UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA NATI ONAL

ASSOCI ATI ON OF HOME : BU I L DERS et al. , : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 09-0548 (RMU) : v. : Re Docume nt No.: 18 : UNI TED STATES ENVI RONMENTAL : PROTECTI ON AGE NCY et al. , : : Def endants. :

MEMORAN DUM OP INION G R A N T I N G T H E D E F E N D A N T S ’ M O T I O N T O D I S M I S S

I. INTRODUCTION This matter come s befor e the c ourt on the motion to dism iss filed by defe ndants the Environmental Protec tion Age ncy (“the EPA”) a

nd the Army

Corps of Eng ineer s (“the Corps” ). 1 The plaintiffs, tra de assoc iations repre senting businesses in the housing and construc tion fields, seek judicia l reviewunder the Administrative Procedur e Ac t (“APA” ), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq ., of the de fenda

nts’ desig nation of two re ache s of the Santa Cruz River in Arizona as “tr aditional navig able wa

ters” ( “TNWs”) unde r the Clean Water Act (“ CW A”) , 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq . The de fenda

nts move to dismi ss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. As discussed in detail infra Part I I I .B, be cause the cour t determines that the CWA prec ludes judicial revie w of the ag ency deter minations at this t ime, the cour t gr ants the def

endants’ motion to dismiss

. 2

A l s o n a m e d a s d e f

e n d a n t s a n d j o i n i n g i n t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s a r e t h e A d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e E P A , 1 t h e A c t i n g A s s i s t a n t A d m i n i s t r a t o r f o r W a t e r o f t h e E P A , t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e A r m y , t h e C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l a n d C h i e f o f E n g i n e e r s o f t h e C o r p s a n d t h e C o m m a n d e r o f t h e C o r p s ’ L o s A n g e l e s D i s t r i c t
. T h e d e f e n d a n t s a l s o m o v e t o d i s m i s s o n t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l g r o u n d s : ( 1 ) t h e a g e n c y a c t i o n s w e r e n o t 2
“ f

i n a l ” u n d e r t h e A P A ; ( 2 ) t h e p l a i n t i f f s l a c k s t a n d i n g ; a n d ( 3 ) t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s a r e n o t r i p e f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . S e e g e n e r a l l y D e f s . ’ M o t
. B e c a u s e t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t t h e C W A p r e c l u d e s j u d i c i a l r e v i e w a t t h i s t i m e , i t n e e d n o t r e a c h t h e s e a r g u m e n t s .II. BACKG ROUND A. Statutory F ram ework The CWA was promulg ated “ to restore and maintain the c hemical, phy sical, and biologica l integr ity

of the Na tion’s water s.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). T he EPA and the Corps share reg ulatory

authority to administer and enf

orce the CWA. See, e .g. , 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (providing that, unless otherwise indica ted, the EPA’s Administrator “ shall administer this chapte r”) ; id. § 1344(d), ( a) ( authorizing the Sec reta ry of the Ar my , “ac ting throug h the Chief of Eng ineer s,” to make pe rmitting dec isions for the dischar g e of dr edg ed or f ill material into “the navig able wa

ters”) . I f a pr operty

owner is unsure if his or her

land contains wa ters re g ulated under the CW A, he or

she ca n reque st a jurisdictional determination (“ J D”) from the Corps. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng ’rs, Reg

ulatory Guidance L etter N o. 08-02 at 1 (June 26, 2008). An “appr oved” JD is the Corps’ decla ration that wa ters either

do or do not fall within fede ral jurisdiction under the CWA; approved JDs are subje ct to administrative re view. 33 C.F.R. § 331.2. Reg ulatory

jurisdiction under the CWA derives f rom Congr ess’s commer ce pow er, see Rapanos v. United States , 547 U.S. 715, 724 (2006) (plura lity opinion), and wa ters ca

n fall under that jurisdiction by

virtue of their

connec tion to TNW s, see id. at 742. Property owner s must apply

for a permit to fill any

water s over whic h the Corps and EPA have jur isdiction under the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). Unsa tisfied permit applica nts can challeng e per

mitti ng decisions in administrative proc eeding s, see 33 C.F.R. § 331.2, as we ll as in fede ral district cour

t, see id. § 331.12; Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 730. I f a pr operty owner deposits dredg ed or f

ill material into feder ally

reg ulated wa ters without a per mit, both t he EPA and the Corps have a

number of tools to addre ss the violation. The EPA can issue a compliance order , see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) , or the Corps ca n issue a ce ase- and-de sist order, see 33 C.F.R. §

2326.3(c) (1). Alter natively , either the EPA or the Corps ca n assess administrative pe nalties. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) ; 33 C.F.R. § 326.6. The asse ssment of administrative pena lties is subj ect to judicial revie w. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g )(8) ; 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(l). Fina lly , both the EPA and the Corps possess authority

to initi ate e nforc ement ac tions in federa l district court seeking injunctive relief and monetar

y penalties. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b); 33 C.F.R. § 326.5.

B. Fac tual & P roce dural Hi story On Dec ember

3, 2008, the EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Water issued a letter

to the Assistant Secreta

ry of the Ar my for Civil W orks, stating that two rea ches of the Santa Cruz River wer e TNWs. Compl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 (“EPA TNW Deter mination”) at 1. I n this letter, the EPA aff irmed ea rlier de terminations made by the Corps’ L os Ang eles District that the two
rea ches qua lified as TNWs. Compl

. ¶ 4; EPA TNW Determination at 1. 3 The plaintiffs c ommenced this ac tion on March 23, 2009, see ge nerally Compl., alleging that the EPA and the Corps violated the APA’s proc edura l require ments in determining that the
rea ches w ere TNWs, id. ¶¶ 58- 66. More spe cifica lly , the plaintiffs cla im that the TNW deter minations were e ither administrative rule s, in which ca se the a g encie s failed to abide by the APA’s rulema king pr ocedur es, or a djudications, in which ca se the a g encie s failed to follow the adjudicator

y proce dures outlined in the APA. Id. The plaintiffs a lso contend that the TNW

B e c a u s e w a t e r s t h a t a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n n e c t e d t o T N W s c a n f a l l u n d e r f

e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r y 3 j u r i s d i c t i o n , s e e R a p a n o s , 5 4 7 U
. S
. a t 7 4 2 , p r o p e r t y o w n e r s w i t h i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e S a n t a C r u z R i v e r m a y f

i n d w a t e r s o n t h e i r l a n d s s u b j e c t t o C W A p e r m i t t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s s h o u l d t h e y w a n t t o d e p o s i t d r e d g e d o r f

i l l m a t e r i a l t o d e v e l o p t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , s e e 3 3 U
. S
. C
. § 1 3 4 4 ( a )

. T h e p e r m i t t i n g p r o c e s s c a n b e a r d u o u s a n d e x p e n s i v e , R a p a n o s , 5 4 7 U
. S
. a t 7 2 1 , a n d m a y r e s u l t i n t h e C o r p s ’ r e f

u s a l t o i s s u e a p e r m i t , f r u s t r a t i n g p r o p e r t y o w n e r s ’ p l a n s t o d e v e l o p t h e i r l a n d , s e e i d

. a t 7 3 0
.

3deter

minations were a

rbitrar y and ca pricious, wer e unsupported by sufficie nt evidence and exceede d the ag encie s’ statutory authority

. Id. ¶¶ 67- 79. The de fenda

nts previously

filed a motion to transfe r this case to the District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), see ge nerally Def s.’ Mot. to Transfe r, which this cour t denied, see ge nerally Mem. Op. (De c. 30, 2009). The defe ndants then filed this motion to di smiss for lack of subject matter jur isdiction pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 1). See generally Def s.’ Mot. As the motion is now ripe for a djudication, the cour t turns to the applicable leg al standar d and the pa rties’ a rg uments.

III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard f

or a Mot ion to Dism iss f or Lack of S ubject M atte r Jurisdiction Fe dera l courts ar e cour

ts of limit ed jurisdiction and the law presumes tha t “a c ause lies outside this li mited jurisdiction.” Kokkone n v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Gen. M

otors Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency , 363 F.3d 442, 448 ( D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that “[a]s a court of limited jurisdiction, we beg in, and end, with an e x amination of our jurisdiction”). Be cause “subjec t-matter jurisdiction is an ‘Ar t[ icle] I I I as we ll as a statutory require ment[,] no action of the parties c an conf er subjec t-matter jurisdiction upon a f eder al court.’” Akinsey e v. D istrict of C olumbia , 339 F.3d 970, 971 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Lt d. v. Compagnie de s Bauxites de G uinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). O n a motion to dismi ss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) , the plaintiff bea rs the

4burden of

establishing by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the c ourt has subjec t matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defende rs of W ildlif e , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Be cause subject matter jur isdiction focuses on the c ourt’s powe r to hea r the c laim, howeve r, the c ourt must give the plaintiff’s fa ctual alleg ations closer sc rutiny when r esolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be require d for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. See Macharia v. U nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 ( D.C. Cir. 2003); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v . Ashcroft , 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D .C. 2001). Thus, the cour t is not limi ted to the alleg ations contained in the c omplaint. Hohri v. United States , 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacate d on other grounds , 482 U.S. 64 (1987). I nstead, “ wher e nec essar y , the cour t may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts evidence d in the rec ord, or the c omplaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of disput ed fa cts.” Herbe rt v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 ( D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing W illiamson v. Tucker , 645 F.2d 404, 413 ( 5th Cir. 1981)).

B. Th e Court Gr ants the Defendants’ Motion to Dism iss The de fenda

nts assert that judicial re view of the challeng ed TNW deter minations is prema ture. De fs.’ Mot. at 14-18. Mor e spec ifically , they contend that Cong ress intende d to prec lude re view of a g ency actions until the EPA or the Corps attempts to enfor ce the CW A by either a ssessing a dminist rative pe nalties or initiating a n action in district court. Id. The defe ndants point to cases in which c ourts have inter prete d the CWA to preclude “ preenfor ceme nt review ” of va rious ag ency

actions, including J Ds and the issuanc e of c ompliance and ce ase- and-de sist orders. Id. at 15-17. B ased on the se authorities, the de fenda nts arg ue that

5when plaintiffs se ek pre -enf orce ment revie w of TNW deter minations, as they

do in this case, revie w is theref

ore pr eclude d by

the CWA. Id. at 17-18. The plaintiffs c oncede that courts have consistently interpre ted the CWA to preclude pr eenfor ceme nt judicial review of complianc e and c ease -and- desist orders, but see k to disti ng uish those ag ency

actions fr om the TNW determinations they now cha lleng e. Pls.’ Opp’n a t 30. They arg ue that Cong ress intende d to give the ag encie s flexibi lity in choosing betwee n revie wable a

nd non-re viewable enfor ceme nt options, but that prec luding r eview of TNW deter minations, which are not enforc ement mea sures, would not fur ther this purpose. Id. at 31- 32. Finally , the plaintiffs conte nd that the def endants’ a

rg ument would have the eff ect of “pre clud[ing] judicial review of any ag ency decision that impacts or r elates to their jur isdictional authority ,” and e ncoura g e the c ourt to rejec t so sweeping a rule

. Id. at 31. The APA g rants a c ause of action to per sons “suffe ring leg al wrong beca use of a g ency action, or a dverse ly

aff ecte d or ag g rieve d by

ag ency action within the meaning of a r eleva nt statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. But judicial re view under the APA is unavailable when it is prec luded by statute. Id. § 701(a) (1). I n deter mining whe ther Cong ress intende d to prec lude a pa rticular ty pe of c halleng e to an a g ency action, a c ourt examines a statute’s e x press lang uag e, as w ell as “the struc ture of the statutory scheme , its objectives, its legislative history , and the na ture of the administrative ac tion involved.” Block v . Cmty. Nutrit ion Inst. , 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). Courts have routinely

held that the CWA preclude s “pre -enf orce ment revie w” of

ag ency actions take n under its authority

. See, e.g. , Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner , 58 F.3d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1995); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Rec lamation & Enforceme nt , 20

6F.3d 1418, 1427 ( 6th Cir. 1994); Rueth v. Env tl. Prot. Agency , 13 F.3d 227, 230 ( 7th Cir. 1993);

S. Pines Assocs. v. U

nited States , 912 F.2d 713, 716- 17 (4th Cir. 1990); Hoffman Group, Inc. v

. Envtl. Prot. Agency , 902 F.2d 567, 568- 69 (7th Cir. 1990). I n Southern Pines and Hoffman 4 Group , the cour

ts took note of the similarity betwee n the CWA and other envir onmental statutes such as the Clea

n Air Ac t and the Comprehe nsive Environmental Response, Compensa tion, and L iability Act, both of whic h have be en interpr eted to pre clude pr e-e nforc ement re view of EPA
reme dial actions. S. Pines , 912 F.2d a t 716; Hoffman Group , 902 F.2d a t 569. The shar ed structure of these sta tutes demonstrates Cong ress’s intent to protec t the EPA from unnec essar y entang lement in litigation. See S. Pines , 912 F.2d a t 716 (stating tha t “[t] he structur e of the se environmenta l statutes indicates that Cong ress intende d to allow EPA to act to addre ss environmenta l problems quickly and without becoming immediately entang led in litigation”)

. Fur thermore , beca

use the CWA clear ly

provides for

judicial revie w of a g ency actions whe n either the EPA or the Corps asse sses administrative pena lties or initiates an enfor ceme nt action in district court, judicial revie w prior to enf orce ment is “impliedly

prec luded.” See S. Ohio Coal Co. , 20 F.3d a

t 1426-27 (quoting Hoffman Group , 902 F.2d a t 569). I n eac h of the Circuit ca ses cited a bove, howe ver, e ither a c ompliance or a ce ase- anddesist order ha d alre ady

been issued or

was impending

. Laguna Gatuna , 58 F.3d a t 565; S. Ohio Coal Co. , 20 F.3d a t 1421; Rueth , 13 F.3d a t 228; S. Pines , 912 F.2d a t 714; Hoffman Group , 902 F.2d a t 568. Thus, the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish this body of ca se law f

rom the pre sent S e e a l s o , e . g . , S h a r

p L a n d C o . v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 9 5 6 F
. S u p p . 6 9 1 , 6 9 3

- 9 4 ( M
. D
. L a . 1 9 9 6 ) ; 4 H o w e l l v . U

. S

. A r m y C o r p s o f E n g ’ r s , 7 9 4 F
. S u p p . 1 0 7 2 , 1 0 7 4 ( D
. N
. M
. 1 9 9 2 ) ; L e s l i e S a l t C o . v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 7 8 9 F
. S u p p . 1 0 3 0 , 1 0 3 3

- 3 4 ( N
. D
. C a l

. 1 9 9 1 ) ; F i s c e l l a & F i s c e l l a v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 7 1 7 F
. S u p p . 1 1 4 3 , 1 1 4 6

- 4 7 ( E
. D
. V a . 1 9 8 9 )

.

7challeng e by pointing out that “the T

NW determination . . . is not a compliance order .” Pls.’ Opp’n a t 30. I n this respec t, the plaintiffs’ ar g ument rese mbles that advanc ed in McG own v. United States , in which the plaintiff c halleng ed a Corps c ease -and- desist order by attempting to distinguish his suit from challeng es to EPA compliance order s. 747 F. Supp. 539, 541-42 (E.D

. Mo. 1990). B ut the district court re jected the plaintiff’s ar g ument, stating tha t “this disti nction [was] immaterial bec ause the ruling s in Southern Pines and Hoffman Group wer e not pre dicated on the issuance of complianc e orde rs. Those c ases, in par ticular Southern Pines, stand for the proposition that pre-e nforceme nt judicial revie w is not available unde r the CWA.” Id. at 542. These c ases make clea

r that the dispositive fac tor is the timing of the c ourt’s re view, rathe r than the spe cific pr e-e nforc ement ac tion of which the c ourt’s re view is soug ht. Courts have c onfirmed this point by holding that JDs are a lso preclude d from pre -enf orce ment revie w. See Child v. United States , 851 F. Supp. 1527, 1533 (D. U tah 1994); Lotz Realty Co. v. United States , 757 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (E .D. Va. 1990) . The re asoning supporting the se holding s was cog ently stated in Rueth , in which the Seventh Circuit af firmed the district c ourt’s dete rmination that “if a g ency

compliance order s are not review able until the enf orce ment stag e, an a g ency ’s initial determination that it has the authority to either re quire pe rmitting or issue or ders in the absenc e of a

permit applica tion must also be unre viewable .” Rueth , 13 F.3d a t 229 (quoting Rueth De v. Co. v. Env tl. Prot. Agency , 1992 WL 560944, at *2 (N.D . I nd. Nov. 24, 1992)); cited in Child , 851 F. Supp. at 1533 n.10 (pr ecluding pre- enfor ceme nt reviewof the Corps’ JD); see also Lotz , 757 F. Supp. at 695 (pr ecluding pre- enfor ceme nt reviewof the Corps’ JD, and
rea soning tha t “[b] eca

use Southern Pines tells us that judicial review of a complianc e orde r is

8pre- enfor ceme nt reviewprec luded by the [CW A], then it necessar ily follows that judicial revie w at a stag e eve n more pre liminary is also prec luded”)

. TNW determinations are more pre liminary than compliance order s, cea se-a nd-desist order s, or eve n the J Ds on which the issuanc e of those or ders is base d. See EPA TNW Deter mination at 2 (stating tha t the TNW determinations will be “used by the Corps to complete pending and future jurisdictional determinations”) . There fore , the cour t holds that the CW A prec ludes judicial revie w of a TNW determination until the EPA or the Corps dec ides to bring an enfor ceme nt action ag ainst a par ticular pa rty , or the Corps issues an a dverse permitting de cision, at which time the a g g rieve d party will be able to cha lleng e the ba sis for asser ting f eder al jurisdiction over wa ters on its proper ty , including the TNW determination under ly ing the
asser tion of that jurisdiction. See S. Pines , 912 F.2d a t 717 (noting tha

t “[the plaintiffs] can contest the e x istence of

EPA’s jurisdiction if and when E PA seeks to enf orce the pena lties provided by

the Act” ). I n arr iving a t this conclusion, the court re jects two additional ar g uments advanc ed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs f irst assert that the r ationale unde rly ing the holdings in the pre cede nt
case s on which the c ourt here relies is to g ive the EPA and the Corps flexibi lity in choosing betwee n revie wable a

nd unrevie wable e nforc ement options. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 31-32. The y arg ue that pre cluding pre- enfor ceme nt reviewof the TNW deter minations would not effec tuate the intent of Cong ress to provide f lexi bility in enforc ement, bec ause the TNW determinations
are not enforc ement mea sures. See id. But the CWA’s statutory scheme seeks to avoid
unnece ssarily

entang ling the a g encie s in pre-e nforc ement litiga tion, and allowing the plaintiffs to

9contest the TNW deter minations at this t ime would impede the a g encie s’ ability to administer the CWA. See S. Pines , 912 F.2d a t 717 (stating tha t “[a]l lowing the parties to cha lleng e the exis tence of EPA’s jurisdiction would delay the ag ency ’s re sponse in the same ma nner a s litigation contesting the extent of EPA’s jurisdiction”). Finally , the plaintiffs ar g ue that pre cluding judicial revie w of the a g encie s’ TNW deter minations at this pre-enf

orce ment stag e would have the ef fec t of “for eclos[ing]” the issue of wher e TNWs exis t, and would “insulate” ag ency decisions about the jurisdictional re ach of the CW A. Pls.’ Opp’n at 27, 31. B ut severa l Supreme Court dec isions dis cuss “tra ditional navig able wa

ters” a nd those wate rs’ re lationship to t he re ach of reg ulatory

jurisdiction under the CW A, dec isions that would not ex ist were the re not a venues f or judicial re view of the se issues. See, e .g. , Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 729-42 (de fining , in a consolidated a ppeal of an EPA enfor ceme nt action and a n adver se per

mitti ng decision, the scope of CWA jurisdiction wit h ref ere nce to TN Ws). The very rea son that the CWA precludes pr e-e nforc ement re view of TN W deter minations is t hat it clear ly provides for

judicial revie w of them in enf orce ment proce eding s,
s ee S. Ohio Coal Co. , 20 F.3d a t 1426-27, and in ac tions challeng ing a dverse permitting decisions, see Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 730. Until then, the ag encie s must be able to administer the CW A without becoming entang led in prema ture litiga tion.

10IV. CONCLUSION

For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt g rants the de fenda nts’ motion to di smiss for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separate ly and conte mporane ously

issued this 18th day

of Aug ust, 2010.

RI CARDO M. URBI

NA United States District J udg e

11