IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

ALLIED PREMIER INSURANCE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

S267746

Ninth Circuit

20-55099

Central District of California

No. 5:18-cv-00088-JGB-KK

July 24, 2023

Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, 

Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
1

ALLIED PREMIER INSURANCE v. UNITED FINANCIAL 

CASUALTY COMPANY

S267746

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

has certified1the following question for our review: Under 

California’s Motor Carriers of Property Permit Act (Veh. Code, 

§ 34600 et seq.; the Act),2 does a commercial automobile 

insurance policy continue in full force and effect until the 

insurer cancels the corresponding Certificate of Insurance on 

file with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV or 

Department), regardless of the insurance policy’s stated 

expiration date? The answer is no. The terms of an insurance 

contract generally determine the duration of the policy’s

coverage. Although an endorsement can amend the policy, 

neither the Act nor the specific endorsement it requires extend 

coverage beyond the underlying policy’s expiration date. 

In Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Tab Transportation, Inc.

(1995) 12 Cal.4th 389 (Transamerica), this court interpreted an 

earlier permitting system codified in the Public Utilities Code. 

We held that the policy endorsement required by that scheme 

did extend insurance coverage until notice of cancellation was 

provided to the Public Utilities Commission. However, the

language in the Public Utilities Code, on which we relied in 

1 California Rules of Court, rule 8.548. 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle 

Code.
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Transamerica, was not carried over when later legislation 

replaced the Public Utilities Code permitting scheme and 

amended the Vehicle Code to add the Act at issue here. As a 

result, Transamerica’s holding does not control the answer to 

the certified question. 

I. BACKGROUND

The facts are taken from the parties’ joint stipulation of 

facts and exhibits as well as the judgment of the United States 

District Court, Central District of California. 

A. The Act

Commercial trucker Jose Porras is a “ ‘motor carrier of 

property’ ” (motor carrier or carrier). (§ 34601, subd. (a).) Under 

the Act, a motor carrier cannot operate on public highways 

without securing a DMV permit, which requires proof of the 

carrier’s financial responsibility. (§§ 34620, subd. (a), 34630, 

subd. (a).) A carrier can satisfy that requirement by obtaining 

a policy of insurance.3 (§ 34631.) If a carrier does so, the insurer 

must submit a certificate of insurance to the Department as 

evidence that the “protection required under [section 34631.5,]

subdivision (a)” is provided. (§ 34631.5, subd. (b)(1).) 

3 Section 34631.5, subdivision (a), establishes the required 

minimum amount of liability protection for bodily injury, death, 

and property damage. (§ 34631.5, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) The proof of 

financial responsibility required under section 34630 must “be 

evidenced by the deposit with the [DMV], covering each vehicle 

used or to be used under the motor carrier permit . . . , of one of 

the following”: (1) a certificate of insurance issued by an 

insurance company; (2) a surety bond issued by a company 

licensed to write surety bonds in the state; (3) evidence of 

qualification as a self-insurer; or (4) evidence that coverage is 

provided by a charitable risk pool. (§ 34631, subds. (a)–(d).)
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The Department has published forms to facilitate the 

administration of the Act’s financial responsibility requirement. 

Two of those forms are a “Certificate of Insurance” and an 

“Insurance Policy Endorsement.” (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, 

§ 220.06, subds. (a), (b).) When a motor carrier complies with 

the Act by obtaining an insurance policy, a DMV regulation

requires that the “Insurance Policy Endorsement . . . , amending 

the insurance policy to comply with insurance requirements 

imposed by the [Act], . . . be attached to and made part of, the 

insurance policy insuring the motor carrier.” (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 13, § 220.06, subd. (b).) 

The Act requires that “proof of financial responsibility

. . . be continued in effect during the active life” of the permit

issued to the motor carrier. (§ 34630, subd. (b).) This 

requirement prohibits cancellation of a certificate of insurance 

without notice to the DMV by the insurer.

4

 (Ibid.) When an 

insurer gives notice that a certificate will be cancelled because 

the policy will lapse or be terminated, the DMV must “suspend 

the carrier’s permit effective on the date of lapse or termination 

4 To effectuate this requirement and prohibition, the Act 

requires that “[e]very insurance certificate or equivalent 

protection to the public . . . contain a provision that the 

certificate or equivalent protection shall remain in full force and 

effect until canceled in the manner provided by [section 34631.5, 

subdivision (b)(3)].” (§ 34631.5, subd. (b)(4).) Section 34631.5, 

subdivision (b)(3) provides that a certificate of insurance “shall 

not be cancelable on less than 30 days’ written notice to the 

[DMV].” California Code of Regulations, title 13, section 220.06, 

subdivision (c) provides that “[w]ritten notice of cancellation of 

[a] Certificate of Insurance, required under [section 34630, 

subdivision (b)], shall be submitted by the insurer to the 

department on a Notice of Cancellation of Insurance.” This form 

is referred to herein as a cancellation notice. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

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unless the carrier provides evidence of valid insurance coverage” 

pursuant to section 34630, subdivision (a). (§ 34630, subd. (c).) 

This procedure ensures that only financially responsible 

carriers are permitted to operate on public highways.

B. The Facts

Effective May 2, 2013, United Financial Casualty 

Company (United) began insuring Porras under a commercial 

automobile insurance policy with an eight-digit policy number 

ending in 772 (the United policy or Policy 772). The policy

provided that, in return for Porras’s premium payment, United 

would, up to the policy limit, pay specified damages Porras 

became responsible for as a result of an accident “arising out of 

the ownership, maintenance or use of” an insured vehicle. The 

policy also provided that United would, at its option, settle or 

defend any covered claim and that, if Porras failed to pay the 

premium to renew, the policy would “automatically terminate at 

the end of the current policy period.” 

As required by the Act, United filed a certificate of 

insurance, identifying United as the insurer and Porras as the 

insured and giving the policy number ending in 772. United 

certified that a “fully executed endorsement, on a form 

authorized by the [DMV], is attached to the referenced policy to 

conform to the requirements of the [Act]” and that “[t]his 

Certificate . . . shall not be canceled on less than thirty (30) days 

notice from the Insurer to the DMV and written on a Notice of 

Cancellation form authorized by the DMV.” 

United attached the required Insurance Policy 

Endorsement to the United policy (the Endorsement). Under 

the Endorsement, United agreed: (1) to “pay, consistent with 

the minimum insurance coverage required by [section] 34631.5 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

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. . . any legal liability of insured for bodily injury, death, or 

property damage arising out of the operation, maintenance, or 

use of any vehicle(s) for which a motor carrier permit is 

required”; (2) that “[n]o provision, stipulation, or limitation 

contained in the attached policy or any endorsement shall 

relieve insurer from obligations arising out of this Endorsement 

or the Act, regardless of the insured’s financial solvency, 

indebtedness[,] or bankruptcy”; (3) that the “Certificate of 

Insurance shall not be canceled on less than thirty (30) days 

notice from the Insurer to the DMV”; and (4) that, “[e]xcept as 

specified in this endorsement, the terms, conditions, and 

limitations of this policy remain in full force and effect.” 5 One 

of the terms in the policy was the termination date. The 

Endorsement also permitted United to seek “reimbursement 

from [Porras] for any payment made by [United] solely on 

account of the [Endorsement’s] provisions.” 

United provided coverage for Porras through the original 

or renewed Policy 772 from May 2, 2013 through April 12, 2015. 

During that period, it appears that United filed at least three 

certificates of insurance and two cancellation notices, one of 

which the Department returned to United as an “incomplete 

filing.” It appears that, as the end of a policy period approached, 

United would file a cancellation notice with the DMV, noting the 

policy number and giving the date the policy would lapse. The 

timing of the notice made the DMV aware that, if Policy 772 was 

not renewed, it would lapse on the date provided, triggering the 

DMV’s duty to suspend Porras’s operating permit. If the policy 

5 Unlike the policy, the “coverage provided by the 

endorsement exclude[d] any costs of defense or other expense 

that the policy provides.” 
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6

was subsequently renewed, United would send a new certificate 

of insurance as evidence that Porras continued to have the 

required protection under Policy 772. The new certificate would 

indicate the date on which the new policy period began. As 

noted, one of United’s cancellation notices was rejected by the 

Department as an incomplete filing. After that filing was 

returned, however, United filed a new certificate of insurance, 

covering the ensuing period. As relevant here, United 

submitted its final cancellation notice on February 6, 2015, 

informing the Department that “the [United] policy, including 

applicable endorsement and certifications” is cancelled 

“effective thirty (30) days after the date” it was either received 

by the DMV, or on April 12, 2015, whichever was later. Every 

certificate and cancellation notice in the record bears both the 

772 policy number and the number of Porras’s permit.

By April 12, 2015, Porras had not paid the premium 

required to renew the United policy. Effective April 13, 2015, 

Allied Premier Insurance (Allied) began to insure Porras under 

a policy that provided the required coverage. Allied submitted 

a certificate of insurance to the Department four days later. The 

record contains no indication that, when it assumed coverage 

and filed its own certificate, Allied was aware that United’s 

earlier certificate remained uncancelled because the DMV had 

rejected United’s cancellation notice. 

On September 1, 2015, Porras was driving a truck covered 

by the Allied policy when he collided with a car driven by 

Jennifer Jones. Jones died as a result of the accident, and her 

parents sued Porras for wrongful death. Porras tendered his 

defense to Allied, which retained counsel to defend him and 

settled the parents’ claim for its policy limits of $1 million. 
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United was not a party to the Jones suit, did not defend Porras 

in that action, and did not contribute to the settlement. 

C. The Action at Issue Here

After the settlement, Allied sued United for declaratory 

relief, equitable contribution, and equitable subrogation,

seeking reimbursement for half the amount it paid to resolve the 

Jones litigation. It argued that, because one of United’s 

cancellation notices was rejected by the Department as 

incomplete, United continued to have an active certificate of 

insurance on file with the DMV. That circumstance, according 

to Allied, meant United’s policy remained in effect on the date 

of the collision between Porras and Jones. 

United urged that it had no obligation to reimburse Allied 

because its policy had expired when Porras failed to renew. 

United acknowledged one of its certificates of insurance 

remained on file with the DMV because a cancellation notice had 

been returned. However, it argued the certificate was not an 

insurance policy. At most, it created a surety-like obligation, 

providing a “safety net” for members of the public injured by 

commercial motor carriers. Because the certificate of insurance 

did not function to make United a co-insurer of Porras, United

argued it was not required to contribute to the settlement. 

The case was removed to federal court. The parties filed a 

joint stipulation of facts and exhibits and then filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court ruled for 

Allied, finding that, because United “failed properly to submit a 

Notice of Cancellation, its policy remained in effect” on the date 

of the accident, “even though [the policy] may have lapsed under 

its own terms or been cancelled by the parties.” Based on that 

finding, the court concluded that Allied and United both 
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8

provided “insurance coverage on the same risk,” and that Allied 

was “entitled to equitable contribution in the amount of 

$500,000.”6 

United appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which certified the 

question of law to this court. (Allied Premier Ins. v. United 

Financial Cas. Co. (9th Cir. 2021) 991 F.3d 1070, 1071.) In the 

Ninth Circuit’s view, the appeal turns on the following question 

of statutory interpretation: “If the [Act] requires a commercial 

auto insurance policy to remain in effect indefinitely until the 

insurer cancels the certificate of insurance on file with the DMV, 

then Allied must prevail. If not, United must prevail.” (Id. at 

p. 1073.) We hold that the Act does not require the policy to 

remain in effect indefinitely. 

II. DISCUSSION

Equitable contribution is the “right to recover, not from 

the party primarily liable for the loss [here, Porras], but from a 

co-obligor who shares such liability with the party seeking 

contribution [here, United].” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. 

Maryland Casualty Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1293

(Fireman’s Fund).) “In the insurance context, the right to 

contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to 

indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has 

paid more than its share of the loss or defended the action 

6 The district court also addressed and rejected United’s 

argument that a certificate of insurance that “remains on record 

after a policy lapses functions as a surety, through which the 

insurer ‘promises to pay up to $750,000 towards a judgment 

against the trucker [for harm to a third party] where coverage 

for some reason is unavailable under an actual insurance 

policy.’ ” The Ninth Circuit has not asked us to assess the 

propriety of that ruling, and we express no view on it.
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without any participation by the others. Where multiple 

insurance carriers insure the same insured and cover the same 

risk, each insurer has independent standing to assert a cause of 

action against its coinsurers for equitable contribution when it 

has undertaken the defense or indemnification of the common 

insured. Equitable contribution permits reimbursement to the

insurer that paid on the loss for the excess it paid over its 

proportionate share of the obligation, on the theory that the debt 

it paid was equally and concurrently owed by the other insurers 

and should be shared by them pro rata in proportion to their 

respective coverage of the risk.” (Ibid.)

The “reciprocal contribution rights of coinsurers who 

insure the same risk are based on the equitable principle that 

the burden of indemnifying or defending the insured with whom 

each has independently contracted should be borne by all the 

insurance carriers together, with the loss equitably distributed 

among those who share liability for it in direct ratio to the 

proportion each insurer’s coverage bears to the total coverage 

provided by all the insurance policies.” (Fireman’s Fund, supra, 

65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1294.) The right to equitable contribution 

“is predicated on the commonsense principle that where 

multiple insurers or indemnitors share equal contractual 

liability for the primary indemnification of a loss or the 

discharge of an obligation, the selection of which indemnitor is 

to bear the loss should not be left to the . . . choice of the loss 

claimant, and no indemnitor should have any incentive to avoid 

paying a just claim in the hope the claimant will obtain full 

payment from another coindemnitor.” (Id. at p. 1295.) 

“Equitable contribution thus assumes the existence of two 

or more valid contracts of insurance covering the particular risk 

of loss and the particular casualty in question.” (Fireman’s 
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Fund, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295, italics added.) This 

assumption lies at the heart of the Ninth Circuit’s question. 

Allied’s entitlement to equitable contribution depends on 

whether United was obligated to indemnify Porras for any 

damages due to the Jones accident. Allied is entitled to 

equitable contribution only if it can show that United was a “coobligor who shares . . . liability” with Allied for the loss resulting 

from that event. (Id. at p. 1293.) Allied must show that United 

was “obligated to indemnify or defend the same loss or claim” as 

Allied. (Ibid.) Resolution of this question turns on an 

interpretation of the Act’s requirements. 

A. The Act Does Not Extend the Policy Beyond the Term 

Contained in the Contract

As mentioned, the district court concluded that the United 

policy’s coverage remained in effect, not based on the policy’s 

terms, but because United had not cancelled all certificates of 

insurance on file with the DMV. The court relied on

Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th 389 in reaching that 

conclusion. Transamerica does not control here because it 

interpreted a different statutory scheme. 

Transamerica addressed the application of the Act’s 

predecessor, the Highway Carriers’ Act of 1951 (Pub. Util. Code,

former § 3501 et seq.; HCA). The Legislature repealed the HCA 

in 1996 and replaced it with the Act, transferring primary 

regulatory authority over commercial truckers to the DMV. (See 

Hill Brothers Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 

Cal.App.4th 1001, 1005; see also Stats. 1996, ch. 1042, § 53, 

p. 6562.) Like the Act that replaced it, the HCA prohibited 

commercial truckers from operating on public highways without 

a permit issued by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). To 
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obtain a permit, a commercial trucker had to show it carried 

“ ‘adequate protection’ against liability.” (Transamerica, supra, 

12 Cal.4th at p. 397, fn. omitted.) This could “be achieved by 

means of an insurance policy, a surety bond, or evidence . . . of 

the carrier’s qualification as a self-insurer.” (Ibid.) Proof of 

insurance coverage could be submitted to the PUC “in the form 

of ‘a certificate of insurance.’ ” (Id. at p. 398.) 

As to cancellation of a policy, the HCA provided that 

“ ‘protection against liability shall be continued in effect during 

the active life of the [trucker’s] permit,’ and that ‘[t]he policy of 

insurance or surety bond shall not be cancelable on less than 30 

days’ written notice to the [PUC], except in the event of cessation 

of operations as a highway carrier as approved by the [PUC].’ ” 

(Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 398, quoting Pub. Util. 

Code, former § 3634, italics omitted.) To promote the continuous 

protection requirement and prohibition on cancellation without 

notice, the PUC promulgated General Order No. 100, which 

required the following provisions to be included in any policy 

subject to the HCA: (1) “ ‘A policy of insurance, or surety bond, 

evidencing such protection, shall not be cancelable on less than 

thirty (30) days’ written notice to the Public Utilities 

Commission’ ”; and (2) “ ‘Every insurance policy, surety bond or 

equivalent protection to the public shall contain a provision that 

such policy, surety bond or equivalent protection will remain in 

full force and effect until canceled in the manner provided’ ” by 

the General Order. (Transamerica, at p. 398, italics added.) The 

regulatory scheme also required “a standard PUC form 

endorsement” be “attached to every policy of insurance 

purchased by a highway carrier.” (Id. at pp. 394, 398.) The 

endorsement certified “that a liability policy issued to a highway 
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carrier [would] continue ‘in full force and effect until canceled’ ” 

by written notice to the PUC. (Id. at p. 394, italics added.)

The dispute in Transamerica was between a commercial 

trucking company (Tab) and its liability insurer (Transamerica). 

In 1980, Tab purchased a one-year term liability insurance 

policy from Transamerica to comply with the HCA. 

(Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 395.) Transamerica filed 

a certificate of insurance with the PUC. The certificate provided 

that the “policy was ‘Effective 2-1-80 Until Canceled.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Tab did not renew the Transamerica policy and, in the ensuing 

years, obtained insurance policies from Federal Insurance 

Company (Federal) and Home Indemnity Company (Home). 

(Ibid.) Both Federal and Home filed certificates of insurance 

representing their policies with the PUC. (Ibid.) However, 

“neither Transamerica nor Tab ever notified the PUC of the 

cancelation of the Transamerica policy.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 

In 1989, a Tab truck collided with a train, causing multiple 

injuries and deaths. (Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 

395.) The plaintiffs sued Tab for various claims and sought $6 

million in damages. (Id. at p. 396.) Tab demanded coverage 

from Transamerica, Federal, and Home under the three policies 

mentioned above. (Ibid.) Federal and Home “each contributed 

[their] policy limits (a total of $1.6 million) to a global settlement 

in which Tab admitted liability.” (Ibid.) Transamerica did not 

participate in the settlement. (Ibid.) 

Transamerica then sued Tab, seeking a declaratory 

judgment that it was not liable for damages from the 1989 

collision because its policy had previously expired. 

(Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 396.) Tab crosscomplained, asserting entitlement to coverage under the policy 
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because the certificate of insurance Transamerica filed with the 

PUC “expressly stated its policy was ‘Effective 2-1-80 Until 

Canceled.’ ” (Ibid.) Because Transamerica never notified the 

PUC that its policy was canceled, Tab argued the policy 

“continued in effect.” (Ibid.) The trial court granted Tab’s 

motion for summary adjudication of the coverage issue. 

Transamerica appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed, 

concluding that the Transamerica policy had “expired of its own 

terms [in] 1981, and that Transamerica therefore had no 

obligation to give 30 days’ written notice to the PUC of its intent 

to cancel the policy.” (Id. at pp. 396–397.) 

On review, this Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s 

judgment and concluded that Transamerica’s policy was still “in 

effect at the time of the 1989 accident, thus providing coverage 

for Tab.” (Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 400.) We 

reasoned that the “policy must be read in light of its original 

provisions as well as those added to the policy by the PUC’s 

standard form endorsement.” (Id. at p. 399.) We then described 

the policy and endorsement as follows: “As initially written, the 

Transamerica policy was to remain in effect for one year only, 

from February 1, 1980, until February 1, 1981. But . . . the 

policy was amended by the standard PUC endorsement, which 

provides for inclusion in the policy of the PUC’s General Order 

No. 100 . . . . [¶] Incorporation of General Order No. 100 . . . into 

the provisions of the Transamerica policy added to the 

provisions the requirement . . . that ‘such policy . . . will remain 

in full force and effect until canceled . . . .’ This language, of 

course, is in direct conflict with the language of the policy as 

originally written stating that the policy was to expire in 

February 1981.” (Id. at pp. 399–400.) We concluded that 

“incorporation into the policy of the PUC’s General Order No. 
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100 language requiring the policy to remain in ‘full force and 

effect until canceled’ converted the policy from a one-year term 

policy to a policy that was to remain in effect ‘until canceled.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 400.) It was undisputed that there was “no compliance 

with the notice requirements” in former section 3634 of the 

Public Utilities Code and General Order No. 100. Therefore, we 

held that the policy was “still in effect” at the time of the 1989 

collision. (Transamerica, at p. 400.) 

Under its terms, the HCA provided that “ ‘protection 

against liability shall be continued in effect during the active life 

of the permit,’ and that ‘[t]he policy of insurance or surety bond 

shall not be cancelable on less than 30 days’ written notice to 

the [PUC], except in the event of cessation of operations as a 

highway carrier as approved by the [PUC].’ ” (Transamerica,

supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 398, quoting Pub. Util. Code, former 

§ 3634, original italics omitted, italics added.) So, the terms of 

the HCA required that protection against liability, which was 

provided by the policy, remain in effect until the motor carrier’s 

permit was cancelled. To effectuate that requirement, the HCA 

and the required endorsement prohibited the policy from being 

cancelled without notice. 

The Act is different. It provides that “[p]roof of financial 

responsibility shall be continued in effect during the active life 

of the motor carrier permit,” and that the “certificate of 

insurance shall not be cancellable on less than 30 days’ written 

notice from the insurer to the [DMV] except in the event of 

cessation of operations as a permitted motor carrier of property.” 

(§ 34630, subd. (b), italics added.) Likewise, section 34631.5, 

subdivision (b)(3) provides that the certificate of insurance, 

“evidencing the protection, shall not be cancelable on less than 

30 days’ written notice” to the DMV. Thus, while the HCA 
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specifically prohibited cancellation of an insurance policy

without notice, the Act only prohibits cancellation of a certificate 

of insurance without notice. This prohibition helps to ensure 

that “proof of financial responsibility” remains “in effect during 

the active life” of the permit. (§ 34630, subd. (b).)

The difference in statutory language is significant. Under 

the HCA and the endorsement required by General Order No. 

100, the underlying policy could not be cancelled without notice

to the PUC. As a result, Transamerica remained obligated. Its 

policy with Tab had been amended by the endorsement, which 

“converted the policy from a one-year term policy to a policy that 

was to remain in effect ‘until canceled.’ ” (Transamerica, supra, 

12 Cal.4th at p. 400.) But under the new language of the Act

only the certificate of insurance remains active until cancelled. 

Cancellation of a certificate triggers the DMV’s obligation to 

suspend the motor carrier’s permit. The statute does not say 

that the underlying policy remains active beyond the period 

called for in the contract between the parties. There is no 

language that “converts” the stated term of the policy. 

Transamerica was decided against the backdrop of a

general rule that an insurance company “incurs no liability for 

an accident that occurs after the policy period has ended.” 

(Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 394.) This Court 

concluded in Transamerica that the HCA created an exception 

to that general rule. The coverage provided by an insurance 

policy subject to the HCA could not be canceled, regardless of its 

stated expiration date, without written notice of the policy’s 

cancellation to the PUC. (Transamerica, at p. 401.) This 

exception was based on explicit statutory language in the HCA 

prohibiting cancellation of a “ ‘policy of insurance, or surety 
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bond’ ” without notice to the PUC. (Transamerica, at p. 398, 

quoting Pub. Util. Code, former § 3634.) 

That language was not carried over into the Act. The 

change does not appear inadvertent. Like the HCA, an early 

draft of the Act would have conditioned a motor carrier’s 

“[r]egistration” with the Department on the filing of either “a 

policy of insurance,” a surety bond, or other evidence of 

insurance. (Assem. Bill 1683 (1995–96 Reg. Sess.) § 55, as 

amended Aug. 30, 1995.) The same draft would have required 

that “protection against liability . . . be continued in effect during 

the active life of the registration.” (Ibid.) In later drafts, that 

language was removed from the relevant provisions and 

replaced with requirements that: (1) a “certificate of insurance” 

be filed with the Department; and (2) “proof of financial 

responsibility . . . be continued in effect during the active life of 

the permit.” (Assem. Bill 1683 (1995-96 Reg. Sess.) § 53, as 

amended July 7, 1996.) These were the requirements the 

Legislature ultimately approved. (§ 34630, subds. (a), (b).) 

We generally infer a change in meaning from a change in 

statutory language. An “ ‘essential change in the phraseology of 

a statutory provision would indicate an intention on the part of 

the legislature to change the meaning of such provision rather 

than interpret it.’ ” (Estate of Todd (1941) 17 Cal.2d 270, 274–

275.) This is especially true if a court has construed the old 

statute as having a particular meaning. (See Benson v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeals Bd. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1557 

(Benson).) As O’Brien v. Dudenhoeffer (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 

327 explained, an “amendment materially changing a statute 

following a court decision interpreting the statute in its original 

form is to be regarded as an indication of legislative intent to 

change the meaning of the law.” (Id. at p. 335.) We should 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

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therefore “reject an interpretation of the statute which would 

leave the prior judicial construction in effect.” (Ibid.) 

The Act prohibits cancellation of a certificate of insurance 

without notice to the DMV. (§ 34630, subd. (b); § 34631.5, subd. 

(b)(3).) Unlike the HCA, it does not speak to cancellation or 

termination of the underlying policy, which embodies the 

agreement between the parties. As a result, the Act does not 

prevent cancellation or termination of an insurance policy under 

the terms of the contract. 

It is undisputed that at least one certificate of insurance 

that United filed during the period it covered Porras remained 

uncancelled at the time of the accident. The question remains: 

What impact does a certificate of insurance remaining on file 

with the DMV have with respect to the coverage that an insurer 

owes to its insured? Again, we return to the language of the 

United policy, the certificate of insurance, and the endorsement. 

B. The Effect Upon Coverage of the Certificate of Insurance 

and the Required Endorsement

Insurance coverage is generally understood to mean an 

obligation on the insurer “to defend and indemnify the insured 

against loss resulting from specified activities.” (2 Witkin, 

Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Insurance, § 210, p. 329.) 

The certificate of insurance required by the Act mentions

neither of these obligations. They are, instead, imposed by the 

terms of the United policy and by the Endorsement, though the 

obligations are described differently in each document. 

In its certificates of insurance, United affirmed that 

Porras was covered by Policy 772, that the policy covered all 

vehicles for which Porras’s permit was required, and that a fully 

executed endorsement was attached to the policy. It also agreed 
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the certificate was not cancellable without 30 days’ written 

notice to the Department. 

The United policy promised that, if Porras “pa[id] the 

premium for liability coverage for the insured auto involved,” 

then United would pay damages up to the policy limits. The 

policy also provided that United would “settle or defend, at [its] 

option, any [covered] claim or lawsuit for damages.” Thus, so 

long as Porras paid the required premium, the policy required 

United to (1) defend or settle any covered claim against Porras 

and (2) indemnify Porras for any damages, up to the limits of 

liability. If Porras did not pay the required premium, however, 

the policy would “automatically terminate at the end of the 

current policy period.” 

The Endorsement also addressed United’s duties to defend 

and indemnify Porras, but it altered some of the obligations 

United and Porras owed to each other under the terms of the 

underlying policy. In the Endorsement, United promised to 

“pay, consistent with the minimum insurance coverage required 

by [section 34631.5], and consistent with the limits it provides 

herein, any legal liability of [Porras] for bodily injury, death, or 

property damage arising out of the operation, maintenance, or 

use of any vehicle(s) for which a motor carrier permit is 

required.” United also promised that “[n]o provision, 

stipulation, or limitation contained in the attached policy or any 

endorsement [would] relieve [United] from obligations arising 

out of this Endorsement or the Act, regardless of insured’s

financial solvency, indebtedness or bankruptcy.” However, the 

Endorsement’s “coverage” excluded any “costs of defense or 

other expense that the policy provide[d].” And the Endorsement 

specifically stated that it did “not prevent [United] from seeking 

reimbursement from [Porras] for any payment made by [United] 
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solely on account of the [Endorsement’s] provisions.” Thus, the 

Endorsement promised that United would pay Porras’s legal 

liability up to the statutorily required minimum amount

notwithstanding any provision or limitation in the policy. But 

it also allowed United to seek reimbursement from Porras for 

any payment United made solely on account of its provisions, 

and it specifically excluded the costs of Porras’s defense from its 

coverage. More importantly for our purposes, the Endorsement 

was an amendment to the United policy. Unlike the HCA and 

the endorsement applying General Order No. 100 in 

Transamerica, nothing in the Act or the Endorsement provides 

that the policy must remain effective until cancellation of the 

certificate of insurance. 

We emphasize that the question before us is a narrow one. 

We hold that an uncancelled certificate of insurance that 

remains on file with the DMV does not cause the corresponding 

insurance policy to remain in effect in perpetuity. But that is 

not to say that an uncancelled certificate of insurance imposes 

no obligation of any kind on the responsible insurer. The 

statutory scheme suggests otherwise. For example, section 

34631.5, subdivision (d) provides that “[e]very insurance 

certificate or equivalent protection to the public shall contain a 

provision that the certificate or equivalent protection shall 

remain in full force and effect until canceled.” Further, under 

the Act, an insurer remains obligated to promptly notify the 

DMV at least 30 days before a certificate of insurance is 

cancelled. This obligation is an important part of the statutory 

scheme, alerting the DMV of the need to suspend a motor 

carrier’s permit until new insurance coverage is acquired. 

United has suggested in the federal litigation, and before 

this court, that an uncancelled certificate of insurance could 
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impose on the insurer something akin to a surety obligation to 

members of the public. The Ninth Circuit has not asked us to, 

and we need not, resolve whether such an obligation is created 

and the scope of any such obligation. We express no opinion on 

those questions. The character, nature, and extent of the

obligations owed by a company that does not properly cancel a 

certificate of insurance are matters that can be clarified by 

further litigation and/or legislative action. 

C. Allied’s Counterarguments Fail

In Allied’s view, the coverage provided by an insurance 

policy subject to the Act cannot lapse or be canceled until the 

insurer files a cancellation notice with the DMV. Indeed, 

Allied’s primary argument is that the insurance policy, the 

endorsement, and the certificate of insurance are all inseparable 

parts of a single whole, none of which can exist or be canceled 

without an effect on the others. 

In support of this position, Allied points to section 34630, 

subdivision (a), which refers to “the policy represented by the 

certificate,” and section 34631.5, subdivision (b)(1), which refers 

to the certificate of insurance as “evidence[]” of the “protection 

required” by the Act. Allied contends that, because the 

certificate is evidence of and “represents the policy,” it “cannot 

exist without an underlying policy.” Allied argues that “even if 

the policy . . . is set to expire on a certain date, the [certificate] 

and the policy it represents will remain in effect until 30 days 

after written notice is given to the DMV.” 

Allied also relies on language in the certificate of 

insurance, in which United certified under penalty of perjury

that Porras “is covered” by the United policy. Allied urges the 

use of the verb “is” means that the policy must remain active 
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until the certificate is canceled. According to Allied, if a policy 

can be canceled while the corresponding certificate remains

active, then the insurer would be subject to penalties for perjury. 

Allied argues the certificate would become “a hollow document” 

that “would certify a falsehood — i.e. that there is insurance 

available.” To support its position that the policy and the

endorsement are inseparable, Allied relies on language in the 

Endorsement providing that it is “attached to and made a part 

of” the United policy. Finally, Allied points to the cancellation 

notice, urging that it provides notice of cancellation of all three 

documents: policy; certificate; and endorsement. Allied argues 

there is “no separate mechanism for canceling only one or two of 

the three . . . . [E]ither all are active or all are canceled.” 

There is, of course, a linkage between an insurance policy 

subject to the Act, the certificate of insurance required by the 

Act, and the endorsement required by the DMV’s regulations. 

But the documents are not one and the same. Rather, each 

serves its own function within the regulatory framework. As 

explained, an insurance policy is an agreement between an 

insurer and its insured. If a motor carrier complies with the Act 

by obtaining insurance, the certificate is evidence tendered to 

the DMV that the insurer agrees to be bound by the terms of the 

endorsement and therefore provides sufficient protection to 

satisfy the Act’s financial responsibility requirements. The 

certificate thus demonstrates the carrier’s financial 

responsibility by virtue of its contractual arrangement with the 

insurer. It is the document that supports issuance of the 

carrier’s permit, and its cancellation triggers the Department’s 

duty to suspend that permit. The certificate, however, does not 

govern the obligations between the parties. The endorsement, 

meanwhile, serves to ensure that the policy complies with the 
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Act’s financial responsibility requirements and amends the 

policy to the extent of the endorsement’s terms. 

Allied’s argument, that an insurer might be subject to a 

perjury charge for failing to cancel a certificate of insurance 

when a policy expires, raises an interesting potentiality, but it 

does not establish that the certificate, the policy, and the 

endorsement are inseparable or cannot exist without one 

another. Indeed, the premise that the three documents are 

indivisible is flawed. On the contrary, a carrier can contract for 

coverage with an insurer, and that coverage can become legally 

binding on the parties without any endorsement and before any 

certificate is filed. The fact a certificate “remains on file” with 

the DMV does not act to extend the policy’s coverage beyond its 

expiration date. As for the Endorsement, its language clearly 

indicates that the nature of coverage it describes is different 

from that provided by the policy. The Endorsement amended 

the policy in several ways. If applicable, it would impose no duty 

to defend, and it would allow United to seek reimbursement 

from Porras under certain circumstances. But, unlike the 

endorsement in Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th 389, it did not 

change the duration of coverage, a subject to which it did not 

speak. Therefore, the Endorsement did not convert the policy 

from one with an agreed-upon term to one which remained in 

effect until cancelled.

Next, Allied argues there is no indication that the 

Legislature intended “to modify the financial responsibility 

requirements for motor carriers” or to change the rule from 

Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th 389. Rather, the Legislature’s 

purpose in passing the Act, according to Allied, was to conform 

state law to a newly enacted federal law that preempted parts 

of the HCA. Allied points out that neither the Act nor its 
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legislative history singles out Transamerica for “disapproval.” 

According to Allied, the change in statutory language was 

simply based on a change in the documentation required to be 

filed with the Department.

7

 

In construing a statute, we consider first the words of the 

statute as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. 

(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources 

Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.) Here, the HCA 

previously prohibited cancellation of an insurance policy 

without notice to the PUC. In the Act, that prohibition has been 

removed and replaced with a prohibition on the cancellation of 

a certificate of insurance without notice to the DMV. If the 

Legislature intended to perpetuate Transamerica’s holding,

relating to the continuation of the underlying policy itself, it 

could have simply used the same language it used in the HCA. 

Allied cites no authority for the proposition that the rule from 

Transamerica must survive because the Legislature failed to 

specifically disapprove it in the new statute or to specifically 

note such an intention as part of its legislative history. Well 

established authority supports the conclusion that a change in 

statutory language can, itself, be an indication of the 

Legislature’s intent. (See O’Brien v. Dudenhoeffer, supra, 16 

Cal.App.4th 327, 335, and cases cited therein; see also Benson, 

7 Under the HCA, an insurer was required to “ ‘deposit’ ” a 

“ ‘policy of insurance’ ” with the PUC as proof of a trucker’s 

financial responsibility (Pub. Util. Code, former § 3632), though 

with the PUC’s consent the insurer could file a certificate of 

insurance “in lieu of the policy” (Transamerica, supra, 12 

Cal.4th at p. 408 (dis. opn. of Baxter, J., citing Pub. Util. Code, 

former § 3633). Under the Act, an insurer need only file a 

certificate of insurance to prove a motor carrier’s financial 

responsibility. (§ 34631.5, subd. (b)(1).) 
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supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557.) Finally, that the Legislature 

sought to avoid federal preemption does not mean it did not act 

with other purposes in mind as well. 

Allied’s final argument is that, if we adopt United’s 

“position that the expiration of a policy eliminates the insurance 

company’s obligation under the policy despite [the] lack of notice 

to the DMV,” then “the entire system of financial responsibility 

for motor carriers [will] be eviscerated.” The argument, though 

a bit hyperbolical, is related to a policy argument we raised in 

Transamerica. There, we stated the “certificate of insurance 

that an insurance company files with the PUC serves as proof of 

a highway carrier’s adequate protection against liability . . . . 

[A] long-term PUC employee testified at trial that the PUC looks 

to the certificate as proof of a highway carrier’s compliance with 

the financial responsibility obligations imposed by the statutory 

scheme: When a certificate for a policy of insurance is on file, 

the PUC assumes that the policy is still in effect, thus providing 

coverage for the highway carrier. [¶] In addition to providing 

an efficient means for the PUC to administer the [HCA’s] 

financial responsibility requirements . . . , the certificate of 

insurance on file with the PUC serves as assurance that the 

public is protected in the event of an accident involving a 

particular highway carrier.” (Transamerica, supra, 12 Cal.4th 

at p. 403.) Allied contends that, if we hold that an insurance 

policy subject to the Act can be canceled without notice to the 

DMV, then the public will be left unprotected if a motor carrier 
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without insurance, but with an active certificate of insurance 

representing an expired policy, is involved in an accident.8 

It is true that commercial trucking is a business affecting

the public interest and that one goal of the regulating legislation 

is to ensure that truckers do not improperly seek to reduce costs 

by carrying inadequate insurance. (Transamerica, supra, 12 

Cal.4th at p. 397.) Transamerica reasoned that, as between an 

insurer who failed to properly notify the PUC of a policy’s 

expiration and a member of the public injured by an 

inadequately insured trucker, the insurer should bear the risk 

of loss. (Id. at pp. 403−404.) The Act’s legislative history 

indicates that it was also intended to “enhance public safety.” 

(See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Energy, Utilities and Communications, 

analysis of Assem. Bill. No. 1683 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended July 7, 1996, p. 2.) However, the extension of 

insurance coverage beyond the underlying policy’s expiration 

date is not the only way to achieve these public protection goals. 

As discussed above, further litigation or legislative action 

may clarify the particulars of how the overall statutory scheme 

will operate to protect the public. That important policy 

question need not be resolved here. The certified question arises 

only in the context of claims for equitable contribution and 

subrogation between two insurance companies. It bears 

repeating that the plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit were 

compensated to the full limits of Allied’s policy under the terms 

8 We conclude that a policy can be cancelled even if the 

corresponding certificate of insurance remains on file. 

Accordingly, we need not consider whether a subsequent, and 

properly filed, certificate of insurance supersedes the vitality of 

any previously filed certificate relating to the same policy. 
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of their settlement and that, at all relevant times, Porras 

properly maintained an active operating permit. 

III. CONCLUSION

Under the Act, a commercial automobile insurance policy 

does not continue in full force and effect until the insurer cancels 

a corresponding certificate of insurance on file with the DMV. 

The duration of the policy’s coverage is regulated by its terms 

and those of any endorsement or amendment to the policy itself. 

CORRIGAN, J.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Allied Premier Insurance v. United Financial 

Casualty Company

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.548)

Review Granted (published)

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S267746

Date Filed: July 24, 2023

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: 

County: 

Judge: 

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Patrick Howe Law, Patrick M. Howe; Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet 

and Peder K. Batalden for Defendant and Appellant.

Booth, Hillary Arrow Booth and Ian P. Culver for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

Peder K. Batalden

Horvitz & Levy LLP

3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor

Burbank, CA 91505

(818) 995-0800

Hillary Arrow Booth

Booth LLP

11835 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 600E 

Los Angeles, CA 90064

(310) 641-1800