# C_2020028EN.01004901.xml

| 27.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 28/49 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/49

---

P8_TA(2018)0257

EU-NATO relations

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO relations (2017/2276(INI))

(2020/C 28/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty of Lisbon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty of Lisbon,

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 28 June and 15 December 2016 and 9 March, 22 June and 15 December 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 28 June and 15 December 2016 and 9 March, 22 June and 15 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 May 2015 and 14 November 2016 on the common security and defence policy, of 6 December 2016 on EU-NATO cooperation, of 6 March, 18 May and 17 July 2017 on the EU Global Strategy, and of 19 June and 5 December 2017 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 May 2015 and 14 November 2016 on the common security and defence policy, of 6 December 2016 on EU-NATO cooperation, of 6 March, 18 May and 17 July 2017 on the EU Global Strategy, and of 19 June and 5 December 2017 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016,

| — | having regard to the document entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the document entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration of 8 July 2016 by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO, to the common set of 42 proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and the progress reports of 14 June and 5 December 2017 on the implementation thereof, and to the new set of 32 proposals endorsed by both Councils on 5 December 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint Declaration of 8 July 2016 by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO, to the common set of 42 proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and the progress reports of 14 June and 5 December 2017 on the implementation thereof, and to the new set of 32 proposals endorsed by both Councils on 5 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the outcome of the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (including defence), held on 13 November 2017 and 6 March 2018, relating specifically to EU-NATO cooperation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the outcome of the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (including defence), held on 13 November 2017 and 6 March 2018, relating specifically to EU-NATO cooperation,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 30 November 2016 to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Defence Action Plan (COM(2016)0950), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 30 November 2016 to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Defence Action Plan (COM(2016)0950),

| — | having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the VP/HR of 10 November 2017 to the European Parliament and the Council on improving military mobility in the European Union (JOIN(2017)0041) and the associated Action Plan presented in March 2018 (JOIN(2018)0005), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the VP/HR of 10 November 2017 to the European Parliament and the Council on improving military mobility in the European Union (JOIN(2017)0041) and the associated Action Plan presented in March 2018 (JOIN(2018)0005),

| — | having regard to the defence package presented by the Commission on 7 June 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the defence package presented by the Commission on 7 June 2017,

| — | having regard to the NATO Secretary-General’s Annual Report 2017, released on 15 March 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the NATO Secretary-General’s Annual Report 2017, released on 15 March 2018,

| — | having regard to NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) Resolution No 439 of 9 October 2017 on closer NATO-EU cooperation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) Resolution No 439 of 9 October 2017 on closer NATO-EU cooperation,

| — | having regard to NATO PA Resolution No 440 of 9 October 2017 on the European defence industrial base, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to NATO PA Resolution No 440 of 9 October 2017 on the European defence industrial base,

| — | having regard to the report of 8 October 2017 of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO PA on NATO-EU cooperation after Warsaw, including its annex contributed by the European Parliament, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of 8 October 2017 of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO PA on NATO-EU cooperation after Warsaw, including its annex contributed by the European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 13 April 2016 on ‘The EU in a changing global environment – a more connected, contested and complex world’ (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 April 2016 on ‘The EU in a changing global environment – a more connected, contested and complex world’ (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union (2),

| — | having regard to its resolutions of 23 November 2016 and 13 December 2017 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolutions of 23 November 2016 and 13 December 2017 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) (3),

| — | having regard to its resolutions of 14 December 2016 and 13 December 2017 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolutions of 14 December 2016 and 13 December 2017 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 on ‘Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty’ (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 on ‘Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty’ (5),

| — | having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0188/2018), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0188/2018),

| A. | whereas our values, such as liberal democracy, multilateralism, human rights, peace, development and the rule of law, on which the EU and the transatlantic bond are founded, as well as the rules-based international system and European unity and cohesion are challenged in an era of geopolitical turbulence and rapid degradation of the strategic environment; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas our values, such as liberal democracy, multilateralism, human rights, peace, development and the rule of law, on which the EU and the transatlantic bond are founded, as well as the rules-based international system and European unity and cohesion are challenged in an era of geopolitical turbulence and rapid degradation of the strategic environment;

| B. | whereas the West’s two major organisations, the EU and NATO, are making progress on enhancing their cooperation in facing complex challenges, risks and threats, both conventional and hybrid, generated by state and non-state actors, coming mainly from the East and the South; whereas the accumulation of crises destabilising the European neighbourhood creates both internal and external security threats; whereas neither organisation has the full range of tools to tackle these security challenges all on its own and each would be better able to address them in cooperation with the other; whereas the EU and NATO are indispensable for ensuring the security of Europe and of their citizens; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the West’s two major organisations, the EU and NATO, are making progress on enhancing their cooperation in facing complex challenges, risks and threats, both conventional and hybrid, generated by state and non-state actors, coming mainly from the East and the South; whereas the accumulation of crises destabilising the European neighbourhood creates both internal and external security threats; whereas neither organisation has the full range of tools to tackle these security challenges all on its own and each would be better able to address them in cooperation with the other; whereas the EU and NATO are indispensable for ensuring the security of Europe and of their citizens;

| C. | whereas EU-NATO cooperation should not be considered a goal in itself but a way to achieve shared security priorities and goals through complementarity of missions and available means; whereas EU Member States and NATO allies have one single set of forces; whereas together they can make efficient use of resources and mobilise more effectively a broad range of existing instruments to respond to security challenges; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas EU-NATO cooperation should not be considered a goal in itself but a way to achieve shared security priorities and goals through complementarity of missions and available means; whereas EU Member States and NATO allies have one single set of forces; whereas together they can make efficient use of resources and mobilise more effectively a broad range of existing instruments to respond to security challenges;

| D. | whereas NATO is a military alliance and the EU is not; whereas the EU is a global strategic actor and a security provider with a unique and wide array of instruments and tools at its disposal to deal with current challenges in a comprehensive manner via its various policies; whereas, according to the objectives of, and in the wake of, the Global Strategy, the EU is enhancing its responsibility for its own security and defence and its role as a partner for international peace and security as well as its ability to act autonomously, while also strengthening its contribution to NATO and fostering closer cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas NATO is a military alliance and the EU is not; whereas the EU is a global strategic actor and a security provider with a unique and wide array of instruments and tools at its disposal to deal with current challenges in a comprehensive manner via its various policies; whereas, according to the objectives of, and in the wake of, the Global Strategy, the EU is enhancing its responsibility for its own security and defence and its role as a partner for international peace and security as well as its ability to act autonomously, while also strengthening its contribution to NATO and fostering closer cooperation;

| E. | whereas NATO has the primary responsibility for the collective defence of its members; whereas it takes note of the NATO guideline for allies to spend 2 % of their GDP on defence within a decade to maintain an appropriate defence capability; whereas NATO, as the key security partner of the EU, remains an essential guarantee of the interoperability of the allied forces’ capabilities and of the coherence of their procurement efforts; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas NATO has the primary responsibility for the collective defence of its members; whereas it takes note of the NATO guideline for allies to spend 2 % of their GDP on defence within a decade to maintain an appropriate defence capability; whereas NATO, as the key security partner of the EU, remains an essential guarantee of the interoperability of the allied forces’ capabilities and of the coherence of their procurement efforts;

| F. | whereas the actions of the EU and NATO should be complementary in the security dimension, to better address new, unprecedented and multifaceted security challenges; whereas common areas between the two organisations also call for closer and more efficient cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the actions of the EU and NATO should be complementary in the security dimension, to better address new, unprecedented and multifaceted security challenges; whereas common areas between the two organisations also call for closer and more efficient cooperation;

| G. | whereas the EU and NATO, both engaged in crisis management, would be more efficient in that activity if they were to act in a truly coordinated manner and make the most of their expertise and resources; whereas, as a follow-up to the EU Global Strategy, the EU is strengthening its joined-up approach to external conflicts and crises as well as responding to threats and challenges along the internal-external security nexus, using civilian or military means; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the EU and NATO, both engaged in crisis management, would be more efficient in that activity if they were to act in a truly coordinated manner and make the most of their expertise and resources; whereas, as a follow-up to the EU Global Strategy, the EU is strengthening its joined-up approach to external conflicts and crises as well as responding to threats and challenges along the internal-external security nexus, using civilian or military means;

| H. | whereas at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, the Alliance and the EU outlined areas for strengthened cooperation in light of common challenges to the east and the south, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security and exercises; whereas 42 measures to advance NATO-EU cooperation in agreed areas were approved by NATO foreign ministers in December 2016 and further areas of joint work were agreed in December 2017; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, the Alliance and the EU outlined areas for strengthened cooperation in light of common challenges to the east and the south, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security and exercises; whereas 42 measures to advance NATO-EU cooperation in agreed areas were approved by NATO foreign ministers in December 2016 and further areas of joint work were agreed in December 2017;

| I. | whereas an EU-NATO partnership is needed to counter hybrid threats, including in countering misinformation and disinformation and bolstering resilience; whereas there needs to be a clear distinction as regards the remit and political strategies of the two institutions; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas an EU-NATO partnership is needed to counter hybrid threats, including in countering misinformation and disinformation and bolstering resilience; whereas there needs to be a clear distinction as regards the remit and political strategies of the two institutions;

| J. | whereas there is an upsurge in Russia’s activities; whereas, while the risk of weakening the transatlantic link and solidarity between the EU Member States persists, their common, strategic approach with regard to Russia needs to be reinforced; whereas both the EU and NATO are concerned by Russia’s more assertive military behaviour; whereas political manipulation and cyberattacks are also causes of concern; whereas the EU has reacted to the Russian interference in European internal affairs violating international law and norms; whereas resilience is, and will continue to be, a key element of collective defence; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas there is an upsurge in Russia’s activities; whereas, while the risk of weakening the transatlantic link and solidarity between the EU Member States persists, their common, strategic approach with regard to Russia needs to be reinforced; whereas both the EU and NATO are concerned by Russia’s more assertive military behaviour; whereas political manipulation and cyberattacks are also causes of concern; whereas the EU has reacted to the Russian interference in European internal affairs violating international law and norms; whereas resilience is, and will continue to be, a key element of collective defence;

| K. | whereas the Southern neighbourhood is facing unprecedented instability and represent a strategically important challenge to both EU Member States and NATO members, especially those located on the front line; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Southern neighbourhood is facing unprecedented instability and represent a strategically important challenge to both EU Member States and NATO members, especially those located on the front line;

| L. | whereas cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly common and sophisticated; whereas in 2014 NATO established cyber defence as part of the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence and in 2016 recognised cyberspace as an operational domain, next to land, air and sea; whereas the EU and NATO can complement each other’s efforts; whereas enhanced cooperation between EU Member States in the area of cybersecurity should be promoted and, in that area, there needs to be a coordinated approach by all EU Member States; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly common and sophisticated; whereas in 2014 NATO established cyber defence as part of the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence and in 2016 recognised cyberspace as an operational domain, next to land, air and sea; whereas the EU and NATO can complement each other’s efforts; whereas enhanced cooperation between EU Member States in the area of cybersecurity should be promoted and, in that area, there needs to be a coordinated approach by all EU Member States;

| M. | whereas in December 2017 NATO and the EU decided to boost their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, primarily by increasing information exchange and improving national resilience; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas in December 2017 NATO and the EU decided to boost their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, primarily by increasing information exchange and improving national resilience;

| N. | whereas both the EU and NATO use the same transport infrastructure in Europe, a key factor in rapid military deployment, and whereas military mobility was recently identified as a priority area of cooperation between the two organisations; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas both the EU and NATO use the same transport infrastructure in Europe, a key factor in rapid military deployment, and whereas military mobility was recently identified as a priority area of cooperation between the two organisations;

| O. | whereas, according to latest polls of the Pew Research Center, public support for NATO is strong and it is rising in most NATO Member States; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas, according to latest polls of the Pew Research Center, public support for NATO is strong and it is rising in most NATO Member States;

A more substantive partnership

| 1. | Is convinced that the EU and NATO share the same values in pursuit of international peace and security, that they face similar strategic challenges and, given their overlapping membership of 22 members, that they have converging security and defence interests, including the protection of their citizens against any threats; considers that the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO is fundamental for addressing these security challenges; underlines that EU-NATO cooperation should be complementary and respectful of each other’s specificities and roles; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Underlines openness and transparency in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations, as well as inclusiveness and reciprocity without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State, as important principles of the EU-NATO strategic partnership; stresses that cooperation with non-NATO EU Member States and non-EU NATO members is an integral part of EU-NATO cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Is convinced that for its members, NATO is the cornerstone of collective defence and deterrence in Europe; is also convinced that a stronger EU with a more effective CSDP, through multiple projects between Member States and capable of honouring the provisions of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, by which Member States can request assistance, contributes to a stronger NATO; underlines the fact that EU-NATO cooperation must also take into account the security and defence policy of those six EU Member States which are not NATO members and of those seven NATO members which are not EU members; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Strongly believes that effective responses to the full spectrum of security challenges require strategic vision, further structural adaptation and a combination of hard and soft power instruments for both the EU and NATO; underlines that time is of the essence for strengthening the EU-NATO partnership, taking into account the differences between both organisations; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Notes that, while a common European strategic culture should be further developed, achieving common threat perception will have a positive impact; is of the view that the Union must work to strengthen its strategic autonomy; encourages the EU Member States therefore to find, in cooperation with the EU institutions, a shared understanding of the evolving threat environment and continue efforts such as joint briefings, civil emergency response training and shared threat assessments; welcomes recent efforts in that direction; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Stresses that European citizens, recognising that purely national responses to terrorism and insecurity are insufficient, expect the EU to protect them from these threats and that close cooperation between the EU and NATO would allow Member States to be more complementary and more effective; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Emphasises the need to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation on missions and operations, at both the strategic and tactical level; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Stresses that the EU-NATO strategic partnership is equally fundamental for the EU’s evolving CSDP and for the future of the Alliance, as well as for EU-UK relations after Brexit; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Considers that the potential of EU-NATO relations can be further exploited and that further development and deepening of the partnership should not be limited to a common response to crises outside Europe, particularly in the neighbourhood, but also to crises on the continent; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Underlines the need for working together on prevention, analysis and early warning by means of effective information sharing aimed at countering emerging threats with common actions; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Considers that the EU-NATO Joint Declaration and the subsequent implementation actions mark a new and substantive phase of the strategic partnership; welcomes the tangible results in the implementation of the Joint Declaration, in particular regarding countering hybrid threats, strategic communications, coherence of output in the respective defence planning processes and maritime cooperation; encourages further progress and welcomes the new set of actions that were added on 5 December 2017, in particular those regarding counter-terrorism, military mobility and women, peace and security; welcomes the change in the culture of engagement and the smooth functioning of staff-to-staff cooperation in the implementation of each action; reiterates that although the process itself is governed by institutions, the success of the implementation of agreed common goals and actions depends on the sustained political will of all Member States; welcomes in this context the engagement also of Members of both the EU and NATO and emphasises that successful implementation of the Joint Declaration depends on the political will of all Member States throughout; considers it important to strengthen a better EU-NATO cooperation and dialogue and to ensure political will and proper resources for continued implementation and further improvement of cooperation; looks forward to a new EU-NATO declaration to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Notes the regular common briefings delivered by the VP/HR and the NATO Secretary-General in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council and NATO’s North-Atlantic Council (NAC), respectively, and continued regular meetings between the EU’s Political and Security Committee and the NAC; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the re-affirmation of US commitment to NATO and European security; recalls the fact that the EU and the United States are key international partners and that this partnership is also asserted through NATO; underlines the value of bilateral relations between EU Member States and the US; strongly believes that strengthening EU-NATO cooperation reinforces the transatlantic bond and that NATO’s ability to fulfil its missions is linked to the transatlantic relationship; notes, therefore, that recent political developments could have an impact on the strength of the transatlantic relationship; notes that the US, which generally encouraged and welcomed the substantive developments in EU defence, should continue efforts for a better understanding of European strategic interests, including the development of European defence capabilities; stresses that the EU’s efforts to achieve strategic autonomy strengthen the Alliance’s security environment; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Welcomes NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in NATO’s Eastern flank; welcomes NATO’s deployment of four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, being led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively; considers that EU-NATO cooperation should be further strengthened on the Eastern and Southern flanks for the security of both organisations and that Russian penetration also into Eastern flank countries, by hybrid or conventional means, should be prevented and countered appropriately; underlines that the current infrastructure in Europe, which is mainly West-East oriented, should be complemented by the development of a new North-South dimension, responding to the requirements for military mobility; stresses that efforts on military mobility should contribute to the effective implementation of CSDP missions and operations and to the Alliance’s defence posture; considers that roads, bridges and railroads should be upgraded so as to allow for the fast deployment of military personnel and equipment; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Emphasises in this regard the importance of improving NATO’s rapid reinforcement capabilities through improving EU and national infrastructure, removing bureaucratic and infrastructural barriers to the swift movement of forces and by pre-positioning military equipment and supplies, which enhances our collective security; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Welcomes the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); stresses its potential to strengthen the European contribution within NATO; believes that it can increase synergies and effectiveness, and that it is a crucial step for improving EU security and defence capabilities as well as the potential performance of the European NATO members, and is convinced that a stronger EU and NATO reinforce each other; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Highlights PESCO’s complementarity to NATO and that it should be a driver for further EU-NATO cooperation in the development of capabilities as it aims to strengthen the EU’s defence capacities and, in general, to make CSDP more effective and relevant for responding to today’s security and military challenges; emphasises the importance of transparency and communication about PESCO to the United States and other NATO members in order to avoid any misconceptions; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Underlines that the next EU-NATO Joint Declaration should insist that the capabilities developed multinationally by EU Member States, including under PESCO, and NATO members be available for both EU and NATO operations; highlights that the recent decisions by the EU (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), PESCO, European Defence Fund (EDF)) aimed at ensuring that Europeans take greater responsibility for their own security contribute to strengthening NATO, as well as ensuring fair transatlantic burden-sharing, while keeping in mind the objective of together addressing common security challenges, avoiding unnecessary duplication and developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities; considers that the development of common standards, procedures, training and exercises should be considered an important enabler for more efficient EU-NATO cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Notes that after Brexit, 80 % of NATO’s defence spending will be non-EU and three out of four battalions in the east will be led by non-EU countries; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Urges the EU and NATO to organise regular strategic level exercises with the participation of the top political leadership of both organisations; welcomes, in this regard, the Estonian exercise EU CYBRID 2017 where, for the first time, the Secretary-General of NATO participated in an EU exercise; |
| --- | --- |

20.

Main areas of cooperation

| 21. | Notes that security threats have become more hybrid and less conventional, and that international cooperation is required to tackle them; calls for the EU and NATO to further build resilience and to develop shared situational awareness of hybrid threats; encourages the EU and NATO to coordinate their crisis response mechanisms in order to provide coherent responses to hybrid threats; welcomes the recent joint inauguration of the Helsinki-based Hybrid Centre of Excellence by the NATO Secretary-General and the VP/HR and encourages EU Member States to create Hybrid Excellence Centres, drawing on the example of the centre in Helsinki; welcomes in this regard the separate but parallel exercises, PACE17 and CMX17, which were held in 2017 and through which EU and NATO staff respectively tested their respective procedures for communicating and sharing information during an unfolding fictitious hybrid threat; applauds the concerted action by Western allies in response to the suspected Russian chemical attack in the UK; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Considers that the forthcoming EU-NATO Joint Declaration should welcome the progress made and call for the practical implementation of all the proposals adopted by both institutions; believes that more efforts are needed with regard to the implementation of the many commitments already made; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Believes, in this context, that the initiatives to strengthen the Europe of Defence should benefit both organisations, thereby enabling EU Member States to strengthen their strategic autonomy and to be able to intervene militarily together in a credible way; recalls that these initiatives are complementary to those of NATO; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Considers it important also to ensure the implementation of the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and full respect of the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, as provided for by the Council conclusions of 5 December 2017; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Welcomes the successful 2017 parallel and coordinated crisis management exercise, which provided a useful platform for sharing best practices; looks forward to examining the lessons learned as well as to continued cooperation on joint exercises between both the EU and NATO, including the EU-led exercise planned in 2018; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Notes that current procedures for sharing classified information between the two organisations remain cumbersome and inefficient; considers that both organisations face similar strategic challenges and, implicitly, will be dealing with the consequences together; believes that – by building mutual trust – cooperation in the exchange of classified information and intelligence analysis must be improved, including in the field of counterterrorism; emphasises that the EU will have to increase its capacity by providing more EU staff with security clearance, dedicated training for working with classified information and by investing in secure communications; is of the opinion that fostering reciprocity and a ‘need-to-share’approach to the exchange of appropriate information would also benefit missions and operations of both organisations; is of the view that the Parallel and Coordinated Intelligence Assessment could be used in fighting hybrid threats more effectively together; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Invites the EU and NATO to enhance their cooperation on strategic communication, including by strengthening the partnership between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the European External Action Service (EEAS) StratCom division; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Welcomes the new EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and its interaction with NATO’s Hybrid Analysis Cell in sharing situational awareness and by exchanging analysis of potential hybrid threats; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Is convinced that cooperation and the exchange and sharing of information are crucial in the area of cybersecurity and recognises the progress that has been made in this area; stresses the need to improve cyber incident prevention, detection and response; invites both organisations to coordinate their monitoring activities and to exchange cyber defence-related data where appropriate, thereby facilitating EU-NATO intelligence efforts; encourages the EU and NATO to enhance their operational cooperation and coordination and to foster interoperability by sharing best practices on means, methods and processes used to attribute cyberattacks; considers the increase of information sharing between the EU and NATO a priority in order to enable the identification of all responsible cyberattack sources and the carrying out of consequent legal actions; considers it important also to harmonise training activities and to cooperate on Research & Technology in the cyber domain; welcomes the arrangement between the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability; believes that within the new mandate frame of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), new activities related to cyber defence cooperation can capture NATO’s interest; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Considers it important to ensure the complementarity and avoid unnecessary duplication of maritime capacity-building efforts in order to safeguard maritime security more efficiently; welcomes increased EU-NATO operational cooperation and coordination, including the sharing of situational awareness based on the experience gained in the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa, thus seeking further opportunities for mutual logistical support and information exchange between the staff of both organisations concerning operational activities, including activities relating to irregular migration; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Welcomes enhanced tactical and operational cooperation, including through direct links between NATO’s Allied Maritime Command and Frontex, as well as between Operation Sea Guardian and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, helping the EU and its missions to stem irregular migration and to counter illegal trafficking networks, including the illegal trafficking of arms; notes that NATO can provide, upon request, logistical support and other capabilities such as re-fuelling at sea and medical support; notes that this follows successful EU-NATO cooperation between Operation Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta in combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Encourages further EU-NATO synergies in the field and further improvements, particularly in the coordination of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Reiterates that the EU initiatives aimed at strengthening European security and defence should also help ensure that those EU Member States which are members of NATO meet their NATO commitments; considers that being both an EU Member State and a NATO member should not be detrimental to any state; similarly, stresses that certain EU Member States’ non-membership of NATO should mean that they have different European Defence Union obligations; stresses that EU Member States should be capable of launching autonomous military missions also where NATO is not willing to act or where EU action is more appropriate; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Welcomes the continuing trend of increased defence spending among NATO members; encourages all EU Member States which are also members of NATO to make substantive progress towards achieving expenditure of 2 % of GDP on defence, with 20 % of this on major new equipment; considers that EU Member States committed to NATO’s defence spending guidelines should consider allocating a specified sum, within the 20 % guideline on procurement, towards research and development in order to guarantee that a minimum expenditure is made towards innovation, which in turn can create a ‘spillover’of technologies to the civil sector; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Recalls the appeal of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of Warsaw to members to ‘facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research’; strongly believes that the members of the EU and NATO need to cooperate and seek synergies on strengthening and developing their technological and industrial base in order to respond to capability priorities, notably through the annual coordinated defence review and the defence planning process of NATO; considers it important that effective and balanced transatlantic defence technological and industrial cooperation should be a strategic priority for both organisations; supports the measures envisaged under the EDF to encourage joint research and development of European capabilities; considers that increased commitment to research and capability planning can lead to more efficiency; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Reiterates the need to ensure coherence of output and timelines between the EU’s Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, the Capability Development Plan and the respective NATO processes, such as the NATO Defence Planning Process; highlights the need to ensure that the multinational initiatives in capability development of both the EU and NATO are complementary and mutually reinforcing; underlines that the capabilities used in CSDP and developed under PESCO remain owned by the Member States, who can also make them available to other frameworks; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Stresses the need to address, in close cooperation between the EU and NATO, the physical and legal obstacles to the swift and rapid movement of military personnel and assets within and beyond the EU in order to ensure, whenever necessary, frictionless movement of equipment and forces across Europe, including the usability of critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges and railroads, notably through the implementation of the action plan presented by the VP/HR and the Commission on the basis of the roadmap developed by the EU Member States in the framework of the European Defence Agency; urges EU Member States to quickly follow up and make use of the momentum that has been generated so far; stresses the need for compatible defence capacities to facilitate EU- and NATO-wide deployment and cooperation; recommends to the EU and NATO to address also the mobility of non-EU NATO forces on the European territory; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Considers that the EU and NATO should do more together to bolster the resilience, defence and security of the neighbours and partners of both organisations; strongly supports the fact that assistance to neighbouring and partner countries for building their capacities and fostering resilience, including on counterterrorism, strategic communication, cyber defence, ammunition storage and security sector reform, is a common objective, particularly in three pilot countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Tunisia); |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Recalls that it is in the interest of both the EU and NATO to address security issues in both the Western Balkans and in the EU’s Neighbourhood and cooperate in certain particular areas; welcomes EU and NATO efforts to provide political and practical support to countries in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the South-Caucasus; suggests that EU Member States continue these efforts to ensure continued democratic development and security sector reform; underlines that cooperation between the EU and NATO and the Western Balkan countries is pivotal in addressing security threats to the continent as a whole; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Stresses the importance of the principles enshrined in the Vienna Document, in particular the principle of openness and transparency; welcomes in this regard the openness of EU and NATO military exercises and joint exercises to international observers; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Reiterates the important role of women in CSDP and NATO missions, in particular in dealing with women and children in conflict areas; welcomes the fact that both the EU and NATO have recognised this important role; recommends that the EU and NATO proactively promote gender diversity in their structures and operations; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Emphasises the need for the EU to ensure a close security and defence relationship with the United Kingdom after Brexit, acknowledging that the UK will remain a lead contributor to European defence as both a NATO member and European nation, while no longer being a member of the EU; |
| --- | --- |

42.

o

o o

| 43. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the Secretary-General of NATO, the EU agencies in the security and defence fields, the governments and national parliaments of the EU Member States and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. |
| --- | --- |

43.

---

(1)  OJ C 58, 15.2.2018, p. 109.

(2)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0435.

(3)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0440 and P8_TA(2017)0492.

(4)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0503 and P8_TA(2017)0493.

(5)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0092.

---