NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN MANUEL VILLASENOR,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 18

- 72609 Agency No. A075

- 270

- 862

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 10, 2022 * * San Francisco, California Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN, ** * District Judge.
Petitioner Juan Manuel Villasenor seek s review of an August 29, 2018,
decision from the Board of Immigration Appeal s (BIA) that denied his third motion

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

FEB 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

to reopen his 1999 removal proceeding as untimely and number

- barred . Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in denying th e motion to reopen , and that the BIA should
have exercised its discretion to reopen his proceeding sua sponte

. We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
1. Because Petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s sua sponte decision is b ased
on the exercise of its discretion and not the resolution of a legal issue , we lack jurisdiction to review it , and dismiss that portion of the petition. Mejia

- Hernandez
v. Holder , 633 F.3d 818, 823

– 24 (9th Cir. 2011); Ekimian v. INS , 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. Bonilla v. Lynch , 840 F.3d 575, 586

– 89 ( 9th Cir. 2016) ( the
C ourt has jurisdiction to review legal issues decided by the BIA when it declines to reopen sua sponte).
2. We have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s remaining claims under
8 U.S.C. § 1252

. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, giving broad deference to the agency’s decision. See Feng Gui Lin v. Holder , 588 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2009)

. Under that standard, we uphold the BIA’s decision unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law. Go v. Holder , 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Perez v. Mukasey , 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2008)

. The
BIA did not do s o here.

a. An alien subject to a final order of removal is generally limited to filing one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of entry of the order. 83

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner ’s final order of removal was issued in 2002, his third motion to reopen was filed on May 7, 2017,
far beyond the 90

- day deadline, and he has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception applies. Accordingly, t he BIA did not abuse its discre tion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and number

- barred

. See Go , 744
F.3d at 609

. b. T he BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. See Najmabadi v. Holder , 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010 ) (“The BIA can deny a motion to reopen on any one of at least three independent grounds

— failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, failure to introduce previously
unavai lable, material evidence, and a determination that even if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief which he sought

. ”) ( internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
PETITION DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part

.