United States District Court

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

ESTATE OF MELVIN NOBLE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

RAY GENE BOLLIN, JR. d/b/a 

ABSOLUT PRODUCTION RECORDING 

STUDIOS, and PURLIE GATES a/k/a 

“P.G.”,

Defendants. 

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Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-716

Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #126). 

Having considered the Motion, the relevant pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court finds that 

the Motion should be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2023, the Estate of Melvin Noble, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed its Original 

Complaint against Ray Gene Bollin, Jr. (Dkt. #1). In its Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory 

judgment and ancillary relief under the copyright laws of the United States (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 3). Plaintiff 

also brings federal claims for copyright infringement, violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright 

Act, and pendent state law claims for breach of contract, conversion, and unauthorized use of 

name, likeness, and voice under Texas Property Code § 26.013 (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 4). On October 12, 

2023—before Bollin answered Plaintiff’s Complaint—Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint,

adding claims for temporary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as a second defendant, Purlie 

Gates a/k/a P.G. (Dkt. #7). The Court will refer to Bollin and P.G., collectively, as Defendants.

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On November 7, 2023,1 Bollin filed his Original Counter[claim] against Plaintiff (Dkt. #27). 

Plaintiff moved to dismiss Bollin’s Counterclaim and, alternatively, requested a more definite 

statement under Rule 12(e) (Dkt. #32). On December 11, 2023, Defendants filed a Joint Answer 

and Counterclaims (Dkt. #36). Defendants raise nineteen defenses in their answer along with five 

counterclaims (Dkt. #36). In response to Defendants’ Joint Answer and Counterclaims, Plaintiff 

filed a second Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #38). On September 5, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s 

first Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #32) but granted Plaintiff’s Motion for a More Definite Statement

(Dkt. #108). Then, the Court ordered Defendants to amend their counterclaims by September 19, 

2024 (Dkt. #109). In doing so, the Court denied Plaintiff’s second Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #38)

as moot in light of its order permitting Defendants to amend their counterclaims (Dkt. #109). 

Defendants timely filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaims on September 19, 2024, 

asserting counterclaims for tortious interference of business relations, breach of contract, unjust 

enrichment, conversion, accounting under copyright laws, and copyright infringement (Dkt. #123).

On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Defendants’

Counterclaims (Dkt. #126). Plaintiff asks that the Court dismiss with prejudice the counterclaims 

asserted against Plaintiff because Defendants “do not sufficiently plead any . . . cause[] of action 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8” (Dkt. #126 at p. 2). On October 17, 2024, Defendants 

filed a Response (Dkt. #129). On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Reply (Dkt. #131).

1 The Clerk’s Office stamp on Bollin’s Original Counter[claim] suggests that it was filed on November 7, 2023 (Dkt. 

#27). The Court’s docket, however, suggests that it was filed on November 8, 2023 (Dkt. #27). Plaintiff and Bollin 

both contend that Bollin filed his counterclaim on November 8, 2023 (Dkt. #126 at p. 1; Dkt. #129 at p. 1). For purposes 

of this Motion, however, the specific date is irrelevant.

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LEGAL STANDARD

A party may seek dismissal in a pretrial motion based on any of the defenses set out in Rule 

12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); see also Albany Ins. Co. v. 

Almacenadora Somex, 5 F.3d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1993).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a pleading that asserts a claim for relief to 

include a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.

P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a) does not proscribe a different set of pleading requirements for a counterclaim

than those that apply to a complaint. See id. Instead, Rule 8(a) treats all “pleadings[s] that state[] 

a claim for relief” the same for purposes of determining the sufficiency of a pleading. Id. Thus, 

while most of the case law interpreting pleading sufficiency naturally focus on the complaint, the 

same rules apply to counterclaims. See id. Each claim must include enough factual allegations “to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the pleading

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the 

movant’s pleading and view those facts in the light most favorable to the movant. See Bowlby v. City 

of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the [pleading], any 

documents attached to the [pleading], and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that 

are central to the claim and referenced by the [pleading].” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays 

Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the pleading

states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

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[movant] pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the 

[nonmovant] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do 

not permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the [pleading] has 

alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 

(quoting FED. R.CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency 

of a pleading in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and disregard 

conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the pleading] to determine if they 

plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to 

raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or 

elements.’” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This 

evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a [pleading] must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ Id. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

ANALYSIS

After reviewing the relevant pleadings and the arguments contained in the briefing, the 

Court finds that Defendants have stated plausible counterclaims for relief for the purposes of 

defeating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

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CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #126) is hereby 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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