T he H onorabl e John G l ees on of t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Co ur t f or t he E as t er n D i s t r i ct of N ew 1 Y o rk, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. N o. 06- 31 40

- cv A m erica n C i vil L i b erti es U nio n v. D ep artm en t o f D efen se 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 3

_________________ 4 Au gus t Term 2006 5 (Argued: Novembe r 20, 2006) (De cided: September 22, 2008) 6 Docke t No. 06-3140-c v 7

_______________ 8 AM ERI CA

N C IVILL I B ERT I ES U

NI ON , CENT ER F OR

CO NST I TU TI ONAL

RI GH TS, 9 PHYSI CIANS FOR HU MAN RI GHTS, VETERANS F OR COMMON SENSE, VETERANS 10 FOR PEACE, 11 Plaintif fs-Appellee

s , 12 -a g a ins t13 DEPARTMENT OF DEF ENSE, AND I TS COMP ONENTS DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, 14 DE PARTM EN T O F NAVY , D EPA RTM EN T O F AIR F OR CE, DE F EN SE I NT ELL I GENC E 15 AGENCY, DE PARTMENT OF H OMELAND SECURI TY, DEPARTMENT OF J USTI CE, 16 AND I TS COMP ONENTS CIVI LRI GHTS DIVI SI ON, CRI MI NAL DIVI SI ON, OF FI CE OF 1 7 I

N F O RM A T I O NA

N D PRIV A CY , O F F I CEO F I N T E L L I G EN CEPO L I CYA N D RE V I E W, 18 FED ERALBU REAU OF I NVESTI GATI ON, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, and CENTRAL 19 I NTEL L I GENCE AGEN CY, 20 De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts , 21

______________ 22 Be fore : MCLAUGHL I N, HALL , Circuit Judges , and GL EESON, District Judge

. 1 23 The United States Department of D efe nse and D epar tment of the Army

appea l from 24 or de rs of

theUn ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the Southe rn

Di stric t of

Ne w Y or k d ir e c tin gthe m to 25 rele ase 21 photographs depicting a busive treatment of detaine es by United States soldiers in Iraq 26 and Af

ghanistan. Appe llants claim that the photographs a re e x empt from disclosure under the 27 F re e do m of

Inf or matio n A c t. 28 Affir

med.2 1 AMRI T SI NGH, Ame rica

n Civil L iberties Union 2 Foundation (J amee l J aff er, Judy Rabinovitz , Lucas 3 Guttentag , Americ an Civil L iberties Union 4 F ound atio n; L awr e nc e S. L us tbe rg , M e g an L e wi s, 5 Gibbons, Del De o, Dolan Griffing er &Vec chione, 6 P.C.; Wil liam Goodman, Michae l Ratner, Center for 7 Constitutional Rights; Be th Haroule s, Arthur 8 Eisenberg , New Y ork Civil L iberties Union 9 Foundation), New Y ork, NY, for Plain tiffs10 Appellee s . 11 MI CHAEL J . GARCIA, United States Attorney for 12 the Southern District of Ne w York ( Sean H. L ane, 13 He athe r K . M c Sha in, Pe te r M . Sk inn e r, Jef fr e y S. 14 Oestericher , Assistant United States Attorney s, Of 15 Counsel), NewYork, NY , for De fe nd an ts16 Ap pe lla nts . 17 J OHN GLEESON, United States District Judge : 18 The United States Department of D efe nse and D epar tment of the Army

(re fer red to he re 19 as “the defe ndants”) a ppeal f rom order s of the United States District Court for the Southern 20 District of Ne w York ( Alvin K. Heller stein, District Judge ) direc ting them to re lease 21 21 photogr aphs pursua nt to the Fre edom of Information Ac t (“F OIA” or “the Ac t”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 22 (2006). The photogr aphs depic t abusive treatment of detaine es by United States soldiers in Iraq 23 and Af

ghanistan. 24 On appe al, the def endants c ontend that the exemption in § 552(b)(7)( F) for law 25 enfor ceme nt rec ords that could re asonably be expected to e ndang er “ any individual” applies her e 26 beca

use the re lease of the disputed photographs will enda ng er United States troops, other 27 Coalition forces, a nd civilians in Iraq a

nd Afghanistan. They

further claim that, notwithstanding 28 there da c tio ns or de re d b y thedis tr ic t c ourt

of 20 of the 21 ph oto gra

ph s, dis c los ur e wi ll r e su lt i n3 1 unwar

rante d invasions of the per sonal privac y of the de tainees the y

depict, justifying 2 nondisclosure unde r § 552(b) (6) a nd (7)( C). 3 We hold that FOIA exemption 7(F) doe s not apply to this case. We furthe r hold that the 4 reda ctions order ed by the district court re nder the privac y exemptions unavailable to the 5 de fe nd ants . A c c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m. 6 BA CKGROUND 7 On Octobe r 7, 2003, the plaintiffs f iled joint requests with the defe ndants and va rious 8 other a g encie s pursuant to FO IA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), see king r ecords relate d to the treatment 9 and death of prisoners he ld in United States custody abroa d afte r September

11, 2001, and 10 rec ords re lated to the pra ctice of “re ndering ” those prisone rs to countries known to use torture. 11 On June 2, 2004, havingrec eived no r ecords in response to the r equests, the plaintiffs f iled the 12 complaint in this case, alleg ing that the ag encie s had fa iled to comply with the law. 13 On August 16, 2004, to facilitate the se arc h for r eleva nt rec ords, the plaintiffs provide d a 14 list of recor ds they claimed we re r esponsive to the F OIA re quests. Amongthe re cords listed 15 wer e 87 photographs a nd other imag es of de tainees at detention fac iliti es in Iraq a nd 16 Af

gha nis tan, inc ludingAb u Ghr a ib p ri so n. Th e ima g e s f ro m Abu Ghra ib ( the “ Ab u Ghr a ib 17 photos”) depic ted United States soldiers eng ag ing in a buse of many

detainee s. The soldiers 18 forc ed deta inees, ofte n unclothed, to pose in dehuma nizi ng , sexually

sug g estive wa

y s. 19 The de fenda nts init ially

invoked only

FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C) as their ground for 20 withholding the Abu Ghraib photos. Those pr ovisions authoriz e withholding where disclosure 21 would constitute an “unw arr anted invasion of pe rsonal priva cy .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) , (7)( C). 22 The de fenda

nts contended in their motion for summar y judgme nt that these per sonal privac y4 1 exemptions war

rante d the withholding of the Abu Ghr aib photos in order to prote ct the priva cy 2 interests of the de tainees depicted in them. The pla intiffs argued in their c ross-motion that 3 r e d a c t i o n s c o u l d

e l i m i n at e any unw ar

r ant e d i nv a s i o n s o f

p r i v a c y. 4 More than two months af ter ora l argument of the c ross-motions, the defe ndants adde d 5 another

justification for withholding the Abu Ghra ib photos: ex emption 7(F) . That exemption 6 authorizes withholding of r ecords “compiled for law enf orce ment purposes” wher e disclosure 7 “could r easona

bly be expected to e ndang er the life or phy sical saf ety of any individual.” § 8 552(b)( 7)(F ). Ac cordingto the defe ndants, rele ase of the Abu Ghr aib photos could rea sonably be 9 e xpe c te d to e nd ang e r t he lif e or phy sic a l sa fe ty

of Un ite d St ate s tr oo ps , o the r C oa lit ion fo rc e s, 10 and civilians in Iraq a nd Afghanistan. 11 On September 29, 2005 the district court re jected the defe ndants’ arguments and orde red 12 the disclosure of

the Abu Ghr aib photos. See ACL U v . D e p’ t of De f. , 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 579 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ( the “Abu Ghraib orde r”) . It determined that reda ction of “a ll identifying 14 char acte ristics of the per sons in the photogr aphs” w ould preve nt an invasion of priva cy interests. 15 Id. at 571. To the e x tent that an invasion of privacy might occ ur in spite of the re dactions, the 16 court found that such an invasion would not be “ unwar rante d” since the public intere st involved 17 “fa

r outweighs any

speculative invasion of per sonal privac y .” Id. at 572-73. 18 The district cour t also rejec ted the def

endants’ e leventh-hour

“supplementa l” argument 19 related to exemption 7(F). Without deciding whe ther the e x emption’s protec tion of “any 20 individual” extended as fa r as the de fenda

nts claimed, the c ourt conc luded that in any event, “ the 21 core values that Exemption 7(F) wa s designed to protec t are not impli cate d by the re lease of the 22 [Abu Ghraib] photogra phs, but . . . the core values of F OIA ar e ver y much implicated.” Id. at5 1 57 8. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt state d, “ Our n atio n d oe s n ot s ur re nd e r t o b la c kma il, and

fe ar o f b la c kma il 2 is not a leg ally

sufficie nt argument to preve nt us from perf orminga statutory

command.” Id. at 3 575. Whil e ac knowledg ing the “risk that the e nemy will seiz e upon the publicity of the 4 photogr aphs and se ek to use such publicity as a pr etext for enlistments and violent acts,” the 5 c ourt

ba lanc e d th at r isk

a g a ins t th e be ne fi ts o f “ e du c atio n a nd de bate that su c h p ub lic ity wi ll 6 foster,” and orde red the photos relea sed in reda cted f orm. Id . at 578. 7 The de fenda nts appea led the Abu Ghr aib orde r, but in Marc h 2006, while the appe al was 8 pending , many

of the Abu Ghraib photos wer e published on the interne t by a third par

ty . The 9 appea l was there afte r withdrawn. 10 After

the appe al was w ithdrawn, the pla intiffs sought c larification reg ardingother 11 detaineeabuse imag es, and the defe ndants confir med that they

wer e withholding a

n additional 29 12 imag es, ag ain base d on exemptions 6, 7(C) and 7( F) . Wherea s the Abu Ghra ib photos were 13 take n at th at on e loc atio n, the29 ph oto gra ph s w e retake n in

at le a st s e ve n d if

fe re nt l oc atio ns in 14 Afghanistan and Iraq, a nd involved a greater number of deta inees a

nd U.S. mili tary

personne l. 15 An d whil e many

of theAb u Ghr a ib p ho tos depic te d unc lot he d d e ta ine e s f

or c e d to po se in 16 degradingand sexually expli cit way s, the detaine es in the 29 photographs we re c lothed and 17 g ener ally

not force d to pose. The photographs we re pa rt of seve n investigative files of the 18 Ar

my ’s Cr imi na l Inv e sti g atio ns Command (“ Ar my CI D” ), and

we repr ov ide d to Ar

my CI D i n 19 c onne c tio n w itha lle g atio ns of mis tr e atme nt o f d e ta ine e s. In thre e of the inv e sti g atio ns , Army 20 CI D found proba ble ca use to believe detainee abuse ha d occur red r elated to the photographs at 21 issue here . Soldiers under scr utiny in two of the investig ations have be en punished unde r the 22 Uniform Code of Military J ustice.In a l et t er dated June 2 9 , 20 0 6 , t he d ef end ant s i nf

o rme d t he p l ai nt i f

f s t hat t hey were wi t hho l d i ng 2 an addi t i onal 23 i mages of det ai nee s bas ed upon FO I A ex emp t i ons 6, 7(C), an d 7(F) , an d t hat t hey woul d cons i der the re le a se o f t h o se p h o to g ra p h s to b e go v e rn e d b y the fi n a l ru ling in this c a se . 6 1 On April 10, 2006, the district cour t established an e x pedited proc edure for de termining 2 whether

the 29 imag es could prope rly be withheld. By

order s dated June 9, 2006 and June 21, 2 3 2006, the district court orde red the rele ase of 21 of the disputed photos, all but one in reda cted 4 form. The 21 photographs we re f rom six of the seve n Army CI D investig ative files; the district 5 court found that the photogr aphs fr om one of the f iles showed no sug g estion of abuse and thus 6 need not be produce d. Since the def endants’ ba sis for withholding the 29 photographs ha d been 7 the same a s their basis for w ithholding the Abu Ghr aib photos, the district court adopte d the 8 rea soning of

the Abu Ghr aib orde r. 9 Th e de fe nd ants ’ a pp e a l of theJune 20 06 or de rs is n owbe fo reus . T he reis n o c ro ss10 appea l, and thus neither the order pe rmitting the withholdingof eight photogr aphs nor the or der 11 direc ting r edac tions of the photogr aphs to be disclosed is bef ore us. We re fer

here to the 21 12 photogr aphs in dispute as the “ Army photos.” 13 DI SCUS SI ON 14 A. Gove rning Legal Standards 15 The F ree dom of Information Ac t require s that “ea ch ag ency , upon any reque st for re cords 16 which (i) r easona bly describes such re cords a

nd (ii) is made in ac corda nce w ith publis hed rule s . . 17 . , shall make the r ecords promptly available to any

person,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (A), unle ss the 18 re c or ds fa ll w ith in o ne of theAc t’ s n ine e xemp tio ns , § 55 2(b) (1 )- (9 ). Th e Ac t is br oa dly 19 conce ived to ref

lect “a g ener al philosophy

of full ag ency

disclosure,” and its exempti ons are 20 exclusive, FLR

A v . U .S . D e p’ t of Ve te ra ns Af

fai rs , 9 58 F .2 d 5 03 , 5 08 (2 d Ci r. 19 92 ), and “ mus t7 1 be nar

rowly construed,” John DoeAgenc y v. J ohn Doe Corp. , 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (quoting 2 De p’ t of Ai r F orc ev . R os e , 4 25 U. S. 3 52 , 3 60 -6 1 ( 19 76 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n o mitte d) ); se eals o 3 Nat’l Council of

La Raza v. Dep’ t of Justice , 411 F.3d 350, 355- 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (“ Consist ent 4 with FOIA’s purpose s, these statutory exemptions are narr owly construed.”(citingcase s)). 5 FOIA’s purpose is to encoura g e public disclosure of information in the possession of 6 fede ral a g encie s so that the people may “know what their g overnme nt is up to.” U.S. Dep’ t of 7 J us tic ev . R e

po rte rs C om m. for Fre e do m o

f th ePress , 489 U.S. 749, 772-73 (1988) ( internal 8 quotation and emphasis omitted). “O fficia l information that sheds light on a n ag ency ’s 9 perf

ormanc e of its statutory

duties falls square ly

within that statutory

purpose.” Id. at 773. The 10 rele ase of

information of this sort vindicates F OIA’s basic purpose: “to e nsure a n informed 11 citizenry , vital to the functioningof a de mocratic society , neede d to chec k ag ainst corr uption and 12 to hold the gove rnors a ccounta ble to the g overne d.” NLRB v. Robbins Ti re &Rubber Co. , 437 13 U. S. 2 14 , 2 42 (1 97 8) ; se eals o Na t’ l A rc hiv es &Re c or ds Ad mi n. v . F av ish , 541 U.S. 157, 172 14 (2004) ( describing F OIA as “ a structur al nec essity in a re al democr acy”). 15 A district court “ has jurisdiction to enjoin the ag ency from withholding a g ency rec ords 16 and to orde r the produc tion of any ag ency rec ords improperly

withheld.” § 552(a)(4) (B ). As 17 F OIA a

pp lie s g ov e rnme nt- wi de and no on e a g e nc y

a dmi nis te rs it, no a g e nc y is e nti tle d to 18 defe renc e in interpre ting its provisions. Al-Faye d v. CIA , 254 F.3d 300, 307 ( D.C. Cir. 2001) 19 (c iti ngc a se s) . F ur the r, F OIA e xpre ssl y

pr ov ide s f

or de no vo re vie w o f a g e nc y de c isi on s to 20 withhold recor ds and plac es the burde n of per suasion on the ag ency . Reporters Comm. , 4 89 U. S. 21 at 75 5; se eals o § 552(a) (4)( B) (“[T]he court shall deter mine the matter de novo . . . and the 22 burden is on the a g ency to sustain its action.”) . Doubts, theref ore, a re to be resolved in f

avor of8 1 disclosure. FLRA , 95 8 F .2 d at 50 8; accord, e .g. , Local 3. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. W orkers v . NLRB , 2 845 F.2d 1177, 1180 ( 2d Cir. 1988). 3 As mentioned above , the district court’s r eview of the def endants’ invoc ation of F OIA’s 4 exemptions was de novo. Our re view of the district court’s de cisions, which wer e made on 5 cross-motions for summar y judgme nt, is de novo as well. See, e .g. , W ood v. FBI

, 432 F.3d 78, 6 82 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ) ( “ Th is C ourt re vie ws de novo a district cour t’s grant of summar

y judgme nt in a 7 FOIA ca se.”)

. 8 B

. FOIA Ex emption 7( F) 9 Th e argume nt d e fe nd ants ra ise d a s a n a ft e rt ho ught b e low

is the ir le a d a rgume nt o n th is 10 appea l. They

contend that F OIA exemption 7(F), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 7)(F ) (2006) , justifies 11 withholding the Ar my photos and that the district court e rre d in concludingotherwise. 12 Ex emption 7(F) allows an a g ency to withhold “rec ords or infor mation compiled for law 13 enfor ceme nt purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enfor ceme nt rec ords 14 or information . . . could rea sonably be expected to e ndang er the life or phy sical saf ety of any 15 individual.” Id. In r e lyingon thi s e xemp tio n, the de fe nd ants c onte nd that ( a ) t he Ar my ph oto s, 16 which we re g ather ed duringArmy CI D investig ations, are documents “c ompiled for law 17 e nf

or c e me nt p ur

po se s” wi thi n th e me anin gof the statut e ; (b) dis c los ur e of the ph oto s c ou ld 18 rea sonably

be expected to incite violenc e ag ainst United States troops, other Coalition force s, and 19 civilians in Iraq a nd Afghanistan; and (c ) since the re is no limit to who is protec ted by exemption 20 7(F ), withholding is wa rra nted. 21 The fir st contention is undisput ed. The second a nd third are disputed, but neither wa s 22 actua lly

decide d by

the district court. Without deciding whether the def endants ha d satisfiedW e t heref o re as sume f

o r t he p urpo ses of t hi s ap p eal , but need not d eci d e, t hat t he p ho t o graphs 3 c o u ld re a so n a b ly b e e x p e c te d to inc ite v io le n c e a g a ins t U n ited S ta te s tro o p s, o the r C o a lit io n fo rc e s, a n d c ivilian s in Ir a q a n d A fgh a n istan

. 9 1 their burde n of showingthat the Army photos “could re asonably be expected to” result in acts of 2 violence by

insurg ents, the district court a cknowledg ed “a risk” of suc h violence. 389 F . Supp. 3 2d at 578. It then balanc ed that risk ag ainst the “c ore va lues” of F OIA and the be nefits of 4 dis c los ur e , c on c lud ingthat di sc los ur e wa s w arr ante d. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xplic itl y

de c lin e d to 5 re so lvethepa

rt ie s’ dis pute re g ard ingthe pr op e r c on str uc tio n o f t

he ph a se “ a

ny ind ivi du a l” in 6 exemption 7(F). Id

. 7 W e res ol ve the l att er di sp ut e her e, an d o ur r eso lu ti ondi sp os es o f the ex emp ti on7(F) 8 issue. The de fenda nts argue that the plain mea ning of the term “ any

individual” is unlim ited, 3 9 and thus includes individuals identified solely as military

and civilian per sonnel in Iraq a nd 10 Af

gha nis tan. Exe mpt ion

7( F ), thede fe nd ants a sse rt , “ do e s n ot l imi t it s p ro te c tio n to so me 11 ind ivi du a ls at th e e xclu sio n o f o the rs .” (A pp e lla nts ’ B r. 29 -3 0. ) R athe r, the argume nt c ontin ue s, 12 “‘a

ny ’ mea ns ‘any ,’” a

nd there is neither nee d nor authority to look beyond the plain languag e of 13 the exemption to determine its breadth. 14 We disagree . The phra se “a ny individual” in exempti on 7(F ) may be fle x ible, but is not 15 va c uo us . Co ns ide ri ng , a s w e mus t, t he wo rd s in

the statut e , th e str

uc tur e of F OIA a nd its 16 exemption provisi ons, the chronology of ame ndments to those provisions, and the requir ement 17 that F OIA e xemp tio ns be na rr ow ly c on str ue d, we c ann ot r e a d th e phra se to i nc lud e ind ivi du a ls 18 identified solely

as member s of a group so larg e that risks which a re c learly speculative for a

ny 19 particula

r individuals become r easona bly fore seea ble for the group. 20 1. ThePh ra se“An yIn div idu al”10 1 Exe mpt ion 7( F ) j us tif

ie s w ithho ldi ngany

law e nf or c e me nt r e c or ds that “ c ou ld r e a so na bly 2 be expected to e ndang er the life or phy sical saf ety of any individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)( F)

. 3 Do the def

endants satisfy

their burde n of establishingthe exemption’s applicability if they do not 4 point to any

one individual and esta

blish that he or she c ould rea sonably be expected to be 5 e nd ang e re d, but in ste a d p oint to a gro up c omp os e d o f m ill ion s o f p e op le and e sta bli shthat it 6 could re asonably

be expected that someone in that group will be enda ng ere d? 7 Th e pla in l angua g e of thephra se “ e nd ang e r t

he lif e or phy sic a l sa fe ty

of any ind ivi du a l” 8 connotes a

degree of spec ificity

above a nd beyond that conveyed by alternative phrase s such as 9 “ e n d an g e r

l i f e o r p hys i c a l s a f

e ty. ” Iti s tr

u e th atth e s t atut e d o e s n o tr e a d “ any named 10 individual,” and we thus understand it to include individuals identified in some way other than by 11 name - - such a s, for e x ample, beingidentified as f amily members or

cowor kers of a name d 12 individual, or some simil arly small and specif

ic group. This does not, howeve r, mea n that the 13 “individual” conte mplated by exemption 7(F) nee d not be identified at all, or may be identified 14 only

as a me mber of a

vast population. To the contra ry , the leg islature’s c hoice to condition the 15 exemption’s availability on dang er to a

n ind iv idu al, rathe r t

ha n d ang e r i n g e ne ra l, i nd ic ate s a 16 require ment that the subject of the dang er be identified with at lea st reasona ble spec ificity

. 17 The de fenda nts emphasize that Congre ss used the word “ any” to modify “individual,” and 18 contend that the br oad scope of the wor d “any” re lieves them of the burden of ide ntifying, e ven 19 roughly , an individual. We are mindful that the Supreme Court has “ stated time and a g ain that 20 courts must presume that a leg islature say s in a statute what it means a nd means in a statute what 21 it say s there.” Con n. Nat ’l Ba nk v . G e rm ain , 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). B ut at least one thing 22 is c le ar f

ro m th e Court ’s de c isi on s inte rp re tin gthe me anin gof the wo rd “ any” in f

e de ra l st atut e s:11 1 “ Any” do e s not

alway s deser

ve the e x pansive a

pplication the def

endants urg e her e. Rather , a 2 court must construe the term ca ref ully , in light of the statute a s a whole a s interpre ted by 3 acc epted principles of construc tion, and, wher e applica ble, the statutory

framework that prec eded 4 its e na c tme nt. 5 In Small v. United States , for e x ample, the Court examined 18 U.S.C. 922(g )(1) , which 6 make s it

ill e g a l f or a pe rs on wh o h a s b e e n c onvic te d o f a fe lony “ in a ny c ourt ” to p os se ss a 7 firea

rm. 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005). In consideringwhether a fe lony conviction in a for eign court 8 bring s a gun-toting de fenda nt within the ambit of the law, the Court did not beg in (and ther eby 9 end) its ana ly sis with a simpl istic “‘any ’ mea ns ‘any .’” To the contra

ry , it beg an by

observing 10 that “[t] he wor d ‘any ’ consider ed alone cannot a nswer this question.” Id. at 38 8. Al tho ugh it 11 “dema

nds a broa d interpre tation, we must look beyond that word itself.” Id. (citation omitted). 12 “ In o rd ina

ry lif e , a sp e ake r who say s, ‘I ’l l se e any fi lm, ’ m ay

or may no t me an to inc lud e fi lms 13 shown in another c ity . In law, a le g islature that uses the statutory phrase ‘any

person’ may

or 14 may

not mean to include ‘ persons’ outside the jurisdiction of the state.” Id. (interna l quotation 15 omitted). S i n ce th e o th er l an gu age i nth e s t atut e d i d n o ts u gges tani nt en tt o re ac hfo re i gn 16 convictions, there was no leg islative history sug g estingsuch an intent, a nd the pre sumption 17 a g a ins t e xtrate rrito ri a l a pp lic atio n o f s tatut e s in str uc te d c ourt s to de c lin e to f ind su c h inte nt i n 18 analog ous case s, id. at 388-89, the Supre me Court held that “a ny court” did not mean “ any 1 9 c o urt , ” b utr ath e r “ any domestic c ourt ,” and fo re ign c onvic tio ns c ou ld t he re fo reno t se rv e a s a 20 predic ate to liability under the statute. Id. at 391-93. 21 The Supreme Court has reje cted a broad inter

pretation of the word “ any” in other 22 contexts as well where such interpr etation is inconsistent with the statutory context and12 1 leg islative purpose. The Ag e Discrimination in Employ ment Act (“ ADEA” ) for

bids an 2 employer’ s discrimination ag ainst “any individual” over 40 year s of ag e “be cause of such 3 individual’s ag e.” 29 U .S.C. § 623 (2006). In Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc . v. Cline , the 4 qu es t i o nwa s wh eth er a h ea l thb en ef

i tp o l i cy fav o ri n g o n l y

wo rk er s atl ea s t5 0 years o f a ge 5 violated the ADE A rights of the employees who wer e over 40 but not y et 50. 540 U.S. 581, 584- 6 8 5 (2 0 0 4 ). Ino th er wo rd s , d i d

th e A DE A’ s p ro t ec t i o no f “ any i n d i v i d u al ” o v er 4 0 fr o mage 7 discrimination protect the young er group of ove r-40 wor kers f rom discrimination that favor ed the 8 older group? Espousing the “‘a ny ’ mea ns ‘any ’” a

rgument advanc ed by

the def endants he re, the 9 Six th Circuit held that it did. See Cline v . Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc

. , 2 96 F .3 d 4 66 , 4 70 (6 th 10 Cir . 2 00 2) (“ [T]he AD EAre qu ir e s u s to ho ld .

. . that e mpl oy me nt a g e dis c ri min atio n a g a ins t any 11 wo rk e r at le a st 4 0 ye ars of a g e is p ro hib ite d .

. . .” (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ). B ut t he Sup re me 12 Court reve rsed, de terminingthat the Six th Circuit’s construction did not “squarewith the natura l 13 rea ding of

the whole pr ovision preventingdiscrimination.” 540 U.S. at 586. The Court he ld that 14 only

individuals subjected to discrimination that prefe rs the youngto the old have a cause of 15 action under

the ADEA

. Id. at 60 0; se eals o Nixon v. Mo. M un. League , 541 U.S. 125, 128-32 16 (2004) ( construingstatute’s re fer enceto “any entity” providingtelecommunications services not 17 to include a state ’s own subdivisions; “‘[A] ny ’ ca n and does me an diffe rent thing s depending 18 upon the setting .”); United States v. Palme r , 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (Mar shall, C.J .) 19 (obser

ving that “[t] he wor ds ‘any person or persons,’ a

re br oad enough to comprehe nd ever y 20 human being ,” but holding that “g ener al words” must be limi ted “to those objec ts to which the 21 leg islature intended to a pply them.”).13 1 To be sure , sometimes the word “ any” in a statute de serve s an expansive application. 2 Howeve r, consistent with the ca ses discussed a bove, the Supre me Court has made it clear that 3 such a r esult must never be the re sult of a wooden, unc ritical ca pitulation to the wor d itself. 4 Rath e r , it

o c c ur s wh e r e th e s ur

r o un d in gs tatuto r

y la n gu a g e an d

o th e r r e le v ant l e g is lati v e c o nte xt 5 support it. In United States v. Gonzales , 520 U.S. 1, 11 (1997), for example, the Court held that 6 the re quirement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1) that sentenc es imposed under the statute be c onsecutive 7 to “any

other ter m of imprisonment” could not properly be limited to federal

terms of 8 imprisonment. But it did so only afte r dete rmining that “other la nguag e in [the statute] reinfor ces 9 our conc lusion.” Gonzales , 520 U.S. at 10. Finding“no intimation” in the statute as a whole that 10 Congr ess meant other wise, and taking into ac count the fa ct that the statute wa s amende d in 1984 11 to repudiate judicial constructions that nar rowe d its scope, the Court adopted a n expansive 12 interpre tation of “a ny other ter m of imprisonment.” Id. at 9-10. 13 Thus , th e de fe nd ants ’ a rgume nt t hat “ any ind ivi du a l” in e xemp tio n 7 (F ) m us t, d ue so le ly 14 to the brute for ce of the word “ any ,” be inter

prete d to ext end its protection to all per sons, whether 15 or not they

can beidentified, no matter how remote the y

are from the law

enfor ceme nt 16 inv e sti g atio n in

wh ic h th e dis pute d r e c or ds we rec omp ile d, and no matte r h owsma ll the ri sk to 17 any

particula r individual, is incorrec t. We mustexamine not only the word “ any” but also the 1 8 la

n gu a g e o f th e r e main d e r

o f th e p r o v is io n , th e s tr

u c tu r e o f F O IA ’ s e xe mp ti o n s , an d th e c o nte xt 19 and history

leadingto its adoption. 20 We beg in with the specific c ontextin which the disputed languag e is used. It bear s 21 e mph a sis that w e c on str ue theF re e do m of

Inf or matio n A c t. “ Th e tit le of an a c t c ann ot c ontr ol i ts 22 words, but may

furnish some aid in showingwhat wa s in the mind of the leg islature.” Palmer ,14 1 16 U. S. ( 3 Wh e at.) at 63 1. Th e law w a s e na c te d to make a g e nc y re c or ds ava ila

ble to t he pu bli c 2 “ e xce pt a s sp e c ifi c all ystated” in one of the e numerated exemptions. § 552(d) (emphasis adde d). 3 As me nti on e d a

bo ve , th ou gh im

po rt ant i nte re sts arese rv e d b y tho se e xemp tio ns , th e Sup re me 4 Court has repe atedly cautioned that they

“ar e to be na

rrowly construed.” FBI v . Abramson , 456 5 U. S. 6 15 , 6 30 (1 98 2) ; accord U .S. Dep’ t of Justice v. J

ulian , 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); Ro se , 425 6 U.S. at 361. 7 This rule of c onstruction is of centr al importance here . The de fenda nts’ construction of 8 “any

individual” as not requiring the g overnme nt to name or e ven roughly identify any 9 individual, besides g esturingto the populations of two nations and two international 10 expeditionary

forc es and showingthat it could rea sonably be expected that at least one pe rson 11 within them will be endang ere d, is not a narr ow one. The rea ding of “any individual” as 12 requiringa F OIA def endant to identify

an individual with rea sonable spec ificity is a narr ower 13 construction, and to be pref err ed on that ground alone . In Sm all , an ana logy to the presumption 14 ag ainst extrate rritorial a pplication of statutes led the Court to construe “any court” not to include 15 fore ign c ourts. 544 U.S. at 388-89. In Gene ral Dynamics , the ADEA ’s statement of pur pose and 16 finding s counseled a g ainst a broa d construction of the statute’s anti-discrimination provision. 17 540 U.S. at 590-91. Simil arly , here the principle that FOIA exemptions are to be c onstrued 18 narr owly

cabins the pe rmissible construction of the phr ase “ any individual.” A construc tion that 19 re qu ir e s th e a g e nc y to i de nti fy

wi th r e a so na

ble sp e c if ic ity the pe rs on

or pe rs on s who c ou ld 20 re a so na

bly be e xpe c te d to be e nd ang e re d a c c or ds wi th t hat princ ipl e . T he de fe nd ants ’ 21 un

bo un de d inte rp re tatio n d oe s n ot.15 1 That interpr etation is also inconsistent with the remainde r of the te x t of the statute. To 2 construe the word “ any” to re lieve the g overnme nt of the burde n of identifying a n individual who 3 could re asonably

be expected to be endang ere d would be to re ad “individual” out of the 4 exemption. In eff ect, it would conve rt the phra se “e ndang er the life or phy sical saf ety of any 5 individual” into “endang er life or phy sical saf ety .” Indeed, it is telling that one of the c ases the 6 de fe nd ants c ite mis qu ote s e xemp tio n 7 (F ) i n ju st this wa y , le a din git t o c on c lud e that di ff us e 7 harms to unknown and unspe cified individuals ar e cove red by the exemption. See B rady-Lunny 8 v. Masse

y , 185 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (C.D. I ll. 2002) (“Unde r 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (F ), the 9 Go ve rnme nt i s e xemp t f ro m di sc los inginf

or matio n a bo ut a ny ind ivi du a l th at ‘ c ou ld r e a so na bly 10 be expected to e ndang er life or phy sical saf ety .’”) . As we c onstrue statutes to avoid surplusag e, 11 see Xiao J

i Chen v. U.S. De

p’t of Justice , 4 34 F .3 d 1 44 , 1 52 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ) ( “ [A] st atut e ou ght, 12 up on

thewh ole , to be so c on str ue d th at, i f i t c an b e pr e ve nte d, no c la us e , s e nte nc e , o r w or d s ha ll 13 be super fluous, void, or insignific ant[.] ” (quotingDuncan v . W alker , 533 U.S. 167, 174 14 (2001)) ), we cannot ignore the role that the w ord “individual” pla y s in ex emption 7(F)

. 15 Whil e all har ms in the end are suffe red by individuals, there is a c rucia l differ ence 16 betwee n a showingthat disclosure “ could re asonably be expected to e ndang er life or phy sical 17 sa fe ty” and

e xemp tio n 7 (F )’ s r e qu ir e me nt t hat di sc los ur e “ c ou ld r e a so na bly be e xpe c te d to 18 e nd ang e r t

he lif e or phy sic a l sa fe ty

of any ind ivi du a l.” Withlarg e e no ugh p op ulatio ns , r e mot e 19 and spec ulative risks bec ome ra dically more likely

to manifest in at least one person. No one 20 person c an re asonably be expected to die in a

car acc ident, but it is cer

tain that someone 21 somewher e in the world will die in a car acc ident ever

y day

. SeeWor ld H e a lthOrg ., Wor ld 22 Report on Road Tra ffic I njury Prevention 4 (2004) , available atW e dr aw s uppo r t f r om t he f

act t hat Co ng r es s el s ewh er e i n t he C od e di s t i ng ui s hes bet ween 4 a sse ssin g a thr e a t t o a re a so n a b ly i d e n tif ia b le p e rs o n a n d a sse ssin g a ge n e ra lize d thr e a t t o a b ro a d e r g ro u p . T h e B a il Ref or m Act a s k s c ou r t s t o de t er mi n e wh et h er a pe r s on ’ s r el ea s e f r om pr et r i al de t en t i on “ wi l l e n dan g er t h e s af et y of any o t her person o r th e c o m m u n ity

. ” 18 U

. S. C. § 3142( b) ( 2006) ( emph as i s a dded)

. T h e r ef er en ce t o t h e s af

et y of “th e c o m m u n ity” w o u ld b e su p e rfluo u s if su c h ge n e ra lize d risk s c o u ld b e c a p tur e d b y a sse ssin g thr e a ts to the sa fety of “ any ” per s on ot her t han t he r el eas ee. T hi s au t hor i zat i on t o cons i der r i s ks t o t he broader “ com muni t y , ” c ons i dere d necessar y by C o ngres s i n t he B ai l R ef o rm A ct , i s co nspi cuo usl y ab sent f rom exem p t i o n 7(F ). 16 1 http://www.who.org/violence_injury _preve ntion/publi cations/road_tr aff ic/world_report/en/index 2 .html (estimating annua l globa l death toll due to motor vehicle a ccide nts as betwee n 750,000 and 3 1,183,492). Readingthe word “ individual” out of exemption 7(F) a llows consideration of such 4 dif

fu se and sp e c ulativ e ri sk s. I f e xemp tio n 7 (F ) c ov e re d in fo rm atio n who se dis c los ur e “ c ou ld 5 re a so na

bly [be ] expe c te d to e nd ang e r l if e or phy sic a l sa fe ty ,” it m ight b e pr op e r t o a g gre g ate 6 ind ivi du a lly

sp e c ulativ e ri sk s and

fi nd that it is r e a so na

bly lik e ly that li feor

phy sic a l sa fe ty

wi ll 7 be enda

ng ere d somewher e in the world. But exemption 7(F), by conditioning its application on a 8 rea sonable e x pectation of dang er to an individual , excludes from consider ation risks that are 9 sp e c ulativ e wi th r e sp e c t to any ind ivi du a l. 4 10 Th is c a se sh ow s th e signif ic anc e of Con gre ss’ s d e c isi on

to r e qu ir e a

sh ow ingof

da ng e r t o 11 an individual. With g ood rea son, the defe ndants do not identify a sing le per son and say

that the 12 rele ase of

the Army

photos could rea sonably

be expected to e ndang er that person’s life or 13 phy sical saf

ety ; the threat to any

one per son is far too spec ulative. What the defe ndants argue, 14 and

wh at w e a ssume fo r t

he purp os e s o f t

his op ini on , is the fa

r d if fe re nt p ro po sit ion

that it c ou ld 15 rea sonably

be expected that out of a population the size of two nations and two international 16 e xpe dit ion ary

fo rc e s c omb ine d, so me on e so me wh e rewi ll b e e nd ang e re d a s a re su lt o f t

he re le a se 17 of the Ar

my photos. Thus, we do not consider a ca se whe re the defe ndants have shown 18 exemption 7(F)’s r equire d rea sonable e x pectation of endang erme nt with respec t to one or more17 1 ind ivi du a ls, but on e wh e rethede fe nd ants atte mpt to c ob ble tog e the r t

hat r e qu ir e d r e a so na

ble 2 expectation of enda ng erme nt by

ag greg atingminiscule and spec ulative individual risks over a 3 vast group of individuals. 4 We hold that in order to justify withholding docume nts under exemption 7(F), a n ag ency 5 must identify

at least one individual with reasonable specific ity and esta blish that disclosure of 6 the documents c ould rea sonably be expected to e ndang er that individual. W e nee d not shape the 7 prec ise contours of the exemption t oday , as it is not a close question whethe r the g overnme nt has 8 ide nti fi e d a

ny re le va nt i nd ivi du a l w ithre a so na ble sp e c if ic ity . It is pla inl y

ins uf fi c ie nt t o c la im 9 that rele asingdocuments could re asonably be expected to e ndang er some unspe cified me mber of 10 a group so vast as to enc ompass all United States troops, coa lition forces, a nd civilians in Iraq 11 and Af

ghanistan. The struc ture of F OIA and the a pplicable leg islative history , both of which 12 c onte mpl ate a

fa r n arr ow e r r olefo r e xemp tio n 7 (F ) t ha n th at e nv isi on e d b y

the de fe nd ants , ampl y 13 confirm our

holding. 14 2. TheStruc tureof F OI A a nd its Ex e mp tio ns 15 Our c onclusion as to the bre adth of e x emption 7(F) is supported by the structure of 16 FOIA’s exemptions. The context of the exempti on sever ely underc uts the defe ndants’ cla im that 17 Congr ess tucked suc h a fa r-r eac hing a

nd nebulous authority

for withholdinginto one of the 18 sever al discre te law e nforc ement exemptions. “Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endea vor. 19 A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the re mainder of

the 20 statutory

scheme .” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex . v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. , 4 84 U. S. 21 365, 371 (1988). Such c larifica tion occurs whe n “only

one of the permissible meaning s produce sF O IA ’s ex e m p tio n 3 , ju stif ying w ithh o ld ing p u rs u a n t t o o the r sp e c ifi c sta tuto ry a u tho riz a tio n , § 5 5 5 2 (b )( 3 ), h a s a lso b e e n a p p lied to p ro te c t ce rta in c la sse s o f na tio n a l se c u rity info rm a tio n , s e e C I A v . S i ms , 471 U

. S. 159, 167- 68 ( 1985) ( h ol di n g CI A’ s or g an i c s t at u t e qu al i f i es a s s t at u t or y a u t h or i za t i on f or w i t h h ol di n g r ec or ds of “i nt el l i gence sources and m et ho d s” under exem p t i o n 3). I f any t hi ng, t hi s d em o nst rat es t hat C o ngres s has gi ven d ue at t ent i on t o t he un i que i s s ues r el at i ng t o nat i onal s ecu r i t y an d f ur t her un dermi nes t he def endan t s ’ s ug ges t i on t hat exem p t i o n 7(F ) must be read t o ove rl ap t he st at ut o ry s chem e p rotect i ng nat i o nal s ecuri t y i nf o rma t i o n. 18 1 a substantive ef

fec t that is compatible with the rest of the la w.” Id . Her e the de fenda nts’ rea ding 2 of exemption 7(F) is inconsistent with FOIA’s tre atment of national security information. 3 To say

that exemption 7(F) does not c ontemplate withholding r ecords on the basis of 4 diffuse thre ats of dea th or phy sical injury , threats which areindividually speculative but which 5 c an r e a so na

bly be e xpe c te d w ithre sp e c t to larg e po pu latio ns , is no t to de nigrate su c h thre ats, 6 wh ic h o f c ours e arec ha ra c te ri sti c of

thenatio na l se c urity

sp he re . Ind e e d, the de fe nd ants 7 acknow ledg e the disclosure issue curr ently befor e us as a

matter of national security . ( See , e.g. , 8 Appellants’ B r. 25 (se ekingsubstantial defe renc e by the Court to the “pre dictive judg ments on 9 issues of national sec urity” of B rig adier Gene ral Car

ter F . Ham and G ener al Richard B . Myers) .) 10 F OIA, ho we ve r, pr ov ide s a se pa rate e xemp tio n s pe c if

ic a lly ta ilo re d to the natio na l se c urity 11 c onte xt, whic h is a po we rf ul r e a so n n ot t o c on str

ue e xemp tio n 7 (F ) a s b ro a dly a s th e de fe nd ants 12 urg e. 13 FOIA’s exemption 1, 5 U.S.C . § 552(b)( 1), exempts from disclosure re cords that a re “ (A) 14 specific ally

authorized under c riteria e stablished by an Executive orde r to be kept secre t in the 15 int e re st o f n atio na l de fe ns e or fo re ign p oli c y

and (B ) a rein f a c t pr op e rl y

c la ssi fi e d p ur su ant t o 1 6 s u chE x ec ut i v e o rd er . ” E x ec ut i v e O rd er 1 3 , 2 9 2 “p re s cr i b es a un i fo rms y s t emfo r c l as s i fyi n g, 5 17 safe guarding , and dec lassifying national security information.” Exec. Or der N o. 13,292, 68 Fe d. 18 Reg . 15,315 (Mar . 25, 2003). It also sets forth limits on what may be cla ssified, by

whatF o r m o re d isc u ssio n o f C o n g re ss’s 1 9 7 4 a m e n d m e n ts to e x e m p tio n 1 , se e S e c tio n B .3 , i n f ra . 6 19 1 authority , and for

how long . First amongthe limits are prohibitions aga inst classifying 2 information in order to “conc eal violations of law, ine fficie ncy , or administrative e rror ” or 3 “pre vent embar

rassment to a pe rson, org anization, or ag ency .” Id. § 1.7(a)

. 4 Al tho ugh E xec uti ve Or de r 1 3, 29 2 is no t a law, F OIA i nc or

po rate s it s sa fe gua

rd s into 5 e xemp tio n 1 . § 55 2(b) (1 )( B ). Ind e e d, e arl ie r v e rs ion s o f t he se pr oh ibi tio ns we reinc lud e d in 6 Exe c uti ve Or de r 1 1, 65 2 ( a pr e c ur so r t o E xec uti ve Or de r 1 3, 29 2) wh e n Co ngre ss i nit ia lly 7 incorpora

ted such saf

eguards into exemption 1 in 1974, P ub. L . No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 8 (1974). SeeExe c . O rd e r N o. 11 ,6 52 , § 4, 37 F e d. Re g . 5 20 9 ( Ma r. 8, 19 72 ) ( “ In n o c a se sh a ll 9 information be c lassified in order to conce al ineff

iciency or administrative e rror , [or] to preve nt 10 embar

rassment to a pe rson or Department . . . .” ). Not only wer e similar such saf

eguards thus 6 11 contemplated by

Congr ess’s 1974 ame ndment of exemption 1, but the cur rent saf eguards we re 12 also in forc e at the time of the 1986 amendme nts to FOIA. SeeEx ec. O rder No. 12,356, § 1.6(a ), 13 47 Fe d. Reg . 14,874 (1982) ( “In no case shall information be c lassified in order to conce al 14 violations of law, ineff iciency , or administrative e rror ; [ or] to prevent emba rra ssment to a person, 15 org anization, or ag ency . . . .”). While the President c ould theoretica lly modify the executive 16 branc h’s classific ation standards to a brog ate these safe guards, substantially the same sa feguards 17 have be en in forc e, and inc orporated into FOIA through exemption 1, from 1974 to the present. 18 Th e y

arethe re fo repr op e rl y

c on sid e re d p art

of the statut or

y ba c kd ro p a g a ins t whic h Co ngre ss 19 le g isl ate d in

19 86 wh e n it

c ha ng e d e xemp tio n 7 (F ) t o p ro te c t in fo rm atio n th at “ c ou ld r e a so na bly 20 be expected to e ndang er the life or phy sical saf ety of any individual.” Pub. L . No. 99-570, §T he d ef end ant s have no t exp l ai ned whet her t he A rmy pho t o s m ay b e p rop erl y cl ass i f i ed , and 7 the re b y re n d e re d e x e m p t f ro m d isc lo su re , o r w h y tha t ha s n o t o c c u rr e d . T h e ir failu re to inv o k e e x e m p tio n 1 w o u ld n ot f or ec l os e t h ei r r es or t t o e x empt i on 7( F) i f i t a ppl i ed, bu t t h e ex i s t en ce of t h e s epa r at e n at i on al s ec u r i t y e x empt i on und ercut s t hei r ar gum ent t hat exem p t i o n 7(F ) encom p ass es i nf o rma t i o n s o l el y be cause of t he nat i o nal s ecuri t y harm it thr e a te n s. 20 1 18 02 (a), 10 0 St at. 3 20 7 ( 19 86 ); see also John D oe Age ncy , 493 U.S. at 162 (Scalia, J., 2 dissenting) (“Congress ha s greatly reduc ed the possibility

of abuse [of ex emption 1] by providing 3 that th e c la ssi fi c atio n mu st be proper unde r criteria established by Exe cutive orde r .” (e mph a sis 4 in orig inal)). 5 Th e e xiste nc e of se pa rate sta nd ard s f or inf or matio n thre ate nin gha

rm to n atio na l se c urity 6 sever ely

underc uts the defe ndants’ asse rted c onstruction of exemption 7(F). It would be 7 anomalous if an a g ency that could not meet the r equire ments for c lassification of national 8 security

materia l could, by

char acte rizing the mate rial as having be en compiled f or law 9 e nf

or c e me nt p ur

po se s, e va de thestric tur e s a nd sa fe gua rd s o f c la ssi fi c atio n a

nd fi nd sh e lte r i n 10 exemption 7(F) simply by asser ting that disclosure could re asonably be expected to e ndang er 11 so me on e un ide nti fi e d s ome wh e rein t he wo rl d. Th e de fe nd ants ’ s tand ard is f ar m or e fa

vo ra ble 7 12 to secre cy

than eve n the lowest tier of the cur rent c lassification sy stem. SeeEx ec. O rder No. 13 13,292, § 1.2(a) (3) ( defininglowest level of c lassified information as “Confidential,” a nd 14 a uth orizin gthat de signa

tio n f or “ inf or matio n, the un a

uth orize d d isc los ur e of

wh ic h r e a so na

bly 15 c ou ld b e e xpe c te d to c a us e damage to the national security that the orig inal classification 16 a uth ority is a bleto i de nti fy

and de sc ribe .” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ). Th e de fe nd ants inv ite us to 17 conver

t exempti on 7(F ) into, in effe ct, an a lternative c lassification mec hanism entirely lacking 18 the executive’s sa feguards a nd standards. The threats that would justi fy keepingsuch 19 information sec ret a re no le ss diffuse a

nd speculative than those involved in the spher e of21 1 natio na l se c urity , b ut a resignif ic antl y le ss gra ve . Su c h a

n a lte rn ativ e c la ssi fi c atio n s y ste m is 2 inc on sis te nt w iththestr uc tur e of F OIA’ s e xemp tio ns . 3 The limitation of exempti on 7(F ) to law e nforc ement re cords doe s not dimi nish that 4 inconsistency . First, the e ase w ith which the g overnme nt can f ind refug e for

its recor ds on the 5 ground that they

wer e compiled f

or “la w enf orce ment purposes” can ha rdly be over stated. See 6 John DoeAgenc

y , 493 U.S. at 162-64 (Sca lia, J ., dissenting) (desc ribingthe ability to transfe r 7 rec ords to an investig ation file as “ a hole one can drive a truc k through”). Sec ond, assuming the 8 utmost good fa ith of the g overnme nt, the disparate treatment that would be ac corde d law 9 e nf

or c e me nt n atio na l se c urity inf or matio n a nd no n- law- e nf

or c e me nt n atio na l se c urity 10 information conf irms that exempti on 7(F ) will not bear the weight the defe ndants place upon it. 11 Inf

or matio n g e ne rate d f

ro m natio na l se c urity

op e ra tio ns un c onne c te d to law e nf or c e me nt w ou ld 12 be inexplicably

subject to higher judicia l scrutiny , through exemption 1, than information 13 g e ne rate d f

ro m natio na l se c urity

op e ra tio ns pe rf or me d b y me ans of law e nf or c e me nt. It is 14 inconsistent with other provisions of the United States Code to construe law enf orce ment 15 national sec urity

operations to be subject to less judicial oversight -- re g ardingthe sec rec y of 16 their re cords or

any thing e lse -- tha

n non-law- enfor ceme nt national security operations. 17 Compare, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006) ( authorizing lawenfor ceme nt electr onic surveillanc e 18 only

for 30 da y s befor e see king a

judicial extension of tim e, and pe rmitting only one 30-da

y 19 extension) with 50 U. S.C. § 1 80 5( e ) ( 20 06 ) ( a uth orizin gva

ri ou s ty pe s o f n atio na l se c urity 20 e le c tr on ic surv e ill anc e fo r 9 0- da y , 1 20 -d ay , a

nd 1- ye ar p e ri od s a

nd pe rm itt ingmul tip le 21 extensions of ti me).22 1 Thus, the structure of F OIA’s exemption provision, with i ts separate exemptions and 2 dif

fe re nt s tand ard s f

or natio na l se c urity

matte rs and

fo r l aw e nf

or c e me nt m atte rs , c ouns e ls i n 3 favor

of the na rrowe r construc tion of 7(F) that we a dopt here

. 4 3

. T h e L eg i s la t i veHis to r

y o f E xe mp t i o n 7 (F) 5 An examination of the leg islative history and bac kground surroundingthe adoption of the 6 curr ent form of

exemption 7(F) conf

irms that the exemption s imply does not function as a

far 7 broade r alter

native to the national se curity classification sy stem. Congr ess has a lway s envisioned 8 exemption 7(F) as a shield ag ainst specific threats to particular individuals arising out of law 9 enfor ceme nt investigations, never a s a mea ns of suppressingworldwide political violenc e. 10 FOIA was e nacte d as an a ntidote to the perc eived “ loopholes” in Section 3 of the 11 Administrative Procedur e Ac t (“APA” ), which a llowed ag encie s “to deny leg itimate information 12 to the public.” S. Rep. No. 89-813 ( 1965), reprinted in Subcomm. on Admin. P rac tice & 13 Procedur e, S. Comm. on the Judi ciar y , 93rd Cong ., Freedom of Information Act Source Book 36, 14 38 (Comm. Print1974) [hereina fter FOIA Sourc e Book ]. S ection 3, the APA’ s disclosure 15 statute, allowed a g encie s to withhold i nformation “r equiringsecr ecy in the public interest” or 16 “for

g ood cause .” APA § 3, Pub. L . No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946), reprinted in FOIA 17 Source Book

, su pra , at 39-40. Congress fe are d that this open-ende d languag e may have a llowed 18 a g e nc ie s to wi thh old inf or matio n “ on ly

to c ov e r u

p e mba rr a ssi ngmis take s o r i rr e gula ri tie s. ” S. 19 Rep. No. 89-813, reprinted in FOIA Sourc e Book, su pra , at 38 ; see also H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497 20 (1966), reprinted in FOIA Sourc e Book, su pra , at 22 , 3 3 ( “ [T]he law whic h w a s d e signe d to 21 provide public infor mation about Gover

nment activities has bec ome the Gove rnment’s major 22 shield of sec rec y .”).W hen FO IA was f i rs t enact ed and m o d i f

i ed by a minor s t y l i st i c am end m ent , t he ni ne exem p t i o ns 8 w ere arti cu l ated as f o l l o w s: T he p rovis i o ns o f

t hi s sect i o n s hal l not b e ap p l i cab l e t o m at t ers t hat are ( 1) s pec i f

i ca l l y r equ i r ed by Exe cu t i v e or der t o be k ept s ec r et i n t h e i n t er es t of n a tio n a l d e fen se o r fo re ign p o licy; (2 ) re la te d so le ly t o the inte rn a l p e rs o n n e l ru le s a n d p ra c tice s o f an a g e n c y; ( 3) s peci f

i cal l y ex emp t ed f

r om di s cl osu r e by s t at ut e; (4) t rade s ecret s and co m m erci al or f i nanci al i nf

o rma t i o n ob t ai ned f

rom any p e rs o n a n d p riv ileg e d o r c o n fid e n tial; ( 5) i n t er - ag en cy or i n t r a- ag en cy me mor an du ms or l et t er s w h i ch w ou l d n ot be a v a ilab le b y law to a p a rty o the r th a n a n a g e n c y in lit iga tio n w ith the a g e n c y; (6 ) p e rs o n n e l an d m e d ic a l f iles a n d sim ilar fi le s the d isc lo su re o f wh ic h w o u ld c o n stitute a c le a rly u n w a rr a n te d inv a sio n o f p e rs o n a l p riv a c y; (7) i nvest i gat o ry f

i l es com p i l ed f

o r l aw enf

o rcem ent purp o ses excep t t o t he e x te n t av a ilab le b y law to a p a rty o the r th a n a n a g e n c y; 23 1 In stating the purpose of FOIA, which wa s passed a s an ame ndment to Section 3 of the 2 APA , th e Se nate Judic iary Committe e state d: 3 It is the purpose of the pr esent bill to . . . establish a g ener al 4 ph ilo so phy of fu ll a g e nc y

dis c los ur e un le ss i nf

or matio n is 5 e xemp te d und e r c le arl y de lin e ate d s tatut or

y langua g e and

to 6 provide a court proc edure by

which citizens and the pre ss may 7 obtain information wrong ly withheld. It is important and ne cessa ry 8 that th e pr e se nt v oid be fi lle d. It is e sse nti a l th at a g e nc y pe rs onne l, 9 and the c ourts as we ll, be g iven def initive guidelines in setting 10 information policies. Standards suc h as “f or g ood cause ” ar e 11 cer tainly not sufficient. 12 S. Rep. No. 89-813, reprinted in FOIA Sourc e Book, su pra , at 38 ; see also H.R. Rep. No. 89- 13 1497, reprinted in FOIA Sourc e Book, su pra , at 33 (“Ademocr atic socie ty require s an informe d, 14 int e lli g e nt e le c tor ate , a nd theint e lli g e nc e of

the e le c tor ate va

ri e s a s th e qu anti ty

and qu a lity of its 15 information varies. A dang er signal to our democ ratic soc iety in the United States is the fac t that 16 such a political truism nee ds repe ating .”). 17 Congr ess re cognized, however , that cer tain information should not be disclosed to the 18 public, so it set forth nine exemptions t o FOIA. Orig inally , exemption 7 allowed the 8(8 ) c o n ta ine d in o r re la te d to e x a m ina tio n , o p e ra ting , o r c o n d iti o n re p o rts p repa red b y , on b ehal f

of, or f o r t he use of

any agency res p o nsi b l e f o r t he regul at i o n or supervi si o n of f i nanci al i nst i t ut i o ns; and (9 ) ge o l o gica l an d ge o p hysi ca l i nfo rm ati o n a nd d ata (includ i ng m ap s) c o n c e rn ing w e lls. 5 U

. S.C

. § 5 5 2 (b) (19 6 7 ). 24 1 withholding of “ investigatory files compiled for

law enf orce ment purposes e x cept to the e x tent 2 available by

law to a pa

rty other than a

n ag ency .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1967). The exemption 3 pr e c lud e d p ri vate pa rt ie s e ng a g e d in

lit ig atio n w iththe g ov e rnme nt f ro m ob ta ini ngmor e via 4 FOIA than they

wer e entitled to re ceive under the rele vant disclosure r ules. SeeH.R. Rep. No. 5 89-1497, reprinted in FOIA Sourc e Book, su pra , at 32 (e x plaining that exempti on 7 was 6 nece ssary

beca use F OIA “is not intended to g ive a private par ty indirectly

any earlier or greater 7 a c c e ss t o inve sti g ator y fi le s th an h e wo uld

have dir e c tly

in s uc h li tig atio n o r p ro c e e din g s. ” ); see 8 also Robbins , 437 U.S. at 224 (“F oremost amongthe purposes of [ex emption 7] was to pre vent 9 harm to the Gove rnment’s c ase in c ourt.” (inter nal quotation omitted)). 10 FOIA g ot off to a slow star t. A series of

oversight hearings c onducted in 1971 and 1972 11 by

a subcommittee of the House Committee on Gover nment Oper ations identified seve ral major 12 pr ob le m are a s in

thea dmi nis tr atio n o f t

he statut e . T he y

inc lud e d b ur e a

uc ra tic de lay s in

re sp on se 13 time, fee schedule abuses, ove r-involvement of political appointees in the de cision-making 14 proce ss and a poor attitude amongtop administration officials towar d the “ope n acc ess” spirit of 15 FOIA. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1419, at 8 (1972), re pr inte d in Subcomm. on Gov. Info. & Individual 16 Rights, H. Comm. on Gov. Operations, 94th C ong . & Subcomm. on Admin. Prac tice & 17 Procedur e, S. Comm. on the Judi ciar y , 94th Cong., Fre e do m o f I nfo rm ati on Ac t an d A me nd me nts 18 of 1974 (

P.L. 93-502) Source Book 8, 15 (Comm. Print1975) [hereina fter 1974 Amendm entA s am en d ed i n 1 9 7 4 , S ec t i o n 5 5 2 (b ) p ro vid ed as f o l l o w s: 9 T hi s s ect i on does not appl y t o m at t er s t hatar e-

(1 )( A ) sp e c ifi c a lly a u tho riz e d un d e r c rite ria e sta b lishe d b y a n E x e c u tive o rd e r to b e ke p t se c re t i n the inte re st o f na tio n a l d e fen se o r fo re ign p o licy a n d (B ) a re in f act pro p erl y cl ass i f

i ed pursuant t o s uch E xecut i ve o rder; (2 ) re la te d so le ly t o the inte rn a l p e rs o n n e l ru le s a n d p ra c tice s o f an a g e n c y; ( 3) s peci f

i cal l y ex emp t ed f

r om di s cl osu r e by s t at ut e; ( 4) t r ade s ec r et s a n d c ommer ci al or f i n an ci al i n f

or mat i on obt ai n ed f

r om a pe r s on a n d p riv ileg e d o r c o n fid e n tial; ( 5) i n t er - ag en cy or i n t r a- ag en cy me mor an du ms or l et t er s w h i ch w ou l d n ot be a v a ilab le b y law to a p a rty o the r th a n a n a g e n c y in lit iga tio n w ith the a g e n c y; (6 ) p e rs o n n e l an d m e d ic a l f iles a n d sim ilar fi le s the d isc lo su re o f wh ic h w o u ld c o n stitute a c le a rly u n w a rr a n te d inv a sio n o f p e rs o n a l p riv a c y; 25 1 Source Book

]. A s a re su lt, thec omm itt e e c on c lud e d th at “ [i]n to o ma ny c a se s, inf or matio n is 2 wi thh e ld, ov e rc la ssi fi e d, or oth e rw ise hid de n f

ro m th e pu

bli c to a vo id a dmi nis tr ativ e mis take s, 3 waste of

funds, or political emba

rra ssment.” Id ., reprinted in 1974 Amendm ent SourceBook, 4 su pra , at 15. 5 Additional oversight hearings in 1973 be fore subcommittees of the Senate Commit tee on 6 the Judiciary

produce d simil ar f

indings, a nd the committee conc luded that “the primary obstacles 7 to the Act’s f

aithful implementation by the executive bra

nch havebeen pr ocedur al rather than 8 substantive.” SeeS. Rep. No. 93-854 (1974), reprinted in 1974 Amendm ent SourceBook, su pra , 9 at 153. The r esulting a mendments, ena cted ove r the ve to of President F ord, tightened a nd 10 clarified some of F OIA’s key proce dural re quirements. Amongthe cha ng es we re r equire d 11 ind ic e s r e fl e c tin ga g e nc y a c tio n, sta

nd ard ize d s e arc h a

nd c op y fe e s f or F OIA p la int if

fs , ti me 1 2 f r am e s f o r a g e n c y a c t i o n , a l l o w an c e f

o r r e c o v e r y o f r e a s o n a b l e att o r n e y f e e s an d c o s t s b y F O IA 13 plaintiffs, requir ed annua l reportingon the administration of F OIA, and a n expanded def

inition 14 of what constitutes an “ag ency .” See id. at 160-87. 15 Th e 19 74 ame ndme nts a lso a lte re d th e e xemp tio ns in s e ve ra l si gnif ic ant r e sp e c ts. F ir st,

9(7) i nvest i gat o ry record s co m p i l ed f o r l aw enf

o rcem ent purp o ses , but o nl y t o t he ext ent t hat t he p rod uct i o n of such r eco rds wo ul d (A) i nt erf ere wi t h enf

o rcem ent procee di ng s , ( B ) depri ve a per s on of a r i gh t t o a f

ai r t r i al or an i mp ar t i al a d j u d i c a t i o n , ( C ) c o n s t i t u t e a n u n w a r r a n t e d i n v a s i o n o f p e r s o n a l p r i v a c y , ( D) d i scl o se t he i d ent i t y of a co nf i d ent i al s o urce and , i n t he case of a record com pi l ed by a c r i mi nal l aw e nf orce ment au t hor i t y i n t he cour s e of a c r i mi nal i nv es t i gat i on, or by an ag enc y conduc t i ng a l awf ul na t i onal s ecu r i t y i nt el l i gen ce i nv es t i gat i on, conf

i dent i al i nf

ormat i on f

ur ni s hed onl y by t he conf i dent i al s our ce, ( E) di s cl os e i n v es t i g at i v e t ec h n i qu es a n d pr oce du r es , or ( F) e n dan g er t h e l i f e or p h ysic a l sa fety o f l a w e n fo rc e m e n t p e rs o n n e l; (8 ) c o n ta ine d in o r re la te d to e x a m ina tio n , o p e ra ting , o r c o n d iti o n re p o rts p repa red b y , on b ehal f

of, or f o r t he use of

an agency res p o nsi b l e f o r t he r eg u l at i on or s u per v i s i on of f i n an ci al i n s t i t u t i on s ; or (9) geo l o gi cal and geo p hy si cal i nf o rma t i o n and da t a, i ncl ud i ng m ap s, co ncerni ng w ell s. Any r ea s on abl y s eg r eg abl e por t i on of a r ec or d s h al l be pr ov i ded t o a n y pe r s on re q u e sting su c h re c o rd a fter d e le tio n o f t h e p o rtio n s w h ic h a re e x e m p t un d e r th is subsect i o n. 5 U .S .C . § 5 5 2 (b ) (1 9 7 4 ); see a lso P ub

. L. N o . 93

- 5 0 2 , § 2 , 88 Stat

. 15 6 1 , 15 6 3

- 6 4 (19 7 4 ) ( am end i ng FO IA e x e m p tio n s)

. 26 1 as noted a

bove, they

incorpora

ted the executive br anch’ s classification standards by providing 2 that any

inf or matio n w ithhe ld p ur su ant t o e xemp tio n 1 in t he int e re st o f n atio na l de fe ns e ha d to 3 be “in f

act pr operly

classified pur suant to” executive orde r. § 552(b) (1)( B) . That ame ndment 4 reve rsed the e ffe ct of the Supre me Court’s holding in EPA v. M ink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973), that 5 FOIA’s grant of judicia l reviewdid not empower c ourts to reviewexecutive classific ation 6 decisions by

conductingin camer a re view of the documents at issue. The amende d exemption 1 7 authorized courts to initiate, wher e appr opriate, suc h in camer a examinations of contested 8 rec ords to deter

mine whether

they had bee n properly

classified. 5 U .S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B ) (1974) ; 9 see also H.R. Rep. No. 93-1380 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 Amendm ent SourceBook, 10 su

pra , at 219, 229 (de scribingintent to override Mink and allow in ca

mera examination). 11 Second, the 1974 amendments responde d to conce rns that the opportunity to exempt l aw 12 e nf

or c e me nt “ fi le s” c re ate d a n in c e nti ve amon ga g e nc ie s “ to c omm ing le va ri ou s in fo rm atio n into27 1 one enor

mous investigator

y file and the n claim it is too di fficult to sift through” to deter mine 2 whether

any of its contents areresponsive to a valid FOI

A re quest. 120 Cong. Re c. S19,806-23 3 (daily

ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (Statement of Sen. Ha rt), reprinted in 1974 Amendm ent SourceBook, 4 su pra , at 451 (“ This ‘contamination tec hnique’ ha s been w idely used by ag encie s to thwart 5 a c c e ss t o p ub lic ly

va lua bleinf or matio n in the ir fi le s. ” ). So Co ngre ss r e pla c e d th e wo rd “ fi le s” in 6 exemption 7 with the word “ rec ords,” a nd order ed ag encie s to ex amine individual rec ords 7 c onta ini nge xemp t in fo rm atio n a nd to d isc los e “ any

re a so na bly se gre g a ble po rt ion ” of

tho se 8 re c or ds up on

re qu e st. § 5 52 (b ) ( 19 74 ); see Robbins , 437 U.S. at 229-30 (notingthat substitut ing 9 the word “ rec ords” f or “f iles” helpe d avoid “imper missibl e ‘c ommingling ’ by an ag ency ’s 10 placingin an investig atory file material that did not legitimately have to be kept conf

idential”). 11 Finally , the 1974 amendme nts replac ed the br oad languag e of e x emption 7, which had 12 c ov e re d a ll i nv e sti g ator y fi le s e xce pt t o th e e xtent th e y we rea lr e a dy

ma de ava ila

ble by law, wi th 13 six specific subprovisions. The amende d exemption required ag encie s to demonstrate that e ach 14 withheld investigatory rec ord fit into one of the six subprovisi ons. Most significa ntly for the 15 purposes of this ca se, the subprovisions authorized the withholding of rec ords that would (1) 16 disclose the identity of a c onfidential sourc e (or , with respec t to criminal law enf orce ment or 17 national sec urity

rec ords, disclose conf

idential information provided solely by such a sour ce) , 18 § 552(b)( 7)(D) (1974); or ( 2) enda ng er the life or phy sical saf ety of “la w enf orce ment 19 personne l,” § 552(b)( 7)(F ) (1974)

. 20 The 1974 amendments wer e intended to r einvig orate FOIA. B y eliminating the a

bility of 21 an ag ency

to place e ntire law e nforc ement files out of the public’s re ach, a nd then nar

rowingthe 22 withholding authority to the six specifie d cate g ories of r ecords, they acc omplished that goa l. But28 1 in doing so, the a

mendments cre ated some pr oblems. Records identify ing a confide ntial source 2 could be withheld, a s could rec ords that would enda ng er la w enf orce ment personne l. But what 3 about re cords that c ould endang er the families of such pe rsons, or per sons assisting law 4 enfor ceme nt who are neither c onfidential sourc es nor g overnme nt employees? Attorney Gene ral 5 Ed wa rd H. L e vi i de nti fi e d th e se pr ob le ms i n a 19 75 me mor and

um r e g ard ingthe ame ndme nts to 6 the executive bra

nch depa rtments and ag encie s. The memora ndum set forth guidelines for the 7 implementation of the ame nded F OIA, and state d as follows with respe ct to exemption 7(F): 8 Clause (F ), which w as adde d by the Confer enceCommi ttee, 9 exempts m aterial whose disclosure would “enda ng er the life or phy sical 10 safe ty of law e nforc ement per sonnel.” 11

. . . 12 Cla us e (F ) m ight a

pp ly , f or e xamp le , to inf

or matio n whic h w ou ld 13 reve al the identity of under cover

ag ents, State or F eder al, workingon such 14 matters as na rcotics, org anized crime, te rrorism, or espionag e. It is 15 unclear whether thephrase “law enforcement pe rsonnel” means that the 16 endangere d individual must be technically an “em ployee ” of a law 17 enforce ment organization; arguably it does not

. It is clear, howeve r, that 18 the language of clause ( F) cannot be stretche d to protect the safety of the 19 families of lawenforce ment personne l or the safety of other persons

. 20 Edwar d H. L evi, Attorney Ge neral’s Me morandum on the 1974 Ame ndments to the Free dom of 21 Information Act

pt. I -B (1975), available at htt p:/ /www .u sd oj. g ov/oip/7 4a g me mo. htm

. 22 Those wor ds proved to be pr ophetic. As the w ar on dr ug s and org anized crime e scalated 23 in the early

1980s, those are as of law enfor ceme nt activity

“constitute[d] a spec ial problem under 24 FOIA.” 132 Cong . Rec. S14,040 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch), a nd the 25 fac t that exempti on 7(F )’s prote ctions werelimit ed to “law enfor ceme nt personnel” was c entra l 26 to this special problem. As the Deputy Attorney Gene ral stated in support of proposed 27 ame ndme nts :S . 7 7 4 w a s p a sse d b y the S e n a te , b u t i t wa s n o t ac te d o n b y the H o u se d u rin g the 9 8 th C o n g re ss. 10 H o wever, § 1 0 of t he b i l l s up p l i ed t he l anguage f o r t he 1 9 8 6 am end m ent s t o exem p t i o n 7, and t he Se nat e Jud i ci ary C o m m i t t ee ’ s rep o rt o n § 1 0 o f S

. 7 7 4 wa s exp l i cit l y ad o p t ed b y bo t h the S en ate a nd t he H o use sp o nso rs o f t ho se ame n dmen t s . 132 Con g . Rec

. S14, 296 ( dai l y e d. Se pt . 30, 1986) ( s t at eme n t of Se n . Le ah y ) ( adopt i n g S. Rep. N o. 2 2 1 as “s et [t i ng] out t he l egi sl at i ve hi st o ry whi ch shoul d be co nsul t ed t o de t erm i ne t he scop e o f t he sect i o n we are ad o p t i ng i n t hi s b i l l ”); 13 2 C o ng. R ec. H 9 4 6 5

- 6 6 (dai l y ed

. O ct . 8, 19 8 6 ) ( joint s t at em ent of R ep s. E ngl i sh and K i nd ness ) ( si m i l ar). 29 1 Th e c ur re nt l angua g e in E xemp tio n 7 (F ) e xemp ts r e c or ds on ly if 2 their disclosure w ould endang er the life of a law enf orce ment 3 office r. Howe ver, the exemption does not give similar protec tion 4 to t he lif e of any oth e r p e rs on . S. 77 4 e xpand s E xemp tio n 7 (F ) t o 5 inc lud e su c h p e rs on s a s w itn e sse s, po te nti a l w itn e sse s, and fa mil y 6 members whose persona l safety is of centr al importance to the law 7 e nf orc e me nt p ro c e ss. 8 131 Cong. Rec . S253 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Carol E. Dinkins, Deputy Attorney 9 Ge ne ra l)

. In r e sp on se , Co ngre ss a g a in a me nd e d F OIA i n c onne c tio n w ithpa ssa g e of the Anti- 10 10 DrugAbuse Ac t of 1986. Senator Ha tch, who author ed the c hang es with Senator L eahy , noted 11 duringCongr essional debate that “no f ewe r than five differ ent reports studying the impact of 12 F OIA h ave c on c lud e d th at th e a c t ha s h arm e d th e a bil ity of law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs to e nli st 13 inf

or mants and

c arr y out c on fi de nti a l inve sti g atio ns .” 13 2 Co ng . Re c . S1 4, 03 8 ( da ily e d. Se pt. 14 27, 1986) (state ment of Sen. Hatch). Instead of be ing use d by members of

the public to lear

n of 15 officia l conduct, F OIA was be ing “ used by lawbre aker s to evade criminal investig ation or 16 reta liate ag ainst informants.” Id. (interna l quotation omit ted). Indeed, a 1982 DrugEnforc ement 17 Ag ency

study that found 60% of

FOIA and Privac y

Act re quests “orig inated within the criminal 18 element.” Id. Thus, the bill’s proponents argued that “the languag e in 7(F ) has a n obvious and 19 absurd limitation. Under this languag e, re cords a re only exempt if they

endang er the life of a 20 police off

icer , without givingsimil ar pr otection to the life of a ny natura l person.” Id. at S14,039. 21 Consist ent with this legislative history , the 1986 amendme nts to ex emption 7 refle ct theA s a m e n d e d in 1 9 8 6 , ex e m p tio n 7 a llo w s g o v e rn m e n t with h o ld ing o f: 11

reco rds or i nf

o rma t i o n co m p i l ed f

o r l aw enf

o rcem ent purp o ses , but o nl y t o t he ext ent t hat t he p rod uct i o n of such l aw enf o rcem ent record s o r i nf o rma t i o n (A ) c o u ld re a so n a b ly b e e x p e c te d to inte rfe re w ith e n fo rc e m e n t p ro c e e d ing s, (B ) w o u ld d e p riv e a p e rs o n o f a rig h t t o a fair tria l o r a n im p a rtia l ad ju d ic a tio n , ( C) c ou l d r ea s on abl y be e x pec t ed t o c on s t i t u t e an u n wa r r an t ed i n v as i on of p e rs o n a l p riv a c y, ( D ) coul d re as onabl y be ex pect ed t o di s cl ose t he i dent i t y of a c onf i dent i al so u rc e , i n c lud ing a S ta te , l o c a l, o r fo re ign a g e n c y o r a u tho rity o r a n y p riv a te i n s t i t u t i on w h i ch f

u r n i s h ed i n f

or mat i on on a c on f

i den t i al ba s i s , a n d i n t h e ca s e of a reco rd o r i nf

o rma t i o n co m p i l ed by cri m i nal l aw enf o rcem ent aut ho ri t y i n t he cour s e of

a c r i mi nal i nv es t i gat i on or by an ag enc y conduc t i ng a l awf ul na t i onal s ecu r i t y i nt el l i gen ce i nv es t i gat i on, i nf ormat i on f

ur ni s hed by a c onf

i dent i al so u rc e , (E ) would d i scl o se t echni q ues and p roce d ures f o r l aw enf

o rcem ent i nvest i gat i o ns o r prosecuti o ns, or wo ul d dis cl o se gui d el i nes f o r l aw enf

o rcem ent i nvest i gat i o ns o r p ro sec uti o ns if

such d i sclo sure co uld rea so na b l y be ex p ec t ed t o ri sk ci rcum vent i o n of t he l aw, o r (F) could reasonab l y be exp ect ed t o end anger t he l i f e o r phys i cal s af

et y of any ind ivid u a l. 5 U

. S.C

. § 5 5 2 (b)(7) (19 8 6 ).

30 1 lawm ake rs ’ d e sir e to l imi t th e a bil ity of dr ugtr a ff ic ke rs and

oth e r l awb re ake rs to u se F OIA t o 2 enhanc e their org anized criminal ac tivity . Amongthe ena cted c hang es wa s the substitut ion of 3 the words “ could re asonably be expected to” for “ would” in exemptions 7(A), 7(C), 7(D ), and 4 7( F ), wh ic h ma de it e a sie r f or theg ov e rnme nt t o d e mon str ate fa c ts n e c e ssa ry to s atis fy tho se 5 exemptions

. See5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) ( 1986). Ex emption 7(D) wa s amende d to clarify and 11 6 expand what ag encie s should understand the ter m “conf idential source ” to include, a nd what 7 information may

be withheld pursua

nt to that subsection. See id. ; 132 Cong. Rec . S14,039 8 (statement of

Sen. Hatch) (notingthat protec tions for information submitted “only by” the 9 confide ntial source in que stion mi ght result in an abse nce of nece ssary

protec tion in the event 10 that multipl e informa nts submitthe same infor mation). Exempti on 7(E) w as expanded to allow 11 a g e nc ie s to wi thh old inf or matio n th at w ou ld d isc los e law e nf or c e me nt guid e lin e s - - i n a dd iti on to31 1 thea lr e a dy

pr ote c te d te c hn iqu e s and pr oc e dure s - - i f d isc los ur e of the guid e lin e s “ c ou ld 2 rea sonably

be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” § 552(b)(7) (E). 3 Finally , exemption 7(F)’s a uthorization t o withhold recor ds to protect “la w enf orce ment 4 pe rs onne l” wa s e xpand e d to a llo w w ithho ldi ngwh e rere le a se of there c or ds in q

ue sti on “ c ou ld 5 rea sonably

be expected to e ndang er the life or phy sical saf ety of any individual.” § 552(b)( 7)(F ). 6 The amendment fixed the “spec ial problem” F OIA had c reated for la w enf orce ment by

removing 7 the “a

bsurd” limitation on the exempti on. 8 Th e def

end ant s co nt endonth is app eal th at the 1 98 6 am endmen t t o ex emp ti on7(F) 9 altere d it fundamentally , transfor ming it from a

shield ag ainst specific risks incident to law 10 enfor ceme nt investigations int o a diffuse and nebulous a uthority for ke epinginflammatory 11 information sec ret (though, curiously , only inflammatory

information in law enf

orce ment files). 12 As an in iti a l matte r, we no te that th e g ov e rnme nt h a d a dif fe re nt v ie w at th e tim e . D e puty 13 Attorney

Gene ral Dinkins’s stateme nt in support of the 1986 amendme nts describe d them as 14 modifying the exemption onl y “slightly ,” in orde r to addre ss the specific law enf orce ment 15 conce rns discussed a bove. 131 Cong . Rec. S248. The same view is expressed in the leg islative 16 history

. See , e.g. , 132 Cong. Rec . H9462 (da ily ed. Oc t. 8, 1986) (stateme nt of Rep. Eng lish) 17 (the 1986 amendments make “ only modest chang es to the F OIA” a nd only “slight[ ly]” ex pand 18 exemption 7(F)). 19 Mo reimp or tantl y , th e de fe nd ants ’ a

rgume nt f or an e xpans ive int e rp re tatio n o f t he phra se 20 “any

individual” misapprehe nds the specia l problem the 1986 ame ndment was e nacte d to corre ct. 21 Congr ess was c oncer ned that criminals mi ght deter or hinder lawenfor ceme nt investigations by 22 identifying those involved in such investigations and targ etingthe involved par ties or associatesSee al s o, e . g. , R ug i er o v. U

. S. D ep’t of Jus t i ce , 257 F. 3d 534, 552 ( 6t h Ci r . 2001) ( i n f or mat i on 12 a b o u t D E A a g e n ts w h o inv e stiga te d F O IA p la intiff ); S h o r e s v . FB I , 185 F. Su pp. 2d 77, 85 ( D

. D

. C. 2002) (i nf o rma t i o n i d ent i f

y i ng t hree co o p erat i ng wi t ness es and o t hers i nt ervi ewed duri ng i nvest i gat i o n of FO IA plai nt i f f ); G arc i a v. U

. S. D ep’t

of Jus t i ce , 18 1 F. Sup p . 2d 35 6 , 37 8 (S. D

. N

. Y

. 20 0 2 ) ( i nf o rma t i o n i d ent i f

y i ng gove rnme nt a g e n ts, p riv a te c iti z e n s a n d third p a rtie s w h o p a rtic ip a te d in inv e stiga tio n o f F O IA p la intiff ); cf

. Rus t on v . D ep’ tof Jus t i ce , N o . 06

- 0 2 2 4 , 20 0 7 W L 8 0 9 6 9 8 , at * 6 (D

. D

. C

. M ar. 15 , 20 0 7 ) ( f i nd i ng 7(F ) i nap p l i cab l e where go vernm ent f ai l ed t o est ab l i sh “pal p ab l e ri sk” t o B O P psy cho l o gi st ’ s l i f e o r phys i cal s af

et y i f f o rme r i nm at e’ s FO IA request were t o be grant ed ). 32 1 or re latives to those parties. Ac cording ly , it relaxed the categ ory of cove red pe rsons, extending 2 its protection to individuals who were not themse lves law e nforc ement per sonnel but who fac ed 3 simil arly

specific threats of violence. What it did not do, and what the leg islative history makes 4 clea

r it never contemplated doing , was to re invent exemption 7(F) as a n all-purpose damper

on 5 g lobal controve rsy . By requiringa showingof dang er to a n individual, Congre ss provided a 6 c on str a int

lim iti nge xemp tio n 7 (F ) t o it s inte nd e d s c op e -- the pr ote c tio n o f i nd ivi du a ls s ub je c t to 7 a no n- sp e c ulativ e ri sk

of ha rm inc ide nt t o a

law e nf orc e me nt i nv e sti g atio n. Th e de fe nd ants ’ 8 att emp t t o s weep far-r eachi ng andsp ecul ati ve n ati on al s ecur ity con cern s i nt o ex emp ti on7(F) 9 rea ches f

ar be yond the intent of Congress in ena ctingor ame nding the provision. 10 4. S

u b s eq u en t

A p p l i ca t i o n o

f E xe mp t i o n 7 (F) 11 Mo st c ourt s th at ha ve up he ld t

he g ov e rnme nt’ s r e lia

nc e on e xemp tio n 7 (F ) h ave do ne so 12 wh e rethec ha lle ng e d n on dis c los ur e so ught t o p ro te c t g ov e rnme nt a g e nts , w itn e sse s, inf or mants , 13 and other s who have participated in law enf orce ment investigations or proce eding s. See Maydak 14 v. U.S. De

p’t of Justice , 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 n.4 (D.D .C. 2005) (“In g ener al, [ex emption 15 7(F )] has been inter prete d to apply

to names and ide ntifying inf ormation of law e nforc ement 16 office rs, witnesses, c onfidential informa nts and other third pe rsons who may be unknown to the 17 reque ster.” ( citing c ases) ). The de fenda nts cite a ha

ndful of district cour

t decisions in support 12T he o t he r ca ses the d efen d an t s cit e g i ve ev en l ess co nsid era t i o n than d o es L i vin g R i ve rs t o t he 13 q uest i o n of ho w f

ar exem p t i o n 7(F ) can be extended

. I n L .A

. Ti m es t h e g ov er n men t s ou g h t t o w i t h h ol d t h e n ame s of pr i v at e s ec u r i t y c on t r ac t or s ( “ PSC ’ s ”) w or k i n g i n I r aq bec au s e of t h e r i s k t h at i n s u r g en t s c ou l d u s e t h at i n f or mat i on 33 1 of their e x pansive c onstruction of the phra se “a ny individual” in the exemption. ( SeeAp pe lla nts ’ 2 Br

. 3 0 -3 4 (c i t i n g L.A. Ti mes Commc ’ns, LLC v. De p’t of the Army , 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 900 3 (C .D . Ca l. 2 00 6) ; Living Rivers, Inc. v . U.S. Bureau of Re clamation , 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321 4 (D . Utah 2 00 3) ; Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U

.S. Dep’ t of Justice , 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 108 5 (D.D.C. 2002), aff ’d in p ar t an d re v ’d

in p ar t , 3 31 F .3 d 9 18 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 3) ; Brady-Lunny v

. 6 Massey , 185 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (C.D. I ll. 2002)).) The se ca ses ar e neither controllingnor 7 persua sive. 8 The de fenda nts rely most heavily

on Liv ing

Ri v e rs , in

wh ic h th e g ov e rnme nt s ou ght t o 9 withhold inundation maps of the are a below the Hoover and Glen Ca

nyon Dams. 272 F . Supp. 10 2d

at 13 14 . T he B ur e a

u o f R e c lamatio n h a d c re ate d th e ma ps to h e lp t

he g ov e rnme nt e va luate 11 the ef

fec ts of a possible dam fa ilure, and to prote ct the people living downstre am from the 12 conseque nces of

such a f ailure. Id. at 1315-16. Since the maps reve aled infor mation about 13 specific populated ar eas, c ritical infra structure s, and powe r plant sites that would be a ffe cted by 14 dam fa ilure, the g overnme nt argued that disclosure of the maps c ould allow terrorists to endang er 15 people who live downstream f rom the dams. Id. Th e c ourt a llo we d th e g ov e rnme nt t o w ithho ld 16 the maps pursua

nt to ex emption 7(F)

. Id. at 1322. 17 L ike the other opinions cited by

the def endants, Liv ing

Ri v e rs fails to g ive serious 18 consideration to the scope of e x emption 7(F) ; to what the g overnme nt must do t o meet its burden 19 of establishingdang er to “ any individual”; and to the lack of fit betwee n an expansive re adingof 20 exemption 7(F) and F OIA’s tre atment of national security information. In holding that pe rsons

13t o organi ze at t acks on vul nerab l e P SC ’ s and t hei r projec t s. 44 2 F. Sup p . 2d at 89 8

. T he co urt uphe l d t he

g o v e rn m e n t’s re lian c e o n e x e m p tio n 7 (F ), b u t d id so w itho u t an y d isc u ssio n o f t h e e x e m p tio n ’s sc o p e . I d. a t 9 0 0

. Simil arl y , t he b ri ef

dis cuss i o n of exem p t i o n 7(F ) i n C ent er f or N at i on al Secur i t

y St ud i es exam i ned only t he c a u sa tio n c o m p o n e n t o f t h e e x e m p tio n , no t t h e e x e m p tio n ’s sc o p e . See 21 5 F. Sup p . 2d at 10 8 (accep t i ng t he g o v e rn m e n t’s re p re se n ta tio n s tha t d isc lo su re o f l o c a tio n s o f d e te n tio n fac ili ties in the U n ited S ta te s h o ld ing p e o p le f or i nv es t i gat i on i n t he wak e of Sept emb er 11, 200 1 woul d pl ace l i f e or phy s i cal s af

et y at r i s k a nd not i ng an “a b se n c e o f an y c o n tra ry e v id e n c e , o r a n y re a so n to d isc re d it the go v e rn m e n t’s re p re se n ta tio n s” ). M o re o v e r, in a ff irm ing tha t d e c isio n , t h e D .C . C irc u it re lied so le ly o n e x e m p tio n 7 (A ), a n d m a d e no m e n tio n o f t h e d istric t co u rt’s re lian c e o n e x e m p tio n 7 (F ). See C t r . f or N at ’ lSec. St ud i es v. U

. S. D ep’t of Jus t i ce , 33 1 F.3d 91 8 , 93 3

- 3 4 (D

. C

. C i r. 2 0 0 3 ). F ina lly, a s n o te d in S e c tio n B .1 , B r ad y- Lun ny v. M ass ey m isq u o te s the e x e m p tio n , compa r e 185 F. Su pp. 2d at 932 ( “ U nder 5 U

. S. C

. § 55 2(b) ( 7)( F), t he G over nment i s ex emp t f r om di s cl osi ng i nf

ormat i on about an y i ndi vi dual tha t ‘ c o u ld re a so n a b ly b e e x p e c te d to e n d a n g e r lif e o r p h ysic a l sa fety.’” ), w ith 5 U

. S.C

. § 5 5 2 (b)(7)(F) (exemp t i ng la w e n fo rc e m e n t re c o rd s fro m d isc lo su re o n ly i f p ro d u c tio n o f t h e re c o rd s “c o u ld re a so n a b ly b e e x p e c te d to end anger t he l i f

e o r phys i cal s af

et y of any i nd i vi d ual ”), be f o re, l i ke t he f

o regoing cases, s i m p l y ass um i ng t he i ss ue cu rren t l y be f

o re u s.

34 1 liv ingdo wn str e am of thedams f

e ll w ith in e xemp tio n 7 (F ), the c ourt state d th at th e e xemp tio n “ is 2 neither limited to protect the lives of ‘law e nforc ement per sonnel,’ nor to known, na med 3 individuals only .” Id. at 1321. The de fenda nts here make much of

that statement -- with which 4 we a gre e -- on

thi s a pp e a l. B ut i t do e s n ot b e ar t he we ight Liv ing

Ri v e rs or the de fenda

nts place 5 on it. Ex emption 7(F) is not li mited to “known, named individuals.” I f disclosure of law 6 enfor ceme nt rec ords conc erningthe Cali car tel could re asonably

be expected to e ndang er the 7 lives of an infor

mant’s (or a

witness’s) e x tended f

amily in Colombia, exemption 7(F) a pplies. 8 Simi larly , the disclosure of the identity

of a pe rson providinginformation about Sicilian drug 9 tr a ff

ic kin gmight r e a so na

bly be e xpe c te d to e nd ang e r t hat pe rs on ’s re lativ e s a

nd a sso c iate s in 10 Palermo. In those circ umstances, the g overnme nt need not eve n know, let alone na me, all of 11 those persons be fore it may properly invoke exemption 7(F) to prote ct them. Indeed, a s 12 discussed above , that was the pur pose of e nlarg ing the exemption’s protection in 1986 from “law 13 e nf

or c e me nt p e rs onne l” to “ any ind ivi du a l.” B ut s ayingthat th e g ov e rnme nt d oe s n ot n e e d to 14 identify

an individual by

name doe s not impl y

that the g overnme nt does not need to identify anI t does ci t e G a rc ia , 181 F. Supp. 2d at 378 , wh i ch s uppo r t s t he propo s i t i on t hat t he i ndi vi dual s at 14 risk ne e d no t b e law e n fo rc e m e n t p e rs o n n e l. L i vin g R i ve rs , 2 7 2 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 1 3 2 1 . B u t G a rc ia , wh i ch appl i ed exem p t i o n 7(F ) t o jus t i f y wi t hho l d i ng t he nam es and i d ent i f y i ng i nf o rma t i o n f

o r s everal pri vat e ci t i zens who p rovided i nf

o rma t i o n t o t he FB I, 18 1 F. Sup p . 2d at 37 8 , pro vi d es no supp o rt f o r t he p rop o si t i o n t hat t he go vernm ent n e e d no t i d e n tif

y the ind ivid u a ls in q u e stio n , o r th a t i t m a y d o so in the m o st ge n e ra l t e rm s. 35 1 ind ivi du a l at a ll , or that the g overnme nt may identify an individual only

as beinga member

of a 2 vast population. Liv ing Ri v e rs do e s n ot atte mpt

to j us tif y that le a p o f l og ic , c iti ngno a

uth ority 3 reg ardinghow spec ifically the individuals contemplated by exemption 7(F) must be identified. 14 4 Liv ing

Ri v e rs ’ construc tion of exempti on 7(F ) may have be en influenc ed by

the abse nce 5 of any

alleg ation of g overnme ntal misconduct in that case

. We agree with the defe ndants that 6 once e x emption 7(F) is deemed a pplicable a

nd the re quisite risk of harm is demonstrate d, the 7 exemption does not call for or e ven per mit a balancingof that risk ag ainst the public’s intere st. 8 B ut t

he int e re st o f t

he pu bli c in “ gre ate r a c c e ss t o in fo rm atio n” mus t be c on sid e re d in 9 deter

mining the sc ope of e x emption 7(F) in the first place

. See J ohn Doe Age ncy , 493 U.S. at 10 157 (“[The Court] has endea vored to a pply a wor kable ba lance betwee n the intere sts of the 11 public in gr eate r ac cess to information and the nee ds of the Gove rnment to protec t cer tain kinds 12 of information from disclosure.” ). Unlike in Liv ing Ri v e rs , the fa cts of this case place 13 g ov e rnme nta l a c c ounta bil ity at th e c e nte r o f t

he dis pute . In a

re sp e c t th at c ourt

ha d n o r e a so n to 14 c on sid e r, we mus t bee sp e c ia lly min df ul t hat e xemp tio ns to F OIA a reto b e “ na

rr ow ly 15 construed,” Abramson , 456 U.S. at 630. 16 In any

event, while Liv ing

Ri v e rs applied a r elaxed standard to the g overnme nt’s 17 identification of a n individual who could rea sonably be expected to be endang ere d, even that 18 court did not g o as fa r as the de fenda

nts wish to here. The court in Liv ing Ri v e rs applied 19 e xemp tio n 7 (F ) t o p ro te c t a sp e c if ic , id e nti fi a

ble se t of ind ivi du a ls. Th ou gh th e pe rs on s at r isk in36 1 the eve nt of dam fa ilures wer e not individually named, they

hardly repr esente d “the public at 2 larg e,” a s the defe ndants have argued. ( See Appellants’ Reply Br . 8.) To the c ontrary , they 3 re sid e d w ith in t

he sp e c if ic are a s id e nti fi e d in

the ma ps at is su e . T he y

may have be e n nume ro us , 4 but un lik e thepo pu latio n at is su e he rethe reis n o s ug g e sti on in t hat c a se that th e y

c ou ld n ot a ll 5 have be en spec ifically identified. 6 It is worth remar king that the defe ndants’ interpr etation of 7(F ) is curr ently idiosy ncratic. 7 Th e ro bu st p ub lic de bate on thec ho ic e be tw e e n la

w e nf or c e me nt a

nd oth e r m e tho ds in 8 formulatingour national sec urity policy has bee n devoid, to our knowledg e, of a ny mention of 9 law enf

orce ment’s broa der shr oud of sec rec y under F OIA than non-la

w-e nforc ement national 10 security

operations -- mention one would expect to find if the g overnme nt’s view of e x emption 11 7(F ) we re the law. Cf. Michae l Sherman, FOIA in the Afterm ath of 9/11 , 19 St. Thomas L . Rev. 12 28 1, 29 3 ( 20 06 ) ( “ To date , E xemp tio n 7 F ha s n ot p laye d a ma jor ro le in p os t- 9/1 1 F OIA c a se 13 law.”)

. 14 Instead, virtually ever y court having oc casion to interpr et exemption 7(F) ha s been c alled 15 upon to determine whether the disclosure of

law enf orce ment rec ords could re asonably be 16 expected to enda

ng er the life or phy sical saf ety of any individuals who participated in some w ay 17 in the investigation, be they law enf orce ment employees, infor mants, or witnesses, or othe rs 18 a sso c iate d in

so me wa y wi th t ho se pe rs on s. Signif

ic antl y , th e de fe nd ants the mse lve s f ir st 19 invoked exemption 7(F) in pre cisely this way . Their initial resor t to the exempti on in the district 20 court sought to protect only “the identities of c itiz ens of Iraq or Afghanistan who may

have 21 cooper ated with [Army] C I D or other U.S. force s.” (Third D ecla ration of Phillip J . McGuire , 22 J uly

20, 2005, ¶ 13.) It was only two months after or al argument of the c ross-motions forW hi l e t he def endan t s he r e c l ai m endang er ment onl y t o pers ons dra wn f r om t he po pul at i ons of t wo 15 n a tio n s a n d no t t h e e n tire w o rld , t h e d e fen d a n ts’ re a d ing o f ex e m p tio n 7 (F ) d o e s n o t p ro v id e a n y li m iti n g p rin c ip le

. 37 1 summary

judgme nt that they

dramatically

expanded their a

pplication, conver

ting a law 2 enfor ceme nt matter into a national sec urity issue. 3 Although this is one of the first ca ses to examine whether exemption 7(F) ca

n be 4 conscripted into service a s an er satz classification sy stem, it is unl ikely to be the last. The 5 de fe nd ants ’ r e a ssu ra nc e s th at th e ir

ru le wo uld

be “ [l]imit e d to the [f]a c ts [p ]re se nte d b y [t]his 6 [c] ase,” (Appe llants’ Reply Br . 17), ringhollow. Whi le it is true, as the de fenda nts contend, that 7 expert aff

idavits deem these pa

rticular doc uments to pose such a da ng er, w e haveno doubt that 8 simil ar a ffidavits could be produce d with respec t to many other doc uments in a wide ra ng e of 9 c a se s, pa

rt ic ula rl y c ontr ov e rs ia l do c ume nts that th e g ov e rnme nt m ight h ave the gre ate st 10 motivation to withhold. ( See Appellee s’ B r. 20 (“ [The gove rnment’s a rgument] l eads to the 11 perve rse c onclusion that the more e greg ious the misconduct reve aled by g overnme nt rec ords, the 12 more c ompelling would be the g overnme nt’s basis for shieldingthese doc uments from disclosure 13 under F OIA.”) .) This is not due to any question reg ardingthe g ood faith or the e x pertise of the 14 a ff

iants , b ut r athe r t o th e fa c t th at e ve n r e mot e po ssi bil iti e s c an b e c ome re a so na ble to e xpe c t to 15 be fa ll at le a st o ne me mbe r o f a larg e e no ugh gro up . An e xpe rt c ou ld i n g oo d f

a ithc la im that it

is 16 rea sonable to expect that disclosure of any number of doc uments could enda ng er the life or 17 phy sical saf

ety of at lea st one person in the w orld. The g overnme nt’s contention that “a ny 15 1 8 in d iv id

u a l”e n c o mp a s s e s a

p e r s o nid e nti f

ie d o n ly a s b e lo n g in gto o f

a p o p u lati o no f

n ati o n a l s iz e 19 would, if ac cepte d, circ umvent the limitation i mposed by the phra se “c ould rea sonably be 20 expected to enda ng er.” It would radica lly

transfor m exempti on 7(F ) fr om a flexible but tailored38 1 protec tion for a f

luid but li mited class of pe rsons into an alterna tive secr ecy

mecha nism far 2 br oa de r t

ha n th e g ov e rnme nt’ s c la ssi fi c atio n s y ste m. A s su c h a re su lt w ou ld r e a d “ ind ivi du a l” 3 out of the provision and would c reate anomalous disparities betwee n the treatment of law 4 enfor ceme nt and non-lawenfor ceme nt national security information, we de cline to so transfigure 5 exemption 7(F). 6 C

. FO

IA Ex e mp tio ns 6 a nd

7( C) 7 FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C) protec t ag ainst disclosure that implicates pe rsonal priva cy 8 interests. The g overnme nt may withhold recor ds in “personne l and medica l files and similar 9 files” only

when their

rele ase “ would constitute a cle arly unwar rante d invasion of per sonal 10 privac y .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006). How ever , when law enfor ceme nt rec ords ar e involved, 11 theg ov e rnme nt m ay wi thh old re c or ds that “ c ou ld re a so na bly be e xpe c te d to constitute an 12 unwar

rante d invasion of per sonal privac y .” § 552(b) (7)( C). Since the Ar my photos are 13 considere d law enf orce ment rec ords for the purposes of e x emption 7, and ar e also pa rt of 14 personne l files of the soldiers depicted in the photographs, they are elig ible for withholdingif the 15 defe ndants satisfy the standards of either

exemption. 16 Ex emption 7(C) is more protec tive of privac y than exemption 6 because it does not 17 requirean invasion of privacy to be c le ar ly

unwa rr ante d b e fo rewi thh old ingis a llo we d, and it 18 may

take e ff e c t no t on ly

wh e n a n inva sio n o f p ri va c y

“ wo uld ” oc c ur , b ut whe n it c ou ld 19 rea sonably

be expected to oc cur. Se eFa v ish , 5 41 U. S. at 16 5- 66 . B e c a us e e xemp tio n 7 (C ) 20 of

fe rs br oa de r p ro te c tio n th an e xemp tio n 6 -- and a low e r e vid e nti ary

sta nd ard fo r t he de fe nd ants 21

-- a

de c isi on that e xemp tio n 7 (C ) d oe s n ot a llo w w ithho ldi nga lso fo re c los e s th e de fe nd ants ’S til l, b e c a u se the se two e x e m p tio n s inv o lve re la te d sta n d a rd s, p re c e d e n t ap p lying e x e m p tio n 6 is 16 re le v a n t t o o u r a n a lysis o f ex e m p tio n 7 (C ). See Rep ort ers Co m m i t t ee , 48 9 U

. S. at 76 8 (app l y i ng exem p t i o n 6 c a se la w to a n a lysis o f ex e m p tio n 7 (C )) ; s e e a ls o FL RA , 9 5 8 F .2d at 5 0 9 (ho l d i ng t he sam e d eg ree o f p rivac y i ntere st i s requir ed t o t ri gger balanci ng pursuant t o exem p t i o ns 6 and 7(C ), t ho ugh onc e a p ri vacy i nt erest i s i m p l i cat ed t he tw o e x e m p tio n s p ro v id e d iff e rin g lev e ls o f p ro te c tio n ). 39 1 relianc e on exemption 6. W e turn, then, to a n examination of ex emption 7(C). 16 2 1

. TheDe tai ne es’ Pr iv ac yIn te re st 3 In th e F OIA c onte xt, th e Sup re me Court ha s r e c ognize d a

n in div idu a l priva c y

int e re st i n 4 “avoidingdisclosure of pe rsonal matter s.” Reporters Committee , 489 U.S. at 762 (interna l 5 quotation omitt ed). “ [O] nce a more than demi nim is privac y interest is implicated the c ompeting 6 interests at stake must be balanc ed in orde r to dec ide whethe r disclosure is pe rmitted under 7 FOIA.” FLRA , 958 F.2d at 510. Disclosure of pe rsonal information “constitutes only a de 8 mi nim is invasion of privac y” whe n identities are unknown. U.S. Dep’ t of State v. Ray , 5 02 U. S. 9 164, 176 (1991). 10 Applying the se principles to the privacy interests of the de tainees depicted in the Abu 11 Ghra ib photos in reasoningit later applied to the Army photos, the district court deter mined that 12 publication of the photos in a for m in which “all identifying c hara cteristics of the persons in the 13 photogr aphs have been r edac ted” would not ca use a c ognizable invasion of persona l privacy

. 14 ACL U

, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 571. Where “individual rec ognition could not be preve nted without 15 reda ction so ext ensive a s to render the imag es mea

ningle ss,” the cour

t ordere d those photographs 16 to be withheld. Id. at 57 2. Th e c ourt dis mis se d a s sp e c ulativ e the ri sk that pe rs on s d e pic te d in 17 theph oto gra

ph s mi ght r e c ognize the mse lve s o r b e re c ognize d b y me mbe rs of

the pu bli c in s pit e 18 of the re dactions. Id. 19 The district cour t also rejec ted arguments that relea se of the photographs would c onflictT he d efen d an t s hav e n o t reli ed o n a ny p rivac y i ntere st o f t he so l d i ers d ep i cted i n the A rm y ph o t o s, 17 and we d o not ad d res s t hat i ss ue here. T he d i st ri ct co urt co nsi d ered t he p ri vacy ri ght s o f t he sol d i ers duri ng t he r edact i on he ar i ng , an d f ound t hat wh er e t hey appear ed t o po s e f or phot ogr aphs , t hei r cons ent r emo ved a ny pri vac y i ntere st t ha t m i gh t o t he rw i se ha ve wa rran t ed red ac t i o n o f t he i r i d en t i f

yi ng f ea t ure s. 40 1 with the Gene va Conventions’ re quirement that de taining pow ers pr otect any prisoner of

war 2 ag ainst insults and “public c uriosity .” Id. at 57 4. Ins te a d, the c ourt fo un d th at r e da c tio n is 3 adequate to protec t the detainee s’ identities and to prese rve the ir honor. Id. 4 The de fenda nts now argue that the r edac tions approved by the district court a

re 5 inadequate to protec t the privac y interests of the de tainees. A ccording to the de fenda nts, when 6 combined with information conta ined in the investig ative reports associate d with the detainee 7 imag es, re lease of the photographs c ould make it possible to identify the detaine es. The 8 defe ndants also asser t that there is a c hancethat the picture d detainee s could identify themselves 9 in a

ny re da c te d p ho tos re le a se d. Th e de fe nd ants e mph a size that ( a ) “ Con gre ss a nd the c ourt s 10 have re c ognize d th at vi c tim s o f c ri me s o r m ist re atme nt, su c h a s th e de ta ine e s in thi s c a se , s ho uld 11 not be forc ed to re live their suffe ringand humiliation as a re sult of Governme nt disclosures,” 12 (A

pp e lla nts ’ B r. at 48 ); (b ) t

he Sup re me Court

ha s r e c ognize d a

str on gpriva c y

int e re st i n 13 “sensitive per sonal information,” ( id. ); and (c ) the Ge neva Conve ntions obli g ate a detaining 14 power

to respec t the dignity

of deta inees a

nd avoid exposing them to “public c uriosity ,” ( id. at 15 51-52). F or these r easons, the de fenda nts assert that the r elea se of imag es that could lea d to the 16 ide nti fi c atio n o f t he de ta ine e s b y

the mse lve s o r o the rs pr e se nts an inva sio n o f t he de ta ine e s’ 1 7 p r i v a c y. 17 18 FOIA provides that “ [t ]o the extent require d to preve nt a clea rly unwar rante d invasion of 19 persona l privacy , an ag ency may delete ide ntifying de tails when it makes ava ilable or publishesO ut s i de t he FO I A cont ext , we hav e f ound t hat wh er e t he publ i c r i gh t of ac ces s t o ju di ci al 18 d o c u m e n ts c o m p e te s w ith p riv a c y rig h ts, “it is p ro p e r fo r a d istric t co u rt, a fter w e igh ing c o m p e ting inte re sts, to e d it and r edact a j udi ci al document i n or der t o al l ow acce s s t o app r op r i at e port i ons of t he do cumen t . ” Uni t ed St at es v. A m od eo , 4 4 F .3 d 1 4 1 , 1 4 7 (2 d C ir. 1 9 9 5 ). 41 1 an opinion, statement of policy , interpre tation, staff manua l, instruction, or copies of r ecords 2 [produced in re sponse to other F OIA re quests and made publicly available due to the likelihood 3 of future reque sts] .” § 552(a)(2) . FOIA furthe r states that “ [a] ny rea sonably

segreg able por

tion 4 of a r ecor d shall be provided to a ny person r equestingsuch re cord a fter de letion of the portions 5 which ar e exempt under this subsection.” § 552(b). 6 Acc ording ly , courts havefound re daction of ide ntifying inf ormation ade quate to pre vent 7 inf ri ng e me nt o f t

he signif ic ant i nte re sts that F OI

A’ s p ri va c y

e xemp tio ns we rede signe d to 8 protec t. See Ray , 502 U.S. at 175-78 (f inding that r edac tion was appropriate to safe guard 9 pe rs on a l priva c y

of Ha iti an n atio na ls i nte rv ie we d b y State Depa

rtme nt i n c onne c tio n w iththe ir 10 inv olu

nta ry repatr iatio n) ; Ro se , 425 U.S. at 354-58, 381 (a ffirmingreda ction of per sonal 11 ref

ere nces a nd other identify

ing inf ormation in Air For ce A cade my disciplinary

rec ords). A

18 12 court may

also order

information re lease d without proposed re dactions whe re the g overnme nt 13 fails to demonstrate a risk of identification in the absence of the re dactions. Se eGran d Ce nt. 14 P’ship, Inc. v . Cuomo , 166 F.3d 473, 485- 86 (2d Cir. 1999) (or deringunreda cted r elea se of 15 broade r set of infor mation where “it is not at all clear ” fr om the g overnme nt’s submissi ons “that 16 disclosure would, in fa ct, lead to the ide ntification of the pe rsons who provided the documents”)

. 17 In this case, the district c ourt held in camera proce eding s to ensure the adequa cy of 18 proposed r edac tions to the Ar my photos. Duringthose proce eding s the court lea rned of the 19 context of eac h photogr aph, includingmatters re lated to how the g overnme nt came to possess the42 1 imag es, the location of events depic ted, and the units that military personne l were assigned to. 2 After

examining ea ch of the 29 photogr aphs, the c ourt deter mined which we re to be rele ased a nd 3 the extent of reda ction nece ssary to shield the identities of individuals depicted. At no point 4 while viewingthe Army photos did the district court note the possibility that a deta inee c ould be 5 identified in spite of the re dactions. Having inspe cted the photographs a nd the re dactions 6 ours e lve s, we have no do ub t th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xami ne d th e Ar

my ph oto s w ithan a im t o 7 reda ct “a ll identifying c hara cteristics of the persons in the photographs,” ACL U , 389 F. Supp. 2d 8 at5 7 1 , an d

th ati td i d

s o a d e qu at e l y. 9 The de fenda nts have c ited no FOIA ca se in which a court ha s found a privacy right to be 10 at r isk

wh e reide nti fy

inginf or matio n h a s b e e n a de qu ate ly re da c te d. Ev e n a c c e pti ngthe ir 11 argument that it may be “possible” to identify

the detaine es in spite of the district cour t’s 12 re da c tio ns , o r t

hat th e rere ma ins a

“ c ha nc e ” that th e de ta ine e s c ou ld i de nti fy the mse lve s, 13 (Appe llants’ Br . 47), such spe culation does not establish a privacy interest that surpa sses a de 14 mi nim is level for the purposes of

a F OIA inquiry

. Cf. Halpern v. FBI , 181 F.3d 279, 297- 98 (2d 15 Cir. 1999) (holdingthat g overnme nt must describe withheld mate rial with “‘r easona ble’ leve l of 16 sp e c if

ic ity” fo r c ourt s to be a

bleto d e te rm ine wh e the r e xemp tio n 7 (C ) a pp lie s) ; Carney v. U

.S. 17 Dep’ t of Justice , 19 F.3d 807, 812 ( 2d Cir. 1994) (ca lling for “re asonably

detailed e x planations 18 why

any withheld documents fa ll within an ex emption”). Indeed, be cause the district court ha s 19 reda cted the Army photos to remove all identify ing f eatur es, thereis no cognizable privacy 20 interest at issue in the r elea se of the Army photos. 21 The de fenda nts’ attention to the privac y rights of crime vic tims and to the conce rns 22 a sso c iate d w ithpe rs on a l in fo rm atio n d oe s n ot a lte r t he a bo ve ana ly sis . F a c tor s th at ma y g ive ri se43 1 to a heightened privacy interest include the prese nce of sensitive persona l information, dignity of 2 crime vic tims, and the risk of har m to reputation. See Nation Magazine, W ash. Bureau v. U

.S. 3 Customs Serv. , 71 F.3d 885, 894 ( D.C. Cir. 1995) (re cognizi ngthat the magnitude of a privacy 4 int e re st t

ur ns on wh e the r d isc los ur e may

re su lt i n unw arr ante d a sso c iatio n w ithc ri min a l a c tiv ity 5 or reputational harm). H oweve r, such a privac y right attache s when infor mation that is sensiti ve 6 may

be linked to ce rtain individuals, not when the individuals involved are unknown. 7 For

example, in Fa v ish , the Supreme Court a pplied exemption 7(C) to allow the 8 withholding of photographs of the death-scene of Vince nt Foster, f ormer D eputy

Counsel to the 9 Pr e sid e nt, a ft e r r e po rt s th at hi s d e ath w a s th e re su lt o f s uic ide . 5 41 U. S. at 16 9- 71 , 1 75 . Impl ic it 10 in t

he Court ’s dis c us sio n o f t he priva c y

ri ghts of me mbe rs of

F os te r’ s f

amil y wi th r e sp e c t to 11 ima g e s o f s c e ne s o f h is d e ath w a s th at th e ima g e s d e pic t an in div idu a l who se ide nti ty wa s w ide ly 12 known to the public. The privacy right attache d to Foster’ s family members “ to securetheir own 13 ref

ug e fr om a sensation-se ekingculture f or their own pe aceof mind and tranquility .” Id. at 166. 14 I f F oster’s identity wer e unknown, suc h a priva cy interest would not arise. 1 5 InRay , the Supreme Court re cognized that disclosure of identities of Ha itians who were 16 repatr iate d a ft e r atte mpt s to e nte r t he Un ite d St ate s c ou ld s ub je c t th e m or

the ir fa mil ie s to 17 “emba

rra ssment in their social and c ommunity relationships,” 502 U.S. at 176 (internal quotation 18 omitted), but that redac tion of names re sulted in a diminished privacy interest, see id. (“ Al th o u gh 19 disclosure of suc h persona l information constitutes only a demi nim is invasion of privac y when 20 the identities of the intervie wee s are unknown, the invasion of privacy become s signific ant whenO n e no n -F O IA c a se c ited b y the d e fen d a n ts, No rth w e ste rn M e m o ria l Ho sp ita l v. A sh c ro ft , 362 19 F.3d 92 3 (7t h C i r. 20 0 4 ), s up p o rt s t he no t i o n t hat a pri vacy i nt erest m ay b e at ri sk even where i d ent i t i es ar e unkno wn. I n No rt h w estern , t he go vernm ent s ub p o enaed m ed i cal record s o f cert ai n pa t i ent s who recei ved l at e- t erm a b o rtio n s. I

d. a t 9 2 4 . T h e re c o rd s w o u ld b e us e d in a id o f t h e go v e rn m e n t’s co n stitutio n a l ch a llen g e to the P a rtia lB i r t h Abo r t i on Act of

200 3, 18 U

. S. C

. § 15 31 , an d woul d i ncl ude det ai l s r el at ed t o t he pat i ent s ’ medi cal an d s exu al h isto ry. I

d. a t 929. I n r ej ec t i n g t h e g ov er n men t ’ s e f f or t s t o g ai n a cc es s t o s u ch i n f or mat i on f

or t h e pu r pos es of lit iga tio n , t h e c o u rt n o te d the fo llo w ing :

Ev e n i f t h e r e w e r e n o p os s i bi l i t y t h a t a pa t i e n t ’ s i de n t i t y mi g h t be l e a r n e d f r om a r eda ct ed medi ca l r ec or d, t h er e wou l d be a n i n v as i on of pr i v ac y . I mag i n e i f

n u de p i ct ures of a wo m an, upload ed t o t he Int ernet wi t ho ut her consent t ho ugh wi t h ou t i den t i f

y i n g h er by n ame , w er e down l oade d i n a f or ei g n c ou n t r y by peop l e wh o wi l l ne ver meet he r . She woul d s t i l l f eel t hat he r pri vac y ha d been inv a d e d . T h e re v e la tio n o f t h e intim a te d e ta ils co n ta ine d in the re c o rd o f a la te -ter m a b o rtio n m a y inflict a sim ilar w o u n d

. No rt h w estern , 3 6 2 F .3 d a t 9 2 9

. No rt h w estern , ho w e v e r, b a se d it s h o ld ing no t o n this h yp o the tica l p riv a c y a n a lysis b ut on t he p at i ent s’ f

ear of reco gni t i o n and ret al i at i o n i n l i ght of t he hi ghl y charged po l i t i cal co nt roversy regardi ng ab o rt i o n; t he p o ss i b i l i t y t hat m any p regnant wo m en wo ul d not und ers t and t he reda ct i o ns t o pro t ect t hei r pri vacy; and the hig h li k e liho o d o f ac tua l re c o g n iti o n d e sp ite th e re d a c tio n s. I d. a t 9 2 8 -2 9

. No rt h w estern is t h u s ina p p lica b le h e re . 44 1 the per sonal information is linked to particular interviewe es.”)

. 19 2 Notwithstanding the defe ndants’ asse rtions that reda ctions of the Ar my photos do not 3 eliminate the possibility that the detaine es in the photographs might be identified (e ven if only by 4 themselves), w e find the district c ourt’s re dactions of identify ing f eatur es suffic ient to warr ant 5 thec on c lus ion

that th e ph oto gra

ph s d o n ot i mpl ic ate the de ta ine e s’ priva c y int e re sts purs ua

nt t o 6 FOIA exemption 7(C). Cf. Ro se , 425 U.S. at 381-82 (upholdingdisclosure of r edac ted re cords 7 under e x emption 6 while acknow ledg ing that “re daction ca nnot eliminate all risks of 8 identifiability”). 9 Even though we a re not c ompelled to balanc e intere sts where there is no more than a de 10 mi nim is priva c y

int e re st at st ake , w e no te that c ontr ary to t he de fe nd ants ’ s ug g e sti on the reis a 11 signific ant public intere st in the disclosure of these photogr aphs. The de fenda nts conce de that 12 these photographs y ield evidenc e of g overnme ntal wrong doing, but none theless argue that theySee, e. g. , M ill e r v . B e ll , 66 1 F.2d 62 3 , 63 0

- 3 1 (7t h C i r. 19 8 1 ) ( p er curi am ) ( ho l d i ng i d ent i f y i ng 20 i nf ormat i on about FB I ag ent s t o be cover ed by ex emp t i on 7(C) and n ot i ng t hat publ i c document s al r eady provi ded su b sta n tial info rm a tio n a b o u t F B I’s inv e stiga tio n ), ab r og at ed i n pa r ton o t her gr ou nd s by U

. S. D ep’t of Jus t i ce v. Landano , 50 8 U

. S. 16 5 , 18 1 (19 9 3 ); N. Y. Ti m es Co. v . NA SA , 78 2 F. Sup p . 62 8 , 63 2

- 3 3 (D

. D

. C

. 19 9 1 ) ( wi t hho l d i ng au di o r ec or di n g of

f i n al w or ds of

a s t r on au t s i n s pac e s h u t t l e di s as t er u n der e x empt i on 6 i n pa r t be ca u s e t r an s cr i pt w a s a lre a d y p u b lic) ; I

n r e KSTP Te l ev i s i on , 504 F. Supp. 360 , 362

- 64 ( D

. M i nn . 198 0) ( concl udi ng comm on l aw rig h t o f ac c e ss to p u b lic re c o rd s d id no t ju stif y d isc lo su re o f vid e o ta p e s o f b lind fo ld e d a n d b o u n d kid n a p vic tim when i nf o rma t i o n had be en m ad e p ub l i c at t ri al ).

See M i l l er , 66 1 F.2d at 63 0 (“ T here i s no al l egat i o n of wro ngd o i ng by hi gh- ranki ng gove rnme nt 21 of f i ci al s or i n dee d by a n y FB I pe r s on n el t o s u ppor t a n y pu bl i c i n t er es t i n a n y f u r t h er pr obe i n t o t h e t h or ou g h n es s of the insta n t i n v e stiga tio n .” ); N

. Y. Ti m es , 78 2 F. Sup p . at 63 3 (f i nd i ng i nf

o rma t i o n on t ap es “ sheds abso l ut el y no l i ght o n the c o n d u c t o f an y G o v e rn m e n ta l ag e n c y o r o ff ic ia l” ); KSTP Te l ev i s i on , 50 4 F

. S u pp . a t 36 3 ( “ I n [ t h e Ab s c a m] ca s e t h er e wa s a de f

i n i t e pu bl i c i n t er es t i n r el ea s e of t h e t ape s be ca u s e t h e t ape s i n v ol v ed t h e al l eg ed wr on g doi n g of el ect ed pub l i c o f

f i ci al s. T here i s, how ever, no p ub l i c i nt erest t o be s erved by r el ease of t he t ap es her e . . . . ”). 45 1 add little additional value to the written summaries of the depicted eve nts, which have alre ady 2 been ma de public. This contention disreg ards F OIA’s ce ntral purpose of fur thering 3 g overnme ntal acc ountability , and the spe cial importanc e the law acc ords to information re vealing 4 officia l misconduct. Robbins , 437 U.S. at 242 (“The basic purpose of F OIA is to ensure a n 5 inf or me d c iti zenry , v ita l to thefu nc tio nin gof

a de moc ra tic so c ie ty , n e e de d to c he c k a g a ins t 6 corr

uption and to hold the gove rnors a ccounta ble to the g overne d.” (inter nal citation omitted)). 7 The de fenda

nts cite sever al ca ses in which public information render ed the incr emental va lue of 8 a dd iti on a l di sc los ur e too sli ght t o o utw e igh p ri va c y int e re sts , but th e c ourt

in e a c h o f t

ho se 20 9 case s expressly

found that therewas no re ason to believe the information would docume nt 10 g overnme nt misconduct. Gover nmental misconduct is conce ded her e, (A ppellants’ B r. 15 21 1 1 ( n o t i n gth ats e v e r a l p e r s o nn e l w e r e d i s c i p l i n e d i n c o nn e c t i o nw i thth e Ar

my C ID 12 inv e sti g atio ns )) , a nd we a c c or din g ly

no te that th e pu

bli c int e re st i n d isc los ur e of the se 13 photogr aphs is strong . In any event, ther e is no more than a demi nim is priva c y int e re st i n 14 wi thh old ingthere da c te d p ho togra ph s. 15 2. The Gene va Conve ntions46 1 The de fenda nts argue that the Ge neva Conve ntions, which protect prisoners of wa r and 2 detained c ivilians “ag ainst insults and public curiosity ,” ser ve as f urther ba sis for a f

inding that 3 FOIA’s priva cy

provisions apply

to preve nt relea se of the Army photos. The Third Ge neva 4 Convention, coveringlawful be lliger ents, provides that “ prisoners of war must at all tim es be 5 pr ote c te d, pa

rt ic ula rl y a g a ins t a c ts o f v iol e nc e or int imi datio n a

nd a g a ins t in su lts and

pu bli c 6 curiosity .” Ge neva Conve ntion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War a rt. 13, Aug . 12, 7 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafte r Third Ge neva Conve ntion] . The F ourth Gene va Convention, 8 c ov e ri ngc ivi lia

ns , s tate s: 9 Protected pe rsons areentitled, in all circumstanc es, to respe ct for 10 their per sons, their honour, their f amily rights, their relig ious 11 convictions and pra ctices, a nd their manne rs and c ustoms. They 12 shall at all times be humanely treated, and sha ll be protec ted 13 e sp e c ia lly a g a ins t a ll a c ts o f v iol e nc e or thr e ats t he re of and a g a ins t 14 insults and public curiosity

. 1 5 Ge n ev a C o nv en t i o nR el at i v e t o th e P ro t ec t i o no f C i v i l i anP er s o n s i nT i m e o f W ar art . 2 7 , Au g. 16 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafte r F ourth Gene va Convention]. Both of these tre aties we re 17 designed to pre vent the abuse of prisoner s. Neither tr eaty is intended to curb those who seek 18 information about prisoner abuse in a

n eff ort to help deter

it. 19 Howeve r, g overnme nt officials have conc luded that re lease of photographs like the one s 20 in this case would cla sh with the Gene va Conventions by subjectingthe detaine es depic ted in the 21 photos to publi c curiosity . ( SeeDec laration of Geoff rey S. Corn, March 25, 2005, ¶ 5 22 (“[R] elea se of [the Abu Ghra ib] photogr aphs, eve n with obscured f ace s and g enitals, would be 23 inc on sis te nt w iththeob lig atio n o f t he Un ite d St ate s to tr e at th e ind ivi du a ls d e pic te d huma ne ly 24 and would pose a great risk of subjectingthese individuals to public insultand curiosity .”);47 1 Dec laration of Richard B . J ackson, A pril 25, 2006, ¶ 9 (re lease of the Ar my photos will subj ect 2 detainee s to public curiosity beca use “[e]ven if the identities of the subjec ts of the photographs 3 arene ve r e sta

bli sh e d .

. . e a c h in div idu a l be ne fi c iary of the se tr e aty

pr ote c tio ns wi ll und ou

bte dly 4 su ff

e r t he pe rs on a l humil iatio n a nd ind ignit y a c c or da nt w iththe kn ow le dg e tha t th e se 5 photogr aphs have been pla ced in the public doma in”).) 6 The de fenda nts do not claim that the Gene va Conventions constitute specific statutory 7 authorization to withhol d these photographs unde r F OIA’s exemption 3, § 552(b)(3), but r ather 8 that FOIA should be re ad to be c onsistent with the Geneva Conventions, see M

urray v. Sc hooner 9 Cha rm ing

Be tsy , 6 U.S. (2 Cranc h) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be 1 0 c o n s tr

u e d to v io lateth e la

wo f n ati o n s if any o th e r p o s s ib le c o n s tr

u c ti o nr e ma in s . . . . ” )

. We 11 note that “[r]espect is ordinarily due the r easona

ble views of the Ex ecutive B ranc h conce rning 12 the meaningof an inter national treaty ,” El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Ts ui Y uan Tseng , 5 25 U. S. 13 155, 168-69 (1999) , so long a s it has been “ consistently adher ed to by

the Executive Depa

rtment 14 of the Gove rnment,” Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921). The defe ndants’ cur rent 15 litigation position, however, is not at a ll consistent with the ex ecutive br anch’ s prior 16 interpre tations of the Gene va Conventions. 17 As an initial matter, the g overnme nt does not curr ently interpre t the Gene va Conventions 18 to prohibit diss emination of photographs or videos of deta inees whe n those detaine es ar e not 19 identifiable. ( See, e .g. , J ennife r K. Elsea , Congressional Research Se rviceReport for Congress: 20 Lawf

ulness of Interrogation Techniques under the G eneva Conventions , at CRS-19 (2004) 21 (“[T]he Depar

tment of Def

ense inter prets the [Third Gene va Convention] to protect POW s from 22 beingfilmed or photographe d in such a manne r that viewe rs would be a ble to rec ognize the48 1 prisoner. Photos and videos depicting POWs with their fac es cove red or their identities 2 otherwise disguised [do] not, in the view of the D epar tment of Def

ense, violate GPW art. 13.”). 3 Howeve r, the de fenda nts note that the g overnme nt’s curr ent pra ctice doe s not allow 4 dissemination of photogr aphs of de tainees be ing a bused, eve n if they

are not identifiable. 5 (Appe llants’ Br . 52-53; Appellants’ Reply Br . 23-25.) The defe ndants argue that a photograph of 6 abuse is so humiliating that its dissemination alway s opens the deta inee to “public c uriosity ,” 7 even if

the detaine e ca

nnot be identified. B ut this was not alway s the g overnme nt’s interpre tation 8 of the Ge neva Conve ntions. 9 Prior to this l itigation, the United States ha s not consistently considere d dissemination of 10 photogr aphic doc umentation of deta inee mistreatment to violate the public curiosity provisions 11 of the Ge neva Conve ntions, at least not when the de tainee is unidentifiable and the dissemination 1 2 i s n o ti t s e l f

i nt e n d e d t o hum i l i at e . T h e 1 9 2 9 G e n e v a C o nv e nt i o n s , i nf

o r c e d ur i n gW o r l d

W ar II, 13 pr ov ide d p ri so ne rs of wa r t he same pr ote c tio n f

ro m “ pu bli c c urios ity” that th e Th ir d a nd F ourt h 14 Gene va Conventions offe r to prisoners of war and civilians. Com

pa reConve nti on

Re lativ e to 15 theTr e atme nt o f P ri so ne rs of War art . 2 , July

27 , 1 92 9, 47 Stat. 2 02 1 ( “ [Pri so ne rs of wa r] mus t 16 at all times be humane ly treated, and pr otected, pa rticularly ag ainst acts of violenc e, insults and 17 public curiosity .”) with Third Gene va Convention, su pra , a rt . 1 3 ( “ Pr iso ne rs of

wa r m us t at a ll 18 times be humanely treated. . . . L ikewise, prisone rs of wa r must at all times be protec ted, 19 particula

rly ag ainst acts of violenc e or intimidation and ag ainst insults and public curiosity .”). At 20 the end of

the war , the United States g overnme nt widely disseminated photographs of prisoners 21 in J apane se and G erma n prison and conc entration camps. (De clar ation of Scott F. Hor ton, Apr. 22 27, 2005, ¶ 17.). The se photographs of emac iated prisoner s, corpse s, and re mains of prisoner s49 1 depicted de tainees in states of powerlessness and subjug ation simil ar to those e ndured by the 2 de ta ine e s d e pic te d in theph oto gra

ph s at is su e he re . Y e t th e Un ite d St ate s c hampi on e d th e us e 3 and dissemination of such photographs to hold per petrators acc ountable. 4 The g overnme nt responds that the individuals in the World W ar I Iphotogr aphs we re not 5 in t

he mil ita ry c us tod y of theUn ite d St ate s, and

thu s th e Un ite d St ate s w a s und e r n o d uty to 6 protec t them from public curiosity . There fore , the argument continues, thereis no inconsistency 7 betwee n the United States’ a ctions in publiciz ing photographs doc umenting G erma n and 8 Japa

ne se de ta ine e a

bu se and its c ur re nt p os iti on

that pu bli c izin gph oto gra

ph s d oc ume nti ngits 9 own abuse of deta inees would violate the Gene va Conventions. On this clever interpre tation, the 1 0 Un it e d

St ate s at t

h e e n d o f Wo r ld War I Iw a s p r o p e rly

f a c il it ati n g“ p u

b li c c ur io s it

y , ” b ut N a zi 11 Ge rm any

and Impe ri a l Jap an w e reob lig ate d b y the 19 29 Ge ne va

Conve nti on s to de fe at th os e 12 eff

orts to document their violation of the 1929 Ge neva Conve ntions. W e ar e not per suaded. The 13 far

more sensible inter

pretation of the United States’ position is that the United States did not at 14 that time consider doc umentation of Ge neva Conve ntion violations in order to hold the 15 perpe trators a ccounta ble to constitute “public curiosity ,” eve n when the doc umentation included 16 ph oto gra

ph s o f d e ta ine e s su

bje c t to mis tr e atme nt. 17 Fur

ther, the de fenda

nts’ contention that documentation of detainee abuse c onstitut es 18 pu

bli c c urios ity

is i mpo ssibleto s qu arewi th t he Un ite d St ate s’ ro le a s th e le a d p ro se c uti ngpa rt y 19 of Imperial Japanese Gene ral Sada o Araki and others be fore the International Mili tary Tribunal 20 for the F ar Ea st (“IMTFE” ). In that case , the IMTFE f ound the J apane se g overnme nt’s 21 c e ns or

sh ip of photographs depicting mistreatment of prisoners of war to be evidenc e of the 22 g ov e rnme nt’ s c omp lic ity in w ar c ri me s, inc lud ingvio latio ns of the 19 29 Ge ne va

Conve nti on s.50 1 See U

nited States v. Sadao Araki(Int’l Mil. Trib. for the F ar Ea st Nov. 4-12, 1948), re pr inte d in 2 60 In te rn ati on al L aw S tud ie s 437, 460-67, 472-76 ( Howard S. L evie e d. 1979). The United 3 States’ leadingrole in that prose cution would have be en odd, to say the least, if the United States 4 at the time took the position that the dissemination of photogra phs showing prisoners of wa r 5 subject to mistreatment wa s itself a wa r crime. 6 In light of this contra ry past prac tice, we do not defe r to the g overnme nt’s curr ent 7 litigation position concer ning the meaningof the “public curiosity” provisions of the Third a nd 8 Four

th Geneva

Conventions. See, e .g. , Pe rk ins v . Elg , 3 07 U. S. 3 25 , 3 39 -4 9 ( 19 39 ) ( de c lin ingto 9 defe r to executive’s interpr etation of tre aty in light of pa st practiceof contra ry interpre tation of 10 simil ar tre aties). We hold that Article 13 of the Third G eneva Convention and Article 27 of the 11 Four

th Geneva

Convention do not prohibit di ssemination of imag es of de tainees be ing a bused 12 when the imag es ar e re dacte d so as to protec t the identities of the detaine es, at lea st in situations 13 wher e, as he re, the purpose of the dissemination is not i tself to humiliate the detainee s. ( Cf. 1 4 Ap p el l an t s ’ B r. 5 3 (c o n s i d er i n g p o s s i b i l i ty o f d et ai n ee s b ei n g “s u

b j ec t edt o m i s tre atm en tthro u gh 15 the stree ts” while hooded) .) This construc tion is consist ent with the past pra ctice of the United 16 States. It is also the construction publicly adopted by

the International Comm ittee for the Red 17 Cross (“I CRC ”), which has “ had a significant influenc e on the inter pretation of Article 13,” 18 (Cummings De cl. 17). See P ics “Not Breaching Convention , ”News24.c om (May 21, 2004), 19 htt

p:/ /www .n e ws 24 .c om/

Ne ws 24 /World/ Ira q/0 ,, 2- 10 -1 46 0_ 15 30 82 5, 00 .html (n oti ngthat I CRC 20 spokesper son stated that photographs of detaineeabuse c ould be re lease d if fac es and ide ntifying 21 features ar e obscur ed). 22 More importantly , this construction is consistent with the purpose of fur theringhumane51 1 treatment of ca

ptives, which animate s Article 13 of the Third Ge neva Conve ntion and Article 27 2 of the F ourth Gene va Convention. See Senator Linie Gmbh &Co. Kg v. Sunway Line, Inc. , 291 3 F .3 d 1 45 , 1 53 n. 7 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 2) (“ A tre aty

sh a ll b e int e rp re te d in

g oo d f a ithin a c c or da

nc e wi th 4 theor din ary

me anin gto b e g ive n to thete rm s o f t he tr e aty in t he ir c onte xt an d in

light o f i ts 5 object and pur

pose.” ( quoting Vie nna Convention on the L aw of Treaties art. 31.1, May

23, 6 19 69 , 1 15 5 U .N .T .S. 33 1) ); se eals o Int’l Comm. for the Red Cross, Commentary: Convention 7 ( III ) Relative to the Treatme nt of Prisoners of W ar 140 (Jean S. Pi ctet ed. 1960) , available at 8 http://www.icr c.org/ihl.nsf/C OM/375-590017 (“ The re quirement that prote cted pe rsons must at 9 all times be humanely treated is the basic theme of the Ge neva Conve ntions.”) [hereinaf ter ICRC 10 Com me nta ry ]; cf. United States v. Noriega , 8 08 F . Su pp . 7 91 , 7 95 n. 6 ( S.D . F la . 1 99 2) (“ Whil e 11 theRe d Cr os s Co mme nta ry is n ot p art

of the tr e aty and is n ot b ind inglaw, it i s w ide ly 12 rec ognized as a re specte d authority on interpre tation of the Ge neva Conve ntions.”). Relea se of 13 the photographs is likely to further the purposes of

the Gene va Conventions by deter ringfuture 14 a bu se of priso ne rs . T o th e e xtent th e pu bli c may be “ c uriou s” a

bo ut t he Ar my ph oto s, it i s n ot i n 15 a wa

y that the text of the Conventions prohibit s; curiosity about “e nemy

prisoners be ing 16 subjected to mistreatment through the stree ts,” (Appe llants’ Br . 53), is differ ent in kind from the 17 ty

pe of c oncer

n the plaintiffs see k to inspire. See IC RC C om me nta ry , su

pra , at 141 18 (cha

rac terizing “public curiosity” provision as c oncer ned with protec ting “ honour” of prisoners)

. 19 He ighte ne d p ub lic awa re ne ss o f e ve nts depic te d in the Ar my ph oto s - - s ome of

wh ic h a pp e ar t o 20 violate the Ge neva Conve ntions -- would serve to vindicate the pur poses of the G eneva 21 Conventions without endang eringthe lives or honor of detainee s whose identities are protec ted. 22 As the Third a nd Four th Geneva

Conventions do not prohibitdisclosure of photographsW e n ot e i n pas s i ng t hat t he def endan t s di d not produce any ev i dence t hat an y det ai nee s pi ct ur ed 22 w ish e d the re d a c te d p h o to g ra p h s to b e w ithh e ld in o rd e r to p ro te c t t h e ir p riv a c y. 52 1 of de ta ine e a

bu se wh e n, a s h e re , th e ph oto gra ph s a rere da c te d a

nd the dis c los ur e is n ot i tse lf 2 intended as a

n act of humiliation, no need arises to a lter the standa rd ana ly sis under F OIA’s 3 exemption 6 and 7(C) in order to c onstrue that statute to be c onsistent with thos e conve ntions. 4 There fore , the def endants’ e x presse d desire to c omply with the Gene va Conventions does not 5 elevate the priva cy interests in withholding the r edac ted Army photos above a demi nim is le ve l. 22 6 CONCLUSI ON 7 As state d a bo ve , th e de fe nd ants have fa ile d to ide nti fy an in div idu a l who c ou ld 8 rea sonably

be expected to be endang ere d within the meaningof exemption 7(F). Thedistrict 9 court’s r edac tions are suff icient to rende r inapplica

ble exemptions 6 and 7(C), even in light of the 10 Th ir d a

nd F ourt h G e ne va Conve nti on s. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m.