The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United Stat es Court of Interna tional Tra de, sitti ng by * designati on. 1 08 -43 87 -cv Do mnis ter

v. Ex clu siv e A m

bu lette, Inc

. 1 UNITED STATE S COURT OF AP PEALS 2 FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 4 5 August Term, 2008 6 7 (A rgu ed : F rid ay , July 17 , 2 00 9 De cid ed : F rid ay , Jun e 4 , 2 01 0) 8 9 Do ck et N o. 08 -43 87 -cv 10 11 12 13 G EN NADI Y M. D OM NI ST ER , V LA DS LA V S I TN I KOV , V LADI MI R M I CHE NKO , E DUAR D L ERNER , 14 E DUAR D M URKA MET DI NOV , A LEUS AND R Y ULDASHEV , o n b eh alf of the m sel ve s an d o the rs 15 similarly situated, 16 17 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts , 18 19 – v. – 20 21 E XCLUSI VE A MBU LET TE , I NC ., do ing bu sin ess 22 as Ex clu siv e T ran sp ort ati on Se rvi ces , E XCLUSI VE T RANS P ORT AT I ON S ERVI CES , YM F L I MI TED 23 L I ABI LI TY C ORP ., S US AN E DE LMAN , M I CHAEL E DE LMAN , D AVI D H. G RE EN BAUM , 24 25 De fen da nts -A

pp ellees . 26 27 28 29 Be fo re: S ACK and B.D. P ARKER , Circuit Judges , and G OLDBERG , Ju dge. * 30 31 32 33 Appeal from a judgm ent of the United Stat es Distri ct Court for the East ern Distri ct of 34 New York (Garaufis, J. ) di sm iss ing cla im s al leg ing dis cri m inatio n o n th e b asi s o f n ati on al 35 origin. REVERSED. 36 37 ANT HONY C. O FODI LE , Ofodile & Associate s, P.C., 38 Brooklyn, NY, for Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts

.2 1 2 R I CHAR D M. H OW ARD , J on ath anD. Farre ll, Mel tze r, L ipp e, 3 Goldstein & Bre itstone, LLP, Mine ola, NY for De fen da nts

4 Ap pe lle es. 5 6 7 8 B ARR I NGT ON D. P ARKER , Circuit Judge : 9 Pl aintif

fs -ap pe llants are Ru ssi animm igr an ts who all eg e th at the ir f orm er e m plo ye r 10 dis cri m inated

an d re tal iat ed

ag ain st the m

ba sed on the ir n ati on al o rig in. Al l ar e f orm er 11 employees of YMF Lim ited Liabi lity Company, a Brooklyn, New York com pany, doing 12 business as Excl usive Transpor tation Ser vices (“ETS”), t hat is engage d in the busine ss of 13 transport ing elderl y persons. Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 7, 12, 16, Doc. No. 46, Do mn ister v . 14 Exclusive Ambulet te, No. 03-cv-1666 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2005). Defendant-appelle e Exclusive 15 Am

bulette ( “EA”), located i n Far Rockaway, New York, engages in the sa me w ork, but most of 16 its em

plo ye es are A m eri can -bo rn. De fe nd an t-a pp ell ee S us anEd elm anowns bo th c om panie s 17 (collec tively t he “Exclusive Defendants ”). Id. ¶¶ 3, 9. Th e E TS an d E A e m plo ye es w ere 18 co ve red

bysep arate c oll ect ive barga ini ng ag ree m en ts w iththe Se rvi ce E m plo ye es I nte rnatio na l 19 Union, Local 455, AFL-CIO. 20 In a complaint filed in federa l court on Sept ember 5, 2003, the Russian-born ETS 21 em

plo ye es a lle ge d th at, no tw ith stand ing the sep arate c oll ect ive ag ree m en ts, ET S and EAwe re, 22 in fact, the same company and the drivers di d the same work, but that the EA agre ement 23 co nta ine d m ore favo rab le t erm s th anET S’ s ag ree m en t w ithits Ru ssi anwo rke rs, pri nc ipa lly 24 higher wages and a s horter work- week. Am . Com pl. ¶ 27, Doc. No. 7, Do mn ister v . E xclus ive 25 Ambulette, No. 03-cv-1666 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003). The EA agreement contained a pr ovision 26 that itwould “apply to al l establ ishments now or hereafter owned, opera ted or contr olled by”3 1 EA. Domnister v. Exclusi ve Ambulette, No. 03-cv-1666, 2007 WL 4244151, at *10 (E.D.N.Y

. 2 No v. 29 , 2 00 7) ( “

Do mn ister I

”). Appellants al leged that , by virtue of this provision, t he EA 3 ag ree m en t ap pli ed to t he m too , and the ref ore the y w ere en tit led

to t he sam e w ag es and

be ne fi ts 4 enjoyed by EA’s American-born workers

. Th e R us sian-b orn

dri ve rs a lso cla im ed

that af ter the y 5 challenged t hese discr epancies wit h their employer and the union, they were “t erminated on 6 pre tex tua l re aso ns in r eta liatio n f or t he ir Unio n a cti vit ies an d f or s eek ing to h av e d ef

en dants ’ 7 discriminatory pr actices stopped.” Am. Com pl. ¶¶ 30, 32, Doc. No. 7, Do mn ister v . E xclus ive 8 Am bu let te, No. 03-cv-1666 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003). 9 Pl aintif

fs ’ f ed era l co m

pla int rai sed sixcla im s: o ne cla im

all eg ing that th eir

un ion fa ile d 10 to f

air ly r ep res en t th em

(C lai m I), tw o c lai m s o f n ati on al o rig in d isc rim inatio n und er s tat e law 11 an d c it y l aw (C la ims II I a ndV) , t wo c la ims of r et al ia ti onun de r s ta te la w a ndci ty la w ( Cl ai ms 12 IV and VI), and one cla im of retali ation under t he National LaborRelations Act ( “NLRA”), 29 13 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (C lai m II)

. 14 Ex clu siv e m ov ed fo r summ ary

jud gm en t, i nit ial ly argu ing that be cau se p lai nti ff s’ f ed era l 15 claims were, in essence , labor cla ims, they were pree mpted by the NLRA , and, consequentl y, the 16 DistrictCourt lacked subj ect-matter jur isdicti on. Th e D istric t C ourt d en ied the m oti on

in p art 17 and granted i t in part

. Domnister I, 20 07 W L 4 24 41 51 , at *1 . T he co urt fi rst fo un d th at i t di d 18 have su

bje ct- m att er j uri sd ict ion

be cau se i t co nc lud ed

that pl aintif

fs ’ tw o c lai m s o f n ati on al 19 origin dis crimination (Clai ms III and V) were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor 20 Management Relations Act ( “LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq. , whic h p rov ide s f or f ed era l 21 jurisdi ction over “ suits for viol ation of contrac ts between an employer and a l abor organiz ation 22 rep res entin g e m

plo ye es. ” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The court rea soned that bec ause plaint iffs4 1 co m

pla ine d o f d if

fe ren ces be tw een

the ir a gre em en t an d th at o f E A’ s A m eri can -bo rn e m plo ye es, 2 LM RApre em

pti on wa s tr igg ere d. Th e C ourt the ref ore fo un d th at i t ha d ju

ris dic tio n to co ns ide r 3 the cla im s as “hyb rid ” L MR A c lai m s ev entho ug h th eyha d b een bro ug ht u

nd er s tat e an d c ity 4 law . See Carrion v. Enter. Ass ’n, Metal Trades Branch Local Union 638, 227 F.3d 29, 33 (2d 5 Cir. 2000) (“[A] suit, which all eges that t he employer breached the CBA and that t he union 6 breached it s duty of fair repres entation, i s known as a hybrid § 301/fairrepresent ation cla im.”). 7 On

the oth er h an d, the Di str ict Co urt ag ree d w iththe de fe nd an ts t hat it lac ke d ju ris dic tio n o ve r 8 Claim II (allegi ng retali ation under t he NLRA), because that cl aim was plainly preempted by the 9 NLRA itself, Section 8 of wh ich grants ex clu siv e juris dic tio n o ve r su chcla im s to the Natio na l 10 Labor Relations Board. Se e 29 U.S.C. § 158. 11 No ne the les s, af ter dis m iss ing on ly C lai m

II f or l ack of jur isd ict ion , th e D ist

ric t C ourt 12 granted defendants summ ary judgment on the merits with res pect to Clai ms I, III, and V. The 13 Co urt

fo un d f or d ef en dants on

the bre ach

of fa ir r ep res en tat ion

cla im (C lai m I) b eca us e it 14 concluded thatplainti ffs had “failed to produce any evi dence to the c ourt regar ding steps t he 15 Un ion

co uld have tak en , b ut d id n ot, to atte m pt t o h av e P lai nti ff

s co ve red bythe m ore favo rab le 16 ter

m s o f t he EA19 98 CB A. ” Domnister I, 2007 W L 4244151, at *15. Be cau se p lai nti ff s’ 17 “hyb rid ” L MR

A c lai m s (C lai m s II I an d V ) al so req uir ed a sh ow ing that th e unio n h ad bre ach ed 18 its duty of fair re presentat ion, the Court gr anted summ ary judgment on those two clai ms as well. 19 Se e S

an ozky v . In t’l

As s’n of M

ac hin ist s & A ero sp ac e Wo rke rs , 415 F.3d 279, 282 (2d Cir. 2005) 20 (“T o p rev ail on

a hyb rid § 3 01 /duty o f f

air rep res en tat ion

cla im , [ a p lai nti ff

] m us t de m on str ate 21 both (1) tha t [an employer] breached its col lec tive barga ining agree ment and (2) that [a union] 22 breached it s duty of fair repres entation.” ).5 1 On ce t

he se f our cl aim s h ad

be endis m iss ed , th e D ist

ric t C ourt d ecl ine d to ex erc ise 2 pendent juri sdiction ove r plaint iffs’ state-l aw and city-l aw retali ation cla ims (Claims IV and VI). 3 The Court dismissed them without prejudic e, and “referre d” them to state courtfor adjudicati on. 4 Domnister I, 20 07 W L 4 24 41 51 , at *1 ; see WWBITV, Inc . v. Village of Rouses Point, 589 F.3d 5 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2009) (“ [G]iven the eventual dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ federal cl aims, we find 6 that th e d istric t co urt act ed we ll w ith in i ts d isc ret ion in d ecl ini ng to a sse rt s up ple m en tal 7 jurisdi ction over pl aintiffs’ stat e-law clai m.”). 8 At this pointthe procedur al posture of the litiga tion became more com plicate d. On 9 De cem

be r 6, 20 07 , w ell be fo re the 28 days fo r f ili ng a m oti on

fo r re co ns ide rat ion

un de r R ule 10 59 (e) ha d e xp ire d, the Ex clu siv e D ef en dants m ov ed

fo r re co ns ide rat ion , argu ing that th e D istric t 11 Co urt

sh ou ld h av e d ism iss ed

the ret ali ati on

cla im s (C lai m s IVan d V I) with pre jud ice be cau se 12 those clai ms w ere preempted by the NLRA. 13 On Decem ber 27, 2007, before the Dist rict Courtruled on the motion for reconsi deration, 14 pla int if

fs fi led a n ewcas e in

state c ourt a lle gin g n ati on al- ori gin dis cri m inatio n c lai m s (o ne un de r 15 state l aw, one under city l aw) and retal iation cl aims (one under state law, one under cit y law). 16 This state complaint -- whose eventua l dismissal plai ntiffs are now appealing - - contains no 17 ref

ere nc es t o c oll ect ive barga ini ng ag ree m en ts. It a lle ge s th at “ the Am eri can -bo rn/ no n-R us sian 18 workers at FarRockaway office are accorded bet ter ter ms and conditions of employm ent for 19 doing similar, if not les s, work as plaint iffs do.” Com pl. ¶17. It l ist s th e sam e sp eci fi c 20 dis parit ies , s uc h a s h igh er p ayan d b ett er h ours, that pl aintif fs ’ earli er f

ed era l co m

pla int ha d 21 attri buted to the American-born workers’ CBA. The state complaint, however , does not ident ify 22 a C BAas t

he so urc e o f t

he se d isp ari tie s, an d p lai nti ff s d o n ot c lai m

to b e entit led

to b e co ve red6 1 by the EA CBA, or any other collec tive agre ement. Com pl. ¶18. Th e st ate co m

pla int als o 2 charges re taliat ion. It al leges thatemployees who “have protested t he discri mination or 3 qu est ion ed

the co rpo rat ion

reg ard ing the dis parity in the ter m s an d c on dit ion s o f t

he ir 4 em

plo ym en t . . . h av e b een

ter m inated fo r pr ete xtu al r eas on s in

ret ali ati on

fo r th eir see kin g to 5 have defendants’ di scriminatory prac tices st opped.” Compl. ¶19. 6 Defendants promptly removed the newly-filed stat e case to t he Distric t Court, invoking 7 federal questi on jurisdi ction pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the LMRA, and the NLRA, arguing 8 that all the clai ms asserted in the st ate-cour t complaint were preempted by federal l aw. 9 Subsequently, on May 28, 2008, t he Distric t Court grant ed defendants’ motion for 10 rec on sid eratio n in the fe de ral law su it, an d d ism iss ed , th is t im e with pre jud ice , p lai nti ff

s’ o rig ina l 11 city-l aw and state- law retal iation cl aims (Claims IV and VI). Do mn ister v . E xclus iveAm bu let te, 12 No . 0 3-c v-1 66 6, 20 08 W L 2 15 71 15 (E .D .N .Y . M ay21 , 2 00 8) ( Do mn ister I

I ). Th e C ourt 13 concluded thatthese cla ims were preempted by the NLRA because they invoked a coll ective 14 bargaining a greement, and that ther efore dismissal was requir ed by Sa n D iego B uil ding T ra des 15 Council v. Garmon, 35 9 U .S . 2 36 , 2 45 (19 59 ). T he Di str ict Co urt no ted that it wa s co m pe lle d to 16 ad dre ss t

he pre em pti on iss ue rai sed

bythe m oti on

fo r re co ns ide rat ion

be cau se p ree m

pti on is a 17 question of subject -matter juris diction t hat cannot be wai ved. Domnister II, 2008 W L 2157115, 18 at * 2 n 1; see Zhong v. Dep’t of Just ice, 48 9 F .3 d 1 26 , 1 29 (2d Ci r. 2 00 7). 19 In i ts M ay20 08 op ini on , th e D istric t C ourt n ote d th at i t ha d a lso rev iew ed pla int if fs ’ 20 no w- rem ov ed

state- co urt

co m pla int , and

that “i t ap pe ars that Garmon pre em pti on ap pli es w ith 21 eq

ua l f orc e to the cla im s as ser

ted in t hat ca se. ” Domnister II, 20 08 W L 2 15 71 15 , at *4 . R ath er 22 than d ism iss the state c om pla int at that junc tur e, ho we ve r, t he Di str ict

Co urt , “ in an a

bund an ceOn

ap pe al, ap pe llants co nte nd that th e D istric t C ourt d en ied the ir “ cro ss- m oti on

fo r le av e to 1 am en d [ the ] am en de d c om pla int .” W e see no recor d of any such motion to am end in the re cord. Because there was no amended com plaint i n 08-cv-0463, we must assume that plainti ffs m ade the ir m oti on

in c onne cti on

wi th 0 3-c v-1 66 6, wh ich

did inv olv e an

am en de d c om

pla int . B eca

us e 03-cv-1666 is notthe case t hat plaint iffs have appealed, we cannot c onsider thi s argument. For the sam e re aso n, we canno t co ns ide r ap pe llants ’ ar gu m en t th at the Di str ict

Co urt lac ke d jurisdi ction to ent ertain de fendants’ motion for reconsider ation in 03- cv-1666. 7 1 of caution,” schedul ed a conference with t he parties to di scuss the ca se. Id. 2 On July 31, 2008, the Court dis missed the newly removed state-cour t complaint. 3 Memorandum

& Order, Doc. No. 16, Domnister v. Exclusi ve Ambulette, No. 08-cv-0463 4 (E .D .N .Y . July

31 , 2 00 8) (

Do mn ister I

II ). The Court, noting t hat plaint iffs “offered no basis on 5 wh ich

to d ist ing uis h” the rem ov ed state c lai m s f

rom the dis m iss ed

fe de ral cla im s, co nc lud ed that 6 “ Garmon pre em

pti on ap pli es t o th e [ state] cla im s f or t he sam e re aso ns stated

in t he co urt ’s M ay 7 21, 2008” opinion. Do mi ns ter III , Slip. Op. at 2. 8 Plaintiffs-appel lants the n filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’ s July 31, 2008 9 judgment dismissing their removed state- court complaint. W e co ns ide r th at d ism iss al i n th is 10 opinion. Plaintiffs have not appe aled the Court ’s other rulings. 1 11 DI SC US SI ON 12 Appellants’ core content ion is thatthe Distri ct Court lac ked jurisdi ction under 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1 33 1 b eca

us e th eir co m pla int did no t ra ise aniss ue of

fe de ral law . “ It i s lo ng settle d law that a 14 cau se o f a cti on

ari ses un de r f

ed era l law o nly

wh enthe pla int if

f’ s w ell -pl ead ed

co m pla int rai ses 15 iss ue s o f f

ed era l law. ” Metro. Lif

e Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). On its face, the 16 complaint raises no i ssues of federal law. 17 In t

he ir n oti ce o f r em ov al, de fe nd an ts c onten de d th at the Di str ict Co urt ne ve rth ele ss h ad 18 jurisdi ction under § 1331 t o dismiss the complaint because pl aintiffs’ discr imination andSo -ca lle d “ co m ple te p ree m

pti on ” h as o nly

be enfo un d in

lim ite d c irc um stanc es , su chas § 301 2 of the La bo r-M an ag em en t R elatio ns Ac t (L MR A) , 2 9 U .S .C . § 18 5; § 50 2(a ) of the Em plo ye e Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); and §§ 85 a nd 86 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86. W e h av e n ot r ule d o n whe the r th e N LR A i s su bje ct t o complete preemption. Sullivan v. Am. Airl ines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that a d ef en dant m ayno t re m ov e a c ase ba sed on a p ree m pti on de fe ns e und er the RL A, a st atute similar to the NLRA in many respects). 8 1 ret ali ati on

cla im s w ere pre em

pte d b y th e L MR

A and NL RA , re sp ect ive ly. “B eca us e f ed era l 2 preemption is a defense to t he plainti ff’s suit and does not appe ar on the face of the complaint, a 3 de fe nd an t ge ne ral ly m ayno t re m ov e an act ion on the ba sis of

fe de ral pre em

pti on .” Franklin H. 4 Willi ams Ins. Trust v. Travel ers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1995) (ci ting Metropoli tan, 5 48 1 U .S . at 63 ). H ow ev er, the Su pre m e C ourt h as r eco gn ize d a lim ite d e xc ep tio n to thi s ru le 6 wh enCo ng res s h as s o c om ple tel y p ree m

pte d an area

of lawthat any c ivi l co m

pla int is 7 necessari ly federal in c haracter

. Id. 8 Even assuming arguendo that the NLRA is subjec t to complete preemption, we conclude 2 9 that plai ntiffs’ state c omplaint does not presentan issue of federal l aw. In its opini on, the 10 DistrictCourt held thatplainti ffs’ state complaint was preempted based on Garmon forth e s ame 11 rea so ns the Co urt stated in i ts M ay21 , 2 00 8 d eci sio n d ism iss ing the ret ali ati on cla im s al leg ed

in 12 pla int if

fs ’ f ed era l co m

pla int . In that May 2 00 8 o pin ion , th e C ourt c on clu de d th at b eca us e 13 pla int if

fs ’ re tal iat ion

cla im s “i nv ok e[ d] a ri gh t pu rpo rte dly pro vid ed fo r in a C BA ,” the y 14 “arguably” fell under Section 8 of the NLRA. Domnister II, 2008 W L 2157115, at *3. 15 Ho we ve r, a s w e expla in, un lik e th eir ear lie r f ed era l-c ourt c om

pla int , p lai nti ff

s’ s tat e-c ourt 16 complaint -- at i ssue before us now -- nei ther invokes , nor substant ially r elies upon, any 17 co lle cti ve ag ree m en t, and the ref ore is no t subject t o Garmon preemption. 18 In Garmon , the Supreme Court held that “ [w]hen an activity is ar guably subjectto [§] 7Se cti on

7 p rov ide s: 3 Em

ployees shal l have the r ight to sel f-organizati on, to form, join, ora ss ist labor organizat ions, to bargain collectivel y through representati ves of their own choosing, and to engage in ot her concert ed activi ties for the purpose of collect ive bargai ning or other mutual aid orprot ection, and shal l al so have the r ight to r efrain from any or all o f s u c ha c ti v it ie s e x c e p t to th e e x te n t th a t s u c hr ig h t m ayb e a f f e c te d b yan agreement requiri ng mem be rs hi p in a l abor organiz ation as a c ondition of em plo ym en t. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 9 1 or [§] 8 of the [N LRA], the States as well as t he federal court s must defer to the exclusi ve 2 competence of the National Labor Rela tions Board.” 359 U.S. at 245. Garmon preemption 3 presents a n issue of law which we revie w de no vo . S ee H ea lth ca re A ss’n o

f N .Y . S tate, Inc . v . 4 Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2006). We “begin by identifying whethe r any specific pr ovision 5 of sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA actuall y or arguably pr ohibits orprotects the conduct t hat is the 6 subject of [the acti on]. Next, we m ust decide whet her the cont roversy is identica l to one thatthe 7 ag gri ev ed

partyco uld

bri ng (or ind uc e it s ad ve rsary t o b rin g) b ef

ore the NL RB .” Id. at 96. 8 Broadly stat ed, sections 7 and 8 govern “concer ted acti vities” and “unfair labor 9 practic es,” respec tively. Bldg. Trades Employers’ Educ. Ass ’n v. McGowan , 311 F.3d 501, 508 10 (2d Cir. 2002). Sect ion 7 protect s workers’ r ights to enga ge in concert ed activi ty, while Section 3 11 8 m ak es i t an

un fa ir l ab or p rac tic e f

or an e m plo ye r to vio lat e th e ri gh ts o utl ine d in § 7 as w ell as 12 “to dischar ge or otherwis e discri minate against an employee because he has filed charge s or 13 given test imony” about an unfair labor pra ctice. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a). 14 In o rde r to fa ll und er S ect ion 8 o f t he NL RA , p lai nti ff

s m us t be all eg ing that th eywe re 15 ret ali ate d a ga ins t on the ba sis of

havin g e ng ag ed

in “ co nc ert ed

pro tec ted act ivi ty. ” C on cer

ted 16 protecte d activit y, as defined by Section 7, r equires “t hat an employee’s acti on be taken for10 1 purpo ses of

co lle cti ve barga ini ng or o the r m utu al a id o r pr ote cti on .” NLRB v. Ci ty D isp os al S ys. 2 Inc., 46 5 U .S . 8 22 , 8 30 (19 84 ) (i nte rna l qu otat ion m ark s o m itt ed ). Unli ke pla int if fs ’ f ed era l 3 co m

pla int , whic h a lle ge d th at p lai nti ff s h ad be enret ali ate d a ga ins t f

or c om pla ini ng to t

he ir 4 employer that they were be ing denied a r ight due to them under a collec tive-bar gaining 5 ag ree m en t, p lai nti ff s’ s tat e co m

pla int do es n ot a lle ge that pl aintif fs ev er c om

pla ine d th at the y 6 were being denie d a collect ively barga ined-for right , or that t hey were acti ng in concertin any 7 way. For the same reason, plaint iffs’ state complaint, which mentions neit her the exi stence of a 8 contractnor a union, does notappear to be pr eempted by § 301 of the LMRA, which governs 9 “[s]uits for violati on of contracts bet ween an employer and a labor orga nization r epresenti ng 10 em

plo ye es. ” 2 9 U .S .C . § 18 5(a ). 11 Caterpillar Inc. v. Wil liams, 48 2 U .S . 3 86 (19 87 ), i s in str uc tiv e. Th ere , a

pp ell an ts 12 alleged t hat respondent s’ stat e-law contr act clai ms w ere preempted by § 301 of the LMRA 13 because they wer e “substant ially depe ndent upon interpretati on of the collect ive-barga ining 14 ag ree m en t” b etw een ap pe llants an d re sp on de nts . 4 82 U. S. at 3 95 . T he Co urt , h ow ev er, 15 recognized t hat respondent s’ complaint, as writ ten, alle ged that pet itioner s had “enter ed into and 16 breached ind

ivi du al employm ent contra cts” with r espondents, and di d not “rely upon t he 17 co lle cti ve ag ree m en t in dir ect ly, no r . . ad dre ss t he rel ati on sh ip b etw een

the ind ivi du al c ontra cts 18 an d th e co lle cti ve ag ree m en t.” Id. at 3 94 -95 . T he Co urt he ld t hat ev entho ug h re sp on de nts we re 19 “b arg ain ing un it m em be rs” wh o “ po sse sse d s ub stanti al r ights und er the co lle cti ve ag ree m en t” 20 with petit ioners, and t herefore “could ha ve brought suitunder § 301,” they ul timately were the 21 “m ast ers of

the co m pla int ” an d “ ch os e n ot t o d o s o. ” Id. at 3 95 . A cco rdi ng ly, the Co urt he ld 22 that res pondents’ complaint was not s ubstantia lly dependentupon interpr etation of theIt s eem s p os sib le that th e em plo ym en t di scr im inatio n c lai m that pl aintif

fs all eg e in

the ir s tat e 4 complaint may, af

ter disc overy and further a rticul ation before the state cour t, prove indee d to be co nt in ge ntup onth e C BA. If so , i t w ou ldbe up to th e s ta te co ur t t o c on si de r w he th erth e c la ims should be dismissed as pre empted by the LMRA or NLRA . At this point , however, preemption ha s n ot b een

est ab lis he d and

pla int if fs are en tit led

to p roc eed

wi th t he ir c om pla int un de r a the ory of discrimination thatdoes not implicate t he LMRA or the NLRA. 11 1 collect ive-barga ining agree ment, and thus was not preempted by the LMRA. Id. 2 Like the res pondents in Caterpillar , a pp ell an ts’ state- co urt

co m pla int rai ses on ly s tat e3 lawan d c ity -law c lai m s, an d d oe s n ot r ely up on or a dd res s (o r ev enm en tio n) anyco lle cti ve 4 bargaining a greement. Plaintiffs do not clai m to be entitled to cove rage under any a greement, or 5 to have acte d in concertin any fashion. Inst ead, the complaint all eges discr imination based on 6 ter m s an d c on dit ion s o f e m

plo ym en t, and

ret ali ati on

fo r havin g c om

pla ine d o f t

hat un eq ua l 7 treatment. As writte n, there is no suggestion i n plainti ffs’ state-cour t complaint that a CBA or 8 any concerte d protecte d activit y will play a r ole in the c ase. Simply put, appellant s’ complaint 9 all eg es p lai n v an ill a em plo ym en t di scr im inatio n. As “m ast ers of the co m pla int ,” pla int if

fs we re 10 entitl ed to construct theircomplaint in this fashion, r egardless of the existence of collective 11 agreements. Thus the complaint, as writ ten, is not pr eempted by either the LMRA or the NLRA, 12 and the Distr ict Court l acked removal jurisdi ction based on pr eemption. 4 13 De fe nd an ts n ev erthe les s co nte nd that th e D ist

ric t C ourt h ad

jur isd ict ion

to d ism iss 14 plainti ffs’ state complaint because plainti ffs’ claims were barred by clai m preclusion and issue 15 pre clu sio n. Ind eed , it ap pe ars that th e D ist

ric t C ourt, altho ug h it

did no t expli cit ly d isc us s ei the r 16 of these doctri nes, may have intended to invoke one of them when it remarked: “Pla intiffs have 17 offered no basis on which to dis tinguish t he claims [raised in the ir stat e complaint] from the 18 st at e- la w c la ims th e c ourtco ns id er edin [the Ma y 2 1, 20 08 ] de ci si onan d i ns te adra is e t he sa meAppellees ass ert thatif plaintiffs’ cla ims in their stat e complaint are consi dered dist inct from 5 their cl aims in the earli er federal complaint, t hose claims “would be time barred.” Resp. Br. 10- 11. The DistrictCourt never dis cussed this issue. In any e vent, as with i ssues of preclusi on, the de ter m inatio n o f whe the r th e st atute o f l im itatio ns ha s expir ed sh ou ld b e m ad e b y th e st ate co urt where, as here, a distri ct court l acks subject -matter juris diction. 12 1 arg um en ts that th e co urt co ns ide red

an d re jec ted the re. ” Domnister III

, Slip. Op. at 2. On the 2 oth er h an d, iss ue an d c lai m pre clu sio n are d oc tri ne s th at typ ica llyreq uir e a n ua nc ed an aly sis that 3 the Di str ict

Co urt did no t pe rf orm he re. 4 In anyev en t, c ontrary t o d ef en dants ’ co nte nti on , a

dis tri ct c ourt m

us t ha ve su bje ct- m att er 5 jurisdi ction in or der to dismiss a case based on eithe r issue orclaim preclusion. “The pr eclusion 6 doctrines . . . are waiveabl e affirmative defenses.” Scherer v. Equit able Life Assur ance Soc’y of 7 U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2003). As the Supre me C ourt held i n Rivet v. Regions Bank of 8 Louisiana, fe de ral jur isd ict ion is a cre ature o f s tat

ute , and be cau se “ Co ng res s h as n ot a uth ori zed 9 removal based on a defense or anti cipated defense feder al in char acter,” a party’s a sserti on of 10 claim preclusion ca nnot provide a feder al cou rt with re moval jurisdicti on. 522 U.S. 470, 472 11 (19 98 ). A cco rdi ng ly, in a cas e ra isi ng no iss ue s o f f ed era l law, “[ t] he de fe ns e o f c lai m 12 pre clu sio n . . . is p rop erl y m ad e in the state p roc eed ing .” Id. The Court’s holdi ng in Ri vet 13 applies wit h equal force to ot her affirmative defenses, includi ng those based on i ssue precl usion 14 or s tat

ute of lim itatio ns . 5 15 Th e D istric t C ourt the ref ore did no t have jur isd ict ion

to d ism iss pla int if

fs ’ st ate 16 complaint based on defendants’ a ffirm ative defenses. St ill, appel lees cla im, the District Judge 17 had jurisdi ction to di smiss the case because he was “doing no more than enforcing his pr ior 18 order.” Resp. Br. at9. They rely chie fly on Bryan v. BellSouth Commc’ns, 49 2 F .3 d 2 31 (4t h 19 Cir. 2007), in which t he Fourth Circui t held thata distri ct court r etained j urisdict ion under the13 1 Al l Writ s A ct, 28 U. S. C. § 1 65 1, to o rde r th e d ism iss al o f c lai m s in state c ourt that th e d ist

ric t 2 court had pre viously remanded. Bryan is disti nguishable. I n Bryan, af ter the dis tri ct c ourt 3 ini tia llyrem an de d th e st ate -law c lai m s, the Fo urt h C irc uit he ld t hat th e re m an d w as i m

pro pe r 4 because the di strictcourt should ha ve dismissed the clai ms on the m erits. I n Bryan, the state 5 cas e th at t

he co urt dis m iss ed

co ns ist ed of lit era llythe sam e cl aim s, in t he sam e ca se, that it

ha d 6 pre vio us ly r em an de d. He re, in c ontra st, we are de ali ng wi th a ne w c ase in s tat e co urt , w ith 7 dif

fe rent al leg ati on s. Th e D istric t C ourt h ere co uld no t have ret ain ed

jur isd ict ion

to d ism iss 8 cla im s d ist inc t f

rom tho se i t ha d d ism iss ed

ear lie r. 9 Appellees urge that we cannot c onsider pla intiffs’ complaint “in a vac uum, w ithout 10 reference to t he prior dec isions of” the Dist rict Court . Resp. Br. at 1. While there might be 11 so m eth ing to b e g ain ed in t erm s o f e ff

ici en cybyall ow ing the Di str ict Co urt to e va luate 12 pla int if

fs ’ st ate -co urt

co m pla int in l ight of

the ir e arl ier

fe de ral co m

pla int , th e f

ed era l co urt s ar e 13 courts of limited juri sdiction. I n order to r emove a case to federal court , a defendant must show 14 that th e co m

pla int , a s p led , p res en ts an is su e o f f ed era l law. Th e st ate -co urt co m pla int wh os e 15 dismissal we are revi ewing here pres ents no such is sue, and does not, as written, pr ovide 16 defendants with a pre emption defense that might otherwise cr eate removal juri sdiction. 17 Accordingly, the DistrictCourt lacked j urisdict ion over the c omplaint, and should not have 18 dis m iss ed

it. Th e d ef

en dants are of

co urs e f ree to p res en t th e st ate co urt s w iththe ir argum en ts 19 about preemption, precl usion, and the st atute of limitations

. 20 CO NC LU SI ON 21 Fo r th e f

ore go ing rea so ns , w e h ere byVA CA TE the Di str ict Co urt ’s July

31 , 2 00 8 O rde r 22 dismissing the complaint thatplainti ffs filed in state cour t (Distr ict Court DocketNo. 08-cv23 04 63 ), and

RE MA ND to t he Di str ict

Co urt so that it can rem an d to state c ourt.