FOR PUBLICATION

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

GEORGE PATRICK GREGORY F. ZOELLER

New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

KYLE HUNTER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

GEORGE PATRICK, )

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 33A04-1311-MI-577

)

KEITH BUTTS, Superintendent, STATE OF )

INDIANA and INDIANA PAROLE BOARD, )

)

Appellees-Respondents. )

APPEAL FROM THE HENRY CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane, Judge

Cause No. 33C02-1309-MI-94

June 18, 2014

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

George Patrick argues an order he participate in the Sex Offender Management and 

Monitoring (“SOMM”) program violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination1

and Indiana’s prohibition of ex post facto laws. He asserts the denial of his petition for writ 

of habeas corpus was therefore error. 

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Patrick was found guilty in 1991 of two counts of Class B felony rape and two counts 

of Class C felony criminal confinement and was sentenced to thirty-two years. He was 

released to parole in 2007. His parole was apparently revoked, and he filed a Petition for 

Writ of State Habeas Corpus Relief. He asserted his parole was revoked “due to his 

involuntary termination [sic] SOMM participation as a result of his special sex offender 

stipulations as a condition of his parole.” (App. at 3.) The trial court denied his petition.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The order that Patrick participate in the SOMM program does not violate the ex post 

facto clause of the Indiana Constitution. Generally, the ex post facto clause prohibits the 

State from enacting a law that imposes a punishment for an act that was not punishable when

it was committed or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed. Gomez v. State, 

907 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. But these prohibitions do not give a 

criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was 

 

1

 Our Supreme Court recently held participation in the SOMM program did not violate a defendant’s right 

against self-incrimination. Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907 (Ind. 2014). We therefore need not address that 

specific allegation of error. 
3

committed. Id. The clause is not designed to limit legislative control of remedies and modes 

of procedure that do not affect matters of substance. Id. Although it may work to the 

disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto. Id. A statutory 

revision is procedural in nature for purposes of the ex post facto doctrine, and may be applied 

to crimes committed before the effective date, if it does not change the elements of a crime or 

enlarge its punishment. Id.

Patrick argues participation in the SOMM program is similar to the requirement to 

register as a sex offender, which cannot be imposed on persons convicted before the 

requirement was passed into law. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 

2007), reh’g denied. Wallace does not control. 

The Parole Board is allowed to impose conditions that are “reasonably related to the 

parolee’s successful reintegration into the community,” Ind. Code § 11-13-3-4-(b), and that

subsection was in place when Patrick was convicted. Our Supreme Court has found that the 

SOMM program “is a valuable tool aimed at the legitimate purpose of rehabilitating sex 

offenders before they are fully released from State control.” Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 

907, 940 (Ind. 2014). As the Parole Board’s authority to impose conditions on parole is not 

limited by the date on which the program was created, but rather is limited by the program’s 

ability to help reintegrate the parolee into society, the order that Patrick participate in SOMM 

does not violate the ex post facto clause. 

We affirm.

KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.