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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SONJA N. WILLIAMS AND §

SHOCKTHEORY DLV, INC., §

§

Plaintiffs, §

§

V. § No. 3:23-cv-854-L-BN

§

TAVA VENTURES, INC., TAVA §

LIFESTYLE, LLC, LACORE §

ENTERPRISES, LLC, LACORE §

LOGISTICS, LLC, LACORE §

NUTRACEUTICALS, LLC, §

CLAVON BROWNING, ANTHONY §

T. FLEMING, KEVIN D. HARRIS, §

TANGIO “TKAY’ WALKER, §

NINA MOORER, JANELLA §

SIMPSON, KENNETH LLOYD, §

CHANTE LLOYD, TERRY §

LACORE, JENIFER GRACE, §

LACHELLE PIERRE, JALENE §

MACK, GENE FORD, KEITH §

WILLIAMS, JEWEL TANKARD, §

STACIA PIERCE, TARA LEWIS §

DBA LGOLDEN TAVA §

LIFESTYLE, AND ARK §

ENTERPRISES, §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate 

judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of 

reference from United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay. See Dkt. No. 55. 

Defendants Tava Ventures, Inc., Tava Lifestyle, LLC, LaCore Enterprises, 

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LLC, LaCore Logistics, LLC, LaCore Nutraceuticals, LLC, Kenneth Lloyd, Chante 

Lloyd, Terry LaCore, Kevin D. Harris, Jenifer Grace, Jalene Mack and Ark Ventures 

(collectively, the “Tava Defendants”) have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Sonja 

N. Williams and ShockTheory DLV, Inc.’s claims against them and a motion to 

strike specific allegations in the pleadings. See Dkt. No. 26 (Defendants’ Second 

Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike). Plaintiffs have filed a response, see Dkt. 

No. 31, and the Tava Defendants have filed a reply, see Dkt. No. 35.

For the following reasons, the undersigned determines that venue is 

improperly laid in the Northern District of Texas and recommends the Court 

transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas.

Background

The following facts are taken primarily from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 

Tava Ventures, Inc. is a multi-level marketing company that markets and

sells health and wellness products through independent distributors. See Dkt. No. 24 

at 5 ¶¶30-31. Tava Ventures, Inc. sometimes does business as Tava Lifestyle. See

Dkt. No. 26 at 1 n.1. The parties do not differentiate between Tava Ventures, Inc. 

and Tava Lifestyle in their pleadings, so the undersigned will refer to them 

collectively as “Tava.”

Kenny Lloyd and Chante Lloyd are Tava’s founders. See Dkt. No. 24 at 5-6 ¶3. 

Terry LaCore is one of Tava’s financial partners. See id. at 6 ¶ 3. LaCore

Enterprises, LLC is Tava Ventures’ majority shareholder and acts as Tava’s 

management, distribution, and manufacturing arm. See id. at 1 at 4-15 ¶62. LaCore 

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Nutracetuticals, LLC manufactures the actual Tava products and product 

packaging, and LaCore Logistics, LLC distributes the Tava products. See id. at ¶63.

Plaintiffs allege that Tava operates a pyramid scheme. See id. at 5 ¶¶30-31, 

7-8 ¶¶40-41, 8-16 ¶¶43-66. Ark Ventures sits at the top of the Tava pyramid and 

makes distributions to the Lloyds and LaCore. See id. at 11 ¶ 53.

Plaintiff Sonja N. Williams was a Tava associate. See id. at 17 ¶¶72-73.

Shortly after Tava was formed, it hired Plaintiff ShockTheory DLV, a 

full-service advertising agency. See id. at 16 ¶¶67-68. Sonja N. Williams is 

ShockTheory’s Chief Executive Office and leads the company as its head digital 

designeer and producer. See id. at ¶67.

Tava and ShockTheory executed an Agency Consulting Agreement on January 

10, 2020. See id. at 16 ¶67, 17 at ¶74. Based on the agreement, ShockTheory

developed marketing materials, Tava’s website, and video and production and event 

planning materials for Tava. See id. at ¶76.

The agreement expired by its written terms on May 9, 2020. See id. at 17 ¶75.

After the agreement expired, Tava asked Williams to design labels and 

product packages for several Tava products (the “package designs”). See id. at 17-18

at ¶¶77-78. Plaintiffs allege that Tava never obtained a license or ownership of the 

package designs and that Tava has been using and distributing the package designs

without ShockTheory’s permission, consent, or authorization. See id. at 18-21 

¶¶79-91.

The Tava and LaCore Defendants ignored Williams’s demand that they cease 

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use of the package designs in the manufacture, marketing, branding, and sale of 

their products. See id. at 20 ¶¶86-86.

Plaintiffs sue all Defendants for copyright infringement, contributory and 

vicarious copyright infringement, and unjust enrichment. See id. at 21-24 ¶¶92-115, 

25-26 ¶¶123-129. Plaintiffs sue the “Corporate Defendants” (which they do not 

identify but presumably are Tava Ventures, Inc., Tava Lifestyle, LLC, LaCore 

Enterprises, LLC, LaCore Logistics, LLC, and Lacore Nutraceuticals, LLC), Terry 

LaCore, Kenneth Lloyd, Chante Lloyd, Jenifer Grace, and Kevin D. Harris for false

designation of origin, unfair competition, and civil conspiracy. See id. at 24-25 ¶¶ 

116-122; 29-30 ¶¶145-152. Plaintiffs sue the Corporate Defendants, Terry LaCore, 

Kenneth Lloyd, and Chante Lloyd for violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities 

Exchange Act and the Texas Deceptive Trade Act. See id. at 26-29 ¶¶ 130-144.

Plaintiffs sue the Corporate Defendants for common law fraud, violation of Section 

1202 of the Copyright Act, and breach of contract. See id. at 31-33 ¶160-168.

The Tava Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that 

this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Kevin D. Harris, venue is improperly laid 

in the Northern District of Texas, and Plaintiffs fail to state a claim on which relief 

can be granted. See Dkt. Nos. 26, 26-1. The Tava Defendants also ask the Court to 

strike specific allegations in the Amended Complaint as immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous.

The undersigned now concludes that venue is improperly laid in the Northern 

District of Texas and the case should be transferred to the Eastern District of Texas.

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Legal Standards

“A court typically decides personal jurisdiction questions before considering 

any venue challenges.” Nuttall v. Juarez, 984 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642 (N.D. Tex. 2013). 

But “when there is a sound prudential justification for doing so, a court may reverse 

the normal order of considering personal jurisdiction and venue.” Leroy v. Great W. 

United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) (explaining that “neither personal jurisdiction 

nor venue is fundamentally preliminary”).

The Tava Defendants challenge personal jurisdiction over one Defendant –

Kevin Harris – on the basis that Plaintiffs cannot establish general jurisdiction over 

him in the state of Texas. They also argue that this case should be dismissed 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) because venue is improper in 

the Northern District of Texas, or, alternatively, should be transferred to the 

Eastern District of Texas. See Nuttall, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 642. Because the personal 

jurisdiction determination would be the same in either the Northern or Eastern 

District or would be resolved if the case is dismissed, it is appropriate to consider 

venue as an initial matter. See id.

On a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) motion, once a defendant raises 

the issue of improper venue, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the chosen 

venue is proper. See International Truck and Engine Corp. v. Quintana, 259 F. Supp. 

2d 553, 558 (N.D. Tex. 2003). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, “the court is 

permitted to look at evidence beyond simply those facts alleged in the complaint and 

its proper attachments.” Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B. V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 

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2009) (cleaned up). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the Court must view all the 

facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 237.

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that “[t]he district court of a district in which is 

filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in 

the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could 

have been brought.”

Section 1406(a) allows a transfer where the first forum chosen is 

improper due to the existence of some obstacle to adjudication on the 

merits. [Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1967).] The 

statute specifically refers to “laying venue in the wrong division or 

district,” but a transfer can be made due to the absence of personal 

jurisdiction in a district where venue is otherwise proper. See Bentz v. 

Recile, 778 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1985).... [A] division or district 

may be “wrong” under Section 1406(a) when the original court lacks 

personal jurisdiction. Id.

Herman v. Cataphora, Inc., 730 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2013). “The district court has 

broad discretion in determining whether to dismiss or transfer a case in the interest 

of justice under § 1406(a).” LSF4 Loan Invs. I, LLC v. Weingart, No. 3:06-cv-419-M, 

2006 WL 2370803, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2006) (cleaned up).

Analysis

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs state that “[v]enue is proper in this District 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because at least one of the Defendants reside in this 

judicial district and because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims 

asserted occurred in this judicial district.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2 ¶3.

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a), provides that a civil action 

may be brought in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all 

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defendants reside in the same State; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part 

of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of 

property that is the subject of the action is situated; or, (3) a judicial district in which 

any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is 

commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 

29 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Venue for a copyright infringement claim is governed exclusively by a special 

provision of the Copyright Act, which provides that infringement claims may be 

brought “in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.”

28 U.S.C. § 1400(a); Nuttall, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 645 (citing Time, Inc. v. Manning, 

366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that, for copyright infringement claims, 28 

U.S.C. § 1400(a), not 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), governs venue).

The district in which a Copyright Act defendant may be “found” is coextensive 

with a court’s jurisdictional reach over the defendant’s person. See Action Tapes, Inc. 

v. Weaver, No. 3:05-cv-1693-H, 2005 WL 3199706, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2005). 

The venue inquiry is conducted as if the district were its own state, and there must 

be contacts with that specific district, not merely a specific state. See Nuttall, 984 F. 

Supp. 2d at 645.; Tayama v. Riom Corp., No. 2:11-cv-167-J, 2012 WL 556007, at *1 

(N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012).

The Tava Defendants argue that venue is improper in the Northern District of 

Texas because Plaintiffs cannot establish venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a), the 

special venue provision for copyright claims. The undersigned agrees.

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In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims over six defendants residing in the 

Eastern District of Texas (Tava Ventures, Inc.; Tava Lifestyle, LLC; LaCore

Enterprises, LLC; LaCore Logistics, LLC; LaCore Nutraceuticals, LLC; and Terry 

LaCore); six defendants residing in the Southern District of Texas (Kenneth Lloyd; 

Chante Lloyd; Tkay Walker; LaChelle Pierre; Jennifer Grace; and Ark Ventures); 

three defendants residing in the Northern District of Georgia (Anthony T. Fleming; 

Kevin D. Harris; and Nina Moorer); one defendant residing in the Eastern District of 

Louisiana (Clavon Browning); and one defendant residing in the Southern District of 

Florida (Janelle Simpson). See Dkt. No 1 at 2-4. Plaintiffs do not allege that any 

defendant resides or may be found in the Northern District of Texas. See id. 

After the Tava Defendants challenged venue in their prior motion to dismiss, 

see Dkt. No. 21, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, adding three defendants who 

reside in the Northern District of Texas, see Dkt. No. 24. But “the district in which 

proper venue lies is determined at the time the complaint is filed and is not affected 

by a subsequent change of parties.” Horihan v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 979 

F. Supp. 1073, 1076 (E.D. Tex. 1997). And Plaintiffs failed to allege that any 

defendant may be found in the Northern District of Texas at the time that suit was 

filed.

Plaintiffs also allege that the “Corporate Defendants” market and sell the 

products with the infringing designs “at marketing and branding events all over the 

country. Many of those events occurred in Texas, including the Dallas-Fort Worth 

Metroplex.” Dkt. No. 1 at 15-16 ¶¶74, 75.

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But this general allegation does not establish that Tava Ventures, Inc., Tava 

Lifestyle, LLC, LaCore Enterprises, LLC, LaCore Logistics, LLC, and LaCore 

Nutraceuticals, LLC, can be found in the Northern District of Texas. And the 

undersigned takes judicial notice that both the Northern and Eastern Districts are 

in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex.

The Tava Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ case should be dismissed instead 

of transferred because Plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in “obvious venue shopping” and 

could have foreseen that the forum in which the suit was filed was improper. See 

Seville v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 53 F. 4th 890, 896-97 (5th Cir. 2022). Alternatively, they 

argue the case should be transferred to the Eastern District of Texas. 

Two days before Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this lawsuit, Plaintiffs’

counsel sent a demand letter to the registered agent of Tava Ventures, Inc., Tava 

Lifestyle, LLC, LaCore Enterprises, LLC, LaCore Logistics, LLC, and LaCore 

Nutraceuticals, LLC, stating that Sonja Williams would be filing suit against them 

on her copyright and related claims. See Dkt. No. 26-2 at 8-10. Plaintiffs’ attorney 

stated that, “[g]iven the nature of Ms. Williams’ claims, the Complaint will be filed 

in the Eastern District of Texas on April 21, 2023.” Id. at 8. The draft complaint 

attached to the demand letter is almost identical to the Complaint filed in this 

Court. Both the venue statement and the allegation that many branding and 

marketing events occurred in Texas, including the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, are 

the same. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2 ¶3, 15-16 ¶¶74, 75; Dkt. No. 26-2 at 13 ¶3, 25 ¶¶ 72-73. 

But the complaint attached to the demand letter was drafted to be filed in the 

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Eastern District of Texas. See id. at 12-36.

Although there is no hint in the record as to why Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit 

in the Northern District of Texas, the undersigned finds it to be in the interest of 

justice to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Texas.

Plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge that venue is proper in the Eastern District 

of Texas and the case originally could have been, and almost was, filed in the 

Eastern District of Texas. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the principal 

place of business for Tava Ventures, Inc., Tava Lifestyle, LLC, LaCore Enterprises, 

LLC, LaCore Logistics, LLC, and LaCore Nutraceuticals, LLC is in Melissa, Texas

and that Terry LaCore and Jennifer Grace reside in Melissa, Texas. The 

undersigned takes judicial notice that Melissa, Texas is in the Eastern District of 

Texas. And so these defendants reside or may be found in the Eastern District of 

Texas.

The parties have engaged in a significant amount of motion practice. And 

Plaintiffs experienced difficulties in serving several defendants. A transfer would be 

in the interest of justice because it would avoid the costs and delay that may result 

from dismissal and refiling. See Nuttall, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (holding that 

transfer, rather than dismissal, was in the interest of justice because the parties had 

already engaged in extensive jurisdictional discovery and motion practice); see also

Blanchard v. Heart of Tex. Regions MHMR, No. 3:08-cv-370-B, 2008 WL 1867400, at 

*2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that transfer, rather than dismissal, was in the 

interest of justice where plaintiff claimed she had difficulty serving defendant).

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The undersigned finds that venue is improperly laid in the Northern District 

of Texas and recommends that the Court transfer the case to the Eastern District of 

Texas. 

Recommendation

Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike [Dkt. No. 26] 

should be granted on the grounds that venue is improper in the Northern District of 

Texas. In the interest of justice, the District Court should transfer this case to the 

Eastern District of Texas.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. ‘ 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge=s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge 

is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party 

from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge 

that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 

See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass=n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

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DATED: November 29, 2023

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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