NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In the Marriage of:

ROBERT F. MORAN, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

KEELY E. MORAN, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0686 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2009-005525

The Honorable Carolyn K. Passamonte, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Cavanagh Law Firm, P.A., Phoenix

By Helen R. Davis, Karen C. Stafford

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix

By Steven D. Wolfson, Scott A. Holcomb

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 11-14-2017
MORAN v. MORAN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Keely E. Moran (“Mother”) appeals the family court’s postdecree orders adopting the report of a Family Law Master (“the Master”) 

that deleted a provision (“Recommendation B”) within a prior report that 

allowed a week of parenting time to be reallocated if the schedule resulted 

in three consecutive weeks of parenting time to either Mother or Robert F. 

Moran (“Father”). Mother argues the prior report became a binding order 

of the court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”)

72(G), and the Master exceeded her authority by deleting Recommendation 

B. In Mother’s view, deletion of Recommendation B constituted an 

amendment of an existing order in violation of Rule 85, and the family court 

failed to make necessary findings and an independent determination in 

overruling Mother’s objection to the deletion. She argues the court’s 

adoption of the Master’s recommendation to delete Recommendation B was 

an impermissible abdication of the court’s authority under Nold v. Nold, 232 

Ariz. 270 (App. 2013). For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 The parties were married in 1995 and have one minor child 

(“the child”) in common. Father petitioned for dissolution of the parties’

marriage in August 2009. On May 4, 2011, the parties stipulated to the 

 

1 We view the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the family court’s orders. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 

Ariz. 317, 323 (1987); Thomas v. Thomas, 142 Ariz. 386, 390 (App. 1984).
MORAN v. MORAN

Decision of the Court

3

appointment of Annette T. Burns as the Master,

2 pursuant to Rule 72.3 On 

July 3, 2012, the family court entered a consent decree of dissolution of the

parties’ marriage.4 Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the court 

reappointed Burns as the Master following entry of the decree.

¶3 In November 2013, Father filed a petition to, inter alia, modify 

parenting time. The parties eventually resolved that proceeding through a 

stipulated order entered October 6, 2015. The stipulated order incorporated 

a “First Amended Joint Legal Decision-Making Agreement and Parenting 

Plan” (“the Amended Plan”), which provided in part as follows:

The Parents will meet with the Parenting Coordinator

to finalize and update the parenting time calendar for the 

following year. Because the school calendar is not released 

until early to mid-February, beginning in 2016 and after, the 

Parents will meet with the Parenting Coordinator by March 1 

each year. However, for the year 2015, the Parents will meet 

with the Special Master on October 28, 2015 for the calendar 

meeting (and then again before March 1, 2016 when they have 

the 2016-2017 school calendar), which has been scheduled 

with the Special Master because no Parenting Coordinator is 

in place at this time. The actual meeting dates will be 

scheduled based on the schedules of the Parenting 

 

2 The order provided in part that the Master “may deal with any 

issues, pursuant to Title 25, A.R.S., that could be presented to the assigned 

Judge including without limit pre-decree motions, petitions, requests for 

costs and attorney’s fees or for injunctive relief and any post-decree 

matters.”

3 A Parenting Coordinator, Judith Wolf, was also appointed in 

December 2011. Wolf was reappointed in January 2013, and again in 

February 2014, over Mother’s objection. Wolf’s second reappointment as 

Parenting Coordinator expired in early 2015, and Mother again objected to 

Wolf’s reappointment. Accordingly, by the fall of 2015, no Parenting 

Coordinator was in place. As of January 1, 2016, the Arizona Rules of 

Family Law Procedure were revised, such that appointment or 

reappointment of a Parenting Coordinator now can be made only by 

stipulation of the parties. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 74(B), (Q).

4 Attached as Exhibit A to the consent decree was a comprehensive 

“Joint Custody Agreement and Parenting Plan.”
MORAN v. MORAN

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Coordinator or Special Master, if applicable, and the Parents. 

If no Parenting Coordinator is in place, the Parents will meet 

with the Special Master to conduct the calendar meeting 

(without lawyers if at all possible).

¶4 In compliance with the Amended Plan, the parties met with 

the Master on October 28, 2015, for the expressed “purposes of finalizing, 

to the extent possible, their parenting time calendar for the remainder of 

2015 and for the first few months of 2016.”5 The Master then filed her 

“Family Law Master’s Report Dated October 29, 2015 Re Calendar Issues”

(“the October 2015 Report”). The October 2015 Report made four 

recommendations, including the recommendation at issue in this appeal, 

Recommendation B, which provided as follows:

Should a break, holiday or vacation period cause a parent to 

have [the child] for three weeks in a row, then if at all possible, 

the last of those three weeks will be swapped, so that each 

parent has [the child] for two weeks in a row rather than one 

parent having her for three weeks in a row. Those swaps, 

when reasonably possible, have already been accommodated 

in the attached calendars.[6]

Although the October 2015 Report was mailed to counsel for each party, the 

report did not advise the parties of an objection period or that the court 

 

5 Under the current version of Rule 72 adopted and effective January 

1, 2017, “[a]n appointment under this rule may not direct a master to 

perform services within the scope of Rule 74 [the Parenting Coordinator] or 

otherwise make decisions or recommendations concerning legal decisionmaking or parenting time.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 72(B). However, “[a]ll 

family law master appointments made prior to January 1, 2017, continue to 

be governed by the prior version of Rule 72.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 72(M).

6 The attached calendars specified each day that each parent was to 

have the child through late May 2016, and tentatively indicated that, for 

2016, Father would have the child from May 26 through June 23, at which 

time a “Mother-Summer” period would begin.
MORAN v. MORAN

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might adopt the report as an order. The family court did not formally adopt 

the report as an order of the court.7

¶5 On May 12, 2016, the parties again met with the Master, this 

time to complete the parenting time calendar for August 2016 through 

August 2017. The Master then issued her “Family Law Master’s Report 

Dated May 31, 2016” (“the May 2016 Report”), which included the 

following finding, supporting a recommendation that Recommendation B 

in the October 2015 Report be deleted:

A recommendation in the [October 2015 Report] is 

inconsistent with the remainder of the recommendations and 

needs to be deleted. Specifically, that recommendation states 

that if a break, holiday or vacation causes a parent to have [the 

child] for more than three weeks in a row, then if possible, a 

week should be swapped so that each parent has her two 

weeks in a row rather than one parent having her for three 

weeks. Mother objects to this provision being deleted, but 

does not want this provision applied to the summer months 

when she has [the child] for more than six (6) weeks in a row. 

This provision simply does not make sense in light of the way 

the parents have divided [the child’s] break time. As Mother 

has the majority (60%) of the summer break days, and they 

are exercised consecutively so that [the child] and Mother can 

travel to Spain, Father is then awarded certain break time 

with [the child] during the school year to make up for having 

lesser time in the summer. It makes no sense to swap only 

weeks during the school year (which would greatly 

complicate an already complicated calendar), which would 

affect Father’s parenting time with [the child] but not 

Mother’s.[8]

 

7 On December 30, 2105, the Master filed a supplement to the October 

2105 Report, giving Mother, at Father’s request, three days and three 

overnight periods originally allocated to Father. Again, the parties were 

not notified of an objection period or that the court might adopt the report 

as an order. The family court did not formally adopt the supplement as an 

order of the court.

8 The parties dispute whether the Master erred in finding that 

Recommendation B is “inconsistent” with the parties’ summer parenting-
MORAN v. MORAN

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The family court adopted the May 2016 Report as a temporary order of the 

court, to become final unless either party filed a written objection by June 

27, 2016.

¶6 Mother timely objected to the May 2016 Report based, in part, 

on the deletion of Recommendation B. The family court summarily denied 

Mother’s objection before Father’s time to respond had run, and an order

denying the objection was filed July 14, 2016. Mother then moved to modify 

the court’s July 14 order, arguing the court should reverse the deletion of 

Recommendation B. The court again summarily denied Mother’s motion 

before Father’s time to respond had run.

¶7 Mother timely appealed the family court’s formal orders. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section

12-2101(A)(2), (4) (2016).

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶8 In general, we review the family court’s orders on parenting 

time for an abuse of discretion. Nold, 232 Ariz. at 273, ¶ 11. A court abuses 

its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary 

decision, reaches a conclusion without considering the evidence, commits 

another substantial error of law, or makes a finding lacking substantial 

evidentiary support. Flying Diamond Airpark, L.L.C. v. Meienberg, 215 Ariz. 

44, 50, ¶ 27 (App. 2007). We review de novo legal questions, such as the 

interpretation of statutes and procedural rules. See Melgar v. Campo, 215 

Ariz. 605, 606, ¶ 6 (App. 2007); Felipe v. Theme Tech Corp., 235 Ariz. 520, 524, 

¶ 10 (App. 2014). Furthermore, under Rule 72(H), “[a]t the time the master 

is appointed, the parties may stipulate that a master’s findings of fact shall 

be final. When so stipulated, the court shall consider only questions of law 

arising from the master’s report. Absent such a stipulation, the court shall 

 

time schedule. We agree with Father that, under the plain language of 

Recommendation B, that recommendation as written would apply to both 

the school year and the summer period. See supra ¶ 4 (“Should a break, 

holiday or vacation period cause a parent to have [the child] for three weeks 

in a row . . . .” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Master correctly found

that Recommendation B was inconsistent with the tentative calendar for the 

2016 summer parenting-time schedule. It was also inconsistent with section 

6 of the Amended Plan.
MORAN v. MORAN

Decision of the Court

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not reverse the special master’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and 

shall review conclusions of law de novo.”

II. The Merits

¶9 Relying on Rule 72(G), Mother argues that the October 2015 

Report, along with its Recommendation B, automatically became an order 

of the family court after the time for the parties to object had passed.9 Father 

counters that, because the court never issued an order formally adopting 

the October 2015 Report, when the Master later recommended deletion of 

Recommendation B in the May 2016 Report, the Master did no more than 

recommend deletion of a term that was never a court order in the first place.

¶10 The applicable portion of the version of Rule 72(G) in effect at 

the time provided as follows:

If no objection [to a Family Law Master’s report] is filed 

by either party pursuant to this rule, the master’s report shall 

become an order of the court, unless the court on its own 

motion sets a hearing upon a particular issue in the report 

within ten (10) days after the time for filing an objection has 

passed. If the master’s report covers all issues in the case, and 

no objection is filed and the court does not set a hearing, the 

court shall enter judgment on the master’s report.[10]

¶11 Even assuming without deciding that Mother is correct that 

Rule 72 is “self-executing,” however, Mother cites no persuasive authority 

that prevented the court from overruling her objection to the Master’s May 

2016 Report.11 The October 2015 Report was generated to create temporary 

orders and was specifically designed to address calendaring issues arising 

 

9 Under Rule 72(F), Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., “[a] party may object to the 

master’s report . . . no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of mailing 

of the master’s report.”

10 The second sentence has been eliminated from the current version of 

Rule 72(G), effective January 1, 2017.

11 Mother’s citation to Rules 85 and 91, Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., is 

unhelpful, as those rules are inapplicable in this context. Further, Nold is 

distinguishable because it regards a physical custody decision, not simply 

a scheduling issue that might lead to minor calendaring changes. See 232 

Ariz. at 273, ¶ 11.
MORAN v. MORAN

Decision of the Court

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from November 2015 through “the first few months of 2016.” The May 2016 

Report recommended the elimination of Recommendation B going 

forward, and the court advised the parties of its approval and adoption of 

the recommendations in that report as a temporary order of the court, 

subject to timely objection by either party. Mother timely objected, and the 

court then followed the directive of Rule 72(G), which provides the 

following options:

In the event any objection(s) are filed, the court may set oral 

argument on the objection(s), adopt the report, modify it, 

reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence. 

The court shall hold a hearing or enter an order in connection 

with any objection to the master’s report within thirty (30) 

days of the filing of the response or other ordered pleading to 

such objection.

¶12 Thus, under the plain language of Rule 72(G), the family court 

retained discretion to set oral argument, adopt the report, modify the 

report, or reject the report in whole or in part. Further, the rule required

the court, within thirty days of Mother’s objection, to either issue an order 

or hold an evidentiary hearing. Here, the court issued its order within 30 

days. Contrary to Mother’s assertion, nothing in Rule 72 required the court 

to hold an evidentiary hearing or to make further findings, and we see no 

reason to judicially impose such requirements. See generally Hart v. Hart, 

220 Ariz. 183, 187, ¶¶ 16-17 (App. 2009) (recognizing current A.R.S. § 25-

411(J) contains “no requirement, as there is in A.R.S. § 25-403(B), that 

findings be reduced to writing or stated on the record”). On this record, the 

family court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to set oral 

argument, hold an evidentiary hearing, or make further findings, and the 

court’s adoption of the Master’s May 2016 Report as a temporary order of 

the court was not an improper abdication of its responsibilities. The court 

had the authority to adopt the May 2016 Report, including the 

recommended deletion of Recommendation B going forward, and we find 

no error in its decision to do so.

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶13 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324 (2017). The record indicates that both Mother 

and Father have substantial financial resources, and any relative disparity 
MORAN v. MORAN

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is not meaningful.

12 Further, Father’s position throughout the proceedings 

has been reasonable. Accordingly, we deny Mother’s request for an award 

of attorneys’ fees on appeal. Mother’s appeal, however, relies on a strained 

legal analysis and, even if she were successful, would not likely benefit her

or the child. See supra note 8. Moreover, in seeking attorneys’ fees, Mother 

argues in her opening brief that “Father has maintained an unreasonable 

position, having never raised any response or argument in response to 

Mother’s Objections or Motion to Modify, having made no suggestion that 

the deletion of Recommendation B was in the best interest of the Minor 

Child, and then refusing to reinstate Recommendation B, despite the lack 

of any substantive opposition to retaining Recommendation B.” Mother’s 

argument implies that Father’s lack of a response in superior court means 

Father agrees with Mother as to the merits of the appeal, but has 

nonetheless forced Mother to appeal an undisputed issue. As Father states

and Mother does not dispute and failed to tell this court, however, the 

superior court in each instance ruled before Father’s responses were due. 

Accordingly, Mother’s argument for an award of attorneys’ fees relies 

primarily on a misrepresentation by omission. Given the above, we 

conclude Mother’s positions have been unreasonable and support an award 

of fees to Father. We therefore grant Father’s request for an award of 

attorneys’ fees on appeal, subject to his compliance with Arizona Rule of 

Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 21. As the successful party on 

appeal, Father is also entitled to an award of his taxable costs upon

compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶14 The family court’s orders are affirmed.

 

12 In our discretion, we deny Father’s motion to strike the Form 8-K, 

attached as Appendix 1 to Mother’s opening brief, and have considered 

Appendix 1 for the limited purpose of evaluating the parties’ requests for 

attorneys’ fees.