In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-1208 

DENIS NAVRATIL, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

CITY OF RACINE and CORY MASON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 2:21-cv-00181-SCD — Stephen C. Dries, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2023 — DECIDED MAY 6, 2024 

____________________ 

Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. On April 24, 2020, plaintiffappellant Denis Navratil attended a rally at the Wisconsin 

State Capitol to protest the recent statewide “Safer at Home 

Order” that limited public gatherings, travel, and business 

operations to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The rally itself 

was a violation of the Safer at Home Order. Also, a permit is 

required to hold rallies at the State Capitol, and the permit 

application for the April 24 rally had been denied because of 
2 No. 23-1208 

the COVID-19 pandemic and the Safer at Home Order. By 

April 24, 2020, 291 people had died of COVID-19 in the state 

of Wisconsin. There were over 5,000 confirmed cases in the 

state, with more than 200 new cases being diagnosed each 

day.1 

In this lawsuit, Denis Navratil, his wife Dimple Navratil, 

and their business, Dimple’s LLC, have asserted several 

constitutional claims against the City of Racine and Mayor 

Cory Mason, as well as a defamation claim against Mason. At 

the heart of all the claims was the city’s decision not to give 

an emergency grant to Dimple’s LLC because Denis had gone 

to the April 24 rally. Presiding with the consent of the parties 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), a magistrate judge granted summary 

judgment for both defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs have 

appealed, and we affirm. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 

plaintiffs as the non-moving parties are entitled to the benefit 

of all conflicts in the evidence and to reasonable inferences in 

their favor. Whitaker v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health Services, 849 

F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2017). All facts are drawn from the 

district court’s account of the facts for purposes of summary 

judgment unless otherwise noted. See Navratil v. City of 

Racine, No. 21-cv-181-SCD, 2023 WL 9190207 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 5, 

2023). 

1 Statistics are from Johns Hopkins University & Medicine’s Coronavirus Resource Center’s Data Timeline for the state of Wisconsin, 

https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/us/wisconsin

[https://perma.cc/T6MM-8N6T]. 
No. 23-1208 3

The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a 

global pandemic on March 11, 2020. In an effort to slow the 

virus’s spread, Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers and 

Department of Health Services Secretary-designee Andrea 

Palm issued the Safer at Home Order, which prohibited 

people from going out in public except to perform limited 

“essential activities.” The order caused many non-essential 

businesses, including restaurants and retail stores, to close 

temporarily. 

The City of Racine, Wisconsin made emergency funds 

available to mitigate economic damage to non-essential businesses forced to close under the Safer at Home Order. As part 

of the grant application process, Racine Mayor Cory Mason 

met with an ad hoc committee to review grant applications. 

Mayor Mason and committee members reviewed applications 

from businesses that met certain objective criteria to qualify 

for the funds. The funds available for emergency grants were 

quite limited, though. Mayor Mason had sole discretion to 

determine which qualifying applicants received emergency 

funding. The city could not guarantee that a business meeting 

the qualifying criteria would receive funding.

Plaintiffs Denis and Dimple Navratil are married and 

operate Dimple’s Fine Imports in Racine, Wisconsin. Dimple’s 

Fine Imports is an import and gift store that is under the 

control of Dimple’s LLC. Dimple is the sole owner of Dimple’s 

LLC, and Dennis works as the store manager.

Dimple applied for emergency funding through Dimple’s 

LLC in March 2020 during the first round of city grants. The 

city distributed $250,000 to eighteen different businesses, but 

Dimple’s LLC was not awarded a grant in that initial round 

of funding.
4 No. 23-1208 

On April 24, 2020, Dimple again applied for funding 

through the LLC during the second round of city grants. That 

was the same day that Denis attended the “Wisconsin 

Freedom Rally #Reopen Wisconsin” in Madison, Wisconsin.

The rally took place at the Wisconsin State Capitol to 

protest the restrictions imposed by the Safer at Home Order, 

including business closures. The rally itself violated the Safer 

at Home Order’s ban on public gatherings. Also, for large 

events at the State Capitol, a permit is required under 

Wisconsin Statute § 16.845 and Wisconsin Administrative 

Code § 2.04. The April 24 rally organizers were denied a 

permit because the gathering would violate the Safer at Home 

Order.

At the April 24 rally, Denis spoke with a television news 

reporter, and a video clip of the interview was aired on a local 

news station. Denis told the reporter that he was present at 

the rally “out of curiosity” and as an “observer” because he 

could “understand both sides of the argument for COVID 

restrictions.” He also told the reporter that he believed the 

Safer at Home Order was harmful to small businesses. Racine 

Mayor Mason saw the interview.

The city denied Dimple’s LLC’s second application on 

May 12, 2020. In that round of grants, nearly 200 businesses 

had applied for about $650,000 in available grant money. 

The day after that denial, on May 13, 2020, the Wisconsin 

Supreme Court invalidated the Safer at Home Order. The 

court based its decision on state administrative law, without 

reaching any federal constitutional issues.

About seven weeks later, on June 26, 2020, Mayor Mason 

told the Racine Journal Times that he denied Dimple’s LLC’s 
No. 23-1208 5

application in the second round of grants because of Denis’s 

attendance at the April 24 rally. The mayor’s press statement 

read in full:

As Mayor, it is my duty to protect the public 

health of our City’s residents. While I certainly 

support the rights of free speech and assembly, 

I cannot in good conscious [sic] send scarce City 

resources to a person or business that willingly 

jeopardized public health, especially when they 

were competing with other businesses who 

were not flagrantly violating safety measures. If 

an applicant was openly violating the statewide 

“Safer at Home” order and the public health 

emergency under which the City was operating 

to help mitigate the spread of coronavirus, that 

applicant would compete less favorably. For instance, participating in mass gatherings outside 

of our community, such as the rally that was 

held at the State Capitol – such large gatherings 

have been linked to cases of COVID-19 around 

the state – and then returning to our City, only 

served to put our residents at unnecessary risk 

and, thus, factored into the funding consideration. When it comes to disbursing discretionary 

funds aimed at helping businesses who were 

sacrificing to protect public health, the City is 

not going to reward business owners who took 

reckless behaviors that risked the health of our 

community.

Dkt. 45 at 7. Testimony in this case showed that Mayor Mason 

brought up Denis’s attendance at the April 24 rally when he 
6 No. 23-1208 

and the ad hoc committee discussed Dimple’s LLC’s application for the second round of funding. Dkt 52-3 at 17, 19; Dkt. 

52-1 at 2–3. Also, during a telephone call with Dimple after 

the denial of her LLC’s second application, Mayor Mason explained that he denied the grant because of Denis’s attendance at the April 24 rally. Dimple’s contemporaneous notes of 

the call say, “He said it was against the compliance to ... be in 

[the] rally. Then I connected that he was talking about Denis 

going to Madison protest.” Dkt 49-2 at 3. 

On February 15, 2021, the Navratils and Dimple’s LLC 

filed this suit against the City of Racine and Mayor Mason 

alleging that the denial of their grant application violated 

their constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, and 

due process. The Navratils and Dimple’s LLC further alleged 

that Mayor Mason defamed Denis in the June 2020 press 

statement describing the reason he denied the application.

The city and Mayor Mason moved to dismiss some claims. 

The district court granted the motion, dismissing Dimple’s 

LLC’s First Amendment retaliation claim, Denis’s equal protection and due process claims, and Dimple’s equal protection 

and due process claims. The appellants do not challenge any 

of these dismissals on appeal. Dkt. 65.

The city and Mayor Mason eventually moved for 

summary judgment on the remaining claims: Denis’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim, Dimple’s LLC’s equal 

protection claim, Dimple’s LLC’s due process claim, and 

Denis’s defamation claim. The district court granted

summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, and this 

appeal followed.
No. 23-1208 7

II. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving parties and drawing all reasonable inferences 

in their favor. E.g., Carmody v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 893 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is 

proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists 

when ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

III. Analysis

A. First Amendment Retaliation

The district court granted summary judgment to the city 

and Mayor Mason on Denis’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim.2 To avoid summary judgment on a section 1983 claim 

of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must offer evidence 

showing that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the 

First Amendment, (2) he suffered an adverse action that 

would likely deter future First Amendment activity, and 

(3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating 

factor in the defendants’ decision to retaliate.” Gekas v. 

Vasiliades, 814 F.3d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations 

omitted). Here, Denis’s claim fails on the first element. His 

attendance at the April 24, 2020 rally was not protected First 

2 Any retaliation claim by Dimple Navratil was waived in the district 

court. Navratil, 2023 WL 9190207 at *4 n.4.
8 No. 23-1208 

Amendment activity because the rally was prohibited by two 

valid time, place, and manner restrictions—the Safer at Home 

Order and the state permit requirement.

1. Valid Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

Whether certain speech or activity is protected under the 

First Amendment is a question of law for the court. Kubiak v. 

City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016). The First 

Amendment protects freedom of speech, the right to assemble 

peaceably, and the right to petition the government for 

redress of grievances, but those rights are not absolute. E.g., 

Heffron v. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 

640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee 

the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places 

or in any manner that may be desired.”). As explained by the 

Supreme Court, “even in a public forum the government may 

impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner 

of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified 

without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that 

they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 

interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels 

for communication of the information.’” Ward v. Rock Against 

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community 

for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 

We assume for purposes of this appeal that Denis’s 

attendance at the rally was expressive conduct that constitutes 

speech pursuant to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Spence v. 

Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974) (explaining that 

conduct must be “sufficiently imbued with elements of 

communication” to constitute a “form of protected 

expression”). His conduct was not protected, however, from 
No. 23-1208 9

reasonable and content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, 

and manner of his expression.3 

a. Safer at Home Order

The Safer at Home Order was content-neutral and designed to serve a significant government interest—protecting 

public health and safety. See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal 

Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 343, 347 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction after district court found 

Illinois governor’s executive order limiting gathering sizes 

during COVID-19 pandemic was supported by compelling 

need to safeguard public health during pandemic).

As we explained in Elim Church in June 2020, “we do not 

evaluate orders issued in response to public-health 

emergencies by the standard that might be appropriate for 

years-long notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Id. at 347, citing 

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). This deference is 

appropriate. The Constitution “principally entrusts ‘[t]he 

safety and the health of the people’ to the politically 

accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’” 

South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 

1613 (2020) (mem.) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (alteration in 

original), quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38. “When those 

officials ‘undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and 

scientific uncertainties,’ their latitude ‘must be especially 

3 Denis asserts that he attended the April 24 rally merely as an “observer” because he could see “both sides” of the issue. Dkt. 50-1 at 4–5.

The district court inferred that Denis’s attendance at the rally was thus not 

expressive conduct because simply observing an event does not communicate any particular message. 2023 WL 9190207 at *4. Defendants do 

not challenge on appeal whether Denis’s attendance at the rally was expressive conduct, so we do not address this alternative holding. 
10 No. 23-1208 

broad.’” Id. (alteration in original), quoting Marshall v. United 

States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974). 

Plaintiffs argue that the Safer at Home Order was too 

broad to be a valid time, place, and manner restriction 

because it banned public gatherings. April 2020 was scarcely 

a month into the COVID-19 pandemic and our understanding 

of the virus’s spread. State and local officials were working to 

slow the transmission of the virus, to “flatten the curve,” to 

protect public health, and to limit the severe demands that 

COVID-19 cases were placing on the health-care system. 

Placing limits on public gatherings within the state was 

tailored to “prevent[ ] the transmission of viral particles ... 

from one person to the next.” Illinois Republican Party v. 

Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2020). With the benefit of 

hindsight and additional scientific evidence, we assume that 

reasonable minds might disagree on whether any particular 

restrictions among those early responses were the most 

effective means of stopping the spread of COVID-19. But our 

analysis is focused on what state and local officials knew at 

the time. See Elim Church, 962 F.3d at 347 (“Perhaps with more 

time—and more data from contact tracing—Illinois could 

figure out just how dangerous religious services are 

compared with warehouses and similar activities, but no one 

contends that such data were available when Executive Order 

2020-32 was promulgated (or, for that matter, now).”).

Here, it is clear at the time of its issuance that a temporary 

ban on large public gatherings during a global pandemic was 

a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech. It was 

reasonable, and it was content-neutral. Denis’s attendance at 

the April 24 rally violated the Safer at Home Order. Therefore, 
No. 23-1208 11

his attendance was not protected First Amendment activity 

and he cannot establish a retaliation claim.

b. State Permit Requirement

Wisconsin Statute § 16.845 authorizes the state to establish 

permitting requirements for gatherings on state property, 

including the State Capitol Park where the April 24 rally was 

held. Under the regulations for permits for events on State 

grounds, permits can be denied on the basis that a proposed 

event is a hazard to the safety of the public or involves an 

activity prohibited by law. Wis. Admin. Code § 2.04 (Aug. 

2014). The Wisconsin permitting scheme for the Capitol is a 

quintessential time, place, and manner restriction. See Thomas 

v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 322, 324 (2002) 

(permitting scheme for park events that allowed denials 

based on risks to public health and safety was valid time, 

place, and manner restriction); Gaylor v. Thompson, 939 F. 

Supp. 1363, 1370–71 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that permitting 

scheme for displaying signs in Wisconsin State Capitol was 

not unconstitutional). 

The April 24 rally organizers were denied a permit 

because the Safer at Home Order prohibited large public 

gatherings for public health reasons during the pandemic. 

The April 24 rally violated the state permit requirement, 

which is another reason that Denis’s attendance at the rally 

was not protected First Amendment activity.

2. Later Invalidation of the Safer at Home Order 

Plaintiffs argue that Denis’s attendance at the April 24 

rally was in fact protected First Amendment activity because 

the Wisconsin Supreme Court later held the Safer at Home 

Order invalid. That later decision does not affect our 
12 No. 23-1208 

conclusion. The court struck down the Safer at Home Order 

in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 942 N.W.2d 900. 

The court based its decision on a failure to follow proper state 

administrative law procedural rulemaking requirements and 

an over-stepping of statutorily delegated authority. Id. ¶¶ 3–

4. At no point did any court find the Safer at Home Order violated the First Amendment.

The Safer at Home Order’s later invalidation on state-law 

grounds does not retroactively render Denis’s attendance at 

the rally protected First Amendment activity. Particularly not 

where, as here, the argument would be used to support 

liability against a municipality relying on a facially valid law 

to protect public health. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 

209 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“[S]tate officials and those with 

whom they deal are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid 

state statute, enacted in good faith and by no means plainly 

unlawful.”); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317, 

320–21 (1967) (affirming criminal contempt convictions for 

violating state-court injunction of dubious constitutionality 

restricting public demonstrations for civil rights). Because 

Denis did not engage in protected First Amendment activity, 

we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the city and 

Mayor Mason on Denis’s First Amendment retaliation claim.4

4 By affirming on this ground, we bypass questions about whether 

Denis has a viable claim for a violation of his own First Amendment rights, 

given that the alleged adverse action was taken against his spouse’s LLC 

instead of him personally. 
No. 23-1208 13

B. Equal Protection

1. Political Animus Theory

Plaintiffs argue that the city and Mayor Mason violated 

Dimple’s LLC’s right to equal protection under the law on the 

theory that its grant application was denied based on Mayor 

Mason’s political animus toward the Navratils. The admissible evidence submitted on summary judgment does not raise 

a genuine issue of fact on this theory but shows instead, beyond reasonable dispute, that Dimple’s LLC was denied 

funding based on Denis’s attendance at the April 24 rally in 

violation of the Safer at Home Order.

Ample evidence supports the defendants’ assertion that 

Dimple’s LLC’s grant application was denied because of 

Denis’s attendance at the April 24 rally. The question on 

appeal is whether plaintiffs offered evidence sufficient to raise 

a genuine factual dispute about that reason. Plaintiffs rely 

most heavily on the deposition testimony of James Palenick, 

City Administrator during the emergency grant process, as 

evidence of Mayor Mason’s political animus. 

Palenick testified that in the discussion of Dimple’s LLC’s 

grant application, Mayor Mason explained he was not 

supportive of the application because of Denis’s attendance at 

the April 24 rally. Palenick testified that Mayor Mason said, 

“if he had anything to say, that [Dimple’s LLC] wouldn’t get 

a grant.” Dkt. 52-1 at 2–3. That comment is not evidence of 

political animus, but only further confirmation that Dimple’s 

LLC was denied emergency funding due to Denis’s rally 

attendance. According to Palenick, Denis’s attendance at the 

rally was the only reason Mayor Mason gave for opposing 

Dimple’s LLC’s grant application.
14 No. 23-1208 

Palenick went on to testify that he believed the denial of 

Dimple’s LLC’s application was “political in nature.” Id. at 4. 

When pressed on what his belief was based upon, however, 

Palenick explained that it was mostly Republicans who opposed the Safer at Home Order and that Mayor Mason had 

longtime ties to the Democratic party. Id. Palenick also testified, that he did not know whether Mayor Mason knew the 

Navratils’ political affiliations, but rather assumed Mayor 

Mason did because politics “was his business.” Id.

Palenick’s belief about Mayor Mason’s political motivation was not supported by any factual basis in the admissible 

evidence. It is well-established that “inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a 

summary judgment motion.” Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington 

Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2017), quoting Herzog 

v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Palenick’s statement that Dimple’s LLC’s grant denial was 

politically motivated was no more than conjecture and 

supposition that a Democratic mayor must necessarily have 

animus toward a Republican constituent. That is not enough 

to defeat summary judgment. See FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth, 

11 F.4th 574, 587 (7th Cir. 2021) (affirming grant of summary 

judgment to defendants: “[w]hile it is clear from [plaintiffs’] 

testimony that they believe [defendant] is the reason they 

went out of business and she intentionally tried to drive them 

out of town, they have failed to present evidence to support 

their beliefs” (emphasis in original)); see also Circle City 

Broadcasting I, LLC v. AT&T Services, Inc., __ F.4th __, 2024 WL 

1634093 at *5 (7th Cir. 2024) (affirming grant of summary 

judgment to defendants because plaintiff’s theory that 

defendants discriminated against plaintiff company on the 
No. 23-1208 15

basis of the company owner’s race was not backed by 

evidence and instead based on conjecture); Garrett v. Barnes, 

961 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding directed verdict 

for defendants: “It may be easy to become cynical about 

politics and politicians, but public perception of political 

machinations, innuendo, and speculation cannot be the basis 

of a jury verdict—and there is nothing else in this case.”); 

Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208, 1215 (7th Cir. 1980) 

(affirming grant of defendants’ motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict and explaining, “all [plaintiff] 

has shown is that he is a Democrat and that the defendants 

are Republicans.... Even drawing all reasonable inferences 

from the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff, we conclude there was insufficient evidence from 

which a jury could find that the defendants’ actions were 

motivated by political considerations”).

The evidence at summary judgment thus showed only one 

reason for denying Dimple’s LLC’s grant application: Denis’s 

attendance at the April 24 rally in violation of the Safer at 

Home Order. The purpose of the city’s emergency grants was 

to keep afloat small businesses forced to close or limit operations by the Safer at Home Order. Basing a denial on Denis’s 

attendance at the rally was not subject to any heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and the defendants’ 

stated reason for the denial easily passes muster as rationally 

related to a legitimate government purpose. It was not unreasonable to deny discretionary grant funds to a business whose 

manager seemed to have violated the law, thereby contributing to the public health crisis that created the need for emergency funding in the first place. The denial of Dimple’s LLC’s 

grant application was not a violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
16 No. 23-1208 

2. Class-of-One Theory

Dimple’s LLC also argues a class-of-one equal protection 

theory. To prevail on a “class-of-one” equal protection claim, 

a plaintiff must show that it was “treated differently from others similarly situated, without a rational basis for the differential treatment.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 441 (7th 

Cir. 2013). To be similarly situated the comparators must be 

“identical or directly comparable in all material respects” to 

the plaintiff. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 

F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Dimple’s LLC’s theory is that other grant applicants who 

violated the Safer at Home Order nevertheless received 

funding. Plaintiffs have provided evidence that some 

successful applicants likely violated the Safer at Home Order. 

The problem for plaintiffs on this theory, however, is that they 

have offered no evidence that, at the time the city was 

considering the second round of emergency funding 

applications, Mayor Mason knew that any other applicants 

had violated the order. See Dkt. 52-3 at 14 (Mayor Mason

testifying Denis was the only applicant he knew to have 

violated the Safer at Home Order at the time grants were 

being considered). Mayor Mason also testified that if he had 

known other applicants were violating the order, he would 

have also denied their applications. Id. at 14, 16. Even if we 

take such explanations with a grain of salt for purposes of 

summary judgment, plaintiffs still have not offered 

affirmative evidence of any similarly situated comparators—

businesses that Mayor Mason knew violated the Safer at 

Home Order but received funding—to support this claim.
No. 23-1208 17

C. Due Process Claims

1. Procedural Due Process

Dimple’s LLC also argues that the city’s denial of its grant 

application violated its right to procedural due process. The 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the 

deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government 

without due process of law. “[W]e consider first whether the 

plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property 

or liberty, and if that is established, we consider whether the 

state’s procedures comport with due process.” Rock River 

Health Care, LLC v. Eagleson, 14 F.4th 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Here, Dimple’s LLC cannot show it had any protected property or liberty interest in the city’s COVID-19 emergency 

grants.

It is well-settled that there is no property interest in a 

purely discretionary government benefit. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an 

abstract need or desire for it. ... He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”); Bell v. City of Country 

Club Hills, 841 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A protected property interest exists only when the state’s discretion is clearly 

limited such that the plaintiff cannot be denied the interest 

unless specific conditions are met.” (cleaned up)). Cf. Rock 

River Health Care, 14 F.4th at 774 (“Because [the Medicaid reimbursement rate] is defined by statute, and is not a discretionary determination, it is the type of entitlement that triggers due process protection.”).

The city’s emergency funding program had certain requirements for eligibility, but once those requirements were 
18 No. 23-1208 

met, the actual award of funds was left to Mayor Mason’s discretion. Neither the city nor any governing legal rules guaranteed that a business meeting the criteria would receive 

funding because the funds available were limited. Dimple’s 

LLC simply had no constitutionally protected property interest in the emergency funds.

Dimple’s LLC also argues that the denial of emergency 

funds deprived it of a liberty interest in its right to run its 

store. We reject this theory. Denying Dimple’s LLC a discretionary grant did not deprive it of any legal right to continue 

to operate, unlike the revocation of a business license or a retroactive revision of zoning laws. Cf. Pro’s Sports Bar & Grill, 

Inc. v. City of Country Club Hills, 589 F.3d 865, 870–71 (7th Cir. 

2009) (business had protected property interest in liquor license and could not be deprived of renewed license without 

due process of law). Dimple’s LLC was not deprived of any 

constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, so its 

procedural due process claim fails at the threshold.

2. Substantive Due Process

Plaintiffs also assert that the denial of the emergency funding application “shocks the conscience.” Suffice it to say that 

the decision to deny one application for limited funds does 

not meet the extraordinarily high “shocks the conscience” 

standard. See generally County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 

833, 846 (1998) (“[T]he cognizable level of executive abuse of 

power [is] that which shocks the conscience,” and “only the 

most egregious official conduct” can meet this standard.). 

It was not unreasonable, and certainly not conscienceshocking, for the city to decide that a business whose key employee violated COVID-19 restrictions should not receive 
No. 23-1208 19

limited COVID-19 emergency funding. This practical policy 

decision is not in the same realm as government actions that 

have been found conscience-shocking. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952) (forcibly pumping criminal 

suspect’s stomach shocked the conscience), and Hess v. Garcia, 

72 F.4th 753, 757, 767 (7th Cir. 2023) (police officer’s repeated 

sexual assault of minor student during class-required police 

car ride-along could be found to shock the conscience), with 

Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 750 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(police officers harassing plaintiff by issuing 24 bogus parking 

tickets did not shock the conscience), and GEFT Outdoors, LLC 

v. City of Westfield, 922 F.3d 357, 368 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming 

denial of preliminary injunction and explaining that city attorney’s threat to arrest plaintiff for violating ordinance did 

not shock the conscience). We affirm summary judgment on 

Dimple’s LLC’s due process claims.

D. Defamation

Plaintiffs also contend that Mayor Mason’s June 2020 press 

statement defamed Denis. First, Denis contends that Mayor 

Mason’s statement that Denis “returned to our City” is false. 

Second, Denis claims that the explanation that funds would 

not be granted to people who “willingly jeopardized public 

health” and “took reckless behaviors that risked the health of 

our community” defamed him.

The elements of a Wisconsin common law action for defamation are familiar:

(1) a false statement; (2) communicated by 

speech, conduct or in writing to a person other 

than the one defamed; and (3) the communication is unprivileged and tends to harm one’s 
20 No. 23-1208 

reputation, lowering him or her in the estimation of the community or deterring third persons from associating or dealing with him or 

her.

Laughland v. Beckett, 2015 WI App 70, ¶ 22, 870 N.W.2d 466, 

473 (internal quotations omitted). 

Truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim so long 

as the statement is “substantially true.” Lathan v. Journal Co., 

140 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Wis. 1966). Denis contends that the statement that he returned to “our City” was false because he actually lived in the adjoining Village of Wind Point and did not 

return to Racine specifically until fourteen days after the rally. 

His home in Wind Point is within half a mile of the Racine city 

line. The Navratils referred to themselves in their emergency 

grant application and the amended complaint in this action as 

living at a Racine address. 

We agree with the district court. “Whether Denis actually 

returned to the City itself or merely to the area is inconsequential—the mayor’s point was simply that it was dangerous for 

someone to attend a rally and then return to the community.” 

Navratil, 2023 WL 9190207 at *8. Mayor Mason’s statement 

that Denis returned to the city was substantially true. The difference between Wind Point and Racine cannot support his 

defamation claim.

Also, statements of pure opinion are not actionable under 

defamation law, and a mixed-opinion statement is actionable 

only “if it implies the assertion of undisclosed defamatory 

facts as the basis of the opinion.” Laughland, 2015 WI App 70, 

¶ 27 (internal quotations omitted). Mayor Mason’s statements 

that Denis “willingly jeopardized public health” and “took 
No. 23-1208 21

reckless behaviors that risked the health of our community” 

are pure opinion statements. They conveyed Mayor Mason’s 

belief that Denis’s attendance at the rally was “reckless” and 

“jeopardized” public health. 

The June press statement was issued to explain why 

Dimple’s LLC was denied an emergency funding grant. In 

this context, the statement did not imply undisclosed, 

defamatory facts, but explained only that Mayor Mason 

declined to award emergency funding to a business whose 

key employee engaged in behavior—attending a rally—that 

the mayor believed to be a dangerous activity in the midst of 

a global pandemic and in violation of public health measures. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on 

Denis’s defamation claim.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.