2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-27-2009

USA v. Allen Guy

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-1565

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Allen Guy" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 944.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/944
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-1565

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ALLEN GUY,

 Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-00102-1)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 17, 2009

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 27, 2009)

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Allen Guy seeks a reduction in his sentence, arguing that the District Court failed

to consider whether his age, medical condition, and cooperation with the government

warranted a sentence below the applicable guideline range under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
2

Because we conclude that the District Court adequately weighed these considerations, we

will affirm the order of the District Court.

Appellant Allen Guy pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute

five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(B)(iii),

and was sentenced to 212 months in prison – a term within his guidelines range of 188 to

235 months. On appeal, Guy maintains that his sentence was unreasonable, arguing that

the District Court did not properly consider the § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, Guy, who

was 52 years old at sentencing, contends that his age, medical condition, and cooperation

with the government warrant a sentence below his guidelines range. We initially observe

that Guy has the burden of demonstrating his sentence was unreasonable, and reiterate

that a sentence within the guidelines range is more likely to be reasonable than one

outside the guidelines range. See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331-32 (3d Cir.

2006). Although “[t]here are no magic words that a district judge must invoke when

sentencing,” the record must “demonstrate that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors

and any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties which have recognized legal

merit and factual support in the record.” Id. at 332.

Here, the District Court carefully considered factors supporting lenience: Guy’s

age, his “difficult economic circumstances,” his numerous medical afflictions, including

“hepatitis C, hypertension, . . . diabetes . . . [and] depression,” and his cooperation with

the government in the prosecution of a large drug ring. A. 56-57, 60-61. Nonetheless, the
 In the section of his brief entitled “Summary of Argument,” Guy urges that 1

“although not argued at sentencing, the disparity between the crack and cocaine powder

guidelines also justifies a variance.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. Even assuming, arguendo,

3

Court concluded that these considerations were overshadowed by § 3553(a) factors

favoring a lengthy prison term. A career offender, Guy had fifteen prior convictions,

eleven of which were for drug offenses and crimes of violence, including murder. A. 60. 

In the Court’s view, Guy’s substantial criminal history, coupled with his heroin addiction

and unlawful possession of a firearm, demonstrated a “strong likelihood of recidivism”

and evinced a fundamental lack of “respect for human life or the law.” A. 60-62. Guy’s

commission of his most recent offense while on parole also convinced the Court that

continued leniency would be ill-advised. A. 60-61. A lengthy sentence, the Court

concluded, was necessary to provide “just punishment and deter the defendant from

becoming reinvolved with drugs and violence.” A. 61-62.

Although Guy urged that his substantial cooperation with the government

warranted a reduced sentence, the Court reasonably concluded that Guy’s plea bargain,

which defense counsel lauded as “generous” and a “good charge bargain . . . in

consideration for his cooperation,” appropriately reflected his assistance. A. 53-54, 61. 

The Court astutely observed, “[H]ad the defendant pled to the indictment based upon the

drug amounts for which he is responsible he would have faced a mandatory minimum of

360 months to life.” A. 61. On this record, we readily conclude that Guy’s sentence of

212 months, imposed after careful evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors, was reasonable.1
that the argument is properly before us, the District Court’s failure to consider the crackcocaine disparity sua sponte was not error. See United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990,

995 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Berggren, 267 Fed. Appx. 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2008).

4

Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the order of the District Court.