FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT MARCH 7, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO N OT PUBLISH]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Nos. 06-152 62 & 07 -1 0167

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 05-80359 -CV -D MM GARY BROWN & ASSOCI ATES, INC., a Fl or id a co rp or at io n, Plaintiff-Appellee Cro ss -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us ASHDON, INC., d.b .a. Im pr es si on Bri da l, EMME BR IDAL, INC., a Tex as co rp or at io n, IMP RESSION BR IDAL, INC., a Tex as co rp or at io n, D ef en dants -Appe llants Cro ss -Ap pe ll ees .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ar ch 7, 200 8)2

Be fo re T JO FL A T , MA RC U S an d W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Appe llant/ Cr oss -Appe lle e A shdo n, I nc . , E m m e Br ida l, I nc . ( “ E m

m e” ), and Im pr es sio n B ri da l, I nc . ( “ Im pr es sio n” ) (c oll ec tiv el y , “ Appe llants ”) appe al the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a llo w an ce of te sti m ony

r el at ing to a pr ior

c opy ri ght inf ri nge m en t la wsu it ag ai ns t Im

pr es si on . Appellee/Cr oss-Appellant Gar y Brow n & Associates, Inc. (“ GBA ”) ap pe al s on three grounds : (1) er

ror in dism issin g Em

m e’ s contract liability

at sum m ary j udgm ent; (2) er

ror in dism issin g exem

plary dam ages under the Illinois Sales Re pr es en ta tiv e A ct

( “ IS RA ”) a t sum

m ar y j udgm en t; an d ( 3) abuse of dis cr et ionin re duc ing a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s and c ost s. Upon tho ro ugh co nsi de ratio n of the part ie s’ presentations at oral argum ent, the parties ’ b r i e f s , an dth e r e c o r d , w e a f

f i rm. I. BACKG ROUND GBAis a Florida corporation that acts as an independent sales represe ntative for clothing apparel c om panies. G BA’ s revenues are generated so le ly from

th e co m m is si on s ea rn edby its pre si de nt , Gary Bro wn. Ni ckYe h i s th e s o l e o wn ero f I m p re s s i o n , wh i ch m an u fa ct u re s wo m en ’s ap pare l i n C hin a fo r sa le thr ough out the U nit ed

S ta te s. I n 19 92, G BAe nte re d in toIn 2000, Impression was dissolved and A shdon, Inc. wa s cre ated. Ashdon a ssumed the 1 assets and liabilities of Impression. 3 ana gr ee m en t t o se ll br ida l dr es se s f or I m pr es sio n. O ve r the ne xt s ev er al y ears ,

1 the tw o c om

panie s e nj oy ed

ac los e an d am ic ab le bus ine ss r el at ion shi p. In199 7, E ve of

Mi la dy , an un re la te d c om pe tit or , br ough t a

c opy ri ght in fri ng em en t s ui t al le gi ng th atIm pr es si on ha d b een co pyin g i ts de si gn s. A cc or din g to G BA , the S pe ci al Ma gis tr at e inf orm ed I m pr es sio n th at

it c oul d co nti nue m anuf

ac tur ing the sub

j ec t br ida l w ear if

asm al l m odi fi catio n w as m ad e to the pa tte rn s of

la ce . E ve of

Mi la dy and I m pr es sio n ul tim at el y

se ttl ed the la wsu it . On April 7, 1997, either while the lawsuit wa s still pen ding or shortly after se ttl em en t, Mi ke Y eh , w ho h ad spe nt t eny ears le ar

nin g th e br ida l bu sin es s f ro m his br oth er

N ic k, f orm ed the se parate c om

pany , E m m e Br ida l, I nc . F ro m

it s inc ep tio n, Mi ke ha s be enthe sol e ow ne r of E m m e, w hic h c ar

ri es ali ne of
m od ifi ed , com

pl ia nt ve rs io ns of t he Eve o f Mi la dy dres se s. G BAbe gan se lli ng dre sse s f or E m m e, w hil e co nti nui ng t o se ll fo r Im pr es sio n. G BAdid

not e nte r int o aw ri tte n c ontra ct w ithE m m e. F or r ea sons not relevant here, the relationship b etwe en Gary Brow n and the Yeh brothers ev en tua lly

f el l i nto dis harm ony . O n January 14, 200 5, G BAr ec ei ve d ale tte r fr om4

Nick Y eh term inating the relationship for both Im pression andEm

m e. Whe n G BAw as una

ble to co lle ct

c er ta in c om m iss ion s f

ro m I m pr es sio n or Em m e, GB A f

iled suit agains t both com panies for breac h of contract (C ount I), vio la tio n of

the I lli noi s S al es Re pr es en ta tiv e A ct ( “ IS RA ”) ( Co unt

I I) , and a c c o u n t i n g ( C o u n tI I I ) . A ts u mmary j u d g me n t , th e d i s t r i c tc o u rth e l dth a tE mme wa s not liabl e for C ount s I and III because E m m e w as not a party

to the original agreem ent and was not a successor-in-intere st to Im pression. Further, the court he ldth atex em

pl ary da m ag es un de r ISRA wer e n ot av ai labl e to GBA. A ttr i a l , th e p r i mary i s s u e w a s w h e t h e r I mp r e s s i o n w a s b o u n db y t h e t e rms of a w ritten contract proffe red by GB A. If the wr itten contract controlled, G BA
w as e nti tle d to c er

ta in c om m iss ion s e xte ndi ng s ixty

day s pa st G BA ’ s date of te rm inatio n. C onve rs el y , if the j ur y w er e to f ind that the part ie s di d no t bi nd them selves to the written contract, but ins tead we re bound bythe sam e oral understandi ng that Im

pression andEm

m e used with nearly

all of their sales rep res en ta ti ve s, GBA h adno cla im to co m m is si on s p as t t he da te of t erm in at io n. Also at issue wa s whether I m pression andEm

m e violated ISRA , which requires p aym en to f c o m

m i s s i o n s wi t h i n th i rt ee n d ays o f as al es re p re s en t at i v e’s te rm inatio n date . 820 I ll. Co m p. S ta t. 120 /2. Af ter a three-day

trial, the j ury

returned a ver dict for G BA on: (1) the breach5

of c ontra ct c la im a ga ins t I m

pr es sio n ( $88, 839. 60) ; ( 2) the I SR A c la im a ga ins t Im pression ($30 ,367.38); and (3) the I SRAclaim against Em

m e ($11,020.48). II. D ISCU SSION A . A dm iss ion of

P ri or C op yr igh t La w su it Appe llants arg ue that the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n by

a llo w ing tr ia l t es tim ony

and arg um en t r el at ing to E ve of Mi la dy ’ s c opy

ri ght inf ri nge m en t ca se a ga ins t I m

pr es sio n. Appe llants m ove d inli m ine to pr ec lud e ev ide nc e of the l aw s u i t , a rg u i n g th at ac cu s at i o n s o f N i ckYe h u n l aw fu l l y co p yin g Ev e o f M i l ad y’ s de sig ns w oul d have ahig hly pr ej udi ci al e ff

ec t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e m oti on. Appe llants a lso obj ec te d th ro ugho ut t ri al to G BA ’ s r ef

er en ce s to the la wsu it , bu t t he di st ric t co ur t o ve rru le d e ach ob jecti on . G BAa sse rt s th at

the law sui t e vid en ce w as ne ce ssary to showthe m an ne r in
w hic h E m

m e w as f orm ed ; i . e. , E m

m e w as f orm ed in re spon se to the law sui t against Im

pression. L ikewise, in its order deny ing Appellants’ m otion for new tr ia l, the dis tr ic t c ourt st at ed that “ [t ] he e vid en ce w as intro duc ed to expla in why an d h ow Emm e Bri da l ca m e in to ex is te nc e, an d was th eref or e rel ev an t.” (D.E. 127 at 4.) Both E m

m e and the district court fail to connect the bridge; neither explains why

Em m e’ s form ation rem ained relevant to the discrete issues before the j ur y : ( 1) br ea chof

c ontra ct a ga ins t I m

pr es sio n; and ( 2) I SR

A a ga ins t6

Im pr es sio n and E m

m e. T he e vid en ce onl y

r em ai ne d pl au sib ly

r el ev an t t o sh ow that E m m e ar ose out

of I m pr es sio n inam an ne r giv ing r ise to suc ce sso rs hip lia bil ity the re by m ak ing E m

m e lia ble und er the c ontra ct . B ut this w as pr ec ise ly th e arg um en t m ad e b y

GBA at s umm ary jud gm en t t ha t t he di st ric t co ur t re jecte d. GBAprovides us with no reason, and we know of none, why the prior law suit had an y pro ba ti ve va lu e. N one the le ss, w hil e the dis tr ic t c our t’ s a llo w an ce of

the e vid en ce m ay

have be enque sti ona

ble , it is cl ear that any

pr ej udi ce suf

fe re d by I m pr es sio n di d no t r ise to the level requiring reversal. It is w ell established th at “ an err oneous evidentiary ruling is a basis for r eversal only if the com

plainin g party ’ s subs tantial rights were affe cted.” Proctor v. Fluor Enters. , I nc. , 494 F. 3d 13 37, 1352 (11t h Cir. 2007 );
se e als o T

ran v. T oy ota M oto r C orp. , 4 2 0 F. 3 d1 3 1 0 , 1 3 1 6 (1 1 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ We will only rever se a district court’ s ruling con cerning the adm issib ility of evidence wher e the appellant can show that the j udge abus ed his broad dis cretion and that the decision affected the substantial rights of the com plainin g party .” (internal quot ation m arks om itted)). T o satisfy this stand ard, Appellants bear “ the burden o f p ro v i n g th at th e e rr o r p ro b ab l y h ad a s ub s t an t i al i n fl u en ce o n th e ju ry’s verdict.” Proc tor , 494 F. 3d at 135 2 (internal quotatio n m arks om itted). Appe llants r ef

er to fi ve poi nts dur ing the tr ia l w he re G BAr ai se d th e7

co py ri ght law sui t. F ir st, G BAstate d a t op en ing arg um en t tha t E ve of Mi la dy claim ed, in its copyright infringem ent case, that Im pression “ im

properly copied Eve of Milady

lace patter

ns” and that Nick Y eh told hi s sales reps that he w as

“ goi ng t o do w ha t he ne ed ed to do t o pr es er

ve I m pr es sio n, ” w hic h le d to the form ation of Em

m e for the purpose of m anufacturing “ not im perm issib le copies.” (T r. Vol. 4 at 7.) Se co nd, G ar

y Br ow n, on d ir ec t e xa m inatio n, te sti fi ed that: (a ) “ the re w as a law sui t f ile d a ga ins t I m

pr es sio n by

E ve of Mi la dy f or c opy ri ght inf ri nge m en t f

or co py ing la ce pa tte rn s on[ E ve of Mi la dy ] dr es se s th at

w er e de cl ar ed

artw ork and co py ri ght ed ”; ( b) the nam e “ E m m e” w as c re at ed

f ro m the “ ini tia ls o f E ve Mu sc io,
w ho w as the de sig ne r of

E ve of Mi la dy , so i t w as sor

t of aw ay to sti ck it ali ttl e b i t ”; an d(c ) E m

m e w as cr ea t ed t o “p ro t ec tImpr es s i o n ” a n dt o k ee p Em m e’s de si gn s fr om

be co m in g p artof t he co pyrig ht laws ui t. (Tr. Vo l. 5 at 1 10 -1 13 .) T hir d, N ic k Y eh , on c ro ss- ex am inatio n, w as a ske d w he the r: ( a) E ve of Milady claim ed that Im

pression was m aking copi es of E ve of Milady ’ s dresses (Y eh agreed) ; (b) as a

result of the law suit, Im

pression hadto stop m aking exact co pie s ( Y eha gr ee d) ; ( c) the re w as aw ay to co py the dr es se s w ith out

vio la tin g E ve of Mi la dy ’ s pate nt r igh ts ( Y eha gr ee d) ; and ( d) the c om pli an t c opi es ult im at el y be cam e th e Em

m e p ro du ctli ne (Yeh di sa gr eed ). (Tr. Vol . 8 at 84 -8 5.)8

Fo urth, Mi ke Y eh , on c ro ss- ex am inatio n, w as a ske d se ve ra l qu es tio ns re la tin g to the c opy

ri ght law sui t. T he he ar

t of the e xc hange w as a s f

oll ow s: Q ue sti on: [ Y ] ou a cknow le dge d th at the dr es se s th at

E m m e m ad e ini tia lly w er e in f ac t c opi es of

the E ve of

Mi la dy dr es se s, but

c om pli an t – but w hic h di dn’ t i m

pr ope rl y c opy the la ce de sig ns, c or

re ct ? A nsw er : Y es , that’ s pr etty m uc h st an dard

in the bus ine ss, that othe r pe opl e m ix i n w itha

dr es s th at ’ s si m ilar to o the r pe opl e, w he n th er e’ s ahot dr es s, hot lin e, every

bodydoes the sam e thing. It’ s a standard of the indust ry an d M r. Br ow n a lso kne wabout that and t es tif

ie d th at a lso . (Tr. Vol 8 at 12 0.) Finally , at closing argum ent GBAstated: “ You also heard evidence that som e tim e ar ound 1997 a law suit was filed against Im pression Bridal claim ing th at I mp r e s s i o n B r i d a l i mp r o p e r l y c o p i e dd e s i g n e r s t yl e s . I tw a s a tth a tp o i n ti n t i me that Em m e Br idal arose, which w as born.” ( Tr . V ol. 10 at 68.) Appe llants arg ue that c re dib ili ty w as c ru ci al to thi s c as e be ca use no c opy

of a fu lly e xe cu te d c ontra ct

e xis te d. T he j ur

y , the re fo re , ha d to de ci de w he the r to believe GB A that there wa s a bindin g written agre em ent or believe Appellants th at there w as only

a verbal a greem ent. T he copyright lawsuit, Appellants argue, w as GBA’s be st ev id en ce t o p ut Im pr es si on ’s cred ib il it y

in qu es ti on . A ft er c ondu ct ing atho ro ugh ex am inatio n of the tr ia l transc ri pt, w e cannot holdthat the evidence “probablyhad a substanti al influence on the j ury ’ s verdict.”GB A re prese nted, and Appe llants did not di spute, that ref ere nces ma de to the copy rig ht 2 lawsuit amounted to no more than thirty -seve n lines in the transcr ipt of a three -day trial. 9 Proc tor , 494 F . 3d at 13 52 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). O ur

r ev ie wr ev ea ls that the c opy

ri ght law sui t w as ne ve r a fo cu s of the tr ia l; r athe r, the m eat of the 2 tr ia l i nvol ve d th e co ur se of e ve nts sur

ro undi ng the dr af

tin g, m odi fy ing , and a l l e g e ds i g n i n g o f

th e w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t , th e me t h o di n w h i c h I mp r e s s i o n an dE mme operated their businesses, the sales and m arketing efforts of G BA conducted ov er thi rt ee n y ears , the gr ad

ua l di sso lut ionof

the r el at ion shi p be tw ee n G BAand the Appe llants , the ult im at e te rm inatio n of G BA , and the a m ount

of c om m iss ion s GBA as se rte d i t was en ti tl edto . Equally im portant, w e do not believe that th e substance of the evidence subs tanti al ly

put int o qu es tio n I m

pr es sio n’ s c re dib ili ty . T he e vid en ce w as that the co py ri ght inf ri nge m en t su it ca

use d—whe the r by

f ina l j udgm en t, se ttl em en t, or vol unt ar y c es sa tio n ( it w as not

m ad e cl ear at

tr ia l) —I m

pr es sio n to c ea se it s m ethod of copy ing Eve of Milady ’ s design s. H owever , the e vidence also sho we d that a S pe ci al Ma gis tr at e advis ed that on ly asli ght m odi fi catio n w as ne ce ssary to m ake perm issib le versions of Eve of M ilady ’ s design s. I n additio n, the undispu ted te sti m ony of Mi ke Y ehw as that the standard pr ac tic e of

the br ida l m anuf

ac tur ing b u s i n es s wa s t o “ m i x i n ” d es i g n s fr o m o t h er“ h o tl i n e[ s ].” (Tr . Vo l . 8 at 1 2 0 ). We10

ar e unpe rs ua de d th at

suc h e vid en ce c re at ed

an im pr es sio n of

untru stw orthi ne ss w orth any

sig nif ic an ce . E ve n if

w e w er e to a ssu m e it did , the im pr es sio n w oul d still have to translate to th e altogether unrelated ac tion o f re fusing to pay co m m iss ion s du e to a

te rm inate d sa le s r ep re se ntativ e, w hic h stre tc he s ou tsi de the
r e a l m o f p r o b ab i l i t y. W e, the re fo re , hol d th at

the a dm iss ionof

the c opy ri ght law sui t w as not suf fi ci en tly pr ej udi ci al to re qui re r ev er sa l. B. Em m e’s Br each of C ontract Liability G BAc ro ss- ap pe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ho ldi ng tha t E m m e w as not

li ab le under the contract betwe en GB A and Im pression as a m atter of law. W e re view th e d is tri ctco ur t’s g ran t o f su m m ary jud gm en t d e n ov o. G ibs on v . R es olu tio n Tr ust Co rp. , 51 F. 3d 10 16, 1020 (11t h Cir. 1995 ). Whil e it is undi sput ed

that E m m e did not c om e int o e xis te nc e unt il fi ve y ears a ft er

G BAand I m

pr es sio n e nte re d in to the c ontra ct , G BAr el ie s onthe co ntr ac tua l l an gua ge pr ovi din g th at the a gr ee m en t sh al l be bin din g up on the parties’ “ heirs, succe ssors, assigns and s uccessors-in-interest.” G BA contends that Em m e was eit he r a s uc ces so r-i n- in te res t, an ass ig ne e, ora rat ifi er.The district cour t applied Florida law to the que stion of Emme’s contra ctual liability and 3 no pa rt y ra ise s th e c ho ic e of

law i ssu e on

a pp e a l. 11 1. S uc ce sso r- in -I nt er es t U nde r Fl or ida

law , the li ab ili tie s of

a se lli ng p re de ce sso r co rp or at ionw ill 3 not be im pose d up on the buy ing suc ce sso r co rp or at ionunl es s “ (1 ) the suc ce sso r im pli ed ly a ssu m es the obl igatio ns o f the pr ed ec es sor , ( 2) the tr an sa ct ionis a de fa ct o m er ge r, ( 3) the suc ce sso r co rp or at ionis a m er e co nti nua tio n of the pr ed ec es sor , or

( 4) the tr an sa ct ionis a fr au dul en t e ff ort t o avoi d th e lia

bil iti es of the predecessor. ” Orlando Ligh t Bulb Serv. Inc. v. Laser Lighting & Ele c. Supp ly, Inc. , 52 3 S o. 2 d 7 40 , 74 2 (F la . Dis t. Ct . App . 19 88 ). In this case, GBA ’ s theory of successorship fails from the outset as GBA doe s no t e sta

bli sh a suc ce sso r- pr ed ec es sor

r el at ion shi p be tw ee n I m

pr es sio n and Em m e. Ther e was no tra ns fer o r m erg er o f as se ts fro m Im pr es si on to Em

m e. As
w e ha ve sa id e lse w he re , “ [g ] en er al ly , one of the f undam en ta l r equir em en ts f or co nsi de ratio n of

the im posi tio n of

suc ce sso r lia

bil ity is a m er ge r or

tr an sf er of assets betwee n the predecessor and successor com panies.” Coffman v. Chugach Supp ort Servs., I

nc. , 41 1 F .3d12 31 , 12 37 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ). H e r e , w h e r e E mme w a s f o rme da s as e p a r a t e c o mp a n y, w h e r e E mme purchased none of its assets from Im pression, wher e neither Im pression no r N ick12

Ye h had any

ownership interest in Em m e and rec eived no roy alties from Em m e, w he re I m pr es sio n c ont inu ed

it s bu sin es s and d id n ot d iss olv e subs eque nt t o E m m e’ s f orm at ion , and whe re the re ha s be enno a sse rt ionof f ra ud, w e cannot

hol d th atGBA est ab li sh edan is su e o f m at eri al fact as t o s uc ces so r-i n- in te res t l iabi li ty. Se e, e . g. , Be rnar d v. Kee M fg. Co. , I nc. , 409 S o. 2d 1 047, 104 8 ( Fl a. 198 2) (h old ing that su cc es sor -i n- int er es t r el at ion shi p di d no t e xis t w he re the old com pany sold its m anufacturing busi ness to a new com pany operating und er dif fe re nt o w ne rs hip and m an ag em en t) ; Orl an do Lig ht Bul b Ser vs ., Inc ., 523 S o. 2d at 742-43 (hol ding that successor-in-interest relations hip di d not exis t wher e al le ge d su cc es sor

w as se parate ly

ow ne d and a cquir ed

onl y ali m ite d am ount

of as se ts f ro m a lle ge d pr ed ec es sor ); cf

. A m jad M uni m v . A zar , 648 S o. 2d 1 45, 154
- 55 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 199 4) (holdin g that successor-in-interest existed where ow ne rs hip be tw ee n th e old and n ewc om

panie s w as the sam e, the ne wc om pany b e g an w h e n th e o l dc o mp a n y c e a s e d , an dth e n e wc o mp a n y p r o v i d e dth e s a me services to the sam e clients while using the sam e staff ) . 2. A ssignm ent G BAa sse rt s th at

I m pr es sio n a ssi gne d th e co ntr ac t t o E m m e. A n a ssi gnm en t is “ a tr an sf

er or se tti ng o ve r of

pr ope rty or of som e ri ght

or int er es t the re in, f

ro m13

one person to ano ther.” Sta te F arm F ire & Ca s. Co
. v . R ay , 556 S o. 2d 8 11, 812 (F la . D ist . Ct . App. 199 0) ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). A n “ as sig nm en t tr an sf er s to the a ssi gne e al l the int er es t of the a ssi gnor

und er the a ssi gne d c ontra ct , [l eavin g] the a ssi gnor

[ w ith ] no r igh t t o m ak e an y c la im on the c ontra ct

onc e the assignm ent is com

plete, unless authorized to do so by the assignee.” Id . at 8 13 . A s Appe llants poi nt o ut, it is undi sput ed

that I m pr es sio n m ai nta ine d it s in te re st i n the em ploym ent contract fr om

1992 through GB A’ s term ination in 200 3. S ince the re w as ne ve r a tim e w he n I m pr es sio n r el inquis he d it s in te re st i n th e co ntr ac t t o Em m e o r to an y on e el se , itfol lo ws t ha t Emm e was no t as si gn edth e co nt ract . 3. R at if ic at ion GBAargues that E m

m e ratified the agreem ent. “ Ratification o f an agreem ent occurs wher e a per son expresslyor im pliedlyadopts an act or contract
en te re d in to i n hi

s or he r be hal f byano the r w ith out

aut hori ty .” D eu tsc he Cr edit Corp. v. Pe ning er , 603 So. 2d 57 , 58 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 1992 ) (e m phasis add ed); Port Largo Club, Inc. v. W arren , 476 S o. 2d 1 330, 133 3 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 198 5) (s am e) . A s st at ed

pr ev iou sly , I m

pr es sio n and G BAe nte re d in to the c ontra ct in 1992 —f ive y ears be fo re E m

m e w as f orm ed . T he c ontra ct , the re fo re , w as not en te re d in to o n E m

m e’ s be ha lf

or w ith out E m m e’ s auth or iz at iona s E m m e did not ex is t at th e ti m e.14

Bec au se Em

m e was no t a s uc ces so r-i n- in te res t, as si gn ee, o r rat ifi er, we af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t pr ec lud ing G BAf ro m recovering under the contract against E m m e. C. Exem plary Dam ages GBAcross-appeals the district court’ s grant of summ ary j udgm ent that barr ed G BAf ro m se ek ing e xe m

plary dam ag es und er

I SR A . O ur r ev ie wis, a ga in, de no vo . G ibs on , 51 F.3d at 1 02 0. Init s sum m ar y j udgm en t or de r, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t I SR A pun iti ve dam ages we re unavailable because G BA had “ not alleged any fac ts which, if

true, w oul d e sta

bli sh tha t D ef

en dants ’ a lle ge d f

ai lur e to p ay

c om m iss ion s r ise s to the le ve l of e gr eg iou s or

outra ge ous co nduc t. ” ( D . E . 82 at 5. ) G BAarg ue s th at thi s part ic ular hol din g w as sua spo nte and f

ai le d to pr ovi de G BAw ithan a de qua te oppo rt uni ty to supp ort i ts r eque st f

or pun iti ve dam ag es . Inthe ir Mo tio n f or S um m ar y Jud gm en t, Appe llants a tta ck ed the I SR A c la im as a w hole, ar guin g that GBAwa s not within th e class of per sons the statute was de sig ne d to pr ote ct . Whil e Appe llants not ed that G BAw as r eque sti ng p uni tiv e da m ag es , App el la nt s d idno t ch al le ng e th em sep arat el y . Ru le 56 o f the F ed er al Ru le s of Ci vil P ro ce dur e pr ovi de s th at am oti on f

orWe n ote that G B A g ive s n o in dic atio n o f a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e , b e y on d th e e vid e nc e in 4 the re cord be fore the district court at summary judgme nt, that would cre ate a n issue of mater ial fac t. As such, this is not a case that impli cate s the conc ern of a non-mova

nt not being a ffor ded 15 sum m ar y j udgm en t “ sha ll be se rv ed a t l ea st 1 0 day s be fo re the ti m e fi xe d f or the he ar ing ” an d a llo w s no nm ovants “ to s er ve opp osi ng a ff

idavit s a t any

ti m e pr ior

to t h e d ay o f t h e h ea ri n g .” Fe d . R . C i v . P . 5 6 (c ). We h av e e x p l ai n ed th at Ru l e 5 6 ’s not ic e pr ovi sio n is “ a vit al pr oc ed ur al sa fe guard ” that e nsur es “ lit igants w ill have at least ten day s in which to form ulate and prepare their best oppo sition to an im pendin g assault up on the conti nued viabi lity of their claim

or defense. ” Massey
v. Co ngress L ife I

ns. Co
. , 11 6 F .3d14 14 , 14 17 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ). W e need not reac h whether G BA wa s provid ed with sufficient notice because even if G BA had been expressly notified that pu nitiv e dam ages we re at is su e, th e o ut co m e wou ldha ve be en th e sa m e. Se e A rti sti c E ntm ’t , I nc . v . Ci tyof W arne r R obi ns , 331 F . 3d 1 196, 120 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( pe r curi am) (“ [E ] ve n if the district court had form ally told [appellant] that the newclaim s would be addressed in the sum

m ar y j udgm en t pr oc ee din gs, w e ar e co nvi nc ed that the out co m e w oul d not have be endif

fe re nt. ”) ; Restigo uche, I

nc. v . T own of Jupit er , 59 F . 3d 1 208, 1213 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ( hol din g th at w he re appe llant f

ai le d, e ve n onappe al , to m ar sha l f ac ts and arg um en ts tha t w oul d have pr ec lud ed sum m ar y j udgm en t, “ an y violatio n of the 10-day

notice rule [w as] harm less”). 4an ade quate oppor tunity to develop the r ecor d on a fa ctual dispute. See A rtisti c Entm’t, I nc. , 331 F.3d at 1201. “In deter mining the law

of the state, f

eder al cour

ts must foll ow the dec isions of the 5 state’s hig hest court, a

nd in the absenc e of suc h decisions on an issue, must adhe re to the decisions of the state ’s intermediate appe llate cour ts unless there is some per suasive indication that the state’s highest court would de cide the issue othe rwise.” Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp. , 678 F.2d 942, 945 ( 11th Cir. 1982). 16 Beca use ISRAis an Illinois s tatute, w e look to Illin ois case lawto interpret the statute. Punitive dam ages under ISRAare only available w hen the “ conduct 5 invo lv[es] an elem ent of outrage sim ilar to that norm ally found in crim e. ” Maher and A sso cs . , I

nc . v . Q ual ityCa bin et

s , 640 N . E . 2d 1 000, 100 8 ( Il l. App. Ct . 199 4) (internal quotation m arks om itted). T he conduct m ust be “ outrageous” su ch that the “ de fe ndant’ s a ct s are don e w ithan e vil m oti ve or w ithr ec kle ss i ndi ff

er en ce to the rights of oth ers. ” Id
. (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) . GBAcontends th at two post-term ination em ails from Nic k Yeh to G arry Brow n, w hich wer e a par t of the rec ord evidence (D .E . 44 at 6), gave rise to an iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t a s to I m

pr es sio n and E m

m e’ s r equis ite m en ta l st at e. T he em ails both depict Nick Y eh requesting the return of certa in sales m aterials bef ore paym en t w oul d be m ad e to G BAand, if not r et ur ne d, G BAw oul d have to re sort t o litigatio n to get any

com m issio ns due. W e cannot

c onc lud e that N ic k Y eh ’ s in str uc tio n to r et

ur n hi s m at er ia ls o r pur sue li tig at ionr ise s to the ty pe of outra ge ous co nduc t “ sim ilar to tha t no rm al ly17

found in crim e. ” Id . A s su ch , w e fi nd n o e rr or in the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of su m m ary jud gm en t o n p un it iv e d am ag es un de r ISRA. D. R educ tion of A ttorn ey’s F ees & Costs

“ W e re view an award of attorney ’ s fees by the district court onlyfor an abuse of discretion.” Johnso n v. Bree den , 28 0 F .3d13 08 , 13 26 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ).

“ An abuse of discretion occurs if the j udge fails to applythe proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in m aking th e determ ination , or bases an aw ard upon findings of fac t that are c learly err oneous .” Id . ( int er

na l qu otatio n m ar

ks om itted). GBAcross-appeals the district court’ s order that reduced G BA’ s proffer ed attor ne y ’ s f ee s by appr oxi m at el y

six ty -f ive pe rc en t ( $99, 661. 50 t o $3 4, 908. 75) and reduced proffer ed costs from $25,921.05 to $611 .00. Fee s and costs were onl y r ec ove ra ble und er G BA ’ s I SR

A c la im —no t G BA ’ s br ea chof

c ontra ct or accounting claim s. T he district court found th at G BA m ade no attem pt to sp ecify
w ha t f ee e ntr ie s r el at ed

to w hic h c la im

and s ubm itt ed

no t es tim ony

a s to ap po rti on m en t. Se e No rm an v . H ous. A uth
. of Ci tyof M

ont gom er y , 836 F . 2d 1292 , 130 3 ( 11th C ir . 198 8) ( “ [F ] ee c ouns el sho uld have m ai nta ine d r ec or ds t o showthe ti m e spe nt o n th e dif fe re nt c la im s, and the ge ne ra l su bj ec t m atte r of

the18

tim e expe ndi tur es oug ht t o be se t ou t w ithsuf fi ci en t part ic ulari ty

so tha t the district court can assess the tim e claim ed for ea ch activity .” ). T he district court de te rm ine d th at

G BA ’ s ti m e w as spl it fi fty -f if ty be tw ee n th e IS RAc la im on the one hand, and the br ea chof c ontra ct and a cc ount ing c la im s onthe oth er . A s su ch , onlyfifty perce nt of the total fee w as aw ardable. T he court found that a further fi ft ee n pe rc en t r ed

uc tio n w as ne ce ssary

in lig ht o f the e xc es siv e an d r ed undant na tur e of the r ec or de d e ntr ie s; s pe ci fi ca lly , thr ee law y er s w orke d onthe c as e an d the m aj or ity

of the ti m e w as bil le d inf

ull or ha lf -h our inc re m en ts. W e fi nd n o ab use of dis cr et ionin the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n a s to f ee s. A s f or c ost s, the tr ia l c ourt f

ound that pl ai nti ff

’ s r eque st w as e ith er : ( 1) not r e c o v e r ab l e u n d e r

2 8 U. S . C . § 1 9 2 0 ; o r

( 2 ) n o ts t a t e dwi t h r e qu i s i t e s p e c i f i c i t y. Specifica lly , G BA’ s requests for m ediation expens es, m eals, courier/postage, Lex is -Nex is res earc h, ai r fare , and lo dg in g a re n ot in cl ud edun de r § 1 92 0. See 28 U . S. C. § 19 20; D uc kw orth v
. W his en ant , 97 F. 3d 13 93, 1399 (11t h Cir. 1996 ) (per curi am) (h old ing that “ co sts suc h a s ge ne ra l c opy ing , c om put er iz ed le ga l r es earc h, post ag e, c ourtho use park ing f ee s and e xpe rt

w itn es s f ee s . . . are c le ar ly nonr ec ove ra

ble ” unde r § 19 20) . I n a ddi tio n, G BAr eque ste d atot al of $6, 698. 82 fo r unsp ec if

ie d c opy ing by

an ou tsi de pr ovi de r, w hic h di d no t a llo wthe c ourt t o de te rm in e whe th er t he do cu m en ts were n eces sa ril y ob ta in edforus e in th e cas e.19

See 28 U . S. C. § 19 20( 4) ( (p ro vid ing f or “ [f ] ee s f or e xe m pli fi catio n and c opi es of pa pe rs necessarily obt ained fo r use in the case (em phasis add ed)). T he district court also foundthat a general $4,602.90 charge for deposition transcripts lacked th e req ui si te sp eci fic it y . See 28 U . S. C. § 19 20( 2) ( pr ovi din g f or “ [f ] ee s of the co urt r ep orte r fo r al l or

any part of the ste nogr ap hic tr an sc ri pt necessarily obt ained for use in the c ase ” (em

ph as is ad de d) ). As b efo re, we fi nd no ab us e o f di sc ret io n. III. C ONC LUS ION A ft er or al arg um en t and c ar ef

ul c onsi de ratio n of

the r ec or d and the part ie s’ br ie fs , w e co nc lud e that the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s du e to b e af fi rm ed . AFFIRMED.