[Cite as State v. Summers, 2014-Ohio-2441.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DARKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2013 CA 16 

v. : T.C. NO. 13CR10 

CHRISTOPHER A. SUMMERS : (Criminal appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 : 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 6th day of June , 2014. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

R. KELLY ORMSBY, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0020615, Prosecuting Attorney, Darke County 

Prosecutor’s Office, Courthouse, Third Floor, Greenville, Ohio 45331 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

J. ALLEN WILMES, Atty. Reg. No. 0012093, 7821 N. Dixie Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45414 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

FROELICH, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Christopher Summers was found guilty on his guilty plea of one count 

of sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(7), in the Darke County Court of Common 

Pleas; Summers was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. Summers had been convicted 

of eight additional counts of sexual battery involving the same victim in Mercer County, and 
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the trial court ordered that his sentence for the Darke County offense be served consecutively 

with the sentence imposed in the Mercer County case. Summers appeals from the Darke 

County conviction, challenging his sentence. 

{¶ 2} The victim of the Darke and Mercer County offenses was an underage 

female high school student; Summers was her teacher and coach, age 35. Summers claimed 

that he and the victim had a close, romantic relationship and that their sexual activity was 

consensual, although he acknowledged that it “crossed the line” and that, as an adult, “any 

contact was wrong.” The victim claimed that she felt coerced and manipulated into the 

sexual relationship and that she was not a willing participant. The sexual conduct occurred 

over the course of more than two years. Summers and the victim lived in Mercer County, 

and most of the sexual activity occurred in Mercer County. The Darke County offense was 

based on a night they spent in a Greenville hotel. The victim eventually told her mother 

about the sexual conduct. 

{¶ 3} In November 2012, Summers was charged with more than forty counts of 

rape, sexual battery, and gross sexual imposition in Mercer County. In January 2013, he 

was indicted on one count of sexual battery in Darke County. He entered guilty pleas in 

both cases in August 2013. In Mercer County, Summers pled guilty to eight counts of 

sexual battery, in exchange for which the other charges were dismissed. On October 10, 

2013, he was sentenced to thirty months on each count, to be served consecutively, for an 

aggregate term of twenty years. The next day, he was sentence in Darke County to a term of 

one year in prison, to be served consecutively with the Mercer County sentence. 

{¶ 4} Summers raises two assignments of error on appeal from his Darke County 
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conviction and sentence. The assignments of error state: 

The trial court committed prejudicial error by imposing 

consecutive service on Appellant which sentence was an abuse of 

discretion and was violative of the statutory purposes and principles of 

sentencing. 

Imposing a sentence consecutive to the sentence in Mercer County 

was not consistent with sentences imposed for similar cases committed by 

similar offenders.

{¶ 5} Summers contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 

consecutive sentence. His argument suggests that the trial court was not permitted to 

impose a consecutive sentence without making “specific findings which are tied to the 

overriding purpose of punishment” and examining whether the sentence is proportionate to 

his conduct and the danger he poses to the public. He claims that the trial court 

“summarily” imposed a consecutive sentence that was “grossly unsound, unreasonable, and 

illegal” and that, because the “teacher/student” relationship “defines the offense” of which 

he was convicted (R.C. 2907.03(A)(7)), that fact should not be viewed as a factor making his 

offense “more serious” under R.C. 2929.12(B). Finally, he contends that his sentence was 

disproportionate to similarly situated offenders. 

{¶ 6} R.C. 2929.41(A) requires that, except as provided in other sections of the 

Revised Code, including R.C. 2929.14(C), “a prison term, jail term, or sentence of 

imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence 

of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 
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2929.14(C)(4) provides that a sentencing court must make certain findings when imposing 

consecutive sentences. Specifically, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) allows for the imposition of 

consecutive sentences if the trial court finds that: (1) a “consecutive service is necessary to 

protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender”; (2) “consecutive sentences 

are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the 

offender poses to the public”; and (3) one or more of the following three findings are 

satisfied: 

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed 

pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was 

under post-release control for a prior offense.(b) At least two of the multiple 

offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the 

harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so 

great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed 

as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of 

the offender’s conduct.(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct 

demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public 

from future crime by the offender. 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c). An explanation of the rationale for a sentence (both 

case-specific and statutory) can only increase the public understanding of a particular 

sanction and thus the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., O’Hear, 

Explaining Sentences, 36 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 459 (Spring 2009); Lamparello, Social 
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Psychology, Legitimacy, and the Ethical Foundations of Judgment: Importing the 

Procedural Justice Model to Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence, 38 Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev. 

115 (2006). 

{¶ 7} However, the text of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not state that a sentencing 

court is required to express its consecutive-sentence findings in a sentencing entry, nor is 

there such a requirement in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(b), which lists what information the trial 

court must include in a sentencing entry. See State v. Slaughter, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

25215, 2014-Ohio-862, ¶ 25-27. 

{¶ 8} Moreover, we have recently held that Ohio law does not currently require a 

sentencing court to explicitly include consecutive-sentence findings in sentencing entries. 

Although the court must consider the record and other pertinent information before imposing 

a sentence, “R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) provides that sentencing entries must simply indicate 

whether multiple sentences are to be served consecutively.” Id. at ¶ 30. 

{¶ 9} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that Summers was convicted 

the previous day of eight counts of sexual battery in Mercer County and was sentenced to 20 

years of imprisonment on those offenses. It also noted that the “Ohio Risk Assessment 

screening tool” indicated that Summers was at low risk to reoffend. The court 

acknowledged factors indicating that Summers was unlikely to reoffend except for “periods 

of bad judgment” (such as the one in which Summers claimed that the relationship with the 

victim in this case began), but the court recognized that periods of bad judgment could recur. 

 

{¶ 10} The judge made inconsistent statements about Summers’s risk of 
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recidivism, noting his lack of criminal history and other risk factors, and the judgment entry 

reiterated that recidivism was unlikely, but concluding that he may reoffend if he again 

found himself in difficult circumstances. These conflicting statements do not appear to be 

the basis for the prison sentence. The court also noted Summers’s position of authority in 

relationship to the victim in discussing the seriousness of the offense. Summers’s position 

of authority was an element of the offenses of which he was convicted;1 thus, although 

Summers’s conduct was serious, his position of authority was not entitled to significant 

weight, if any, in rendering the offense “more serious than conduct normally constituting the 

offense,” under R.C. 2929.12(B). See State v. Nichols, 195 Ohio App.3d 323, 

2011-Ohio-4671, 959 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.) 

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R.C. 2907.03(A)(7) states that “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, 

when * * * [t]he offender is a teacher, administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or serving in a school for 

which the state board of education prescribes minimum standards pursuant to division (D) of section 3301.07 of the Revised Code, 

the other person is enrolled in or attends that school, and the offender is not enrolled in and does not attend that school.” 

{¶ 11} Summers also points out that the court made several comments at the 

sentencing hearing about “why there is sin in the world.” Certain statements may create the 

appearance that a court is improperly basing its sentence on the judge’s religious beliefs. 

See State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) (holding that a judge’s 

personal experiences and beliefs cannot be divorced from his or her exercise of personal 

discretion in sentencing, but recognizing that “a sentencing judge’s religious comments may 

violate an offender’s due process rights when they reveal an ‘explicit intrusion of personal 

religious principles as the basis of a sentencing decision.’” (Id., distinguishing United States 
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v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (C.A.4, 1991)). However, the court clearly described these 

reflections as “anecdotal” and having “nothing to do with the sentence,” and we conclude 

that these comments did not influence the sentence. 

{¶ 12} The court stated that the victim’s age, Summers’s relationship to the victim, 

including his position of authority, and the “ongoing series of conduct” made the offense a 

“more serious” one. The court further stated that it was “considering this to be a course of 

conduct case,” because it “wouldn’t make sense” not to consider the events that occurred in 

Mercer County. The court asserted that the sentence had “a component of punishing and 

protecting the public.” Further, the sentencing entry stated that this was the worst form of 

the offense, that the court sought to deter others in positions of authority from engaging in 

such behavior, that a non-consecutive sentence would demean the severity of the conduct, 

and that the sentence did not place an unnecessary burden on governmental resources. 

{¶ 13} The trial court considered and addressed the issues pertinent to determining 

an appropriate sentence, as set forth in R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, and R.C. 2929.14. 

When imposing the consecutive sentence, the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4), including that the offense was committed as part of a course of conduct and 

that the court was “protecting the public.” We do not clearly and convincingly find either 

that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) or that 

the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). See State v. Rodeffer, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery Nos. 25574, 25575, 25576, 2013-Ohio-5759. Further, considering the 

abuse of discretion standard, which Summers references in his appellate brief, we cannot 

conclude that the consecutive sentence was unreasonable. See id. at ¶ 48-50 (Froelich, J., 
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concurring in judgment). 

{¶ 14} Summers takes issue with the court’s finding that a “course of conduct” 

was involved, where only one charge occurred in Darke County. The term “course of 

conduct” is not defined in R.C. 2929.14, but other sources provide some guidance. The 

supreme court has held that, for purposes of a death specification in a case involving 

multiple murders, a course of conduct may be established by factual links, including time, 

location, weapon, cause of death, or similar motivation. State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 

2011-Ohio-3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 144. Ohio Jury Instructions has included this 

definition in at least one of its instructions. See 2 Ohio Jury Instructions 513.49(E)(6). 

Similarly, “some connection, common scheme, or some pattern or psychological thread that 

ties” offenses together can establish a single course of conduct. State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio 

St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, syllabus. The trial court reasonably 

considered the motivation, connection, and scope of Summers’s offenses against the victim 

in weighing the seriousness of the Darke County offense and other sentencing factors. 

{¶ 15} Moreover, it is well established that the court may consider information 

beyond that strictly related to the offense(s) of which a defendant is convicted, even 

including criminal charges and supporting facts that are dismissed under a plea agreement 

and charges of which the offender is ultimately acquitted. See State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio 

App.3d 162, 2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Blake, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 17355, 1999 WL 375576 (June 11, 1999) and State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 

71, 78, 571 N.E.2d 97 (1991). 

{¶ 16} Summers also argues that his sentence was inconsistent with sentences 
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imposed in other Ohio cases for similar crimes committed by similar offenders. The 

consistency of sentences is one of the mandates of R.C. 2929.11(B). Summers cites several 

cases in which a shorter sentence was imposed than he received, including State v. Schuler, 

Warren C.P. No. 11 CR 27196 (where a female teacher committed sexual battery on several 

male students after “cultivating” them with alcohol); State v. Valentine, Lake C.P. No. 09 

CR 0311 (involving 16 counts of sexual battery); and State v. Ralston, Clermont C.P. No. 

2008 CR 1054 (sexual battery involving three juvenile victims). He has also attached to 

his reply brief a chart of cases involving sexual battery and the sentences imposed. 

Summers acknowledges that “full details of said offenses are not available,” but he asserts 

that they establish that the sentence in this case was unduly harsh. 

{¶ 17} The sentence imposed in the Darke County case involved only one count, for 

which Summers received a one-year sentence to be served consecutively with the sentences 

imposed in Mercer County. Summers’s consistency argument appears to be focused on the 

twenty year sentence he received in Mercer County, as the cases to which he compares his 

own sentence imposed sentences substantially greater than one year, but less than twenty 

years. We recognize the difficulty in establishing such a claim, especially if a record is not 

made at the trial court level, but the facts of the other cases on which Summers relies and the 

individuals involved in those cases are not before us. Similarly, Summers’s Mercer County 

sentence is not before us, and we have no authority to review it. 

{¶ 18} The assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 
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HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

R. Kelly Ormsby, III 

J. Allen Wilmes 

Hon. Jonathan P. Hein