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18-2235-cr 

United States v. Odiase 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 30th day of September, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

GERARD E. LYNCH, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 18-2235-cr 

v. 

SYLVESTER T ODIASE, AKA THOMAS SEAN GRANT, SHARYI A. HARRIS, 

Defendants, 

RACHELL ODIASE, AKA RACHEL ODIASE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

FOR APPELLEE: SEBASTIAN SWETT (Daniel B. Tehrani, on 

the brief), Assistant United States 

Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United 

States Attorney for the Southern District 

of New York, New York, NY. 
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: IRVING COHEN (Chanel Sochacki, on the 

brief), New York, NY. 

Appeal from the July 19, 2018 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Sidney H. Stein, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Rachell Odiase (“Odiase”), AKA Rachel Odiase, appeals her 

convictions, following a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1956(h); money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); and engaging in a 

monetary transaction in property derived from a specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1957. Odiase argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. 

She further argues that the Government wrongfully shifted the burden of proof to her. She next 

contends that the District Court erred or “abused its discretion” by excluding portions of her video 

interview with law enforcement.1

 Finally, she argues that the District Court erred by entering a 

restitution order holding her responsible for the entire loss caused by the fraud underlying the 

money laundering. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

“We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal 

conviction.” United States v. Lebedev, 932 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2019). “We view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the 

government’s favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and its assessment 

of the weight of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We will uphold the judgment 

of conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 737 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160, 179 (2d Cir. 2015). We likewise review a district court’s restitution order for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Smathers, 879 F.3d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 2018). 

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 “We have noted on many occasions that ‘abuse of discretion’ is a distinctive term of art that is 

not meant as a derogatory statement about the district judge whose decision is found wanting.” 

United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2014); see also In re The City of New York, 607 F.3d 

923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “abuse of discretion” is a nonpejorative “term of art”). 
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Odiase first argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show that she knew 

that the funds at issue were the proceeds of an unlawful activity and that she knew that the financial 

transaction was for the purpose of obscuring the nature, source, location, or ownership of the funds. 

The substantive offense of “transaction money laundering” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) requires proof of both knowledge that the property involved represents the 

proceeds of unlawful activity and knowledge that the transaction is designed to conceal or disguise 

the proceeds. See United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2008). The offense of 

conspiring to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), requires proof that the defendant 

“knowingly engaged in the conspiracy with the specific intent to commit the offenses that were the 

objects of the conspiracy.” Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). The offense 

of transacting property derived from a specified unlawful activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 requires a 

showing of knowledge that the money at issue was “criminally derived property.” 18 U.S.C. § 

1957(a). Circumstantial evidence can provide sufficient evidence of intent. Moreover, “jurors are 

entitled, and routinely encouraged, to rely on their common sense and experience in drawing 

inferences.” Huezo, 546 F.3d at 182. 

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show both Odiase’s knowledge that the 

proceeds were derived from unlawful activity and knowledge that the financial transaction she 

engaged in was for the purposes of concealing or disguising the funds. The evidence at trial showed 

that a cashier’s check in the amount of $50,000 was deposited into Odiase’s Bank of America 

account. Less than two weeks later, Odiase went in person to a Bank of America branch and 

withdrew a $50,000 cashier’s check and deposited the check into an account in her name at Chase 

Bank. Both accounts were opened several months before this transaction occurred and did not 

appear to be used for Odiase’s routine financial activity. The evidence further showed that the 

movement of the funds was directed by Odiase’s son and co-defendant, Sylvester Odiase, and that 

the funds were the proceeds of a fraudulent scheme. The evidence also included portions of 

Odiase’s interview with law enforcement in which she explained that she received the $50,000 from 

a man named “Frank” who had purchased merchandise from her discount store that she had 

shipped to Nigeria. Odiase could not provide further details about “Frank” such as his last name or 

phone number. She told officers she would provide evidence corroborating her story, but testimony 

showed that she failed to ever do so. Moreover, evidence showed that Customs and Border 

Protection had no record of Odiase’s supposed exports. 

Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a 

rational jury could find that Odiase knew that the funds were derived from criminal activity. A jury 

could reasonably further find that Odiase moved the funds from one account to another in order to 

conceal and disguise the funds. 

Odiase next contends that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding portions of 

her video interview with law enforcement. She argues that she was entitled to submit the entirety of 
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the video to the jury under the “rule of completeness” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 106. 

Under Rule 106, if a party introduces part of a statement, the adverse party may introduce the 

remainder of the statement if “necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place the admitted 

portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial understanding of the 

admitted portion.” United States v. Thiam, 934 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But the rule does not require the admission of any part of a statement that is “neither 

explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passages.” Id. Moreover, “the rule of completeness is 

violated only where admission of the statement in redacted form distorts its meaning or excludes 

information substantially exculpatory of the declarant.” Id. Odiase does not point to specific 

excluded passages that were necessary to explain admitted portions. Instead, Odiase argues generally 

that the entire video was necessary to put the admitted statements in context and to explain Odiase’s 

emotional state. But the portions of the video that the Government admitted did not distort the 

interview’s meaning. Nor does Odiase point to any exculpatory information excluded by the 

Government’s chosen excerpts. Accordingly, we conclude that Rule 106 did not require the 

admission of the entire interview, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 

portions of the video. 

Odiase further argues that the Government improperly shifted the burden of proof to her by 

suggesting that she was obligated to produce evidence to defend herself. The Government may not 

“suggest that the defendant has the burden of producing evidence.” United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 

726, 733 (2d Cir. 1994). But the Government may argue that the defendant has failed to support her 

own factual theory. See United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, the 

Government questioned a witness about whether Odiase had ever provided to the Government the 

corroborating evidence she claimed to have to support her story of selling merchandise in Nigeria. 

The witness responded that she had not. This questioning is best understood as the Government’s 

attempt to highlight Odiase’s lack of credibility in her law enforcement interview, in which she 

repeatedly stated that she would provide specific materials, such as shipping receipts, to support her 

story. Moreover, any suggestion that that the defendant had the burden to produce evidence was 

corrected by the District Court’s curative instruction immediately after the Government’s 

questioning. See Bautista, 23 F.3d at 733.

Odiase finally argues that the District Court wrongfully entered a restitution order holding 

her liable for the full amount of the fraudulent funds that were laundered, rather than solely the 

funds that she herself laundered. Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, a District Court 

must enter a restitution order for certain specified crimes of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1). A 

court may order restitution only for “loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis for the 

offense of conviction.” United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195 n.7 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Where the crime of conviction is a conspiracy, a district court may order 

the defendant to pay restitution for the reasonably foreseeable losses caused by the conspiracy. See 

United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 2000). In the instant case, Odiase was convicted of a 
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money laundering conspiracy, and it was reasonably foreseeable to Odiase that the conspiracy 

involved additional losses. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by directing 

Odiase to pay the full amount involved in the money laundering conspiracy for which she was 

convicted. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Odiase on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the July 19, 2018 judgment of the District 

Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk