* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the un derlying administrative decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

*** Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation

.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/6/97 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LEON HILL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-7046 (D.C. No. CV-95-195) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, *** District Judge.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Leon Hill appeals from the district court’ s order affirming the denial of his application for supplemental securityincome benefits by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). After his claim was denied administratively, a hearing was held before an admi nistrative law judge (ALJ) who denied benefits at step four of the five-step s equential evaluation process. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing five steps). The ALJ concluded that claimant could perf orm his past work as a bus driver. The Appeals Council denied review. The di strict court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to uphold the Sec retary’s decision, and claimant now appeals to this court. We affirm. We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whe ther the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence based onthe entire record, and to ascertain whether she applied the correct legal sta ndards. Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Soliz v. Chate r , 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir.-3-

1996)(quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(further quotation omitted)). We do not reweigh the evidence. Hamilt on v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 961 F.2d 1495, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). Claimant alleges disability due to pain in his back , chest and shoulder, numbness and weakness in his left hand and leg, mem ory deficits and other residuals of a mild stroke. He maintains the ALJ c ommitted the following errors in arriving at the decision to deny him benefits: (1) the ALJ did not obtain a consultative evaluation of claimant’s arm impairmen t, (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated claimant’s credibility and failed to linkthe testimony to the other evidence, (3) the ALJ’s evaluation of claimant’s re sidual functional capacity was flawed, and (4) the ALJ erred in characterizing cla imant’s past work as light work because the Dictionary of Occupational Titles lists bus driver as medium work. Claimant maintains that a consultative evaluation w as necessary to evaluate his arm impairment. Relying on the reports of the consulting physician and the psychological tester, he claims that the evidence available to the ALJ was inadequate to ascertain the extent of his manipulat ive impairment. The consulting physician stated that claimant’s “grip strength was slightly decreasedon the left.” Appellant’s app. vol. II at 98 (emphasis added). T he psychological tester noted that claimant’s hands trembled significantly during the psychological testing. The ALJ did not credit as medical evidence the tester’s observation that claimant’s-4-

hands trembled because the tester was not a physici an, and the medical evidence did not support a finding that claimant’s hands or arms were significantly impaired. The ALJ gave specific, legitimate reason s for rejecting the tester’s remarks about claimant’s manipulative problems. Cf

. Miller v. Chater , 99 F.3d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1996)(ALJ must give specific, l egitimate reasons for rejecting treating physician’s opinion). Because the medical evidence from the consulting physician was adequate to evaluate claimant’s condi tion, the ALJ was not required to obtain a consultative evaluation of cla imant’s arms and hands. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(where medical evidence is i nadequate to determine whether claimant is disabled, additional informatio n will be sought). Claimant next asserts that the ALJ improperly asses sed his credibility because the ALJ failed to link his conclusion to th e evidence. Claimant produced medical evidence to establish that he suffered from a pain-producing impairment; therefore, the ALJ was required to evaluate his subjective complaints of disabling pain, and to “decide whether he believe[d them].” Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)(quotation omitted). In evaluating a claimant’s pain, an ALJ should consider factors such as the levels of medication and their effectiveness, t he extensiveness of the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain reli ef, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities , subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and-5-

other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibili ty of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence. Id. (quotations omitted). Here, the ALJ considered the relevant factors, noti ng that the medical evidence indicated that claimant’s chest pains resp onded to medication, he had full function of his upper extremities, he had no n eurological deficits or muscle weakness, he had only mild to moderate degenerative spinal disease, and there was no evidence of considerable progressive changes in his back condition. The ALJ also noted that claimant had not required exten sive medical treatment since 1986, and did not require prescription medications. In addition, the ALJ considered claimant’s daily activities. Under the circumstances, we will defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination. Gay v. Sulliv an , 986 F.2d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1993). Next we address claimant’s argument that the ALJ’s evaluation of his residual functional capacity (RFC) was flawed. In addition to the arguments discussed above regarding evaluation of his manipul ative impairment and his credibility, claimant asserts that the ALJ failed t o point to specific evidence to support his finding that claimant retains the RFC f or light work with occasional medium exertion job functions. On the contrary, th e ALJ’s review of the testimony and documentary evidence demonstrates sub stantial evidence to support the RFC determination.-6-

Finally, we address claimant’s argument that the AL J erred in characterizing claimant’s past work as light work, contrary to the classification in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Claimant be ars the burden to show that he cannot perform his particular former job or his former occupation as generally performed throughout the national economy. Andrade v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 985 F.2d 1045, 1051 (10th Cir. 1993); Social Secu rity Ruling 82-61. The ALJ determined that claimant could perf orm his specific job as a bus driver. Therefore, the ALJ was not bound by the cl assification of bus driver in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. We have carefully reviewed the record and we have c onsidered claimant’s arguments in light of the record. We conclude thatsubstantial evidence supports the determination that claimant could perform his p ast work as a bus driver, and therefore, he was not disabled within the meaning o f the Social Security Act. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge-7-