### F I LE D U. S . COURT OF AP PE ALS E LEVE NTH CI RCUI T Ap r i l 6, 2005 T HOM AS K. KAHN C L E RK [ P UB L I S H]
I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 04- 12630 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D. C
. Do c k e tNo . 0 3
- 0 0 2 1 6
- C R
- T
- 1 7
- E AJ U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif f
- A p p e lle e , v ersu s M I G U E L O R D U N O
- M I R E L E S , D e f e n d a n t- A p p e lla n t.

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f ort he M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( A p r i l 6, 2005) B efo re B IR C H , B A R K E T T an d M A R C U S , C i rcu i tJu d g es. M A R C U S , C i rc ui tJudg e: M i gue l O r duno- M i r e l e s a ppe a l s hi s 46- m onth s e nt e nc e , i m pos e d aft e rhe pl e d gui l t y t o i l l e ga l l y r eent e r i ng t he U ni t e d S t a t e s a f t e rbe i ng de por t e d s ubs e que nt2

t o an a gg r a va t e d f

e l on y c on vi c t i on , i n v i ol a t i on of 8 U
. S. C. § 1 32 6( a ) a nd ( b) ( 2). O n a p p e a l, h e p r e s e n ts th e f o llo w in g a r g u m e n ts : ( 1 ) th e d is tr ic t c o u r t e r r e d w h e n it fo u n d t h ath e p rev i o u sl y w as d e p o r te d a f t er a co n v i ct i o n fo r a fel o n y t h ati s a “c r im e o f

v io le n c e ,” th u s q u a lif

y in g h im f

o ra 1 6
- le v e l e n h a n c e m e n t p u r s u a n t to U . S
. S
. G
. § 2 L 1. 2(b)(1)(A ), and (2) t he § 2 L 1. 2(b)(1)(A ) e nh ance m entw as
u n c o n s titu tio n a l b e c a u s e it w a s b a s e d o n f a c t s th a t w e r e n e ith e rc h a r g e d in h is i n d i c t me n tn o rp r o v e n t o a j u r y , i n v i ol a t i o n o f Bl a k e l y v . W a s h i n g t o n , 5 4 2 U . S.

__ , 12 4 S
. C t . 25 31 , 15 9 L
. E d. 2d 40 3 (20 04 ), w hi ch w as ext ended to the fe dera l S e n te n c in g G u id e lin e s r e c e n tly in U n ite d S ta te s v . B o o k e r , 5 4 3 U .S . _

_ , 1 2 5 S . C t. 73 8 (20 05 ). W e r e v i e w d e n o v o a d i s tr i c tc o u r t ’ s d e t e r mi n a t i o n th a ta p r i o rc o n vi c t i on q u a l i f i e s a s a c r i m e o f

v i o l e n c e f

o rp u rp o s e s o f

a n e n h a n c e m e n tu n d e rU. S
. S
. G. § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A )
. U ni t e d St a t e s v. W i l s on , 39 2 F. 3d 12 43 , 12 45 ( 11 th C i r. 20 04 ). A s fo r O rd u n o -M ir e le s ’s B l ak el y/ B o o k er arg u m en t , si n ce h e rai ses i tfo r t h e fi rst t i m e o f ap p eal , w e r e vi e w t he i s s ue onl y f orpl a i n e r r or . S e e U ni t e d S t a t e s v. O l ano, 50 7 U . S
. 7 2 5 , 7 3 1 -3 2, 11 3 S
. C t . 17 70 , 17 76 , 12 3 L
. E d. 2d 50 8 (19 93 ); U n ite d S tat es v . R o d ri g u ez, 3 9 8 F . 3 d 1 2 9 1 , 1 2 9 8 (1 1 th C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) (ap p l yi n g p l a in
e r r orr e vi e w t o ne w l y r a i sed B l ak el y/ B ooke rc l a i m )
. W e w i l l c or r e c tpl a i n e r r or onl y w he r e ( 1) t he r e i s a n e r r or ; ( 2) the e r r ori s pl a i n orobvi ou s; (3 ) t he e r r or3

affects th e d efen d an t ’ s su b st an t i al ri g h t s i n th ati tw as p rej u d i ci al an d n o th arm l ess; and (4) t he er ror s er i ou sl y a ff ec ts the fa i rnes s, i nt egri ty, or pu bl i c r eput at i on of a j ud i ci al proceedi ng . S ee U ni t ed S t at es v. C hi shol m , 73 F . 3d 30 4, 30 7 (11 th C i r. 19 96 ). U pon thor ough r e vi e w of the r e c or d, a s w e l l a s c a r e f ul c o n si de r a t i on of

t he p a r t i e s ’ b r i e f

s , w e f i n d n o r e v e r s i b l e e r r o ra n d t h e r e f o r e w e a f f i r m. F i rst , O rd u n o -M i rel es arg u es t h a t n e ith er o f h i s tw o p ri o r fel o n y co n v i ct i o n s, on e f or un l a w f

ul s e xu a l a c t i vi ty w i th c e r t a i n mi no r s a nd the othe r f or bu r gl a ry of a d we l l i n g , c a n b e u s e d t o s u p p o r tth e 1 6
- l e v e l e n h a n c e m e n tu n d e rU. S
. S
. G. § 2 L1
. 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A) b e c a u s e t h e c r i me s d o n o tq u a l i f y a s “ c r i me s o f

v i o l e n c e . ” U n d er t he S ent enci ng G u id elines , w hen sent enci ng a def endantconv i ct ed of i l l egal
r e e nt r y , t he di s tri c tc our tc a n e nha nc e the de f e nda nt ’ s ba s e of

f e ns e l e ve l by 16 l evel s i f “ t he defendantprevi ou sl y w as depo rt ed .
. . af t er. . . (A ) a con v icti o n for a f e l ony t h at i s . . . a c r i m e of vi ol e nc e . . . . ” U . S
. S
. G
. § 2L 1. 2( b) ( 1)
. A “ c r i m e of
v io le n c e ” is d e f

in e d a s in c lu d in g :
m urder, m ansl augh t er , ki dn appi ng , aggravat ed as sa ul t , forc i bl e s ex of f e ns e s , s t a tut or y r ap e, se xua l a bus e of a m i nor , r obbe r y , a r s on, e xt ort i on, e xt or t i ona t e e xt e ns i on of c r e di t , bur gl a r y of

a dw e l l i ng, or a ny of f e ns e unde rf

e de r a l , s t a t e , orl oc a l l a w t h at h as a s a n e l e m e ntthe use , a t t e m pt e d us e , orthr e a t e ne d us e of phy s i c a l f

or c e a ga i ns tthe pers on of anot her. I d . a t c o m m e n t. ( n .1 ( B ) ( iii) ) ( e m p h a s is a d d e d )
.We arenot persuade d by Orduno-Mire les’s novel a rgument that since hesucce ssfully g ot 1 this conviction vacated af ter illeg ally

returningto the United States, the offen s e s h o u l dnot count for pur poses of the § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A) enhanc ement. By its plain languag e, the Guide line’s re levant time period is the time of deportation, not the tim e of se ntencingfor a n illegal ree ntry

conviction. In other words, it is true that Orduno- M i re l es “p re v iously was deported . . . a fter . . . a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of

violence,”reg ardle ss of what ha ppened a fter his deportation. Our rea ding of

the Guideline is consistent with our si ster circuits’ treatment of this argument. See, e.g ., Un ite d St ate s v . G arc ia -L op e z, 3 75 F .3 d 5 86 , 5 88 (7 th C ir . 2 00 4) (“ [T]hea pp ro priateinq

uir y is whether the def endant ha d been c onvicted of a crime of violence at the time of deportation. Nothing in the guideline sug g ests that the analy sis should consider whethe r the c onviction has bee n vacated subsequent to the deportation but prior to the s entenc ing for the reentry offe nse.”) ; United States v. Luna-D iaz, 222 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T] he re levant time is the time of depor tation . . . and not the time of sentenc ing. . . . The guideline . . . is in the past tense, whic h sug g ests that the pre sent status of the a ggrav ated felony conviction is irrele vant.”) ; United States v. Cisneros-Cabre ra, 110 F.3d 746, 748 ( 10th Cir. 1997) (holding that b ei n g “d ep o rt ed af ter a conviction for a

n ag gravated felony” is a ll th at is r e qu ire d , an d it is ir r e le v ant wh e th e r th e c o nv ic ti o n is v a li d at the time of sentenc ing)
. The district c ourt did not indicate whic h prior convic tion it considered to support the 16- 2 level enha

nceme nt. Although wehave addresse d both, we note that the U .S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A) require s only

one prior f

elony conviction that is for a

crime of violence. 4 B e c a u s e O r d u n o - M ir e le s ’s f e lo n y c o n v ic tio n f

o ru n la w f

u l s e x u a l a c tiv ity
w i t h cer t ai n m i no rs qu al i fi es as a c ri m e of vi ol ence w i thi n t he G ui del i nes d e f in itio n , e ith e r a s s e x u a l a b u s e o f a m in o ro rs ta tu to r y r a p e , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t d id note r ri n a ppl y i ng the 16- l e ve l e nha nc e m e nt . M or e ove r , t he defi n i t i on of “ pr i or 1
c r i m e of

vi ol e nc e ” una m bi guous l y i ncl u d es the bur gl a r y of a dw e l l i ng. A c c o r d i n g l y , e i th e ro f

O r d u n o - M i r e l e s ’ s p r i o rf e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n s s u p p o r t e d t he d is tr ic t c o u r t’s im p o s itio n o f th e U .S .S .G . § 2 L 1 .2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) e n h a n c e m e n t. 2 W e a r e lik e w is e u n p e r s u a d e d b y O r d u n o - M ir e le s ’s s e c o n d a r g u m e n t , h is B l a ke l y ( now B ooke r ) c l a i m t ha tthe e nha nc e m e ntof hi s s e nt e nc e w a s ba s e d on a5

f a c t th a t m u s t e ith e rb e s u b m itte d to a ju r y a n d f o u n d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t,
ora dm i t t e d by the de f e nda nt . I n B ooke r , t he S u p r e m e C our the l d tha tt he
m a nda t or y na tur e of

the f e de r a l G ui de l i ne s r e nde r e d t h em i nc om pa t i bl e w i th the Si x t h A me n d me n t ’ s g u a r a n t e e t o th e r i g h tt o a j u r y tr i a l
. Se e 543 U . S
. __ , 1 2 5 S. C t . at74 9-50
. H ow ever , the C ou rtl ef tun d isturbed i t s hol di ng i n A l m endarez
T orre s v. U ni t ed S t at es , thatre ci di vi sm i s nota s epar at e e l em entof an offense that t he gove r nm e nti s r e qui r e d t o pr ove beyo n d a r e a s ona bl e doubt
. S e e 523 U
. S
. 224, 2 4 7 , 1 1 8 S
. C t . 1 2 1 9 , 1 2 3 3 , 1 4 0 L . E d
. 2 d 3 5 0 (1 9 9 8 ). In A p p ren d i v . N ew Jersey, 5 3 0 U .S . 4 6 6 , 1 2 0 S . C t. 2 3 4 8 , 1 4 7 L . E d
. 2 d 4 3 5 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , th e C o u r t s im ila r ly d ecl i n ed t o rev i si t A l m en d arez-T o rres. Id
. at 4 8 9 -9 0 , 1 2 0 S
. C t . at 2 3 6 2 ; s e e al so U ni t ed S t at es v. T ho m as , 24 2 F
. 3d 10 28 , 10 35 (11t h C i r. 20 01 ) (o b se rv i ng that A ppr e ndi s pe c i f

i c a l l y e xc l ude d the f

a c tof a pr i orc onvi c t i on f

r om i t s hol di n g a nd af fi rm i ng 18 U . S
. C
. § 9 24 (e )( 1)-e nh ance d sent ence , pu rs uantt o A l m endarez
T o r r e s )
. M o r e o v e r , in its r e c e n t B o o k e rd e c is io n , th e C o u r t a g a in r e a f f ir m e d its ho l di ng fi rs t pron ou nced i n A pp re nd i : “ A ny fa ct (ot her than a pr io r con vi ct i on ),
w h i c h i s n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r ta s e n t e n c e e x c e e d i n g th e ma x i mu m a u th o r i z e d b y t he f a c t s e s t a bl i sh ed b y a p l e a of gui l ty ora j ur y ve r di c tm us ta dm i t t e d by t he de f e nda ntorpr ove d t o a j ur y be y ond a r e a s ona bl e doubt
. ” 1 2 5 S
. C t . a t756T h e Su p r e me Court’s r e c e nt d e c is io nin Sh ep ar d v . Un it e d

St ate s , - - - U . S. - - - , 2 0 0 5 WL 3 516494 (Mar . 7, 2005), does not cha ng e our a nalysis in this case . Orduno-Mire les does not contend, and our own de novo revie w of the record doe s not reveal, that the district court re solved disputed fac ts related to the prior conviction which were not adjudicate d in the prior proce eding
. I d. at *8. (“Whi l e th e d isputed fac t herecan bedescribed as a fac t about a prior c onviction, it is too far re m o v edfr o mth e c o n cl u s i v e s i gn i fi can ce o f ap ri o r j u d i ci al re co rd , an d t o o mu ch l i k e th e f i n d i n gs subject to J ones and A

pprendi, to say

that Almendarez-Torre s clea rly authorizes a judg e to re solve the dispute.”). 6 (e m ph as i s added). T he re as on for the exce pt i on for pri or conv i ct i on s i s cl ea r: “a pr i orc onvi c t i on m us ti t s e l f ha ve be e n e s t a bl i s he d t hr ough p ro c e dur e s s a t i s f y i ng t h e fai r n o t i ce, re a s o n a b l e d o u b t , an d j u ry t ri al g u aran t ees. ” Jo n es v . U n i t ed S t at es, 526 U
. S
. 2 2 7 , 2 49, 119 S
. C t . 1215, 1227, 143 L
. E d. 2d 311 ( 1999)
. T hus , t he C our t ’ s hol di ng i n B ooke r , t ha tthe G ui de l i ne s c a nnotbe m a nda t or y c ons i st e nt
w ith a d ef

en d an t’ s S ix th A m en d m en t rig h ts, i s n o t i m p li ca ted w h en a d ef en d an t’ s s e nt e nc e i s e nha nc e d ba s e d on a pr i or c onvi c t i on. P ut a not he r w a y , be c a use t he pri or-c on vi ct i on exce pt i on re m ai ns un di sturbed aft erB oo ker, a di stri ct co urtdo es no ter r by r el yi ng on pri or conv i ct i on s t o enh ance a def endant ’ s s ent ence . 3 W e h a v e h e l d t ha t “ A l me n d a r e z - To r r e s r e ma i n s th e l a w u n t i l th e Su p r e me C ou rtdet er m i nes thatA l m endarez -T orre s i s notcont rol l i ng preced ent . ” U ni t ed S t at es v. G uadam uz-S ol i s, 23 2 F
. 3d 13 63 , 13 63 (11t h C i r. 20 00 ); se e al so U n it ed S t at es v. M ar se il le, 3 77 F . 3d 12 49 , 12 57 & n. 14 (11t h C i r. ) ( re fusi ng t o i nt erpret A p p ren d i as o v erru l in g th e p ri o r S u p rem e C o u rtd eci si o n i n A l m en d arez-T o rres, a nd c onc l udi ng tha tB l ake l y “ doe s nott a ke s uc h f a c t - f i ndi ng outof

the ha nds ofOrduno -M ir e le s w a s sente nc e d und e r t hepre -B oo ke r m and ator

y Se ntenc ingGuide lin e s. 4 We h avefo un d th e fi rs t tw o p ro ng s o f t heplain- e rror te st satis fi e d, e ve n in thea bs e nc e of a Sixth Amendment violation, where a de fenda nt was sentenc ed

u n d er th ep re - B o o ker

ma ndatory sentenc ing scheme by a district c ourt that considere d the Guidelines binding as opposed to adv i s o ry . Un i t ed States v. Shelton,--- F . 3d --- , 2005 WL435120, at *5 (11th Cir. Feb. 2 5 , 2 0 0 5 ). InShelton, the defendant also satisfied the “ exceeding ly difficult” third prong , which requires a defendant t o show “‘a rea s o n ab l e p ro b abil ity

of a diff erent result if the guidelines had be en applied in a n advisory instead of binding fashion by the s entenc ing judge in this case .’” I d. at *6 (quotingRodrigue z, 398 F.3d at 1299)
. Put anothe r way , to establish that the error af fec ted substantial rights in that itwas prejudicial and not harmless, a s require d under thethird prong of the plain-er ror test, Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 307, a defendant must “ satisfy the judgme nt of the re viewingcourt, infor med by the entire re c ord, that th e prob a

bil ity of a dif ferent re su lt is suf

fi c ie nt to und e rm ine c on fi de nc e in t heoutc ome of the proc eeding .” United States v. Domingue z Benitez,
--- U.S. ---, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Shelton carried his burden on the third prongby po i n t i n g t o th e following : (1) during sentenc ing, thedistrict court stated, numerous times, that the Gu i d eli nes sentenc e see ms “too severe”; a

nd (2) the district c ourt senten ce d h im to the lowest possibl e sente nce under the Guidelines. We were convinced “that there is a re asonableprobability the district court would have im p o s e d a le s s e r s e nten c e in

Sh e lt o n ’ s c a s e if

it h a d n o t f e lt b o un d b y th e Gu ide line s . ” 2 0 0 5 WL 435120, at *6. We also f

ound the fourth prong satisfied in light of the district court’s “ express desire to impose a sentenc e lesser than t h e l o w en dof the Guide lines rang e” a nd the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker “plainly indicated that the district c ourt now has the disc retion to do so, provided the re sulting sentenc e is rea sonable in light of the § 3553(a) fa ctors.” I d. at *7. As for non- constitutional Booker plain error, werea ch the opposite c onclusion on the third prongin the instant case. Ordun o -M i re les does not sug g est, and our own thorough revie w of the re c ord, inc ludingthese ntenc ingtr ans c ript a nd thePSI , d oe s no t indic atethat th e dis tric t c ourt wo uld have imposed a

lesser se ntence , even if

it could have. The district c ourt did not say that the sentenc e was too seve re, a s the court did i n Shelton; indeed, in denying O rduno-Mire les’s motion for a downward depar

ture, the c ourt observe d: “Your history and the wa

y you lived your l ife is why I ’m denying your motion for downwa rd de p arture. . . . Your

criminal history

speaks moreclea

rly on a c tio ns tha

n me re wo rd s. ” On thi s re c ord, Orduno -M ir e le s h a s n ot s ho wn a re a so na bleprob a bil ity of a diff erent result if the Guidelines had been applied in an advisory instead of bindingfashion, as require d to satisfy

the third prongof non-c onstitut ional Booker plain er ror. 7 t he c our t s ” ) , c e r t . de ni e d, 125 S
. C t . 637 ( 2004) ; T hom a s , 242 F . 3d a t1034- 35 ( r e f us i ng t o r e c ons i de rt he hol di ng of A l m e nda r e z - T or r e s i n t he l i ghtof A ppr e ndi beca use of the “ very basi c f ac tt hatw e c an n o t o v er rul e S up re m e C ou rtdeci si on s” ). In sh o rt , w e can fi n d n o p l ai n erro r o n th i s b asi s. 48

A c c or di ngl y , the d i str i c tc our tdi d note r rw he n i te nha nc e d O r dunoM i re l es ’ s s ent ence pu rs uantt o U . S
. S
. G
. § 2 L 1. 2(b)(1)(A ). AF F I RME D.