IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 46 / 06-1382 

Filed August 31, 2007 

MICHAEL JOSEPH BERENT, 

MICHAEL STEVEN ROMP, JEFF 

WAYNE THORNE, PAUL BRYSON 

INGRAM, NICHELLE ALINE 

THOMPSON, RODNEY EDWARD 

SULLIVAN, SARA LILLIS EPSTEIN, 

SARA CRANE SWISHER, BETTE 

JAYNE MAYES, CAROLINE M. 

DIETERLE, MATT BLIZEK, MORI 

CONSTANTINO, AMANDA COYNE, 

LOLLY EGGERS, ELLEN HAYWOOD, 

JON KLINKOWITZ, KAREN KUBBY, 

BOB THOMPSON, JAMES WALTERS, 

ROBERTA TILL RETZ and JENNIE 

LOUISE EMBREE, 

 Appellees, 

vs. 

CITY OF IOWA CITY and “OBJECTIONS 

COMMITTEE” OF IOWA CITY, 

 Appellants. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, William L. 

Thomas, Judge. 

 The City of Iowa City appeals a district court decision which held the 

objections committee exceeded its legal authority in refusing to present 

three proposed charter amendments to public vote and that the City’s 

preelection challenge of the amendments’ legality was not ripe for judicial 

review. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED 

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
2

Eleanor M. Dilkes, City Attorney, and Susan M. Dulek, Assistant City 

Attorney, for appellants. 

Bruce D. Nestor of De Leon & Nestor, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 

for appellees. 
3

APPEL, Justice. 

 In this case, we are asked to determine whether three proposed 

amendments to the Charter of the City of Iowa City should be placed before 

the voters. The three proposals called for a retention election for the city 

manager and the police chief, established a permanent police citizens review 

board with certain investigative and other powers, and sought to limit police 

practices with respect to nonviolent misdemeanors. After timely objections 

were filed, the City’s objections committee determined that the proposed 

amendments were legally flawed and, as a result, the City did not present 

the amendments to the voters. 

 Citizens challenged the City’s refusal in district court. The City, 

alternatively, sought a declaration that the proposed amendments were 

unlawful. The district court ruled that the objections committee exceeded 

its authority, refused to grant the City declaratory relief on the ground that 

the legal issues raised by the City were not ripe for judicial review, and 

ordered the City to present the proposed charter amendments to the voters. 

For the reasons expressed below, the decision of the district court is 

affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case remanded with 

instructions. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

 A. Home Rule Framework for Charter Government. In order to 

put this case, involving city governance, in proper perspective, we begin by 

reviewing the development of home rule in Iowa. This home rule review will 

provide an overview of the scope of and limitations on the power of 

municipalities in Iowa to structure their local governments. 

 In 1868, the Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, John F. Dillon, 

declared that municipalities were creatures of the legislature and had only 
4

those powers expressly granted by the legislature. City of Clinton v. Cedar 

Rapids & Missouri River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868). For the next 

hundred years, the General Assembly, through application of what became 

known as the Dillon Rule, maintained a tight legislative grip over municipal 

affairs through a combination of inaction and a jungle of code provisions. 

This tight legislative grip was relaxed, to some extent, in 1968, when Iowa 

enacted a home rule amendment to the Iowa Constitution. Iowa Const. 

art. III, § 38A. 

 The Iowa home rule amendment was a compromise between those 

who desired unlimited home rule and those who favored continued 

legislative control of municipal affairs. Bechtel v. City of Des Moines, 225 

N.W.2d 326, 328–29 (Iowa 1975). While the Iowa home rule amendment 

reversed the Dillon Rule, the legislature retained the right to legislate even 

on matters involving local affairs. The constitutional amendment allocated 

no areas or subject matter exclusively for municipal control. The continued 

ability of the legislature after the enactment of the home rule amendment to 

trump or preempt local law has been repeatedly recognized by this court. 

Iowa Grocery Indus. Ass’n v. City of Des Moines, 712 N.W.2d 675, 678–79 

(Iowa 2006); Bechtel, 225 N.W.2d at 332. Iowa’s type of home rule, 

sometimes referred to as legislative home rule, has been criticized by some 

as not providing municipalities with sufficient local autonomy. Richard 

Briffault, Our Localism: Part I--The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 

Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (1990). 

 After the enactment of the home rule amendment, the legislature for 

several years worked on a revision of the substantial state legislative 

framework in which municipalities were required to operate. After a few 

years of study, the legislature in 1972 enacted what was known as a home 
5

rule bill. While the legislative revision reflected in the home rule bill was in 

many respects a nip and tuck operation, the legislature also made changes 

in substantive law. Among other things, the home rule bill authorized Iowa 

municipalities to adopt a charter form of government. Iowa Code § 372.1(5) 

(2001). See generally Sam F. Scheidler, Survey of Iowa Law: Implementation 

of Constitutional Home Rule in Iowa, 22 Drake L. Rev. 294, 316 (1973). 

 By allowing municipalities to adopt a charter form of government, the 

legislature permitted local governments to engage in some variations from 

the traditional structure of government. The legislature required, however, 

that all municipal charters include provisions for a city council of at least 

five members, a mayor who may be a council member, and staggered 

elections for the office of mayor and city council. The legislature also 

required that the powers and duties of the mayor and the council be 

established and that such provisions be consistent with the city code. Iowa 

Code § 372.10. 

 B. Method of Adopting and Amending a City Charter. Iowa City 

has chosen to adopt a charter form of government, which petitioners now 

seek to amend. The legislature has provided three methods of amending a 

city charter by: (1) the city council submitting the matter to voters, (2) the 

city council passing an ordinance with submission to the voters if so 

requested by petition, and (3) petitioners proposing an amendment to be 

submitted to voters for approval. Id. § 372.11. It is the third method that is 

at issue in this case.

 The legislature has established a substantive and procedural 

framework with respect to petitions that trigger municipal elections, 

including elections to consider amendments to a municipal charter. In 

order to invoke the electoral process by petition, the legislature required the 
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petition to “include the signatures of the petitioners, a statement of their 

place of residence, and the date on which they signed the petition.” Id.

§ 362.4. The legislature has declared that a petition is “valid” if it is “signed 

by eligible electors of the city equal in number to ten percent of the persons 

who voted at the last preceding regular city election. . . .” Id.

 Upon receipt of a petition, the legislature has authorized the city clerk 

to examine it before accepting it for filing. Id. If upon the clerk’s 

examination the petition “appears valid on its face,” the legislature has 

directed that the petition “shall” be accepted for filing. On the other hand, if 

the petition lacks the required number of signatures, the clerk is directed to 

return the petition to the petitioner. Id. 

 Once the clerk has accepted a petition for filing, the petition is 

deemed “valid” unless written objections are filed with the city clerk within 

five working days after the petition is received. Id. The receipt of a timely 

written objection triggers review by an objections committee, consisting of 

the mayor, the city clerk, and one member of the council chosen by council 

ballot. Id. § 44.8. The legislature has directed that the city council must

present a “valid” petition to amend a city charter to the voters in a special 

election. Id. § 372.11(3). 

 C. Proposed Charter Amendments. This case involves three 

petitions to amend the Charter of the City of Iowa City. The first petition 

related to the appointment and retention of the city manager and the chief 

of police [hereinafter retention proposal]. As with the current charter, the 

retention proposal vested authority in the city council to appoint a city 

manager and chief of police. The retention proposal also directed the city 

council to conduct an annual performance review for each position. In 
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addition, the retention proposal stated that the city manager and the police 

chief “shall be subject to” a retention vote every four years. 

 The second petition sought to create a permanent police citizens’ 

review board [hereinafter PCRB proposal]. The PCRB proposal provided that 

the board would investigate citizen claims of misconduct by sworn police 

officers, issue reports on these complaints to the city council, hold at least 

one community forum per year, and make recommendations regarding 

police practices to the city council. The PCRB proposal clothed the board 

with subpoena power in order to fulfill its functions. 

 The third petition sought to alter police procedures regarding 

nonviolent misdemeanor offenses [hereinafter community policing proposal]. 

The community policing proposal sought to direct the police to issue 

citations rather than arrest perpetrators of nonviolent misdemeanor 

offenses, restrict the police’s ability to investigate, apprehend, and arrest 

subjects of misdemeanor crimes, declare that arresting persons in 

possession of personal-use amounts of marijuana not be a priority of the 

Iowa City Police Department, and restrain the use of warrants for 

nonviolent, misdemeanor offenses. 

 D. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Related to the 

Proposed Charter Amendments. The three petitions were submitted to 

the city clerk in August 2001. Each petition was signed by approximately 

1600 electors. The city clerk examined the petitions, found them valid on 

their face, and accepted them for filing. Seven individuals and the League 

of Women Voters timely filed objections to each of the three petitions. As a 

result, an objections committee was formed consisting of the mayor, the city 

clerk, and a member of the city council. 
8

 The objections committee held a public hearing at which it 

entertained a wide range of objections to each of the proposed amendments. 

The city attorney advised the objections committee that it could not reject a 

petition on policy grounds, but could only dismiss them for “legal 

insufficiency.” At the hearing, the objections committee refused to sustain a 

number of challenges that questioned the wisdom, but not the legal validity, 

of the proposals. The objections committee, however, sustained at least one 

objection to each of the proposals. 

 With respect to the retention proposal, the objections committee 

unanimously sustained an objection that the text of the retention petition 

was “misleading” and therefore “legally insufficient.” At the hearing, it was 

undisputed that the text of the retention proposal petition as circulated and 

signed by the electors contained erroneous references to the existing 

charter. The literal language in the petition repealed existing charter 

provisions related to the city attorney instead of the charter provisions 

relating to the police chief and city manager. If the retention proposal was 

enacted as written, the city charter would contain two competing provisions 

relating to the appointment and retention of the city manager (one in the 

existing city charter and one contained in the retention proposal) and no 

charter provision related to the appointment of the city attorney. Objectors 

argued that under this state of affairs, neither the signators of the petition 

nor the voters in the election, if held, would understand what was at stake if 

the retention proposal were adopted. 

 On both the PCRB proposal and the community policing proposal, the 

objections committee voted 2-1 to sustain an objection that the proposal 

was “legally insufficient” because the substance of the proposal was not a 

proper subject for a city charter and should, instead, be the subject of a city 
9

ordinance. The action was based, at least in part, on advice from the city 

attorney, who opined that matters related to “form of government” were 

properly included in a city charter, but that matters related to the 

operations of a specific department should not be enacted as charter 

provisions but instead addressed in city ordinances. 

 Plaintiffs filed an application for writ of mandamus in district court, 

praying that the court order the city council to submit the proposed 

amendments to the voters of Iowa City at a special election. The district 

court ruled that mandamus was not the proper remedy and granted the 

City’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the court of appeals 

affirmed, but remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend to allege a 

certiorari action. 

 On remand to the district court, the plaintiffs amended their petition 

to seek a writ of certiorari. The City filed a counterclaim seeking a 

declaratory judgment that the proposed amendments were contrary to Iowa 

law and, as a result, no election needed to be held. The district court 

granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the objections 

committee had exceeded its statutory authority. The City sought expanded 

findings to obtain a ruling on its petition for a declaratory judgment. The 

district court expanded its ruling and denied the City relief, holding that the 

issues raised were not ripe for judicial review. The City filed a timely 

appeal. 

 II. Standard of Review. 

 This is a review of a ruling granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

judgment and denying the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment. 

Review is for errors at law. Bushby v. Washington County Conservation Bd., 

654 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Iowa 2002). 
10

 III. Discussion. 

 A. Authority of the Objections Committee to Sustain Objections 

to Charter Proposals on Grounds of “Legal Insufficiency.” On appeal, 

the City first claims that the objections committee acted properly in 

sustaining objections to each of the three charter proposals, and, as a 

result, the district court erred in ruling that the proposals should be placed 

before the voters. The City concedes that under Iowa law the objections 

committee has no power to reject proposed charter amendments based 

upon their perceived lack of merit. The City claims, however, that the 

objections committee is empowered to review proposed charter amendments 

generated by petition for what it calls “legal sufficiency.” 

 As is generally true in law, it is the substance and not the label that is 

important. “Legal sufficiency,” according to the City, includes authority to 

reject a proposal, like the retention proposal, which is “misleading” in 

nature. The City further asserts that the objections committee is authorized 

to reject as “legally insufficient” charter amendments that do not deal with 

“form of government,” but only with the manner in which government power 

is exercised. The City argues that because the PCRB proposal and the 

community policing proposal do not deal with “form of government,” the 

objections committee acted lawfully in rejecting the proposals as legally 

insufficient. 

 We disagree. Iowa Code section 362.4 states that a petition to amend 

a city charter is “valid” if it has the requisite number of signatures of eligible 

electors including their place of residence and the date on which they 

signed. There are no other statutory requirements for validity of a proposed 

charter amendment. Our legislature, moreover, has directed that if a 

petition meets these two statutory requirements, it is “valid” under section 
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362.4 and the city council “must” submit the proposed amendment to the 

voters. Iowa Code § 372.11(3). 

 While there are no Iowa cases directly on point, other courts have 

repeatedly and routinely limited review by city officials of citizen petitions 

that trigger election processes based upon the plain language of the 

applicable law. See, e.g., Farley v. Healey, 431 P.2d 650, 652 (Cal. 1967) 

(city officials must place on ballot initiative in compliance with formal 

requirements unless otherwise directed by a court); Gaines v. City of 

Orlando, 450 So. 2d 1174, 1177 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984) (governing body must 

place initiative on ballot notwithstanding advice from city attorney as to 

their substantive validity); Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 119 N.E.2d 

644, 652 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (city council cannot reject petition meeting all 

applicable provisions of city charter and statutes); Glass v. Smith, 244 

S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1951) (city council cannot fail to perform ministerial 

duties based upon opinion of legal invalidity provided by city attorney); 

Arenas v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the City of McAllen, 841 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 

Ct. App. 1992) (city officials must call an election, despite the advice of the 

city attorney that initiative was legally insufficient, where all procedural 

requirements were met and election is the only remaining option). Our 

holding in this case that city officials cannot engage in substantive review 

beyond that expressly authorized by applicable statutes is thus well within 

the mainstream of municipal law. 

 The City seeks to avoid the plain meaning of Iowa Code section 362.4 

with a structural argument. The City argues that any approach limiting the 

authority of the objections committee to the specific criteria in Iowa Code 

section 362.4 illogically creates a redundant review structure. According to 

the City, the city clerk reviews the petitions for compliance with Iowa Code 
12

section 362.4. The City claims that the legislature could not have intended 

the objections committee to duplicate the clerk’s review by applying the 

same statutory criteria. 

 We disagree with the City’s contention that the statutory structure 

overrides the plain meaning of the statute for two reasons. First, the two 

levels of review established by Iowa Code section 362.4 are not redundant, 

but are in fact quite different. Review by the city clerk for “validity” under 

Iowa Code section 362.4 is limited to an intrinsic facial review of the four 

corners of the petition. In contrast, the objections committee could consider 

extrinsic evidence produced at a public hearing tending to show, for 

instance, that the addresses listed for electors who purportedly signed the 

petitions were nonexistent, that the purported electors could be found only 

in graveyards, or that the electors who signed the petitions no longer 

resided in the city. Second, to the extent the reviews of the city clerk and 

the objections committee are similar, it would not be irrational for the 

legislature to establish a second level of review by a multi-member 

committee in the event of an objection. 

 Indeed, to the extent there are structural arguments, they cut against 

the City’s position. The objections committee is comprised of the city clerk, 

the mayor, and a member of the city council. The objections committee is 

not comprised of members who ordinarily have expertise in the resolution of 

legal issues. The composition evinces a legislative intent that the objections 

committee serve as a fact finder, not a court of law. 

 Finally, the City seeks refuge from the plain meaning of Iowa Code 

section 364.2 by citation to prior authority. None of the cited cases, 

however, involved a determination by an objections committee of whether a 

petition is “valid” under the narrow command of Iowa Code section 362.4. 
13

Further, all of the cases involved judicial intervention in different statutory 

and factual contexts. Petersen v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 

99, 103–04 (Iowa 2001) (wording of petition allegedly not in compliance with 

Iowa Code section 257.18(2)); Hinders v. City of Ames, 329 N.W.2d 654, 655 

(Iowa 1983) (question of compliance with Iowa Code section 388.2); 

Honohan v. United Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 Iowa 57, 61–62, 137 N.W.2d 601, 

604 (1965) (Iowa Code section 296.2 requires that a petition specify the 

purpose for which indebtedness is created). 

 In summary, we agree with the district court that the objections 

committee exceeded its statutory authority when it sustained objections to 

the charter proposals based on grounds other than “validity” under Iowa 

Code section 362.4. As a result, the actions of the objections committee did 

not provide the city council with a lawful basis for refusing to place the 

proposed charter amendments on the ballot at a special election. 

B. Ability of City to Mount Preelection Challenge to Substantive 

Legality of Proposed Charter Amendments.

1. The issues of who and when. The fact that the objections 

committee and the city council may not prevent a charter amendment 

petition from being placed before the voters based upon criteria other than 

that established by Iowa Code section 364.2 does not end this controversy. 

The City asserts that even if the objections committee exceeded its 

authority, the City may launch a broadly framed preelection attack in 

district court challenging the legality of the proposed charter amendments. 

 The City’s argument presents two closely related preliminary issues. 

The first question is whether the City has standing to challenge the 

potential validity of the proposed charter amendments. The second 

question is whether the City or any other party may bring a preelection 
14

challenge to the legal validity of proposed charter amendments that have 

not been formally approved or rejected by the voters. This second question 

has often been characterized as a question of ripeness. 

 Questions of standing and ripeness raise delicate issues regarding the 

exercise of judicial power. On the one hand, state courts do not want to 

intervene too soon in legal matters by deciding abstract issues without a 

fully developed factual record made by parties with a strong motivation to 

illuminate the issues. On the other hand, state courts do not want to 

intervene too late, after legal rights have been irreparably harmed or where 

the potential benefits of a timely and authoritative judicial determination 

have been lost. The questions of who and when are often as important as 

what and why. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive 

Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1843–44 

(2001); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and 

When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1363–64 (1973). 

 2. The issue of who: The doctrine of standing. The thrust of the 

petitioners’ standing argument is that that the City has no dog in this fight. 

 Just as no city would be allowed to challenge the validity of an ordinance 

pending before the city council, the petitioners claim that the City cannot 

challenge the lawfulness of a proposed charter amendment. In the charter 

amendment process, the people stand in the shoes of the city council as the 

source of governing power. As a result, the petitioners claim that the City 

itself has not suffered an injury in fact and, in effect, that city hall should 

be a neutral bystander with respect to any legal issues presented in the 

proposed charter amendments. 

 The City counters that it should not be forced to incur the expense of 

an election over proposals that are, in its view, unlawful. In addition, the 
15

City maintains that the appellants have failed to preserve the issue because 

the district court did not rule on standing and the appellants did not file a 

rule 1.944 motion to expand findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 

generally Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.944. 

 We disagree with the City that plaintiffs have not properly preserved 

the issue of standing. The City is certainly correct that normally a party 

must seek expanded findings to preserve an issue or claim submitted for 

adjudication but not resolved by the district court. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 

N.W.2d 532, 539 (Iowa 2002). This court, however, has long recognized “a 

distinction between successful and unsuccessful parties for purposes of 

error preservation.” Ritz v. Wapello County Bd. of Supervisors, 595 N.W.2d 

786, 789 (Iowa 1999). A party would have no motivation to move to expand 

the findings or appeal a successful verdict. As the successful party, the 

plaintiffs were therefore not required to file a rule 1.944 motion to obtain a 

double victory. 

 Finding no error preservation problem, we now turn to the standing 

issue. We have found no Iowa authority expressly addressing the question 

of a city’s standing to litigate the lawfulness of proposed charter 

amendments. In Polk County Board of Supervisors v. Polk County Charter 

Commission, 522 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa 1994) [hereinafter Polk County], this 

court addressed the merits of a preelection declaratory judgment action 

brought by the county and the board of supervisors challenging the validity 

of a proposed Commonwealth Charter. The parties did not raise the issue 

of the standing of the county or the board. 

 Standing has been defined to mean that a party must have 

“ ‘sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial 

resolution of the controversy.’ ” Birkhofer ex rel. Johannsen v. Brammeier, 
16

610 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1405 (6th 

ed. 1990)). We have held that in order to have standing a party must (1) 

have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be 

injuriously affected. Id. 

 A number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that the potential 

expenditure of funds by a municipality in connection with a voter petition is 

sufficient to allow a city standing to litigate the underlying legality of 

proposed or existing ordinances or charter provisions. City of Irvine v. Irvine 

Citizens Against Overdevelopment, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797, 799–800 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1994); Branca v. City of Miramar, 634 So. 2d 604, 605–06 (Fla. 1994); 

Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So. 2d 505, 506–07 (Fla. 1962); Housing & 

Redevelopment Auth. v. City of Minneapolis, 198 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 

1972); City of Sequim v. Malkasian, 79 P.3d 24, 26–27 (Wash. Ct. App. 

2003). But see City of Mishawaka v. Mohney, 297 N.E.2d 858, 859–60 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1973); Slama v. Attorney General, 428 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Mass. 

1981). 

 While the City’s pecuniary interest in this litigation may be 

comparatively small, it is no less substantial than the injury to an 

individual taxpayer who challenges the lawfulness of a statute. Taxpayers 

are almost universally acknowledged as having suffered sufficient injury in 

fact to confer standing. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 

2005) (noting “the well-established rule that ‘a taxpayer may maintain an 

action in his own name to prevent unlawful acts by public officers which 

would increase the amount of taxes he is required to pay. . . .’ ” (quoting 

Polk County v. Dist. Ct., 133 Iowa 710, 712, 110 N.W. 1054, 1055 (1907))); 

see also Comment, Taxpayers’ Actions: Public Invocation of the Judiciary, 13 
17

Wake Forest L. Rev. 397, 399–400, 402–03 (1977) (observing nearly every 

state confers standing on taxpayers). 

 We find that the City meets the two-pronged standing test of 

Birkhofer. The test is met because if unsuccessful in this litigation, the City 

will be required to expend funds on a special election. The expenditure of 

funds on a special election presents a concrete, tangible financial injury to 

the City that will result absent judicial intervention, but which will be 

avoided if the City prevails in this litigation. This potential cost of an 

unnecessary election is a special injury different and apart from general 

harm to the public. 

3. The issue of when: The doctrine of ripeness. We have recognized 

that the question of ripeness in the context of an action for declaratory 

judgment is difficult. Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of 

Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 2004); Wesselink v. State Dep’t of 

Health, 248 Iowa 639, 643, 80 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1957). We have stated 

that the question is “whether the facts alleged show there is a substantial 

controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient 

immediacy and reality to warrant a declaratory judgment.” Citizens, 686 

N.W.2d at 474. 

 We have further observed in the municipal law context that rules 

authorizing declaratory judgments are broad and should be applied 

liberally. Bechtel, 225 N.W.2d at 330. The key to ripeness in a declaratory 

judgment setting such as the one before us is an “antagonist assertion and 

denial of right.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 This court, however, has not provided clear guidance on the 

applicability of the ripeness doctrine in the context of citizen-initiated 

municipal elections. In Mathews v. Turner, 212 Iowa 424, 426–27, 236 N.W. 
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412, 413 (1931), the court considered a preelection attack on a proposed 

state constitutional amendment, but the issue of ripeness was not raised 

and was expressly reserved. A similar result occurred in Richardson v. City 

of Jefferson, 257 Iowa 709, 134 N.W.2d 528 (1965), where the district court 

granted a preelection injunction to prevent the City from presenting to the 

voters a revenue issue that would extend and improve a swimming pool. 

This court affirmed, but did not discuss the question of ripeness. 

 More recently, in Polk County, 522 N.W.2d at 783, the court 

considered the claims that a provision calling for the creation of a 

commonwealth mayors’ commission violated the one person, one vote 

provisions of the Iowa and United States Constitutions and that other 

provisions of the proposed commonwealth charter did not comply with the 

public hearing and content requirements of Iowa law. Id. at 788–89, 794–

96. In a concurring opinion, Justice Carter emphasized that the issues 

presented were ripe for review. Id. at 796. Like the Mathews and 

Richardson matters, however, Polk County has no value as a precedent on 

the ripeness issue as the issue was not raised in the litigation. 

 The subsequent case of Citizens, 686 N.W.2d at 470, presents a fact 

situation in the context of municipal government where we held that the 

controversy was not ripe. In Citizens, a nonprofit corporation brought a 

declaratory action objecting to a public improvement project that included a 

recreational lake and a public park. Id. at 472. The project was to be 

financed largely through the sale of revenue bonds, which had not yet been 

approved by the necessary governing bodies. Id. The court, citing ripeness 

concerns, refused to consider potential legal challenges to the project, 

emphasizing the contingent status of the project. Id. at 474–75. 
19

 The question of whether state courts should entertain facial 

challenges to ballot measures prior to an election generally raises an issue 

of judicial propriety, not jurisdiction. It is a question of prudence, not 

power. Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Gaines, 450 

So. 2d at 1178; Housing & Redevelopment Auth., 198 N.W.2d at 535. 

 Whether to exercise the judicial power to decide preelection 

challenges to ballot measures has been considered by a number of state 

courts, with mixed results. Nearly all state courts allow preelection 

challenges based on procedural compliance with statutory criteria governing 

the petition process such as validating the required number of signatures, 

etc. See Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1228 n.8 (Nev. 2006) 

(and cases cited therein). 

 In addition, most state courts allow preelection challenges based 

upon subject matter or content restrictions for ballot measures established 

by constitution or statute. Id. at 1228 n.9 (and cases cited therein). The 

notion that courts engage in process and subject matter review of ballot 

matters prior to the election has support in the academic commentary. 

James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-election Judicial Review of 

Initiatives and Referendums, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 298, 298 (1989); 

Michael J. Farrell, The Judiciary and Popular Democracy: Should Courts 

Review Ballot Measures Prior to Elections?, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 919, 925 

(1984). According to the commentary and the applicable cases, the function 

of the state courts in engaging in threshold legal review is to ensure that the 

electoral path is not clogged with proposals that fail to meet the basic 

requirements for gaining ballot access. 

 While state courts routinely serve as gatekeepers on issues of 

compliance with threshold ballot access requirements related to process 
20

and content, many state courts decline to extend the gatekeeping function 

to include resolution of what are often termed “substantive challenges” to 

the lawfulness of proposals prior to the election. See, e.g., Winkle v. City of 

Tucson, 949 P.2d 502, 504 (Ariz. 1997); City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 293 

P.2d 974, 976 (Colo. 1956); Coppernoll v. Reed, 119 P.3d 318, 321–22 

(Wash. 2005); State of Wisconsin ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 255 

N.W.2d 449, 455 (Wis. 1977). The rationale of these state courts is that 

because measures are often used to send a message to elected 

representatives, preelection review even of measures that are subsequently 

found invalid by a court may unduly infringe on free speech values. Gordon 

& Magleby, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 312; M. Sean Radcliffe, Pre-election 

Judicial Review of Initiative Petitions: An Unreasonable Limitation on Political 

Speech, 30 Tulsa L.J. 425, 436–37 (1994). 

 In addition, where facial attacks on constitutional grounds are 

presented, the doctrine of necessity is implicated. Under the prudential rule 

of necessity, constitutional issues must not be resolved in advance of a 

strict necessity for deciding them. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 937, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2776–77, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 

331 (1983); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346, 56 S. Ct. 

466, 482, 80 L. Ed. 688, 710 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 

 On the other hand, a number of state courts have held that 

substantive, facial challenges to the legality of legislative initiatives are 

subject to judicial determination prior to their adoption by the electorate 

under proper circumstances. Many states limit such substantive, facial 

preelection review to cases where the illegality is “clear,” “compelling,” or 

“manifest.” Alaska Action Ctr. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 992 

(Alaska 2004) (proper where “controlling authority” is present); Legislature v. 
21

Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1983) (“clear showing of invalidity”); In re 

Initiative Petition No. 360, State Question No. 658, 879 P.2d 810, 814 (Okla. 

1994) (discretion to consider substantive review where issues are “clear”). 

While these courts generally concede that judicial intervention to determine 

legal issues related to proposals pending, but not finally enacted by a 

legislative body would be improper, citizen initiatives are distinguished on 

the ground that, unlike legislative proposals, they are not subject to 

amendment prior to enactment and involve direct and indirect costs 

associated with the holding of elections. Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 

759, 762 n.5 (Alaska 1980); Associated Taxpayers of Idaho v. Cenarrusa,

725 P.2d 526, 532–33 (Idaho 1986) (Huntley, J., dissenting); Wyoming Nat’l 

Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 289 (Wyo. 1994). 

 Some courts, however, reject the notion that there are degrees of 

illegality that affect the exercise of judicial review of ballot measures prior to 

the election. As noted by one court, it makes no difference whether a 

proposal is “clearly illegal” or just “illegal,” as under either circumstance, 

the proposal is invalid. Haumant v. Griffin, 699 N.W.2d 774, 780 (Minn. Ct. 

App. 2005); see also Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 648, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 

 Based on our review of the cases, we adopt the concensus view that a 

preelection challenge with respect to threshold process and content 

requirements for proposed municipal charter amendments should generally 

be considered ripe for adjudication. In this context, the issues do not relate 

to substantive validity of the proposal, but only to whether a particular 

proposal qualifies under applicable law for presentation to the voters. 

Alaska Action Ctr., 84 P.3d at 992. In so holding, we are concerned not 

solely with the cost of a needless special election. Utz v. City of Newport, 
22

252 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Ky. 1952). We believe the time and money citizens 

are willing to devote to political activity are valuable resources that should 

not be squandered on charter initiatives that fail to meet even threshold 

ballot requirements. Am. Fed’n of Labor-Cong. of Indus. Org. v. Eu, 686 P.2d 

609, 615 (Cal. 1984). As a result, we hold that the issue of whether the 

three proposals contain charter material, or are related to “form of 

government,” is ripe for review. 

 We next turn to the more difficult question of whether a preelection 

challenge to the substantive, facial validity of a proposed city charter 

amendment may be entertained. Even advocates of judicial restraint 

recognize that there are some cases where preelection judicial review of the 

substantive validity of underlying proposals is appropriate. See, e.g., In re 

Initiative Petition No. 358, State Question No. 658, 870 P.2d 782, 791 (Okla. 

1994) (Ovala, J., concurring) (noting that preelection judicial review is 

appropriate where constitutional law is “firmly settled” and “absolutely” 

condemns the proposal); Gordon & Magleby, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 318 

(advocating a circuit breaker exception allowing preelection substantive 

review in exceptional cases). We therefore reject the blanket rule that such 

challenges may never be considered. 

 We conclude that preelection review of the substantive facial 

challenge to the retention amendment, namely, that the retention proposal 

is inconsistent with various provisions of the city code, is ripe for review. In 

this case, there is no pending election. Where there is no pending election, 

judicial review may take its ordinary course without the shortcomings 

associated with an expedited review. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. 

McPherson, 136 P.3d 178, 181 (Cal. 2006); Brosnahan v. Eu, 641 P.2d 200, 

202 (Cal. 1982) (Broussard, J., concurring). Further, because the election 
23

has not yet been scheduled, the harm to the political process will be 

minimal. Early judicial intervention may give the measure’s proponents an 

opportunity to cure defects before time and money is expended on a doomed 

effort. Douglas C. Michael, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative 

in Voter Protection, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1216, 1217 (1983). 

 In addition, to timing matters, the substantive nature of the legal 

challenges does not prevent consideration of the legal issues at this time. 

The substantive facial challenge in this case presents an issue of law that is 

clear and not subject to serious dispute. Alaska Action Ctr., 84 P.3d at 992;

Deukmejian, 669 P.2d at 21; In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 879 P.2d at 814. 

Because fundamental and difficult issues of constitutional law are not 

involved, the rule of necessity lays dormant. As a result, we proceed to 

address the merits of the claim.1

 C. Threshold Issues and Substantive Merit of Charter Proposals.

1. Inconsistency with state law. The City attacks the retention 

proposal as substantively unlawful. The City claims that the retention 

proposal is contrary to provisions of Iowa law related to the appointment 

and retention of the city manager and the police chief. In considering this 

matter, we do not pass on the merits of proposed charter amendment. Our 

only task in the legislative home rule environment is to determine whether 

the proposal is consistent with state law. 

 The question of whether the City may determine the method of 

appointment and removal of city officials free from legislative interference 

 

1Because the district court held that the City’s declaratory judgment action was not 

ripe for review, it did not rule upon the substantive validity of each of the proposed 

amendments. This court is thus left with the choice of remanding the case back to the 

district court or deciding the additional issues itself. “Where . . . the additional issues have 

been fully briefed and argued in this court, we conclude that it is in the interest of sound 

judicial administration to decide these issues here.” Barnes v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp. Motor 

Vehicle Div., 385 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1986). 
24

has been a topic of discussion in municipal governance. As early as 1953, a 

model constitutional provision advanced by city advocates reserved the right 

to structure the appointment and retention process to the cities. Am. Mun. 

Ass’n, Model Const. Provisions for Mun. Home Rule § 6 (1953) (as cited in 

George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint upon the Exercise of 

Municipal Power in Home Rule, 20 Stetson L. Rev. 5, app. 1 at 74 (1990)). At 

least three state constitutions currently have home rule provisions that 

expressly reserve the right of local governments to structure the 

appointment and retention process with respect to city officials. See Cal. 

Const. art. XI, § 5(b) (“It shall be competent in all city charters to provide 

. . . for . . . the manner in which, the method by which, the times at which, 

and the terms for which the several municipal officers and employees . . . 

shall be elected or appointed. . . .”); Ill. Const. 1970 art. VII, § 6(f) (“A home 

rule municipality shall have the power to provide for its officers, their 

manner of selection, and terms of office only as approved by referendum or 

as otherwise authorized by law.”) (as cited in Clarke v. Village of Arlington 

Heights, 309 N.E.2d 576, 577 (Ill. 1974)); Ohio Const. art. X, § 3 (“Every 

such charter shall provide the form of government of the county and shall 

determine which of its officers shall be elected and the manner of their 

election.”). 

 The Iowa home rule amendment, however, does not reserve such 

power to municipalities. As a result, we turn to the Code to determine 

whether the retention proposal on its face is inconsistent with state law. If 

so, the proposed charter amendment would be invalid. Goodell v. Humboldt 

County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 500 (Iowa 1998); Iowa Code § 364.1. 

 The Iowa legislature has allowed the cities a degree of discretion in 

determining who appoints city officials. For example, Iowa Code section 
25

372.13(4) provides that “[e]xcept as provided by state or city law,” the city 

council appoints officers and employees and prescribes their duties, 

compensation, and terms. Thus, the first sentence of Iowa Code section 

372.13(4) allows cities to provide for an appointing body other than the city 

council. See Flowers v. City of Moline, 622 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 

(appointment powers distributed between city council and mayor). 

Regardless of who appoints city officers and employees and prescribes their 

duties, however, the second sentence of section 372.13(4) contains the 

unqualified statement that “[t]he appointment of a city manager must be 

made on the basis of that individual’s qualifications and not on the basis of 

political affiliation.” Iowa Code § 372.13(4).2 Similarly, regardless of the 

appointing authority, the civil service code requires that the selection of all 

appointed officers and employees of cities must be based upon their 

“qualifications and fitness and for the good of the public service, and 

without regard to their political faith or party allegiance.” Id. § 400.16. 

 The retention proposal in this case arguably conflicts with the spirit if 

not the letter of Iowa Code sections 372.13(4) and 400.16. The retention 

proposal injects an extraneous political process into the employment 

relations between the city manager and police chief and the appointing 

authority not related to job qualifications. We doubt that the proposed 

retention amendment is consistent with the legislative intent behind these 

Code sections. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 500. 

 More importantly, however, the legislature has addressed the issue of 

how these appointed officials may be terminated. In Iowa Code section 

 

2Iowa Code section 372.13(4) states, “Except as otherwise provided by state or city 

law, the council may appoint city officers and employees, and prescribe their powers, 

duties, compensation, and terms. The appointment of a city manager must be made on the 

basis of that individual’s qualifications and not on the basis of political affiliation.” Iowa 

Code § 372.13(4). 
26

372.15, the legislature has provided that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 

state and city law,” the appointing authority has the power to remove the 

city officer. Pursuant to this provision, a city has the option of vesting 

removal authority in an entity or person other than the original appointing 

authority. Section 372.15, however, is qualified by the provision “but every 

such removal shall be by written order.” The section further provides that 

the written order “shall give the reasons” for the dismissal. The officer is 

then entitled to a public hearing before the council on all issues connected 

with the removal. Iowa Code § 372.15.3 

 The very specific “but every such removal” language in Iowa Code 

section 372.15 is designed as a limitation on the city’s power to remove 

public officers. State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 614 (Ore. 2005) (stating 

the phrase “but every” describes exceptions or modifications). This 

statutory removal provision applies to all public officers regardless of the 

form of government that a city may choose to employ. City of Des Moines v. 

Civil Service Comm’n, 540 N.W.2d 52, 59–60 (Iowa 1995); La Peters v. City of 

Cedar Rapids, 263 N.W.2d 734, 736–37 (Iowa 1978). While Iowa Code 

section 372.15 does not require that the appointing authority demonstrate 

that removal was for cause, Bennett v. City of Redfield, 446 N.W.2d 467, 473 

(Iowa 1989), it does mandate that a public officer have notice of the reasons 

 

3Iowa Code section 372.15 states, 

Except as otherwise provided by state or city law, all persons appointed to 

city office may be removed by the officer or body making the appointment, 

but every such removal shall be by written order. The order shall give the 

reasons, be filed in the office of the city clerk, and a copy shall be sent by 

certified mail to the person removed who, upon request filed with the clerk 

within thirty days of the date of mailing the copy, shall be granted a public 

hearing before the council on all issues connected with the removal. The 

hearing shall be held within thirty days of the date the request is filed, 

unless the person removed requests a later date. 

Iowa Code § 372.15. 
27

for termination and the opportunity to be heard before the appointing 

authority. 

 The retention proposal provides for removal of the city manager and 

the police chief through a vote of the people, without written notice, without

a statement of reasons, and without a hearing before the city council. These 

three procedural omissions are fatal to the proposed charter amendment. 

Iowa Code § 364.6 (“A city shall substantially comply with a procedure 

established by state law for exercising a city power.”). Removal under the 

retention amendment does not involve deliberation of elected 

representatives that is at the heart of representative democracy which our 

legislature has chosen to prescribe. State ex rel. Connie v. Hunter, 117 A. 

548, 549 (Conn. 1922) (applying referendum to appointment and removal of 

city manager would defeat system of putting business affairs in hands of 

trained expert rather than a popular favorite); State ex rel. Becker v. 

Common Council of City of Milwaukee, 305 N.W.2d 178, 182–83 (Wis. Ct. 

App. 1981) (initiative for removal of police chief violates state statute vesting 

authority in board). 

 The petitioner’s sole defense of the retention proposal is that it might 

be interpreted in a fashion that would allow the city manager or the police 

chief to remain in office after a negative vote in a retention election. The 

defense has two thematic variations. First, the petitioners suggest that a 

negative retention vote might not require the removal of the official in 

question, but may be regarded as advisory only. Second, the petitioners 

suggest that even if the proposal were interpreted as requiring the removal 

of an officer that failed to prevail in a retention election, the City could 

simply reappoint the official. 
28

 We reject the contention that the proposed charter provision may be 

saved by characterizing the retention election as merely advisory. The 

retention proposal expressly states that the appointment of the city 

manager and the police chief “shall be subject to” a “retention” election. 

The term “shall” is mandatory. Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (“The word ‘shall’ 

imposes a duty.”); State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Iowa 2000) (“the 

word ‘shall’ does not mean ‘may’ ”); State v. Luckett, 387 N.W.2d 298, 301 

(Iowa 1986) (use of the word “shall” connotes mandatory action). The 

phrase “subject to” means “governed by” or “dependent upon.” Util. Cost 

Mgmt. v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist., 36 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2001); Mayor of 

City of Lansing v. Michigan Public Serv. Comm’n, 680 N.W.2d 840, 843–44 

(Mich. 2004). Retention means a “state of being kept in place.” Webster’s 

Third International Dictionary 1938 (unabr. ed. 2002). Given this 

unambiguous language, we will not twist the plain meaning of the retention 

proposal beyond recognition to suggest that it merely authorizes a public 

opinion poll on the performance of the police chief and city manager. State 

v. Welton, 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981). Similarly, we will not distort 

the plain meaning of the proposal to allow an officer who was not retained 

to be immediately rehired, thereby converting the retention election into a 

straw poll. 

 The retention proposal also contains a provision requiring yearly job 

evaluations of the city manager and the police chief. The City does not 

directly attack this aspect of the retention proposal. On the other hand, the 

retention proposal does not contain a severability clause and the petitioners 

have not asked us to sever any remaining lawful portions of the retention 

proposal. Cf. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Iowa 2004) 

(in the context of statutory severance, this court has held that severance “is 
29

appropriate if it does not substantially impair legislative purpose, the 

enactment remains capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, and 

the remaining portion of the enactment can be given effect without the 

invalid provision” (citations omitted)). 

 It is not clear that the doctrine of severance should apply in the 

context of preelection substantive review of a proposed municipal charter 

amendment. Compare Bennett v. Drullard, 149 P. 368, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1915) (refusing to allow severability as not germane to the will of the 

electorate); Housing & Redevelopment Auth., 198 N.W.2d at 538 (severance 

not appropriate as court cannot determine intent of signators if some 

portions invalid); State ex rel. Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon Comm. v. Klos, 35 

S.W.3d 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting severability because it is 

impossible for court to determine what petition drafters or signators 

intended), with McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 94 (Alaska 1988) 

(allowing severability because the court’s duty in conducting preelection 

review is akin to review of an enacted statute); City of Colorado Springs v. 

Bull, 143 P.3d 1127, 1138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding that unlawful 

portions of proposed initiative should be severed from remainder of ballot 

initiative). 

 In any event, even if the doctrine of severance did apply, it would not 

be the proper approach in this case. Where the main portions of a citizen 

petition are invalid, the remainder should not be sent to the voters in 

redacted form. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 95 n.26; Alexander v. Mitchell, 260 

P.2d 261, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Fossella v. Dinkins, 485 N.E.2d 1017, 

1019 (N.Y. 1985). “[T]o separate the good from the bad and permit the 

submission to the voters of a maimed and worthless thing would be folly.” 
30

McCabe v. Voorhis, 153 N.E. 849, 853 (N.Y. 1926). As a result, we hold that 

no part of the retention proposal should be submitted to the voters. 

 Having found that the retention proposal is invalid because of its 

conflict with Iowa law regarding the appointment and removal process of 

city officials, we do not decide the question of whether the erroneous 

citation to charter provisions in the petition is a basis for legal challenge. 

2. Threshold Limitation of Charter Amendments to “Form of 

Government.” The City attacks the PCRB proposal and the community 

policing proposal on the sole ground that the proposals do not contain 

proper charter material. The City zealously argues that only matters related 

to “form of government” may be subject to proposed ballot amendments. 

According to the City, the content of charter amendments is limited by Iowa 

Code section 372.9 to amendments that relate to the “form of government.” 

Iowa Code section 372.9 states that “[a] city to be governed by the home 

rule charter form shall adopt a home rule charter in which its form of 

government shall be set forth.” The City raises no other challenge to the 

validity of these proposed charter amendments. 

 In considering the meaning of the term “form of government,” we 

must consider relevant legislative history. Prior to 1975, Iowa Code section 

372.10 stated that a home rule charter must contain “and is limited to” five 

specific provisions related to the structure of city councils, the manner of 

holding elections, and the duties of the city council and city officers. As a 

result of this strict language, the contents of a city charter prior to 1975 

were severely limited. In 1975, however, the legislature opened Iowa Code 

section 372.10 by deleting the phrase “and is limited to.” 1975 Iowa Acts 

ch. 203, § 22. 
31

 The City contends that the legislative purpose behind this 

amendment was modest. According to the City, lifting the strict limitations 

in charter content was not designed to allow any imaginable law, policy, 

practice, or procedure to become part of the charter, but only to expand the 

potential form of government provisions that cities might choose to employ 

in light of the passage in 1968 of the home rule amendment to the Iowa 

Constitution. Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A. 

 The plaintiffs, in contrast, reject the limitation of city charters to 

content involving “form of government.” They argue that the 1975 

amendment to Iowa Code section 372.10 dramatically expanded permissible 

charter content. Further, they note that under Iowa Code section 372.2, 

the “form of government” of a municipality may be changed only every six 

years. This provision, appellants argue, implies that charter amendments 

that do not involve “form of government” may be offered at any other time. 

 There are no Iowa cases dealing with this precise issue. The closest 

case cited by the parties is City of Clinton v. Sheridan, 530 N.W.2d 690, 692 

(Iowa 1995). In this case, however, the issue was whether a proposed 

referendum dealing with various building codes was consistent with state 

law. The issue of potential restrictions on charter content arising from the 

use of the term “form of government” was not presented and, of course, not 

decided in that case. In dictum, the court suggested that the amendment to 

Iowa Code section 372.10 was designed to “allow the home rule charters to 

include the broad powers to determine local affairs and government. . . .” 

City of Clinton, 530 N.W.2d at 694. 

 When the legislature amended Iowa Code section 372.10, it did not 

alter Iowa Code section 372.9, which provides that a city may adopt a home 

rule charter “in which its form of government is set forth.” The legislature’s 
32

inclusion, moreover, of the phrase “form of government” in Iowa Code 

section 372.9 was deliberate. Ashby v. Sch. Twp. of Liberty, 250 Iowa 1201, 

1214, 98 N.W.2d 848, 858 (1959) (“A cardinal rule of statutory construction 

is that, if reasonably possible, effect should be given every part of a 

statute.”). We view this language as establishing the kind of material or 

subject matter that may be contained in a city charter. The 1975 

amendment was designed to permit more experimentation with respect to 

form of government, while not abandoning the preexisting “form of 

government” limitation. In re Barry, 720 A.2d 977, 979 (N.H. 1998) (New 

Hampshire Constitution allows city charter to include various forms of 

government, but does not grant municipality unbridled authority to amend 

its charter to include retirement plan provisions); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 

415 A.2d 255, 261 (Md. 1980) (charter is vehicle for form of government 

which identifies, distributes, and restricts municipal power). To the extent 

that dictum in City of Clinton implies that material that does not relate to 

form of government may be included in the charter, it is disapproved. 

 We do not believe Iowa Code section 372.2 requires a different result. 

Iowa Code section 372.2 provides that unless otherwise provided by law, a 

city may not adopt a different “form of government” more often than once in 

a six-year period. We read Iowa Code section 372.2 to mean that a city may 

enact a fundamental change in its “form of government” (e.g. from city 

council/mayor, city council/city manager or commission to another form) 

every six years, but may tinker with less sweeping amendments at other 

times. See Clarke, 309 N.E.2d at 579 (distinguishing between amendments 

and total adoption or repeal of form of government); Kelly v. Laing, 242 N.W. 

891, 892 (Mich. 1932) (distinguishing between amendments to charter and 

redraft of entire document). We do not read this section as authorizing 
33

“non-form of government” amendments during the six-year cycle 

established by Iowa Code section 372.2. 

 Having determined that amendments to city charters must, as a 

matter of law, relate to “form of government,” the next question is what 

subject matter falls within the ambit of the phrase. In the context of 

municipal charters, the term “form of government” has been said to refer to 

“fundamental” provisions that provide “a broad organizational framework 

establishing the form and structure of government.” Cheeks, 415 A.2d at 

261. Another formulation suggests that a municipal charter is a plan that 

establishes the structure of local government and constitutes “nothing more 

than the machinery by which the powers and responsibilities of government 

may be executed. . . .” Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 471 (Ky. 

1973). 

 These general statements about what constitutes “form of 

government” are not always helpful, however, and the case law in other 

jurisdictions suggests that the phrase “form of government” is often defined 

more by what it does not include than anything else. A number of cases 

contrast charter provisions with ordinances, noting that a proposal to 

amend a charter cannot be an ordinance in masquerade. For instance, in 

Cheeks, 415 A.2d at 255, the court found that a charter amendment 

establishing a detailed rent control regulatory regime did not relate to “form 

of government,” but instead amounted to substantive legislation that could 

not be included in a city charter. See also Mayor & City Council of Ocean 

City v. Bunting, 895 A.2d 1068, 1075–76 (Md. Ct. App. 2006) (charter 

amendment permitting police department employees to engage in collective 

bargaining held too specific and not related to broad organizational 

framework of government); In re Initiative Petition No. 1 of Midwest City v. 
34

Melton, 465 P.2d 470, 472 (Okla. 1970) (proposed charter amendment 

requiring voter approval of ordinances affecting sale or transfer of real 

estate held too specific to be valid charter amendment). Under this line of 

authority, the more detailed a proposal and the more it establishes 

substantive policy instead of structure, the greater the likelihood that the 

proposal does not relate to form of government and does not qualify for 

inclusion in a city charter. 

 It also is clear that matters that are best characterized as 

administrative are not the stuff of valid charter proposals. Such matters do 

not even qualify as municipal ordinances that may be enacted through the 

initiative process, let alone enshrined as charter provisions. See, e.g., Jones 

v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local Union No. 936, 601 S.W.2d 454, 455–56 

(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1980) (proposal must be legislative in character to qualify 

as a charter amendment); Save Our Fire Dep’t Paramedics Comm. v. City of 

Appleton, 389 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (same). The rationale of 

these cases is that in order to allow for efficient administration of the city, 

administrative matters without sufficient generality and permanence should 

not be subjected to popular vote. City of Wichita v. Fitzgerald, 916 P.2d 

1301, 1304 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). 

 There is no clear method for determining whether a proposal to be 

placed before the electorate involves impermissible administrative matters. 

One test of whether a proposal is administrative in nature is whether it 

executes law previously established. Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 821 P.2d 

146, 150 (Ariz. 1991); City of Lawrence v. McArdle, 522 P.2d 420, 425 (Kan. 

1974). Matters that have been found administrative in nature, and thus not 

subject to being placed on the ballot as initiative measures, are proposals to 

reorganize special districts, measures concerning the acquisition, 
35

construction, and regulation of penal facilities, a proposal regarding the use 

and placement of speed bumps, and a proposal for increased salaries for 

city employees. Friends of Mt. Diablo v. County of Contra Costa, 139 Cal. 

Rptr. 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Murphy v. Gilman, 204 Iowa 58, 62, 214 

N.W. 679, 681–82 (1927); State ex rel. Hazel v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of 

Elections, 685 N.E.2d 224 (Ohio 1997); Save Our Fire Dep’t, 389 N.W.2d at 

43. 

 We embrace the general contours of the above cited authorities as 

consistent with the direction of our legislature. Under this approach, basic 

structural proposals truly involving the form, not the substance, of 

government are subject to voter approval through the charter amendment 

process. Matters of policy or administration, however, are to be processed 

through the ordinary channels of representative democracy with its 

Madisonian virtues. The Federalist No.10 (James Madison) (advocating 

deliberation by representative bodies). Policy and administrative matters 

are thus subject to the give and take of the deliberative processes of 

representative government and are not to be implanted in a city charter by 

transient majorities. 

 Applying these above concepts, we hold that the PCRB proposal 

relates to the form of government under Iowa Code section 372.9 and is a 

permissible charter amendment under Iowa Code section 372.10. The 

PCRB proposal establishes a permanent body to investigate and make 

recommendations to the city council regarding police practices. The PCRB 

proposal does not invade the province of the city council by dictating 

particular law enforcement practices or by controlling budget priorities. It 

simply establishes a permanent entity to engage in public hearings, conduct 

investigations, and make recommendations to the city council. It is 
36

involved primarily with government processes, not substantive law, and 

thus is an amendment involving “form of government.” 

 We believe the PCRB proposal is a model of the kind of measure that 

the legislature’s removal of limitations in Iowa Code section 372.10 was 

designed to allow. As a result, the district court order requiring this matter 

to be placed before the voters is affirmed. 

 On the other hand, we hold that the community policing proposal 

does not relate to form of government and therefore is an impermissible 

amendment to the charter. The community policing proposal declares that 

city police officers “shall” issue citations in lieu of arrest for most nonviolent 

misdemeanor offenses, “shall” notify persons of the existence of an arrest 

warrant unless there is a danger to the community or risk of flight, and 

“should” not engage in certain activities such as “knock and talks” or going 

as undercover agents in bars, restaurants, and other public places, and 

acting on certain anonymous tips. The community policing proposal further 

declares that enforcement of laws related to the possession of personal-use 

amounts of marijuana are not a “priority” of the City. As can be seen from 

the above description, the community policing proposal does not relate to a 

“form of government,” but simply seeks to establish executive or 

administrative policy for the City with respect to law enforcement practices 

in a narrow category of crimes. As a result, the community policing 

proposal does not relate to “form of government” as required by Iowa Code 

section 372.9. 

 Our holding that a charter is not the place to cement executive and 

administrative policy for the enforcement of certain criminal laws does not 

leave the plaintiffs without a remedy. If the plaintiffs are dissatisfied with 

the manner in which city officials are making executive and administrative 
37

decisions regarding the enforcement of nonviolent misdemeanors, they have 

a remedy through the ballot box when responsible city officials stand for 

election. 

 For the above reasons, we conclude that the community policing 

proposal does not involve “form of government.” It is, therefore, not a valid 

charter amendment, and should not be presented to the voters. 

 IV. Conclusion.

 We find that the objections committee exceeded its statutory authority 

by rejecting the proposals as legally insufficient. The district court order 

granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is affirmed. 

 We further hold that the City is entitled to a declaratory judgment 

that the retention and community policing proposals are inconsistent with 

Iowa law and, as a result, the City is under no obligation to place these 

matters before the voters. With respect to the PCRB proposal, however, we 

find that the City is not entitled to a declaratory judgment of invalidity and 

that the voice of the voters should be heard on this issue. 

 As a result, the district court order, which refused to grant the City 

declaratory relief on the retention and community policing proposals and 

granted the appellants relief on these issues is reversed. The district court 

order denying the City declaratory relief on the PCRB proposal and directing 

the City to place this proposal on the ballot is affirmed. The case is 

remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 

this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.