United States District Court

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

JEFFERY BROWN AND NICKI BROWN,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

PACCAR INC.,

Defendant. 

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Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-705

Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant PACCAR Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #5). 

Having considered the Motion, the relevant pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court finds that 

the Motion should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

 On August 7, 2023, Plaintiffs Jeffery and Nicki Brown filed a Complaint with the Court

against Defendant PACCAR Inc. (Dkt. #4). As pleaded in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, PACCAR

designed, manufactured, assembled, and tested a 2000 Peterbilt Tractor 

(VIN#1XP5DB9X6YN516804) (the “Tractor”) before selling it to Rush Truck Center in Phoenix, 

Arizona on November 30, 1999 (Dkt. #4 at ¶¶ 8–17). On January 14, 2019, Mr. Brown was

operating the Tractor in Bryan County, Oklahoma, when he struck a defective expansion joint on 

the bridge crossing the Red River, causing him to lose control of the Tractor and roll over on the 

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roadway (Dkt. #4 at ¶¶ 9–11).

1 Mr. Brown suffered spinal injuries as a result of the accident (Dkt. 

#4 at ¶ 11). Plaintiffs allege that PACCAR is liable for Mr. Brown’s injuries because, during the 

rollover, the Tractor’s cab “crushed excessively, causing severe and permanent spinal injuries to 

Jeffery Brown” (Dkt. #4 at ¶ 11). Plaintiffs assert that PACCAR knew that accidents, like the one 

Mr. Brown suffered here, “[were] entirely foreseeable” and “well-known” (Dkt. #4 at ¶ 15). 

Plaintiffs originally filed suit on November 12, 2019, in the 431st Judicial District Court of 

Denton County, Texas, then voluntarily dismissed the suit two months later (Dkt. #5-1, 5-3). On 

January 12, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint in the District Court of Bryan County, Oklahoma,

against PACCAR and the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (Dkt. #5-4). PACCAR 

responded with a Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction, as PACCAR claims the accident 

occurred in Texas, not Oklahoma (Dkt. #4 at ¶ 6). The district court denied PACCAR’s motion 

(Dkt. #4 at ¶ 6). PACCAR then filed an Application for Writ of Prohibition with the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court (Dkt. #5-7). The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted PACCAR’s writ and 

prohibited personal jurisdiction over PACCAR in Oklahoma (Dkt. #5-10). The claim was then filed 

in the 467th Judicial District Court of Denton County, Texas, and removed to this Court on 

diversity grounds (Dkt. #1).2

1 In its Motion to Dismiss, PACCAR provides evidence from a land surveyor suggesting that the accident took place 

in Texas, not Oklahoma (Dkt. #5 at p. 8). In their Response, Plaintiffs explain, “[t]here was, and continues to be, a 

dispute as to where exactly in the process Mr. Brown incurred the injuries made the basis for suit (in Texas, Oklahoma, 

or a bit of both) but for this Response, save when specifically addressed, the same is not relevant” (Dkt. #10 at p. 8). 

In any event, the Oklahoma Supreme Court holds that jurisdiction is proper in Texas, not Oklahoma (Dkt. #4 at ¶ 6).

2 As pleaded in PACCAR’s Notice of Removal, both Plaintiffs are domiciled in Sumner, Texas (Dkt. #1 at p. 2). 

Therefore, both Plaintiffs are Texas citizens (Dkt. #1 at p. 2). PACCAR, on the other hand, is a Delaware corporation 

with its principal place of business in Washington (Dkt. #1 at p. 2). Accordingly, the parties are completely diverse. 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(a). Further, the amount in controversy is satisfied because Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages 

totaling over $1,000,000—far exceeding the amount in controversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction. Id.; (Dkt. #1 

at p. 2).

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On August 14, 2023, PACCAR filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 

Claim upon which Relief can be Granted (Dkt. #5). Plaintiffs filed their Response on September 

11, 2023 (Dkt. #10). Then, one week later, PACCAR filed its Reply on September 18, 2023 (Dkt. 

#12). On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their First Sur-Response to PACCAR’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Dkt. #18). On June 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Supplemental Sur-Response to 

PACCAR’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #19). On November 7, 2024, the Court ordered the parties 

to submit supplemental briefing on Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.031 (Dkt. #20). 

Both parties submitted their respective briefing on November 14, 2024 (Dkt. #21; Dkt. #22).

LEGAL STANDARDS

A party may seek dismissal in a pretrial motion based on any of the defenses set out in Rule 

12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); see also Albany Ins. Co. v. 

Almacenadora Somex, 5 F.3d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1993).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a 

“short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2). Each claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the 

plaintiff’s complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City 

of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the complaint, any 

documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that 

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are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays 

Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the 

complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not 

permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 

(quoting FED. R.CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency 

of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and 

disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine 

if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts 

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or 

elements.’” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This 

evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ Id. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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ANALYSIS

The crux of the instant dispute is a conflict-of-laws analysis. In this endeavor, the Court 

faces a proverbial fork in the road. The Court, sitting in diversity, could turn right and apply Texas 

law. If it so chooses, the Court would have no choice but to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action as time-barred 

under Texas’s fifteen-year statute of repose. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.012(b). On 

the other hand, the Court could take the road less traveled, turn left, and apply Arizona law, which 

would allow Plaintiffs’ claims to survive as Arizona law does not have a statute of repose. The 

Court does not approach this analysis lightly, as its decision could foreclose Plaintiffs’ relief. As 

demonstrated by the sections that follow, Texas’s statute of repose appliesto bar Plaintiffs’ claims.

In arriving at its conclusion, the Court must perform a two-step inquiry. First, the Court 

must perform a choice-of-law analysis. After determining which state’s law applies, the Court must 

apply that law to the facts of this case. The Court addresses each prong of the analysis in turn. 

I. Conflict of Laws

The first step is for the Court to determine which state’s law applies. The options before 

the Court are Texas and Arizona. PACCAR urges the Court to apply Texas substantive law (Dkt. 

#12). In support of its position, PACCAR notes that the injury occurred in Texas, Plaintiffs are 

Texas citizens, and Texas policy favors the application of Texas law (Dkt. #12 at pp. 3–13). 

Therefore, according to PACCAR, Texas law is the only logical—and proper—law to apply. 

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, see the issue quite differently. Plaintiffs ask the Court to apply 

Arizona law because the Tractor entered the stream of commerce in Arizona, not Texas (Dkt. #10 

at pp. 6–14). The consequences of the Court’s decision with respect to this issue are serious, as the 

viability of Plaintiffs’ claims hangs in the balance. Application of Texas law warrants dismissal, 

while application of Arizona law would allow their claims to survive. See infra Section II. 

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A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. 

Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Texas courts use the Restatement 

(Second) of Conflict of Laws to resolve choice-of-law questions and select the substantive law that 

governs a case. Stevenson v. Ford Motor Co., 608 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no 

pet.). “[The Restatement] provides two sequential analyses, the second of which is conditioned 

on the inapplicability of the first.” Id. Section 6 of the Restatement reads:

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of 

its own state on choice of law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the 

applicable rule of law include

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests 

of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. L. INST. 1971).

In short, courts must apply local choice-of-law statutory provisions unless doing so would 

be unconstitutional. Stevenson, 608 S.W.3d at 117 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 

OF LAWS § 6(1) cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1971)). While Texas generally applies the “most significant 

relationship” test, the Texas Legislature provides a statutory provision that determines the choice 

of law in this case.3 TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 71.031; Hyde v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 

511 F.3d 506, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Texas law to a products liability action while sitting in 

diversity). “When deciding which state’s law should apply to a suit for injury or death occurring 

3 Initially, neither party briefed the Court on the applicability—or lack thereof—of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 

Code § 71.031. In fairness, the Court allowed the parties to brief the issue (Dkt. #21; Dkt. #22). After reviewing the 

parties’ briefing, the Court determines that § 71.031 applies to decide the choice of law issue this case presents.

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outside Texas, Texas courts apply Texas’s choice-of-law rules.” Stevenson, 608 S.W.3d at 119. 

Specifically, the applicable choice-of-law rule governing this case is codified in Texas Civil Practice 

and Remedies Code § 71.031. Section 71.031 applies in both state and federal courts. Id.; Burdett v. 

Remington Arms Co., L.L.C., 854 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2017). In Texas: 

(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of this state, 

of the United States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of 

this state, although the wrongful act, neglect, or default causing the death or 

injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:

(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right to 

maintain an action for damages for the death or injury;

(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the laws of 

this state for beginning the action;

(3) for a resident of a foreign state or country, the action is begun in this 

state within the time provided by the laws of the foreign state or country 

in which the wrongful act, neglect, or default took place . . . .

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a)(1)–(3). Notably, “Section 71.031(a) is not a 

jurisdictional bar, but it is a statutory requirement or prerequisite that affects a plaintiff's right to 

obtain relief and should be met before a trial court proceeds.” Stevenson, 608 S.W.3d at 120 (citing 

Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76–77 (Tex. 2000)). Section 71.031 operates as a 

codified choice-of-law rule governing the timeliness of actions. Id. (citing Owens Corning v. Carter, 

997 S.W.2d 560, 573 (Tex. 1999)).

A plaintiff who resides in a foreign state must satisfy § 71.031(a)(1)–(3), while a Texas

resident need only satisfy the first two requirements. Burdett, 854 F.3d at 737. Here, Plaintiffs are 

Texas residents and therefore must only satisfy § 71.031(a)(1)–(2) to seek relief under the statute. 

See id. (using § 71.031 to resolve a conflict of laws in a products liability case in which a Texas 

resident brought an action against a foreign corporation for an accident occurring in Texas); (Dkt. 

#4 at p. 1). Section 71.031(a)(2) applies to all personal injury actions in Texas and includes a time 

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limitation to prevent forum shopping. Stevenson, 608 S.W.3d at 120. “Both statutes of limitations 

and statutes of repose serve to limit the amount of time under which suit may be brought, and a 

plaintiff bringing suit under § 71.031 must satisfy not only the statute of limitations but also the 

statute of repose.” Id. As the Fifth Circuit observed in Hyde, Texas law requires resident plaintiffs 

to “establish under subsection (a)(2) that [their] action was instituted in Texas ‘within the time 

provided by the laws of [Texas] for beginning the action.’” Hyde, 511 F.3d at 511–12 (quoting TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a)(2)). Critically, that includes the time provided by 

Texas’s statute of repose. Id.

Yet Plaintiffs submit that § 71.031 is inapplicable to these facts. Plaintiffs interpret 

§ 71.031(a) to apply only when the injury itself occurs outside of Texas (Dkt. #21 at pp. 3–4). So,

the argument goes, § 71.031 is inapposite here because Mr. Brown’s injury occurred in Texas(Dkt. 

#21 at pp. 3–4).

4 But that is not what the statute says. Section 71.031(a) does not require the injury 

to occur outside of Texas for § 71.031(a)(1)–(3) to apply. The bare language of the statute makes 

that much clear. TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODE ANN. § 71.031(a) (allowing a Texas court to enforce 

an action for the death or personal injury of a Texas citizen “although the wrongful act, neglect, or 

default causing the death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country”) (emphasis added). 

Clearly, the injury itself need not occur outside the state of Texas for § 71.031 to apply. Instead, it 

is enough if the conduct causing the injury occurs out of state. Any other reading offered by 

Plaintiffs would run afoul of fundamental principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Duncan v. 

4 Ironically, by advancing this argument, Plaintiffs seem to abandon their prior stance that the injury occurred in 

Oklahoma, not Texas (Dkt. #4 at pp. 3–4) (claiming that the car struck a defective bridge joint in Oklahoma, causing 

the accident at issue); (Dkt. #10 at p. 8) (“Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown was operating his 2000 Peterbilt Model 379 tractor 

(the “Tractor”) wholly within the State of Oklahoma when the Tractor struck a bridge abutment on the Oklahoma side

of the Red River Bridge on State Highway 78 in Oklahoma.”) (emphasis added).

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Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“‘[i]t is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and 

word of a statute.’”) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)). For

instance, the crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that § 71.031 is only applicable when the injury—and 

nothing else—occurs outside of Texas. But that reading would render the words “wrongful act, 

neglect, or default causing” in the statute mere surplusage. That is not how courts have ever read 

statutes. And today is no exception.

Here, in short, “the defect causing the injury” occurred out of state. TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.

CODE ANN. § 71.031(a). Thus, § 71.031 applies. This is a products liability action in which Plaintiffs 

assert that the Tractor that PACCAR sold was “defective,” “unreasonably dangerous,” and “not 

reasonably crashworthy” as “designed, manufactured, marketed, assembled, and/or tested” (Dkt. 

#4 at ¶¶ 15–22). Notably, however, all of those acts occurred outside of Texas (Dkt. #5 at p. 10). 

PACCAR designed the cab structure in California (Dkt. #5 at p. 10). PACCAR tested the Tractor 

in Washington (Dkt. #5 at p. 10). PACCAR manufactured and assembled the Tractor in Tennessee 

(Dkt. #5 at p. 10). Finally, PACCAR sold the Tractor in Arizona (Dkt. #5 at p. 10). 

The Fifth Circuit interpreted § 71.031 in a factually similar case, Burdett v. Remington Arms

Co., L.L.C. 854 F.3d at 735. There, the plaintiff injured himself when his rifle “suddenly 

discharged, firing a bullet through his foot.” Id. at 734. The plaintiff was a Texas resident and the 

injury occurred in Texas. Id. Further, the defective rifle was manufactured out of state, in New 

York, where the plaintiff argued the conduct causing the injury occurred. Id. The plaintiff 

purchased the rifle from a reseller in Georgia. Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit conducted a choice-oflaw analysis to determine whether New York or Texas law applied. Id. at 735. Applying § 71.031 

because the conduct causing the plaintiff’s injury—the manufacturing of the rifle—occurred out 

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of state, the court determined that Texas law applied. Id. at 736–37. Thus, the Fifth Circuit

affirmed the district court’s determination that Texas’s statute of repose time-barred the 

plaintiff’s claims. Id.

Here, the Court’s choice-of-law analysis is no different. Like the plaintiff in Burdett, 

Plaintiffs are Texas residents and Mr. Brown was injured in Texas (Dkt. #1 at p. 2; Dkt. #5 at p. 8). 

Like the rifle in Burdett, the Tractor at issue in this case was manufactured, assembled, and later 

sold out of state (Dkt. #5 at p. 10). Following the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Burdett, the Court 

determines that the conduct causing Mr. Brown’s injury—the alleged defective design, 

manufacture, assembly, marketing, and testing of the Tractor—occurred out of state (See Dkt. #4 

at pp. 4–6; Dkt. #5 at p. 10). Accordingly, the Court will apply § 71.031.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs insist that because “PACCAR introduced its product into the 

stream of commerce” in Arizona, “there is no reason to apply the Texas statute of repose” (Dkt. 

#10 at p. 17). The Court disagrees. Although the Tractor was released to a dealership in Arizona, 

the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, has held that Texas’s statute of repose—codified in Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.012(b)—applies even when the product enters commerce 

in a foreign state. See, e.g., Burdett, 854 F.3d at 737 (barring an action pursuant to Texas’s statute 

of repose when the product’s earliest sale could be tracked to Georgia before being purchased by a 

Texas resident). 

Yet still, in their final sur-reply, Plaintiffs submit that Ford Motor Co v. Parks precludes the 

Court from applying Texas’s statute of repose (Dkt. #19) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Parks, 691 

S.W.3d 475 (Tex. 2024)). There, the Texas Supreme Court contemplated the question of when 

§ 16.012(b) is triggered to time bar an action. Parks, 691 S.W.3d at 481. The court held that in cases

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involving the sale of vehicles, the event triggering application of § 16.012(b) is the date when the 

dealership takes possession of the vehicle. Id. at 483–84. As far as the Court can tell, Plaintiffs’ 

reading of Parks goes like this: the applicable statute of repose is that of the state in which the 

vehicle was sold—i.e., if delivery of the vehicle determines when the repose period begins, where

the vehicle was sold also determines which state’s statute of repose applies (Dkt. #19 at pp. 2–3). 

That is to say, for example, if a vehicle is sold in Arizona, Arizona law applies as to whether a repose 

period is triggered. But Parks does not stand for that proposition. In fact, Plaintiffs’ final sur-reply 

concedes that the issue in Parks was when Texas’s statute of repose clock began to tick, not where

(See Dkt. #19 at p. 2). Yet, Plaintiffs go on to argue that Parks is instructive on the issue the Court 

addresses in this case—the crux of which is a conflict-of-laws analysis (Dkt. #19 at pp. 2–3). The 

issue here is which state’s law governs. The choices are these: Arizona or Texas. Parks offers no 

guidance for, much less an answer to, this question. Put simply, that case has nothing to say 

regarding the proper conflict-of-laws inquiry for purposes of determining whether a statute of 

repose applies to bar an action. Indeed, the Parks court never conducted a conflicts analysis because 

the facts were purely local. Thus, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Parks is misplaced.

The Court concludes that “even if [PACCAR’s] wrongful acts occurred in [Arizona] or 

another state, in order to prevail in the Texas action, [Plaintiffs] would nevertheless be required to 

establish that [their] Texas suit was filed within the time permitted under the Texas statute of 

repose for products liability actions.” Hyde, 511 F.3d at 512. Accordingly, § 71.031(a)(2) directs the 

Court to apply Texas’s statute of repose for products liability actions. See TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 71.031(a)(2).

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II. The Texas Statute of Repose

Having determined that § 71.031(a)(2) requires the Court to apply Texas’s statute of 

repose for products liability actions, the Court next evaluates whether the statute bars Plaintiffs’ 

claims. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.012(b) provides that “a claimant must 

commence a products liability action against a manufacturer or seller of a product before the end 

of 15 years after the date of the sale of the product by the defendant.” The code defines “products 

liability action” as “any action against a manufacturer or seller for recovery of damages or other 

relief for harm allegedly caused by a defective product.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 16.012(a)(2). The statute of repose “runs from a specified date without regard to accrual of any 

cause of action.” Stevenson, 608 S.W.3d at 121. For vehicles, the statute of repose is triggered when 

the vehicle is released from the manufacturer to the dealership. See Camacho v. Ford Motor Co., 993 

F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2021).5

Texas’s statute of repose operates as a clock, which starts on the date that the vehicle is 

released from the manufacturer to the dealership. See Camacho, 993 F.3d at 313. The repose clock 

expires fifteen years after the date of sale. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.012(b). If an 

action is commenced within that fifteen-year period, the statute does not bar the action. Id. If, on 

the other hand, a plaintiff does not bring a claim within that fifteen-year period, the statute forbids 

the action. Id. While seemingly clear cut in many cases, the date that a plaintiff is said to have 

commenced an action requires some analysis in situations in which a plaintiff has brought multiple 

claims in different jurisdictions. That is the case here. As PACCAR observes, this is not Plaintiffs’

5 “Repose differs from limitations in that repose not only cuts off rights of action after they accrue but can cut off rights 

of action before they accrue.” Stevenson, 608 S.W.3d at 121. “The purpose of a statute of repose is to provide certain 

parties with absolute protection from the burden of indefinite potential liability.” Id.

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first attempt to seek redress for Mr. Brown’s injuries (Dkt. #5 at p. 1). Plaintiffs filed their first 

lawsuit against PACCAR on November 12, 2019, in Denton County, Texas (Dkt. #5-1). Plaintiffs

voluntarily dismissed that suit (Dkt. #5-3). Then, on January 12, 2021, Plaintiffs filed suit against 

PACCAR in Oklahoma state court (Dkt. #5-4). On May 23, 2022, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

ordered dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction (Dkt. #5-7, 5-10). Finally, Plaintiffs filed the 

instant matter in Texas state court on July 11, 2023, after which PACCAR removed to this Court

(Dkt. #1). This in mind, the threshold question becomes: when did Plaintiffs “commence” their 

suit within the meaning of the Texas statute of repose? The answer is July 11, 2023—the date on 

which Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Texas state court (Dkt. #4 at p. 1).

Here, Section 16.012(b) requires Plaintiffs to commence their products liability action 

“before the end of 15 years after the date of the sale” of the Tractor by PACCAR. TEX.CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 16.012(b). PACCAR released the Tractor to Rush Truck Center on 

November 30, 1999, thereby triggering the fifteen-year statute of repose (Dkt. #4 at ¶ 8). See id.; 

Stevenson, 608 S.W.3d at 121; Camacho, 993 F.3d at 315. Therefore, Plaintiffs had until November 

30, 2014, to timely file their products liability action against PACCAR. See TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.

CODE ANN. § 16.012(b). Plaintiffs did not commence this action until July 11, 2023—more than 

eight years after the statutory period expired (Dkt. #1 at p. 1).6 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are 

barred by the Texas statute of repose for products liability actions.

Based on the Court’s holding that the statute of repose bars Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court 

need not address PACCAR’s statute of limitations defense.

6 Plaintiffs do not contest whether July 11, 2023 is the proper date to stop the clock on Texas’s statute of repose. To 

be sure, however, the Court notes that even by stopping the clock on November 12, 2019—the date of Plaintiffs’

earliest-filed lawsuit—Plaintiffs still missed the repose window by nearly five years (Dkt. #5 at pp. 1, 8 n.9).

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CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #5) is hereby 

GRANTED.

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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