After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is *

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 14, 2008*

Decided August 18, 2008

Before

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08-1446

STEVE PIGG,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ALAN FINNAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Terre Haute Division.

No. 07 C 209

Larry J. McKinney, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Guards at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility searched inmate Steve Pigg and

his cell. Mr. Pigg had a bag of loose tobacco, and there was a can of chewing tobacco in the

cell. After the search Mr. Pigg admitted that the loose tobacco was his. Mr. Pigg was

charged with a Class B offense under § B-245 of the Indiana Adult Disciplinary Procedures

for unauthorized possession of “more than one (1) cigarette, any tobacco, tobacco

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-1446 Page 2

associated products or unauthorized tobacco substitute products.” At his disciplinary

hearing, Mr. Pigg apparently tried, but was not permitted, to introduce a written statement

from his cellmate, who claimed responsibility for the “pinch of snuff” found in the cell. 

Mr. Pigg told the board that the bag of tobacco was his, but said there wasn’t enough loose

tobacco to roll more than one cigarette. The board found Mr. Pigg guilty of the violation

and sanctioned him with a loss of 60 days earned credit time. In his administrative appeal,

Mr. Pigg argued unsuccessfully that the board should have considered his cellmate’s

statement, and he makes the same claim in the petition for habeas corpus he filed in the

district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court, reasoning that Mr. Pigg was not

denied due process because his cellmate’s statement is not exculpatory, denied the petition. 

On appeal Mr. Pigg presses his argument that the statement is relevant to the proper

classification of his infraction and thus should have been considered by the board.

Our review is de novo. Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2002). Indiana

inmates have a liberty interest in their good-time credits, and prison officials may not

revoke them without due process. Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004); Piggie

v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2002). Due process requires, as relevant here, that

prisoners have the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003). 

It is not clear that Mr. Pigg even offered his cellmate’s statement at the disciplinary

hearing; he says he did, so at this stage we accept his representation as true. But assuming

he did, any error on the board’s part was harmless. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d at 666 (7th

Cir. 2003). In his written statement the cellmate acknowledges ownership of the “pinch of

snuff,” while at the same time insisting that the “cigarette” found by the guards was

Mr. Pigg’s. Even viewing this statement in the most generous possible light, it serves to

incriminate, rather than exculpate. Mr. Pigg argues that the cellmate’s statement supports

his contention that only the tobacco in the bag belonged to him and that the amount of

loose tobacco was equivalent to one cigarette. Therefore, reasons Mr. Pigg, he is guilty, not

of violating § B-245, but of a lesser Class C offense. See ADULT DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES §

C-369. But there are a couple of problems with Mr. Pigg’s argument. First, § B-245

provides that an inmate commits a Class B offense by “use or possession of more than one

(1) cigarette, any tobacco, tobacco associated products or unauthorized tobacco substitute

products.” The state argues that the amount of tobacco is irrelevant because possession of

any loose tobacco instead of an actual cigarette violates the proscription. This

interpretation fits the language of § B-245, and Mr. Pigg does nothing to convince us to

adopt any other interpretation. Second, even if the chewing tobacco did not belong to

Mr. Pigg, it was found in his bunk. Prison disciplinary decisions must be supported by

“some evidence.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007). When only a few

inmates have access to the place contraband is found, constructive possession is “some
No. 08-1446 Page 3

evidence” sufficient to sustain a disciplinary conviction. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d

341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992); Mason v. Sargent, 898 F.2d 679, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1990). Because the

cellmate’s statement would not have changed the outcome of Mr. Pigg’s case, any error in

refusing to admit it was harmless, and the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.