Filed 11/3/21 In re I.S. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re I.S., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.S., et al.

Defendants and Appellants.

 D078887

 (Super. Ct. No. J518904)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Affirmed.

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Appellant L.S.

Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Appellant I.S.

Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy
2

County Counsel, and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

In this juvenile dependency proceeding involving her seven-year-old 

son I.S., L.S. (Mother) appeals an order made at a combined six- and 12-

month review hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 

366.21.1 At that hearing, the court determined there was a substantial risk 

of detriment to I.S. if he was returned to Mother’s care and that the 

reunification services provided to Mother were reasonable. On appeal, 

Mother and I.S. contend that the juvenile court erred in not returning I.S. to 

her care because its finding of substantial risk of detriment was not 

supported by substantial evidence. I.S. also challenges the court’s reasonable 

services finding, specifically focused on the failure of the San Diego County 

Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) to provide Applied Behavioral 

Analysis (ABA) services. Mother and I.S. join in each other’s arguments. 

Granting the appropriate deference, we conclude the juvenile court did 

not err in making its rulings. Although the Agency’s efforts to enroll I.S. in 

ABA services were met with repeated delays, the evidence demonstrates that 

many of the impediments were beyond the control of the Agency and 

prevented I.S. from beginning ABA services until shortly before the review 

hearing. Without those services, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that 

Mother was not ready to resume custody of I.S. Although the circumstances 

of this case are far from ideal, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

findings. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

In February 2020, the Agency petitioned the juvenile court under 

section 300, subdivision (a), on behalf of I.S., who was five years old at the 

time. The petition alleged that Mother physically abused I.S., causing 

substantial bruising. In the detention report, the Agency explained it 

received a report that I.S. returned to school with marks on his side after 

being absent for three days. When questioned, I.S. disclosed that Mother hit 

him with a rope. A child abuse expert examined his injuries and concluded 

they were indicative of physical abuse. The report also discussed prior 

incidents where it was claimed that Mother physically abused I.S. The 

current petition was the third dependency proceeding for I.S.; he had been

returned to Mother’s care after each of the prior two proceedings. When 

interviewed, Mother denied that she ever physically abused I.S. 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found the Agency had made 

a prima facie showing that I.S. was a person described by section 300, 

subdivision (a), and ordered him detained. The court directed that services 

be provided and allowed for supervised visits. 

In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the Agency noted that Mother 

had been diagnosed with a mild developmental disability, I.S. had reportedly 

been diagnosed with autism, and both Mother and I.S. were clients of the San 

2 Mother previously appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and 

disposition orders, which this court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. (In 

re I.S. (Jan. 26, 2021, D077949) [nonpub. opn.].) The factual and procedural 

history of this proceeding through the disposition hearing are detailed in that 

opinion and we focus our discussion on the background relevant to the issues 

raised on appeal.
4

Diego Regional Center.3 In March 2020, the Agency provided referrals for 

Mother to receive a transit pass, attend a child abuse group, and take part in 

parenting education. Mother was already receiving independent living 

services and participating in individual therapy. 

In an addendum report, the Agency explained that a social worker 

spoke with a Regional Center worker regarding “ABA services” for I.S. in 

which Mother would also participate. ABA, or Applied Behavioral Analysis, 

focuses on providing techniques to help address extreme behaviors. It was 

hoped that ABA services would assist Mother in working with I.S. to avoid 

extreme behaviors and to set daily routines. 

Mother was in the process of being transferred to another Regional 

Center counselor and the Agency’s social worker intended to follow up once 

the new counselor was assigned. The initial case plan included goals for 

Mother to participate in Child and Family Team (CFT) meetings, work with 

the Regional Center to enhance Mother’s parenting skills, and complete a 

parenting education program. 

In July 2020, the Agency sought approval from the court to provide 

psychotropic medication to I.S. In a report, a psychiatrist explained that due 

to “oppositional and aggressive behaviors” associated with I.S.’s autism 

diagnosis, he was at risk of losing his current foster home placement. The

court granted the request despite Mother’s opposition. 

At a status hearing in August 2020, minor’s counsel expressed concern 

that I.S. had not started ABA services due to an issue with insurance 

coverage and had also not been seeing a therapist. A social worker responded 

3 The Regional Center is a non-profit agency, funded and regulated by 

the state, tasked with providing services to persons diagnosed with 

developmental disabilities. (See People v. Cuevas (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 94, 

104, fn. 9.)
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that due to I.S.’s autism diagnosis, regular therapy was not appropriate and

he had been referred for specialized therapy. The Agency had been working 

on beginning ABA services, but I.S.’s current insurance denied coverage. The 

social worker informed the court that she was continuing to work on securing 

ABA services, but that the case was being reassigned to a new social worker 

soon. 

In a September 2020 addendum report, the social worker detailed the 

repeated attempts to work with the Regional Center to secure ABA services. 

The newly-assigned social worker was still waiting for confirmation from the 

Regional Center regarding funding for ABA services. 

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the social worker reported

that child welfare services could pay directly for ABA services, which could 

begin before I.S. was returned home. After hearing from the parties, the 

juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition, found the Agency had 

made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for removal of I.S., but that 

there was clear and convincing evidence that I.S. should continue to be 

removed from Mother’s care. The court set a review hearing in six months. 

In advance of the six-month review hearing, the Agency reported I.S. 

was receiving therapeutic services and the Agency had contacted an ABA 

service provider to enroll I.S., but learned there was a waitlist to begin 

services. Part of the delay was caused by I.S.’s current caregiver, who was 

“overwhelmed” and not willing to participate in the ABA assessment. The 

Agency decided to change his placement to ensure ABA services could be 

secured. To begin services, however, I.S. was required to participate in a 30-

day assessment period and there would be additional delay after completion 

of the assessment to secure approval for the proposed services. The social 

worker opined that Mother was currently not able to safely parent I.S. and 
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that initiation of full ABA services would assist Mother to avoid her 

frustration that could lead to physical abuse. I.S. was eventually able to 

begin ABA services in January 2021. 

The assigned social worker testified at a combined six-month and 12-

month review hearing. He stated that when he was assigned this case in 

November 2020, there were several issues preventing I.S. from beginning 

ABA services. In addition to the payment issues, I.S. lacked the paperwork 

necessary to begin receiving the services. The ABA provider received the 

required paperwork in December 2020 or January 2021. Additionally, the 

ABA provider had a staffing shortage that resulted in a waitlist for new 

clients. The social worker considered finding another provider, but the 

current provider was located close to Mother’s residence and would be more 

accessible to Mother given her reliance on public transportation. Additional 

billing issues caused delay between November 2020 and January 2021. 

Mother had also participated in other services and successfully completed all 

components of her case plan other than participating in ABA services. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that 

returning I.S. to Mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment, 

but that there was a substantial probability that I.S. would be returned to 

Mother’s care before the 18-month review hearing. Regarding services, the 

court found that in the six to seven months before the hearing, the Agency 

had provided reasonable services.4 It explained that since the jurisdiction 

hearing in September 2020, the Agency had provided reasonable services 

4 The juvenile court stated that it was making its finding under the 

heightened “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof. The Agency 

contends that the court should have applied a lower standard of proof. 

Although the standard of proof has an effect on our review, we conclude that 

the evidence supports affirmance under either standard.
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individually tailored to I.S. and his Mother. It also noted that in that time 

frame, the social worker identified and overcame the barriers to I.S.’s 

enrollment in ABA services, which was an appropriate “next step” following 

Mother’s completion of her other classes. 

Reviewing the specific details of the Agency’s efforts to secure ABA 

services, the court found that “the Agency did what it needed to do.” 

However, the court explained that if it considered the entire time period since 

I.S. was removed from Mother’s care and the initiation of the proceeding, 

“obviously the Agency dropped the ball. There has been no evidence really 

presented on why that happened. But for several months it does appear as 

though the ABA services and the need for those was being neglected. No one 

was lining that up for several months at a time even if the intention had been 

to stagger the services.” The court concluded that Mother was doing a “great 

job” and set an 18-month review hearing. 

Both Mother and I.S. appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I

Both Mother and I.S. contend the juvenile court erred in not returning 

I.S. to Mother’s care. I.S., joined by Mother, also contends the court erred in 

finding the Agency provided reasonable services. Considering these 

arguments under the proper standard of review, we see no basis for reversal.

We review both the finding of detriment and a reasonable services 

finding for substantial evidence. (V.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 521, 529; Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 

762.) Under this standard of review, “this court must view the evidence in a 

light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all legitimate 

and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. If there is substantial 
8

evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not 

be disturbed.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.); 

see also Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) 

“The purpose of the California dependency system is to protect children 

from harm and to preserve families when safe for the child. (§ 300.2; In re 

Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) The focus during the 

reunification period is to preserve the family whenever possible. [Citation.] 

Until services are terminated, family reunification is the goal and the parent 

is entitled to every presumption in favor of returning the child to parental 

custody. (§§ 366.21, 366.22; [citation].)” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 

202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424 (Tracy J.).)

1. Return to Mother’s Custody 

At the six-month review hearing, the court is required to return a child 

to parent’s care “unless the Agency proves, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that return would create a substantial risk of detriment to the 

child's physical or emotional well-being. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)” (In re Mary B. 

(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1483 (Mary B.).) Viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling, as we must, we conclude 

the court properly found that returning I.S. to Mother’s physical custody 

would create a substantial risk of detriment. 

To meet its burden, the Agency focused on an incident during a visit 

between Mother and I.S. approximately one month before the review hearing. 

At that visit, I.S. had an emotional outburst and, rather than calming I.S., 

Mother walked away and did not return for several minutes, leaving a 

visitation coach to care for I.S. Mother returned and spoke to I.S. in a “ ‘noncalm tone manner’ ” and then left again. After she returned, she became 

upset and called I.S. a “liar” after he stated that Mother hit him. I.S. was
9

hiding under a bench and Mother pulled him out by his arm and accused him 

of making her late for a medical appointment. The Agency cited this visit as 

evidence that Mother, despite her completion of many reunification services, 

was not ready to parent I.S. independently and “needs to continue practicing 

parenting techniques she is learning to manage her frustration with [I.S.].” 

The juvenile court cited this incident as supporting the finding of detriment, 

explaining that Mother was “still learning how to respond to a child having a 

tantrum without using physical discipline.” 

On appeal, Mother and I.S. contend that this incident cannot, standing 

alone, support a finding of detriment. However, this was not an isolated 

incident, and the juvenile court appropriately viewed it within the broader 

context of Mother’s past conduct. (In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 

461.) Given the similarities between the recent incident and Mother’s past 

behavior necessitating repeated dependency proceedings, the juvenile court 

could reasonably conclude that despite Mother’s substantial progress, her 

improvement by the time of the hearing was not sufficient to eliminate the 

conditions that led to I.S.’s removal.

Additionally, although I.S. had begun his initial participation in ABA 

services, the anticipated services had not been fully implemented. As both 

Mother and I.S. recognize in the context of their other contention on appeal, 

ABA services were a central component of the case plan. Thus, the juvenile 

court could reasonably conclude it was not safe to return I.S. to Mother’s care 

until additional progress had been made by fully implementing the ABA 

services.

Mother compares her situation to the circumstances of In re E.D. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 960, in which the Court of Appeal reversed a juvenile court’s 

finding of detriment unsupported by any evidence beyond the court’s general 
10

stated preference that the minor remain in his current placement. (Id. at pp. 

965-966.) But the juvenile court did rely on evidence, specifically Mother’s 

actions at a recent visit and her prior actions, to support its conclusion. 

Another case cited by Mother, Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 

Cal.App.5th 856 (Georgeanne G.), is also distinguishable. In Georgeanne G., 

the court held that a juvenile court may not rely exclusively on a parent’s 

lack of “insight” into the circumstances necessitating the minor’s removal as 

a basis for finding a risk of detriment. (Id. at pp. 868-870.) And because

Mother continued to deny that she ever physically abused I.S., the Agency 

cited this lack of “insight” as a basis for finding a risk of detriment if I.S. was 

returned to her care. But unlike in Georgeanne G., here the juvenile court 

did not rely on this factor in reaching its determination. 

Mother and I.S. point to other evidence in the record supporting the 

conclusion that Mother’s parenting skills had improved due to the great 

strides she made in completing the services included in her case plan. The 

Agency does not dispute that evidence, the juvenile court recognized Mother’s 

progress, and we likewise acknowledge and applaud it. However, under our 

deferential review of the juvenile court’s order, it is not our role to substitute 

our judgment for that of the juvenile court or to reweigh the evidence. (In re 

J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123.) Where, as here, there is sufficient 

evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination, we must conclude that 

the court did not abuse its discretion.

2. Reasonable Services

We similarly conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s finding that the Agency provided reasonable services. Reasonable 

services during the reunification period are statutorily required, though there 

is “no constitutional ‘entitlement’ to these services.” (In re Baby Boy H. 
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(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 475.) The purpose of these services—a critical 

component of the reunification plan—is “to overcome the problem that led to 

removal in the first place.” (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 

Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.)

“At each review hearing, if the child is not returned to the custody of 

his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether 

reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent in overcoming the 

problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the 

child have been offered or provided to the parent . . . . (§ 366.21, subds. (e), 

(f).)” (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 121.) In making its 

determination, the juvenile court considers the appropriateness of services 

offered, the extent to which the agency facilitated utilization of those services, 

and the extent to which the parent availed him or herself of the services 

provided. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) 

“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that 

might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were 

reasonable under the circumstances.” (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 

547.) Reunification services “should be tailored to the particular needs of the 

family.” (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.) The adequacy of the 

plan and the Agency’s efforts must be judged according to the circumstances 

of the particular case. (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.) 

“To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided 

to the parent, ‘the record should show that the supervising agency identified 

the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to 

remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents 

during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist 
12

the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. . . .’ ” (In re A.G.

(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001.) 

I.S. does not contend that the Agency failed to identify the problems 

leading to the loss of custody. The Agency reasonably determined that 

Mother’s inability to safely parent I.S. without allowing her frustration to 

lead to physical abuse necessitated services. Similarly, appellants do not 

dispute that ABA services to address I.S.’s behavior and Mother’s ability to 

respond to that behavior were a reasonable component of the reunification 

case plan. Instead, Mother and I.S. challenge the reasonableness of the 

Agency’s efforts to secure ABA services. 

As the juvenile court recognized, the Agency’s early efforts to enroll I.S. 

encountered obstacles. The record discloses that the Agency first inquired 

about ABA services in April 2020, but then encountered delays. After the 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing in September 2020, at which the court 

ordered the Agency to provide reunification services, the Agency was able to 

locate an ABA service provider by November and I.S. had begun his initial 

assessment with the ABA service provider in January 2021. 

Although the delay in securing services is at best unfortunate and 

perhaps even troubling, the record does not support that the delay was 

necessarily unreasonable given the entire circumstances of the case. The 

record demonstrates that many of the delays in providing ABA services were 

caused by issues beyond the direct control of the Agency, which worked 

diligently in the period after the jurisdiction and disposition hearing to 

overcome the obstacles.

In T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1242, the court 

held that placing a parent on a six- to 12-month waiting list caused an 

unreasonable delay. Here, the Agency located an ABA service provider 
13

within one to two months after the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, and 

I.S. was on a two-month waitlist. Although the delays may have been 

unexpected and ideally would have been overcome sooner, the juvenile court 

is in the best position to understand the practical realities in its own 

jurisdiction and it could appropriately find that the Agency made reasonable 

efforts to overcome the difficulties in providing services to I.S. and Mother. 

(See In re T.W. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 339, 348-349 [“ ‘The effort must be made 

to provide reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in doing so 

or the prospects of success.’ ”].)

I.S. contends that when the Agency learned there was a waitlist to 

obtain ABA services with the identified provider, it should have sought out 

an alternative provider. We cannot say, however, that was the only 

reasonable course of action. The Agency consulted with a Regional Center 

coordinator, who had already explored other provider options for I.S., but 

concluded that it would be beneficial to have a provider in close proximity to 

Mother’s residence to allow her to fully participate. It is significant that the 

Agency intended ABA services would continue after I.S. was reunited with 

Mother and would require multiple sessions a week. Because the Agency was 

unaware of any other ABA services located near Mother, it determined it was 

in I.S.’s best interests to wait for an opening with the identified provider. 

When considering the reasonableness of the services provided by the 

Agency, we must consider the Agency’s actions in the context of the specific 

circumstances presented in each case. (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 547.) Although the circumstances here present a close case, the deferential 

standard of review requires us to uphold the juvenile court’s determination 

that the Agency provided reasonable services to Mother. 
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DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

HALLER, J.