[Cite as State v. Miller, 2012-Ohio-2132.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HENRY COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 7-11-21 

 v. 

KEVIN L. MILLER, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 01CR071 

Judgment Vacated 

Date of Decision: May 14, 2012 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Gregory L. VanGunten for Appellant 

John H. Hanna for Appellee 
Case No. 7-11-21 

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ROGERS, J. 

{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we elect, 

pursuant to Local Rule 12(5), to issue a full opinion in lieu of a judgment entry. 

{¶2} Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Miller (“Miller”), appeals the judgment 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Henry County designating him a sexual predator 

under former R.C. 2950.09. On appeal, Miller argues that insufficient evidence 

was presented to establish that he was a sexual predator, and that the trial court’s 

eight-year delay between the classification hearing and the judgment entry 

determining the sexual predator status is unconstitutional. Finding that the delay 

was unreasonable and that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to enter such 

a finding, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶3} In December 2001, Miller pled guilty to three counts of gross sexual 

imposition. The State sought to classify Miller as a sexual predator. During the 

evidentiary hearing on the matter, the State presented no testimony but submitted a 

copy of the police report, a copy of the social worker’s report, cards, and a rock 

given by Miller to the victim. Miller presented the testimony of his minister 

concerning the progress he had made in counseling. In February 2002, the trial 

court held a sentencing and sexual predator classification hearing. At the hearing, 

the trial court, after hearing evidence and reading the presentence investigation, 

ruled that Miller was a sexual predator and sentenced him to five years’ 
Case No. 7-11-21 

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community control sanctions. Miller appealed the trial court’s entry designating 

him a sexual predator, arguing insufficient evidence. On appeal, this court 

reversed and remanded for further proceedings as the trial court failed to discuss 

on the record the particular evidence that formed the basis of its decision as 

required by State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158 (2001). 

{¶4} On remand, the trial court held a second evidentiary hearing in May 

2003 to determine Miller’s sexual predator status. In October 2011, the trial court, 

sitting “[b]y [a]ssignment” evaluated the evidence introduced at the 2003 hearing 

and again classified Miller a sexual predator. Judgment Entry, Docket No. 25. It 

is from this judgment Miller appeals, asserting the following as error for our 

review. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT, AS A MATTER OF 

LAW, TO PROVE “BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 

EVIDENCE” THAT APPELLANT “IS LIKELY TO ENGAGE 

IN THE FUTURE IN ONE OR MORE SEXUALLY 

ORIENTED OFFENSES.[”] 

Assignment of Error No. II 

THE DELAY OF OVER EIGHT YEARS IN DECIDING THE 

STATUTORY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS OFFENDER 

VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, §16. 

{¶5} As the second assignment of error is dispositive, we elect to address it 

first. 
Case No. 7-11-21 

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Assignment of Error No. II 

{¶6} In his second assignment of error, Miller argues that the eight-year 

delay between the time of the R.C. 2950.09 sexual predator classification hearing 

and the judgment entry on the matter violates Crim.R. 32(A) and Art.I § 16 of the 

Ohio Constitution, Ohio’s due process clause. 

{¶7} We hold that the sexual predator classification is void as the trial court 

was divested of jurisdiction. First, the delay was unjustified, lengthy, and 

unreasonable. Art. I § 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides that justice shall be 

administered without denial or delay. Crim.R. 32(A) mandates that “sentence 

shall be imposed without unnecessary delay.” In Neal v. Maxwell, the Ohio 

Supreme Court held that a reasonable delay in imposing sentence does not 

invalidate a sentence. 175 Ohio St. 201, 202 (1963). Subsequently, appellate 

courts have held that a delay in sentencing must be reasonable in order to be valid 

and that any unreasonable delay invalidates the sentence. State v. Brown, 152 

Ohio App.3d 8, 2003-Ohio-1218 (7th Dist.); State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. No. 

CA2002-07-016, 2003-Ohio-6261 (more than six-year delay between guilty plea 

and sentence divested trial court of jurisdiction to sentence defendant); Warren v. 

Ross, 116 Ohio App.3d 275 (11th Dist. 1996) (without an explanation for delay, 

trial court lost jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s driver’s license as more than four 

years elapsed between the conviction and the order purporting to revoke the 
Case No. 7-11-21 

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license); City of Willoughby v. Lukehart, 39 Ohio App.3d 74 (11th Dist. 1987)

(without a substantive reason, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to impose 

sentence as a sixteen-month delay between the time of arrest and sentencing was 

unjustified and lengthy). 

{¶8} Although this case is factually distinguishable from the foregoing, the 

reasoning is nonetheless instructive. In the instant case, Miller is challenging not 

the delay in time before the sentence was imposed, but the nearly eight-and-onehalf-year delay in classifying him a sexual predator. As the trial court provided no 

reasonable justification for the delay on the record, we find this delay 

unreasonable and unjustifiable. Accordingly, the trial court was divested of 

jurisdiction over the matter. 

{¶9} Secondly, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to deem Miller a 

sexual predator in 2011 because he had completed his sentence. Once a defendant 

completes serving his or her sentence, the authority of the trial court terminates. 

See State v. Harrison, 122 Ohio St.3d 512, 2009-Ohio-3547, ¶ 34-37 (the trial 

court’s authority to impose mandatory post-release control ended when defendant 

completed his original incarceration), citing State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 

2008-Ohio-1197, State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, Hernandez 

v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126. 
Case No. 7-11-21 

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{¶10} In February 2002, Miller was sentenced to five years’ community 

control sanctions. Miller undeniably completed serving his sentence in 2007. 

Four years later, when Miller was ultimately deemed a sexual predator, the trial 

court no longer had authority over the matter. Accordingly, we hold that the 

sexual predator classification is void. Ruling otherwise would condone an 

indefinite jurisdiction of the trial court over all matters before it, which contradicts 

our aspirations of an efficient and effective judiciary as well as resolving cases 

without unreasonable delay. 

{¶11} Thirdly, the trial court lacked authority to preside over the matter and 

issue an entry as he was improperly assigned. Art. IV § 6(C) of the Ohio 

Constitution provides for the assignment of a retired judge to serve as an acting 

judge. The assignment is made by the chief justice or acting chief justice of the 

Ohio Supreme Court. Ohio Const. Art. IV § 6(C). In this case, the decision and 

judgment entry were signed and entered by the trial court “[b]y 

[a]ssignment.” Docket No. 25. The record reveals, however, that there was no 

assignment by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Therefore, the assigned trial judge 

lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to the erroneous assignment, and the sexual 

predator classification is void. 

{¶12} In light of the foregoing analysis, we sustain Appellant’s second 

assignment of error. 
Case No. 7-11-21 

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Assignment of Error No. I 

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Miller argues that the evidence 

introduced at the second hearing failed to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that he was likely to engage in future sexually oriented offenses and 

therefore, the trial court erred in determining that he was a sexual predator. Due to 

the resolution of the second assignment of error, this assignment is moot and we 

decline to address it. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

{¶14} Having found error prejudicial to Appellant herein, in the particular 

assigned and argued in the second assignment of error, we vacate the judgment of 

the trial court. 

Judgment Vacated 

SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur. 

/jlr