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NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY ET

AL. v. JEFFREY S. PASIAK ET AL.

(AC 36922)

Keller, Prescott and West, Js.

Argued May 19—officially released November 10, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket,

Brazzel-Massaro, J.)

Charles W. Fortune, with whom were Heather L.

McCoy and, on the brief, Robert D. Laurie, for the

appellants (plaintiffs).

David J. Robertson, with whom, on the brief, were

Madonna A. Sacco, Christopher H. Blau and Alyssa

M. Tornberg, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. In this declaratory judgment action,

the plaintiffs, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company,

appeal from the judgment of the trial court determining

that, pursuant to a personal umbrella insurance policy

issued by the plaintiffs in favor of the defendant Jeffrey

S. Pasiak,1the plaintiffs had a duty to defend the defendant and to indemnify him for damages awarded against

him in a tort action brought by Sara Socci, a former

employee of his business, and her spouse, Kraig Socci.

See Socci v. Pasiak, 137 Conn. App. 562, 49 A.3d 287,

cert. denied, 307 Conn. 919, 54 A.3d 563 (2012). The

dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court

properly determined that a provision in the umbrella

policy excluding occurrences ‘‘arising out of the business pursuits or business property of an insured’’ from

coverage did not bar the defendant’s indemnification

claim.2 We conclude that the court improperly concluded that the business pursuits exclusion did not

apply and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial

court and remand the case with direction to render

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

Before turning to the relevant facts, as set forth in the

trial court’s memorandum of decision, and procedural

history underlying this appeal, we first recount the facts

as set forth in our decision in Socci v. Pasiak, supra,

137 Conn. App. 562, the underlying tort action that gave

rise to this insurance coverage dispute. Sara Socci was

an employee of the defendant’s company, Pasiak Construction Services, LLC, and worked out of an office

located on the second floor of the defendant’s home.

Id., 565–66. On May 9, 2006, while she was working

alone at the office, a masked intruder entered the office

carrying a gun and demanded that she open the safe.

Id. Unaware that a safe even existed in the home, she

could not provide the intruder with the safe’s combination. Id., 566. The intruderled herinto a bedroom, where

he tied her hands, gagged her and blindfolded her. Id.

At one point, he pointed a gun at her head and threatened to kill her family if she did not give him the combination. Id.

The defendantreturned home during the incident and

was attacked by the intruder. Id. During the ensuing

struggle, the defendant pulled off the intruder’s mask,

revealing him to be Richard Kotulsky, a friend of the

defendant. Id. The defendant began talking to Kotulsky

and inquired about Sara Socci. Id. Kotulsky led the

defendant to the bedroom, where the defendant found

Sara Socci on the floor, crying and hysterical. Id. The

defendant picked her up and removed her restraints,

all the while conversing with Kotulsky. Id. She asked

to leave, but the defendant told her to stay and sit

down. Id. After further discussions with Kotulsky, the

defendant allowed him to leave the house. Id. Sara Socci
then told the defendant about the threats that Kotulsky

had made to her and her family, but the defendant

would not call the police. Id. He told Sara Socci to stay

with him and refused to let her call the police or to

discuss the incident further. Id., 566–67. She remained

with the defendant for several hours, in fear that, if she

left, she or her family might be harmed. Id., 567. Only

after he drove Sara Socci to Greenwich to discuss the

incident with a mutual friend did he allow her to leave.

Id. Eventually, the police were contacted, ultimately

leading to Kotulsky’s arrest and subsequent conviction. Id.

As a result of the incident, Sara Socci developed posttraumatic stress disorder, requiring extensive therapy,

and was unable to return to work. Id. In March, 2008,

she and her husband, Kraig Socci, filed a civil action

against the defendant alleging causes of action for false

imprisonment, negligence, intentional, reckless, and

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of

consortium (Socci action). Id., 567–68. On February 23,

2010, a jury returned a general verdict in favor of the

Soccis. Id., 568. It awarded Sara Socci compensatory

damages of $628,200 and punitive damages of $175,000,

and awarded Kraig Socci $32,500 for loss of consortium. Id.

At the time of the incident at issue in the Socci action,

the defendant had three insurance policies in effect, all

issued by the plaintiffs: an automobile policy, a homeowner’s policy, and a personal umbrella policy.

Although the plaintiffs provided the defendant with

counsel in the Socci action, they notified him by letter

on March 13, 2008, that they were reserving their right

to contest coverage. In December, 2008, the plaintiffs

filed the present action. Count one of their amended

complaint sought a declaration that the plaintiffs did

not have a duty to defend the defendant in the Socci

action under any of his policies with the plaintiffs.

Count two sought a declaration that the plaintiffs had no

duty to indemnify the defendant under those policies.

Count three sought a declaration that the defendant

had breached his policies by failing to tender timely

notice to the plaintiffs of the occurrence alleged in the

Socci action and, therefore, had forfeited any right to

coverage or defense.3

On July 28, 2009, prior to the verdict in the Socci

action, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgmentin the declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that they did not have a duty to defend the

Socci action.4 The defendant filed a memorandum of

law in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment and also filed a cross motion for summary

judgment seeking to establish the plaintiffs’ duty to

defend. Following a hearing, the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J., issued a memorandum of decision, concluding

as follows: ‘‘[T]he court finds that the allegations of the
amended complaint fall within the acts covered by both

the homeowner’s policy and the umbrella policy.5 Thus,

the court finds that the plaintiff[s] [have] a duty to

defend. The declaratory judgment is denied and the

defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment as to

the duty to defend is granted.

‘‘As a result of the court finding that there is a duty

to defend and the Supreme Court decision that a duty

to indemnify should not be decided on a summary judgment, and the lack of any supporting argument by the

plaintiff[s] regarding the duty to indemnify, the court

determines that judgment cannot enter at this time in

favor of the plaintiff[s] in this declaratory judgment as

to the duty to indemnify.’’ (Footnote added.)

Regarding the plaintiffs’ argument that their duty to

defend was barred pursuant to the policies’ business

pursuits exclusions, the court found that although it

was undisputed that the defendant owns and operates

a construction business that employed Sara Socci to

assist in office related work, the complaint did not

expressly allege that Sara Socci was injured as a result

of her employment. The allegations regarding the tortious conduct of the defendant related to his treatment

of her after the attempted robbery of his home.

According to the court, ‘‘[h]er employment or the relation thereto is not an element in the basis of her claims

of his negligent and/or intentional acts.’’ The court suggested that because there were no allegations connecting Sara Socci’s work duties to the incident or the

injuries claimed and ‘‘[t]here [was] no element of any

regular activity of the business that is related to the

events,’’ the business pursuit exclusion did not apply.

The plaintiffs filed a second motion for summary

judgment on April 18, 2011, asking the court to determine that they had no duty to indemnify the defendant

for the damages awarded by the jury in the Socci action.

According to the plaintiffs, the policies at issue only

provided coverage for accidents, not intentional or

criminal conduct or claims of emotional distress. The

plaintiffs further contended that coverage for damages

arising out of business pursuits or employee injuries

covered under workers’ compensation was expressly

excluded. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to the homeowner’s

policy, concluding that coverage under that policy was

limited to physical injuries and that the policy expressly

excluded coverage for damages related to emotional

distress not tied to a physical injury.6 The court denied

the motion, however, with respect to the plaintiffs’ duty

to indemnify the defendant pursuant to the umbrella

policy. The court concluded that the umbrella policy

contained broader coverage than the homeowner’s policy with respect to emotional distress and that none

of the exclusions relied on by the plaintiffs precluded

indemnification as a matter of law.
On August 29, 2012, the court conducted a bench

trial on the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a duty

to indemnify the defendant pursuant to the terms of

the umbrella policy. The parties submitted trial briefs.

The court issued its memorandum of decision on April

25, 2004.

With respect to the plaintiffs’ argument that indemnification was barred by the policy’s business pursuits

exclusion, the court stated that the ‘‘real issue’’ was

‘‘whether the actions of [the defendant] in response to

the robbery arose out of the business pursuits for the

[defendant’s] business or as the defendant contends

because he was trying to protect a lifelong friend.’’ The

court ultimately concluded that the exclusion did not

apply because the evidence ‘‘strongly support[ed] the

conclusion that [the defendant] was attempting to protect his friend’’ratherthan further his business pursuits.

After rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that other

exclusions precluded a duty to indemnify the defendant

for his damages in the Socci action, the court rendered

judgment in his favor. This appeal followed. Additional

facts will be set forth as necessary.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the court

properly determined that the business pursuits exclusion of the defendant’s umbrella policy did not preclude

him from obtaining indemnification from the plaintiffs

for his liability in the Socci action. The plaintiffs argue

that the language of the exclusion establishes a broad

causal standard, which was satisfied by the evidence

introduced at trial, and that the court improperly

focused on the defendant’s motivations rather than on

determining whether his conduct arose out of his business pursuits. The defendant responds that the court

properly concluded that the exclusion did not apply

because there was no causal connection between his

business and his conduct.

For reasons we now explain, we conclude that, consistent with our case law interpreting identical or similar coverage exclusions, the language of the business

pursuits exclusion in the defendant’s umbrella policy

establishes an expansive standard of causation between

the incident giving rise to a claim for coverage and the

insured’s business pursuits. Because the facts found by

the court in this case satisfied that expansive standard

of causation, we agree with the plaintiffs that the court

improperly concluded that the business pursuits exclusion did not apply.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable

standard of review. ‘‘[C]onstruction of a contract of

insurance presents a question of law for the [trial] court

which this court reviews de novo. . . . [T]he terms of

an insurance policy are to be construed according to

the general rules of contract construction. . . . The

determinative question is the intent of the parties, that
is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to

receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. . . . In evaluating the expectations of the parties, we are mindful of the

principle that provisions in insurance contracts must be

construed as laymen would understand [them] and not

according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters and that the policyholder’s expectations should

be protected as long as they are objectively reasonable

from the layman’s point of view. . . .

‘‘If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous,

then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and

ordinary meaning. . . . However, [w]hen the words of

an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible

of two [equally responsible] interpretations, that which

will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted. . . . [T]his rule of construction

favorable to the insured extends to exclusion clauses.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Vermont Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 290 Conn.

582, 591–92, 966 A.2d 672 (2009).

‘‘Homeowners’ . . . liability policies typically

exempt from coverage bodily injury or property damage

arising out of or in connection with a business engaged

in by an insured. People characteristically separate their

business activities from their personal activities, and,

therefore, business pursuits coverage is not essential

for their homeowners’ . . . coverage and is excluded

to keep premium rates at a reasonable level.’’ 9A L.

Russ & T. Segalla, Couch on Insurance (3d Ed. 2005)

§ 128:12, pp.128-30 through 128-31.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the terms

of the defendant’s umbrella policy. The provision relevant to this appeal provides in relevant part that

‘‘[e]xcess liability and additional coverages do not apply

to . . . [a]n occurrence arising out of the business pursuits or business property of an insured.’’ ‘‘Occurrence’’

is defined in the policy as ‘‘an accident including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general conditions. It must result in bodily injury, property damage,

or personal injury caused by an insured.’’ The term

‘‘business’’ is defined as ‘‘a trade, profession, occupation, or employment including self-employment, performed on a full-time, part-time or temporary basis.’’

The plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s coverage

claim falls within the scope of this exclusion because

the incident giving rise to the claim—essentially, the

defendant’s refusal to let Sara Socci leave his presence

and her resulting injuries—arose out of the operation

of his construction business. More particularly, they

argue that Sara Socci would not have been attacked

by Kotulsky, and consequently would not have been

threatened and restrained by the defendant, if she had

not been at the office of the defendant’s construction
business performing her duties as an employee.

We first consider whether the defendant’s operation

of his construction business, and his employment of

Sara Socci in support thereof, constituted ‘‘business

pursuits’’ under his umbrella policy. Although the

umbrella policy does not explain what ‘‘business pursuits’’ are, our Supreme Court has previously determined, in the context of interpreting an insurance policy

exclusion, that the phrase ‘‘contemplates a continuous

or regular activity engaged in by the insured for the

purpose of earning a profit or a livelihood. The determination of whether a particular activity constitutes a

business pursuit is to be made by a flexible fact-specific

inquiry.’’ Pacific Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 240 Conn. 26, 33, 688 A.2d 319 (1997).

‘‘Thus, our analysis of whether the business exclusion

applies follows the two part test of continuity and profit

motive, as set forth by our Supreme Court in Pacific

Indemnity Ins. Co.’’ Cambridge Mutual Fire Ins. Co.

v. Sakon, 132 Conn. App. 370, 377, 31 A.3d 849 (2011),

cert. denied, 304 Conn. 904, 38 A.3d 1202 (2012). In the

present case, the record establishes that the defendant’s

construction business was sufficiently continuous and

profit driven to satisfy this test. The defendant does

not dispute this conclusion.

We next consider whether Sara Socci’s injuries arose

out of the defendant’s operation of his construction

business. ‘‘Our [Supreme Court’s] previous interpretations of insurance contracts with similar arising out of

language, which originated in the motor vehicle context,

are helpful to our determination of the import of the

relevant endorsement. . . . In Hogle [v. Hogle, 167

Conn. 572, 577, 356 A.2d 172 (1975)], for example, [the

court] observed that it is generally understood that for

liability for an accident or an injury to be said to arise

out of the use of an automobile for the purpose of

determining coverage under the appropriate provisions

of a liability insurance policy, it is sufficient to show

only that the accident or injury was connected with,

had its origins in, grew out of, flowed from, or was

incident to the use of the automobile, in order to meet

the requirement that there be a causal relationship

between the accident or injury and the use of the automobile. . . . Connecticut’s reviewing courts subsequently have applied this definition of arising out of to

insurance policies beyond the context of motor vehicle

exclusions.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Property

Casualty Co. of America, 308 Conn. 146, 157–58, 61

A.3d 485 (2013).

Thus, when used in an exclusionary clause of an

insurance agreement, the term ‘‘arising out of’’ establishes an ‘‘[expansive] standard of causation’’; (internal

quotation marks omitted) New London County Mutual

Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 759, 36 A.3d 224
(2012); and must be ‘‘interpreted broadly . . . .’’ Cambridge Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Sakon, supra, 132 Conn.

App. 380. ‘‘[U]se of [the phrase] does not require a

direct proximate causal connection but instead merely

requires some causal relation or connection.’’ 7 S. Plitt

et al., Couch on Insurance (3d Ed. Rev. 2013) § 101:52,

p. 101-96; see Board of Education v. St. Paul Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., 261 Conn. 37, 48, 801 A.2d 752 (2002)

(‘‘[u]nder this standard of causation, it need not be

shown that the incident in question was proximately

caused by the vehicle for coverage to attach’’).

Applying this broad standard to the facts of the present case, we agree with the plaintiffs that Sara Socci’s

injuries arose out of the defendant’s business pursuits.

The trial court found, and no party disputes, that at the

time that Kotulsky assaulted her, Sara Socci ‘‘was at

the office location [of the defendant’s construction business] performing duties for [the business] . . . .’’ The

defendant arrived thereafter and, after initially struggling with Kotulsky, assisted him in concealing his

actions by detaining Sara Socci until she agreed to

refrain from contacting the police. Thus, the sine qua

non of the defendant’s tortious conduct was Sara

Socci’s presence at his business office fulfilling her

responsibilities as his employee. See 9A L. Russ & T.

Segalla, supra, 128:17, pp. 128-39 through 128-40 (‘‘liabilities in connection with workplace altercations have

been held to necessarily involve the insured’s business

pursuits and therefore fall within the business pursuits

exclusion’’). Stated alternatively, had Sara Socci not

been at the office performing her duties as an employee

of the defendant’s business, there is no reason to believe

that she would have been assaulted by Kotulsky and,

consequently, detained by the defendant. Indeed, there

was no other reason for Sara Socci’s presence on the

premises, and her acquiescence in obeying the defendant’s commands to wait and not leave were, in part,

a function of their employer-employee relationship.

Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant’s conduct,

and Sara Socci’s resulting injuries, were connected

with, had their origins in, grew out of, flowed from, or

were incident to the defendant’s business pursuits. See

Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of

America, supra, 308 Conn. 157–58.

The trial court’s conclusion to the contrary is supported by analysis that we find unpersuasive. For

instance, the court reasons at one point in its memorandum of decision that ‘‘[i]n determining whether there

is a profit motive, the plaintiff must prove that the

injuries alleged in the underlying action arise from the

insured’s business pursuits.’’ That assertion conflates,

however, the test for determining whether an insured’s

activities constitute business pursuits with the test for

determining whether a particular injury arose out of

an insured’s business pursuits. As the court in Pacific

Indemnity Ins. Co., explained, proving that a profit
motive exists is one requirement in proving that an

activity constitutes business pursuits. See Pacific

Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,

supra, 240 Conn. 31–33. Thus, the trial court could not

logically require the plaintiffs to first prove that an

activity arose out of the defendant’s business pursuits

in order to establish that there was a profit motive. The

fact that the court appears to have done so suggests a

misapplication of the business pursuits exclusion in the

defendant’s umbrella policy.

The court’s decision also indicates that it treated the

defendant’s motivation or mental state as a dispositive

factor in determining whether his actions and Sara

Socci’s injuries arose out of his business pursuits. Specifically, the court stated that ‘‘[c]ontrary to the [plaintiffs’] argument, it was not clear that [the defendant’s]

actions had anything to do with his business as compared to his thoughts of preventing his friend from

going to jail.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court further

stated that the ‘‘real issue’’ was ‘‘whether the actions

of [the defendant] in response to the robbery arose out

of the business pursuits for the [defendant’s] business

or as the defendant contends because he was trying

to protect a lifelong friend.’’ (Emphasis added.) The

defendantraises the same argument on appeal, claiming

that his actions ‘‘had nothing to do with [his] business

and [were] entirely personal.’’ More specifically, he

argues that his actions were motivated by his desire to

protect his friend and that they ‘‘had nothing to do with

furthering the profits of his business.’’

As previously discussed, however, the phrase ‘‘arising

out of’’ establishes an expansive standard of causation.

Thus, whether the occurrence claimed under the

umbrella policy arose out of the defendant’s business

pursuits is not dependent on his state of mind. It is

sufficient for the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the tortious acts and resulting injuries in the underlying action

were connected with, had their origins in, grew out

of, flowed from, or were incident to the defendant’s

business pursuits to establish the necessary causal

nexus. See Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty

Co. of America, supra, 308 Conn. 157–58. Thus, regardless of the reasons or motivations underlying the defendant’s actions, including whether the actions were

motivated by profit, the fact that Sara Socci’s injuries

would not have occurred had she not been engaged in

work for the defendant’s business at the time of her

injuries is sufficient to satisfy that standard. We therefore conclude that the occurrence underlying the defendant’s claim for indemnification arose out of his

business pursuits.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to render judgment for the plaintiffs on

count two of their amended complaint. The plaintiffs’

appeal with respect to their claim regarding their duty to
defend under the umbrella policy is dismissed as moot.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the operative amended complaint in this action named Sara

Socci, Kraig Socci, and the defendant’s business, Pasiak Construction Services, LLC, as additional party defendants, the trial court’s decision is limited

to the coverage issues arising from the personal umbrella insurance policy

issued by the plaintiffs to Jeffrey S. Pasiak as the sole policyholder. Accordingly, we refer to him throughout this opinion as the defendant and to the

remaining defendants by name.

2 The plaintiffs also claim on appeal that the court improperly (1) failed

to afford them a full and independent hearing, (2) denied them a full and

fair opportunity to develop their coverage defenses during discovery and

at trial,(3) made factual findings on the basis of inferences and presumptions

drawn from an incomplete record, (4) failed to find that indemnification

was barred pursuant to the policy’s abuse exclusion, (5) failed to find that

indemnification was barred pursuant to the policy’s workers’ compensation

exclusion, and (6) determined thatthe defendant was entitled to indemnification for punitive damages. Because we reverse the court’s judgment as to

indemnification on the basis of its failure to properly apply the policy’s

business pursuits exclusion, we do not address these additional claims

of error.

Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined by

way of summary judgment that they had a duty to defend the defendant in

the Socci action and that, accordingly, they are entitled to reimbursement

of all defense costs incurred on behalf of the defendant. We cannot reach

this claim, however, because the court found that in addition to having a

duty to defend arising from the umbrella policy, the plaintiffs also had a

duty to defend under their homeowner’s policy with the defendant. On

appeal, the plaintiffs have failed to advance any argument that the court

improperly determined that it had a duty to defend under the homeowner’s

policy, limiting its arguments challenging the duty to defend to the umbrella

policy. Although the court later determined, after judgment in the Socci

action, that the plaintiffs had no duty to indemnify the defendant under

the homeowner’s policy, that decision had no legal effect on the court’s

prior determination that the plaintiffs had a duty to defend under that same

policy. We have often repeated, in a variety of contexts, that a party wishing

to challenge a court’s decision on appeal must address all grounds relied

on by the court in reaching its decision or else risk the dismissal of the

claim as moot. ‘‘[I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot

questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit

the plaintiff or defendant in any way. . . . [If] alternative grounds . . .

unchallenged on appeal would support the trial court’s judgment, independent of some challenged ground, the challenged ground that forms the basis

of the appeal is moot because the court on appeal could grant no practical

relief to the complainant.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Abushaqra, 151 Conn. App. 319, 325, 96 A.3d 559 (2014); see

also Horenian v. Washington, 128 Conn. App. 91, 98–99, 15 A.3d 1194 (2011)

(dismissing portion of appeal challenging summary judgment because trial

court provided two independent grounds for granting summary judgment

and appellant only challenged one on appeal). The plaintiffs’ failure to

address their duty to defend under the homeowner’s policy renders moot

their claim regarding their duty to defend under the umbrella policy, and

we dismiss that portion of the appeal.

3 The plaintiffs later withdrew count three of the amended complaint on

March 12, 2012. In addition to answering the complaint, the defendant filed

a twelve count counterclaim against the plaintiffs alleging, inter alia, various

acts of bad faith, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The trial court

granted a motion to bifurcate the trial of the declaratory judgment complaint

from the counterclaim. Although the counterclaim remains pending before

the trial court, the present appeal was nevertheless taken from an appealable

final judgment because the court’s decision following trial disposed of all

remaining counts of the complaint. See Practice Book § 61-2.

4 The record shows that the defendant was represented in the Socci action

by counsel provided by the plaintiffs and by private counsel. His private

counsel did not take an active role in the trial proceedings but may have

advised the defendant or discussed trial strategy with the other counsel.

5 Earlier in its decision, the court indicated that the parties had stipulated

that there was no coverage available under the automobile policy.

6 The court stated in its memorandum of decision that ‘‘[t]he homeowners

policy as written clearly contemplates the coverage for a physical injury or

illness as a result of the occurrence. It is obvious based upon the trial
testimony [in the Socci action] that any physical symptom or injury that

Sara Socci claimed as a result of the incident was a side effect of the [posttraumatic stress disorder] or the emotional injuries she has claimed. This

is the opposite of what is covered under the language of the policy. In other

words, the policy clearly covers a physical injury and if, as a side effect,

the injury also caused emotional distress, such as depression or otherrelated

mental impacts, it would be covered because the bodily injury would be

the trigger for coverage. Here, there was no evidence or testimony that

would support this claim. . . .

‘‘Because this court has determined, based upon the trial evidence, that

there is no clear claim for bodily injury or personal injury that was related

directly or indirectly to the physical or mental abuse to trigger a possibility

of coverage, the exclusion for damages of emotional distress is applicable

and precludes coverage.’’