1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUFKIN DIVISION

SHONDA THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:23-CV-26-MAC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Plaintiff, Shonda Thomas (“Thomas”), requests judicial review of a final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security Administration with respect to her application for disabilitybased benefits. This action is before the undersigned magistrate judge for review, hearing if 

necessary, and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.1 

The undersigned finds that the administrative law judge’s decision lacks reversible error and is 

supported by substantial evidence, and therefore recommends affirming the decision denying 

benefits.

I. JUDICIAL REVIEW

United States district courts may review decisions of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2020). The scope of judicial review is limited, 

however, to determining whether (a) the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and (b) the 

decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 

1 General Order 05-06 refers civil proceedings involving appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Social 

Security Administration to magistrate judges serving the divisions where the cases are filed. See also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) (2009) and E.D. TEX. CIV. R. CV-72 for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 976
2

1995); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). When the Commissioner applies 

proper law and the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings are 

conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Reviewing courts, therefore, give the Commissioner’s decisions great deference. Leggett,

67 F.3d at 564. Courts may not re-weigh evidence, try issues de novo, or substitute their 

judgments for those of the Commissioner. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1995). 

A court cannot reverse the Commissioner simply because the court might have decided the case 

differently in the first instance. Elfer v. Texas Workforce Comm’n, 169 F. App’x 378, 380 (5th 

Cir. 2006); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the court may not 

“substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary”). Rather, it is for the Commissioner to weigh 

evidence and resolve conflicts. See Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295; Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 

617 (5th Cir. 1990).

When the Commissioner fails to apply correct principles of law, or when “substantial 

evidence”2does not support the Commissioner’s decision, the governing statute authorizes a 

reviewing court to enter, upon the pleadings and the transcript of the record, a judgment modifying, 

or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the 

cause for a rehearing. See 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g). Thus, courts have power to remand for further 

administrative proceedings, or they may direct the Commissioner to award benefits without a 

rehearing. Ordinarily, courts remand for further administrative proceedings to address and cure 

2

“Substantial evidence” is a term of art meaning “more than a mere scintilla.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 

1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Anthony v. 

Sullivan, 954 F.2d at 292. Evidence is “substantial” when it is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; Marcello 

v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1986). 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 977
3

deficiencies. See, e.g., Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 2000).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Thomas applied for disability insurance benefits on August 19, 2020, due to impairments 

that allegedly became disabling on April 11, 2020. (Tr. 374-385.) Following the denial of her 

claim, she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge which was held on July 21, 2021. 

(Tr. 52-78.) Thomas and Susan Rapant, a vocational expert, testified at the hearing. (Id.)

On August 13, 2021, Administrative Law Judge William Howard (ALJ Howard) issued a 

decision denying Thomas’ application. (Tr. 135-153.) Thomas requested review of the ALJ’s 

decision by the Appeals Council, which was granted, and the Appeals Council remanded the case 

for further administrative proceedings. (Tr. 159-162.) 

A second administrative hearing was held on August 31, 2022. (Tr. 79-107.) At that 

hearing, Thomas, Kathy Bottroff (vocational expert), and Nitin Dhiman (medical expert) testified. 

(Id.) On September 14, 2022, ALJ Howard again denied Thomas’ application for disability 

benefits. (Tr. 23-40.) Thomas appealed this second decision, and the Appeals Council denied 

her request for review, thereby prompting this appeal. (Tr. 1-3.) 

B. Factual History

Thomas was 38 years old at the time of her application date, with a high school education 

and past work experience as a certified nurse’s aide. (Tr. 38.) Thomas’ application was denied 

at the initial and reconsideration levels. 

C. Administrative Decision and Appeal

ALJ Howard utilized the five-step sequential analysis model specified by regulations and 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: 978
4

approved by courts in reaching his decision denying Thomas’ application.3 At step one, ALJ 

Howard found that Thomas has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 19, 2020, 

the application date. (Tr. 25.) At steps two and three, he found that Thomas has the following 

severe impairments: psoriatic arthritis, idiopathic thrombocytopenia purpura (ITP), hypertension, 

anemia, and obesity. (Tr. 25-29.) However, none of these impairments met or medically 

qualified under the criteria of any listed impairment in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. 

P, app 1 (Listed Impairments) for presumptive disability. (Tr. 29-30.) ALJ Howard determined 

that Thomas retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a limited range of light

work, but can only: lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours in 

an 8-hour workday; stand and/or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with no more than 2 hours 

of standing and/or walking at a time; never crawl or climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; occasionally 

stoop, kneel, negotiate stairs and ramps; never work in proximity to hazards; and never work in 

environments with concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants or heavy industrial vibrations due 

to her ITP. (Tr. 30-38.) 

ALJ Howard found Thomas was not able to perform her past relevant work at step four. 

(Tr. 38.) However, at step five, ALJ Howard, relying on vocational expert testimony, found that 

3

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f), the five steps are generally as follows:

1. The Commissioner ascertains whether an applicant currently engages in substantial gainful activity. 

(If so, a finding of non-disability is entered, and the inquiry ends.) 

2. The Commissioner determines whether an applicant has a severe impairment or combination of 

impairments. (If not, the inquiry ends, and a finding of non-disability is entered.) 

3. The Commissioner determines whether any severe impairment(s) equals or exceeds those in a Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpt. P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”). (If so, disability is presumed, and benefits 

are awarded. If not, the analysis continues.)

4. The Commissioner determines whether any impairment(s) prevents the claimant from engaging in 

regular previous employment. (If so, a prima facie case of disability is established and the burden of going 

forward (to the fifth step) shifts to the Commissioner. See Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th 

Cir. 1987)).

5. The Commissioner determines whether other work exists in the national economy which the applicant 

can perform. (If so, the burden shifts back to the applicant to show he cannot perform the alternative 

labor. See id.; Taylor v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1986)). 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 979
5

Thomas was not disabled because she was able to perform other work that existed in significant 

numbers in the national economy, such as storage facility rental clerk, office helper, and mail clerk 

(non-postal). (Tr. 39-40.) 

III. POINTS OF ERROR

Thomas argues that ALJ Howard failed to properly consider the medical opinions of Nurse 

Practitioner Melanie Parker (NP Parker) regarding her physical and mental impairments. (Doc. 

No. #15.) The Defendant responds that all of Thomas’ impairments (severe and non-severe) were 

considered by ALJ Howard in assessing her RFC, and he also properly considered and discounted 

the medical opinion of NP Parker as unpersuasive. (Doc. #16.)

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Step Two – Severity of Impairments

At step two of the evaluation process, the ALJ determines whether an applicant has a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2012). In Stone v. Heckler, 

752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit considered the standard of “severity” and 

established that “[a]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality 

[having] such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the 

individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience.” Recently, in Keel 

v. Saul, 986 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2021), the Fifth Circuit resolved a split among the district 

courts in the Fifth Circuit and concluded that Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-28, while not using 

the identical language of Stone, comports with the Stone severity standard. As the Fifth Circuit 

stated in Keel, SSR 85-28 provides that “‘[a]n impairment or combination of impairments’ is ‘not 

severe’ if ‘medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight 

abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 5 of 13 PageID #: 980
6

even if the individual’s age, education, or work experience were specifically considered.’” S.S.R. 

85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3 (1985). The Fifth Circuit concluded that SSR 85-28 uses language 

“similar” to Stone, and that “[t]hough the precise wording differs, Stone and SSR 85-28 are not 

substantially different enough to warrant a finding of error” where an ALJ applies the SSR 85-28 

standard. Keel, 986 F.3d at 556-557. 

ALJ Howard found Thomas had some severe physical impairments but did not find any 

severe mental impairments. (Tr. 25-29.) He discussed her alleged impairments of depression, 

anxiety, and ADHD, but found that they were not severe. Thomas argues that ALJ Howard failed 

to properly consider the severity of these impairments as opined by NP Parker. 

In making his step two determination, ALJ Howard references SSR 85-28 and uses the 

correct standard. (Tr. 26-29.) He addressed Thomas’ complaints, discussed her treatment, exam, 

and the opinion of NP Parker. (Id.) He pointed out that although NP Parker found limitations in 

all levels of functioning, there were no objective signs of inattention or cognitive deficits on exam 

consistent with the severity indicated by NP Parker. (Id.) He also noted that although Thomas’ 

assessment showed the presence of ADHD, it did not indicate the severity. (Id.) In addition, her 

records indicate that her depression was related to situational stressors, including becoming a 

grandmother, her brother’s murder trial and financial issues, and she was in the process of being 

tapered off of her depression medication. (Id.)

Dr. Jean Stanley, Ph.D., LP at Pathways Mental Health Clinic prepared a treatment 

summary stating that Thomas began services in 2019 and that the primary source of her stress was 

family dynamics, parenting, and an unhealthy relationship. (Tr. 663.) Her records from 

Pathways show that in June 2020, her medication was decreased, and she gained some coping 

skills to manage her anger and anxiety. (Tr. 663-666.) Her mental status exams were normal in 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 6 of 13 PageID #: 981
7

all areas with mild to moderate anxious mood. (Id.) She was not seen between January 28, 2020, 

and February 1, 2021. Dr. Stanley stated that no opinion was being made as to her work capacity. 

(Tr. 666.) On March 30, 2021, Brandy Goins, MS, LPC, with Pathways administered an ADD 

assessment and found that her results “may be suggestive of an attention problem, including 

ADHD.” (Tr. 670-671.) 

In addition, the state agency medical consultants, Mark McGaughey, Ph.D. and Dave 

Sanford, Ph.D., both found these impairments were not severe. (Tr. 28, 111-112, 124-125.) ALJ 

Howard also noted that Thomas had a “plethora of normal mental status exams,” and the 

supplemental evidence received showed a stable psychiatric presentation and good adaptive 

functioning. (Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, the court finds that ALJ Howard properly considered 

Thomas’ mental impairments and his findings are supported by substantial evidence. His opinion 

that Thomas’ mental impairments were non-severe coincides with that of the SAMCs, which also 

found these impairments were non-severe. (Tr. 27, 74, 85.) Accordingly, the court finds no 

reversible error at step two. 

B. Residual Functional Capacity – Physical Impairments

The regulations state that RFC means “the most you can still do despite your limitations.” 

20 C.F.R. § 416.945 (2012). Thus, when making an RFC determination, the ALJ decides whether 

an applicant retains the physical and mental abilities necessary to perform activities generally 

required by competitive, remunerative work. See id.; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 

1996). The RFC involves three components: physical abilities, mental abilities, and other abilities 

affected by impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(b)-(d).

A person’s RFC is assessed at steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process. At 

that point, the person has demonstrated an impairment of a magnitude sufficient to significantly 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 7 of 13 PageID #: 982
8

limit the ability to do basic work activities (step two), but not so severe as to match listed 

impairments (step three) from which disability is presumed. Thus, the Commissioner must 

determine whether, despite the presence of severe impairments, the person retains functional 

capacity to perform past relevant work (step four), and, if not, any available alternative work (step 

five). SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). An ALJ’s assessment of a person’s RFC 

forms the basis of a hypothetical question to which a vocational expert may respond with an 

opinion as to whether there is alternative available work that a person with the applicant’s 

impairments and functional limitations can perform. See Frazier v. Colvin, No. A-11-CA-901-

SS, 2013 WL 12393909, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013).

In assessing an applicant’s physical, mental, and sensory abilities, the regulation directs an 

ALJ to consider the claimant’s exertional and non-exertional capacity. Exertional capacity 

addresses an individual’s limitations and restrictions of physical strength and defines the 

individual’s remaining abilities to perform each of seven strength demands: sitting, standing, 

walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). 

Non-exertional capacity considers all work-related limitations and restrictions that do not depend 

on an individual’s physical strength, i.e., all physical limitations and restrictions that are not 

reflected in the seven strength demands, and mental limitations and restrictions, including an 

individual’s abilities to perform physical activities such as postural (e.g., stooping, climbing), 

manipulative (e.g., reaching, handling), visual (seeing), communicative (hearing, speaking), and 

mental (e.g., understanding and remembering instructions and responding appropriately to 

supervision). Id. In addition to these activities, the ability to tolerate various environmental 

factors (e.g., tolerance of temperature extremes) is also a non-exertional capacity consideration. 

Id. 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 8 of 13 PageID #: 983
9

In the present action, the ALJ concluded that Thomas can perform light work, including: 

lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; 

stand and/or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with no more than 2 hours of standing and/or 

walking at a time; never crawl or climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; occasionally stoop, kneel, 

negotiate stairs and ramps; never work in proximity to hazard; and never work in environments 

with concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants or heavy industrial vibrations due to her ITP. 

(Tr. 30-38.) Thomas argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding is unsupported by substantial evidence 

because it conflicts with NP Parker’s medical opinions regarding her physical functionality. 

1. Evaluation of Medical Opinions

The Social Security Administration promulgated a new rule regarding residual functional 

capacity determinations to govern all claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520c (2017). Thomas applied for disability insurance benefits on August 19, 2020. (Tr. 

25.) Therefore, the new rule applies. This rule addresses how the ALJ is to consider and evaluate 

medical opinions and prior administrative medical filings in evaluating a claimant’s residual 

functional capacity and eliminated the longstanding “treating-physician rule,” which required the 

ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion “controlling weight” in the absence of certain other 

specific findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (describing the former “treating physician” 

rule).

The new rule states that the ALJ is no longer required to defer or give any specific 

evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion or prior administrative 

medical finding. Id. at § 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ is to consider all medical opinions and 

prior administrative medical findings using the same specific factors outlined in the rule, the most 

important of which are supportability and consistency. Id. at § 404.1520c(b)(2). The other 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 9 of 13 PageID #: 984
10

factors are treatment relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors, such as 

familiarity with other evidence in the claim. Id. at § 404.1520c(c). The ALJ must articulate how 

persuasive he finds each of the opinions in the record and explain the consideration of the 

supportability and consistency factors. Id. at § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ may, but is not 

required to, articulate the consideration of the other factors, unless the Commissioner finds that 

“two or more medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings about the same issue are 

both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the 

same.” Id. at § 404.1520c(b)(3). In those cases, the ALJ must articulate the consideration of the 

other factors.

Thomas argues that ALJ Howard erred in finding the opinion of NP Parker unpersuasive

as to her physical RFC. ALJ Howard considered this opinion, as well as the opinions of medical 

expert Dr. Nitin Paul Dhiman and the SAMCs, Drs. Amita Hegde, M.D. and Dennis Pacl, M.D. 

(Tr. 36-38.) He discussed each opinion in detail regarding its supportability and consistency with 

the record and decided how persuasive the opinion was in reaching his RFC assessment. (Id.) 

On April 6, 2021, treating NP Parker with Groveton Family Medical examined Thomas for 

her impairments. (Tr. 675-676.) She filled out a checklist form opining that Thomas: must 

recline or lie down during the workday outside of normal breaks; sit and stand/walk for 2 hours in 

an 8-hour workday; take unscheduled breaks; frequently lift/carry ten pounds or less, 20 pounds 

occasionally; never lift 50 pounds; can only perform handling 30% of the time and fingering 30-

40% of the time; and would be absent from work three to four times a month. (Id.) The only 

diagnosis listed, however, on this form is ADD and inattention which does not comport with her

physical RFC assessment, or the limitations listed. (Tr. 675.) NP Parker lists the same diagnosis 

for her mental capacity RFC checklist form, which was done separately. (Tr. 679-681.) As 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: 985
11

noted by ALJ Howard, NP Parker’s treatment notes do not document manipulative limitations and 

were not consistent with the need for these kinds of sitting limitations, breaks, and absenteeism. 

(Tr. 37.) The only physical complaints listed during Thomas’ exams were edema in her legs and 

joint pain, but she had a normal gait and “no gross abnormalities with extremities; normal muscle 

tone & moves all extremities well.” (Tr. 736, 690.) NP Parker referred Thomas to Dr. Bochra 

Jandali, a rheumatologist for a joint pain evaluation. Dr. Jandali noted that Thomas had tender 

wrists but no synovitis and had full range of motion of all joints and spine. (Tr. 745.) Thomas 

tested negative for lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and a genetic test. (Tr. 839, 856.) She was given 

medication and saw improvement in her joint pain. (Tr. 853-856.) Dr. Jandali stated that her 

pain seems to be mechanical since all tests were negative, but she “could have” psoriatic arthritis 

due to her history of psoriasis. (Tr. 853-856; 882.)

Other medical records with Dr. Pierre Khoury also indicate that while she is symptomatic 

for thrombocytopenia, she is “completely ambulatory.” (Tr. 571.) Dr. Warrier also noted on 

exam that Thomas complained of joint pain, but she had no definite synovitis around the joints of 

the wrists, normal gait, and normal strength in her extremities. (Tr. 656-657.) 

Given the lack of consistency and support in the record, ALJ Howard found the opinion of 

NP Parker unpersuasive. Furthermore, ALJ Howard stated that he found the opinion of Dr. 

Dhiman, M.D. persuasive over that of NP Parker because of his higher level of expertise as a 

board-certified doctor in internal medicine for the last 13 years and the supportability and 

consistency of his findings. (Tr. 37, 86.) Dr. Dhiman reviewed Thomas’ medical records and 

testified as a medical expert in this case. (Tr. 86-92.) He found that Thomas’ records show 

diagnoses of psoriatic arthritis, idiopathic thrombocytopenia purpura (ITP) 4, and high blood 

4

ITP is an autoimmune blood disorder characterized by an abnormal decrease in the number of platelets in the blood, 

which can result in easy bruising, bleeding gums, and internal bleeding. Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura, JOHN 

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 11 of 13 PageID #: 986
12

pressure. (Tr. 87.) He opined that Thomas can: lift 20 pounds occasionally or 10 pounds 

frequently; sit/stand/walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday (but only 2 hours at a time for walking); 

climb ramps and stairs frequently; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; stoop, crouch, crawl 

frequently; no manipulative restrictions; no talking, hearing, tasting, smelling restrictions; avoid 

working at unprotected heights, heavy machinery, and vibrations; only occasional exposure to 

pulmonary irritants; and frequently push/pull. (Tr. 37; 88-89.) Many of these limitations are in 

consideration of her ITP as it can cause dizziness, fatigue, and a propensity for pulmonary 

infection. (Id.) ALJ Howard found this opinion generally persuasive as it was consistent with 

the record showing many unremarkable physical examinations and supported by the medical 

records he reviewed. (Tr. 38.) 

On October 26, 2020, SAMCs, Dr. Amita Hegde, M.D. evaluated Thomas’ records and 

found that she had the RFC to perform the limitations as set forth in ALJ Howard’s findings except 

ALJ Howard further limited her postural (climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, 

crawling) and environmental limitations. (Tr. 113-115.) On March 16, 2021, Dr. Dennis Pacl, 

M.D. evaluated Thomas’ updated records and made the same findings. (Tr. 127-130.) Although 

ALJ Howard found many of the same limitations, he noted these opinions were unpersuasive since 

he gave additional postural limitations (in Thomas’s favor) in consideration of her severe obesity 

and reports of joint pain and fatigue. (Tr. 36.)

After consideration of all of the evidence, the undersigned finds that there is substantial 

evidence supporting ALJ Howard’s findings.

HOPKINS MEDICINE, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/idiopathic-thrombocytopenicpurpura#:~:text=Idiopathic%20thrombocytopenic%20purpura%20is%20a,last%20longer%20than%206%20months.

(last visited Mar. 26, 2024); (Tr. 87).

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 12 of 13 PageID #: 987
13

V. RECOMMENDATION

ALJ Howard’s application of the sequential analysis is free from legal error and supported 

by substantial evidence for the reasons discussed in the preceding sections. Consequently, the 

administrative decision should be affirmed. 

VI. OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), each party to this action has the right to file objections 

to this report and recommendation. Objections to this report must: (1) be in writing, (2) 

specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, and (3) be 

served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). A party who objects to this report is 

entitled to a de novo determination by the United States district judge of those proposed findings 

and recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

(2009); FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). 

A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy 

of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States district 

judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–

77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings 

of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States district judge, see Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, at 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

.

___________________________________

Christine L Stetson

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SIGNED this the 7th day of May, 2024.

Case 9:23-cv-00026-MAC-CLS Document 17 Filed 05/07/24 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: 988