* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determ ined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4 . United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 14, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50475 Summary Calendar

LARRY EDDLIN KEELE, Peti tionerAppellant,

versus NATANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, RespondentAppellee.

----------------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:04-CV-1122

------------------------------------------------------------------ Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Larry Keele, Texas pri soner # 1077576, appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus peti tion, in which he challenged his jury-trial conviction on th ree counts of indecency wit h a child. The district court granted Keele a certificate of appealability (COA) onhis federal habeas claim that his jury charge was unconstituti onal i n t hat it permitted the jury to convict him upon less-than-unanimous agreement as to which conduct constituted the of fense. Keele h as not made such an express request to expand his COA to include the additiona l issues of ineffect ive assistance of trial and appellate counsels and arrest wit hout probable cause which he raises in his brief. Because this court’s review is limited to the issue specified in the grant of COA, these issues will not be considered. See Lackey v. Johnson , 116 F.3d 149, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1997). Where, as here, there has been no clear adjudication on the merit s of an issue raised in state court, federal habeas review is conducted de novo. S ee Miller v. Johnson , 200 F.3d 274, 281 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted). Habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is reserved fo r vindication of federal constitutional rights. See Martinez v. Johnson , 255 F.3d 229, 246 (5th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has not held that the Constitution impo ses a jury unanimit y requirement. See Hoover v. Johnson , 193 F.3d 366, 369 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Richardson v. United States , 526 U.S. 813, 821 (1999)). A tri al court is authorized to instruct a jury that it may find t hat the defendant com

mit ted an of

fense by one or mo re specified means, even if the of fense is charged in the conjunctive. S

ee Schad v. Arizona , 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991); Capps v. Collins , 900 F.2d 58, 60 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Use of the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive in the indict ment did not oblige the state to prove both.”). The same is true under Texas state law. S ee, e.g., Kitchens v. State , 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Cruz v. State , 742 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex. App. 1988). Based upon the fo regoi

ng authori

ty, Keele can

not demonstrate consti

tutional error with respect to his challenge to the disjunctive jury charge. S ee Martinez , 255 F.3d at 246. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.