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Asia R. Mann, now known as 

Asia R. Harrison, appellee, v. 

Brian L. Mann, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed August 26, 2022. No. S-19-1194.

1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does 

not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a 

matter of law.

2. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s decision to certify a 

final judgment pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but whether § 25-1315 is implicated in a case is a question of law which an appellate court considers 

de novo.

3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues 

presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine 

whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of 

whether the issue is raised by the parties.

4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely 

statutory, and unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does 

not exist.

5. Legislature: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. The Legislature has 

authorized appeals from judgments and decrees, as well as final orders, 

made by the district court.

6. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. In cases that present multiple claims 

for relief or involve multiple parties, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) 

(Reissue 2016) permits a trial court to certify an otherwise interlocutory 

order as a final, appealable judgment under the limited circumstances 

set forth in the statute.

7. ____: ____. When a court properly directs the entry of a final judgment 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) as to certain claims 

or parties, the order is treated as a judgment from which an aggrieved 

party can appeal.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/16/2022 09:07 AM CDT
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8. Claims: Parties. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) is implicated only when a case presents more than one claim for relief or 

involves multiple parties, and the court enters an order which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than 

all the parties.

9. Actions: Words and Phrases. For purposes of determining whether 

a case presents more than one “claim for relief” under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016), the term is not synonymous with “issue” 

or “theory of recovery,” but is instead the equivalent of a “cause 

of action.”

10. Claims: Parties: Judgments: Appeal and Error. When a case involves 

multiple claims for relief or multiple parties, and the court has entered 

an order adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, then, absent a specific statute governing the appeal providing otherwise, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 

2016) controls and mandates that the order is not immediately appealable unless the trial court issues an express direction for the entry of 

judgment upon an express determination that there is no just reason 

for delay.

11. Claims: Parties: Judgments. Absent the entry of a final judgment 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016), orders adjudicating 

fewer than all claims against all parties are not final and are subject to 

revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 

claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

12. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. The term “final judgment” as used 

in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) is the functional equivalent of a “final order” within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Cum. Supp. 2020).

13. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. To be appealable, an order must 

satisfy the final order requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. 

Supp. 2020) and, where implicated, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) 

(Reissue 2016).

14. Claims: Parties: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. In cases where 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) is implicated, and no more 

specific statute governs the appeal, an order resolving fewer than all 

claims against all parties is not final and appealable if it lacks proper 

§ 25-1315 certification. This is so even if the order otherwise satisfies 

one of the final order categories in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(1) (Cum. 

Supp. 2020).

15. Actions: Final Orders. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) 

can be implicated in civil actions, in special proceedings, and in civil 

actions joined with special proceedings.
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Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, 

Moore, Bishop, and Welch, Judges, on appeal thereto from 

the District Court for Douglas County, J Russell Derr, Judge. 

Judgment of Court of Appeals vacated and remanded with 

directions.

Aaron F. Smeall and Jacob A. Acers, of Smith, Slusky, 

Pohren & Rogers, L.L.P., for appellant.

Kathryn D. Putnam, of Astley Putnam, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Stacy, J.

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of partial summary judgment entered in a proceeding brought to 

modify custody and child support. The Nebraska Court of 

Appeals concluded the summary judgment order was immediately appealable as a final order in a special proceeding 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2020) and 

affirmed. On further review, we conclude that Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) was also implicated because the 

case involved multiple claims for relief and the partial summary judgment order resolved fewer than all such claims. 

Because § 25-1315(1) is implicated but has not been satisfied, we must vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 

remand the cause with directions to dismiss the appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

In 2009, Asia R. Mann, now known as Asia R. Harrison 

(Harrison), gave birth out of wedlock to a daughter, Maleah D. 

In 2010, a California court established paternity and entered 

a judgment which granted Harrison sole legal and physical 

custody of Maleah and granted visitation rights to Maleah’s 

biological father.
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Marriage and Divorce

In 2011, Harrison married Brian L. Mann. Their marriage 

produced two children. In 2016, Harrison filed a complaint for 

dissolution in the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska. 

While the dissolution was pending, Maleah’s biological father 

registered the California paternity judgment in the same court. 

However, no party brought the registered paternity judgment 

to the attention of the dissolution court before the decree was 

entered, nor was the court informed that Maleah was the subject of a California custody judgment.

In July 2018, the district court entered a stipulated decree 

dissolving the parties’ marriage. The decree provided for 

joint legal and physical custody of the parties’ two children. 

Additionally, the decree recited that Mann stood in loco parentis to Maleah and ordered the parties to share joint physical 

custody of Maleah, with Harrison having sole legal custody. 

The decree also approved the parties’ stipulated parenting plan 

and ordered Mann to pay child support for all three children. 

Neither party appealed the 2018 decree.

Complaint to Modify Joined With 

Declaratory Judgment Action

In July 2019, Mann filed a complaint to modify his child 

support obligation and certain provisions of the parenting plan. 

Harrison’s answer generally denied that Mann was entitled 

to modification. Harrison’s answer also alleged two counterclaims. Her first counterclaim was framed as an action under 

the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 1 and it attacked the 

validity of provisions in the 2018 decree relating to Maleah’s 

custody and care. 2 Harrison alleged, summarized, that when the 

decree was entered, the 2010 California judgment of paternity 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 (Reissue 2016).

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-346 (Reissue 2016) (providing that divorce decrees 

are “conclusively presumed . . . valid in all respects, notwithstanding some 

defect . . . unless an action is brought within two years from the entry of 

such decree of divorce attacking the validity thereof”).
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and custody was still in full force and effect, and that California 

had not relinquished its exclusive and continuing jurisdiction 

over Maleah under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act. 3 She therefore alleged the Nebraska court 

did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Maleah when the 

dissolution decree was entered, and she sought a declaration 

that “any orders for [Maleah’s] custody and care should be 

declared void as a matter of law.” Harrison’s second counterclaim sought to modify custody of the other two children to 

give her sole legal and physical custody.

Partial Summary Judgment Granting 

Declaratory Relief

Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on 

Harrison’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment. After an 

evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an order which 

granted Harrison’s summary judgment motion and vacated that 

“portion of the Decree that provides for ‘in loco parentis’ rights 

to [Mann] with regard to Maleah.” The order did not expressly 

overrule Mann’s summary judgment motion or address his support obligations regarding Maleah.

Mann filed a motion to clarify and to set a supersedeas bond. 

In an order entered December 20, 2019, the district court clarified its prior order by granting Harrison’s motion for summary 

judgment, denying Mann’s motion for summary judgment, 

voiding every provision in the 2018 decree and parenting plan 

pertaining to Maleah, and eliminating all of Mann’s support 

obligations regarding Maleah. The December order also denied 

Mann’s request for a supersedeas bond.

Mann filed a notice of appeal from the partial summary 

judgment order, assigning error to the district court’s conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Maleah under 

the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 

when the decree was entered. It is undisputed that when the 

3 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1226 to 43-1266 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 

2020).
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notice of appeal was filed, the parties’ competing complaints to 

modify custody and support remained pending and unresolved 

in the district court. Likewise, it is undisputed that Mann did 

not ask the court to enter final judgment on the declaratory 

judgment claim under § 25-1315(1), and no such certification 

was issued sua sponte.

Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 It first addressed appellate 

jurisdiction, rejecting Harrison’s argument that the partial summary judgment order was not immediately appealable under 

any of the final order categories enumerated in § 25-1902. 

Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned that custody modifications are considered special proceedings, 5 so the order 

granting partial summary judgment was an order “affecting 

a substantial right made during a special proceeding” under 

§ 25-1902(1)(b). The opinion did not discuss or distinguish our 

cases reciting the rule that partial summary judgment orders 

are interlocutory in nature and will not be considered final 

4 Mann v. Mann, 29 Neb. App. 548, 956 N.W.2d 318 (2021).

5 See, Yori v. Helms, 307 Neb. 375, 390, 949 N.W.2d 325, 337 (2020) 

(“[p]roceedings regarding modification of a marital dissolution are 

special proceedings”); Huskey v. Huskey, 289 Neb. 439, 449, 855 N.W.2d 

377, 385 (2014) (“an order modifying custody arises from a special 

proceeding”); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 286 Neb. 96, 105, 835 N.W.2d 44, 

51 (2013) (“modification of child custody and support in a dissolution 

action is . . . a special proceeding”); Steven S. v. Mary S., 277 Neb. 124, 

129, 760 N.W.2d 28, 33 (2009) (“proceedings regarding modification of 

a marital dissolution . . . are special proceedings”); State ex rel. Reitz 

v. Ringer, 244 Neb. 976, 980, 510 N.W.2d 294, 299 (1994), overruled 

on other grounds, Cross v. Perreten, 257 Neb. 776, 600 N.W.2d 780 

(1999) (“custody determinations, which are controlled by § 42-364, are 

considered special proceedings”). But see Carmicheal v. Rollins, 280 

Neb. 59, 72, 783 N.W.2d 763, 772 (2010) (Connolly, J., concurring) 

(acknowledging prior holdings treating custody modifications as special 

proceedings but noting they are arguably “more properly” treated as order 

affecting substantial right made on summary application in action after 

judgment is rendered).
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until all issues in the case are determined. 6 And although the 

Court of Appeals noted that the modification case presented 

other claims for relief that had not yet been resolved, 7 its 

jurisdictional analysis did not address whether § 25-1315(1) 

was implicated.

After concluding it had appellate jurisdiction, the Court of 

Appeals framed the question on appeal as whether the district 

court had the authority to vacate or modify portions of the 

2018 decree upon learning that it “should not have exercised 

jurisdiction on issues related to Maleah’s custody due to the 

California court’s continuing jurisdiction.” 8 It answered that 

question in the affirmative, finding the necessary authority in 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001(4) (Reissue 2016), which governs 

a district court’s power to vacate or modify judgments after 

term. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the district 

court’s order granting partial summary judgment in favor 

of Harrison.

We granted Mann’s petition for further review and ordered 

supplemental briefing. Among other questions, we asked the 

parties to brief whether, to be immediately appealable, an order 

of partial summary judgment which adjudicates fewer than all 

claims for relief presented in a custody modification case must 

satisfy both § 25-1902 and § 25-1315. The parties submitted 

supplemental briefs addressing this question, which we summarize later in our jurisdictional analysis.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On further review, Brian assigns three errors, which can 

be consolidated and restated into one. He asserts the Court of 

Appeals erred in concluding the district court had authority, 

6 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Kearny Junction, 295 Neb. 981, 987, 893 N.W.2d 

684, 690 (2017) (“[p]artial summary judgments are usually considered 

interlocutory. They must ordinarily dispose of the whole merits of the case 

to be considered final . . .”).

7 See Mann, supra note 4.

8 Id. at 559, 956 N.W.2d at 327.
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under § 25-2001(4), to vacate the 2018 decree provisions relating to Maleah.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter 

of law. 9

[2] A trial court’s decision to certify a final judgment pursuant to § 25-1315(1) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 10

but whether § 25-1315 is implicated in a case is a question of 

law which an appellate court considers de novo.

ANALYSIS

Appellate Jurisdiction

[3] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it 

is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of whether 

the issue is raised by the parties. 11

[4,5] The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely statutory, 

and unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does 

not exist. 12 The Legislature has authorized appeals from judgments and decrees, as well as final orders, made by the district 

court. 13 A judgment is defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301 

(Cum. Supp. 2020) to mean “the final determination of the 

rights of the parties in an action.” 14 Final orders are defined in 

§ 25-1902, which currently recognizes four categories of final 

9 Clason v. LOL Investments, 308 Neb. 904, 957 N.W.2d 877 (2021).

10 Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, 291 Neb. 163, 864 N.W.2d 391 

(2015).

11 See Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 N.W.2d 

906 (2016).

12 Heckman v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 894 N.W.2d 296 (2017).

13 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2020).

14 See, also, Becher v. Becher, 311 Neb. 1, 27, 970 N.W.2d 472, 492 (2022) 

(“[a] ‘judgment’ is a court’s final consideration and determination of the 

respective rights and obligations of the parties to an action as those rights 

and obligations presently exist”).
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orders; some categories pertain to actions, 15 and one pertains to 

special proceedings. 16

[6,7] Additionally, in cases that present multiple claims for 

relief or involve multiple parties, § 25-1315(1) permits a trial 

court to certify an otherwise interlocutory order as a final, 

appealable judgment under the limited circumstances set forth 

in the statute. 17 Subsection (1) of that statute provides:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 

third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, 

the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 

one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 

only upon an express determination that there is no just 

reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 

entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 

however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all 

the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all 

the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 

claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 

judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 

liabilities of all the parties.

When a court properly directs the entry of a final judgment 

under § 25-1315(1) as to certain claims or parties, the order 

is treated as a judgment from which an aggrieved party can 

appeal. 18

Here, the Court of Appeals concluded it had appellate jurisdiction, reasoning the order granting partial summary judgment 

15 See § 25-1902(1)(a) and (c).

16 See § 25-1902(1)(b).

17 Castellar Partners, supra note 10.

18 See Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). 

See, also, § 25-1912(1) (providing procedure for appeals from district 

court); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2729(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020) (providing appeal 

procedure from county court).
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was an order affecting a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding and thus was a final order under § 25-1902(1)(b). 

Neither party challenges this conclusion on further review, and 

we express no opinion on the Court of Appeals’ final order 

analysis or the circumstances, if any, under which a summary judgment order granting declaratory relief can satisfy 

the final order requirements of § 25-1902(1)(b). Instead, we 

focus on a different jurisdictional question: Is this a case where 

§ 25-1315(1) is implicated?

The parties addressed this question in their supplemental briefing. Mann argues, summarized, that our appellate 

jurisdiction turns exclusively on the final order requirements in § 25-1902(1)(b). He reasons that “[w]here an order 

already meets the clear statutory definition of a final order 

under [§ 25-1902], a separate order by the trial court designating that same order as final under [§ 25-1315] would 

be superfluous for the purposes of determining appellate 

jurisdiction.” 19 And he contends this case presents a final 

order under § 25-1902(1)(b) because the summary judgment 

order was entered in a special proceeding and affected his 

substantial rights.

Harrison argues that even if the summary judgment order 

was entered in a special proceeding, both § 25-1315(1) and 

§ 25-1902 must be satisfied in this case to confer appellate 

jurisdiction. Harrison argues that § 25-1315(1) is implicated 

here because the case presents multiple claims for relief and 

the summary judgment order resolved only the counterclaim 

for declaratory judgment. She also argues, “There is no indication that the [L]egislature intended to [exempt] custody modification proceedings, or any other type of special proceedings 

from [the] requirements” 20 of § 25-1315.

To address the parties’ competing jurisdictional arguments, 

we begin by reviewing § 25-1315(1) and the pertinent cases 

construing it.

19 Supplemental brief for appellant at 8.

20 Supplemental brief for appellee at 9.
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§ 25-1315(1)

Under Nebraska’s liberal joinder rules, a case can involve 

multiple plaintiffs, multiple defendants, and multiple claims for 

relief, including counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party 

claims. 21 Appellate jurisdiction is relatively straightforward 

when a judgment or decree resolves all claims presented as to 

all parties. But before § 25-1315 was enacted, the rules governing interlocutory appeals in civil cases involving multiple 

claims or multiple parties generally provided:

[A]n order that effected a dismissal with respect to one 

of multiple parties was a final, appealable order, and 

the complete dismissal with prejudice of one of multiple 

causes of action was a final, appealable order, but an 

order dismissing one of multiple theories of recovery, all 

of which arose from the same set of operative facts, was 

not a final order for appellate purposes. 22

Uncertainty in applying these rules in multiclaim, multiparty 

cases prompted some parties to file premature appeals, and 

others to miss appeal deadlines altogether. 23

To clarify and simplify appellate jurisdiction in cases involving multiple claims and multiple parties, 24 the Legislature 

enacted what is now codified as § 25-1315. 25 In enacting § 25-1315, the Legislature attempted to strike a balance 

21 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-311, 25-320, 25-701, and 25-705 (Reissue 

2016).

22 TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard, 307 Neb. 795, 801, 950 N.W.2d 

640, 646 (2020).

23 See, e.g., Thrift Mart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 251 Neb. 448, 

558 N.W.2d 531 (1997), overruled on other grounds, Hornig v. Martel 

Lift Systems, 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000) (missed deadline to 

appeal); Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990) (appeal 

prematurely filed).

24 See Bargmann v. State, 257 Neb. 766, 773, 600 N.W.2d 797, 804 (1999) 

(noting what is now codified as § 25-1315 was enacted to “simplif[y]” 

appellate jurisdiction and “clear[] up many of the questions regarding final 

orders when there are multiple parties and claims”).

25 See § 25-705(6) and (7) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the potential need for making review available at a time that best serves 

the needs of the parties. 26

[8,9] By its terms, § 25-1315(1) is implicated only when a 

case presents more than one claim for relief or involves multiple 

parties, and the court enters an order which adjudicates fewer 

than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than 

all the parties. 27 For purposes of determining whether a case 

presents more than one “claim for relief” under § 25-1315(1), 

we have said the term is not synonymous with “issue” or 

“theory of recovery,” but is instead the equivalent of a “cause 

of action.” 28 Because of this construction, our cases sometimes 

use the phrases “claim for relief” and “cause of action” interchangeably when analyzing whether § 25-1315 is implicated. 29

[10,11] When § 25-1315 is implicated, we have explained 

the consequences this way:

[When a case involves] multiple claims for relief or 

multiple parties, and the court has [entered an order 

adjudicating] fewer than all the claims or the rights and 

liabilities of fewer than all the parties, then, absent a 

specific statute governing the appeal providing otherwise, § 25-1315 controls and mandates that the order is 

not immediately appealable unless the lower court issues 

an “express direction for the entry of judgment” upon 

“an express determination that there is no just reason 

for delay.” 30

26 TDP Phase One, supra note 22.

27 See, Clason, supra note 9; State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v. 

Ricky K., 300 Neb. 179, 912 N.W.2d 747 (2018); Rafert v. Meyer, 298 

Neb. 461, 905 N.W.2d 30 (2017); Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. 

Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017); Cerny, supra note 18.

28 State v. Poindexter, 277 Neb. 936, 766 N.W.2d 391 (2009). See, also, 

Poppert v. Dicke, 275 Neb. 562, 747 N.W.2d 629 (2008).

29 Compare, e.g., Guardian Tax Partners, supra note 27 (cause of action), 

with Cerny, supra note 18 (claim for relief).

30 TDP Phase One, supra note 22, 307 Neb. at 800, 950 N.W.2d at 645-46.
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Further, absent the entry of a final judgment under § 25-1315(1), 

orders adjudicating fewer than all claims against all parties are 

not final and are “‘subject to revision at any time before the 

entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 

liabilities of all the parties.’” 31

Here, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the summary 

judgment order satisfied the final order requirement under 

§ 25-1902, but it did not discuss whether § 25-1315(1) is also 

implicated in this case. As we explain, it is implicated here, 

and because the district court did not certify the order as a final 

judgment under § 25-1315(1), we lack appellate jurisdiction.

§ 25-1315 Is Implicated

Although this case does not involve more than one plaintiff 

or defendant, it does involve multiple claims for relief, and no 

party contends otherwise. Mann’s complaint sought to modify 

child support and the parenting plan under the 2018 decree, 

and Harrison’s answer alleged a counterclaim which sought to 

modify custody. In addition, Harrison filed a counterclaim for 

declaratory judgment, asking that portions of the 2018 decree 

pertaining to Maleah be declared void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Without addressing the propriety of Harrison’s 

choice to attack the validity of the decree through a declaratory 

judgment action, this is plainly a case where the order of partial 

summary judgment adjudicated fewer than all of the claims for 

relief that were permissively joined in this modification case.

We therefore conclude that § 25-1315(1) is implicated here 

because the case involves multiple claims for relief, and the 

court entered an order adjudicating fewer than all of them. 32

And because § 25-1315(1) was implicated, the partial summary 

judgment order resolving the declaratory judgment action was 

not appealable unless the summary judgment order was properly certified under § 25-1315(1) or until all of the claims for 

31 Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 826, 906 N.W.2d 31, 38 (2018). See 

§ 25-1315(1).

32 See Clason, supra note 9.
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relief were resolved. The Court of Appeals thus erred by not 

addressing § 25-1315(1) in its jurisdictional analysis.

Both § 25-1902 and § 25-1315 

Must Be Satisfied

Mann argues that certification under § 25-1315 was unnecessary because “[a]n order for partial summary judgment in a 

custody modification which satisfies [§] 25-1902(1)(b) need 

not also satisfy [§] 25-1315.” 33 His argument is contrary to 

settled precedent and must be soundly rejected. To explain 

why, we begin by reviewing the role that § 25-1902 plays in 

our § 25-1315 jurisprudence.

[12,13] For nearly 20 years, our cases have construed the 

term “final judgment” as used in § 25-1315(1) as “the functional equivalent of a ‘final order’ within the meaning of 

[§ 25-1902].” 34 In other words, we have looked to the final 

order statute to provide the standard for finality 35 that must be 

satisfied for an order to be certified as a “final judgment” under 

§ 25-1315. To that end, our cases hold that “a ‘final order’ is 

a prerequisite to an appellate court’s obtaining jurisdiction of 

an appeal initiated pursuant to § 25-1315(1).” 36 Thus, it is a 

well-settled principle in our § 25-1315 jurisprudence that to be 

appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements 

of § 25-1902 and, where implicated, § 25-1315(1). 37

33 Supplemental brief for appellant at 7.

34 Cerny, supra note 18, 273 Neb. at 805, 733 N.W.2d at 884, citing Bailey 

v. Lund-Ross Constructors Co., 265 Neb. 539, 657 N.W.2d 916 (2003).

35 See Cerny, supra note 18, 273 Neb. at 808, 733 N.W.2d at 885 (explaining 

that § 25-1315(1) requires finality “in the sense that [there] is an ultimate 

disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple 

claims action”).

36 Bailey, supra note 34, 265 Neb. at 546, 657 N.W.2d at 923. See, also, 

Rafert, supra note 27.

37 See Tyrrell v. Frakes, 309 Neb. 85, 958 N.W.2d 673 (2021); Rafert,

supra note 27; Guardian Tax Partners, supra note 27; Connelly v. City 

of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009); Cerny, supra note 18; 

Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100, 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005).
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This principle was applied by the Court of Appeals in the 

2004 case of Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte.

 38 In 

that case, the appellant argued that “§ 25-1315 is not applicable 

to special proceedings, such as condemnation actions, and 

that appeals in such proceedings, irrespective of whether they 

involve multiple claims or multiple parties, are governed only 

by [§ 25-1902].” 39 The Court of Appeals rejected that argument 

and expressly held that when an order resolves one of multiple 

claims in a special proceeding, it is immediately appealable 

only if the order satisfies the requirements of both § 25-1902 

and § 25-1315. This court summarily affirmed.

More recently, this court has issued several opinions which 

illustrate that when § 25-1315(1) is implicated, satisfying 

§ 25-1902 alone is not sufficient to make an order final and 

appealable. For instance, in State on behalf of Marcelo K. & 

Rycki K. v. Ricky K.,

 40 the State filed an action to establish 

child support, and the father filed a counterclaim and crossclaim seeking to disestablish paternity as to one child and 

seeking a custody order regarding the other child. The court 

entered an order that disestablished paternity, and the State 

filed an interlocutory appeal arguing that the order affected 

a substantial right and was entered in a special proceeding. 

We held that § 25-1315(1) was implicated, because the case 

involved multiple parties and multiple claims for relief and the 

order resolved fewer than all claims against all parties. We thus 

concluded that absent § 25-1315(1) certification, we lacked 

appellate jurisdiction.

As relevant to Mann’s argument, our opinion in State on 

behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. expressly rejected the State’s 

suggestion that it was unnecessary to satisfy § 25-1315(1) 

because the order of disestablishment was immediately appealable as a final order under § 25-1902. We reasoned:

38 Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte, 12 Neb. App. 720, 685 N.W.2d 

505 (2004).

39 Id. at 724, 685 N.W.2d at 508.

40 State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K., supra note 27.
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[T]he State does not explain how this would avoid the 

effect of § 25-1315. That section states, “In the absence 

of such determination and direction, any order or other 

form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates 

fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 

fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as 

to any of the claims or parties . . . .” Even if disestablishment was fully adjudicated by [the order being appealed], 

it was asserted with other claims in the overall proceeding. Because the [order being appealed] did not adjudicate 

those other claims, it did not “terminate the action as to 

any of the claims or parties,” including the disestablishment claim. 41

We reached a similar conclusion in TDP Phase One v. The 

Club at the Yard.

 42 There, we found that § 25-1315(1) was 

implicated when a forcible entry and detainer proceeding 43

was joined with actions for breach of contract and breach of 

guaranty, as well as counterclaims alleging fraud and tortious 

interference. When one of the parties attempted to appeal from 

an order of partial summary judgment granting restitution of 

the premises, we determined the order was not immediately 

appealable absent proper certification under § 25-1315(1). And 

because the order of partial summary judgment had not been 

properly certified pursuant to § 25-1315(1), we found it unnecessary to analyze whether the order qualified as a final order 

under § 25-1902.

We applied similar reasoning in Clason v. LOL Investments.

 44

That case involved competing actions to quiet title, joined with 

counterclaims for ejectment and unjust enrichment. When one 

party appealed from an order of partial summary judgment that 

41 Id. at 184, 912 N.W.2d at 750.

42 TDP Phase One, supra note 22.

43 See Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003) 

(describing forcible entry and detainer as special proceeding).

44 Clason, supra note 9.
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resolved only the quiet title claims, we held that § 25-1315(1) 

was implicated because the case involved multiple claims for 

relief and the order of summary judgment adjudicated fewer 

than all such claims. We rejected the appellant’s suggestion 

that satisfying § 25-1902(1)(b) made the order immediately 

appealable, reasoning:

[I]n this case, we need not consider [the appellant’s] argument that the [summary judgment] order is a final order 

under § 25-1902. Even assuming that it is a final order 

for the reason urged by [the appellant], § 25-1315 does 

not permit appeal until either the remaining claims are 

resolved or the court enters judgment under § 25-1315, 

accompanied by an express determination that there is no 

just reason for delay of an appeal. 45

Finally, in Tyrrell v. Frakes,

 46 we held that satisfying 

§ 25-1902 alone was insufficient to make the order final and 

appealable in a case where § 25-1315(1) was implicated. In 

Tyrrell, the appellant permissively joined an application for 

a writ of habeas corpus, which we have described as a special proceeding, 47 with a petition in error. 48 The district court 

quashed the habeas claim, and no appeal was taken from that 

order. Several months later, the court dismissed the petition 

in error, and the appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging 

the denial of habeas relief within 30 days of that dismissal. 

The State argued the appeal was untimely because it was filed 

45 Id. at 910, 957 N.W.2d at 881.

46 Tyrrell, supra note 37.

47 See, Flora v. Escudero, 247 Neb. 260, 266, 526 N.W.2d 643, 647 (1995); 

(“[h]abeas corpus is a special proceeding, civil in character, which 

provides a summary remedy open to persons illegally detained”); In re 

Application of Tail, Tail v. Olson, 144 Neb. 820, 827, 14 N.W.2d 840, 

843-44 (1944) (“we decide that the denial of relator’s application for a 

writ of habeas corpus and the refusal to allow the writ by the district 

court was a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding”).

48 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 2016).
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more than 30 days after the order quashing the habeas claim. 

We disagreed.

Our opinion in Tyrrell acknowledged that an order denying habeas relief generally qualifies as a final order entered 

in a special proceeding. But we explained that because the 

habeas proceeding and the petition in error had been joined in 

a single case, § 25-1315(1) was also implicated. And because 

no proper certification had been issued under § 25-1315(1), 

we concluded the order disposing of the habeas claim did not 

become final and appealable until disposition of the petition 

in error.

[14] Our decisions in Tyrrell, Clason, TDP Phase One, and 

State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. are controlling and 

demonstrate that in cases where § 25-1315(1) is implicated, 

and no more specific statute governs the appeal, 49 an order 

resolving fewer than all claims against all parties is not final 

and appealable if it lacks proper § 25-1315 certification. This 

is so even if the order otherwise satisfies one of the final order 

categories in § 25-1902(1). Thus, Mann is simply incorrect 

when he argues that § 25-1315(1) need not be satisfied so long 

as the order he seeks to appeal satisfies the final order requirements under § 25-1902.

§ 25-1315 Can Be Implicated 

in Special Proceedings

Finally, to the extent Mann can be understood to argue that 

§ 25-1315(1) cannot be implicated in special proceedings, 

49 See R & D Properties v. Altech Constr. Co., 279 Neb. 74, 78, 776 N.W.2d 

493, 496 (2009) (explaining “[t]o the extent there is a conflict between 

two statutes on the same subject, the specific statute controls over the 

general statute,” and finding Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315.03 (Reissue 2016), 

rather than § 25-1315(1), controlled the appeal because it was more 

specific). See, also, TDP Phase One, supra note 22, 307 Neb. at 802, 

950 N.W.2d at 646-47 (acknowledging “[t]o the extent there is a conflict 

between two statutes on the same subject, the specific statute controls 

over the general,” but finding no applicable statute that conflicted with 

§ 25-1315).
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we are unpersuaded. The above-cited cases demonstrate that 

§ 25-1315(1) can be implicated in civil actions, in special proceedings, and in civil actions joined with special proceedings. 

And while we acknowledge that § 25-1315(1), by its terms, 

applies when “more than one claim for relief is presented in 

an action,” 50 our § 25-1315 cases have not construed the term 

“action” as a term of art 51 that equates only to civil actions and 

excludes special proceedings.

We generally construe the term “action” to mean “civil 

action.” 52 And we generally consider civil actions and special 

proceedings to be mutually exclusive. 53 But when the context 

supports it, we have also said “[t]he term ‘action’ is a comprehensive one, and is applicable to almost any proceeding in 

a court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy 

which the law affords.” 54 Our cases construing § 25-1315 illustrate that the term “action” is used in the comprehensive sense, 

to broadly reference civil cases that present multiple claims for 

relief or involve multiple parties.

Asking whether the order at issue was entered in an action or 

a special proceeding does little to inform the threshold inquiry 

of whether § 25-1315 is implicated. As already explained, 

the relevant inquiry for determining whether § 25-1315(1) is 

50 § 25-1315(1) (emphasis supplied).

51 State ex rel. Peterson v. Creative Comm. Promotions, 302 Neb. 606, 614, 

924 N.W.2d 664, 670 (2019) (explaining legal term of art “is a word or 

phrase having a specific, precise meaning in a given specialty apart from 

its general meaning in ordinary contexts”).

52 In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 413, 470 N.W.2d 780, 787 (1991), 

disapproved on other grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 

N.W.2d 350 (1998).

53 See Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 597, 788 

N.W.2d 538, 546 (2010) (“regardless of a statutory remedy’s location 

within Nebraska’s statutes, actions and special proceedings are mutually 

exclusive”).

54 Champion v. Hall County, 309 Neb. 55, 76, 958 N.W.2d 396, 411 (2021) 

(emphasis omitted).
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implicated turns on whether the case presents multiple claims 

for relief or involves multiple parties, as well as whether the 

“order or other form of decision, however designated . . . adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 

fewer than all the parties.” This inquiry is the same whether the 

order at issue was entered in a civil action, a special proceeding, or a case permissively joining the two.

We cannot ignore the reality that under Nebraska’s liberal 

joinder statutes, 55 civil actions and special proceedings can 

be permissively joined in the same civil lawsuit. Here, for 

instance, the parties have permissively joined what is commonly characterized as a civil action 56 with what is commonly 

characterized as a special proceeding. 57 As this case illustrates, 

civil cases involving multiple claims for relief are not always 

amenable to binary classification as either an action or a special proceeding.

[15] We now expressly hold what our prior cases have 

implied: Section 25-1315(1) can be implicated in civil actions, 

in special proceedings, and in civil actions joined with special 

proceedings. Although we remind litigants and judges that not 

every order entered in a special proceeding will necessarily 

implicate § 25-1315(1), 58 we reject Mann’s suggestion that 

special proceedings are categorically exempted from the reach 

of § 25-1315.

55 See §§ 25-701 and 25-705 (Reissue 2016).

56 See, e.g., Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 269 Neb. 631, 694 

N.W.2d 832 (2005) (describing declaratory judgments as actions to which 

§ 25-1315 would apply). But see Graham v. Beauchamp, 154 Neb. 889, 

894, 50 N.W.2d 104, 107 (1951) (“[i]n an action for declaratory judgment 

the matter of entering a declaratory judgment has been held to be one of 

practice and procedure rather than one of jurisdiction. An action for such 

a judgment or relief is a special proceeding . . .”).

57 See cases cited supra note 5.

58 See State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K., supra note 27, citing 

Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family, 297 Neb. 773, 901 N.W.2d 284 (2017); State 

v. Harris, 267 Neb. 771, 677 N.W.2d 147 (2004); Guardian Tax Partners,

supra note 27.
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CONCLUSION

We need not determine whether the order of partial summary judgment is a final order under § 25-1902, because 

even if it is, we conclude § 25-1315(1) is implicated because 

the case involves multiple claims for relief and the summary 

judgment order resolved fewer than all such claims. There has 

been no proper certification under § 25-1315, and we therefore 

lack appellate jurisdiction over this appeal, as did the Court 

of Appeals. We vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision and 

remand the cause with directions to dismiss the appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction.

Vacated and remanded with directions.