18-21 Chris H. v. The State of New York 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29 th day of October, two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., GUIDO CALABRESI, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ Chris H., Plaintiff-Appellant , v. 18-21 The State of New York , Tandra L. Dawson, severally, jointly, in her individual capacity, in her official capacity as Judge of Supreme Court of the State of New York, Defendants-Appellees .

_____________________________________ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Chris H., pro se , New York, NY. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, Mark S. Grube, Assistant Solicitor General, for Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY.2 Appeal from judgment of the United States Dist rict Court for the Sout hern District of New York (Abrams, J .). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Appellant Chris H., proceeding pro se , appeals from the district court’s December 18, 2017 judgment dismissing his complaint against (1) th e State of New York a nd (2) New York State Supreme Court Justice Tandra L. Dawson in her offi cial and individual capacities. Chris H. had appeared before Justice Dawson at a state co urt hearing in ongoing proceedings relating to a matrimonial dispute. At the state court hearing, af ter Chris H. failed to comply with a court order requiring him to pay for an appraisal of his mari tal residence, Justice Dawson found him in civil contempt and he was remanded into custody. Chris H. was in custody from April 12 to April 14. Based on the hearing and his subs equent imprisonment, Chris H. filed suit in federal court, asserting 25 claims based on both federal and st ate law and seeking damages of $20 million. New
York State and Justice Dawson moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the federal claims on the grounds of sovereign and judicial immunity, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims . We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedur al history of the case, and the issues on appeal. On appeal from a judgment under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., we review “the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo .” Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc. , 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005). A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if, after co nstruing all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the district court “lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Id. (quoting Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). A district court's3 decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisd iction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp. , 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018). Here, the district cour t properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Chris H.’s federal claims for damages against New York and against Justice Dawson in her official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions in federal court against a state and against state officials acting in their official cap acities, unless the state wa ives sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates it. Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis. , 804 F.3d 178, 193 (2d Cir. 2015). New York has not waived its sovereign immunity in federal court for actions seeking damages like those sought in this case. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park
Comm’n , 557 F.2d 35, 39–40 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that Ne w York waives immunity from liability and consents to suit if a claimant brings suit in the Court of Claims, but does not do so for suits in federal court). Nor has Congress ab rogated state immunity for claims brought under § 1983 and § 1985. See Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y. , 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990) (§ 1983); Fincher v. State of Fla. De p’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n , 798 F.2d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1986) (§ 1985). Accordingly, New York is en titled to sovereign immunity, as is Justice Dawson. Chris H.’s federal dama ges claims against them are therefore barred. The district court was also correct in hol ding that judicial immunity barred Chris H.’s federal claims against Justice Dawson in her indi vidual capacity. “It is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits fo r money damages for their judicial actions,” and “even allegations of bad faith or malic e cannot overcome judi cial immunity.” Bliven v. Hunt , 579 F. 3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009). Judicial immunity ap plies if (1) “the releva nt action is judicial in nature” and (2) the judge “had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” Huminski v.
Corsones , 396 F.3d 53, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)). Judicial immunity can thus be overcom e in only two circumstance s: “First, a judge is4 not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e. , actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actio ns, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted). Neither circumstan ce is present here. Justice Dawson was acting in her judicial capacity as a justice of the New York State Supreme Court when she presided over the hearing in Chris H.’s matrimonial dispute and he ld him in civil contempt for failing to comply with a court order. The New York State Supr eme Court had jurisdicti on over these proceedings,

see N.Y. Const. art. VI § 7(a)–(b) (“The supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in law and equity.”), and Justice Dawson possessed th e authority to punish Chris H. “by fine and imprisonment” for his misconduct, which included “non-payment of a sum of money, ordered or adjudged by the court to be paid,” N.Y. Jud. Law § 753(A)(3). Judicial immunity thus bars Chris H.’s claims against Justice Dawson in her individual capacity. As to Chris H.’s state law claims, a federa l district court may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp. , 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006). Because the district court properly dismisse d Chris H.’s federal claims against New York and against Justice Dawson in her official and indi vidual capacities, the dist rict court did not abuse its discretion by also dismissing Chris H.’s st ate law claims against those defendants. We have considered all of Chris H.’s rema ining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk