IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROCHE DIABETES CARE, LTD.,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:23-cv-00585-JRG-RSP

PATENT CASE

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANT ROCHE DIABETES CARE, LTD.’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

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i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES........................................................................................... 1

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................... 2

III. LEGAL STANDARD............................................................................................................ 3

A. Personal Jurisdiction ..............................................................................................3

B. Failure to State a Claim..........................................................................................6

IV. ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................... 7

A. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over RDC, Ltd........................................7

1. RDC, Ltd. is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in this

District..........................................................................................................8

2. RDC, Ltd. is not subject to specific jurisdiction in this District. ................10

3. The assertion of personal jurisdiction would be neither reasonable

nor fair........................................................................................................13

B. Display Tech’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim.....................................................15

1. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Direct Infringement......................15

2. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Indirect Infringement. ..................16

V. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................... 17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Advanced Analogic Techs., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs., Inc.,

No. C-09-1360 MMC, 2009 WL 1974602 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009).......................................16

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct.,

480 U.S. 102 (1987)...........................................................................................................11, 12

Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd.,

566 F.3d. 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2009)...............................................................................................10

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 554 (2007)...................................................................................................................6

Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen,

681 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................6, 7

Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan,

447 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................10

Centre One v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,

No. 08-cv-00467, 2009 WL 2461003 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (Davis, J.) ...........................3

Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.,

No. 6:14-CV-752-JRG-JDL, 2015 WL 4910427 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2015) 

(Gilstrap, J.) ...............................................................................................................................7

Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U.S. 117 (2014)...................................................................................................................6

Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc.,

179 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................11

Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. AI Tech., Inc.,

562 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (Schell, J.).....................................................................8

F & G Research, Inc. v. Dynapoint (Taiwan), Inc.,

262 F. App’x 277 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................5

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

564 U.S. 915 (2011).........................................................................................................4, 5, 11

Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams Cnty. Asphalt, Inc.,

85 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................11

Case 2:23-cv-00585-JRG-RSP Document 21 Filed 05/08/24 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: 799
iii

Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235 (1958)...................................................................................................................5

Harris v. Action Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc.,

No. 2:09–CV–286, 2010 WL 3489084 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010)...........................................8

Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Propet USA, Inc.,

62 F. App’x 322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..............................................................................................5

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310 (1945)...............................................................................................................4, 5

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,

564 U.S. 873 (2011)...........................................................................................................11, 12

Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp.,

523 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................................4

Kovalchuk v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB,

528 F. Supp. 3d 647 (E.D. Tex. 2021) (Mazzant, J.).................................................................4

Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.,

134 S.Ct. 2111 (2014)..............................................................................................................16

Mayne Pharma Int’l PTY Ltd. v. Merck & Co.,

No. CV 15-438-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 7833206 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2015) ...................................16

Med. Sols., Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC,

541 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................4

Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.,

681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................5

N. Star Innovations, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.,

No. 16-115-LPS-CJB, 2016 WL 7107230 (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2016)..........................................16

Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Co. S.A.,

263 F. Supp. 3d 498 (D. Del. 2017)...................................................................................12, 13

Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Comp. SA,

264 F. Supp. 3d 498 (D. Del. 2017).....................................................................................6, 13

Nu-You Techs., LLC v. Beauty Town Int’l Inc.,

No. 3:15-CV-03433-N, 2016 WL 4717991 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2016).......................................7

Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House,

626 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................4

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iv

Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

253 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 2001) .....................................................................................................3

Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy,

829 F. 3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016)...............................................................................................12

Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Facebook, Inc.,

No. 2:11-CV-400-JRG, 2012 WL 3647182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2012) 

(Gilstrap, J.) ...............................................................................................................................9

Stragent, LLC v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,

No. 6:16-CV-446-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 2821697 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) 

(Mitchell, M.J.) ....................................................................................................................7, 16

Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico,

563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................6

Systems Div., Inc. v. Teknek Elecs., Ltd.,

253 Fed. Appx. 31 (Fed. Cir. 2007)...........................................................................................5

U.S. v. Jon–T Chemicals, Inc.,

768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986)...........................................11

Univ. of Mass. Med. Sch. v. L’Oréal S.A.,

No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 WL 5919745 (D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018).......................................12

Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co.,

84 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................................14

WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp.,

776 F. Supp. 2d 342 (E.D. Tex. 2011).....................................................................................15

World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV Ya Mawlaya,

99 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................................5, 6

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286 (1980)...................................................................................................................5

York Group, Inc. v. Horizon Casket Group, Inc.,

No. H-05-2181, 2006 WL 2141081 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2006) ..................................................8

In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc.,

609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................14

Other Authorities

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) .......................................................................................................6, 15, 16

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).....................................................................................................5, 6, 7, 13

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Plaintiff Display Technologies, LLC’s (“DT’s”) lack of diligence should not be rewarded. 

Roche Diabetes Care, Ltd. (“RDC Ltd.”)1 was chosen by DT as the Defendant simply because it 

resembled a foreign corporation name, allowing DT to improperly assert venue in this District. 

The company that provides the accused instrumentalities is Roche Diabetes Care, Inc. (“RDC 

Inc.”). DT sued the wrong entity by ignoring publicly available facts, and it continues to do so. 

In its Complaint, DT did not even attempt to allege that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

RDC Ltd. The Complaint does not even include the word “jurisdiction.” This reason alone 

warrants dismissal of DT’s Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over RDC Ltd.

Non-party RDC Inc., the provider of the accused instrumentalities in the U.S., is a U.S. 

company headquartered in Indiana and has no regular or established place of business in this 

District. DT refused to substitute or add it as a party to the current case. 

DT’s claims should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Because RDC Ltd. does 

not directly conduct any business activities in the U.S., it cannot be alleged to have performed any 

infringing acts in the U.S. Accordingly, DT’s claims should also be dismissed for the additional 

reason that its allegations do not put forth a plausible claim for infringement by RDC Ltd. 

I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. A court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant when either (i) the

defendant is alleged to have committed an act or acts in the district giving rise to a stated 

claim or (ii) the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the district such that 

exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice. Here, RDC Ltd. is a non-U.S. entity and DT has not 

1 DT also did not properly identify the foreign Defendant, which is registered in England and Wales as

“Roche Diabetes Care Limited,” not the short form “Roche Diabetes Care, Ltd.” that DT used. Reference 

to “RDC Ltd.” herein refers to “Roche Diabetes Care Limited.” 

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plausibly alleged any facts that purport to show that RDC Ltd. has any operations within 

Texas or contacts with Texas. Should the Court therefore dismiss DT’s claims against 

RDC Ltd. for lack of personal jurisdiction?

2. To establish infringement by a defendant, a plaintiff must identify an 

infringing act or acts attributable to the defendant. Here, RDC Ltd. does not act within the 

U.S., and DT has not plausibly alleged any acts attributable to RDC Ltd. Should the Court 

therefore dismiss DT’s claims against RDC Ltd. for failure to state a claim?

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its Complaint, DT did not provide any facts that show this Court has jurisdiction over 

RDC Ltd. The only allegation is a screenshot from www.accu-chek.com. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.) RDC 

Ltd. does not, however, develop, sell, or distribute the accused instrumentalities in the U.S.. The 

entity related to the accused instrumentalities, instead, is RDC Inc., a U.S. entity based in 

Indianapolis, IN. This, too, is clearly shown on accu-chek.com (e.g., see link “About Us”). (Ex. 

1.) 

In the Complaint, DT accused Roche’s blood glucose meter devices called Accu-Chek 

Guide and Guide Me (the “Accused Devices”) when paired with the mySugr mobile application 

(the “Accused Application”) (collectively the “Accused Instrumentalities”) of infringing its 

patents. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 27, 28, Dkt Nos. 1-3, 1-4.) The Accused Devices are manufactured and 

distributed by RDC Inc. in the U.S., not RDC Ltd. This is clearly stated on the Accu-Chek website 

(Ex. 1, accessible at https://www.accu-chek.com/about-us):

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This information also is clearly listed on the packaging, manuals, and product inserts of the 

Accused Devices, as well as the FDA 510(k) applications for the Accused Devices. (Exs. 2-6.) 

RDC Inc. also offers the Accused Application in the U.S., not RDC Ltd. 

RDC Ltd. is a foreign entity based in the United Kingdom. RDC, Ltd. and RDC, Inc. are 

not directly affiliated with each other. Other than the copyright notice of accu-chek.com that 

erroneously listed “Roche Diabetes Care Limited”, as cited in the Complaint, there is no evidence 

pointing to any relationship between RDC Ltd. and the Accused Instrumentalities in the U.S. 

(Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.) In fact, RDC Ltd. does not even offer the Accused Devices, as evidenced by RDC 

Ltd.’s website which does not list the Accused Devices. (Ex. 7.) (See id.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Personal Jurisdiction

In response to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion challenging personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears 

the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate. See Centre One v. Vonage Holdings 

Corp., No. 08-cv-00467, 2009 WL 2461003, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (“Once a movant 

challenges a court’s jurisdiction over him, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden to show 

the movant has minimum contacts with the forum state to support jurisdiction over the movant.”) 

(Davis, J.) (citing Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 265 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). In assessing 

personal jurisdiction, this Court need not credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted. 

See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Further, “[i]t is well settled that courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record”

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Kovalchuk v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB, 528 F. Supp. 3d 647, 658 (E.D. Tex. 2021) 

(Mazzant, J.) (citing Sanders v. Univ. of Texas Pan Am. , 776 F. App’x 835, 837 (5th Cir. 2019)). 

The law of the Federal Circuit applies to determine whether a district court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state accused infringer in a patent case. Nuance Commc’ns, 

Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “A district court has personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant in a patent infringement case if two things are true. First, 

jurisdiction must exist under the forum state’s long-arm statute. Second, the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction must be consistent with the limitations of the due process clause.” Med. Sols., Inc. v. 

C Change Surgical LLC, 541 F.3d 1136, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). “Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of 

federal due process, the two-step inquiry collapses into one federal due process analysis.” Johnston 

v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008).

Personal jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways. The first is specific 

jurisdiction, which “depends on ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ 

principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to 

the State’s regulation.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 

(2011). Two methods of establishing specific jurisdiction include the “stream-of-commerce” 

theory and the “alter ego” theory. The “stream-of-commerce” theory contemplates “a nonresident 

defendant, acting outside the forum, plac[ing] in the stream of commerce a product that ultimately 

causes harm inside the forum.” Id. at 926. Under the alter ego theory, “[e]ven though a party 

would not normally be subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular forum, courts may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over an individual or corporation that is an alter ego or successor of a 

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corporation that would be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court.” Systems Div., Inc. v. 

Teknek Elecs., Ltd., 253 Fed. Appx. 31, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

The second basis for establishing personal jurisdiction is general jurisdiction. “A court 

may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear 

any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 

systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 

(citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S., at 317). For general jurisdiction to apply, federal due process requires 

that defendants have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that maintaining the suit “does 

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. A defendant has minimum 

contacts with a forum state when the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). It is unlawful to exercise personal jurisdiction over 

a defendant without such minimum contacts. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; F & G Research, Inc. v. 

Dynapoint (Taiwan), Inc., 262 F. App’x 277, 278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s 

grant of Taiwanese defendant’s motion to dismiss where defendant had “no contacts” with the 

forum). “Under the ‘minimum contacts’ test, a defendant may be subject to either specific 

jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.” Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Propet USA, Inc., 62 F. App’x 

322, 336 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Additionally, Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a federal court 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant that has sufficient contacts with the U.S. as a 

whole but is not subject to jurisdiction in any single state. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). Merial Ltd. v. 

Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV Ya 

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Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1996). In effect, Rule 4(k)(2) “approximates a federal 

long-arm statute” where the “(1) the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law, (2) the defendant is 

not subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of any state, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction 

satisfies due process requirements.” World Tanker, 99 F.3d 717 at 721-22. “The third requirement 

under Rule 4(k)(2)—the due process analysis—contemplates a defendant’s contacts with the entire 

U.S., as opposed to the state in which the district court sits.” Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis

Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Rule 4(k)(2)’s due process 

analysis incorporates the same constitutional standard applicable in other personal jurisdiction 

contexts. Synthes (U.S.A.) 563 F.3d 1285 at 1296–97. 

Even in this situation, however, a non-US corporation itself—not its managing agent, 

subsidiary, or affiliate—must be “at home” in the forum state for a court to exercise general 

personal jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014). Further, if 

“minimum contacts have not been established through either a stream of commerce or agency 

approach, . . . personal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).” Nespresso 

USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Comp. SA, 264 F. Supp. 3d 498, 506 (D. Del. 2017).

B. Failure to State a Claim

A party may move to dismiss a claim for a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When a court considers a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must 

assume that all well-pleaded facts are true and must view them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court 

must decide whether those facts state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded 

factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

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misconduct alleged.” Bowlby, 681 F.3d at 217 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009)).

In a patent case, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the accused infringer practices 

each and every limitation of at least one patented claim to adequately plead direct infringement by 

that entity. See Nu-You Techs., LLC v. Beauty Town Int’l Inc., No. 3:15-CV-03433-N, 2016 WL 

4717991, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2016) (dismissing claims of direct patent infringement because 

the complaint failed to plausibly allege the defendant practiced all limitations of any asserted 

claim); Stragent, LLC v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-446-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 2821697, 

at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) (Mitchell, M.J.). With respect to indirect infringement, a claim for 

induced infringement must: “1) adequately plead direct infringement by defendant’s customers; 2) 

contain facts plausibly showing that defendant specifically intended for its customers to infringe 

the asserted patents; and 3) contain facts plausibly showing that defendant knew that the 

customer’s acts constituted infringement.” Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., No. 

6:14-CV-752-JRG-JDL, 2015 WL 4910427, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2015) (Gilstrap, J.) (citing 

In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 

2012)).

IV. ARGUMENT

A. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over RDC Ltd.

DT’s Complaint against RDC Ltd. should be dismissed because this Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over it. RDC Ltd. is subject to neither general nor specific jurisdiction under any 

theory of personal jurisdiction, including the stream-of-commerce of alter-ego theories. 

Additionally, Rule 4(k)(2) does not grant this Court personal jurisdiction over RDC Ltd. because 

RDC Ltd. lacks sufficient contacts with the U.S. 

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1. RDC Ltd. is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in this District.

A court may only exercise general jurisdiction when a defendant maintains “continuous 

and systematic” contacts with the state. “However, these contacts must be ‘so substantial and of 

such a nature as to justify suit [against the defendant] on causes of action arising from dealings 

entirely different from those activities.’” Hockerson-Halberstadt, 62 F. App’x at 337 (citing Int’l 

Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). 

This requirement is a hurdle that DT cannot overcome. Indeed, DT’s Complaint makes no 

effort to satisfy this requirement. See Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. AI Tech., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 

866, 876 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (Schell, J.) (citing Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Intern, Co., Ltd., 

552 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). And “[o]nce a non-resident defendant files a motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden of establishing the district court’s jurisdiction 

lies with the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Id. 

The types of contacts that give rise to personal jurisdiction include property ownership, 

payment of taxes, frequent travel, having an office or employees in the district, designating an 

agent for service of process in the district, regular conduct of business, and maintenance of bank 

accounts in the district. Harris v. Action Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc., No. 2:09–CV–286, 2010 WL 

3489084, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010) (Everingham, M.J.) (finding no general jurisdiction 

where defendant was not licensed to do business in Texas, had no presence in Texas, and had no 

agents or employees in Texas); York Group, Inc. v. Horizon Casket Group, Inc., No. H-05-2181, 

2006 WL 2141081, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2006). DT’s Complaint fails to allege that RDC Ltd. 

has any such contacts with the U.S., let alone with Texas. 

DT’s Complaint does not establish how, without any operations or employees, RDC Ltd. 

purposefully directed any activities at Texas. In fact, DT failed to allege that the Court has 

jurisdiction over RDC Ltd. and the Complaint does not even mention the word “jurisdiction.” 

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Specifically, the Complaint alleges “Defendant’s ACCU-CHEK Guide meter and ‘ACCU-CHEK 

Guide Me’ meter,” implying that RDC Ltd. is somehow accountable for the Accused Device and 

the Accused Application. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 6.) These allegations are legal conclusions unsupported by 

any plausible factual allegations. Nor could they be because these statements are untrue. 

DT’s Complaint also fails to allege plausible facts to suggest RDC Ltd. has any contacts 

with Texas that could justify exercise of general jurisdiction. RDC Ltd. has never done business 

in Texas, has never had offices or employees in Texas, and has never paid any taxes or fees in 

Texas. It has no properties in Texas and directs no activities within the state. 

RDC Ltd.’s situation in this case is therefore similar to that before this Court in Princeton 

Digital Image Corp. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-400-JRG, 2012 WL 3647182, at *1 (E.D. 

Tex. Aug. 23, 2012) (Gilstrap, J.). In that case, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including 

Getty Images, “a holding company that ha[d] never done any business in Texas, never had any 

offices or employees in Texas, and ha[d] never paid taxes in Texas.” Id. at *2. The Court therefore 

found it did not have personal jurisdiction over Getty Images because “[t]here [was] no evidence 

in the record to support a plausible claim that Getty Images use[d] (and allegedly infringe[d]) the

technology at issue in Texas. In fact, because it [was] simply a holding company, there [was] no 

evidence before the Court that Getty Images use[d] the allegedly infringing technology in any 

District.” Id. The Court therefore dismissed the claims against Getty Images, even though its 

operating subsidiary, Getty Images US, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas and other 

states. Id. at *3.

This case presents similar facts. RDC Ltd. is a foreign company with no operations, 

businesses, offices, or employees in Texas. On the other hand, RDC Ltd.’s sister company, RDC 

Inc., for example, may be subject to jurisdiction in the U.S., but it is not subject to venue in this 

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District. And DT has not properly alleged that the RDC Inc.’s acts should be imputed to RDC 

Ltd.—nor can it. Accordingly, DT’s Complaint is devoid of any facts to support general 

jurisdiction over RDC Ltd., and DT’s claims against RDC Ltd. should be dismissed. 

2. RDC Ltd. is not subject to specific jurisdiction in this District. 

The Court also does not have specific jurisdiction over RDC, Ltd. Specific jurisdiction 

exists when (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, (2) the 

claim arises out of or relates to those activities, and (3) assertion of personal jurisdiction is 

reasonable and fair. Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d. 1012, 1018 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009). The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first two prongs. Only if the plaintiff first 

meets its burden of proof, then the defendant is required to present a compelling case that the 

presence of other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Id.

DT has not met and cannot meet the first two prongs under either theory: stream-ofcommerce or alter ego. Here, RDC Ltd. does not put any products into the stream of commerce in 

the U.S., and RDC Inc. is not the alter ego of RDC Ltd. Accordingly, there is no basis for DT to 

argue personal jurisdiction over RDC Ltd. based on its activities or the activities of RDC Inc. 

(a) This Court does not have specific jurisdiction under an alter-ego 

theory.

DT cannot impute any of RDC Inc.’s activity to RDC, Ltd. under an alter-ego theory, nor 

does DT attempt to make any jurisdiction allegations. In fact, the Complaint does not even contain 

the word “jurisdiction.” “The alter ego doctrine, like all variations of piercing the corporate veil 

doctrine, is reserved for exceptional cases.” Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 

411, 416 (5th Cir. 2006). As such, DT must undertake an exhaustive 11-factor2analysis to apply 

2 The Fifth Circuit has developed the following list of factors to be used when determining whether a subsidiary is the 

alter ego of the parent: “(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership; (2) the parent and the 

subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3) the parent and the subsidiary have common business departments; 

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this doctrine. Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams Cnty. Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 208-09 (5th 

Cir. 1996). Yet, DT’s Complaint does not address a single factor. 

DT does not provide any plausible factual allegations suggesting any kind of relationship 

between RDC Inc. and RDC Ltd., apart from the copyright notice on Accu-chek.com. (Dkt. 1 at 

¶ 2.) In fact, DT does not even mention RDC Inc. in its Complaint. DT also turns a blind eye to 

the overwhelming amount of evidence that RDC Inc. is the entity responsible for the Accused 

Instrumentalities. (See Exs. 2-6.) In sum, DT can point to no facts justifying a deviation from the 

long-established “institutional independence of related corporations.” Dickson Marine Inc. v. 

Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, DT has not established that this 

Court can exercise specific jurisdiction over RDC, Ltd. under an alter ego theory.

(b) Specific jurisdiction does not exist under the stream-of-commerce 

theory.

The “stream-of-commerce” theory contemplates “a nonresident defendant, acting outside 

the forum, plac[ing] in the stream of commerce a product that ultimately causes harm inside the 

forum.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 926. But in patent infringement actions, this theory applies only 

in limited circumstances, none of which is present here.

The Supreme Court has articulated two tests for specific jurisdiction under a stream-ofcommerce theory. The first test requires that the defendant place the accused products into the 

stream of commerce and be “aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State.” 

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987); accord J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 

(4) the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax returns; (5) the parent finances the 

subsidiary; (6) the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary operates with grossly 

inadequate capital; (8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary; (9) the subsidiary receives no 

business except that given to it by the parent; (10) the parent uses the subsidiaries property as its own; (11) the daily 

operations of the two corporations are not kept separate; and (12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate 

formalities, such as keeping separate books and records and holding shareholder and board meetings.” U.S. v. Jon–T 

Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691–92 (5th Cir.1985) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).

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Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881-82 (2011). The second test is the same as the first but additionally 

requires “an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. 

at 112; J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883. The Federal Circuit has thus far not decided which test to 

adopt for patent cases. See, e.g., Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F. 3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016).

DT cannot satisfy the most basic element of either Asahi test. As clearly explained in the 

manuals, packaging, and product inserts of the Accused Devices (Guide and Guide Me), RDC Inc. 

is the manufacturer of these devices. (See Exs. 5, 6.) Similarly, the publicly available FDA 501(k) 

applications for the Guide and Guide Me devices were filed by RDC Inc. (See Exs. 2, 3, 43.) 

Meanwhile, RDC Ltd. does not sell either the accused Guide or Guide Me devices in the U.S. or 

the UK. In addition, public information clearly shows that the Accused Application, mySugr, was 

not developed or owned by RDC Ltd. 

DT also does not allege any facts to suggest that RDC Ltd. puts any products in the stream 

of commerce. The stream-of-commerce “refers to the movement of goods from manufacturers 

through distributors to consumers.” J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 881-82. RDC Ltd. does not develop, 

manufacture, distribute, import, or ship the Guide and Guide Me devices, or the mySugr 

application in the U.S. The meters that RDC Ltd. sells in the UK are not even sold in the U.S.

market. Therefore, RDC Ltd. does not put any products into the stream of commerce in the U.S., 

and this Court has no specific jurisdiction over RDC Ltd. See Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical 

Coffee Co. S.A., 263 F. Supp. 3d 498 (D. Del. 2017) (finding no specific jurisdiction under streamof-commerce theory where foreign defendant did not manufacture, distribute, import, or ship the 

3 These Exhibits do not show the full name of the applicant entity as RDC Inc.; however, other information on them 

reveal that they are directed at RDC Inc. For example, the addresses as shown is that of RDC Inc.

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accused products); Univ. of Mass. Med. Sch. v. L’Oréal S.A., No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 WL 

5919745 (D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018) (same).

Courts have found that a U.S. entity introducing an accused product into the stream of 

commerce is insufficient to show personal jurisdiction over a foreign affiliate. In Nespresso, for 

example, the court rejected the argument that the Swiss defendants could be held responsible for 

the actions of their U.S. subsidiary. 263 F. Supp. 3d at 504. Rather, the plaintiff must “demonstrate 

that Nestlé and Nestec [Swiss defendants] were responsible for introducing the Nespresso 

machines [accused products] into the stream of commerce, and not simply that a subsidiary within 

the U.S. introduced the Nespresso machines.” Id. The Nespresso court found that “[s]ince 

minimum contacts have not been established through either a stream of commerce or agency 

approach, ipso facto, personal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).” Id. at 

506. 

The same applies here. RDC, Ltd. is a separate entity located overseas, and RDC, Inc.’s 

activities cannot be imputed onto RDC, Ltd. to establish personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). 

DT cannot and did not allege otherwise, and thus any “stream-of-commerce” theory of personal 

specific jurisdiction must fail.

3. The assertion of personal jurisdiction would be neither reasonable nor 

fair.

Even if DT could properly allege facts to support the first two prongs of the personal 

jurisdiction test (which it did not), this Court should still decline to exercise personal jurisdiction 

because it would be neither fair nor reasonable to force RDC Ltd. to litigate DT’s claims in this 

unfamiliar forum. 

The third factor regarding traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice involves a 

balancing test with five questions: First, what is the burden on the defendant? Second, what, if any, 

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are the interests of the forum state? Third, what is the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief? 

Fourth, what is the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 

the controversies? And fifth, what are the interests of the states in furthering their social policies? 

Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 429 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

These factors weigh against finding specific jurisdiction here. Traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice should weigh against allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the patent 

venue rules set by the Supreme Court in TC Heartland. RDC, Ltd. is a foreign company with no 

employees in Texas. It has been pulled into this dispute by DT solely because it was mistakenly 

listed on a copyright notice on a website—while the same website also clearly shows that RDC, 

Inc. is the actual company involved in providing the Accused Instrumentalities in the U.S. (Exs. 

1-6.) RDC, Inc. is based in Indianapolis, not Texas. 

Considering the five questions, it becomes even clearer that the Court should not find 

specific jurisdiction here: First, the burden on RDC Ltd. is significant, as exercising jurisdiction 

would force RDC Ltd. to litigate in an unfamiliar forum wherein it has no activities or personnel. 

This dispute centers on activities involving the Accused Instrumentalities, and the entity 

responsible for them is one that DT refused to add to this case, because adding RDC Inc. as a 

defendant would then require that it be dismissed from the case for lack of proper venue. 

Proceeding with RDCLtd. as the defendant would nonetheless introduce delay for the Court and 

increased costs for the parties because any evidence or witnesses for RDC Ltd. would be located 

outside the U.S., and any relevant witnesses for RDC Inc. would be located in Indiana.

Second and third, neither the parties nor the State of Texas has any interest in forcing a 

sister company with no employees to litigate in this District. DT has no genuine interest in 

litigating this lawsuit in Texas. DT has no website, and makes no products. In short, it appears 

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DT was created solely for purposes of litigation (as evidenced by the approximately 95 lawsuits it 

has filed), and any local interest therefore is minimal. See In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 

1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding plaintiff’s interest entitled to no weight where its “presence 

in Texas appears to be recent, ephemeral, and an artifact of litigation”).

Fourth, the interstate judicial system has no interest in maintaining this litigation in EDTX 

because the relevant parties, RDC, Ltd. and RDC, Inc., do not have any connection to EDTX. And 

fifth, resolving allegations of patent infringement is not relevant to any state’s social policies. 

Consequently, the answers to these questions establish that exercising personal jurisdiction over 

RDC, Ltd. would not be fair or reasonable.

B. Display Tech’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim 

1. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Direct Infringement. 

DT’s only alleged support for direct infringement is that RDC Ltd. is listed on the copyright 

notice of Accu-chek.com, (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.), but a minimal investigation (e.g., looking at Accuchek.com’s “About Us” Page) would show that the provider of the Accused Devices is actually 

RDC Inc. (Ex. 1.) As discussed above, RDC Ltd. does not perform any business activities in the 

U.S. and therefore engages in no activities that DT could accuse of direct infringement. None of 

the remaining allegations in the Complaint suggests that RDC Ltd provides the Accused 

Instrumentalities to customers in this District. DT knows the proper defendant is RDC Inc., but 

DT also knows that any attempt to add RDC Inc. as a defendant would make venue improper in 

this District pursuant to TC Heartland. If DT seeks relief, it should file suit against RDC Inc. in 

Delaware or Indiana, where it resides and has a regular and established places of business. 

Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a complaint fails to adequately 

plead infringement against the appropriate defendant. See, e.g., WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion 

Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (dismissing patent infringement claims 

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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where the allegedly infringing acts took place outside of the 

U.S.); Advanced Analogic Techs., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs., Inc., No. C-09-1360 MMC, 2009 WL 

1974602, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009) (“To the extent KTI seeks dismissal of the complaint for 

failure to allege infringing activity by KTI within the U.S., the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion will be 

granted.”); Mayne Pharma Int’l PTY Ltd. v. Merck & Co., No. CV 15-438-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 

7833206, at *4, 6 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2015) (dismissing infringement claim against a foreign 

defendant pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)); N. Star Innovations, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., No. 16-115-LPSCJB, 2016 WL 7107230, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2016) (dismissing complaint pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) for failing to provide “factual allegations about the nature of defendant’s business, nor 

their activities in the United States” and observing that “without more, the fact that [the Japanese 

defendant] is not a U.S.-based entity might well affirmatively suggest that it has not done any of 

these things”). DT failed to plead any facts to support direct infringement by RDC, Ltd.

2. Display Tech Fails to State a Claim for Indirect Infringement. 

DT did not explicitly allege indirect infringement by RDC, Ltd. because it merely alleged 

that “Defendant . . . infringe only Patent Claims asserted directly and indirectly.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4.) 

Further, even if DT tried, its indirect infringement claims against RDC Ltd. should be dismissed 

because it failed to adequately plead direct infringement, which is a required element of any 

indirect infringement claim. Stragent, LLC v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-00446-

RWSKNM, 2017 WL 2821697, *7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) (Mitchell, M.J.), adopted by, 2017 

WL 2832613 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2017) (Schroeder, J.) (“As a threshold matter, Stragent’s indirect 

infringement claims fail because the Complaint has not plausibly pled that [the accused products] 

directly infringe the asserted claims.”); see also Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 

134 S.Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014) (“[W]here there has been no direct infringement, there can be no 

induced infringement under § 271(b).”).

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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, RDC, Ltd. respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the 

allegations against RDC Ltd. with prejudice under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).

Dated: May 8, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Aaron P. Pirouznia

Terry J. Stalford

Texas Bar No. 24011686

stalford@fr.com

Aaron P. Pirouznia

Texas Bar No. 24098958

pirouznia@fr.com

Noel F. Chakkalakal

Texas Bar No. 24053676

chakkalakal@fr.com

Alexander H. Martin

Texas Bar No. 24091828

martin@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000

Dallas, TX 75201

Telephone: (214) 747-5070

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

ROCHE DIABETES CARE, LIMITED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

document has been served on May 8, 2024, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have 

consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

/s/ Aaron P. Pirouznia

Aaron P. Pirouznia

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