IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROCHE DIABETES CARE, LTD.,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:23-cv-00585-JRG-RSP

PATENT CASE

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANT ROCHE DIABETES CARE, LTD.’S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES........................................................................................2

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................3

III. LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................5

A. Personal Jurisdiction...........................................................................................5

B. Failure to State a Claim ......................................................................................8

IV. ARGUMENT.....................................................................................................................9

A. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over RDC Ltd. ......................................9

1. RDC Ltd. is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in this 

District. ....................................................................................................9

2. RDC Ltd. is not subject to specific jurisdiction in this District..................12

3. The assertion of personal jurisdiction would be neither reasonable 

nor fair. ..................................................................................................15

B. Display Tech’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim ..............................................17

1. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Direct Infringement.....................17

2. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Indirect Infringement. .................19

V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................19

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Advanced Analogic Techs., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs., Inc.,

No. C-09-1360 MMC, 2009 WL 1974602 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009).....................................18

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct.,

480 U.S. 102 (1987)............................................................................................................14

Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd.,

566 F.3d. 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2009)...........................................................................................12

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 554 (2007)..............................................................................................................8

Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen,

681 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................8

Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan,

447 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2006) ...............................................................................................12

Centre One v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,

No. 08-cv-00467, 2009 WL 2461003 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009)...........................................5

Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.,

No. 6:14-CV-752-JRG-JDL, 2015 WL 4910427 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2015) 

(Gilstrap, J.) ..........................................................................................................................9

Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U.S. 117 (2014)..............................................................................................................8

Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc.,

179 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1999) ...............................................................................................13

Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. AI Tech., Inc.,

562 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D. Tex. 2008) .................................................................................10

F & G Research, Inc. v. Dynapoint (Taiwan), Inc.,

262 F. App’x 277 (Fed. Cir. 2008).........................................................................................7

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

564 U.S. 915 (2011).................................................................................................... 6, 7, 13

Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams Cnty. Asphalt, Inc.,

85 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................13

Case 2:23-cv-00585-JRG-RSP Document 41 Filed 07/26/24 Page 3 of 26 PageID #: 1709
iii

Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235 (1958)..............................................................................................................7

Harris v. Action Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc.,

No. 2:09–CV–286, 2010 WL 3489084 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010).......................................10

Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Propet USA, Inc.,

62 F. App’x 322 (Fed. Cir. 2003).......................................................................................7, 9

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310 (1945)..........................................................................................................6, 7

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,

564 U.S. 873 (2011)............................................................................................................14

Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp.,

523 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................6

Kovalchuk v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB,

528 F. Supp. 3d 647 (E.D. Tex. 2021) ...................................................................................5

Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.,

134 S.Ct. 2111 (2014) .........................................................................................................19

Mayne Pharma Int’l PTY Ltd. v. Merck & Co.,

No. CV 15-438-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 7833206 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2015)..................................18

Med. Sols., Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC,

541 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................6

Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.,

681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..............................................................................................7

N. Star Innovations, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.,

No. 16-115-LPS-CJB, 2016 WL 7107230 (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2016)........................................18

Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Co. S.A.,

263 F. Supp. 3d 498 (D. Del. 2017)............................................................................... 14, 15

Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Comp. SA,

264 F. Supp. 3d 498 (D. Del. 2017).................................................................................8, 15

Nu-You Techs., LLC v. Beauty Town Int’l Inc.,

No. 3:15-CV-03433-N, 2016 WL 4717991 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2016).....................................8

Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House,

626 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..............................................................................................6

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iv

Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

253 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................5

Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy,

829 F. 3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016)...........................................................................................14

Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Facebook, Inc.,

No. 2:11-CV-400-JRG, 2012 WL 3647182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2012) 

(Gilstrap, J.) ........................................................................................................................11

Stragent, LLC v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,

No. 6:16-CV-446-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 2821697 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) ..................9, 19

Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH Ltd.

2017 WL 2832613 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2017) .................................................................1, 19

Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico,

563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..............................................................................................8

Systems Div., Inc. v. Teknek Elecs., Ltd.,

253 Fed. Appx. 31 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................................6

U.S. v. Jon–T Chemicals, Inc.,

768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).........................................13

Univ. of Mass. Med. Sch. v. L’Oréal S.A.,

No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 WL 5919745 (D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018).....................................15

Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co.,

84 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................................16

WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp.,

776 F. Supp. 2d 342 (E.D. Tex. 2011) .................................................................................18

World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV Ya Mawlaya,

99 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................................7, 8

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286 (1980)..............................................................................................................7

York Group, Inc. v. Horizon Casket Group, Inc.,

No. H-05-2181, 2006 WL 2141081 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2006)..............................................10

In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc.,

609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................................17

Other Authorities

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) ................................................................................................ 7, 8, 9, 15

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FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2)............................................................................................... 5, 8, 18, 19

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Roche’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction went unopposed for over two 

months before Display Technologies finally got around to amending its Complaint. (See Dkt. 37

(Second Notice of Non-Opp).) In all that time, Display Technologies never asked for an extension 

or explained its lack of opposition—not even after this Court granted another Roche entity’s 

Motion to Dismiss that went unopposed by Display Technologies’ counsel.1 Nor did Display 

Technologies otherwise litigate its case, as it never served infringement contentions, which were 

originally due May 15, 2024, and never served Initial and Additional Disclosures, which were 

due June 20, 2024.

Rather than cure its past failings, Display Technologies misuses the DCO’s Amended 

Pleading deadline to put forth a half-hearted amendment that further demonstrates why dismissal 

is appropriate. The pleading notably fails to include any facts tying the named Defendant to this 

District, opting instead for bare and unsupported legal conclusions regarding what Defendant 

“and/or . . . intermediaries” have done “[u]pon information and belief.” (Dkt. 38 at ¶ 6.) These 

allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, and this case should thus be dismissed.

As explained in Roche’s first motion, Display Technologies should not be rewarded for its 

lack of diligence and improper forum shopping. (See Dkt. 21.) Roche Diabetes Care, Ltd. (“RDC 

Ltd.”)2 was sued because it is a foreign corporation, allowing Display Technologies to improperly 

assert venue in this District. But public documentation reveals that the company that actually 

1

See Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH Ltd., E.D.Tex. 2:23-cv-00630-

JRG, Dkt. No. 14 (Gilstrap, J.).

2 Display Technologies also did not properly identify the foreign Defendant, which is registered in 

England and Wales as “Roche Diabetes Care Limited,” not the short form “Roche Diabetes Care, 

Ltd.” that Display Technologies used. Reference to “RDC Ltd.” herein refers to “Roche Diabetes 

Care Limited.” 

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provides the Accused Instrumentalities is Roche Diabetes Care, Inc. (“RDC Inc.”)—a U.S.

company headquartered in Indiana with no place of business in this District.

Display Technologies ignored these public facts in suing RDC Inc., and its Amended 

Complaint doubles down on its baseless allegations, despite being informed of the relevant public 

facts in Defendant’s first motion. Display Technologies has now had multiple opportunities to sue 

the correct defendant in the proper jurisdiction. After refusing to do so, Display Technologies’

case should be dismissed with prejudice. 

Display Technologies’ claims should also be dismissed because RDC Ltd. does not directly 

conduct any business in the U.S. Nor has Display Technologies plausibly alleged as much. RDC 

Ltd. thus cannot have performed any infringing acts in the U.S., and Display Technologies has

failed to plead a plausible claim of patent infringement. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.

I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. A court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the plaintiff pleads facts 

plausibly alleging that either (i) the defendant committed an act or acts in the district giving rise to 

a stated claim or (ii) the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the district such that 

exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice. Here, RDC Ltd. is a non-U.S. entity, and Display Technologies has not 

plausibly alleged any facts that purport to show that RDC Ltd. has any operations within or 

contacts with this District. Should the Court therefore dismiss Display Technologies’ claims for 

lack of personal jurisdiction?

2. To sufficiently plead infringement, a plaintiff must identify an infringing act or acts 

attributable to the defendant. Here, Display Technologies has not plausibly alleged any acts 

attributable to RDC Ltd. Nor could it, as RDC Ltd. does not act within the U.S. Should the Court 

therefore dismiss Display Technologies’ claims for failure to state a claim?

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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its Complaint, Display Technologies did not provide any facts alleging that this Court 

has jurisdiction over RDC Ltd. Instead, Display Technologies included a screenshot with a “Roche 

Diabetes Care Limited” copyright footer from www.accu-chek.com. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.) RDC Ltd. 

does not, however, develop, sell, or distribute the Accused Instrumentalities in the U.S. The entity 

responsible for the Accused Instrumentalities is RDC Inc. This, too, is clearly shown on the accuchek.com website that Display Technologies cited:

(Ex. 1, , accessible at https://www.accu-chek.com/about-us.) 

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The same is true for the Amended Complaint. Indeed, the only new allegations related to 

personal jurisdiction are three conclusory paragraphs:

(Dkt. 38 at ¶¶ 5-7.) None of these paragraphs include any specific facts, references to the Accused 

Instrumentalities, or citations to public information. (Id.)

Display Technologies accuses Roche’s blood glucose meter devices called Accu-Chek 

Guide and Guide Me (the “Accused Devices”) when paired with the mySugr mobile application 

(the “Accused Application”) (collectively the “Accused Instrumentalities”) of infringing its 

patents. (Dkt. 38 at ¶¶ 9, 32, 33; Dkts. 38-3, 38-4.) The Accused Devices are manufactured and 

distributed in the U.S. by RDC Inc.—not RDC Ltd. As shown above, this is clearly stated on the 

Accu-Chek website. (Ex. 1, accessible at https://www.accu-chek.com/about-us). This information 

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is also clearly listed on the packaging, manuals, and product inserts of the Accused Devices, as 

well as the FDA 510(k) applications for the Accused Devices. (See Exs. 2-6.) Likewise, the 

Accused Application is offered in the U.S. by RDC Inc.—not RDC Ltd. 

RDC Ltd. is a foreign entity based in the United Kingdom. RDC, Ltd. and RDC, Inc. are 

not directly affiliated with each other, and RDC, Inc. is not an “intermediary” of RDC Ltd. Other 

than the copyright notice on the accu-chek.com website that erroneously listed “Roche Diabetes 

Care Limited,” there is no evidence pointing to any relationship between RDC Ltd. and the 

Accused Instrumentalities in the U.S. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.) In fact, RDC Ltd. does not even offer the 

Accused Devices, as evidenced by RDC Ltd.’s website, which does not list the Accused Devices. 

(Ex. 7.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Personal Jurisdiction

In response to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion challenging personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears 

the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate. See Centre One v. Vonage Holdings 

Corp., No. 08-cv-00467, 2009 WL 2461003, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (“Once a movant 

challenges a court’s jurisdiction over him, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden to show 

the movant has minimum contacts with the forum state to support jurisdiction over the movant.”) 

(citing Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 265 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). In assessing personal 

jurisdiction, this Court need not credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted. See Panda 

Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001). Further, “[i]t 

is well settled that courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record” Kovalchuk v. 

Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB, 528 F. Supp. 3d 647, 658 (E.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Sanders v. 

Univ. of Texas Pan Am. , 776 F. App’x 835, 837 (5th Cir. 2019)). 

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The law of the Federal Circuit applies to determine whether a district court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state accused infringer in a patent case. Nuance Commc’ns, 

Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “A district court has personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant in a patent infringement case if two things are true. First, 

jurisdiction must exist under the forum state’s long-arm statute. Second, the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction must be consistent with the limitations of the due process clause.” Med. Sols., Inc. v. 

C Change Surgical LLC, 541 F.3d 1136, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). “Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of 

federal due process, the two-step inquiry collapses into one federal due process analysis.” 

Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Personal jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways. The first is specific 

jurisdiction, which “depends on ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ 

principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to 

the State’s regulation.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 

(2011). Two methods of establishing specific jurisdiction include the “stream-of-commerce” 

theory and the “alter ego” theory. The “stream-of-commerce” theory contemplates “a nonresident 

defendant, acting outside the forum, plac[ing] in the stream of commerce a product that ultimately 

causes harm inside the forum.” Id. at 926. Under the alter ego theory, “[e]ven though a party 

would not normally be subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular forum, courts may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over an individual or corporation that is an alter ego or successor of a 

corporation that would be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court.” Systems Div., Inc. v. 

Teknek Elecs., Ltd., 253 Fed. Appx. 31, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

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The second basis for establishing personal jurisdiction is general jurisdiction. “A court 

may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear 

any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 

systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 

(citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S., at 317). For general jurisdiction to apply, federal due process requires 

that defendants have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that maintaining the suit “does 

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. A defendant has minimum 

contacts with a forum state when the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). It is unlawful to exercise personal jurisdiction over 

a defendant without such minimum contacts. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; F & G Research, Inc. v. 

Dynapoint (Taiwan), Inc., 262 F. App’x 277, 278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s 

grant of Taiwanese defendant’s motion to dismiss where defendant had “no contacts” with the 

forum). “Under the ‘minimum contacts’ test, a defendant may be subject to either specific 

jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.” Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Propet USA, Inc., 62 F. App’x 

322, 336 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Additionally, Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a federal court 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant that has sufficient contacts with the U.S. as a 

whole but is not subject to jurisdiction in any single state. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). Merial Ltd. v. 

Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV Ya 

Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1996). In effect, Rule 4(k)(2) “approximates a federal 

long-arm statute” where the “(1) the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law, (2) the defendant is 

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not subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of any state, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction 

satisfies due process requirements.” World Tanker, 99 F.3d 717 at 721-22. “The third requirement 

under Rule 4(k)(2)—the due process analysis—contemplates a defendant’s contacts with the entire 

U.S., as opposed to the state in which the district court sits.” Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis 

Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Rule 4(k)(2)’s due process 

analysis incorporates the same constitutional standard applicable in other personal jurisdiction 

contexts. Synthes (U.S.A.) 563 F.3d 1285 at 1296–97. 

Even in this situation, however, a non-US corporation itself—not its managing agent, 

subsidiary, or affiliate—must be “at home” in the forum state for a court to exercise general 

personal jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014). Further, if 

“minimum contacts have not been established through either a stream of commerce or agency 

approach, . . . personal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).” Nespresso 

USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Comp. SA, 264 F. Supp. 3d 498, 506 (D. Del. 2017).

B. Failure to State a Claim

When a court considers a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must assume that all well-pleaded facts 

are true and must view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bowlby v. 

City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court must decide whether those facts 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 

570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Bowlby, 

681 F.3d at 217 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

In a patent case, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the accused infringer practices 

each and every limitation of at least one claim to adequately plead direct infringement. See NuYou Techs., LLC v. Beauty Town Int’l Inc., No. 3:15-CV-03433-N, 2016 WL 4717991, at *2 (N.D. 

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Tex. July 7, 2016) (dismissing claims of direct infringement because the complaint failed to 

plausibly allege the defendant practiced all limitations of any asserted claim); Stragent, LLC v. 

BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-446-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 2821697, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 

3, 2017). With respect to indirect infringement, a claim for induced infringement must: “1) 

adequately plead direct infringement by defendant’s customers; 2) contain facts plausibly showing 

that defendant specifically intended for its customers to infringe the asserted patents; and 3) 

contain facts plausibly showing that defendant knew that the customer’s acts constituted 

infringement.” Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:14-CV-752-JRG-JDL, 2015 

WL 4910427, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2015) (Gilstrap, J.) (citing In re Bill of Lading 

Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).

IV. ARGUMENT

A. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over RDC Ltd.

Display Technologies’ Amended Complaint against RDC Ltd. should be dismissed 

because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. RDC Ltd. is subject to neither general nor 

specific jurisdiction under any theory of personal jurisdiction, including the stream-of-commerce 

of alter-ego theories. Additionally, Rule 4(k)(2) does not grant this Court personal jurisdiction 

over RDC Ltd. because RDC Ltd. lacks sufficient contacts with the U.S. 

1. RDC Ltd. is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in this District.

A court may only exercise general jurisdiction when a defendant maintains “continuous 

and systematic” contacts with the forum state. “However, these contacts must be ‘so substantial 

and of such a nature as to justify suit [against the defendant] on causes of action arising from 

dealings entirely different from those activities.’” Hockerson-Halberstadt, 62 F. App’x at 337

(citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). 

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This requirement is a hurdle that Display Technologies cannot overcome. Indeed, Display 

Technologies’ Amended Complaint makes no effort to satisfy this requirement besides asserting 

the bare legal conclusion. (Dkt. 38 at ¶ 5.) And “[o]nce a non-resident defendant files a motion 

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden of establishing the district court’s 

jurisdiction lies with the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Diebold Election Sys., 

Inc. v. AI Tech., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 866, 876 (E.D. Tex. 2008).

The types of contacts that give rise to personal jurisdiction include property ownership, 

payment of taxes, frequent travel, having an office or employees in the district, designating an 

agent for service of process in the district, regular conduct of business, and maintenance of bank 

accounts in the district. Harris v. Action Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc., No. 2:09–CV–286, 2010 WL 

3489084, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding no general jurisdiction where defendant was 

not licensed to do business in Texas, had no presence in Texas, and had no agents or employees in 

Texas); York Group, Inc. v. Horizon Casket Group, Inc., No. H-05-2181, 2006 WL 2141081, at 

*6 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2006). Display Technologies’ Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts

that RDC Ltd. has any such contacts with the U.S., let alone with Texas. 

Display Technologies’ Amended Complaint does not allege how, without any operations 

or employees, RDC Ltd. purposefully directed any activities at Texas. Instead, the Amended 

Complaint merely points to “Defendant’s ACCU-CHEK Guide meter and ‘ACCU-CHEK Guide 

Me’ meter,” implying without factual support that RDC Ltd. is somehow accountable for the 

Accused Device and the Accused Application. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4.) These allegations are legal 

conclusions unsupported by any plausible factual allegations. Nor could they be because these 

statements are untrue. 

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Display Technologies’ Amended Complaint also fails to allege plausible facts to suggest 

RDC Ltd. has any contacts with Texas that could justify exercise of general jurisdiction. RDC 

Ltd. has never done business in Texas, has never had offices or employees in Texas, and has never 

paid any taxes or fees in Texas. It has no properties in Texas and directs no activities within the 

state. 

RDC Ltd.’s situation in this case is therefore similar to that before this Court in Princeton 

Digital Image Corp. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-400-JRG, 2012 WL 3647182, at *1 (E.D. 

Tex. Aug. 23, 2012) (Gilstrap, J.). In that case, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including 

Getty Images, “a holding company that ha[d] never done any business in Texas, never had any 

offices or employees in Texas, and ha[d] never paid taxes in Texas.” Id. at *2. The Court therefore 

found it did not have personal jurisdiction over Getty Images because “[t]here [was] no evidence 

in the record to support a plausible claim that Getty Images use[d] (and allegedly infringe[d]) the 

technology at issue in Texas. In fact, because it [was] simply a holding company, there [was] no 

evidence before the Court that Getty Images use[d] the allegedly infringing technology in any 

District.” Id. The Court therefore dismissed the claims against Getty Images, even though its 

operating subsidiary, Getty Images US, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas and other 

states. Id. at *3.

This case presents similar facts. RDC Ltd. is a foreign company with no operations, 

businesses, offices, or employees in Texas. On the other hand, RDC Ltd.’s sister company, RDC 

Inc., may be subject to jurisdiction in the U.S., but it is not subject to venue in this District. And 

Display Technologies has not properly alleged that the RDC Inc.’s acts should be imputed to RDC 

Ltd.—nor can it. Accordingly, Display Technologies’ Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts 

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to support general jurisdiction over RDC Ltd., and Display Technologies’ claims against RDC Ltd. 

should be dismissed. 

2. RDC Ltd. is not subject to specific jurisdiction in this District. 

The Court also does not have specific jurisdiction over RDC, Ltd. Specific jurisdiction 

exists when (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, (2) the 

claim arises out of or relates to those activities, and (3) assertion of personal jurisdiction is 

reasonable and fair. See Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d. 1012, 1018 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009). The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first two prongs. Only if the plaintiff first 

meets its burden of proof is the defendant then required to present a compelling case that the 

presence of other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Id.

Display Technologies has not and cannot meet the first two prongs under either theory: 

stream-of-commerce or alter ego. Here, RDC Ltd. does not put any products into the stream of 

commerce in the U.S., and RDC Inc. is not the alter ego of RDC Ltd. Accordingly, there is no 

basis for Display Technologies to argue personal jurisdiction over RDC Ltd. based on its activities 

or the activities of RDC Inc. 

(a) This Court does not have specific jurisdiction under an alter-ego 

theory.

Display Technologies cannot impute any of RDC Inc.’s activities to RDC, Ltd. under an 

alter-ego theory, nor does Display Technologies attempt to make any such allegations. “The alter 

ego doctrine, like all variations of piercing the corporate veil doctrine, is reserved for exceptional 

cases.” Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2006). As such, 

Display Technologies must undertake an exhaustive 11-factor3analysis to apply this doctrine. 

3 The Fifth Circuit has developed the following list of factors to be used when determining whether 

a subsidiary is the alter ego of the parent: “(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock 

ownership; (2) the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3) the parent and 

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Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams Cnty. Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 208-09 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Yet, Display Technologies’ Amended Complaint does not address a single factor, even though 

Defendant raised this issue in its first motion. 

Display Technologies does not provide any plausible factual allegations suggesting any 

kind of relationship between RDC Inc. and RDC Ltd., apart from the copyright notice on Accuchek.com. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.) In fact, Display Technologies does not even mention RDC Inc. in its 

Amended Complaint. Display Technologies also turns a blind eye to the overwhelming amount 

of evidence that RDC Inc. is the entity responsible for the Accused Instrumentalities. (See Exs. 2-

6.) In sum, Display Technologies can point to no facts justifying a deviation from the longestablished “institutional independence of related corporations.” Dickson Marine Inc. v. 

Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Display Technologies has not 

established that this Court can exercise specific jurisdiction under an alter ego theory.

(b) Specific jurisdiction does not exist under the stream-of-commerce 

theory.

The “stream-of-commerce” theory contemplates “a nonresident defendant, acting outside 

the forum, plac[ing] in the stream of commerce a product that ultimately causes harm inside the 

forum.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 926. But in patent infringement actions, this theory applies only 

in limited circumstances, none of which are present here.

the subsidiary have common business departments; (4) the parent and the subsidiary file 

consolidated financial statements and tax returns; (5) the parent finances the subsidiary; (6) the 

parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary operates with grossly 

inadequate capital; (8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary; (9) the 

subsidiary receives no business except that given to it by the parent; (10) the parent uses the 

subsidiaries property as its own; (11) the daily operations of the two corporations are not kept 

separate; and (12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate formalities, such as keeping 

separate books and records and holding shareholder and board meetings.” U.S. v. Jon–T 

Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691–92 (5th Cir.1985) (internal citations omitted), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).

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The Supreme Court has articulated two tests for specific jurisdiction under a stream-ofcommerce theory. The first test requires that the defendant place the accused products into the 

stream of commerce and be “aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State.” 

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987); accord J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 

Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881-82 (2011). The second test is the same as the first but additionally 

requires “an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. 

at 112; J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883. The Federal Circuit has thus far not decided which test to 

adopt for patent cases. See, e.g., Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F. 3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016).

Display Technologies cannot satisfy the most basic element of either test. As clearly 

explained in the manuals, packaging, and product inserts of the Accused Devices (Guide and Guide 

Me), RDC Inc. is the manufacturer of these devices. (See Exs. 5, 6.) Similarly, the publicly 

available FDA 501(k) applications for the Guide and Guide Me devices were filed by RDC Inc. 

(See Exs. 2, 3, 44.) Meanwhile, RDC Ltd. does not sell either of the Accused Devices in the U.S. 

In addition, public information clearly shows that the Accused Application (mySugr) was not 

developed or provided by RDC Ltd. 

Display Technologies also does not allege any facts to suggest that RDC Ltd. puts any 

products in the stream of commerce. The stream-of-commerce “refers to the movement of goods 

from manufacturers through distributors to consumers.” J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 881-82. RDC 

Ltd. does not develop, manufacture, distribute, import, or ship the Guide and Guide Me devices, 

or the mySugr application in the U.S. The meters that RDC Ltd. sells in the UK are not even sold 

4 These Exhibits do not show the full name of the applicant entity as RDC Inc.; however, other 

information on them reveal that they are directed at RDC Inc. For example, the addresses as shown 

is that of RDC Inc.

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in the U.S. market. Therefore, RDC Ltd. does not put any products into the stream of commerce 

in the U.S., and this Court has no specific jurisdiction over RDC Ltd. See Nespresso USA, Inc. v. 

Ethical Coffee Co. S.A., 263 F. Supp. 3d 498 (D. Del. 2017) (finding no specific jurisdiction under 

stream-of-commerce theory where foreign defendant did not manufacture, distribute, import, or 

ship the accused products); Univ. of Mass. Med. Sch. v. L’Oréal S.A., No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 

WL 5919745 (D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018) (same).

Courts have found that a U.S. entity introducing an accused product into the stream of 

commerce is insufficient to show personal jurisdiction over a foreign affiliate. In Nespresso, for 

example, the court rejected the argument that the Swiss defendants could be held responsible for 

the actions of their U.S. subsidiary. 263 F. Supp. 3d at 504. Rather, the plaintiff needed to

“demonstrate that Nestlé and Nestec [Swiss defendants] were responsible for introducing the 

Nespresso machines [accused products] into the stream of commerce, and not simply that a 

subsidiary within the U.S. introduced the Nespresso machines.” Id. The Nespresso court found 

that “[s]ince minimum contacts have not been established through either a stream of commerce or 

agency approach, ipso facto, personal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).” 

Id. at 506. 

The same applies here. RDC, Ltd. is a separate entity located overseas, and RDC, Inc.’s 

activities cannot be imputed onto RDC, Ltd. to establish personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). 

Display Technologies cannot and did not allege otherwise, and thus any “stream-of-commerce” 

theory of personal specific jurisdiction must fail.

3. The assertion of personal jurisdiction would be neither reasonable nor 

fair.

Even if Display Technologies could properly allege facts to support the first two prongs of 

the personal jurisdiction test (which it did not), this Court should still decline to exercise personal 

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jurisdiction because it would be neither fair nor reasonable to force RDC Ltd. to litigate Display 

Technologies’ claims in this unfamiliar forum. 

The third factor regarding traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice involves a 

balancing test with five questions. First, what is the burden on the defendant? Second, what, if 

any, are the interests of the forum state? Third, what is the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief? 

Fourth, what is the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 

the controversies? And fifth, what are the interests of the states in furthering their social policies? 

Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 429 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

These factors weigh against finding specific jurisdiction here. Traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice should weigh against allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the patent 

venue rules set by the Supreme Court in TC Heartland. RDC, Ltd. is a foreign company with no 

employees in Texas. It has been pulled into this dispute by Display Technologies solely because 

it was mistakenly listed on a copyright notice on a website—while the same website also clearly 

shows that RDC, Inc. is the actual company involved in providing the Accused Instrumentalities

in the U.S. (Exs. 1-6.) And RDC, Inc. is based in Indianapolis, not Texas. 

Considering the five questions, it becomes even clearer that the Court should not find 

specific jurisdiction here. On the first question, the burden on RDC Ltd. is significant, as 

exercising jurisdiction would force RDC Ltd. to litigate in an unfamiliar forum wherein it has no 

activities or personnel. This dispute centers on activities involving the Accused Instrumentalities, 

and the entity responsible for them is one that Display Technologies refused to add to this case, 

because adding RDC Inc. as a defendant would destroy venue. Proceeding with RDC Ltd. as the

lone defendant would nonetheless introduce delay for the Court and increased costs for the parties 

because RDC Ltd. does not possess any relevant information, and any evidence or witnesses for 

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RDC Ltd. would be located outside the U.S., while any relevant witnesses for RDC Inc. would be 

located in Indiana.

For the second and third questions, neither the parties nor the State of Texas has any interest 

in forcing a sister company with no employees to litigate in this District. Nor does Display 

Technologies have any genuine interest in litigating this lawsuit in Texas. Display Technologies 

has no website and makes no products and it appears Display Technologies was created solely for 

purposes of litigation (as evidenced by the approximately 95 lawsuits it has filed). Any local 

interest therefore is minimal. See In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (finding plaintiff’s interest entitled to no weight where its “presence in Texas appears to be 

recent, ephemeral, and an artifact of litigation”).

Regarding the fourth question, the interstate judicial system has no interest in maintaining 

this litigation in this District because the relevant parties, RDC, Ltd. and RDC, Inc., do not have 

any connection to this District. And on the fifth and final question, resolving allegations of patent 

infringement is, at best, marginally relevant to any state’s social policies. Consequently, the 

answers to these questions establish that exercising personal jurisdiction over RDC, Ltd. would 

not be fair or reasonable.

In sum, Display Technologies’ Amended Complaint should be dismissed because this 

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the only named defendant—RDC Ltd.

B. Display Tech’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim 

1. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Direct Infringement. 

The Amended Complaint fails to tie the alleged infringement to RDC Ltd. and thus fails to 

state a claim for direct infringement. Display Technologies’ only pleaded connection between

RDC Ltd. and the alleged direct infringement is that RDC Ltd. is listed on the copyright notice of 

Accu-chek.com, (Dkt. 38 at ¶ 2), but a minimal investigation (e.g., looking at Accu-chek.com’s

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“About Us” Page) would show that the provider of the Accused Devices is actually RDC Inc. (See

Ex. 1.) As discussed above, RDC Ltd. does not perform any business activities in the U.S. and 

therefore engages in no activities that Display Technologies could accuse of direct infringement. 

None of the remaining allegations in the Amended Complaint suggest that RDC Ltd. provides the 

Accused Instrumentalities to customers in this District. Display Technologies knows the proper 

defendant is RDC Inc., but Display Technologies also knows that any attempt to add RDC Inc. as 

a defendant would make venue improper in this District. If Display Technologies seeks relief, it 

should file suit against RDC Inc. in Delaware or Indiana, where it resides and has a regular and 

established places of business. 

Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a complaint fails to adequately 

plead infringement against the named defendant. See, e.g., WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical 

Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (dismissing patent infringement claims pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where the allegedly infringing acts took place outside of the U.S.); 

Advanced Analogic Techs., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs., Inc., No. C-09-1360 MMC, 2009 WL 1974602, 

at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009) (“To the extent KTI seeks dismissal of the complaint for failure to 

allege infringing activity by KTI within the U.S., the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion will be granted.”); 

Mayne Pharma Int’l PTY Ltd. v. Merck & Co., No. CV 15-438-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 7833206, at 

*4, 6 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2015) (dismissing infringement claim against a foreign defendant pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6)); N. Star Innovations, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., No. 16-115-LPS-CJB, 2016 WL 

7107230, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2016) (dismissing complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failing 

to provide “factual allegations about the nature of defendant’s business, nor their activities in the 

United States” and observing that “without more, the fact that [the Japanese defendant] is not a 

U.S.-based entity might well affirmatively suggest that it has not done any of these things”). 

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Display Technologies failed to plead any facts to support direct infringement by RDC, Ltd., and 

its case should thus be dismissed.

2. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Indirect Infringement. 

The Amended Complaint also fails to connect RDC Ltd. to any alleged indirect 

infringement. Indeed, Display Technologies does not even explicitly allege indirect infringement,

and instead merely pleads that the “Patent Claims [are] asserted directly and indirectly.” (Dkt. 38

at ¶ 9.) To the extent this can be read as an allegation of indirect infringement, this claim should 

nevertheless be dismissed at least because Display Technologies failed to adequately plead direct 

infringement, which is a required element of any indirect infringement claim. See Stragent, LLC 

v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-00446-RWSKNM, 2017 WL 2821697, *7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 

3, 2017, adopted by, 2017 WL 2832613 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2017) (“As a threshold matter, 

Stragent’s indirect infringement claims fail because the Complaint has not plausibly pled that [the 

accused products] directly infringe the asserted claims.”); see also Limelight Networks, Inc. v. 

Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014) (“[W]here there has been no direct infringement, 

there can be no induced infringement under § 271(b).”). And because Display Technologies has 

wholly failed to the plead the other elements of indirect infringement, it has failed to state a claim 

for indirect infringement. Dismissal of all infringement claims is thus warranted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, RDC, Ltd. respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the 

allegations against RDC Ltd. with prejudice under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).

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Dated: July 26, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Aaron P. Pirouznia

Terry J. Stalford

Texas Bar No. 24011686

stalford@fr.com

Aaron P. Pirouznia

Texas Bar No. 24098958

pirouznia@fr.com

Noel F. Chakkalakal

Texas Bar No. 24053676

chakkalakal@fr.com

Alexander H. Martin

Texas Bar No. 24091828

martin@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000

Dallas, TX 75201

Telephone: (214) 747-5070

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

ROCHE DIABETES CARE, LIMITED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

document has been served on July 26, 2024, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have 

consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

/s/ Aaron P. Pirouznia

Aaron P. Pirouznia

Case 2:23-cv-00585-JRG-RSP Document 41 Filed 07/26/24 Page 26 of 26 PageID #: 1732