UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4070

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MARLON J. PEGRAM, a/k/a Marlon Jamel Pegram,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior

District Judge. (3:06-cr-00383-REP-1)

Submitted: January 22, 2014 Decided: February 14, 2014

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Valencia D. 

Roberts, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, 

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Peter Sinclair Duffey, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Marlon J. Pegram appeals from the thirty-six-month 

sentence imposed by the district court after revocation of his 

supervised release. Pegram's counsel filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but 

questioning whether Pegram’s sentence is plainly unreasonable

because the district court failed to adequately explain the 

reasoning for the sentence. Pegram has not filed a pro se 

supplemental brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do 

so. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in 

part, and remand for resentencing. 

I. 

“This Court reviews whether or not sentences imposed 

upon revocation of supervised release are within the prescribed 

statutory range and are not ʽplainly unreasonable.’” United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). Because 

Pegram’s sentence was within the statutory range, the issue 

before us is whether his sentence is plainly unreasonable. 

In sentencing for a violation of supervised release, a

district court must consider the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e), the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range in the U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 7B1.4, p.s. (2012), as 

well as the Chapter Seven policy statements and relevant 18 
3

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Moulden, 478 

F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007).

Here, there is no record evidence that the district 

court in the revocation hearing considered the sentencing range, 

which would have been calculated under the Chapter 7 policy 

statements of the Guidelines. See USSG § 7B1.4. There is no 

record of a sentencing worksheet, mention of the worksheet on 

the record, or discussion of the sentencing range at the 

hearing. Thus, Pegram’s sentence is plainly unreasonable. See

United States v. Waller, ___ F. App’x ___, 2013 WL 6727896, at 

*1-*2 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (No. 13-4118) (remanding for 

resentencing because district court failed to consider policy 

statement range on record).1

 

II.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found one meritorious ground for appeal. Thus, 

for the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the thirty-six-month 

sentence and remand for resentencing in conformity with this 

 1 We do not resolve whether the standard of review is for 

harmless or plain error because reversal is appropriate under 

either standard. 
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opinion.2 We affirm the district court’s decision to revoke 

Pegram’s supervised release. 

This court requires that counsel inform Pegram, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Pegram requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Pegram. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

 2 By this disposition, we intimate no view as to the length 

of the sentence to be imposed on remand, leaving that decision 

to the district court in the first instance.