COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DERRELL WILLIAM CHAPPELLE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2161-97-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 SEPTEMBER 8, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Susan D. Hansen, Deputy Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Derrell William Chappelle (defendant) appeals his 

convictions of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of 

a felony. He contends the trial court erred in defining the 

elements of robbery. Specifically, defendant contends the crime 

of robbery requires proof the victim felt actual fear when being 

robbed. Because we hold the common law definition of robbery 

does not require proof of fear, we affirm. 

 Given defendant's full confession, the facts of this case 

are remarkably clear. On the evening of April 7, 1997, Michael 

Staten sat in his car on Lauralee Drive in Richmond when 

defendant, wearing a mask to conceal his features, approached 

Staten's car and tapped on the driver's window. Defendant 

displayed a handgun and asked Staten to give him money. Staten 

testified he felt no fear when he complied, yet he did not 
- 2 - 

surrender the money voluntarily. 

 Defendant took the money and a ring Staten wore and fled 

toward a nearby house. Staten drove his car down the block, 

turned it around, drove back to the house and exited the car. He 

then began to complain loudly to the occupants of the house that 

he had been robbed. Defendant fired two shots in the air and ran 

into the house. Police later found him hiding in the attic of 

the house with the gun, money and ring. 

 At trial, defendant moved to strike the evidence because the 

Commonwealth had not proven the victim was put in fear. Because 

Staten specifically testified he had not felt fear when he 

surrendered his property, defendant argued he was guilty of 

larceny, not robbery. The trial court ruled that, "It doesn't 

make any difference about him not being in fear. He might be 

very courageous but he gave up his money." The trial court found 

defendant guilty of robbery and use of a firearm in the 

commission of a felony and sentenced him to serve eight years. 

 The legal issue at bar is a narrow one: does the crime of 

robbery require the prosecution to prove the victim felt actual 

fear when he was robbed? If so, Staten's plain testimony that he 

was not afraid would prove fatal to the Commonwealth's case. If 

not, then defendant's convictions must stand. The answer to this 

question lies in the Commonwealth's common law tradition. 

 It remains an unshakable maxim that "[r]obbery is a common 

law crime in this State and while our statute, [Code § 18.2-58], 
- 3 - 

regulates the punishment, it does not attempt to define robbery, 

but leaves the crime as it was defined at common law." Brookman 

v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 522, 525, 145 S.E. 358, 359 (1928). See 

also George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 277, 411 S.E.2d 12, 20 

(1991); Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 860, 864, 183 S.E. 452, 

454 (1936); Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 811, 133 S.E. 

764, 767 (1926); Jones v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 736, 738, 496 

S.E.2d 668, 669 (1998). Therefore, we have but to examine the 

common law elements of robbery to determine if proof of fear is 

necessary to the Commonwealth's case. 

 The essential elements of common law robbery are "(1) a 

felonious taking, (2) accompanied by an asportation of (3) 

personal property of value (4) from the person of another or in 

his presence, (5) against his will, (6) by violence or by putting 

him in fear, (7) animo furandi (with the intent to steal)." 67 

Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 12 (1998) (citing Mason v. Commonwealth, 

200 Va. 253, 105 S.E.2d 149 (1958)). It is element six which 

defendant claims was not proven at his trial. He claims the mere 

presentation of a firearm to Staten did not create fear and, 

therefore, did not satisfy element six. 

 While it is true Staten testified he was not afraid, element 

six may be satisfied even though the victim is not put in fear. 

The word "or" appears between the words "violence" and "putting 

him in fear." Because element six is constructed using the 

disjunctive "or," it is satisfied when a defendant instills fear 
- 4 - 

in the heart of his victim, when he perpetrates violence against 

the victim, or both. Proof of both conditions is not necessary 

so long as one is present. This interpretation of the offense of 

robbery is widely recognized as the law in our Commonwealth. See

Mason, 200 Va. at 256, 105 S.E.2d at 151 ("robbery must be 

accomplished by violence to the person . . . or must be 

accomplished by putting such person in fear of immediate injury 

to his person." (emphasis added)). See also United States v. 

Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 69 (1995) (citing Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 

Va. 303, 310, 377 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1989)); Jones v. Commonwealth, 

218 Va. 18, 22, 235 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1977) ("The 'gist' of 

robbery is the taking and carrying away of the personal property 

of another by fear or intimidation."). 

 If either violence or fear may precede robbery, there is 

little question defendant's actions served to complete the crime. 

 Defendant, by his own words, approached the car wearing a mask. 

 He displayed the gun to Staten and told him to give up his 

money. Staten characterized the event as a "stick up" and 

admitted he did not relinquish the property voluntarily. The 

violence inherent in the presentation of a firearm caused Staten 

to surrender his property. This is the essence of robbery. See

Jones, 218 Va. at 20, 235 S.E.2d at 314 (presentation of firearm 

constituted violence for purposes of robbery). 

 We reaffirm the long-standing doctrine that proof the victim 

felt fear is not an indispensable element to the offense of 
- 5 - 

robbery if violence is shown. Because the record fully supports 

the conclusion that such violence took place, we affirm 

defendant's convictions. 

 Affirmed.