## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Independence Plus, Inc. v. Walter , 2012 IL App (1st) 111877

Appellate Court Caption I NDEPENDEN CE P L US, I NC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCES WAL TER, KRI STEN PRI NZ
, and BEL L OWS AND BEL L OWS, P.C., Def endants-A

ppellees.

District & N o. First District, F ifth Division Docke t No. 1-11-1877

Filed Dec ember 14, 2012

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The malicious prosec ution action plaintiff filed ag ai n s t a discharg ed employ ee and her attorney s afte r the employ ee’ s administrative complaints and civil action cha lleng ing he r termination were dismi ssed

was proper ly dismiss ed for failing to state a cause of action, since the fac ts alleg ed by pl ai n t i ff failed to establish the requisite element of specia l injury

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 09-L -011922; the Hon. Charles R. Winkler, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Claudia Oney
, of Oney & Arthur, P.C., and Her man J

. M arino, both of Chicag o, for a

ppellant.

David G. Ha

rding , of Chicag o, for a

ppellee F ranc es Walter.

Daniel B. Mey er and Edwar d C. Eberspa cher I V, b o th of Chicag o, for appellee Kristen Prinz.

Michae l R es i s , Ellen L

. Gre en, and Andre w Seiber, all of Smit hAmundsen L L C, of Chicag o, for appellee Be llows & Be llows, P.C.

Panel J USTI CE PAL MER delivered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion. Presiding J ustice McB ride and J ustice Howse concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff Independen ce P l u s , I n c. (IPI), appea ls from the dismiss al of its malicious
p ro s ecution suit ag ainst defe ndants Fr ance s Walter, Kristen Prinz and Prinz ’s law fi rm , Be llows and Be llows, P.C . (B ellows). ¶ 2 T h e fa ct s b eh i n d t h e u nderlying proce eding s are as follows. I PI
, a comp an y t h at specia liz es i n providing in-home private duty nursing care, h i re d Walter in May 2006 and fired her in November of that same y ear , alleg edly for t h re at en i ng another staff member following a series of em o tional outbursts. Subsequently
, Walter filed a series of administrative complaints ag ainst I PI
, namely
, (1) a complaint under the Personnel Record Review Act (820 I L CS 40/1 et seq. (West 2008)) with the I llinois Depa rtment of L abor, (2)

a com p l ai n t u nder the Wage Pay ment and Collection Act (820 I L CS 115/1 et seq. (West 2 008)) with the I llinois Depa rtment of L abor, and (3) a char g e of discrimination with th e I llinois Depa

rtment of Human Rights, alleg ing sexual hara ssment, age d i scrimination and
reta liation. These complaints we re a ll dism issed. Additionally , Walter filed a c omplaint in the circ uit court ag ainst I PI
, seeking damag es for reta liatory discharg e and wrong ful termination. Walter voluntarily dismiss ed this action on August 17, 2009. In both her action befor e the circ uit court and in her administrative complaints, Walter was repr esente d by Prinz and by

Prinz ’s law f

irm, Be llows. ¶ 3 On October 7, 2009, I PI filed the instant compl ai n t fo r malicious prosec ution ag ainst Walter, Prinz and Bellows. De fenda nts moved t o dismiss I PI ’s complaint under section 2- 615 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-615 (West 2008)), contending
, inter alia
,

-2-that I PI had failed to alleg e specia l injury
, as require d to rec over for malicious prosec ution.

The trial court initially denied defe ndant s ’ m otion, but upon rec onsideration, the court g rante d it and dis missed I PI ’s co mplaint. I PI now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we aff irm.

¶ 4 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 5 I PI ’s amende d complaint, which frames the issues now befor e us, alleg es the following

. I PI hired Walter as a clinical manag er on May 5, 2006. By October 2006, Walter’s conduct had become “incr easing ly err atic and abusive” ; she had scre aming arguments with staff and locked h er s el f in her office

. On November 16, 2006, Walter sent threa tening emails to another I PI employ ee. I PI launche d an in vestig ation into her actions and fired her on November

27, 2006. ¶ 6 Following her termination, Walter, through her attorney Prinz
, filed a total of four a ctions
ag ainst I PI
, all of which wer e alleg edly filed without probable cause and with malice solely for the purpose of hara ssing and debilitating I PI

. As noted ear lier, these actions consist of (1)

a Personnel Record Review Act complaint with the I llinois Depa rtment of L abor, (2) a Wage Pay ment an d Collection Act complaint with the I llinois Depa rtment of L abor, and (3) a char g e of discr imination with the I llinois Depa rtment of Human Rights, all t hree of which

wer e filed on May 25, 2007, and (4) a circ uit court complaint ag ainst I PI
, filed on November 15, 2007. ¶ 7 I P I ’s complaint discusses each of these actions in turn. Walter’s first action, u n d er t h e Personnel R ecor d Review Act, was an attempt to acc ess “certa in unidentified documents”
t hat she claimed wer e a part of her personne l file at I PI

. Howeve r, acc ording t o I P I
, s u ch documents did not exis t, Walter was awa re that they did not exis t, and, in any event, had such documents exis ted, Walter could have obtained them throug h her o t h er civi l actions, rende ring this complaint “duplicative and unnece ssar y .” This complaint was dismiss ed in favor of I PIon J anuar

y 2, 2008. ¶ 8 In Walter’s second action, a wag e claim filed with the I llinois Depa rtment of L abor, she
soug ht to rec over wag es based upon her alleg ation that, when she was hired, I PI promised her a raise if she had a positive six -month perf ormanc e evaluation. I PI alleg ed that this claim

was both fac tually unsound, since I PI had made no such promise in the first place and Walter did not rec eive a positive six -month evaluation, and lega lly without merit, since t he W ag e Pay ment and Collection Act only cover s ear ned wag es, not promised raises. This complaint was dismissed in favor of I PIon August 7, 2007. ¶ 9 Walter’s third action was a char g e of discrimination, f iled with the I llinois Depa rtment of Human Rights, in which she alleg ed that she was subjected to sexual hara ssment and ag e discrimination by another I PI employ ee and that I PI fired her in reta liation for repor ting this conduct. This compl ai n t was dismiss ed in favor of I PI on August 28, 2008. The I llinois De partment of Human Rights specific ally found that its investigation did not reve al t h at Walter was sexually hara ssed or hara ssed beca use of her ag e, and it a lso spe cifica lly found that I PI did not fi re W al t er in reta liation but beca use of her “esc alating behavior ” toward another I PIemploy ee.

-3-¶ 10 Walter’s fourth and final action was a complaint for reta liatory discharg e and wrong ful

termination filed in the circ uit court agai n s t I P I o n November 15, 2007, when two of her administrative complaints wer e still pending

. T h e wrong ful termination count was both duplicative of and pree mpted by Walter’s char g e of discrimination filed with the I l l inois Depa rt m ent of Human Rights, and afte r I PI filed a motion to dismiss this count, Walter voluntarily dismiss ed it in Marc h 2008. Meanwh il e , in h e r r e ta li atory discharg e count, Walter claimed, for the first time, that I PI had terminated her employ ment beca

use she complained about patient car e. I PI states that this claim was a complete fabr ication and not cre dible, since Walter, as a licensed nurse, had a statutory duty to rep o rt an y failure of car e, and she had made no such repor

t. In any event, Walter voluntarily dismiss ed her reta liat o ry d i s charg e count on August 17, 2009. ¶ 11 Walter also amende d her circ uit court complaint to add two more counts, both of which,

a c cording to I PI
, wer e equally nonmeritorious, and both of which wer e eventua lly voluntari ly dismiss ed by Walter. First, afte r the I llinois Depa rtment of Human Rights dismiss ed her char g e of discrimination, Walter attempted to seek revie w of that d ec i s i o n in the circ uit court, despite being awa re that un d er the applicable statute, the circ uit court lacke d jurisdiction over such a cl ai m

. Second, Walter amende d her complaint to add a count for spoliation, which I PI argues was without merit beca use sp o l i ation is not an independe nt

cause of ac tion in I llinois

. As noted, Walter subseque ntly voluntarily dismiss ed these two 1 counts, on August 17, 2009. ¶ 12 Wit h reg ard to the injury it suffe red as a result of Walter’s four actions, I PI alleg ed that Walter’s alleg ations that I PI was eng ag ed in illega l and improper conduct had “an immediate an[d] direc t debilitating eff ect on I PI ’s ability to co n du ct business,” beca use I PI is in a “hig hly regulated industry .” I PI further alleg ed that, throug hout the course of Walter’s circ uit
court action ag ainst I PI
, defe ndants inflicted injury on I PI by issuing “outra g eous discovery demands” for the sole purpose of causingfinanc ial difficulty to I PI : “F or example, Def

endants demande d Def

endant Walter’s hard drive y ear s afte r Walter’s employ ment was terminated. When I PI rec on s t ru ct ed Def endant Walter’s hard drive, Def endants failed to make arr ang ements to examine it. Def endants then demande d I PI ’s

serve r [bac k

up ] t ap es that wer e in use during Walter’s six -month employ

. After

rec overing them, Def

endants failed to exami n e t hem or even take possession of them. Def endants demande d thousands of pag es of private nursing information and patient car e

re cords, requiring hours of reda ction by Plaintiff, which Def endants failed to examine *** as well. Def

endants also demande d I PI produce the names and contac t information of hundreds of I PI employ ees in order to sear ch for disgr untled employ ees and inform I PI employ ees that I PIwas de fending a [l awsuit] alleg ing improper pay ment of employ ees and dang erous policies a

nd proce dures a ffe ctingpatient ca re.” ¶ 13 I PI ’s complaint further states that on J anuar y 21, 2009, I PI filed its orig inal complaint in

See Boyd v. Trav el ers Ins ura nce Co.
, 166 I ll

. 2d 188, 192-93 (19 95) (a n act ion for negli gent 1
spo li at ion can be st at ed unde r exi st ing negli gence la w wit hout nee d for t h e cr eat ion of an ind epe nde nt cau se of act ion fo r s pol ia ti on)

.
-4-the circ uit court ag ainst Walter, seeking damag es for malicious prosec ution. (That case was

the prede cessor to this action. For clar ity
, we shall ref er to it as “the J anuar

y 2009 action.”) Walter, repr esente d by Prinz and Bellows, fil ed a motion to dismiss I PI ’s complaint. Prior
to any hear ing on that motion, I PI filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint without prejudice

. The trial court denied Walter’s motion and g rante d I PI ’s m o t i o n. Walter then
soug ht to appea l the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss
, even though, acc ording to I PI
, she was awa

re that such order was not final and appea lable. Subsequently
, t h i s co u rt dismiss ed Walter’s a

ppeal f or lac k of appe llate jurisdiction. ¶ 14 On October 7, 2009, I P I fi l ed t h e instant complaint, seeking damag es for malicious
prosec ution for Walter’s four actions as well as for her appea l in I PI ’s J anuar y 2009 action. ¶ 15 Def

endants moved to dismiss I PI ’s complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L C S 5 / 2 -6 15 (West 2008)), contending
, among other things, that I PI had failed to state a cause of action for malicious prosec ution beca use i t had not alleg ed that it suffe red any specia l injury

. Def endants’ other contentions in their motion to dismiss are not at issue in this ap p ea l an d t h ere fore need not be discussed here

. The trial court initially denied defe ndants’ motion. Howe ver, defe ndants filed a motion to rec onsider, and the trial
court g rante d that motion in an order issued on May 23, 2011. The court found that I PI had

mere ly alleg ed “re putational harm and ordinary expenses and in ju r ie s incidental to defe nding

a lawsuit,” which wer e insufficient to constitute specia l injury under I l l i n o i s law. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t dismi ssed I PI ’s complaint. I PInow appe als.

¶ 16 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 17 In this appea l, the sole issue is whether the trial court err ed in dismiss ing I PI ’s malicious
prosec ution complaint for fa i l u re to adequately plead the element of specia l injury

. In 2 revie wing the sufficie ncy of a complaint under a section 2-615 motion to dismiss
, we acc ept

as true all well-pled fac ts and all rea sonable infere nces that may be drawn from those fac ts, and we construe the alleg ations of the complaint in the light most favor able to the plaintiff. Y oung v. Bryco Arms
, 213 I ll. 2d 433, 441 (2004). We revie w the trial court’s order g ranting defe ndants’ sec tion 2-615 motion de novo

. Id. at 440. ¶ 18 To preva il on a claim for malicious prosec ution, the plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) the de fenda

nt brought the underly

ing suits maliciously and without probable cause , (2) the underlying suits wer e terminated in favor of plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff su ff ere d “spec ial injury ” beyond the usual expense, time and annoyance involved i n d efending a lawsuit. Cult Aware n e

ss Ne twork v. Church of

Scientology International
, 177 I ll. 2d 267, 272 (1997). Spec ial injury has been define d as “ ‘injury not nece ssarily resultingin any

and all suits prosec uted t o rec over for l ike causes of a ction.’ ” Doyle v. Shl ensky
, 120 I ll. App. 3d 807, 817 (1983) ( quoting Schwartz v. Schwartz , 366 I ll. 247, 250 (1937)); see also Ree d v.

Alt hou gh def

end ant s st at e for the re cor d in the ir bri ef tha t the y do not con ced e tha t I PI 2
pro per ly ple d the re m ai nin g two el ements of m al ic iou s p r o sec uti on, the ar gum ent s and aut hor it y pre sen te d in def

end ant s’ bri ef ar e foc use d exc lus ively on the el ement of spe ci al inj ury. Acco rdi ngly,

we s hal l c onf

ine ourana lysis to th at el ement.

-5-Doctor’s Associ a t es , In c. , 355 I ll. App. 3d 865, 875 (2005) (the plaintiffs’ litigation costs

“constitute nothing mo re t h an ordinary litigation expenses and are not considere d specia l damag es”) ; Keefe v. Aluminum Co. of America
, 166 I ll. App. 3d 316, 319 (1988) (whe re the plaintiff was forc ed to spend time and money to defe nd himself and his persona l and business aff airs we re e x amined in the course of discovery
, such “lit iga tion inconvenienc es” did not constitute specia l injury
, s i n ce they are “common to most lawsuits”); Petrick v. K aminski
, 68 I ll. App. 3d 649, 651 (197 9) (affirming dismiss al of suit for malicious prosec ution of a debt collection action where the plaintiff’s claimed damag es were shame and humi liation, lost wag es, lost cre dit rating and expense of attorney fee s, since such damag es wer e “matter s attendant to the or dinary

civil suit”). ¶ 19 The rea soning behind the specia l injury require ment lies in the fac t that the law does not look with favor upon malicious prosec ution suits, beca use of the g ener al principle that the
courts should be open for litigants to settle their rig hts without fea ring prosec ution for doing

so. Schwartz
, 366 I ll. at 2 5 0; Shedd v. Patterson
, 302 I ll. 355, 359 (1922) (cause of action for malicious prosec ution is limit ed beca use “the courts of law are open to ever y citizen upon the penalty of lawful costs, and he may have his rig hts deter mined without the risk of being sued and having to respond in damag es for seeking to enfor ce his rig ht”). As o u r supreme court ha s expl ained: “[T] he cour

ts are ope n to ever

y citizen to claim what ‘he deems to be his rig ht without fea r of being prosec uted for heavy damag es.’ [C itation.] Thus, the ordinary trouble and
expense which arise from ‘ ordinary forms oflegal controve rsy , should be endure d by the law-a biding citizen as one of the inevitable burdens, which men must sustain under civil
g overnme nt.’ (Emphasis added.) [C itation.] ” Cult Awareness
, 177 I ll. 2d at 280-81 (quoting Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co. , 175 I ll. 619, 628-29 (1898)).
Howeve r, the societal interest in permitting the honest asser tion of rights in our court rooms must be b a la

n c e d a g a in s t the societal interest in preve nting hara ssment throug h lawsuits. Cult Awareness , 177 I ll. 2d at 284. ¶ 20 Her e, plaintiffs alleg e that they have adequately alleg ed specia l injury in three way s: ( 1) defe ndants made f

alse a lleg ations of illeg al conduc t on the part of I PI , (2) de fenda nts filed

a total of four claims ag ainst I PI
, there by subjecting I PI to a “s u s t ai n ed onslaug ht of litigation”; and (3) defe ndants abused the d i s cover y proce ss for the sole purposes of hara ssing a

nd causingexpense to I PI . We consider these contentions in turn.

¶ 21 A. Fa lse Alleg ations of I lleg al Conduct ¶ 22 I PI ’s first contention is that it suffe red specia l injury beca use defe ndants falsely

acc used it of illega l a

nd improper conduct in or der to inflict “direc t damag e to the business of I PI .” In particula

r, I PI claims that it was inj ured by Walter’s allegation in the underlyin g ci rc uit
court action that I PI terminated her employ ment in reta liation for complaining about patient

car e. Although I PI ’s complaint do es n o t g ive any further detail about this alleg ation, I PI

asser ted during oral argument befor e this court that the complained- of failure of car e, if true, would have c onstitut ed a f elony

. ¶ 23 At the outset, we note that virtually all civil actions sounding in tort involve acc usations

-6-of illega l or improper conduct in some capa city

. Such acc usations are hardly “spec ial” but,

rathe r, are entirely ordinary conseque nces of litigation. See Ree d
, 355 I ll

. Ap p

. 3 d at 875 (ordinar y litigation expenses are not considere d specia l damag es); Keefe
, 166 I ll. App. 3d at 319 (litigation inconvenienc es that are common to most lawsuits do not constitut e specia l injury). This is particula

rly true for a reta liatory discharg e claim, such as the one at issue in the underlying action, which is pr emised upon alleg ations that the plaintiff wa s discharg ed in reta liation for her repor ting of illega l or improp er conduct. See Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C.
, 185 I ll. 2d 372, 376 (1998) (discussing elements of a reta li at o ry d i s ch arg e claim). In the under lying action, W alter claimed that I PI ’s ostensible re asons for f iringher

wer e mer ely

a pre textfor reta liation be cause she had c omplained about patient c are . Thus, Walter’s alleg ed complaint about patient car e was not unrelated to her reta liatory discharg e claim, as implied by counsel for I PI during oral argument but, rathe r, an integ ral part of that claim. Such alleg ations of illega l or improper conduct would be a part of “ ‘any and all suits
prosec uted to rec over for like cause s o f action.’ ” Doyle
, 120 I ll. App. 3d at 817 (quoting Schwartz , 366 I ll. at 250). ¶ 24 I PI never

theless contends that, in this particula r case , defe ndants’ acc usations of illeg al and im proper conduct caused “specia l injury ” to I P I i n two way s: first, it suffe red harm t o its reputa tion; and second, it was require d to spend “an exceptional amount of its resour ces” in d ef en d i n g aga inst these acc usations. In this reg ard, I PI notes that it is in a “hig hly
regulated industry ,” such that claims of illega l a nd improper conduct would be particula rly harmful to I PI ’s business. ¶ 25 Wit h reg ard to the re putational harm a lleg ed by I PI , it is well established that injury to one’s rep u t at i o n “is an unfortunate consequenc e of most litigation and does not constitute

a specia l loss.” Doyle
, 120 I ll. App. 3d at 817; see also Stopka v. Lesser
, 82 I ll. App. 3d 323, 325 (1980); Balthazar v. Dowling
, 65 I ll. App. 3d 824, 826 (1978). For instance, in Stopka
, 82 I ll. App. 3d at 324, the plaintiff phy sician broug ht a malicious prosec ution suit ag ainst an attorney who had filed an alleg edly basele ss malprac tice suit ag ainst him. The Stopka court aff irmed the dismiss al of his complaint for failure to adequately alleg e specia l injury

. Id. at 325. In doing so, the court expli citly held that the “ ‘nec essity for defe nding one’s reputation’ ” was considere d “ ‘ordinar y injury ’ ” as a matter of law and was insufficient to support a claim for malicious prosec ution. Id. (quoting Lyddon v. Shaw
, 56 I ll. App. 3d 815, 818 (1978))

. Simi larly
, in Balthazar
, 65 I ll. App. 3d at 826, the court found that the plaintiff phy sicians had failed to show specia l injury as a result of a malprac tice suit wher e they

asser ted that thei r m al p ra cti ce premiums had risen and their profe ssional reputations had been impaired. We additionally note that the phy sician-plaintiffs in both Stopka and Balthazar wer e members of a “hig hly regulated industry ,” namely
, the prac tice of medicine, and y et such status did not rende r their claims of reputational harm cog nizable in the context of a m al i ci o us prosec ution claim. L ikewise, the fac t that I PI conducts business in a highly
regulated industry does not transfor m reputational harm into specia l injur y

. Nor does I PI
prese nt us with any

authority that would support such a pr oposition. ¶ 26 I PI ’s alleg ation that it was require d to spend a signific ant amount of resour ces to defe nd
ag ainst defe ndants’ claims is simil arly insufficient to constitute specia l injury

. L itigation
costs are mere ly “ordina

ry injuries” that would result from any litigation and are there fo re

-7-not specia l in nature . See Doyle , 120 I ll. App. 3d at 817-18; Ree d
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 875;

Petrick
, 68 I ll. App. 3d at 651. Consequently
, we must reje ct I PI ’s contention t h at i t adequately alleg ed specia l injury based upon defe ndants’ acc usations of illega l and improper conduct.

¶ 27 B. Multiplicity of Ac tions ¶ 28 Notwithstanding the fore g oing, I PI contends that the multipl icity of basele ss actions filed by the def endants in this case forms a c ampaig n of har assment t hat i s g reater than the s um of its parts and that, when v i ew ed as a whole, can hardly be considere d ordinary

. In that
reg ard, I PI claims that this case is analog ous to Cult Awareness
, 177 I ll. 2d 267, and Shedd
, 302 I ll. 355, both case s in wh i ch o u r s up reme court found that a “sustained onslaug ht of litigation” ( Cult Awareness
, 177 I ll. 2d at 285) was sufficie nt to satisfy the s p ec i al injury require ment. Def

endants, on the other hand, contend that both Cult Awareness and Shedd are fac tually inapposite in that the complained- of conduct here is not near ly as eg reg ious as the conduct involved in those c ases. We agree with defe ndants. ¶ 29 The plaintiff in Cult Awareness was a not-for- profit corpor ation eng ag ed in educating the public with respe ct to relig ious rights, fre ed o m s an d responsibilities. Id. at 269. Plaintiff broug ht a malicious prosec ution suit ag ainst t h e Church of Scientology
, alleg ing that the Church of Scientology induced i t s members to bring a total of 21 meritless suits ag ainst plaintiff in a 17-month time span for the express purpose of driving plaintiff to bankruptc y

. Id

. Our supreme court held that these alleg ations, if true, wer e sufficie nt to satisfy the specia l injury rule: “[T] he prese nt case involves alleg ations that a l ar ge national corpor ation improperly induced its members to eng ag e in a national campa ign of simult aneous malicious
prosec ution. Plaintiff has alleg ed that the Church of S cientology instituted the simult aneous suits, not to resolve any leg al dispute betwee n the parties, but to keep plaintiff from eng ag ing in its business of disseminating information reg arding relig ious fre ed o m

. The invidiousness of the alleg ed conspirac y is best ref lected in the fac t that plaintiff was sued 21 times over the course of a 17-month period in jurisdictions rang ing from New York to California. Such a sustained onslaug ht o f l i tigation can hardly be deeme d ‘ordinar

y ’ if plaintiff can prove that the actions wer e broug ht without pr obable

cause and with malice.” Id. at 285. ¶ 30 Plaintiff contends that the “sustained onslaug ht of litigation” instigate d by the defe ndant in Cult Awareness is analog ous to the multipl e actions broug ht by the defe ndants here
, g oing

so far as to state that in this reg ard, this case is “[i] dentical to Cult Awareness .” We disag ree

. The actions filed by Walter and her counsel–thre e administrative complaints and a single ci rc u i t court complaint in I llinois –are not compar able in scope to the situation in Cult Awareness
, wher e a larg e org anization induced its members to eng ag e in a n a tional campa ign of litigation that comprised a total of 21 a ctions. ¶ 31 Nor is t h i s ca s e analog ous to Shedd
, 302 I ll. 355. In that case , the defe ndant had filed nine succe ssive lawsuits ag ainst the plaintiff relating to the fore closure of a lease hold estate for unpaid rents. Id. at 356. The Shedd court found that the plaintiff had adequately alleg ed

-8-specia l injury
, since the defe ndant continued to bring succe ssive lawsuits ag ainst the plaintiff

despite the fac t that the substantive issues in the case “had been finally and conclusively adjudicate d ag ainst the defe ndant” and the courts “had repe atedly decide d that the defe ndant had no g rieva

nce.” Id. at 361-62. ¶ 32 By contra st, the three administrative complaints filed by Walter and her counsel wer e not

succe ssive actions attempting to r elitigate substantive issues that had alre ady been decide d but, r ather
, wer e filed simult aneously and addre ssed separ ate and distinct issues. As noted, Walter’s complaint filed under the Personnel Record Review Act wa s an attempt to obtain documents that Walter claimed wer e part of her personne l file at I PI

. Her wag e claim was an attempt to obtain compensation that she claimed was owed to her under the I llinois Wage Pay ment and Collection Act based on an alleg ed promised raise. Finally
, her discrimination char g e with the I llinois Depa rtment of Human Rights was premised on alleg ations of sexual hara ssment, ag e discrimination and reta liatory discharg e. T h es e t hree complaints wer e

con cu rr ent actions litigating separ ate matters, not succe ssive actions litigating the same matter, a s was the c ase in Shedd

. ¶ 33 I PI alleg es that Walter’s Personnel Record Review Act complaint was “duplicative and

unnece ssary” in that, if such documents exis ted, she could have obtained them via her other civil actions. Howeve r, even taking that alleg ation as true, as we must upon considering a section 2-615 motion to dismiss
, this complaint was not an attempt to relitig ate an issue that had alre ady been substantively decide d ag ainst her. On the contra ry , it was filed concur

rently with her other administrative complaints and prior to her circ uit court action. Thus, it cannot be said to be a

nalog ous to the claims of the Shedd defe ndant. ¶ 34 The only action broug ht by defe ndants in this case that was arguably compar able to the

succe ssive actions broug ht in Shedd was her circ uit court action, to the extent that it was an attempt to relitig ate the alleg ations of reta liatory discharg e that Walter had previously raised i n h er complaint with the I llinois Depa rtment of Human Rights. Howeve r, we note t h at Walter’s circ uit court claim for reta liatory discharg e was not entirely duplicative of her prior complaint. Rather, it was at least partially premised upon distinct fac tual alleg ations, namely
, W al t er ’s cl ai m that I PI dismiss ed her in reta liation for her complaints about t he quality of patient car e. In any event, a single
, partially duplicative action cannot fairly be compar ed to the multipl icity of actions that wer e broug ht in Shedd to relitig ate substantive issues that had alre ady been c onclusively

decide d by

the cour ts. ¶ 35 Rather, we find t his case to be analog ous to Howard v. Firmand , 378 I ll. App. 3d 147, 153 (2007), wher e the court found that succe ssive actions filed by the defe ndant ag ainst the plaintiff di d not rise to the l ev el o f hara ssment found i n Cult Awareness and in Shedd and there fore wer e insuffic ient to constitute special injury

. ¶ 36 The fac ts of Howard are as foll o ws : t h e p l ai n t i ff an d the defe ndant initially lived toge th er , b ut, following an argument, the defe ndant moved out. Id. at 148. The defe ndant then filed two succe ssive petitions seeking order s of protec tion ag ainst the plaintiff, alleg ing that the plaintiff had phy sically abused her. Id. Both petitions wer e denied. Id. The plaintiff subsequently brought a malicious prosec ution suit ag ainst the defe ndant. Id. at 148-49. The trial court dismiss ed his compl aint at the summary judgme nt stag e, and the Howard court

-9-aff irmed, explaining: “The fac ts here do not rise to the level of hara ssment that conce rned the court in Shedd and Cult

. There was no onslaug ht of litigation here

. Nor did [the defe ndant] bring

sever al succe ssive petitions ag ains t [t he plaintiff]. [The defe ndant] filed two section 214(a ) p et i t i o ns and alleg ed differ ent fac ts in eac h. The only injury suffe red by [t he plaintiff] was the customary expense, time and annoyance in defe nding ag ainst the litigation. T h es e injuries are not sufficie nt to sustain a cause of action for malicious
prosec ution.” Id. at 153. ¶ 37 L ikewise, as has been discussed, we find that the fac ts of this case do not rise to the level of hara ssment that conce rned the court in Shedd and Cult Awareness

. Although this c ase is
not e x actly like Howard
, we find it to be significantly closer to the f

acts of Howard than it is to the conspirac y in Cult Awareness
, wher e the plaintiff was sued 21 times in a 17-month period in jurisdictions acr oss the country , or even to the nine succe ssive actions filed by the defe ndant in Shedd . Consequently
, like the cour t in Howard , we r ejec t I PI ’s ar gument that the multiple actions filed by defe ndant constitute specia l injury to I PI

.

¶ 38 C. Discovery Abuse ¶ 39 I PI finally contends that it incurre d specia l injury as a result of defe ndants’ abuse of the discovery proce ss during Walter’s circ uit court action. I PI ’s alleg ations in this reg ard fall into
two cate g ories. First, I PI alleg es that defe ndants made expensive discovery demands for the sole appar ent purpose of causing economic harm to I PI

. Specifica lly
, I PI allege s t h at defe ndants demande d Walter’s hard drive, serve r backup tapes that wer e in use during Walter’s employ

ment and “thousa

nds of pag es” of private nursing information and patient

car e rec ords; howeve r, when I PI produce d these items, defe ndants failed to ev en ex amine them. Second, I PIalleg es that def endants de manded the names and contac t information of I PI employ ees so that they could contac t those employ ees and inform them that I PI had been

acc used of imprope r pay

ment of employ ees a

nd improper pa

tient car e. ¶ 40 I PI ’s alleg ations reg arding the cost of complying with discovery demands do not amount to specia l injury

. A defe ndant in a t y p i ca l lawsuit can expect that the plaintiff will make

v ar i o u s d iscovery demands, and the defe ndant can also expect that complying with tho s e demands may be both expensive and time-consuming
, particula rly if th e d ef

en d ant is a business with extensive rec ords that may potentially be rele vant t o t h e case

. Such inconvenienc e and expenditure is a routine, if unfortunate
, part of the litigation proce ss and does not constitute specia l injury for purposes of a malicious prosec ution action. See Keefe
, 166 I ll. App. 3d at 319 (havingone’s pe rsonal and busine ss affa irs examined in the course of discover

y is an inconvenie nce “ common to most l awsuits” and is not spec ial in nature)

. ¶ 41 I PI never

theless argues that the discovery expenditures it incurre d here went beyond the normal costs of lit i gat i o n beca use the discovery demands at issue wer e made solely for
purposes of hara ssing and causing economic harm to I PI

. Indeed, I PI claims that defe ndants made these discovery reque sts, in pa rt, so that they could sear ch for disgr untled employ ees and inform them that I PIhad bee n acc used of imprope r pay ment of employ ees and patient

car e proce dures. We cannot acc ept the argument that I P I ’s ex penditures in this reg ard

-10-constitute specia l injury
, beca use such an interpre tation of the el em ent of specia l injury would rende r it near ly toothless by way of conflating it with the element of malice and lack of probable cause

. Probable cause has been define d as a state of fac ts that would lead an ordinary person to have “ ‘an honest and sound suspicion’ ” that her claim is meritorious. Ely

v. National Super Marke ts, Inc.
, 149 I ll. App. 3d 752, 757-58 (1986) (quoting Carbaugh v. Peat
, 40 I ll. App. 2d 37, 47 (1963))

. Where a plaintiff lacks even an honest suspicion that her claim has merit, then her su i t i s n o t broug ht for the honest vindication of rig hts, and any discovery demands that she makes i n the cour se of that suit are likely to be for ha

rassment of one form or another

. I f the inconvenienc e and expense of such discovery demands could be considere d specia l injury
, then the specia l injury require ment would lose near ly all of its vitality as an element separate and distinct from that of ma lice and la ck of pr obable cause. I PI has not prese nted an y au thority that would support such a chang e in the law. On the
contra ry , our supreme court in Cult Awareness emphasiz ed t h e continuing vitality of the specia l injury require ment. Cult Awareness
, 177 I ll. 2d at 286 (stating that “we wish to stress that our holding with respe ct to the special injury require ment should not be viewed as a reje ction of the rule as set forth in our ear lier opinions”). Consequently
, we reje ct I PI ’s
cont enti on that the expense it incurre d in complying with defe ndants’ discovery demands constitutes a spec ial injury

. ¶ 42 We note in passing that even wher e a party fails to meet the require ment of specia l injury for purposes of a malicious prose cu t ion suit, that party may still obtain relief for an opponent’s abuse of the discovery proce ss throug h sanctions un d e r Su p r e me Court Rules 137 and 219. I ll. S. Ct. R. 137 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994); R. 219 (ef f. J uly 1, 2002). Rule 137 provides that an attorne y ’s sig nature on a plea ding, motion, or other paper constitutes a ce rtificate
“that to th e best of his knowledg e, information, and belief formed afte r rea sonable inqu i ry it is well g rounded in fac t and is war rante d by exis ting law or a g ood-fa ith
argument for the extensio n, modification, or reve rsal of exis ting law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to hara ss or to cause unnece ssary delay or needle ss increa se in the cost of litig ation.” I ll. S. C t. R. 137 (eff. F eb. 1, 1994).
I t further provides that, wher e an attorney violates this rule, the trial court m ay impose
appropr iate sanctions upon the attorney or her client. Id. L ikewise, under Rule 219(c)
, the trial court is authorized to respond to discovery abuses by imposing sanc t i ons upon the offe nding party
, including rea sonable ex penses i n cu rre d as a result of the abuse as well as a monetar y penalty in case of willful abuse. I ll. S. C t. R. 219 (eff. July 1, 2002). ¶ 43 Plaintiff corr ectly points out that the availability of such relief does not pree mpt recove ry for malicious prosec ution as long as all elements of the to rt have been satisfied. See Cult Awareness
, 177 I ll. 2d at 279 (“A lthough Rul e 137 was ado p t ed as a m eans of preventing false and fr ivolous filings, it was not meant to pre empt our existi ngtort law. The c ourts of this state have rec og nized, both befor e and afte r the adoption of Rule 137, the viability of a

cause of action sounding in malicious prosec ution.”). Howeve r, for all the rea sons that have been discussed above, we find that the element of specia l injury has not been satisfied under the fa cts as alleg ed by

I PIin its complaint. ¶ 44 Acc ording ly
, the judgme nt of the trial court dismiss ing I PI ’s complaint for failure to state

-11-a ca use of a ction for malicious prose cution is affirme d.

¶ 45 Affir

med.

-12-