IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 12–0912

Filed November 15, 2013

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KENNETH R. MICHAEL

AND MELISSA J. MICHAEL

Upon the Petition of

KENNETH R. MICHAEL,

Appellant,

And Concerning

MELISSA J. MICHAEL,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 

Andrea J. Dryer, Judge.

Ex-husband sought, and we granted, further review of a court of 

appeals decision reversing in part the district court’s modification of his 

spousal support obligation. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Steven H. Lytle and Ryan G. Koopmans of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., 

Des Moines, for appellant.

Ashley A. Tollakson of Hartung & Schroeder, LLP, Des Moines, for 

appellee.
2

HECHT, Justice.

The district court modified Kenneth Michael’s obligation to pay

Melissa Michael traditional alimony, concluding the payments should 

cease when Kenneth reaches age sixty-seven. The court’s order also 

terminated immediately Kenneth’s obligation to pay for Melissa’s health 

insurance. The court of appeals affirmed the termination of Kenneth’s 

health insurance obligation, but found no substantial change of 

circumstances justifying the termination of the alimony obligation prior 

to Melissa’s remarriage or death. On further review, we vacate the 

decision of the court of appeals, modify the decision of the district court, 

and affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Kenneth and Melissa Michael were married in April 1971. Both 

are now sixty-three years old, and they are the parents of two adult 

children who are not involved in this appeal. Melissa worked as a 

homemaker and stay-at-home mother for the duration of the parties’ 

twenty-three year marriage. Melissa secured part-time work outside the 

home shortly after Kenneth initiated a dissolution proceeding in 

September 1993. She worked in various jobs during the course of the 

proceeding, but when the dissolution decree was entered in June 1994, 

she was temporarily unemployed and without any expectation of 

retirement or pension benefits. At the same time, Kenneth had just 

begun a new job at Brown & Brown—a construction company in 

Kansas—at an annual salary of approximately $47,000. 

The decree required Kenneth remain responsible for: (1) the 

student loans of the children, up to $20,000 exclusive of interest for each 

child; (2) medical and hospital insurance for the children until they 

completed postsecondary education; (3) a life insurance policy for as long 
3

as he was obligated to contribute to the costs of postsecondary education 

for the children; (4) medical insurance coverage for Melissa; and (5)

weekly spousal support payments of $450 for fifty-two weeks, followed by

payment of one-third of his annual gross salary and bonuses thereafter 

until Melissa died, remarried, or cohabited. 

Kenneth sought modification of the spousal support obligation in 

December 1996. By the time of the trial on the modification in November 

1997, Kenneth had married his current wife, Barbara, and had 

established a new home with her. He had continued working at Brown & 

Brown and had seen his salary increase to $1500 weekly, or 

approximately $78,000 annually. He had earned annual bonuses of 

$1500, $7000, and $20,000 in 1994, 1995, and 1996, and he had 

consistently made his support payments based on his gross earnings 

including weekly wages and bonuses. After fifty-two weekly payments of 

$450, his obligation had been reduced briefly to $397 weekly, but the 

obligation thereafter increased as his salary increased. By November 

1997, Kenneth was paying Melissa $500 per week plus one-third of his 

annual bonus. Beyond the spousal support obligation, Kenneth was also 

making monthly loan payments of approximately $440 on a debt of 

nearly $45,000 incurred in part for the cost of the children’s

postsecondary education. Barbara was then employed full-time, making 

approximately $10.35 per hour. Melissa had secured full-time 

employment with Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company at an annual 

salary of $17,551, exclusive of bonus and overtime. 

After the 1997 trial on modification, the district court noted 

various changes had occurred since the entry of the original decree but 

nonetheless denied Kenneth’s request for relief, explaining the changes 

were not substantial or material and would have been within the 
4

contemplation of the district court at the time of the decree. In August 

1998, while an appeal of the court’s order was pending, the parties 

stipulated to and the court entered an order modifying Kenneth’s spousal 

support obligation, setting the amount at $480 weekly until Melissa died, 

remarried, or cohabited. The other provisions, including the medical 

insurance support provision, were neither litigated nor mentioned in the 

stipulated modification and remained unchanged.

Kenneth filed a second petition for modification in July 2011, 

requesting termination or significant reduction of his weekly support and 

monthly medical insurance payments to Melissa. The district court held 

a trial on the matter in February 2012. Although Kenneth had earned 

$111,399 in the 2010 calendar year at Hall Brothers, he had been laid off 

in early 2011 as part of a reduction in the employer’s workforce.1 After 

three weeks of job search, he had secured new full-time employment as a 

project manager with Venture Corporation at an annual salary of 

$85,020, or approximately $1635 per week. At the 2012 modification 

trial, Kenneth expressed doubt that he would receive bonuses with his 

new employer. He also testified that despite his receipt of steadily 

increasing bonuses prior to the 1998 proceeding, he had not received a 

substantial bonus in any of the years following the 1998 proceeding.2 He 

was making payments on a credit card debt of approximately $44,000, 

some of which remained from the obligations allocated to him in the 

1994 decree, and some of which was attributable to Kenneth’s and 

 

1Hall Brothers acquired Brown & Brown in 2008. Kenneth remained with the 

company as vice president of operations through that transition and until the layoff in 

2011. 

2He did, however, receive a special $5000 bonus at the beginning of 2011 for his 

work relating to the Hall acquisition of Brown & Brown. 
5

Barbara’s increasing medical expenses. Kenneth owned an individual 

retirement account with a value of $90,614. Barbara had remained in 

the same full-time employment since the 1998 modification and her 

annual income had approximately doubled over the years. Her gross 

earnings in 2010 were $43,530 and she earned $39,749 in 2011.

Melissa had remained with the same employer, now called 

Principal Financial Group (Principal), since the 1998 modification. By 

2011, her pension benefits had vested, and she had accumulated 

approximately $190,000 in retirement funds. With wages of $29,201,

3

Kenneth’s weekly support payments totaling $24,960 for the year, and 

$333 in interest and dividend income, Melissa’s reportable income in 

2010 was $54,494.

Kenneth testified at the 2012 modification trial that he had 

growing concerns about his and Barbara’s medical expenses. Kenneth 

and Barbara are smokers, and Kenneth is a recovering alcoholic. 

Kenneth had received treatment for his alcoholism once during the 

marriage in 1982. He suffers from degenerative spondylitis and 

underwent back surgery to repair two herniated discs in 2008. He 

entered treatment for alcoholism again voluntarily in 2009 following the 

back surgery. He now takes Aleve® for his back pain, but he does not 

currently take any prescription medications. He has also dealt with 

various neck and knee problems. His job as project manager at Venture 

Corporation requires a 160-mile roundtrip commute, longer on-the-job 

hours, and more daily physical exertion than his previous job. He did 

 

3Melissa’s rate of pay since 2007 has been $17 per hour, or $35,638 annually, 

exclusive of overtime and bonuses. Her pay has been capped for the past four years 

and she does not expect a raise in the foreseeable future. The discrepancy between her 

gross wages and her reportable income is apparently due to her pre-tax contributions to 

her retirement accounts. 
6

not testify at the trial that he was incapable of performing these tasks, 

but he speculated that he might not be capable for much longer, based 

on his physician’s advice and his own perception of his condition. 

Barbara testified at the trial that she suffers from inflammatory 

neuropathy, chronic pain, and numbness in her feet. She takes Lyrica®

for the chronic pain, after having tried several other medications, each of 

which brought various side effects. The Lyrica® affects Barbara’s vision 

and has contributed significantly to an increase in Barbara’s and 

Kenneth’s out-of-pocket medical expenses. The prognosis for her 

condition is uncertain, but she presently plans to continue working fulltime and has no plans for retirement.

Melissa raised medical concerns of her own at the trial. She 

suffers from osteoarthritis and takes prescription medication for joint 

inflammation. She wears eye glasses and incurs optometry expenses 

each year. She has also experienced shingles and migraines. She has, 

however, characterized her medical concerns and expenses as routine.

After considering the evidence, the district court determined the 

increase in Melissa’s income, her continued employment with Principal, 

and the pension and other resources that would be available to her upon 

retirement were circumstances not contemplated by the district court at 

the times the 1994 decree and 1998 modification were entered. Further, 

the court explained, these changes were substantial and more or less 

permanent. The court found inequitable the requirement that Kenneth 

continue making weekly support payments indefinitely. Accordingly, the 

court modified the decree to require instead that Kenneth continue 

making weekly payments of $480 until he reaches age sixty-seven, or 

until Melissa remarries or either party dies. Finding Melissa’s continued 

employment with Principal had allowed her to obtain medical, dental, 
7

and vision insurance coverage, the court further modified the decree by 

eliminating the requirement that Kenneth subsidize Melissa’s monthly 

health insurance premium. The court ordered that the parties pay their 

own attorney fees and split the court costs of the modification action. 

Melissa appealed and we transferred the case to the court of 

appeals. The court of appeals reversed the modification of Kenneth’s 

weekly support obligation, concluding Kenneth had failed to demonstrate 

a substantial change in the parties’ financial circumstances not 

contemplated by the court at the time of the 1998 modification. The 

court of appeals found any disparities in savings and debt obligations

between the parties had been self-inflicted and could not constitute 

grounds for a reduction in Kenneth’s spousal support obligation. The 

court of appeals affirmed, however, the termination of Kenneth’s monthly 

health insurance payment obligation and the allocation of attorney fees 

and costs. We granted Kenneth’s application for further review of the 

court of appeals decision.

II. Scope of Review.

We review de novo a decision modifying the terms of a marriage 

dissolution decree. In re Marriage of Johnson, 781 N.W.2d 553, 554 

(Iowa 2010). We will not disturb the trial court’s conclusions “unless 

there has been a failure to do equity.” In re Marriage of Wessels, 542 

N.W.2d 486, 490 (Iowa 1995). We review a district court’s decision on 

attorney fees for abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Goodwin, 606 

N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa 2000). 

III. Discussion.

Kenneth raises two issues on appeal, contending (1) the district 

court erred in failing to eliminate or substantially reduce his weekly

support obligation before he reaches the age of sixty-seven, and (2) the 
8

district court erred in failing to award him reasonable attorney fees as 

the prevailing party below. Melissa cross-appeals, assigning as error the 

district court’s elimination of Kenneth’s weekly support obligation at age 

sixty-seven and the court’s immediate elimination of his monthly health 

insurance payment obligation. Both parties request appellate attorney 

fees.

A. The Spousal Support Obligations. The parties dispute the 

soundness of the district court’s determination that Kenneth established

a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the 1998 

modification. Kenneth argues that because Melissa now supports herself 

and has accumulated substantial retirement savings, no justification for 

a continuing traditional alimony payment remains. Further, Kenneth 

contends, his decrease in real earnings from employment after his 

transition from Hall Brothers to Venture Corporation, his significant 

health issues, his inability to accumulate significant retirement 

resources in part due to his spousal support and debt service obligations 

arising from the original decree, and his advancing age, when taken 

together, constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying 

immediate modification of his support obligations, instead of prospective 

relief delayed five years as the district court ordered. Melissa responds 

that the facts Kenneth presents, regardless whether taken in isolation or 

in combination, cannot constitute a change in circumstances justifying 

modification. She also contends that regardless whether Kenneth has 

demonstrated a substantial change, she has demonstrated a need for 

continuing support until her death or remarriage. Therefore, she argues, 

the district court erred in making any further modification beyond that 

agreed to by the parties in 1998.
9

Our marriage dissolution statute provides that a district court

“may subsequently modify child, spousal, or medical support orders 

when there is a substantial change in circumstances.” Iowa Code

§ 598.21C(1) (2009). The statute adds that the court shall consider a 

number of specific factors in determining whether there has been a 

substantial change. Among the factors relevant here are:

(a) Changes in the employment, earning capacity, 

income, or resources of a party.

(b) Receipt by a party of an inheritance, pension, or 

other gift.

(c) Changes in the medical expenses of a party.

. . . .

(e) Changes in the physical, mental, or emotional 

health of a party.

. . . .

(l) Other factors the court determines to be relevant in 

an individual case.

Id. 

In reviewing an earlier version of this provision, which enumerated 

substantially the same list of factors, we explained that we examine the

factors in conjunction with several “other well-established principles 

governing modification.” See In re Marriage of McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d 

322, 329 (Iowa 2004). The party seeking modification, for example, bears 

the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the 

substantial change in circumstances. Wessels, 542 N.W.2d at 489–90. 

A substantial change justifying a modification must be permanent or

continuous rather than temporary in nature. McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d at 

329–30. We have also consistently explained the substantial change 

must not have been within the contemplation of the district court when 

the decree was entered, and we presume the decree is entered with a 
10

“view to reasonable and ordinary changes that may be likely to occur.” 

Wessels, 542 N.W.2d at 490; see also McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d at 329–30.4

Several additional principles from our prior modification cases 

guide our analysis. We may consider the unrealized but existing earning 

potential of a party at the time of the decree and contrast that with a 

later established earning potential as part of our determination of

whether a substantial change in circumstances has been demonstrated. 

See McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d at 330; see also In re Marriage of Sjulin, 431 

N.W.2d 773, 777 (Iowa 1988). We have cautioned that while changes in 

earning capacity or earning potential may constitute substantial changes

for purposes of the statutory determination, the changes will not justify a 

modification if they result from an improper intent to deprive an obligee 

of support. In re Marriage of Rietz, 585 N.W.2d 226, 229–30 (Iowa 1998). 

In addition, in certain modification cases, we have distinguished 

rehabilitative alimony from permanent alimony awards and explained 

that the rationale underlying the award may have some bearing on the 

determination of whether modification is justified. See Wessels, 542 

N.W.2d 489–90. Finally, regardless the type of award, we have often 

observed that a change in an obligee spouse’s ability to or potential for 

self-support may be an important consideration in our determination. 

See id. at 490 (affirming modification extending duration of award in case 

where obligee had been unable to meet rehabilitative goal of selfsupport); cf. In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 1989)

(explaining, in reviewing an initial dissolution decree, that traditional

 

4In developing that principle in the context of modification of child support 

orders, we have emphasized we examine what the court entering the decree actually 

knew, as opposed to what the parties knew or should have known at the time of the 

earlier proceeding. See Mears v. Mears, 213 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Iowa 1973). 
11

alimony is “payable for life or so long as a spouse is incapable of selfsupport”).

The parties have raised various significant equitable considerations 

for our analysis here. Addressing Kenneth’s present circumstances first, 

we note the district court found Kenneth failed to establish that his 

current salary at Venture Corporation is permanent and raised the 

possibility that his salary might soon approach his previous 

compensation level at Hall Brothers. We view Kenneth’s current position 

somewhat differently. Kenneth reached his 2009 and 2010 

compensation levels at Hall Brothers after more than ten years of service 

as a vice president at the company, and after having previously served 

for several years as a project manager for the company Hall Brothers 

later acquired. He now works again as a new project manager, not a vice 

president, at Venture Corporation, and the record suggests he has had 

no indication thus far of any prospect for advancement. He has not 

received a substantial bonus since the 1998 modification and has had no 

indication that bonuses—a very significant component of his 

compensation prior to the 1998 modification—will be paid by his new 

employer. Moreover, despite his advancing age and his deteriorating 

health and physical condition, he now works in a more physically 

demanding role than the one he had performed for the previous twelve 

years, casting significant doubt on his potential for longevity and 

advancement at the company.5 See Iowa Code § 598.21C(1)(a) (requiring 

consideration of changes in both income and earning capacity in

determining whether modification is appropriate); see also In re Marriage 

 

5The record does not suggest Kenneth has any desire to retire or choose a course 

of employment for the purpose of reducing his support obligation; rather, it merely 

suggests he has significant uncertainty regarding his future at the company. 
12

of Wegner, 434 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Iowa 1988) (noting distinction between 

changes in present income and changes in earning potential and 

explaining both were relevant in affirming modification of obligee’s 

award).

Melissa notes that regardless whether Kenneth has the potential 

for advancement with Venture Corporation, his current salary is actually 

greater than the salary he received at the time the 1998 decree was 

entered, but we find this contention unpersuasive. Kenneth’s annual 

salary of $85,000 in 2011 is nominally greater than his 1998 base salary 

of $78,000, but we think it important to note again that Kenneth 

received significant year-end bonuses from Brown & Brown in the years 

preceding the 1998 modification—bonuses that rendered his total 

compensation for those years greater than his 2011 compensation. In 

addition, we have often explained that we may consider the effects on 

income of inflation and increasing costs of living—both of which render 

Kenneth’s 2011 compensation significantly smaller in real terms than his 

1998 compensation. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 219 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Iowa 

1974) (concluding a twenty percent decrease in income at a time when 

the cost of living had increased constituted a substantial decrease in the 

obligee’s income and affirming the district court’s modification of the 

obligor’s support obligation).6 Taken together, Kenneth’s new 

uncertainty regarding his employment longevity and earning potential

and his significantly smaller income relative to his income at the time of 

the 1998 modification strongly influence our determination of whether a 

substantial change has been established and modification is appropriate. 

 

6We note these considerations will also inform our analysis of Melissa’s position, 

and we consider the relative impact of these factors on the positions of both parties. 

See Page v. Page, 219 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Iowa 1974).
13

See Iowa Code § 598.21C(1)(a); see also Rietz, 585 N.W.2d at 231 

(affirming district court’s modification when record revealed obligor was 

no longer likely to be employed at the high income level he had enjoyed 

at the time of the original decree); cf. American Law Institute, Principles 

of the Law of Family Dissolution § 5.08 cmt. d, at 970 (2000) [hereinafter 

Principles] (explaining modification may be appropriate when “the former 

spouses’ living standards are less disparate than expected because of a 

decline in the obligor’s income”). 

Our modification analysis also requires consideration of Melissa’s 

current financial position. As Kenneth contends, and as the district 

court found, Melissa now earns more than twice what she earned at the 

time of the 1998 modification and she is more than capable of supporting 

herself. Her position now provides significant medical, dental, and vision 

insurance coverage. She has minimal debt, she holds an undergraduate 

degree in business, and she has remained employed at Principal for the 

past seventeen years. Her pension at Principal has now vested and will

yield her an estimated payment of approximately $774 monthly upon her 

retirement. The district court observed, and we think it important to 

note, she had been at Principal just three years at the time of the 1998 

modification, and her pension had not yet vested. We agree with the 

district court’s finding that her longevity at the company, her substantial 

increase in income, and her accrual of significant retirement benefits 

were not likely within the contemplation of the district court at the time 

the 1998 modification was entered. See McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d at 330 

(explaining change from an unrealized earning potential to an 

established earning potential may be an important consideration in the

modification analysis); Sjulin, 431 N.W.2d at 777 (same). 
14

We acknowledge Melissa’s current income remains significantly 

less than Kenneth’s, but we think it important to emphasize, as the 

district court did, that our equitable analysis must also account for 

changes in the relative positions of the parties. See, e.g., McCurnin, 681 

N.W.2d at 330–31 (affirming modification of award extending payment 

obligation despite finding obligee’s income had nearly doubled, in part 

because obligor’s income had nearly tripled and his financial position 

had “vastly improved” since the decree); see also Principles § 5.08(1)(a), at 

963 (recommending modification when the living standards of the 

spouses are “substantially more or substantially less disparate than 

contemplated by the prior order” as a result of a decline in the obligor’s 

income); cf. Wegner, 434 N.W.2d at 399 (“[B]oth parties, if they are in 

reasonable health, need to earn up to their capacities . . . and not lean 

unduly on the other party for permanent support.”). Given Melissa’s 

current financial position as compared to her position in 1998, the 

change in Melissa’s financial position relative to Kenneth’s position at 

present as compared to her position relative to Kenneth’s position in 

1998, and Melissa’s present ability to support herself, we conclude 

Kenneth has established a substantial change in circumstances and is 

entitled to a modification of his weekly support obligation. In addition, 

we conclude Kenneth has established a substantial change with respect

to Melissa’s medical support requirements, given the advent of her

employer-sponsored insurance coverage, which she had not obtained at 

the time of the dissolution and was not addressed at the time of the 1998

modification. We therefore turn to the question of what modification of 

Kenneth’s obligations is justified by this record.

Giving due account to our various equitable considerations, 

including the parties’ respective financial positions and the change in the 
15

income gap between the parties, we conclude Kenneth’s weekly support 

obligation should be reduced to $285 per week.7 Cf. Rietz, 585 N.W.2d at 

228–29, 231 (affirming district court’s modification of an obligation from

$4000 monthly to $1000 monthly when obligor’s expected annual 

income declined from approximately $200,000 to approximately $50,000

and obligee’s earning capacity remained stable). We do not disturb that 

portion of the 1998 modification requiring that the obligation persist

until Melissa’s remarriage, cohabitation, or death.8 We agree with the 

district court’s determination that the changed circumstances dictate

Kenneth’s monthly medical insurance payment obligations should cease

now.

B. Attorney Fees. As we have already noted, Kenneth contends

the district court erred in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney 

fees incurred in the district court proceedings, and he requests this court 

order Melissa to pay his appellate attorney fees. Melissa responds that 

 

7We note that at the time of the 1998 modification, Kenneth earned $98,000 

($78,000 base pay plus a bonus of $20,000) per year. Melissa earned $17,551 per year. 

The 1998 modification established a spousal support obligation of $24,960 per year 

($480 per week)—a figure equivalent to approximately thirty-one percent of the 

difference between the parties’ annual employment earnings at the time (24,960 ÷ 

80,449 = .3102). The reduction of Kenneth’s support obligation to $285 per week 

($14,820 per year) will maintain Kenneth’s support obligation at approximately thirtyone percent of the difference between Kenneth’s current annual earnings of $85,020 

and Melissa’s current earnings of $37,413 (14,820 ÷ 47,607 = .3113). 

8Although the district court concluded the support obligation should terminate 

when Kenneth reaches the age of sixty-seven, equitable considerations lead us to a 

different result. Whether Kenneth’s obligation to pay traditional spousal support 

should terminate at that future date will depend on the circumstances of the parties 

prevailing at that time. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rietz, 585 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 

1998) (affirming modification setting support obligation “based on [obligor’s] present 

actual income”); In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Iowa 1993) (striking 

portion of modification that “prejudge[d]” obligee’s right to modification and noting 

“future events” would “determine the parties’ relative rights”); cf. In re Marriage of 

Schlenker, 300 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Iowa 1981) (“[T]rial courts should make final 

disposition of [dissolution] cases on the circumstances then existing.”).
16

the district court’s order was reasonable and within its discretion, but 

she requests an award of her appellate attorney fees. The court of 

appeals affirmed the district court’s order on attorney fees below, and 

denied both parties’ requests for attorney fees incurred in the appeal. 

Section 598.36 addresses attorney fee awards in modification 

proceedings. The section provides that the district court “may award 

attorney fees to the prevailing party in an amount deemed reasonable by 

the court.” Iowa Code § 598.36. We have emphasized that the language 

of the provision is permissive and that we give the district court 

considerable discretion in determining whether it should award fees at 

the district court level. See In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 

568 (Iowa 1999). We have similar discretion in awarding appellate 

attorney fees. See id. We have often explained the controlling 

considerations in the attorney fee determination are the parties’ 

respective abilities to pay. See Wessels, 542 N.W.2d at 491; Francis, 442 

N.W.2d at 67. We may also consider whether a party resisting the 

modification petition was successful, and whether a party has been 

obliged to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal. In re Marriage of 

Bolick, 539 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Iowa 1995). 

Here, we note both parties may be deemed to have prevailed to 

some extent in the proceedings below. While neither party is affluent, 

both parties have resources with which to pay their fees, and we find 

their respective abilities to pay comparable. Accordingly, we cannot find 

the district court erred in ordering the parties pay their own attorney 

fees, and we decline to award either party appellate attorney fees. 

IV. Conclusion.

We modify the parties’ dissolution decree by reducing Kenneth’s 

obligation to pay weekly spousal support and terminating his monthly 
17

obligation to contribute to the cost of Melissa’s health insurance. 

Accordingly, we vacate in part and affirm in part the decision of the court 

of appeals, and affirm as modified the judgment of the district court. 

Each party shall pay half the costs of the appeal.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART AND 

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS 

MODIFIED.