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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TYLER DIVISION 

KIRK STEVEN JACKSON, 

#01916072, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

E. BAR BARRICK, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 6:23-cv-617-JDK-JDL 

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Kirk Steven Jackson, a Texas Department of Criminal Justice inmate 

proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case 

was referred to United States Magistrate Judge John D. Love pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636. 

On February 26, 2024, Judge Love issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending that the Court dismiss this case with prejudice for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 

1915(e)(2). Docket No. 12. Plaintiff objected. Docket No. 15. 

Where a party timely objects to the Report and Recommendation, the Court 

reviews the objected-to findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge de novo. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In conducting a de novo review, the Court examines the entire 

record and makes an independent assessment under the law. Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded on other 

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grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 

ten to fourteen days). 

Judge Love recommended dismissal because Defendant, an employee of the 

private corporation Securus Technologies, was not acting “under color of state law” 

as required to establish a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket No. 12 

at 4–6. Plaintiff attempts to persuade the Court that Securus—and by extension its 

employee—is a state actor by reiterating that “Securus Technologies and the TDCJ 

are in a contractual agreement.” Docket No. 15 at 4. From that fact, he extrapolates 

that all Securus actions are “known, accepted, approved, and authorized” by TDCJ. 

Id. at 5. But Plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing that any TDCJ officer or 

official was involved in allegedly depriving him of an electronic tablet. And, as Judge 

Love correctly explained, the existence of a contract for services alone does not make 

a private company a state actor. Docket No. 12 at 5. 

Plaintiff also attempts to establish that Securus performs a governmental 

function because its service is related to his fundamental right to send and receive 

mail. Docket No. 15 at 5–6. But Securus, by providing the technology to support a 

particular means of communication, does not take over responsibility for prisoners’ 

exercise of their First Amendment rights. In this regard, providing a means of 

electronic communication is no different than providing a means of telephonic 

communication, which this and other courts have repeatedly held does not make the 

provider a state actor. See Streater v. Thaler, 2012 WL 3308109, at *14 (E.D. Tex. 

July 2, 2012); Keaghey v. Securus Techs. & T-Netix Inc., 2020 WL 5413581, at *2 (E.D. 

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La. Aug. 7, 2020) (holding that Securus Technologies and others “are not state actors 

subject to liability under § 1983”); Sims v. SecurusTech.net Connection, 2014 WL 

1383084, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2014) (“Its public contract with the Suffolk Jail does 

not render SecurusTech.net a ‘state actor’ or to be ‘acting under color of state law’ for 

purposes of Section 1983.”). 

Plaintiff objects to the Report’s reliance on those cases, arguing that “each case 

is ultimately based on its own facts.” Docket No. 15 at 7. But he does not establish 

any materially distinguishable facts about his case that justifies a different result 

here. 

Plaintiff also complains that for some period of time he was “left without the 

ability to send any messages to his family and friends, receive any messages or 

incoming from family or friends, or make any phone calls.” Docket No. 15 at 6. But 

he alleges that this deprivation took place while his tablet was malfunctioning during 

a temporary lockdown. Id. He does not allege that this was a permanent or 

longstanding deprivation or that it was the result of any intentional or deliberately 

indifferent conduct by Defendant or anyone else to violate his First Amendment 

rights. A delay in a prisoner’s mail, without more, does not violate his constitutional 

rights. Jones v. Lumpkin, 2023 WL 4275476, at *9 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2023) (“[A]n 

allegation that a prisoner’s mail was delayed, without more, is insufficient to show a 

violation of the First Amendment.”). Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s allegations 

sufficiently raised a constitutional claim, that deprivation would not be attributable 

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to a Securus employee with no control over anything other than the provision and 

operation of an electronic tablet. 

Having conducted a de novo review of the record in this case and the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report, the Court has determined that the Report of the 

Magistrate Judge is correct, and Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Accordingly, 

the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 12) as 

the opinion of the District Court. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B). 

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