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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

vs.

ADRIAN CASTRO-DIAZ (1)

ESTEBAN DE JESUS VILLALOBOS 

RANGEL (2)

 

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§ CASE NO. 6:23-CR-123-JCB

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Suppress Evidence (ECF 34 and 35). United 

States District Judge J. Campbell Barker referred the motions for a recommendation as to 

disposition. The Court conducted a hearing on the motions on April 2, 2024. For the reasons 

below, the Court recommends that the motions be DENIED. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 15, 2023, a federal grand jury returned an Indictment charging Defendants 

Adrian Castro-Diaz and Esteban De Jesus Villalobos Rangel with one count each of Conspiracy 

to Transport Illegal Aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). Defendants filed 

identical motions to suppress evidence on March 1, 2024. Defendants argue that Trooper 

Maldonado stopped the vehicle they were traveling in on May 15, 2022, even though he did not 

observe any traffic violations and had no reason to believe the occupants of the vehicle had 

engaged in criminal activity. Defendants assert that Trooper Maldonado told them the stop was 

due to a reasonable suspicion, based on his training and experience that R.M. 334 is used for human 

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smuggling to avoid checkpoints, but he did not offer any supporting facts for that conclusion. 

Defendants acknowledge that, following the stop, Trooper Maldonado viewed several passengers 

crouched down in the vehicle and later learned that four men in the vehicle were not U.S. citizens. 

They argue, however, that Trooper Maldonado did not have a particularized or objective basis for 

suspecting that they were engaged in criminal activity sufficient to support the stop and that all 

evidence obtained following the stop must be suppressed.

The Government filed a response asserting that Trooper Maldonado properly drew rational 

inferences from the vehicle type, the vehicle location, his experience with R.M. 334, and his 

knowledge gleaned from his training and experience that this route is used to dodge border patrol 

checkpoints. The Government submits that the stop properly resulted from a reasonable suspicion 

that the vehicle’s occupants were engaged in illegal activity. More specifically, the Government 

states that the vehicle was stopped within 30 miles of the border, late at night, on a remote road 

primarily used by ranchers and hunters that is also known to be used by undocumented persons 

and smugglers to avoid checkpoints. The vehicle was observed traveling on the road at a time not 

customary for ranchers and the vehicle, a Honda CR-V, is not a vehicle typically used by ranchers. 

The Government asserts that Trooper Maldonado has extensive experience with human smuggling 

interdictions in the area. When he ran the license plate, it was registered in Smith County, which 

is not a normal endpoint for travel on R.M. 334. As a result, the Government argues that Trooper 

Maldonado had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was simply using R.M. 334 to evade 

permanent checkpoints set up on adjacent roadways. 

The Court conducted a hearing on the motions. At the hearing, Trooper Maldonado 

testified that he was a Trooper with the Texas Department of Public Safety, assigned to Operation 

Lone Star, on the night of the stop. At that time, he had been a Trooper for approximately ten 

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months. He had experience on a DPS brush team interdicting illegal immigrant and human 

smuggling activities. Trooper Maldonado testified that he observed a Honda CR-V traveling from 

U.S. Highway 90 to R.M. 334 late at night. He stated that he followed the vehicle for at least five 

minutes. Trooper Maldonado explained that the vehicle was riding low or sagging in the back, it 

was 33 miles or less from the border, and it was not the type of vehicle typically seen being driven 

by ranchers or hunters on R.M. 334. Trooper Maldonado opined that Jeeps and trucks are more 

common vehicles on that road. He also noted that ranchers are not typically traveling on that road 

between 11 p.m. and 12 a.m. Prior to initiating the stop, Trooper Maldonado stated that he ran the 

license plate and learned that the car was registered in Tyler, Smith County, Texas. He stated that 

R.M. 334 does not offer a direct path to travel to Tyler. He also stated that, in his experience, R.M.

334 is used by individuals seeking to avoid a border checkpoint on U.S. Highway 90. Trooper 

Maldonado testified that he decided to initiate a stop when he did because it would be more 

difficult to obtain backup further down the road.

Another Trooper, Cade Young, was stopped on R.M. 334 when Defendants’ vehicle and 

Trooper Maldonado passed by him, and he pulled out behind Trooper Maldonado. Trooper 

Maldonado testified that he initiated the stop and Defendants’ vehicle pulled over without incident. 

During testimony by Trooper Maldonado, the Government offered Trooper Maldonado’s body 

camera footage into evidence and displayed portions of the video. The video begins while Trooper 

Maldonado is stopping the vehicle. After stopping the vehicle, Trooper Maldonado and Trooper 

Young approached the vehicle together. Trooper Maldonado commented to Trooper Young that 

the vehicle was riding low and Trooper Young stated that he used his alley lights to illuminate the 

vehicle when it passed him, revealing multiple occupants in the car. Trooper Maldonado stated 

that he approached the vehicle and asked Defendants their names and where they were headed. 

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He also tried to identify the other occupants in the vehicle. Trooper Maldonado explained that he 

stated to Defendants that the stop was for “reasonable suspicion,” without elaborating on the 

specific reasons for the suspicion, because that is a de-escalation technique used by law 

enforcement. Trooper Maldonado contacted U.S. Border Patrol. U.S. Border Patrol arrived on 

scene and determined that four occupants in the vehicle were undocumented. Trooper Maldonado 

then arrested Defendants on a state charge of smuggling of persons.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Generally, in a suppression hearing, the burden of production and persuasion rests with the 

movant. United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932, 

97 S.Ct. 2640 (1977), and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954, 98 S.Ct. 479 (1977). For an initial stop 

without a warrant, however, the burden is on the government to show reasonable suspicion. United 

States v. Jaquez, 421 F.3d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir.2005). The government must show a “minimum 

level of objective justification for the officer’s actions, measured in light of the totality of the 

circumstances.” United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir.1993).

“The stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the 

Fourth Amendment.” U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). When a police 

officer stops a vehicle and questions its occupants, there is a modest intrusion of that person’s 

liberty. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579 (1975). To justify that 

limited intrusion, a police officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 

taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry 

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). Under the Terry framework, a law 

enforcement officer “may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory 

stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” U.S. 

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v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 2000). When determining whether a Terry stop is supported 

by reasonable suspicion, a court looks at “whether the officer’s action was: (1) ‘justified at its 

inception’; and (2) ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 

interference in the first place.’ ” U.S. v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879).

In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court considered “whether a roving patrol [as opposed to 

a checkpoint stop] may stop a vehicle in an area near the border and question its occupants when 

the only ground for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry.” U.S. v. 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 876, 95 S.Ct. at 2578. The Government argued that warrantless stops 

in border areas were authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), which authorizes an INS officer or 

employee “to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to 

remain in the United States.” Id. at 877. The Court rejected the argument, however, that a border 

patrol agent has broad and unlimited discretion to stop vehicles without meeting the reasonable 

suspicion requirement of the Fourth Amendment, as articulated in Terry. Id. at 882. As such, the 

Court evaluated whether the stop—in that case, effected by border patrol agents—was supported 

by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. In comparing a stop near the border 

with other investigatory stops, the Court stated:

In this case as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, 

the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for 

policing the border, we hold that when an officer’s observations lead him 

reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally 

in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that 

provoke suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be ‘reasonably related 

in scope to the justification for their initiation.’ The officer may question the driver 

and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them 

to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be 

based on consent or probable cause. We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol 

dispense entirely with the requirement that officers must have a reasonable 

suspicion to justify roving-patrol stops. In the context of border area stops, the 

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reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands something more 

than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government.

Id. at 881–882 (citation omitted). The Court identified eight predominant factors that may result 

in reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop a vehicle in a border area: (1) the area’s proximity to the 

border; (2) the characteristics of the area; (3) usual traffic patterns; (4) the agents’ experience in 

detecting illegal activity; (5) the driver’s behavior; (6) the aspects or characteristics of the vehicle; 

(7) information about recent illegal trafficking of aliens or narcotics in the area; and (8) the number 

of passengers and their appearance and behavior. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 

884–885. 

At the hearing, Defendants argued that the factors espoused in Brignoni-Ponce do not apply 

because Trooper Maldonado was acting as a Texas law enforcement officer and was not acting 

under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1357. Defendants’ argument misconstrues the Court’s holding. 

The Court expressly determined that officers acting under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1357, such 

as border patrol agents on roving-patrol, do not have broader powers than other law enforcement 

officers, such as a State Trooper, to conduct investigatory stops. Instead, the Court applied the 

Terry framework and identified relevant factors that may support reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity in a border area. The Court specifically limited officers on roving patrol to stops when 

“they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that 

reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.” 

Id. at 884. The Court did not present a different standard to be applied to border patrol agents or 

other officers who are authorized to perform border operations by federal law. On the contrary, 

the Court explained that the same standard applicable to all law enforcement officers applies when 

those agents conduct stops while on roving patrol, as opposed to when they are conducting an 

authorized border checkpoint stop.

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Here, Trooper Maldonado observed a small utility vehicle traveling on a remote ranch-tomarket road at 11:50 p.m. He saw that the vehicle was weighed down and was within 

approximately 30 miles of the border. He ran the license plate and discovered that the car was 

registered in Tyler, Smith County, Texas, as opposed to the area where the car was traveling. 

Trooper Maldonado deduced that R.M. 334 does not provide a direct route for travel to Tyler and 

that a small utility vehicle is not typical for a rancher or a hunter that might be using that road. 

Although he had only been on the job for approximately 10 months at the time of the stop, Trooper 

Maldonado testified that he had experience performing hundreds of interdictions in the area and 

that R.M. 334, in his experience, is used by undocumented persons and smugglers to avoid border 

checkpoints. 

A vehicle’s close proximity to the border—within 50 miles—is a paramount factor in 

determining reasonable suspicion. U.S. v. Orozco, 191 F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1999). A vehicle’s 

registration showing that the vehicle is taking an indirect route on a less-heavily patrolled road and 

a road’s “reputation as a route commonly used for transporting illegal aliens” may add to 

reasonable suspicion. U.S. v. Olivares-Pacheco, 633 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2011). R.M. 334 is 

“a remote road used primarily by ranchers and hunters in trucks or jeeps,” it is the site of many 

Border Patrol interceptions of vehicles transporting undocumented persons, and it is known “as a 

convenient route used by smugglers and undocumented persons for purposes of bypassing a 

permanent federal checkpoint on U.S. Highway 90 near Cline, Texas.” U.S. Cardona, 955 F.2d 

976, 978 (5th Cir. 1992). The fact that a vehicle is riding low also contributes to reasonable 

suspicion. U.S. v. Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2001).

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Viewing the evidence presented and the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Maldonado 

was aware of and identified specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect that the occupants 

of the vehicle were involved in the illegal activity of transporting illegal aliens when he initiated 

the stop of Defendants’ vehicle. The Government has shown that Trooper Maldonado had a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, sufficient to warrant a brief 

investigatory stop, when the stop was initiated.

RECOMMENDATION

In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motions to Suppress 

Evidence (ECF 34 and 35) be DENIED.

Within fourteen days after receipt of the magistrate judge’s report, any party may serve and 

file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b). Written objections shall not exceed eight pages. Local Rule CV-72(c).

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and 

recommendations contained in this Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the district 

judge of those findings, conclusions and recommendations and, except upon grounds of plain error, 

from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions 

accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 

1430 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

(extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 19th day of April, 2024.

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