If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re WALLACE, Minors. October 8, 2019

No. 348351

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 18-001697-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and BECKERING and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order of the trial court terminating her parental rights 

to her minor children, DW and MW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent caused physical 

injury), MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(iii) (nonparent adult caused physical injury), MCL 

712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable 

likelihood of harm if returned to parent), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(iv) (parent abused the child, 

including serious impairment of limb). We affirm. 

I. FACTS

This case arises out of allegations that respondent caused physical injury to her minor 

child, and failed to protect both minor children from physical injury caused by her partner, Erik 

McNamee. In September 2018, the children lived with respondent and McNamee. On 

September 29, 2018, respondent took MW to the hospital because his left arm was swollen. 

MW, who was then one year old, was transferred to Children’s Hospital where it was confirmed 

that certain of his injuries were not accidental. The pediatrician examining MW later testified 

that MW’s left arm had two fractures, being a fracture at the bottom of the forearm near the 

wrist, and a fracture at the top of the left arm near the shoulder. The pediatrician testified that 

the radiology report indicated that the factures were the result of non-accidental trauma, and that 

the two fractures were at different stages of healing, and thus had not occurred at the same time. 

The pediatrician also testified that MW had a burn on his back that was not a new burn and was 

in the process of healing, an abrasion on his right cheek, a bruise to the inside of the mouth, and 

a hematoma, or large swelling, on his forehead. The pediatrician also testified that MW was 

very underweight. 
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The pediatrician testified that the areas of the injuries, the combination of the injuries, 

and the failure to timely seek medical care for the injuries suggested that the trauma was not 

accidental. He testified that respondent had explained that MW’s arm fractures were caused 

when the child fell out of a wagon, but the pediatrician testified that was not the likely cause of 

the injuries based on the type of injury that occurred. He also testified that respondent told him 

that she accidentally caused the burn on MW’s back by splashing hot water out of the shower, 

that the abrasion on MW’s face was caused when the child climbed on a toy, and that the 

swelling of MW’s forehead was simply because the child had a large forehead. 

The investigating Child Protective Services (CPS) worker testified that respondent 

explained to her that MW’s arm fractures occurred when she was at work and the children were 

in the care of McNamee. When respondent returned home, she noticed the injury and put ice on 

MW’s arm, then bathed MW and put him to bed. The next day when she came home from work, 

she noticed that MW’s arm was still swollen so she took him to the hospital. Respondent 

explained the abrasion on MW’s face as being the result of a fall on a concrete step at their 

home. She explained that the burn on MW’s back was the result of respondent accidentally 

spraying MW with hot water when he startled her while she was cleaning the shower. 

The CPS worker testified that in light of MW’s injuries, DW, then two years old, was 

given a medical examination that revealed a healing burn on DW’s left forearm. Previously, 

DW’s biological father had taken DW to the hospital emergency room upon discovering the 

burn. The father reported that the burn had occurred while the child was in the care of McNamee 

and further reported that the burn was caused by a cigarette lighter. Respondent told the CPS 

worker that she was aware of the burn on DW’s arm, that it had occurred when she was not home 

and the children had been in McNamee’s care, and that McNamee and DW’s father had talked 

about the burn and resolved the issue; respondent explained that when she asked McNamee 

about the conversation, he told her it was resolved and not to worry about it. Respondent did not 

seek medical care for either of the children’s burns, although she asked for advice from a friend 

who is a nurse regarding MW’s burn. At the time the petition seeking termination of her parental 

rights was filed, respondent was still in a relationship with McNamee. 

A second CPS worker testified that she interviewed McNamee and he explained that MW 

fractured his arm when he fell from a wagon while playing. He explained that MW may have 

injured his forehead by bumping it on the ground that same day. With regard to the burn on 

MW’s back, he told the CPS worker that he accidently sprayed MW with the shower sprayer 

because MW startled him while he was in the bathroom. 

The investigating CPS worker further testified that respondent had only one car seat for 

the children, and that she observed respondent and McNamee driving with one of the children in 

the car but no car seat. The CPS worker testified that petitioner Department of Health and 

Human Services (“DHHS”) was seeking termination of respondent’s parental rights because of 

the injuries suffered by the children, the status of MW’s arm fractures, and respondent’s failure 

to seek medical care for the children. 

On October 11, 2018, DHHS filed a petition seeking to terminate respondent’s parental 

rights to the children. At the conclusion of the trial on the petition, the trial court terminated 
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respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (ii), (g), (j), and (k)(iv). Respondent 

appeals from the trial court’s order. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that the statutory grounds for 

termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. To terminate 

parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory ground for termination under 

MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich 

App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings 

and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination, MCR 3.977(K); In re 

LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014), and defer to the trial court’s 

factual findings if the findings are not clearly erroneous. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 

NW2d 587 (2009). A trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if this Court is 

definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court has made a mistake, id., deferring to the 

special ability of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses. In re Miller, 433 Mich 

331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). To be clearly erroneous, a trial court’s determination must be 

more than possibly or probably incorrect. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 

(2011). 

In this case, the trial court found that termination was warranted under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(iii), (g),

1 (j), and (k)(iv). The relevant portions of that statute provide: 

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, 

by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following: 

* * *

(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or 

sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances: 

(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse 

and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer 

from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home. 

 1 Although the petition was filed October 11, 2018, and the trial court’s order was entered 

December 19, 2018, the order references the previous language of subsection (g), before its 

amendment effective June 12, 2018. However, because it is necessary to establish only one 

statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a parent’s parental rights, In re 

Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011), we decline to reach the issue whether 

termination of respondent’s parental rights in this case was also warranted under the applicable 

language of subsection (g). 
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* * *

(iii) A nonparent adult’s act caused the physical injury or physical or 

sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child 

will suffer from injury or abuse by the nonparent adult in the foreseeable future if 

placed in the parent’s home. 

* * *

(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, fails 

to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within 

a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent. 

(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, the abuse included 1 or 

more of the following, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will be 

harmed if returned to the care of the parent. 

* * *

(iv) Loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb.

The trial court found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was warranted under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). The record supports this finding. MW had two arm fractures, a burn 

on his back, a cheek abrasion, a bruise inside his mouth, and a hematoma on his forehead, all 

which occurred at different times and were at different stages of healing. The pediatrician 

testified that MW’s injuries and the circumstances of the injuries support a finding that they were 

caused by non-accidental trauma. Respondent admitted that some of the injuries occurred in her 

presence, and admitted that MW’s burn was a result of her accidentally spraying him with hot 

water. Respondent did not seek immediate medical care following MW’s injuries. The record 

therefore supports the finding that respondent caused MW’s injury and there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the children will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in 

respondent’s home. 

The trial court also did not err did not err in finding that termination of respondents’ 

parental rights was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(iii), finding that the act of a nonparent 

adult, McNamee, caused the physical injury and there is a reasonable likelihood that the children 

will suffer from injury or abuse by McNamee in the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s 

home. Both respondent and McNamee agree that the children were in McNamee’s care when 

MW’s arm was fractured, and when MW incurred the hematoma on his forehead. McNamee’s 

explanation for the burn was that he accidentally sprayed MW with hot water when the child 

startled him in the bathroom; respondent’s explanation was that she accidentally sprayed MW 
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with hot water when he startled her in the bathroom. There was also a healed burn on DW’s 

arm, reportedly caused by being burned by a lighter while in McNamee’s care. Again, 

respondent did not seek medical care for the children when she discovered that these injuries had 

occurred. Respondent was still in a relationship with McNamee at the time the petition was 

filed, and it was unknown whether she was still in a relationship with him at the time of the 

termination hearing. The record therefore supports a finding that McNamee injured MW and 

DW and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the children will suffer from injury or abuse in 

the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s home. For these same reasons, the trial court also 

did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), finding that 

there is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of respondent, that the children 

will be harmed if returned to respondent’s home. 

The trial court also terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k), 

finding that respondent abused the child or a sibling of the child, resulting in serious impairment 

of a limb. The evidence supports a finding that MW was injured by non-accidental trauma that 

resulted in multiple arm fractures at different stages of healing, indicating a pattern of abuse. 

There was no specific evidence, however, that the injuries resulted in a serious impairment of 

MW’s arm. However, because it is unnecessary to establish more than one statutory ground by 

clear and convincing evidence to terminate a parent’s parental rights, In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 

at 32, we decline to reach the issue whether termination of respondent’s parental rights in this 

case was warranted under subsection (k)(iv). 

B. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent also contends that the trial court clearly erred in finding that it was in the best 

interest of the children to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.

Once a statutory ground for termination has been demonstrated, the trial court must find 

that termination is in the best interests of the child before it may terminate parental rights. See In 

re Moss, 301 Mich App at 88. If the trial court finds that a preponderance of the evidence 

establishes that termination is in the best interests of the child, the trial court is required to 

terminate the parent’s parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 88. This 

Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests for clear error. In re 

Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 226; 894 NW2d 653 (2016).

To determine whether the termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the 

trial court should weigh all of the available evidence. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 

NW2d 61 (2014). Typically, the trial court considers a variety of factors, including the child’s 

bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and 

finality, the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home, the parent’s compliance with 

the case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being in the 

foster home, and the possibility of adoption. Id. In this case, however, the evidence 

demonstrated that the children were at risk of serious injury while in respondent’s care and that 

respondent was unlikely to seek medical care for their injuries; by contrast, the children were 

being well-cared for in a foster home. The safety and security of the children being preeminent, 

the trial court accordingly did not err in finding that the termination of respondent’s parental 
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rights was in the children’s best interests. See Medina, 317 Mich App at 237 (at the best 

interests stage, the interest of the child in a stable home is superior to any interest of the parent).

C. REASONABLE EFFORTS

Respondent also contends that she should have been given an opportunity to regain 

custody of the children and should have been provided services aimed at reunification. Again, 

we disagree. Generally, after a child has been removed from a parent’s custody, the agency must 

make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent unless certain aggravating 

circumstances exist. MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90-91. However, services 

are not mandated in every case. See MCL 712A.18f(1)(b); In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 

272; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). The agency is not required to provide services when reunification 

is not intended and termination of parental rights is the agency’s goal. In re Moss, 301 Mich 

App at 91. 

MCR 3.977(E) provides:

(E) The court shall order termination of the parental rights of a respondent at the 

initial dispositional hearing held pursuant to MCR 3.973, and shall order that 

additional efforts for reunification of the child with the respondent shall not be 

made, if

(1) The original, or amended, petition contains a request for termination;

(2) at the trial or plea proceedings, the trier of fact finds by a preponderance of 

the evidence that one or more of the grounds for assumption of jurisdiction over 

the child under MCL 712A.2(b) have been established;

(3) at the initial disposition hearing the court finds on the basis of clear and 

convincing legally admissible evidence that had been introduced at the trial or 

plea proceedings, or that is introduced at the dispositional hearing, that one or 

more facts alleged in the petition:

(a) are true, and 

(b) establish grounds for termination of parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), or (n);

(4) termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
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In this case, the initial petition requested termination, the trial court found by a 

preponderance of the evidence that there were grounds to assume jurisdiction, the trial court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the grounds for termination had been 

established, and the trial court further found that termination was in the best interests of the 

children. The agency therefore was not required to make reunification efforts. MCR 3.977(E); 

In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 91-92. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Michael F. Gadola