No, 68929 

FILED 

JUL 2 1 2016 

TRACIE K. LINDEMAN 

BY 

132 Nev., Advance Opinion 51 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

LECORY L. GRACE, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 

CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE 

DOUGLAS W. HERNDON, DISTRICT 

JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Real Party in Interest. 

Original petition for writ of mandamus challenging a district 

court order reversing a justice court's order of suppression. 

Petition granted. 

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Robert E. O'Brien and Howard 

Brooks, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County, 

for Petitioner. 

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, 

District Attorney, Marc P. DiGiacomo and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy 

District Attorneys, and Ofelia L. Monje, Deputy District Attorney, Clark 

County, 

for Real Party in Interest. 

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BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. 

OPINION 

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, C.J.: 

In Nevada, justice courts "are courts of limited jurisdiction 

and have only the authority granted by statute." Parsons u. State 

(Parsons III), 116 Nev. 928, 933, 10 P.3d 836, 839 (2000); accord Nev. 

Const. art. 6, § 8(1) ("The Legislature shall determine the limits of [a 

justice court's] civil and criminal jurisdiction. . . ."). However, justice 

courts also have "limited inherent authority to act in a particular manner 

to carry out [their] authority granted by statute." State v. Sargent, 122 

Nev. 210, 214, 128 P.3d 1052, 1054-55 (2006). 

In the criminal realm, justice courts are statutorily 

empowered to conduct preliminary hearings for gross misdemeanor and 

felony charges. NRS 171.196; NRS 171.206; accord Parsons III, 116 Nev. 

at 933, 10 P.3d at 839. During a preliminary hearing, justice courts must 

examine the evidence presented, and if "there is probable cause to believe 

that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed 

it, the Uustice court] shall forthwith hold the defendant to answer in the 

district court; otherwise the [justice court] shall discharge the defendant." 

NRS 171.206. 

The present matter requires this court to determine whether 

Nevada's justice courts are authorized to rule on motions to suppress' 

"Motion to suppress' is a term of art which is defined as a request 

for the exclusion of evidence premised upon an allegation that the 

evidence was illegally obtained." State v. Shade, 110 Nev. 57, 63, 867 P.2d 

393, 396 (1994). 

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during preliminary hearings. We now conclude that justice courts have 

express and limited inherent authority to suppress illegally obtained 

evidence during preliminary hearings. 

FACTS 

In March 2014, the State filed a criminal complaint against 

petitioner LeCory Grace in the Las Vegas Justice Court. The complaint 

charged Grace with one count of possession of a controlled substance. 

Soon after, the justice court held a preliminary hearing. There, the State 

called one witness, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Officer 

Allyn Goodrich. Goodrich testified that he supervised the transfer of 

several people, including Grace, from Planet Hollywood's security office to 

a prisoner transport van. Goodrich was told Grace was arrested for a 

probation violation. However, Goodrich did not witness the arrest, he 

never received or reviewed any documents regarding Grace or his arrest, 

and he never learned the precise probation violation that led to Grace's 

detention. 

Goodrich watched as another officer performed what was 

purportedly a search incident to Grace's arrest. During that search, 

Goodrich observed a baggie containing a white substance around Grace's 

shoe, sock, or foot. That substance was later revealed to be cocaine. At his 

preliminary hearing, Grace orally moved to suppress the baggie of cocaine 

because the State failed to introduce evidence of Grace's lawful arrest, and 

without a lawful arrest, officers were not entitled to perform a search 

incident to arrest. The State opposed the motion, arguing the justice court 

lacked the authority to hear and rule on suppression issues. 

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The justice court determined that it had authority to rule on 

suppression issues because the Legislature had previously rebuffed efforts 

to strip Nevada's justice courts of the authority to hear such matters. 

Further, the justice court held that the State failed to meet its burden of 

showing a predicate lawful arrest before availing itself of the warrant 

exception for searches incident to arrest. Therefore, the justice court 

concluded that the search was unlawful, suppressed the evidence derived 

from that search, and dismissed the case against Grace for lack of 

probable cause. 

Pursuant to NRS 189.120, the State appealed the justice 

court's order of suppression and dismissal to the Eighth Judicial District 

Court, again arguing the justice court lacked authority to rule on 

suppression issues. The district court found in the State's favor, 

concluding that Nevada's justice courts are limited jurisdiction courts 

without the power to adjudicate suppression issues in the preliminary 

hearing context. 

The district court remanded Grace's case back to the justice 

court. Soon after, Grace filed the instant petition, which seeks a writ 

directing the district court to vacate its "order ruling that Justice Courts 

in Nevada do not have authority to consider a motion to suppress where 

the State attempts to enter evidence at [a] preliminary hearing that was 

unlawfully obtained by a state actor in violation of the United States and 

Nevada Constitutions." 

DISCUSSION 

A writ of mandamus is available "to compel the performance of 

an act which the law requires ... or to control an arbitrary or capricious 

exercise of discretion." Schuster v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 

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187, 190, 160 P.3d 873, 875 (2007); see also NRS 34.160. "Mt is within the 

discretion of this court to determine if a petition will be considered." 

Schuster, 123 Nev. at 190, 160 P.3d at 875. This court may also address 

writ petitions when "an important issue of law requires clarification and 

public policy is served by this court's exercise of its original jurisdiction." 

Id. 

We will exercise our discretion to entertain Grace's petition. 

First, Grace's petition raises an important and novel legal issue. 

Additionally, preliminary hearings are commonly utilized in Nevada, and 

a clarification on the issue raised here would have a broad and significant 

impact; thus, the petition raises significant public policy concerns. 

Moreover, our resolution of this matter will promote judicial economy by 

ensuring the state's justice courts have a uniform view regarding their 

power to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings 

Accordingly, our discretionary intervention is warranted here, 

and we must decide whether justice courts have the authority to suppress 

illegally obtained evidence during a preliminary hearing. 

Justice courts have express authority to suppress illegally obtained 

evidence during preliminary hearings 

Grace argues NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 expressly require 

justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence. The district court 

disagreed, holding that justice courts do not have the requisite statutory 

authorization to determine the constitutionality of evidence presented 

during a probable cause hearing. Upon review, we conclude Grace's 

argument has merit. 

This court reviews questions of statutory construction de novo. 

Sargent, 122 Nev. at 213-16, 128 P.3d at 1054-56. Statutory language 

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must be given its plain meaning if it is clear and unambiguous. State v. 

Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). A statute is 

ambiguous if its language is susceptible to two or more reasonable 

interpretations. Id. 

First, the rules of evidence apply at preliminary hearings. 

NRS 47.020(1) states that NRS Title 4, which promulgates Nevada's rules 

for witnesses and evidence, "governs proceedings in the courts of this State 

and before magistrates" unless otherwise provided by rule or statute. 

Although NRS 47.020(3) expressly excludes certain proceedings from Title 

4's evidentiary rules, it does not exclude preliminary hearings. 2 Cf. Sonia 

F. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 495, 499, 215 P.3d 705, 708 

(2009) (stating that "where the Legislature has. . . explicitly applied a 

rule to one type of proceeding, this court will presume it deliberately 

excluded the rule's application to other types of proceedings"). The parties 

have not identified, and this court has not discovered, any statute 

exempting preliminary hearings from Title 4's evidentiary rules. We 

perceive no ambiguity here; therefore, NRS Title 4 applies to preliminary 

hearings. 

Second, NRS 48.025, which is part of NRS Title 4, bars the 

admission of evidence that would be barred by the United States or 

Nevada Constitutions. Specifically, it provides that 101 relevant 

2Specifically, NRS 47.020(3) excludes the following proceedings from 

Nevada's evidentiary rules: (1) proceedings related to issuing arrest 

warrants, search warrants, and criminal summonses; (2) bail proceedings; 

(3) sentencing and probation determinations; and (4) extradition 

proceedings. 

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evidence is admissible, except . . . [a] s limited by the Constitution of the 

United States or of the State of Nevada." MRS 48.025(1)(b). Article 1, 

Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution 3prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures 

such that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless an 

established exception, like a search incident to arrest, applies. State v. 

Lloyd, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 79, 312 P.3d 467, 469 (2013); Cortes v. State, 127 

Nev. 505, 514-15, 260 P.3d 184, 190-92 (2011). Evidence derived from an 

unreasonable search typically must be suppressed. Somee v. State, 124 

Nev. 434, 444, 187 P.3d 152, 159 (2008). Therefore, when read together, 

the United States and Nevada Constitutions, NRS 48.025, and MRS 

47.020 authorize justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence 

during preliminary hearings. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 

Procedure § 14.4(b) (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that Nevada's evidence rules 

likely require the suppression of illegally obtained evidence during 

preliminary hearings). 

Justice courts also have limited inherent authority to suppress illegally 

obtained evidence during preliminary hearings 

This court has held that "[a] justice court has the direct 

authority granted to it by statute and also has limited inherent authority 

to act in a particular manner to carry out its authority granted by 

statute." Sargent, 122 Nev. at 214, 128 P.3d at 1054-55 (citations 

omitted). In Sargent, this court held that justice courts do not have 

3The Fourth Amendment's bar on unreasonable searches and 

seizures applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp 

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). 

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express or limited inherent authority to order a defendant to appear 

personally for a preliminary hearing. Id. at 217, 128 P.3d at 1056-57. In 

examining the extent of the justice court's limited inherent authority, we 

focused on whether a particular power was necessary for the justice court 

to "carry out its judicial functions." Id. at 216, 128 P.3d at 1056. 

Ultimately, we concluded that justice courts could perform their judicial 

function without the power to order defendants to appear for preliminary 

hearings because in-court identifications are but one of several ways the 

State can establish probable cause that the defendant was the person who 

committed the crime alleged. Id. at 215-16, 128 P.3d at 1055-56. 

Sargent's rationale, if not its result, is compelling here. 

Justice courts must determine whether it appears "from the 

evidence . . . that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has 

been committed and that the defendant has committed it." NRS 171.206. 

We believe that vetting the State's probable cause evidence is an 

important part of the justice courts' judicial function. See Goldsmith v. 

Sheriff of Lyon Cty., 85 Nev. 295, 303, 454 P.2d 86, 91 (1969) (holding that 

the evidence presented at a preliminary hearing "must consist of legal, 

competent evidence" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also LaFave 

et al., supra, § 14.1(a) (discussing the role preliminary hearings play in 

"screening" the state's decision to bring charges). Therefore, justice courts' 

authority to make probable cause determinations includes a limited 

inherent authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence. 

The Legislature's actions over several sessions support our conclusion 

NRS 189.120; A.B. 65, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007); and A.B. 193, 

78th Leg. (Nev. 2015) support our conclusion that justice courts have 

express and limited inherent authority to suppress illegally obtained 

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evidence during preliminary hearings First, in 1969, the Legislature 

enacted NRS 189.120, which expressly envisions the appeal of suppression 

orders made during a preliminary hearing Specifically, it provides that 

"[t]he State may appeal to the district court from an order of a justice 

court granting the motion of a defendant to suppress evidence," NRS 

189.120(1), and "[s]uch an appeal shall be taken .. . [w]ithin 2 days after 

the rendition of such an order during a. . . preliminary examination," NRS 

189.120(2)(a). 

The State correctly points out that NRS 189.120 is a 

procedural rule explaining how and when appeals must be taken, and it 

does not actually authorize justice courts to suppress illegally obtained 

evidence. Nevertheless, NRS 189.120 plainly allows the State to appeal a 

justice court's suppression order, made during a preliminary hearing, to 

the district court. Thus, NRS 189.120 demonstrates the Legislature's 

foundational presumption that justice courts are empowered to suppress 

illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings. NRS 189.120's 

legislative history further shows that the LegislatureS believed justice 

courts were empowered to suppress illegally obtained evidence. In 

discussing NRS 189.120's purpose, Assemblyman Torvinen stated: 

At the preliminary hearing [district attorneys] 

produce evidence and the court [suppresses] it 

because it was taken without a warrant or 

something. The case is dismissed and they turn 

the guy loose and that is the end of it. With this, 

the State can appeal the case. 

Hearing on A.B. 641 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 55th Leg. 

(Nev., March 19, 1969). Therefore, NRS 189.120 and its history 

demonstrate that the Legislature believed justice courts had the power to 

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suppress illegally obtained evidence presented during a preliminary 

hearing. 

Second, the Legislature rejected bills in 2007 (A.B. 65) and 

2015 (A.B. 193) that would have barred justice courts from considering the 

constitutionality of evidence presented during a preliminary hearing. 

Again, the State correctly argues these failed bills do not confer 

jurisdiction upon Nevada's justice courts. However, the failed bills show 

that the Legislature believed justice courts already •had the power to 

suppress illegally obtained evidence and declined to divest them of that 

power. 

A.B. 65 would have amended (1) NRS 174.125 to clearly state 

that only district• courts can hear motions to suppress in gross 

misdemeanor and felony matters, and (2) NRS 189.120 to remove any 

reference to appealing suppression orders made during preliminary 

hearings. A.B. 65, §§ 1, 2, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007). Legislators heard 

testimony indicating that the current practice in Nevada's justice courts 

was for suppression issues to be heard during preliminary hearings. 

Hearing on A.B. 65 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 74th Leg. 

(Nev., Feb. 21, 2007). Ultimately, A.B. 65 failed when the Legislature 

declined to act on it. 

Similarly, in 2015, the Legislature considered A.B. 193, which 

sought to amend NRS 174.125 and NRS 189.120 in essentially the same 

ways as A.B. 65 (2007). Compare A.B. 65, §§ 1, 2, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007), 

with A.B. 193, §§ 11, 12, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015) (as introduced). 

Legislators' comments largely show they believed evidentiary standards 

for preliminary examinations should not be relaxed. See Hearing on A.B. 

193 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 78th Leg. (Nev., March 13, 

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2015). The Legislature later removed the proposed amendments in A.B. 

193's first reprint. Compare A.B. 193, §§ 11, 12, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015) (as 

introduced), with A.B. 193, §§ 11, 12, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015) (first reprint). 

Thus, A.B. 65 (2007) and A.B. 193 (2015) show that the Legislature has 

not been inclined to adopt legislation that would require justice courts to 

rely on evidence they know to be illegally obtained during preliminary 

hearings. 

In sum, we conclude justice courts have the power to suppress 

illegally obtained evidence because (1) NRS 47.020 and NRS 48.025 

expressly authorize justice courts to do so; (2) NRS 171.206 and Sargent 

show that justice courts have limited inherent authority to do so; and 

(3) NRS 189.120, A.B. 65 (2007), and A.B. 193 (2015) show that the 

Legislature envisions justice courts as having that power. 

Accordingly, we• grant Grace's petition. 4We direct the clerk of 

this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to 

4The State also argues that justice courts can only hear a 

defendant's motion to suppress after the filing of a written motion. 

Because the briefing on that point was insufficiently developed, we decline 

to address it at this time. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 

P.2d 3, 6 (1987). 

Additionally, we note that Grace's petition does not require us to 

examine the merits of the justice court's suppression ruling, and we 

express no opinion on that matter. 

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cs4Arsi... 
vacate its July 31, 2015, order concluding that the justice court lacked 

jurisdiction to adjudicate suppression issues during a preliminary hearing. 

We concur: 

I Wt 

Parraguirre 

TC.J. 

ces-ttt J. 

Hardesty 

ttd 17% Douglas 

Gibbons 

Pickering 

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