J-S61010-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

v. 

JOHN GANTZ 

 Appellant No. 1728 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 6, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-62-CR-0000313-2005 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 

This is a pro se appeal from the order dismissing the “Motion for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus” filed by John Gantz (“Appellant”) as an untimely serial 

petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

9541-46. We affirm. 

 The pertinent facts and partial procedural history have been 

summarized as follows: 

 On August 16, 2005, Appellant pled guilty to theft by 

unlawful taking in case number 313 of 2005. On September 9, 

2005, Appellant was sentenced in that case to, inter alia, five 

years of probation, which was to run consecutive to his 

sentences in several other cases. Appellant did not file a direct 

appeal. In 2012, following the appropriate hearings, Appellant 

pled guilty to violating the terms of his probation. As a result, 

Appellant’s probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to 

nine months to five years of imprisonment. Again, Appellant did 

not file a direct appeal. 
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 On October 5, 2012, filed a PCRA petition pro se. Counsel 

was appointed and instructed to file an amended petition. 

Instead, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and no merit letter 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 

1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (en banc). On February 4, 2013, the PCRA court 

entered orders granting counsel’s petition and informing 

Appellant, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its intention to 

dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant filed 

objections to the Rule 907 notice, which the PCRA court 

reviewed and nonetheless dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition by 

order of March 28, 2013. 

Commonwealth v. Gantz, 689 WDA 2013, at 1-2 (Pa. Super., filed 

December 12, 2013) (unpublished memorandum). 

Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. The panel affirmed the 

order denying post-conviction relief. In doing so, the panel noted that, 

absent waiver, Appellant’s claims regarding his original 2005 judgment of 

sentence were untimely and Appellant did not plead and prove an exception 

to the PCRA’s time bar. See id., at 4 n.1. Appellant did not file a petition for 

allowance of appeal. 

 On July 13, 2015, Appellant filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

at issue. Treating the filing as a second PCRA petition, the PCRA court issued 

notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition as untimely. Appellant filed a 

response and a supplemental response. The PCRA court ultimately dismissed 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition. This timely appeal follows. 

Initially, we note that it is well settled that the PCRA subsumes the 

remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA. 

See generally Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998). 
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Appellant’s claims involve the validity of his 2005 plea and clearly are 

cognizable under the PCRA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 

1260, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that “PCRA review is limited to 

defendants who claim they were wrongfully convicted and/or are serving an 

illegal sentence.”) Thus, the PCRA Court properly treated Appellant’s petition 

under the PCRA.1

 Within his pro se brief, Appellant raises eighteen issues regarding the 

validity of his guilty plea based on his claim that, in the months preceding its 

entry he had been involuntarily committed and was “severely mentally 

disabled.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Before addressing these claims, however, 

we must first determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition was untimely filed. 

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

is final, unless the petition alleges and proves an exception to the time for 

filing the petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A PCRA petition

____________________________________________ 

1

 In his motion for writ of habeas corpus, Appellant argued that his request 

for relief fell outside the parameters of the PCRA. See Motion, 7/13/15, at 8-

9. It does not. 
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invoking one of these statutory exceptions must “be filed within sixty days of 

the date the claims could have been presented.” Hernandez, 79 A.3d 651-

52 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)). 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on October 10, 2005, 

when the thirty-day time period for filing an appeal to this Court expired. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Appellant needed to file the 

petition at issue by October 10, 2006, in order for it to be timely. As 

Appellant filed the instant petition almost ten years later, it is untimely 

unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the 

enumerated exceptions applies. 

In his initial response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, Appellant 

asserted that his “efforts to present his claims in his first PCRA, either 

through error, slight, intentional malice, OR [sic] through a misapplication of 

law as applied, presented government interference of those claims.” Reply, 

8/27/15, at 7. In essence, Appellant asserts that the continued refusal of the 

trial court to recognize his mental incompetency at the time of entering his 

plea equated to governmental interference in that the court attempted to 

conceal the presentation of his claims regarding his mental state. 

The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s claim, and explained as follows: 

 The [c]ourt will address [Appellant’s] PCRA time exception 

claim and incompetency claim together because [Appellant] 

claims that the Court prevented presentation of the claim to hide 

the fact that he was incompetent. [Appellant] attempts to 

characterize his claim as one subject to the 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(i) time exception, Although [Appellant] suffered 
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from mental illness, he was not incompetent because he fully 

understood his rights. A review of the record refutes 

[Appellant’s] incompetency claim. Mental health documentation 

shows that [Appellant] was able to understand his rights 

regardless of the need for inpatient treatment. During [his guilty 

plea colloquy], [Appellant] was able to list his mental illnesses 

and various medications he took for treatment. [Appellant] could 

accurately define the crimes to which he entered guilty pleas. 

Additionally, [Appellant] was also able to interject regarding one 

theft charge and explain that he admitted to the conduct but was 

unsure about the value of the items. During [sentencing], 

[Appellant] was able to inform trial counsel of a mistake in the 

pre-sentence report regarding restitution. Furthermore, 

[Appellant] was able to speak about the concurrent nature of his 

New York probation revocation sentence and whether a sentence 

on the instant case would run concurrently or consecutively with 

the New York sentence. Since there is no evidence that 

[Appellant] was incompetent, then his related claim regarding 

the timeliness exception of his Petition must also fail. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/7/16, at 2. 

 Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions. See 

Commonwealth v. Howard, 788 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 2002) (rejecting 

governmental interference claim regarding refusal to grant request of funds 

to hire an expert regarding his mental health; “[w]e do not see how a proper 

court order can, in any fashion, be perceived as governmental 

interference”). Thus, the PCRA court correctly concluded that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s serial PCRA petition. We therefore affirm 

the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant post-conviction relief. 

 Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/28/2016