IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

INTERCURRENCY SOFTWARE LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES RIVER SYSTEMS, INC. (D/B/A/ 

CHARLES RIVER DEVELOPMENT), STATE 

STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND 

STATE STREET CORPORATION,

Defendants.

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Case No. 2:24-cv-0079-JRG

 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

 

DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS

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DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS – Page i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II. LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 4

A. Eligibility Under § 101 ........................................................................................... 4

B. Sufficiency of the Pleadings ................................................................................... 5

III. THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE INELIGIBLE UNDER § 101 ...................................... 6

A. The Asserted Patents’ Common Specification Describes the Alleged 

Invention as Economic Activity.............................................................................. 6

B. Claim 1 of the ’107 Patent is Representative.......................................................... 7

C. During Prosecution of the ’107 Patent, Patentee Relied Upon the 

“Important” Parts of the Invention to Overcome Section 101 Rejections............ 13

D. Alice Step One: The Claims Are Impermissibly Abstract.................................... 15

1. Fundamental Economic Concepts Are Ineligible ..................................... 16

2. Intercurrency’s Prosecution-Based “Graphical User Interface” 

Argument Does Not Render the Claims Non-Abstract............................. 18

E. Alice Step Two: There Is No Inventive Concept in the Claims Beyond the 

Abstract Idea Itself................................................................................................ 21

IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE 

PLAUSIBLE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR 

INFRINGEMENT............................................................................................................. 24

V. VENUE IS IMPROPER IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS ........................... 26

A. State Street Has No Physical Place in the Eastern District................................... 27

B. State Street Has No Regular and Established Place of Business Within the 

Eastern District...................................................................................................... 28

C. State Street Exerts No Control Over any “Place” in the Eastern District of 

Texas..................................................................................................................... 29

VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 30

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DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS – Page ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,

890 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................5

Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,

573 U.S. 208 (2014)......................................................................................................... passim

Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings,

967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................20

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009).....................................................................................................3, 6, 9, 24

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)......................................................................................................... passim

Bilski v. Kappos,

561 U.S. 593 (2010).............................................................................................................2, 16

Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am.,

4 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..............................................................................................6, 25

Bozeman Fin. LLC v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta,

955 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2020)....................................................................................................2

Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,

778 F. App’x 882 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..........................................................................................17

Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,

17 F.4th 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................27, 28, 30

Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify, Inc.,

No. 18-CV-00300, 2018 WL 6981828 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018)................................6, 24, 25

Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,

776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................8, 10

In re Cordis Corp.,

769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985)..................................................................................................28

In re Cray Inc.,

871 F.3d at 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..........................................................................27, 28, 29, 30

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DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS – Page iii

cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings,

986 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021)................................................................................................20

Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,

815 F. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ....................................................................................20, 21

Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,

830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)......................................................................................4, 19, 20

Fractus, S.A. v. TCL Corp.,

No. 20-CV-00097, 2021 WL 2483155 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2021)..................................6, 24, 25

In re Google LLC,

949 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..........................................................................................28, 29

In re Greenstein,

774 F. App'x 661 (Fed. Cir. 2019)...........................................................................................17

IBM Corp. v. Zillow Group, Inc.,

50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................23

Intell. Ventures I, LLC v. Cap. One Bank (USA),

792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................5

Island Intellectual Property LLC v. TD Ameritrade, Inc.,

No. 21-CV-00273, 2022 WL 17080738 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2022).................................16, 17

Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,

66 F. Supp. 3d 829 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (Bryson, J.)...............................................................2, 17

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc.,

566 U.S. 66 (2012).................................................................................................................4, 5

Miller Mendel, Inc. v. City of Anna, Tex.,

598 F. Supp. 3d 486 (E.D. Tex. 2022).................................................................................5, 23

OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015)......................................................................................5, 16, 19

Potter v. Cardinal Health 200, LLC.,

381 F. Supp. 3d 729 (E.D. Tex. 2019).......................................................................................9

PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs.,

404 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (E.D. Tex. 2019).........................................................................9, 10, 12

RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,

855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4

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DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS – Page iv

Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc.,

65 F.4th 698 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ............................................................................................19, 23

SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,

898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018)....................................................................................16, 17, 22

Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,

873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir. 2017)....................................................................................................5

SkillSurvey, Inc. v. Checkster LLC,

178 F. Supp. 3d 247 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 683 F. App’x 930 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................5, 23

Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,

839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................17, 22

TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,

581 U.S. 258 (2017).............................................................................................................4, 27

Trading Technologies International Inc. v. IBG LLC,

No. 21-CV-00273, 2022 WL 17080738 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2022)...........................18, 19, 20

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc.,

675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................14, 19, 20

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC,

921 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019)........................................................................................ passim

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Avg Techs.USA, Inc.,

No. 16-CV-00393, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45125 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2017) .........................4

Vervain, LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc.,

No. 6:21-CV-00487, 2022 WL 23469 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2022) ......................................25, 26

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1400........................................................................................................................3, 27

35 U.S.C. § 101...................................................................................................................... passim

Other Authorities

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)....................................................................................................................1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)....................................................................................................................1

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TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit Description

A U.S. Patent No. 10,062,107 (“’107”)

B U.S. Patent No. 10,776,863 (“’863”)

C U.S. Patent No. 11,449,930 (“’930”)

D ’107 Prosecution: 2010-04-16 Response to Restriction Requirement

E ’107 Prosecution: 2015-01-13 Response to First Office Action (RCE)

F ’107 Prosecution: 2015-08-13 Response to Final Office Action in 2nd RCE

G ’107 Prosecution: 2016-06-09 Response to First Office Action in 2nd RCE

H ’107 Prosecution: 2017-05-24 Response to Final Office Action in 2nd RCE

I ’107 Prosecution: 2018-01-20 Response to First Office Action in 3rd RCE

J ’863 Prosecution: 2018-10-03 Office Action 

K ’863 Prosecution: 2019-12-05 Terminal Disclaimer 

L ’930 Prosecution: 2021-01-31 Response to Office Action 

M ’930 Prosecution: 2021-01-31 Terminal Disclaimer 

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Defendants Charles River Development, State Street Bank and Trust Company, and State 

Street Corporation (collectively, “State Street” or “Defendants”) respectfully move to dismiss 

Intercurrency Software LLC’s (“Intercurrency”) First Amended Complaint (D.I. 13, “Compl.”) 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because the claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,062,107 (“’107”) (Ex. 

A); 10,776,863 (“’863”) (Ex. B); and 11,449,930 (“’930”) (Ex. C) (collectively, “Asserted 

Patents”) are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and because Intercurrency fails to plead sufficient 

facts to plausibly allege a claim for relief. Defendants also move to dismiss Intercurrency’s 

Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), because venue in this District is improper.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Asserted Patents are directed to the fundamental economic practice of trading an asset 

in a preferred currency and are unequivocally patent ineligible under the Supreme Court’s Alice

test. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-19 (2014). As the Supreme 

Court, Federal Circuit, and this Court have confirmed repeatedly, fundamental economic activities 

like the ones claimed here are abstract ideas (Alice Step One) that are not eligible for patent 

protection unless they claim an inventive concept that transforms the claims into something more 

(Alice Step Two). Here, Intercurrency’s allegations and arguments make clear that the claims of 

the three Asserted Patents—which share a common specification—are directed to the same 

unpatentable concept: “methods, processes and systems for conducting security transactions in a 

preferred currency.” Compl. ¶ 26. No factual allegations can change the legal conclusion here that 

the claims are abstract, non-inventive, and unpatentable.

At Alice step one, the asserted claims are directed to the abstract idea of trading an asset in 

a preferred currency and, in particular, to performing a currency exchange at the time of a security 

transaction, “so that a trader or investor knows exactly what profit or loss may occur with a 

transaction.” Compl. ¶ 25. Courts have repeatedly rejected these fundamental economic concepts 

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as unpatentable. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216 (finding concept of intermediated settlement a 

fundamental economic practice and patent-ineligible); Bozeman Fin. LLC v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of 

Atlanta, 955 F.3d 971, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“‘Fundamental economic practices long prevalent in 

our system of commerce’ are examples of abstract ideas, which are ineligible subject matter”)

(quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. Am. 

Airlines, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 829, 837 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (Bryson, J.) (finding ineligible claims 

directed to the “unpatentable concept of currency exchange”). Here, Intercurrency’s claims are 

directed entirely to these abstract, ineligible concepts.

This is true even in view of Intercurrency’s description of its alleged invention. In the 

patentee’s own words, the alleged invention is no more than “a Graphical-User-Interface design 

that helps a trader buy and sell a stock with certainty even [sic] the currency exchange rates 

fluctuate rapidly.” Ex. I at 16. The Federal Circuit has held that this is not a patentable invention:

“a particular graphical user interface that improves usability, visualization, and efficiency” does 

not confer eligibility because “[t]he claims are focused on providing information to traders in a 

way that helps them process information more quickly...not on improving computers or 

technology.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“IBG 

II”). In other words, the alleged invention “focuses on improving the trader, not the functioning of 

the computer,” and is thus unpatentable. Id. at 1383.

At Alice step two, once the abstract idea is removed from the claims, none of what remains 

recites anything inventive that might transform the claims into patent-eligible subject matter. To 

the extent the claims recite components, those components—such as client computer[s], trading 

servers, currency exchange servers, and market exchange servers—are indisputably conventional, 

and the claims recite them to perform only their routine functions (e.g., displaying, analyzing, and 

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transmitting information). Indeed, the only alleged inventive concept identified by Intercurrency 

during prosecution is the abstract idea itself—“deriv[ing] a prevailing exchange rate from all 

exchange rates” and presenting this information to a trader. Ex. I at 15. But it is well-settled that 

“[t]he abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive concept.” IBG II, 921 F.3d at 1385.

To the extent the Court credits arguments by Intercurrency that the claims are patenteligible, it should nonetheless dismiss the Complaint as failing to plausibly state a claim for relief 

under Iqbal/Twombly. Intercurrency fails to allege any facts—let alone sufficient facts—to 

plausibly suggest that Defendants infringe any claim of the Asserted Patents. Rather, Intercurrency 

repeats the same boilerplate allegations raised against multiple defendants in multiple prior suits 

without addressing any of the particular limitations Intercurrency classified during prosecution as 

“important features” of the alleged invention. For example, Intercurrency argued that “one of the 

important features in Claim 1 [of the ’107 patent] is how and when the prevailing exchange rate is 

derived. Claim 1 recites explicitly that the prevailing exchange rate is derived from all exchange 

rates obtained from the one or more currency exchange servers [and] is calculated again from all 

exchange rates...right before the transaction takes place.” Ex. H at 17. These features—according 

to Intercurrency—ensure that the claims “do[] not pose a risk tying up the alleged abstract idea nor 

pre-empting others from using the alleged abstract idea.” Ex. G at 16. But nowhere in its Complaint 

does Intercurrency offer any plausible facts to suggest that State Street’s accused systems meet 

these “important features” of the claims. Intercurrency’s Complaint should be dismissed.

To the extent that the Court finds that the claims are patent-eligible under § 101 and that 

the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to plausibly state a claim for infringement of the Asserted 

Patents, the case should nonetheless be dismissed for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

Defendants are not incorporated in Texas, nor do they have a “regular and established place of 

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business” in this District. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 581 U.S. 258, 

268 (2017). Intercurrency’s reliance on several remote employees that purportedly work in this 

District and its unsupported—and incorrect—allegations regarding Defendants’ activities in the 

District are not sufficient to establish a place of business in the District.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Eligibility Under § 101

Abstract ideas are not patentable. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216-17. Rather, they are “the basic 

tools of scientific and technological work” and the “monopolization of those tools through the 

grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.” Mayo 

Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).1 Courts apply a two-step 

framework “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 

ideas from those that claim patent-eligible application of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. 

At step one, courts “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patentineligible concept,” id. at 218, by “looking at the ‘focus’ of the claims, their ‘character as a 

whole.’” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “The inquiry 

often is whether the claims are directed to ‘a specific means or method’ for improving technology 

or whether they are simply directed to an abstract end-result.” RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 

855 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Avg Techs.USA, Inc., No. 16-

CV-00393, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45125, at *18-19 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2017).

At step two, courts remove the abstract idea from the claim, and search the remainder for 

an “‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure 

that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] 

1 All citations omitted unless otherwise indicated.

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itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). There 

is nothing inventive about applying an abstract idea using “‘well-understood, routine, conventional 

activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Id. at 225 (alteration in original). Where a “pen 

and paper version of the claimed method...could be completed,” the claimed method is merely an 

abstract idea. Miller Mendel, Inc. v. City of Anna, Tex., 598 F. Supp. 3d 486, 495 (E.D. Tex. 2022) 

(quoting SkillSurvey, Inc. v. Checkster LLC, 178 F. Supp. 3d 247, 256 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 683 

F. App’x 930 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Further, claiming “[a] simple instruction to apply an abstract idea 

on a computer,” or “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract 

idea on a computer provide a sufficient inventive concept” will not cure a patent’s abstraction.

Intell. Ventures I, LLC v. Cap. One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Patent eligibility under § 101 is a question of law which may be resolved on a motion to 

dismiss. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). While 

courts must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint and consider them in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, “[i]n ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court need not ‘accept as 

true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,’ such as 

the claims and the patent specification.” Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 

905, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, dismissal of the Complaint on ineligibility grounds is appropriate 

where there is no genuine dispute of fact that the recited claim elements are “well-understood, 

routine, and conventional.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 

1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). 

B. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff must 

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plead facts that allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Id. Courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as 

a factual allegation.” Id. Moreover, as this Court has noted, for claims directed to “hardware and 

software involved in an electronic transaction...system,” Fractus, S.A. v. TCL Corp., No 20-CV00097, 2021 WL 2483155, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2021), a Complaint must include more than 

the bare bones allegations found sufficient by the Federal Circuit in the Disc Disease case.

Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify, Inc., No. 18-CV-00300, 2018 WL 6981828 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 

2018). Rather, 

“[t]he level of detail required in any given case will vary depending upon a number 

of factors, including the complexity of the technology, the materiality of any given 

element to practicing the asserted claim(s), and the nature of the allegedly 

infringing device. Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot assert a plausible claim for 

infringement under the Iqbal/Twombly standard by reciting the claim elements and 

merely concluding that the accused product has those elements.”

Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “There must be some 

factual allegations that, when taken as true, articulate why it is plausible that the accused product 

infringes the patent claim.” Id.

III. THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE INELIGIBLE UNDER § 101

A. The Asserted Patents’ Common Specification Describes the Alleged Invention 

as Economic Activity

The Asserted Patents share a common specification, which explains that “the invention 

relates to methods, processes and systems for conducting security transactions in a preferred 

currency, regardless of what original or market currency the securities are being traded in and 

where the transaction may take place.” ’107, 2:15-19. As described in the specification, the alleged 

problem in the prior art was that “[a]t the time of buying or selling the stocks, as well as during 

the whole period the investor held the stocks, the investor had no certain knowledge of what profit 

or loss he was going to get.” ’107, 1:53-57. Thus, “[t]here is a great need for an improved system 

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which performs currency conversion at a transactional level so that a trader or investor knows 

exactly what profit or loss may occur with a transaction.” Id., 1:61-66. The specification further 

explains that “[t]he invention may be implemented in numerous ways” (’107, 2:62-63) and “[t]he 

detailed description of the invention is presented largely in terms of procedures, steps, logic blocks, 

processing, and other symbolic representations that directly or indirectly resemble the operations 

of data processing devices coupled to networks.” ’107, 4:13-17.

According to the specification, the claimed servers represent conventional financial 

institutions: “server 206 represents a bank [or] an exchange agency”; “server 208 represents a 

brokerage (e.g., Scottrade) to facilitate a transaction decided by a trader”; and “server 210 

represents an asset or market exchange (e.g., NYSE), where an asset is caused to change hands.”

Id. at 4:66-5:6. Likewise, the “client machine may include...any form of desktop or laptop or 

server computer, handheld wireless device, or mobile phone.” Id. at 4:49-53. The specification 

also concedes that “well known methods, procedures, components, and circuitry have not been 

described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring aspects of the present invention.” ’107, 4:24-

27. Thus, critically, the specification does not explain how a prevailing exchange rate is calculated; 

rather, it teaches merely that “a prevailing exchange rate is obtained at 306 from a currency 

exchange.” ’107, 5:48-49. Likewise, the specification does not teach how to specially program any 

of the client computer, currency exchange server, trading server, or market exchange servers to 

perform the alleged invention, relying instead on the conventional functionality of these common 

components.

B. Claim 1 of the ’107 Patent is Representative

For purposes of the § 101 analysis, Claim 1 of the ’107 patent is representative of all the 

claims of the asserted patents because all the claims are “substantially similar and linked to the 

same abstract idea”—currency exchange for a security transaction. Content Extraction & 

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Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Claim 1 of the ’107 

recites functional steps using conventional hardware:

1. A method for providing a consolidated trading platform, the method 

comprising:

providing a trading server coupled to one or more currency exchange servers and 

one or more market exchange servers;

receiving in the trading server an indicator of a preferred currency from a trader;

causing a client computer associated with the trader to display at least an asset in 

the preferred currency while the asset is being traded in a market currency, wherein 

said causing a client computer associated with the trader to display at least an asset 

in the preferred currency comprises:

determining in the trading server a prevailing exchange rate between the 

preferred currency and the market currency, wherein the prevailing exchange rate 

is derived from all exchange rates obtained from the one or more currency exchange 

servers when the asset is displayed in the preferred currency; and

displaying all costs and fees in the preferred currency to own or sell the asset, 

wherein the all costs and fees are dynamically changed in accordance with the 

prevailing exchange rate updated constantly even when a market value of the asset 

remains unchanged, wherein the trader has certain knowledge of what to pay for 

the asset, or profit or loss when acting on the asset;

conducting in the trading server a transaction of the asset by transmitting a 

transaction request from the trading server to a market exchange server when the 

trader decides to proceed with trading the asset;

receiving a settlement notification in the trading server when the transaction of the 

asset is performed by the market exchange server in accordance with conditions set 

by the user, wherein the conditions include a price at which the asset is traded in 

the preferred currency, the trading server is configured to calculate the prevailing 

exchange rate from all exchange rates obtained from the one or more currency 

exchange servers right before the transaction takes place when the asset is not 

priced in the preferred currency, and executes the transaction with the calculated 

prevailing exchange rate obtained at the transaction to prevent uncertainty in 

currency exchanges in another time; and

performing a currency conversion of some portion or all of the transaction from 

the market currency to the preferred currency when the preferred currency is not 

identical to the market currency, the conversion being performed with the 

calculated prevailing exchange rate.

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’107, 8:45-9:27 (emphasis added). Although Intercurrency alleges in its Complaint that “[n]o 

single claim is representative of any other” (Compl. ¶ 22), the Court “need not accept as true legal 

conclusions couched as factual allegations” (and Intercurrency provides no support for its 

statement in the first place), Potter v. Cardinal Health 200, LLC., 381 F. Supp. 3d 729, 733 (E.D. 

Tex. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In fact, (1) Intercurrency’s own allegations in the 

Complaint and its arguments during prosecution of the Asserted Patents, (2) the fact that the patents 

share a common specification and are terminally disclaimed against their respective parents, and 

(3) the substantial overlap in claim language, all confirm the representativeness of ’107 claim 1 

for purposes of the § 101 analysis. See PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., 404 F. Supp. 3d 

1021, 1036 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (“The cumulative effect of these three justifications—terminal 

disclaimer, common specification, and particularized analysis tethered to the claim language—is 

that JHA has met its burden to initially show representativeness.”).

First, in describing the purported inventions of the Asserted Patents, Intercurrency cites 

only to the common specification and offers a single description of the invention for all three 

patents. See Compl. ¶¶ 26-29. Likewise, Intercurrency’s barebones (and insufficient, see § IV0, 

infra) allegations of infringement rely entirely on conclusory language regarding claim 1 of the 

’107 patent and fail to provide any additional or different allegations for any claim of the ’863 or 

’930 patents. Compare Compl. ¶ 49 (paraphrasing claim 1 of the ’107), with ¶¶ 65, 81 (alleging 

infringement of the ’863 and ’930 patents). Moreover, during prosecution of the ’107 patent, 

patentee expressly represented to the Examiner that “[a]ll of the claims in the present application 

recite the same claimed invention, namely a consolidated trading platform involving a trading 

server, one or more currency exchange servers, and one or more market exchange servers.” Ex. D

at 2; see also Ex. E at 16 (“Without repeating the same, the Applicant wishes to rely upon the 

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above reasoning supporting Claims 1-18 to support Claims 19-36.”); Ex. I at 16 (following 

discussion of claim 1, arguing “[c]laims 9, 19 and 27 have been amended similarly to Claim 1.

Without repeating the same, the Applicant wishes to rely upon the above reasons/arguments 

supporting Claim 1 to support Claims 9, 19 and 27”). Likewise, during prosecution of the ’930 

patent, the patentee presented arguments directed at claim 1 and then concluded “Independent 

Claims 5 and 12 have been amended similarly to claim 1. Without repeating the same, the 

Applicant wishes to rely on the above arguments supporting Claim 1 to support Claims 5 and 12.”

Ex. L at 11. Thus, at least for the ’107 patent and the ’930 patent, claims within each patent are 

indisputably “substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea.” Content Extraction, 776 

F.3d at 1348.

Second, this Court recognizes that a “terminal disclaimer offers support for the Court’s 

conclusion regarding representativeness because it ‘is a strong clue that a patent examiner and, by 

concession, the applicant, thought the claims in the continuation lacked a patentable distinction 

over the parent.’” PPS Data, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1034. Similarly, “[a] common specification is 

some additional indication of representativeness.” Id. Here, there is no dispute that the patents 

share a common specification. Likewise, there is no dispute that the claims of the ’863 patent are 

terminally disclaimed against the ’107 patent, or that the claims of the ’930 patent are terminally 

disclaimed against both the ’107 and ’863 patents. See Exs. K, M.

Third, the relevant claim language is substantially similar across all three Asserted Patents.

For example, patentee argued during prosecution that “[o]ne of the important features or 

limitations recited in Claim 1 [of the ’107 patent] is the specially designed mechanism to derive a 

prevailing exchange rate from all exchange rates obtained from one or more currency exchange 

servers.” Ex. I at 15. Further, “Claim 1 recites a set of processes or combined actions that must be 

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performed collaboratively by a client computer, one or more currency exchange servers and one 

or more market exchange servers to minimize possible uncertainty from currency exchanges that 

may considerably affect the price, profit or loss when a transaction related to the asset takes place.”

Id. These same “important” features are recited in the same way in each of the nine independent 

claims across all three patents.

For example, claims 1 and 9 of the ’107 patent recite “a method for providing a 

consolidated trading platform,” while claims 19 and 27 recite a similar “non-transitory computer 

readable storage medium with an executable software product providing a consolidated trading 

platform” with a list of “operation[s]” similar to the method steps of claims 1 and 9. Independent 

claims 1 and 6 of the ’863 patent and independent claims 1, 5 and 12 of the ’930 patent all recite 

a “method for trading an asset” or “system for trading an asset,” with each claim requiring similar 

multi-server architecture performing similar steps as ’107 claim 1. All nine independent claims 

require a trading server coupled to market exchange servers and currency exchange servers. All 

claims require displaying costs and fees in a preferred currency using a prevailing exchange rate 

derived from all exchange rates obtained from the currency exchange servers. All claims require 

that the displayed value for the asset changes based on changes in the exchange rate, even when 

the value of the asset on the market exchange server has not changed.

And, finally, in setting forth its infringement allegations in the Complaint, Intercurrency 

identifies claim 1 of the ’107 patent, claim 1 of the ’863 patent, and claim 12 of the ’930 patent, 

as exemplary of Defendants’ alleged infringement. Claim 1 of the ’107 patent, claim 1 of the ’863 

patent, and claim 12 of the ’930 patent, however, all require the same things: (a) coupling a trading 

server to one or more currency exchange servers and one or more market exchange servers (’107, 

8:47-49; ’863, 8:48-50; ’930, 8:48-50 and 10:44-45); (b) displaying costs and fees in a currency 

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set by a trader, where the costs and fees are displayed and dynamically updated in accordance with 

a prevailing exchange rate (’107, 8:64-67; ’863, 9:1-4; ’930, 10:47-53); (c) conducting a trade of 

the asset at the prevailing exchange rate at the time of transaction by transmitting a request from 

the trading server to the market exchange server (’107, 9:5-8; ’863, 9:6-9; ’930, 10:54-57); and (d) 

concluding a settlement of the transaction in accordance with market conditions set by the trader 

(’107, 9:10-13; ’863, 9:10-13; ’930, 10:47-53 and 10:58-60).

To the extent that there are stylistic differences and narrowing limitations in the various 

independent and dependent claims, they do not reach a degree of legal distinctiveness such that 

Intercurrency would be deprived “of an adequate day in court.” PPS Data, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 

1033. Intercurrency’s attempts to distinguish the ’930 and ’863 patents from representative ’107

patent fall short. See Compl. ¶ 22. First, Intercurrency fails to explain how the purportedly distinct 

limitations of claim 12 of the ’930 patent (“wherein the trading server causes a display of a market 

value...;” “wherein costs and fees in the settlement...”) and claim 1 of the ’863 patent (“coupling 

a trading server...”) are material to the eligibility analysis. See PPS Data, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1036

(plaintiff must identify limitations and explain materiality to the eligibility inquiry to defeat 

representativeness claim). Second, the limitations of the ’930 and ’863 patents are not at all 

distinct—they are merely minor rephrasing of claim limitations from the ’107 patent. Compare 

e.g., ’930 claim 12 (“display[ing] of a market value of the asset in second currency in reference to 

a setting of the second currency by the trader”) with ’107 claim 1 (“receiving...preferred currency 

from a trader...causing...computer to display...asset...in preferred currency while the asset is 

being traded in a market currency”);’863 claim 1 (“coupling a trading server to one or more 

currency exchange servers and one or more market exchange servers”) with ’107 claim 1 

(“providing a trading server coupled to one or more currency exchange servers and one or more 

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market exchange servers”). Indeed, Intercurrency’s infringement allegations refer to specific ’107 

patent claim limitations (see Compl. ¶ 49), but not to specific ’930 and ’863 claim limitations (see

Compl. ¶¶ 65, 81)—an implicit acknowledgment that the ’107 patent is fully representative of the 

claims of the ’930 and ’863 patents. Any differences between the patents are too slight to render 

the claims patentably distinct for purposes of this analysis.

C. During Prosecution of the ’107 Patent, Patentee Relied Upon the “Important” 

Parts of the Invention to Overcome Section 101 Rejections

During the long prosecution of the ’107 patent, which took place from 2007 to 2018, the 

claims were repeatedly rejected as ineligible under Section 101. Exs. D-I. In response, patentee 

classified the claims and set forth the “important” features of the invention.

For example, in its January 13, 2015 response, patentee argued “that Claims 1-18 are 

directed to a method...for trading an asset in a preferred currency [] with a prevailing exchange 

rate.” Ex. E at 14. Then, in its August 13, 2015 response, patentee argued that “Claims 1-36 are 

directed to facilitating traders in overseas trade, e.g., US securities priced in US dollars in their 

local currency with a prevailing exchange rate at a minimum cost to the trader.” Ex. F at 20. There, 

patentee conceded that the claims realize a “collaborated operation that happens to be related to a 

finance-related transaction,” but argued that the claims were non-abstract because the “operations 

involve data distribution, data gathering, data analysis/comparison, data display and data 

transformation.” Id. See also Ex. G at 13 (“The area of the instant application is indeed related to 

an economic practice but can only be accomplished with uniquely combined computing 

technologies.”). But by the time it submitted its May 24, 2017 response, the patentee had conceded 

the abstract nature of the claims: “The Applicant does not intend to argue on the assumption by 

the Examiner under the Mayo Test Part 1. Therefore, the claim appears directed to an abstract idea 

(Step 2A: YES).” Ex. H at 17.

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In its May 24, 2017 and January 20, 2018 responses, the patentee also identified what it 

considered to be “[o]ne of the important features” of the invention: “how and when the prevailing 

exchange rate is derived.” Ex. H at 17; see also Ex. I at 15 (stating that “one of the important 

features...is the specially designed mechanism to derive a prevailing exchange rate from all 

exchange rates obtained from one or more currency exchange servers”). The goal of the invention, 

according to patentee’s January 20, 2018 response is “to minimize possible uncertainty from 

currency exchanges that may considerably affect the price, profit or loss when a transaction related 

to the asset takes place.” Ex. I at 15. In arguing that the alleged invention is technological, patentee 

relied expressly “on the speed of processing that can only be afforded by sophisticated computing 

systems over human methods.” Id. Finally, relying on the Federal Circuit’s nonprecedential 

decision in Trading Technologies v. CGQ, the patentee argued that the invention here is “a 

Graphical-User-Interface design that helps a trader buy and sell a stock with certainty even the 

[sic] currency exchange rates fluctuate rapidly.” Id. at 16.

Likewise, in the subsequent prosecution of the ’930 patent, patentee argued the claims are 

nonabstract because computer-implemented limitations requiring displaying and calculating costs 

and fees based on the prevailing currency exchange rate “cannot practically be performed in the 

human mind.” Ex. L at 11. Patentee again focused on the timing of the currency exchange 

calculation as the alleged improvement over the prior art, not any technological improvement:

“The second prevailing exchange rate is calculated just before an transaction takes 

place based on the unique architecture to integrate ‘an abstract idea’ into a practical 

application in which a trader can be certain how much he/she pays for the 

transaction regardless how the exchange rate fluctuates (vs. a prior art system in the 

which a trader waits till the end of the day for the exchange rate, which may result 

in significant fluctuation in the cost and fees).”

Id. The ’930 claims were subsequently allowed without further rejection.

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Section 101 was not addressed during the prosecution of the ’863 patent, but the claims 

there were initially rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting over 

the ’107 patent claims because the Examiner determined they “are not patentably distinct” from 

the patent application’s claims. Ex. J at 3. The ’863 patent was subsequently allowed after the 

patentee filed a terminal disclaimer. Ex. K.

D. Alice Step One: The Claims Are Impermissibly Abstract

The claims of the Asserted Patents are directed to an abstract idea—trading an asset in a 

preferred currency, and in particular, to performing a currency exchange at the time of transaction 

for a security transaction—and not a technological solution to a technical problem. As the 

specification explains, “[a]t the time of buying or selling the stocks, as well as during the whole 

period the investor held the stocks, the investor had no certain knowledge of what profit or loss he 

was going to get.” ’107, 1:53-57. Thus, “[t]here is a great need for an improved system which 

performs currency conversion at a transactional level so that a trader or investor knows exactly 

what profit or loss may occur with a transaction.” Id. at 1:61-66.

During prosecution, Intercurrency conceded that the claims are directed to economic 

activity and, in particular, to “trading an asset in a preferred currency.” Ex. E at 14; see also Ex. F

at 20 (claims “directed to facilitating traders in overseas trade...in their local currency”). Likewise, 

when identifying the important aspects and alleged novelty of the invention, Intercurrency argued 

to the Patent Office that “[o]ne of the important features in Claim 1 as amended is how and when

the prevailing exchange rate is derived.” Ex. H at 17; Ex. I at 14-15 (“one of the important features 

or limitations...is the specially designed mechanism to derive a prevailing exchange rate from all 

exchange rates obtained from one or more currency exchange servers”); Ex. L at 11. (“second 

prevailing exchange rate is calculated just before an transaction takes place” in contrast to “a prior 

art system in the which a trader waits till the end of the day for the exchange rate”). While 

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Intercurrency eventually secured allowance of the claims by arguing that the invention is “a 

Graphical-User-Interface design that helps a trader buy and sell a stock with certainty,” Ex. I at 

16, this too relies entirely on the resultant business benefits—providing certainty in a transaction—

not any technological improvement to any underlying platform. But regardless of whether the 

claims are directed to (1) currency exchange or (2) “a Graphical-User-Interface design,” the claims 

are impermissibly abstract for multiple independent reasons.

1. Fundamental Economic Concepts Are Ineligible

The Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and courts in this district have consistently and 

repeatedly confirmed that fundamental economic concepts—such as trading an asset in a preferred 

currency—are, without more, patent ineligible. For example, in Alice, the Supreme Court 

invalidated computer-implemented claims directed to “the concept of intermediated settlement 

[which] is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” Alice, 

573 U.S. at 219. Likewise, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court found the concept of hedging 

risk patent ineligible. 561 U.S. at 611. The Federal Circuit has addressed economic concepts in 

multiple cases, each time finding the patents ineligible even when reciting computer hardware and 

computer-implemented steps because “the ‘investment’ character of this information simply 

invokes a separate category of abstract ideas involved in Alice and many of our cases—‘the 

creation and manipulation of legal obligations such as contracts involved in fundamental economic 

practices.’” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (collecting 

cases); see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362-63 (finding concept of “‘offer based 

pricing’...similar to other ‘fundamental economic concepts’ found to be abstract ideas by the 

Supreme Court” and the Federal Circuit).

Similarly, this Court has invalidated claims directed to cash management because “[l]ike 

the alleged innovation in the InvestPic patent...the purported innovation in ‘cash 

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management’...concerns the abstract idea of fundamental economic and accounting activities 

itself, which is not sufficient to confer eligibility.” Island Intellectual Property LLC v. TD 

Ameritrade, Inc., 2:21-CV-00273, 2022 WL 17080738, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2022). And 

Judge Bryson, sitting by designation in this judicial district, confirmed the ineligibility of claims 

directed to “the unpatentable concept of currency exchange.” Loyalty Conversion, 66 F. Supp. 3d 

at 837 (“[C]lose examination of the asserted claims shows that they are largely functional in nature 

and do little more than set forth the general concept of currency exchange...and then announce the 

use of ‘one or more’ computers to obtain various efficiencies in the process....”). Id. at 837-38.

Even assuming that it was novel and non-obvious to calculate a prevailing exchange rate 

at the time of a transaction using all exchange rates obtained from one or more currency exchange 

servers, this cannot save the claims from abstraction. As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[n]o 

matter how much of an advance in the finance field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in 

the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application 

realm. An advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting.” SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1163 (finding 

claims ineligible when “[t]heir subject is nothing but a series of mathematical calculations based 

on selected information and the presentation of the results of those calculations”). Indeed, “[w]here 

a claim’s ‘essential advance’ is abstract, a novel method of performing that advance ‘does not 

avoid the problem of abstractness.’” Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x

882, 892 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (non-precedential); see also In re Greenstein, 774 F. App’x 661, 665 

(Fed. Cir. 2019) (non-precedential) (rejecting argument that “confuses eligibility with novelty”

and explaining that “the alleged novelty of Greenstein‘s investment strategy—an abstract idea—

is immaterial to the claims’ eligibility”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 

, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”). Accordingly, 

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Intercurrency’s claims are indisputably directed to abstract economic concepts.

2. Intercurrency’s Prosecution-Based “Graphical User Interface”

Argument Does Not Render the Claims Non-Abstract

Re-packaging the claims as directed to a “Graphical-User-Interface design” does not make 

the claims non-abstract and technological. Indeed, the Federal Circuit addressed this argument 

directly in two precedential decisions, finding similar claims patent-ineligible. In Trading 

Technologies International Inc. v. IBG LLC (“IBG I”), the Federal Circuit affirmed the ineligibility 

under Section 101 of claims directed “a graphical user interface (“GUI”) for electronic trading.”

921 F.3d 1084, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2019). There, the Federal Circuit “[saw] no technological invention 

in this software method for trading [because t]he claims require receiving bid and offer information 

from an electronic exchange, displaying such information...and sending an order to the electronic 

exchange based on a user input.” Id. at 1089. The Federal Circuit rejected patentability arguments 

that the patents “addressed problems related to speed, efficiency, and usability” because “[t]his 

invention makes the trader faster and more efficient, not the computer. This is not a technical 

solution to a technical problem.” Id. at 1089-90. Here, too, “the claims...do not improve the 

functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently, or solve any technological problem.

Instead, they recite a purportedly new arrangement of generic information that assists traders in 

processing information more quickly.” Id. at 1093.

Similarly, in IBG II, the Federal Circuit addressed related patents that patentee argued were 

not abstract “because they provide a particular graphical user interface that improves usability, 

visualization, and efficiency.” IBG II, 921 F.3d at 1384. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument 

as well because “[t]he claims are focused on providing information to traders in a way that helps 

them process information more quickly...not on improving computers or technology.” Id. Like 

Electric Power, the purported advance “is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a 

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specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive 

technology for performing those functions.” Id. at 1384-85 (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d 

at 1354).

The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in both IBG I and IBG II confirms that the asserted claims 

are unpatentable. Like the claims at issue in those cases, the claims here merely recite functional 

limitations for receiving and transmitting information about assets and currencies, calculating 

(analyzing) information of a specified content, and displaying the results of those calculations. See

§ III.B, supra. As Intercurrency concedes, the purported improvement over the prior art is “how 

and when” those calculations are performed (Ex. H at 17; see also Ex. I at 14-15; Ex. L at 11), not 

on any improvement to the underlying servers or client computers that perform those operations.

Indeed, IBG II makes clear that “merely providing a trader with new or different information in an 

existing trading screen is not a technical solution to a technical problem. Instead, it focuses on 

improving the trader, not the functioning of the computer.” IBG II, 921 F.3d at 1383. The claims 

here are no different.

The non-precedential Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc. case relied on 

by Intercurrency during prosecution of the ’107 patent is non-binding (and distinguishable). See

Ex. I at 16;2 Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential). Indeed, the later IBG I court expressly rejected the argument that it was bound by 

2 Contrary to Intercurrency’s erroneous assertion in the Complaint, it is irrelevant whether “any 

arguments relating to eligibility...are necessarily merely cumulative with those already 

considered, and rejected, by the Patent Examiners in allowing the Patents-in-Suit.” Compl. ¶ 30. 

As the Federal Circuit has explained, “courts are not required to defer to Patent Office 

determinations as to eligibility,” even in the face of “evidence that the Patent Office concluded, 

in allowing the [challenged] patent, that the claimed inventions improve...device technology 

itself.” Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 705 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing OIP 

Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362 (“Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an issue of law reviewed de 

novo.”)).

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the non-precedential Trading Techs. decision. IBG I, 921 F.3d at 1095 (“TT argues that because 

non-precedential decisions of this court held that other TT patents...claimed eligible subject 

matter, we should too. We are not bound by non-precedential decisions at all, much less ones to 

different patents, different specifications, or different claims.”). But more fundamentally, CGQ is 

inapposite. There, the claims required “a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with 

a prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user interface’s structure.” CGQ, 675 

F. App’x at 1004 (emphasis added). Here, there is no such required structure for the graphical user 

interface, nor is there any claimed functionality related to any such structure. Accordingly, like the 

claims in IBG I and IBG II, the claims of the Asserted Patents here recite nothing more than an 

abstract idea designed to improve traders and not any underlying technology.

Finally, the claims here use “essentially result-focused, functional...claim language 

[which] has been a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in the area of 

using generic computer and network technology.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356. Because 

the claims here do not even purport to specify how any of its functional results are achieved (i.e., 

how to “determine[]” or “derive[]” a prevailing exchange rate or how to “dynamically change[]”

the displayed costs and fees), they cannot escape abstraction. Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., 

Inc., 815 F. App’x 529, 533 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (non-precedential) (“The patent has to describe how 

to solve the problem in a manner that encompasses something more than the ‘principle in the 

abstract.’”); cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings, 986 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[T]he 

claims provide no useful guidance as to how this purported function is achieved and thus cannot 

be directed to a technological solution.”) (emphasis added); Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco 

Holdings, 967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Even the specification lacks detail on how to accomplish 

many of the claimed limitations, including the requirement that “the trading server is configured 

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to calculate the prevailing exchange rate from all exchange rates obtained from the one or more 

currency exchange servers.” ’107, 9:14-16. Rather, as taught in the specification, “a prevailing 

exchange rate is obtained at 306 from a currency exchange.” ’107, 5:48-49.

Aside from concerns surrounding written description and enablement, this lack of detail is 

particularly troubling in the Section 101 context given Intercurrency’s prosecution arguments that 

“the trading server recited in Claim 1 must be specifically programmed to work with a currency 

exchange server and a market exchange server [and] must be configured to perform a series of 

data manipulation operations to obtain a prevailing exchange rate from the currency exchange 

server before the transaction takes place.” Ex. E at 15. Thus, even under Intercurrency’s own views 

of the technology, because no claim recites details on the “series of data manipulation operations”

necessary to derive a prevailing exchange rate, the claims do not explain how to solve any problem 

“in a manner that encompasses something more than the ‘principle in the abstract.’” Dropbox, 815 

F. App’x at 533. The claims of all three Asserted Patents fail at Alice Step One.

E. Alice Step Two: There Is No Inventive Concept in the Claims Beyond the 

Abstract Idea Itself

The claims of the Asserted Patents require, at most, conventional hardware—a “client 

computer,” a “trading server,” one or more “market exchange servers,” and one or more “currency 

exchange servers”—for carrying out the abstract idea of currency exchange at the time of a 

transaction. See, e.g., ’107, 8:45-9:27. Indeed, the specification admits that these conventional 

components are well-known in the industry for use in financial transactions: “server 206 represents 

a bank [or] an exchange agency”; “server 208 represents a brokerage (e.g., Scottrade) to facilitate 

a transaction decided by a trader”; and “server 210 represents an asset or market exchange (e.g., 

NYSE), where an asset is caused to change hands.” Id. at 4:66-5:6. Likewise, the “client machine 

may include...any form of desktop or laptop or server computer, handheld wireless device, or 

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mobile phone.” Id. at 4:50-53. As Alice itself makes clear, “mere recitation of a generic computer 

cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. 

at 223.

Indeed, the patentee conceded during prosecution that “the additional features, when 

viewed individually, are merely ‘generic computer and networking components performing 

generic computer and networking functions.’” Ex. H at 17-18. Instead, the patentee argued that the 

claims recite an inventive concept in the combination of elements requiring that “the prevailing 

exchange rate is derived or calculated from all exchange rates...at a specific location (i.e., the 

trading server), remote from the end-user[and] the timing of the operation (i.e., when the asset is 

displayed and right before the transaction takes place) confines an abstract idea to a particular and 

practical application of the abstract idea.” Id. at 18. In its final response to the Patent Office, the 

patentee relied on “the fact that there are no more 35 USC 102 or 103 rejections again [sic] the 

claims” to argue that “[t]his means the claims as a whole amounts to significantly more than the 

abstract idea plus the details to implement the abstract idea on one or more generic computers.”

Ex. I at 16. But these patentability arguments fail as a matter of law.

As the Federal Circuit made clear in SAP:

We may assume that the techniques claimed are “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or 

even brilliant,” but that is not enough for eligibility. Nor is it enough for subjectmatter eligibility that claimed techniques be novel and nonobvious in light of prior 

art, passing muster under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.... The claims here are 

ineligible because their innovation is an innovation in ineligible subject matter. 

Their subject is nothing but a series of mathematical calculations based on selected 

information and the presentation of the results of those calculations.... No matter 

how much of an advance in the finance field the claims recite, the advance lies 

entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the 

non-abstract application realm. An advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting.

SAP, 898 F.3d at 1162 (internal citations omitted); Synopsys, Inc., 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim 

for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101 inventive concept is thus 

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distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty.”). Accordingly, Intercurrency’s arguments fall short 

because the alleged innovations they identify—“how and when” a prevailing exchange rate is 

calculated—remain abstract, and the claims therefore lack any inventive concept.

Likewise, Intercurrency cannot rely on the efficiency of a computer to support an inventive 

concept. As this Court confirmed, “‘the alleged efficiency of the method through 

computerization,’...is not enough to confer patent eligibility.” Miller Mendel, 598 F. Supp. 3d at

498 (quoting SkillSurvey, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (“It is inarguable that using computer technology 

would necessarily make the claimed method more efficient. However, adding efficiency to a longstanding process through computerization also does not render an abstract idea patentable.”)).

“[T]he problem being solved by the use of computer technology does not solve a specific 

computing problem.” Id.

Similarly, limitations requiring that the display of “all costs and fees are dynamically 

changed in accordance with the prevailing exchange rate” (e.g., ’107, 8:65-67) also cannot provide 

an inventive concept to save the claims from abstractness. For example, in IBM Corp. v. Zillow 

Group, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that “dynamically altering visual characteristics” of a 

computer display is not inventive, because “that dynamic re-layering or rematching could also be 

performed by hand, though more slowly.” 50 F.4th 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “Any of the 

patent’s improved efficiency comes not from an improvement in the computer but from applying 

the claimed abstract idea to a computer display.” Id.

Finally, claim construction is unnecessary to resolve this issue because Intercurrency 

cannot “articulate how adoption of the construction [for any proposed claim term] would 

materially impact the analysis at step one (and/or at step two).” Sanderling, 65 F.4th at 704 (“If 

claims are directed to ineligible (or eligible) subject matter under all plausible constructions, then 

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the court need not engage in claim construction before resolving a Section 101 motion.”).

IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE 

PLAUSIBLE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR 

INFRINGEMENT

In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the Complaint for failure to plead “factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [State Street] is liable for the 

misconduct alleged,” based on “more than a sheer possibility that [State Street] has acted 

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In particular, 

Intercurrency’s Complaint fails to include sufficient factual allegations that reasonably suggest 

State Street meets any of the allegedly important features identified by Intercurrency as supporting 

the alleged eligibility of the Asserted Patents.

As this Court has noted, for claims “directed to ‘hardware and software involved in an 

electronic transaction...system,’” Fractus, 2021 WL 2483155, at *2, a Complaint must include 

more than the bare bones allegations found sufficient by the Federal Circuit in the Disc Disease

case, Chapterhouse, 2018 WL 6981828, at *2. This Court’s rulings in Chapterhouse (finding 

Complaint deficient) and Fractus (finding Complaint sufficient) are instructive. In Chapterhouse, 

this Court dismissed several counts of direct infringement for patents directed to “hardware and 

software involved in an electronic transaction receipt system” because the plaintiff failed to include 

sufficient factual allegations. 2018 WL 6981828, at *2. While the complaint there listed an 

exemplary claim from each patent and included supporting screenshots of the defendant’s software 

product, it did not include descriptive paragraphs explaining those screenshots or connecting them 

to the claim language. Id. In contrast, in Fractus, the Complaint “describe[d] the accused products 

in a manner that corresponds [to] the asserted claims.” 2021 WL 2483155, at *3. Moreover, the 

Complaint in Fractus “include[d] both images of the accused structures and descriptive 

paragraphs.” Id. Nonetheless, despite finding “Fractus’s allegations...sufficient as a technical 

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matter, the Court [did] share some of TCL’s concerns,” recognizing that inventions that are 

“necessarily abstract and inherently intangible as the software-based system claims in 

Chapterhouse” might require a higher pleading standard than was required for Fractus. Id.

Here, Intercurrency’s allegations do not meet even the “somewhat thin” standard found 

sufficient in Fractus, let alone the heightened standard called for in Chapterhouse. The Complaint 

includes only one generic paragraph identifying the “Charles Rivers River Investment 

Management Solution trading platforms and systems” without any explanation for why this

accused instrumentality allegedly infringes any asserted claim of the Asserted Patents. Compl. 

¶ 44. Indeed, Paragraph 49 contains a rote recitation of Claim 1 of the ’107 patent but does not 

include any specifics on how State Street has infringed those elements. Compl. ¶ 49. While 

Intercurrency includes screenshots, it fails to provide any description of how those screenshots 

relate in any way to the patent claims Intercurrency contends are infringed. Even the marketing 

materials Intercurrency attaches to their Complaint do not contain the claim limitations broadly 

alleged in Paragraph 49. There is no mention of trading servers, currency exchange servers, or 

market exchange servers; no currency preferences; nor any indication of when or how often 

exchange rates are calculated. Intercurrency’s included screenshots, without supporting factual 

allegations that arise to more than mere conclusory statements, fail to meet the Iqbal/Twombly

pleading standard. See Chapterhouse, 2018 WL 6981828, at *2.

Intercurrency’s silence is particularly problematic given the Federal Circuit instruction to 

consider, inter alia, “the materiality of any given element to practicing the asserted claim(s)” in 

determining the appropriate level of detail required. Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1353. In applying this 

“materiality” inquiry to particular limitations, courts consider whether “the relevant prosecution 

history and the [c]omplaint suggest that these limitations capture the point of novelty.” Vervain, 

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LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 6:21-CV-00487, 2022 WL 23469, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2022).

This is important because, without allegations directed to the points of novelty used to traverse the 

prior art during prosecution, the Complaint “begs the ‘obvious alternative explanation’ that the 

accused infringer is merely practicing the prior art.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).

Here, Intercurrency argued during prosecution that “one of the important features in Claim 

1 [of the ’107 patent] is how and when the prevailing exchange rate is derived. Claim 1 recites 

explicitly that the prevailing exchange rate is derived from all exchange rates obtained from the 

one or more currency exchange servers [and] is calculated again from all exchange rates...right 

before the transaction takes place.” Ex. H at 17. These features—according to Intercurrency 

itself—ensure that the claims “do[] not pose a risk tying up the alleged abstract idea nor preempting others from using the alleged abstract idea.” Ex. G at 16. Likewise, Intercurrency’s 

amendments required that the displayed “costs and fees are dynamically changed in accordance 

with the prevailing exchange rate constantly updated, a value of the asset being displayed changes 

as the exchange rate changes, even when a market value of the asset remains unchanged.” Ex. I at 

5. According to Intercurrency, “[i]n view of the above amendments...it is believed that the pending 

Claims 1-36 shall be in condition for allowance over the cited references.” Id. at 17. Given the 

apparent importance of these features during prosecution and Intercurrency’s assurances that the 

claims do not pre-empt others from engaging in foreign exchange transactions, Intercurrency has 

no excuse for its deficient allegations. 

V. VENUE IS IMPROPER IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

To the extent that Intercurrency’s Complaint alleges anything at all, these allegations are 

not related to the Eastern District of Texas. In patent infringement cases, venue is only proper “in 

the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 

infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Domestic 

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corporations—like each of the Defendants (collectively, “State Street”)—reside only in its state of 

incorporation. See TC Heartland, 581 U.S. 258 at 269. There is no dispute that State Street is 

incorporated in Massachusetts, thus the validity of Intercurrency’s venue contentions rely on 

proving that State Street has a “regular and established place of business” in the Eastern District 

of Texas, which Intercurrency cannot do. See Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 17 F.4th 1111, 

1119 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (plaintiff has burden of establishing proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400).

As the Federal Circuit explained in In re Cray Inc., a “regular and established place of 

business” for venue purposes requires “(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) [that 

is] a regular and established place of business; and (3) [is] the place of the defendant.” 871 F.3d 

1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Without satisfying each of these requirements, venue is “improper 

under § 1400(b).” Id. Intercurrency cannot prove any of these requirements—let alone all three—

rendering venue in the Eastern District of Texas improper.

A. State Street Has No Physical Place in the Eastern District

Intercurrency must show that State Street has a “building or a part of a building set apart 

for any purpose” from which business is conducted. In re Cray Inc. at 1362. This place cannot be 

virtual or established solely through electronic communications, it must be a “physical, 

geographical location in the district from which the business of the defendant is carried out.” Id.

State Street has no such location in the District. State Street is both incorporated and headquartered 

in Massachusetts. And while State Street has office locations in several cities within the United 

States, there is no office located within the District. See Declaration of Jeremy Kream (“Kream 

Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-11.

It is not enough that an employee of a defendant is located in a district or conducted 

business therein, the defendant themselves must establish the place where the employee worked 

to meet this requirement. In re Cray Inc. at 1366. An employee’s presence in the district by itself, 

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without additional indicia, is not sufficient to establish the defendant’s “physical place” within the 

district. Compare In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (venue proper where 

sales representatives in district stored employer’s products in home for sales meetings in district) 

with Celgene Corp., 17 F.4th at 1123 (roster of employees and LinkedIn profiles mentioning 

district insufficient to establish physical location of defendant in district).

Here, Intercurrency does not allege sufficient facts to establish a physical location of State 

Street within the District. Contrary to Intercurrency’s unsupported allegations (see Compl. ¶ 12), 

State Street does not own or operate data servers in the Eastern District of Texas. Kream Decl., 

¶¶ 7, 9, 11. And State Street’s remote employees currently residing in the Eastern District of Texas 

are not sufficient to establish a physical location for State Street within the District. See § V.B, 

infra. Intercurrency’s vague and conclusory assertions that State Street employees “possess 

inventory” and “sample products” (Compl. ¶ 16) appear designed to manufacture venue in the 

theoretical, but Defendants are at a loss to understand to what “inventory” and “sample products” 

Intercurrency refers as these things do not exist in State Street’s business of banking and finance.

Regardless, State Street employees residing within the District are not required to and do not hold 

product inventory in their homes, nor do they deliver sample products to customers in the District.

Kream Decl., ¶ 16. Intercurrency likewise does not provide any factual evidence in support of its 

conclusory allegation that “Defendant has further solicited employees in public advertisements to 

cover the challenged venue area and preferred that those employees live in their assigned area.”

Compl. ¶ 17. Defendants are not aware of any such advertisements. Kream Decl., ¶ 17.

B. State Street Has No Regular and Established Place of Business Within the 

Eastern District

The second Cray factor requires that an employee is conducting business at the defendant’s 

“physical, geographical location” within the district. In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 

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(Fed. Cir. 2020). Again, it is not enough that some employees are present in the district; their 

presence must be at the defendant’s regular and established place of business, conducting the 

defendant’s business. Id. In this context, courts have interpreted “established” to mean “stable” 

and not transient in nature. See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. Where an employee can move their 

home out of the district on their own accord and with no contentions from the defendant, this 

“cut[s] against the employee’s home being considered a place of business of the defendant.” Id.

State Street employees in the Eastern District of Texas are remote employee who work out 

of their homes of their own accord. Kream Decl., ¶ 12. These homes are not owned, operated, or 

rented by State Street. See id., ¶¶ 6, 8, 10, 12-15. The employees’ presence in the District is not a 

requirement of employment by State Street, and they are under no obligation to continue residency 

within the District to maintain employment by State Street. Id., ¶ 12. Intercurrency has offered no 

evidence or allegations sufficient to establish that State Street has a regular physical presence 

inside the homes of State Street’s remote employees residing in the Eastern District, nor are they 

able to. Thus, Intercurrency fails to prove the second Cray factor as State Street has no regular and 

established place of business within the Eastern District of Texas.

C. State Street Exerts No Control Over any “Place” in the Eastern District of 

Texas

The third Cray factor requires the plaintiff to show that the place of business used to 

establish venue is a place of the defendant. The Federal Circuit has outlined a number of factors 

relevant to this analysis including:

“(1) whether the defendant owns or leases the place, or exercises other attributes of 

possession or control over the place; (2) whether the defendant conditioned 

employment on an employee’s continued residence in the district or the storing of 

materials at a place in the district so that they can be distributed or sold from that 

place; (3) a defendant’s representations about that place, including advertisements; 

and (4) the nature and activity of the alleged place of business of the defendant in 

the district in comparison with that of other places of business of the defendant in 

other venues.” 

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DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS – Page 30

Celgene Corp., 17 F.4th at 1122 (quoting In re Cray, 871 F.3d, at 1363-64). Put simply, the place 

in the district must be a place “of the defendant, not solely a place of the defendant’s employee.”

In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1363. Any such place of business must be “established or ratified” by 

the defendant, an employee cannot do this on their own. Id.

The third Cray factor is particularly fatal to Intercurrency’s claim. Beyond a general 

assertion that State Street has employees in the District, Intercurrency has failed to allege any 

specifics sufficient to meet this factor. As noted above, Intercurrency has not identified any alleged 

“place” State Street has established as a regular place of business within the District. To the extent 

Intercurrency attempts to establish venue through State Street’s employees, Intercurrency fails to 

allege that State Street has exerted sufficient possession or control over employees’ homes to meet 

Cray’s place of business requirements. State Street does not advertise employees’ addresses in the 

District, nor do they hold these locations out as State Street business locations. See Kream Decl., 

¶¶ 6, 8, 10, 17. There is nothing to suggest that State Street has “established” or “ratified” their 

employees’ homes as places of business, nor do these homes represent typical State Street business 

locations. Indeed, any State Street employee residing in the Eastern District of Texas is free to 

move out of the District without affecting their employment status with State Street. Id., ¶¶ 12, 17.

Because State Street has no physical presence in the District and exerts no control over any aspect 

of their Eastern District employee’s homes as physical locations for regular State Street business, 

Intercurrency cannot point to State Street employees as the basis for establishing venue within the 

Eastern District of Texas.

Without a “place of the defendant” located within the Eastern District, Intercurrency’s 

Complaint fails on improper venue grounds.

VI. CONCLUSION

For at least these reasons, the Court should dismiss Intercurrency’s Complaint.

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DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS – Page 31

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: May 13, 2024 /s/ Melissa R. Smith

Kevin J. Post 

(NY Bar No. 4382214)

(Eastern District of Texas Member)

ROPES & GRAY LLP

1211 Avenue of the AmericasNew 

York, NY 10036

Telephone: (212) 596-9000

Facsimile: (212) 596-9090

kevin.post@ropesgray.com

Scott S. Taylor

(MA Bar No 677812)

(Eastern District of Texas Member)

ROPES & GRAY LLP

Prudential Tower

800 Boylston St.

Boston, MA 02199

scott.taylor@ropesgray.com

Melissa R. Smith

State Bar No. 24001351

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP

303 South Washington Avenue

Marshall, Texas 75670

Tel: (903) 934-8450

Fax: (903) 934-9257

melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com

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DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS – Page 32

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT’S

35 U.S.C. § 101 MOTION PRACTICE ORDER 

The parties disagree on whether prior claim construction is not needed to inform the 

Court’s analysis as to patentability.

/s/ Melissa R. Smith

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to 

electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system 

per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) on this 13 day of May 2024.

/s/ Melissa R. Smith

Case 2:24-cv-00079-JRG Document 20 Filed 05/14/24 Page 38 of 38 PageID #: 490