1994 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-12-1994

Trent, et al. v. Dial Medical of FL, Inc., et al.

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 92-2047

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Recommended Citation

"Trent, et al. v. Dial Medical of FL, Inc., et al." (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 110.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/110
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 92-2047 

 ___________ 

EARL TRENT, and all those similarly situated; EDWIN SNEAD, 

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ELAINE SNEAD IntervenorPlaintiff in D.C.; EDWIN SNEAD, IN HIS OWN RIGHT 

Intervenor-Plaintiff in D.C. 

 vs. 

DIAL MEDICAL OF FLORIDA, INC.; COMMUNITY DIALYSIS CENTERS; 

 vs. 

W. W. GRAINGER, INC.; AMERICAN MACHINE AND TOOL CO. INC. OF 

PENNSYLVANIA, a/k/a AMERICAN MACHINE AND TOOL CO., 

INC.; BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION 

 Earl Trent, 

 Appellant. 

 ___________ 

 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 (D.C. Civil No. 92-04493) 

 ___________ 

 

 ARGUED JULY 26, 1993 

 BEFORE: MANSMANN, GREENBERG and LEWIS, Circuit Judges. 

 (Filed August 12, 1994) 

 ___________ 
Ronald V. Cole, Esquire (ARGUED) 

Suite 2323 

1601 Market Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Attorney for Appellant

Paul C. Quinn, Esquire (ARGUED) 

Steven G. Wigrizer, Esquire 

Wapner, Newman & Associates 

115 South 21st Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Attorney for Appellee, Edwin Snead, Executor of the Estate 

of Elaine Snead and in his own right

Joseph Frontino, Esquire 

Richard W. Yost, Esquire 

L'Abbate & Balkan 

Four Penn Center Plaza 

1600 John F. Kennedy Boulevard 

Suite 1401 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Attorney for Appellee, Dial Medical of Florida, Inc.

Andrew A. Chirls, Esquire (ARGUED) 

Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen 

S.E. Corner 15th & Chestnut Streets 

Packard Building, 12th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

Attorney for Appellee, Community Dialysis Centers

Charles T. Roessing, Esquire 

White & Williams 

1500 Lancaster Avenue 

Suite 206 

Paoli, PA 19301 

Attorney for Appellee, W. W. Grainger, Inc. and American 

Machine and Tool Co., Inc. of Pennsylvania a/k/a 

American Machine and Tool Co., Inc.

 ___________ 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 ___________ 

LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 

 Appellant Earl Trent challenges a district court's 

decision to abstain from hearing his case until a similar state 

court case is resolved. We will affirm. 

I. 

 Trent receives dialysis treatment at defendant 

Community Dialysis Center ("CDC") in Lansdowne, Pennsylvania. 

Defendant Dial Medical of Florida, Inc. ("Dial Medical") sells 

acid concentrate to CDC for use in dialysis treatment. Between 

late 1988 and early 1992, several CDC patients, including Trent, 

were found to have high serum aluminum levels, which could result 

in aluminum poisoning. 

 In July, 1992, Trent filed a class action complaint in 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania alleging negligence against CDC and Dial Medical.1 

Specifically, Trent alleged that the elevated aluminum levels in 

CDC patients resulted from CDC's use of aluminum pumps to pump 

acid concentrate through patients as part of their dialysis 

treatment. In September, 1992, he filed a "motion for class 

 

1. CDC apparently filed a third-party complaint against W.W. 

Grainger, Inc. ("Grainger"), and American Machine and Tool 

Co., Inc. of Pennsylvania ("American Machine"), and Dial 

Medical filed a third-party complaint against Baxter 

Healthcare Corp. ("Baxter"). Dial Medical, Grainger, and 

American Machine have since been dismissed from this appeal 

pursuant to stipulations of dismissal filed with the 

district court, and Baxter was not a party to this appeal. 
maintenance," seeking certification of the class described in his 

amended complaint -- fifty-three CDC patients who have tested 

positive for serum aluminum levels of greater that 100 micrograms 

per liter (mcg/l) since January, 1990. 

 Shortly thereafter, Edwin Snead, who had earlier filed 

a similar class action complaint against CDC and its two medical 

directors in state court, moved to intervene in Trent's lawsuit. 

Snead, whose wife had died of aluminum poisoning after receiving 

dialysis treatment at CDC, sought in his case to represent a 

class comprised of all CDC patients injured by CDC's allegedly 

defective dialysis equipment and methods. Snead's complaint 

alleged negligence and outrageous conduct and included counts for 

wrongful death and survival. 

 In November 1992, the district court granted Snead's 

motion to intervene, denied Trent's motion for class 

certification and sua sponte decided to abstain from hearing the 

Trent case in light of the pendency of the Snead case in state 

court. The following order issued: 

 The motion of Edwin Snead . . . to 

intervene as a party plaintiff is GRANTED. 

 The motion of plaintiff Earl Trent for 

class certification is DENIED without 

prejudice. 

 This suit is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. This case is to remain in status 

quo and the Statute of Limitations is tolled. 

 It is further understood that all 

discovery and settlement discussions will 

continue in coordination with the action 

currently pending in the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas styled Snead v. 
Community Dialysis Center, Inc. . . . . If 

intervention by the court is needed or 

desired, the parties may ask for assistance 

by either filing the appropriate motions, 

writing to the court or setting a telephone 

conference. 

 The parties shall keep the court advised 

of the status of this case and the state 

court action. When they are ready for trial 

or wish a settlement conference all that is 

necessary is to write directly to the court 

or set a telephone conference. 

App. at 185-86. 

 Since this appeal was argued, a class has been 

certified in the Snead case as to duty and breach of duty. 

Although the time period for opting out of that class has 

expired, Trent has chosen not to opt out. Trent appeals the 

district court's decision to abstain from hearing his case. 

II. 

 Initially we must determine whether federal appellate 

jurisdiction exists. The district court had jurisdiction over 

this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).2 The inquiry into 

 

2. Stating that it "anticipates that discovery will reveal to a 

legal certainty that plaintiff will not be able to recover 

the jurisdictional amount of $50,000," CDC urges that the 

district court may not have had diversity jurisdiction over 

this case. CDC's brief at 12 (footnote omitted). Trent's 

complaint, however, alleges damages in excess of $50,000, 

exclusive of interest and costs. Unless it appears to a 

legal certainty from the facts alleged that this case does 

not involve potential damages on that scale, the district 

court had jurisdiction. Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d 

Cir. 1971); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Given that Trent seeks 

both compensatory and punitive damages, and the lack of 

clarity as to the extent of his injuries, if he suffered 

any, we cannot say with any certainty -- legal or otherwise 

-- at this time that his damages will amount to less than 

$50,000. 
our jurisdiction, which we would undertake in any event but which 

is also the subject of a pending motion to dismiss for lack of 

appellate jurisdiction, is more complex due to conflicting 

statements in the district court's order. 

 That order indicates that Trent's case was dismissed 

without prejudice. An order dismissing a case is, of course, 

final and appealable. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callison, 844 

F.2d 133, 134-35 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1988). Even dismissals without 

prejudice have been held to be final and appealable if they 

"end[] [the] suit so far as the District Court was concerned," 

United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 

(1949), although we have indicated that such dismissals may not 

constitute final orders until the party seeking relief renounces 

any intention to reinstate litigation. See Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 

F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991). 

 The court's order is not clearly a dismissal, however, 

for it states that the case is "to remain in status quo," 

"discovery and settlement discussions will continue in 

coordination with" the Snead case, the parties may contact the 

court if they desire judicial intervention, and the parties need 

only "write directly to the court or set a telephone conference" 

when they "are ready for trial or wish a settlement conference." 

App. at 185-86. The order thus appears to remove the case from 

the district court's docket of pending cases but to anticipate 

reactivation. See Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1977). 

Therefore, the proper jurisdictional inquiry focusses on an 

interpretation of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and other cases addressing the issue of 

whether a stay order is final for purposes of appeal. See Rolo 

v. General Development Corp., 949 F.2d 695, 700-02 (3d Cir. 

1991); Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1989); 

Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, Inc., 846 F.2d 196, 198 

(3d Cir. 1988); Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 

F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1983). 

 In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court held that a stay 

grounded in the pendency of similar litigation in state court is 

appealable if it "effectively deprive[s] the plaintiff of its 

right to a federal forum because once the state court 

adjudicate[s] the issues in the case, a federal court would be 

bound to honor those determinations as res judicata." Schall, 

885 F.2d at 104. Under Moses H. Cone, even if a stay order is 

entered with the expectation that the federal litigation will 

resume if the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court, 

the stay decision may be appealed if "the object of the stay is 

to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be 

litigated in a state forum." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11. 

 That is precisely the effect the district court's order 

will have here. It is clear that the district court judge 

expected that Snead would resolve this case, at least in large 

part. A decision in Snead will constitute res judicata as to at 

least the two major issues (duty and breach) in Trent.

3 

 

3. CDC has asserted a counterclaim against Trent in his lawsuit 

alleging that he has failed to pay for his dialysis 

treatments. Snead may not resolve this counterclaim, 

although, depending on the substance of Trent's defense to 
Effectively requiring Trent either to wait until Snead is 

resolved or to remain in the Snead class deprives him of the 

opportunity to pursue remedies in federal court, thus 

constituting a requirement that "all or an essential part of the 

federal suit . . . be litigated in a state forum." Moses H. 

Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11. Since issuing the order in question, 

in fact, the district court has denied as moot a motion to file a 

second amended complaint, thus implying that it believes it has 

effectively disposed of the case. 

 In Moses H. Cone, "[t]he Court distinguished between 

stay orders that `merely . . . have the practical effect of 

allowing a state court to be the first to rule on a common issue' 

(such as an `ordinary delay in the interest of docket control') 

and stay orders whose `sole purpose and effect . . . are 

precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state 

court.' . . . Only the latter type of stay order is immediately 

appealable." Schall, 885 F.2d at 104, quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 

U.S. at 10 n.11. CDC attempts to categorize this case as one in 

which the district court has issued a stay merely to afford the 

state court an opportunity to rule first on a common issue. It 

sees this order as an attempt at docket control rather than an 

action which effectively dismisses Trent's case. Thus, it argues 

that we lack jurisdiction. 

 

it, it is conceivable that even that counterclaim may be 

resolved by a verdict in Snead. 
 Indeed, portions of the order point in the direction 

CDC indicates. The order provides that "the case is to remain in 

the status quo" and that "all discovery and settlement discussion 

will continue in coordination with the action currently pending 

in . . . Snead." App. at 185. It also instructs the parties 

that the judge will be amenable to intervening if the parties ask 

him to do so, and that they should keep him "advised of the 

status of this case and the state court action." Id. In the 

same vein, it provides that "[w]hen [the parties] are ready for 

trial or wish a settlement conference all that is necessary is to 

write directly to the court or set a telephone conference." App. 

at 185-86. Moreover, since entering the order, the district 

court judge has denied a motion to stay discovery pending this 

appeal, thus perhaps implying that he expects discovery to 

continue because the case is still pending.4

 The order's unintended lack of clarity, which has been 

exacerbated by the denial of the discovery motion, does not, 

however, compel a conclusion that we lack appellate jurisdiction. 

Two relevant precedents assist in line-drawing here, and 

comparison with those cases provides the focus for our decision 

that we have appellate jurisdiction. 

 In Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, supra, 

we examined a district court's decision to abstain from a class 

 

4. Of course, this could alternatively imply that the judge 

believes he has no jurisdiction to consider the motion to 

stay discovery because the case has been dismissed. 
action suit alleging segregation in the Pennsylvania higher 

education system until the United States Department of Education 

had adjudicated administrative procedures regarding the 

allegation. We acknowledged Moses H. Cone's holding that, 

although a stay is not ordinarily a final decision, an appellate 

court may review it when it "amounts to a dismissal of the 

underlying suit." Cheyney, 703 F.2d at 735. We also 

acknowledged that "[a]n indefinite stay order that unreasonably 

delays a plaintiff's right to have his case heard is appealable." 

Id. We held, however, that "[t]he stay in this case does not 

have the practical effect of a dismissal. Nothing in the 

district court's opinion or order intimates that the stay was 

intended to `deep six' the suit. Plaintiffs have not been put 

`effectively out of court.' . . . Nor is the case `rife with 

special circumstances which bring it outside the general rule and 

so limit its precedential value as to not measurably weaken our 

continued aversion to piecemeal appeals.'" Id. Rather, based in 

large part on the district court's instruction that the parties 

report to it on the progress of the administrative proceedings, 

we were "convinced" that "this stay [was] merely a temporary 

suspension of proceedings." Id. at 735. Therefore, we 

determined that we lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from the 

stay order because the district court was only abstaining until 

the plaintiffs proceeded on the administrative level. There was 

no indication that the outcome of the administrative proceeding 

would deprive plaintiffs of their day in federal court. 
 Conversely, in Schall, we held that a district court's 

decision to stay a case pending the disposition of a state court 

case was appealable because: (1) there was no indication that 

the order was tentative (i.e., there was no basis to suppose that 

the district judge contemplated any reconsideration of his 

decision to defer to the parallel state-court suit (quoting Moses 

H. Cone)); (2) the district court had instructed the plaintiff to 

proceed in state court and then ordered the stay pending the 

outcome of those state court proceedings, leading us to believe 

that "the district court stayed the suit to relegate the 

plaintiff to state court rather than to exercise control over its 

docket"; and (3) the issues in the state court suit constituted 

the heart of the federal court suit, thus effectively preventing 

the litigation in federal court of a significant part of 

plaintiff's federal case. Schall, 885 F.2d at 105. 

 Arguably, unlike Schall, the order on appeal here 

indicates that the district court might reconsider whether to 

defer to Snead. The court's statements that it will "intervene" 

if asked and will set a trial date or a settlement conference 

upon request imply not only that it recognizes that there may be 

some issues remaining after Snead is disposed of, but also that 

it might try the case whenever the parties (apparently jointly) 

seek a trial date. Like Schall, however, the issues in Snead

provide the central focus of this case, so the district court's 

order effectively prevents litigation of Trent's claims in 

federal court and requires him to abide by the state court 

decision in Snead. (Although Snead alleges more legal bases for 
relief that the Trent case does, the allegations of the Trent

case are subsumed within Snead.) Unlike Cheyney, then, this stay 

has the practical effect of a dismissal rather than merely 

delaying adjudication until completion of administrative or state 

court proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that, like the orders 

in Schall and Moses H. Cone, this stay order is immediately 

appealable and we may exercise jurisdiction over it. 

III. 

 The district court decided to defer exercising 

jurisdiction over this case under the "exceptional circumstances" 

doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 

States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). See Ingersoll-Rand, 844 F.2d 133. 

Colorado River abstention is not one of the three 

constitutionally- or comity-based traditional grounds for 

abstention.5 Instead, under Colorado River, even if a case (such 

as this one) does not fall within one of the three traditional 

categories, 

 

5. The three constitutionally- or comity-based grounds for 

abstention are Pullman abstention, an outgrowth of Railroad 

Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which 

is proper when a state court determination of a question of 

state law might moot or change a federal constitutional 

issue presented in a federal court case; Burford abstention, 

an outgrowth of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), 

which is proper when questions of state law in which the 

state has expressed a desire to establish a coherent policy 

with respect to a matter of substantial public concern are 

presented; and Younger abstention, an outgrowth of Younger 

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which is proper when federal 

jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining 

certain state proceedings. See generally Colorado River 

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-16 

(1976). 
 there are principles unrelated to 

considerations of proper constitutional 

adjudication and regard for federal-state 

relations which govern in situations 

involving the contemporaneous exercise of 

concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal 

courts or by state and federal courts. These 

principles rest on consideration of "[w]ise 

judicial administration, giving regard to 

conservation of judicial resources and 

comprehensive disposition of litigation." 

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. 

C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952). While 

abstention even under the three traditional categories is the 

exception, rather than the rule, Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 

(Moses H. Cone, 406 U.S. at 14), Colorado River abstention is 

even rarer, for two reasons. First, generally, the pendency of a 

case in state court will not bar federal litigation of a case 

concerning the same issues if the federal court has jurisdiction 

over the case before it. Id. at 817. Second, the federal courts 

have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 

jurisdiction given them." Id. at 817; see also Olde Discount 

Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 1993). 

A. 

 In reviewing an abstention decision, "the underlying 

legal questions are subject to plenary review, although the 

decision to abstain is reviewed for abuse of discretion." 

University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 

269 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19; 

General Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Medical Found., 973 F.2d 

197, 200 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 In other words, 

 The determination of whether this case falls 

in the area within which the district court 

may exercise discretion is . . . a matter of 

law, reviewable on a plenary basis. Only if 

we determine that the case falls within this 

range will we apply an abuse of discretion 

standard in reviewing the district court's 

decision to abstain. 

University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 270. 

B. 

 Cases that are not truly duplicative do not invite 

Colorado River deference. University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 

276; Complaint of Bankers Trust Co. v. Chatterjee, 636 F.2d 37, 

40-41 (3d Cir. 1980); see also LaDuke v. Burlington Northern R.R. 

Co., 879 F.2d 1556 (7th Cir. 1989). Therefore, we initially 

inquire whether the Trent case and the Snead case are parallel. 

 Generally, cases are parallel so as to justify 

abstention under Colorado River when they involve the same 

parties and claims. In LaDuke, a plaintiff sued his employer in 

state court and then filed an identical suit in federal court. 

The cases were "parallel" because they involved identical parties 

and claims. La Duke, 879 F.2d at 1559. Similarly, in Moses H. 

Cone and Colorado River, the state and federal cases involved the 

same claims and the same parties, although the defendants in the 

federal cases appeared as plaintiffs in the state cases. Moses 

H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 805-06. 

Thus, those cases, too, were parallel. 

 In contrast, when a federal court case involves claims 

that are distinct from those at issue in a state court case, the 
cases are not parallel and do not justify Colorado River

abstention. In University of Maryland, for example, we reversed 

a district court's dismissal of a class action fraud case filed 

by policyholders of an insolvent insurance company against the 

insurance company's independent auditor. The district court 

decided to abstain under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 

(1943) (see note 5, supra), in favor of a state court case 

against the same auditor brought by the Pennsylvania insurance 

commissioner on behalf of the insurance company and its 

policyholders. Although the district court had based its 

decision upon Burford, we reviewed its decision under both 

Burford and Colorado River. 

 We reversed the district court because the parties and 

claims in each of the two cases differed. The insolvent 

insurance company was a party to the state court suit but not to 

the one brought in federal court. The classes of policyholders 

involved in each case differed. And the insurance commissioner's 

lawsuit alleged fewer legal bases for relief than did the federal 

court suit. University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 268-69. 

Therefore, the policyholders' claims in the federal court case 

were "distinct" from those asserted in the commissioner's case; 

because of this "lack of identity of all issues," and because 

there was "no theoretical obstacle to both actions proceeding 

independently," we ruled that abstention under Colorado River

would be improper. Id. at 276. 

 Similarly, in Complaint of Bankers Trust, we admonished 

that "[i]t is important . . . that only truly duplicative 
proceedings be avoided. When the claims, parties, or requested 

relief differ, deference may not be appropriate." Complaint of 

Bankers Trust, 636 F.2d at 40. In that case, we reviewed a 

federal district court's decision to defer in favor of litigation 

pending in another federal district court. Because neither the 

parties to nor the relief requested in the two cases at issue 

were identical, and because the two cases employed substantially 

different "approaches" and might "achieve potentially different 

results," we reversed the district court's "docket-control 

dismissal" of one of the cases. Id. at 41. 

 In this case, the district court ruled that Trent and 

Snead were parallel because it found them to be "substantially 

identical." App. at 180. The two cases do in fact raise nearly 

identical allegations and issues, and the defendants in each are 

essentially identical.6 Moreover, as the district court found, 

the plaintiffs in the two cases are effectively the same.7 That 

 

6. The Snead case in state court includes as defendants the two 

medical directors of CDC in addition to CDC itself. This 

does not trouble us, since abstention will in no way deny

Trent an opportunity to have his claims litigated against 

the remaining defendant in this federal suit -- CDC. See

supra n.1. 

7. The court stated: 

 The class previously certified by the state 

court includes all CDC patients who utilized 

the defective dialysis equipment at CDC and 

suffered injury as a result. Although the 

putative class defined by plaintiff Trent is 

somewhat more limited, he relies upon the 

same allegations of negligence. 

 App. at 180 (emphasis added). 
Snead has been certified only as to duty and breach of that duty 

does not negate the fact that the determination of those issues 

in Snead will resolve them in Trent. Trent's decision not to opt 

out of Snead8 means that Snead will result in recovery for him if 

the class prevails on the class-wide issues and he is found to 

have suffered damages as a result of the defendants' actions. In 

sum, Trent and Snead are parallel and thus present an appropriate 

setting for Colorado River abstention. 

C. 

 Given that this case is one in which Colorado River

abstention may be appropriate, we now must determine whether the 

decision to abstain constituted an abuse of the district court's 

discretion. We conclude that it did not. 

 

 In fact, the class in Snead had not yet been certified at 

the time the district court decided to abstain. App. at 

177. Subsequent events have nonetheless proven the district 

court judge to have been prescient, for, as previously 

noted, the judge handling Snead has, during the pendency of 

this appeal, certified a class consisting of "all persons 

who received bicarbonate dialysate treatments at CDC's 

Lansdowne facility between January 1, 1990 and February 7, 

1992, the spouses of all such patients and the 

administrators and the executors of the estates of such 

persons and/or their spouses." Attachment to Letter from P. 

Quinn to P. Lester (Deputy Clerk, Third Circuit) of June 30, 

1994 (state court order in Snead granting class 

certification). Clearly, Trent would be a member of that 

class. 

8. Trent states that he intends to move for permission to opt 

out of the Snead class after receiving our decision in this 

appeal. At oral argument, he expressed an intention to 

pursue his case on an individual basis instead of as a class 

action. We cannot assume that his belated motion to opt out 

of the Snead class will be granted, however, so we must 

consider him to be a member of the Snead class as we decide 

this appeal. 
 The factors which govern a district court's exercise of 

discretion in deciding whether to abstain under Colorado River

are: 

 (1) Which court first assumed jurisdiction 

over property involved, if any; 

 (2) Whether the federal forum is 

inconvenient; 

 (3) The desirability of avoiding piecemeal 

litigation; 

 (4) The order in which the respective courts 

obtained jurisdiction; 

 (5) Whether federal or state law applies; 

and 

 (6) Whether the state court proceeding would 

adequately protect the federal 

plaintiff's rights. 

See generally Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15-16, 19-26; see also

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19 ("No one factor is necessarily 

determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into 

account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the 

combination of factors counselling against that exercise is 

required. . . . Only the clearest of justifications will warrant 

dismissal."). 

 Many factors weigh in favor of abstention in this case. 

The principal reasons to abstain, once abstention has been found 

to be possible, are to avoid piecemeal litigation and to 

adjudicate state-law issues in state court. Cf. DeCisneros v. 

Younger, 871 F.2d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 1989). Here, state rather 

than federal law is at issue, and piecemeal litigation might 
result if the district court presided over Trent while Snead was 

progressing through the state court system. Moreover, the class 

certified in Snead is broader than that asserted in Trent. Snead

thus will resolve more individuals' claims than Trent would; it 

makes more sense to resolve common issues in a setting which will 

dispose of the most claims. Finally, Snead was filed before 

Trent and, more importantly under Moses H. Cone, it appears as if 

Snead has invested more time into substantive work and discovery 

in his case. See App. at 32. 

 In sum, because the parties agree that there is no res

over which any court has exercised jurisdiction, only one factor 

truly weighs in favor of the district court exercising federal 

jurisdiction. That is simply that the federal forum is not 

inconvenient. This alone, even given the obligation federal 

courts have to exercise their jurisdiction, cannot justify a 

decision to exercise jurisdiction when the countervailing factors 

weigh so heavily in favor of abstention. Accordingly, we will 

affirm. 
IV. 

 Trent and CDC also argue that the district court erred 

in granting Snead's motion to intervene because Snead had not 

complied with the requirements of Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure in filing it.9 We need not reach the merits 

of this argument on appeal because orders granting intervention 

are not final for purposes of appeal. In re Continental 

Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 286 (3d Cir. 1991); Matter of Marin 

Motor Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1982); Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 

506 F.2d 735, 742 (3d Cir. 1974). Trent's and CDC's arguments 

must await the conclusion of this case before they may be 

considered. 

V. 

 In conclusion, we will affirm the district court's 

decision to abstain from proceeding further with Trent until the 

parties inform it either that Snead has reached some conclusion 

but issues remain for disposition in Trent or that it is 

appropriate to proceed in Trent despite the continuing pendency 

of Snead. 

 

9. Rule 24(c) requires that a person seeking to intervene in a 

lawsuit serve upon the parties to the lawsuit a motion to 

intervene which sets forth the grounds for intervention and 

is accompanied "by a pleading setting forth the claim or 

defense for which intervention is sought." Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 24(c).