# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O


## . 12-0657

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

# A S H IS H 

# P A T E L 

# , A N V E R A L I 

# S A T A N I 

# , N A Z IR A 

# M O M IN 

# , M IN A Z 

# C H A M A D IA 

# , A N D 

# V IJ A Y 

# L A K S H M I 

# Y O G I 

# , P E T IT IO N E R S 

# /C R O S S


# - R E S P O N D E N T S 

# ,

v . 

# T E X A S 

# D E P A R T M E N T O F 

# L IC E N S IN G A N D 

# R E G U L A T IO N 

# , E T A L


# . ,

R E S P O N D E N T S 

# /C R O S S


# - P E T IT IO N E R S 

# ,

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## T H I R D 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## C H I E F 

## J U S T I C E 

## H E C H T 

## , joined by J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## and J U S T I C E 

## B R O W N 

## , dissenting.

This is one of t hose cases i n which, once t he C ourt has decided whom it wants t o win, the less said the better. Result is an inapt tool for shaping principle; it’s supposed to work the other way around. And when principle ends up being mutilated, it can no longe r be used to g uide other results. Since it turns out that the Court thinks substantive due proce ss means whateve r judge s say it means, it would be best to leave bad enoug h alone rathe r than prete nd the i d ea has any support in the Constit ution’s text or history

. The Court runs the risk that what passes for constitutional analy sis around he re w ill be seen a s just picking wor ds out of the air. The Thr eade rs deserve to have the y oke of the reg ulatory state t hrown off, the shac kles on their fre e enter

prise shattere d, in short—althoug h brevity is n o t the hallmark of some of today ’s

## writing s—to stick it to the man. And wha t better wa

y to do all that than by

having judge s hold the State’s 80-y ear -old cosmetolog y licensing scheme , also found i n ten ot her states, unconstitutional as applied to ey ebrow threa ding. The t rouble is, this Court, li ke the United States Supreme Court, has repe atedly held that a statute with a rational basis does not violate substantive due proce ss, and apply ing that standard here will not help the Threa ders. Casting about , t h e C ourt comes up with “oppre ssive”, a brand- new entra nt in the substantive due proce ss lexi con. Neither this Court nor any other the Court c an find has ever used “oppre ssive” as a test for substantive due proce ss. Which is
g rea t beca use the Court is now fre e—as fre e as the g rate ful Threa ders from public health and safe ty
reg ulation—to make up substantive due pr ocess f rom scra tch. Whether ey ebrow threa ders need 750 hours’ training , or only 430, or 40, or 1, to prac tice their trade on the public is not for us to say , as long as the L eg islature, whose job it is to say , is making a rational eff

ort to protec t public health and sa fety

. As the C ourt acknow ledg es at one point , “it is
not for courts to second- g uess [l eg islative and ag ency ] decisions as to the nece ssity for and the extent of training that should be require d for differ ent ty pes o f co m m er cial service providers.” The 1 

## question for us is whether , by requiring 750 hours’ training , the L eg islature has violated substantive due proce ss by depriving ey ebrow threa ders of their fundame ntal liberty without the due course of law g uara nteed by the Texas Constit ution.
Be cause the final authority to interpre t a nd apply the Constit ution be longs to the J udiciary , only the people t h em s elves, by constitutional amendment, can alter the Court’s substantive due

A n t e a t

_ _ _ . 1


### 2

## proce ss decisions. The J udiciary ’s authorit y is enormous and not lightly to be exercised. J ustice

Powell once observe d that “[t] he history of substantive due proce ss counsels caution and restra int.” 2


## The history to which he ref err ed was the Supreme Court’s own adven t u re wi th substantive due
proc es s b egi nning with Lochner v. New Y ork , in which the Court abrog ated a state statute as 3


## “u nrea sonable, unnece ssary and arbitra ry ”, and ending with United States v. Carolene Products 4 

## Company , in which the Court established that a statute with any rational basis will be upheld. The

5


## Court disreg ards the fede ral courts’ experience with substantive d u e p rocess in Lochner and its
prog eny , invents a n ew t es t u nprec edente d in Americ an jurisprudence, and ushers in a new era of
g overnme nt by

judge s. The Court, and J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## ’ S 

## concur ring opinion in its wild championing of economic liberty , seem oblivious to the rea lity that social liberty is no less important. The same substantive due
proce ss that can fre e ey ebrow threa ders from onerous tr ai n i n g re q uirements can also be used to establish a ri g ht of privac y not otherwise to be found in the Constit ution. Are restric tions on 6


## abortion “oppre ssive”? How about restric tions on marria g e? Unconstra ined b y any meaning ful standard, substantive due proce ss allows judge s to define liberty acc ording to their persona l policy

R e g e n t s o

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### 3

## pref

ere nces. H istory

and re ason wa

rn that the Court has g one too fa r. I respe ctfully

dissent.
I The L eg islature has reg ulated cosmetic service s for 80 y ear s. The o ri g inal impetus was

conce rn for public health and safe ty

. “[T] he public,” the L eg islature found in the Cosmetology Act of 1935, “is daily exposed to disease due to insufficient car e as to sanitation and hy g iene [and should be p ro t ected by the Act] from inexperience d and unscrupulous beauty parlors and beauty culture schools”. Protect i o n of the public health and welfa re rema ins the driving forc e for reg ulating 7 

## cosmetolog y . Be auty schools, salons, and prac titioners are subject to “sanitation rules to preve nt the

8


## sprea d of a

n in f e c ti o u s o r c o n ta g ious disease” , inspections to ensure compliance , and investiga tion 9 1 0

A c t o f A p r . 2 5 , 1 9 3 5 , 4 4 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 1 6 , § 2 6 , 1 9 3 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s 3 0 4 , 3 1 1 , a m e n d e d b y A c t o f N o v . 7 1 4 , 1 9 3 5 , 4 4 t h L e g . , 2 d C

. S

. , c h

. 4 6 9 , § § 1

– 2 , 1 9 3 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s 1 8 4 6 , 1 8 4 6

– 1 8 4 8

. T h e 1 9 3 5 A c t a n d i t s s u c c e s s o r p r o v i s i o n s w e r e c o d i f

i e d f i r s t a s a r t i c l e 7 3 4 b i n t h e f o r m e r P e n a l C o d e , l a t e r a s f o r m e r a r t i c l e 7 3 4 c , t h e n “ t r a n s f e r r e d ” t o f o r m e r a r t i c l e 8 4 5 1 a o f t h e T e x a s R e v i s e d C i v i l S t a t u t e s , w h i c h w a s i n t u r n r e p l a c e d b y C h a p t e r 1 6 0 2 o f t h e n e w O c c u p a t i o n s C o d e . S e e A c t o f M a y 2 8 , 1 9 7 1 , 6 2 d L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 0 3 6 , § 4 9 , 1 9 7 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s 3 3 8 9 , 3 4 0 2 ( a d o p t i n g a n e w P e n a l C o d e a n d r e p e a l i n g f o r m e r a r t i c l e s ) ; A c t o f M a y 2 4 , 1 9 7 3 , 6 3 d L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 3 9 9 , § 5 , 1 9 7 3 T e x . G e n . L a w s 8 8 3 , 9 9 5 , 9 9 6 a , 9 9 6 c ( a d o p t i n g a n e w P e n a l C o d e a n d t r a n s f e r r i n g c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s t o t h e R e v i s e d C i v i l S t a t u t e s ) ; A c t o f M a y 1 3 , 1 9 9 9 , 7 6 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 3 8 8 , § § 1 , 6 , 1 9 9 9 T e x . G e n . L a w s 1 4 3 1 , 2 1 8 2

– 2 2 0 6 , 2 4 3 9

– 2 4 4 0 ( a d o p t i n g t h e O c c u p a t i o n s C o d e , i n c l u d i n g C h a p t e r 1 6 0 2 , a n d r e p e a l i n g f o r m e r a r t i c l e 8 4 5 1 a ) ; s e e a l s o A c t o f M a y 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 , 7 9 t h L e g . , R

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. 7 9 8 , § § 1

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. 0 1

– . 0 2 , 2 0 0 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s 2 7 3 4 , 2 7 3 5 , 2 7 5 9

– 2 7 6 0 ( a d o p t i n g C h a p t e r 1 6 0 3 o f t h e O c c u p a t i o n s C o d e a n d r e p e a l i n g o r a m e n d i n g r e l a t e d p r o v i s i o n s i n C h a p t e r s 1 6 0 1 a n d 1 6 0 2 )

. B e f o r e 1 9 3 5 , a s t a t u t e r e q u i r e d r e g i s t r a t i o n , b u t n o t l i c e n s i n g , o f “ b e a u t y p a r l o r ” o w n e r s a n d o p e r a t o r s , i m p o s e d c e r t a i n h e a l t h a n d c l e a n l i n e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s , a n d s e t f i n e s f o r s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s . S e e A c t o f 1 9 2 1 , 3 7 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 7 9 , 1 9 2 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s 1 5 5 , 1 5 5

– 1 5 8 , c o d i f i e d i n T E X
. P E N
. C O D E a r t s . 7 2 8

– 7 3 3 ( V e r n o n ’ s 1 9 2 5 )

. S e e H o u s e C o m m . o n G o v ’ t O r g . , B i l l A n a l y s i s , T e x . S

. B

. 3 8 4 , 6 6 t h L e g . , R

. S

. ( 1 9 7 9 ) ( “ T h e n e e d f o r 8
r e g u l a t i o n h a s p r i m a r i l y b e e n b a s e d o n t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c h e a l t h a n d w e l f a r e . ” ) ; H o u s e C o m m . o n P u b l i c H e a l t h , B i l l A n a l y s i s , T e x . S

. B

. 1 2 7 , 6 9 t h L e g . , R

. S

. ( 1 9 8 5 ) ( “ T h e n e e d f o r r e g u l a t i o n h a s p r i m a r i l y b e e n b a s e d o n t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c h e a l t h a n d w e l f a r e . ” )

. T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § 1 6 0 3

. 1 0 2

. 9

I d

. § § 1 6 0 3

. 1 0 3 , 1 6 0 3

. 1 0 4

. 10


### 4

## o f p ublic complaints. The 1935 Act made it unlawful to prac tice, provide, or teach 1 1 

## cosmetolog y

—broadly define d to include any prac tice for beautify ing the upper body —without a 1 2


## license. Applicants wer e require d to complete 1,000 hours of training at a licensed school of beauty

1 3


## culture a nd pass an e x amination. 1 4


## I n 1971, the L eg islature rew rote the Act. An expanded definition of cosmetolog y specific ally included “re moving superf luous hair from the body b y u s e o f depilatories or tweezer s”. The 1 5 1 6


## revised Act was more discriminating, cre ating five classes of licenses with differ ent restric tions on the activities in which a holder could eng ag e. Training require ments rang ed from 1,500 hours down 1 7


## to 150 hours, and applican ts had to pass written and prac tical examinations. Since then, the

1 8 1 9

I d

. § 5 1

. 2 5 2 ; s e e a l

s o i d

. § 1 6 0 3

. 1 5 1

. 11

A c t o f A p r . 2 5 , 1 9 3 5 , 4 4 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 1 6 , § 3 ( a ) , 1 9 3 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s a t 3 0 4 , c o d i f i e d a s f o r m e r T E X
. 12 P E N
. C O D E a r t

. 7 3 4 b , § 3 ( a ) ( “ A n y p e r s o n w h o w i t h h a n d s , o r m e c h a n i c a l o r e l e c t r i c a l a p p a r a t u s o r a p p l i a n c e s , o r b y t h e u s e o f c o s m e t o l o g i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n s , a n t i s e p t i c s , t o n i c s , l o t i o n s o r c r e a m s , e n g a g e s i n a n y o n e o r c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e f o l l o w i n g p r a c t i c e s f

o r r e m u n e r a t i o n o r p a y , t o - w i t : c l e a n s i n g , b e a u t i f y i n g , o r a n y k i n d r e d w o r k o f t h e s c a l p , f a c e , n e c k , a r m , b u s t , o r u p p e r p a r t o f t h e b o d y o r m a n i c u r i n g t h e n a i l s o f a n y p e r s o n , s h a l l b e c o n s t r u e d t o b e p r a c t i c i n g t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f a c o s m e t o l o g i s t

. ” )

.

I d

. § 1 , 1 9 3 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s a t 3 0 4 , c o d i f i e d a s f o r m e r T E X
. P E N
. C O D E a r t

. 7 3 4 b , § 1

. 13

I d

. § § 9 , 1 1 ( a ) , 1 9 3 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s a t 3 0 6

– 3 0 7 , c o d i f i e d a s f o r m e r T E X
. P E N
. C O D E a r t

. 7 3 4 b , § § 9 , 1 1 ( a )

. 14

A d e p i l a t o r y i s “ a c o s m e t i c f o r t h e t e m p o r a r y r e m o v a l o f u n d e s i r e d h a i r ”

. W E B S T E R ’ S T H IR D N E W 15 I N T E R N A T IO N A L D IC T IO N A R Y 6 0 5 ( 2 0 0 2 )

.

A c t o f M a y 2 8 , 1 9 7 1 , 6 2 d L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 0 3 6 , § 1 ( 3 ) ( C ) , 1 9 7 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s 3 3 8 9 , 3 3 8 9 , c o d i f i e d a s 16 f o r m e r T E X
. P E N
. C O D E a r t

. 7 3 4 c , § 1 ( 3 ) ( c )

.

I d

. § § 1 3

– 1 7 , 1 9 7 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s a t 3 3 9 2

– 3 3 9 4 , c o d i f i e d a s f o r m e r T E X
. P E N
. C O D E a r t

. 7 3 4 c , § § 1 3

– 1 7

. 17

I d

. 18

I d

. § § 4 ( d ) , 1 3

– 1 7 , 1 9 7 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s . a t 3 3 9 1

– 3 3 9 4 , c o d i f i e d a s f o r m e r T E X
. P E N
. C O D E a r t

. 7 3 4 c § § 4 ( d ) , 19 1 3

– 1 7

. 

### 5

## L eg islature h as repeatedly adjusted the kinds of licenses and the training require ments for eac h. 2 0



## There are now six classes of licenses with require d training rang ing from 1,500 hours to 320 hours. 2 1


## I n 2005, the L eg islature assig ned the reg ulation of cosmetolog y to the Texas Depa rtment of
L icensing and Reg ulation (“the Depa rtment”), “the primary state ag ency responsible for the

2 2 

## oversig ht of businesses, industries, g ener al trade s, and occupations that are reg ulated by the state and assig ned to the depar

tment by the leg islature. ” T h e De partment is manag ed by an executive 2 3


## direc tor and go verne d by the Texas Commi ssion of L icensing and Reg ulation (“the

2 4


## Commi ssion”). The Commi ssion is comprised of seven members appointed by the Gover nor and 2 5


## confirme d by the Senate, eac h of whom must be “a repr esenta ti v e of the g ener al public.” The 2 6 2 7


## Commi ssion soon beca

me awa re of the prac tice of ey ebrow threa ding, and in 2008 it beg an to insist that threa ding be included in the reg ulatory scheme like other forms of hair remova l. I n a 2011 case ,

S e e , e
. g
. , A c t o f M a y 2 8 , 1 9 7 9 , 6 6 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 6 0 6 , § 1 , 1 9 7 9 T e x . G e n . L a w s 1 3 4 0 , 1 3 4 3

– 1 3 4 4 20 ( a m e n d i n g f

o r m e r T E X
. R E V
. C IV
. S T A T
. a r t

. 8 4 5 1 a , § § 1 0

– 1 2 ) ; A c t o f M a y 2 7 , 1 9 9 1 , 7 2 d L e g . , R

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. 6 2 6 , § 1 1 , 1 9 9 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s 2 2 6 0 , 2 2 6 5 ( a d d i n g § 1 3 A t o f o r m e r T E X
. R E V
. C IV
. S T A T
. a r t

. 8 4 5 1 a ) ; A c t o f M a y 2 7 , 2 0 1 1 , 8 2 d L e g . , R

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. 1 2 4 1 , § § 1 5

– 1 7 , 2 0 1 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s 3 3 1 9 , 3 3 2 5

– 3 3 2 6 ( a m e n d i n g T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 7 a n d a d d i n g § § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 7 1 , 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 7 2 , a n d 1 6 0 2

. 2 6 1 )

.

T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 4

– . 2 5 7 2 , 1 6 0 2

. 2 6 1 , a m e n d e d b y A c t o f M a y 2 2 , 2 0 1 5 , 8 4 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , 21 H

. B

. 2 7 1 7 , a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : / / w w w . c a p i t o l

. s t a t e . t x . u s / t l o d o c s / 8 4 R / b i l l t e x t / p d f / H B 0 2 7 1 7 F

. p d f

. A c t o f M a y 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 , 7 9 t h L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 7 9 8 , § § 1

. 0 1 , 6

. 0 1

– . 0 2 , 2 0 0 5 T e x . G e n . L a w s 2 7 3 4 , 2 7 3 5 , 22 2 7 5 9

– 2 7 6 0 ( a d o p t i n g C h a p t e r 1 6 0 3 o f t h e O c c u p a t i o n s C o d e a n d r e p e a l i n g o r a m e n d i n g r e l a t e d p r o v i s i o n s i n C h a p t e r s 1 6 0 1 a n d 1 6 0 2 ) ; s e e T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § 1 6 0 3

. 0 0 2

.

T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § 5 1

. 0 5 1 ( a )

. 23

I d

. § § 5 1

. 1 0 1 , 5 1

. 1 0 3

. 24

I d

. § 5 1

. 0 5 1 ( b )

. 25

I d

. § 5 1

. 0 5 2 ( a )

. 26

I d

. § 5 1

. 0 5 3 ( a )

. 27


### 6

## the court of a ppeals wa s skeptical of the Depa rtment’s position, but a fter the decision issued, the 2 8


## L eg islature amende d the definition of cosmetolog y to include “re moving superf luous hair from a
p erson’s body using depilatories, prepa rations, or tweezing techniques ”

. The Depa rtment then 2 9



## am en d ed its reg ulations to define “twee zing techniques” as “the extraction of hair from the hair fo llicle by use of

. . . an instrument, appliance or implement

. . . made of

. . . threa d o r o t h er materia l.” 3 0


## The Depa rtment require s an esthetician specia lty license for threa ding. The license cover s 3 1


## various skin ca re trea tments such as fac ials and clea nsing, “bea

utify ing a person’ s fac e, neck, or arms” with prepa

rations or other products, and removing superf luous hair from t h e skin. An 3 2 

## applicant for an esthetician specialty license must compl et e 7 5 0 h ours of instruction in a li cense d beauty culture school, half the hours require d for an “oper ator license” allowing the perf ormanc e 3 3

K u n t z v
. K h a n , N o . 0 3

- 1 0

- 0 0 1 6 0

- C V , 2 0 1 1 W L 1 8 2 8 8 2 , * 7

– 8 ( T e x . A p p . — A u s t i n , J a n . 2 1 , 2 0 1 1 , n o p e t

. ) 28 ( m e m . o p . ) , a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : / / w w w . s e a r c h

. t x c o u r t s . g o v / C a s e . a s p x ? c n = 0 3

- 1 0

- 0 0 1 6 0

- C V & c o a = c o a 0 3

. I n a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l f r o m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s p a r t i a l d e n i a l o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l d e f e n d a n t s ’ p l e a t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d t e m p o r a r y i n j u n c t i o n b a r r i n g d e f

e n d a n t s f

r o m t a k i n g a n y a c t i o n t o f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t e , r e g u l a t e , o r o t h e r w i s e d i s r u p t K h a n ’ s b u s i n e s s , t h e D e p a r t m e n t a r g u e d t h a t e y e b r o w t h r e a d i n g c o n s t i t u t e s t h e p r a c t i c e o f c o s m e t o l o g y i n t h r e e w a y s : t h r e a d i n g i n v o l v e s “ b e a u t i f

y i n g a p e r s o n ’ s f

a c e ” u s i n g a n “ a p p l i a n c e ” , “ a d m i n i s t e r i n g a f a c i a l t r e a t m e n t ” , a n d “ r e m o v i n g s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r f

r o m a p e r s o n ’ s b o d y u s i n g d e p i l a t o r i e s ”

. S e e T E X O C C
. C O D E § § 1 6 0 2

. 0 0 2 ( 7 ) , 1 6 0 2

. 0 0 2 ( 8 ) , 1 6 0 2

. 0 0 2 ( 9 )

. I n a f

f i r m i n g t h e t e m p o r a r y i n j u n c t i o n , t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s c o n c l u d e d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e a s o n a b l y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t K h a n h a d s h o w n “ a p r o b a b l e r i g h t t o r e c o v e r y b a s e d o n t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e ”

. K h a n , 2 0 1 1 W L 1 8 2 8 8 2 , a t * 8

.

A c t o f M a y 2 7 , 2 0 1 1 , 8 2 d L e g . , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 2 4 1 , § 1 2 , 2 0 1 1 T e x . G e n . L a w s 3 3 1 9 , 3 3 2 3

– 3 3 2 4 ( e m p h a s i s i n 29
o r i g i n a l ) ( a m e n d i n g T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § 1 6 0 2

. 0 0 2 ( a ) ( 9 ) t o s u b s t i t u t e “ t w e e z i n g t e c h n i q u e s ” f o r “ m e c h a n i c a l t w e e z e r s ” )

. 3 7 T e x . R e g . 6 8 1 , 6 8 1 ( F e b

. 1 0 , 2 0 1 2 ) , c o d i f i e d a t 1 6 T E X
. A D M IN
. C O D E § 8 3

. 1 0 ( 3 6 )

. 30

T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 7 ( e l i g i b i l i t y f o r e s t h e t i c i a n s p e c i a l t y l i c e n s e )

. 31

I d

. § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 7 ( a ) ( s e t t i n g o u t t h e s e r v i c e s t h a t t h e h o l d e r o f a n e s t h e t i c i a n l i c e n s e i s a u t h o r i z e d t o p e r f o r m )

. 32

I d

. § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 7 ( b ) ( 3 )

. 33


### 7

## of “any prac t ice of cosmetolog y .” The instruction for an esthetician specia lty license cover s the 3 4 

## following subjects : 3 5 

## orientation, rules a

nd laws.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 hours sanitation, safe ty , and first a id.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 hours anatomy and phy siology

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 hours fac ial trea tment, cleansing , masking , thera py . . . . . . . . . . 225 hours superf luous hair re moval.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 hours elec tricity , machines, a

nd rela ted equipment.

. . . . . . . . . . . 75 hours makeup.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 hours chemistry

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 hours car e of c lient.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 hours manag ement.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 hours aroma thera py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 hours nutrition.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 hours color psy cholog y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 hours Depe nding on the school, the training can take from nine to six teen months and cost any wher e from $3,500 for a

public junior colleg e to $22,000 for a private school. Threa ding is not a require d part of the curr iculum, which g ener ally cover s “super fluous hair remova l”, and only a handful of schools offe r instruction in threa ding. Hea lth, safe ty , and sanitation issues are cover ed as part of the first five subjects listed above; these subjects ac count for 430 of the pre requisite hours.
An applicant must a lso pa ss a written a nd a pra ctical e x amination. The examinations test 3 6



## on safe ty , sanitation, and disinfectant criter ia as well as the ability to perf orm various service s. Hair

I d

. § § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 4 ( a ) ( p e r m i t t i n g “ a n y p r a c t i c e o f c o s m e t o l o g y ” ) , ( b ) ( 3 ) ( r e q u i r e d h o u r s )

. 34

1 6 T E X
. A D M IN
. C O D E § 8 3

. 1 2 0 ( b ) ( e s t h e t i c i a n c u r r i c u l u m )

. 35

I d

. § § 8 3

. 2 0 ( a ) ( 6 ) , ( b ) ( 6 ) , 8 3

. 2 1 ; s e e a l s o T E X
. O C C
. C O D E § § 1 6 0 2

. 2 5 4 ( c ) ( 3 ) , 1 6 0 2

. 2 6 2 ( a ) ( 2 )

. 36


### 8

## remova l is part of the pract i ca l exam, though threading is not, but an applicant may use t hrea ding

to demonstrate he r hair- remova l ability

. 3 7 

## Cosmetology reg ulations require ey ebrow threa ders, like other cosmetolog ists, to wash their hands or use a liquid hand sanitiz er befor e perf orming any service s on a cu s t o mer; dispose of all single -use items t h at h ave come in contac t with the client’s skin; store threa d in seale d bag s or

cover ed container s and in a clea n, dry , and debris-f

ree storag e are a; and clea

n, disinfect, and sterilize

or sanitiz e all multi-use items prior to eac h service

. Reg ulations further require cosmetolog ists and 3 8


## estheticians to clea

n the client’s skin befor e perf orming hair remova l service s. Special prec autions 3 9



## must be taken with items su ch as cre ams, astring ents, lotions, and other prepa rations, which are subject t o possible cross-c ontamination. Single- use i tems used t o apply these produc ts—such as 4 0 

## tissue, cotton pads, or cotton balls—must be discarde d in a trash rec eptac le that is emptied daily and kept clea n by washing or using plastic liners. Fa cial chair s, beds, and headr ests must be clea ned and 4 1

P e t i t i o n e r s a r g u e t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t d o s o b e c a u s e t h e e x a m i n e e i s r e q u i r e d t o “ h o l d t h e [ c l i e n t ’ s ] s k i n t a u t ” 37
w h i l e r e m o v i n g t h e h a i r s , a n d t h e t h r e a d i n g t e c h n i q u e r e q u i r e s t w o h a n d s . B u t t h e r e c o r d s h o w s t h a t i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e c l i e n t ’ s s k i n b e h e l d t a u t d u r i n g t h r e a d i n g a n d t h a t t h e u s u a l p r a c t i c e i s t o d i r e c t t h e c l i e n t t o h o l d h e r o w n s k i n t a u t d u r i n g t h e t h r e a d i n g p r o c e s s . T h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t t e l l u s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s w o u l d s u f f i c e d u r i n g t h e e x a m i n a t i o n .

1 6 T E X
. A D M IN
. C O D E § § 8 3

. 1 0 2 ( c ) , ( d ) , ( f ) , 8 1

. 1 0 4 ( a ) , ( d ) , ( e ) , 8 3

. 1 0 5 ( a ) , ( c ) , ( e ) , ( f )

. 38

I d

. § 8 3

. 1 0 5 ( b )

. 39

I d

. § 8 3

. 1 0 4 ( g )

. 40

I d

. § § 8 3

. 1 0 2 ( i ) , 8 3

. 1 0 4 ( e )

. 41


### 9

## disinfected befor e service is pr ovided to a client. Reg ulations also provide specific proce dures to 4 2


## follow whene ver a

cosmetolog y

service cause s bleeding

. 4 3


## The Threa ders acknow ledg e that threa ding poses health risks. I n the trial court, they offe red evidenc e from a phy sician, Dr

. P at el (no relation to Petitioner Ashish Patel), t hat removing a hair from its follicle opens a portal throug h which bacte ria or a vir u s ca n p er m ea t e the skin. Dr. Patel opined that threa ding may lead t o “r edness, swelling , itching, inflammation of the hair follicles, discoloration, and

. . . superf icial bacterial and viral i nfec tions.” She testified that threa ding c ould

cause t h e s prea d of infec tions such as flat war ts, skin-colore d lesions known as molluscum contag iosum, pink ey e, ring worm, impetigo, and methicillin-resistant staphy lococc us aure us (often called a “staph i n fection”). She opined that a threa der’ s failure to use appropr iate sanitation
prac tices—such as using disposable materia ls proper ly , clea ning the work st at i o n , u s ing effe ctive hand-w ashing techniques, and corr e c tl y tr e a ti n g s k in ir

r it a ti o n s and abra sions—can expose threa ding clients to infec tion and dis ease . She als o t estified that these health risks can be full y addre ssed by
g iving thre ader s one hour’ s training in sanitation and hy g iene. The Threa ders alleg e that, as applied to them, the cosmetol o gy l i censing scheme violates substantive due proce ss—that is, that it deprive s them of economic liberty without due course of law in violation of Article I , Section 1 9 of the Texas Constit ution. The Threa ders asser t that Texas’
reg ulation of cosmetolog y “plac es senseless burdens on ey ebrow threa ders and threa ding businesses without any actua l benef

it to public health and safe ty .” But the Threa ders acknow ledg e that Texas’

I d

. § 8 3

. 1 0 4 ( c )

. 42

I d

. § 8 3

. 1 1 1

. 43


### 1 0

## longsta

nding reg ulation of cosmetolog y , including superf luous hair remova l, is neede d to protec t the public health. The y

arg ue only

that it is ex cessive.

II On our rec ord, Texas’ reg ulation of threa ding seems excessive and misguided as a matter of policy , though I hasten to ad d , nothing of what prompted the reg ulation is befor e us. We have conducte d no investi gat i o n s and held no hear ings. As in any case , we know what the parties have told us, and nothing more. This distinguishes the J udiciary from the L eg islature. We are ill-equipped
to set policy beca

use we have no way of summoning the various interests for input or exploring all considerations. But on this recor d, threa ding r egulation is obviousl y too much.
I s it also unconstitutional? Fe dera l and Texas constitutional protections of due process are closely re l at ed

. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constit ution, adopted by Congr ess in
1 7 8 9 and ratified by the states two y ear s later, provides that no person shall “be deprive d o f l i fe , liberty , or p ro p er ty , without due proce ss of law”. The Four teenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, 4 4 

## prohibits the states from violating the same g uara ntee. I n betwee n, in 1845, the first Constit ution 4 5


## for the State of Texas provided that “[n] o citizen of this State shall be deprive d of life, liberty , [or]
proper ty

. . . except by due course of the law of the land.” The provision is now Article I , Section 4 6


## 19 of the Te x as Constitut ion.

U

. S

. C O N S T
. a m e n d

. V

. 44

U

. S

. C O N S T
. a m e n d

. X I V , § 1

. 45

T E X
. C O N S T
. O F 1 8 4 5 , a r t

. I , § 1 6

. 46


### 1 1

## A

This Court has rec og nized that Texas’ due course of law g uara ntee protec ts both proce dural and substantive rig hts. But we have be en mindful that apply ing substantive due proce ss doctrine 4 7


## to economic reg ulation has never met with rec og nized succe ss. The United States Supreme Court has vacillated in its view of the scope of fede ral due proce ss protec tion. I n Lochner v. New Y ork , the Supreme Court famously took a broad view, holding that New York’s reg ulation of baker s’ working hours violated the Four

teenth Amendment. Finding an implicit rig ht of contra ct in th e U nited States 4 8


## Constit ution, the Supreme Court conclude d that whether the state reg ulation deprive d baker s of this rig ht depends on whe ther it is:

a fair, rea sonable, and appropr iate exercise of the police power of the state, or [rather] an unrea sonable, unnece ssary and arbitra ry interfe renc e wi t h t h e rig ht of the individual to his persona l liberty or to enter

into those contrac ts in relation to labor which may

seem to him appropr iate or nece ssary for the support of himself a nd his family [.] 4 9


## J ustice Oliver Wende ll Holmes dissented, warning : This case is decide d upon an economic theory which a larg e part of the country does not e ntertain. I f it were a question whe ther I ag ree d with tha t the ory , I should desire t o s t u d y i t further and long befor e making up my mind. But I do not co n ce i v e that to be my duty , beca use I strong ly believe that my ag ree ment o r disag ree ment has nothing to do with the rig ht of a majority to embody their opinions in law[.] I t is settled by various decisions of this court that state con s t i t u tions and state laws may reg ulate life in many way s which we as leg islators might t h ink as injudicious or if y ou like as ty rannic al as this, a

nd which equally with this interf ere with the liberty to contra ct. Sunday laws and usury laws are ancie nt examples.

. . .

B a r s h o p v
. M e d i n a C n t

y
. U n d e r g r o u n d W

a t e r C o n s e r v a t i o n D i s t

. , 9 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 1 8 , 6 3 2 ( T e x . 1 9 9 6 )

. 47

1 9 8 U

. S

. 4 5 , 5 8

– 5 9 ( 1 9 0 5 )

. 48

I d

. a t 5 6

. 49


### 1 2

## Some of these laws embod y convictions or prejudice s which judge s are likely to

share

. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embod y a p ar t i cular economic theory , whether of pater nalism and the org anic rela tion of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire

. I t is made for people of fundame ntally differ ing views, and the acc ident of our finding cer tain opinion s natura l and familiar or novel and even shocking oug ht not to conclude our judgme nt upon the question whethe r statutes embody ing the m conflict with the Constitut ion of the United States. 5 0 

## Subsequent case s proved true Holmes’ war ning that a mere rea sonablene ss standard for substantive due proce ss was unworka

ble and that judge s cannot prac tically or leg ally constitutionaliz e economic theory

. Lochner ’s substantive due pr ocess a dventure soon ended.

5 1 

## Thirty -three y ear s later, the Supreme Court rec anted Lochner , stating matter-of -fa ctly , as if it should alway s have be en obvious:
reg ulatory leg islation aff ecting ordinary commerc ial t ra n s actions is not to be pronounce d unconstitutional unless in the light of the fac ts made known or g ener ally assumed, it is of such a ch ar ac t er as to prec lude the assumption that it rests upon some rational ba sis . . . . 5 2

I d

. a t 7 5

– 7 6 ( H o l m e s , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g )

. 50
S e e , e
. g
. , N e w S t a t e I c e C o
. v
. L i e b m a n n , 2 8 5 U

. S

. 2 6 2 , 2 7 8 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ( s t r i k i n g d o w n a s t a t e l a w p r o h i b i t i n g 51 t h e s a l e o f i c e w i t h o u t a p e r m i t a s u n r e a s o n a b l e b e c a u s e t h e s a l e o f i c e w a s n o t a “ p u b l i c b u s i n e s s ” t h a t c o u l d b e s o r e g u l a t e d ) ; L o u i s K

. L i g g e t t C o
. v
. B a l d r i d g e , 2 7 8 U

. S

. 1 0 5 , 1 1 3

– 1 1 4 ( 1 9 2 8 ) ( p r o h i b i t i o n o n a n y o n e n o t a l i c e n s e d p h a r m a c i s t o w n i n g a p h a r m a c y o r d r u g s t o r e s t r u c k d o w n b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e h a d n o t s h o w n a “ r e a s o n a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e p u b l i c h e a l t h ” ) ; A d a m s v
. T a n n e r , 2 4 4 U

. S

. 5 9 0 , 5 9 6

– 5 9 7 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ( f i n d i n g a s t a t u t e p r o h i b i t i n g e m p l o y m e n t a g e n c i e s f r o m d e m a n d i n g o r r e c e i v i n g f e e s f r o m w o r k e r s “ a r b i t r a r y a n d o p p r e s s i v e ” a n d “ u n d u l y r e s t r i c t [ i v e ] ” ) ; B u n t i n g v
. O r e g o n , 2 4 3 U

. S

. 4 2 6 , 4 3 3

– 4 3 4 , 4 3 8 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ( l a w t h a t p r o h i b i t e d e m p l o y e e s i n f a c t o r i e s f

r o m w o r k i n g m o r e t h a n 1 0 h o u r s a d a y , o r 1 3 h o u r s a d a y i f p a i d o v e r t i m e , u p h e l d a s a r e a s o n a b l e e x e r c i s e o f t h e p o l i c e p o w e r )

. C o m p a r e A d k i n s v
. C h i l d r e n ’ s H o s

p . , 2 6 1 U

. S

. 5 2 5 , 5 5 9 ( 1 9 2 3 ) ( m i n i m u m w a g e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r w o m e n i s a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t r u s i o n o n f r e e d o m o f c o n t r a c t , n o t p r o p e r e x e r c i s e o f t h e p o l i c e p o w e r ) , w i t h W

. C o a s t H o t e l C o
. v
. P a r r i s h , 3 0 0 U

. S

. 3 7 9 , 3 9 9

– 4 0 0 ( 1 9 3 7 ) ( m i n i m u m w a g e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n i s p r o p e r e x e r c i s e o f p o l i c e p o w e r , a s a m e a n s o f p r o t e c t i o n f

o r t h o s e “ i n a n u n e q u a l p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r ” ) ; c o m p a r e M u l l e r v
. O r e g o n , 2 0 8 U

. S

. 4 1 2 , 4 1 6 , 4 2 3 ( 1 9 0 8 ) ( l i m i t a t i o n o n h o u r s w o r k e d i n “ a n y m e c h a n i c a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t , o r f a c t o r y , o r l a u n d r y ” b y w o m e n u p h e l d a s a v a l i d e x e r c i s e o f t h e p o l i c e p o w e r a i m e d a t t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f w o m e n ) , a n d H o l d e n v
. H a r d y , 1 6 9 U

. S

. 3 6 6 , 3 9 5 ( 1 8 9 8 ) ( l i m i t a t i o n o n h o u r s w o r k e d i n u n d e r g r o u n d m i n e s a v a l i d e x e r c i s e o f t h e p o l i c e p o w e r f

o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h o s e e m p l o y e d i n a d a n g e r o u s p r o f e s s i o n ) , w i t h L o c h n e r , 1 9 8 U

. S

. a t 5 8 ( l i m i t a t i o n o n h o u r s w o r k e d i n a b a k e r y i s n o t a v a l i d e x e r c i s e o f t h e p o l i c e p o w e r )

.

U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. C a r o l e n e P r o d s
. C o
. , 3 0 4 U

. S

. 1 4 4 , 1 5 2 ( 1 9 3 8 )

. 52


### 1 3

## This require ment that economic reg ulation need only bear a rational rela tionship to a leg itimate state interest i s fa r more defe rential to state leg islatures than Lochner ’s rea sonablene ss test. L ater ref lecting on the passing of the Lochner era , J ustice Doug las wrote f or the Supreme Court: The day is g one when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Four t ee nth Amendment to strike d o wn s t ate laws reg ulatory of business and industrial conditions, beca

use they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particula r school of thought.

. . . For protec tion ag ainst abuses b y leg islatures the people must resor

t to the polls, not to the courts. 5 3



## B The United States Constitution does not, of course , prohibit the states from e x perimenting with substantive due proce ss based in their own const i t u t i ons, and Texas has done a bit of that. 5 4 

## Twenty y ear s ag o we summarized the c ase la w thusly : Texas courts have not been consistent in articula ting a standard of revie w under the due course clause

. Our courts have sometimes indicated that section 19 provides an identical g uara

ntee to its fede ral due proce ss counter part. Under fede ral due proce ss, a law that does not aff

ect fu n d am en t al rig hts or interests—such as the economic leg islation at issue here —is valid if it mere ly bear s a ra t i o n al rela tionship to a leg itim at e s tate interest. On other occa sions, howeve r, our Court has attempted to articu late our own independe nt due course standard, which some courts have char acte rized as more r igor ous than the fe dera l standard. 5 5 

## But, in the deca des since the fede ral courts adopted the rational basis test, we have not wande red far from that standard. Even in State v. Richards —the case relied on principally by the Threa ders to

W i l l i a m s o n v
. L e e O

p t i c a l o f O k l a
. , I

n c
. , 3 4 8 U

. S

. 4 8 3 , 4 8 8 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ( q u o t i n g M u n n v
. 53 I l l i n o i s , 9 4 U

. S

. 1 1 3 , 1 3 4 ( 1 8 7 6 ) )

.

S l a u g h t e r - H o u s e C a s e s , 8 3 U

. S

. ( 1 6 W a l l

. ) 3 6 , 7 4

– 7 8 ( 1 8 7 2 )

. 54

T e x
. W o r k e r s ’ C o m p
. C o m m ’ n v
. G a r c i a , 8 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 0 4 , 5 2 5 ( T e x . 1 9 9 5 ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ( i n t e r n a l 55 q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) ; s e e a l s o T r i n i t y R i v e r A u t h

. v
. U

R S C o n s u l t a n t s , I

n c
. , 8 8 9 S

. W

. 2 d 2 5 9 , 2 6 3 & n . 5 ( T e x . 1 9 9 4 )

. 

### 1 4

## support heightened scrutiny of economic reg ulation—the Court’s rea soning and result wer e

defe rential to the leg islation at issue. We conclude d that a provis i o n authoriz ing forf eiture of a

v ehicle that had been used in further ance of a crime without the owner ’s knowledg e did n o t
contra vene the Texas Consti tution. We expl ained: 5 6


## A larg e discretion is nece ssarily vested in the L eg islature to deter mine not only what the interests of the public require , but what measure s are nece ssary for the protec tion of such inter ests. I f there is room for a f air diff ere nce of opinion as to the nece ssity and rea sonablene ss of a leg islative enac tment on a subject which lies wit h i n the domain of the police power , the cour ts will not hold it void. 5 7 

## Thoug h we did not re fer

to the fede ral rational basis test, our analy sis was consistent with it.
For the past 20 y ear s, we ha ve consistently adher ed to the rational basis test. I n Barshop v. Medina County Underground W ater Conservation District , we uphe ld water reg ulations ag ainst a substantive due proce ss challeng e as “ra tionally rela

ted to leg itimate state purposes in manag ing and
reg ulating this vital resour ce.” I n City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Properties , we applied 5 8


## the ra tional basis test to city street reg ulations. We explained that the proper i nquiry “is whethe r 5 9


## the actions rationally could have been rela ted to a proper ex er cise of its police power .” And in 6 0 

## Mayhe w v. Town of Sunnyvale , we uphe ld a zoning ordina nce, e x plaining:

S t a t e v
. R i c h a r d s , 3 0 1 S

. W

. 2 d 5 9 7 , 5 9 9

– 6 0 0 , 6 0 2

– 6 0 3 ( T e x . 1 9 5 7 ) ( o n c e r t i f i e d q u e s t i o n s f

r o m c o u r t o f c i v i l 56
a p p e a l s )

. I

d

. a t 6 0 2

. 57
9 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 1 8 , 6 3 1

– 6 3 3 ( T e x . 1 9 9 6 )

. 58

2 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 6 0 , 6 5 ( T e x . 2 0 0 7 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. 59

I d

. 60


### 1 5

## A g ener ally applicable zoning ordin an ce wi l l survive a substantive due proce ss

challeng e if it is desig ned to acc omplish an objective within the g overnme nt’s police p o we r an d if a rational rela tionship exis ts betwee n the ordinanc e and its purpose. This defe rential inquiry does not focus on the ultimate eff ectivene ss of the ordinanc e, but on whether the enac ting b o d y could have rationally believed at the time of enac tment that the ordinan ce wo uld promote its objective. I f it is at least fairly debata ble that the decision was rationally rela ted to leg itimate g overnme nt interests, the decision must be upheld. The ordinanc e will violate substantive due proce ss only if it is clearly

arbitra ry and unre asonable

. 6 1


## Under our prec edent, a clea rly arbitra

ry and unrea sonable reg

ulation is one that has no ra t ional rela tionship t o its purpose in further ing a leg itimate state interest. The Court i nstead opts to concoc t an entire ly new standa

rd from the di ffe ring terminolog y used in our prec edents. To avoid violating substantiv e d u e p ro cess, a statute must not be “cle arly arbitra ry and unrea sonable” , must be sufficie ntly “ra tio n al and rea sonable” , must “strike [] a fair balanc e” betwee n the leg islative purpose and individual rig hts, must be “justified”, and must not be “oppre ssive” or “in contra vention of common rig ht”. Put all these words in a blender and out pours 6 2


## the corr ect standard: a statute must not be “so unrea sonably burdensome that it become s oppressive”

. Reasonable burdensomenes s i s o k ay . And I think the Court rea lly means unduly oppressive, as dist i n gu i shed from the oppressivene ss of the g overnme nt in g ener al. The analy sis would be laug hable if the conseque nces w ere not so serious. One c annot distill a sing le test from c ommon 6 3


## elements of the rational basis and “fa ir balanc e” standards; one must choose betwee n them. I nstead,

9 6 4 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 2 , 9 3 8

– 9 3 9 ( T e x . 1 9 9 8 ) ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. 61

A n t e a t

_ _ _ . 62

A s w e r e c e n t l y o b s e r v e d i n a d i f f e r e n t s e t t i n g , “ t h e t e s t f

o r d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g i s o p p r e s s i v e w i l l 63
n e c e s s a r i l y v a r y f

r o m o n e c o n t e x t t o t h e n e x t , a n d t h u s t h e t e r m h a s m u l t i p l e m e a n i n g s , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ” R i t c h i e v
. R u

p e , 4 4 3 S

. W

. 3 d 8 5 6 , 8 6 7 ( T e x . 2 0 1 4 )

. 

### 1 6

## the Court bree ds a strict, defe rential standard with a loose, non-def ere ntial one, and the resulting misbeg ot is . . . loose and non-def ere ntial. Whil e substantive due proces s h as been the subject of many case s and much study since Lochner , the C ourt cannot find a Tex as case, a case from an Americ an jur i s diction, or a scholarly
t re ati se or article to cite in support of its “oppre ssive” test. The obvious rea son is th at i t i s n o 6 4


## standard at all. Oppre ssion is very much in the ey e of the beholder

. I n this case , the Court takes into

acc ount the amount, cost, and apparen t u s ef u lness of the require d training , a threa der’ s lost income-e arning opportunity , and the dang er to public health and safe ty

. I suppose the Court would
ag ree that it should also take into acc ount the number and sever ity of incidents of harm due to poor training and the benef

it to thre ader s and the public. This proc ess is what is g ener ally ref err ed to a s leg islating. I t should be done. I t should not be done by judge s. The Court’s answe r is that a rational basis standard is no better beca use if, as in the prese nt

case , the State could rationally require some training , the State could re quire a n unlimit ed amount of training

. The arg ument is nonse nse. That some training is r ational does not me an that more is.

6 5


## There are no brig ht lines for setting a permissible tr ai n i n g require ment under either test. The

T h r e e L o c h n e r - e r a c a s e s r e f e r e n c e t h e i m p r o p r i e t y o f “ a r b i t r a r y o r o p p r e s s i v e ” l e g i s l a t i o n , b u t n o t o n e u s e s 64 t h e p h r a s e a s a f

o r m a l t e s t f

o r s u b s t a n t i v e d u e p r o c e s s . A d a m s v
. T a n n e r , 2 4 4 U

. S

. 5 9 0 , 5 9 5

– 5 9 6 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; M c L e a n v
. A r k a n s a s , 2 1 1 U

. S

. 5 3 9 , 5 4 7 ( 1 9 0 9 ) ; a c c o r d H o u s
. & T e x
. C e n t

. R y
. C o v
. C i t

y o f D a l l

. , 8 4 S

. W

. 6 4 8 , 6 5 3 ( T e x . 1 9 0 5 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t w i t h o u t j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a n “ i n v a s i o n o f [ ] r i g h t s u n d e r t h e g u i s e o f [ t h e S t a t e ’ s p o l i c e ] p o w e r ” w o u l d b e p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s “ u n r e a s o n a b l e , a r b i t r a r y , [ o r ] o p p r e s s i v e ” )

. T h e C o u r t i n s t e a d f o c u s e d i t s L o c h n e r - i a n s i g h t s o n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a “

j u s t r e l a t i o n t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r , ” a n d f i n d i n g n o n e , c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a d o v e r s t e p p e d i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b o u n d s . A d a m s , 2 4 4 U

. S

. a t 5 9 6 ; M c L e a n , 2 1 1 U

. S

. a t 5 4 7 ; c f

. H o u s
. & T

e x
. C e n t

. R y
. C o , 8 4 S

. W

. a t 6 5 3

. A n t e a t

_ _ _ . 65


### 1 7

## differ ence is that the rational basis stand ar d i n v o kes objective rea son as its measure , while the

“oppre ssive” test is nothing more than an a ppeal to a judg e’s pr edilections. The subjectiveness of the C ourt’s new test i s cl ear from it s response to the fact that Texas is not the only state that has conclude d threa ding should be reg ulated as p ar t of the prac tice of cosmetolog y or est h et i cs . Eig ht other states expli citly reg ulate threa ding in this way : Delaw are , Hawa ii, I llinois , I owa, L ouisiana, Mississippi , Oklahoma, a nd West Virginia. Two others de fine 6 6 

## cosmetolog y to encompa ss any ty pe of superf

luous hair remova l. These states eac h require aspiring 6 7 

## cosmetolog ists and estheticians to complete hours of course work in numbers simil ar to those require d in T exas. This is strong e vidence that Texas’ reg ulatory fra mework has a rational basis; 6 8

2 4 D E L
. A D M IN
. C O D E § 5 1 0 0

- 1 4

. 7 ( l i s t i n g “ t h r e a d i n g ” a s a n e x a m p l e o f “ h a i r r e m o v a l ” a n d p r o v i d i n g t h a t 66

“ [ h ] a i r r e m o v a l s h a l l b e p e r f o r m e d b y a l i c e n s e d c o s m e t o l o g i s t o r l i c e n s e d a e s t h e t i c i a n o n l y ” ) ; H A W
. R E V
. S T A T
. § 4 3 9

- 1 ( “ ‘ E s t h e t i c i a n ’ m e a n s a n y p e r s o n w h o , w i t h h a n d s o r n o n m e d i c a l l y p r e s c r i b e d m e c h a n i c a l o r e l e c t r i c a l a p p a r a t u s o r d e v i c e s . . . e n g a g e s f

o r c o m p e n s a t i o n i n . . . [ r ] e m o v i n g s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r a b o u t t h e b o d y o f a n y p e r s o n . ” ) ; 2 2 5 I L L
. C O M P
. S T A T
. 4 1 0 / 3

- 1 ( c o s m e t o l o g y i n c l u d e s “ r e m o v i n g s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r f

r o m t h e b o d y o f a n y p e r s o n b y t h e u s e o f d e p i l a t o r i e s , w a x i n g , t h r e a d i n g , o r t w e e z e r s ” ) ; i d

. 4 1 0 / 3 A

- 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( e s t h e t i c s i n c l u d e s “ r e m o v i n g s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r f

r o m t h e b o d y o f a n y p e r s o n ” ) ; I O W A C O D E § 1 5 7

. 1 ( 5 ) ( c ) ( “ ‘ C o s m e t o l o g y ’ m e a n s . . . [ r ] e m o v i n g s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r f

r o m t h e f a c e o r b o d y o f a p e r s o n w i t h t h e u s e o f d e p i l a t o r i e s , w a x , s u g a r s , t h r e a d i n g , o r t w e e z i n g ” ) ; i d

. § 1 5 7

. 1 ( 1 2 ) ( c ) ( e s t h e t i c s i n c l u d e s “ [ r ] e m o v i n g s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r ” ) ; L A
. R E V
. S T A T
. A N N
. § 3 7 : 5 6 3 ( 6 ) ( e s t h e t i c s i n c l u d e s “ h a i r r e m o v a l b y c o s m e t i c p r e p a r a t i o n s , t h r e a d i n g , w a x i n g , o r o t h e r s i m i l a r m e a n s ” ) ; M IS S
. C O D E A N N
. § 7 3

- 7

- 2 ( b ) ( i v ) ( c o s m e t o l o g y i n c l u d e s

“ [ a ] r c h i n g e y e b r o w s , t o i n c l u d e t w e e z i n g , w a x i n g , t h r e a d i n g o r a n y o t h e r m e t h o d s o f e p i l a t i o n ” ) ; i d

. § 7 3

- 7

- 2 ( d ) ( i i ) ( e s t h e t i c s i n c l u d e s t h e s a m e ) ; O K L A
. A D M IN
. C O D E § 1 7 5 : 1 0

- 9

- 5 5 ( a ) ( “ O n l y l i c e n s e d F a c i a l i s t / E s t h e t i c i a n s , C o s m e t o l o g i s t s o r B a r b e r s m a y p e r f o r m t h r e a d i n g . ” ) ; W

. V A
. C O D E § 3 0

- 2 7

- 3 ( a ) ( 4 ) ( e s t h e t i c s i n c l u d e s “ [ t ] h e w a x i n g , t w e e z i n g a n d t h r e a d i n g o f h a i r o n a n o t h e r p e r s o n ’ s b o d y ” )

.

6 3 P A
. C O N S
. S T A T
. § 5 0 7 ( c o s m e t o l o g y i n c l u d e s “ t h e r e m o v a l o f s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r ” ) ; S

. D

. C O D IF IE D L A W S 67 § 3 6

- 1 5

- 2 ( 4 ) ( t h e p r a c t i c e o f c o s m e t o l o g y i n c l u d e s “ r e m o v a l o f s u p e r f l u o u s h a i r b y n o n p e r m a n e n t m e a n s ” )

. L i k e T e x a s , I l l i n o i s a n d L o u i s i a n a r e q u i r e a p p l i c a n t s f o r a c o s m e t o l o g y l i c e n s e t o c o m p l e t e 1 , 5 0 0 h o u r s o f 68
c o u r s e w o r k

. 2 2 5 I L L
. C O M P
. S T A T
. 4 1 0 / 3

- 2 ( 1 ) ( c ) ; L A
. A D M IN
. C O D E t i t

. 4 6 § 3 0 1

. A n d , l i k e T e x a s , t h e y r e q u i r e a p p l i c a n t s f

o r a m o r e l i m i t e d e s t h e t i c i a n ’ s l i c e n s e t o c o m p l e t e 7 5 0 h o u r s o f c o u r s e w o r k

. 2 2 5 I L L
. C O M P
. S T A T
. 4 1 0 / 3 A

2 ( c ) ; L A
. A D M IN
. C O D E t i t

. 4 6 § 3 0 3

. D e l a w a r e , M i s s i s s i p p i , a n d O k l a h o m a r e q u i r e a p p l i c a n t s f o r a c o s m e t o l o g y l i c e n s e t o c o m p l e t e 1 , 5 0 0 h o u r s o f c o u r s e w o r k

. D E L
. C O D E A N N
. t i t

. 2 4 § 5 1 0 7 ; M IS S
. C O D E A N N
. § 7 3

- 7

- 1 3 ; O K L A
. A D M IN
. C O D E § 1 7 5 : 1 0

- 3

- 3 4

. T h e s e s t a t e s r e q u i r e a p p l i c a n t s f o r a n e s t h e t i c s l i c e n s e t o c o m p l e t e 6 0 0 h o u r s o f c o u r s e w o r k

. D E L
. C O D E A N N
. t i t

. 2 4 § 5 1 3 5 ; M IS S
. C O D E A N N
. § 7 3

- 7

- 1 8 ; O K L A
. A D M IN
. C O D E § 1 7 5 : 1 0

- 3

- 3 9

. H a w a i i a n d W e s t V i r g i n i a r e q u i r e 1 , 8 0 0 h o u r s o f

c o u r s e w o r k f

o r c o s m e t o l o g y a n d 6 0 0 h o u r s f o r e s t h e t i c s . H A W
. R E V
. S T A T
. § 4 3 9

- 1 2 ( b ) , ( d ) ; W

. V A
. C O D E R

. § § 3

- 1

- 5

. 1 , 3

- 1

- 9

. 1

. I o w a a n d S o u t h D a k o t a r e q u i r e 2 , 1 0 0 h o u r s o f c o u r s e w o r k f

o r a c o s m e t o l o g y l i c e n s e 

### 1 8

## it is common to many states. The Court’s response is “so what”. The rea soned judgme nt of multipl e

state leg islatures is irrele vant to the Court beca use whether the training require ments are excessive and oppressive depends on what Texas judg es think. The Court’s “oppre ssive” test is pure judicial policy

. As long as judicial policy is made in the name of substantive due proce ss, the Court arg ues, it i s j u d gi n g, not leg islating. But the Court cannot, simply by invoking a constitutional doctrine, mask the true policy -making char acte r of its ruling

. One could take the Court’s analy sis of the costs and benefits of reg ulating ey ebrow threa ders an d o ff er i t in evidenc e at a legislative hearing , only there would also be evidenc e rela ting to t h e needs of the public and the cosmetolog y industry
g ener ally , evidenc e that the Court does not have and ca n n o t weigh. The substantive due proce ss doctrine em p o we rs the J udiciary to chec k reg ulation that is a clea rly arbitra

ry depriva tion of

econom ic liberty in violation of due course of law. The rational basis test for making this deter mination is not a disclaimer of judicial responsibility but a leg al and prac tical rec og nition that “[t] he wisdom or expediency of the lawis the L eg islature’s pr erog ative, not ours.” 6 9

a n d 6 0 0 h o u r s f

o r a n e s t h e t i c s l i c e n s e . I O W A C O D E § 1 5 7

. 1 0 ( 1 ) ; I O W A A D M IN
. C O D E r . 6 4 5

. 6 1

. 1 4 , S

. D

. A D M IN
. R

. 2 0 : 4 2 : 0 6 : 0 9 , 2 0 : 4 2 : 0 6 : 0 9

. 0 2

. P e n n s y l v a n i a r e q u i r e s 1 , 2 5 0 h o u r s o f c o u r s e w o r k f o r a c o s m e t o l o g y l i c e n s e a n d 3 0 0 h o u r s f o r a n e s t h e t i c s l i c e n s e . 6 3 P A
. C O N S
. S T A T
. § § 5 1 0 ( a ) ( 3 ) , 5 1 1 ( b ) ( 1 )

. S o m e s t a t e s a l l o w a s p i r i n g c o s m e t o l o g i s t s a n d e s t h e t i c i a n s t o c o m p l e t e a n a p p r e n t i c e s h i p i n l i e u o f o r i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h c l a s s r o o m w o r k

. S e e , e
. g
. , D E L
. C O D E A N N
. t i t

. 2 4 § 5 1 0 7 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( b )

– ( c ) ; H A W
. R E V
. S T A T
. § 4 3 9

- 1 2 ( b ) , ( d ) ; 6 3 P A
. C O N S
. S T A T
. § § 5 1 0 ( a ) , 5 1 0

. 3 , 5 1 6 ; S

. D

. A D M IN
. R

. 2 0 : 4 2 : 0 7 : 0 6

– 0 7

.

T e x
. W o r k e r s ’ C o m p
. C o m m ’ n v
. G a r c i a , 8 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 0 4 , 5 2 0 ( T e x . 1 9 9 5 ) ( q u o t i n g S m i t h v
. D a v i s , 4 2 6 69 S

. W

. 2 d 8 2 7 , 8 3 1 ( T e x . 1 9 6 8 ) )

. 

### 1 9

## III

That t h e Court has g one wher e no one has g one befor e is proudly decla red by J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## ’ S 

## concur

ring opinion. Go n e ar e the constraints of t he rational basis standard, a s tandar d dismiss ed as a “rubbe r stamp” and a “judicial shrug ”. J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## ’ S 

## rhetoric al torrent ag ainst economic reg ulation car

ries along its ultimate demand: Texas judge s must conduct an investiga tion “asking ” what the “g overnme nt [i s] actua lly up to”, weig hing “wha t policy maker s really had in mind
at t he ti me,” “ scrutin[iz ing]” “ actua l assertions with actua l evidenc e.” All this Sturm und Drang 7 0



## announce s a new day

. And to be sure, all this “asking ” and “scr utiniz [i ng ]” is not judicial activism.
I t is merely

judicial un-passivism.
I ag ree with J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## about one thing: “[t] his case conce rns far more than whether Ashish Patel can pluck unwanted hair with a strand of threa d.” I t is about a drama tic arr og ation of 7 1


## power by the Court. Economic reg ulation is invalid whene ver a m aj o ri t y o f this Court fee ls it is oppressive. Hair sty lists could make the same arg ument the Threa ders do: w hy should the y be require d
to h av e i n s t ruction and ex amination in fac ial trea tment, manicuring , massag e, and the removal of unwanted hair? Whether to c rea te various licensing classifica tion sc hemes, and which prac tices to include within eac h, have been questions centr al to cosmetolog y reg ulation since 1971. I t is the kind of line-dra

wing that the L egi s l at ure and the Depa rtment, not courts, are equipped to do. More

A n t e a t

_ _ _ ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l )

. 70

A n t e a t

_ _ _ . 71


### 2 0

## importantly , the Constit ution g ives this line-dra wing power

—this policy

making—to the L eg islature and the Executive, not to the Judi ciar y . The same issue applie s to o th e r o c c u p a ti o n al reg ulation. There is an ong oing debate reg arding whether law school should have a third y ear , whether students should be allowe d to sit for the bar

exam ear lier, and whether a lawy er should be allowed to obtain a special, limit ed-pr actice license with less instruction. Fur

ther, students intent on pursuing a particula r are a of prac tice—tax law, for example—question why they should be require d to take other course s, including those, like civil
proce dure, thought to be part of a fundame ntal first-y ear curr iculum. Medica l education is simil arly questioned. Why should students intent on confining their prac tice to particula r are as or specia lities be require d to take unrela

ted course s? The answe r is often that subjects unrela ted to a particula r field of prac tice are never

theless part of the backg round information important to the discipline. But even when this rationale is lacking , substantive due proce ss i s n o t violated mere ly beca use medical education is not tailor-made for eac h student. Our inquir y i s wh et h er the cosmetolog y licensing scheme is unconstitutional, not whether we think the lines chosen by the L eg islature are well-plac ed

as a ma tter of policy

. And wh i l e Lochner justified judicial invalidation of economic reg ulation in the name of substantive due proce ss to protec t a liberty interest g rounded in an im p l i ed co n s t i tutional rig ht to
contra ct, liberty

is not solely , not e ven primarily , an economic conce pt. O ther constitutional rig hts have been found by implication in our constitutions. Scholars arg ue that the rig ht to privac y implied 7 2

F o r a r e c e n t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s u b s t a n t i v e d u e p r o c e s s a n d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s i t h a s b e e n 72 h e l d t o p r o t e c t , s e e J o s h u a D

. H a w l e y , T h e I n t e l l e c t u a l O r i g i n s o

f ( M o d e r n ) S u b s t a n t i v e D u e P r o c e s s , 9 3 T E X
. L

. R E V
. 2 7 5 , 2 8 0 , 3 2 8

– 3 3 4 ( 2 0 1 4 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e d e m i s e o f t h e L o c h n e r - e r a p o l i c e p o w e r s j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d i t s r e p l a c e m e n t 

### 2 1

## by the United States Supreme Court in the fede ral Constit ut i o n p ro v ides the basis for protec ting

persona l liberty from social reg ulation. The Court’s power g rab will not be limit ed to the 7 3


## “re g ulation of economic interests”, but will be wielded in future cases ag ainst all manner of 7 4 

## leg islation, may

be not by members of this Court , b u t by others who see today as prec edent. The Lochner monster, rediscove red and unleashe d by the Court, will stray far from the J udiciary ’s proper sphere of authority

—and to place s far afie ld of t h e ec o n o m ic rea lm to which the Court is
sy mpathetic. J udicial usurpation of authority over the State’s policies may provide protec tion for the economic liberties on which the concur renc e waxes eloquent, but it also g ives rise to such decisions

as Roe v. W

ade

. J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## applauds t h e C o urt for “nar row[ing] the differ ence ” betwee n 7 5


## fundame ntal rig hts—a varsity team (to use his metaphor) that includes not only rig hts protec ted by the Fir st Amendment, but also privac y -base d liberty interests discover ed solely in the due proc ess clause itself—and the economic interests asser ted here

. J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## ’ S 

## concur ring opinion fills the Court’s sails and sets a Lochner -ian c ourse.

w i t h m o d e r n f

u n d a m e n t a l

- r i g h t s j u r i s p r u d e n c e , a n d a r g u i n g t h a t t h i s s h i f t o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t c a m e t o f i n d “ p e r s o n a l m o r a l c h o i c e ” a n d “ s e l f

- d e v e l o p m e n t ”

— s u c h a s t h e “ r i g h t o f p r i v a c y ” t h e C o u r t p r o t e c t e d i n R o e v
. W a d e , 4 1 0 U

. S

. 1 1 3 , 1 5 3 ( 1 9 7 3 )

— t o b e m o r e “ c o m p e l l i n g ” t y p e s o f l i b e r t y t h a n t h e p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y p r o t e c t i o n s t h a t w e r e t h e a i m o f t h e L o c h n e r e r a )

.

S e e , e
. g
. , D a v i d

. E

. B e r n s t e i n , L o c h n e r E r a R e v i s i o n i s m , R e v i s e d : L o c h n e r a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f F u n d a m e n t a l 73 R i g h t s C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , 9 2 G E O
. L

. J

. 1 , 6 0 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ( a r g u i n g t h a t “ L o c h n e r i a n f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s a n a l y s i s r e t u r n e d i n m u t a t e d f

o r m ” i n m o d e r n f

u n d a m e n t a l

- r i g h t s d e c i s i o n s s t r i k i n g d o w n l a w s a s v i o l a t i v e o f “ u n e n u m e r a t e d d u e p r o c e s s r i g h t s ” ) ; D a v i d N

. M a y e r , S u b s t a n t i v e D u e P r o c e s s R e d i s c o v e r e d : T h e R i s e a n d F a l l o

f L i b e r t y o f C o n t r a c t , 6 0 M E R C E R L

. R E V
. 5 6 3 , 6 4 0

– 6 4 2 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e l i b e r t y o f c o n t r a c t c a s e s t h a t w e r e u s e d a s g r o u n d w o r k f o r t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ’ s l a t e r p r o t e c t i o n s o f a “ r i g h t t o p r i v a c y ” )

.

A n t e a t

_ _ _ . 74

4 1 0 U

. S

. 1 1 3 ( 1 9 7 3 )

. 75


### 2 2

## IV

I would apply the test established by our pre cede nt: reg ulation is unc onstitut ional only if it lacks a rational rela tionship to a leg itimate g overnme nt interest. The parties’ evidenc e, the State’s 7 6


## purpose in its reg ulatory scheme , and the eff ects of that reg ulation are all to be considere d. But our 7 7


## prec edent makes clea

r that judge s are not t o we i gh t h e evidenc e to deter mine whether the State’s
purpose and approa ch are rea sonable or whether they will be succe ssful; the role of judge s is instead to decide whether , in light of the e vidence prese nted, the ena cting body “could ha ve ra tionally

. . . decide d that the measure might achie ve the objective.” Unlike the Court’s “oppre ssive” test, this 7 8 

## inquiry is objective, looking not to whether the g overnme ntal body subjectively believed the purpose would be acc omplished, but to whether a rea sonable g overnme ntal body could have so believed in light of the evidenc e. I t is not for the J udiciary to corr ect a mere err or in judgme nt by the policy making branc hes. The Threa ders do not dispute that, in g ener al, Texas’ l o ng -standing reg ulation of

S e e C i t y o f S a n A n t o n i o v
. T

P L P O f f i c e P a r k P r o p s
. , 2 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 6 0 , 6 4

– 6 6 ( T e x . 2 0 0 7 ) ( p e r c u r i a m ) ; 76 M a y h e w v
. T

o w n o f S u n n y v a l e , 9 6 4 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 2 , 9 3 8

– 9 3 9 ( T e x . 1 9 9 8 ) ; B a r s h o p v
. M e d i n a C n t

y
. U n d e r g r o u n d W

a t e r C o n s e r v a t i o n D i s t

. , 9 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 1 8 , 6 3 1

– 6 3 3 ( T e x . 1 9 9 6 ) ; S t a t e v
. R i c h a r d s , 3 0 1 S

. W

. 2 d 5 9 7 , 6 0 2

– 6 0 3 ( T e x . 1 9 5 7 )

.

I n B a r s h o

p , w e c o n s i d e r e d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t ( 1 ) t h e S t a t e h a s a l e g i t i m a t e p u r p o s e i n 7 7
r e g u l a t i n g t h e u s e o f w a t e r i n t h e E d w a r d s A q u i f e r , w h i c h i s a s c a r c e r e s o u r c e ; a n d ( 2 ) t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e d p r o v i s i o n s w e r e r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e S t a t e ’ s “ p u r p o s e s i n m a n a g i n g a n d r e g u l a t i n g t h i s v i t a l r e s o u r c e . ” 9 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d a t 6 2 5 , 6 3 3

. W e e x p l a i n e d t h a t , b e c a u s e B a r s h o p w a s a f a c i a l c h a l l e n g e , “ w e s h o u l d p r e s u m e ” t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y f a c t s u n d e r w h i c h t h e A c t w o u l d b e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l “ w i t h o u t m a k i n g a s e p a r a t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . . . o r a t t e m p t i n g t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e L e g i s l a t u r e h a s r e a c h e d a c o r r e c t c o n c l u s i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f a c t s . ” I d

. a t 6 2 5

. T h i s p r e s u m p t i o n e x i s t s b e c a u s e a f a c i a l c h a l l e n g e r e q u i r e s t h e c h a l l e n g e r t o s h o w t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e d r e g u l a t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l u n d e r “ a n y p o s s i b l e s t a t e o f f a c t s . ” I d

. A l t h o u g h t h i s b u r d e n i s h i g h , a p l a i n t i f f c h a l l e n g i n g a l a w o n i t s f a c e n e v e r t h e l e s s h a s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u t o n e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e d l a w i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n a l l p o s s i b l e a p p l i c a t i o n s .

T P L P O f f i c e P a r k P r o

p s
. , 2 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 6 4

– 6 5 ( c i t i n g N o l l a n v
. C a l

. C o a s t a l C o m m ’ n , 4 8 3 U

. S

. 8 2 5 , 8 3 4 78
n . 3 ( 1 9 8 7 ) )

. 

### 2 3

## cosmetolog y is rationally

rela ted to the State’s leg itimate interest in protec ting public he alth and safe ty

. The Threa ders arg ue only that the reg ulation as applied to ey ebrow threa ding—spe cifica lly ,

7 9


## the training and testing require d for licensure —is so excessive as to deprive them of their liberty in choosing an occ upation. The State doe s not dispute that as m any as 320 of t he required 750 hours

are not useful to ey ebrow threa ders, but it arg ues that the require ments are not clea rly arbitra ry , as 8 0 

## they must be to violate substantive due proc ess under the cor rec t test.
T h e h ealth risks of commerc ial hair remova l cannot be minimi zed. Dr. Patel, the expert offe red by the Threa ders in the trial court, testified that avulsive hair remova l opens a portal throug h which b ac t eria can enter the body throug h the skin. For this rea son, she explained, she trains threa ders in her medical spa to use an antiseptic on the ey ebrow are a befor e beg inning the threa ding
proce ss a nd to a pply an astring ent to the skin a fter the proce ss is complete. The astring ent helps to close up the hair follicle to make it diffic ult for bac teria to e nter. Patel testified that she also trains threa ders o n m et h o ds of keeping their work are a clea n, keeping the threa d sanitary , and on the importa n ce of alway s using a new piece of threa d (and any other single-use items) on eac h client. She testified t hat t hrea ders may need to be able to identify skin infec tions or ot her conditions that would make threa ding unsafe for a particula r client. Patel rec og nized that threa ding may lead to the

W e n o t e t h a t T e x a s h a s r e g u l a t e d a r e l a t e d p r a c t i c e , b a r b e r i n g , s i n c e 1 9 0 7

. A c t o f A p r . 1 8 , 1 9 0 7 , 3 0 t h L e g . , 79 R

. S

. , c h

. 1 4 1 , 1 9 0 7 T e x . G e n . L a w s 2 7 3

. W e h a v e t w i c e h e l d t h a t r e g u l a t i o n o f b a r b e r i n g i s i m p o r t a n t t o p u b l i c h e a l t h a n d s a f e t y . T e x
. S t a t e B d

. o

f B a r b e r E x a m ’ r s v
. B e a u m o n t B a r b e r C o l l

. , 4 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 7 2 9 , 7 3 1 ( T e x . 1 9 7 0 ) ; G e r a r d v
. S m i t h , 5 2 S

. W

. 2 d 3 4 7 , 3 5 0 ( T e x . C i v . A p p . — E l P a s o 1 9 3 2 , w r i t r e f ’ d )

.

A t o r a l a r g u m e n t , t h e S t a t e a g r e e d t h a t “ 4 3 0 h o u r s o f t h e 7 5 0

- h o u r c u r r i c u l u m a r e a d d r e s s e d t o s u b j e c t m a t t e r 80
r e l e v a n t t o e y e b r o w t h r e a d i n g ” a n d e x p l a i n e d t h a t i t “ h a s n o t a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e m a i n i n g 3 2 0 h o u r s o f i n s t r u c t i o n a r e [ ] n e c e s s a r y . ” 

### 2 4

## s p read of various contag ious bacte rial and viral infec tions and that a threa der’ s failure to ut i l i z e

appropr iate sanitation ca

n further expose threading

clients to infection and dise ase. Applicants for a g ener al cosmetolog y license or an e s th e ti c ia n s p e c ia li ty li c e nse are instructed in g ener al sanitation and safe ty prac tices, and eac h of the specific proce dures they lear n incorporates the hy g iene and safe ty prac tices pertinent to that proce dure. I f they attend a school that t ea ches threa ding, they lear

n to apply these conce pts spe cifica lly to tha t pr actice , and if instead they attend

a school that does not instruct in threa d i n g, t h ey never theless lear

n these safe ty implications and require ments as applied to o t h er av u lsive forms of hair remova l. Moreove r, althoug h there is evidenc e that only a few cosmetolog y school s cu rrently teac h threa ding, the L eg islature could

rea sonably have conclude d that more scho o ls will teac h it as demand for the proce dure g rows. Although there is evidenc e that no more than an hour of sanitation training is nece ssary for threa ding, there is other evidenc e from which the L eg islature could re as o n ab l y conclude that the require d instruction and testing would further its g oal of protec ting p u b l i c health and safe ty throug h the
reg ulation of cosmetolog y . * * * * * Texas’ cosmetolog y reg ulation as applied to threa di n g is, to quote J ustice Holmes, “injudicious”, though I would not g o so far as to say “ty rannic al”, and cer

tainly not clea

rly arbitra ry . I would hold that the reg

ulation is rationally rela ted to the State’s leg itimate interest in protec ting the health and sa fety

of the public.

2 5

## The Court pooh-poohs the Lochnerian “monster”

. A word of caution: those who cannot

reme mber the pa st are c ondemned to re peat it. 8 1


## I would aff

irm the judg ment of the c ourt of appe als. Acc ording ly , I respe ctfully dissent.

Nathan L . Hec ht Chief J ustice Opinion delivere d: J une 26, 2015

I G E O R G E S A N T A Y A N A , T H E L IF E O F R E A S O N : R E A S O N I N C O M M O N S E N S E 2 8 4 ( C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ’ s S o n s , 2 d 81
e d

. 1 9 2 9 

## ).
2 6