No. 90-564 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1991 

LESTER NORMAN, 

Claimant/Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF WHITEFISH, 

Employer, 

and 

CITY OF WHITEFISH, 

Defendant/Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: Workers1 Compensation Court 

The Honorable Timothy W. Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

John H. Bothe, Bothe & Lauridsen, 

Columbia Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Oiver H. Goe, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry 

& Hoven, Helena, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: February 28, 1991 

Decided: June 4, 1991 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Claimant Lester Norman appeals from an order of the Workers1 

Compensation Court denying him temporary total disability benefits. 

We affirm. 

Two issues are raised on appeal: 

1. Whether substantial credible evidence supports the 

Workerst Compensation Court's finding that claimant's current 

condition is not causally related to his injury of February 12, 

1987; and 

2. Whether the court's order on rehearing is inconsistent 

with its prior findings and conclusions regarding the causal 

relationship between claimant's current condition and the February 

12, 1987, injury. 

Claimant Lester Norman was employed as a police officer for 

the City of Whitefish from 1969 until 1975, and again from 1979 

until 1988, when he voluntarily left the force. Norman suffered 

compensable auto accident injuries on November 16, 1980, and 

February 12, 1987. He timely reported both injuries and filed 

appropriate claim forms. He suffered no immediate wage loss from 

either accident. Following the February 1987 accident, Norman 

continued to work until March 1988, when he quit due to what he 

characterized as a "nervous breakdown." He subsequently pursued 

disability retirement benefits, claiming his disability was from 

stress. No mention was made of any disability related to the 

February 12, 1987, auto accident. 
On or about December 5, 1989, Norman filed a petition for 

hearing with the Workers' Compensation Court, alleging that the 

City of Whitefish was liable for his accident of February 12, 1987. 

When the matter was heard in March 1990, the issues presented were: 

(1) whether Norman's current cervical condition is related to the 

February 12, 1987, accident; (2) if it is related, whether Norman 

is entitled to temporary total disability benefits and medical 

benefits; and (3) whether he is entitled to a 20 percent delay 

increase. The court found, in August 1990, that Norman had failed 

to prove that his current inability to work was proximately caused 

by his February 12, 1987, auto accident, and that therefore, he was 

not entitled to temporary total disability benefits, or fees, 

costs, or penalty. 

Norman then filed a motion for clarification, requesting the 

court to order the City of Whitefish to accept liability for his 

current cervical condition and pay medical benefits accordingly. 

The court classified Norman's motion for clarification as a motion 

for rehearing and denied it on the basis of its former finding that 

Norman lacked the requisite credibility to support a finding that 

the February 12, 1987, injury was medically related to his current 

cervical complaints. Norman appeals from that denial. 

Does substantial credible evidence support the Workers' 

Compensation Court's finding that the claimant's current condition 

is not causally related to his injury of February 12, 1987? 
The general rule is that the findings of the Workersv 

Compensation Court will not be overturned on appeal if substantial 

evidence supports them. Nelson v. ASARCO, Inc., 227 Mont. 272, 

277, 739 P. 2d 943, 946 (1987) . Norman claims that he presented 

substantial evidence to show that the February 1987 accident, which 

occurred while he was working for the City of Whitefish, aggravated 

a pre-existing shoulder and back condition. He states that it is 

that condition which now prevents him from working, and that 

therefore, the City of Whitefish should be held liable. He argues 

that because his evidence was substantial and credible, the 

Workersv compensation Court's decision not to grant benefits must 

have been erroneous. 

Liability in workerst compensation cases is defined in 

5 39-71-407, MCA (1985): 

Every insurer is liable for the payment of compensation, 

in the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided, to 

an employee of an employer it insures who receives an 

injury arising out of and in the course of his employment 

or, in the case of his death from such injury, to his 

beneficiaries, if any. 

An "injuryIv is defined as: 

[A] tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an 

unexpected cause or unusual strain resulting in either 

external or internal physical harm and such physical 

condition as a result therefrom . . . . 

Section 39-71-119 (1) , MCA (1985) . Norman reads these statutes 

together and reasons that because he had an injury and now claims 

a resultant physical condition the City is liable under 

5 39-71-407, MCA (1985). 
A review of the evidence does not yield the result Norman now 

urges the Court to reach. The following excerpts of findings and 

conclusions by the Workers' Compensation Court support its 

conclusion that the claimant is not entitled to benefits because 

he has failed to show a nexus between his 1987 injury and his 

present complaint: 

1. The claimant was referred to a psychiatrist in February 

1987 and was diagnosed with "generalized anxiety disorder and 

psychological factors influencing physical condition." 

2. Claimant expressed symptoms of worsening stress and 

anxiety in 1988, which eventually led him to quit the police force. 

3. By October 1988, Norman's psychiatrist indicated that 

Norman could return to work. By November 1988, the psychiatrist 

revised his opinion based on a report by another doctor that Norman 

had suffered another anxiety episode leading to an emergency room 

visit. 

4. In the summer of 1989, a neurosurgeon diagnosed a 

herniated disc in Norman's neck, which he stated was related to the 

auto accidents he had suffered in 1980 and 1987. On crossexamination in his deposition, the neurosurgeon stated that his 

opinion relating Norman's cervical problems to his auto accidents 

was entirely dependent on the history related by Norman some two 

years after the fact. He further stated that the condition he 

diagnosed could be caused by trauma or by aging. 
5. Norman was treated extensively by another doctor for his 

cervical complaints. His visits increased following the February 

1987 accident, but at no time did the doctor advise Norman to quit 

work due to his physical problems. 

6. During calendar year 1988, Norman's claim for disability 

retirement benefits named stress as his disability. 

7. The evidence is overwhelming that claimant's anxiety 

disorder is his predominant disabling condition. 

The City of Whitefish does not dispute that it must pay all 

medical and wage loss benefits to which Norman is entitled as a 

result of his February 1987 injury. However, the record shows that 

his present disability is stress or anxiety related. Because 

Norman has failed to show that the 1987 injury caused the condition 

which now results in his total loss of wages, and because the 

findings and conclusions of the Workers' Compensation Court are 

supported by substantial credible evidence, the City of Whitefish 

is not liable for Norman's present disability. 

Is the court's order on rehearing inconsistent with its prior 

findings and conclusions regarding the causal relationship between 

Norman's current condition and the February 12, 1987, injury? 

The court's original order of August 23, 1990, stated as part 

of Conclusion of Law No. 3: 

Dr. Mahnke did diagnose two disk level problems which 

would require surgery. The Court does feel that given 

Dr. Mahnke's report, plus Dr. Wensel's office notes 

reflecting an increase in the number of visits claimant 

made for chiropractic manipulation following the 
February 12, 1987 auto accident, that claimant may well 

have a disability related to that event. 

Norman maintains that the courtls decision on the motion for 

rehearing on October 4, 1990, was inconsistent with the above 

conclusion, and therefore, this Court should direct the lower court 

to conform its judgment to the findings and conclusions, or vacate 

the judgment and remand to the lower court for more specific 

findings and consistent conclusions. 

When read in their entirety, the August 1990 and October 1990 

decisions of the Workers1 Compensation Court are specific and 

consistent. The above conclusion in the August order additionally 

states that: 

However, in order to be entitled to total disability 

benefits, the accident must cause the condition which 

results in claimant's total loss of wages. Claimant has 

not met that burden. 

The October order states that: 

The prior ruling, in the Conclusions of Law, notes that 

claimant may well have some entitlement under the ACT for 

that February 12, 1987 event but that his lack of 

credibility fails to support a determination medically 

that claimantls current cervical complaints can be 

related to the February 12, 1987 accident. In short, he 

failed to meet the requisite burden of proof in that 

regard. 

The orders are consistent in their rationale that although 

Norman may have suffered a compensable injury in 1987, and that 

injury may be related to his current cervical problems, he has not 

shown in any respect that his total inability to work now is a 

result of the 1987 injury. His failure to prove the causal 
connection between injury and inability to work relieves the City 

of Whitefish of liability for his present total disability. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: