UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4947

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ROGER VAN SANTVOORD CAMP,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:11-cr-00155-BO-1)

Argued: January 28, 2014 Decided: April 15, 2014

Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. 

May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Yvonne V. WatfordMcKinney, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Roger Van Santvoord Camp appeals his sentence on several 

grounds and requests a vacatur of his guilty plea. For the 

reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court. 

Roger Van Santvoord Camp established Piedmont Center 

Investments, LLC (PCI) in 1999. He was solely responsible for 

running the company. Timothy Buckley, Camp’s friend, was a 

passive investor in the business. In 2009, Camp sought to 

establish a bowling alley and family entertainment center. From 

July 2009 until December 2010, Camp secured or attempted to 

secure financing from four financial institutions through the 

fraudulent use of Buckley’s personal identifying information. He 

also obtained additional financing from Buckley.

In 2009, Camp secured a $3.8 million dollar commercial 

mortgage from Key Source Bank. Camp falsely told the bank 

representatives that Buckley agreed to be a guarantor and 

provided the bank with a falsified financial statement,

representing that it was prepared by Buckley, and a forged 

guaranty form. As a result of Camp’s fraudulent representations, 

Key Source Bank disbursed the $3.8 million commercial mortgage 

to PCI. 

Around this same time, Camp submitted a commercial loan 

application to Capital Bank for $2 million. This application 

also included falsified documents representing that Buckley had 
3

agreed to personally guarantee the loan. Capital Bank ultimately 

disbursed the loan, and the bowling alley’s equipment was 

pledged as collateral. 

Camp also sought a personal loan from Buckley in order to 

cover some of the renovation costs for the bowling alley. 

Buckley loaned Camp $250,000, unaware that Camp had already

received loans from Key Source and Capital Bank by falsely 

representing Buckley as the guarantor. The loan was secured by 

Camp’s interest in PCI, which is currently in bankruptcy. 

Camp continued to experience financial problems and thus 

applied to Trust Atlantic Bank for a $500,000 unsecured line of 

credit. Camp falsely told the bank that Buckley was going to cosign this loan. However, Trust Atlantic ultimately did not 

approve the loan because Camp could not produce Buckley to 

personally meet with bank representatives. 

Camp also received a $150,000 line of credit from North 

State Bank by fraudulently listing a fake brokerage account as 

proof of his assets. When the bank realized the fraud, it 

informed Camp he needed to immediately repay the $70,000 that 

Camp had already withdrawn. Camp then obtained a $125,000 

personal loan from Buckley to repay North State and pocketed the 

additional $55,000. To obtain this personal loan, Camp lied to 

Buckley, telling him that the bank loan was for $200,000, that 

he had $75,000 to repay it, but that he needed another $125,000. 
4

Camp’s fraudulent scheme was eventually discovered, and he 

pled guilty to several counts of bank fraud and aggravated 

identity theft. Camp was sentenced to a total of 102 months 

imprisonment and $442,827.02 in restitution to Buckley. At 

sentencing, the judge applied an 18-level enhancement for the 

amount of loss exceeding $2.5 million. The judge also applied a 

2-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means. Camp 

timely appealed to this Court and makes several arguments 

regarding his sentencing and guilty plea.

First, Camp argues that the district court erred at 

sentencing when it applied an 18-level enhancement for the 

amount of loss exceeding $2.5 million, pursuant to USSG § 

2B1.1(b)(1). Under the guidelines, 

loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss. 

“Actual loss” means the reasonably foreseeable 

pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense. 

“Intended loss” . . . means the pecuniary harm that 

was intended to result from the offense . . . . The

court need only make a reasonable estimate of the 

loss. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to 

assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon 

that evidence. For this reason, the court’s loss 

determination is entitled to appropriate deference. . 

. . In a case involving collateral pledged or 

otherwise provided by the defendant, [loss shall be 

reduced by] the amount the victim has recovered at the 

time of sentencing from disposition of the collateral, 

or if the collateral has not been disposed of by that 

time, the fair market value of the collateral at the 

time of sentencing. 
5

USSG § 2B1.1.1(b)(1) cmt. We review a district court’s factual 

finding of loss for clear error. See United States v. Parsons, 

109 F.3d 1002, 1004 (4th Cir. 1997). 

Here, considering only actual loss, there was loss 

exceeding $2.5 million. Key Source Bank loaned $3.8 million to 

Camp, but only received $1.5 million upon sale of the property 

after default. Thus, Key Source Bank suffered a loss of $2.3 

million. 

Buckley lost $250,000 in a personal loan to Camp, which 

Buckley made because he was unaware Camp had already obtained 

other financing for the project by fraudulently representing 

Buckley as a guarantor. Although this personal loan was backed 

by Camp’s interest in PCI (which is now in bankruptcy), the 

district court, by awarding the full restitution amount 

requested for Buckley, implicitly found the PCI interest was 

worth only a nominal value. Further, Camp lied to Buckley in 

order to obtain an additional $125,000 loan from him, which 

Buckley also lost. Buckley also incurred $67,827.02 in legal 

fees as a result of the instant offense. In total, Buckley lost 

$442,827.02. 

The district court did not clearly err in its finding of a 

$2.3 million dollar loss for Key Source Bank. That loss is 

clearly supported in the record. Further, the district court 

must only make a reasonable estimation of the loss. Thus, even
6

if the loss incurred by Buckley was only half of what the 

district court found when awarding restitution, it would still 

push the loss incurred over the $2.5 million threshold for the 

18-level enhancement. Therefore, the district court’s estimation 

that the loss exceeded $2.5 million was not clear error, and we 

affirm the 18-level enhancement. 

Second, Camp argues the district court erred in applying a 

2-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means, pursuant 

to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(c). “‘Sophisticated means’ means 

especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct 

pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” USSG 

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(c) cmt. “We . . . review for clear error the 

district court's finding that [defendant] used sophisticated 

means.” United States v. Noel, 502 F. App'x 284, 290 (4th Cir. 

2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 366 (2013).

In the instant case, Camp used great effort to secure or 

attempt to secure loans from four financial institutions and 

Timothy Buckley. He forged assignment of guaranty forms; 

manipulated Timothy Buckley’s financial statements; forged 

Buckley’s signature, as well as the signatures of others; and 

engaged in extended negotiations with financial institutions 

based upon false information, among other things. 
7

The district court’s finding that Camp used sophisticated 

means is amply supported by the record, and thus the 2-level

enhancement was appropriate. 

Third, Camp argues that he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel because his defense lawyers did not pursue protection 

for him under the North Carolina business judgment rule. “A 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is normally 

considered on collateral review, not on direct appeal.” United 

States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1363 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing 

United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 441 (4th Cir. 1993)). “For 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be heard on 

direct appeal, it must ‘conclusively appear[ ] in the trial 

record itself that the defendant was not provided with effective 

representation.’” United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th 

Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Hanley, 974 F.2d 14, 16 n.

2 (4th Cir. 1992)) (alteration in original).

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim in the context of a conviction following a 

guilty plea, [defendant] must show that defense 

counsel's representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness pursuant to the prevailing 

professional norms, and that but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors he would not have pled guilty 

and would have insisted on going to trial.

McGraw v. United States, 106 F.3d 391 table, No. 96-6161, 1997 

WL 34431, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 

U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). 
8

Here, it does not “conclusively appear in the trial record” 

that Camp received ineffective assistance of counsel. Camp does 

not even argue that he would not have pled guilty but for his 

defense attorneys’ failure to pursue the business judgment rule 

defense; rather, he simply argues he was prejudiced by their 

failure to do so. The business judgment rule, however, does not 

protect against an individual’s purposeful and fraudulent 

misconduct, but rather protects mere errors in judgment. See

State ex rel. Long v. ILA Corp., 513 S.E.2d 812, 822 (N.C. Ct. 

App. 1999). Therefore, it does not “conclusively appear” on the 

record that Camp received ineffective assistance at trial. 

Fourth, Camp argues that the district court wrongfully 

participated in plea negotiations in violation of Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 11. Because Camp did not object to this at 

trial, his Rule 11 claim is subject to plain error review. See

United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 461 (4th Cir. 2006). To 

show plain error, Camp 

must demonstrate that (1) the asserted violation of 

Rule 11(c)(1) is error, (2) the error is plain, and 

(3) the error affected [his] substantial rights; if 

these three conditions are met, an appellate court may 

then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited 

error, but only if (4) “the error seriously affect[s] 

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).

Bradley, 455 F.3d at 461.
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Here, at the close of the prosecution’s evidence, the 

district court stated, 

You never know what happens in court but perjury is a 

spector and obstruction of justice and whatever. I’ve 

tried a few cases and I can only remember one other

one—I won’t go into it—where something like the 

evidence that just came out came out. 

J.A. 672. 

This statement does not constitute a Rule 11(c) error. Even 

if these remarks were to be construed as a comment on plea 

negotiations, this Court has distinguished cases where judges 

have made “single brief remark[s] during negotiations” from 

those where judges have fully inserted themselves into the 

negotiations process. See Bradley, 455 F.3d at 462–63 (citing 

United States v. Bierd, 217 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2000), for the 

proposition “that court's mention of a guilty plea and 

acceptance of responsibility to defense counsel was not

reversible error” and citing United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 

778, 783 (11th Cir. 1996), for “finding no improper 

participation when the court warned the defendant of the risk 

involved in pleading guilty to the substantive offense and 

contesting the conspiracy charge”).1

 1 In Bradley, this Court explained there was a Rule 11 error 

because:

[t]he record clearly demonstrate[d] that the district 

court initiated plea discussions, advised the 

(Continued)
10

Here, rather than involve itself in plea negotiations, the 

court simply warned Camp against committing perjury on the stand 

and did not mention pleading or the benefits of pleading versus 

continuing with trial. Additionally, rather than attempt to 

coerce Camp into pleading guilty during the trial, the court 

twice reminded Camp that he had already been at trial for 

several days and asked if he was sure he wanted to proceed with 

the guilty plea rather than continuing with the trial. J.A. 674–

75. This record shows a single, brief remark warning against 

perjury, rather than judicial engagement in plea negotiations, 

and therefore, there is no Rule 11(c) error here, let alone a 

plain error.

 

Defendants that they might “be better off pleading to 

the indictment,” suggested that they would likely 

receive life sentences if they went to trial, 

commented on the amount and weight of the Government's 

evidence, criticized the Defendants for turning down 

plea offers from the Government, urged the Defendants 

to attempt “to dispose of the charges against them on 

a reasonable basis,” and explained to the Defendants 

that even if the prosecution would not recommend the 

sentence the Defendants desired, this should not 

prevent a plea because the court-not the prosecutionwould determine the sentence.

Bradley, 455 F.3d at 462.

This extensive engagement in plea negotiations stands in 

stark contrast to the single remark made in this case regarding 

perjury. 
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Fifth, Camp argues that the district court improperly 

questioned witnesses at trial and that this resulted in a denial 

of due process for Camp. By pleading guilty, Camp has waived any 

argument regarding “nonjurisdictional defects” in the trial 

proceedings below. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 

280 (4th Cir. 2010) (“When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives 

all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior 

to the entry of the plea.” (quoting United States v. Bundy, 392 

F.3d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 2004))). Therefore, his argument about 

judicial questioning of witnesses is waived.2

In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we refuse to 

vacate Camp’s guilty plea, and we affirm the district court’s 

sentence. 

AFFIRMED

 2 Camp also raises an argument regarding his restitution to 

Buckley, which we find to be without merit.