PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 23-4072

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMIE CHRISTOPHER HENDERSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:20-cr-00088-FL-1) 

Argued: May 8, 2024 Decided: July 9, 2024 

Before AGEE and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in which Judge 

Agee and Judge Thacker joined. 

ARGUED: Paul K. Sun, Jr., ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Lucy Partain Brown, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS & 

WINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United 

States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, John L. Gibbons, 

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Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge:

Jamie Christopher Henderson (“Henderson”) appeals his convictions and sentence

following a jury trial for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine base, and possession of firearms in furtherance of his drug 

trafficking crimes. Henderson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support these 

convictions, and that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We 

affirm.

I.

On April 30, 2019, law enforcement officers with the Robeson County, North 

Carolina, Sheriff’s Office executed a search warrant at Henderson’s residence. Just prior 

to the arrival of the officers, a blue car pulled into the front yard of the residence and 

Henderson walked out to it. As the officers approached the residence, they witnessed 

Henderson open his hand and toss items underneath the vehicle, including a gun that he 

retrieved from his back pocket or waistband. The officers recovered a loaded .45 caliber 

Glock handgun, a plastic bag with 2.61 grams of powder cocaine and 3.37 grams of crack 

cocaine, a cigarette lighter, and a glass crack pipe from underneath the vehicle. Henderson 

was placed under arrest. Two men fled from the rear of the trailer when the officers arrived. 

Inside the trailer, a third man, who was legally blind, was lying on the couch with a 

loaded AR-15 style rifle next to him. Police found a loaded handgun, cocaine powder and 

crack cocaine in a toilet tank, and a second loaded handgun was found in the bottom of a

kitchen trash can. Police also seized three digital scales, one of which contained white 

powder residue, and a digital video recorder containing footage from security cameras 

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located on the exterior of the residence. The videos spanned the week prior to Henderson’s 

arrest and depicted Henderson and other men, armed with multiple handguns and an AR15 style rifle, standing in the front yard of the residence as cars and people would approach 

it. On one occasion, Henderson is seen repeatedly aiming an AR-15 style rifle at a vehicle 

approaching the residence. Other video clips depict an armed Henderson distributing crack 

cocaine to various men through the backdoor of the residence, while another man is 

positioned strategically to ensure that he is behind the customer during the transaction. Still 

other clips show Henderson on the front porch of the residence conducting drug sales. 

Henderson, who is often seated at a table, is seen measuring drugs on a scale, selling drugs 

to customers with an easily accessible handgun placed on the table in front of him, and 

counting money.

A few months after his arrest, Henderson sent word through his sister that he wanted 

to speak with Major Damien McLean, a deputy sheriff with the Robeson County Sheriff’s 

Office, who was married to one of Henderson’s family members. After executing Miranda 

and Sixth Amendment waiver forms, Henderson provided a videotaped statement to Major 

McLean and Lieutenant Terry Sampson, who was also with the Robeson County Sheriff’s 

Office. During the interview, Henderson confessed to being a drug trafficking 

“middleman” in a cocaine distribution ring that had been operating in the Robeson County 

area from 2015 until his arrest in 2019. He identified several of his suppliers and told the 

officers that he had obtained a total of approximately 25 kilograms of cocaine from the

suppliers during this time period. After one of his suppliers (“Leon, Jr.”) introduced him 

to a drug trafficker by the name of “Red Cloud,” Henderson cut Leon, Jr., out of the chain 

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and began dealing primarily with Red Cloud. Henderson admitted that he was dealing in 

“major weight” drugs that he first obtained from Red Cloud and, if Red Cloud didn’t have 

the drugs, he would go to the other local suppliers. Henderson stated that he had obtained 

approximately 20 kilograms of cocaine from Red Cloud alone. When asked how he

became a middleman in the operation, Henderson stated that he would “get out and 

network” in various places in the area. J.A. 486. Detective Sampson had worked in the 

Narcotics Division at the Robeson County Sheriff’s Office for more than ten years and was 

assigned to the ATF Task Force. He was personally familiar with Red Cloud, as well as at 

least six of the other named drug suppliers and traffickers, and he confirmed that Henderson 

had accurately identified the suppliers and their locations.

Henderson remained in custody after his arrest, during which time he wrote an 

incriminating letter to his brother that was intercepted by jail personnel and turned over to 

the prosecution. Among other things, Henderson tells his brother that “I could easy have 

been a rat and told on everybody, but I’m going to trial.” J.A. 294. He asks his brother to

get “Chandler and Dusty and Nick” to “say that I did not live” in the trailer and “then [the]

case will be dismissed. They cannot go back and charge anyone.” J.A. 294. He goes on 

to state that he “know[s] Nick and them gonna step up for me.” J.A. 294.

A grand jury returned a five-count superseding indictment against Henderson, 

charging him with: (1) conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and a 

quantity of cocaine base, from 2015 and continuing until on or about April 30, 2019, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); possession of a firearm, 

in furtherance of the drug-distribution conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) 

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(Count Two); possession with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine and a quantity of 

cocaine base, on or about April 30, 2019, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 

Three); possession of a firearm in furtherance of the possession-with-intent offense, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Four); and possession of a firearm as a felon, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Five). Henderson pleaded not guilty.

At trial, the Government presented, inter alia, the testimony of the law enforcement 

officers, Henderson’s videotaped confession, the security footage from the trailer, and the 

letter Henderson had written to his brother. Henderson presented the testimony of his 

mother and daughter who claimed that Henderson was a drug user, thief, and liar—but not 

a drug dealer. 

The jury convicted Henderson on all counts. On the Count One conspiracy offense, 

the jury found Henderson accountable for less than 500 grams of cocaine and a quantity of 

cocaine base (crack). On the Count Three offense, the jury found Henderson guilty of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack) only. Following a two-day 

sentencing hearing, the court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 324 months 

imprisonment—which was comprised of 120 months on Counts One and Three, 

concurrent; 60 months on Count Two, consecutive; 60 months on Count Four, consecutive;

and 84 months on Count Five, consecutive. The court also imposed terms of supervised 

release for each count. On appeal, Henderson challenges his convictions and sentences on 

Counts One through Four.1

1 Henderson has not argued that his conviction on Count Five should be reversed.

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II.

“A defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” 

United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490, 499 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Although we 

review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, our role is limited to 

considering whether there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the 

Government, to support the conviction.” United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 232 (4th 

Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact 

could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “[A]ppellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence 

is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Savage, 885 

F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

A.

We begin with Henderson’s challenge to his Count One conspiracy conviction and 

its accompanying Count Two firearms charge. To prove the charged conspiracy, the 

government was required to establish that “(1) an agreement to distribute and possess 

cocaine [or cocaine base] with intent to distribute existed between two or more persons; 

(2) [Henderson] knew of the conspiracy; and (3) [Henderson] knowingly and voluntarily 

became a part of the conspiracy.” United States v. Hackley, 662 F.3d 671, 678 (4th Cir. 

2011) (cleaned up). The underlying “agreement need not be formal and may instead be a 

tacit or mutual understanding between the defendant and his accomplice.” United States 

v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). “[E]vidence of 

continuing relationships and repeated transactions can support the finding that there was a 

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conspiracy, especially when coupled with substantial quantities of drugs,” United States v. 

Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). And while “[a] mere buyer-seller relationship is 

insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction,” such evidence is relevant and probative 

“on the issue of whether a conspiratorial relationship exists.” United States v. Howard, 773 

F.3d 519, 525-26 (4th Cir. 2014).

Henderson argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment 

of acquittal on Counts One and Two because his confession was insufficient as a matter of 

law to prove his involvement in a drug trafficking conspiracy and, in his view, the 

government failed to offer the independent corroborating evidence of conspiracy necessary 

to support a conviction. He claims that his confession was false and that the evidence 

presented by the government was at most sufficient to prove buyer-seller relationships, but 

not a conspiracy to deal in drugs. We are unpersuaded.

“‘[I]t is a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice in the federal 

courts that a conviction must rest upon firmer ground than the uncorroborated admission 

or confession of the accused’ made after commission of a crime.” United States v. Abu Ali, 

528 F.3d 210, 234 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-

89 (1963)). “This is so because the doubt persists that the zeal of the agencies of 

prosecution to protect the peace or the aberration or weakness of the accused under the 

strain of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of the confession.” Id. (cleaned up). Courts, 

therefore, “require corroboration to prevent confessions to crimes never committed and 

convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.” Id. (cleaned up). 

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Nonetheless, “the Supreme Court has cautioned that since this corroboration rule 

infringes on the province of the primary finder of facts, its application should be scrutinized 

lest the restrictions it imposes surpass the dangers which gave rise to them.” Id. at 234-35

(cleaned up). “[T]he government must introduce substantial independent evidence which 

would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant’s statement,” but the 

“corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the defendant’s 

incriminatory statements, to establish the corpus delicti.” Id. at 235 (cleaned up). Thus, 

“it is sufficient if the corroboration supports—not establishes—the essential facts 

admitted,” and the “corroboration need only tend to establish—not establish—the 

trustworthiness of the confession.” Id. at 237. 

Relying primarily upon our decision in United States v. Stephens, 482 F.3d 669 (4th 

Cir. 2007), Henderson argues that his confession to being a middleman and networker in 

the Robeson County drug conspiracy was not sufficiently corroborated. We are 

unpersuaded.

In Stephens, the defendant was taken into custody after a police officer heard 

gunshots on a nearby street and apprehended the defendant after he ran from the officer. 

The defendant later told ATF officers that a local dealer by the name of “Red” had fronted 

him cocaine months before, which he had not paid for, and that the dealer planned to kill 

him. He claimed he fired the shots that day because someone in Red’s white Mazda vehicle 

fired at him first. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 

using, carrying and discharging a firearm in relation to the drug trafficking crime. 

However, the only evidence presented at trial to corroborate the defendant’s confession 

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was an ATF agent’s testimony that he was aware of a suspected drug dealer by the name of 

“Red” who drove a white Mazda. We vacated the defendant’s convictions because there 

was insufficient corroborating evidence to establish that the defendant and Red “were 

engaged in a conspiracy to sell cocaine,” and no “corroborating evidence to establish that 

[defendant] was engaged in the drug trade” as he had claimed. Id. at 673.

Here, in contrast, there was abundant independent evidence that Henderson was 

engaged in a large-scale drug trade, which supported the trustworthiness of his confessions. 

Henderson named multiple drug suppliers in the Robeson County area from whom he had 

obtained drugs to sell to others. He also identified their residences or other locations from 

which they operated. Detective Sampson, in connection with his work in the Narcotics 

Division of the Robeson County Sheriff’s Office and with the ATF drug task force, was 

personally familiar with many of the named dealers and corroborated the accuracy of 

Henderson’s descriptions of the dealers and their locations. But that was not all. The jury 

also watched six days of video leading up to the April 30 search and arrest showing multiple 

acts that also supported the trustworthiness of Henderson’s admissions. The jury saw an 

armed Henderson, supported and protected by other armed men, aggressively defending 

the property—and the drug dealing going on there—against approaching vehicles and 

persons. Henderson is seen engaging in repeated drug transactions with multiple, different 

buyers, weighing drugs on scales, and selling drugs from both the front and the rear of the 

residence. These transactions occurred at various times of the day and night—and always 

under the protection of handguns or an AR-15 rifle, or both, and other men who were 

present at the residence. The evidence found during the April 30 search further 

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corroborates the trustworthiness of Henderson’s confession that he was dealing in “major 

weight” drugs that he obtained from Red Cloud and the other local suppliers. J.A. 484. 

When officers pulled up on the residence, two men fled the rear of the residence and left 

the third, who was legally blind, on the sofa with the AR-15 rifle. The other handguns had 

been stashed in a toilet tank and trash can, along with more cocaine and crack cocaine, and 

three digital scales consistent with large-scale drug trafficking were discovered. 

In light of the totality of the evidence presented to the jury, we have no trouble 

concluding that this independent evidence was sufficient to support the trustworthiness of 

Henderson’s confession, and that the evidence as a whole was more than sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Henderson was guilty of the conspiracy offense. 

Accordingly, we affirm Henderson’s convictions on Count One and Count Two. 

B.

Henderson also argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to convict him 

on Counts Three and Four, for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine on April 

30, 2019, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of his drug trafficking crimes. More 

specifically, Henderson argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that he 

intended to distribute the crack cocaine that he possessed on April 30, when the search 

warrant was executed, as opposed to personally consuming it.

“The offense of possession with intent to distribute requires the government to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) possessed a controlled 

substance (3) with the intent to distribute it.” United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 

(4th Cir. 1984). Again, Henderson “faces a heavy burden” to overturn the conviction. 

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Small, 944 F.3d at 499. “[T]his court must give full play to the jury to resolve testimonial 

conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate 

facts.” United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th 656, 665 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). 

Drawing all such reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the 

government, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conviction. 

The security footage shows a blue car pulling into Henderson’s driveway just before the 

officers arrived. Henderson walks towards the just-arrived car, with his left hand in his 

shorts pocket and a handgun on the right side of his body. As the officers pull into the 

driveway, Henderson pulls his left hand out of his pocket and opens it, pulls the handgun 

from his back pocket or waistband with his right hand, and tosses the items under the car. 

Aplastic baggie containing crack cocaine and the Glock firearm were recovered from under 

the car. In addition to this evidence, the guns, drugs, scales, and videos showing an armed 

Henderson weighing crack cocaine and repeatedly selling the drug to approaching buyers, 

provides substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer 

that Henderson also intended to sell the crack cocaine that was in his pocket on April 30, 

2019, to an occupant in the blue car, and that he possessed firearms in furtherance of his 

drug trafficking crimes. Accordingly, we also affirm Henderson’s convictions on Count 

Three and Count Four.2

2 As noted above, Henderson has made no specific challenge to his conviction for 

possession of a firearm as a felon (Count Five) and, to the extent he would argue otherwise, 

the evidence overwhelmingly supports this conviction as well.

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III.

We now turn to Henderson’s contention that the district court procedurally and 

substantively erred by imposing a 340-month term of imprisonment for his convictions. 

In the presentence report (PSR), Henderson was found responsible for 25 kilograms 

of cocaine. This was calculated based upon the 20 kilograms he confessed to having 

purchased from Red Cloud alone, 90 ounces he purchased from two other named suppliers, 

54 ounces he purchased from a fourth named supplier, and a kilogram he purchased from 

a fifth named supplier. He was also found responsible for 0.33 grams of methamphetamine 

and 16.13 grams of crack. This calculated drug quantity resulted in a base offense level of 

32. Two points were added for Henderson’s maintenance of the premises for the purpose 

of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances and two points were added for 

obstruction of justice, resulting in a total offense level of 36. Combined with his category 

VI criminal history, the Guidelines range for Counts One and Three alone was 324 to 405 

months’ imprisonment. The Guidelines range for Counts Two and Four was the mandatory 

minimum of 60 months each, consecutive to the other counts. And, for Count Five, 84 

months was added. Accordingly, Henderson’s total advisory Guidelines range was 444 to 

525 months imprisonment. After conducting a two-day sentencing, the district court 

departed downward 120 months and imposed a total sentence of 324 months.

A.

“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an 

abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of whether the sentence is inside, just outside or 

significantly outside the Guidelines range.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th 

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Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining 

whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating 

the Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence.” Id. If the sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider 

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in 

concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id.

(cleaned up).

Henderson argues that his 324-month sentence is procedurally unreasonable 

because it was based on an overstated drug quantity. More specifically, he argues that the 

district court erred in adopting the PSR’s calculation of drug quantity because it was at 

least partially based on his confession, which he claims was unreliable. Henderson argued 

(and testified at the sentencing hearing) that he had exaggerated his involvement in the 

drug trafficking business when he confessed and, as support, relies upon evidence that he 

lied about other matters during the case. For example, he admitted that he lied to the 

officers when he told them that he did not throw the gun and the drugs under the blue car 

on April 30, and he admitted that he lied when he claimed, in pretrial proceedings, that the 

officers had promised him leniency if he would agree to give his statement. He also points 

to the testimony of his mother and daughter, who branded him a liar and thief.

“We review the district court’s calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to a 

defendant for sentencing purposes for clear error.” United States v. Crawford, 734 F.3d 

339, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). “Under this clear error standard, we will reverse the 

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district court’s finding only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed.” Id. “When a court renders factual findings based on determinations 

regarding the credibility of witnesses, we give even greater deference to the trial court’s 

findings.” United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224, 233 (4th Cir. 2019).

The district court observed Henderson’s testimony at the sentencing hearing, 

disavowing the veracity of his confession, and reviewed his videotaped confession. In light 

of Henderson’s recantation, the government also presented the district court with additional 

witnesses and evidence that corroborated the extent of Henderson’s drug trafficking 

activities. Faced with this classic credibility determination, the district court found that 

Henderson was more likely telling the truth when he confessed than when he testified at 

the sentencing hearing. Henderson has given us no plausible reason upon which we could 

find that this finding was clearly erroneous.3

B.

Having determined that there is no procedural error, we turn to Henderson’s 

challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. We review the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Louthian, 756 

3 To the extent Henderson relies upon the fact that the jury convicted him of the 

lesser included offense of conspiracy to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine and a 

quantity of crack cocaine, that is of no moment. “It has long been established that 

sentencing courts may consider acquitted conduct in establishing drug amounts for the 

purpose of sentencing.” United States v. Davis, 918 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned 

up). “[T]he court must find the drug amounts established by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Thus, even if a court knows that a jury had a reasonable doubt about drug 

quantities, that doubt would not preclude the court’s finding of those quantities by a 

preponderance of the evidence, a lower standard.” Id.

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F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated 

Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” Id. The “presumption can only be rebutted 

by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a) factors.” Id. The factors include, inter alia, “the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), “the need for 

the sentence imposed” to “provide just punishment for the offense” and “afford adequate 

deterrence to criminal conduct,” § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), “to protect the public from further 

crimes of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(C), and “to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 

among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” § 

3553(a)(6). 

Henderson argues that the district court’s 324-month sentence, although below the 

Guidelines range, is substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to 

comply with the purposes of sentencing. See 8 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In particular, he points 

to his history and characteristics, including his troubled childhood which involved physical 

and verbal abuse of his mother by his stepfather and Henderson’s ensuing drug and alcohol 

addiction. He also argues that the sentence is substantially longer than the median 

sentences that federal courts have imposed for more serious offenses.

Henderson has plainly failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness that 

we apply to this below-Guidelines sentence. The district court carefully considered all of 

the § 3553(a) factors, including the history and characteristics that Henderson relies upon, 

as well as his age. However, the district court also considered Henderson’s substantial 

criminal conduct and history and the need to protect the public, noting in particular that 

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Henderson’s criminal history was “probably the highest” the court had seen. J.A. 547. 

Having weighed the pertinent facts, the district court then imposed a sentence that was ten 

years below the minimum Guideline’s calculation. Considering the totality of the 

circumstances, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Henderson’s criminal convictions and 

sentence.

 AFFIRMED

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