RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4150-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAZAAR R. REDDING,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted January 21, 2021 – Decided March 9, 2021

Before Judges Alvarez and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 04-11-

2729.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Monica do 

Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Jazaar R. Redding appeals Law Division orders of August 2, 

2013 and August 23, 2018, denying his petitions for post-conviction relief 

(PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. 

The basis for defendant's petitions arises from his claim that trial counsel 

advised him that he would be receiving community supervision for life (CSL)

and not the more stringent parole supervision for life (PSL) when he pled guilty 

on January 10, 2005, to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A.

2C:24-4(a). The record reveals that defendant was placed on CSL and PSL, and 

then just PSL.

Trial counsel stated the Megan's Law plea form, including "[t]he special 

one that . . . explains to [defendant] exactly what community supervision for life 

entails[,]" was "filled out[]" with and "explained" to defendant. Defendant 

confirmed this, also stating that he read and understood the plea form. The 

Megan's Law conditions were reinforced by the judge's admonition to defendant 

that he would be "subject to [the] provisions of Megan’s Law. That is 

community supervision for life . . . . [A]mong other things, . . . you can’t leave 

the state without anybody telling you to, and there has been a two-page

document explaining to you in detail what community supervision for life is."

After defendant admitted that he had "sexual relations" with a fourteen-year-old 
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girl, the judge accepted his plea because it was entered "with full 

understanding[]" and "voluntarily[.]" 

In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced by the 

same judge on April 29, 2005, to two years' probation and time served. The 

judge stated he would be subject to "[t]he provisions of Megan’s Law[,]" with 

"parole supervision for life." There was no mention of CSL. The judgment of 

conviction (JOC) entered on May 3, 2005, noted that, with two pre-filled check 

boxes indicating defendant was sentenced to "community supervision for life"

and "a LIFE . . . term of parole supervision[.]" Defendant did not file a direct 

appeal. 

On December 2, 2005, an amended JOC dated November 28, 2005, was 

entered, noting: "THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED, AND 

THE DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED TO PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR 

LIFE."

On April 19, 2012, nearly seven years after his May 3, 2005 JOC and sixand-a-half years after his December 2, 2005 amended JOC, defendant filed a pro 

se PCR petition alleging counsel was ineffective for not fully explaining the 

concept of PSL and not arguing that he should not be subject to PSL because, 

among other reasons, the victim was not raped and she misled him to believe 
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she was eighteen years old, and he was not a sexual predator. After being 

assigned counsel, defendant argued that the five-year statutory time limit to file

for PCR should not apply "because he did not understand the law or the benefits 

of appealing his case, and he felt that the case was closed once he was 

convicted." 

Defendant's petition was dismissed with prejudice in an August 2, 2013

order, when he failed to appear for oral argument. PCR counsel did not know 

why defendant was not present. He advised the judge that the last time they met 

he told defendant of the court date, and that "every [phone] number I . . . have 

right now is off and not working." The judge stated defendant's petition was 

filed "almost" six-and-a-half years after the amended JOC, "well outside the 

five-year time limit[] mandated by [Rule] 3:22-12(a)(1)." Despite noting that 

he "was not overly impressed with [defendant's] argument[,]" the judge did not 

address "the merits of the petition in light of the fact that defendant has failed 

to" appear. 

Defendant did not appeal the August 2, 2013 dismissal order, but over 

thirteen months later, on November 12, 2014, a different defense counsel filed 

a motion to reconsider the order. Defendant asserted that prior PCR counsel 

failed to advise him of the August 2, 2013 argument date. He also alleged that 
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prior counsel forged his signature on a "Notice of Right to Appeal (PostConviction Relief)" form. 

The same PCR judge who dismissed defendant's first PCR petition, heard 

argument, and denied the application in a July 10, 2015 order and written 

decision. The judge initially determined that the motion to reconsider was 

untimely because it was filed over a year past the twenty-day period to file a 

reconsideration motion required by Rule 1:7-4(b). Considering the motion a 

second PCR because it alleged that the first PCR counsel failed to advise 

defendant of PCR argument date, the judge determined the application was 

untimely under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C) because it was not filed within one year 

of the August 2, 2013 dismissal of the first PCR petition. Defendant's 

application was three months and ten days late. The judge further pointed out 

that defendant failed to provide an affidavit or certification supporting the 

allegation that he was not advised of the August 2, 2013 hearing date. See State 

v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). 

The judge also addressed the merits of defendant's underlying PCR claim

that counsel was ineffective for not fully explaining the concept of PSL and,

therefore, he should not be subject to PSL. Noting the claim was untimely filed 

over nine years after defendant was sentenced in April 2005, the judge found 
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there was no proof of excusable neglect for the late filing. R. 3:22-12(a)(1). 

The judge further found there was no showing that a fundamental injustice 

would result because defendant professeed no claim of innocence to the 

conviction of endangering the welfare of a child, but merely asserted he should 

not be subject to PSL. R. 3:22-12(a)(1). Defendant did not appeal the July 10, 

2015 order. 

Nearly three years later, a self-represented defendant filed another PCR 

petition dated June 28, 2018. Based upon the record, it is not apparent what 

defendant alleged because that petition is not provided. Defendant's two-page 

form affidavit in support of PCR, specifying his conviction, sentence, and prior 

PCR petition, is provided, but it makes no mention of his claims. 

A different judge, treating the petition as a "second" PCR petition, denied 

relief in an August 23, 2018 order stating the:

. . . petition is out of time under Rule 3:22-12(a)(3), 

which only permits a second petition for postconviction relief to be treated as a first petition if filed 

within 90 days of the date of the judgment on direct 

appeal, and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which requires a 

second petition for post-conviction relief be filed 

within one year after the denial of the first petition 

. . . . 

Before us, defendant argues:
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POINT I

TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 

BY FAILING TO PROPERLY INFORM 

DEFENDANT THAT HE WAS SUBJECT TO 

PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE, THEREBY

MAKING DEFENDANT'S PLEA UNKNOWING 

AND INVOLUNTARY. HE ALSO FAILED TO 

OBJECT OR CORRECT THE TRIAL COURT WHEN 

IT IMPOSED PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE. 

POINT II

DEFENDANT WAS NOT AWARE OF THE AGE OF 

THE ALLEGED VICTIM, AND THUS HIS GUILTY 

PLEA WAS NEITHER KNOWING NOR 

VOLUNTARY[.] 

We find no merit in these arguments. 

Defendant's appeal of the August 2, 2013 order, which dismissed his first 

PCR petition, was not timely filed within forty-five days. R. 2:4-1(a). It is too 

late to challenge that order in his appeal. The petition was also deficient because 

it was filed well after five years of the conviction being challenged, with no 

showing of excusable neglect for its tardy filing and that fundamental injustice 

would occur if relief were denied. R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). 

Defendant's appeal of the September 5, 2018 order likewise suffers from 

a timeliness deficiency. The order properly denied essentially defendant's third 
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PCR petition filed on June 28, 2018, because it was filed well after one year of 

the second or subsequent petition. R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C). 

No further discussion is needed in this opinion as defendant's arguments 

lack sufficient merit.1 R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

1

 The appendix to defendant's merits briefs includes a May 22, 2019 certification 

from an Assistant Public Defender and a September 6, 2018 letter to defendant 

from the Office of Attorney Ethics of the Supreme Court enclosing a Court order 

of the same date stating that trial counsel was suspended from the practice of 

law for three months as a result of an ethics complaint defendant filed against 

counsel. The Court agreed with the findings of the Disciplinary Review Board 

that counsel violated

RPC 1.2(a) (failure to abide by a client's decisions 

concerning the scope and objectives of the 

representation)[;] RPC l.4(b) (failure to keep a client 

reasonably informed about the status of the matter)[;]

RPC 3.3(a)(l) (knowing[ly] making a false statement of 

material fact or law to a tribunal)[;] RPC 4.l(a)(1) 

(knowingly making a false statement of material fact or 

law to a third person)[;] RPC 8.1(a)(knowingly making 

a false statement of material fact in connection with a 

disciplinary matter)[;] and RPC 8.4(c)(conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation)[.] 

Because the Court's order was not brought to trial court's attention and 

defendant's brief does not explain how the order impacts this appeal, we do not 

consider it. See State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super. 349, 373 (App. Div. 2017) 

(holding we "decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to 

the trial court . . . unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction 

of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.") (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)); Gormley v. Wood-
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Affirmed.

El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014) (recognizing an issue not briefed is deemed 

waived).