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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LT. COL. ALEXANDER VINDMAN,

 Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 22-257 (JEB)

DONALD TRUMP, JR., RUDOLPH 

GIULIANI, JULIA HAHN, and DANIEL 

SCAVINO, JR.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman’s name entered the public lexicon in 2019. 

Vindman was serving a detail on the National Security Council on July 25 of that year when he 

listened in during the now-infamous phone call between former President Donald Trump and 

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, which conversation would lead to Trump’s first 

impeachment. Vindman alleges that, after he reported concerns about the call through official 

channels and testified before the House Intelligence Committee, a group of conspirators formed 

an agreement to intimidate and unlawfully retaliate against him. He brings this action against 

some of those alleged conspirators — namely, Donald Trump, Jr., Rudolph Giuliani, Julia Hahn, 

and Daniel Scavino, Jr. — alleging that they thereby violated provisions of the Ku Klux Klan 

Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) and (2). Defendants now move to dismiss the case.

History will be the final judge of Vindman’s actions and the former Administration’s 

response. This Court’s task is to adjudicate something far narrower: whether Plaintiff’s

Complaint pleads facts sufficient to state a claim for civil conspiracy under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). As the Court will explain, Vindman must allege facts that plausibly suggest 
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two things: first, that each Defendant agreed with others not just to vigorously defend their boss,

but to unlawfully intimidate or injure Vindman; and second, that one of the co-conspirators 

committed an unlawful act — e.g., defamation — to further such scheme.

Plaintiff’s pled facts, taken as true, certainly suggest that Defendants leveled harsh,

meanspirited, and at times misleading attacks against him. But political hackery alone does not 

violate § 1985. Because Vindman does not sufficiently allege a violation of the 1871 Act, the 

Court will grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. 

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint and for purposes of these Motions 

presumes them to be true. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 

2000). 

Vindman joined the United States Army more than two decades ago and over the years

rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 32. He was detailed to the 

National Security Council in 2018, where he served as Director for Eastern European, Caucasus, 

and Russian Affairs. Id., ¶ 43. While there, Vindman was one of several participants who 

listened in on a phone call that the NSC had arranged to allow Trump to congratulate Ukraine’s 

Zelensky on his recent election. Id., ¶¶ 62–63. On that highly controversial call, Trump tried to 

coerce Zelensky to announce an investigation of members of the Biden family in return for the 

release of American military aid that Congress had appropriated. Id., ¶¶ 60–63. Plaintiff then

reported his concerns about that call through internal NSC channels. Id., ¶ 63. 

That phone call soon came to the attention of the House of Representatives through a 

complaint from an unidentified whistleblower who was not Vindman. Id., ¶ 65. The House then
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initiated an impeachment inquiry and subpoenaed Plaintiff to testify. Id. Vindman testified 

twice, first in a closed-door deposition and then in a publicly televised hearing. Id., ¶¶ 104, 122, 

154.

On October 28, 2019, the day prior to Vindman’s closed-door testimony, The New York 

Times ran a story identifying him as a witness and previewing his testimony. Id., ¶ 105. 

Vindman consequently found himself dragged into a media firestorm, which continued through 

his public testimony on November 19, 2019, and beyond. Id., ¶¶ 107–40 (events around closeddoor testimony), ¶¶ 141–204 (around public testimony). The Court discusses below the specific 

roles Vindman alleges that each Defendant played in that firestorm. 

In addition, Plaintiff contends that Defendants or their co-conspirators leaked classified 

information that Republican Counsel Stephen Castor used to question him during his public 

testimony. Id., ¶¶ 157–59. Specifically, Castor asked Vindman about an offer he had received 

earlier that year to serve as Ukrainian Minister of Defense. Id., ¶ 159. Vindman testified that he 

had unequivocally declined the offer and had filed a report documenting the event. Id., ¶ 160. 

He alleges that Defendants or their co-conspirators unlawfully leaked that report to House 

Republicans to falsely insinuate that he might have had divided loyalties. Id., ¶ 157.

Plaintiff contends that after his testimony he was retaliated against in various ways. He

pleads that, following the former President’s Senate acquittal, he was “abruptly and publicly 

escorted out of the White House” and removed from his NSC post. Id., ¶ 194. While Vindman

notes that the President’s National Security Advisor said that removing Vindman was his 

decision alone, Plaintiff maintains that this statement was a false attempt to cover up the true 

retaliatory nature of his removal by the former President and other co-conspirators, including 

Defendants. Id., ¶ 202. Vindman also alleges that Defendants and other co-conspirators engaged 
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in an internal, coordinated effort to derail his promotion to Colonel. Id., ¶¶ 209–17. In the face 

of concerted attacks by Defendants and others, Vindman states, he finally “made the difficult 

decision to retire from the military.” Id., ¶ 222.

These events all caused significant harm to Plaintiff and his family. Id., ¶¶ 224–38. 

More than the “hurt feelings” that Defendants blithely identify, see ECF No. 20 (Trump, Jr. and 

Scavino MTD) at 1, Vindman describes how Defendants’ onslaught prevented him from 

continuing his military career, id., ¶ 227; caused him to fear for the physical safety of his family, 

id., ¶ 230; subjected him to personal threats online, id., ¶ 233; and caused his wife and daughter 

to alter their behavior to stay safe. Id., ¶ 236. He paid this price because he complied with a 

duly issued Congressional subpoena, not because he thrust himself into the fray. Defendants’ 

actions had consequences, and while the Court is duty bound to apply governing legal standards,

it nonetheless pauses to recognize the real harm that their attacks inflicted on Vindman and his 

family.

The crux of his present lawsuit is that each of the four Defendants entered into an 

unlawful conspiracy to intimidate and harm him as a result of his role in these events. The 

Defendants are, from least to most centrally involved: Julia Hahn, former White House Deputy 

Communications Director; Rudy Giuliani, a friend and close advisor of the former President’s; 

Daniel Scavino, Jr., the former President’s Director of Social Media and Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Communications; and Donald Trump, Jr., the former President’s eldest son. Id., ¶¶ 21–24. 

The specific facts pled against each are as follows.

Hahn

Hahn was a White House media liaison and previously worked for Fox News host Laura 

Ingraham. Id., ¶¶ 24, 72. She distributed talking points about Vindman to media surrogates at 
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the direction of more senior White House communications officers. Id., ¶¶ 146–53. Those 

included the header “Vindman Has Major Credibility Issues,” as well as the remark “Vindman 

has faced accusations of poor judgment, leaking, and going around normal procedures.” Id., 

¶ 148. Another sentence read, “There was nothing wrong with the call with Zelensky at all, 

Vindman was just upset that President Trump was leading foreign policy instead of sticking to 

Vindman’s talking points. . . . But it’s not Vindman’s job to set foreign policy, it’s the 

President’s.” Id., ¶ 149. 

Giuliani

Plaintiff pleads that Giuliani was personally close with Trump and helped spread false

theories regarding the former President’s 2016 and 2020 election rivals. See Compl., ¶¶ 59–61, 

76. In particular, Vindman alleges that Giuliani recruited two Ukrainian businessmen to pressure 

Ukraine to investigate Hunter Biden. Id., ¶ 77. On the phone call with Zelensky, Trump 

suggested that Zelensky coordinate any investigation of the Bidens with Giuliani. Id., ¶ 62. The 

Complaint also alleges that Giuliani “engaged in a coordinated attack” against Ambassador 

Marie Yovanovitch, then the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. Id., ¶ 97. 

Giuliani also sent two relevant tweets during the impeachment proceedings. In the first, 

on the day of Vindman’s closed-door testimony, he tweeted: “ANOTHER SCHIFFTY 

BACKFIRE: A US gov. employee who has reportedly been advising two gov’s? No wonder he 

is confused and feels pressure. However the only opinion that legally counts is Pres. Zelensky’s. 

Who has clearly said NO pressure. End of impeachment. End of Schiff.” Id., ¶ 124. In the 

second, the next day, Giuliani tweeted: “Schiff is thanking him for his secret testimony and for 

giving advice to two countries. I thought he worked for US. Schiff is using this to cover-up 
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major Pay-for-Play Dem scandal. Ukraine corruption was not only one. Corrupt media is 

enabling this phony. The truth will emerge.” Id., ¶ 125. 

Scavino

Plaintiff alleges that Scavino served as the former President’s Director of Social Media, a 

role in which he managed the White House Twitter account and wrote many of Trump’s tweets. 

Id., ¶ 23. Scavino also was a close Trump confidant and one of his chief advisors, as well as one 

of Hahn’s supervisors in the White House Communications shop. Id., ¶¶ 70–71, 146. Vindman

alleges that Scavino participated in public campaigns to have former FBI Deputy Director 

Andrew McCabe fired and to attack Ambassador Yovanovitch. Id., ¶¶ 96–97. The day that 

Vindman testified, Scavino tweeted: “#ICYMI: Lt. Col. Vindman was offered the position of 

Defense Minister for the Ukrainian Government THREE times! #ImpeachmentSHAM.” Id., 

¶ 171. President Trump retweeted that tweet. Id., ¶ 172. 

Trump, Jr.

Plaintiff pleads that Trump, Jr. serves as a surrogate for his father “for particularly 

distasteful attacks on his father’s perceived enemies” and is among his closest confidants. See

Compl., ¶¶ 73–74. Like Giuliani, he allegedly met with two Ukrainian businessmen about 

pressuring Ukraine to investigate Hunter Biden. Id., ¶ 77. He was a Fox News regular and also 

participated in public campaigns to fire McCabe and to attack Yovanovitch. Id., ¶¶ 89, 96–97. 

The morning after Vindman’s testimony, Trump, Jr. went on Fox News and made 

negative comments about him, saying, “[I]t turns out he’s, you know, talking to the Ukraine” and 

suggesting Vindman was a “leftist.” Id., ¶¶ 127–28. He also retweeted a Gateway Pundit article 

that falsely stated that Vindman had been reprimanded for inappropriate and partisan behavior 

while in the military, and he retweeted a remark by right-wing commentator Charlie Kirk about 
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the same. Id., ¶¶ 133–40. Later, when Vindman was removed from the NSC, Trump, Jr. tweeted 

two comments: “On the bright side, he may still be able to take the defense minister position in 

the Ukraine that he was offered a few times,” id., ¶ 196, and “Allow me a moment to thank—and 

this may be a bit of a surprise—Adam Schiff. Were it not for his crack investigation skills, 

@realDonaldTrump might have had a tougher time unearthing who all needed to be fired. 

Thanks, Adam!,” which he followed with a crying-laughing emoji and “#FullOfSchiff.” Id., 

¶ 197. 

Several months later, after Vindman had been removed from the NSC, Trump, Jr. 

tweeted twice more about him: “A name that’s not appearing NEARLY enough in the ‘news’ –

VINDMAN. Media covered his bogus Ukraine transcript constantly. Dems yelled ‘impeach!!’ 

NOW he admits to actually making up parts of it. Another hoax exposed. And yet again the 

media cover the fake scandal but not the TRUTH,” and “You’d think that someone would be

criminally charged for making up things that lead to an impeachment based on false premises. 

But I guess that would only happen if they did it to a liberal! Alexander Vindman Admits 

making up Parts of Trump Call Summary,” linking to a Breitbart story with that title. Id., ¶ 203. 

B. Procedural History

Vindman filed this lawsuit on February 2, 2022. He contends that each Defendant agreed

with others to intimidate and unlawfully retaliate against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) 

and (2). Each of the four Defendants — with Trump, Jr. and Scavino acting together — filed a 

Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the facts Plaintiff pleads are insufficient to state a § 1985 civilconspiracy claim. See Trump/Scavino MTD; ECF No. 25 (Giuliani MTD); ECF No. 26 (Hahn 

MTD). Those Motions are now ripe.
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II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In evaluating such a motion to dismiss, courts 

must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of 

all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113 

(quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Although “detailed 

factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) — that is, the facts alleged in the 

complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. Particularly where the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct has “an obvious 

alternative explanation,” the complaint must allege facts that “plausibly suggest[ ]” — and are 

“not merely consistent with” — the defendant’s liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 567; accord

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (explaining that complaint in Twombly

failed because defendants’ alleged conduct “was not only compatible with, but indeed was more 

likely explained by, lawful . . . free-market behavior”). 

The court need not accept as true, then, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation,” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986)), nor “inferences . . . unsupported by the facts set out in the 

complaint.” Id. (quoting Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 

1994)). And it may consider not only “the facts alleged in the complaint,” but also “any 

documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which [courts] 
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may take judicial notice.” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Francis Xavier

Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Rule 12 plays an especially important role in claims involving defamation. “[T]he 

Supreme Court has directed courts to expeditiously weed out unmeritorious defamation suits.” 

Kahl v. Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc., 856 F.3d 106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (formatting modified). 

“Early resolution of defamation cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) not only 

protects against the costs of meritless litigation, but provides assurance to those exercising their 

First Amendment rights that doing so will not needlessly become prohibitively expensive.” 

Fairbanks v. Roller, 314 F. Supp. 3d 85, 89 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 

Palin v. New York Times Co., 264 F. Supp. 3d 527, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)).

III. Analysis

Vindman’s lawsuit contends that Defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a civil-rights statute passed in the wake of Reconstruction. See

ECF No. 43 (Brief of Amici Curiae First Amendment Scholars) at 4. As relevant here, § 1985 

creates liability where “two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to” commit 

proscribed offenses. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1)–(2). Vindman’s two counts each allege two

§ 1985 violations, for a total of four central claims. His first count alleges that Defendants: 

 “conspire[d] to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or 

holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from 

discharging any duties thereof,” § 1985(1); see Compl., ¶¶ 241–42, 249; and

 “conspire[d] . . . to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge 

of the duties of his office.” § 1985(1); see Compl., ¶¶ 243, 249.

His second count alleges that Defendants:

 “conspire[d] to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court 

of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending 

therein, freely, fully, and truthfully,” § 1985(2); see Compl., ¶¶ 244, 260; and
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 “conspire[d] . . . to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of 

his having so attended or testified.” § 1985(2); see Compl., ¶¶ 245, 260.

Put another way, Vindman’s first and third challenges allege that Defendants conspired to 

intimidate him from performing job functions or testifying before Congress, and his second and 

fourth allege that Defendants conspired to unlawfully retaliate against him for the same.

Because § 1985 punishes civil conspiracies, Plaintiff agrees that in order to prevail on 

any of his claims he must properly plead (for each) all of the general elements of a civil 

conspiracy. See ECF No. 30 (Pl. Opp.) at 7. Vindman also agrees that the four elements are

those the D.C. Circuit articulated in its landmark case of Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 

(D.C. Cir. 1983): 

(1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in 

an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury 

caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to 

the agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in 

furtherance of the common scheme.

Id. at 477; see Pl. Opp. at 7 (citing Halberstam and reciting these elements). 

“[T]he principal element of [a civil conspiracy],” which is captured by the first two 

Halberstam elements, “is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury 

upon another.” Brady v. Livingood, 360 F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (D.D.C. 2004) (formatting 

modified). Relevant here, an agreement to do something unsavory but lawful is not enough; the 

agreement must be to do something itself unlawful. The recent case of Thompson v. Trump, No. 

21-400, 2022 WL 503384 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2022), furnishes a helpful example. There, in a 

separate § 1985 action, Judge Amit Mehta concluded that the plaintiffs “adequately pleaded that 

Giuliani was involved in a conspiracy to engage in a months-long misinformation campaign to 

convince Trump’s supporters that the election had been illegally stolen.” Id. at *36 (internal 
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quotations omitted). But to state a § 1985 claim, that was not enough: “What Plaintiffs must 

plausibly establish is that Giuliani conspired to prevent Congress from discharging its duties on 

January 6th by force, intimidation, or threat.” Id. Because “[t]here, they fall short,” Judge 

Mehta concluded that the plaintiffs did not state a claim with respect to Giuliani. Id. at *37. 

That analytic approach applies here, too. It is not enough for Vindman to allege that Defendants 

agreed to do something inappropriate; he must specifically plead that they agreed “to participate 

in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the unlawful or unlawfully performed act was both: 1) to deter 

him “by force, intimidation or threat” from performing his duties or testifying, and 2) to “injure 

him in his person or property” on account of having so performed or testified. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985(1)–(2). That latter phrase — to injure a plaintiff in his person or property — refers to 

compensable injuries under tort law. That follows from the Supreme Court’s holding in Haddle 

v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998). The Court there held that a plaintiff who had been fired from 

his at-will job to discourage his testimony stated a claim under § 1985(2) because the harm he

alleged — a species of third-party interference with at-will employment relations — “has long 

been a compensable injury under tort law.” Id. at 126 (citing Cooley, 2 Law of Torts 589–91 (3d 

ed. 1906)). This Court follows the Supreme Court’s conclusion that, in the § 1985 context 

(subsections 1 and 2 use the same language), the phrase “injured in his person or property” refers 

to a tortious injury under principles of tort law. See also id. at 127 (citing 3 W. Blackstone, 

Commentaries on the Laws of England 118 (1768), and quoting its language describing universe 

of common-law torts as “all private wrongs, or civil injuries, which may be offered to the rights 

of either a man’s person or his property”). That also makes sense: a conspiracy must involve an 

agreement to do something unlawful, and so an agreement to lawfully injure a person (say, by 
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publishing their old embarrassing writings or halting donations to their campaign) cannot form 

the basis for one.

Having laid the legal and statutory groundwork, the Court will now assess whether the 

Complaint adequately states a claim under § 1985 and Halberstam. Its analysis proceeds in two 

parts. First, it considers how Vindman fares on the first and second Halberstam elements — that 

is, whether he has pled facts that plausibly suggest that any of the Defendants agreed among 

themselves or with others to participate in an unlawful or unlawfully performed act. In doing so,

Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants formed an 

agreement to protect the former President by undermining Vindman’s credibility, itself a lawful 

act. But it ultimately concludes that Plaintiff has not pled facts that plausibly suggest, in the face 

of obvious alternative explanations, the further conclusion that Defendants agreed to do so in an 

unlawful manner. While it is a fairly close question, Vindman’s facts do not plausibly suggest 

that Defendants agreed to intimidate him so as to prevent him from testifying or doing his job, or 

to unlawfully retaliate against him. 

Second and independently, assuming Vindman had plausibly alleged an unlawful 

agreement, the Court considers whether he has also plausibly alleged the fourth civil-conspiracy 

requirement: that a conspirator performed an unlawful overt act pursuant to the common scheme. 

It concludes that he clearly has not. Plaintiff principally contends that various statements 

Defendants and their alleged co-conspirators made were defamatory. The Court examines each 

statement and finds that none was defamatory under the demanding actual-malice standard. It 

also determines that Vindman has not pled facts that suggest that any other co-conspirator

committed any other unlawful overt act, such as leaking classified information. For both 

reasons, then, his Complaint must be dismissed.
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A. Elements One and Two: Agreement to Participate in Unlawful Acts

Recall that a civil conspiracy requires “(1) an agreement between two or more persons; 

(2) to participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner.” Halberstam, 705 

F.2d at 477. Defendants initially assert that Vindman fails to plausibly allege the existence of 

any agreement. Even if he did plead facts sufficient for the Court to infer some agreement, 

Defendants add, he does not plead facts suggesting that such agreement was to participate in an 

unlawful or unlawfully performed act. See Trump/Scavino MTD at 13–19; Giuliani MTD at 6–

7; Hahn MTD at 10–17. As the Court agrees on the latter point, it need not decide the former. 

Vindman does not contend that Defendants entered into an explicit agreement to 

intimidate or unlawfully injure him, nor is he required to. As in “most civil conspiracy cases,”

he asks this Court “to infer an agreement from indirect evidence.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 486; 

see also id. at 477 (“Proof of a tacit, as opposed to explicit, understanding is sufficient to show 

agreement.”). 

That said, courts nevertheless hesitate to find that a plaintiff has plausibly suggested 

illegal conduct where the pled facts have “an obvious alternative explanation” since a complaint 

must allege facts that “plausibly suggest[ ]” — and are “not merely consistent with” — the 

defendant’s liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 567; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682; see also id.

at 680 (explaining that complaint in Twombly failed because defendants’ alleged conduct “was 

not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful . . . free-market 

behavior”). Iqbal itself is illustrative on this point. There, the Court held that a plaintiff had

failed to state a claim for purposeful discrimination because he had not sufficiently alleged that

the decisionmakers took the challenged course of action “because of” the action’s adverse effects 

on an identifiable group. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. The Court considered evidence that the 
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challenged policies disproportionately targeted Arab Muslims but noted that Al Qaeda was 

headed by and largely consisted of Arab Muslims. “As between that ‘obvious alternative 

explanation’ for the arrests,” the Court wrote, “and the purposeful, invidious discrimination 

respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.” Id. at 682 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). Plaintiffs accordingly must account for any such obvious alternative 

explanations, and they must plead facts to suggest that their legal conclusions are not merely 

conceivable but are plausible. The D.C. Circuit has reiterated that point as well, holding that 

“allegations that a defendant acted in ways consistent with a conspiratorial agreement, but also 

equally well explained by legitimate . . . incentives, do not suffice to show illegality.” RSM 

Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP, 682 F.3d 1043, 1051–52 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A district court here has recently applied that lesson in a similar context. In Black Lives 

Matter D.C. v. Trump, 544 F. Supp. 3d 15 (D.D.C. 2021), Judge Dabney Friedrich considered 

whether several plaintiffs had stated a claim against former President Trump based on his 

clearing of Lafayette Square so that he could be photographed at St. John’s Church. Id. at 38–

39. Judge Friedrich held that those plaintiffs had alleged facts that, if true, showed only that the 

defendants were communicating with each other to jointly clear the square — not that they had

formed an unlawful agreement to violate the plaintiffs’ rights based on membership in a 

protected class. Id. at 39 (“Merely alleging that the defendant officials communicated, without 

alleging any details of those communications that suggest an unlawful agreement, cannot justify 

inferring the requisite agreement for a [§ 1985] conspiracy.”). In so holding, Judge Friedrich 

noted that “the management of possible violence, enforcement of the impending curfew, and 

policing of demonstrators in Lafayette Square in advance of the President’s travel across the 
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Square generate ‘obvious alternative explanation[s]’ for the defendants’ communications and 

activities other than having formed an agreement to violate the plaintiffs’ civil rights.” Id. at 39–

41 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682). In the face of those obvious alternative explanations, she 

concluded that the plaintiffs had not pled facts plausibly suggesting an invidious motive.

The question here is thus whether Plaintiff’s Complaint pleads sufficient non-conclusory 

facts, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to justify as plausible an inference that any Defendant entered 

into an agreement whose aim was to either intimidate Vindman or unlawfully injure him. The 

Court considers each in turn. 

Agreement to Intimidate Vindman

Taken as true, the facts establish that Defendants worked together and had the common 

motive of defending Trump during his impeachment proceedings. They do not, however, show

that any Defendant here joined with any other co-conspirator in the specific goal of intimidating

Vindman from testifying or performing his job. See also Thompson, 2022 WL 503384, at *36

(defendant’s agreement to convince others election had been stolen was alone not enough to 

establish further unlawful agreement violating § 1985); Black Lives Matter D.C., 544 F. Supp. 

3d at 39; cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1868 (2017) (suggesting but not deciding that 

“officials employed by the same governmental department do not conspire when they speak to 

one another and work together in their official capacities”). 

Recall the facts pled against each Defendant, which are detailed above: Hahn circulated 

talking points that attacked Vindman’s credibility; Giuliani twice tweeted comments critical of 

Vindman and enjoyed a close relationship with the former President; Scavino was a senior 

official on the White House Communications team and tweeted critically of Vindman on the day 

he testified; and Trump, Jr. called Vindman a “leftist” on Fox News and tweeted barbs about 
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him. Without more, those facts do not make plausible an inference that any Defendant agreed 

with any others on the common goal of intimidating Vindman. That is particularly so given the 

“obvious alternative explanation” for these facts, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682 — namely, that 

Defendants each sought to undermine the credibility of a key impeachment witness to weaken 

the case against Trump. 

Agreement to Retaliate Against Vindman by Unlawful Means

Plaintiff similarly does not plead facts that suggest a plausible inference that any 

Defendant agreed to otherwise unlawfully injure Vindman. Here, the compensable actions that 

he alleges that Defendants agreed to take include defamation, leaking classified information, 

removing him from his NSC post, delaying his promotion, and causing his constructive 

termination. See Pl. Opp. at 21–25. 

The pled facts, however, do not plausibly suggest that any Defendant entered into any 

agreement with such an unlawful goal. As to removal, non-promotion, and constructive 

termination, Plaintiff does not allege any facts that suggest that these Defendants, who had no 

power to take any such actions, entered into an agreement to do so, particularly in light of the 

National Security Advisor’s statement that Vindman’s NSC removal was his decision alone. As 

to defamation, separate from whether any Defendant did in fact defame Plaintiff — a question 

the Court takes up below — the issue here is whether any of them agreed with any other person 

to do so. As discussed, the facts pled against these Defendants include only allegations that they

had targeted others in the past, that they worked together to defend the former President during 

his impeachment proceedings, and that they either circulated talking points or tweeted critically 

about Vindman. As before, these facts do not allow for a plausible inference that any Defendant 

agreed with any other on the common goal of unlawfully injuring Vindman. Again, that is 
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particularly so given obvious alternative explanations for their behavior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

682

Counterarguments

Plaintiff offers several responses, none of which alters the Court’s conclusion. First, he

cites a series of antitrust cases for the proposition that conspiratorial agreement may be shown by 

“parallel conduct” coupled with “plus factors.” Pl. Opp. at 8 (quoting In re Domestic Airline 

Travel Antitrust Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 58–60 (D.D.C. 2016)). Vindman then explains how 

Defendants’ close relationships, history of coordination, communications relevant to the 

impeachment effort, similar statements, and similar motives all plausibly suggest a common 

plan. Id. at 9–13. While Plaintiff gives good reasons to think that Defendants formed some sort 

of agreement, as this Court’s analysis has assumed, he pleads no facts to suggest that such

agreement was for the unlawful end of intimidating or unlawfully retaliating against him. It is 

perfectly natural for a presidential Administration to coordinate internally and with outside allies

to defend its actions, which here offers a lawful obvious alternative explanation to Vindman’s 

charge of unlawful conspiracy. See also Pl. Opp. at 12 (recognizing that it “strains credulity that 

[Defendants] would not have worked together to defend Trump during a direct threat to his 

presidency”); Black Lives Matter D.C., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 39 (allegations of coordination alone 

insufficient to show agreement for purposes of § 1985 conspiracy). Parallel conduct among 

political allies does not alone plausibly establish unlawful conspiracy.

Second, Plaintiff contends that Defendants take too blinkered a view of what can count as 

intimidation. He identifies as examples various Defendants’ tweets suggesting that he was 

disloyal because he was offered a job in the Ukrainian government or implying that he 

committed perjury. See Pl. Opp. at 21–22. But Defendants’ intimations that Vindman had a 
18

sympathetic relationship with Ukraine or that his filed report and testimony contained

discrepancies, true or not, again suggest only that Defendants were looking for ways to 

undermine his credibility — not the further conclusion that Defendants had the specific aim to 

intimidate him out of testifying or performing functions of his job, or to unlawfully injure him by 

defaming him or otherwise. Plaintiff accordingly has still not alleged facts rendering that 

conclusion plausible.

Third, Vindman offers more general observations about the troubling character of the 

former Administration. He identifies other instances where he concludes that its members acted 

unlawfully, including with respect to Ambassador Yvonavitch and Hunter Biden, in order to 

suggest generally that the former President’s team may have done so here, too. Regardless of 

Plaintiff’s conclusions regarding individuals’ actions in those prior instances, however, he

neglects to plead specific facts in support of his conclusions regarding Defendants’ conduct here. 

Bare allegations that the Administration took a political hatchet to other perceived enemies in the 

past, without more, cannot sustain a claim that in this matter this set of Defendants conspired to 

commit unlawful acts.

The Court is also mindful of the broader implications of Plaintiff’s argument. Were a 

close relationship with a President, combined with a smattering of sharp public barbs, enough to 

state a claim under § 1985, every political fight would invite endless litigation about potential 

conspiracies. Given the natural alternative explanation for such political rough-and-tumble —

i.e., that each side wants to present itself as credible and the other as not — more is needed to 

state a § 1985 conspiracy claim. See also Black Lives Matter D.C., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 37–40.
19

B. Element Four: Unlawful Overt Acts

A second and stronger reason also supports dismissal here: Plaintiff has not sufficiently 

pled an unlawful overt act in furtherance of the common scheme. 

Vindman acknowledges that to prevail on a claim for civil conspiracy, unlike criminal 

conspiracy, he “also must prove that an unlawful overt act produced an injury and damages.” 

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; see id. (“It is only where means are employed, or purposes are 

accomplished, which are themselves tortious, that the conspirators who have not acted but have 

promoted the act will be held liable.”) (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 46, at 293 (4th ed. 

1971)); see also Pl. Opp. at 23. Civil conspiracy, in other words, “depends on performance of 

some underlying tortious act.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 479; see also Second Amend. Found. v. 

U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff identifies two unlawful overt acts. First, he contends that conspirators made 

defamatory statements about him; and second, he maintains that they unlawfully leaked 

classified information to harm him. See Pl. Opp. at 23–24. Vindman also alleges “numerous 

other overt acts in furtherance of the scheme” that are themselves otherwise lawful, such as 

holding strategy meetings and issuing talking points. Id. at 24–25. Because civil conspiracy 

requires at least one overt act that is itself unlawful, Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477, these lawful 

acts cannot satisfy this element. The Court first considers whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled

that Defendant or any other co-conspirator made any defamatory statements, and it then 

examines the allegations of unlawful leaking. 
20

Defamation

a. Legal Standard

Vindman identifies “multiple instances of defamatory statements” as his principal 

example of the conspiracy’s unlawful overt acts. See Pl. Opp. at 24. He must thus satisfy two 

requirements. First, he must plead falsity; this is because truth is a complete defense to 

defamation. See, e.g., Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

For a statement to be false, moreover, it must be “sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being 

proved true or false.” Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990). Expressions of mere 

opinion are thus actionable only where they imply defamatory facts. See id. at 20–23. For 

example, “the statement ‘In my opinion Jones is a liar because he cheats on his taxes’ could be 

libelous if the allegation of cheating were untrue.” Moldea, 15 F.3d at 1144; see also Weyrich v. 

New Republic, Inc., 235 F.3d 617, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2001). On the other hand, mere “loose, 

figurative, or hyperbolic language” does not imply facts, Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21; similarly,

where a statement is “obviously unverifiable,” it constitutes non-defamatory opinion. Ollman v. 

Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21–22. Our circuit 

has held, for instance, that political charges of “fascist” and “political Marxis[t]” constitute mere 

“loosely definable, variously interpretable statement[s] of opinion . . . made inextricably in the 

contest of political, social or philosophical debate.” Ollman, 750 F.2d at 987 (quoting Buckley 

v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 895 (2d Cir. 1976)). Such statements are subjective opinion rather than 

objectively verifiable fact and so not actionable. On a motion to dismiss, then, the court first 

“must determine whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly establish that the 

allegedly defamatory statement is false.” Libre By Nexus v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 

149, 156 (D.D.C. 2018); see also id. at 155 n.2. 
21

In addition to falsity, public figures, including limited-purpose public figures like 

Vindman, see Pl. Opp. at 34 n.5 (conceding such status), must allege that the statement was 

published with actual malice. Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This 

standard similarly applies in § 1985 cases. Id. The actual-malice standard derives from the 

landmark Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and 

requires that a statement be made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 

whether it was false or not.” Id. at 280. A defendant has acted recklessly if “the defendant in 

fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication” or acted “with a high degree of 

awareness of . . . probable falsity.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 

A plaintiff can “prove the defendant’s subjective state of mind through the cumulation of 

circumstantial evidence, as well as through direct evidence.” Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 

789 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “But it is not enough to show that defendant should have known better; 

instead, the plaintiff must offer evidence that the defendant in fact harbored subjective doubt.” 

Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 822 F.3d 576, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Ill will by a defendant is not 

sufficient to demonstrate actual malice. See Parsi v. Daioleslam, 890 F. Supp. 2d 77, 90 (D.D.C. 

2012); see also Arpaio v. Zucker, 414 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[T]he motivations 

behind defendants’ communications — inspired by political differences or otherwise — do not 

impact whether defendants acted with actual malice as a matter of law.”). The actual-malice 

standard accordingly “is a daunting one.” McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 

1501, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, then, a public-figure plaintiff must allege facts that support 

a plausible inference that a statement was false and made with actual malice. Byd Co. Ltd. v. 

All. for Am. Mfg., No. 21-7099, 2022 WL 1463866, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 2022) (citing 
22

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). That is, such a plaintiff must plead “nonconclusory facts alleging the 

[defendant] knew [its statement] was false or questioned its truth.” BYD Co. Ltd. v. All. for Am. 

Mfg., 554 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 1463866 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 2022); 

see also Hourani v. Psybersolutions LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 128, 141 (D.D.C. 2016) (“To allege 

actual malice, a plaintiff must assert that the defendant realized that his statement was false or 

that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement.”) (formatting 

modified), aff’d, 690 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

b. Allegedly Defamatory Statements

This is a high bar that Vindman cannot clear. Begin with Hahn, who Plaintiff alleges 

distributed talking points that said: “Vindman Has Major Credibility Issues,” “Vindman has 

faced accusations of poor judgment, leaking, and going around normal procedures,” and “There 

was nothing wrong with the call with Zelensky at all, Vindman was just upset that President 

Trump was leading foreign policy instead of sticking to Vindman’s talking points. . . . But it’s 

not Vindman’s job to set foreign policy, it’s the President’s.” Compl., ¶¶ 148–49. Plaintiff 

originally alleged neither that these statements were false nor that Hahn acted recklessly by 

circulating them. See Hahn MTD at 18. In his Opposition, he contends that one of these three 

statements — “Vindman has faced accusations of poor judgment, leaking, and going around 

normal procedures” — so qualifies. See Pl. Opp. at 45–46. Plaintiff’s only basis for that 

conclusion is a suggestion that Hahn’s circulated talking points “blatantly misrepresented” the 

underlying testimony on which they were based. Id. (citing Compl., ¶¶ 148, 151–52). 

Vindman does not plead any facts, however, that indicate that this talking point (or the 

others) was false. Indeed, it appears to the Court that it is consistent with the underlying 

testimony. See ECF No. 44 (Hahn Reply) at 12 (reprinting public-record testimony, where 
23

witness made allegations similar to those the talking point raised). In other words, there were

such accusations; whether they were accurate or not does not matter for assessing the falsity of 

the statement. Finally, Vindman does not allege that Hahn made that statement with any 

subjective belief that it was false, nor does he plead any facts to suggest that she held such a 

belief. At bottom, he does not plead facts that state an unlawful overt act with respect to Hahn.

Giuliani’s alleged defamation came in two tweets, which read: “ANOTHER SCHIFFTY 

BACKFIRE: A US gov. employee who has reportedly been advising two gov’s? No wonder he 

is confused and feels pressure,” and then, “Schiff is thanking him for his secret testimony and for 

giving advice to two countries. I thought he worked for US.” Compl., ¶¶ 124–25. To the extent

that these statements imply a false fact — viz., that Vindman was “advising two gov[ernment]s” 

or “giving advice to two countries”— the Complaint pleads no facts that suggest that Giuliani 

knew that this was false, and it offers no evidence that it was so inherently improbable that only 

a reckless person would have made such statements. Plaintiff’s own Complaint points to a

contemporaneous New York Times article that reported that “Ukrainian officials sought advice 

from [Vindman].” Id., ¶¶ 105, 107. Officials seeking advice is of course different from 

Vindman giving it, but that Times report does make it difficult for Plaintiff to plead that Giuliani 

had subjective knowledge of his statement’s falsity. Because the Court finds that Vindman has 

not nudged to plausible the inference that either tweet was made with actual malice, the Court 

cannot conclude that either constitutes an unlawful overt act.

Scavino’s allegedly defamatory tweet meets the same fate. His read: “#ICYMI: Lt. Col. 

Vindman was offered the position of Defense Minister for the Ukrainian Government THREE 

times! #ImpeachmentSHAM.” Id., ¶ 171. The tweet was based on Vindman’s testimony that he 

recalled being offered the position of Defense Minister three times, a fact that he himself pleads. 
24

Id., ¶¶ 164, 169. As Plaintiff thus cannot show that the facts in that tweet were false, this cannot 

be an overt act either. 

So, too, with Trump, Jr.’s tweets and comments. As described above, these are a bit 

more extensive. Plaintiff alleges that Trump, Jr. made defamatory comments on Fox News, 

saying, “[I]t turns out he’s, you know, talking to the Ukraine” and suggesting that Vindman was 

a “leftist.” Id., ¶¶ 127–28. Vindman adds that Trump, Jr. also tweeted a variety of allegedly 

defamatory remarks, including: 

 Retweeting a story that falsely stated that Vindman had been reprimanded for 

inappropriate and partisan behavior while in the military, with the comment: “Amazing. 

Of course anyone who’s been watching this for the past three years is not at all surprised 

that this would be their ‘star witness,’” later adding, “All I’ve heard is that there’s no way 

you could possible question him or his motives because he was once in the military,” id., 

¶¶ 133–40; 

 Commenting when Vindman was removed from the NSC, “On the bright side, he may 

still be able to take the defense minister position in the Ukraine that he was offered a few 

times,” id., ¶ 196; 

 Tweeting, “Allow me a moment to thank—and this may be a bit of a surprise—Adam 

Schiff. Were it not for his crack investigation skills, @realDonaldTrump might have had 

a tougher time unearthing who all needed to be fired. Thanks, Adam!,” which he 

followed with a crying-laughing emoji and the hashtag “#FullOfSchiff,” id., ¶ 197; 

 Tweeting several months later, “A name that’s not appearing NEARLY enough in the 

‘news’ – VINDMAN. Media covered his bogus Ukraine transcript constantly. Dems 

yelled ‘impeach!!’ NOW he admits to actually making up parts of it. Another hoax 
25

exposed. And yet again the media cover the fake scandal but not the TRUTH”; id., ¶ 203;

and

 Adding shortly thereafter, “You’d think that someone would be criminally charged for 

making up things that lead to an impeachment based on false premises. But I guess that 

would only happen if they did it to a liberal! Alexander Vindman Admits making up 

Parts of Trump Call Summary,” linking to a Breitbart story with that title. Id., ¶ 203.

While the closest call of the four Defendants, Vindman pleads no facts that create a 

plausible inference that Trump, Jr. made false statements while subjectively entertaining serious 

doubts about them. Begin with the Fox appearance where he called Vindman a “leftist,”

whatever that is supposed to mean. Under binding Circuit precedent, that remark does not 

constitute or imply a statement of fact. Rather, it is like the political charges of “fascist” and 

“political Marxis[t]” that our Circuit has held are “obviously unverifiable” as mere “loosely 

definable, variously interpretable statement[s] of opinion . . . made inextricably in the contest of 

political, social or philosophical debate.” Ollman, 750 F.2d at 987 (quoting Buckley, 539 F.2d at 

895); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (“loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language” does not 

imply facts). 

Moving next to the tweets, the Court starts with Trump, Jr.’s retweet of an article 

accusing Vindman of “Inappropriate and Partisan Behavior in Military.” Compl., ¶ 137. The 

Complaint alleges that the article source’s reliability was “self-evidently questionable” because 

the source at one point had the hashtag #Q in his profile (the Complaint does not specify for how 

long or whether it was there during the time Trump, Jr. retweeted the article) and because the 

source was “a motivated partisan” who “reportedly wrote more than a hundred tweets 

recirculating QAnon-related theories.” Id., ¶ 134. These facts, taken as true, suggest that the 
26

article Trump, Jr. retweeted stated or implied false conclusions. But Plaintiff does not plead 

facts sufficient to suggest actual malice. Trump, Jr. did not retweet the article source’s tweets, 

which is what Plaintiff contends he had reason to know were false; rather, he retweeted only an 

article from Gateway Pundit based on those tweets, which he is not alleged to have known was 

false and which did in fact make such accusations of inappropriate and partisan behavior. 

Speakers are not presumed to have scrolled through the Twitter history of the source for every 

article that they re-tweet, and nothing in the pleadings suggests that Trump, Jr. saw (or should 

have seen) anything suggesting that the source was a QAnon supporter or otherwise a conspiracy 

theorist.

Plaintiff similarly falls short with respect to Trump, Jr.’s other tweets. The sarcastic 

tweet that, “[o]n the bright side, [Vindman] may still be able to take the defense minister position 

in the Ukraine that he was offered a few times,” Compl., ¶ 196, does not contain a verifiably

false statement of fact, as explained above in connection with Scavino. The tongue-in-cheek 

tweet thanking Adam Schiff, accompanied by a crying-laughing emoji and the hashtag 

“#FullOfSchiff,” similarly does not make a verifiably false statement of fact; it sarcastically 

thanks a political antagonist. Perhaps recognizing as much, the Complaint does not specifically 

allege that either of these tweets was defamatory and instead principally uses them to suggest

that Vindman’s firing was retaliatory. Id., ¶¶ 195–201.

Trump, Jr.’s two final tweets suggest that Vindman admitted “making up” parts of his 

testimony. Id., ¶¶ 203–04. The Breitbart article that Trump, Jr. linked to in support was titled 

“Alexander Vindman Admits Making Up Parts of Trump Call Summary.” Id., ¶ 203. Vindman 

alleges only that the article “does not establish that Lt. Col. Vindman made up things leading to 
27

an impeachment.” Id., ¶ 204. Yet he needs to allege far more to establish actual malice —

namely, that Trump, Jr. knew or should have known that the article was not true. 

Faced with the lack of an unlawful defamatory statement by any Defendant, Plaintiff 

suggests that others, including Laura Ingraham, John Yoo, and former President Trump, are 

themselves co-conspirators who said defamatory things and so committed unlawful overt acts on 

behalf of the conspiracy. But just as Vindman does not plead facts sufficient to plausibly suggest 

that any Defendant entered into a conspiratorial agreement, he similarly does not sufficiently 

allege that any such agreement included these other characters. The Court, consequently, need 

not consider their statements.

That said, because former President Trump worked closely with each Defendant — he 

was the boss of some (Hahn, Scavino), close confidant of others (Giuliani), and father of one 

(Trump, Jr.) — the Court will nonetheless examine his statements to see whether any could 

constitute an unlawful overt act on behalf of the conspiracy.

Unfortunately for Plaintiff, several of the former President’s tweets do not contain 

information specifically about Vindman and are pled only to show the purportedly unlawful 

nature of the conspiracy (those at Compl., ¶ 100); did not allege statements of fact (that at 

Compl., ¶ 129); or concerned material the Court has already held non-defamatory (that at 

Compl., ¶ 172, retweeting Scavino). The only remaining tweets that Plaintiff specifically alleges 

were false and made with actual malice are those at paragraphs 199–201 of the Complaint, in 

which the former President tweeted:

Fake News @CNN & MSDNC keep talking about “Lt. Col.” 

Vindman as though I should think only how wonderful he was. 

Actually, I don’t know him, never spoke to him, or met him (I don’t 

believe!) but, he was very insubordinate, reported contents of my 

“perfect” calls incorrectly, &...was given a horrendous report by his 

superior, the man he reported to, who publicly stated that Vindman 
28

had problems with judgement, adhering to the chain of command 

and leaking information. In other words, “OUT.”

To the extent that this tweet contains or implies false statements, however, Vindman does 

not plead facts suggesting that Trump made these statements with actual malice. The Complaint 

repeatedly alleges that it was “not true” that Vindman had received a horrendous report by his 

superior, had problems adhering to chain of command, or leaked anything. See Compl., ¶ 200. 

But it pleads no facts to further suggest that Trump subjectively knew these statements to be 

untrue or that he had a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.

The Court of course passes no judgment on the fairness or propriety of such attacks. As a 

limited-purpose public figure, however, Vindman was a man in the arena. Defendants may have 

played ugly, but Vindman does not plead facts suggesting that they acted with actual malice. 

Leaking

Vindman also alleges a second overt unlawful act: that “conspirators at the White House” 

leaked classified information to House Republicans — namely, Vindman’s report documenting 

that he received and declined an offer to serve as Ukrainian Minister of Defense — who then 

questioned him about it during his committee appearance. See Pl. Opp. at 24 (citing Compl., 

¶¶ 157–67). While leaking classified information could indeed be an unlawful overt act, Plaintiff 

offers no basis for concluding that any Defendant leaked this information or formed an 

agreement with anyone who did so. Vindman contends only that “some Defendants” were 

involved in the leak but offers no non-conclusory facts to support that inference. See id. at 12. 

Indeed, none of the four Defendants held White House positions in the national-security space, 

and Plaintiff does not even plead that any of the four held security clearances. It is unclear, then, 

how Vindman theorizes that they could have obtained this information so as to help leak it. 

These conclusions are thus entirely speculative. 
29

* * *

The Court will end where it began: by emphasizing the narrowness of the task before it. 

Plaintiff certainly pleads that Defendants each helped propagate harmful and unfair attacks 

against him. The Court does not decide the validity of those attacks, regardless of whether some 

were outside the bounds of appropriate political discourse. It instead looks only to whether 

Vindman’s pleadings satisfy the civil-conspiracy elements that the D.C. Circuit articulated in 

Halberstam and the 12(b)(6) standard that the Supreme Court established in Iqbal. Such inquiry 

yields the inescapable conclusion that they do not.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. A 

separate Order so stating will issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg

JAMES E. BOASBERG

United States District Judge

Date: November 8, 2022