COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

January 14, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1772-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF4422

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

SAMTERIOUS GORDON,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: THOMAS J. McADAMS and T. CHRISTOPHER DEE, 

Judges.

1

 Affirmed. 

Before Kessler, Dugan and Fitzpatrick, JJ. 

 

1

 The Honorable Thomas J. McAdams presided at trial and sentencing and entered the 

judgment of conviction. The Honorable T. Christopher Dee presided over postconviction 

proceedings and entered the order denying Gordon’s postconviction motion. We will refer to 

Judge McAdams as the circuit court and to Judge Dee as the postconviction court. 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

2

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Samterious Gordon appeals a judgment of 

conviction for one count each of first-degree reckless injury with use of a 

dangerous weapon, first-degree recklessly endangering safety with use of a 

dangerous weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Gordon also 

appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief. 

Gordon argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied his right to a 

fair trial and because Gordon’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. For 

the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the order 

of the circuit court. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 There is no dispute as to the following facts.

¶3 On September 28, 2015, Milwaukee police department detectives 

were dispatched to Froedtert Hospital where two victims were being treated for 

gunshot wounds. One victim, C.J., informed police that he and a man driving a 

black Infiniti had been in an argument. The driver of the Infiniti shot C.J. and 

drove away. The second victim, L.C., informed police that he had observed C.J. 

standing by the side of a black vehicle. L.C. approached the vehicle and, when 

L.C. turned away from the vehicle, he heard gunshots and was shot. Multiple 

witnesses identified Gordon, in photo arrays, as the shooter. Gordon was 

subsequently charged with one count each of first-degree reckless injury with use 

of a dangerous weapon, first-degree recklessly endangering safety with use of a 

dangerous weapon, and with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

3

¶4 The jury found Gordon guilty of all charges. Gordon filed a 

postconviction motion contending that he was entitled to a new trial. Gordon 

argued, first, that he was denied his right to a fair trial because jurors who 

deliberated and found him guilty allegedly fell asleep during material testimony. 

Gordon also argued to the postconviction court that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failure to take “action to remedy the inattentiveness of the sleeping 

juror[s]” and because trial counsel elicited prejudicial, false, and inadmissible 

testimony. 

¶5 The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing at which there 

was testimony from Gordon’s trial counsel, Gordon, and Gordon’s mother. 

Following the hearing, the postconviction court denied Gordon’s motion. The 

court ruled that Gordon was not denied his right to a fair trial and that his trial 

counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. 

¶6 Gordon appeals. We discuss additional material facts in the 

discussion that follows. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 As noted, Gordon argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he

was denied his due process right to a fair trial because the circuit court did not 

dismiss the jurors that he alleges were sleeping during parts of his trial. Gordon 

also argues that he should be granted a new trial because he was denied his right to 

effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, Gordon argues that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for not making additional requests for relief at trial 

concerning the jurors that Gordon alleges were sleeping and for eliciting testimony 

from a law enforcement officer that was purportedly prejudicial, false, and 

inadmissible. Below, we address and reject Gordon’s arguments.
No. 2018AP1772-CR

4

I. Gordon Was Not Denied His Right to a Fair Trial

Based on Alleged Sleeping Jurors.

A. Governing Principles and Standard of Review.

¶8 “The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury underlies the 

requirement that jurors have heard all of the material portions of the trial.” State 

v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, ¶47, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 N.W.2d 610. The failure of a 

juror to hear all material portions of the trial, “whether it is due to a hearing 

deficiency or a state of semi-consciousness, could imperil the guarantees of 

impartiality and due process.” Id. (citation omitted). Where there is an allegation 

of juror inattentiveness, the circuit court engages in a two-step analysis. See id. 

“First, the circuit court must determine, as a question of fact, whether the juror 

was actually inattentive to the point of potentially undermining the fairness of the 

trial.” Id. “Second, if the circuit court finds that the juror was in fact sufficiently 

inattentive, the court must determine whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a 

result of the juror’s inattentiveness.” Id. 

¶9 “[Q]uestions involving juror conduct and attentiveness implicate the 

circuit court’s broad discretion.” Id., ¶48. On appeal, we will uphold the circuit 

court’s factual findings regarding juror conduct and attentiveness unless those 

findings are clearly erroneous. See id. A circuit court’s factual findings are not 

clearly erroneous if the findings are supported by any credible evidence in the 

record, or any reasonable inferences from that evidence. See Insurance Co. of 

N. Am. v. DEC Int’l, Inc., 220 Wis. 2d 840, 845, 586 N.W.2d 691 (Ct. App.

1998). However, we review de novo a circuit court’s determination as to 

prejudice. Novy, 346 Wis. 2d 289, ¶48.
No. 2018AP1772-CR

5

B. The Circuit Court’s Finding That No Juror Was Asleep 

During the Trial is Not Clearly Erroneous.

¶10 Gordon contends he was denied his due process right to a fair trial 

under the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions because the circuit court 

failed to dismiss jurors who Gordon alleges were sleeping during material

testimony.2 The State responds that Gordon has forfeited this argument because 

his trial counsel “fail[ed] to request any action” concerning the allegedly sleeping 

jurors at trial. See State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 826-29, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. 

App. 1995) (stating that a failure to raise a specific challenge before the circuit 

court forfeits the right to raise that challenge on appeal). Gordon does not dispute 

the State’s forfeiture argument. Schlieper v. DNR, 188 Wis. 2d 318, 322, 525 

N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that a proposition asserted by a respondent on 

appeal and not disputed by the appellant’s reply is taken as admitted). We 

conclude that Gordon has forfeited this argument. However, even if Gordon had

properly preserved this argument for appeal, we would reject his contention. See 

State v. Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117, ¶7, 320 Wis. 2d 811, 772 N.W.2d 702

(stating that an appellate court may in its discretion address an issue that has been 

forfeited).

¶11 At trial, the circuit court addressed whether two jurors, who had 

been observed by the court, prosecutor, and defense counsel with their eyes closed 

during testimony, had been asleep. The court found that neither of the jurors had 

actually been sleeping. The court stated that one of the jurors had “been resting ... 

 

2

 Gordon’s inattentiveness argument is premised on Gordon’s allegation that the jurors 

were sleeping during the trial. Gordon does not argue that the alleged sleeping jurors were 

otherwise inattentive. 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

6

his face on his hand” but that the court did not believe the juror was “actually 

asleep,” and that the other juror had merely “had his eyes closed here and there.” 

¶12 Gordon argues that the circuit court’s finding that neither juror was 

sleeping was clearly erroneous because affidavits submitted to the court by him 

and his mother, Ms. Lollie Gordon, and testimony at the evidentiary hearing by 

him, Ms. Gordon, and his trial counsel demonstrate that the jurors were “clearly 

asleep for a significant part of the testimony taken during the afternoon of the 

second day of trial.” We now summarize those allegations.

¶13 Trial counsel testified at the post-trial evidentiary hearing that one

juror’s “eyes were closed and his head was down” and “he was leaning his head 

against[] his ... hand.” Trial counsel testified that he observed that juror with his 

eyes closed for “five minutes or so,” but that counsel “couldn’t tell if [the juror] 

was sleeping or not.” Trial counsel did not testify that any juror was sleeping.3

¶14 In his affidavit, Gordon stated that, during testimony, he observed a 

“balding man in the far left of the front row of the jury panel ... nod off with his 

hand over his head” and that he then observed the juror “drop his hand and fall 

sound asleep for at least 20-30 minutes.” Gordon also stated that he observed 

another juror “nodding off during a portion of that afternoon’s testimony,” but that 

he “was unable to see for how long or how deeply [that] juror was sleeping.” At 

the evidentiary hearing, Gordon testified that he observed a “guy who was balding 

 

3

 Gordon mischaracterizes trial counsel’s testimony in his briefing in this court. Gordon 

states that his trial counsel testified “that he had observed three separate jurors sleeping at various 

times during” the trial and that trial counsel testified that “there were three jurors sleeping at 

different times.” There is nothing in the transcript of the evidentiary hearing to support Gordon’s 

assertion that trial counsel testified, unequivocally, that he observed a juror or jurors sleeping. 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

7

... sitting ... with his head, like down as if he was sleeping[] [and] [h]is head 

nodding.” Gordon testified that the juror’s eyes were closed and that the juror’s 

“head was just completely limp, as if he was out of it” and that the juror was 

“plainly asleep.” Gordon testified that this went on for “about fifteen to twenty 

minutes.” Gordon also testified that he “got [his] attorney[’s] attention as soon as 

[he] noticed it” and that after that, “the juror was sleeping, for at least another five 

or ten minutes.” 

¶15 Ms. Gordon stated in her affidavit that she observed a “man in the 

middle of the front row of the jury panel” sleeping. She further stated: 

During most of the afternoon testimony, [she] observed this 

juror nodding off, drifting to the side, and then briefly 

waking up again. He appeared to be fast asleep. During 

this time, he had his eyes closed and when he woke up it 

was only for a few seconds. He then nodded off again and 

went to sleep.

At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Gordon testified that she observed a juror who 

“[k]ept nodding his head,” that the juror had his eyes closed for “about a minute or 

two,” and that “several times” the juror “was just drifting, head from side to side” 

and that “[i]n total,” this happened for “[t]hree minutes.” She further testified that 

the juror “appear[ed] to be asleep.” 

¶16 The State responds that it “does not dispute that two jurors appeared 

to close their eyes” during certain portions of the trial but that the circuit court’s 

finding that the jurors had not been asleep is not clearly erroneous. We agree with 

the State. 

¶17 To repeat, this court may not set aside a circuit court’s factual 

findings as to any juror’s attentiveness unless that finding is not supported by any 

credible evidence in the record, or any reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

8

from that evidence. See Novy, 346 Wis. 2d 289, ¶48; DEC Int’l, 220 Wis. 2d at

845. This is true even where there is evidence that could lead to the opposite 

conclusion. See Jacobson v. American Tool Cos., Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 384, 390, 

588 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1998). 

¶18 As noted, the circuit court found, based on its personal observation 

of the jurors, that none of the jurors were sleeping. The postconviction court did 

not make any express findings as to Gordon and Ms. Gordon’s credibility. 

However, when a circuit court sitting as the fact finder does not make express 

findings, we assume that the circuit court made implicit findings in a manner 

supporting the court’s decision; in this case, denying the motion. State v. 

Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶31, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. This includes 

implicit findings regarding the credibility of a witness who provides testimony 

contrary to the circuit court’s decision. See State v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 673, 

499 N.W.2d 631 (1996) (“Where it is clear under applicable law that the [circuit] 

court would have granted the relief sought by the defendant had it believed the 

defendant’s testimony, its failure to grant the relief is tantamount to an express 

finding against the credibility of the defendant.”). For those reasons, we conclude 

that the postconviction court found the testimony of Gordon and Ms. Gordon not 

to be credible.

¶19 Accordingly, there is no basis to reject the circuit court’s findings, 

and we conclude that the circuit court’s finding that the jurors were not sleeping is 

not clearly erroneous. We, therefore, reject Gordon’s argument that he was denied 

his due process right to a fair trial. 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

9

II. Gordon Was Not Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel.

A. Governing Principles and Standard of Review.

¶20 When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this 

court applies the two-part analysis described in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant 

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

prejudiced his or her defense. Id.

¶21 To demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, the

defendant must point to specific acts or omissions by the lawyer that are “outside 

the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. “When 

evaluating counsel’s performance, courts are to be ‘highly deferential’ and must 

avoid the ‘distorting effects of hindsight.’” State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19, 264 

Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “Counsel need 

not be perfect, indeed not even very good, to be constitutionally adequate.” Thiel, 

264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶19 (citation omitted). 

¶22 To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. “The focus of this inquiry is not on the outcome of the trial, but on 

‘the reliability of the proceedings.’” Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶20 (citation

omitted). We need not address both aspects of the Strickland test if the defendant 

does not make a sufficient showing on either one. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

697.
No. 2018AP1772-CR

10

¶23 Our review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a 

mixed question of fact and law. Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶21. We will uphold the 

postconviction court’s factual findings, which “include ‘the circumstances of the 

case and the counsel’s conduct and strategy,’” unless those are clearly erroneous. 

Id. (citation omitted). However, we review de novo the question of “[w]hether 

counsel’s performance satisfies the constitutional standard for ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Id.

B. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Not Taking Additional 

Action Regarding the Allegedly Inattentive Jurors.

¶24 Gordon alleged in his postconviction motion that his trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to take action to “protect [Gordon’s] rights to be tried 

before a fair and impartial jury” after “the issue of the sleeping juror[s] had been 

brought to the court’s attention.” Gordon alleged that effective trial counsel would 

have “request[ed] that the sleeping jurors be stricken, ... request[ed] a mistrial[,] 

... request[ed] the individual voir dire of the juror[s,] ... [or] object[ed] to the 

continued service of the juror[s].” 

¶25 As mentioned, the circuit court found, based upon its own 

observations, that the jurors were not sleeping during testimony. We have already 

determined that the circuit court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, 

any of the actions Gordon asserts his trial counsel should have undertaken

concerning the allegedly sleeping jurors would have been an exercise in futility. 

Counsel is not deficient for failing to make meritless arguments. See Quinn v. 

State, 53 Wis. 2d 821, 827, 193 N.W.2d 665 (1972); State v. Toliver, 187 Wis. 2d 

346, 360, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, we conclude that trial 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

11

counsel was not ineffective for failing to take additional actions with regard to the 

jurors who were not sleeping.

C. Trial Counsel’s Deficient Performance Did Not Prejudice Gordon.

¶26 Next, Gordon argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

allowing the jury to hear purportedly prejudicial, false, and inadmissible testimony 

concerning an identification of Gordon as the shooter. 

¶27 Edmund Fitting, an officer with the Milwaukee police department, 

investigated the shooting and testified at trial. On cross-examination by Gordon’s 

trial counsel, Officer Fitting testified at trial as follows:

[Defense Counsel] Did anyone else witness and make a 

statement to the police[] [about the] shooting?

[Officer Fitting] Besides who?

[Defense Counsel] Other than family members related 

to [C.J.], Coleman ... and [L.C.].

Anyone else make a statement saying that they saw 

[Gordon] allegedly shoot?

[Officer Fitting] I do recall, yes. 

[Defense Counsel] And ... [w]as there a police report 

made of that?

[Officer Fitting] (No response.) 

[Defense Counsel] If you know?

[Officer Fitting] I recall somebody telling what you 

just explained. Whether or not there was a police report 

written on it, there should be. And I believe it was – had to 

do with somebody on a bicycle. 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

12

¶28 Gordon argues that the above-mentioned testimony is inadmissible

hearsay and that the testimony is also false.4 Gordon argues that Officer Fitting’s 

testimony is refuted by a police report, which Gordon introduced as part of his 

postconviction motion. The police report indicates that on the day of the shooting, 

police spoke with an individual named Jeffrey McClain who informed police that 

he was riding his bicycle and heard “at least 10 shots,” but that he did not see the 

actual shooting take place and did not see the shooter’s face. 

¶29 The State does not develop an argument that trial counsel was not 

deficient in eliciting the challenged testimony by Fitting. Instead, the State 

“assumes for the sake of argument” that trial counsel was “deficient by eliciting 

[the testimony] and then failing to impeach [Officer] Fitting with the police 

report.” However, the State argues that Gordon has failed to show that his trial 

counsel’s errors were prejudicial in light of the other evidence presented at trial. 

We agree with the State. 

¶30 To prove that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s errors, Gordon 

must show that counsel’s errors rendered the resulting conviction unreliable in 

light of the other evidence presented. State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, ¶58, 

261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 12. We conclude that challenged testimony by 

Officer Fitting does not undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict in light of 

 

4

 Gordon asserted in his postconviction motion that trial counsel was deficient “by 

permitting [the alleged hearsay testimony by Officer Fitting] without objection.” As pointed out 

by the State, the challenged testimony was elicited by defense counsel and, therefore, Gordon 

cannot complain about a failure to object to the testimony as hearsay. See Shawn B.N. v. State, 

173 Wis. 2d 346, 372, 497 N.W.2d 141 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that litigants who invite error at 

trial cannot complain of that error on appeal). Accordingly, we broadly construe Gordon’s 

postconviction motion as asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting the challenged 

testimony.
No. 2018AP1772-CR

13

other evidence that overwhelmingly pointed to Gordon’s guilt. We now 

summarize that evidence.

¶31 At trial, L.C. testified that on September 28, 2015, he arrived at his 

mother’s residence in Milwaukee and observed a “commotion” going on in the 

street between C.J., who was standing in the “middle of the street,” and Gordon, 

who was sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle. L.C. testified that he had an 

unobstructed view of Gordon’s face, and that he had previously seen Gordon 

“around the neighborhood.” L.C. testified that, as he approached C.J. and Gordon, 

“gunshots started ringing out” and L.C. was shot in the left arm. L.C. identified 

Gordon as the shooter. L.C. testified that he knew the shots came from Gordon’s 

vehicle because he was only approximately one foot away from Gordon’s vehicle 

at the time of the shooting. On cross-examination, L.C. testified that he did “[n]ot 

actually see” Gordon fire the shots, but that he knew the shots came from the 

direction of the driver’s side of Gordon’s vehicle. 

¶32 Nicole Fry5testified that, on September 28, 2015, she arrived at 

L.C.’s mother’s house with L.C. She observed C.J. and L.C.’s daughter, Loretta 

Coleman, arguing in the street with Gordon, who was sitting in the driver’s seat of 

a vehicle. Fry testified that she was sitting inside L.C.’s car and that, as she was 

beginning to exit the vehicle, Gordon began shooting. Fry testified that she “fell 

down to the ground, and [she] could see [Gordon] shooting out the window of his 

car ... as he started driving away.” On cross-examination, Fry testified that she 

 

5

 Nicole Fry is also referred to as Nicole Johnson and as Nicole Johnson Fry in the 

record. 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

14

had seen Gordon prior to the shooting and that she was “more than a hundred 

[percent] sure” that Gordon fired gunshots in the direction of C.J. and L.C. 

¶33 C.J. testified that, on September 28, 2015, he argued with Gordon, 

who was sitting in the driver’s seat of his vehicle. C.J. testified that he was 

standing “close” to the driver’s side of Gordon’s vehicle and that he “swung at 

[Gordon][] [and] [t]hat’s when [Gordon] shot me.” C.J. testified that he was shot 

in his left and right arms, his left hand, and that a bullet grazed his head, and that 

L.C. was also shot. C.J. further testified that, at the time of the shooting, he was 

carrying a Ruger handgun in a holster, that he did not take the gun out of the 

holster during his interaction with Gordon and that, after he was shot, Loretta 

Coleman took the gun from him. 

¶34 Also, Officer Fitting testified that, following the shooting, he 

interviewed a witness, showed photo arrays to witnesses, and conducted an 

investigation of the scene. Fitting testified that “5 fired brass casings ... from a 

[.]380 caliber firearm” were found in the street after the shooting. Officer Fitting 

testified that during his witness interviews, he was informed that C.J. had a 

concealed carry permit; that C.J. had a firearm on his person at the time of the 

shooing; and that after the shooting, the gun was removed “and then placed it up in 

the house.” Officer Fitting testified that a 9-millimeter Ruger was found in an 

“upstairs bedroom, on a bookshelf,” at C.J.’s home and that the weapon “was fully 

loaded with 14 rounds in the magazine.” Officer Fitting testified that the 

ammunition in the Ruger was different from the spent shell casings that were 

recovered at the scene of the shooting. Officer Fitting testified that the Ruger was 

tested to determine if it had been recently fired and that “it didn’t appear that it had 

been fired.” 
No. 2018AP1772-CR

15

¶35 Gordon testified in his own defense. Gordon testified that he 

stopped his vehicle near C.J.’s mother’s house and that Loretta Coleman came 

over to his vehicle to talk to him. Gordon testified that C.J. then “came running ... 

up to [Gordon’s] car” and the two men started to argue. Gordon testified that C.J.

punched him, “bust[ing] [Gordon’s] top lip,” and that at that time, C.J. “pulled [a] 

gun off his waistband.” Gordon testified that after C.J. punched him, he “hit the 

gas, and ... [took] off ... [a]nd from there, I just hear plenty [of] shots. I hear his 

gun go off.” Gordon testified that as he pulled away, he heard “10 shots at least” 

from “different calibers of guns.” 

¶36 We conclude that there was overwhelming evidence of Gordon’s 

guilt because multiple witnesses identified Gordon as the shooter, and there was 

no evidence (other than Gordon’s testimony) that anyone else fired the shots 

which wounded L.C. and C.J. Officer Fitting’s testimony about the third-party 

identification of Gordon as the shooter was isolated in the context of the entire 

trial and lacked probative value. Officer Fitting did not identify the supposed 

witness or provide any details about what information was provided to police by 

the unidentified witness. For those reasons, there is no reasonable likelihood that 

Officer Fitting’s challenged testimony affected the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, 

Gordon has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel eliciting 

the challenged testimony. Therefore, his ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claim fails.

CONCLUSION

¶37 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction and order of 

the circuit court are affirmed.
No. 2018AP1772-CR

16

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2017-18).