NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 16-1190

_____________

THOMASON WOODSON,

Appellant

 

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D. N.J. No. 2-14-cv-06129)

District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 16, 2016

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 28, 2016)

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OPINION*

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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Thomason Woodson appeals a District Court order affirming the Commissioner of 

Social Security’s denial of his application for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I.

We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 

disposition. Woodson filed an application for disability insurance on June 21, 2011, 

alleging disability beginning on June 23, 2009. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

held a hearing on January 30, 2013 and on March 1, 2013, held that Woodson “has not 

been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 23, 2009,

through the date of this decision.” Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 18. The ALJ 

determined that Woodson suffered from severe impairments of alcohol dependence in 

remission (secondary cocaine abuse in remission), asthma, sleep apnea, congestive heart 

failure, obesity, back disorder, and arthritis in the knees. A.R. 14. But the ALJ found 

that none of these impairments, or a combination of the impairments, meets or equals any 

of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. Subpt. P. App. 1. The ALJ found that 

Woodson has residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of sedentary 

work, even if this RFC is insufficient to allow Woodson to perform his previous relevant 

work as a bridge operator. After considering Woodson’s circumstances, the ALJ found 

there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he can perform. On 

July 31, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Woodson’s request for review. Woodson filed 

suit, and the District Court affirmed the Commissioner’s final decision in an order dated

December 2, 2015. Woodson filed a timely appeal. 
3

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have 

appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Our review is limited to 

determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny benefits. Substantial evidence has been defined as more than a mere 

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 633 (3d Cir. 

2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

III.

On appeal, Woodson makes the same four arguments he made to the District 

Court: (1) the Commissioner’s step three finding is beyond judicial review;1(2) the RFC

 

1 We have previously explained that:

The Social Security Administration has promulgated a five-step process for 

evaluating disability claims. First, the Commissioner considers whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the 

Commissioner considers in the second step whether the claimant has a ‘severe 

impairment’ that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to perform basic 

work activities. If the claimant suffers a severe impairment, the third inquiry is 

whether, based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets the criteria of an 

impairment listed in the ‘listing of impairments,’ which result in a presumption of 

disability, or whether the claimant retains the capacity to work. If the impairment 

does not meet the criteria for a listed impairment, then the Commissioner assesses 

in the fourth step whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the 

residual functional capacity to perform his past work. If the claimant cannot 

perform his past work, then the final step is to determine whether there is other 

work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. The claimant bears 

the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four of this test. The Commissioner 

bears the burden of proof for the last step.
4

determination at step four was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ did not 

evaluate Woodson’s subjective complaints; and (4) the Commissioner did not sustain her

burden at step five.

The District Court focused in on two “principal defects” in Woodson’s action: (1) 

Woodson failed to deal with his burden of proof at the first four steps of the evaluation 

process, see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987), and (2) his failure to 

address the harmless error doctrine, see Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 

(2009). 

We have considered Woodson’s arguments, and for the following reasons, we will 

affirm the District Court’s determination. 

A.

Woodson first argues that Commissioner’s step three finding is beyond judicial 

review. He believes the ALJ did not consider whether his impairments in combination 

are medically equivalent to a listed impairment. In particular, Woodson argues that the 

ALJ’s analysis was not individualized, especially with respect to his obesity. We 

disagree.

“At step three, an ALJ is charged with determining whether a claimant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments meets, or medically equals, the criteria of an 

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d).” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2009). For meaningful judicial review, the ALJ must 

 

Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).
5

provide a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of reasoning, id. at 504, but we 

do not “require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in 

conducting his analysis,” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).

Woodson contends that the ALJ’s analysis was merely “mentally assessed,”

Woodson Br. 8, because there was limited written analysis comparing his impairments 

with those in the listings. The ALJ, however, did conclude that Woodson did not satisfy 

the requirements of the Listing of Impairments, specifically 1.00 (Musculoskeletal 

System), 3.00 (Respiratory System), and 12.00 (Mental Disorders). Further, the ALJ 

repeatedly considered the role of Woodson’s obesity, evaluating it within the context of 

the overall record, consistent with the appropriate guidelines. 

Woodson simply speculates about how his obesity might exacerbate other 

impairments — his back disorder, complaints of pain, arthritic knees, congestive heart 

failure, asthma attacks, or sleep apnea, Woodson Br. 16. But Woodson never points to 

specific medical evidence in the record to demonstrate that his obesity, in combination 

with other impairments, is sufficiently disabling. Instead, the evidence before the ALJ 

suggests otherwise. For instance, Dr. Rambhai Patel noted that Woodson walked without 

assistive devices and had a normal gait. A.R. 17. Dr. Patel also noted that Woodson had 

no acute distress, and the ALJ placed great emphasis on Dr. Patel’s report. A.R. 17. Dr. 

Patel noted that the use of a CPAP machine has helped Woodson’s sleep apnea. A.R. 

262. 

Woodson argues that the ALJ never explicitly addressed congestive heart failure 

under Listing 4.02. But the record evidence undercuts Woodson’s position. It is true that 
6

Woodson claimed a history of congestive heart failure and that he has been hospitalized 

twice. A.R. 262. But Dr. Patel found that a chest x-ray demonstrated cardiomegaly 

without congestive heart failure. A.R. 263. Woodson never received consistent 

treatment for any of these impairments. A.R. 17. 

Woodson repeatedly states that his circumstances were not compared to the 

listings. But he never explains how, even if the ALJ’s analysis was lacking, the 

deficiency was harmful to his claims. Woodson only says in very vague terms that an 

actual discussion of his impairments would lead to the conclusion that he was disabled at 

step three. This is unconvincing. Woodson has not affirmatively pointed to specific 

evidence that demonstrates he should succeed at step three. In other words, any error 

would be harmless. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409 (“[T]he burden of showing that an 

error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.”); see 

also Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] remand is not 

required here because it would not affect the outcome of the case.”).

We hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination at step three, 

but even if any error occurred, it would be harmless.

B.

Next, Woodson challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination at step four, arguing that 

it is not supported by substantial evidence. Woodson says there is no evidence to support 

the determination that he could perform “the full range of sedentary work.” Woodson Br. 

28. The ALJ is responsible for making the RFC finding based on all relevant medical 

and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1546(c).
7

The ALJ provided sufficient analysis for its RFC finding, which was supported by 

substantial evidence. As already explained, the ALJ cited to Dr. Patel’s report, on which 

it placed “great weight.” A.R. 17. Dr. Patel noted that Woodson walked with a normal 

gait. A.R. 17. Dr. Patel’s report further explained: “He can do both fine and gross 

movements in both hands and the grip was normal. Gait, he was walking without any 

walking device and there was no[t] any gross sensory or motor deficit.” A.R. 263. The 

ALJ explained that notes from rehab indicated few physical complaints. A.R. 16. It is 

true that Woodson claimed that he could not sit at a table packing two pound items 

because repetitive movement causes shortness of breath and chest pains. A.R. 16. But 

the ALJ did not find Woodson entirely credible, A.R. 16, even though Dr. Patel’s report 

did explain that Woodson experiences shortness of breath with exertion, A.R. 262. 

Woodson has not pointed to any other specific medical evidence to support his position. 

In sum, the ALJ’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence. 

C.

Woodson also contends that the ALJ never seriously evaluated his subjective 

complaints about pain, but dismissed them with boilerplate language questioning

Woodson’s credibility. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

determination that Woodson’s statements were “not entirely credible,” A.R. 16, because 

Woodson’s claims were contradicted by the medical evidence in the record. See

Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Allegations of pain and other 

subjective symptoms must be supported by objective medical evidence.”). As already 

mentioned, Dr. Patel’s report stated that Woodson walked with a normal gait. Dr. Patel 
8

reported that Woodson had no motor or sensory deficits, nor any acute distress. Other 

evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s credibility finding, including Woodson’s daily 

routines, including doing household chores, and driving locally, A.R. 16-17. Substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision regarding the credibility of Woodson’s subjective 

statements.

D.

Finally, Woodson argues that the Commissioner did not sustain its burden at step 

five because he had non-exertional impairments, such as respiratory impairments, which 

required the ALJ use a vocational expert. The ALJ found that Woodson has the RFC to 

perform a full range of sedentary work even though he must avoid environmental irritants 

and temperature extremes. Woodson is quite vague about what his specific nonexertional impairments are, referring again to respiratory issues and congestive heart 

failure. The District Court found that Woodson failed to establish a predicate nonexertional limitation that was omitted from the RFC analysis in step four. But even if he 

does have a non-exertional impairment, Woodson’s argument that the Commissioner 

must use a vocational expert is not correct. Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 

2005) (“[W]e hold that if the Secretary wishes to rely on an SSR [Social Security Ruling]

as a replacement for a vocational expert, it must be crystal-clear that the SSR is probative 

as to the way in which the nonexertional limitations impact the ability to work, and thus, 

the occupational base.”). Even if the ALJ could have better relied on a SSR or used a 

vocational expert, we hold that any error is harmless. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553. 
9

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that significant numbers of jobs 

exist in the national economy that Woodson can perform. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.