alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# The Attorney General of Texas
June 16, 1982 MARK WHITE Attorney General
Supreme Court Building P.0. BOX 12546 Austin. TX. 76711. 2548 512/475-2501 Telex 91W674.1367 Telecopier 51214750266
1607 Main St.. Suite 1400 Dall*s. TX. 75M14709 2141742.6944
4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160 El Paso. TX. 79905-2793 9151533-3404
1220 Dallas Ave., Suite 202 liousto”. TX. 770026966 713/6-
806 Broadway. Suite 312 Lubbock. TX. 79401379 80617473236
4309 N. Tenth. Swte 6 McAllen, TX. 76501.,665 51215824547
200 Main Plan. suite 400 San Antonio. TX. 702052797 512n25d191
An Equal Opportwmtyl Affirmative Action Employer HonorableReynaldo S. Cantu. Jr. CriminalDistrictAttorney Cameron County Hall of Justice 974 E. Harrison Street Brownsville,Texas 78520 opinionNo. NW-480 Re: Whether amunicipal regulationis a criminal

DearMr. Cant": You have asked whether a municipal regulation governing inmetered spaces is a criminal law in Texas. parking law

parking
Your office informs us that citations for illegalparking are issued pursuant to city regulations. The:citstdons are attached by city personnel to illegally parked cars and charge their owners with parking in violation of city regulations. The owner arustappear in municipal court to answer to the charge. Brownsville.Tex., Ordinance Code 032-317. You inform us that these parking violations are resolved, as are all other Class C misdemeanors, in Municipal Court throughpayment of a fine -- not renditionof a civil judgment. Under the bifurcated Texas appellate court system, convictions for violation of parking regulations are appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Snell v. State, 518 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Grim. App. - 1975); AshworthV. State, 357 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Crim. App. - 1962)'. The issuance of a parking citation sets lo motion criminal proceedings against an individualwho has parked in violation of the local law. In our opinion, a municipal parking regulation enacted under the city's police power authority constitutes a criminal law. See V.T.C.S. art. 1175. 5516, 18, 34; art. 6701d. 927(a)(l). See Ferally Ex Parte Harrison. 122 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1939); Cityof Austin v. Daniels, 322 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1959). aff'd. 335 S.W.Zd 753; City of Abilene v. Woodlock. 282 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1955) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956); Harperv. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1937,writ ref'd).

?. 1696HonorableReynaldoS. Cantu,Jr. - Page 2 (MW-450)

SUMMARY A municipal parking regulation is a criminal law. Ver trulyy rs. * 

# A&

hARK WH‘ITE Attorney General of Texas JOENW. FAINTER,JR. FirstAssistantAttorney General RIC~ARII

E. GRAY III ExecutiveAssistantAttorney General -

Preparedby SusanL. Garrison AssistantAttorttey General APPROVEU: OPINION COhhITTEE Susan~L.~

Garrison,Chairman Jon Bible Rick Gilpin PatriciaEinojosa Reed Lo&hoof Jim Moellinger BruceYoungblood

P. 1697
# C_2017253EN.01000902.xml

| 4.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 253/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 253/9

---

Reorganisation measures — Decision on a reorganisation measure in respect of Insurance company ‘Nadejda’

(Publication made in accordance with Article 271 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II))

(Publication made in accordance with Article 271 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II))

(2017/C 253/07)

| Insurance undertaking | Insurance company ‘Nadejda’ |
| --- | --- |
| Date, entry into force and nature of decision | Decision on the restriction of the free disposal of assets
  Date: 16.6.2017 |
| Competent authorities | Financial Supervision Commission
  Address: 16 Uzundzhovska Str., floor 3, Sofia 1000, Bulgaria |
| Supervisory authority | Financial Supervision Commission
  Address: 16, Budapeshta str., Sofia 1000, Bulgaria |
| Administrator appointed | Rozalina Gradinarova-Stoyanova
  Address: 999 VETs Simeonovo, Zh.k. Vitosha, Lozenets district, Sofia 1700, Bulgaria |
| Applicable law | Republic of Bulgaria, Article 633, para 2 with regard to Article 587, para 3, point 3 of the Bulgarian Code on Insurance |

Insurance undertaking

Insurance company ‘Nadejda’

Date, entry into force and nature of decision

Decision on the restriction of the free disposal of assets

Date: 16.6.2017

Competent authorities

Financial Supervision Commission

Address: 16 Uzundzhovska Str., floor 3, Sofia 1000, Bulgaria

Supervisory authority

Financial Supervision Commission

Address: 16, Budapeshta str., Sofia 1000, Bulgaria

Administrator appointed

Rozalina Gradinarova-Stoyanova

Address: 999 VETs Simeonovo, Zh.k. Vitosha, Lozenets district, Sofia 1700, Bulgaria

Applicable law

Republic of Bulgaria, Article 633, para 2 with regard to Article 587, para 3, point 3 of the Bulgarian Code on Insurance

---
Orando Ricardo THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA.

No. 19-7530.

Supreme Court of the United States.

March 23, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District denied.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-00-00229-CR

Gerald Mayo, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY, 195TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. F-9402790-SN, HONORABLE JOHN NELMS, JUDGE PRESIDING

In December 1994, appellant Gerald Mayo was placed on deferred adjudication

community supervision after pleading guilty to retaliation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.06

(West Supp. 2001). In March 2000, appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the State’s motion

to adjudicate. The district court revoked supervision and adjudicated appellant guilty. The court

then assessed punishment, enhanced by two previous felony convictions, at imprisonment for

twenty-five years.

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is

frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State,

573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App.
2

1974); Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d

137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant, and appellant

was advised of his right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief

has been filed.

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree that the appeal is

frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the

appeal.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

 

Lee Yeakel

Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Yeakel and Patterson

Affirmed

Filed: February 1, 2001

Do Not Publish
<TABLE> <S> <C>


        <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-QSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>1

<S>                                                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                       JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                         MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                               44,646
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     44,646
<PP&E>                                               18,181
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       6,519,100
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                1,062,449
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             77,852
<OTHER-SE>                                           4,903,651
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         6,519,100
<SALES>                                              40,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     40,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     10,183,238
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   97,500
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (10,143,238)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (10,143,238)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (10,143,238)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (.31)


</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 20-2128

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Columbus Tre Lawrence, also known as Tre, also known as Country Lawrence

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern

 ____________

 Submitted: February 26, 2021

Filed: March 4, 2021 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRASZ, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Columbus Lawrence appeals the sentence the district court1 imposed after he

pled guilty to a firearm offense. His counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed

1The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.
a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the district

court’s application of United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)’s four-level enhancement to Lawrence’s advisory offense level for

possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense (Iowa Code

§ 724.4(1)).

Lawrence argues the district court erred in imposing the enhancement because

the conduct leading to his conviction was the same conduct by which he could be

held accountable under section 724.4(1). As Lawrence acknowledges, this argument

is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Walker, 771 F.3d 449, 452-53 (8th

Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Manning, 786 F.3d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 2015) (“A

panel of this Court is bound by a prior Eighth Circuit decision unless that case is

overruled by the Court sitting en banc.”).

Further, having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75 (1988), we find no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant

counsel’s motion and affirm. 

______________________________

-2-
Ruth TORRES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, Fifth District, et al.

No. 19-5208

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas denied.
Donald J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et al.

No. 18-588.

Supreme Court of the United States.

April 20, 2020

Motion of respondents Martin Jonathan Batalla Vidal, et al. in No. 18-589 for leave to file a supplemental brief after oral argument granted.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

MWAVUA MSHIMBA,

Petitioner

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 406 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 4th day of December, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED. The Motion to Delay Suspension of Driving Privilege is dismissed as moot.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION 

DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROCHE DIABETES CARE, LTD., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 2:23-cv-00585-JRG-RSP 

PATENT CASE 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and 

Failure to State a Claim. 

Having considered the motion, and for good cause shown, the motion is hereby 

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Case 2:23-cv-00585-JRG-RSP Document 21-8 Filed 05/08/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 850
# C_2019162EN.01012801.xml

| 10.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 162/128 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 162/128

---

P8_TA(2018)0062

Accord de coopération et d’assistance administrative mutuelle en matière douanière entre l’Union européenne et la Nouvelle-Zélande ***

Résolution législative du Parlement européen du 13 mars 2018 sur le projet de décision du Conseil relative à la conclusion, au nom de l’Union européenne, de l’accord de coopération et d’assistance administrative mutuelle en matière douanière entre l’Union européenne et la Nouvelle-Zélande (07712/2016 – C8-0237/2017 – 2016/0006(NLE))

(Consent)

(2019/C 162/17)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (07712/2016), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (07712/2016),

| — | having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union and New Zealand on cooperation and mutual administrative assistance in customs matters (07682/2016), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union and New Zealand on cooperation and mutual administrative assistance in customs matters (07682/2016),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 207 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C8-0237/2017), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 207 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C8-0237/2017),

| — | having regard to Rule 99(1) and (4), and Rule 108(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 99(1) and (4), and Rule 108(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A8-0029/2018), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A8-0029/2018),

| 1. | Gives its consent to conclusion of the agreement; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of New Zealand. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---
Brian ANDERSON, petitioner, v. COLORADO.

No. 18-7652.

Supreme Court of the United States

Aug. 23, 2019.

Petition for rehearing denied.










requesting extension:

 



 







 





 



















































Case 2:24-cv-00098-JRG-RSP Document 8 Filed 04/03/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 202
Exhibit Y

Redacted in Entirety

Case 2:24-cv-00021-JRG Document 54-26 Filed 07/18/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 3512
BOSTON FINANCIAL TAX CREDIT FUND VIII, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP









EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boston Financial Tax Credit Fund VIII, a Limited Partnership (the “Fund”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, the Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Fund.








/s/Kenneth J. Cutillo


Kenneth J. Cutillo


Principal Executive Officer and


Principal Financial Officer


Arch Street VIII, Inc., as


General Partner of


Arch Street VIII Limited Partnership, as


General Partner of


Boston Financial Tax Credit Fund VIII,


A Limited Partnership





Date:           August 15, 2011








A signed original of this written statement required by section 906 has been provided to the Fund and will be retained by the Fund and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```
 
 
VIX FUTURES - CBOE FUTURES EXCHANGE                                  Code-1170E1
OPTION AND FUTURES COMBINED POSITIONS AS OF 11/19/13          |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  Long  | Short  |Spreads |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
($1000 X INDEX)                                      OPEN INTEREST:      439,641
COMMITMENTS
 123,411  178,266  102,761  190,268  131,213  416,440  412,240   23,201   27,401

CHANGES FROM 11/12/13 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:     31,917)
   6,737   17,067    5,231   19,846    9,367   31,814   31,665      103      252

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADER
    28.1     40.5     23.4     43.3     29.8     94.7     93.8      5.3      6.2

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:      192)
      53       78       88       35       39      147      162
```

----

Updated November 22, 2013
Mariano ALVAREZ, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6519.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 3, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
**Exhibit 31.1 -  Certification of Chief Executive Officer  -  Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302**

 

I, Mark K. Tonnesen, certify that:

 

| 1. | I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A (“Amendment No. 1”) of Triad Guaranty  Inc.; |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| 3. | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Date:  August 10, 2007

|   | /s/ Mark K. Tonnesen |
|--------|----------------------|

|   | Mark K. Tonnesen |
|--------|------------------|

|   | President and Chief Executive Officer |
|--------|---------------------------------------|
Amendment to Gas Purchase Agreement dated July 1, 2011



 Exhibit 10.21 
 AMENDMENT 
 TO 

GAS PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
 THIS AMENDMENT to that certain Gas Purchase Agreement, dated May 1, 2009 (the “Agreement”) is made and entered into as of July 1, 2011, by and between MidMar Gas LLC, (successor to
Feagan Gathering Company insofar as the Agreement is concerned) (“Buyer”) and Windsor Permian LLC (“Seller”). 
 Recitals 
 WHEREAS, Buyer and Seller are parties to the Agreement covering the
purchase and sale of gas from wells located on the acreage described in Exhibit “A” to the Agreement. 
 WHEREAS, in
consideration of the mutual benefits derived by the parties hereto Buyer and Seller agree as follows: 
 Effective August 1,
2011, Article III., Receipt Point(s), Delivery Point(s) and Delivery Pressure, of the Agreement is hereby amended to include the following provision as Section 3.7: 
 “Seller shall retain title to Seller’s gas and all of its components following delivery of such gas to Buyer at the Receipt Point(s) as defined in Article III herein. Title to the gas, recovered
natural gas liquids and residue gas and all other components shall pass and vest in Buyer at (a) the tailgate of Buyer’s plant where Seller’s gas is processed or (b) such other Delivery Point(s) utilized by Buyer from time to
time in the sale of gas attributable to Seller.” 
 Except as herein amended, the Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect as previously written. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly executed as of the day and
year first written above. 
  

									
	“Buyer”	 		 	“Seller”
			
	MidMar Gas LLC	 		 	Windsor Permian LLC
					
	By:	 	/s/ Mike Feagan	 		 	By:	 	/s/ Travis D. Stice
	Title:	 	Vice President	 		 	Title:	 	President & COO