## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Fischetti v. V

illage of Schaum burg , 2012 IL App (1st) 111008

Appellate Court Caption GI NA FI SCHETTI
, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VI L L AGE OF SCHAUMBURG, De fenda nt-Appellee

.

District & N o. First District, F ifth Division Docke t No. 1-11-1008

Filed Marc h 23, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action challeng ing a village ’s use of automated ca mera s to prosec ute the violation of red lights, the t ri al court proper ly enter ed
summary judgme nt for defe ndant village on the g rounds that the I llinois
sta tutes authorizing such came ras provided for the administrative adjudication of violations and that civil penalties did not trig g er plaintiff’s rig ht to a jury

trial.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 09-CH-12523; the Hon. Caroly

n Quinn, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Br ianne M. Connell and J ames P. Newma n, both of J ames P. Newma n & Associates, L L C, of St. C harle s, for a ppellant.

J ack M. Siege l and Andre w Fiske, both of Holland & Knig ht L L P, of Chicag o, for a

ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE McBRI DE delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices J . Gordon a

nd Howse c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion

OP INION

¶ 1 In 2009, defe ndant Villag e of Schaum b u rg, I l l i n o i s, used automated came ras at the intersec tion of

Meac ham and Woodfield Roads to photog raph car s that ran red light traff ic signa ls. Schaumburg ’s traf fic c ode provide d that a car’s owner wa s liable for the violation of a r ed lig ht r eg ardle ss of who wa s driving, unle ss the car was pre viously

repor ted stolen. Plaintiff G ina Fische tti, a resident of St. Charle s, I llinois
, was fined $100 as the owner of a

car that ran a red light. She complained to the circ uit court that Schaumburg adjudicate d the alleg ed violation throug h an a d mi n is tr a ti v e h ear ing proce ss even though the municipality had

no statutory authority to utiliz e that method an d h ad d isreg arde d her statutory and constitutional rig hts to a trial by jury

. The circ u i t co u rt g rante d summary judgme nt to Schaumburg on g rounds that I llinois laws which authorized automated red light came ras also expressly provided for violations to be administratively adjudicate d and that civil penalties did not trig g er constitutional a nd statutory rig hts to a jury of one’s peer s. Fische tti appe als. ¶ 2 This action beg an in the circ uit court of Cook County when F ischetti filed a two- count complaint seeking decla

ratory judgme nt and administrative revie w. Attache d to her pleading

was a “Red L ight Violation Notice” issued by S ch au m b u rg on J anuar y 26, 2009, which included two photogr aphs of her vehicle taken on J anuar y 19, 2 0 0 9
, at 2:01:50 p.m. as it
proce eded throug h a snowy inters ec t i on 42.2 seconds after the signa l light had chang ed to red and one close-up photogr aph of the vehicle’ s license plate. The notice to Fische tti cited title 7, chapte r 78, of Schaumburg ’s municipal code and stated this “photog raphic rec ord *** constitutes prima facie evidenc e of a violation,” “all individuals appea ring on the vehicle’ s license plate reg istration are leg ally responsible for this violation,” and “YOU MUST EI THER PAY THE APPL I CABL E [$100] FI NE OR CONTEST THI S CI VI L VI OLATI ON NOTI CE [by Fe bruar

y 16, 2009].” The notice informed Fische tti that she had the option of contesting by mail or at an “in-pe rson hear ing.” On Fe bruar y 8, 2009, she contested in a letter which stated “yo u d o n o t h av e jurisdiction to issue me a citation for disobeying a traff ic control signa l.” A hear in g o fficer took this into consideration and on Fe bruar y 26, 2009, issued a “Notice of Finding s[,] Dec ision a nd Orde r” indicating lack of jurisdiction wa s not

one of the rec og nized defe nses to the violation and that Fische tti was liable for disobey ance

-2-of the tra ffic c ontrol signa l. Fische tti paid the $100 fine.

¶ 3 In count I of the complaint Fi s chetti filed on Marc h 19, 2009, she soug ht four judicial decla rations. First, a decla

ration th at S chaumburg did not have jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate her traff i c v iolation due to section 1-2.1-2 of the I llinois Municipal Code, which provide s that a municipality may administratively

adjudicate local code vio l at i o n s “except for *** any offe nse under the I llinois Vehicle Code or a simil ar offe nse that is a traff

ic regulation g overning the movement of vehicles.” 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2006); 625 I L CS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2006). She also sough t a d ec laration that section 103-6 of the I llinois Code of C ri m inal Procedur e of 1963 and “the constitution” entitled her to a

trial by jury reg ardingthe alleg ed civil violation. 725 I L CS 5/ 103-6 (West 2006). Then, without any further alleg ations, she asked the court to decla re t h at the administrative proce ss “ violate[d] due proce ss” and that the judgme nt of liability was void ab initio . Fische ttti s ty led count I I as a r equest for administrative re view and a lleg ed that a lack of jurisdiction entitled her to a $100 judg ment. ¶ 4 After Fische tti and Schaumburg filed and briefe d cross-motions for summary judgme nt, Fische tti filed an amende d complaint which added class alleg ations to her orig inal pleading

. The circ uit court hear d oral arguments, g rante d Schaumb u rg’ s motion for summary judgme nt, and then struck Fische tti’s c ross-motion a s moot. As we summarized a bove, the
court rea soned that state laws expressly provide for automated red l i gh t t i ck ets to be administratively adjudicate d and that civil penalties do n o t t ri g g er any rig ht to a jury

. Fische tti’s motion for rec onsideration was unsucce ssful. She now seeks a differ ent outcome on appea l. ¶ 5 The interpre tation of a statute a

nd the entry

of summary

judgme nt are questions of law that we revie w de novo without any defe renc e to the trial co u rt ’s interpre tation. Founders Insurance Co. v. American Country Insurance Co.
, 366 I ll. App. 3d 64, 69, 851 N.E.2d 120, 125 (2006). Summary judgme nt is proper ly g rante d when t h e p l ea d ings, aff idavits, depo s i t i o n transcr ipts and exhibi ts on file, viewed in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party , show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving pa

rty is entitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law. Founders Insurance , 366 I ll. App. 3d at 69, 851 N.E.2d at 125; Catom Trucki n g , In c. v. C i t

y of Chicago
, 2011 I L App (1st) 101146, ¶ 9, 952 N.E.2d 170, 173. ¶ 6 We are not persua ded by Fische t t i’s primary argument on appea l. Fische tti has simply disreg arde d pertinent statutes whe n she argues there is no authority for Schaumburgto use

an administrative proce ss in conjunction with its automated red light came ras. S h e h as

acc urate ly quoted section 1-2.1-2 of the I l l i n o i s M unicipal Code, which authorizes administrative adjudication of loca l code violations “except for *** offe nse[s] under the I llinois Vehicle Code or a simil ar offe nse that is a traff ic regulation g overning the movement of vehicles.” 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2006). See Catom Trucking
, 2011 I L App (1st) 101146, 952 N.E.2d 170 (finding that section 1-2.1-2 stripped city ’s depar tment of administrative hear ing s o f ju r isdic tion to adjudicate citations for operating overw eight trucks

on Chicag o streets, as citations were for movingviolations). She char acte rizes that section of the Municipal Code as “the enablingstatute,” but then fa ils to reconcile it with sec tions of the I l l i n o i s Vehicle Code which specific ally allowed for the proce dure Schaumburg

-3-followed once it photogr aphed her vehicle running the red light at Meac ham and Woodfield.

The Vehicle Code, howeve r, was at the hear t of Schaumburg ’s motion for summ ar y judgme nt and the court order now on appea l. Citi zens cannot pick and choose which statutes apply to them. Statutes are rea d toge th er and construed in a harmonious fashion. Schaumburg State Bank v. Bank of W

heaton
, 197 I ll. App. 3d 713, 720, 555 N.E.2d 48, 52 (1990); Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms
, 2 0 2 I ll. 2d 450, 458-59, 781 N.E.2d 261, 267 (2002) (“A
court presumes that the leg islature intended that two or more statutes which relate to the

same subject are to be rea d harmoniously so that no provisions are rende red inoperative.”). Fur thermore
, it is presumed that the Gene ral Assem b l y ac t s rationally and with full knowledg e of all previous enac tments and will n o t en act a law which contra dicts a prior
statute unless it expressly repe als the prior languag e. State of Illinois v. Mikusch
, 138 I ll. 2d 242, 247-28, 562 N.E.2d 1 6 8
, 1 7 0 (1990). In the unlikely event, howeve r, that a g ener al
statute and specific statute on the same subject are conflicting
, the specific languag e will control. Mikusch , 138 I ll. 2d at 254, 562 N.E.2d at 173. ¶ 7 The Municipal Code section that Fische tti cites was alre ady in e ffe ct when the Gene ral Assembly enac ted l eg islation in 2006 that aut h o ri z ed t he deploy ment of red light camera s in I llinois ; cre ated a civil, noncriminal penalty ; a n d p r o v ide d for administrative adjudications in which it is presumed that reg istered vehicle owner s are liable for violations. Sec tion 11- 208 of the Vehicle Code, which conce rns “Power s of local authorities,” was amende d by the
state leg islature eff

ective May 22, 2006, with the addition of para g raph (f)
, which states, “A municipality or county desig nated in Section 11-208.6 may enac t an ordinanc e providing for

an automated traff

ic law enfor ceme nt sy stem to enfor ce violations of this Code or a simil ar provision of a local ordinanc e and imposing liability on a reg istered owner of a vehicle used in such a violation.” Pub. Act 94-795, § 5 (ef f. May 22, 2006); 625 I L CS 5/11-208.6 (West 2006). Section 11-208.3 of the Vehicle Code, which had previously provided for “a sy stem of administrative adjudication of vehicular s t anding and parking violations and vehicle compliance violations,” was amende d to also encompa ss “ automated traff ic law violations

as define d in Sec tion 11-208.6.” Pub. Act 94-795, § 5 (ef f. May 22, 2006); 625 I L CS 5/11- 208.3 (West 2006). New languag e authorized “[any municipal i t y ] t o operate an administrative adjudication sy stem” and stated the municipality should pr ovide “ser vice of

an automated traff

ic law violation notice by mail to the addre ss of the reg istered owner of the cited vehicle.” Pub. Act 94-795, § 5 (ef f. May 22, 2006) (adding 625 I L CS 5/11-208.3(b)( 3) (West 2006)). Section 11-208.6 was an entirely new addition to the traff ic laws and it stated in pertinent par

t: “Sec. 11- 208.6. Automated tra ffic la w enf orce ment sy stem. (a) As used in this Section, ‘automate d traff i c l aw en forc ement sy stem’ means a device with one or more motor vehicle se nsors workingin conjunction with a re d light signa l to produce rec orded image s of m otor vehicles entering an int erse ctio n aga i n s t a red signal indication in violation of S ection 11-306 of t his Code or a simi lar provision of a local ordinanc e.” Pub. Act 94-795, § 5 (ef f. May 22, 2006) (adding 625 I L CS 5/11- 208.6 (West 2006)).
T h e s t at utory section cited there
, section 11-306, alre ady provided for the familiar re d
, y ellow, and g ree n light tra ffic- control sy stem and said in per tinent part:

-4-“§ 11-306. Traf fic-c ontrol signa l leg end. Whenever traff ic is controlled by traff

iccontrol si g nals exhibi ting differe nt colore d lights or color li g hted arrows, success i vely

one at a time or in combin at i o n , o n l y the colors g ree n, red and y ellow shall be used, except for specia l pedestria n signa ls car

rying a word leg end, and the lights shall indicate and apply to drivers of ve hicles and pe destrians a s follows:
* * * (c) Steady red indication.
1. Ex cep t as provided in para g raph 3 of this subsection (c)
, vehicular traff ic fac ing a steady circ ular red signa l a lone shall stop at a clea rly marke d stop line, but if t h er e i s no such stop line, befor e enter ing the crosswa lk on the near side of the intersec tion, or if there is no such crosswa lk, t h en befor e enter ing the intersec tion, and shall re main standing until an indication to procee d is shown.
2. Ex cept as provided in para g raph 3 of this subsection (c)
, vehicular traff i c fac ing a steady red arr ow signa l shall not enter the inters ection to make the
movement i n d icated by the arr ow and, unless enter ing the intersec tion to make a movement per

mitted by another

signa l, shall stop at a clea rly marke d stop line, but if there is n o s u ch stop line, befor e enter ing the crosswa lk on the near side of the intersec tion, or if there is no such cro s swalk, then befor e enter ing the intersec tion, and shall rema in standing until an indication permitting the movement indicated by such re d arr ow is shown.
3

. E x cept when a sign is in place prohibiting a turn and local authorities b y ordinanc e or State authorities by rule or regulation prohibit any such turn, vehicular traff ic fac ing any steady red signa l may cautiously enter the intersec tion to turn rig ht,

or to turn left from a one-w ay street into a one-w ay street, afte r stopping as require d by para g raph 1 or para g raph 2 of this subsection. After stopping, the driver shall yield the rig ht of way to any vehicle in the intersec tion or approa ching on another roadw ay

so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time such driver is moving

acr oss or within the intersec tion or junction or roadw ay s. Such driver shall yield the rig ht of way to pedestria

ns within the intersec tion or an adjac ent cr o s s wa l k.” 625 I L CS 5/ 11-306 (West 2006).
The new leg islation added para g raph (d) to section 11-208.6 to require that a written notice of a violation specify “the amount of the civil penalty i m p osed” and “be delivere d to the
reg istered owner of the vehicle, by mail.” Pub. Act 94-795, § 5 (ef f. May 22, 2006); 625 I L CS 5/11-208.6 (West 2006). And finally
, the Gene ral Assembly made it clea r that this new statutory scheme would not be subject to the prohibition in section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code ag ainst the administrative adjudication of moving violations. 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2006). I n para g raph (j) of section 11-208.6, t he Genera l Assembly stated, “A violation for which a c ivil penalty

is imposed unde r this Sec tion is not a violation of a tr aff ic re g ulation
g overning the m ovement of vehicles and may not be recorde d on the drivi ng rec ord of the

owner of the vehicle.” Pub. Act 94-795, § 5 (ef f. May 22, 2006); 625 I L CS 5 / 1 1 -2 0 8 .6(j) (West 2006)

. By chang ing four sections of the Vehicle Code and adding three entirely new sections (Pub. Act 94-795 (eff. May 22, 2006)), the state leg islature compre hensively

-5-provided for the use of automated red light came ras and an administrative proce ss to impose

civil penalties on reg istered vehicle owner s when their vehicles are used to commit red light

came ra violations. ¶ 8 On Marc h 25, 2008, Schaumburg passed local ordinanc e No. 08-045, which trac ked the languag e of the new state laws and established an automated traff ic law enfor ceme nt sy stem, including administrative a d ju d ic a ti o n s , w it h in it s g e o gr a

p h ic b o undarie s. Schaumburg joined

a number of jurisdictions that have deployed came ras and sensors to detec t traff ic violations without a law enfor ceme nt of fice r prese nt on the scene

. See City of Dave nport v. Seym our , 755 N.W.2d 533, 536 (I owa 2008) (indicating red light came ras are opera ting in 45 countries and speed detec tion sy stems are in use i n 7 5 countries)

. Schaumburg expressly ref ere nced chapte r 78 of its local ordinanc es in the violation notice it issued to Fische tti as the reg istered

owner of the ve hicle that trig g ere d the red light came ra at Meac ham and Woodfield Roads on J anuar y 19, 2009, at 2:01:50 p.m. ¶ 9 Fi s ch et t i ar gu es S ch aumburg cannot rely on the Vehicle Code unless it ex pres s l y ref ere nces those state laws in its local leg islation, but she cites no authority which re quires a municipality

to refe r to an e nablingstatute in the body of its local ordinanc es. ¶ 10 In our opinion, the meaning of the state and local laws is a ppare nt a nd does not require further explanat i o n

. W e find there was both state and municipal authorization for the admin i s t ra tive proce dure that Schaumburg applied to Fische tti and that her relianc e on section 1-2.1-2 was misplaced. 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2006). We reje ct her main argument for r ever sal. ¶ 11 Fische tti next contends that she was ticketed pursuant to section 11-306(c ) of the I llinois Vehicle Code and that this statute ref ers to drivers, meaning that Schau m b u rg b ore the burden of proving that she was the driver of the vehicle, not mere ly its reg istered owner , when the violation was rec orded. She made simil ar arguments during th e ci rc u i t court proce eding s, but a s the judge pointed out, F ischetti did not plead this theor y in he r orig inal

or amende d complaints and we need not addre ss it. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale
, 229 I ll. 2d 296, 305, 891 N.E.2d 839, 845 (2008) (I llinois is a fac t-pleading jurisdiction); Kincaid

v. Ame s De

p a r tment Stores, Inc.
, 283 I ll. App. 3d 555, 568, 670 N.E.2d 1103 (1996) (“A plaintiff fix es the issues in controve rsy and the theories upon which rec overy is soug ht by the alleg ations in her complaint. [Cit ation.] I t is a fundame ntal rule, with no exceptions, that a party must rec over on and acc ording to the case she has made for herse lf by her pleading s.”). ¶ 12 In any event, Fische tti’s fac tual premise is incorre ct, beca use she was not issued a ticket for violating s ection 11-306–the exhibi ts attache d to her complaints indicate Fischetti was cited pursuant to a local ordinanc e which incorporated section 11-306. 625 I L CS 5/11-306 (West 2006). ¶ 13 Fur

thermore
, we do not rea d s ec t i o n 1 1 -3 0 6 t o ap p ly to drivers only

. The re levant portions of section 11-306 (quoted above) use the t er m s “d ri vers” and “vehic ular traff ic” in te r c h a n g e a b ly

. M o r e specific ally
, section 11-306(c ) states that traff ic-c o ntro l s ig

n a ls “ a p p ly
to drivers of vehicles and pedestria ns,” “vehic ular traff

ic fac ing a steady circ ular red signa l alone shall stop,” “vehic ular traff ic fac ing a steady red arr ow si gn al shall not enter the intersec tion,” and “veh i cu l ar t raffic fac ing any steady red signa l may cautiously enter the

-6-intersec tion to turn rig ht” afte r “the driver *** yield[s] the rig ht of way .” 625 I L CS 5/11-306

(West 2006). Fische tti’s exclusive focus on the word “drive rs” in section 11-306 disreg ards the principle of statutory construction that statutory terms are construed in contex t

. In re Application of the County Collector
, 356 I ll. App. 3d 668, 670, 826 N.E.2d 951, 953 (2005) (statutory terms are given their plain meaning and construed i n context). Section 11-306’s wordingis ge nera l enoug h to be applied to the r eg istered owne rs of ve hicles as we ll as the drivers. ¶ 14 Fische tti also fails to rec oncile section 11-306 with t h e re d l i gh t ca m er a leg islation adopted in 2006. Her argument is contra ry to the principle of statutor y construction that related laws must be rea d toge ther and harmonized and the principle of statutory construction that ever y word the leg islature has used is to be g iven eff ect, if possible. Schaumburg State Bank, 197 I ll. App. 3d at 720, 555 N.E.2d at 52 (it is pr esumed that statutes addre ssing the

same subject are g overne d by one spirit and a single policy and that the leg islature intended consistency and harmony in its various enac tments); Knolls Condominium Ass’n
, 202 I ll. 2d at 458-59, 781 N.E.2d at 267 (two or more statutes which relate to the s ame subject are to be read harmoniously so that no provisions are rende red in o p erative); In re Application of the County Collector
, 356 I ll. App. 3d 668, 670, 826 N.E.2d 951, 953-54 (20 0 5 ) (s t atutes should be construed, if possible, so that no part is rende red su p er fluous or meaning less; courts should not cre ate e x ceptions or limitations which the leg islature did not intend). As discussed above, Fische tti was ticketed pursuant to a local ordinanc e which was authorized by compre hensive s t at e l egis lation and mi rror ed the wording of t hose new state l aws. The I llinois red light ca

mera leg islation spec ifically provided for ticketing the reg istered owner of a vehicle photogr aphed by an automated red light came ra, reg ardle ss of who was driving

. See 625 I L CS 5/11-208.6(d) (West 2006). The I llinois leg islation also indicated notice shall be delivere d to the reg istered owner of the vehicle within 30 day s afte r the Secre tary of State notifies the municipality or county of the identity of the owner of the vehicle. See 625 I L CS 5/11-208.6(d) ( West 2006). The I llinois law fur ther provide d “[i] f a pe rson cha rg ed with a traff ic vi olation, as a result of the automated traff ic l aw enforc ement sy stem, does not pay

or succe ssfully contest the civil pe nalty resulting from that violation, the Secre tary of State shall suspend the driving privileg es of the reg istered owner of the vehicle.” 625 I L CS 5/11- 208.6(e) (West 2006). This plain languag e indicates Schaumburg was not require d to prove Fische tti was personally driving h er v eh icle when it proce eded ag ainst the t raf fic signal at Meac ham and Woodfield. ¶ 15 Fische tti also contends that some of her rig hts un d er t h e I l l i n o i s Constit ution were violated, but w e find that she wa ived these the ories of relief by failing to ple ad them in the circ uit court. She first contends that the adjudication proce ss violated her due proce ss rig hts. The constitut ional g uara

ntee of due process encompasses both p ro ce du ral and subst antive due proce ss. Segers v. Industrial Comm’n
, 191 I ll. 2d 421, 433-34, 732 N.E. 2 d 4 8 8
, 496 (2000). Procedur al due proce ss is about the specific proce dures that have been used to deny

a person’ s life, liberty
, or proper ty

. Segers
, 191 I ll. 2d at 434, 732 N.E.2d at 496. Procedur al due proce ss “prote ct[s] persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty or proper ty .” Segers
, 191 I ll. 2d at 434, 732 N.E.2d at 496. Substantive due proce ss preve nts the g overnme nt f rom taking cer

tain action even if it

-7-does provid e proper procedura l safe g uards. Casanova v. C ity of Chicago
, 342 I ll. App. 3d

80, 91, 793 N.E.2d 907, 917 (2003). In re Perona
, 294 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d 7 5 5
, 7 6 0, 690 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (1998) (stating that proce dural due proce ss g overns methods by which a protec ted interest may be deprive d and that substantive due proce ss imposes absolute limit s

on the state’s ability to act without r eg ard to a pplicable proce dural protec tions). F ischetti’s only ref ere nce to due proce ss was in the prayer of her pleading
, wher e she vaguely asked the
court to decla

re, “the Villag e of Schaumburg ’s administrative proce eding s descr ibed here in violate due proce ss.” I t is unclea r from this wording whether she was asser ting a proce dural due proce ss claim, a substantive due proce ss claim, or, perha ps, both; and it was unclea r what fac ts, if any , were al l eged in support of this claim. Statutes and municipal ordinanc es are presumed constitutional and a party challeng ing their validity bear s the burden of rebutting that presumption and clea rly demonstrating a constitutional violation. Napleton
, 229 I ll. 2d
at 306, 891 N.E.2d at 846. Fur thermore
, as a fa ct-pleading jurisdiction, I llinois does not p er m i t p l aintiffs to make vague alleg ations and then introduce specific theories as it suits them duringlitigation. Kincaid , 283 I ll. App. 3d at 568, 670 N.E.2d at 1112. ¶ 16 Waiver aside, there has been no proce dural due proce s s o r s u b s t an t i v e due proc ess violation. Procedur al due proce ss g ener ally ref ers to notice and the opportunity to be hear d. Bartlow v. Shannon
, 399 I ll. App. 3d 560, 570, 927 N.E.2d 8 8
, 9 8 (2010). Procedura l due
proce s s ri g hts include a rig ht to prese nt evidenc e and argument, a rig ht to cross-e x amine witnesses, and impartiality in rulings upon the e vidence which is offe red. Bartlow
, 399 I ll. App. 3d at 570, 927 N.E.2d at 98. I t is undisputed that Fische tti rec eived written notification

o f t h e p ro ce eding s ag ainst her, that she was offe red the opportunity to contest t hroug h the mail or at a hearing, that she chose to dispute the alleg ations by sending a letter to the municipality reg arding its “jurisdiction,” and that her letter was taken into consideration by the hear ing office r who found her liable for the violation and responsible for the $100 fine. The re cord, thus, indicate s that Fische tti wa s aff orded pr ocedur al due pr ocess. In Idris , the
court reje cted a substantive due proce ss challeng e to a Ch i ca go o rd inance which, like the Schaumburg ordinanc e, provided for fining a car ’s owner for a red light came ra violation no matter who was driving the car

. Idris v. City of Chicago
, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009). The

car owner s there complained they wer e fined even tho u gh s o meone else was driving their

car s at the time and that the imposition of vicarious liability was a substantive due proc ess violation. Idris , 552 F.3d at 565. Charac terizing the substantive due proce ss a rgument as a “dud,” the court re asoned:
“Substantive d u e p ro cess depends on the exis tence of a fundame ntal liberty interest, [citation]
, and no one has a fundame ntal rig ht to run a red light or avoid being seen by

a came ra on a public street. The interest at stake is a $90 fine for a traff ic infrac tion, and the Supreme Court has never held that a proper ty interest so modest is a fund amental rig ht.” Idris , 552 F.3d at 566. Fische tti contends Idris is not binding authority beca use it addre ssed fede ral rig h t s , rather than s tate or local rights. I n our opi nion, howeve r, t he federal co u rt ’s reasoning is direc tly applicable to a substantive due proce ss a rgument based on the I llinois Constit ution a nd we adopt it as our own. Since no fundame ntal liberty interest was implicated by the traff ic signa l and automate d came ra in Schaumburg and the $100 fine imposed on F ischetti, there c ould

-8-be no substantive due pr ocess violation.

¶ 17 C o n t i n u i ng , the Idris court also considere d whether fining the reg istered o wn er o f a vehicle when his or her vehicle trig g ers a red light came ra is somehow arbitra ry and
capr icious and thus could not pass the rational basis test that applies to all leg islation:
“I s it rational to fine the owner rathe r than driver? Certainly so. A came ra can show reliably which cars and trucks go through red l ights but i s less likely to show who was driving

. That would make it easy for owner s to point the fing er at friends or children–a nd essentially impossibl e for the City to prove otherwise. A s y s t em o f photogr aphic evidenc e reduc es the costs of law enfor ceme nt and incre ases the proportion of all traff ic offe nses that are detec ted; these benef its can be achie ved only if the owner is hel d responsible. This need not mean that the owner bear s the economic loss; an owner can insist that the driver reimburse the outlay if he wants to use the car ag ain (or mai n tain the friendship). L eg al sy stems often achie ve deter renc e by imposing fines o r penalties without fault. Consider, for example, a sy stem that subjects to forf eiture any car used in committing a crime, even though the owner may have had nothing to do with the offe nse. *** [S ]uch a sy stem is constitutional, beca use it incre ases owner s’ vigilanc e. Simi larly
, *** it is constitutional to evict a tenant from public housing beca use of a g uest’s misbehavior; the threat of eviction induces owner s to e x erc ise control over their g uests (and not invite people whose conduct they will be unable to influence ). *** [I n y et another example,] [t ]he Court held it proper to impose penal t i es o n a taxpay er whose
return is false, even when an attorney or acc ountant is responsible for the err or; the Court conclude d that the threat of a penalty will cause taxpay ers to choose their advisers more

car efully –and, when the taxpay er is the victim of an expert’s blunder, a malprac tice suit will shift the expense to the person whose err ors led to the exaction. Fining a car ’s owner is rational for the same rea sons: Owner s will take more car e when lending their car s, and often they can pa ss the expense on to the rea l wrong doer.” Idris , 552 F.3d at 566. See also Cooper J

. Strickland, Lights

, Camera ... Ticket: Red L ight Cameras After Idris v. City of Chicago
, 10 N.C. J .L

. & Tec h. On. 119 (2009) (indicating red light came ra technolog y

is widesprea d and wa s not impeded by Idris ). ¶ 18 Fische tti next contends her constitutional rig ht to equal protec tion was violated bec ause she did not rec eive the presumption of innocenc e that would have b ee n g iven to a driver

s t o p p ed by a police office r for violating section 11-306. Howeve r, there is no languag e i n Fische tti’s pleading which could be construed as an equal protec tion claim. Since she did not plead his theory
, she cannot introduce it into the proce eding s whene ver it suits her to do so. Kincaid
, 283 I ll. App. 3d at 568, 670 N.E.2d at 1112 (plaintiff waived issues not pr esente d in complaint). We also point out that this arg ument is based on the faulty fac tual premise that Fische tti was ticketed for violating section 11-306 rathe r than th e s e p a r a te leg islation specific to red lig ht camer as. ¶ 19 Finally
, Fische tti’s contention that she had a constitutional or statutory rig ht to a jury trial is based on the faulty premise that she was acc used of a criminal ac t

. Section 11-208.6(d) indicates automated red light violations incur civil penalties. 625 I L CS 5/11-208.6(d) (West

-9-2006). What occur red was not a criminal offe nse; it was a civil violation and, there fore
, not subject to the protec tions, presum p t i ons, and standard of proof aff orded in criminal
prosec utions. See Van Harke n v. City of Chicago
, 103 F.3d 1346, 135 0 (7 t h C i r. 1997) (indicating the City of Chicag o did not violate d u e p r o c ess by rec lassifying parking violations fr o m criminal offenses to civil violations and reducing the procedura l safe g uards requi re d in criminal proce eding s). Acc ording ly
, Fische tti’s r eliance on section 103-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is unavailing . 725 I L CS 5/ 103-6 (West 2006). ¶ 20 For these rea sons, we reje ct Fische tti’s appea l and affi rm t h e judgme nt of the circ uit
court.

¶ 21 Affir

med.

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