DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CHARLES DELMAS ROBERSON,

Appellant,

v.

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF FLORIDA, LLC,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-557

[June 14, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE19-

017272.

Robert L. Sirianni, Jr., of Brownstone, P.A., Winter Park, for appellant. 

Christopher N. Bellows and Lee P. Teichner of Holland & Knight LLP, 

Miami, for appellee.

FORST, J.

Charles Delmas Roberson (“Renter”) appeals from a final summary 

judgment in favor of appellee Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida, LLC

(“Enterprise”). The trial court ruled that there was no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact regarding Renter’s claims against Enterprise for 1) 

making a false police report; 2) false arrest or imprisonment; and 3) 

malicious prosecution. We agree and affirm summary judgment on all 

counts.

Background

In February 2018, Renter rented a vehicle from Enterprise for a 

specified two-week period pursuant to a written agreement, which 

provided the agreement’s terms “cannot be altered by another document 

or oral agreement unless agreed to in writing and signed by Renter and 

Owner.” On the day Renter was to return the vehicle, he called Enterprise

to extend the rental period. Enterprise informed Renter he would need to 

pay for an extension. That same day and in the coming days, Enterprise 

attempted to charge Renter’s credit card, but the charge was declined as 

Renter was over his credit limit. Enterprise told Renter it would not grant 
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an extension without an up-front credit card authorization or other 

authorized form of payment for the extended rental period. Renter 

reported no other source of funds, but nonetheless encouraged Enterprise 

to “force the payment through.”

Despite not paying for an extension, Renter drove the vehicle for an 

additional nine days (“post-agreement term”). Enterprise employees called 

Renter several times during the post-agreement term demanding that he 

return the vehicle. Moreover, Enterprise sent a letter to Renter’s address 

that echoed this repeated demand. The letter stated that Renter’s failure 

to return the vehicle would be evidence of his willful refusal to redeliver 

and Enterprise would report the matter “to the authorities for enforcement 

under Florida law.”

Renter claimed that different Enterprise employees granted extensions 

of various lengths. Renter specifically alleged that towards the end of the 

post-agreement term, he called Enterprise and promised a customer 

service representative he would return the vehicle in one week. Enterprise 

responded that it did not grant an extension of any length, in writing (as 

required by the rental agreement) or otherwise, and that this 

representative was not authorized to extend overdue rentals.

An Enterprise supervisor, who had been in communication with Renter 

during the post-agreement term, testified that, because Enterprise was 

concerned that Renter would not return the vehicle and ultimately pay for 

the additional period, Enterprise followed its procedure for reporting stolen 

vehicles. The supervisor completed an affidavit identifying Renter as the 

individual who last rented the vehicle and the date when the vehicle was 

due back to Enterprise. The supervisor then submitted the affidavit to 

local law enforcement. The affidavit did not request Renter’s arrest.

The following day, while Renter was driving the vehicle, police stopped 

and arrested him pursuant to section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes (2017) 

(“Failure to Redeliver Hired Vehicle”). While a criminal court judge found 

probable cause for the charge, the state attorney declined to prosecute 

Renter.

Renter thereafter sued Enterprise for: 1) making a false police report;

2) false arrest or imprisonment; and 3) malicious prosecution. Enterprise 

moved for summary judgment. During the hearing on Enterprise’s motion,

Renter admitted the following: he breached the rental agreement;

Enterprise “just wanted the vehicle back”; and after Enterprise recovered 

the vehicle, Enterprise did not pursue the matter with police.

As the trial court delivered its ruling granting Enterprise’s summary 

judgment motion, the court acknowledged Enterprise’s exhaustive efforts 
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to recover the vehicle from Renter voluntarily before resorting to police 

involvement. The trial court described Enterprise’s actions as a “textbook 

layout of what a rental car company is supposed to do under the 

circumstances here.” This appeal followed.

Analysis

We review the trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Palm Beach Mall, LLC, 177 So. 3d 37, 45 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2015). The trial court shall grant summary judgment where 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Constr. Consulting, Inc. v. Dist. 

Bd. of Trs. of Broward Coll., 347 So. 3d 14, 21–22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) 

(quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)).

Qualified Privilege

“[The Florida Supreme] Court and others have long recognized that a 

judicially created qualified privilege exists in regard to injuries resulting 

from malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, defamation, and 

slander.” Valladares v. Bank of Am. Corp., 197 So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla. 2016). 

“This qualified privilege for mistaken, but good faith reports of suspected 

criminal activity is rooted in a public policy concern.” Id. at 10. 

[U]nder Florida law a private citizen may not be held liable in 

tort where [the citizen] neither actually detained another nor 

instigated the other’s arrest by law enforcement officers. If the 

private citizen makes an honest, good faith mistake in 

reporting an incident, the mere fact that [the citizen’s]

communication to an officer may have caused the victim’s 

arrest does not make [the citizen] liable when [the citizen] did 

not in fact request any detention.

Pokorny v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678, 682 (Fla. 

1980).

“Merely providing information to the authorities that a violation of law 

occurred is not sufficient to support an action for false arrest.” Harris v.

Kearney, 786 So. 2d 1222, 1225–26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (submission of 

affidavit to state attorney’s office asserting that defendant engaged in 

public assistance fraud did not instigate or directly procure defendant’s 

arrest); see also Harder v. Edwards, 174 So. 3d 524, 531–32 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2015) (store investigator who submitted affidavit and potential evidence of 

crime to investigating detective was entitled to final judgment; “merely 
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providing information to law enforcement cannot give rise to liability for 

false imprisonment”).

Here, Renter was aware that his rental term had ended, Enterprise did 

not receive payment for any additional time, and Renter continued to drive 

the vehicle over Enterprise’s repeated demand that he return it. Despite 

this awareness of Enterprise’s exhaustive efforts to recover the vehicle 

from him, Renter expressed his intent to deprive Enterprise of possession 

for an additional week. These events transpired before the Enterprise

supervisor completed the affidavit identifying Renter that ultimately 

resulted in Renter’s arrest. We note Renter’s concession that Enterprise 

“just wanted the vehicle back” supports Enterprise’s contention regarding 

its motive in reporting Renter to law enforcement.

This summation of undisputed facts leads us to agree with the trial 

court’s assessment of Enterprise’s actions as a “textbook” example of how 

a rental car company should act under the circumstances. Renter was 

given ample opportunity to either pay for an extension of the rental or 

return the vehicle and avoid arrest. Accordingly, Enterprise’s actions, 

specifically that of its supervisor in submitting the affidavit, did not 

instigate Renter’s arrest. See Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 682 (“[A] private 

citizen, making an honest, good faith effort in reporting an incident, cannot 

be held liable in a case based upon false imprisonment or malicious 

prosecution unless it further appears that the defendant was personally 

involved in detaining the victim.”).

Because we determine that Enterprise had grounds to report Renter for 

his refusal to return the vehicle, we decline to engage in any further 

discussion of false or negligent reporting. Cf. Valladares, 197 So. 3d at 11 

(holding that “a cause of action for negligent reporting arises when there 

is incorrect reporting plus conduct on the part of the reporting party that 

rises to the level of punitive conduct” (emphasis added)).

Probable Cause

We comment on probable cause because its presence here also defeats 

Renter’s false arrest or imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims. 

See, e.g., Alvarez-Mena v. Miami-Dade County, 305 So. 3d 63, 67–68 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2019).

Because Renter dedicates considerable space in the initial brief to his 

argument that the police had no probable cause to arrest him, citing 

section 812.155, Florida Statutes (2017), we direct him to our holding in

State v. Sampaio, 291 So. 3d 120, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). In both 

Sampaio and the instant case, the arrested party argued the 
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reporting/prosecuting party acted contrary to section 812.155. However, 

here, as in Sampaio, Renter was arrested only pursuant to section 

817.52(3), Florida Statutes (2017), a separate and distinct statute from 

section 812.155. Id. at 124. Thus, as in Sampaio, we reject Renter’s

argument about alleged defects in Enterprise’s communications, including 

its written demand, because section 817.52(3) does not include nor impose 

a notice requirement. Id. Pertinent to both Sampaio and the instant case,

section 817.52(3)’s probable cause focus is whether, at the termination of 

the rental period, the renter, without the consent of the party “letting such 

motor vehicle,” “willfully refuse[s] to redeliver such vehicle as agreed.” §

817.52(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). As detailed above, that was what happened 

here.

Malice

We also find Renter’s argument that Enterprise acted with malice to be

unsupported by the record. Cf. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 

2d 1352, 1357 (Fla. 1994). In Mancusi, our supreme court noted: “In an 

action for malicious prosecution it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove 

actual malice; legal malice is sufficient and may be inferred from, among 

other things, a lack of probable cause, gross negligence, or great 

indifference to persons, property, or the rights of others.” Id. The court 

then determined that Alamo’s request for a directed verdict on the issue of 

malice was appropriately denied because “the issue of probable cause is 

in dispute and Mancusi produced evidence from which a jury could infer 

that Alamo’s employees intentionally provided false information to 

authorities.” Id.

Even if we were to assume that the police lacked probable cause to 

arrest Renter, Renter did not respond with any evidence that Enterprise’s 

employees “intentionally provided false information to authorities.” 

Enterprise resorted to contacting police only after it became apparent that

Renter would not be returning the vehicle voluntarily. Also, as 

acknowledged by Renter, Enterprise “just wanted the vehicle back” and 

elected to not prosecute Renter after recovering it.

Conclusion

Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact on Renter’s 

claims, we affirm the final summary judgment in its entirety.

Affirmed.

GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.
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* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.