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| 5.6.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 190/24 |

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank — Annual Growth Survey 2019: For a stronger Europe in the face of global uncertainty’

(COM(2018) 770 final)

(2019/C 190/04)

Rapporteur: Anne DEMELENNE

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| Consultation | European Commission, 18.2.2019 |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted in section | 1.2.2019 |
| Adopted at plenary | 20.2.2019 |
| Plenary session No | 541 |
| Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions) | 124/1/0 |

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

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| | 1.1. | The Annual Growth Survey (AGS) gives a broadly positive assessment of past economic and social progress, in relation to economic growth, investment and labour market developments. Despite welcome improvements since 2014, the data presented shows that performance has not been impressive in comparison with that of other advanced economies. |

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| | 1.2. | The AGS mentions dangers from external events, but does not propose adequate countermeasures. External threats should point to the need to prepare stimulus polices for the maintenance of growth and employment levels. This has implications for the EU and Member State budgets. |

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| | 1.3. | Improved productivity is crucial for retaining the EU’s competitive position and for improved wellbeing. Reforms that can lead to enhanced productivity should be welcomed. However, there is a need for thorough evaluation of past policies, in the light of mixed results to date, including the slow pace of economic recovery, continuing concerns over productivity relative to competitors and the increase in precarious employment. |

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| | 1.4. | Higher productivity depends on improved education and training, as emphasised in the AGS. This should be supported by social partners, civil society and from public and private investment, including investment backed by EU Structural Funds. |

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| | 1.5. | The Social Pillar is given welcome prominence. It should be made clearer how it will be put into practice, how resources can be made available through European Social Funds and other European instruments and how that will be financed at EU and Member State level. |

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| | 1.6. | There are references to areas where new policies have been proposed, including fair taxation, the banking union and the functioning of the euro area. Progress is very slow and proposals often rather modest. Full involvement of the social partners and civil society would be beneficial. |

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| | 1.7. | The importance of addressing climate change is mentioned briefly but, given the associated risks to the economy as set out in the Global Risks Report [(1)](#ntr1-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0001) for the World Economic Forum, is given very short shrift. Nor are the external costs of the carbon-based economic addressed. Climate-protection measures so far adopted remain insufficient. An important step would be to rename the Annual Growth Survey as the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey. Besides recognising the importance of climate change this would also recognise the importance of sustainability of finite resources, the protection of the environment and thereby the safeguarding of the interests of the economy and future generations. |

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| | 1.8. | In many areas policy implementation depends on some private and also public sector financing. This should be facilitated both with reforms to create a favourable environment for private-sector investment and with an adequate EU budget and with commitment to a ‘golden rule’ allowing funding from Member State budgets for socially and economically productive investment that does not threaten future budget sustainability. |

2.   The broad priorities of the European Commission in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 2019

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| | 2.1. | The 2019 Annual Growth Survey is set in the broader context of 22 consecutive quarters of economic growth, thus providing the opportunity to implement the reforms needed to cope with rising global uncertainties and possible internal risks, in other words: | | | | --- | --- | | — | increased private and public sector investments to increase total factor productivity growth; | | | | | --- | --- | | — | providing high-quality investments in R&D, innovation, education, skills and infrastructure; | | | | | --- | --- | | — | enhancing productivity, social inclusion and institutional capacity; | | | | | --- | --- | | — | well-functioning and integrated capital markets; | | | | | --- | --- | | — | guaranteeing macro-financial stability and sound public finances. | |

3.   General comments on the recommendations of the European Commission

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| | 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the continuing commitment to support for reforms aimed at increasing high-quality investment and productivity growth, inclusiveness and institutional quality, and to continuing to ensure macro-financial stability and sound public finances. It welcomes the recognition of the need for investment focused on education and training and the increased recognition of the need to strengthen the EU’s social dimension, to respond to inequalities inside and between regions and in terms of access to education, and to achieve coordination between policy instruments. However, it remains to be specified how these objectives are to be achieved and the assessment of economic performance does not match the data appended in all areas, remaining complacent on some points, exaggerating positive features and, in some cases, making unsubstantiated claims about the positive effects of past policies. |

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| | 3.2. | Dangers and uncertainties are referred to, including changes in the global economy, US trade policy and uncertainties in future relations with the United Kingdom. The risk of a recession in the near to medium term future point to the need to prepare stimulus measures for maintaining growth and employment levels, as recommended by the OECD [(2)](#ntr2-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0002). To this end, the establishment, within the EU budget, of a function for macroeconomic stabilisation, which would allow an increase of the economic resilience of the area, should be considered. It can serve as a buffer against shocks and may allow the Euro Area to run the positive fiscal stance requested by the EESC [(3)](#ntr3-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0003) even if individual Member States do not use their available fiscal space in line with European objectives. |

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| | 3.3. | There are also risks from internal political developments following the relatively disappointing economic and social performance of the post-2008 period. This also highlights the importance of both such reforms and policy measures as would lead to improved productivity and economic growth and to the strengthening of cohesion and the social dimension of policies. |

3.4.   Growth

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| | 3.4.1. | The EU has experienced five years of economic growth from 2014, with levels above the EU average in a number of lower income countries. This has reduced to some extent divergences between the highest and lowest incomes across the EU as a whole, although some other countries have been falling behind to create new dimensions of divergence. |

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| | 3.4.2. | Since 2017, there has been some growth in all EU Member States for the first time since before the crisis. Nevertheless, growth is still slower in the EU as a whole than in the pre-crisis period and not impressive when set against recent growth in other advanced economies. The EU also has more substantial ground to make up, following the exceptional length of the post-2008 depression. |

3.5.   Social aspects

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| | 3.5.1. | The level of employment and the employment rate have both shown substantial recovery from the depressed years after 2008. Although, as indicated by data annexed to the AGS, the trend in new job creation has been towards higher skill levels, this has been accompanied by a decline in the quality of much of the newly created employment. |

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| | 3.5.2. | Increasingly employees are being hired on temporary and part-time contracts, the majority of whom would prefer a standard, full-time contract [(4)](#ntr4-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0004). The proportion of part-time workers increased from 16,8% to 18,7% of the total in employment from 2008 to 2017, with higher levels and a larger increase for younger people. Although more people are now working, the total hours worked in 2017 was still slightly below the level of 2008 [(5)](#ntr5-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0005). |

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| | 3.5.3. | As recognised in the AGS, the number of people in work and at risk of poverty is high and rising in several Member States (2008, 8,6%, 2017, 9,6% of working population [(6)](#ntr6-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0006)). A higher total employment level – although employment should be preferable to unemployment – is not proof of inclusive growth. |

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| | 3.5.4. | Groups, such as those receiving disability benefits, are often not counted in unemployment rates [(7)](#ntr7-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0007). This should be taken into account in recommendations, particularly with regard to offering flexibility and security to such groups to facilitate access to the open labour market without the loss of subsequent entitlement to benefits. |

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| | 3.5.5. | Attention should also be paid to ensuring that those in precarious and atypical work contracts, such as the self-employed, part-time workers, or those involved in platform employment, have access to adequate social protection. Also of concern are persons whose outgoings, owing to an underlying health condition or disability, can make it impossible to make ends meet, and who sometimes lose adequate financial assistance for related outgoings once in paid employment. |

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| | 3.5.6. | The Commission proposes adapting social protection based on the new forms of employment. Admittedly, new sources of financing will need to be found, yet the way forward is a return to quality jobs that reflect labour market needs, and to sustainable employment contracts, that give people the right to an adequate social protection. It will also be necessary to combat discrimination in the labour market of certain groups — older people, those of foreign origin, people with disabilities, young people, and women — many of whom are often highly qualified. |

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| | 3.5.7. | References to ensuring wider access to high-quality services and improving parents’ (and particularly women’s) access to the labour market, are to be welcomed for their positive effects in countering social exclusion and also in improving labour supply. Policies to support the social integration of immigrants should likewise be promoted as part of a migration policy reflecting European values of solidarity and tolerance and respecting human rights. |

3.6.   Wages and productivity

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| | 3.6.1. | Wage growth has been very modest and divergences between countries, even for the same work, remain substantial. Wage growth for the EU as a whole remains below the level of productivity growth. |

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| | 3.6.2. | This means that a lower share of national income is accounted for by wages. The extent to which the benefits of higher productivity are evenly shared varies among Member States, depending on the scope for successful collective bargaining and policies to encourage wage growth. Although higher productivity should normally be considered the necessary, albeit not sole, precondition for higher wages, the systematic link between productivity (which is also dependent on investments) and wages should not obscure the increases in the cost of living when it comes to setting wages; otherwise it may lead to major social tensions. |

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| | 3.6.3. | Low wages are also a barrier to higher productivity in lower-wage countries, encouraging the best-qualified people to seek employment elsewhere. Mobility of labour should be welcomed where it reflects individuals’ first choices. It also allows acquisition of skills and experience that can be taken back to a home country. However, outward migration of the most qualified has also discouraged investment in activities requiring high skill levels, leaving lower-wage countries unable to develop the most demanding economic activities. |

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| | 3.6.4. | Increased pay levels in a number of Member States (mostly in eastern and central Europe) have followed increased minimum wages and higher public sector pay. Higher consumption has contributed to higher GDP. Likewise, measures to ensure a minimum wage and minimum income as part of a process of social convergence in the EU may constitute an important element of social protection and achieving a decent standard of living in all countries while also helping to support growth. |

3.7.   Productivity and skills

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| | 3.7.1. | Lagging productivity growth relative to the major global competitors followed a longer-lasting depression after 2008, as shown in Graph 3 [(8)](#ntr8-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0008). The lag has been particularly pronounced in the euro area. Reducing that gap will require the development of an environment conducive to increased private investment and to the application of research and innovation. It will also require using the full potential of the EU’s population, minimising labour market and social exclusion and investing in means to assist recruitment of the long-term unemployed into the labour market. |

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| | 3.7.2. | Improving knowledge, skills, qualifications, attitudes and creativity remains an absolute precondition to increasing productivity. It also contributes to democracy and sustainable development. The AGS correctly emphasises the importance of investment in developing skills, education and lifelong learning. 40% of employers report difficulties in recruiting adequately qualified personnel. Many prospective employees also find it difficult to apply qualifications in their home countries. |

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| | 3.7.3. | The development of strategies to anticipate future skills requirements, along with proper skills validation systems, and to ensure education and training match employment needs is essential. Supporting employers in sourcing available employees with adequate skills and qualifications should also be ensured by investing in support services to prevent early school leaving especially amongst discriminated groups such as persons with disabilities or people of a migrant background, and to provide support in the continuation of higher education [(9)](#ntr9-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0009). There is an important responsibility on employers to enable and facilitate the enhancement of skills and qualifications – this varies enormously between Member States – and development and implementation of successful strategies are unimaginable without the full participation of the social partners, civil society, education establishments and training companies. As the AGS also argues, ensuring equal access to quality education ‘requires adequate investment’, which should include public investment backed by the EU through CSRs and appropriate participation from Structural Funds and its Investment Plan. |

3.8.   Climate challenge

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| | 3.8.1. | The AGS is very vague and far too weak on the dangers presented by climate change and on the EU’s progress towards reaching the Paris targets. Compared to the Global Risks Report [(10)](#ntr10-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0010), which was presented to the participants of the World Economic Forum in January 2019, the relevance of climate change to growth and the economy is given quite marginal consideration. The Global Risks Report in contrast shows that the three (!) greatest threats to the global economy are linked to climate change and overly cautious policy action to decarbonise the economy. Climate protection is therefore no longer simply a question of environmental protection, but is necessary for the economy to survive. The regular reports produced by Bloomberg NEF show that clean energy investments have declined since 2011 [(11)](#ntr11-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0011). The EU cannot claim world leadership in this area or in innovations leading to reductions in green-house gas emissions. |

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| | 3.8.2. | The report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stresses the urgency of actions against climate change, which may become irreversible in three years. Budgets should also be made available at all levels of governance (both public and private investment) to modernise and decarbonise industry, transport and energy. |

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| | 3.8.3. | This is also advisable from a fiscal policy point of view, due to the extremely high external costs in today’s economy. However, the Annual Growth Survey largely ignores this issue, despite the fact that the Commission published figures at more or less the same time as the Annual Growth Survey showing that, in 2017, weather-related disasters alone caused EUR 283billion in economic damages [(12)](#ntr12-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0012). The EESC has repeatedly pointed out that the International Monetary Fund estimates direct and indirect subsidies for carbon-based energy production in the EU at USD 330billion per year. It is therefore a shortcoming of the Annual Growth Survey that it fails to address the question of the internalisation of external costs or the debate on ‘beyond GDP’. |

3.9.   Investment

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| | 3.9.1. | Investment is crucial to productivity growth. The issue is pressing for the EU given that it is lagging behind its major competitors in crucial branches of the most modern technology and in the development of low-carbon technology. A continuously improving economy is a crucial basis for financing social security and healthcare benefits at the level desired by European citizens. Indeed, advancing well-being, cohesion and social justice is fully compatible with economic and productivity growth [(13)](#ntr13-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0013). |

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| | 3.9.2. | The EESC repeats its view that the Commission and the Member States should put greater efforts into removing the bottlenecks to investment and to creating a favourable investment climate. The completion of the Energy Union, the Digital Single Market Strategy and the Action Plan for the Circular Economy could all present opportunities for investment. Additionally, new opportunities for green investment combating climate change need to be considered. |

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| | 3.9.3. | International trade agreements can also offer prospects for stimulating economic growth. The issue is particularly pressing in view of the dangers presented by the UK’s possible departure from the EU and trade conflicts involving the USA. The EU should support a rules-based system of international economic relations supplemented by negotiation of free trade agreements. These should aim for minimal tariff levels, taking due account of human rights, ILO standards and the right of the states to regulate in the public interest. |

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| | 3.9.4. | The AGS is unconcerned by levels of investment, suggesting that the gap identified after 2008 has almost been closed. Investment (understood as gross fixed capital formation) was set to reach 20,6% of GDP in 2018, compared with 22,5% in 2007 and 19,4% in 2014 [(14)](#ntr14-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0014). The investment gap, measured in these terms, has therefore been reduced somewhat, but not overcome. |

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| | 3.9.5. | Investment remains at a low level compared with that in the USA and South Korea, among the EU’s natural competitors for innovation. Levels remain particularly subdued in a number of lower income countries and in countries that suffered the greatest declines after 2008. |

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| | 3.9.6. | The AGS favours a number of areas of social investment, including health, long-term care systems and public housing. The EESC has argued for the many positive effects of well planned, effective and efficient future-oriented social investment which should be viewed not as a cost but as an investment in Europe’s growth and employment potential [(15)](#ntr15-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0015). Implementing these objectives requires space for public spending. |

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| | 3.9.7. | The Investment Plan for Europe is welcomed as a means for supporting investment targeted towards the EU’s policy priorities. However, the resources made available have been limited and, in aggregate terms, have been enough only to maintain, and not to increase, the total of EIB credits [(16)](#ntr16-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0016). These were in fact 7% below the average level for 2013-2016 in 2017 [(17)](#ntr17-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0017). |

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| | 3.9.8. | An approach is needed that will provide an adequately funded investment programme, including resources from the EU budget with backing from Member States’ budgets. With this, the EU will be better able to implement its stated objectives of support for SME development, for investment in new technologies promoting the desired green transformation, and for investment in enhancing education and skill levels and in improving social conditions. The EESC has previously argued that the flexibility currently allowed in the growth and stability pact is not enough and that discussions should be opened at EU level on a fully-fledged rule which excludes value-adding public investment from the scope of the SGP, generally referred to as the ‘golden rule’ [(18)](#ntr18-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0018), so that debt sustainability can be assured. |

3.10.   Debt

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| | 3.10.1. | The EESC, in line with its previous opinion [(19)](#ntr19-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0019), concurs with the concerns expressed in the AGS that high levels of public and private debt are persistent sources of vulnerability, notably within the euro area. Gross public debt has fallen from its peak level of 88,1% of GDP in 2014 to 81,4% of GDP in 2018, still well above the 2008 level and well above the target of 60% of GDP. However, international comparisons show that public debt levels over 60% of GDP are not necessarily linked to slower economic growth. Reducing public debt appears easiest where there is rapid economic growth. The best protection against the dangers associated with high debt levels is therefore a full restoration of economic growth through anti-cyclical macroeconomic policies. Moreover, growth-friendly fiscal consolidation in good times may help to prevent adverse market reactions in bad times. |

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| | 3.10.2. | Private debt has come down in recent years but remains above the level before the introduction of the euro in most EU Member States. Deleveraging of households and firms is less lengthy and painful when economic growth is high. The destabilisation of euro area economies through a pro-cyclical housing market must be closely monitored and avoided by regulatory means to prevent economic crises. |

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| | 3.10.3. | Debt reduction is helped by high quality institutions on a par with the best performing economies. They ensure efficiency in product, service, financial and labour markets, help to achieve an adequate quality of public administration, and support appropriate pensions, competition and taxation policies. |

3.11.   Banking Union

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| | 3.11.1. | If current proposals for the Banking Union were put into practice, they would be insufficient when set against the experience of past financial crises. Measures should be taken to ensure that expanding capital markets are properly supervised so as to not to allow any toxic securitised products in European capital markets that may contribute to the next financial crisis. Supervisory bodies in the European Union need to ensure that a capital markets union does not result in an acceleration of capital flight out of individual Member States during financial market stress. In order to ensure conducive financing conditions for the real economy, the negative feedback-loop between banks and sovereign interest rates should be weakened. Two integral parts to this end are a European Deposit Insurance and the provision of an appropriate backstop to the Single Resolution Fund by the European Stability Mechanism. Before establishing a European Deposit Insurance, non-performing loans should be cleared from the balance sheets of participating banks to the greatest extent practicable and possible. |

3.12.   Euro area reforms

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| | 3.12.1. | Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) should be pursued with more imagination and vigour. Proposals for the reform of the EMU and its governance are currently insufficient to protect against the risks of asymmetric shocks. The previous one-sided, debtor only, current account rebalancing has harmed the overall GDP of the euro area, contributing to its slow recovery after 2008. To allow former current-account deficit countries more room to expand their economies (in terms of their fiscal and external balance), current account surplus countries should not only be incentivised to invest more, but also to increase their wages and social benefits to support private consumption. |

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| | 3.12.2. | The EESC urges European leaders to step up the speed of reform regarding the EMU, Banking Union, and Capital Markets Union. However, as long the euro area lacks a common budget that can create a positive fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole, monetary stimulus will remain necessary during any future recession. With the foreseeable end of the ECB’s asset purchasing programmes at the end of 2018, we recommend that the ECB considers an asset purchasing programme that can be swiftly activated during a recession, should fiscal stimulus fail to materialise. The programme should be oriented towards the real economy and climate-friendly investments. |

3.13.   Fair taxation

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| | 3.13.1. | Noting the discussions within the European Commission that taxation could become a matter for qualified majority voting, the EESC continues to support an emphasis on fair taxation policies, i.e. taking account of each individual’s ability to contribute. The EESC, in line with previous opinions, supports the development of a widely accepted Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base as a means of enhancing the single market by simplifying the tax affairs of larger companies and a means of tackling aggressive tax planning [(20)](#ntr20-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0020). It also welcomes digital tax initiatives, believing it very important to develop new globally acceptable principles on how to attribute corporate profits in line with value creation to an EU country and tax them accordingly [(21)](#ntr21-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0021). It also welcomes the importance attached in the AGS to combatting tax fraud, evasion and aggressive tax planning, in line with previous EESC opinions [(22)](#ntr22-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0022). |

3.14.   Structural reforms

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| | 3.14.1. | The AGS emphasises once more the importance of structural reforms, seen as helpful for creating employment and reducing levels of debt. However, it remains unclear what is meant by ‘structural reform’ making it difficult to interpret claims that past reforms have had demonstrably positive effects. The EESC has in previous opinions advocated structural reforms geared towards social and economic development: more and better jobs, improved access to the labour market, education, training and skills acquisition, sustainable growth, administrative and institutional quality, and environmental sustainability [(23)](#ntr23-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0023). It has argued that such reforms should be country-specific, consistent with National Reform Programmes (NRPs) to improve well-being, and backed by democratic support, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach for all Member States [(24)](#ntr24-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0024). |

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| | 3.14.2. | Recent modest growth performance and labour market developments raise questions about the benefits of some of the past policies, introduced under the label of ‘structural reform’. The numbers employed have increased, in line with rising demand, but with frequent deteriorations in job quality and increases in labour market segmentation. |

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| | 3.14.3. | The results of past ‘structural reforms’ remain an area of controversy. Some assessments have been positive, with employers reported as expressing some degree of satisfaction with reforms in labour markets [(25)](#ntr25-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0025). However, there is also a substantial body of literature casting serious doubts on the European Commission’s past labour-market policy recommendations [(26)](#ntr26-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0026). Thus, the latest OECD Jobs Strategy now argues on the basis of ‘new evidence’, that ‘countries with policies and institutions that promote job quality, job quantity and greater inclusiveness perform better than those where the focus is predominantly on enhancing (or preserving) market flexibility’ [(27)](#ntr27-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0027). |

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| | 3.14.4. | The EESC repeats its observation that the success or failure of a given reform measure often plays out over a period of more than five years [(28)](#ntr28-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0028). An assessment should be undertaken of the effects of past policies introduced as ‘structural reforms’, based on evidence and with the full involvement of the social partners and civil society, as a basis for informing future policy recommendations [(29)](#ntr29-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0029). |

3.15.   European pillar of social rights

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| | 3.15.1. | The EESC welcomes the recognition of the importance of the social pillar, repeating the urgency of making it a reality in view of the poor economic and social performance in many countries since 2008. |

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| | 3.15.2. | The social pillar should be fully integrated into the European semester. It should not feature only as an annex. The accompanying scoreboard indicates the scale of the task ahead if the EU is to achieve a ‘social triple-A rating’. An acceptable level of incomes, living standards, social security, welfare provision, educational attainment and digital access has clearly not been achieved across all Member States [(30)](#ntr30-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0030). |

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| | 3.15.3. | The Pillar of Social Rights should be used as a means to measure recommendations to Member States. The Pillar’s 20 principles should be a used as markers for assessing countries’ success in integrating their commitment to the Social Pillar into their economic policies. |

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| | 3.15.4. | This also points to the need for adequate means of financing, including contributions from the EU level. The EU’s investment plan, if adequately funded, and the EU’s cohesion policy can both contribute, in coordination with country-specific recommendations. This implies allowing appropriate flexibility within the growth and stability pact. As argued in a previous opinion, it also implies continued adequate funding for cohesion policy from the EU budget [(31)](#ntr31-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0031). |

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| | 3.15.5. | Careful thought should also be given to the proposal made by President Juncker in his State of the Union Address 2017 for a European Labour Authority. This could help ensure the effective enforcement of EU labour and social security rights and combat unfair competition. |

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| | 3.15.6. | As well as being used as a guide to policy recommendations, the scoreboard attached to the social pillar should be used as an example for similar analyses of performance of individual countries in relation to environmental and climate-change polices, so that they can be assessed at a similar level of seriousness. |

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| | 3.15.7. | In view of the importance of promoting sustainable growth, meaning sustainable in economic, environmental and social terms, the title of the Annual Growth Survey should be changed to the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey. |

3.16.   The role of the social partners in the European Semester

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| | 3.16.1. | The Member State governments, the social partners and civil society organisations have to reach agreement on essential national reforms that will best enable their economies to maintain or improve the living standards of their citizens. Therefore, the inputs of local EU semester officers, national fiscal councils, national productivity boards and national social and economic committees should be involved. Members of the EESC can also play a role in this field. |

Brussels, 20 February 2019.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Luca JAHIER

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[(1)](#ntc1-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0001)  WEF Global Risks Report 2019.

[(2)](#ntc2-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0002)  OECD Economic Outlook November 2018: ‘Editorial’ of the Chief Economist, and ‘General Assessment of the Macroeconomic Situation’ p. 43-46.

[(3)](#ntc3-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0003)  EESC additional opinion on Euro area economic policy 2018 ([OJ C 62, 15.2.2019, p. 312](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_062_R_TOC)).

[(4)](#ntc4-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0004)  COM(2018) 761 final, p. 14.

[(5)](#ntc5-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0005)  COM(2018) 761 final, p. 14.

[(6)](#ntc6-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0006)  COM(2018) 761 final, p. 41.

[(7)](#ntc7-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0007)  The European Commission's Joint Employment Report 2018 shows that only 47,4% or persons with disabilities of working age are in employment in the EU.

[(8)](#ntc8-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0008)  COM(2018) 770 final, p. 6.

[(9)](#ntc9-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0009)  The European Commission's Joint Employment Report 2018 indicates that persons with disabilities are more likely to be early school leavers than non-disabled people by 10,3 percentage points (based on figures from 2015), and are less likely to complete tertiary education than non-disabled people by 13,6 percentage points (based on figures from 2015).

[(10)](#ntc10-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0010)  WEF Global Risks Report 2019.

[(11)](#ntc11-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0011)  BloombergNEF - Clean Energy Investment Trends, 3Q 2018.

[(12)](#ntc12-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0012)  COM(2018) 773 final.

[(13)](#ntc13-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0013)  EESC opinion on Euro area economic policy 2017 ([OJ C 173, 31.5.2017, p. 33](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2017_173_R_TOC)).

[(14)](#ntc14-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0014)  AMECO database.

[(15)](#ntc15-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0015)  EESC opinion on Funding the European Pillar of Social Rights ([OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_262_R_TOC)).

[(16)](#ntc16-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0016)  ECA opinion on EFSI: an early proposal to extend and expand, p. 21.

[(17)](#ntc17-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0017)  EIB, Statistical Report 2017.

[(18)](#ntc18-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0018)  EESC opinion on Euro area economic policy 2017, point 3.4 ([OJ C 81, 2.3.2018, p. 216](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_081_R_TOC)).

[(19)](#ntc19-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0019)  EESC opinion on Euro area economic policy 2018 ([OJ C 197, 8.6.2018, p. 33](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_197_R_TOC)).

[(20)](#ntc20-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0020)  EESC opinion on Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base ([OJ C 434, 15.12.2017, p. 58](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2017_434_R_TOC))

[(21)](#ntc21-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0021)  EESC opinion on Taxation of profits of multinationals in the digital economy ([OJ C 367, 10.10.2018, p. 73](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_367_R_TOC)).

[(22)](#ntc22-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0022)  EESC opinion on Tax system for competition/growth ([OJ C 434, 15.12.2017, p. 18](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2017_434_R_TOC)).

[(23)](#ntc23-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0023)  For example, improving the business environment, the financing of companies and R&D expenditure; increasing the productivity of companies, sectors and economies; promoting the creation of good quality jobs with higher wages, and the simultaneous reduction of temporary and unstable jobs with low wages; strengthening collective bargaining, and the autonomy of the social partners in it, and social dialogue at local, regional, national and European levels; reforming public administrations to make them more effective for economic and social development, and more transparent for the public; promoting the quality of education and training systems for workers to bring about equal opportunities and results for all social groups.

[(24)](#ntc24-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0024)  EESC opinion on Funding the European Pillar of Social Rights ([OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_262_R_TOC), point 2.5).

[(25)](#ntc25-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0025)  ECB, Structural policies in the euro area

[(26)](#ntc26-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0026)  A. Piasna & M. Myant (eds) Myths of Employment Deregulation: How it neither creates jobs nor reduces labour market segmentation, Brussels, ETUI, 2017.

[(27)](#ntc27-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0027)  Good Jobs for All in a Changing World of Work, The OECD Jobs Strategy, p. 8.

[(28)](#ntc28-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0028)  EESC opinion on Reform Support Programme ([OJ C 62, 15.2.2019, p. 121](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_062_R_TOC)).

[(29)](#ntc29-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0029)  EESC opinion on Reform Support Programme ([OJ C 62, 15.2.2019, p. 121](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2019_062_R_TOC)).

[(30)](#ntc30-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0030)  EESC opinion on Funding the European Pillar of Social Rights ([OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_262_R_TOC)).

[(31)](#ntc31-C_2019190EN.01002401-E0031)  EESC opinion on Multiannual Financial Framework post 2020 ([OJ C 440, 6.12.2018, p. 106](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2018_440_R_TOC)).

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