J-S01036-20

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

QUINZELL REDDICK,

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

No. 2195 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 8, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009191-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 06, 2020

Quinzell Reddick (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the order

entered on February 8, 2019, which dismissed his petition filed under the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with, inter alia, first-degree murder for the 

shooting death of Correal Combs (the decedent), as well as attempted 

murder in connection with shooting Erica Rosa, both of which occurred on 

January 12, 2011.

1 On December 11, 2012, a jury was selected to hear this 

____________________________________________

1 According to the Commonwealth, the decedent was driving a car, Rosa was 

in the passenger seat, and Appellant was seated in the rear. “Moments 

before the shooting, the decedent stopped the car and both men stepped 

outside the car in order to have a drug related conversation. It was then 

that [Appellant] pulled out a gun and shot [the decedent] multiple times, 

and then raised his gun and shot [] Rosa and she pled for mercy.” 

Commonwealth’s Motion to Obtain DNA Samples for Comparison Purposes, 

9/13/2012, at ¶ 4; see also, N.T., 12/12/2012, at 68-69.
J-S01036-20

- 2 -

case. The next day, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea and 

pleaded guilty to third-degree murder, attempted murder, carrying a firearm

without a license, and possession of an instrument of crime. In exchange, 

the Commonwealth agreed to drop the first-degree murder charge and 

recommend a sentence of 25 to 50 years of incarceration. The trial court 

conducted a thorough colloquy of Appellant and accepted the plea. 

Appellant then asked for sentencing to be deferred for family reasons related 

to issues with being in county custody. N.T., 12/12/2012, at 75. The trial 

court agreed to this request, and explained to Appellant that his chances of 

withdrawing the plea at the time of sentencing were extremely limited. Id. 

at 76. The trial court heard two victim impact statements and informed 

Appellant that she was accepting the Commonwealth’s recommendation of a 

25-to-50-year sentence. Id. at 89.

Sentencing was scheduled for February 7, 2013. The parties 

appeared, and counsel for Appellant told the trial court that Appellant was 

requesting to withdraw his guilty plea and go forward with trial. Appellant 

explained to the trial court that he was coerced by counsel into pleading 

guilty. N.T., 2/7/2013, at 9. He requested that the trial court allow him “to 

maintain [his] innocence.” Id. at 10. The trial court denied the motion and 

sentenced Appellant to 25 to 50 years of incarceration. Id. at 28-29. 

Appellant, through newly-appointed counsel, timely filed a notice of 

appeal to this Court. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea by “disregarding [his] claim 
J-S01036-20

- 3 -

of innocence.” Commonwealth v. Reddick, 106 A.3d 155 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (unpublished memorandum at 2). This Court concluded that 

Appellant waived this issue by failing to raise it specifically in his Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. Id. at 3. Thus, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal. Id., appeal denied, 106 A.3d 679 (Pa. 2015).

Appellant pro se timely filed a PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed, 

and an amended petition was filed raising claims of 1) ineffective assistance 

of direct appeal counsel for failing to preserve the issue on appeal, and 2) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a written motion to 

withdraw the guilty plea prior to sentencing and clearly articulate Appellant’s 

actual innocence claim.

The PCRA court heard argument on this petition on September 29, 

2017, to consider whether 1) to reinstate Appellant’s right to direct appeal 

nunc pro tunc due to direct appeal counsel’s ineffectiveness, or 2) to 

consider the trial-counsel-ineffectiveness claims pursuant to the PCRA. See 

generally N.T., 9/29/2017. The PCRA court ordered the parties to brief the 

issues and held a hearing on May 14, 2018. At that hearing, the 

Commonwealth conceded that Appellant was entitled to the reinstatement of 

his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. N.T., 5/14/2018, at 7. However, it 

was PCRA counsel’s position that because Appellant would not prevail on 

direct appeal, Appellant should waive his right to a direct appeal in favor of 

pursuing the trial-counsel-ineffectiveness claims at the PCRA court. Id. at 8. 
J-S01036-20

- 4 -

Appellant elected to proceed with the PCRA claims instead of pursuing a 

direct appeal. Id. at 10. Appellant was informed that even if he were not to 

prevail on his PCRA claims, he could not then revive his direct appeal claims. 

Id. at 9. 

On December 14, 2018, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to 

dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907. Appellant did not respond, and on February 8, 2019, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.2,3

On appeal, Appellant sets forth three questions for our review. See

Appellant’s Brief at 5.4 We begin with Appellant’s claim that the PCRA court 

erred in denying relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file 

a requested “formal motion to withdraw the plea ... because [Appellant] was 

____________________________________________

2 On April 4, 2019, Appellant, through counsel, filed a PCRA petition 

asserting that counsel had neglected to file timely a notice of appeal from 

the February 8, 2019 order. Counsel, recognizing the petition was a second, 

untimely PCRA petition, asserted the newly-discovered fact of his own failure 

to file the appeal and his abandonment of Appellant as an exception to the 

timeliness requirements. The PCRA court granted that petition, and this 

appeal followed. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 

2007).

3 The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court 

relies on its February 8, 2019 opinion, filed along with its Rule 907 notice, in 

compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

4 We note that despite asking for two extensions of time, the Commonwealth 

did not file a brief on appeal in this case by the time this case was submitted 

to this panel for its consideration on January 6, 2020. On February 4, 2020, 

the Commonwealth requested that this Court consider its brief filed the 

same day. We deny that request as moot.
J-S01036-20

- 5 -

innocent.” Id. at 20. According to Appellant, he informed trial counsel well 

in advance of formal sentencing that Appellant wished to withdraw the plea, 

yet trial counsel never filed a motion and waited until sentencing to raise the 

issue. Id. at 20-21. Then, according to Appellant, at sentencing, trial 

counsel did not adequately advocate the reasons for withdrawal, particularly 

Appellant’s claim of actual innocence. Id. at 21. Appellant contends he was 

prejudiced because of trial counsel’s inadequate performance.

“Our standard of review for issues arising from the denial of PCRA 

relief is well-settled. We must determine whether the PCRA court’s ruling is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2018).

In order for Appellant to prevail on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, he must show, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place. Appellant must demonstrate: 

(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel 

had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or 

inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, 

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. The petitioner bears the 

burden of proving all three prongs of the test.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 394, 397-98 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(internal citations omitted).

First, we dispose of Appellant’s claim that a formal, written motion 

would have yielded a different result. This Court has specifically held that 

where trial counsel has failed to file a written motion to withdraw a guilty 
J-S01036-20

- 6 -

plea, yet the defendant had the opportunity to present the issue to the trial 

court prior to sentencing, the defendant cannot claim prejudice. See 

Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1159 (holding Johnson was not prejudiced where trial 

counsel did not file a formal, written motion, but Johnson had the 

opportunity to seek withdrawal prior to being sentenced).

We now turn to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel presented 

Appellant’s motion to withdraw ineffectively, and in particular with regard to 

Appellant’s claim of innocence. In doing so, we set forth the standard by 

which the trial court was to consider such a motion in this case. 

[T]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; trial courts 

have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal request will 

be granted; such discretion is to be administered liberally in 

favor of the accused; and any demonstration by a defendant of a 

fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless 

withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the 

Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Pa. 2015).

Prior to Carrasquillo, our courts have held that a claim of innocence 

generally is a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea prior to 

sentencing.5 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (Pa. 

____________________________________________

5 “The pre-sentence standard starkly contrasts with the one applicable to a 

defendant’s post-sentence motion to withdraw. Post-sentence motions for 

withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny since courts strive to discourage 

entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices.” Commonwealth v. 

Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 39 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017). To withdraw a guilty plea 

after sentencing, “[a] defendant must demonstrate that manifest injustice 

would result” from the denial of the motion. Id. However, our Supreme 

Court has held that even where a defendant enters into a negotiated guilty 

plea, and therefore knows the sentence that will be imposed, the trial court 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S01036-20

- 7 -

1973). In Carrasquillo, our Supreme Court modified that approach, 

holding that “a defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible to 

demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence 

withdrawal of a plea.” 115 A.3d at 1292; see also Commonwealth v. 

Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 121 (Pa. 2019) (“[T]he Carrasquillo Court clearly 

established that trial courts have the discretion to assess the plausibility of 

claims of innocence. Consistent with the well-established standards 

governing trial court discretion, it is important that appellate courts honor 

trial courts’ discretion in these matters, as trial courts are in the unique 

position to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and measure, under 

the circumstances, whether defendants have made sincere and colorable 

claims that permitting withdrawal of their pleas would promote fairness and 

justice.”).

At sentencing, Appellant himself explained to the trial court why he 

wished to withdraw his guilty plea.

Today I move, I would like to move forward withdrawing 

my guilty plea on the record made on December [12], 2012. I 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

must still utilize the pre-sentence standard when considering a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea so long as the request is made prior to formal 

sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 2015).

In this case, it is worth pointing out that sentencing would have 

occurred the same day Appellant entered into the negotiated guilty plea but 

for Appellant’s request to delay sentencing for family reasons. Thus, 

although we must utilize the liberal pre-sentence standard for withdrawal, 

this case arguably presents a situation more akin to a post-sentence motion 

to withdraw. 
J-S01036-20

- 8 -

wish to withdraw my guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty to 

all charges as charged.

I entered a plea of guilt made with a [sic] unassured 

and/or uncertain heart and confused mind. I believe my 

decision was not knowing, intelligent and/or a voluntary act on 

my behalf on December [12], 2012. Moments before I signed 

for a plea of guilt, I was informed by my attorney Gary Silver, 

quote, you will be committing an act of suicide going in there, 

referring to taking the case to trial.

My decision was a cowardly and vital decision made under 

a coerced and confused mind. Please note, I was under the 

impression that the maximum term would be twenty-five years 

and not fifty. My attorney Gary Silver stated that the most you 

would have to serve would be twenty-three years, which gave 

me an indication that the negotiated plea was twelve and a half 

to twenty-five years.

I ask the Court to allow me to undo my plea under distress 

and false intentions and allow me to have a fair trial with a jury 

of my peers. I plead with the Court to allow me to maintain my 

innocence and not allow me to make a tactical decision under 

blatant coercion by counsel.

N.T., 2/7/2013, at 8-10.

Based on Appellant’s statements and the facts of this case, it is not at 

all clear how trial counsel could have offered a plausible assertion of 

Appellant’s innocence. Appellant himself did not state that he did not 

commit the crime, he merely stated that he believed he was misled by the 

terms of the plea and wished to “maintain [his] innocence” and “allow [him] 

to have a fair trial with a jury of [his] peers.” Id. at 10. Furthermore, while 

Appellant’s brief to this Court states that trial counsel should have asserted 

Appellant’s innocence, see Appellant’s Brief at 21, Appellant does not set 

forth any basis as to how trial counsel should have done that. Based on the 
J-S01036-20

- 9 -

foregoing, we conclude that Appellant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s 

failure to assert Appellant’s actual innocence because any assertion would 

not have risen to the level of plausibility required to satisfy a fair and just 

reason for withdrawal of the plea. Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA 

court that Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

Appellant also contends that direct appeal counsel was ineffective: 1) 

for “omitting from Appellant’s concise statement the ground of actual 

innocence;” and 2) and for “omitting from the direct appeal brief to the 

Superior Court [] Appellant’s other fair and just reasons for seeking to 

withdraw his plea.” Appellant’s Brief at 5.

With respect to these claims, the proper relief to grant Appellant 

should direct appeal counsel be found ineffective would be the right to file a 

new direct appeal. As discussed supra, the Commonwealth agreed to 

reinstatement of Appellant’s right to file a direct appeal; however, Appellant 

elected to proceed instead with his claims regarding trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. The PCRA court ensured that Appellant understood this 

procedure. Accordingly, we conclude Appellant has waived these first two 

claims by electing not to proceed with his direct appeal in the first place. 

Moreover, even if Appellant did not waive these claims, he is not 

entitled to relief. As discussed supra, the trial court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Appellant’s claim of 

innocence was not and could not be plausible. Accordingly, direct appeal 

counsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. See 
J-S01036-20

- 10 -

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 869 A.2d 1191, 1211 (Pa. 2006) (finding that 

“counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless 

claim”).

Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court did not err by dismissing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition due to Appellant’s failure to meet his burden in 

demonstrating trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, we affirm the 

order of the PCRA court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/6/20