No. 3--00--0669

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2001 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 			)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS,					)	of the 13th Judicial Circuit,

							)	La Salle County, Illinois,

	Plaintiff-Appellee,			)	

							)

	v.						)	No. 00--CF--104

							)	

JOHN E. BROWN,					)	Honorable

                                )	James Lanuti,

	Defendant-Appellant.		)	Judge, Presiding.

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	JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

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	The defendant, John E. Brown, was convicted of two counts of

unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24--1.1(a)

(West 2000)), and sentenced to concurrent terms of eight years’

imprisonment.  The defendant now appeals his conviction, alleging

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

was a felon.  We reverse.

	The defendant, John E. Brown, was charged with two counts of

possession of a weapon by a felon.  The evidence showed that the

weapons involved were found at the home of the defendant.  At

trial, the State introduced the certified copy of a Cook County

conviction naming John Brown to prove that the defendant was a

felon.  After the close of the State’s case, defense counsel

moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had failed

to prove that the defendant, John E. Brown, was the same John Brown named in the certified copy of conviction.  The trial court

denied the motion.  Defense counsel attempted to introduce

evidence that there were 49 John Browns listed in a Chicago phone

book, but the court refused to admit the evidence because it was

hearsay.  The defense rested without presenting any evidence.  In

closing argument, defense counsel argued that John Brown was an

extremely common name, and that the defendant was not the same

John Brown as named in the Cook County conviction.  The jury was

not instructed on any presumption of identity.  The defendant was

convicted.  This appeal followed.

	The defendant asserts that the State failed to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that he was the John Brown named in the Cook

County conviction.  When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence, the question is whether, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any reasonable jury

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985).

	A presumption is a legal device that permits proof of one

fact to substitute for proof of another.  People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133, 692 N.E.2d 315 (1998).  The law presumes that if the

name on a certified copy of conviction is identical to the name

of the defendant they are the same person.  People v. Smith, 148 Ill. 2d 454, 593 N.E.2d 533 (1992).  If the presumption is

established, the entry into evidence of a certified copy of

conviction is sufficient to prove the defendant is a felon beyond

a reasonable doubt.  Smith, 148 Ill. 2d 454, 593 N.E.2d 533.  If the presumption is not established, or if the defendant rebuts

the presumption, the State must introduce additional evidence to

show the defendant and the individual named on the certified copy

of conviction are the same person.  People v. Moton, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 661 N.E.2d 1176 (1996).

	In the instant case, the named defendant was Jamesohn E. Brown. 

The name on the certified conviction was Jamesohn Brown.  This

difference in name is sufficient to defeat the presumption of

identity.  Without the presumption of identity, and with no other

evidence that the defendant was the John Brown named in the

certified copy of conviction, the State failed to prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt.

	We do not find persuasive the State’s argument, based on two

early twentieth century civil cases, that the middle initial is

irrelevant.  The cases cited by the State do not involve proof of

identity beyond a reasonable doubt.  People ex rel. Johnson v. Traeger, 340 Ill. 147, 172 N.E. 168 (1930), involved an extradi tion proceeding, where the court merely had to have reasonable

certainty that the individual named in the extradition warrant

was the individual standing before it.  In Illinois Central Rail Co. V. Hasenwinkle, 232 Ill. 224, 83 N.E. 815 (1908), the issue concerned who had been served with notice in a property action.

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court

of La Salle County is reversed.

	Reversed.

	HOMER, P.J., and McDADE, J., concur.