[ J
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MIDDLE DISTRICT SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

S & H TRANSPORT, INC.,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF YORK, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 8 MAP 2018 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered October 5, 2017 at No. 242 C D 2017 r eversing the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Civil Division, dated February 7, 2017, entered February 9, 2017 at No. 2012

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4143

- 54 ARGUED: December 5, 2018

O PINION

JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: July 17, 2019 In this appeal , we are asked to consider whether the Business Privilege and Mercantile T ax (“BPT”) impose d by Appellee the City of York (“City”) , must be paid by Appellant, S & H Transport, Inc. (“S & H”) , a freight broker , on the total yearly amount of
money S & H receives from its customers for arranging shipping of commercial goods with freight carriers on their behalf , whe re , after deducting its commission, S & H remits the remaining money to the freight carriers as payment of their shipping fees. After careful review, we find that the amount of money S & H collects and passes on to freight carriers for their fees is excluded from taxation under the City’s BPT

. We therefore reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.[J

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- 2 I. Background and Procedural History S & H is a freight brokerage company which arranges freight delivery for sellers of commercial goods , via a common carrier

. 1 Freight brokers do not directly ship or transport freight ; rather, they function as intermediaries which facilitate the shipment of goods

. Reiter v. Cooper

, 507 U.S. 258, 261 (1993) ; c f. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) (defining “ [ b ] roker” as “ a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling, providing, or arranging for, tr ansportation by motor carrier for compensation.”)

. They are the “connecting link between shippers and carriers, uniting shippers who have cargo to deliver with carriers who have available motor transportation.” Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Motor Freight Brokers: A Tale of Federal Regulatory
Pandemonium , 14 Northw estern Journal of International Law and Business 289 (1994). As explained by the Commonwealth Court in its opinion in this matter , freight brokerage is a process in which a freight broker such as S & H receive s an order from a
customer (“seller”) who desires to ship commercial goods to a buyer. The broker then contracts with a common carrier to perform this task. Once the goods have been delivered to the buyer, the broker will invoice the seller for th e amount of the shipping fee charged by the common carrier , as well as its broker’s commission. When the seller pays the amount of the invoice to the broker , the broker remits the shipping fee to the common carrier, while retaining its commission. S & H Transport , Inc. v. City of York

, 174 A.3d
679 , 680 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)

.

1 A common carrier is “[a] commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the public as offering to transport fr eight or passengers for a fee . . . [and] generally [is] required by law to transport freight or passengers without refusal if the approved fare or charge is paid.” Black's Law Dictionary 256 (10th ed. 2014)

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S & H is headquartered in York , Pennsylvania, and, thus, lik e all businesses within that City , it is obligated to pay that City’s BPT , which was created by an ordinance passed by York City Council , pursuant to the authorization of the Local Tax Enabling Act (“LTEA”)

. 2 Briefly, by way of background, t he LTEA is the means by which the General Assembly has conferred on local municipalities the authority to impose a broad range of
taxes other than just real estate taxes, which were , historically, the means by which their governments derive d revenue to provide necessary public services to their residents. Joseph C. Bright, Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence , Taxatio n § 17:1 (2018). As
a gen eral matter, the LTEA authorized local municipalities to enact taxes on tangible objects or activities which the Commonwealth does not itself tax, subject to certain legislatively specified restrictions

. After the LTEA became law in 1966 , various municipalities utilized the authority granted to them by this enactment to levy taxes on the gross receipts of businesses within their jurisdiction for “the privilege of doing business

. ” 53 P.S. § 6924.301 .1(a.1)(1)

. As our Cour t has explained, the LTEA allowed such local taxation “as a quid pro quo for businesses advantaging themselves of local governmental benefits, including the availability of police, fire, and other services.” V.L. Rendina, Incorporated v. City of Harrisburg , 938 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. 2007). 3

2 Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, No. 511, 53 P.S. §§ 6924.101 to 6924.901. 3 In 1988, as part of a broad initiative to fundamentally restructure the manner in which municipalities collect local taxes, the legislature enacted the “Local Tax Reform Act,” Act of December 13, 1988, P.L. 1121, No. 145. Section 533 of that Act, 72 P.S. § 4750.533, prohibited municipalities from enacting new ordinances levying business privilege taxes on the gross receipts of businesses after November 30, 1988 ; however, it preserved the business privilege taxes which municipalities had already enacted, but capped their rates to those which were in effect on that date. The majority of the provisions of the Local Tax Reform Act were set to take effect upon the passag e of a constitutional amendment to implement it, but the voters of the Commonwealth rejected this amendment in the primary election of May 16, 1989. Subsequently, the General Assembly repealed t he majority of the Local Tax Reform Act, except for Section 533 and a few other provisions.[J

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Although municipalities were authorized to impose such “business privilege” taxes, the General Assembly also excluded from t his taxing power certain enumerated objects
or activities. See generally 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1. Pertinent to the issues we are considering in the case at bar, municipalities are forbidden “[t] o levy, assess and collect a mercantile or business privilege tax on gross rece ipts or part thereof which are: . . . (ii) charges advanced by a seller for freight, deliv ery or other transportation for the purchaser in accordance with the terms of a contract of sale .” Id. § 6924.301. 1(f)( 1 2 ) (ii). As noted, York enacted its BPT via ordinance (“BPT Ordinance”) , which provides , in pertinent part :

LEVY; RATE; EXEMPTIONS; BU SINESS VOLUME

. There is hereby levied

. . . a tax for general revenue purposes on the privilege of doing business as herein defined in the City. BPT Ordinance, § 343.02. The tax is imposed on “the whole or gross volume of business transacted within the territorial limits of the City.” Id. § 343.02(a) . The BPT Ordinance further defines these terms in the following fashion:

(a) “ Business ” means any activity carried on or exercised for gain or profit in the City, including but not limited to, the sale of merchandise or other tangible personalty or the performance of services. As to those taxpayers having a plac e of business within the City, “business” includes all activ ities carried on within the City and those carried on outside the City attributable to the place of business within the City.
* * * (f) “ Gross volume of business ” means the money or money’s worth received by any vendor in, or by reason of, the sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services rendered. (g) “ Service ” means any act or instance of helping or benefitting another for consideration. Id. § 343.01

.[J

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In 20 04, pursuant to the BPT Ordinance , the City promulgated an interpretative regulation (“ BPT Regulation”) to “ provide a formal interpretation ” of t he BPT O rdinance, and to establish criteria for its administration. See BPT Ordinance , Introduction. The section of the BPT Regulation applicable to the instant matter defines the “ gross receipts ” of a business subject to taxation as :

Cash, credits or property of any kind received in exchange for merchandise sold or services performed or other business activi ty conducted within or attributable to the City, without deduction there from [ sic ] on account for costs of property or merchandise sold; materials, labor or services furnished or used; interest or discount paid; or any other business related expense, as p ermitted by regulation. BPT Regulation § 201

. The Regulation further describes “ s ale ” as: “ [t]h e passing of ownership from a seller to a buyer for a price, or for a consideration,” and “ s ervice ” to

mean “ any act or instance of helping or benefiting another for consideration. ” Id. Of particular relevance here, the Regulation also excludes from taxation of a business’s gross receipts any “ [f] reight delivery or transportation charges paid by the seller for the purchaser. ” Id. § 206(j)(2). 4 In 2011, an audit of S & H’s business privilege tax returns conducted by the City
revealed that , for the tax years 2007

- 2011 , S & H claimed that, under the “public utility service” exemption of the LTEA , 5 i t was entitled to deduct from its gross receipts t he shipping fees it collected . The City took the position that S & H was not entit led to claim this exemption and, consequently , issued a tax assessment against S & H in the amount of $11 8,346.88 , plus interest and penalties. S & H appealed to the Court of Common
Pleas of York County , arguing that it was entitled to claim this exemption , and raising

4 Although the BPT Ordinance contains the same definition of “service” as does the BPT Regulation, it does not define “sale”.

5 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1 (f)( 2)

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other arguments as to why it was not subject to the BPT. The trial court concluded that S & H qualified for the “public utility service” exemption of the LTE A, and vacated the
assessment order on that basis

. 6
The City next appealed to the Commonwealth Court , which reversed the trial court based on its finding that S & H was ineligible for the exemption because it was not rendering a public utility service t hrough its business activities

. S & H Transport , Inc. v. City of York

, 102 A.3d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). S & H further appealed that decision to our Court , and we unanimously upheld the Commonwealth Court’s decision

. S & H Transport

, Inc. v. City of York

, 140 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2016)

. However, we remanded the matter to the trial court for it to rule on S & H’s other challenges to the imposition of the BPT , which it had not previously addressed

. One of these challenges, which is the subject of the present appea l, was S & H’s
claim that the City improperly included in its calculation of S & H’s gross receipts the amount of shipping fees it was paid by sellers utilizing its services , which it then remitted
to the carrier s it hired to deliver the s ellers ’ products , in addition to the commissions it earned for arranging the transactions

. S & H maintained that it was only responsible for paying the gross receipts tax on the portion of the total sum paid to it by the seller of the products that S & H retained as its c ommission

. The City , by contrast, contended that S
& H was a middlem an which arranged transportation for sellers of goo ds and, as such, all money it received as a result of performing this service was taxable as gross receipts , regardless of the fact that S & H passed the shipping fees it collected on to the carrier

.

6 The Honorable John W. Thompson adjudicated this matter before his retirement from the Court of Common Pleas of York County.[J

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The trial court ruled in favor of S & H. 7 It interpret ed the BPT Ordinance as apply ing solely to the gross revenue earned by S & H for acting as an agent of the seller

— its
commissions. The court viewed S & H as merely a “ conduit ” of the shipping fees charged by the carrier and paid by the seller

. Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/17 , at 6. The court analogized this arrangement to one where a real estate closing company acts as a conduit of moni es related to the sale of the property, like mortgage proceeds and down payment funds, which it merely passes through to other parties to the sale, but does not itself retain. The court considered it “patently unfair” to impose the BPT on such monies whic h merely
pass ed through S & H ’s accounts

. Id.
T he trial court also noted that the BPT Regulation “ specifically provides for delivery or transportation charges paid by a seller for a buyer to be excluded.” Id. In the court’s view, it was immaterial for purposes of this exclusion whether the seller paid the charges directly or “by an agent of the seller , i.e. , S & H, act ing as a conduit for the seller .” Id. The City appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which reversed in a unanimous published opinion a uthored by Senior Judge Dan te Pellegrini. 8 S & H Transport , Inc. v. City of York

, 174 A.3d 679 (Pa. Cmwlth

. 2017)

. First, t he Commonwealth C ourt emphasized that it has repeatedly held that fairness is not the standard utilized in interpreting tax statutes; rather, only the legislative intent to include or exclude the proceeds of particular business activities from a BPT is relevant. Thus, the Commonwealth Court found that the trial court erred in evaluating the tax for fairness or
reasonableness

.

7 Due to Judge Thompson’s retirement, the matter was reassigned to Judge Stephen P. Linebaugh.

8 Judge Pellegrini was joined by Judges Kevin Brobson and Patricia McCullough.[J

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In order to ascertain the legislative intent regarding the taxability of the monies at
issue under the BPT, the Commonwealth Court examine d what it considered to be the governing provisions of the O rdinance and the R egulation

. The court observed that , under the BPT Ordinance , the tax is levied on all “ business ” occurring within the City , including “any activity carried on, or exercised for gain or profit , in the City, including . . . the provision of services ,” and, thus, encompasse d S & H ’s freight brokerage services.
Id. at 682 ( quoting BPT Ordinance § 343.01(a) ). Next, the Commonwealth Court noted that the BPT is assessed on the “gross volume of business , ” which is further defined by the BPT Ordinance as “the money or money’s worth received by any vendor in, or by reason of, the sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services rendered.” Id. (quoting BPT Ordinance § 343.01 (f ) ) . The court found that “[t]his broad language indicates that the City intended to impose the BPT on all gross receipts attributable to corporations such as S & H conducting business within the City , not just to gross profits as was held by the trial court.” Id

. (e mphasis original). The Commonwealth Court further determined that the shipping fees received by S & H were not excludable under the BPT Regulation ’s exclusion for “[f] reight delivery or transportation charges paid by the seller for the purchaser .” BPT Regulation § 206(j)(2)

. Likewise, the court concluded that the shipping fees were not barred from taxation under Section 6924.301.1(f)(12) of the LTEA, which , as noted above, prohibits local municipalities like the City from taxing gross receipts comprised of “charges advanced by a seller for freight, delivery or othe r transportation for the purchaser in accordance with the terms of a contract of sale.” S & H Transport , 174 A.3d at 683 (quoting 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(12) ). With respect to both the BPT Regulation and the LTEA, t he court observed that, in the transa ctions at issue , S & H , acting in its capacity as a broker, was neither the seller[J

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nor purchaser of the goods which were the subject of the transaction s , nor did it transport those goods ; hence, the court reasoned tha t neither the plain text of the LTEA , nor the
BPT Regulation , permitted S & H to exclude the shipping fees it received

. Additionally, the court found no legal authority to support the trial court’s treatment of an agent of the
seller as if it were the seller , in order to allow the agent to cl aim the seller’s tax exemption. Lastly, the court observed that it had previously rejected a similar argument that money which merely passed through a business entity was exempt from a business privilege tax because the business received no profit on it

. Id. at 683 ( citing Wightman v. City of Pittsburgh , 430 A.2d 717, 718 (Pa. Cmwlth 1981) (rejecting nursing home’s argument that it was exempt from paying Pittsburgh’s business privilege tax on Medicaid and Medicare monies , which it passed through in the form of payment to private
contractors that the nursing home hired to perform services , on the basis that the BPT is imposed “on gross receipts without regard to related expenses or the ultimate profitabili ty of the taxpayer’ s enterprise ”) )

. S & H filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our Court granted as to the following issues, as set forth by S & H :

1. Whether a freight broker is permitted to exclude freight delivery charges, to which the broker has no right t o retain but rather utilizes solely for the purposes of purchasing transportation services for its customers, from its taxable gross receipts under the City of York’s Business Privilege and Mercantile Tax Ordinance? 2. Whether a municipality may rely on m ore narrowly tailored exclusionary language contained in the Local Tax Enabling Act, 53 P.S. 5924.101 et seq. , to interpret and enforce a more broadly worded exclusion contained in the municipalit[y’s] ordinances

. S & H Transport, Inc. v. City of York , 182 A.3d 994 (Pa. 2018) (order).
II. Arguments of the Parties[J

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S & H first claims that the LTEA and the BPT Regulation create what it refers to as “freight delivery exclusion s , ” and , as tax exclusions , they must be construed against York as the taxing body

. Accordingly, S & H argues that the Commonwealth Court erred in construing these provision s against it as the taxpayer. In this regard, S & H notes that , under federal laws which govern the interstate shipping of goods, no transportation charges may b e levied until delivery of the goods is confirmed through issuance of a bill of lading 9 by the carrier. S & H asserts that , as a broker, it is required by federal law to retain the bill of lading, and document that it collected the shipping charges from t he shipper and paid them to the carrier. According to S & H, t he Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission also requires that charges collected by a broker for shipping be paid in full to the carrier without deduction for its fees, and that it must post a bond to ensure such payment. Thus, in S & H’s view, these laws and regulations establish that it has no legal right to possess money paid by a shipper to it for the delivery of the shipper’s goods, so the se monies do not qualify a s a “receipt ” under
either the LTEA or the BPT Ordinance. With respect to the BPT Regulation, S & H argues that the freight delivery
exclusion , as set forth in the Regulation , applies broadly to all “freight delivery or transportation charges paid by th e seller for the purchaser , ” and it does not limi t the class of individuals who can be considered sellers to only those who are sellers of goods , as the Commonwealth Court found

. S & H Brief at 11 (quoting BPT Regulation § 206(j)(2)). Indeed, S & H point s out that the Federal Motor Carrier Act defines a “freight broker , ” such as itself , as a person who “sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out . . . as selling . . . transportation by motor carrier for compensation,” id

. (quoting 49 U.S. C.

9 A bill of lading is “the receipt a common carrier gives to a shipper for goods given to the carrier for transportation.” Jack P. Friedman, Barron’s Dictionary of Business Terms 52 (2d ed. 1994).[J

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§ 13102), so it, as a broker, can be considered a seller for purposes of this exclusion

. S & H asserts that the BPT Ordinance itself indicates that the tax can be levied on the monetary value of services rendered, so, from its perspective, it is engaged in the type of activity

— furnishing a service

— which makes it subject to the tax, but also eligible for
this exclusion. Id. at 1 2 (quoting BPT Ordinance § 343.02(a)(1)). 10
S & H contends that , because the plain language of the BPT Regulation does not limit the class of sales covered by the exclusion to only the sale of goods , in order to justify its interpretation of the Regula tion , the Commonwealth Court improperly relied on
the narrower exclusion ary language in Section 6924.301.1(12) of the LTEA , which refers only to contracts for the sale of goods. Such a construction , S & H argues, is at odds with the principle that these type s of enactments should be construed against the taxing authority. The City responds by arguing that , in order for the freight delivery exclusion
contained in the BPT Regulation to apply , “ [a] s is the case with the LTEA

. . . the entity claiming the exclusion must be a seller who is paying the transportation charges for the purchaser

. ” City Brief at 3. The C ity offers as an example a situation where a manufacturer

/seller of a product agrees to pay the upfront shipping costs to a purchaser in order f or the product to be delivered. Thereafter, once delivery of the product is complete, the seller bills the purchaser for the product plus the shipping costs. In the City’s view, t he purpose of the exclusion is to ensure that the shipping costs reimbursed
to the seller are not included in the seller’s gross receipts since they essentially represent

a loan. The City asserts that S & H is not similarly situated.

10 S & H contends that, if the Commonwealth Court’s i nterpretation is left to stand, it would have feder al constitutional ramifications

. However, as S & H acknowledges , we did not accept for review any issue concerning whether the City’s BPT tax is un fairly appo rtioned such that it violates the United States Constitution. Consequently, we will not further address this portion of S & H’s argument.[J

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In furtherance of its argument that the BPT Regulation does not permit the exclusion of these shipping fees, in that they were not sales of commercial goods, t he City notes that the terms “sales” and “services” are both uniquely defined in the BPT Ordinance as two different types of activities which are each individually subject to taxation

— i.e. , sales of tangible things, and services performed

. Id. at 5 (citing BPT Ordinance § 343.01(a) , ( g) ). It notes that the BPT Ordinance maintains this dichotomy between “ sales ” and “ services ” in the definiti on of “gross volume of business, ” which the
BPT Ordinance defines as “the money or money’s worth received by any vendor in, or by reason of, the sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services rendered.” Id. (quoting
BPT Ordinance § 343.01(f ) )

. According to the City, this distinct treatment shows that whenever “ sale ” is referred to e lsewhere in the Regulation , it must be understood to mean the transfer of goods for consideration. The City adds that , had it wished to treat sales as encompassing the sale of services as well as goods , it could easily have said so and would not have gone through the bother of defining the two terms separately. Moreover, t he City asserts that S & H cannot be considered a “ seller ” under the
BPT Regulation , given that its brokerage business procures services , but sells no goods

. As the City highlights , the term “ sale ” is specifically defined in the Regulation as “the passing of ownership from a seller to a buyer for a price,” which contemplates the idea
that there mus t be transfer of title to a tangible object in order for the transferor to be
deemed a “ seller ” under the freight delivery exclusion

. Id. at 8 (quoting BPT Regulation § 201 ). Th e City proffers that this is also consistent with how Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “seller,” as “someone who sells or contracts to sell goods; a vendor , UCC §2

- 103(1)(d),” or “the transferor of property in a contract of sale.” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed

. 2014) )

. By contrast, the term “ [ s ] ervice” is defined in the Regulation[J

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as “any act or instance of helping or benef iting another for consideration, ” i d. (quoting BPT Regulation § 201), which describes S & H ’s business activity. Additionally, and in answer to S & H’s assertions, t he City argues the definition of

“ freight b roker ” as that term is used in the Federal Motor Carrier Act has no applicability here, as the term “ seller ” is not ambiguous , nor is it a “term of art” which has acquired unique meaning, and , thus , resort ing to technical definitio ns from unrelated statutes is unnecessary and unhelpful. Moreover, the City points out, even if the term “ seller ” could include the sale of services, here , it is the common carrier that actually sells the shipping
services , not a broker like S & H. To S & H’s broader argument, t he City notes that there is no express provision in the BPT Ordinance excluding so

- called “conduit payments” received by a business and forwarded to a third party from the tax. City Brief at 11. The City reminds that this tax is a tax on the privilege of doing business in a particular community and is imposed on

“ every dollar of the whole or gross volume of business transacted within the territorial limits of the city

. ” Id. (quoting BPT Ordinance § 343.02(a)) (emphasis original )

. Consequently, the City maintains that the only relevant and dispositive inquiry is whether a business receives money from a particular activity, not whether it profits from doing so. Lastly, t he City denies that the Commonwealth Court improperly rested its interpretation of the freight delivery exclusion afforded by the Regulation on Section
6924.301.1 (f) (12) of the LTEA, inasmuch as that tribunal never discussed the contract of sale language contained in that section in arriving at its conclusion that , under the BPT Regulation , a business must be a seller of goods to qualify for this exclusion

. Rather, the[J

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City contends , the Commonwealth Court interpreted the BPT Regulation according to the plain and common meaning of its words. 11
III. Analysis The issues presented for our consideration involve the interpretation of statutes
and ordinances , which are legislative enactments, and the interpretation of an administrative regulation promulgated to implement a municipal ordinance . These are all questions of law of which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Verizon v. Commonwealth , 127 A.3d 745 , 753 n.12 ( Pa. 2015) ; Popowsky v. Public Utility Commission , 910 A.2d 38, 48 (Pa. 2006)

. In interpreting both statutes and ordinan ces , we follow the principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act (“SCA”) , 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1921

- 39. Williams v. City of Philadelphia , 188 A.3d 421, 428 ( Pa. 2018); Council of Middletown Twp., Delaware County v. Benham , 523 A.2d 311, 315 ( Pa. 1987)

.

11 The City of Allentown has filed an amicus brief in support of the City of York, noting that it has a similar ordinance , and that multiple business entities located in Allentown are seeking to utilize the exclusions furnished by the LTEA; hence, it seeks clarity from our Court regarding this question. Contrary to the City’s position , it concludes the Commonwealth Court ’s decision relied on Section 6924.301.1 (f) (12) of the LTEA. Allentown contends that the Commonwealth Court properly looked to the LTEA because the Regulation was at odds with the LTEA , and, under the doctrine that an administrative rule cannot contravene a legislative enactment , the LTEA takes precedence. Thus, Allentown reasons that , because the term “contract of sale,” as used in Section 6924.301.1 9(f) (12) of the LTEA , refer s to purchased goods or merchandise , shipping costs should be viewed as only “incidental” costs attendant to a retail transaction involving goods or merchandise which must be shipped , akin to the collection of sales taxes. Amicus Brief at 7

- 8. Allentown notes , however, that S & H does not actually sell anything which requires shipping , nor is it a common carrier . Allentown points out that the fact that S & H is required to collect the shipping fees under federal law establishes that doing so is part of i ts normal business activities , and, hence, like all other business activities it is subject to the tax. Allentown also proffers a novel argument that the freight delivery exclusion renders the LTEA violative of the Uniformity Clause of our state charter

. That argument , however, is beyond the scope of our allocatur grant

.[J

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Likewise, as a general matter, we employ the interpretative principles of the SCA to
construe a regulation implementing a legislative enactment. Freedom Medical Supply v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company , 131 A.3d 977, 984 (Pa. 2016); Slippery Rock
Ar ea School District v. Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School , 31 A.3d 657 , 667 (Pa. 2011)

. T he primary goal of this interpretive process is “to ascertain and effectuate the
int ention ” of the g overnment al body enacting a statute or ordinance , or promulgating a regulation

. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921; Snyder Brothers , Inc. v. PUC , 198 A.3d 1056, 1071 (Pa. 2018); Council of Middletown Townshi p , 523 A.2 d at 315 ; Slippery Rock Area School
District , 31 A.3d 663

. Thus, we will interpret the terms of a statute , ordinance, or regulation in accordance with their plain meaning, unless those enactments are ambiguous

. Williams , 188 A.3d at 429; Council of Middletown Township , 523 A.2 d at
315 ; Pelton v. Commonwealth Department of Welfare , 523 A.2d 1104 , 1108 n.3 (Pa

. 1987). In situations where the language of the statute, ordinance, or regulation is ambiguous, the additional factors enumerated in Section 1921(c) of the SCA may be employed to ascertain the meaning of its provisions.
Whenever a tax enactment is found to be a mbiguous, the SCA provides special rules of construction. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(3) (requiring strict construction of “[p]rovisions imposing taxes” ); id. § 1928 (b)(5) (mandating strict construction of “provisions exempting persons and property from taxation” ). However, these rules of strict construction will be employed only if all other efforts at interpreting the enactment using the tools of statutory construction enumerated in Section 1921(c) “ yiel d no definitive
conclusion

. ” Snyder Brothers Inc. , 198 A.3d at 1073 n.20 (quoting Dechert L.L.P. v. Commonwealth , 998 A.2d 575, 584 n.8 (Pa. 2010)). As a general matter, an enactment which imposes a tax is strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer aga inst the taxing body. Greenwood Gaming v. Commonwealth[J

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Department of Revenue , 90 A.3d 699, 711 (Pa. 2014). Likewise , a provision of a tax
enactment that excludes certain property , income , or activities from being subject to the
tax is also to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing bo d y

. AMP Incorporated v. Commonwealth , 852 A.2d 1161 , 1167 (Pa. 2004).
In our Commonwealth , the foundation of a municipality’s authority to levy a tax , and the permissible scope of that tax , is based on the grant of such power by the General Assembly : Absent a grant or a delegation of the power to tax from the

General Assembly, no municipality

. . . has [a] ny power or authority to levy, assess or collect taxes. To determine whether a municipality possesses the power to tax and, if so, the extent of such power, recourse must be had to the acts of the General Assembly

. Mastrangelo v. Buckley , 250 A.2d 447, 452

– 53 ( Pa. 1969) . Hence, because the City’s authority to subject particular busi ness activities to its BPT is conferred by the LTEA , and concomitantly circumscribed by any restrictions contained therein, our analysis necessarily begins with a consideration of whether the controlling provision of the LTEA , Section 6924.301.1 (f) (12) , prohibits the City from imposing the BPT on the shipping fees S & H collects. The City’s authority to impose its BPT on these monies cannot, as the City has argued, be determined by solely examining its own BPT Ordinance or Regulation, inasmuch as they ar e subordinate to t he LTEA. As set forth above, Section 6924.301.1 (f) (12) (ii) of the LTEA explicitly forbids a municipality such as the City from taxing “ charges advanced by a seller for freight, delivery or other transportation for the purchaser in accordance with the terms of a contract of
sale .” 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(12)(ii). Rejecting S & H’s argument to the contrary, t he Commonwealth Court found that this prohibition did not apply , inasmuch as S & H was “neither the seller nor the purchaser i n the transactions at issue but merely a broker. ” S & H Transport

, 174 A.3d at 683. We discern no error in this conclusion , given that there[J

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was no “contract of sale” between S & H and a buyer of goods under which S & H advanced the costs of shipping suc h commodities to the buyer. Although t he term “contract of sale” is not defined in the LTEA, it is well understood in the con text of
commercial transactions to mean a contract for the sale of goods. See , e.g ., 13 Pa.C. S. § 2106 (defining “[c] ontract for sale , ” for purposes of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, as including “both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time.”). As the Commonwealth Court found , and as S & H admits, it is not a seller of goods , nor does it sh ip any goods itself; rather , it contracts with common carriers to perform that task , and there is no record evidence to show that it , at any time , advanced monies as part of these transactions

. Consequently , Section 6924.301.1(f)(12)(ii) of the
LTEA did n ot bar the City from imposing its BPT on the monies S & H received from its brokered shipping arrangements. This does not , however, end our inquiry. While all local taxing ordinances must comport with the restrictions imposed by the LTEA, there are no provisions in the LTEA
which mandate that a local municipality adopt a specific kind of tax, nor does the LTEA limit the exclusions a municipality may afford taxpayers if it elects to adopt such a ta x. Thus, we must consider, as did the Commonwealth Court , whether the terms of the City’s
BPT Regulation excluded the shipping fees S & H collected from the gross receipts tax. First, we reject S & H’s argument that the shipping fees it collected and t hen remitted to the carrier were not “ gross r eceipts” within the meaning of that term as it is
used in the Regulation . S ection 201 of the BPT Regulation defines “gross receipts ” in relevant part to mean “[c] ash . . . received in exchange for

. . . services performed or other business activity conducted within or attributable to the City, without deduction there from [sic] on account for costs of property or merchandise sold; materials, labor or services furnished or used; interest or discount paid; or any other business related expense, as[J

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permitted by regulation. ” BPT Regulation § 201

. The BPT Regulation further defines “business” as “ any activity carried on or exercised for gain or profit in the City, including but not limited to, the sale of mer chandise or other tangible personalty or the performance of services. ” Id

. Finally, “s ervice ” is defined in the BPT Regulation as “ any act or instance of helping or benefitting another for consideration. ” Id. The record in this matter supports the Co mmonwealth Court’s conclusion that S & H was carrying on a business activity within the City, whereby it provided a service to its customers of arranging shipping of their goods , and that it did so for consideration

— n amely , payment in exchange for the performance of those services , albeit those payments included both the cost of shipping and its commission . Therefore, the monies paid to S & H by its customers constituted taxable gross receipts within the meaning of Section 201 of the BPT Regulation and was subject to assessment of the tax. However, with respect to the applicability of the “ freight delivery exclusion” afforded by Section 206(j)(2) of the BPT Regulation , we conclude S & H must prevail . This section
excludes from the BPT “ gross receipts which constitute . . . [f] reight delivery or transportation charges paid by the seller for the purchaser

. ” BPT Regulation § 206(j)(2) (emphasis added)

. A co mparison of the plain terms of BPT Regulation § 206(j)(2) and Section 6924.301.1(f)(12)(ii) of the LTEA, indicates that the class of gross receipts excluded from taxation by the BPT Regulation is broader than that excluded by the LTEA

. The BPT Regulation excludes all freight delivery charges “ paid ” by a seller for the purchaser, whereas the LTEA specifically restricts the application of the exclusion to only
those shipping costs “advanced” by a seller to a purchaser pursuant to the terms of a contract of sale . Thus, th e BPT R egulation allows exclusion of all sh ipping costs paid by a seller for a purchaser at any time , while the LTEA exclusion requires that a seller[J

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advance the costs of shipping to a purchaser according to the provisions of a contract of
sale , which means that those cos ts be paid prior to the shipping taking place. 12 We acknowledge the credibility of t he City’s argument , which is endorsed by the dissent, see Dissenting Opinion (Dougherty, J.), that the BPT Regulation ’s separate definition of sales and services , and its treatment of the two activities disjunctively in its definition of “gross volume of business , ” see BPT Regulation § 201 , indicates that , for purposes of the BPT Regulation , the two terms were intended to descr ibe separate activities

— the selling of goods and the provision of services . Thus, it is plausible that
the term “ seller ” in Section 206(j)(2) of the BPT Regulation could be read as referring only to a seller of goods ; however , critically, this restrictive definition is not the only reasonable interpretation of this exclusion

. S & H’s argument that the term “seller” as used in Section 206(j)(2) could be read broadly enough to encompass its core business activities

— th e selling of shipping
services

— is equally reasonable

. Significantly , thoug h the BPT Regulation initially defines sales and services separately, nothing in t he plain language of the exclusion created by Section 206(j) limits the class of sellers entitled to claim the exclusion to only those businesses which sell physical goods or merchandise

. As S & H has contended,
because the nature of its brokerage business is the selling of transportation services to shippers of goods , it is reasonable for it to be considered a “ seller ” for purposes of Section 206(j)

. Cf. 49 U.S.C. § 13102 (2) (defining broker as “ a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent sells

. . .

12 It is for these reasons we cannot agree with our colleagues that the exclusion created by the BPT Regulation merely mirrors the exclusion established by the LTEA. See Concurring Opinion (Saylor, C.J.) at 1 (this exclusion “merely effectuates the parallel requirement for exclusion of the LTEA”); Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (Baer, J.) at 2 (the analysis of this exclusion is “[s]imilar to the analysis of the par allel provision of the LTEA”).[J

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transportation by motor carrier for compensation ”). Consequently , because S & H pays the delivery or transpo rtation costs for the purchaser of its services

— the shipper of goods or commodities

— to the common carrier who transported those items to the shipper’s designated recipient; accordingly , for purposes of Section 206(j) , S & H may be deemed to have paid t he shipping costs “for the purchaser.” BPT Regulation § 206(j). Given that both suggested interpretations of Section 206(j) offered by the parties are reasonable under the circumstances, we find this provision to be ambiguous. See Snyder Brothers , 198 A.3d at 1073. Notably, t he City , which drafted and adopted this exclusionary regulation, has not presented us with any l egislative history to support its suggested construction , nor has the City argued the applicability of any of the other factors
i n Section 1921(c) of the SCA which would favor one interpretation over the other

. Hence , because the BPT Regulation uses the ambiguous term “seller , ” which we conclude is broad enough to be read as to include both a seller of physical merchandise and a seller of services , and due to the fact the BPT Regulation’s “freight delivery exclusion” is an exclusion of income from taxation, the principles of construction set forth in Section 1928 of the SCA control . We therefore construe this regulation in favo r of S & H, as the taxpayer, and against the City , inasmuch as the General Assembly has directed t hat the taxpayer is entitled to the benefit of any ambiguity in such situations

. Accordingly , we conclude that S & H was entitled to exclude from its gross r eceipts the amount of the delivery costs it was paid by shippers who purchased its services. For all of the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the or der of the Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction relinquished. Justice Donohue, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion. Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion. Justice Baer files a concurring and dissenting opinion.[J

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Justice Dougherty files a dissenting opinion.