IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-254

Filed 17 September 2024

Mecklenburg County, No. 2021 JT 393

In the matter of:

B.A.J.

Appeal by respondent-mother and respondent-father from order entered 26 

October 2023 by Judge Faith A. Fickling-Alvarez in Mecklenburg County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 August 2024.

Mecklenburg County Attorney’s Office, by Senior Associate Attorney Kristina A. 

Graham, for Petitioner-Appellee Mecklenburg County Department of Social 

Services.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by Brittany T. McKinney, for Guardian ad 

Litem.

Emily Sutton Dezio for Respondent-Appellant Mother.

Peter Wood for Respondent-Appellant Father.

COLLINS, Judge.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their 

child, Billy.

1 Mother argues that some of the adjudicatory findings of fact were 

unsupported by evidence, the court’s remaining findings were insufficient to support 

the court’s conclusions that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights, and the 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the minor child. See N.C. R. App. P. 42.
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 2 -

court abused its discretion when it determined that termination of her parental rights 

was in Billy’s best interest. Father argues only that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it determined that termination of his parental rights was in Billy’s 

best interest. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. Background

Mother and Father are the biological parents of Billy. Billy was born in 2021 

and has two older sisters, Stephanie and Sarah, who are Mother’s biological 

daughters but who have different biological fathers than Billy.2 The three children 

came into Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) custody on 16 

September 2021 when DSS received a report alleging physical abuse of Sarah. The 

report alleged that Mother and Father hit Sarah with belts, cords, and shoes; “tie[d]

up [Sarah’s] hands and feet with sheets and t-shirts and . . . and h[u]ng her from a 

door”; taped her mouth shut; yelled at her; and made her do squats and push-ups; 

and that Mother told Stephanie and Sarah not to tell anyone about these things. The 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”) executed a search warrant on 

the house and located items that corroborated the report. Additionally, CMPD found 

a pit bull locked in a cupboard under the kitchen sink without access to food or water,

a broken bed frame in the children’s bedroom with dried and fresh feces smeared on 

the bed frame, and a smashed tv on top of the broken bed frame in the children’s 

2 Stephanie and Sarah are not subjects of this appeal.
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 3 -

room. Sarah was taken to the emergency room, where doctors found she had

“multiple injuries in various stages of healing” and these injuries were

“non-accidental.” Mother admitted to causing Sarah’s injuries with a belt; she was 

arrested and charged with Felony Child Abuse.

DSS filed a petition on 20 September 2021 alleging that Sarah was abused and 

neglected and that Stephanie and Billy were neglected, and DSS took non-secure 

custody of the children. The initial adjudication and disposition hearings took place 

in February and March 2022, and the trial court adjudicated Billy a neglected 

juvenile. At disposition, the trial court did not order reunification efforts with the 

parents because it found that Mother and Father “committed or encouraged the 

commission of . . . chronic physical or emotional abuse of [Sarah] and torture of 

[Sarah]” and that Billy was “present in the home and observed to some degree the 

torture and physical abuse imposed upon [Sarah] by [parents].” The trial court 

adopted a primary plan of adoption for Billy with a secondary plan of guardianship 

but permitted the possibility of supervised visitation between the parents and Billy 

for two hours twice per week.

The trial court held a permanency planning hearing over 22 April 2022, 28 

September 2022, and 6 October 2022. The trial court found that the parents were not 

making adequate progress under the plan and that they were not “actively 

participating in or cooperating with the plan, [DSS], and GAL.” The trial court found 

that 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 4 -

Mother and Father [] are acting in a manner inconsistent 

with the health and safety of the juveniles. . . .

. . . .

Both Mother and Father [] refused to answer questions 

during this proceeding in reliance on the 5th amendment 

privilege. These questions were related to the acts of 

torture and physical abuse that they imposed on [Sarah], 

and the injurious consequences of neglect that they 

imposed on [Stephanie] and [Billy]. Pursuant to case law, 

the [c]ourt draws an adverse inference against Mother and 

Father [], but the [c]ourt does not solely use these adverse 

inferences to support the continued cessation of reasonable

efforts, but in conjunction with all the other findings the 

[c]ourt has made in this order.

If Mother and Father [] cannot admit and/or recognize the 

abuse and neglect they imposed on the juveniles, they are 

not able to demonstrate to the Court that they understand 

the impact on the juveniles and they are not able to 

demonstrate they have rehabilitated themselves and the 

circumstances that caused the abuse and neglect.

Mother and Father [] have had another child and they are 

residing together. Both of them have expressed an intent 

to reunify with all the children as one family unit. This 

intent demonstrates that Mother is not considering the 

best interest of the juveniles [Stephanie] and [Sarah], as 

she intends them to reunify with her significant other who 

this [c]ourt has found committed acts of physical and 

emotional abuse upon them, including torture upon 

[Sarah].

The trial court then found that DSS “appropriately ruled out” Father’s mother 

as a possible relative placement based on concerns that she “would fail to protect the 

juveniles and/or would fail to follow court orders” as she had “previously allowed 

unauthorized contact between [Billy] and Mother and Father” against the trial court’s 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 5 -

order. Father then identified his brother as a potential relative placement for Billy 

and the trial court ordered DSS to assess Father’s brother for possible placement.

The trial court held another permanency planning hearing on 30 August 2023 

and 7 September 2023, and it again found that the parents were not making adequate 

progress and that the issues that brought Billy into custody had not been resolved. 

The trial court found that Mother had attended classes and mental health treatment, 

but she was “involved in another domestic violence incident with [Father] and has 

continued to engage with him thereafter.” During the domestic violence incident, 

Father struck Mother in the face, grabbed her neck and squeezed, and hit her on the 

side of her head with a gun. Later that same night, Mother’s home was “shot into at 

least eight times.” The trial court found that Mother was “unsure whether she will, 

or even wants to” file for a domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”) against 

Father and that Father has been calling Mother from the jail and “[Mother] has 

accepted and engaged in these phone calls with [Father].” Additionally, the court 

found that Mother testified that she had been “fully honest” with her therapist but 

still would not discuss in therapy the “heinous, cruel, and inappropriate actions of 

abuse and torture” that resulted in Billy entering DSS custody. The trial court again 

found that Father’s mother was appropriately ruled out by DSS as a possible relative 

placement for Billy, and it found that Father’s brother had three drug-related felony 

charges and that DSS ruled him out as a possible relative placement.

On 11 January 2023, DSS filed a motion to terminate the parents’ parental 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 6 -

rights on the grounds of neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress in 

correcting the conditions which led to removal of the juvenile, and willful failure to 

pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care of the juvenile. The termination of 

parental rights hearing (“TPR hearing”) took place on 20 and 26 September 2023. 

DSS did not proceed on the willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of 

care ground. During the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the underlying 

orders without objection from any party, received live testimony from a social worker 

employed with DSS, and admitted twenty exhibits into evidence. Mother did not 

testify or call any witnesses, and she offered exhibits that were not properly admitted 

as conceded by her attorney during the hearing. Father did not testify but called his 

mother and brother as witnesses.

After considering all the evidence, the trial court terminated the parents’ 

parental rights to Billy on the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make 

reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to Billy’s removal. The trial 

court proceeded to the dispositional phase and concluded that it was in Billy’s best 

interest for the parents’ rights to be terminated.

II. Discussion

Mother argues that some of the adjudicatory findings of fact were unsupported 

by evidence, the court’s remaining findings were insufficient to support the court’s 

conclusions that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights, and the court 

abused its discretion when it determined that termination of her parental rights was 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 7 -

in Billy’s best interest. Father argues only that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it determined that termination of his parental rights was in Billy’s best interest.

A. Standard of Review

“Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for termination of parental 

rights proceedings consisting of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In 

re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 94, 839 S.E.2d 792, 796-97 (2020) (citation omitted). “At the 

adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination under 

section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5-6, 832 S.E.2d 

698, 700 (2019) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f)). We review a trial court’s 

adjudication of grounds to terminate parental rights “to determine whether the 

findings are supported by clear, cogent[,] and convincing evidence and the findings 

support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 

(2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Unchallenged findings of fact are 

“deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 

372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) (citations omitted). “The trial court’s 

conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19, 

832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019) (citation omitted).

If the trial court concludes that there are grounds to terminate parental rights, 

“the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court must consider 

whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.” In re 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 8 -

D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citations omitted). We review 

the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they are supported 

by competent evidence. In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 57, 839 S.E.2d 735, 740 (2020) 

(citations omitted). Unchallenged dispositional findings are binding on appeal. In re 

Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2019) (citation omitted). A trial court’s 

best interests determination “is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 

373 N.C. at 6, 832 S.E.2d at 700 (citation omitted).

B. Mother’s Appeal

1. Judicial Notice of Prior Orders

Mother first argues that adjudicatory findings 11, 15, 16, and 18 are 

unsupported by the evidence because the trial court “impermissibly relied on its prior 

findings in the dispositional and permanency planning hearings” that were “found 

under a lower standard of proof than the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 

standard” of those findings made at the TPR hearing. Mother claims that the trial 

court “simply adopted the findings” and “that there was not sufficient evidence to 

support these findings[.]”

“A trial court may take judicial notice of findings of fact made in prior orders, 

even when those findings are based on a lower evidentiary standard because where 

a judge sits without a jury, the trial court is presumed to have disregarded any 

incompetent evidence and relied upon the competent evidence.” In re T.N.H., 372 

N.C. at 410, 831 S.E.2d at 60 (citation omitted). “[T]he trial court may not rely solely 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 9 -

on prior court orders and reports but must receive some oral testimony at the hearing 

and make an independent determination regarding the evidence presented.” Id.

Here, in addition to the trial court taking judicial notice of prior orders, the 

social worker assigned to the case testified at the TPR hearing regarding Mother’s 

past and present lack of progress on her case plan and the progression of the case 

since Billy entered into DSS custody and through the TPR hearing. The trial court 

also admitted into evidence without objection the GAL report and twenty exhibits 

that were relevant to Billy’s entrance into DSS custody and the progression of the 

case through the TPR hearing. Additionally, adjudicatory findings of fact 21, 23, and 

24 all pertain to Mother’s circumstances at the time of the TPR hearing. The 

challenged findings of fact are based, at least in part, on live testimony and other 

exhibit evidence provided at the TPR hearing, and the challenged findings are thus 

“sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court made an independent determination 

regarding the evidence presented.” Id. at 410, 831 S.E.2d at 61. We conclude that 

Mother’s argument is without merit.

2. Competency of the Evidence

Mother next argues that portions of adjudicatory findings 20, 23, and 24

pertaining to Mother’s honesty in therapy are not supported because “the trial court 

relied on incompetent evidence in [its] findings regarding whether or not [Mother] 

was honest with her therapist.” Mother argues that the social worker’s testimony, 

based upon the social worker’s recollection of Mother’s testimony from a prior 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 10 -

permanency planning hearing in August 2023 (“the August 2023 hearing”), is 

incompetent evidence because “[t]he social worker is merely reciting a recollection of 

[Mother’s] testimony from a prior hearing.”

Mother cites to Hensey v. Hennessy, 201 N.C. App. 56, 685 S.E.2d 541 (2009),

for the proposition that, because a trial court “does not have the authority to issue an 

order based solely upon the court’s own personal memory of another entirely separate 

proceeding,” the social worker here was not permitted to testify as to her recollection 

of Mother’s testimony at a prior hearing. Mother’s reliance is misplaced.

In Hensey, the trial court issued an order after it did not hear “any evidence” 

at a civil hearing and instead based its order upon the trial court’s personal memory 

of a prior criminal proceeding. Id. at 67-68, 685 S.E.2d at 549. Our Court examined 

the appellate record and concluded that the

plaintiff presented absolutely no evidence before the trial 

court. The most troubling aspect of this case is that the 

transcript of the hearing reveals that the trial judge 

granted the order without hearing any evidence because he 

“heard it on the criminal end.” In other words, because he 

was the judge presiding over the criminal case in which 

charges stemming from this incident were brought against 

defendant, the trial judge concluded that he need not hear 

any evidence regarding this civil matter.

. . . .

Although we appreciate the trial court’s concern for judicial 

economy, a judge’s own personal memory is not evidence. 

The trial court does not have authority to issue an order 

based solely upon the court’s own personal memory of 

another entirely separate proceeding, and it should be 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 11 -

obvious that the evidence which must be taken orally in 

open court must be taken in the case which is at bar, not in 

a separate case which was tried before the same judge.

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Here, the social worker testified about her personal recollections of Mother’s 

statements at the August 2023 hearing; this was not an instance where the trial court 

“issued an order based upon the court’s own personal memory.” Id. at 67, 201 N.C. 

App. at 549. The social worker testified that she was present in court at the August 

2023 hearing and heard Mother’s testimony during that hearing. She then testified 

without objection as to her personal memories of Mother’s testimony about her 

engagement in therapy. Hensey is thus inapplicable here.

Additionally, Mother concedes that her testimony at the August 2023 hearing 

is “a statement by a party and would pass the hearsay exception and be admissible 

as evidence.” Mother argues, however, that “the social worker’s recollection or prior 

testimony should not be afforded sufficient weight to terminate [Mother’s] parental 

rights.” Mother’s testimony at the August 2023 hearing is admissible and we cannot

re-examine the weight the trial court afforded to the social worker’s testimony. See 

In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 11, 822 S.E.2d 693, 700 (2019) (explaining that the trial 

court is “uniquely situated” to “assess[] the demeanor and credibility of witnesses” 

and, as such, “appellate courts may not reweigh the underlying evidence presented 

at trial”); see also In re J.I.G., 380 N.C. 747, 754, 869 S.E.2d 710, 715 (2022) (refusing 

to review the trial court’s assignment of weight and credibility to testimony, stating 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 12 -

that the determination “resides solely in the purview of the trial court”).

When the social worker was questioned about Mother’s engagement in 

therapy, the social worker testified:

Q: [Mother] has participated in mental health services and 

is in individual therapy; is that correct?

[Social Worker]: Yes.

Q: And at the [hearing] which happened on August 30, 

2023, Mother did testify that she felt she has been fully 

honest with her therapist as to why the children are in 

[DSS] custody, correct?

[Social Worker]: Yes.

Q: But then, further within that same hearing, Mother 

further testified that she did not admit to her therapist 

committing physical abuse against [Sarah], correct?

[Social Worker]: Yes.

Q: To your knowledge, has Mother discussed with her 

therapist anything surrounding physical abuse, emotional 

abuse, torture, or inappropriate physical discipline of her 

children?

[Social Worker]: No, she has not.

Q: At that August 30, 2023, hearing, [Mother] also testified 

that she did discuss the domestic violence incident from 

July 5th with her therapist, correct?

[Social Worker]: Yes.

Q: But then she further testified at that same hearing that 

[Mother] does not discuss [Father] . . . with her therapist, 

correct?

[Social Worker]: Yes.

Q: So you would agree that [Mother] is not being fully 

honest and transparent with her therapist about the facts 

and circumstances of why her children are in [DSS] 

custody, correct?
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 13 -

[Social Worker]: Yes.

This testimony is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Mother was not 

honest with her therapist. The social worker further testified that Mother “being 

forthcoming with her therapist in regard to her behavior and what led to her children 

entering [DSS] custody” would demonstrate to DSS Mother’s acceptance of 

responsibility, which further supports that Mother was not honest or transparent 

with her therapist. The challenged portions of adjudicatory findings 20, 23, and 24 

pertaining to Mother’s honesty in therapy are supported by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence.

3. Refusal to Testify – Fifth Amendment

Mother argues that her “refusal to testify cannot be the sole basis to terminate 

her parental rights” and cites to adjudicatory findings 15, 16, 18, 23, and 24 as 

support that the trial court’s basis to terminate her parental rights was made “upon 

her refusal to testify.”3 Upon our review of the challenged findings, we note that they 

reference Mother’s invocations of the Fifth Amendment at prior hearings, specifically 

relating to questions about “the acts of torture and physical abuse that the parents 

imposed on [Billy’s] next oldest sibling . . . .” In In re K.W., this Court explained that

a parent may not invoke their Fifth Amendment right not to answer questions and 

then use that right as both a shield and sword in a civil proceeding:

3 We note that adjudicatory finding 23 does not mention Mother’s choice to invoke her Fifth 

Amendment right.
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 14 -

[S]ince [m]other invoked her 5th Amendment right not to 

answer questions . . . , the trial court could infer that her 

answers would have been damaging to her claims . . . . 

Although mother had a right to assert her constitutional 

right not to answer, this proceeding is a civil case and she 

is not entitled to use the privilege against 

self-incrimination as both a “shield and a sword.”

282 N.C. App. 283, 288, 871 S.E.2d 146, 151 (2022) (citation omitted). The trial court 

was permitted to draw an adverse inference against Mother for invoking the Fifth 

Amendment and the unchallenged findings of fact indicate that the trial court did not 

terminate Mother’s parental rights solely because of her refusal to answer questions 

at prior hearings.

4. Grounds to Terminate Mother’s Rights

Mother argues that the trial court committed reversible error by concluding 

that she (1) neglected Billy, specifically arguing that there is a lack of evidence to 

support that there was a probability of repetition of neglect; and (2) willfully left Billy 

in foster care for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the 

court that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in correcting 

the conditions which led to Billy’s removal.

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), the trial court may terminate a 

parent’s parental rights upon finding that “[t]he parent has . . . neglected the 

juvenile[,]” as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)

(2023). In relevant part, a neglected juvenile is defined as one whose parent “[d]oes

not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline” or “[c]reates or allows to be created 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 15 -

a living environment that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§§ 7B-101(15)(a), (15)(e) (2023).

Such “neglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing.” In re B.S.O., 

234 N.C. App. 706, 714, 760 S.E.2d 59, 65 (2014) (quotation marks, brackets, and 

citation omitted). “[I]f the child has been separated from the parent for a long period 

of time, there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by 

the parent.” In re V.S., 380 N.C. 819, 822, 869 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2022) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). This Court has expressly stated that “[a] parent’s 

failure to make progress in completing a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of 

future neglect.” In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. 647, 655, 803 S.E.2d 853, 859 (2017)

(citation omitted). Additionally, a parent’s failure to “demonstrate that sustained 

behavioral change of the type necessary to ensure the [minor child’s] safety and 

welfare” can support a conclusion that there is a likelihood of repetition of neglect. 

See In re R.L.R., 381 N.C. 863, 875, 874 S.E.2d 579, 590 (2022).

Here, it is undisputed that Billy was previously adjudicated neglected. As to 

the likelihood of future neglect, the trial court made numerous supported findings of 

fact that Mother could continue to neglect Billy if he was returned to her care, 

including:

15. . . . .

b.(i)(3) If the respondent parents could not admit 

and/or recognize the abuse and neglect they imposed 

on [Billy] and his older siblings, they were not able 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 16 -

to demonstrate to the [c]ourt that they understood 

the impact they have had on the juveniles and they 

were not able to demonstrate they have 

rehabilitated themselves and the circumstances that 

caused the abuse and neglect.

b.(i)(4) The respondent parents had another child 

named [Penny] and they are residing together. Both 

of them have expressed an intent to reunify with all 

the children as one family unit. This intent 

demonstrates that Mother was not considering the 

best interest of all of the children, as she intended 

them to reunify with her significant other who this 

[c]ourt had found committed acts of physical and 

emotional abuse upon them, including torture upon 

[Sarah].

. . . .

16. [M]other participated in DV services, mental health 

treatment and parenting. However,

. . . .

b. Additionally, Mother failed to be transparent with 

her therapist and had not discussed with her 

therapist about the actions of abuse, torture, 

improper supervision and improper discipline that 

the respondent parents committed against [Billy] 

and his siblings, despite Mother indicating at the 

[permanency planning hearing] that she has been 

completely honest with her therapist.

. . . .

18. At [the second permanency planning hearing], the 

[c]ourt ruled:

. . . .

b. That . . . the respondent parents were not . . . 

actively participating or cooperating with the plan, 

[DSS] and GAL. They . . . were both acting in a 

manner inconsistent with the health and safety of 

the juvenile.

. . . .
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 17 -

20. As of the completion of this TPR hearing, Mother has 

demonstrated that she had employment and housing. She 

had engaged in mental health services, parenting classes, 

and DV services, but she failed to provide 

documentation/evidence that she has accepted the role she 

played in [Sarah’s] abuse or the neglect she imposed on 

[Stephanie and Billy]. She failed to demonstrate to the 

[c]ourt that she understands the impact on [Billy] and 

failed to demonstrate that she has been able to rehabilitate 

herself from the circumstances that caused the neglect 

against [Billy]. Mother has not been forthcoming with her 

therapist. She also continues to engage with, and not 

protect herself from, Father [] despite a recent severe 

incident of domestic violence he perpetrated against her at 

her residence.

. . . .

23. The respondent parents have been separated from 

[Billy] for approximately two years—a long period of time. 

As noted above, [Billy] was adjudicated neglected on 

February 2, 2022. The neglect that led to the removal and 

adjudication created a substantial risk of harm to [Billy]. 

There is a likelihood of repetition of neglect in that there 

exists a substantial risk of harm to [Billy] if he were 

returned home, as demonstrated by the respondent 

parents’ collective failure to accept responsibility for the

conditions that led to the removal and adjudication which 

makes it impossible for this [c]ourt to know whether the 

respondent parents know their behavior was wrong and/or 

that they know (or have learned) how to change said 

behavior. Respondent parents’ behavior was so egregious 

and severe that [Billy’s] safety in their care cannot be 

ensured. [Billy] is currently 2 years old, is not potty 

trained, and likely to engage in bed wetting for a significant 

period of time which could result in the same heinous,

cruel, and tortuous disciplinary measures taken by the 

respondent parents against [Sarah] for bed wetting. 

Additional factors the [c]ourt considered as it relates to 

willfulness and the creation of a substantial risk of harm 

for [Billy] are mother’s voluntary decision not to be honest 

with her therapist about what led [Billy] to be taken into 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 18 -

[DSS] custody, mother’s voluntary decision to continue 

contact with father after a recent severe domestic violence 

incident, and her failure to file for a DVPO after said 

incident all of which demonstrated a likelihood of mother 

not protecting [Billy] as she had not protected herself. . . .

24. [Mother] could have been, but made a voluntary 

decision to not be[,] honest and forthcoming with her 

therapist. . . . [S]he made a voluntary choice to continue 

contact with father by accepting his phone calls while he 

was in jail following the recent DV incident and not seek a 

DVPO after said incident despite having the ability to file 

a DVPO against him and serve him in jail. . . .

These supported findings of fact show that Mother failed to complete all of the 

components of her case plan, failed to acknowledge or accept responsibility for the 

reasons that Billy came into DSS custody, and failed to understand the role she 

played in Billy’s neglect. These findings support the trial court’s conclusion that there 

was a likelihood of future neglect by Mother. See R.L.R., 381 N.C. at 875, 874 S.E.2d 

at 589 (determining that parents are “required to demonstrate acknowledgement and 

understanding of why the juvenile entered DSS custody as well as changed 

behaviors”); see also In re M.S.E., 378 N.C. 40, 58-59, 859 S.E.2d 196, 210-11 (2021) 

(upholding ground of neglect in part based on the parent’s inadequate engagement in 

remedial services and inability to understand the needs of their children).

Because the trial court’s findings support its conclusions of law that there was 

a previous adjudication of neglect and a likelihood of future neglect if Billy was 

returned to Mother’s care, the trial court did not err in determining that grounds 

existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 19 -

See In re V.S., 380 N.C. at 822, 869 S.E.2d at 701.

“In termination of parental rights proceedings, the trial court’s finding of any 

one of the enumerated grounds [in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)] is sufficient to 

support a termination.” In re N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. 722, 733, 760 S.E.2d 49, 57 (2014) 

(quotation marks, ellipsis, and citation omitted). Accordingly, we need not address 

the other ground for termination found by the trial court.

5. Best Interest Determination

Mother lastly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating 

her parental rights because it was not in Billy’s best interest to do so.

After an adjudication that one or more grounds exist to terminate parental 

rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111, the trial court “proceeds to the dispositional 

stage.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 6, 832 S.E.2d at 700. The court shall determine

whether it is in the juvenile’s best interest to terminate parental rights by considering 

the following criteria:

1. The age of the juvenile.

2. The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

3. Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 

the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.

4. The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

5. The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and

the proposed adoptive parent.

6. Any relevant consideration.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2023). The trial court must make written findings of 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 20 -

the factors it considers to be relevant. In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. at 99, 839 S.E.2d at 799.

Here, the trial court made the following dispositional findings of fact:

1. The Adjudicatory Findings of Fact are incorporated 

herein by reference as if fully set forth.

2. [DSS] proffered live testimony from [the social worker]. 

The GAL proffered live testimony . . . and GAL Exhibit 1. 

GAL Exhibit 1 was the GAL’s Termination of Parental 

Rights Report which was admitted into evidence without 

objection.

3. The permanent plan in [Billy’s] best interest is adoption. 

The parents having their parental rights is a barrier to 

adoption.

4. [Billy] recently turned 2 years old. He has been in [DSS] 

custody since he was approximately one month old so he 

has been in custody almost his entire life.

5. Terminating the respondent parents’ parental rights 

will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan of 

adoption. Neither the family nor any other prospective 

adoptive home can adopt the juvenile unless the 

respondent parents consent to an adoption or their 

parental rights are terminated. The respondent parents 

have insufficient progress on addressing the removal 

conditions. Given that lack of progress, significant barriers 

to reunification remain. Therefore, the best option 

available for [Billy] is for him to be adopted which requires 

that the parental rights of the respondent parents be 

terminated.

6. The Court has evidence that a bond exists between 

[Billy] and the respondent parents. However, the Court 

has no evidence of the type of bond that exist[s]. 

Specifically, whether it is strong or nurturing bond; or 

whether [Billy] even recognizes Mother and Father [] to be 

his parents. Additionally, Father [] has missed all his 

visits with [Billy] beginning July 6, 2023 through the date 

of the TPR hearing due to his incarceration for committing 

domestic violence against Mother.
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 21 -

7. It is not in [Billy’s] best interest to keep him in [DSS] 

custody indefinitely for the respondent parents to have 

more time to show progress, to admit and/or recognize the 

neglect they imposed, to demonstrate to the Court that 

they understand the impact on [Billy], to demonstrate they 

have rehabilitated themselves and the circumstances that 

caused the neglect against [Billy], and/or to find an 

alternative placement for possible guardianship which is 

not the primary permanency plan.

8. It is in his best interest for [Billy] to obtain a safe, stable, 

and permanent home.

9. [Billy] has lived with his current foster family since 

January 12, 2022 so for approximately one year and nine 

months of his 2-year-old life. [Billy] has a strong, loving 

bond with his foster parents, as well as the biological 

children of the foster parents. [Billy] calls foster parents 

“mommy” and “daddy[,]” and he refers to the foster parents’ 

biological children as “sister” and “brother.” The quality of 

the relationship and care provided by the foster parents is 

excellent, as they ensure that all of [Billy’s] physical, 

mental, emotional, and developmental needs are met. The 

foster parents provide positive and nurturing care to 

[Billy]. [Billy] is happy, nurtured[,] and loved by the foster 

parents.

10. The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt 

[Billy] and have remained committed throughout the case 

to adopting [Billy] if he became legally cleared to do so.

11. The likelihood of [Billy] being adopted is very high.

12. Terminating the respondent parents’ parental rights is 

in the juvenile’s best interest.

Mother argues that dispositional finding 6 is not supported by the evidence 

because the trial court finds “no evidence of the type of bond existed between Billy 

and [Mother] despite the social worker testifying that a bond existed.” The record 

evidence supports dispositional finding 6, as testimonial evidence shows that a bond 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 22 -

existed between Billy and Mother, but there is no evidence of the type of bond that 

existed, such as a strong or nurturing bond. The GAL report entered into evidence

and the social worker’s testimony merely show that Mother had “appropriate and 

positive interactions with [Billy] during supervised visits[,]” but they are otherwise

completely silent as to the type and extent of the bond between Mother and Billy. 

There is additionally no evidence that Billy recognized Mother to be his parent. 

Finding 6 is thus supported by competent evidence.

Mother argues that dispositional finding 7 is not supported by the evidence 

because “Father . . . provided approved by Gaston County DSS placements of close 

family relatives,” our General Statutes prefer relative placements over non-family 

members, and Father’s mother and brother “were inappropriately excluded.”

We first note that the trial court’s unchallenged adjudicatory finding 22, 

incorporated by reference into its dispositional findings, supports dispositional 

finding 7. The trial court found:

22. As of the completion of this TPR hearing . . . [DSS] had 

already appropriately ruled out [Father’s] proposed family 

members. Furthermore, this [c]ourt did not hear any 

evidence at this hearing that warranted reconsideration of 

[Father’s] proposed family members. [Father’s mother’s] 

testimony confirmed that she allowed unauthorized 

contact between the parents and [Billy] against the 

[c]ourt’s order. Additionally, [father’s brother’s] testimony 

at this hearing is not credible in that it is inconsistent with 

the [DSS social worker’s] credible testimony during this 

hearing and with the [c]ourt’s [prior] order.

Mother did not challenge adjudicatory finding 22, and it is thus binding on appeal. 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 23 -

In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437, 831 S.E.2d at 65 (citations omitted). This finding 

demonstrates that the trial court considered the testimony from Father’s mother and 

Father’s brother offered during the TPR hearing and weighed the credibility of their 

testimony before deciding that it would not reconsider Father’s mother or brother as 

possible relative placements. The dispositional finding 7 is supported by the 

competent evidence.

Moreover, our Supreme Court has consistently held that a trial court is not 

required to consider potential relative placements during the dispositional phase of a 

TPR proceeding. See In re H.R.S., 380 N.C. 728, 736, 869 S.E.2d 655, 660 (2022) 

(explaining that the trial court is required to consider relative placements in the 

“initial abuse, neglect, and dependency stage of a juvenile proceeding” and “the trial 

court is not expressly directed to consider the availability of a relative placement” 

during the dispositional phase); see also In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. 285, 289, 837 S.E.2d 

854, 857 (2020).

The trial court properly considered all the relevant factors of N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7B-1110, and it was within the discretion of the trial court to decide how each factor 

should be weighed. In re I.N.C., 374 N.C. 542, 550, 843 S.E.2d 214, 220 (2020). This 

Court may not “substitute our preferred weighing of the relevant statutory criteria 

for that of the trial court[.]” Id. at 550-51, 843 S.E.2d at 220. The trial court’s 

conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Billy’s best interest 

“was not manifestly unsupported by reason.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 438, 831 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 24 -

S.E.2d at 66.

C. Father’s Appeal

Father’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating his parental rights without first making adequate findings of fact about 

two relatives offered as relative placements for Billy.

Father does not challenge any of the adjudicatory findings of fact and 

challenges only the portion of dispositional finding 7 pertaining to alternative 

placement for possible guardianship for Billy. The dispositional finding 7 states:

7. It is not in [Billy’s] best interest to keep him in [DSS] 

custody indefinitely for the respondent parents to have 

more time to show progress, to admit and/or recognize the 

neglect they imposed, to demonstrate to the [c]ourt that 

understand the impact on [Billy], to demonstrate they have 

rehabilitated themselves and the circumstances that 

caused the neglect against [Billy], and/or to find an 

alternative placement for possible guardianship which is 

not the primary permanency plan.

We first note that the trial court’s unchallenged adjudicatory finding 22, 

incorporated into its dispositional findings, supports dispositional finding 7. The trial 

court found:

22. As of the completion of this TPR hearing . . . [DSS] had 

already appropriately ruled out [Father’s] proposed family 

members. Furthermore, this [c]ourt did not hear any 

evidence at this hearing that warranted reconsideration of 

[Father’s] proposed family members. [Father’s mother’s] 

testimony confirmed that she allowed unauthorized 

contact between the parents and [Billy] against the 

[c]ourt’s order. Additionally, [father’s brother’s] testimony 

at this hearing is not credible in that it is inconsistent with 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 25 -

the [DSS social worker’s] credible testimony during this 

hearing and with the [c]ourt’s [prior] order.

Father did not challenge adjudicatory finding 22, and it is thus binding on appeal. In 

re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437, 831 S.E.2d at 65 (citations omitted). This finding 

demonstrates that the trial court considered the testimony from Father’s mother and 

Father’s brother offered during the TPR hearing and weighed the credibility of their 

testimony before deciding that it would not reconsider Father’s mother or brother as 

possible relative placements. The dispositional finding 7 is supported by the 

evidence.

Moreover, our Supreme Court has consistently held that a trial court is not 

required to consider potential relative placements during the dispositional phase of a 

TPR proceeding. See In re H.R.S., 380 N.C. at 736, 869 S.E.2d at 660 (explaining that 

the trial court is required to consider relative placements in the “initial abuse, 

neglect, and dependency stage of a juvenile proceeding” and “the trial court is not 

expressly directed to consider the availability of a relative placement” during the 

dispositional phase); see also In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. at 289, 837 S.E.2d at 857.

The trial court properly considered all the relevant factors of N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7B-1110, and it was entirely within the discretion of the trial court to decide how 

each factor should be weighed. In re I.N.C., 374 N.C. at 550, 843 S.E.2d at 220. This 

Court may not “substitute our preferred weighing of the relevant statutory criteria 

for that of the trial court[.]” Id. at 550-51, 843 S.E.2d at 220. The trial court’s 
IN RE: B.A.J.

Opinion of the Court

- 26 -

determination that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Billy’s best interest 

“was not manifestly unsupported by reason.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 438, 831 

S.E.2d at 66.

III. Conclusion

The trial court’s adjudicatory findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, 

and convincing evidence, which in turn support the trial court’s conclusion of law that 

Billy was a neglected juvenile. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights was in Billy’s best 

interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother and 

Father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

Judges ARROWOOD and WOOD concur.