IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20388

Summary Calendar

In the Matter of: HOUSTON BLUEBONNET, L.L.C.,

 Debtor

JENNIE KAY LYLE BIERSCHEID, Executrix of the Estate of Kenneth R. 

Lyle, Deceased; LYLE ENGINEERING COMPANY; HOUSTON 

BLUEBONNET, L.L.C.; E&H, L.P.; AMERICAN UNIVERSAL 

INVESTMENT COMPANY; ESTHER SUCKLE, Trustee of the Suckle 1999 

Living Trust, 

 Appellants

v.

HENRY R. HAMMAN; THE GEORGE AND MARY JOSEPHINE HAMMAN 

FOUNDATION; LAURA HAMMAN FAIN; ELIZABETH HAMMAN 

OLIVER, 

 Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-3422

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 8, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-20388

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Before JOLLY, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges.

GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:*

This appeal asks us to wade through the cobwebs of Texas oil and gas 

history, interpreting 1913 and 1920 leases and a 1934 state supreme court 

decision to determine who today owns an interest in oil proceeds. Tantalizing 

as that prospect is, we must decline. The bankruptcy court only decided 

liability. With more work to be done in the adversary proceeding, it has not 

yet entered a final judgment. As a result, there was no basis for appealing the 

liability ruling first to the district court and now to the court of appeals. 

I.

Ima Hogg, the daughter of a Texas governor who became known in her 

own right as the “First Lady of Texas” for philanthropic work, executed an oil 

and gas lease to John Hamman (and various associated parties) in 1913. The 

Hammans turned and assigned the lease to Producers Oil Company, keeping 

a one-eighth interest in the net proceeds of the sale of any oil for themselves. 

The Hogg lease covered over 700 acres, but subsequent assignments 

subdivided it. In 1919, the 20-acre plot at issue here was assigned to Humble 

Oil & Refining Company (a company co-founded by Ross Sterling, who went on 

to become, like “Big Jim” Hogg, governor of Texas). The Hammans, owners of 

the one-eighth interest, tussled with Humble at some point until a 1920 

settlement agreement resolved their contention.

Almost a century later, the successors of the Hammans sued the 

successors of Humble’s interest in state court, claiming that they are still 

entitled to net proceeds from the 20 acres. One of the defendants, Houston 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Bluebonnet, filed for bankruptcy and the case was removed to the bankruptcy 

court. Another defendant, Kenneth Lyle,1 moved for summary judgment and 

the plaintiffs cross-moved. The bankruptcy court determined that the 

Hammans continued to hold the one-eighth interest and granted partial 

summary judgment in their favor. But that ruling did not award a remedy to 

the Hammans or even result in a declaration of rights. Before the bankruptcy 

court proceeded to those matters, Lyle appealed. The district court summarily 

affirmed. 

II.

There are two primary paths to appealing a bankruptcy court ruling. See 

28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Appeals can be taken from “final judgments, orders, and 

decrees.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Appeals of interlocutory orders are also 

allowed “with leave of the [district] court.” See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).2

The bankruptcy court’s grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of 

the Hammans did not result in a final judgment. That is why it was “partial”; 

it only answered who owned the disputed interest without deciding any 

potential remedy. No final judgment was entered in the adversary proceeding. 

Developments in the bankruptcy court after the filing of the appeal show that 

this was no clerical error. A subsequent summary judgment motion has been 

filed as there are more questions to answer before resolving the litigation. In 

response to our request for supplemental briefing on the jurisdictional 

question, appellants note that if we were to reverse the summary judgment 

rulings and interpret the contract in favor of Lyle, then the litigation would be 

at an end. But that is typically true of a decision denying a defendant’s request 

for summary judgment, yet such rulings are not appealable final judgments. 

 

1 After Lyle’s death, Jennie Bierschied, the executrix of his estate, came into the case. 2 Section 158(a)(2) permits interlocutory appeals in a situation not present here.

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The finality rule is relaxed in bankruptcy, In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 650 F.3d 593, 

599–600 (5th Cir. 2011), but that relaxation does not extend to the classic 

interlocutory orders appellants are asking us to review. 

Appellants could have asked the district court to authorize an 

interlocutory appeal, see FED. R. BANKR. P. 8004, but they did not. And the 

district court’s ruling on the appeal does not count as an implicit authorization.

In re Delta Produce, L.P., 845 F.3d 609, 618 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that the 

district court must expressly exercise its discretion to allow an interlocutory 

appeal). Both parties ask now for a limited remand so can they can request 

the authorization from the district court. But because the district court opinion 

issued without that jurisdictional prerequisite, we must vacate the decision. 

See id. at 618. 

Both sides bemoan the inefficiency of this result for their lawsuit. But 

in the grand scheme of things, the final judgment rule promotes efficiency by 

eliminating the delay caused by piecemeal appeals. Firestone Tire & Rubber 

Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). Indeed, the bankruptcy court would 

have likely wrapped up this adversary proceeding in the time this 

unauthorized interlocutory appeal has been pending. But whatever the impact 

of the final judgment rule on efficiency in a particular case, we cannot pick and 

choose when to honor this fundamental principle of appellate jurisdiction. 

* * *

We VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND with 

instructions to dismiss the appeal. Delta Produce, 845 F.3d at 618 (citing 

Smith v. Gartley, 737 F.3d 997, 1003 (5th Cir. 2013)). 

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