1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

GARY LEE GOODMAN SR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23–CV–00064–JCB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff Gary Lee Goodman, Sr., initiated this civil action pursuant 

to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3) & 405(g) for judicial review of the Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for social 

security benefits and supplemental security income benefits. (Doc. No. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b), the case was referred to the undersigned for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 

recommendation for the disposition of the instant action. For the reasons stated below, the court 

RECOMMENDS that the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED. 

BACKGROUND

On October 30, 2020, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI, alleging disability beginning 

March 2, 2020. (Doc. No. 5-4, at 2–3). Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied on February 

10, 2021 (Doc. No. 5-4, at 20, 38), and denied upon reconsideration on October 4, 2021. (Doc. No. 

5-4, at 108, 109). Thereafter, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

Solomon Boyle on March 28, 2022. (Doc. No. 5-3, at 49–71). The ALJ issued a decision on May 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:

888
2

23, 2022, finding that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Social Security Act. Id. at 28–42. Plaintiff 

appealed, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review. Id. at 2–4. Therefore, 

the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 

106–107 (2000). Plaintiff has filed this civil action for judicial review.

LEGAL STANDARD

Judicial review of the denial of disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to 

“determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether 

the proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence.” Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 

435 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990)). A finding of 

no substantial evidence is appropriate only where there is a “conspicuous absence of credible 

choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343–44 (5th Cir. 

1988) (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, the court “may 

not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [the court’s] 

judgment for the [Commissioner’s], even if the evidence preponderates against the 

[Commissioner’s] decision.” Bowling, 36 F.3d at 435 (quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 

475 (5th Cir. 1988)). Rather, conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to decide. 

Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 

(5th Cir. 1990)). A decision on the ultimate issue of whether a claimant is disabled, as defined in 

the Act, rests with the Commissioner. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455–56 (5th Cir. 2000); 

SSR 96–5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34471 (July 2, 1996).

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance—that is, 

enough that a reasonable mind would judge it sufficient to support the decision.” Pena v. Astrue, 

271 Fed. App’x 382, 383 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994)). 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:

889
3

Substantial evidence includes four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; 

(2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the 

plaintiff’s age, education, and work history. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1302 n.4 (5th Cir. 

1987). If supported by substantial evidence, the decision of the Commissioner is conclusive and 

must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). However, the court must do 

more than “rubber stamp” the ALJ’s decision; the court must “scrutinize the record and take into 

account whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of evidence supporting the 

[Commissioner]’s findings.” Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations 

omitted). The court may remand for additional evidence if substantial evidence is lacking. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g).

A claimant for disability has the burden of proving a disability. Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 

123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991). The Act defines “disability” as an “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 

of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A). A “physical or mental 

impairment” is an anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormality which is demonstrable 

by acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3),

1382c(a)(3)(D).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner must utilize a five–step, 

sequential process. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022. A finding of “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step 

of the sequential process ends the inquiry. Id. Under the five–step sequential analysis, the 

Commissioner must determine at Step One whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. At Step Two, the Commissioner must determine whether one or more of the 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 3 of 14 PageID #:

890
4

claimant’s impairments are severe. At Step Three, the Commissioner must determine whether the 

claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal one of the listings 

in Appendix I. Prior to moving to Step Four, the Commissioner must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), or the most that the claimant can do given his impairments, 

both severe and non-severe. Then, at Step Four, the Commissioner must determine whether the 

claimant can perform his past relevant work. Finally, at Step Five, the Commissioner must 

determine whether the claimant can perform other work available in the local or national economy. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b)–(g) & 404.1520(b)–(g). The burden of proof is on the claimant for the 

first four steps; the burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five if the claimant shows that he 

cannot perform his past relevant work. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632–33 (5th Cir. 1989) 

(per curiam).

ALJ AND APPEALS COUNCIL FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following findings in his May 23, 2022 decision:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirement of the Social Security Act 

through December 31, 2021.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 2, 2020, 

the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: depressive disorder, anxiety 

disorder, degenerative disc disease, diverticulosis, obesity, right bundle branch 

block, hypertension, mild degenerative changes of the right first 

metacarpophalangeal (thumb) joint, and status-post left clavicle fracture (20 CFR 

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926), especially taking into consideration sections 

4.00, 1.15, 1.18, 12.04, and SSR 19-2p.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant is limited to the light level of exertion except never climb ladders, ropes, 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 4 of 14 PageID #:

891
5

or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps or stairs; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, 

or crawl; occasionally reach overhead bilaterally; frequently handle and finger 

bilaterally; and understand, remember, and carry out detailed non-complex tasks 

involving detailed non-complex instructions.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965).

7. The claimant was born on July 20, 1970, and was 49 years old, which is defined as 

a younger individual age 18–49, on the alleged disability onset date. The claimant 

subsequently changed age category to closely approaching advanced age (20 CFR 

404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because 

using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the 

claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills 

(See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, 

and 416.969a).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

at any time from March 2, 2020, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 

404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

(Doc. No. 5-3, at 33–42).

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 

1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Id. at 42. The Appeals Council did not grant review of 

the ALJ’s decision, so this became the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 2.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises two grounds for remand: (1) the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by substantial 

evidence because the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical opinions of Drs. Hardaway and 

Willits; and (2) the ALJ’s RFC failed to properly consider Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. 

(Doc. No. 9, at 1, 14). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly addressed the medical 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 5 of 14 PageID #:

892
6

opinion evidence in accordance with the revised regulatory framework, and that the ALJ based his 

findings and ultimate decision on substantial evidence from the record. (Doc. No. 14, at 5–6, 8–

11).

1. The ALJ’s Analysis of the Medical Opinions

In his first point of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity 

assessment is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly consider

the opinions of Drs. Richard Hardaway and V. Leroy Willits, the consultative medical providers 

who conducted Plaintiff’s mental and physical health exams, respectively. (Doc. No. 9, at 1).

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) is an assessment made by the Commissioner, based 

on all the relevant evidence, of a claimant’s ability to do work on a sustained basis in an ordinary 

work setting despite his physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a); Myers v. 

Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 2001). When evaluating a claimant’s physical abilities, the 

Commissioner first assesses the nature and extent of physical limitations and then determines the 

RFC for work activity on a regular and continuing basis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. The ALJ makes 

separate function-by-function findings of the seven exertional strength demands (sitting, standing, 

walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling), and other non-exertional physical functions 

(including manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching). 

SSR 96-8; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b). Only after the function-by-function analysis may the RFC be 

expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very 

heavy). SSR 96-8. 

As the fact finder, the ALJ has the responsibility to weigh the evidence and choose 

whichever medical opinion is most supported by the record. Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 790 

(5th Cir. 1991) (citing Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ has 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 6 of 14 PageID #:

893
7

discretion in this task. Newton, 209 F.3d at 455–56. Indeed, unlike judicial courts, “Social Security 

proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial.” Sims, 530 U.S. at 110–11. Accordingly, “[i]t 

is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting 

benefits.” Id. at 111 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400–01). 

The Social Security Administration recently promulgated a new rule regarding RFC 

determinations to govern all claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. 

Because Plaintiff filed his claim on October 30, 2020, the new rule applies. This rule addresses 

how the ALJ is to consider and evaluate medical opinions and prior administrative medical filings 

in evaluating a claimant’s RFC and eliminates the longstanding “treating-physician rule,” which 

required the ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion “controlling weight” in the absence of 

certain other specific findings. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2).

The new rule states that the ALJ is no longer required to defer or give any specific 

evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion or prior administrative 

medical finding. Id. at § 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ is to consider all medical opinions and 

prior administrative medical findings using the same specific factors outlined in the rule: 

(1) supportability1; (2) consistency2; (3) relationship with the claimant, which includes considering 

the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the purpose of the 

treatment relationship, the extent of the treatment relationship, and the examining relationship; 

(4) specialization; and (5) other factors. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c). The most 

important of these factors are “supportability” and “consistency.” Id. at § 404.1520c(b)(2). 

1

“The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source 

are to support his or his medical opinion(s) . . . , the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(c)(1).

2

“The more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical 

sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 7 of 14 PageID #:

894
8

Notably, under the regulation, administrative law judges “may, but are not required to, explain 

how” they considered the three other factors in determining the persuasiveness of the medical 

source's opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ must articulate how persuasive he finds each of 

the opinions in the record. Id. at § 404.1520c(b).

While the ALJ must articulate his consideration of all medical opinions, the new 

regulations no longer mandate particularized procedures that the ALJ must follow in considering 

opinions from treating sources. Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2), with 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) (effective Mar. 27, 2017), 416.920c(b) (effective Mar. 27, 2017). Rather, 

the ALJ is directed to focus on the persuasiveness of all medial opinions or administrative medical 

findings using the five factors referenced above. Id at §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c). 

Additionally, administrative law judges “must consider” medical findings of non-examining state 

agency medical or psychological consultants according to the new regulation. Id. 

§ 404.1513a(b)(1).

There is little binding case law applying the new regulations regarding RFC 

determinations. However, consistency and supportability have always been relevant factors that 

the ALJ may consider in deciding whether to accept or reject the opinion of a treating physician. 

It has also been long recognized that ALJs may give “less weight, little weight, or even no weight” 

to a physician’s testimony if found to be inconsistent with a physician’s own record or with other 

medical evidence. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994). For example, in 

Nugent v. Astrue, the Fifth Circuit found that an ALJ properly discounted a treating physician’s 

statement because it was conclusory and contradicted prior treatment notes, objective medical 

findings, and other examining physician’s opinions. Nugent v. Astrue, 278 Fed. App’x 423, 426 

(5th Cir. 2008). In Williams v. Colvin, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the decision of an ALJ to give 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 8 of 14 PageID #:

895
9

“little weight” to a doctor’s examination wherein he opined—using a check-box form—that the 

plaintiff was suffering from severe depression and disabled. Williams v. Colvin, 575 Fed. App’x 

350, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The Colvin court upheld the ALJ’s decision as supported 

by substantial evidence in part because the doctor’s own notes were inconsistent with his checkbox form. Id. The longstanding principles articulated in these opinions remain instructive.

a. Dr. Richard Hardaway

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in his findings regarding Dr. Hardaway’s mental 

evaluation. In his opinion, the ALJ noted that Dr. Hardaway concluded that Plaintiff likely could 

not “sustain concentration and persist in work-related activity at a reasonable pace due to severe 

depression and anxiety,” “maintain effective social interaction on a consistent and independent 

basis with supervisors, coworkers, and the public,” or “cope with normal pressure in a competitive 

work setting.” (Doc. No. 5-3, at 39 (citing Doc. No. 5-9, at 97)). The ALJ determined that Dr. 

Hardaway’s opinion was “not supported or consistent with the objective findings and extent of 

mental health treatment received and recommended.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that remand is required because the ALJ’s analysis of supportability and 

consistency is insufficient. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s analysis is “conclusive” 

and “inappropriately relies on a few normal mental status findings without pointing to any genuine 

inconsistencies between Dr. Hardaway’s opinion and the other evidence.” (Doc. No. 9, at 8–9). 

However, the court notes that the ALJ clearly stated the bases for his decision: (1) “The claimant 

usually did not report mental health symptoms to his treating providers except recently and he was 

prescribed medications for severe depression”; (2) “The mental status exams were fairly normal 

before then and in November 2021”; and (3) “[Dr. Hardaway’s] findings also revealed few 

objective deficits.” Id. 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 9 of 14 PageID #:

896
10

Each of these assertions is supported by substantial evidence in the record. For instance,

the ALJ cited medical records from October and November of 2021 that do not indicate any mental

health issues. See (Doc. No. 5-10, at 51–100). In fact, medical records from the provider that

treated Plaintiff for depression show that Plaintiff sought medical care for lower back pain and

other physical conditions in January of 2022, but that neither Plaintiff nor the medical provider

initially indicated any concerns about Plaintiff’s mental health. See id. at 145–77. And as noted by

the ALJ, Dr. Hardaway’s conclusions about Plaintiff’s inability to concentrate and socialize in a

normal work environment are not supported by his own objective findings. Dr. Hardaway’s exam

notes state that Plaintiff’s memory and judgment appeared to be average or low average, his

concentration appeared adequate, he presented in an organized manner, he was able to maintain

eye contact and easily established rapport, and he spoke in full, grammatically correct sentences.

(Doc. No. 5-9, at 95–96). Because the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Hardaway’s opinion was based on

the correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err in finding

his opinion unpersuasive.

b. Dr. V. Leroy Willits

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his findings regarding Dr. Willits’s physical 

evaluation. The ALJ noted that Dr. Willits found that Plaintiff could “sit, stand, and move about,” 

and “his ability to lift and carry is impaired due to the shoulder issue on the left,” but otherwise, 

“he is able to handle objects effectively.” (Doc. No. 5-3, at 40 (citing Doc. No. 5-10, at 46)). The 

ALJ found Dr. Willits’s opinion “only partially persuasive and consistent with the evidence 

overall, including objective findings, extent of treatment received and recommended, and the State 

agency medical consultants’ opinions.” (Doc. No. 5-3, at 40).

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 10 of 14 PageID #:

897
11

Plaintiff contends that remand is required because the ALJ’s analysis of supportability and

consistency is insufficient. Specifically, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ’s “cursory” reference to 

Dr. Willits failed to explain which parts of the report he found unpersuasive or why the ALJ 

rejected Dr. Willits’s opinion that Plaintiff’s ability to lift and carry should be restricted. (Doc. No. 

9, at 9). However, the court notes that the ALJ gave a more detailed explanation of these issues in 

his discussion of the medical evidence in a previous part of the opinion. See Belk v. Colvin, 648 

Fed. App’x 452, 455 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding support for ALJ’s conclusions in other parts of ALJ’s 

opinion). 

The ALJ noted that in July of 2021, Dr. Willits found that Plaintiff had good range of 

motion in the neck, he had limited motion of the left shoulder, and his hand grip was good 

bilaterally. (Doc. No. 5-3, at 35 (citing Doc. No. 5-10, at 45–46)). The ALJ also noted that there 

is no indication of any ongoing problems with grip and “only mild degenerative changes of the 

distal articular surface of the right first metacarpal in February 2022.” Id. at 39. And the medical 

examinations conducted by the agency medical consultants, Drs. Patty Rowley and Kavitha Reddy,

indicated that Plaintiff has the RFC for a full range of medium level exertion. (Doc. No. 5-3, at 

40). However, he similarly found their opinions only partially persuasive.

Last, Dr. Willits’s own report specifically stated that Plaintiff’s “[g]rip strength and ability 

to reach, handle, finger and feel are unimpaired.” (Doc. No. 5-10, at 46). Nonetheless, the ALJ’s 

RFC determination limited Plaintiff to only occasionally reaching overhead bilaterally. The ALJ’s 

RFC reflects the consideration of Dr. Willits’s opinion and the other record evidence regarding 

Plaintiff’s ability to lift, carry, and reach. Because the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Willits’s opinion

was based on the correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not

err in finding his opinion only partially persuasive.

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 11 of 14 PageID #:

898
12

2. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Subjective Statements of Pain

Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ failed to adequately consider Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints regarding the intensity and persistence of his symptoms. (Doc. No. 9, at 14–15). He 

notes that the SSA will not reject an applicant’s subjective complaints about the intensity or 

persistence of pain solely because the objective medical evidence doesn’t substantiate those 

statements. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c). He claims the ALJ’s opinion improperly 

discredited his subjective complaints because there are no genuine inconsistencies between his 

description of symptoms and the evidence in the record. (Doc. No. 9, at 11–13). 

Once the ALJ finds a medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to 

produce the applicant’s alleged symptoms, the ALJ must assess the intensity and persistence of 

the alleged symptoms, such as pain, to determine the extent to which they limit the applicant’s 

capacity to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b), (c). In evaluating the intensity and persistence of 

symptoms, the ALJ considers all the available medical and nonmedical evidence, including the 

applicant’s own statements about their symptoms and the extent to which those statements conflict 

with the objective medical evidence and other evidence. Id. § (c)(4). The factors relevant to the 

evaluation of symptoms include: (1) the applicant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, 

frequency, and intensity of the applicant’s symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; 

the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the application takes to alleviate 

symptoms; (4) treatment, other than medication, received to relieve the symptoms; (5) any other 

measures the applicant takes to relieve symptoms; and (6) other factors affecting the applicant’s 

functional limitations and restrictions. Id. § (c)(3).

Here, the ALJ clearly considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The ALJ opinion cites 

the appropriate standard for assessing the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a physical 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 12 of 14 PageID #:

899
13

or mental impairment and summarizes Plaintiff’s descriptions of his physical and psychological 

symptoms. (Doc. No. 5-3, at 37–38). The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms 

were “not entirely consistent” with the evidence in the record and proceeded to discuss, in detail, 

the medical evidence that contradicts Plaintiff’s description of symptoms (including the evidence 

discussed above). See id. at 38–40.

Plaintiff’s main complaint seems to be that because the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s physical 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause limitations in lifting, reaching, and standing, 

as Plaintiff alleged, it was improper for the ALJ to discredit Plaintiff’s subjective statements of 

pain. See Doc. No. 15, at 5–6. But that is exactly the type of credibility determination an ALJ is 

entitled to make when there are discrepancies between the applicant’s subjective statements and 

the objective medical evidence. See Carrier v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1991) (“How 

much pain is disabling is a question for the ALJ since the ALJ has primary responsibility for 

resolving conflicts in the evidence.”); Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001)

(upholding ALJ’s determination that SSA applicant’s subjective complaints of chest pain were not 

entirely credible given a lack of ongoing cardiac problems). The court may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute its judgement for the Commissioner’s. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 

1022 (5th Cir. 1990). Regardless, as previously discussed, the ALJ did partially credit Plaintiff’s 

subjective description of symptoms, along with the medical opinion of Dr. Willits, in limiting 

Plaintiff’s RFC determination to a light level of exertion, even when there was medical evidence 

to the contrary. (Doc. No. 5-3, at 37). 

For the reasons discussed herein, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial 

evidence and the ALJ did not err in weighing the medical opinions and Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints. 

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:

900
14

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the court RECOMMENDS that the ALJ’s decision be 

AFFIRMED and that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Within 14 days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may serve and file 

written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in this Report. A party’s failure 

to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this 

Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy shall bar that party from de novo review 

by the District Judge of those findings, conclusions and recommendations and, except on grounds 

of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected–to factual findings and legal conclusions 

accepted and adopted by the District Court. Douglass v. United States Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 

1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

(extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 16th day of October, 2023.

Case 6:23-cv-00064-JCB-JDL Document 16 Filed 10/16/23 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:

901