J-S17036-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

WILLIAM M. LOVE, :

:

Appellant : No. 2559 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-45-CR-0002788-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 27, 2017

William M. Love (“Love”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his conviction of sexual assault, aggravated indecent 

assault, indecent assault, corruption of minors, furnishing alcohol to minors 

and unlawful contact with a minor.1 We affirm.

In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the procedural history 

underlying the instant appeal, which we adopt as though fully restated 

herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/15, at 1-3.

On October 26, 2013, Love’s girlfriend, 19-year-old Kayshawn Clark

(“Clark”), contacted the victim, 17-year-old B.C. (“the victim” or “B.C.”), 

seeking assistance with planning Clark’s baby shower. The next day, Clark 

texted B.C. to remind her of their plans. Thereafter, Clark and Love picked 

up and drove B.C. and her baby to Love’s house. Upon arriving at Love’s 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.1, 3125, 3126, 6301, 6310.1, 6318. 
J-S17036-17

- 2 -

house, Love offered a drink to B.C., which he identified as iced tea. After 

drinking the iced tea, B.C. began losing consciousness. As she went in and 

out of consciousness, B.C. became aware that she was being sexually 

assaulted and raped by Love. 

Following a jury trial, Love was convicted of the above-described 

charges.2 Love filed a post-sentence Motion, which, after a hearing, the trial 

court denied. In its Opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial 

court stated the following: “Despite raising both weight and sufficiency 

claims, [Love] did not request transcription of the trial. In his appeal 

documents, he asked only for the transcript of the July 21, 2015 hearing on 

his post-sentence [M]otions....” Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/15, at 3. 

Thereafter, Love filed the instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Love raises ten claims of error for our review:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside the 

verdict for the charge of unlawful contact with a minor where 

there was no contact as defined by statute?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside the 

verdict where the criminal statute of unlawful contact with a 

minor is unconstitutionally broad?

III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside 

the verdict where there was insufficient evidence to convict 

[Love] of unlawful contact with a minor?

 

2 Separately, Clark pled guilty to criminal use of a communication facility.
J-S17036-17

- 3 -

IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside 

the verdict where there was insufficient evidence to convict 

[Love] of sexual assault?

V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside the 

verdict where there was insufficient evidence to convict [Love] of 

aggravated indecent assault?

VI. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside 

the verdict where there was insufficient evidence to convict 

[Love] of indecent assault?

VII. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside 

the verdict where it was against the weight of the evidence to 

convict [Love] of unlawful contact with a minor?

VIII. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside 

the [verdict] where it was against the weight of the evidence to 

convict [Love] of sexual assault?

IX. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside 

the verdict where it was against the weight of the evidence to 

convict [Love] of aggravated indecent assault?

X. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not setting aside the 

verdict where it was against the weight of the evidence to 

convict [Love] of indecent assault?

Brief for Appellant at 4-5 (some capitalization omitted, issues renumbered 

for ease of disposition).

In his first and second claims, Love challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence underlying his conviction of unlawful contact with a minor, and the 

constitutionality of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318. Id. at 10. Love first asserts that

there is no evidence [that Love] contact[ed] the [victim] over 

the internet. There is no evidence that [Love] contacted the 

victim through any other means. The only contact [Love] had 

was when the victim was at his house[;] however, there still is 

no evidence that during this direct contact, that [Love] made 

any comments, remarks, suggestions, or questions to the victim 
J-S17036-17

- 4 -

of a sexual nature. There is no evidence that [Love] had contact 

for the purpose of engaging in the prohibited activity.

Brief for Appellant at 11-12 (emphasis omitted). Simply put, Love claims 

that he did not have “contact” with B.C., as defined by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318. 

Id.

In his second claim, Love challenges the definition of “contact,” set 

forth at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318, as overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional. 

Id. at 14. Love posits that section 6318 bars contact for the purpose of 

engaging in the prohibited activity. Id. at 15. Love contends that “[t]he 

only contact [Love] had was when the victim was at his house[;] however, 

there still is no evidence that during this direct contact, [Love] made any 

comments, remarks suggestions, or questions to the victim of a sexual 

nature.” Id. Love again argues that there is no evidence that he “had 

contact for the purpose of engaging in the prohibited activity.” Id. at 16 

(emphasis omitted). Love cites Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 

911 (Pa. Super. 2006), in support. Brief for Appellant at 16-17. 

In addressing these claims, we are cognizant of our scope and 

standard of review:

There is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction when the 

evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to enable the 

fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of 

the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Further, we note that the entire trial 

record is evaluated and all evidence received against the 
J-S17036-17

- 5 -

defendant is considered, being cognizant that the trier of fact is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 718 (Pa. 2014) (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted). 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Love’s first two claims, and

concluded that they lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/15, at 3-7. 

We agree with the legal analysis and ultimate conclusion reached by the trial 

court, and affirm on this basis as to Love’s first and second claims. See id.

In his remaining claims, Love challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence underlying each of his convictions, and claims that each verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. See Brief for Appellant at 18-33. 

Regarding Love’s challenges to each verdict as against the weight of 

the evidence, we are cognizant that

[t]he weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder 

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is 

not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and 

must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them 

equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our 

purview is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not 

shock one’s conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim 

consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not 

a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court may not 

reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice.
J-S17036-17

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en 

banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Our review discloses that the record does not include the notes of 

testimony from the entire trial. Rather, this Court received the transcripts of 

the victim’s trial testimony, the sentencing hearing, and the hearing on 

Love’s post-sentence Motion. No other trial testimony was transcribed. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/15, at 3 (stating that Love did not request 

transcription of the trial, and setting forth the notes of testimony available in 

the record). 

“This Court cannot meaningfully review claims raised on appeal unless 

we are provided with a full and complete certified record.” Commonwealth 

v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). “As an 

appellate court, we are ‘limited to considering only those facts that have 

been duly certified in the record on appeal.’” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 

A.3d 244, 323 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 715 A.2d 

1101, 1103 (Pa. 1998)). “In the absence of an adequate certified record, 

there is no support for an appellant’s arguments and, thus, there is no basis 

on which relief could be granted.” Preston, 904 A.2d at 7. “Our law is 

unequivocal that the responsibility rests upon the appellant to ensure that 

the record certified on appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of 

the materials necessary for the reviewing court to perform its duty.” Id.; 

see also Pa.R.A.P. 1911(d) (stating that “[i]f the appellant fails to take the 
J-S17036-17

- 7 -

action required by these rules and the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial 

Administration for the preparation of the transcript, the appellate court may 

take such action as it deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the 

appeal.”). 

As the trial court observed in its Opinion, “[d]espite the fact that 

[Love’s] weight and sufficiency claims constituted fact-based challenges, 

[Love] did not ask that the trial be transcribed.” Trial Court Opinion, 

10/29/15, at 7. Consequently, the trial court deemed these claims waived. 

See id. at 7-9 (deeming Love’s claims waived based upon Love’s failure to 

have transcribed the notes of testimony of the trial). Upon review, we agree 

with the trial court, and conclude that Love’s failure to have transcribed the 

necessary notes of testimony impedes our review of his remaining weight 

and sufficiency claims. Consequently, we deem those claims waived. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1911(d).3 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/27/2017

 

3 Our holding does not preclude Love from seeking post-conviction collateral 

relief.
/! 

1 

Assault, Aggravated Indecent Assault, Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Furnishing 

On March 10, 2015, a jury found Defendant guilty of Sexual Assault, Indecent 

old friend of Defendant's nineteen year-old girlfriend, Kayshawn Clark. 

Minor, and Selling or Furnishing liquor to a Minor. The victim was the seventeen yearof a Substantially Impaired Person, Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Corruption of a 

Indecent Assault without Consent, Indecent Assault without Consent, Indecent Assault 

Sexual Assault, Aggravated Indecent Assault of an Impaired Person, Aggravated 

Unconscious Person, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse by Forcible Compulsion, 

Forcible Compulsion, Rape of a Substantially Impaired Person, Rape of an 

On October 28, 2013, Defendant was arrested and charged with Rape by 

Background 

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Defendant complied. We now file this opinion in 

Thereafter, we directed Defendant to file a statement of errors complained of on 

("Defendant") filed an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered on May 29, 2015. 

Following the denial of his post-sentence motions, Defendant William Love 

OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Defendant 

APPEAL DOCKET NO. 

William M. 2559 EDA 2015 Love, 

v. 

NO. 2788 CR 2013 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA . 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

( 

Circulated 03/28/2017 02:46 PM
2 

I The case in which Ms. Clark pied guilty is docketed to No. 599 Criminal 2014. The transcript of her sentencing 

hearing was filed of record in that proceeding. To ensure that the Superior Court has a complete record on which 

to evaluate Defendant's appeal in this case, we have issued an order directing our Clerk of Courts to include a 

copy of Ms. Clark's sentencing transcript in the certified record. 

10). We incorporate our on-record statements into this opinion by reference. 

briefly summarized our reasons for the denial on the record. (N.T., 7/21/2015, pp. 7- 

motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, we issued an order denying the motions. We 

On July 21, 2014, we convened a hearing on Defendant's post-sentence 

Defendant at trial, was sentenced. Transcripts of both sentencing hearings were 

prepared and filed.1 

her role in the crimes committed against the victim and who had testified against 

girlfriend, who previously pied guilty to Criminal Use of a Communication Facility for 

motions for transcription of his sentencing hearing as well as the hearing at which his 

constitutional and statutory interpretation grounds. Simultaneously, Defendant filed 

evidence as to all offenses, and challenging the Unlawful Contact conviction on both 

reconsideration of his sentence, challenging both the sufficiency and weight of the 

On June 8, 2015, Defendant filed post-sentence motions seeking 

Institution. 

Section 9799.10 et. seq., and sentenced to 108 to 260 months in a State Correctional 

was classified as a Tier 3 lifetime registrant under Megan's Law IV, 42 Pa. C.S.A. 

On May 29, 2015, the sentencing hearing was held, as scheduled. Defendant 

scheduled sentencing for May 29, 2015. (Order, dated March 10, 2015). 

testimony of the victim be transcribed as part of the SOAB assessment process, and 

assessment by the State Sexual Offender's Board ("SOAB"), directed that the 

Alcohol to Minors, and Corruption of a Minor. We accepted the verdict, ordered an 
3 

I. Unlawful Contact 

Defendant's first two assignments of error challenge his conviction for Unlawful 

Contact with a Minor. Specifically, Defendant contends that the Unlawful Contact 

statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and, in any event, that he did not have contact 

with the victim within the meaning of the statute as written. His arguments lack merit. 

a. The Unlawful Contact Statute is Not Overbroad 

The constitutional analysis is well settled. Properly enacted legislation is 

presumed . to be valid and, "unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the 

Constitution, it will not be declared unconstitutional." Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 

Discussion 

Subsequently, Defendant filed this appeal. In 'bis appeal statement, Defendant 

raises eight assignments of error which, for the most part, mirror his post-sentence 

motions. The first two assignments repeat his constitutional and statutory constructionbased challenges to the Unlawful Contact conviction. The remaining eight 

assignments of error reiterate his sufficiency and weight claims. 

Despite raising both weight and sufficiency claims, Defendant did not request 

transcription of the trial. In his appeal documents, he asked only for the transcript of 

the July 21, 2015 hearing on his post-sentence motions. As a result, references 

throughout this opinion to the facts of this case are based on the hearing transcripts 

that have been filed, the transcript of the victim's testimony that was prepared for the 

SOAB evaluation, the pre-sentence investigation report, and the recollection and 

perceptions of the undersigned as the judge who presided over the trial as well as pre 

and post-trial hearings. 
4 

In Morgan, the Superior Court rejected the argument being made by Defendant 

in this case. Specifically, applying the constitutional principles summarized above, the 

Superior Court found that the Unlawful Contact statute was not overbroad because the 

"statute by its reach does not punish a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 

conduct" and "is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, that being 

the protection of minors who lack capacity to consent to sexual intercourse." Id. Under 

the holding and rationale of Morgan, Defendant's constitutional challenge does not 

hold water. 

b. Defendant had "Contact" with the Minor Victim 

Defendant's contention that he did not have contact with the victim within the 

meaning of the statute requires that we interpret the Unlawful Contact statute. Again, 

the applicable rules are well settled. 

In determining the meaning of a statute, courts are obliged to consider and give 

effect to the intent of the legislature. "A statute's plain language generally provides the 

best indication of legislative intent." Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 

A.2d 198, 207 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad 

only if it punishes constitutionally protect activity as well as illegal activity. Id. at 208 

(citation omitted). The court must determine whether the enactment of a statute 

"reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Ickes, 873 A.2d 698, 702 (Pa. 2005)). See a/so Commonwealth v. 

Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 912 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 927 A.2d 623 (Pa. 

2007). 
5 

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Booth, 564 Pa. 228, 766 A.2d 843, 846 (2001 )). 

The need for strict construction does not require that the 

words of a penal statute be given their narrowest possible 

meaning or that legislative intent be disregarded, nor does it 

override the more general principle that the words of a 

statute must be construed according to their common and 

approved usage. It does mean, however, that where 

ambiguity exists in the language of a penal statute, such 

language should be interpreted in the light most favorable to 

the accused. More specifically, where doubt exists 

concerning the proper scope of a penal statute, it is the 

accused who should receive the benefit of such doubt. 

Significantly, a court may not achieve an acceptable 

construction of a penal statute by reading into the statute 

terms that broaden its scope. 

Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 40 A.3d 1201, 1210 (Pa. 2012). 

839, 846 (Pa. Super. 2012). However, "the rule of lenity itself has limits." 

Penal statutes must be strictly construed. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 53 A.3d 

(2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 970 A.2d 1100, 1106 (Pa. 2009), cert. den., 558 U.S. 875 

the object of all interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and 

effectuate the intention of the General Assembly, and that 

the plain language of the statute is generally the better 

indicator of such intent. When ascertaining the intent of the 

General Assembly, there is a presumption that the General 

Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible 

of execution or unreasonable when enacting legislation. 

Furthermore, the words of a statute shall be construed 

according to the rules of grammar and according to their 

common and approved usage. We will only look beyond the 

plain meaning of the statute where the words of the statute 

are unclear or ambiguous. 

construction, it is well settled that 

(Pa. 2009). In more expansive terms, under firmly established rules of statutory 
6 

unlawful to either contact or communicate with a minor for a prohibited purpose. Since 

The Unlawful Contact statute is framed in the disjunctive. Accordingly, it is 

statute. 

argument. Moreover, the argument runs contrary to the express language of the 

However, defense counsel was unable to cite to any case that supported this 

and that such communication must be of a sexual nature. (N.T., 6/21/2015, pp. 3-5). 

interpreted by the courts to mean communication, typically through electronic means, 

contended that contact within the meaning of the Unlawful Contact statute has been 

At the hearing on Defendant's post-sentence motions, counsel for Defendant 

that Defendant had contact with the victim. 

18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6318. Under the plain language of this statute, there is no question 

"Contacts." Direct or indirect contact or communication by 

any means, method or device, including contact or 

communication in person or through an agent or agency, 

through any print medium, the mails, a common carrier or 

communication common carrier, any electronic 

communication system and any telecommunications, wire, 

computer or radio communications device or system. 

* * * 

(c) Definitions. 

* * * 

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he is 

intentionally in contact with a minor .... for the purpose of 

engaging in an activity prohibited under any of the following, 

and either the person initiating the contact or the person 

being contacted is within this Commonwealth: 

(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to 

sexual offenses). 

The Unlawful Contact statute states, in relevant part: 
7 

the evidence presented by the Commonwealth established that Defendant had both 

direct and indirect contact and communication with the minor victim for the purpose of 

committing a Chapter 31 offense, it is clear that the Unlawful Contact statute was 

violated. 

Specifically, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Defendant had 

Ms. Clark lure the victim to the house. Defendant and Ms. Clark then picked the victim 

up and brought her to their home. Defendant communicated and interacted directly 

and indirectly with the victim both during the ride and in the home. Defendant gave the 

victim a spiked drink which opened the door to the assault that he perpetrated while 

the victim was in and out of consciousness. These contacts and communications were 

part of the set-up and the lead-up to the sexual assault. Of course, during the assault 

Defendant had physical contact with the victim and also spoke to her. 

Simply put, Defendant communicated and had direct and indirect contact, both 

physically and verbally, with the minor victim within the ordinary and statutory 

meanings of those terms. His statutory interpretation argument to the contrary is 

completely devoid of merit. 

II. Defendant Waived the Remainder of his Assignments of Error 

As noted, Defendant's final eight assignments of error are comprised of 

challenges to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Despite the fact that his 

weight and sufficiency claims constitute fact-based challenges, Defendant did not ask 

that the trial be transcribed. As a result, we believe that Defendant has waived 

assignments of error three through eight. 
8 

contrary, Rule 1911 makes it abundantly plain that it is the responsibility of the 

of trial or appellate courts to order the transcription of necessary proceedings. To the 

other parts of the record. Commonwealth v. Lesko, supra. It is not the responsibility 

need for appeal, are responsible to take affirmative actions to secure transcripts and 

contemplate that the parties, who are in the best position to know what they actually 

The plain terms of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, including Rule 1911, 

(d) Effect of failure to comply. If the appellant fails to take the 

action required by these rules and the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Judicial Administration for the preparation of the transcript, 

the appellate Court may take such action as it deems 

appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. 

* * * 

(a) General rule. The appellant shall request any transcript 

required under this chapter in the manner and make any 

necessary payment or deposit therefor in the amount and 

within the time prescribed by Rules 5000.1 et seq. of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration (court 

reporters). 

pertinent part that: 

In this regard, Pa. R.A.P. 1911, entitled Request for Transcript, provides in 

798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), appeal denied, 40 A.3d 1237 (Pa. 2012); Pa. R.A.P. 1911. 

Commonwealth v. Steward, 775 A.2d 819 (Pa. Super. 2001); Com. v. Geatti, 35 A.3d 

A.2d 1101 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2006); 

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Williams, 715 

transcripts necessary to permit resolution of the issues raised on appeal. See 

record which is sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. This includes 

It is well settled that it is the appellant's duty to supply appellate courts with a 
9 

appellant (or cross-appellant) to order all transcripts necessary to the disposition of his 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Williams, supra; Commonwealth v. Preston, supra; 

Commonwealth v. Steward, supra. 

With regard to missing transcripts, the Rules of Appellate Procedure require an 

appellant to order and pay for any transcript necessary to permit resolution of the 

issues raised on appeal. Pa.R.A.P.1911 (a). When the appellant fails to conform to the 

requirements of Rule 1911, any claims that cannot be resolved in the absence of the 

necessary transcript or transcripts must· be deemed waived for the purpose of 

appellate review. It is not proper for either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the 

Superior Court to order transcripts nor is it the responsibility of the appellate courts to 

obtain the necessary transcripts. Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d at 7 (citations 

omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Geatti, supra (Defendant's failure to request a 

transcript from the Court of Common Pleas as part of his appeal meant the appellate 

court could not conduct an appropriate review of the issues raised by defendant and 

resulted in waiver of those issues). 

In this case, Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence to convict him of 

Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Sexual Assault, Indecent Assault, and Aggravated 

Indecent Assault. He further claims that his convictions for those crimes are against 

the weight of the evidence. Because the weight and sufficiency challenges are factbased claims that require our appellate courts to examine all of the evidence, including 

the testimony of all witnesses, the trial transcript is necessary to resolve the claims. By 

failing to request that transcript, Defendant waived his challenges to the weight and 

sufficiency of the evidence. 
10 

(Pa. Super. 1994). 

of a defendant of sexual offenses. Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 646 A.2d 1211 , 1214 

uncorroborated testimony of the victim, if believed, is enough to support the conviction 

Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1236 n. 2 (Pa. 2007). The 

[TJhe facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact 

may be drawn from the combined circumstances. Moreover, 

in applying the above test, the entire record must be 

evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. 

Our Supreme Court has instructed: 

have based its verdict." Id. 

reasonable inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact finder properly could 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and accept as true all evidence and all 

1267 (Pa. 1989). We "must view evidence in the light most favorable to the 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Hughes, 555 A.2d 1264, 

The court must determine "whether the evidence is sufficient to prove every element of 

presents a question of law. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). 

evidence to sustain the convictions. A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

As noted, Defendant challenges both the sufficiency and the wright of the 

Ill. In the Alternative, Defendant's Challenges to the Weight and Sufficiency 

of the Evidence are Devoid of Merit. 
11 

person." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. 

parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126. Indecent contact is "[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate 

(4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that 

the complainant is unaware that the indecent contact is 

occurring; 

(5) the person has substantially impaired the complainant's 

power to appraise or control his or her conduct by 

administering or employing, without the knowledge of the 

complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the 

purpose of preventing resistance; 

* * * 

the person has indecent contact with the complainant, 

causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the 

person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into 

contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of 

arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant and: 

(1) the person does so without the complainant's consent; 

(2) the person does so by forcible compulsion; 

A person commits Indecent Assault if 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125. 

(5) the person has substantially impaired the complainant's 

power to appraise or control his or her conduct by 

administering or employing, without the knowledge of the 

complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the 

purpose of preventing resistance. 

* * * 

[A] person who engages in penetration, however slight, of 

the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the 

person's body for any purpose other than good faith medical, 

hygienic or law enforcement procedures commits 

aggravated indecent assault if: 

(1) the person does so without the complainant's consent; 

[or] 

The Crimes Code defines Aggravated Indecent Assault as follows: 
12 

27, 2013, Ms. Clark invited the victim over for dinner, ostensibly so that the victim 

boyfriend and the father of her baby. Defendant was a man in his thirties. On October 

The victim and Ms. Clark were teenage friends. Defendant was Ms. Clark's 

summarized as follows: 

The evidence, viewed in the light of the applicable standards, may be 

crimes. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318. 

engaging in an enumerated prohibited activity, including all Chapter 321 sex offense 

commits the offense if he is intentionally in contact with a minor for the purpose of 

Finally, Unlawful Contact is defined as quoted above. In summary, A person 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. 

"Sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human 

beings and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. 

The term also includes penetration, however slight, of the 

genitals or anus of another person with a foreign object for 

any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law 

enforcement procedures." 

is: 

slight; [and] emission is not required." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. Deviate sexual intercourse 

meaning, includes intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration however 

intercourse" have specific meanings. "Sexual intercourse, [i]n addition to its ordinary 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1. The terms "sexual intercourse" and "deviate sexual 

Except as provided in section 3121 (relating to rape) or 3123 

(relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a person 

commits a felony of the second degree when that person 

engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse 

with a complainant without the complainant's consent." 

Sexual Assault, in turn, is defined as follows: 
13 

could help plan Ms. Clark's baby shower. The baby shower was a pretext; 

unbeknownst to the victim, Defendant wanted the victim to come over so that there 

could be a sexual tryst. The victim accepted Ms. Clark's invitation and was picked up 

at her house by Defendant and Ms. Clark. The victim brought her infant daughter 

along with her. 

At his home, Defendant spoke with the victim and asked her about her age. 

The victim said that she was seventeen, and Defendant said that Ms. Clark told him 

that she was eighteen. The victim offered to show Defendant her identification but 

Defendant declined. Defendant offered the victim a drink, which she accepted. This 

drink contained alcohol and an unknown drug which caused the victim to feel dizzy, sit 

down, and ultimately lose control of her faculties. 

After the victim drank the concoction that Defendant prepared for her, 

Defendant pressed himself against her. The victim felt Defendant's erection through 

their clothes. The victim began to fade in and out of consciousness. As this was 

occurring, the victim felt Defendant remove her breast from her shirt and lick her 

nipple, put his fingers into her vagina, pull her pants down, and put his penis into her 

vagina. After she left the house, the victim was taken by ambulance to the hospital 

where she spoke with police and samples were taken for DNA analysis. 

Ms. Clark testified at trial. She confirmed and supported the testimony of the 

victim and the sexual assaults perpetrated by Defendant. In addition, the 

Commonwealth presented DNA evidence. 

It is clear from even this quick summary overview of the facts that, when viewed 

in light of the applicable standards, the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain 
15 

convictions do not shock one's sense of justice. 

by the Commonwealth was more than enough to sustain the verdict, and the 

challenges are addressed on their merits, they are baseless. The evidence presented 

waived appellate review of his sufficiency and weight claims. However, even if these 

In short, by failing to request the necessary transcription of his trial, Defendant 

the evidence and this contention is meritless. 

sense of justice. Defendant's conviction of these offenses is not against the weight of 

to do so. Further, the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence that it shocked our 

the other Commonwealth witnesses credible. It was entirely within the jury's province 

heard the testimony of a defense DNA expert. The jury obviously found the victim and 

Commonwealth's DNA expert. All witnesses were cross-examined. In addition, the jury 

In this case, the jury heard the testimony of the victim, Ms. Clark, and the 

quotation marks omitted). 

Armbruster v. Horowitz, 813 A.2d 698, 702-703 (Pa. 2002) (internal citations and 

The general rule in this Commonwealth is that a weight of 

the evidence claim is primarily addressed to the discretion of 

the judge who actually presided at trial. There is, of course, 

some tension between the power of trial courts to overturn 

jury verdicts premised upon weight claims, and the bedrock 

principle that questions of credibility are exclusively for the 

fact-finder. Accordingly, the authority for the trial judge to 

upset a verdict premised upon a weight claim is narrowly 

circumscribed. 

on a weight of the evidence challenge. 

Additionally, trial courts possess only narrow authority to reverse a jury verdict 

footnote, and quotation marks omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (internal citations, 
16 

Cc: Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

r--;» Jonathan Mark, J. c::::i 

3::: ........ 

c..r, District Attorney 0 0 

•"- C') r 

Public Defender (FC) zo c::, rn 

0 --{ :::D 

rn r-o 

;.., 

(.") (D c::, 

c.--:> 

., 

c:: -u 0 

2: 3 0 

-I c:: 

:< r-o ;.D 

-l 

u (J) 

)> G) 

co ts: 

J. 

Date: October 29, 2015 

For these reasons, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.