IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 30, 2010 at Knoxville

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES ARTHUR JOHNSON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2007-A-129 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge

No. M2009-01147-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 24, 2010

The Defendant, James Arthur Johnson, was charged with two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of aggravated robbery for events

that occurred on the evening of June 18, 2006. Co-defendant Rodney Lenier Williams was

also charged in all five counts, but his case was severed from the Defendant’s case before

trial. A jury sitting in the Criminal Court for Davidson County found the Defendant not

guilty of the two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, guilty of the two counts of

felony murder, and guilty of the count of aggravated robbery. The Defendant was given

concurrent life sentences for the felony murder convictions. For the aggravated robbery

conviction, the Defendant was given an eleven year sentence to run consecutively to the two

life sentences. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in allowing a non-expert

witness to give his opinion, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant.

Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court are Affirmed.

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD

WITT, JR., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

David M. Hopkins, Nashville, Tennessee, attorney for appellant, James Arthur Johnson.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney

General; Victor S. Johnson III, District Attorney General; and Robert McGuire, Assistant

District Attorney General, attorneys for appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION

On the night of June 18, 2006, Leonard Swann of the Robertson County Sheriff’s

Department was working an off-duty security assignment at Kroger grocery store on Eighth

Avenue and Monroe Street in Nashville. As he was standing outside the store, Swann heard

an estimated eleven to thirteen gunshots fired, and seconds later, he observed Marcus

Edmondson running across the Kroger parking lot holding a handgun. Swann testified that

Edmondson was bleeding and bending over as he ran and repetitively stating that he had been

shot. Edmondson then fell in a grassy area at the end of the parking lot, and an ambulance

arrived shortly thereafter. Edmondson died at Vanderbilt Medical Center as a result of his

injuries.

After the ambulance departed with Edmondson, Detective Warren Fleak of the

Nashville Metropolitan Police Department arrived at the scene to find the deceased body of

Ricky McCorkle in an alleyway behind the Kroger. About twenty-five feet away from

McCorkle’s body, thirteen .22 caliber cartridge casings were found on the ground. Detective

Fleak stated that officers found a water bottle and a Swisher Sweet cigar box containing

marijuana when approaching the front of the Kroger from the location of McCorkle’s body.

In front of the store, officers found a Lorcin 380 semiautomatic handgun, an empty magazine

belonging to that gun, and a cell phone.

Detective Leonard Peck of the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department was

assigned to investigate the scene at approximately 9:30 P.M. on the night of the incident.

Detective Peck returned to the scene the following morning and found McCorkle’s wallet

and driver’s license. After searching McCorkle’s phone records, Detective Peck discovered

that McCorkle had dialed the phone number of Rodney Williams several times directly

before the time of the shootings. After interviewing Williams, Detective Peck developed the

Defendant as a suspect. After receiving a message that Detective Peck wished to speak to

him, the Defendant voluntarily went to the police station.

In a recorded interview that was played for the jury, the Defendant told Detective Peck

that Rodney Williams had called the victims and made plans to meet them behind the Kroger

to purchase drugs. The Defendantstated that the original plan was to purchase drugs and that

he had no intention to harm anybody. However, he also stated that Williams discussed

robbing the victims for their drugs and money before arriving at the Kroger. The Defendant

stated that he was to be the lookout and hoped to be paid for his role. Specifically, after

being asked, “So, when Rodney did the robbery, you were hoping to get paid from the

robbery,” the Defendant answered, “Yes.” At trial, the State asked Detective Peck what that

statement meant to him, and over objection by the Defendant, Detective Peck answered,

“That means to me that he’s a willing participant.”

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The Defendant stated that after he arrived at the Kroger parking lot, Williams left the

car with the .22 caliber rifle while he remained in the vehicle. The Defendant then heard

several gunshots, and Williams returned to the car with McCorkle’s wallet and stated, “They

tried to kill me.” After leaving the Kroger, Williams left the rifle with the Defendant, who

gave it to Christopher Phillips. Although Phillips did not possess the weapon when

questioned, officers discovered the rifle wrapped in a plastic bag in a dumpster off Jefferson

Street.

Dr. Thomas Deering, assistant medical examiner for the State Medical Examiner’s

Office in Nashville, performed autopsies on both of the victims’ bodies and served as a

witness for the State at trial. Dr. Deering testified that McCorkle had two gunshot wounds

on the lower left side of his back. McCorkle had no exit wounds. One bullet had passed

through the victim’s spinal cord and lodged in his right lung, while the other passed through

the left lung, heart, and into the chest plate. Dr. Deering stated that the bullet that passed

through the spinal cord was possibly fatal and that the bullet to the heart was certainly fatal.

Dr. Deering concluded that McCorkle had been shot in the back and that the cause of his

death was multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Deering added that McCorkle’s blood tested

positive for THC, indicating that he had recently used marijuana.

Dr. Deering stated that Edmondson had one gunshot wound on his right lower back,

two gunshot wounds on his scrotum, and one gunshot wound on his thigh. Dr. Deering had

difficulty analyzing some of Edmondson’s injuries because surgeons had altered many of his

organs in an attempt to save him. However, Dr. Deering did find two bullets in the victim’s

abdomen and concluded that it appeared the victim had bled to death after being shot in the

back. Like McCorkle, Edmondson also tested positive for THC.

Steve Scott, a ballistics and firearms identification expert who works for the

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, examined both the Lorcin handgun found at the scene

and the .22 rifle found in the dumpster off Jefferson Street. Scott also received five bullets

taken from the bodies of the victims and the thirteen cartridge casings found at the crime

scene. Although Scott received the Lorcin with one cartridge, he was unable to test fire the

pistol due to a buildup of oil and lubricant that would not allow it to properly function. Scott

was able to test fire the .22 rifle. Due to the cheap quality of the rifle and the soft nature of

the .22 caliber bullets, Scott was unable to determine whether the bullets taken from the

victims’ bodies were shot from the rifle. However, Scott was able to determine with “no

doubt at all” that the thirteen shell casings found at the scene were fired from the rifle.

At the sentencing hearing on March 20, 2009, both of the victims’ mothers and Ricky

McCorkle’s brother made victim impactstatements, all requesting that the Defendant receive

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the maximum penalty for his crimes. The Defendant also made a statement, apologizing to

the victims’ families and asking for their forgiveness.

The court determined that concurrent life sentences were appropriate for the felony

murder convictions. In determining the sentence for the aggravated robbery and whether to

impose consecutive sentences, the court considered the victim impact statements, the

Defendant’s allocution, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103, the characteristics of

the criminal conduct, and the evidence of mitigating and enhancing factors.

The court cited the Defendant’s previous criminal history, including being declared

delinquent as a juvenile on a felony drug case, five misdemeanor convictions as an adult, and

six to eight arrests in cases that were dismissed or retired, as an enhancing factor. Although

the Defendant disagreed, the court also found that he was on probation at the time of the

offense and considered that as another enhancing factor. Further, the court stated that the

Defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk of human life was high.

The court considered the Defendant’s remorse at the sentencing hearing and his assistance

in solving the crime as mitigating factors. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven

years for the aggravated robbery conviction. In ordering that the sentence should be served

consecutively to the felony murder convictions, the court stated that extended confinement

was necessary to protect society from the Defendant’s antisocial behavior.

The Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the length of his

aggravated robbery sentence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences in his case.

Additionally, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Peck to give his

opinion as to the meaning of one of the Defendant’s statements.

ANALYSIS

Sufficiency of the Evidence

An appellate court’s standard of review when the defendant questions the sufficiency

of the evidence on appeal is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, (1979). The

appellate court does not reweigh the evidence; rather, it presumes that the jury has resolved

all conflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor

of the State. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbage,

571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions regarding witness credibility, conflicts in

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testimony, and the weight and value to be given to evidence were resolved by the jury. See

State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). “A verdict of guilt removes the

presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, and [on appeal] the

defendant has the burden of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict.” Id. (citing State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)). “This [standard]

applies to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a

combination of direct and circumstantial evidence.” State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389,

392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-401, “[a] person is criminally

responsible as a party to an offense, if the offense is committed by the person’s own conduct,

by the conduct of another for which the person is criminally responsible, or by both.” As

relevant to this case, a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another

if “[a]cting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit

in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person . . . aids . . . another person to commit the

offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2).

Aggravated robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property accomplished with

a deadly weapon. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. A killing committed in the perpetration

of or attempt to perpetrate robbery is felony murder. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2).

Further, the only mental state required to commit felony murder is the intent to commit the

specific felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(b).

Here, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient because there was no

evidence that he planned to rob the victims or that he even participated in the discussion to

rob the victims. However, the Defendant was aware that Williams was armed and listened

to Williams discuss his plan to rob the victims for their drugs and money. The Defendant

told Williams he would act as a lookout and admitted that he hoped to be paid for doing so.

He still expected to receive payment after hearing several gunshots and seeing Williams

return to the vehicle with McCorkle’s wallet. Further, the jury heard the recorded interview

where the Defendant answered, “Yes,” when asked if he hoped to receive payment for the

robbery. Contrary to the Defendant’s argument, there exists ample evidence for a reasonable

trier of fact to conclude that he intended to and did assist Rodney Williams in committing

aggravated robbery, making him criminally responsible for the robbery as well as the two

murders under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402(2). Accordingly, we conclude

that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions.

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Detective Peck’s Opinion at Trial

Next, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Detective Peck to

give his opinion as to the meaning of a recorded statement made by the Defendant and used

as evidence at trial. The State responds that any error committed by the trial court in

allowing Detective Peck to state his opinion was harmless. During the recorded interview,

the Defendant was asked, “So when Rodney did the robbery, you were hoping to get paid

from the robbery,” to which he responded, “Yes.” At trial, the State asked Detective Peck

what that answer meant to him, and he stated, “That means to me that he’s a willing

participant.”

The admissibility of a non-expert witness’s testimony is to be primarily judged by the

standard established in Rule 701 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. See State v. Justin

Bradley Haynie, No. W2006-01840-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4335481, at *18 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Dec. 7, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 5, 2008). Rule 701 states:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s testimony in the form

of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are

(1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and

(2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony

or the determination of a fact in issue.

Tenn. R. Evid. 701(a)(1)-(2). “Because it is the jury’s duty to draw conclusions from the

evidence presented, a ‘non-expert witness must ordinarily confine histestimony to a narration

of facts based on first-hand knowledge and avoid stating mere personal opinions.” Justin

Bradley Haynie, No. W2006-01840-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4335481, at *18 (quoting State

v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 330 (Tenn. 1992)). “[T]he admission of lay opinion

testimony is limited to those situations wherein the jury could not readily draw its own

conclusions on the ultimate issue, without the aid of the witness’s opinion testimony.” State

v. McCloud, No. E2008-01541-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1643445, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App.

June 12, 2009).

As Detective Peck was testifying as a non-expert witness, his opinion regarding the

Defendant’s statement was not admissible under Rule 701 of the Tennessee Rules of

Evidence. Detective Peck’s opinion was not helpful to a clear understanding of his

testimony; the conversation was recorded and played for the jury, who were free to determine

the meaning of the Defendant’s statement on their own. Detective Peck’s statement was an

intrusion upon the jury’s duty to form conclusions after weighing the evidence and is the type

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of personal opinion by non-expert witnesses that Rule 701 seeks to eliminate. Tenn. R. Evid.

701(a)(1)-(2).

Our finding that the trial court erred in admitting Detective Peck’s opinion does not

end our analysis. As our supreme court has stated, “[a]ll errors are not the same, nor do they

have the same effect on the judicial process in general or on a particular trial.” State v.

Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008). Accordingly, our supreme court “has

recognized three categories of error-structural constitutional error, non-structural

constitutional error, and non-constitutional error.” Id. (citations omitted). As relevant to this

issue, our supreme court has noted that “errors in the admission of evidence do not normally

take on constitutional dimensions.” Id. at 375 (citing State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 397

(Tenn. 2003)).

In determining whether non-constitutional errors are harmless, “Tennessee law places

the burden on the defendant who is seeking to invalidate his or her conviction to demonstrate

that the error ‘more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to

the judicial process.’” Id. at 372 (quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)). While substantial

evidence of the defendant’s guilt makes it difficult for “the defendant to demonstrate that a

non-constitutional error involving a substantial right more probably than not affected the

outcome of the trial,” harmless error inquiry “does not turn upon the existence of sufficient

evidence to affirm a conviction or even a belief that the jury’s verdict is correct.” Id. at 372.

Rather, “the crucial consideration is what impact the error may reasonably be taken to have

had on the jury’s decision making.” Id.

Here, the Defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing that Detective Peck’s

statement prejudiced the judicial process. The jury watched the interview in which the

Defendant stated, “Yes,” after being asked if he expected to receive payment from the

robbery. The jury also heard the Defendant in the same interview admit that he knew

Williams was armed and that he planned to rob the victims. Further, the Defendant admitted

that he was acting as a lookout. The Defendant was convicted on a theory of criminal

responsibility for another’s actions, and there exists sufficient evidence to support a finding

beyond a reasonable doubt that he assisted in the aggravated robbery with the intent to

benefit in the proceeds. Considering the strength of the evidence against the Defendant,

including the Defendant’s statement, we cannot say that Detective Peck’s statement more

probably than not affected the final judgment. Detective Peck merely stated the obvious:

that a person expecting to benefit from the proceeds of a robbery is a willing participant in

the robbery. Accordingly, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this

issue.

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Sentencing

The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence for

aggravated robbery beyond the minimum in the range. The State responds that the trial court

properly enhanced the Defendant’s sentence.

An appellate court’s review of sentencing is de novo on the record with a presumption

that the trial court’s determinations are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. §40-35-401(d) (2006). As

the Sentencing Commission Comments to this section note, on appeal the burden is on the

defendant to show that the sentence is improper. This means that if the trial court followed

the statutory sentencing procedure, made findings of fact that are adequately supported in the

record, and gave due consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles that are

relevant to sentencing under the 1989 Sentencing Act, the court may not disturb the sentence

even if a different result were preferred. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1991).

In conducting its de novo review, the appellate court must consider (1) the evidence,

if any, received at the trial and sentencing hearing, (2) the presentence report, (3) the

principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives, (4) the nature and

characteristics of the criminal conduct, (5) any mitigating or statutory enhancement factors,

(6) any statement that the defendant made on his own behalf, (7) the potential for

rehabilitation or treatment, and (8) any statistical information provided by the Administrative

Office of the Courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee. Tenn. Code

Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210; see also Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168; State v. Moss, 727

S.W.2d 229, 236-37 (Tenn. 1986).

The Defendant committed this offense on June 18, 2006; thus, he wassentenced under

the revised sentencing act as enacted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 2005. The act

provides that:

(c) The court shall impose a sentence within the range of punishment,

determined by whether the defendant is a mitigated, standard, persistent,

career, or repeat violent offender. In imposing a specific sentence within the

range of punishment, the court shall consider, but is not bound by, the

following advisory sentencing guidelines:

(1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the

sentence that should be imposed, because the general assembly

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set the minimum length of sentence for each felony class to

reflect the relative seriousness of each criminal offense in the

felony classifications; and

(2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as

appropriate, by the presence or absence of mitigating and

enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.

Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-210(c)(1)-(2) (2006). “[A] trial court’s weighing of various

mitigating and enhancement factors has been left to the trial court’s sound discretion;”

therefore, the appellate court must not re-weigh such factors. State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d

335, 345 (Tenn. 2008).

The appropriate sentence for a Range I offender convicted of aggravated robbery is

eight to twelve years. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402; 40-35-112(a)(2). When sentencing

the Defendant to eleven years for the aggravated robbery conviction, the court considered the

Defendant’s criminal history, the serious bodily injury endured by the victims, that the

Defendant was on probation when the offense was committed, and that the Defendant had

no hesitation in committing a crime when the risk to human life was great in accordance with

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114. The court stated it gave “some” weight to the

Defendant’s remorse and his willingness to assist the authorities in solving the crime as

mitigating factors.

The Defendant contends that the court erred in finding that he had no hesitation to

commit a crime when the risk to human life was high. In support of his contention, the

Defendant states that he never left the vehicle while the crimes were being committed.

However, the Defendant remained in the vehicle with the purpose of acting as a lookout

while Williams left the vehicle with a rifle to rob the victims. Although not argued by the

Defendant, this particular enhancement factor is generally inapplicable to aggravated robbery

convictions because a high risk to human life is inherent in the crime. State v. Eric DeWayne

McElmore, No. 03C01-9802-CR-00056, 1999 WL 301489, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14,

1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 22, 1999). The enhancement factor “might be

applicable when the proof established the risk to the life of a person other than the victim.”

State v. Hicks, 868 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). However, this court has held

the enhancement factor may not be applied if the other person put at risk by the Defendant’s

conduct is the victim of a separate crime involving risk to life for which the Defendant was

convicted. See, e.g., State v. Tony E. Cannon, Jr., No. M2007-00557-CCA-R3-CD, 2008

WL 2448341 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2008). Here, the Defendant was convicted of the

aggravated robbery of Ricky McCorkle. Although Marcus Edmondson was not a victim of

the robbery because no property was taken from him, the Defendant was convicted of felony

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murder for his conduct that endangered Edmondson’s life. Therefore, we conclude that the

trial court improperly applied this factor.

The Defendant also contends that the court erred in finding that he was on probation

at the time of the offense in this case. The record reflects that the Defendant was convicted

of an offense and sentenced to probation and that his probation was imposed on October 26,

2005 and expired on October 26, 2006. The Defendant committed these offenses on June

18, 2006; however, the Defendant argues that there is no evidence that he was still on

probation at the time of these offenses. He offers no evidence to suggest that his probation

had expired. Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that

the Defendant was on probation when he committed these offenses.

Although the trial court erred in applying that the Defendant had no hesitation to

commit a crime when the risk to human life was high as an enhancement factor, the

erroneous application does not affect the length of sentence imposed in light of the remaining

factors. The minimum sentence for an aggravated robbery conviction for a Range I offender

is eight years and the maximum sentence is twelve years. The trial court sentenced the

Defendant to eleven years for his aggravated robbery conviction. In determining his

sentence, the trial court considered, in addition to the two factors the Defendant disputes, the

serious bodily injury inflicted upon the victims and the Defendant’s extensive criminal

records. The court also considered two mitigating factors, the Defendant’s remorse

expressed at the sentencing hearing, and his willingness to assist authorities. After

identifying and balancing the mitigating and enhancing factors, the court found that an eleven

year sentence was appropriate for the Defendant’s offenses. We cannot say that the

Defendant’s sentence is inappropriate because one enhancement factor was improperly

applied when several other enhancement factors exist. Further, the Defendant was still

sentenced below the maximum twelve years for a Range I offender convicted of aggravated

assault. Therefore, we conclude that the record supports the imposition of a sentence three

years above the minimum for aggravated robbery.

Consecutive Sentencing

The Defendant further contends that the trial court inappropriately imposed the

sentence for aggravated robbery to run consecutively to the felony murder sentences. The

State responds that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences.

Consecutive sentencing is guided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b),

which states, in pertinent part, that the trial court may order sentences to run consecutively

if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he defendant is a dangerous offender

whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about

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committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high” or “is sentenced for an offense

committed while on probation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4), (6) (2006). When

imposing consecutive sentences based on the defendant’s status as a dangerous offender, the

trial court must, “in addition to the application of general principles of sentencing,” find “that

an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct by

the defendant and that the consecutive sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of the

offenses committed.” State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn.1995). In all cases

where consecutive sentences are imposed, the trial court is required to “specifically recite [on

the record] the reasons” behind imposition of consecutive sentences. See Tenn. R. Crim. P.

32(c)(1); see, e.g., State v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 638, 647-48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (noting

the requirements of Rule 32(c)(1) for purposes of consecutive sentencing).

Here, the trial court followed the appropriate guidelines for imposing consecutive

sentences. The Defendant contends that the record does not support the trial court’s finding

that a consecutive sentence was necessary to protect the public and was reasonably related

to the severity of the crime and that therefore, the court wrongly based the consecutive

sentence on his being a dangerous offender. However, the trial court found that the

Defendant had an increasingly severe criminal record that culminated in the loss of two

human lives in this case. Further, the court also found that the Defendant was on probation

at the time of these offenses. Only one factor is needed for the trial court to act within its

discretion to impose consecutive sentences. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115, Sentencing

Comm’n Cmts; State v. Luis Castanon, No. M2003-01491-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 544724,

at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 8, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 22, 2005).

Following our review, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the

Defendant was a dangerous offender and was on probation at the time of these offenses and

that the imposition of consecutive sentences was appropriate.

CONCLUSION

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the trial

court are affirmed.

________________________________

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE

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