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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED June 20, 2017

v No. 330292 Macomb Circuit Court DONNA KAY SCRIVO, LC No. 2014-003257-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M ARKEY , P.J., and M ETER and S HAPIRO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant appeals as of right her jury trial convictions of fi rst-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), disinterment, mutilation, defacement , or carrying away of a human body (mutilation of a human body), MCL 750.160, and removing a body without medical examiner permission, MCL 52.204. The trial court sentenced def endant to life in prison without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, 57 months to 10 years in prison for the mutilation of a human body conviction, and one y ear for the removal of a b ody conviction. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant’s convictions arise f rom the death of her son, 32-ye ar-old Ramsay Scrivo, and the dismemberment of his body, the remains of which were discov ered in 12 pieces near Fred Moore Highway and Allington Road in St. Clair County. The pros ecution presented evidence that defendant drugged her son with Xanax, 1 strangled him, dismembered his body, and scattered the remains along the highway.

Defendant was living with the victim at the time of his death. The victim’s neighbors testified that they last saw him on January 24, 2014. On Janua ry 30, 2014, defendant was observed in a silver SUV along Fred Moore Highway and AllingtonRoad driving slowly and

1 Xanax is a brand name for the prescription drug alprazolam and is used to treat anxiety disorder; symptoms of a Xanax overdose include “extreme drowsin ess, confusion, impaired coordination, diminished reflexes, fainting, or coma.” Everyda y Health, What is Xanax (Alprazolam) <http://www.everydayhealth.com/drugs/xanax> (accessed May 19, 2017).-2- disposing of something from the SUV. Earlier that day, and als o on the previous day, defendant was seen by the victim’s neighbors loading large garbage bags i nto her vehicle. Later that day authorities found the victim’s remains scattered in bags along Fred Moore Highway and Allington Road. Along with the victim’s remains, authorities a lso found a power saw that was the same model number that witnesses recalled defendant purchas ing from a Lowe’s store earlier that week. 2 A subsequent search of the victim’s home did not reveal any l arge blood stains, but investigators did testify to a strong smell of bleach and the e xistence of small blood stains. One of the victim’s neighbors also tes tified that between January 2 5 and January 30 she heard a saw being used and that during the same time, she smelled both a bu rning and chemical odor emanating from the victim’s apartment.

The medical examiner who performed the victim’s autopsy, Dr. D aniel Spitz, testified that the cause of death was asphyxiation and that, due to large amounts of Xanax in his system, he believed that the victim had been drugged before being kille d. Defendant had a prescription for Xanax and a search revealed 10.5 pills missing from her mos t recent prescription. An analysis of defendant’s and the victim’s cell phone records als o did not reveal any calls made from the defendant to the victim after January 24 despite sever al witnesses testifying that defendant asked them if they ha d seen the victim and defendant’ s filing of a missing person’s report for the victim.

Defendant testified in her own defense. According to her test imony, on the morning of January 26, 2014 she observed a masked man in the victim’s room who said he was going to kill the victim. Defendant testified that this man tied her to the bed and then brought her back into the victim’s bedroom when he had finished killing the victim. Defendant testified that the man remained five days but that she never saw his face due to the m ask he was wearing. Defendant stated that the man then made her help dispose of the victim’s body threatening to harm further members of her family if she did not comply.

I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant argues that she was d enied a fair tri al by the prose cutor’s conduct of (1) asking questions and commenting on her ex ercise of her right to remain silent after her arrest; (2) introducing inadmissible and irre levant evidence; and (3) yelli ng at and arguing with witnesses. Although some of the prosecutor’s conduct was improper, we disa gree that it prejudiced defendant or denied her a fair trial. 3

2 Although the saw found along the highway matched the model num ber of the one defendant purchased earlier that week, because the saw did not have a spe cific identification number on it, it could not be definitively determined that the saw found on t he highway was the exact saw that defendant purchased.

3 Defendant did not object to the alleged questions and comments regarding her right to remain silent or to the alleged introduction of evidence that she was a bad person. Therefore, these claims are unpreserved and are reviewed for plain error affecti ng substantial rights. People v Jackson , 313 Mich App 409, 425; 884 NW2d 297 (2015). Defendant did ob ject to some-3- A. DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

During the prosecutor’s cross-ex amination of defendant, the fo llowing exchange occurred:

Q . You see, you were picked up on the night of January 31, 2014 . You spoke to the police for two hours that night. You didn’t tell them this story, did you?

A . No, sir.

The exchange continued:

Q . That, but you, we had to wait 16 months to hear this story a bout this intruder?

* * *

A . The night that the Detective [Margaret] Eidt walked me to th e holder cell I was pretty crazed. But I do remember asking: Can you pl ease talk to me tomorrow afternoon? And I got no response.

Q. Well, wasn’t there a reason?

A. Then I asked my first attorney to please let me do, talk to them and do a polygraph test.

Q. You invoked Miranda.[ 4 ] We can’t talk to you after you say that. That is why we don’t come to you. They can’t ask those questions.

Then again, during his closing ar gument, the prosecutor argued:

Next, another thing, okay, point I was making during cross. S he sees the murderer for six days, gives the height, weight, sound of the v oice, looks at his face. . . . Do you not think that those are significant number of clues?

* * *

But we sit on it instead. We play the martyr. She prefers to remain charged and 16 months before I hear the details, mother of the year. I don’t think

so.
instances of the prosecutor yelling at or arguing with witnesse s. The trial court then instructed the prosecutor to control his tone and not argue with the witne ss. Therefore, these claims are preserved and are reviewed “de novo to determine if the defenda nt was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Thomas , 260 Mich App 450, 453; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).

4 Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).-4- “[I]f a person remains silent a fter being arrested and given Miranda warnings, that silence may not be used as evidence against that person.” People v Shafier , 483 Mich 205, 212; 768 NW2d 305 (2009). “[A] defe ndant’s post-arrest, post- Miranda silence cannot be used to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory testimony.” Id . at 213 (citations omitted). Additionally, while a prosecutor is allowed to inquire about a defendant’s si lence to rebut a d efendant’s claim that she told the same exculpatory story to police upon arrest, Shafier , 483 Mich at 214 n 10, defendant had not offered any testimony about telling the polic e her exculpatory story at the time the prosecutor first made inquiri es about her post-arrest, post

- Miranda silence. While defendant did eventually testify that she told an officer in the hospital about the masked man, this testimony came only after the prosecutor’s initial questioning of her sil ence and invocation of Miranda

. This initial questioning was, t herefore, clearly improper.

However, because there was no objection, our review is limited to determining whether the prosecutor’s conduct amounted to plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights. People v Jackson (On Reconsideration) , 313 Mich App 409, 425; 884 NW2d 297 (2015). Therefore, defendant is not enti tled to relief unless the prose cutor’s actions “affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” People v Carines , 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Given the strength of the evidence in this case, we do not believe the prosecutor’s improper comments affecte d the outcome of the trial.

A saw was used, in part, to dismember the victim’s body, and d uring the time that the victim was missing, defendant purchased the same type of saw as was found near the victim’s body with his blood on it. The victim had a significantly elev ated level of Xanax in his system, defendant had a prescription for Xanax, and 10.5 pills from her prescription were unaccounted for at the time of her arrest. Defendant was seen carrying bla ck bags out of the victim’s condominium and putting them into a silver Blazer. She was als o seen driving the Blazer and dumping items that were later determined to be the victim’s bod y parts. She subsequently took items out of the Blazer, removed the license plate, and donated the vehicle. The victim’s blood was found in the vehicle. When defendant reported the victim m issing, she was wearing gloves similar to those found with the victim’s body parts. Her DNA w as also found on one of those gloves. Several witnesses testified that defendant told them that she called the victim after he went missing, but there were no calls from her phone to the vic tim’s phone after January 25, 2014.

Additionally, defendant’s own account of events was not credib le. She presented no corroborating evidence for her account that a masked man was re sponsible for her son’s murder and thereafter stayed at the home for five days to dismember th e body, all the while she was able to go to a Lowe’s store and to her car insurance agent. And he r testimony that this masked man also injured her was contradicted by several witnesses who saw her during the week preceding her arrest and who testified that she did not have visible inju ries. Accordingly, defendant cannot establish prejudice, and despite the prosecutor’s improper cond uct, she is not entitled to relief on this basis.

B. INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly presented char acter evidence to show that she is a bad person. Several of defendant’s claims of err or come from the testimony of-5- Allison Furtaw, who was the defendant’s sister-in-law and the v ictim’s aunt. The others come from the prosecutor’s comments during defendant’s own testimony and during the testimony of defense witness, Ann Cusmano.

Initially, we agree with defendant that portions of the prosec utor’s cross examination of her were improper. Specifically, the prosecutor acted inapprop riately during the following exchange concerning defendant’s other son, Jason:

Q . Okay. But now you’re not afr aid for Jason an d the niece anymore and the nephew?

A . Do you see my son Jason here?

Q . Hell, I haven’t seen him since this case started. He won’t return my calls?

A . You got that right.

Q . Because he doesn’t like you, and he thinks something else ha ppened.

A . And he verbally told you that?

Q . Not me, but somebody else.

A . We’re going with hearsay.

Q . Oh, your whole testimony is hearsay. Okay. Don’t talk to m e about hearsay.

The prosecutor’s comment was not a question and, as defendant a rgues, it suggested that Jason believed defendant may have been involved in the victim’s death . Additionally, the prosecutor’s questioning was overly argumentative. However, defense counsel objected, the trial court sustained the objection, and the prosecutor was instructed by t he trial court to pose a question and not argue with the witness. Therefore, any prejudice cause d by the prosecutor’s improper conduct was swiftly and appropriate ly corrected by the trial co urt. People v Mann , 288 Mich App 114, 121-122; 792 NW2d 53 (2010) (concluding that the appro priate response to an improper remark by the prosecutor is a limiting instruction).

During his examination of Furtaw, the prosecutor elicited test imony that one of the causes of defendant’s husband’s death was an infection on his h ip where defendant had given him a B-12 injection. The prosecutor also elicited testimony f rom Furtaw that at least implied that defendant had been terminated from her previous job due to possible misconduct. Defendant argues that such testimony should have been excluded under MRE 404(b), which states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” In both instances, we agree with defendant that Furtaw’s testimony should have been excluded. While Furtaw’s testimony about the death of defendant’s husband at most suggests defendant was somehow accidentally responsible for her husband’s death, it is not at all clear why this testimony was in any way-6- relevant and given its potential for prejudice, it should have been excluded. Additionally, while the questions about defendant’s separation from her past employ ment were arguably aimed at rebutting statements defense counsel made in his opening statem ent, we also fail to see the relevance of this testimony and agree that it had the potential to draw attention to defendant’s character in an impermissible way.

However, defendant has not framed this issue as evidentiary error and has instead claimed that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting t his testimony. Our determination that the testimony should have been excluded is m ade in the abstract and not in the context of reviewing an evidentia ry ruling of the trial court. Had the trial court admitted the testimony and permitted the argument over objections, it is lik ely that such a ruling would have amounted to a proper exercise of its discretion not subject to reversal on appeal. The fact that the prosecution had a colorable argument for the admissibility of t hese portions of Furtaw’s testimony is sufficient for us to conclude that its actions did not amount to misconduct, even if we ultimately disagree on the underlying evidentiary question.

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly portrayedher as a bad person during his questioning of Ann Cusm ano. Defendant had called Cu smano as a defense witness, and she testified that defendant was a good mother whom Cusmano did not believe was capable of hurting her sons. Then, on cross examination, the prosecuto r challenged Cusmano’s testimony by stating, “Because in fact she is such a good mothe r that Jason wants nothing to do with her; won’t take her phone calls, isn’t coming back from Ne w Orleans. That is how good of a mother she is.” Because defendant opened the door concerning her character as a mother, it was not improper for the prosecution to attempt to rebut the sa me, MRE 404(a)(1), including by making references to specific instance of conduct on cross-exam ination, MRE 405(a). Defendant also complains that the prosecutor improperly yelled at and argued with Cusmano. During the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Cusmano, defense c ounsel objected that the prosecutor was arguing with the witness. The trial court direc ted the prosecutor to control his tone. This instruction allevia ted any prejudic ial effect.

C. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS

Lastly, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the pro secutor’s improper conduct denied her a fair trial. “[T]he cumulative effect of several e rrors can constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal where the prejudice of any one error would not.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 591; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). As discussed, the pro secutor improperly asked questions about and commented on defendant’s right to rem ain silent, sugge sted that Jason believed defendant was guilty, and argued with witnesses. Howe ver, in this case, evidence of defendant’s guilt was clearly overwhelming. Given that, as wel l as the trial court’s curative instructions, we not find suffici ent prejudice to undermine con fidence in the reliability of the jury’s verdict. See id . at 591 n 12 (finding that a claim of cumulative error also re quires a showing of prejudice).

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In order to obtain relief on an ineffective assistance of coun sel claim, defendant must show first, “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and sec ond, that “the deficient-7- performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). “A de fendant must overcome a stro ng presumption that the assistance of his counsel was sound trial strategy . . . .” People v Sabin (On Second Remand)
, 242 Mich App 656, 659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). To establish prejud ice under Strickland , a defendant is required to show tha t there exists a “reasonable p robability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland , 466 US at 694. “A reasonable probabil ity is a probability sufficie nt to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “Because the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both d eficient performance and prejudice, the defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim.” Jackson , 313 Mich App at 432 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 5

A. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO TH E PROSECUTOR’S CONDUCT

Defendant argues that trial counsel should have objected to (1 ) the prosecutor’s questions and comments regarding her right to remain silent; and (2) the prosecutor’s interjection of inadmissible and irrelevant evide nce. As discussed in Part I, the prosecutor’s questions and comments regarding defendant’s right to remain silent were impr oper. Further, the prosecutor improperly suggested that the victim’s brother, Jason, believed defendant was involved in the victim’s death. Trial counsel’s failure to object to these err ors was not objectively reasonable. Nonetheless, trial counsel’s fa ilure to object did not prejudic e defendant given the trial court’s instruction that the lawyers’ comments are not evidence and the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. In light of this body of evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been different if defense counsel h ad objected.

B. FAILURE TO CALL EXPERT WITNESSES

Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failin g to call expert witnesses to testify regarding (1) the inges tion and metabolization of Xanax , (2) the ability of a 100-pound, 60-year-old woman to strangle and move a 250-pound, 32-year-old man; and (3) defendant’s bruises following her arrest. Def endant argues that such exper ts would have supported the testimony of the medical examiner that the Xanax could not have been injected, attested to the improbability of defendant forcing or deceiving the victim into ingesting enough Xanax to induce unconsciousness, attested to the improbability of defend ant manually strangling and moving the victim from the bedr oom to the bathtub, and showed t hat defendant’s bruising had occurred earlier in the w eek before her arrest.

Decisions regarding whether to retain witnesses, including exp ert witnesses, are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Payne , 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). “[T]he failure to call a witness can constitute in effective assistance of counsel only when it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.” Id . (citation and quotation marks omitted). Defendant has not made an offer of proof regarding the proposed expert testimony she

5 Because no hearing pursuant to People v Ginther , 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), was held to create a factual record, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Hurst , 205 Mich App 634, 641; 517 NW2d 858 (1994).-8- believes should have been presented at trial. She merely specu lates that expert witnesses could have provided testimony favorable to the defense. Without an a ppropriate offer of proof, defendant has failed to establish the factual predicate for her claim. She has failed to show that such expert witnesses would have affected the outcome of the tr ial.

C. FAILURE TO CALL OFFICE R DRULA AS A WITNESS

Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failin g to secure the testimony of Officer Jessica Drula concerning statements defendant claims sh e made to Drula. According to trial counsel, Drula would have t estified that while she was re moving defendant’s handcuffs, defendant asked Drula to stand in front of a little man staring at her, even though there was no one behind Drula. Defendant then allegedly told Drula, “[T]hatlittle man in black looked just like the one that killed my son.” Defendant argues that her tr ial counsel should have sought to secure Drula’s testimony about what defendant said to her under MRE 803(1), the present sense impression exception to the hears ay rule. However, while defen se counsel initially sought to admit Drula’s testimony as a non -hearsay, prior consistent stat ement, when the trial court rejected that argument, 6 trial counsel alternatively soughtadmission of the statement under MRE 803(1) arguing that defendant’s statement to Drula was a statem ent describing or explaining an event or condition while defendant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. Accordingly, defenda nt’s contention on appeal is i ncorrect. Trial counsel did seek to introduce the testimony under the same theory presented by defe ndant on appeal, but the trial court disagreed and denied the admission of the testimony. 7

D. FAILURE TO REQUEST A MISTRIAL

Defendant argues that trial counsel should have requested a mi strial after the penalties for the crimes charged were inadvertently included in the instructi ons given to the jury. After the jury was selected, the jurors were handed a packet of instructi ons. As the trial court began to give the instructions, trial counsel approached the bench and i nformed the court that the felony information was attached to the jury instructions, which identi fied the penalties for each offense. The prosecution had prepared the instructions, and it could not explain how this had happened. The trial court asked each juror what he or she saw. Eight jur ors indicated that they had read the

6 The trial court rejected this argument and ruled that because the statement was made after defendant was in custody and, thus, had a motive to fabricate, the statement could not qualify as a prior consistent statement.

7 Defendant was ordered to attend an evaluation relative to crim inal responsibility at the State’s Center for Forensic Psychology. Additionally, defendant’s tria l counsel requested the trial court appoint an independent expert for an evaluation of criminal res ponsibility, and the trial court granted this request. While the results of these evaluations a re not contained in the record, presumably they were not favorable to an insanity defense, as d efendant did not present an insanity defense at trial, and she has not argued that trial co unsel was ineffective for failure to pursue such a defense on appeal.-9- first sheet. Of those, four jurors indicated that they had rea d the penalties. 8 The trial court instructed those jurors not to share the penalties with their f ellow jurors. Then, after conducting its own research, the trial court ruled that the error was harm less and that it intended to give a “very strong” curative instruction to the jurors. Defendant’s trial counsel stated that his “independent research led [him] to no case law which would deem this anything other than harmless error,” and requested that the trial court give the ad ditional curative instruction. The trial court then instructed the jury that the possible penalty should not influence its decision.

Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that trial co unsel’s decision to request a curative instruction, rather than a mistrial, was sound trial strategy. Further, “[a] mistrial is warranted only when an error or irregularity in the proceedings prejudices the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” People v Waclawski , 286 Mich App 634, 708; 780 NW2d 321 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because a c urative instruction was given, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, People v Graves , 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), the fair ness of the trial wa s not affected, no r was defendant prejudiced. Thus, trial counsel’s failure to request a mistrial was not unreasonable, and there is no reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the trial.

E. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ADM ISSION OF AUTOPSY PHOTOGRAPHS

Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failin g to object to the admission of autopsy photographs. During the testimony of Dr. Spitz, the prosecution admitted into evidence several autopsy photogr aphs. Trial counsel indicated that he had no objection because any objectionable material had been eliminated after a motion i n limine was filed and the attorneys conferred. We have held that autopsy photographs may be relevant where the nature, type, and location of a victim’s injuries are at issue and wher e the photographs are necessary to illustrate and augment the complex medical testimony. People v Unger , 278 Mich App 210, 257; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Moreover, “[w]hile gruesome photographs should not be admitted solely to garner sympathy from the jury, a photograph that is a dmissible for some other purpose is not rendered inadmissible be cause of its gruesome details.” People v Mesik (On Reconsideration) , 285 Mich App 535, 544; 775 NW2d 857 (2009).

Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption of sound tria l strategy given that trial counsel successfully moved to exc lude the autopsy photographs that he believed were objectionable. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s argument, the photographs were relevant because the photographs showed the post-mortem cuts and charrin g described by Dr. Spitz, the blue plastic material on the victim’s body, and the mark on the victim’s neck, which Dr. Spitz testified was related to the cause of death. The photographs a lso helped explain Dr. Spitz’s testimony that some of the cuts were made by a saw. The photog raphs were not admitted solely to garner sympathy from the jury. Because the photographs were relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, they were admissible, and trial counsel was not in effective for failing to further object to their admissibility.

8 Juror Numbers 2 and 12 only saw the penalties for Count 1, and Juror Numbers 3 and 4 saw the penalties for Counts 1 and 3.-10- F. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO CERTAI N EVIDENCE FROM CRIME SCENE

Defendant argues that trial c ounsel should have objected to th e admission of certain evidence arguing that that evidence was tainted when the victim ’s cousin, James Scrivo, was allowed to walk through the crime scene. Detective Sergeant Jay Cohoe testified that James Scrivo was with the officers duri ng the second search of the vi ctim’s condominium and that he recovered the ashes of the victim’s father from the kitchen but that he did not take or touch anything else. Thus, contrary t o defendant’s argument, there w as no indication that any evidence was tainted and an objecti on would have been futile.

G. FAILURE TO PERSUADE DEF ENDANT NOT TO TESTIFY

Defendant argues that trial counsel should have persuaded her not to testify. At trial, defendant affirmed that she understood that she had the right t o remain silent, her attorney had explained that right to her, and she understood that she could choose to testify, but would be subject to cross-examination by the prosecutor. Defendant indi cated that she wished to testify, that she had given it a lot of thought, and that she was certai n. During cross-examination by the prosecutor, however, defendant sai d, “Sir, I didn’t want to tes tify. I’m going to be confused. I’m going to misspeak.”

“A defendant’s right to testify in his own defense arises from the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Altho ugh counsel must advise a defendant of this right, the ultimate decision whether to testi fy at trial remains with the defendant.” People v Bonilla-Machado , 489 Mich 412, 419; 803 NW2d 217 (2011) (citations omitted). Because it was defendant’s decision whether to testi fy, her claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to persuade her not to testify is merit less. Despite her subsequent indication on cross-examination that she did not want to testif y, she clearly stated that defense counsel had explained to her tha t she had the right not to test ify, that she had given the issue much thought, and that she was certa in that she wanted to testi fy when she was questioned by her attorney. Trial counsel explaine d defendant’s rights to her, b ut he could not persuade her not to exercise her right to testify. T herefore, trial counsel was no t ineffective.

H. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS

Defendant argues that the cumul ative effect of trial counsel’s errors requires reversal of her convictions. “[T]he cumulative effect of several errors ca n constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal where the pr ejudice of any one error would not .” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich at 591. However, as our Supreme Court explained, “ ‘cumulative error,’ properly understood, actually refers to cumulative unfair prejudice , and is properly considered in connection with issues of harmless error.” Id . at 591 n 12. As discussed earlier , trial counsel’s failure t o object to two instances of the prosecuto r’s improper conduct did not prej udice defendant given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, there was no unfair prejudice to accumulate.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to suppo rt her conviction of firstdegree premeditated murder. In reviewing a claim that the evid ence was insufficient to support a-11- conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorab le to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Bennett , 290 Mich App 465, 471-472; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). “Circumstantial evid ence and any reasonable infere nces arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Allen , 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 869 (2000). We “will not interfere with the jury ’s determinations regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” People v Unger , 278 Mich App 210, 222; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

As we have already discussed, the evidence of defendant’s guil t in this case was strong enough to preclude a finding of prejudice concerning defendant’ s claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, th e evidence was certainly sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact’s determination that defend ant committed each element of the charged offenses. Defendant ar gues that the prosecution failed to prove how the victim ingested Xanax and how she could have strangled and moved the victim. H owever, the prosecution was not required to prove the exact d etails of how defendant commit ted the crime. The evidence presented, as well as the reasonable inferences that could be d rawn from that evidence were sufficient to show that defendant committed each element of the charged offense. The jury apparently did not find credible defendant’s testimony that a m an wearing a mask committed the offenses, and we will not interfere with that determination. S ee People v Solloway , 316 Mich App 174, 180; 891 NW2d 255 (2016) (“[T]he reviewing court will not interfere with the factfinder’s role of deciding the credibility of witnesses.”).

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro