* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-40361

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LAZARO F PEREZ, SR

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:04-CR-774-6

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lazaro F. Perez, Sr., challenges the sentence imposed following his guilty

plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than

1,000 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and

846. Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Perez to 135 months

of imprisonment, which was at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range, to

be followed by a five-year term of supervised release.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 11, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-40361

2

Perez argues that the remedial opinion in United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220, 258-60 (2005), constitutes an impermissible exercise of judicial power.

Perez urges this court to rely on Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Booker,

543 U.S. at 303-04. We are bound by the majority opinion in Booker. 

Perez next argues that the district court erred in adjusting Perez’s base

offense level by four levels based on his role as an organizer or leader in the

offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Perez alternatively argues that, at most, he

was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy, which warrants only a threelevel adjustment. We review the district court’s finding that Perez had an

aggravating role in the offense for clear error. United States v. Rose, 449 F.3d

627, 633 (5th Cir. 2006). The record reflects that Perez was the closest to the

source of the marijuana as he had contacts with the suppliers in Mexico and

coordinated the delivery of marijuana to various members of the organization.

Perez recruited three of his co-defendants, including his own son, as participants

in the offense. Perez provided another co-defendant with the keys to a red Ford

van that was loaded with marijuana. In addition, Perez made payments to four

of his co-defendants, totaling approximately $10,000. In light of the record as

a whole, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that

Perez was a leader or organizer. See id.; United States v. Caldwell, 448 F.3d

287, 293 (5th Cir. 2006). 

Perez also argues that the waiver provision in his plea agreement is

invalid. In his plea agreement, which he executed prior to Booker, Perez (1)

waived any rights he had to have the facts that the law makes essential to the

punishment either charged in the indictment, proven to a jury, or proved beyond

a reasonable doubt; and (2) agreed that the district court was authorized to

impose a sentence authorized by the Guidelines up to and including the

statutory maximum under the relevant statute of conviction. Perez argues that

the waiver is invalid because (1) it does not specify whether he consented to a

mandatory or advisory application of the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) the
No. 06-40361

3

term statutory maximum is ambiguous. Perez’s arguments are unavailing.

Perez was sentenced after Booker pursuantto an advisory guidelines range. The

waiver provision is immaterial. Cf. United States v. Reyes-Celestino, 443 F.3d

451, 453 (5th Cir. 2006). Perez was sentenced to 135 months in prison, which

was the bottom of the advisory guidelines range, and the sentence is entitled to

a non-binding presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct.

2456, 2462 (2007). 

Perez next argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

several respects. This court generally will not consider claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal except in those “rare cases where the

record allowed [this court] to evaluate fairly the merits of the claim.” United

States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1987). This is not one of those

cases.

Perez also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it

denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. None of the seven factors

discussed in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984),

supported the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Perez has not established that, in

denying his motion to withdraw, the district court abused its discretion.

Finally, Perez argues thatthe district court erred in sentencing him under

the remedial holding of Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-60, in violation of the Ex Post

Facto and Due Process Clauses. Perez’s arguments are, as he concedes,

foreclosed by this court’s ruling in United States v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572,

575-76 (5th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.