No. 6:23-cr-00123

United States of America

v.

Adrian Castro-Diaz and

Esteban De Jesus Villalobos Rangel

ORD ER

In this criminal action, defendants filed motions to suppress 

evidence. Docs. 34, 35. The magistrate judge conducted a hearing 

on the motions and issued a report recommending that the motions be denied. Doc. 43. Defendants filed written objections. 

Docs. 50, 51. The government responded to the objections. Doc. 

52. The court reviews objected-to portions of the magistrate 

judge’s report and recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1).

Defendants are charged in an indictment with one count each 

of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). Doc. 1 at 1. The magistrate judge’s report 

finds that the Texas Department of Public Safety officer who initiated the traffic stop resulting in these charges, Trooper Israel

Maldonado, was aware of and identified specific and articulable 

facts leading him to suspect that the occupants of the vehicle were 

involved in the illegal activity of transporting illegal aliens. Doc. 

43 at 7. Further, the report concludes that Trooper Maldonado 

had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was 

afoot, sufficient to warrant a brief investigatory stop, when the 

stop was initiated. Id. at 8.

Defendants’ objections argue that the Terry-stop test applies 

to investigative stops made by local law enforcement and that the 

factors outlined in U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce apply only to stops made 

by roving border patrol agents. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). As a result, 

defendants contend that the Brignoni-Ponce factors do not apply 

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to Trooper Maldonado’s stop, which consequently lacked a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.

In support of this argument, defendants rely on two statements from the Fifth Circuit. See U.S. v. Hernandez-Moya, 353 F. 

App’x 930, 934 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (“Terry analysis 

applies to investigative stops made by local police officers, while 

Brignoni-Ponce applies to stops by roving border agents.”); United 

States v. Brown, 209 F. App’x 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“The test set forth in Brignoni-Ponce does not apply 

in non-border patrol cases . . . .”). However, the latter pronouncement in Brown is unpublished and thus not binding as 

precedent. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 

Furthermore, Hernandez-Moya is distinguishable because it 

analyzed the Brigoni-Ponce factors only in the context of the defendant’s argument that applying Terry to white vehicle occupants and Brignoni-Ponce to Hispanic occupants violated Equal 

Protection. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the application of Terry or Brigoni-Ponce turned on “the type of law enforcement officers and the nature of the stop” and not race or 

ethnicity, the Equal Protection Clause was not violated. Hernandez-Moya, 353 F. App’x at 934. But stating that Brignoni-Ponce

generally applies to roving border patrol agents is different from 

holding that Brignoni-Ponce does not apply to stops by roving law 

enforcement officers, and, therefore, defendants’ objections are 

misguided. In short, the Fifth Circuit has not clearly decided 

whether reasonable suspicion for immigration-related investigative stops by local police should be analyzed under the BrignoniPonce factors.

As the magistrate judge explained in the report, the Supreme 

Court’s holding in Brignoni-Ponce does not create a different 

standard for investigatory stops by border patrol agents. Instead, 

the Court expressly applied the standard articulated in Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to stops initiated by roving border patrol 

agents. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 881–82. Terry requires that a 

law enforcement officer making a traffic stop “be able to point to 

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specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” 

392 U.S. at 21. Under this test, a brief investigatory stop is warranted when “the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that criminal activity is afoot.” U.S. v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 448 

(5th Cir. 2000). 

After finding that Terry applies equally to stops by border patrol agents and other law enforcement officers, the Brignoni-Ponce

Court identified seven predominant factors that are relevant in 

the reasonable suspicion analysis when an investigatory stop

based on suspicion of illegal immigration activity is effected in 

close proximity to the border: (1) the area’s proximity to the border; (2) usual traffic patterns; (3) the officer’s experience in detecting alien traffic; (4) the driver’s behavior; (5) the aspects or 

characteristics of the vehicle; (6) information about recent illegal 

trafficking of aliens or narcotics in the area; and (7) the number of 

passengers and their appearance and behavior. Brignoni-Ponce, 

442 U.S. at 884–85. Importantly, the Court clarified that these 

factors are relevant to a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle in a 

border area “contain[s] aliens who may be illegally in the country.” Id. at 884.

Here, as part of Operation Lonestar, Trooper Maldonado was 

stationed “near the border . . . looking for illegal immigration.” 

Doc. 45 at 19. Prior to the stop at issue in this case, he had been 

involved in hundreds of stops related to illegal immigration. Id. At 

a hearing before the magistrate judge, Trooper Maldonado also 

articulated specific facts, detailed below, that led him to stop defendants’ vehicle on suspicion of human smuggling, a federal immigration offense. Id. at 21. Because of the immigration-related 

nature of the stop, the Brignoni-Ponce factors are relevant to a determination of the Terry reasonable suspicion standard. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding 

that “nothing in federal law precluded [local] police from enforcing the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization 

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Act”), overruled on other grounds in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 

199 F. 3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).

Defendants’ vehicle was a small utility vehicle in close proximity to the border late at night, on Farm to Market Route (F.M.)

334, a remote road primarily used by ranchers and hunters driving 

trucks or jeeps, that is known “as a convenient route used by 

smugglers of undocumented persons for purposes of bypassing a 

permanent federal checkpoint on U.S. Highway 90 near Cline, 

Texas.” U.S. v. Cardona, 955 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1992); see also 

Doc. 45 at 13. Prior to initiating the stop, Trooper Maldonado observed that the vehicle was weighed down. He also deduced that 

the vehicle was taking an indirect route when a license plate check 

revealed that the vehicle was registered in Smith County, Texas. 

Observing a vehicle riding low contributes to reasonable suspicion. U.S. v. Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Similarly, a law enforcement officer may properly consider the 

fact that the vehicle is taking an indirect route in close proximity 

to the border on a less-heavily patrolled road with a reputation as 

a smuggling route. U.S. v. Olivares-Pacheco, 633 F.3d 399, 404 (5th

Cir. 2011).

As articulated by the Supreme Court, these are all factors that 

support a reasonable suspicion of human smuggling. See BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. at 884–85. Thus, in compliance with Terry, 

Trooper Maldonado identified specific and articulable facts sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that, at the time of the 

stop, the occupants of the vehicle were involved in the illegal activity of smuggling aliens.

Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s report de novo, and 

being satisfied that it contains no error, the court overrules defendants’ objections and accepts the report’s findings and recommendation. The court denies the motions to suppress evidence.

Docs. 34, 35.

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So ordered by the court on September 11, 2024.

J. CAMPBELL BARKER

United States District Judge

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