MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2020	ME 42 Docket: Cum

- 19

- 192 Argued: December	6,	2019 Decided: April	2,	2020 Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY , and	HJELM ,	JJ. *

U.S.	BANK	NATIONAL	ASSOCIATION	AS	TRUSTEE	FOR	RASC	2005KS9

v. THOMAS	MANNING

HUMPHREY,	J. [¶1]		U.S.	Bank	National	Association	as	Trustee	 for	RASC	2005KS9	(the Bank),	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court	 (Cumberland	 County, Wheeler,	 J. )	 granting	 Thomas	 Manning ’ s	 motion	 for	 reconsideration	 and dismissing	 with	 prejudice	 the	 Bank ’ s	 foreclosure	 complaint.	 	 The	 Bank	 also appeals	 from an	 order	 of sanctions	 imposed	 by	 the	 court	 ( L. Walker,	 J. ) following	a	judicial	settlement	conference. [¶ 2 ]	 	 The	 procedural	 record	 of	 this	 case	 stretches	 back	 to	 2010 and includes	 one	 prior	 appeal	 in	 which	 we	 vacated	 the	 trial	 court ’ s	 judgment

* Although	 Justice	 Alexander	 participated	 in	 the	 appeal, he retired	 before	 this	 opinion	 was certified. Justice	Hjelm	sat	at	oral	argument	and participated	in	the	initial	conference	while	he	was	a n Associate Justice,	 and,	 on	 order	 of	 the Senior	 Associate Justice,	 was	 authorized	 to	 continue	 his participation	in	his	capacity as	an	Active	Retired	Justice.2 dismissing	the	Bank ’ s	foreclosure	complaint	with	prejudice. See U.S.	Bank	Nat ’ l
Ass ’ n	v.	Manning	(Manning	I) ,	2014	ME	96,	¶ ¶	1, 20,	97	A.3d	605 .		In	this	appeal, we	are	 asked again	 to	determine	whether	 the	court	 abused	its	 discretion	by dismissing	with	prejudice	the	Bank ’ s	foreclosure	complaint.		After	review,	we affirm	 the	 sanctions	 imposed	 by	 the	 court	 ( L.	 Walker,	 J. )	 following	 the settlement	conference	and	vacate	the	court ’ s ( Wheeler,	J. )	judgment	dismissing the	Bank ’ s	complaint	with	prejudice.		We	remand	the	matter	with	instruction s to	dismiss	the	Bank ’ s	foreclosure	complaint without prejudice.
I.		BACKGROUND
A. Foreclosure	Complaint	and	Prior	Appeal [¶ 3 ]		On	August	2,	2005, Manning	signed	a	promissory	note	in	the	amount of	$520,000	listing	Mortgage	Lenders	Network USA,	Inc. , as	the	lender , and,	in order	 to	 secure	 the	 note,	 executed	 and	 delivered	 a	 mortgage	 to	 Mortgage Electronic	Registration	Systems,	Inc.,	as	the	nominee	of the	lender.		On	May	24, 2010,	 the	 Bank	 filed	 a	 complaint	 for	 foreclosure	 against	 Manning, and it amended the	complaint on	July	15,	2010. [¶ 4 ]	 	 More	 than	 three	 years	 after	 the	 complaint	 was	 filed,	 the	 court ( Wheeler,	J. ) dismissed	the	Bank ’ s	complaint	with	prejudice	because	the Bank had failed	 to	 timely	 pay	 a	 $150	 sanction. See	 Manning	 I ,	 2014	 ME	 96,	 ¶	 3,3
97 A.3d	605	(chronicling	the	previous	pre

- trial	history	of	this	case).		Following the	 Bank ’ s	 timely	 appeal,	 we	 held	 that	 the	 court	 abused its	 discretion	 in dismissing	 the	 complaint,	 vacated	 the	 judgment,	 and	 remanded	 the	 case	 for further	proceedings. See	id. ¶¶	14

- 20.
B. Proceedings	After	Remand
1. Initial	Proceedings	Following	Remand [¶ 5 ]	 	Upon	 remand,	 the	 court	 held	 a	 status	 conference	 o n	October	 14, 2014,	 set	 a	 discovery	 deadline	 of	 March	 6,	 2015,	 and	 scheduled	 a	 judicial settlement	 conference to	 be	 held “in	 March	 including	 [a]	 Bank	 official	 with authority	to	settle.”		On	February	3,	2015,	the	Bank

— to	address	the	issue	of	its standing	in light	of	our	decision	in Bank	of	America,	N.A.,	v.	Greenleaf ,	2014	ME 89,	 96	 A.3d	 700

— filed	 a	 motion	 to	 amend	 its	 complaint	 and	 to	 stay	 the foreclosure	 proceeding.	 	 Manning	 opposed	 the	 Bank ’ s	 motion	 and,	 instead, moved	for	summary	judgment	because	the	Ban k	lacked	standing	to	foreclose.
See M.R.	Civ.	P.	56.		The	Bank	opposed	the	motion	for	summary	judgment	and moved	to	voluntarily	dismiss	its	complaint	without	prejudice. 1 See M.R.	Civ.	P. 41(a)(2).		Manning	opposed	the requested dismissal.

1 In	its	motion,	the	Bank	acknowledged	that the	originating	lender,	Mortgage	Lenders	Network USA,	Inc. ,	was	no	longer	in	business	and	requested	that,	in	light	of	our	decisions	in Bank	of	America,4 [¶ 6 ]		On	June 1,	2015,	the	court	entered	an	order	addressing	the	parties ’ pending	 motions.	 	 First,	 the	 court	 denied	 Manning ’ s	 motion	 for	 summary judgment,	 reasoning	 that , because	it	 “lack[ed]	 subject	matter	jurisdiction,” it could	not	enter	a	final	judgment	on	the	merits	of	the	Bank ’ s	complaint

. Second, the	 court	 granted	 the	 Bank ’ s	 motion	 to	 voluntarily	 dismiss	 its	 complaint without	prejudice. 2 [¶ 7 ]	 	 Two	 weeks	 later,	 on	 June	 15,	 Manning	 filed	 a	 motion	 for reconsideratio n	of	the	court ’ s	order,	which	the	Bank	opposed. See M.R.	Civ.	P. 7(b)(5).		Manning	argued	that	the	court ’ s	June 1	order	incorrectly	implied	that the	court had heard	oral	argument	from	the	parties , and he	asserted	that the court	had	subject	matter	jurisdic tion	over	all	residential	foreclosures. [¶ 8 ]	 	 On	 July	 1,	 2015,	 Manning	 filed	 a	 letter	 alerting	 the	 court	 to	 the then

- pending appeal	in Bank	of	America	v.	Greenleaf ,	2015	ME	127,	124	A.3d
1122 ( Greenleaf	 II ) , and	 suggest ed that,	 because	 the	 anticipated	 decision	 in Greenleaf	II “may	address	or	inform	the	question	posed	here:	whether	a	lack	of standing	removes	subject	matter	jurisdiction,”	the	court	stay	all	briefing	on	his

N.A.,	v.	Greenleaf ,	2014	ME	89,	96	A.3d	700 and CitiMortgage,	Inc.	v.	Chartier ,	2015	ME	17,	111	A.3d 39 ,	the	complaint	be	dismissed	without	prejudice.

2 In	its	order,	the	court	also	declined	to	award	costs	or	fees	to	Manning.5 motion	 to	 reconsider	until	a	decision	in Greenleaf	 I I was	issued.		On	 July	16, 2015,	the	court	granted	the	parties ’ joint	motion	to	stay	further	proceedings	on the	motion	for	reconsideration	until	thirty	days	after	the	decision	in Greenleaf II was	issued. [¶ 9 ]		We	issued	our	decision	in Greenleaf	II on	Se ptember	22,	2015. [¶1 0 ]		On	October	15,	2015,	the	court	granted	Manning ’ s	“consented

- to” motion	 to	continue	 the	stay	until	November	6,	2015.		A	week	later,	 the	court ordered	that	a	judicial	settlement	conference	be	set	for	“early	December”	and that	the	c ase	remain	stayed	until	after	the	settlement	conference. [¶1 1 ]		On	December	4,	2015,	Manning	requested	a	conference with the court	and	counsel for	the	parties .		On	February	26,	2016,	the	Bank	objected	to Manning ’ s	 request	 and	 moved	 to	 lift	 the	 July	 16,	 2 015,	 stay	 on	 Manning ’ s motion	for	reconsideration.		The	Bank pointed	out that	it	had	been	eight	months since	Manning	filed	his	motion	and	five	months	since	the	decision	in Greenleaf
II was	issued.		Manning	opposed	the	Bank ’ s	motion	to	lift	the	stay. [¶1 2 ]		Four	months	later,	on	July	13,	2016,	the	Bank	filed	a	letter	with	the court,	inquiring	about	the	status	of	the	pending	motions	regarding	Manning ’ s request	for	a	conference	and	the	Bank ’ s motion to	lift	the	July	16,	2015,	stay.6 On	July	25,	2016,	the	court	ordered	that	a	settlement	conference	be	scheduled “within	the	next	sixty	days.”
2. Judicial	Settlement	Conferences [¶1 3 ]	 	 On	 September	 23,	 2016,	 the	 court	 ( L. Walker,	 J. )	 conducted	 a settlement	 conference	 with	 the	 parties,	 but the	 case	 was	 not	 settled. 3 On October	 12,	 2016,	 the same	 judge	 who	 had	 served	 as	 the	 mediator held	 a follow

- up	telephone	conference	with	counsel , a fter which	the	court	ordered	the parties	to	brief	the	issues	addressed	during	the telephone conference,	inc luding whether	 the	 Bank had “complied	 with	 the	 court ’ s	 order	 to	 have	 present	 all persons	 with	 full	 settlement	 authority	 who	 [were]	 prepared	 to	 make reasonable	concessions.” [¶1 4 ]	 	 On	 November	 18,	 2016,	 Manning	 filed	 a	 motion	 for	 contempt against	the	Bank for	its	conduct	at	the	settlement	conference,	arguing	that	the Bank had “fail[ed]	to	produce	a	representative	with	authority	to	settle,”	made misrepresentations	 to	 the	 court,	 and	 failed	 to	 negotiate	 in	 good	 faith.	 	 On April 11,	2017,	the	court	ordered	the	parties	to	“negotiate	fastidiously	in	good

3 In	an	order	entered	on	July	20,	2018,	the	court	stated	that,	at	the	settlement	conference,	“the Bank	represented	to	the	court that	better	terms	could	not	be	offered	unless	the	[pooling	and	servicing agreement]	was	 reformed. [The]	 court	 relied	 on	 the	 Bank’s	 representations	 and	 terminated	 the [settlement	conference] without	reaching	[a]	settlement.”7 faith”	 in	 order	 to	 resolve	 all	 claims	 and,	 if	 no	 agreement	 was	 reached	 by April 28,	 the	 court	 would	 hold	 a	 one

- day	 testimonial	 hearing	 on	 Manning ’ s motion	for	contempt. 4 [¶1 5 ]		On October	6,	2017,	Manning	filed	a	renewed	motion	for	contempt, arguing	 that	 the	 court	 should	 dismiss	 the	 Bank ’ s	 foreclosure	 complaint	with prejudice	 “or,	 in	 the	 alternative,	 hold	 the	 Bank	 in	 contempt	 and	 impose sanctions.”		The	court	held	a	hearing	on	the motion	on	February	9,	2018,	and conducted	a	second	judicial	settlement	conference	on	May	18,	2018. [¶1 6 ]		On	July	20,	2018,	the	court	granted	Manning ’ s	motion	for	contempt and	imposed	sanctions	on	the	Bank,	ordering	it	to	pay	Manning ’ s	attorney	fees and costs	 “associated	 with	 preparation	 for	 and	 attendance [at] both J udicial
S ettlement C onferences.”		The	court	found	that	the	Bank had “failed	to	comply with	 the	 court ’ s	 order	 regarding	 the	 judicial	 settlement	 conference,	 despite having	the	ability	to	do	so. ”		The	court	“stop[ped]	short”	of	dismissing	the	case with	prejudice,	and	left	it	to	the	trial	court	to	“consider	the	[Bank ’ s]	conduct	.	.	.

4 On	May	12,	2017,	the	Bank	filed	a	motion	to	vacate	the	court’s	April	11,	2017,	order,	arguing that	 “the	 foreclosure	 action	is	 non

- justiciable	 [because]	 the	 court	 relinquished	its	 subject	matter jurisdiction	over	the	parties	and the claims	by	 the	entry	of the	 June	1,	2015,	order	dismissing	the case.”		On	September	8,	2017,	the	court	denied	the	Bank’s	motion.8 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 litigation	 generally	 as	 to	 whether	 dismissal	 with prejudice	is	justified	as	a	final	dispos ition”	of	the	case. 5 [¶1 7 ]		By	this	time,	it	had	been	more	than	three	years	since	the	court ’ s June 1,	 2015,	 order	 dismissing	 the	 Bank ’ s	 foreclosure	 complaint	 without prejudice	and	Manning ’ s	subsequent	June	15,	2015,	motion	for	reconsideration.
3. Motio n	to	Reconsider the June	1,	2015,	Order [¶1 8 ]	 	 On	 September	 11,	 2018,	 Manning	 filed	 a	 motion	 to	 set	 a	 final briefing	 schedule	 on	 his	 pending	 motion	 for	 reconsideration	 and	 motion	 to extend	the	existing	stay ,	which	had	been	in	effect	since July	16,	2015.		The	court ( Wheeler,	J. )	 granted	 the	motion	 to	 continue	 the	 stay	 and	 set	 a	 final	 briefing schedule.		On	January	17,	2019,	Manning	filed	a	brief	in	support	of	his	pending motion	 for	reconsideration,	requesting	 that	 the	court	dismiss	 the	 fore closure complaint	with	prejudice	and	award	Manning	attorney	fees.		In	response,	the Bank	argued	that	the	court	should	not	rely	on	the	events	that	occurred	after	the June	 1,	 2015,	 dismissal	 without	 prejudice	 when	 evaluating	 the	 motion	 for reconsideration.

5 On	July	31,	2018,	the	Bank	filed	a	motion	to	reconsider	the	court’s	July	20	order,	arguing	that the	court	erred	in	imposing	sanctions	on	the	Bank for	a	period	of	time	in	which	Manning	refused	to compromise.		The	court	denied	the	motion	on	August	30.9 [¶1 9 ]	 	 On	 April	 24,	 2019,	 the	 court	 granted	 Manning ’ s	 June	 15,	 2015, motion	to	reconsider	the	court ’ s	June	1,	2015,	order.		The	court	dismissed	with prejudice	the	Bank ’ s	foreclosure	complaint	as	a	sanction	for	the	Bank ’ s	failure to	cooperate	with	discovery	requests,	disregard	of	court	orders,	and	conduct	at the	judicial	settlement	conference,	and	also	awarded	Manning	his	attorney	fees from	 July	19,	2018

— the	date	 the	Bank	was	 sanctioned	 for	its	conduct	at	 the judicial	set tlement	conferences

— to	the	conclusion	of	the	case. [¶ 20 ]	 	 The	 Bank	 then	 filed	 a	 timely	 notice	 of	 appeal. See M.R.	 App.	 P. 2B(c)(2).
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 2 1]		 The	 Bank	contends	 that	 the	court	abused	its	 discretion	when	it (1) required	the	parties	to	partic ipate	in	a	settlement	conference	after	staying Manning ’ s	 motion	 for	 reconsideration,	 (2)	 imposed	 sanctions	 on	 the	 Bank following	 the	 settlement	 conference,	 and	 (3)	 granted	 the	 motion	 for reconsideration	and	dismissed	the	foreclosure	complaint	with	prejudic e.		We address	each	in	turn.10
A. Judicial	Settlement	Conference
1. Orders	to	Hold	a	Settlement	Conference [¶ 22 ]		The	Bank	argues	that	the	court	abused	its	discretion	by	extending the	July	16,	2015,	stay	on	Manning ’ s	motion	for	reconsideration	and	“forcing” the	Bank	to	participate	in	the	judicial	settlement	conference.		We	review	court orders	 supervising	 and	 managing	 proceedings	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion.
See Geary	v.	Stanley ,	2007	ME	 133,	¶	12,	931	A.2d	 1064 ; see	 also M.R.	Civ.	P. 16(a)

- (b).	 	 “The	 touchsto ne	 of	 determining	 whether	 the	 court	 has	 properly exercised	its	discretion	is	whether	in	a	given	case	that	discretion	is	exercised	in furtherance	of	justice.” Unifund	CCR Partners v.	Demers ,	2009	ME	19,	¶	8,	966 A.2d	400 (alterations	omitted) (quotation	ma rks	omitted)

. [¶ 23 ]		Here,	upon	remand	in	2014,	the	court	ordered	the	parties	to	attend a	settlement	conference. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	16(b). A settlement conference	was

not held	 because,	 in	 part,	 the	 Bank	 filed	 a	 motion	 to	 voluntarily	 dismiss	 its complaint	without	prejudice,	which	was	granted by	 the	court

. Manning then filed a motion	for	reconsideration	of	the	dismissal and,	at the	parties ’ request ,11 the	 court	 staye d Manning ’ s	 motion	 in	 anticipation	 of	 our	 decision	 in Greenleaf II

. 6 [¶ 24 ] During	 this	stay,	 the	court	again	 ordered	 the	parties	 to	attend	a settlement	conference and extended	 the	 stay	 until	 after	 that	conference	was held.		A	settlement	conference eventually took place	on	September	23,	2016; however, it	 was	 unsuccessful	 and,	 on	 November 18,	 2016,	 Manning	 filed	 a motion	 for	 contempt	 based	 on	 the	 Bank ’ s	 alleged	 conduct	 at	 the	 settlement conference.		This	was	followed	by	a	hearing	on	Manning ’ s	motion for	contempt and	a	second	unsuccessful	settlement	conference. [¶ 25 ] In	the	circumstances	of	this	case,	where Manning	filed	a	motion	for reconsideration	and	the	parties	then	both	agreed	to	stay	further	proceedings on	that	motion, t he court ’ s	decision	to	require	the	p arties	to	attend	a	settlement conference	 was	 “exercised	 in	 furtherance	 of	 justice,” Unifund	 CCR Partners , 2009	ME	19,	¶	8,	966	A.2d	400, and,	thus,	was	not	an	abuse	of	discretion. 7

6 Manning’s motion	for	reconsideration,	which	we	treat	as	a	motion	to	alter	or	amend	a	judgment, s ee Arsenault	v.	Arsenault ,	2008	ME	75,	¶	5,	946	A .2d	412 ;	M.R.	Civ.	P.	59(e) , “ suspend [ed] the	finality of	the	initial	judgment	and	defer [red] the	running	of	the	appeal	period , ” Most	v.	Most , 477	A.2d	250, 258 n.12 (Me.	1984)

.
7 Although	we	 do	 not	 take	issue	with	 the	 court’s	 decision	 to	 require	 a settlement	 conference during	the	stay ,	the	court’s	management	of	this	case ,	in	general, did	not	comport	with	“the	overall purpose	 of	 the	 [Maine]	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure,	 which	 is	 to	 ensure	 the	 speedy	 and	inexpensive resolution	of	a	case.” Merrifield	v.	H adlock ,	2009	ME	1,	¶	6,	961	A.2d	1107 (discussing	a	pretrial scheduling	order); see M.R.	Civ.	P.	1

.12
2. Sanctions	Imposed	at	Settlement	Conference [¶ 26 ]	 	 The	 Bank	 also	 challeng es	 the	 sanctions	 imposed	 by	 the	 court ( L. Walker,	 J. )	 following	 the	 settlement	 conference,	 arguing	 that	 the	 court abused	its	discretion	when	it	attempted	“to	force	[the	Bank]	to	settle	and	accept Manning ’ s	settlement	demands.”		We	review	a	court ’ s	imposition	of	sanctions for	an	abuse	of	discretion. See Bayview	Loan	Servicing ,	LLC v.	Bartlett ,	2014	ME 37,	¶	10,	87	A.3d	741

. [¶ 27 ]		A	court	may	conduct	a	settlement	conference	and	direct	the	parties to	appear	and	“participate	in	good	faith.”		M.R. Civ.	P.	16(b).		If	a	party	fails	to comply	with	a	pretrial	rule	or	order,	a	court	may	impose	“such	sanctions	as	the circumstances	 warrant,”	 including	 a	 dismissal	 of	 the	 action	 or	 an	 award	 of attorney	fees.		M.R.	Civ.	P.	16(d).		“Although	the	court	cannot	f orce	a	settlement on	the	parties,	the	failure	to	negotiate	in	good	faith	may	lead	to	an	abuse	of	the litigation	process	and	be	sanctionable.” Chiappetta	v.	LeBlond ,	544	A.2d	759, 761	(Me.	1988) (citation	omitted).		A	court	also	has	“the	inherent	authority to sanction	a	party ’ s	failure	to	comply	with	the	rules.” Baker ’ s	Table,	Inc.	v.	City	of Portland ,	2000	ME	7,	¶	1 6 ,	743	A.2d	237 ; see Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC v.	Cope , 2017	 ME	 68,	 ¶	 18,	 158	 A. 3 d	 931 (stating	 that	 even	 when	 a	 plaintiff	 lacks13 standing,	 a	 “ court	 is	 not	 divested	 of	 its	 inherent	 authority	 to	 dismiss	 the complaint	with	prejudice	as	a	sanction	for	misconduct”). [¶ 28 ]		When	imposing	sanctions,	a	court	must	consider	certain	factors, including	“(1)	the	purpose	of	the	specific	rule	at	issue;	(2)	the party ’ s	conduct throughout	 the	 proceedings;	 (3)	 the	 party ’ s	 basis	 for	 its	 failure	 to	 comply; (4) prejudice	to	other	parties;	and	(5)	the	need	for	the	orderly	administration of	justice.” Bayview	Loan	Servicing ,	LLC ,	2014	ME	37,	¶	12,	87	A.3d	741. [¶ 29 ]		In	this	case,	the	court	possessed	the	authority	to	impose	sanctions on	 the	 Bank	 for	 its	 conduct	 at	 the	 settlement	 conference. See Green	 Tree Servicing,	LLC ,	2017	ME	68,	¶	18,	158	A. 3 d	931; Baker ’ s	Table,	Inc. ,	2000	ME	7, ¶	1 6 ,	743	A.2d	237.		At	the	Feb ruary	9,	2018,	hearing	on	Manning ’ s	motion	for sanctions,	the	court	found,	and	the	Bank	acknowledged,	that	the	Bank had failed

to ensure	that a	person	with	“full	authority”	to	settle	at tended the	settlement conference.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 i ts	 discretion	 in	 imposing sanctions	for	the	Bank ’ s	conduct	during	the	settlement	conference. See Bayview Loan	Servicing , LLC ,	2014	ME	37,	¶	23,	87	A.3d	741.
B. Motion	for	Reconsideration [¶ 30 ]		 The	 Bank	contends	 that	 the	court	abused	its	 discretion	when it granted	Manning ’ s	motion	 for	reconsideration	and	dismissed	 the	 foreclosure14 complaint	with	prejudice,	arguing	 that	 the	court	improperly	relied	on	events that	occurred	after	it	entered	the	original	dismissal	order	on	June	1,	2015. [¶ 3 1]	 	 Manning ’ s	 motio n	 for	 reconsideration	 was	 filed	 pursuant	 to Rule 7(b)(5)	 of	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	 and	 was	 directed	 at	 the

court ’ s	original	 June	1,	2015,	order,	which both	denied	Manning ’ s	motion	 for summary	judgment	and	granted	the	Bank ’ s	motion	to	voluntaril y	dismiss	the foreclosure	action	without	prejudice. To	the	extent that Manning ’ s	motion for reconsideration challenged	the	court ’ s	order	denying	his	motion	for	summary judgment,	we	treat	it	as	a	motion	to	reconsider	the	court ’ s	order	in	accordance with	 Ru le	 7(b)(5);	 however,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 Manning ’ s	 motion	 sought	 a reconsideration	 of	 the	 court ’ s judgment dismissing	 the	 complaint	 without prejudice, we	treat	his	motion	for	reconsideration	as	a	motion	to	alter	or	amend the	judgment. 8 See Arsenault	v.	Ars enault ,	2008	ME	75,	¶	5,	946	A.2d	412 ;	M.R. Civ.	P.	59(e); see	also Geary	v.	Stanley	Med.	Research	In s t. ,	2008	ME	9,	¶ 10,	939

8 See M.R.	Civ.	P.	7,	Advisory	Committee’s	Notes	May	1,	2000	(“A	new	subdivision	(b)(5)	is	added to	 address	 the	 continuing	 confusion	 about	 motions	 for	 reconsideration. A	 corresponding amendment	has	been	made	to	Rule	59	to	provide	explicitly	that	a	motion	to	re consider	a	judgment	is a	Rule	59	motion	 to	alter	or	amend	 the	judgment.”);	M.R.	Civ.	P.	59,	Advisory	Committee’s	Notes May 1,	 2000	 (“Rule	 59(e)	is	 amended	 to	 add	 a	 new	 last	 sentence	 making	 clear	 that	 a	 motion	 to reconsider	the	judgment	is	a	motion	to	alter or	amend	the	judgment,	thereby	removing	confusion	as to	whether	the	appeal	period	is	suspended	until	the	court	can	dispose	of	the	motion.”).15 A.2d	86 (stating	that	a	denial	of	a	motion	for	summary	judgment	is	not	a	final judgment). [¶ 32 ]		We	 review for	an	 abuse	 of	discretion a	court ’ s	 ruling	 on	both	 a motion	 for	 reconsideration	 of	 an	 order	 and	 a	 motion	 to	 alter	 or	 amend	 a judgment. See Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC ,	2017	ME	68,	¶	12,	158	A.3d	931 ; Shaw v.	Shaw ,	2003	ME	153,	¶	7,	8 3 9	A.2d	714 .		In	each instance,	our	review	for	an abuse	of	discretion	“involves	 three	questions:	(1)	whether	 the	court ’ s	 factual findings	 are	 supported	 by	 the	 record	 according	 to	 the	 clear	 error	 standard, (2) whether	 the	 court	 understood	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 it s discretion,	 and	 (3)	 whether	 the	 court ’ s	 weighing	 of	 the	 applicable	 facts	 and choices	was	within	the	bounds	of	reasonableness.” Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC , 2017	ME	68,	¶	12,	158	A.3d	931

. [¶ 33 ]	 	 We	 also	 “closely	 review” for	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion a	 court ’ s dismissal	with	prejudice	of	a	 foreclosure	complaint. Manning	 I ,	2014	ME	96, ¶ 12,	97	A.3d	605.	“Due	to	the	severity	of	dismissal	.	.	.	and	the	constitutional implications	of	such	an	action	.	.	.	the	trial	court ’ s	discretion	in	imposing	[this] ultimate sanction	is	narrow	indeed	and	will	be	given	close	scrutiny	on	appeal.” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted).16 [¶ 34 ]		A	motion	for	reconsideration	of	an	order	“shall	not	be	filed	unless required	 to	bring	 to	 the	court ’ s	attention	an	error,	omission	or	new	material that	 could	 not	 previously	 have	 been	 presented.”	 	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 7(b)(5). “Rule 7(b)(5)	 is	 intended	 to	 deter	 disappointed	 litigants	 from	 seeking ‘ to reargue	 points	 that	 were	 or	 could	 have	 been	 presented	 to	 the	 court	 on	 the underlying	 motion. ’ ” Shaw ,	 2003	 ME 153,	 ¶	 8,	 8 3 9	 A.2d	 714	 (quoting	 M.R.
Civ. P.	7,	Advisory	Committee ’ s	Notes	(May	1,	2000)); see Roalsvik	v.	Comack , 2019	 ME	 71,	 ¶	 3,	 208	 A.3d	 367 (affirming	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 for reconsideration	 when	 the	 motion	 presented	 “allegations	 of	 events	 that occurred	only	after	the	hearing	was	held	and	the	record	was	closed”). [¶ 35 ]		Similarly,	when	ruling	on	a	motion	to	alter	or	amend	a	judgment,	a

cou rt	is	“free	within	a	very	limited	time	period	to	alter	or	amend	its	judgment when	convinced	it	was	erroneous,	and	 substitute	 the	proper	judgment	in	its place.” Most	v.	Most ,	477	A.2d	250,	258	(Me.	1984) .		When	doing	so,	a	court	“is not	 free	 to	 litigate	 an ew	 .	 .	 .	 [and]	 may	 only	 re

- examine	 those	 facts	 already presented	 to	determine	whether	an	error	 of	law	 or	 fact	has	 taken	 place	and whether	substantial	justice	has	been	rendered.” Id. at	260; see Perez	v.	Lorraine
Enters. ,	769	F.3d	23,	32	(1st	Cir.	2014) (s tating	that	Fed.	R.	Civ.	P.	59(e)	“does17 not	permit	a	party	to	turn	back	the	clock,	erase	the	record,	and	try	to	reinvent its	case	after	an	adverse	judgment	has	entered”). [¶ 36 ] Here ,	 in	 granting	 the	 motion	 for	 reconsideration,	 the	 court reasoned	that	its dismissal	of	the	Bank ’ s	foreclosure	complaint	with	prejudice was	warranted	by	the	Bank ’ s	failure	to	cooperate	in	discovery,	its unwillingness to	 follow	 court	 orders,	 and	 its	 failure	 to	 negotiate	 in	 good	 faith	 during	 the judicial	settlement	conference	proce ss ,	which	occurred	after	the	order	that	was being	reconsidered

. M uch	of	this	conduct	was	already	addressed	following	the settlement	conference	when	the	court	( L. Walker,	J. )	sanctioned	the	Bank	for	its failure	to	follow	court	orders	or	negotiate	in	good	f aith.		In	effect,	two	different judges	sanctioned	the	same	party	for	the	same	alleged	misconduct. [¶ 37 ]		The	trial	court ( Wheeler,	J. ) abused	its	discretion	in	both	granting Manning ’ s	 motion	 for	 reconsideration	 and	 imposing	 sanctions	 on	 the	 Bank, which	inc luded	a	dismissal	with	prejudice	of	the	Bank ’ s	foreclosure	complaint. As	such,	we	remand	the	matter	to	the	trial	court	with	instruction	to	dismiss	the Bank ’ s	 complaint without prejudice,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 court ’ s	 original June 1,	2015,	order. The	e ntry	is: Order imposing	 sanctions for	 conduct at settlement	 conference	 affirmed.	 	 Judgment18 imposing	 sanctions	 and	 dismissing	 complaint with	prejudice	vacated.		Remanded	for	trial	court to	 dismiss	 the	 Bank ’ s	 foreclosure	 complaint without	prejudice.

Brett	L.	Messinger,	Esq. (orally) ,	and	Elizabeth	M.	Lacombe,	Esq.,	Portland,	for appellant	US	Bank	NA Kelly	 W.	 McDonald,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Murray,	 Plumb	 &	 Murray,	 Portland,	 for appellee	Thomas	Manning

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	RE

- 2011

- 20 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY