J-S77029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: F.M.B. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF D.D.M., MOTHER :

: No. 1616 EDA 2014

 :

Appeal from the Decree entered April 22, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court Division, at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000145-2014,

and CP-51-DP-0000529-2013

BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS, AND STRASSBURGER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 03, 2015

D.D.M. (Mother), appeals from the decree of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered on April 22, 2014, that terminated her 

parental rights to her daughter, F.M.B. (Child), born in November of 2012. 

We affirm.1

Mother gave birth to Child on November 8, 2012. On November 9, 

2012, Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) received a 

substantiated General Protective Services (GPS) report alleging that Mother 

and Child had both tested positive for cocaine.2 The GPS report claimed 

 



 Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.

1

 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.B., Child’s father 

(Father). Father did not appeal that termination and is not a party to this 

appeal.

2

 At trial, counsel for Mother stipulated that, if called to testify, DHS 

witnesses would testify in accordance with the facts set forth in the 

Statement of Facts attached as Exhibit A to DHS’s petition to terminate 
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Mother had admitted to a history of substance abuse during the preceding 

six years.3 The GPS report also stated that Mother was taking 

benzodiazepines for diagnosed anxiety. 

Through a consensual family agreement, Child went to reside with 

G.S.H., her godmother. On January 22, 2013, DHS implemented In-Home 

Protective Services for Child with the godmother through the Juvenile Justice 

Center.4

On January 30, 2013, DHS conducted a Family Service Plan meeting 

attended by Mother and Father that set forth the following basic objectives 

for the parents: (1) to provide appropriate supervision for Child; (2) to 

properly clothe and clean Child; (3) to participate in drug and alcohol 

evaluations; and (4) to comply with all drug and alcohol treatment 

recommendations. Both parents signed the Family Service Plan.

On February 11, 2013, Mother entered intensive outpatient substance 

abuse treatment at NHS Parkside Recovery in Germantown, Pennsylvania. 

 

Mother’s parental rights. N.T. 4/22/14, at 6. That Statement supports this 

recitation of the facts.

3

In 2006, upon the birth of Child’s older sibling, DHS received a 

substantiated report alleging that Mother had a history of using controlled 

substances and that she was not in treatment at that time.

4 Ultimately, following the termination of the DHS In-Home Protective 

Services, Child remained with the godmother, who provided pre-adoptive 

foster care through an organization called Volunteers of America. See N.T. 

4/22/2014, 9.
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Three weeks later, on March 8, 2013, NHS Parkside negatively discharged 

Mother for missing seven consecutive days of treatment.

Also on March 8, 2013, DHS learned that Mother had been evicted 

from her last known address.

Due to Mother’s noncompliance with substance abuse treatment, and 

because she lacked stable housing, on March 13, 2013, DHS obtained an 

Order of Protective Custody for Child to ensure Child’s safety and wellbeing. 

Child continued to reside in foster care with the godmother.

The trial court appointed counsel for Mother at a March 15, 2013 

shelter care hearing. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on March 

25, 2013, and committed Child to DHS’s care. At the same hearing, the trial 

court referred Mother to the Clinical Evaluation Unit for an evaluation and 

drug and alcohol screen with orders to comply with all Family Service Plan 

objectives, services, and recommendations. The trial court granted Mother 

supervised weekly visits with Child with a goal of reunification. Accordingly, 

the court further ordered Mother to attend a reunification program 

conducted by the Achieving Reunification Center.

Upon reporting to the Clinical Evaluation Unit, Mother tested positive 

for cocaine and opiates. Although the Clinical Evaluation Unit staff verified 

that Mother had been treating at NHS Parkside Recovery, Mother’s Parkside 

therapist was unable to provide the Clinical Evaluation Unit with any details 
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regarding Mother’s treatment because Mother refused to sign the required 

release forms.

On April 24, 2013, DHS conducted a second meeting to develop Family 

Service Plan objectives for Mother. Mother did not attend. In her absence, 

DHS developed the following Family Service Plan objectives for Mother: (1) 

to meet with the Juvenile Justice Center on a weekly basis to learn expected 

child behavior; (2) to obtain appropriate housing; (3) to sign appropriate 

authorization forms allowing the release of medical evaluations and reports 

regarding her sobriety and mental health; (4) to comply with all treatment 

recommendations; and (5) to maintain visitation with Child. To help her 

achieve these objectives, DHS referred Mother to the Achieving Reunification 

Center for parenting and housing services, the Juvenile Justice Center for 

parenting services, and the Clinical Evaluation Unit for drug/alcohol and 

mental health treatment.

Thereafter, DHS learned that NHS Parkside had readmitted Mother for 

outpatient substance abuse treatment. DHS additionally learned that Mother 

had consistently tested positive for opiates, cocaine, and/or marijuana 

throughout treatment, had missed twelve days of medication in June of 2013 

and five days of medication in the first two weeks of July of 2013, and had 

met with her counselor only once. NHS Parkside had placed Mother on a 

behavioral contract by which she risked discharge from the program if she 

failed to attend all scheduled group and individual sessions. 
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NHS Parkside staff recommended that Mother move to inpatient 

treatment at My Sister’s Place to aid in her struggle to maintain her sobriety 

as an outpatient. NHS Parkside personnel envisioned Mother returning to 

outpatient status at NHS Parkside after the inpatient treatment. 

Accordingly, Mother was admitted to My Sister’s Place for inpatient 

treatment on October 1, 2013. However, My Sister’s Place discharged 

Mother as absent without leave nineteen days later when she walked out of

the facility and did not return. 

The Juvenile Justice Center likewise negatively discharged Mother 

effective October 16, 2013.

The trial court conducted a permanency hearing on November 25, 

2013. At the hearing, the trial court received into evidence a Clinical 

Evaluation Unit report of Mother’s noncompliance with the court’s ordered 

drug and alcohol evaluations. Additionally, the court heard testimony that 

Mother did not receive substance abuse treatment, only made five out of ten 

scheduled supervised visits with Child, had not obtained appropriate 

housing, and did not attend the Achieving Reunification Center’s 

reunification program. The trial court modified Mother’s visits with Child to 

once weekly, supervised at DHS.

At a December 30, 2013 Family Service Plan meeting, DHS changed 

Child’s goal from reunification to adoption. On March 21, 2014, DHS filed 
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petitions seeking the termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights and 

a goal change to adoption.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the petitions on April 22, 2014. 

Mother failed to appear. Mother’s counsel stipulated to DHS’s 

documentation that Mother had been properly served with notice of the 

hearing and the order to attend. A social worker testified that she had 

personally handed Mother notice of the hearing. N.T. 4/22/14 (N.T.), at 14. 

Counsel for Mother and DHS stipulated to the facts giving rise to the 

filing of the petitions and to the DHS documents supporting those facts that 

were admitted into evidence. N.T., at 6. DHS further provided the 

testimony of social workers, Rachel Brown and Aleah Frazier. Counsel for 

Mother presented no evidence on her behalf. Accordingly, the evidence 

presented was uncontroverted. N.T., at 15. 

The trial court entered its decree terminating Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing 

Child’s goal to adoption on April 22, 2014. Mother filed her notice of appeal 

and statement of errors complained of on appeal on May 22, 2014.

Mother raises the following questions on appeal:

1. Was mother deprived of a fair hearing as she was unable to 

appear at the Goal Change Termination Hearing?

2. Was mother denied effective representation as DHS and/or its 

agents withheld information from [M]other’s counsel as counsel 

did not know the reason [M]other was unable to appear at the 

hearing?
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3. Did the [trial court] fail to make a searching inquiry as to the 

best interest[s] of [Child] when terminating [M]other’s parental 

rights?

Mother’s Brief, at 5.

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super.2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have 

adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not 

evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible 

evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all 

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and 

deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve 

errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial 

court’s sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super.2004) (citations omitted). 

In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need 

only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to 
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subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super.2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa.2004).

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 governs requests to terminate a natural parent’s 

parental rights, and provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency 

for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, 

the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within 

a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

. . .
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa.Super.2004). 

To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the 

person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and 

convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the 
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filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrated a settled purpose to 

relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 

(Pa.Super.2003).

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa.1988). Further, 

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa.Super.2004) (citations omitted).

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Although the Act does not 

specifically refer to the necessity of an evaluation of the bond between 

parent and child, our case law requires an evaluation of any such bond. See 

In re E.M., 533 Pa. 115, 620 A.2d 481 (1993). However, this Court has 

held that neither statute nor precedent require a trial court to order that an 
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expert perform a formal bonding evaluation. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 

529, 533 (Pa.Super.2008). Further, as this Court has explained:

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by 

waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa.Super.2008) 

(internal citations omitted).

In her first two issues, Mother claims that she was denied a fair 

hearing and effective counsel because the social workers withheld from her 

counsel the fact that she was unable to attend the hearing due to her 

participation in in-patient drug treatment. No evidence supporting these 

allegations appears in the trial court record. Instead, the trial court record 

establishes that Mother received proper service and notice of the hearing 

and that she failed to appear without explanation. Accordingly, Mother’s 

first two issues are without merit.

In Mother’s third issue, she claims that the trial court failed to make an 

appropriate inquiry into Child’s best interests when it terminated her 

parental rights. In support of this claim, Mother argues that the trial court 

was unable to make such an inquiry because Mother was not present at the 

hearing to testify regarding her efforts to complete the Family Service Plan 

objectives. This claim lacks merit. Mother had notice of the hearing and did 
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not appear. Therefore, Mother cannot benefit by any limitations created by 

her own unexplained failure to appear and testify. Further, even had Mother 

appeared and testified credibly that she was making diligent efforts to 

complete her Family Service Plan, the trial court would not have been able to 

consider that testimony. In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the 

focus of our inquiry rests upon the period at least six months prior to the 

filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights. M.E.P., supra. The 

fact that Mother might have been working toward the completion of her 

family service plan objectives at the time of the hearing would have had no 

bearing on the trial court’s analysis of her case. 

We turn now to the merits of the trial court’s determination to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. DHS presented evidence that, in at least 

the six months prior to the filing of its petition, Mother had not complied 

with the permanency plan and had not met any of her Family Service Plan 

objectives. Mother had not followed through with the Clinical Evaluation 

Unit’s recommended dual diagnosis services and had been discharged from 

the Achieving Reunification Center reunification program for lack of 

participation. Mother had not completed the parenting course at Juvenile 

Justice Center, and had not secured appropriate housing. N.T., at 8. 

Mother’s visitation with Child was inconsistent. In the five months since the 

previous court date of November 25, 2013, Mother attended only four of the 

twenty scheduled weekly visits. Id. 
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Further, Ms. Frazier, who supervised the visits, testified that Mother 

did not share a bond with Child and that Child did not recognize Mother as 

her mother. N.T., at 8. According to Ms. Frazier, Mother was just someone 

who “comes to see her and they walk around and play.” Id. at 12-13. Both 

Ms. Frazier and Ms. Brown agreed that severing Mother’s parental rights 

would not cause Child any emotional harm and that termination of those 

rights was in Child’s best interest. N.T., at 10, 13. Further, Ms. Brown 

testified that Child had bonded with her foster parent – the godmother –

with whom she had resided during her entire placement, and that the 

godmother was willing to adopt Child. Id. at 9-10.

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s decision to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1) and 

(b), and to permit Child’s adoption without notice to or consent from Mother, 

is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in so ordering.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/3/2015