Opinion issued October 10, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-12-00269-CR

———————————

JAMES LEON LAURENTZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 184th District Court 

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1305796

MEMORANDUM OPINION

James Leon Laurentz was convicted by a jury of indecency with a child 

involving sexual contact.1

 The same jury assessed his punishment at eight years’

 1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011).
2

confinement but recommended that the trial court place him on community 

supervision. Following the jury’s recommendation, the trial court suspended the 

imposition of the sentence as to confinement and placed Laurentz on community 

supervision for ten years.2 In his single appellate issue, Laurentz contends that the 

trial court abused its discretion in admitting a chain of Facebook messages

allegedly exchanged between him and the complainant (State’s exhibit 1) without 

sufficient authentication. We affirm.

Background

On December 31, 2010, N.B.3 spent the night at her friend, Kaylah 

Laurentz’s, house, as she had done many times before. After playing video games 

and spending time with friends, N.B. testified that she went to sleep in Kaylah’s 

bed. Later that evening, Laurentz, Kaylah’s father, came into the bedroom to 

speak to Kaylah and then gave the two girls foot massages. Laurentz left the 

bedroom, but after Kaylah fell asleep, he returned. This time, Laurentz began by 

rubbing N.B.’s feet but he did not stop there. According to N.B., after he 

massaged her feet, Laurentz moved his hands up her body, going underneath her 

shirt, and “tickling on [her] belly” until he reached the bottom of her bra. N.B.

 2 Further terms of his community supervision included Laurentz’s 120 days in the 

Harris County jail, sex-offender treatment, 150 hours of community service, and 

no contact with children.

3 In order to protect her identity, the complainant, who was fifteen-years old when 

the assault took place, will be referred to by her initials (N.B.).
3

testified that Laurentz then started massaging her legs again and finally rubbing her 

vagina through her clothing. Laurentz left and returned to the room multiple times

that night, and each time he would roll N.B. onto her back against her will, and 

begin the ordeal again. According to N.B., Laurentz did not stop touching her until 

Kaylah’s mother came to the bedroom door twice that night and inquired as to 

what Laurentz was doing in there.

Laurentz and Kaylah drove N.B. home early the next morning, January 1, 

2011. N.B. testified that she was scared of being alone with Laurentz and insisted 

that Kaylah accompany them. At 6:29 a.m., the same morning, “James Laurentz” 

sent a Facebook message to N.B.’s Facebook account asking for her forgiveness 

and promising to never put her in that situation again. Specifically, “James 

Laurentz” wrote:

I sinned against you and am sorry. I as[k] your forgiveness even 

though I do not deserve it. I can’t take it back but I can assure you 

that I will never put you in that situation again. I should have been a 

better example of a Christian man than I was. Please forgive me. 

At 10:04 p.m. that evening, N.B. responded to the message, stating:

I was terrified, I woke up the next morning and thought I dreamt it all; 

I was so confused. It[’]s to[o] soon for me to forgive you, hopefully I 

will in time, but I will never look at you the same. I can barely even 

type this message. It’s repulsive.
4

At 7:38 a.m. the next morning “James Laurentz” replied to N.B.’s response, 

expressing remorse for his actions, apologizing for his “moment of weakness,” and 

asking N.B. not to hold what happened between them against his daughter, Kaylah.

Please don’t hate Kaylah because of me. And remember we all have 

weak moments in our lives. I have had many. My only saving grace 

comes from God. I will regret what I did but don’t stop trusting in 

Jesus because of me. My moment of weakness has happened and I 

would be destroyed if I damaged your faith. I regret the grief I caused 

you and God. Again I am sorry.4

On January 5, 2011, N.B. confided in her friend, Destiny Lily, about the 

assault and showed Lily some Facebook messages on her cell phone. According 

to Lily, N.B. logged onto her Facebook account and accessed the messages in her 

Facebook inbox. Lily testified that when a message is sent via Facebook’s 

messaging feature, which is similar to e-mail, the recipient can tell who the 

message is from because “it would have [the sender’s] name and a picture of [the 

sender].” 

At Lily’s urging, N.B. told Lily’s aunt, Sandy Edwards, what happened and 

reluctantly showed her the Facebook messages on her cell phone. Edwards

immediately contacted both Laurentz’s wife and N.B.’s grandfather. When Mrs. 

 4 After State’s exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence, N.B. testified that she had a 

Facebook account and that she received a Facebook message from Laurentz after 

the assault. Although she was “shocked and scared” by the message, N.B. 

subsequently responded to the message and Laurentz replied to her response. N.B. 

identified State’s exhibit 1 as a copy of the Facebook messages she and Laurentz 

exchanged.
5

Laurentz and Kaylah arrived at Edwards’ home that evening, Edwards informed 

them about N.B.’s allegations and showed Mrs. Laurentz the messages.5

 N.B.’s 

grandfather, who arrived at Edwards’ home after Kaylah and Mrs. Laurentz had 

left, was also shown the messages and testified that he viewed them again when he 

took N.B. to the police station and Detective Jason Meredith (Deer Park Police 

Department) instructed N.B. to log into her Facebook account and show him the 

Facebook messages that she and Laurentz had exchanged after the assault. He 

portrayed the messages on a computer screen and printed a copy of the messages. 

Detective Meredith identified State’s exhibit 1 as a screen shot of the Facebook 

messages exchanged by Laurentz and N.B. that he printed at the police station. 

According to the Detective, the URL printed on State’s exhibit 1, as well as the 

contents of the exhibit, identified it as N.B.’s Facebook account.6

 At this time, 

 5

 After State’s exhibit 1 was admitted, Mrs. Laurentz testified for the defense that 

her husband had told her that he had sent N.B. a Facebook message and 

apologized to N.B. because he had yelled at her the morning after she spent the 

night at their home. Although it is not expressly identified as such, it is apparent 

from her testimony that Mrs. Laurentz is referring to the Facebook messages 

contained in the State’s exhibit 1. Kaylah Laurentz, another defense witness, also 

testified that her father had a Facebook account, he was Facebook “friends” with a 

lot of her friends, he frequently communicated with her friends via Facebook, and 

that it was common for her father to send private messages to her friends via 

Facebook. We note, however, that this defensive testimony does not necessarily 

render any error associated with the allegedly improper admission of State’s 

exhibit 1 harmless. See generally Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1998) (stating harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence not 

cured by fact that defendant sought to meet, destroy, or explain it by introducing 

rebutting evidence).

6 Detective Meredith testified that each Facebook profile has a unique URL number.
6

however, the State did not attempt to admit the exhibit into evidence or elicit any 

testimony from the Detective as to the specific contents of the messages. 

During cross-examination, Laurentz’s counsel questioned Detective 

Meredith regarding the vagueness of the Facebook messages. Detective Meredith 

disagreed with defense counsel’s characterization of the messages as “vague,” 

lacking detail, and failing to reference a specific incident. Arguing that the defense 

had “opened the door” with respect to the actual content of the messages and that

the record would be incomplete without the information, the State then moved to 

have the Facebook messages admitted as State’s exhibit 1. Laurentz objected to 

the admission of State’s exhibit 1 on the basis that “no one from Facebook is here 

to testify as to how Facebook messaging works. These Facebook messages were 

never accompanied with a business record affidavit stating that they’re kept in the

normal course of business in Facebook. And there has been no witness that can 

authenticate that it was Mr. Laurentz who, indeed, sent the messages.” The trial 

court overruled the objection and admitted State’s exhibit 1 into evidence. 

Discussion

A. Standard of Review 

We review a trial court’s decision as to whether evidence is properly 

authenticated for an abuse of discretion. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it 
7

reasonably believes that a reasonable juror could find that the evidence has been 

authenticated. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If 

the trial court’s ruling is at least “within the zone of reasonable disagreement,” we 

will not interfere. Id.

B. Applicable Law

Under Rule of Evidence 104(a), whether or not to admit evidence at trial is a 

preliminary question to be decided by the court. TEX. R. EVID. 104(a); Tienda, 358 

S.W.3d at 638. A bedrock condition of admissibility of evidence is its relevance to 

an issue in the case—that is to say, its tendency to make a fact of consequence 

more or less probable. TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402; Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. The 

issue of authentication (i.e., that the proffered evidence is what the evidence’s

proponent claims it to be) arises when “the relevancy of any evidence depends 

upon its identity, source, or connection with a particular person, place, thing, or 

event.” Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d). 

Evidence has no relevance if it is not authentically what the proponent claims it to 

be. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638.

The proponent of the evidence need not rule out all possibilities inconsistent 

with authenticity, or to prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it

purports to be. See Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012, 

pet. ref’d). In fact, in performing its gate-keeping function under Rule 104, the 
8

trial court need not be persuaded that the proffered evidence is authentic. Tienda, 

358 S.W.3d at 638. Rather, the ultimate question under Rule 104 for the trial court 

is simply whether the proponent of the proffered evidence has supplied sufficient 

facts from which a fact-finder could reasonably determine that the evidence is 

authentic. Id.; see also Manuel, 357 S.W.3d at 74 (“The proponent must only 

produce sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact finder could properly find 

genuineness.”).

Authentication is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence and 

the requirement is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 

matter in question is what the proponent claims it is. TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). 

Whether the proponent of the evidence has satisfied the threshold requirement of 

authenticity is one of the preliminary questions to be decided by the court. See 

TEX. R. EVID. 104(a), 901(a); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. 

Rule 901 provides a non-exclusive list of methods for the authentication of 

evidence, including witness testimony, appearance, contents, substance, or other 

distinctive characteristics taken in conjunction with circumstances. TEX. R. EVID.

901(b); see generally Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. App.—Austin

2012, no pet.) (stating Rule 901 creates low hurdle for admissibility which can be 

easily cleared by circumstantial evidence). 
9

C. Analysis

Both Laurentz and the State argue that the present case is analogous to the 

Austin Court of Appeals’ opinion in Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 549, in which the 

appellate court upheld the trial court’s admission of Facebook messages sent by the 

defendant to the complainant a few days after an assault. Although the defendant 

denied having sent the messages and argued that the complainant had logged into 

his account and sent the messages to herself, the court concluded that the messages 

were sufficiently authenticated based upon several factors, including that: (1) the 

messages were sent to the complainant’s Facebook account from a Facebook 

account bearing the defendant’s name; (2) the messages contained internal 

characteristics that tended to connect the defendant as the author (i.e., a distinctive 

speech pattern); (3) undisputed testimony that connected the defendant to the 

messages (e.g., the defendant had a Facebook account, only he and the 

complainant ever had access to his account, the complainant denied having access 

to the account when the messages were sent, and the complainant recognized the 

messages as having been sent by the defendant); and (4) the messages, which were 

sent within days of the assault, specifically referenced the assault (i.e., the 

defendant apologized for putting his hands on the complainant). See Campbell, 

382 S.W.3d at 551–53.
10

In the instant case, State’s exhibit 1 was properly authenticated through 

witness testimony and circumstantial evidence, including the contents and 

characteristics of the Facebook messages themselves. A review of the 

circumstantial evidence indicating that State’s exhibit 1 is what the State claims it 

to be (i.e., an exchange of communications between Laurentz and N.B.) includes 

the following: (1) the first and third messages in the chain contain a banner 

identifying the sender as “James Laurentz”; (2) the first and third messages in the 

chain also contain a date and time stamp indicating that “James Laurentz” sent 

those messages within roughly a day of the assault (i.e., 6:29 a.m. on January 1, 

2011, and 7:38 a.m. on January 2, 2011, respectively); (3) “James Laurentz” 

repeatedly expresses remorse for his actions, apologizes for his “moment of 

weakness,” and asks N.B. not to hold what happened between them against 

Kaylah, Laurentz’s daughter; (4) Detective Meredith testified that the URL listed 

on State’s exhibit 1 identified the exhibit as having been printed from N.B.’s 

Facebook account; (5) both Lily and Detective Meredith testified that N.B. logged 

into her password-protected Facebook account in order to access the messages; (6) 

N.B. showed Facebook messages on her cell phone to Lily and Edwards when she 

confided in them about the assault; (6) N.B.’s grandfather’s testified that he viewed 

Facebook messages between N.B. and Laurentz first on N.B.’s cell phone, and then 

later on a computer at the police station, and finally, he viewed a printout of the 
11

message chain; (7) Detective Meredith testified that he directed N.B. to log onto 

her Facebook account when she and her grandfather came to the police station; (8) 

Detective Meredith printed out a screenshot of the Facebook messages that N.B. 

showed him on the computer at the police station; (9) Detective Meredith 

identified State’s exhibit 1 as the screenshot of the Facebook messages that he 

printed out between Laurentz and N.B.; and (10) although the messages do not 

explicitly reference the assault, “James Laurentz” apologizes for having “sinned 

against” N.B. and he characterizes his “moment of weakness” as something serious 

enough to be capable of damaging N.B.’s faith in God. 

Laurentz argues that the State failed to properly authenticate State’s exhibit 

1 because (1) unlike in Campbell, the Facebook messages did not specifically 

mention an actual assault and, (2) the State failed to exclude the possibility that the 

messages were sent by someone other than Laurentz. The fact that the Facebook 

messages in Campbell specifically referenced the underlying offense is merely one 

factor that the court considered. The fact that the messages in the present case do 

not explicitly reference the assault does not mean that the State failed to proffer 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the messages 

were sent by Laurentz—rather, it is merely one factor for the jury to consider when 

determining the weight and credibility of the evidence. Similarly, the proponent of 

the evidence does not need to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with 
12

authenticity or prove that the evidence is what it purports to be beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 549. As the Court of Criminal 

Appeals stated in Tienda, even though it may be possible that someone else sent an 

electronic communication, ultimately it is up to the fact-finder to weigh the 

evidence and decide whether the communication was sent by the defendant or 

another person. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 646. 

Laurentz’s argument that the State’s failure to subpoena a Facebook 

employee to verify that the messages were sent from Laurentz’s Facebook account 

or admit evidence directly linking Laurentz’s computer to the Facebook messages 

is equally unpersuasive because the State is not required to do either of these things 

in order to authenticate a non-traditional communication under Rule 901. Here, 

the State was able to authenticate the exhibit through other accepted manners of 

authentication under the rule, including the contents and characteristics of the 

messages and witness testimony.

Laurentz further argues that State exhibit 1’s content raises questions as to 

the document’s authenticity because N.B.’s name is misspelled on the exhibit. As 

previously discussed, the State elicited testimony identifying the Facebook account 

as N.B.’s, including testimony from Lily and Detective Meredith. The fact that 

N.B.’s name is misspelled is merely one factor for the jury to consider when 

evaluating the weight and credibility of the witness testimony linking the 
13

correspondence to N.B. It was up to the jury to consider the exhibit itself, as well 

as the witness testimony, and determine whether the account was actually N.B.’s.

In light of the witness testimony and circumstantial evidence in this case, 

including the contents and characteristics of the Facebook messages themselves, 

we conclude that the State proffered sufficient evidence pursuant to Rule 901 from 

which the jury could have reasonably determined that State’s exhibit 1 is what the 

State claimed it to be—an exchange of Facebook messages between Laurentz and 

N.B. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting State’s exhibit 1 into evidence. We overrule Laurentz’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jim Sharp

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).