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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49356

CINDY A. CHAMBERS,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

IDAHO BOARD OF PHARMACY AND 

AGENCY,

 Respondent.

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Boise, May 2022 Term

Opinion filed: August 24, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 

Idaho, Ada County. Samuel Hoagland, District Judge. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Bernadette Cecile Buentgen, Eagle, for Appellant. Bernadette Buentgen argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Alexandra 

Breshears argued.

__________________________________________________________________

MOELLER, Justice.

The Idaho Board of Pharmacy (“Board”) filed an administrative complaint against Cindy 

A. Chambers, a pharmacist, alleging that she dispensed a controlled substance without a valid 

prescription. Chambers prevailed before the Board and it determined that she was entitled to 

recover her reasonable attorney fees and costs; however, she failed to comply with the 14-day 

deadline for requesting her award. When she filed a request almost seven months after the deadline 

had passed, the Board denied her request upon finding that she failed to show good cause for the 

late filing. Chambers then sought judicial review from the district court, which dismissed her 

petition. Chambers now appeals to this Court, maintaining that both the Board and the district court 

erred by applying the wrong legal standard. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2018, Chambers was a pharmacist working at a Sav-On Pharmacy for Albertsons, LLC,

in Boise, Idaho. She was the “Pharmacist-in-Charge” at the Boise pharmacy during all times at 
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issue in this case. On September 25, 2018, a Board compliance officer conducted a routine 

inspection of the Sav-On pharmacy’s records where Chambers is employed. During the audit, the 

compliance officer found a record showing Chambers had dispensed 50 mg of Tramadol, a 

Schedule IV medication, on July 14, 2018, without an accompanying valid prescription. Board

staff filed an administrative complaint against Chambers, alleging she violated the statutes or rules 

governing the practice of pharmacy in Idaho by dispensing a controlled substance without a valid 

prescription. 

At the hearing before the Board, Chambers presented evidence that she rejected the original 

Tramadol prescription, written by a veterinarian for a dog, because it lacked the required

information, “including, but not limited to, the drug name and strength.” Because of this immediate 

rejection, the prescription was never scanned into Sav-On’s electronic records system. The dog’s

owners subsequently returned to Sav-On with an additional prescription to acquire the medication. 

However, Chambers rejected the second prescription because it still lacked the necessary 

information. Chambers testified that she then called the prescribing veterinarian by phone to 

verbally obtain the necessary information to create a valid prescription. Chambers reduced the 

verbal prescription to writing and provided it to a pharmacy technician for processing. Chambers 

then dispensed 50 mg of Tramadol to the dog’s owners. Additional evidence was submitted to 

show a pharmacy technician had failed to scan the valid prescription into the record-keeping 

system, but that the veterinarian confirmed that she prescribed the 50 mg of Tramadol to the dog’s 

owners and that she later verified the prescription with Chambers over the phone. 

From these findings, the Board concluded “there is no evidence in the record alleging or 

suggesting any efforts by [Chambers] to divert any drugs.” In its final order, issued on May 6, 

2019, the Board concluded that Chambers acted reasonably and dismissed the administrative 

complaint. The Board also determined that Chambers was entitled to recover attorney fees and 

costs. The final order did not specify a deadline for requesting attorney fees, but stated: “. . . 

pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-117(5) and 54-1728(6), [Chambers] is entitled to recover her 

reasonable attorney’s fees and defense costs necessarily and actually incurred in this matter, which 

[Chambers] may apply for in accordance with Rule 741 of the Idaho Rules of Administrative 

Procedure of the Attorney General (IDAPA 04.11.01.741).” 

Rule 741, referred to in the final order, generally provides that the time for filing a request 

for attorney fees awarded by an agency is “(14) days from the service date of the final order” unless 
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the final/preliminary order specifically extends that time. IDAPA 04.11.01.741. Thus, where the 

time is not specifically set forth in a statute, rules of the agency, or the final order itself, “the 

deadline for filing for costs and/or fees and/or for moving for an extension of the time to file for 

costs and fees is fourteen (14) days from the service date of the final order or preliminary order.” 

IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(c). Additionally, “[t]he agency may exercise its discretion to consider 

and grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown.” IDAPA 

04.11.01.741.02(d). The certificate of mailing for the final order indicates it was served on 

Chambers’ attorney on May 7, 2019, making May 21, 2019, the deadline to file a request for 

attorney fees.

Almost seven months (204 days) later, on December 11, 2019, Chambers filed a request 

for $6,761.25 in attorney fees through her counsel, Bernadette Buentgen. The Board filed an 

objection to this request, arguing it was untimely and lacked a showing of good cause to explain 

the late filing. Buentgen then submitted a second declaration in support of the request for attorney 

fees, which included detailed information concerning her health status from 2006 forward. In her 

declaration, Buentgen explained that she was diagnosed with Chronic Myeloid Leukemia 13 years 

earlier and, following her diagnosis, underwent targeted chemotherapy from 2006 until November 

2013. Her daily medications “had numerous side-effects, including overwhelming fatigue.” To 

reach remission, Buentgen underwent a stem cell transplant in 2014. The procedure was successful

but not without complications: Buentgen contracted GVHD (graft vs. host disease), which required

additional medications and blood transfusions until 2017. While Buentgen has been “leukemia free 

for six years,” she reports that she “still [has] a compromised immune system and continues to 

struggle with fatigue.” She explained in the declaration that her “new normal changes daily” and 

requires constant reassessments and adjustments. 

On reviewing this second declaration, the Board informed Buentgen she had again failed 

to explain any “specific events between May 2019 and December 2019” that “prevented [her] from 

filing or seeking an extension of time to file.” Buentgen then filed a third declaration in support of 

the request for attorney fees, which argued her health conditions were good cause and “there [was] 

no showing of harm or prejudice” to the Board. This third declaration also included information 

from Buentgen that she “did not calendar the fourteen (14) day deadline,” and “did not anticipate 

. . . an issue concerning the payment of [her] attorney fees if the bill was presented more than 

fourteen (14) days after the Final Order.” She conceded, however, that “possibly . . . was a mistake 
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on [her] part.” Additionally, Buentgen explained that she is a solo practitioner without “the 

resources to hire someone to prepare the statement of attorney fees.” 

The Board conducted a hearing on the attorney fees matter on April 9, 2020. At the hearing, 

Buentgen argued that “prejudice is a determining factor in whether good cause is shown.” She 

explained in full:

So the issue here is not whether the Board is awarding attorney’s fees. That’s 

already been decided. The issue is whether the documentation showing what the 

attorney’s fees were was timely filed. And if it wasn’t, what prejudiced [sic] was 

caused to the Board, which I submit was none. And the reason for the delay I feel 

was reasonable, given the circumstances. 

And I do admit that I didn’t look at the 14 days, because first off the order is 

silent, so that it reverts back to that. I think a reasonable person would allow the 

petitioner -- I’m sorry, the respondent time to file the memorandum basically -- the 

memorandum of cost, which is what I did with the declaration. 

. . . you can’t just look at my health in a vacuum. I had other work that I was 

doing during that time period. I am a sole practitioner. I don’t have any employees. 

Additionally, this type of declaration is based on personal information and belief, 

so it would require me to prepare it; that I do suffer from extreme fatigue; and that 

I have to prioritize. And I didn’t think that was going to be an issue, quite frankly. 

And I think a reasonable person would allow the document to be filed after the 14 

days. 

Lastly, she added that there was “absolutely no prejudice or hardship” to either the petitioner or 

the Board, stating: “in fact it allows them a longer period of time to pay the attorney’s fees, 

therefore being able to budget those into their budget.” Notably, the Board expanded the time 

allowed for both parties to present their arguments and answer questions from Board members. At 

the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied Chambers’ untimely request for attorney fees 

because “the Board [could] not find that good cause existed to warrant a delay of more than six 

months.” 

Chambers then filed a petition for judicial review with the district court, arguing the Board 

erred in denying the attorney fees because it applied a good cause standard without considering 

the lack of prejudice. Following full briefing and argument, the district court affirmed the Board’s 

decision and dismissed the petition. The district court concluded that the plain language of IDAPA 

Rule 741 gives the agency discretion to consider an untimely request for fees for “good cause 

shown.” However, nothing in the rule required the Board to consider a lack of prejudice as good 

cause for a late filing. The district court further noted that “Idaho Code § 12-117(5) does not 

mandate that a prevailing party obtain its fees when it did not properly comply with the rules 
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regarding applying for fees.” Ultimately, because Buentgen failed to specify how her current health 

issues caused the seven-month delay, and because she admitted “the failure to timely file for 

attorney fees was due to her error and misreading of the rules,” the court found that there was 

substantial and competent evidence supporting the Board’s decision. Accordingly, it concluded 

that the Board “was well within its discretion to deny an untimely request on these facts and find 

that good cause had not been demonstrated.” 

Chambers timely appealed the district court’s dismissal of her petition for judicial review

to this Court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case comes before the Court on a petition for judicial review of a final order by the 

Idaho Board of Pharmacy. Idaho’s Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) governs agency actions 

and provides that a reviewing court “shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the 

agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or 

statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful 

procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, 

capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” I.C. § 67-5279(3). The APA also states that a reviewing 

court “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 

questions of fact.” I.C. § 67-5279(1).

“When reviewing a decision by the district court acting in its appellate capacity under the 

[APA], this Court analyzes the record independently of the district court.” Hawkins v. Bonneville 

Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011). We also freely review

questions of law. Id. However, “[w]here the district court has affirmed the Board’s actions, we will 

uphold its decision provided the Board’s findings were supported by substantial and competent 

evidence.” Id.

Additional standards of review will be addressed in turn. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Board applied the correct standard of review. 

Chambers first argues that “the Board abused its discretion by failing to apply the correct 

standard of review” required by Rule 741 of IDAPA. Although her argument rests on the discretion 

given the Board under Rule 741 “to consider and grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for 

good cause shown,” Chambers ultimately contends she is entitled to relief because the Board “did 
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not consider, nor did it find any prejudice caused by an untimely request for attorney’s fees.” She 

also alleges that the Board’s final order “failed to give a specific date to file a declaration and failed 

to state the rule in the Notice of Due Process in an attempt to avoid paying attorney fees.” The 

Board argues that Rule 741 only requires a “good cause” analysis, not a separate consideration of 

prejudice. Additionally, it points out that the final order gave notice that any request for costs and 

attorney fees be made “in accordance with Rule 741.” We agree with the Board on both points. 

There is no abuse of discretion where the Board: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 

of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 

legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 

exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). 

Without specifying which Lunneborg standards were violated, Chambers appears to make two 

separate contentions suggesting that the Board failed to act consistently with the applicable legal 

standard: first, that the Board was required to consider prejudice in its determination of whether 

there was good cause to permit an untimely request for attorney fees; and second, that attorney 

fees are mandatory under Idaho Code section 12-117(5) regardless of IDAPA’s deadlines. 

1. The Board and the district court properly applied the good cause standard because

Rule 741 does not require consideration of prejudice. 

IDAPA Rule 741 states that the agency “must allow no fewer than fourteen (14) days from 

the service date of the final order or the preliminary order for the party to whom costs and/or fees 

were awarded . . . to file necessary papers . . . quantifying and otherwise supporting costs or fees.”

Generally, the applicable statute, rules of the agency, or the final order or preliminary order will 

specify the filing deadline; however, Rule 741 provides for a 14-day deadline as a default where 

the statute or final order is otherwise silent. IDAPA 04.11.01.741. Such is the case here: the 

Board’s order did not provide Chambers with an express deadline, but it directed her instead to 

Rule 741 which provided her with 14 days to file either a memorandum of costs or request an 

extension of time to file the necessary paperwork to recover her costs and fees. 

Additionally, Rule 741 grants the agency “discretion to consider and grant an untimely 

filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown.” Id. (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that 

prejudice is not mentioned in Rule 741. It only states that the Board’s decision is dependent on 

whether “good cause” is shown. This Court has typically addressed good cause in the context of 

delays in serving pleadings, motions, or other court filings. We have held that “[t]here is no brightline test in determining whether good cause exists.” Harrison v. Bd. of Pro. Discipline of Idaho 
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State Bd. of Med., 145 Idaho 179, 183, 177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008). However, to ascertain whether 

good cause exists for delays and untimeliness, courts typically “look to factors outside of the 

plaintiff's control,” such as sudden illness, natural catastrophe, or evasion by third parties. Id.

Nevertheless, we have expressly held that a “[l]ack of prejudice is irrelevant to the good cause 

analysis.” Id.

Although Chambers cites two cases to support her argument—Ada County Highway Dist. 

By and Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and Sammis v. 

Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 348, 941 P.2d 314, 320 (1997)—she mischaracterizes both

holdings. Acarrequi dealt only with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, which simply permits time 

periods to be enlarged at the discretion of the trial court. 105 Idaho at 874–75, 673 P.2d at 1068–

69. Here, there was no motion to enlarge time filed until it was too late. Similarly, the Sammis

Court rejected a plaintiff’s assertion that a lack of prejudice should be considered in the good cause 

analysis under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)(2). 130 Idaho at 348, 941 P.2d at 320. This

Court explained that the rule only required a showing of “good cause” for “why such service was 

not made” within the deadline’s time frame. Id.

This Court has never applied a prejudice standard in place of, or even as part of, a good 

cause analysis. Importantly, the plain language of Rule 741 does not include the word “prejudice” 

or any similar language that would trigger questions of harm or substantial rights to either party. 

The rule focuses only on timeliness, deadlines, and whether there is “good cause” for any delay. 

See IDAPA 04.11.01.741. The rule also directs that the determination of good cause lies within 

the discretion of the agency. Id. Therefore, only the good cause standard was applicable here. This 

was the legal standard and inquiry employed by the Board and the district court in considering the

untimely request for attorney fees. There can be no abuse of discretion when the reviewing agency 

applies the exact standard prescribed by the governing rule. 

2. Although Idaho Code section 12-117(5) provides for an award of attorney fees under 

certain circumstances, the district court properly affirmed the Board’s determination 

that Chambers waived her right to recover her attorney fees by failing to timely file 

the request. 

As part of her prejudice argument, Chambers also argues that attorney fees are mandatory, 

regardless of filing deadlines. She cites specifically to Idaho Code section 12-117(5) (amended in 

2018), which is the governing statutory authority for the Board’s award of fees. Idaho Code section 

12-117(5) provides for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in an administrative 
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proceeding where a licensing authority and a licensee are adverse parties. Such was the underlying 

case here and the Board determined that, under section 12-117(5), Chambers was entitled to 

recover her reasonable attorney’s fees and defense costs. However, Chambers still needed to apply 

for recovery of her attorney fees and costs upon completion of the administrative proceedings. 

IDAPA 04.11.01.741.01. 

In civil cases and agency actions, the failure to timely file a memorandum of costs 

following an award of attorney fees generally results in the waiver of that right. See Medrano v. 

Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767, 769–70, 40 P.3d 125, 127–28 (2002); Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 

904, 908, 781 P.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App. 1989). See also I.A.R. 40(c) (“Failure to file a memorandum 

of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver of the right to costs.”). For 

example, in Medrano, this Court determined that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion 

upon awarding attorney fees after counsel “missed [the 10-day] deadline by six months with no 

explanation for the delay.” 136 Idaho at 769–70, 40 P.3d at 127–28. While the prevailing party in 

Medrano was originally entitled to an award of attorney fees for succeeding in its case, Medrano 

waived the award by failing to submit a memorandum of costs and fees until after “the deadline 

had long passed.” Id. The same result occurred in Harney v. Weatherby, where the prevailing party 

waived the right to recover his award of attorney fees and costs when he filed his memorandum of 

costs fifty-five days late. 116 Idaho at 908, 781 P.2d at 245. 

Chambers has not explained why this general rule should not likewise apply to an 

administrative proceeding. We conclude there is no reason to adopt a different rule for this case 

and, therefore, Chambers waived her right to recover her fees and costs by failing to timely submit 

a memorandum of costs and fees. She had 14 days to submit her memorandum, yet she waited 

almost seven months. The Board did not abuse its discretion because it applied the correct legal 

standard when it denied Chamber’s untimely request for costs and fees. Nothing in Idaho Code 

section 12-117(5) absolved Chambers of the requirement in Rule 741 to timely file the necessary 

papers in support of her requested costs and fees.

B. The Board’s finding that Chambersfailed to demonstrate good cause for her untimely 

request for attorney fees was supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

Chambers next argues that the Board and the district court “grossly minimized the medical 

condition of [Buentgen]” and that counsel’s extreme fatigue over the time period at issue was 

substantial evidence of good cause. No one disputes the medical hardships apparently faced by 

Buentgen over the years; however, the Board made its determination to deny the untimely request 
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on the basis counsel failed to provide specific medical details concerning her condition during the 

seven months in question. The district court affirmed on similar grounds. We agree that the Board’s 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

Where there is conflicting evidence, an “agency’s findings are binding on this Court as 

long as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, regardless of whether [the 

Court] might have reached a different conclusion.” Chisholm v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 142 

Idaho 159, 164, 125 P.3d 515, 520 (2005). “Substantial and competent evidence is relevant 

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” but “less than a preponderance of evidence.” 

Id.

Here, the Board correctly applied the standard of good cause, which generally looks to 

circumstances and factors outside the party’s control. See Harrison, 145 Idaho at 183, 177 P.3d at 

397. It primarily considered the evidence proffered by Chambers’ counsel, Buentgen, to explain

her delay in requesting fees. Without disregarding the extensive medical issues Buentgen has faced

over the years, the Board concluded that Chambers failed to provide good cause for her untimely 

filing. The Board focused on the fact that Buentgen failed to provide any specific medical events 

or circumstances during the relevant period at issue—from May to December 2019—that would 

justify the late filing. 

The medical history provided in Buentgen’s declarations centers on her cancer diagnosis 

in 2006, her subsequent chemotherapy treatments, and her stem cell transplant in 2014. Her 

medical history also indicates ongoing fatigue and complications, stating that constant adjustments 

in concern for her health are part of her “new normal.” However, when the declarations addressed

the events of 2019 that contributed to the delay, the explanations offered by Buentgen had little or 

nothing to do with her health. For example, Buentgen explained that she failed to calendar the 

deadlines, she is a solo practitioner without support staff, and stated that she “didn’t think that was 

going to be an issue, quite frankly.” Such admissions were not limited to her declarations. Under 

query from the Board and district court below—and during oral argument before this Court—

Buentgen repeatedly conceded that the missed deadline was her error in failing to sufficiently read 

over the IDAPA rules and calendar the deadline. 

Chambers is effectively asking this Court to apply a new standard for her benefit, one akin 

to the excusable neglect standard set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). However, that 
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is not the governing standard here. Chambers, through her counsel, was required to show good 

cause for the seven-month delay, and she has failed to do so. As the district court summarized: 

Buentgen admitted in declarations and at the hearing that the failure to timely 

file for attorney fees was due to her error and misreading of the rules. She detailed 

health issues, however, nothing specific over the seven month time period at issue, 

which would have impacted her ability to timely request fees and costs. Instead, the 

error was one of misjudgment. 

We agree and conclude that there was substantial and competent evidence in the record below to 

support the Board’s determination. Its decision to deny the untimely request for attorney fees was 

well within its discretion. 

Chambers raises additional arguments on appeal, including whether the Board’s decision 

was arbitrary and capricious, whether the Board’s order denied Chambers of due process, and 

whether the Board’s failure to consider prejudice resulted in prejudice to her substantial rights. 

Each of these arguments is based on her initial assertion that the Board was required by Idaho law 

to consider prejudice. Yet, as we have explained, this is not the standard under Rule 741. Harrison, 

145 Idaho at 183, 177 P.3d at 397 (“Lack of prejudice is irrelevant to the good cause analysis.”).

Thus, the Board’s decision applied the correct legal standard and its final determination was based 

on substantial and competent evidence. Accordingly, we need not consider Chambers’ remaining 

issues on appeal. 

C. Chambers is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 

Chambers requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-117(5) and 

54-1728(7). These statutes allow for an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party 

“in any administrative proceeding or administrative judicial proceeding involving as adverse 

parties a licensing authority and a licensee.” I.C. 12-117(5). Inasmuch as Chambers is not the 

prevailing party on appeal, she is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s determination to dismiss the 

petition for judicial review. As the prevailing party, the Board is entitled to costs as a matter of 

course. I.A.R. 40(a).

Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, STEGNER and ZAHN CONCUR.