Supreme Court

No. 2020-167-M.P.

(PM 19-3924)

Danielle LeFebvre :

v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 
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Supreme Court

No. 2020-167-M.P.

(PM 19-3924)

Danielle LeFebvre :

v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court 

pursuant to a writ of certiorari, seeking review of a Superior Court decision that 

denied an application for postconviction relief filed by the applicant, Danielle 

LeFebvre (LeFebvre). LeFebvre filed her application for postconviction relief on 

the grounds that she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and, thus, 

she should have been afforded a new trial. LeFebvre faults her trial counsel

(defense counsel) for failing to consult, and present at trial, an expert in the 

medically complicated child abuse prosecution and for purposefully disclosing

harmful information that was damaging to her case. For the reasons set forth in this 

opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
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Facts and Travel

The facts from LeFebvre’s jury trial are detailed in State v. LeFebvre, 198 

A.3d 521 (R.I. 2019) (LeFebvre I). We set forth below the relevant facts.

On October 18, 2011, LeFebvre brought her almost seven-week-old infant 

son1to her grandmother’s home for an overnight visit. LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 523. 

The next morning, on October 19, 2011, LeFebvre returned to work from maternity 

leave. Id. While LeFebvre was at work, her grandmother “noticed that James was 

not acting normally.” Id. LeFebvre’s grandmother made two telephone calls to 

LeFebvre to communicate her concerns regarding James’s unusual behavior; 

however, rather than immediately leaving to check on her son, LeFebvre remained 

at work, and left an hour early. Id. Upon arriving at her grandmother’s home, 

LeFebvre observed her son’s behavior and realized he needed medical attention. Id. 

Rather than immediately proceeding to Hasbro Children’s Hospital (Hasbro), 

LeFebvre returned to her apartment, packed a few items, and then drove to Hasbro’s 

emergency room. Id.

When LeFebvre and James arrived at the emergency room, medical staff 

performed several tests including a head CT and a skeletal survey of the infant’s 

1

 Throughout this opinion, we refrain from referring to LeFebvre’s infant son by his

legal name in order to preserve the infant’s privacy. As this Court observed in State 

v. LeFebvre, 198 A.3d 521 (R.I. 2019) (LeFebvre I), we refer to the infant as 

“James.” See LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 522 n.1. We intend no disrespect. 
- 3 -

body—which Dr. Amy Goldberg explained were “x-rays of two views” and 

included a “front and a side view of every bone in the body.” These tests revealed 

that James had suffered life-threatening injuries, which caused serious permanent 

damage. These injuries included complex skull fractures, subdural and 

subarachnoid hemorrhages, and brain contusions. James was admitted to Hasbro,

where he remained inpatient for several days. On November 3, 2011, James’s

x-rays revealed that he suffered rib fractures that were consistent with having 

sustained the injury on or around the time of his admission at Hasbro (October 19,

2011)—the day after LeFebvre recalled her son having accidentally fallen off the 

bed. 

While Hasbro was conducting multiple medical tests on the child, LeFebvre 

revealed to the attending physician that, “the day before [i.e., October 18, 2011], 

she had been sitting on the edge of her bed with James * * * trying to lull him to 

sleep for a quick nap, when she herself fell asleep.” LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 522. 

LeFebvre explained that when she woke up, she found James crying on the floor by 

the bed. Id. LeFebvre also told the attending physician about her grandmother’s 

observations that “James appeared listless, was not eating, had rapid eye 

movements, and that his limbs were twitching.” Id. at 523. Based on James’s

extensive injuries, Hasbro notified the Department of Children, Youth, and Families 

(DCYF). Id.
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On May 10, 2012, LeFebvre was charged by way of criminal information 

with one count of first-degree child abuse, in violation of G.L. 1956

§ 11-9-5.3(b)(1). See LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 523. Defense counsel and the state

entered into plea negotiations, and as part of the parties’ discussions, defense 

counsel provided the state with LeFebvre’s medical records (medical records) from 

Butler Hospital, regarding her mental health treatment. Id. Defense counsel offered 

this material to the prosecution as part of LeFebvre’s mitigation package in hopes 

that it would convince the state to reduce the charge brought against her. 

Nonetheless, as noted by the trial justice, “[t]he prosecutor had not provided 

[defense] counsel with any assurances or promises that she would amend the charge 

if she received mitigation material.” The prosecutor subsequently reviewed the 

medical records but did not amend the charge; by that point, the state had already 

made its best offer at pretrial—the mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree 

child abuse. LeFebvre rejected this offer.2 After LeFebvre rejected the plea offer, 

trial ensued.

2

In her decision, the trial justice noted that “[defense] counsel had good reason to 

hope for an amendment to the charge” because “the evidence against * * * 

Le[F]ebvre overwhelmingly supported the [s]tate’s claim that she committed 

first-degree child abuse on her infant son.” The trial justice further noted that the 

state did not make any assurances or promises that the charged offense would be 

amended if defense counsel provided the medical records as part of the mitigation 

materials; however, the trial justice also recounted that she cautioned the state’s 

prosecutor that “just because she could use the records doesn’t mean she should use 

them.” The state agreed to refrain from using the medical record evidence in its 
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At trial, LeFebvre testified to her version of the events that transpired on 

October 18, 2011; specifically, that James fell off the bed and onto the floor when 

she dozed off. LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 523. The trial justice—who also presided 

over LeFebvre’s application for postconviction relief—later found in her written 

decision on the application that in light of several witnesses’ trial testimony and 

LeFebvre’s testimony,3she deemed LeFebvre to be “not credible, and the [c]ourt 

and likely the jury discounted [LeFebvre’s testimony] and rejected her claim that 

the baby suffered his * * * injuries in an accidental short-fall from her bed.” 

On March 24, 2015, LeFebvre was convicted of first-degree child abuse as 

a result of the permanent injuries to her seven-week-old infant son. LeFebvre filed 

a motion for a new trial, which the Superior Court denied. The trial justice 

subsequently sentenced LeFebvre to twenty years at the Adult Correctional 

Institutions, with eighteen years to serve, and the balance suspended, with 

probation. LeFebvre appealed from the judgment of conviction, which we affirmed. 

See LeFebvre I, 198 A.3d at 528. 

case-in-chief but made clear to the defense counsel that the state reserved the right 

to use the medical records in rebuttal if LeFebvre testified in a manner inconsistent 

with the records.

3 We note that LeFebvre did not testify at the postconviction-relief hearing. We also 

note that LeFebvre is represented by different counsel in this appeal from the 

postconviction-relief hearing and trial.
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Subsequently, LeFebvre filed an application seeking postconviction relief.

After considering the parties’ memoranda and testimony at the postconviction-relief 

hearing, the trial justice issued a written decision denying LeFebvre’s application. 

The trial justice noted LeFebvre first contended that “[defense] counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel by going to trial without presenting an expert 

witness and without consulting with [an expert] before cross-examining Dr. 

Goldberg * * *.” (Emphases added.) Second, the trial justice noted that LeFebvre 

argued in her application that defense counsel “voluntarily produc[ed] mental health 

records to the prosecution, incorrectly believing them to be inadmissible at trial.” 

During the postconviction-relief hearing, the trial justice had the opportunity 

to evaluate the testimony of an expert, Dr. Joseph Scheller (Dr. Scheller). In her 

decision, the trial justice noted that “[i]n an effort to provide * * * Le[F]ebvre with 

a broad and complete opportunity to pursue her post-conviction relief application, 

the [c]ourt provided requested funds to her post-conviction relief attorney to engage 

the services of an expert.” Accordingly, “the [c]ourt analyze[d] the proffered 

testimony of Dr. Scheller and decide[d] [LeFebvre’s] petition as though [defense] 

counsel had obtained funds and had consulted with and presented an expert such as 

Dr. Scheller at trial.” (Emphases added.) The court evaluated “whether [Dr. 

Scheller’s] opinions would be admissible at trial as legally sufficient, having 

evidentiary reliability, scientific validity and relevance.” In the event that Dr. 
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Scheller’s expert opinion was deemed to be admissible, the court would then proceed 

to determine “whether [Dr. Scheller’s] credibility was so poor that no reasonable 

jury would have accepted his opinions and that failure to present him at trial failed 

to meet the prejudice prong * * *.” The trial justice determined that Dr. Scheller

failed in both respects. 

Mindful of the proper standard for the use of medical expert opinions, the trial 

justice noted several concerns with Dr. Scheller’s proffered opinion. For example, 

the trial justice observed that “it [was] unclear whether [Dr. Scheller’s] testimony 

would have survived a Daubert challenge.”4 Doctor Scheller, although Board 

Certified in pediatrics and pediatric neurology, did not hold certifications in child 

abuse pediatrics, radiology, or neuroradiology. The trial justice also found Dr. 

Scheller’s testimony to be concerning when he stated that he did not believe that a 

person “without a history of a serious psychological problem or a serious behavior 

problem * * * would violently shake a child just simply out of frustration * * *.” 

The court later engaged in the following colloquy to clarify its concerns: 

4

“In DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I. 1999), this Court 

discussed the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony that should govern 

the trial court’s decision about whether to allow the jury to hear this type of 

evidence.” Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 890 (R.I. 2003). Although this Court 

“declined to expressly adopt the standards outlined in the United States Supreme 

Court decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113

S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), we drew guidance from the principles of that 

case.” Id.
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“THE COURT: Is it your testimony, just so I understand 

it, that you haven’t seen a confession yet in one of those 

cases that you found to be reliable?

“[DOCTOR SCHELLER]: I use the word ‘credible.’ * * * 

I have not found one that’s credible.”

Significantly, the trial justice also observed that Dr. Scheller “spoke not only 

in terms of possibilities, but * * * rare possibilities. He never quantified his opinion 

that it was possible for the injuries to have been sustained in an accidental short-fall.” 

For example, Dr. Scheller testified that “it is possible that [James’s] injuries 

documented at the end of October, 2011, did happen from a short fall even though 

they are very dramatic and very serious.” (Emphasis added.) The court interjected 

and reminded counsel that the “case law is exceptionally clear that ‘possible’ is not 

a basis for an expert opinion * * *.” 

Thus, the trial justice determined that Dr. Scheller’s testimony “failed to 

provide a scientifically valid and reliable opinion to challenge the strength of Dr. 

Goldberg’s contention that the infant did not sustain his multiple injuries from an 

accidental short-fall.” Without sufficiently reliable and credible testimony from Dr. 

Scheller, the trial justice concluded that the absence of this testimony did not rise to 

a level that deprived LeFebvre of effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, with 

respect to LeFebvre’s contentions that defense counsel failed to consult and present 

an expert at trial—the trial justice concluded that, LeFebvre failed to meet her burden 
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under the seminal case, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which will 

be discussed infra. 

In further support of her contention that defense counsel’s failure to consult 

an expert constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, LeFebvre argued that defense 

counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Goldberg was ineffective and deprived her of a 

fair trial. At the postconviction-relief hearing, defense counsel testified, and 

admitted, that she did not believe that she had the medical knowledge or 

understanding to properly cross-examine Dr. Goldberg. However, defense counsel 

also testified that she extensively researched the subject in preparation for trial. In 

addition to her independent research, defense counsel further testified that she

received some assistance from “an acquaintance who was a nurse,” and that she 

believed she “paid her very minimally just to give me the basics of what was in the 

[medical] records.” 

Noting her observations from trial, the trial justice stated that defense counsel 

“questioned [Dr. Goldberg] in detail about the infant’s injuries[,]” and that defense 

counsel particularly inquired about James’s brain contusions, rib fractures, the aging 

and timing of the rib fractures, and the mechanisms that could have caused his

injuries. Based on the court’s observations from the postconviction-relief hearing,

and in referencing defense counsel’s efforts from trial, the trial justice concluded 

that defense counsel “made every effort to familiarize herself with [James’s]
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condition[,]” and that defense counsel “was well-prepared and that her 

cross-examination was adequate.” Accordingly, the trial justice determined that 

LeFebvre failed to satisfy the Strickland test with respect to both issues—defense 

counsel’s alleged failure to consult, and ultimately, present an expert to effectively 

cross-examine the state’s expert at trial; and voluntarily disclosing the medical 

records to the state that contained inculpatory statements made by LeFebvre—and,

thus, LeFebvre failed to meet her burden showing that she was deprived of her Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 

As such, the trial justice found no Strickland violation and denied the 

application for postconviction relief. The trial justice issued a written decision on 

February 24, 2020, and judgment entered on June 8, 2020. LeFebvre subsequently 

filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.

Standard of Review

“A party aggrieved by a final judgment entered in response to a 

postconviction-relief application may seek review ‘by filing a petition for writ of 

certiorari.’” Atryzek v. State, 268 A.3d 37, 41 (R.I. 2022) (deletion omitted) (quoting 

G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-9). “Our review of a case on certiorari is limited to an 

examination of the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.” Id.

(quoting State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 423 (R.I. 2013)). “In addition to examining 

the record for judicial error, we inspect the record to discern if there is any legally 
- 11 -

competent evidence to support the findings of the hearing justice below.” Id.

(quoting Poulin, 66 A.3d at 423). “This Court will not disturb a trial justice’s factual 

findings made on an application for post-conviction relief absent clear error or a 

showing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in 

arriving at those findings.” Id. (quoting Chapdelaine v. State, 32 A.3d 937, 941 (R.I. 

2011)).

Analysis

On appeal, LeFebvre argues that the trial justice erred in denying her 

application for postconviction relief because the trial justice incorrectly concluded 

that LeFebvre failed to meet the two-prong test adopted by the United States 

Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel. For “[a] convicted defendant’s claim that 

counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction[,]” the 

Strickland Court set forth the following test:

“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient. This requires showing that 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 

whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both 

showings, it cannot be said that the conviction * * * 

resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that 

renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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This Court has adopted the Strickland test. Whitaker v. State, 199 A.3d 1021, 

1027 (R.I. 2019) (“When examining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is 

well settled that we will adhere to the requirements set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington.”). “The benchmark issue is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined 

the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 

having produced a just result.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Barros v. State, 180 

A.3d 823, 828 (R.I. 2018)). “In evaluating counsel’s performance, we keep in mind 

that there is ‘a strong presumption * * * that an attorney’s performance falls within 

the range of reasonable professional assistance and sound strategy.’” Id. (brackets 

omitted) (quoting Navarro v. State, 187 A.3d 317, 326 (R.I. 2018)); see also State v. 

Andrade, 209 A.3d 1185, 1192 (R.I. 2019) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the 

effective assistance of counsel.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).

Here, LeFebvre alleges two separate instances of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, which she contends warrants a new trial. First, she contends that defense 

counsel’s failure to consult and present an expert witness at trial resulted in a defense 

that fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. For example, LeFebvre 

submits that defense counsel was “woefully underprepared” and that defense counsel

“acknowledged that she was in over her head.” Second, LeFebvre asserts that under 

the first prong of the Strickland test, defense counsel’s disclosure of LeFebvre’s 

medical records to the state’s prosecutor “cannot be dismissed as a reasonable 
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strategic choice.” As a result of defense counsel’s disclosure of the medical records 

to the state, albeit ignorant of G.L. 1956 § 40-11-11,

5 LeFebvre asserts that the legal 

representation she received fell below the objective standard of reasonableness set 

forth in Strickland’s first prong. 

LeFebvre maintains that the second prong under Strickland (the prejudice 

prong) is also met, specifically, that “there was a reasonable probability that, absent 

[defense counsel’s] deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been 

different.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We first address LeFebvre’s argument 

with respect to defense counsel’s decision to produce the medical records to the 

prosecution.

5 General Laws 1956 § 40-11-11, “Abrogation of privileged communications,”

states:

“The privileged quality of communication between 

husband and wife and any professional person and his or 

her patient or client, except that between attorney and 

client, is hereby abrogated in situations involving known 

or suspected child abuse or neglect and shall not constitute 

grounds for failure to report as required by this chapter; 

failure to cooperate with the department in its activities 

pursuant to this chapter; or failure to give or accept 

evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse 

or neglect. In any family court proceeding relating to child 

abuse or neglect, notwithstanding the provisions of 

chapter 37.3 of title 5, or the provisions of § 9-17-24, no 

privilege of confidentiality may be invoked with respect to 

any illness, trauma, incompetency, addiction to drugs, or 

alcoholism of any parent.” 
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Disclosure of LeFebvre’s Medical Records 

Strickland’s Objective Standard of Reasonableness Prong

This Court has stated that it “will not meticulously scrutinize an attorney’s 

reasoned judgment or strategic maneuver in the context of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 17 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Brennan v. 

Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 173 (R.I. 2001)). 

LeFebvre contends on appeal that “[defense] counsel’s decision to disclose

* * * [the medical] records to the prosecutor cannot be dismissed as a reasonable 

strategic choice.” Specifically, the trial justice found that the “pretrial statements 

were so damaging, and [LeFebvre’s] version of how the injuries were sustained was 

so lacking in credibility” that “the production of [the medical] records did not alter 

the outcome of the case.” Accordingly, the trial justice determined that defense 

counsel’s “decision to produce those records was a tactical one * * *. It was strategic 

because the evidence against [LeFebvre] was overwhelming.” As such, the trial 

justice concluded that because the decision to produce the medical records was 

tactical, LeFebvre could not satisfy Strickland’s first prong that defense counsel’s 

representation was “objectively unreasonable.” See Rice, 38 A.3d at 18. We 

disagree. 

Although this Court affords deference to the trial justice’s finding that defense

counsel’s production of the medical records was a tactical decision, we are 
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unpersuaded by her reasoning. It is our conclusion that in the context of this case, 

the uninformed disclosure to the prosecution of her client’s medical records was 

“objectively unreasonable,” and LeFebvre has satisfied the first prong under 

Strickland. 

In Rice, this Court was confronted with a similar situation where trial counsel 

“testified that he communicated with Rice prior to and during the trial as to the 

strategic components of his defense, particularly in regard to the decision to not call 

* * * a potential medical expert.” Rice, 38 A.3d at 17. Rice’s trial counsel decided 

not to use the potential medical expert because “the physician essentially agreed with 

the state’s witness * * * and that, ultimately, a pretrial evidentiary ruling in favor of 

the defense negated the need for such a medical opinion.” Id. Accordingly, we held 

in Rice that “in light of trial counsel’s strategic reasoning for not procuring a medical 

expert, and Rice being apprised of such, [this Court] consider[ed] that decision to be 

tactical in nature and not objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 17-18 (emphases added). 

At LeFebvre’s postconviction-relief hearing, defense counsel testified that 

early in her representation of LeFebvre, she learned that LeFebvre had been 

previously admitted to Butler Hospital for mental health treatment; and defense 

counsel obtained those medical records. 

Upon reviewing some of the medical records, defense counsel learned that the 

documents contained statements attributable to LeFebvre, which were potentially 
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inculpatory. For instance, one record contained a statement stating that “[LeFebvre] 

doesn[’]t remember what she did or h[o]w many occasions, but has enough ‘fuzzy 

recollection’ to know she did indeed cause the harm[,] remembers feeling ‘enraged’

at the baby, ‘throwing him on the bed just to get away from him.’” At the 

postconviction-relief hearing, defense counsel further testified that the state became 

aware of the medical records because, as part of the then-ongoing plea negotiations,

she intentionally “turned them over as mitigation evidence hoping to get a reduced 

or amended charge.” 

In a pretrial motion, the state advised the court, in the presence of LeFebvre, 

that the prosecution would potentially offer the medical records pursuant to Rule 

801(d)(2)(A) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, as a statement of the party 

opponent. The state further argued that pursuant to § 40-11-11, the privilege that 

protects information given to a health care provider is abrogated in situations 

involving known or suspected child abuse or neglect. The trial justice determined 

that § 40-11-11 was clear and unambiguous. Consequently, the trial justice allowed 

the state to use the information within the medical records for its prosecution. We 

pause to note that the trial justice cautioned the state’s prosecutor “that just because 

[she could] use [the records] doesn’t mean she should” use them. The prosecution 

agreed not to use this evidence in its case-in-chief, but warned LeFebvre that it 

reserved the right to use the evidence for impeachment purposes. As the trial justice 
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noted, “[t]hat is exactly what happened.” To its credit, the state waited until its 

rebuttal case to use this evidence. 

Importantly, during her testimony, defense counsel admitted that because she 

failed to appreciate and understand the implications of § 40-11-11, when she

provided the medical records to the state, she did not know the records would be 

admissible at trial “in [any] way, shape, or form.” Nonetheless, defense counsel 

proceeded to disclose medical records containing prejudicial and inculpatory

evidence of suspected child abuse that were not privileged and could be used by the 

state in ignorance of the law. In her decision, the trial justice observed that defense 

counsel “hoped to demonstrate that * * * Le[F]ebvre was remorseful and was 

seeking and obtaining psychiatric treatment to address mental health issues that 

purportedly led to the alleged conduct in question.” The trial justice further found 

that based on the evidence, it was “clear that [defense] counsel produced the records 

in an effort to provide the [s]tate with mitigating information to prompt the 

prosecutor to amend the charge to second-degree child abuse and recommend a 

lesser sentence.” Thus, the trial justice concluded, the disclosure was strategic in 

nature because “[c]ounsel sought to demonstrate remorse by producing those records 

to prompt the [s]tate to amend the charge.” 

Although we held in Rice that the “tactical” decision in that case was “not 

objectively unreasonable,” this Court based its conclusion on the totality of the 
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circumstances. Rice, 38 A.3d at 18 (emphasis added). In Rice, we considered two 

factors. Id. First, the potential expert for the defense agreed with the state’s witness,

which led to an evidentiary ruling that ultimately negated the need for that medical 

opinion. Id. at 17. Second, the fact that the defendant in Rice was continuously 

apprised of the situation by his defense attorney was notable. Id. at 17-18. This 

Court noted that “a choice between trial tactics, which appears unwise only in 

hindsight, does not constitute constitutionally deficient representation under [the 

Strickland] standard.” Id. at 18 (quoting State v. D’Alo, 477 A.2d 89, 92 (R.I. 1984)).

Here, we are presented with vastly different circumstances than those in Rice. 

We are of the opinion that defense counsel’s decision to disclose the medical records, 

while unaware that privileged communications were abrogated under § 40-11-11, 

can only be described as unwise and ill-informed at the outset, and not in hindsight.

Rice, 38 A.3d at 18. Although we appreciate defense counsel’s thought process and 

valiant efforts to pursue a plea deal in the face of these facts, defense counsel made 

a tactical decision that was not informed and resulted in disclosing incriminating 

medical records to the state.

Having proceeded without an understanding of the applicable law and its 

potential consequences, we are of the opinion that defense counsel’s disclosure of 

LeFebvre’s medical records amounted to “objectively unreasonable” conduct. Rice, 

38 A.3d at 18. We further conclude that defense counsel’s uninformed decision does 
- 19 -

not afford her the benefit of Rice’s “hindsight” consideration. Id. (“[A] choice 

between trial tactics, which appears unwise only in hindsight, does not constitute 

constitutionally deficient representation * * *.”) (quoting D’Alo, 477 A.2d at 92). 

Because defense counsel’s decision was tactical but uninformed, the decision to 

disclose LeFebvre’s inculpatory statements was, in fact, “objectively unreasonable,”

and satisfies the first prong under the Strickland test. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

We now turn to whether LeFebvre has met Strickland’s second prong. 

Strickland’s Prejudice Prong

This Court has noted that “[u]nder the second prong of Strickland, * * * the 

applicant bears the burden of proving that prejudice resulted from deficient 

performance.” Hazard v. State, 64 A.3d 749, 757 (R.I. 2013). To meet this burden, 

the applicant “must show that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”

Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1027 (quoting Barros, 180 A.3d at 829). This Court has

further observed that a “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Hazard, 64 A.3d at 757 (quoting Brown v. 

State, 964 A.2d 516, 529 (R.I. 2009)). 

In Hazard, this Court was presented with a similar issue concerning the 

disclosure of a defendant’s mental health records and “whether trial counsel’s 

deficient performance was so prejudicial that [Hazard] was deprived of a fair trial.”
- 20 -

Hazard, 64 A.3d at 753, 757. During the postconviction-relief hearing, Hazard 

“explained that his trial counsel had requested his authorization to release his 

mental-health treatment records” and that trial counsel “never informed him that this 

material would be provided to the prosecutor.” Id. at 755. The postconviction-relief

justice conducted her analysis in accordance with Strickland and determined that 

“trial counsel’s conduct in relation to the disclosure of [defendant’s] psychiatric 

records fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, thus satisfying the first 

prong” under Strickland. Id. at 756-57. 

After our review of the Hazard record, this Court concluded that there was

“other compelling evidence of [Hazard’s] guilt that was more than sufficient for the 

jury to convict [him] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hazard, 64 A.3d at 758 (quoting 

Brown, 964 A.2d at 541). Accordingly, we held that Hazard failed to meet his 

“burden of showing with reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors, the 

result of his trial would have been different.” Id.

Like Hazard, the record before us contains an overwhelming amount of 

evidence against LeFebvre, including damaging admissions she made from the 

outset. See Hazard, 64 A.3d at 758. In the trial justice’s postconviction-relief 

decision, the trial justice recounted the testimony of several witnesses from trial. For 

instance, the state’s witness, Sergeant Carl Weston (Sergeant Weston) of the 

Providence Police Department assigned to the Youth Services Bureau testified that 
- 21 -

after LeFebvre was read her Miranda rights,

6

she voluntarily provided a statement

and admitted that she shook James. Sergeant Weston testified concerning his

observations of LeFebvre, and described her demeanor during this interview as 

“[f]lat and very matter of fact, * * * no emotion, lack of emotion.” A DCYF child 

protective investigator, Bridget Crook (Crook), also testified about her observations 

of LeFebvre during a separate interview and stated that LeFebvre expressed “feeling 

depressed” and admitted that she “ha[d] a short fuse.” More notably, Crook testified 

that, when she asked LeFebvre who was to blame for James’s injuries, LeFebvre 

told her that she, “[h]erself” was to blame for the injuries. Finally, several other 

witnesses testified at trial, including Dr. Goldberg, whose testimony the trial justice 

found “compelling and highly credible,” regarding the infant’s injuries. 

We are mindful that, as discussed supra, LeFebvre was given fair warning 

that if she testified and offered testimony inconsistent with her statements in the 

medical records, LeFebvre would open the door to rebuttal evidence, including the 

information contained within the medical records. As the trial justice stated, “[t]hat 

is exactly what happened.” The trial justice noted that “[defense] counsel had good 

reason to hope for an amendment to the charge” because “the evidence against 

[LeFebvre] overwhelmingly supported the [s]tate’s claim that [LeFebvre] 

committed first-degree child abuse on her infant son.” 

6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- 22 -

LeFebvre’s trial testimony also added to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 

The trial justice considered LeFebvre’s credibility and, based on her observations, 

she found LeFebvre “detached” and “unemotional” and concluded that her testimony 

of events lacked credibility and did not align with that of the state’s witnesses. For 

example, LeFebvre testified that she did not recall ever shaking James, which was 

contrary to the statement she made to Sergeant Weston.

In denying LeFebvre’s application for postconviction relief, the trial justice 

noted:

“[I]n light of * * * Le[F]ebvre’s poor chance for an 

acquittal at trial, [the] [c]ourt cannot conclude that the 

strategy was ill advised and certainly not tantamount to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. This is particularly the 

case because the evidence against * * * Le[F]ebvre was so 

strong, her pretrial statements were so damaging, and her 

version of how the injuries were sustained was so lacking 

in credibility.”

The trial justice particularly found that “it [was] not reasonably probable that but for

the production of those records [LeFebvre] would have been acquitted.” (Emphasis 

added.) 

Although damaging to LeFebvre’s case, we are of the opinion that the medical 

records amounted to cumulative evidence. Had defense counsel refrained from 

disclosing the medical records to the state, we conclude that the outcome of 

LeFebvre’s trial would not have been different. See Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1027. As 

such, the trial justice did not err in finding that defense counsel’s representation did 
- 23 -

not amount to a “deprivation of [LeFebvre’s] right to a fair trial.” Id. (quoting 

Barros, 180 A.3d at 829). 

Despite satisfying the first prong under Strickland, LeFebvre has failed to 

demonstrate on appeal that the trial justice erred in finding that defense counsel’s 

production of the medical records to the state deprived her of a fair trial. See

Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1027. As discussed supra, even if the medical records were 

excluded and never presented at trial, “there [was] an abundance of other compelling 

evidence of [LeFebvre’s] guilt that was more than sufficient for the jury to convict

* * *.” Hazard, 64 A.3d at 758 (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to 

the medical records, we affirm the trial justice’s finding that LeFebvre failed to meet

the second prong under Strickland and in denying LeFebvre’s application for 

postconviction relief. 

Defense Counsel’s Failure to Consult and Present an Expert Witness 

Strickland’s Objective Standard of Reasonableness Prong

It is well settled that this Court “will not disturb a trial justice’s factual 

findings made on an application for post-conviction relief absent clear error or a 

showing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in 

arriving at those findings.” Atryzek, 268 A.3d at 41 (quoting Chapdelaine, 32 A.3d 

at 941). Moreover, “[t]he admissibility of evidence, expert opinion or otherwise, 

‘rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on 
- 24 -

appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.’” Riley v. Stone, 900 A.2d 1087, 1092 (R.I. 

2006) (quoting Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472, 476 (R.I. 2002)); see also State v. 

Robinson, 297 A.3d 80, 92 (R.I. 2023). This Court has stated that an “expert witness 

must testify that the opinions offered rise to the level of reasonable medical certainty, 

that is, some degree of positiveness or probability and not possibility.” Riley, 900 

A.2d at 1092 (emphasis added). “If the expert has testified with the requisite degree 

of positiveness, ‘his or her testimony is admissible and issues relative to the weight 

of the evidence are left to the fact-finder.’” Id. (quoting Morra, 791 A.2d at 477). 

As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial justice acknowledged in her 

decision that there exists a threshold question of whether the Superior Court would 

have granted defendant’s request for funds to retain the services of an expert witness. 

The record reveals that during the course of her representation, defense counsel was 

clear with LeFebvre that she qualified for the services of the Public Defender if she 

so wished. Indeed, LeFebvre initially was screened and deemed eligible for indigent 

representation, but opted to retain private counsel. When passing upon LeFebvre’s 

application for postconviction relief, the trial justice assumed that funds to retain an 

expert witness would have been provided had defense counsel made such request. 

Before this Court, LeFebvre suggests that at the time of trial, there was a 

dispute within the scientific community concerning the diagnosis of abusive head 

trauma, and therefore LeFebvre argues that “any competent trial counsel” would 
- 25 -

have been aware of the controversy, and presented expert testimony. Thus, 

LeFebvre argues that defense counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below 

the objective standard of reasonableness by failing to consult with an expert witness

regarding abusive head trauma—let alone, present one at trial.

Contrary to LeFebvre’s argument that defense counsel failed to consult with 

a medical expert, the record reflects that defense counsel did, in fact, communicate 

with potential experts in preparation for trial. At the postconviction-relief hearing, 

defense counsel testified that she “spoke to three, maybe four, experts talking about 

potentially retaining them for the case.” Although defense counsel could not recall 

the exact number, she testified that she sent one or two of the potential experts some 

portions of the medical records in this case. 

The record does not indicate how many documents defense counsel submitted 

to each potential expert witness; nor does the record reveal whether these experts

had formed any opinions regarding the medical condition of James and the causation 

of his injuries. Nonetheless, we decline to speculate about the quantity of 

information exchanged between defense counsel and any expert witnesses; and

instead conclude that, contrary to LeFebvre’s appellate argument, the record 

contains sufficient evidence that defense counsel did consult with several potential

experts in preparation for trial. 
- 26 -

Finally, we note that LeFebvre has not presented any evidence of any potential 

witness who could render an opinion contrary to the evidence in this case. As 

discussed supra, the trial justice noted in her decision that “the [c]ourt ha[d] the 

benefit of analyzing the testimony of Dr. Scheller * * *.” After Dr. Scheller testified, 

the trial justice observed that “[s]itting as a gatekeeper, facing a Daubert challenge, 

th[e] [c]ourt would have concluded that Dr. Scheller failed to provide a scientifically 

valid and reliable opinion to challenge the strength of Dr. Goldberg’s contention

that [James] did not sustain his multiple injuries from an accidental short-fall.” 

(Emphasis added.) Based on our review, we reach the same result as the trial justice. 

Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not overlook or 

misconceive material evidence when she rejected LeFebvre’s argument that defense 

counsel’s failure to consult and present an expert at trial deprived her of the effective 

assistance of counsel. 

We hold that LeFebvre does not satisfy the first prong under Strickland. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be 

said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 

process that renders the result unreliable.”). Consequently, our holding serves to 

defeat defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and we need not reach 

Strickland’s prejudice prong, based on our longstanding requirement that “[a]n 

applicant must satisfy two criteria to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
- 27 -

counsel.” Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1027 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we affirm 

the trial justice’s decision denying LeFebvre’s application for postconviction relief. 

See Robinson, 297 A.3d at 92 (“The trial justice’s ruling will be sustained provided 

that his or her discretion ‘has been soundly and judicially exercised, that is, if it has 

been exercised in the light of reason applied to all the facts and with a view to the 

rights of all the parties to the action * * *.’”) (quoting State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 

154 (R.I. 2009)). 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we quash the writ of certiorari and affirm the 

judgment of the Superior Court. The record in this case is remanded to the Superior 

Court with our decision endorsed thereon.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Danielle LeFebvre v. State of Rhode Island.

Case Number No. 2020-167-M.P.

(PM 19-3924)

Date Opinion Filed May 21, 2024

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg 

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel 

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Appellant:

Angela M. Yingling

Rhode Island Public Defender

For Appellee:

Christopher R. Bush

Department of the Attorney General