FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BEATRIZ V. LOUNSBURRY,  No. 04-15690

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.

v. CV-02-03956-JSW

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,  ORDER

Commissioner of Social Security, AMENDING

Defendant-Appellee. OPINION AND

AMENDED

OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 17, 2006—San Francisco, California

Filed September 20, 2006

Amended November 7, 2006

Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Arthur L. Alarcón, and

M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hug

18247
COUNSEL

Kelly Dunn, Richmond, California, for the appellant. 

18250 LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART
Sarah Ryan, Assistant Regional Counsel, United States Social

Security Administration, San Francisco, California, for the

appellee.

ORDER

The Opinion filed on September 20, 2006, is amended as

follows: on slip opinion page 11744, lines 1-3, delete the following text: 

An individual with both exertional and non-exertional limitations cannot, however, be found “nondisabled” based only

on the grids. 

OPINION

HUG, Circuit Judge: 

Beatriz V. Lounsburry (“Lounsburry”) appeals the district

court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social

Security’s decision to deny her disability benefits under Title

II of the Social Security Act. Lounsburry’s application for

benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration, and

Lounsburry requested a hearing before an administrative law

judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ found that although Lounsburry had

severe exertional and non-exertional impairments that precluded her performing her previous work, these impairments

were not disabling because they did not preclude Lounsburry

from performing a single occupation that existed in significant

numbers in the economy. Lounsburry contends that the ALJ

committed legal error because Rule 202.00(c) of the MedicalVocational Guidelines, as applied to the ALJ’s uncontested

findings of fact, directs as a matter of law a determination that

Lounsburry is disabled. We agree, and hereby REVERSE and

LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART 18251
REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS for the payment of benefits.

I. Factual And Procedural Background

On February 24, 2000, Lounsburry filed a claim for Social

Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) under Title II of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Lounsburry

alleged that her disability arose on August 16, 1999, when she

was sixty-two years of age. As the basis of her disability,

Lounsburry alleged “easy fatigue, pains & discomforts on

[the] upper and lower extremities, severe pain in both hips,

joints, back & shoulder, not feeling well at times, [and] bunionous . . . toes.” A series of medical evaluations between May

1999 and December 2000 resulted in diagnoses of (1) degenerative joint disease, resulting in chronic bilateral lower

extremity, knee, ankle, heel, and foot pain, and pain in the

lumbar spine, (2) adult-onset diabetes mellitus, (3) hypertension, and (4) sick sinus syndrome — for which Lounsburry

received a permanent dual-chamber pacemaker implant. 

Lounsburry completed high school and two years of postsecondary education. She was employed as a certified nurse’s

assistant from October 1985 to May 1999 and was employed

as a certified home health aide from June 1998 to November

1999. She has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at

any time since the alleged onset of her disability. 

Lounsburry’s application for social security disability

insurance was denied initially and on reconsideration. At the

hearing before the ALJ on November 20, 2001, medicalvocational testimony revealed Lounsburry to have the residual

functional capacity to perform “light work,” defined as lifting

and/or carrying 15 pounds frequently and 25 pounds occasionally. A vocational expert (“VE”) indicated that Lounsburry also had postural limitations preventing her from

repetitive stooping, crouching, crawling, kneeling, and climbing activities. Because Lounsburry’s past relevant work as a

18252 LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART
certified nurse’s assistant requires a medium exertional capacity, the VE testified she would not be able to return to that

job. The VE did find, however, that Lounsburry’s past work

was semi-skilled and involved skills transferable to other

work. Specifically, the VE identified four jobs that Lounsburry could do, but in response to interrogatories propounded

by the ALJ, later eliminated all but one as requiring more than

“very little [vocational] adjustment,” pursuant to the requirements of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, App. 2, Rule 202.00(f) (“the grids”). 

The VE identified the remaining occupation, “companion,”

as semi-skilled, requiring light exertional capacity and very

little vocational adjustment. He testified that 1,639 companion

positions exist in the local economy, and 65,855 nationally.

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation required

by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. He determined in his written decision dated March 25, 2002 that Lounsburry was not disabled.1

The Social Security Appeals Council declined review and

adopted the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Having exhausted her administrative remedies,

Lounsburry sought review in the Northern District of California. District Judge White rejected Lounsburry’s argument that

the ALJ was required to apply the Medical-Vocational Guidelines directly, including Rule 202.00(c), denied her motion for

summary judgment, and granted the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment, thereby upholding the ALJ’s

decision.

1The ALJ determined that Lounsburry (1) was not participating in substantial gainful activity; (2) had severe impairments; (3) did not have

impairments meeting the criteria of 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1; (4)

possessed a residual functional capacity for only light work limited by

postural restrictions and was thus unable to perform “past relevant work;”

and (5) could make the adjustment to other work that existed in significant

numbers in the national economy because she had skills transferable to the

occupation “companion.” 

LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART 18253
II. A Medical-Vocational Guidelines Analysis

We review de novo the decision of the district court affirming the decision of the ALJ. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d

1033, 1034-1035 (9th Cir. 2001). We may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits when the

ALJ’s findings are based on legal error. See Penny v. Sullivan,

2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993). In this appeal we are called

on to determine Lounsburry’s disability status under the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines, commonly referred to as the

grids. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. 

[1] The Ninth Circuit articulated the five-step sequential

process for determining whether a claimant is “disabled” in

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). The

five steps are as follows: 

Step 1: Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant is

“not disabled” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation

proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not,

then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled

to benefits. If the claimant’s impairment is severe,

then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step

two and the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 

Step 3: Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of

a list of specific impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and therefore

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one of the

18254 LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART
impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the

evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(d). 

Step 4: Is the claimant able to do any work that he

or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant

is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any

work he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s

case cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Step 5: Is the claimant able to do any other work? If

not, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore

entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1). If the claimant is able to do

other work, then the Commissioner must establish

that there are a significant number of jobs in the

national economy that claimant can do. There are

two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden

of showing that there is other work in “significant

numbers” in the national economy that claimant can

do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2)

by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),

404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore

entitled to disability benefits. 

Id.; see also Tackett, 180 F.3d 1098-99. 

[2] The grids are applied at the fifth step of the analysis

under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and present, in table form, a

LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART 18255
short-hand method for determining the availability and numbers of suitable jobs for a claimant. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101.

The grids categorize jobs by their physical-exertional requirements, and set forth a table for each category. A claimant’s

placement with the appropriate table is determined by applying a matrix of four factors identified by Congress—a claimant’s age, education, previous work experience, and physical

ability. For each combination of these factors, they direct a

finding of either “disabled” or “not disabled” based on the

number of jobs in the national economy in that category of

physical-exertional requirements. Id. If a claimant is found

able to work jobs that exist in significant numbers, the claimant is generally considered not disabled. Heckler v. Campbell,

461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983). 

However, the grids are predicated on a claimant suffering

from an impairment which manifests itself by limitations in

meeting the strength requirements of jobs (“exertional limitations”); they may not be fully applicable where the nature of

a claimant’s impairment does not result in such limitations

(“non-exertional limitations”). 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart p,

Appx. 2 § 200.00(e); 30 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 71:205. The reason for this limitation on the grids’ application is that, despite

having the residual functional capacity to perform a full range

of unskilled occupations at a given exertional level, a claimant

may not be able to adjust to these jobs because of nonexertional limitations. Soc. Sec. Rul. 83-10 (January 1983). In

particular, non-exertional impairments — including postural

and manipulative limitations such as difficulty reaching, handling, stooping, climbing, crawling, or crouching—may, if

sufficiently severe, limit a claimant’s functional capacity in

ways not contemplated by the grids. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569;

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101-02 (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1988)

(Pregerson, J., concurring)). Thus, the Tackett court held that

“[t]he grids should be applied only where a claimant’s functional limitations fall into a standardized pattern ‘accurately

and completely’ described by the grids.” Id. at 1103; see also

18256 LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART
Burkhart, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding

that the use of “the grids will be inappropriate where the predicate for using the grids — the ability to perform full range

of either medium, light or sedentary activities—is not present.”).2

[3] Application of the grids is not discretionary here. Where

a claimant suffers only exertional limitations, the ALJ must

consult the grids. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155

(9th Cir. 1989). Where a claimant suffers only non-exertional

limitations, the grids are inappropriate, and the ALJ must rely

on other evidence. Id. Where a claimant suffers from both

exertional and non-exertional limitations, the ALJ must consult the grids first. Id. However, the grids provide that:

where an individual has an impairment or combination of impairments resulting in both strength limitations and nonexertional limitations, the rules in this

subpart are considered in determining first whether

a finding of disabled may be possible based on the

strength limitations alone. . . . 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, § 200.00(e)(2) (2006)

(emphasis added). And conspicuously, “[W]here application

of the grids directs a finding of disability, that finding must

be accepted by the Secretary . . . whether the impairment is

exertional or results from a combination of exertional and

non-exertional limitations.” Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d

2Tackett’s bar on exclusive reliance on the grids is limited by its

requirement that the nonexertional impairments invoked must be significant enough to limit further the range of work permitted by exertional limitations before precluding application of the grids. Tackett, 180 F.3d at

1104; Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573,

577 (9th Cir. 1988). Although the ALJ had not determined Lounsburry’s

postural restrictions were severe, the district court reasoned that this element could be inferred, and the “ALJ was not required to use the grids

because Lounsburry’s non-exertional limitations made it such that her

abilities were not completely and accurately represented by the grid.” 

LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART 18257
1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Because the

grids are not designed to establish automatically the existence

of jobs for persons with both severe exertional and nonexertional impairments, they may not be used to direct a conclusion of nondisability.

3

See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

1102 (9th Cir. 1999). In other words, where a person with

exertional and non-exertional limitations is “disabled” under

the grids, there is no need to examine the effect of the nonexertional limitations. But if the same person is not disabled

under the grids, the non-exertional limitations must be examined separately. 

Here, the ALJ declined to apply the grids, except as an

advisory framework, because Lounsburry’s residual functional capacity was further reduced by her severe nonexertional, postural limitations. This was error; the ALJ

should have first inquired if Lounsburry was disabled under

the grids on the basis of her exertional limitations alone. The

ALJ also relied on testimony from the vocational expert in

concluding that Lounsburry was not disabled. This was also

error; the ALJ should not have substituted extrinsic evidence

for the mandatory analysis under the grids. 

It is Social Security Administration policy that the ALJ

may not look to other evidence to rebut this conclusion. Soc.

Sec. Rul. 83-5a. Under no circumstances may a vocational

expert’s testimony supplant or override a disability conclusion

dictated by the Guidelines. See Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d

683, 688 (9th Cir. 1989). In other words, the grids serve as a

ceiling. establishing a claimant’s maximum functional capacity. Cooper, 880 F.2d at 1156. Before turning to a vocational

3The cases cited by the Commissioner for the proposition that the ALJ

was entitled to bypass the grids are inapplicable because they “hold only

that [the Commissioner] may not rely solely on the grids to deny benefits

when additional impairments detract from a claimant’s ability to work.”

Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis

added). 

18258 LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART
expert, the ALJ should have analyzed whether Lounsburry’s

exertional impairments were enough, by themselves, to warrant a finding of disabled.

III. Assessing Lounsburry Under the Grids

With the benefit of a complete analysis under the grids, it

is clear that Lounsburry is disabled. The ALJ’s factual findings are not in dispute. Lounsburry’s residual functional

capacity to perform light work prevents her return to past

work but includes some transferable skills. Ignoring Lounsburry’s non-exertional limitations, we hold that this medicalvocational profile qualifies Lounsburry as disabled. 

[4] Because she has transferrable skills, Lounsburry’s case

is controlled by grid Rule 202.07, which generally directs a

finding of “not disabled.” However, the ALJ misapplied Rule

202.07 by failing to consider fully the effect of Rule

202.00(c). Footnote (2) to Rule 202.07 explicitly incorporates

language from Rule 202.00(c) that expands the circumstances

under which claimants with transferable skills can be found

disabled. Rule 202.00(c) provides:

(c) However, for individuals of advanced age who

can no longer perform vocationally relevant past

work and who have a history of unskilled work

experience, or who have only skills that are not

readily transferable to a significant range of semiskilled or skilled work that is within the individual’s

functional capacity, or who have no work experience, the limitations in vocational adaptability represented by functional restriction to light work warrant

a finding of disabled.

(emphasis added) 

Under Rule 202.00(c), although Lounsburry has some

transferable skills, she will be disabled if those skills “are not

readily transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or

LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART 18259
skilled work.” Thus, the specific issue we confront is the

meaning of the phrase “significant range of work.” The Commissioner takes the position that the term “work” refers to

individual jobs, and the phrase “significant range” only

requires Lounsburry to adjust to other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy in one or more occupations. However, the term “work” under Rule 202.00(c)

means distinct occupations, and “significant numbers” is no

substitute for and cannot satisfy the plain language of Rule

202.00(c) requiring a “significant range of . . . work” (emphasis added). 

[5] Social Security Ruling 83-10 (1983) (“SSR 83-10”)

“address[es] the issue of capability to do other work” by providing “definitions of terms and concepts frequently used in

evaluating disability under the medical-vocational rules.” Id.

at *1. Id. At 17. SSR 83-10 defines the phrase, “Range of

Work,” as “Occupations existing at an exertional level.” It

defines the related phrase, “Full Range of Work,” as: “All or

substantially all occupations existing at an exertional level.”

Id. at *16 (emphasis added). We thus construe the phrase

“significant range of . . . work” in Rule 202.00(c) to require

a significant number of occupations. The record in this case

establishes that Lounsburry’s skills would transfer to precisely one occupation at her residual functional capacity. One

occupation does not constitute a significant range of work.

Rule 202.00(c) directs a finding of disability for Lounsburry.

The Commissioner’s reliance on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b)

(2004), which provides that “[w]ork exists in the national

economy when there is a significant number of jobs (in one

or more occupations),” is misplaced. In whatever manner

“work” is defined, Rule 202.00(c) demands a “significant

range of” it. To interpret “significant range of . . . work” to

mean simply “work” nullifies the concept of “range” contained in the text. Congress might have drafted Rule 202.00(c)

to require only a “significant number of jobs”; it chose not to

do so. 

18260 LOUNSBURRY v. BARNHART
Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b) is inapplicable to

Lounsburry’s case. It defines “work” at a high level of generality and only to operationalize the broad definition of disability articulated by the Commissioner in interpreting a different

statute 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).4 However, the purpose of

the grids is to individualize the disability determination process; the grids supply the test for satisfying § 423(d)(2)(A) in

particular cases. The Commissioner may not substitute a definition of disability applicable generally for one narrowly tailored by the grids to Lounsburry’s circumstances. 

For the foregoing reasons, Lounsburry is disabled under the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines and eligible to receive disability insurance benefits as a matter of law. 

REVERSED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

for the payment of benefits. 

4Section 423(d)(2)(A) provides: 

An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only

if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,

engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

in the national economy. . . . For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), “work which exists in the

national economy” means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several

regions of the country.” (emphasis added). 

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