Filed 4/30/14 In re Julio C. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re JULIO C., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B251098 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK80668)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
LESLIE M.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Veronica McBeth, Judge. (Retired judge of the L.A. Sup. Ct . assigned by th e Chief Justic e pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Jonathan B. Steiner and Anne E. Fr agasso, under appointm ent by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County C ounsel, James M. Owens, Assi stant County Counsel, and Kimberly A. Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

——————————2 A mother appeals from an order of the ju venile court terminati ng her parental rights
over two of her five sons. She contends that th e court erred in terminating her parental rights
under Welfare and Institutions Code sectio n 366.26 because the beneficial sibling relationship exception, found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B )(v), should apply. 1 We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROC EDURAL BACKGROUND
Twins Julio C. and P. C., born in March 2011, are the only subjects of this appeal. At the time of the twins’ birth, their three older brothers, Gi ovanny (born Se ptember 2002), Frankie (born July 2008), and Douglas (born January 2010), we re already juvenile court dependents. The ju venile court took jurisd iction over the older boy s in February 2010, after Douglas was born with methamphetamine in his system. The court found the boy s’ mother, appellant Leslie M. (mother), had a lengthy history of substance abuse which placed the
children at risk. The three boys were removed from the care of mother and Julio C. (father, who is not a party to this appeal), and placed in foster care. The twin s were born premature, and a hospital referral reported that mother refused to feed or burp them, and appeared depressed, distant and unconcerned about the newb orns. Mother and father participated in a voluntary family mainte nance program for the twins from March until October 12, 2011. In June 2011, when the twin s were about three mont hs old, the three olde r boys were returned to the parents’ care. Respondent Department of Children and Family Servi ces (DCFS) received a new referral alleging genera l neglect in mid-Januar y 2012. Accordi ng to the referr al, mother had reported that the boys had been watching TV when fa ther heard screamin g. Father found Douglas with blood in his nose. Giov anny was also bloodied, an d Frankie had bloody nose and, possibly, a broken blood vessel in one eye. The responding social worker reported that,
on the second of two occasions on which she went to investigate the referral, she was almost

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.3 unable to walk through the family home, which was filthy and full of trash. Mother explained that Frankie had been hit by another child, and that Giovanny had also hit Frankie the same day, causing a nosebleed. Douglas had a fresh bite mark where Frankie had bitten him. Giovanny said Fran kie had annoyed him, so he used his hand to hit hi s brother on the head. Frankie had a black eye from an unrelated child. Mother ha d not sought medical attention for Frankie’s injuri es. The parents admitted that father, who had a medical marijuana card for his back pain, began smok ing marijuana again on ce the parents stopped being required to drug test fo r DCFS. Mother cleared the tr ash from the home, and took a drug test, which was clean. In early February 2012, DC FS filed a nondetained petition , pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of the twins, and in order to provide additional services to the family. On a subsequent visit to the family’s home for a sche duled appointmen t, DCFS staff found Giovanny, Douglas and the tw ins home alone. The worker heard th e children inside,
knocked on the door multiple times and called the homephone number wi th no answer. After about 10 minutes, mother emerged from another apartment at th e shelter and returned to the family’s apartm ent, which was filthy. DCFS de termined it was necessary, due to safety and other concerns, to detain all five children from the parents. On February 14, 2012, when social workers came to remove the children, they found Giovanny wandering ar ound the shelter. After accompanyin g him back to the family’s apartment, they observed foul odo rs, old food in one crib and the children were very dirty. The maternal grandparents (M GP’s or, when mentioned individually, MGF and MGM), by then already caring for Douglas, took in the other four children. The same day, the court
ordered that the twins be detained in the MGP’ s care and gave the parents monitored visits. Three days later the court orde red that the older th ree boys be detained with the MGP’s. Within two weeks, all the children were removed from the MGP’s care after one of the 11-month-old twins was injure d in mother’s care during a vi sit that was s upposed to have been monitored by MGM. Mother, unsupervised, was in a bedroom with the twins. While mother was changing diap er of one of the twins, the othe r boy pulled a ta ble over and it
landed on his head. Mother and MGM sought medical attention fo r the injured infant. On4 February 27, 2012, the juvenile court ordered the children remo ved from the MGP’s care. At that time, Giovanny wa s separated from his brothers and placed by himself in one foster home, and the four younger children were placed together in anothe r. DCFS recommended the separation because of Giovanny’s “aggressiv e behaviors with his younger siblings which include hitting them in anger and frustratio n, and rough interactions.” DCFS promised to
make an effort to ensure regular sibling visits. The adjudication hearing was conducted on March 7, 2012. In its repo rt for that hearing, DCFS reported that Giovanny said he “punched Frankie [because] he was getting [o]n [his] nerves,” and that Fran kie always bit people. Mother told the social worker Frankie needed therapy for his biting is sues. Giovanny was in therapy to learn to deal with his aggressive behavio r. The report also refl ected DCFS’s observation that mother had ongoing issues with depression underlying her substan ce abuse and parenting problems, and that she had not taken advantage of counseling services . The court asserted jurisdiction over the
children under section 300, subdivision (b), term inated its home of pa rents order as to the
three eldest children an d ordered permanent placement services for all fi ve children. Mother was given monitored vis its, and father was permitted unmonito red visitation so long as his drug tests were nega tive. The court ordered relative placement fo r Giovanny, and suitable placement for the other children. Giovanny was again placed with his MGP’s. The fo ur youngest siblings were placed together in a foster home. However, in earl y May 2012, all four child ren were removed from
that foster home after the caret akers complained they could no longer work with the parents who were disrespectful and critical of them. DCFS tried to, but could not, find a fo ster home willing to take all four siblin gs. On May 3, 2012, Douglas and Frankie were placed in one foster home and the twins in another. The pa rents and MGP’s visited the children regularly and appropriately. Giov anny, who reported ly missed his siblings and was struggling with his separation from them, also visite d the twins when the MGP’s did so. In August, the twins’ foster mother toldDCFS she could no longer care for them because they displayed too many negative behaviors, includin g biting and hitti ng each other
and her other foster children. Although the twins ha d made positive ch anges, the foster5 mother recommended that they be in separate placements because of the risk that they could severely hurt one another. By September 28, 2012, the twins had been moved to two more
foster homes. Their current caretakers were not interested in adoption. Mother, the MGF and Giovanny visited the twins twice a week. On October 22, 2012, the juvenile court found that mother and father had not complied with their case plans, and terminated reunification services. Monitored visits were continued, the court ordered an adoptive homestudy for the twins an d set the matter for a selection and implementation hearing in mid- February 2013. In November 2012, DCFS repo rted that the twins, who had been in five different placements, had had 20 sibling visits with Gi ovanny in the past six months, but none with Frankie or Douglas, who were now placed in separate foster homes. A ll four of the younger boys had been moved se veral times since thei r February 2012 detent ion; the boys were
considered a “handful” and “no fo ster home wanted them together.” The children’s behavior began stabilizing after they were separated. On February 19, 2013, the juvenile court ordere d DCFS to prov ide an update regarding adoption for the twins. No prospect ive adoptive parents had been identified yet,
and DCFS was ordered to addre ss the possibility of placing them with th e MGP’s, in whose care Giovanny was doing well. The MGP’s wanted to adop t all five boys. DCFS reported that Frankie, Douglas, and the twins were doing well in their foster homes. The twins were developing well and enjoyed playing together, bu t their foster parent was not interested in adoption. Visits for the parent s and grandparents were scheduled for three separate days and times for the twins, Frankie, and Douglas. Giovanny pa rticipated in the vi sits. He expressed feeling happy during visits with hi s brothers, and wanted more visits. According to DCFS, the children did not ha ve “consistent sibling visits due to long distances among foster parents, school schedules of minors Fr ankie and Giovanny and foster parents[’] issue with driving long distances.” On February 21, 2013, DCFS coordinated a sibling visit for Frankie, Dougla s, and the twins by taking the two older boys to the twins’ foster home, where the children sp ent two hours together. DCFS indicated it would continue making reasonable efforts to a rrange sibling visits. DCFS note d that in the past, the boys’6 aggressive and disrupti ve behavior had made it impossible to place the siblings in a single placement. But th e children had stabilized in their current placements, and their current caregivers expressed no concerns. DCFS was conc erned that if the child ren were returned to the MGP’s, their disruptive beha vior might resurface due to a la ck of structur e and parenting
skills in the MGP’s home. DCFS identi fied prospective adoptive parents in February 2013, and began the preplacement process. On March 6, 2013, the juveni le court ordered DC FS to prepare a pr ogress report to address the possibility of adoption of the three eldest boys by the MGP’s, and their participation in services. DCFS was also ordered to facilitate sibling visits. On March 28, 2013, th e twins were pl aced in a preadoptive home with caregivers Mr. A. and Mr. H., with whom they remain. DCFS reported that the twins were adjusting well, their caregivers were meeting all their needs an d the family was developing a close and loving relationship wi th the children. The caregivers were strongly committed to adopting
the twins. MGF had weekly monitored visits with the twins, although he missed several in April, May, and June. In late April 2013, he began atte nding parenting classes and counseling. MGM had not enrolled in any programs. At a hearing on June 18, 2013, mother’s counsel inform ed the court that only one sibling visit had ta ken place, and asked that sibling visits immediately be facilitated. DCFS was ordered to address “the status of sibling vis its” in its next report. That report, submitted in July, reflected that Frankie, Douglas, and the twins had one two-hour sibling visit in July 2013. The boys played soccer, ate snacks and interacted cheerfully at a park. DCFS reported that the boys had not had sibling visits due to conf licting school sc hedules, and because some foster parents were unable to drive long distances. DCFS expected the boys would have monthly sibling visits during su mmer, but that the frequ ency would taper off again once school began. DCFS noted that Giova nny saw his siblings during the MGP’s
visits. On July 9, 2013, separate counsel was appointed to repr esent the twins after the boys’ counsel declared a conflict, and the matter was continued.7 At a hearing on August 20 , 2013, father’s coun sel informed the co urt that sibling visits had not been occurring as often as they should be. DCFS was ordered to establish a regular visitation schedule . Mother requested vi sits with all five boy s together. The court ordered DCFS to see if such visits could be arranged. On August 30, 2013, the MGP’ s filed a section 388 petition seeking to have all five boys placed in their care, on the ground that they wantedto “maintain the strong familial bond and relationship.” The allegedly change d circumstances was the MGP’s participation
in court-recommended services and ongoing weekly visits with the children.
In its final status review report for the Septembe r 4, 2013 hearing, DC FS reported that Giovanny was doing well in the MGP’s home. Through therapy, he had learned ways to communicate his needs without re sponding aggressively toward his peers, and had discussed sibling separation an d visits. Frankie was doing well in his foster home, but wanted to live with his MGP’s. DCFS reported that Douglas was also doing we ll in his foster home. The twins too were doing well in the care of th eir foster parents, who we re committed to adopting
them. The twins were developing well, an d responding to servi ces from the Regional Center. The twins’ vocabulary was increasing, and they were l earning to feedthemselves. Their disruptive behavi ors had diminished, alt hough some biting was ongoing. One teacher told DCFS she believed the biting behavior was the result of the boys’ frustration with an inability to communicate and that as their voca bulary increased, the bi ting would decrease. The family continued to deve lop a close and loving bond. The twins had become very attached to their prospective adoptive parents, and “w[ould] run with great joy when [the] caregivers show[ed] up to the daycare to take them back home.” MGF had consistent weekly monitored visits with the tw ins, who responded well to him. MGM had visited inconsistently, and the twins often ran from, and refused to interact with her, unless she offered them junk food. The pare nts’ visits were in consistent, but they acted appropriately when they came. The report indicated that an August 2013 sibling visit had been considered, but did not say whether one occurred. MGF was taking parenting classes and counseling, and MGM had begun parenting courses.8 On September 4, 2013, the juvenile court first addre ssed the MGP’s section 388 petition, and observ ed that it lacked any new information. Mother’s counse l requested that all five boys be placed wi th their grandparents. Counsel fo r the three oldest children asked that plans be made to return Frankie and Douglas to the grandpar ents, noting th ey were “very differently situated from the younger twins,” and argu ed it was in the three olde r boys’ best interest to be together. Counsel for th e twins requested that the petition be deni ed as to them. He noted that one of the twins had been inju red due to MGM’s failure to supervise mother, and that the grandparent s had not visited ofte n: MGF came about tw ice a month, and MGM had hardly visited at all until r ecently. Moreover, it was not in the twins’ best interest to be
returned to their grandparents. The children were “thriving in the hom e,” of their prospective adoptive parents and would be adopted if parental rights were terminated. The court agreed and denied the petition as to th e twins. The court observed that the
cause for the children’s remova l from the MGP’s had been very serious. Moreover, the twoyear-old twins were not bonded to their older brothers in the same way the older siblings might be to them. In addition, five ch ildren was a lot for two olde r adults to car e for. The court observed that the twins appeared to be thriving in thei r preadoptive home. The court also denied the petition as to the three older boy s, but observed that as those boys were on a “totally different track” than th e twins, their plan wa s to work toward placing them with the
MGP’s. The court then proceede d to the section 366.26 hearing as to the twins.
Mother testified that at firs t, the twins had not wanted to leave when visits ended. Now they seemed to have adjusted . In recent visits, she had tried to explain to the twins who their mother, grandparents and oldest brother was. They ran to her during visits, were happy and called her “mommy” or “mama. ” They used “papa” to refer, not to father, but to their
foster father. Mother believe d there had been two sibling visits in 2013 between the four younger children, and that Giovanny visited his siblings with hi s MGF. Giova nny told the
court he wanted his brothers to bewith him on his upcoming birthday. Mother argued the parental and sibling relationship exceptions should apply to prevent termination of parental rights. With re gard to the sibling relationship exception, she9 asserted that DCFS had not made reasonable efforts to facilita te sibling visits. Father joined mother’s argument.
Counsel for the three oldest boys informed the cour t that her client s wished to be
reunited with their brothers. The twins’ attorney urged th e court to terminate parental rights. He not ed that the twins had been separated from their siblings si nce they were 11 mont hs old, and that under the circumstances, it was difficult to argue that the siblings had formed a significant bond. Counsel argued it was in the twins’ “best intere st to remain with the current adoptive parents as they are thriving . . . , a nd it would be a detriment for them to be removed from that setting.” The juvenile court agreed. The court observed that after having had to be moved from several foster homes, the twins had found “a place wher e they’re thri ving, doing exceptionally well.” The court also observ ed that, while it did no t “doubt that the older
children are bonded to the younger children , . . . it would be very diff icult for [it] to see these younger children are bonded in that way to the older kids.” After ex pressing its hope that future sibling visits co uld be facilita ted, the court found the twins adoptabl e, found that no exception applied and terminated parental rights as to them.
Mother’s counsel asked that the twins’ ma tter be referred to the Consortium for Children, indicating that the prospective adoptive parents had indicated their willingness to allowing ongoing sibling visits. The court agreed a referral was appropriate “to see if we can work out future sibling visits.” Mother filed th is timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in term inating her parental rights because it should have applied the sibling relati onship excepti on to termination under section 366.26, subdivisi on (c)(1)(B)(v). “At a hearing under section 366.26, the court must select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent ch ild. Where there is no probability of reunific ation with a parent, adoption is the preferre d permanent plan. [Citation.] To implement a doption as the permanent plan, the juvenile court must find , by clear and convinci ng evidence, that the10 minor is likely to be adopted if parental ri ghts are terminated . (§ 366.26, s ubd. (c)(1).) Then,
in the absence of evid ence that termination of parental rights would be de trimental to the child under statutorily specified exceptions (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)–(B)), the juvenile court ‘shall terminate pa rental rights’ (§ 366. 26, subd. (c)(1)).” (In re K.P . (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 620.) “The sibling relationship exception [to te rmination of parental rights] applies where the juvenile court finds that ‘substantial interfer ence with a child’s sibl ing relationship’ is a ‘compelling reason’ to conclude that adoption would be detrimenta l to the child. In making this determination, the court should take into consideration ‘the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child sh ared significant common experi ences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing c ontact is in the chil d’s best interest, including the child’s l ong-term emotional interest, as co mpared to the benefit of legal permanence through adopti on.’ (§ 366.26, subd . (c)(1)(B)(v).)” ( In re Bailey J . (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1317.) Th e court must also bear in mind that “‘th e “sibling relationship exception contains str ong language creating a h eavy burden for the pa rty opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determ ines that there is a ‘compelling reason’ for concluding that the term ination of parental righ ts would be ‘detrimental ’ to the child due to
‘substantial interference’ with a sibling relationship.” [Citations.]’” ( In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 823.) Further, the possible detriment to be consid ered is not detriment to any sibling, but on ly the detriment of the child being considered for adoption. ( In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54.) On appeal, we review the juvenile court’ s factual determinati on as to whether a significant sibling relationship exists for substa ntial evidence. That co urt’s decision as to whether termination of that relationship would be detrimental to the child is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re K.P. , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 621–622.) Mother maintains that the juvenile court s hould have applied the sibling relationship exception to the termination of parental rights because the twins, who were two and one-half years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, and had lived with their three siblings for11 only about 11 months of their lives, “had as good a sibling relationship as was possible under the circumstances,” and because it would be “unc onscionable for [DCFS] to prevent a sibling relationship from forming by refu sing to comply with court orders to fa cilitate sibling visits.” We disagree.
The court noted that although it didn’t “doub t that the older chil dren [were] bonded to [the twins],” it was “very diffi cult . . . to see these younger children are bonded . . . to the older kids,” and concluded that the sibling ex ception did not apply. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s dete rmination that no si gnificant sibling rela tionship existed. Before the petition was filed in mid-February 2012, the 11-month-o ld twins had lived with
their three brothers for only about seven months of their liv es. By the end of February 2012, Giovanny was separated from the other three boys because of his aggressive and controlling
behavior with his brothers. By early May 2012, the twins had been removed from the first of
a series of several foster home s and separated from all three of their brothers because the boys hit and kicked one another and other foster children in the home. The twins have been apart from their siblings ever since. On this reco rd and in light of their young age and the relatively brief period they lived with their br others, the twins cannot be said to share with their siblings the sort of bond this exception wa s designed to protect. The record co ntains no evidence that prior to separation, the relation ship between the twins and their brothers was particularly close or strong, or that they shar ed significant common experiences. Indeed, the
scant evidence in the record of the nature of the relationship between the siblings, reflects one largely characterized by aggression, anger and violen ce. “Since the undisputed evidence did not compel a finding that [the siblings] had a sibling relationship th at was beneficial to [the twins], the juvenile court’s finding that the sibling rela tionship exception to adoption did not apply was supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Bailey J.
, supra , 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318, italics omitted.) Even assuming the evidence was sufficient to establish a significant sibling relationship, mother could not prevail on appeal. Th e second prong of the exception involves a determination by th e court “‘that there is a “c ompelling reason” for concluding termination of parental rights would be “det rimental” to the child due to “substantial12 interference” with the sibling relationship’” when weighed against the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. ( In re Celine R.
, supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 61; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) We bear in mind that “application of this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceed ings concern young children wh ose need for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount.” ( In re Valerie A . (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.) Here, the balance between the sibling relation ship versus the benef its of adoption tilts strongly in favor of a doption. By the time the section 366.26 hearing, the twins had spent approximately five months in the home of th eir prospective adoptive parents, a home DCFS characterized as close and loving. The twins were re portedly thriving in the care of foster parents, who were prepared to adopt them and who attended to their phy sical, emotional, and psychological needs. Failing to terminate parental rights would have deprived the twins of the permanent home their caregivers were prepared to provid e. Their immediate need is for stability and permanence. In rare cases, a closely bonded re lationship betw een siblings
constitutes sufficient reason to preclude the termination of pare ntal rights of an otherwise adoptable child. This is no t the “rare” case in wh ich the sibling rela tionship exception applies. ( In re Valerie A
., supra , 152 Cal.App.4t h at p.1014.)
This case thus bears a marked resemblance to In re Valerie A.
, supra , 152 Cal.App.4th 987. There, toddler twins and their half-sibling, who was six years older, had daily contact before the twins were removed from parental custody. ( Id . at pp. 994, 1010, 1013.) The siblings s ubsequently lived together for abou t seven months, from the time the twins were 17 months to about two years old, before the siblings were separated. ( Id . at pp. 994, 1010.) The cour t concluded that “the record cl early shows the ch ildren’s best
interests were served by adoption and the sibling relationship exception did not apply to preclude termination of parental rights. The ch ildren . . . were raised in the same home for a relatively short period of time. Although they had contact . . . since birth, the trial court reasonably could infer th e experiences the children shared . . . would not be as meaningful to them, as infants and toddlers, as the experiences were to [a ch ild], who was six years older. Even though . . . interactions . . . were loving, affectionate, pl ayful and nurtur ing, the court13 reasonably could determine the children’s long-term emotional in terests, due to their ages and needs, were better served by the permanency of adoption rather than by continued sibling contact.” ( Id . at p. 1013, fn. omitted.)
The record does not reflect that the tw ins suffered emotional distress from missing their brothers either between their sporadic vi sits, or that they enc ountered any difficulty separating from them at the end of the few visits they did have. Moreover, the twins’ prospective adoptive pa rents reported a willingn ess to facilitate futu re visits between the siblings. Thus, “termination of parental ri ghts [will] not nece ssarily foreclose the continuation of the sibling relationships.” ( In re Valerie A.
, supra , 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014.) Here, as in Valerie A ., the trial court justifiably was not convinced th ere would be a disruption in the siblings’ relationship. (Ibid .) Finally, we reject mother’s assertion that the order terminating parental rights must be
reversed because to affirm wo uld permit the “unconscionable” result of allowing DCFS to “prevent a sibling relationship from forming by refusing to comply with court orders to facilitate sibling visits.” We turn again to Valerie A ., in which the mother argued that because of an improper denial of sibling visitation, she was denied a fair opportunity to litigate the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights. The court observed that statutory considerations relevant to determining the nature and extent of the sibling relationship include the disjunctive alte rnative factors of “whether the child shared significant common experiences with a sibling or whether the child has existing bonds with a sibling.” ( Valerie A.
, supra , 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.) The juvenile co urt is thus able to
consider whether the child shared significant common experiences with his or her siblings in the past and to evaluatethe strength of their relationship, before re gular visitation became difficult or impossible. In other words, the Le gislature recognized that children i nvolved in dependency procee dings often exert little or no control in maintaining sibling relationships. Further, in contrast with the s ection 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i) “benefic ial relationship ” exception to termination of parental rights, the juvenile court need not consider whether a child has maintained regular visitation and contact with his or her siblings to determine the applicability of the sibling relationship exception. In sum, while it should certainly not be14 condoned, even an erroneous denial of sibling visitation, as may have occurred in Valerie A

. or here, will not compromise a parent’s ability to pr ove the sibling relati onship exception. ( Ibid .) Under these circumstances, an y detriment to the twins from the loss of a legal tie to their siblings was necessarily ou tweighed by the bene fit of being freed fo r adoption into a loving, permanent home. We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s determination that the sibling relationshi p exception of sectio n 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) did not apply.
DISPOSITION The order terminating pare ntal rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

MILLER, J *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t, assigned by the Ch ief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.