IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

MOBILE HEALTH INNOVATIVE 

SOLUTIONS, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

APPLE INC., 

Defendant. 

Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-14-JRG

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

DEFENDANT APPLE INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL 

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(3) OR TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT ....................................2

III. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2

A. The Parties ...............................................................................................................2

B. The Technology .......................................................................................................3

C. The Complaint .........................................................................................................5

IV. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................6

A. The Court Should Dismiss This Suit Because Venue Is Not Proper In The Eastern 

District Of Texas. .....................................................................................................6

B. The Court Should Also Dismiss This Suit Because The ’984 Patent Claims Nothing 

More Than The Unpatentable Abstract Idea Of Determining The Stress Level Of 

An Individual From Generic Biometric Data. .......................................................10

1. The ’984 Patent Is Directed To An Abstract Idea. .....................................10

2. The ’984 Patent Does Not Include An Inventive Concept. .......................15

C. The Court Should Also Dismiss This Suit Because The Complaint Fails To State A 

Claim For Direct Or Indirect Infringement. ...........................................................19

V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................21

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 Page(s) 

Cases

Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 

573 U.S. 208 (2014) ......................................................................................................... passim

In re Apple Inc., 

No. 21-181, 2021 WL 5291804 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) .......................................................9

In re Apple Inc., 

No. 22-128, 2022 WL 1196768 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) ........................................................9

In re Apple, Inc., 

581 F. App’x 886 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................3

Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 

881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................5

Braemar Manufacturing, LLC v. ScottCare Corp., 

816 Fed. App’x. 465 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ......................................................................................13

CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 

No. 20-2123, 2021 WL 5024388 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................12 

CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 

816 F. App’x 471 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................12

CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 

955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................11

ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 

920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................15 

Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 

859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................10

Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 

No. 6:14-CV-752-JRG-JDL, 2015 WL 4910427 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2015) ...................20, 21

In re Cray Inc., 

871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................ passim

Customedia Technologies, LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 

951 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................18

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Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A.,

830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)........................................................................................ passim

FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc.,

839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................11, 13

In re Genentech, Inc.,

566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................7

In re Google LLC,

949 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................6

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA),

792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................18

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. J. Crew Group, Inc.,

No. 6:16-CV-196-JRG, 2016 WL 4591794 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2016)..................................17

In re Killian,

45 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................11

McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.,

837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................11, 17

Memory Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp.,

No. 13-1804-GMS, 2015 WL 632026 (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2015).................................................7

Miller Mendel, Inc. v. City of Anna, Texas,

598 F.Supp.3d 486 (E.D. Tex. 2022).......................................................................................18

Network Architecture Innovations LLC v. CC Network Inc.,

No. 2:16-CV-00914-JRG, 2017 WL 1398276 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2017) ..............................10

NorthStar Systems LLC v. Volkswagen AG,

No. 2:22-CV-00486-JRG, 2023 WL 5723648 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2023) ...............................20

Odom v. Microsoft Corp.,

596 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D. Tex. 2009).......................................................................................7

Parker v. Flook,

437 U.S. 584 (1978).................................................................................................................16

Philips North America LLC v. Fitbit LLC,

626 F.Supp.3d 292 (D. Mass. 2022)........................................................................................13

Ruby Sands LLC v. American National Bank of Texas,

No. 2:15-cv-1955, 2016 WL 3542430 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2016) ....................................19, 20

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Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Products, Inc.,

983 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................15

TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,

581 U.S. 258 (2017)...................................................................................................................6

Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc.,

72 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ................................................................................................10

Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc.,

10 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................14

Valeant Pharmaceuticals North America LLC v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,

978 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................6

Van De Vliert v. Tam International, Inc.,

2015 WL 6745811 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2015) .........................................................................19

Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co.,

927 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..............................................................................................8, 9

In re ZTE (USA) Inc.,

890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................1, 6, 7

Docketed Cases

Mobile Health Innovative Solutions, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.,

No. 24-cv-00106 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2024)..............................................................................9

Mobile Health Innovative Solutions, LLC v. Zepp Health Corp.,

No. 24-cv-01030 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2024) ................................................................................9

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1391..............................................................................................................................6

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)............................................................................................................... passim

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) .........................................................................................................................8

35 U.S.C. § 101...................................................................................................................... passim

Federal Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) ....................................................................................................................1, 2

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I. INTRODUCTION

The scant eight-page complaint filed by Plaintiff Mobile Health Innovative Solutions, 

LLC—a company that did not exist until six months ago and does not appear to conduct any 

business other than suing smartwatch manufacturers—is deficient on its face and should be 

dismissed for three independent reasons.

First, the complaint should be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(3) because it does not establish 

that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas. The relevant statute requires Mobile Health

to show that Apple “has a regular and established place of business” in this District. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1400(b). The only two venue allegations in the complaint allege that “Defendant is a company 

that has offices in this District” and that “[v]enue is proper as Apple files lawsuits in this District 

on a regular basis, including against competitor Ericsson.” Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶¶ 2, 8. Those 

allegations are plainly insufficient for Mobile Health to meet its burden under Section 1400(b)

based on the factors laid out by the Federal Circuit in cases like In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 

1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008, 1013-15 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 

Mobile Health has failed to show that Apple has a “regular and established place of business” in 

the District that is “the place of the defendant,” as Apple has no offices or Apple stores in the 

District.

Second, the complaint should be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

because the only asserted patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, U.S. Patent No. 

11,468,984 (“’984 patent”) claims nothing more than the basic idea of gathering and analyzing 

vital signs to display an individual’s stress level, which fails the test for patent eligibility under 

Alice. Nothing in the ’984 patent transforms this abstract idea into an inventive concept; the patent 

simply claims the application of this abstract concept using conventional and generic technology. 

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Third, the complaint should also be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim of infringement. Far from pleading sufficient facts to allege a claim for direct infringement, 

Mobile Health’s complaint and accompanying claim charts show that the “direct infringement”

allegation in the complaint is implausible because the accused Apple product is admittedly not

manufactured or sold with one of the accused components. The complaint also fails to state a 

claim for indirect infringement as it fails to allege specific intent necessary for induced 

infringement or the requisite knowledge and no substantial non-infringing use for contributory 

infringement. 

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT

1. Whether this Court should dismiss this action under FRCP 12(b)(3)—or, at a 

minimum, transfer this action to the Northern District of California—because 

Mobile Health has not established that venue is proper in the Eastern District of 

Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

2. Whether this Court should dismiss this action under FRCP 12(b)(6) because Mobile 

Health has failed to state a viable claim because the sole asserted patent is invalid 

under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

3. Whether this Court should dismiss this action under FRCP 12(b)(6) because Mobile 

Health has failed to allege a viable infringement claim.

III. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties 

Defendant Apple Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California. 

See Apple Inc. 2023 SEC Form 10-K.

1

 “Apple[] [is] headquartered in Cupertino, California,” In 

1 Available at http://tinyurl.com/pv9kuyyj (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

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re Apple, Inc., 581 F. App’x 886, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2014), which is in the Northern District of 

California. Apple manufactures and sells a wide range of consumer products, including iPhone, 

iPad, and—as relevant here—Apple Watch. Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 25. Apple sells these products 

through its website, directly to consumers in Apple Stores, and through retailers and distributors. 

The last Apple Store in the Eastern District of Texas closed five years ago. See Davis, Apple Shuts 

Stores In EDTX, But Will Other Cos. Follow?, Law360 (Feb. 25, 2019).

2

According to the complaint, Mobile Health “is a Wyoming company having its principal 

place of business in Cheyenne, Wyoming.” Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 1. Public records reveal that Mobile 

Health was formed in Wyoming on October 11, 2023. See Wyoming Secretary of State Business

Center: Mobile Health Innovative Solutions, LLC.

3

 

The sole asserted patent—U.S. Patent No. 11,468,984 (“’984 patent”)—was originally 

assigned to Soma Analytics UG. Dkt. 1-2 [’984 patent] at cover. Soma Analytics and three of the 

patent’s four named inventors are located in Germany, and the fourth named inventor is located in 

London, England. Id. Since the patent issued on October 11, 2022, its ownership has been 

transferred at least four times before finally landing with Mobile Health on October 12, 2023—

i.e., the day after Mobile Health was formed. See Patent Center Assignments for U.S. Patent No. 

11,468,984.

4

 Mobile Health does not appear to (1) own any other patents, (2) sell any products, 

or (3) conduct any business other than suing smartwatch manufacturers. See, e.g., Patent 

Assignment Search for Assignee Name Mobile Health Innovative, USPTO.

5

 

B. The Technology

The ’984 patent is entitled “Device, Method and Application for Establishing a Current 

2 Available at https://tinyurl.com/2dybeke5 (last visited Mar. 18, 2024). 3 Available at http://tinyurl.com/5yzr2wfc (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

4 Available at http://tinyurl.com/3ywm9jnj (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

5 Available at http://tinyurl.com/35vss8bp (last visited Mar. 18, 2024).

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Load Level,” and states that it relates to “a device, a method, a computer program product and an 

application for establishing a current load level of a user.” Dkt. 1-2 [’984 patent] at cover, 

Abstract. According to the patent, the claimed “invention relates to an apparatus for ascertaining 

a current stress level for a user ... , to a method for ascertaining a current stress level, to a computer 

program product[,] and to an application for a mobile terminal.” Id. at 1:11-15. 

The patent acknowledges that much of what is claimed in the invention existed in the prior 

art—e.g., “mobile terminals” with integrated sensors and a plurality of applications, id. at 1:25-36, 

“special devices for sensor-based measurement ... [used to] determine a current stress level from 

the measured values,” id. at 1:53-60, and “methods based on questionnaire data ... help to show 

the alteration in a stress level over time,” id. at 1:61-2:3. The “object of the invention” is to 

purportedly aggregate these prior innovations into a more convenient form—i.e., to “provide a 

user with an inexpensive and non-time-consuming solution for determining a current stress level” 

and “dispense[] with additional apparatuses, particularly sensors, that the user needs to fix or wear 

directly on his body.” Id. at 7:14-24; id. at 2:41-48.

Mobile Health’s complaint treats independent claim 1 of the asserted patent as 

“exemplary.” See Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 30. That claim describes a device “for calculating a current 

load level of a user” by performing the following steps: 

(1) “calculating biometric data about the user, at least from the at least one signal data 

produced by said at least one sensor, and from use data of said plurality of available 

applications used by the user,” 

(2) dividing the biometric data “into a plurality of categories,” 

(3) ascertaining “category-specific load levels ... by means of an arithmetic mean or a 

weighted mean of features relating to the biometric data pertaining to each category in the 

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plurality of categories,” 

(4) “determining the current load level of the user from the biometric data,” 

(5) “calculating the plurality of artificial neural networks in parallel,” and 

(6) displaying “the determined current load level of the user ... to the user via the mobile 

end unit in the form of a consolidated load level obtained from a combination of categoryspecific load levels by the evaluation unit forming the arithmetic mean or weighed mean 

of the category-specific load levels.” 

Dkt. 1-2 [’984 patent] at 22:59-23:39.6 In short, claim 1 describes gathering biometric data (point 

1 above), analyzing that data (points 2-5), and displaying that data (point 6). 

Claim 1 does not rely on any novel component or part. Rather, it vaguely-describes generic

computer parts and applications used in conventional ways to perform the claimed functions, 

including “a mobile end unit,” “at least one signal data generating sensor,” “a plurality of available 

applications,” “an evaluation unit provided in the mobile end unit or a central server,” “a plurality 

of processors,” and “at least one graphics card with at least one graphics card processor.” Id. It 

likewise does not identify any novel means to analyze the data, relying instead on basic 

mathematical concepts of “an arithmetic mean or a weighted mean.” Id.

C. The Complaint

Mobile Health’s eight-page complaint alleges that “Apple Smartwatches” infringe the ’984

patent but provides very few factual allegations supporting that conclusion. Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 25; 

Dkt. 1-3 [Claim Chart]. The complaint’s venue allegations are similarly sparse; they allege only 

Apple “is a company that has offices in this District” and that “[v]enue is proper as Apple files 

6 The Federal Circuit has held that “[c]ourts may treat a claim as representative ... if the 

patentee does not present any meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim 

limitations not found in the representative claim[.]” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 

(Fed. Cir. 2018). 

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lawsuits in this District on a regular basis, including against competitor Ericsson.” Dkt. 1 [Compl.] 

¶¶ 2, 8. The complaint does not recite the relevant statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) or provide 

any venue allegations under that statute. 

IV. ARGUMENT

A. The Court Should Dismiss This Suit Because Venue Is Not Proper In The 

Eastern District Of Texas.

“In 2017, the Supreme Court dramatically changed the venue landscape in patent cases” 

by holding “that the general venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 ... does not modify ... the more 

specific venue statute applicable to patent cases.” Valeant Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. Mylan Pharms. 

Inc., 978 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands 

LLC, 581 U.S. 258 (2017)). The Supreme Court recognized instead that “[Congress] placed patent 

infringement cases in a class by themselves, outside the scope of general venue legislation.” ZTE, 

890 F.3d at 1012. In other words, the patent venue statute—28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)—is both 

“intended to be restrictive of venue in patent cases compared with the broad general venue 

provision,” id. at 1014, and to serve as “the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent 

infringement proceedings,” Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360. The Supreme Court has accordingly 

“cautioned against a broad reading of the venue statute.” In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1346-

47 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (collecting case law). 

Section 1400(b) provides that venue is proper in only two situations: (1) where the 

defendant “resides” in the judicial district or (2) where the defendant has a “regular and established 

place of business in the district.” There can be no dispute that Apple does not “reside” in the 

Eastern District of Texas. As the Supreme Court has explained, “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ 

only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.” TC Heartland, 581 

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U.S. at 262. Here, as noted above, it is matter of public record that Apple is incorporated in 

California. See supra pp. 2-3. 

Because Apple does not “reside” in Texas, Mobile Health can establish venue only by 

showing that Apple has a “regular and established place of business in the district.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1400(b); see also ZTE, 890 F.3d at 1013-14 (patentee “bears the burden of establishing proper 

venue”). The Federal Circuit has explained that there are “three general requirements relevant to 

the inquiry” of whether a defendant has a “regular and established place of business” in a venue: 

“(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of 

business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.” Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360. 

Mobile Health’s complaint does not even attempt to meet its burden under the test set forth

in Cray and its progeny. While the complaint focuses on one past litigation in this District, that 

says nothing about the dispositive venue question of whether Apple has a “regular and established 

place of business” here. Indeed, the existence of prior unrelated litigation has been held not to be 

relevant when analyzing whether transfer of venue is proper. See In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 

1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding “court clearly erred in finding ... prior suit weighed against 

transfer” where there was no indication the prior suit “involved the same parties, witnesses, 

evidence, and facts”); see also Memory Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp., 2015 WL 632026, at *3 (D. 

Del. Feb. 13, 2015) (“[T]hat Intel initiated unrelated cases in the District of Delaware is irrelevant 

to the transfer analysis in this case.”); Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1002 n.5 

(E.D. Tex. 2009) (“[G]iven the fact specific nature of venue transfer analysis, it is unlikely that 

Microsoft’s prior litigation in this District would be highly relevant to the analysis in this case.”). 

It cannot be the case that prior litigation is enough to satisfy the bright-line Cray standard that 

evaluates whether venue is proper at all when it does not play any role in the Section 1404 analysis 

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that evaluates whether venue should be transferred for the convenience of the parties and witnesses 

in the interest of justice.7

The closest the complaint comes to addressing the Cray test is its allegation that Apple 

“has offices in this District.” Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 2. That is incorrect as a factual matter—Apple 

has no offices in the Eastern District of Texas. The “offices” allegation is also insufficient even 

under the deferential standard of review applied at the complaint stage. It is Mobile Health’s 

“burden to plead specific facts showing that the defendant has a regular and established place of 

business physically located in the judicial district.” Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co., 927 F.3d 

1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added), and a vague assertion that “offices” exist cannot be 

enough to make that showing without rendering the three-factor test laid out by Cray essentially 

meaningless. To take just one example, the complaint does not include any factual allegations to 

attempt to identify “a regular and established place of business” in this District that would meet 

the “place of the defendant” requirement—e.g., by establishing that Apple “owns or leases [a]

place” or “exercises other attributes of possession or control over [a] place” in the Eastern District 

of Texas. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.

The proper remedy for Mobile Health’s failure to file this case in a proper venue is 

dismissal. While this Court retains the authority to transfer this suit to “any district or division in 

which it could have been brought” instead of dismissing it outright if transfer is “in the interest of 

justice,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this is not a case where Mobile Health made an understandable 

mistake as to the propriety of bringing suit in this District. To the contrary, the complaint makes 

no serious effort to show this case has any connection to the Eastern District of Texas, much less 

7 Mobile Health’s allegation that “Apple files lawsuits in this District on a regular basis,” 

Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 8, is also incorrect. Apple has filed a single case in this District in the last 

decade.

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meet its burden to establish venue under the three factors identified by the Federal Circuit. See 

Westech Aerosol Corp., 927 F.3d at 1382-83 (affirming dismissal for improper venue where 

plaintiff “disregard[ed] controlling law, here Cray and ZTE” and “failed to plead any facts showing 

[defendant] had a regular and established place of business physically located in the Western 

District of Washington”). Mobile Health’s paper-thin allegations are particularly notable because 

it has recently sued several other companies over precisely the same patent and those complaints 

at least (1) acknowledge the existence of Section 1400(b) and (2) identify the defendants’ specific 

office addresses located in the District where the suit was filed.8 Given that Mobile Health is 

capable of crafting more detailed venue allegations—and apparently made a strategic choice not 

to do so here—it should not be given a second chance in this case. 

At minimum, this Court should transfer this case to the Northern District of California. 

There can be no dispute that venue would be proper in that judicial district because Apple “resides” 

in the Northern District of California within the meaning of Section 1400(b). Specifically, it is 

incorporated in California and headquartered in Cupertino, California, which is located in the 

Northern District of California. See, e.g., In re Apple Inc., 2021 WL 5291804, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 

Nov. 15, 2021) (ordering case transferred from Texas to the Northern District of California 

because, inter alia, “the Northern District of California had ‘a strong local interest in this matter’”); 

In re Apple Inc., 2022 WL 1196768, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) (similar). In contrast, public 

8 See, e.g., Mobile Health Innovative Solutions, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., No. 

24-cv-00106 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2024), Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 10 (“Venue is proper in this judicial 

district ... pursuant to ... 1400(b) because [Samsung] ... maintain[s] regular and established places 

of business with offices and/or facilities in this District at least at 6625 Excellence Way, Plano 

Texas 75023, and 2601 Preston Road, Frisco, Texas 75034.”); see also Mobile Health Innovative 

Solutions, LLC v. Zepp Health Corp., No. 24-cv-01030 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2024), Dkt. 1 [Compl.] 

¶¶ 3, 10 (“Venue is also proper in this district as to Defendants pursuant to ... 1400(b)” because 

“Defendants maintain a regular and established business presence in this District” at “1551 

McCarthy Blvd., Ste. 107, Milpitas, California 95305”). 

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information does not suggest that Mobile Health has any ties to this District or to Texas more 

broadly. See supra p. 3. Accordingly, if this case is not dismissed outright, the most logical 

location for it to be heard is not in the Eastern District of Texas—a venue that no party has any 

link to—but in the Northern District of California, where Apple resides.

B. The Court Should Also Dismiss This Suit Because The ’984 Patent Claims 

Nothing More Than The Unpatentable Abstract Idea Of Determining The 

Stress Level Of An Individual From Generic Biometric Data. 

Section 101 bars patents that claim “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 

ideas”—i.e., the “basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 

Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). A patent is invalid under Section 101 where (1) it is directed 

to unpatentable subject matter, such as an abstract idea and (2) it fails to include an inventive 

concept that transforms the subject matter into a patent-eligible invention. Id. at 217-18. This 

determination can be made at any stage of the case, including at the 12(b)(6) stage. As this Court 

has explained, “[i]f a patent is ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, then a court may dismiss a 

complaint asserting infringement of that patent.” Network Architecture Innovations LLC v. CC 

Network Inc., 2017 WL 1398276, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2017); see also Trinity Info Media, 

LLC v. Covalent, Inc., 72 F.4th 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (noting “[w]e have repeatedly affirmed 

§ 101 rejections at the motion to dismiss stage”); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health 

Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (collecting cases affirming Section 101 

rulings at the 12(b)(6) stage).

1. The ’984 Patent Is Directed To An Abstract Idea. 

Alice Step One considers the “focus of the claims, their character as a whole” to determine 

whether the claims are directed to unpatentable subject matter. Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom 

S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This inquiry is a “legal question that can be answered 

based on the intrinsic evidence”—i.e., “the plain claim language [and] statements in the written 

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description[.]” CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 

In determining whether a patent is directed to an abstract idea, courts “look to whether the claims 

... focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead 

directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and 

machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 

see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(considering whether “claims merely implement an old practice in a new environment”). 

Here, exemplary claim 1 from the ’984 patent boils down to nothing more than three basic 

and abstract concepts to achieve a desired result (i.e., determining an individual’s “current load 

level”9 based on certain biometric data): (1) gathering information (i.e., collecting biometric data 

from applications on a mobile device), (2) analyzing that information (i.e., determining an 

individual’s stress level by performing basic mathematical calculations using that biometric data), 

and (3) displaying the results (i.e., displaying the current stress level to the user on the mobile 

device). See supra pp. 3-5; see also Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 15. 

There is nothing inventive about the basic notion of gathering and analyzing information, 

and then displaying the results. See, e.g., Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1353-54 (collecting cases); 

In re Killian, 45 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (explaining that “claims must fail Alice/Mayo

step one as they are directed to collection of information, comprehending the meaning of that 

collected information, and indication of the results, all on a generic computer network operating 

9 The term “load levels” appears only in the title, abstract and claims of the ’984 patent and 

is not defined in the specification. Mobile Health’s complaint treats “load level” as synonymous 

with “stress level.” See Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 15 (“The ’984 Patent teaches devices and methods for 

establishing a current load or stress level of a user”); Dkt. 1-3 [Claim Chart] at 2 (“Company 

provides Apple Watches such as the Series 8 Watch, which is compatible with multiple apps such 

as the Apple Health app and the Stress Monitor app that are used for calculating stress level 

(‘current load level’) for the user.”). For purposes of this motion, Apple applies Mobile Health’s 

definition but reserves the right to challenge “load levels” as indefinite at a future point.

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in its normal, expected manner”). This is because such steps “can be performed by a human, using 

observation, evaluation, judgment, [and] opinion, because they involve making determinations and 

identifications, which are mental tasks humans routinely do.” Killian, 45 F.4th at 1379. For 

example, for decades, medical industry professionals have gathered information about a patient’s 

vital signs that suggest stress (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, temperature), analyzed those vital 

signs, and provided the results to the patient. 

Several courts have found claims directed towards similar ideas as those at issue here to be 

abstract under the same basic Electric Power logic. In CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., for 

instance, the Federal Circuit found claims to a comparable device—i.e., one that monitors the 

electrical activity of a patient’s heart rate, analyzes the data for anomalies, transmits the data to a 

remote monitoring station for storage or analysis, and displays said information—were directed to 

the abstract idea of collecting, analyzing, and displaying data. 816 F. App’x 471, 475 (Fed. Cir. 

2020). The court rejected the argument that the claims were sufficiently non-abstract to survive 

Section 101, as they did not recite “specific methods for identifying cardiac events or determining 

correlation between machine- and human-identified events.” Id. at 475. Like the patent at issue 

in CardioNet, claim 1 of the ’984 patent identifies nothing more than a generic device that uses 

unaltered, conventional sensors and applications to measure, analyze, and display a user’s stress 

level—i.e., a “conventional processes ... [that] cannot be said to require anything more than 

generic data analysis.” Id.; see also CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 2021 WL 5024388, at *2, 

*4 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding similar claim directed to filtering heartbeat signals abstract because it 

relied on existing signal data and “supplie[d] no specific way to collect and process the data or to 

implement the [claimed] filter”); Braemar Mfg., LLC v. ScottCare Corp., 816 Fed. App’x. 465, 

470 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding patent abstract because the “claims [were] directed to collecting 

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13

(‘receiving a cardiac biological signal’), classifying (‘classifying the events’), and filtering data 

into groups based on identifying characteristics (‘determining a measure of merit,’ ‘comparing the 

measure of merit’), and transmitting the data for review”).

Similarly, in FairWarning, the Federal Circuit held that the asserted patent was directed to 

an abstract idea because it claimed a method for “collect[ing] information regarding accesses of a 

patient’s personal health information, analyz[ing] the information according to one of several 

rules ... to determine if the activity indicates improper access, and provid[ing] notification if it 

determines that improper access has occurred.” 839 F.3d at 1093. The FairWarning patent, too, 

closely tracks the idea claimed by the ’984 patent. Both patents collect a certain type information 

(here: biometric data; there: data regarding access to a patient’s personal health information), 

analyze that information (here: to determine a user’s stress level; there: to detect improper access), 

and present that information to a user (here: by displaying the user’s stress level; there: by notifying 

a user if improper access had occurred). Compare FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1092 (quoting claim 

1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,578,500), with Dkt. 1-2 [’984 patent] at claim 1. Likewise, in Philips North 

America LLC v. Fitbit LLC, 626 F.Supp.3d 292, 301 (D. Mass. 2022), the court concluded that a 

patent that described a way of collecting, analyzing, and displaying exercise-related information 

(such as the amount of exercise performed and the user’s “physiologic status”) was directed to an 

abstract idea, as it did not recite any specific innovation that went beyond the type of generic 

concept described in Electric Power. Id. As with the ’984 patent, the patent at issue in Fitbit 

merely recited a series of steps that involved gathering data (here: collecting biometric data; there: 

exercise data), analyzing that data (here: through an “evaluation unit”; there: from a server), and 

showing the results—under FitBit’s logic, such a claim is fundamentally abstract because it does 

not provide any “inventive technology for performing th[e claimed] functions.” Id. 

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Mobile Health may attempt to save its patent by pointing to the fact that it purports to claim 

a method for determining the user’s “load” or “stress” levels and that it relies on the use of 

“biometric” information. But as to the former, the patent fails to explain precisely what the “load” 

or “stress” levels limitation requires beyond the kind of generic measurements that are part of a 

routine physical. A patentee cannot survive Section 101 by relying on mere generalities. See 

Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc., 10 F.4th 1342, 1352, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2021) 

(patentee must provide “a specific technical solution” rather than rely on generalities). Moreover, 

the patent itself acknowledges that the idea of automating the process of measuring “load” or 

“stress” is not particularly unconventional—“there are differently designed apparatuses and 

methods that use special devices for sensor-based measurement of specific vital functions and 

determine a current stress level from measured values” in the prior art. Dkt. 1-2 [’984 patent] 

1:53-56. As to the latter (the use of biometric information), the patent acknowledges that the type 

of biometric data it relies on is already collected by sensors that exist in the prior art. See Dkt. 1-

2 [’984 patent] at 3:30-34, 3:47-4:21, 7:8-24. In any event, the Federal Circuit has previously held 

that other patents that involve “the collection of biometric information”—without more—were 

directed to an abstract idea. Universal Secure Registry, 10 F.4th at 1354.

10

At the end of the day, though “the claims are couched as systems or articles, [the ’984 

patent’s claims] essentially recite and are directed to collecting, analyzing, and displaying 

[biometric] data by conventional means.” See CardioNet, 816 Fed. App’x at 475; see also Electric 

Power, 830 F.3d at 1351 (holding that “performing real-time performance monitoring of an electric 

power grid by collecting data from multiple data sources, analyzing the data, and displaying the 

10 The same analysis applies to the many other buzzwords used in the claims without being 

attached to a specific new technique, such as “artificial neural networks” or the various specific 

categories of biometric data and sensors claimed in dependent claims 5 and 11. A patentee cannot 

overcome Section 101 merely by using a thesaurus.

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results” is directed to unpatentable abstract idea). The claim is accordingly directed to an 

unpatentable abstract idea. 

2. The ’984 Patent Does Not Include An Inventive Concept.

Alice Step 2 is a “search for an inventive concept—i.e., an element or combination of 

elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than 

a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, the claims of the ’984 patent do not recite such an inventive concept. They simply 

claim the abstract ideas discussed above and apply those abstract ideas using generic computer 

parts and basic math. That the claims purport to improve the efficiency of an abstract process is 

not sufficient to transform the abstract ideas into an inventive concept. 

First, Mobile Health cannot rely on any of the abstract ideas discussed above to claim an 

inventive concept. See Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods., Inc., 983 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. 

Cir. 2020) (“[A] claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot 

supply the inventive concept[.]”). This is because “transformation into a patent-eligible 

application requires ‘more than simply stat[ing] the [abstract idea] while adding the words ‘apply 

it.’” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Alice, 

573 U.S. at 221); see also Simio, 983 F.3d at 1363. That, however, is precisely what the ’984 

patent does. There are two problems the patent contends exist in the art: (1) “the current stress 

level is determined on the basis of very few biometric data ... which means that different categories 

of biometric data are not combined [and] [t]herefore, the current stress level can be determined 

less reliably than when a large number of different categories of biometric data are used,” Dkt. 1-

2 [’984 patent] at 2:4-13; and (2) “sensor-based apparatuses resort to special devices ... that 

capture a specific category of biometric data” (a result that is both costly and a nuisance to the 

user), id. at 2:14-28. The patent’s solution, as exemplified in claim 1, is simply to use a single 

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generic device with sensors and applications that considers a wider range of generic biometric 

data. In other words, “the only possible inventive concept ... is the abstract idea [of gathering, 

analyzing, and displaying] itself.” ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 774-75.

It is similarly insufficient that the ’984 patent attempts to limit the abstract ideas of 

gathering, analyzing, and displaying data to a “particular technological environment”—here, 

measuring stress level based on biometric data. Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1354. If that were 

sufficient, a patentee could monopolize the Pythagorean Theorem simply by claiming the idea of 

applying it to the particular context of surveying land. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 

(1978). 

Second, Mobile Health cannot show an inventive concept because no claim element 

describes anything beyond the use of “conventional, generic technology” nor do they “require a 

new source or type of information, or new techniques for analyzing it.” Electric Power, 830 F.3d 

at 1355-56. As the patent’s specification explains, “[d]etermination of a plurality of biometric data 

is firstly facilitated by virtue of mobile terminals, such as smartphones, being equipped with an 

increasing number of sensors as standard.” Dkt. 1-2 [’984 patent] at 3:35-39. And while the claims 

make reference to a “further application,” that term appears to reference a purely generic 

application—i.e., one that “can be obtained via ... an online shop integrated in the operating system 

of the mobile terminal,” id. at 3:6-11, and that “interacts with other components ... arranged in the 

mobile terminal,” id. at 2:55-58.11 Finally, the claims reference an “evaluation unit,” but again 

this “unit” appears wholly generic—it can exist on the application or a server. Id. at 4:49-54. 

11 Nor does the “further application” appear to perform any particularly unconventional

function. Rather, it determines biometric data from “sensors integrated in the mobile terminal,” 

“use data of other applications installed on the mobile terminal,” or via user questionnaires. Dkt. 

1-2 [’984 patent] at 3:30-34, 4:45-58. These are all steps that could be taken by nearly any 

application on a smart phone and do not entail an inventive algorithm.

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This unit is not described as performing any function more specific than “ascertain[ing] a current 

stress level for the user,” id. at 5:42-45, by using basic math to analyze the gathered biometric data 

such as an “arithmetic ... or weighted mean,” id. at 11:39-42. See also, e.g., id. at 12:23-45 

(describing a “data analyzer [that] analyzes the conditioned signal data ... by means of a statistical 

regression model”).

12 Application of mathematical principles without more cannot constitute an 

inventive contribution or transform otherwise non-patentable subject matter into patentable subject 

matter. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312 (“[C]laims requiring the use of a specific equation [are] 

unpatentable...”). 

In short, the common components described in the patent do not go beyond the ordinary 

use of generic sensors and applications, or use any unique or inventive algorithm as to how load 

levels are calculated. Simply put, “the claims do not recite a new ... technique, but rather combine 

nonspecific, conventional [biometric data collection] techniques”; “[t]here is nothing in the 

specification suggesting ... that the claimed combination of these conventional [biometric data 

collection] techniques achieve more than the expected sum ... provided by each technique.” 

Universal Secure Registry, 10 F. 4th at 1355; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 

2016 WL 4591794, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2016) (“Combining generic data, from generic data 

stores, across generic networks does not reflect the necessary innovation to salvage [the] 

underlying abstract idea.”); CardioNet, 816 Fed. App’x. at 476 (no inventive concept where 

“claims depend on methods that can be performed on any general-purpose computing device 

without reciting or requiring any nonconventional components or characteristics”).

12 Even the specification’s description of terms like “artificial neural networks” does not 

encompass more than a generic device using normal machine learning processes—i.e., “train[ing] 

on the basis of available biometric data from a multiplicity of users,” Dkt. 1-2 [’984 patent] 6:14-

18, to “improve[] the reliability of the method” over time, id. at 7:1-7.

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Finally, while the “object of the invention” is to “provide a user with an inexpensive and 

non-time-consuming solution for determining a current stress level” and to “dispense[] with 

additional apparatuses ... that the user needs to fix or wear directly on his body,” Dkt. 1-2 [’984 

patent] at 7:14-24, 2:41-48, the Federal Circuit has consistently held that simply improving the 

efficiency of an abstract process is not sufficient to survive 101. See, e.g., Customedia Techs., 

LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[C]laiming the improved 

speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer [is] insufficient to render 

the claims patent eligible as an improvement to computer functionality.” (cleaned up)); Intellectual

Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]ur 

precedent is clear that merely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of 

the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.”); see also Miller 

Mendel, Inc. v. City of Anna, Texas, 598 F.Supp.3d 486, 498 (E.D. Tex. 2022) (explaining that 

“the alleged efficiency of the method through computerization” fails to establish an inventive 

concept because “the problem being solved by the use of computer technology does not solve a 

specific computing problem”). Any other result would be inconsistent with the result in Alice, 

which holds that a patentee cannot avoid Section 101 by implementing an abstract idea on a 

computer, 573 U.S. at 223-224—almost any implementation of an abstract idea on a computer 

would generally result in increased speed and efficiency. 

In short, Mobile Health’s complaint should be dismissed because “[t]hough lengthy and 

numerous, the [’984 patent’s] claims do not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and 

display of available information in a particular field [and] stat[e] those functions in general terms.” 

Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1351.

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C. The Court Should Also Dismiss This Suit Because The Complaint Fails To 

State A Claim For Direct Or Indirect Infringement.

The Court should also dismiss this case because the complaint fails to state a claim for 

either direct or indirect infringement. “[T]o state a claim for direct infringement, a plaintiff must 

explicitly plead facts to plausibly support the assertion that a defendant ‘without authority makes, 

uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention during the term of the patent.’” Ruby Sands 

LLC v. Am. Nat’l. Bank of Texas, 2016 WL 3542430, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2016). Despite 

alleging that Apple “has infringed and continues to infringe one or more claims, including at least 

Claim 1, of the ’984 patent by manufacturing, using, importing, selling, offering for sale, and/or 

providing (as identified in the Claim Charts attached hereto as Exhibits B) products ... which 

infringe at least Claim 1 of the ’984 Patent,” Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 25, the complaint does not allege 

sufficient facts to plausibly support the assertion of direct infringement by Apple. To the contrary, 

the claim chart attached to the complaint shows that the direct infringement allegation is 

implausible as the accused Apple product is not manufactured, imported, sold, offered for sale, or 

provided with one of the accused components. In particular, the claim chart attached to the 

complaint relies on a third-party “Stress Monitor” application to plead infringement. See, e.g., 

Dkt. 1-3 [Claim Chart] at 2 (“Company provides Apple Watches such as the Series 8 Watch, which 

is compatible with multiple apps such as the Apple Health app and the Stress Monitor app that are 

used for calculating stress level (‘current load level’) for the user.”). But Apple Watches as sold 

do not include the Stress Monitor app. Rather, as shown in the claim charts, the application is 

provided by a company called “ActiveAce.” Id. at 4. In other words, Apple Watch is at most only 

a part of Mobile Health’s infringement allegations and therefore cannot be directly infringing. See 

Van De Vliert v. Tam Int’l., Inc., 2015 WL 6745811, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2015) (dismissing 

complaint where “[o]n the face of the complaint, the Court [was] unable to determine whether a 

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“Swellable Packer” comprises the entire claimed system or is simply a component of the allegedly 

infringing system”). 

Mobile Health’s complaint also fails to state a claim for indirect infringement. “To state a 

claim for induced infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly support the assertion that 

the defendant specifically intended a third party to directly infringe the plaintiff’s patent and knew 

that the third party’s acts constituted infringement.” Ruby Sands, 2016 WL 3542430, at *3. And 

“[t]o state a claim for contributory infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly support 

the assertion that there was (1) an act of direct infringement; (2) that the defendant knew that the 

combination for which its components were especially made was both patented and infringed; and 

(3) the components have no substantial non-infringing use.” Id. Here, although the complaint 

alleges that Apple “has infringed and continues to infringe ... through acts of contributory 

infringement or inducement,” Dkt. 1 [Compl.] ¶ 25, the complaint alleges no facts to plausibly 

support claims for induced or contributory infringement. As an initial matter, the complaint does 

not identify any acts of direct infringement. Moreover, with respect to induced infringement, the 

complaint alleges no facts to plausibly support the assertion that Apple specifically intended a third 

party to directly infringe the plaintiff’s patent and knew that the third party’s acts constituted 

infringement. See NorthStar Sys. LLC v. Volkswagen AG, 2023 WL 5723648, at *3 (E.D. Tex. 

Sept. 5, 2023) (plaintiff “has inadequately pled indirect infringement” where plaintiff “has not 

sufficiently pled that [defendant] has caused or encouraged infringing activity”); Core Wireless 

Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 2015 WL 4910427, at *1, *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2015) (adopting 

report and recommendation and dismissing induced infringement claims where complaint failed 

to allege any facts “that Apple had the specific intent to induce its customer’s actions, and 

knowledge that those actions amounted to infringement”). With respect to contributory 

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21 

infringement, the complaint does not allege that Apple “knew that the combination for which its 

components were especially made was both patented and infringed” or that “the components have 

‘no substantial non-infringing uses.’” See id., at *1, *5 (adopting report and recommendation and 

dismissing contributory infringement claims where complaint “is devoid of any facts from which 

the Court can plausibly infer that any components of the products being sold have ‘no substantial 

non-infringing uses’”). 

Mobile Health’s complaint should therefore be dismissed for failing to plead infringement.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Apple’s motion to dismiss should be granted. 

DATED: March 18, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

 

By: /s/ Sarah R. Frazier 

Sarah R. Frazier (pro hac vice)

Sarah B. Petty (pro hac vice) 

Courtney C. Merrill (pro hac vice) 

sarah.frazier@wilmerhale.com

sarah.petty@wilmerhale.com

courtney.merrill@wilmerhale.com

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

 HALE AND DORR LLP

60 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

Telephone: (617) 526-6000

Facsimile: (617) 526-5000

Mark D. Selwyn (pro hac vice) 

Joseph F. Haag (pro hac vice) 

Thomas G. Sprankling (pro hac vice) 

Jungyeon Kim (pro hac vice) 

mark.selwyn@wilmerhale.com

joseph.haag@wilmerhale.com

thomas.sprankling@wilmerhale.com 

john.kim@wilmerhale.com

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

Case 2:24-cv-00014-JRG Document 17 Filed 03/18/24 Page 26 of 29 PageID #: 165
22

2600 El Camino Real, Suite 400

Palo Alto, CA 94306

Telephone: (650) 858-6000

Facsimile: (650) 858-6100

Steven Horn (pro hac vice)

steven.horn@wilmerhale.com 

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

 HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

Telephone: (202) 663-6000

Facsimile: (202) 663-6363

Vikram Iyer (pro hac vice)

vikram.iyer@wilmerhale.com

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Telephone: (213) 443-5300

Facsimile: (213) 443-5400

Melissa R. Smith

State Bar No. 24001351 

melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

303 South Washington Avenue 

Marshall, TX 75670 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257

Attorneys for Defendant Apple Inc.

Case 2:24-cv-00014-JRG Document 17 Filed 03/18/24 Page 27 of 29 PageID #: 166
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT’S

35 U.S.C. § 101 MOTION PRACTICE ORDER

 The parties agree that prior claim construction is not needed to inform the Court’s 

analysis as to patentability.

 X The parties disagree on whether prior claim construction is not needed to inform 

the Court’s analysis as to patentability. 

By: /s/ Sarah R. Frazier 

Sarah R. Frazier

Case 2:24-cv-00014-JRG Document 17 Filed 03/18/24 Page 28 of 29 PageID #: 167
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the foregoing document was filed electronically and served on all counsel of 

record by the Court’s CM/ECF system on March 18, 2024. 

By: /s/ Melissa R. Smith 

Melissa R. Smith

Case 2:24-cv-00014-JRG Document 17 Filed 03/18/24 Page 29 of 29 PageID #: 168