IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2019-CA-00292-COA
M. HAYES HUNT APPELLANT

v. MICHAEL C. ALLEN APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/11/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CHARLES HAYS BURCHFIELD KARSUNN EZEKIEL MOORE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: J. NILES McNEEL NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/03/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ. BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. On Septem

ber 12, 2013, M. Hay es Hunt convey ed real property l ocated a t 340 Tom Street, S turgis, Mississippi, to his daughter, Brittany Allen. The deed was recor ded in
O k t i b b e h a County on the sam e day

. On Decem ber 7, 2 015, B rittany convey ed a “Quick
Claim D eed” f

or t he sam e property to Hunt. However, bef ore that deed w a s recorded (on February 3 , 2016), Brittany c onvey ed the sam e property to h er h usband, Michael Allen, on
Decem ber 9, 2015, by w arranty deed, which was recorded in O ktibbeha County on the sam e day

. 1

1 T h e r eco r d in d icates th at th e c o u p l e w as later g r a n t e d a d iv o rce o n O cto b er 1 1 , 2 0 1 8

.¶2. On January 20, 2016, M i c h a e l f i l e d a c ivil declaration with the Oktibbeha County
Justice Court, requesting Hunt’s eviction f rom the subject property

. On February 24, 2016,
the justice court entered its judgm ent and evicted Hunt f rom the p roperty

. Hunt im m ediately appealed f

rom the j ustice court ’ s j udgm ent to the Oktibbeha County C ircuit Court. On August 23, 2017, the circuit c lerk m oved to dism iss the action f o r w a n t o f p r osecution.
Hunt’s counsel f

i led an appearance and requested that a court date be set f o r the m atter. ¶3. In the m eantim e, on March 7, 2016, M ich a e l a n d B r ittany had f iled a com

plaint in
Oktibbeha County C hancery Court, requesting that the “Q u i c k Claim Deed” Brittany
executed in f

avor of her f

ather be declared void and that title be conf irm ed in Michael. The

c o m plaint alleged that (1) t he Decem ber 7 deed w as e xecuted under duress and thre a t o f bodily harm ; (2) there was no consi d e r a t i o n g i ven; and ( 3) it was signed without proper notarization. Af

ter a trial held on Decem

ber 13, 2016, and January 11, 2018, the chancery

court issued its opinion a nd f i n a l j u dgm ent on April 16, 2018. The chancery court
determ ined that the Decem ber 7 deed f

rom Brittany to Hunt was signed under duress, was
not supported by a ny consideration, and was not properly notarized because B rittany did not sign the deed i n the presence of a notary public. 2 T heref ore, t he court declared the deed void
and set it aside. W ith there being no challenge to the validity of the Decem ber 9 deed f

rom Brittany to Michael, the court held that de e d w a s v alid, and title to the property vested in

2 T h e ch an cery c o u rt’s f in d in g s in d icated th at H u n t an d B rittan y ’s b ro th er “am b u sh ed ” h er, w ith h eld h e r cell p h o n e f ro m h er, an d f

o rced h er to sig n th e “q u ick claim d eed ” b ef o re th ey w o u ld let h er leav e th e p rem ises. 2Michael. Hunt f i led a m otion f

or a new trial, which the chancery court denied on June 14,
2018. ¶4. On Septem

ber 2 7 , 2 0 1 8 , M i c hael f

iled a m otion f

o r sum m ary judgm ent with the
Oktibbeha County Circuit Court, noting the chancery court’s April 2 018 order and alleging
that there were n o other issues or def enses to prohibit Hunt’s eviction f rom the property

. In
respons e , H u

n t argued that Michael had f ailed to f ile the required m em orandum of authorities
under Unif

orm C ivil Rule of Circuit and County Court 4

. 0 2 ( 2 ) a n d that genuine issues of

m aterial f a ct existed a s to whether Michael had lawf u l grounds to evict Hunt and h ad given
Hunt “ p r o p e r notice regarding the eviction.” Af ter a hearing, the circuit court granted
Michael’s m otion f

o r sum m ary judgm ent on Decem

ber 11, 2018, f

i nding that “no genuine
issue of m aterial f

act exists as to whether [ Michael] owned the property in question” and that nothing indicated Hunt “had a lawf ul reason to be on the prem ises.” ¶5. Hunt f

iled a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59 m ot i o n t o a l t e r o r am end the judgm ent on Decem

ber 20, 2 018, in which he contended that Michael had f ailed to provide
him with thirty -day s’ notice that his tenancy was being term inated, a s required by Mississippi
Code Annot a t e d s ection 89-8-19(3) (Rev. 2011). He also noted that Brittany and Michael
had been granted a divorce two m o nths bef ore t he c o urt’s judgm ent and that Brittany becam e

a joint owner of the property ; s o Brittany s hould have been added as a necessary party to the
action. 3 The circuit court denied Hunt’s m otion.

3 T h e d iv o rce d ecre e o rd e red M ich ael to ex ecu te a w arran ty d eed co n v ey in g th e p ro p erty to h im self

an d B rittan y

as j o in t ten an t s w i th rig h ts o f su r v iv o rsh ip

. 3¶6. Appealing f rom the circuit court’s judgm ent, Hunt reasserts his claim s that Michael
f ailed to subm it a m em orandum o f a u t h o rities with h is m otion f or sum m ary judgm ent and
f ailed to p rovide him with proper notice. 4 Finding no error in the c ircuit court’s grant of

sum m ary judgm ent, we af

f irm

. 5
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the c ircuit court erred in granting the m o tion for sum m ary judgm ent. ¶7. Hunt argues that the c ircuit court erred in gra n t i n g s u mma r y judgm e nt f or Michael
because there was a genuine issue of m aterial f act w h e t h e r Michael com p lied with certain

statutes involving Hunt’s r ight to notice of the term ination of tenancy and b ecause Michael
f ailed to f ile a m em orandum o f authorities, m aking his sum m ary j udgm e n t m otion im proper. A circuit court’s decision to g r a n t sum m ary judgm ent is reviewed de novo. Robinson v. Robinson Prop. Grp. Corp. , 274 So. 3d 9 52, 956 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules o f Civil Procedure, a party m ay b e granted s um m a ry j udgm ent
when “the pleadings, depositions, answers t o interrogatories and a dm ission on f ile, together
with the af

f i davits, if any , show that there is n o genuine issue as to any m aterial f act and that

4 W e th in k it is im

p o r t a n t t o c l a rif

y th at H u n t is n o t a

p p ealin g f

ro m th e ch an cery co u rt’s A p r il 1 6 , 2 0 1 8 o rd er, w h ich ren d ered t h e D e c e mb er 7 d eed v o id an d v ested o w n e rsh ip o f

th e p ro p erty

in M ich ael.

5 H u n t also claim s f

o r th e f irst tim e o n ap p eal th a t a g e n u in e issu e o f m aterial f act ex ists w ith resp ect to sev e ral o th er statu tes r eg ard in g n o t ice req u irem en ts f o r t erm in atio n o f ten an cy
. A s w e n o te in o u r d i scu ssio n , th ese claim s w ere n o t raised b ef o re th e trial co u rt; as su ch , th ey

are p ro ced u rally

b arred f ro m co n sid e r atio n o n ap p e al. 4the m oving p arty is entitled to a judgm ent as a m atter of law.” “The burden is on t he m oving

party to establish that there is n o m aterial issue of f act, and t he evidence m

ust be v iewed in
the l ight m ost f

avorable to the non-m oving party

. ” M axwell v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-Desoto
Inc. , 958 So. 2d 284, 287 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). ¶8. Specif

i cally , Hunt c ontends there was a genuine issue of m aterial f act as to whether
Michael com

plied with sections 89-7-23, 89-7-29, 89-7-31, 89

- 8

- 9 , and 89-8-19(3) of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev. 2 0 1 1 ). However, H unt’s m otion to alter o r am end the judgm ent only claim ed that h e f a i l e d to receive proper notice under section 89-8-19(3), which provides that “[ t]he landlord or t he tenant ma y t e r mi nate a m o nth-to-m onth tenancy by a written notice given to t he other at least thirty ( 30) d ay s prior to the term ination date.” Miss.
Code Ann. § 89-8-19(3). The claim s t h a t M ichael f ailed to com

ply with t he other statutes

were never brought bef

ore the circuit court. “It is well-settled that issues presented f or the
f irst tim e on a p p e a l are p rocedurally barred f rom consideration.” Lewis v. Forest Family
Practice Clinic P.A. , 124 So. 3 d 654, 658 (¶16) (Miss. 2013). Hunt has also f ailed to m ake
any substantive argum ent with regard to those claim s on appeal. ¶9. Furtherm ore, Hunt’s claim that he did not receive proper notice under section 89-8- 19(3) r ests solely on h i s assertion that at the tim e the s um m ons and civil d eclaration were posted on his door on January 27, 2016, he was t he o wner of the s u b j e c t p r o p e r ty

. His

r e a s o ning f

or this argum ent is that it was not until the chancery c o urt’s April 2018 or d e r , setting aside the Decem

ber 7 d eed f

rom Brittany to Hunt, t hat Michael b ecam e t he property

5owner. He cites n o a uthority t o s u p p o r t his argum ent. “Failure to c ite legal authority in support of

an issue is a procedural bar on appeal.” Herrin v
. P erkins , 282 So. 3d 727, 733 (¶21) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Nevertheless, w e f ind no m erit to Hunt’s claim

. The chancery

court f o und that the Decem

ber 7 deed was void a nd unenf o r c e a b l e d u e to duress in its
inducem ent and set the deed aside. As such, t he d eed was null f rom the beginning; theref ore, Michael was the property owner a s of Decem ber 9 , 2015. See Greenwood v. Y oung , 80 So.
3 d 1 40, 1 46 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the chancellor’s setting a s i d e o f a warranty deed a s v o i d me a n t t he deed “was v oid f rom the beginning, and the Youngs received no rights to the property f rom the warranty deed”). ¶10. Hunt also c ontends that Michael f ailed t o subm i t a me mo r a n d u m of authorities in support of the m otion f

or s um m ary judgm ent, as required by R ule 4 .02(2), which provides:
I n circuit c ourt a m e m orandum o f authorities i n support of any m ot i o n t o dism i ss or f

or s u m m a ry judgm ent shall be m ailed to the j udge presiding over the action at t h e tim e that the m otion is f iled. Respondent shall r eply within ten (10) day s a f

t e r service of m ovant’s m em orandum

. A rebuttal m em orandum m ay be subm itted within f i v e (5) d ay s of service of t he r eply m em orandum

. Movant s f or sum m ary judgm ent s hall f ile with t he clerk as a part of the m otion a n i t e m ization of the f acts relied upon and not genuinely disputed and the respondent shall indicate either agreem ent or specif i c reasons f or disagreem e nt that such f acts are undisp u t e d and m a terial. Copies of m otions t o dism iss or f

o r s u mma r y judgm ent sent to the judge shall also be accom panied by copies of the com p laint and, if

f iled, the answer.
UCRCCC 4.02 ( 2 )

. Hunt claim s that without t he m em orandum of authorities, “Michael’s

m otion f or sum m ary j udgm ent was not procedurally proper bef or e t h e [ c]ourt.” Michael does

not dis p u t e that no m em orandum of authorities was f iled, but he reasons that the

6m em orandum o f authorities was not necessary because “ n o authorities were r ef erred to in the

m otion.” ¶11. In T

hornton v. Big M Transportation Co. , 146 S o. 3d 393, 397 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App.
2 0 1 4 ), t he m ovant, Big M Transportation, f i led an untim ely m e m orandum of a uthorities. The
circuit court denied the Thorntons’ m otion to strike t he m e mo r a n d u m. Like Hunt, the
Thorntons cited no authority except t h e r u l e “ i n support of their claim that the f ailure to
sim ultaneously f

ile the m em orandum of authorities should p rove f ata l t o B ig M Transportation’s request f or sum m ary

judgm ent.” Id . at (¶17). W e f urther concluded:
In reviewing applicable c aselaw, we f i nd t hat, in Braddock Law Firm, PLLC v. Becnel , 949 So. 2d 3 8, 46- 4 7 ( ¶ ¶ 2 9

- 3 1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), this Court held that the chancellor possessed the discretion to look past the def endants’ f ailure to technically c om

ply with Rule 4.03(2) where the purposes of t he rule were still satisf

ied.
Af ter reviewing the record in this case, we f i nd that Big M Transportation’s sum m ary -judgm ent m otion f ailed to strictly com

p ly w ith Rule 4. 0 3(2)’s requirem ents. D espite this f ailure, however, the record r ef lects that the purposes of Rule 4 [ .]03 were still f u lf i lled. See Braddock Law F irm , 949 So. 2d at 46-47 (¶¶29-31). The delay in f iling did n o t “unf

airly sandbag” the circuit court with “unadvertised f actual issues” or f

orce the circuit c o urt judge to “f erret” through the reco r d t o d i s c e rn the m aterially disputed f acts. See Estate o f Jackson v. Miss. Life Ins. Co. , 755 So. 2d 1 5, 22 (¶28) (Miss

. C t

. App. 1999).
Thornton , 146 S o. 3d at 397-98 ( ¶ ¶ 17-18). 6 Besides his claim that Michael did not f ully explain to the court the issues to be litigated on appeal, Hunt has not stated how Michael’s
f ailure to c om

ply strictly with Rule 4.02(2) has resulted i n any unf air prejudice to Hunt. He

6 T h o rn to n cites f

o rm e r R u le 4

. 0 3 ( 2 ) , w h i ch w as ren u m b ered a s R u le 4 .0 2 an d am en d ed , ef

f ectiv e Ju ly 1 , 2 0 1 7

. 7sim

ply claim s that the techn i c a l v i o l ation was an error a n d renders Michael’s sum m ary judgm ent m otion im

p roper. As in Thornton , we reject this argum e nt, particularly since, as Michael notes, there were no authorities cited in his m otion.
II. Whether the circuit court erred in deny ing Hunt’s m otion to alter or am end the judgm ent. ¶12. On October 1 1 , 2018, the Circuit Court of Pickens C ounty , Alabam a, entered a f inal
decree of di v o r c e b e t w een Michael and Brittany , ordering Michael to convey t he property
in q uestion t o h i m self and B rittany as joint tenants with right of survivorship. In his m otion

to alter o r am end the judgm ent, H unt argued t hat he did not l earn of this divorce decree until
af ter the c ircuit court’s order g ranting sum m ary judgm ent to Michael and t hat “[ s]uch newly
discovered evidence justif ies altering or a m e n d i ng” the circuit court’s order so t hat Hunt
could add Brittany a s an a dditional party t o the suit. Appealing f rom the court’s denial of his

m otion to alter or am end the judgm ent, he cites the sam e argum ent. 7 ¶13. It is within the circuit court’s discretion whether to grant or deny a Rule 59 m otion,
“and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion or if allowing the judgm ent to stand
would result in a m iscarriage of justice.” F reeman v. CLC of Biloxi LLC , 119 So. 3d 1164,
1 1 6 7 ( ¶ 1 0 ) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Harrison v. M iss. Transp. C

omm’n , 57 So. 3 d

7 In h is ap p ellan t ’s b rief , H u n t cites n o a

u th o ri t y t o su p p o rt t h is claim

. It is th e ap p ellan t’s d u t y “ t o p ro v id e au th o rity in su p p o rt o f an assig n m en t o f erro r
. . . [ , an d ] th e “f ailu re to cite au th o r ity in su p p o r t o f an arg u m e n t p reclu d es co n sid eratio n o f th e issu e o n ap p eal.” H

errin , 2 8 2 S o
. 3 d a t 7 3 2 -3 3 (¶2 1 ) (citatio n s o m itted ). H o w ev er, i n h is rep ly b rief , H u n t d o es cite th e stan d ard f o r g ran tin g a R u le 5 9 m o tio n ; so w e w ill ad d ress th is issu e o n its m erits. 8648, 651 (¶11) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2010)). “In order to succeed on a Rule 5 9(e) m otion, the

m ovant m ust show: (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent

m anif est injustice.” I

d . (quoting Harrison , 57 So. 3d at 651 (¶13)). ¶14. H u n t c laim s t hat the new evidence of Brittany and Michael’s divor c e d e c r e e a n d property settlem ent justif

ied granting his m otion to alter or am end the judgm ent because it “brings into question again who is the lawf ul o wner of the property .” W e d isagree. Per the chancery court’s o rder, ownership of the property was vested in Michael as of Decem ber 9,
2015. Thus, when Michael had Hunt evicted on February 2 4, 2016, and f iled his sum m ary judgm ent m otion on Septem ber 27, 2018, h e w a s t h e sole owner of the property

. There is
also n o evidence in the trial court’s record that a warranty deed granting Mich ael and Brittany joint ownership of the property was executed prior to t he court’s Decem ber 11, 2018 judgm ent. 8 ¶15. Moreover, this Court has held:
A m o tion based upon newly discovered evidence m ay not be granted unless it can be shown that (1) the evidence was discovered f ollowing the trial; (2) due diligence on the part o f the m ovant to d iscover the new evidence is s hown or m ay be inf

e r r e d ; ( 3 ) the evidence is m aterial and not cum u lative or im p eaching; (4) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a new result.

8 O n Ju n e 1 0 , 2 0 1 9 , M i ch ael f iled a m o tio n to su b stitu te B rittan y as t h e ap p ellee, in w h ich h e n o ted th at th e q u itclaim d ee d c o n v e y i n g all o f M i ch ael’s in terest in th e su b j ect p ro p erty to B rittan y w as sig n ed o n M arch 1 0 , 2 0 1 9 , an d reco rd ed w ith t h e ch an cery clerk ’s o f f ice. T h e su p rem e co u rt d en ied th e m o tio n to su b stitu te B rittan y as a p a rty to th e ap p eal o n Ju ly 1 0 , 2 0 1 9

. 9Goode v. S

ynergy Corp. , 852 So. 2 d 661, 663 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (em phasis added) (citing Moore v. Jacobs , 752 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (¶18) (Miss. 1 999)). Hunt has provided no evidence that even if Brittany had been a joint owner of the property prior to the court’s order
and j oined as a party , “ that a new trial would p robably produce a new result.” I d

. W e f ind
Michael’s argum ent—that “Brittany , the victim of [ Hunt’s] threats, duress and joint bearer
of tim e, costs, etc. ca u s e d b y [ H unt] would b e even m o re anxious f or [ him ] to be
evicted”—to be a rational one. Accordingly , w e f i n d n o abuse of discretion in the circuit
court’s denial of

Hunt’s m o t ion to alter or am end the judgm ent. ¶16. AFFIRMED.
C A R L T O N A N D J . W I L S O N , P.J J . , G R E E N L E E , W E S T B R O O K S , T I N D E L L , McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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