[Cite as Argabrite v. Neer , 2015-Ohio-125.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY PAMELA ARGABRITE : : Appellate Case No. 26220 Plaintiff-Appellant : : Trial Court Ca se No. 12-CV-7402 v. : : JIM NEER, et al. : (Civil Appeal from : ( Common Pleas Court) Defendants-Appellees : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 16th day of January, 2015.

. . . . . . . . . . . KENNETH J. IGNOZZI, Atty. Reg. #0055431, Dy er, Garofalo, Mann, & Schultz, 131 North Ludlow Street, Suite 1400, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, Pamela Argabrite LISA A. LUEBKE, Atty. Reg. #0081315, and JOHN CUMMING, Atty. Reg. #0018710, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, Tony Ba ll, Daniel Adkins, Julie Stephens and Karen Osterfield LAWRENCE E. BARBIERE, Atty. Reg. #0027106, Schroeder, Maundr ell, Barbiere & Powers, 5300 Socialville Foster Road, Suite 200, Mason, Ohio 45040 Attorney for Defendant-A ppellee, John Dipietro EDWARD J. DOWD, Atty. Reg. #0018681, and JOSHUA SCHIERLOH, Atty. Reg. #0078325, 1 Prestige Place, Suite 700, Miamisburg, Ohio 45342 Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Jim Neer and Gregory Stites

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J. 2

 {¶ 1} Around noon on July 11, 2011, Miami Township police officers Jim Neer and Gregory Stites pursued fleeing burglary suspect Andrew Barnhart along streets in Miami Township and Washington Township while Deputy Chief John DiPietro supervised from the police department. Deputy Tony Ball and Sergeant Daniel Adkins of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office were also providing assistance. The pursuit ended when the suspect pulled into the opposing traffic lane and crashed head- on into the oncoming vehicle driven by Pamela Argabrite. The suspect was killed, and Argabrite was seriously injured. Argabrite filed a negligence action against the five officers invol ved in the pursuit to r ecover damages for her injuries. {¶ 2} The defendants all moved for summary judgment, contending that they are immune from liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, which “provides immunity to employees of a political subdivision for acts that are not committed in a wanton or reckless manner,” Anderson v. Massillon , 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 39. The defendants al so contended that they were not the proximate cause of Argabrite ’s injuries under the rule applied by this Court in Whitfield v. Dayton , 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 2006-Ohio-2917, 854 N.E.2d 532 (2d Dist.) 1 , which requires extreme or outrageous conduct by police officers before proximate cause is established in a pursuit where the injuries result from a crash by the pursued vehicle. Th e county officers also argued that they were not pursuing the suspect. Argabrite argued that the pursuit was wanton and reckless because the officers engaged in a high-s peed chase through commercial and residential areas during heavy traffic when the suspect was not violent and could have been later

1 We note that Whitfield was effectively overruled, in part, on other grounds by Anderson v. Massillon , 134 Ohio St.3d 380, at ¶ 29-31. 3

 apprehended with a warrant. {¶ 3} The trial court granted the summary judgment motions on the proximate-cause issue. As to the county officers, the court conc luded that no reasonable ju ror could find that the conduct of either officer was ex treme or outrageous. Officer Adki ns, said the court, was not involved in the pursuit, and Officer Ball’s track ing of the suspect was at a distance and at reasonable speeds, breaking off well before the accide nt in favor of the Miami Township officers. As to the township officers, the trial court concluded that their c onduct was reckless, but no reasonable juror could conclude that their conduct was extreme or outrageous. {¶ 4} Argabrite appealed, alleging in the sole assignment of error that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. Our review of a summary judgment decision is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). This means we use the same standard that the tria l court should have used, and we determine whether the evidence presents a genuine issue of fact for trial. Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co. , 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980). The trial cour t’s decision is not granted an y deference by the reviewing appellate court. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. Of Commrs. , 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993). Therefore, we could revi ew and analyze whether the trial court’s conclusion that Township officers Neer and Stites we re reckless is supported by the record or, if a genuine issue of recklessness is found, whether that behavior was th e proximate cause of Barnhart’s collision with the Argabrite vehicle. If there is no genuine issue of either recklessness or proximate cause resulting fro m recklessness, then the offi cers are entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). But we need not, and do not, engage in that analysis at this juncture because of our determination that the no-proximate-cause rule of Whitfield v. Dayton, requiring extreme 4

 or outrageous conduct, is dispositive of this appeal. {¶ 5} Argabrite asks us to reconsider the proximate-cause rule applied in Whitfield

. This rule comes from the Ninth Distri ct’s “no proximate cause” holding in Lewis v. Bland : “When a law enforcement officer pursues a fleeing violator and the violator injures a third party as a result of the chase, the officer’s pursuit is not the proximate cause of those injuries unless the circumstances indicat e extreme or outrageous conduct by the officer, as the possibility that the violator will injure a third party is too remo te to create liability until the officer’s conduct becomes extreme.” 75 Ohio App.3d 453, 456, 599 N.E.2d 814 (9th Dist.1991). We adhered to this holding in Whitfield because we recognized it as “established law” in Ohio. Whitfield , 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 2006-Ohio-2917, 854 N.E.2d 532, at ¶ 59. “Ohio appellate districts, including our own,” we said, “* * * apply th e ‘no proximate cause’ holding of Lewis to cases where pursuits end in injury to innocen t third parties or to occupants of the pur sued vehicle without direct contact with a police vehicle.” Id . at ¶ 57, citing Jackson v. Poland Twp. , 7th Dist. Mahoning Nos. 96 CA 261, 97 CA 13, and 98 CA 105, 1999 WL 783959 (Sept. 29, 1999); Pylypiv v. Parma , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85995, 2005-Ohio-6364; Shalkhauser v. Medina , 148 Ohio App.3d 41, 2002-Ohio-222, 772 N.E.2d 129 (9th Dist.); Heard v. Toledo , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1032, 2003-Ohio-5191, ¶ 12 (rej ecting an argument that Lewis is “outdated, contrary to sound public policy and should no long er govern Ohio cases”); and Sutterlin v. Barnard , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13201, 1992 WL 274641 (Oct. 6, 1992) (a previous case in which this district followed Lewis ’s approach). {¶ 6} According to Argabrite, the “no proximate cause” rule is the minority position in this country: “The majority of jurisdictions, focusing on the im portance of public safety, adopt 5

 the longstanding, general rules of proximate causation in which a police officer may be liable for damages where his actions are a s ubstantial factor in bringing a bout the end result, or at least when their conduct is reckless. C ourts that reject the ‘no proxima te cause rule’ have urged that using the majority standard increases public safety and is generally more consistent with the policies of police agencies.” (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Pamela Argabrite, 25). Argabrite also cites the dissenting judge in Whitfield , Judge Brogan, who disagreed with the “no proximate cause” rule. He agreed with the dissenting judge in Lewis that the rule fails to recognize that “ ‘multiple actors can combine to provide causation in a given instance.’ ” Whitfield at ¶ 118 (Brogan, J., dissenting), quoting Lewis at 459 (Cacioppo, J., dissenting). Judge Brogan agreed with the majority view, that if a plaintiff alleges police negligence in a pursuit, the issue of proximate cause should be consider ed simply a question of fact. Ra ther, we should say that Judge Brogan agrees with the majority view. He is the trial judge in this case, and in his summary-judgment decision he urges us to reverse Whitfield on this point. {¶ 7} The “no proximate cause” rule is still the established law in this state. Since Whitfield , no Ohio court has questioned th e rule, and at least one has rejected an argument not to follow it, see Perry v. Liberty Twp. , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-0056, 2013-Ohio-741, ¶ 18-21. We are not convinced that this is th e case in which to reconsider the rule. {¶ 8} The remaining issue is whether the trial court applied the “no proximate cause” rule correctly in this case. To determine wh ether the police officers’ conduct was extreme or outrageous in Whitfield we referred to the description of extreme and outrageous conduct adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court: The conduct is “ ‘so ex treme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 6

 community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” ’ ” Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of America , 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 375, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983), quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 46, Comment d (1965). “Obviously, th is is an exceptionally difficult standard to
meet.” Whitfield , 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 2006-Ohio-2917, 854 N.E.2d 532, at ¶ 61. {¶ 9} “In a case decided on summary judgment, we must determine whether an issue of material fact remains to be litigated, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and whether when viewing the evidence mo st strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only reach a conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party.” Snyder v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources , Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3942, ¶ 20, citing Civ.R. 56(C), and Temple v. Wean United, Inc. , 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). The evidence here is primarily the depositi ons of the defendant police o fficers plus the depositions and affidavits of two experts retain ed by Argabrite. About the relevant facts the evidence shows no genuine dispute. The question here is whethe r a reasonable mind, view ing the evidence most strongly in Argabrite’s favor, c ould find that the conduct of any of the officers was extreme and outrageous, that is, “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” {¶ 10} At 11:37 a.m. on July 11, 2011, Sergeant Rex Thompson was sitting in his office at the Miami Township Police Department when he heard on his police radio dispatch that there was a burglary in progress in Washington Townsh ip. The suspects were identified as two black males who had just broken into a residence, taken some items, and were leaving in a white vehicle without a front license pl ate. About 15 minutes later, th e suspects’ vehicle was further 7

 described as a white, older mode l “box style” Chevy Caprice, missing its hubcaps. The suspects were said to be wearing white t-shirts and fleeing in th e direction of Interstate 675. {¶ 11} Sergeant Thompson was the shift supervisor of the Miami Township police road patrol division that day and was in charge of all the Miami Township police officers and responsible for any police pursuits. Thompson left hi s office and got into his cruiser so that he could monitor the roadways nearby in the event the suspects’ vehicle drove past. While Thompson monitored the roadway, he heard on the radio one of his patrol officers tell officer Gregory Stites that the description of the car i nvolved in the burglary sounded like a car last seen at a residence on Mardell Drive. Thompson radioed Stites that he would meet him on Mardell Drive to investigate. {¶ 12} Thompson arrived first. Parked in the dr iveway at 2037 Mardell Drive, he saw an older, white Chevy Caprice with no hubcaps. Th e driver’s side door wa s open and someone was sitting in the driver’s seat with a leg draped out the door. Thompson pulled into the driveway and parked his cruiser 6 to 8 feet behind the car. Meanwhile, Stites had arrived and pulled up to the curb. {¶ 13} Thompson got out and slowly approached the car, hoping to catch its occupant off-guard. Thompson was within 10 feet of the ope n driver’s side door when the person sitting in the driver’s seat exited the car, talking on a cell phone. He startled when he saw Thompson and immediately turned around and got back into th e car. Thompson, concerned that the man might be attempting to get a weapon, drew his gun and started shouting at the man to stop. But he didn’t stop. Instead, he slammed the car door closed and started the engine. Thompson moved to within touching distance of the driver’s side and con tinued to shout to the suspect through the open 8

 driver’s side window, “Police, stop, don’t do it. ” (Thompson dep. 21). The suspect didn’t listen. He revved the engine, dropped the car into revers e, and tires spinning, slammed into Thompson’s cruiser. The suspect then threw the car into drive and smashed into the brick garage in front of him. Again the suspect dropped into reverse a nd slammed into the cruiser. Suddenly, the passenger-side door opened and a man, who Thompson had not seen, leapt out and started to run. At the same time, the suspect threw the car into drive and cranked the steering wheel to the right. Its tires spinning, the car tore off a corner sec tion of the brick garage and escaped down the side yard. The car drove through several back yards before making it back to Mardell Drive. {¶ 14} Thompson called in the license plate of the fleeing car. Then, since there were other officers around, he turned his attention to the fleeing passenger. Thompson found the man laying in the ravine behind the house, where the man had broken his leg. After calling for medical assistance, Thompson stayed with the man and as ked him the name of the driver, but the man refused to say. {¶ 15} Miami Township police officer Jim Neer was on patrol a few blocks away from Mardell Drive when he heard the radio broadcas t about the burglary and the white car on Mardell Drive. He headed that way, arriving on the street just in time to see the car going through the side yard. Neer turned on his lights and sirens and told dispatch that he was in pursuit. Officer Stites, parked in front of the Mardell Driv e house, joined Neer in the pursuit. {¶ 16} John DiPietro was the Deputy Chief of Police for Miami Township. When the radio broadcast about the burglary went out, he was at the police service garage. Initially, DiPietro only heard a small portion of the inform ation relayed over the ra dio as he was talking with people at the garage, and the radio did not have his full attention. DiPietro did hear a 9

 transmission from Thompson stating that he was on pa trol looking for the su spects’ vehicle. Then DiPietro thought he heard Thompson say that he ha d been hit. Shortly thereafter, when DiPietro heard Thompson say that he was out of service, he started paying atte ntion. DiPietro was not entirely sure what had just occurred, but based on what he had heard, he a ssumed that some sort of violent encounter had taken place between Thompson and the suspect. After it became apparent to DiPietro that several officers were now pursuing the suspect, and that Thompson was out of service, DiPietro realized that it was his duty, as the next highest ranking officer listening to the radio, to assume control of the pursuit, wh ich he did at 11:54 a.m. By then, DiPietro had left the service garage and was heading back to the police department. He began monitoring the pursuing officers’ actions and asked them to keep calling out their locations and any other information. DiPietro’s intention was to have ot her officers get ahead of the pursuit and deploy Stop Sticks to halt the suspect’s vehicle. He also asked dispatch to issue an alert to surrounding agencies. {¶ 17} From Mardell Drive the suspect’s car headed south on Graceland Street and then east on State Route 725. At the Lyons Road intersec tion the light was red, and the suspect slowed as he approached the intersection before going into the opposing lane, through the red light, and north on Lyons Road. Neer, then Stites, cautiously followed through the intersection. By the time Neer was on Lyons Road, the suspect was more th an 100 yards ahead of him. At McEwen Road, the suspect slowed and turned south. As the su spect approached S.R. 725, he slowed and waited for traffic to clear before continuing. Neer and Stites also slowed before proceeding through the intersection, “inch[ing] [their] way through it as well.” (Stites de p. 39). Captain Karen Osterfeld of the Montgomery County Sheri ff’s Office assisted by blocking westbound traffic from entering 10

 the S.R. 725-McEwen Road intersection. {¶ 18} Further south of S.R. 725, on McEwen Road, is the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office Washington Township substati on. Deputy Tony Ball was there when he heard over his radio that Miami Township officers were headed into Washington Township. Ball got into his cruiser and headed north on McEwen Roa d. Before he got to S.R. 725, a white car that matched the description of the vehicle being driven by the suspect passed him in the opposite lane, traveling “faster than nor mal” and going into opposing lane s of travel. (Ball dep. 14-15). Ball could not see any police vehicles in pursuit, though he saw their lights in the distance and figured that they had gotten “h eld up” at an intersection. ( Id . at 17). He decided to follow the suspect to at least keep eyes on it until the Miami Township officers caught up. Ball turned on his lights and siren, made a u-turn, and immediately turned off the lights and siren. At Spring Valley Pike intersection, Ball again turned on his lights and siren briefly and fo llowed the suspect west. Ball looked back to see whether the Miami Township officers were close enough so that he could “get out of their way,” ( Id . at 22), as he was only trying to keep the suspect in sight and did not intend to pursue. They hadn’t caught up yet. As he followed the suspect, Ball activated either his lights or his lights and siren when he was passing vehicles or goin g through intersections in order to warn motorists that he and the Miami Township officers were coming through the area. Finally, Ball saw that the Miami Township police officers had caught up, so he began looking for a place to pull over to allow them to pass. Fearing that if he pulled over or tried to maneuver out of their way, they would follow him, Ball radioed the officers to pass him when he was just east of Washington Church Road. When he pulled into the middle lane and slowed, Neer and Stites passed him. Ball continued west on Spring Valley Pike without his lights or siren, though he 11

 occasionally turned on his lights to pass a vehicle. {¶ 19} After Neer and Stites passe d Ball, they accelerated b ecause the suspect was now well ahead of them. They slowed as they crested a hill to see if the suspect had gone down a side street, but Neer saw the white car ahead of them, at the S.R. 741 intersection. The suspect slowed, or stopped, and waite d for traffic to clear the intersecti on before going through a red light and turning south. {¶ 20} Sergeant Daniel Adkins of the Montgo mery County Sheriff’s Office heard the radio broadcast about the burgl ary while he was on patrol in Washington Township. While driving to the scene of the burglary, Adkins heard that the suspects had left the area in an older white car, so Adkins started driving around the ge neral area, hoping to find it. When he heard over the radio that Miami Township officers were in pursuit, Adkins began to follow the pursuit from the north, thinking that they might need him to assist in clearing intersections or to wait for the suspect to flee on foot. He worked his way over to S.R. 741, reasoning that if the suspect went north on that road, he (Adkins) would need to help direct traffic becau se at that time of the day traffic would be “horrendous .” (Adkins dep. 12). But the su spect went south, and Adkins never saw him. {¶ 21} When Neer reached the Spring Valley Pi ke and S.R. 741 inte rsection, he slowed, then stopped, and made sure no tr affic was coming in either dir ection before proceeding. Once on S.R. 741, Neer accelerated in order to catch up to the suspect, who was well ahead of him and cresting a hill near Waldruhe Park. Neer and Stites lost sight of the suspect until they crested the same hill. When they caught sight of him agai n, they watched him move left into the opposing lane of traffic and crash head-on into Argabr ite. The crash was announced over the radio at 11:57 12

 a.m. When Ball heard the announcement, he was stopped at a red light at the S.R. 741 intersection. When the light turned green, he tu rned on his lights and siren and responded to the crash to assist. {¶ 22} Argabrite contends that the pursuit was extreme or outrageous because the officers pursued at high speeds through residential areas, because the police officers violated their respective policies on motor vehicle pursuits, a nd because they knew who the suspect was and could have arrested him with a warrant. {¶ 23} In all, the pursuit covered just under 6 miles and lasted just under 7 minutes. The speed limits along the route ranged from 25 m .p.h. on Graceland Street to 45 m.p.h. on S.R. 725 to 35 m.p.h. on Spring Valley Road to 55 m.p.h. on S.R. 741. Ball estimated that while on McEwen Road he drove 45-50 m .p.h. Stites testified that on Spri ng Valley Road, before he reached Washington Church Road, he was travelin g at 45-50 m.p.h. Neer tes tified that, after he passed Ball, he accelerated to between 60 and 80 m.p.h. because the suspect was now well ahead of him. Stites said that on S. R. 741 he never went over 70 m .p.h. The weather during the pursuit was clear, dry, and sunny. Neer and Stites both testifie d that the traffic during the pursuit was generally light. Stites said that he was able to ne gotiate it without any problems. Under the described circumstances, no reasona ble juror could conclude that the officers’ speeds during the pursuit were extreme or outrageous. {¶ 24} The Miami Township Pursuit of Motor Vehicles Policy allows an officer to pursue a fleeing suspect who the officer has probable cause to believe committed a burglary or felonious assault. (Miami Township Pursuit of Motor Vehicles Policy, 41.2.8(C)). But the policy also states that “[i]f the risk to the public from the initiation or continuation, of a pursuit 13

 outweighs the risk from not initiating the pur suit or discontinuation, the pursuit shall be terminated.” ( Id .). An officer “must terminate a pursuit” when “[t]he risks to personal safety and/or the safety of others outwe igh the dangers presented if the suspect is not apprehended” or when “[t]he identity of the offender is known and risk of escape poses less threat than risk from attempt to capture.” ( Id . at 41.2.8(C)(7)(b)(1) and (2)). An offi cer must also terminate a pursuit “when the probability of harm to the officer or ge neral public is increased by the actions of the suspect vehicle,” which occurs when “[t]he su spect vehicle travels into oncoming traffic” or when “[s]peeds increase to a level unsafe for conditions.” ( Id . at 41.2.8(C)(8)(a)(1) and (4)). According to the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office pursuit policy, the only offense for which a deputy may pursue a suspect is a “felony involving the inflicti on or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.” (General Or ders Manual, 5.1.4(A)(2) (5th Ed.)). {¶ 25} Even if it is assumed for the sake of analysis that the officers did violate their respective pursuit policies, their conduct was not extreme or outra geous. The most that can be said of a violation of a “departmental policy enacted for the safety of the public” is that it “may be relevant to determining the cu lpability of a course of conduct.” Anderson , 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, at ¶ 37; see also Shalkhauser , 148 Ohio App.3d at 51, 772 N.E.2d 129 (saying, “a violation of an internal depar tmental procedure is irre levant to the issue of whether appellees’ conduct constitu ted willful or wanton misconduc t”). “ ‘Without evidence of an accompanying knowledge that the violations “will in all probability result in injury,” Fabrey [v. McDonald Village Police Dept. ], 70 Ohio St.3d [351] at 356, 639 N.E.2d 31 [ (1994) ] evidence that policies have been violated demonstrates negligence at best.’ ” Anderson at ¶ 38, quoting O’Toole v. Denihan , 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 92. Here, 14

 even if there is a factual question as to whether either Neer or Stites violated their pursuit policy, there is no evidence to conclude that either knew that the violation would probably cause someone injury. Neer testifie d that he knew that under the pursuit policy he could pursue a fleeing suspect who had committed a burglary or felonious assault. DiPietro testified that he did not believe that any of the information that he received from his officers during the pursuit warranted terminating the pursuit. Although DiPietro never asked for the speeds of the vehicles, we note that, in all, he was in control of the pursuit for only about 3 minutes. With regard to Ball and Adkins not only is there is no evidence that either of them knew of any violation of their pursuit policy, but if there was a violation, there is no evidence that either knew that the violation would probably cause someone injury and, regardless of the standard applied, their actions were not the proximate cause of the eventual crash. Each of Argabrite’s experts states in his affidavit that the defendants intentionally disregarded their respective pursuit policies. ( See McDevitt Aff. ¶ 5; Ashton Aff. ¶ 6). This evidence, though, “does not create any issues of fact , but merely states appellant’s position with respect to appe llees’ culpability, which is a legal conclusion.” (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis sic.) Shalkhauser at 51. {¶ 26} Neer and DiPietro each testified that he did not know who the suspect was until after the crash. But Stites knew early on. Three mont hs earlier, the same white car had failed to stop for another officer, and Stites and that officer discovered that the car was registered to Andrew Barnhart’s mother. One could speculate whether the officers s hould have discontinued the pursuit, and at what point th at decision should be made. But th at’s not the right question here. The question is, was the pursuit extreme or outra geous? We do not think that a reasonable person could fairly say that it was. 15

 {¶ 27} None of the officers’ conduct may fair ly be characterized as “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Ce rtainly, nothing about Ball’s or Adkins’ conduct comes close. While one of Argabrite’s experts states in his affidavit that Neer’s, Stites’s, DiPietro’s, and Ball’s conduct was outrageous and unconscionable, ( see McDevitt Aff. ¶ 5), such evidence, as we said above, states a legal c onclusion, not a factual a ssertion. The trial court disagreed and so do we. {¶ 28} Lastly, we need not address whether the officers are immune under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. As we said in Whitfield , “since there must always be a causal connection between disputed c onduct and an injury, a plain tiff would have to satisfy proximate-cause require ments even if an officer’s conduct is wanton or reckless.” Whitfield , 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 2006-Ohio-2917, 854 N.E.2d 532, at ¶ 44. That issue is dispositive. {¶ 29} The sole assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 30} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J., concurs. FROELICH, P.J., dissenting. {¶ 31} I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Whitfield v. Dayton , 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 2006-Ohio-2917, 854 N.E.2d 532 (2d Dist.) , should continue to be followed. {¶ 32} A claim for personal injuries requires the existence of a duty, the defendant’s breach of that duty, and injury or damages that are proximately caused by that breach. Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce , 96 Ohio St.3d 266, 2002-Ohio-4210, 773 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 22. Without proximate cause, there can be no liability. 16

 {¶ 33} Proximate cause is the law’s distinction between the injury’s cause in fact and causation for which society hol ds an actor responsible. 2 The Supreme Court of Ohio has discussed proximate cause, stating: The term, “proximate cause,” is often difficult of exact definition as applied to the facts of a particular case. However, it is generally true that, where an original act is wrongful or negligent and in a na tural and continuous sequence produces a result which would not have taken place without the act, proximate cause is established, and the fact that some other act unites with the original act to cause injury does not relieve the initial offender from liability. Clinger v. Duncan , 166 Ohio St. 216, 222, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957). An injury is the natural and probable consequence of an act if the injury complained of “could have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated” from the conduct. Strother v. Hutchinson , 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 287, 423 N.E.2d 467 (1981). {¶ 34} According to Lewis v. Bland , 75 Ohio App.3d 454, 599 N.E.2d 814 (9th Dist.1991), and the cases that follow it, police o fficers must engage in “extreme or outrageous conduct” before there can be proximate cause. Id . at 456. This approach is contrary to traditional notions of pr oximate cause, which focus on the fore seeability of the consequence, not

2 Everything causes everything. As we stated in Didier v. Johns , 114 Ohio App.3d 746, 684 N.E.2d 337 (2d Dist.1996): In our universe, all events can be analyzed as caused by all other events. It is a weary truism now, thanks to the explorations of chaos theory, that “but for” the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in Mexico, Dorothy would never have been blown to Oz. On the scale of human (not just physical) events, historical interactions have been thoroughly revealed and explored. In short, the “but for” analysis casts a net so wide that conceivably all events are traceable to all othe r events, and the touchstone of individual responsibility sinks beneath a sea billowing with enumerable occurrences all jostling each other. (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 753 (Yo ung, J.). 17

 on the wrongfulness of the conduct that produces the result. {¶ 35} Ohio’s sovereign immunity statute sets forth standards imposing liability of governmental entities and their employees fo r wrongful conduct. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) grants employees of political subdivisions immunity from lia bility, unless any of three exceptions to that immunity applies. Anderson v. Massillon , 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 21. Those exceptions are (1) the employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee's employment or offi cial responsibilities; (2) the employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious pur pose, in bad faith, or in a wa nton or reckless manner; and (3) civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employ ee by a section of the Revised Code. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a)-(c). Thus, of rele vance here, police officers invol ved in police chases have a duty not to proximately cause injury by acting malic iously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). They are imm une from suit, unless their actions were performed “with malicious purpose, in bad fa ith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Id. {¶ 36} As we stated in Moon v. Trotwood Madison City Schs ., 2014-Ohio-1110, 9 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist.): The terms “wanton” and “reckless” desc ribe different and distinct degrees of care and are not interchangeable. Anderson v. Massillon , 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, paragraph one of the syllabus. They are sometimes described “as be ing on a continuum, i.e., willful conduct is more culpable than wanton, and wanton conduct is more culpable than reckless.” Id. at ¶ 42 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgme nt in part and dissenting in part). Recklessness is a high standard. Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of 18

 Children and Family Servs ., 118 Ohio St.3d 392, 2008-Ohio-2567, 889 N.E.2d 521, ¶ 37. “Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantia lly greater than negligent conduct.” Anderson at ¶ 34, adopting 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500 (1965).

Moon at ¶ 20-21. {¶ 37} By requiring extreme and outrageous conduct to establis h proximate cause (which is required for liability), Lewis usurps the legislative determination as to the type of conduct that is required of employees of politi cal subdivisions for immunity from liability. Under Lewis , even if a police officer is reckless, the officer would still be immune from liability unless the conduct is extreme or outrageous. The argument that Lewis involves “proximate cause” as opposed to “duty” could devolve into a historical or pedago gical discussion of duty versus proximate cause. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.Co ., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Suffice it to say, the bottom-line concerni ng potential responsibility is the same. It may or may not be good public policy to require “extreme or outrageous” conduct to remove immunity and impose liability upon police officer s who pursue a fleeing suspect, but that question has been decided by the legislat ure when it only require d “reckless” conduct. {¶ 38} If the legislature desired a different standard for immunity when police officers are pursuing fleeing suspects in their vehicles, the legislature could have expressly created such an exception. The legislature has created an exception to po litical subdivision liability for negligent operation of a motor vehicle when a police officer “was operating a motor vehicle 19

 while responding to an emergency call and the ope ration of the vehicle di d not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.” R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a). No specific immunity provision exists for police officers regarding their pursuit of a fleeing suspect other than that found in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). {¶ 39} I concede that stare decisis weighs in favor of following Whitfield , which followed Lewis . However, Anderson has since clarified certain definitions regarding the degrees of care for purposes of the sovereign immun ity statute. Moreover, I believe that Whitfield was wrongly decided at the time, the decision defi es practical workability, and abandoning the precedent would not cause undue hardship for those who have relied on it. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis , 100 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 48 (adopting a standard to determine when courts may vary from established precedent).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . Copies mailed to: Kenneth J. Ignozzi Liza J. Luebke John Cumming Lawrence E. Barbiere Edward J. Dowd Joshua R. Schierloh Hon. James A. Brogan (sitting for Judge Barbara P. Gorman)