Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1703-SC-731 | September 13, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Keith A. Hoglund

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Aaron T. Craft

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keith A. Hoglund,

1

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Michael Lautzenheiser, Sr., and 

Kenton Kiracofe,

Appellees-Defendants.

September 13, 3017

Court of Appeals Case No.

90A02-1703-SC-731

Appeal from the Wells Superior 

Court

The Honorable Robert R. 

McCallen III, Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

90D01-1703-SC-71

 

1 Hoglund lists himself as “Keith A. Hoglund ex rel. KEITH A. HOGLUND©” and “Keith Hoglund, 

Secured Party/Creditor Authorized Representative/Attorney-In-Fact in behalf of KEITH HOGLUND,

©

DEBTOR” on the cover page of his brief. Appellant’s Brief at 1.
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Brown, Judge.

[1] Keith A. Hoglund appeals the dismissal of his small claims notice of claim. We 

affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 1, 2017, Hoglund filed a Verified Notice of Small Claim in the Wells 

Superior Court against Michael W. Lautzenheiser Sr., Kenton Kiracofe, and 

“et al. (to be determined).” Appellant’s Appendix at 37. Hoglund asserted that 

“[t]he circumstance which brought about the loss is (A Tax recovery Issue)”, 

and that the “extent of the loss is: Loss of Liberty re: to fraud and nondisclosure, unjust enrichment by the Official(s) named herein, based on the 

Claimant’s Source and Origin. (Cestui Que Vie Trust) Note * IC § 30 et seq.

(Trusts and Fiduciaries).” Id. He alleged that the amount of damages sought 

was “United States Dollars Value listed @ Six Million Nine Hundred Eighty 

Four Thousand, Seven Hundred and Seventy dollars ($6,984,770 est.[2]) in a 

deferred debt unknown to the Claimant, Revenue in International Monetary 

Units (negative numbers, based on accrual accounting, qualifying as a ‘small 

claim’).” Id. 

[3] On March 6, 2017, the court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. On March 17, 2017, Hoglund filed a Claimant’s 

 

2

In a footnote, Hoglund stated: “A felony = 40,000 * 3 (bid, performance, payment bonds) = 120,000 * 50 

years = 6,000,000.00 Incarceration Rate $53.96 per day *365 = $19,695.40*50 years=$984,770.” Appellant’s 

Appendix at 37.
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Reply to Order Dismissing Cause of Action requesting the court to disregard its 

order to dismiss. On March 23, 2017, the court denied his requested relief. On 

March 29, 2017, Hoglund filed a Notice of Default. On March 30, 2017, the 

court noted that the cause had been dismissed on March 6, 2017, and default 

was improper. That same day, Hoglund filed a notice of appeal. 

Discussion

[4] Initially, we observe that Hoglund is proceeding pro se. Such litigants are held 

to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural 

rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

This court will not “indulge in any benevolent presumptions on [their] behalf, 

or waive any rule for the orderly and proper conduct of [their] appeal.” Ankeny 

v. Governor of State of Ind., 916 N.E.2d 678, 679 n.1. (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) 

(citation omitted), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

[5] Hoglund’s statement of issues provides:

This matter was to be docketed as a small claim based on set-off 

(closing of escrow of the cause by 1096/1099 O.I.D.) The matter 

was created under 90C01-0605-FA-1 in Wells County, Indiana 

underwritten based on my implied consent to any/all 

presentments by Kenton Kiracofe and Michael Lautzenheiser Sr. 

et al. for acceptance of their charging information, when I never 

was in agreement to the drafting of instruments based on my 

source and origin. I had requested disclosure pursuant to the 

presentments on January 20, 2017 and February 3, 2017, made 

respectively. As such, the parties named as Respondent(s) have 

dishonored me, saying that I am not entitled to any disclosure or 

relief: Hence the reason for this action.
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Appellant’s Brief at 5. Hoglund does not cite to the record in his Statement of 

Facts. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) (providing that the Statement of Facts 

“shall be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in 

accordance with Rule 22(C).”). 

[6] In his argument section, Hoglund asserts that “[t]his ‘small claim’ action 

enables Claimant(s) to obtain enforcement of the Federal Tax form 1099 OID 

issue, because that filing is voluntary and it defines the small claim issue as a 

tax, requested to return to source.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Hoglund defines 

“source” as “a mutual fund held by the Respondent(s) and that mutual fund 

was purchased with a BLOCKED GRANT that used my foreign credit blocked 

therein to enable Respondent(s) to assume the use of these funds in a true bill 

against me,” and he asserts that “[t]hese mutual funds are the derivatives used 

to finance the IMF and are the ‘source’ the 1099 instructions refer to.” Id. at 7 

n.1. He asserts that the amount claimed of $6,984,770 is not for a monetary

judgment but is claimed in a “deferred debt (location unknown to the 

Claimant); this is due to the lack of full disclosure by the Respondent(s) named 

herein.” Id. at 8. The section of his brief titled “ARGUMENT” does not 

contain a standard of review or any citations to authority. Id. at 7. See Ind. 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (providing that “[e]ach contention must be supported 

by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record 

on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22,” and that “[t]he argument 

must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of 

review”). 
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[7] In the section of his brief titled “IN SUMMARY,” Hoglund cites United States v. 

Kis, 658 F2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, for the proposition that no more 

than affidavits are necessary to make a prima facie case.3 Appellant’s Brief at 9. 

He also cites Ind. Small Claims Rule 10(B) and appears to request default 

judgment because the respondents failed to respond to the claim in the 

summons. He also requests in part that “escrow be closed/Poll 

Settlement/Accord and Satisfaction/Closure/ Discharge of Cause no. 90C01-

0605-FA-1,” that “a writ of body attachment should be applied and arrest be 

made (due to Respondent(s) contempt of Court),” and that he should be 

released because he is “being held unjustly as a surety without full disclosure.” 

Id. at 10. 

[8] Lautzenheiser and Kiracofe (the “Appellees”) argue that the legal theory 

supporting Hoglund’s claim is unclear, he has waived any and all issues by 

failing to provide a cogent argument supported by legal authority, he lacks 

standing to sue them because their alleged refusal to complete his fraudulent tax 

documents did not cause him any legally cognizable injury, the defendants are 

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, the small claims court lacked 

authority to grant Hoglund release from prison, and he is not entitled to default 

judgment.4 

 

3 Hoglund appears to be citing Kis for the statement that “[a]ffidavits alone should therefore certainly be 

sufficient to prove a prima facie case in summons enforcement proceedings.” Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 536 n.28.

4 The Appellees state that Hoglund is currently serving a fifty-year sentence for child molesting as a class A 

felony and that this court affirmed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. See Appellee’s Brief at 
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[9] To the extent Hoglund fails to cite to relevant authority or relevant portions of 

the record or develop an argument with respect to the issues he attempts to raise 

on appeal, those arguments are waived. See Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 

N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding argument waived for failure to 

cite authority or provide cogent argument), reh’g denied, trans. denied. To the 

extent he cites Ind. Small Claims Rule 10(B) and argues that the trial court 

erred in not granting his request for default judgment, he does not develop an 

argument that he properly filed the notice of default following the dismissal of 

the case. We also observe that Ind. Small Claims Rule 10(B) provides that 

under certain circumstances the court may render default judgment where, in 

part, “[t]he plaintiff has a prima facie case.”

5

 We cannot say that Hoglund has 

developed a cogent argument that he had presented a prima facie case. 

 

8 (citing Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2012); Hoglund v. State, No. 90A02-1503-PC-182 (Ind. Ct. 

App. February 5, 2016)). They also state that Lautzenheiser is the former Wells County Prosecutor and that 

Kiracofe was the deputy prosecutor who prosecuted Hoglund for child molesting. 

5

Ind. Small Claims Rule 10(B) provides:

If the defendant fails to appear at the time and place specified in the notice of claim, or for 

any continuance thereof, the court may enter a default judgment against him. Before 

default judgment is entered, the court shall examine the notice of claim and return thereof 

and make inquiry, under oath, of those present so as to assure the court that:

(1) Service of notice of claim was had under such circumstances as to establish a 

reasonable probability that the defendant received such notice;

(2) Within the knowledge of those present, the defendant is not under legal 

disability and has sufficient understanding to realize the nature and effect of the 

notice of claim;

(3) Either (a) the defendant is not entitled to the protections against default 

judgments provided by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, as amended (the 

“Act”), 50 U.S.C. appx. § 521, or (b) the plaintiff has filed with the court, 

subscribed and certified or declared to be true under penalty of perjury, the 

affidavit required by the Act (i) stating whether or not the defendant is in military 

service and showing necessary facts to support the affidavit; or (ii) if the plaintiff is 

unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service, stating 
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Conclusion

[10] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the small claims court.

[11] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.

 

that the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military 

service; and

(4) The plaintiff has a prima facie case.

After such assurance, the court may render default judgment and, upon entering such 

judgment, shall assess court costs against the defendant.