alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```
 
 
VIX FUTURES - CBOE FUTURES EXCHANGE                                  Code-1170E1
OPTION AND FUTURES COMBINED POSITIONS AS OF 09/03/13          |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  Long  | Short  |Spreads |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
($1000 X INDEX)                                      OPEN INTEREST:      355,427
COMMITMENTS
  84,394  188,282   67,957  180,607   76,029  332,958  332,268   22,469   23,159

CHANGES FROM 08/27/13 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:    -27,528)
  -8,807  -15,141   -7,394  -10,839   -2,715  -27,040  -25,250     -488   -2,278

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADER
    23.7     53.0     19.1     50.8     21.4     93.7     93.5      6.3      6.5

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:      161)
      49       62       64       37       32      121      132
```

----

Updated September 6, 2013
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-1786

___________ Jeanette E. Oye, * * Petitioner, * * Petition for Review of v. * an Order of the * Railroad Retirement Board Railroad Retirement Board, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Respondent. *

___________ Submitted: January 6, 2000 Filed: January 13, 2000

___________ Before McMILLIAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Jeanette E. Oye appeals from the final order of the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) denying a waiver of recovery of overpaid benefits. For reversal appellant argues that the RRB failed to follow its internal policy regarding waiving recovery of overpayments and defined “against equity and good conscience” too narrowly; she also challenges the accuracy of the RRB’s calculations.-2-

Our review of an RRB decision is limited to determining whether it is supported by substantial evidence, not arbitrary, and reasonably based in the law; the RRB’s findings of fact, if supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud, are conclusive. See 45 U.S.C. § 355(f); King v. Railroad Retirement Bd. , 981 F.2d 365, 367 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We conclude the evidence does not support Oye’s contention that she relinquished a valuable right and that recovery of the overpayment would thus be “against equity and good conscience.” See Groseclose v. Bowen , 809 F.2d 502, 506 (8th Cir. 1987) (recovery of social security benefits is “against equity andgood conscience” if, inter alia, beneficiary relinquishes a valuable right); 20 C.F.R. § 255.12 (c) (1997) (beneficiary has no entitlement to waiver of recovery of overpaid RRB benefits; factors considered in determining whether waiver should be granted include whether individual knew or should have known amount was incorrect and failed to inquire or advise RRB of incorrectness of amount).
We further conclude that the RRB’s explanation as to why its waiver policy was not applicable to Oye is “adequate to satisfy the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking.” See Reed v. Railroad Retirement Bd. , 145 F.3d 373, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (court satisfied with RRB’s explanation of what appeared to be inconsistent rulings). Finally, we conclude the RRB’s calculations were supported by evidence in the record and Oye submitted no evidence of fraud. We also deny any further postponemen t in rendering our decision, because Oye’s request for a temporary postponement was based upon the RRB’s allegedly incorrect calculations.-3-

Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

REDSTONE LOGICS LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD 

AND SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 

AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-CV-00485-JRG

ORDER 

Before the Court is the Joint Motion to Stay Case (the “Motion”) filed by Plaintiff Redstone 

Logics LLC and Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, 

Inc. (the “Parties”) (Dkt. No. 23). In the Motion, the parties represent that they have reached an 

agreement in principle and are preparing a settlement agreement. (Id. at 1.) The parties request a 

stay of thirty (30) days. (Id.) 

Having considered the Motion, and noting its joint nature, the Court finds that it should be 

and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly, all deadlines in the above-captioned case are STAYED 

for thirty (30) days, up to and including October 4, 2024, during which time appropriate dismissal 

papers are to be filed with the Court.

.

____________________________________

RODNEY GILSTRAP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE So ORDERED and SIGNED this 4th day of September, 2024.

Case 2:23-cv-00485-JRG Document 38 Filed 09/04/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 274
EXHIBIT P 

Case 2:24-cv-00021-JRG Document 44-14 Filed 06/07/24 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 1633
Discover How Far Your Dollar Goes in Marshall!

Finding a job is about so much more than the business or the work itself. Getting the most out of your income is an incredibly important part of the equation. Marshall

offers a desirable Cost of Living to supplement the excellent career options. Compared to the rest of the country, Marshall's cost of living is 29.6% lower than the U.S.

average. Per BestPlaces, Marshall offers a quite favorable Cost of Living comparison versus Texas and the rest of the country, as illustrated in the chart below.

Cost Of Living Marshall Texas USA

Overall 70.4 93.9 100

Grocery 90.1 93.7 100

Health 103.1 95.4 100

Housing 30.3 84.3 100

Utilities 95.2 99.2 100

Transportation 66.8 103.3 100

Miscellaneous 97 96.4 100

Marshall also compares favorably with other regional cities, as seen by the chart below, also based on BestPlaces data.

City Overall Cost Of Living

Marshall 70.4

Texarkana, TX 76.8

Shreveport, LA 77.5

Beaumont, TX 78.3

Lufkin, TX 78.4

Longview, TX 85.0

Marshall Economic Development Corporation

100 North Bolivar Street, Suite 206 Marshall, TX 75670

Phone: (903) 934-8035

rushharris@marshalledc.org

© 2024 Marshall Economic Development Corporation. All rights reserved. Economic Development Websites by Golden Shovel Agency.

5/29/24, 6:18 PM Cost of Living in Marshall TX

https://www.marshalledc.org/life/cost-of-living/ 1/1

Case 2:24-cv-00021-JRG Document 44-14 Filed 06/07/24 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 1634
# C_2017384EN.01000502.xml

| 14.11.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 384/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.11.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 384/5

---

EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Publication of the final accounts for the financial year 2016

(2017/C 384/17)

The complete version of the final accounts may be found at the following address:

http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/about-cedefop/finance-and-budget/annual-accounts

---
Brandon WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Brian B. KEMP, Governor of Georgia, et al.

No. 19-7803.

Supreme Court of the United States.

April 27, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
Jorge MACLI, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 19-8220.

Supreme Court of the United States.

May 18, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
Maurice BRACK, aka Maurice Barrack, aka Maurice Black, aka Maurice L. Brack, aka Socca Bopum, aka Socka Bopa, Petitioner, v. NEW JERSEY.

No. 19-8058.

Supreme Court of the United States.

May 26, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration
Statements:

-     Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-87863) pertaining to the
      Brightpoint, Inc. 1994 Stock Option Plan, as amended, the 1996
      Brightpoint, Inc. Stock Option Plan, as amended, the Brightpoint, Inc.
      Non-employee Director Stock Option Plan and the Brightpoint, Inc. Employee
      Stock Purchase Plan

-     Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-108496) pertaining to the
      Brightpoint, Inc. Amended and Restated Independent Director Stock
      Compensation Plan, and

-     Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-118769) pertaining to the
      Brightpoint, Inc. 2004 Long-Term Incentive Plan;

of our reports dated February 21, 2006, with respect to the consolidated
financial statements and schedule listed in Item 15(a) of Brightpoint, Inc. and
Brightpoint, Inc., management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting of Brightpoint, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form
10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2005.

                                                   /S/  ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana
March 2, 2006
Exhibit 10.2 Wells Fargo Agreement Amendment No. 1






Amendment No.1 to the Merchant Financial Services Agreement 
between
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Heartland Payment Systems, Inc.




THIS AMENDMENT No.1 (“Amendment  No. 1”) to the Merchant Financial Services Agreement dated February 8 , 2012  (the “Agreement”) is made as of the 30th day of April 2012 (the “Effective Date”), by and between Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. (“Company”), and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“WFB”).  Company and WFB are collectively from time to time referred to herein as the “Parties” with each being individually referred to as a “Party.”  


WFB and Company desire to amend the Agreement to extend the period during which the Parties may negotiate and execute the ACH Agreement.


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, WFB and Company agree as follows: 


		
	1.
	Section 8.2.6 of the Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:




Either WFB or Company may terminate this Agreement on ten (10) days' notice if they have been unable, after good faith negotiations, to agree to the terms of and execute the ACH Agreement on or prior to June 30, 2012.


2.    This Amendment No.1 does not, and shall not be construed to, modify any term or condition of the Agreement other than those specific terms and conditions expressly referenced herein and the Agreement shall remain unchanged, except as provided for in this Amendment No.1, and in full force and effect.  In the event of any inconsistency or discrepancy between the Agreement and this Amendment No. 1, the terms and conditions set forth in this Amendment No.1 shall  control.  This Amendment  No.1 may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same document.  
3.    Except as otherwise modified herein, the capitalized terms used in this Amendment shall have the meaning specified in the Agreement.
    
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the Parties has caused this Amendment to be executed on its behalf by its duly authorized officers as of the Effective Date.




	
			
	HEARTLAND Payment Systems, Inc.
	 
	WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

	By:       /s/ Robert O. Carr                                                
	 
	By:       /s/ Mark Baumli                                                    

	Name:  Robert O. Carr                                                     
	 
	Name:  Mark Baumli                                                         

	Title:    Chief Executive Officer                                       
	 
	Title:    Executive Vice President                                      

	Date:    May 3, 2012                                                         
	 
	Date:    May 3, 2012
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 3 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 3

  Expressing the sense of Congress that the use of offensive military 
force by a President without prior and clear authorization of an Act of 
 Congress constitutes an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor under 
               article II, section 4 of the Constitution.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2013

  Mr. Jones submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
  Expressing the sense of Congress that the use of offensive military 
force by a President without prior and clear authorization of an Act of 
 Congress constitutes an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor under 
               article II, section 4 of the Constitution.

Whereas the cornerstone of the Republic is honoring Congress' exclusive power to 
        declare war under article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution: 
        Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That it is the sense of Congress that, except in response to an actual 
or imminent attack against the territory of the United States, the use 
of offensive military force by a President without prior and clear 
authorization of an Act of Congress violates Congress' exclusive power 
to declare war under article I, section 8, clause 11 of the 
Constitution and therefore constitutes an impeachable high crime and 
misdemeanor under article II, section 4 of the Constitution.
                                 <all>
```
Jeffrey Todd PALUMBO, Petitioner, v. CONNECTICUT.

No. 19-1118.

Supreme Court of the United States.

April 20, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Connecticut denied.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

SECTION 906CERTIFICATION—CFO

 

In connection with theAnnual Report of J.B. Poindexter & Co., Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the period ending December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert S. Whatley,Vice President Finance of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

To the best of my knowledge,after reasonable investigation:

 

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and result of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| Date:  March 31, 2009 | By  /s/ Robert S. Whatley |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
|                       | Robert  S. Whatley,       |
|                       | Vice  President Finance   |

 

 

The foregoing certificationis being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separatedisclosure document.

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906, orother document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting thesignature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, has been provided to theCompany and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
                        MICRO COMPONENT TECHNOLOGY, INC.
                                   FORM 10-Q
                                     EX-27
                            FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-24-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-25-2000
<CASH>                                           1,875
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,450
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (516)
<INVENTORY>                                      9,599
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,777
<PP&E>                                           4,984
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (3,408)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  43,279
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           12,062
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           110
<OTHER-SE>                                      31,049
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    31,159
<SALES>                                         22,750
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,750
<CGS>                                           11,140
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                11,554
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (20)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     36
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 36
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        36
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00






</TABLE>
Elijah JACKSON, Jr., petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.

No. 19-7559.

Supreme Court of the United States.

April 6, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
Maria Mercedes CANCINO, et al., Petitioners, v. CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS, et al.

No. 19-8017.

Supreme Court of the United States.

May 4, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
EXHIBIT 17

Case 2:23-cv-00443-JRG Document 1-18 Filed 09/27/23 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 259
Case 2:23-cv-00443-JRG Document 1-18 Filed 09/27/23 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 2
Page 2 

https://www.att.com/support/article/u-verse-high-speed-internet/KM1231556/

https://fiber.att.com/internet/wi-fi/

Case 2:23-cv-00443-JRG Document 1-18 Filed 09/27/23 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 2
Page 3 

Id.IEEE 802.11 – 2020 

Case 2:23-cv-00443-JRG Document 1-18 Filed 09/27/23 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 2
Page 4 

IEEE 802.11 – 2020 IEEE 802.11 - 2020 

[10a] a wireless transceiver to send and receive data; and 

APs include a wireless transceiver to send and receive data. IEEE 802.11 - 2020 IEEE 802.11 - 2020 

Case 2:23-cv-00443-JRG Document 1-18 Filed 09/27/23 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 2
Page 5 

[10b] a clock, APs include a clock, such as the TSF timer. 

IEEE 802.11 - 2020 

[10c] said first access point to: The APs sold by AT&T are configured to perform as described in limitations 10[[10d] transmit a beacon signal, said beacon signal comprising a value of the clock of the first access point at a time when the first access point transmits that beacon signal, 

Beacon frames comprise the value of the TSF timer at the time of transmission. IEEE 802.11 - 2020 

[10e] such that a second access point operating in the multichannel radio system synchronizes a clock of that second access point by extracting the time data from the beacon signal of the first access point and adjusting the clock of the second access point in accordance with that 

In mesh networks, the mesh STA examines the reception time of the Beacon frammost delayed neighbor STA. 

Case 2:23-cv-00443-JRG Document 1-18 Filed 09/27/23 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 2
Page 6 

time data from the beacon signal of the first access point. 

IEEE 802.11 – 2020 

Case 2:23-cv-00443-JRG Document 1-18 Filed 09/27/23 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 2
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-40570

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ENRIQUE RAMIREZ-LOARCA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

No. 7:12-CR-96-1

Before SMITH, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Enrique Ramirez-Loarca appeals the forty-six-month sentence imposed

following his conviction of being present unlawfully in the United States after

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 15, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 12-40570 Document: 00512242475 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/15/2013
No. 12-40570

deportation. He contends that the district court erred by imposing a sixteenlevel enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2 based on

his conviction of statutory rape under Georgia Code Annotated § 16-6-3(a)

(2005). He particularly argues that his offense does not satisfy the “generic, contemporary meaning” of the enumerated offenses of “statutory rape” or “sexual

abuse of a minor” because the statute of conviction prescribes a three-year age

differential between the victim and the defendant, rather than four years. 

The sole argument raised by Ramirez-Loarca is foreclosed by United States

v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). There, we applied a “plainmeaning” approach to determine the “generic, contemporary meaning” of “statutory rape” and “sexual abuse of a minor” and concluded that the generic definitions of those offense categories do not include any specific age differential. Id.

at 561-62 & n.28. We expressly rejected the claim that the statute at issueSS

§ 21.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal CodeSSdid not satisfy the “generic, contemporary

meaning” of “sexual abuse of a minor” because the statute prescribed a threeyear instead of a four-year age differential between the victim and the defendant. Id. at 562 n.28. 

In light of Rodriguez, Ramirez-Loarca has not shown that it was error for

the district court to impose a sixteen-level enhancement under § 2L1.2 based on

his conviction of statutory rape under § 16-6-3(a). Thus, the judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 12-40570 Document: 00512242475 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/15/2013