# C_2020076EN.01008601.xml

| 9.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 76/86 |
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9.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/86

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P8_TA(2018)0225

Interpretation and implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making

European Parliament resolution of 30 May 2018 on the interpretation and implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (2016/2018(INI))

(2020/C 76/10)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), |
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having regard to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

| — | having regard to Article 295 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
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having regard to Article 295 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (1) (‘the new IIA’), |
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having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (1) (‘the new IIA’),

| — | having regard to the Framework Agreement of 20 October 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (2) (‘the 2010 Framework Agreement’), |
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having regard to the Framework Agreement of 20 October 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (2) (‘the 2010 Framework Agreement’),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2003 on Better Law-Making (3) (‘the 2003 IIA’), |
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having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2003 on Better Law-Making (3) (‘the 2003 IIA’),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 December 1994 – Accelerated working method for official codification of legislative texts (4), |
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having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 December 1994 – Accelerated working method for official codification of legislative texts (4),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of Community legislation (5), |
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having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of Community legislation (5),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts (6), |
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having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts (6),

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration of 13 June 2007 on practical arrangements for the codecision procedure (7), |
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having regard to the Joint Declaration of 13 June 2007 on practical arrangements for the codecision procedure (7),

| — | having regard to the Joint Political Declaration of 27 October 2011 of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on explanatory documents (8), |
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having regard to the Joint Political Declaration of 27 October 2011 of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on explanatory documents (8),

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2017 (9), |
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having regard to the Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2017 (9),

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2018-2019 (10), |
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having regard to the Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2018-2019 (10),

| — | having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 18 March 2014 (the ‘Biocides case’), 16 July 2015 (the ‘Visa Reciprocity Mechanism case’), 17 March 2016 (the ‘CEF delegated act case’), 14 June 2016 (the ‘Tanzania case’) and 24 June 2014 (the ‘Mauritius case’) (11), |
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having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 18 March 2014 (the ‘Biocides case’), 16 July 2015 (the ‘Visa Reciprocity Mechanism case’), 17 March 2016 (the ‘CEF delegated act case’), 14 June 2016 (the ‘Tanzania case’) and 24 June 2014 (the ‘Mauritius case’) (11),

| — | having regard to its decision of 13 December 2016 on the general revision of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (12), |
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having regard to its decision of 13 December 2016 on the general revision of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT): State of Play and Outlook (13), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT): State of Play and Outlook (13),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2016 on the strategic priorities for the Commission Work Programme 2017 (14), |
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having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2016 on the strategic priorities for the Commission Work Programme 2017 (14),

| — | having regard to its decision of 9 March 2016 on the conclusion of an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (15), |
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having regard to its decision of 9 March 2016 on the conclusion of an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (15),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 27 November 2014 on the revision of the Commission’s impact assessment guidelines and the role of the SME test (16), |
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having regard to its resolution of 27 November 2014 on the revision of the Commission’s impact assessment guidelines and the role of the SME test (16),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 February 2014 on follow-up on the delegation of legislative powers and control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (17), |
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having regard to its resolution of 25 February 2014 on follow-up on the delegation of legislative powers and control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (17),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 4 February 2014 on EU Regulatory Fitness and Subsidiarity and Proportionality – 19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011 (18), |
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having regard to its resolution of 4 February 2014 on EU Regulatory Fitness and Subsidiarity and Proportionality – 19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011 (18),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2012 on the 18th report on better legislation – Application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (2010) (19), |
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having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2012 on the 18th report on better legislation – Application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (2010) (19),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2011 on better legislation, subsidiarity and proportionality and smart regulation (20), |
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having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2011 on better legislation, subsidiarity and proportionality and smart regulation (20),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2011 on guaranteeing independent impact assessments (21), |
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having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2011 on guaranteeing independent impact assessments (21),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 October 2017 entitled ‘Completing the better regulation agenda: better solutions for better results’ (COM(2017)0651), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 24 October 2017 entitled ‘Completing the better regulation agenda: better solutions for better results’ (COM(2017)0651),

| — | having regard to Article 294 TFEU on the codecision procedure, |
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having regard to Article 294 TFEU on the codecision procedure,

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 24 October 2017 entitled ‘Overview of the Union’s Efforts to Simplify and to Reduce Regulatory Burdens’ (SWD(2017)0675), |
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having regard to the Commission staff working document of 24 October 2017 entitled ‘Overview of the Union’s Efforts to Simplify and to Reduce Regulatory Burdens’ (SWD(2017)0675),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 21 December 2016 entitled ‘EU law: Better results through better application’ (22), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 21 December 2016 entitled ‘EU law: Better results through better application’ (22),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 September 2016 entitled ‘Better Regulation: Delivering better results for a stronger Union’ (COM(2016)0615), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 14 September 2016 entitled ‘Better Regulation: Delivering better results for a stronger Union’ (COM(2016)0615),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 19 May 2015 entitled ‘Better regulation for better results – An EU agenda’ (COM(2015)0215), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 19 May 2015 entitled ‘Better regulation for better results – An EU agenda’ (COM(2015)0215),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 7 July 2017 on better regulation guidelines (SWD(2017)0350), |
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having regard to the Commission staff working document of 7 July 2017 on better regulation guidelines (SWD(2017)0350),

| — | having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on International Trade, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Petitions (A8-0170/2018), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on International Trade, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Petitions (A8-0170/2018),

| A. | whereas the new IIA entered into force on the day of its signature, 13 April 2016; |
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A.

whereas the new IIA entered into force on the day of its signature, 13 April 2016;

| B. | whereas, on the occasion of the adoption of the new IIA, Parliament and the Commission made a statement affirming that the new agreement ‘reflects the balance between, and respective competences of, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission as set out in the Treaties’ and ‘is without prejudice to the Framework Agreement of 20 October 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (23); |
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B.

whereas, on the occasion of the adoption of the new IIA, Parliament and the Commission made a statement affirming that the new agreement ‘reflects the balance between, and respective competences of, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission as set out in the Treaties’ and ‘is without prejudice to the Framework Agreement of 20 October 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission’ (23);

| C. | whereas, in order to implement the provisions of the new IIA on interinstitutional programming, Parliament revised its Rules of Procedure inter alia to set out the internal processes for negotiating and adopting joint conclusions on multiannual programming and joint declarations on annual interinstitutional programming; |
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C.

whereas, in order to implement the provisions of the new IIA on interinstitutional programming, Parliament revised its Rules of Procedure inter alia to set out the internal processes for negotiating and adopting joint conclusions on multiannual programming and joint declarations on annual interinstitutional programming;

| D. | whereas, in the context of annual interinstitutional programming, the three Institutions agreed on two joint declarations on the EU’s legislative priorities for the years 2017 and 2018-2019 respectively; |
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D.

whereas, in the context of annual interinstitutional programming, the three Institutions agreed on two joint declarations on the EU’s legislative priorities for the years 2017 and 2018-2019 respectively;

| E. | whereas, contrary to the 2003 IIA, the new IIA no longer includes a legal framework for the use of alternative methods of regulation, such as co-regulation and self-regulation, with the result that any reference to such methods is missing; |
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E.

whereas, contrary to the 2003 IIA, the new IIA no longer includes a legal framework for the use of alternative methods of regulation, such as co-regulation and self-regulation, with the result that any reference to such methods is missing;

| F. | whereas paragraph 13 of the new IIA requires the Commission to consult as widely as possible in its impact assessment process; whereas, similarly, paragraph 19 of the new IIA requires the Commission, before adopting a proposal and not after, to conduct public consultations in an open and transparent manner, ensuring that the modalities and time limits of those public consultations allow for the widest possible participation, not restricted to vested interests and their lobbyists; |
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F.

whereas paragraph 13 of the new IIA requires the Commission to consult as widely as possible in its impact assessment process; whereas, similarly, paragraph 19 of the new IIA requires the Commission, before adopting a proposal and not after, to conduct public consultations in an open and transparent manner, ensuring that the modalities and time limits of those public consultations allow for the widest possible participation, not restricted to vested interests and their lobbyists;

| G. | whereas in July 2017 the Commission revised its Better Regulation guidelines so as to better explain and exploit the linkages between the various steps of policy-making within the Commission, replacing the previous stand-alone guidelines, which addressed separately impact assessment, evaluation and implementation, and so as to include new guidance on planning and stakeholder consultation; |
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G.

whereas in July 2017 the Commission revised its Better Regulation guidelines so as to better explain and exploit the linkages between the various steps of policy-making within the Commission, replacing the previous stand-alone guidelines, which addressed separately impact assessment, evaluation and implementation, and so as to include new guidance on planning and stakeholder consultation;

| H. | whereas under paragraph 16 of the new IIA, the Commission may, on its own initiative or upon invitation by Parliament or the Council, complement its own impact assessment or undertake other analytical work it considers necessary; |
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H.

whereas under paragraph 16 of the new IIA, the Commission may, on its own initiative or upon invitation by Parliament or the Council, complement its own impact assessment or undertake other analytical work it considers necessary;

| I. | whereas the new IIA acknowledges the replacement of the former Impact Assessment Board with the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board; whereas the latter’s task is, inter alia, to carry out an objective quality check of the Commission’s impact assessments; whereas in order for an initiative, accompanied by an impact assessment, to be tabled for adoption by the Commission, a positive opinion is needed from the Board; whereas, in the case of a negative opinion, the draft report must be reviewed and resubmitted to the Board, and, in the case of a second negative opinion, a political decision is required for the initiative to proceed further; whereas the Board’s opinion is made public on the Commission’s website at the same time as the report relating to the initiative concerned and, in the case of impact assessments, once the Commission has adopted the related policy initiative (24); |
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I.

whereas the new IIA acknowledges the replacement of the former Impact Assessment Board with the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board; whereas the latter’s task is, inter alia, to carry out an objective quality check of the Commission’s impact assessments; whereas in order for an initiative, accompanied by an impact assessment, to be tabled for adoption by the Commission, a positive opinion is needed from the Board; whereas, in the case of a negative opinion, the draft report must be reviewed and resubmitted to the Board, and, in the case of a second negative opinion, a political decision is required for the initiative to proceed further; whereas the Board’s opinion is made public on the Commission’s website at the same time as the report relating to the initiative concerned and, in the case of impact assessments, once the Commission has adopted the related policy initiative (24);

| J. | whereas at the beginning of 2017, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board completed the recruitment of its staff, including three members from outside the EU Institutions; whereas in 2016 the Board reviewed 60 separate impact assessments, of which 25 (42 %) received an initial negative assessment, resulting in revision and resubmission to the Board; whereas the Board has subsequently given positive overall assessments to all but one of the revised impact assessments that it has received; whereas the Board has exchanged information with Parliament’s services on best practices and methodologies relating to impact assessments; |
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J.

whereas at the beginning of 2017, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board completed the recruitment of its staff, including three members from outside the EU Institutions; whereas in 2016 the Board reviewed 60 separate impact assessments, of which 25 (42 %) received an initial negative assessment, resulting in revision and resubmission to the Board; whereas the Board has subsequently given positive overall assessments to all but one of the revised impact assessments that it has received; whereas the Board has exchanged information with Parliament’s services on best practices and methodologies relating to impact assessments;

| K. | whereas under paragraph 25 of the new IIA, if a modification of the legal basis is envisaged entailing a change from the ordinary legislative procedure to a special legislative procedure or a non-legislative procedure, the three Institutions will exchange views thereon; whereas Parliament has revised its Rules of Procedure to give effect to this provision; whereas this provision has not yet had to be applied; |
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K.

whereas under paragraph 25 of the new IIA, if a modification of the legal basis is envisaged entailing a change from the ordinary legislative procedure to a special legislative procedure or a non-legislative procedure, the three Institutions will exchange views thereon; whereas Parliament has revised its Rules of Procedure to give effect to this provision; whereas this provision has not yet had to be applied;

| L. | whereas in paragraph 27 of the new IIA, the three Institutions acknowledge the need for the alignment of all existing legislation to the legal framework introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular the need to give high priority to the prompt alignment of all basic acts which still refer to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS); whereas the Commission proposed that latter alignment in December 2016 (25); whereas Parliament and the Council are currently examining this proposal in great detail; |
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L.

whereas in paragraph 27 of the new IIA, the three Institutions acknowledge the need for the alignment of all existing legislation to the legal framework introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular the need to give high priority to the prompt alignment of all basic acts which still refer to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS); whereas the Commission proposed that latter alignment in December 2016 (25); whereas Parliament and the Council are currently examining this proposal in great detail;

| M. | whereas a new version of the Common Understanding on Delegated Acts and on the related standard clauses is annexed to the new IIA; whereas under paragraph 28 of the new IIA, the three Institutions will enter into negotiations without undue delay after the entry into force of the agreement, with a view to supplementing this Common Understanding by providing for non-binding criteria for the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU; whereas, after lengthy preparatory work, these negotiations finally began in September 2017; |
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M.

whereas a new version of the Common Understanding on Delegated Acts and on the related standard clauses is annexed to the new IIA; whereas under paragraph 28 of the new IIA, the three Institutions will enter into negotiations without undue delay after the entry into force of the agreement, with a view to supplementing this Common Understanding by providing for non-binding criteria for the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU; whereas, after lengthy preparatory work, these negotiations finally began in September 2017;

| N. | whereas in paragraph 29 of the new IIA the three Institutions committed to setting up, at the latest by the end of 2017, a joint functional register of delegated acts, providing information in a well-structured and user-friendly way, in order to enhance transparency, facilitate planning and enable traceability of all the different stages in the lifecycle of a delegated act; whereas the register has now been set up and became operational in December 2017; |
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N.

whereas in paragraph 29 of the new IIA the three Institutions committed to setting up, at the latest by the end of 2017, a joint functional register of delegated acts, providing information in a well-structured and user-friendly way, in order to enhance transparency, facilitate planning and enable traceability of all the different stages in the lifecycle of a delegated act; whereas the register has now been set up and became operational in December 2017;

| O. | whereas point 32 of the IIA stipulates that ‘the Commission shall carry out its role as facilitator by treating the two branches of the legislative authority equally, in full respect of the roles assigned by the Treaties to the three Institutions’; |
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O.

whereas point 32 of the IIA stipulates that ‘the Commission shall carry out its role as facilitator by treating the two branches of the legislative authority equally, in full respect of the roles assigned by the Treaties to the three Institutions’;

| P. | whereas in paragraph 34 of the new IIA, Parliament and the Council, in their capacity as co-legislators, underlined the importance of maintaining close contacts already in advance of interinstitutional negotiations, so as to achieve a better mutual understanding of their respective positions, and agreed, to that end, to facilitate a mutual exchange of views and information, including by inviting representatives of the other institutions to informal exchanges of views on a regular basis; whereas these provisions have not given rise to any new specific procedures or structures; whereas, while contact between the Institutions has intensified within the framework of the joint declaration on legislative priorities, the experience of the committees suggests that there is no systematic approach to facilitate such a mutual exchange of views and that it remains difficult to obtain information and feedback from the Council on issues raised within it by the Member States; whereas Parliament finds this situation highly unsatisfactory; |
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P.

whereas in paragraph 34 of the new IIA, Parliament and the Council, in their capacity as co-legislators, underlined the importance of maintaining close contacts already in advance of interinstitutional negotiations, so as to achieve a better mutual understanding of their respective positions, and agreed, to that end, to facilitate a mutual exchange of views and information, including by inviting representatives of the other institutions to informal exchanges of views on a regular basis; whereas these provisions have not given rise to any new specific procedures or structures; whereas, while contact between the Institutions has intensified within the framework of the joint declaration on legislative priorities, the experience of the committees suggests that there is no systematic approach to facilitate such a mutual exchange of views and that it remains difficult to obtain information and feedback from the Council on issues raised within it by the Member States; whereas Parliament finds this situation highly unsatisfactory;

| Q. | whereas, in order to further reinforce the transparency of the legislative process, Parliament revised its Rules of Procedure so as to adapt its rules on interinstitutional negotiations during the ordinary legislative procedure, building on the provisions introduced in 2012; whereas, while all of Parliament’s negotiating mandates are public, the same does not hold true of the Council’s mandates; whereas Parliament finds this situation highly unsatisfactory; |
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Q.

whereas, in order to further reinforce the transparency of the legislative process, Parliament revised its Rules of Procedure so as to adapt its rules on interinstitutional negotiations during the ordinary legislative procedure, building on the provisions introduced in 2012; whereas, while all of Parliament’s negotiating mandates are public, the same does not hold true of the Council’s mandates; whereas Parliament finds this situation highly unsatisfactory;

| R. | whereas in paragraph 39 of the new IIA, in order to facilitate traceability of the various steps in the legislative process, the three Institutions undertook to identify, by 31 December 2016, ways of further developing platforms and tools to that end, with a view to establishing a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files; whereas no such joint database has been created to date; |
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R.

whereas in paragraph 39 of the new IIA, in order to facilitate traceability of the various steps in the legislative process, the three Institutions undertook to identify, by 31 December 2016, ways of further developing platforms and tools to that end, with a view to establishing a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files; whereas no such joint database has been created to date;

| S. | whereas in paragraph 40 of the new IIA, regarding the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, the three Institutions committed to meeting within six months after the entry into force of the new IIA in order to negotiate improved practical arrangements for cooperation and information-sharing within the framework of the Treaties, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas such negotiations began in November 2016 and are still ongoing; |
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S.

whereas in paragraph 40 of the new IIA, regarding the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, the three Institutions committed to meeting within six months after the entry into force of the new IIA in order to negotiate improved practical arrangements for cooperation and information-sharing within the framework of the Treaties, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); whereas such negotiations began in November 2016 and are still ongoing;

| T. | whereas regulatory cooperation has emerged as a key instrument in international trade agreements on a path towards regulatory dialogue and coherence between trading partners; whereas the Commission is to remain committed in that process to the principles of a fair and level playing field for all stakeholders and guaranteeing the utmost transparency in decision-making; |
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T.

whereas regulatory cooperation has emerged as a key instrument in international trade agreements on a path towards regulatory dialogue and coherence between trading partners; whereas the Commission is to remain committed in that process to the principles of a fair and level playing field for all stakeholders and guaranteeing the utmost transparency in decision-making;

| U. | whereas in paragraph 46 of the new IIA, the three Institutions confirm their commitment to using the legislative technique of recasting for the modification of existing legislation more frequently and in full respect of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts; |
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U.

whereas in paragraph 46 of the new IIA, the three Institutions confirm their commitment to using the legislative technique of recasting for the modification of existing legislation more frequently and in full respect of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts;

| V. | whereas under paragraph 48 of the new IIA, by way of contribution to its regulatory fitness and performance programme (REFIT), the Commission undertakes to present annually an overview, including an annual burden survey, of the results of the Union’s efforts to simplify legislation and to avoid overregulation and reduce administrative burdens; whereas the results of the first annual burden survey were presented on 24 October 2017 as part of the Commission Work Programme for 2018; |
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V.

whereas under paragraph 48 of the new IIA, by way of contribution to its regulatory fitness and performance programme (REFIT), the Commission undertakes to present annually an overview, including an annual burden survey, of the results of the Union’s efforts to simplify legislation and to avoid overregulation and reduce administrative burdens; whereas the results of the first annual burden survey were presented on 24 October 2017 as part of the Commission Work Programme for 2018;

| W. | whereas the annual burden survey offers a unique opportunity to identify and monitor the results of EU efforts to avoid overregulation and reduce administrative burdens; whereas this survey provides an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the added value of EU legislation and to provide transparency to EU citizens; |
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W.

whereas the annual burden survey offers a unique opportunity to identify and monitor the results of EU efforts to avoid overregulation and reduce administrative burdens; whereas this survey provides an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the added value of EU legislation and to provide transparency to EU citizens;

| X. | whereas the new IIA calls for interinstitutional cooperation with the aim of simplifying existing Union legislation and avoiding overregulation and administrative burdens for citizens, administrations and businesses; whereas Parliament emphasises that with regard to international trade agreements these objectives should not lead to lower standards on the protection of the environment, public health, workers’ health, safety, International Labour Organisation standards or consumer rights; |
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X.

whereas the new IIA calls for interinstitutional cooperation with the aim of simplifying existing Union legislation and avoiding overregulation and administrative burdens for citizens, administrations and businesses; whereas Parliament emphasises that with regard to international trade agreements these objectives should not lead to lower standards on the protection of the environment, public health, workers’ health, safety, International Labour Organisation standards or consumer rights;

| Y. | whereas under paragraph 50 of the new IIA, the three Institutions will monitor the implementation of the new IIA jointly and regularly, at both the political level through annual discussions and the technical level in the Interinstitutional Coordination Group; whereas monitoring at the political level includes regular discussions in the Conference of Committee Chairs and the annual high-level stocktaking meeting; whereas, furthermore, specific monitoring arrangements were laid down in the context of the joint declarations on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2017 and 2018-2019 respectively; whereas, moreover, the experience gained by committees so far is an invaluable tool for assessing the implementation of the new IIA; whereas the Committee on Legal Affairs has specific competence for better law-making and simplification of Union law; |
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Y.

whereas under paragraph 50 of the new IIA, the three Institutions will monitor the implementation of the new IIA jointly and regularly, at both the political level through annual discussions and the technical level in the Interinstitutional Coordination Group; whereas monitoring at the political level includes regular discussions in the Conference of Committee Chairs and the annual high-level stocktaking meeting; whereas, furthermore, specific monitoring arrangements were laid down in the context of the joint declarations on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2017 and 2018-2019 respectively; whereas, moreover, the experience gained by committees so far is an invaluable tool for assessing the implementation of the new IIA; whereas the Committee on Legal Affairs has specific competence for better law-making and simplification of Union law;

Common commitments and objectives

| 1. | Considers the new IIA as an interinstitutional exercise which seeks to improve the quality of Union legislation; recalls that, in many instances, EU legislation harmonises or replaces different rules in 28 Member States, making national markets mutually and equally accessible and reducing administrative costs overall to establish a fully functional internal market; |
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1.

| 2. | Welcomes the progress achieved and the experience gained in the first year and a half of the application of the new IIA and encourages the Institutions to undertake further efforts to fully implement the agreement, in particular with regard to the interinstitutional negotiations on non-binding criteria for the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the alignment of all basic acts that still refer to the RPS, the interinstitutional negotiations on practical arrangements for cooperation and information-sharing regarding the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, and the establishment of a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files; |
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2.

| 3. | Recalls that the new IIA aims to develop a more open and transparent relationship between the three Institutions with a view to delivering high-quality legislation in the interest of EU citizens; considers that, although the principle of sincere cooperation among Institutions is only mentioned in paragraphs 9 and 32 in relation to specific areas covered by the new IIA, it should be observed throughout the legislative cycle as one of the principles enshrined in Article 13 TEU; |
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3.

Programming

| 4. | Welcomes the three Institutions’ agreement to reinforce the Union’s annual and multiannual programming in accordance with Article 17(1) TEU by means of a more structured procedure with a precise timeline; notes with satisfaction that the first exercise of interinstitutional annual programming under the new IIA saw the active participation of the three Institutions, participation that led to a joint declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2017, with 59 key legislative proposals identified as priorities for 2017 and, further to a joint declaration on legislative priorities for 2018-2019, 31 key legislative proposals identified as priorities until the end of the current term; particularly welcomes, in this context, the active involvement of the Council and trusts that it will continue in the future, including as regards multiannual programming for the new term; considers, however, that priority treatment for certain legislative files agreed upon in joint declarations should not be used to exert undue pressure on the co-legislators and that greater speed should not be prioritised at the expense of legislative quality; considers it important to evaluate how the current practice and rules for approving the joint declarations are applied and whether certain improvements can be made to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with regard to the negotiations on interinstitutional programming, for example to reinforce the mandate given to the President by the political groups; |
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4.

| 5. | Considers it of the utmost importance that parliamentary committees are fully consulted throughout the joint declaration preparation and implementation process; |
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5.

| 6. | Points out that the new IIA is without prejudice to the mutual undertakings agreed between Parliament and the Commission in the 2010 Framework Agreement; recalls, in particular, that the arrangements relating to the timetable for the Commission Work Programme set out in Annex 4 to the 2010 Framework Agreement must be complied with when implementing paragraphs 6-11 of the new IIA; |
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6.

| 7. | Considers that the Commission should, when presenting its Work Programme, in addition to the elements referred to in paragraph 8 of the new IIA, indicate how the envisaged legislation is justifiable in the light of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and specify its European added value; |
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7.

| 8. | Welcomes the establishment of the Commission Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’, which must work hand in hand with the new IIA to increase the trust of citizens who consider the principle of subsidiarity to be a key aspect of the democratic process; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission to present more inclusive, more detailed and more reliable Work Programmes; requests, in particular, that the Commission Work Programmes clearly indicate the legal nature of each proposal with accurate and realistic timeframes; calls on the Commission to ensure that forthcoming legislative proposals – especially key legislative packages – arrive well before the end of this legislative term, thereby giving the co-legislators enough time to exercise their prerogatives in full; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Encourages developing efficient legislation geared to developing employment protection and European competitiveness with a particular focus on small and medium-sized enterprises, across all sectors of the economy; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission replied to Parliament’s requests for proposals for Union acts under Article 225 TFEU, for the most part within the three-month deadline referred to in paragraph 10 of the new IIA; points out, however, that the Commission failed to adopt specific communications as foreseen in that provision; calls on the Commission to adopt such communications with a view to ensuring full transparency and providing a political response to requests made by Parliament in its resolutions, and with due regard for Parliament’s relevant European Added Value and Cost of Non-Europe analyses; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Underlines the importance of transparent cooperation in good faith between Parliament, the Council and the Commission, which should be translated into practice by a genuine commitment on the part of the Commission to involving Parliament and the Council, at the same level, in the implementation of its programming arrangements, and reminds the Commission of its obligation to respond promptly to legislative and non-legislative own initiative reports; deplores the fact that several own-initiative reports have remained unanswered, and calls on the Commission to provide the co-legislators, within three months, with reasons for the withdrawal of a text and also with a reasoned reply to requests for legislative or non-legislative proposals; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Considers that the deletion of all references to the use of alternative methods of regulation in the new IIA is without prejudice to Parliament’s position that soft law should be applied only with the greatest of care and on a duly justified basis, without undermining legal certainty and the clarity of existing legislation, and after consultation of Parliament (26); is concerned, furthermore, that a lack of clear boundaries on the use of soft law may even encourage recourse to it, with no guarantee that Parliament would be able to carry out scrutiny; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Invites the Council and the Commission to agree that alternative methods of regulation, provided that they are strictly necessary, should be included in the multiannual and annual programming documents, so as to allow proper identification and scrutiny by the legislators; |
| --- | --- |

14.

Tools for better law-making

| 15. | Underlines that impact assessments may inform but must never be a substitute for political decisions or cause undue delays to the legislative process; underlines that, throughout the legislative process and in all assessments of the impact of proposed legislation, particular attention must be paid to the potential impacts on those stakeholders who have least opportunity to present their concerns to decision-makers, including SMEs, civil society, trade unions and others who do not have the advantage of easy access to the Institutions; believes that impact assessments must pay equal attention to the evaluation of social, health and environmental consequences in particular, and that the impact on the fundamental rights of citizens and on equality between women and men must be assessed; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Recalls that SMEs represent 99 % of all businesses in the EU, generate 58 % of the EU’s turnover and are responsible for two thirds of total private employment; recalls, furthermore, that the Commission, in the Small Business Act, made a commitment to implementing the ‘think small first’ principle in its policymaking, and that this includes the SME test to assess the impact of forthcoming legislation and administrative initiatives on SMEs (27); recalls that in its decision of 9 March 2016 on the new IIA Parliament stated that the wording of the new IIA does not sufficiently commit the three Institutions to include SME and competitiveness tests in their impact assessments (28); stresses the importance of taking into account and paying attention to the impact on competitiveness and innovation and to the needs of SMEs at all stages of the legislative cycle, and expresses satisfaction that the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines prescribe that potential impacts on SMEs and competitiveness must, where relevant, be considered and reported systematically in all impact assessments; notes that SME tests often lack quality and coherent implementation; calls on the Commission to consider how the impact on SMEs can be better taken into account, and intends to monitor this issue closely in the years to come; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Urges the Commission, in the context of better law-making, to better assess the social and environmental consequences of its policies and their impact on the fundamental rights of citizens, by keeping in mind also the cost of non-legislation at European level and the fact that cost-benefit analyses are only one of many criteria; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Reiterates its call for the compulsory inclusion in all impact assessments of a balanced analysis of the medium- to long-term economic, social, environmental and health impacts; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls on the Commission to use impact assessments and ex-post evaluations to examine the compatibility of initiatives, proposals or pieces of existing legislation with the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as their impact, respectively, on the progress and implementation of these Goals; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Recalls that the idea of a supplementary ad hoc technical independent panel contained in the Commission’s initial proposal for the new IIA was not further pursued in the course of the negotiations; points out that the aim of the creation of such a panel was to enhance the independence, transparency and objectiveness of impact assessments; recalls that it was agreed in paragraph 15 of the new IIA that Parliament and the Council, where and when they consider it appropriate and necessary, would carry out impact assessments in relation to their own substantial amendments to the Commission proposal, which are much needed in order to take an informed and well-founded decision; reminds its committees of the importance of availing themselves of this tool wherever needed; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Welcomes the reference in the new IIA to the inclusion of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the scope of impact assessments; stresses, in this regard, that impact assessments should always encompass a thorough and rigorous analysis of the compliance of a proposal with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and specify its European added value; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Notes that a significant number of Commission proposals were not accompanied by impact assessments and that committees have expressed concern that the quality and level of detail of impact assessments varies from the comprehensive to the rather superficial; points out that in the first phase of application of the new IIA 20 out of 59 Commission proposals included in the 2017 joint declaration were not accompanied by impact assessments; recalls in this regard that, while it is in any case foreseen that initiatives which are expected to have significant social, economic or environmental impact should be accompanied by an impact assessment, paragraph 13 of the IIA also states that the initiatives included in the Commission Work Programme or the joint declaration should, as a general rule, be accompanied by an impact assessment; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Welcomes the fact that the IIA stipulates that the ‘European added value’ of any proposed Union action, as well as the ‘cost of non-Europe’ in the absence of action at Union level, should be taken into account when setting the legislative agenda; highlights the fact that the cost of non-Europe can be estimated at EUR 1,75 trillion per year, equivalent to 12 % of EU GDP (2016); honours the work of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in this context; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Calls on the Commission to further clarify how it intends to assess the cost of non-Europe – inter alia the cost for producers, consumers, workers, administrations and the environment of not having harmonised legislation at EU level and where divergent national rules cause extra cost and render policies less effective – as referred to in paragraphs 10 and 12 of the new IIA; points out that such an assessment should not only be conducted in the event of sunset clauses, towards the end of a programme, or when a repeal is envisaged, but should also be considered in cases where action or legislation at EU level is not yet in place or under review; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Recalls that the former Impact Assessment Board has been replaced with the new Regulatory Scrutiny Board, thereby enhancing the independence of the Board; reiterates that the independence, transparency and objectiveness of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and its work must be safeguarded and that the members of the Board should not be subjected to any political control (29); underlines that the Commission should ensure that all of the Board’s opinions, including negative ones, are made public and accessible at the same time as the relevant impact assessments are published; calls for an evaluation of the performance of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board in fulfilling its role of supervising and providing objective advice on impact assessments; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Points out that Parliament’s Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, established within its administration, assists parliamentary committees and offers them a variety of services, for which sufficient resources must be available so as to ensure that Members and committees receive the best possible support available; notes with appreciation the fact that the Conference of Committee Chairs adopted an updated version of the ‘Impact Assessment Handbook – Guidelines for Committees’ on 12 September 2017; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls on all its committees to review Commission impact assessments and to review Parliament’s ex-ante impact assessment analysis as early as possible in the legislative process; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Recalls that under paragraph 14 of the new IIA, upon considering Commission legislative proposals, Parliament will take full account of the Commission’s impact assessments; recalls in this context that parliamentary committees may invite the Commission to present its impact assessment and the policy option chosen at a full committee meeting and invites its committees to avail themselves of this opportunity more regularly, and of the possibility to see a presentation of the initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment by Parliament’s own services; points out, however, that this must not lead to a restriction of the room for manoeuvre available to the co-legislators; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Welcomes the possibility for the Commission to complement its own impact assessments during the legislative process; considers that paragraph 16 of the new IIA should be interpreted to the effect that, when requested by Parliament or the Council, the Commission should as a rule promptly provide such complementary impact assessments; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Stresses the importance of timely, public and transparent stakeholder involvement and consultation, with sufficient time for meaningful replies; maintains that it is essential for public consultations to be carried out by the Commission in all official languages during the preparatory phase; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Notes that, as specified in paragraph 17 of the new IIA on better law-making, ‘each of the three Institutions is responsible for determining how to organise its impact assessment work, including internal organisational resources and quality control’; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Welcomes the fact that in paragraph 17 of the new IIA the three Institutions committed to exchanging information on best practices and methodologies relating to impact assessments; is of the opinion that this should include the sharing of raw data underpinning the Commission’s impact assessment wherever possible, and notably whenever Parliament decides to complement the Commission’s impact assessment with its own further work; encourages, to that end, the services of the three Institutions to cooperate to the maximum possible extent, including with regard to joint training sessions on impact assessment methodologies, with a view, moreover, to achieving a future, common interinstitutional methodology; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Maintains that it is essential that, to quote paragraph 18 of the new IIA, ‘the Commission’s initial impact assessment and any additional impact assessment work conducted during the legislative process by the Institutions’ be made public by the end of the legislative process in order to ensure transparency in relation to citizens and stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Reiterates its position that stakeholders, including trade unions and civil society, should be able to provide effective input on the impact assessment process as early as possible in the consultation phase, and encourages the Commission, to that end, to make more systematic use of roadmaps and inception impact assessments and to publish them in due time at the beginning of the impact assessment process; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Welcomes the commitment made by the Commission, before adopting a proposal, to consult widely and encourage, in particular, the direct participation of SMEs, civil society and other end-users in consultations; notes with satisfaction that the Commission’s revised Better Regulation Guidelines take such a direction; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Underlines the new provisions for public and stakeholder consultations, which should serve as an important tool both in the preparatory phase and throughout the entire legislative process; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Urges the Commission to respect the mandatory deadlines set for implementation reports and reviews of directives and regulations; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Underlines the importance of the ex-post evaluation of existing legislation, in accordance with the ‘evaluate first’ principle, and recommends that, whenever possible, it take the form of ex-post impact assessments applying the same methodology as in the ex-ante impact assessment relating to the same piece of legislation, so as to enable a better evaluation of the performance of the latter; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Welcomes paragraph 22 of the new IIA, wherein, in order to support the evaluation process of existing legislation, the three Institutions agree to, as appropriate, establish reporting, monitoring and evaluation requirements in legislation, while avoiding overregulation and administrative burdens, in particular on the Member States; notes the challenges linked to collecting data in the Member States on the performance of legislation and encourages the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Welcomes paragraph 23 of the new IIA, wherein the three Institutions agree to systematically consider the use of review clauses in legislation; invites the Commission to include review clauses in its proposals whenever appropriate and, if not, to state its reasons for departing from this general rule; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Legislative instruments

| 41. | Welcomes the commitments made by the Commission as regards the scope of the explanatory memorandum accompanying each of its proposals; expresses particular satisfaction at the fact that the Commission will also explain how the measures proposed are justified in the light of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; underlines, in this regard, the importance of a strengthened and comprehensive assessment and justification regarding compliance with these principles as well as the European added value of the measure proposed; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Considers that consistency between the explanatory memorandum and the impact assessment related to the same proposal is necessary; invites the Commission, therefore, to ensure such consistency and to explain the choice made where it deviates from the conclusions of the impact assessment; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Draws attention to the fact that in paragraph 25 of the new IIA, the Commission only committed to taking ‘due account of the difference in nature and effects between regulations and directives’; reiterates its request that, pursuing the same approach as that outlined in the Monti report, greater use should be made of regulations in legislative proposals (30), in accordance with the legal requirements established by the Treaties as to their use, in order to ensure consistency, simplicity and legal certainty across the Union; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Welcomes the three Institutions’ commitment to exchanging views on modifications of the legal basis, as referred to in paragraph 25 of the new IIA; stresses the role and the expertise of its Committee on Legal Affairs in verifying legal bases (31); recalls Parliament’s position that it will resist any attempt to undermine the legislative powers of Parliament by means of unwarranted modifications of the legal basis; invites the Council to fully respect its commitment to pursuing a dialogue with Parliament in the event of disagreement over the proposed legal basis, especially in politically sensitive files; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Highlights the fact that the choice of legal basis for a Commission proposal should be made on objective grounds which are subject to judicial review; stresses, however, Parliament’s right, as co-legislator, to propose modifications to the legal basis, on the basis of its interpretation of the Treaties; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Delegated and implementing acts

| 46. | Underlines the importance of the principle enshrined in paragraph 26 of the new IIA and reiterates that it is the competence of the legislator to decide, within the limits of the Treaties, and in the light of the case law of the CJEU, whether and to what extent to use delegated acts and whether and to what extent to use implementing acts (32); |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Notes that the delegation of power to the Commission is not merely a technical issue but can also involve questions of political sensitivity which are of considerable importance to EU citizens, consumers and businesses; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Welcomes the Commission’s effort to comply with the deadline referred to in paragraph 27 of the new IIA for proposing the alignment of all basic acts which still refer to the RPS; further considers that, as a rule, all cases previously dealt with under the RPS should now be aligned to Article 290 TFEU and thus be converted into delegated acts (33); |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Warns that the inclusion of the obligation for the Commission of systematic recourse to Member States’ experts in connection with the preparation of delegated acts should not amount to making the relevant procedure very similar, if not altogether identical, to that established for the preparation of implementing acts, especially as regards procedural prerogatives conferred upon those experts; considers that this may also blur the differences between the two types of acts to the extent that it could imply a de facto revival of the pre-Lisbon comitology mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Expresses dissatisfaction at the fact that, in spite of the concessions made by Parliament, the Council is still very reluctant to accept delegated acts when the criteria under Article 290 TFEU are met; recalls that, as laid down in its recital 7, the new IIA should facilitate the negotiations in the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure and improve the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU; points out that in several legislative files the Council, nevertheless, insisted either on the conferral of implementing powers under Article 291 TFEU or on the inclusion of all the elements in abstracto eligible for the delegation of powers or for the conferral of implementing powers in the basic act itself; expresses disappointment at the fact that, in those cases, the Commission did not defend its own original proposals; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Is very concerned that the Council is trying almost systematically to replace delegated acts with implementing acts; finds it particularly unacceptable that the Council is trying to use the post-Lisbon alignment to replace the RPS with implementing acts, rather than delegated acts; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Welcomes the start of the interinstitutional negotiations referred to in paragraph 28 of the new IIA; confirms its position on the non-binding criteria for the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU as established in its resolution of 25 February 2014 (34); considers that they should be the basis for those negotiations; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Recalls that politically significant elements, such as Union lists or registers of products or substances, should remain an integral part of a basic act – where appropriate in the form of annexes – and should therefore only be amended by means of delegated acts; stresses that the creation of self-standing lists should be avoided in the interests of legal certainty; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Considers that the criteria for the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU must take account of the rulings of the CJEU, such as those issued in the Biocides case, in the CEF delegated act case and in the Visa Reciprocity Mechanism case (35); |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Welcomes the Commission’s commitment, should broader expertise be needed for the early preparation of draft implementing acts, to make use of expert groups, consult targeted stakeholders and carry out public consultations, as appropriate; considers that, whenever any such consultation process is initiated, Parliament should be duly informed; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Notes with appreciation the fact that the Commission, in paragraph 28 of the new IIA, agreed to ensure that Parliament and the Council have equal access to all information on delegated and implementing acts, so that they will receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts; welcomes the fact that experts from Parliament and the Council will systematically have access to the meetings of Commission expert groups to which Member States’ experts are invited and which concern the preparation of delegated acts; calls on the Commission to abide by this commitment genuinely and consistently; notes that such access has already improved; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Emphasises the need to improve informal cooperation during the preparatory phase of delegated acts and implementing acts; warns against losing sight of the intention of the co-legislators, as expressed in a legislative act and as a part of its aim, when preparing delegated and implementing acts; emphasises the importance of the Delegated Act Register, which is now operational; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Regrets the fact that on many occasions the Commission considers level 2 measures proposed by the three financial services authorities (ESAME, EBA and EIOPA) as adopted without changes, which reduces the amount of scrutiny time available to Parliament when important or a substantial number of changes are introduced; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Commends the swift progress made at interinstitutional level in the establishment of a joint functional register of delegated acts and welcomes its official launch of 12 December 2017; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Looks forward to making use of a well-structured and user-friendly functional register of delegated acts, which was published on 12 December 2017 and had been requested by Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Notes that improved legislative procedures at EU level, with timely and deeper interinstitutional cooperation, can lead to a more consistent and harmonised application of EU law; |
| --- | --- |

61.

Transparency and coordination of the legislative process

| 62. | Welcomes the fact that under paragraph 32 of the new IIA, Parliament and the Council, as the co-legislators, are to exercise their powers on an equal footing, and the Commission must carry out its role as facilitator by treating the two branches of the legislative authority equally; recalls that this principle is already enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon; requests, therefore, that the Commission make available and, when feasible, public, all relevant documents relating to legislative proposals, including non-papers, to both legislators at the same time; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Deplores the fact that paragraphs 33 and 34 of the new IIA have not yet led to an improvement in the information flow from the Council, notably since there seems to be a general lack of information on the issues raised by the Member States within the Council and no systematic approach to facilitate the mutual exchange of views and information; notes with concern that the information flow usually varies greatly from Presidency to Presidency and varies between services of the Council’s General Secretariat; underlines the asymmetrical access to information between the co-legislators, since the Council can attend parliamentary committee meetings but Parliament representatives are not invited to attend the meetings of the Council’s working groups; considers, therefore, that a coherently transparent approach is desirable; suggests that the Council should as a rule conduct all its meetings in public, as Parliament does; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Requests that paragraphs 33 and 34 of the new IIA be fully implemented; asks the Council, in particular, that the agendas, working documents and presidency proposals of working parties and the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (Coreper) be transmitted to Parliament in a regular and structured manner in order to allow for a matching level of information between co-legislators; considers that paragraphs 33 and 34 of the new IIA should be interpreted to the effect that, in addition to informal exchanges of views, Parliament may be invited to send a representative to the meetings of the Council’s working parties and Coreper; |
| --- | --- |

64.

| 65. | Stresses that, within the meaning of paragraphs 35 and 36 respectively of the new IIA, synchronisation and acceleration of the legislative process may only be pursued while ensuring that the prerogatives of each Institution are fully preserved; considers, therefore, that on no account may synchronisation or acceleration entail the imposition of a timetable on Parliament by other Institutions; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Urges that efforts be stepped up to set up the dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files referred to in paragraph 39 of the new IIA; recalls that this database should include information on all steps of the legislative procedure to facilitate its traceability; suggests that this should also include information on the impact assessment process; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | Reminds the three EU institutions that further progress is needed in establishing a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Proposes that the Council meets Parliament at least once during the consultation procedure to allow Parliament to present and explain the reasons for the approved amendments, and the Council to state its position on each of them; proposes, in any case, that the Council provide a written reply; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Suggests that Parliament conduct a quantitative study on the effectiveness of the consultation procedure; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Urges the Commission to respect the timeframe set in the European Supervisory Authorities Regulation for deciding whether to endorse, amend or not to endorse draft technical standards, and, as a minimum, to officially inform the co-legislators well in advance if it, on an exceptional basis, is unable to respect such a timeframe, as well as stating its reasons for this; underlines the fact that the Commission recently omitted to do so in numerous cases; reminds the Commission that procedures through which Parliament declares it has no objections to an act are not intended to compensate for delays originating from the Commission’s side and that these procedures significantly impact the time available for Parliament to exercise its scrutiny rights; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Welcomes the fact that the interinstitutional negotiations referred to in paragraph 40 of the new IIA began in November 2016; notes with disappointment that after more than one year of discussions, three rounds of negotiations at political level and a number of meetings at technical level, no agreement has yet been reached despite clear and established case law; notes the progress made so far and strongly insists that these negotiations should be concluded still under the Bulgarian Presidency; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Welcomes the written briefings provided by the Commission ahead of international conferences and the daily oral briefings provided by the Council Presidency and the Commission during those conferences; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Regrets the fact that Parliament is not allowed to attend, as an observer, EU coordination meetings during international conferences; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Reminds the Council and the Commission that practical arrangements in relation to international agreements must be compliant with the Treaties, notably Article 218(10) TFEU, and take account of rulings of the CJEU, such as those issued in the Tanzania case and the Mauritius case (36); |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Calls on the other institutions to comply with the Treaties and regulations and to observe the relevant jurisprudence in order to ensure that Parliament:






  (a) | is immediately, fully and accurately informed during the whole life-cycle of international agreements in a proactive, structured and streamlined way, without undermining the EU’s negotiation position, and is given sufficient time to express its views at all stages and have them taken into account as far as possible; |
| --- | --- | --- |

75.

(a)

is immediately, fully and accurately informed during the whole life-cycle of international agreements in a proactive, structured and streamlined way, without undermining the EU’s negotiation position, and is given sufficient time to express its views at all stages and have them taken into account as far as possible;

| (b) | is accurately informed and involved in the implementation stage of the agreements, especially in regard to the decisions taken by the bodies set up by agreements, and is allowed to fully exercise its rights as a co-legislator when they impact EU legislation; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

is accurately informed and involved in the implementation stage of the agreements, especially in regard to the decisions taken by the bodies set up by agreements, and is allowed to fully exercise its rights as a co-legislator when they impact EU legislation;

| (c) | is proactively informed about the Commission’s position in international fora, such as the WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, UNDP, FAO and UNHRC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

is proactively informed about the Commission’s position in international fora, such as the WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, UNDP, FAO and UNHRC;

| 76. | Believes it is essential to respect horizontally the long-standing practice of awaiting Parliament’s consent before provisionally applying the trade and investment provisions of politically important agreements, as also committed to by Commissioner Malmström in her hearing on 29 September 2014; calls on the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service to continue to extend this practice to all international agreements; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Notes that Parliament stands ready to seize the CJEU again to ensure that the rights of Parliament are respected, should no conclusive progress be made in the near future in the negotiations on paragraph 40 of the new IIA; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Notes that each of the institutions should be mindful that their responsibility as legislators does not end once international agreements are concluded; stresses the need for close monitoring of implementation and ongoing efforts to ensure that agreements are meeting their aims; calls for the institutions to extend best practice and a collaborative approach to the implementation and evaluation phases of international agreements; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Notes that impact assessments including an analysis of the human rights situation can be an important tool in negotiating trade and investment agreements, helping parties to comply with their human rights obligations, and recalls the binding character of agreements such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Calls on the Commission and the Council to fully respect the distribution of competences between the EU and its Member States, as can be deduced from the CJEU Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, for the adoption of negotiating directives, negotiations and the legal basis of proposals to sign and conclude, and in particular for the Council’s signature and the conclusion of international trade agreements; |
| --- | --- |

80.

| 81. | Calls on European representatives to pay particular attention to consistency between international standards/requirements and adopted binding EU legislation; |
| --- | --- |

81.

| 82. | Calls on the Commission to disclose documents outlining its stance in the international organisations which set standards in the financial, monetary and regulatory fields, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; requests that Parliament be fully informed at all stages of the development of international standards that may have an impact on EU law; |
| --- | --- |

82.

| 83. | Calls for the establishment and formalisation of a financial dialogue on the adoption and coherence of European positions in the run-up to major international negotiations, in accordance with its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the EU role in the framework of international financial, monetary and regulatory institutions and bodies (37); emphasises that on the basis of detailed guidelines, which could be supplemented by proactive guidance resolutions, these positions should be discussed and known ex ante and a follow-up should be ensured, with the Commission reporting back regularly on the application of these guidelines; |
| --- | --- |

83.

| 84. | Recalls its statement adopted on 15 March 2018 on the location of the seat of the European Medicines Agency (38), in which Parliament regretted that its role and rights as equal co-legislator with the Council had not been duly taken into account; |
| --- | --- |

84.

| 85. | Acknowledges the mandate approved by the Coreper on 6 December 2017 agreeing on the Council’s position on the Commission proposal for a mandatory transparency register; calls on all parties to finalise the negotiations in a spirit of good cooperation to improve the transparency of the legislative process; |
| --- | --- |

85.

| 86. | Takes due note of the De Capitani judgment (39), which reaffirms that the principles of publicity and transparency are inherent to the EU legislative process and that no general presumption of non-disclosure can be upheld as regards legislative documents, including trilogue documents; |
| --- | --- |

86.

Implementation and application of Union legislation

| 87. | Underlines the importance of the principle set out in paragraph 43 of the new IIA, that when the Member States, in the context of transposing directives into national law, choose to add elements that are in no way related to that Union legislation, such additions should be made identifiable either through the transposing act(s) or through associated documents; notes that this information is often still lacking; calls on the Commission and the Member States to act jointly and consistently to tackle the lack of transparency and other problems related to ‘gold-plating’ (40); |
| --- | --- |

87.

| 88. | Is of the opinion that in the implementation and transposition of EU acts, a clear distinction must be made between cases of ‘gold-plating’, in which Member States introduce additional administrative requirements unrelated to EU legislation, and the setting of higher standards that go beyond EU-wide minimum standards for environmental and consumer protection, healthcare and food safety; |
| --- | --- |

88.

| 89. | Considers that, in order to reduce the problems related to ‘gold-plating’, the three Institutions should commit to adopting EU legislation which is clear, easily transposable and which has a specific European added value; recalls that, while additional unnecessary administrative burdens should be avoided, this should not prevent the Member States from maintaining or taking more ambitious measures and adopting higher social, environmental and consumer protection standards in cases where only minimum standards are defined by Union law; |
| --- | --- |

89.

| 90. | Calls on the Member States to refrain as much as possible from creating additional administrative requirements when transposing EU legislation, and in accordance with paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement, to make such additions identifiable in the transposing act or associated documents; |
| --- | --- |

90.

| 91. | Recalls that, under paragraph 44 of the new IIA, Member States are called upon to cooperate with the Commission in obtaining information and data needed to monitor and evaluate implementation of Union law; calls, therefore, on the Member States to take all necessary measures to respect their commitments, including by providing correlation tables containing clear and precise information on the national measures transposing directives in their domestic legal order, as agreed in the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents and in the Joint Political Declaration of 27 October 2011 of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on explanatory documents; |
| --- | --- |

91.

| 92. | Considers that the commitment made by the Commission under paragraph 45 of the new IIA should be interpreted to the effect that, with due respect for confidentiality rules, Parliament’s access to information relating to pre-infringement and infringement procedures will improve considerably; reiterates, to that end, its long-standing requests to the Commission as regards the data which Parliament is entitled to access (41); |
| --- | --- |

92.

| 93. | Reiterates its appreciation for the EU Pilot problem-solving mechanism as a more informal, but nonetheless effective, way to ensure compliance with Union law on the part of the Member States (42); disapproves of the Commission’s announcement that, as a rule, it will launch infringement procedures without relying on the mechanism anymore (43); |
| --- | --- |

93.

| 94. | Points out that Members of the Commission are required to respect the legislative prerogatives of Members of the European Parliament; is of the opinion that they should provide Parliament with all the independently conducted studies on the basis of which they have taken their decisions, while at the same time disclosing those which contradict their conclusions; |
| --- | --- |

94.

| 95. | Regrets that not all translations of legislative proposals are made available at the same time, which delays the legislative process; |
| --- | --- |

95.

| 96. | Stresses that when it comes to its application, effective EU legislation must aim to ensure that the procedures established therein match the underlying purpose of the piece of legislation itself, and particularly the ultimate goal of protecting the environment when it comes to ensuring a high degree of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- |

96.

| 97. | Acknowledges the importance of the work being done in the Committee on Petitions in assessing the quality of EU law-making with regard to its actual implementation, and as a basis for improving legislative texts and procedures; notes in this regard the importance of genuine interinstitutional cooperation with the Commission when it comes to ensuring that the petitions are properly examined; |
| --- | --- |

97.

Simplification

| 98. | Welcomes the commitment made in paragraph 46 of the new IIA for a more frequent use of the legislative technique of recasting; reiterates that this technique should constitute the ordinary legislative technique as an invaluable tool to achieve simplification (44); considers, however, that in the event of a complete policy overhaul, the Commission should, instead of using the recasting technique, put forward a proposal for an entirely new legal act repealing existing legislation, so that the co-legislators can engage in broad and effective political discussions and see their prerogatives as enshrined in the Treaties fully preserved; |
| --- | --- |

98.

| 99. | Recalls that, in assessing unnecessary regulatory and administrative burdens, pursuant to the agreement made by the three Institutions in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the new IIA, and when examining possible burden reduction objectives in order to lower costs for administrations and businesses, including SMEs, better law-making can, where appropriate, also mean more EU legislation, including harmonisation of disparities in national legislation, taking account of the benefits of legislative measures and the consequences of failure to act at EU level with regard to social, environmental and consumer protection standards, and bearing in mind that Member States are free to apply higher standards if only minimum standards are defined by Union law; recalls, furthermore, that the horizontal social clause enshrined in Article 9 TFEU requires the Union to give careful consideration to the impact of EU legislation on social standards and employment, involving proper consultation of social stakeholders, in particular trade unions, consumers and representatives of vulnerable groups’ interests, with respect for the autonomy of the social partners and the agreements that they may conclude in accordance with Article 155 TFEU; stresses, therefore, that the reduction of administrative burdens does not necessarily mean deregulation and that, in any event, it must not compromise fundamental rights and environmental, social, labour, health and safety, consumer protection, gender-equality or animal welfare standards, including the information requirements related thereto, and thus must not be detrimental to workers’ rights – regardless of the size of the company –, or lead to an increase in precarious employment contracts; |
| --- | --- |

99.

| 100. | Welcomes the Commission’s first annual burden survey undertaken in the context of simplification of EU legislation, for which it carried out a Flash Eurobarometer survey on business perceptions of regulation, interviewing over 10 000 businesses across the 28 Member States, mainly SMEs and reflecting the distribution of business in the EU; draws attention to the findings of the survey, which confirm that the focus on cutting unnecessary costs remains appropriate and suggest that there is a complex interplay of different factors that influence the perception of businesses, which may also be caused by variations in national administrative and legal set-ups concerning the implementation of legislation; points out that gold-plating and even inaccurate media coverage can also affect such perception; considers that the concept of the annual burden survey, while being an important tool for the identification of problems with the implementation and application of EU legislation, may not give rise to the assumption that regulation results by its nature in excessive administrative burdens; agrees with the Commission that the only way to identify concretely what can actually be simplified, streamlined or eliminated is to seek views from all stakeholders, including those who have less powerful representation, on specific pieces of legislation or various pieces of legislation that apply to a particular sector; calls on the Commission to refine the annual burden survey, on the basis of the lessons learnt from the first edition, to apply transparent and verifiable data collection methods, to pay particular regard to SMEs’ needs, and to include both actual and perceived burdens; |
| --- | --- |

100.

| 101. | Takes note, furthermore, of the outcome of the Commission’s assessment of the feasibility, without detriment to the purpose of legislation, of establishing objectives to reduce burdens in specific sectors; encourages the Commission to set burden reduction objectives for each initiative in a flexible but evidence-based and reliable manner, and in full consultation with stakeholders, as it does already under REFIT; |
| --- | --- |

101.

| 102. | Stresses that an EU standard generally replaces 28 national standards, thereby underpinning the single market and cutting down on bureaucracy; |
| --- | --- |

102.

| 103. | Stresses the importance of avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy and taking into account the correlation between company size and the resources required to implement obligations; |
| --- | --- |

103.

Implementation and monitoring of the new IIA

| 104. | Notes that the Conference of Presidents will receive a regular report, drawn up by the President, outlining the current state of play of implementation both internally and interinstitutionally; considers that this report should take due account of the assessment made by the Conference of Committee Chairs on the basis of the experiences of the various committees, in particular the Committee on Legal Affairs, as the committee responsible for better law-making and the simplification of Union law (45); |
| --- | --- |

104.

| 105. | Welcomes the first annual interinstitutional high-level political stocktaking meeting on the implementation of the IIA, which took place on 12 December 2017; encourages the Conference of Committee Chairs to provide the Conference of Presidents with any recommendation it deems appropriate on the implementation of the new IIA; |
| --- | --- |

105.

o

o o

| 106. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

106.

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(1)  OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47.

(3)  OJ C 321, 31.12.2003, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 102, 4.4.1996, p. 2.

(5)  OJ C 73, 17.3.1999, p. 1.

(6)  OJ C 77, 28.3.2002, p. 1.

(7)  OJ C 145, 30.6.2007, p. 5.

(8)  OJ C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 15.

(9)  OJ C 484, 24.12.2016, p. 7.

(10)  OJ C 446, 29.12.2017, p. 1.

(11)  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 March 2014, European Commission v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-427/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:170; judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2015, European Commission v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-88/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:499; judgment of the Court of 17 March 2016, European Parliament v European Commission, Case C-286/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:183; judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 14 June 2016, Parliament v Council, Case C-263/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:435; judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 24 June 2014, Parliament v Council, Case C-658/11, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025.

(12)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0484.

(13)  OJ C 58, 15.2.2018, p. 39.

(14)  OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 116.

(15)  OJ C 50, 9.2.2018, p. 91.

(16)  OJ C 289, 9.8.2016, p. 53.

(17)  OJ C 285, 29.8.2017, p. 11.

(18)  OJ C 93, 24.3.2017, p. 14.

(19)  OJ C 353 E, 3.12.2013, p. 117.

(20)  OJ C 51 E, 22.2.2013, p. 87.

(21)  OJ C 380 E, 11.12.2012, p. 31.

(22)  OJ C 50, 9.2.2018, p. 91.

(23)  See Annex II to European Parliament decision of 9 March 2016 on the conclusion of an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

(24)  Article 6(2) of the Decision of the President of the European Commission of 19 May 2015 on the establishment of an independent Regulatory Scrutiny Board (C(2015)3263).

(25)  See COM(2016)0798 and COM(2016)0799.

(26)  See paragraph 47 of Parliament’s resolution of 9 September 2010 on Better lawmaking – 15th annual report from the Commission pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (OJ C 308 E, 20.10.2011, p. 66).

(27)  See paragraph 16 of Parliament’s resolution of 27 November 2014 on the revision of the Commission’s impact assessment guidelines and the role of the SME test.

(28)  See paragraph 4 of Parliament’s decision of 9 March 2016 on the conclusion of an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

(29)  See paragraph 12 of Parliament’s resolution of 27 November 2014, cited above, and paragraph 6 of Parliament’s decision of 9 March 2016, cited above.

(30)  See paragraph 5 of Parliament’s resolution of 14 September 2011 on better legislation, subsidiarity and proportionality and smart regulation, cited above.

(31)  See Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex V, point XVI.1.

(32)  See recital D of Parliament’s resolution of 25 February 2014 on follow-up on the delegation of legislative powers and control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, cited above.

(33)  See paragraph 6 of Parliament’s resolution of 25 February 2014 on follow-up on the delegation of legislative powers and control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, cited above.

(34)  Ibid., paragraph 1.

(35)  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 March 2014, European Commission v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, cited above; judgment of the Court of 17 March 2016, European Parliament v European Commission, cited above; judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 14 June 2016, Parliament v Council, cited above.

(36)  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 14 June 2016, Parliament v Council, cited above; judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 24 June 2014, Parliament v Council, cited above.

(37)  OJ C 58, 15.2.2018, p. 76.

(38)  See Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0086.

(39)  Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) of 22 March 2018, De Capitani v European Parliament, Case T-540/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:167.

(40)  See paragraph 7 of Parliament’s resolution of 21 November 2012 on the 28th annual report on monitoring the application of EU law (2010) (OJ C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 73).

(41)  See paragraphs 21 and 22 of Parliament’s resolution of 4 February 2014 on the 29th annual report on monitoring the application of EU law (2011).

(42)  See paragraph 16 of Parliament’s resolution of 6 October 2016 on monitoring the application of Union law: 2014 Annual Report (Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0385).

(43)  See point 2 of Commission communication entitled ‘EU law: Better results through better application’, cited above (see page 12 in OJ C 18, 19.1.2017).

(44)  See paragraph 41 of Parliament’s resolution of 14 September 2011, cited above.

(45)  See Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Annex V, point XVI.3.

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