COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00027-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., THE 

CHILD

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FROM THE 393RD DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 2012-61009-393

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellants N.K. (Mother) and J.R. (Father) appeal the trial court’s order 

terminating their parental rights to their daughter, A.R. We will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Mother and Father were both twenty years old when A.R. was born in May 

2012. A social worker at the hospital met with the couple to address several 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

concerns that were raised regarding their ability to care for A.R. Although the 

hospital released A.R. into Mother’s and Father’s care, a report was made to 

CPS detailing concerns about A.R.’s safety and care, including that Mother and 

Father needed multiple explanations about how to perform basic tasks for A.R.

(like properly preparing a bottle), that there was domestic violence occurring in 

the household (there were holes in the wall of the apartment), and that the family

home was not yet ready for A.R. CPS consequently initiated an investigation and 

recommended that Mother and Father participate in family-based safety services, 

such as counseling and parenting classes. During that period of time, Mother 

and Father were “very defensive” about CPS’s involvement in their lives, were 

openly hostile to investigators at times, and failed to complete the services. 

Concerned about Mother’s and Father’s ability to ensure A.R.’s safety, in early 

August 2012, when A.R. was about two months old, Appellee Texas Department 

of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) filed its petition for protection of a 

child, for conservatorship, and for termination in suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship and removed A.R. from the parents’ care.

2 During the removal, a 

struggle ensued when Father refused to turn over A.R., and Father struck a CPS 

investigator. Police arrested Father and charged him with injury to a child and 

 

2CPS found reason to believe neglectful supervision by both Mother and 

Father and reason to believe physical abuse by Father based on an incident that 

occurred during A.R.’s removal.
3

assaulting a public servant; he remained incarcerated throughout the pendency 

of the case.

Between A.R.’s removal and the termination trial in January 2014, Mother

completed only part of her service plan, and one caseworker opined that Mother 

did not learn or benefit from the services that she did perform. Indeed, among 

other things, Mother refused to cooperate with one provider, she prohibited 

another provider from performing his job because she failed to complete an 

evaluation, and her hyper-religiousness, or preoccupation with religion, caused a 

number of providers serious concern about her ability to care for A.R. Mother 

testified at the termination trial that all of the service providers were conspiring 

with CPS to ensure that her parental rights were terminated, and she contended

that no service was offered for a legitimate purpose.

A jury found by clear and convincing evidence (1) that Mother and Father 

had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed A.R. to remain in conditions or 

surroundings that endangered her physical or emotional well-being; (2) that 

Mother and Father had engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed A.R. with 

persons who had engaged in conduct, that endangered her physical or emotional 

well-being; (3) that Mother and Father had failed to comply with the provisions of 

a court order that specifically established the actions necessary to obtain the 

return of A.R.; and (4) that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to 

A.R. was in the child’s best interests. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann.

§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (West 2014). Mother and Father appeal.
4

III. FATHER’S APPEAL

A. Evidentiary Sufficiency

Father argues in his first and second issues that the evidence is legally 

and factually insufficient to support the jury’s subsection 161.001(1)(D) and (E)

endangerment findings.

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a) (West 2014); In re 

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012). Evidence is clear and convincing if it 

“will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the 

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 101.007 (West 2014); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination 

cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the challenged ground for 

termination was proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We 

review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment, 

resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could 

have done so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have 

disbelieved. Id.

In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we determine whether, on 

the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief 

that the parent violated section 161.001(1). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; 
5

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire record, the 

disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of 

the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a 

firm belief or conviction in the truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually 

insufficient. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).

Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize. In re 

J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial 

court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed 

the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the physical or 

emotional well-being of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D). Under 

subsection (D), it is necessary to examine evidence related to the environment of 

the child to determine if the environment was the source of endangerment to the 

child’s physical or emotional well-being. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). A child is endangered when the 

environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but 

disregards. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, 

no pet.). Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the 

child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis 

in his home is a part of the “conditions or surroundings” of the child’s home under 

subsection 161.001(1)(D). Id. Conduct of a parent in the home can create an 
6

environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. 

J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125.

The trial court may also order termination of the parent-child relationship if 

it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct 

or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that 

endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 161.001(1)(E). Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether 

evidence exists that the endangerment of the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and 

failures to act. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. Termination under subsection (E) 

must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, 

and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. Id.; D.T., 34 S.W.3d 

at 634.

To support a finding of endangerment, the parent’s conduct does not 

necessarily have to be directed at the child, and the child is not required to suffer 

injury. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). 

The specific danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from parental 

misconduct alone, and to determine whether termination is necessary, courts 

may look to parental conduct both before and after the child’s birth. Id.; In re 

D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). A 

factfinder may also infer from past conduct endangering the well-being of the 

child that similar conduct will recur if the child is returned to the parent. In re 
7

M.M., No. 02-08-00029-CV, 2008 WL 5195353, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

Dec. 11, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). In conducting an evidentiary sufficiency 

review of a factfinder’s subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) findings, this court has 

previously considered, among other things, evidence that a child was exposed to 

domestic violence. See In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 818 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2007, no pet.).

Because the evidence pertaining to subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) is 

interrelated, we conduct a consolidated review. In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 

439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.); J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 126.

The record contains evidence from which the jury could have concluded 

that Father has committed, and is inclined to further commit, domestic violence.3

Mother and Father have a history of engaging in heated arguments laced with 

profanity. On one occasion in April 2012, Mother, who was pregnant, called 911 

after an argument with Father because she thought that she had gone into labor. 

On another occasion, in a recorded conversation, Father threatened to sodomize 

Mother and to kill himself. Mother downplayed the severity of the incidents or

altogether denied that domestic violence was occurring in the household, and

one provider expressed concern about Mother’s outright refusal to answer 

 

3One of Mother’s provider’s defined domestic violence as “the continued 

and purposeful demeaning and abuse of a partner or a family member through 

physical, emotional, sexual and financial means.”
8

questions about potential domestic violence. Once Father became aggressive 

and yelled obscenities at a CPS investigator.

The jury also heard evidence relating to physical violence. CPS had 

questions and concerns about multiple holes in the sheetrock of Mother and 

Father’s apartment. Mother claimed that the holes were caused by Father’s 

roughhousing with friends, but a caseworker believed that Mother and Father 

were untruthful about their origin. In another incident, Father endangered A.R. 

during an altercation with CPS investigators and police when CPS attempted to 

remove A.R. from Mother’s and Father’s care. Holding A.R., Father became irate 

when officers prohibited him from leaving the residence. A.R. began crying and 

turning “red, almost purple,” and when a caseworker attempted to retrieve A.R. 

from Father—thinking that A.R. was in “extreme distress” in Father’s arm—he 

grabbed one of A.R.’s legs and struck the caseworker’s face. A.R. went to the 

hospital afterwards and had a cast placed on one of her legs. A caseworker 

opined that the chances of domestic violence occurring in the future between 

Mother and Father were “very great.”

Additional endangering conduct by Father included his inability to 

understand how to properly care for A.R. Father was A.R.’s primary caregiver 

after Mother returned to work (Father was unemployed), and Mother testified that 

she intended to stay with Father after his release from jail. The initial report to 

CPS regarding A.R. included concerns about Father’s need to have certain 

caregiving activities explained to him multiple times. Indeed, during the 
9

investigation stage, Father confirmed that he was “slow,” that he did not know 

how to read, and that he needed things explained to him several times. When an

investigator attempted to discuss basic newborn care with Father—e.g., how 

many ounces of water and formula go into a bottle and how many feedings 

should be performed in a day—Mother interrupted and attempted to answer for 

him. When the investigator redirected the question to Father, he said that he did 

not know and that he needed multiple explanations. The investigator 

demonstrated how to prepare a bottle for A.R., and even made a chart for Father

to use, but he did not grasp the process. Along those lines, a nurse practitioner

from PediPlace testified that Mother and Father had expressed concern to her 

about A.R. vomiting—which is caused by overfeeding—even after they had

previously been counseled about overfeeding A.R.

A psychologist who examined Father described him as “quite immature”; 

explained that Father’s responses were akin to something that he would expect 

from a seven-, eight-, or nine-year-old child; and opined that Father had “some 

rather grandiose or unrealistic and narcissistic beliefs about himself.” According 

to the psychologist, narcissistic individuals believe that they possess abilities that 

other people do not have, and an example of this in Father’s case was his belief

for a brief period of time that A.R., a newborn baby, could communicate with him 

by squeezing his finger—once meaning that she needed a diaper change and 

twice meaning that she needed a feeding. According to the psychologist, 

Father’s narcissism “will negatively impact his ability to appreciate how his 
10

choices affect [A.R.’s] well-being,” and his immaturity could pose a danger to a 

small child in his care. Likewise, a nurse practitioner testified that she had 

concerns about A.R.’s basic care, and one of Father’s caseworkers testified that 

she did not believe that Father had the ability to properly care for a young child.

Father additionally endangered A.R. through his ongoing association and 

relationship with Mother. A number of providers expressed concern about 

Mother’s refusal to communicate with them during counseling and her repeated 

references to and invocation of religion, which effectively hampered or prohibited 

the sessions from progressing. One provider provisionally diagnosed Mother as 

having features of a schizotypal personality and explained that “the extremity and 

pervasiveness of her spiritual beliefs can be viewed as pathological and interfere 

with important aspects of her functioning.” In other words, Mother uses her 

“religiosity . . . [as] a defense against [the things that are complex, stressful, or 

threatening to her] by saying, hey, nobody can say anything, that I’m doing 

anything wrong because it’s based on my religion. So that way, I can’t be 

criticized, I can’t be given feedback, I can’t be challenged.” According to the 

provider, Mother’s preoccupation with religion interfered with her daily life and 

can put a child at risk.

Similarly, a psychiatrist who examined Mother was unable to make a 

formal diagnosis because Mother refused to answer numerous questions, but he 

did express concern about mother’s “hyper-religious attitude, as well as her 

inability to be open with” him. The psychiatrist opined that Mother’s behavior 
11

could be indicative of schizotypal personality disorder, in which “one does not

have intact reality testing.” As that pertains to Mother’s ability to parent, the 

psychiatrist expressed concern that Mother was “unable to assess situations with 

[her] child and properly care for [her].”

4

There was no indication in the record that 

Father did not intend to be in a relationship with Mother in the future.

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the 

jury’s family code subsection 161.001(1)(D) and (E) endangerment findings. We 

overrule Father’s first and second issues. Because only one ground under 

section 161.001(1) is needed to support termination, we do no reach Father’s 

third issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s 

subsection (O) finding. See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005).

B. Directed Verdict

In his fourth issue, Father argues that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion for a directed verdict because one of the requirements of family code 

section 161.003 (that the illness or deficiency will continue to render the parent 

unable to provide for the child’s needs until her eighteenth birthday) is implicitly 

required by subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E), and TDFPS failed to meet its 

burden of proof as to the implied requirement. Father’s directed-verdict motion 

did not include this specific ground for relief. Because his argument on appeal 

 

4When asked what she would do if A.R. was sick, Mother responded that 

she would “pray over” A.R. and “pour the blood of Jesus over” her to help heal 

her. After some prompting, Mother said that she would then take A.R. to the 

doctor.
12

does not comport with his motion at trial, he failed to preserve this issue for 

appellate review.5 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). We overrule Father’s fourth 

issue.

IV. MOTHER’S APPEAL

Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw 

as counsel and a brief in support of that motion.6 Counsel’s brief and motion 

meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional 

evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no reversible grounds on 

appeal and referencing any grounds that might arguably support the appeal. See

386 U.S. 738, 741, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). This court previously has held 

that Anders procedures apply in parental termination cases. See In re K.M., 98 

S.W.3d 774, 776‒77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

In our duties as a reviewing court, we must conduct an independent 

evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining 

that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922‒23 (Tex. App.—Fort 

 

5We also note that Father asserted only factual sufficiency grounds in his 

motion for a directed verdict. While a trial court may grant a motion for judgment

on legal or factual sufficiency grounds, see Qantel Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Custom 

Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. 1988), a motion for directed verdict

challenges the existence of legally sufficient evidence to support a ground. See 

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 

2000).

6Mother filed what we construed to be a response.
13

Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82‒83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the appellate record, counsel’s brief, and 

Mother’s response. We agree that Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous and 

without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the 

appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

Accordingly, we grant Mother’s appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw.

V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Father’s dispositive issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

order terminating the parent-child relationship between Father and A.R. Having 

determined that Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit, and having 

granted Mother’s appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, we affirm the trial 

court’s order terminating the parent-child relationship between Mother and A.R.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: July 17, 2014