IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

KARA MORRIS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-2036-D

§

ARTA TRAVEL, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 AND ORDER 

In this employment discrimination action, defendant Travel Acquisition Group, Ltd.

d/b/a ARTA Travel (“ARTA”) moves to dismiss for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(3), or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman

Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that

venue is not proper in this district and transfers this case to the Eastern District of Texas,

Sherman Division. 

I

Plaintiff Kara Morris (“Morris”) filed her original complaint, alleging that ARTA

Travel (then the sole defendant) had discriminated against her based on her disability and had

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). The following day, Morris

filed a first amended complaint to add ARTA as a party. That amendment was made as a

matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)(A).

According to Morris’ first amended complaint, Morris, who suffers from multiple

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sclerosis, informed defendants1

 of her condition and requested to work from home (at least

on a part-time basis) during the COVID-19 epidemic and to have her wages restored to the

rate of an in-office employee. Morris alleges that defendants did not engage in conversation

with her and refused her requested accommodation, despite the fact that she could have

performed the essential functions of her job. Morris alleges that she was “constructively

discharged” from her travel agent position because she was forced to choose between her

health and her job.

ARTA answered Morris’ first amended complaint (it did not answer her original

complaint), and, in pertinent part, denied that venue is proper in this district. ARTA now

moves to dismiss this action for improper venue, or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the

Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division. ARTA maintains that venue is not proper in

this district because it employed Morris and made decisions regarding her employment at its

office located in Collin County in the Eastern District of Texas. In response, Morris

maintains that the motion is moot because, after ARTA filed the motion, she filed a second

amended complaint, which “supersedes” her previous pleading and “renders it of no legal

effect.” P. Resp. (ECF No. 17) at 1. In reply, ARTA contends that Morris’ second amended

complaint violates Rule 15 because she did not seek this court’s leave or ARTA’s written

consent before she filed it. The court is deciding the motion on the briefs, without oral

1

In the first amended complaint, both defendants are referred to collectively as the

“Defendant.” 1st Am. Compl. (ECF No. 5) at 1. The claims are based on allegations

pertaining to “the Defendant.” E.g., id. at 3.1 (referring to “Defendant’s unlawful

employment practices”). 

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argument. 

II

The court first considers whether to strike Morris’ second amended complaint. 

A

Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend her pleading once as a matter of course

within 21 days after serving it, or “if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is

required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion

under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Rule 15(a)(1)(A), (B). “In all other cases,

a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s

leave.” Rule 15(a)(2). The court in its discretion may strike an amended complaint for

failure to comply with these procedural requirements. See, e.g., Ike v. U.S. Citizenship &

Immigr. Servs., 2021 WL 2167054, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.); Barbour

v. City of Forney, 2015 WL 4094005, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 2015) (Horan, J.) (striking

amended complaint that could not be filed as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)), rec.

adopted, 2015 WL 4113571 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2015) (Boyle, J.).

B

Morris filed her original complaint against ARTA Travel on September 11, 2023. She

filed her first amended complaint the following day, on September 12, 2023, adding ARTA

as a defendant. ARTA answered the first amended complaint and served Morris with its

answer on September 26, 2023. ARTA filed the instant motion to dismiss or transfer on

October 12, 2023. Morris filed her second amended complaint on November 1, 2023, and

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then responded to the motion to dismiss or transfer, maintaining that it was moot because it

was filed before she filed her second amended complaint, which rendered the previous

pleading of no legal effect.

Morris neither sought nor obtained leave of court to file her second amended

complaint. Under Rule 15, “a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course . . . .” 

Rule 15(1) (emphasis added). The Rule is clear and affords parties only one opportunity to

amend as a matter of course. See Merisier v. Johnson County, 2020 WL 13856958, at *1

(N.D. Tex. May 26, 2023) (Horan, J.) (quoting Logue v. Patient First Corp., 246 F.Supp.3d

1124, 1126-27 (D. Md. 2017)) (interpreting Rule 15). Morris filed her original complaint on

September 11, 2023. She exercised her right to amend her pleading once as a matter of

course on September 12, 2023, when she filed her first amended complaint within 21 days

of serving her original complaint. See Rule 15(a)(1)(A). Because Morris failed to comply

with Rule 15’s procedural requirements, the court strikes her second amended complaint. 

The court need not address whether Morris’ second amended complaint mooted ARTA’s

motion to dismiss because the first amended complaint is the effective complaint.

III

The court now considers ARTA’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.

A

Venue in a civil action is usually governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), but claims under

the ADA are governed by the special venue provisions adopted in Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See also In re Horseshoe Ent., 337 F.3d 429,

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432-33 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).2

 In the instant case, venue is governed by 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f)(3), which provides, in relevant part, that venue is proper 

(1) in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful

employment practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) in

the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to

such practice are maintained and administered, or (3) in the

judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have

worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, (4)

but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such

an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the

respondent has his principal office.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). 

A party may challenge venue in a responsive pleading or by filing a motion. See Rule

12(b)(3). “Once a defendant has objected to a plaintiff’s chosen venue, . . . the burden shifts

to [the plaintiff] to establish that venue is proper.” Davis v. Billick, 2002 WL 1398560, at

*7 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2002) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Advanced Dynamics Corp. v. Mitech

Corp., 729 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Belew, J.)). Because ARTA has challenged

venue by filing this motion to dismiss, Morris has the burden of establishing that venue is

proper in this district. See id. 

The court may decide whether venue is proper based upon “(1) the complaint alone;

(2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” 

Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ginter ex rel.

2

ARTA incorrectly states that no special venue statute expressly identifies venue for

the claims in this case.

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Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439, 449 (5th Cir. 2008) (Dennis, J.,

dissenting)). When resolving the matter on the pleadings without an evidentiary hearing, the

court “must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and resolve all conflicts in favor

of the plaintiff.” Ginter, 536 F.3d at 448 (Dennis, J., dissenting); Laserdynamics Inc. v. Acer

Am. Corp., 209 F.R.D. 388, 390 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 

“Where venue is improper, the district court should generally dismiss the case. But

the court retains discretion to transfer it to a proper venue if such a transfer would serve the

interest of justice.” Seville v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 53 F.4th 890, 894 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)). When determining whether to

dismiss or transfer the case in the interest of justice, “courts examine the plaintiff’s reason

for filing suit in the improper district and ask whether the plaintiff’s belief that venue was

proper was in good faith and reasonable.” Id. (quoting 14D Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3821 (4th ed. 2021)). 

B

According to Morris’ first amended complaint, the Northern District of Texas is a

proper venue because “the unlawful employment discrimination giving rise to Plaintiff’s

claims occurred in this District.” P. 1st Am. Compl. (ECF No. 5) at 2, ¶ 3.3. But “an

employment practice is committed where the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred, rather

than where its effects are felt.” Fowler v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2017 WL 1293983, at *8

(W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Kapche v. Gonzales,

2007 WL 3270393, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2007)); see also Ausler v. ASG/DKS

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Installations LLC, 2021 WL 24542, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2021) (Horan, J.). The alleged

discriminatory conduct in Morris’ first amended complaint is based on ARTA’s decision not

to grant or discuss her requested accommodation. That decision occurred where ARTA

employed Morris, and it is undisputed that ARTA employed Morris at its office located in

Collin County, which is situated in the Eastern District of Texas. Morris’ first amended

complaint does not include any facts demonstrating that any alleged discriminatory conduct

may have occurred elsewhere. The Eastern District of Texas is the proper venue under the

first prong of § 2000e-5(f)(3).

The Eastern District of Texas is also the proper venue under the second and third

prongs of § 2000e-5(f)(3). The Eastern District of Texas is presumably the judicial district

where the employment records relevant to the alleged discriminatory practices are maintained

and administered because it is where Morris was employed. And, according to Morris’ first

amended complaint, the Eastern District of Texas is the judicial district in which she would

have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. Although Morris resides in

Carrollton, Texas, a municipality that lies partially within this judicial district, “a plaintiff’s

residence is equally insufficient to establish venue under [] § 2000e-5(f)(3) and to overcome

a plaintiff’s choice of venue where, like here, other provisions of [] § 2000e-5(f)(3) are

satisfied.” Ausler, 2021 WL 24542, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Graham v. Spireon, Inc., 2014 WL 3714917, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2014)). The court

concludes that the Eastern District of Texas is the proper district under the special venue

provisions for ADA claims and that, in the interest of justice, this case should be transferred

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rather than dismissed.

* * *

For the reasons explained, the court concludes that venue is not proper in this district

and transfers this case to the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division.3

 The clerk of court

shall effect the transfer according to the usual procedure.

SO ORDERED.

November 30, 2023.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

SENIOR JUDGE

3

By statute, court for the Sherman Division is held at Sherman and Plano. See 28

U.S.C. § 124(c)(3). The decision whether to assign the case to the Sherman or Plano docket

is left, of course, to the procedures adopted by the Eastern District of Texas.

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