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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

Valtrus Innovations Ltd.

Plaintiff

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§

v.

SAP America, Inc. and SAP, SE.

Defendants.

 CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24cv21

 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR INTRA-DISTRICT 

TRANSFER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1

II. LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................................ 3

III. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 3

A. SAP Didn’t Seriously Investigate the Transfer Issues ....................................... 3

2. SAP Didn’t Seriously Investigate the Location of Likely Trial Witnesses . 4

B. Private Interest Factors ........................................................................................ 6

1. Private Factor 1: The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof is 

Neutral......................................................................................................... 6

2. Private Factor 2: The Availability of Compulsory Process Weighs Against 

Transfer ....................................................................................................... 7

3. Private Factor 3: The Convenience and Cost of Attendance for Willing 

Witnesses Slightly Weighs Against Transfer .............................................. 9

4. Private Factor 4: Practical Problems Strongly Weigh Against Transfer ... 12

C. Public Interest Factors ....................................................................................... 13

1. Public Factor 1: The Court’s Localized Interest Is Neutral ...................... 13

2. Public Factor 2: Court Congestion Weighs Against Transfer ................... 14

3. Public Factor 3: Familiarity of the Forum With Governing Law Weighs 

Against Transfer ........................................................................................ 14

4. Public Factor 4: Conflict of Law Weighs Against Transfer ...................... 15

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 15

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 Page(s) 

Federal Cases

In re Apple, Inc., 

979 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................6, 11

Athalonz LLC v. Under Armour, Inc., 

2023 WL 8809293 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2023) .........................................................................11

In re Clarke, 

94 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................................ passim

CXT Sys., Inc. v. Container Store, Inc., 

2019 WL 1506015 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2019) ...........................................................................15

Defense Distributed v. Bruck, 

30 F.4th 414 (5th Cir. 2022) ..............................................................................................1, 3, 8

Diem LLC v. BigCommerce, Inc., 

2017 WL 6729907 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017) ...........................................................................5

In re EMC Corp., 

501 F. App’x 973 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................13

In re Fort Worth, 

2024 WL 1976963 (5th Cir. May 3, 2024) ......................................................................1, 3, 12

In re Google LLC, 

2021 WL 5292267 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) ........................................................................6, 7

J2 Global Commc’ns, Inc. v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., 

2008 WL 5378010 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008) ...........................................................................8

Kajeet, Inc. v. Trend Micro, Inc., 

2022 WL 126490 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2022) ............................................................................9

Moore v. Unit Tex. Drilling, LLC, 

2009 WL 10704741 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2009) ........................................................................8

Morris v. Copart, 

2016 WL 6608874 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2016) ............................................................................4

In re Planned Parenthood, 

52 F.4th 625 (5th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................ passim

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R2 Sols, LLC v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 

2022 WL 2484539 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2022) ...........................................................................12

SVV Tech. Innovations, Inc. v. Acer Inc., 

2023 WL 2764765 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2023) ............................................................................6

In re TikTok, Inc., 

85 F.4th 352 (5th Cir. 2023) ............................................................................................ passim

U.S. Ethernet Innovations, LLC v. Acer, Inc., 

2010 WL 2771842 (E.D. Tex. July 13, 2010) ...................................................................13, 15

VisionX Techs. v. Sony Grp., 

2023 WL 3572898 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2023) ...................................................................11, 12

In re Volkswagen, 

545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................15

Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C. 1404 ....................................................................................................................... passim

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I. INTRODUCTION 

SAP’s motion should be denied. Pursuant to recent controlling Fifth Circuit precedent, 

none of which SAP addresses, five of the eight transfer factors weigh against transferring this case, 

while the remaining factors are neutral. See, e.g., In re Clarke, 94 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2024); In re 

TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th 352 (5th Cir. 2023); In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th 625 (5th Cir. 2022); 

Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414 (5th Cir. 2022). 

At the heart of SAP’s transfer motion is its representation that two satellite offices in Plano 

and Allen provide a more convenient nexus to this case. 

SAP offered no evidence 

that it will maintain a presence in the Sherman Division after August 2024. See In re Fort Worth, 

2024 WL 1976963, at *7 (5th Cir. May 3, 2024) (Oldham, J., concurring) (the plaintiff’s choice of 

venue controls unless the defendant identifies a “clearly more convenient” alternative, coupled 

with credible evidence that the purported benefits will “actually materialize.” (citation omitted)). 

Though SAP promises additional conveniences based on its “capability to access” electronic 

documents from Plano, it confuses the location of “access” with the location of “storage” and 

“custodians” (the actual relevant legal inquiry) and ignores the fact that its documents are equally 

accessible from Marshall or any location with an Internet connection. 

SAP’s arguments about party and third-party witnesses in Sherman fare no better. SAP

identified 18 “potentially relevant” employees, two of which are in Plano with the remaining 16 

mostly scattered around the globe. See Pandya Decl. at 3-4 (Dkt. 22). But SAP’s lone 30(b)(6) 

witness couldn’t articulate the relevance of any of these employees or whether they are likely trial 

witnesses at all. Attending trial for these additional 

16 individuals would already require substantial travel for them, making any added inconvenience

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includes an overlapping patent with this case (Patent No. 6,871,264), resulting in this Court’s 

familiarity with some of Valtrus’s patented technology. Relatedly, all of Valtrus’s patents were 

acquired from HPE, meaning that all of the cases will involve the same questions of ownership

and similar issues pertaining to marking and damages (such as hypothetical negotiation issues). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Transfer under § 1404(a) is only proper if “a movant [shows] (1) that the marginal gain in 

convenience will be significant, and (2) that its evidence makes it plainly obvious—i.e., clearly 

demonstrated—that those marginal gains will actually materialize in the transferee venue.” In re 

Clarke, 94 F.4th at 508 (5th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added). “Whenever a defendant is haled into 

court, some inconvenience is expected and acceptable.” In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at

629 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up, citation omitted). But “the fact that litigating would be more 

convenient for that defendant elsewhere is not enough to justify transfer.” Id. In fact, “Plaintiffs 

are permitted to engage in a certain amount of forum-shopping.” In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th at 357 

(5th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added). So “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient 

than the venue chosen by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Def. Distributed, 

30 F.4th at 433 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up, citation omitted). 

III. ARGUMENT

A. SAP Didn’t Seriously Investigate the Transfer Issues 

Venue discovery made plain that SAP didn’t seriously investigate most of the factual issues 

relevant to the 1404(a) inquiry. Without a credible investigation, the Court should not credit SAP’s

convenience analysis, as SAP has failed to meet its burden. See In re Fort Worth, 2024 WL 

1976963, at *7 (Defendant’s “burden reflects the longstanding deference that courts show towards 

the plaintiff’s choice of venue.”) (Oldham, J., concurring); 

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 SAP’s investigation is insufficient as a matter of law. See 

Diem LLC v. BigCommerce, Inc., 2017 WL 6729907, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017) (“while 

BigCommerce identifies several employees . . . in the San Francisco office, BigCommerce fails to 

identify the relevance of these individuals to this litigation.”). 

Further, six of these 18 SAP employees aren’t even listed on SAP’s initial disclosures 

served on April 15, after Mr. Pandya submitted his declaration. See Ex. D at 5-6. 

 Beyond this, SAP made no effort to consider relevant witnesses based in its 

Atlanta and Houston offices, which appear to have many more relevant witnesses who could just 

as conveniently attend trial in Marshall. Id. at 280:12-282:5; see also Ex. E (Shreveport flights); 

Ex. F (Houston to Marshall map). SAP’s failings warrant denying its motion. See In re Clarke, 

94 F.4th at 508 (“It is the movant’s burden—and the movant’s alone—to adduce evidence and 

arguments that clearly establish good cause for transfer” (cleaned up, citation omitted)). 

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B. Private Interest Factors

1. Private Factor 1: The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof is 

Neutral 

SAP’s sole reason for weighing this factor for transfer is this: The bulk of electronic 

evidence (from SAP and PPS) is accessible from the Sherman Division. Tr. Br. at. 7-9. But when 

the relevant documents are stored electronically with no physical evidence in the transferee venue 

(as is the case here), what matters is “the [1] location of servers where documents are stored, . . . 

[2] the location of document custodians and [3] location where documents are created and 

maintained.” In re Google LLC, 2021 WL 5292267, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) (cleaned up, 

emphasis added). What’s more, “In re Planned Parenthood indicates a shift in the analysis of this 

factor [as] [t]he Fifth Circuit has recently . . . concluded that this factor is neutral because electronic 

evidence is equally accessible in either forum.” See SVV Tech. Innovations, Inc. v. Acer Inc., 2023 

WL 2764765, *6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2023) (citation omitted) (analyzing tension between Federal 

Circuit decisions like In re Apple (cited by SAP) and recent Fifth Circuit case law). Here, in a 

footnote, SAP concedes that it “stores and maintains documents relating to the design and 

development of the Accused Products in Germany and India,” see Tr. Br at 8, n.3, and that most 

relevant custodians are in Germany and India. Tr. Br. at 3. Nor has SAP identified any servers that 

it owns or controls in Texas in response to Valtrus’s document requests. 

 Nevertheless, SAP tries to shoehorn this factor in its favor by flagging that electronic 

records Tr. Br. at 7-9. But no case cited by 

SAP holds that the mere fact that a defendant is capable of accessing electronic evidence in a 

transferee forum supports transfer. See Tr. Br. at 7-9. 

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In discussing PPS, SAP (incorrectly) speculates that “all of Valtrus’s documents are either 

located or accessible via [PPS],” and that PPS’s documents “are exclusively located in the Sherman 

Division.” Tr. Br. at 8-9. SAP is wrong,

4 as most relevant documents in PPS’s custody or control 

are managed by PPS employees located in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and/or are hosted on thirdparty Microsoft servers (using SharePoint). Kumar Decl. at ¶7. Further, Valtrus controls its own 

documents (from Ireland) and possesses documents that PPS does not. Quinlan Decl. at ¶¶8-9. 

SAP also points to HPE and its satellite office in Plano. But HPE’s worldwide headquarters 

is in Spring, TX (closer to Marshall than to Sherman), and it stands to reason that any relevant 

evidence from HPE is likely stored and created there. Ex. K (HPE HQ); Ex. L (HPE to Marshall).

Under In re Google and SVV Technology this factor is properly neutral. 

2. Private Factor 2: The Availability of Compulsory Process Weighs 

Against Transfer 

SAP argues that this factor weighs in favor of transfer because a Mr. “Philip Jones” resides 

closer to Sherman than Marshall. SAP further speculates that certain unnamed former employees 

of SAP, HPE, and PPS may reside in the Sherman Division. Tr. Br. at 12. 

As a threshold matter, the compulsory process factor “receives less weight when it has not 

been alleged or shown that any witness would be unwilling to testify.” See Planned Parenthood, 

52 F.4th at 630-631 (emphasis added). But SAP’s basis for considering these witnesses to be 

unwilling is unstated. See generally Tr. Br. at 11-13. Either way, SAP’s argument fails, as SAP 

identifies no evidence that any purported convenience is either significant or “will actually 

materialize.” In re Clarke, 94 F.4th at 508. 

4 SAP points to things like “technical documents concerning the operation of the Accused Products” that are 

likely in PPS’s possession. Tr. Br. at 9. But SAP is the relevant source for these documents, not PPS.

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Starting with SAP’s identification of “Philip Jones,” it appears that SAP identified the 

wrong person. SAP represents “Philip Jones” as a named inventor for the ’409 patent and a current 

“senior consultant for HPE” residing in Georgetown, TX. Tr. Br. at 12. SAP cites a one-page 

LinkedIn profile of someone named “philip jones, senior consultant at HP.” But the inventor of 

the ’409 is spelled “Phillip” (with two Ls). See Ex. M (’409 patent). Accordingly, the Philip Jones 

identified by SAP does not appear to be a relevant witness.5 

SAP’s speculations about the existence of former employees of PPS, HPE, and SAP in the 

Sherman Division should not be credited. Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 434 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(“[G]ood cause . . . requires an actual showing of the existence of relevant sources of proof, not 

merely an expression that some sources likely exist in the prospective forum.”). PPS has no former 

employees in or around the Sherman Division. Kumar Decl. at ¶7. And PPS’s current employees 

are willing to testify if they are deemed to have relevant information, so their location should not 

matter under this factor. See id. at ¶9; see also Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630–31. As for

potential former HPE and SAP employees, SAP doesn’t identify any unwilling witnesses requiring 

a subpoena to attend trial. Moore v. Unit Tex. Drilling, LLC, 2009 WL 10704741, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 

Nov. 17, 2009) (“[Compulsory process] is not to be based on hypothetical unwilling witnesses; a 

party seeking transfer must specifically identify unwilling witnesses.”); see also J2 Global 

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., 2008 WL 5378010, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008). 

In fact, two relevant third parties (HPE and AMD) maintain a substantial presence north of

Houston, which is closer to Marshall than to Sherman. See Ex. L (Google map comparison). HPE 

is likely to be a relevant third-party with respect to numerous issues, including (1) conception and 

5 Furthermore, it appears that the cited LinkedIn profile is an automatically populated LinkedIn page by 

LinkedIn based on public data and not owned or operated by a “philip jones” at HPE. See Ex. J to Mot. to Tr. at 20. 

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reduction to practice evidence; (2) SAP’s “marking” defense, which specifically references the 

“predecessors in interest to the Patents in Suit,” Dkt. No. 23 at p. 10; and (3) damages issues, 

including licenses, and any hypothetical negotiation taking place with HPE at the negotiation table.

Similarly, SAP asserts that AMD, a supplier of accused processors, is in Austin and 

therefore (marginally) closer to the Sherman Division. 

AMD also maintains an

office in Spring, TX and can likely designate a corporate witness who could similarly attend trial 

in Marshall more easily. See Ex. N (AMD list of offices); Ex. S (Maps of AMD to courthouses). 

Given SAP’s failure to identify any unwilling witnesses near the Sherman Division and 

Valtrus’s identification of HPE and AMD, this factor weighs against transfer. 

3. Private Factor 3: The Convenience and Cost of Attendance for Willing 

Witnesses Slightly Weighs Against Transfer 

This factor concerns the convenience of attending trial for willing witnesses. SAP weighs 

this factor in favor of transfer for three reasons (1) Messrs. Padakal and Tumu are in Plano; (2) the 

proximity of PPS employees to Sherman; and (3) the ability of SAP’s out-of-state employees and 

Valtrus’s foreign employee to travel to DFW airport and drive to Sherman. Tr. Br. at 9-11. 

 But this factor concerns 

convenience for likely trial witnesses, a convenience benefit SAP can’t claim without some effort 

to identify which of the 18 employees listed in Mr. Pandya’s declaration are likely to be its fact or 

corporate representatives at trial. See Kajeet, Inc. v. Trend Micro, Inc., 2022 WL 126490, at *5 

(W.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2022) (refusing to perform a witness-counting exercise in the absence of any 

indication that those witnesses would be a fact or corporate witness). 

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With respect to Valtrus’s trial witnesses, Valtrus’s only likely trial witness is Angela 

Quinlan, who lives in Ireland. See Quinlan Decl. at ¶2. Valtrus does not consider Ms. Kumar or 

other PPS employees to be likely trial witnesses, but regardless they are willing to attend trial in 

Marshall. Quinlan Decl. at ¶11; Kumar Decl. at ¶9. Furthermore, Messrs. Padakal or Tumu are 

unlikely to be trial witnesses, as venue discovery shows that they lack relevant information. 

 Tellingly, SAP doesn’t appear to have

collected any documents from either of these employees (a requirement if they are custodians of 

relevant information). 

SAP’s motion also fails to mention the numerous engineers and potential trial witnesses in 

its Houston office, who could conveniently drive to Marshall, or those in Atlanta, who can take a 

1.75-hour flight to Shreveport. For example, SAP employee Muhammad Alam appears to reside 

in the Atlanta area and is a Member of the Executive Board of SAP SE and knowledgeable about 

SAP’s cloud-based business application portfolio. Ex. O at 2-4. 

SAP employee Shashi (Reddy) M. resides in Atlanta and is a Chief Architect and 

previously a Director for S/4 HANA Cloud (an accused product). Ex. O at 5-7. 

 SAP employee Kevin Hester is in Woodstock, GA (in Atlanta) and is the COO of 

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SAP Ariba of North America. Ex. O at 8-10. SAP Ariba integrates with SAP HANA, meaning 

Mr. Hester will know about the importance of SAP Cloud Integration and SAP HANA (both 

accused products). Id. Sara Mani is a Development Manager and a resident of Lawrenceville, GA

(a suburb of Atlanta). Ex. O at 12-13. 

SAP employee Elizabeth Carrier is in Atlanta and is one of the top salespeople at 

SAP and likely highly knowledgeable about the value of the accused products and functionalities. 

Id. at O at 20-23. SAP employee Tami Morrison is in Houston and has more than two decades of 

experience at SAP Labs, Id. at 14-

15; She is especially skilled in SAP HANA per her LinkedIn. SAP 

employee Milena Mathyl is in Houston (but was formerly in Germany) and appears knowledgeable 

about SAP Cloud Integration and HANA (both accused). Ex. O at 16-18. 

With respect to Ms. Quinlan in Ireland or SAP witnesses flying from India, Germany, 

Canada, or other far-away destinations, the Federal Circuit has “held that the ‘100-mile’ rule should 

not be rigidly applied where witnesses . . . will be required to travel a significant distance no matter 

where they testify.” In re Apple, Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up, citation 

omitted). In other words, any additional inconvenience from flying to DFW and then driving to 

Marshall to stay at a hotel vs. flying to DFW then driving to or near Sherman to stay at a hotel is 

de minimis. See Athalonz LLC v. Under Armour, Inc., 2023 WL 8809293, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 

20, 2023) (courts shouldn’t overweigh “travel inconvenience when the witnesses will be traveling 

a significant distance”); see also VisionX Techs. v. Sony Grp., 2023 WL 3572898, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 

May 19, 2023) (finding willing witness factor neutral when most Sony witnesses had to travel 

internationally with only a few traveling from other states). This is particularly true with respect 

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to Ms. Quinlan given recent Fifth Circuit decisions clarifying that any speculative inconvenience 

of the plaintiff or its advisors has no bearing on the transfer analysis. See In re Fort Worth, 2024 

WL 1976963, at *7 (Oldham, J. Concurring) (“the plaintiffs are the masters of the complaint . . . 

That characterization would mean very little if the travel costs of the plaintiffs’ lawyers could be 

used to oppose the plaintiffs’ own choice of venue.” (cleaned up)). 

Finally, Marshall is significantly cheaper than Plano in terms of cost of living (30% below 

the U.S. average for Marshall vs. 21% above the U.S. average for Plano), all of which would affect 

hotel and food costs for these witnesses. Compare Ex. P (Marshall costs), with Ex. Q (Plano costs); 

see also Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 631 (not error for district court to consider lower costs 

in Amarillo vis-à-vis Austin in denying transfer); see also VisionX, 2023 WL 3572898, at *4 & n.1 

(considering “cost of hotels, food, and related overnight expenses” in NDCA as compared to 

EDTX (citation omitted)). Accordingly, this factor slightly weighs against transfer. 

4. Private Factor 4: Practical Problems Strongly Weigh Against Transfer 

SAP declares that “[t]his factor is neutral because this case is in its infancy.” Tr. Br. at 13. 

But SAP again ignores the relevant law, which “considers all other practical problems that make 

trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.” In re TikTok, 85 F.4th at 362. This includes 

considerations like “judicial economy [and] duplicative suits involving the same or similar 

issues.” R2 Sols, LLC v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 2484539, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 

2022), vacated on other grounds, 2022 WL 10887770 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2022). 

Here, this factor strongly weighs against transfer. Valtrus has six other cases pending 

before this Court, all concerning patents that it acquired from HPE in 2021. See Quinlan Decl. at 

¶6. The Court has (or will shortly have) familiarity with many of Valtrus’s patents. One of 

Valtrus’s asserted patents here (U.S. Patent No. 6,871,264) is also asserted in the pending Wireless 

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Carrier cases. “[A] district court’s experience with a patent in a prior litigation and the copendency of cases involving the same patent are permissible considerations in ruling on a motion 

to transfer venue.” In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App’x 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Transferring this 

case to the Sherman Division would require a new Judge to duplicate this Court’s efforts on this 

patent (including claim construction), risking inconsistent rulings. See U.S. Ethernet Innovations, 

LLC v. Acer, Inc., 2010 WL 2771842, at *8 n.8 (E.D. Tex. July 13, 2010) (cleaned up) (“Two claim 

constructions on the same patent risk inconsistency, create greater uncertainty regarding the 

patent’s scope”). For these reasons, this factor weighs strongly against transfer. 

C. Public Interest Factors 

1. Public Factor 1: The Court’s Localized Interest Is Neutral 

SAP weighs this factor in favor of transfer for two reasons: (1) purportedly relevant 

employees of SAP, PPS, and HPE reside near the Sherman Division and (2) Ms. Kumar’s prelitigation calls with SAP employees in Pennsylvania and Germany while residing in Texas. 

SAP’s first stated reason is legally irrelevant. See In re Clarke, 94 F.4th at 511–13 (mere 

residency and presence in a venue does not alone constitute a local interest). SAP also 

mischaracterizes the relevance of Ms. Kumar’s pre-suit discussions because courts must analyze 

the “significant connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a suit,” not 

the parties’ connections to the forum. See In re TikTok, 85 F.4th at 364 (cleaned up). Thus, the 

mere location of SAP’s witnesses and PPS cannot support local interest. Planned Parenthood, 52 

F.4th at 632 (“the defendants and the witnesses are located across the state and across the country. 

We agree that this is not the sort of localized case where the citizens of Austin have a greater ‘stake’ 

in the litigation than the citizens of Amarillo.”). 

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Dated: May 31, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Matthew G. Berkowitz by permission Claire 

Abernathy Henry 

Matthew G. Berkowitz – LEAD ATTORNEY

Patrick Colsher

Navid. C. Bayar 

Savannah H. Carnes

Reichman Jorgensen Lehman & Feldberg LLP

100 Marine Parkway, Suite 300 

Redwood Shores, CA 94065 

Tel: (650) 623-1401 

mberkowitz@reichmanjorgensen.com 

pcolsher@reichmanjorgensen.com 

nbayar@reichmanjorgensen.com 

scarnes@reichmanjorgensen.com

Philip J. Eklem 

peklem@reichmanjorgensen.com 

Reichman Jorgensen Lehman & Feldberg LLP

1909 K Street NW, Suite 800 

Washington DC, 20006 

Tel: (202) 894-7310 

Khue V. Hoang 

Reichman Jorgensen Lehman & Feldberg LLP 

400 Madison Avenue, Suite 14D 

New York, NY 10017 

Tel: (212) 381-1965 

khoang@reichmanjorgensen.com

Of Counsel: 

Andrea L. Fair

Texas Bar No. 24078488 

Claire Abernathy Henry

Texas State Bar No. 24053063 

WARD, SMITH & HILL, PLLC

1507 Bill Owens Pkwy. 

Longview, TX 75604 

Tel: (903) 757-6400 

andrea@wsfirm.com 

claire@wsfirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL

The undersigned hereby certifies that pursuant to the protective order in the abovecaptioned case, this motion contains confidential information. Accordingly, this document is to be 

/s/ Claire Abernathy Henry

Claire Abernathy Henry

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on May 31, 2024, all counsel of record who are 

deemed to have consented to electronic service are being with a copy of this document via the 

Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3). 

/s/ Claire Abernathy Henry

Claire Abernathy Henry

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