his] claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible,” if the complaint pleads facts merely consistent with or creating a 

suspicion of the defendant’s liability, or if a complaint lacks a factual allegation regarding any 

required element necessary to obtain relief. Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 

2006). Pro se plaintiffs are held to a more lenient standard than are lawyers when analyzing a 

complaint, but pro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations which raise the right to relief 

above the speculative level. Chhim v. University of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 

2016); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (pro se litigants are not 

exempt from the requirement that they plead sufficient facts to allege a plausible claim for relief or 

from the principle that mere legal conclusions do notsuffice to prevent dismissal). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

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Although all well-pleaded facts are taken as true, the district court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 

F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)).

Dismissal is proper if a complaint lacks a factual allegation regarding any required element

necessary to obtain relief. Rios, 444 F.3d at 421.

The FifthCircuit has explained that while pro se complaints are construed liberally, the court 

isstill bound by the allegations of the complaint and is not free to speculate that the plaintiff “might” 

be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to amend the complaint. Macias v. Raul A. 

(Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). The court explained as follows:

For example, if an IFP plaintiff, in amending his complaint through a response to a 

questionnaire, allegesin his response that he received inadequate medical care while 

incarcerated, we should not reverse the dismissal of the complaint on the basis that 

the plaintiff could possibly add factsthat would demonstrate that he wastreated with 

deliberate indifference in the medical care that he received. As another example,if 

an IFP prisoner asserts in the questionnaire response that he has been denied 

recreation time, we should not reverse dismissal on the ground that he might also be 

able to assert a claim that the denial was in retaliation for his having filed a 

grievance.

Id. at 97. 

In addition to failing to follow Court orders, as described above, Plaintiffhasnot namedany 

defendant amenable to suit and has not alleged factsshowing that any jail officials were deliberately 

indifferent to his safety. Consequently, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. 

RECOMMENDATION

It is accordingly recommended that the above-styled civil action be dismissed without 

prejudice for failure to state a claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and for failure to prosecute or to 

obey an order of the Court regarding payment of the initial partial filing fee of $6.00, see

McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988).

A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendations shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations mustfile specificwritten objections within 14 days after being servedwith a copy. 

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In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation 

to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate 

Judge’s proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection which merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

Magistrate Judge is not specific, and the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections. See Battle v. United States Parole Commission, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 

1987). 

Failure to file specific written objections will bar the objecting party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which are accepted and adoptedby 

the district court except upon grounds of plain error. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 858 F.3d 348, 352 

(5th Cir. 2017). 

.

____________________________________

J. Boone Baxter

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SIGNED this the 21st day of March, 2024.

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