This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 ELLEN WYLIE, 7 Petitioner-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 29,908 9 JOHN WYLIE, 10 Respondent-Appellee. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Gerard J. Lavelle, District Judge 13 Ellen Wylie 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 Pro Se Appellant 16 John Wylie 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 Pro Se Appellee 19 MEMORANDUM OPINION 20 FRY, Chief Judge. 21 Ellen Wylie (Mother) appeal s from the district court’ s three minute orders. [RP 22 46A-46B, 54, 61] Mother contends that the district court judge erred as follows: (1) 23 in not requiring Father to pay for the parties’ daughter Hannah’s current college 242 education costs [DS 11]; (2) in not requiring Father to continue to pay $300 per month 1 in child support for the parties’ daughter Kate [DS 13]; (3) in not requiring Father to 2 pay child support for Hannah until she reached twenty-one when, Mother asserts, the 3 disturbances/violence between Father and Hannah were caused by Father not Hannah 4 [DS 13]; (4) in not looking at Father’s in come and in not using the child support 5 guidelines and worksheets to calculate child support in the past for Kate and presently 6 for Hannah [DS 13]; and (5) innot listening to Mother or ruling in her favor, because 7 the district court judge was biased in favor of Father [DS 13]. 8 This Court’s calendar notice proposed su mmary affirmance. [CN1] Mother has 9 filed a memorandum in opposition that we have duly considered. [MIO] 10 Unpersuaded, however, we affirm. 11 DISCUSSION 12 A. Standard of Review 13 “The determination of child support is w ithin the district court’s discretion and 14 we review it on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Klinksiek v. Klinksiek , 15 2005-NMCA-008, ¶ 4, 136 N.M. 693, 104 P. 3d 559 (filed 2004). “However, that 16 discretion must be exercised in accordan ce with the child support guidelines.” Id. 17 Under NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-11.2 (1989), moreover, any deviation from the 18 guidelines “shall be supported by a written finding in the decree, judgment or order 193 of child support that application of the gui delines would be unjust or inappropriate.” 1 In order to modify an existing order or j udgment regarding child support, a substantial 2 change in circumstances must be shown. Bustos v. Bustos , 2000-NMCA-040, ¶ 15, 3 128 N.M. 842, 999 P.2d 1074. 4 B. Child Support for Kate and Hannah (Issues 1, 2, 3, and 4) 5 On February 12, 2009, Father filed a mo tion to adopt changes to the parties’ 6 December 14, 2007, parenting plan and child support obligation agreement (the 7 parenting plan agreement) with regard to both Kate and Hannah. [RP 22] Mother 8 filed a response, objecting to any changes to the parenti ng plan agreement and asking 9 the district court to enforce its terms. [RP 30] After the district court entered its June 10 18, 2009 minute order regardi ng Kate and its July 1, 2009 minute order regarding 11 Hannah, on July 28, 2009, Mother filed a mo tion to modify or enforce child support 12 order, essentially asking the district court to reconsider the July 1 minute order with 13 regard to Hannah. [RP 55] 14 The parenting plan agreement provides thatKate is to reside with Mother, and 15 Father is to pay $300 per month in child s upport to Mother for Kate until Mother has 16 obtained “gainful employment.” [RP 14 ¶ 1] Father’s obligation to pay child support 17 to Mother for Kate is to cease when Kate reaches the age of eighteen. [RP 14, ¶ 1] 18 Kate was born on December 24, 1991. [RP 12] 194 The parenting plan agreement provides th at Hannah is to re side with Father. 1 [RP 14, ¶1] If Father asks Hannah to moveout of his home prior to her twenty-first 2 birthday, in the absence of justification, “such as, Hannah [] becomes unstable and 3 poses a real threat of violence to herself and her family,” then Mother reserves the 4 right to request child support for supporti ng Hannah, “if such becomes necessary.” 5 [RP 16] Hannah was born on January 9, 1990. [RP 12] 6 In the parenting plan agreement, the parties specificallyagreed not to follow the 7 child support guidelines because of the “nature of the custody issues,” the parties’ 8 separate agreement providing that Hannah w ould live with Father and Kate would live 9 with Mother, and “the age and employment c onsideration” of the parties. [RP 14, ¶ 10 1] In the final decree, the district court specifically explained that the child support 11 guidelines were not appropriate in this cas e generally for the same reasons. [RP 20, 12 No. 6] The parties further agreed to ev enly split the other expenses relating to the 13 care and support of both Hannah and Kate, as set forth in a table incorporated into the 14 parenting plan agreement. [RP 14-15] The parties agreed to e qual percentages rather 15 than to specific dollar amounts, “becausewe do not have actual dollar figures to 16 include on the worksheet.” [RP 14, No. 4] 17 In support of his motion to adopt changes to the parenting plan agreement filed 18 on February 12, 2009, Father reported that Kate had been living with Father rather 195 than Mother since February 2, 2009, that sh e would continue to reside with him, and 1 that he would ask for no child support from Mother for Kate, but presumably wanted 2 to cease paying child support to Mother for Kate . [RP 23, ¶ C] Father also reported 3 that Hannah had become so unruly that a re straining order that restricted her from 4 entering his house was needed and had been issued on January 27, 2009. [RP 23, ¶ D] 5 Mother’s response requests that Father be required to continue to pay $300.00 6 per month as child support for Kate on the grounds that Father is simply trying to get 7 out of his financial obligations to her, Father does not support Mother’s parenting, 8 Kate cannot safely reside at Father’s house because Father does not consult Mother 9 on decisions, and Father does not enforce curfew or other house rules. [RP 30-32] 10 With regard to Hannah, Mother asserts thatFather obtained a restraining order against 11 Hannah in order to avoid hi s financial obligations to support Hannah until her twenty12 first birthday under the parenting plan agreement and in order to get out of providing 13 support for her while in college. [Id.] Mother’s memorandum in opposition continues 14 to raise the same contentions, including th at Father obtained the restraining order 15 against Hannah in order to relieve himself of his support obligations to her, that the 16 basis for the restraining order has no merit, and that Mother understood the MSA as 17 requiring Father to unconditi onally continue to support Hannah until she is twenty18 one. [MIO, 2] Mother further points out that she continues to have medical issues 196 and financial strain as a result and that Fath er has engaged in acts that are contrary to 1 the MSA with regard to the support of hi s daughters, Hannah in particular. [Id.] 2 Mother continues to request that the terms of the MSA regarding child support be 3 enforced and appears to contend that the minute orders do not do so. [Id.] 4 As we discussed in the calendar notice, we are not persuaded that the terms of 5 the MSA require Father to unconditionally continue to pay ch ild support for Hannah. 6 With regard to the validity of Father’s restraining order against Hannah, another 7 tribunal was persuaded as to the validity and necessity of the restraining order against 8 her and the district court in this case c onsidered Mother’s allegations that Father 9 merely obtained the restraining order to get out of his child support obligations to 10 Hannah and ruled against Mother on this i ssue. As further discussed below, we 11 decline to revisit these issu es of the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, as we 12 discussed in the calendar notice, given the existence of the restraining order, the 13 express terms of the MSA do not require Father to continue to provide support for 14 Hannah. The district court determined th at Kate no longer lives with Mother, and 15 therefore, determined that Father’s childsupport obligations to pay Mother for her 16 support has ended. Under the circumstan ces, we remain persuaded that summary 17 affirmance of the three minute orders is the appropriate and correct disposition. 187 As we discussed in the calendar notice, in the district court’s June 18, 2009 1 minute order, Father was ordered to pay $850 in child support arrearages to Mother 2 for Kate through June 2009. [RP 46A] Father was also ordered to make the 3 remaining future child support payments for Kate to another family since Kate was 4 apparently no longer residing with Mother or Father. [Id.] In the July 1, 2009 minute 5 order, the district court found that Fatherhad obtained the restraining order against 6 Hannah because she “became unstable and e ngaged in behavior which posed a real 7 threat of violence to [Father] and, therefore, [Father] was justified in asking Hannah 8 to move from his home.” [RP 54, No. 2] In accordance with the parenting plan 9 agreement, therefore, the di strict court concluded that “[a]ny obligation [Father] might 10 have had to provide post-minority support for Hannah is terminated based upon 11 Hannah’s threats of violence on January 27, 2009.” [RP 54, No. 3] In the September 12 10, 2009 minute order, the district court denied Mother’s July 28, 2009, motion to 13 modify or enforce child support order, which we have construed as a motion to 14 reconsider the July 1, 2009 minute order, noting that Hannah had reached the age of 15 majority, that any obligation Father had had to support Hannah post-majority had 16 terminated for the reasons set forth in the July 1, 2009 minute order, and that the 17 court’s jurisdiction regarding Hannah had ended. [RP 61-62] 188 We affirm the June 18 and the July 1 minute orders, which granted Father’s 1 February 12, 2009, motion to adopt changes to the parenti ng plan agreement regarding 2 Father’s support obligations for Kate and Hannah. The parties provided conflicting 3 testimony regarding the reasons for Kate’s moving out of Mother’s residence and the 4 basis for Father obtaining a restraini ng order against Hannah. Although Mother 5 disagrees with the basis for the rulings, the district court as fact finder, however, 6 resolved the conflicts in the evidence and weighed the testimony in favor of Father. 7 See, e.g. , Buckingham v. Ryan , 1998-NMCA-012, ¶ 10, 124 N.M. 498, 953 P.2d 33 8 (filed 1997) (“[W]hen there is a conflict inthe testimony, we defer to the trier of 9 fact.”). 10 That is, Father’s payment of child support to Mother for Kate under the 11 parenting plan agreement was based on Kate ’s residing with Mother. The district 12 court found that Kate no longer resides with Mother. As such, Father is no longer 13 obligated to pay Mother $300 in child s upport for Kate. Under the terms of the 14 parenting plan agreement, Father’s oblig ation to support Hannah until age twenty-one 15 terminated if Father had justification fo r requiring Hannah to move out of his home. 16 The district court found that Father was justified in requiring Hannah to move out 17 because she had threatened hi m with violence and he had obtained a restraining order 189 against her. Thus, Father’s obligation to support Hannah terminated after she reached 1 majority but prior to age twenty-one. 2 We hold, therefore, that Father sustaine d his burden to show that a substantial 3 change in circumstances had occurred in the living situations of both Hannah and Kate 4 from the December 14, 2007, entry of the parenting plan agreement. See Mintz v. 5 Zoernig , 2008-NMCA-162, ¶ 18, 145 N.M. 362, 198 P.3d 861 (discussing that in 6 order to modify an existing child support order, a substantial change in circumstances 7 must be shown and “[t]he burden of proof is on the moving party to satisfy the court 8 that the circumstances have so changed as to justify the modi fication” (internal 9 quotation marks and citation omitted)). To the extent that Mother’s subsequent 10 motion filed on July 28, 2009, was a request to the district court to reconsider its 11 rulings in the June 18 and the July 1 minute orders, we hold that Mother did not 12 provide a basis, such as ne w facts or changed circumstan ces, for the district court to 13 do so. See, e.g. , GCM, Inc. v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. , 1997-NMSC-052, ¶ 28, 14 124 N.M. 186, 947 P.2d 143 (“A district court has broad discretion in ruling upon a 15 motion for reconsideration and will only be reversed for an abuse of that discretion.”). 16 We affirm the June 18, July 1, and the September 10 minute orders. 17 C. The District Court’s Bias Against Mother (Issue 5) 1810 In the docketing statement and the memorandum, Mother asserts that the district 1 court judge was prejudiced agai nst her and that he did not listen to her arguments that 2 Father had caused the disturbances with Hannah. [DS 13] She points out that the 3 district court may favor Father since Fatherworks as a juvenile probation officer and 4 may have worked with the district court judge. We disagree. 5 First, it appears that Mother’s frustrations result from the district court’s 6 adverse rulings, which are insu fficient to demonstrate bias. See State v. Case , 100 7 N.M. 714, 717, 676 P.2d 241, 244 (1984) (stati ng personal bias cannot be inferred 8 from an adverse ruling). In this regard, moreover, we have duly considered Mother’s 9 contentions, and, based on our standard of review, we affirm the district court’s 10 rulings as based on and consistent with Ne w Mexico law. Second, as we discussed 11 above, it is for the district court as fact finder to weigh the ev idence and the credibility 12 of the witnesses. See, e.g. , State v. Hernandez , 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 312, 326 13 (1993) (stating that adverse rulings or en forcement of the rules does not establish 14 judicial bias). Third, Mother asserts that the district court may be prejudiced or biased 15 in favor of Father but rec ites to no particular facts and makes no specific showing in 16 support of these assertions. State v. Hoxsie , 101 N.M. 7, 10, 677 P.2d 620, 623 (1984) 17 (stating that, “[a]n assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice”), overruled 18 on other grounds, Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency , 108 N.M. 722, 731, 779 P.2d 99, 1911 108 (1989). Finally, comments by the district court criticizing a party do not 1 demonstrate bias or improper judicial conduct. See, e.g. , United Nuclear Corp. v. 2 Gen. Atomic Co. , 96 N.M. 155, 172-74, 629 P.2d 231, 248-50 (1980) (stating that 3 rulings by the court rejecting a party’s pos ition, and criticism of counsel by the court, 4 do not demonstrate bias). 5 CONCLUSION 6 We affirm the district c ourt’s rulings set forth in the June 18, July 1, and 7 September 10, 2009 minute orders. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

10 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 11 WE CONCUR: 12

13 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 14

15 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 16