IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0752

Filed February 10, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

JAYEL ANTRONE COLEMAN,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, 

Christine Dalton Ploof, District Associate Judge. 

Defendant appeals conviction for driving while barred. DECISION 

OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

REVERSED.

Micki M. Meier of Meier Law Firm, Davenport, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant 

Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Robert C. 

Bradfield and Steve Berger, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee. 
2

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we consider whether a law enforcement officer, after 

making a valid traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion that an 

offense may being committed, must terminate the stop when the 

underlying reason for the stop is no longer present. For the reasons 

expressed below, we hold that under the search and seizure provision of 

article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, the stop must end when 

reasonable suspicion is no longer present.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

On the evening of August 18, 2014, Officer James Morris was 

parked along Highway 61 in Eldridge, Iowa, conducting random 

computer checks on the license plates of passing motorists to see if the 

vehicle was reported stolen or if there were outstanding warrants 

associated with the owner of the vehicle. His check of the license plate of 

a vehicle that passed him revealed that the female registered owner, 

Arvis Quinn, had a suspended driver’s license.

Because it was dark, Morris could not determine when the vehicle 

passed him whether the driver was male or female. Morris pulled the 

vehicle registered to Quinn over to investigate the possibility that Quinn 

was driving the vehicle while her license was under suspension. As 

Morris approached the vehicle, it was clear to Morris that the driver was 

male, not female.

Morris did not terminate the stop upon determining that Quinn 

was not the driver of the vehicle. Instead, Morris proceeded to ask the 

driver of the vehicle, Jayel Coleman, for his license, registration, and 

proof of insurance. Coleman did not produce a registration but did 

produce “an Iowa ID.” Coleman stated that he was driving a vehicle he 

had borrowed from his sister. At the time Morris made his requests, 
3

Morris no longer had reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense had been 

committed.

Based on Coleman’s identification, Morris determined that 

Coleman was driving while barred in violation of Iowa Code sections

321.555(1) and 321.561 (2013). He was so charged. Coleman filed a 

pretrial motion to suppress with the district court. The district court 

denied the motion. After a bench trial, Coleman was convicted of the 

offense.

Coleman appealed. We transferred the case to the court of 

appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Coleman sought 

further review, which we granted. For the reasons expressed below, we 

vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of 

the district court.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress on 

constitutional grounds de novo. State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 152 

(Iowa 2015). In reviewing a search and seizure dispute under article I, 

section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, we construe the provision “in a broad 

and liberal spirit.” State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 657, 661, 91 N.W. 935, 

937–38 (1902) (construing fundamental guarantees, like the right against 

self-incrimination, broadly and liberally). We strongly favor the warrant 

requirement, subject only to “jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.” 

State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992); accord State v. Ochoa, 

792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (Iowa 2010). In interpreting article I, section 8, we 

may look to federal caselaw, the caselaw of other states, the dissenting 

opinions of state and federal courts, and to secondary materials for their 

persuasive power. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 481 (Iowa 2014).
4

III. Issue Preservation.

We must initially confront issue preservation. In the district court 

proceedings, Coleman did not identify either the Iowa or the Federal 

Constitution in support of his motion to suppress. Further, the district 

court, in its ruling, simply stated that the motion to suppress was 

denied.

On appeal, Coleman cites both article I, section 8 of the Iowa 

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Coleman essentially makes 

the same argument under both constitutional provisions—namely, that 

the seizure of Coleman could not be constitutionally extended once the 

underlying reason for the stop was resolved.

The State does not contest error preservation. In its briefing on 

appeal, the State recognizes that Coleman has made claims under 

article I, section 8 and the Fourth Amendment. Like Coleman, the State 

makes the same argument under both constitutional provisions. The 

State asserts that prolonging the stop to ask for a driver’s license, 

registration, and proof of insurance is permissible.

We find the state constitutional issue is minimally preserved. We 

have held that when a defendant in the trial court only identifies the 

Fourth Amendment as the basis for a search and seizure claim, the state 

constitutional claim has not been preserved at the district court. State v. 

Prusha, 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016).1

1As in Prusha, counsel here does not make a claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel in this appeal. When trial counsel fails to preserve an issue below, appellate 

counsel may, of course, on appeal assert a claim of ineffective assistance. State v. 

Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2015). When the ineffective-assistance claim 

does not require further development of the factual record, we may decide the claim on 

direct appeal even though the underlying issue was not preserved in the trial court. Id. 

When the claim of ineffective assistance cannot be resolved on the record, however, we 

will decline to rule on direct appeal and a party may file an action for postconviction 

 
5

Here, however, the defendant did not identify either constitution in 

the trial court although it was apparent that he was raising a search and 

seizure claim. This raises a different preservation question than that 

presented in Prusha. We have said that when a party brings a 

constitutional claim but fails to identify whether the party is proceeding 

under the Iowa or the Federal Constitution, claims under both the Iowa 

and the Federal Constitutions are preserved. State v. Harrington, 805 

N.W.2d 391, 393 n.3 (Iowa 2011); King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 

(Iowa 2011). The State impliedly recognized our prior caselaw by 

declining to challenge issue preservation under the Iowa Constitution 

and addressing both claims. We adhere to the approach in Harrington

and King.

On appeal, Coleman did not state the claim under the Iowa 

Constitution should be evaluated under a standard different than that 

employed by the United States Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment

cases. Nonetheless, he makes only one argument on appeal, namely, 

that once reasonable suspicion for the original traffic stop was resolved, 

the State could not extend the stop by asking for Coleman’s driver’s 

license, registration, and insurance. It would elevate form over 

substance to declare that Coleman’s argument actually cannot be 

considered under the Iowa Constitution because he did not specifically 

state that he was asking the court to depart from uncertain federal law.

In any event, we reserve the right to apply principles established in the 

federal caselaw in a fashion different from prevailing federal law. See,

e.g., State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771–72 (Iowa 2011); State v.

relief where the record can be more fully developed. State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 240 

(Iowa 2006).

___________________________
6

Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). Under these 

circumstances, the argument Coleman specifically made and specifically 

asks us to resolve is preserved under the Iowa Constitution.

IV. Discussion.

A. Introduction. The question of whether an automobile stop 

may be extended to require production of documents may sound 

mundane, and even petty, but it is not. Thousands of persons drive 

upon the roadways daily. Further, the central purpose of constitutional 

provisions regarding search and seizure is to structure and limit the 

scope of police interference in the daily life of citizens. Generalized police 

discretion to engage in search and seizure is antithetical to search and 

seizure law. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 287.

Further, as we have noted previously, unlimited discretion to stop 

vehicles on the open road may give rise to allegations of racial 

discrimination, characterized by the descriptive phrase “driving while 

black.” See State v. Lyon, 862 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Iowa 2015); see also 

State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 371–72 (Iowa 2014) (Appel, J., 

dissenting); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 772 n.2; David A. Harris, “Driving While 

Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual 

Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544, 546–47 (1997).

As noted in Pals, traffic stops have emerged as a major issue in 

search and seizure law. 805 N.W.2d at 772–73. The use of minor traffic 

violations as a springboard into consent searches has prompted charges 

of abuse and racial profiling. Id. at 772; see also Barbara C. Salken, The 

General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution 

to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 

221, 235–36 (1989).
7

Indeed, the cases dealing with automobile stops sometimes have a 

flavor of racial profiling. See State v. Diaz-Ruiz, 211 P.3d 836, 846 (Kan. 

Ct. App. 2009) (questioning credibility of officer because facts 

demonstrated trooper was motivated by a “desire to search the vehicle of 

these two Hispanic men”). As we said in Pals, we approach these issues 

with

due regard to the legitimate needs of law enforcement, but 

with a recognition that our constitutional limitations on 

searches and seizures by law enforcement protect 

fundamental values of liberty and human dignity and are a 

bulwark against arbitrary governmental intrusions into the 

lives of citizens.

805 N.W.2d at 773.

B. Scope of Issues. The parties do not dispute that stopping an 

automobile and detaining its occupants is a seizure under article I, 

section 8 and the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 

648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979). Further, 

the parties do not dispute that Morris initially had sufficient reasonable 

suspicion under both constitutions to initiate a traffic stop under the 

facts and circumstances of this case. Further, the parties do not dispute 

that once Morris determined that Coleman was a male, the reasonable 

suspicion that triggered the stop was no longer present. The narrow 

question here, which is strictly a legal question, is whether law 

enforcement may extend the traffic stop by asking for a driver’s license, 

vehicle registration, and proof of insurance.

C. Federal Caselaw Under the Fourth Amendment.

1. Analytic framework applicable to automobile stops. The United 

States Supreme Court has developed a framework for the evaluation of 

automobile stops under the Fourth Amendment. The foundation for 

analysis of an automobile stop is provided in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
8

88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Although Terry did not involve 

an automobile stop, the Supreme Court has considered a routine traffic 

stop more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest. See Knowles v. 

Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498

(1998); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, 

82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 334 (1984).

The United States Supreme Court applied Terry principles in the 

context of an automobile stop in Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at 

1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 660. In Prouse, the Supreme Court considered the 

question of whether a law enforcement officer may perform a random 

traffic stop for the purpose of checking license and registration when 

there is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion that any violation of 

law is occurring. Id. at 650, 99 S. Ct. at 1394, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 665.

The Prouse Court held that such random stops violated the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673. While 

Prouse recognized the legitimacy of the state’s general interest in safety 

as advanced by license and registration requirements, the Prouse Court 

was “unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety of 

the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at 658–59, 99 S. Ct. at 1398–99, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 670–

71. According to the Prouse Court,

[W]e cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a 

patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for 

a spot check would be more productive than stopping any 

other driver. This kind of standardless and unconstrained 

discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in 

previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the 

official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.

Id. at 661, 99 S. Ct. at 1400, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 672.
9

The United States Supreme Court refined the Prouse analysis in 

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). 

In the plurality opinion in Royer, the Court emphasized that the scope of 

an investigatory stop “must be carefully tailored to its underlying 

justification” and “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 

purpose of the stop.” Id. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 238.

In Royer, the Supreme Court plurality emphasized that a person “may 

not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds 

for doing so.” Id. at 498, 103 S. Ct. at 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 236 

(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court confronted another traffic-stop controversy in 

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842

(2005). In Caballes, the Supreme Court considered whether a dog sniff 

conducted during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Id. at 406–07, 125 S. Ct. at 836–37, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46. The 

Caballes Court concluded that it did not. Id. at 409, 125 S. Ct. at 838, 

160 L. Ed. 2d at 847. The Caballes Court viewed a dog sniff as 

“sui generis”—unique, in other words—because it revealed only the 

presence or absence of contraband and, therefore, was not a search. Id.

Even if a dog sniff is not a search, the Caballes Court recognized “[a]

seizure . . . can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete [the initial] mission.” Id. at 407, 125 

S. Ct. at 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846. In Caballes, the Illinois Supreme 

Court had determined, as a matter of fact, that the duration of the stop 

was justified by the underlying traffic offense. Id. at 408, 125 S. Ct. at 

837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846–47. According to the Caballes Court, a dog 

sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no 

information other than the location of a substance that no individual has 
10

any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 410, 

125 S. Ct. at 838, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 848.

Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented. Justice Souter forcefully 

argued that a dog sniff was, in fact, a search just like thermal imaging 

equipment in Kyllo. Id. at 413, 125 S. Ct. at 840, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 850 

(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 

S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001)). Such a search ancillary to a traffic 

stop, according to Justice Souter, must be supported by reasonable 

suspicion. Id. at 415, 125 S. Ct. at 841, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 851. According 

to Justice Souter, to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for the 

detention amounts to an “open-sesame” for general searches that the 

Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit. Id.

In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that in Terry-type 

stops, the limitation related to the “scope” of the seizure was not limited 

to duration, but also to the manner in which it is conducted. Id. at 418, 

125 S. Ct. at 843–44, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 853–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 

(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 1, 88 S. Ct. at 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 889).

Justice Ginsburg thus did not find it dispositive that the length of the 

stop was not extended. Id. at 420, 125 S. Ct. at 844, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 

854–55.

Shortly after Caballes, the Supreme Court returned to the general 

topic of automobile seizures in Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 

S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009). In Johnson, the Supreme Court 

confronted the question of whether passengers in a lawfully stopped 

vehicle could be subject to a Terry-type pat-down. Id. at 326, 129 S. Ct. 

at 784, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 700. The Supreme Court concluded that officers 

who conduct routine traffic stops may engage in pat-downs of a driver 
11

and any passenger upon reasonable suspicion that they are armed and 

dangerous. Id. at 332, 129 S. Ct. at 787, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 703.

2. Federal caselaw applying Terry-Prouse-Royer principles to 

extended automobile stops. The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Tenth Circuit has led the way in considering several traffic-stop cases in 

which the stop was extended after the underlying purposes were 

resolved. A frequently cited case in the field is United States v. McSwain, 

29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994). In McSwain, the sole purpose of a traffic 

stop was to verify the expiration date on a temporary registration sticker 

on the rear window of the vehicle. Id. at 559–60. Once the officer

determined the temporary registration sticker remained valid, the court 

held that “further detention of the vehicle to question [the defendant] 

about his vehicle and travel itinerary and to request his license and 

registration exceeded the scope of the stop’s underlying justification.” Id.

at 561.

McSwain thus drew a “sharp contrast” between a situation where a 

traffic violation “has occurred or is occurring” and one where the 

reasonable suspicion for the stop had been completely dispelled. Id.

(quoting United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993)). 

Only in the later circumstance did the lawfulness of the seizure come to 

an end. Id. at 562.

In the next case, United States v. Edgerton, the Tenth Circuit again 

considered a case in which a vehicle was stopped because a temporary 

registration tag could not be read because of darkness. 438 F.3d 1043, 

1044 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth Circuit held, however, that once the 

trooper was able to read the temporary tag, the trooper “as a matter of 

courtesy, should have explained to [the] Defendant the reason for the 
12

initial stop and then allowed her to continue on her way without 

requiring her to produce her license and registration.” Id. at 1051.

A third Tenth Circuit case is United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 

F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009). In that case, the Pena-Montes court 

confronted the familiar situation in which an officer pulled over a vehicle 

believing it lacked a license plate, only to discover that the vehicle had a 

proper “dealer tag.” Id. at 1049. In Pena-Montes, the officer did not end 

the stop at that point, but continued his investigative activities, 

questioning a passenger about his immigration status. Id. at 1051. 

After canvassing the facts, the Pena-Montes court concluded that no 

additional reasonable suspicion was present. Id. at 1058. In response to 

the government’s argument that it is reasonable for officers to enquire 

about dealer tags after a traffic stop even if they appeared lawful, the 

Pena-Montes court declared, “We decline to sign this blank check.” Id.

Finally, in United States v. Trestyn, the Tenth Circuit considered a 

similar case in which a vehicle was missing a front license plate, but 

displayed a rear license plate. 646 F.3d 732, 736 (10th Cir. 2011). As in 

the other cases, when approaching the vehicle, it became clear that the 

rear license plate satisfied all statutory requirements. Id. at 744. At that 

point, according to the Tenth Circuit, questions of the drivers about their 

travel plans and a request for their licenses “exceeded the scope of the 

stop’s underlying justification because . . . [the officer] no longer had an 

objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had 

occurred or was still occurring.” Id.

Another frequently cited case involving extended automobile 

searches is the Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 

395 (5th Cir. 2001). In Valadez, an officer who passed a motorist 

traveling in the opposite direction believed the motorist was operating a 
13

vehicle with an expired vehicle registration and illegal window tinting and 

initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 396. When the officer approached the 

vehicle and spoke with the driver, Valadez, the registration issue was 

quickly resolved, but the window tinting issue remained. Id. The officer

asked Valadez for his driver’s license and insurance card. Id. When he 

returned to his patrol car, the officer requested a criminal history check 

on Valadez. Id. While the background check was still in progress, the 

officer returned to Valadez’s vehicle with a window-tint meter and 

determined the windows were legal. Id.

But the officer did not terminate the encounter at this point. Id. 

Although the purpose of the stop had been resolved, the officer proceeded 

to ask Valadez if he had any weapons or drugs in the vehicle. Id. 

Valadez responded that he had a loaded pistol in the front seat of the car 

and a rifle in the trunk. Id. The officer removed the weapons from the 

car to run a check to determine if they were stolen. Id. The results of his 

background check indicated that Valadez had a criminal history but did 

not apparently indicate whether it involved misdemeanors or felonies. Id. 

The officer returned to Valadez’s vehicle and asked him whether he had a 

felony conviction. Id. Valadez responded that he was not sure, but that 

he might have a felony conviction. Id. After being transported to the 

station, Valadez’s prior conviction was confirmed as a felony. Id. at 397. 

He was subsequently charged with the crime and entered a conditional 

guilty verdict allowing him to contest an unfavorable suppression ruling. 

Id.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Valadez’s 

motion to suppress. Id. at 399. The Fifth Circuit noted that Valadez did 

not dispute the initial lawfulness of the stop. Id. at 398. But the Fifth 

Circuit reasoned that once the officer determined that the registration 
14

was valid and the window tinting was lawful, at that point he had no 

basis to continue the stop. Id. The Fifth Circuit emphasized the 

detention was lawful up until the purposes of the stop were resolved, but 

when those purposes were resolved, there was no lawful reason to detain

Valadez. Id.

The Sixth Circuit considered the validity of an extension of a traffic 

stop in United States v. Jones, 479 F. App’x 705 (6th Cir. 2012). In 

Jones, the Sixth Circuit held that a police officer exceeded the scope of a 

traffic stop for failure to display proper license plates when he detained 

the driver after he observed a lawful temporary tag in plain view. Id. at 

712; see also United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995)

(“Once the purposes of the initial traffic stop were completed, there is no 

doubt that the officer could not further detain the vehicle or its 

occupants unless something that occurred during the traffic stop 

generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a further 

detention.”).

The Second Circuit grappled with an automobile stop in United 

States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006). In Jenkins, the officers 

believed that the vehicle pulled over lacked appropriate license plates. 

Id. at 209. After the stop, the officer became aware of a temporary plate 

posed on the vehicle. Id. When the officers approached the vehicle to 

speak to the driver, however, they smelled marijuana. Id. A subsequent 

search turned up unlawfully possessed firearms. Id. at 210.

The fighting issue in Jenkins was whether the police acted lawfully 

after their concern about unlawful licensure had been resolved. Id. at 

212–13. The defendant claimed that once the officers observed the 

temporary license plate they could proceed no further and were required 

simply to waive the motorist on. Id. at 211. The state contended that 
15

the officers could reasonably approach the driver to explain the reason 

for the stop. Id. The Second Circuit agreed, noting that in McSwain, the 

Tenth Circuit suggested in dictum that such a courtesy was not 

unlawful. Id. at 213.

A number of reported United States district court decisions follow 

the general approach of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. In 

United States v. Salinas, the United States district court considered a 

case where a stop was initiated because of suspicion of a violation of the 

Texas license plate display requirement. 665 F. Supp. 2d 717, 718–19

(W.D. Tex. 2009). The district court noted that the officers could have 

determined even before they asked for the driver’s license and proof of 

insurance that there was not a violation of the Texas license plate 

requirement. Id. at 721. Because “[t]hey did not encounter reasonable 

suspicion of an additional violation—driving without a license—until 

after his traffic stop for failure to display a front license plate should have 

ended,” the evidence should have been suppressed. Id.; see also United 

States v. Castro, 929 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (D.N.M. 2013) (“[O]nce the 

officer’s suspicion that a traffic violation occurred is dispelled, prolonging 

the detention by retaining the defendant’s identification, questioning the 

defendant further, or waiting for the outcome of a computer check, even 

if the check is in progress, is improper and a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment.”).

In United States v. Smith, the United States district court 

considered whether a traffic stop could be extended in an obscured 

license plate case. 37 F. Supp. 3d 806, 808 (M.D. La. 2014). The district 

court determined that once the license plate issue was resolved, there 

was no further basis to detain the driver. Id. at 813–14. In Smith, the 

roadside officer had received statements from another officer that the 
16

motorist was believed to be a member of a motorcycle gang and 

suspected drug dealer. Id. at 812–13. This alone, however, did not 

justify prolonging the search. Id. at 813. While the state argued that 

officer safety was involved, the court rejected the argument, noting 

among other things that the officers did not act as if they were in fear of 

their safety, did not conduct pat-downs of either occupant of the car 

prior to their eventual arrest, and did not isolate them out of the car in 

order to separate them from a potential weapon. Id. 

Finally, a federal district court in Iowa considered a traffic-stop 

issue similar to that raised in this case. In United States v. Wise, Chief 

Judge Longstaff considered a prolonged detention after any potential 

reason for the stop—a question about temporary tags—had been 

resolved. 418 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1102 (S.D. Iowa 2006). Relying on 

Edgerton, Judge Longstaff concluded that the deputy unlawfully detained 

the defendants when they asked for identification and brought one of the 

defendants back to the police car, because his investigation was no 

longer related to the purpose of the stop. Id. at 1108.

The Eighth Circuit, however, has declined to follow the approach of 

the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. For example, in United States v. 

$404,905.00 of U.S. Currency, the Eighth Circuit held that additional 

detention for thirty seconds to two minutes after the traffic stop was 

complete was lawful. 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1999), abrogated by

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 

492 (2015). The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a two-minute canine sniff 

was de minimus, noting, among other things the “strong interest in 

interdicting the flow of drugs on the nation’s highways.” Id.

3. The United States Supreme Court’s most recent foray into 

extended automobile stops: Rodriguez v. United States. The United 
17

States Supreme Court returned to the question of extended automobile 

stops in Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 

492. In that case, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether 

the Fourth Amendment allows a dog sniff to be conducted after the

completion of a traffic stop. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191 L. Ed. 2d 

at 498.

The Rodriguez Court concluded that the dog sniff in that case may 

have unlawfully extended the duration of the stop and ordered the issue 

of independent justification for the dog sniff to be heard on remand. Id.

at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616–17, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 501. The Rodriguez Court 

observed that when making a traffic stop, beyond determining whether to 

issue a ticket, an officer may engage in ordinary inquiries incident to the 

traffic stop, including “checking the driver’s license, determining whether 

there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 

automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499.

The Rodriguez Court, however, concluded that the stop may have

extended beyond the circumstances justifying the stop and would thus 

be unlawful without additional reasonable suspicion. Id. at ___, 135 

S. Ct. at 1616–17, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 501. Echoing Caballes, the 

Rodriguez Court emphasized a traffic stop prolonged beyond the “time 

reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission” is unlawful. Id. at 

___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. 

at 407, 125 S. Ct. at 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846). In Rodriguez, the 

Supreme Court specifically declined to follow the reasoning of the Eighth 

Circuit in $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 

191 L. Ed. 2d at 499–501.
18

D. State Caselaw.

1. Majority approach under Fourth Amendment to stops extended 

after original purpose of stop resolved. A considerable number of states 

have considered the question of the validity of extended automobile 

stops. Most of them decide the issue under the Fourth Amendment, but 

a few have considered the issue under state constitutional provisions. 

Whether under the Fourth Amendment or under the state constitution, 

the majority of the cases have held that once the underlying reason for a 

traffic stop has been resolved, it cannot be lawfully extended.

For example, in State v. Diaz, the Florida Supreme Court 

considered a case in which an officer pulled over a motorist because he 

could not read the temporary tag on the top of the rear window. 850 

So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2003). Once the car was pulled over and the officer 

approached it, the officer was able to read the tag and learned that 

nothing was improper. Id. Nonetheless, the officer walked up to the 

driver’s window and asked for the driver’s information. Id. The driver 

could not produce a proper license and was ultimately convicted of felony 

driving with a suspended license. Id.

The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the seizure had been 

unlawfully extended after the underlying purpose of the stop had been 

resolved. Id. at 440. According to strong words of the Florida Supreme 

Court:

It would be dangerous precedent to allow overzealous law 

enforcement officers to place in peril the principles of a free 

society by disregarding the protections afforded by the 

Fourth Amendment. To sanction further detention after an 

officer has clearly and unarguably satisfied the stated 

purpose for an initial stop would be to permit standardless, 

unreasonable detentions and investigations.

Id. at 439.
19

The Colorado Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in 

People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85–86 (Colo. 1995) (en banc). The 

Redinger court confronted facts similar to those in Diaz. An officer 

pulled over a vehicle after the officer could not see a license plate or 

temporary sticker on the rear of the vehicle. Id. at 82. When 

approaching the stopped car, however, the officer could plainly see a 

valid temporary plate properly displayed on the rear window on the 

driver’s side. Id. The officer then approached the driver’s window, 

explained the reason for the stop, but then extended the stop by asking 

for driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Id. When the 

driver removed a wallet from his jacket pocket, a plastic bag containing a 

white powdery substance fell onto his leg. Id. The officer then directed 

the driver to step out of the car, seized the bag, and asked the driver to 

identify the contents. Id. The driver identified the substance as 

methamphetamine and was charged with a drug crime. Id.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that the extended search 

violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 86. According to the Colorado 

Supreme Court, when “the purpose for which the investigatory stop was 

instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion 

exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for 

continued detention and interrogation of citizens.” Id. 85–86. State 

appellate courts in Utah, Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, 

Maryland, and Washington have come to similar conclusions to the 

decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Diaz and the Colorado Supreme 

Court in Redinger under the Fourth Amendment. See Holly v. State, 918 

N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. 2009); Diaz-Ruiz, 211 P.3d at 836; Ferris v. State, 

735 A.2d 491, 500 (Md. 1999); State v. Chatton, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240–

41 (Ohio 1984); State v. Pichardo, 623 S.E.2d 840, 852 (S.C. Ct. App.
20

2005); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en 

banc); State v. Morris, 259 P.3d 116, 124 (Utah 2011); State v. DeArman, 

774 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).

2. Cases refusing to allow extended stops under both Fourth 

Amendment and state constitutions. In some cases, however, state 

supreme courts have invalidated extended searches under both state and 

federal search and seizure constitutional provisions. In State v. Hayen, 

the South Dakota Supreme Court considered yet another case in which

an officer stopped a motorist because he was unable to see the expiration 

date on the bottom of the temporary thirty-day dealer’s license. 751 

N.W.2d 306, 307 (S.D. 2008). A box in the new pick-up truck obstructed 

the view of the bottom of the license when the officer followed the vehicle. 

Id. The officer, however, did not bother to look at the temporary license, 

but walked by and asked the motorist for driver’s license and proof of 

insurance. Id. After this initial contact, the officer stepped back, saw the 

expiration date on the license, and determined it to be valid. Id.

The officer continued the stop by returning to his patrol vehicle to 

run a warrant and license check. Id. at 308. The warrant check revealed 

an outstanding warrant for the driver’s arrest. Id. A search incident to 

arrest then revealed methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia 

in the driver’s coat pocket. Id. The state charged the driver with 

possession of a controlled drug or substance and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Id. The defendant filed a motion to suppress. Id.

In Hayen, the South Dakota Supreme Court, citing McSwain, held 

that the detention exceeded the lawful investigative stop and that the 

fruits of prolonged detention were properly suppressed. Id. at 311. 

Without any further articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the 
21

extended detention violated Hayen’s federal and state constitutional 

rights. Id.

A similar case is presented in McGaughey v. State, 37 P.3d 130 

(Okla. Crim. App. 2001). In McGaughey, an officer observed a vehicle 

pass by and believed that the taillights on the back of the truck were not 

working. Id. at 132. The officer pulled the vehicle over. Id. When 

approaching the vehicle, the officer could see that, in fact, the taillights 

were functioning properly. Id.

Notwithstanding the officer’s awareness of the functioning of the 

taillights, the officer asked the driver to step out of the car and asked for 

his driver’s license. Id. at 132–33. The officer then continued to inspect 

the vehicle, observing a pistol in the driver’s side door pouch. Id. at 133. 

After determining the gun belonged to the driver and was loaded, the 

officer asked if the driver would mind if he searched the vehicle, and the 

driver responded “go ahead.” Id. The search revealed three bags of 

amphetamine between the two front seats. Id. The driver was then 

patted down and over $6000 in cash was seized and the driver arrested. 

Id. A later inventory search revealed more drugs and cash. Id.

The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals held that the extended 

stop was unlawful. Id. at 141. According to the Oklahoma court,

Although an officer effecting a valid traffic stop can 

require a driver to exit his car, and produce his license, and 

can check the validity of the inspections sticker on that 

vehicle, an officer who realizes that his stop of a vehicle was

mistaken—and who has no other cause for reasonable 

suspicion of the driver—has no authority to further detain 

the driver or his vehicle. The seizure becomes illegal at the 

point where its initial justification has ceased and no new 

justification has arisen.

Id. 140–41. The Oklahoma court declared the search unlawful under 

both the search and seizure provision of article II, section 30 of the 
22

Oklahoma Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. Id. at 140.

3. Distinction between extended stop where underlying problem is 

resolved and ongoing investigation pursuant to valid stop. A number of 

court decisions differentiate between a situation in which the original 

purpose has been resolved and when the original purpose of the stop is a 

valid and ongoing concern. See McSwain, 29 F.3d at 561. When the 

purpose of the original stop remains valid, a number of courts have held 

that a request for driver’s license, insurance, and registration is not 

invalid as long as the stop is not unduly prolonged. See, e.g., Trestyn, 

646 F.3d at 744; McGaughey, 37 P.3d at 140–41.

4. State court outliers. The state court cases, however, have not 

been unanimous. Other states have allowed a driver’s license check 

under circumstances similar to the facts presented here. As a general 

matter, these states hold that if the traffic stop was initially supported by 

reasonable suspicion, a request for driver’s license, registration, and 

insurance papers is permitted even after the problem that led to the 

initial stop has been resolved in favor of the driver. See, e.g., State v.

Gulick, 759 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Me. 2000); Hart v. State, 235 S.W.3d 858, 

861 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Williams, 655 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Wis. 

Ct. App. 2002).

5. Post-Rodriguez developments. After Rodriguez, it is noteworthy 

that one state supreme court changed its course, at least under the 

Fourth Amendment. In People v. Cummings, the Illinois Supreme Court 

suppressed evidence resulting from an extended automobile stop. 6 

N.E.3d 725, 733–34 (Ill. 2014). The United States Supreme Court 

granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the 

Illinois Supreme Court for consideration in light of Rodriguez. Illinois v. 
23

Cummings, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d 760, 

760 (2015) (mem.).

On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that in light of 

Rodriguez, a driver’s license request of a lawfully stopped driver is 

permissible irrespective of whether that request relates directly to the 

purposes of the stop. People v. Cummings, 46 N.E.3d 248, 253 (Ill. 

2016). As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s 

suppression of the evidence. Id. Pointedly, the Illinois Supreme Court 

noted that the defendant did not raise a parallel claim under article I, 

section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 250.

E. Iowa Caselaw.

1. The contours of State v. Jackson. In State v. Jackson, we 

considered a case in which the defendant was stopped for lack of a 

license plate. 315 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1982). Upon approaching the 

vehicle, the officer found the vehicle had a lawful properly displayed 

department of transportation paper plate. Id. After making that 

determination, the officer asked the driver if he had a valid driver’s 

license. Id. The driver did not produce a license and admitted that he 

was driving while his license was under suspension. Id.

The defendant was subsequently charged with driving while his 

license was under suspension in violation of Iowa Code section 321A.32. 

Id. The district court granted a motion to suppress on the ground that 

there was no “articulate and specific reason to believe criminal activity 

[was] afoot.” Id. The state appealed. Id.

On appeal, the state filed a short brief citing Prouse for the 

proposition that there is no requirement of articulable and reasonable 

suspicion to support a request for production of a driver’s license. See 

Appellant’s Br. in Jackson at 4–5. The reference to Prouse implies that 
24

the Fourth Amendment may have been in play. There is no mention at 

all of the Iowa Constitution in the state’s Jackson brief. The pro se 

defendant did not file a brief in the case and the state’s position was thus 

unresisted.

In a brief two-page conclusory opinion, we held that the initial stop 

was valid under Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d

at 660. Jackson, 315 N.W.2d at 767. Citing only Iowa Code section 

321.27 and no other authority, we further stated that “there was nothing 

illegal about the fact that, once he was stopped and exonerated, he was 

asked to display his operator’s license.” Id. This conclusion is stated, 

but perhaps because of the absence of a brief on behalf of the defendant, 

no reasoning is provided. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Iowa 

Constitution was mentioned in the opinion. See id.

Jackson was decided before the Supreme Court decided Royer. As 

noted by the court of appeals in this case, Jackson does not specifically 

address whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the 

officer to prolong the detention of the motorist to demand his or her 

driver’s license. In addition, there is certainly no holding under article I, 

section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in Jackson.

2. Reemergence of independent state constitutional law. As has 

been thoroughly canvassed in some of our other opinions, the Iowa 

Supreme Court has a long history of independent adjudication of state 

constitutional issues. In recent decades, we have reemphasized that 

independent constitutional tradition. In State v. Cline, we reexamined

filaments in our prior law noting the ability of state courts to engage in 

independent constitutional analysis. 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 

(Iowa 2001). In Cline, we specifically declined to follow the approach of 
25

the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 

922, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 698 (1984). Id. at 293. 

Subsequent to Cline, we have engaged in independent state 

constitutional analysis in a number of search and seizure cases. See,

e.g., Short, 851 N.W.2d at 481; State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 790–91

(Iowa 2013); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 775; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 262; State v. 

Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Iowa 2004).

3. Recent Iowa cases involving traffic stops. Since 2010, we have 

considered the legality of automobile stops in five cases. The first case is 

State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 2010). In Vance, we considered 

whether law enforcement had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth 

Amendment to stop a vehicle when the officers knew that the owner of 

the vehicle had a suspended driver’s license and when the officers had no 

evidence or circumstances indicating that the registered owner was not 

the driver of the vehicle. Id. at 781. Joining a majority of jurisdictions, 

we held that under these circumstances, the officers had reasonable 

suspicion to make an initial stop. Id. at 781–83. In a footnote, however, 

we noted that counsel for Vance failed to raise the question of whether 

the basis for the stop continued to be valid upon the officer’s discovery 

that the driver of the vehicle was not, in fact, the registered owner. Id. at 

783 n.1. We also noted that counsel had failed to raise any claim that 

the stop was invalid under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 780.

In Vance, we then proceeded to consider an Iowa constitutional 

claim that was preserved—namely, whether Vance’s counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the search of his 

car under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 786. In New York v. Belton, the 

Supreme Court held under the Fourth Amendment that 
26

when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the 

occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 

incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of 

that automobile [as well as] any containers found within the 

passenger compartment. 

453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 768, 775 (1981) 

(footnotes omitted). In a 1981 case, State v. Sanders, we adopted Belton

as the proper analysis under the Iowa Constitution. 312 N.W.2d 534, 

539 (Iowa 1981), overruled by State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 

2015).

After Sanders and by the time of Vance, Belton had come under 

heavy attack as overbroad. As noted in Vance, academic commentators 

sharply criticized the decision, eight states declined to follow it under 

their state constitutions, and the Supreme Court itself began to question 

broad readings of the case in its subsequent opinion. 790 N.W.2d at 

787–90. Further, at the time Vance was pending, the United States 

Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230, 

128 S. Ct. 1443, 170 L. Ed. 2d 274 (2008) (mem.) (Certiorari granted to 

answer the question: “Does the Fourth Amendment require law 

enforcement officers to demonstrate a threat to their safety or a need to 

preserve evidence related to a crime of arrest in order to justify a 

warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the 

vehicle’s recent occupants have been arrested and secured?”).

Under these circumstances, we stated in Vance that we would 

ordinarily proceed to determine whether counsel violated professional 

norms by failing to challenge Sanders and Belton under the Iowa 

Constitution. 790 N.W.2d at 789–90. We stopped short of finding 

counsel’s performance deficient on direct appeal, however, on the ground 

that it was possible that trial counsel failed to raise a challenge to Belton 

because trial counsel may have reasonably believed that there were other 
27

exceptions to the warrant requirement that would allow admissibility. Id.

at 790. As a result, the matter was left for possible postconviction relief.

Id.

In Vance, we did not, then, expressly hold that counsel had been 

ineffective for failing to challenge the search of the vehicle on Iowa 

constitutional grounds. However, there would have been nothing to leave 

for postconviction relief if Sanders and Belton remained good Iowa law.

Our next traffic-stop case is Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 767. The first 

issue in Pals was whether an officer could validly stop a vehicle for an 

ongoing civil infraction. Id. at 774. We concluded that such a stop was 

lawful under both the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. Id. 

at 775. We next considered whether the scope of the search had 

unlawfully expanded after the initial valid stop. Id. We concluded, 

however, that the issue was not preserved in the district court and 

declined to address it. Id. at 776–77.

Finally, we considered whether a consent to the search was 

constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 777. We concluded that it was not. Id. 

While we recognized that many states had abandoned the United States 

Supreme Court’s “totality of circumstances” vegetable-blender approach 

to consent in the search and seizure context found in Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973), in 

favor of the more rigorous knowing and voluntary approach of Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938), we 

determined that it was not necessary to reach that issue. Pals, 805 

N.W.2d at 779. Instead, we determined, for the purpose of the case 

before us, to apply Schneckloth “with teeth” to invalidate the consent to 

search because of its coercive features. Id.
28

Our next automobile-stop case is State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288

(Iowa 2013). In Tyler, we considered a case where an officer made a 

traffic stop based on a mistake of law, namely, that a license plate cover 

unduly obstructed his view of the plate and was unlawful. Id. at 290. 

After making the initial stop, the officer detected the odor of alcohol on 

the driver’s breath. Id. at 291.

In considering the issues in Tyler, we examined a videotape of the 

stop which demonstrated that both the rear and front license plate 

covers were clear rather than tinted. Id. at 290–91. The officer who 

made the stop could plainly read the license plate as demonstrated by 

his call to dispatch providing the information. Id. at 291. The only 

claimed violation of law was a violation of Iowa Code section 321.37(3), 

which provided that any frame around the registration plate must permit 

full view of all numerals and letters printed on the plate. Id. at 294. We 

held that the statute was not violated and the officer had made a mistake 

of law in initiating the stop. Id. at 295–96. As a result, both the Fourth 

Amendment and the Iowa Constitution, article I, section 8 were violated.2 

Id. at 298.

We also noted there was evidence in the record indicating the 

officer has specifically targeted Tyler’s vehicle for a stop for a reason 

other than an obscure license plate. Id. at 297. A friend of Tyler’s with 

identical license plate covers passed by the officer without incident 

immediately prior to Tyler’s arrest. Id. We observed in a footnote that 

2After Tyler, the United States Supreme Court determined that a reasonable 

mistake of law could support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Heien v. North 

Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475, 486 (2014). Of 

course, the ruling in Tyler under the Iowa Constitution is unaffected by Heien. Further, 

the approach in Heien would be very difficult to square with our rejection of the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 8 of the Iowa 

Constitution in Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 293.

 
29

while Tyler—who was black—argued that he was victim of racial 

profiling, we did not need to reach that particular issue in light of our 

resolution of the case. Id. at 297 n.4. We made the commonsense 

observation, however, that the possibility for racial profiling requires us 

to carefully review the objective basis for asserted justifications behind 

the traffic stops. Id.

The next case in our parade is Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 1. In 

Gaskins, an officer made a routine traffic stop for an expired license 

plate. Id. at 3. When the officer approached the vehicle, he smelled 

marijuana and confiscated a blunt from the driver. Id. A search of the 

passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a small portable locked 

safe. Id. Police opened the safe without a warrant and discovered drugs, 

paraphernalia, and a gun. Id. We held that the search of the safe was 

unlawful under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. In doing 

so, we specifically overruled Sanders, noting that it was no longer good 

law under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 16.

The final case is In re Property Seized from Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384 

(Iowa 2015). Pardee involved a traffic stop that was prolonged by efforts 

to engage in a dog sniff for drugs. Id. at 385–86. In Pardee, we noted 

under the Fourth Amendment an officer “ ‘may conduct certain unrelated 

checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop’ but ‘may not do so in a 

way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily 

demanded to justify detaining an individual.’ ” 872 N.W.2d at 393 

(emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 

191 L. Ed. 2d at 499).

F. Analysis. In developing the proper approach to the Iowa 

Constitution, we may look to United States Supreme Court opinions, 

dissents in those opinions, various federal precedents, state court 
30

precedents, and any other persuasive authorities. See Short, 851 N.W.2d 

at 481; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 264–67. Indeed, there is a healthy body of 

independent state constitutional law developing in the area of traffic 

stops. See Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision, 

66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1039, 1046–54 (2015) (citing cases from 

Washington, New Mexico, and Alaska departing from the doctrine in 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 

(1996), in which the United States Supreme Court unanimously held 

that traffic stops based on objective probable cause are reasonable 

regardless of the officers actual motivation for the stop).

We think the federal and state cases have some common themes. 

First, cabining official discretion to conduct searches is designed to 

prevent arbitrary use of police power. Limiting both the scope and 

duration of warrantless stops on the highway provides important means 

of fulfilling the constitutional purpose behind article I section 8, namely, 

ensuring that government power is exercised in a carefully limited 

manner.

The caselaw repeatedly emphasizes that even de minimus

extensions of traffic stops are not acceptable. The fountainhead case of 

the United States Supreme Court is Royer. It has been picked up in the 

caselaw with some enthusiasm. See United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 

651, 663 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding six minutes measurably prolonged 

traffic stop); United States v. Dolson, 673 F. Supp. 2d 842, 867 (D. Minn.

2009) (finding a delay of one minute and twenty-four seconds to call drug 

task force to be an unlawful extension).

That said, it is possible that when there is a valid ongoing traffic 

stop officers may properly seek driver’s identification, registration, and 
31

insurance information. This distinction is well recognized in the caselaw. 

Here, however, there was no ongoing valid traffic stop.

We, of course, are not obliged to follow Rodriguez in our 

interpretation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. In any 

event, nothing in Rodriguez is to the contrary. In dicta, Justice Ginsberg 

indicates that obtaining driver’s license, registration, and insurance 

information is a normal part of an ordinary traffic stop. Rodriguez, 575

U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. But she was

referring to a valid, ongoing stop, not a traffic stop in which the 

underlying reason for the stop has been satisfied. Early on, the McSwain

case recognized the critical distinction between a case in which there is a 

violation or ongoing violation and one in which the basis for the stop has 

dissipated. 29 F.3d at 561. Other cases prior to Rodriguez emphasized 

the distinction as well. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 136 P.3d 579, 589 

(N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (noting the state “ignore[d] the distinguishing fact in 

each case cited to support [its position]—the initial stop in each case was 

valid”); Hayen, 751 N.W.2d at 310 (distinguishing cases where actual 

traffic violation was present). A leading commentator on the Fourth 

Amendment emphasizes the distinction between a valid or ongoing 

investigation and one that has been resolved for purposes of records 

checks:

The importance of the violation of law to the authority 

to run a check on a license and registration is illustrated by 

those cases holding that if there is a stopping on either 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a traffic violation 

which is determined immediately after the stop not to have 

been a violation at all, the officer may not continue the 

detention for a license/registration check.

4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 

Amendment § 9.3(c), at 510 n.162 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, the language 
32

used by Justice Ginsberg in Rodriguez does not suggest a different result 

is required in this case.

And even if it did, we would not be deterred from pursuing our own 

independent path under the Iowa Constitution. Although this case 

raises distinctive issues, our recent traffic-stop cases have evinced an 

awareness of the potential for arbitrary government action on the state’s 

roads and highways. In Vance, we severely questioned the rationale of 

our older precedent regarding searches of closed containers pursuant to 

an automobile stop in Sanders—a case we ultimately explicitly overruled 

in Gaskins. See Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 16; Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 787; 

Sanders, 312 N.W.2d at 539. In Pals, we put traffic stops in the larger 

context of concerns surrounding racial profiling. 805 N.W.2d at 772 n.2. 

That theme was continued in Tyler where we noted the stop involved an 

African-American driver in which a previous driver with similar features 

on the license plate was not stopped. 830 N.W.2d at 297 & n.4. These 

recent cases all have a common feature of demanding compliance with 

Iowa constitutional commands in the traffic-stop context.

We recognize, however, that officer safety is a legitimate and 

weighty interest in the context of traffic stops. See Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336–37

(1977) (per curiam). Yet, as the Supreme Court stated in Knowles, the 

safety concerns arising out of a potential traffic citation are “a good deal 

less than in the case of a custodial arrest.” 525 U.S. at 117, 119 S. Ct. 

at 487, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 498. Nonetheless, in Mimms, the Supreme 

Court held that an officer can direct a driver to get out of the car to 

ensure the officer’s safety. 434 U.S. at 110–11, 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54 

L. Ed. 2d at 337.
33

Yet, for a more intrusive Terry-type stop, reasonable suspicion is 

constitutionally required before the officers may engage in a pat-down 

search. United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United 

States v. Coley, 974 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.C. Dist. 1997). There is no 

categorical approach to pat-down searches. The validity of a pat-down 

search, an important part of ensuring officer safety, depends upon the 

facts of each case. See Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 

1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Terry-type pat-down based on “conclusory 

references to ‘officer safety’ ”).

The same is true in the context of extending the duration of an 

automobile stop when the underlying problem has been resolved. While 

in most extended traffic-stop cases an officer safety claim has not been 

asserted, in cases where officer safety has been raised, the courts have 

repeatedly rejected generalized, unsubstantiated claims related to officer 

safety as a basis for extending a traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v. 

Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2006) (conclusory argument of 

officer safety not based on facts insufficient); Smith, 37 F. Supp. 3d at

812–13 (insufficient evidence of threat to safety to justify extended stop); 

State v. McCaulley, 831 N.E.2d 474, 476–77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (no 

safety reasons for detention of driver in back seat of squad car). Here, 

there is no indication in the record that the officer feared for his safety. 

Indeed, the officer allowed the unhandcuffed driver to accompany him 

back to the vehicle when the officer conducted the search.

Further, our holding does not increase the risks of harm to 

officers, but in fact lessens it. Under the result in this case, the officer is 

required to allow the driver to go on his or her way after the resolution of 

the reason for the stop. This can be accomplished by a brief gesture, an 

announcement from the back of the vehicle, or a brief conversation at the 
34

driver’s window. In this case, it would have simply only required the 

officer to say “good-bye” to the driver and allow him to return to the car. 

In fact, any increased officer danger arises from continuing the detention 

of the driver while the license and warrant checks are conducted. Thus, 

the very outcome sought by the State in this case would increase danger 

to officers, not lessen it. Officer safety might be a valid concern when 

tethered to a suspect’s continuing detention, but not when the suspect is 

free to go. The State is not entitled to relief from an exigency of its own 

creation.

As indicated above, it is not clear whether Jackson was a Fourth 

Amendment or article I, section 8 case. In any event, to the extent that 

Jackson is inconsistent with our holding today, we overrule it. We 

conclude that when the reason for a traffic stop is resolved and there is 

no other basis for reasonable suspicion, article I, section 8 of the Iowa 

Constitution requires that the driver must be allowed to go his or her 

way without further ado.

V. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, we conclude that the motion to suppress 

should have been granted. We therefore vacate the decision of the court 

of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.

All justices concur except Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ., 

who dissent.
35

#15–0752, State v. Coleman

WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting). 

I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court ruling 

denying Coleman’s motion to suppress, as did the court of appeals. Until 

today, a police officer who lawfully stopped a motorist could ask to see 

his or her driver’s license, especially when the officer knew the driver was 

not the car’s registered owner. Almost all Iowans, I believe, would find 

this activity completely unobjectionable and, indeed, mundane. But not 

the majority. Instead, our court has determined that this act of routine 

traffic enforcement violates the search and seizure provision of the Iowa 

Constitution. The United States Supreme Court reached the opposite 

conclusion under the Fourth Amendment in 2015. See Rodriguez v. 

United States, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d 

492, 499 (2015). 

To get to its result, the majority overrules another one of our 

established search and seizure precedents. In State v. Jackson, we 

correctly decided a quarter century ago that the constitution does not 

require an officer who lawfully stops a vehicle to “treat the [driver] as if 

he had never seen him.” 315 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1982). Rather, 

after dispelling the original purpose for the stop, the officer could perform 

the minimally intrusive step of checking the driver’s license, which Iowa 

drivers are required by statute to carry and display upon an officer’s 

request. Id.; see also Iowa Code § 321.174(3) (2013) (“A licensee shall 

have the licensee’s driver’s license in immediate possession at all times 

when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same upon demand 

of a . . . peace officer . . . .”). I would affirm Mr. Coleman’s conviction for 

driving while barred by following our commonsense decision in Jackson

and United States Supreme Court precedent explicitly allowing officers to 
36

check the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance as 

part of the routine mission of any traffic stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 

___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. 

We recently followed Rodriguez in In re Property Seized from 

Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 391–93 (Iowa 2015), and have no good reason 

to depart from it here. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court within this 

past year unanimously applied Rodriguez to uphold a license check 

under the same facts presented. People v. Cummings, 46 N.E.3d 248, 

252 (Ill. 2016). 

Iowans who get pulled over expect to show their driver’s license to 

the officer. This practice helps law enforcement get dangerous, illegal 

drivers off the road. The majority fails to mention why Coleman had 

been barred from driving. His criminal record includes four prior 

convictions for driving while barred, two prior convictions for driving 

while suspended, several narcotics convictions, and notably, a conviction 

for second-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) committed two days

before Officer Morris pulled him over. The majority gives Coleman a free 

pass. 

The majority goes out of its way to connect this case, at least 

implicitly, to racial profiling. This is hardly the case to impugn motives 

of Iowa law enforcement. It is undisputed Officer Morris could not see 

the driver that night and did not know the driver’s gender or race. He 

stopped the vehicle because its registered owner (a woman) had a 

suspended driver’s license, and he reasonably assumed she was driving 

her own car. There is no evidence or claim by Coleman that Officer 

Morris pulled him over due to his race. See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 

54, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“This is not an instance of an indefatigable 

Inspector Javert mercilessly pursuing, harassing, and hounding his 
37

quarry through Paris sewers or Kendall County highways by concocting 

excuses to detain him.”). To the contrary, Coleman’s counsel expressly 

rejected this possibility in response to a question from a member of this 

court at oral argument. Officer Morris was entitled to ask for Coleman’s 

driver’s license and to detain him upon discovering he was driving while 

barred. After today, habitual offenders stopped under similar 

circumstances will be able to simply drive away without an identity 

check. 

The majority flouts our error preservation rules to make another 

end run around precedent by deciding this case under a sua sponte 

interpretation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.3 Coleman 

never raised the Iowa Constitution in district court and never argued on 

appeal that it provided more restrictions on police than the Fourth 

Amendment. I would hold Coleman waived any claim for greater 

protection under the Iowa Constitution. I will now further develop the 

reasons for my dissent, beginning with the threshold issue of waiver. 

A. Error Preservation—the Iowa Constitution. Coleman’s 

motion to suppress filed in district court did not mention the Fourth 

3See State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 41 (Iowa 2015) (Waterman, J., dissenting) 

(criticizing majority opinion that diverged from settled federal precedent and “revers[ed] 

the district court for failing to credit an argument the defendant never made at trial”); 

State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 508 (Iowa 2014) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“Today’s 

majority . . . once again uses the Iowa Constitution to evade well-settled Fourth 

Amendment precedent without setting forth any principled basis for construing Iowa’s 

nearly identically worded search and seizure provision to require greater restrictions on 

the law enforcement community and elected branches.”); State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 

785, 837 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (noting majority had “venture[d] into 

state constitutional issues that no one has briefed”); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 784 

(Iowa 2011) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“Although Pals[’s] appellate brief raised both the 

federal and Iowa constitutional search and seizure provisions, he never argued our state 

constitution provided broader protection.”).

 
38

Amendment or Iowa Constitution,4 nor did he cite to either constitution 

during the hearing on that motion. Just last term, in State v. Prusha, we 

unanimously held the defendant failed to preserve a state constitutional 

search and seizure claim when he mentioned only the Fourth 

Amendment in district court. 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016). Now, 

the majority finds error was preserved when trial counsel failed to 

mention either the Fourth Amendment or the Iowa Constitution. 

So less has become more. See State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 526 

(Iowa 2014) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[I]t almost seems as if a lawyer in 

this court would be wiser not to develop an Iowa constitutional 

argument.”). Constitutional jurisprudence should not be a race to the 

bottom. Notwithstanding the State’s incorrect statement that error was 

preserved, Coleman waived his belated claim for broader restrictions on 

police under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.5 

4Coleman’s motion to suppress stated in its entirety: 

COMES NOW the Defendant by counsel and, pursuant to I.R.Cr.P. 

2.11(2)(c) 2.12(1)(a), moves the Court for an order suppressing certain 

evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop, on or about August 18, 2014, 

on the ground that the stop was[sic] probable case: the registered owner 

of the vehicle was not under suspension. 

The transcript of the oral hearing on the motion to suppress indicates the district court 

agreed with the State that our decision in Jackson controlled. Coleman obtained 

different counsel for his appeal. 

5The State in its appellate briefing indicated it “does not contest error 

preservation,” presumably because it assumed we would honor our precedent to apply 

the federal standard when the defendant sought no different standard under the Iowa 

Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291–92 (Iowa 2013). “Where a 

party raises both state and federal constitutional claims but does not argue that a 

standard independent of the federal approach should be employed under the state 

constitution, we ordinarily apply the substantive federal standards . . . .” Id. “[W]e 

generally decline to consider an independent state constitutional standard based upon 

mere citation to the applicable state constitutional provision.” State v. Lowe, 812 

N.W.2d 554, 566 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Iowa 2009) 

(Appel, J., concurring specially)). The State concluded, “Coleman cites both the state 

and federal constitutions, but does not argue that one requires a different analysis or 

result than the other. As such, the Court should treat the claims coextensively.” I 

 
39

By surprising the State with a new interpretation of our state 

constitution, the majority rewards trial counsel’s silence and gives all 

defense counsel a perverse incentive to lay in the weeds in district court. 

This approach deprives the State of the opportunity to address the state 

constitutional claim at the trial level, perhaps by making a different 

evidentiary record. It also deprives the district court of the opportunity 

to rule on the state constitutional claim. 

“Error preservation is important for two reasons: (1) affording the 

district court an ‘opportunity to avoid or correct error’; and (2) providing 

the appellate court ‘with an adequate record in reviewing errors 

purportedly committed’ by the district court.” State v. Ambrose, 861 

N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 

869 (Iowa 2003)). We do not consider issues for the first time on appeal. 

See Geisler v. City Council, 769 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Iowa 2009). Because 

Coleman did not raise a claim under the Iowa Constitution in district 

court, I would find he did not preserve it. See id. 

“Our obligation on appeal is to decide the case within the 

framework of the issues raised by the parties.” Feld v. Borkowski, 790 

N.W.2d 72, 78 (Iowa 2010). We should “do no more and no less.” Id.

The majority in this case unnecessarily overturns existing law 

sua sponte. In so doing, the majority violates the admonition so recently 

reiterated in Feld:

[I]n the absence of the most cogent circumstances, we do not 

create issues or unnecessarily overturn existing law 

sua sponte when the parties have not advocated for such a 

change. In this case, we are restrained to apply the 

controlling law as advocated by the parties, and we do not 

agree, but going forward the State should no longer rely on our precedent treating state 

and federal constitutional claims coextensively. 

___________________________
40

consider or forecast whether or not that controlling law 

should be abandoned or changed . . . .

Id. at 78 n.4 (citations omitted). The restraint exercised by our court in 

Feld should have been employed here.

Error preservation rules apply to the State and defendant alike. 

DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002) (“Because error 

preservation is based on fairness, we think both parties should be bound 

by the rule.”).6 We should not reverse the district court for failing to 

credit an argument a party never made at trial. See id. (“Ordinarily, we 

attempt to protect the district court from being ambushed by parties 

raising issues on appeal that were not raised in the district court.”). 

Judges cannot assume the role of a partisan advocate and do counsel’s 

work. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will 

not speculate on the arguments [the parties] might have made and then 

search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such 

arguments.”); see also State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89, 97–98 (Iowa 2010) 

(declining to speculate as to argument not made at district court); Feld, 

790 N.W.2d at 83 (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 

(“Judges are not advocates who reach out to decide questions the parties 

themselves either deem unimportant or, for whatever reasons, fail to 

raise. The job of the court is to decide concrete cases the parties bring to 

it.”); In re S.P., 719 N.W.2d 535, 539–40 (Iowa 2006) (stating “the court is 

prohibited from assuming the role of an advocate” and calling for “what 

Edmund Burke described as the ‘cold neutrality of an impartial judge’ ”

(quoting State v. Glanton, 231 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 1975))); State v. 

Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002) (noting the “constitutional right 

6For example, in State v. Ochoa, we concluded the State waived several grounds 

for upholding a warrantless search of a parolee’s motel room based on consent because 

it failed to raise those grounds in district court. 792 N.W.2d 260, 291–92 (Iowa 2010). 

 
41

to have a neutral and detached judge”); Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. 

Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (noting that we do not “assume a 

partisan role and undertake [a party’s] research and advocacy”). 

When Coleman belatedly raised the Iowa Constitution on appeal, 

he never argued for a different standard than we apply under the Fourth 

Amendment. Therefore, our court should have applied the federal 

framework. See, e.g., Reilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 

2010) (“Because Reilly has not advanced a standard for interpreting the 

due process clause under the Iowa Constitution different from its federal 

constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general principles as 

outlined by the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 

N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (applying Federal Eighth Amendment 

framework because defendant “has not advanced a standard for 

interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the Iowa 

Constitution differently”); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n.1 

(Iowa 2000) (refusing to deviate from federal analysis in considering state 

constitutional claim because appellant “ha[d] suggested no legal 

deficiency in the federal principles . . . nor ha[d] he offered an alternative 

test or guidelines”). 

“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do 

not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but 

essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the 

parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 

1983). We should not break from precedent and plow new ground 

without affording all parties the opportunity to address the issue in 

district court and on appeal. The risk of unintended consequences 

escalates when our court freelances. Constitutional errors cannot be 

fixed legislatively. 
42

B. The Search and Seizure Analysis. To me, this is an easy 

case. As Judge McDonald observed in his special concurrence in this 

case, “Jackson is rooted in long-standing Fourth Amendment principles 

[that were] reaffirmed in Rodriquez and Pardee.” It is undisputed that 

Officer Morris lawfully stopped Coleman. Officer Morris could not 

identify who was driving the moving vehicle at night and its registered 

owner had a suspended license. In State v. Vance, we determined 

an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate an 

investigatory stop of a vehicle to investigate whether the 

driver has a valid driver’s license when the officer knows the 

registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license, and 

the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances 

indicating the registered owner is not the driver of the 

vehicle. 

790 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Iowa 2010). Even when an officer is mistaken 

about a driver’s identity, “[o]ur precedent is clear that a mistake of fact 

may justify a traffic stop.” Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 294. Having lawfully 

stopped Coleman, Officer Morris crossed no constitutional line by simply 

asking to see Coleman’s driver’s license. 

The majority gives short shrift to the dispositive caselaw and 

reaches the wrong result through a meandering discussion of dissenting 

opinions and out-of-date precedent.7 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court, 

in a majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, delineated the 

bounds of a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion. 575 U.S. at ___, 

135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. An officer stopped Dennys 

Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law. 

Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 496. After attending to 

7The majority first cites Rodriguez on page 16 after ten pages discussing earlier 

Fourth Amendment decisions. The majority first cites Jackson on page 23, after five 

additional pages discussing pre-Rodriguez cases from other states. In my view, a proper 

analysis should begin with the controlling precedent.

 
43

everything related to the stop, including checking the driver’s license and 

issuing a warning citation, the officer detained Rodriguez for another 

seven to eight minutes to walk a drug-detection dog around the vehicle. 

Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1612, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 497. The Court held this 

seven- to eight-minute delay violated the Fourth Amendment if it was not 

supported by independent reasonable suspicion and remanded the case 

for determination of that issue. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616–17, 191 

L. Ed. 2d at 500–01. “Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police 

inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s 

‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and 

attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191 

L. Ed. 2d at 498 (citation omitted). The Court concluded the officer’s 

mission ended after the time reasonably required to issue the warning 

citation. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. The officer 

could not prolong the stop by detaining the driver to wait for the drug 

dog without independent reasonable suspicion. Id. 

In so holding, the Court made clear that “[b]eyond determining 

whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary 

inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 

191 L. Ed. 2d at 499 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 

543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 847 (2005)). 

“Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, 

determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, 

and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. 

The Court stated these actions serve the same “objective” as the traffic 

code: “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and 

responsibly.” Id. Rather than an interest in criminal enforcement, the 
44

Court noted, these actions “stem[] from the mission of the stop itself.” Id. 

at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. 

The Court contrasted these “negligibly burdensome precautions” 

with running a drug dog around the vehicle, which “is a measure aimed 

at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 

S. Ct. at 1615–16, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499–500 (alteration in original) 

(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S. Ct. 447, 

454, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343 (2000)). “Lacking the same close connection 

to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries,” the Court held unrelated 

inquiries to search for other criminal wrongdoing could not prolong the 

duration of the stop without reasonable suspicion. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. 

Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito dissented on the validity of 

the drug search, but all nine justices agreed the officer may obtain 

license and registration information as an ordinary incident of any lawful 

stop. See id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1624, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (Alito, J., 

dissenting) (noting the majority’s conclusion that asking for driver’s 

license and completing a records check on driver was “properly part of 

the traffic stop”). I would follow this unanimous contemporary decision 

of our nation’s highest court. 

We applied Rodriguez in Pardee, 872 N.W.2d at 391–93. A 

highway patrolman on a drug interdiction mission began trailing a car 

with California license plates and stopped the driver, John Saccento, for 

a broken taillight and following a semitrailer too closely. Id. at 386. 

Robert Pardee was a passenger in the car. Id. at 387. After twenty-five 

minutes, the trooper told the occupants they were free to go, but when 

they lingered, the officer resumed his questioning. Id. at 388. The 

officer, based on responses he found suspicious, detained Pardee and the 
45

driver to run a drug dog around the vehicle. Id. We concluded the officer 

had unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop without particularized 

suspicion of wrongdoing and reversed the district court’s denial of 

Pardee’s motion to suppress. Id. at 397. But we emphasized 

[a] dog sniff, unlike matters such as “checking the driver’s 

license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants 

against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s 

registration and proof of insurance,” can only be undertaken 

without individualized suspicion if it does not prolong the 

traffic stop. 

Id. at 393 (emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499).8 Thus, both Rodriguez and Pardee

recognized that a license check is within the original mission of the traffic 

stop. These checks do not require separate, articulable, individualized 

suspicion because they fall within the scope of the stop. 

Well before Rodriguez and Pardee, our precedent allowed an officer 

to check a driver’s license once the driver had been stopped lawfully. In 

Jackson, a deputy sheriff pulled over a car driven by Louis Jackson 

because it had no license plate. 315 N.W.2d at 767. “Upon being alerted 

to the reasons for the stop, defendant directed the officer’s attention to a 

properly displayed department of transportation paper plate.” Id. At that 

point, reasonable suspicion for the stop dissipated. Id. But Jackson was 

unable to produce a driver’s license and admitted his license had been 

suspended. Id. He was charged with driving under suspension. Id. 

Jackson filed a motion to suppress, stating, 

The request of the Defendant to see his license constituted a 

search and was violative of the court, the Fourteen[th] 

Amendment[] of the United States Constitution and the 

8Two members of our court dissented, concluding the drug-dog search was lawful based 

on reasonable suspicion raised during the stop. Pardee, 872 N.W.2d at 397–98 (Cady, 

C.J. dissenting). 

 
46

Constitution of the State of Iowa as being conducted without 

probabl[e] cause.” 

Def.’s Mot. to Suppress in Jackson, at 2. The district court granted the 

motion to suppress. Jackson, 315 N.W.2d at 767. We reversed the 

district court. Id. We held the officer was authorized to ask for the 

driver’s license: 

The stop of defendant’s vehicle was not a random or 

selective stop. His vehicle did not have license plates 

displayed. This failure would ordinarily be a violation of 

section 321.37, [t]he Code. When the department of 

transportation paper plates were pointed out to the officer 

there arose no requirement that he treat the defendant as if 

he had never seen him. Section 321.174, [t]he Code, 

requires all persons operating a motor vehicle upon a 

highway in the state to have immediate possession of a valid 

operator’s license, and to display the same upon the demand 

of a peace officer. Notwithstanding the fact that a mistake 

concerning the license plates led to the defendant’s stop 

there was nothing illegal about the fact that, once he was 

stopped and exonerated, he was asked to display his 

operator’s license. 

Id. I would follow Jackson.

The majority inaccurately suggests Jackson was undermined by 

Florida v. Royer, a 1983 decision correctly stating that investigatory stops 

should “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 

stop.” 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 

(1983). The majority overlooks two subsequent Iowa decisions that belie 

its conclusion. First, in 2004, we upheld the arrest of a passenger on an 

outstanding warrant, unanimously holding that the officer did not violate 

the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights by checking his identification 

after the conclusion of a traffic stop. State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 

547–48 (Iowa 2004) (“The entire episode lasted but a minute; it was no 

more intrusive to check Smith’s identification than to ask him a few 
47

questions.”). Here, Coleman voluntarily produced his identification to 

Officer Morris and makes no claim that encounter took over a minute. 

Second, in 2005, we expressly reaffirmed Jackson in State v. Lloyd, when 

the officer initiated a traffic stop on a mistaken belief that a vehicle had 

no license plate but a temporary plate actually was in the rear window. 

701 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa 2005) (per curiam). The driver was charged 

and convicted of OWI, with a blood alcohol level over twice the legal limit. 

Id. at 679. We held the stop was valid and “there was nothing illegal 

about the fact that . . . [Lloyd] was asked to display his operator’s 

license.” Id. at 681 (quoting Jackson, 315 N.W.2d at 767). We cited with 

approval post-Royer Eighth Circuit precedent that allowed the officer to 

check the driver’s identification after stopping the vehicle on the 

mistaken belief it failed to display a required license plate. Id. (citing 

United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming 

conviction for felony possession of firearm discovered after check of 

identification showed driver was under suspension and a suspect in a 

recent shooting). Under the majority’s new regime, after noticing the 

validly displayed plate, the officer could only wave on the driver, 

permitting someone like Lloyd to drive away drunk, and Smart, the 

shooting suspect and felon, to depart the scene armed. 

It has long been settled in Iowa, well after Royer, that when an 

officer lawfully stops a vehicle based on a reasonable mistake of fact, the 

officer, after resolving that reason for the stop, could proceed to check 

the driver’s license.9 See id. Other jurisdictions, like Iowa, have 

9In Vance, in dicta, we suggested (without citing Jackson or Lloyd) that the issue 

of whether an officer could request a driver’s license from a detained motorist was 

debatable. See 790 N.W.2d at 783 n.1 (“Vance’s counsel failed to raise in the district 

court or on appeal whether the stop continued to be valid upon the stopping officer’s 

discovery that the driver of the vehicle was, in fact, not the registered owner. . . . 

 
48

recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit asking a driver 

for identification after the reasonable suspicion that prompted the stop 

has dissipated.10 

The majority relies on contrary state appellate decisions decided 

before Rodriguez. Those now outdated decisions concluded if an officer 

initiated a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion from a mistaken 

observation, the officer could only inform the driver of the mistake and 

allow him or her to drive away. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 259 P.3d 116, 

124 (Utah 2011). Such decisions are unpersuasive after Rodriguez. 

Decisions applying Rodriguez consistently hold that an officer may 

request identification from a driver lawfully stopped even if reasonable 

suspicion for the stop has dissipated.11 See United States v. Reidy, No. 

CR 13-71-BLG-DWM, 2016 WL 6208398, at *3 & n.3 (D. Mont. Oct. 24, 

Accordingly, we express no opinion on the merits of this issue because it has not been 

preserved for our appellate review.”). Vance did not decide the issue and did not have 

the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 

10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557, 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) 

(concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to 

request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing 

temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police 

officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after 

making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth 

amendment.”); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (determining after valid stop 

for mistaken traffic violation, asking for license was minimal intrusion and did not 

violate Fourth Amendment); Hart v. State, 235 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) 

(“[W]here the initial traffic stop is valid, a license check of the driver, even if conducted 

after the officer has determined the motorist is not guilty of the violation for which he or 

she was originally stopped, is not unreasonable so long as it does not unduly prolong 

the motorist’s detention.”); State v. Williams, 655 N.W.2d 462, 469 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 

2002) (concluding that officer could have lawfully checked license after pulling over 

driver who was not registered owner with a suspended license). 

11Several courts have continued to refer to the majority rule without addressing 

the impact of Rodriguez. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d 669, 681–82, 

685 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Rodriguez without analysis); State v. Hollister, No. 

112,983, 2016 WL 197742, *8 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2016) (per curiam) (no citation to 

Rodriguez). 

___________________________
49

2016) (ruling that deputy who pulled over driver on suspicion that 

license plate was inadequately illuminated could check driver’s license 

first); State v. Allen, 779 S.E.2d 248, 251, 254–55 (Ga. 2015) (holding 

that Rodriguez permitted officer to check identification of a passenger as 

“part of the authorized mission of the traffic stop”); Cummings, 46 N.E.3d 

at 252; State v. Cotter, No. 2015AP1916-CR, 2016 WL 4468406 (Wis. Ct. 

App. Aug. 25, 2016) (per curiam) (“Consistent with Rodriguez, as well as 

with Wisconsin precedent . . . , [the officer], after determining that he 

could not issue a ticket on the basis for which the stop was initiated, was 

permitted to continue the stop for purposes of completing routine 

matters such as gathering Craig Tomlinson’s license information . . . .”). 

The Illinois Supreme Court twice addressed the issue, before and 

after Rodriguez, in a factually analogous case, People v. Cummings, 

6 N.E.3d 725, 727 (Ill. 2014) (Cummings I), cert. granted, judgment 

vacated sub nom. Illinois v. Cummings, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 191 

L. Ed. 2d 760 (2015) (mem.), decision after remand, 46 N.E.3d 248 (Ill. 

2016) (Cummings II). Derrick Cummings was driving a van owned by a 

woman named Pearlene Chattic. Cummings I, 6 N.E.3d at 727. A police 

officer initiated a traffic stop because Chattic had a warrant for her 

arrest. Id. The officer knew Chattic was a woman. Id. at 728. After 

stopping the vehicle, the officer saw the driver was a male. Id. The 

officer nevertheless asked for his license and registration. Id. Cummings 

had no license and was arrested. Id. The trial court granted 

Cummings’s motion to suppress, and the Illinois Supreme Court initially 

affirmed, holding that reasonable suspicion “disappeared when [the 

officer] saw that the defendant was not a woman and, therefore, could 

not be Chattic.” Id. at 731. The court concluded that requesting 
50

Cumming’s license “impermissibly prolonged the stop.” Id. at 731, 734. 

Two justices dissented, stating, 

The majority’s rule, while narrow in this case, casts a 

wider shadow—that officers need an independent basis for 

requesting a driver’s license in a lawful traffic stop. This 

result protects a driver from an objectively and subjectively 

minimal intrusion, at the expense of complicating law 

enforcement in a situation “especially fraught with danger to 

police officers.” 

Id. at 738 (Garmin, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 

1032, 1047, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1218 (1983)). 

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated 

the judgment, remanding to the Illinois Supreme Court “for further 

consideration in light of Rodriguez v. United States.” Illinois v. Cummings, 

___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 760. On remand, 

the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the officer’s actions. Cummings II, 46 

N.E.3d at 251. The Illinois Supreme Court observed that Rodriguez

established 

[t]he seizure’s mission consists of the purpose of the stop—in 

Rodriguez, traffic enforcement—and “related safety 

concerns.” Those related safety concerns include “ordinary 

inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,” and typically “involve 

checking the driver’s license . . . .” 

Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614–15, 191 

L. Ed. 2d at 498–99). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reached the same 

conclusion applying Rodriguez under nearly identical facts. Cotter, 2016 

WL 4468406, at *5. I find the Cummings II court’s analysis of Rodriguez

persuasive. 

“Ordinary inquiries within the traffic stop’s mission clearly do not 

offend the fourth amendment.” Cummings II, 46 N.E.3d at 251. In 

rejecting the defendant’s argument that a license check must relate to 

the initial purpose of the stop, the Illinois Supreme court reasoned, 
51

Rodriguez makes clear that unrelated inquiries 

impermissibly prolong the stop beyond its original mission 

when those inquiries are not precipitated by reasonable 

suspicion. Ordinary inquiries incident to the stop do not 

prolong the stop beyond its original mission, because those 

inquiries are a part of that mission. Indeed, defendant’s view 

would collapse the two parts of the mission—the initial 

purpose of the stop and ordinary inquiries of the stop—into 

just the purpose of the stop. Nothing in Rodriguez suggests 

that license requests might be withdrawn from the list of 

ordinary inquiries for a nontraffic enforcement stop. 

Id. at 252 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion 

may dissipate when the officer fulfills one part of the mission of the 

stop—to address the perceived traffic violation. However, the officer can 

still proceed to fulfill the other part of the mission by attending to related 

safety concerns, such as checking the driver’s license. See Rodriguez, 

575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 498. 

“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is 

always ‘the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular 

governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. 

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 335 

(1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 

L. Ed. 2d 889, 904 (1968)). We must weigh the “balance between the 

public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from 

arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. at 109, 98 S. Ct. at 332, 54 

L. Ed. 2d at 336 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 

878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 614–15 (1975)); see also 

State v. DeWitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 468 (Iowa 2012) (“[T]he test for 

reasonableness of police conduct ‘requires a careful balancing of “the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests” against the countervailing governmental interests 
52

at stake.’ ” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 

1865, 1871, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 455 (1989))). 

Checking a driver’s license is within a traffic stop’s original mission 

and is minimally intrusive. The balancing of interests easily favors the 

State, given the importance of ensuring that drivers who are lawfully 

stopped are in fact authorized to drive on Iowa roads. These “negligibly 

burdensome precautions” an officer takes to “complete his mission 

safely” are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 

U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. I reach the same 

conclusion under the Iowa Constitution. 

States have a “vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to 

do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 

U.S. 648, 658, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1398, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 670 (1979). 

Licenses are issued “to evidence that the drivers holding them are 

sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road and are physically qualified 

to operate a motor vehicle.” Id. “[D]rivers without licenses are 

presumably the less safe drivers whose propensities may well exhibit 

themselves.” Id. at 659, 99 S. Ct. at 1399, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 671; see also 

State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Iowa 1993) (“The State has a valid 

interest in the safety of its citizens on its roads and highways.”). 

Coleman, a habitual offender, was driving while barred at the time he 

was pulled over by Officer Morris. 

Motorists whose careless or reckless driving is so serious as 

to lead to license suspension constitute a genuine threat to 

the safety of their fellow citizens, few of whom will appreciate 

that today’s decision places them at greater risk of injury. 

Holly v. State, 918 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ind. 2009) (Shepard, C.J., 

dissenting). I share the concern that today’s decision will put the driving 

public at greater risk.
53

If a motorist with a suspended license—who is detained but 

allowed to drive away without being identified—later harms someone, it 

“will be difficult ‘to explain to the family’ of an innocent injured party that 

the police had a chance to prevent the injury but were powerless to act.” 

Id. (quoting Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 978, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12, 175 

L. Ed. 2d 322, 324 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of 

certiorari)). Coleman exemplifies the reason officers should be able to 

check whether a driver they lawfully stop is barred from our roadways. 

He was pulled over by Officer Morris two days after he was arrested for a 

second-offense-drunk-driving charge, following at least six prior 

convictions for driving while barred or suspended and multiple 

convictions for possession of narcotics. 

Iowa Code section 321.174 obligates drivers to possess a valid 

license and have it in their possession at all times when driving. 

Id. § 321.174(3). Drivers are required to display the license upon 

demand by a peace officer. Id. “The statutory authority for police to 

demand a driver’s license would mean little if the police could not check 

the validity of the license.” State v. Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d 427, 430 

(Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 

The reason for allowing police to request a driver’s license on 

demand is to deter persons from driving without a valid 

license, since a license is a statement that the driver can be 

expected to comply with the state’s requirements for safe 

driving. Where it is reasonable for a police officer to ask for 

a license, running a status check on the license is simply 

carrying out this deterrent function of the law. 

Id.; see also Godwin, 826 P.2d at 455 (same); People v. Redinger, 906 

P.2d 81, 88 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (Vollack, C.J., dissenting) (“Because 

motorists are required by state law to carry a driver’s license, 
54

registration, and proof of insurance when operating a motor vehicle, 

Officer Wise’s request for such documents was proper.”). 

Officers may request proof of liability insurance during a lawful 

traffic stop, even without an accident. See State v. Acevedo, 705 N.W.2d 

1, 2 (Iowa 2005) (stating defendant was stopped for traffic offense and 

arrested when operating without a license and without proof of 

insurance). Iowa has a valid interest in enforcing laws requiring liability 

insurance to protect accident victims. Allowing officers to request proof 

of insurance deters uninsured drivers. In the same vein, checking 

identification during a lawful stop deters barred motorists who may 

wreak havoc on our roadways. The majority undermines these legislative 

goals. 

Asking a driver for a license also promotes “transparency in traffic 

stops.” Cummings I, 6 N.E.3d at 739 (Garmin, C.J., dissenting) (citing 

625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-212 (West 2012) (requiring law 

enforcement officers to gather statistical information on drivers stopped 

or cited and department of transportation to analyze data and assess 

practices that resemble racial profiling)). As the Wisconsin Court of 

Appeals noted,

In many cases, police officers are required to make a written 

report of contacts with citizens. An officer needs to know 

whom he or she is assisting in the event a citizen later 

complains about improper behavior on the part of the officer 

or makes any kind of legal claim against the officer. 

Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d at 430. “Requesting identification may also be 

beneficial if the seemingly innocuous activity the officer observes later 

turns out to be illegal—for instance, if the vehicle turns out to have been 

stolen.” State v. Huck, No. 2014AP2120–CR, 2015 WL 423239, at *4 

(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015); see also State v. Calzadas, No. 2015AP162–
55

CR, 2015 WL 5146526, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2015). Officer Morris 

knew by his gender that Coleman was not the registered owner of the 

car.12 What if minutes after the officer had allowed the driver to depart 

unidentified, the real owner reported the car stolen? 

The safety of the officer is another reason to permit checks of the 

driver’s identity. This safety interest “stems from the mission of the stop 

itself.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 

500. “Traffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’ ” 

Id. (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786, 

172 L. Ed. 2d 694, 702 (2009)). The Cummings II court recognized that 

Rodriguez relies in part on United States v. Holt, which “approved 

criminal record and warrant checks ‘even though the purpose of the stop 

had nothing to do with such prior criminal history.’ ” Cummings II, 46 

N.E.3d at 252 (quoting United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th 

Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stewart, 473 

F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007)). These checks were justified because 

“an officer will be better appri[s]ed of whether the detained motorist 

might engage in violent activity during the stop.” Id. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Holt, 264 F.3d at 1222). License checks were relevant 

to officer safety regardless of the original purpose of the stop: 

To the extent the ordinary inquiries are justified by the 

officer safety interest, defendant’s view would also require a 

conclusion that it is the type of stop, and not the occurrence 

of the stop itself, that generates danger for officers. The 

relevant authorities instead reveal it is the stop itself that 

poses danger. 

12In some cases, the officer may be unable to determine the driver is not the 

registered owner until he or she checks the driver’s license. Some people appear older 

or younger than their age; even race or gender may not be immediately apparent in a 

darkened vehicle. 

 
56

Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 

500).

Traffic stops are inherently dangerous because they involve close 

officer contact with unsecured individuals.13 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1052, 

103 S. Ct. at 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221–22; see also State v. Smith, 739 

N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 2007) (noting defendant stopped for speeding 

fired four shots at officer who was unaware vehicle stolen). The Supreme 

Court has repeatedly acknowledged the weighty government interest in 

officer safety during traffic stops.14 “Knowledge of identity may inform an 

officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of 

violence or mental disorder.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 

177, 186, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 303 (2004). Officers 

13Statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate that a traffic stop 

poses the second-greatest risk of death for an officer, after investigation of a suspicious 

person, and the third-greatest risk of assault. More officers have been killed during 

traffic violation stops than in attempting an arrest for burglary, robbery, or drugs, or in 

responding to domestic abuse violence calls. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI, Law 

Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed & Assaulted Table, 

https://UCR.fbi.gov/leoka/2014/home (follow “Overview” of officers feloniously killed 

hyperlink; then follow “Table 21” hyperlink); Id. Table 79 (follow “Overview” of officers 

assaulted hyperlink; then follow “Table 79” hyperlink). In 2005–2014, ninety-three 

officers were killed during traffic stops. Id. Table 21. 

14See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330–32, 129 S. Ct. at 786–87, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 702–

03 (holding officer authorized to perform pat-down on passenger because of safety 

interest of officer); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885, 137 

L. Ed. 2d 41, 47 (1997) (recognizing “traffic stops may be dangerous encounters” and 

citing statistics of officers killed during traffic stops in 1994); Long, 463 U.S. at 1052, 

103 S. Ct. at 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221–22 (“[W]e stress that a Terry investigation, 

such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation ‘at close range’ when 

the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has 

not been effected, and the officer must make a ‘quick decision as to how to protect 

himself and others from possible danger . . . .’ ” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 28, 88 

S. Ct. at 1881, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908, 910); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S. Ct. at 

333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 336 (stating government’s interest in safety is “both legitimate and 

weighty” and “specifically recognize[ing] the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he 

approaches a person seated in an automobile”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at 1881, 

20 L. Ed. 2d at 906 (“Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers 

take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”). 

 
57

initiating these stops “need to know who[] they are dealing with in order 

to assess the situation [and] the threat to their own safety.” Id. 

We should balance this weighty government interest against the 

minimal intrusion on the defendant’s liberty interest. “[W]hen stopped 

for a traffic violation, a motorist expects ‘to spend a short period of time 

answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and 

registration.’ ” Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 

U.S. 420, 437, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 333 (1984)); see 

also Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186, 124 S. Ct. at 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 302 

(“Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity 

are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.”). Most Iowans will 

be quite surprised to hear Officer Morris violated Coleman’s 

constitutional rights by asking to see his driver’s license after lawfully 

stopping the car he was driving. 

In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that an officer can require a 

driver to step out of a vehicle during a traffic stop based on officer safety 

concerns. 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 337. The 

Court determined the intrusion requiring the driver to get out of the car 

was “de minimis.” Id. “The police have already lawfully decided that the 

driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall 

spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car or standing 

alongside it.” Id. In Wilson, the Court expanded this analysis to allow 

officers to order passengers out of the vehicle. 519 U.S. at 413–14, 117 

S. Ct. at 886, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 47. The Court reasoned, 

On the personal liberty side of the balance, the case 

for the passengers is in once sense stronger than that for the 

driver. There is probable cause to believe the driver has 

committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no such 

reason to stop or detain the passengers. But as a practical 

matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the 
58

stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances 

which will result from ordering them out of the car is that 

they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car. 

Id. Indeed, 

many people would find providing their identification to a 

police officer for a computer records check far less intrusive 

than being ordered out of the car to stand on the shoulder of 

a busy highway or on the side of a street in their 

neighborhood. 

Allen, 779 S.E.2d at 256; see also United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 

F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007) (“If an officer may ‘as a matter of course’ 

and in the interest of personal safety order a passenger physically to exit 

the vehicle, he may surely take the minimally intrusive step of requesting 

passenger identification.” (Citation omitted)); cf. Smith, 683 N.W.2d at 

547–48 (holding officer did not “seize” passenger by requesting 

identification).

The Supreme Court has stressed the need to evaluate the initial 

detention and scope of the stop to ensure traffic stops are not used as 

“fishing expedition[s].” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S. Ct. 

417, 422, 136 L. Ed. 347, 356 (1996). “But the Supreme Court has 

expressly rejected placing any rigid time limitations on Terry stops; 

instead, the issue is ‘whether the police diligently pursued a means for 

investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly 

. . . .’ ” Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 

U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616 (1985)). A 

traffic stop’s mission includes both “an investigation into the specific 

suspected criminal activity and a routine check of the driver’s license,” 

but “neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Supreme Court dictate that 

an officer . . . must investigate the situation in a particular order.” Id. at 

65. 
59

Here, there is no evidence—or even suggestion—that Officer Morris 

failed to diligently pursue the mission of the traffic stop. Neither 

Coleman nor the majority contend this traffic stop was unduly prolonged 

by the request to see a driver’s license, which likely transpired in less 

than a minute. 

For these reasons, I do not join the majority’s conclusion that

Officer Morris violated Coleman’s rights under the Iowa Constitution. 

Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.