After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is

not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 30, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SRBISLAV STANOJEVICH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

WELLS FARGO BANK; BANK OF

AMERICA; NORWEST BANK,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-2163

(D.C. No. 05 MC 18 MV)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

Before HENRY, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Srbislav Stanojevich appeals from an order of the district court

denying his motion to quash and granting the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS)

motion to enforce a summons to the Bank of America. We have jurisdiction
The IRS withdrew the summons to Norwest Bank, and Mr. Stanojevich’s 1

motion to quash the summons to Wells Fargo Bank in Oregon was dismissed by

the district court for lack of jurisdiction. See I.R.C. § 7609(h)(1) (providing that

jurisdiction to hear a motion to quash lies with “[t]he United States district court

for the district within which the person to be summoned resides or is found”).

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirm the order, and grant respondent the United States

of America’s motion for sanctions.

In 2004, the IRS began looking into Mr. Stanojevich’s failure to file federal

income taxes for the years 1997-1998 and 2001-2003. When efforts to meet

informally failed, IRS Agent K. Steve Cordova caused a summons to be issued to

the Bank of America for his bank records.1

Mr. Stanojevich filed a motion to quash the summons. The IRS moved for

enforcement of the summons, and submitted an affidavit from Agent Cordova, 

which stated that (1) the summons was issued for the purpose of determining

Mr. Stanojevich’s tax liabilities, (2) the materials sought were relevant to that

purpose, (3) the IRS did not already possess the information, (4) the

administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code were followed, and

(5) the matter had not been referred to the Justice Department. Applying the test

announced in Codner v. United States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1332 (10th Cir. 1994),

concerning the enforceability of IRS summonses, the district court held that the
We deny Mr. Stanojevich’s motions to “Demand This Court Read all 2

Pleadings Petitioner Files With This Court, And Adhere Only to Constitutionally

Compliant Law and Case Law, And More Particularly, The Bill of Rights, in its

[R]ulings” and to “Claim And Exercise Constitutional Rights and Require The

Presiding Judge to Rule Upon This Motion, and All Public Officers of This Court

to Uphold Said Rights.”

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summons should be enforced. The court denied Mr. Stanojevich’s motion for

reconsideration and this appeal followed.2

Mr. Stanojevich’s appeal is nothing more than a rehash of arguments that

we have previously rejected as frivolous. For example, he claims that (1) he is a

“free, [s]overeign, live man,” who is immune from tax liability, Aplt. Br. at 14,

(2) income tax violates the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against

involuntary servitude, id. at 14-15, (3) the Internal Revenue Code is invalid,

id. at 5-6, and (4) the summons was invalid because it did not bear a number, 

id. at 6-8. See, e.g., Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir.

1990) (rejecting as frivolous arguments concerning the government’s authority to

impose income tax and listing arguments that have been repeatedly rejected by the

courts). Therefore, we affirm the district court for substantially the same reasons

stated in its well-reasoned orders dated March 24, 2006, and April 13, 2006.

Despite the fact that the district court warned Mr. Stanojevich that he faced

sanctions if he continued to press his arguments, he persists in presenting his

frivolous contentions in this court. In his response in opposition to the

government’s motion for sanctions, he simply repeats his arguments in the
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underlying appeal and questions the legality of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, which empowers this court to award damages as a sanction

for a frivolous appeal. We hold that this appeal is frivolous and grant the

government’s motion. See generally Stafford v. United States, 208 F.3d 1177,

1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (awarding $4,000 in sanctions to the government for

defending a frivolous appeal). As to the amount, we have examined the appellate

briefs and determine that a sanction of $4,000 is appropriate. 

The government’s motion for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of

$4,000. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

PER CURIAM