The Hon. George F. Gunn, Jr., United States District Judge

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for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the report and

recommendation of the Hon. Terry I. Adelman, United States

Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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No. 95-4188EM

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Arvin J. Garrett, *

*

Appellant, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court

* for the Eastern District

* of Missouri

Michael Groose, *

*

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: September 11, 1996

 Filed: November 1, 1996

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Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

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RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Arvin Garrett appeals the dismissal of his second habeas corpus

petition by the District Court. The Court dismissed two of his four

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proffered grounds for relief as successive and two as abusive. We hold

that petitioner has not met the requirements necessary to allow us to

consider this successive petition on its merits. Therefore, we affirm.
 Garrett was at the time serving a life sentence for another 2

murder for which he had been convicted in 1977.

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I.

Arvin Garrett was convicted in 1978 of the first degree murder of

James Bundy. The Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without

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possibility of parole for 50 years. After an unsuccessful appeal of the

guilty verdict, State v. Garrett, 595 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. App. 1980), Garrett

brought his initial federal habeas corpus action, which was rejected.

Garrett v. Armontrout, No. 85-2168-C(2) (E.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, No. 86-2282

(8th Cir., Oct. 21, 1986). In 1990, Garrett sought post-conviction relief

in state court, but again had no success. Garrett v. State, 814 S.W.2d 325

(Mo. App. 1991). He then, in 1995, filed this action in the District

Court. The Court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, dismissing

two of Garrett's claims as successive and two as abusive. Garrett v.

Groose, No. 4:95CV00758 (E.D. Mo., Oct. 4, 1995).

Garrett advanced four grounds for relief in his petition to the

District Court. He contended first that his confession was involuntary

because of his diminished mental capacity. He also claimed that his

conviction was obtained through a violation of his right not to incriminate

himself, again because his diminished mental capacity impeded his ability

to recognize his rights. He asserted that the trial court's failure to

sequester the jury and notify him of the nature of the charges violated his

equal-protection rights. Finally, he argued that his trial, appellate, and

state post-conviction counsel were ineffective. Recognizing that he faced

a higher hurdle on his second petition, Garrett offered mental incapacity

as an excuse providing the cause that a repeat petitioner must show to

avoid having his claim dismissed. He offered to present as evidence in

support of this claim the fact that drugs were being administered to him

while in prison to treat
 Garrett claims he was being treated with Mellaril and

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Thorazine. Mellaril is used to treat adults for depression and

anxiety. Thorazine is used to control manic depression and some

psychotic disorders. Drugs of these types have, in rare instances,

been associated with temporary psychosis. See Physicians' Desk

Reference 2269-71, 2523-25 (50th ed. 1996).

Garrett claimed in his state post-conviction proceeding that

he had been taking Mellaril and Thorazine at the time of his trial.

His trial lawyer, however, noted that Garrett appeared perfectly

competent when the two conferred prior to and during trial. As no

question arose about his competency to stand trial, no pretrial

motion for a mental examination was made. See Garrett v. State,

814 S.W.2d at 327-28. Garrett's lawyer unsuccessfully moved for a

mental examination after the guilty verdict and before sentencing.

See State v. Garrett, 595 S.W.2d at 433-34.

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his anti-social personality disorder. Garrett argued that the mental

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illness prevented him from developing fully the claims he made previously,

and from realizing the existence of the claims he failed to make.

II.

In general, second or successive petitions for writs of habeas corpus

must be dismissed unless the petitioner can show both cause and prejudice -

cause, for example, justifying his failure to raise certain claims in an

earlier petition, and prejudice resulting from those claims' not having

been raised and decided earlier. See, e.g., Washington v. Delo, 51 F.3d

756, 760 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 205 (1995). Under certain

narrowly limited circumstances, a petitioner might be able to show that,

at the time of a previous filing, he had been suffering from a mental

disorder so severe that it was impossible for him to understand the papers

filed on his behalf or to make rational decisions about what claims to

include in them. We have said, for example, that "[a] conclusive showing

of incompetence is required before mental illness can constitute cause."

Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995). "Mental illness

and legal incompetence are not identical, nor are all mentally ill people

legally
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incompetent." Ibid.

Even if petitioner's allegations in the present case meet this

standard, which we doubt, he cannot succeed, because the state courts have

already found him competent, and this finding is entitled to a presumption

of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). Defendant has been contending

ever since 1978 that he was suffering from mental infirmity and was being

treated with Thorazine and Mellaril. His motion for a mental examination

before sentencing was denied, and this action was affirmed on direct

appeal. State v. Garrett, supra, 595 S.W.2d at 433-34. The opinion

rejecting petitioner's contentions in this regard was filed in 1980.

Later, when petitioner applied for post-conviction relief in the state

courts, an evidentiary hearing was held. The lawyer who had represented

petitioner at trial testified that he had no problems with petitioner in

preparing the case, that petitioner was competent, that he was able to

assist in his own defense, and that he did ably assist counsel. Postconviction relief was denied. The Missouri Court of Appeals said: "The

testimony of movant's lawyer, which the motion court obviously believed,

established there was no indication movant had any mental affliction or

that the medication impaired his mental acuity." Garrett v. State, supra,

814 S.W.2d at 328.

We have no reason to doubt these findings. They certainly establish

that petitioner was competent and able to assist in his own defense at the

time of the trial. It appears from papers filed by petitioner in the

District Court in the instant case that the mental condition he now alleges

is precisely the same as the impairment that he claimed in the state

courts. No facts are alleged to indicate that his condition worsened

between the time of his trial in the state court and the filing of his

first habeas petition. Criminal law presumes that individuals are

competent, see Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502, 1506 (8th Cir. 1988) (en

banc) (subsequent history omitted), and a finding of competence,
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once made, continues to be presumptively correct until some good reason to

doubt it is presented. Nothing like this has occurred in the present case.

We hold, therefore, that petitioner's allegation of cause, when

considered in the context of the state-court records in his case, is

legally insufficient. The District Court was therefore correct in

dismissing his second petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the judgment

is

Affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.