United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-40091

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Andres Manuel Alvarez, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:20-CR-41-1

Before Jones, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

During a roundup of gang members with outstanding warrants, 

Corpus Christi police were given information describing one suspect only as

a “Hispanic male” who had “run from officers” on a “bicycle with large 

handlebars” in the “area of Leopard and Up River” at some unspecified time 

in the past. The officers had nothing else—not the suspect’s photo, his age, 

his build, his clothing, or any other identifying features. Nor were they told 

when the suspect had last been seen in the area. Nor were they told anything 

about the bicycle other than it had “large handlebars.”

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 13, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Armed with this meager description, the police soon found a person 

who fit it: Andres Alvarez, who was riding a bicycle with large handlebars in 

the noted area. Alvarez at first ignored the officers, but he was soon stopped 

and a frisk revealed he had a revolver and ammo. The officers later 

determined Alvarez was not the Hispanic male on a bicycle they were looking 

for. The government then charged Alvarez with being a felon in possession,

and Alvarez moved to suppress the evidence against him. The district court 

denied the motion, holding the officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop.

Reasonable suspicion to stop someone suspected of criminal activity 

is a low threshold, but not this low. Our cases require officers to have 

information more specific than “a Hispanic male who once rode away from 

police on a bicycle with large handlebars in a particular area,” especially in 

Corpus Christi, Texas. That open-ended description would effectively 

authorize random police stops, something the Fourth Amendment abhors.

See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Our dissenting colleague 

sharply disagrees with our analysis. Post at 1–9. But as we explain below, infra

pp. 16–17, nn.6–7, 10, 13, 15–16, the dissent is mistaken.

We reverse the denial of Alvarez’s motion to suppress, vacate his 

conviction and sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

On July 15, 2019, federal and Texas law enforcement conducted a 

state-wide “roundup” of known gang members with outstanding warrants. 

Officer Martin Deleon, a thirty-two-year Corpus Christi Police Department 

veteran with twenty-eight years in the gang unit, led a team of about a dozen 

officers. Each team received a packet of fifteen to twenty subjects grouped 

geographically.

One subject in the Deleon team’s packet was described as a “Hispanic 

male” in the “area of Leopard and Up River.” The information stated the 

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subject “may be in the area on a bicycle and that he had run from officers in 

the past [o]n that bicycle.” It described the bicycle only as having “large 

handlebars.” But the officers did not know anything about the bicycle’s color 

or condition or whether it had other identifiers like pegs or distinctive tires. 

Nor did the officers know the subject’s age, body type, or build; whether he 

had identifying marks or features; what he was last seen wearing; or when he 

was last seen in the area. 

The officers searched for the subject in an apartment complex in the 

Leopard–Up River area but could not find him, so they left for another 

location. Officer Deleon and his partner drove in a marked patrol car down 

Old Robstown Road toward Up River Road, an area known for gang activity. 

They saw a man who fit the subject’s description riding a bicycle with large 

handlebars on the sidewalk approaching the intersection from the opposite 

side of Up River Road. The suspect turned left, and the officers turned right, 

so they were traveling parallel on Up River, with a lane of oncoming traffic 

between them. The officers pulled alongside the suspect, and Deleon honked 

the horn and shouted, “stop, pull over[!]” The suspect asked, “Why?” and 

kept pedaling. 

After the suspect traveled about seventy-five yards, the officers pulled

ahead of him and blocked the sidewalk. The suspect laid his bicycle down,

and the officers grabbed him. They placed him against the car and frisked 

him, finding a revolver on his waistband and ammunition in his pocket. They 

cuffed him and put him in their car. 

The officers could not immediately identify their detainee. Deleon did 

not recall the name of the wanted gang member described in the packet. The 

team apparently had been looking for Jose Morales, “the third or fourth guy 

on the list.” The officers later learned that they had instead detained Alvarez, 

a convicted felon, who himself had an outstanding warrant. 

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A grand jury indicted Alvarez on one count of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),

924(a)(2). Alvarez moved to suppress the revolver and ammo, arguing the 

officers unlawfully stopped him. At an evidentiary hearing, Deleon testified 

for the government, and Alvarez introduced bodycam footage from an officer 

who arrived on scene after the seizure, as well as photographs and maps of 

the area.

The district court denied Alvarez’s motion, holding the stop was 

supported by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Alvarez, No. 2:20-CR-41, 

2020 WL 5984078, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2020). It reasoned: “Alvarez 

matched the description of the subject who had an outstanding warrant. He 

was a Hispanic male, he rode a bicycle with particularly large handlebars, and 

he was spotted in the area where the subject was known to reside.” Ibid. The 

court added that “collectively,” these factors were “not so general as to 

negate reasonable suspicion.” Ibid. (citing United States v. Lawson, 233 F.

App’x 367, 370 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)).1

Alvarez entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to an agreement 

that reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. See Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 11(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to time served. Alvarez timely 

appealed.

1 The government had also argued that Alvarez’s riding his bicycle on the sidewalk 

violated a city ordinance, which justified the stop. But evidence showed the area where the 

stop occurred was not covered by the ordinance. After the hearing, the government argued 

that regardless of that point, the stop fell within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 

rule. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). The district 

court observed that the officers “believed, incorrectly, that riding the bike on that sidewalk 

was a violation of a city ordinance.” Alvarez, 2020 WL 5984078, at *1. Finding reasonable 

suspicion supported the stop based on the description of the wanted suspect, the court did 

not reach whether the good-faith exception applied as to the ordinance. Id. at *1 n.2.

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II.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual 

findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Whether 

officers had reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop is a 

question of law. United States v. Burgos-Coronado, 970 F.3d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 

2020) (citation omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party—here, the government. United States v. Thomas, 997

F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). We will uphold the district 

court’s ruling “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” 

United States v. Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

III.

Alvarez challenges only whether the officers had reasonable suspicion 

for the stop; he does not challenge the frisk. He argues the description of the 

wanted gang member was too general and the detail about past flight from 

police on the bicycle was too “sparse” and potentially “stale.” The 

government relies on the description of the subject and the bicycle, the

location, and the officers’ knowledge of gang activity in the area.

2

A.

The Fourth Amendment provides:

2 Alvarez also argues that the officers’ mistaken belief that he violated the 

ordinance was objectively unreasonable. See supra note 1. The government does not 

contend the officers’ mistake was reasonable, relying solely on the officers’ having 

reasonable suspicion that Alvarez was the wanted suspect on their list. The government 

therefore has forfeited any argument of mistake about the ordinance. See, e.g., United States 

v. Aguilar-Alonzo, 944 F.3d 544, 552 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Guillen-Cruz, 853 F.3d 

768, 777 (5th Cir. 2017).

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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule, a judicially created

deterrence measure, provides that evidence obtained by an unreasonable 

search or seizure generally may not be used as evidence of guilt at trial. See 

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 

393 (1914). Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable subject 

to certain narrow exceptions. Cotropia v. Chapman, 978 F.3d 282, 286 (5th 

Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2002)). 

The government bears the burden of showing an exception applies. United 

States v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 306, 309 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005)).

One exception permits officers to conduct brief investigatory stops 

based on reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity 

or wanted in connection with a completed felony. United States v. Hensley, 

469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27–31; see also United States v. 

Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). A seizure “must be 

‘justified at its inception.’” Thomas, 997 F.3d at 609 (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth 

Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004)). Reasonable suspicion therefore 

“must exist before the initiation of an investigatory detention.” Ibid. (quoting

McKinney, 980 F.3d at 490).

Reasonable suspicion “is a low threshold, requiring” only a “minimal 

level of objective justification.” United States v. Castillo, 804 F.3d 361, 367 

(5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). But it 

“must be founded on specific and articulable facts rather than on a mere 

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suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 

2014) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1993)). 

Reasonable suspicion “takes into account the totality of the circumstances—

the whole picture.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2020) (quoting 

Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)).

“Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop is answered 

from the facts known to the officer at the time.” United States v. Vickers, 540 

F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 2008). Relevant facts and considerations may include 

a description of a suspect, a suspect’s location and proximity to known or 

reported criminal activity, the timeliness of information or the stop, a 

suspect’s behavior, and the officer’s experience. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 

528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Thomas, 997 F.3d at 610–11; McKinney, 980 F.3d 

at 491–95; Vickers, 540 F.3d at 361. Facts that appear innocent when viewed 

in isolation can constitute reasonable suspicion when viewed collectively. 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002).

A physical description of a suspect known to officers must be 

sufficiently specific and particularized to justify an investigatory stop. See, 

e.g., Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736–38 (5th Cir. 2000).

“Terry does not authorize broad dragnets . . . . Without more, a description 

that applies to large numbers of people will not justify the seizure of a 

particular individual.” United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 594 (7th Cir. 

2019) (citing United States v. Turner, 699 A.2d 1125, 1128–29 (D.C. 1997)); 

see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (rejecting justification that 

would “describe a very large category of presumably innocent” persons).

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A general, imprecise physical description of a suspect, standing alone, 

is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion.3 For example, in United States 

v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1980), an officer stopped a man 

matching “the general description that he had heard over the police radio the 

day before” of “a black male, 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 9 inches tall and 

weighing between 150 and 180 pounds, with a medium afro hair style, who 

was wearing jeans and a long denim jacket.” (The information reported by 

the police radio was in fact five weeks old. See id. at 496.) We found no 

reasonable suspicion because the officer “acted on the basis of an incomplete 

and stale description of a suspect that could, plainly, have fit many people.” 

Id. at 498. Similarly, in United States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1975), 

an officer stopped two black males in a black Chevrolet, knowing that “two 

black males in a black or blue Chevrolet were suspects in a series of Farm 

Store robberies” a few weeks prior. We held the facts “clearly did not rise to 

the required level, and in reality were so tenuous as to provide virtually no 

grounds whatsoever for suspicion,” because “[t]he officer was unsure 

3 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 349 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[G]eneric 

descriptions of race, gender, and build, without more, have been held insufficient to justify 

reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Clarkson, 551 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009) 

(noting “general descriptions of suspects or vehicles . . . standing alone . . . will not support 

a finding of reasonable suspicion” (citations omitted)); United States v. Goddard, 491 F.3d 

457, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[G]eneric racial descriptions devoid of 

distinctive individualized details cannot, without more, provide police adequate 

justification for a Terry stop.”); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 

Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(j), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 

2021) (noting a stop is impermissible if “the description provided in the [police] bulletin 

was so general and vague as to not permit a reasonable degree of selectivity in the making 

of stops for the purpose of finding the person wanted”); William E. Ringel, 

Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 13:22 (2d ed.), 

Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2022) (noting a “description must contain more than 

general characteristics that could fit any number of people” and “[i]f the description is too 

vague . . . , the stop will be invalidated”).

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whether the automobile used in the robberies was black or blue; the only 

description of the robbers was that they were black males; . . . [and] it was not 

unusual for blacks to be seen in the area.” Id. at 121.

A less specific description may support reasonable suspicion where 

there is temporal and geographic proximity to recent criminal activity. 4 

LaFave, supra note 3, § 9.5(h).4In Vickers, officers received a report of a 

recent burglary by a “black male last seen wearing red shirt, blue or black 

shorts.” 540 F.3d at 361. We held the officers had reasonable suspicion to 

stop a man “wearing clothing that met the description” found “75 to 100 

yards from the burglarized home.” Ibid. Similarly, in United States v. Hall, 

557 F.2d 1114, 1115–16 (5th Cir. 1977), a police dispatch reported an armed 

robbery by three men—two black and one either black with a light 

complexion or white—who fled in a red 1969 two-door Ford. An officer

stopped “a red 1969 Ford driven by a light complexioned black male, 

proceeding away from the vicinity of a bank robbery within twenty minutes 

after the robbery.” Id. at 1116–17. We upheld the stop, emphasizing that 

“[t]he most important factors” were “the timing of the initial stop and its 

location.” Id. at 1117.

4 See United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362, 1365 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding stop 

where officer “had personally observed the appellants’ car in the vicinity of two armed 

robberies shortly after the crimes had been committed [and] [t]he occupants fit the sex and 

race of the robbers and the driver was wearing a bush hat, a distinctive item of apparel 

described by one of the victims”); see also, e.g., Irvin v. Richardson, 20 F.4th 1199, 1205 (8th 

Cir. 2021) (“[A] person’s temporal and geographic proximity to a crime scene, combined 

with a matching description of the suspect, can support a finding of reasonable suspicion.” 

(collecting cases)); Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 559–

60 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Courts have typically found reasonable suspicion to stop . . . an 

individual who closely resembles a description or composite sketch when that resemblance 

is combined with both geographic and temporal proximity.” (collecting cases)).

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Accordingly, our case law distinguishes between stops related to 

completed crimes and stopsrelated to ongoing crimes or crimes very recently 

committed. See Jones, 619 F.2d at 498 (distinguishing case from those 

“where an officer has acted upon timely information of criminal activity” 

(citing Hall, 557 F.2d 1114)); see also United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 485 

(7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting “application of those cases involving urgent 

situations to the cold surveillance involved here”).

B.

The officers’ stop of Alvarez was not supported by reasonable 

suspicion. This case involves an outstanding warrant—completed criminal 

activity—so the information the officers relied on must satisfy a higher level 

of specificity than if they were responding to a report of ongoing or very 

recent criminal activity. See Jones, 619 F.2d at 498; Hall, 557 F.2d at 1114.5

The government cannot clear this hurdle under our precedent. If a weeks-old 

description of two black males in a black or blue Chevrolet was insufficient to 

stop two black males in a black Chevrolet, Rias, 524 F.2d at 119–21, and a 

five-week-old description of a man’s race, height, weight, hair style, and 

clothing was insufficient to stop someone matching it, Jones, 619 F.2d at 496, 

498, then the description of a Hispanic male who had once ridden a bicycle 

with large handlebars in a general area at some unknown time in the past 

5 See also 4 LaFave, supra note 3 (observing “it would be incorrect to assume that 

a wanted-man bulletin concerning a past crime need be no more specific than those 

descriptions often held to suffice as to stops made in the vicinity of a crime very recently 

committed” (citing Rias, 524 F.2d 118)). At oral argument, the government claimed there 

was an “ongoing situation” with “ongoing crime” because the subject is in a “constant, 

perpetual state of being wanted until he is captured.” O.A. Rec. 26:50–27:07, available at 

https://coa.circ5.dcn/OralArgRecordings/21/21-40091_1-5-2022.mp3. We disagree.

Even assuming there is a basis for such a theory, the government introduced no evidence 

about the crime for which the subject gang member was wanted or when the crime was 

committed. See id. at 24:25–24:45, 27:07–27:28.

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cannot justify the stop of Alvarez.6 To explain why this is so, we consider in 

detail each factor relied on by the government—the description of the subject 

and the bicycle, the location, and the officers’ knowledge of local gang 

activity.7

The subject’s physical description was too general and vague. The 

officers did not have a photograph and did not otherwise “know what [the 

suspect] looked like.” Other than race and sex, they knew of no descriptors—

age, height, weight, identifying marks, or clothing. See supra note 3; cf. United 

States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1975) (rejecting 

argument that “police bulletin relied upon was too vague and overbroad in 

its description of the wanted man” because it had “a picture of the wanted 

man as well as a description of his physical characteristics”). “Hispanic” has 

negligible predictive value here given Corpus Christi is predominantly

Hispanic or Latino.8 Put simply, the physical description “fit too many 

6 The government ignores our decisions in Jones and Rias. And at oral argument, 

the government could not identify any case that supports its position that the description 

supported reasonable suspicion. O.A. Rec. 17:43–18:18 (“We don’t have a best case for 

description.”). Contrary to the dissent’s claims, we have not misapplied Jones and Rias. 

Post at 3. Those cases directly show why the physical description here was inadequate to 

support the stop. Indeed, the dissent acknowledges that “Jones and Rias suggest only that 

the description of Alvarez, by itself, would be insufficient.” Post at 3. The dissent would 

distinguish those cases, however, by pointing to other information the government relies

on, as well as some information it does not. Post at 3–4. But, as we explain below, that other 

information was inadequate to justify the stop. So, contrary to the dissent, Jones and Rias

are “dispositive.” Post at 3.

7 Given our analysis of multiple factors, we disagree with our dissenting colleague 

that we ignore the “totality of the circumstances” and instead “narrowly” focus “solely” 

on the “suspect’s physical description.” Post at 1–4. In reality, the dissent disagrees with 

our assessment of the additional factors, to which we respond below. Moreover, the dissent 

adds another factor—the fleeing-the-police notion—which is unsupported by the record 

and has, in any event, been forfeited by the government. See infra pp. 16–17. 

8 Corpus Christi is 63.8% Hispanic or Latino. QuickFacts: Corpus Christi City, 

Texas, U.S. Census Bureau, 

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people[] to constitute particular, articulable facts on which to base reasonable 

suspicion.” Goodson, 202 F.3d at 737 (citing Jones, 619 F.2d at 497–98; and 

Rias, 524 F.3d at 121); see also, e.g., United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 98

(1st Cir. 2014) (observing a “physical description of a black man in dark, 

heavy clothing . . . would likely be insufficient to give rise to reasonable 

suspicion” because it “might fit a significant percentage of the local 

population on a late October day”).

The same is true of the bicycle. Other than “large handlebars,” the 

officers knew of no identifiers—color, make, model, condition, features, or 

style of handlebars. “Large handlebars” pales in comparison to vehicle 

descriptions that have created or contributed to reasonable suspicion.9

Furthermore, when asked if certain types of large handlebars were “more 

prevalent in that area,” Officer Deleon answered, “most bikes have regular 

handlebars. Those there . . . will stand out . . . because they’re not normal.” 

“But the success or failure of a suppression motion cannot hinge on an officer 

saying, in essence, ‘I know it when I see it.’” United States v. Drakeford, 992 

F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 2021) (Wynn, J., concurring). Unable to point to 

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/corpuschristicitytexas (last visited July 13, 2022); see 

Hollinger v. Home State Mut. Ins. Co., 654 F.3d 564, 571–72 (5th Cir. 2011) (“United States 

census data is an appropriate and frequent subject of judicial notice.” (collecting cases)).

9 See United States v. Jaquez, 421 F.3d 338, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) 

(holding “red vehicle” was too “sparse and broadly generic” to stop a red car in vicinity 

of shooting fifteen minutes later because officer had no other “particular information about 

the vehicle, such as its make or model, or any description of its occupant(s)”); cf. United 

States v. Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 347–48 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding stop where person 

“matched the physical description” of bank robber and “was approaching a car that 

matched a detailed description of the getaway vehicle and bore the same license plate,” 

specifically “a late 1980s, black Chevrolet Cavalier with Tennessee license plate 

600TTP”); cf. also United States v. Brown, 558 F. App’x 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2014) (per 

curiam) (upholding stop where victim identified truck as “look[ing] just like” suspects’ 

truck and it “matched the make, model, and color” and had the same license plates).

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specific identifiers, the government has not shown that Alvarez’s handlebars

were sufficiently distinctive to create reasonable suspicion. See United States 

v. Jones, 998 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding “flimsy” description of 

two black men in black Mercedes did not support stop “based solely on the 

color and manufacturer of the car, and the fact that it contained two black 

men,” particularly with no showing that “the sight of two African–

Americans in a black Mercedes was a highly unusual event”).

10

The location fares no better. The officers knew only that the subject 

had previously been seen in the Leopard–Up River area and “may be” there. 

They had no information whatsoever about where in the area he had been 

seen11 or when he had been seen there—whether “that day,” “the day 

10 The dissent argues we should defer to Officer Deleon’s view that the descriptor

“large handlebars” was specific enough to equate Alvarez’s bicycle with the wanted 

suspect’s. Post at 4. We disagree. As explained, this vague description is nowhere close to 

the kind of vehicle descriptions that would support reasonable suspicion. And, contrary to 

the dissent, there is nothing “illogical” in relying on automobile cases. Post at 4. If the 

description of a “red vehicle” involved in a shooting fifteen minutes ago is too generic to 

support stopping any red car in the vicinity, Jaquez, 421 F.3d at 340–41, then so is the 

description of a bicycle with “large handlebars” from an unknown time in the past.

Moreover, the dissent offers no basis in the record for speculating that bicycles 

“are far less numerous—and therefore more readily identifiable—on the streets that 

automobiles” or that “large handlebars” are “more akin to a very distinctive hood 

ornament or wheel covers” than to a car’s color, make, or model. Post at 4. Moreover, as 

discussed at oral argument, the government could have bolstered the record on any of these 

points—say, by putting into the record what the suspect’s bicycle looked like, why it was 

similar to Alvarez’s, or why “large handlebar” bikes are distinctive—but it failed to do so. 

O.A. Rec. 27:08–27:29, 30:12–30:22, 33:38–33:57 (panel members questioning government 

about “shortcomings” in the record); see, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376, 

382 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding most “indicative of a stop lacking in reasonable suspicion . . . in 

this case . . . is what is missing from the record”); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 

282, 287–88 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing denial of suppression motion based on government’s 

failure to introduce evidence of relevant reasonable-suspicion factors).

11 The government claims the location was a “narrow geographic area.” O.A. Rec. 

16:42–50, 17:16–23. Despite admitting “the record describes [the area] in different ways,” 

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before,” or “the week before.” Nor did they have reason to believe he might

still have been in the area—for example, if he resided there.

12 See Jones, 619 

F.2d at 498 (finding description of suspect from robbery five weeks ago

“stale”); see also United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 420 (7th Cir. 1985)

(discussing staleness of information in police bulletins).

13

The government also relies on the area being known by the officers for 

gang activity. It is true that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant 

characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are 

sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation,” and so “the fact that 

the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual 

considerations in a Terry analysis.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Adams 

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972)); see also United States v. 

Flowers, 6 F.4th 651, 656 (5th Cir. 2021) (same) (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 

124). Still, “[a]n individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal 

it insists “the most specific description is that it was just . . . the intersection of Leopard 

and Up River.” Id. at 16:50–17:06. The record does not limit the description to the 

intersection, however. Officer Deleon loosely described the area, and before spotting 

Alvarez, the officers had been looking for the subject in a nearby apartment complex.

12 The district court erroneously stated the subject was “known to reside” in the 

area. Alvarez, 2020 WL 5984078, at *2. This finding is wholly unsupported by the record. 

See United States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2005). The government 

confirmed this at oral argument. See O.A. Rec. 35:22–36:06 (“There was no testimony 

specifically to [the subject’s] residence.”). The officers knew only that the subject had been 

seen in the area and so they believed he might be there.

13 The dissent claims we require officers to “know exactly when and where the 

subject had previously been seen.” Post at 5. Our opinion imposes no such requirement. All 

we say is that the bare-bones location the officers had—that a Hispanic male was once seen 

riding a bike near an intersection at some unspecified time in the past—was not enough to 

create reasonable suspicion. One strains even to call this information “stale” because there 

is nothing in the record to suggest when the suspect was last seen near the intersection (a 

week ago? a month? a year? three years?). Cf., e.g., Jones, 619 F.2d at 498 (for purposes of 

a Terry stop, contrasting a five-week-old “incomplete and stale description of a suspect” 

with “timely information of criminal activity”).

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activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized 

suspicion that the person is committing a crime.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 

(citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)). Something more is needed—

some observed fact beyond the person’s mere presence that gives an officer 

“reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to 

be engaged in criminal activity.” Vickers, 540 F.3d at 361 (quoting Hensley, 

469 U.S. at 227).14 That is where the government stumbles. Beyond 

Alvarez’s presence in a high-crime area, it points to no fact suggesting that 

Alvarez “ha[d] been, [wa]s, or [wa]s about to be engaged in criminal 

activity.” Ibid.

15

14 See also, e.g., McKinney, 980 F.3d at 492 (holding officers’ awareness of recent

gang shootings in area did not create reasonable suspicion because they had no “articulable 

suspicion about a connection between the person [stopped] and those crimes”); Thomas, 

997 F.3d at 610 (Terry stop justified if officers have “a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity,” a standard satisfied “if 

specific and articulable facts give rise to a suspicion that the person stopped has committed, 

is committing, or is about to commit a crime” (internal quotation marks omitted) (first 

quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981); then quoting United States v. 

Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2017))). 

15 The dissent incorrectly asserts that our analysis “shrink[s] the boundaries 

articulated in Wardlow and disabl[es] officers from responding in high crime areas.” Post at 

6. To the contrary, we recognize—along with the Supreme Court and our precedents—

that a person’s presence in a high crime area, while relevant, is not enough standing alone to 

create reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. Something more is needed, and on this record, 

it is lacking.

The dissent is also mistaken that we “did not” mention that “Alvarez’s stop was 

the result of a coordinated ‘roundup’ of gang members.” Post at 7. Literally the first words 

of our opinion are: “During a roundup of gang members with outstanding warrants . . . .” 

Supra p. 1. Nor does our opinion slight the “enhanced danger to police officers” during 

gang roundups, as the dissent claims. Post at 7. This case has nothing to do with officers’ 

settled right to frisk suspects who have been properly stopped. Alvarez does not even 

contest the frisk. This case is solely about whether the stop preceding the frisk was 

supported by reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 

(2009) (“[T]o proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that 

the person stopped is armed and dangerous.” (emphasis added)). The dissent’s cited cases 

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Finally, our dissenting colleague asserts that the stop was justified 

because Alvarez “fle[d],” “abscond[ed],” and “deliberately evaded” the 

officers. Post at 2, 4 n.6, 8. Not so. If any of that were true, this case would be 

governed by Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119. There, Wardlow—while 

standing in an area known for drug dealing and “holding an opaque bag”—

saw patrolling officers and “fled,” running through a “gangway and an alley” 

before being stopped. Id. at 121–22. This “[h]eadlong flight” was, the Court 

explained, “the consummate act of evasion[,]” justifying the officers “in 

suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 124–25.

Wardlow is nothing like this case. Alvarez was not “absconding” or 

“fleeing” from the police—he was already riding his bicycle when Officer 

Deleon spotted him, and he ignored the officers and kept riding when asked 

to stop. He had every right to do so. See id. at 125 (“[W]hen an officer, 

without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, 

the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.” 

(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983))). So, “this is not a case of 

headlong flight at the mere sight of a police officer.” Hill, 752 F.3d at 1037 

(cleaned up). The dissent is thus mistaken in saying our analysis “is in serious 

tension” with Wardlow or any other case involving unprovoked flight or 

evasive behavior. Post at 4 n.6, 5. If there were any doubt, the government 

conceded at oral argument that this case is not Wardlow. See O.A. Rec. 19:25–

19:34 (“I understand this is not the same as flight. I am not suggesting this 

support the basic distinction between a stop and a frisk, as each case primarily concerned a 

frisk. See post at 7–8 (citing United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1576 (5th Cir. 1992) (en 

banc); Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 844; and United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 

1993)). No case the dissent cites supports the proposition that, during a gang roundup, the 

Terry standard for initiating a stop should be relaxed.

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case had the same facts such as Illinois v. Wardlow, where unprovoked flight 

was enough.”).

C.

The government further defends the stop by arguing the description, 

location, and gang activity were “identified in the information obtained by 

the officers during the gang roundup investigation,” citing the collective 

knowledge doctrine. We disagree.

“[R]easonable suspicion can vest through the collective knowledge of 

the officers involved in the search and seizure operation.” United States v. 

Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2013). This doctrine applies “so long as 

there is ‘some degree of communication’ between the acting officer and the 

officer who has knowledge of the necessary facts.” Ibid. (quoting United 

States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007)). Officers may conduct an 

investigatory stop in reliance on information issued through police channels, 

such as a wanted flyer or bulletin or a radio dispatch, if the information is 

based on “articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted 

person has committed an offense.” Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232 (flyer or 

bulletin); see, e.g., United States v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d 1216, 1217–18 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (radio dispatch). But if the information “has been issued in the absence 

of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective reliance upon it violates 

the Fourth Amendment.” Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232.

Officer Deleon’s team could rely on the information in the round-up 

packet only “if the police who issued [the packet] possessed a reasonable 

suspicion justifying a stop.” Id. at 233. But Deleon did not know who 

provided the information in the packet, and he only vaguely described the 

investigation leading up to the round-up. And the government did not 

introduce into evidence the packet or any details about the origin or 

timeliness of the information therein to show that it was premised on 

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articulable facts. See O.A. Rec. 29:20–30:45. As our dissenting colleague

remarked at oral argument, “the government didn’t offer the packet into 

[evidence]. That is incredibly derelict . . . .” Id. at 30:12–30:22; see also id. at 

33:54–33:57 (government conceding “[t]here are certainly shortcomings” in 

the record).

We do not blindly accept officers’ reliance on information obtained 

through police channels; the government must substantiate the basis of the

information. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232–33; United States v. Maryland, 479 

F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1973). Because the government here has not 

established reasonable suspicion that could have been transferred between 

officers, the collective knowledge doctrine does not apply. Cf. United States 

v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting “if [Agent] 

Mattas possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the van when he 

made his call to the dispatcher, then the actual stop by the [police] officers, 

acting on the dispatcher’s bulletin, was also supported by reasonable 

suspicion” (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232)).

16

16 The dissent asserts that our discussion of the collective knowledge doctrine is 

“dicta” because “[t]he government hardly broached, and in fact, disclaimed its reliance on 

this doctrine.” Post at 9. That is incorrect. Collective knowledge has always been an issue 

in this case. The district court’s order denying the motion to suppress relied, in part, on 

the “collective knowledge and experience of the officer or officers.” Alvarez, 2020 WL 

5984078, at *2 (citation omitted). And the government’s brief to our court sought to justify 

the stop, in part, based on the collective knowledge doctrine. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee 

at 20–21, United States v. Alvarez, No. 21-40091 (5th Cir. July 7, 2021), ECF No. 35 (relying 

on the officers’ “collective knowledge” and citing authorities); id. at 22–23 (arguing stop 

was justified based on officers’ possession of “packets of information of wanted subjects,” 

the suspect “was collectively identified as a Hispanic male,” and the “area is collectively 

known by law enforcement for gang activity”). Finally, the government never “disclaimed 

its reliance” on the doctrine; to the contrary, when asked about the doctrine at oral 

argument, the government responded, “Collective knowledge is certainly important in this 

case, and it’s certainly relevant.” O.A. Rec. 29:15–29:35. 

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IV.

We REVERSE the denial of Alvarez’s motion to suppress, 

VACATE his conviction and sentence, and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion “takes into account the 

totality of circumstances—the whole picture.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 

1183, 1191 (2020) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 

134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014)). Despite this clear standard, the majority

opinion narrowly focuses on the suspect’s physical description while 

disregarding several additional facts that supported the Terry stop of Alvarez 

in this case. The majority’s unduly restrictive view of reasonable suspicion 

is inconsistent with our precedent and that of the Supreme Court. I 

respectfully dissent.

BACKGROUND

In the summer of 2019, several law enforcement agencies combined 

resources to conduct a state-wide “roundup” of gang members with 

outstanding warrants. Officer Martin Deleon, an experienced police officer 

with 32 years on the force, 28 of them in the Police Gang Unit, led part of this 

effort. Teams of officers were provided packets of subjects, divided based on 

geographic location. Such “roundups” are more dangerous than regular 

patrol assignments because the officers are specifically pursuing criminals 

who are known to be violent.

One of the suspects on Officer Deleon’s list was described as a 

“Hispanic male” on a “bicycle with large handlebars” who had been 

previously seen in the Leopard and Up River area and who “had run from 

officers in the past” on his bicycle. While on patrol for these wanted gang 

members, Officer Deleon and his partner spotted a Hispanic male riding a 

bicycle with unusually large handlebars on the sidewalk on Up River Road 

traveling toward Leopard, an area known for gang activity. Officer Deleon

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also observed that the individual was riding his bicycle on the public 

sidewalks, which is illegal by ordinance in many places in Corpus Christi.1

The officers first attempted to make contact with the man (later 

determined to be Alvarez) by pulling up next to him, honking, and telling him 

to “stop” and “pull over.” Alvarez refused to do so, and at one point asked 

“why?” while riding on. The officers drove next to him for about seventyfive yards, giving him “a few chances to stop.” Eventually, the officers cut 

him off by pulling the patrol car into a driveway entrance, blocking his ability 

to continue biking on the sidewalk. A protective frisk uncovered a handgun 

and ammunition on Alvarez, a convicted felon. Thus was Alvarez charged 

with a federal gun violation.

Based on these facts, the majority determines that the officers acted 

solely based on a general, imprecise physical description of the suspect. See 

generally Maj. Op. 8–13. Little attention, if any, is given to the collective 

features of the stop, including that it (i) was part of a systematic “roundup” 

of gang members with outstanding warrants, which involved enhanced 

danger to police officers and increased risk of violence; (ii) was conducted in 

an area known for gang activity; (iii) was performed by a seasoned police 

officer with 28 years of experience in the gang unit; and (iv) involved the 

search for a Hispanic male, riding a bicycle with unusually large handlebars 

in the Leopard and Up River area. Importantly, the sought-after suspect also 

had a history of absconding from the police on his bicycle, behavior replicated 

when Alvarez deliberately evaded their requests to stop for seventy-five 

yards.

1 During the suppression hearing, the defense established that the ordinance did 

not apply to the area where the officers stopped Alvarez. Officer Deleon testified that he 

was unaware that this area was not covered by the ordinance when he stopped Alvarez.

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DISCUSSION

Reasonable suspicion is a “low threshold,” which requires only a 

“minimal level of objective justification.” United States v. Castillo, 804 F.3d 

361, 367 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 

109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)). “[T]he level of suspicion the standard requires is 

considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the 

evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Glover, 

140 S. Ct. at 1187 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority 

acknowledges this low bar and even cites several “relevant facts and 

considerations” in the calculus,

2 noting that otherwise innocent facts, when 

viewed in isolation, can collectively amount to reasonable suspicion. United 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S. Ct. 744, 753 (2002). Nonetheless, 

the majority overrules the district court and finds no reasonable view of the 

record that provided the officers here with anything more than a hunch. But 

see United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) 

(“[T]his court ‘should uphold the district court’s ruling to deny the 

suppression motion if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support 

it.’” (quoting United States v. Register, 931 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1991))). 

The majority opinion errs for several reasons.

First, neither of the cases principally relied on by the majority compels 

rejecting the basis for Alvarez’s stop. In each case, unlike the present one, 

the only information the police articulated to justify reasonable suspicion was

general physical descriptions. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 

496–98 (5th Cir. 1980) (when officers act solely “on the basis of an 

2 The facts and considerations include “a description of a suspect, a suspect’s 

location and proximity to known or reported criminal activity, the timeliness of information 

or the stop, a suspect’s behavior, and the officer’s experience.” Maj. Op. at 7. By my 

reckoning, as will be shown, four of those five factors are present here.

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incomplete and stale description of a suspect that could, plainly, have fit 

many people,” there is no “reasonable” suspicion); United States v. Rias,

524 F.2d 118, 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1975) (suspicion arising exclusively from the 

description of “two black males in a black or blue Chevrolet [who] were 

suspects in a series of . . . robberies,” which was “so tenuous as to provide 

virtually no grounds whatsoever for suspicion”). Id. at 121.

These cases furnish no authority for overturning the considered view 

of the district judge after a hearing. Far from being dispositive, Jones and 

Rias suggest only that the description of Alvarez, by itself, would be 

insufficient.3 But as discussed below, Alvarez’s physical description had to 

be considered along with his behavior, the location in which he was riding, 

Officer DeLeon’s experience, and the high-stakes nature of the officers’ 

activity. “In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, a court may not 

consider the relevant factors in isolation from each other.” United States v. 

Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005).4

Next, the totality of circumstances strongly supports the Terry stop of 

Alvarez. Obviously, Alvarez matched the description of a Hispanic male 

3 The majority draws from these two cases an additional requirement that the 

police should not be able to claim reasonable suspicion when the suspect’s description has 

become “stale” by passage of time following the crime. Maj. Op. at 10–11, 13–14. There 

is no evidence in the record that Alvarez’s warrant, much less the description of his unusual 

bike and behavior toward police, was “stale.” That the majority construes this gap in the 

record against the government and the district court’s judgment is characteristic of its 

reasoning in this case, but flouts the requirement that, on appeal, all “evidence and 

inferences . . . are reviewed in the light most favorable to the Government as the prevailing 

party.” United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2012).

4 See also United States v. Tuggle, 284 F. App’x 218, 223–26 (5th Cir. 2008)

(unpublished) (reversing a district court for “erroneously split[ting] the evidence” rather 

than “objectively examin[ing] the ‘totality of the circumstances’”); United States v. 

Lawson, 233 F. App’x 367, 370–71 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“Each factor by itself 

may not justify a Terry stop; but, the totality of these factors, along with [the defendant’s] 

unprovoked flight, provided the Officer with reasonable suspicion to detain him.”).

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riding a bicycle with large handlebars. And his conduct in continuing to ride 

his bike while ignoring the officers until they blocked his path was consistent 

with the gang member’s evasive behavior as described in the officers’ 

briefing. The majority, however, understates or disregards other significant 

features about the stop, such as its geographic location, Officer DeLeon’s 

relevant experience, and the nature of the officers’ pursuit. The officers’ 

apprehension of Alvarez was based on all these factors.

The majority belittles the officer’s explanation that the large 

handlebars on Alvarez’s bike “will stand out . . . because they’re not 

normal.” But the majority’s only support for denying the relevance of this 

fact is by analogy with cases about automobile descriptions. Maj. Op. at 12 

n.9. This is illogical. Bicycles are plainly distinct from automobiles. They 

have no license plates and are far less numerous—and therefore more readily 

identifiable—on the streets than automobiles. Moreover, unlike one case’s 

insufficient generic description of a “black Mercedes,” “large handlebars” 

on a bike are more akin to a very distinctive hood ornament or wheel covers 

than an automobile’s make and color.5 Furthermore, discounting the 

officer’s experience borne of practical observation is contrary to the record 

and applicable law.

Contrary to the majority’s conclusions, Alvarez’s location was 

significant because he was found in the general vicinity where the subject of 

the warrant “had been seen” and this area was also independently known for 

gang activity. Thus, his location both corroborated the description provided 

to the officers and afforded the officers the right to consider the heightened 

5 The majority asserts that there is “no basis” on which to differentiate the basic 

features of automobiles from the basic features of bicycles. Maj. Op. at 13 n.10. But what 

the majority calls “speculat[ion]” some would call common sense.

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criminal activity in that area.6 United States v. Flowers, 6 F.4th 651, 656 (5th 

Cir. 2021) (“[T]he fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area is among 

the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” (quoting Illinois 

v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000))).

Yet the majority erroneously discredits reliance on the high-crime 

characteristics of the location for either purpose. Without citing any 

authority, it determines that, because the officers did not know exactly when 

and where the subject had previously been seen within the “Leopard-Up 

River area,” the fact that Alvarez was found in this admittedly geographically 

confined area was insignificant. Again, this conclusion flouts the 

requirement that appellate courts “review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government as the prevailing party.” Michelletti, 13 F.3d at

6 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly upheld findings of reasonable suspicion where 

defendants absconded from law enforcement in high crime areas. See, e.g., United States v. 

Darrell, 945 F.3d 929, 933–35 (5th Cir. 2019) (upon spotting law enforcement, defendant 

walked away quickly outside of a house known for crime); United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 

200, 207 (5th Cir. 1993) (defendant walked away after spotting a squad car pulling up in a 

high crime area); Tuggle, 284 F. App’x at 224–26 (defendant “walked briskly away from 

the officers” in a high crime neighborhood); Lawson, 233 F. App’x at 370 (defendant ran 

away when approached by law enforcement in a high crime neighborhood).

Unfortunately, the majority, following its pattern of construing all factual 

inferences against the government, concludes that Alvarez’s evasion was emphatically not

an attempt to abscond from the police. But our case law supports a broad definition of 

“evasion” for purposes of reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Darrell, 945 F.3d at 935–36, 939 

(where defendant merely “walked away from the police and never left their field of vision,”

such evasive behavior in a high-crime area was sufficient to warrant a stop); Sanders, 

994 F.2d at 207 (holding that “[o]nce [defendant] saw the squad car pulling up . . . and 

started to walk away,” the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him and “did not act 

unreasonably in immediately drawing his weapon when he confronted” him).” In Sanders, 

this court added that walking away “can be used by a criminal to prepare for a violent 

confrontation by surreptitiously retrieving a concealed weapon then spinning back around 

to face the officer and use the weapon against him,” and the officers feared for their own 

safety and the safety of the public. Id. But this majority ignores our precedent merely 

because the confrontation with Alvarez did not result in “headlong flight.”

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841. Beyond that, the majority rejects the significance of this high crime 

neighborhood because the government mentioned “no fact suggesting that 

Alvarez ‘had been, was, or was about to be engaged in criminal activity.’” 

Maj. Op. at 15 (quoting United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 

2008)). But it is unclear what the majority requires the officers to have 

observed beyond the circumstances present in this case. On the contrary, 

this court has held that evading officers in an area known for crime is enough 

to meet the “low threshold” for a brief investigatory stop. United States v. 

Darrell, 945 F.3d 929, 933–35 (5th Cir. 2019).

7

Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent is in serious tension with the 

majority’s analysis. In Wardlow, the officers had reasonable suspicion after 

observing the defendant flee from police officers in an area known for heavy 

narcotics trafficking. 528 U.S. at 124–25, 120 S. Ct. at 676. That is all. The 

officers witnessed nothing else on the ground that would have connected the 

defendant to narcotics trafficking. Yet, the Supreme Court explained:

[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics 

of a location in determining whether the circumstances are 

sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.

Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop 

occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual 

considerations in a Terry analysis.

Id. at 124 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–148, 92 S. Ct. 

1921, 1922–24 (1972)). The Court further stated that conduct which is 

“ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation” can justify a Terry

stop. Id. at 125. In fact, “Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop 

innocent people.” Id. at 126; see also Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S. Ct. at

753 (“A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not 

7 See supra note 6.

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rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”). But the majority construes

the Fourth Amendment to require more, shrinking the boundaries articulated 

in Wardlow and disabling officers from responding in high crime areas (and 

thereby endangering law-abiding residents) absent some obscure “observed 

fact.”8 Also important is that Terry does not require “particularized 

suspicion of a particular, specific crime, as distinguished from a particular 

and objective basis for suspecting the detained person or persons of some 

criminal activity.” United States v. Pack, 622 F.3d 383, 383 (5th Cir. 2010)

(collecting cases). Otherwise, an officer’s reasonable suspicion elevates to 

probable cause.

The majority’s analysis fails to consider other collective features of 

the stop, including Officer Deleon’s extensive experience in the Police Gang 

Unit. “In assessing reasonableness, ‘due weight’ must be given to the facts 

and inferences viewed ‘in light of [the officer’s] experience.’” Michelletti, 

13 F.3d at 841 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883

(1968)). The Court in Terry emphasized the importance of affording some 

deference to an officer’s seasoned judgment when assessing his suspicion

8 The majority cites United States v. McKinney in support of its analysis, which is 

wholly inapposite. 980 F.3d 485, 492 (5th Cir. 2020). There, this court affirmed the 

uncontroversial rule that the mere fact that an area is known for a specific type of criminal 

activity does not support a reasonable inference that anybody found in that area is engaged 

in crime. But it is also uncontroversial that officers may consider “the relevant 

characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently 

suspicious.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676.

Also note that McKinney rejected a denial of suppression on a bare record and 

remanded the case for factfinding. 980 F.3d at 496–97. Because there had not been an 

evidentiary hearing, the district court made “no credibility determinations” and “the 

record before [the appellate court was] insufficient to determine whether the officers had 

reasonable suspicion.” Id. Whereas here, the district court’s findings are shielded by clear 

error. See also infra note 10.

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post hoc.

9

 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S. Ct. at 1875 (“[W]e approach the issues in this 

case mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the 

myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other 

on the street.”). At the suppression hearing,10 Officer Deleon testified that, 

based on his experience, it was unusual behavior for an individual to not pull 

over voluntarily after being asked to stop by the police. Further, he knew 

from his extensive law enforcement experience with gangs that the LeopardUp River area was known for gang activity. And because he had previous

experience with criminals on bicycles, he was aware that the handlebars on 

Alvarez’s bicycle were unusually large compared to the typical bicycle. Yet, 

the officer’s underlying qualities are afforded no credit in the majority’s 

analysis.

Finally, it is important to reiterate, since the majority did not,11 that 

Alvarez’s stop was the result of a coordinated “roundup” of gang members. 

9 The Supreme Court has repeated this admonishment since Terry. See, e.g.,

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996) (“[W]e hasten to 

point out that a reviewing court should take care . . . to give due weight to inferences drawn 

from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.”); id. (“[A] police 

officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise.”); Arvizu, 

534 U.S. at 273, 122 S. Ct. at 750–51 (“[In assessing whether there is reasonable suspicion, 

officers are allowed] to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make 

inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that 

might well elude an untrained person.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

10 Special deference is owed to the trial court where, as here, the trial court heard 

live oral testimony. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700, 116 S. Ct. at 1663 (“An appeals court should 

give due weight to a trial court’s finding that the officer was credible and the inference was 

reasonable.”); United States v. Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 

142 S. Ct. 910 (2022) (“Our review is particularly deferential where denial of the 

suppression motion is based on live oral testimony because the judge had the opportunity 

to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” (quoting United States v. Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606, 

612 (5th Cir. 2011))).

11 Cf. Maj. Op. at 15–16 n.15. The majority defensively contends that it did in fact 

note that the stop was a result of a roundup of gang members. But the point is not the 

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Officer Deleon testified that such “roundups” often involve enhanced 

danger to police officers and increased risk of violence because officers are 

targeting known criminals. Officer and citizen safety have consistently been 

relevant considerations in the reasonable suspicion analysis. Reviewing 

courts must “look to the reality that the setting in which the police officer 

acts may reasonably and significantly affect his decisional calculus.” United 

States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1576 (5th Cir. 1992). And when an officer is 

unsure whether an individual is dangerous, a “minimally intrusive action” to 

ensure the safety of the public and the officers does not constitute a 

constitutional violation. Id. See also Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 844 (“Surely the 

constitutional legitimacy of a brief patdown . . . may and should reflect the 

horrendously more violent society in which we live, twenty-five years after 

Terry.”); United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1993). The 

heightened danger inherent in this encounter should be considered among 

the factors supporting the prophylactic reasonableness of the officer’s 

suspicion.

The majority suggests that officers can only consider danger to police 

officers and the public when determining whether to conduct a “frisk.” Maj. 

Op. at 15–16 n.15. On the contrary, our precedent does not limit safety 

concerns to frisks.12 Here, based on what Officer Deleon knew at the time 

majority’s cursory reference to the fact of the round-up, but the absence of that fact from 

the majority’s assessment of reasonable suspicion.

12 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680–84 (1985) (authorizing 

Terry stops for “investigation of past crimes,” particularly in the context of “felonies or 

crimes involving a threat to public safety”); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272, 120 S. Ct. 

1375, 1379 (2000) (acknowledging that “[o]ur decisions recognize the serious threat that 

armed criminals pose to public safety” while declining to modify the standard for a Terry

stop for illegal gun possession); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356, 135 S. Ct. 

1609, 1616 (2015) (noting that “the government’s officer safety interest stems from the 

mission of the stop itself” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Darrell, 945 F.3d at 936 

(considering that “retreat may be a tactical strategy for an armed suspect who wishes to 

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and based on his experience dealing with gang members, he reasonably 

believed that Alvarez matched the description of a wanted criminal who was 

evading law enforcement in a high crime area where he had previously been 

seen. Without acknowledging the heightened risk, the majority faults

Officer Deleon for conducting an investigatory stop to dispel his suspicion 

that this man was wanted and dangerous rather than just letting him flee.13 

Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S. Ct. at 1923 (“A brief stop of a suspicious 

individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo 

momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in 

light of the facts known to the officer at the time.”); Glover, 140 S. Ct. at

1189–90 (officers may use principles of common sense to make inferences 

supporting suspicion).

harm the police” when holding that a stop was justified); McKinney, 980 F.3d at 495 

(considering whether the “officers . . . fear[ed] for their safety” before holding that there 

was no reasonable suspicion for the stop). See also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 

Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 197, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2465 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)(“At 

the same time, it recognized that in certain circumstances, public safety might require a 

limited ‘seizure,’ or stop, of an individual against his will.”).

13 The Supreme Court has characterized the search for wanted criminals as a 

“strong government interest.”

[W]here police have been unable to locate a person suspected of 

involvement in a past crime, the ability to briefly stop that person, ask 

questions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause 

promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing 

offenders to justice . . . . Particularly in the context of felonies or crimes 

involving a threat to public safety, it is in the public interest that the crime 

be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible. The law 

enforcement interests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the 

individual’s interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more 

extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or ongoing 

crimes.

Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229, 105 S. Ct. at 680.

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Finally, and gratuitously, the majority sua sponte concludes that the 

descriptive information provided to Officer Deleon and his partner via the 

“roundup” packets could not contribute to reasonable suspicion because the 

government did not establish that any prior suspicion “vested” via the 

collective knowledge doctrine. The majority’s gratuitous ruling is useless 

dicta. The government hardly broached, and in fact, disclaimed its reliance 

on this doctrine, and Alvarez never raised this argument in the district court 

or on appeal.14 In fact, if Alvarez had raised this argument on appeal, we 

would likely deem it forfeited. See Martinez v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 

300 F.3d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 2002). Yet, this discourse illustrates the 

majority’s tendency to view the record before us in the light least favorable to 

the government.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

14 The government briefly acknowledges the collective knowledge doctrine in 

passing, but importantly, Alvarez does not. Furthermore, the district court never 

considered the collective knowledge doctrine because the theory was never presented

below. United States v. Alvarez, No. 2:20-CR-41, 2020 WL 5984078, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 

Oct. 8, 2020). The majority asserts that the district court “relied, in part,” on the 

collective knowledge doctrine, but the only mention of “collective knowledge” in the 

district court’s opinion is within its articulation of the standard for reasonable suspicion. 

Specifically, it innocuously noted that “a court must look to the ‘totality of the 

circumstances and the collective knowledge and experience of the officer or officers.’” Id.

(citing United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631–32 (5th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). 

(Estrada was also not about the collective knowledge doctrine.) That is the full extent of the 

district court’s consideration of the matter.

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