The Honorable Mir iam Goldm an Cedarbaum, of the United States Distr ict Court for the * Southern Distr ict of New York, sitting by de signation. 1 09 -2 38 0- ag Co st a v . H ol der UNI TED S TATES CO URT O F AP PEALS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT
A ugus t T er m , 2009 ( Subm i t t ed: J une 8, 2010 D eci ded: J ul y 2, 2010) D o c k e t N o . 09 -23 80 -ag ANTON IO JOAO CO STA,

Pe tit ion er , v. ERIC H. HO LD ER , J R. , U nit ed St ate s A tto rne y G en era l, Respondent
. Be fo re: W I NTER and H ALL , Ci rcu it J ud ges , and CEDARB AUM, District Judge
. * Petitione r seeks re view of an order of the Board of Imm igrati on Appeals (“BIA” or “B oard” ) af

fi rm ing the de cis ion

of anImm igr ati on

Ju dg e th at d en ied

Pe tit ion er’ s m oti on

to terminate and order ed him rem oved as an ali en who had been convicte d of an aggravated felony pursuant to s ection 101(a )(43)(F) of the Imm igrati on and Nationali ty Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (F). Because underthis Court’ s decision i n Ch ery v. As hc ro ft , 347 F.3d 404, 408-09 (2d Cir. 2003), Peti tioner’ s convicti on for violation of Connecti cut General St atutes § 53a- 712

constitut es an aggravat ed felony pursuant t o INA § 101(a)(43)( F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), we DENY the petition for revi ew.

APPEARING FOR TH E PETITIONER: J A M ES A. W E L C OME , W aterbury, CT. APPEARING FOR TH E RESPON DENT: C ARM EL A. M ORGA N , Trial Attor ney (Tony W est , A ssi stant A tto rne y G en era l, J ennif er Levings, Senior Lit igation Counsel , on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigat ion, Civil Divisi on, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. P ER C URI AM : Petitione r Antonio Joao Costa s eeks revie w of a May 7, 2009 order of the BIA affirming the Jan uary 2 2, 20 09 de cis ion

of Imm igr ati on

Ju dg e (“ IJ” ) Mi ch ael W . S tra us , d enyin g C os ta’ s
m oti on to t erm inate and

ord eri ng him

rem ov ed as an a lie n who ha s b een co nv ict ed

of an aggravated felony pur suant to INA § 101(a) (43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)( 43)(F), for a “cr ime of violence,” a s defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Se e In re A nto nio Jo ao Co sta , No. A034 068 160 (B.I.A. May 7, 2009), aff ’g No. A034 068 160 (Imm ig. Ct. Hartford, CT, Jan. 22, 2009). On appeal, Costa ar gues, inter a lia , that neit her his convi ction for sexual assault i n the second degree in vi olation of Connectic ut General Sta tutes (“ CGS”) § 53a-71 nor his convi ction for
sexua l as sau lt i n th e f

ourthde gre e in

vio lat ion of CG S § 53 a-7 3a

co ns tit ute s an ag gravated felony. BACKGROUND Pe tit ion er, a n ati ve an d c iti zen of Po rtu ga l, w as a dm itt ed

to t he Un ite d S tat es o n M arc h 24 , 1 97 3 a s a l eg al p erm an en t re sid en t (“ LP R” ). I n F eb ruary 2 00 6, the Co nn ect icut S tat e P oli ceSe e N or th C ar oli na v. Al

for d , 4 00 U.S . 2 5, 37 (1 97 0) (“ An i nd iv idua l a cc us edof c ri me 1 m ayvo luntar ily , k

no wi ng ly, an d und ers tan din gly co ns en t to the im

po sit ion of a p ris on senten ce ev enif he is unw ill ing or u

na ble to a dm it h is p art ici patio n in the act s co ns tit

uti ng the cri m e. ”). 3 rec eiv ed a co m pla int fr om a f ourte en -ye ar- old

fe m ale sp eci al e du cat ion stu de nt a lle gin g th at Co sta , who dro ve a v eh icl e f or a co m panypro vid ing trans po rtatio n to an d f rom the stu de nt’ s sch oo l, h ad

sexua l co nta ct w ithhe r on tw o o cca sio ns in J anuary 2 00 6. At the tim e o f t

he all eg ed sexual conduct , Costa was thirt y-five years ol d. In November 2006, pursuant to an Al for d ple a, Co sta

ple ad ed gu ilty to sexua l as sau lt i n 1 the sec on d d eg ree in v iol ati on of CG S § 53 a-7 1 and

sexua l as sau lt i n th e f

ourthde gre e in vio lat ion of CG S § 53 a-7 3a . In

Jan uary 2 00 7, pursu an t to his Al for d ple a, Co sta

wa s co nv ict ed of the crimes to which he had pleade d guilty. He was sent enced to eight years inca rcerat ion, with a minim

um of nine months to serve, the ba lance suspende d, plus a ten- year peri od of probation for sexua l assault in the second de gree, and a concur rent one-ye ar sentenc e of inc arc eratio n f

or s ex ua l as sau lt i n th e f

ourthde gre e. Th e f oll ow ing June , b ase d o n h is c onvic tio ns , th e D ep artm en t of Ho m eland

Se curity served Costa wit h a notice t o appear, char ging that he was r emovable pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2) (A)(iii ), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)( iii), be cause after he was a dmitted to this count ry, he
wa s co nv ict ed

of anag gravated

fe lony a s d ef

ine d in su bp ara gra ph s (A ) (s ex ua l ab us e o f a m ino r)
an d (F ) (c rim e o f v iol en ce) of IN A § 10 1(a )(4 3), 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (a) (43 ). Be fo re the IJ, Co sta

adm itt ed the fa ctu al a lle gatio ns in t he no tic e to ap pe ar, but he de nie d that he is removable. The IJ issued an or al decisi on finding Costa removable as charge d. Relying on this Court ’s decisi on in Ch ery v. As hc ro ft , 3 47 F. 3d

40 4, 40 8-0 9 (2 d C ir. 20 03 ),4

because the c rime involves a substa ntial r isk that phys ical force wil l be used in t he course of
comm itting t he offense, the IJ deter mined that Costa’s convic tion under CGS § 53a-71 constitut ed an aggravat ed felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) a nd that the amendm ents to tha t statut e subsequent t o Ch ery did no t al ter his an aly sis
. Costa filed a ti mely appeal to the BIA, which subsequent ly dismissed Costa’s appe al, concluding tha t Costa’s convi ction for viola tion of CGS § 53a-71 (sexual ass ault in t he second degree) i s, inter a lia , an a gg rav ate d f elo nyun de r 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (a) (43 )(F )— i.e
. , a “crime of vio len ce” as d ef

ine d in 18 U. S. C. § 1 6(b ). I n s o d oin g, the Bo ard rej ect ed Co sta ’s argum en ts and ruled tha t amendm ents made to CGS § 53a-71 after this Court’ s decision i n Ch ery ne ith er altere d the analysi s set forth in t hat case norits appli cation to Cost a’s cir cumstances. The Bo ard ’s d eci sio n d id n ot a dd res s C os ta’ s co nv ict ion

fo r vi olatio n o f C GS § 5 3a -73 a (s ex ua l ab us e in the fo urt h d eg ree ), and

ne ith er d o w e. DISCUSSION Jurisdict ion Any a lie n who ha s b een

co nv ict ed

of an“ag gra

vated fe lony” at anytim e af

ter he ha s be enadm itt ed

to t he Un ite d S tat es i s re m ov ab le. 8 U .S .C . § 12 27 (a) (2) (A )(i ii) ; seeals o Va rg as -Sa rm ien to v . U

.S . D ep ’t o f Ju sti ce , 4 48 F. 3d

15 9, 16 5 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ). “ As a ru le, fe de ral courts la ck jurisdi ction to r eview final agency or ders of removal based on an alie n’s convict ion fo r ce rta in c rim es, inc lud ing ag gravated fe lon ies .” Va rg

as -Sa rm ien to , 448 F.3d at 164 (cit ing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)). Court s of appeals ret ain juri sdiction, however , to review an or der of removal insofar as the pet ition for revi ew of such an order rai ses “consti tutional claims or qu est ion s o f l aw .” Id . (c iti ng 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (a) (2) (D )); seeals o Ch ery , 3 47 F. 3dat40 7 ( “WeSe cti on 16 (b) of Ti tle 18 pro vid es a s f

oll ow s: 2 Th e te rm “cr im e o f v iol en ce” m ean s -- (b) any . . . of

fe ns e th at i s a f

elo nyan d th at, byits natur e, inv olv es a su bs tantia l ri sk

that physical force a gainst the person or prope rty of another may be used in the c ourse of co mm itt ing the of

fe ns e. 5 ret ain jur isd ict ion

. . . to de ter

m ine wh eth er [ pe tit ion er] ha s b een co nv ict ed

of anag gravated fe lony . . . .” ). Where, as her e, the BIA adopts the IJ’s re asoning and offers additi onal comm entary, we review the dec ision of the IJ a s supplemented by the BIA. See Gertsensht eyn v. U.S. Dep’t of Ju sti ce , 5 44 F. 3d

13 7, 14 2 (2 d C ir. 20 08 ); Wal a v . Mu ka sey , 511 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). W e review the I J’s and BIA’s det erminations of law de no vo , seeBa h v . Mu ka sey , 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008), acc ording Chevron de fe ren ce t o th e B IA ’s c on str uc tio n o f t

he IN A b ut n ot t o its int erpreta tion of state orfederal cri minal laws, seeVa rg as -Sa rm ien to , 448 F.3d at 165. Ag grav ate d F

elo nyas a “ Cr im e o

f V iolen ce” Th e IN A d ef

ine s “a gg rav ate d f

elo ny ” to inc lud e “a

cri m e o f v iol en ce ( as d ef ine d in section 16 of Titl e 18 . . . ) for which the te rm of imprisonm ent [is] at least one year.” INA § 101(a)(43) (F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)( F). “A ‘crime of violence’ is any ‘offense that is a felony
an d th at, byits natur e, inv olv es a su bs tantia l ris k that physic al force agains t the pers on or pro pe rtyof

an oth er may be used in t he co urs e o f c om

m itt ing the of

fe ns e. ’ ” Do s S

an tos v. Go nz ale s , 4 40 F. 3d

81 , 8 3 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ) (q

uo tin g 1 8 U .S .C . § 16 (b) ). “A‘cr im e o f v iol en ce’ 2 thus has two ele ments: it is a felony, and i t involves a substanti al risk t hat physical force may be
us ed durin g it s co mm iss ion .” Id . (citi ng Ch ery , 347 F.3d at 407). Additiona lly, 18 U.S.C. §6

16(b) “refers only to those offenses in whic h ther e is a subst antial l ikelihood t hat the perpetrator wi ll i nte nti on all y e m

plo y p hy sic al f

orc e. ” Id . at 83-84 (quot ing Da lto n v . A sh cro ft , 257 F.3d 20 0, 20 8 (2 d C ir. 20 01 )). “In de ter m ini ng wh eth er a

cri m e satis fi es t

he se r eq uir em en ts, we us e th e so -ca lle d cat eg ori cal ap pro ach .” Id . at 84 (cit ing Ch ery , 347 F.3d at 407). Applying thi s method, “we focus on the ‘intr insic nat ure of the offense rather t han on the factual c ircumstances surr ounding
any p art icu lar

vio lat ion .’ A cco rdi ng ly, ‘on ly t he m ini m um cri m ina l co nd

uc t ne ces sar

y to su sta in a convicti on under a given st atute is relevant ,’ and the factual aspects of a defendant’ s situat ion
are imm ate ria l.” Id . (quoting Ch ery , 347 F.3d at 407) (footnote omitted)
.Co nn ect icut G en era l S tat ute s § 53 a-7 1(a ) pr ov ide s as fo llo ws : 3 (a) A p ers on

is g uil ty o f s ex ua l as sau lt i n th e se co nd de gre e w he n s uc h p ers on en ga ge s in sexual int ercourse wit h another per son and: (1) Such ot her person i s thirt een years of age or o lde r but un de r si xte enye ars of ag e an d th e ac tor

is m ore than three ye ars old er than su choth er p ers on ; or

(2) su choth er p ers on

is m en tal ly d ef

ect ive to t he ex tent th at s uc h oth er p ers on

is una ble to c on sent to su chsexua l inter co urs e; o r (3 ) su choth er p ers on is physicall y helpless; or (4) such ot her person i s less tha n eighteen yea rs old and the actor is s uc h p ers on ’s g ua

rdi anor o the rw ise res po ns ibl e f or t he ge ne ral su

pe rvi sio n o f s uc h person’s welfare ; or (5) s uch other per son is in cust ody of law or detained i n a hospital or oth er i ns tit

uti on an d th e ac tor

ha s su pe rvi so ry o r di sci pli nary a uth ori ty o ve r su choth er person; or ( 6) the act or is a psychot herapistand such other pe rson is (A) a patient of the actor and t he sexual int ercourse oc curs during t he psychotherapy session, (B) a patient or form er patie nt of the actor a nd such patient or former patient is emotionall y dependent up on the act or, or ( C) a p ati en t or fo rm er p ati en t of

the act or and

the sexua l inter co urs e oc curs b y m ean s o f t

he rap eutic de cep tio n; o r (7 ) th e ac tor acc om pli sh es t he sexua l intercour se by means of f alse repr esentati on that the s exual inte rcourse i s for a bona fide medical purpose by a healt h care professi onal; or ( 8) the act or is a school employee and such other per son is a stude nt enroll ed in a school i n which the actorworks or a school under the jur isdicti on of the local or r egional boar d of education which employs the act or; or ( 9) t

he act or i s a c oa chin an athl eti c ac tiv ityor a pe rso n who pro vid es i nte ns ive , ongoing instruction and such ot her person i s a recipi ent of coaching or i nstructi on from the actorand (A) is a se condary school s tudent and re ceives such c oaching or ins tructi on in a sec on dary s ch oo l se tti ng , o r (B ) is un de r ei gh tee n y ear s o f a ge ; or (10 ) th e ac tor

is twenty years of age orolder and st ands in a posit ion of power, authorit y or supervis ion over such otherperson by virt ue of the actor’ s professional, l egal, occupat ional or vo luntee r st atu s an d s uc h o the r pe rso n’s parti cip ati on in a pro gram or a cti vit y, an d s uc h oth er p ers on

is und er e ightee n y ear s o f a ge . 7 Co sta ass ert s th at a s a r esu lt o f am en dm en ts t o C GS § 5 3a -71 en act ed sin ce t his Co urt ’s 3 decision i n Ch ery

that st atute i s n owdiv isi ble , and it i s th ere fo re s ub

jec t to a m od if

ied cat eg ori cal ap pro ach . C os ta i de nti fi es t hre e am en dm en ts t o C GS § 5 3a -71 that he ass ert s b rin g it outside the realm of Ch ery ’s holding. We do not agree. We examine each argument in turn. Fi rst , in 20 00 , s ub sec tio n (2 ) of

the statut e w as r ev ise d to de let e th e w ord s “o r m en tal ly inc ap aci tat ed ” af

ter “m en tal ly d ef

ect ive .” Se e Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-71 (2000). As wri tten, the pro vis ion

pro hib its sexua l inter co urs e und er c irc um stanc es whe re the vic tim “is m en tal ly8

de fe cti ve to t

he exten t th at [

thevic tim ] is u na bleto c on sen t to s uc h s ex ua l inter co urs e. ” Id . § 53 a-7 1(a )(2 ) (e m

ph asi s ad de d). Co sta

arg ue s th at the rev ise d s ect ion les sen ed the of fe ns e
co nd uc t cr im ina liz ed

by§ 5 3a -71 su chthat it

no lon ge r ne ces sar ilyco ns tit ute s an ag gravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)( F). This argument is without merit. The ver y language of subsection ( 2) limits its applicati on to protect ing victi ms who are “mentally defecti ve to the
ex tent” t hat th eyare “una

ble to c on sent” t o s ex ua l inter co urs e. Th e re vis ion to t his su bs ect ion is of no consequence to the a nalysis se t forth in Ch ery . Se e C he ry , 347 F.3d at 408-09. Second, in 2002, subsect ion (9) was added, whic h prohibits sexual int ercourse wher e “the actor is a coach in an at hletic a ctivit y or a person who provi des intensi ve, ongoing instruction
an d s uc h o the r pe rso n is a re cip ient of co ach ing or i ns tru cti on

fr om the act or and

(A ) is a secondary school student and r eceives suc h coaching or i nstructi on in a secondar y school sett ing, or ( B) is und er e ightee n y ear s o f a ge .” Id . § 53 a-7 1(a )(9 ) (2 00 2). Co sta arg ue s th at this provision “for t he first ti me, changes the age for which a violat ion can occur from the age of six tee n to the ag e o f e ightee n. In C onne cti cut, t he ag e o f c on sent is six tee n y ear s o ld. ” Appellant’s Br. 16. This argument fails as well. At t he time of our decision in Ch ery , a violati on of § 53a-71 could occur wit hout regard t o the victi m’s age under every subsect ion of the stat ute except s ubsections ( 1) and (4), and s ubsection ( 4) alrea dy defined a victi m as a person who was “less than ei ghteen years old.” Third, in 2004, subsec tion (10) was a dded. It prohi bits sexual intercour se where “the actor is twenty years of age orolder and st ands in a posit ion of power, authorit y or supervis ion
ov er s uc h o the r pe rso n b y v irt ue of the act or’ s p rof

ess ion al, leg al, oc cu

patio na l or

vo luntee r status an d s uc h o the r pe rso n’s parti cip ati on in a pro gram or a cti vit y, an d s uc h o the r pe rso n is9

un de r ei gh tee n y ear s o f a ge .” Id . § 53 a-7 1(a )(1 0) ( 20 04 ). C os ta argu es t hat th is p rov isi on

is “vague and broadl y written” a nd that the t erms “power, authority orsupervisi on” are not defined. Costa also ass erts, as he did with respe ct to subsec tion (9), t hat the provi sion changes t he age de fi nin g a vic tim fr om un de r si xte ento “ un de r th e ag e o f e ightee n. ” C os ta’ s ar gum en ts o n th is po int are als o unava ili ng . N on e o f t he am en dm en ts t o § 53 a-7 1 a lte rs the statut e in a w aythat renders ouranalysis i n Ch ery ina pp lic ab le. To the co ntr ary , e ach of the statut e’s su

bs ect ion s, including t hose added as amendments to the statut e considere d in Ch ery , categori cally desc ribe crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Ther e is, ther efore, no need to apply a
m od if ied cat eg ori cal ap pro ach

in o ur ana lys is. Applying the cat egorical approach in Ch ery , w e h eld that a d ef

en dant c onvic ted

un de r CG S § 53 a-7 1 h as c om

m itt ed a “c rim e o f v iol en ce. ” Ch ery , 347 F.3d at 408-09. CGS § 53a-71 prohibits , inter a lia , s ex ua l inter co urs e w itha p ers on thi rte enor o lde r but yo un ge r th ansix tee n wh enthe pe rpe trator

is m ore than three ye ars old er and int erc ourse wi th s om eo ne wh os e m en tal deficiencies vitiat e his or herconsent. “In s hort, because of the disparat e ages of the defendant
an d th e v ict im , o r th e m en tal inc ap aci ty o r phy sic al h elp les sn ess of the vic tim , o r th e d ef

en dant’ s position of author ity over t he victim, the crime, semper et ubique , includes a s ubstantia l risk of phys ica l f orc e. ” Ch ery , 3 47 F. 3d

at 4 08 -09 . In

ho ldi ng that a c onvic tio n und er this statut e
co ns tit ute d a “cr im e o f v iol en ce, ” w e n ote d that “a lth ou gha co nv ict ion m aybe ob tai ne d und er § 53a-71 for consensual sexual int ercourse a nd force may not be present in al l circumstances, t he ris k of the us e o f f

orc e is inh ere nt i n e ach

of the of fe ns es s et f

ort h in the statut e. ” Id . at 408. Ind eed , “ ‘[ i] t m att ers no t on e w hit wh eth er the ris k u lti m ate ly c au ses act ua l harm .’ ” Id
.10

(quoting Un ite d S

tates v . R od

rigue z , 979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir. 1992)) . What matters is t hat the risk of force is inhe rent in t he offense. Id
. Mo reo ve r, “ wh enthe vic tim canno t co ns en t—t

he statut e inh ere ntl

y inv olv es a

su bs tantia l ris k th at p hy sic al f

orc e m aybe us ed

in t he co urs e o f c om

m itt ingthe of

fe ns e. ” Id . “ Thus , in Ch ery , we held that bec ause § 53a-71 cr iminalizes sexual conduct with vic tims who cannot
co ns en t—b eca

us e o f t he ir a ge , m en tal status , e tc. —th e co nd uc t th at i t pr oh ibi ts i s inhe rently
acc om panie d b y a

ris k o f v iol en ce. ” Dos Santos , 440 F.3d at 84 (cit ing Ch ery , 3 47 F. 3d at 40 8-0 9). “S uc h c on du ct thu s co ns tit ute s a ‘ cri m e o f v iol en ce. ’” Id . In so holding, we
em ph asi zed that “[ i] n c ase s invo lvi ng sexua l cr im es a ga ins t ch ild ren , c ourts have rep eat ed ly
rec og niz ed

a su bs tantia l ri sk

that phys ica l f

orc e w ill be us ed

to e ns ure co m

pli an ce. ” Ch ery , 347 F. 3d at 4 09 . T his is b eca

us e “[ a] ch ild

ha s v ery fe w, if any, res ource s to de ter

the us e o f p hy sic al force by an adult i ntent on touchi ng the child. I n such circumstances, t here is a s ignificant lik eli ho od

that phys ica l f

orc e m aybe us ed

to p erp etr ate the cri m e. ” Id . Indeed we have endorsed the Tent h Circuit’ s reasoning t hat “ ‘when an olde r person at tempts to sexually t ouch a ch ild
. . . th ere is alw ay

s a su bs tantia l ri sk

that phys ica l f

orc e w ill be us ed

to e ns ure the ch ild ’s
co m pli an ce. ’” Ch ery , 347 F.3d at 409 (quoting Un ite d S tates v . R eye

s-C as tro , 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10 th C ir. 19 93 )) ( em

ph asi s ad de d). CONCLUS ION Accordingly, underthis Court’ s decision i n Ch ery and notwithsta nding subsequent amendm ents to the Connecticut st atute, we hold t hat Costa’s c onviction i n violati on of CGS § 53a-71 consti tutes an aggr avated felony pursua nt to INA § 101(a)( 43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 11 01 (a) (43 )(F ).11

W e have consider ed all of Costa’s ot her arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing re asons, the pet ition for revi ew is DENIED.