[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-11864

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00064-RDP

KEVEN ROBINSON, 

on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

VIRGINIA COLLEGE, LLC, 

EDUCATION CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Defendants - Appellants.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

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(October 16, 2019)

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Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Virginia College, LLC, and its parent company, Education Corporation of 

America, appeal the denial of their motion to compel Keven Robinson to arbitrate 

his complaint against the entities and to strike the class allegations from his 

complaint. Robinson earned three degrees from Virginia College, and later he 

became its employee and signed an arbitration agreement. After the College lost its 

accreditation and closed several of its campuses, Robinson sued the College and 

Education Corporation for allegedly awarding worthless degrees, deceiving former 

and current students, and depriving students of postgraduation services and 

employment opportunities. The district court ruled that Robinson’s complaint fell 

outside the scope of his employment-related arbitration agreement. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

To determine whether Robinson’s complaint was arbitrable, we accept as 

true his allegations about his education at and his employment with the College. 

See Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1328 n.1 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (accepting as true allegations in a complaint dismissed due to an 

arbitration agreement). According to Robinson, between 2000 and 2011, he

obtained an associates degree, a bachelor’s degree, and a master’s degree from the 

College. The College and Education Corporation promised to provide students

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credentials necessary to obtain a job following graduation. And Robinson amassed 

a student debt of more than $100,000 to pay for his education.

In 2015, the College hired Robinson as an employee. He signed an

arbitration agreement that referred to him as “Employee” and to Education 

Corporation, its “affiliates, [and] subsidiaries” as “the Company” and defined 

Robinson’s “Employment with the Company [as] at-will.” The agreement required 

that the “dispute, controversy or claim[] aris[e] out of or relate[] to this Agreement, 

the employment relationship between the parties, or the termination of the 

employment relationship . . . .” Those disputes “include[d] any claims that the 

Company may have against the Employee or that Employee may have against the 

Company. . ., including any claims that could have been brought before any court.” 

The agreement also contained a class action waiver that allowed “the Company . . . 

[to] lawfully seek enforcement of this Arbitration Agreement” despite the right of 

“Employee . . . [to] exercis[e] . . . rights under Section 7 of the National Labor 

Relations Act . . . .” The class action provision permitted the parties, “BY 

ENTERING THIS AGREEMENT, . . . [TO] BRING CLAIMS AGAINST 

THE OTHER ONLY IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT AS 

A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS 

AND/OR COLLECTIVE PROCEEDING.”

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The agreement required the arbitration to be administered under “the 

American Arbitration Association Employment Arbitration Rules,” a copy of 

which Robinson could obtain from his “HR representative.” And the agreement 

required Robinson to comply with employment laws that required him to “exhaust 

administrative remedies” with labor organizations such as “the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the National Labor Relations Board 

(“NLRB”), [and] the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”).”

The agreement delineated what employment-related claims were included 

and excluded from arbitration. Robinson and the company agreed to a nonexhaustive list of claims to arbitrate that included,

. . . claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans With 

Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Family 

Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor Standards, [sic] Act, Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act, Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, . . . 

any . . . anti-discrimination laws, or any other federal, state or local law, 

ordinance, or regulation based on any public policy, contract, tort, or 

common law.

The agreement also required arbitration of “claims for workers compensation 

retaliation . . . [and] violation[s] of the Employment Retirement Income Security 

Act of 1974, as amended.” Claims excluded from the agreement included,

. . . (i) claims for workers compensation, state disability insurance and 

unemployment insurance benefits . . .; (ii) claims based upon the 

Company’s current (successor or future), employee pension and/or 

welfare benefit plans if those plans contain some form of a grievance 

or other procedure for resolution of disputes . . .; (iii) to the extent 

permitted by law claims for injunctive relief to enforce rights to trade 

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secrets, or agreements not to compete or solicit clients or employees 

and (iv) claims that may not be subject to predispute arbitration 

agreements as provided by the Frank-Dodd Wall Street Reform Act and 

Consumer Protection Act.

In December 2018, Education Corporation, which operated private colleges 

across the United States, lost its accreditation. The Education Corporation then 

closed the College and its other educational institutions.

Robinson filed a complaint in an Alabama court against Education 

Corporation and the College (collectively Education Corporation), which removed 

the action to the district court. Robinson complained, on behalf of himself and a 

putative class of all similarly situated persons, of negligence, wantonness, breach 

of contract, breach of implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violations of the 

Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Robinson sought monetary damages and 

injunctive relief.

Education Corporation filed a motion to compel Robinson to arbitrate his 

complaint and to strike his class allegations, which he opposed. Education 

Corporation argued that Robinson had “specifically agreed to arbitrate any claims 

he may have against [it] and [had] waived his right to participate in any class 

proceeding against [it]” and submitted a copy of his arbitration agreement. 

Robinson responded that the arbitration agreement was “expressly limited to 

employment disputes,” postdated his education at the College, and “in no way . . . 

require[d] . . . [him] to arbitrate . . . [his] claims in exchange for employment.”

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The district court denied the motion filed by Education Corporation on the 

ground that “the dispute [was] not within the scope of the arbitration agreement 

and the class action waiver is inapplicable.” The district court ruled that “the 

language in the subject arbitration agreement . . . [was limited] to any and all 

employment-based or employment-related claims.” The district court also ruled 

that, “[b]ecause [Robinson’s] class claims arising from his role as a student (a role 

that predates the parties’ arbitration agreement) are beyond the scope of the 

employment arbitration agreement, the class action waiver cannot obligate him to 

pursue his claims individually.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Doe v. 

Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

Education Corporation argues that the denial of its motion to arbitrate and to 

strike Robinson’s class allegations “conflicts with . . . hornbook law” and the 

policy goals of the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration agreements. It 

argues that the arbitration agreement “is drafted broadly enough to capture 

nonemployment-related claims.” It also argues that the class action waiver is 

“independently enforceable.”

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“[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. 

Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). To further the purpose of the Federal 

Arbitration Act to “guarantee[] the enforcement of private contractual 

arrangements,” arbitration agreements must be interpreted consistent with “the 

clear intent of the parties . . . [and] the plain language of the contract . . . .”

E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002). It follows that “the 

language of the contract . . . defines the scope of disputes subject to arbitration.” 

Id. at 289. So “parties . . . [are not required] to arbitrate when they have not agreed 

to do so.” Id. at 293 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 

Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).

The district court correctly denied the motion to compel Robinson to 

arbitrate. Education Corporation cannot force Robinson to arbitrate claims about 

his education when their arbitration agreement applies exclusively to employmentrelated disputes. For a claim to “be arbitrable . . . [it must be] either directly or 

indirectly related to the subject matter of the contract.” Telecom Italia, SpA v. 

Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1114 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Joseph 

T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 

905, 932 (1996)). The agreement Robinson signed addresses only his employment,

and it requires the arbitration of only employment-related claims. “If the language 

about employment . . . did not limit the scope of the arbitration provision, it would 

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have no purpose, and that is an interpretative no-no.” Doe, 657 F.3d at 1218.

Because employment is the sole subject matter of the arbitration agreement, it does 

not encompass Robinson’s dispute with the company as his educator.

Education Corporation argues that the agreement to arbitrate “any claim” is 

broad enough to subsume claims related to Robinson’s education, but that 

argument is belied by “the plain text of the contract” and “the clear intent of the 

parties,” Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294. The sentence on which the company relies 

states plainly that Robinson “agree[s] to arbitrate . . . any claims . . . [he has as an] 

Employee . . . against the Company” and does not mention education. The 

preceding sentence reinforces that conclusion; it states that Robinson agrees to

arbitrate “any dispute, controversy or claim[] arising out of or related to this 

Agreement, the employment relationship . . . , or the termination of the 

employment relationship . . . .” For a claim to “aris[e] out of” or be “related to” a 

contract “requires the existence of some direct relationship between the dispute and 

the performance of duties specified by the contract.” Doe, 657 F.3d at 1218

(discussing Telecom Italia). Robinson’s claims concerning a worthless degree from 

the company are not founded in or intertwined with his later employment with the 

company. Robinson’s complaint concerning claims unrelated to his employment is 

not arbitrable.

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The district court also correctly refused to strike the class action allegations 

in Robinson’s complaint. By its terms, the class action waiver applies only to 

claims governed by the arbitration agreement. Because Robinson’s complaint is 

not subject to arbitration under the agreement, its class action waiver does not 

govern this dispute.

Education Corporation argues that the severability provision in the 

arbitration agreement salvages the class action waiver, but its argument is 

irreconcilable with the plain text of the severability provision. That provision

states, “[i]f any provision(s) of this Arbitration Agreement is declared overbroad, 

invalid, or unenforceable such provisions shall be severed . . . and the remaining 

provisions of the Arbitration Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and 

shall be construed in a fashion which gives meaning to all of the other terms of this 

Arbitration Agreement.” The arbitration agreement is inapplicable, so by “the plain 

language of the contract,” a condition required for severability does not exist. See

Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the denial of the motion to compel arbitration of and to strike 

the class action allegations in Robinson’s complaint.

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