33576 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2022 / Notices 

Æ Are FTA’s methods of stakeholder 

engagement sufficient? What other 

methods should FTA consider? 

6. Workforce 

Automation will not replace transit 

bus operators in the foreseeable future, 

nonetheless, transit bus automation and 

automated features will impact the 

transit workforce, including bus 

operators, maintenance workers, and the 

domestic supply chain, including bus 

manufacturers. 

FTA seeks information from 

stakeholders on: 

Æ What activities have agencies 

undertaken to understand and prepare 

for the impacts of automation on their 

workforce? Please be specific and 

include examples where possible. 

Æ What types of new skills, training, 

and resources may be required for 

transit workforce development and 

transition? 

Æ What specific areas of workforcerelated research should FTA consider? 

Æ What types of resources could FTA 

provide to help agencies and their 

workers adopt transit bus automation? 

Please note, this RFI will serve as a 

planning document. The RFI should not 

be interpreted as policy, a solicitation 

for applications, or an obligation on the 

part of the Government. 

Nuria I. Fernandez, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–11782 Filed 6–1–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–57–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket No. PHMSA–2022–0063] 

Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage 

to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth 

Movement and Other Geological 

Hazards 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance of updated 

advisory bulletin. 

SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this 

updated advisory bulletin to remind 

owners and operators of gas and 

hazardous liquid pipelines, including 

supercritical carbon dioxide pipelines, 

of the potential for damage to those 

pipeline facilities caused by earth 

movement in variable, steep, and rugged 

terrain and terrain with varied or 

changing subsurface geological 

conditions. Additionally, changing 

weather patterns due to climate change, 

including increased rainfall and higher 

temperatures, may impact soil stability 

in areas that have historically been 

stable. These phenomena can pose a 

threat to the integrity of pipeline 

facilities if those threats are not 

identified and mitigated. Owners and 

operators should consider monitoring 

geological and environmental 

conditions, including changing weather 

patterns, in proximity to their facilities. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mary McDaniel at 202–366–4595 or 

Mary.McDaniel@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The purpose of this updated advisory 

bulletin is to remind owners and 

operators of gas and hazardous liquid 

pipelines, particularly those with 

facilities located onshore or in inland 

waters, about the serious safety-related 

issues that can result from earth 

movement and other geological hazards. 

Additionally, changing weather patterns 

due to climate change may result in 

heavier than normal rainfall and 

increased temperatures causing soil 

saturation and flooding or soil erosion. 

Either phenomenon may adversely 

impact the stability of soil surrounding 

or supporting nearby pipeline facilities. 

The United States Geological Survey 

(USGS) is a resource for pipeline owners 

and operators in evaluating earth 

movement vulnerabilities of pipeline 

facilities. 

Gas and hazardous liquid pipelines 

are required to be designed to withstand 

external loads including those that may 

be imposed by geological forces. 

Specifically, gas pipelines must be 

designed in accordance with 49 CFR 

192.103 and hazardous liquid pipelines 

must be designed in accordance with 49 

CFR 195.110. To comply with these 

regulations, the design of new pipelines, 

including repairs or replacement, must 

consider the load that may be imposed 

by geological forces. 

Once operational, § 192.317(a) states 

that for gas transmission and part 192- 

regulated gathering pipelines ‘‘[t]he 

operator must take all practicable steps 

to protect each transmission line or 

main from washouts, floods, unstable 

soil, landslides, or other hazards that 

may cause the pipeline to move or to 

sustain abnormal loads. In addition, the 

operator must take all practicable steps 

to protect offshore pipelines from 

damage by mudslides, water currents, 

hurricanes, ship anchors, and fishing 

operations.’’ This advisory bulletin 

addresses those protective requirements 

associated with damage caused by 

geological factors. 

In addition, § 192.705 requires 

operators of gas transmission lines, and 

applicable gas gathering lines, to have a 

patrol program to observe surface 

conditions on and adjacent to the 

pipeline right-of-way for indications of 

leaks, construction activity, and other 

factors affecting safety and operation. 

The frequency of these patrols must be 

based upon the size of the line, 

operating pressures, class locations, 

terrain, seasonal weather conditions, 

and other relevant factors. One of the 

primary reasons for this patrol 

requirement is to monitor geological 

movement, both slowly occurring and 

acute changes, which may affect the 

current or future safe operation of the 

pipeline. 

Furthermore, for applicable gas 

pipelines § 192.613(a) states that ‘‘each 

operator shall have a procedure for 

continuing surveillance of its facilities 

to determine and take appropriate 

action concerning changes in class 

location, failures, leakage history, 

corrosion, substantial changes in 

cathodic protection requirements, and 

other unusual operating and 

maintenance conditions.’’ Section 

192.613(b) further states that ‘‘[i]f a 

segment of pipeline is determined to be 

in unsatisfactory condition but no 

immediate hazard exists, the operator 

shall initiate a program to recondition or 

phase out the segment involved, or, if 

the segment cannot be reconditioned or 

phased out, reduce the maximum 

allowable operating pressure in 

accordance with § 192.619(a) and (b).’’ 

For hazardous liquid pipelines, 

§ 195.401(b)(1) states that ‘‘[w]henever 

an operator discovers any condition that 

could adversely affect the safe operation 

of its pipeline system, it must correct 

the condition within a reasonable time. 

However, if the condition is of such a 

nature that it presents an immediate 

hazard to persons or property, the 

operator may not operate the affected 

part of the system until it has corrected 

the unsafe condition.’’ Section 

195.401(b)(2) further states that ‘‘[w]hen 

an operator discovers a condition on a 

pipeline covered under [the integrity 

management requirements in] § 195.452, 

the operator must correct the condition 

as prescribed in § 195.452(h).’’ Land 

movement, soil instability due to 

saturation, severe flooding, river scour, 

and river channel migration are the 

types of conditions that can adversely 

affect the safe operation of a pipeline 

and require corrective action under 

§§ 192.613(a) and 195.401(b). 

Additional guidance for identifying risk 

factors and mitigating natural force 


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1Mcf stands for one thousand cubic feet. The 

‘‘M’’ is representative of the roman numeral for one 

thousand. 

hazards on pipeline segments that could 

affect high consequence areas, are 

outlined in Appendix C, section I, 

subsection B, to part 195. 

PHMSA integrity management 

regulations require operators to take 

additional preventative and mitigative 

measures to prevent, and to mitigate the 

consequences of, failures on gas 

transmission lines in high consequence 

areas (§ 192.935) and hazardous liquid 

pipelines that are in or which could 

affect a high consequence area 

(§ 195.452(i)). An operator must base the 

additional measures on the threats the 

operator has identified for each pipeline 

segment. If an operator determines there 

is a threat to the pipeline, such as 

outside force damage (e.g., earth 

movement or floods), the operator must 

take steps to prevent a failure and to 

minimize the consequences of a failure 

under these regulations. 

PHMSA is aware of recent earth 

movement and other geological-related 

incidents and accidents and safetyrelated conditions throughout the 

country. Some of the more notable 

events, including those discussed in a 

prior advisory bulletin (ADB–2019–02; 

84 FR 18919, 05/02/2019) are briefly 

described below: 

• On March 11, 2022, a 22-inch 

hazardous liquid pipeline spilled 3,900 

barrels of crude oil adjacent to the 

Cahokia Creek approximately 15 miles 

east of St. Louis, Missouri. Preliminary 

information indicates land movement 

may have contributed to this failure. 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) investigation into the 

cause continues as of the date of this 

notice. 

• On May 30, 2021, a hazardous 

liquid pipeline spilled 640 barrels of 

gasoline in Greens Bayou affecting high 

consequence areas near Houston, Texas. 

The operator’s reported cause indicated 

earth movement/progressive ground 

movement over time on a bayou bank. 

• On February 19, 2021, 22,318 one 

thousand cubic feet 1 (Mcf) of natural 

gas was released from a Type A 

gathering pipeline system in Belmont, 

Ohio. A third-party subject matter 

expert determined the proximate cause 

of this incident was land movement, or 

slip, that exerted force on the pipe 

causing a circumferential crack in an 

area where evidence of stress corrosion 

cracking and general corrosion were 

found. 

• On December 23, 2020, 4,450 Mcf 

natural gas was released from a gas 

distribution main line in the City of 

Newport News, Virginia. The operator 

report indicated that the apparent cause 

was pipe stress created by ground 

settlement which caused misalignment 

of a flange resulting in a pinhole leak on 

gasket. 

• On November 19, 2020, a pipeline 

spilled 17.50 barrels of crude oil east of 

I–5 in Kern, California during routine 

start-up. A metallurgical analysis 

determined the root cause to be related 

to external factors (i.e., historical land 

movement, terrain, and cyclic weather 

patterns around this pipeline segment). 

There is a history of land movement in 

the area, all of which contributed to 

unintentional bending of the pipeline 

causing the circumferential cracking 

found at the leak site. 

• On October 4, 2020, an intrastate 

gas transmission pipeline in Goodrich, 

Texas released 118,724 Mcf of natural 

gas below the Trinity River. While no 

definitive root cause was determined, 

the operator used the geological, 

meteorological, site-gathered 

information and historical data in its 

computer modeling and identified earth 

movement of the soil surrounding the 

pipe as the most plausible cause of the 

rupture. Circumferential stress corrosion 

cracking may have been a contributing 

factor to the failure. 

• On May 19, 2020, 447 Mcf was 

released from a gas distribution main 

pipeline in Edenville Township, 

Michigan due to heavy rain fall. An 

investigation confirmed a 4-inch steel 

pipeline was severed when significant 

flooding in the area caused a road 

washout/scouring. 

• On May 4, 2020, a 30-inch natural 

gas pipeline ruptured and ignited near 

Hillsboro, Kentucky. Preliminary 

information indicates land movement 

may have contributed to this failure. 

The NTSB investigation into the cause 

continues as of the date of this notice. 

• On February 22, 2020, a carbon 

dioxide pipeline failed approximately 

one mile southeast of Satartia, 

Mississippi, releasing approximately 

30,000 barrels of liquid carbon dioxide 

that immediately began to vaporize at 

atmospheric conditions. The pipeline 

failed on a steep embankment which 

had subsided adjacent to a local 

highway. Heavy rains are believed to 

have triggered a landslide, which 

created axial strain on the pipeline and 

resulted in a full circumferential girth 

weld failure. 

• On January 29, 2019, a pipeline 

ruptured near the town of Lumberport 

in Harrison County, West Virginia. The 

rupture was located at a girth weld of an 

elbow on the 12-inch interstate pipeline. 

The root cause investigation concluded 

that a landslide about 150 yards from 

the rupture moved the pipeline 

approximately 10 feet from its original 

location causing excessive stress on the 

pipe resulting in the rupture. 

• On January 21, 2019, a 30-inch 

natural gas pipeline ruptured and 

ignited near Summerfield, Ohio. A 

metallurgical analysis indicates a girth 

weld failed due to ductile overload from 

a longitudinal tensile or bending force, 

likely from land movement. 

• On June 7, 2018, a 36-inch pipeline 

ruptured in a rural, mountainous area 

near Moundsville, West Virginia, 

resulting in the release of approximately 

165,000 Mcf of natural gas. According to 

a metallurgical analysis, the rupture was 

caused by earth movement on the rightof-way due to a single overload event. 

Overloading of the pipeline likely 

resulted from a series of lateral 

displacements with accompanying 

bending. 

• On April 30, 2018, an 8-inch 

intrastate pipeline failed in a remote 

mountainous region of Marshall County, 

West Virginia resulting in the release of 

2,658 barrels of propane. The failure 

was caused by lateral movement of the 

pipeline due to earth movement along 

the right-of-way. 

• On January 31, 2018, a 24-inch 

interstate pipeline ruptured near the 

city of Summerfield, Ohio releasing 

approximately 23,500 Mcf of natural gas 

in a rural forested area. A root cause 

analysis concluded that the girth weld 

failure was caused by axial stress due to 

movement of the pipe that exceeded the 

cross-sectional tensile strength of the 

net section weld zone surrounding the 

crack initiation location. 

• On January 9, 2018, a 22-inch 

transmission pipeline failed in 

Montecito, California. The incident 

resulted in a fire and explosion and the 

release of an estimated 12,000 Mcf of 

natural gas. Heavy rains and localized 

flooding contributed to the pipe failure. 

• On December 5, 2016, 

approximately 14,400 barrels of crude 

oil were spilled into an unnamed 

tributary to Ash Coulee Creek, Ash 

Coulee Creek itself, the Little Missouri 

River, and their adjoining shorelines in 

Billings County, North Dakota. The 

metallurgical and root cause failure 

analysis indicated the failure was 

caused by compressive and bending 

forces due to a landslide impacting the 

pipeline. The landslide was the result of 

excessive moisture within the hillside 

creating unstable soil conditions. 

• On October 21, 2016, a pipeline 

release of over 1,238 barrels of gasoline 

spilled into the Loyalsock Creek in 

Lycoming County, Pennsylvania. The 

release was caused by extreme localized 

flooding and soil erosion. 


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2CEQ, ‘‘Carbon Capture, Utilization, and 

Sequestration Guidance,’’ 87 FR 8808, 8810 (Feb. 

16, 2022). 

3For example, PHMSA has funded the following 

research and development projects on the impact of 

soil movement and pipeline monitoring: Pipeline 

Integrity Management for Ground Movement 

Hazards (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/ 

PrjHome.rdm?prj=202); Combined Vibration, 

Ground Movement, and Pipe Current Detector 

(https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/ 

PrjHome.rdm?prj=655); Definition of Geotechnical 

and Operational Load Effects on Pipeline 

Anomalies (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/ 

PrjHome.rdm?prj=561); and Fiber Optic Sensors for 

Direct Pipeline Monitoring Under Geohazard 

Conditions (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/ 

PrjHome.rdm?prj=889). 

Within its rulemaking entitled ‘‘Safety 

of Gas Transmission Pipelines: Repair 

Criteria, Integrity Management 

Improvements, Cathodic Protection, 

Management of Change, and Other 

Related Amendments’’ (RIN 2137– 

AF39), PHMSA notes that it is 

considering adopting revisions to 

§ 192.613 that would oblige operators of 

gas transmission pipelines to conduct 

inspections on their facilities following 

an extreme weather event to ensure 

timely identification and remediation of 

damage to those facilities. In addition, 

the Council on Environmental Quality 

(CEQ) recently issued interim guidance 

underscoring the importance of the 

evaluation of, and emergency planning 

for, geohazards for safe operation of 

carbon dioxide and other pipeline 

facilities.2

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2022–01) 

Advisory: All owners and operators of 

gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, 

including supercritical carbon dioxide 

pipelines, are reminded that earth 

movement, particularly in variable, 

steep, and rugged terrain and terrain 

with varied or changing subsurface 

geological conditions, can pose a threat 

to the integrity of a pipeline if those 

threats are not identified and mitigated. 

Additionally, changing weather patterns 

due to climate change may result in 

heavier than normal rainfall and higher 

temperatures, resulting in soil saturation 

and flooding or soil erosion, each of 

which may adversely impact soil 

stability surrounding or supporting 

nearby pipeline facilities. 

Pipeline operators should consider 

taking the following actions to ensure 

pipeline safety: 

1. Identify areas surrounding the 

pipeline that may be prone to large earth 

movement, including but not limited to 

slope instability, subsidence, frost 

heave, soil settlement, erosion, 

earthquakes, and other dynamic 

geologic conditions that may pose a 

safety risk. 

2. Use geotechnical engineers during 

the design, construction, and ongoing 

operation of a pipeline system to ensure 

that sufficient information is available 

to avoid or minimize the impact of earth 

movement on the integrity of the 

pipeline system. At a minimum, 

operators should consider soil strength 

characteristics, ground and surface 

water conditions, propensity for erosion 

or scour of underlying soils, and the 

propensity of earthquakes or frost heave. 

3. Develop design, construction, and 

monitoring plans and procedures for 

each identified location, based on the 

site-specific hazards identified. When 

constructing new pipelines, develop 

and implement procedures for pipe and 

girth weld designs to increase their 

effectiveness for taking loads, either 

stresses or strains, exerted from pipe 

movement in areas where geological 

subsurface conditions and movement 

are a hazard to pipeline integrity. 

4. Monitoring plans may include 

provisions related to the following: 

• Ensuring during construction of 

new pipelines that excavators do not 

steepen, load (including changing the 

groundwater levels) or undercut slopes 

which may cause excessive ground 

movement during construction or after 

operations commence. 

• Conducting periodic visits and site 

inspections. Increased patrolling may be 

necessary due to potential hazards 

identified and existing/pending weather 

conditions. Right-of-way patrol staff 

must be trained on how to detect and 

report conditions that may lead to or 

exhibit ground movement to appropriate 

staff. 

• Identifying geodetic monitoring 

points (i.e., survey benchmarks) to track 

potential ground movement. 

• Installing slope inclinometers to 

track ground movement at depth which 

may otherwise not be detectable during 

right-of-way patrols. 

• Installing standpipe piezometers to 

track changes in groundwater 

conditions that may affect slope 

stability. 

• Evaluating the accumulation of 

strain on the pipeline by installing 

strain gauges. 

• Conducting stress/strain analysis 

utilizing in-line inspection tools 

equipped with inertia mapping unit 

technology and high resolution 

deformation in-line inspection for pipe 

bending and denting from movement. 

• Utilizing aerial mapping light 

detection and ranging or other 

technology to track changes in ground 

conditions. 

5. Develop mitigation measures to 

remediate the identified locations. 

6. Monitor environmental conditions 

and changing weather patterns in 

proximity to their facilities and evaluate 

soil stability that may have been 

adversely impacted. 

• The National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration’s National 

Centers for Environmental Information 

has excellent information publicly 

available. For example, see the National 

Temperature and Precipitation Maps at 

the National Centers for Environmental 

Information (https://

www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/ 

us-maps/). 

7. Use available data and information 

resources to assess pipeline facility 

vulnerability relative to landslides and 

other types of earth movement. 

• The USGS has excellent 

information publicly available regarding 

land movement. For example, see the 

Landslide Hazards Maps at the USGS 

website (https://www.usgs.gov/ 

programs/landslide-hazards/maps). 

8. Consider the findings and 

recommendations of pertinent research 

projects, studies, and reports on the 

impact of changing weather patterns on 

soil stability.3 PHMSA also notes that 

industry and academic materials could 

be informative regarding relevant 

considerations and strategies for 

ensuring pipeline integrity in areas of 

land movement or soil subsidence. 

9. Mitigation measures should be 

based on site-specific conditions and 

may include: 

• Re-routing the pipeline right-of-way 

prior to construction to avoid areas 

prone to large ground movement such as 

unstable slope areas, earthquake fault 

zones, permafrost movement, or scour. 

• Utilize properly designed 

horizontal directional drilling to go 

below areas of potential land movement. 

• Installation of drainage measures in 

the trench to mitigate subsurface flows 

and enhance surface water draining at 

the site including streams, creeks, runs, 

gullies, or other sources of surface runoff that may be contributing surface 

water to the site or changing 

groundwater levels that may exacerbate 

earth movement. 

• Reducing the steepness of 

potentially unstable slopes, including 

installing retaining walls, soldier piles, 

sheet piles, wire mesh systems, 

mechanically stabilized earth systems 

and other mechanical structures. 

• Installing trench breakers and slope 

breakers to mitigate trench seepage and 

divert trench flows along the surface to 

safe discharge points off the site or 

right-of-way. 

• Building retaining walls and/or 

installing steel piling or concrete 

caissons to stabilize steep slope areas as 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2022 / Notices 33579 

long as the corrosion control systems are 

not compromised. 

• Reducing the loading on the site by 

removing and/or reducing the excess 

backfill materials to off-site locations. 

Soil placement should be carefully 

planned to avoid triggering earth 

movement in other locations. 

• Compacting backfill materials at the 

site to increase strength, reduce water 

infiltration, and achieve optimal 

moisture content. 

• Drying the soil using special 

additives such as lime-kiln dust or 

cement-kiln to allow the materials to be 

re-used and worked at the site. Oversaturated materials may require an 

extensive amount of time and space to 

dry. 

• Regrading the pipeline right-of-way 

to minimize scour and erosion. 

• Bringing the pipeline above ground 

and placing it on supports that can 

accommodate large ground movements 

(e.g., transitions across earthquake fault 

zones or unstable slopes, without 

putting excessive stress or strain on the 

pipeline). 

• Reducing the operating pressure 

temporarily or shutting-in the affected 

pipeline segment completely. 

• Re-routing the pipeline when other 

appropriate mitigation measures cannot 

be effectively implemented to maintain 

safety. 

Pipeline safety regulations require 

reporting of certain conditions that 

impair the serviceability of a pipeline, 

as noted in §§ 191.23 and 195.55. 

PHMSA encourages pipeline 

operators to enhance their preparations 

and procedures beyond the minimum 

Federal standards and to address the 

unique threats, vulnerabilities, and 

challenges of each individual pipeline 

facility. Pipeline operators, Federal and 

state regulators, and the public have a 

common goal of no damage and no 

releases from pipeline infrastructure. 

Working together will better achieve our 

goal of zero incidents and releases. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on May 26, 

2022, under authority delegated in 49 CFR 

1.97. 

Alan K. Mayberry, 

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. 

[FR Doc. 2022–11791 Filed 6–1–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Office of the Secretary 

[Docket No. OST 2022–0014] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Notice of Request for New 

Information Collection 

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary of 

Transportation (OST), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The OST invites public 

comments about our intention to request 

the Office of Management and Budget’s 

(OMB) approval to submit one 

information collection, which is 

summarized below under 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION. We are 

required to publish this notice in the 

Federal Register by the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995. 

DATES: Please submit comments by 

August 1, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

identified by Docket ID OST 2022–0014 

by any of the following methods: 

Website: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received go to the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://

www.regulations.gov. Follow the online 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Fax: 1–202–493–2251. 

Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

Hand Delivery or Courier: U.S. 

Department of Transportation, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tara 

Lanigan (tara.lanigan@dot.gov), 

Department of Transportation, Office of 

the Secretary of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. Office hours are from 7 a.m. to 

4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Title: Strengthening Mobility and 

Revolutionizing Transportation 

(SMART) Grant Program. 

OMB Control Number: Not applicable; 

this is a new collection. 

Summary: The Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law (BIL, also known as 

the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs 

Act), enacted on November 15, 2021 

provides for significant investments in 

America’s transportation infrastructure. 

A key program of the legislation is the 

Strengthening and Revolutionizing 

Transportation (SMART) Grant Program 

($100 million per year), under which 

‘‘the Secretary shall provide grants to 

eligible entities to conduct 

demonstration projects focused on 

advanced smart city or community 

technologies and systems in a variety of 

communities to improve transportation 

efficiency and safety’’ (BIL § 25005; 23 

U.S.C. 502(b)). More specifically, 

SMART Grants may be used to carry out 

a project that demonstrates at least one 

of the following: 

• Coordinated Automation 

• Connected Vehicles 

• Systems Integration 

• Commerce Delivery and Logistics 

• Leveraging Use of Innovative Aviation 

Technology 

• Smart Grid 

• Smart Technology Traffic Signals 

For this competitive grant program, 

the Office of the Secretary will issue a 

Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) 

that describes the requirements of the 

SMART Grant program, including the 

criteria that will be used to evaluate 

applications. The NOFO will provide a 

description of the application 

requirements. All eligible entities must 

submit a completed application in order 

to be considered for a grant award. 

The applicants who are selected for a 

grant (i.e., the grantees) will have 

additional reporting requirements 

associated with their SMART grant, 

outlined below. 

• Annual Implementation Reports. 

These annual reports document project 

progress in meeting its goals. The first 

report is submitted not later than 2 years 

after the date on which the SMART 

grant is received and annually thereafter 

until the date on which the SMART 

grant is expended. 

Æ The Final Implementation Report 

will demonstrate how the deployment 

and operational costs of the project 

compared to the benefits and savings; 

the means by which each project has 

met its original expectation, including 

data findings on the impacts of the 

project (e.g., safety, mobility, access, 

system efficiency, etc.) and lessons 

learned. 

• Evaluation Plan. The evaluation 

plan describes how the project will be 

evaluated, including the anticipated 

impacts of the project (e.g., goals), the 

methods that will be used to measure 

those impacts, and the performance 

measures. 

• Data Management Plan. The data 

management plan provides more 

detailed information on the types of 

data being collected by the grantee and 


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