### In the



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-3317
E RI C H S P E C HT

, E T A L ., Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

G OO GL E I N C ., Defen dant-Appellee.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 09 C 2 57 2 — Harry D. Lei nen webe r , Judg e.
A RGU E D A PRI L 2, 2012— D E C I D E D A PRI L 4, 2014

Before R OVN E R

, S YKE S , and T I ND E R

, Circ uit Judges.

R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge

. During the dot-com boom of t he 1990s, Erich Specht founded Android Data Cor porat i o n, and reg i stered the “And r o i d Data” tr ademark. The company ceased prin ci pal oper ations in 2002, but the Android Data mark remain ed reg i stered to i t. Fiv e y ears la t e r , Go ogle Inc.
ro lled out i ts new Android op erat ing system for mobi le phones. Specht responded wi th thi s sui t against Go ogle,2 No. 11-3317 allegin g prim arily that, by releasing the Android oper a t ing system, Goog le had infringed on hi s Android Data mark. Goog le co un ter clai med t hat Specht had abandoned the mark after 2002, for fe itin g hi s abi li ty to assert any rights to i t. Becaus e we agr ee wi th the di stric t court that the undi sputed evidenc e in the recor d e st a bli shes that Specht abandoned t he mark, w e affi rm the di stric t cour t’s gr ant of sum mary judgment to Go ogle. Background Inspi red by the rece nt su cc ess of a numb er of technology start -ups, Erich Specht deci ded in 1998 to enter the bus iness
w or ld hims e lf. He desi gned a sui te of e-commerce softw are and formed Android Data Cor porat i on (ADC), thro ugh whi ch he intended to li cens e the softw are to cli ents. ADC also perfor med a numb er of other w eb-bas ed services to cli ents, inclu ding websi te hosting and des i gn, and computer consulting services

. T

w o y ears later

, Specht appli ed to reg i ster the tr ademark “Android Data” wi th the Uni ted St ates P atent and T rademark Offi ce. The app li cati on w as approv ed in 2002. Despi te the tr ademark’s approv al, by the end of 2002 ADC stopped major oper ations

. That yea r , the company lost fi v e cli ents, prompting Specht to lay off hi s only employ ee, c ancel ADC’s internet service contract, and mov e the bus iness into hi s home. Signi fying the end of A DC ’s li fe, he tr ansferr ed all of ADC’s assets, inclu ding i ts softw are and the reg i stered “Android Data” mark, to another of hi s wholly-owned compani es, The Android’s Dun geo n, I ncorpor ated (ADI). Specht spent all of the next y ear uns ucc essf ully seeking a buyerNo. 11-3317 3
for ADC’s assets. As A DC w as i dle, he also shut off i ts phone line that y ear

. After 2002, Specht’s bus iness acti viti es w ere li mi ted. He continued to host ADC’s w ebsi te a whi le lon ger and conduc ted
some hosting services for other s. But he let the reg i strat i on for the company’s URL (android data.com) lapse in 2005, at whi ch tim e he could no longer be reached at hi s associ ated emai l address. Specht pas sed out bus iness cards in 2005 bearin g the Android Data mark, but the recor d does not di scl ose how many , to whom, or why

. In 2007, about fi v e y ears after he fi rst began to wind down ADC’s oper ations, Specht atte mpted t o rev i v e the use of the Android Data mark. First, to promo te hi s softw are sui te to catalog compani es, S pecht sent o ut a mass mai ling in Dec ember 200 7 w ith the Android Data mark. These mai lings gar nered
no sales. Second, tw o months later , Specht atte mpted to li cens e hi s softw are to a healthcare consu ltin g fi rm , a l so to no av ai l. He made no other use of “Android Data” in 2 0 0 7 o r t he next y ear

. In Ap r il 2 0 09, he used the mark once again when he
resurr ected hi s w ebsi te, albei t wi th a sli ghtly di ff e r e nt URL (android -data.com) becau se hi s prev i ous URL had by then been reg i stered by a thi rd party

. He also assi gned the Android Data mark to ADI, ret ro acti v e to the Decembe r 2002 asset tr ansfer

. Meanwhi le, during the y ears that Specht strugg led wi th hi s shrinking busine ss, another technology start -up calling i tself “Android, In corpor ated” began dev elopin g what w ould become known as the Android oper atin g system fo r smart p ho nes. Goog le purchas ed Android, Inc., in 2005. T w o y ear s4 No. 11-3317
after the purchas e, Goog le released to the publi c a beta v ersi on of i ts Android softw are. Thi s release, in N o v ember 2007, occurred about a month before Specht had atte mpted to rev i v e hi s use of the Android Data mark in his mail mai ling that December

. Goog le’s beta release of Android in Nov embe r 2007 allow ed softw are dev elop e rs to populate the market place for Android appli cati ons before the fini shed product appeared on a mo bil e phone. About a y ear after Android’s beta release, under a li cens e from Goog le, T -Mobi le US, Inc., released the fi rst publi cly-av ai lable smartphone to run Android. Ev er since A ndroid’s beta release, Goog le has continuousl y been using the Android mark. Google tried in Nov ember 2007 to reg i ster “Android” as i ts own tr ademark, but the P atent and T ra demark Offi ce deni ed that appli cati on an d Goog le’s sub sequent appeal, ci tin g the li kelih ood of confus i on wi th Specht’s Android Data mark. Specht, ADC, and ADI sued Goog le, the founders of Android, Inc., and the Open Handset Alli ance (an indus tr y consortium create d t o foster innov ation in mobi le phone technology ) ov er the use of the A nd r o id mark. The plainti ffs (wh om we wi ll, except where necess ar y , refer to si mply as “Specht”) rais e tw o clai ms under the Lanham A ct : one for tr ademark infr ingement, see 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), and one for unfai r competi tion, see id. § 1125(a). They also adv ance a clai m for a violati on of Illinoi s’s Decepti v e T rade Practi ces Act, see 815 ILCS 510/2, and t w o claim s for common-law tr ademark violati ons.No. 11-3317 5
The di st r i ct court di smi ssed all of the defendants except Goog le. No clai m could be stated again st A nd r o i d, Inc.’s founders, the court explain ed, becau se a s corpor ate offi cers they w ere not li able for Goog le’s acti ons. Th e Open Hands et Alli ance w as di smi ssed bec ause i t does not exis t as a di stinct legal entity

. The di stric t court also di smi ssed Specht and ADC
as plainti ffs from the infringeme nt cl ai m; since Specht and ADC no longer owned the Android Data mark, the court ruled that only ADI had standing to assert infringement. Goog le
answered the surviving allegations, rais ing tw o counterclai ms relev ant to thi s appeal. First, i t sought a declaration that Specht had abandoned the mark, depriving hi m and hi s compani es of any rights to i t. (Thi s clai m also func tions as an affi rmativ e defense to Specht’s Lanham Act clai ms.) Second, Goog le asked the di stric t courtto cancel the plainti ff’s m ark

. After Goog le mov ed for sum mary judgment, the parties locke d horns ov er what evidenc e w as proper ly before the court. Goog le challen ged the admi ssi bi li ty of a slew of Specht’s evidenc e. Relev ant to thi s appeal, Goog le challen ged Specht’s atte mpts to sub mi t screensh ots from webp a g e s of Specht’s former cli ents from 2005, bearin g the Android Data mark. The contested screensh ots w ere from an internet archi v e ser v i ce. The di stric t court excluded these screensh ots becau se, wi thout
an affi davit describing the reliab i li ty of the arc hiv e service, they w ere not proper ly authenti cated. S ee F E D

. R. E VI D

. 901. Specht al so br ought evidenti ary objections of hi s own. As relev ant here, he objecte d to Goog le’s screenshots of S pecht’s
o wn w ebsi te from August 2010 and to tw o of Goog le ’ s p r e ss releases from Nov e mb e r 2007 about the Android oper atin g
s ys te m
. B u t the di stric t court ov err uled both objections be c a u s e6 No. 11-3317 Specht had sub mi tte d an i denti cal screensh ot and had alleged in hi s compl aint the infor mati on from t he press releases. Eviden ti a ry i s s u e s re solv ed, the di stric t court addressed the merits. It found that Specht had abandoned the m ark in 2002; the few tim es Specht used the Android Data mark a fter 2002 di d not demons tr ate continu ed use or in tent t o r esum e use of the mark. Becaus e Specht there fore had forfeited any rights he mi ght hav e to the mark, the di stric t co urt ruled that all of Specht’s clai ms fai led as a matter of law

. The di stric t court also i ssu ed Goog le’s r equested declaration, and canc eled Specht’s reg i strat i on. Analysis Before w e proceed w e mus t address appellate jurisdi cti on. Goog le fi led a numb er of cross- cl ai ms that i t later di smi ssed wi thout prej udi ce, permi tting i t to reins t a t e t ho se clai ms at some lat er poin t. Becaus e these cl a ims mi ght be r enew ed, w e or dinaril y w ould di smi ss thi s appeal for lack of finali ty as the li tigati on on those di smi ssed clai ms has not come to a conclu

si on in t he di stric t court. But at or al arg ument Goog le repr esented that i t w a s wil l ing to di smi ss those clai ms wi th prej udi ce. Under au thor i ty such as JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Moto r Fue ls, Inc. , 190 F .3d 775, 776–77 (7th Ci r
. 1999), and First Health Group Corp. v
. BCE Emer gis Corp. , 269 F .3d 800, 801–02 (7th Ci r
. 2001 ), Goog le’s repr esentation suffi ces to make the di stric t court’s entry of j ud g me nt appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Assu red of our authority to resolv e thi s appeal, w e turn to the merits, fi rst addressing tw o procedural rulings that preceded the deci si on on summ ary judgment.No. 11-3317 7 Specht fi rst attacks the di stric t court’s di smi ssal of hi m and ADC as plainti ffs in the tr ademark infringement clai m, but the ruling w as corr ect. The Lanham Act gr ants standing to tr ademark reg i strants, defining that ter m to in c lu de reg i strants and their “legal repr esentativ es, predecessors, suc cess or s, and assi gns.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Specht arg ues that, becau se the defini tion of “reg i strant” in the L a nham Act i s conjuncti v e, both the reg i strants ( Specht an d ADC) and the as si gnee ( ADI) hav e standing to sue. But the Lanham Act tr ansfers standing to assi gnees, ev en i f that party i s not the reg i strant, to ensure that only the current owner of the mark can clai m inf r ing ement. See Gaia T

echs, Inc. v
. Reconver sion T e c h s
. , In c. , 93 F .3d 774, 780 (Fed. Ci r
. 1996); Gillette Co. v
. Kempel , 254 F .2d 402, 404 (C.C.P .A. 1958) (“the assi gnee of a reg i strat i on stand s in the place of the reg i strant in all respects”). Sinc e that party i s now ADI, only ADI has standing to clai m that the Android Data mark has been infringed. Specht’s second procedural challen ge concerns evidenti ary rulings t hat the di stric t court made befor e ruling on Goog le’s
summa r y judgment motion. He contests the exclusi on of the screensh ots of certain cl ie nt w ebsi tes as they supp osedly appeared in 2005, bearing the Andr oid D ata m ark

. He arg ues that the screensh ots are admi ssi ble becau se the creato rs of the si tes asserted from memory that the screensh ots reflected how those si tes appeared in 2005. But the dis tr i ct court r easonably required mo r e t han memory , whi ch i s falli

ble; i t required authenti cati on by someone wi th personal knowledge o f reliab i li ty of the archi v e service fr o m whi ch the screensh ots
w ere ret riev ed. See United States v
. Bansal, 663 F .3d 634, 667–68 (3d Ci r
. 2011) (sc reenshots from internet archi v e authenti cated8 No. 11-3317
via testim o ny of wi tness wi th personal knowledge of how internet archi v e w or ks). Specht also arg ue s that the di stric t court i mproper ly too k judi ci al notic e of news art i cles reflectin g Goog le’s asserti on that i t fi rst used “Android” in commerce in N ov ember 2007. But the fact that Goog le fi rst relea se d a
v ersi on of the Androi d softw are in Nov ember 2007 w as alleged in S pecht’s complaint. That allegation is binding on Specht at summary judgment. See Crest Hill Land Developmen t, LLC v
. City of Joliet, 396 F .3d 801, 805 (7th C ir

. 2005); Kelle r v
. United States , 58 F .3d 1194, 1199 n.8 (7th Ci r . 1995). Wi th the procedural i ssu es res o l v ed, we finally reach the central i ssu e of thi s appeal—whether the undi sputed evidenc e shows that the “ A ndroid Data” tr ademark w as abandoned after 2002. If Specht abandoned and nev er resumed use of the mark, then Goog le could not hav e infringe d o n Specht’s intelle ct ua l proper ty when i t later released the Android oper atin g system in 2007. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Central Mfg., Inc.
v
. Brett, 492 F .3d 876, 881 (7th Ci r
. 2007). A tr ademark i s abandoned i f i ts “ use in commerce” has been di scontinued wi th no intent to resume use. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Rust Env’t & Infra s tr u c tu re, Inc. v
. T

eun issen , 131 F .3d 1210, 1214 (7th Ci r
. 1997). Under the Lanham Act, “ [n ]o nus e for 3 consecuti v e y ears shall be prim a faci e evidenc e of abandonment,” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. A prim a facie showin g of abandonment may be rebutte d wi th evidenc e excusing the nonuse or demonstrating
an intent to resume use. See Sands, T aylor & W

ood Co. v
. Quaker Oats Co. , 978 F .2d 947, 955 (7th Ci r
. 1992). But the intent to
resume use in commerce mus t be formulated wi thin the three y ears of nonuse. ITC Ltd. v
. Punc hgini, Inc. , 482 F .3d 135, 149 n.9 (2d Ci r
. 2007); Imperi al T ob ac co Ltd., Assignee of Imperial GroupNo. 11-3317 9
PLC v
. Philip Morris, Inc. , 899 F .2d 1575, 1581 (Fe d

. C ir

. 1990). Furt hermor e, the use mus t pert ain to the sale of g oods or prov i si on of services. S e e 1 5 U.S.C. § 1127; United Drug Co. v
. The odor e Rectanus Co. , 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Rearden LLC v
. Rearden Commer ce, Inc. , 683 F .3d 1190, 1204 (9th Ci r
. 2012); Int’l Bancorp, LLC v
. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cer cle des Estrangers a Ma naco , 329 F .3d 359, 364 (4th Ci r . 2003). Under these prin ci ples, thi s appeal turns on three dates: the date (i f any) that Specht di scontinued using the Android Data mark, the date Goog le began using the A nd r o id mark in commerce an d a cq uired rights t o i t, and the date (i f any ) that Specht intended to resume use of the mark. W e di scu ss each in turn. Wi th respect to Specht’s di scontinued use of the mark, the evidenc e i s conclu siv e that Specht ceased using the Android Data mark at the end of 2002. Th a t is t he y ear that ADC essenti ally shu t down after losing fi v e cli ents, layin g off i ts one employ ee, and tr ansferr ing it s assets to ADI. Specht ci tes to four acti viti es that he beli ev es show hi s continued use of the Android Data mark after 2002, but they ar e insu ffi ci ent. First Specht notes that he a t t e mpted to sell hi s bus iness ’s assets in 2003 and 2004. But an effo r t t o sell the assets of a bus iness i s di fferent from tr ading on the goo dwi ll of a tr ademark t o sell a bus iness ’s goo ds or services and therefor e does not consti tute a use of the mark in commerce. See Electro Source, LLC v
. Brandess-Kalt-Aet na Grp., Inc. , 458 F .3d 931, 938 n.5 (9th Ci r . 2006). Second, Specht observ es t hat ADC’s phone ser vic e
w as not canc eled unti l 2003. But Specht inc l uded any phone10 No. 11-3317
expenses from 2003 o n A DC ’s 2002 balanc e sheet preci sely becau se, in hi s vi ew

, ADC di d not o perat e in 2003. The remaining tw o acti viti es are also insu ffi ci ent to show a resumpti on of use. Specht poin ts out t hat ADC’s w ebsi te w as oper atin g unti l 2005, and a w ebsi te that bears a tr ademark may consti tute a bo na fi de use in commerce. See generally N. Am. Med. Corp. v
. Axiom W orldwid e, Inc. , 522 F .3d 1211 (11th Ci r
. 2008). But Specht di d not identi fy any go ods or servic es ADC could hav e prov i ded thro ugh or in connecti on wi th the websi te aft e r 2 0 02. Cf. Rescu ecom Corp. v
. Google Inc. , 562 F .3d 123, 129–30 (2d C ir

. 2009); N. Am. Med. Corp. , 522 F .3d at 1218–19. As such, the w ebsi te w as not a use in commerce. Specht’s reply th a t the si te av erag ed 2,925 monthly vis i tor s (actually the
recor d shows only 808 monthly vis i ts), goe s nowhere becau se he furni shed no evidenc e of any commerci al intere st a s s oc i a ted wi th the vis i t s. Fin ally , Specht maintains that hi s tw o sales efforts in 2007 (the mass mai ling and hi s fai led bi d to l ice nse softw are t o a healthcare fi rm) are evi dence of commerci al use of the mark. But these tw o efforts w ere i solated and not
sus tained; sporadic atte mpts t o soli ci t business are nota “use in commerce” meriting the prot ecti on of the La nh a m Act. S e e Z azu Design s v
. L’Oreal, S.A. , 979 F .2d 499, 503 (7th C ir

. 1992); Akt ieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v
. Fame Jeans Inc. , 525 F .3d 8, 20 (D.C. Ci r
. 2 0 08). The di stric t court, there fore, cor
rectly deter mined that Specht had abandoned the mark at the end of 2002. That brings us to the questi on of when Goog le fi rst used the

w or d “Android” in commerce, and the evidenc e i s undi sputed that i t di d so in Nov ember 2007. Specht concedes the poin t, but arg ues that Goog le nev er a cq ui red any lasting right to theNo. 11-3317 11
Android mark becau se Goog le r e l eased i ts oper atin g system wi thout ret aining contro l ov er how dev elo p e r s or mobi lephone compani es li ke T -Mobi le could use the softw are, giving them a so-call ed “naked li cens e.” W e see a numb er of flaws wi th Specht’s “ nak ed li cens e” arg ument. First, he rais es i t for the fi rst tim e on appeal, and so i t i s w ai v ed. See Frey Corp. v
. City of Peoria, Ill. , 735 F .3d 505, 509 (7th Ci r
. 2013); Perry v
. Sul livan , 207 F .3d 379 , 3 8 3 (7 t h Ci r
. 2000). Second, becau se a naked li cens or abandons an alreadyowne d mark, see Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v
. Halanick Enters., Inc. , 639 F .3d 788, 790 (7th Ci r
. 2011); Doebler’s Penns ylvania Hybrids, Inc.
v
. Doebler

, 442 F

. 3 d 8 1 2 , 823–24 (3d Ci r
. 2006), Specht’s arg ument presupposes that Goog le had an enforceable right to the And ro i d mark, a posi tion t hat undercuts Specht’s clai m t o be the holder of that right. Thi rd, an arg ume nt about naked li cens ing i s an argument about Goog le’s rights against li cens
ees, and li cens ees are notan i ssu e in thi s cas e. Ev en i f w e put these flaws a sid e , Specht’s arg ument does not address the di stric t court’s sound co nclu si on that Goog le becam e the s eni or user of the Androi d mark wh en i t u sed the mark in commerce in Nov ember 2007. By the n, the Android mark lay abandoned. Once a mark i s abandoned, i t returns to the publi c domain, and may be appropr i ated anew

. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v
. Metr o. Baltimor

e Footb all Clu b Ltd. P’Ship , 34 F .3d 410, 412 (7th Ci r
. 1994); ITC Ltd. , 482 F .3d at 147. By adopting the abandoned mark fi rst, Goog le becam e the seni or user

, entitled to asser t r ights to the Android mark again st the w or ld. Its use since Nov ember 20 0 7 has been uninterr upted a nd continuous. That i s enough to w arr ant tr ademark prot ecti on. See Zazu Design s , 979 F .2d at 503; Blue12 No. 11-3317 Bell, Inc. v
. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc. , 508 F .2d 1260, 1265 (5th Ci r
. 1975) ( “ev en a single use in tr ade may sus tain tr ademark rights i f follow ed by continuous commerci al ut ilizat i on”); see also Planetary Mot ion, Inc. v
. T echsplosion, Inc. , 261 F .3 d 1 188, 1194–95 (11th Ci r
. 2001) (release of softw are to end users i s use in commerce ev en though no sale w as made)

. Specht replies that, ev en i f he had a ba ndo ned the mark after 2002, he ei ther resumed using or d e vel oped an intent to
resume using the Android Data mark by December 2007, again ci tin g hi s mass mai ling. But by then i t w as too late. Specht had abandoned the mark by t he end of 2002, and more than thr ee y ears had pass ed before Goog le publi ci zed i ts release of the Android o perat ing system in November 2007. Wi th the mar k permanently abandoned by Nov ember 2007, Specht could not reclai m i t the fo l l o win g month. The di stric t court there fore
corr ectly gr anted sum mary judgment on all of Specht’s clai ms. See TMT N. Amer

. v. Magic T

ouch GmbH

, 124 F .3d 876, 885 (7th Ci r
. 1997) (“aband onment

... result[s] in the loss of tr ademark rights against the w or ld”). T w o final matter s remain

. First, Specht arg ues that the di stric t court canc eled hi s mark wi thout the authority to do so. Although 15 U.S.C. § 1119 gr ants courts the authority to canc el
a t r a demark’s reg i strat i on, the di stric t court here ci ted 1 5 U.S.C. § 1064 , wh i ch authorizes si mi lar acti on by the P atent and T rademark Offi ce. The di stric t court’s ci tation t o the incorre ct statuto ry prov i si on does not inv ali date i ts authority to canc el the mar k. And canc ellation in thi s case w as proper

. “Where, as here, a reg i st rant’ s asserted rights to a mark are shown to be inv ali d, canc ellation i s not merely app ro priate, i t i s the best course.” Central Mfg. , 492 F .3d at 883.No. 11-3317 13
Fin ally , Specht arg ues that the di stric t court i mproper ly
aw arded costs becau se the judgment w as si lent about whether the losing party w as to bear the costs of the li tigati on. Thi s arg ument i s fri v olous. A judgmen t si lent about costs i s a judgment allowing costs to the prev ai ling party

. Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v
. T ouche, Ross & Co. , 854 F .2d 219, 221 (7th Ci r
. 1988). Specht’s arg ument t ha t Go ogle i s not the prev ai ling party lacks any merit. Goo gle i s the only party to t he sui t who suc ceeded on a si gni fi cant legal i ssu e in the sui t. See Kin g v
. Ill. State Bd. of Elections , 410 F .3d 404, 414 & n.10 (7th Ci r
. 2005). Indeed , Goog le w as aw arded all the relief for whi ch i t asked. The or der gr anting costs to Goog le w as proper

. AFF IRM ED.