IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 24, 2013

WENDOLYN WALDEN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S62275 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E2013-01165-CCA-R3-PC - Filed October 22, 2013

The Petitioner, Wendolyn Walden, pled guilty to the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine

within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to eight years in the Tennessee

Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief

almost two years after pleading guilty, which the post-conviction courtsummarily dismissed.

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Wendolyn Walden, Nashville, Tennessee, pro se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney

General; Barry Staubus, District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Background

In the post-conviction petition, the Petitioner asserts that she pled guilty, on May 31,

2011, to the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a school zone. On April 22, 2013,

the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief. In the petition, the Petitioner

explained thatshe was filing her petition outside the statute of limitations because her attorney

never informed her of a time limit in which she must file her petition, citing Thompson v.
United States, 481 F.3d 1297 (11 Cir. 2007).

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The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely stating that

“The final conviction occurred more than one year ago and limitations for filing has expired

and the petitioner does not allege any new or developing law that has come into effect since

her conviction.” Further, it stated that the Petitioner’s reliance on Thompson was misplaced

because Thompson addressed the statute of limitations on a direct appeal and not a postconviction proceeding. It is from this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

The Petitioner asserts that her conviction is based on an involuntary guilty plea. She

further contends that her confession was coerced, evidence used against her was gained

pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure and unlawful arrest, her privilege against

self-incrimination was violated, the evidence against her wasinsufficient, and her attorney did

not “zealously defend” her or “protect her rights.” The State responds that the trial court

properly dismissed the petition as untimely. We agree with the State.

A person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must petition for post

conviction relief within one year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate

court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one year of the date on

which the judgment becomes final. T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a) (2012). The statute explicitly

states, “The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or

saving provision otherwise available at law or equity.” Id. It further stresses that “[t]ime is

of the essence of the right to file a petition for post-conviction relief or motion to reopen

established by this chapter, and the one-year limitations period is an element of the right to

file the action and is a condition upon its exercise.” Id. In the event that a petitioner files a

petition for post-conviction relief outside the one-year statute of limitations, the trial court is

required to summarily dismiss the petition. T.C.A. § 40-30-106(b) (2012).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b)sets out three exceptionsto the statute

of limitations for petitions for post-conviction relief:

No court shall have jurisdiction to consider a petition filed after the expiration

of the limitations period unless:

(1) The claim in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an appellate court

establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the

time of trial, if retrospective application of that right is required. The petition

must be filed within one (1) year of the ruling of the highest state appellate

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court or the United States supreme court establishing a constitutional right that

was not recognized as existing at the time of trial;

(2) The claim in the petition is based upon new scientific evidence establishing

that the petitioner is actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which the

petitioner was convicted; or

(3) The claim asserted in the petition seeks relief from a sentence that was

enhanced because of a previous conviction and the conviction in the case in

which the claim is asserted was not a guilty plea with an agreed sentence, and

the previous conviction hassubsequently been held to be invalid, in which case

the petition must be filed within one (1) year of the finality of the ruling

holding the previous conviction to be invalid.

Additionally, due process concerns may toll the statute of limitations for post-conviction

relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded:

[B]efore a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural

requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that

potential litigants be provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,

455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982)).

In the case under submission, the Petitioner was required to file her petition for

post-conviction relief within one year of June 30, 2011, the date that her judgment became

final. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a) (2012); State v. Green, 106 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tenn. 2003)

(holding that “a judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty plea becomes final thirty days

after acceptance of the plea agreement and imposition of sentence”). She did not file her

petition, however, until April 22, 2013, after the statute of limitations had expired. The

Petitioner does not allege, nor do we find applicable, any of the statutory exceptions to the

one-year statute of limitations. After reviewing the record and the Petitioner’s claims, we

conclude that the Petitioner has been “provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. Therefore,

due process does not require the tolling of the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court

properly dismissed the Petitioner’s petition.

III. Conclusion

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After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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