The Honora ble J oseph H. McKinley , J r., United States District J udg e for th e W estern * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. File Na me: 08a0134n.06 Filed: Mar ch 6, 2008 NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

No. 06-6132 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT JO DE AN NU CH OL S, a nd DA VI D N UC HO L S, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. J AM ES BERRONG, a

nd BL OUNT COUN TY, TENNESSEE, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

/ Be fore : MARTI

N and ROGERS, Circuit J udg es, and MCKI NL EY, District Judge. * BO YCE F. MARTI

N, J R., Circ uit Judge

. I n this § 1983 case, Jo Dean Nuc hols appea ls the district court’s gr an t o f summary judgme nt in favor of

Blount County

Sheriff James Be rrongand Blount Co u n ty

. N u c h o ls a ll e g e d th a t B e r r o n g v io late d h e r 1 4 th A me n d me n t r ig h ts when he threatened to set fir e to her dog and burn he r ho u s e down, kill ing he r fa mily in the proce ss. The district court concluded that Nuchols had not stated a c onstitut ional violation and that Be rrongwas otherwise e ntitled to qualified immuni ty . We ag re e and AFFI RM the district court’s g rant of

s u m m a r y j u d g m e n ti nf

a v o r o f B e r r o n g an d B l o u n tC o u n t y. I. Bac kgr oundNo. 06-6132

Nuchols, et al v. Berrong Pag e 2 Th e fa c ts g ivi ng ri se to Nu c ho ls’ s cla ims a g a ins t Be rr on g and B lou nt C ounty c an o nly be sa id to b e re min isc e nt o f a

so a p o pe ra . N uc ho ls’ s c la ims aro se in t he c on te xt o f B e rr on g ’s a lle g e d a ff a ir with a S heriff

’s Department employ ee. Appar ently , Be rrong ’s wife, Gale, was suspicious about her husband’s e x tra-c urricula r ac tiviti es and a sked Nuchols, who was Be rrong ’s sec reta ry at the time, to c on fi rm

he r sus pic ion s. B e rr on g fo un d o ut t hat hi s w if

e ha d ta lke d to Nu c ho ls a

nd c a lle d N uc ho ls into his office. In the prese nce of two deputies, Be rrong told Nuc hols that he had a n audiotape of Nuchols’s c onversation with Gale. B err ong then y elled at Nuc hols, telling her “y our ass is fired, you g et out of her e!” When Nuchols ask ed what she ha d done, B err ong responde d that Nuchols had called G ale. When Nuc hols asked Ber rong whether Gale knew about the tape, B err ong said in an ang ry manner : “No; if y ou tell Gal e or [ y our husband] David, I ’ll burn y our house down, se t y our do g on fi re and the re wo n’ t be a

me mbe r o f your f

a mil y le ft , d o y ou

un de rs tand

me ? ” Ac c or din g to Nuchols, B err ong moved towar ds her a nd repe ated his threat, adding “I won’t hire it done, I

will do it my self! D o y ou understand me? ” Nuchols maintains that Be rrongwas a ng ry and re d-fa ced w hen he made these threats. Nuchols claims that Be rrong ’s threat la nded her in the hospital for treatment of mental a

nd emotional distress, and that she ha s not recove red. Nuchols filed suit in dis t ri ct court a lleg ing va rious constitutional viol ations. The district court initially

dismiss ed Nuc hols’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6). On a ppeal, a panel of this court af fi rm ed i n part a

nd reve rsed in par

t. Nuchols v. Berrong , 141 Fe d. App’x. 451 (6th Ci r. 2005). Re le va nt t o th e pr e se nt a

pp e a l is this c ourt ’s de c isi on re g ard ingNu c ho ls’ s su

bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss

c la im. Th e pa

ne l c on c lud e d th a t it

wa s e rr or fo r the dis tr ic t c ourt to d ism iss Nu c ho ls’ s F ourt e e nth Amendment cla im at the pleadingstag e, stating that “we are unable t o co n cl u d e at this point thatNo. 06-6132

Nuchols, et al v. Berrong Pag e 3 there are no set of fa cts that, if proven, would entitle Nuchols t o relief .” Id. at 453. I n a footnote, ho we ve r, the pa

ne l st a te d tha t it

wa s n ot “ imp ly [ing ] an

ans we r t o th e qu e sti on

of wh e the r t

hr e a ts

a lo n e , a p art f r o m c u s to dy , p h y s ic a l c o n ta c t, o r s o me o th e r a d d it io n a l f a c to r , ma y amount to a

su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss v iol a tio n. . . . B e c a us e a mor e de ve lop ed r e c or d w ou ld b e us e fu l in resolving such a diff

icult issue, we conc lude here that the issue should be dec ided in the context of a summary

judgme nt motion rather than at the pleadingstag e.” Id. at 453 n.2. Following the re mand from this court, Be rrong , individually and in his officia l capa city , filed a motion for summary

judgme nt arguing that his conduct di d n o t s h ock the c onscienc e in a constitutional sense and that he was e ntitled to qualified immunit y . Blount County also moved for summary judgme nt, arguing that Nuchols had fa iled to establi s h any policy , usag e or c ustom of B lou nt C ounty tha t r e su lte d in

the de pr ivatio n o f her con st it ution a l r ig hts . N uc ho ls atte mpt e d to conduct discove ry , but the mag istrate judge stay ed all discovery until the dist rict cour t ruled on the pending motions for summary judgme nt. Nuchols filed an a ppeal f rom the mag istrate judg e’s or der

and mov e d, purs ua

nt to Rul e 56 (f

), fo r a dd iti on a l tim e to c omp le te dis c ov e ry be fo re re sp on din g to the pendingsummary

judgme nt motions

. T he district cour t denied Nuc hols’s appea l of the mag istrate judg e’s or der. N uchols resp o nded in opposition to bot h of the pe nding summar y judgme nt motions and filed he r own a ffidavit alleg ing a dditional facts. The district cour

t gr anted the de fenda

nts’ motions for summary jud gm en t on Aug ust 18, 2006, and re manded Nu ch o l s’s state law c laims. The district court c oncluded that, a cce pting Nuchols’s ve rsion of events, Be rrong ’s threats did not r ise to a constitutional violation because the threats did not “shock the conscience ,” as is require d for a plaintiff to succe ed on a substantive dueNo. 06-6132

Nuchols, et al v. Berrong Pag e 4 proce ss claim. The district cour t pointed out th at it was unable to locate any authority supporting the conc lus i on that the ver bal conduc t at issue in this case amounted to a denial of N uchols’s substantive d u e p ro ce s s ri g hts. The cour t also conclude d that, even a ssuming a violation of Nuchols’s substantive due proce ss rig hts, Ber rong was e nt itled to qualified immunit y beca use the la w w a s n o tc l e ar l y

e s t a b l i s h e d a tt h e t i m e o f

B e r r o n g ’ s c o n d

u c t

. F i n a l l y , t h e F o ur te e nth Amendment claim ag ainst Blount County was dismiss ed, beca use wher e, as here , the C o u n t y ’s liability is alleg ed on the basis of the unconstitutional a ctions of its employ ee, it is nec essar y to show that the employ ee a ctually inflicted a constitutional harm. Given the district court’s c onclusion that no constitutional viol ation occur red, summar

y judgme nt was g rante d in favor of Blount County

. Nu c ho ls n ow a

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t court ’s g ra nt of su mma

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f B e rr on g , in bo th h is i nd ivi du a l and

of fi c ia l c a pa c ity . Sh e do e s n ot a

pp e a l th e g ra

nt o f su mm ary ju dg me nt i n f a v o r o f B l o u n tC o u n t y. II. A. Standard of

revie w The district c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt is reviewe d de novo. Plan t v . M or ton In t’ l, Inc. , 212 F.3d 929, 933 ( 6th Cir. 2000 ). S u m m ar y judgme nt is appropriate only wher e “the pleading s, depositions, answers to int er ro gatories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the

a ff ida vit s, if any , s ho w that the re is no g e nu ine iss ue a s to any ma te ri a l fa c t and that the mov ingpa rt y is entitled to a j udg ment as a matter of law .” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c). “ The e vidence of the non-movant is to be believe d, and all justifiable infere nces are to be draw n in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc

. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Howeve r, “[t] he mer e existence of a scintilla ofNo. 06-6132

Nuchols, et al v. Berrong Pag e 5 evidenc e in support of the pla intiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidenc e on which the jury could re asonably

find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. B. Th e districtcourt did not violate th e man d a te of the prior pan el wh en it granted

sum m ar y j udgm e nt Be cause the prior pa

nel’s judg ment did not prevent a g rant of summary judgme nt, or requir e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a llo w di sco very , the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t vi olate the mand a te ru le wh e n it sta y e d d isc ov e ry

pe nd inga

ru lin g on th e de fe nd ants ’ s umm ary jud g me nt m oti on s. Ac c or din g to Nuchols, the manda t e ru l e, which “r equire s lower c ourt to adher e to the commands of a super ior court,” require d that the di s t rict cour t allow her to c onduct discover y beca use the prior

panel

“ re mand e d s pe c if

ic a lly fo r a re c or d to be de ve lop e d. ” Ho we ve r, the “ ‘m and a te ru le ’ i s a sp e c if ic application of the ‘law of the ca se’ doc trine; as s u ch , a t ri al court may consider those issues not

ex p ressly or impliedly

decide d by

the appe llate cour

t or the prior tria l court.” Tr e p e l v. Roadway Exp., Inc

. , 4 0 Fe d

. Ap p ’x 1 0 4 , 1 0 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g J on es v . Le wis , 9 57 F .2 d 2 60 , 2 62 (6 th Cir. 1992)). Nothing in the prior panel’ s decision expressly or impliedly dealt with the issue of qualified i m m u n i t y b e c a u s e th e p r i o r

p an e l ’ s d e c i s i o nd e a l t

o n l y w i t h t h e d i s m i s s a l a t t h e p l e a d i n g s t a g e . It is tru e that th e pr ior

pa ne l no te d th a t a

mor e de ve loped reco rd would b e he lpf ul. Ho we ve r, thi s Court inMcKenzie v. Be llSouth T elec omm., Inc

. , 219 F.3d 508, 513 ( 6th Cir. 2000), aff irmed a g rant of su mma ry jud g me nt fo llo wi ng a

re ve rs a l of

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s 12 (b )( 6) dis mis sa l on sim ila r f a c ts. The c ourt in Mc

Ke nz ie stated that its prior “holding on a motion to dism iss does not establish the law of the c ase f

or purpose s of summary

judgme nt, when the c ompla i n t h as b ee n supplemented byNo. 06-6132

Nuchols, et al v. Berrong Pag e 6 discovery .” Id. Although the McKenzie court mentioned that the rec ord had be en supplemente d by discovery , the only additional evidenc e in the re cord in that c ase c onsisted of a ne wspape r ar ticle and d epositions of the plaintiff and he r husband c oncer ning the plaintiff’s alleg ations. Id. at 512. Simi larly , in the prese nt case , Nuchols filed an affidavit providi ng additional details reg ardingthe basis for he r substantive due pr ocess c laim — spe cifica lly , that Be rrong was a war e of N uchols’s fe ar of fire stemming fr om a house fir e that Nuc hols survived s ev er al y ear s ear lier. Thus, the district

c ourt ha d in its po sse ssi on the inf or ma tio n it ne e de d to c on str ue the fa c ts i n a

lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to Nuchols, including a cla im that Ber rong intentionally

soug ht to ex ploit Nuchols’s fea r of f ire. Nuchols appe ars to re ly

on her perc eption that “it is implicit from this Court’s opinion in the prior appe al that, i n an egr eg ious case, intentional infliction of e motional dist ress c an be a substantive due proc ess violation cog nizable under § 1983,” to supp o rt h er c ontention that the district court er

red i n g ranting summary

judgme nt without additional dis cover y . Howeve r, eve n assuming N uchols is corre ct in her r eadingof t he prior pa nel’s opinion, it does not alter the f act that the dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s f re e to c on c lud e that this wa s no t an eg reg ious case a mounting to a

c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n. F ur the rm or e , we fa il to se e ho w thi s imp lie d c on c lus ion wo uld c omp e l a district court to permit discover y to proce ed whe n the leg al question prese nted can be answ ere d on the basis of the f

acts as alleg ed by the plaintiff. This w ould a ppear to be espec ially

true in lig ht of the fa ct that a district cour t cannot avoid r

uling on a

m otion for summary

judgme nt based on qualified immunity , espec ially wher e the plaintiff ha s failed to articulate why additional discovery is neede d. See, e .g. , Su mm e rs v . Le is , 368 F.3d 881, 886 ( 6th Cir. 2004).No. 06-6132

Nuchols, et al v. Berrong Pag e 7 F i n a l l y, N u c h o l s h a s n e v e r art i c u l a t e d

e x a c t l y w h a ts h e h o p e d t o u n c o v e r d u r i n g d i s c o v e r

y. See Lanier v . Bryant , 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 2002) (in the c ontext of Rule 56(f) , “[a] plainti ff complaining that the district court g rante d summary judgme nt without allowing adequate discover y

mus t be a ble to s ho w that he c ou ld h a ve ob ta ine d in fo rm a tio n thro ug h dis c ov e ry tha t w ou ld d isc los e

ma te ri a l f a c ts.

. . . Ne bu lou s a sse rt ion s that mor e dis c ov e ry tim e wo uld have pr od uc e d e vid e nc e to de fe a t summa

ry jud g me nt wi ll be un a va ili ng .” (c itatio n omi tte d) ). B e c a us e Nu c ho ls ha s fa ile d to show that she would have uncover ed material fac ts throug h more discovery , the di strict court did not

e rr in s tay ingdis c ov e ry

pe nd inga dju dic a tio n o f B e rr on g ’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. C. Berr ong is entitled to qu alif ied im mu nity because there was no constitutional violation The district c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt to Be rrong and Blount County was c orre ct be c a us e Nu c ho ls’ s a lle g a tio ns do no t r ise to t he le ve l of a c on sti tut ion a l vio la tio n. I n or de r t o p re va il on her § 1983 c laim, Nuchols “must establish that a per son actingunder c olor of state la w depr ived [her] of a rig ht secured b y the Constitut ion or laws of the United States.” W aters v. City of Mo rri sto wn , 242 F.3d 353, 358- 59 (6th Cir. 2001). She also bear s the burde n of establishing that t h e d e f e n d an t s ar e n o te n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i ty. Sm oa k

v . H all , 4 6 0 F

. 3 d

7 6 8 , 7 7 8 ( 6 th

Cir. 2006). Nuchols alleg es that B err ong ’s threatening behavior towar d s h er violate d her substantive due proce ss rig hts as secur ed by the Four

teenth Amendme nt. The Sup re m e Court in County of Sa c ra me nto v . Le wis , 523 U.S. 8 3 3 , 846 (1998), r epeated that “only the most eg reg ious official

co n d u ct ca n b e s ai d

t o b e ‘ ar b i t ra ry i nt h e c o n s t i tu t i o n al s en s e. ’” (q u o t i n g Col lin s v . H ar k e r H e igh ts ,No. 06-6132

Nuchols, et al v. Berrong Pag e 8 50 3 U .S. 11 5, 12 9 ( 19 92 ))

. We fi nd that Be rr on g ’s a c t of thr e a te nin g Nu c ho ls, wh ile sh oc kin g in the g ener al sense, doe s n o t s h o ck the c onscienc e in a c onstitut ional sense; the a lleg ations of the single event do not re ach the level of a constitutional rights violation. Ac c or d P itt sle yv . W ar ish , 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1 s t C i r. 1991) (of fice rs’ thre ats to children did not rise to the leve l of a c onstitut ional vio la tio n) . A c c or din g ly , w e ho ld t hat Nu c ho ls ha s fa ile d to s ta te a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n a nd , th us , her § 1983 c laim fails. Fi n all y , Nuchols’s re liance on the Eig hth Circuit’s decision in Hawkins v. Holloway , 316 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2003), is misplaced bec ause the sheriff in Hawkins had a na sty

habit of pointing loaded weapons at his employ ees, and appar ently pref err ed to point his weapons towa rds the g enital

are a of male employ ees. The acts in Hawkins may shock the c onscienc e in a c onstitut ional sense, but pointing a l o ad ed we apon at an employ ee is a far cry from B err ong ’s threats, which wer e

acc ompanied by

neither a n assault nor an immediate thre at of ha rm. This is not to s ay

that verba l threats or hara ssment ca n not be so sever e as to shock the conscie nce a nd state a c onstitut ional violation, but a one-time, exag g erated t hreat of harm made in a moment of a ng er doe s not rise to the level of a constitutional viol ation, even if Be rrongwas a

war e of N uchols’s fe ar of fire. B e c a us e Nu c ho ls h a s f

a ile d to e sta

bli sha c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n, sh e c ann ot e sta bli sh liability ag ainst Be rrong in his official c apac ity

. Bukowski v. City of Ak ron , 326 F.3d 702, 712- 13 (6th Cir. 2003). III . F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e AF F I RM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

.