[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13426

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

In re:

TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL, 

Debtor.

___________________________________________________

TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 

Defendants- Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13426

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01075-TJC,

Bkcy. No. 3:20-bk-00618-JAF

____________________

____________________

No. 21-13429

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

In re: TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL, 

Debtor.

___________________________________________________

TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 3

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01047-TJC,

Bkcy. No. 3:20-bk-00618-JAF

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Taquan Rahshe Gullett-El appeals from the district court’s 

order (1) holding that his appeal from the bankruptcy court’s 

dismissal of his adversary complaint was untimely and otherwise 

frivolous, and (2) denying his request for permission to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal. Gullett-El argues that he timely

filed his administrative appeal from the bankruptcy court’s 

adversary proceeding to the district court and that the district court 

erred in denying him IFP status on appeal. Additionally, he asserts 

that both the bankruptcy court and the district court made multiple 

errors in the disposition of his adversary complaint. After review, 

we conclude that we lack jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is 

dismissed. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13426

I. Background

Although this appeal arises out of a dismissal of two 

bankruptcy court appeals, a brief summary of events leading to that 

ruling is necessary for context.

In 2017, Gullett-El was convicted in the Central District of 

California of two counts of submitting false, fictious, or fraudulent 

claims to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and two counts of 

attempting to file a false lien or encumbrance against the property 

of government employees. See United States v. Taquan-Rashe, 752 F. 

App’x 531, 531 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished). 

Thereafter, in 2020, while imprisoned for those crimes, 

Gullett-El, filed a pro se petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the 

bankruptcy court for the Middle District of Florida. He alleged, 

among other types of debt, that he had judicial liens, statutory 

liens, and tax liens. And he listed as creditors, among others, the 

California Franchise Tax Board and the United States of America. 

On July 23, 2020, Gullett-El received a discharge from the 

bankruptcy court. The discharge notice explained generally that 

some debts are not dischargeable, including “debts for most taxes.” 

The bankruptcy court closed the bankruptcy proceeding in 

September 2021. 

In March 2020, prior to receiving the bankruptcy discharge, 

Gullett-El filed a pro se adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court

against the IRS, the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and several 

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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 5

other defendants.1 In the adversary complaint, he cited numerous 

international treaties and alleged that (1) the IRS had instituted an 

unlawful lien against him in 2010; (2) he was the victim of malicious 

prosecution and his convictions were unlawful and violated 

various international laws; (3) the California district court judge 

breached a “contract” that Gullett-El filed in his criminal case 

(which he contended created a binding contract between himself 

and the district court judge over various matters); (4) the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons attempted to force him via threats and extortion 

to enter into a contract setting up a schedule of payments for the 

allegedly unlawful $400 special assessment imposed as part of his 

criminal sentence; (5) he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus

from the bankruptcy court; (6) he was entitled to billions in 

damages from the “United States Federal Corporation” and its 

privies; (7) he was entitled to specific performance of the “contract” 

he filed in his criminal case; and (8) he sought to invoke the 

jurisdiction of the international court of criminal justice and the 

international criminal court because he was a “non-immigrant 

alien” and he was subject to genocide, war crimes, crimes against 

humanity, and the denial of procedural justice by the United States, 

1 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that certain bankruptcy 

related proceedings are “adversary proceedings,” including a proceeding for 

money damages, and a proceeding “to determine the dischargeability of a 

debt.” See Fed. R. Bank. P. 7001. “[A]n adversary proceeding in the 

bankruptcy court and the companion bankruptcy case are two distinct 

proceedings.” In re Morris, 950 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992). 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13426

citing various international laws, treaties, and conventions. As 

relief, he requested the bankruptcy court order: (1) specific 

performance of the “contract” in his criminal case; (2) discharge of 

the IRS’s allegedly unlawful tax lien, the $100,000 assessment owed 

to State of California, and the $400 special assessment imposed as 

part of his sentence; (3) his immediate discharge from unlawful 

detainment; and (4) reparations, restitution, and damages related 

to the unlawful convictions. 

In response, the United States moved to dismiss the 

adversary proceeding for lack of service, lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, and because the complaint was an impermissible 

shotgun pleading. Similarly, the ABA moved to dismiss the 

complaint, arguing that it was a shotgun pleading and alternatively 

because it alleged no injuries caused by the ABA. Gullett-El 

opposed the motions to dismiss.

On July 21, 2020 (the “July 21 order”), the bankruptcy court 

granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed Gullett-El’s 

adversary complaint. As an initial matter, the bankruptcy court 

concluded that Gullett-El failed to state a claim concerning his 

request for release from prison and for damages based on his 

convictions, and it dismissed these claims with prejudice. Next, it 

determined that Gullett-El failed to allege a legal or factual basis 

concerning the dischargeability of his state or federal tax debts, but 

it granted him leave to amend his adversary complaint as to those 

claims within 30 days. 

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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 7

Instead of filing an amended adversary complaint, however, 

Gullett-El filed a notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court. In the 

notice of appeal, he asserted that “[d]ue to Defendants’ mail

tampering/obstruction/delay/hindering /withholding,” he did 

not receive notice of the dismissal order, and that this delay 

constituted “excusable neglect and good cause” for an extension of 

time to appeal, citing various provisions of Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 4. Meanwhile, Gullett-El filed an identical 

notice of appeal with the district court seeking to appeal the 

bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the adversary complaint. The 

district court docketed the appeal as Case No. 3:20-cv-01075. 

With regard to the notice of appeal filed in the bankruptcy 

court, the bankruptcy court dismissed it as untimely because it was 

not filed within 14 days of the entry of the order dismissing the 

adversary complaint as required by the bankruptcy rules. GullettEl appealed the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing his notice of 

appeal as untimely to the district court. This appeal was docketed 

in the district court as Case No. 3:20-cv-01047. 

On September 20, 2021, in a single order, the district court 

held that both the appeal from the dismissal of the notice of appeal 

as untimely and the appeal from the dismissal of the adversary 

complaint were frivolous. Specifically, as to the bankruptcy court’s 

dismissal of the notice of appeal as untimely, the district court 

concluded that “the record includes no information upon which 

the Court could find the decision as to [the] untimeliness [of the 

appeal of the order dismissing the adversary complaint] to be 

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13426

erroneous,” even under the prison mailbox rule. Furthermore, 

because the appeal was untimely, the district court concluded that 

it “need not consider Gullett-El’s appeal of the [bankruptcy court’s] 

order dismissing his adversary complaint.” Nevertheless, the 

district court noted that even if it considered the merits of his 

appeal from the dismissal of the adversary complaint, the appeal 

would still be frivolous because the bankruptcy court (1) concluded 

correctly that it lacked jurisdiction over Gullett-El’s claims seeking 

discharge from prison and damages from his convictions, and 

(2) granted Gullett-El leave to amend his claim for dischargeability 

of the tax debts, and a dismissal with leave to amend is not final and 

appealable. 

Thereafter, Gullett-El filed a motion to proceed on appeal 

IFP in both cases. The district court denied the motions in a single 

order, concluding that any appeal would be frivolous for the 

reasons stated in its prior order. 

Gullett-El appealed to this Court the district court’s order 

concluding that the appeals were frivolous and its order denying 

his motions to proceed on appeal IFP.2 Gullet also moved for IFP 

status on appeal in this Court, and a judge of this Court granted his 

IFP motion. 

II. Discussion

2 These appeals were initially docketed as two separate cases (case nos. 21-

13426 and 21-13429) and were later consolidated. 

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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 9

As a threshold matter, we must consider whether we have 

jurisdiction over this case. See In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 

550 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts have an independent 

obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, 

even if no party raises the issue, and if the court determines that 

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, it must dismiss the entire 

case.” (quotations omitted)). 

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal 

court’s jurisdiction is limited to active “[c]ases” and 

“[c]ontroversies.” U.S. Const., art. III, § 2. An “actual 

controversy” must exist throughout all stages of the litigation. 

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013). “A case 

becomes moot . . . when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ 

or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id.

at 91 (quotations omitted). In considering whether a case is moot, 

we “look at the events at the present time, not at the time the 

complaint was filed or when the federal order on review was 

issued.” Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 

2001). “When events subsequent to the commencement of a 

lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the 

plaintiff meaningful relief, the case is moot and must be dismissed.” 

Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Health & 

Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).

As an initial matter, we note that the district court’s denial 

of Gullett-El’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is not an 

appealable order. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5) & advisory 

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13426

committee notes (1967 Adoption) (noting that Rule 24(a)(5) 

“establishes a subsequent motion in the court of appeals, rather 

than an appeal from the order of denial . . . as the proper procedure 

for calling in question the correctness of the action of the district 

court”); see also Gomez v. United States, 245 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 

1957) (indicating that “[a]n application for leave to proceed [IFP on 

appeal] is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and an 

order denying such an application is not a final order from which 

an appeal will lie”).3 Regardless, because we subsequently granted 

Gullett-El IFP status on appeal, this issue is rendered moot.

Turning to the substantive issues on appeal, even assuming 

that Gullett-El’s notice of appeal from the dismissal of the 

adversary complaint was timely,4 meaningful relief is not available 

to Gullett-El. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, an order of 

3 Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that 

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to the close of business on 

September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit). 

4 Adversary proceedings incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, which requires a court 

to set out a judgment in a separate document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58; Fed. R. 

Bankr. P. 7058. Thus, in adversary proceedings, a judgment is entered for 

purposes of filing a notice of appeal at the earliest of when the judgment is set 

out in a separate document or once 150 days have run from the entry of the 

order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5)(ii). The bankruptcy court’s order 

dismissing the adversary complaint was dated July 21, 2020, and it was entered 

on the bankruptcy docket on July 22. But the bankruptcy court failed to issue 

a separate judgment as required by Rule 58. Thus, Gullett-El had 150 days to 

file his notice of appeal, such that his notice of appeal from August 19, 2020, 

was timely. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5)(ii).

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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 11

discharge is a final order marking the end of the adjudication of 

claims against the bankruptcy estate. See In re McLean, 794 F.3d 

1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015). Here, two days after the bankruptcy 

court dismissed Gullett-El’s adversary complaint, it issued him a 

Chapter 7 discharge, and it later closed the bankruptcy case. 

Gullett-El’s challenge to the dismissal of the adversary complaint 

was rendered moot by the bankruptcy court’s discharge order and 

closing of his bankruptcy case. See In re Morris, 950 F.2d 1531, 1534 

(11th Cir. 1992). Specifically, although “[a]n adversary proceeding 

in the bankruptcy court and the companion bankruptcy case are 

two distinct proceedings,” we have noted that “the dismissal of a 

bankruptcy case normally results in the dismissal of related 

proceedings because federal jurisdiction is premised upon the 

nexus between the underlying bankruptcy case and the related 

proceedings.” Id. (citing In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 

1989)); see also In re Stardust Inn, Inc., 70 B.R. 888, 890 (Bankr. E.D. 

Pa. 1987) (“As a general rule, the dismissal of a bankruptcy case 

should result in the dismissal of all remaining adversary 

proceedings.”).5 In the adversary proceeding, Gullett-El sought a 

5 This general rule of dismissal is not without exception, however, because 

“nothing in the statute governing jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy 

courts prohibits the continuance of federal jurisdiction over an adversary 

proceeding which arose in or was related to a bankruptcy case following 

dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.” In re Morris, 950 F.2d at 1534. 

We have identified certain factors that a court should consider in determining 

whether discretionary jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding should be 

retained following the dismissal of the related bankruptcy proceeding: 

“(1) judicial economy; (2) fairness and convenience to the litigants; and (3) the 

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13426

declaration that certain debts were dischargeable in the related 

bankruptcy proceeding. The order of discharge, however, marked 

the end of the claims against the bankruptcy estate and the 

bankruptcy proceeding is closed. In other words, any ruling as to 

the dischargeability of those debts was rendered moot by GullettEl’s discharge and the closing of his bankruptcy case. 

Gullett-El also sought relief from his convictions and 

damages related to the allegedly wrongful convictions.6 But such 

relief is not available in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather, a motion 

to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive 

procedure for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his sentence, 

and such motions must be filed in the district where the defendant 

was convicted and sentenced—in this case the United States 

District Court for the Central District of California. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255(a); Amodeo v. FCC Coleman—Low Warden, 984 F.3d 992, 997 

(11th Cir. 2021). Thus, we lack jurisdiction to grant the requested 

relief. 

Accordingly, Gullett-El’s appeal is dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.

DISMISSED. 

degree of difficulty of the related legal issues involved.” Id. at 1535. None of 

these factors weigh in favor of the court’s discretionary jurisdiction in this case. 

6 We note that, since filing this appeal, Gullett-El has been released from 

prison. 

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