[Cite as State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-683.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

 Appellee 

v. 

DARNELL M. JONES

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 29784

Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 02642

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on February 23, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

CLYDE BENNETT, II, Attorney for Appellant

 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Darnell M. Jones appeals from his conviction following a no-contest plea to

charges of possessing a fentanyl-related compound, aggravated drug possession, and 

two counts of having a weapon while under disability. 

{¶ 2} Jones contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a hearing 
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pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), to 

challenge the veracity of allegations in two search-warrant affidavits. He also alleges 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to present proof to 

support his Franks claim. 

{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a 

Franks hearing. We also see no ineffective assistance of counsel related to defense 

counsel’s handling of the issue. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Background

{¶ 4} A grand jury indicted Jones on the above-referenced charges, which 

stemmed from two August 7, 2021 searches of his home. On that date, officers with the 

Montgomery County sheriff’s office began investigating a complaint about Jones 

assaulting his girlfriend, C.R., with a metal rod inside his Harrison Township residence. 

As part of the investigation, officers spoke with the victim, who reported that she had gone 

to a bar with Jones before accompanying him to his home. The victim claimed Jones 

became angry with her inside the house and hit her in the head with a metal bar or pipe. 

{¶ 5} Law-enforcement officers apprehended Jones at his residence and 

transported him to jail. After he refused to consent to a search of his home, officers 

secured the property while Detective Kent Saunders obtained a search warrant. A 

municipal-court judge signed the warrant at 1:16 p.m. on August 7, 2021. Detective 

Saunders and other officers promptly executed the warrant and searched the home for 

the metal object and additional evidence related to the alleged assault. Among other 

things, they found the victim’s hairpiece in the living room and a metal bar in a bedroom. 
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Detective Saunders also claimed to have seen firearms in plain view in the kitchen and 

drugs and cash in plain view in an open bedroom dresser drawer. 

{¶ 6} Based on his observation of the firearms, drugs, and cash, Detective 

Saunders exited the home and sought a second warrant to search more extensively for 

evidence related to felonious assault as well as evidence related to drug and firearm 

offenses. The same municipal-court judge issued another warrant at 3:34 p.m. on August 

7, 2021. Officers returned to the home and conducted a more thorough search resulting 

in discovery of digital scales, cell phones, various suspected illegal drugs, handguns, 

ammunition, and more than $10,000 cash. 

{¶ 7} Following his indictment, Jones moved to suppress the seized evidence and

incriminating statements. He later filed a supplemental motion requesting a hearing under 

Franks to test the veracity of Detective Saunders’ search-warrant affidavits. The trial court 

held a suppression hearing on December 9, 2021, and January 14, 2022, primarily to 

determine the existence of probable cause based on a review of the search-warrant 

affidavits. The trial court denied Jones’ request for a Franks hearing to challenge the 

truthfulness of Detective Saunders’ averments. Although defense counsel had two 

witnesses ready to testify on the Franks issue, the trial court declined to hear from them 

based on its determination that Jones had not established his entitlement to a Franks

hearing. The trial court nevertheless did allow defense counsel to proffer what the 

witnesses would have said. Defense counsel proffered that the first witness was a 

neighbor who would have testified that he saw Detective Saunders enter Jones’ house 

immediately after another officer left to get the first warrant. Defense counsel proffered 
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that the second witness was C.R., the victim, who would have testified that there were no 

drugs or firearms in plain view in Jones’ house when she was there the previous night 

and into the early-morning hours of August 7, 2021. 

{¶ 8} On February 16, 2022, the trial court filed a decision, entry, and order 

overruling Jones’ suppression motion and formally denying his request for a Franks

hearing. Jones later pled no-contest to the charges set forth above. The trial court 

accepted the plea and made findings of guilt. Prior to sentencing, Jones moved to 

supplement a probation report with affidavits from three witnesses regarding the Franks

issue. Accompanying the motion were affidavits from the neighbor, the victim, and a third 

person who had been present when police took Jones into custody. The trial court 

subsequently sentenced Jones to an aggregate four-to-six-year prison term without ruling 

on his motion regarding the affidavits. Jones appeals, advancing two assignments of 

error.

II. Franks Hearing

{¶ 9} Jones’ first assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT/

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A FRANKS HEARING. 

{¶ 10} Jones contends the trial court erred in denying him a Franks hearing 

because defense counsel’s proffer established (and testimony from two available 

witnesses would have confirmed) that Detective Saunders entered his residence before 

obtaining a search warrant and that no weapons or drugs were in plain view. Jones claims 

Saunders’ first search-warrant affidavit omitted the fact that he had entered the house 
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before obtaining a warrant. He asserts that the second affidavit falsely stated that 

weapons and drugs were in plain view when he executed the first warrant. At a minimum, 

Jones asserts that defense counsel’s representations entitled him to a hearing on the 

Franks issue so he could present testimony from his witnesses.

{¶ 11} Under Franks, a search violates the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted 

pursuant to a warrant based on an affidavit containing one or more false statements and 

these misrepresentations were made knowingly or in reckless disregard of the truth. State 

v. Miser, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25105, 2013-Ohio-1583, ¶ 12. Omissions qualify as 

false statements if they were intended to mislead or were made in reckless disregard of 

whether they would do so. Id. “ ‘[E]xcept in the very rare case where the defendant makes 

a strong preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical 

information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable cause, 

Franks is inapplicable to the omission of disputed facts.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. 

Blaylock, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24475, 2011-Ohio-4865, ¶ 15, quoting Mays v. City of 

Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir.1998). 

{¶ 12} If the defendant makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that an 

intentionally or recklessly false statement was included in a search-warrant affidavit, and 

if the challenged statement is necessary to probable cause, a hearing must be held at the 

defendant’s request. Franks at 155-156. At the hearing, if the defendant establishes a 

perjury allegation by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false 

material excluded, the remaining content does not establish probable cause, the search 

warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded. Id. at 156.
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{¶ 13} “To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more 

than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. 

There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, 

and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.” Id. at 171. The 

allegations “should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed 

to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. 

Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or 

their absence satisfactorily explained.” Id.

{¶ 14} With the foregoing standards in mind, we see no error in the trial court’s 

refusal to hold a Franks hearing. In his first warrant affidavit, Detective Saunders averred 

that the victim claimed Jones, her boyfriend, had struck her in the head with a metal pipe. 

According to the victim, the assault occurred in Jones’ home. Detective Saunders further 

averred that an eyewitness, A.S., had been in the home at the time and had confirmed 

the victim’s account. 

{¶ 15} In his proffer, defense counsel asserted that Detective Saunders unlawfully

had entered Jones’ house without a warrant shortly after another officer left to get the 

warrant. See Jan. 14, 2022 Suppression Transcript at p. 7, 17. One problem with this 

claim is that the warrant at issue says Detective Saunders personally appeared before 

the judge who issued it. Unless the issuing judge lied, Detective Saunders could not have 

been simultaneously searching Jones’ house and applying for a warrant. A second 

problem is that the foregoing scenario does not raise a Franks issue. If Detective 

Saunders did prematurely enter the house without a warrant, he may have violated the 
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Fourth Amendment. But that act would not establish any falseness in the search-warrant 

affidavit’s factual allegations regarding Jones’ assault of the victim inside the house. 

{¶ 16} Possibly in recognition of the foregoing problems, Jones contradicts 

counsel’s proffer on appeal. He now argues that Detective Saunders personally searched 

the house without a warrant and found the metal bar. According to Jones, the detective

then left the scene and obtained the first warrant, whereupon he returned and searched 

the house again and, apparently, found the bar again. Even if we ignore the fact that this 

scenario is at odds with defense counsel’s proffer, we see no substantial preliminary 

showing of a Franks violation. Once again, if Detective Saunders entered the house 

without a warrant, he may have violated the Fourth Amendment. But even if he did so 

and omitted that fact from his first affidavit, the omission was not critical to a finding of 

probable cause. The affidavit included allegations from the victim and an eyewitness 

claiming that Jones had struck the victim in the head with a metal pipe inside his home. 

Even if Detective Saunders had entered the home before obtaining a warrant, that fact 

would not detract from the probable cause established by the statements from the victim 

and the eyewitness. 

{¶ 17} With regard to the second search-warrant affidavit, Detective Saunders 

included the same averments supporting the first warrant. He also included additional 

information about what he saw when he executed the first warrant. Detective Saunders 

averred that in a bedroom he saw “an open drawer containing a large amount of cash 

and a brown paper bag containing a large amount of suspected illegal narcotics.” He 

further averred that he saw two handguns on the top shelf of a kitchen cabinet and that 
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he had knowledge of Jones being under a weapons disability. According to Detective 

Saunders, these items were in plain view when he executed the first warrant. 

{¶ 18} In his proffer, defense counsel stated that the victim had been in every part 

of the house the previous night and into the early-morning hours and that she had not 

seen any drugs or weapons in plain view. On appeal, Jones contends the victim was 

present at the suppression hearing and was prepared to testify that Detective Saunders’ 

averments about observing weapons and contraband in plain view were false.

{¶ 19} Even if we accept defense counsel’s proffer and Jones’ claim about what 

the victim would have stated, we see no substantial preliminary showing of a Franks

violation. Notably, the victim’s claimed observations occurred at least several hours 

before law-enforcement officers took Jones into custody and secured the house. 

According to defense counsel, the latest the victim made her observations was in the 

early-morning hours of August 7, 2021. When officers initially spoke to her that morning, 

she was at a different residence in the city of Dayton. During the suppression hearing, 

Detective Saunders testified that officers spoke to the victim again at the hospital roughly 

between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. The detective also testified that he was not dispatched 

to Jones’ house until around 12:00 noon or the “early afternoon hours.” Therefore, the 

officers did not apprehend Jones at his home until roughly noon or later, and the first 

search warrant was not issued until 1:16 p.m. 

{¶ 20} Given the foregoing timeline, Jones likely had been home without the victim 

there for hours before his arrest. That being so, the victim’s claim that she did not see any 

weapons in the kitchen or any drugs in an open bedroom drawer did not conflict with 
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Detective Saunders’ averments about later observing those items in plain view. 

Depending on what time the victim left Jones’ house, the detective’s search could have 

occurred as many as ten or more hours later. A non-contradictory explanation for the 

difference between what the victim saw and what the detective observed is that Jones 

placed the firearms in the kitchen and opened his dresser drawer after the victim left. In 

light of that simple explanation, we find no substantial showing of a Franks violation. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to hold a hearing. The first assignment of 

error is overruled. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 21} Jones’ second assignment of error states:

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WHEN 

HIS COUNSEL FAILED TO PROPERLY AND TIMELY PRESENT PROOF 

TO SUPPORT HIS FRANKS CLAIM.

{¶ 22} Jones contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to 

substantiate the alleged Franks violations with affidavits at the suppression hearing. He 

also claims defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by proceeding on the second 

day of the suppression hearing in Detective Saunders’ absence. Jones reasons that if the 

detective had been present he could have been cross-examined to prove the falseness 

of his search-warrant averments. Finally, Jones asserts that defense counsel’s filing of 

three affidavits just before sentencing proves that defense counsel knew his prior 
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performance had been prejudicially deficient.

{¶ 23} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under 

the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which was adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. 

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). To prevail on an ineffectiveassistance claim, a defendant must show that trial counsel rendered deficient 

performance and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland at 

paragraph two of the syllabus; Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus. Failure to make 

a showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats an ineffective-assistance 

claim. Strickland at 697.

{¶ 24} To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his trial 

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Id. 

at 688. In evaluating counsel’s performance, a reviewing court “must indulge in a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Id. at 689. “The adequacy of counsel’s performance must be viewed in light 

of all of the circumstances surrounding the trial court proceedings.” State v. Jackson, 2d 

Dist. Champaign No. 2004-CA-24, 2005-Ohio-6143, ¶ 29. To establish prejudice, a 

defendant must show that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 

the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 

2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204, citing Strickland at 687-688 and Bradley at 

paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 25} Upon review, we see no ineffective assistance of counsel. A request for a 
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Franks hearing should be supported by “[a]ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable 

statements of witnesses,” or their absence should be explained. Franks at 171. Although 

defense counsel did not present affidavits to support Jones’ request for a Franks hearing, 

counsel had two witnesses ready to testify in lieu of affidavits. The trial court deemed their 

testimony unnecessary, instead permitting defense counsel to proffer what they would 

have said if called. In our view, defense counsel’s production of actual witnesses 

adequately explained the absence of affidavits. We note too that Jones was not 

prejudiced by the lack of affidavits given defense counsel’s ability to proffer the two 

witnesses’ testimony. 

{¶ 26} Defense counsel also did not provide ineffective assistance by proceeding 

on day two of the suppression hearing in Detective Saunders’ absence. Defense counsel 

had a full opportunity to cross-examine the detective about the affidavits on the first day 

of the hearing. At no time during that cross-examination did the detective admit including 

any false statements in his affidavits. We have no reason to believe the detective would 

have made such admissions if only he had been cross-examined again the second day. 

As explained more fully above, we also see no basis for a Franks hearing even if we 

assume, arguendo, that Detective Saunders entered Jones’ house before obtaining the 

first warrant and that the victim did not see any weapons or contraband in plain view the 

previous night. Accordingly, we find no deficient performance and no prejudice to Jones 

based on defense counsel’s failure to object to Detective Saunders’ absence from the 

second day of the suppression hearing. 

{¶ 27} The three affidavits Jones filed shortly before sentencing likewise do not 
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establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The first affidavit was from the neighbor who 

claimed to have seen Detective Saunders unlawfully enter Jones’ house. The affidavit 

stated that the detective entered the house without a warrant and came back outside 

holding a stick. The neighbor then saw the detective enter again and leave for about an 

hour before returning with a paper and going inside yet again. Jones contends this 

affidavit supports the proposition that Detective Saunders searched the house without a 

warrant before leaving, obtaining a warrant, and searching it again. We fully addressed 

this issue in our analysis of the first assignment of error, and the neighbor’s affidavit adds 

nothing new. 

{¶ 28} A second affidavit was from Jones’ girlfriend, C.R., the alleged victim of the 

assault. Consistent with defense counsel’s proffer and Jones’ appellate argument, C.R. 

averred that she did not see any open drawers, drugs, or cash in plain view when she 

was inside Jones’ house. Once again, we fully considered this argument in our analysis 

above, and the victim’s affidavit adds nothing. 

{¶ 29} The third affidavit was from A.S., who was present when Jones allegedly 

assaulted his girlfriend. According to Detective Saunders’ two search-warrant affidavits, 

A.S. also was at the scene when law-enforcement officers initially arrived at Jones’ house. 

In his affidavit, A.S. averred that he had cleaned inside the house just minutes before 

police arrived to secure the scene. A.S. averred that the firearms, drugs, and money were 

not in plain view when he finished cleaning. This affidavit was more helpful to Jones than 

the affidavit from the victim, who had not been in the home for at least several hours 

before the search. Given the temporal proximity of the claims in A.S.’s affidavit to the 
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search, A.S.’s allegations, if true, would cast doubt on the truthfulness of Detective 

Saunders’ averments about observing guns, drugs, and money in plain view.

{¶ 30} We nevertheless conclude that A.S.’s affidavit fails to demonstrate 

ineffective assistance of counsel. During the suppression hearing, defense counsel 

identified two witnesses who were prepared to testify in support of a Franks violation. 

Those witnesses were Jones’ neighbor and Jones’ girlfriend. Defense counsel did not 

identify A.S. as a potential witness during the suppression hearing, and counsel did not 

proffer anything on behalf of A.S. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that defense 

counsel even knew A.S. had anything helpful to offer when the trial court resolved the 

Franks issue. As a result, the record does not portray ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on defense counsel’s failure to obtain an affidavit from A.S. or to proffer A.S.’s 

testimony at the time of the suppression hearing. 

{¶ 31} We note too that A.S.’s affidavit came too late to establish any error in the 

trial court’s Franks ruling. As noted above, defense counsel filed the affidavit shortly 

before sentencing. By that time, the trial court already had overruled Jones’ suppression 

motion and denied his request for a Franks hearing. Jones also had pled no contest, and 

the trial court had accepted the plea and made findings of guilt. In order to re-litigate the 

Franks issue based on A.S.’s new affidavit, Jones first would have needed to seek and 

obtain permission to withdraw his no contest plea. But he never sought to withdraw his 

plea. Instead, defense counsel simply filed the three affidavits and moved to have them 

included with a probation or presentence-investigation report, apparently so they would 

be part of the record on appeal. Therefore, none of the affidavits demonstrate error in the 
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trial court’s denial of a Franks hearing. For all of the foregoing reasons, we overrule Jones’ 

second assignment of error.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 32} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

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EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.