alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

ROBERT C. CARR,

 Plaintiff, 

v.

DAVID BOWEN, et al.

 Defendants. 

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§

CASE NO. 6:23-CV-492-JCB-KNM

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Rober C. Carr, proceeding pro se and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, filed

the above-styled lawsuit on October 2, 2023. Doc. No. 1. 

On October 6, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within thirty

(30) days addressing the fact that his complaint fails to establish that this Court has jurisdiction

over the case. On October 12, the Court received an acknowledgment of receipt. The receipt was 

signed by Plaintiff, but the Date of Delivery field was blank. See Doc. No. 5. The October 6 Order 

warned Plaintiff that the complaint may be dismissed if he failed to amend it as ordered. To date,

Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint. Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure

to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 

RECOMMENDATION

The Court recommends that the complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure

to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge's report, any party must 

serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate 

Case 6:23-cv-00492-JDK-KNM Document 6 Filed 11/15/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 18
2

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place 

in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. 

An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate 

judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the unobjectedto factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by the district 

court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that 

such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,

79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 15th day of November, 2023.

Case 6:23-cv-00492-JDK-KNM Document 6 Filed 11/15/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 19
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION 

No. 2:23-CV-0288-JRG-RSP 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 

Please take notice that the undersigned attorney is admitted to this Court and hereby enters 

his appearance of counsel on behalf of Defendant Restaurant Brands International, Inc. in this 

matter. Counsel consents to electronic service of all papers in this matter. 

Dated: December 18, 2023 /s/ Alexander H. Martin 

Alexander H. Martin 

Texas Bar No. 24091828 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

Telephone: (214) 747-5070 

Facsimile: (214) 747-2091 

Email: martin@fr.com

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

RESTAURANT BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

ANALYTICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

RESTAURANT BRANDS 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case 2:23-cv-00288-JRG-RSP Document 29 Filed 12/18/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 244
2 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has 

been served on December 18, 2023, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have 

consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

/s/ Alexander H. Martin 

Alexander H. Martin 

Case 2:23-cv-00288-JRG-RSP Document 29 Filed 12/18/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 245
Francisca GUILLEN, Petitioner, v. DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC.

No. 19-182

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Lloyd E. AUSTIN, IV, Petitioner, v. Bridgitte AMSBERRY.

No. 18-9497

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
AO 458 (Rev. 06/09) Appearance of Counsel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff

v. Case No.

Defendant

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

.

Date:

Attorney’s signature

Printed name and bar number

Address

E-mail address

Telephone number

FAX number

 Eastern District of Texas XR Communications, LLC, dba Vivato Technologies VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL. 2:23-cv-00470 XR Communications, LLC, dba Vivato Technologies 01/17/2024 /s/ Qi (Peter) Tong Qi (Peter) Tong, TX SBN 24119042

Russ August & Kabat 

4925 Greenville Ave., Suite 200 

Dallas, TX 75206

ptong@raklaw.com (310) 826-7474 (310) 826-6991 Print Save As... Reset

Case 2:23-cv-00470-JRG-RSP Document 31 Filed 01/17/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 882
PHARMERICA CORPORATION, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES, EX REL. Marc SILVER

No. 18-1044

Supreme Court of the United States.

October 7, 2019

Motion of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* granted. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe annual report on Form 10-K of BioSphere Medical, Inc. (the “Company”)for the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned MartinJ. Joyce, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1)         The Report fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)         Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| Dated: March 29, 2005 | /s/  MARTIN  J. JOYCE                    |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
|                       | Martin J. Joyce                               |
|                       | *Vice  President and Chief Financial Officer* |
|                       | *(principal  financial officer)*              |

 

1

----
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-03-398-CR

FLOYD FRANK-VOLLIEN, JR.	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Floyd Frank-Vollien, Jr. attempts to appeal from the trial court’s judgment revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudicating his guilt for the offense of aggravated sexual assault, and sentencing him to eight years’ confinement.  On September 8, 2003, the trial court signed a certification of appellant’s right to appeal, which was also signed by appellant’s counsel.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).  The certificate states that this case “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal” and that “the defendant has waived the right of appeal.”  Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 2, 2003.

	On October 6, we notified appellant that the certification indicating that he had no right to appeal and had waived the right to appeal had been filed in this court and that we would dismiss this appeal unless appellant or any party filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal.  Appellant’s response indicates that his appeal is based on ineffective assistance of counsel and new information and evidence showing his innocence.  Appellant does not refute that he waived his right to appeal.

	A valid waiver of appeal will prevent a defendant from appealing without the trial court’s consent.  Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f).

									PER CURIAM

PANEL D: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: November 20, 2003
# C_2017169EN.01000601.xml

| 30.5.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 169/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.5.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/6

---

Notice for the attention of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP and in Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria

(2017/C 169/07)

The following information is brought to the attention of the persons and entities designated in Annex I to Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP (1), as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/917 (2), and in Annex II to Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 (3), as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/907 (4), concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria.

1

2

3

4

The Council of the European Union, after having reviewed the list of persons and entities designated in the above-mentioned Annexes, has determined that the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2013/255/CFSP and in Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 should continue to apply to those persons and entities.

The attention of the persons and entities concerned is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities of the relevant Member State(s) as indicated on the websites in Annex IIa to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds for basic needs or specific payments (cf. Article 16 of the Regulation).

The persons and entities concerned may submit a request to the Council before 1 March 2018, together with supporting documentation that the decision to include them on the above-mentioned list should be reconsidered to the following address:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| DG C 1C |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG C 1C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

Any observations received will be taken into account for the purpose of the Council’s next review, pursuant to Article 34 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP and Article 32(4) of Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, of the list of designated persons and entities.

---

(1)  OJ L 147, 1.6.2013, p. 14.

1

(2)  OJ L 139, 30.5.2017, p. 62.

2

(3)  OJ L 16, 19.1.2012, p. 1.

3

(4)  OJ L 139, 30.5.2017, p. 15.

4

---
David MEYERS, Petitioner v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections

No. 18-9711

Supreme Court of the United States.

February 24, 2020

The petition for rehearing is denied.
Tony BUCK, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 19-7843.

Supreme Court of the United States.

March 30, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
Exhibit 10.25

                                  AMENDMENT TO
                              EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

      The Employment Agreement (the "Agreement") of Stephen Duerk dated as of
May 18, 2001, is hereby amended as follows:

      1.    Section 9.1 of the Agreement is hereby amended to read as follows:

            "9.1 The Employee agrees that during the Non-Competition Period (as
            defined in Section 9.4 below), without the prior written consent of
            the Company: (a) he shall not, within the Territory (as defined in
            Section 9.5 below), directly or indirectly, either as principal,
            manager, agent, consultant, officer, director, greater than two (2%)
            percent holder of any class or series of equity securities, partner,
            investor, lender or employee or in any other capacity, carry on, be
            engaged in or have any financial interest in or otherwise be
            connected with, any entity which is now or at the time, has material
            operations which are engaged in the manufacture or sale of
            automotive airbag products competitive with the Company; and (b) he
            shall not, within the Territory (as defined in Section 9.5 below),
            on behalf of any competing entity, directly or indirectly, have any
            dealings or contact with any suppliers or customers of the Company
            or its Affiliates."

      2.    All other provisions of the Agreement are hereby confirmed and
            ratified.

      IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment to
the Agreement as of the 29th day of September, 2003.

                                SAFETY COMPONENTS INTERNATIONAL, INC.


                                By: /s/ Mary Jones
                                   ------------------------------


                                /s/ Stephen Duerk
                                ---------------------------------
                                Stephen Duerk

Figure 1 - Exhibit 10.25
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### SEP 19 2001 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
JASON EDWARD WALKER,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 01-1071
v. (D.C. No. 00-Z-1890) CORRECTIONS CORPORATION AMERICA, INC., and their disciplinary and administrative boards at the Kit Carson Correctional Facility; WARDEN AT CCA; RONALD LUNK; MR. BREEDLOVE; MS. BAIR; and MR. BRILL, (D. Colo.)

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOURand McKAY , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge.
After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without ora l argument.-2-

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, appeals the district c ourt’s sua sponte dismissal of his civil rights complaint. The court dismissed the suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) (permitting dismissal of legally fr ivolous claims) and Edwards v. Balisok , 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (barring § 1983 claims for de privation of good time credits where the claims necessarily imply the inva lidity of the deprivation). For the reasons given by the district court, we affirm. See R. Doc. 18 (Order and Judgment of Dismissal). Plaintiff is ordered to pay costs and fees in parti al payments as outlined in the payment order filed April 24, 2001. Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUE BING HUANG,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 13-71190

Agency No. A070-169-278

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 25, 2015** 

Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Hue Bing Huang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen deportation

proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

FILED

SEP 02 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, Avagyan v.

Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011), and we deny the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reopen

on the grounds that notice was proper and that Huang failed to rebut the strong

presumption of effective service arising from the service of his hearing notice by

certified mail. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(1)(F) (1994) (repealed) (obligation to

notify court of address change); see also id. § 1252b(a)(2)(A), (c)(1) (written

notice is considered sufficient if sent to the most recent address provided). 

To the extent Huang contends he failed to appear due to exceptional

circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion as

untimely where he waited seventeen years to file a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (motion to reopen in absentia proceedings generally must be

filed within 180 days of the removal order), and he did not establish the due

diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline where he admits he

purposefully evaded numerous opportunities to redress his in absentia order, see

Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678-80.

In addition, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying where Huang

failed to establish that reopening was warranted based on a claim of changed

country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii); Avagyan, 646

2 13-71190
F.3d at 678 (“The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary,

irrational, or contrary to law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Huang’s remaining contentions are unavailing.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 13-71190
#### Anthony Lo Cascio, as Agent for Masaryk Towers Corporation, Respondent, *v.*Helen E. Bailey et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

July 6, 1973.

*931*Berger, Kramer & Levenson (Jerome M. Kay*of counsel), for appellants. *Weiss, Wiener & Levine, P. C. (Leo Wiener*of counsel), for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The tenants, in the nonpayment eviction proceeding here appealed from, raised the defense that the landlord failed to comply with the provisions of the ‘ ‘ Merola Law ’ ’ (Administrative Code of City of N. Y., § B61.0) providing that a public hearing be held prior to a rent increase and therefore that increase, which they stipulate they did not pay, was illegal and void. The dismissal of the defense was erroneously based on the court’s finding that the *‘ ‘*Merola Law ’ ’ had no application to the particular and agreed facts of the case as the Housing and Development Administration was not the 1 ‘ supervising agency ’ ’ and that there was not a rent increase but an initial fixing of rent.

The landlord was incorporated pursuant to article 2 of the Private Housing Finance Law and therefore in accordance with the terms of its certificate of incorporation as well as the provisions of the Private Housing Finance Law, it subjected itself to the supervision of the Housing and Development Administration (HDA). It is clear from the record that the HDA did exercise such supervision by screening and approving the tenants before they were accepted and approving the initial fixing of rent. These tenants have been paying this rent for approximately six years until it was increased without public hearing. The HDA also utilized the New York City Housing Authority as its agent for its other normal supervisory duties.

The “ Merola Law” simply mandates what the HDA is required to do by its own rules and regulations which it rightfully promulgated as the designated agency under the Private Housing Finance Law *(Matter of Strycker’s Bay Apts.*v. *Walsh,*67 Misc 2d 134; see, also, *Matter of Fuller*v. *Urstadt,*28 N Y 2d 315; *Tompkins Sq. Neighbors*v. *Zaragoza,*73 Misc 2d 126).

The final judgments should be reversed with $30 costs and final judgments directed in favor of tenants dismissing the petitions with costs.

Concur — Markowitz, P. J., Quinn and Frank, JJ.

Final judgments reversed, etc'.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending
December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Patrick J. Moore, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

|/s/PATRICK J. MOOREPatrick J. Moore
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|March 3, 2004                                                                       | 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation and will be retained by
Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks