FILED

Nov. 3, 1995

Cecil Crowson,

Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

JOSEPH F. MANSFIELD, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

) Williamson Chancery

) No. 21482

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01-A-01-9412-CH-00587

DEBORAH ANN WILLS MANSFIELD, )

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY

AT FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE HENRY DENMARK BELL

For the Plaintiff/Appellant: For the Defendant/Appellee:

Robert Todd Jackson Mary Frances Lyle

Nashville, Tennessee Bruce, Weathers, Corley,

Dughman & Lyle

Nashville, Tennessee

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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O P I N I O N

This appeal involves a divorce that ended a brief, unhappy marriage. Both

the husband and the wife sought a divorce in the Chancery Court for Williamson

County. The trial court, sitting without a jury, declared the parties divorced and

directed the husband to pay certain pre-divorce debts and to continue making

pendente lite support payments until the wife received her share of the increase in

the parties’ net worth during the marriage. The trial court later ordered the

husband to pay the wife an additional $4,405 for the legal expenses she incurred

to compel compliance with her discovery requests. The husband insists on this

appeal that the trial court should not have required him to assume the debts the

wife incurred prior to the divorce or to pay the wife’s discovery-related legal

expenses. We have determined that the evidence supports the trial court’s

decision on both issues and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

I.

Joseph F. Mansfield met Deborah Ann Wills Mansfield on a blind date in

August 1986. Mr. Mansfield was ten years older than Ms. Mansfield, and both

parties had been married before. Mr. Mansfield was employed by Capitol Records

in Hollywood, California, and Ms. Mansfield worked for a music publishing and

artist management company in Nashville. She also owned a small interest in a

personnel agency. The parties dated sporadically and decided to marry after Mr.

Mansfield accepted a job in Nashville with Liberty Records.

The parties married in Tennessee on June 30, 1990. Accompanied by Ms.

Mansfield’s minor son from her first marriage, they moved into a home in

Brentwood that Mr. Mansfield purchased shortly before the marriage. Mr.

Mansfield later left Liberty Records to start his own business as a marketing

consultant to various record labels in Nashville. Ms. Mansfield stopped working

before the marriage to concentrate on her household responsibilities. She also

supported Mr. Mansfield’s consulting business.
1The monthly pendente lite support included (1) payment of $1,200, (2) the monthly

payments for Ms. Mansfield’s 1991 Mercedes, (3) Ms. Mansfield’s automobile insurance

premiums, and (4) medical insurance for Ms. Mansfield.

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Although the marriage appeared outwardly successful, it was troubled from

the very beginning. Conflicts quickly arose stemming from Mr. Mansfield’s

interest in pornography and his insistence that Ms. Mansfield wear sexually

provocative clothes while entertaining business guests. Ms. Mansfield, for her

part, was extremely jealous of Mr. Mansfield and suspicious about his marital

fidelity. The parties had heated and, on occasion, physically violent arguments.

Mr. Mansfield sued for divorce in August 1990 but dismissed the complaint one

month later after Ms. Mansfield agreed to moderate her suspicions about his

faithfulness.

Mr. Mansfield filed a second divorce complaint in July 1992 and obtained

an order restraining Ms. Mansfield from harassing him and from destroying or

dissipating marital assets. Ms. Mansfield counterclaimed for divorce in February

1993. A short time later, Ms. Mansfield and her son moved out of the marital

home. Ms. Mansfield requested the trial court’s permission to remove furnishings

from the house and also sought an order directing Mr. Mansfield to provide her

with funds to establish a separate residence. On April 19, 1993, the trial court

entered an order directing Mr. Mansfield to pay Ms. Mansfield $5,200 to establish

a separate residence and permitting Ms. Mansfield to enter the home to remove

specific household furnishings.

Preparation for trial was delayed because Mr. Mansfield and his lawyer

refused to respond to Ms. Mansfield’s discovery requests. In September 1993 Ms.

Mansfield requested pendente lite support and an order directing Mr. Mansfield

to complete discovery. Mr. Mansfield retained new counsel, and on October 11,

1993, the trial court directed Mr. Mansfield to complete his responses to Ms.

Mansfield’s discovery requests and to pay Ms. Mansfield pendente lite support for

five months.1
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On the day following the entry of the order granting Ms. Mansfield

pendente lite support, Mr. Mansfield petitioned to hold Ms. Mansfield in criminal

contempt for three violations of the July 1992 restraining order. In December

1993, the trial court found that Ms. Mansfield had violated the restraining order

on two occasions and imposed two concurrent 10-day sentences on her. The trial

court suspended the sentences and placed Ms. Mansfield on unsupervised

probation.

Ms. Mansfield changed lawyers in February 1994. The trial court

eventually heard the proof in the divorce case over five days in late March and

early April 1994. In a final divorce decree filed on May 2, 1994, the trial court

declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b) (1991).

It awarded Ms. Mansfield her 1991 Mercedes as well as $75,000 representing her

share of the increase of the parties’ combined net worth during the marriage. The

trial court also directed Mr. Mansfield to be responsible for all debts incurred prior

to October 11, 1993, except for the debt related to Ms. Mansfield’s automobile,

and ordered Mr. Mansfield to continue paying Ms. Mansfield $1,200 per month

and to continue making her automobile payments until he had paid the $75,000

judgment.

In addition to adjudicating the financial matters relating to the divorce, the

trial court awarded Ms. Mansfield reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred to compel

Mr. Mansfield to comply with the discovery rules but directed that the award be

reduced by the attorneys’ fees Mr. Mansfield incurred with regard to the contempt

proceedings against Ms. Mansfield. The trial court conducted another hearing on

the attorneys’ fees issue in June 1994 and filed an order on July 13, 1994,

directing Mr. Mansfield to pay Ms. Mansfield an additional $4,405 “as the

expense of enforcement of discovery issues during the divorce proceedings.”

II.

We turn first to the award of $4,405 to Ms. Mansfield for the legal expenses

she incurred to compel Mr. Mansfield to comply with the discovery rules. Mr.
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Mansfield takes issue with this award because it included services not directly

related to the preparation and presentation of the September 1993 motion to

compel and because the proof supporting the request for these fees was not

sufficiently detailed. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate

against the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Mansfield is entitled to receive an

additional $4,405 because of Mr. Mansfield’s failure to respond to her timely and

proper discovery requests.

A.

Two months after Mr. Mansfield filed his divorce complaint, Ms.

Mansfield’s lawyer prepared and served interrogatories and a request for

production of documents on Mr. Mansfield. This discovery involved the financial

aspects of the parties’ marriage and sought routine information that would provide

a complete picture of the parties’ financial position for use in negotiations or trial.

Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer did not press for responses to these requests after Mr.

Mansfield’s attorney informed him that the parties were discussing a possible

reconciliation. 

Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer renewed his requests for discovery in January 1993

after his client informed him that reconciliation was not possible. When he

received no response from Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer, Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer

prepared a motion to compel Mr. Mansfield to answer the discovery requests and

informed Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer that the motion would not be heard until March

2, 1993, in order to provide ample time to provide the discovery voluntarily.

Following a conversationwith opposing counsel in late February, Ms. Mansfield’s

lawyer prepared and filed an order extending the time for responding to his

discovery requests to March 12, 1993.

On March 10, 1993, Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer provided his adversary with

a partially completed, unsigned draft of his client’s answers to the interrogatories.

He stated that he could not provide any of the requested documents because they

were contained in a filing cabinet that Ms. Mansfield had removed from Mr.
2Although the record contains twenty authorizations, Ms. Mansfield's lawyer discusses

only seventeen in his testimony. The discrepancy is not significant.

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Mansfield’s home. Since Ms. Mansfield had not taken any of Mr. Mansfield’s

financial documents, her lawyer and one of his paralegals prepared seventeen2

separate authorizations permitting them to gain direct access to Mr. Mansfield’s

accounts. Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer mailed these documents to his adversary for

Mr. Mansfield’s signature. Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer did not return the signed

authorizations to Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer despite repeated assurances that he

would do so.

On July 7, 1993, Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer filed a motion to compel Mr.

Mansfield to execute the authorizations. On the eve of the hearing of the motion,

Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer informed his adversary that Mr. Mansfield had delivered

three boxes of documents to his office and that he was prepared to turn them over

to Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer without even examining them. Following a hearing on

July 13, 1993, the trial court directed Mr. Mansfield to execute the releases.

Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer obtained the three boxes of unidentified documents

from Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer and requested one of his paralegals to inventory and

catalogue the documents. They soon discovered that the boxes contained many

records that they had not requested and that they did not contain many of the

records that they had requested. Sorting through the documents took

approximately three days because the documents were neither identified nor

catalogued.

Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer continued to press his adversary to return the signed

authorizations for access to Mr. Mansfield’s accounts. In early August 1993, he

sent Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer a two page list of missing documents. After

receiving no satisfactory response, Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer filed a motion to

compel Mr. Mansfield to comply with the prior discovery orders and to recover

sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, forMr.Mansfield’s failure to comply with the

earlier discovery orders.
3Sixteen of these hours represented work by Ms. Mansfield’s former lawyer, and 60.25

of these hours represented work performed by the lawyer’s paralegal.

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Mr. Mansfield retained new lawyers shortly thereafter. His new lawyers

participated in the October 4, 1993 hearing of all the pending motions, including

Ms. Mansfield’s motion to compel discovery. At the hearing, Ms. Mansfield’s

lawyer presented an affidavit stating that prior to October 4, 1993, he had

expended 7.75 hours in connection with the efforts to obtain discovery from Mr.

Mansfield and that his paralegal had spent fifteen hours for the same purpose. On

October 11, 1993, the trial court directed Mr. Mansfield to provide Ms. Mansfield

with copies of all his financial documents and ordered Ms. Mansfield to provide

Mr. Mansfield with a “master list of missing documents.” The trial court took Ms.

Mansfield’s request for sanctions for failure to respond to her discovery requests

under advisement.

Mr. Mansfield’s responsiveness to Ms. Mansfield’s discovery requests

improved dramatically after he changed lawyers. However, a paralegal working

for Ms. Mansfield’s lawyer was required to spend a significant amount of time

after the October 1993 hearing reconciling the contents of the three boxes of

documents with Mr. Mansfield’s discovery responses and preparing the “master

list of missing documents” ordered by the trial court.

Based on the evidence presented at the divorce hearing, the trial court

issued a memorandum opinion concluding that Ms. Mansfield was entitled to

reasonable attorneys’ fees relating to compelling Mr. Mansfield to comply with

the discovery rules but that this recovery should be reduced by the attorneys’ fees

Mr. Mansfield incurred in prosecuting the criminal contempt charges against Ms.

Mansfield. The trial court left the parties to negotiate the amount of this award but

left open the possibility of another hearing if they could not agree.

The trial court conducted another hearing when the parties reached an

impasse on the amount of attorneys' fees. Ms. Mansfield’s former lawyer stated

that he and his paralegal spent 80.253 hours relating to their efforts to obtain and
4Ms. Mansfield’s former lawyer stated that his regular rate was $150 per hour and that

his paralegal’s hourly rate was $65 per hour. The total cost of the lawyer’s time was $2,400 (16

hrs. × $150), and the total cost of the paralegal’s time was $4,176.25 (64.25 hrs. × $65).

5Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer stated that he devoted 12.6 hours to the contempt proceedings

and that his normal rate was $125 per hour.

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decipher Mr. Mansfield’s discovery responses and that the total billings for these

services was $6,576.25.4 Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer stated that his bill for the

services connected with the contempt proceeding was $1,575.5 He also took issue

with the amount of Ms. Mansfield’s attorneys’ fees because they were not

documented in adequate detail and because they included time that ordinarily

would have been spent even if Mr. Mansfield’s discovery responses had not been

dilatory and inadequate. The trial court reduced Ms. Mansfield’s requested fees

to $5,580 and Mr. Mansfield’s requested fees to $1,175 and accordingly awarded

Ms. Mansfield $4,405. 

B.

The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure promote the discovery of relevant,

non-privileged information prior to trial. Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d 783, 786

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Wright v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 789 S.W.2d 911, 915

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Proper discovery promotes economy and efficiency by

helping to identify and narrow the issues for trial. See Airline Constr., Inc. v.

Barr, 807 S.W.2d 247, 263 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). It also does away with trial by

ambush by eliminating the element of surprise. Hood v. Roadtec, Inc., 785

S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Ingram v. Phillips, 684 S.W.2d 954, 958

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). 

Trial courts have broad authority in discovery matters, including the scope

of discovery, Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 416 (Tenn. 1992), the time

permitted for discovery, Payne v. Ramsey, 591 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tenn. 1979);

Masters v. Rishton, 863 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), and the

imposition of sanctions for abuse of discovery. Brooks v. United Uniform Co.,

682 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. 1984). Decisions with regard to these matters are

discretionary.
6Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(D).

7Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(A).

8Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(C).

9Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(C).

10Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02.

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The discovery rules would be ineffectual if courts did not have the authority

to impose sanctions for their abuse. 8A Charles A. Wright, et al. Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2281 (2d ed. 1994). Thus, the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure authorize serious sanctions against persons who seek to evade or thwart

full and candid discovery, including being found in contempt,6

 having designated

facts be taken as established,7 striking pleadings,8 dismissing an action or claim

or granting a judgment by default,9 or assessing expenses and attorneys’ fees.10

These sanctions serve a three-fold purpose: (1) to secure a party’s compliance with

the discovery rules, (2) to deter other litigants from violating the discovery rules,

and (3) to punish parties who violate the discovery rules. Electronic Data Sys.

Corp. v. Tyson, 862 S.W.2d 728, 735 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). Monetary sanctions

serve the additional purpose of providing compensation for the expenses caused

by the inappropriate conduct. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440,

1453 (11th Cir. 1985).

The authority to impose sanctions for abuse of the discovery process derives

from the rules and the court’s inherent powers. Lyle v. Exxon Corp., 746 S.W.2d

694, 698-99 (Tenn. 1988); Strickland v. Strickland, 618 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1981). Courts may fashion sanctions that are commensurate with a

party’s conduct. Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d at 787. Monetary sanctions are now

the most common sanction for discovery abuse. When monetary sanctions include

legal expenses, the appropriate amount of legal expenses should be determined

using the relevant portions of Tenn. S. Ct. R. 8, DR 2-106(B), the rule generally

used by courts when they are required to award reasonable attorneys’ fees.

C.
11Clients are not bound by their lawyer’s agreement to dismiss their suit with prejudice

unless they have authorized or acquiesced in the dismissal. Absar v. Jones, 833 S.W.2d 86, 89

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

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Mr. Mansfield does not deny that discovery abuses occurred between

January and October 1993. He asserts, however, that monetary sanctions were not

warranted because (1) his former lawyer was responsible for the abuses, (2) Ms.

Mansfield did not adequately document her claimed expenses, and (3) Ms.

Mansfield’s claimed expenses involved routine discovery matters, not just the

costs incident to the preparation and presentation of the September 1993 motion

to compel. We find little merit in these claims.

CLIENT’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYER’S CONDUCT

Mr. Mansfield attempts to avoid the monetary sanctions by laying the

responsibility for the discovery abuses at his former lawyer’s feet. We will not

permit him to distance himself from his former lawyer because the record indicates

that he was not completely innocent with regard to the untimely and incomplete

interrogatories, the failure to return the signed authorizations to gain access to his

financial records, and the failure to respond timely and appropriately to the request

for production of documents.

Clients in civil proceedings cannot easily avoid the consequences of actions

of their voluntarily chosen attorneys. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34,

82 S. Ct. 1386, 1390 (1962); Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 470 N.W.2d 859,

867-68 (Wis. 1991). Except for certain circumstances not at issue here,11 a

lawyer’s conduct during the course of litigation is attributable to and binding on

his or her client. Hart v. First Nat’l Bank, 690 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1985). Thus, our courts have found that clients are responsible for the manner in

which their lawyer initiated a bad check case, Coffee v. Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc.,

795 S.W.2d 656, 659-60 (Tenn. 1990), and for their lawyer’s failure to pursue

adequate discovery and to insist on a jury trial. Memphis Bd. of Realtors v. Cohen,

786 S.W.2d 951, 952-53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). 
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Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02 permit imposing

monetary sanctions for discovery abuse against a party, the party’s lawyer, or both.

These sanctions must relate directly to the particular type of abuse involved in the

case and must not be excessive. The punishment, in other words, must fit the

crime and must be visited upon the criminal. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court

of Texas has noted,

The trial court must at least attempt to determine

whether the offensive conduct is attributable to counsel

only, or to the party only, or to both. This we recognize

will not be an easy matter in many instances. On the

one hand, a lawyer cannot shield his [or her] client from

sanctions; a party must bear some responsibility for its

counsel’s discovery abuses when it is or should be

aware of counsel’s conduct and the violation of

discovery rules. On the other hand, a party should not

be punished for counsel’s conduct in which it is not

implicated apart from having entrusted to counsel its

legal representation.

Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).

The root cause of the discovery problems in this case was Mr. Mansfield’s

insistence throughout most of 1993 that he could not comply with Ms. Mansfield’s

discovery requests because she had taken a filing cabinet containing his financial

records. Ms. Mansfield repeatedly denied taking any of Mr. Mansfield’s records,

and her denial was substantiated in July 1993 when Mr. Mansfield turned over

three boxes containing many of the requested records. The fact that Mr. Mansfield

insisted that he did not have records that were actually in his possession warrants

concluding that he was directly responsible for many of the discovery delays and

that he was aware of his former lawyer’s inadequate responses to Ms. Mansfield’s

discovery requests.

DOCUMENTATION OF THE LEGAL EXPENSES

Mr. Mansfield also argues that the trial court should have denied Ms.

Mansfield’s claim for monetary sanctions because she did not present adequate

proof of the additional legal expenses she incurred as a result of the discovery
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abuse. He bases his argument on this court’s unpublished opinion in Gentry v.

Gentry, App. No. 85-318-II, slip op. at 11-12, 11 T.A.M. 50-8, 1 T.F.L.L. 3-8

(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1986) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) wherein

we vacated an award of attorneys' fees in a divorce case because of the absence of

a fully developed record containing evidence of the nature of the services

rendered, the time spent rendering them, or any of the other factors listed in Tenn.

S. Ct. R. 8, DR 2-106(B). 

Mr. Mansfield’s brief accurately states the rationale of the Gentry v. Gentry

decision, but it does not go far enough because Gentry v. Gentry is no longer

controlling precedent in Tennessee. Two years after the Gentry decision, the

Tennessee Supreme Court held that a fully developed record of the nature of the

services rendered was not a prerequisite to an award of attorneys’ fees and that

trial courts could make proper attorneys’ fee awards based on their familiarity with

the case and with the factors in Tenn. S. Ct. R. 8, DR 2-106(B). Kahn v. Kahn,

756 S.W.2d 685, 696-97 (Tenn. 1988).

The trial judge who imposed the monetary sanctions in this case presided

at the divorce trial and was also involved with portions of the pre-trial discovery

squabbles. In addition, the parties participated in a hearing during which Ms.

Mansfield’s former lawyer was examined and cross-examined at length

concerning the cost of the additional work required by the discovery abuses. The

lawyer also provided an itemized statement detailing all the services provided

from October 1991 through January 1994. The statement contained a description

of each service and the date on which it was rendered. It also contained the total

number of hours spent but did not break down the time required for each particular

service. The statement of services rendered and Ms. Mansfield’s former lawyer’s

testimony enabled the trial court to identify the additional services required by the

discovery abuse, to determine the reasonable amount of time these services

required, and to calculate their cost. Accordingly, we find that the trial court had

before it sufficient evidence to assess a financial sanction against Mr. Mansfield.
12Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 899 (8th Cir. 1978).

13In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613, 621 (N.D.

Ill. 1981).

14United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d at 911.

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SERVICES BEYOND THOSE NORMALLY REQUIRED

As a final matter, Mr. Mansfield insists that the monetary sanctions require

him to reimburse Ms. Mansfield for legal services she would have received even

if he had not impeded the discovery process and that the sanctions should include

only reasonable attorneys’ fees incident to the preparation, filing, and presentation

of the motion to compel. This argument reflects an inappropriately narrow

understanding of the trial court’s authority to impose monetary sanctions for

discovery abuse.

The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the

appropriateness of monetary sanctions. Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 323

(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906,

910-11 (9th Cir. 1986). While Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4) is limited to the expenses

incurred in obtaining an order compelling discovery, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02

broadly extends to all “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by

the failure [to comply with the discovery order].” The “reasonable expenses”

contemplated by the rule include the expenses required to employ other means to

obtain the information sought to be discovered. Thus, federal courts, applying a

rule substantially identical to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02, have imposed sanctions for

(1) the costs of taking a second deposition when a party improperly refuses to file

the first deposition,12 (2) the costs of taking a deposition after a party improperly

destroyed a report,

13 and (3) the costs stemming from a lawyer's discouraging

witnesses to provide documents.14

Ms. Mansfield incurred additional legal expenses because of Mr.

Mansfield’s refusal to provide appropriate responses to her interrogatories and her

request for production of documents. These expenses relate to (1) drafting and

presenting the three motions to compel, (2) drafting the orders granting the
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motions to compel, (3) preparing and presenting the authorizations to obtain

access to Mr. Mansfield’s accounts after he refused to produce his financial

records, (4) examining and cataloguing the three boxes of unsorted documents

belatedly provided by Mr. Mansfield, and (5) preparing the master list of missing

documents ordered by the trial court. Ms. Mansfield’s evidence amply

documented the cost of these services and provided the trial court with an ample

evidentiary basis to determine the reasonableness of the claimed expenses in light

of Tenn. S. Ct. R. 8, DR 2-106(B). We find that the record supports the trial

court’s decision that Ms. Mansfield incurred $5,580 in additional legal expenses

because of the discovery abuses attributable to Mr. Mansfield and his former

lawyer.

III.

Mr. Mansfield also takes issue with the trial court’s decision to require him

to be responsible for approximately $11,955 of debts Ms. Mansfield incurred

between the time she and her son moved out of the marital home and the date she

began to receive alimony pendente lite. He insists that these debts were

“excessive, unreasonable, and uncontrolled” and that requiring him to pay them

would be inequitable. We disagree.

A.

The Mansfields continued to live in the marital home after Mr. Mansfield

filed for divorce in July 1992. Ms. Mansfield and her son moved out of the home

in March 1993, and one month later she requested the trial court’s permission to

remove certain household furnishings from her former residence and also

requested 

an order directing Mr. Mansfield to provide her additional funds to help her

establish a separate household. The trial court ordered Mr. Mansfield to pay Ms.

Mansfield $5,200 to help defray her moving expenses and other expenses related

to establishing a separate household.
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Ms. Mansfield also purchased on credit approximately $11,955 worth of

additional furnishings, appliances, and clothing. After she lost her job with

Greenwood Music in August 1993, she requested the trial court to order Mr.

Mansfield to pay her alimony pendente lite and to provide her with additional

funds to pay her lawyer. On October 11, 1993, the trial court directed Mr.

Mansfield to pay Ms. Mansfield $1,200 per month for five months and to pay her

an additional $2,000 for her legal expenses.
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The trial court divided the marital property and allocated the parties' debts

as follows:

SEPARATE PROPERTY & DEBT

Husband Wife

Assets

1. Premarital furniture ? 1. Premarital furniture ?

2. House $ 453,000 2. Royalty Interests for Will/Clement ?

3. Mercedes 40,000 3. Interest in Alcan Music ?

4. Chemical Bank IRA 12,850 4. Interest in Pride Music ?

5. CenFed IRA 81,925

6. Cap. Solid Gold Sav. 80,965

7. Dean Witter 13,500 

$ 682,240 ?

Debts

1. Home Mortgage $ 323,000 

Total Sep. Prop. $ 359,240 Total Sep. Prop. ?

MARITAL PROPERTY & DEBT

Husband Wife

Assets

1. Furnishings $ 54,835 1. Furnishings $ 12,150

2. Increase in Home Equity 47,000 2. 1991 Mercedes 27,800

3. Bank Accounts 13,045 3. Bank Accounts 645

4. Increase / Retirement Accts. 69,460

5. Increase / Dean Witter Acct. 15,475

6. Handleman Stock 5,625

7. STS Acct. 2,195

8. Woodmont C/C Membership 23,000

9. Song Bonus 25,000

10. Phantom Records Bonus 5,000 

$ 260,635 $ 40,595

Debts

1. Sears $ 5,580 1. Car loan $ 26,000

2. Sears 2,275

3. McClures 1,245

4. Sprintz 2,675

5. Dillards 180 

$ 11,955 $ 26,000

Total Marital Prop. $ 248,680 Total Marital Prop. $ 14,595

Cash Award ($ 75,000) Cash Award $ 75,000

NET DISTRIBUTION $ 173,680 NET DISTRIBUTION $ 89,595
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B.

Trial courts hearing divorce cases are frequently called upon to apportion

the parties’ debts since few married couples today are debt-free. The process used

to allocate debt is similar to the one used to distribute separate and marital

property, Mondelli v. Howard, 780 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989);

Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 775 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), and the

allocation of debt generally follows the division of the property. Hanover v.

Hanover, 775 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). 

In most divorce cases, the trial court first classifies the parties’ property,

then awards each party their separate property, and then divides the marital

property between the parties in an equitable manner. Batson v. Batson, 769

S.W.2d 849, 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). After dividing the property, the trial

court must classify the parties’ debt and then must apportion the debt between the

parties in a just and equitable manner. Hanover v. Hanover, 775 S.W.2d at 614.

Debts frequently follow their related assets, but they need not be divided in

precisely the same manner as the assets. Mondelli v. Howard, 780 S. W.2d at 773.

In addition to the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (1991), trial courts

dividing debt should consider (1) the party who incurred the debt, (2) the purpose

of the debt, (3) the party or parties who benefitted from the debt, and (4) the party

better able to assume the debt. Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 775 S.W.2d at 624.

Trial courts have wide latitude in allocating debt, and appellate courts are

hesitant to second-guess their decisions as long as the debt has been properly

classified and then divided in a fair and equitable manner. Determining whether

debt has been divided fairly and equitably requires appellate courts to consider the

trial court’s allocation of the debt in light of the division of property and the

provision, if any, for spousal support. Accordingly, Tenn. Ct. App. R 15 requires

parties who take issue with the allocation of marital debts to include with their
15Mr. Mansfield’s lengthy brief included a table that included just the five disputed debts.

It would have been better practice to list all the parties’ debts and assets in the table. Including

only the disputed debts does not provide the reviewing court with an overview of the manner in

which the trial court divided the entire marital estate. Ms. Mansfield’s brief contained no

tabulation of any sort. 

-18-

brief a tabular summary of the classification and division of the parties' debts and

assets.15

C.

The debts challenged by Mr. Mansfield were incurred by Ms. Mansfield

while she was establishing a new residence after she moved out of the marital

home. While she was the chief beneficiary of these expenditures, her purchases

were consistent with the types of furnishings the parties had purchased earlier for

the marital home, and the total amount of the charges was only a fraction of the

cost of the furnishings that Ms. Mansfield left in the house for Mr. Mansfield. 

Ms. Mansfield incurred these debts at a time when Mr. Mansfield was not

paying alimony pendente lite, and Mr. Mansfield could more easily repay these

debts after Ms. Mansfield lost her job in August 1993. Because of Mr. Mansfield’s

superior earning power and because he received the bulk of the marital property,

we conclude that the trial court did not act inequitably by requiring Mr. Mansfield

to assume responsibility for Ms. Mansfield’s pre-divorce debts.

IV.

As a final matter, Mr. Mansfield takes issue with the portion of the trial

court’s July 13, 1994 order directing him to pay Ms. Mansfield $2,400

representing the alimony pendente lite payments for March and April 1994. He

now argues that Ms. Mansfield did not need these funds because he paid her the

$75,000 ordered by the trial court in late April 1994. We find that Mr. Mansfield

has waived his opportunity to challenge this award on appeal because he did not

take issue with it in the trial court. 
-19-

The October 1993 order required Mr. Mansfield to pay alimony pendente

lite payments for only five months. Thus, his obligation to pay Ms. Mansfield

alimony pendente lite expired with his fifth payment in February 1994. The trial

was delayed because Ms. Mansfield changed lawyers. Following the divorce

hearing, the trial court directed Mr. Mansfield to continue to pay Ms. Mansfield

$1,200 per month and to pay her car note until he paid her the $75,000 for her

contributions to the appreciation in the value of his separate property. Mr.

Mansfield paid Ms. Mansfield the entire $75,000 in late April 1994 thereby

avoiding any continuing obligation to make monthly payments of any sort to Ms.

Mansfield. 

At a hearing in June 1994, Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer informed the trial court

that he 

could not determine if you meant that support starts for

April, when Your Honor issued the memorandum, or if

it goes back to March. 

And if Your Honor says that it does, then I’ll

advise my client, and he’ll have to pay the difference.

He’s got a good track record showing that he will pay

whatever this Court orders.

In response to this statement, the trial court determined that it had intended that

the payments should relate back to March 1994.

Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) provides that relief on appeal should not be granted

to parties who are responsible for an error in the trial court or who failed to take

whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect

of the error. Rather than asserting that requiring the $1,200 payments for March

and April would be error, Mr. Mansfield’s lawyer simply sought clarification of

the judge’s memorandum and, upon receiving that clarification, stated that Mr.

Mansfield would “pay the difference.” This concession in the trial court places

the propriety of the award beyond Mr. Mansfield’s reach on appeal.
-20-

V.

Ms. Mansfield asserts that she in entitled to an additional award to defray

her legal expenses both in the trial court and on appeal. The trial court has already

awarded Ms. Mansfield a judgment for her additional attorneys’ fees brought

about by Mr. Mansfield’s discovery abuse and also awarded her $2,000 for her

legal fees pendente lite. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we have

determined that these awards are sufficient and that Ms. Mansfield is not entitled

to receive an additional award for her legal expenses at trial or on appeal. 

An additional award for legal expenses is appropriate in a divorce case

when an economically disadvantaged spouse lacks sufficient funds to pay for his

or her legal representation. Ingram v. Ingram, 721 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1986). It is inappropriate, however, when the requesting spouse is able to

pay his or her lawyer either from his or her own earnings or from the assets

received in the divorce. Inman v. Inman, 811 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tenn. 1991);

McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 722 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Thompson v.

Thompson, 797 S.W.2d 599, 605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). The trial courts have

broad discretionary authority with regard to these awards, and their decisions will

not be disturbed on appeal unless they are contrary to the preponderance of the

evidence. Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983); Houghland v.

Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Hardin v. Hardin, 689

S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Ms. Mansfield is employable and has marketable skills as a result of her

broad experience in the music business. She also owns royalty rights that, by her

own evidence, produce income of approximately $900 per month. In addition, she

has received $75,000 from Mr. Mansfield in payment for her contributions to the

increase in the value of Mr. Mansfield’s separate assets during the parties’

marriage. In light of the assets she has received as well as the trial court’s

findings concerning her earning capacity, we decline to award Ms. Mansfield

additional funds to help defray her legal expenses.
VI.

The judgments are affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for

whatever further proceedings may be required. We tax the costs of this appeal to

Joseph F. Mansfield and his surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

__________________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

__________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, P.J., M.S.

__________________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE