Supreme Court

No. 2020-168-M.P.

(WC 11-615)

No. 2020-169-M.P.

(WC 11-616)

Champlin’s Realty Associates :

v. :

Coastal Resources Management 

Council et al. 

:

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical 

or other formal errors in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published.

October 14, 2022
- 1 -

Supreme Court

No. 2020-168-M.P.

(WC 11-615)

No. 2020-169-M.P.

(WC 11-616)

Champlin’s Realty Associates :

v. :

Coastal Resources Management 

Council et al. 

:

Present: Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. On October 19, 2020, this Court granted 

two petitions for writ of certiorari filed by the plaintiff, Champlin’s Realty 

Associates (Champlin’s), and we issued writs to review a June 17, 2020 judgment 

of the Superior Court “affirm[ing] in all respects the May 6, 2011 decision and the 

September 27, 2013 decision” of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management 

Council (the CRMC). The effect of the Superior Court judgment is to deny 

Champlin’s application, originally filed in 2003, to expand its marina on the Great 

Salt Pond in the Town of New Shoreham.

1

On December 15, 2020, Champlin’s sought from this Court an extension of 

time to submit its statement required by Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court 

1 The Town of New Shoreham comprises the entire area of Block Island. 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure, for the reason that it was engaged in mediation with 

the CRMC. Shortly thereafter, on January 8, 2021, Champlin’s and the CRMC filed 

a motion seeking to “incorporate and merge” a Joint Memorandum of Understanding 

(the MOU) “into a consent order of this Court.” Under its terms, the MOU purports 

to “serve as the CRMC’s Decision relative to this matter.” 

The intervenors, the Town of New Shoreham (the town), the Committee for 

the Great Salt Pond, the Block Island Land Trust, the Block Island Conservancy, and 

the Conservation Law Foundation (collectively the intervenors), as well as the 

Rhode Island Attorney General (the attorney general), contested the propriety of the 

purported settlement and the validity of the MOU. We remanded the matter to the 

Superior Court for findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the “propriety 

and conclusiveness” of the purported settlement and the validity of the MOU. On 

remand, the Superior Court held several hearings and issued a written decision. 

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision and resulting June 17, 

2020 judgment of the Superior Court, and we deny the request by Champlin’s and 

the CRMC to incorporate and merge the MOU into a consent order of the Supreme 

Court. 
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I

Facts and Travel 

In a state that proudly calls itself the Ocean State, it is perhaps not surprising 

that an application to expand a marina would generate intense public interest. Rhode 

Island measures only forty-eight miles from north to south and thirty-seven miles 

from east to west, yet it boasts 400 miles of shoreline. The fondness of Rhode 

Islanders for the ocean is indeed visceral and is reflected in such activities as 

swimming, fishing, sailing, surfing, motorboating, kayaking, quahogging, and 

simply viewing its breathtaking beauty. The right to enjoy many such activities was 

originally set forth in the Royal Charter of 1663 and is now enshrined in the state’s

constitution. R.I. Const., art. 1, § 17. 

The obligation of protecting Rhode Island’s marine resources falls primarily 

on the CRMC, as does the challenging task of balancing the myriad interests in and 

to the tidal waters and adjacent upland areas. In light of the many competing 

activities and the intense public interest which they generate, it is of the utmost 

importance that the CRMC operate under a clear set of parameters. These 

parameters are provided by the enabling statutes creating the CRMC (G.L. 1956 

chapter 23 of title 46), its own rules and regulations, and the overarching framework 

of the Administrative Procedures Act (the APA) (G.L. 1956 chapter 35 of title 42). 

With these principles in mind, we embark upon our review. 
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Champlin’s I

The travel of this case spans nearly two decades, and the facts concerning the 

origin of the case and the first phases of the litigation can be found in this Court’s

opinion in the case of Champlin’s Realty Associates v. Tikoian, 989 A.2d 427 (R.I. 

2010) (Champlin’s I). We refer the interested reader to that previous opinion for a 

recitation of the facts and travel leading up to the issuance of that opinion, and we 

confine ourselves herein to only those facts that are relevant to the present writs of 

certiorari. 

Champlin’s “operates a large marina on Block Island serving the needs of 

boaters and their craft.”

2 Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 431. In 2003, Champlin’s filed 

an application with the CRMC to extend its existing marina 240 feet into the Great 

Salt Pond, in order to accommodate 140 additional boats. Id. “The proposed 

expansion included 2,990 feet of fixed pier and an additional 755 feet of floating 

docks”; “[u]nder the proposal, the additional dockage would extend from the 

existing marina.” Id. The intervenors formally opposed the application, thereby 

making the proceeding a “contested case[]” under the CRMC Management 

Procedures, to be heard by a “duly authorized and appointed [s]ubcommittee.” Id.

2 At oral argument, counsel for Champlin’s indicated that Champlin’s had been sold 

to new owners, but he maintained that the sale has no bearing on the issues before 

this Court. 
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On January 10, 2006, following twenty-three hearings, the CRMC 

subcommittee “made forty-seven findings of fact and issued a recommendation with 

three votes in favor of a scaled-down modification of the proposal” that would result 

in a 170-foot expansion—rather than a 240-foot expansion—and one vote against. 

Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 432, 433. Ultimately, five members of the full CRMC

voted to approve the subcommittee’s recommendation, and five members voted 

against approval; the resulting tie vote constituted a rejection of the subcommittee’s 

recommendation. Id. at 433.

Champlin’s thereafter filed an administrative appeal with the Superior Court 

in accordance with the APA, § 42-35-15, seeking review of the CRMC’s decision 

rejecting its application. Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 433. The trial justice made 

extensive factual findings and credibility determinations regarding the testimony of 

the witnesses during sixteen evidentiary hearings, a show-cause hearing regarding 

this Court’s decision in Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813 (R.I. 2007)—a case that 

clarifies what ex parte communications are proscribed under the APA—and a 

limited hearing as to the disqualification of subcommittee member Gerald P. 

Zarrella. See Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 434-35. 

Based on her findings, the trial justice held that (1) Champlin’s substantial 

rights had been prejudiced by the subcommittee’s consideration of an 

“off-the-record” “compromise plan” (the Goulet plan) promoted by then-CRMC 
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chairman Michael Tikoian and subcommittee member Paul E. Lemont after the 

subcommittee hearings were completed; (2) the CRMC’s decision was made upon 

unlawful procedure and in excess of its statutory authority; and (3) Champlin’s 

substantial rights had been violated when two of the council members—Tikoian and 

Lemont—voted at the full council hearing despite what the trial justice viewed as

their demonstrated bias against the application. Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 435, 436, 

438. The trial justice ultimately found that members Tikoian, Lemont, and Zarella 

should not have taken part in the CRMC decision with respect to Champlin’s 

application. Id. at 435.

The trial justice thereafter declined to remand the case to the CRMC for 

further proceedings because, according to the justice, it would result in further delay 

in Champlin’s efforts to obtain a decision on its application. Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d

at 436. Instead, in reliance on Acierno v. Folsom, 337 A.2d 309 (Del. 1975), the trial 

justice “simply subtracted the votes of the three disqualified members from the five

to five tie vote rendered at the CRMC full council meeting.” Id. Accordingly, the 

trial justice reconfigured the final vote of the full council to four-to-three in favor of 

adopting the subcommittee recommendation, finding that such a determination was 

“supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record.” Id. at 

436-37. On April 20, 2009, the CRMC, Tikoian, and the intervenors sought review 
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of the Superior Court’s decision by petition for certiorari, which this Court granted. 

Id. at 437.

In the resulting opinion in Champlin’s I, we first addressed Champlin’s 

challenge to standing. Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 437. This Court held that, “[w]e 

are of the opinion that Tikoian, the CRMC, and the intervenors are all aggrieved 

parties within the statute and, therefore, properly are before this Court.” Id. at 438. 

Specifically, the Court concluded that the intervenors had established that they were 

aggrieved by a final judgment in accordance with § 42-35-16(a), noting that the 

Superior Court’s “substitution of the CRMC decision with the subcommittee 

recommendation left the intervenors with no avenue of review except through the 

discretionary writ of certiorari.” Id. 

This Court additionally held that the trial justice erred when she subtracted 

the disqualified votes and elevated the subcommittee recommendation to a CRMC 

decision. Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 442. Rather, the Court held that, in light of this 

Court’s opinion in Arnold, the only appropriate remedy was to remand the matter to 

the CRMC “for supplementation of the record with the ex parte communications to 

be included to allow the parties to appropriately respond and cross-examine.” Id. 

Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to 
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remand the matter to the CRMC for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.3

Id. at 450.

Post-Champlin’s I Proceedings 

The case was then remanded to the CRMC, and three hearings were conducted 

between May and July 2010, followed by briefing by all parties. On January 11, 

2011, the CRMC held a hearing and rendered a decision on Champlin’s application. 

Seven members were present, and each member attested to having read “all of the 

documents that have been engendered over the years of the deliberation of this 

matter.” Counsel for the CRMC then reviewed the status of the CRMC’s previous 

decision and summarized the charge to the members. Each of the seven CRMC 

members present then offered specific comments on Champlin’s application. 

In addition, the members offered comments on the location of “Mooring Field 

E.” The town utilizes Mooring Field E for rental moorings for transient boaters; it 

is located northeast of Champlin’s marina. In 1988, the United States Army Corps 

of Engineers granted the town a permit to establish Mooring Field E with a capacity 

of eighty moorings; in 1995, it approved the town’s application to expand Mooring 

Field E to an area that surrounded the existing marina and to increase its mooring 

3 We note that in Champlin’s Realty Associates v. Tikoian, 989 A.2d 427 (R.I. 2010) 

(Champlin’s I), this Court addressed further issues beyond what we have discussed 

herein; we address only those rulings that are relevant to our review relating to the 

present writs of certiorari. 
- 9 -

capacity to one hundred. In 1991, the CRMC approved—and the town adopted—

the first Harbor Management Plan (the 1991 plan), which identified the rental 

mooring field as Mooring Field E; its configuration reflected an “imperfect 

triangular shape, with its southern border situated one hundred feet from the 

outermost dock of Champlin’s Marina and a portion extending around the western 

boundary of Champlin’s Marina, forming a so-called lobe.” 

In 1999, the town submitted a new Harbor Management Plan to the CRMC 

(the 1999 plan), which “did not alter or otherwise reconfigure Mooring Field E from 

that which was plotted and approved in the 1991 [p]lan.” After it was submitted by 

the town to the CRMC for review and approval, the 1999 plan was not reviewed 

until 2003, when Champlin’s application at issue in these cases was filed. This was 

“[b]ecause Champlin’s application, in part, sought to expand into the adjacent 

Mooring Field E and/or to relocate certain rental moorings.” The CRMC therefore 

consolidated the two matters—Champlin’s application and the town’s proposed 

1999 plan. 

On remand, the members unanimously voted to deny Champlin’s application 

for a proposed expansion plan into the Great Salt Pond. The members also 

unanimously voted to adopt the location of Mooring Field E so as to allow a 300-foot 

fairway from Champlin’s existing structure to Mooring Field E, an increase from an

existing one-hundred-foot fairway, and to eliminate the lobe that was situated to the 
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west of Champlin’s existing dock. The CRMC then issued a written decision on 

May 6, 2011, containing ninety-one findings of fact and ten conclusions of law. 

Champlin’s filed two complaints in Providence County Superior Court: (1) on 

February 4, 2011, appealing the oral vote of the CRMC denying Champlin’s 

application on January 11, 2011, and (2) on June 1, 2011, appealing that oral vote 

and the CRMC’s May 6, 2011 written decision.4 Additionally, the town filed a 

complaint against the CRMC in Washington County Superior Court on May 19, 

2011, appealing the portion of the May 6, 2011 written decision of the CRMC 

mandating that, “Mooring Field E must be drawn so as to allow a 300 foot-wide

navigational channel between the mooring field and Champlin’s marina as well as 

the other existing marinas in the [Great Salt Pond].” The three cases were 

consolidated by the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court, and venue was 

designated as Washington County.5

In its memorandum before the Superior Court, Champlin’s compared the 

CRMC’s treatment of Champlin’s expansion to that of its neighbor, Payne’s Dock, 

alleging disparate treatment. The cases were then remanded “to the CRMC for a 

4 The defendants named in Champlin’s Superior Court complaints are the members 

of the CRMC in their official capacities; the CRMC; and the intervenors, namely: 

the Town of New Shoreham, the Committee for the Great Salt Pond, the Block Island 

Land Trust, the Block Island Conservancy, and the Conservation Law Foundation.

5 Upon transfer, Champlin’s two administrative appeals were assigned Washington 

County case numbers; therefore, PC 11-661 became WC 11-615 and PC 11-3130 

became WC 11-616. 
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second time for the presentation of evidence into whether Champlin’s received 

disparate treatment from the CRMC.” Four evidentiary hearings were held before 

the CRMC on the matter; and, on September 27, 2013, the CRMC issued its written 

decision comparing the two marinas and concluding that there was a rational basis 

for the CRMC’s denial of Champlin’s application and the approval of Payne’s

Dock’s application. 

While on remand, the CRMC additionally addressed and modified its May 6, 

2011 decision concerning the configuration of Mooring Field E, noting a

discrepancy between the CRMC’s oral vote and the written decision. The CRMC 

ordered that Mooring Field E “shall be situated 300 feet off of all three marinas 

(Payne’s, Block Island Boat Basin, and Champlin’s) in order to provide for a 

300-foot-wide fairway”; the town thereafter withdrew its Superior Court appeal. 

The cases were thereafter returned to the Superior Court, and the parties filed 

additional memoranda addressing the September 2013 CRMC decision. 

A second trial justice ultimately issued a written decision on February 11, 

2020, affirming “in all respects the May 6, 2011 decision and the September 27, 

2013 decision of the CRMC.”6 The trial justice found that there was legally 

sufficient evidence in the record to support both the CRMC’s denial of Champlin’s 

6 We note that the trial justice filed a lengthy and meticulous decision approximately 

six years after the parties filed their memoranda. The record contains no explanation 

for the lapse of time, and we are troubled by the seemingly unwarranted delay. 
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application to expand its marina and the CRMC’s determination that there were 

significant differences in the applications filed by Champlin’s and Payne’s Dock. 

The trial justice held that the CRMC had acted within its authority in denying

Champlin’s application and that the agency’s decision was “rational, logical, and 

supported by substantial evidence.” The court concluded that “Champlin’s rights 

have not been prejudiced by any constitutional violations, error of law, or arbitrary 

or capricious conduct on the part of CRMC.” 

Judgment entered in favor of the CRMC and the intervenors on June 17, 2020. 

Proceedings on Certiorari in this Court

Champlin’s thereafter filed petitions for writs of certiorari on July 1, 2020, 

which were opposed by the intervenors and the CRMC. The petitions were granted, 

and the writs issued on October 19, 2020. 

On January 8, 2021, Champlin’s and the CRMC filed a joint motion seeking 

to “incorporate and merge” the MOU “into a consent order of this Court[,]” the MOU 

having been arrived at by the two moving parties—Champlin’s and the CRMC—in 

the context of a private mediation.7 The intervenors and the attorney general—the 

latter official having moved successfully to intervene “for the sole and limited 

7 The MOU is dated December 29, 2020. The proposed consent order document that 

the movants seek to have entered has never been filed with this Court.
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purpose of opposing” the joint motion—filed memoranda in opposition to the joint 

motion. 

On March 26, 2021, this Court denied the joint motion and ordered 

Champlin’s to file a statement pursuant to Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court 

Rules of Appellate Procedure within twenty days, which Champlin’s did. 

On May 13, 2021, Champlin’s filed a motion for remand to the Superior 

Court, to which the intervenors and the attorney general objected; on June 10, 2021, 

the CRMC submitted a memorandum in support of Champlin’s motion for remand. 

On June 11, 2021, this Court granted Champlin’s motion and remanded the matter 

“to the Superior Court for findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the 

‘propriety and conclusiveness’ of the purported settlement and the validity of the 

MOU.” The Court further ordered that the matter “be returned to this Court no later 

than ninety (90) days from the date of this Order.” 

The Remand Hearings in Superior Court

On remand, a third justice of the Superior Court (the remand justice) held 

several evidentiary hearings to allow for findings of fact and conclusions of law. A 

written decision was issued on September 9, 2021, wherein the remand justice stated 

that he had

“established a three-phase procedure in order to gather the 

necessary information to follow the Supreme Court’s 

order. The first phase was for the proponents of the MOU 

to present evidence about what happened surrounding the 
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mediation and the execution of the MOU; the second 

phase was for the opponents to present witnesses and 

evidence questioning what happened; and the third phase 

was for the proponents to present rebuttal evidence.” 

The remand justice then set forth approximately forty-five pages of factual findings. 

He began by reviewing the circumstances surrounding the ultimate formation of the 

MOU, and he additionally summarized the testimony of the witnesses and assessed 

their credibility. The remand justice then made conclusions of law regarding the 

propriety and conclusiveness of the settlement between Champlin’s and the CRMC 

and the validity of the MOU itself. 

The remand justice began his analysis by addressing whether the CRMC had 

the authority to mediate with Champlin’s. He noted the strong public policy in favor 

of settlements and this Court’s support of mediation and alternative dispute 

resolution. He further stated that, once an agency’s decision is challenged (by appeal 

in the court system under the APA), the agency’s role changes from that of an 

adjudicator to that of an advocate before the judiciary; he determined that the

“CRMC became a party to the appeal in the Superior Court” and that, therefore, the 

“CRMC and Champlin’s, as two parties, could enter settlement discussions and 

proceed to mediation.” Indeed, the remand justice found that the CRMC was not 

precluded by state law or by its own regulations to resolve cases through mediation, 

citing § 46-23-20 and 650 RICR 10-00-1.8(C). The remand justice was additionally 

persuaded by the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Local Number 93 v. City 
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of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); the remand justice found that, under the 

reasoning in that case, “the [i]ntervenors do not have the ability to block the mediated 

settlement itself, but * * * the [i]ntervenors have the right to notice and an 

opportunity to be heard before the MOU is ratified or adopted[.]” 

The remand justice then addressed the issue of notice to the intervenors. He 

found that, because mediation is “extra-judicial” and “very informal[,]” it does not 

require formal notice. He then determined that “sufficient, actual notice was 

given[,]” identifying the four ways in which he found that the intervenors had been 

notified of the mediation. 

Finally, the remand justice considered “whether entry of final judgment in 

accord with the MOU is appropriate.” On that issue, he determined that, although 

the intervenors “do not have the authority to block a mediated settlement[,]” a 

“fairness hearing” should be held in accordance with Local Number 93, to give the 

intervenors an “opportunity to present evidence and have their objections heard.” 

On September 14, 2021, Champlin’s moved on an emergency basis for further 

remand for a “fairness hearing,” which was supported by the CRMC; the intervenors 

and the attorney general objected to the motion for further remand. The papers were 

returned to this Court from the Superior Court on September 20, 2021. On October

15, 2021, we entered an order which (1) added the Superior Court record of the 
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remand proceedings to the record previously certified by the Superior Court on 

certiorari and (2) denied Champlin’s emergency motion for further remand. 

II

Standard of Review

The APA, G.L. 1956 chapter 35 of title 42, governs the Superior Court’s 

review of an administrative appeal. Section 42-35-15(g) of the APA sets forth that:

“The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of 

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or 

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse 

or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant 

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, 

inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

“(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

“(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

“(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

“(4) Affected by other error of law;

“(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, 

and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

“(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 

discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”

The APA also limits this Court’s review of the Superior Court’s judgment in 

administrative proceedings. Section 42-35-16 (governing review by this Court of 

judgments entered pursuant to § 42-35-15). “In conducting such a review, we are 
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restricted to questions of law, which we review de novo.” Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 

437 (citing Rossi v. Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 895 A.2d 106, 

110 (R.I. 2006)). “The factual findings of the administrative agency are entitled to 

great deference.” Id. “However, when the review of the trial court’s decision is 

conducted under a writ of certiorari, as it is here, ‘this Court applies the some or any 

evidence test and reviews the record to determine whether legally competent 

evidence exists to support the findings.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Sartor v. 

Coastal Resources Management Council, 542 A.2d 1077, 1082-83 (R.I. 1988)).

III

Discussion 

A

The 2020 Decision and Judgment

We begin our analysis by addressing the issues raised by Champlin’s 

concerning the Superior Court’s 2020 judgment and the underlying decision of the 

trial justice. Before this Court, Champlin’s submits that the trial justice committed 

multiple errors and urges this Court to reverse her decision denying Champlin’s 

appeal and affirming the CRMC’s decisions. In its brief, Champlin’s first asserts 

that the subcommittee recommendation issued in January 2006 was not vacated by

this Court’s opinion in Champlin’s I and that the recommendation should have

“served as the starting point” for the hearings on remand. According to Champlin’s,
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this error was compounded by the trial justice, who allegedly failed to consider the 

subcommittee recommendation and instead focused solely on the original 

application by Champlin’s to the CRMC. Finally, Champlin’s faults the trial 

justice’s handling of the water quality certificate issue, the mooring field issue, and 

the issue of disparate treatment, all of which Champlin’s suggests warrant reversal. 

We shall address these issues seriatim.

Subcommittee Recommendation

Champlin’s first takes issue with the procedure pursuant to which the CRMC 

conducted its proceedings after this Court’s decision in Champlin’s I. It argues that 

the procedure was “unlawful * * * in violation of § 46-23-20.4, clearly erroneous 

and constituted an arbitrary, capricious abuse of discretion.” Most significantly, 

Champlin’s faults the CRMC for rejecting the subcommittee recommendation, 

ignoring the subcommittee’s findings, and disregarding this Court’s mandate to 

“reopen the hearing on the Champlin’s application” and expand the record to include 

the Goulet plan. 

Champlin’s contends that it was “irrevocably prejudiced” by the following 

statement by the CRMC’s counsel at the outset of the hearing on remand: 

“I think the Supreme Court case law is very clear, that 

when a matter is remanded to an agency with the hearing 

of additional evidence * * * that that matter is then heard 

de novo by the agency, and I stated that on previous 

occasions. Additionally, I believe the Supreme Court 

decision invalidated both the full Council decision and the 
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subcommittee recommendation. So, that being said, 

hearing the matter de novo, you are here to approve, 

modify or deny the application filed by Champlin’s Realty 

as well as the request of the Town of New Shoreham for 

the location of Mooring Field E.” 

According to Champlin’s, the decision in Champlin’s I did not invalidate the 

subcommittee recommendation that a 170-foot expansion be allowed rather than the 

240-foot expansion as contemplated in the original application. Rather, it provided 

for an expanded record, which then “should have served as the starting point for 

these hearings, with due consideration, for the Goulet plan[.]” As a result, the full 

committee allegedly “ignored virtually all of the findings of the [s]ubcommittee” 

and considered only the original application. 

This error was exacerbated, Champlin’s maintains, by the CRMC’s failure to 

comply with § 46-23-20.4(a), which provides: 

“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, every hearing 

for the adjudication of a violation or for a contested matter 

shall be held before a hearing officer or a subcommittee. 

The chief hearing officer shall assign a hearing officer to 

each matter not assigned to a subcommittee. After due 

consideration of the evidence and arguments, the hearing 

officer shall make written proposed findings of fact and 

proposed conclusions of law which shall be made public 

when submitted to the council for review. The council 

may, in its discretion, adopt, modify, or reject the findings 

of fact and/or conclusions of law; provided, however, that 

any modification or rejection of the proposed findings of 

fact or conclusions of law shall be in writing and shall state 

the rationales therefor.”

In her decision, the trial justice commented: 
- 20 -

“The clear mandate by the Supreme Court on remand to 

the CRMC was to expand the record to include all 

previously impermissible ex parte communications, 

including the Goulet plan, allow cross-examination by any 

party on such additional testimony or evidence, and render 

a decision based upon the entire record—the 

subcommittee and workshop records, supporting data, 

supplementary material and, naturally, the records of all 

proceedings before the full Council. * * * The CRMC did 

just that.” 

We agree. 

In Champlin’s I, the Court returned the case to the Superior Court with 

directions to remand the matter to the CRMC to reopen the hearings and expand the 

record to include the Goulet plan and all supporting materials. Champlin’s I, 989 

A.2d at 449, 450. The matter was to be heard by the then-members of the CRMC, 

provided that each voting member certify that he or she had read the entire record.

Id. at 449. Clearly the mandate required the CRMC to consider Champlin’s 

application in a de novo manner. See Hagopian v. Hagopian, 960 A.2d 250, 253 

(R.I. 2008) (referring to the obligation of the lower court to implement the letter and 

spirit of the mandate of the appellate court). 

The Court also emphasized in Champlin’s I that “the subcommittee simply is 

not authorized under the CRMC Management Procedures to render a decision for 

the CRMC. The subcommittee recommendation remained just that, a mere 

recommendation to the full council.” Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 448. However, the 
- 21 -

subcommittee findings and recommendation were a part of the record. As counsel 

for the CRMC advised the members:

“[T]he members having read the entire record and having 

the complete record before them, if any of the findings of 

either the previous full Council’s decision or the 

subcommittee recommendation still have vitality to them, 

they are certainly free to adopt those as their own 

findings.” 

Based upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that the CRMC 

appropriately implemented both the letter and spirit of this Court’s mandate in 

Champlin’s I. As the Court observed, the record upon which the subcommittee 

recommendation was based was not complete because the “impermissible ex parte

information” was not made available for the examination of the parties. Champlin’s 

I, 989 A.2d at 449. We also find it significant that, at the full council hearing on 

February 28, 2006, the CRMC failed to adopt the subcommittee recommendation in 

a tie vote. Id. at 433. To be sure, two members of the CRMC voting thereon—one 

voting in favor of adoption and one against—were subsequently disqualified because 

of bias. Id. at 433, 435.8 Nevertheless, the “tie vote constituted a rejection of the 

recommendation.” Id. at 433.

8

In Champlin’s I, this Court observed that the trial justice determined that three 

members of the CRMC should have been disqualified due to bias. Champlin’s I, 989 

A.2d at 435. The Court, however, held that the trial justice’s finding of bias as to

one of the members was not based on legally competent evidence. Id. at 447-48. As 

a result, this Court held that only two of those three members had been properly 

disqualified. Id. at 444. 
- 22 -

Also, we discern no error in the CRMC’s failure to state its rationale for 

rejecting the subcommittee’s findings of fact in writing as required by 

§ 46-23-20.4(a). As noted supra, the subcommittee findings at issue were predicated 

upon an incomplete record and were “reject[ed]” by a tie vote of the full CRMC.

Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 433. More significantly, the Court’s opinion in 

Champlin’s I provided that: 

“[T]his case should be returned to the Superior Court with 

an order that that tribunal remand the matter to the CRMC. 

That body should be ordered to expeditiously reopen the 

hearing on the Champlin’s application. The record is to be 

expanded to include the Goulet plan and all supporting 

materials.” Id. at 449. 

It is patently evident from that language that such proceedings were to 

transpire before the full CRMC and not the subcommittee. Thus, it was not 

necessary for the subcommittee to consider the new evidence and perhaps reassess 

its recommendation. The remand further permitted all members of the CRMC to 

vote on Champlin’s application, but only on the condition that each member “certify 

that he or she has read the entire record before the council, including the transcripts 

of the subcommittee hearings and workshop[.]” Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 449. In 

accordance with the remand instructions, therefore, each voting member was aware 

of the subcommittee’s findings and the underlying evidence, but the members were

not required to give deference to such findings. 
- 23 -

Moreover, in accordance with the remand order, the CRMC rendered a 

decision containing ninety-one findings of fact and ten conclusion of law that 

comprehensively set forth its rationale for denying Champlin’s application. 

Champlin’s repeatedly emphasizes that “the Superior Court’s examination of 

the record was focused, almost exclusively on the original application[,]” 

notwithstanding the fact that Champlin’s “specifically adopted the recommendation 

of the subcommittee.” The record reveals, however, that the original application 

was never withdrawn or amended. Indeed, the record suggests that agendas for the

CRMC meetings at which Champlin’s application was heard referred to the original 

application.9

9 For example, at the January 11, 2011 CRMC meeting, the agenda item read as 

follows:

“Application before the Full Council in accordance with 

Remand Order from the Rhode Island Supreme and 

Superior Courts and Continuance Order issued on 

November 18, 2010:

“2003-05-155 CHAMPLIN’S REALTY ASSOCIATION --

Expansion of existing marina facility consisting of an 

additional 2,990 linear feet of fixed pier, and 755 linear 

feet of floating docks, with corresponding expansion of 

existing marina perimeter limit (area) by approximately 4 

acres, however, it should be noted that the requested 

marina perimeter limit (‘MPL’) seeks approximately 13 

acres. The stated increase in marina capacity is 140 boats. 

Additionally, this matter was consolidated with the Town 

of New Shoreham’s request for CRMC approval of its 

Harbor Management Plan. The Harbor Management Plan 
- 24 -

Water Quality Certificate

Champlin’s next ascribes error to the trial justice’s determination that the 

water quality certificate issued by the Rhode Island Department of Environmental 

Management (DEM) was not the controlling authority with respect to all issues 

concerning water quality. It argues that “the trial justice overlooked the evidence 

that it is the practice of CRMC to rely on the DEM water quality certificate and not 

issue [its] own certificate[,]” a practice that, Champlin’s asserts, has been codified 

in § 46-23-6(1)(iv): 

“* * * all plans and programs shall be developed around 

basic standards and criteria, including: 

“* * * 

“(D) Water quality standards set by the director of 

[DEM].” 

Under the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMP),

CRMP § 300.1 sets forth eleven requirements that Champlin’s had to satisfy to 

obtain a Category B Assent, one of which was to “demonstrate that there will be no 

significant deterioration in the quality of the water in the immediate vicinity as 

issues were limited to the location and size of Mooring 

Field E. Project to be located at plat 19, lots 5 and 6; West 

Shore Road, New Shoreham, RI.” 
- 25 -

defined by DEM[.]” CRMP § 300.1(8).10 Other requirements, however, also 

concern issues of water quality, such as: 

“(5) demonstrate that the alteration or activity will not 

result in significant impacts on the abundance and 

diversity of plant and animal life[;]”

“* * *

“(7) demonstrate that the alteration will not result in 

significant impacts to water circulation, flushing, 

turbidity, and sedimentation[.]” CRMP § 300.1(5), (7). 

When confronting this issue, the trial justice stated that “[t]he criteria that 

Champlin’s is required to satisfy for a Category B assent includes several distinct 

areas which all deal with water quality in different ways[.]” She further noted that 

the CRMC’s decision addressed the interplay between a water quality certificate 

issued by DEM and the CRMC’s approval process. The council emphasized in its 

decision that the “CRMC’s review regarding water quality issues is independent and 

broader than DEM’s review of water quality issues[,]” and that the issuance of a 

DEM water quality certificate does not resolve all issues associated with water 

quality. 

10 In the CRMC’s May 6, 2011 decision, it is stated that “[t]he applicable provisions 

of the Coastal Resources Management Program (‘CRMP’) are Sections 120, 200.3, 

300.1, 300.4, and 335.” In the trial justice’s 2020 written decision, she also 

confirmed that the CRMC’s May 6, 2011 decision identified, and the parties did not 

dispute, that sections 200.3, 300.1, 300.4, and 335 of the CRMP were applicable.
- 26 -

In Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council of Rhode Island, 434 

A.2d 266 (R.I. 1981), this Court stressed that very point; there, an applicant seeking 

to build a summer home challenged the requirement that the plan for sewage disposal 

had to be reviewed by two agencies—the Rhode Island Department of Health (DOH) 

and the CRMC. Milardo, 434 A.2d at 267, 272. The Court emphasized that the 

“Legislature could have assigned both functions to the same agency[, but] [i]n 

choosing not to do so, the Legislature doubtless considered the need for special types 

of expertise in the discharge of the separate but similar functions of both agencies.” 

Id. at 273. Although DOH had conditionally approved the proposed sewage disposal 

system, the CRMC denied the application; and this Court stated that “this result 

derived from the distinct functions of these tribunals as was implicit in the [DOH’s] 

requirement that [the applicant] present his [or her] plan to the council.” Id. at 267, 

268, 273. 

In New Castle Realty Company v. Dreczko, 248 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2021), the 

Court grappled with a similar issue wherein the plaintiff, after receiving a DEM 

permit to alter freshwater wetlands, filed an application with the municipal zoning 

board for a special-use permit to install a septic system within one hundred feet of 

wetlands and for a dimensional variance from requirements for house placement on 

a parcel. New Castle Realty Company, 248 A.3d at 640-41. The zoning board denied 

the application for both a special-use permit and a dimensional variance. Id. at 641. 
- 27 -

The plaintiff appealed the zoning board’s denial, contending, inter alia, that the 

standard to approve a special-use permit was ipso facto satisfied by DEM’s approval. 

Id. However, the zoning board contended that DEM’s approval did not require the 

zoning board to grant a special-use permit. Id. at 642. 

In New Castle Realty Company, we explained that, “[w]hile both DEM and 

zoning boards address public interest considerations, not every standard set forth in 

the zoning ordinance is pertinent to what must be considered by DEM in granting or 

denying a permit—DEM and zoning boards each serve separate functions.” New 

Castle Realty Company, 248 A.3d at 644. We also held, however, that the zoning 

board lacked the specialized knowledge necessary to refute DEM’s decisions; we 

determined therefore that “an applicant for zoning relief ought to be able to rely on 

permits granted by DEM with respect to those matters uniquely within DEM’s 

expertise.” Id. at 645, 646. 

Unlike in New Castle Realty Company, where DEM’s findings were not 

expressly contradicted, in the case at bar the trial justice held that not only did CRMP 

§ 300.1 provide for separate and distinct criteria that Champlin’s was required to 

satisfy in addition to the water quality certificate issued by DEM, but also the CRMC 

had found that the surveys offered by Champlin’s professional wetland scientist, 

Scott Rabideau, were incomplete. The CRMC emphasized that Rabideau’s shellfish 

survey did not include sampling points within the area of the proposed expansion 
- 28 -

and also the “survey was conducted at a time of year when shellfish would not be 

expected to be found,” thus requiring a follow-up survey. The trial justice noted that 

the CRMC had faulted Champlin’s for “failing to conduct the follow up surveys that 

Rabideau himself opined were necessary[.]” Specifically, the trial justice stated that 

the water quality certificate issued by DEM “did not fill the void that was left when 

he failed to complete the surveys as he said needed to be done to address the skewed 

results based upon the time of the year that he had conducted his survey.” 

The trial justice cited to other competent evidence, including the testimony of 

a DEM witness that revealed the narrower focus of DEM’s review. Angelo Liberti, 

who was, at that time, Chief of the Office of Water Resources within DEM, testified 

that a water quality certificate focuses primarily on “complying to anti-degradation,” 

which he described as looking at a change in water quality. Liberti further described 

a model that analyzes the amount of fecal coliform existing in gray water vessel 

discharge. The trial justice stated in her decision that “DEM’s analysis of the number 

of vessels that will result in a permissible amount of fecal coliform is limited in scope 

as compared to the CRMP, and specifically the eleven criteria for a Category B 

assent.” For these reasons, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in upholding 

the CRMC’s review of all the evidence and the agency’s ultimate determination with 

respect to water quality that differed from the determination that had been made by 

DEM. 
- 29 -

Mooring Field E

Champlin’s additionally avers that the trial justice committed reversible error 

in her findings concerning the impact of Champlin’s proposed expansion upon the 

mooring field. In the context of explaining her conclusion that Champlin’s and 

Payne’s Dock were not similarly situated, the trial justice made the following finding 

of fact: “the evidence of record established that the [t]own would lose up to forty of 

its rental moorings (from the currently approved one hundred rental moorings) if 

Champlin’s expansion were granted.” She based this finding upon the testimony of 

the CRMC staff engineer Kenneth Anderson before the subcommittee on February 

17, 2005. 

Champlin’s argues that this finding is “simply incorrect and result[s] from 

[Anderson’s] hypothetical statement about fictitious moorings.” Anderson testified 

that Mooring Field E consisted of seven acres and that, if Champlin’s application 

were granted, three of those acres would be eliminated. He further stated that he had 

seen “diagrams that presented [one hundred] moorings in the field” and that, by 

eliminating those acres, he would “venture to guess [that forty], [thirty] to [forty] 

moorings” would be lost. 

In a 2013 hearing before the CRMC, Anderson clarified his earlier testimony: 

“The estimate of the number of moorings lost was based 

on the ratio of how much of the mooring field area was 

being eliminated by the proposed expansion in the 

fairway. They weren’t actual moorings. The [t]own had 
- 30 -

the right to deploy moorings up to within [one hundred] 

feet of the existing facility, but it did not -- I think your 

testimony was that the moorings, the closest mooring ball 

was some [three hundred] feet from Champlin’s dock. 

That was by virtue of the fact that the [t]own didn’t 

exercise its full right to deploy moorings up to within [one 

hundred] feet of the existing marina. So, all of those 

moorings that I summarized as being lost, some of them 

were not actual moorings in the water. They were virtual 

moorings or potential moorings that the [t]own would 

have or had the right to install in the previous mooring 

field.” 

Champlin’s characterizes the finding that the town would lose approximately 

forty moorings if Champlin’s were allowed to expand as arbitrary, capricious, 

egregious, and clearly erroneous. The relevant findings of the CRMC with respect 

to rental moorings are as follows: 

“66. Mooring fields and marinas are equally high priority 

uses in Type 3 waters. Mooring Field E and the Existing 

Marina are in direct competition for use of the public trust 

resources of the [Great Salt Pond].

“ * * *

“70. The [e]xisting [m]arina cannot be expanded further 

into the waters of the [Great Salt Pond] without 

significantly affecting and impairing competing uses of 

the [Great Salt Pond].

“ * * * 

“89. The application if approved would result in an 

unacceptable impingement on other uses of the public of 

the [Great Salt Pond] including the [t]own’s designated 

mooring areas.
- 31 -

“90. The application if approved would facilitate only one 

priority use of Type 3 waters, marinas, while unacceptably 

restricting another priority use, mooring areas.” 

In an appeal under the APA, the Superior Court is bound to give deference to 

the factual findings of the agency unless such findings are clearly erroneous, 

arbitrary, capricious, or affected by error of law. See § 42-35-15(g). Here, the trial 

justice found “no error in the CRMC’s conclusion that Champlin’s proposed 

expansion would negatively infringe upon the [t]own’s mooring areas.” A review 

of the record reveals ample support for her conclusions. 

When asked if any moorings would have to be removed if Champlin’s dock 

was extended 240 feet seaward, former Harbormaster Steven Land responded, 

“[a]bsolutely,” placing the number at a minimum of forty. Harbormaster Chris Willi 

testified that more than twenty-three moorings would be lost with the proposed 

expansion. And it is also worth noting Kenneth Anderson’s uncontradicted 

testimony that approximately three of the seven acres of mooring field would be 

eliminated. 

Whether the moorings Anderson referenced were actual or virtual, 

Champlin’s has not successfully refuted the assertion that its proposed expansion 

could result in the space for forty moorings being no longer available to the town. 

We are of the opinion that this constitutes legally competent evidence to support the 

finding that Champlin’s “failed to sustain its burden of proving that its proposed 
- 32 -

project will not unreasonably interfere with, impair, or significantly impact existing 

public uses of, or result in significant conflicts with water-dependent uses and 

activities in, the [Great Salt Pond].” See Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 437 (“[T]his 

[C]ourt applies the ‘some’ or ‘any’ evidence test and reviews the record to determine 

whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings.”) (quoting Sartor, 

542 A.2d at 1082-83). 

Disparate Treatment

Shortly after the CRMC denied Champlin’s application, it granted an

expansion to Payne’s Dock, a neighboring marina that is a competitor of Champlin’s 

in the Great Salt Pond. Champlin’s asserted that it was similarly situated to Payne’s

Dock and that it had received disparate treatment from the CRMC. Champlin’s then 

moved in Superior Court to expand the record or, in the alternative, to have the 

Superior Court take judicial notice of the CRMC’s decision on Payne’s Dock. The 

trial justice treated Champlin’s motion as a request for presentation of additional 

evidence under § 42-35-15(e) and issued an order granting the same. The trial justice

then issued a second order requiring the CRMC to accept additional evidence and to 

consider whether Champlin’s and Payne’s Dock are similarly situated and whether 

there was a rational basis for treating its expansion application differently. 

Thereafter, the CRMC held four evidentiary hearings and issued a written 

decision dated September 27, 2013. In its decision, the CRMC found that 
- 33 -

Champlin’s and Payne’s Dock are similarly situated in the following ways: (1) both 

are located in the Great Salt Pond in the same Type 3 water classification; (2) “[t]hey 

are in close proximity to one another”; (3) “[t]hey serve the same markets and are 

business competitors”; (4) “[o]n occasion, they both accommodate large vessels”; 

(5) “[t]hey are both located proximate to a heavily utilized fairway”; and (6) “[t]hey 

are both located proximate to the intersection of the fairway and associated 

navigational channels.”

The CRMC also made findings as to how the two marinas are dissimilar: 

(1) Champlin’s fuel pump is located at the end of the marina, whereas Payne’s 

Dock’s fuel pump is along the side of the marina; (2) “Champlin’s maintains a 

dinghy dock that provides public access between the shore and vessels moored in 

the pond”; Payne’s Dock does not; (3) “Champlin’s is a much larger marina * * *, 

occupying about three times the amount of acreage and servicing significantly more 

vessels”; (4) Champlin’s dock configuration is not as efficient as Payne’s Dock’s, 

resulting in fewer vessels being able to be docked within the area of the marina; 

(5) “an extension into the pond by Champlin’s would have a greater impact on the 

[t]own’s rental mooring field than an extension into the pond by Payne’s [Dock]”; 

and (6) there is “a greater amount of vessel traffic and congestion near Champlin’s 

than exists near Payne’s [Dock].”
- 34 -

Concerning the respective applications of the two marinas, the CRMC found: 

(1) “[b]oth applications were subject to the same standards of review” set forth in 

the CRMP; (2) “Champlin’s application was deemed a ‘significant’ expansion of an 

existing marina[,]” and Payne’s Dock “was not deemed a ‘significant’ expansion”; 

(3) Champlin’s was a contested case subject to extensive hearings before a 

subcommittee, whereas Payne’s Dock’s application was not contested; (4) “[t]he 

record reflects no evidence of disparate treatment, bias, procedural inequities, or 

selective enforcement in the review and consideration of the two applications, 

notwithstanding the disparate outcomes”; (5) “[w]ith regard to impacts on plant and 

animal life in the Great Salt Pond: the record associated with the Champlin’s 

application failed to demonstrate that the proposed project would not cause 

significant impacts[,]” whereas “the record associated with the Payne’s [Dock]

application showed no evidence that the proposed project would cause significant 

impacts”; and (6) Champlin’s application “failed to demonstrate that the proposed 

project would not cause significant impacts” to navigation in the Great Salt Pond 

and “Payne’s [Dock’s] application showed no evidence that the proposed project 

would cause significant impacts.”

The CRMC concluded that:

“Based on the application of identical regulatory 

standards, and based on the significant differences 

regarding the size of the two marinas, the size of the 

proposed extensions, the efficiencies of their 
- 35 -

configurations, the amount of vessel traffic and congestion 

that occurs near each facility, the impacts of the proposed 

expansion on safe navigation within appropriately sized 

fairways, and the impacts of the proposed expansions on 

the [t]own’s mooring field, the Council finds that there is 

a rational basis for the denial of the Champlin’s 

application and the approval of the Payne’s [Dock]

application.” 

As its final challenge to the Superior Court decision, Champlin’s asserts that 

the trial justice “applied the wrong standard of review to the issue of disparate 

treatment.” It further maintains that “[t]he question of disparate treatment is a mixed 

question of law and fact” and that the trial justice erred “by declaring that in an 

agency appeal she was required to ‘uphold the CRMC’s conclusions if they are 

supported by legally competent evidence’ and that the court ‘may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the CRMC even if this court might be inclined to view the 

evidence differently and draw inferences different from the CRMC.’” Thus, 

according to Champlin’s, she “erroneously concluded that the two marinas were not 

similarly situated.” 

On appeal, Champlin’s claims that it was treated arbitrarily by the CRMC and 

disfavorably in comparison to Payne’s Dock. It ascribes fault to the trial justice for 

not applying a de novo standard of review to the issue of disparate treatment. 

Champlin’s further underscores the similarities between the two marinas and 

asserts that the trial justice overlooked evidence that “200 feet plus cruise ships 

regularly docked at Payne’s [Dock.]” What is more, it argues that a different 
- 36 -

standard was applied to Champlin’s concerning the separation between the marinas 

and the mooring field and the water quality certificate. In addition, it points out that 

its application was referred to a subcommittee, whereas Payne’s Dock’s application 

was not treated as a contested case, even though both applications faced similar

objections by “the exact same objectors.” Finally, Champlin’s argues that the trial 

justice overlooked the inappropriate ex parte communications that plagued its own 

application. See Champlin’s I, 989 A.2d at 440-50.

After carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the trial justice 

undertook the correct steps in analyzing the issue of disparate treatment, and we see 

no error in the trial justice’s analysis. Citing to Mill Realty Associates v. Crowe, 841 

A.2d 668 (R.I. 2004), the trial justice stated that it was Champlin’s burden “to 

demonstrate that it [was] similarly situated to Payne’s Dock and that there was no 

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” In Mill Realty Associates, we affirmed 

a trial justice’s decision rejecting the petitioner’s claim of selective enforcement and 

disparate treatment because the petitioner’s building permit application was not 

similarly situated to other applications. Mill Realty Associates, 841 A.2d at 675. 

Under this framework, and looking to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), the trial justice applied a 

two-part test for a disparate treatment claim: (1) there is intentional and different 

treatment from others similarly situated, and (2) there is no rational basis for 
- 37 -

difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564; see also 

Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 251 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[P]laintiffs must show 

an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom 

they compare themselves.” (quoting Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 

(2d Cir. 2006))). 

“A [trial] justice’s findings on mixed questions of law and fact are generally 

entitled to the same deference as the justice’s findings of fact.” Morse v. Minardi, 

208 A.3d 1151, 1155 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Cummings v. Shorey, 761 A.2d 680, 684 

(R.I. 2000)). “But, when those mixed questions of law and fact impact constitutional 

matters, we shall review the findings de novo.” Id. (deletion omitted) (quoting 

Cummings, 761 A.2d at 684). 

Champlin’s has advanced no argument counter to the trial justice’s 

articulation of the law governing a disparate treatment claim. Rather, Champlin’s 

appears to take issue with the CRMC’s factual findings and the trial justice’s 

subsequent upholding of those findings. For these reasons, we review Champlin’s 

claims only as they pertain to the trial justice’s findings of fact. See State v. 

Florez, 138 A.3d 789, 798 n.10 (R.I. 2016) (“[A] litigant has an obligation to spell 

out its arguments squarely and distinctly[.]” (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 

F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990))).
- 38 -

In her decision, the trial justice reviewed the CRMC’s factual findings, 

concluding that the “two marinas are not similarly situated[.]” She highlighted that 

Champlin’s is a larger facility, “covering almost three times the area that Payne’s 

Dock occupies.” She noted that Champlin’s application “sought approval for an 

additional 140 vessels, or between 56[ percent] and 62[ percent] more than its

authorized number of vessels[,]” whereas “Payne’s Dock only sought approval for 

an additional fifteen vessels beyond the seventy presently approved, or 

21[ percent].”11 The trial justice noted that Champlin’s “sought an additional four 

acres of Type-3 waters in Great Salt Pond, while Payne’s Dock sought only an 

additional 0.38 acres[,]” observing that “[i]t is abundantly clear that Champlin’s 

Marina is a much bigger operation than Payne’s Dock, and the expansion proposed 

by Champlin’s would increase its footprint exponentially as compared to that of 

Payne’s Dock even with Payne’s Dock’s approved expansion.” 

Referencing the testimony of various witnesses, the trial justice explained that 

the location of the two marinas’ respective fuel docks contributes to greater 

congestion in the area of Champlin’s fuel dock. She also cited to evidence in the 

record concerning Champlin’s inefficient dock configuration and ultimately stated 

11 Champlin’s references testimony of Harbormaster Land that, on at least one 

occasion, Payne’s Dock accommodated up to 275 boats, “notwithstanding the 

application which represented only [seventy]” vessels. Champlin’s also represents 

that Payne’s Dock sought an additional eighty-five vessels, although it does not cite 

to where specifically in the record this figure can be found. 
- 39 -

that the evidence presented “establishes the differences in size, navigational impact

and congestion, and efficiencies in existing facilities as between the two expansion 

applications.” For example, the trial justice noted Anderson’s testimony as it related 

to Champlin’s “inefficient three-pronged, trident [dock] configuration,” which 

differed from Payne’s Dock’s “simple, rectilinear design[.]” She further touched 

upon the evidence suggesting that the two applications would have differing impacts 

on animal and plant life. Regarding Champlin’s application, evidence by DEM 

showed that there were “healthy and productive shellfish resources within the 

proposed [Champlin’s] expansion area[.]” And the CRMC staff biologist testified 

that there were “‘significant impacts’ anticipated to shellfish resources within the 

affected area.”

Moreover, Champlin’s wetlands scientist had been unable to assuage the 

CRMC; thus, according to the trial justice, the CRMC had “concluded that there 

were unresolved issues relating to water quality.” On the other hand, a CRMC staff 

biologist stated with respect to Payne’s Dock’s application that “[m]inimal impacts 

are expected on fish, shellfish or wildlife from the proposed seaward expansion 

which avoids impacts to coastal features and shallow water habitats.” Finally, the 

trial justice remarked that “the evidence of record established that the [t]own would 

lose up to forty of its rental moorings * * * if Champlin’s expansion were granted. 
- 40 -

* * * By comparison, Payne’s Dock[’s] expansion resulted in the loss of only one of 

the [t]own’s rental moorings.” 

After determining that the CRMC’s conclusions were supported by legally 

competent evidence, the trial justice found that the CRMC did not act arbitrarily or 

capriciously in its treatment of Champlin’s “or that its conclusions and decisions 

were otherwise erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence 

in the whole record.” She concluded, “[t]he evidence of record demonstrates that 

Payne’s Dock, while similar in some respects to Champlin’s Marina, was dissimilar 

in important respects which provide a rational basis for the CRMC to reach different 

results on their respective applications.” 

We are of the opinion that these findings by the trial justice are not clearly 

erroneous; rather, the trial justice meticulously combed through the CRMC’s 

findings and found that they were supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not misconceive or overlook 

material evidence, and we therefore uphold the 2020 decision and resulting judgment 

of the Superior Court. 
- 41 -

B

Mediation and the MOU 

As discussed supra, following our grant of Champlin’s petitions for writs of 

certiorari, Champlin’s and the CRMC engaged in private mediation that ultimately 

resulted in the execution by those two parties of a Joint Memorandum of 

Understanding. On January 8, 2021, Champlin’s and the CRMC filed a joint motion 

seeking “to incorporate and merge the Memorandum of Understanding * * * into a 

consent order of this Court.” The intervenors and the attorney general opposed that 

motion, and we ultimately remanded the case to the Superior Court for findings of 

fact and conclusions of law concerning the “‘propriety and conclusiveness’ of the 

purported settlement and the validity of the MOU.” 

The Superior Court justice on remand conducted an extensive hearing over 

seven full days, during which thirteen witnesses testified. Subsequently, he made 

numerous findings of fact, all of which, we are satisfied, are supported by evidence 

in the record. Among those findings are the following. 

On November 24, 2020, at a duly noticed meeting, the CRMC authorized its 

executive director, acting chair, and legal counsel to engage in mediation with 

Champlin’s. On November 30, 2020, CRMC legal counsel sent an email to the 

solicitor for the Town of New Shoreham stating that the CRMC had “voted to 

participate in mediation * * * on the condition that the Town of New Shoreham also 
- 42 -

participate.” On December 3, 2020, the mediator called the town solicitor asking 

about the mediation, and he also emailed the town solicitor in an attempt to enlist 

the town in the mediation process. The town solicitor replied to both the mediator 

and the CRMC indicating that the town council would discuss the matter on 

December 7, 2020. The council did discuss the proposed mediation in executive 

session on December 7 and voted not to participate. The town solicitor notified both 

the CMRC and the mediator the following day. 

Regrettably, the legal counsel for the intervenors had not been notified of the 

proposed mediation. It is clear, however, that he was well aware of it and had in fact 

argued against mediation at the town council meeting. 

On December 15, 2020, Champlin’s moved in the Supreme Court for 

additional time to file a statement of the case required by Rule 12A of the Supreme 

Court Rules of Appellate Procedure because Champlin’s and the CRMC were 

engaged in mediation. On December 29, 2020, the CRMC discussed the MOU in 

executive session and then voted to ratify it in open session. 

The remand justice thoroughly reviewed the testimony and credibility of each 

of the thirteen witnesses. He then framed his analysis by addressing three issues: 

(1) did the CRMC and Champlin’s have authority to mediate; (2) what notice is 

required for mediation and was sufficient notice given; and (3) is the MOU a final 

decision. 
- 43 -

As the remand justice correctly recognized, this Court is a strong proponent 

of alternative dispute resolution as a means of amicably settling cases. Most notably, 

Rule 35 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes an Appellate 

Mediation Program, the purpose of which “is to afford a meaningful opportunity to 

the parties in all eligible civil appeals to achieve a resolution of their dispute in a 

timely manner as early in the appellate process as feasible[.]” Not infrequently, we 

have encouraged parties to mediate even after oral argument and offered the services 

of our Appellate Mediation Program to assist in that endeavor. So too, have we often 

exhorted parties to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations. See Ryan v. Roman 

Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 186 (R.I. 2008) (“It is very much an 

important part of the policy of the courts of Rhode Island (and courts in general) to 

encourage the amicable settlement of disputes, whether by mediation or 

otherwise.”); Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Company, 799 A.2d 997, 1012 (R.I. 2002) 

(“It is the policy of this state to encourage the settlement of controversies in lieu of 

litigation.”); Calise v. Hidden Valley Condominium Association, Inc., 773 A.2d 834, 

839 (R.I. 2001) (“Our policy is always to encourage settlement. Voluntary 

settlement of disputes has long been favored by the courts.” (quoting Homar, Inc. v. 

North Farm Associates, 445 A.2d 288, 290 (R.I. 1982))). 

The threshold issue before this Court with respect to the MOU is whether 

Champlin’s and the CRMC had the authority to mediate. This Court, in the context 
- 44 -

of the cases currently before the Court on certiorari, is presented with a purported 

settlement agreement resulting from mediation between the CRMC and Champlin’s 

that took place after the CRMC had already issued a final decision on Champlin’s 

application and while the cases were pending before this Court. 

The intervenors assert that the CRMC did not have authority to mediate with 

Champlin’s because the matter was undergoing judicial review and had been 

transmitted from the CRMC to the Superior Court and then docketed in this Court 

on certiorari; therefore, the intervenors submit, the CRMC lacked the power “to add 

or subtract from the record, or alter or amend its findings and conclusions, while the 

final order is on appeal.” 

The attorney general, also an intervenor, argues that both the CRMC 

regulations and the APA “preclude settlement on appeal where the council has 

denied an application” and that the remand justice erred in finding that the MOU 

was a proper exercise of the CRMC’s authority. The attorney general additionally 

takes issue with the remand justice’s finding that the role of an administrative agency 

changes when the agency’s decision is contested; instead, the attorney general 

contends that an administrative agency is not similarly situated to a private or public 

litigant in a civil lawsuit, and therefore cannot engage in litigation “in whatever 

manner it deems fit.” 
- 45 -

In response, Champlin’s and the CRMC both assert that they had the authority 

to mediate. They contend that the remand justice did not err in determining that the 

role of an administrative agency changes after a final decision of the agency is issued 

and an appeal has been taken from that final decision. The CRMC additionally 

submits that the remand justice was correct in determining that § 46-23-20 gives the 

CRMC the authority to participate in mediation. 

We begin our analysis by addressing the remand justice’s determination that 

“[t]he role of [an] administrative agency changes after the final agency decision is 

issued”—“from that of [a] quasi-judicial authority to that of [an] advocate for the 

agency ruling[.]” Based on an application of that reasoning, the remand justice 

found that the CRMC was “subject to the same rules as other litigants” and that, 

therefore, the “CRMC and Champlin’s, as two parties, could enter settlement 

discussions and proceed to mediation.” He further found that the “CRMC was not 

acting as an agency or as an adjudicator when it participated in the mediation.” 

This Court has said that “[t]he scope of review of this [C]ourt, like that of the 

Superior Court, is an extension of the administrative process.” Environmental 

Scientific Corporation v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 208 (R.I. 1993) (emphasis added); 

see generally § 42-35-15 (APA section governing “Judicial review of contested 

cases”); § 42-35-16 (APA section governing “Review by supreme court”). 
- 46 -

Additionally, we have made clear that an administrative agency is not a normal 

litigant: 

“[A] governmental official, agency, commission, or board 

[is] charged with the responsibility of administering a 

particular set of rules and regulations designed to promote 

the public safety and welfare acts for the people and, as 

such, must be permitted to represent the people when a 

matter of public interest is involved.” Newman-Crosby 

Steel, Inc. v. Fascio, 423 A.2d 1162, 1165 (R.I. 1980) 

(emphasis added). 

In its enabling legislation, the General Assembly directed the CRMC “to 

exercise effectively its responsibilities in the coastal zone through the development 

and implementation of management programs to achieve wise use of the land and 

water resources of the coastal zone.” Section 46-23-1(b)(1). That section also 

provides: 

“Furthermore, that implementation of these policies [to 

preserve, protect, develop, and, where possible, restore the 

coastal resources of the state] is necessary in order to 

secure the rights of the people of Rhode Island to the use 

and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state with 

due regard for the preservation of their values, and in order 

to allow the general assembly to fulfill its duty to provide 

for the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, 

mineral, and other natural resources of the state, and to 

adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the 

natural environment of the people of the state by providing 

adequate resource planning for the control and regulation 

of the use of the natural resources of the state and for the 

preservation, regeneration, and restoration of the natural 

environment of the state.” Section 46-23-1(b)(2) 

(emphasis added). 
- 47 -

Neither the remand justice, the CRMC, nor Champlin’s cite to any caselaw or 

statutory law that supports the notion that the CRMC’s responsibilities to the public 

end at the point a contested agency decision results in litigation before our court 

system. 

The remand justice was correct in stating that, on appeal, an administrative 

agency is “an advocate for the agency ruling.” However, we find no support in our 

jurisprudence for the proposition that an administrative agency can, under any 

circumstance, act not as an agency but merely as a litigant. An administrative 

agency’s statutory and regulatory responsibilities do not end when its final decision 

is appealed; rather, an agency’s advocacy on appeal is in furtherance of the 

administrative process. See Environmental Scientific Corporation, 621 A.2d at 208. 

The CRMC therefore continues to be bound by the APA, its enabling legislation, 

and its regulations—the CRMC’s duty to the people of Rhode Island does not end 

when it becomes a party to litigation that involves the propriety of one of its 

decisions. 

We turn next to the issue of whether the CRMC had the authority to engage 

in mediation. The remand justice found explicit statutory authority for the CRMC 

“to mediate or otherwise resolve contested cases” in § 46-23-20, which provides: 

“All contested cases, all contested enforcement 

proceedings, and all contested administrative fines shall be 

heard by the administrative hearing officers, or by 

subcommittees as provided in § 46-23-20.1, pursuant to 
- 48 -

the regulations promulgated by the council; provided, 

however, that no proceeding and hearing prior to the 

appointment of the hearing officers shall be subject to the 

provisions of this section. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 

the commissioner of coastal resources management shall 

be authorized, in his or her discretion, to resolve contested 

licensing and enforcement proceedings through informal 

disposition pursuant to regulations promulgated by the 

council.”

He then looked to the CRMC regulations, specifically 650 RICR 10-00-1.8, which 

states: 

“C. Modification of Assents and Final Decisions

“1. At any time prior to the expiration of an Assent, 

the full Council by majority vote may, based 

upon the evidence presented to it, modify an 

Assent. The City or Town Clerk and the local 

building official in the community shall be 

notified of the modification.

“2. The Council authorizes the Executive Director in 

his discretion to modify an Assent or final 

decision of the Council when the requested 

modification is consistent with the prior approval 

of the Council and the applicant and staff review 

have clearly demonstrated to the Executive 

Director’s satisfaction that the project’s overall 

impact to the State’s coastal resources will be less 

than or equal to the existing Assent or decision.”

The trial justice indicated that “[a]lthough no assent ever issued here, the statute and 

regulation demonstrate that settlement is favored. Of course, there was no clear 

authority provided to this Court to suggest that mediation is prohibited.” 
- 49 -

The APA states, as a general rule, that, “[u]nless precluded by law, informal 

disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, 

consent order, or default.” Section 42-35-9(d). Pursuant to § 46-23-20, however, 

“the commissioner of [the CRMC is] authorized, in his or her discretion, to resolve 

contested licensing and enforcement proceedings through informal disposition 

pursuant to regulations promulgated by the council.” (Emphasis added.) 

The issue before us is therefore governed not by § 42-35-9(d) but rather by 

§ 46-23-20 and, more specifically, the CRMC’s regulations. See City of Woonsocket 

v. RISE Prep Mayoral Academy, 251 A.3d 495, 501 (R.I. 2021) (noting that “it is a 

‘general rule of statutory construction that when a statute of general application 

conflicts with a statute that specifically deals with a special subject matter, and when 

the two statutes cannot be construed harmoniously together, the special statute 

prevails over the statute of general application’” (deletion omitted) (quoting 

Whitehouse v. Moran, 808 A.2d 626, 629-30 (R.I. 2002))). The CRMC “is bound, 

of course, by its own regulations.” Town of Burrillville v. Pascoag Apartment 

Associates, LLC, 950 A.2d 435, 451 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Arnold, 941 A.2d at 821 

n.2); see also Ratcliffe v. Coastal Resources Management Counsel, 584 A.2d 1107,

1110 (R.I. 1991). “It is a ‘simple but fundamental rule of administrative law’ that 

an ‘agency must set forth clearly the grounds on which it acted.’” Town of 
- 50 -

Burrillville, 950 A.2d at 451 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 

Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973)). 

In the case at bar, this Court is presented with a purported settlement 

agreement resulting from mediation between the CRMC, a state agency, and 

Champlin’s, an applicant, that took place after the CRMC had already issued a final 

decision on Champlin’s application. 

The MOU, in effect, modifies the CRMC’s May 6, 2011 final decision. The 

CRMC denied Champlin’s application in its decision; it has now mediated with 

Champlin’s and agreed to what appears to be a modification of Champlin’s 

application. 

Our review of the CRMC’s regulations reveals only one avenue for the CRMC 

to modify a final decision: 

“The Council authorizes the Executive Director in his 

discretion to modify an Assent or final decision of the 

Council when the requested modification is consistent 

with the prior approval of the Council and the applicant 

and staff review have clearly demonstrated to the 

Executive Director’s satisfaction that the project’s overall 

impact to the State’s coastal resources will be less than or 

equal to the existing Assent or decision.” 650 RICR 

10-00-1.8(C)(2).

When interpreting a regulation, we employ the same rules of construction that we 

apply when interpreting a statute. See Murphy v. Zoning Board of Review of Town 

of South Kingstown, 959 A.2d 535, 541 (R.I. 2008) (“The construction of a 
- 51 -

regulation is a question of law to be determined by the court. The principles or rules 

of statutory construction apply to administrative regulations.” (quoting 2 Am. Jur. 

2d Administrative Law § 245 at 221 (2004))). Thus, “[i]f the [regulation] is clear 

and unambiguous, we must enforce it as written by giving the words of the 

[regulation] their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quoting Ruggiero v. City of 

Providence, 893 A.2d 235, 237 (R.I. 2006)). 

A plain reading of 650 RICR 10-00-1.8(C)(2) indicates that, in order to 

modify a final decision, the CRMC must have granted the application and issued an 

“assent.” 650 RICR 10-00-1.8(C)(2). In the case at bar, Champlin’s application was 

denied by the CRMC in the final decision dated May 6, 2011. Because Champlin’s 

application was denied, pursuant to 650 RICR 10-00-1.8(C)(2), the CRMC did not 

have the authority to modify the final decision. Although the remand justice was 

correct in indicating that “there was no clear authority * * * to suggest that mediation 

is prohibited[,]” the plain language of 650 RICR 10-00-1.8(C)(2) requires that an 

application be granted in order for a final decision or assent to be modified. See 

Murphy, 959 A.2d at 541. 

Certainly, “[a]dministrative agencies retain broad enforcement discretion and, 

as always, considerable deference is accorded to such agencies about how to enforce 
- 52 -

regulations[,]” Arnold, 941 A.2d at 820-21; however, here, no such applicable

regulation exists.

12

 

We additionally do not find any regulation permitting a post-final-decision 

settlement to be discussed in an executive session and then approved in an open 

session. Indeed, the CRMC’s regulations appear to favor the opposite:

“The Council finds that an open, traceable 

decision-making process is essential for an effective 

coastal management program, and where required should 

be done in an open transparent public forum. The Council 

will therefore follow the procedures set forth in the Coastal 

Resources Management Program, including applicable 

Special Area Management Plans, for all permit 

applications which, by regulation come before it.” 650 

RICR 20-00-1.5(A)(4) (emphasis added). 

 We are also of the conviction that the MOU falters for a more fundamental 

reason. Under its terms, the MOU “shall serve as the CRMC’s [d]ecision relative to 

this matter.” Indeed, the MOU contemplates the issuance by the CRMC of an 

Assent, which Assent shall “flow” from the MOU and be “subject to the terms” of 

12 We note that Champlin’s reliance on Town of Richmond v. Rhode Island 

Department of Environmental Management, 941 A.2d 151 (R.I. 2008), is misplaced. 

In that case, this Court indicated that § 11(f) of the Department of Environmental 

Management Rules and Regulations for Assessment of Administrative Penalties

“explicitly provide[d] that ‘nothing herein shall preclude the Director from resolving 

the outstanding penalty through a Consent Agreement at any time he or she deems 

appropriate.’” Town of Richmond, 941 A.2d at 157 (emphasis added) (brackets 

omitted). The only analogous rule in the CRMC’s regulations concerns applications 

for freshwater wetlands permits exclusively. See 650 RICR 20-00-9.15.4 (the 

CRMC’s rule concerning consent agreements with regard to freshwater wetlands

permits).
- 53 -

the MOU. We are satisfied, therefore, that the MOU is intended to constitute the 

final decision on Champlin’s application, and as such, it fails to comport with the 

CRMC’s regulations and the APA in that it is devoid of any findings of fact with 

respect to the requirements that applicants must satisfy under CRMP § 300.1. See 

§ 42-35-12 (“Any final order shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

separately stated.”). 

This is particularly disconcerting in light of the factual findings that the 

CRMC did make in its May 6, 2011 decision, several of which indicated that 

Champlin’s had failed to meet its burden with respect to the regulatory requirements. 

“An administrative decision that fails to include findings of fact required by statute 

cannot be upheld.” Sakonnet Rogers, Inc. v. Coastal Resources Management 

Council, 536 A.2d 893, 896 (R.I. 1988). 

We therefore hold that the remand justice erred in determining that the CRMC 

and Champlin’s had authority to mediate. Accordingly, we decline to incorporate 

and merge the MOU into a consent order of this Court.

13

 

13 Because we have determined that the CRMC did not have the authority to mediate 

with Champlin’s, we need not reach the additional issues raised by the intervenors 

and the attorney general with respect to the propriety of the MOU and the remand 

justice’s decision with respect to the same. 
- 54 -

IV 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision and resulting June 17, 

2020 judgment of the Superior Court; and we deny the request by Champlin’s and 

the CRMC to incorporate and merge the MOU into a consent order of the Supreme 

Court. The record may be returned to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed 

thereon. 

Justice Goldberg did not participate. 
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Champlin’s Realty Associates v. Coastal Resources 

Management Council et al.

Case Number

No. 2020-168-M.P.

(WC 11-615)

No. 2020-169-M.P.

(WC 11-616)

Date Opinion Filed October 14, 2022

Justices Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kristin E. Rodgers

Associate Justice Jeffrey A. Lanphear

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Robert D. Goldberg, Esq.

For Defendants:

Anthony DeSisto, Esq.

R. Daniel Prentiss, Esq.

Sara Rice, Department of Attorney General