J-S62024-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIE MAURICE HARRIS

Appellant No. 525 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 25, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003121-1997

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2015

Appellant Willie Maurice Harris appeals from the order entered in the 

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition for 

relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

This Court previously set forth the underlying facts and procedural 

history of this appeal as follows:

On August 9, 1996, the victim, Roderick McMahon, 

(hereinafter referred to as “McMahon”), who was also 

known by his street name of Rebel, was drinking beer with 

his friend, Shawn Featherstone, (hereinafter referred to as 

“Featherstone”), in an area near 7320 Fleury Way. 

McMahon, Featherstone, and several other individuals, 

continued to drink beer into the early morning hours of 

August 10, 1996. Shortly after midnight on August 10, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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1996, Susie Venson, (hereinafter referred to as “Venson”), 

who lived at 7320 Fleury Way, came out of her house and 

engaged McMahon in a discussion. Initially, the discussion 

appeared to be friendly; however, it ultimately led to an 

argument, which caused Venson to go back into her house 

where she had a conversation with Appellant. As a result of 

that conversation, Appellant then left Venson’s residence 

and went out into the street calling for McMahon to identify 

himself. When McMahon approached Appellant, an 

argument ensued between them and Appellant produced a 

gun and pointed it at McMahon. During their discussion, a 

second gun was produced thereby preventing Appellant 

from carrying out the threats that he was making. 

Appellant then turned and left and returned to Venson’s 

apartment. It is at this point that the testimony presented 

by the Commonwealth and the defense differs.

The Commonwealth maintained at trial that once Appellant 

returned to Venson’s residence, he went out the back door 

of her residence and went into an alleyway, hiding himself 

from view of McMahon and his friends and then fired 

several shots at McMahon, one of which struck McMahon in 

the abdomen and ultimately led to his death. Appellant 

offered testimony that he expressed fear for his safety 

when he returned to Venson’s apartment, that he called a 

jitney, and that he was going to leave the area. Appellant 

further testified that he went out the back door and he was 

going to run across the backyard when he was fired upon 

and he returned that fire in self-defense when he was 

standing at the back of the alley, which abutted Venson’s 

building. The physical facts found at the scene of the 

accident including the casings from Appellant’s gun 

contradicted Appellant’s testimony since all of the casings 

were found in the front of the alley near Fleury Way and 

not at the rear of Venson’s building where Appellant said 

he was fired upon.

Appellant was charged generally with the crime of criminal 

homicide and a jury trial was held on August 4, 1997 

through August 7, 1997, when the jury convicted Appellant 

for the crime of first-degree murder. On September 4, 

1997, Appellant was sentenced to the mandatory sentence 

of life without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed 

timely post-sentence motions in which he alleged that his 
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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two 

witnesses. A hearing was held on those motions and after 

that hearing, Appellant’s post-sentence motions were 

denied. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the 

Superior Court and after the trial court filed its opinion, 

Appellant’s appeal was dismissed for failure of his appellate 

counsel to file a brief. In dismissing Appellant’s appeal,

the Superior Court acknowledged that it was without 

prejudice with respect to Appellant’s rights to raise the 

claims asserted in that appeal in any subsequent postconviction relief petition.

On October 1, 2001, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking the reinstatement of his appellate 

rights. Following the answer submitted by the 

Commonwealth and an argument on that motion, 

Appellant’s direct appeal rights were reinstated on March 

26, 2002. Appellant filed a timely appeal and was directed 

to file his concise statement of matters complained of on 

appeal. Appellant requested several continuances to file 

that statement and on March 18, 2003, he filed a concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal to which he 

attached an alleged affidavit from Featherstone, the 

Commonwealth’s [eyewitness] at the time of Appellant’s 

trial, in which Featherstone allegedly recanted his 

testimony.

On August 6, 2004, the Superior Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence and after determining that while 

post-conviction proceedings were timely filed and 

dismissed without prejudice, the claims of the 

ineffectiveness of Appellant’s counsel could be raised in a 

subsequent petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant 

filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme 

Court, which petition was granted on February 11, 2005, 

however on February 20, 2007, that appeal was dismissed 

as being improvidently granted.

On October 1, 2007, Appellant filed a pro se petition for 

post-conviction relief, claiming that he was entitled to have 

his judgment of sentence vacated and be granted a new 

trial. Thereafter, counsel was appointed by order dated 

October 17, 2007 and an amended petition was filed on 
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February 1, 2010. Following a hearing on the petition for 

post-conviction relief, Appellant’s petition was denied....

Commonwealth v. Harris, No. 1404 WDA 2011, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed June 20, 2012) (quoting the PCRA 

court opinion, filed December 12, 2011, at 2-5).

This Court affirmed the order denying Appellant’s petition for PCRA 

relief on June 20, 2012. Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal on March 21, 2013.

On May 28, 2013, Appellant filed the present PCRA petition, which he 

subsequently amended on September 26, 2013.2 On July 2, 2014, the PCRA 

court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s 

petition without a hearing. On August 5, 2014, Appellant filed an answer to 

the PCRA court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. On February 25, 2015, the PCRA 

court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal3and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.4

____________________________________________

2 On February 14, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which the PCRA 

court quashed as a nullity on February 13, 2015, because the PCRA court 

had not yet issued a final order.

3 Although Appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed with the court until 

March 31, 2015, we deem Appellant’s notice of appeal timely because he 

mailed it from prison on March 23, 2015. See Commonwealth v. 

Patterson, 931 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa.Super.2007) (“Pursuant to the prisoner 

mailbox rule, we deem a document filed on the day it is placed in the hands 

of prison authorities for mailing.”). 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant raises the following issue for our review.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GAVE A DEFECTIVE ORDER, 

BY FAILING TO SPECIFY HOW APPELLANT’S PETITION WAS 

UNTIMELY, THEREBY CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION OF 

APPELLANT’S U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PA 

CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND 

COMMITTING FRAUD UPON THE COURT?

Appellant’s Brief at iii.

Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must determine 

whether his PRCA petition was timely. The timeliness of a PCRA petition 

implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal 

denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law makes clear that no 

court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id. To “accord 

finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no authority 

upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA 

timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011). With 

respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA, this Court has further explained: 

The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a 

PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

4 On April 13, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) by May 7, 

2015. Although Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was not filed with 

the court until May 12, 2015, both the statement and the verification are 

dated May 4, 2015. Thus, we decline to find Appellant’s issue waived for 

failure to timely file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The PCRA court issued a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on June 11, 2015. 
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shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying 

judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at 

the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

time for seeking the review. 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010) 

(citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.2011); 

see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. This Court may review a PCRA petition filed 

more than one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final only if the 

claim falls within one of the following three statutory exceptions, which the 

petitioner must plead and prove:

(i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court 

to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, if a petition pleads one of these 

exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60 

days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(2).
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Additionally, a heightened standard applies to a second or subsequent 

PCRA petition to avoid “serial requests for post-conviction relief.” 

Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1043 (Pa.2011). A second or 

subsequent PCRA petition will not be entertained unless “the petitioner 

makes a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have 

occurred.” Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1215 

(Pa.Super.2014) (en banc), appeal granted, 105 A.3d 658 (Pa.2014). 

“Appellant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief only if he 

demonstrates either that the proceedings which resulted in his conviction 

were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized 

society could tolerate, or that he was innocent of the crimes for which he 

was charged.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 21, 2007, 

when his time for seeking review with the United States Supreme Court 

expired. See Monaco, supra. Therefore, he had until May 21, 2008 to 

timely file a PCRA petition. Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, 

his second,5on May 28, 2013. Thus, his PCRA petition is facially untimely, 

and we must determine whether Appellant has pled and proved any of the 

exceptions to the PCRA time limitation. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). 

____________________________________________

5 The PCRA court states this is Appellant’s fourth petition for relief, however, 

this is the second petition Appellant filed for relief after his judgment of 

sentence became final.
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Appellant raises seventeen (17) claims in his pro se PCRA petition. He 

claims he is entitled to relief for prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury 

instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel. He offers no reason why 

he could not have raised these claims in his last PCRA petition or at his 

evidentiary hearing on the petition, nor does he explain how he has raised 

them within sixty (60) days of the date the claims could have been 

presented. 

Appellant also claims he is entitled to relief pursuant to Miller v. 

Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (U.S.2012), in which the Supreme Court held that 

the mandatory imposition of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 

juveniles was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. Even if the Supreme Court rules in Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, 135 S.Ct. 1546, ___ U.S. ___ (2015) that this constitutional 

right applies retroactively, Appellant would not be eligible for such relief. 

Although Appellant claims he was seventeen at the time of the murder, the 

record reflects that he was born on October 3, 1977, and he committed the 

murder on August 10, 1996. Thus, Appellant was almost nineteen years old 

when he murdered his victim, and this rule would not apply to him.

Appellant’s petition is time-barred, and the PCRA court properly denied 

it. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2015