IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of:

KRISTIN HARPER,

Respondent,

v.

BENJAMIN STONER-DUNCAN,

Appellant.

No. 84532-2-I 

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, C.J. — Kristin Harper and Benjamin Stoner-Duncan have been 

together for nearly two decades and have two children. In 2010, when StonerDuncan was in medical school, the couple decided that Harper would forego her 

academic career to be the children’s primary caretaker and the family’s primary 

breadwinner until Stoner-Duncan finished his residency and began working as an 

emergency physician in Seattle in 2019. Harper petitioned for dissolution in 2021

and the parties agreed to resolve the matter by arbitration. The arbitrator 

awarded the parties’ house and maintenance to Harper, along with a $171,000 

judgment to offset Stoner-Duncan’s remaining medical school loans, which had 

been rolled into the home’s mortgage.

Stoner-Duncan, appealing the trial court’s refusal to vacate or modify the 

arbitrator’s decision, asserts that the arbitrator committed an error of law by 

assigning a value to Stoner-Duncan’s medical degree when distributing property. 

He also asserts that they erred when awarding the house to Harper. And he 
No. 845322-I/2

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contends that they exceeded their powers in giving most of the couple’s assets to 

Harper. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

Kristin Harper and Benjamin Stoner-Duncan1 met in 2000, began 

cohabitating in 2003 and married in 2008. They have two children: a son, born in 

2004, and a daughter, born in 2010. Over the course of their relationship, both 

parties pursued and received advanced degrees. Harper received a Master of 

Public Health in global epidemiology and a Ph.D. in genetics and microbiology 

from Emory University in 2008 and worked at Columbia University as a post

doctoral (postdoc) scholar. Stoner-Duncan entered Columbia Medical School in 

2010 and began his residency in 2014.

Harper’s education was paid for by fellowships from the National Science 

Foundation and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, which included stipends 

the couple used to support themselves. During this period—which was before 

Stoner-Duncan began medical school—Stoner-Duncan worked a variety of jobs, 

including as a lab technician, a busboy, an artist, a bartender, a stagehand, and 

running his own business, Ben’s Bikes. When the couple moved to New York so 

that Harper could pursue her postdoc research, Stoner-Duncan sold his business 

and began to contemplate medical school. Because he needed additional 

 

1 Briefing on appeal and the record below both refer to the parties by their 

first names, as is customary in family law matters because individuals often 

share family names. Because Harper and Stoner-Duncan do not share a name, 

however, we will not follow suit.
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pre-med requirements before applying, Stoner-Duncan attended Columbia for a 

year, with tuition paid by his grandfather.

The couple’s daughter was born around the time Stoner-Duncan was 

accepted to Columbia Medical School. The next year, their son was diagnosed 

with Asperger’s syndrome and began attending therapy five times a week. 

Faced with suddenly increased family demands, the couple concluded that one 

of them would have to give up their career prospects to become a primary 

caregiver, at least for a time. Because of Stoner-Duncan’s considerably higher 

potential earnings—Harper estimated her income as a professor would at most 

reach $260,000—they decided that Harper would stop pursuing an academic 

career. 

In 2013, knowing that their residence would be determined by the location 

of Stoner-Duncan’s medical residency and reluctant to commit to any specific 

employer, Harper began a freelance writing business, Harper Health and Science 

Communication. The couple moved to Seattle for Stoner-Duncan’s residency at 

the University of Washington. They purchased a house for $535,000 using a 

$230,000 gift from Stoner-Duncan’s mother as a down payment. 

The residency period put significant strain on their relationship, with 

Stoner-Duncan working 80-100 hours a week. During the residency, StonerDuncan made roughly $55,000 annually and Kristin worked 20 hours a week at 

her business.

Stoner-Duncan completed his residency in 2018 and is now an emergency 

room doctor at Northwest Hospital in Seattle. As of the arbitration of this case, 
No. 845322-I/4

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his gross monthly income was $27,703. Harper’s was $10,025. Her work has 

been featured in a number of publications, including the New York Times, BBC, 

and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and her clients have included the Bill and 

Melinda Gates Foundation, Medscape, the World Health Organization, and the 

National Institute of Health. In 2020, the couple refinanced their house to roll 

Stoner-Duncan’s remaining $171,000 student loans into their mortgage. 

Harper petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in March 2021. The 

parties stipulated to proceed by arbitration rather than in superior court. The 

arbitrator issued their decision in May 2022. They issued parenting plan and 

child support orders that are not at issue in this appeal. They also ordered 

maintenance payments from Stoner-Duncan to Harper at $5,000 per month for 

78 months. The arbitrator based this award on the 10 years of support Harper 

provided to Stoner-Duncan as he pursued his current position as an emergency 

room doctor, as well as her sacrifice of her own academic career and earning 

potential. Taking into account Stoner-Duncan’s future earning potential, the 

arbitrator awarded Harper the house and ordered Stoner-Duncan to pay a 

judgment to Harper of $171,000 to compensate for the medical school loans that 

are now part of the mortgage. In a somewhat unusual move, when determining 

the distribution of the parties’ property, the arbitrator valued Stoner-Duncan’s 

medical degree and license at roughly half a million dollars and used this value in 

determining the appropriate distribution of assets.
No. 845322-I/5

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Much of the equitable reasoning behind the arbitrator’s decision appears 

to be reflected by this table, which lays out the parties’ respective contributions to 

their marital community:

YEAR [Harper] [Harper] [StonerDuncan]StonerDuncan]

2002 $0 Undergrad $1,312

2003 $0 Undergrad $102

2004 $26k-30k Grad School $5,824

2005 $26k-30k Grad School $5,241

2006 $26k-30k Grad School $11,763

2007 $26k-30k Grad School $5,432

2008 $23,878 Grad School $0

2009 $77,616 Post Doc $17,013

2010 $66,112 Post Doc $22,704 Med Sch

2011 $37,985 $0 Med Sch

2012 $44,356 $0 Med Sch

2013 $29,385 $0 Med Sch

2014 $11,914 $24,598 Residency

2015 $96,555 $51,301 Residency

2016 $97,482 $55,072 Residency

2017 $93,800 $60,329 Residency

2018 $94,800 $77,543 Indep K’tr

2019 $97,600 $237,079

2020 $116,000 $311,558 [2]

In short, Harper served as the couple’s primary source of income throughout their 

relationship, including when she was in school. The marriage ended only shortly 

after the community began to realize the financial benefits of Stoner-Duncan’s 

degree.

Harper moved for reconsideration, which the arbitrator denied as to most 

of the issues raised, though they did grant Stoner-Duncan some partial relief, 

including reducing the valuation of his medical degree from $542,400 to 

 

2 Minor edits have been made to this table to alter formatting and remove 

citations to exhibits reviewed by the arbitrator when assembling it.
No. 845322-I/6

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$470,000. Stoner-Duncan moved the superior court to modify, correct, or vacate 

the arbitration. This request was denied, and the court awarded fees to Harper.

Stoner-Duncan appeals.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

Appellate review of property divisions and other orders coming out of the 

arbitrated dissolution of a marriage is strictly limited by the courts’ interests in

carving out a space for finality in arbitration. Davidson v. Hensen, 135 Wn.2d 

112, 118, 954 P.2d 1327 (1998). Arbitration is governed by the Washington 

uniform arbitration act, chapter 7.04A RCW. Broom v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 

169 Wn.2d 231, 236, 236 P.3d 182 (2010). 

RCW 7.04A.240 and RCW 7.04A.230 lay out, respectively, the scope of a 

trial court’s ability to modify and vacate arbitration awards, and therefore the 

scope of appellate review of the trial court’s orders. As relevant here, 

modification is required where “[t]here was an evident mathematical 

miscalculation or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, or 

property referred to in the award.” RCW 7.04A.240(1)(a). Vacation is required 

where, among other possibilities, there was evident partiality on the part of the 

arbitrator, misconduct by the arbitrator that prejudiced the rights of a party, or the 

“arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers.” RCW 7.04.230(1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(iii), 

(1)(d).

An error of law on the face of the award demonstrates that an arbitrator 

has exceeded their powers under RCW 7.04A.230(1)(d). Broom, 169 Wn.2d 
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at 237. Such error may be shown either through “adoption of an erroneous rule 

or mistake in applying the law.” Lindon Commodities, Inc. v. Bambino Bean Co., 

Inc., 57 Wn. App. 813, 816, 790 P.2d 228 (1990). But the evidence before the 

arbitrator will not be considered. Lindon Commodities, 57 Wn. App. at 816. 

“Judicial review of an arbitration award, therefore, does not include a review of 

the merits of the case.” Davidson, 135 Wn.2d at 119.

The $230,000 Gift

We first address Stoner-Duncan’s contention that the arbitrator committed 

an error of law in the characterization of the $230,000 gift that his mother made 

while the couple was purchasing their house. He asserts that the arbitrator erred 

by treating the gift as community rather than separate property, and therefore 

committed a downstream error by awarding the couple’s house to Harper. The 

arbitrator’s characterizations are supported by their factual findings. And the 

arbitrator’s ultimate distribution of the house is not dependent on the

characterization of either the house or the gift as separate or community 

property, but rather on their determination as to the equitable distribution of the 

communities’ assets and liabilities given all the circumstances. We

correspondingly reject this argument.

Washington is a community property state. Chapter 26.16 RCW. 

Property acquired by either spouse during a marriage is typically owned and 

managed by both partners equally. RCW 26.16.030. Property acquired before 

the marriage is and remains separate, as is any property acquired after the 

marriage but gained by “gift, bequest, devise, descent, or inheritance.” 
No. 845322-I/8

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RCW 26.16.010. Notably, RCW 26.09.080 permits property’s distribution at the 

end of a marriage regardless of whether it is separate or community, though it 

does direct the trial court to consider the nature of the property when distributing 

assets.

A gift of property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be community 

property. In re Smith's Estate, 73 Wn.2d 629, 631, 440 P.2d 179 (1968). This 

presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of intent by the 

donor to make the gift to one spouse specifically, rather than to the community. 

Matter of Marriage of Olivares, 69 Wn. App. 324, 331, 848 P.2d 1281 (1993).

A trial court’s characterization of property as either community or separate 

is a mixed question of law and fact. Matter of Marriage of Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d 

342, 348-49, 506 P.3d 630 (2022). Factual findings—reviewable when made by 

a trial court, but not typically when made by an arbitrator—are reviewed for 

substantial evidence. Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d at 348-49. Where factual findings 

are not challenged or are supported—as here—our review is limited to whether 

those findings support the characterization of property as a matter of law, and 

review is de novo. Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d at 348-49.

In this case, Stoner-Duncan’s mother gifted $230,000 toward the down 

payment used to purchase the couple’s house. The gift letter itself named only 

Stoner-Duncan as a recipient. Stoner-Duncan relied on this fact to argue that the 

gift was meant for him along, increasing his stake in the house itself. The 

arbitrator disagreed. The gift was made as a part of the process of securing a 

mortgage and title to the house, title was in both Stoner-Duncan and Harper’s 
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names, and the gift letter itself was required by the lender as a condition of the 

mortgage. Harper testified that Stoner-Duncan’s mother represented the gift as 

meant for both of them. And Harper used some of her separate property to 

purchase the house and mortgage payments were made from community funds. 

The arbitrator therefore found that Stoner-Duncan had not demonstrated that the 

gift was intended for him as separate property, regardless of its nominal 

assignment to him alone. Additionally, when refinancing the mortgage, title 

remained in both the parties’ names. The arbitrator found as a result that no 

evidence supported the notion that the house itself was intended to be anything 

other than community property. 

As findings of fact going to intent, and with intent determinative of the legal 

character of property, this panel is not in a position to decide that either the 

house or the gift of $230,000 are anything other than community property. This 

is because our review is limited to errors of law or mathematical miscalculations, 

and Stoner-Duncan’s challenge goes instead to the merits of the arbitrator’s 

decision. We see no error of law or mathematical miscalculation here.

Additionally, though RCW 26.09.080 requires consideration of the 

separate or communal nature of property before it is divided, property of either 

nature may be distributed to either spouse if it is just and equitable to do so. 

Regardless of the nature of the property, then, the arbitrator did not error.

Division of Property and Maintenance Award

We now address Stoner-Duncan’s challenges to a number of the 

arbitrator’s decisions in deciding how to divide the couple’s property and whether 
No. 845322-I/10

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to award maintenance. He raises two primary concerns in this context. He 

asserts, first, that the arbitrator erred in assigning a value to his professional 

degree. He then asserts that the arbitrator did not properly account for the 

$171,000 judgment against him. He characterizes these as errors of law or 

evident mathematical miscalculations that led to an inequitable distribution of 

property and an inequitable maintenance award. 

We disagree. The arbitrator’s division of property and award of 

maintenance both took into account a range of equitable factors. Their treatment 

of Stoner-Duncan’s professional degree assigned it a monetary value as an aid 

to provide understanding of their thought process about the property division. 

More broadly, the distribution of assets and liabilities and award of maintenance 

do not constitute an error of law. Despite Stoner-Duncan’s attempt to paint the 

arbitrator’s responsibility as equally distributing assets, their duty was instead to 

create an equitable distribution. 

1. Principles of Property Division and Maintenance

A brief overview of the dissolution process’s treatment of property 

distribution and maintenance is useful. Asset distribution at the end of a 

marriage is guided by RCW 26.09.080, which, although statutory, retains many of 

the equitable characteristics that courts have traditionally applied. The statute 

directs the dividing tribunal to, “without regard to misconduct, make such 

disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or 

separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all the relevant 

factors.” RCW 26.09.080. It lists four non-exclusive factors to consider:
No. 845322-I/11

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(1) The nature and extent of the community property;

(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;

(3) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership; 

and

(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse or domestic 

partner at the time the division of property is to become effective.

RCW 26.09.080.

A tribunal’s powers when seeking to place the parties on just and 

equitable footing are not limited to distribution of property held by the parties at 

the time of their dissolution. Tribunals may also award maintenance, ongoing 

monetary support from one former spouse to another. RCW 26.09.090(1). 

Maintenance is awarded “in such amounts and for such periods of time as the 

court deems just” and, like property distribution, is made without consideration of 

misconduct. RCW 26.09.090(1). The statute again lists a number of nonexclusive factors for the tribunal to consider when awarding maintenance:

(a) The financial resources of the party seeking 

maintenance, including separate or community property 

apportioned to him or her, and his or her ability to meet his or her 

needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for 

support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party;

(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or 

training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find 

employment appropriate to his or her skill, interests, style of life, 

and other attendant circumstances;

(c) The standard of living established during the marriage or 

domestic partnership;

(d) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership;

(e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial 

obligations of the spouse or domestic partner seeking maintenance; 

and

(f) The ability of the spouse or domestic partner from whom 

maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs and financial 
No. 845322-I/12

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obligations while meeting those of the spouse or domestic partner 

seeking maintenance.

RCW 26.09.090(1).

The tribunal’s powers are plainly broad. And both maintenance and 

property distribution are guided principally by concerns about equity and justice 

in light of the parties’ circumstances. Fundamentally, “[a]n equitable division of 

property does not require mathematical precision, but rather fairness, based 

upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the marriage, both past and 

present, and an evaluation of the future needs of parties.” Matter of Marriage of 

Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996). 

Of particular concern to Stoner-Duncan is the arbitrator’s treatment of his 

professional degree, to which they assigned a monetary value of roughly half a 

million dollars when dividing property, and then considered when awarding 

Harper a maintenance award.

Washington’s treatment of professional degrees in cases like the present 

one is best described in the seminal decision on the subject, Washburn v. 

Washburn:

When a person supports a spouse through professional school in 

the mutual expectation of future financial benefit to the community, 

but the marriage ends before that benefit can be realized, that 

circumstance is a “relevant factor” which must be considered in 

making a fair and equitable division of property and liabilities 

pursuant to RCW 26.09.080, or a just award of maintenance

pursuant to RCW 26.09.090. A professional degree confers high 

earning potential upon the holder. The student spouse should not 

walk away with this valuable advantage without compensating the 

person who helped him or her obtain it.

101 Wn.2d 168, 178, 677 P.2d 152 (1984). The tribunal “may compensate a 
No. 845322-I/13

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spouse who has assisted the student spouse in obtaining his or her professional 

degree . . . through property division, maintenance, or a combination of these.” 

Fernau v. Fernau, 39 Wn. App. 695, 707, 694 P.2d 1092 (1984) (emphasis 

added).

Washburn lists a number of factors for tribunals to consider while 

distributing assets and awarding maintenance based on one spouse’s support for 

the other during professional school: (1) the amount of community funds 

expended for educational costs, though not living expenses that would have 

been incurred regardless; (2) the amount the community would have earned had 

the student spouse not been pursuing professional school; (3) any education or 

career opportunities foregone by the supporting spouse; (4) the future earnings 

of each spouse. 101 Wn.2d at 179-80. These first two standards consider the 

past conditions of the marriage, while the third and fourth allow adjustment of any 

corresponding award to account for future circumstances as well. Washburn, 

101 Wn.2d at 180-81. Where maintenance is concerned, Washburn emphasizes 

that it “is not just a means of providing bare necessities, but rather a flexible tool 

by which the parties’ standard of living may be equalized for an appropriate 

period of time.” 101 Wn.2d at 179.

2. The Arbitrator’s Awards

The arbitrator in this case considered Stoner-Duncan’s professional 

degree and license both in distributing assets and in awarding maintenance, as 

Washburn allows. The basic distribution of the assets was simple and, in the 

arbitrator’s calculation, reflected an equitable split between the Stoner-Duncan
No. 845322-I/14

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and Harper accounting for Stoner-Duncan’s degree. Harper was awarded the 

couple’s Ballard house, valued at $970,000 but encumbered by a $389,043 

mortgage, leaving an actual value of $580,957. She also received her business, 

Harper Health and Science Communications, LLC, valued at $41,000, $31,126 of 

the couple’s bank accounts, $24,786 of their investment accounts, and $221,352 

of their retirement accounts. These assets total $899,221. 

Stoner-Duncan, meanwhile, received $59,993 of the bank accounts, 

$63,223 of their investment accounts, and $284,658 of their retirement 

accounts.3 He also retained his share of ownership of an island in Canada, 

valued at $14,500. And the arbitrator gave a value of $472,000 to his medical 

degree and license to determine how they arrived at an equitable split of the 

parties’ assets and liabilities. In making this determination the arbitrator 

considered two components: (1) the money spent in obtaining the degree, and 

(2) the lifetime earnings that would not be realized by the community.4 This 

provided an illustrative value of $894,374 to Stoner-Duncan’s assets. The 

couple’s personal property was divided more or less evenly. 

Stoner-Duncan was also ordered to pay a judgment of $171,000 to 

Harper. This accounted for his outstanding medical education debt, which the 

 

3 As Stoner-Duncan points out, the arbitrator’s property division sheet 

contains a scrivener’s error. It awards Stoner-Duncan a Fidelity account valued 

at $52,564.08 as well as a Vanguard 401k valued at $57,525.69, but erroneously 

counts both accounts as worth $52.564 in the column totaling the valuation of his 

assets. The correct total is $284,658.

4 The arbitrator initially valued the degree at $542,500, 10 percent of an 

expert witness’s valuation of his future earnings. On reconsideration, it lowered 

this amount slightly to the $472,000 figure.
No. 845322-I/15

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couple had rolled into their mortgage several years earlier and which, as a result, 

Harper would otherwise have been responsible for paying off.

In addition to the property division, the arbitrator awarded Harper

maintenance of $5,000 a month for 78 months—a total of $390,000. The 

arbitrator found that Harper “set aside her career and her professional and 

financial advancement to support through . . . 4 years of medical school, through 

4 years of his residency, through a lap year, and while he established his current 

position as an ER doctor.” The arbitrator viewed maintenance as “a reasonable 

and appropriate way to compensate her for the income she has foregone and the 

financial gain Stoner-Duncan will enjoy.” 

The arbitrator’s decision may also have been informed by testimony that 

Harper is going blind. Harper asserted that she is losing her eyesight and might 

become blind because of a hereditary disease. Stoner-Duncan presented 

Harper’s condition as less severe, limited to “droopy eyelids and dry eyes,” and 

not one that would significantly affect her ability to work or live. The arbitrator did 

not make a finding on this factual dispute, but did state in passing that Harper “is 

slowly going blind, which [Stoner-Duncan] verified.”

Much of the dispute in this case arise out of the arbitrator’s use of a 

property division spreadsheet. Stoner-Duncan’s degree was included on the 

spreadsheet as an asset he possessed, valued at $472,000. The $171,000 

judgment against him however, was excluded from the spreadsheet. The result 

is that the spreadsheet creates the appearance of an equal property distribution, 

with each spouse awarded roughly half of their total shared assets.
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3. Valuation of the Degree

Stoner-Duncan contends, first, that the arbitrator’s decision to assign a 

monetary value to his degree and include it in the property division spreadsheet 

was error, saying that “a spouse’s earning capacity or future earning potential, 

like a professional degree, is not an asset that can be valued and used to offset 

an award of other assets.” We conclude that the arbitrator acted within their

powers when considering Stoner-Duncan’s degree. 

Washburn is clear that a professional degree or license may be a “relevant 

factor” in distributing property. 101 Wn.2d at 178. In this case, the heuristic used 

by the tribunal was to assign a monetary value to the degree to equitably weigh 

property distribution to Harper by accounting for Stoner-Duncan’s future earning 

potential. That value was then included in the property division spreadsheet as 

an asset on Stoner-Duncan’s side of the ledger. This is unusual, and does not 

conform to the usual practices when making a property division spreadsheet. 

These spreadsheets typically tally assets and liabilities understood as financial 

items that are fungible, transferable, and either monetary or easily reducible to a 

monetary value. Professional degrees and licenses are not typically included as 

assets on these spreadsheets. By including the degree’s value on the 

spreadsheet, the arbitrator included an atypical asset to demonstrate the 

financial parity they determined in the asset distribution.

Though the arbitrator’s approach was unusual, their property distribution, 

understood holistically, nevertheless did not exceed their statutory powers. 

Instead, by assigning Stoner-Duncan’s degree a monetary value, they quantified 
No. 845322-I/17

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how a just and equitable distribution was accomplished without an entirely equal 

distribution. An entirely equal distribution would have ignored the resulting 

inequity caused by Stoner-Duncan’s professional prospects and earning potential

in comparison to Harper’s.

Stoner-Duncan cites to case law when attempting to rebuff this, but these 

citations are unhelpful to him. Washburn, it is true, declined “to address at this 

time the somewhat metaphysical question of whether a professional degree is 

‘property.’ ” 101 Wn.2d at 176. It is “property” in its more usual sense that is 

included on property division spreadsheets, a practice that accords with the 

tribunal’s statutory mandate to distribute separate and community property held 

by the spouses. See RCW 26.09.080 (requiring “disposition of the property and 

liabilities of the parties”). But as already discussed, Washburn went on to allow 

consideration of a degree in property distribution, leaving it to the tribunal to 

determine the method to do so. And In re Marriage of Hall, which Stoner-Duncan

also cites, explicitly says that “we have emphasized future earning capacity as a 

factor to be considered in property distribution in the context of professional 

degrees.” 103 Wn.2d 236, 247, 692 P.2d 175 (1984). We conclude that StonerDuncan’s critique of the way in which the arbitrator used his degree to 

demonstrate a just and equitable property distribution does not, on its own, 

establish that the arbitrator exceeded their authority.

4. The Distribution and Maintenance Were Not Inequitable

Stoner-Duncan next contends that the arbitrator erred by considering his 

degree in three places: distribution of property, the award of maintenance, and 
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the separate $171,000 judgment. He asserts that this counts his degree against 

him three times; a mathematical error and an error of law. He points out that the 

division of assets, when his professional degree is removed from consideration 

and the judgment is accounted for, awards Harper roughly 80 percent of the 

couple’s existing assets. He treats this as a distribution so lopsided that it 

constitutes an error of law. We disagree.

Washburn and its progeny cases are clear that a professional degree may 

be considered not only when distributing property but simultaneously elsewhere. 

The question is whether the final distribution and maintenance are, examined as 

a whole, equitable.5 There is good reason for this. A dissolution may come at a 

time when all the costs of a degree have already been borne by a community, 

but the benefits of that degree have not yet accrued or are only beginning to 

accrue. Where this happens, one party may reap the benefits of the other’s 

sacrifices, while the other spouse is left having permanently forgone 

opportunities. Asset distribution alone can, as a result, be insufficient to address 

the inequities caused by the community’s dissolution, because the community 

will not have had the time to accumulate sufficient assets to address the inequity. 

In these circumstances, distribution of assets may be weighted toward non-

 

5 Stoner-Duncan also asserts that there is an internal conflict in the 

arbitrator’s decision by saying that this unequal distribution conflicted with their 

stated intent. But the pages of the arbitrator’s decisions to which he cites do not 

support the inference he encourages us to make that the arbitrator sought to 

equally distribute the community’s assets. Instead, those portions of the 

arbitrator’s decisions repeatedly reference the creation of “just and equitable” 

distribution and affirm the arbitrator’s belief that the distribution in this case 

matches that standard.
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professional spouse, but that spouse may also receive maintenance and other 

benefits to account for the sacrifices they made in support of the spouse whose 

earning capacity is now higher. 

That is precisely the situation here. The arbitrator’s unchallenged (and 

unchallengeable) findings of fact demonstrate that Harper, for over a decade, 

supported Stoner-Duncan as he applied to medical school, attended medical

school, went through residency, and established his career. She did so at a cost 

to her own career, and with the assumption that she and their family as a whole 

would be able to benefit from his higher earning capacity. This dissolution came 

only shortly after the community began to see the benefits of Stoner-Duncan’s 

degree. And the degree’s value was not doubly or triply counted, since the 

arbitrator’s valuation of the degree during asset distribution only considered less 

than 10 percent of its total value as measured in future earnings. Similarly, the 

arbitrator’s award of a separate $171,000 judgment was also not error. This 

award reflected Stoner-Duncan’s remaining medical school debt, now 

incorporated into the mortgage for which Harper is responsible. Distributing that 

debt to Stoner-Duncan is does not mean that the arbitrator counted his degree 

against him more than once. 

Stoner-Duncan also attacks the arbitrator’s treatment of the $171,000 

judgment by saying that they should have placed it on the property distribution 

spreadsheet. It’s absence from that document, he asserts, makes it appear that 

the distribution of property was wholly equal while ignoring a significant liability 

on his side. Certainly, including the $171,000 judgment on the spreadsheet 
No. 845322-I/20

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would allow for a more complete view of the parties assets and liabilities at the 

end of the dissolution process. But the spreadsheet is only one part of the 

arbitrator’s final order, and the treatment of the $171,000 medical school debt 

and the reasoning behind the distribution and maintenance decisions is 

thoroughly explained elsewhere in their decision. Our concern is whether the 

arbitrator committed an error of law and exceeded their statutory authority. Once 

again, the asserted error must be analyzed in light of whether it rendered the 

property distribution as a whole unjust and inequitable. Where, as here, the 

spreadsheet was used to illustrate the arbitrator’s thought process as a 

supplement to the nearly 100 other pages of analysis and background they had 

provided, this exclusion is not an error of law.6

The arbitrator’s decision fully and completely addressed the couple’s 

assets and liabilities. It is considered, thoughtful, and thorough. As a result of 

this, any fault in the spreadsheet, despite the spreadsheet’s lack of total fidelity to 

the reasoning behind the arbitrator’s decision, is not fatal to the decision as a 

whole. Nor is the arbitrator’s treatment of Stoner-Duncan’s degree erroneous. 

The value the arbitrator assigned to it at various places in the decision—

$472,000 during asset distribution, the maintenance award of $390,000, and 

$171,000 payment of his medical debt—is reflective of the difference in StonerDuncan’s future earning capacity as compared to Harper’s. Considering the 

 

6 We emphasize that our review is not de novo. We are not determining 

whether we agree with the arbitrator’s decision or would have arrived at the same 

decision. Our review is very narrow: whether the arbitrator committed an error of 

law or a mathematical miscalculation.
No. 845322-I/21

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parties’ 20-year relationship, and the opportunities Harper forwent to support him, 

the arbitrator’s decision as a whole is just and equitable. We find neither 

mathematical error nor an error of law.

Attorney Fees Below

Stoner-Duncan contests the trial court’s award of fees to Harper. 

RCW 7.04A.250 permits the award of fees and costs to the prevailing 

party on motions to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award. The 

trial court below, rejecting Stoner-Duncan’s challenge to the arbitrator’s decision, 

awarded Harper attorney fees as the prevailing party. 

Stoner-Duncan now asks this court to reverse that award. His request, 

however, is premised on us agreeing with his arguments that the arbitrator 

exceeded their powers. Since we do not, we affirm the fee award.

Attorney Fees on Appeal

Both sides request fees on appeal. We may rely on applicable law to 

grant party’s reasonable attorney fees and costs on review. RAP 18.1(a). We

may therefore award fees to the party who prevails on appeal under RCW 

7.04A.250. We award fees to Harper.

Stoner-Duncan contends that Harper did not adequately brief this issue, 

nitpicking her citations to authority and mischaracterizing her request. He latches 

onto her use of the word “frivolous” and her assertion that his arguments on 

appeal are not “meritorious” to characterize her request for fees as one made 

because his arguments were frivolous. He then argues that she did not cite to 

relevant authority to make this request. See Faulkner v. Racquetwood Vill. 
No. 845322-I/22

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Condo. Ass'n, 106 Wn. App. 483, 487, 23 P.3d 1135 (2001) (failure to cite 

applicable law supporting grant of attorney fees supported denial).

But Harper’s request for fees comes directly after her discussion of RCW 

7.04A.250, which supports her request as the prevailing party. Her citation to the 

appellate rules is, admittedly, to RAP 18.2(c), rather than to RAP 18.1. But this is 

a clear scrivener’s error; RAP 18.2, concerning voluntary withdrawal of review, 

has no subparts, and RAP 18.1(c) concerns affidavits of need submitted to 

support fee awards. We reject Stoner-Duncan’s attempt to read all meaning out 

of Harper’s request and award her fees.7

We affirm. 

WE CONCUR:

 

7 Both parties have filed affidavits of financial need and argue about 

whether this is necessary and appropriate at this step. We disregard these 

affidavits. Where financial need is relevant to an attorney fee award, affidavits 

can be considered. RAP 18.1(c). Here, because an award is to the prevailing 

party, they are superfluous.