2021 IL App (1st) 181309-U

No. 1-18-1309 

Order filed September 21, 2021. 

Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. 

) 

v. ) No. 17 CR 1205 

) 

CORNELL MCWILLIAMS, ) The Honorable

) Stanley L. Hill, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s factual findings comported with the counts for which defendant 

was convicted but the court lacked the authority to require defendant to register as a sex offender 

and the sentencing proceedings were influenced by unfavorable media coverage prior to 

sentencing. 

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Cornell McWilliams was found guilty of vehicular

invasion and burglary, for which he received concurrent 30-year sentences. He was acquitted of 
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several sex offenses. On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his convictions, the trial court lacked the authority to require him to register as a sex offender, 

and the media improperly influenced his sentencing proceedings. For the following reasons, we 

vacate the order requiring defendant to register as a sex offender, vacate his sentence and remand

for a new sentencing hearing. We otherwise affirm the court’s judgment. 

¶ 3 I. Background

¶ 4 A. Trial

¶ 5 On December 21, 2016, defendant, without invitation, entered victim K.A.’s car while 

she was inside it. The State proceeded to trial on two counts of vehicular invasion, two counts of 

burglary and six counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Specifically, the charges against 

defendant alternatively alleged that he entered the vehicle with the intent to commit (1) criminal 

sexual abuse or (2) aggravated battery. The charges also alleged that defendant touched K.A.’s 

breast or her “sex organ.” At trial, defendant asserted that he entered K.A.’s car with only the 

intent to commit theft and denied touching her inappropriately. 

¶ 6 The evidence at trial showed that shortly before defendant’s encounter with K.A. that 

December day, he encountered Angela Resto at Octapharma Plasma. Resto testified that she was 

taking defendant’s vitals when she noticed that a blood vessel in his eye had burst. When 

defendant was informed that he could not sell his plasma that day, he repeatedly demanded to be 

paid and refused to leave. Resto threatened to call the police, but defendant said he did not care. 

Ultimately, the police removed him from the premises. Defendant next encountered K.A.

¶ 7 K.A., then 26 years old, testified that she was putting gas in her white Mazda Miata at a 

gas station in the Village of Northlake when defendant approached her. She described him as a 

tall black man wearing sweatpants, a sweatshirt, a beanie and glasses. Defendant asked if she 
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“had a square,” which she understood to be a cigarette, and she told him she did not smoke. As 

K.A. stood by the open driver’s side door of her car, defendant told her she “looked good” and 

walked toward her. He asked for her phone number, but she said she had to leave. Despite being 

rebuffed, defendant continued to approach her and insisted that she give him her phone number. 

Once K.A. had sat down in her car, he reached his phone over the door for her to enter her 

number. She repeated that she needed to leave and closed her door.

¶ 8 When K.A. turned on the car, defendant opened her door and leaned in. He said, “Give 

me a kiss,” and attempted to kiss her. Most of his upper body was inside the car and she saw that 

he had a burst blood vessel in one eye. When defendant placed his left hand on her vagina, she 

tried to push him off of her, saying “Please stop. Leave me alone.” Defendant repeated, “Give 

me a kiss.” K.A. pushed defendant off of her but he grabbed her vagina a second time.

¶ 9 After managing to push him out of her car, she braced her body so that he could not get in

and she screamed for help. Despite her protests, defendant touched her breasts. She managed to 

honk her car horn with her elbow, but he attempted to pull her out of the car by her jacket, 

saying, “Get the F[uck] out of the car.” As she continued honking and screaming, she made eye 

contact with a civilian, who approached and spoke to defendant. Defendant told the civilian to go 

ahead and call the cops, as he did not care. When a second civilian arrived, defendant reversed 

course and tried pushing K.A. into her car. The second civilian yelled at defendant, who was 

telling K.A. to move over. Defendant briefly let go of K.A.’s jacket, allowing her to move the car 

forward, close the door and drive away.

¶ 10 K.A. spoke to the 911 dispatcher from the parking lot next door and returned to the gas 

station once the police arrived. She testified that during her brief conversation with the police at 

the gas station, she did not mention that defendant tried to kiss her. Rather, she first mentioned it 
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at the police station. The 911 call, in which K.A. said defendant had inappropriately touched her, 

was played in court, as was the gas station surveillance video. The testimony of Ken Bailey, the 

first civilian to assist K.A., corroborated several aspects of her account. 

¶ 11 Before the had police arrived at the scene, defendant went inside the gas station. Manager 

Alberto Sanchez testified that he saw defendant “disturbing [sic] inside the store.” Defendant, 

standing in front of the cash registers, pulled down his pants and showed his penis, which was 

not erect. In a “smooth voice,” he told Sanchez to touch his penis. When Sanchez asked 

defendant to leave, he repeated himself. At one point, defendant took a banana and ate it.

Defendant eventually left the building but continued to expose himself outside. 

¶ 12 Officer Kruschke testified that he did not recall whether K.A. alleged that defendant said 

“Give me a kiss” and the officer did not memorialize that allegation. The parties also stipulated 

that Detective Wajnicz would testify that when he and Assistant State’s Attorney Knight 

interviewed K.A., she provided the same information she had provided Detective Kruschke.

¶ 13 Defendant, then 31 years old, testified that prior to his incarceration, he lived with his 

mother and worked about three times a month for a temporary employment agency. On the day 

in question, he attempted to sell plasma for $40 but was turned away because he appeared to 

have an eye infection. Defendant acknowledged that he became aggressive. After the police 

removed him from that facility, he went to the gas station and purchased a cigar for 50 cents. He 

then saw K.A., who he found to be attractive, and asked her for a cigarette. Defendant also told 

her she looked good and asked for her phone number because he wanted to take her on a date. 

Defendant denied that he became aggressive when she declined.

¶ 14 Defendant testified that he had, however, seen a wallet in the console of K.A.’s car. He

opened her door and tried to grab the wallet, but she was pushing him off. He did not perceive 
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that she was scared, although he acknowledged she was screaming. Defendant denied grabbing

her breasts or vagina, trying to kiss her or saying, “Give me a kiss.” Furthermore, he denied 

trying to get her in or out of the car. While he and K.A. tussled, Bailey asked defendant what he 

was doing, which led to an argument. When Bailey threatened to call the police, defendant left 

K.A. alone. He denied saying he did not care if the police were called and did not recall a second 

civilian appearing at the scene. Defendant testified that K.A. fled before he could get her wallet. 

¶ 15 Defendant then went inside the gas station and took a banana. The employee behind the 

counter wanted him to leave due to the altercation outside. In addition, defendant was angry and 

disappointed that he did not get the wallet and angry regarding his dispute with the employee. He 

testified, “I had released my penis and just told [an employee] to suck my penis.” Defendant did 

not actually want the employee to do that, however. Defendant acknowledged that the 

surveillance video showed his penis was outside of his pants before he entered the gas station. 

While defendant denied that he was masturbating or stroking his penis, he acknowledged that the 

surveillance video showed his hand “clearly moving back and forth on the shaft of [his] penis.” 

¶ 16 The State presented certified copies of defendant’s 2008 conviction for the manufacture 

or delivery of cannabis (08 CR 01733(01)), his 2009 conviction for aggravated robbery (09 CR 

18864), his 2013 conviction for possession of a controlled substance (13 CR 15877(01)), and his 

2014 conviction for merchant retail theft (14 CR 15530). 

¶ 17 The trial court found that K.A. was “very credible,” but also accepted defendant’s 

testimony that his conduct was not sexually motivated. The court found that he entered or 

reached into K.A.’s car with the intent to steal and to commit aggravated battery, not to obtain

sexual gratification: 
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“I don't view [defendant’s] goal as being sexual gratification that day. I didn't see 

it. I didn't see that. Clearly she was correct when she says that he grabbed her breasts, his 

hand grabbed her vagina twice, but I view that as his attempt to try to get the wallet.”

The court emphasized that the case presented a question of intent:

“Was he there trying to get sexual gratification, or was he there trying to commit a 

robbery, again, trying to startle and confuse the complainant to the point of where he was 

able to get the wallet? I think his goal was to try to get the wallet.” 

Furthermore, the court found defendant’s gross, bizarre conduct in the gas station was intended 

to get the employees to back off. It was not masturbation.

¶ 18 The trial court found defendant guilty of the counts charging him with vehicular invasion

(count 2) and burglary (count 9) by entering K.A.’s vehicle with the intent to commit aggravated 

battery. The court acquitted him of the remaining offenses. Moreover, the court identified the 

touching of K.A.’s breasts and vagina as insulting or provoking conduct that would have led the 

court to find defendant guilty of aggravated battery had the State not nol-prossed that count.

¶ 19 B. Post-Trial Proceedings 

¶ 20 On July 20, 2017, CBS 2 ran a news story that questioned why defendant was not 

convicted of a sex offense. According to CBS 2, the trial court’s ruling angered K.A. and the

Village of Northlake Police Chief, who stated, “it’s disappointing because it’s important that 

convicted sex offenders publicly register their address.” The story noted that defendant had 79 

prior arrests and a Scrooge McDuck tattoo on his forehead. 

¶ 21 At a hearing four days later, apparently attended by CBS 2 reporters, the trial court 

tendered the presentence investigation (PSI) report to the parties. The State then filed K.A.’s 

victim impact statement and tendered case law that, according to the State, authorized the court 
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to require defendant to register as a sex offender, despite having acquitted him of the sex offense

charges. The case was continued.

¶ 22 The PSI report tendered that day stated that defendant was adjudicated delinquent six 

times, largely for the possession of cannabis. His 21 adult convictions included cannabis related 

offenses as well as drinking alcohol on the parkway, battery, aggravated robbery, gang loitering, 

criminal trespass to a vehicle, theft, criminal damage to property and possession of a stolen 

motor vehicle. In addition, defendant, a former Vice Lord, was shot in 2005. He began using 

marijuana at age 11, PCP at age 14 and ecstasy at age 19. Although he had not smoked marijuana 

since 2008, he used PCP and ecstasy two to four times per week. Defendant participated in 

substance abuse treatment while on juvenile probation and desired treatment again. According to 

defendant, he was arrested in the ninth grade and never returned to school. Before then, he was 

repeatedly suspended for fighting and other behavioral issues. He took GED classes in prison but 

was released before taking the exam. Defendant reported having a fair childhood, free of abuse, 

and claimed to be his diabetic mother’s caretaker. He spent all of his time with her and had no 

close friends. 

¶ 23 In her victim impact statement, K.A. stated that the courtroom proceedings “were almost 

as tragic as” what occurred during the offense. She stated, “Mr. McWilliams sexually attacked 

me that day. Plain and simple!” In addition, her car did not have a center console and she had not 

had a wallet that day, as her license and credit card were inside her pants pockets. “Until 

someone attacks you and grabs your sexual organs and plays it off as they were simply trying to 

‘rob’ you[,] [y]ou will never feel the pain I’m waking up with every single day.” K.A. stated that

defendant had stolen her pride in the judicial system, and that she hoped he would be “punished 

for the crime he committed, not just for the crime he was convicted of.” 
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¶ 24 At some point before sentencing, the court typed an extensive nine-page, single-spaced 

order that (1) denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, (2) imposed two concurrent maximum

30-year sentences, and (3) ordered defendant to register as a sex offender. 

¶ 25 Although the court had previously believed defendant’s testimony that he was not 

seeking sexual gratification on the day in question, the court’s sentencing order found only that

“the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt [that] defendant's touching was sexual 

touching.” (Emphasis added.) The court noted that K.A.’s statements to police did not 

corroborate her testimony that defendant said, “give me a kiss.” In determining whether a 

defendant was sexually motivated and required to register as a sex offender, however, a lower 

standard applied. Under this lower standard, the State had shown that defendant’s conduct was 

sexually motivated, through K.A.’s testimony and defendant’s own admission that he revealed 

his penis inside the gas station. The trial court had stated after trial that it “did not view 

[defendant’s conduct] as masturbation.” In contrast, the sentencing order found that defendant

“was observed masturbating.” The court speculated that while defendant lacked an erection, he 

may have had erectile disfunction. The court also speculated that defendant’s “sexual confidence 

and satisfaction is restored and he is erotically thrilled, empowered and stimulated by kinky

domination and commandeering of females by force and taking their valuables in a sadistic 

sexual rage. Who knows for sure?” 

¶ 26 With respect to sentencing, the order noted defendant’s education, his criminal history, 

his desire for drug treatment and the facts of the crime: this “was an unplanned irrational crime 

of opportunity.” According to the order, the case involved sex and emotion, but drug addiction 

and poverty were the primary motivating factors: 
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“He is a drug addicted, robbery and theft felon who unsuccessfully tried to snatch 

and grab valuables in an insulting and provoking manner from an innocent woman whom 

he terrorized. The post-traumatic consequences for [K.A.] were devastating. Defendant's 

conduct was reprehensible and appalling.”

In aggravation, the court found that defendant threatened serious harm, that he had a criminal 

history and that the sentence was necessary to deter others. The court found no mitigating 

factors. 

¶ 27 On September 7, 2017, with the written order in hand, the trial court commenced the 

hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial as well as sentencing.1 According to an 

uncontradicted representation later made by the public defender, those in attendance included 

CBS 2 reporters, a sketch artist and the Village of Northlake Police Chief. The trial court denied

defendant’s motion for a new trial and proceeded to sentencing. 

¶ 28 K.A. read her victim impact statement. The State then argued in aggravation that due to 

his criminal background, defendant was required to be sentenced as a Class X offender and

deserved the maximum 30-year sentence on each count. Despite having a strong family 

background, defendant had joined a gang, regularly used PCP and ecstasy, and had failed to 

follow through on drug treatment. He also relied on his mother for housing and financial support. 

Furthermore, “his testimony was rampant with lies, was clearly planned, and was motivated in 

efforts to separate himself from the counts that involved the sex offenses.” The State urged the 

court to find defendant’s actions were sexually motivated: 

“And, although your Honor found that the defendant's activities were not for the 

purpose of sexual gratification, that does not preclude you from the ability to do the right 

1

This hearing apparently lasted more than three hours, with the majority of the hearing devoted to 

the question of whether defendant could be required to register as a sex offender.
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thing now. The right thing for the victim, the right thing for the community in which we 

all serve, and the right and the just thing for the defendant, what he has earned. 30 years 

in the Illinois Department of Corrections. And upon his release that he register[] as a sex 

offender.” 

¶ 29 Defendant’s mother testified on his behalf that she had a physical disability and her son

helped her with “getting [it] together.” He cleaned on the weekends, prepared meals and helped 

her walk. She testified that after defendant was arrested, “I got well, and I started going to the 

doctor with transit and got on the bus.” Upon defendant’s release, he would return to live with 

her and help around the house. In elocution, defendant asked for drug treatment so he could be a 

productive member of society and a good son. He apologized and asked for mercy, stating that 

he had reflected on his stupidity and mistakes: “Instead of thinking before I react, my selfish

ambitions led me to destruction.” Finally, defense counsel argued that defendant grew up without 

a father and had not chosen to be poor. He was admittedly addicted to drugs and wanted 

treatment. Counsel sought the minimum six-year term and argued that the court lacked the 

authority to require defendant to register as a sex offender. 

¶ 30 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated:

“Now, I've got a written opinion, and I've got ten copies of it. So whoever wants a 

copy of it can get it and read it and find out why the Court did what it did so that you can 

have the specifics of what this Court did and understand what this Court did, and not 

speculate about what this Court did or is doing.” 

The court then read its written sentencing order into the record. 

¶ 31 On the same day, CBS 2 ran another story: “Judge Throws Book at Serial Offender After 

[CBS] 2 Investigator[’]s Report.” The report stated that in “[a] stunning about face,” the court 
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ordered defendant to register as a sex offender and imposed a “stiff” 30-year sentence after 

previously acquitting him of a sex crime. The acquittal “normally would have gotten 

McWilliams off the hook for registering as a sex offender,” making the court’s decision 

unprecedented. According to Irv Miller, CBS 2’s legal analyst, “the media scrutiny had an effect 

on everyone in the courtroom.” K.A.’s mother stated, “I’m glad that he did right today.” The 

report noted that defendant pleaded for mercy but received none.

¶ 32 Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider arguing that his sentence was excessive, that

the court erroneously ordered him to register as a sex offender, and that CBS 2’s first story about 

the case denied him a fair sentencing hearing. At the hearing on that motion, defense counsel 

argued that a 30-year sentence did not correspond to a defendant whom the court had previously 

characterized as “a common robber, a common thief and a nitwit, and who you originally found 

did not commit these crimes for the purpose of sexual gratification.” The court responded, “I 

said, beyond a reasonable doubt. That's what I said. I didn't find it beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

¶ 33 In response, the State was indignant that defense counsel implied the court submitted to 

media pressure. The State argued that the media was regularly present in courtrooms without 

influencing judges and that only one media outlet had been present in defendant’s case. The State 

also argued that the court was “well able to rise above the fray” and to “un-ring the bell, to unsee what's been seen, to not hear what has been heard.” Furthermore, defense counsel was merely 

confusing the different standards that applied at trial and at sentencing. According to the State, 

defendant was the “poster boy” for the maximum sentence.

¶ 34 The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider, responding to many of defendant’s 

arguments. The court did not, however, directly respond to defendant’s allegations that the media 

influenced his sentence. In addition, the court stated:
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“I am not going to reduce the sentence. I thought long and hard on that. I thought 

long and hard on it. I suspect that you are not going to find many judges, no offense to 

the judges in Cook County, but you are not going to find many that are going to do a ten 

page opinion prior to sentencing in a case. They may. I don't know. But I did because I 

respect the role that I have been put in and I take it seriously.”

¶ 35 II. Analysis

¶ 36 A. Intent

¶ 37 On appeal, defendant first asserts that we should vacate his convictions for vehicular 

invasion and burglary. Although the counts that defendant was convicted of alleged that he 

entered K.A.’s vehicle with the intent to commit aggravated battery, defendant contends the 

court did not find that he had that intent. He characterizes this as a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence.

¶ 38 When deciding whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt, reviewing courts must determine whether any rational trier of fact, 

when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the 

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wise, 2021 IL 

12392, ¶ 27. In making this determination, we defer to the trial court’s credibility findings and 

reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70.

¶ 39 “A person commits vehicular invasion when he or she knowingly, by force and without 

lawful justification, enters or reaches into the interior of a motor vehicle while the motor vehicle 

is occupied by another person or persons, with the intent to commit therein a theft or felony.”

(Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 5/18-6(a) (West 2016). Additionally, “[a] person commits burglary 

when without authority he or she knowingly enters *** a “motor vehicle *** with intent to 
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commit therein a felony or theft.” (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2016). Thus, the 

elements of these offenses require that defendant enter or reach into K.A.’s car with the specific 

intent to commit theft or any other felony. These offenses do not require, however, that a 

defendant enter with the specific intent to commit any particular felony. See People v. 

Alexander, 190 Ill. App. 3d 192, 196 (1989) (stating that a trial court’s finding of guilt for 

burglary “will be sustained if the evidence supports the finding that the defendant intended to 

commit any felony”); see also 720 ILCS 5/2-7 (West 2016) (defining “Felony” as an offense for 

which a defendant may be sentenced to one year or more in prison; cf. People v. Toolate, 101 Ill. 

2d 301, 308 (1984) (stating that where the predicate of rape was the only underlying felony 

charged and at issue, the defendant could not be convicted of burglary with intent to commit 

theft); see also People v. Payne, 194 Ill. App. 3d 238, 247 (1990) (recognizing that Toolate drew 

a distinction between burglary with the intent to commit theft and burglary with the intent to 

commit any other felony).

¶ 40 We question whether defendant has actually presented a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence. Indeed, defendant concedes that he entered K.A.’s vehicle with the intent to 

commit theft. Instead, defendant appears to be challenging a perceived variance between the 

indictment and the proof at trial. See People v. Oglesby, 2016 IL App (1st) 141477, ¶ 204 

(finding that where the defendant argued “the State's proof failed to establish the specific 

deception alleged in the indictment,” the defendant was essentially arguing that the State’s 

evidence fatally varied from the indictment’s allegations, not that the evidence was insufficient).

To that extent, defendant has forfeited his legal contention by failing to provide a developed 

argument supported by citation to relevant legal authority. Oglesby, 2016 IL App (1st) 141477,

¶¶ 204-05. 
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¶ 41 Regardless of how defendant’s contention is best characterized, it is based on a 

misunderstanding of the trial court’s findings. Following trial, the court expressly stated that it 

believed K.A.’s testimony that defendant touched her vagina and breasts. The court found , 

however, that defendant did not do so for the purpose of sexual gratification. Instead, the court 

found defendant committed vehicular invasion when he “reached into the interior of *** a 2016 

Mazda that was occupied [by] K.A. with the intent to commit therein a felony, to-wit aggravated 

battery.” (Emphasis added.) The court similarly found defendant committed burglary when he

“entered a motor vehicle, to-wit the property of K.A. *** with the intent to commit therein a 

felony, to-wit aggravated battery.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 42 While the trial court did not elaborate on why defendant intended to touch K.A. in an 

insulting or provoking manner if not for sexual gratification, the court’s reasoning is sufficiently 

clear:

“Was he there trying to get sexual gratification, or was he there trying to commit a 

robbery, again, trying to startle and confuse the complainant to the point of where he was 

able to get the wallet? I think his goal was to try to get the wallet.” (Emphasis added.) 

When read in their entirety, the court’s findings reflect a determination that defendant entered the 

vehicle with the intent to commit aggravated battery against K.A. as a means to distract her and 

obtain her wallet. An intent to commit aggravated battery and an intent to commit theft are not 

mutually exclusive. 

¶ 43 We are also not persuaded by defendant’s suggestion that the trial court found defendant 

formed the intent to commit aggravated battery only after he entered the car, particularly when 

considering the court’s comments as a whole. The court’s gratuitous finding that aggravated 
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battery actually did occur and that the court would have convicted defendant of that count had it 

not been nol-prossed does not change that assessment. 

¶ 44 Accordingly, the evidence supports a determination that defendant entered K.A.’s vehicle

with the intent to commit aggravated battery, satisfying the elements of vehicular invasion and 

burglary.

¶ 45 B. Sex Offender Registration 

¶ 46 Next, defendant asserts, and the State now correctly concedes, that the order requiring 

defendant to register as a sex offender must be vacated because defendant was not convicted of a 

qualifying offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 

2016)). Accordingly, we vacate the order requiring defendant to register.

¶ 47 C. Sentencing Impropriety

¶ 48 Finally, defendant asserts that the media impacted the court’s sentencing decision. He 

notes, among other things, that the court wrote its nine-page sentencing order before the 

sentencing hearing began and that this order made statements that were contrary to the court’s 

prior findings. 

¶ 49 A trial court is required to conduct a sentencing hearing at which the court must consider 

aggravating factors as well as evidence and information offered in mitigation. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-

1(a) (West 2016). The court must “hear arguments as to sentencing alternatives” and “afford the 

defendant the opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(5), (6) 

(West 2016). Yet, evidentiary standards are relaxed. People v. Rose, 384 Ill. App. 3d 937, 940 

(2008). The court may even consider criminal conduct that does not result in prosecution or 

conviction. People v. Harris, 375 Ill.App.3d 398, 409 (2007). Still, sentences must be based on 

the court’s “independent assessment” of sentencing factors. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(b) (West 2016).
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¶ 50 A defendant also has the constitutional right to an open-minded, unbiased trier of fact. 

People v. Jones, 2017 IL App 143403, ¶ 32. Conversely, a sentencing hearing affected by 

judicial bias is fundamentally unfair, even if the sentence falls within statutory limits. People v. 

Rademacher, 2016 IL App (3d) 130881, ¶ 47. A defendant's right to a fair trial is also violated 

when the trier of fact prejudges the case (see People v. Hardin, 2012 IL App (1st) 100682, ¶ 14) 

or makes its determination based on information outside the record (People v. Pellegrini, 2019 

IL App (3d)170827, ¶ 64). “While all judges come to the courtroom influenced, either 

consciously or unconsciously, by the experiences, associations, and prejudices developed over a 

lifetime, they are expected to make an effort to put those predilections aside and make 

determinations based only upon the evidence presented.” People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 266 

(1997). “If it is shown that the convicted has been prejudiced by the procedure adopted, or 

material considered by the trial court in conducting its inquiry prior to the imposition of 

punishment, the resultant penalty will not be allowed to stand.” People v. Crews, 38 Ill. 2d 331, 

338 (1967).

¶ 51 The trial court is presumed to be impartial, however. People v. Romero, 2018 IL App 

(1st) 143132, ¶ 96. The party claiming prejudice has the burden of overcoming this presumption.

People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (3d) 160350, ¶ 34; People v. Cunningham, 2012 IL App (3d) 

100013, ¶ 14. To do so, a defendant must show something more than an unfavorable result. 

Rademacher, 2016 IL App (3d) 130881, ¶ 47. That may be animosity, hostility, ill will or 

distrust. Id. Furthermore, the presumption that the court considered only appropriate evidence is 

rebutted “when it affirmatively appears that the trial court was misled or improperly influenced 

as would be indicated by a judgment or sentence contrary to the law or the evidence.” (Emphasis 

added.) People v. Collins, 21 Ill. App. 3d 800, 805-06 (1974). Moreover, Prejudice is ordinarily 
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proven by circumstances, not direct positive evidence. See People v. Robinson, 18 Ill. App. 3d 

804, 807 (1974). We review this issue de novo (Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96),

considering alleged bias or prejudice in the context of the trial judge’s specific reaction to the 

events occurring (People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 426 (2007)). 

¶ 52 At trial, the court believed defendant’s testimony that his goal was to obtain K.A.’s 

wallet, albeit with the assistance of some aggravated battery, and categorically rejected the 

notion that defendant was seeking sexual gratification. The propriety of the latter determination 

is not before us. See People v. Hull, 2020 IL App (3d) 190544, ¶ 7 (stating that the prohibition 

against double jeopardy protects a defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense 

after acquittal). Yet, this sentencing issue requires us to acknowledge that the court did not 

merely find that the State failed to prove defendant’s goal was sexual beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

¶ 53 CBS 2’s subsequent coverage then criticized the decision to acquit defendant of any sex 

offense and the record strongly suggests that the court was aware of that before sentencing. 

Specifically, CBS 2’s report said that it left the trial judge messages, albeit messages that were 

not returned, and CBS 2 reporters had apparently attended proceedings in this case. The court’s 

later comment about eliminating the need for individuals to speculate regarding the court’s 

reasoning also show that the court was aware of the unfavorable coverage. We would be remiss 

not to consider that before the sentencing hearing, the court had also been given K.A.’s victim 

impact statement, which similarly expressed her displeasure that the court acquitted defendant of 

a sex offense. She stated that defendant stole her “pride in the American Judicial System” and 

that “[u]ntil someone attacks you and grabs your sexual organs *** [y]ou will never feel the pain 
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I’m waking up with every single day.” She asked that defendant be punished for the crime he 

committed but was acquitted of. 

¶ 54 At some point before the sentencing hearing, the trial court took the admittedly unusual 

step of typing a lengthy, detailed sentencing order, an act which also suggested that the court was 

aware of the CBS 2 coverage. Additionally, this order went beyond tentative musings. Cf. People 

v. Gallo, 54 Ill. 2d 343, 355 (1973) (finding no error in arriving at tentative factual conclusions 

prior to closing argument). The order found that while the State had not proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt that defendant’s conduct was sexually motivated, the evidence was strong 

enough to find defendant’s conduct was sexually motivated for the purpose of sentencing and sex 

offender registration. Although courts can and do draw such distinctions, the court’s prior 

categorical findings were inconsistent with drawing such a distinction in this case. Additionally, 

the sentencing order stated that there were no factors in mitigation even though defendant had 

not yet been given the opportunity to present or argue factors in mitigation, as the sentencing 

hearing had not occurred at that point. While the court did not issue the order prior to the 

hearing, it left no indication that the court’s mind was still open. 

¶ 55 The sentencing hearing that subsequently ensued was lengthy, but it was largely 

dedicated to the matter of sex offender registration, not defendant’s sentence. Additionally, the 

court’s comments regarding defendant’s conduct struck a tone decidedly less favorable to 

defendant. At the hearing’s conclusion, the court stated:

“Now, I've got a written opinion, and I've got ten copies of it. So whoever wants a 

copy of it can get it and read it and find out why the Court did what it did so that you can 

have the specifics of what this Court did and understand what this Court did, and not 

speculate about what this Court did or is doing.”
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As stated, these statements were clearly a response to CBS 2’s prior report. We further note that 

when the court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider, the court responded to several of 

defendant’s contentions but did not specifically deny or otherwise respond to, the allegation that 

the media had influenced the court’s sentencing decision. Cf. Gallo, 54 Ill. 2d at 354-55 (stating 

that while a newspaper article’s comment could potentially impair a defendant’s constitutional 

right to a fair trial, the trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial where the judge 

acknowledged reading the article and stated he was not intimidated by it); People v. Little, 2018 

IL App (1st) 151954, ¶¶ 1-2, 99 (finding no due process violation where the trial court 

prematurely made a finding of guilty before the defendant had the opportunity to make a closing 

argument but then acknowledged its inadvertent error, reopened the case and promised to keep 

an open mind); see also People v. Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d 832, 838-39 (1976) (finding it 

improper for the trial judge to consult with members of the public to determine whether 

probation or conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of the offense, which denied 

the defendant the opportunity to challenge bias behind the opinions).

¶ 56 The State correctly argues, as it did below, that courts routinely maintain impartiality 

despite media presence or commentary. Yet, considering the record as a whole, defendant has 

shown that the trial court, whether consciously or unconsciously, was influenced by CBS 2’s

coverage. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing 

before a different judge. See People v. Wardell, 230 Ill.App.3d 1093, 1102 (1992) (stating that 

the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing where the trial court relied on an improper 

factor or made comments indicating it did not consider the requisite statutory factors); see also 

People v. Hooper, 133 Ill. 2d 469, 513 (1989) (stating that “[a] judge, of course, should be 

disqualified from hearing a case where he has prejudged it in favor of one of the parties”). In 
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light of our determination, we need not address defendant’s contention that his 30-year sentence

was excessive. The full statutory sentencing range will be available to the trial court on remand. 

¶ 57 III. Conclusion

¶ 58 Here, the trial court’s findings and evidence supported defendant’s convictions for 

vehicular invasion and burglary. We vacate the order requiring defendant to register as a sex 

offender, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand for resentencing before a different judge.

¶ 59 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.