NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1902

___________

TIMOTHY J. FELLOWS,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN LEWISBURG USP

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1:22-cv-01900)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

on August 3, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 9, 2023)

____________________________________
2

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Timothy Fellows, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying his petition pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will summarily affirm.

On February 5, 2021, Fellows received an incident report charging him with refusing a drug/alcohol test in violation of Bureau of Prisons Code 110. In the report, Corrections Officer D. Kane alleged that, on that date, he instructed Fellows to provide a urine 

sample. When Fellows replied that he could not provide a sample at the moment, Kane 

offered Fellows a cup of water (which Fellows refused) and told Fellows that he would be 

back in two hours. Kane returned two hours later, and Fellows was still unwilling or unable 

to provide a sufficient sample. Fellows appeared for a hearing before the Discipline Hearing Office (DHO) on February 18, 2021. After considering the evidence presented, the 

DHO found that the evidence supported a finding that Fellows committed the prohibited 

act of refusing a drug/alcohol test in violation of Bureau of Prisons Code 110. The DHO 

imposed the following sanctions: 41 days’ loss of good-conduct time, 30 days of disciplinary segregation, a monetary fine, and the loss of visiting and commissary privileges for 

six months.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
3

In December 2022, Fellows filed his petition pursuant to § 2241 in the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, arguing that his due process rights 

were violated during the disciplinary proceedings. The District Court denied the petition 

and Fellows filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s

denial of Fellows’s habeas petition de novo. Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 

2011) (per curiam); see also Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam) (explaining that a challenge to a disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of 

good-conduct time credits “is properly brought pursuant to § 2241, as the action could affect the duration of the petitioner’s sentence”). Because Fellows is a federal prisoner challenging the denial of a § 2241 petition, he need not obtain a certificate of appealability to 

proceed. See Reese v. Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2018). We may 

summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 

27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good-conduct time. See Wolff 

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1); Vega v. United 

States, 493 F.3d 310, 317 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007). A disciplinary hearing that may result in the 

loss of good-conduct time must provide certain due process safeguards to a prisoner, including: (1) written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to any hearing, 

(2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense, (3) an opportunity 

to receive assistance from an inmate representative, in some circumstances, and (4) a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. See
4

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–71. Further, the decision must be supported by “some evidence” 

in the record. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985).

We agree with the District Court’s conclusions. Fellows received due process in 

accordance with Wolff: he was provided written notice several days in advance of his DHO 

hearing, the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence, the opportunity to have 

representation, and written reports containing the reasons for the decision.1

Additionally, the DHO’s decision meets the due process requirement of being supported by “some evidence” in the record. The DHO considered the officer’s incident report, Fellows’s statement, the testimony of another inmate, the testimony of the prison’s 

clinical director, and a chain of custody form. While Fellows claimed that he was unable 

to provide a more substantial urine sample due to stress, the presence of staff, and medications that reduced his urine output, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the 

evidence was sufficient to support the DHO’s conclusion. Specifically, the DHO noted 

that Fellows was offered (and declined) a cup of water and was left in his cell with access 

to drinking water for two hours, but he still did not produce an adequate urine sample. 

Additionally, the clinical director testified that Fellows had no medical conditions or medications that would have prevented him from providing a urine sample. And while Fellows 

presented the testimony of another inmate to show that he produced “a little bit” of urine, 

1 Fellows also argues that the prison placed an unfair condition on his administrative appeal. However, in identifying the process due to an inmate, Wolff did not include an administrative appeal, see O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1214–15 (11th Cir. 2011), and 

we therefore conclude that no relief is warranted, see generally Crawford v. Littlejohn, 963 

F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We have been told not to add procedures to Wolff’s list.”).
5

the DHO determined that this testimony also supported the conclusion that Fellows failed 

to produce a sufficient amount of urine for testing. The DHO concluded that the greater 

weight of the evidence supported a finding that Fellows committed the act of refusing to 

provide a urine sample. For these reasons, the DHO’s conclusion is supported by some 

evidence.2 See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56 (explaining that the “some evidence” standard 

“does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence,” and “[i]nstead, the relevant question is 

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 

the disciplinary board”).

Finally, we agree that, to the extent that a loss of good-conduct time credits can 

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, Fellows’s punishment was not excessive in relation to the underlying offense. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). The 

offense of refusing to provide a urine sample is classified as a “greatest severity level” 

offense pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 541.3. Available sanctions include the forfeiture of up to 

100% of non-vested good-conduct time and the disallowance of between 50% and 75% of 

good conduct time credit available for the year (27 to 41 days). See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3

2 To the extent that Fellows argued that he is actually innocent because he was able to 

provide some urine, the District Court correctly noted that the BOP Code 110 prohibited 

“[r]efusing to provide a urine sample,” see 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, and that the relevant BOP 

Program Statement defined “urine sample” as “approximately a full specimen bottle” or 

about two ounces of urine. As the DHO concluded, there was evidence to support that 

Fellows failed to provide enough urine to be considered a “urine sample.” And despite his 

assertions that his medications reduced his urine output and prevented him from providing 

a larger sample, there was some evidence to support the DHO’s conclusion that his medications or medical issues did not prevent him from providing a full sample.
6

(Table 1). The DHO sanctioned Fellows to the loss of 41 days. Given the severity of 

Fellows’s offense, and because the sanctions fall within the applicable range permitted by 

the regulation, we conclude that the punishment here did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See generally United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1145 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that, while the “loss of one thousand days good time credits may at first glance appear 

to be harsh,” it was necessary to demonstrate “the importance of continued good behavior”).

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d 

Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.3

3 Fellows’s “Motion to File a Standard Opening Brief,” ECF No. 9, is denied as presented 

because his opening brief was not yet due. However, we have considered his proposed 

opening briefs, ECF Nos. 10 & 11, which we construe as documents in support of appeal.