[Cite as Hason USA Corp. v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2016-Ohio-8273.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Hason USA Corporation, : 

 Appellant-Appellant, : 

 No. 16AP-150 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 15CV-10165)

Director, Ohio Department of Job and : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

Family Services, 

 : 

 Appellee-Appellee. 

 : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 20, 2016 

 

On brief: Lundrigan Law Group Co, LPA, W. Kelly 

Lundrigan, and Nicole M. Lundrigan, for appellant. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Robin A. 

Jarvis, for appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Hason USA Corporation ("Hason"), appeals a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that affirmed the decision of the Unemployment 

Compensation Review Commission ("commission") that the director of the Ohio 

Department of Job and Family Services ("director") lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the 

unemployment contribution rate applicable to Hason for 2014 and 2015. For the 

following reasons, we reverse that judgment and remand this matter to the trial court so 

that it may reverse the commission's decision and order the director to consider the 

merits of Hason's application for reconsideration. 
No. 16AP-150 2 

{¶ 2} In November 2014, Hason received from appellee, the Ohio Department of 

Job and Family Services ("ODJFS"), a document entitled "Ohio Unemployment Tax 

Notification, Contribution Rate Determination, Calendar Year 2015." That document 

stated that Hason's unemployment contribution rate for 2015 was 2.7 percent.1

{¶ 3} On February 14, 2015, ODJFS issued a determination that altered Hason's 

unemployment contribution rate for 2015 (hereinafter "the revised determination"). The 

revised determination stated that ODJFS had concluded that Hason was a successor in 

interest to Odom Industries, Inc. ("Odom"), and it assigned Odom's unemployment 

contribution rate to Hason. Thus, Hason's unemployment contribution rate for 2015 

increased from 2.7 percent to 8.2 percent. 

{¶ 4} According to Jacques Dalphond, Hason's general manager, Hason did not 

know about the revised determination until April 23, 2015. On that date, a Hason 

employee spoke on the telephone with an ODJFS representative, who informed the Hason 

employee of the revised determination. At Hason's request, ODJFS forwarded a copy of 

the revised determination to Hason. 

{¶ 5} On May 13, 2015, Hason applied to the director for reconsideration of the 

revised determination. In a decision issued May 21, 2015, the director concluded that she 

lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the revised determination because Hason failed to apply 

for reconsideration within 30 days of February 14, 2015, the date that ODJFS purportedly 

emailed notice of the revised determination to Hason. 

{¶ 6} Hason appealed the director's May 21, 2015 decision to the commission. 

The commission directed a hearing officer to conduct a hearing. At that hearing, 

Dalphond testified and ODJFS submitted documentary evidence. 

{¶ 7} On October 21, 2015, the commission issued a decision affirming the 

director's decision. The commission found that ODJFS attached the revised 

determination to an email that ODJFS sent to Hason on February 14, 2015 and, 

consequently, the 30-day period R.C. 4141.26(D)(2) provided for seeking reconsideration 

began running on February 14, 2015. Since Hason did not seek reconsideration until after 

 

1 Employers owe contributions to the unemployment compensation fund. The amount an employer must 

pay depends upon the contribution rate assigned by the director. R.C. 4141.24 and 4141.25. 
No. 16AP-150 3 

the 30-day window closed, the commission concluded that the director lacked jurisdiction 

to reconsider the revised determination. 

{¶ 8} Hason appealed the commission's October 21, 2015 decision to the trial 

court. Hason moved to supplement the administrative record with the attachments to an 

exhibit the hearing officer had admitted into the administrative record. In a judgment 

entered February 12, 2016, the trial court denied Hason's motion to supplement and 

affirmed the commission's decision. 

{¶ 9} Hason now appeals the February 12, 2016 judgment to this court, and it 

assigns the following errors: 

[1.] The Trial Court erred in affirming the Unemployment 

Compensation Review Commission's ("UCRC") conclusion 

that Appellant Hason USA Corp. did not file a timely request 

for reconsideration of the Ohio Unemployment Tax 

Notification Determination of Employer's Liability and 

Contribution Rate Determination, with a mailing date listed 

on the document of February 14, 2015 (the "New 

Determination"), which was an attempt to amend the original 

Ohio Unemployment Tax Notification Contribution Rate 

Determination Calendar Year 2015, with a mailing date of 

November 9, 2014 which had already become final (the 

"Original Determination"). 

[2.] The Trial Court erred in denying Appellant Hason USA 

Corp.'s Motion to Supplement the Record where the 

administrative record submitted by the Commission to the 

Trial Court was incomplete on its face, and failed to include all 

evidence relevant to the appeal. 

{¶ 10} By its first assignment of error, Hason argues that the trial court erred in 

affirming the commission's decision that the director lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the 

revised determination. We agree. 

{¶ 11} An administrative body created by the General Assembly has only those 

powers expressly delegated by statute and must operate within any limitations imposed 

by statute. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 

2013-Ohio-224, ¶ 13; Shell v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd., 105 Ohio St.3d 420, 

2005-Ohio-2423, ¶ 32. Thus, when the General Assembly grants an administrative body 

the authority to hear appeals, the statutory language determines the parameters of the 

administrative body's jurisdiction. Chesapeake Exploration at ¶ 13; Cordial v. Ohio Dept. 
No. 16AP-150 4 

of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-473, 2006-Ohio-2533, ¶ 20. If that statutory 

language requires the filing of an administrative appeal within a specified time period, the 

party seeking to appeal must comply with that requirement to invoke the jurisdiction of 

the administrative body. Clemons v. Ohio State Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. 

No. 03AP-976, 2004-Ohio-6251, ¶ 12; Moffett v. Salem City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 7th 

Dist. No. 2003 CO 7, 2003-Ohio-7007, ¶ 33. Whether an administrative body possessed 

jurisdiction to hear a matter is an issue of law, which appellate courts review de novo. 

Abraitis v. Testa, 137 Ohio St.3d 285, 2013-Ohio-4725, ¶ 17; Akron v. Ohio Dept. of Ins., 

10th Dist. No. 13AP-473, 2014-Ohio-96, ¶ 21; Kingsley v. Ohio State Personnel Bd. of 

Rev., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-875, 2011-Ohio-2227, ¶ 27. 

{¶ 12} Pursuant to R.C. 4141.26(D)(2), an unemployment contribution rate 

determination becomes binding on the employer unless "[w]ithin thirty days after the 

mailing of notice of the employer's rate or a revision of it to the employer's last known 

address or, in the absence of mailing of such notice, within thirty days after the delivery of 

such notice, the employer files an application with the director for reconsideration." 

Thus, for the director to acquire jurisdiction to reconsider a rate determination, the 

employer must apply for reconsideration within 30 days after the mailing of a notice of 

the rate determination or, if no mailing occurred, the delivery of a notice of the rate 

determination. 

{¶ 13} An administrative body "must strictly comply with the procedural 

requirements governing the issuance of its decision before the appeal deadline begins to 

run." Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio2907, ¶ 21. When those procedural requirements include the mailing of an administrative 

decision, the administrative body bears the burden of establishing that the decision was 

mailed and the actual date of mailing. Procter v. Giles, 61 Ohio St.2d 211, 213 (1980). A 

notation on an administrative decision cannot, on its own, satisfy the administrative 

body's burden to prove the date of mailing. Id. 

{¶ 14} Here, ODJFS contends that the 30-day window for seeking reconsideration 

of the revised determination began on February 14, 2015, when ODJFS sent Hason an 

email to which ODJFS attached the revised determination. All parties agree that ODJFS 

transmitted an email to Hason on February 14, 2015. The parties disagree, however, 
No. 16AP-150 5 

regarding whether that email contained any notice of the revised determination. 

Pursuant to R.C. 4141.26(D)(2), the 30-day period for applying for reconsideration begins 

with "the mailing of notice of the employer's rate or a revision of it." Consequently, if the 

February 14, 2015 email did not include notice of the revised determination, then it did 

not trigger the beginning of the 30-day period. 

{¶ 15} Dalphond, Hason's general manager, provided the only testimony regarding 

the February 14, 2015 email. Dalphond stated that Hason searched its computer system 

for the February 14, 2015 email after ODJFS told Hason that it had sent Hason an email 

on that date with notice of the rate revision. Hason discovered an email, sent February 14, 

2015 at 3:36 a.m., from "NoReply@odjfs.state.oh.us" to Michael O'Keefe, a Hason 

accountant. Dalphond testified that the email stated only that Hason "ha[d] a new 

message from ODJFS" and included "a link that open[ed] to a general page of basically 

the home page of the [ODJFS] portal." (Tr. at 16.) According to Delphond, the email 

included no attachments. 

{¶ 16} Dalphond's testimony describes a document attached as Exhibit 1 to 

Hason's notice of appeal of the director's decision, filed with the commission on June 18, 

2015. Exhibit 1 is an email from "NoReply@odjfs.state.oh.us" to "Michael O'Keefe" sent 

February 14, 2015 at 3:36 a.m. regarding "a new message from ODJFS." In relevant part, 

Exhibit 1 reads, "A message has been sent to your online message box regarding your 

ODJFS Unemployment Compensation Tax account. Please visit our website at 

https://unemployment.ohio.gov/wp/wps/myportal to access your account and view your 

messages." Exhibit 1 contains no reference to any attachments. 

{¶ 17} In its appellee's brief, ODJFS completely ignores Exhibit 1 and Dalphond's 

testimony regarding it. ODJFS, instead, identifies a different document as the 

February 14, 2015 email that ODJFS sent Hason regarding the rate revision. In ODJFS' 

view, the email at issue is the second page of Exhibit A, which ODJFS introduced and the 

hearing officer admitted during the hearing before the commission.2 

{¶ 18} Exhibit A is a printout of a webpage found at a web address beginning 

"http://eric-int.odjfs.oh.us/wp/wps/myportal." The header on Exhibit A reads, "Message 

 

2 For ease of reference, we will hereinafter call the second page of Exhibit A merely "Exhibit A." 
No. 16AP-150 6 

Details Page." The message contained in Exhibit A was sent by "UCTAX" to "Hason USA 

Corp" on February 14, 2015 at 3:27 a.m. In relevant part, the message reads, "Attached to 

this message is correspondence regarding your ODJFS Unemployment Compensation 

Tax account." (Ex. A.) ODJFS asserts that the attached correspondence the message 

references is the revised determination.3 

{¶ 19} ODJFS presented no witness testimony to authenticate or explain the 

meaning of Exhibit A. Thus, we can only examine the text of Exhibit A itself to determine 

its significance. After reviewing that text, we conclude that Exhibit A is not an email, but a 

message that ODJFS posted to the "my portal" portion of its website. In Exhibit 1, ODJFS 

directed O'Keefe to "our website at https://unemployment.ohio.gov/wp/wps/myportal" 

to view a "new message from ODJFS." (Emphasis added.) Exhibit A is a printout of a 

webpage found at "http://eric-int.odjfs.oh.us/wp/wps/myportal." (Emphasis added.) 

Given the similarity in the two web addresses, we conclude that Exhibit A is the "new 

message from ODJFS" that O'Keefe would have seen had he logged into Hason's account 

on ODJFS' website. 

{¶ 20} In short, Exhibit 1 is an email sent from ODJFS to Hason, while Exhibit A is 

a posting on ODJFS' website. Because Exhibit A was never mailed to Hason—either by 

ordinary mail or email—it cannot qualify as a "mailing" under R.C. 4141.26(D)(2). 

{¶ 21} Having identified Exhibit 1 as the sole "mailing" to Hason, we must examine 

its content to determine whether it gave Hason notice of the revised determination. 

Notably, Exhibit 1 does not include the revised determination as an attachment, and it 

makes no mention of the rate revision. The email, instead, merely informs the recipient of 

a new message "regarding your ODJFS Unemployment Compensation Tax account." (Ex. 

1.) We find this generic description insufficient to notify Hason of a revision to its 

unemployment contribution rate. Therefore, ODJFS' dispatch of the February 14, 2015 

email does not constitute "the mailing of notice of the employer's rate or a revision of it." 

{¶ 22} Because the February 14, 2015 email failed to accomplish "the mailing of 

notice of the employer's rate or a revision of it," the period in which Hason had to apply 

 

3 For this assertion, ODJFS cites the revised determination itself. However, nothing in the text of the 

revised determination indicates that it is an attachment to Exhibit A. Moreover, nothing in the text of 

Exhibit A describes the contents of the attached correspondence. ODJFS' evidence, therefore, does not 

prove ODJFS' assertion. 
No. 16AP-150 7 

for reconsideration of the revised determination did not begin on February 14, 2015. That 

period began, instead, on April 23, 2013, the date on which ODJFS actually delivered to 

Hason a copy of the revised determination. Consequently, the application for 

reconsideration that Hason filed on May 13, 2015 was timely, and the director had 

jurisdiction to consider it. 

{¶ 23} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Hason's first assignment of error. Our 

resolution of the first assignment of error moots Hason's second assignment of error, and 

thus, we do not rule on it. We reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, and we remand this matter to that court so that it may reverse the 

commission's decision and order the director to consider the merits of Hason's 

application for reconsideration. 

Judgment reversed; cause remanded.

BROWN and SADLER, JJ., concur.