[Cite as Anderson v. Preferred Title & Guaranty Agency, Inc., 2014-Ohio-518.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Kim L. Anderson, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 

v. : No. 13AP-385 

 (C.P.C. No. 11CV-9083) 

Preferred Title & Guaranty Agency, : 

Inc. et al., (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on February 13, 2014 

 

Kim L. Anderson, pro se. 

DeSanto & McNichols, Debra J. DeSanto and David J. 

McNichols, for appellees Preferred Title & Guaranty Agency, 

Inc. and Frank Farkas. 

Sikora Law LLC, Michael J. Sikora, III, Richard T. Craven

and Joni S. Todd, for appellee Stewart Title Guaranty 

Company. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

O'GRADY, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Kim L. Anderson, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for summary judgment and 

granting the motions for summary judgment of defendants-appellees Stewart Title 

Guaranty Company, Preferred Title & Guaranty Agency, Inc., and Frank Farkas. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 
No. 13AP-385 2 

I. BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Appellant brought this action, pro se, against Stewart Title Guaranty 

Company ("Stewart Title"), Preferred Title & Guaranty Agency, Inc. ("Preferred Title"), 

Frank Farkas (collectively "appellees"), and Rebecca Barley.1 According to the parties, 

appellant was a facilitator who brought buyers and sellers together for three real estate 

transactions, which are at issue in this case. Preferred Title provided title, escrow, and 

closing services related to the transactions. Farkas, a vice president at Preferred Title, and 

Barley, an employee at Preferred Title, were involved in the transactions. Stewart Title 

had a business relationship with Preferred Title, pursuant to which it underwrote the title 

insurance policies issued by Preferred Title during the transactions. 

{¶ 3} Appellant claims Stewart Title, Preferred Title, Farkas, and Barley had a 

duty to disclose accurate information to lenders but, despite that duty, Barley listed 

appellant's business debts incorrectly as second mortgages on HUD-1 Settlement 

Statements related to the sale of properties located at 873-875 Kelton Avenue, Columbus, 

Ohio 43206; 69 Dakota Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43222; and 296 Olentangy Ridge Place, 

Powell, Ohio 43068. Farkas approved the paperwork prepared by Barley. Appellant also 

contends he was listed as a real estate broker in error. 

{¶ 4} The errors on the paperwork played a role in causing funds to flow into 

appellant's possession that he was not legally entitled to receive, and he retained those 

funds. Consequently, appellant was indicted, tried before a jury, and convicted of 

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, identity fraud, theft, forgery, and money 

laundering. Appellant was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison and ordered to pay over 

$1 million in restitution. 

{¶ 5} Appellant does not dispute that his convictions are related to the sale of five 

properties, including the three at issue in this case. Appellant contends that appellees are 

civilly liable to him because Barley's errors on the HUD-1 Settlement Statements caused 

him to become convicted, incarcerated, and subject to the restitution order. He argues 

that Preferred Title is liable to him as Barley and Farkas' employer, and Stewart Title is 

vicariously liable to him due to its relationship with Preferred Title and underwriting the 

 

1 Rebecca Barley was never served with process in the underlying lawsuit, nor did she enter an appearance or 

otherwise plead. She is, likewise, not a party to this appeal. 
No. 13AP-385 3 

title insurance policies. Appellant's operative complaint is imprecise, but it includes 

allegations of negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. 

{¶ 6} On November 26, 2012, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment. 

He argued that there was no genuine dispute that Barley prepared the flawed HUD-1 

Settlement Statements, Farkas approved those documents, and the mistakes on those 

documents cause him to be prosecuted. Therefore, appellant contended the trial court 

should grant him judgment as a matter of law and award him $12 million in 

compensatory and punitive damages. 

{¶ 7} On December 10, 2012, Stewart Title filed a motion for summary judgment 

arguing that appellant did not allege any direct wrongdoing on its part, and appellant 

could not otherwise establish a viable theory of liability pertaining to Stewart Title. On 

January 15, 2013, Preferred Title and Farkas filed a motion for summary judgment 

arguing that they committed clerical errors and did not act with malice or knowingly 

commit fraud. Preferred Title and Farkas noted they relied on documents provided to 

them by appellant. Additionally, Preferred Title and Farkas argued that appellant's claims 

were barred by application of the unclean hands doctrine, referencing appellant's criminal 

conduct and convictions. 

{¶ 8} On April 12, 2013, the trial court ruled on the three motions for summary 

judgment. The court denied appellant's motion and granted appellees' motions due to 

appellant's unclean hands. The court also found appellant's claims against Stewart Title, 

Preferred Title, Farkas, and Barley failed as a matter of law regardless of whether they 

were based on theories of direct or vicarious liability. The court concluded that 

"[appellant] accepted and retained the funds disbursed at the three closings and it was his 

acceptance and retention of those funds that led to his criminal convictions and 

incarceration." (R. 210, Decision and Entry, 19.) Appellant has timely appealed the trial 

court's judgment. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 9} Appellant presents the following three assignments of error for our review: 
No. 13AP-385 4 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

Discretion by Denying Plaintiff-Appellant's Motion for 

Summary Judgment; when there were no genuine issues of 

material fact and Plaintiff-Appellant was entitled to Summary 

Judgment; where the issue of liability was based on the 

wrongful acts of the Defendants incident to three Real Estate 

Transactions and the Paramount wrongful act was admitted 

to by one Defendant and acknowledged by all the others. 

Further, more specifically, the Trial Court erred and abused 

its Discretion by not Granting Summary Judgment against 

Defendant Rebecca Barley, who under the facts conceded by 

all parties and the Trial Court; admitted she listed the 

Plaintiff's Business Debt wrongly as a Second Mortgage on 

Three Real Estate Transactions HUD-1 Settlement 

Statements. Again, under the facts, this act was committed by 

her and not Plaintiff. 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

Discretion by Granting Defendants-Appellees Preferred Title 

& Guaranty Agency, Inc. and Frank Farkas's Motion for 

Summary Judgment; where, again, the issue of liability was 

based on the wrongful acts of the Defendants incident to three 

Real Estate Transactions and the fatal act was done by one of 

the Defendants but argued away as a clerical error, repeated at 

least Three times and committed without malice or 

knowingly; and that they relied on documents provided by 

Plaintiff, who simply had presented invoices, not Second 

Mortgages, to said Defendants; and under these facts it was 

unreasonable to grant them Summary Judgment. 

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

Discretion by Granting Defendant-Appellee Stewart Title 

Guaranty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment; where 

the issue of liability was based on the wrongful acts of the 

Defendants incident to three Real Estate Transactions and the 

fatal act was done by one of the Defendants but argued away 

as a clerical error; but repeated three times, and Stewart Title 

was aware of Preferred's Acts and even approved them 

repeated as well as holding themselves out as the Principal 

and had privity of contract to be held liable under contract law 
No. 13AP-385 5 

and should also be held vicariously liable for the acts of its 

agents. 

III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

{¶ 10} Preliminarily, because appellant is proceeding pro se on appeal as he did in 

the trial court, we note that "Ohio courts hold pro se litigants to the same rules and 

procedures as those litigants who retain counsel. Pro se litigants are not entitled to greater 

rights, and they must accept the results of their own mistakes." Williams v. Lo, 10th Dist. 

No. 07AP-949, 2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 18, citing Whitehall v. Ruckman, 10th Dist. No. 07AP445, 2007-Ohio-6780, ¶ 21; State ex rel. Leon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 

123 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-4688, ¶ 1, quoting State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 100 Ohio 

St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 

145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist.2001) (" ' "[P]ro se litigants * * * are held to the same 

standard as litigants who are represented by counsel." ' "). Thus, like members of the bar, 

pro se litigants are required to comply with the rules of practice and procedure. Hardy v. 

Belmont Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-116, 2006-Ohio-3316, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 11} With that in mind, we note that appellant raises issues in both his merit 

brief and reply brief that fall outside of the parameters of his assignments of error. Most 

notably, appellant is displeased with the trial court's denial of numerous motions, without 

specific explanations, at the same time the trial court ruled on the motions for summary 

judgment that are the subject of this appeal. However, appellant did not assign error to 

the denial of the other motions. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(b), an appellate court must 

"[d]etermine [an] appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs 

under App.R. 16." "Thus, this court rules on assignments of error only, and will not 

address mere arguments." Ellinger v. Ho, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1079, 2010-Ohio-553, 

¶ 70, citing In re Estate of Taris, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1264, 2005-Ohio-1516, ¶ 5. 

Accordingly, we will address appellant's assignments of error as written and disregard his 

extraneous arguments. See Bonn v. Bonn, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1047, 2013-Ohio-2313, 

¶ 9. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶ 12} Appellate review of summary judgments is de novo. Titenok v. Wal-Mart 

Stores E., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-799, 2013-Ohio-2745, ¶ 6; Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 
No. 13AP-385 6 

101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41 (9th Dist.1995). "When an appellate court reviews a trial court's 

disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same standard as the trial court 

and conducts an independent review, without deference to the trial court's 

determination." Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-466, 2013-

Ohio-5714, ¶ 6. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any grounds the movant 

raised in the trial court support it, even if the trial court failed to consider those grounds. 

Tilley v. Dublin, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-998, 2013-Ohio-4930, ¶ 18, citing Coventry Twp. at 

41-42. 

{¶ 13} Summary judgment is proper only when the party moving for summary 

judgment demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving 

parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come 

to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the 

motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence 

most strongly construed in its favor. Id. at ¶ 19, citing State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. 

Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 (1997); Civ.R. 56(C). 

{¶ 14} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of 

informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the 

record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 

75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The moving party, however, cannot discharge its initial 

burden under this rule with a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no 

evidence to prove its case; the moving party must specifically point to evidence of a type 

listed in Civ.R. 56(C), affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no 

evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. Id.; Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 

(1997). Once the moving party discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is 

appropriate if the nonmoving party does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise 

provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. 

Dresher at 293; Vahila at 430; Civ.R. 56(E). 

V. DISCUSSION

{¶ 15} For ease of discussion, we will address appellant's assignments of error out 

of order, beginning with his second assignment of error. In his second assignment of 
No. 13AP-385 7 

error, appellant argues the trial court erred in granting Preferred Title and Farkas' motion 

for summary judgment. We disagree. 

{¶ 16} According to appellant, the "fatal act" in this case is that Barley listed his 

business debts incorrectly as second mortgages on HUD-1 Settlement Statements related 

to three real estate transactions. Appellant does not dispute that he received funds from 

those transactions, and that he accepted and retained those funds. As noted by appellees 

and the trial court, it was appellant's acceptance and retention of those funds that led to 

his claimed injury in this civil case: criminal prosecution and convictions, a 15-year prison 

sentence, and a restitution order for over $1 million. Appellant simply argues that his 

criminal conduct is not germane to these proceedings. Appellant is mistaken. 

{¶ 17} In order for appellant to prevail on his tort claims, he must prove that 

appellees' tortious acts proximately caused his injuries. White v. Vrable, 10th Dist. No. 

98AP-1351 (Sept. 30, 1999). Appellant's own criminal acts were the proximate cause of 

his criminal convictions. See State v. Anderson, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1071, 2009-Ohio6566 (affirming appellant's convictions and sentence), aff'd by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio, In re Cases Held for Decision in State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 234, 2011-Ohio228, ¶ 6; DiNozzi v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-609, 2009-Ohio-1376, 

¶ 14. 

{¶ 18} Appellant's criminal conduct broke the causal chain between appellees' 

allegedly tortious acts and his claimed injury. See DiNozzi at ¶ 14; White, citing Bilicic v. 

Brake, 64 Ohio App.3d 304, 307 (11th Dist.1989); see also Evans v. Thrasher, 1st Dist. 

No. C-120783, 2013-Ohio-4776, ¶ 22, citing Taylor v. Webster, 12 Ohio St.2d 53, 56 

(1967), and Feichtner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 114 Ohio App.3d 346, 359 (10th Dist.1995) 

("When a third person's criminal act intervenes between a defendant's conduct and a 

plaintiff's injuries, the defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 

injuries only where the defendant could have reasonably foreseen the intervening act."). 

Due to appellant’s conduct, which was not reasonably foreseeable, he cannot prevail on 

his tort claims, and Preferred Title and Farkas are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 19} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in 

granting Stewart Title's motion for summary judgment. We disagree. It is undisputed 
No. 13AP-385 8 

that Stewart Title was not directly a party to or involved in the three transactions at issue.2 

Appellant contends Stewart Title is vicariously liable for the actions of Preferred Title, 

Farkas, and Barley. However, all of appellant's tort claims against Stewart Title fail 

because " 'there can be no vicarious liability imputed to a principal, if there is no liability 

on the part of the agent.' " Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-527, 

2008-Ohio-6959, ¶ 54, quoting Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 

¶ 21; Krause v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 8th Dist. No. 70712 (Dec. 19, 1996) ("The master 

or principal is not liable unless the servant or agent is liable in the first instance."). Thus, 

because Preferred Title, Farkas, and Barley are not liable to appellant, neither is Stewart 

Title. 

{¶ 20} Appellant also purports to have contract based claims against Stewart Title; 

however, such claims are not supported by the record. Appellant's amended complaint 

does not contain any contract claims. It is captioned "CIVIL COMPLAINT WILLFUL 

AND NEGLIGENCE-TORT" and, true to that description, it only discusses tort causes of 

action. Appellant conceded at the trial level that Stewart Title was not directly involved in 

the real estate transactions at issue, and appellant described his theory of liability against 

Stewart Title as "based on agency principles and claims of negligent supervision and 

negligent training." (R. 159, Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 7.) Now, on 

appeal, appellant alleges there was an "implied contract" between him and Stewart Title 

without citing to the record. (Appellant's brief, 13.) It is not this court's duty to search the 

record for evidence to support an appellant's argument as to alleged error. Hardy at ¶ 10, 

citing Sherman v. Sherman, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-757, 2006-Ohio-2309, ¶ 15 and State ex 

rel. Petro v. Gold, 166 Ohio App.3d 371, 2006-Ohio-943, ¶ 94 (10th Dist.). Furthermore, 

this court may disregard arguments if the appellant fails to identify the relevant portions 

of the record from which the errors are based. Id., citing In re C.C., 10th Dist. No. 04AP883, 2005-Ohio-5163, ¶ 80; App.R. 12(A)(2). In any event, we do not find support for an 

independent contract claim against Stewart Title in the record. 

 

2 As the trial court noted, appellant admitted in his discovery responses that Stewart Title did not create the 

HUD-1 Settlement Statements in the three transactions, Stewart Title did not make any misrepresentations 

upon which appellant relied, and appellant did not have any direct written or oral communications with 

Stewart Title. 
No. 13AP-385 9 

{¶ 21} There was a title insurance underwriting agreement between Stewart Title 

and Preferred Title in place at the time of the real estate transactions. However, appellant 

only references that agreement in an attempt to substantiate his tort based vicarious 

liability arguments, which fails for the reasons above. Therefore, the trial court properly 

granted Stewart Title’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, appellant's third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 22} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for summary judgment. We disagree. For the reasons above, 

appellant could not prevail on his motion. Therefore, his first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

VI. APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 

{¶ 23} On August 19, 2013, appellant filed a motion to strike Preferred Title and 

Farkas' brief. Appellant argued the brief was untimely. However, on July 11, 2013, this 

court granted Preferred Title and Farkas an extension of time until July 25, 2013 to file 

their brief, and they filed their brief on that day. Therefore, appellant's motion to strike 

is denied. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 24} Accordingly, having overruled all three of appellant's assignments of error, 

we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Motion denied; 

judgment affirmed. 

BROWN and McCORMAC, JJ., concur. 

McCORMAC, J., retired, formerly of the Tenth Appellate 

District, assigned to active duty under authority of the Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C). 

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