UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. ARNOLD DEVONNE BUTLER, Defendant - Appellant. No. 20-8037 (D.C. No. 2:19-CR -00100-SWS-1) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , McHUGH , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Arnold Devonne Butler was convicted of numerous drug-related offenses after police found large quantities of controlled substances concealed in a car he was transporting on his flatbed tow truck. He a ppeals the district c ourt’s denial of his motion to suppress the evid ence found during the traf fic stop and the court’s admission of certain co-conspirator statements at his trial. Ex ercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 22, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 12 I. Background A. The Traffic Stop On May 14, 2019, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Joshua Gebauer was driving eastbound on I-80 near Cheyenne, Wyoming, when he observed a flatbed tow truck transporting a Ford Fusion sedan. He noted the truck had a California license plate, indicating it had crosse d state lines. Troo per Gebauer believed the truck was an interstate commercial vehi cle subject to Wyoming statut es and regulations. As he pulled alongside the truck, he noticed the straps tying down the Ford Fusion were loose, flapping in the wi nd, and fraying in places, pr esenting a potential load securement violation. In addition, th e only Department of Transportation (DOT) number on the cab—which ended in “CA”—a ppeared to be a California DOT number rather than the required United States DOT number. At approximately 10:03 a.m., Trooper Gebauer activated hi s lights and stopped the tow truck to address these issues a nd to conduct a Level 1 commercial vehicle inspection. He testified at the suppression hearing that a Level 1 inspection ultimately involves a physical inspection of th e vehicle, but includes several previous steps beginning with the entry of a USDOT number in the online inspection program. For safety reasons, Trooper Gebauer generally conducts su ch a Level 1 inspection off of the roadway, aw ay from traffic. Upon approaching the tow truck, Tr ooper Gebauer observed that the rear license plate on the Ford Fusion had been removed, while a California license plate remained on the front of the ca r. He also noted the front and back windshields of the Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 23 Ford Fusion were covered with dust and grim e, giving the appearance it had not been recently driven. Trooper Gebauer approached the tow truck and greeted Butler, who was the driver and sole occupant. He asked Butler for his license and regi stration, insurance, medical card, annual inspection for the truc k, and the bill of lading for the Ford Fusion. Butler had an unexecuted salvag e title for the Ford Fusion but no bill of lading. Trooper Gebauer aske d Butler if he was keeping track of his driving hours, as required for interstate commercial ve hicle operation. Be cause Butler had no logbook to track his duty status, Trooper Gebauer inte nded to place Butler out of service for ten hours, pursuan t to the Commercial Vehicl e Safety Alliance. When asked for his USDOT number allowing for in terstate transporta tion, Butler stated both that he did not believe he needed it a nd that he did not have it with him. Trooper Gebauer inquired a bout Butler’s travel history and plans. Butler said he had stayed the previous night with fa mily in Colorado Springs, Colorado, after delivering a different vehicl e there around 7:00 p.m. He claimed that a person—who he identified only as “Gordo”—had contact ed him when he arrived in Colorado Springs, asking him to pick up another vehi cle in Denver and haul it to Nebraska. But Butler did not know the location of his de stination in Nebraska. When asked for further information, Butler said he had met Gordo at an auto auction and had previously hauled vehicles for him. He gave Trooper Gebauer inconsistent information about his compensation for hauli ng the Ford Fusion, stating both that he was doing it for a friend for free and that Gordo had paid him $2,000. Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 34 Trooper Gebauer noted Butler’s presence on I-80 near Cheyenne, rather than the more direct route from Denver to Ne braska on I-76. He also observed that Butler’s description of his previous trav el seemed compressed given the duty hour limits for a commercial truck driver. Over the course of their discussi ons, Butler gave Trooper Gebauer three different explanations for not having the necessary paperwork related to the Ford Fusion: (1) he did not need paperwork, (2) he had it electronically but could not retrieve it on his phone becau se he was unable to get AT&T cell service in the mountains (even though he was no longer in the mountains), and (3) the paperwork had blown out of the tow tr uck. Trooper Gebauer obser ved Butler using his phone at various times during their interactions. Butler told Trooper Gebauer that the Ford Fusion was an insurance salvage vehicle, but the Trooper did not notice a ny obvious damage to the car. Trooper Gebauer determined that the Ford Fusi on was titled to someone in Rio Linda, California. According to his driver’s license, Butler was al so from Rio Linda. In addition to conducting the Level 1 inspection, Trooper Gebauer wanted to check whether the total gross weight of Butler’s tow truck and the Ford Fusion exceeded 26,000 pounds, in which case he would need a fuel tax permit. The Trooper therefore directed Butler to reloca te to a port of entry (POE) that was fewer than five miles away. Furt her, based upon Butler’s respons es to his questions and the circumstances he observed, at 10:12 a.m. Trooper Gebauer also asked dispatch to send a drug-sniffing dog to the POE. Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 45 Trooper Gebauer and Butler proceeded to the POE at 10:14 a.m., arriving there at 10:20. While driving, the Trooper lear ned that Butler was on federal supervised release. Butler’s tow truck was weighed a nd determined to be below the fuel tax threshold. At approximately 10:26 a.m., Trooper Gebauer directed Butler to park his truck and again requested any commercial paperwork. At that time, Bu tler told the Trooper that he remembered where he wa s taking the Ford Fusion, showing him an online image of a Ford dealer ship in Omaha, Nebraska. A sheriff’s deputy arrived at the POE at 10:28 a.m. and i mmediately deployed a drug-sniffing dog. At that time, Troope r Gebauer was still se arching for Butler’s USDOT number in a federal database. He explained that, due to the common name of Butler’s towing business, he had initially located several potentially valid USDOT numbers. The drug-sniffing dog alerted near the Ford Fusi on at 10:35 a.m. Seconds before the alert, Trooper Geba uer received Butler’ s criminal history, which revealed prior drug-trafficking convictions. Trooper Gebauer and the sheriff’s deputy proceeded to search the Ford Fusion, eventually finding suspected narcotics con cealed behind the rear passenger seat. A full-scale search discovered a manufactured hidden compartment at that location containing multiple packages. Police offi cers field tested and took custody of approximately 21 kilograms of methamphet amine, 3 kilograms of heroin with varying mixtures of fentanyl , 2.5 kilograms of cocaine, 1 kilogram of fentanyl, and 23 grams of crack cocaine. Officer s also seized Butler’s cell phones. Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 56 B. Federal Charges and Further Investigation Butler was arrested on state charges on May 14, released on bond, and then rearrested on federal charge s on May 22. A superseding indictment charged Butler with possession with inte nt to distribute and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, heroin, co caine, and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and (B), 846, and 851. Federal agents obtained call records fo r Butler’s cell phones and investigated the telephone numbers he had contact with and the location of his phones both before and after his arrest on May 14. The agents determined that Butler had communicated with phones belonging to drug trafficker s operating in and around the Sacramento, California area, specifically Armando Tabarez a nd Gabriel Lopez. Lopez had been arrested on April 29, 2019, with prescrip tion pills and $18,000 of suspected drug proceeds in his possession, after which Lop ez began cooperating with federal agents. On June 1, federal agents seized contro lled substances at a suspected drug stash house located at 1 Shoal Court in Sacram ento. Tabaraz fled from the drug stash location and was arrested later that day. The agents believed that certain cell phone communications between Butler, Tabarez, a nd/or Lopez related to a drug trafficking conspiracy. C. Motion to Suppress Butler moved to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop. He conceded that Trooper Gebauer permissibl y stopped him for not displaying a USDOT number and was permitted to inquire about his paperwork and ticket him for any Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 67 violations. But he argued Trooper Gebauer unreasonably ex tended a routine traffic stop by redirecting him to the POE without le gal justification. Butler contended the Trooper had no reason the believe the truck’ s weight exceeded the fuel tax threshold and had no other basis to order him to pro ceed to the POE. He maintained that Trooper Gebauer had directed him to the POE to buy time until the arrival of the drug-sniffing dog. Butler further argued that Trooper Gebauer’s extension of the traffic stop was not justifie d by a reasonable suspicion th at he was involved in drug trafficking. The district court held, based on the tota lity of the circumstances, that Trooper Gebauer had a reasonable suspicion Butler wa s engaged in illegal activity. The court further found that the Trooper had legal au thority to direct Butler to the POE to conduct a Level 1 commerc ial vehicle inspection. 1 The court held that the timing of the deployment of the drug-sniffing dog u nder these circumstances did not prolong the Level 1 inspection to infringe upo n Butler’s Fourth Amendment rights. Regarding reasonable suspic ion of illegal activity, the district court pointed to the following:

 the lack of a bill of la ding for the Ford Fusion and Butler’s inconsistent and non-credible explanations for not possessing the necessary paperwork;

 the absence of a logbook and documenta tion of operating authority for the tow truck;

1 Butler does not challenge on appeal the district court’s holding that Trooper Gebauer had legal authority to direct hi m to relocate the tow truck to the POE. Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 78  Butler’s travel history and plans, in cluding the compressed timeline of his reported travel route in light of his duty-hour limit, his lack of knowledge regarding his destination in Nebraska, and his presence on I-80 rather than the more direct route between Denver and Nebraska;

 Butler’s evasivenes s when asked for further information about Gordo;

 the unlikelihood that someone would pa y the high cost of hauling a salvage vehicle hundreds of miles from one state to another on a single-car commercial tow truck;

 the unlikelihood that a salvage vehicle titled in Rio Linda, California, would coincidentally end up in Denver a nd be transported by Butler, whose hometown is also Rio Linda;

 Butler’s possession of an unexecuted titl e for the Ford Fusion, which Trooper Gebauer testified was uncom mon based on his prior experience with traffic stops, car carriers, and the salvage industry;

 the removal of only the rear license plate from the Ford Fusion, which suggested a desire to prev ent license plate readers fr om checking the vehicle’s registration;

 the thick layer of dirt and grime on the Ford Fusion, including both windshields, given that Gor do had reportedly driven th e car to Denver for pick up by Butler; and

 Butler being on federal supervised release. Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 89 The court therefore denied Butler’s motion to suppress. D. Pretrial Hearing Regarding Co-conspirator Statements The district court held a so-called James hearing 2 to consider whether certain communications between Butler, Tabarez, and/or Lopez were admissible as co-conspirator statements ma de “during and in furthe rance of the conspiracy” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2 )(E). For the proffe red statements to be admissible, the district court stated it must find “by a preponderance of evidence that, one, a conspiracy exis ted; two, the declarant a nd the defendant were both members of the conspiracy; and three, the st atements were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspir acy.” R., Vol. IV at 94. Addressing the first two issues, the court found that a conspiracy exis ted and that it “involved at a minimum Mr. Gabriel Lopez . . . . In addition it i nvolved Mr. Tabarez, who was identified and in contact with the defendant. There were other individuals.” 3 Id. at 95. The court then proceeded to address particular communications, finding that those in the government’s Exhibits 2 a nd 3, as well as part of Exhibit 6, qualified as co-conspirator statements. It found that other proffere d communications might also qualify but reserved ruling at that ti me pending further evidence at trial.

2 See United States v. James , 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979).

3 The district court also found the cons piracy included a “Mr. Hernandez,” R., Vol. IV at 95, a name identified as an alias for Lopez on Tabarez’s phone, see id. at 67. Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 910 E. Conviction and Sentence The only issue at trial was whether Bu tler knew about the drugs concealed in the Ford Fusion he was transporting. A ju ry found Butler guilty on all charges, and the district court sentenced him to concu rrent terms of 240 months’ imprisonment on each count.
II. Discussion On appeal, Butler challenges the distri ct court’s denial of his motion to suppress and the use at his trial of the co-cons pirator statements that the district court held were admissible at the James hearing. A. Denial of Motion to Suppress In reviewing the district court’s de nial of Butler’s motion to suppress, “we view the evidence in the light most favor able to the government , accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate question of reasonablene ss under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v.
Pettit , 785 F.3d 1374, 1378-79 (10th Cir. 2015). “[A] lawful traffic stop may not extend beyond the time reasonably requi red to effectuate its purpose,” and “[c]ontinued detention is la wful only if the encounter becomes consensual or if, during the initial lawful traffi c stop, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the detained person is engage d in criminal activity.” Id. at 1379 (internal quotation marks omitted). Butler argues that (1 ) the drug-sniffing dog arrived after any regulatory or commercial justification fo r the traffic stop ha d been resolved, abandoned, or was not pursued with the re quisite diligence, and (2) the facts did not Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1011 give rise to a reasonable susp icion of criminal activity. We need not address Butler’s first contention because we hold that Tr ooper Gebauer had a re asonable suspicion that Butler was engaged in illegal activity. Reasonable suspicion requires “a pa rticularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal conduct under a totality of the ci rcumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[It ] is not, and is not meant to be, an onerous standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mo reover, “[w]e defer to all reasonable inferences made by law enforcement offi cers in light of their knowledge and professional experience distinguishing betw een innocent and suspicious actions.” Id. Butler argues the factors relied on by the district court do not provide a sufficient legal basis for reasona ble suspicion. His contenti ons largely assert that his conduct and the circumstances were consistent with innocen t travel. But “an officer need not rule out the possibility of i nnocent conduct, or even have evidence suggesting a fair probability of criminal activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Butler first contends his lack of doc umentation and failure to comply with commercial trucking requirements do not s upport a finding of reasonable suspicion because Trooper Gebauer testified it wa s not uncommon for a trucker not to understand or follow all regulati ons. But this assertion fails to construe the record in Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1112 the light most favorable to the government , as Trooper Gebauer testified that the extent of Butler’s lack of i ndustry knowledge was unusual. See R., Vol. IV at 1137. Butler argues his inability to retrieve documentation electronically was not implausible or suspicious because “[h]av ing intermittent or poor cell service on the AT&T network while traveling out of stat e or while driving th rough Wyoming is a common experience.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 38. Setting aside that Butler provides no record citation for this a ssertion, it also ignores th at Trooper Gebauer found his specific explanation—lack of cell servi ce in the mountains— suspicious because Butler was not in the mounta ins when stopped on I-80. Butler also argues there was nothing implau sible or suspicious about his travel route from Colorado to Nebraska via Wyom ing. He notes this court has been reluctant to deem travel plans implausibl e simply because they are unusual, strange, or atypical. See United States v. Simpson , 609 F.3d 1140, 1149 ( 10th Cir. 2010). But he overlooks Trooper Gebaue r’s reasoning that the choi ce of a longer route was inconsistent with a commercial truc k driver’s economic interests. See Pettit , 785 F.3d at 1382 (noting defend ant’s travel plans were not sufficiently implausible “to independently suggest criminal activ ity, [but] were worthy of consideration alongside several other suspicious factors”). Butler maintains that transporting a single vehicle a long distance is not suspicious, pointing to trial testimony by the general manager of a towing company that he had transported a single vehi cle on a flatbed tow truck from Casper, Wyoming, to Fort Collins, Co lorado. But once again, Bu tler fails to consider the Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1213 entire testimony, in which th e witness stated that par ticular transport involved a high-end vehicle, which contra sts with a Ford Fusion. See R., Vol. IV at 397-98. The same witness also testifie d that, because cost is the biggest consideration, light duty vehicles are generally transported long distances by a multiple-car hauler. See id. at 394, 396-97. Butler next challenges the removal of th e rear license plate on the Ford Fusion as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. He asserts that the front plate would also have been removed if the intent was to prevent law enforcement from checking the car’s registration. Trooper Gebauer, how ever, focused on the inability of license plate readers to capture the pl ate number on the roadway. As to the dirty state of the Ford Fusion, Butler argues it had been driv en through a dusty, ru ral area to get to Denver. But he provides no record citation s upporting this assertion. And he fails to address the district court’s re asoning that the extent of the dirt and grime on the car’s windshields was inc onsistent with Gordo having dr iven it to the location where Butler picked it up in Denver. Butler is correct that Trooper Ge bauer’s knowledge he was on federal supervised release was not enough, by itsel f, to support a reas onable suspicion of criminal activity. See Simpson , 609 F.3d at 1147. But “i n conjunction with other factors, criminal history c ontributes powerfully to the r easonable suspicion calculus.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, Butler contends that seve ral factors weigh against reasonable suspicion, including his compliance with Trooper Gebauer’s directions; his valid Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1314 driver’s license and registra tion, and what turned out to be a valid USDOT number; the fact he did not flee, act suspiciously, or try to destr oy evidence; and the lack of any indication there were drugs in the Ford Fusion prior to the drug dog alert. “[W]e have held that courts must look at fact ors weighing against r easonable suspicion as well as factors supporting such a finding.” Pettit , 785 F.3d at 1383. But our analysis must consider the totality of the circumst ances, and taken as a whole, the facts as observed by Trooper Gebauer establish a reasonable suspic ion of criminal activity. Moreover, the overall length of Butler’s detention until the drug dog alerted— approximately 32 minutes—did not viol ate his Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g. , United States v. Cervine , 347 F.3d 865, 872-73 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding denial of motion to suppress where of ficer had reasonable suspic ion and detention awaiting canine search lasted 50 minutes). Butler has not demonstrated error in the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. B. Admission of Co-conspirator Statements Butler contends the district court erred in admitting certain out-of-court statements by his co-conspirators as non- hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Under that Rule, the district court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) “a conspiracy existed, (2) the de clarant and the defendant were both members of the conspiracy, and (3) the statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Urena , 27 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). Th e court must state its findings Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1415 on these issues on the record. United States v. Alcorta , 853 F.3d 1123, 1137 (10th Cir. 2017). We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. See
Urena , 27 F.3d at 1490. “Clear-error review asks whether, on the entire evidence, the appellate court is left with the defini te and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Alcorta , 853 F.3d at 1138 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found at the pre-trial James hearing that certain statements by Tabaraz and Lopez were made in furthe rance of a drug traffi cking conspiracy. Butler challenges the admission of these statements at th e trial, arguing the court failed to make the necessary finding durin g the hearing that he was part of a conspiracy with Tabarez and Lopez, and if the court made such a finding, it was clearly erroneous. Butler contends the dist rict court found during the James hearing only that Lopez, Tabarez, and “other individuals” were i nvolved in a conspiracy, R., Vol. IV at 95, and failed to make a finding on the record that Butler was involved in the same conspiracy. We disagree. The court was explicitly considering the question whether “the declarant and the defendant were both members of the conspiracy.” Id. at 94. Although its finding on that issu e could have been more clea rly stated, we read it as addressing which other indi viduals—specifically Lopez and Tabarez—were involved in a conspiracy with Butler . In any event, any error wa s cured by the district court’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence at trial “that a conspiracy existed between at least Mr. Butler and Mr. Lopez, Mr. Armando Tabaraz and others.” Id. at 825; see Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1516 United States v. Gonzalez-Montoya , 161 F.3d 643, 649 ( 10th Cir. 1998) (holding district court may satisfy prerequisites for admission of co-conspirator statements through a James hearing or at trial). Butler argues the district court’s finding that he was involved in a conspiracy with Tabaraz and Lopez was clearly err oneous because the government failed to show a mutual benefit between the drug dealers and Butler. See United States v. Caldwell , 589 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 2009) (holdi ng government must show “the alleged coconspirators were interdependent,” meaning they “inten[ded] to act together for their shar ed mutual benefit within the sc ope of the conspiracy charged” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “[ w]e . . . consider wh ether the activities of the alleged coconspirators were a dvantageous to the activities of other coconspirators, or the success of the venture as a whole.” United States v. Rutland , 705 F.3d 1238, 1250 (10th Cir. 2013). We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the dist rict court erred. It found that the conspiracy between Butler, Tabarez, and Lopez involved both “the transportation and distributi on of drugs” and “the travel from Sacramento down to . . . the L.A. area for purposes of re-upping or reloading with drugs.” R., Vol. IV at 825. Lopez testified that Butler met Tabare z in prison, and after their release, Butler “knew some people that needed the drugs that we had, and so Ta barez started selling them to him.” Id. at 778. Lopez supplied Butler with drugs seven or eight times— including three pounds of methamphetamine on May 12, 2019, two days before Butler’s arrest. Lopez made th at delivery to Butler at a T aco Bell restaurant parking Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1617 lot near the stash house at 1 Shoal Court. Lopez testified that Tabarez was the source of all drugs he supplied to Butler and that the drug deliveries were done at Tabarez’s direction. He also tes tified that he sometimes co llected money from Butler. Butler’s phone communications and th e locations of his phones further supported the conclusion he was involved in a drug-relate d conspiracy with Tabarez and Lopez. That evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom showed that Butler twice drove from Sacramento to the Los A ngeles area in April and May of 2019 to pick up drugs for Tabarez. When Butler a rrived in Los Angeles on the second trip, Tabarez texted him a phone nu mber that federal agents la ter connected to a separate drug trafficking investigation. Butler communicated with that phone number and received a text with the addr ess of a restaurant. On both trips, after very short stops in southern California, Butler returned to Sacramento and the vi cinity of the Taco Bell and stash house, which wa s 13 miles from his home in Rio Linda. During these trips, Butler’s phones had nume rous contacts or attempte d contacts with Tabarez’s phones, including one call with Tabarez wh ile Butler was near the stash house. Butler was also in the vicinity of th e stash house at other times, including on May 12, the date Lopez supplied him with three pounds of methamphetamine. On those days, he communicated with Tabarez and Lopez, from near the stash house and from other locations. In add ition, Tabarez and Lopez disc ussed the delivery of three pounds of methamphetamine to Bu tler in text messages on May 12. Further, Butler communicated with Ta barez after his release from state custody and before he was re-arrested on fe deral charges. Taba rez texted Butler a Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 1718 screen shot of a news article about a 2016 drug arrest of a person named Ray Rodriguez in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Shortly thereafter, Bu tler was recorded on a jail phone call asking his wife to create a bill of lading indi cating he was paid $2,000 to tow a car for Ray Rodriguez and stating he was not responsible for the contents of the towed car. Butler fails to demonstrate that the distri ct court clearly erre d in finding that he was involved in a drug conspiracy with Ta barez and Lopez. Consequently, he does not show error in the admissi on of the challenged co-conspira tor statements at trial.
III. Conclusion We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 20-8037 Document: 010110608372 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 18