2017 UT App 72

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF C.A., M.A., AND M.A.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

B.D.J.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20170143-CA

Filed April 27, 2017

Seventh District Juvenile Court, Monticello Department

The Honorable Mary L. Manley

No. 1129857

Don M. Torgerson, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, KATE A. TOOMEY, and

DAVID N. MORTENSEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 B.D.J. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights. Mother asserts that it was not in the best interests of the 

children to terminate her parental rights. We affirm.

¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to 

terminate a person’s parental rights,] the result must be against 

the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with 

a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” In 
In re C.A.

20170143-CA 2 2017 UT App 72

re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We “review the juvenile court’s 

factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous standard.” In 

re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding of fact is 

clearly erroneous only when, in light of the evidence supporting 

the finding, it is against the clear weight of the evidence. See id.

Further, we give the juvenile court “wide latitude of discretion 

as to the judgments arrived at based upon not only the court’s 

opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the 

juvenile court judges’ special training, experience and interest in 

this field.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s decision exists in 

the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing 

of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.

¶3 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred in 

determining that it was in the children’s best interests to 

terminate her parental rights. Specifically, Mother argues that 

because the children were not yet eligible to be adopted by their 

foster parents, the court should have given her more time to 

demonstrate her fitness. The juvenile court made specific 

findings, unchallenged by Mother, that support its best interests

determination. For example, the juvenile court found that 

Mother’s visits with the children reversed the positive progress 

of the children’s behavior since being taken into the State’s 

custody. The court went on to find that because of this 

regression, “contact by the mother is compromising the 

placement” of the children and “[c]ontinued visitation with the 

mother is detrimental to the children.” Further, the juvenile 

court found that the children appear to have “no bonds of love 

and affection with their Mother or any significant relationship 

with her.” The juvenile court similarly made several findings 

concerning the lack of any progress Mother had been making 

with her service plan. These unchallenged findings support the 

juvenile court’s determination that it was in the best interests of 

the children to terminate Mother’s parental rights regardless of 
In re C.A.

20170143-CA 3 2017 UT App 72

the timing of any potential approval to allow the foster parents 

to adopt the children. Because a foundation for the juvenile 

court’s decision exists in the record, we may not engage in a 

reweighing of that evidence. See id.

¶4 Affirmed.