BLD-177 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 20-2903

___________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. PEDRITO SANTIAGO MORETA, Appellant

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2:06-cr-00096-ER-1) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno

___________________ _________________ Submitted on Appellee’s Mo tion for Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circu it LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 June 16, 2022 Before: McKEE, GREENAWAY, JR ., and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: September 8, 2022)

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM Pro se appellant Pedrito Santiago Moreta appeals from the District Court’s order denying his motion for compassionate rel ease under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). The

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Government has filed a motion for summary affi rmance. For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion and will summar ily affirm the District Court’s judgment. In 2005, Moreta and others attempted to rob a Brinks truck and a check cashing store using a gun and a can of mace. After tria l, a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of using and carrying, and aiding a nd abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during a cr ime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The District Court imposed a sentence of 421 months’ impr isonment, which included mandatory consecutive 7- and 25- year sentences on the § 924(c) counts. We affirmed the conviction and sentence. See C.A. No. 07-43 09. In 2010, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied. In 2019, after we authorized him to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, Moreta filed a motion arguing that a Hobbs Act robbery could not serve as a predicate crim e of violence under § 924(c). That motion remains pending. The Bureau of Prisons currently estimates th at Moreta will be released on July 10, 2039. In August 2020, Moreta filed a motion fo r compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), seeking relief from the stacke d consecutive sentences imposed for his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He ar gued that, if sentenced today under § 924(c) as amended in 2018 by the First Step Act, he would receive a substantially shorter3 sentence for those convictions. 1 His motion also detailed his extensive efforts at rehabilitation while in prison. The Government filed a respon se in opposition. In an order entered on August 27, 2020, the District Court denied Moreta’s motion because he had not demonstrated “extrao rdinary and compelling” re asons as required under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See ECF No. 327. The Court relied on an analogous case, United States v. Andrews, 480 F.Supp.3d 669 (E.D. Pa. 2 020), in which it had re cently held that the sentencing disparities occasione d by the First Step Act amendment did not constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons under § 3582. The Court also explained that, while Moreta’s rehabilitation was “commendab le,” it was not sufficient to support a reduction in sentence. ECF No. 327 at 1(citi ng 28 U.S.C. §994(t), which provides that rehabilitation alone cannot constitute “e xtraordinary and compelling” reasons). Moreta filed this timely appeal. After he filed an opening brief, we granted the Government’s motion to stay briefing in th e appeal pending a decision in the Andrews case, which was also on appeal before this Court. We decided the Andrews appeal in August 2021, see United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021), and the stay of briefing was lifted. The Government has now moved for summary affirmance of the District Court’s order denying Moreta’s mo tion for compassionate release. Moreta opposes summary action.

1 According to the Government, under the amended § 924(c), Moreta’s total minimum term would be 15 years less than what was imposed. See Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance at 5.4 We have jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We re view the District Court’s order for an abuse of discretion, see Andrew s, 12 F.4th at 259, an d we “will not disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judg ment in the conclusion it re ached upon a we ighing of the relevant factors.” United States v. Pawlowsk i, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its di scretion by denying Moreta’s motion for compassionate release. Our decision in Andrews is dispositive here. In that case, we rejected the assertion that the nonretroactive changes to § 924(c) through the First Step Act qualified as “extraordinar y and compelling” reasons for reduction or release under § 3582. Andrews, 12 F.4th at 2 60-61. That is precisely what the District Court decided with respect to Moreta’s motion. Moreta has not meaningfully distinguished his situation from that in Andrews. Further, although Moreta contends that his rehabilitative efforts should have provided a sufficient “extraordinary and comp elling” reason for release, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion on this issue, also. There is no debate that Moreta submitted evidence of laudable re habilitative efforts. Neverthe less, the statute is clear that rehabilitation alone cannot constitute ex traordinary and compelling grounds under § 3582. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).5 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order. Moreta’s motion to stay the appeal pending the District Court’s decision on his § 2255 motion is denied.