IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SHERMAN DIVISION

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

KEVIN SHELTON (1)

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 NO. 4:24-CR-00027-SDJ-BD

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Kevin Shelton moved to reopen the matter of his pretrial detention. Dkt. 143. The 

government filed a response in opposition, Dkt. 144, to which Shelton offered no reply. The motion 

will be denied.

I.

Shelton was indicted for alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 846, conspiracy to possess with intent 

to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance, and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), conspiracy to 

commit money laundering. Dkt. 20. He was arrested and released on conditions. Docket and 

Minute Entries for Feb. 29, 2024; Minute Entry for Mar. 6, 2024.

Months later, Shelton was arrested again—this time on a petition alleging that he violated 

several conditions of his pretrial-release order. Dkts. 135 (sealed), 142. At his initial appearance on 

that petition, he declined to contest the petition’s allegations and waived his right to a detention 

hearing. Dkts. 140, 141. A couple of weeks after that, he filed the motion at issue here. Dkt. 143.

II.

As is typical, the court’s order on the petition for revocation of Shelton’s pretrial release stated 

that Shelton was “detained pending trial without prejudice to re-raising the issue of pretrial 

detention at any time.” Dkt. 141. The right to reopen a pretrial-detention determination is, 

however, qualified by statute. Before that right may be invoked, the court must “find[] that 

information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a 

material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the 

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appearance of [the movant] as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B).

If the movant’s evidence is not newly discovered, was not previously unavailable, or is not 

material, the court should deny the motion to reopen the question of detention. United States v. 

Stanford, 341 F. App’x 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Stanford I”); United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 

796, 799 (5th Cir. 1989). “Courts interpreting . . . § 3142(f) require ʻtruly changed circumstances, 

something unexpected, or a significant event,’ and [they] have interpreted the requirements of this 

provision strictly,” such that a “defendant cannot re-open detention to present evidence that he 

could have investigated before the detention hearing.” United States v. Jacob, No. CR 21-31, 2023 

WL 2867324, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2023) (citations omitted). Section “3142(f)’s ʻnot known to 

the movant at the time of the hearing’ language [means] not just actual knowledge, but also 

constructive knowledge, i.e., knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have.” 

United States v. Munguia, No. 3:19-cr-191-B (03), 2020 WL 1471741, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 

2020) (quotation marks omitted). The existence of friends or family members willing to testify in 

support of a defendant’s release does not constitute new information within the meaning of the 

statute, see, e.g., United States v. Stanford, 367 F. App’x 507, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Stanford 

II”); Stanford I, 341 F. App’x at 984; United States v. Bennett, 46 F.3d 1132, 1132 (6th Cir. 1995); 

United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1415–16 (1st Cir. 1991); Hare, 873 F.2d at 799, and a party 

cannot be “less than diligent in bringing forth all material evidence the first time a [detention] 

hearing is held,” United States v. Flores, 856 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (E.D. Cal. 1994).

As to whether evidence has “material bearing,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B), the new evidence 

“must relate in some significant or essential way to the decision whether to detain.” United States 

v. Worrell, No. 1:21-cr-00292-RCL, 2021 WL 2366934, at *9 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021) (emphasis 

removed) (citing United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 614 (10th Cir. 2003)). “[T]he purpose of 

[18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B)] . . . is to allow parties to present unknown information that increases 

the chances the defendant appears for [his or her] criminal hearing[] or decrease[s] the danger the 

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defendant poses to an individual or the community as a whole.” United States v. Martin, No. 13-

00466 JSW (KAW), 2015 WL 1738362, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015).

III.

In his motion, Shelton asserts that, since his initial appearance, he and his attorney “have had 

enough time to adequately prepare for the revocation hearing, and [he] has located a suitable thirdparty custodian to serve as his pretrial release custodian.” Dkt. 143 at 1. The motion neither 

attaches nor describes any evidence. It does not cite 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) or any case law

interpreting that provision. It just makes the conclusory assertion that Shelton “does not pose a 

risk or threat to the community if [he] is released from pretrial detention.” Id. And it appears to 

have been filed before Shelton’s counsel discussed with counsel for the government the request to 

revisit the matter of detention. See id. at 3.

In its response, the government first quotes the relevant statutory language. Dkt. 144 at 1. It 

then asserts that “[n]othing in [Shelton’s] motion suggests that the information to be presented at 

the hearing was unavailable or unknown to [Shelton] at the time he waived detention.” Id.

If Shelton had filed a reply explaining that the “suitable third-party custodian” that his motion 

vaguely identified, Dkt. 143 at 1, could not have been identified sooner, maybe his motion would 

have stood some chance of success. But even in that hypothetical, Shelton’s prospects would have 

been dim under the statutory language and case law interpreting it. See supra Part II. That he 

declined to file a reply suggests an understanding that he cannot meet the applicable standard. In 

any event, his motion is insufficient to establish an entitlement to relief.

CONCLUSION

It is ORDERED that Shelton’s motion to reopen the matter of his pretrial detention, Dkt. 143, 

is DENIED. Shelton will remain in the custody of the United States Marshal pending further 

proceedings.

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