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******************************************************IN RE JACCARI J.* (AC 36608)
IN RE JUSTIN J. (AC 36609)
Sheldon, Mullins and Foti, Js. Argued September 8—officially released October 16, 2014** (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Juvenile Matters at Bridgeport, B. Kaplan, J.)
David E. Schneider, Jr., for the appellant (respondent maternal grandmother). Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, andSusan T. Pearlman, former assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner). Barry A. Charles, for the appellee (respondent father).Opinion MULLINS, J. The respondent Carol B., the maternal grandmother ofthe minor children at issue in this matter (grandmother), appeals from the judgments of the trial court removing her as guardian and custodian of the children, Jaccari J. and Justin J., and ordering that custody and guardianship be vested in the children’s father, the respondent Angel J.1 On appeal, the grandmother claims that, afterthe court adjudicatedthe children neglected, it improperly employed a rebuttable presumption in favor of the children’s father when determining in whom to vest custody and guardianship ofthe children, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (j) (2), and that the use of the rebuttable presumption
was harmful. We conclude that the court’s use of a rebuttable presumption in favor ofthe children’s father during the dispositional phase of the neglect proceedings was improper. That error notwithstanding, however, we further conclude, on the basis of the trial court’s extensiveuncontestedfactualfindings andthorough best interest analysis, that the grandmother has failed to demonstrate that she was harmed by the court’s use of a rebuttable presumption in this case. Accordingly, we affirmthejudgments ofthetrial court.2
OnApril25, 2005, theProbate Courtawardedcustody and guardianship of the children to the grandmother.3 On June 19, 2013, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed aneglectpetition onbehalf of the children. After the trial on the neglect petition, the courtfoundthat, while livingwiththe grandmother, the children had ‘‘been denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally, and [had] been permitted to live under conditions, circumstances, or associations injurious to their wellbeing.’’ In its decision, the court notedthatthe children have several medical and behavioral issues. They need daily medication, and they lack exercise and healthy eatinghabits.4Appointmentswithdoctors, nutritionists, therapists andcounselorsweremade forthembutwere not attended, andprevioustherapy andmedicalproviders discharged the children due to missed appointments. During its analysis of the dispositional phase of the trial, the court engaged in a thorough examination of and comparison between placing the children with the grandmother and placing them with their father.5 With respect to the grandmother, the court made the following relevant findings. The children had resided withthe grandmothersincetheywereinfants, butherapartment is small. The grandmother and her brother, who also lives in the small apartment, had smoked in the home despite the presence of the children and an oxygen tank. The grandmothersuffersfrommedical conditions that limit her mobility; she is disabled. Her medical conditions previously have caused her to be hospital-ized, and have caused her to miss, cancel, reschedule

or be unable to schedule medical and counseling appointments for the children. Those conditions also hamperherabilityto insurethatthe childrengetproper medical care and therapy. She also has no means of transportation. For months prior to trial, she refused to allow the employees of the Department of Children and Families to enter her home, and the trial court stated that it was not sure whether the children were residing there; Jaccari J. reported to atherapist that he and his brother were residing, instead, with their great aunt, who lives in the same apartment building as the grandmother. The grandmother is strict with the children and has struggled with the parenting style recommended by therapists. The grandmother loves the children and has tried to do the best that she can for them.
With respect to the children’s father, Angel J., the court found that he has been arrested and jailed previously; his criminal record includes felonies from the 1980s and 1990s. He does work at his father’s church and runs errands for his father. His father, a reverend atthe church, allowsAngelJ., in exchange forthe work he does, to live rent free in a two-family home owned by the church. The home is large enough for each child to have his own room. Angel J.’s father also gives him money for the care ofthe children and for food. Angel J. has access to a car, and he transports the children to and from school each day. He also is available to take the children to their various medical and therapy appointments. He always has been a part of the children’s lives and attends church with them on Sundays, but has a hard time saying ‘‘no’’ to them and would bringthemtoMcDonald’safterschool. Thecourtfound, however, that Angel J. now understands that the children need to be on a strict diet. Angel J. loves the children. Significantly, the court found that the children’s father could best tailor the food intake of the children and regulate their meals. The children were more open and acted differently when attending therapy sessions with their father. The court also found that the father could better follow the recommendations ofthe therapists in addressingthe behavioral issues ofthe children at home. Ultimately, the court concludedthatthe children had ‘‘along-term continuous relationship withtheirbiological parent, the father. [The grandmother] has been unable to provide for the boys’ medical and therapy needs and follow through with the recommendations of the therapists on a consistent basis. Their housing is now in question as to the condition ofthe apartment, the boys’ accommodations in the apartment and whetherthe boys actuallyreside inthat apartment. The father has his own first floor unit with plenty of roomfor the boys. He has transportation to take them to school and to all their medical and therapy appointments. Hehastheflexibilitywithhisscheduletoaccommodate their needs. He is their natural parent. There is apresumption that the boys should be with a natural parent. The court knowsthatpresumptionis rebuttable but, in light ofall the above, there has been insufficient evidence presented to rebut the presumption.’’
The court went on to find, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that ‘‘it is in the best interest of both [children] that guardianship and custodybe transferred to their father, Angel J., and that there be a period of protective supervision for [six] months; that Angel J. sign specific steps to ensure the boys’ medical and therapeutic needs are met; that he conform their diet to the recommendations oftheir doctors and the nutritionist; and that he allow [the grandmother] visitation with the boys.’’6 Thereafter, the grandmother filed the present appeal.
The petitioner filed motions for articulation requesting that the court articulate whether it had found, on the basis ofthe evidence, that the children’s father was suitable and worthy to care for each of the children. The grandmother offered no objection to the petitioner’s motions, and the court responded by filing

an articulation related to each of the children, setting forth the same findings in each articulation: ‘‘The court finds that Angel J., the biological father of [the children] is suitable and worthy. This is based

ontherecordandfindingsstatedinthecourt’s decision, including, but not limited to, the following:
‘‘1. The fatherhashadaloving, active and continuous relationshipwith [thechildren] since [theywere] young. He was transporting [them] to school every day and to medical and therapy appointments when allowed. He had weekend visitations with [the children].
‘‘2. He has a motor vehicle to take [the children] to [their] medical, therapy and specialist appointments that are necessary to address [their] specialized needs. ‘‘3. The father resides on the first floor of a house that has ample room for [the children]. They each have their own room. ‘‘4. The father has the time necessary to take [the children] to all [their] required appointments. ‘‘5. The father can prepare and supervise [the children’s] dietary needs.’’
On appeal, the grandmother does not contest the court’s finding of neglect or any of the extensive findings supporting the court’s disposition in this case; she argues only that, after adjudicating the children neglected, the court improperly used a rebuttable presumption in favor ofthe children’s father, and that this

was harmful because the result ofthe proceedings mayhave been different had the presumption not been employed.7 Under the uncontested facts of this case, which the court set forth in specific detail in its memorandum of decision, we conclude that, although the

use of the rebuttable presumption was improper, the grandmother has failed to demonstrate that the error
was harmful. Here, the grandmother contends that, although there is no rebuttable presumption found in § 46b-129 (j) (2), which applies in this case, the court improperly used

a presumption in favor of the parent when it was determining in whom to vest custody and guardianship of the children. We agree. ‘‘When construing astatute, [o]urfundamental objective isto ascertain andgive effecttothe apparentintent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, includingthe question ofwhetherthe language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning ofsuch text is plain and unambiguous and does notyield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) InreElvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 499–500, 78 A.3d 797 (2013).
Theparties agree that, afterthe court adjudicatedthe children neglected in this case, the decision to transfer custody and guardianship was governed by § 46b-129 (j) (2), which provides: ‘‘Upon finding and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared-for, neglected or abused the court may (A) commit such child or youth tothe CommissionerofChildrenandFamilies, andsuch commitment shall remain in effect until further order of the court, except that such commitment may be revoked or parental rights terminated at any time by thecourt; (B)vestsuchchild’soryouth’slegalguardianship in any private or public agency that is permitted by law to care for neglected, uncared-for or abused children or youths or with any otherperson orpersons found to be suitable and worthy of such responsibility by the court, including, but not limited to, any relative of such child or youth by blood or marriage; (C) vest such child’s oryouth’s permanent legal guardianship in any person or persons found to be suitable and worthy of such responsibility by the court, including, but not limited to, any relative of such child or youth by blood

or marriage in accordance with the requirements set forth in subdivision (5) ofthis subsection; or (D) place the child oryouth inthe custody oftheparent orguardian with protective supervision by the Commissioner of Children and Families subject to conditions estab-lished by the court.’’
Unlike General Statutes § 46b-56b, which provides that ‘‘[i]n any dispute as to the custody ofaminor child involving a parent and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent, which presumption mayberebuttedbyshowingthatitwouldbedetrimental tothechildtopermittheparenttohavecustody,’’ § 46b129 (j) (2) contains nopresumptioninfavorofaparent. It is clearthat § 46b-56b does not applyto this proceeding, and all parties concede this. See also footnotes 6 and 7 of this opinion. The parties also agree that the court’s use of the presumption in this case was error, and, on the basis ofthe plain language of § 46b-129 (j) (2), weagree. Wehavefoundnoapplicablecaselawthat wouldleadustoadifferentconclusion.Accordingly, we concludethatthe courtimproperlyappliedarebuttable presumption in favor of the father in this case. Next, the grandmother claims that the use of this presumptionbythe trial courtwas harmfulbecause the results ofthe proceedings may have been different had the court not employed such a presumption. We disagree.
Thepartiesagreethatourstandardofreviewrequires thegrandmothertoprovethatthe court’suse ofarebuttable presumption in favor of the father was harmful. See generally In re Avirex R., 151 Conn. App. 820, 833–34, 96 A.3d 662 (2014) (despite court’s use of improper subsection of § 46b-129, impropriety was harmless because court properly found that transfer of guardianship was in child’s best interest and that guardian was suitable and worthy); In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 506 (court’s failure to provide statutorily mandated steps was harmless because, ‘‘even if such steps had been provided, they could not have made a difference in the trial court’s finding of the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate’’). ‘‘Errors of law constitute no ground of reversal ifthey are immaterial

or such as have not injuriously affected the appellant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 87 Conn. 341, 350, 87 A. 983 (1913). ‘‘It is axiomatic that to require reversal, error must be harmful. See General Statutes § 52-265

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10718), 188 Conn. 259, 266, 449 A.2d 165 (1982) ( Shea, J., dissenting). ‘‘Questions of custodial placement generally are resolved by a factbound determination of what is in the best interest of the child

. . . as shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

. . . To determine whether a custodial placement is in the best interest of the child, the courtusesitsbroaddiscretionto choose a place that will foster the child’s interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of its environment.

. . . We have statedthat when making the determination of what is in the best interest ofthe child, [t]he authorityto exercise the judicial discretion underthe circumstances revealedby the finding is not conferred upon this court, but upon the trial court

. . . . Nothing short ofa conviction that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.

. . . [G]reat weight is given to thejudgment ofthe trial court because of [the court’s] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence.

. . . [Appellate courts]
are not in a position to second-guess the opinions of witnesses, professional or otherwise, nor the observations and conclusions ofthe [trial court] when they are based on reliable evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Isaiah J., 141 Conn. App. 474, 476, 62 A.3d635, cert. denied, 308Conn. 936, 66A.3d498 (2013).
In the present case, the court very clearly set forth its reasons for transferring custody and guardianship ofthe children from the grandmother to the children’s father. It is evident from the court’s findings that it believed that the grandmother loves these children and that she hasprovidedforthemto the best ofherability. Nevertheless, the grandmotherhas, interalia, extensive health issues that render her unable to provide for the particular needs of these children, despite her desire to do so. The court, in turn, found that the children’s father has the desire and the means to care for his children and to address their particular medical and behavioral

concerns. It further found that it would be in the best interest of the children for custody and guardianship to be transferred to the father, and that he is a suitable and worthy guardian. The grandmother does not contest any of the court’s findings, and they are fully supported by the record. Accordingly, although the court improperly statedthatthere was arebuttable presumption in favor of the parent, it is clear, based on its best interest analysis, that the presumption played an insignificant role, if any, in the court’s reasoned decision; the court made the necessary findings pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (2) to support its decision to transfer custody and guardianship to Angel J. Accordingly, we affirm that decision.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers ofthis case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

** October 16, 2014, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 Themotherofthe children,therespondentJanielleB., hasfiledaposition paper in this court adopting the brief of the grandmother. During the trial, the attorney for the children asked that the children remain with the grandmother. On appeal, however, the attorney for the children and the attorney for the respondent father have filed position papers adopting the brief ofthe petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families.

2 We note that the grandmother filed separate appeals in this case from each of the individual judgments. Both judgments arise from the same memorandum of decision and both appeals are based on the same substantive issues, namely, whether the court improperly employed a rebuttable presumption and whether the use of that presumption was harmful. As a result, we will resolve both appeals in the same opinion in the interests of judicial economy.
3 There is nothing in the record that indicates the circumstances surrounding the Probate Court’s award of custody and guardianship to the grandmother.

4 Thecourtsetforthlengthyandsignificantfactualfindingsinitsmemorandum of decision with respect to the grandmother’s medical condition as well as the medical conditions of the minor children. It serves no useful purpose to repeat all of the court’s specific findings as to these issues in this opinion, except to note generallyhow these issues impactedthe court’s ultimate findings regarding the best placement for the children.

5 A careful review of the electronic transcripts in this case also reveals that in March, 2013, the father apparently had filed, in the family court, a petition for custody ofthe children. The exact status ofthat petition is not part of our record. It also is not clear whether the trial court had a copy of that petition or whether it considered the filing thereof when rendering the judgments in this case.
6 The court issued the relevant orders on form JD-JM-65, generally used in neglect proceedings pursuant to § 46b-129 (j), adjudicating the children neglected and ordering that custody and guardianship be vested in the children’s father, subject to six months of protective supervision. At the same time, however, the court also issued two orders on form JDJM-76, whichtraditionallyapplies inrevocation ofcommitmentproceedings underGeneral Statutes § 46b-129 (m), orderingtherevocationofthe custody and guardianship vested in the grandmother, and ordering that custody and guardianship revert to the children’s father with six months protective supervision. The propriety, import or relevance of this order has not been raised, briefed or addressed by the parties, nor was a copy of the order made part of the grandmother’s appendix.

7 In its memorandum of decision, the court did not cite to any statute uponwhichitreliedinapplyingthepresumptionatissue. We note, however, that the petitioner, in an argument to the trial court, cited General Statutes § 46b-56b in support of the position that the court should transfer custody and guardianship to Angel J.; the grandmother did not object to or argue the inapplicability of that statute. Thus, we presume that the court was referring to § 46b-56b when it stated that there was a rebuttal presumption in favor of the father in this case. Section 46b-56b contains a statutory rebuttable presumption in favor ofthe parent in custody disputes between

a parent and a nonparent. We use this opportunity to reiterate that the applicability of § 46b-56b is restricted to dissolution and custody matters brought under chapter 815j ofthe General Statutes and is not applicable in

cases that do not arise from dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment actions. In re Cameron C., 103 Conn. App. 746, 754, 755, 930 A.2d 826 (2007) (‘‘[t]he plain meaning of § 46b-56[b], readwithin the context of related statutes within chapter 815j, makes clear that this provision is intendedto applyonlyin dissolutionofmarriage, legalseparationandannulment actions’’), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008).