IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

ROBERT RAYMOND DOWELL §

#02414619

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23cv517

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY §

AND ARCHIVES, et al.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Robert Raymond Dowell, a prisoner of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice 

proceeding pro se, filed this civil lawsuit and has been granted leave to proceed as a pauper. The 

case was referred to the undersigned for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations 

for the disposition of the case. 

Plaintiff sues a host of government agencies, high-ranking government officials, and other 

prominent figures, including the FBI, CIA, U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland, and Bill

Gates. (Dkt. #1 at 3.) His allegations are rambling and incoherent, but they include references to 

Havana Syndrome, covid19 nanobots, microwave signals controlling the nanobots, unspecified 

torture, and the 2016 presidential election. The stated relief sought is “freddom of information act 

to agencys [sic] & military tort clam [sic] & releif [sic] instint [sic] protection order.” (Id. at 4.)

I. Legal Standards and Preliminary Screening

Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity,

and he is proceeding as a pauper, so his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2). Those statutes provide

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for sua sponte dismissal of a complaint—or any portion thereof—if the Court finds it frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 

F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint lacks an arguable basis 

in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which 

a complaint relies is indisputably meritless.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 

(5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, during the initial screening 

under section 1915A, a court may determine that a prisoner’s complaint is frivolous if it rests upon 

delusional scenarios or baseless facts—and dismiss the complaint. See Henry v. Kerr County, 

Texas, 2016 WL 2344231 *3 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) (“A court may dismiss a claim as factually 

frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, delusional, or otherwise 

rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, regardless of whether there are judicially 

noticeable facts available to contradict them.”) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 

(1992)). 

Moreover, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does 

not allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and thus 

does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground 

Packaging Sys. Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows 

the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See 

Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a probability standard; rather, 

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the plausibility standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis supplied). 

All well-pleaded facts are taken as true, but the district court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Whatley v. Coffin, 

496 F. App’x 414 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 

(5th Cir. 2005)). Crucially, while the federal pleading rules do not require “detailed factual 

allegations,” the rule does “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does a complaint 

which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. 

Particularly with regard to any claim that defendants have conspired to harm him, a plaintiff must 

plead specific, non-conclusory facts that establish that there was an agreement among the 

defendants to violate his federal civil rights. Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th 

Cir. 2004); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs asserting 

conspiracy claims under Section 1983 must plead the operative facts on which their claim is based; 

bald allegations that a conspiracy existed are insufficient). 

A federal court has an independent duty, at any level of the proceedings, to determine 

whether it properly has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 

526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their 

own initiative even at the highest level.”); McDonal v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 182 n.5 (5th 

Cir. 2005) (“federal court may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte”).

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II. Discussion and Analysis 

Plaintiff’s claims about torture by Covid 19-related nanobots controlled by microwaves

and other advanced secret weapons are clearly delusional and thus subject to dismissal as factually 

frivolous. See Starrett v. United States Dep’t of Def., 763 F. App’x 383, 383–844 (5th Cir. 2019)

(affirming dismissal of “outlandish claims of near-constant surveillance, theft of intellectual 

property, and painful remote communication accomplished using nonexistent technology” brought 

against “a wide variety of government agencies and private companies” because the “pleaded facts 

are facially implausible”); Gary v. U.S. Gov’t, 540 F. App’x 916, 916-918 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(affirming dismissal of complaint as frivolous where plaintiff alleged that government officials

implanted microchips in her body that caused her injury and pain).

This Court has previously dismissed claims of “widespread and far-reaching surveillance”

where a plaintiff’s “allegations of conspiracy are baseless and appear to be spun entirely from 

fantasy.” Lewis v. Country of Russia, No. 4:18-00124, 2019 WL 2246574, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 

1, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:18-CV-124, 2019 WL 2225358 (E.D. Tex. 

May 23, 2019). And it has recently dismissed a similar lawsuit filed by Plaintiff on the same basis. 

Dowell v. Austin, No. 6:23-cv-239 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2023) (dismissing because Plaintiff’s 

claims of “being hurt and brainwashed by microwave radiation and that he has a lot of evidence

that he has been trying to communicate to various government agencies for many years” are

“facially implausible and are properly subject to dismissal”). Plaintiff’s complaint is therefore 

deserving of dismissal as frivolous. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim 

for which relief can be granted. Traditionally, district courts permit a pro se plaintiff an opportunity 

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to amend his complaint before dismissing the case. However, giving a plaintiff an opportunity to 

amend is not necessary if he has pleaded his “best case,” such that an amended claim would remain 

frivolous. See Norman v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, 582 F. App’x 430, 431 (Mem) (5th Cir. 

2014) (unpublished); Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s core 

allegations are clearly delusional, and there is no reason to believe that he could amend his 

complaint in a way that would make it viable. Dismissal is therefore appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff=s complaint be dismissed with 

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2).

Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and 

recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy 

shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and 

recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to 

factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 26th day of October, 2023.

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