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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

LAVERNE WILLIAMS §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23cv68-RWS-JBB

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On June 28, 2023, Laverne Williams (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil action pursuant to the 

Social Security Act (“The Act”), Section 405(g), for judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial 

of Plaintiff’s application for Social Security benefits. The Court is of the opinion the above-entitled 

social security action should be AFFRIMED.

HISTORY OF THE CASE

On February 1, 2021, Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income (SSI), alleging 

disability beginning October 22, 1997, due to leg injuries sustained in a car accident, anxiety, and 

depression (Dkt. Nos. 6-1 through 6-8, “Tr.” 27, 67, 83, 156, 158). The Commissioner denied 

Plaintiff’s application initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff subsequently requested a 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). An ALJ held a telephonic hearing on March 

7, 2023, where Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified (Tr. 40-65). On April 14, 2023, the ALJ 

issued a decision finding Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security 

Act, since February 1, 2021, the date the application was filed (Tr. 22-33). Plaintiff’s request for a 

review by the Appeals Council was denied by letter dated June 13, 2023 (Tr. 1-6), and the ALJ’s 

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decision became the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of the Court’s review pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Age, education, and work experience

Plaintiff was born on July 10, 1980, and was forty years of age on the date the application 

was filed (Tr. 31). At the date of the hearing, she had a tenth-grade education and had not obtained

a GED (Tr. 50). She has no past relevant work experience (Tr. 31). 

Medical record evidence

Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision in 1997 that resulted in a severe fracture 

of her left leg that required a rod and three bolts (Tr. 301).

On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff saw her primary care provider, Marjorie E Hudson, M.D., for 

mood complaints (Tr. 265-82). Dr. Hudson’s treatment notes noted that Plaintiff complained of a 

history of depression. Plaintiff reported she used to take multiple anti-depressants, but she stopped 

taking them after a number of years because Plaintiff tried to manage her depressed mood on her 

own (Tr. 267). Her primary care provider noted that Plaintiff had a normal mood and affect, she 

was alert and oriented, and she maintained normal attention and concentration (Tr. 256-66). Dr. 

Hudson prescribed Plaintiff 25mg of Zoloft (Sertraline HCL) daily for her depression with anxiety 

(Tr. 269). 

On December 14, 2020, Plaintiff had an office visit at UAMS Health Family Medical 

Center in Texarkana (Tr. 283-307). The office notes list depression and anxiety as problems (Tr. 

283). 

On April 14, 2021, consultative examiner David Grant, Ph.D., provided a Psychological 

Report – Mental Status (Tr. 314-19). Dr. Grant reported that Plaintiff seemed to appear open and 

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honest throughout the assessment, and there was no indication of malingering (Tr. 314). Dr. Grant 

observed on examination that Plaintiff was cooperative; she demonstrated no evidence of a thought 

disorder or tangential thinking; she had good abstract thinking; she displayed adequate memory, 

concentration, and persistence; she worked at a good pace; and she had good judgment (Tr. 315-

17). Plaintiff claimed that she regularly felt depressed and anxious (Tr. 314). Dr. Grant noted that 

Plaintiff explained that she has not received outpatient mental health counseling and that she 

stopped taking psychotropic medication a couple of months before the visit because she claimed 

the medication did not help with her mood (Tr. 315). After examining Plaintiff, Dr. Grant opined 

she would be able to understand, carry out, and follow instructions but would not likely respond 

appropriately to work pressure due to depressive and anxiety symptoms (Tr. 318). Additionally, 

Dr. Grant found that Plaintiff had a poor ability to tolerate stress and make reasonable occupational 

adjustments (Tr. 318). 

On April 24, 2021, a consultative examination was conducted by Mohammed Shabana, 

M.D. (Tr. 320-28). Following the examination, Dr. Shabana opined that Plaintiff had no 

limitations with sitting, standing, or walking (Tr. 324). Additionally, he opined that there were no 

limitations with lifting, carrying weight, bending, stooping, crouching, squatting, reaching, 

grasping, handling, fingering, and feeling (Tr. 324). Finally, he found that there were no relevant 

visual, communicative, or workplace environmental limitations (Tr. 324). 

On May 25, 2022, Plaintiff was evaluated by Richard B. Sharp, M.D., at Collom & Carney

Clinic (Tr. 427-34). Under symptoms, Dr. Sharp noted Plaintiff was positive for fatigue, gait 

disturbance, and anxiety (Tr. 431). On physical examination, Plaintiff had a “slight antalgic gait 

on left” but normal stance (Tr. 431). She ambulated with no device; her tandem gait was normal; 

Romberg was negative; and her affect was normal (Tr. 431). Plaintiff arose from a chair and moved 

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on and off the exam table with ease (Tr. 431). No lower extremity spasm or atrophy was noted (Tr. 

432). Straight leg raise was negative bilaterally (Tr. 432). Dr. Sharp further noted:

Left hip is 90 degrees flexion and 5 degrees extension. Left abduction is 20 degrees 

and 10 degrees adduction. Left internal rotation is 15 degrees and 35 degrees 

external rotation. Mild tenderness noted at the left lateral hip. No warmth, crepitus, 

redness or effusion noted. FABER mildly positive. Extremities with no cyanosis, 

clubbing or edema noted.

(Tr. 432).

X-rays of Plaintiff’s knees, pelvis, and left femur were ordered (Tr. 427-29). Regarding 

Plaintiff’s knee, Dr. Sharp noted the x-rays showed “mild patellofemoral joint space narrowing.”

(Tr. 433). Dr. Sharp further noted an intact left distal femur rod with interlocking screws (Tr. 433). 

Regarding Plaintiff’s left hip, Dr. Sharp noted the hardware was intact, the fracture healed, and 

Plaintiff had a mild limp and would have difficulty with ladders and stairs (Tr. 433). Dr. Sharp 

further noted the distal aspect of the hardware was incompletely imaged (Tr. 433). Additionally, 

the x-ray provided the following findings:

There is a remote, healed fracture deformity of the left proximal femoral diaphysis. 

There is bony prominence of the superolateral acetabuli bilaterally, suggestive of 

pincer type deformities. There is mild superior joint space narrowing of the hips, 

slightly greater on the left. The SI joints and pubic symphysis are maintained.

(Tr. 427).

On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff was evaluated by Licensed Clinical Psychologist, Randall 

Rattan, Ph.D. (Tr. 437-43). Gait disturbance was not observed, and Plaintiff’s primary complaints 

included mood and anxiety related symptoms (Tr. 437). Similar to Dr. Grant, Dr. Rattan noted that 

Plaintiff was polite, she did not have a thought disorder, and she had intact memory (Tr. 439-40). 

Dr. Rattan opined Plaintiff is capable of carrying out basic instructions and exhibiting contextually 

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appropriate behavior, but she might have some intermittent difficulty maintaining consistent 

employment from a mental health standpoint (Tr. 441).

THE HEARING

Plaintiff’s testimony

Plaintiff was not represented by counsel at the telephonic hearing; however, the ALJ 

advised Plaintiff that she had the right to representation (Tr. 42-43). Plaintiff told the ALJ that she 

wanted to proceed without representation (Tr. 43). The ALJ asked Plaintiff if she had the 

opportunity to review the medical records in her file, and she answered “no.” (Tr. 44-45). The 

ALJ then advised Plaintiff that he would connect her with someone to go over her file after the 

hearing and show her how to access her file online (Tr. 45).

Plaintiff testified that she lived with her youngest son (age 17) in a duplex and had resided 

at this location for around five years (Tr. 48). Plaintiff stated that she does not have a driver’s 

license, and she has never had one (Tr. 49). According to Plaintiff, she never learned to drive due 

to her anxiety (Tr. 49). Plaintiff testified that, due to her anxiety of driving, she does not travel

often so she mostly stays at home (Tr. 49). Plaintiff stated that when she needs something she gets 

one of her three children to go pick it up for her (Tr. 49). However, according to Plaintiff, she will 

only leave the house when it is something important like paying her rent or attending doctor’s 

appointments (Tr. 49-50). When she does leave home, Plaintiff gets one of her three children to 

drive her (Tr. 49-50). Plaintiff stated that her 17-year-old son does not have a vehicle; however his 

girlfriend does, and both of them pick up things for Plaintiff (Tr. 50). 

Plaintiff testified that she has a 10th grade education and never completed her GED (Tr. 

50). Plaintiff stated that she injured her left leg when she was young; however she faces more 

problems with her leg as she grows older (Tr. 52). According to Plaintiff, she had “a lot of pains”

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and “certain medicines make it worse.” (Tr. 52). Plaintiff testified that she was not getting 

treatment for her leg and had not gotten treatment since the surgery she had in 1997 (Tr. 52). 

Outside of the physicians she saw for her social security claims, Plaintiff has not seen a doctor 

regarding her leg problems (Tr. 52). Plaintiff stated that she receives Medicaid, and she only goes 

to the doctor for her yearly checkups. She stated she is unable to afford a doctor for her leg 

problems (Tr. 52). Plaintiff testified that she has pain in her left leg every day, and the pain will 

occur throughout the day from sitting, walking, and going up and down stairs (Tr. 53). She stated 

that she does not do a lot of walking, so she usually just walks from one end of her home to the 

other (Tr. 53). She also stated that she does not do much lifting, but when she does, she lifts things 

like dirty clothes (Tr. 53). She testified that the longest she can sit is maybe thirty minutes, after 

which time her leg begins to cramp up (Tr. 53-54). 

When asked about moderating her pain, Plaintiff stated that she is “not big on pain medicine 

or anything.” (Tr. 54). According to Plaintiff, she was taking anxiety medicine; however the 

medication made her leg spasms worse (Tr. 54). Plaintiff testified that she was not taking any 

medication at the time of the hearing. According to Plaintiff, her doctor put her on anxiety 

medicine, but she experienced side effects from the medication (Tr. 54-55). Plaintiff also stated 

that she was on several different high blood pressure medicines, but she could not take them 

because they were too strong and made her “head and stuff hurt.” (Tr. 55). Plaintiff stated that her

primary doctor is at UMAS Health Family Medical Center in Texarkana, but it had been about five 

or six months before the hearing since she had been there (Tr. 55). Plaintiff asserted the pain in 

her left leg limits her ability to stand, walk, or sit for a long period of time (Tr. 60). 

Plaintiff testified that other than her left leg and anxiety, she does not have any other 

medical conditions that would cause her problems working (Tr. 56). As far as her anxiety, Plaintiff 

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testified that she does not see a doctor for it, nor has she seen a mental health professional (Tr. 

56). Plaintiff stated she saw a mental health professional as a child, but she had not seen one during 

her adult life (Tr. 56-57). Additionally, Plaintiff confirmed that she had not taken any medication 

for her anxiety from the time of her SSI application to the hearing (Tr. 57). When asked about how 

her anxiety affects her daily life, Plaintiff stated that she mainly stays to herself in her room and 

sleeps (Tr. 57). Plaintiff explained that she prefers not to be around “a whole lot of people” because 

of her anxiety (Tr. 58). According to Plaintiff, the only time she is around a big group of people is 

during church; however, she stopped attending church a couple of months before the hearing (Tr. 

58-59).

The ALJ inquired about Plaintiff’s daily schedule, and she answered that she “don’t do 

nothing every day.” (Tr.59). Plaintiff claimed that she sleeps better in the daytime, so she sleeps 

until the afternoon, after which she will eat and watch a little TV (Tr. 59). Plaintiff confirmed that 

she can dress, bathe, shower, and comb her hair by herself (Tr. 59). Plaintiff also confirmed that 

she does the chores around the house, like laundry, cooking, and cleaning (Tr. 59). 

According to Plaintiff, the last time she worked was three years prior to the hearing (Tr. 

51). Plaintiff stated that she cleaned houses; however, this position lasted for around three weeks 

(Tr. 51). Plaintiff stated that “the lady I was working for, she kind of wanted me to split my income 

with her.” (Tr. 51). According to Plaintiff, this resulted in her telling this lady that she was not able 

to work the job anymore (Tr. 51). According to Plaintiff, she was supposed to be given other work,

but she never heard anything about a follow-up job (Tr. 51). Plaintiff stated that she believed she 

was unable to work because of her left leg and the possibility of her standing and using the leg for 

work (Tr. 51-52). 

Vocational expert testimony

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A vocational expert also testified at the hearing. In the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the

vocational expert to consider a person with Plaintiff’s same age, education, and work history who 

would have the residual functionals to perform work at the medium exertional level, except that 

person could understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, tolerate occasional 

interaction with the general public, and frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors (Tr. 

62). The vocational expert testified that the hypothetical person would be able to work in the 

national economy (Tr. 62). According to the vocational expert, examples of available jobs would 

be hand packager, sandwich maker, and stores laborer (Tr. 62-63). 

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to modify the first 

hypothetical such that the hypothetical person would be limited to a sedentary duty level of work, 

but could only sit for thirty minutes at one period of time and could only sit for a total of four hours 

out of an eight hour day; could stand and walk a total of two hours out of an eight hour day; could 

also understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; and could tolerate occasional 

interaction with the general public and frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors (Tr. 

63). According to the vocational expert, such person would not be able to perform any work in the 

national economy (Tr. 63). The vocational expert stated that “the total number of hours worked 

would be less than eight hours, which is considered full time work.” (Tr. 63). 

APPLICABLE LAW

Standard of review

In an appeal under § 405(g), the Court must review the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s factual 

findings and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the 

evidence. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial 

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evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 

620 (5th Cir. 1983). The Court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of 

the Commissioner, Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1995), and conflicts in the 

evidence are resolved by the Commissioner, Carry v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Entitlement to benefits

The Disability Insurance Benefit (“DIB”) program provides income to individuals who are 

forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled, 

regardless of indigence. Plaisance v. U.S. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., Civil Action No. 6:18-CV00033, 2019 WL 2608884, at *14 (W.D. La. May 13, 2019), report and recommendation adopted 

sub nom. Plaisance v. U.S. Comm’r, No. 6:18-CV-00033, 2019 WL 2607498 (W.D. La. June 25, 

2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)). The Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) program provides 

income to individuals who meet certain income and resource requirements, have applied for 

benefits, and are disabled. Plaisance, 2019 WL 2608884, at *14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1) & 

(2)).

Sequential evaluation process and burden of proof

Pursuant to the statutory provisions governing disability determinations, the Commissioner 

has promulgated regulations that establish a five-step process to determine whether a claimant 

suffers from a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2012). First, a claimant who, at the time of his 

disability claim, is engaged in substantial gainful employment is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(i) (2012). Second, the claimant is not disabled if his alleged impairment is not 

severe, without consideration of his residual functional capacity, age, education, or work 

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2012). Third, if the alleged impairment is severe, the 

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claimant is considered disabled if his impairment corresponds to a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R., 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (2011). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (2012). Fourth, a claimant 

with a severe impairment that does not correspond to a listed impairment is not considered disabled 

if he is capable of performing his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (2012). Finally, a 

claimant who cannot return to his past work is not disabled if he has the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to engage in work available in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 

(2012). If, at any step, the claimant is determined to be disabled or not disabled, the inquiry is 

terminated. Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 

F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1987)). 

Under the first four steps of the sequential analysis, the burden lies with the claimant to 

prove disability. Audler, 501 F.3d at 448. If the claimant satisfies his or her burden under the first 

four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that there is other gainful 

employment available in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Greenspan v. 

Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). This burden may be satisfied either by reference to the 

Medical–Vocational Guidelines of the regulations or by expert vocational testimony or other 

similar evidence. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir.1987). However, this process is 

used only when an initial determination of disability is being evaluated, not when a claimant is 

already receiving disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(5). The Code explicitly states, 

“If you are already receiving disability benefits, we will use a different sequential evaluation 

process to decide whether you continue to be disabled. We explain this process in § 404.1594(f).” 

Id. 

THE ALJ’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

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At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

February 1, 2021, the application date (Tr. 25). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe 

impairments of degenerative joint disease of the left hip and knee with a remote history of ORIF 

surgery, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder (Tr. 25). At step three, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix I, including Listings 1.18, 12.04, and 12.06 (Tr. 25).

The ALJ next found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform medium 

work with the following non-exertional limitations: she could understand, remember and carry out 

simple instructions, tolerate occasional interactions with the general public, and frequent 

interaction with co-workers and supervisors (Tr. 26-31).

At step five, relying on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that, considering 

Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, Plaintiff could 

perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy (Tr. 31-32).

Specifically, the ALJ determined Plaintiff would be able to perform the requirements of 

representative occupations such as hand packager, sandwich maker, and stores laborer. (Tr. 32).

The ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from February 

1, 2021, the date the application was filed (Tr. 32).

ANALYSIS

“The Commissioner’s decision is granted great deference and will not be disturbed unless 

the reviewing court cannot find substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s 

decision or finds that the Commissioner made an error of law.” Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 

564 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is a term of art used to describe how courts are to review 

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agency fact-finding. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Under the substantial 

evidence standard, a court looks to the existing administrative record to determine whether it 

contains sufficient evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations. Id. Although 

“substantial” has a different meaning in other contexts, the threshold of sufficient evidence to 

satisfy the substantial evidence standard “is not high.” Id. Substantial evidence requires more than 

a mere scintilla of evidence, but it “means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Substantial evidence has 

four categories: “(1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining 

physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the plaintiff’s age, education, 

and work history.” Redford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:21-CV-00333-JCB, 2022 WL 

16626738, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Redford 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:21-CV-00333, 2022 WL 16625661 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2022) (citing 

Fraga, 810 F.2d at 1302 n.4.) If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, 

then his findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 390 (1971)). However, the court must do more than “rubber stamp” the ALJ’s decision; the 

court must “scrutinize the record and take into account whatever fairly detracts from the 

substantiality of evidence supporting the [Commissioner]’s findings.” Id. (quoting Cook v. 

Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985)).

The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Moreover, a claimant also bears the burden of showing 

any alleged error of law was prejudicial because the Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine 

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of harmless error applies to administrative determinations, and the Fifth Circuit has specifically 

held it will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party are affected. See Shinseki 

v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407-08 (2009); Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2012); Mays 

v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988). 

The overarching issues are whether substantial evidence of record supports the 

Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period, and whether 

the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching that decision. Having reviewed the parties’ 

briefs, the Court notes the following specific issues on appeal: (1) whether substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s physical residual functional capacity finding; and (2) whether the ALJ erred in 

his evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s physical residucal functional capacity finding

As to the first issue, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s physical RFC determination was 

unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to rely on any medical opinion. Dkt. 

No. 9 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s finding her capable of performing medium 

work. Id. Plaintiff relies on the evidence of record regarding the problems with her left leg since 

the 1997 motor vehicle collision. She also relies on her hearing testimony as to her limited finances 

and why she has not sought treatment for her left leg. Id. at 4-10. In its response, the Commissioner 

argues the ALJ’s RFC decision is supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ considered 

Plaintiff’s treatment history and objective medical findings.1

 Dkt. No. 12 at 4. 

1 Plaintiff filed her claims after March 27, 2017; as such, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c governs. Generally, this means, “ALJs 

are no longer required to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion.” Simon v. Kijakazi, No. CV 22-

3101, 2023 WL 2562754, *7 (E.D. La. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2021)). 

Instead, the ALJ “considers a list of factors in determining what weight, if any, to give a medical opinion.” Webster, 

19 F.4th at 719 (citing § 404.1520c). These factors include (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with 

the claimant, including length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment 

relationship, extent of the treatment relationship, and examining relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors. 

§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5).

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The RFC is an assessment made by the Commissioner, based on all the relevant evidence, 

of a claimant’s ability to do work on a sustained basis in an ordinary work setting despite his 

physical or mental impairments. Redford, 2022 WL 16626738, at *2 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

416.945(a); also citing Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 2001)). When evaluating a 

claimant’s physical abilities, the Commissioner first assesses the nature and extent of physical 

limitations, and then determines the RFC for work activity on a regular and continuing basis. Id. 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545). The ALJ makes separate function-by-function findings of the seven 

exertional strength demands (sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling), 

and other non-exertional physical functions (including manipulative or postural functions, such as 

reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching). Id. (citing SSR 96-8; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b)). Only 

after the function-by-function analysis may the RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional levels 

of work (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy). Id. (citing SSR 96-8).

“The ALJ as factfinder has the sole responsibility for weighing the evidence and may 

choose whichever physician’s diagnosis is most supported by the record.” Muse v. Sullivan, 925 

F.2d 785, 790 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir.1987)). 

“[T]he ALJ is entitled to determine the credibility of medical experts as well as lay witnesses and 

to weigh their opinions and testimony accordingly.” Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th 

Cir. 1990) (quoting Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir.1985)) (internal quotations 

omitted). “The ALJ is responsible for assessing the medical evidence and determining the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Perez v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1985)

(citing Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1983)). The ALJ “must build an accurate and 

logical bridge between the evidence and the final determination.” Price v. Astrue, 401 Fed. Appx. 

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985, 986 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Glomski v. Massanari, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082 (E.D. Wis. 

2001)). 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform 

medium work except she could understand, remember and carry out simple instructions, tolerate 

occasional interactions with the general public and frequent interaction with co-workers and 

supervisor (Tr. 26). After considering the evidence of record, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms: however, 

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the 

reasons explained” in the following four pages of substantive discussion (Tr. 27-31). Among other 

things, the ALJ noted as follows:

The medical record shows that the claimant has a remote history of a traumatic 

injury to her left lower extremity requiring prior surgical intervention. However, 

treatment notes do not show that she has sought treatment or care for this condition. 

Further, imaging received does not reveal any significant issues and findings on 

physical examination throughout the record does not indicate any significant 

abnormalities in her lower extremity. This evidence is not consistent with the 

claimant’s allegations regarding the severity, frequency or intensity of her 

symptoms of pain in her lower extremity and does not support her alleged 

functional limitations in terms of difficulties sitting, lifting, carrying, to performing 

weight bearing activities.

Treatment notes show that the claimant has received medication management 

through a primary care provider at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences 

since the alleged onset date. . . . However, the records do not show that the claimant 

has sought treatment for any pain in her lower extremity, and just denotes her lower 

extremity fracture and repair as part of her past medical history. Treatment records 

do not indicate that the claimant has discussed this condition with her medical 

providers, and review of systems records negative responses regarding pain. 

Further, findings on physical examination with her primary care provider, 

consistent denote no abnormalities, with a normal gait and station. . . . In total, the 

lack of sought care from her primary care provider for this principal impairment 

that the claimant has alleged causes her disabling limitations is not consistent with 

the claimant’s allegations regarding the severity, intensity or frequency of the 

symptoms that she has alleged result from this impairment.

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(Tr. 27-28).

The ALJ considered the opinions of two physical evaluations performed by two separate 

consultative examiners, as well as the opinions of the state agency medical consultants (Tr. 29-

31). The ALJ considered the opinions of two state agency medical consultants, finding as follows:

Cynthia Linardos, M.D., a state agency medical consultant, concluded that the 

claimant’s lower extremity fracture limited her to medium work (1A). Nancy 

Childs, a state agency medical consultant, also concluded that the lower extremity 

fracture was severe, but did not state functional limitations resulting from this 

impairment (2A). The undersigned finds Dr. Linardos’s opinion persuasive, as this 

is consistent with the findings on examinations throughout the record of a 

maintained normal gait and station, intact neuromuscular findings, and only some 

mild tenderness. . . . Further, this opinion is supported with well-reasoned analysis 

with the medical records ability when the opinion was rendered. However, Dr. 

Child’s opinion is not persuasive, as no opinion on the functional limitations 

imposed by the claimant’s impairment was rendered, this is not supported with a 

well-reasoned analysis of the available medical records, nor consistent with the 

available findings on examination and testing.

(Tr. 30).

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in discrediting the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. 

Sharp. However, the ALJ did explain his findings. Regarding Dr. Sharp’s consultatiation, he found

the following:

On May [sic] 25, 2022, the claimant underwent a consultative examination with 

Richard Sharp, M.D. but, following examination and imaging did not provide an 

opinion on any functional limitations imposed by the claimant’s impairments (Ex. 

5F). The undersigned finds this to be unpersuasive. Although no real opinion is 

given regarding the claimant’s exertional limitations, the findings on examination 

are significant in evaluating the severity of the claimant’s impairment.

(Tr. 31). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ relied on evidence that only described her conditions 

rather than evidence that demonstrated “her ability to work despite those impairments.” Dkt. No. 

9 at 8. Plaintiff questions why the ALJ did not required Dr. Sharp to performa a functional 

limitation as to Plaintiff’s ability to sit, stand, walk, etc. Id. Plaintiff argues the record does not 

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clearly establish how Plaintiff’s conditions impacted her ability to perform medium work, and 

“there are no medical opinions to otherwise serve as a foundation for [the ALJ’s] decision.” Id. at 

9. As such, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in making a physical RFC determination without 

evidence of how her impairments affected her ability to work. Id. In conclusion, Plaintiff contends 

the record does not contain substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALJ’s determination 

concerning Plaintif’s medical condition and its impact on her ability to work. Id. at 11.

In its response, the Commissioner first asserts the medical evidence of record showing 

Plaintiff had a normal gait, normal range of motion, 5/5 muscle strength, negative straight leg 

raising and could squat and rise with ease and move on and off the examination table with ease 

(Tr. 26-31, 314, 322-323, 332, 347, 351, 431-432, 453, 456) “supports the ALJ’s RFC finding and 

easily surpasses the substantial evidence threshold.” Dkt. No. 12 at 4. According to the 

Commissioner, what Plaintiff characterizes as the ALJ’s “impermissible interpretation of medical 

data is actually the ALJ properly interpreting the medical evidence to determine Plaintiff’s capacity 

for work.” Id. In response to Plaintiff’s suggestion that the ALJ should have recontacted Dr. sharp 

for an opinion about Plaintiff’s limitations, the Commissioner states the ALJ already had an 

opinion from Mohamed Shabana, M.D.2

, who conducted an earlier physical consultative 

examination and opined Plaintiff had no limitations in sitting, standing, walking, lifting, and 

carrying.3 Id. at 5. Although the ALJ did not find Dr. Shabana’s opinion to be persuasive, the 

2 The ALJ stated that James Jean, M.D., authored this opinion; however, Dr. Jean appears as the physician who 

interpreted Plaintiff’s consultative x-ray (Tr. 327). 

3

 Consultative examiner Mohamed Shabana, M.D., opined Plaintiff had no limitation in sitting, standing, walking, 

lifting, and carrying (Tr. 31, 324). Although the ALJ did not find the opinion persuasive, the ALJ did note certain 

aspects of the opinion were supported by findings on examination:

In general, the opinion that the claimant’s impairment would not cause limitations to their weight 

bearing capacity, tolerance for sitting, or performing postural changes is supported by the findings 

on his examination, showing no significant abnormalities aside from some mild tenderness in her 

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Commissioner asserts, in any event, the ALJ was not required to rely on any particular opinion in 

his RFC analysis. Id. Thus, according to the Commissioner, Plaintiff shows no error. The Court 

agrees.

It is true an ALJ cannot determine, from raw medical data, the effects of impairments on a 

claimant’s ability to work. See Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit 

has noted that an ALJ may not “without opinions from medical experts--derive the applicant’s 

residual functional capacity based solely on the evidence of his or her claimed medical 

conditions... the ALJ may not rely on his own unsupported opinion as to the limitations presented 

by the applicant’s medical conditions.” Williams v. Astrue, 355 Fed. Appx. 828, 832 n.6 (5th Cir. 

2009); see also Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557; Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (“An 

ALJ should avoid ‘playing doctor’ and [make] their own independent medical assessments.”).

Thus, “the record must contain evidence of the effects the claimant’s medical conditions have on 

her ability to work.” Moreno v. Astrue, No. 5:09-CV-123-BG, 2010 WL 3025525, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 

June 30, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 509-CV-123-C, 2010 WL 3025519 

(N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2010) (citing Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557). However, the ALJ may consider residual 

functional capacity assessments made by “State agency medical and psychological consultants and 

other program physicians” to be a “medical source statement.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913.

As noted above, state agency medical consultant Cynthia Linardos, M.D., specifically 

addressed how Plaintiff’s physical impairments affected her ability to work. In his decision, the 

left hip. That conclusion is also consistent with the lack of treatment sought by the claimant for her 

condition or noted normal findings on physical examination with her primary care provider. . . . 

However, this is not consistent with the claimant’s testimony regarding the functional limitations 

imposed by her impairment and symptoms, or the analysis and opinion of the state agency medical 

consultant, who concluded that some limitations to her functional capacity were supported. . . .

(Tr. 31).

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ALJ noted Dr. Linardos’ opinion that Plaintiff’s lower extremity fracture limited her to medium 

work (Tr. 30). Subsequently, the ALJ found this determination to be persuasive. The ALJ stated 

that Dr. Linardos’ opinion was “consistent with the findings on examinations throughout the record 

of a maintained normal gait and station, intact neuromuscular findings, and only some mind 

tenderness.” (Tr. 30). Further, the ALJ elaborated that it was “supported with well-reasoned 

analysis with the medical records ability when the opinion was rendered.” (Tr. 30). This evidence 

supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. See Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000) (“A 

finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical 

findings support the decision.”).

The ALJ thoroughly examined the evidence and was able to make a determination based 

on medical opinions, which did not necessitate any additional examination from Dr. Sharp. 

Although an ALJ has a duty to develop the facts, Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557, an ALJ is not required to 

recontact a medical source based on inconsistent or insufficient evidence if he is still able to make 

a disability determination based on the evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b. Here, 

the ALJ’s decision contained several pages of objective medical records from Plaintiff’s primary 

care providers and consultative physicians. As noted above, the ALJ addressed the opinions of two 

physical evaluations performed by two separate consultative examiners, only one of which was 

Dr. Sharp (Tr. 31). The ALJ also considered the opinions of two state agency medical consultants, 

one of which provided a functional limitation examination. Jones, 691 F.3d at 733 (noting that the 

ALJ is required to request more documentation only where there is no relevant evidence from other 

sources). 

Within her first claim for relief, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in discrediting her because 

of the limited treatment on her left leg, stating she testified regarding her limited finances. Dkt No. 

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9 at 4. Indeed, Plaintiff testified about her ability to afford care regarindg her leg during the hearing

(Tr. 52). This was the only evidence regarding her inability to afford care. Although Plaintiff cited 

finances for her lack of care, she failed to provide evidence showing that she sought low-cost or 

free care. Gena R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:21-CV-1352, 2022 WL 16924116, at *11 (S.D. 

Tex. Nov. 11, 2022), appeal dismissed sub nom. Roden v. Kijakazi, No. 23-20032, 2023 WL 

4846446 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) (“However, an inability to afford treatment by itself is 

insufficient to establish disability; a claimant must also show that he could not obtain medical 

treatment from other sources, such as free or low-cost health clinics.”); Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 

F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Buchholtz v. Barnhart, 98 Fed. Appx. 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Osborne v. Barnhart, 316 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir.2003)) (“An absence of evidence that a 

claimant sought low-cost or free care may warrant discrediting his excuse that he could not afford 

treatment.”). 

In sum, the Court finds the ALJ’s RFC decision is supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

In her second claim for relief, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly assess her

symptoms, which resulted in the ALJ not complying with the proper legal standards. Dkt. No. 9 at 

11. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not follow 20 C.F.R. §416.929 and SSR 16-3P, 2016 

SSR Lexis 4. Id. at 11. In its response, the Commissoner asserts the ALJ gave due consideration 

to Plaintiffs subjective symptoms. Dkt. No. 12 at 6. Again, the Commissioner maintains the

objective findings (showing Plaintiff had a normal gait, normal range of motion, 5/5 muscle 

strength, negative straight leg raising and could squat and rise with ease and move on and off the 

examination table with ease) do not entirely support Plaintiff’s claims of disability. Id. The 

Commissioner further points out that Plaintiff is able to prepare meals, clean, shop, and do laundry, 

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and she stated that she could pay attention, finish what she started, and follow instructions well. 

Id. (citing Tr. 26-31, 208-211, 231-234, 318, 321). 

The ALJ must consider the claimant’s subjective symptoms, including pain, and how these 

symptoms affect their daily living and ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). Twenty C.F.R.

§ 416.929(c)(3) provides a non-exclusive list of factors for considering the credibility of a 

claimant’s subjective complaints: (1) daily activities; (2) location, duration, frequency 

and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) type, 

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 

(5) treatment, other than medication, received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any 

measures used to relieve pain or other symptoms; (7) other factors concerning your functional 

limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

A claimant’s statements regarding her “pain and other symptoms will not alone establish 

that [she is] disabled.” § 416.929(a). Along with subjective symptoms, the ALJ must consider 

“objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source” and the extent to which those 

symptoms can be reasonably accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other 

evidence. Id.; see Salgado v. Astrue, 271 Fed. Appx. 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2008) (“adjudicators 

consider both objective evidence from medical reports and subjective evidence, such as an 

applicant’s claims regarding symptoms and pain.”). 

The Social Security Administration republished SSR 16-3P,4 which reimplemented the 

guidance about how the agency evaluates statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and 

4 The ALJ cited the requirements of both 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 and SSR 16-3p before his analysis, which shows 

acknowledgment of the legal standards. (Tr. 26); see Guillory v. Saul, Civil Action No. 1:19-CV-632, 2021 WL 

1600283, at *11 (E.D.Tex. April 23, 2021) (“First, the ALJ cited the pertinent Regulations, which demonstrate their 

relevance in his deliberations of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms.”); see also Jackson v. Commissioner of Social 

Security, Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-01149-O-BP, 2021 WL 5042479 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 20, 2021).

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limiting effects of symptoms in disability claims under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security 

Act (Act). Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p Titles II & XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, 

SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017). Accordingly, ALJs have a two-step 

process for evaluating an individual’s symptoms. Id. The Fifth Circuit has coined the term as the 

“objective-subjective” two-step process when “evaluating an applicant’s subjective evidence and 

the applicant's credibility if a credibility determination is necessary.” See Salgado, 271 Fed. Appx.

at 458. At step one, the ALJ determines whether the objective evidence from “an acceptable 

medical source establishes the existence of a medically determinable impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce an individual's alleged symptoms.” SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 

5180304, at *3. If there is no impairment, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. If there is an 

impairment, then at step two, the ALJ evaluates the “intensity and persistence of an individual’s 

symptoms such as pain and determine the extent to which an individual's symptoms limit his or 

her ability to perform work-related activities for an adult[.]” Id. at *4. Specifically, the ALJ 

“considers the applicant’s statements about symptoms and the remaining evidence in the record to 

determine the strength of the symptoms and how the symptoms affect the applicant’s ability to do 

basic work.” Salgado, 271 Fed. Appx. at 458. 

Here, at step one of the “objective-subjective” process, the ALJ considered the evidence 

and found that Plaintiff’s impairments reasonably caused the alleged symptoms (Tr. 27). The ALJ 

then proceeded to step two and determined that her statements regarding the intensity, persistence, 

and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and 

other evidence in the record (Tr. 27). Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s findings at the second step and 

argues that the ALJ failed to consider her subjective symptoms. 

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Focusing first on her physical impairments, Plaintiff claims the ALJ improperly discredited 

her pain based on three visits to her primary care doctor which showed on examination that 

Plaintiff had normal gait and station. Dkt. No. 9 at 11. Plaintiff maintains there was no examination 

of her hip or left leg during these three visits. Id. at 11. Plaintiff states she complained to both 

consultative examinders about the pain in her left leg, and Dr. Sharp noted Plaintiff had a “gait 

disturbance.” Id. at 11-12. Further, she cited her testimony during the hearing in support of her 

“chronic pain in her left leg and hip.” Id. at 12. Again, Plaintiff suggests the ALJ should have 

requested that Dr. Sharp, who performed a thorough evaluation, provide an additional opinion as 

to Plaintiff’s functional limitations. Id. at 13 (noting the ALJ knew Plaintiff was unrepresented and 

had limited treatment).

The ALJ noted several times that Plaintiff failed to seek regular treatment regarding the 

pain in her left leg and hip. (Tr. 27) (“treatment notes do not show that she has sought treatment 

or care for this condition”); (Tr. 28) (“the lack of sought care from her primary care provider for 

this principal impairment that the claimant has alleged causes her disabling limitations is not 

consistent with the claimant’s allegations”); (Tr. 28) (“treatment notes from her primary care 

provider does not indicate that the claimant has sought any treatment for this condition”). Despite 

Plaintiffs contention, a claimant’s lack of treatment is within the scope of evidence the ALJ may 

consider. See Villa, 895 F.2d at 1024 (noting that lack of treatment is also an indication of nondisability); see, e.g., Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:22CV492-KNM, 2024 WL 778392, *7 

(E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2024). Thus, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s lack of treatment in his 

RFC determination.

“[S]ubjective complaints of pain must be corroborated by objective evidence.” McHugh v. 

Berryhill, 2019 WL 2471669, at *3 (N.D.Tex., 2019) (citing Houston v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1012, 

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1016 (5th Cir. 1989)). The ALJ need not discuss each piece of evidence that was accepted or 

rejected, instead, he is required to explain his reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s complaints of 

pain. See Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 163-164 (5th Cir. 1994); Loya v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 211, 

215 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[t]he evaluation of a claimant’s subjective symptoms is a task, particularly 

within the province of the ALJ, who has had an opportunity to observe whether the person seems 

to be disabled.”). 

Here, the ALJ acknowledged the statements Plaintiff made to the consultative examiners:

In order to evaluate her lower extremity condition, the claimant attended two 

consultative examinations [Dr. Sharp and Dr. Shabana]. In both, the claimant 

alleged an ongoing history of pain in her left lower extremity following her accident 

years ago, causing her difficulty with weight bearing activities, climbing stairs, any 

other activities, due to consistent pain in her left lower extremity.

(Tr. 28). Additionally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s hearing testimony in his decision. 

In hearing, the claimant testified that she lived with her youngest son, who was in 

high school, and that she had never had a driver’s license as she has been scared to 

learn due to a car accident when she was younger where she injured her leg. She 

got around by getting rides from her children to go to doctor’s appointments, 

grocery shopping, or other places. She alleged she was unable to work due to pain 

in her left leg causing her difficulty standing or walking for long periods but was 

not currently receiving medical treatment for that condition and hasn’t received 

treatment following her surgier in 1997. She alleged that walking, climbing stairs, 

sitting too long, or other activities will cause pain, and that she didn’t even try to 

walk due to the pain. She alleged problems sitting longer than 30 minuets at a time 

due to cramping and pain. The claimant also alleged a history of anxiety, which had 

previously been managed through medications from her primary care provider. She 

stated that she primarily stayed in her room during the day, and has problems being 

around other people. The claimant testified that she could attend to her personal 

care and household chores independently

(Tr. 27). It is quite apparent that the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s subjective complaints during 

her consultative examination and in the hearing; however, the ALJ’s decision process did not stop 

with merely acknowledging Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and limitations.

After acknowledging Plaintiff’s complaints, the ALJ found the objective evidence to be 

more consistent. The ALJ considered Dr. Sharp’s findings and concluded that Plaintiff had “a 

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prior, remote history of injury to her left lower extremities.” (Tr. 28). However, the ALJ noted that 

these examinations only showed general “normal findings on examination, aside from some mild 

joint tenderness, and imaging displayed minimal findings.” (Tr. 28). As such, the ALJ found the 

objective evidence did not “support the claimant’s allegations regarding the severity of her 

physical impairments, or the resulting functional limitations.” (Tr. 28). 

The ALJ detailed the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms and the 

objective evidence. However, the subjective evidence could not hold up against the objective 

evidence. See Villa, 895 F.2d at 1024 (stating that subjective evidence need not take precedence 

over objective evidence.) The ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s symptoms and his analysis of the 

objective evidence demonstrate that he considered and used the proper legal standards. 

Finally, as it pertains to her mental health, Plaintiff asserts she testified that “she suffered 

from anxiety and depression.” Dkt. No. 9 at 13. According to Plaintiff, these statements were 

supported by the mental evaluations performed by Dr. Grant and Dr. Rattan. Id. In particular, 

Plaintiff argues that “Dr. Grant and Dr. Rattans’ opinions show that she has a substantial loss of 

ability to (on a sustained basis) maintain consistent performance and handle pressures in a work 

setting, and deficits in accomplishing complex tasks due to attention/concentration problems”5 Id.

at 16. According to Plaintiff, “[t]he findings and conclusions of [Dr. Grant and Dr. Rattan] could 

have adduced evidence that might have altered the results as to Plaintiff’s ability to physically and 

mentally perform medium work.” Id. In its response, the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff 

shows no error because the ALJ fully accounted for Dr. Grant’s and Dr. Rattan’s opinions; 

5 Plaintiff also points to her primary care provider’s notation, where it was noted that she complained of depression, 

anxiety, and mood swings. Dkt. No. 9 at 14 (citing Tr. 403). However, these complaints are considered subjective 

evidence. 

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however, he correctly found them to be unpersuasive because they were inconsistent with the 

record. Dkt No. 12 at 6. Again, the Court agrees.

The party seeking to overturn the Commissioner’s decision has the burden of showing that 

prejudice resulted from an error. Jones, 691 F.3d at 734-35. In essence, the party with this burden

must “somehow swing the evidentiary pendulum in his [or her] favor” Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 

F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2018). 

Here, the ALJ considered the objective evidence from Dr. Grant and Dr. Rattan. The ALJ

noted that Dr. Grant opined that Plaintiff was able to understand, carry out, and follow instructions 

but would not respond appropriately to work pressures in a work setting due to her 

depressive/anxiety symptoms and her ability to tolerate stress associated with competitive work 

and work adjustments were poor (Tr. 30). The ALJ then considered the evidence from Dr. Rattan

and noted that he opined that “the claimant could carry out basic instructions and exhibit 

contextually appropriate behavior but might have some intermittent difficulty maintaining 

consistent employment from a mental health standpoint.” (Tr. 30). 

The ALJ found that neither opinion was persuasive and provided a detailed explanation for 

his decision. As to Dr. Grant, the ALJ noted as follows:

The findings in this opinion are entirely unsupported by findings on examination, 

showing intact thought process and content, reasoning, memory, attention, 

concentration and other benign findings aside from a depressed mood and flat 

affect. The significant opined limitations are entirely unsupported with reference to 

the findings on examination. Further, this opinion is not consistent with the medical 

record as a whole, showing the claimant to not seek ongoing treatment for her 

symptoms of anxiety and depression and display normal findings on mental status 

evaluation with her primary care provider.

(Tr. 30) (citing Ex. 1F, 24; 4F, 4, 19; 8F, 6, 9). Further, the ALJ elaborated on Dr. Rattan’s 

opinion:

It is entirely unsupported by findings on examination, showing intact cognitive 

functioning, reasoning, thought process and content, aside from a somewhat 

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depressed mood and a slightly restricted expression, and no support is articulated 

as to how the claimant’s impairments would inhibit her from maintaining 

employment. Further, this opinion is not consistent with the medical record as a 

whole, showing the claimant to not seek ongoing treatment for her symptoms of 

anxiety and depression and display normal findings on mental status evaluation 

with her primary care provider.

(Tr. 30) (citing Ex. 1F, 24; 4F, 4, 19; 8F, 6, 9). 

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b), an ALJ is required to “articulate in [her] determination 

or decision how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior 

administrative medical findings in [the claimant's] case record.” The regulation sets forth certain 

“articulation requirements” and provides that “the most important factors” are “supportability” and 

“consistency.” § 404.1520c(b)(2). Miller v. Kijakazi, No. 22-60541, 2023 WL 234773, at *3 (5th 

Cir. Jan. 18, 2023). In Miller, although the Fifth Circuit held the ALJ failed to explain how she 

considered the supportability and consistency factors, the claimant failed to meet her burden of 

showing the ALJ’s error was prejudicial. Id. at *3. The Fifth Circuit explained that an ALJ’s failure 

to provide a sufficient explanation articulating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion is 

prejudicial when he “would have adopted” the opinion had he given “further explanation.” Id. at 

*4. In Miller, the court evaluated the ALJ’s opinion and found that she considered the medical 

opinions in the record by acknowledging that they contained limiting restrictions. Id. However, 

the ALJ ultimately did not find them to be persuasive. Id. The Fifth Circuit found no harmful error 

because the claimant did not show that “if the ALJ had given a further explanation, then she would 

have adopted them.” Id. 

Here, the ALJ not only considered the medical opinions of Dr. Grant and Dr. Rattan, but 

he also provided a sufficient explanation for why he rejected those opinions. The ALJ found both 

opinions were unsupported by findings on examination and that they were not consistent with the 

medical record as a whole (Tr. 30). For instance, Dr. Grant observed on examination that Plaintiff 

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was cooperative; demonstrated no evidence of a thought disorder or tangential thinking; had good 

abstract thinking; displayed adequate memory, concentration, and persistence; worked at a good 

pace; and had good judgment (Tr. 315-317). Similarly, Dr. Rattan noted that Plaintiff was polite, 

did not have a thought disorder, and had intact memory (Tr. 439-440). Thus, the ALJ considered 

whether these opinions were supported by Drs. Grant’s and Rattan’s own examination findings. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1) (ALJ considers whether opinion is supported). In addition, other 

examination notes show Plaintiff had an appropriate mood, clear thought process, normal memory, 

good concentration, normal thought content, and normal judgment (Tr. 26-31, 322, 332, 347, 453, 

456). The ALJ therefore considered whether Drs. Grant’s and Rattan’s opinions were consistent 

with the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2) (ALJ considers whether opinion is consistent with 

the record). Plaintiff shows no error.

Even if Plaintiff had shown error, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to show how further 

supportability and consistency analysis would have led the ALJ to a different outcome. She merely 

argues that it “might have altered the results as to Plaintiff’s ability to physically and mentally 

perform medium work.” Dkt No. 9 at 16. Thus, even if the Court were to find the ALJ failed to 

meet the “articulation requirements,” the Court would find any error harmless. See Miller, 2023 

WL 234773, *4 (rejecting the argument that ALJ erred because the medical evidence contained 

functional limitations that may have changed the outcome of the case); see also Walker v. Kijakazi, 

No. 23-60116, 2023 WL 7443302, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2023) (claimant has to “outline how 

further ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency’ analysis would lead the ALJ to a different outcome, and 

thus fails to show prejudice.”). 

In sum, the ALJ fully accounted for Plaintiff’s mental impairments by limiting her to 

understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, occasional interaction with the 

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general public, and frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors (Tr. 26). Contrary to 

Plaintiff’s assertions, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual functional capacity 

assessment. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, the ALJ’s decision should 

be affirmed.

RECOMMENDATION

“The Commissioner’s decision is granted great deference and will not be disturbed unless 

the reviewing court cannot fund substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s 

decision or finds that the Commissioner made an error of law.” Legget v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 

565-66 (5th Cir. 1995). Having reviewed the record, the Court determines the record shows that 

the Administration correctly applied the applicable legal standards and that substantial evidence 

supports the Administration’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. Accordingly, it is

RECOMMENDED the above-entitled Social Security action be AFFIRMED.

Objections

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the Magistrate Judge’s report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 

U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(C). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place 

in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. 

An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate 

judge is not specific.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and 

recommendations contained in this Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the district 

judge of those findings, conclusions and recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, 

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from appellate review of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and 

adopted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 

1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the 

time to file objections from ten to fourteen days). 

____________________________________

J. Boone Baxter

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SIGNED this the 9th day of May, 2024.

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