In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1320

HOSEA WORD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 18-cv-00141 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 6, 2020

____________________

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Hosea Word is a sergeant 

and aspiring lieutenant in the Chicago Police Department

(CPD). Having just missed out on a promotion following the 

2006 lieutenants’ examination, Word missed the cut again after receiving a lower-ranking score on the 2015 examination. 

Word alleges that high-ranking members of CPD leadership

connived to sneak early test content to their “wives and paramours” prior to the 2015 exam, resulting in those romantic 
2 No. 19-1320

partners acing the test and receiving promotions. The district 

court dismissed Word’s constitutional due process and equal 

protection claims, as well as his breach of contract claims. Illinois and federal caselaw squarely preclude Word’s case. We 

affirm.

I. Background

From time to time, the CPD administered an examination 

for those sergeants seeking promotion to lieutenant. While the 

CPD retained discretion over whom to promote, those who 

scored highest on the exam were generally first in line. 

Word has served with the CPD since 2001. When he took 

the departmental lieutenants’ exam in 2006, he was ranked 

150th of all candidates. The sergeants ranked 1 through 149 

all received promotions; Word was the highest-scoring sergeant who did not. In 2015, when Word next took the exam, 

his ranking fell to 280th. He was passed over a second time.

The three individual defendants served as senior members 

of CPD leadership: former Superintendent Eddie Johnson, 

former First Deputy Superintendent Al Wysinger, and former 

Chief for Bureau of Organizational Development Eugene Williams. According to Word, each of these men’s “wives or paramours” were CPD sergeants who took the 2015 exam and 

then received promotions. Word alleges that defendant Williams had early access to the exam and provided test content 

to the wives and paramours, who formed a clandestine 

“study group” and cheated their way to passing scores. For 

example, Word claims that Wysinger’s wife (who, like the 

other women, is not named as a defendant in the complaint) 

went from ranking 280th in the 2006 exam results to first in 

the 2015 results.
No. 19-1320 3

Word filed his complaint in early 2018, suing the City of 

Chicago, Johnson, Williams, and Wysinger. He alleged two 

counts: (1) violations of equal protection and due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) breach of contract. Defendants 

moved to dismiss all counts and the district court granted 

their motion in January 2019. Word timely appealed.

II. Discussion

“We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting all well-pleaded 

facts in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Hutchison v. Fitzgerald Equip. 

Co., Inc., 910 F.3d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

Word appeals the dismissal of each of his claims and offers 

multiple rationales for reversing the district court. He argues 

that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in a 

fair lieutenants’ examination; that he established an equal 

protection claim because he was irrationally treated differently than the “wives and paramours” (and further sufficiently alleged Monell liability); and that he has cognizable 

breach of contract claims based on (1) a “contract” created by 

his “accepting the city’s offer” of a fair examination and 

(2) purported third-party beneficiary status in a contract between the City and the exam administrator. None of his arguments are persuasive.

A. Due Process

According to Word, he and other legitimate test-takers 

had a constitutionally protected property interest in a fair 

lieutenants’ examination “free of cheating and rigging.” 

Word grounds this claim in the Illinois Municipal Code’s lan-
4 No. 19-1320

guage that “[n]o person or officer shall ... wilfully or corruptly furnish to any person any special or secret information 

for the purpose of either improving or injuring the prospects 

or chances of any person so examined, or to be examined, being appointed, employed or promoted.” 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 

§ 5/10-1-26. Word contends this statute “creates a protectable 

property interest in fair civil service examinations, and specifically prohibits the cheating that transpired here.”

Word does not cite any authority holding that a statute, by 

merely forbidding an act, creates a property interest in the act 

not occurring. The cases on which he relies are inapt. In 

Mueller v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs of the Vill. of Lake Zurich, 

the Illinois Appellate Court held that a village’s process for 

hiring paramedics was subject to state judicial review under 

Illinois’s Administrative Review Law. 643 N.E.2d 255, 262 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 1994). Per Word, Mueller shows that “Illinois law recognizes that the integrity of the promotional process is itself 

protected.” But Mueller does not hold that there is a property 

interest in any municipal promotional process; indeed, the 

word “property” appears nowhere in the decision, and property as a concept formed no basis for its conclusions.

Likewise, Word’s reference to Peoria Police Sergeants v. City 

of Peoria Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 574 N.E.2d 1240 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 1991), is not relevant. There, the Illinois Appellate Court 

held that a city’s promotional procedure violated 65 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. § 5/10-2.1-15, which required police and fire 

boards to “provide for promotion in the fire and police departments on the basis of ascertained merit and seniority in 

service and examination.” Id. at 1241, 1243. Peoria says nothing about a constitutionally protected property interest.
No. 19-1320 5

Word argues that cases and statutes need not “contain language explicitly declaring” a property interest exists but has 

not shown why we should find a property interest here. No 

court has ever cited Peoria or Mueller to suggest they created 

or described a property interest, for the simple reason that 

neither does so. It takes little imagination to foresee the chaos 

that would result if we began to recognize every act forbidden 

by law as implying a mirror-image property right to the act’s 

non-existence.

We need not engage in such conjecture, as we already have 

determined that there are no protected property interests in 

either promotion within the police department or a fair examination for such preferment. In Bigby v. City of Chicago, a group 

of police sergeants challenged an earlier version of the lieutenants’ examination as arbitrary and capricious, and thus violative of due process. 766 F.2d 1053, 1055 (7th Cir. 1985). We 

held that while a police officer had a property interest in retaining his job, he had no such interest in an unattained higher 

rank. Id. at 1056. Concomitant with this conclusion, we also 

ruled that there is no constitutionally protected property interest in a fair examination for promotion. “It is true that state 

law requires promotions of government employees, including 

policemen, to be ‘on the basis of ascertained merit and seniority in service and examination.’” Id. (quoting 65 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. § 5/10-2.1-15). “The statute and ordinance create an expectation that the examinations used for promotions in the 

civil service will be fair but, as the Illinois courts have held, 

not so firm and definite an expectation as to be ‘property’ in a 

constitutional sense.” Id.1

 1 This holding is consistent with those of our sister circuits. See, e.g., 

McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Although 
6 No. 19-1320

Word tries to distinguish himself from the sergeants in 

Bigby on the ground that he does not claim to possess a property interest in the promotion or lieutenant’s rank, but in a fair 

examination for the rank. But as just described, we already 

rejected that distinction: “[I]t is not the examination that the 

applicant is interested in—no one likes taking tests—but the 

job.” Id. Word insists that the relevant language in Bigby is 

mere dicta, or otherwise should be repudiated today, but offers no compelling arguments for doing so. As we and other 

courts have held, state law does not provide a property interest in state promotional procedures.

B. Equal Protection

Word also claims that the defendants’ actions violated his 

equal protection rights and that the City is liable under Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 426 U.S. 658 (1978). 

He raises two bases for his equal protection claim: (1) he and 

other legitimate test-takers were singled out “for arbitrary 

and irrational treatment” because they were not romantically 

entwined with CPD leadership; and (2) he is a member of a 

protected gender class, “as opposed to the wives and paramours.” Neither argument convinces, and because Word has 

failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation, the 

 

New York State law clearly requires a ‘competitive’ examination, the law 

does not create a cognizable property interest in a competitive examination. 

An examination is not an end in itself; it has value only because it may 

lead to something valuable.”); Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1080–81 

(10th Cir. 2007) (“The subtle distinction between the right to be selected 

for promotion and the right to take part in the promotion process is insufficient to salvage Plaintiffs’ due process claims. ... [I]t is well established 

that an entitlement to nothing but procedure cannot be the basis for a 

property interest.”) (citation omitted). 
No. 19-1320 7

district court appropriately dismissed his Monell claim. See 

King v. East St. Louis School Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir.

2007) (“It is well established that there can be no municipal 

liability based on an official policy under Monell if the policy 

did not result in a violation of [a plaintiff's] constitutional 

rights.”).

1. Arbitrary and Irrational Treatment

Word argues that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals against arbitrary and irrational treatment by state 

action, even if such action is not taken due to a plaintiff’s 

membership in any particular class. In other words, Word 

maintains he has a “class of one” equal protection claim 

against the defendants. “Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where 

the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook 

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).2

Word asserts that there is no “class of one” bar against 

equal protection claims. We do not dispute that such claims

may be viable under certain circumstances. But Word has 

failed to address defendants’ argument that class of one equal 

protection claims are barred in the public employment context. Word’s claim runs headlong into Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of 

Agric., in which the Supreme Court held that

 2 The “class of one” language may be slightly misleading; it describes 

a type of a claim rather than a numerical limitation. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 

564 n.* (“Whether the complaint alleges a class of one or of five is of no 

consequence because we conclude that the number of individuals in a 

class is immaterial for equal protection analysis.”).
8 No. 19-1320

[t]he question in this case is whether a public 

employee can state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that she was arbitrarily treated differently from other similarly situated employees, with no assertion that the different treatment was based on the employee’s 

membership in any particular class. We hold 

that such a “class-of-one” theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment 

context.

553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008). Word has not provided any argument 

against the application of Engquist. Furthermore, his citation 

to Esmail v. Macrane is misplaced, as that case addressed a liquor store owner’s dispute with a mayor, having nothing to do 

with public employment. 53 F.3d 176, 177–78 (7th Cir. 1995).3

2. Protected Gender Class

Word makes the cursory point that he “is in a protected 

gender class, as opposed to the wives and paramours.” Word 

arguably forfeited this claim by failing to develop it; but even 

if we were to consider it, it would fail. In a protected-class 

equal protection analysis, a plaintiff must show that “defendants acted with a nefarious discriminatory purpose and dis-

 3 We do wish to correct one statement in the district court’s opinion, 

which cited Moore v. Muncie Police & Fire Merit Comm’n, 312 F.3d 322, 326 

(7th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that “Word must establish that the defendants deprived him of a protected property interest” under either a due 

process or equal protection claim. But Moore only addresses due process, 

not equal protection claims; equal protection claims do not require showing deprivation of a property interest.
No. 19-1320 9

criminated against him based on his membership in a definable class.” Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1996)

(internal citation omitted).

Word tries to claim gender discrimination, but his theory 

does not add up to gender discrimination. He claims he was 

discriminated against because he was not in a romantic relationship with a CPD executive. Such an allegation does not 

suffice to state an equal protection claim:

A male executive’s romantically motivated favoritism toward a female subordinate is not sex 

discrimination even when it disadvantages a 

male competitor of the woman. Such favoritism 

is not based on a belief that women are better 

workers, or otherwise deserve to be treated better, than men; indeed, it is entirely consistent 

with the opposite opinion. The effect on the 

composition of the workplace is likely to be nil, 

especially since the disadvantaged competitor is 

as likely to be another woman as a man ... . Neither in purpose nor in consequence can favoritism resulting from a personal relationship be 

equated to sex discrimination.

Preston v. Wis. Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2005).4

Word makes precisely this claim, and therefore we must affirm its dismissal.

 4 Preston concerns a Title VII claim, but its logic applies with equal 

force here. “Our cases make clear that the same standards for proving intentional discrimination apply to Title VII and § 1983 equal protection.” 

Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 788 n.13 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
10 No. 19-1320

C. Breach of Contract

Word states that he sufficiently alleged breach of contract 

claims for two reasons: (1) he and the City had a contract for 

the fair administration of a lieutenants’ examination; and 

(2) he is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the 

City and the exam’s administrator. Both fall short of the mark.

1. Direct Breach

Word’s complaint alleges that “the City offered Sergeant 

Word a fairly administered lieutenant’s examination free of 

cheating” and that “Word accepted the City’s offer by registering, paying money, studying, and sitting” for the exam. But 

as in the district court, Word cannot identify any actual offer.

“The test for an offer is whether it induces a reasonable 

belief in the recipient that he can, by accepting, bind the 

sender.” Architectural Metal Sys., Inc. v. Consol. Sys., Inc., 58 

F.3d 1227, 1229 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing McCarty v. Verson Allsteel 

Press Co., 411 N.E.2d 936, 943 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980)). Word has 

not identified any statement, oral or written, that constitutes 

a contractual offer. He has merely alleged the legal conclusion

that there was a contract. 

The only statement of the defendants identified in the 

briefing is the announcement of the examination, which explicitly states that it is not “an offer of promotion.” Word 

again tries to distinguish his right to promotion and to a fair 

examination, but even if we were to accept such a dichotomy, 

the announcement still would contain no language which 

would “induce[] a reasonable belief in” Word that he could 

bind the City by acceptance. Id.
No. 19-1320 11

2. Third-Party Beneficiary

Finally, Word posits that he can bring a breach-of-contract

claim as the third-party beneficiary of a contract between the 

City and its examination administrator. In Word’s view, the 

City and the administrator had contracts that prohibited 

cheating and contained confidentiality requirements, and

considering the totality of the circumstances, these contracts 

are clearly meant to benefit good-faith test-takers like Word.

Illinois law, however, strongly disfavors finding that a

third-party beneficiary relationship exists absent express language creating one. See Martis v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 905 

N.E.2d 920, 924 (Ill. Ct. App. 2009) (“There is a strong presumption that the parties to a contract intend that the contract’s provisions apply only to them, and not to third parties.”). As the Martis court explained, “[a]n individual not a 

party to a contract may only enforce the contract’s rights 

when the contract’s original parties intentionally entered into 

the contract for the direct benefit of the individual.” Id. 

Word suggests that the City knew it would only have an 

applicant pool for the exam if aspiring sergeants knew the 

exam would be fair and no cheating would occur. Therefore, 

the City’s contract with the administrator effectively treated 

the applicant pool as third-party beneficiaries. This is not sufficient, however, to demonstrate the existence of third-party 

beneficiaries under Illinois law. “That the contracting parties

know, expect, or even intend that others will benefit from 

their agreement is not enough to overcome the presumption 

that the contract was intended for the direct benefit of the parties.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Bank of Am. N.A. v. Bassman 

FBT, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 1, 11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“A strong presumption exists that parties intend a contract to apply solely 
12 No. 19-1320

to themselves.”). Word simply has not plausibly alleged that 

the city and exam administrator intended to confer legally enforceable rights on the test takers.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.