UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4785

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DEVIN ROCHARD MEANS, JR., a/k/a Little D, a/k/a Devin 

Rochard Means,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (7:07-cr-01467-HMH-5)

Submitted: April 24, 2014 Decided: May 2, 2014

Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States 

Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr., Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Devin Rochard Means, Jr., appeals from his 

twenty-four-month sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of 

his supervised release. On appeal, Means avers that his 

sentence was plainly unreasonable because the district court did 

not give individualized reasoning for the chosen sentence.* We 

affirm.

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory 

maximum and not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). In making our

review, we “follow generally the procedural and substantive 

considerations that [are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original 

sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into 

account the unique nature of supervised release revocation 

sentences.” Id. at 438-39. Only if a sentence is found 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we “decide 

whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. (emphasis 

in original).

 * Means’ counsel initially filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there 

were no meritorious issues for appeal. However, when our review 

of the record pursuant to Anders revealed non-frivolous claims, 

we ordered counsel to file a merits brief. Means’ merits brief 

challenges only the adequacy of the court’s explanation of 

sentence and, therefore, waives all other claims.
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When imposing sentence, the district court must 

provide individualized reasoning:

The sentencing judge should set forth enough to 

satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority

. . . . Where the defendant . . . presents 

nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence 

than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a 

district judge should address the party’s arguments 

and explain why he has rejected those arguments.

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The 

Carter rationale applies to revocation hearings; however, “[a] 

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a 

post-conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 

544, 547-48 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that a district court’s 

reasoning may be “clear from context” and the court’s statements 

throughout the sentencing hearing may be considered). In fact, 

in a case of supervised release revocation, we “may be 

hard-pressed to find any explanation for within-range, 

revocation sentences insufficient given the amount of deference 

. . . afford[ed to] district courts when imposing these 

sentences; but a district court may not simply impose sentence 

without giving any indication of its reasons for doing so.” Id. 

(emphasis in original).

“[I]f a party repeats on appeal a claim of procedural 

sentencing error . . . [that] it has made before the district 
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court, [this court] review[s] for abuse of discretion” and will 

reverse unless it concludes “that the error was harmless.” 

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). For 

instance, if “an aggrieved party sufficiently alerts the 

district court of its responsibility to render an individualized 

explanation” by drawing arguments from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012) “for a sentence different than the one ultimately 

imposed,” the party sufficiently “preserves its claim.” Id. at 

578. However, we review unpreserved non-structural sentencing 

errors for plain error. Id. at 576–77. To establish plain 

error, a defendant must show that an error occurred, that the 

error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial 

rights. United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 611 (4th Cir. 

2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 627 (2012). Finally, plain 

errors should only be corrected where not doing so would result 

in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Robinson, 627 

F.3d 941, 954 (4th Cir. 2010). Because counsel did not request 

a sentence below the Guidelines range, we review for plain 

error.

Here, there is no dispute that the sentence falls 

within the applicable statutory maximum of five years’ 

imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1) (2012); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). The district court also adopted without 

objection the Chapter 7 advisory policy statement range of 
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twenty-four to thirty months’ imprisonment and heard argument 

from counsel and allocution from Means. However, the record 

reveals that the court offered no reasoning for its chosen 

sentence. Such was error, and the error was plain. See

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548 (noting that the requirement to 

provide a minimal statement of reasons for the sentence imposed 

in revocation proceedings is “clearly settled”).

However, we conclude that the error did not affect 

Means’ substantial rights. Means was sentenced to the bottom of 

the policy statement range, his counsel did not request a lower 

sentence, and a district court has broad discretion to impose 

sentence. Means does not argue that the court would have 

imposed a lower sentence had it provided a more thorough 

explanation, and nothing in the record supports such an 

argument. See United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th

Cir. 2010) (explaining that, to demonstrate that a sentencing 

error affected defendant’s substantial rights, the defendant 

must show that he would have received a lower sentence had the 

error not occurred).

In addition, there was no miscarriage of justice in 

this case. Although the court’s explanation did not reveal that 

it had considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, the court 

explicitly adopted the probation officer’s Guidelines range as 

calculated in his violation report, and the report addressed the 
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facts and circumstances of Means’ violation, as well as his 

underlying criminal conduct. Moreover, the court clearly 

listened to counsel’s argument, as the court permitted the 

self-reporting that Means requested. Given that counsel did not 

request a lower sentence, the court acted well within the bounds 

of justice by imposing a presumptively reasonable sentence at 

the low end of the advisory Guidelines range. United States v. 

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e may 

and do treat on appeal a district court’s decision to impose a 

sentence within the Guidelines range as presumptively 

reasonable.”). As such, we decline to correct the district 

court’s error. 

Accordingly, Means’ sentence is affirmed. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED