* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

______________________________

No.96-60643

(Summary Calender)

______________________________

TONY TILLMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF WEST POINT,

MISSISSIPPI

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________

Appeal From the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(No. 1:95-CV-198-S-D)

____________________________________________

February 17, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This is an appeal by a former city policeman who challenges

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Defendant-Appellee City of West Point, Mississippi (the City).

Plaintiff-Appellant Tony Tillman claims that he was deprived of his
2

constitutional right to a name-clearing hearing under the Due

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and that he

was deprived of his First Amendment right of association. With

regard to the first constitutional claim, the district court found

that Tillman had failed to establish entitlement to a name-clearing

hearing under the Due Process Clauses on two grounds: (1) The

newspaper article that reported that Tillman had been charged with

violating the City police department’s procedures by associating

with a known criminal and by refusing a polygraph was not false

because the City had in fact asserted such charges; and (2) the

questions posed to citizens by law enforcement officers

investigating whether Tillman was involved in drug trafficking or

in a local murder were not rhetorically defamatory in nature, but

rather were properly interrogatory and at most implied a

professional opinion or belief that Tillman could have been engaged

in criminal conduct. The court found that Tillman’s First

Amendment claim failed because his association with one Robert

Rupert, an old friend who had fallen into a life of crime, was not

an association protected by the First Amendment.

In conducting our de novo review, we carefully combed the

record on appeal, evaluated the arguments of counsel for both

parties as set forth in their respective briefs to this court, and

considered the relevant facts and the applicable law; and reached

the firm conclusion that the district court correctly analyzed the

issues, applied the appropriate law, and reached the correct result
1 See Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir.

1993); Arrington v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir.

1992); Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir.

1989).

2 Tillman apparently only refused to take a City administered

polygraph, but he was willing and in fact did submit to a

polygraph administered by a third party, which he eventually

failed.

3

in dismissing both of Tillman’s constitutional claims. We add,

however, that the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

Tillman’s due process claim is bolstered by another central fact,

perhaps not fully articulated by the district court. 

As the City points out in its brief, Tillman admits explicitly

that he did maintain a long-standing relationship with one Robert

Rupert, an individual who was a known criminal, even though such an

association was strictly prohibited by the City police department’s

own rules. Indeed, much of Tillman’s argument in this case is

devoted not to denying his rather blatant association with Rupert

but to attempting to explain why this continuing relationship was

justified in this particular instance, and even to asserting that

the association was protected by the First Amendment. In so doing,

however, Tillman demonstrates that he cannot satisfy one of the

fundamental elements necessary to state an actionable claim that he

was deprived of his limited constitutional right to a name-clearing

hearing, i.e., that the charges brought against him were false.1

Although we acknowledge that Tillman might possibly show that the

City’s other charge —— that he refused a polygraph —— was false,2
4

Tillman still is not entitled to relief on this fact alone because

the other and far more important charge of consorting with a known

criminal is, as we have explained above, admittedly true.

We sense that Tillman and his counsel have either

misunderstood or mischaracterized the interplay between the

important constitutional protections he claims to assert in this

action and the solemn responsibilities he undertook in accepting a

position as a police officer, a guardian of the public’s safety and

security. When an individual accepts the privilege and

responsibility of a position of public authority, such as that of

a police officer, he will enjoy new associations with his fellow

citizens that he did not enjoy before; at the same time, however,

he also must relinquish some associations he previously enjoyed,

particularly when those associations involve individuals who are

the subject of law enforcement scrutiny. This trade-off is in no

way unique to police officers. Others who assume important public

roles find their associational rights properly altered and in some

respects curtailed. To cite just one obvious example, lawyers who

become judges can no longer associate with other lawyers with the

same freedom they enjoyed before they assumed their privileges and

duties on the bench. In short, Tillman implicitly but knowingly

waived his right of free association, to the extent such right

might have allowed association with police characters like Rupert,

when Tillman commenced a career in law enforcement. In so doing he

agreed to abide by the rules and regulations of the police force,
5

and is held to have understood that he had to change or curtail the

exercise of some rights of ordinary, private citizens, including

aspects of free association. 

Finally, we note that the City adduced ample evidence of the

serious harm Tillman’s association with Rupert inflicted on its

police department’s internal functioning and integrity as well as

its public reputation in the community. This clearly demonstrates

why the City established its rules limiting police officer’s

association with criminals in the first place and why its interests

in enforcing such restrictions far outweigh any limited

associational rights Tillman could possibly assert here. This is

not diminished by Tillman’s lame rationale that his association

with Rupert sprang from a lofty motive of rehabilitating Rupert and

influencing him to turn from a life of crime —— none of which was

communicated to or approved by Tillman’s superiors in advance. 

For all these reasons and for those set forth in the district

court’s thoughtful and well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion, the

district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing Tillman’s

claims is

AFFIRMED.