IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jose Ignacio Padron, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 537 C.D. 2022

 : Submitted: May 19, 2023

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: July, 21, 2023 

Jose Ignacio Padron (Claimant) petitions for review of an October 27, 2021 

Order of the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review (Board), 

affirming the decision of a Referee that determined Claimant was ineligible for UC 

benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 after 

he voluntarily left his employment at Belback Services Inc. (Employer). The Board 

determined that Claimant left his employment for personal reasons, which were not 

necessitous and compelling in nature. Based upon the factual findings and 

credibility determinations of the Board, by which this Court is bound, we affirm. 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§ 802(b). Section 402(b) states in relevant part, “[a]n employee shall be ineligible for 

compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his employment is due to voluntarily leaving work 

without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . .” Id. 
2

I. BACKGROUND 

Claimant began working full time for Employer on January 22, 2018. 

(Board’s Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 1.) March 16, 2020, was Claimant’s last 

day working for Employer. (Id.) Claimant initially filed a claim for benefits on 

August 17, 2020, indicating he was discharged for requesting too much time off for 

medical appointments and was forced to sign a resignation letter. (Certified Record 

(C.R.) at 17-20.) Employer responded, indicating that Claimant had voluntarily 

resigned his employment and signed a resignation letter. (Id. at 22-24.) A UC 

Service Center issued a Notice of Determination finding Claimant was “eligible for 

benefits under Section 402(e) of the . . . Law,”

2 as Employer had discharged 

Claimant and not met its burden of establishing Claimant’s actions constituted 

willful misconduct. (Id. at 35.) Employer appealed the decision, and a telephone 

hearing was scheduled before the Referee. (Id. at 39, 47.) 

At the hearing, Employer’s Office Manager, who was also the daughter of 

Employer’s owner (Owner), testified that Claimant missed a day of work and came 

into the office to tell her that he was leaving his position with Employer. (Id. at 65.) 

At that time, Office Manager asked Claimant to sign a letter of resignation as 

Employer had continuing work available.

3

(Id.) Office Manager further testified 

that she was unaware of Claimant’s alleged recent issues with doctor’s appointments 

2 Section 402(e) provides, in relevant part, “[a]n employe shall be ineligible for 

compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary 

suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work . . . .” 43 P.S. § 802(e).

3 Although the letter of resignation is signed and dated by Claimant as effective on March 

16, 2020, it states Claimant was resigning “[a]s per our conversation in your office on Wednesday, 

February 12, 2020.” (C.R. at 42.) Office Manager explained she had drafted the resignation letter 

in February as that was when Claimant first began talking about his food truck and leaving his 

position. (Id. at 68.)
3

until Claimant filed for UC benefits.4(Id.) Office Manager testified that she was 

under the impression that Claimant was resigning because “he started his own 

thing.” (Id.) Specifically, Office Manager testified Claimant relayed to her that 

Claimant had bought a food truck, which he planned to park on the lot next to a 

house he owns and sell tacos. (Id.) Office Manager stated that she had given 

Claimant “information on legalities about food handling, [and] getting his license to 

operate the food truck” at that time. (Id.) In addition, Office Manager explained 

that Claimant was a landlord and provided some taxi or Uber-like services, so “it 

sounded like he was going on to bigger and better things.” (Id.)

Claimant appeared pro se at the hearing and testified that he occasionally 

needed to leave work early for doctor’s appointments. (Id. at 66.) Claimant stated 

that on Friday, March 13, he was preparing to leave for his appointment, of which 

he had previously given Employer notice, when Owner became angry and ordered 

Claimant to resign. (Id.) Claimant left work to attend his appointment. (Id.) The 

following Monday, Claimant returned to work and was once again prompted by 

Owner to sign a letter of resignation, which Claimant testified that he signed to avoid 

“trouble.” (Id.) 

The Referee reversed the determination of the UC Service Center and found 

that Claimant was ineligible for benefits, having voluntarily quit his employment 

without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. (Referee’s Decision, C.R. at 

73, 75.) Claimant appealed the decision of the Referee to the Board. (C.R. at 88-

89.) Upon review, the Board affirmed, finding as follows: 

4 Office Manager acknowledged there were previous issues where Claimant missed work 

or left early. At the beginning, he was reprimanded, but Office Manager explained that because 

they needed somebody, they just “let it go.” (C.R. at 65.)
4

1. [] [C]laimant was last employed as a full-time 

mechanic/inspector by [Employer] from January 22, 2018, and his last 

day of work was March 16, 2020. 

2. On March 15, 2020, [] [C]laimant did not show up for a 

scheduled shift. 

3. On March 16, 2020, [] [C]laimant told [] [Office Manager] that 

he was quitting his employment. 

4. [Office Manager] understood that [] [C]laimant was leaving his 

employment to start his own business because [] [C]laimant stated that 

he bought a food truck and was going to sell tacos from it in the lot next 

to his residence. 

5. [Office Manager] gave [] [C]laimant information on the legalities 

of food handling and getting a food truck license. 

6. [Office Manager] asked that [] [C]laimant sign a resignation 

letter that she drafted, and [] [C]laimant voluntarily signed it. 

(Board’s Decision, FOF ¶¶ 1-6.) The Board acknowledged Claimant and Office 

Manager provided conflicting testimony as to circumstances surrounding Claimant’s 

separation from employment and “resolve[d] the conflicts in the testimony, in 

relevant part, in favor of [Office Manager] and f[ound] her testimony to be credible 

that [] [C]laimant voluntarily quit his employment.” (Board’s Decision at 2.) The 

Board further determined that “[s]ince [] [C]laimant voluntarily left his employment, 

the burden rests upon him to show a cause of a necessitous and compelling nature 

for doing so,” which Claimant did not do. (Id.) Rather, the Board determined 

“[C]laimant left his employment for personal reasons,” namely, to operate his own 

food truck. (Id.) Accordingly, it denied benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law. 

(Id.)
5

Thereafter, Claimant filed a Petition for Review with this Court.5 

II. PARTIES ARGUMENTS 

On appeal, Claimant maintains he was terminated by Employer, but argues 

that should Section 402(b) of the Law apply, he had necessitous and compelling 

reasons to leave his employment. Claimant asserts that he had necessitous and 

compelling reasons, because he had a medical issue for which Claimant provided 

documentation to Employer, which Employer accommodated at first but was no 

longer willing to accommodate. (Claimant’s Brief (Br.) at 13-14.) Instead, 

according to Claimant, Employer demanded Claimant’s resignation on two separate 

occasions and gave Claimant a letter of resignation to sign. (Id. at 15.) Claimant 

asserts he resigned in lieu of termination, and based on Owner’s demeanor and 

previous statements such as “yell[ing], berat[ing], and inform[ing] [Claimant] that 

he needed to go and he never wanted to see him again,” termination was imminent

if Claimant did not resign. (Id. at 15-17.) 

Claimant further argues that, alternatively, he should be found eligible for UC 

benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. Claimant asserts that there has been no 

evidence on the record that he acted with any type of willful misconduct and that 

Employer has not given evidence that rebuts Claimant’s testimony regarding his 

treatment by Employer. (Id. at 21.) 

5 Claimant filed his Petition for Review of the Board’s October 27, 2021 Order on June 2, 

2022. By order dated June 16, 2022, this Court directed the parties to address the timeliness of the 

Petition for Review “in their principal briefs on the merits or in an appropriate motion.” (See 

Order, filed June 17, 2022.) On July 14, 2022, the Board filed an Application for Summary Relief, 

challenging the timeliness of the Petition for Review. Claimant subsequently filed a “Motion for 

Leave to File Petition for [Review] Nunc Pro Tunc,” which was granted following a hearing, and 

the Board’s Application for Summary Relief was dismissed as moot. (See Memorandum and 

Order filed Nov. 14, 2022.) 
6

The Board responds that Claimant voluntarily left his employment, and thus, 

Section 402(e) of the Law is not applicable. The Board asserts that Claimant 

demonstrated a conscious intention to quit to start his own food truck business, 

which is supported by substantial evidence. The Board also argues Claimant did not 

prove a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily leave his employment and

Claimant cannot rely on his own version of events over the testimony credited by 

the Board to show otherwise. Accordingly, the Board asks the Court to affirm its 

Order. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Initially, we note that the scope of “[t]his Court’s review is limited to 

determining whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, 

whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether errors of law were 

committed.” Showers v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 64 A.3d 1143, 1146 n.4 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). On appeal, “[t]he Board’s findings of fact are conclusive” as 

“long as the record taken as a whole contains substantial evidence to support them.” 

Henderson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 77 A.3d 699, 718 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013). “Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence upon which a 

reasonable mind could base a conclusion.” Id. Furthermore, “[i]t is irrelevant 

whether the record contains evidence to support findings other than those made by 

the fact finder; the critical inquiry is whether there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support the findings actually made.” Wise v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 

Rev., 111 A.3d 1256, 1262 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). This Court must view the testimony 

in a light that is most favorable to the party that prevailed before the Board, in this 

case, Employer. Henderson, 77 A.3d at 718. The fact “[t]hat the court might have 
7

a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of an agency is not a sufficient 

ground for interference; judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative 

discretion.” Bowman v. Dep’t of Env’t. Res., 700 A.2d 427, 428 (Pa. 1997) (quoting 

Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n., 413 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Pa. 1980)). 

That is because “[t]he Board is the ultimate fact finder and has exclusive power to 

resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide witness credibility and the weight to 

be accorded the evidence.” Wise, 111 A.3d at 1261-62. 

With these principles in mind, we turn to Claimant’s arguments. Claimant 

first argues that under Section 402(b) of the Law, he had necessitous and compelling 

reasons for leaving his employment. Claimant argues that these reasons include a 

medical issue, which Employer was unwilling to accommodate any longer, such that 

Claimant was forced to quit in lieu of termination. However, Claimant’s arguments 

as to his reasons for leaving his employment rely solely on his own testimony, which 

the Board did not credit. Instead, the Board credited Office Manager’s testimony 

and found Claimant quit to start his own business operating a food truck, to which 

Claimant provided no response. (Board’s Decision at 2.) Because Claimant did not 

specifically challenge any of the Board’s findings of fact, those findings of fact are 

conclusive on appeal. Hessou v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 942 A.2d 194, 

198-99 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Even if Claimant had challenged the Board’s findings, 

we are bound by those findings, which are supported by Office Manager’s testimony 

of her conversation with Claimant referencing his purchase of a food truck, plans to 

sell tacos, and voluntary signing of a resignation letter. (C.R. at 65.) The Court 

would exceed its scope of review if it were to reweigh the findings of fact once it 

determined the findings were supported by substantial evidence. Stringent v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 703 A.2d 1084, 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
8

Case law supports the conclusion that when an employee voluntarily leaves 

his employment to become self-employed, he has not left his employment for “good 

cause” for the purpose of the Law. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 56 A.2d 254, 236 (Pa. 1948). See Dennis v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 137 A.2d 811, 812 (Pa. Super. 1958) (holding 

“[t]he appellant voluntarily terminated his employment to go into a private venture 

of his own and such a termination of employment is without cause of a necessitous 

and compelling nature”).

Next, Claimant argues that because his termination was not voluntary, it 

should be assessed under Section 402(e) of the Law, and not Section 402(b). If 

assessed under Section 402(e), Claimant asserts that Employer has not provided 

evidence to prove willful misconduct. Similar to the first issue, because the Board 

found that Claimant voluntarily left his employment, and this finding is supported 

by substantial evidence, we are bound by this finding as discussed above. Therefore, 

Claimant’s separation was correctly assessed under Section 402(b) of the Law. 

For the foregoing reasons we conclude that Claimant did not prove he had 

necessitous and compelling reasons to voluntarily leave his employment and the 

Board did not err in finding Claimant ineligible for UC benefits pursuant to Section 

402(b) of the Law. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jose Ignacio Padron, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 537 C.D. 2022

 : 

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, July 21, 2023, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board 

of Review, dated October 27, 2021, is AFFIRMED. 

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge