J-S05010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES BEAHAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 748 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County 

Criminal Division at No(s): 20-40835, 

CP-35-MD-0000136-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2022

James Beahan appeals from his judgment of sentence for indirect 

criminal contempt for violating a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order. We 

issued a rule to show cause why Beahan’s appeal should not be quashed 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018) (adopting 

a bright-line rule that separate notices of appeal must be filed when a single 

order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket), overruled 

in part by Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 465 (Pa. December 21, 

2021). While we find no need to quash the appeal pursuant to Walker, we 

conclude Beahan has waived the issues he attempts to raise on appeal. We 

therefore affirm.

The trial court issued a final PFA order against Beahan on December 7, 

2020. The PFA order generally prohibited Beahan from having contact with his 
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estranged wife, Danielle Beahan. It specifically prohibited him from, among 

other things, stalking, harassing, or threatening Danielle or his two minor 

children with Danielle, J.B. and P.B. The PFA order did allow Beahan to have 

contact and supervised visits with J.B. and P.B, as well as to text or email 

Danielle about matters related to the visitation. Beahan did not appeal the PFA 

order, which was set to expire on December 7, 2023.

In April of 2021, Beahan was arrested and charged with indirect criminal 

contempt for violating the PFA order. The trial court held a hearing on the 

contempt charge on May 5, 2021, during which both Danielle and Beahan 

testified. Danielle testified that on April 13, 2021, she and her oldest daughter 

were on their way to pick up J.B. and P.B. from daycare when Danielle got a 

text from Beahan saying he had already picked the children up. See N.T., 

5/5/21, at 14. Danielle testified that it was not Beahan’s period of custody,1

and nothing in the PFA order allowed Beahan to pick the kids up from daycare 

during her period of custody without her permission. See id. at 14, 16. 

Danielle testified that she and her daughter then drove to Beahan’s 

house. When they arrived, Danielle recounted that P.B. came out and got into 

her car. See id. at 17. Beahan, who was standing on his porch, told Danielle 

he would be taking J.B. to baseball practice that evening, to which Danielle 

replied that it was her day and she would take J.B. to practice if he had it. 

____________________________________________

1 Apparently, the restrictions requiring Beahan’s visits to be supervised were 

later lifted. See N.T., 5/5/21, at 9-10.
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See id. She instructed Beahan to send J.B. out of the house. See id. Danielle 

stated that she and Beahan began to argue about J.B. attending baseball 

practice for a baseball team on which J.B. no longer played. See id. at 18. At 

that point, Danielle testified, J.B. came out of the house and stood on the 

porch looking “scared.” Id. at 18. J.B. walked down the porch steps and got 

into his mother’s car and shut the door. See id. 

According to Danielle, Beahan then jumped over the porch railing, went 

to the car, and tried to open the car door. See id. at 18-19. J.B. began to cry. 

See id. at 19. Danielle recounted that when Beahan couldn’t open the locked 

car door, he began to take a video with his phone, while repeatedly asking, 

“What did mommy do to you? Why are you crying?” Id. at 19. Danielle’s oldest 

daughter called the police.2

Beahan testified he had previously picked the children up after school 

before doing so on April 13, 2021. See id. at 60-61. On that day, he testified 

he texted Danielle to tell her he was at the daycare to pick the kids up and 

Danielle told him that was fine. See id. at 45. When Danielle came to his 

house to pick the children up, Beahan asserted that while he did leave the 

porch, he did not think he jumped over the porch railing. See id. at 52. He 

also stated he did not try to open the car door, see id. at 79, that J.B. was 

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2 Danielle’s oldest daughter also testified at the hearing, essentially 

corroborating Danielle’s testimony about what occurred at Beahan’s house on 

April 13, 2021.
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emotional but not crying, see id. at 77, and he only videotaped the incident 

so Danielle didn’t “change the story,” id. at 76. 

In an order dated May 5, 2021, and entered May 6, 2021, the trial court 

found Beahan guilty of indirect criminal contempt for violating the PFA order 

and sentenced him to six months of probation. Beahan did not file a postsentence motion.

Beahan did file a notice of appeal to this Court. In his notice of appeal, 

Beahan listed both the PFA order’s civil docket number and the indirect 

criminal contempt order’s criminal docket number in the caption. The notice 

of appeal, however, specifically stated that Beahan was appealing the trial 

court’s order, dated May 5, 2021, finding him guilty of indirect criminal 

contempt. Because Beahan had listed two docket numbers in a single notice 

of appeal, this Court issued a rule to show cause why this Court should not 

quash the appeal pursuant to Walker.

Counsel for Beahan filed a response to the rule to show cause. In that 

response, counsel stated that although he had inadvertently listed the two 

lower court docket numbers on the single notice of appeal, he was aware that 

the deadline to appeal the PFA order had long passed and his intent was only 

to appeal the May 5, 2021 order finding Beahan guilty of indirect criminal 
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contempt.3 We agree with counsel that, under these circumstances, we do not 

need to quash his appeal. See Commonwealth v. Rebecca Johnson, 236 

A.3d 63 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (holding that an appellant complies with 

Walker when she files a separate notice of appeal for each lower court docket 

number she wishes to appeal, even if each one of the separate notice of 

appeals contains multiple docket numbers).4

After Beahan filed his notice of appeal, the trial court ordered him to file 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal. Beahan 

complied and raised the following issues in his statement:

a. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of indirect 

criminal contempt;

b. The trial court erred in finding that the alleged contact violated 

the terms of the PFA;

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3 Curiously, Beahan’s response seems to confuse the docket number that is 

associated with his appeal from the order dated May 5, 2021. He claimed his 

only intent was to appeal that order, and yet, he followed that assertion with 

a contention that he was therefore only filing an appeal from the PFA civil 

docket number. This assertion aside, it is clear that the appeal deadline period 

for the PFA order has passed and that Beahan’s intent is to appeal the order 

dated May 5, 2021, which found him guilty of indirect criminal contempt under 

the criminal docket number. 

4 We recognize that our Supreme Court recently overruled Walker in part in 

Young. Young held that “[Pa.R.A.P.] 341 requires that when a single order 

resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal 

must be filed from that order at each docket; but, where a timely appeal is 

erroneously filed at only one docket, [Pa.R.A.P.] 902 permits the appellate 

court, in its discretion, to allow correction of the error, where appropriate.” 

265 A.3d at 477. We do not need to take this step here, given that, as 

explained above, the notice of appeal currently of record allows for the appeal 

of the order dated May 5, 2021.
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c. The trial court erred in giving too much weight to the 

Appellee’s witnesses[;]

d. The trial court erred in failing to give proper weight to the 

appellant's testimony.

Statement of Errors Complained of on a PFA Violation Conviction, 6/29/21, 

(single page).

Beahan raises the same issues in his appellate brief. His arguments in 

support of those issues are difficult to follow, primarily because Beahan 

improperly intertwines claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

indirect criminal contempt verdict with claims that such a verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence. This is highlighted by his summary of the 

argument, which reads in its entirety:

The weight of the evidence does not support a finding of indirect criminal 

contempt. In order to be found guilty of indirect criminal contempt the 

following four elements must be supported by the weight of the 

evidence: (1) the court’s temporary [PFA] order and its subsequent 

agreed upon order dated December 2020 must be definite, clear, 

specific and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to 

whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor 

must have notice of the specific order or decree; (3) the act constituting 

the violation must have been volitional; and (4) the contemnor must 

have acted with wrongful intent.

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

The Commonwealth also recognizes that Beahan’s issues improperly 

conflate challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with challenges to the 

weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9, 15. In doing so, the 

Commonwealth reinforces that sufficiency claims are necessarily distinct from 

weight claims: sufficiency claims challenge whether the Commonwealth 
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established all of the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 

whereas weight claims concede the evidence is sufficient but aver the 

evidence was so weighted in favor of acquittal that a new trial is warranted. 

See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. 

The Commonwealth asserts that to the extent Beahan is raising a weight 

claim, it is waived. In support, the Commonwealth points out that Beahan 

never raised a weight claim with the trial court in a motion for a new trial, as 

he was required to do to preserve such a claim for appeal. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

607(A) (stating that a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence must be raised with the trial court in a motion for a new trial orally 

or by written motion before sentencing, or in a post-sentence motion). We 

agree. Beahan does not point to any place in the record where he preserved 

a weight claim, and our own review of the record does not reveal one. 

Accordingly, any attempt Beahan has made to raise a weight claim offers him 

no basis for relief as any such claim has been waived. 

The Commonwealth also argues that, to the extent Beahan is raising a 

sufficiency claim, it is also waived as he did not clearly identify in his 1925(b) 

statement what elements of indirect criminal contempt he believes the 

Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, we agree. 

See Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(stating that in order to preserve a sufficiency claim on appeal, an appellant 
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must specify in the 1925(b) statement the element or elements upon which 

the evidence was insufficient). 

As the Commonwealth observes, Beahan’s arguments on appeal 

exemplify why it is imperative for an appellant to present with sufficient 

specificity in his 1925(b) statement what elements he believes were not 

sufficiently proven at trial so as to allow the trial court the ability to address 

those arguments in its 1925(a) opinion. In his brief, Beahan asserts there was 

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for indirect criminal contempt 

because the PFA order was not clear. Specifically, he contends the PFA was 

contradictory in its terms and was not clear because the trial court did not use 

standardized forms for his PFA order. The trial court, however, did not address 

either of these contentions in its 1925(a) opinion because the 1925(b) 

statement did not specify, directly or inferentially, either of these arguments. 

Beahan also asserts that “the third and fourth elements [to make out a 

case for indirect criminal contempt], that the act consitut[ing] the violation 

must have been volitional and willful intent, is clearly not supported by the 

weight of the evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. Again, to the extent Beahan 

is raising this as a weight claim, it is waived for failure to timely present such 

a claim to the trial court. It is also waived to the extent Beahan is arguing the 

evidence was insufficient to support his indirect criminal contempt conviction 

because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Beahan 

committed a volitional act. He did not specifically challenge this element in his 
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1925(b) statement as one that the Commonwealth failed to sufficiently prove 

at the hearing, and the trial court therefore did not address it. The claim is 

waived for that reason as well. See Roche, 153 A.3d at 1072. 

Beahan also argues the trial court erroneously found that he “harassed” 

or “stalked” Danielle. In support, Beahan recites the elements for the offenses 

of stalking and harassment, and asserts the evidence was insufficient to 

support those elements. Of course, as the Commonwealth observes, Beahan 

was not convicted of either stalking or harassment, but rather, was convicted 

of indirect criminal contempt for violating the PFA order prohibiting him from 

stalking or harassing Danielle. His argument simply misses the mark. Even so, 

any argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding that he harassed Danielle is waived, as his 1925(b) statement does 

not raise that issue with sufficient specificity. 

Beahan’s last two issues, as framed in his statement of questions 

involved, challenge the weight the trial court accorded to the witnesses’ 

testimony. Beahan’s argument section in support of those issues, however, 

only cites cases addressing the sufficiency of the evidence. As such, he has 

violated Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (providing that no question will be considered unless 

it is stated in the statement of questions involved), and his issues are waived 

for that reason. Any claim Beahan is attempting to make that the verdict was 

against the weight of the witnesses’ testimony has also been waived pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Despite his waiver of these issues, we add only that 
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the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, was free to believe all, part or none of 

the witnesses’ testimony. See Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 

607 (Pa. 2011). 

While we find that Beahan has waived all of his issues, we note that, 

although the trial court only had an overly-broad and vague 1925(b) 

statement from which to write its 1925(a) opinion, it did generally explain its 

reasons for finding the evidence sufficient to support an indirect criminal 

contempt conviction. To that end, the court first noted that in order for the 

Commonwealth to sustain a conviction for indirect criminal contempt for 

violating a PFA order, it must prove: (1) the PFA order was definite, clear and 

specific so as to leave no uncertainty of what conduct is prohibited; (2) the 

contemnor had notice of the PFA order; (3) the act constituting the violation 

of the PFA order was volitional; and (4) the contemnor acted with willful intent. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/21, at 2 (unpaginated) (citing Commonwealth 

v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2005))

In finding the Commonwealth had proven these elements here, the trial 

court initially observed the PFA order clearly prohibited Beahan from 

harassing, stalking or attempting to threaten Danielle, and that Beahan 

conceded he had notice of the PFA order. Despite Beahan’s notice of the PFA 

order and what it prohibited, the court stated that: 

when [Danielle] arrived at [Beahan’s] home to retrieve the 

children during her period of custody, [Beahan] first withheld the 

minor child, J.B., and when he eventually released the minor child, 

J.B., to [Danielle], [Beahan] jumped over the banister of the 
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home, began to film [Danielle], and persisted he would take the 

minor child, J.B., to baseball practice. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/21, at 3 (unpaginated). The trial court then found 

that this course of conduct, “failing to release [J.B.] to [Danielle] when she 

stated she would take [J.B.] to baseball practice[,]... jump[ing] over the 

banister at [Danielle], videotap[ing Danielle] and continu[ing] harassing 

behavior after [Danielle] instructed [Beahan] she would take [J.B.] to baseball 

practice” showed Beahan had violated the terms of the PFA by intentionally 

harassing Danielle. Id. at 6 (unpaginated).

We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the court to find Beahan 

guilty of contempt. See Haigh, 874 A.2d at 1176-77 (stating this Court will 

only reverse a trial court’s contempt conviction when there has been a plain 

abuse of discretion). Accordingly, even if we were to overlook Beahan’s waiver 

of his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for 

indirect criminal contempt, we would find that the trial court did not err in 

reaching the contrary conclusion. No relief is due.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2022