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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

WILLIAM EDWARD FERGUSON,

 Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

v.

U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, BUT 

SOLELY AS TRUSTEE OF THE 

TRUMAN 2021 SC9 TITLE TRUST,

 Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff,

v.

RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, LLC,

 Defendant.

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 Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-122-ALM-KPJ

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant U.S. Bank Trust National Association’s, not in its 

Individual Capacity, but Solely as Trustee of the Truman 2021 SC9 Title Trust (“U.S. Bank”),

Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (the “Motion for Summary Judgment”) 

(Dkt. 24). Plaintiff William Edward Ferguson (“Plaintiff”) did not file a response. For the reasons 

that follow, the Court recommends the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On June 12, 2015, Plaintiff executed a home equity note (the “Note”) in the original 

principal amount of $318,200.00. Dkt. 24-2 at 2–4. Contemporaneously, Plaintiff executed a 

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corresponding security instrument (the “Security Instrument”) (collectively with the Note, the 

“Loan Agreement”), which secured the repayment of the Note with the real property located at 

4104 Forbes Drive, Plano, Texas 75093 (the “Property”). Dkt. 24-3 at 2–3, 11. The Security 

Instrument was later assigned to U.S. Bank, who is the current holder of the Note. See Dkts. 24-

11 at 2; 24-12 at 2. Plaintiff failed to timely make all payments due, resulting in a default under 

the Loan Agreement. Dkt. 24-13 at 3–4. On or about March 16, 2022, a notice of default and intent 

to accelerate was mailed to Plaintiff. Id. The default was not cured, and the balance of the Note 

was accelerated. Dkt. 24-14 at 3, 6.

On September 20, 2022, U.S. Bank filed an application for foreclosure in the 471st District 

Court of Collin County, Texas. Dkt. 24-1 at 6. After receiving Plaintiff’s answer, the 471st District 

Court signed a foreclosure order on December 9, 2022. Dkt. 24-15 at 2–3. U.S. Bank mailed a 

notice of foreclosure to Plaintiff on December 29, 2022, notifying Plaintiff of the foreclosure sale 

scheduled for February 7, 2023. Dkt. 24-16 at 2–9. As of May 23, 2023, the balance owed on the 

Loan Agreement was $435,663.64. Dkt. 24-18 at 2.

B. Procedural History

On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Original Petition (the “Petition”) in the 471st

Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas (“State Court”). Dkt. 5 at 1. In the Petition, Plaintiff 

contends that the Loan Agreement violates provisions of the Texas Constitution that regulate home 

equity loans within the State. See Id. at 3–4. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: (1) he did not receive 

“a copy of all finalized and signed loan documents at closing,” in violation of Article XVI, 

§ 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) of the Texas Constitution; (2) the loan closed before twelve days after he received 

notice that the loan was governed by Article XVI, in violation of Article XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(i) of 

the Texas Constitution; and (3) the lender did not properly execute an acknowledgement of fair 

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market value, in violation of Article XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix) of the Texas Constitution. Id. Based 

on these violations, Plaintiff brings a claim for suit to quiet title and requests declaratory and 

injunctive relief. Id. at 4–6. On February 15, 2023, U.S. Bank removed this action from State Court 

and filed its Original Answer and Counterclaim Against Plaintiff (the “Answer”) (Dkt. 3). See 

Dkts. 1; 3. In the Answer (Dkt. 3), U.S. Bank denies Plaintiff’s allegations and asserts 

counterclaims for foreclosure and, in the alternative, equitable subrogation. Dkt. 3 at 1–5, 11–12.

On February 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. 6), alleging the same 

constitutional violations and bringing the same causes of action as asserted in the Petition (Dkt. 5).

See Dkt. 6.

On July 27, 2023, U.S. Bank filed the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24), wherein 

U.S. Bank argues that (1) it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim because the loan 

complied with the Texas Constitution; (2) Plaintiff’s requests for a declaratory judgment and a 

permanent injunction fail as a matter of law; and (3) it is entitled to summary judgment on its 

counterclaim of foreclosure because Plaintiff defaulted on the Loan Agreement. Dkt. 24 at 10–11. 

Plaintiff did not file a response.

On August 11, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel filed an Unopposed Motion to Withdraw as 

Counsel for Plaintiff (the “Motion to Withdraw”) (Dkt. 27), wherein Plaintiff’s counsel 

represented that they had been “unable to communicate with Plaintiff since May 23, 2023,” and 

“Plaintiff has not responded to emails or telephone calls.” Dkt. 27 at 2. The Court set the Motion 

to Withdraw (Dkt. 27) for a hearing (the “Hearing”) and ordered Plaintiff, along with Plaintiff’s 

counsel, to be present at the Hearing. See Dkt. 31. The Hearing was held on September 11, 2023. 

Dkt. 32. While Plaintiff’s counsel and U.S. Bank’s counsel appeared at the Hearing, Plaintiff did 

not. See id. At the Hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel represented that they had been unable to 

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communicate with Plaintiff since May 23, 2023. See id. Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel 

represented that they attempted on multiple occasions to reach Plaintiff by both email and 

telephone, to no avail. See id. Plaintiff’s counsel further represented that Plaintiff had not fulfilled 

his obligation to pay Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees. See id.

On September 14, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s Amended Unopposed 

Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff (Dkt. 33),

1 permitting Plaintiff’s counsel to withdraw 

and ordering Plaintiff to “advise the Court of new counsel or his decision to proceed pro se” by 

October 13, 2023. Dkt. 34 at 3. That same day, the Clerk of Court sent this order to Plaintiff by 

certified mail, return receipt requested, at his last known address and by e-mail at the e-mail 

address provided by Plaintiff’s counsel. On October 12, 2023, the mail was returned as 

undeliverable and marked as “RETURN TO SENDER – UNCLAIMED – UNABLE TO 

FORWARD.” See Dkt. 35.

On November 3, 2023, the Court ordered that if Plaintiff intended to pursue claims against 

U.S. Bank, Plaintiff shall respond to the Court’s order by November 17, 2023. Dkt. 37 at 2. On 

November 11, 2023, the Clerk of Court sent this order to Plaintiff by certified mail, return receipt 

requested, at his last known address and by e-mail at the e-mail address provided by Plaintiff’s 

counsel. On December 15, 2023, the mail was returned as undeliverable and marked as “RETURN 

TO SENDER – VACANT – UNABLE TO FORWARD.” See Dkt. 39.

On February 9, 2024, the Court ordered that Plaintiff shall file a response, if any, to the 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) no later than seven (7) days after receipt of the order. 

Dkt. 40 at 1. On February 12, 2024, the Clerk of Court sent this order to Plaintiff by certified mail, 

1 Plaintiff’s counsel amended the Motion to Withdraw (Dkt. 27) after the hearing to include counsel that was 

inadvertently omitted from the Motion to Withdraw (Dkt. 27). See Dkt. 33.

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return receipt requested, at his last known address and by e-mail at the e-mail address provided by 

Plaintiff’s counsel. To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“One of the principal purposes of . . . summary judgment . . . is to isolate and dispose of 

factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). 

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “If 

the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the 

nonmovant’s response.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). “If the 

movant does, however, meet this burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and 

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 325).

“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no 

genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) 

(emphases omitted). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248. A fact is 

“material” if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law; factual 

disputes that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” do not affect the summary judgment determination. 

Id. Dispute over a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Trial courts “must resolve all reasonable doubts and 

draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Sanchez v. Young 

Cnty, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020).

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When appropriate, the Court can grant summary judgment even if the nonmoving party 

fails to respond to the motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(3); see also Vargas v. 

McHugh, No. 14-cv-334, 2015 WL 10766924, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 13, 2015). “A motion for 

summary judgment cannot be granted simply because there is no opposition . . . .” Day v. Wells

Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 768 F.3d 435, 435 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. 

Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985)). “The movant has 

the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and, unless he has done 

so, the court may not grant the motion, regardless of whether any response was filed.” Hetzel v. 

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 362 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).

Nonetheless, the Court may grant summary judgment if the movant has made a prima facie 

showing that it is entitled to such relief. See Eversley v. MBank Dall., 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 

1988). The court may also accept as undisputed the facts set forth in support of the unopposed 

motion for summary judgment. See id.; Yowman v. Jefferson Cnty. Cmty. Supervision & Corr. 

Dep’t, 370 F. Supp. 2d 568, 581–82 (E.D. Tex. 2005).

III. ANALYSIS

U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for suit to quiet title and

requests for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction, as well as its own claim for 

foreclosure.

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Suit to Quiet Title Claim

“[A] suit to quiet title ‘is an equitable action that involves clearing a title of an invalid 

charge against the title.’” Cruz v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11-cv-2871, 2012 WL 1836095, at *4 

(N.D. Tex. May 21, 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Longoria v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 165 

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n.7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied)). To succeed on a quiet title action, “Plaintiff 

must show that: (1) he has an interest in the Property, (2) title to the Property is affected by a claim 

by [U.S. Bank], and (3) the claim, although facially valid, is invalid or unenforceable.” See 

McLerran v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, No. 12-cv-718, 2013 WL 2468733, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 

2013) (citing Cruz, 2012 WL 1836095, at *4).

U.S. Bank does not dispute that Plaintiff has an interest in the Property and that Plaintiff’s 

title to the property is affected by the Security Instrument on the Property. See Dkts. 6 at 2–4; 24 

at 7–9. Thus, the only issue before the Court is whether the Security Instrument, although facially 

valid, is invalid or unenforceable. The Amended Complaint (Dkt. 6) alleges that the Security 

Interest is invalid and unenforceable because there are “uncured constitutional violations [that] 

have rendered [U.S. Bank’s] underlying lien void ab initio.” Dkt. 6 at 4. U.S. Bank moves for 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s suit to quiet title claim, arguing the evidence shows that the Loan 

Agreement complied with the Texas Constitution. Dkt. 24 at 11.

“In Texas, ‘the homestead has always been protected from forced sale, not merely by 

statute as in most states, but by the Constitution.’” Rideau v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 18-

3937, 2019 WL 1789729, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2019) (quoting Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan 

Servicing, LLC, 497 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Tex. 2016)). Article XVI, § 50(a) of the Texas Constitution 

“protects the homestead from foreclosure for the payment of debts” except for a home equity loan 

that meets the requirements in subsection (6). See Garofolo, 497 S.W.3d at 477; See TEX. CONST. 

art. XVI, § 50(c) (“No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid 

unless it secures a debt described by this section . . . .”) “A plaintiff must allege violations of 

§ 50(a)(6) in conjunction with a cause of action to state a claim.” Rideau, 2019 WL 1789729, at 

*2 (citing Garofolo, 497 S.W.3d at 478).

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Plaintiff alleges that the Loan Agreement, and, thus, U.S. Bank’s lien on the Property, 

violates the Texas Constitution in three ways: (1) he did not receive “a copy of all finalized and 

signed loan documents at closing,” in violation of Article XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) of the Texas 

Constitution; (2) the loan closed before twelve days after he received notice that the loan was 

governed by Article XVI, in violation of Article XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(i) of the Texas Constitution; 

and (3) the lender did not properly execute an acknowledgement of fair market value, in violation 

of Article XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix) of the Texas Constitution. Dkt. 6 at 2–3. Thus, the Court 

considers whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each alleged violation of the Texas 

Constitution.

i. Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v)

Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) states: “at the time the extension of credit is made, the owner of the 

homestead shall receive a copy of the final loan application and all executed documents signed by 

the owner at closing related to the extension of credit.” TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(v). 

Plaintiff attested in his Texas Home Equity Affidavit and Agreement (the “Home Equity 

Affidavit”) that “[t]o the best of [his] knowledge and belief, all owners of the Property, after 

receiving a copy of the final loan application and all documents signed by them at closing, will 

sign a receipt acknowledging the delivery of such copies.” Dkt. 42-1 at 4; see also Summers v. 

PennyMac Corp., No. 12-cv-1235, 2012 WL 5944943, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2012) (relying 

on a home equity affidavit to grant a motion to dismiss). Plaintiff further signed an 

acknowledgement that he “received a copy of the final Loan Application and all executed 

documents [he] signed at closing in connection with the extension of credit on [his] homestead 

property.” Dkt. 24-7 at 2.

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The evidence therefore demonstrates that Plaintiff received a copy of the final loan 

application and all executed documents signed by him at the closing, as required by 

§ 50(a)(6)(Q)(v). Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged noncompliance 

with § 50(a)(6)(Q)(v).

ii. Section 50(a)(6)(M)(i)

Section 50(a)(6)(M)(i) states that a home equity loan cannot close until at least “the 12th

day after the later of the date that the owner of the homestead submits a loan application to the 

lender for the extension of credit or the date that the lender provides the owner a copy of the notice 

prescribed by Subsection (g) of this section.” TEX.CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(i). Accordingly, 

the loan application and the § 50(g) notice must have both occurred at least twelve days before the 

closing of the Loan Agreement for there to be no violation of the Texas Constitution. Plaintiff 

signed and dated the Loan Agreement at the closing on June 12, 2015. Dkts. 24-2 at 2, 4; 24-3 

at 11–12. Plaintiff signed and dated the § 50(g) notice on May 18, 2015. Dkt. 24-5 at 4. Thus, at 

least twelve days elapsed between the date of the § 50(g) notice and the closing of the Loan 

Agreement.

Furthermore, Plaintiff affirmed in the Home Equity Affidavit that “[t]he Note and Security 

Instrument have not been signed before the twelfth (12th) day after the later of the date the owner 

of the Property submitted a loan application to the Lender, or the Lender’s representative for the 

Extension of Credit, or the date that the Lender or the Lender’s representative provided the owner 

with a copy of the Notice Concerning Extensions of Credit defined by Section 50(a)(6), Article 

XVI of the Texas Constitution.” Dkt. 42-1 at 3. Plaintiff’s sworn testimony in the Home Equity 

Affidavit confirms that the loan application was submitted and the § 50(g) notice was received at 

least twelve days before closing on the Loan Agreement.

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The evidence shows that Plaintiff submitted the loan application and received a copy of the 

§ 50(g) notice at least twelve days before closing on the Loan Agreement, as required by 

§ 50(a)(6)(M)(i). Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged noncompliance 

with § 50(a)(6)(M)(i).

iii. Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix)

Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix) states: “the owner of the homestead and the lender sign a written 

acknowledgment as to the fair market value of the homestead property on the date the extension 

of credit is made.” TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix). Plaintiff and Joseph A. Miller, the 

Managing Director of National Operations for Bank of America, N.A., signed the 

Acknowledgment as to Fair Market Value of Homestead Property, wherein they attested that “the 

extension of credit is being closed today[,] 06/12/2015, and the fair market of the . . . Property is 

$400,000.00.” Dkt. 24-6 at 2. The closing for the Loan Agreement occurred on June 12, 2015. See 

Dkts. 24-2 at 2; 24-3 at 2.

The evidence shows that the acknowledgment as to the fair market value of the Property 

was signed by both Plaintiff and the original lender, Bank of America, on the day of closing, as 

required by § 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix). Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the alleged 

noncompliance with § 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix). Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any 

of the alleged violations under the Texas Constitution, the Court recommends that the Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) be granted as to this claim.

2. Declaratory Judgment

The Declaratory Judgment Act does not itself create a substantive cause of action. See

Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The federal Declaratory 

Judgment Act is procedural only . . . .” (internal citation omitted) (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201; 

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and then citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950))). Rather, a

declaratory judgment action allows a party to obtain an “early adjudication of an actual 

controversy” arising under other substantive law. Collin Cnty. v. Homeowners Ass’n for Values 

Essential to Neighborhoods, 915 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1990). Because there is no genuine issue 

of material fact as to any of Plaintiff’s alleged violations under the Texas Constitution, there is no 

actual controversy that would allow Plaintiff to obtain declaratory judgment. Thus, Plaintiff’s 

request for a declaratory judgment fails as a matter of law.

3. Permanent Injunction

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is equitable in nature and does not constitute an 

independent cause of action. See Garza v. J.P. Morgan, Alt. Loan Tr., No. 17-cv-82, 2017 WL 

6513655, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2017), R. & R. adopted sub nom. Garza v. J.P. Morgan Alt.

Loan Tr., 2017 WL 6498142 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017). “To be entitled to a permanent injunction, 

one must establish ‘(1) success on the merits; (2) that a failure to grant the injunction will result in 

irreparable injury; (3) that the injury outweighs any damage that the injunction will cause the 

opposing party; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.’” Cooper v. Harvey, 

No. 14-cv-4152, 2016 WL 4427481, at *22 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2016) (quoting Env’t Tex. Citizen 

Lobby, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 15-20030, 2016 WL 3063302, at *16 (5th Cir. May 27, 

2016)). Because there is no viable underlying legal claim, Plaintiff’s request for permanent 

injunction fails as a matter of law. See Howard v. AMH ROMAN TWO TX, LLC, No. 15-cv-526, 

2016 WL 3392417, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2016) (“A request for equitable or injunctive relief 

must be premised upon the existence of a viable underlying legal claim.”), R. & R. adopted, 2016 

WL 3382032 (E.D. Tex. June 17, 2016).

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B. U.S. Bank’s Claim

1. Foreclosure

“To foreclose under a security instrument in Texas with a power of sale, the lender must 

demonstrate that: (1) a debt exists; (2) the debt is secured by a lien created under [Article XVI]

§ 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution; (3) [the] plaintiff[ is] in default under the note and security 

instrument; and (4) [the] plaintiff[] received notice of default and acceleration.” Singleton v. U.S. 

Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 15-cv-100, 2016 WL 1611378, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2016) (quoting 

Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 988 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2013)). Plaintiff 

executed the Note in 2015 for the principal amount of $318,200.00, creating the debt. See Dkt. 24-

2 at 2. Plaintiff simultaneously executed the Security Interest securing the Note by lien on the 

Property created under § 50(a)(6). See Dkt. 24-3 at 2. Plaintiff failed to make payments, defaulting 

on the Loan Agreement. See Dkt. 24-13 at 3–4. Plaintiff received the notices of default and 

acceleration via first-class mail on or about March 16, 2022 and July 25, 2022.2 See Dkt. 24-13 at 

2–3; 24-14 at 2–6. U.S. Bank has presented sufficient summary judgment evidence to establish the 

elements of its counterclaim. Because U.S. Bank has met its initial burden, the burden shifts to 

Plaintiff “to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue 

for trial.” See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. However, Plaintiff did not file a response, despite multiple 

orders from the Court providing Plaintiff the opportunity to participate in this case.3 See supra 

2 “The [Texas] Property Code requires the mortgage servicer to serve a debtor in default with written notice by certified 

mail stating that the note is in default and providing at least 20 days to cure before any notice of sale can be given.” 

Huston, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d)). Further, “[s]ervice . . . by certified mail 

is complete when the notice is deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to the debtor at 

debtor’s last known address.” PROP. § 51.002(e).

3 After granting Plaintiff’s counsel’s request to withdraw due to Plaintiff’s unresponsiveness to his counsel and failure 

to pay his counsel’s fees, the Court made three separate efforts to contact Plaintiff and encourage his participation in 

this case. See Dkts. 34; 37; 40. Each of these attempts has gone unanswered, despite service to Plaintiff’s last known 

address and the e-mail address provided by his former counsel. See Dkts. 34–35; 37; 39–40.

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Section I.B. Hence, there is no contrary evidence for the Court to consider that could raise a fact 

issue. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that 

the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” (emphasis omitted)). Thus, the 

Court recommends that summary judgment be granted as to U.S. Bank’s counterclaim.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends the Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 24) be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claim for suit to quiet title be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

The Court further recommends that U.S. Bank be authorized to foreclose its lien on the 

property that secured the note indebtedness, to wit: 

Lot 21 in Block D, Whiffletree No. X, an addition to the City of Plano, Collin 

County, Texas, according to the map or plat thereof recorded in Volume J, Page 

699 of the Map and/or Plat Records of Collin County, Texas

and which has the address of 4104 Forbes Dr., Plano, Texas 75093-6609, pursuant to the Note and 

Security Instrument and the Texas Property Code § 51.002.

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge’s report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

A party is entitled to de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions 

contained in this report only if specific objections are made, and failure to timely file written 

objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report 

shall bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal conclusions 

accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been 

served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 

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474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985); see also Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

(extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

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