AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed May 16, 2024 

S 

In the 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-23-00921-CV 

REPAIRIFY, INC. AND REPAIRIFY HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellants 

V. 

OPUS IVS, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 471-00867-2023 

OPINION 

Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Carlyle 

Opinion by Justice Carlyle 

Appellants Repairify, Inc. and Repairify Holdings, LLC [“Repairify”] appeal 

the trial court’s order granting appellee Opus IVS, Inc.’s special appearance. We 

affirm. 

Repairify sued Opus, its competitor in the worldwide automotive repair 

services industry, for tortious interference with contract after Opus hired William 

O’Brien away from Repairify. Repairify’s principal place of business is in Plano, 

Texas while Opus is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business 

in Michigan. 
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In its first issue, Repairify argues that a prior panel of this court adopted an 

“erroneous (but common) misunderstanding of International Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)” in Asshauer v. Glimcher Realty Trust, 228 S.W.3d 

922, 933 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.), and that we should rectify this 

misunderstanding by holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mallory v. 

Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 600 U.S. 122, 135 (2023) abrogates our 

personal jurisdiction precedent. Mallory concluded that Pennsylvania’s statutory 

scheme specifically requiring registering non-resident corporations to consent to 

general jurisdiction in the Commonwealth’s courts does not violate Due Process. 

Mallory, 600 U.S. at 134–35 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301(a)(2)(i)). 

The Mallory Court answered only that question, whether consent jurisdiction 

for non-resident corporate defendants comports with Due Process. See id. at 139 

(analogizing Norfolk Southern’s Due Process arguments against consent jurisdiction 

to those made against tag jurisdiction in Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Co. of Marin, 

495 U.S. 604 (1990)). Mallory never sought to instruct how to read a state’s statutes 

or whether to intuit from them that they meant a registering business consented to 

general jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement of that consent. Cf. BRYAN 

A. GARNER, ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 655 (2016) (state high courts 

have the final say and final authority over interpretation of the state’s laws). The 

Mallory Court answered “a very old question indeed—one this Court resolved more 

than a century ago in Pennsylvania Fire [Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Min. 
–3– 

& Mill. Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917)].” Mallory has no effect on this court’s interpretation 

of the Texas non-resident corporation registration scheme and we decline the 

invitation to reinterpret settled Texas law. See Asshauer, 229 S.W.3d at 933 (“having 

a registered agent and being registered to do business in Texas only potentially 

subjects a foreign corporation to jurisdiction in this state”); Dowdy v. Miller, 122 

S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ch. 9. 

For similar reasons, we reject Reparify’s second issue, asking us to conclude 

Texas’s statutory scheme related to non-resident businesses requires a conclusion 

that Opus has consented to general jurisdiction in Texas simply by registering to do 

business here. See id. The supreme court has repeatedly rejected mechanical tests for 

jurisdiction, see Guardian Royal Exch. Assur., Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 

815 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Tex. 1991), and unlike Pennsylvania law in Mallory, none of 

Texas’s business registration statutes—and nothing in Texas’s long-arm scheme—

includes any language specifically directing that complying with them would subject 

a business to personal jurisdiction in Texas. See Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 

829 F. Supp. 882, 886–89 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (gently distinguishing Texas case law 

holding otherwise). 

In its third issue, Repairify argues Opus has sufficient minimum contacts with 

Texas to subject it to specific jurisdiction and that subjecting Opus to specific 

jurisdiction would not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
–4– 

We review issues of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants de 

novo. TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 36 n.4 (Tex. 2016). When a 

trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special 

appearance ruling, we imply all facts necessary to support the judgment and 

supported by the evidence. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 

558 (Tex. 2018). And when the relevant facts are undisputed, an appellate court need 

not consider any implied findings of fact and considers only the legal question of 

whether the undisputed facts establish Texas jurisdiction. Id. 

Specific jurisdiction exists where a defendant purposefully avails itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum state and the plaintiff’s claim arises 

out of or is related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. See LG Chem Am., 

Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex. 2023). In connection with its special 

appearance, Opus introduced evidence that (1) it has 289 employees and offices in 

Michigan, California, New York, and Arizona, (2) it does not have an office in Texas, 

(3) it has never owned any property in Texas, (4) it does not have any physical 

locations in Texas, (5) it does not have any bank accounts in Texas, (6) O’Brien is a 

resident of Arizona, (7) O’Brien works for Opus in Arizona, (8) Opus has never 

communicated or otherwise interacted with O’Brien in Texas, (9) 19 of Opus’s 

employees reside in Texas, (10) Opus recruits employees from every U.S. state, (10) 

none of its salespeople are in Texas, and (11) O’Brien’s contract with Opus was 

executed pursuant to Michigan law. 
–5– 

Repairify’s live petition alleges: 

Specific jurisdiction over Opus is proper in the state of Texas because 

Opus solicited and recruited Defendant William O’Brien away from 

Repairify, despite having knowledge of O’Brien’s restrictive covenants 

with Repairify. O’Brien is the Global Sales Leader for Opus—

responsible for overseeing all of Opus’s sales. Opus directly competes 

with Repairify, including in the state of Texas. Accordingly, O’Brien’s 

knowledge of customers, vendors, employees, and confidential 

information relating to diagnostic tools—of which he learned by means 

of his employment with Repairify (a Texas resident)—is extremely 

valuable to Opus. To gain the benefits of O’Brien’s knowledge of the 

above, Opus purposefully interfered with the agreements between 

O’Brien and Repairify. 

Opus’s knowledge that its conduct might cause Repairify to suffer a competition 

injury in Texas does not create sufficient minimum contacts to trigger specific 

jurisdiction here. See Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 68–69 (Tex. 2016) 

(“Mere knowledge that the ‘brunt’ of the alleged harm would be felt—or have 

effects—in the forum state is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction.”); Asshauer, 

228 S.W.3d at 933. Notably missing from these allegations is the claim that Opus 

took actions in Texas related to Repairify’s claims here. Repairify’s allegations 

relating to O’Brien’s knowledge or the actions related to him joining and working 

for Repairify are not relevant to analyzing specific jurisdiction over Opus. See 

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (cleaned up) (only the “defendant 

himself[’s]” contacts are relevant). 

Repairify also argues that Opus has purposefully availed itself because it “has 

recruited and employed at least 26 Texas residents since April 2021,” citing Texas 
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Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 17.042(3).1 The acts listed in § 17.042 are those 

that can bring a defendant within the Texas long-arm statute but have no special 

relevance to the purposeful availment analysis, which is part of the analysis whether 

exercising jurisdiction would satisfy federal and state constitutional due process 

guarantees. See Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356–57 (Tex. 1990). We 

give this the minimal weight it deserves. 

Under these circumstances, Repairify’s claim neither arises out of nor is 

related to Opus’s purposeful contacts with Texas because none of the relevant actions 

or actors sufficiently connect to Texas, as detailed above in the extensive non-Texas 

actions related to the controversy here. See LG Chem Am., Inc., 670 S.W.3d at 347. 

In light of this conclusion, we need not consider whether exercising jurisdiction 

comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Foley v. 

Trinity Indus. Leasing Co., 314 S.W.3d 593, 602 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). 

Finally, Repairify argues Opus is subject to general jurisdiction in Texas. For 

at least all the reasons we reject specific jurisdiction, we reject the conclusion that 

Opus’s contacts with Texas have been systematic and continuous, rendering it 

essentially at home here. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n. 19 

(2014); Searcy, 496 S.W.3d at 72. 

1

 “In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does business 

in this state if the nonresident . . . recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary 

located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state.” 
–7– 

 Having overruled each of Repairify’s four issues on appeal, we affirm the 

trial court’s judgment. 

230921F.P05 

 

/Cory L. Caryle/

CORY L. CARLYLE 

JUSTICE 
–8– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

REPAIRIFY, INC. AND 

REPAIRIFY HOLDINGS, LLC, 

Appellants 

No. 05-23-00921-CV V. 

OPUS IVS, INC., Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 471st Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 471-00867-

2023. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. 

Justices Partida-Kipness and 

Pedersen, III participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee OPUS IVS, INC. recover its costs of this 

appeal from appellant REPAIRIFY, INC. AND REPAIRIFY HOLDINGS, LLC. 

Judgment entered May 16, 2024