alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?


C\_2018216EN.01000601.xml


| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 20.6.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 216/6 |

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.8904 — PIMCO/Echo/JV)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2018/C 216/06)

1.

On 13 June 2018, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [(1)](#ntr1-C_2018216EN.01000601-E0001).

This notification concerns the following undertakings:

| | |
| --- | --- |
| — | R4R S.à.r.l. (‘R4R’, Luxembourg), belonging to Pacific Investment Management Company LLC (‘PIMCO’, United States), |

| | |
| --- | --- |
| — | Echo Investment S.A. (‘Echo’, Poland), |

| | |
| --- | --- |
| — | a newly established Joint Venture (‘the JV’, Poland). |

PIMCO and Echo acquire within the meaning of Articles 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of a newly established Joint Venture (‘JV’).

The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   for PIMCO: investment activities, including in real estate assets and services,

—   for Echo: real estate development in the office, retail and residential sectors,

—   for the JV: rental of real estate.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [(2)](#ntr2-C_2018216EN.01000601-E0002) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified:

M.8904 — PIMCO/Echo/JV

Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:

| |
| --- |
| Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu |
| Fax +32 22964301 |
| Postal address: |
| European Commission |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

---

[(1)](#ntc1-C_2018216EN.01000601-E0001)  [OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOL_2004_024_R_TOC) (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

[(2)](#ntc2-C_2018216EN.01000601-E0002)  [OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2013_366_R_TOC).

---
Wesley Scott HAMM, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 19-7986.

Supreme Court of the United States.

April 20, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
Manuel GONZALEZ-REYES, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General.

No. 18-9633

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAY 13 1999

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JIMMY DAVID HARDIN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

vs.

R. MICHAEL CODY, Warden;

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

Respondents - Appellees.

No. 98-7064

(D.C. No. 95-CV-94-B)

(E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.**

Mr. Hardin, an inmate appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. The magistrate judge, whose findings and recommendations were 
- 2 -

adopted by the district court, found that Mr. Hardin had failed to exhaust

available state court remedies as required by § 2254(b). The district court also

denied a certificate of appealability.

Raising the same issues he raised in the district court, Mr. Hardin argues

that this court should grant a certificate of appealability because the state trial

court impermissibly used two prior felony convictions to enhance the sentence

which he is currently serving. Mr. Hardin was convicted and sentenced on May

15, 1992, and his direct appeal was dismissed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal

Appeals for failure to prosecute on May 3, 1994. He filed his federal habeas

petition on March 1, 1995, and subsequently filed a post-conviction application

for a direct appeal out of time with the state district court on May 6, 1996. This

application was granted, and Mr. Hardin raised nine issues in his appeal. 

However, he failed to challenge the use of the prior convictions to enhance his

sentence. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Court of Criminal

Appeals on April 17, 1997. Mr. Hardin has yet to pursue state post-conviction

remedies.

Given these facts, we agree with the recommendation of the magistrate,

adopted by the district court, that Mr. Hardin’s petition be dismissed without

prejudice for failure to exhaust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). We DENY his request 
- 3 -

for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS his appeal.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

Circuit Judge
ET&T HOST PROCESSING AGREEMENT

This Agreement states that Betting, Inc., a Missouri corporation, does hereby
agree that Electronic Transactions & Technologies (ET&T) shall be the sole
provider of of bank host processing for all Betting, Inc. transactions that
are sent by terminals that read cerdti cards, ATM cards, or smart cards.

That ET&T shall charge Betting, Inc. a fee of $0.25 per transaction or 2.5% of
the wager being sent by Betting, Inc. to gaming operators.

That these transactions shall originate from globally placed Betting, Inc.
equipment and/or Betting, Inc. licensed operators.

Tthis exlcusive ET&T host service contract for Betting, Inc. expires on
January 1, 2006.


				Electronic Transactions & Technologies



Dated: April 28, 1997		       By:_/s/  Thomas S. Hughes__
Thomas S, Hughes, Chariman & CEO




					Betting, Inc.



Dated: April 28, 1997		By:/s/_Thomas S. Hughes__
					Thomas S. Hughes, Chariman & CEO
```
 
 
WHEAT - MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE                                   Code-001626
FUTURES ONLY POSITIONS AS OF 01/07/14                         |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  LONG  | SHORT  |SPREADS |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(CONTRACTS OF 5,000 BUSHELS)                         OPEN INTEREST:       60,680
COMMITMENTS
  15,291   11,157    1,010   29,908   35,881   46,209   48,048   14,471   12,632

CHANGES FROM 12/31/13 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:     -1,186)
    -579     -107     -149     -643     -969   -1,371   -1,225      185       39

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADERS
    25.2     18.4      1.7     49.3     59.1     76.2     79.2     23.8     20.8

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:       83)
      22       20       10       32       24       57       52
```

----

Updated January 10, 2014
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent, V. BOBBY D. COLBERT,

Appellant. No. 76714-3 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: April 16, 2018 C) es - 1 CA0 C= 1 --4 c0 7 .2:0 4 7 I
- rt C7 ( -1 1 ./.% rt't (.9) rn 2 31 "

Crt



### PER CURIAM. Bobby Colbert appeals superior court orders denying his request to be transported for a hearing and correcting a scrivener's error in his judgment and sentence. Colbert's court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw on the ground that there is no basis for a good faith argument on review. Pursuant to State
v. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d 184,470 P.2d 188 (1970), and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967),the motion to withdraw must [1]be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. [2]A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and [3]time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses;[4]the court--not counsel--then proceeds,after a full examination of all the proceedings,to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d at 185 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). This procedure has been followed. Colbert's counsel on appealfiled a briefwith the motion to withdraw. Colbert was served with a copy of the brief and informed of

### No.76714-3-1/2

his rightto file a statement ofadditional groundsfor review. Hefiled a pro se statement of additional grounds. The facts are accurately set forth in counsel's brief in support of the motion to withdraw. The court has reviewed the briefs filed in this court and has independently reviewed the entire record. The court specifically considered the following potential issues raised by counsel:

1. Did the trial court err in treating an erroneous maximum sentence on the face of Colbert's judgmentand sentence as a scrivener's error? 2. Did the trial courterr in addressing the scrivener's errorwithout Colbert being present? The courtalso considered issues raised by Colbert in his statementofadditional grounds: 1. Was the information fatally defective for failing to state all the essential

elements ofthe offense? 2. Is Colbert entitled to a new trial under State v. W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134(2014)when that case is not retroactive, In re Colbert, 186Wn.2d 614,380 P.2d 504(2016),Colbert's directappeal has long since been mandated, and the current appeal is from the correction of a scrivener's error? The potential issues are wholly frivolous. Colbert's motion for new counsel and supplemental briefing is denied. Counsel's motion to withdraw is granted. The

2No. 76714-3-1/3

challenged orders are affirmed.

3 For the Court:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION 

XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, dba 

VIVATO TECHNOLOGIES, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON 

WIRELESS 

 Defendants. 

ERICSSON INC. and 

NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORATION, 

 Intervenors.

 Case No. 2:23-cv-00470-JRG-RSP 

 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF JOHN R. GIBSON 

Notice is hereby given that John R. Gibson of the law firm Duane Morris LLP, admitted to 

practice in this Court, enters his appearance as lead counsel of record for Intervenor Ericsson Inc. 

and counsel of record for Verizon Communications, Inc., Cellco Partnership dba Verizon Wireless 

and Intervenor Nokia of America Corporation. Mr. Gibson will accept service of all pleadings, 

discovery, orders, notices, correspondence, and other material related to this litigation on their 

behalf at his contact information below. 

Dated: December 12, 2023 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ John R. Gibson 

John R. Gibson 

jrgibson@duanemorris.com 

DUANE MORRIS LLP 

1075 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1700 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Telephone: (404) 253-6900 

Counsel for Verizon Communications, Inc., Cellco 

Partnership dba Verizon Wireless and Intervenors 

Ericsson Inc. and Nokia of America Corporation

Case 2:23-cv-00470-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 12/12/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 867
 2 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to 

electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system 

per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) on December 12, 2023. 

/s/ John R. Gibson 

John R. Gibson 

Case 2:23-cv-00470-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 12/12/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 868
Carlos German Lema NOGALES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 19-5897

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 15, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Ali MEHDIPOUR, Petitioner, v. Keith SWEENEY, et al.

No. 19-7912.

Supreme Court of the United States.

May 18, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 105 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the mandate that 

individuals purchase health insurance. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 3, 2013 

Mr. GARRETT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the mandate that individuals purchase health insurance. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Reclaiming Individual 

5 Liberty Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MAN7 DATE. 

8 Section 5000A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 

9 as added by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 


PWALKER on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with 
2 

•HR 105 IH

1 Act, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

2 subsection: 

3 ‘‘(h) TERMINATION.—This section shall not apply 

4 with respect to any month beginning after the date of the 

5 enactment of this subsection.’’. 

Æ 


PWALKER on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with
237 F.2d 166

#### Joann A. VAN DOLAH, by Anne T. Van Dolah Gordon, Mother and Next Friend, Appellant, v. Salvatore MELE, Myrtle Hollman and Charles J. Brady, Partners, doing business as The Red Cab Company, Appellees.

No. 14335.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Oct. 1, 1956.

*426Bell, Saunders & Tallman, Bailey E. Bell, Anchorage, Alaska, for appellant.

Davis, Renfrew & Hughes, Anchorage, Alaska, for appellees.

Before STEPHENS and CHAMBERS, Circuit Judges, and BOLDT, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

In appellant’s Statement of Facts it is said: “On October 5, 1951 between 5 :30 and 6:00 in the evening, when it was about dusk the plaintiff, Joann Van Dolah, age about nine years, was struck by a Red Cab and seriously injured. She had been sent on an errand and was struck when she was crossing Spenard Road on Romig Hill near the City of Anchorage at the regular crossing, used by the people in that neighborhood.” Suit was brought by and for the child for damages sustained against owners of the cab business and others. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

Appellant claims prejudice by reason of the presiding Judge’s conduct in general. The judge urged speed but after reviewing the transcript of proceedings we see nothing of prejudice one way or another. Appellant charges specifically that the judge unduly limited rebuttal and denied appellant the right to introduce as rebuttal a drawing by thefinjured child of the scene of the accident. In chief the child had described the scene, there were drawings of it on a blackboard and photos in evidence. It is quite apparent that the introduction of the drawing would entail practically the repetition of the child’s testimony in explanation. The ruling was well within the judge’s discretion.

There is claim that several instructions were erroneous. We have given them our attention and hold that taken as a whole they were clear as detailed and technical instructions pertinent in injury cases could well be. One *427or two instructions taken out of context with the instruct tions as a complete exposition of applicable law would seem deficient. But when in text they are not erroneous.. The court refused certain requested instructions proffered by plaintiff. The points covered by each of them were clearly and correctly covered by instructions given.

A reading of the whole transcript of the trial proceedings shows a careful, unbiased though hurried conduct of the trial. The injury was regrettable but the jury found no liability of the defendants. We think a detailed analysis of each or any of the several objections of the plaintiff to the instructions would serve no useful purpose.

Affirmed.
III 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 592 

Recognizing the religious and historical significance of the festival of Diwali. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 14, 2012 

Mr. WARNER (for himself and Mr. CORNYN) submitted the following 

resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Recognizing the religious and historical significance of the 

festival of Diwali. 

Whereas Diwali, a festival of great significance to Indian 

Americans and South Asian Americans, is celebrated annually by Hindus, Sikhs, and Jains throughout India, the 

United States, and the world; 

Whereas Diwali is a festival of lights that marks the beginning of the Hindu new year, during which celebrants 

light small oil lamps, place the lamps around the home, 

and pray for health, knowledge, peace, wealth, and prosperity in the new year; 

Whereas the lights symbolize the light of knowledge within 

the individual that overwhelms the darkness of ignorance, 

empowering each celebrant to do good deeds and show 

compassion to others; 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with 
2 

•SRES 592 IS 

Whereas Diwali falls on the last day of the last month in the 

lunar calendar and is celebrated as a day of thanksgiving 

for the homecoming of the Lord Rama and worship of 

Lord Ganesha, the remover of obstacles and bestower of 

blessings, at the beginning of the new year for many Hindus; 

Whereas, for Sikhs, Diwali is celebrated as Bandhi Chhor 

Diwas (The Celebration of Freedom), in honor of the release from prison of the sixth guru, Guru Hargobind; and 

Whereas, for Jains, Diwali marks the anniversary of the attainment of moksha, or liberation, by Mahavira, the last 

of the Tirthankaras (the great teachers of Jain dharma), 

at the end of his life in 527 B.C.: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) recognizes the religious and historical sig3 nificance of the festival of Diwali; and 

4 (2) in observance of Diwali, the festival of 

5 lights, expresses its deepest respect for Indian Amer6 icans and South Asian Americans, as well as fellow 

7 countrymen and diaspora throughout the world on 

8 this significant occasion. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with
David M. ROBINSON, Petitioner v. WARDEN, FORT DIX FCI, et al.

No. 19-5661

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Jonathan Javier ALEMAN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 19-5603

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       7,708,793
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               24,106,238
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 21,098,314
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,181,500
<PP&E>                                      56,743,899
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             125,986,605
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       13,179,583
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       259,873
<OTHER-SE>                                 112,547,149
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               125,986,605
<SALES>                                     41,168,378
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            41,168,378
<CGS>                                       21,759,469
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               21,759,469
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               624,387
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (193,056)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              9,611,368
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,120,891
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          8,490,477
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 8,490,477
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .30
        

</TABLE>
Rafael ALVARADO, Petitioner v. Frank LAWRENCE, Warden

No. 19-6347

Supreme Court of the United States.

November 25, 2019

*564Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District denied.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-76,556

EX PARTE RAUL PINA HERRERA, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 61141-243-2 IN THE 243 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

RD

FROM EL PASO COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant pleaded guilty to attempted murder

and originally received a ten-year probated sentence. His probation was later revoked, and he was

sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. 

Applicant contends, inter alia, that his plea was involuntarybecause neither trial counsel nor

the trial court advised him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. We remanded this

application to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
2

The trial court pointed out on remand that Applicant has previously sought habeas relief on

the grounds that he was not properly admonished as to the immigration consequences of his plea. 

However, at the time of his first writ application, Applicant had not been subject to deportation

proceedings. At the time he filed this, his second application, Applicant had been deported, and is

currently serving a federal sentence for illegal re-entry.

Relief is granted. The judgment in Cause No. 61141-243-2 in the 243rd Judicial District

Court of El Paso County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff of El

Paso County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department ofCriminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: May 11, 2011

Do Not Publish
Michael WESLEY, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK.

No. 18-9519

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New York, Queens County denied.