MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 166 Docket: Pen

- 16

- 536 Argued: June	15,	2017 Decided: July	25,	2017
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

RICHARDIE	KELLEY

v.
NORTH	EAST	INSURANCE	COMPANY

GORMAN ,	J. [¶1] Richardie	Kelley appeals	from the entry	of a summary	judgment in the	 Superior	 Court	 (Penobscot	 County, Anderson,	 J. )	 in	 favor	 of	 North	 East Insurance	 Company	 on the reach	 and	 apply	 action she	 brought pursuant	 to
24

- A	M.R.S.	§ 2904	(2016)

. The	court	concluded	that the	damages	awarded	to Kelley	in	the	underlying	action, see 7	M.R.S.	§	3961(2)	(2016) ,	were	based	on	a
claim that	 was not	 covered	 by the North	 East automobile	 insurance	 policy. We	agree	and	affirm	the	judgment.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶2 ] The	 following	 facts	 are undisputed

. Teresa Snyder	 held	 an automobile	insurance	policy	 from	North	East pursuant	 to	which	she	was	 the
“named	insured”	and her	1999	Ford	Mustang was	the	“covered	auto

. ” Snyder2 and	 T im	McCann	were	 the	 unmarried	 co

- owners	 of	 a	 dog. On	 February	 21, 2009,	McCann drove one	 of	 his	employer’s	 cars to Frankfort	 to	meet Kelley , who ha d purchased an old	pickup	truck	from	McCann’s	son

. McCann brought the	dog with	him	in	the	car. During	the	transfer	of	the	pickup	truck,	someone 1 opened	 the	 door	 to	 the	 car	 containing the dog , and the	 dog ,	without leaving the	car, bit	Kelley	in	the	face

. Snyder	was	not	present	during	this	incident	and was	not	a	driver,	passenger,	or	owner	of	the	car	that the	dog was	in	when it bit Kelley. Kelley	filed	a	lawsuit	against	Snyder	and	McCann,	for	which	North	East declined	 to	defend	or	indemnify	Snyder. See 7 M.R.S.	§ 3961(2). The	parties to	that	suit	stipulated	to	a	judgment	of $ 100,000

. [¶3 ] On	December	4,	2015,	Kelley	filed	a	complaint	against	North	East
pursuant	 to 24

- A	 M.R. S.	 §	 2904 , seeking	 to	 satisfy	 her	 judgment	 against Snyder through Snyder’s	auto	insurance	policy. 2 After	discovery,	 the	parties
filed	cross

- motions	for	summary	judgment. On	November	16,	2016,	the	court granted	North	East’s	motion	for the	entry	of	a summary	judgment	and	denied Kelley’s. The	 court	 concluded	 that,	 pursu ant	 to	 the	 definition	 in	 the	 policy,

1 The	parties	dispute	whether	McCann	or	Kelley	opened	the	door	to	the	car ,	an	issue	that	is	not material	 to	 our	 resolution	 of	 this	 case

. See Strong	 v.	 Brakeley ,	 2016	 ME	 60,	 ¶	 4,	 137	 A.3d	 1007 (“[A]n	issue	is	material	if	it	could	potentially	affect	 the	 out come	of	 the	mat ter.”	 (quotation	marks omitted ) ).

2 Neither	 S nyder nor	 McCann had a homeowner ’ s	 insurance policy

. The	 record	 contains	 no information	about	any	insurance	policy	covering the	vehicle	McCann	was	driving.3 Snyder	was	not	an	“insured”	for	the	purposes	of	Kelley’s	suit	and	that	Kelley’s bodily	injury did	not	arise	 from an	“auto	accident”	as	required	by	 the	policy. Kelley	timely	appealed.
II.		DISCUSSION [¶4 ] We	review	de novo	both	a	court’s	grant	of	summary	judgment	and its	 interpretation	 of	 an	 insurance	 policy. Cox v.	 Commonwealth	 Land	 Title
Ins. Co. ,	2013	ME	8,	¶ 8,	59	A.3d	1280 .		Where,	as	here,	the	material	 facts	are not	 in	 dispute,	 we	 limit	 our	 review	 to	 whether	 the	 prevailing	 party	 was entitled	to	judgment	as	a	matter	of law

. Langevin	v.	Allstate	Ins.	Co. ,	2013	ME 55,	¶	7,	66 A.3d	585 ; see M. R.	Civ.	P.	56. [¶5 ] The	review of	a	judgment	in	a	reach	and	apply	action	requires	us
to	 first “identify	 the	 basis	 of	 liability	 and	 damages	 from	 the	 underlying complaint	 and	 judgment”	 and then	 to	 “ review	 the	 .	 .	 .	 insurance	 policy	 to determine	 if	 any	 of	 the	 damages	 awarded	 in	 the	 underly ing	 judgment	 are
based	 on	 claims	 that	 would	 be	 recoverable pursuant	 to	 the	 .	 .	 .	 policy.” Langevin ,	 2013	 ME	 55,	 ¶	 8,	 66 A.3d	 585 (quotation	 marks	 omitted);

see 24

- A M.R.S.	§	2904. If	the	language	of	an	insurance	policy	is	unambiguous, we	 interpret	 it in accordance	 with its	 plain	 meaning , but	 we “ construe ambiguous	 policy	 language strictly against	 the	 insurance	 company	 and4 liberally	in	 favor	 of	 the	 policyholder.” 3 Langevin ,	 2013	ME	 55,	 ¶	 9,	 66	 A.3d
585 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		Further,	we	view	 the	lang uage	of	 the	policy “from	the	perspective	of	an	average	person	untrained	in	either	the	law	or	the insurance	field	in	light	of	what	a	more	than	casual	reading	of	the	policy	would reveal	 to	 an	 ordinarily	 intelligent	 insured.” Union	 Mut.	 Fi re	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.
Comm ercial Union Ins.	 Co. ,	 521 A.2d	 308,	 310	 (Me. 1987) (quotation	 marks omitted). [¶6 ] Kelley	 bear s	 the	 burden	 of	 showing	 that the	 damages	 she	 was
awarded in	 the	 underlying	 action are	 based	 on	 a	 claim	 that fall s within	 the scope	 of	 Snyder’s	 policy	 with	 North	 East. See Langevin ,	 2013	 ME	 55,	 ¶	 8,
66 A.3d	585 .		The	policy obligated North	East	to	indemnify	Snyder	for	“‘bodily injury’	 .

. .	 for	which any	‘insured’ becomes	legally	 responsible	 because	 of	an
auto	 accide nt.” The	 policy	 did	 not	 define	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident.” Kelley
urges us to	c onclude	that	the term is	broad	enough	to include	a	dog	bite	that

occurr ed	in	or	near	a	car	because, she	contends,	the	bite	arose	out	of	the	use

3 One	of Kelley ’s	arguments	is	that we must construe all policy	language	in	favor	of	the	insured

. T o the	extent	that we	have	been	less	than	clear on	this	point in	the	past ,	we	clarify	that we	construe insurance policy	 language “ strictly	 against	 the	 insurance	 company	 and	 liberally	 in	 favor of	 the policyholder ” only	where	that language	is	ambiguous

. Langevin	v.	Allstate	Ins.	Co. , 2013 ME	55,	¶	9 , 66 A.3d	585 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. As	with	any	contract,	w here	the	language	of	an	insurance policy	is clear	and unambiguous,	we	interpret	it in	accordance	with	its	plain	meaning. See Cookson v.	Liberty	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co. ,	2012	ME	7, ¶	8,	34	A.3d	1156	(“Unambiguous	language	in	an	insurance contract	must	be	interpreted	according	 to	its	plain	and	commonly	accepted	meaning.”	 (quotation marks	omitt ed)); see	also Richardson	v.	Winthrop	Sch.	Dep’t ,	2009	ME	109,	¶	9,	983	A.2d	400.5 of	 a	 vehicle. Interpreting	 “auto	 accident” in	 accordance	 with its “ plain and commonly	accepted meaning, ” Cookson	v.	Liberty	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co. ,	2012	ME	7, ¶	8,	34	A.3d	1156 (quotation	marks	omitted) ,	we conclude otherwise

. [¶7 ] “Accident,”	 which	 is	 also	 undefined	 in	 the	 policy,	 is	 commonly
understood to mean	“[ a]n	event	that	is	without	apparent	cause	or	unexpected; an	 unfortunate	event,	 [especially] one	 causing	injury	 or	 damage .” 1 Shorter Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 14 (6th	 ed. 20 0 7) ; see Patrick v. J. B. Ham Co. , 119 Me.	 510, 517, 111	 A.	 912 (1921) ( “ [A] n accident is	 a	 befalling;	 an	 eve nt that	 takes	 place	 without	 one’ s	 forethought	 or	 expectation;	 an	 undesigned, sudden,	 and	 unexpected	 event. Its	 synonyms	 include	 mishap, mischance,
misfortune [ , ] disaster,	calamity,	catastrophe. ” )

. We	 therefore	interpret “auto
accident”

— an	 unambiguous	 term

— to mean an	 unintended	 and	 unforeseen injurious	occurrence	involving	an	automobile. “ [ V ] iewed	from	the	perspective of	 an	 average person,” Union	 Mut.	 Fire	 Ins.	 Co. ,	 521 A.2d at	 310 , the plain meaning	of	“auto	accident”

— although broader	than	a	collision	or	car	crash

— does not	 stretch	 so	 far	 as	 to encompass bodily	 injury	 from a dog	 bite	 that
occurred	in a car that had absolutely no	caus al	 connection	 to	 the	injury and
that was	not	even	in	operation

. 4

4 Our conclusion that this dog	 bite	 injury	 does	 not	 fit	 within	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident”	 is bolstered	by	the	current	definition	of	that	term	in	legal	dictionaries ,	which	woul d	support	an	even6 [¶8 ] Kelley	contends	 that	 our	decision	in Union	Mutual	 Fire	 Insurance Company	v.	 Commercial	Union	 Insurance	 Company , 521 A.2d	 308	 (Me.	 1987) , oblige s	 us	 to conclude	 that her damages	 are recoverable	 pursuant	 to the policy	 because her	 bodily	 injury arose	 from	 the “ use ” of	 an	 automobile.
A lthough the auto	 insurance policy	 in that	 case contained language	 nearly
identical	 to the	 language we	 consider	 today, our holding in Union	 Mutual is inapposite	here

. 5 See id. at	309. There , we	accepted	two	certified	questions	o f
state	law	from	the	United	States	District	Court	for	the	Di strict of Maine

. I d. at
310. Those	questions asked us to determine	whether	a	particular injury	arose
from	the “use” of	a	vehicle

— language	contained	in	one	clause	of	the	policy

. Id. Constrained	 by	 the questions	 presented ,	 we	 did	 not consider whether	 that injury resulted	 from an	 “auto accident”

— language	 contained	 in	 another
clause. See id. at 309

- 11. C onsequently , Union	Mutual is not	controlling in	this

case, in which our	de	novo	 review	is	not	limited	 to	 the	interpretation	 of the
“use”	clause	of the policy

.

more	restrictive	interpretation

. See ,	e.g. , Black’s Law	Dictionary	18	(10th	ed.	2014 ) (defining	“car accident”	as	“[a]n	accident	in	which	a	motor	vehicle	collides	with	another	vehicle	or	with	a	person, animal,	or	obj ect,	[usually]	causin g	damage	or injury.

— Also	termed automobile	accident

.	.	.	. ”)

.
5 The	auto insurance policy	in Union	Mutual obligated	 the	insurer	 to “pay	damages	 for	bodily injury

.	.	. for	which	any	covered	person	becomes	legally	responsib le	because	of	an	auto	accident , ” cf.	 supra ¶	6, and defined	 “covered	 person”	as	 “the	 named	insured	 or	any	 family	member	 for	 the ownership,	maintenance	or	use	of	any	auto	or	trailer.” Union	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co. v.	Commercial	Union Ins.	Co. , 521 A.2d 308, 309 (Me.	1987) (quotation	marks	o mitted).7 [¶9 ] Because	we	conclude	that	Kelley’s	claim	in	the	underlying	action	is

not covered	 by the North	 East policy , she	 has	 failed	 to	 carry	 her	 burden ,

s ee 24

- A	M.R.S.	§	2904; Langevin ,	2013	ME	55,	¶ 8,	66 A.3d	585 , and	we	affirm the	judgment. 6 The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Arthur	 J.	 Greif,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Gilbert	 &	 Greif,	 P.A.,	 Bangor,	 for	 appellant Richardie	Kelley John	 S.	 Whitman,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Richardson,	 Whitman,	 Large	 &	 Badger, Portland,	for	appellee	North	East	Insurance	Company

Penobscot	County	Superior	Cou rt	docket	number	CV

- 2015

- 236 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

6 We	 find	 Kelley’s	 contention	 that	 Snyder	 was	 an	 “insured”	 for	 this	 accident	 wholly unpersuasive	and	decline	to	address it.