Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-877 | November 27, 2019 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Wilmer E. Goering, II

Vevay, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

R.L.N.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

P.A.B., M.J.B., and C.L.B., Jr.,

Appellees-Petitioner.

November 27, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PO-877

Appeal from the Clark Circuit 

Court

The Honorable William Dawkins, 

Jr., Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

10C02-1901-PO-48

10C02-1901-PO-49

10C02-1901-PO-50

Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-877 | November 27, 2019 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary

[1] R.N. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct error after the trial 

court entered an order for protection against R.N. in favor of P.B., M.B., and 

C.B. (collectively, “Appellees”).1

 We reverse. 

Issues

[2] R.N. raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: 

I. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss or 

transfer the case on the grounds of improper venue. 

II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support an 

allegation of stalking.

Facts

[3] On January 23, 2019, Appellees, who are siblings, filed individual petitions for

orders for protection against R.N. and requested a hearing. The petitions 

alleged that the Appellees each were presently or had been victims of stalking 

by R.N. The petitions alleged that, in 2017, R.N. threatened to kill Appellees; 

in 2018, R.N. “place[d] a $1,000.00 death threat for [Appellees] to be killed;” 

and in 2019, R.N. threatened to kill Appellees and “admitted to killing” two 

other individuals. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 7, 56, 105.

1 For simplicity and ease of reading, we have removed the middle initials from the parties’ names. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-877 | November 27, 2019 Page 3 of 16

[4] The petitions were filed in the Clark Circuit Court. The form petition Appellees 

each filled out, includes the following section: 

5. This case is filed in this county because: 

_____ a. the Respondent lives in this county. 

______b. the incident(s) of domestic violence of family 

violence, stalking, or the sex offense happened in this 

county. 

______c. I live in this county. 

Id. at 6, 104. P.B.’s and M.B.’s petitions bear an “X” on each line preceding 

“a,” “b,” and “c.” Id. In the margins, next to this portion of the form, 

however, is also handwritten: “Jefferson County, IN.” Id. C.B.’s form is 

identical, except for portion “a,” which appears to have been marked, but 

subsequently crossed out. Id. at 55. C.B.’s petition also includes “Jefferson 

County, IN,” handwritten. Id. 

[5] On February 4, 2019, R.N. filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellees’ individual 

petitions for “lack of jurisdiction” because all parties resided in Jefferson 

County and because the alleged incidents also occurred in Jefferson County. Id. 

at 12, 61, 110. On February 6, 2019, R.N. also filed a motion to continue the 

hearing as to all petitions scheduled for February 7, 2019. 

[6] The trial court held a hearing on February 7, 2019; neither R.N. nor his 

attorney appeared. After Appellees were placed under oath, P.B. and M.B.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-877 | November 27, 2019 Page 4 of 16

represented to the trial court that R.N. was not related to Appellees but that 

they knew R.N. because R.N. was the guardian for Appellees’ now-deceased 

mother beginning in 2012. M.B. alleged that R.N. stalked Appellees and “even 

had people follow [Appellees] and run [Appellees] off the roads.” Tr. Vol. II p. 

6. When asked where they lived, M.B. testified that the Appellees are homeless 

and that their last physical address was in Madison, Indiana. When the trial 

court asked Appellees whether they were living in Clark County, M.B. stated: 

“Right now, we are, no, we’re not. We’re staying here, but today, in Jefferson 

County [ ], where [R.N. is an elected official, R.N.] has paid the police off up 

there.” Id. P.B. agreed with this statement. P.B. and M.B. elaborated that they 

attempted to file orders for protection in Jefferson County but “nothing 

happens” because the county believes Appellees are “making it up” because 

R.N. is “an upstanding citizen.” Id. 

[7] The trial court initially noted that the parties had no connection to Clark 

County, and the following colloquy occurred: 

THE COURT: But, if there’s no connection between the 

allegations you guys make and Clark County, if you’re not 

residents here, [R.N. is] not a resident here, and the acts you 

allege did not occur in Clark County, I . . . 

[M.B.]: The one did when he made us a threat that he was going 

to kill [P.B.], going to kill [C.B.], and then deadly torture and kill 

me for months because he thinks I, we killed our mother, and we 

did not. I even filed a police report.
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THE COURT: Well, talk to me about that. Where, so this was 

a, this is a conversation that happened in Clark County?

[M.B]: Yes, it is. [R.N.] called us via phone, on one of my cell 

phones, called us, and [R.N.] said “I told you what I wanted you 

to do,” speaking to [P.B.] and [P.B.] had the phone on speaker 

where we could all hear. [R.N.] said “you are to keep tabs of 

[M.B.], what [M.B.] did because I know [M.B.] killed [M.B.’s]

mother, and I know [M.B.] killed [M.B.’s] mother.” . . .

THE COURT: But what about the threats [ ] [R.N.] ma[d]e? . . . 

[M.B.]: [R.N.] threatened to kill us all. [R.N.] has even, when

[R.N.] drives by and sees us, [R.N.] even had the vehicle bugged 

with listening devices. How [R.N.] broke into it, I don’t know 

because I was never a criminal or a person to break into vehicle 

and stuff like that. We’re scared for our lives. We’re scared for 

our lives. I did, we did not kill [our mother]. I guess the only 

thing I’m guilty of is loving [our mother] the way the Holy Bible 

says you’re to love, God says you’re to love your parents and do 

good to them if somebody is doing something. . . .

Id. at 6-7. At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated: “Look, the 

allegations you make that he has threatened you on multiple occasions is [sic] 

enough for me. The counsel entered an appearance for [R.N.] and they have 

elected not to appear. So I’ll grant your orders.” Id. at 10. The trial court 

issued written orders for protection on February 7, 2019. 

[8] On February 28, 2019, R.N. filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s

February 7, 2019 order. The trial court denied R.N.’s motion to reconsider as 

to the orders for protection granted to all Appellees. 
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[9] On March 11, 2019, R.N. filed a motion to correct error with regard to the 

order for protection issued to P.B. against R.N. Specifically, R.N. argued the 

trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss and in denying R.N.’s 

motion for continuance. The trial court denied R.N.’s motion to correct error. 

On April 1, 2019, R.N. filed a motion to correct error with regard to the orders 

of protection issued to M.B. and C.B.2

 The trial court denied R.N.’s motion to 

correct error. R.N. now appeals. 

Analysis

[10] At the outset, we note that Appellees did not file an appellees’ brief. “When an 

appellee fails to submit a brief, we apply a less stringent standard of review with 

respect to the showing necessary to establish reversible error.” In re Paternity of 

S.C., 966 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 970 N.E.2d 248 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “In such cases, we may reverse if the 

appellant establishes prima facie error, which is an error at first sight, on first 

appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. “Moreover, we will not undertake the 

burden of developing legal arguments on the appellee’s behalf.” Id. 

2 It appears that R.N. filed the motions on March 8, 2019; however, the motion was not listed on the CCS 

until April 1, 2019. The trial court indicated that “[s]ince the moving party failed to comply with Trial Rule 

59(C), the Court was unaware that additional motions to correct error had been filed.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 

II pp. 99, 148. The trial court concluded “[n]onetheless, the motion to correct error is hereby denied.” Id. 
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I. Venue 

[11] R.N. appeals from the denial of a motion to correct error. “We generally 

review the denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.” Fox v. 

Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

[12] Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (“ICPOA”) is codified at Indiana Code 

Section 34-26-5. Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-4 states: 

(a) Any court of record has jurisdiction to issue a civil order for 

protection. 

(b) A petition for an order for protection must be filed in the 

county in which the: 

(1) Petitioner currently or temporarily resides; 

(2) Respondent resides; or

(3) Domestic or family violence or harassment occurred. 

(c) There is no minimum residency requirement to petition for an 

order for protection. 

[13] Each court of Indiana has jurisdiction to issue a civil order for protection; 

however, the question here is whether Clark County was the proper venue for 

this order for protection. See Muneer v. Muneer, 951 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011) (“Specifically, Indiana Code section 34-26-5-4(b) requires that a 

petition for an order for protection be filed in 1) the county in which the 

petitioner resides; 2) the county in which the respondent resides; or 3) the 
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county in which the domestic or family violence occurs. The Act therefore is a 

special venue statute to which Trial Rule 75(A)(8) applies.”) (emphasis 

supplied). 

[14] Indiana Trial Rule 75(A) states: 

Any case may be venued, commenced and decided in any court 

in any county, except, that upon the filing of a pleading or a 

motion to dismiss allowed by Rule 12(b)(3), the court, from 

allegations of the complaint or after hearing evidence thereon or 

considering affidavits or documentary evidence filed with the 

motion or in opposition to it, shall order the case transferred to a 

county or court selected by the party first properly filing such 

motion or pleading if the court determines that the county or 

court where the action was filed does not meet preferred venue 

requirements or is not authorized to decide the case and that the 

court or county selected has preferred venue and is authorized to 

decide the case. 

[15] Preferred venue, as set out in Indiana Trial Rules 75(A)(1) through (A)(10)

exists in many places, including: “. . . the place where any individual defendant 

so named resides;” or “the county where a claim in the plaintiff’s complaint 

may be commenced under any statute recognizing or creating a special or 

general remedy or proceeding.” Indiana Trial Rules 75(A)(1), (8). 

[16] R.N. improperly labeled the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; however, 

R.N. later acknowledged in the motion to correct error that he should have 

used the term “venue” instead of jurisdiction. See K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 

541 (Ind. 2006) (“Attorneys and judges alike frequently characterize a claim of 

procedural error as one of jurisdictional dimension. The fact that a trial court 
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may have erred along the course of adjudicating a dispute does not mean it 

lacked jurisdiction.”). 

[17] Neither R.N. nor his attorney appeared at the hearing on their motion to 

dismiss and on the petition for the order for protection to dispute Appellees’ 

account of their connection with Clark County. We acknowledge R.N.’s 

arguments that the chronological case summary (“CCS”) does not explicitly 

indicate the motion to dismiss was scheduled for hearing that particular day; 

however, at the beginning of the hearing, the trial court acknowledged the 

motion to dismiss was also set for hearing that day. The trial court granted the 

petitions for orders for protection which included a finding of venue as required 

by Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-4(c). R.N. and his counsel failed to appear for 

the hearing on the petition for the order for protection to contest the issue of 

venue.

3

 

[18] At the hearing, Appellees acknowledged that R.N. lived in Jefferson County 

and that several of the events occurred in Jefferson County. Appellees also 

stated that one of the incidents happened while Appellees were in Clark County 

and that Appellees were currently homeless and living in their vehicle. The 

Appellees did acknowledge that their last home address was in Madison, 

3 R.N.’s argument that it was error for the trial court to deny R.N.’s motion for continuance is without merit. 

R.N. was notified of the hearing and was given an opportunity to be heard; R.N. chose not to appear. Even 

if the court clerk’s office represented that a motion would be granted, it is the trial court, not the court clerk’s 

office, that grants or denies these motions. Accordingly, the burden was on R.N. to ensure that someone was 

at the hearing on R.N.’s behalf. 
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Indiana (Jefferson County); however, Appellees also stated that they were 

living in their vehicle, and the evidence is uncontroverted, pursuant to 

Appellees’ testimony, that they were “staying here” in Clark County. Tr. Vol. 

II p. 6. 

[19] The statute specifically sets forth no minimum residency requirement; therefore, 

Appellees, living in their vehicle in Clark County, cannot be precluded from

filing in Clark County when the evidence was uncontroverted. See Ind. Code § 

34-26-5-4(c). This is especially true in light of the purpose of the ICPOA, which 

states: 

This chapter shall be construed to promote the: 

(1) Protection and safety of all victims of domestic or 

family violence in a fair, prompt, and effective manner; 

(2) Protection and safety of all victims of harassment in a 

fair, prompt, and effective manner; and 

(3) Prevention of future domestic violence, family 

violence, and harassment. 

I.C. § 34-26-5-1. Accordingly, Appellees established Clark County as a proper 

venue under the ICPOA and Indiana Trial Rule 75(A). R.N., who sought the 

dismissal of the petition based on venue, failed to appear, and failed to establish 

that preferred venue existed elsewhere. See Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, 

Inc. v. Garcia, 876 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Indiana Trial Rule 

8(C) provides that a claim of improper venue is an affirmative defense, which 
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the pleading party must prove. Accordingly, the IHSAA had the burden of 

proof in challenging venue in Lake County”) trans. denied; see also Indiana Trial 

Rule 8(C) (indicating that improper venue is an affirmative defense, and thus, 

the “party required to affirmatively plead any matters, . . . shall have the burden 

of proving such matters.”). R.N. failed to meet his burden to prove Clark 

County was not a preferred venue pursuant to the ICPOA. We, therefore, 

cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying R.N.’s motion to 

correct error on these grounds. 4

 

II. Sufficient Evidence

[20] R.N. also argues there is insufficient evidence to support Appellees’ allegation 

of stalking. “To obtain an order of protection under the [ICPOA], the petition 

must establish by a preponderance of the evidence at least one of the allegations 

in the petition.” A.S. v. T.H., 920 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “In 

determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we neither weigh the 

evidence nor resolve questions of credibility.” Id. “We look only to the 

evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences that support the trial 

court’s judgment.” Id. 

4 We pause briefly to acknowledge that, although we find venue is appropriate here, Appellees stated at 

the hearing that they have filed orders for protection in Jefferson County and “nothing happens.” Tr. 

Vol. II p. 6. We remind Appellees that the proper course of action regarding a denied order for 

protection is to appeal, not to find another venue. Still, based on these facts, Clark County is a proper 

venue. 
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[21] Appellees sought an order for protection for stalking, which is defined as “a 

knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing 

harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel 

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the 

victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.” I.C. § 35-45-

10-1. The statutory definition of stalking requires Appellees to prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, a knowing or intentional “course of conduct 

involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person.” I.C. § 35-45-

10-1. 

A. Order for protection filed by P.B. and M.B.

[22] Both P.B. and M.B. gave the trial court information surrounding the allegations 

of stalking. According to P.B. and M.B., the undisputed evidence at the 

hearing was that R.N. has “had people follow [Appellees] and run [Appellees] 

off the road” and threatened to kill Appellees more than once; broken into and 

“bugged” the Appellees’ vehicle. Tr. Vol. II pp. 6, 7. P.B. and M.B. stated that 

R.N. was “still after” them and that the most recent contact happened just a few 

days before Appellees filed the petition. Id. at 7. P.B. and M.B. also testified

that R.N. has been after them since Appellees’ mother died, which was in 2013. 

Other than this evidence, P.B. and M.B. put forward no other specific 

information regarding the dates these allegations occurred.

[23] R.N. cites Maurer v. Cobb-Maurer, 994 N.E.2d 753, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), in 

support of his arguments. There, we found: 
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With respect to the extent of contact between [the parties], the 

trial court had before it a single email entered into evidence and a 

claim by [petitioner’s] counsel that it was “one of many.” Her 

counsel’s description of the emails as “constant” is noticeably

vague and is more akin to hyperbolic argument than to evidence. 

There was no mention of particular dates on which the contacts 

occurred, an estimation of the number of impermissible contacts 

over the course of a period of time, or even evidence of when the 

alleged impermissible contact began. “Many emails over the 

course of an undisclosed timeframe could be as few as two or as 

numerous as two million; the trial court’s guess would have been 

as good as ours. 

Maurer, 994 at 758-59 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

[24] Although Appellees’ petitions each allege that these events occurred in 2017, 

2018, and 2019; that R.N. has harassed them since 2013; and that the most 

recent incident occurred a few days before the petition was filed, we do not 

have any specific or temporal evidence. See C.V. v. C.R., 64 N.E.3d 850, 854 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (finding respondent’s contact with petitioner was 

“relatively insignificant” and insufficient to prove continued or repeated 

harassment where respondent left notes on petitioner’s car and a seven-month 

period elapsed between two of the notes). The evidence was devoid of any 

specific incident, time, place, and identification of persons affected. Both P.B. 

and M.B. made statements using “we”; however, they never disclose who “we” 

is. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 7-9. The evidence presented by P.B. and M.B. at the 

hearing was not sufficient to establish continued or repeated harassment 

because no evidence was presented regarding the specific time frame during 

which the purported stalking occurred or the dates of any of these alleged 
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incidents, save one. Accordingly, the evidence is insufficient to support an 

order for protection against P.B. and M.B.5

 

B. Order for protection filed by C.B.

[25] Similarly, C.B. offered no testimony at the hearing, except to confirm R.N. was 

not related to him. Accordingly, this cannot be sufficient evidence regarding 

R.N. stalking C.B. Moreover, “[t]here must also be evidence that 

[respondent’s] conduct qualified as harassment that would cause a reasonable 

person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that it 

actually caused [petitioner] to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or 

threatened.” Maurer, 994 N.E.2d at 757. Again, because C.B. did not offer any 

testimony, we cannot find sufficient evidence with regard to his state of mine

either. See id. at 759 (finding that the petitioner “offered no testimony at the 

hearing regarding the effect the contacts had on her. In fact, [petitioner] offered 

no testimony at all during the hearing. Where an inquiry is so dependent upon 

the victim’s perception and state of mind—as is the case when issuing a [order 

for protection] on the grounds of stalking—[petitioner’s] lack of participation 

works only to diminish the record and hinder our review”) (emphasis supplied). 

5 Because we conclude there was insufficient evidence regarding the stalking allegations by P.B. and M.B., 

we do not address whether there was sufficient evidence regarding P.B.’s and M.B.’s state of mind. We note, 

however, that P.B. stated: “All I want to do is get this man put away from us. I’m sick of looking over my 

head, over my shoulders,” and that M.B. stated: “We’re scared for our lives. We’re scared for our lives.” Id.

at 7, 10.
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[26] The evidence is insufficient to support an order for protection against R.N. for 

stalking. Accordingly, we reverse. 

Conclusion

[27] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying R.N.’s motion to correct 

error based on improper venue; however, the evidence of stalking was 

insufficient. We reverse. 

[28] Reversed. 

Altice, J., concur.

Brown, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-877 | November 27, 2019 Page 16 of 16

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

R.L.N.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

P.A.B., M.J.B., and C.L.B., Jr.,

Appellees-Petitioners.

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PO-877

Brown, Judge, dissenting.

[29] I respectfully dissent. I do not view multiple death threats from the guardian of 

a recently deceased relative as “relatively insignificant.” At the hearing, the 

court addressed and questioned P.B., M.B., and C.B. collectively about R.L.N. 

and the threats to “kill all three (3) of you.” Transcript at 10. Ultimately, I 

would find that the trial court could have reasonably inferred a pattern of

threatening behavior and affirm its issuance of the orders for protection.