J-A07034-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

REBECCA QUINN HALL, AS 

ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

ROBERT ERIC HALL DECEASED

v.

HUSQVARNA PROFESSIONAL 

PRODUCTS, N.A., INC., HUSQVARNA 

PROFESSIONAL PRODUCTS, INC., 

HUSQVARNA AB, HUSQVARNA 

GROUP, HUSQVARNA AND MADLE'S 

HARDWARE, INC. AND MADLE'S 

HARDWARE

APPEAL OF: HUSQVARNA 

PROFESSIONAL PRODUCTS, INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1026 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered May 14, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 201001099

REBECCA QUINN HALL, AS 

ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

ROBERT ERIC HALL

v.

HUSQVARNA PROFESSIONAL 

PRODUCTS, N.A., INC., HUSQVARNA 

PROFESSIONAL PRODUCTS, INC., 

HUSQVARNA AB, HUSQVARNA 

GROUP, HUSQVARNA, MADLE'S 

HARDWARE, INC., AND MADLE'S 

HARDWARE

APPEAL OF: MADLE'S HARDWARE, 

INC., AND MADLE'S HARDWARE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1162 EDA 2021
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Appeal from the Order Entered May 14, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 201001099

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JUNE 24, 2022

Appellants, Husqvarna Professional Products, N.A., Inc., Husqvarna 

Professional Products, Inc., Husqvarna AB, Husqvarna Group, Husqvarna 

(collectively, “HPP”)1 and Madle’s Hardware, Inc. and Madle’s Hardware 

(collectively, “Madle’s Hardware”), appeal from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which overruled their preliminary 

objections to venue in Philadelphia County.2 We affirm. 

In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows. 

On or about October 20, 2018, Decedent was operating a 

lawn tractor at his property in Coopersburg, PA, Lehigh 

County, when “the tractor unexpectedly rolled and caused 

Decedent to fall off the tractor onto his right foot and leg 

and then onto the ground.” Decedent sustained a rupture 

of his right patellar tendon which required surgical repair on 

October 29, 2018. On November 25th, 2018, Decedent died 

from a pulmonary embolism, alleged to have resulted from 

the injuries he suffered to his right knee on October 20, 

____________________________________________

1 The parties stipulated to the dismissal of some of the HPP defendants prior 

to this appeal.

2 This appeal is properly before us pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(b)(2) (stating 

appeal may be taken as of right from order in civil action or proceeding 

sustaining venue of matter or jurisdiction over person or over real or personal 

property if court states in order that substantial issue of venue or jurisdiction 

is presented). 
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2018. As a result, on October 15, 2020, [Appellee Rebecca 

Quinn Hall, as administratrix of the estate of Decedent 

Robert Eric Hall,] filed the instant action by way of a civil 

complaint.

[Appellee’s] complaint names multiple defendants, all of 

whom fall into two distinct categories: [HPP] and [Madle’s 

Hardware]. [Madle’s Hardware is] located in Coopersburg, 

PA, Lehigh County. It is not averred that [Madle’s 

Hardware] regularly conduct[s] business in Philadelphia 

County. Therefore, whether venue is proper in Philadelphia 

County is reliant on a finding that [HPP] regularly conduct[s] 

business in Philadelphia.[3]

[HPP] in the instant matter [is] the same [group of] 

defendants as [those] in [Hangey v. Husqvarna 

Professional Products, Inc., 247 A.3d 1136 (Pa.Super. 

2021) (en banc)]. Identical to the Plaintiff in Hangey, 

[Appellee] alleges in the instant matter [that HPP] regularly 

conduct[s] business in Philadelphia, whereas the other 

named Defendants have no relation to Philadelphia County. 

HPP is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of 

business in Charlotte, North Carolina. HPP primarily sells 

lawn and garden equipment, including riding lawn tractors. 

... HPP is not registered to do business in Philadelphia 

County. HPP also does not rent, own or utilize any 

warehouses or other facilities in Philadelphia County. HPP 

does not have any addresses or telephone numbers in 

Philadelphia County. HPP does not own or rent any real 

property in Philadelphia County. HPP does not have any 

officers or employees residing in or based out of Philadelphia 

County.

On November 9, 2020 and November 11, 2020, [HPP] and 

[Madle’s Hardware], respectively, filed preliminary 

objections claiming venue is improper in Philadelphia 

County. On November 30, 2020, [Appellee] filed answers 

to both [Appellants’] preliminary objections. On December 

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.C.P. 1006(c)(1) (stating “an action to enforce a joint or joint and 

several liability against two or more defendants...may be brought against all 

defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against any one of 

the defendants...”).
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8, 2020, this [c]ourt issued a rule to show cause allowing all 

parties until January 26, 2021 to take discovery and file 

supplemental briefs on the issue of improper venue. On 

December 22, 2020, [HPP] filed both a motion for 

reconsideration and motion to stay proceedings, asking this 

[c]ourt to not rule on the instant preliminary objections until 

the Superior Court’s en banc panel issued an opinion in ... 

[Hangey]. On January 11, 2021, this [c]ourt denied said 

motions, however, on January 14, 2021, this [c]ourt 

granted a request for an extension of time to file 

supplemental briefs until February 15, 2021. On February 

15, 2021, all parties submitted to this [c]ourt supplemental 

briefs on the issue of improper venue.

On March 8, 2021, the Superior Court filed its en banc

opinion in Hangey[.] ...[T]he en banc panel in the Superior 

court overturned the Philadelphia Trial Court opinion that 

[HPP] did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia 

County. On March 10, 2021, [Appellee] filed a second 

supplemental brief as a result of the decision in Hangey. 

On March 11, 2021, [HPP] also filed a second supplemental 

brief addressing Hangey, in which [HPP] stated [its] 

intention to petition for allowance of appeal to the PA 

Supreme Court [in that case]. On March 16, 2021, [Madle’s 

Hardware] filed a second supplemental brief adopting the 

position of [HPP’s] second supplemental brief. On April 7, 

2021, [HPP] filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the 

PA Supreme Court [in Hangey] under the docket number 

147 EAL 2021.

On May 14, 2021, this [c]ourt entered an Order overruling 

[Appellants’] preliminary objections [based on the Hangey

decision]. ...

On May 18, 2021, [HPP] filed an Appeal to the Superior 

Court. On June 9, 2021, Madle’s Hardware...filed an Appeal 

to the Superior Court. On June 15, 2021, this [c]ourt 

entered an Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) ordering 

[Appellants] to file a statement of matters complained of on 

appeal. On July 6, 2021 and July 7, 2021, Madle’s 

Hardware...and [HPP], respectively, filed a statement of 

matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). On August 31, 2021, the Superior Court granted 

an order for consolidation of the...appeals. 
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(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/24/21, at 1-4) (internal citations to record and 

footnotes omitted). On May 10, 2022, the Supreme Court granted allowance 

of appeal in Hangey. Thereafter, Appellants filed an application to stay in 

this Court pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Hangey. We denied 

Appellants’ application on May 18, 2022.

Appellants raise one issue for our review:

Did the trial court misapply the law and rule unreasonably—

thereby abusing its discretion—by eschewing the required 

case-by-case application of the quality-quantity test for 

venue and instead categorically applying this Court’s holding 

in Hangey v. Husqvarna Prof. Prods. to determine that 

[HPP] regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County 

under Rule 2179(a)(2)? 

(Appellants’ Brief at 3).

Appellants argue the trial court improperly concluded that HPP regularly 

conducts business in Philadelphia County. Appellants assert that the trial court 

was not bound by this Court’s en banc decision in Hangey and it should have 

conducted an analysis based on the facts of this case. Appellants insist the 

record evidence in this case materially differs from the record evidence in 

Hangey. Appellants emphasize that HPP’s business contacts in Philadelphia 

are de minimis such that the quantity prong of the venue test is not satisfied. 

Appellants submit that HPP’s sales in Philadelphia during 2019 should drive 

the analysis because it shows a “snapshot of the case” at the time it was 

initiated. Thus, Appellants contend that HPP’s sales in Philadelphia between 

2014-2020 are not relevant. Appellants also claim Appellee’s “estimation” of 
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HPP’s sales in Philadelphia between 2014-2020 is speculative. 

In any event, Appellants maintain that HPP’s sales in Philadelphia ranged 

from 0.003% to 0.017% of its national sales between 2014-2020, which is an 

average of only 0.009%. During 2019, Appellants insist HPP’s sales in 

Philadelphia were approximately 0.003% of its national sales. Appellants 

contend the dollar amount of business conducted in Philadelphia in 2019 is 

materially less than that at issue in Hangey. In sum, Appellants maintain 

HPP’s business activities in Philadelphia are not continuous and sufficient. 

Aside from HPP’s de minimis sales in Philadelphia, Appellants claim HPP 

lacked the other sorts of qualifying business contacts that, when coupled with 

the company’s local sales, could possibly support a finding that the company 

was regularly conducting business in the chosen forum. For example, 

Appellants stress that HPP is not registered to do business in Philadelphia, 

does not own, rent, or utilize any facilities in Philadelphia, does not have any 

addresses or telephone numbers in Philadelphia, does not have any officers or 

employees residing or based in Philadelphia, and has not entered into any 

contracts with the local government. Appellants submit that any alleged

online advertising HPP conducts to “target” Philadelphia County is irrelevant

to the trial court’s analysis because advertising does not satisfy the quality 

prong of the test. Likewise, Appellants posit that the existence of product 

warranties or product registrations tied to Philadelphia residents does not 
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satisfy the quality prong of the test, where such warranties “are collateral and 

incidental” to HPP’s corporate purpose to sell lawn and garden equipment. 

Further, Appellants insist that the allegedly voluminous sales of HPP 

products to consumers at Lowe’s stores in Philadelphia County are of no 

moment because those are Lowe’s sales—not HPP’s sales. Appellants explain 

that HPP generates its revenue by selling the products in question to Lowe’s 

outside of Philadelphia; if and when Lowe’s later sells the products to 

consumers at one of its Philadelphia stores would evince Lowe’s doing 

business in Philadelphia, not HPP. Appellants conclude the court abused its 

discretion in overruling their preliminary objections to venue, and this Court 

must reverse and remand for transfer of venue to Lehigh County. We 

disagree.

This Court has explained:

The trial court is accorded considerable discretion in 

determining whether or not to grant a petition for change of 

venue, and the standard of review is one of abuse of 

discretion. The plaintiff’s choice of forum is given great 

weight. Thus, the party seeking a change of venue bears 

the burden of proving that a change of venue is necessary, 

while a plaintiff generally is given the choice of forum so 

long as the requirements of personal and subject matter 

jurisdiction are satisfied. 

In determining whether a corporation or partnership 

regularly conducts business in a county, we employ a 

quality-quantity analysis. ... A business entity must perform 

acts in a county of sufficient quality and quantity before 

venue in that county will be established. Quality of acts will 

be found if an entity performs acts in a county that directly 

further or are essential to the entity’s business objective; 

incidental acts in the county are not sufficient to meet the 
J-A07034-22

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quality aspect of the test. Acts that aid a main purpose are 

collateral and incidental while those necessary to an entity’s 

existence are direct. [Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, 525 

Pa. 237, 579 A.2d 1282 (1990)] (incidental acts include 

advertising, solicitation of business from a county, 

education programs for personnel in county, hiring of 

personnel from the county, and purchase of supplies from 

county); see also Krosnowski v. Ward, 836 A.2d 143, 

147 (Pa.Super.2003) (en banc) (business referrals to and 

from an independently operated business entity in another 

county do not establish venue in that county as referrals 

were in aid of main business purpose and not actual conduct 

of business in that county). Quantity of acts means those 

that are sufficiently continuous so as to be considered 

habitual. Each case must be based upon its own individual 

facts.

Zampana-Barry v. Donaghue, 921 A.2d 500, 503-04 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 596 Pa. 709, 940 A.2d 366 (2007) (some internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). See also Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a)(2) (stating venue is 

proper against corporation or similar entity in county where it “regularly 

conducts business”). “Further, the venue rules exclusively address where 

venue properly may be laid at the time the suit is initiated. Thus, question of 

improper venue is answered by taking a snapshot of the case at the time it is 

initiated; if it is ‘proper’ at that time, it remains ‘proper’ throughout the 

litigation.” Hausmann v. Bernd, 271 A.3d 486, 493 (Pa.Super. 2022) 

(internal citation omitted). 

“Pennsylvania appellate courts have often considered the percentage of 

overall business a defendant company conducts in a county to determine if 

the quantity prong was met.” Hangey, supra at 1141. 

[C]ourts often consider whether the percentage of a 
J-A07034-22

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defendant’s business is sufficient to constitute “habitual”

contact. However, no court has stated that the percentage 

of a defendant’s business is the sole evidence relevant to 

the “quantity” analysis. Rather, courts must determine 

whether all the evidence presented, including the scope of 

the defendant’s business, viewed in the context of the facts 

of the case, establish that a defendant’s contacts with the 

venue satisfy the quantity prong. 

Where this Court concluded that conducting a small 

percentage of a business in a venue did not satisfy the 

quantity prong, the Court’s core finding was that the 

contacts failed the quality prong of the venue test and the 

cases often addressed defendants who were small and/or 

local companies, not multi-billion-dollar corporations. ... 

* * *

The percentage of a company’s overall business that it 

conducts in a given county, standing alone, is not 

meaningful and is not determinative of the “quantity” prong. 

Each case turns on its own facts, and we must evaluate 

evidence of the extent of a defendant’s business against the 

nature of the business at issue. A small or local business 

may do all of its work in just a few counties or even a single 

one, while a large business may span the entire nation. 

Indeed, the percentage of sales a multi-billion-dollar 

company makes in a particular county will almost always be 

a tiny percentage of its total sales. Courts thus should not 

consider percentages in isolation. Rather, courts must 

consider all of the evidence in context to determine whether 

the defendant’s business activities in the county were 

regular, continuous, and habitual.

Id. at 1141-42 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). See also 

Dibble v. Page Transportation, Inc., No. 565 EDA 2021, 2021 WL 5408725

(Pa.Super. filed Nov. 19, 2021) (unpublished memorandum at *6)4 (stating: 

____________________________________________

4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this 

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value).
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“[I]n analyzing the quantity prong of the test, the number of contacts with 

Philadelphia County is to be considered from the perspective of the county 

rather than solely from that of the business. While a percentage of sales in a 

county may be miniscule viz-a-viz the company’s overall sales, they may 

nonetheless amount to systematic, continuous and habitual, and therefore 

‘regular,’ business in the county”). 

In Hangey, the Hangeys filed a complaint in Philadelphia County in 

March 2017 against HPP and Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc., after Mr. 

Hangey was maimed when he fell off his lawnmower and the lawnmower ran 

over his legs while the blades were still engaged. The accident occurred in 

Wayne County. The defendants filed preliminary objections alleging improper 

venue. Discovery related to the issue of venue revealed, inter alia, that in 

2016, HPP had approximately $1.4 billion in sales revenue in the United 

States, of which $75,310.00 came from direct sales in Philadelphia County. 

Of the $75,000 in sales made in Philadelphia in 2016, roughly $69,700 came 

from a single Husqvarna authorized dealer, DL Electronics, Inc. Approximately 

0.005% of HPP’s 2016 United States sales revenue resulted from direct sales 

in Philadelphia County. 

Sales data from 2014 and 2015 was substantially similar, with 

approximately 0.005% of annual United States sale revenue resulting from 

direct sales within Philadelphia County. These figures did not include the 

revenue generated by selling products at retailers such as Home Depot, 
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Lowe’s, or Sears. In the case of “big box” retailers, John Stanfield, the 

corporate representative for HPP, testified that HPP delivers its products to 

the retailers’ distribution centers, none of which are located in Philadelphia 

County. The retailers then retain sole discretion as to where the products are 

offered for sale, including stores located in Philadelphia County. See id. at 

1139. Following oral argument, the trial court sustained the preliminary 

objections and transferred venue to Bucks County. The Hangeys appealed. 

This Court, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court’s decision.5 In doing

so, this Court held:

Here, HPP is a multi-billion-dollar corporation. It had at 

least one authorized dealer located in Philadelphia to which 

it delivered products for sale. Although HPP’s sales through 

authorized dealers in Philadelphia constituted only 0.005% 

of HPP’s national sales, the dollar figure of those 

Philadelphia sales in 2016 was $75,310. The number and 

dollar figure of sales in Philadelphia, and the fact that 

HPP has an authorized dealer in Philadelphia to sell 

its products, is relevant to the determination of 

whether HPP’s contacts with Philadelphia satisfied 

the “quantity” prong of the venue analysis. Therefore, 

we conclude the trial court erred in relying almost 

exclusively on evidence of the percentage of defendant’s 

business that occurred in Philadelphia when addressing the 

quantity prong.

Further, based on the totality of the evidence, HPP’s 

contacts satisfied the quantity prong of the venue test. Its 

contacts with Philadelphia—including having an authorized 

dealer in Philadelphia, and selling $75,310 worth of products 

through that dealer in 2016 in Philadelphia—were 

“sufficiently continuous so as to be considered habitual.” 

See Zampana-Barry, 921 A.2d at 504.

____________________________________________

5 Judge Stabile wrote a dissent, which this author joined.
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In reaching this conclusion, we do not find it necessary to 

approve or disapprove of any of our prior decisions. Rather, 

our conclusion is based on the prior precedents of the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court and consistent with those of 

our Court. However, as discussed above, we clarify that the 

percentage of sales of a corporation in a venue is but one 

factor to consider when determining whether the quantity 

prong of the venue analysis is satisfied, and such evidence 

must be viewed within the context of the business at issue 

in each case.

Hangey, supra at 1142-43 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 

This Court noted that venue was proper in Philadelphia without reference to 

sales from Lowe’s or similar stores. Id. at 1142 n.2. This Court further stated

that there was no challenge to the trial court’s finding that the quality prong 

of the venue test was met. Id. at 1143. Accordingly, this Court reversed the 

order sustaining the preliminary objections to venue. 

Instantly, the trial judge in this case is the same trial judge who presided 

in Hangey. The court offered the following rationale for overruling Appellants’ 

preliminary objections:

It was this [c]ourt’s decision in Hangey, due to the facts 

Plaintiff provided on the record, that [HPP] did not regularly 

conduct business in Philadelphia County. This [c]ourt 

decided the evidence produced by the Hangey Plaintiffs, 

expressly noting $75,310 worth of sales amounting to 

.005% of [HPP’s] total revenue in 2016, was not enough to 

overcome the jurisdictional challenge of [HPP]. Ultimately, 

on March 8, 2021, an en banc panel of the Superior Court 

held that Plaintiff had not met their burden and it was an 

abuse of this [c]ourt’s discretion to decide [HPP] did not 

regularly conduct business in Philadelphia County. While 

this [c]ourt still believes it did not abuse its discretion in 

rendering its opinion, it respects and remains deferential to 

the opinion of the Superior Court.
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In the instant matter, [Appellee relies] on identical 

arguments and elements of proof. As such, since the instant 

matter involves the exact same question about [HPP] 

addressed by the Superior Court in Hangey, whether [HPP] 

regularly conduct[s] business in Philadelphia County, this 

[c]ourt is bound by that decision.

7 This [c]ourt recognizes [Appellee has] a less 

complete picture of the applicable sales numbers in 

the relevant years in the instant matter than the 

Plaintiffs in Hangey, as [Appellee] did not provide this 

[c]ourt with sales figures for the year 2018 (the year 

of the accident) or the year 2020 (the year the instant 

matter was initiated). [Appellee] did, however, 

provide this [c]ourt with the following figures: In 

2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively, the percentage 

of Philadelphia based sales was .017%, .003% and 

.010%. ... 

(Trial Court Opinion at 7-8).

The record supports the trial court’s analysis. Here, John Stanfield, the 

Assistant Secretary for the parent company of HPP provided deposition 

testimony on February 8, 2021. Mr. Stanfield confirmed that HPP has four 

authorized independent dealers in Philadelphia. Those dealers are not the 

same as “big box” retailers located in Philadelphia such as Home Depot and 

Lowe’s. Additionally, HPP confirmed its percentage of sales in Philadelphia 

from 2014-2020 as follows: 2014: 0.005%, 2015: 0.005%, 2016: 0.005%, 

2017: 0.015%, 2018: 0.017%, 2019: 0.003%, and 2020: 0.010%. HPP did 

not provide the dollar amount of sales for 2018 (the year of the accident) or 

2020 (the year Appellee filed the complaint). Instead, HPP disclosed only the 
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dollar amount of sales for 2019.6 

Although Appellants contend 2019 is the relevant year to analyze, 

Appellee initiated the instant lawsuit in late 2020. Thus, 2020 is the more 

appropriate year for a “snapshot” of the case.7 See Hausmann, supra. Even

without the specific dollar amount of sales for 2020, the record makes clear 

the quantity prong of the venue test was satisfied. As in Hangey, the record 

in this case demonstrates that HPP had at least one authorized dealer located 

in Philadelphia (specifically, four). At the time the complaint was filed in 2020, 

HPP’s percentage of sales in Philadelphia was 0.010% of its total national 

sales. The fact that this percentage might be small is not determinative on 

its own. See Hangey, supra. See also Dibble, supra. In light of the law 

as set forth in this Court’s decision in Hangey,

8 we agree with the trial court 

that the record in this case similarly demonstrated that HPP’s contacts in 

____________________________________________

6 The parties stipulated to a confidentiality order concerning the dollar amount 

of HPP’s sales. As we write for the benefit of the parties, and in light of their 

stipulation, we will not reveal the dollar amount of sales in this memorandum.

7

In Hangey, this Court analyzed HPP’s sales in 2016, where the action was 

initiated in March 2017. Because the complaint in Hangey was filed in early 

2017, the 2016 sales were more appropriate to analyze in that case. 

8 Although our Supreme Court has granted allowance of appeal in Hangey, 

unless and until our Supreme Court rules otherwise, this Court’s en banc 

decision in Hangey remains binding precedent. See Commonwealth v. 

Martin, 205 A.3d 1247 (Pa.Super. 2019) (stating this Court is bound by 

existing precedent and continues to follow controlling precedent unless it is 

overturned by our Supreme Court).
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Philadelphia satisfy the quantity prong of the venue analysis.9 Accordingly, 

we affirm the order overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections to venue.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/24/2022

____________________________________________

9 Any challenge to the quality prong of the venue test is waived where neither 

Madle’s Hardware nor HPP’s Rule 1925(b) statement articulated a specific

challenge under the quality prong of the test. See Lineberger v. Wyeth, 

894 A.2d 141 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating general rule that vague Rule 1925(b) 

statement can render issues waived on appeal; when court has to guess what

issues appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review). 

Although Appellants mentioned the “quality-quantity” test in their respective 

concise statements, Appellants failed to specify a complaint concerning the 

quality prong of the test, instead, focusing their claims of error on the 

quantity prong of the test. 

Moreover, HPP is in the business of distributing consumer outdoor products.

HPP furthers this business objective by having independent authorized dealers 

in Philadelphia. HPP derives revenue directly from sales of its products in 

Philadelphia. Thus, HPP performs acts in Philadelphia that directly further or 

are essential to its business objective, such that the quality prong of the venue 

test is satisfied. See Zampana-Barry, supra.