DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MANUEL NAVARRO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D14-4474

[April 27, 2016]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 

Okeechobee County; Sherwood Bauer, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 

472013CF000490.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale 

Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CIKLIN, C.J.

Manuel Navarro appeals his conviction for manslaughter. We find 

that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Navarro had 

no duty to retreat and we reverse.

The defendant was charged with second-degree murder after stabbing 

his roommate in their home. According to the evidence adduced at trial, 

on the evening of the incident, the defendant and the victim went to a 

bar together and had been drinking. The defendant was approximately 

fifty-five years old and the victim was twenty-eight to thirty years old and 

in good physical condition.

A detective interviewed the defendant following the incident and the 

transcript of the interview was read to the jury. According to the 

defendant’s statements during the interview, he and the victim returned 

home around 1:30 A.M. and continued drinking until around 2:00 A.M. 

The defendant stated that the victim “becomes crazy” when he is drunk

and he began kicking the defendant’s bedroom door. Later in the 
2

evening, the victim came out of his room, swore at the defendant, and 

grabbed the defendant by the collar, lifting him up. The defendant told 

the victim to leave him alone. The defendant tried to get up but the 

victim sat him down. The defendant’s “blade” was lying open on the 

table at the time. The victim saw the blade and told the defendant to 

grab it, and said, “That’s the only way you’re going to be able to defend 

yourself.” The victim tried to hit the defendant and was threatening to 

beat him, so the defendant grabbed and flung the blade to cut the victim. 

 

The defendant testified in his defense. He explained that the victim 

became very angry with him and grabbed his shirt and his throat. The 

victim’s fist was clenched. On the evening of the incident, the defendant 

had gotten away from the victim twice before when the victim wanted to 

hit him, and the victim told him that his “time had come,” and that he 

was “not going to get away” from him. The defendant testified that he 

had no doubt that the victim was going to seriously hurt him, so he 

grabbed the knife and swung it. The defendant only meant to cut his 

hand, and believed he had only cut the victim’s hand. He never intended 

to kill the victim or hurt him badly. 

During the charge conference, the defendant requested a special 

instruction modeled after the standard “stand your ground” jury 

instruction and the trial court declined to give the instruction, stating, “I 

think that [section] 776.013 was meant for non-residents entering into 

the residence, not residents having a confrontation in the residence. So I 

would strike that section.”

The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 

manslaughter and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in 

prison. 

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

instruct the jury that, consistent with the so-called stand your ground

law, the defendant had no duty to retreat. He further contends that the 

instructions implied a duty to retreat by instructing the jury that, in 

order to justifiably use deadly force, the defendant had to believe that the 

danger could only be avoided through the use of that deadly force. We 

agree that the defendant was entitled to the instruction he requested.

This court has previously explained:

“[T]he failure to give special jury instructions does not 

constitute error where the instructions given adequately 

address the applicable legal standards.” Stephens v. State, 
3

787 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 2001). “Thus, [a defendant] has 

the burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its 

discretion in giving standard instructions.” Id. at 755-56. 

To meet that burden, a defendant must ‘“show that: (1) the 

requested instruction accurately states the law applicable to 

the facts of the case; (2) the testimony and other evidence 

presented support the giving of the instruction; and (3) the 

instruction was necessary to resolve the issues in the case 

properly.’” McConnell v. Union Carbide Corp., 937 So. 2d 

148, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Force v. Ford Motor 

Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)) (emphasis 

added).

Dorsett v. State, 147 So. 3d 532, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (alterations in 

original) (emphasis in original), approved, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015). 

See also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Whittler, 584 So. 2d 579, 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1991) (“If jury instructions, viewed as a whole, fairly state the applicable 

law to the jury, the failure to give particular instructions will not be 

error.”) (citations omitted). 

The defendant’s requested instruction stated as follows:

If [the defendant] was not engaged in an unlawful activity 

and was attacked in any place where he had a right to be, he 

had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand his ground 

and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he 

reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent 

death or great bodily harm to himself or to prevent the 

commission of a forcible felony.

First, the requested instruction accurately stated the law regarding a 

lack of a duty to retreat. Section 776.012, Florida Statutes (2013), i.e., 

the “stand your ground” law, provides in pertinent part that:

[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not 

have a duty to retreat if:

(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary 

to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or 

herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of 

a forcible felony[.]

(Emphasis added). While section 776.013, Florida Statutes (2013), 

requires an element of home protection, section 776.012 does not. 
4

Accordingly, the requested instruction accurately stated the law 

regarding a lack of a duty to retreat.

Second, the evidence produced in the case supported giving the 

instruction. The transcript of the defendant’s interview as well as his incourt testimony each supported a conclusion that the defendant used 

force to prevent the infliction of great bodily harm.

Third, the requested instruction was necessary to resolve the issues in 

the case because the instructions actually given to the jury did not 

adequately address the applicable legal standard. Specifically, the given 

instruction exacerbated the problem of failing to instruct on the lack of a 

duty to retreat by providing: “[T]o justify the use of deadly force, the 

appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious 

and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed 

that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that force.” 

(Emphasis added).

While this language does not directly state that there is a duty to 

retreat, considering the two basic human instincts of fight or flight when 

confronted with danger, the implication is clear. A jury could very well 

conclude from the given instruction that the use of deadly force is not 

lawful where the danger could be avoided by retreating. Further, the 

omitted instruction was highly pertinent and material to what the jury 

was required to consider for it to convict. The jury instructions, as given, 

negated the defendant’s sole defense by effectively requiring that the 

defendant’s only option was the use of force, and omitting the fact that 

he had no duty to retreat. 

Because the jury was not instructed that there is no duty to retreat, 

and the given instruction implied that there is such a duty, the 

instructions ultimately given did not adequately address the applicable 

law. The requested instruction was necessary to resolve the self-defense 

theory of the defendant’s case, and the trial court erred in failing to give 

it. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

WARNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.