## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 15 - 00027 - CR NO. 02 - 15 - 00028 - CR NO. 02 - 15 - 00029 - CR

WILLIAM BRUCE SENN JR. APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 43RD DISTRI CT COURT OF PARKER C OUNTY TRIAL COU RT NO. CR14

- 0051, CR14

- 0052, CR14

- 0163

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellan t Wil l iam Bruce Senn Jr. entered an open plea of guilty to count one in the two cases for which he was indicted f or sexual assault of a child and to all three counts i n the case for which he was indicted for possession of child pornography

. The trial court accepted Senn ’s guilty plea s but reserved a finding

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

of guilt . At the punishment hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of Senn’s presentence investigation re port, the victim testified concerning the events that formed the basis of the three indictments , Senn’s military records were admitted into evidence, and Senn’s father

- in

- law provided charact er testimony on Senn’s behalf. After hearing the testimony and r eviewing the evidence, the trial court found Senn guilty in accordance with his five guilty pleas and sentenced him to twenty years’ confinement in each of the cases involving sexual assault of a child and to ten years’ confinement on each of the three cou nts in the case involving possession of child pornography and ordered all five of the sentences to run concurrently. In a single issue, Senn argues that his guilty pleas w ere not made knowingly

. We will affirm. Due process requires that a guilty plea be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 24 2

– 44 , 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969); Kniatt v. State , 206 S. W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. ) , cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1052 (2006)

. When the record reflects that a defendant was properly admonished, a prima facie showing exists that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State , 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish that, notwithstanding t he statutory admonishments, he did not understand the consequences of his plea. Id. T he record reflects that Senn and his counsel signed written admonishments complying with article 26.13(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal3

Procedure

. See Tex. Code Crim. Pr oc. Ann. art. 26.13(a) (West Supp. 2014). Senn signed his name right after the paragraph stating, I sign this document after consulting with my attorney. I have read each and every paragraph above [,] . . . and I fully understand each and every paragraph and admonishment herein. I am aware of the consequences of my plea. Furthermore, I have no questions about these admonis hments, as given by the Court. Senn orally reaf firmed his understanding of th e admonishments when the trial court went over them at the plea hearing. Because the record reflects that Senn was properly admonished, the record constitute s a prima facie showing that Senn’s guilty plea s were knowingly and voluntarily made. See Martinez , 981 S.W.2d at 197

. The burden therefore shifts to S enn to establish that, notwithstanding the statutory admonishments, he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea s

. See i d. Senn argues that his pleas were not made knowingly because there was a lack of both “ a clear explanation ” and “ a clea r understanding of the
consequences ” of his guilty pleas. With regard to his argument that a lack of a clear explanation of the admonishments exists , Senn points to a single admonishment

— the admonishment that when there is no plea bargain, any appeal of a conviction based on a plea of guilty is limited to jurisdictional issues

. Senn contends that this admonition “is inadequate and in fact amounts to no meaningful admonition.” The admonition that Senn complains of is not required to be given by article 26 .13 , and th ere are no statutory or judicial requirements that a defendant pleading guilty without the benefit of a plea bargain be advised4

of his limited right of appeal

. 2 See Fennell v. State , 958 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1997, no pet.). Th us, the inclusion of this admonition does not render Senn’s guilty plea involuntary. With regard to his argument that there was a lack of a clear understanding of the consequences of his guilty pleas, Senn points to an impairment rating decision from the D epartment of Veterans Affairs , which was admitted as part of Senn’s military record s . The record s show that Senn suffer s from post

- traumatic stress disorder and that “[a]n evaluation of 70 percent is assigned for occupational and social impairment, with d eficiencies in most areas, such as . . . judgment, thinking, . . . [and] impaired impulse control

. ” Senn argues that “[g]iven the evidence of [his] dramatic disabilities, it is unreasonable to conclude that Appellant, a lay person unschooled in the law, u nderstood the meaning or the significance of ‘ jurisdictional issues. ’ ” Because, as explained above, the admonition that he complains of i s not statutorily required to be given, an understand ing of the meaning or the significance of the term “jurisdictiona l issues” is not required in order for a plea to be made knowingly

. See id. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Senn failed to understand the proceedings generally or the specific rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.

2 To the extent that Senn’s argument can be broadly construed as requesting this court to rewrite the admonitions that are given by trial court s , such task must be left to the legislature. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp v. State , 273 S.W.3d 157, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (Cochran, J., concurring) (explaining that statutory inadequacies are best left to the legislature to remedy)

.5

Senn has not shown h ow his mental impairment prevented him from knowingly making his guilty pleas. See Dickey v. State , Nos. 05

- 07

- 01090

- CR, 05

- 07

- 01214

- CR, 2008 WL 2877761, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas July 25, 2008, pet ref’d ) (not designated for publication). We hold that Se nn failed to meet his burden of establish ing that, notwithstanding the statutory admonishments, he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea s and therefore hold that his guilty pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily

. See Martinez , 981 S.W. 2d at 197 ; Rudnick v. State , No. 03

- 02

- 00767

- CR, 2003 WL 22023435, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Austin Aug. 29, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding appellant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty without an agreed punishment

recomm endation , despite appellant ’s claims that his guilty plea was not kno wingly made because he did not understand he was not eligible for probation )

. We overrule Senn’s sole issue. Having overruled Senn’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Sue Walker SUE WALKER JUSTICE PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 1, 2015