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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JEFFREY PAUL CORNWELL (6)

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§

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CRIMINAL NO. 4:24-CR-27-SDJ

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Jeffrey Paul Cornwell’s Second Notice of 

Opposition to a Trial Continuance and Request for Severance, (Dkt. #121), and the 

Government’s response. (Dkt. #123). After considering the Parties’ filings, record, and 

applicable law, the Court concludes the motion should be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2024, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas 

indicted Cornwell on two conspiracy counts. (Dkt. #1). According to the indictment, 

Cornwell conspired and participated in a multi-state drug and money laundering 

scheme. Based on this alleged conduct, the indictment charges Cornwell with (1) 

conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a controlled 

substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and (2) conspiracy to commit money 

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). (Dkt. #25).

On February 29, 2024, Cornwell was arrested and made his initial appearance.

(Dkt. #121 at 1). At that time, he was detained. (Dkt. #121 at 1). Following his first 

appearance, Cornwell’s codefendants filed multiple motions delaying this proceeding. 

First, a co-defendant filed the first granted continuance motion on April 29, 2024. 

(Dkt. #87). Cornwell did not oppose that continuance. Second, a co-defendant filed 

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another continuance on June 10, 2024. (Dkt. #95). Cornwell opposed this motion. 

Even so, the Court granted the continuance. (Dkt. #102). Finally, the Government 

requested another continuance on September 3, 2024. (Dkt. #118). Cornwell opposes

this continuance. (Dkt. #121). 

Invoking his rights under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment, 

Cornwell maintains that this case is not complex and additional continuances are 

unwarranted. (Dkt. #121 at 2). Cornwell further claims the Government is unwilling 

or unable to go to trial, and that the Government’s request for a continuance based 

in part on the discovery of new evidence is exaggerated because the evidence has 

purportedly been available for several months. (Dkt. #121 at 2). On these bases, 

Cornwell alleges the Government’s delay is prejudicing him. (Dkt. #121 at 2–3). For 

its part, the Government explains that this case concerns a complex, multi-state 

conspiracy involving several marketers, pharmacists, and healthcare providers who 

dispensed controlled substances online to thousands of customers nationwide. 

(Dkt. #123 at 1–2). The Government further contends that during recent months it 

has executed multiple search warrants that resulted in extensive discovery. 

(Dkt. #123 at 2). In the Government’s view, the nature of this case and the recent 

collection of substantial discovery merit a further continuance of trial.

In conjunction with his speedy-trial request, Cornwell requests severance from 

his codefendants. (Dkt. #121 at 6–7). The Government opposes severance, contending 

that Cornwell has not overcome the “strong interest” that courts have in avoiding 

multiple trials for defendants charged together. (Dkt. #123 at 5). 

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The Court will address Cornwell’s speedy-trial and Sixth Amendment 

arguments first, followed by his request for severance.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Rights Under the Speedy Trial Act Were Not Violated.

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (“Act”) requires that a criminal defendant’s trial 

commence “within [seventy] days after he is charged or makes an initial appearance, 

whichever is later, see § 3161(c)(1), and entitles him to dismissal of the charges if that 

deadline is not met, § 3162(a)(2).” Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 198–99, 130 

S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed. 2d 54 (2010) (cleaned up). The Act excludes “delay resulting 

from other proceedings concerning the defendant” in its calculations. 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). Additionally, “delay resulting from a continuance granted by 

the district court may be excluded [from a Speedy Trial Act calculation] if the district 

court makes the findings required by 18 U.S.C. 3167(h)(7).” Bloate, 559 U.S. at 199 

(cleaned up). The defendant bears the burden of proving violations of the Act. 

18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).

Cornwell insists his rights under the Act were violated because he purportedly 

has been awaiting trial for 146 days. (Dkt. #121 at 4). Cornwell is mistaken. 

As the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have made clear, when construing 

a statute, courts “must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and 

unambiguous” and if it is, the statute must be applied “according to its terms.” 

Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009) 

(citations omitted); see also BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 

1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation 

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requires us to ‘presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and 

means in a statute what it says there.’”) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 

503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992)); United States v. 

Sharp, 62 F.4th 951, 953 (5th Cir. 2023) (“The text at issue is unambiguous, and so 

our inquiry begins and ends with the text.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

The Act’s language is unambiguous and provides that trial must begin within 

seventy days of the later of (1) “the filing date . . . of the information or indictment,” 

or (2) “from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court 

in which such charge is pending[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Fifth Circuit has 

consistently applied the Act’s plain language this way. See United States v. Gordon, 

93 F.4th 294, 302–04 (5th Cir. 2024) (applying the Speedy Trial Act’s seventy-day 

language); United States v. Burrell, 634 F.3d 284, 286–88 (5th Cir. 2011) (same). 

Cornwell’s theory that a pretrial delay occurred is untethered to the Act’s text. 

The Act explicitly starts the clock from the later of the filing date of the information 

or indictment or “from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer 

of the court in which such charge is pending.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

So, applying Section 3161(c)(1) as written, the Act’s clock did not commence 

until Cornwell appeared in the Eastern District of Texas on February 29, 2024.

Cornwell’s contrary argument that the clock began on February 15 is mistaken

because February 29 is the later date and thus the triggering event under the Act. 

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The relevant triggering event matters because Cornwell’s seventy-day window 

has not expired. To the contrary, only sixty-two days have tolled. See (Dkt. #88, #102)

(calculating the relevant days between February 29, 2024, April 30, 2024, and June

27, 2024). The Act exempts delays “resulting from a continuance” based on a judge’s 

conclusion that the “ends of justice served by taking such [a delay] outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)

(cleaned up). These delays are known as ends-of-justice continuances. The Supreme 

Court has made clear that the ends-of-justice provision “gives the district court 

discretion—within limits and subject to specific procedures— to accommodate limited 

delays for case-specific needs.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 498–99, 126 

S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006). And the Fifth Circuit has explained that “the only 

requirements for an ends-of-justice continuance are that the order memorializing the 

continuance indicate when the motion was granted, and that the reasons stated be 

and can be fairly understood as being those that actually motivated the court at the 

time it granted the continuance.” Gordon, 93 F.4th at 305 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing 

United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 283 (5th Cir. 2002)). 

Cornwell agreed to one continuance but opposed the second. The Court, in 

granting the continuances, considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B).

(Dkt. #88, #102). The Court’s orders also provided the reasons for granting the 

continuances. See Gordon, 93 F.4th at 305. As a result, the delays were excludable 

time under the Act. On this record there has been no violation of the Speedy Trial 

Act. 

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B. Defendant’s Rights Under the Sixth Amendment Were Not Violated.

The Sixth Amendment has been described as “the heartland of constitutional 

criminal procedure.” Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO.

L.J. 641, 641 (1996). It affords “the accused” “the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S.

CONST. amend. VI.1 As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[b]ecause no two cases are the 

same and because ‘the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are designed to 

move at a deliberate pace,’ the ‘right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative’ and 

circumstance-specific.” United States v. Ansari, 48 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 

(1966)). The Fifth Circuit has also noted that “[i]t will be the unusual case, however, 

where the time limits under the Speedy Trial Act have been satisfied but the right to 

a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment has been violated.” Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 

at 284.

In evaluating whether a defendant has been denied his Sixth Amendment 

speedy-trial right, a court considers the factors first laid out by the Supreme Court in

Barker v. Wingo: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) a

defendant’s diligence in asserting the right, and (4) prejudice to a defendant. 407 U.S. 

514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The first factor, the delay’s length, is 

a “triggering mechanism” for determining whether a court must examine the other 

Barker factors. United States v. Serna-Villareal, 352 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2003). 

1 The Speedy Trial Act is “distinct from [a defendant’s] constitutional speedy-trial 

rights.” United States v. Lamb, No. 5:19-CR-25, 2020 WL 6482977, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 

2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-CR-25, 2020 WL 5269535 (E.D. Tex. 

Sept. 4, 2020). 

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Whether a delay is long enough to trigger examining the remaining Barker factors is 

a case-specific inquiry, but delay exceeding one year generally meets this threshold 

requirement. See id.

When balancing the Barker factors, courts weigh the first three factors against 

any prejudice a defendant has suffered because of prosecutorial delay. Id. at 230–31. 

A defendant has the burden to show prejudice. Id. at 230. And unless the first three

Barker factors weigh so heavily in the defendant’s favor that prejudice is presumed, 

the defendant must demonstrate “actual prejudice” to prove his speedy trial rights

were violated. Id. at 231.

i. Length of Delay

As to the threshold inquiry under Barker, “[a] delay of less than one year will 

rarely qualify as ‘presumptively prejudicial’ for purposes of triggering the Barker 

inquiry.” Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1994). And “any delay caused 

by [the defendant’s] own requests for continuances should be discounted.” United 

States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 2008).

Here, since Cornwell first appeared in the Eastern District of Texas, he agreed 

to the initial continuance. See (Dkt. #88, #121 at 4). As a result, the delays caused by 

his accepted continuance are discounted. In other words, he cannot contribute to his

trial’s delay and then claim a constitutional violation occurred. 

Cornwell has also been indicted for less than a year. Because Cornwell has 

been indicted for less than the period that typically qualifies as “presumptively 

prejudicial,” he is not prejudiced. Thus, Barker’s threshold inquiry has not been 

triggered. The delay therefore is not “presumptively prejudicial,” and weighs against 

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Cornwell. See Cowart, 16 F.3d at 646 (“A delay of less than one year will rarely qualify 

as ‘presumptively prejudicial.’”). 

ii. Reasons for Delay

Although no Barker factor alone is dispositive, the second one—the reason for

the delay—is the “flag all litigants seek to capture.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 

474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986). When applying this factor,

different reasons for delay are assigned different weights. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

Bad-faith prosecutorial delays designed “to hamper the defense” are “weighted 

heavily against the government.” Id. Delays caused by “negligence or overcrowded 

courts,” however, are weighted “less heavily.” Id. And other delays, such as those 

attributable to the defendant, do not count against the government. For example, a 

defendant can contribute to delay by asking for continuances, and “if he later claims 

a speedy trial violation, he ‘will not be heard to complain of a lapse of time 

attributable to continuances he sought and received from the trial court.’” United 

States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Nelson v. Hargett, 

989 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Jackson, 549 F.3d at 970 (same).

According to Cornwell, the Government has stalled discovery production, 

procrastinated plea negotiations, and delayed examining new evidence. But these 

conclusory assertions are contradicted by the record, which shows that the trial 

continuances have been driven by the complexity of the case and the associated 

extensive discovery. In this regard, the Court notes that Cornwell’s codefendants 

asked for the first and second continuances precisely because of the amount of 

discovery material in this matter. Cornwell was unopposed to the first such 

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continuance. The Government now seeks a continuance for similar reasons, citing the

discovery of new evidence, retrieved following the execution of post-indictment search 

warrants, that has changed the Government’s case analysis. Given the foregoing, 

Cornwell’s unsupported assertions of deliberate delay by the Government are 

unpersuasive. 

In sum, this factor weighs against Cornwell’s claim that his rights under the 

Sixth Amendment are in jeopardy. 

iii. Diligence in assertion of the speedy-trial right

Under the third factor, the “defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right” 

receives “strong evidentiary weight,” while “failure to assert the right will make it 

difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Gordon, 93 F.4th 

at 308 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531–32). Thus, a “mere assertion of the right does 

not automatically cause this factor to weigh in a defendant’s favor, and a defendant 

who waits too long to assert his right will have his silence weighed against him. Id. 

In conducting this inquiry, courts “assess[] the totality of the proceedings in 

considering the amount of time that passed before a defendant should have raised his 

speedy trial rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 

2007)). 

Although Cornwell asserts his right to a speedy trial, he has not diligently 

pursued that right. Indeed, Cornwell acquiesced in the first continuance of this case. 

His consent contradicts his assertions of diligence. See Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d at 378 

(“At the very least, a defendant should manifest his desire to be tried promptly.”) 

(quotation omitted). Along with his acquiescence, Cornwell did not assert his right to 

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a speedy trial until June 2024. (Dkt. #96). Thus, while Cornwell has twice invoked 

his speedy-trial right, the fact that he waited several months to assert that right 

undermines his claim of diligence. See Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d at 378 (“If a defendant 

waits too long to assert his right, his ‘silence will be weighed against him.’”) (citing 

Parker, 505 F.3d at 329–30). This factor provides little support for Cornwell’s speedytrial complaint. 

iv. Prejudice from delay

Taken together, the first three Barker factors do not weigh in Cornwell’s favor. 

As a result, Cornwell is not entitled to a presumption of prejudice and must show 

actual prejudice. Serna-Villareal, 352 F.3d at 231. He has not done so.

The Supreme Court has identified three interests protected by the speedy-trial 

guarantee: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety 

and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be 

impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. “Of these, the most serious is the last.” Id. As to 

the first interest, “[t]he time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on 

the individual.” Id. Concerning the second interest, even absent incarceration, a 

defendant “is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a 

cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.” Id. at 533. But courts “regard none of 

the [Barker] factors ... as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a 

deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. Because Cornwell has not shown that any 

of these interests have been compromised by the continuances in this case, he has 

also necessarily failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.

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The Court concludes that no Barker factors support Cornwell’s motion and 

therefore his Sixth Amendment right has not been compromised.

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C. Cornwell Will Not Be Severed from His Codefendants.

In general, “persons indicted together should be tried together, especially in 

conspiracy cases.” United States v. Hankton, 51 F.4th 578, 608 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. 

denied, 143 S.Ct. 839, 215 L.Ed. 2d 82 (2023). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

8(b) allows the joinder of multiple defendants “if they are alleged to have participated 

in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, 

constituting an offense or offenses.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). Rule 14, however, permits 

severance when “joinder of offenses or defendants ... appears to prejudice a defendant 

or the government.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a).

The Fifth Circuit has admonished that its “caselaw does not reflect a ‘liberal 

attitude toward severance.’” United States v. Ledezma-Cepeda, 894 F.3d 686, 690 (5th 

Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 822 (5th Cir. 2012)). Indeed, 

“severance is the exception,” not the rule, Ledezma-Cepeda, 894 F.3d at 690, and is

justified “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific 

trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable 

judgment about guilt or innocence,” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 

S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed. 2d 317 (1993). “This presumption stems from the belief that ...

joint trials ‘promote efficiency’ and protect against the ‘inequity of inconsistent 

2 Cornwell did not assert Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 as a basis for relief. 

In any event, any potential arguments by Cornwell of undue delay under Rule 48 would 

lack merit for the same reasons that his Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment claims fail. 

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verdicts.’” Ledezma-Cepeda, 894 F.3d at 690 (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537).

As a result, “to surmount this heavy presumption, a defendant must show that 

(1) the joint trial prejudice[s] him to such an extent that the district court [can] not 

provide adequate protection; and (2) the prejudice outweigh[s] the government’s 

interest in economy of judicial administration.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); see also id. (“[g]eneric allegations of prejudice will not suffice...”).

In other words, a defendant must prove a “specific compelling prejudice” resulting 

from joinder. United States v. Hertzberg, No. 6:22-CR-003-JDK-JDL, 2023 WL 

5943115, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2023) (citing United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 

383 (5th Cir. 2007)). 

Additionally, in conspiracy cases, the Fifth Circuit “generally favor[s] specific 

instructions over severance.” Ledezma-Cepeda, 894 F.3d at 690. “That is because it is 

generally presumed that juries follow the instructions given to them by the district 

court and are capable of compartmentalizing the evidence against each defendant.” 

Id. (cleaned up). So even when the evidence in a case is “both massive and complex,” 

the court can “explicitly instruct[ ] the jury to consider each offense separately and 

each defendant individually.” Hertzberg, 2023 WL 5943115, at *3 (quotation omitted). 

Thus, “[l]imiting instructions such as these are generally sufficient to prevent the 

threat of prejudice resulting from unsevered trials.” Id.

Cornwell does not come close to meeting the high standard for severance. He 

provides no evidence of any prejudice to him associated with being joined with his 

codefendants for trial in this conspiracy case, much less a “specific compelling 

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prejudice” resulting from joinder. Likewise, Cornwell provides no argument that

overcomes the Fifth Circuit’s presumption against severance. See Ledezma-Cepeda, 

894 F.3d at 690 (“severance is the exception.”). Rather, Cornwell asserts only “generic 

allegations of prejudice” that are insufficient on their face. Id.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant Jeffrey Paul Cornwell’s

Second Notice of Opposition to a Trial Continuance and Request for Severance, 

(Dkt. #121), is DENIED. An order considering the Government’s Motion for 

Continuance, (Dkt. #50), will follow separately. 

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