FILED JULY 31, 2012
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 142874
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICH IGAN and FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.

PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant- Appellant,
v No. 143330
RYAN DeYOUNG and NICOLE L. DeYOUNG, Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Robert P. Young, Jr. Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra2 Defendants,
and
SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS and MARY FREE BED REHABILITATION HOSPITAL,
Intervenors/Cross-Plaintiffs- Appellees,
and
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Intervenor/Cross-DefendantAppellee.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
Z AHRA , J. We granted leave in these cases to addr ess the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicl e that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (commonly known as “PIP benefits”) under the no-fault act, 1 notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP be nefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she “had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably
believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.”

1 MCL 500.3101 et seq

.3 We hold that any person wh o takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code 2 —including MCL 750.413 and MC L 750.414, informally known as the “joyriding” statutes—has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). 3 We also hold that the use of the phrase “a person” in MCL 500.3113(a) clearly and plainly includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precluding that person from r eceiving PIP be nefits. In reaching this conclusion, we consider an d reject two distinct legal theories that the respective panels of the Court of Appeals applied in concluding that the PIP claimants are not excluded from receiving be nefits by MCL 500.3113(a). In Spectrum Health Hospitals v Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co of Michigan (Docket No. 142874), we examine the “chain of permissive use” theo ry, which the Court of Appeals initially adopted in Bronson Methodist Hospital v Forshee

. 4 This theory arises when a vehicle owner authorizes the vehicle’s use by another person (the intermediate user), who in turn authorizes a third person (the end us er) to use the vehicle. Applying Bronson in Spectrum Health , the Court of Appeals held that, fo r the purposes of MCL 500.3113(a), a vehicle owner is presumed to have allowed the end user to take the vehicle, regardless of

2 MCL 750.1 et seq

. 3 We acknowledge that MCL 5 00.3113(a) may allow a user who has unlawfully taken the vehicle to receive PIP benefits if the user “reasonably belie ved that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” However, becau se no real argument is presented in these cases that the claimants r easonably held these beliefs , we do not address these circumstances, only the meaning of th e phrase “taken unlawfully.”

4 Bronson Methodist Hosp v Forshee , 198 Mich App 617; 499 NW2d 423 (1993).4 whether the owner had expressly forbid den the end user from taking the car. 5 We conclude that Bronson erred by applying a theo ry developed in owne r-liability caselaw to the context of MCL 500.3113(a ) because this caselaw did not address whether the end user of a vehicle violated the Michigan Penal Code, including MCL 750.413 or MCL 750.414, by unlawfully taking a vehicle. Therefore, we overrule Bronson ’s application of the “chain of permissive use” theory as inconsistent with MCL 500.3113(a). To
determine whether the end user in Spectrum Health unlawfully took the vehicle, we consider the undisputed facts of this case: th e vehicle’s owner expre ssly told the end user that he was not allowed to drive the vehicle. Therefore, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the circuit c ourt’s grant of summary disposition to Spectrum Health because MCL 500.3113(a) precludes the cl aimant from receiving PIP benefits in
this case.
In Progressive Marathon In surance Co v DeYoung (Docket No. 143330), we examine the “family joyriding exception” to MCL 500.3113(a). This theory, first
articulated in Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion in Priesman v Meridian Mutual Insurance
Co , 6 involves the unauthorized taking of a pe rson’s motor vehicle by a family member
who did not intend to steal it. Justice L EVIN opined that the Legislature did not intend that a relative’s “joyride” be considered an unlawful taking under MCL 500.3113(a) because, given that most legislators are parents and grandparents, they may have

5 Spectrum Health Hosp s v Farm Bureau Mu t Ins Co of Mich , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued Fe bruary 24, 2011 (Docke t No. 296976), pp 3-4.

6 Priesman v Meridian Mut Ins Co , 441 Mich 60; 490 NW2d 314 (1992).5 experienced children who used a family ve hicle without permission and may have done
so themselves. 7 Thus, he concluded that the Legisl ature did not truly intend to exclude teenagers who joyride in their relatives’ au tomobiles. Because the family-joyriding exception has no basis in th e language of MCL 500.3113( a), we disavow Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion in Priesman and overrule the Court of Appeals decisions applying it: Butterworth Hospital v Farm Bureau Insurance Co , 8 Mester v State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co , 9 Allen v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co , 10 and Roberts v Titan Insurance Co (On Reconsideration)

. 11 Cross-defendants, Progressive Marathon Insurance Company and Citiz ens Insurance Company of America, are entitled to summary disposition because MCL 500.3113(a) excludes th e injured claimant from
coverage. Therefore, in both Spectrum Health (Docket No. 142874) and Progressive (Docket No. 143330), we reverse the ju dgments of the Court of App eals and remand these cases to their respective circuit courts for furthe r proceedings consistent with this opinion.

7 Id . at 67-68.

8 Butterworth Hosp v Farm Bureau Ins Co , 225 Mich App 244; 570 NW2d 304 (1997).

9 Mester v State Farm Mut Ins Co , 235 Mich App 84; 596 NW2d 205 (1999).

10 Allen v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 268 Mich App 342; 708 NW2d 131 (2005).

11 Roberts v Titan Ins Co (On Reconsideration) , 282 Mich App 339, 342; 764 NW2d 304 (2009).6 I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. SPECTRUM HEALTH PIP claimant Craig Smith, Jr. (Craig Jr.), wa s injured in a single-car accident that occurred while he was driving a vehicle owned by his fathe r, Craig Smith, Sr. (Craig Sr.), and insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan. Craig Sr. had forbidden Craig Jr. to operate the vehicle beca use he had no valid dr iver’s license. Craig Jr. acknowledged that he knew he was forbid den to operate the vehicle. Craig Sr. entrusted the vehicle to Craig Jr.’s girlfriend, Kathleen Chirco, to enable Craig Jr. and Kathleen to perform landscaping services. Nevertheless, Craig Sr. instructed Kathleen, in Craig Jr.’s presence, that she was not to allow Craig Jr. to drive it. That night, Craig Jr. began drinking and asked Kathleen for the ke ys to Craig Sr.’s vehicle. Although she initially resisted, Kathleen even tually gave him the keys, and he later crashed the vehicle into a tree. Craig Jr. pleaded no contest to operating while intoxicated causing serious injury, MCL 257.625, and was sentenced to a minimum of 21⁄2 years in prison. Spectrum Health Hospitals, wh ich rendered care to Crai g Jr., brought suit against Farm Bureau to recover payment for those se rvices and subsequently moved for summary disposition. Farm Bureau opposed Spectrum Health’s motion and to ok the position that Craig Jr. was not entitled to PIP benefits becau se the vehicle he was using had been taken unlawfully. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of Spectrum Health, ruling that Kathleen had been empowered to pe rmit Craig Jr. to operate the vehicle. The7 Court of Appeals affirmed, applying th e chain-of-permissive -use theory from Bronson to conclude that Craig Jr. had not taken the vehicle unlawfully. 12 This Court granted Farm Bureau’s appli cation for leave to appeal, requesting the parties to address whether an immediate family member who knows that he or she has been forbidden to drive a vehicle may nevert heless be a permissive user of the vehicle eligible for [PIP] benefits under MCL 500.3113(a) when, contrary to the owner’s prohibition, an intermedia te permissive user grants the [PIP] claimant permission to opera te the accident vehicle. [13]
B. PROGRESSIVE By age 26, Ryan DeYoung had accumula ted three drunk-driving convictions, which resulted in the repeated loss of his valid driver’s license beginning at age 17. Ryan’s wife, Nicole DeYoung , owned and insured the family’s four vehicles with Progressive Marathon Insuran ce Company. Ryan was a name d excluded dr iver on the Progressive policy. As a result, Nicole expressly prohibited Ryan from driving the vehicles, including the 2001 Oldsmobile Bravada that she used as her principal vehicle. On the night of September 17, 2008, Ryan came home intoxicated and without his house key. He banged on th e window of their home. Nicole rose from her bed, admitted him, and, perceiving his intoxicated state, went back to bed. Ryan took the key to the Bravada out of Nicole’s purse and then took the vehicle, contrary to Nicole’s standing instructions and without her permission.

12 Spectrum , unpub op at 3-4.

13 Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich , 490 Mich 869 (2011).8 Within 20 minutes of taking Nicole’s vehicle, Ryan was badly injured in a singlecar accident. He incurred bills of more than $53,000 at Spectrum Health Hospitals and another $232,000 at Ma ry Free Bed Rehabilitation Hospita l. Progressive denied PIP benefits, arguing that Ryan had been injured while using a vehicle that he had unlawfully taken. It commenced a declaratory action against Ryan and Nico le on this basis. Spectrum Health and Mary Free Bed intervened as cross-plai ntiffs to recover payment from Progressive for the outstanding bills. Spectrum Health and Mary Free Bed also
filed a claim with the Mich igan Assigned Claims Facility , which designa ted Citizens Insurance Company of America to respond to Ryan’s clai m. Citizens also denied coverage, and Progressive name d Citizens as a cross-defenda nt in this lawsuit. Progressive moved for summary disposition, contending that at the time of the accident Ryan was using a motor vehicle that he had taken unlawfully and without a
reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so, which precluded hi m from receiving PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a). The circu it court granted summary disposition to both Progressive and Citizens, ruling that although the Court of Appeals decisions recognizing and applying the family-joyriding exception we re binding precedent, none had extended the exception to a case in whic h the family member was a named excluded driver on the underlying no-fault policy. The circuit c ourt concluded that “[t]o further extend the ‘joyriding’ exception so as to overturn excluded driver provisions is to increase the risk in all such policies, and may resu lt in good drivers w ith uninsurable family members (due to excessive risk associated with poor driving records) becomi ng uninsurable themselves.”
The circuit court concluded that it would “ not engage in such rewriting of private
contracts.”9 The Court of Appeals reversed , concluding that it had no alternative but to follow the binding precedent of prior Court of Appe als decisions recogniz ing and applying the family-joyriding exception to the disqualific ation from coverage of MCL 500.3113(a). 14 We granted Spectrum Health and Mary Free Bed’s applic ation for leave to appeal, requesting that the parties address (1) whether an immediate family memb er who knows that he or she has been forbidden to drive a vehicle, and has been named in the no-fault insurance policy applicable to the vehicle as an excluded driver, but who nevertheless operates the vehicle and sust ains personal injury in an accident while doing so, comes with in the so-called “family joyriding exception” to MCL 500.3113(a); and (2) if so, whet her the “family joyriding exception” should be limited or overruled. [15]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW These cases involve the interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). Issues of statutory interpretation are questi ons of law that this Court reviews de novo. 16 In examining MCL 500.3113(a), we must apply our longstanding principles of statutory interpretation: The primary goal of statutory in terpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasona bly be inferred from the statutory language. The first step in that dete rmination is to review the language of the statute itself. Unless statutorily de fined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accord ed its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the wo rds are used. We may consult dictionary definitions to give words their common and ordinary meaning.

14 Progressive Marathon Ins Co v DeYoung , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 24, 20 11 (Docket No. 296502), pp 4-5.

15 Progressive Marathon Ins Co v DeYoung , 490 Mich 869 (2011).

16 Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co , 490 Mich 145, 155; 802 NW2d 281 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).10 When given their common and ordinary meaning, “[t]he words of a statute provide ‘the most reliable ev idence of its intent . . . .’” [17]
A circuit court’s decision on a motion for su mmary disposition is also reviewed de

novo. 18
III. ANALYSIS MCL 500.3113 excludes certain people from entitlement to PIP benefits. It states in relevant part: A person is not entitled to be pa id [PIP] benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed: (a) The person was using a motor vehi cle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the pe rson reasonably belie ved that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.
Each of these cases involves a Court of Appeals decision not to apply the PIP benefits exclusion in MC L 500.3113(a) to the und erlying claimant. In Spectrum Health , the Court of Appeals applied the chain-of -permissive-use theo ry articulated in Bronson 19 to conclude that Craig Jr. was a permissive user of the vehicle notwithstanding the fact that his father had expressly forbi dden him to drive the vehicle. In Progressive , the Court of Appeals applied the family-joyriding exception articulated in Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion in Priesman 20 to conclude that MCL 500.3113(a) did not exclude the claimant

17 Id. at 156-157 (citations omitted).

18 Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

19 Bronson , 198 Mich App at 624-625.

20 Priesman , 441 Mich at 60 (opinion by L EVIN , J.).11 after he took his wife’s vehicle contrary to her standing prohibition. Both of these theories purport to limit application of the phrase “taken unlawfully” in MCL 500.3113(a). In determining the Legislature’s in tended meaning of the phrase “taken unlawfully,” we must accord the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, and we may consult dictionary definitions because th e no-fault act does not define the phrase. 21 The word “unlawful” commonly means “not lawful; contrary to law; illegal,” 22 and the word “take” is commonly understood as “to get in to one’s hands or possession by voluntary
action.” 23 When the words are cons idered together, the plain meaning of the phrase “taken unlawfully” readily em braces a situation in which an individual gains possession of a vehicle contrary to Michigan law. The Michigan Penal Code contains seve ral statutes that prohibit “takings,” including two that prohibit “joyriding,” MC L 750.413 and MCL 750. 414. MCL 750.413 states that “[a]ny person who shall, wilfully and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away . . . any motor vehicle, belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony . . . .” Similarly, MCL 750.414 prov ides in pertinent part that “[a]ny person who

21 Krohn , 490 Mich at 156.

22 Random House Webster’ s College Dictionary (2000). Justice C AVANAGH ’s dissenting opinion claims “there is no indication that it is proper to resort to the Penal Code to give meaning to a specific phrase in the no-fault act.” Post at 6. However, in this context, the term “unlawful” can only refer to the Michigan Pe nal Code, and Justice C AVANAGH tacitly admits this point by opining that th e term “taken unlawfu lly” refers to “car thieves.” Post at 8 (emphasis omitted).

23 Id

.12 takes or uses without authority any motor vehicle without inte nt to steal the same, or who is a party to such unauthorized taking or using, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” 24 Thus, both joyriding statutes make it unlawful to take any motor vehicl e without authority, effectively defining an unlawful taking of a vehicle as that which is unauthorized. 25 Because a taking does not have to be larcenous to be unlawful, the phrase “taken unlawfully” in MCL 500.3113(a) applies to anyone who takes a vehicle without the authority of the owner, regardless of wh ether that person intended to steal it. 26 With this

24 MCL 750.414 contains disjunctive prohibitio ns: it prohibits someone from “tak[ing]” a motor vehicle “without authority” and, altern atively, it prohibits someone from “us[ing]” a motor vehicle “without authority.” Thus, it is possible to violat e MCL 750.414 without unlawfully taking the vehicle and, as a result, not all violations of MCL 750.414 necessarily constitute unlawful takings within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). Nevertheless, a taking that violates MCL 750 .414 qualifies for the exclusion under MCL 500.3113(a) because it is an unlawful taking.

25 The “authority” referred to in the joyriding statutes is obviously the authority of the owner of the vehicle. Accordingly, fo r purposes of MCL 500.3113(a), a vehicle is “unlawfully taken” if it is taken with out the authority of its owner. See Farmers Ins Exch v Young , 489 Mich 909 (2011) (M ARKMAN , J., concurring) (“ [MCL 500.3113(a)] requires a threshold determination that a vehicle was ‘unlawfully taken’ from its owner .”). Therefore, MCL 500.3113(a) does not apply to the lawful owner of a vehicle, even if that person drives it un der a circumstance that renders him or her legally unable to operate a vehicle. However, driving while le gally unable may have implications under MCL 500.3113(a) for a person who has taken a vehicle unlawfully because “as a matter of law, one cannot reasonably believe that he or she is entitled to use a vehicle when the person knows that he or she is unabl e to legally operate the vehicle.” Amerisure Ins Co v Plumb , 282 Mich App 417, 431-4 32; 766 NW2d 878 (2009).

26 Otherwise, it would have be en unnecessary for the Legisl ature to have created an exception that allows an inju red person to recover PIP benefits when he or she “reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” See Priesman , 441 Mich at 76 (G RIFFIN , J., dissenting). Justice H ATHAWAY ’s dissenting opinion claims that this interpretation “precludes a class of injured parties from recovering PIP benefits even when a party was given13 statutory interpretation in mind, we consider seriatim the theories that the two Court of Appeals panels applied in these cases.
A. SPECTRUM HEALTH AND THE “CHAIN OF PERMISSIVE USE” THEORY
In Spectrum Health , the Court of Appeals applied th e “chain of permissive use” theory from Bronson to allow the injured claimant to recover PIP benefits. In Bronson , the injured claimant, Mark Fo rshee, was drinking beer an d taking controlled substances with three friends, Thomas Pefley , William Morrow, and Brian Antles. 27 The group was traveling in a car driven by Pefley and owned by his fathe r, who had expressly indicated that only his son could drive the vehicle a nd who had expressly fo rbidden Forshee from doing so. 28 The police stopped the car and arrested Pefley for violating his probation by carrying a concealed weapon. Pefley yelled from the police car for Morrow to “take the
car home.” 29 When the police left with Pefley, Morrow began driving the car. After taking Antles home, Morrow and Forshee purchas ed a case of beer and continued to use
the car. 30 Morrow later allowed Forshee to drive. 31
permission to take a car by an intermediate user.” Post at 7. This is incorrect because we are only interpreting the phrase “taken unla wfully” in MCL 500.3113 (a). An end user who takes a vehicle without authority can still recover PIP benefits as long as he or she “reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” MCL 500.3113(a).

27 Bronson , 198 Mich App at 620.

28 Id. at 625.

29 Id

. 30 Id

. 31 Id . at 621.14 Later that night, another polic e officer saw the car speeding and signaled the driver to stop. 32 Forshee instead accelerated and a high -speed chase ensued , ending when the car struck an embankment, rico cheted off a metal post, and landed some 50 feet away. 33 Following a bench trial, the circuit court held in part that Forshee was not eligible for nofault benefits because he ha d unlawfully taken the motor ve hicle within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). 34
The Bronson Court reversed and concluded that Forshee was entitled to recover PIP benefits. After observing the lack of caselaw interpreting the “unlawful taking” language in MCL 500.3113(a), the Bronson Court turned for “guidance [to] the decisions
that have construed whether a vehicle was ta ken with consent for purposes of the owner’s liability statute, MCL 257.401.” 35 Specifically, the Court considered this Court’s
decision in Cowan v Strecker 36 and determined that we have “interpreted ‘consent’ broadly” in the context of an owner’s vicarious liability. 37 Bronson then held that an

32 Id . at 620-621.

33 Id . at 621.

34 Id . at 621-622.

35 Id. at 623. MCL 257.401(1) states in part: The owner is not liable unless the mo tor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle is being dr iven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of the inju ry by his or her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or ot her immediate member of the family.

36 Cowan v Strecker , 394 Mich 110, 229 NW2d 302 (1975).

37 Bronson , 198 Mich App at 623.15 owner “‘“consents” to assumption of the risk s attendant upon his surrender of control regardless of admonitions which woul d purport to delimit his consent.’” 38
While Bronson recognized that MCL 500.3113(a) “is not concerned with placing the liability of [sic] the proper party, but, rather, with precluding the receipt of [PIP] benefits by someone who has unlawfully taken an automobile,” 39 it nevertheless adopted
Cowan ’s “broad definition of ‘consent’” as “of equal a pplicability” in the no-fault

context. 40 In applying this broad definition of consent, the Bronson Court observed that
“when an owner loans his vehicle to anothe r, it is foreseeable that the borrower may thereafter lend the vehicle to a third party” a nd concluded that “such further borrowing of the vehicle by the third party is, by implication, with the consent of the owner.” 41 This “unbroken chain of permissive use” renders inapplicable th e “unlawful taking” exclusion of MCL 500.3113(a). 42
We hold that the Bronson Court’s “chain of permissive use” theory is inconsistent with the statutory language of the no -fault act. In articulating its theory, Bronson first
looked to another statutory scheme, the owner’s liability statute, to interpret the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). However, the first step of statutory interpretation is to review the language of the statute at issue, not that of an other statute. Indeed, the relevant phrase in

38 Id. at 624, quoting Cowan , 394 Mich at 115.

39 Bronson , 198 Mich App at 624.

40 Id

. 41 Id . at 625.

42 Id.16 MCL 500.3113(a) that we must interpret, “tak en unlawfully,” does not appear in the owner’s liability statute that Bronson considered analogous. The owner’s liability statute, MCL 257.401, differs from the no-fault act in several important respects. 43 In particular, it explains that the owner “is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge.” 44 The owner’s liability statute, therefore, consid ers not just an owner’s consent but also the owner’s knowledge, which is much broade r than the focus in MCL 500.3113(a) on whether the taking was unlawful. Indeed, th e owner’s liability statute does not speak in terms of lawfulness or unlawfulness. Moreover, MCL 500.3113(a) does not contain language regarding an owner’s “express or implied consent or knowledge” because it examines the legality of the taking from the driver’s perspective—a perspective that the owner’s liability statute lacks. Therefore, MCL 500.3113(a) does not incorporate from

43 MCL 257.401(1) provides: This section shall not be construed to limit the right of a person to bring a civil action for damages for inju ries to either person or property resulting from a violation of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her agent or servan t. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caus ed by the negligent opera tion of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a viol ation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by co mmon law. The owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of the injury by his or her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or other immediate member of the family.

44 Id

.17 the owner’s liability statute th e presumption regarding an ow ner’s consent or knowledge that determines a driver’s statutory vicarious liability. Not only did the Bronson Court err by analogizing the owner’s liability statute to the no-fault act, it erroneously applied this Court’s casel aw interpreting the owner’s liability statute. Cowan indeed articulated a broad concep tion of consent in attempting to interpret the broad language in the owner’s liability statute. 45 However, Bronson ’s complete reliance on Cowan is in conflict with other Michigan Supreme Court precedent discussing a vehicle owner’s vicarious liability. In Fout v Dietz , this Court emphasized that the holding in Cowan provided for an owner’s liability when “the owner had initially given consent to the operation of his motor vehicle by others and then had subsequently sought, unsuccessfully, to place restrictions on that operation.” 46 However, Fout also emphasized that a party may present eviden ce to “rebut[] the common-law presumption that the vehicle in question wa s being operated with the expr ess or implied consent of the
owner” at the time of the accident. 47 Furthermore, in Bieszck v Avis Rent-a-Car System, Inc , this Court held that a rental contract forbidding anyone under age 25 fro m operating the rented vehicle conclusively rebutted the presumption that the 21-year-old driver was operating the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied consent. 48 The Court reiterated that the common law and the

45 Cowan , 394 Mich 110.

46 Fout v Dietz , 401 Mich 403, 406; 258 NW2d 53 (1977) (emphasis added).

47 Id

. 48 Bieszck v Avis Rent-a-Car Sys, Inc , 459 Mich 9; 583 NW2d 691 (1998).18 owner’s liability statute merely presumed that an owner has consen ted to the operation of a vehicle that was voluntarily given to some one else, a presumption that can be rebutted with “‘positive, unequivocal, strong and credib le evidence’” that a particular use was outside the scope of the consent. 49 For all these reasons, we believe that the “chain of permissive use” theory set forth
in Bronson does not faithfully apply the standard articulated in MCL 500.3113(a) to
determine whether the claimant “had taken [the vehicle] unlawfully.” Therefore, we
overrule Bronson to the extent it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). In examining whether a taking is unlawful within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a), it is irrelevant whether the taki ng would have subjecte d the vehicle’s owner to vicarious liability under MCL 257.401. What is relevant to this determination is whether the taking was “with out authority” within the me aning of MCL 750.413 or MCL 750.414. If so, then the taking was “unlawful” within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). 50 In applying this principle of law to the fact s of this case, we c onclude that there is no factual dispute that Craig Sr. gave his consent only to allow Kathleen to use the

49 Id. at 19 (citation omitted).

50 Justice H ATHAWAY ’s dissenting opinion criticizes as “look[ing] outside the text of MCL 500.3113(a),” post at 6, the fact that this opinion considers whether a taking violates the criminal joyriding statutes in determining whether an unlawful taking has occurred within the meaning of MCL 500.31 13(a). This criticism misses the mark because MCL 500.3113(a) specifi cally discusses the taking in terms of whether it was “unlawful,” and our criminal joyriding statutes consider a taking to be unlawful when it is done “without authority.”19 vehicle and, at the same time, expressly inst ructed both Kathleen an d Craig Jr. that Craig
Jr. was not allowed to take and use the vehi cle. Thus, Craig Jr. admitted that he had express knowledge that Craig Sr. did not give him consent to take and use the vehicle. As a result, Craig Jr. took his father’s vehi cle without authority co ntrary to MCL 750.414 and, therefore, took it unlawfully w ithin the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). Spectrum Health argues that Craig Jr. did not unlawfu lly take the vehicle because Kathleen had given him permission to take it. We disagree because a taking does not
have to be forcible to be unlawful. Give n the undisputed fact that Craig Jr. took the vehicle contrary to the express prohibition of the vehicle’s owner (his father), Spectrum Health provides no legal suppor t for its conclusion that Crai g Jr.’s actions did not violate MCL 750.414. Accordingly, the circuit cour t and Court of Appeals erred by granting Spectrum Health’s mo tion for summary disposition becau se MCL 500.3113(a) precludes
PIP benefits in this case. 51 We reverse the lower court ju dgments and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedi ngs consistent with this opinion.
B. PROGRESSIVE AND THE “FAMILY JOYRIDING” EXCEPTION
In Progressive , the Court of Appeals applied th e “family joyriding” exception,
first articulated in Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion in Priesman , 52 to conclude that MCL

51 Spectrum Health is not entitled to summary disposition on the alternative basis of the family-joyriding exception b ecause that exception is also inconsistent with MCL 500.3113(a) for the reasons we explain in part III(B) of this opinion. More over, the same facts that show that Craig Jr. had taken his fa ther’s vehicle unlawfully establish that Craig Jr. could not have reasonably be lieved that he was entitled to take and use the vehicle. Therefore, MCL 500.3113 (a) precludes PIP benefits in this case.

52 Priesman , 441 Mich at 60 (opinion by L EVIN , J.).20 500.3113(a) did not exclude the claimant from receiving PIP benefits for taking his wife’s vehicle contrary to her standing instruction. Priesman involved the motor vehicle accident of the vehicl e owner’s 14-year-old son, Corey, who ha d taken the vehicle without her permission. 53 The mother’s no-fault insure r refused payment pursuant to MCL 500.3113(a), claiming that Core y had unlawfully taken the vehicle. 54 The circuit court granted the insurer’s mo tion for summary disposition, finding no dispute that Corey
had violated MCL 750.414 by taking his mother’s vehicle without permission. 55 The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit cour t, concluding that Corey’s use “was not unlawful under the no-fault act” and stating, “W e cannot say that the Legislature intended that [MCL 500.3113(a)] would apply un der the circumstances of this case.” 56 This Court granted leave to appeal, 57 although no major ity holding resulted regarding the interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). In concl uding that MCL 500.3113(a)

53 Id . at 62.

54 Id

. 55 Id . At that time, MCL 750.414 provided, in relevant par t: “Any person who takes or uses without authority any moto r vehicle without intent to st eal the same, or who shall be a party to such unauthorized taking or using, shall upon c onviction thereof be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” Although MCL 750. 414 was amended by 2002 PA 672, the alterations to the quoted langua ge were not substantive.

56 Priesman v Meridian Mut Ins Co , 185 Mich App 123, 126; 460 NW2d 244 (1990).

57 Priesman v Meridian Mut Ins Co , 439 Mich 867 (1991).21 does not apply to a family me mber’s joyride, Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion first identified other provisions in the no-fa ult act providing for PIP benefits unlimited in amount for every person, including even a person who does not insure a vehicle he owns (except when driving that vehicle) and the spouse and relatives domiciled in the household of the owner of an uninsured vehicle even when driving or riding as a passenger in that uninsured vehicle . . . . [58] The plurality opinion then looked to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA) and explained th at the UMVARA “excepts from coverage a ‘converter’—a person who steals—unless covere d under a no-fault policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household.” 59 While the Legislature substituted “taken unlawfully” for “converts” in the UMVARA, the plurality explained the significance of this substitution as only refl ecting the Legislature’s intent to “except from no-fault coverage thieves wh ile driving stolen vehicles ev en if they or a spouse or relative had purchased no-fault insurance.” 60 The plurality did not believe that the substitution showed the intent to except joyriders from coverage. 61 Rather, the plurality

58 Priesman , 441 Mich at 65 (opinion by L EVIN , J.) (emphasis omitted). Justice B OYLE concurred only in the result of Justice L EVIN ’s opinion.

59 We stress the sequence of the analysis in Priesman to highlight the flawed statutory interpretation that Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion undertook. Rather than reviewing the words of the relevant provision, the opin ion instead based its interpretation on the uniform statutory language that the Legislature had rejected in order to further what it considered to be the general purpose of the no-fault act to aw ard unlimited no-fault benefits to family members of insureds. See id . at 64-66.

60 Id. at 67.

61 Id

.22 believed that the Legislature seemingly intended to “simpli f[y] the complex verbiage of the no-fault exception, and thereby avoi d[] litigation concerning what constitutes ‘conversion,’ a term of art in cr iminal and personal property law.” 62 Thus, the plurality concluded that the legislative decision to s ubstitute the phrase “tak en unlawfully” for the proposed UMVARA term “converts” did not indi cate “any substantial difference in scope or meaning.” 63 The plurality, however, did not specifica lly define the phrase “taken unlawfully” as pertaining exclusively to thieves, but concluded instead that the phrase did not include joyriding teenage family members, stating: We are not persuaded that legisl ators, sitting at a drafting session, concluded that the evil against wh ich the UMVARA exception was aimed was not adequate because it did not co ver teenagers who “j oyride” in their parents’ automobiles, especially auto mobiles covered by no-fault insurance, in the context that countless persons w ould be entitled, under the legislation they were drafting, to no-fault benefits without regard to whether they are obliged to purchase no-fault insurance or, if obliged to insure, do in fact do so. [64] Subsequent Court of Appeals panels interpreted this “fam ily joyriding” exception.
In Butterworth , the Court examined Priesman and MCL 500.3113(a) to determine whether that provision applied to an adu lt family member who did not live with his

62 Id

. 63 Id . The plurality opinion also relied on a secondary source, which interpreted the “Michigan provision [MCL 500.3113(a)] as ex cepting a person injure d in an automobile that he has ‘stolen.’” Id. at 68, citing Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law, § 410, p 422.

64 Priesman , 441 Mich at 68.23 parents. 65 While the Court recognized that “the precedential value of Priesman is . . . somewhat problematic,” the Cour t felt “compelled to follow it.” 66 The panel thus concluded that the unlawful-taking exclusi on in MCL 500.3113(a) “does not apply to cases where the person taking the vehicle unlawfully is a family member doing so without the intent to steal but, instea d, doing so for joyriding purposes.” 67 The panel rejected the insurer’s claim th at the joyriding exception shoul d not extend to a joyrider who had been expressly prohibite d by the owner from driving the vehicle, reasoning that the joyrider’s intent rema ined only to borrow the vehicle, not to steal it. 68 The panel also rejected the insurer’s claim th at the joyriding exception shou ld not extend to users who take a vehicle knowing that th ey are “physically incapable of operating the vehicle safely
and . . . not entitled to be a licensed driver.” 69 Last, the panel rejected the insurer’s claim that the joyriding exception should not extend to adult j oyriders who lived apart from their parents at the time of the accident. The panel concluded that the age of the joyrider had no legal significance given Priesman ’s focus on “the fact that the driver was a family member who merely in tended to joyride.” 70

65 Butterworth , 225 Mich App 244.

66 Id. at 249.

67 Id

. 68 Id . at 249-250.

69 Id . at 250.

70 Id . at 251.24 Later, the Court of Appeals in Mester declined “to extend the Priesman holding to apply to anyone who is merely joyriding.” 71 The panel considered, but ultimately rejected, Judge H OEKSTRA ’s concurring opinion in Butterworth , which had interpreted
Priesman for the broad proposition that “the le gislators intended to except from [PIP] benefits only persons injured while driving a car they intended to steal . . . .” 72 The
Mester panel explained that “the justices of the Supreme Court who recognized a joyriding exception in the Priesman case did so not because j oyriding does not involve an unlawful taking, but only because of special considerations attendant to the joyriding use of a family vehicle by a family member.” 73 In Allen , the Court of Appeals reaffirmed
Mester ’s limitation of the family -joyriding exception to moto r vehicle users who were
related to the owners. 74 Finally, in Roberts , an inebriated 12-ye ar-old, Kyle Roberts, was injured while driving his landlord’s vehicle, which Kyle’s mother had been allowed to use on a regular
basis. 75 Relying on the no-fault act’s definiti on of “owner” in MCL 500.3101 and the Court of Appeals’ previous recognition that “there may be more than one ‘owner’ of a vehicle,” 76 the majority concluded that Kyle’s mo ther was properly considered an owner

71 Mester , 235 Mich App at 88 (emphasis added).

72 Butterworth , 225 Mich App at 253 (H OEKSTRA , J., concurring).

73 Mester , 235 Mich App at 88.

74 Allen , 268 Mich App at 347-348.

75 Roberts , 282 Mich App at 342.

76 Id . at 354-355.25 of the vehicle. As a result, the family-joyriding exceptio n allowed Kyle to claim PIP
benefits. 77 As stated, Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion in Priesman is the only instance in
which this Court addressed the “taken unlawfully” language in MCL 500.3113(a). It is
axiomatic that the first step of statutory interpretation is to review the language of the
statute itself. Yet Priesman relied more on the language of the UMVARA and its commentary to interpret MCL 500 .3113(a) than on the actual text of MCL 500.3113(a) enacted by the Legislature. This Court has previously expressed disapproval of re lying on model acts to interpret existing statutes rather than on the cl ear language of the actual statutes at issue.
In Jarrad v Integon Na tional Insurance Co , 78 we overruled the Court of Appeals’
decision in Spencer v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co , 79 which had interpreted the phrase “other health and acci dent coverage” in MCL 500.3109a by reference to the
UMVARA. In Spencer , the plaintiff was injured in a mo tor vehicle accident during work and sought no-fault benefits. 80 The insurer argued that th e wage-continuation benefits the plaintiff received pursuant to a union agre ement were “other health and accident coverage” under MCL 500.3109a and were th erefore subject to coordination with no-

77 Id

. 78 Jarrad v Integon Nat’l Ins Co , 472 Mich 207; 6 96 NW2d 621 (2005).

79 Spencer v Hartford A ccident & Indemnity Co , 179 Mich App 389; 445 NW2d 520 (1989).

80 Id . at 391.26 fault benefits. 81 The court referred to the counterpart language in the UMVARA and compared it with the statutory text. 82 The model language provi ded that PIP benefits were to be coordinated with “‘loss otherwis e compensated by benefits or advantages a person receives or is unconditionally ent itled to receive from any other specified
source . . . .’” 83 The Court of Appeals also found it “clear from the comments that, under the UMVARA, wage continuatio n benefits pursuant to a union agreement were intended
to be coordinated with no-fau lt benefits otherwise payable.” 84
The Spencer Court held in this regard that [i]nstead of adopting the broader lang uage of the uniform act, . . . the Michigan act was drafted much more narrowly, and limited coordination to “other health and accident coverage.” It appears, therefore, that in enacting the Michigan act the Legislature did no t intend for no-fault benefits to be coordinated with a broad array of ot her benefits which may perhaps be equally duplicative. [85] In response to this holding , this Court emphasized in Jarrad “that a court’s fundamental interpretive obligation is to di scern the legislative intent th at may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.” 86 And we stated that the Spencer Court simply had not analyzed the language of the statute. Rather, Spencer had perfunctorily held that

81 Id . at 395.

82 Id . at 398-399.

83 Id . at 399.

84 Id . at 400.

85 Id

. 86 Jarrad , 472 Mich at 221, citing Koontz v Ameritech Serv, Inc , 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).27 “(1) the statute is narrower than the model provision, and (2) the st atute must therefore produce a different outcome than th e model provision would generate.” 87 We explained that “[a] court may not simply announce th at the text of a statute differs from the language in a model act . . . as an excuse to avoid the court’s duty to interpret the statutory text adopted by the Legislature.” 88 The plurality opinion in Priesman appears to have embraced the erroneous method of statutory interpretation advan ced by the Court of Appeals in Spencer and subsequently rejected by this Court in Jarrad

. 89 Rather than taking the first step of statutory

87 Jarrad , 472 Mich at 222.

88 Id . at 223 (emphasis omitted).

89 Justice C AVANAGH ’s dissenting opinion notes that “thi s Court has previously looked to the UMVARA as a source of guidance in cons truing provisions of the no-fault act.” Post at 4. However, in two of th e cases cited, the language of the UMVARA was the same as the language of the Michigan provi sions under consideration. See MacDonald v State Farm Mut Ins Co , 419 Mich 146, 151; 350 NW2d 233 (1984) (stating that MCL 500.3107(b) is “virtually identical” to the co rresponding provision of the UMVARA), and Thornton v Allstate Ins Co , 425 Mich 643, 657; 391 NW2d 320 (1986) (construing the phrase “arising out of the use of a mo tor vehicle as a moto r vehicle” in MCL 500.3105, which is identical to the corresponding provision in the UMVARA). The third case, Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co , 460 Mich 243; 596 NW2d 574 (1999), is clearly distinguishable. This Court recognized that Michigan common law prohibited an intentional tortfeas or from seeking contribution. Id . at 249. The Legislature enacted a contribution statute, MCL 600.2925a(1), which provided in part that “‘when 2 or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to a person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them . . . .’” Id . at 247. This Court properly concluded that the Legislature did not intend any limitation or proh ibition concerning inten tional tortfeasors. Id . at 250. Indeed, the statute refers to liability “in tort” including “wrongful death,” which obviously may include an intentiona l tort. This Court only noted that MCL 600.2925a(1) “was based upon the model c ontribution act that itself retained the prohibition recognized in our common law . . . .” Id . at 257 n 14. The Court simply pointed out that “[t]he fact that our Legislat ure did not include this restriction in adopting28 interpretation, i.e., examini ng the relevant statute, the Priesman plurality referred to the

its version of the model contribution act is significant to any good-fa ith effort to give meaning to the Legislature’s intent.” Id

. Donajkowski relied on the absence of language in MCL 600.2925a(1) because it differed from the Michigan common-law rule. That the model contribution act included this comm on-law distinction merely supported the Court’s conclusion. Donajkowski is clearly distinguishable because the enacted statutory language at issue here is different from that of the UM VARA, not omitted. More important is that in n one of these cases did this Court find that the model act provides more guidance than th e actual text of the enacted statute. In this case, the language of the relevant statute differs fro m the corresponding provision of the model act, yet Justice C AVANAGH still holds the belief that “‘ the Legislature did not intend any substantial difference in scope or mean ing from the prototypical UMVARA concept excepting thieves from no-fault coverage . . . .’” Post at 5, quoting Priesman , 441 Mich at 67-68. There is a very substantial differe nce between language that excludes only car thieves from receiving PIP benefits and lang uage that excludes a ll persons who have unlawfully taken vehicles fro m receiving PIP benefits. Some 20 years after Priesman , Justice C AVANAGH still seeks to insert into Michigan Law the UMVARA provision that “except[ed] from coverage a ‘converter’—a person who steals—unless covered under a no-fa ult policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household.” Priesman , 441 Mich at 66 (opinion by L EVIN , J.) (emphasis omitted). He ad mits as much by endorsing Priesman ’s attempt to “g[i]ve meaning” to the statute’s language by “consider[ing] the modifications that the Legislature made to the model act that was the starting point for the statute that was eventually enacted.” Post at 3-4. Contrary to Justice C AVANAGH ’s assertion, our “true disagreement with Priesman is [not] that Priesman simply defined the phrase ‘taken unlawfully’ more narrowly than . . . [we] would like.” Post at 5. Our disagreement is that Priesman did not consider the statute as the starting point ; rather, it first considered the UMVARA, then concluded that the Le gislature intended to exclude “only car thieves” from receiving PIP be nefits. Of course, the Legi slature clearly could have readily excluded “only car thie ves” and indeed could have simply adopted the UMVARA language and excluded “converters .” Instead, the Legislatur e decided to except from PIP benefits persons who ha ve “unlawfully taken” the vehicle. Rather than accepting this Legislative decision, Justice C AVANAGH prefers an interpreta tion in which any person can take and use any other person’s vehicle with or without the owner’s permission at any time for whatever reason as lo ng as the person merely inte nds to return the vehicle at some later point in time. This interpretation is not gr ounded in the text of MCL 500.3113(a) and would, in fact, serve to entice uninsured persons to unlawfully take vehicles for joyrides.29 UMVARA and compared the UMVARA—which used the te rm “converter”—to the relevant phrase in MCL 500. 3113(a), “taken unlawfully.” From this difference, the plurality presumed that “[t]he legislativ e purpose, in rejecting the UMVARA language, was thus to except from no-fault coverage thie ves while driving stolen vehicles even if they or a spouse or relativ e had purchased no-fault insura nce, and not necessarily to except joyriders from coverage.” 90 This presumption is en tirely unfounded . The only legislative purpose that can be gleaned from the text of MCL 500.3113(a) is the intent to exclude persons who had unla wfully taken vehicles. We conclude that the family-joyriding ex ception is not support ed by the text of MCL 500.3113(a). Unlike th e plurality opinion in Priesman , our decision is not based on the presumed driving ha bits of legislators or their fa milies, and we certainly will not speculate whether, “sitting at a drafting session,” 91 a majority of legislators collectively decided that family joyriders are entitled to PIP benefits, regardless of any circumstances surrounding the taking of the vehicle. Rather, we simply refer to the statutory text, which provides that [a] person is not entitled to be paid [PIP] benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed: (a) The person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle. [92]

90 Priesman , 441 Mich at 67 (opinion by L EVIN , J.).

91 Id . at 68.

92 MCL 500.3113(a) (emphasis added).30 “If the language of the statute is unambiguo us, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute mu st be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or permitted.” 93 There is absolutely no textual basis to support a family-joyriding exce ption to MCL 500.3113(a). The plurality decision in Priesman demonstrates the ramifica tions of decisions that stray from the statutory text. 94 The plurality decision stra yed by sanctioning a child’s unlawful taking of his parent’s motor vehicle. Butterworth expanded the joyriding exception to include even an adult family member who did not reside in the home of the insured and who had been expressly pr ohibited from taking the vehicle. Mester and Allen reaffirmed the family-joyriding exception, while Roberts expanded the exception to encompass someone who was no t a family member of the vehicle’s title owner, but a family member of someone w ho had received permission to use the vehicle from the title owner. Therefore, we conclude that Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion in Priesman and its progeny—including Butterworth , 95 Mester , 96 Allen , 97 and Roberts 98 —did not apply the plain meaning of MCL 500.3113(a).

93 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward , 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).

94 We disagree with the sweeping proposition in Justice H ATHAWAY ’s dissenting opinion that “the purpose of the no-fa ult act [is] to provide a sour ce and means of recovery to persons injured in auto accidents.” Post at 7. What is commonl y referred to as “the nofault act” for the sake of conveni ence is in fact the no-fault insurance act. The purpose of the act can be derived from its express language. Given th at the express language of MCL 500.3113(a) excludes drivers from receiv ing benefits under these circumstances, it is the exclusion of benefits that effe ctuates the purpose of the no-fault act.

95 Butterworth , 225 Mich App 244.

96 Mester , 235 Mich App 84.31 C. STARE DECISIS AND RETROACTIVITY
Priesman was not a majority opinion of the Court. As a result, the principles of stare decisis do not apply to Priesman : “The clear rule in Mich igan is that a major ity of the Court must agree on a ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases. If there is merely a majo rity for a particular result, then the parties to the case are b ound by the judgment but th e case is not authority beyond the immediate parties.” [99] Thus, Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion Priesman only bound the parties before it and
does not bind this Court’ s decision. Likewise, Butterworth , Mester , Allen , and Roberts are Court of Appeals decisions, and, as such, are not binding precedent in this Court. “‘The general principle is that a deci sion of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, bu t that it never was the law.’” 100 This principle does have an exception: When a
“statute law has received a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and ri ghts acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such contract s may not be invalidated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaired, by a change of construction made by a subsequent decision.” [101]

97 Allen , 268 Mich App 342.

98 Roberts , 282 Mich App 339.

99 People v Sexton , 458 Mich 43, 65; 580 NW 2d 404 (1998), quoting People v Anderson , 389 Mich 155, 170; 205 NW2d 461 (1973).

100 Gentzler v Constantine Village Clerk , 320 Mich 394, 398; 31 NW2d 668 (1948).

101 Id. (citation and emphasis omitted).32 Spectrum Health and Mary Free Bed clai m that this opinio n should only apply prospectively. They maintain that insurance companies set their premiums to reflect the family-joyriding exception and that it is the medical providers and insureds who will suffer the consequences of this opinion. Justice C AVANAGH similarly claims there is an expectation that family members who drive a family vehicle without express permission will be covered. However, it is undisputed th at there is no contractual right to have insurance companies provide PIP bene fits to operators in these cases. 102 Indeed, Ryan DeYoung is a named excluded driver on the po licy purchased from Progressive. In other words, our decision today does not at all affect the parties’ contractual rights, and it is retrospective in its operation.
IV. CONCLUSION Our decision today applies the plain language of MCL 500.3113(a), which excludes from receiving PIP be nefits someone who “was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless th e person reasonably believed
that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” Therefore, any person who ta kes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code—including MCL 750.413 and MC L 750.414, informally known as the

102 See Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 469 Mich 41, 51; 664 NW 2d 776 (2003) (holding that the approach to contractual interpreta tion in which “judges divine the parties’ reasonable expectations and then rewrite the contract accordingly” is “contrary to the bedrock principle of American c ontract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforc e the agreement as written ab sent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in viola tion of law or public policy”); see also Singer v American States Ins , 245 Mich App 370, 381 n 8, 631 NW2d 34 (2001).33 “joyriding” statutes—has taken the vehicl e unlawfully within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). We overrule Bronson ’s “chain of permissive use” theory, which incorporated concepts from the owner’s liability statute, as inconsistent with MCL 500.3113(a). The owner’s liability statute establishes an owne r’s civil liability for injury caused by the negligent operation of his or her vehicle whenever the vehicle was “being driven” with the owner’s “express or implied knowledge or consent.” Because its focus on the unlawful nature of the taking involves the driver’s authority to take the vehicle, MCL 500.3113(a) is not analogous to the owner’s liability statute. Because the legality of the taking does no t turn on whether the driver intended to steal the car, MCL 500.3113(a) applies equa lly to joyriders. Moreover, because MCL 500.3113 refers to “ a person,” the Legislature clearly and plainly intended to exclude from receiving PIP benefits even a relative who took a vehicle unlawfu lly. Therefore, we
disavow Justice L EVIN ’s plurality opinion in Priesman and overrule its Court of Appeals progeny as inconsistent with MCL 500.3113(a). Accordingly, in both Spectrum Health (Docket No. 142874) and Progressive (Docket No. 143330), we reverse the Cour t of Appeals’ judgments and remand these cases to the respective circuit courts for furt her proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Brian K. Zahra Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Mary Beth KellyS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 142874
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICH IGAN and FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.

PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Cross-DefendantAppellant
v No. 143330
RYAN DeYOUNG and NICOLE L. DeYOUNG, Defendants,
and
SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS and MARY FREE BED REHABILITATION HOSPITAL,
Intervenors/Cross-PlaintiffsAppellees,
and2 CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Intervenor/Cross-DefendantAppellee.

C AVANAGH , J. ( dissenting ). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reject the well-established caselaw interpreting the availability of pers onal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under MCL 500.3113(a). Instead, I w ould reaffirm the “chain of permissive use” doctrine as well as the interpretati on of MCL 500.3113(a) from Priesman v Meridian Mut Ins Co , 441 Mich 60; 490 NW2d 314 (19 92). Because the Court of Appeals panels in these cases correctly applied these principles, I would affi rm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in both

cases. Under MCL 500.3113(a), an injured person is barred from recovering PIP benefits if the injured person “was using a motor ve hicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully . . . .” (Emphasis added.) In Priesman , the lead opinion held that the insured’s teenage son, who drove his mothe r’s vehicle without express permission, had not taken the vehicle unlawfully fo r purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Priesman ’s analysis formally became part of Michigan’s case law when it was adopted by the Court of Appeals in Butterworth Hosp v Farm Bureau Ins Co , 225 Mich App 244; 570 NW2d 304 (1997). Thus, in accordance with MCR 7.215(J)(1), 1 the Court of Appeals in Progressive

1 MCR 7.215(J)(1) states, in relevant part: A panel of the Court of Appeal s must follow the rule of law established by a prior published decisi on of the Court of Appeals issued on3 Marathon Ins Co v DeYoung , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 24, 2011 (Docket No . 296592), accurately applied Priesman ’s progeny as binding caselaw to conclude that MCL 500 .3113(a) does not prohibit Ryan DeYoung from recovering PIP benefits. The majority now reverses the Court of Appeals in Progressive and discards
Priesman and its progeny, claiming that Priesman erroneously interpreted MCL 500.3113(a). The majority’s reading of Priesman is flawed, however. To begin with, the majority inaccurately claims that Priesman “stray[ed] from” and is thus entirely divorced from the statutory language in MCL 500.3113(a). Ante at 30. Rather, like the majority opinion in this case, Priesman focused on the requirement th at the vehicle be “taken unlawfully” in order to trigger the exclusion under MCL 500.3113(a).
Priesman gave meaning to this phrase by re viewing the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA). Contrary to the majority’s claims, consideration
of the UMVARA was an entirel y logical approach to determ ining the legislative intent behind MCL 500.3113(a) becaus e, as the lead opinion in Priesman explained, MCL 500.3113(a) was modeled after a provision in the UMVARA. Accord ingly, an obvious method for determining the legislative inte nt behind MCL 500.3113(a) and the plain meaning of the words used was to determine what the Legisl ature intended to accomplish by modifying the language of the model provision from which MCL 500.3113(a) was ultimately crafted. Thus, the majority is incorrect when it implies that Priesman “rel[ied]

or after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special pane l of the Court of Appeals . . . .4 on [a] model act[] . . . rather than the clear la nguage of [the] actual statute at issue.” Ante at 25. Rather, to define the cr itical phrase used in the statute[], Priesman merely considered the modifications that the Legisl ature made to the model act that was the starting point for the statute that was eventually en acted. Notably, Priesman did not break new ground in considering the UMVA RA; indeed, this Court has previously considered the UMVARA as a sour ce of guidance in construi ng provisions of the no-fault act. See, e.g., MacDonald v State Farm Mut Ins Co , 419 Mich 146; 350 NW2d 233 (1984), and Thornton v Allstate Ins Co , 425 Mich 643, 391 NW2d 320 (1986); see, also, Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co , 460 Mich 243, 257 n 14; 596 NW2d 574 (1999) (finding the fact that the Legislature deviat ed from a model act “significant to any goodfaith effort to give meaning to the Legislature’s intent”). 2
Priesman specifically focused on the fact th at the UMVARA “except[ed] from coverage a ‘converter’—a person who steals— unless covered under a no-fault policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household.” Priesman , 441 Mich at 66. Priesman concluded that [t]he legislative purpose, in rejecti ng the UMVARA language, was thus to except from no-fault coverage thieves while driving stolen vehicles even if they or a spouse or relative had pu rchased no-fault insurance, and not necessarily to except j oyriders from coverage. At the same time, the

2 In citing these cases, I do not argue that Priesman ’s consideration of the UMVARA is identical to this Court’s cons ideration of the UMVARA in MacDonald , Thornton , or any other case for that matter. Rather, I merely not e that, contrary to the majority’s apparent belief that model acts are not worthy of any consideration regardless of the role that the model act may have played in the legislative process, this Court ha s previously concluded that, under certain circumstances, model act s are a valid tool in determining the Legislature’s intent. I believe that Priesman aptly explained why it was proper to use the UMVARA as a tool to in terpret MCL 500.3113(a).5 Legislature simplified the complex verb iage of the no-fault exception, and thereby avoided litigation concerning what constitute s “conversion,” a term of art in criminal and personal property law. [ Id. at 67 (emphasis added).] Accordingly, Priesman definitively concluded that the phrase “taken unlawfully” included car thieves but not those who simply drive a vehicle without express permission
and without the intent to steal the vehicle. Priesman also concluded that “in substituting ‘taken unlawfully’ for ‘converts,’ the Legislature did not intend any substantial difference in scope or meaning from the prototypical UMVARA concept excepting thieves from nofault coverage . . . .” Id. at 67-68. 3 In summary, Priesman closely considered the critical phrase within MCL 500.3113(a)—“taken unlawfully”—and merely acted to define that phrase, which the majority admits is not defined in the statute. Moreover, Priesman considered a logical source for that definition, gi ven the legislative process th at created MCL 500.3113(a). Accordingly, it appears that the ma jority’s true disagreement with Priesman is that
Priesman simply defined the phrase “taken unlawfully” more na rrowly than the majority would like. This is not a sufficient justific ation for the majority’s decision to supplant more than 15 years of this state’s jurisprudence.

3 In support of this conclusion, Priesman cited Keeton & Widiss’s treatise on insurance law, which explained that “[e]xclusions from PIP coverage apply to the owner of a vehicle who does not purchase the mandatory coverage an d who is injured in his own vehicle; a person injured in an automobile that he has stolen; and a non-resident who does not have covera ge that has been certif ied by his insurer.” [ Priesman , 441 Mich at 68 n 15, citing Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law, § 410, p 422.]6 The majority also argues that it is prope r to consider the Michigan Penal Code,
MCL 750.1 et seq. , to give meaning to the phrase “tak en unlawfully.” Ironically, this approach runs afoul of the majority’s conclusion that Priesman erred because it considered sources other than the statutory te xt at issue. Other than the majority’s strained exaggeration of its carefully selected dictionary definitions, there is no indication that it is proper to resort to the Penal Code to give meaning to a specific phrase in the nofault act. It is axiomatic, however, that “[w] hen considering the corr ect interpretation, the
statute must be read as a whole” and th at “[i]ndividual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme .” Mich Props, LLC v Meridian Twp , 491 Mich 518, 528; ___ NW2d ___ (2012) (emphasis added, citations omitted). Accordingly, while the majority is apparently compelled by a dictionary to look outside the no-fault act, I am compelled by the canons of statutory interpretation to conclude that Priesman wisely recognized that MCL 500.3113(a) must be considered within the full context of the no-fault act and that Priesman , therefore, correctly concluded that the Legislature’s intent to provide broad accessibility to benefits informed the proper interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). Priesman , 441 Mich at 64-66. 4

4 Although the majority is correct that taking a car with the inte nt to steal is a violation of the Penal Code, the majority un successfully attempts a leap in logic to conclude that the phrase “taken unlawfully” must refer to the Penal Code. In my view, Priesman persuasively explains that when the phrase “taken unlawfully” in MCL 500.3113(a) is considered in the context of the entire no-fault act as the ru les of statutory interpretation require, the Legislature did not intend the broa d meaning that the ma jority imparts on the phrase “taken unlawfully.” Accordingly, the majority is obviously mistaken in concluding that I “tacitly admit[]” that the phrase “t aken unlawfully” in MCL 500.3113(a) “can only refer to the Michigan Penal Code.” Ante at 11 n 22.7 The majority ignores the legislative intent to provi de broad accessibility to benefits by conflating the con cept of providing PIP benefits to a person who made a poor decision with that of endorsin g that person’s conduct. See ante at 28 n 89 (implying that
Priesman condones or encourages a pers on’s decision to joyride). Priesman no more condoned or encouraged this conduct than the no-fault act condones or encourages any other irresponsible conduct that results in an automobile accident. Nevertheless, a person who causes an accident by texting, fiddling with the radio, or simp ly daydreaming while driving is generally entitled to PIP benefits. Accordingly, if the majority truly believes
that Priesman would “serve to entice” joyriders, ante at 28 n 89, the majority must also believe that the no-fault act entices other type s of irresponsible condu ct that is likely to cause automobile accidents. Moreover, I se riously doubt that th e average would-be joyrider pauses to consider the availability of PIP coverage when deciding to go for a spin in another person’s car. The majority also relies heavily on the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Butterworth , 225 Mich App 244, and Mester v State Farm Mut Ins Co , 235 Mich App 84; 596 NW2d 205 (1999), to support its mischa racterization and dismissal of Priesman ’s analysis. Although those opinions reac hed the right result under Priesman ’s analysis, they also improperly interpreted Priesman . Specifically, Butterworth stated that MCL 500.3113(a) “does not apply to cases where the person taking the vehicle unlawfully is a family member doing so without the intent to steal bu t, instead, doing so for joyriding purposes.” Butterworth , 225 Mich App at 249 (emphasis added). Similarly, Mester stated that “the justices of the Supreme Court who re cognized a joyridin g exception in the Priesman case did so not because joyriding does not involve an unlawful taking , but only because of8 special considerations attendant to the joyr iding use of a family vehicle by a family
member.” Mester , 235 Mich App at 88 (emphasis added). Indeed, nowhere in the
Priesman plurality opinion did Justice L EVIN use the phrase “family joyriding exception,”
and Butterworth coined the phrase “‘family memb er’ joyriding exception” by citing
Justice G RIFFIN ’s Priesman dissent rather than Justice L EVIN ’s lead opinion. Butterworth , 225 Mich App at 248.
These statements in Butterworth and Mester are erroneous because Priesman accurately interpreted the phrase “t aken unlawfully” as including only car thieves

. Accordingly, Butterworth and Mester incorrectly concluded that Priesman “exempts” a person who “takes the vehicle unlawfully.” Instead, Priesman held that a vehicle that was driven without express permission does not meet the definition of one that was “taken unlawfully” under MCL 500.3113(a). Moreov er, the majority in Butterworth rejected Judge H OEKSTRA ’s concurring opinion, in wh ich he argued that a person’s familial relationship to the owner of a car is irrelevant when applying Priesman . Judge
H OEKSTRA concluded that nothing in Priesman supported the Butterworth majority’s conclusion; rather, Judge H OEKSTRA determined that Priesman stood for the proposition that “the legislators intended to except fro m [PIP] benefits only persons injured while driving a car they intended to steal . . . .” Butterworth , 225 Mich App at 253 (H OEKSTRA , J., concurring). Judge H OEKSTRA was correct in his interpretation of Priesman ’s holding. Specifically, Priesman expressly stated that “[t]he legislative purpose . . . was thus to except from no-fault coverage thieves while driving stolen vehicles . . . .” Priesman , 441 Mich at 67 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Judge H OEKSTRA accurately concluded that9 Priesman ’s discussion of the family relationship at issue in that case “was merely part of
the factual basis of the case and did not esta blish a limiting paramete r for interpreting the Court’s remaining discussion.” Butterworth , 225 Mich App at 253 (H OEKSTRA , J., concurring). Thus, I would reject Butterworth and Mester to the extent that those opinions are inconsistent with the proper interpretation of Priesman . Additionally, I would clarify this area of law by eliminat ing the misleading label “family joyriding exception .” There is no “exception”; rather, Priesman simply applied the rules of statutory interpretation to give meaning to the phrase “taken unlawfully” as it is used in MCL 500.3113(a). Finally, although the principles of stare decisis do not apply to Priesman because
it is a plurality opinion, it should not go u nnoticed that the Court of Appeals adopted
Priesman ’s holding and those Court of Appeals opinions have been binding law for the
last 15 years. 5 Accordingly, as applied by the Cour t of Appeals, the rule has created an expectation that, at a minimu m, a family member who driv es a family vehicle without express permission would be covered for PIP be nefits. Furthermore, insureds have paid their insurance premiums for the last 15 years with this expectation. 6 The majority may

5 It is also noteworthy that the Legislature has not chosen to modify MCL 500.3113(a) in response to Priesman and its progeny. If the ma jority is correct that Priesman was a grossly inaccurate interpretation of the Legislature’s intent that has caused untold harm, it would seem that the Legisl ature would have acted to vindicate its true intent.

6 It is important to note that although Ryan DeYoung was an excluded driver under the policy at issue in Progressive , that exclusion only applied to tort coverage. Pursuant to the language in the policy its elf, Ryan was not excluded from recovering PIP benefits. Thus, despite the majority’s atte mpt to inject this issue in s upport of its holding, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the excl uded-driver provision is irrelevant. Only the caselaw interpreting the mean ing of “taken unlawfully” in MCL 500.3113(a) governs10 not agree with Priesman ; however, Priesman is nevertheless a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language, and the Court of Appeals caselaw adop ting and applying the
rule is binding law . MCR 7.215(J)(1). Accordingly, in surers and insureds alike have rightfully conformed their conduct in reliance on Priesman ’s progeny. Thus, I believe that although Priesman and its progeny are not entitled to stare decisis consideration, the
reliance interests related to this area of the law are significant, worthy of some consideration, and strongly counsel against departing from the existing state of the law. 7 Accordingly, I see no reason to reject Priesman . I would instead affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Progressive and uphold Priesman ’s interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). Additionally , I agree with Justice H ATHAWAY ’s conclusion that the Court of Appeals in Spectrum Health did not clearly err by hold ing that Craig Smith, Jr.,

whether Ryan is entitled to PIP benefits, which, under Priesman ’s progeny, the Court of Appeals in Progressive correctly concluded that he is.

7 The correction of the Court of Appeals’ misinterpretation of Priesman that I propose would not have the same negative effect th at the majority opini on will have on the reliance interests at issue b ecause insureds would not be denied coverage that was previously provided. Stated differently, despite their erroneous interpretation of Priesman , the previous Court of Appeals opinions nevertheless reached the right result. Furthermore, the majority misinterprets my discussion of the reliance interests related to Priesman and its progeny to the extent that the majority reads my analysis to argue that the majority decision in this case sh ould have prospective effect only. Rather, I discuss the reliance interests at issue to further explain why I disagree with the majority’s decision to discard 15 years of binding caselaw. Sp ecifically, not only do I believe that Priesman is a proper interpretati on of the statute, but because insureds and insurers have relied on that interpretation and conformed their conduct accordingly, I believe any disturbance of those reliance interests is unwarranted.11 did not unlawfully take the vehicle. Thus, I would also affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Spectrum Health

.
Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Diane M. Hathaway (with respect to Progressive only)S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 142874
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICH IGAN and FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.

PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant- Appellant,
v No. 143330
RYAN DeYOUNG and NICOLE L. DeYOUNG, Defendants, and
SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS and MARY FREE BED REHABILITATION HOSPITAL,
Intervenors/Cross-PlaintiffsAppellees,
and2 CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Intervenor/Cross-DefendantAppellee.

H ATHAWAY , J. ( dissenting ). I fully join Justice C AVANAGH ’s dissenting opinion w ith respect to today’s
decision in Progressive Marathon In surance Company v DeYoung . I write separately to address the majority’s decision in Spectrum Health Hospitals v Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan , in which the majority reject s and discards the “chain of permissive use” theory. I am not persuaded that this theory s hould be discarded. It is a
well-reasoned and well-establis hed doctrine that has been part of this state’s jurisprudence for decades.
At issue in Spectrum Health is the proper interpretati on of MCL 500.3113, which provides in pertinent part: A person is not entitled to be pa id [PIP] benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed: (a) The person was using a motor ve hicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the pe rson reasonably belie ved that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle. As the language of the statute provides, MCL 500.3113(a) generally precludes an injured person from recovering personal pr otection insurance (PIP) benefits under a policy associated with a vehicle if that person had taken the vehicle unlawfully. The question before us in Spectrum involves determining whether th e PIP claimant’s taking of the vehicle in question was unlawful under this provision.3 Because the no-fault act doe s not define “taken unlawfu lly,” courts have looked beyond the words of the statute to effectuate th e intent of the Legislature. In giving this phrase meaning, our courts have developed the doctrine known as the chain-ofpermissive-use theory. I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in Spectrum Health 1 because the Court of Appeals properly app lied this theory to the facts before it. The chain-of-permissive-use th eory was first recognized in Bronson Methodist Hospital v Forshee

. 2 In Bronson , the Court of Appeals he ld that a person had not unlawfully taken the car in whic h he was later injured even though he had not been given permission by the owner to use the car. The vehicle owner’s son, Thomas Pefley, was arrested while driving with friends in his fam ily’s car. Given that he was under arrest, he asked one of his friends, Willia m Morrow, to take the car home. Later that night, Morrow let another friend, Mark Forshee, dr ive the car. Forshee was intoxicated and eventually crashed the car after being chased by police. The primary issue in the case was whether Forshee had unlawfully taken the car and was ther efore excluded from recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a). The unanimous panel in Bronson noted that there was no caselaw that specifically defined “taken unlawfully” as that phrase is used in the no-fault act. 3 Accordingly, the
Bronson panel turned to a similar area of la w involving a vehicle owner’s liability.

1 Spectrum Health Hosp s v Farm Bureau Mu t Ins Co of Mich , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 24, 2011 (Docket No. 296976).

2 Bronson Methodist Hosp v Forshee , 198 Mich App 617; 499 NW2d 423 (1993).

3 Id . at 623.4 Specifically, the panel consider ed this Court’s decision in Cowan v Strecker , 4 which involved the taking of a vehicl e with the consent of an inte rmediate user but without the express consent of the owner. While Cowan did not involve the no-fa ult act, it involved a similar statute, MCL 257.4 01, commonly known as the owner’s liability statute.
In Cowan , the owner of the vehicl e loaned it to an acquain tance with the express direction to not let anyone else use it. Ne vertheless, the acquaintance let her son use the car, and he was involved in an accident. This Court determ ined that the owner of the vehicle was liable under the owner’s liability st atute, based on a broad understanding of consent. The Court reasoned that given the owner’s willing surrender of the vehicle to the acquaintance, the owner had consented to th e risks inherent in surrendering control of a vehicle to another, “regardless of adm onitions which would pu rport to delimit his
consent.” 5 Thus, this Court held th at an owner’s consent to an intermediate user included the consent to any subsequent users of the ve hicle, even when the owner set restrictions on the use by the intermediate user. The Court of Appeals in Bronson found this Court’s inte rpretation of the owner’s liability statute persuasive and applied the sa me analysis and reasoning to the unlawfultaking provision contained within the no-fault act. As such, Bronson held that when an owner of a vehicle gives permission to an in termediate user to take the vehicle, the intermediate user then has the authority to gi ve permission to a subsequent user to take

4 Cowan v Strecker , 394 Mich 110; 229 NW2d 302 (1975).

5 Id . at 115.5 that vehicle. Therefore, the subsequent user in Bronson had lawfully taken the vehicle
with the consent of the ow ner under the no-fault act. 6
In Spectrum Health , the Court of Appeals corre ctly applied the chain-ofpermissive-use theory to the facts before it. Plaintiff, Sp ectrum Health Hospitals, seeks
to recover the cost of care th at it provided to Craig Smith Jr. from the insurer of a truck owned by Craig Smith Jr.’s fa ther, Craig Smith Sr. Craig Sr.’s truck was insured by
defendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michig an. Farm Bureau claims that Craig Jr. is excluded from coverage un der MCL 500.3113(a) because he had taken his father’s truck unlawfully. Craig Sr. had loaned the truck to Craig Jr.’s girlfriend with instructions not to let Craig Jr. drive it. However, Craig Jr.’s girl friend did allow him to drive it, and he was involved in an accide nt. Spectrum Health treated Craig Jr. and brought the instant suit to recover PIP benefits associated with his care. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that Cr aig Jr. was not excluded from coverage under the chain-of-permissive-use theo ry because Craig Sr. had turn ed control of the truck over to Craig Jr.’s girlfriend, and she in turn gave Craig Jr. permission to use the truck. The majority’s decision overrules the Court of Appeals and discards the well-established chain-of-permiss ive-use theory. I disagree with the majority because th e Court of Appeals correctly applied
Bronson and the chain-of-permissiv e-use theory based on Cowan . I find that the Bronson analysis was a well-reasoned inte rpretation of the phrase “taken unlawfully” in its context within MCL 500.3113(a). It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended “taken

6 Bronson , 198 Mich App at 625.6 unlawfully” to be applied in terms of c onsent of the owner, and this Court in Cowan properly defined what the consent of an ow ner includes. The majority’s opinion simply substitutes its own definition of “taken unlawf ully” for the well-established definition set
forth in Bronson. However, the definition in Bronson was consistent with the policy of this state under the no-fault act that “‘pers ons who suffer loss due to the tragedy of
automobile accidents in this state shall ha ve a source and a means of recovery.’” 7 Unfortunately, the majority’s new definition strays from this policy when there is no compelling reason to do so. The majority criticizes Bronson for looking outside the text of the no-fault act in
order to determine the meani ng of “taken unlawfully.” Th e majority expresses concern
that Bronson relied on the meaning of an owner’s “consent,” a term found on ly in one unrelated provision of the no-fault act. See MCL 500.3116(3). However, the majority uses the same approach in reaching its definiti on of “taken unlawfully .” Specifically, the majority looks outside the text of MCL 500 .3113(a) and relies on the word “authority,” which is also found only in one unrelated provision of the no-fault act. See MCL 500.3104(1). In its search fo r the meaning of “taken unlawf ully,” the majority looks to the dictionary for the definitions of “unl awful” and “take.” From the dictionary definitions, the majority concludes that “taken unlawfully” refers to a criminal act. Then, just as the panel did in Bronson , the majority seeks guidan ce from a statute governing another area of law, and it turns to MCL 750. 414, a statute that places criminal liability on a person who “takes or uses without authority any motor ve hicle without intent to steal

7 Coburn v Fox , 425 Mich 300, 311 n 3; 389 NW2d 424 (1 986) (citation omitted).7 the same . . . .” The majority focuses on the word “authority” in the criminal statute despite the fact that “authority” is not found in the relevant provisio n of the no-fault act. It then concludes that if a person takes a ve hicle against the express wishes of the owner, he or she has taken the vehicle without the owner’s “authority” and has done so unlawfully under the no -fault act. Thus, like Bronson ’s reliance on “consent” from the owner’s liability statute, the majority relies on an owner’s “authority” under another area of law. Given that the majority engages in the same “outside the text of the statute” analysis, its criticisms of Bronson fall flat. I disagree with the majority’s interp retation of “taken unlawfully.” Its interpretation precludes a class of injured parties from recoveri ng PIP benefits even when a party was given permission to take a car by an intermed iate user. The Bronson interpretation is the better interpretation becau se it was more consistent with the purpose of the no-fault act to provide a source and m eans of recovery to persons injured in auto accidents. The majority’s interpretation conflic ts with that purpose. Moreover, the idea that the consent of an owner can be passed down though a chain of permissive users is well established in the law, and I se e no reason to depart from it. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I w ould affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Spectrum Health because it correctly applied the well-reasoned and wellestablished chain-of-permissive-use theory.

Diane M. Hathaway Marilyn Kelly