No. 2-- 06--0235 Fil ed: 11-20-07

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ In re MARRIAG E OF ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court STEVE N L. BLUM, ) o f La ke Co un t y. ) Petitioner-A

ppelle e, ) ) and ) No. 98-- D--409 ) JUDY KOSTER, ) Ho no r ab le ) Joseph R. Wal deck, Re sp on den

t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ Mo dified Up on D enial of Re hear ing JU STI CEGI LL

ER A N JOH NS ON de l i v er ed th e op i n i on of th e c our t: The resp ondent, Ju

dy Koster, appe al s f

rom th e tri al court's ordersmod ify

ingthe ma in tenance she re ceives fr om t he pe ti

ti one r, Ste ve n B l um, an d di sm i ss i ng he r peti ti on f or con tri bu ti on to atto rney fees. In addi

tion, Judy ask s us t o r eco nsider ou r d ecisio n in In re M arr i ag e of Konch ar , 312 Ill . App. 3d 441 (2000). For t he f

oll owing reas ons, we reverse an d reman d. BACK GROUND Judy and Steven

wer e mar r ied o n S ep t emb er 13 , 19 82 . T he y had t wo so ns: E lio t ( bo rn in 1984) and Theodore (born in 1986). St even

al so had a son, Josh, f

rom his f irst m arriage, who li

ved wi th the fam il y f or several ye ars. On Feb

ruary 25, 1998, Steven f

il ed a petiti on for di ssolution. On Ap r il 6, 2000, t he trial

courtent er ed a judg ment fo r d isso lut ion t hat incor po ra t ed a marit al set t lement agree men t (MSA ).No. 2-- 06--0235

-2-

The j udgme

nt granted Judy

sole custo dy

of the part ies'

chi l dren , who were 1 5 an d 13 y ears ol d at t he tim e. In the MSA, t he parties also ag r ee d t ha t Ju dy w o uld recei ve un al located m

ai ntenan ce and support as foll

ows: "Judy sh al l rec ei ve asthe unal l oca ted mai nte na nc e a nd su ppor t f orher and the

m i nor childre n, comm

enci ng A pril 1, 2000, t he sum

of Fi ve Thous and Doll

ars ($5,000.00) per
m on th for a t ot al of sixt y-o ne ( 61) co nsec ut ivem onths . Judy

's ri ght to recei

ve m ai ntenan ce and Stev en 's obl i ga ti on to pay ma in tenance af ter April 30, 2005 is revi

ewabl e. Mai ntenan ce sha ll not termi nate wi thout a court o rder. Thi s award i s based on St even' s g r o ss mo nt hly in co me o f T hir tee

n Thous an d Th re e H un dr ed Th i rty Th re e D oll ar s a

n d th i rty th re e c en ts ($13,3 33.33) and the f

act that Judy i s presentl

y un em ploy ed. In addi

tion to t he af

ores aid , Judy sha ll al so receiv

e thirty ei ght and one-ha

lf percent (38 1⁄2% ) o f the gr os s amo unt of a ny bonusre ceived by

St even d ur ing t his time fra me. I n add itio n, $ 3, 600 .0 0 pe r year shall be pa id by Steven to Judy f rom these b on

usch ecksf or th e f i rs t 24m on th s of sa i d b on uspa y men ts at th e rate of an addi ti on al $1 ,20 0.0 0 i

n addi ti on to her perc en tag e f or e ach b on uspa y men t. Ea ch pa yment

shal l b e m ade at the tim

e Steven receives h

is b onus check, but t he tot al m ust be pai d on

or b ef oreDe cem

b er 31 st of each

ye a r. The to tal am

ount o f thes e addi

tional pa y men ts is $7, 200 .0 0. Said mont hly payments a nd pe rc ent age of S t even's bonu s will continue until

the fi rst t o o ccur o f the f

ollowi ng events: A. T he dea th o f Judy Kost er[ ;] B. The rem

arriage of Judy Koster; C. Jud y Kost er 's co ha

bitat ion with a

n adul t male on a resident contin uin g conj ugal basi s;No. 2-- 06--0235

-3- D. T he de at h o f St ev en Blu m; E. The chang e o f cust od y of o ne o r mo re of t he minor childre n; F. Upon a showi

ng of s ubstanti al chan ge i n ci rcumstances which sha ll not include t he attai nm en t of m aj ority or other em

anci patory ev en t of one or more of the m i nor ch i l dren ." Wit hin t he sa me sect ion o f the MSA, t he pa r t ie s a gr ee d t ha t Ju dy h ad a d ut y t o mak e r ea so na ble ef f ortsto becom

e economi cally sel f-suf fi ci ent "durin

g said period." At the proveup of t he disso lut ion, St eve n testifi ed that he understood t he ab ove m ai ntenan ce provis ions

to me an that he wo uld pa y ma in tenance to Judy until April 30, 2005, aft er which mainte nance wo uld be r eviewa ble by the cou rt. Judy testifi

ed sim il arly , as foll ows: "Q. Yo u u nd er st an d t ha t in t he r ev iew pr o visio ns t ha t if the mai nt en an ce is s t ill continui ng, if it has n't be en termi

nated for a reas on t hat's se t forth in thi

s Agreem ent, that St even's obli

gation to pay

maintena nce a fte r Ap ril 30, 200 5, and yo ur right t o r ece iveit af ter th at date i s rev i ew ab l e b y th e C our t? A. Y es, I u

nde rstan d tha t." Both pa r t ies t es t ified t ha t t he y we r e fa mili ar w ith all o f the var iou s pr ovisio ns o f the MSA a nd un de r st o o d t he m. In 2002 and 2003, the parties b ot h f il ed petitions

relati ng to colle ge expenses, and Steven fi le d a pe ti ti on to reduce m

ai ntenan ce. Thereaf

ter, o n May

28, 2003, t he parties

entered in to an agreed order (Agreed Order) pro vi din g that St even

would pay

for the chi

ldren 's col le ge expen

ses an d that Judy would pay

for thei r travel to and f

rom coll ege and certai

n other in ci dental expenses. In a ddit ion, t he agr eement ident ifi

ed inco me of S t even's t hat was "de scr ibed as a 'o t her ' on his e mployment recor ds" and m

ade provis ions

for the allocati on of thi s i ncom e. Steven retain

ed the "other in

come"No. 2-- 06--0235

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f or2000 th rough 2002 i n return for hi s pay

me nt of Judy 's attorney fees , and was requi

red to pay Judy 25% of t he gro ss amou nt of t he "o t her income" in 200 3 and t her eaft er . T he pa rt ies spe cified t hat t he a greeme n t re gar ding t he "o t her income" in no wa y modified t he pr ovisio ns o f the MSA r ega rd ing
mai nten ance a nd s upport, bu

t in stead i m posed new, "addi

tion al mai nten ance pa y men ts." On January 3, 20 05 , Ste

v en f i l ed a p eti ti on se ek i n g a mon g oth

er th i n gsto ter

m i n ate ma in tenance aft er Apr il 30, 2 005 , p ur sua nt t o t he MS A's pr ovisio n t hat t he unal located m ai ntenan ce and su pp o r t pa yment s w o uld be r ev iew ab le after that date. St even argued that his obli gation to pay ma in tenance sh oul d b e te rm i n ate d b ec au se

th e ch i l dr en

h ad atta i n ed th ei r m aj ori ty , he was p aying t he ir co llege exp ense s in the am ount of $55,00 0 per y

ear, Judy' s li

vi ng expenses were l

ower because she had m oved i nto a smal

le r home, and Judy

was a licensed at t or ney who co uld su ppo rt her self and had an obl i ga ti on u nd er th e M SA to do so. I n re spo nse, Jud y denied t hat t he major ity o f the unal located pay me nts had b een ch

il d supp ort and p oi

nte d out th

at the c hi l dre n' s a ttai nm en t of
maj ori ty ha d b ee n e xp r es sly

excl uded as a gro und to modif y the pay men ts under t he MSA. She al so deni ed t hat St even's per so nal co nt ribut ion t o t he chil dr en's c ollege expe nses w as a s high as he cl ai me d, because m

aritall y f unded account s had been created for t hose ex pen ses earl i er. Judy deni ed that she w as a ble to sup po rt her self and co nt ende d t ha t St even had f ai le d to show any

substantial chan ge in ci rcumstances asrequi

red under the M SA

and section 510(a--5) o f the Il li nois Marriage an d D i ss ol ution of Marriage Act (t he Act) (750 I LCS 5/ 51 0( a- -5 ) ( Wes t 20 04 )) in o rd er t o mo dify ortermi nate m ai ntenan ce. Judy comb in ed her re spo nse w ith a co unt er pet itio n, in which she so ught an acc ounti ng of the d i stri bu ti on of the ma ritally fun ded accounts for the chi

ldren 's educational expenses.No. 2-- 06--0235

-5-

Pri ort o t he t rial o f the ma

tt er, Steven m

oved t o r ese t Jud y's maintena nce t empo ra rily, for t he pe riod b etw een A pri l 30 , 20 05 , a

n d th e tri al date. On Ma y 25 , 20 05 , t he t r ial c o ur t gr an t ed t his
moti onan d redu

ced J udy 's mai nten ance to $3,00 0 per m

onth. On J

une 28, 200 5, the

tria l court modifi ed th e i n ter i m mai n ten an ce to $5,000 per month. On Au gu st 11 , 20 05 , t he t r ial c o ur t ag ain reduced the i nteri m mai nten ance to $3,0 00 per month, b ut mai ntain ed Steven' s obliga

tion to pay 38.5% of his bonuse s pursuant to t he MSA , plus the a dditional ma in tenance prov ided fo r in t he Agreed Order. In addition, the trial court awarded Judy

$1 0, 00 0 in int er im at t o rne y fee s p r io rt o t r ial. Trial comm enced on A ugu st 9 , 20 05, an

d c onti nu ed i nte rm i tten tl y f orseve n days, culminating on Octo ber 25, 2005 . At t he close o f Steven's case, Judy f i l ed a m oti onfo ra d ire ct ed find ing , in whi ch she argued that St even ha d failed t o c ar ry his bur den o f pro ving t hat t her e had been a substantial

chan ge i n ci rcumstan ces su ffi

cient t o w ar ra nt mod ify

ing t he judg ment fo r d isso lut ion. Steven argued that he b ore no such burden of proof, citi

ng In re Marri age of Golden, 358 Ill . App. 3d 464 (2005), for the pro positi on that a "revi ew" of m ai ntenan ce dif f er s f rom a p roc ee di

n g to mo dify ma in tenance and i n a revi ew nei ther party m

ust prove a substantial

change i n ci rcumstances. Relying on Golden , the trial

court deni

ed the m ot ion f or a directed fi

ndi ng. The evi dence prese

nted at tr ia

l e stablis hed t he fo llowing fact s. J udy wa s bo rn in 19 49, and graduated f

rom th e Un i versi ty of Il l i noi s wi th a b ach elor'sdegre e i

n French and Eng li

sh l iterature. She obt ained a mast er 's de gr ee in t eac hing i n 1 972 , but never ta

ugh t exce pt f orher student teachi

ng. She worked as an edi

to r for about two ye ars. She bega n taking n igh t class es at law s chool i

n 1975. Dur ingla w school s

he w o r ke d b r ief

ly for a perso nal

in jury lawy er and then began work at Foos, Mey ers & Ja cobs. Af

ter she graduated and passed the February 1978 bar exa

m, sh e beca mea n as soc i ate at t he sam

e f i rm f or approxi

matel y one y ear, wri tin g br i ef s an d doi ng w ha teve r tasks wereNo. 2-- 06--0235

-6-

assi gned her. Af ter leaving t hat firm, she was hi red by a compan

y c al le d Franch

is e Concepts, which assi stedfranc hisees a cr os s t he co unt ry wit h r egi stration, contract s, and other lega l work. Judy testifi ed t hat she was not f

am i l i ar wi th f ranchi se l aw an d proced ures and rel i ed on otherswi th m ore expertis e. Judy

then opened h

er own law

pr act ice in Chicag o, which she ma in taine d for about a year and a half, han

dli ng a vari ety of sm

all cases. Judy an d S tev en mar ried i n Septem b er 19 82 . A t th e ti me, Stev en

h ad j us t com pl ete d his resi dency in anesthes iol

ogy an d was l iv in g in Calif ornia. Judy

wound up her law practice an d joi ned him i n Califor nia in Oct obe r 1 982 . T he pa rt ies' so ns El i ot and Te ddy were born in 1984 and 1986. In addition, Steven's son Josh from h is f irst marriage l

iv ed with them f

or several years. Judy pa ss ed th e C al i f orn i a b ar ex am an d di d oc ca si

on al l eg al wor k f or on e c l i en t, bu t did not have an acti

ve l egal career. Steven

wa s on call on a re gular basis and was ver y busy with w or k. At one point whi

le Josh was l

iv in g with them

and af ter Eli ot was bor n, Ju dy was involved in a case that de man de d m ost of her t ime for 1 0 da ys, and she sa w t hat her abse nce d ur ing t ha t t ime ha d a visib ly nega t iveim

pact on the fam

il y. A fter that she dedi

cated herse lf to t he family. Ju dy ser ved a s t he hom em aker, raisi

ng the children an

d mai ntaini ng a kosher home. She assi ste d w i ththe boys' edu cat ion, reli

gious upbrin

gin g, and extracu rricular activ ities . She p lanned t he family vaca t ions a nd en t er t ain ed gu es t s fr eq ue nt ly. St even's career

pr os per ed, and in 19 87 t he parties purch ased a $600,000, si

x-bedroom h

ouse, whi ch they renovated at a cost of over $50,000. The fa mi ly ma in taine d a hi

gh standard of l

iv in g, employing ho use hold help and t aking va cat ions includ ing a cr uise. In 1 993 t he f am i l y re l oca ted to Ill in ois. St even's pay wa s slight ly l ow er , a nd t hey bou ght a five-be dr oo m hou se in Highland Park f or $475,000. The

hous e was

l arge a nd h ad a s wi m m i ng p ool a nd s pa. Jo sh co nt inued t o live wit h t heNo. 2-- 06--0235

-7-

family in Ill in ois. Judy continued to raise th e ch i l dr en an d m an ag e th e h om e. De sp i te Stev en's drop in inc o me, t he family s t ill e njoyed a high s tandard of liv in g. In 1998, Steven's

to tal i ncom e was $26 1, 522 , a nd t he family

's livi ng exp ense s we re app ro ximately $18 ,0 00 p er mont h. Steven move d out i

n 19 98 an d f i l ed f or di vorce . Fi na nc i al sta tem en ts f i l ed by the pa rti essh ow that in 1999, after Steven h

ad m oved out, the monthl

y l iv in g expenses for Judy

and the b oys totaled $14,285 per

month . In

A pri l 200 0 the j udg

men t f or diss ol ution of m arriage wa s entered. Judy began re ceiving unal

located support o f $5,000 per m onth plus a share of

Steven' s bonuse s, for a tot al inc o me of approxi

ma tely $94,843 in

2000. Steven was awarded the homehe h ad p ur chas ed, and Judy wa s awarded the ma

rital home . Each party was s olel y res ponsi ble for the debt on his or her res ide nce. Each

party kept on e ca

r. The parties tran

sf erred monies b etween thei

r in dividua l re t irement acc ou nt s (I RAs) acc or ding to the MSA, wi th the fi nal bal ance i n each IRA b ei ng over $1 mil lion. The boys , who were 14 and 16 i n 2000, continue d to li

ve pri ma ril y w ith J udy, al though they vi si ted with thei

r father r eg ula r ly. S t ev en 's v isit at io n w as st ruc t ur ed ar o un d h is work schedule: each
m on th wh en he go t his s ch ed ule he wo uld inform Ju dy, a nd t he parties would arrange vi si tation that coor din ated wit h hi s s ch ed ul e. T he t imes t ha t t he bo ys were ou t of the hou se thu s v ari ed f rom mon th to month. W

hen the boy s were at home wi th Judy , she conti

nued to coo k mea ls and maint ain the ho me for t hem, a nd

to assist them

wi th the i r educ ati on an

d ex tracurri cul ar activ i tie s. In 200 2, El i ot began at t en din g c o lleg e. T ed dy s t ar t ed co lleg e in t he fall o f 20 04 . T he bo ys s t ill live a t Ju dy' s ho me approx i matel y 41⁄2 m onths per y ear. St even's mainte na nc e p ayme nt s t o Ju dy in cr ea se d ( as a r es ult o f inc r ea se s in h is ye ar ly bonuses) from

$94,843 in

2000 (about $7,904 per month) to $103,335 in 2004 (about $8,611 perNo. 2-- 06--0235

-8-

m onth). Ju dy p aid inc o me taxes on the pay me nts she rece iv

ed. Judy testifi ed that sin

ce the div orce she r eg ula r ly exp er ien ce d a sho r t fall b et we en t he ho us eh o ld living ex pe nse s a nd t he mo nt hly inc o me she received. She would go into debt t o pay for expenses as t he y ar os e and t hen pa y off the debt when she rec ei ve d he r share of the p eriodi c b onus

pay men ts f rom S teve

n. Sh e a lso pa id

do wn de bt when ever sh e re f i na nc ed the hou se , al thou gh sh e te sti f i ed tha t he r pr i mary goal f orthe refi nan ces was not de bt
- r ela t ed . Ju dy mo ve d in t o a s malle r , t hr ee - be dr o o m ho me in 2003. Prior to movi ng, she h ad ho me mai

n te n ance expe nses r elat ed t o s t or m damage fro m a micro bur st , r eplac ement of t he swimmi ng pool heater, the fen

ce ar o un d t he po o l an d p r o pe r t y, re place ment o f tw o a ir co ndit ioning condensers, and p ainting and r epa irs t o p re par e t he house f or sale. Af

ter m ovi ng, J udy made re pai rs to t he new home a s we ll. She t est ifi ed t hat t he net pr ofit fro m the sa le of h er f orm er h om e w en t i n to t he cost o f the n

ew hom e, movi ng, and repai

rs. Judy h

as not withdrawn

any fun ds f rom her IRA , whi ch has decrea sed i

n va lue du e to a declin

e i n the stock market. Her monthl y h ousehold ex

penses at the time

of trial were $7,964. St even's in

come h as i ncreased s in

ce the di vorce, gr owi

n g f rom $2 81 ,62 6 i

n 20 00 to $330,520 in 2004. He p ays for almost all of t he boys' c ollege expe nses, which t ot aled $ 62, 433 bet wee n June 2004 an d J un e 2 00 5. T he su pp o r t pa yment s t ha t he mad e t o Ju dy w er e d ed uc t ible fr o m his t ax ab le inc o me. S t ev en st ip ul at ed t ha t he ha s t he ab ilit y t o pa y main t en an ce t o Ju dy. Af ter t he div o r ce , Ju dy sought to devel op a practice i

n i mm igration la

w. She j oine d prof es si ona l as soc i ati ons of i m m i gra ti on lawy ers, at tended classes and sem in ars, and b ought boo ks and other m

aterial s rel

ated to work

in that fi el d. Between 2000 and 2004, sh e re pre sente d e i gh

t or ninecl i en ts i n i m m i gra ti on ma tt ers. She al so worked in

dependently

for ot her att orneys, writing b rief s, revi ewi ng c ontracts , ha

ndl i ng d i scovery, and doi

ng other "s cut work."No. 2-- 06--0235

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Fr om 20 00 t o 20 05 , Ju dy ma int ain ed an o ffice in do wnt own Chi

cago a nd worked there ap pr o ximat ely

two days per week, f

i ttin g he r work sc he du le a r o un d t he ch ildr en 's s ch o o l sc he du le and their v

is its wi th Steven. In addi

tion, she of

ten worked on leg al ma

tt ers from a hom e off ic e seve ral hours a week. In 2000, Judy grossed $6,541 from h

er law practice; in

2001, she grossed $20,309; and i

n 20 02, sh

e gross ed ap

proxi matel y $15,47 0. Her i

nco me was m uch l ower in 2003, when she grossed $3,060, and i

n 2004, when

she grossed onl

y $1,455. At no tim

e, however, di d Judy ever earn a profi

t; even in 200 1 and 200 2, expe nses c ons umed he r g ro ss ea rnings. Nea r t he end of 2003, Judy was approached by a woman who adm ired a n ec kla ce Ju dy h ad mad e a nd as ke d if Judy wo uld mak e s o me add itio nal jewelry fo r a t ru nk sh ow. J udy agree d a nd sp en t ti me a nd m one y on mak ing jew elr y in

the hop e of suppl em entin g her i ncom e, but was unsucc essf

ul. Judy testifi ed that she con tin ued to work

the sam e num ber of h ours at her l

aw practice an

d worked on her jewe lry

at ni ght. Judy di

scontin ued her j ewel

ry m aki ng at the end of 2004. In May 2005 Judy

cl osed her downtown offi ce and opened a

sm al l of fi ce i n Northbrook, wh i ch sh e sh ar es wi th Renee B ass, an es

tabli shed im mi gration lawy

er. Judy curren

tly works about 30 to 35 hours per week. She assists Ms. Bass wi thca se s a

nd rec ei ve s r ef errals f rom Sharon Greensp an, another ex

peri enced i m m i gration l awy er. Her m

onthl y bus i ne ss e xpe ns es a re ap pr o ximat ely

$1,100, and she h

ad o ne -ti me s tart- up c osts

f or eq ui pm en t an d f urn i ture of approxim ately $850. She has

had f iv e new cl ie nts si nce m ovin g her off ic e. Judy t est ifi ed t hat she a lso r egu larly app lied for law jobs , app rox i m ate ly 10 to 12 jobs

per m on th through out the peri od f

rom 2 000 to the prese

nt. She ha

d no documen

tary evi denceof those atte m pts an d te st ifie d t hat most of t he ap plicat ions w er e o n-line and gene ra t ed no re co rd . S heNo. 2-- 06--0235

-10-

testifi ed in some detai

l a bout four or fi

ve j obs that she appl

ie d for recentl

y. Sh e nev er receiv ed an in terview from an

y of these appl

ications. Grace Gi an f orte testifi ed as a vocati onal

ex pert f or Steve n. Sh e se rve s as a v ocati onal

ex pert wit ne ss at So cia l Se cu r it y hea r ing s, an d a lso do es vo ca t io na l an d me nt al h ea lt h c o un se lin g. Sh e i n ter v i ew ed Judy f or a n h our an d a h al f i n 19 99 , pr i or to t he div o r ce , r eg ar din g J ud y's c ar ee rgo als and skil ls. Wh en sh e was co nt act ed in 20 05 t o p ro duc e an u pda t ed o pinion o f Judy's e mployment ef f ortsand p ro spe ct s, s he recei ved a resum

e of Judy 's that was al most i dentic al

to the one she h

ad recei ved i n 19 99 an d h ad n o n ew i n f orm ati on on i t. She di d n

ot re -int er view Ju dy pr ior t o p re par ing her new report . In 1999, she recom me nded that Judy fol low up on he

r in terest in i mm igration la w by beco ming involved in pr ofe ssio nal asso ciat ions fo r a t t or neys, a t t ending semi nars, and ne t wo rk ing wi th ot her att orneys. These were reasona ble steps to t ake to est abl

is h an im mi gration law practice. Judy too k all

of these steps. Ms. Gia nf ort e testif ie d that she vi

ewed Jud y's age (5 1 at t he t ime of t he divo rc e, and 5 6 at t he t ime of the trial

on ma in tenance) asa n

eu tral f ac torin her em ploy abi li ty, nei ther positiv

e nor negativ

e. Based on occu pational stati sti cs, s

he esti mated that there

are 95 2 open

i ngs f or la wy ers in the Chi cago area. The m

edi an earn

in gs f or lawy ers i n thi s area were $65,000 i n 2005, and s

he b elie ved that Judy co uld ea rn t his much. Arlene Hir sc h t es t ifie d a s a vo ca t io na l ex pe r t fo rJu dy. She is l i cen se d b y th e S tate o f I llino is as a cl i ni cal prof ess i onal coun sel or and as a prof ess i onal coun sel or. She has done career

co unse ling si nce 1983, and also do es p sycho log ical co unse ling. T en t o fifte en pe rc ent of t he cl i en ts i n h er careerco unse ling

practiceare atto rney

s. In 2003 and 2004, sh

e contracted wi

th J ohn Ma rs ha l l l aw school to pr ov i de

ca re er cou n se l i n g to studen

ts and a lumni who w er e co ming back i nto t he l egal fi el d afterNo. 2-- 06--0235

-11-

an abse nce. Dur ing t hat same t ime, she s er ved a s t he co -c hair o f the Car eer s Co mmi t t ee o f the Young Le aders

hi p Di vision of the Chi cago B ar A ssoc i ati on. Sh e has c ouns eled attorne

y s wh o are 50 yea rs ol d or old er . O ne r ece nt example w as a wo man who was a pa rt ner in a labor law firm and who had w or ked co nt inuo usly in the l egal f i eld f or 25 y ears , al though part-ti me f or some of

that. She wis hed t o w or k o ut side o f a firm, and she wa s a ble to fi nd a n acade m i c j ob af ter sea rch i ng f or more than a y ear. Another older

woman clie nt went to law school af

ter havi ng be en an

anesthesiologist and spe cialized in hea lth ca re law, but co uld no t find a full- t ime jo b a ft er gr ad ua t ing . Sh e e ve nt ua lly fou nd a contractual position with A bbott after about 18 months . A thi rd woman went to l aw school when she was i n he r fi fti es but could n

ot get hired as

an ass ociate i

n a f irm when she graduated. That woman even tuall y took a part -tim

e paral egal

positi on in

the suburb s. Based

on her experience i

n he r counsel in g practice, Ms. Hi

rsch opi ne d tha t la wy ers who are older than 50 a nd seeki ng to be hi

red areex pe cte d to have e xt ensive legal experien ce and a book o f b

usin ess. The inabil

ity to meet these expectat ions would not make fi ndi ng a j ob im

possibl e, but wo uld present a lot o f obstacles. Ms. Hi rs ch met w i th J udy twicedur i ng the su m mer of 2005. She int er viewed Jud y reg ar ding her work histo ry, her

professi onal goals, an d her at t emp t s s inc e h er div o r ce t o find a le ga l jo b o rbu ild a l aw pra cti ce . Ms . Hi

rs ch rev i ew ed j ob l istings Jud y had r esp ond ed t o, app licatio n lett er s, a nd publicat ions Judy was usi

ng to updat e her skil

ls. Jud y'sle gal

work during h

er marri age was m

in im al (lessthan fi ve h ours per week), she had

no recent experi

ence i n f ranchi se law, and the j ob ma

rket had chan ged sub stan tia l l y si nc e Judy f i rst practic ed l

aw re gul arl y 25 y ears ago. Ms. Hi

rsch v ie wed Judy as not having de velop ed a ny le gal spec i al ty b ef oreh er di v orc e i n 20 00 , a n d f oun d i t di f f i cul t to com pare he r ex pe ri en ceeven to tha t of a fi rst- or seco nd-year associate. There was a dis crepancy between t he jobs t hat Jud y was ap plying for a nd her expe rience ; t hey wo uld be a st re t ch fo r he r, andNo. 2-- 06--0235

-12-

she wo uld no t loo k like t he bes t cand i da t e. Ba se d o n Ju dy's leve l o f exp er ienc e a nd la ck o f a spe cial ty, s he wasnot a good ca

ndi date f or a recru i ter or he adh

unter. Jud y's ef for t s t o d evelo p her ow n pr act ice we re hamper ed by her lack o f exper ienc e in i m m i gra ti on law , fo rwh ich she wo uld need a m entor t o assis

t her; her n

eed to learn f

rom scratch

how to ru n a bus iness, including deve lop ing her co mput er skills; and u nder cap italizat ion, be ca us e s he sa id that sh e c oul d n ot af f or d ma lpractice i nsuran ce. Judy 's goal of bui ldi ng an im mi gration practice rece nt ly be cam e m ore appr opri ate wh

en she ac qui

red a m en tor and a source of re f erral s. Ju dy' s f ac i l i ty wi th l an gu ag es an d emoti on al

con n ec ti on to th e p l i gh

t of i m m i gr an ts ma ke her a good match for i mm igration la w. Ms. Hirs ch cri

tici zed Ms. Gianfo rt e's 2005 repo rt and assessment of Judy on sev eral grounds. Fi rs t, Ms . G i an

f orte did n ot co n si

der i m por tan t i n f orm ati on ab out J ud y' s work ex perien ce an d e f f orts si nce 1999, because she revie we d th e s am e r es um e th at s h e r ev i ew ed i n 19 99 an d di d n ot s eek to me et wit h Jud y again t o s upp lement the i nf orma tion on the resu me. Second, Ms. Gi anf

ort e's rel ia nce on qua nt itat ive dat a fro m the Departmen t o f L abor was m

is pla ced in this context, as these general statistics are not reall

y rel evan t t o t he s it ua t io n o f a 5 6- yea r - o ld w o man , su ch as Ju dy, wh o is re ent er ingthe job m

arket after many

years and l

acks an area of expertise. Ms. Hirs ch opi ned that Ms. Gi an f orte "underesti

ma ted or perhaps was

i n den i al ab out" th e deg

re e of b i as ag ai n st o l der a pp l i ca n ts that exist s t hro ugho ut t he lega l pro fessio n. Ms . G ianfor t e's su gge st ion t hat Jud y mi ght be able t o find wor k i n th e g ov er

n men tal or n on pr of i t se ctor s i f sh e c an n ot f i n d w ork i n th e p ri v ate se ctor re f l ec ts an i nc orre ct a ss

um ption th at the g ove

rn men tal an d n onprof i t se ctors are not co mpet itive or t hat age bias do es no t exi st there. Finally , Ms . H irsch no t ed a n inter nal co nt ra dict ion in Ms. Gianfo rt e's repor t, whi ch ackn owl edge d tha

t Judy 's l egal work durin g her m arriage wa s sporadic an

d producedNo. 2-- 06--0235

-13-

"inc o nse qu en t ial" income, but t hen as sess ed J udy's e mployability as if she had 26 ye ars of ex

perien ce. Ms. Hirsc h agr eed wit h Ms. Gianfo rt e's r eco mmendat ions bu t believed t hat t hey wo uld no t be suf fi ci ent to r esul

t in a s uccessf ul l aw practice or em

ploy me nt without men

to rin g. As to t he reasonablen

ess of Judy' s eff

ort s to fi nd or develop pro fessi

onal work, Ms. Hirs ch bel ie ved that Judy h

ad been taking a ppropriate steps and "try

in g reall y h ard" to develop a lawpractice si nce the dat e of the divorce, but sh e f ac ed a s te ep l earni

ng curve i

n a n umb er of areas an

d was un like ly to succeed i

n he r eff ort s wi thout a m entor. No w that Judy h

ad a cquired a m

entor and a source of referrals, Ms. Hi rsch b elie ved sh e had a b etter chan

ce of succe edi

ng. Shar on G re ensp an, an immi gr at ion lawyer , t est ifi

ed t hat she had approxi

matel y 25 y ears of experience

in im mi gration law, but that illn

ess had pr ev en t ed he rfr o m maint ain ing a fu ll-t ime practice for the l ast several

years. She h

asmore p oten

ti al cl i en ts c onta cti ng he r th an sh e c an serv e, a nd f or so me tim e she h as ref erredsome of

her cl ie nts to Renee Bass, an

ot her im mi gration lawy

er. She has known Judy si nce l awsc ho o l. E ar ly in

20 05 , s h e b

rough t toge th er Ms . B as s, wh

o wish ed to re l oca te from her downtown off

ic e and was

se ek i n g s om eon e to s h ar e s pace wi th in t he su bu r

bs , an d J ud y, who wassee

ki ng s ome one to sh

arespace with who could also advi se her i n he r im mi gration practice. They now have al

l three att orneys' n

ames on the off

ice door, although Ms. Greenspa n d oesnot par t icipat e in the physical wo rk suc h as filing documen ts. Ms. Greenspan h

as ref erredfou r o r five casesto Judy

and Ms . Bass si

nce they opened thei

r offi ce toget her and h

as worked with them

on two of those cases. Judy

is a hard worker and her cl ie nts hav e been satisf ie d. Renee Bass t est ifi

ed, des cr ibing the law o ffi ce s he sha r es wit h Ju dy a nd t he ir work on cases. She has practiced i

mm igration la w for approxi

ma tely 27 ye ars, and be li

eves t ha t it ha s b ecom

e m ore dif f i cul t to serv e cl i en ts' n eeds be caus e of

addi tion al restri cti ons on i m m i gration tha

t wereenactedNo. 2-- 06--0235

-14-

si nce Sep t ember 1 1, 200 1. In ad dit io n, i t has be com e a m ore com peti tiv e are a b eca

use there are many m ore i m m i gration l awy ers now. Bot h Ms. Bas s and M s. Greenspan testifi ed that it i s essen

tial fo ra n ew immigr at io n la wye rt o ha ve a me nt o rt o be co me s uc ce ss ful. Jud y'sfi nal witne ss was W

il li am Browers, a lawy

er who worked for 20 years at t he St at e's Atto rneys A

ppell ate Pr osecut or's o ff

ice an d ro se to the positi on of deputy di rector there, and then served f or another f

i ve years as chief of t he cr imi

nal app eals d ivisi

on o f the Illinois At t or ney Gene ra l's of f i ce . He took ear ly ret irement in 200 2 at t he ag e o f 521⁄2 . Aft er eight mont hs in a new po sitio n, h e s oug h t oth er em pl oy men t. D es pi te s eeki n g w ork f or ov er two y ea rs , he w as n ev er ab l e ev en to get an i nterv i ew. The trial

court li mi ted his testim ony, f in din g that he was not si

mi la r enough to Judy i n ter m s of ex perien ce or spe ci al ty to b e p rob ati

v e on th e iss ue of th e l eg al j ob mar ke t. The trial court ann

ounced i ts decis ion on Oc

to ber 25, 2005. It first construed the la nguage of t he MS A, de t er mining t ha t t he MS A p r o vid ed t ha t maint en an ce wo uld be r ev iew ab le af ter 61 months, and h

el d that t he i

nstant proceedin

g was a revi

ew. Becau se it wa s a r ev ie w a n d n ot a m odif i ca ti on proceedin

g, Stev en di d n ot ha ve an y bu r de n t o pr o ve a s ub st an t ial c ha ng e in circumstances. Instead, the trial court found that

t he pa rt ies had co nt emplat ed a gene ra l review, and si ngled out J ud y' s obl i ga ti on to m ake r ea son

ab l e e f f ortsto be co me e co no mica lly sel f-suf fi ci ent as "an is sue to be consi

dered on review." The trial

court then conducted a redetermi nation of ma in tenance pur sua nt to s ec ti on

51 0( a- -5 ) of

th e A ct (750 ILC S 5 /5 10( a- -5 ) ( West 200 4) ), which r equ ires t he co ur t t o c ons ider eight factors enum erated in tha

t se cti on i n a ddi ti on to th e f ac tors l i ste d i n s ec ti on 504(a ) of th e A ct (750 IL CS 5/5 04(a) (We st 2004 )). The trial court spe ci fical ly discusse d and made fac t ual findings r ega rd ing eac h of t he eight f actors unde r se ct ion 5 10( a- -5 ). As t o t he firs t fac t o r , ch an ge in t he pa rt ies' emplo yment st at us, t heNo. 2-- 06--0235

-15-

trial court found that there had been no chang e. The sec ond f ac tor w as th e e f f ortsmade b

y th e p ar ty re ceiving mai

n ten an ce to b ec om

e s el f -s uppor ti ng . The tria l court f ound th at Judy 's ef f orts were "minima l" and ch

aracterized h

er eff ort s as attendin

g a few s em in ars and onl

y rece ntly establ is hi ng a la woffi ce conduct in

g a "less t han pa rt -t ime pra ct ice. " In c ons ider ing t he t hird fac t or , impairment to t he pr ese nt and fu t ur e ea rning c apa city o f the par t ies, t he t rial co ur t st at ed t hat t he o nly i mpairment of Judy 's earn in g capaci ty was s el f-i

mposed. The tri al

court stated that it did n

ot consider

th e f our th f actor, t he t ax co nse qu en ce s o f t he maint en an ce pa yment s o n t he ec o no mic ci rcu m sta nc esof each pa r t y. The

tria l courtsta ted th at i t di d c on si der the f i v e- yea r d ur ati on of th e m ai n ten an ce pa y men ts r ela t iv e to th e 1 8- yea

r len gth of th e m ar riag e, al th oug h i t di d n ot s tate h ow th i s f ac tor a f f ec ted i ts dec ision. The si

xth f ac tor w as th e p rop er

ty i n cl udi n g r eti re men t b en ef i ts awarded to each party at di ss ol ution and the status of thatpropert y today . The trial court noted that each party recei ved over $1.3 million in

assets atthe tim

e of di ssolution, and that although J udy' s IRA h

ad decreased i

n va lue her co mbine d a ss et s s t ill

t ot aled o ver $1 milli

on. W i th r es pe ct to the s even

th f ac tor, the i

nc rea se or decr ease in

each party

's i ncom e si nce dissolution, the trial

court found that Steven' s i ncom e h a d in creased and t hat Jud y'sin

come h ad not changed, co mmenting t hat it int er pr et ed t his fact or in li ght of "a condi tion i mposed on Judy to be com e s el f -s uf f i ci en t." R eg ard i ng the ei gh th f ac tor un de r s ec ti on 510(a--5) of

th e A ct, th e p rop er

ty acqui red after t he divo rc e and cur re nt ly owned by each p ar t y, t he trial cou rt sta ted (ap pa ren tl y ref err i ng i nc orre ctl y to the di stri bu ti on of pro perty at di ssol uti on): "Agai n, the parti

es h ad an equa l di vision of the a sse ts." The t rial co ur t re cite d t hat it also t oo k int o a cco unt all of the f ac tors e nu mera ted i n s ec ti on 504(a) of the A ct, s uc h as th e n ee dsof eac h par t y, t he pr ese nt and future earni ng capaci ty of eac hNo. 2-- 06--0235

-16-

par t y, and t he st anda rd of living est ablished d ur ingt he marr iage, altho ugh it did no t st at e ho w any of these factor s in

fl uenced its ulti

mate deter mi

nation. The tr ial

cour t summed up i

ts decision thus: "THE CO UR

T: [ I a m] ta ki n g i n to acc ou nt *** t he express a greeme nt of the parties that Judy had a du t y a n d a f

f i rm ati v e ob l i ga ti on [on ] her pa rt to m ake r ea son

ab l e e f f ortsto become economicall

y sel f-suf fi cien t dur in g the past fi

ve y ears. Giv en that t hese m

in im al at best eff

ort s hav e fai le d, and gi

ven that t he origi

nal order of unal located m ai ntenan ce and support was f

or J udy an d two m i nor ch i l dre n, both of wh om areem anci pated to day , it i s thi s Court's order t hat the m ai ntenan ce obligat ion of Steven ha ving be en r ev iew ed by t his Cou rt sh al l con ti nu e f ora p eri od of

th re e m oreyea rsat a ra te of $3,500 per month at whi ch tim e said ma in tenance s hal l term in ate. That's the Court 's order." On No vember 2 , 2 005 , t he t rial co ur t ent ered an order refl ectin g this dis positi on. The order pro vided, among ot her things:

"2. That the Petitioner, STEVEN BLUM sh al l pa y to the Respo nde nt, JUDY KOSTER, the sum

of Three thousand F iv e hun dred dollars ($3,500.00 ) per m on th comm enci ng on the 30th day

of May , 2005, and conti

nui ng on the 30th day

of each mon th thereafter until a tot al of t hirt y-six (3 6) mont hly payments o f the aforesai d am ount are made. T his is in full

and com pl ete sa ti sf ac ti on of STEVE N B LU M' s obl i ga

ti on to pay ma in tenance to JUDY KOST ER and o t her t han t he afo re said p ayments , she shall be f orev er b arred f rom see king mai

nten ance f rom th e Peti tion er. Th i s Order i s n

on-m odif ia bl e as t o d ur at ion and amou nt and ca

n n ot [ sic ] be ch

an ge d if th er e is a ch an ge i n ci rc um sta n ce s n or i s i t su b j ec t to an y re v i ew b y th i s C our t.No. 2-- 06--0235

-17- * * * 7. JUDY KOSTER sha

ll be en titled to receiv

e i n addi tion to t he m

ai ntenan ce set f orth in paragraph

2 ab ove, 3 8.5% of

4/12th s of

STEVEN

BL UM 's yea ren d b o nu s fo r20 05 o nly. T his am ount of addi tional ma in tenance is ordered to compl y w ith the pri

or mai ntenan ce ordersof thi s Court. Thi s i s the onl y a dditional ma in tenance to be pai

d by STEVEN BLUM other th an

the a mounts s et f

orth i n pa ragra ph 2ab ove." The trial court 's order

t hus mo dified St even's maintena nce o bligat ions u nder bot h t he MS A and t he Agreed Or der , r edu cing his mont hly payment s to Judy f rom appr ox i mate l y $8 ,60 0 p er

mon th (a ver age d ac ro ss t he year t o includ e bo nuse s) t o $ 3, 500 per mont h. Wit hin 30 da ys o f t he t r ial court 's order, Judy f il ed a m ot ion f or reco nsi deration combin

ed wi th a pe ti ti on f orcon tri b uti on to atto rney

fees . She i

ncl uded i n he r motion a request that the trial courtreduc e or el

i m i na te he r obl i gations u nde r the A greed Order , as she was no lo nger re ceiving any inc o me und

er tha t ord er a nd cou ld n o longer afford to pay the designated expenses for the boys. Steven mov ed to di sm i ss th e peti tion f or contri buti on on th e groun d tha t it wa s un

tim el y und er In re Marriage of Konch

ar , 31 2 I ll. A pp . 3d 44 1 ( 20 00 ) . T he t r ial c o ur t de nie d J udy 's moti on f or rec ons i de rati

on and gr an ted Stev en ' s m oti on to dis miss t he co nt r ibu t io n p et it io n. Ju dy file d a t imely no t ice o f ap pe al. AN AL YSIS Judy rais es two arguments on appeal : that t he trial court erred in

reducin g her m ai ntenan ce and ma kin g it nonm odif ia ble, and that the trial

court erredin dismissing

her co nt ribut ion p et itio n. We co nsider eac h ar gument in tu rn. I. Revi ew of Mai ntenan ceNo. 2-- 06--0235

-18-

Judy first co nt ends t hat t he tri al cou rt er red asa m atte r of l aw i n i ts in terpretation of

the MSA as contem pl ati ng a gen eral revi ew of

mai nten ance a f ter 61 m onths . In our rec en

t de ci si on in In re Marriage of Golden, 35 8 I l l . A

pp . 3d 46 4, 4 72 (2 00 5) , w e h

el d th at in a g eneral review, unl

ike a pr oc eed ingfo rmo dific at io nor te rminat ion o f maintenanc e, t he moving p ar t y doe s no t bear t he burden of pr ov i n g a su b sta n ti al ch an ge i n ci rc um sta nc es. The t rial co ur t re lied on Golden in det er mini ng that Stev

en bore n o such bur den of proof. J

udy argue s that this determ

in ation was erroneous and t hat bo t h du ring and aft er t he 61-month peri od set o ut in the M SA, Steven was required to show a sub stantial

chan ge i n ci rcumstances be fore m

ai ntenan ce could b e m

odif ie d. Steven re spo nds t hat int erpre t ing t he MS A as Ju dy sug ges t s wo uld effec t ively el imi nat e fro m the contract the provi sion tha t "Jud y's ri ght to re ceive m

ai ntenan ce and Steven

's obl iga tion to pay
mai nten ance a f ter Apri l 30, 200 5 [the

ex pi rati on of the 6 1 m onths ] i s rev

i ewabl e." A ma rital settlem ent agreem

ent is construed as i f

i t werea contract, and the court should see k to ef f ectuate the p arti es'

i nten t. In re Marri age of Carrier , 332 Ill . App. 3d 654, 658 (2002) . Ordin ar ily, the b es t gu ide t o t he pa r t ies ' int en t is t he lan gu ag e t he y us ed . "T he t r ial c o ur t sho uld consider parol evi dence to decide w

hat the partiesin

tended onl

y w hen t he langu age co nt ained in t he set t lement ag r ee men t is amb iguous." Carrier , 332 Ill . App. 3d at 658, citin g In r e Ma rr iage o f Wenc , 294 I ll. A pp . 3d 23 9, 24 3 ( 19 98 ) . T he int er pr et at io n o f a ma r it al s et t leme nt ag r ee men t is a que sti on of law ( Carrier , 332 Ill . App. 3d at 658), which we review de novo . Af ter r ev iew in g the MS A

ca ref ul l y , we con cl ude tha t wem us t rej ec t the

i nte rpreta ti on advan ced by Jud y, as it wo uld indee d eliminate t he 61 -mo nt h per iod fro m the co nt r ac t . "G en er ally, we wil l not ass um e tha t the pa rtie s i ns erted ke

y contractual

l anguag e f

or no re ason

at al l , a s a do cument should be read to g iv e eff ect t o all i ts pro vi sions." Wenc , 2 94 I ll. App. 3d a t 247 . T heNo. 2-- 06--0235

-19-

MSA, wh i l e n ot a m ode l of un am b i gu ous dr af ti ng , cle ar ly pr ovid es t hat : ( 1) Jud y wou ld re ceive unal located support and mai

ntenan ce of $5,000 per m

onth (plus

a per centage of Steven

's v arious bonuses) for 61 months; (2) after the end of that period, mai ntenan ce would b e reviewabl

e; and (3) t he monthl

y pa ym ents and s

hare of b onuses woul d continueu nt il t he o cc ur r en ce o f o ne o f six specifi ed even ts. Judy see

ks t o r ea d t he se pr o visio ns t o mea n t ha t t he 61
- mo nt h p er io d is i rre l ev an t, an d that either duri

ng or after this

period m ai ntenan ce could n

ot be m odif ie d unless one of the s i x fact or s we re sho wn. We ca nnot acc ept t his inter pr et at ion, asi t m akesthe pa rti es ' i de nti f i ca ti on of t he 61
- mo nt h p er io d me an ing les s. T he pla in la nguageof the MSA

in dic ates that t he parties

in tended that t he st ruc t ur e u nd er wh ich maint en an ce wa s p aid would ch ange i n som e way after the 61 months, orel se they

would not hav e del

i beratel y estab l i shed such

a peri od. In a ddit ion, t he pa rt ies' t est imony at th e p roveu

p of th e d i ss ol uti on re f l ec ts th at b oth pa rti esun de rs tood the m

ai nte na nc e p rovi si

on of t he MSA to mean

that St even

would pay

ma in tenance un

til April 30, 2005, af

ter which ma in tenance wo uld be rev i ew ab l e. B ec au se

weca nn ot agree wi th J udy 's con trar y i nte rpreta ti on of the MSA , we find tha t t he t rial co ur t did no t er r in re ject ing t his inter pr et at ion. Judy conten ds that, ev en

i f the tri al court did not err

as a m atter of l aw i

n con strui ng the MSA as it did, its reduction of

her m ai ntenan ce was an abuse of dis cretion, base d on the evi dence adduce d at trial . I n r ev iew ing iss ue s o f main t en an ce , a t r ial c o ur t is t o co nsid er t he 12 fac t o r s s et fo r t h in se cti on 504(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/504 ( a) ( We st 20 04 ) ) as we ll as t he 8 fa ct o r s s et fo r t h in sec ti on 51 0( a- -5 ) o f t he A ct (7 50 IL CS 5/ 51 0( a- -5 ) ( Wes t 20 04 )) . W e r evie w t he p ro pr iet y of a ma in tenance award for an

abuse of d i scre tion . In re

Marri age of Conn ors , 303 Ill . App. 3d 219, 230 (1999 ).No. 2-- 06--0235

-20-

In this case, i t is cl ear that the tr ia

l c ourt focu sed

primar ily o n Ju dy' s e ffo r t s t o be co me ec o no mica lly

sel f-suf fi ci ent, and the i ssueof whether tho se effor t s we re "re aso nable" a s re quir ed by t he MSA. Altho ugh t he t rial co ur t did no t find that Ju dy 's ef f orts were not

re aso nable, t he co ur t 's co mments s how t hat it viewe d Ju dy's effor t s neg at ively, desc ribing Ju dy's 25-to -30-hour-per-week sc he du le as "l

ess than pa r t - t ime" an d h er effo r t s o ve r all a s " minimal a t be st . " I t is uncl ear on what evi dence the trial court based thes e descri ptions. Both vocational

experts testif

ie d t hat , in t he ir op ini ons, Judy was takin g reasonable steps to laun ch her i mm igration law pract ice. Ms. Hirsc h testifi ed that Jud y' s pract ice was n o t su cc es sfu l in

the fi rst few y ears beca use she di d not have a
men torat that t im

e, an opin ion that was co rr obo ra t ed by t wo expe rience d immi gr at ion at t or neys who t est ifi ed t hat having a m

en tor is ess en tia l to estab l i sh

i ng a n i m m i gration pra

cti ce. In addi tion , there was ev ide nc e r eg ar din g t he o bst ac les Ju dy fa ce d in find ing leg al e mplo ym ent wi thout substantial experience

in any special ty an d with a n 18-y ear gap si nceher la st regular em

ploy me nt. Judy testi fi

ed t hat she c ur t ailed her law pr act ice ea rly in her marr iage in o rd er t o s upp or t her famil y and r aise t he childre n, in

cl udin g a chi ld of Steven' s prior m

arriage. In l

igh t o f this testim

ony, we are hard pressed t o find a b as is fo rt he t r ial c o ur t 's c o nc lus io n t ha t "[ t ] he o nly i m pai rm en t of Judy ' s e ar n i n g c ap ac i ty i s *** sel f -i m posed ." "[I]n det er mini ng t he amo unt of maint enanc e t o g ra nt *** , t he t rial co ur t sho uld k eep in mi nd t he r ea so na ble needs

of [th e party rece i vi ng m ai nten ance] in li ght of t he st anda rd of living establ is hed dur ing the marriage." (Em

phasi s i n ori gi na l .) In re Marr i ag e of Bracke tt , 309 Ill . App. 3d 329, 342 (199 9). Al

though the trial

court recited that it had c onsi dered the fac to rs enum

erated in s ect io n 504(a) of t he Act , includ ing t he nee ds o f each p ar t y, t he pr ese nt and future earni ng capaci ty of eac h pa rty an d a ny i m pai rm en t to tha t ca pa ci ty due to the de voti on of t ime t o do mes t ic duti es, the stan dardNo. 2-- 06--0235

-21-

of l iv in g establ is hed duri ng the m arriage, and t he age and ph ys ic al and em ot iona l c ondition of each part y, i ts fin din gs do not reflect any considerat ion of these f acto rs. The re co rd re veals t hat Jud y's st anda rd of living has de clined su bst ant ially s in ce t he dis soluti on. Durin

g the ma rriage the f

am il y l iv ed i n l arge houses with pa

id h el p and spen

t $18,000 per m onth on

thei r needs an

d wants. Judy

now has h

ousehold l

iv in g expenses of a l

ittle l ess than $8,000 per mont h, w hich include p ro vidinga h o me f o rt he bo ys for 41⁄2 mont hs ea ch year and p aying so me of their ex penses . Sin

ce the di ssolution she h

as move d in

to a sm al le r home wi

th hi gh homema in tenance cost s. T he bu lk o f t he o ve r$1 million in a ss et s is hel d in her IRA a

nd he r home, n ei ther of wh i ch i s a l i qui d a ss et a va i l ab l e f orda ily living ex pe nse s. By c o nt r as t , St ev en 's a ss et s a nd inc o me have i ncreased, ev

en taki ng i nto a cc oun t the su m s h e i s exp en di ng f orthe boys' coll

ege educat ions. Steven st ipulat ed w itho ut lim

itat ion t hat he is able t o p ay maintena nc e. "Th e dependen t former spouse i s e

n ti tl ed to co n ti n ue to live in s ome approxi

ma tion to t he standard of

li vi ng establ is hed dur ing the ma rriage un le ss the p ay or spouse' s f

i na nc i al si tua ti on, the dur ati on of the marr i ag e, or ot her f ac torsi n di ca te ot herwise." Conn

ors , 3 03 I ll. App. 3d a t 229 . T he evi dence sh owed that even at the f orm er l evel of maintena nc e, Judy's standa rd of liv in g was bel

ow that o f the m

arriage. Ac co r di ng ly, we fi

nd that the trial

co ur t abus ed it s discr et ion in re duc ing Jud y'smaint en an ce fr o m a to talof appr ox i mate l y $8 ,60 0 p er

mon th to $3,500 pe r m

onth . W e re

man d f or a n ew de term i na ti on of an appropriate m

ai ntenan ce awa rd, re t ro act ive to May 1, 200 5, t hat t ake s into acc ou nt t he pr inciples discu ssed her ein. Because we are rem

andi ng thi s case f

or a new determi

nation of an appr opri ate

ma in tenance award, we need n

ot reach the rem

ai nder of the issues Judy

rai se s r eg ard i ng the i ss ueof ma in tenance. The re i s on e i ss ue , h owe ve

r, on which we find it nec essa ry t o c omment : t hat asp ect of t he t rial co ur t 'sNo. 2-- 06--0235

-22-

order li mi ting J udy' s m ai ntenan ce to t hree y

ears and stating thatthe award was "n on-modi fi abl e as to du ra ti on an d a moun t an d c an n ot [ sic ] be changed if there is a ch an ge in

cir cu mst an ce s no ris it subj ect t o a ny review bythis Court ." Judy

contends that this aspect of the order was contrary to law, and we agree. Counsel

hasn ot ci ted , nor c an

we l oca te, an y au th ori ty perm i tti n g a cou rt sua sp on

te to mak e a n aw ar d o f pe rio dic maint ena nce no nmo difiab le. Pu rs ua nt t o se ct io n 50 2( f) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/502( f) (West 20 04 ) ) , t he pa r t ies t o a ma r it al s et t leme nt ag r ee men t may agree to ma ke ma in tenance n onmodifi abl e and n onreviewabl

e. In re M arr i ag e of Ko zlo ff , 101 Ill . 2d 526, 533-34 (1984 ). However, in

the absen ce of a n agr eement , no pro vi sion of the Act permi ts a co urt to im

pose t hos e t er ms upo n t he pa rt ies t o a disso lut ion. Ra the r, p urs ua nt to s ec ti on 5 10( a-- 5) of t he Ac t , all awards of peri odic m

ai ntenan ce are modifi

abl e or reviewa

ble. See 7 50 IL CS 51 0(a--5 ) (We st 2004 ); In re Marriage

of Sel in ger , 351 Il l . App . 3d 61 1, 61 7 ( 20 04 ) . I nd ee d, a t r ial c o ur t may mo di fy a ma in tenance orde r ev en i f the orde r doe s n ot expressl

y s tate t hat a court may

review i t, so long a s the cou rt f i nds m odif i ca ti on to be appropri atean

d a pe ti ti on to m odif y i s f i l ed wi thi n th e p eri od of ma in tenance ordered . Seli

nger , 351 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 618. As the tri al court he re l acke d an

y statutory authority to im

pose nonm

odif ia ble m ai ntenan ce on the parties

out si de of an

agreem ent, its attempt to mak e J ud y's ma int en an ce t er minat e p er man en t ly aft er 36 mo nt hs is ineffect ive and does n ot bar a future petiti on for m

odif ic ation f rom ei ther party. See Seli

nger , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 618. Mai ntenan ce i n g ros s is a n e xc ep ti on t o t he rule t ha t maint en an ce aw ar ds ar e mo difia ble unl ess t he parties agr ee othe

rwi se. S ee In re Marri age of Freem an , 106 Ill . 2d 290, 295 (1985). Steven argues th at th

i s c our t shoul d pres erv e the

tria l court's attem pt to mak

e i ts m ai nten ance a ward nonm odif ia ble, b y i nte rpreti ng the cou rt' s orde r as

es tab l i sh i ng ei the r m ai nte na nc e i n g ros s or "so mething 'in

bet wee n' per iod ic maintena nce a nd maintena nce in gr os s." When ent er ing a judg mentNo. 2-- 06--0235

-23-

of di ss ol ution, pur suan

t to se cti on 504 (a ) o f the Act (750 IL CS 5/5 04(a) (We st 2004 )) a tri al court ma y award ma

in tenance i n gross, an awar

d "in the n at ur e o f a p ro pe rt y set t lemen t " o f a

" 'no nmo difiab le su m ce rt ain' " t o be p aid re ga rd less o f c han ges i n ci rcum stan ces . Michaelso n v. Mi ch ae l son , 3 59 Ill . App. 3d 706, 712 (2005), quo ting Freem an , 10 6 Il l . 2d at 2 98. A

n a wa rd of ma in tenance in gr o ss "is ap pr o pr iat e o nly inex ce pt io na l cir cu mst an ce s" ; n o r mall y, periodi c p ay men ts arethe pref

erred f orm of mai nten ance. La mp v . La mp , 81 Ill . 2d364 , 3 74 ( 198 0) . S t even c ites no au th ori ty f ort he no ve l p r o po sit io n t ha t a c o ur t may, years aft er a disso lut ion and its a cco mpanying pr operty redistri buti on, sua sp on

te transm ute an agreed award of peri odic m ai nten ance int o mai nte na nc e i n g ros s. S ec ti on

510 of t he Act , w hich go ver ns t he mod ifi cat ion o f maintenanc e and ch ild suppor t awar ds, co nt ains no pr ovisio ns perm i ttin g m odi f i cation of a peri odi c m ai nten ance a ward in this fas hi on. See 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2004). There is even less su ppo rt for cr eat ing

some n ew f orm of mai nte na nc e " i n b etw een" pe riodic m

ai nte na nc e a nd mai nte na nc e i n g ros s. The di ss ol ution of ma rriage is enti

rely statut ory i

n origi n an d nature, and courts in dissolution cases m us t e xercise t he ir po wer s wit hin the l i

m i ts of th e A ct. In re Marriage

of Rhodes , 326 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 38 6, 389 ( 2001) . Ac co r di ng ly, we fi

nd that the trial

court exceeded i

ts authority i

n pu rpor ti ng to make i

ts a wa rd of ma in tenance n onmodifi abl e. Even if the trial court had not exceeded

its statuto ry authori

ty i n pronounci

ng i ts mai ntenan ce awar d non

modif i ab l e, i t woul d have a bu se d i ts d i screti on i n d oi ng so. " [T]h

e op ti mal goal of ma in tenance is f or t he dependent former spouse t o become fi nanci all y i ndependent." Conn

ors , 303 I ll. App. 3d at 229. Ho wever, t hi s goal "m ust be balan

ced against a realistic appraisal o f t he l i ke l i hood t he sp o us e w ill

be ab le t o su pp o r t he r se lf in so me reas onab l e approxi mati on of the standard of li v in g establi shed during the m arriage." In re Marri age of Ch eger , 213 Ill . App. 3d 371, 378No. 2-- 06--0235

-24-

(1991 ). "Li

m i ted mai n ten an ce i s a pp rop riate

o nly where the spouse i s em

ploy abl e at an i ncom e that would provide the appro xi mate standard o f l

iv in g enj oyed during the m

arriage." Seli

nger , 351 I ll. App. 3d at 61 5. Whe r e, as he r e, t he r e w as no ev id en ce su gg es t ing t ha t Ju dy, a d ependen t former spouse, wo uld be ab le t o ea rn a n inc o me c o mpa r ab le to the standard of l iv in g durin g the ma rriage an yt ime in

the near f

uture, t he trial

court abused i

ts discretion in

ordering t hat maintena nce m ust ter m i n ate after 36 m

onths wi thout the possibil

ity of extens ion. See Seli

nger , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 619 (abuse of di scre ti on

to l im it term of ma in tenance; wif

e who was regi stered nurse could n ever approachmarit al st anda rd of living, and ex ecuti ve hus ba nd w ho had b enef

i tted f rom w i f e' s su pport dur ing l engthy marr ia ge had rising income and co uld afford maintenance) ; In re M arr i ag e of Ru bins t ein , 14 5 I ll. A

pp. 3d 3 1, 4 0 (1 986 ) (" Il

l i noi s c ourts gi ve con si de rati on t o a mor e pe rmanent awar d of maint enanc e t o w ives who have un de r t ak en t o ha ve ch ildr en , r ais e a nd su pp o r t t he fa mily, and who have lost or been subs t ant ially

impaired in maintaining t heir sk ill s for co nt inued e mployment dur ing the y ears wh en the h usb and was

getti ng h i s ed ucati on an d be com i ng e stab l i shed" ). Ac co r di ng ly, o n r ema nd , wit ho ut an ag r ee men t , t he t r ia lcou rt may not m ake the a wa rd of ma in tenance n onmodifi abl e. II. P eti

ti on f or Con tri bu ti on We tur nn ow to t he issue s ra ised in co nnect ion wit h t he t rial co ur t 's dismissal o f Judy's pe ti ti on f or c on tri b uti on to attorney

fees . The trial

court dis mi ssed the contrib

ution petition as unt imely filed u nde r t he r ule o f In re Marriage of Konch ar , 31 2 I ll. App. 3d 441 (2000). Judy as ks t ha t we no w r ev isit ou r d ecisio n in Konch ar . In that case we ex amin ed t he imp ac t o f t he r ec en t lyenacted se ct io n 5 03 (

j) of the A ct (7 50 I LC S 5/ 503 (j ) (W es t 199 8)) on s ec ti on

508(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1998)), whic h ha d pre vi ous l y govern ed pe ti ti ons f or contributi on to atto rneyNo. 2-- 06--0235

-25-

fees, bu t wh ich wa s a men de d t o pr o vid e th at contr ib ution sh ould be awarded " i

n ac corda n ce wi th su bs ec ti on (j ) of Sec ti on 503 ." (E mphasis ad ded .) The que st ion we dec ided in Konch ar , and t he o ne we revisi t today, i s wh at the l egi slature i

nten ded b y the phra se " i

n accorda nc e wi th." The relevan

t po rtion of section 503(

j) states: "Afte r p ro ofs ha ve clo sed in the fina l he ar ing o n a ll ot her i ssues b etween the parties (or in conjunc t ion wit h t he f inal he ar ing , if all p ar t ies so st ipu lat e) an d b efo r e ju dg men t is entered, a p arty

's pe ti ti on f orco nt ribut ion t o fe es a nd co st s incur re d in t he pr oc eed ingsha ll be heard and decided, in accordance with the foll owing provisi

ons: (1) A pe t it io n fo r c o nt ribu t io n, if no t filed b efo re t he fi na l he ar in g on ot her is sues b etw een

th e p arti es , sh

al l be f i l ed no l ater th an 30 d ay s af ter th e c l osi ng of pro ofs in the fi nal hearin g or withi n such other period as t he court ord ers. (2) Any aw ard of con tri b uti on to one party f

rom the other party shal

l b e based on t he cr it er ia fo rdiv isio n o f mar it al p ropert y un de rt his S ec t io n 5 03 an d, if
mainte nanc e has b een awarded, on the cri teria f or an award of m

ai ntenan ce under Secti on 504 ." 750

ILCS 5/503 (j ) (We st 1998 ). In Konch ar , we i nterpreted t he l

anguage i n section 508(a), t hat

co nt r ibu t io n sh o uld be aw ar de d " in accordance wi

th" s ection 503 (j ), to mea

n th at the ti me d eadl i ne s c onta i ne d i n s ec ti on 50 3( j ) a pp l y to a pe ti t i on f

or attor ne y f ee s i nc urred i n p ostdec ree

proc ee di ng s, a nd the ref ore a pe ti ti on f or con tri bu ti on m ust b e f i l ed b ef ore the d ate of j udgm en t. Konch ar , 312 Ill. App . 3 d at 443 -4 4. We aff irm ed the tri al cou rt' s d i sm i ss al of the con tri bu ti on petition i n that case be cause, al

though it had been f i l ed wi th i n 30 da y s af ter th e c l osi n g of th e p roof

s, i t wa s n ot f i l ed b ef oreth e judgm

ent was en tered. Konch

ar , 312 Ill . App. 3d at 444.No. 2-- 06--0235

-26-

Sin ce Konch ar wa s iss ue d, oth er d i stri ctsof t he I llino is Appe llate C ou rt have c ons ider ed t he sa me que st ion wit h differing r esu lts. In In re Marri age of Carr , 323 Ill . App. 3d

481 (2 001), the th

i rd div is io n of the Fi

rst District was presented wi th the is sue of wh

ether the appella

te co ur t ha d j urisd i cti on over a n a ppea l f rom a postdecree m

odi f i cation of chi l d sup port. T he ord er mod ify

ing ch ild su pp ort h ad b een en te re d o n Apr il 28, 1 999 , a nd t he t rial co ur t had g ra nt ed t he hus band's
m oti on to reconsi der the judgm

ent on August 27, 1999. The wif e h ad f i l ed a p eti ti on f or con tri bu ti on to att orney fees

on August 16, 199 9, b

ut the tri al cou rt di d n ot rul e on tha t pe ti ti on until March 9, 2000. Thereaf

ter, t he wi fe appe al ed

t he t rial co ur t 's orders of Apri l 28, 1999, an d August 27, 1999. The iss ue wa s w h eth er the appeal

was tim el y f il ed. The appel

la te court hel

d that t he A

ugust 27, 1999, order, which

ruled on the m

ot ion f or reco nsi deration, di sposed of the onl y m atter ra ised by

t he husba nd's pet i ti on to set chil d suppor t and t he petition for contr ib ution to post decree fees was a se pa ra te pr oc eed ingt ha t did no t t o ll t he t ime fo rfiling a n o t ice o f ap pe al. Carr , 323 Ill . App. 3d at 485. In a sp ecial co ncur re nce, one judg e wr ot e t hat he wo uld have re ache d t he sa me res ult on t he ba sis of Konch

ar , as the petition f

or co ntrib ution was f

il ed after Apri

l 28, 1999 (wh

ic h he viewed as t he dat e o f the final j udg ment on the postdecree pe

titi on), an d theref ore was unti

me ly --so t he March 9, 2000, order re l ati

ng to con trib uti on wa s i

ne f f ecti ve . Carr , 323 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 487 (Ce rda, J ., sp ec ially co nc ur r ing ) . T he majo r it y, however, rej ected this i nterpretat ion, com

me ntin g that i t did " not ne ce ss ar ily

agree with" Konch

ar 's c o nc lus io n t ha t t he t ime d ea dlin es o f se ct io n 5 03 ( j) of the Act

ap ply to postdecree pro ceedi

ngs , a nd dis

tingui shi ng Konch

ar on the gro und that it did not discuss jurisd ictio n. Carr , 323 Ill . App. 3d at 485. Thus, the court suggested a dist inctio n in the t re at mentNo. 2-- 06--0235

-27-

of pe t it io ns f

o rco nt r ibu t io n t o wa r d a t t o rne y fee s, be t we en t ho se in pr oce ed i n gsre l ati n g to the in

itial entry of the judgm

ent of dissolution and those in post decree pro ceedings. A se pa ra te d i v i si on of th e F i rs t Distr i ct A pp el l ate Court too k a d iff

er ent view in In re Marr ia ge o f Li ndsey-Robi

ns on , 3 31 I ll. App. 3d 2 61 ( 200 2) , d ue t o t he pr oc edu ra l po st ur e o f the case. In that case, the wi fe f il ed a petiti on for atto rney fees af t er t he t r ial c ourt had en tered a judg ment f

or di ss ol uti on of mar riag e. The tr

i al cou rt gra n ted h er pe ti ti ondespite its untim

eli ness, stating: " 'The st at ut e is ext re mely cl ear t his hear ing sho uld have been d one pr ior t o my ent er ingt he j udgm en t. *** I will hold t hat any

o bje ct io n is w aiv ed , sinc e n o bo dy o bje ct ed t o it . ' " ( E mph as is omi tted.) Li ndsey-Robi

ns on , 331 Ill . App. 3d at 268. On appeal , the husba

nd attackedthe

tri al cou rt' s a wa rd of fees , arguin

g that t he award was

im proper under se cti on 5 03( j ) of the A ct b ec au se

the pe ti ti on f orco nt ribut ion wa s no t fil ed be for e t he en

try of j udgm en t. The a ppel l ate court agree d that the p eti

ti on was unti me ly , citi ng Konch ar . Lin ds eyRob i ns on , 331 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 268. Li

ndsey-Robin son

has no appli

cation to post decree cases, however, as it ar os e fro m the pr ede cr ee p ro cee dings. Thu s, a ltho ugh Li ndsey-Robi

ns on is a slig ht ly
m ore re cent cas e, Carr

re mains the only st at ement of the Fi rs t Di stri ct on the i ss ueof con tri bu ti on petitions for att orney fees in post decree cases. The Thi rd D i stri ct a dopte d a

pos i ti on d i rectl y con trar y to Konch ar in Macaluso v. Macal

uso , 334 Il l . Ap

p. 3d 10 43 (20 02), a

case i nvol vi ng a co nt r ibu t io n p et it io n fo rat t o rne y fee s inc ur r ed in postdecree pr oc eed ings. The con tri bu ti on petition wa s f

il ed after the f

in al deci si on on the postdecree is sue was entered, and the tri al co ur t dis miss ed t he pe t it io n a s u nt imely und er Konch ar . Th e a pp el l ateNo. 2-- 06--0235

-28-

courtreversed . Fo cus ing o n t he r efer ence in sect ion 5 03( j) o f the Act to a "fi

nal he ar ing o n a ll ot her is sues b etween

t he pa rt ies" ( emphas is add ed) (7 50 I LCS 5/ 503 (j) ( West 200 0) ), t he court hel d that t his l an gu ag e r ef er re d to t he bifu r ca t ed he ar ing r eq uir ed in pr ede cr ee p ro cee dings, indicat ing t hat t he t iming requiremen

t o f section 503(j) was l

im ited to such proceedings. Macaluso , 334 Ill . App. 3d at 1047. Th e c ourt c onc l

ude d that, c ontr

ary to Konch

ar , se ct ion 5 03( j) did no t impose a t imi ng requirem ent for contribution petitions in postdecree cas es. "W

e hold that so l ong a s the

tria l court ot herwise hasj uri sdi

cti on ove r the c ase , ei

ther p arty may peti tion f or contri buti on toward

atto rney f e es '[a]t t he conclusi

on of the case.' " Macaluso , 334 I ll . App. 3d at 1047, qu ot in g 750 ILCS 5/508 (a) (W

est 200 0). The most recen t ca se

to touch on i ss ue s r el ate d to Konch

ar is this c ou rt 's de cision in In re Ma rri ag e of Be rto , 344 Il

l . A pp . 3d 70 5 ( 20 03 ), i

n wh i ch we f oun d th at Konch ar wa s ina pp lica ble to t he f ac ts o f th e c as e. In

th at c as e, th e p eti

ti on er sou gh t to have t he r esp ond ent pay t he fees she in curredto enf

orce a pr eviou s o rd er , p ur sua nt t o s ubse ct ion ( b) o f sect ion 5 08 o f the Act (750 I LCS 5/508(b) (West 2000)). On the date it entered an or der re so lving the enfo rc ement pr oc eed ing, t he t r ial c o ur t sp ec ifica lly gr an t ed t he pe t it io ne rad dit io na l t ime to fi le a fee pe tition, an d the petitione

r did so w i th i n th e ti me s et. The r es

pon den t th en f i l ed a m oti on to dism i ss th e f ee pe ti ti o n, cit in g Konch ar . Relying on Konch

ar , the trial

court hel d that it had

no jurisd i cti on to h ea r th e f eepe ti ti on because it had been filed aft er t he t rial co ur t ru led o n t he und er lyi ng enfo rc ement pr oc eed ing . Be rto , 344 Ill . App. 3d at 709-10. We re v er se d, f

i n di n g th at Konch ar was in applic abl e becaus e the trial

court expressl

y gran ted t he pe ti ti one r ad di ti ona l ti me to f i l e the f eepe ti ti on . W e n ote d that section 503(j )(1) of the Act permi ts t he court to extend the t im e to fi le f ee petitions:No. 2-- 06--0235

-29- "(1) A pe tition f

or co ntrib ution, i f n ot fi le d bef ore t he f in al heari ng on other is sue s between t he pa rt ies, s hall befi

le d no la ter t han 30 day s af

ter t he cl osin g of proofs i

n the f in al hear ing or w i

th i n such oth er period a s th

e c our t orders ." (Emphasi s added.) 7 50 ILCS 5/503 (j )(1) (W

est 200 0). The pe t it io ne rfiled he rfee pe t it io n w it hin the time granted by the trial cour t, and thus, the tri

al court er re d in dismissing t he pe t itio n for lack o f jurisdict ion. Judy as ks t ha t we r ev isit o ur de cis io n in Konch ar in li ght of the above de ci si ons. Af ter careful co nsider at ion, we

f i n d i t ap pr opri ate to rev i si t the que sti on of how t he legislat ur e inte nded sec t ions 508 and 503(j) of the A

ct to in teract in the wake

of the 1997 am

endm ents to t he A

ct. As al way s, we be gin our i

nq ui ry i nto l eg i sl ati ve i nte nt b y l ooki ng to the sta tutes the m se l ve s. The pri mary rul e of statutory construction requires

that the c ourt asce

rtai n a nd gi ve ef f ect to the l

egi slati ve i nten t. In re Marriage of Ta ka ta , 30 4 I l l . A

pp . 3d 85 , 94 (1 99 9) . In

ord er to de ter m i n e th e l eg i sl ati v e i n ten t, t he courtsh oul d l ook to the la

ngu age of t he st at ut e and give t he wo rd s and phr ase s t heir p lain and ordi na ry mean i ng. Ta ka ta , 304 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 94. In doing so , t he co ur t must co nsider all of t he pa rtsof the statute togeth

er an d gi ve ev ery word o rph r as e s o me reas onab l e m ean i ng. Ta ka ta , 304 Ill . App. 3d at 94. Sec ti on 508 of t he Ac t ( 75 0 I LC S 5 /5 08 ( We st 20 04 ) ) is t he se ct io n mo st dir ec t ly concerned wi th t he r ec o ve ry o f at t o rne y fee s by o ne pa r t y ag ain st an o t he rwit hina di ss ol ution action, and was t he se cti onof

the A ct that e xc l

us i ve l y govern ed thi s a rea pri or to th e 1 997en

ac tmen t of se cti on 50 3( j) an d the re l ate d a

men dm en t of section 508(a ) (the 1 997 a

mendm en ts). Konch

ar , 312 Ill . App. 3d at 44 2, cit ing P ub. Act 89
-- 71 2, §5 , e ff. Ju ne 1, 1 997 ; s eealso In re

Ma rri ag e of Bracke tt , 309No. 2-- 06--0235

-30-

I ll. App. 3d 329, 344 (1999). Prior t o t he 1997 am endm ents, section 508 ( a) pe r mi t t ed t he de term i na ti on and al locati on of reasonab le

atto rney fees in so mewhat co nfusing lan guage, as follows: "The court from

tim e to t im e, after due not ice and hear ing, a nd aft er co nsider ingt he fi nan ci al r es o ur ce s o f t he pa r t ies , may o r de ran y pa r t y t o pa y a r ea so na ble amo un t fo rhis own costs and a t t or ney's fees

and f or t he costs and attorney' s f ees nec essari

ly in curredor , fo r t he purpo se o f en ab ling a p ar t y lac kin g s uffic ien t fina nc ia lresources to obtain or retain le gal re pr ese nt at ion, ex

pe cte d to b e i

nc urred by an y pa rty , wh i ch aw ard sh al l be mad e i n c onn ec ti on wi th t he fo llowing: [five br

oad ca teg ori esof

di ss ol ution- rel ate d leg al proc ee di ng s f orwhi ch al l ocati on of

attorney f ees may be sough t]." 750 I LCS 5/508 (a) (W est 199 6). As m odifi ed by the 1997 amendmen

ts, sect ion 508(a) now st ates as follows: "The court from

tim e to t im e, aft er due not ice and hear ing, a nd aft er co nsider ingt he fi nan ci al r es o ur ce s o f t he pa r t ies , may o r de ran y pa r t y t o pa y a r ea so na ble amo un t fo rhis own orthe othe r pa rty 's cos ts a nd attor ney 's f ees. Int er im att or ney's fees a nd co st s may be awarded f rom the opp osi

ng p arty , i

n accorda nc e wi th su bs ection (c-- 1) of

Secti on 501 . At t he co nclusio n of t he ca se, co nt ribut ion t o a t t or ney's fees a nd co st s may be awa rd ed fr om t he oppos ing par t y in acco rd ance wit h subs ect ion ( j) o f Sec t ion 5 03. Fees and c os t s may be awarded to counse l

f rom a f orme r cl ient in ac co rd ance wit h subs ect ion ( c) of t his Sec t ion. Awardsmay

be mad e i n c onn ec ti on w i th th e f ol l owi ng : [c ate gori

esof disso lution-related pr oc eed ings for which fees may beso ught , includ ing t he o riginal five cat ego ries a nd ad ding two new ones ]. The court ma

y order t ha t t he aw ar d o f at t o rne y's fe es an d c o st s ( inc lud ing an int er im orcontributi on award) shal l b e pai d directl

y to the atto rney, who may en fo r ce t he o r de rin hisNo. 2-- 06--0235

-31-

orhe rna me, o rt ha t it shal l b e pai d to the appropriate party. Judgm ent ma y b e entered

and enfo rc ement ha

d a cc ordi ngl y . Exce pt a s oth erw i se prov i de d i n s ub di vi si on ( e)( 1) of

th is Se cti on , s ub se cti

on (c ) of th i s S ec ti on

i s ex cl us i v e a s to the

righ t of any counsel (or former co un se l) of

rec ord to p eti

ti on a cou rt f oran aw ar d and j udgm

en t f or f i n al f ee s a n d c ost s duri ng th e pen den cy of a procee di ng u nde r thi s Act." 750

ILCS 5/508 (a) (W

est 200 4). The 1997 am

endm ents al so to ughen

ed the l anguage of

subse ction (b), whi

ch m andates payment of atto rney fees and costs i

ncurred to enforce an order wh erethe fai

lure to compl

y w ith the order was withoutcompel

li ng cause or j ustif

ic ation, and s ign

ifica nt ly expa nded subs ect ion ( c) , e st ablishing procedures to gov

er n pr oce ed i n gsto recover

f ees broug ht by an attorney agai nst hi s cl i en t. Com pare 750 ILC S 5 /5 08( b), (c ) ( West 199 6) wit h 750 ILC S 5 /5 08( b) , (c) (W est 2004). The 1997 am en dm en ts th usmade a v ari ety of ch an ge s to th e stru ctu

reof th e A ct. W i th referen ce to section 508(a) of the Act specifi cally , the amen

dme nts served s everal pur poses. For instance, the 1997 am endm ents clarif

ie d the ma

nne r in whi ch f ees could b e aw ard ed --on an int er im

b as i s or at th e en d of th e p ar ti cul ar pr oce ed i n g. Th e a men dm en ts se t a t ime when the issue of

the f i na l al l ocati on of

attorney f ees may be rai sed : "[a]t the con

cl usi on of the c ase ." 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2004). Fin al ly , the amen dme nts al so iden

tif ie d ot her provi si ons of the A ct to be consi

dered in conj unction w

ith the a ward of i nterim fees (section 501(c--1)) and f in al fees (section 503(j )). 750 ILCS 5/5 08(a) ( We st 2004 ). Co nsider ingal

l of th e ch an ge s to section 508(a) to gether, we bel ie ve that the new ref

erence to section 503(j) was i

nten de d n

ot to i m pos e a n a ddi ti ona l ti m i ng req ui rem en t f or con tri bu ti on petitions, but t o co dif

y other factor s for cour ts t o co nsider in awardin g fi nal fees. Pr ior t o t he 1997 amen dmen ts, the only

factor that t he s tatut e exp re ssly req uire d a c ou rt t o c ons ider in decidingNo. 2-- 06--0235

-32-

con tri bu ti on iss u es w as " the f

i na nc i al resourc es of

the p arti es." 750 IL CS 5/5 08(a) (We st 1996 ). Nevertheless, ev

en b ef oreth e 1 99 7 a

men dm en ts , cou rts ac t ua lly co nsid er ed o t he rfac t o r s a s w ell, including "th

e al l oca ti on of a sset s and liabil

ities, t he awa rd of maint enanc e, and t he r elat ive ear ning abi li tiesof the parties w

hen determi ni ng whether

one par t y shou ld co nt ribut e t ow ar d t he pa yment of t he ot her part y' s att orney fees ." In re Marri age of M cGui re , 305 Ill . App. 3d 474, 478 (1 999 ) ( citing ca se s) . Th

e a men de d s ec ti on

50 8( a) ' s ref

er en ce to s ec ti on

50 3( j ), w h i ch di re cts cou rtsto consider t he fact or s liste d in sec t ions 5 03 a nd 50 4 o f the Act when a war ding att orney fees , makes the use of these f actors expl

ic it. See McG

ui re , 305 Ill . App. 3d at 479 (t he 1997 am endm ents "m erely codif ie [d] th e cri ter i a th at tr i al cou rtsand courts of reviewh av e a l wa y s c on si dere d i n de ter m i n i n g w h eth er to awar d atto rney fees and i n what pro port ion" ); 750 ILCS 5/503(j )(2) (West 2004). Thus, we conclude that sec t ion 5 08( a) 's ma

ndate that fees an

d costs be awarded f

rom the opposing pa

rty "i n accordance wit h" section 503(j ) must be read to me an that a c ourt m

us t take the f ac tors d el i ne ate d i n s ec ti on 503(j)(2) into acc ou nt i

n d ec i di ng con tri bu ti on pe ti ti on s, n ot to m

ea n th at th e ti m i n g r eq ui re men ts of section 503(j) govern all awards o f atto rney f

ees. Our re ading of

se cti on 5 08( a) i

s s upp orted by the role of se ct io ns 5 08 an d 5 03 in t he o ve r all statutory sc he me o f t he Ac t . As w e h av e n o t ed , se ct io n 5 08 go ve rns a t t o rne y fee s a nd co st s in proceedin gs re lat ed t o dis so lut io n o r it s a ft ermath. Sec tion 508 m akes no di stin

ction be tween predecree an

d p ost de cr ee

pr oce ed i n gs ; i n ei th er proce ed i n g, a ttorn ey f ee s a reto be det er mined and awar ded " [a]t the c oncl

usi on of the c ase ." 750

ILCS 5/508 (a) (W

est 200 4). By contras t, secti on 503 of the A ct (750 IL CS 5/5 03 (W est 200 4)) i s p r ima ril

y c oncerned wi th the alloca

ti o n of mari tal prop erty , a proce ss

tha t take s p l ac e a

t the ti me the j udg

men t of di ss ol ution is entered. Entitled " Dis

positi on of property," section 50 3 c o nt ain s a va ri ety ofNo. 2-- 06--0235

-33-

su bse ct io ns r el

ati ng to the eq ui tab l e a ppor ti onm en t of the m ari tal es tatebe twe en the pa rti esto a di ss ol ution ac t io n. On ly

one of these sub sections , subsection (j), deal s wi th the al locati on of atto rney fees related t o a d iss o lut io n p r o ce ed ing . 75 0 I LC S 5 /5 03 ( j) ( We st 20 04 ) . T he o ve r ar ch ing pr inc iple em bodie d i n se ction 503 i s that of e qui

table di strib

ution: ensu r ing t ha t mar it al p r o pe r t y is fa irly dis tributed between the parti es, takin g in to account a vari ety of f

actors incl

udin g a do zen

f actors li stedin the stat ute. 750 ILCS 5/5 03 (West 2004) . To ensure that equitabl e di stribution is

achi eved, cou rtscon si der the iss

ue of pr operty di str i b uti on n ot i n i sol ati on b ut t og et her wit h i ss

ue s of ma in tenance, child sup po rt , insu ra nce, and a ny ot her issue a ffect ing t he fi nan ci al future of the parties and an y chi l dren they ha ve . In re Marriage of Leopando , 96 I ll. 2 d 1 14 , 11 9 ( 19 83 ) ( "it is d ifficu lt to concei ve of a s ituation i

n wh ic h the issues a

re more i nte rre l ate d than

thos e i nv ol ve d i n a di ss ol ution proceedin g" and thus

al l the issues s

houl d be resol ve d by the tri al court at one ti

me). Thes e in terrelated is sues mus

t be resolved toget her, ei ther through sett le

me nt or t rial, when the i

ni tial j udgm en t for dissol

uti on of marriage i

s en tered. Leopando , 96 Ill . 2d at 119. In predecree proceedin

gs, the apport ionm

ent of atto rney

fees is viewed as an

ot her aspect

of f i na nc i al al l oca ti on th at a tri al cou rt m us t f ac tori nto the total

pi cture at the ti

me of di ssol uti on. In re Ma rri ag e of Tomei , 25 3 I ll. A pp . 3d 66 3, 66 6 ( 19 93 ) ( t he allo ca t io n o f at t o rne y fee s is "int eg r ally related to de ci si ons reg ard i ng the f i na nc i al res ourc esof

each of the p arti es, [a

nd] a dis po sit io n o f t he ir alloca t ion sho uld be mad e befo re t he r eviewing c ou rt can p ro per ly assess t he t rial co ur t 's dec isions re gar ding mai

nte na nc e, chi l d supp ort, or d

i vi si on of prop erty ");se e al so In r e Ma rr iage o f Der ning , 117Ill . A pp. 3d 6 20, 626

(19 83)("th

e al l oca ti on of atto rney fees [p rio r t o] judg ment is d epe ndent upon and int egr ally relat ed t o d ecisio ns re gar ding property, mai nten ance a nd c hi l d sup port"). The la nguageof secti on 503(j) requi res that contribution peti

tions b e decided

aft er pr o o fs ha ve clo se d inNo. 2-- 06--0235

-34-

t he f i na l he ari ng , but b ef

ore j udg men t i s ente red--i n oth er words , as

soon as t he final amount of f

ees can be ca lcu lat ed , bu t wh ile t he t r ial c o ur t ca n st ill inc lud e t he fee s in its decisi on on al l of the fi nan ci al
matters that have ari sen. Secti on 503(j) i s clearly directed towar d ensuri

ng that all

fi nan ci al alloca t ions are determi

ned at the sam

e tim e that att orney f

ees f or predecree pro ceedi

ngsaresou

gh t. The ti m i ng req ui rem en ts c onta i ne d i n s ec ti on 50 3( j ) th usar e a pp rop riate

in the context of predecree pro ceedings. These sam

e poli cy considerations h

ave l ess f orce once the m

arital estate has been

dis tributed and t he in itial al locati on of f

in anci al assets has

occurred. See In re Custody of Purdy , 112 Ill . 2d 1, 4-5 (1986) ( Leopando 's di rective to deci de al

l di ss ol uti on -re l ate d i ss

ue s to ge th er

doe s n ot ap pl y to postdecree proceed ings). Po st dec re e disp ut es t ypically involve at t empt s t o mo dify or e nfor ce t he part ies' origi nal obli gations un

der t he judg ment o f disso lut ion, rath er th an the wh ol es al e re di stri bu ti on of mar it al p r o pe r t y. T he aw ar d o f at t o rne y fee s inconnecti on with thes e proceedin gs thus does not requi re t he sa me d eg r ee o f we igh ing t ha t mu st o ccur in awardin g fees upon the parties'

in itial disso lut ion, i

n w hi ch the al l oca ti on of fees mus t be b al

an ce d w i th th e a l l oca ti on of oth er mari tal as sets and obl i gations. See Carr , 323 Ill . App. 3d a t 485 ("A ttorn ey f ee s i n p ostdec ree

ca se s a re s i m pl y not dir ec t ly related to the central

is sues i n the equi table dis tributi on of property as they are in cases at t he t ime of a judg ment o f disso lut ion") . Fu rt her , w e ag re e wit h t he ho ldingo f Macaluso t hat t he la nguageof secti on 503(j) i ndicates that t he t imin g r eq ui re men ts a rei n ten de d to a pp l y on l y to predecree procee di

ngs . Macaluso , 33 4 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 104 7. A cc ordi ngl y , th e i m pos i ti on of se cti on 503(j)' s tim

e lim its on the award of

atto rney fees in postdecree pro ceedi

ngs is not warranted. To t he ext ent that one

of our e arl

i er ca ses , In r e Ma rr iage o f Piccio ne , 158 Ill . App. 3d 955 (1987 ), contai

ns l anguag e su

ggestin g a con trary approach (to the eff

ect t ha t at t o rne y fee s a r e e qu allyNo. 2-- 06--0235

-35-

"c en t r al" in

predecree an d postdecree pro ceedi ngs), we rej ect that language as not givi ng proper weight to the

di sti nc ti on dr awn by t he su pr eme co ur t in Purdy . However, we co nt inue t o he w t o t he basic ho ldingo f Piccio ne and subse quent cases, wh ic h was that when

an order resolve s f

ewer than all of t he cla ims p en din g in a p o st de cr ee pr o ce ed ing , t he o r de ris no t ind ep en de nt ly ap pe ala ble unl ess it co nt ains a w rit t en finding o f app ealability pur sua nt to Supreme C ourt Rul e 304(a) (155 Ill . 2d R. 304(a )). See In re Marri age of Duggan , No. 2- -06--0061, sli p op. at 22-26 ( Octobe r 16, 2 007) (d iscuss ingapp ellate jurisd ictio n in Piccio ne an d sub se que

nt c as es ); se e al so In

re M arr i ag e of Gutman , No. 2-- 06--0213 (Octo ber 16, 2007) ( discussi ng the special

case of appe l l atej urisd

i cti on in postdecree cases i

nvol vi ng ci vi l c ontemptpr o ce ed ing s) . T he se ca se s d o no t go ve rn o ur an alys is here, because

no postdecree i ss ue s r ema in pendin g before the tr ial

cour t and t herefore this case pr ese nt s no issue o f app ellate jurisd ictio n. Our d ecisio n t od ay is supp or t ed by pr act ical co nsider at ions a s we ll. Pr ior t o t he en t r y o f judg ment in

a case, atto rney

s f ace di ff ic ulties i n prepari ng f ee petiti ons that are suf

fi ci ently detail ed, because fees

typically continue to accrue throughout the fi nal heari ng or settlem

ent negotiati ons that cul m i n ate i n the j udgm

en t. Unde r Konch ar , to p rese rve

cl i en ts' ri ghts to bri ng f ee pe titi ons l ater, att orneys m

ust sub m i t in i tia l reque sts f

or fe es l ong b ef ore t he r eso lut ion o f the issues ra ised by t he postdecree petitions , and then prepare l ater, more detail ed supplem ents i mm edi ately bef ore t he f in al hearin gs, a pract ice that results in the needl ess expendi

tur e of att orneys'labor and cli ents' fun ds. Moreov er, the

ne ed f or a p eti ti on f orat t or ney fees may dep end in pa rt on t he tri al cou rt' s r es ol ution of the postdecree request for reli ef. F or instan

ce, parties wh

o re ce i v e f i n an ci al re l i ef on th e m eri ts ma y ch o o se t o fo r go filing pe ti ti on s, kn owi n g th at th ei r f i n an ci al si tua ti on s a ren o l on ger l

i ke l y to jus t ify awards o f contribution. A l itigan t whose pos tde cre e p eti

ti on has be en de emed fr ivolo us byNo. 2-- 06--0235

-36-

t he t rial co ur t may also c hoo se t o fo rg o s eek ing co nt ribut ion, kno wing t hat it is unlikely to be su cc es sfu l. Un

der the c urrent practice, however, parties cann ot wai t until the is sues are resol

ved be f ore dec iding whet her t o s eek co nt ribut ion; i f th ey wa n t to pres er

v e th e ri gh t to seek i t at all, they must file p et it io ns in ad va nc e. T his c r ea t es an un ne ce ss ar y dr ain on t he re so ur ces of t he co ur t s and the part ies. In predecr ee c ase s, t he po licy conside ra t ions s et ou t in Leopando , Tomei , and Der ning
man da te tha t pa rti esne ve rth el es s s ubm i t the i r con tri bu ti on p eti ti ons pri orto the en try of j udgm en t, de sp i te these di ff

ic ulties. See Leopando , 96 Ill . 2d at 119 ; Tomei , 253 Ill . App. 3d at 666 ; Der ning , 117 I ll. A pp . 3d at 62 6. I n p o st de cr ee ca se s, ho we ve r , t he r e is no sim ilar reason to require that con tri bu ti on pet itio ns be filed befo re t he fina l re so lut io n of the post decree issues. In these circumstances, t he go al o f eq uit ab le a llo ca t io n be t we en t he pa r t ies is best ser ved by r equ iring parties to f i l e a ny pe ti ti ons f orcontributi on promptly

after the i ssues raised i

n the postdecree pet itio n have been deci ded. In su m, we r eco nsider t he ho ldingo f Konch ar and h old that the tim

e lim its of s ection 503(j )(1) of th e A ct d o n ot a p ply to petitions for cont ribution to at to rney f ees in post decree pro ceedings. Rather, in c o nfo r mit y wit h t he lan gu ag e o f se ct io n 5 08 ( a) o f t he Ac t , su ch pe t it io ns a r e t imely if fi le d "at the conclus ion of

the case," that is , withi

n 30 da y s af ter th e date on whi ch j udgme

nt is entered. I nt his case, Judy

's peti tion f or co ntrib ution was f

il ed wi thin that period, and so her petition was tim el y a nd m ust be heard b

y the trial co ur t . B eca use we a re re manding t o p er mit t he trial cou rt to hear and deci de the contribution petition, we do not reach the other iss ues that were

rais ed on appeal re gar ding t he dismissal o f tha t pet itio n. CONCLUSIONNo. 2-- 06--0235

-37-

For the forego in

g reasons, we r everse t he judg ment o f the circu it co ur t of La ke C ou nt y and re mand fo r fur t her pr oc eed ings co nsist ent wit h t his dec ision. Reversed a

nd rem anded. GROM ETER, P.J ., and CA

LL UM, J ., conc

ur.