United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3932

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Allen G. Gibson; David Hall, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellants, *

*

Richard St. Cloud, Sr., *

*

Plaintiff, *

 *

Michael Langley, *

 * Appeal from the United States

Plaintiff - Appellant, * District Court for the 

 * District of South Dakota. 

v. *

 * 

Doug Weber; Darrell Slykhuis; *

Jeff Bloomberg; Kay Paa; John *

Degreef: Eugene Regier; Herbert *

Saloum; James H. Shaeffer; Mike Rost; *

Healthcare Medical Technology; *

Doneen Hollingsworth, *

 *

Defendants - Appellees. *

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Submitted: November 18, 2005

Filed: December 15, 2005

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Before MURPHY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
1

Richard St. Cloud, Sr., a fourth inmate listed as a plaintiff in the case caption,

filed a separate appeal which was docketed with the file number 05-1888; it will be

decided in a separate opinion.

2

The Honorable John A. Simko, United States Magistrate Judge for the District

of South Dakota. 

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Allen Gibson, David Hall, and Michael Langley1

 were all diabetic inmates in

custody of the South Dakota Department of Corrections ("DOC") when they brought

these claims against state correctional officials and outside medical personnel, alleging

deliberate indifference to their medical needs and inadequate medical facilities in

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law. The district court2

granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants and declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for medical malpractice. Gibson,

Hall, and Langley appeal, arguing that they have presented sufficient evidence to

present their claims to a jury and that the court erred by dismissing the state law

claims. We affirm.

Appellants developed infections related to their diabetes which physicians

determined made it necessary to perform amputations to portions of their lower

extremities. They amputated portions of the feet of Gibson and Langley, as well as

the bottom of Hall's left leg and a portion of his right foot. Appellants admit they

received copies of the Inmate Living Guide (Guide) when they were incarcerated.

 The Guide contains an administrative remedy provision which states as

follows: 

If you are unable to resolve a complaint through informal contacts with

staff members, you may seek formal review of your complaint through

the use of the Administrative Remedy for Inmates System. . . . Forms for

filing complaints and appeals, and details on how the procedure is to be

followed can be obtained from unit staff. 
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You may use the Administrative Remedy for Inmates system while

housed at any DOC facility, contractual agency or while at a community

house assignment. 

Appellants concede that before bringing this action they did not complain about

their medical care through the Guide's administrative remedy provision. Gibson and

Langley stated in affidavits that this was because "it was always made clear . . . by

healthcare and DOC personnel that any healthcare complaints were to be made

informally to the Sioux Valley doctors, nurses, and P.A.'s and not to the prison

administration under its grievance procedures." Hall stated in his affidavit that

"throughout the years of [his] contact with health care people [he] followed the

Inmates Living Guide and made [his] complaints informally to the health care staff.

No one ever told [him] to do it differently until this case was filed."

In their complaint appellants sued eleven separate defendants. They alleged

that the defendant medical personnel and state officials were deliberately indifferent

to their medical needs and had denied them their due process rights by failing to

provide adequate medical facilities and care. They also alleged a medical malpractice

claim based on state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants, finding that the Inmate Living Guide provided an administrative grievance

procedure for inmate complaints relating to the adequacy of medical care and that the

appellants failed to exhaust administrative procedures available to them. It also

granted summary judgment in favor of Gibson's parole officer, John DeGreef, finding

that there were not facts sufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference to

Gibson's medical needs and that DeGreef was entitled to qualified immunity. Having

no remaining federal grounds for retaining jurisdiction, the court dismissed their state

law claims. 

Gibson, Hall, and Langley appeal, arguing that there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the Guide's administrative grievance procedure was

available to them and that the court erred by dismissing the state law claims even if
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it properly dismissed the federal claims. The defendants respond that the appellants

had no excuse for failing to follow the Guide's procedures and that the decision to

dismiss the state law claims is vested solely in the district court's discretion. We

review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lund v. Hennepin Cty,

427 F.3d 1123, 1125 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper if there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Id. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA"), codified in 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a), requires immediate dismissal of all claims brought by inmates with respect

to prison conditions by inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law until

"such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Appellants do not now argue that the Guide's grievance procedures were not

applicable to medical claims. They argue instead that the Guide's procedures were not

available because unnamed prison and healthcare personnel had "made it clear" to

them that they should voice all complaints regarding medical care informally to

medical personnel. They also contend that they had had prior success informally

airing grievances directly to medical personnel and that they had had a reasonable

belief that grievances concerning medical care should be informally directed to the

medical providers and not the warden.

We have only excused inmates from complying with an institution's grievance

procedures when officials have prevented prisoners from utilizing the procedures, see

Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2001), or when officials themselves have

failed to comply with the grievance procedures. See Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687

(2001). An inmate's subjective belief that the procedures were not applicable to

medical grievances "does not matter" and is not determinative. Lyon v. Vande Krol,

305 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2002). 
3

Because we conclude appellants failed to exhaust available administrative

remedies, it is unnecessary to determine which of the eleven defendants were state

actors. See, e.g., Lacy v. City of Bolivar, 416 F.3d 723 n.3 (8th Cir. 2005). 

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Appellants have presented no evidence that any prison official thwarted an

attempt to initiate the procedures or that any official made it impossible for them to

file grievances. See Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000). Moreover,

the Guide explained the applicable grievance procedure and its application to all

aspects of inmate life, and appellants admit they received a copy of it. The district

court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.3

 

Appellants also argue that the district court erred by declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims after dismissing all of their federal

claims. They argue that we should reverse because the court failed to enumerate any

reason for declining jurisdiction and because the interests of judicial economy,

convenience, and fairness weigh in favor of maintaining supplemental jurisdiction

over their state law claims. They argue that dismissal of their state claims was

exceptionally unfair because the statute of limitations bars them from refiling in state

court. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a court may "decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Congress unambiguously gave district

courts discretion in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to dismiss supplemental state law claims

when all federal claims have been dismissed. The district court did not err by

dismissing the state law claims. See Labickas v. Arkansas State University, 78 F.3d

333, 334 (8th Cir. 1996); McLaurin v. F.C. Prater, Co-1, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.

1994). 

For these reasons the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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