UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-4210

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

NATHANIEL DEVON BAILEY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. 

Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:04-cr-00196-RJC-CH-1) 

Submitted: August 28, 2009 Decided: December 8, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Ross H. Richardson, 

FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Nathaniel Devon Bailey appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his supervised release. Bailey’s counsel has 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal but questioning whether the district court erred in 

relying upon evidence seized on November 24, 2008, allegedly in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment, to conclude that Bailey 

committed new criminal conduct. Bailey was informed of his 

right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done 

so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

 We review a district court’s decision to revoke a 

defendant’s supervised release for an abuse of discretion, 

United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999), and 

review for clear error factual determinations underlying the 

conclusion that a violation occurred. United States v. Miller, 

557 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2009). A district court need only 

find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 

2000 & Supp. 2009); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 

(2000). 

 Bailey’s claim that evidence seized after the November 

24 stop should have been excluded fails because the exclusionary 

rule does not apply in supervised release revocation 

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proceedings. See United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 

393-95 (4th Cir. 1999). We therefore find that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Bailey committed new criminal 

conduct. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform the client, in writing, 

of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States 

for further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED