2021 UT App 124

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, 

Appellee, 

v. 

ZACHARY LYNN GODDARD, 

Appellant. 

Opinion

No. 20190740-CA

Filed November 12, 2021 

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Royal I. Hansen 

No. 171910247 

Lori J. Seppi and Samantha R. Dugan, Attorneys 

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and David A. Simpson, Attorneys 

for Appellee

JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred. 

HAGEN, Judge: 

¶1 Zachary Lynn Goddard entered a conditional plea to one 

count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 

person, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence he alleges was obtained as a result of an 

unlawful search. On appeal, Goddard argues that the district 

court’s factual findings on the motion to suppress are clearly 

erroneous and that the court should have granted the motion for 

three reasons: (1) officers conducted a Terry stop of Goddard 

without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, (2) officers 

frisked Goddard for weapons without reasonable suspicion that 

he was armed and dangerous, and (3) officers subjected 
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Goddard to custodial interrogation without providing Miranda

warnings. We reject these arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 While on bike patrol, an officer and his partner were 

passing through an alley known to them as a “high-drug-use 

area.” They spotted Goddard, alone, “kind of hunched over 

some items.” Among those items were some twist wrappers that 

the officer recognized as drug paraphernalia. The officer testified 

that “a twist is a small user amount of a controlled substance”—

usually “heroin or cocaine”—that is “tightly wrapped” in plastic 

and then “wrapped up in another plastic which is tightly tied.” 

The color of the twist wrapper indicates which “drug is inside.” 

The officer had been trained to recognize illegal drug use and 

drug paraphernalia and had learned “quite a bit” about 

identifying drug paraphernalia from patrolling the area around 

the alley, where he commonly saw paraphernalia strewn about. 

In particular, the officer was familiar with twists as he had 

observed “hundreds” of them in his career.

¶3 The officer testified that he suspected the twist wrappers 

belonged to Goddard because they were “directly in front” of 

him and close enough to reach. The only other people in the 

alley were some distance from the twists, “maybe 30 feet up or 

so and on the other side.” The officer noticed that “one of the 

white twist wrappers,” which “was directly underneath” 

Goddard, “appeared to be relatively clean,” meaning “[i]t didn’t 

appear that it had been there and had dirt on it . . . from being 

1. When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to

suppress, “[w]e recite the facts in a light most favorable to the

[district] court’s findings.” State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 147

(Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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kicked around the alley for a little while.” The officers walked 

toward Goddard, but as they approached, he “stood up” and 

attempted to “leave the area.” 

¶4 Based on these facts, the officers initiated a Terry stop2 to 

investigate whether Goddard was engaged in drug-related 

activity. When the officers approached Goddard and asked for 

identification, he “appeared nervous” and “made some motion 

towards his chest.” Specifically, the officertestified that Goddard 

“reach[ed] up towards” the “area above [his] breast line” and 

“point[ed] and motion[ed] as if he was going to continue and 

put his hand inside [his] coat.” The officer testified that 

Goddard’s actions “made us feel nervous,” so his partner asked

Goddard whether he had any weapons. Goddard told the

officers that he had a gun “in his left coat pocket” and “moved 

his hand toward that.” Goddard discontinued the motion only 

when the officers “told him to stop.”

¶5 The officers told Goddard to put his hands above his 

head, and the partner reached into Goddard’s left coat pocket, 

pulling out a handgun. The officers asked if Goddard had a 

concealed weapon permit, and Goddard admitted that he did 

not.3 Then, after giving Goddard Miranda warnings, the officers

arrested him. 

2. “A Terry stop,” or level two stop, “occurs when a police officer

temporarily seizes an individual because the officer has a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed

or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Perkins, 2019 UT App 117,

¶ 15, 446 P.3d 145 (cleaned up).

3. At the time of the stop, carrying a concealed firearm without a

permit violated Utah law, even if the person was at least 21 years

(continued...)
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¶6 Relevant to this appeal, the State charged Goddard with 

crimes arising from his possession of the firearm. At the 

preliminary hearing, the officer testified regarding the stop and 

events leading up to Goddard’s arrest.

¶7 Goddard later moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, 

along with his statements about having a gun and lacking a 

concealed weapon permit. Goddard argued that (1) the officers 

lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a 

stop, (2) the officers frisked Goddard for weapons without 

reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, and (3) 

Goddard was subjected to custodial interrogation before 

receiving Miranda warnings. 

¶8 After hearing testimony from the officer at the motion to 

suppress hearing,4 the district court denied the motion. The 

court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to 

stop Goddard. The court found that Goddard “was segregated 

from others” and “hunched over the drug paraphernalia,” that 

the drug paraphernalia “was new and clean,” and that Goddard 

and the drug paraphernalia were “isolated” because “there 

wasn’t anyone else in the same vicinity.” The court did not, 

however, explain its reasons for rejecting Goddard’s challenges 

to the seizure of the gun or the pre-Miranda questioning. 

(...continued)

old and could otherwise lawfully possess a firearm. See Utah 

Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). 

4. Goddard attached the preliminary hearing transcript to his

motion to suppress, placing the officer’s earlier testimony before

the district court as well. We refer to the officer’s testimony from

both hearings in reciting and applying the facts.
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¶9 After the district court denied the motion to suppress, 

Goddard entered a conditional plea to possession of a dangerous 

weapon by a restricted person and reserved his right to appeal 

the ruling on the motion to suppress. The State dismissed the 

remaining charges. Goddard now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 Goddard challenges the district court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress, contending that: (1) the court’s factual 

findings supporting reasonable suspicion were clearly erroneous

and, in any event, the stop was not “justified by reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that [Goddard] 

was sufficiently connected to that criminal activity”; (2) the 

officers “did not have reasonable suspicion that Goddard was

armed and presently dangerous” to justify a frisk for weapons; 

and (3) “Goddard was entitled to Miranda warnings before the 

officers” asked him “whether he had a firearm or a concealed 

weapon permit.” (Cleaned up.) “We review a denial of a motion 

to suppress as a mixed question of law and fact and will disturb 

the district court’s factual findings only when they are clearly 

erroneous, but we afford no deference to the district court’s 

application of law to the underlying factual findings.” State v. 

Paredez, 2017 UT App 220, ¶ 11, 409 P.3d 125 (cleaned up). 

ANALYSIS

I. Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Goddard

¶11 Goddard contends that the officers lacked reasonable 

suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity and, 

therefore, were not legally permitted to detain him to investigate 

his connection to the drug paraphernalia. In challenging the 

district court’s conclusion to the contrary, Goddard first argues 
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that the court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. Next, 

Goddard argues that even if the court’s findings are supported 

by the evidence, those facts do not give rise to reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Goddard was 

sufficiently connected to that activity. We address both 

arguments in turn.

A. The district court’s findings are adequately supported by

the evidence.

¶12 Goddard first challenges the factual findings supporting 

the district court’s reasonable suspicion determination. We 

review a district court’s factual determination under a “clearly 

erroneous” standard and in so doing, we “do[] not consider and 

weigh the evidence de novo.” State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 

(Utah 1987) (cleaned up). Accordingly, the mere fact that we 

“might have reached a different result” when looking at the 

same evidence will not justify setting the findings aside. Id.

(cleaned up). Rather, we “may regard a finding as clearly 

erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary 

support or induced by an erroneous view of the law.” Id. 

(cleaned up). Under this standard, the district court’s findings

are not clearly erroneous.

¶13 The district court made three factual findings that

Goddard challenges. First, the court found that, during the 

events in question, Goddard was “segregated from others” and 

that he and the drug paraphernalia “were isolated” because

“there wasn’t anyone else in the same vicinity.” Second, the 

court found that the drug paraphernalia “was new and clean” at 

the time. Lastly, the court found that Goddard had been 

“hunched over the drug paraphernalia.” The court’s findings are 

adequately supported by the officer’s testimony at both the 

preliminary hearing and the evidentiary hearing on the motion 

to suppress. 
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¶14 Goddard first challenges the court’s finding that he was 

“segregated from others,” he was “isolated,” and “there wasn’t 

anyone else in the same vicinity.” Goddard argues that he was 

not isolated because the alley where he was stopped is “public.” 

But the court did not find that Goddard was alone in a private 

space, only that Goddard and the drug paraphernalia were 

“segregated” or “isolated” relative to others in the alley. The 

officer testified that there were no people in Goddard’s 

“immediate area” and that the closest group of people was

sitting “maybe 30 feet up or so and on the other side” of the 

alley. The distance between Goddard and the other group of 

people supports the court’s finding that, with respect to their 

proximity to the drug paraphernalia, Goddard was “segregated” 

and “isolated,” and “there wasn’t anyone else in the same 

vicinity.” Thus, the court’s finding is adequately supported by 

the officer’s testimony and not clearly erroneous. 

¶15 Goddard next challenges the court’s finding that the drug 

paraphernalia was “new and clean.” The officer testified that he 

had seen “hundreds” of twist wrappers in his career and 

confirmed that he commonly saw them strewn about the area

where Goddard was sitting. In comparison, the paraphernalia 

directly underneath Goddard “appeared to be relatively clean.” 

He explained that at least one of the twist wrappers had an

“appearance of, I guess you say, maybe cleanliness. It didn’t 

appear that it had been there and had dirt on it . . . from being 

kicked around the alley for a little while.” Goddard argues that, 

“at most, th[is] evidence showed that [the officer] considered the 

wrapper to be relatively clean” and cannot support the district 

court’s finding that the drug paraphernalia was “new and 

clean.” We disagree.

¶16 The court could reasonably infer that the paraphernalia 

was “new and clean” based on the officer’s experience with 

seeing twist wrappers in the area and his testimony that the 

twist observed directly underneath Goddard did not appear to 
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have been there for long. When the district court makes findings 

of fact, it is entitled to draw all reasonable inferences from the 

facts. See State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990). Here, 

the officer testified that the twist did not have “dirt on it” from 

“being kicked around the alley for a little while,” supporting an 

inference that it was “new,” in the sense that it had been recently 

discarded, and “clean” in comparison to other paraphernalia 

that the officer commonly saw in the alley. Thus, the court’s 

finding that the paraphernalia was “new and clean” is fully 

supported by reasonable inferences from the officer’s direct 

testimony and is not clearly erroneous.

¶17 Finally, Goddard challenges the court’s finding that he 

“was hunched over the drug paraphernalia,” as opposed to 

other unidentified items. The officer testified that Goddard was 

“sitting on the ground in this alley and he was kind of hunched 

over some items and I observed drug paraphernalia directly

underneath him.” The district court could reasonably construe 

this testimony to mean that the drug paraphernalia was among 

those items over which Goddard was hunched. And when asked 

how close Goddard was to the twists, the officer confirmed that 

Goddard “was seated on the ground and he was hunched over 

and they were directly be—like in his area where he was

hunched over, if that makes sense.”5 Based on this testimony, the 

district court’s characterization of Goddard being “hunched over 

the drug paraphernalia” is not clearly erroneous.

5. The record also suggests that the officer may have physically

demonstrated the wrapper’s location relative to Goddard during

his testimony. The deference afforded by the clearly erroneous

standard recognizes that the “lower court often has a

comparative advantage in its firsthand access to factual

evidence.” Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 32, 266 P.3d 806.
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¶18 In sum, the court’s factual findings were not clearly 

erroneous. Having determined the court’s findings are 

adequately supported, we next turn to whether those facts 

supplied the officers with reasonable suspicion to detain

Goddard. 

B. The officers reasonably suspected Goddard was engaged

in criminal activity.

¶19 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from 

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

“The Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against 

all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches 

and seizures.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 

Accordingly, the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 

reasonableness.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (cleaned 

up). “Whether a particular seizure is unreasonable depends 

upon the level of the encounter between the police officer and 

citizen and the justification for it.” State v. Jervis, 2017 UT App 

207, ¶ 14, 407 P.3d 1072. 

¶20 The Utah Supreme Court has articulated three levels of 

“constitutionally permissible” police encounters. See State v. 

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617–18 (Utah 1987). “A level one 

encounter is a consensual encounter, which does not implicate 

the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Bui-Cornethan, 2021 UT App 56, 

¶ 17, 490 P.3d 191 (cleaned up). “A level two encounter occurs 

when a police officer temporarily seizes an individual because 

the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person 

has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Applegate, 

2008 UT 63, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 925 (cleaned up). A level three 

encounter “occurs when a police officer has probable cause to 

believe that a crime has been committed and effects an arrest of 

the suspect.” Id. (cleaned up).
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¶21 The State does not contend that the interaction between 

Goddard and the officers was a level one consensual encounter. 

Rather, it is undisputed that Goddard was subject to a level two 

investigative detention when the officers approached him. A 

level two encounter, otherwise known as a Terry stop, see Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1968), is reasonable only if the “officer’s 

action was justified at its inception,” and “the detention 

following the stop was reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances that justified the interference in the first place,” 

Jervis, 2017 UT App 207, ¶ 15 (cleaned up). Goddard does not 

challenge the scope of the detention; therefore, we analyze only 

whether the Terry stop was justified at its inception.

¶22 A Terry stop is justified at its inception so long as the

officers have reasonable suspicion that the suspect “has been, is, 

or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Worwood, 

2007 UT 47, ¶ 23, 164 P.3d 397 (cleaned up). Reasonable 

suspicion does not require officers to “rule out innocent conduct 

or establish the likelihood of criminal conduct to the same 

degree as required for probable cause.” Id. We measure the 

articulated facts “in objective terms by examining the totality of 

the circumstances,” State v. Mitchell, 2019 UT App 190, ¶ 11, 455 

P.3d 103 (cleaned up), “and avoid the temptation to divide the

facts and evaluate them in isolation,” State v. Markland, 2005 UT

26, ¶ 11, 112 P.3d 507 (cleaned up). Thus, facts which might

appear innocent on their own may “collectively amount[] to

reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274–

75 (2002).

¶23 Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had 

reasonable suspicion that Goddard was engaged in illegal drug 

activity. While patrolling a “high-drug-use area,” the officers 

spotted Goddard alone, “hunched over,” with “new and clean” 

drug paraphernalia “directly underneath him.” When Goddard 

saw the officers, he stood up and attempted to leave. Each of 

these facts contributed to the officers’ reasonable suspicion.
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¶24 First, Goddard’s proximity to “new and clean” drug 

paraphernalia supported an objectively reasonable suspicion 

that he was actively involved in criminal activity. Goddard does 

not dispute that the officers recognized the twist wrappers as 

drug paraphernalia, but argues that the officers “identified 

nothing about Goddard that suggested his proximity to the litter 

was anything more than coincidence.” But just because 

Goddard’s proximity to the wrappers “was ambiguous and 

susceptible of an innocent explanation,” does not mean that the

officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Illinois v. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). Law enforcement need not 

“rule out the possibility of innocent conduct” when conducting a 

Terry stop. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Indeed, the Fourth 

Amendment “accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent 

people.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126. So long as the facts known to 

the officer support an objectively reasonable belief “that criminal 

activity may be afoot,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, the officers are 

permitted to conduct a Terry stop to “resolve the ambiguity,” 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. While there might have been an 

innocent explanation for why Goddard was “hunched over” 

drug paraphernalia “directly underneath him,” the totality of the 

circumstances justified a brief detention to investigate and

resolve that ambiguity.

¶25 Goddard argues that the presence of drug paraphernalia 

in this case did not give rise to reasonable suspicion because he 

“was merely in the vicinity of the discarded twist wrappers in a 

public area next to a parking lot where the wrappers could have

been discarded by any member of the public.” But in addition to 

seeing Goddard hunched directly over the twist wrappers, the 

officer noticed that at least one of the wrappers was “new and 

clean” and did not appear to have been on the ground in the 

alley for long, suggesting that it had been recently discarded. Cf. 

State v. Vinh Ba Nguyen, 212 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) 

(holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a 
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group of people for drinking in a public park, in part, because 

there was no evidence as to whether the nearby beer cans 

“appeared to be brand new or old, facts from which it might be 

inferred how long the containers had been lying next to the 

tree”). And the people nearest to Goddard and the twist 

wrappers were approximately thirty feet away. Under these 

circumstances, it was reasonable to suspect that the wrapper had 

just been dropped by the person hunched directly over it.

¶26 In addition, the location of the stop further contributed to 

the officers’ reasonable suspicion. While “[a]n individual’s 

presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, 

is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion 

that the person is committing a crime,” officers may rely on 

“relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the 

circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 

investigation.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Here, the fact that the 

alley was known as a high-drug-use area provided important 

context. When the officers saw Goddard hunched over what 

appeared to be a recently discarded twist wrapper in a location 

where drugs were commonly used, it increased the likelihood 

that he was actively using drugs or otherwise involved in drugrelated activity.

¶27 To a more limited extent, Goddard’s attempt to leave the 

area when the police approached also reinforced the officers’ 

reasonable suspicion. While a suspect “has a right to ignore the 

police and go about his [or her] business,” the suspect’s

“nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining 

reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 124–125. When the officers spotted 

Goddard, he was seated and hunched over. Then, when the 

officers approached, he stood up and attempted to leave. 

Although Goddard did not engage in headlong flight—“the 

consummate act of evasion,” see id. at 124—his sudden change of 

behavior suggested not only that he might be trying to avoid 

police interaction but also that he was trying to physically 
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distance himself from the evidence of criminal activity. This fact, 

standing alone, carries very little weight; but in combination 

with the officers’ other observations, Goddard’s apparent 

attempt to avoid police scrutiny and distance himself from the 

paraphernalia contributed to reasonable suspicion that he was 

involved in illegal drug activity. Cf. State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 

521 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (holding that officers lacked 

reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect for an open container 

violation, in part, because the record did not “indicate that [the 

suspect] stood or moved away from the bottle when he saw the 

police approach”). Under the totality of the circumstances, the 

officers were justified in temporarily detaining Goddard to 

investigate their suspicions.

¶28 In reaching this conclusion, we reject Goddard’s 

argument that the officers had insufficient information to 

support a reasonable inference that he was in constructive 

possession of the twist wrappers. Goddard appears to contend

that the only “alleged crime at issue here is possession of drug 

paraphernalia” because the officer “testified that he initiated the 

level two stop because he suspected Goddard of possessing one 

of the ‘twist wrappers’ discarded on the ground near him.” 

Goddard points out that the crime of possession of drug 

paraphernalia under Utah Code section 58-37a-5(1)(a) requires 

proof of either actual or constructive possession. Although he 

acknowledges that “an officer does not need proof of 

constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt to initiate a 

level two stop,” he argues that there must be “a sufficient nexus 

between the person stopped and the paraphernalia for the officer 

to form a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped had both 

the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over 

the paraphernalia.” (Cleaned up.) 

¶29 We reject Goddard’s argument for two reasons. First, our 

reasonable suspicion analysis is not limited to the crime of 

possession of drug paraphernalia. Although the officer testified 
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that he suspected Goddard of possessing drug paraphernalia, 

the officer’s subjective suspicions, while “a factor in the 

analysis,” are not determinative. See State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, 

¶ 15, 147 P.3d 425. Rather, we “consider police officers’ 

subjective interpretation of the facts as part of an objective 

analysis” based on the “totality of the circumstances.” See id. 

¶¶ 14–15 (cleaned up). 

¶30 Here, possession of drug paraphernalia was not the only 

criminal activity suggested by the totality of the circumstances. 

The officer testified that he had stopped Goddard because of 

“his proximity to the twists and my believing that it was likely 

the twist was his and then . . . the area, it was [a] known highdrug use-area.” And the “new and clean” appearance of the 

twist suggested that Goddard had just discarded it. These facts 

not only supported a reasonable suspicion that Goddard was in 

possession of drug paraphernalia, but also gave rise to an 

objectively reasonable suspicion that Goddard was in possession 

of the recently unwrapped drugs, was in the process of using 

drugs, or was packaging drugs for sale. In other words, the 

circumstances objectively gave rise to reasonable suspicion of a 

variety of criminal activities relating to illicit drugs, not limited 

to possession of drug paraphernalia. 

¶31 Second, Goddard’s argument assumes that reasonable 

suspicion requires some basis for concluding that the suspect’s 

conduct satisfies each element of a particular criminal code 

violation. Based on this assumption, Goddard argues that the 

question “is whether there was a sufficient nexus between the 

person stopped and the paraphernalia for the officer to form a 

reasonable suspicion that the person stopped had both the 

power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 

paraphernalia,” as required to prove constructive possession of 

drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah Code section 58-37a5(1)(a). (Cleaned up.) But neither our controlling case law nor 

persuasive authority from other jurisdictions supports the 
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assumption that there must be evidence to support each 

statutory element of a specific criminal offense for an officer to 

initiate a Terry stop.

¶32 The United States Supreme Court has not directly 

addressed the question of whether a Terry stop must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion of a particular offense. See 4 

Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.5(c) (6th ed. 2020) (noting 

that “the Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on” the 

question of “whether the available information must support a 

conclusion that there is reasonable suspicion of a particular 

offense . . . , or whether it should suffice that there is reasonable 

suspicion of criminality generally”). But Terry itself speaks in 

general terms of “criminal activity” and, although it refers to the 

investigating officer’s “hypothesis that these men were 

contemplating a daylight robbery,” the opinion does not suggest 

that the legality of the stop hinged on whether the officers’ 

observations supported reasonable suspicion of each statutory 

element of that particular crime. 392 U.S. at 28–30. And 

subsequent Supreme Court decisions continue to speak in terms 

of reasonable suspicion of “criminal activity,” of “legal 

wrongdoing,” or “that criminal activity is afoot,” not in terms of 

whether the police have reasonable suspicion of a particular 

statutorily defined crime. See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; 

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 358 (2015). 

¶33 Requiring officers to observe evidence of each element of 

a particular crime before making a Terry stop is also 

incompatible with the rule allowing officers to conduct a brief 

investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion that the 

suspect “is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” See United 

States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983). Terry itself involved a stop 

of “suspicious individuals [who] were not involved in the actual 

commission of a crime. Instead, the officers stopped the 

individuals out of concern that a crime was going to occur ‘at 

some point.’” State v. Martinez, 2008 UT App 90, ¶ 13, 182 P.3d 
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385 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28). The Court recognized the 

governmental interest in “effective crime prevention and 

detection” and explained that “it is this interest which underlies 

the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate 

circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person 

for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even 

though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Terry, 392 

U.S. at 22. Unlike an arrest, which requires that the officer be

“apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person 

has committed or is committing a crime,” the lesser intrusion 

involved in a Terry stop is justified “absent that kind of 

evidence,” id. at 26, so long as “the officer has reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to 

be engaged in criminal activity,” State v. Simons, 2013 UT 3, ¶ 21, 

296 P.3d 721 (cleaned up). Because Terry allows officers to 

conduct a brief seizure based on reasonable suspicion that a 

crime is about to occur, it cannot require officers to observe facts 

that support each element of a completed crime.

¶34 Similarly, Utah courts have never required reasonable 

suspicion of each element of a specific statutorily defined crime

for a Terry stop. To the contrary, our supreme court has upheld a 

level two stop where the officer had “reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that crime was afoot” even though the facts did not 

establish that any identifiable crime had been or was about to be 

committed. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 16, 112 P.3d 507. 

In Markland, a deputy received information from dispatch that 

someone was “screaming or crying out for help” near an 

apartment complex in the early morning hours. Id. ¶ 2 (cleaned 

up). About five minutes later, the deputy drove down a poorly 

lit, dead-end street next to the apartment complex where he saw 

Markland, alone, walking toward the dead end. Id. The deputy 

stopped Markland, told him “there had been a report of 

screaming in the area,” and asked him whether he “had heard 

anything.” Id. ¶ 3. When Markland denied hearing anything, the 
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deputy asked “where he was headed.” Id. “Markland replied 

that he was walking home . . . approximately twenty blocks 

away.” Id. The deputy, knowing that Markland was on a deadend street and surmising it would “not lead him home,” asked 

for identification and ran a warrants check. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Markland 

claimed the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. 

See id. ¶ 15. The Utah Supreme Court rejected his challenge, 

holding that the “detention of Markland was justified by a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that crime was afoot and that 

Markland was connected to that crime.” Id. ¶ 16. The facts 

justifying the stop in Markland do not point to any specific crime, 

let alone give rise to reasonable suspicion that each element of a 

specific crime was satisfied.

¶35 And the weight of authority from other jurisdictions 

holds that reasonable suspicion does not require particularized 

suspicion of a specific crime to conduct a Terry stop.6 Even those 

6. See, e.g., United States v. Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th

Cir. 2012) (holding that “[d]irect evidence of a specific, particular

crime is unnecessary” for reasonable suspicion); United States v.

Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 353, 357 (5th Cir.) (rejecting a defendant’s

argument that “a police officer’s reasonable suspicion must be

directed toward a particular crime” and holding that “police do

not have to observe the equivalent of direct evidence of a

particular specific crime in order to detain a lawfully stopped

individual to investigate where there is reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity”), modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th

Cir. 2010); Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011) (distinguishing reasonable suspicion required for a

stop from probable cause required for arrest and explaining that

“it is not a sine qua non of reasonable suspicion that a detaining

officer be able to pinpoint a particular penal infraction”); State v.

Perez-Jungo, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014)

(continued...)
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 18 2021 UT App 124

jurisdictions that do require more than reasonable suspicion of 

general criminal activity do not require the type of 

particularization that Goddard suggests is necessary. For 

example, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that, to justify an 

investigative detention, “the officers must reasonably suspect 

that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a 

specific crime or type of crime.” State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 389 P.3d 

1121, 1131 (Or. 2017) (en banc) (emphasis added). Even under 

that formulation, the officers here had reasonable suspicion that 

Goddard was engaged in a specific “type of crime,” namely, a 

drug-related offense. The officer testified that he stopped 

Goddard because of “his proximity to the twists and my 

believing that it was likely the twist was his and then . . . the 

area, it was [a] known high-drug-use area.” This testimony

supports an objectively reasonable suspicion that Goddard was 

(...continued)

(“[R]easonable suspicion does not require a belief that any 

specific criminal activity is afoot to justify an investigative 

detention; instead, all that is required is a showing of objective 

and specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that the 

individual has been or is about to be involved in some criminal 

activity.”); State v. Leyva, 250 P.3d 861, 870 (N.M. 2011) 

(“Suspicion of criminal activity need not necessarily be of a 

specific crime.”); State v. Harder, No. 117,937, 2018 WL 5091883, 

at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018) (“Terry does not require an 

officer to have reasonable suspicion that a specific crime has 

been or will be committed” but “only requires reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” (cleaned up)); 

Simmons v. Commonwealth, No. 2434-09-2, 2010 WL 4174730, at *3 

(Va. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010) (“We do not require the officer to 

suspect a specific crime; rather, he must have a reasonable 

suspicion, based on objective facts, that the person is involved in 

criminal activity.” (cleaned up)).
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 19 2021 UT App 124

involved in a narrow set of crimes related to drug activity—and 

was far more particular than the reasonable suspicion that 

justified the stop in Markland. 

¶36 In sum, the officers were entitled to stop Goddard 

because the circumstances gave rise to objectively reasonable 

suspicion that Goddard was engaged in criminal activity. To 

defeat Goddard’s motion to suppress, the State was not required 

to establish reasonable suspicion of the exact crime the officers 

had subjectively suspected, nor were the officers required to 

observe facts supporting each element of a particular crime. 

Because the officers’ observations supported a reasonable 

suspicion that Goddard was involved in drug activity, the 

officers were justified in briefly detaining Goddard to investigate 

whether a crime had been, was, or was about to be committed. 

II. Reasonable Suspicion to Seize the Gun

¶37 Goddard next contends the officers were not justified in 

searching him for weapons and seizing the gun because they 

lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.7

If during a lawful stop, a law enforcement officer has reasonable 

suspicion that the suspect is “armed and presently dangerous,” 

an officer may “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer 

clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons 

which might be used to assault him” or others. Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 30 (1968). And “[i]f the officer discovers what he believes 

to be a weapon, he may reach inside the suspect’s clothing and 

7. This court requested supplemental briefing on the issue of

whether the Fourth Amendment allows officers to protect their

safety by temporarily seizing a known gun during an

investigative detention even absent reasonable suspicion that the

suspect is “presently dangerous.” Because we can decide this

case without resolving that question, we do not reach it.
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 20 2021 UT App 124

remove it.” United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 

2002) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972)). 

¶38 Our court has previously identified specific circumstances 

that could provide reasonable suspicion that an armed suspect is 

presently dangerous, including “an otherwise inexplicable 

sudden movement toward a pocket or other place where a 

weapon could be concealed” or “discovery of a weapon in the 

suspect’s possession.” State v. Wilkinson, 2009 UT App 202, ¶ 16, 

216 P.3d 973 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure

§ 9.6(a), at 628–30 (4th ed. 2004)). Such discovery may occur

through the suspect’s own admission “in response to the

officer’s question” as to whether the suspect is armed. See United

States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 234 (6th Cir. 2010). The ultimate

inquiry is whether the totality of the circumstances would

“warrant [an officer] of reasonable caution in the belief that the

action taken was appropriate.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (cleaned up).

¶39 Here, when Goddard reached toward the inside of his 

coat, subsequently admitted that he had a gun in his left coat 

pocket, and then moved his hand toward that pocket again, the 

officers had reasonable suspicion that Goddard was both armed 

and dangerous. Specifically, upon being detained by police on 

suspicion of drug activity, Goddard “reach[ed] up toward” the 

“area above [his] breast line,” “point[ed],” and “motion[ed] as if 

he was going to continue and put his hand inside [his] coat.” 

Then, in response to the partner’s question about Goddard 

having any weapons, Goddard admitted he had a gun “in his 

left coat pocket” and “moved his hand toward that” pocket until 

he was ordered to stop. A detained suspect reaching toward a 

known firearm provides an officer with an objectively 

reasonable basis to believe that the suspect intends to use that 

weapon and therefore poses a danger to the officers.

¶40 Goddard argues that moving his hand toward his pocket 

“was not the kind of sudden or inexplicable movement that 
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 21 2021 UT App 124

would justify a frisk.” To be sure, it is entirely possible that 

Goddard was merely reaching for his requested identification or 

gesturing to indicate where the gun was located in response to 

the officers’ questions. But officers are not required to risk their 

safety in hopes that a suspect reaching toward a gun does not 

intend to use it. By simply disarming Goddard, the officers 

effectively defused the potential danger using the least intrusive 

means and without resorting to the use of physical force. Under 

the circumstances, it was reasonable to “protect the officer[s] and 

other prospective victims by neutralizing” the known weapon. 

See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 13, 78 P.3d 590. Therefore, we 

affirm the district court’s denial of Goddard’s motion to 

suppress evidence of the gun.

III. Custody for Purposes of Miranda

¶41 Goddard also contends that the district court should have 

suppressed his statements to police because he was subjected to 

a custodial interrogation before receiving Miranda warnings. 

Specifically, Goddard argues that he was “entitled to Miranda

warnings before being questioned about whether he had a 

firearm and whether he had a concealed weapon permit.”8

Although the district court did not make findings on this issue, 

the undisputed facts show that Goddard was not in custody 

8. Because it is not clear whether Goddard seeks to suppress

only his incriminating statements or the gun itself, we note that a

Miranda violation does not bar “the admission into evidence of

the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.” United States v.

Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004). Goddard has not argued that his

admission regarding the presence of the gun was involuntary.

Therefore, only the statements themselves are potentially subject

to suppression.
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 22 2021 UT App 124

when those questions were asked. Therefore, he was not entitled 

to Miranda warnings.9

¶42 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that a defendant will 

not be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 

himself.” U.S. Const. amend V. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436 (1966), the Court addressed the coercive pressures inherent 

in custodial interrogations where suspects are generally in 

“unfamiliar surroundings,” “cut off from the outside world,” 

and subjected to “sustained and protracted questioning” in a 

“police-dominated atmosphere.” Id. at 445–46, 448, 450. As a 

prophylactic measure, the Court established the Miranda 

warnings requirement “to insure that the right against 

compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 

U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (cleaned up). 

¶43 But Miranda warnings are required only “in those types of 

situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are 

implicated,” namely “custodial interrogation.” Berkemer v. 

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435, 437 (1984). And, the Court clarified,

“by custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by 

law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123 (1983) 

(per curiam) (cleaned up).

¶44 To determine whether a suspect is in custody for 

purposes of Miranda, “the initial step is to ascertain whether, in 

9. Because we conclude that Goddard was not in custody when

the officers asked him whether he had a firearm and whether he

had a concealed weapon permit, we do not address whether

these questions constitute “interrogation” for purposes of

Miranda or whether an exception to the Miranda rule would

apply in these circumstances.
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 23 2021 UT App 124

light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a 

reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to 

terminate the interrogation and leave.” State v. MacDonald, 2017 

UT App 124, ¶ 21, 402 P.3d 91 (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 

499, 509 (2012)). “Determining whether an individual’s freedom 

of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in 

the analysis, not the last.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509. “If ‘an 

individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed,’ the focus 

turns to ‘whether the relevant environment presents the same 

inherently coercive pressures as the type of stationhouse 

questioning at issue in Miranda.’” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, 

¶ 31, 428 P.3d 1052 (quoting Howes, 565 U.S. at 509). In making 

this determination, a court must examine the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation, “but the ultimate 

inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint 

on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 

arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per 

curiam) (cleaned up).

¶45 Focusing on the first step of this inquiry, Goddard argues 

that he was in custody because “a reasonable person in 

Goddard’s position would not have felt free to leave.” This 

statement is true enough, as a suspect “is not free to leave . . .

during a Terry stop.” MacDonald, 2017 UT App 124, ¶ 24. But 

“the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and 

not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Maryland v. 

Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010). “Not all restraints on freedom of 

movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda.” Howes, 

565 U.S. at 509. 

¶46 Relevant here, the Supreme Court has held that “the 

temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a 

traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.” 

Id. at 510 (cleaned up). The Court first addressed this issue in

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). In that case, the Court 

“held that a person detained as a result of a traffic stop is not in 
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 24 2021 UT App 124

Miranda custody because such detention does not ‘sufficiently 

impair [the detained person’s] free exercise of his privilege 

against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his 

constitutional rights.’” Howes, 565 U.S. at 510 (quoting Berkemer, 

468 U.S. at 437). Although motorists at traffic stops are not free to 

leave, “two features of an ordinary traffic stop” alleviate the 

inherently compelling pressures at work in a custodial 

interrogation. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437. First, such stops are 

“presumptively temporary and brief,” and second, the

“circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not 

such that a motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.” 

Id. at 437–38. “In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is 

more analogous to a so-called Terry stop.” Id. at 439 (cleaned up). 

“The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of 

this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in [Supreme 

Court] opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of 

Miranda.” Id. at 440; see also State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 

(Utah 1996) (“In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver 

and the passengers, even though they have been stopped and, at 

least momentarily, are not free to leave, are not in custody for 

Miranda purposes.” (cleaned up)). 

¶47 Although Terry stops are presumptively non-custodial,

the encounter may “evolve[] into a state of detention tantamount 

to a formal arrest.” State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987). 

If an individual is temporarily detained but “thereafter is 

subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical 

purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections 

prescribed by Miranda.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. “The 

safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a 

suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated 

with formal arrest.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 

1147 (“[T]he standard is whether a defendant’s freedom of action 

is curtailed to an extent associated with a formal arrest.”). 
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 25 2021 UT App 124

¶48 Only one prior Utah case has analyzed a Terry stop to 

determine whether the detention escalated to a de facto arrest for 

purposes of Miranda. In State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 

1996), our supreme court held that the defendant was in Miranda

custody during a traffic stop after the officer asked him to enter 

the patrol car, “told him that it was clear he had been using an 

illegal drug,” and directed him to either “retrieve the drugs from 

his car or the officer would.” Id. at 1147. “To guide the decision 

as to when one is in custody and entitled to a Miranda warning 

prior to a formal arrest,” the court in Mirquet evaluated the four 

factors set out in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 

1983): “(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation 

focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest 

were present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.” 

Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (cleaned up). 

¶49 Our supreme court has since clarified that “[s]trict or sole 

reliance on the Carner factors is inconsistent with the totality of 

the circumstances analysis prescribed by federal law.” Fullerton, 

2018 UT 49, ¶ 23. “Each of the Carner factors should be 

considered when relevant, ignored when not, and given 

appropriate weight according to the circumstances” and must be 

considered “in conjunction with all other relevant 

circumstances.”10 Id. ¶¶ 23–24. Other potentially relevant factors 

10. In State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), our supreme

court analyzed the Carner factors to determine whether, during

the course of a presumptively non-custodial traffic stop, the

defendant’s freedom of movement was curtailed to a degree

associated with formal arrest triggering the protections of

Miranda. Id. at 1147. But in State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, 428 P.3d

1052, the court identified the Carner factors as relevant to “[t]he

first part of [the] inquiry—whether a reasonable person would

have felt free to leave.” Id. ¶ 22. Presumably, the Carner factors—

(continued...)
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 26 2021 UT App 124

might include “‘the location of the questioning, its duration, 

statements made during the interview, the presence or absence 

of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of 

the interviewee at the end of the questioning.’” Id. ¶ 25 (quoting 

Howes, 565 U.S. at 509). “In determining whether an individual 

was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances 

surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply 

whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 

movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (cleaned up).

¶50 In this case, none of the circumstances surrounding the 

stop suggest that Goddard was in Miranda custody before the 

officers administered Miranda warnings and placed Goddard 

under arrest. Neither the location nor the length and nature of 

the questioning distinguish this from a typical Terry stop. 

Goddard was stopped in a public alley in full view of other 

people. As the Supreme Court has explained, the “exposure to 

public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous 

policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating 

statements and diminishes” the suspect’s “fear that, if he does 

not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. 

at 438. The detention was remarkably brief, just long enough for 

the officers to ask Goddard for identification, whether he was 

armed, and whether he had a permit for the firearm he was 

carrying.11 Although the “investigation focused on the accused,

(...continued)

along with all other surrounding circumstances—may be 

relevant to both inquiries.

11. Goddard also argues that asking whether he was armed and

whether he had a concealed weapon permit was coercive

because it “was wholly unrelated to the reason for the Terry

stop,” not reasonably expected, and “was designed to elicit an

(continued...)
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 27 2021 UT App 124

. . . that factor alone does not dispositively determine whether a 

person is in custody,” see Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147–48, and does 

not distinguish Goddard’s detention from an ordinary Terry

stop. Importantly, none of the objective indicia of arrest were 

present. Goddard was not handcuffed, placed in a patrol vehicle, 

or told that he was under arrest before he was questioned about 

the firearm. The officers did not draw weapons or employ any 

other physical force, threats, or coercion. In short, there was 

nothing to distinguish this encounter from an ordinary Terry 

stop.

¶51 Goddard argues that the stop was nonetheless coercive 

because the officers “built an environment suggesting that 

Goddard was completely at their mercy and created the 

impression that Goddard would be held until he provided the 

answers they wanted.” This characterization is not borne out in 

the record. Goddard was approached by only two uniformed 

police officers in a public alley, not in an inherently coercive 

setting such as an interrogation room of a station house. There is 

(...continued)

incriminating response” and “produce incriminating evidence.”

But the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that 

asking questions unrelated to the reason for the detention is 

permissible during a Terry stop, so long as the questions do not 

measurably prolong the detention. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 

93, 101 (2005); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) 

(“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification 

for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into 

something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries 

do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”). Goddard 

does not contend that the two questions about weapons 

measurably prolonged his detention. Such permissible 

questioning does not distinguish Goddard’s detention from a 

presumptively non-custodial Terry stop.
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 28 2021 UT App 124

no suggestion that the officers brandished firearms, threatened 

Goddard, or employed any kind of physical force. Goddard was 

not handcuffed, physically restrained, or even placed in the back 

of a police vehicle for questioning. Cf. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 

(holding that a defendant was in Miranda custody where, among 

other things, “the site of the interrogation was inside the police 

car,” which “added to the coercive environment”). While “the 

aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and 

the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding 

whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure 

on the detainee to respond to questions,” those features do not 

transform a Terry stop into a custodial arrest. See Berkemer, 468 

U.S. at 438–39. A brief investigative detention, such as the one at 

issue here, is simply not the type of inherently coercive 

environment that Miranda guards against.

¶52 Although Goddard was not free to leave once the officers 

initiated a Terry stop, his freedom of action was not curtailed to a 

degree associated with formal arrest. And because Goddard was 

not in custody for purposes of Miranda when asked whether he 

was armed and whether he had a concealed weapon permit, the 

district court correctly declined to suppress his unwarned 

statements. 

CONCLUSION

¶53 Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers were 

justified in briefly detaining Goddard to investigate their 

reasonable suspicion that he was involved in drug activity. After 

Goddard admitted he was carrying a firearm and twice moved 

his hand toward the gun, the officers acted reasonably in 

disarming him based on reasonable suspicion that he was both 

armed and dangerous. Lastly, because Goddard was not in 

custody when the officers asked whether he was armed and 

whether he had a concealed weapon permit, he was not entitled 
State v. Goddard

20190740-CA 29 2021 UT App 124

to Miranda warnings at that point. Accordingly, we affirm the 

denial of Goddard’s motion to suppress.