2019 UT App 6

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EDWARD J. FRAUGHTON,

Petitioner,

v.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION AND BOARD OF 

EQUALIZATION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,

Respondents.

Opinion

No. 20170430-CA

Filed January 10, 2019

Original Proceeding in this Court

Edwin S. Wall, Attorney for Petitioner

Bradley C. Johnson, Attorney for Respondent Board 

of Equalization of Salt Lake County

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES KATE APPLEBY and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 In 2015, Edward J. Fraughton challenged the assessed 

value on his residence, claiming that promises made in 1973 by 

unidentified persons from South Jordan City (the City) were key 

to determining the correct value. Fraughton’s challenge was, in 

large part, successful, resulting in just a three percent difference 

in the assessed value from Fraughton’s claimed value. But 

Fraughton refused to stipulate to the new assessed value and 

appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission (the Commission). 

Fraughton now seeks review of the Commission’s final decision

that Fraughton had neither shown an error in the assessment nor 

provided a sound evidentiary basis for a lower residential 

property value. We are unpersuaded by Fraughton’s arguments 

and decline to disturb the decision of the Commission.
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BACKGROUND

¶2 Edward Fraughton purchased an abandoned brick church 

in the City in 1973. Fraughton, an artist, planned to preserve the 

historic building and the 2.41 acres of land on which it sat (the 

Property) for use as his workshop and as a residence for his 

family.

¶3 For the 2015 tax year, the Property was assessed at 

$1,163,780. In September 2015, Fraughton appealed that

assessment to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization (the 

Board), arguing that the fair market value of the Property was 

$704,480. In a March 2016 hearing, the Board reduced the

assessed value to $947,000 based on evidence submitted by the 

Salt Lake County Assessor. The Board noted that Fraughton had 

not “provided evidence to establish a value.” Fraughton then 

appealed the Board’s decision to the Commission.

¶4 At the Commission hearing in April 2017, Fraughton did 

not provide comparable sales values, an appraisal, or any other 

evidence of the Property’s value. Instead, he argued that the fair 

market value of the Property should be based on a “reasonable 

adjustment” to the purchase price instead of “speculative” 

market value. In contrast, the Commission based its conclusion 

on a report submitted by an appraiser for Salt Lake County. The 

appraiser, relying primarily on comparable land sales, valued 

1.48 acres of the Property at $8.65 per square foot and .93 acres of 

the Property at $4.11 per square-foot, for a total value of $724,155 

in land. The appraiser noted that nearly all of the value consisted 

of the land, with the building valued at only $1,500, for a total 

rounded value of $725,700 for the Property.

¶5 The Salt Lake County appraiser also stated that the 

county assessor’s office contacted Fraughton and offered to 

stipulate to a value of $725,700 for the Property. Fraughton had 

requested an assessed value of $704,480 from the Board in 

August 2015, but in October 2015, he declined to stipulate to Salt 

Lake County’s adjusted lower value. These two values differ by 

$21,200, or about three percent.
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20170430-CA 3 2019 UT App 6

¶6 The Commission also received evidence at the hearing, in 

the form of a letter from the City, that the Property was zoned—

current as of October 2015—as RM or “Residential 

Multi-Family” by the City, and it had been in that zoning 

category since at least 1987. Allowed uses in RM zoning include 

various residential dwellings, community and public safety 

services, worship, public utilities, and daycare. Fraughton 

testified that the Property was indeed zoned RM, but he 

contended that this designation meant “Rural Mix,” which 

allowed “a mix of agricultural and residential uses as well as an 

art studio.” He further contended that the City had agreed to 

this special zoning designation when he purchased the property 

in 1973.1

¶7 After considering the evidence presented, the 

Commission set the fair market value of the Property at $725,700.

The Commission limited its decision to determining the 

Property’s value and did not address the zoning issue.

Fraughton petitions for judicial review.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 Fraughton brings two claims. First, he contends the 

Commission erred in its determination of the fair market value

of the Property. When reviewing proceedings before the 

Commission, this court “grant[s] the Commission deference 

concerning its written findings of fact, applying a substantial 

evidence standard on review,” and grants “no deference 

concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error 

standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained 

 

1. No exhibit or other evidence corroborates that zone RM means 

anything other than “Residential Multi-Family.” Moreover, there 

is no documentary or testimonial evidence, other than 

Fraughton’s recollection, that the City changed any zoning 

designation of the Property.
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in a statute at issue before the appellate court.” Utah Code Ann. 

§ 59-1-610(1) (LexisNexis 2015); see also Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah

State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112, ¶ 14, 61 P.3d 1053 (stating that 

the Commission’s findings of fact receive a substantial evidence 

standard of review, but its conclusions of law receive no 

deference).

¶9 Second, Fraughton argues that the Commission violated 

the federal and state constitutions by basing the fair market 

value of the Property on comparable property values without 

taking into consideration “non-intrinsic human values,” such as 

open space, history, and aesthetics. This court reviews 

constitutional questions for correctness. State v. Van Dyke, 2009 

UT App 369, ¶ 18, 223 P.3d 465.

ANALYSIS

I. The Commission Correctly Determined the Fair Market Value 

of the Property

¶10 When challenging an assessment made on property by 

the Commission, the “protesting taxpayer is required not only to 

show substantial error or impropriety in the assessment, but also 

to provide a sound evidentiary basis upon which the 

Commission could adopt a lower valuation.” Utah Ry. Co. v. Utah 

State Tax Comm’n, 2000 UT 49, ¶ 6, 5 P.3d 652 (cleaned up). Thus, 

Fraughton, as the protesting taxpayer, has a two-pronged 

burden. He must (1) show that the Commission made a 

substantial error in arriving at the Property’s current value and 

(2) provide a sound evidentiary basis for the Commission to 

change the valuation. See id.2 We address each prong in turn.

 

2. We note that although Fraughton recognizes the existence of 

both prongs in his brief, he conflates them in his analysis by 

stating that he has “provided evidence that the current value 

contains error.”
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A. Fraughton Fails to Show That the Commission Erred in 

Arriving at the Property’s Current Value

¶11 On review, Fraughton does not challenge the actual dollar 

value the Commission placed on the Property; rather, he 

challenges the zoning designation. Fraughton contends that the 

City, in an effort to encourage completion of the purchase of the 

Property, agreed in 1973 to rezone, or spot zone,

3 the Property as

“Rural Mix.” Fraughton argues that his testimony of what 

happened in 1973 shows that there has been an error in the 

zoning designation of the Property. He further argues that the 

Commission should have obtained from the City evidence of the 

Property being zoned Residential Multi-Family in 1973 if the 

Property had, in fact, been zoned Residential Multi-Family at 

that time. Because the City failed to provide such evidence to the 

Commission, Fraughton argues that the Rural Mix zoning 

designation should be grandfathered to the present. He asserts, 

“The zoning as of and from 1973 should not merely be presumed 

based on the [City planner’s] evidence as to the zoning . . . at 

least of 1987.” In a nutshell, Fraughton’s argument is that (1) he 

was told by an unidentified City official that the Property would 

be spot-zoned as Rural Mix in 1973 when he purchased it and (2) 

the Commission has not provided evidence that this putative 

Rural Mix zoning was ever changed.

¶12 Fraughton’s argument is a classic red herring in that he is 

attempting to bring the Commission into a dispute that 

essentially involves a disagreement that he has with the City.

4

 

3. “Under Utah’s jurisprudence, spot zoning occurs when a 

municipality either grants a special privilege or imposes a 

restriction on a particular small property that is not otherwise 

granted or imposed on surrounding properties in the larger 

area.” Tolman v. Logan City, 2007 UT App 260, ¶ 15, 167 P.3d 489.

4. City records show that the Property was zoned Residential 

Multi-Family from at least 1987. The Commission relied on the 

(continued...)
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Therefore, Fraughton’s evidence about an oral pledge given in 

1973 is largely irrelevant to the issue before this court. To 

persuade this court, Fraughton needed to provide material 

evidence that a pledge allegedly made in 1973 was acted upon

and, therefore, that the Commission made a substantial error in 

arriving at the Property’s current value. See Utah Ry., 2000 UT 49, 

¶ 6. Fraughton has failed to do so, and, more importantly, he has 

 

(...continued)

City’s zoning designation to establish the assessment value of 

the Property. Fraughton argues that the Commission should 

investigate whether “RM” means “Rural Mix,” as Fraughton 

contends, or “Residential Multi-Family,” as the City indicated in 

its letter. The essence of Fraughton’s argument is that the City 

has applied the incorrect zoning designation to the Property. But 

the Commission’s task is to determine the fair market value of 

the Property, see Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103 (LexisNexis 2015), 

not to resolve zoning disputes between residents and 

municipalities. Although the zoning designation is a factor in 

determining fair market value, see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 

U.S. 606, 625 (2001) (stating that fair market value depends on 

“restrictions on use imposed by legitimate zoning or other 

regulatory limitations”), the Commission’s task is limited to 

assessing and taxing property on the basis of its fair market 

value as of the beginning of the calendar year. See University

Heights, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 364 P.2d 661, 662 (Utah 1961) 

(“[T]he authority of the Commission over local assessments is a 

general supervisory one to enable it to assist in keeping the 

values for property tax purposes in counties and localities on a 

fair and equitable basis in relation to each other, rather than to 

suppose it was intended that the Commission would maintain 

active detailed supervision of the appraisals of all of the 

individual properties in the state.”). Fraughton appears to 

assume, but offers no support for his assumption, that the 

Commission has the authority to revise the zoning designations 

made by municipalities. 
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20170430-CA 7 2019 UT App 6

failed to provide evidence that the Property ever was zoned 

otherwise than as identified by the City in 2015. 

¶13 In contrast, the Commission acted on evidence that the 

Property was zoned as Residential Multi-Family in October 2015 

and that it has been so zoned since at least 1987. If the Property 

was zoned Residential Multi-Family in 1987, the presumption, in 

the absence of evidence of a pre-1987 change to the contrary, is 

that it was zoned Residential Multi-Family in the years before. 

Fraughton fails to explain why his assertion regarding how the 

Property was zoned in 1973 is any more credible than the 

Commission’s evidence of the Property’s 2015 and 1987 zoning 

designation. And as a protesting taxpayer, the evidentiary 

burden is on Fraughton. Id.

¶14 Fraughton admits that no change in zoning status can 

occur in the absence of notice and a hearing, implying that the 

Property must currently be zoned Rural Mix because there was 

no notice or hearing regarding a change in the zoning to 

Residential Multi-Family. Yet this is exactly what Fraughton 

infers happened between 1973 and 1987 when he contends that 

the Property’s zoning was improperly changed from Rural Mix 

to Residential Multi-Family. One possible explanation for the 

lack of evidence about notice and a hearing is that the zoning 

change was done illicitly. Yet Fraughton offers no evidence of 

such an illicit change other than his personal, uncorroborated

contention. A more likely and simpler explanation is that there is 

no evidence of a change in zoning because the zoning 

designation was never changed. In any event, even if the 

Property is not currently zoned correctly, that fact does not 

change the current market value. Ultimately, zoning is a point of 

contention between Fraughton and the City having nothing to 

do with the original assessing authority, the County. Moreover, 

these facts do not inform the question on review, which is 

whether an evidentiary basis exists for the Commission’s 

determination.

¶15 Therefore, we conclude that Fraughton’s assertions 

regarding the 1973 zoning status of the Property fail to show that 
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20170430-CA 8 2019 UT App 6

the Commission erred when it relied on evidence of the 

Residential Multi-Family zoning status produced by the City.

B. Fraughton Fails to Provide a Sound Evidentiary Basis to 

Support Adopting a Lower Valuation

¶16 In addition to showing that the Commission made an 

error in arriving at the value of the Property, Fraughton must 

also provide a sound evidentiary basis for the Commission to 

adopt a lower value. Utah Ry. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2000 

UT 49, ¶ 6, 5 P.3d 652. Fraughton has not satisfied this prong 

either. 

¶17 At the hearing before the Commission, Fraughton did not 

put forward any evidence regarding the value of the Property. 

He did not provide comparable sales for the Property, nor did he 

provide an appraisal or any other evidence of its value. Indeed, 

Fraughton explicitly concedes that he “did not submit any 

valuation evidence.”5

¶18 In this regard, Fraughton’s case bears striking similarity 

to Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 590 P.2d 

332 (Utah 1979). There, a utility company protested the 

assessment placed on one of its properties following a hearing 

before the Commission. Id. at 333. After the court determined 

that there had been no error in the method of assessment, it also 

stated that the utility appeared to argue “that it is entitled to a 

reduction of its assessment if it shows any error to its 

disadvantage in the method of evaluation or the computation of 

 

5. Fraughton may have decided not to press this point before the 

Commission because the value he requested before the Board 

and the value arrived at by Salt Lake County were already very 

close, at least for the purpose of imposing a property tax. Rather, 

Fraughton’s arguments on review center on changing the zoning 

status of the Property to a more restrictive category—a change 

that presumably would have resulted in a lower assessed value.
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20170430-CA 9 2019 UT App 6

the Commission’s original assessment.” Id. at 335. Because the 

purpose of a proceeding before the Commission is to “determine 

what should be the fair, reasonable and proper valuation and 

assessment, . . . where the taxpayer claims error, [the taxpayer]

has an obligation . . . to provide a sound evidentiary basis upon 

which the Commission could adopt a lower valuation.” Id. The 

court noted it was “significant here that [the utility company] . . . 

presented no alternative evaluation or appraisal which could be 

subject to critical scrutiny by the Commission.” Id. Likewise, 

here it is not enough for Fraughton to show that there has been 

an error. See Utah Ry., 2000 UT 49, ¶ 6. He must also provide an 

“alternative evaluation or appraisal” by which the Commission 

could determine “fair, reasonable and proper valuation and 

assessment” of the Property. See Utah Power & Light, 590 P.2d at 

335; see also Utah Ry., 2000 UT 49, ¶ 6.

¶19 Thus, we conclude that Fraughton also failed to meet the 

second prong of his burden: showing a sound evidentiary basis 

to the Commission for arriving at a lower value for the Property.

II. Fraughton’s Constitutional Claim Was Inadequately Briefed

¶20 We do not reach the substance of Fraughton’s 

constitutional claim because this issue has not been properly 

briefed. “We have long held that we have discretion to not 

address an inadequately briefed argument. Rather, a party must 

plead his claims with sufficient specificity for this court to make 

a ruling on the merits. We will not assume a party’s burden of 

argument and research.” Angel Inv'rs, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, 

¶ 35, 216 P.3d 944 (cleaned up). “We accordingly decline to 

address [an] inadequately briefed issue.” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf

Mountain Resorts, LC, 2013 UT 24, ¶ 16, 309 P.3d 201.

¶21 An adequate brief provides “meaningful legal analysis” 

and “fully identifies and analyzes the issues with citation to 

relevant legal authority.” State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 60, 

366 P.3d 884; see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The argument 

must explain, with reasoned analysis supported by citations to 

legal authority and the record, why the party should prevail on 
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20170430-CA 10 2019 UT App 6

appeal.”). “A brief is inadequate when it merely contains bald 

citations to authority without development of that authority and 

reasoned analysis based on that authority.” Smith v. Four Corners 

Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46, 70 P.3d 904 (cleaned 

up). “Under this standard, [Fraughton] inadequately briefed this 

claim. Accordingly, he fails to carry his burden of persuasion on 

[judicial review].” See Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 60.

¶22 Fraughton argues in his brief that taxing the Property 

based on its fair market value is “neither fair, equitable, or just.”

Instead of a fair market value approach, he argues that “both 

state and federal constitutional principles” require the 

“consideration of ‘non-intrinsic human values’” in determining a 

property’s value. In support of this proposition, Fraughton 

claims that the “Declaration of Independence and the United 

States Constitution were written to establish a possible means for 

achieving humanity’s highest form for civil human 

engagement.” “[T]hese meaningful, lofty, fair and noble 

principles,” Fraughton asserts, require the State of Utah to honor 

the individual’s right to possess and protect property. Therefore, 

Fraughton concludes, “Utah’s method of taxing real estate based 

solely on ‘fair market value,’ is neither fair, equitable or just. It 

entirely discriminates against any ‘non-intrinsic human values.’

As such, the tax law as applied is unconstitutional.”

¶23 In his brief, Fraughton cites only one constitutional 

provision—Article 1, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution—as he 

makes his argument, and this he does in passing.6 He fails to 

explain how the Commission’s fair market valuation method 

 

6. This Article states: “All men have the inherent and inalienable 

right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 

possess and protect property; to worship according to the 

dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest 

against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 

communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being 

responsible for the abuse of that right.” Utah Const. art. I, § 1.
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20170430-CA 11 2019 UT App 6

violates this provision. He cites no case law supporting his 

position that fair market valuation is unconstitutional. Nor does 

he attempt to explain why the fair market value standard is 

unconstitutional when the Utah Constitution itself states that 

“all tangible property in the State . . . shall be . . . assessed at a 

uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value.” 

Utah Const. art. XIII, § 2.

¶24 Fraughton’s broad statements are simply not enough to 

make a cogent argument concerning the constitutional fairness, 

equity, and justness of the fair market value standard. And “we 

will not exercise appellate review based on our best guess as to 

the subject of the appeal.” ASC Utah, 2013 UT 24, ¶ 15. As our 

supreme court has “repeatedly noted, we are not a depository in 

which a party may dump the burden of argument and research.” 

Four Corners Mental Health, 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46 (cleaned up).

¶25 Therefore, we decline to further address Fraughton’s 

constitutional arguments concerning the fair market value 

standard for property tax determinations because this issue has 

been inadequately briefed.

CONCLUSION

¶26 Fraughton’s arguments are unpersuasive. Fraughton has 

not shown that there was an error in the assessment of the 

Property, nor has he presented a sound evidentiary basis for a 

lower value on the Property. Finally, we decline to address 

Fraughton’s constitutional arguments concerning fair market 

value because they are inadequately briefed. For the foregoing 

reasons, we decline to disturb the decision of the Commission.