IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION

HANSHOW TECHNOLOGY CO., 

LTD. AND SHANGHAI HANSHI 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

CO., LTD

Plaintiffs,

v. 

SES-IMAGOTAG SA, SESIMAGOTAG GMBH AND 

CAPTANA GMBH

Defendants.

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 Case No. 2:23-cv-00617-RWS-RSP

DEFENDANTS VUSIONGROUP GMBH f/k/a SES-IMAGOTAG GMBH and CAPTANA 

GMBH’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. 

CIV. P. 12(B)(2) AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

Defendants VusionGroup GmbH (f/k/a SES-Imagotag GmbH) (“VusionGroup GmbH”)

and Captana GmbH (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”), by and through undersigned counsel, 

hereby file this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Hanshow Technology Co., Ltd. and Shanghai Hanshi 

Information Technology Co., Ltd.’s (collectively, “Hanshow”) Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(2) and Brief in Support. In support thereof the Moving Defendants show as follows:

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AND CAPTANA GMBH’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... II

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1

II. FACTS .................................................................................................................................... 1

III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................................................................................... 3

IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... 3

A. LEGAL STANDARD – PERSONAL JURISDICTION ............................................................. 3

B. THE COURT LACKS GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER THE MOVING DEFENDANTS. ....... 4

C. THE COURT LACKS SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER THE MOVING DEFENDANTS. ........ 5

i. The Moving Defendants Have Not Directed Any Activities to Texas. ................. 6

ii. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Under a Stream of Commerce Theory. 8

iii. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Moving Defendants Would Offend Traditional

Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice. ...................................................... 9

D. PERSONAL JURISDICTION CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 4(K)(2).

......................................................................................................................... 11

E. VUSIONGROUP GMBH’S APPEARANCE IN PRIOR LITIGATION DOES NOT WAIVE ITS

CHALLENGE TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE ........................................... 12

V. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................................. 16

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Technology Corp., 

689 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................. 10

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 

480 U.S. 102 (1987).............................................................................................................. 4, 10

Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., Inc., 

924 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2019)........................................................................................................ 8

Clemens v. McNamee, 

615 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2010)....................................................................................................... 4

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

571 U.S. 117 (2014). ................................................................................................................... 5

Diece-Lisa Indus., Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc., 

943 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2019)....................................................................................................... 9

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 

592 U.S. 351 (2021).................................................................................................................... 5

In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 

888 F.3d 753 (5th Cir. 2018)....................................................................................................... 9

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310 (1945).................................................................................................................... 4

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 

564 U.S. 873 (2011).................................................................................................................. 10

Lewis v. Fresne, 

252 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2001)....................................................................................................... 4

McFadin v. Gerber, 

587 F.3d 753 (5th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 68 (2010); ......................................... 4, 11

Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 

768 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2014)................................................................................................... 5, 6

NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc., 

859 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................... 6

Rozenblat v. Sandia Corp., 

No. 05-1556, 2006 WL 678923, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 2006) ............................................. 15

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE iii

Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 

513 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2008)....................................................................................................... 6

Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, 

563 F.3d 1285 (Fed.Cir.2009)................................................................................................... 14

Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 

574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009 ............................................................................................ 13, 14

Wapp Tech Ltd. P’ship v. Micro Focus Int’l, PLC, 

406 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Tex. 2019) .............................................................................. 8, 9, 15

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)................................................................................................................... 3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)....................................................................................... 11

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE 1

I. INTRODUCTION

VusionGroup SA is a French corporation and the corporate parent of the two moving 

Defendants VusionGroup GmbH—an Austrian company—and Captana GmbH—a German 

company. Ex. 1 ¶ 4; Ex. 2 ¶ 4. The primary accused products are CaptanaTM sensors and camera 

systems (the “Accused Products”). These products are sold in the United States by Captana, Inc. 

and VusionGroup, Inc.—neither of which are named defendants. Hanshow did not name these

obvious parties because neither are present in this district and Hanshow wanted to manufacture 

venue here. So, it named only foreign entities. But the foreign entities Hanshow named are not 

present in the United States, do not operate in the United States, and do not sell the accused 

products in the United States. Indeed, VusionGroup GmbH (the Austrian entity) is a technology 

research organization with no products at all, and Captana GmbH (the German entity) exclusively 

makes and sells its products and services outside of the United States; it does not import its

products into (or perform services in) the United States. So, while venue might be technically 

correct, personal jurisdiction over these defendants is not.1 The Court should dismiss VusionGroup 

GmbH and Captana GmbH for want of personal jurisdiction.

II. FACTS

VusionGroup SA is a French corporation and the parent company of Defendants 

VusionGroup GmbH and Captana GmbH. Ex. 1 ¶ 3; Ex. 2 ¶ 3. VusionGroup SA develops, sells, 

and manufactures its products in Europe (and in other locations outside of the United States) Ex. 

1 ¶ 5; Ex. 2 ¶ 4. But neither VusionGroup GmbH nor Captana GmbH sell, market, import, or 

1 VusionGroup SA, the corporate parent for both defendants, does not move to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction and is filing herewith an answer to Hanshow’s complaint. 

VusionGroup SA does not, however, concede that personal jurisdiction over it is appropriate in 

this Court, and specifically, reserves all objections with respect to personal jurisdiction.

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manufacture the accused CaptanaTM devices in the United States, let alone in Texas. Ex. 1 ¶ 7; Ex. 

2 ¶ 11.

VusionGroup GmbH is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Austria. Ex. 

1 ¶ 4. VusionGroup GmbH is a wholly owned subsidiary of VusionGroup SA, but has at all times, 

maintained its separate corporate identity from both VusionGroup SA and Captana GmbH. Id. ¶ 5.

VusionGroup GmbH’s primary business is developing technology and holding related intellectual 

property. Id. ¶ 6. VusionGroup GmbH does not make, sell, offer to sell, or import any Accused 

Products in the United States or the State of Texas. Id. ¶ 7. It also does not have a place of business 

or employees in the United States or the State of Texas. Id. ¶ 8.

Captana GmbH is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Germany. Ex. 2

¶ 6. Captana GmbH is a wholly owned subsidiary of VusionGroup SA, but it, like VusionGroup 

GmbH, has at all times maintained its separate corporate identity. Id. ¶ 9. Captana GmbH was 

initially a technology startup known as “Findbox.” Id. ¶ 7. In 2017, Findbox was acquired by 

VusionGroup SA. Id. ¶¶ 7-8; see also Ex. 3 to Hanshow’s Complaint [Dkt. 1] at p. 6 (VusionGroup 

SA’s Strategic Plan indicating that it acquired Findbox in or around 2017). Captana GmbH has been 

an independent, operational company and brand before and after it was acquired by VusionGroup 

SA. Id. ¶ 9. It develops its own technologies and has maintained largely uninterrupted leadership, 

with Michael Unmussig serving as its CEO, since its founding. Id. ¶ 9; see Ex. 3 to Hanshow’s

Complaint [Dkt. 1] at p. 120 (listing Mr. Unmussig as Captana’s CEO). Captana GmbH does not

market, sell, offer for sale, or import any products into the United States or the State of Texas. Id. 

It also does not maintain a place of business or employees in the United States or the State of Texas. 

Id. ¶ 11. 

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III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over either VusionGroup GmbH or Captana 

GmbH because they are both foreign companies with no operations, employees, or sales of 

Accused Products in the United States or the State of Texas. Besides the initial paragraphs of its 

Complaint, Hanshow lumps these separate entities together, referring to them collectively as 

“defendants.” But Hanshow pleads no facts to support its assertion that the Court has personal 

jurisdiction over any of the named defendants. Indeed, the barebone facts Hanshow does allege 

relate to entities not named in the complaint.2 In fact, screenshots and attachments included as 

part of Hanshow’s Complaint, suggest that the Moving Defendants do not have the necessary 

contacts for personal jurisdiction to exist against them in Texas and thus are not proper parties to 

this lawsuit. See generally Dkt. 1 Ex. 3. Besides general statements concerning “Defendants”, 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint offers no specific facts suggesting that the Moving Defendants have 

sufficient contacts with the forum to confer personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ insufficient 

jurisdictional pleading is grounds enough to dismiss the Moving Defendants from this case, but 

nevertheless, the facts confirm that the Moving Defendants have no relationship to the forum and 

should be dismissed. 

IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Legal Standard – Personal Jurisdiction

A district court must dismiss an action if it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. 

2 Hanshow is presumably well aware that there are two U.S. based VusionGroup-related 

parties that it declined to name in this case. This is so because Hanshow and VusionGroup have 

been involved in litigation in multiple jurisdictions for several years. Thus, Hanshow’s decision 

not to name any of the U.S.-based entities was intentional. Therefore, to the extent that Hanshow 

later requests leave to add these parties, the Court should deny that request.

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Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010). “A federal court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal 

jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th 

Cir. 2009), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 68 (2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). Because the Texas 

long-arm statute extends as far as constitutional due process allows, this Court need only consider 

the second step of the inquiry. Id.

The Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to determine if personal jurisdiction 

comports with due process: (1) whether the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with the 

forum state; and (2) whether the defendant’s submission to jurisdiction in the forum state would 

not infringe on “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 

Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

“There are two types of ‘minimum contacts’: those that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction 

and those that give rise to general personal jurisdiction.” Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th 

Cir. 2001). Neither is present here.

B. The Court Lacks General Jurisdiction Over the Moving Defendants. 

General jurisdiction requires that “a defendant [be] essentially at home in the State.” Ford 

Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (internal quotation omitted). 

A defendant is “at home” when its contacts with the forum state are “continuous and systematic.” 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014). Corporations are considered “at home” in the 

state of “its place of incorporation and principal place of business.” Ford, 529 U.S. at 358 (citations 

omitted). The Supreme Court has recently made it clear that the exercise of general jurisdiction 

arises in “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum [that] will render a defendant amenable to 

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all-purpose jurisdiction there.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. The Fifth Circuit concurs, finding that it 

is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of 

incorporation or principal place of business of a defendant.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 

768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014).

Neither VusionGroup GmbH nor Captana GmbH are incorporated or have a principal place 

of business in Texas or the United States. Hanshow does not allege otherwise. Nor has it pled any 

facts relating to the “limited set of affiliations” that would suggest that either Moving Defendant 

had “continuous and systematic” contacts with Texas. As such, Hanshow cannot establish general 

jurisdiction as to either defendant.

C. The Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction Over the Moving Defendants. 

Specific jurisdiction is established when a Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Id. at 359 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

“The defendant ... must take some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff “must 

show that the defendant deliberately reached out beyond its home—by, for example, exploi[ting] 

a market in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). 

The requirements for specific jurisdiction can be coalesced as follows: “(1) the defendant 

purposefully directed its activities to the forum State; (2) the claims arise out of or relate to those 

activities (collectively, the minimum contacts prong); and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction is 

reasonable and fair.” NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc., 859 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2017); see also Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2008).

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i. The Moving Defendants Have Not Directed Any Activities to Texas.

The Moving Defendants do not have the minimum contacts with Texas that are necessary 

to establish personal jurisdiction in this forum. Each of the alleged instances of “contacts” 

identified in the Complaint are either contacts by a separate entity or do not meet the standard of 

minimum contacts under Texas law. 

Hanshow alleges that jurisdiction exists because “[o]n information and belief,

[VusionGroup GmbH and Captana GmbH] have made, used, provided, supplied, distributed, sold, 

offered for sale, and/or imported . . . the accused infringing Captana devices . . . in the State Texas

and continue to do so”. See Dkt. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 15. But this is factually incorrect. Ex. 1 ¶ 7; Ex. 

2 ¶ 12.

Neither VusionGroup GmbH nor Captana GmbH make, sell, advertise, or import any 

CaptanaTM products in or into the United States or the State of Texas. Ex. 1 ¶ 7; Ex. 2 ¶ 12. Indeed, 

as corroborated in the exhibits attached to the complaint, the Moving Defendants do not have a 

presence in the United States, much less with respect to the CaptanaTM Accused Devices.

Hanshow’s Exhibits 5-6, partially depicted in their Complaint, include “job postings” for “SESimagotag SA” (now VusionGroup SA), and not SES-imagotag GmbH (now VusionGroup GmbH)

or Captana GmbH. See passim Dkt. No. 1, Exs. 5-6. Those same exhibits make reference to the 

“Captana Sensor Cloud” within the SES-imagotag SA job description. Further, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 

3 is a presentation for VusionGroup SA’s 2022-2027 Strategic Plan. See generally Dkt. 1 at Ex. 3.

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3 specifically shows that Captana maintains its own CEO, separate from the 

SES-imagotag leadership. Id. at p. 120 (listing Captana GmbH’s CEO). Plaintiffs’ exhibits do not 

mention VusionGroup (or SES-imagotag) GmbH at all.

Next, Hanshow alleges that Defendants are doing substantial business in Texas, “either 

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directly or indirectly through intermediaries[.]” Dkt. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 13. Hanshow does not 

identify any specific “intermediaries.” Nor does Hanshow explain the factual basis for attributing 

acts of the unnamed intermediaries to VusionGroup GmbH or Captana GmbH. It is wellestablished law that personal jurisdiction does not arise out of the unilateral acts of third parties, 

including unnamed intermediaries. See Wapp Tech Ltd. P’ship v. Micro Focus Int’l, PLC, 406 F. 

Supp. 3d 585, 595 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (internal quotation omitted) (“The Supreme Court has 

forbidden the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of unilateral acts of thirdparties.”). Thus, even if Hanshow’s allegations were correct, they would not establish personal 

jurisdiction over either defendant. 

Hanshow has also failed to show that the Moving Defendants have themselves engaged in 

“substantial business” in Texas. Besides general allegations as to “Defendants,” collectively, 

Hanshow has not pled any specific facts indicating that VusionGroup GmbH or Captana GmbH

have sufficient contacts with Texas or this forum for the Court to properly exercise personal 

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 10-15, pp. 57-228; see Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., Inc., 924 F.3d 

190, 193 (5th Cir. 2019) (To establish minimum contacts, Plaintiff must show that Defendants 

“purposefully availed [themselves] of the benefits and protections of the forum state such that 

[they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”).

Hanshow does not allege any specific contacts in Texas (or the United States in general) 

associated with either VusionGroup GmbH or Captana GmbH. Hanshow acknowledges in its

Complaint that VusionGroup GmbH is an Austrian company with a principal place of business in 

Austria, and that Captana GmbH is a German company with a principal place of business in 

Germany. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 7-8. Yet, the only evidence that Hanshow presents in its complaint to establish 

this Court’s personal jurisdiction over the Moving Defendants is the presence of SES-Imagotag 

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America’s—an entity that is not a party to this case—office in Irving, Texas, and job postings for 

SES-Imagotag SA showing availability in an Irving office. Id. ¶¶ 10-15; see Wapp Tech, 406 F. 

Supp. 3d at 595; see also Diece-Lisa Indus., Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc., 943 F.3d 239, 251 (5th 

Cir. 2019) (internal quotation omitted) (“Generally, the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction 

over a nonresident corporation may not be based solely upon the contacts with the forum state of 

another corporate entity with which the defendant may be affiliated.”). Plaintiffs do not allege any 

contacts in Texas by VusionGroup GmbH or Captana GmbH. As such, Plaintiffs’ claims against 

the Moving Defendants must be dismissed.

ii. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Under a Stream of Commerce Theory.

Nor can Hanshow establish specific jurisdiction under a so-called “stream of commerce”

theory. The stream of commerce “doctrine recognizes that a defendant may purposely avail itself 

of the protection of a state’s laws—and thereby will subject itself to personal jurisdiction—by 

sending its goods rather than its agents into the forum.” In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle 

Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 778 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). 

However, this theory is inapplicable to the Moving Defendants.

Hanshow has not pled sufficient facts to allege a plausible theory of personal jurisdiction 

under a stream of commerce theory as to the Moving Defendants. See AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton 

Technology Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The paltry allegations in the complaint 

cannot support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in [the forum].”). As mentioned previously, 

VusionGroup GmbH does not sell any products whatsoever, let alone in Texas. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 6-7. And 

other than conclusory allegations leveled against all Defendants collectively, Plaintiffs do not offer 

any specific facts suggesting that Captana GmbH purposefully directs products to the state of 

Texas (or anywhere else in the United States). See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of 

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California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (“The placement of a product into the stream 

of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum 

State.”). 

In fact, the evidence confirms the opposite—that neither Moving Defendant has directed

its activities toward Texas at all. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 7-8; Ex. 2 ¶¶ 11-12; see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 

Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (“These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, 

but they do not show that [defendant] purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”). 

Accordingly, because VusionGroup GmbH and Captana GmbH lack sufficient contacts 

with the forum to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the case against them should be 

dismissed.

iii. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Moving Defendants Would Offend 

Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice. 

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper only if it would not offend 

notions of fair play and substantial justice. The exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant offends 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice where “(1) the burden on the nonresident 

defendant, (2) the forum state’s interests, (3) the Plaintiffs’ interest in securing relief, (4) the 

interest of the interstate judicial system in the efficient administration of justice, and (5) the shared 

interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 

F.3d 753, 760 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, each of these factors weighs against this Court’s jurisdiction.

First, the burden on the VusionGroup GmbH and Captana GmbH would be substantial. As 

stated, VusionGroup GmbH is located in, and conducts its business in Austria, and Captana GmbH 

is located in, and conducts its business in Germany. All the relevant personnel and evidence related 

to these companies is located in Austria and Germany, because they are headquartered and operate 

in Europe. The companies have no employees in the United States. See Ex. 1 ¶ 8; Ex. 2 ¶ 11. The 

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Moving Defendants would be unduly burdened by time and expense if forced to litigate this case 

in a forum of which they have not purposefully availed themselves. 

Second, while this State may have a general interest in dissuading patent infringement 

within its borders, it has no interest in parties, such as the Moving Defendants, who do not operate 

or sell any products within its borders or in the United States. Hanshow has alleged no particular 

sales within the State or any significant presence in the State whatsoever. Hanshow itself is from 

China with no obvious connection to the State. 

As such, this case is very different from one in which a Texas resident is seeking to obtain 

a judgment from another Texas resident, or even a resident of another U.S. state. Instead, this case 

is in Texas due solely to Hanshow’s venue manipulation. The tenants of fair play and substantial 

justice exist precisely to create a stop gap when, at the very least, neither party have any connection 

to the State. In any event, to the extent the State has any interest in this case, itsinterest is protected 

because this case will, at the very least, be litigated as to VusionGroup SA.

Third, and similarly, the Plaintiffs’ interests in securing relief will not be negatively 

impacted by dismissing the Moving Defendants. This case will nevertheless proceed and will 

simply not include parties with no connection to the State. Moreover, Plaintiffs are not domiciled 

in Texas—they are Chinese companies, and they have not alleged that they have any interest in 

Texas besides their desire to file a lawsuit here. 

Fourth, dismissing the Moving Defendants would have no impact on the “efficient 

administration of justice”. Hanshow and Defendants have been engaged in litigation for several 

years in other forums. See, e.g., SES-Imagotag SA, et al. v. Hanshow America, Inc. and Hanshow 

Technology Co. Ltd., Case No. 1:23-cv-01667-BMC (E.D.N.Y.). Hanshow knows full well by now 

who it should have named in this suit, but conveniently omitted the parties that would have 

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deprived the Court of venue. have simply sued wrong parties. Because the Moving Defendants to 

not have employees, sales, products, or marketing in the United States this is not a case of 

competing forums, but rather, the improper exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign entities operating 

outside of the United States. So, this litigation would claim this Court’s time for matters that 

involve parties, activities, and events that do not affect this State. 

Fifth, the only social policy at issue here is to enforce the patent laws of the United States, 

which will be served by the existence of this lawsuit, litigating over the same Accused Products, 

following dismissal of the Moving Defendants. Neither the social interests of the United States, 

Texas, or indeed, Plaintiffs are offended by the dismissal of the Moving Defendants.

Therefore, litigating in this State would offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice. The Moving Defendants should be dismissed. 

D. Personal Jurisdiction Cannot Be Established Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in 

Federal question claims where a defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts, and 

exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws. The Federal 

Circuit describes Rule 4(k)(2) as closing,

a loophole that existed prior to the 1993 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Before the adoption of Rule 4(k)(2), a non-resident defendant who did 

not have “minimum contacts” with any individual state sufficient to support [the] 

exercise of jurisdiction, but did have sufficient contacts with the United States as a 

whole, could escape jurisdiction in all fifty states.

Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 2009

Thus, for Federal question cases in which a defendant does not identify a particular 

jurisdiction that is appropriate for personal jurisdiction, see id., at 1415, the court analyzes, not 

only the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, but with the United States in general. As the 

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE 12

Federal Circuit put it, “Rule 4(k)(2) ‘contemplates a defendant’s contacts with the entire United 

States, as opposed to the state in which the district court sits.’ Thus, while the test of specific 

jurisdiction under 4(k)(2) involves the same steps ... , we must consider appellees ‘contacts with 

the nation as a whole.’” Id. at 1416 (quoting Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de 

Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1297, 1296 (Fed.Cir.2009)).

In this case, the analysis is the same as above because neither defendant has any contacts 

with the United States such that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants is consistent with 

Due Process. This is not a circumstance where the defendants have contacts with the United States 

but not a particular state. Instead, neither of the Moving Defendants are incorporated or have 

principal places of business in the United States, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 4, 8; Ex. 2 ¶¶ 5, 12, the Moving 

Defendants do not direct any activity towards the United States, Ex. 1 ¶ 7; Ex. 2 ¶ 12, Plaintiffs’ 

claims do not arise out of any supposed contacts by the Moving Defendants with the United States, 

and personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) would offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice. 4(k)(2), thus, cannot and does not apply.

E. VusionGroup GmbH’s Appearance In Prior Litigation Does Not Waive 

Its Challenge to Personal Jurisdiction In This Case3

It does not matter that VusionGroup GmbH did not challenge personal jurisdiction in 

Hanshow Technology Co., Ltd. v. SES-Imagotag SA and SES-Imagotag GmbH Case No. 2:23-cv00174 (E.D. Tex.) (“Hanshow I”). This is so because courts have consistently held that a party’s 

prior appearance does “not necessarily waive the personal jurisdiction requirement in future 

3

The Moving Defendants have also not waived their challenge to personal jurisdiction by filing joint or unopposed 

case management motions in this case as required by the Court’s orders. See Stubblefield v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 826 

F. App'x 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2020) (no waiver of jurisdictional challenge when case was pending for over two years 

and, prior to filing an initial Rule 12 Motion, Defendant had participated in discovery, filed jury demand, negotiated 

a joint protective order, moved to extended discovery deadlines, and a scheduling order was modified with a new trial 

date).

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE 13

actions, nor constitute related business conduct within the jurisdiction.” Wapp Tech., 406 F. Supp. 

at 594 (quoting Rozenblat v. Sandia Corp., No. 05-1556, 2006 WL 678923, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 

17, 2006)) (holding that a defendant did not waive its personal jurisdiction challenge even though 

it appeared in another, unrelated case in the same district); see also Rozenblat, 2006 WL 678923, 

at * 3 (holding that defendant did not waive personal jurisdiction even though it generally appeared 

in a previous case filed by the same plaintiff). Thus, as a general matter, VusionGourp GmbH’s 

appearance in Hanshow I does not waive challenges to personal jurisdiction in later cases.

Furthermore, although Hanshow I and this case involve related parties (Hanshow 

Technology Co., Ltd. and VusionGroup SA) and have some overlap in accused products, the cases 

are nevertheless significantly different. First, neither Plaintiff Shanghai Hanshi, nor Defendant 

Captana GmbH, are parties to Hanshow I. Hanshow I also involves entirely different patents in 

different technology fields than in this case. See Hanshow I Amended Complaint, 2:23-cv-00174 

at Dkt. 25 (alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 11,540,216; 8,346,210; and 9,641,994).

Hanshow I involves patents and infringement allegations relating to “electronic or bearer 

tags”. Id at ¶¶ 25 (“’216 patent relates to an interactive electronic tag device communication system 

and method”); 114 (“’210 patent relates to an approach for managing one or more services 

corresponding to a bearer tag . . .”); 183 (“’994 patent relates to an approach for managing one or 

more services corresponding to a bearer tag”). In contrast, this case involves U.S. Patent Nos. 

11,087,272 directed to “[s]ystem[s] and method[s] for location, identifying and counting items”, 

and 10,701,321 direct to “[s]ystem and method for distributed video analysis.” See Complaint, 

Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 17, 20. Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case are directed to “infringing Captana 

devices, systems, and/or functionality”. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 14, 15, 24, 26, 32, 34; see also Dkt No. 1-8 

(preliminary infringement charts accusing “Captana solution”). CaptanaTM products are not 

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE 14

accused in Hanshow I. See generally, Hanshow I Amended Complaint, 2:23-cv-00174 at Dkt. 25.

Accordingly, there is no reason why VusionGroup GmbH’s appearance in Hanshow I is 

should either be a waiver of a personal jurisdiction challenge in this case, nor considered related 

business conduct with respect to the jurisdictional analysis.

V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Moving Defendants respectfully pray that the Court dismiss 

this case specifically as to VusionGroup GmbH and Captana GmbH pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(2) and grant the Moving Defendants such further relief to which it may be entitled.

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE 15

Dated: April 25, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Matthew C. Acosta 

Matthew C. Acosta

Texas State Bar No. 24062577

PLATT RICHMOND PLLC

1201 N. Riverfront Blvd., Suite 150

Dallas, TX 75207

Tel. (214) 559-2700

Fax: (214) 559-4390

Grant E. Kinsel

Washington State Bar No. 49576

Perkins Coie LLP

1201 Third Avenue Suite 4900

Seattle, WA 98101

Tel: (206) 359-3516

Fax: (206) 359-9000

Matthew J. Moffa

New York State Bar No. 5045067

Perkins Coie LLP

1155 Avenue of the Americas, 22nd Floor

New York, NY 10036

Eric H. Findlay

State Bar No. 00789886

Findlay Craft, P.C.

7270 Crosswater Avenue

Suite B

Tyler, Texas 75703

Tel: (903) 534-1100

Fax: (903) 534-1137

Attorneys for Defendants VusionGroup SA,

VusionGroup GmbH, and Captana GmbH.

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PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2) PAGE 16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel for Defendants does hereby certify that this pleading was served 

on all counsel of record on April 25, 2024 by the Court’s ECF system.

/s/ Matthew C. Acosta

MATTHEW C. ACOSTA

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