File Na me: 07a0724n.06 Filed: Oc tober 10, 2007 NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

No. 05-6910 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT CHARL ES R. AL L EN, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v. R IC K Y B E LL, Respondent-Appe llee. ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R

T H E M ID D LE DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

/ Be fore : BOG GS, Chief J udg e; MARTI N and SUTTON , Circuit J udg es
BO YCE F. MARTI

N, J R
. , Circuit J udg e. The district court dismissed Charles Allen’s petition for a wr it of habea s corpus a s untimely , having been submit ted after the one-y ear limit ations period imposed by

the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act. On a

ppeal to this court, Allen
co n ce d es t h at h e s u

b m i t t edt h e p et i t i o n l at e, b u t c o n t e n d s t h at h e i s en t i t l edt o eq u i t ab l e t o l l i n g. Be cause Allen fa iled to prese nt compelling r easons f or g ranting equitable tolling, w e AF FI RM the de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

I
. On the mor nin g of Ap ri l 15 , 1 99 8, Al le n sho t tw o un a rm e d me n in a c ro wd e d r e sta

ur a nt, killing one of

them. A jury

convicted him of f

irst-deg ree preme ditated murder and cr iminal attemptNo. 05-6910

Al le n v . B e ll Pag e 2
to commit volunt ary

manslaug hter, a

nd sentenc ed him to life with the pos sibili ty of parole plus four y e a rs . Th e Court of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls of Te nn e sse e a ff ir me d th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

( Sta te v. Allen , 2000 Tenn. Crim . App. L EXI S 878), and the Te nnessee Supreme Court denie d permission to appea l. Allen then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the di strict court, which dismis sed the application as untimely . Allen now appe als.

Th e An tit e rr or ism

a nd Ef fe c tiv e De a th P e na lty

Ac t, c od if

ied princ ipa lly

in 2 8 U .S. C. §2244(d), state s that a one- y ear period of limitation shall apply to an application f

or a wr it of habea s
c or pu s f ro m th e c on c lus ion of dir e c t re vie w. 28 U. S.C. § 2 24 4( d) (1 )( A) . T he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court denied per

mission t o appea l on April 19, 2001; Allen had 90 day s to p et i tion for ce rtiorar i from the judg ment of the state c ourt (S UP . C T . R. 13(1)) and did not do so. The one -y ear statute of limit ati o n s t h u s beg an to run on July 8, 2001, ninety

day s after

the Tenne ssee Supre me Court’s
ru l i n g.

Two hu nd red and sixty -s e ve n d a y s p a sse d b e fo re Al le n f ile d h is s ta te pe tit ion

fo r p os tconviction re lief on April 1, 2002, ninety -eig ht day s befor e the deadline. Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) of the Antiterr oris m and Eff ective D eath Pena lty

Act, the limitations period was tolled during the state habe as proc eeding s, when the state trial court reje cted Allen’s petition, the state appe llate cour t aff irmed that judg ment, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denie d Allen’s application for per missionNo. 05-6910

Al le n v . B e ll Pag e 3

The Supreme Court’s rec ent dec ision in Lawrence v. Florida (127 S
. Ct. 1079, 1084 (2007))

1 he ld t hat th e nin e ty -d a y

pe ri od fo r se eki ng c e rt ior a ri to t he Sup re me Court

fo llo wi ngstate po stconviction revie w is included in the one-y ear limit ations period, over

ruling thi s c ourt ’s de c isi on in Ab e la v . M

ar tin , 348 F.3d 164, 172- 73 (6th Cir. 2003). to appea l. This denial came on September 7, 2004 ( Al le n v . S tat e , 2004 Tenn. L EXI S 749 (Tenn. 2004)), a nd the clock be g an to run a g ain. 1
Allen ultimately signe d his f eder al petition f

or a writ of habe as cor

pus on Aug ust 23, 2005, At least five months afte r the expiration of the one-y ear limit ations period. There fore , the district
c o u rtc o r r e c t l y d e t e r

m i n e d t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n w a s u n t i m e l y.

I I
. Be cause we ha

ve held that the A ct’s on e-y ear statute of limitations i s not jurisdictional, a petitioner who misses the deadline may still maintain a viable habea s action if a court de cides that equitable tolling i s appropriate. Dunlap v. United States , 250 F.3d 1001, 1007 ( 6th Cir.), c e rt. denied , 534 U.S. 1057 (2001). “T he petitioner be ars the bur den of demonstrating that he is entitled to equitable tolling.” Allen v. Y ukins , 366 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2004). I n a ca se like the pre sent
o n e , w h e r e t h e f

a c t s a r e u n d i s p u t e d

a n d t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd e c i d e s a s a m a t t e r o f l a w t h a te qu i t a ble tolling does not apply , we r eview the district court’s de cision de novo
. Dunlap , 250 F.3d at 1007-08 n.2.No. 05-6910

Al le n v . B e ll Pag e 4
A c ourt

mus t c on sid e r t

he fo llo wi ngfa c tor s in

de c idi ngwh e the r e qu itab le tol lin g sh ou ld apply : (1) petitioner’ s lack of notice or construc tive knowledg e of the filing r equire ment; (2) diligenc e in pursuing one’s r ights; (3) absenc e of prejudice to the responde nt; and (4) the pe titioner’s
re a so na ble ne ss i n r e ma ini ng

ig no ra nt of the le g a l re qu ir e me nt f or fi lin g his c la im. Id. a t 10 08 . “ Th is list of f actor s is not nece ssarily compre hensive, and not a ll f actor s are rele vant in all case s.” Vroman v. Brigano , 346 F.3d 598, 605 ( 6th Cir. 2003). This court has a lso emphasized that “abse nce of prejudice is a fac tor to be considere d only afte r a fac tor that might justify tolling is identified.” Id.
(1) Knowledge, constructive k nowledge, and reasonable ignoranceof deadline Allen claims th a t h e b e li e v e d th a t th e s tatute o f li mi tati o n s d id n o t s ta rt to r u n u n ti l, or restar ted af ter, the c onclusion of his state pos t -convic tion procee dings. I f this were true, Allen’ s petition would be timely , since the state habea s proce eding s terminated in September 2004 a nd he fi le d h is p e tit ion

in Aug us t 20 05. He cla im s th a t he did no t ha ve c ouns e l to c or

re c t hi s mis un de rs tand ing of the law, that he is a man wi th l itt le fo rm a l e du c a tio n, a nd that he lik e ly

ha s a low I Q b e c a us e he ha s tr ie d a

nd fa ile d to e a rn

his GE D mult ipl e tim e s.

I n Y ukins , this court held that the text of §2244 itself provided a petitioner with notice that the limitations period be g ins to run at the conc lusion of dir ect revie w and does not r estart based on the i nterve ning c ommenceme nt of state habe as proc eeding s. Y ukins , 366 F.3d at 402. I t rea soned that the Act “ plainly

states that the one- y ear statute of limitations runs from the ‘conc lusion of directNo. 05-6910

Al le n v . B e ll Pag e 5
revie w’ a nd that the s tatutory

period is tolled during the time when a motion for state postconviction revie w is pending .” Id.

Be cause of t his court’s dec ision in Y ukins a nd the Ac t’ s c le a r p ro vis ion s r e g a rd ingthe statut e of limitations, All en ca

nnot cl aim a lac k of construc tive knowledg e re g ardingthe filing deadline. Ev e n if Al le n la c ke d a c tua l kn ow le dg e of the re le va nt p ro vis ion s o f t

he Ac t, t his c ourt ha s r e pe a te dly held t hat “ignora

nce of the law is not sufficie nt to warra nt equitable tolling.” Ro se v . D ole , 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991).

Allen argues that his low I Q entitles him to equitable tolling. Perhaps if Allen had ma de any fac tual s h o wi n g o f mental incapa city (other tha

n failed attempts to earn his GED) , his arg ument could be leg ally

cre dited. See Lawrencev. Florida 127 S. Ct . 1079, 1086 (2007). He presents no fac ts, however , to support this assertion.
(2) Di lig e nc e in p ur

su ing rig hts This court has f

ound that wher e an ext erna l circ umstance prevente d an applicant from filing
on tim e , h e may

be e nti tle d to e qu ita

ble tol lin g if he c a n e sta

bli sh his dil ig e nc e in purs uin g his ri g hts
. See, e .g. , Solomon v. United States , 4 6 7 F. 3 d 9 2 8 , 9 3 3 -4 3 (2 0 0 6 ). Al l en , h o we v er , d o es n o tal l ege any extraordinary

circ umstance that wo u l d ex cu s e his failure to file, or esta blish that he has bee n pursuing his rights dilig ently . Allen’s entire argument is based on his ig noranc e of the law, which we ha ve held is not a ba sis for equitable tolling
. Y ukins , 366 F.3d 396, 403 ( 6th Cir. 2004).No. 05-6910

Al le n v . B e ll Pag e 6 (3) Ab se nc e of p re

jud ic e to t he sta te Allen ar g ues that equitable tolling is a ppropriate beca

use the state has not bee n prejudice d by the delay . This court, howe ver, ha s held that the “absence of prejudice is a fa ctor to be c onsidered only afte r a fac tor that might jus tify tolling i s identified.” Vroman v. Brigano , 346 F.3d at 605. No such fa ctor ha s been ide ntified here
.

III
. B e c a us e Al le n’ s p e tit ion wa s unti me ly , an d be c a us e we se e no ba sis fo r a

pp lyinge qu ita

ble tol lin g , w e AF F I RM the de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.