1

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-1312

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United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Larry Rennie Stropes, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

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Submitted: June 17, 2004

 Filed: October 28, 2004 

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Before BYE, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Larry Rennie Stropes appeals the district court’s1

 refusal

to grant a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). He also appeals

the district court’s determination that officers who executed the search warrant made

a legal forcible entry into his home. We affirm.
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I.

Mr. Stropes sought a Franks hearing because an officer omitted relevant

information from a search warrant application. The omitted information related to the

credibility of an informant, Elvin Blakely (“Mr. Blakely”). Accordingly, we begin

our recitation of the facts with background information about Mr. Blakely.

Cedar County Sheriff’s Deputies investigated a burglary at the residence of Mr.

Blakely’s cousin, Buford Blakely. They discovered that burglars stole multiple

firearms. Buford Blakely suggested Mr. Blakely as a suspect because Mr. Blakely

used to live with him, asked him for money earlier on the day of the burglary, and

recently posted bond from jail. The deputies verified that Mr. Blakely was recently

in jail in neighboring Muscatine County following an arrest for interference with

official acts, going armed with intent, and possession with intent to deliver a

controlled substance. They also verified that he was out on bond.

The next day, police officers in the City of Muscatine responded to a report of

a suspicious person with a shotgun case. The officers arrested Mr. Blakely, who

carried two shotguns and a rifle identified as stolen from Buford Blakely. The

officers called in a detective, Detective Quinn, and told him of Mr. Blakely’s arrest.

At about 10:15 p.m., Det. Quinn met with Mr. Blakely. At the meeting, Det. Quinn

noted that Mr. Blakely slurred his speech. Det. Quinn asked if Mr. Blakely had been

drinking. Mr. Blakely said that he had not been drinking but admitted that he had

taken some pills and was tired. Mr. Blakely claims to have been sound asleep at the

beginning of his first meeting with Det. Quinn.

Det. Quinn gave Mr. Blakely his Miranda warnings and asked him about a

prior car stereo theft in Muscatine. Mr. Blakely denied involvement with that theft

but said he saw another man with the stolen stereo. Regarding the guns, Mr. Blakely

first claimed he bought them from an unknown man at his girlfriend’s trailer for $200.
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He later claimed he bought them from a known burglar. Still later he claimed that the

man he named as the stereo thief stole the guns and sold them to him. Finally, he

admitted that he went to his cousin’s home with the stereo thief, stole the guns

himself, and gave some of the guns to Mr. Stropes as payment for a drug-related debt.

During the interview, Det. Quinn repeatedly challenged the truthfulness of Mr.

Blakely’s statements and questioned his ability to separate fact from fiction. At one

point before giving his final version of the facts, Mr. Blakely asked if he could “cut

a deal.”

Det. Quinn then contacted the Cedar County Sheriff’s Department to interview

Mr. Blakely about the burglary. A Cedar County Sheriff’s Deputy, Deputy Fitch,

arrived in Muscatine. Det. Quinn told him of the earlier interview. Deputy Fitch

conducted a recorded interview with Mr. Blakely. Mr. Blakely gave Deputy Fitch the

same final version of the facts, namely, that he was one of the burglars at his cousin’s

residence and that he gave some stolen guns to Mr. Stropes as payment for a drugrelated debt.

At about 1:15 a.m., Det. Quinn contacted Officer Jirak of the Muscatine Drug

Task Force. Det. Quinn relayed the evening’s events and the stories that Mr. Blakely

told earlier that night. Det. Quinn then obtained from Mr. Blakely and gave to

Officer Jirak a handwritten, notarized statement that contained Mr. Blakely’s final

version of the facts.

Officer Jirak prepared an affidavit to apply for a warrant to search Mr.

Stropes’s residence for guns. In the affidavit, he did not mention that Mr. Blakely

initially lied to officers and repeatedly changed his story. Also, he did not mention

Mr. Blakely’s prior arrest on charges of interference with official acts, going armed

with intent, and the controlled substance offense. Finally Officer Jirak did not

mention that Mr. Blakely slurred his speech, appeared tired, and admitted that he had

taken pills before his police interviews.
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In the affidavit Officer Jirak did describe Mr. Blakely’s involvement in the

burglary, possession of the stolen firearms, confession to the burglary, and

implication of Mr. Stropes. In addition, he wrote, “Blakely stated that Stropes came

out to [Mr. Blakely’s] residence . . . and retrieved the known stolen items. Blakely

describes Stropes[’s] residence as being located near Scott’s Outdoors in Muscatine[,]

Iowa.” Officer Jirak claimed in the affidavit that officers verified the exact address

of Mr. Stropes’s residence and verified that it was in the general area of a

convenience store named Scott’s Outdoors. Finally, Officer Jirak wrote that Mr.

Stropes was the brother of Mr. Blakely’s girlfriend, Crystal Stropes.

Officer Jirak provided, as attachments to the application, a Cedar County

incident report and Mr. Blakely’s handwritten, notarized statement. The Cedar

County incident report described the interview of Buford Blakely in which Buford

Blakely listed the items stolen and named Mr. Blakely as a suspect. Buford Blakely’s

description of his own stolen guns matched Mr. Blakely’s description of the guns that

Mr. Stropes received. The attachment also reported Deputy Fitch’s interview of Mr.

Blakely.

Officer Jirak obtained a warrant based on the affidavit. He, Det. Quinn, and

four other officers executed the warrant at 5:40 a.m. Uncontested testimony

established that Officer Jirak knocked three times on Mr. Stropes’s door and

simultaneously announced “police, search warrant.” Officer Jirak estimated that he

waited approximately five seconds between each knock and approximately fifteen

seconds after the final knock before he gave one of the accompanying officers the

order to batter the door for entry. Four officers entered the house, one remained in

front of the house, and one remained in the rear. Neither of the outside officers saw

anyone leave the house during the search.

Once in the house, Officer Jirak encountered Mr. Stropes rising from bed in a

room near the front door. Officer Jirak placed him on the floor and handcuffed him.
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Some of the other officers searched the house. They discovered a gun case that held

several rifles and ammunition. None of the rifles were the stolen guns, and the

officers did not seize any of the rifles in the case. One of the officers encountered Mr.

Stropes’s wife in the kitchen. She admitted that she had just finished smoking

cocaine and that she used cocaine daily. In addition, she disclosed to the officer the

location where she kept drugs in the house. The officers held her in custody only

until completion of the search. 

While officers continued with the search, Det. Quinn advised Mr. Stropes of

his Miranda rights. Mr. Stropes then admitted that he received nine guns from Mr.

Blakely that he believed to be stolen. During this interview, other officers discovered

marijuana and methamphetamine. After completion of the initial search, officers

obtained another search warrant to enable a further search for drugs. The application

for the second search warrant contained additional information related to the

discovery of drugs during execution of the first warrant. Also, Mr. Stropes signed a

“voluntary consent to search and seize” form prior to a second search. During the

second search, officers found and seized the stolen guns and approximately 200

grams of amphetamine.

The United States charged Mr. Stropes with possession with intent to distribute

amphetamine and amphetamine purported to be methamphetamine in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), possession and use of a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possession

of stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Mr. Stropes filed a motion to

suppress the fruits of the search under Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65, and requested a

hearing. He also contested the officers’ forcible entry and moved for suppression of

the fruits of the search. The district court denied a Franks hearing, denied the motion

to suppress, but referred the forcible entry issue to a magistrate judge for a hearing.
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At the hearing, Officer Jirak testified that he knew there was a high probability

that there were drugs and guns in Mr. Stropes’s residence. In addition, he claimed he

was concerned for the officers’ safety because Mr. Stropes’s sister was Mr. Blakely’s

girlfriend, and she might have told Mr. Stropes about Mr. Blakely’s arrest. Officer

Jirak did not have any knowledge concerning contact between Mr. Blakely and Ms.

Stropes. No officers claimed that they saw lights or movement in the residence in the

early morning before their forced entry. All officers testified that Officer Jirak

knocked and announced. At least one of the officers provided an estimate of the time

between the knocks and between the knock and entry that closely matched Officer

Jirak’s estimate. No officers contradicted these estimates. The magistrate judge

found “overwhelming evidence” that the officers knocked and announced prior to

their forcible entry. However, because there was no specific evidence to suggest Mr.

Stropes might be violent and because the evidence (rifles) could not be easily

destroyed, the magistrate judge found there to be no exigent circumstances.

Ultimately, the magistrate recommended that the district court find the forcible entry

unreasonable and grant the motion to suppress.

The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s findings regarding the

sufficiency of the knock and announce, but rejected the magistrate judge’s

recommendation to suppress. The district court specifically found that it is not

necessary to reach the issue of exigent circumstances when there is a specific finding

that officers satisfied the knock and announce requirement. Mr. Stropes then pled

guilty, but reserved his right to appeal the Franks and forcible entry issues. We

affirm.

II.

We review the district court’s refusal to grant a Franks hearing for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Fairchild, 122 F.3d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1997). “[T]he

common-law knock-and-announce requirement . . . is part of the reasonableness
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inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Goodson, 165 F.3d 610, 614

(8th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We review the

district court’s legal determinations surrounding the forcible entry issue de novo.

United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir. 1994). Mr. Stropes does not

challenge the district court’s factual findings regarding the officers’ knock-andannounce entry.

Under Franks, if an officer omits critical information from a search warrant

application and obtains a warrant, the resultant search may be unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65. “To prevail on a Franks claim

based on omissions of fact, [a defendant] must prove first that facts were omitted with

the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit

misleading, and, second, that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted

information, could not support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Allen,

297 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2002). In other words, the defendant must show “that the

alleged omission[s] would have made it impossible to find probable cause.” United

States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1998).

Here, the affidavit omitted certain information that Officer Jirak possessed at

the time he prepared the affidavit. In particular, Officer Jirak failed to note that Mr.

Blakely spoke with slurred speech and admitted that he took pills earlier in the

evening; that Mr. Blakely initially lied to officers about the stolen firearms; that

criminal charges were pending against Mr. Blakely regarding interference with

official acts; and that Det. Quinn questioned Mr. Blakely’s ability to separate fiction

from fact. These omissions did not make the affidavit misleading because even if the

omitted information had been included, there would have remained “a fair

probability” that stolen firearms were in Mr. Stropes’s residence. See Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (stating that probable cause exists where there is “a

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place”). 
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We agree with all the arguments the district court set forth to support this

conclusion. First, Mr. Blakely made a statement against his own penal interest related

to criminal activities beyond the investigation. He admitted that he gave Mr. Stropes

stolen guns to pay a drug debt even though the ongoing investigation related solely

to a burglary. Such a statement carries considerable reliability because Mr. Blakely

took responsibility for actions unrelated to the burglary investigation rather than

“merely trying to blame someone else for his own crimes.” United States v. Tyler,

238 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d

547, 553 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Second, the omission of Mr. Blakely’s initial false statements to the

investigating officers and the omission of Mr. Blakely’s criminal record did not make

the affidavit misleading. The affidavit showed that the Muscatine County Jail

recently released Mr. Blakely on bond, and officers arrested him carrying stolen

weapons. Judicial officers asked to sign warrants understand that criminal suspects

often have criminal records and frequently are uncooperative or untruthful before they

eventually cooperate and provide truthful admissions. Allen, 297 F.3d at 796.

Accordingly, the omission of this information did not make the application

misleading. 

Third, Mr. Blakely’s desire to “cut a deal” and his ability to create a

handwritten confession demonstrate that he understood the interrogation that took

place and was able-minded when, finally, he confessed. Mr. Blakely’s earlier

sleepiness, slurred speech, and admitted use of pills does not detract from the

reliability of the information he provided later, when he was lucid. Accordingly,

Officer Jirak’s failure to mention Mr. Blakely’s sleepiness, slurred speech, and use

of pills cannot be viewed as fatally prejudicial to the affidavit. Finally, the

application contained additional assurances of reliability because officers

corroborated the location of Mr. Stropes’s residence, and Mr. Blakely’s description
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of the guns given to Mr. Stropes matched the description of guns that Buford Blakely

reported as stolen.

As to the issue of forcible entry, the district court found that the brief five

second delays between repeatedly knocking and announcing and the subsequent

fifteen second wait with no response after the final knock was a reasonable amount

of time to delay before battering the door. The district court based its legal

conclusion on that facts that officers suspected the presence of drugs and guns and

reasonably believed their yelling and pounding on the door would alert people in the

house of their presence. We agree. 

“The determination of whether an officer was justified in forcing entry after

announcing his presence and purpose does not turn on any hard and fast time limit,

but depends upon the circumstances confronting the officer serving the warrant.”

Lucht, 18 F.3d at 549; see also, United States v. Vesey, 338 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir.

2003) (approving a ten second delay where the residence was small and officers

suspected the presence of drugs); Goodson, 165 F.3d at 614 (approving a twenty

second delay where officers suspected the presence of drugs and expressed a

legitimate concern for officer safety). Here, contrary to Mr. Stropes’s arguments, the

officers’ probable cause was based on specific, credible, corroborated evidence. Mr.

Blakely incriminated himself when he claimed that he traded guns to pay his drug

debt to Mr. Stropes. He also specifically identified the guns he gave to Mr. Stropes,

and the officers knew Mr. Blakely’s description matched Buford Blakely’s own

description of the missing guns. With this reliable, corroborated tip, officers

reasonably suspected that they faced a drug dealer who sought multiple firearms and

traded drugs for those firearms. Further, Officer Jirak pounded on the door and yelled

loudly enough that an officer at the rear of the house heard him. Under these

circumstances, officer safety is a clear concern and fifteen to twenty seconds is a

sufficient time to wait before entering the home of a suspected drug dealer to search

for multiple stolen firearms.
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Although Mr. Stropes focuses on the facts that he had neither a criminal record,

a history of resisting arrest, nor a history of violence, these factors are not

prerequisites to a finding that officers had a reason to suspect danger. Mr. Stropes

also argues that quick entry was unnecessary because officers reasonably could not

have believed that he might quickly destroy the large guns that were the object of the

warrant. Mr. Stropes’s argument is misplaced because the information from Mr.

Blakely clearly showed that officer safety rather than the destruction of evidence was

the primary concern surrounding the search of Mr. Stropes’s residence. See Lucht,

18 F.3d at 549 (“The need to force entry may result from danger to the safety of the

entering officers or from the imminent destruction of evidence.”). On the facts of this

case, the wait was sufficient. We need not address the issue of exigency further

because the officers satisfied the knock-and-announce requirement. See Vesey, 338

F.3d at 916 (finding the execution of a warrant constitutional under the Fourth

Amendment based on officers’ satisfaction of the knock and announce requirement).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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