United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 6, 2008

Decided February 6, 2008

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge 

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

No. 07-2019

Appeal from the United States District 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Court for the Eastern District of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, Wisconsin

v. No. 06-CR-303

DuJUAN WILLIAMS, Lynn Adelman,

Defendant-Appellant. Judge.

O R D E R

DuJuan Williams pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute in

excess of 50 grams of crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Pursuant to a plea

agreement, the government dismissed an additional charge that Williams was a

felon in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and did not pursue any

penalty enhancement for his prior convictions, see 21 U.S.C. § 851. The district

court found that the applicable guidelines range for Williams’s offense was 121-151

months’ imprisonment, but after considering the factors contained in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), the court imposed a sentence of 120 months, the mandatory minimum by

statute, see § 841(b)(1)(A). Williams filed a notice of appeal, but counsel now moves

to withdraw because he cannot discern a non-frivolous basis for appeal. See Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We invited Williams to respond to counsel’s

motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), but he has not done so. Counsel’s supporting brief is

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07-2019 Page 2

facially adequate, so we limit our review to the potential issues it identifies. See

United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first considers whether Williams could challenge the voluntariness of

his guilty plea. Counsel is correct, however, that he cannot proceed to consider such

a challenge because, after discussing the appeal with Williams, Williams did not

ask counsel to pursue the argument in light of its associated risks. See United

States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we examine it no

further.

Counsel also correctly determines that any challenge to the reasonableness of

Williams’s sentence would be frivolous. At sentencing, Williams advanced a policy

argument against the then-applicable 100:1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio, and he

argued that the mandatory minimum of 120 months was adequate punishment for

his offense. Williams did not otherwise dispute the calculation of his applicable

guidelines range. After a thorough review of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court

gave Williams the sentence he asked for—120 months—which was one month below

the guidelines range. The court was free to impose a sentence below the guidelines

range based upon Williams’s § 3553(a) arguments, including his policy arguments,

provided they showed that his guidelines sentence was greater than necessary. See

Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 573-74, 575-76 (2007). But the district

court was not free to go below the mandatory minimum sentence provided by

statute, and therefore the district court’s sentence cannot be unreasonably high

when the court was not empowered to impose a lesser term. See United States v.

Cannon, 429 F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lee, 399 F.3d 864,

866 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.