NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 22-3121

____________

YANKEES ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS NETWORK, LLC,

Appellant

v.

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 1:22-cv-00622)

District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 6, 2023 ____________

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 27, 2023)
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OPINION*

____________

FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network (“YES”) sued Hartford Fire Insurance 

Company (“Hartford”) over a coverage dispute. The United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction because the 

lawsuit did not arise from any actions Hartford took in Delaware. We will affirm. 

I

We write primarily for the parties and recount only the facts most important to our 

decision. Briefly, YES is a New York regional sports television network that primarily 

serves New York, though its streaming viewership spans the United States. It was 

formed in Delaware as a limited liability company and has its headquarters and principal 

place of business in New York.

YES purchased an insurance policy for business interruption coverage from

Hartford, which operates principally out of Connecticut. The policy was not negotiated 

in Delaware and does not cover losses to any property in Delaware. 

During the COVID-19 pandemic, YES filed a claim under the policy and Hartford 

denied coverage. YES then sued in Delaware Superior Court, alleging breach of contract 

and seeking a declaratory judgment that Hartford had a duty to provide coverage. 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
3

Hartford removed the case to federal court and then moved to dismiss the operative 

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District Court granted the motion to 

dismiss, and YES timely appealed. 

II1

We review dismissals for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Pinker v. Roche Holdings 

Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). In doing so, we must accept as true all factual 

allegations in the complaint and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff. Id. We 

review a district court’s decision to deny jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. 

Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 2003).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be authorized by state 

law and “not violate the outer limits permissible under the [United States] Constitution.” 

Fischer v. Fed. Express Corp., 42 F.4th 366, 382 (3d Cir. 2022). Here, we look to 

Delaware law to determine whether the District Court may exercise jurisdiction over 

Hartford. Under Delaware law, YES has the burden of showing that jurisdiction is 

authorized under Delaware’s long-arm statute. AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Cirrus 

Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 438 (Del. 2005). YES fails to satisfy Delaware’s long-arm 

statute, so we need not reach whether it meets constitutional requirements.

YES argues that Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(6) of Delaware’s long-arm statute,

10 Del. C. § 3104, confer personal jurisdiction over Hartford. As we explain below, 

the Subsection (c)(1) argument fails, and YES forfeited its Subsection (c)(6) argument.

1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and we 

have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4

Subsection (c)(1) gives Delaware courts jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 

who “[t]ransacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State” 

and where the plaintiff’s cause of action “aris[es] from” that conduct. Del. Code Ann. tit. 

10, § 3104(c)(1). YES argues that Subsection (c)(1) reaches Hartford’s activities because 

it “entered into countless contractual relationships with Delaware entities.” Appellant’s

Br. at 25. But Hartford’s relationships with Delaware entities unrelated to this action are 

not the basis for YES’s claims, so they do not satisfy Subsection (c)(1). See LaNuova D 

& B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986) (“Where personal jurisdiction is 

asserted on a transactional basis [under Subsection (c)(1)], . . . a single transaction is 

sufficient if the claim has its origin in the asserted transaction.” (emphasis added)).

Hartford’s other contacts with Delaware are insufficient for similar reasons. 

Although Hartford secured a license to sell insurance policies in Delaware, it did not sell 

insurance to YES in Delaware. And although Hartford has been a party to prior court 

cases in Delaware, see Gould v. Gould, Civil Action No. 3332-VCP, 2011 WL 141168, at 

*8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2011) (filing a lawsuit in Delaware may constitute “transacting 

business” under Subsection (c)(1)), this lawsuit does not arise from that prior litigation. 

In sum, YES was not a party to any of Hartford’s prior court cases in Delaware, and YES 

has not demonstrated that the facts of those prior cases relate to this lawsuit. Mere 

factual or legal similarities between cases do not establish that YES’s lawsuit “arose

from” prior lawsuits between Hartford and other parties. See LaNuova, 513 A.2d at 768;

see also Uribe v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 115 A.3d 1216 (Table), 2015 WL 3536574, at *4 

(Del. 2015) (unpublished disposition) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal 
5

jurisdiction where the plaintiffs’ claim did not derive from the nonresident defendant’s

filing of “unrelated lawsuits” in Delaware). So Subsection (c)(1) cannot be the basis for

personal jurisdiction over Hartford.2

And YES did not rely on Subsection (c)(6) as basis for personal jurisdiction while 

this matter was in the District Court. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(6) (permitting 

courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who “[c]ontracts to insure . . . 

any person . . . located . . . within the State at the time the contract is made”). When 

Hartford moved to dismiss the complaint, it argued that Subsection (c)(6) could not serve 

as a basis for personal jurisdiction. YES acknowledged Hartford’s argument in its 

opposing brief but made no attempt to refute it. Instead, it stated that “10 Del. C. 

§ 3104(c)(6) is just another way, not the only way, for Delaware to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over an insurance company.” App. 307. And its entire argument about 

personal jurisdiction was based on Subsection (c)(1). App. 306–08; see also App. 339–

40 (Hartford’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss) (“YES effectively concedes 

that Section 3104(c)(6) of Delaware’s long-arm statute does not provide a basis to 

exercise jurisdiction over Hartford, as it offers no response to Hartford’s arguments with 

respect to that provision.”). Because YES did not present a Subsection (c)(6) argument to 

2 YES argues that the District Court conflated specific and general personal jurisdiction. 

We disagree. The District Court analyzed specific personal jurisdiction when it asked 

whether the claims in question “‘aris[e] from’ [Hartford’s] transaction of business.” 

Yankees Ent. & Sports Network, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 3d 203, 209

(D. Del. 2022) (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(1)); see also Provident Nat’l

Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436–37 (3d Cir. 1987) (defining 

specific jurisdiction).
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the District Court, it is forfeited on appeal. Premier Comp Sols., LLC v. UPMC, 970 F.3d 

316, 319 (3d Cir. 2020).

Finally, YES appeals from the District Court’s denial of its request to conduct 

jurisdictional discovery. But YES sought leave to conduct discovery about issues that 

have no bearing on whether its claims “aris[e] from” Hartford’s conduct in Delaware. 

Del. Code Ann., tit. 10, § 3104(c)(1). So the District Court’s decision was well within its 

discretion. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.