IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia :

:

v. :

:

Leslie Nelson, : No. 1479 C.D. 2021

Appellant : Submitted: April 11, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 9, 2024

Leslie Nelson (Nelson) appeals from the Philadelphia County Common 

Pleas Court’s (trial court) December 6, 2021 orders denying the motion for summary 

judgment (Nelson’s Motion) she filed relative to the City of Philadelphia’s (City) in 

personam action seeking unpaid water and sewer rents, and granting the City’s 

motion for summary judgment (City’s Motion) and Nelson’s counterclaim in the 

City’s favor. Nelson presents two issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether the 

trial court erred by denying Nelson’s Motion where docketed water and sewer liens 

afforded the City a final in rem judgment1for the same debt; and (2) whether res 

judicata bars the City’s claim. After review, this Court affirms.

1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed:

The distinction between actions in rem and actions in personam is 

set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [(1877) (overruled on 

other grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977))] (cited by 

this [C]ourt in [Atlantic Seaboard Natural Gas Co[.] v. Whitten, 173 

A. 305, 307 (Pa. 1934),]) where the Supreme Court of the United 

States stated: 
2

Nelson owns real property located at 2134 East Hagert Street in the City 

(Property). During the time Nelson has owned the Property, the City’s Water 

Department docketed the following municipal liens for unpaid water and sewer 

rents2and served the liens at the Property:

‘It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one 

taken directly against property, and has for its object the 

disposition of the property, without reference to the title of 

individual claimants; but, in a larger and more general 

sense, the terms are applied to actions between parties, 

where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property 

owned by them, or of some interest therein.’

The [Pennoyer] Court said with respect to actions in personam: 

‘But where the entire object of the action is to determine 

the personal rights and obligations of the defendants, that 

is, where the suit is merely in personam, constructive 

service in this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for 

any purpose.’

Commonwealth by Hilbert v. Lutz, 60 A.2d 24, 25-26 (Pa. 1948) (italics added).

2 Section 3(a)(1) of what is commonly referred to as the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens 

Act (Municipal Claims Act), Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 7101-7505

provides, in relevant part:

All municipal claims, municipal liens, taxes, tax claims and tax 

liens which may hereafter be lawfully imposed or assessed on any 

property in this Commonwealth, and all such claims heretofore 

lawfully imposed or assessed within six months before the passage 

of this act and not yet liened, in the manner and to the extent 

hereinafter set forth, shall be and they are hereby declared to be a 

lien on said property, together with all charges, expenses, and 

fees incurred in the collection of any delinquent account[.]

53 P.S. § 7106(a)(1) (emphasis added). Further Section 3(b) of the Municipal Claims Act states, 

in relevant part:

With the exception of those claims which have been assigned, any 

municipal claim, municipal lien, tax, tax claim or tax lien, including 

interest, penalty and costs, imposed by a city of the first or second 

class or by a county of the second class or by a municipality therein, 

shall be a judgment only against the said property when the lien has 

been docketed by the prothonotary. The docketing of the lien shall 
3

Lien Filing Date Lien Dates Docket Number Lien Amount

4/30/07 1/1/06-12/31/06 1803W17027053 $8,775.67

4/1/17 7/16/07-12/31/16 1807W18017795 $4,180.87

1/1/19 4/13/18-9/30/18 1901W18000889 $3,747.59

10/1/19 10/16/18-6/30/19 1910W19000970 $1,230.28

4/1/21 7/15/19-12/31/20 2104W20001122 $1,076.81

7/1/18 7/17/17-3/31/18 1809W18001926 $1,047.67

10/2/17 1/1/17-6/30/17 1807W8057220 $651.67

4/1/16 7/1/15-12/31/15 1806W17039934 $607.99

10/1/14 1/1/16-6/30/14 1806W17002888 $593.75

10/1/15 1/1/15-6/30/15 1806W17026939 $590.35

10/1/16 1/1/16-6/30/16 1807W18002459 $563.52

4/1/14 7/1/13-12/31/13 1805W1710788 $541.34

10/1/12 1/1/12-6/30/12 1805W17070117 $539.58

4/1/13 7/1/12-12/31/12 1805W17070118 $521.44

10/1/13 1/1/13-6/30/13 1805W17135776 $514.87

4/9/15 7/1/14-12/31/14 1806W17013848 $502.36

4/2/12 7/1/11-12/31/11 1805W17014048 $438.19

12/10/07 1/1/07-6/30/07 1803W17027052 $412.19

10/1/11 1/1/11-6/30/11 1805W17014047 $279.89

See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 272a-276a.

On February 5, 2019, the City filed an in personam complaint 

(Complaint) in the trial court seeking to collect $10,092.91 in unpaid water and 

sewer debt accrued at the Property between July 15, 2013, and January 19, 2019.3

The docketed liens are among the debt at issue herein. Nelson failed to file an answer 

to the Complaint and the City obtained a default judgment. On July 31, 2019, upon 

Nelson’s petition to open the default judgment, the trial court opened the default 

judgment. Nelson filed an answer to the Complaint and the matter proceeded to 

arbitration, after which the arbitrators awarded the City $10,092.91. Nelson 

appealed from the arbitration award to the trial court. On February 8, 2021, with 

be given the effect of a judgment against the said property only 

with respect to which the claim is filed as a lien. 

53 P.S. § 7106(b) (emphasis added).

3 The record reflects that the disputed period began with a $14,677.14 outstanding balance. 

See R.R. at 257a.
4

leave of the trial court, Nelson filed an amended answer to the Complaint, which 

included a counterclaim against the City under Pennsylvania’s Fair Credit Extension 

Uniformity Act.4 On June 10, 2021, the City filed an answer to Nelson’s 

counterclaim.

On November 1, 2021, the parties filed their respective Motions for 

summary judgment. The City sought judgment in its favor on both its collection

claim and Nelson’s counterclaim. Nelson sought judgment in her favor on the City’s 

collection claim. Each party opposed the other party’s Motion. On December 6, 

2021, the trial court denied Nelson’s Motion with prejudice and granted the City’s 

Motion and Nelson’s counterclaim in the City’s favor. Nelson appealed to this 

Court.5

Nelson argues that the trial court erred by granting the City’s Motion

and denying her Motion.

6

 According to Nelson, consistent with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s decision in Philadelphia Gas Works v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 

Commission, 249 A.3d 963 (Pa. 2021) (PGW),

7

the City’s docketed municipal liens 

against the subject Property “are ‘the equivalent of a final resolution of a claim 

4 Act of March 28, 2000, P.L. 23, 73 P.S. §§ 2270.1-2270.6.

5 This Court’s review of a trial court order granting summary 

judgment is limited to determining whether the trial court erred as a 

matter of law or abused its discretion. This Court examines the 

record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

accepting as true all well-pled facts and reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from those facts.

Z&R Cab, LLC v. Phila. Parking Auth., 187 A.3d 1025, 1031 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

6 Nelson acknowledges that she is not challenging on appeal the trial court’s order granting 

the City’s Motion with respect to her counterclaim.

7 This Court recognizes that although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued PGW after 

the trial court decided the instant matter, Nelson’s appeal to this Court was pending when our 

Supreme Court decided PGW. See Christy v. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc., 856 

A.2d 43 (Pa. 2004) (an appellate court will apply decisions involving changes of law in civil cases 

retroactively to cases pending on appeal).
5

between the parties’ and [are] ‘to be treated in the same manner as a judgment that 

has been rendered following an adjudicative process’ and therefore [the City’s] in 

personam claim against [Nelson] [is] barred by res judicata.” Nelson Br. at 7-8 

(quoting PGW, 249 A.3d at 973, 974). The City responds that the express language 

of what is commonly referred to as the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act 

(Municipal Claims Act) permits the City to pursue both in rem and in personam

relief, and PGW supports that interpretation.

PGW

In PGW, several residential building owners and managers filed 

complaints against the municipally-owned natural gas utility, Philadelphia Gas 

Works (Gas Works). The complaints challenged Gas Works’ practice of charging 

an 18% per year late fee (Tariff Rate) on overdue gas bills instead of the standard 

statutory post-judgment 6% interest rate on docketed municipal liens representing 

the overdue amounts. 

The PGW Court held that, because, pursuant to Section 3(b) of the 

Municipal Claims Act, 53 P.S. § 7106(b), when the City dockets a lien with the 

prothonotary, the lien constitutes a “judgment” on the property, Gas Works could 

only charge the statutory 6% post-judgment interest rate, not the 18% Tariff Rate.

The PGW Court reasoned:

While this interpretation may force a municipality to 

choose between forgoing the collection of the [T]ariff 

[R]ate on a delinquent account in favor of obtaining a 

judgment upon which it can execute, this is a choice 

Section [3 of the Municipal Claims Act] requires. Indeed, 

this is not the exclusive means for collection of a 

municipal lien; a municipality may also elect to pursue a 

judgment against the customer, as utility bills are personal 

debts upon the customer who receives the service. See

[Section 1 of the Act of April 17, 1929, P.L. 527, as 
6

amended,] 53 P.S. § 7251 [(Section 1)] (providing that in 

addition to liens municipalities may seek to collect on 

municipal claims by instituting an action in assumpsit 

against the owner of the property at the time charges first 

became payable). In that scenario, the municipality has 

the option of allowing the tariff to accrue until the dispute 

is reduced to judgment.

PGW, 249 A.3d at 974-75 (emphasis added).

Justice Saylor dissented, noting that Section 1 “authoriz[es] [utilities] 

to pursue the various avenues -- including perfection of liens and commencement of 

actions to establish personal liability -- simultaneously or serially.” PGW, 249 A.3d 

at 975 (Saylor, J., dissenting). And he raised a concern that “the majority appears to

conceptualize the perfection of liens against real property and the pursuit of in

personam judgments as mutually[ ]exclusive, alternative options.” Id.

The PGW Majority responded to Justice Saylor, stating:

Justice Saylor contends that our analysis “appears to 

conceptualize the perfection of liens against real property 

and the pursuit of in personam judgments as mutuallyexclusive, alternative options.” Dissenting Op. at 2. We 

do not so hold. To the contrary, [Section 1]

unquestionably permits a municipality to obtain an in 

personam judgment against the owner of the property 

through the filing and prosecution of an action in 

assumpsit, and this remedy is available in addition to 

other remedies (including an in rem judgment pursuant to 

Section [3](b) [of the Municipal Claims Act]). We refer 

to the in personam route as an “alternative” only because 

the result of both courses of action is largely the same, 

namely the acquisition of a judgment for the delinquent 

amounts due along with the tariff rates that accrued up 

until the time of entry of the judgment, after which time 

the statutory judgment rate applies.

PGW, 249 A.3d at 973 n.8 (bold and underline emphasis added).

Accordingly, the PGW Court made it exceedingly clear that although a 

docketed municipal lien constitutes a judgment against a property, the Municipal 
7

Claims Act permits the municipality to also obtain an in personam judgment against 

the property owner for the same debt. Therefore, Nelson’s assertion that PGW

prohibits the City’s in personam action is without merit.

Res Judicata

Nelson also contends that since PGW holds that the docketed lien from 

the City’s in rem action is considered a judgment against the Property, res judicata

bars the City’s in personam action against her. The City retorts that res judicata

only applies where there has been a judgment on the merits, and an in rem judgment 

is not a judgment on the merits since it arises without court intervention. The City

also claims that one of the four required res judicata factors is lacking in this case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared:

Res judicata - literally, a thing adjudicated - is a judiciallycreated doctrine. See Est[.] of Bell, . . . 343 A.2d 679, 681 

([Pa.] 1975). It bars actions on a claim, or any part of a 

claim, which was the subject of a prior action, or could 

have been raised in that action. See R/S Fin[.] Corp. v. 

Kovalchick, . . . 716 A.2d 1228, 1230 ([Pa.] 1998); Balent 

v. City of Wilkes-Barre, . . . 669 A.2d 309, 313 ([Pa.] 

1995). This Court has explained that

[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits 

parties involved in prior, concluded litigation 

from subsequently asserting claims in a later 

action that were raised, or could have been 

raised, in the previous adjudication. The 

doctrine of res judicata developed to shield 

parties from the burden of re-litigating a 

claim with the same parties, or a party in 

privity with an original litigant, and to protect 

the judiciary from the corresponding 

inefficiency and confusion that re-litigation 

of a claim would breed.

Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 

. . . 902 A.2d 366, 376 ([Pa.] 2006) (citation omitted[; 
8

italics added]); see also R/S Fin[.], . . . 716 A.2d at 1230 

(“The purposes of the rule are the protection of the litigant 

from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same 

party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy 

through prevention of needless litigation.” (quoting Foster 

v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., . . . 676 A.2d 652, 

661 ([Pa.] 1996))).

In re Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 244 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. 2021).

This Court has expounded:

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies only when there 

exists a “coalescence of four factors: (1) identity of the 

thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the causes of 

action; (3) identity of the persons or parties to the action; 

and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties 

suing or being sued.” [J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 

794 A.2d 936, 939 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)]. When res 

judicata applies, “[a]ny final, valid judgment on the 

merits by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes any 

future suit between the parties or their privies on the same 

cause of action.” Balent . . . , . . . 669 A.2d [at] 313 . . . .

Robinson v. Fye, 192 A.3d 1225, 1231 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (italics and emphasis 

added).

Under both federal and Pennsylvania law, a central 

hallmark of the preclusion doctrine is that a prior judgment 

may bar relitigation only of a claim that has been 

decided “on the merits.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 . . . (1979) (“[u]nder the doctrine of 

res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars 

a second suit . . .”); Mariner Chestnut Partners, L.P. v. 

Lenfest, . . . 152 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“[u]nder 

the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final 

judgment on the merits by a court of competent 

jurisdiction will bar any future action on the same cause of

action . . .”) (quotation marks omitted). For res judicata

purposes, a judgment on the merits “is one that actually 

‘pass[es] directly on the substance of [a particular] claim’

before the court.” Semtek [Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin 

Corp.], 531 U.S. [497,] 501-02 [(2001)] (interpolation in 

original; quoted citation omitted). This has been the law 

of Pennsylvania for more than a century. See Weigley v. 
9

Coffman, . . . 22 A. 919, 921 . . . ([Pa.] 1891). Accordingly, 

we have emphasized that res judicata “cannot be applied”

to any judgment that does not render a final substantive 

decision on a claim.

Weinar v. Lex, 176 A.3d 907, 915-16 (Pa. Super. 2017) (italics and emphasis added; 

footnote omitted). “A municipal lien arises by operation of law whenever a 

municipal claim is lawfully assessed or imposed upon the property.” Twp. of Summit 

v. Prop. Located at Vacant Land in Summit Twp., 92 A.3d 121, 127 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014) (quoting N. Coventry Twp. v. Tripodi, 64 A.3d 1128, 1132 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013)); see also City of Phila. v. Manu, 76 A.3d 601 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Here, the 

City’s judgments arose by operation of law when the City docketed the liens. They

were not judgments on the merits because their docketing did not “actually pass[]

directly on the substance of [the] claim.” Weinar, 176 A.3d at 916 (quoting Semtek,

531 U.S. at 501).

Additionally, with respect to the res judicata factors - specifically, the 

second factor, requiring identity of causes of action - this Court has considered, inter 

alia, whether causes of action were identical as between a municipal lien and an in 

personam action. In Reading Area Water Authority v. Stouffer (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 

1307 C.D. 2013, filed Sept. 10, 2014),

8

the Reading Area Water Authority 

(Authority) sought stand by fees (i.e., fees arising from water connection to the 

property) from the property owner. The Authority filed breach of contract and unjust 

enrichment claims against the property owner. Thereafter, the Authority filed a 

municipal lien claim for unpaid water services. Following arbitration on the breach 

of contract and unjust enrichment claims, an arbitration panel held that the property 

owner owed nothing to the Authority and the Authority did not appeal the decision. 

Two days later, the Authority obtained a writ of scire facias seeking judgment on 

8 Unreported decisions of this Court, while not binding, may be cited for their persuasive 

value. Section 414(a) of the Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court, 210 Pa. 

Code § 69.414(a). The unreported cases cited herein are cited for their persuasive authority.
10

the municipal lien claim and notifying the property owner to file an affidavit of 

defense. The Authority withdrew its claim without prejudice for the arbitrated

unpaid water charges and sought to recover only charges incurred thereafter. The 

property owner filed his affidavit of defense, contending, inter alia, that the

Authority had already fully litigated its claim before the arbitrators, the property 

owner had prevailed, and the Authority did not appeal from the arbitrators’ decision 

which had become final. The Authority responded that res judicata did not bar its 

action because its lien was for amounts different from those at issue before the 

arbitrators. 

In considering the res judicata issue, this Court observed:

“Generally, a cause of action will be considered identical 

when the subject matter and the ultimate issues are the 

same in both proceedings.” Tobias [v. Halifax Twp.], 28 

A.3d [223,] 226 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)]. The identity of the 

thing sued for are “the subject matters; or the things in 

dispute; or the matters presented for consideration.” 

McCandless T[wp.] v. McCarthy, 300 A.2d 815, 820 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1973). “[W]here a subsequent action is brought 

to recover damages from injuries during a different period 

of time, the ‘thing sued for’ generally is not the same, and 

claim preclusion does not apply.” Carroll T[wp.] Auth[. v. 

Mun. Auth. of Monongahela], 603 A.2d [243,] 249 [(Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1992)]. Moreover, an in personam action, such 

as a contract action, may be distinguished from an in 

rem action, such as an action seeking a lien against a 

property. Matternas v. Stehman, 642 A.2d 1120 (Pa. 

Super. 1994). In Matternas, the Superior Court held that 

a prior mechanics’ lien action did not claim preclude a 

subsequent contract action. Id. at 1123-24. The 

Superior Court reasoned that the lien’s in rem nature 

and the contract action’s in personam nature made the 

causes of action and the things sued for different. Id. at 

1123.

Here, [the] Authority filed a lien in the amount of the stand 

by fees for a period of time not covered by the [p]rior 

[arbitration a]ction . . . . During this time period, [the]
11

Authority continued to charge [the property owner] stand 

by fees and [the property owner] continued not to pay 

them. Thus, each time [the property owner] did not pay 

those fees, [the] Authority sustained an additional injury 

and damages accrued. Moreover, [the] Authority’s 

[municipal] [l]ien [c]laim was an in rem action against

[the] property and the [p]rior [arbitration a]ction was 

an in personam contract action. Because of the in rem

and in personam natures of the [l]ien [c]laim and the 

[p]rior [arbitration a]ction, respectively, we conclude 

that the causes of action in this matter are different. 

Accordingly, res judicata in the form of claim preclusion 

does not bar the [l]ien [c]laim.[9] 

9 The Reading Court also noted that:

This does not end our inquiry, however, because [the property 

owner] also argues collateral estoppel bars the trial court’s award on 

the [l]ien [c]laim because the [p]rior [arbitration a]ction resolved the 

issue of [the property owner’s] liability for stand by fees. [The 

property owner] contends that the [p]rior [a]ction before the panel 

of arbitrators resulted in a final judgment on the merits in [the 

property owner’s] favor, [the] Authority was a party to the prior 

action, [the] Authority had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

issue of stand[]by fees in the [p]rior [arbitration a]ction, and [the]

Authority did not appeal the [a]rbitration [d]ecision.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been subsumed by res 

judicata, but it can be asserted independently thereof and does not 

require the identity of the causes of action. Under collateral 

estoppel, “a final judgment forecloses relitigation in a later action 

involving at least one of the original parties, of an issue of fact or 

law which was actually litigated and which was necessary to the

original judgment.” Clark v. Troutman, 502 A.2d 137, 139 (Pa. 

1985).

Where the second action between the same parties is 

[based] upon a different claim or demand, the 

judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel 

in the second action only as to those matters in issue 

that (1) are identical; (2) were actually litigated; (3) 

were essential to the judgment . . . ; and (4) were 

‘material’ to the adjudication.
12

Reading, slip op. at 11-12 (italics and emphasis added). 

In the case at bar, the City’s “[l]ien [c]laim was an in rem action against 

[the] [P]roperty and the [instant action is] an in personam contract action. Because 

of the in rem and in personam natures of the [l]ien [c]laim and the [instant a]ction, 

respectively, [this Court] conclude[s] that the causes of action in this matter are 

different.” Id. at 12; see also Levy v. Solomon, 56 A. 1007, 1008 (Pa. 1904) (where 

prior action was in personam and the present one is in rem, “[e]ven between the 

same parties, where the same facts give rise to two distinct causes of action, action 

and judgment for one of these causes will be no bar to an action on the other”); 

Gywnedd Club Condo. Ass’n v. Dahlquist (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 1628, 1816 C.D. 2017, 

filed Apr. 15, 2019), slip op. at 13 (concluding that lis pendens criteria were not met 

because although the two actions involved the same parties, “the relief requested in 

each action was not the same[,] [as] the relief sought in the [i]n [p]ersonam [a]ction 

was a monetary judgment against [the defendant], whereas the relief sought in the 

[i]n [r]em [a]ction was enforcement of the [homeowners’ a]ssociation’s lien on her 

property.”) (italics added).

10 Accordingly, res judicata does not bar the instant 

McCandless Twp., 300 A.2d at 820-21. As previously stated, 

whether collateral estoppel applies is a question of law subject to 

plenary review. 

Reading, slip op. at 12-13 (italics added; citations omitted).

The Reading Court concluded that the trial court properly held that collateral estoppel did 

not prevent the Authority from pursuing the stand by fees incurred after the arbitration decision 

since the Authority withdrew its claim for the period that was litigated before the arbitrators, and 

the property owner’s liability for the period following the arbitration award had not been actually 

litigated. Similarly, in the instant action, collateral estoppel does not bar the City’s in personam

action claims because, although docketed, the in rem judgment was not “actually litigated.”

McCandless Twp., 300 A.2d at 820.

10 While Section 1 allows the City to pursue both a municipal lien on the property and an in 

personam judgment in this matter, it cannot be construed as allowing the City a double recovery 

of the amounts Nelson owes. To the extent the City ultimately receives payment through one 

avenue of relief, it cannot also collect through the other available remedy.
13

action and the trial court did not err by denying Nelson’s Motion and granting the 

City’s Motion and Nelson’s counterclaim in the City’s favor.

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s orders are affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia :

:

v. :

:

Leslie Nelson, : No. 1479 C.D. 2021

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of May, 2024, the Philadelphia County 

Common Pleas Court’s December 6, 2021 orders are affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge