IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–2044

Filed June 5, 2015

Amended July 31, 2015

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SUSAN MICHELLE THATCHER 

AND RONALD DEAN THATCHER

Upon the Petition of 

SUSAN MICHELLE THATCHER, 

Petitioner, 

ANNA CARSON as Executor for the 

ESTATE OF SUSAN MICHELLE THATCHER,

Appellee, 

And Concerning 

RONALD DEAN THATCHER, 

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Marsha M. 

Beckelman, Judge. 

Appellant seeks further review of court of appeals decision 

dismissing his appeal of district court order granting bifurcated decree of 

dissolution of marriage without division of property. DECISION OF 

COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT DECREE 

REVERSED; PROCEEDINGS ABATED; CASE REMANDED FOR 

DISMISSAL. 
2

Kerry A. Finley and Allison M. Heffern of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, 

P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant. 

Sherry L. Schulte of Bradley & Riley, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for 

appellee. 
3

WATERMAN, Justice.

This appeal presents a question of first impression in Iowa: 

whether the district court has discretion to end a marriage through a 

decree of dissolution without dividing the marital property until a later 

judgment. This two-step process is known as a “bifurcated divorce” and 

is expressly allowed by statute in other states. Iowa Code chapter 598 

(2013) does not expressly permit such bifurcation. Our rules of civil 

procedure allow separate trials of issues, but can be superseded by 

statute. Iowa Rs. Civ. P. 1.101, 1.914. Iowa Code section 598.21(1) 

states, “Upon every judgment of . . . dissolution, . . . the court shall 

divide the property of the parties . . . .” The parties disagree whether the 

marital dissolution and division of property must be contemporaneous. 

In this case, a terminal cancer patient whose death was imminent 

filed a motion to bifurcate her dissolution proceeding. Her husband 

resisted. The day before her death, the district court entered an order 

granting the motion to bifurcate and dissolving the marriage, with the 

division of property to “be determined at a later date.” The husband 

appealed, and the decedent’s estate, as the substituted appellee, moved 

to dismiss the appeal as premature. We transferred the case to the court 

of appeals, which held the bifurcation order and decree of dissolution 

was not an appealable final judgment and did not meet the conditions for 

interlocutory appeal. We granted further review. 

We now determine that the decree of dissolution is an appealable 

final judgment. For the reasons explained below, we hold section 

598.21(1) requires the decree of dissolution to divide the property at the 

same time, which prohibits bifurcated divorces. We therefore vacate the 

opinion of the court of appeals and reverse the order of bifurcation and 

decree of dissolution. This outcome means the parties were married at 
4

the time of the wife’s death, and the dissolution proceedings abated. We 

remand the case for entry of an order of dismissal. The probate court 

will determine the division of the decedent’s property. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Susan and Ronald Thatcher were married on November 10, 1984. 

They had one daughter, Lillian, born in 1993. In January 2013, Susan 

was diagnosed with cervical cancer. Her doctors told her she had a oneyear life expectancy. Eight months later, on September 13, Susan filed a 

petition for dissolution of marriage in Linn County. She wanted to end 

their twenty-nine-year marriage and die unmarried. She was fifty years 

old. Ronald, age sixty-seven, was employed part-time as a pastor. They 

were living apart. Lillian, age twenty-one, was a full-time college student.

Susan’s petition alleged the marriage relationship had broken down and 

there was no likelihood the marriage could be preserved. She asked 

Ronald to waive the conciliation provisions. Ronald filed his answer on 

September 27. Ronald denied the breakdown of the marriage and that 

reconciliation services would be ineffective and reserved his right to 

counseling.

In November, each party filed an affidavit of financial status.

These disclosed Susan had several life insurance policies, an inherited 

farm valued at $100,819, and inherited securities. Ronald cosigned 

Lillian’s student loan of $41,000. Ronald and Susan each listed

retirement accounts and bank accounts, and each listed securities 

owned jointly worth $76,352. Susan listed medical bills of $75,150, with 

insurance claims pending for $37,575. The homestead was valued at 

$105,000. The record is silent whether Susan had a last will and 

testament. 
5

On November 22, Susan filed a motion to bifurcate dissolution.

She “request[ed] that the Court dissolve the marriage of the parties at 

this time and that the issue of the property and debts of the parties be 

litigated at a later date.” As grounds, she noted her terminal cancer and 

that her physicians told her “at this time” her experimental treatments

were not working. She alleged “it is highly unlikely that she will survive 

her condition for a trial.” She noted efforts to schedule a settlement 

conference, but that Ronald said “he was not available on the dates given 

and the next available dates were February of 2014, which is not a 

realistic date for [her].” She stated “she would like to have their marriage 

dissolved prior to her passing.” Her motion cited no financial reasons or 

legal authority to bifurcate the marital dissolution from the property 

division. 

The motion was set for hearing on November 26. The day before 

the unreported hearing, Susan supplemented her motion with

correspondence from her treating physicians stating her life expectancy 

was “limited from days to possibly weeks.” Ronald resisted the motion,

arguing there is no legal basis to bifurcate the marital dissolution from a 

contemporaneous property division. As an alternative to bifurcation, he 

offered to participate in an expedited settlement conference and trial 

within two weeks. He stipulated to the breakdown in the marriage and 

waived the ninety-day waiting period. He argued bifurcation would 

prejudice his rights and complicate resolution of the property issues. In 

particular, he argued he would be forced to litigate the property division 

in probate court without the opportunity to depose or cross-examine 

Susan, lose health insurance and his status as beneficiary on her life 

insurance, and lose the right to file a joint tax return for 2013. 
6

On November 27, the district court filed a two-page “Order 

Granting Motion to Bifurcate and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage.”

The court granted the motion to bifurcate “for the reasons stated in 

[Susan’s] motion.” The court also “granted a dissolution of marriage” 

and decreed that Ronald and Susan “are returned to their status of 

single persons.” The order allowed the parties to transfer one bank 

account of approximately $10,000 to their daughter. The order otherwise

provided that “all property and debts of the parties and a division thereof 

will be determined at a later date” and prohibited the parties from 

transferring assets except for ordinary living expenses and reasonable 

legal fees. Susan died the next day. 

On December 20, Ronald filed a notice of appeal. We granted an 

unresisted motion to substitute Susan’s estate as appellee. On 

February 5, 2014, Susan’s estate filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as 

interlocutory. Ronald resisted, arguing the decree of dissolution is a final 

order appealable as a matter of right. Alternatively, he sought 

interlocutory review. We ordered the motion to dismiss to be submitted 

with the appeal and transferred the case to the court of appeals. 

On October 21, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal, 

concluding the district court’s order and decree was not final and 

appealable because it contemplated “some later act—namely, the 

distribution of the parties’ property” to finally decide the case. The court 

of appeals declined to allow interlocutory review, concluding Ronald

“cannot show the bifurcation order will materially affect the final 

decision” and noted that he may appeal from the future ruling that 

divides the property. We granted Ronald’s application for further review.
7

II. Standard of Review. 

“An action for dissolution of marriage is an equitable proceeding 

and, consequently, this court’s review is de novo.” In re Marriage of 

Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1977) (reviewing appeal from 

bifurcated proceeding); see also In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824

N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 2012) (noting de novo standard of review for 

“[a]ppeals regarding the dissolution of marriage”). Our review of the 

district court’s interpretation of a statute in an equitable proceeding is 

for correction of errors of law. In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 

(Iowa 2012). “Our review of district court rulings on motions to bifurcate 

is usually for abuse of discretion,” but we may apply de novo review 

based on the nature of the appeal. In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d 310, 

315 (Iowa 2013). An abuse of discretion may be shown when the district 

court’s ruling “ ‘is based on an erroneous application of the law.’ ” In re 

A.M., 856 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Office of Citizens’ 

Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 2012)). 

III. Analysis. 

We first must decide whether the district court’s bifurcation order 

and decree of dissolution is reviewable at this time. Because we 

determine the dissolution decree is reviewable, we then address whether 

the district court erred by bifurcating the dissolution of the Thatchers’

marriage from the division of property and the effect of Susan’s 

intervening death.

A. Is the Bifurcated Decree of Dissolution a Reviewable Final 

Judgment? Susan’s estate argues there is no reviewable final judgment 

until the district court divides the marital property. Ronald argues the

decree of dissolution itself is a final judgment. The court of appeals held 
8

that the dissolution was not a final order because it contemplated 

division of property at a future time. 

“As repeatedly articulated by this court, a final judgment or 

decision is one that finally adjudicates the rights of the 

parties. It must put it beyond the power of the court which 

made it to place the parties in their original position. A 

ruling or order is interlocutory if it is not finally decisive of 

the case.” 

In re Marriage of Denly, 590 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Iowa 1999) (quoting 

Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Harris, 248 N.W.2d 145, 146 (Iowa 

1976)). The bifurcated decree in this case bears a key attribute of a final 

judgment; it ended the marriage of the parties. The court entered this 

decree while Susan’s death was imminent; indeed, she died the next day. 

Thus, while district courts are generally free to revisit interlocutory 

orders to correct error, Susan’s death deprived the court of the ability to 

place the parties back in the position of being married to each other

while alive. This decree “put it beyond the power of the court which 

made it to place the parties in their original position.” Id.

We have long held that the death of a party ends his or her 

marriage and abates the dissolution proceeding. See In re Estate of Peck, 

497 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1993) (stating that dissolution is a purely 

personal action that abates upon the death of either party “even when 

the disposition of significant property rights will be determined by the 

entry of a decree, or lack thereof”); Oliver v. Oliver, 216 Iowa 57, 58, 248 

N.W. 233, 234 (1933) (“If [an enforceable] decree of divorce has not been 

entered prior to the death of a party, none can ever be entered . . . .”); 

Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa 189, 193 (1862) (holding death of party ended 

appeal of dissolution decree); see also Myers v. Myers, 580 A.2d 384, 

385–86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that the death of a party abates 

both a pending divorce action and all economic claims); cf. Maghee v. 
9

State, 773 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Iowa 2009) (addressing survival statutes to 

conclude death abates proceedings when the contested issue becomes 

moot in that a ruling on the underlying issue would no longer have force 

or effect). The death of a party in a dissolution proceeding obviates the 

need for a decree of dissolution because death ends the marriage. But,

this case is not moot because resolution of the fighting issue—whether 

bifurcated divorces are allowed—will determine whether the marital 

property is divided in probate proceedings or under chapter 598. 

Missing from the decree at issue is the final division of marital

property, a matter the district court expressly reserved for a later 

determination. Does that unfinished business make the order 

interlocutory? In that respect, the bifurcated order did not finally 

determine the rights of the parties. The problem is that (for the reasons 

we explain below), the district court erred by failing to divide the property 

contemporaneously with its decree of dissolution as required by Iowa 

Code section 598.21(1). Should we now hold the very error warranting 

reversal of the decree of dissolution prevents appellate review to correct it 

until after the property is divided by the wrong court? We have held 

other dissolution decrees with property divisions subject to contingencies 

or open issues are appealable final orders. See In re Marriage of Welp, 

596 N.W.2d 569, 571–72 (Iowa 1999); In re Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207, 

209 (Iowa 1978). We hold this bifurcation order and dissolution decree, 

despite its reservation of the property division for later proceedings, is a 

final order appealable by Ronald as a matter of right. Accordingly, we 

will proceed with our review of that order. 

B. Does Iowa Code Section 598.21(1) Permit Bifurcated 

Divorces? We begin our analysis of Iowa law by reviewing the operative 

statutory language in light of our canons of construction. “Our starting 
10

point is the statutory text.” In re A.M., 856 N.W.2d at 371. “The goal of 

statutory construction is to determine legislative intent.” Auen v. 

Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). Iowa Code 

chapter 598 governs the dissolution of marriage. Iowa Code section 

598.21, entitled “Orders for disposition of property,” states:

1. General Principles. Upon every judgment of

annulment, dissolution, or separate maintenance, the court 

shall divide the property of the parties and transfer the title of 

the property accordingly, including ordering the parties to 

execute a quitclaim deed or ordering a change of title for tax 

purposes and delivery of the deed or change of title to the 

county recorder of the county in which each parcel of real 

estate is located.

Iowa Code § 598.21 (emphasis added). We conclude the plain language 

of this provision requires a division of property contemporaneous with 

the decree of dissolution. Our conclusion is reinforced by related 

statutory provisions, the legislative history, and precedent construing 

equivalent provisions. We note competing public policy arguments for 

and against bifurcated divorces, but conclude those arguments are best 

addressed to the legislature. We begin with the words of section 

598.21(1). 

1. Textual analysis. Ronald argues this statute requires the

district court to divide the property at the time it enters the decree of 

dissolution of the marriage. We agree. “We generally ‘presume words 

used in a statute have their ordinary and commonly understood 

meaning.’ ” In re A.M., 856 N.W.2d at 371 (quoting McGill v. Fish, 790 

N.W.2d 113, 119 (Iowa 2010)). Section 598.21(1) uses mandatory 

language: “Upon every judgment of . . . dissolution . . . , the court shall 

divide the property of the parties . . . .” Iowa Code § 598.21(1) (emphasis 

added). Our legislature has codified the rule of construction that 

“[u]nless otherwise specifically provided by the general assembly, . . .
11

[t]he word ‘shall’ imposes a duty.” Id. § 4.1(30)(a). “In a statute, the 

word ‘shall’ generally connotes a mandatory duty.” In re Det. of Fowler, 

784 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 2010) (recognizing word “shall” in Iowa Code 

section 229A.7(3) imposed mandatory duty). 

Susan’s estate acknowledges section 598.21(1) requires the court 

to divide the property, but contends the court may dissolve the marriage 

first and divide the property at a later date. We disagree. The statutory 

command begins with the words “[u]pon every judgment.” The MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “upon” to mean “on the surface,”

“on it,” “THEREAFTER, THEREON.” Merriam-Webster’s Colligate 

Dictionary 1375 (11th ed. 2014). Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary has several temporal definitions for “upon,” including 

“immediately following” and “at the time of,” as well as definitions of

physical location, such as “in or into close proximity or contact.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2517–18 (unabr. ed. 2002). 

Giving the words of section 598.21(1) their ordinary meaning, “[u]pon 

every judgment” means “at the time of the judgment” and within the four 

corners of the judgment or annexed thereto. We conclude the decree 

ending the marriage and division of property are to be contemporaneous, 

not days or months apart. 

Susan’s estate relies on Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.914, which 

allows the court “for convenience or to avoid prejudice, [to] order a 

separate trial of any claim . . . or . . . separate issue.” What the district 

court purported to do here, and what Susan wanted, however, went 

beyond merely separating the trials of particular issues. Instead, on 

November 27, 2013, the district court purported to enter a final 

judgment on part of the case (i.e., whether the marriage was dissolved) 

without resolving the rest of it (i.e., the distribution of property). This is 
12

different from trying the case in segments while entering a final judgment 

only at the end, which is what rule 1.914 authorizes. In any event, rule 

1.101 makes clear that statutes may “provide different procedure in 

particular courts or cases.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.101. Section 598.21(1) is 

such a statute and governs this bifurcation issue. 

We have allowed bifurcated procedures to determine threshold 

issues in dissolution proceedings. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shanks, 

758 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2008) (noting a bifurcated trial to determine 

validity of prenuptial agreement before subsequent trial on property 

division and remaining issues); In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 

at 612–13 (allowing a bifurcated trial to determine whether common law 

marriage existed). In these cases, however, the dissolution of the 

marriage did not precede the property division. As noted above, a decree 

of dissolution is a final judgment. 

Our rules permit separate judgments to be entered at different 

times against separate parties: 

Where the action involves two or more parties, the court 

may, in its discretion, and though it has jurisdiction of them 

all, render judgment for or against some of them only, 

whenever the prevailing party would have been entitled 

thereto had the action involved the prevailing party alone, or 

whenever a several judgment is proper; leaving the action to 

proceed as to the other parties. 

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.953. However, our rules of civil procedure do not allow 

the district court to enter serial final judgments at different times in a 

single action between two parties, except for collateral matters such as 

cost or fee awards. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d at 

614 (holding an order allowing temporary attorney fees in a dissolution 

action is a final judgment appealable as a matter of right and noting it is 

collateral to the main action). The marital dissolution itself and the final 
13

division of marital property are inseparable parts of the main action that 

must be addressed together in the final judgment. 

2. Related statutory provisions. Our conclusion that the property 

division is to be contemporaneous with the marital dissolution is 

reinforced by the accompanying statutory provisions. Section 598.21(5) 

directs the court to consider in equitably dividing the property a number 

of factors that contemplate both parties are living when the final decree

divides the marital property. These provisions include: 

d. The age and physical and emotional health of the 

parties. 

. . . . 

f. The earning capacity of each party, including 

educational background, training, employment skills, work 

experience, length of absence from the job market, custodial 

responsibilities for children, and the time and expense 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of 

living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the 

marriage. 

g. The desirability of awarding the family home or the 

right to live in the family home for a reasonable period to the 

party having custody of the children, or if the parties have 

joint legal custody, to the party having physical care of the 

children. 

h. The amount and duration of an order granting 

support payments to either party pursuant to section 

598.21A and whether the property division should be in lieu 

of such payments. 

i. Other economic circumstances of each party, 

including pension benefits, vested or unvested. Future 

interests may be considered, but expectancies or interests 

arising from inherited or gifted property created under a will 

or other instrument under which the trustee, trustor, trust 

protector, or owner has the power to remove the party in 

question as a beneficiary, shall not be considered. 

j. The tax consequences to each party. 

Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (emphasis added). Death of either party would 

end ongoing payments for spousal or child support; resolve the question 
14

as to which party lives in the family home; trigger pension rights and life 

insurance payments; and render irrelevant the custodial responsibilities, 

earnings, and earning capacity of the decedent. 

As noted above, we have long held the death of a spouse abates the 

dissolution proceedings. The decedent’s property is then divided in 

probate court. See id. ch. 633 (Iowa Probate Code). Nothing in chapter 

598 or chapter 633 expressly retains jurisdiction to divide the marital 

property when a party dies after the decree of dissolution but before a

final property division. We see no indication in these interrelated 

provisions within chapter 598 or the probate code that the legislature 

intended to permit bifurcated divorces. To the contrary, the structure of 

chapter 598, and specifically section 598.21, clearly contemplates an 

equitable division of property no later than the decree of dissolution.

3. The legislative history and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 

The legislative history of Iowa Code chapter 598 supports our conclusion 

that section 598.21(1) prohibits bifurcation of the marital dissolution and 

property division. Specifically, the Iowa legislature never adopted the

Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), enacted forty-two years ago, 

which expressly permits bifurcation of the dissolution decree and 

property division. Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 302(a)(4) (amended 

1973), 9 U.L.A. 200–01 (1998) (allowing entry of a decree of dissolution 

after the court has considered or approved “the disposition of property; 

or has provided for a separate, later hearing to complete these matters” 

(emphasis added)). We conclude the fact that the Iowa legislature chose 

not to adopt the Uniform Act is significant:

We can determine legislative intent from selective 

enactment or divergence from uniform acts. We presume the 

Iowa legislature was aware of, but declined to follow, the 

[Uniform Probate Code]’s dower provision because it chose to 
15

shield the dower interest in all real estate from the estate’s 

creditors. 

Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate of Boesen, 805 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Iowa 2011) 

(citations omitted). Similarly, we conclude the “Iowa legislature was 

aware of, but declined to follow,” the UMDA and its provision allowing 

bifurcated divorces. Id. 

Eight states adopted the UMDA. James Burd, Note, Splitting the 

Marriage in More Ways than One: Bifurcation of Divorce Proceedings, 30 J. 

Fam. L. 903, 905 (1992). Six of those states adopted the provision 

allowing bifurcated divorces. Id. at n.12 (noting that Arizona, Colorado, 

Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington 

adopted the Act, but Arizona and Kentucky deleted the provision 

permitting bifurcation). The Colorado statute varies from the language of 

the UMDA, but expressly allows bifurcated divorces, stating:

[The] disposition of property may be deferred by the court 

until after the entry of the decree of dissolution of marriage 

or the decree of legal separation upon a finding that a 

deferral is in the best interests of the parties. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10-106(1)(b) (West, Westlaw current through 

various chapters 1st Reg. Sess. 2015). 

Other state statutes expressly allow bifurcated divorces. See, e.g., 

Cal. Fam. Code § 2337(a) (West, Westlaw current through ch. 2 of 2015

Reg. Sess.) (“In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court, upon 

noticed motion, may sever and grant an early and separate trial on the 

issue of the dissolution of the status of the marriage apart from other 

issues.”); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/401(b) (West, Westlaw current 

through P.A. 99-3 of 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“The court may enter a judgment 

for dissolution that reserves any of these issues either upon (i) agreement 

of the parties, or (ii) motion of either party and a finding by the court that 
16

appropriate circumstances exist.”); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-15-2-14 (West, 

Westlaw current through 2015 Reg. Sess. with effective dates through 

April 29, 2015) (“The court may bifurcate the issues in an action for 

dissolution of marriage . . . to provide for a summary disposition of 

uncontested issues and a final hearing of contested issues.”). Similarly, 

New Jersey allows bifurcated proceedings under limited circumstances 

through a court rule: 

Bifurcation of trial of the divorce, dissolution of civil union, 

termination of domestic partnership or custody dispute from 

trial of disputes over support and equitable distribution shall 

be permitted only with the approval of the Family Presiding 

Judge, which approval shall be granted only in extraordinary 

circumstances and for good cause shown. 

N.J. Ct. R. § 5:7-8 (West, Westlaw current with amendments through 

April 15, 2015). We presume the Iowa legislature, if it chose to allow 

bifurcated divorces, would have enacted a provision expressly allowing 

the procedure, as did these sister states. 

4. Precedent. Other courts have interpreted statutory language

like Iowa’s to prohibit bifurcated divorces. Section 598.21(1) contains 

operative language similar to the statute in the District of Columbia. 

Upon entry of a final decree of legal separation, annulment, 

or divorce, or upon the termination of a domestic partnership 

pursuant to § 32-702(d) and the filing of a petition for relief 

available under this section, in the absence of a valid 

antenuptial or postnuptial agreement resolving all issues 

related to the property of the parties, the court shall: 

(a) assign to each party his or her sole and separate property 

. . . . 

D.C. Code § 16-910 (Westlaw current through May 7, 2015) (emphasis 

added). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals interpreted that 

provision to require a division of property contemporaneous with the 

marital dissolution. Davis v. Davis, 957 A.2d 576, 581 (2008). In that 
17

case, the husband lived in the forum, but the wife lived elsewhere. Id. at 

578–79. He filed a dissolution proceeding without an adjudication of 

property rights. Id. His wife moved to dismiss his petition on several 

grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction and 

forum non conveniens. Id. The trial court dismissed the action, 

reasoning that a divorce without an adjudication of property rights was 

not allowed under section 16-910. Id. at 579. The D.C. Court of Appeals 

agreed,1 stating: 

[I]n a divorce proceeding where the Superior Court has 

personal jurisdiction over both parties, the court must in the

same proceeding value and distribute marital property 

located in the District and determine and adjudicate rights 

in marital property located elsewhere. 

Id. at 581 (emphasis added) (citing Argent v. Argent, 396 F.2d 695, 698 

(D.C. Cir. 1968)). As noted in Domestic Relations Manual for the District 

of Columbia, 

the text of the statute appears to prohibit the court from 

bifurcating the dissolution judgment from the equitable 

distribution portion of the trial and granting a divorce or 

legal separation while reserving equitable distribution issues 

to be determined at a later date. 

Diane M. Brenneman & Linda J. Ravdin, Domestic Relations Manual for 

the District of Columbia § 4.03[1]; accord Davis, 957 A.2d at 580 n.7. 

We reach the same conclusion under Iowa Code section 598.21(1). 

Susan’s estate cites no decision from any jurisdiction allowing a 

bifurcated divorce under a statute comparable to section 598.21(1), and 

we found no such decision in our independent research. 

1The court of appeals vacated and remanded the case on other grounds, 

including a failure by the trial court to determine whether personal jurisdiction existed. 

Davis, 957 A.2d at 581, 584. 

 
18

Susan did not raise the court’s inherent authority in her motion to 

bifurcate, nor did the district court purport to rely on inherent authority 

in its bifurcation ruling. Moreover, Susan’s estate does not rely on 

inherent authority on appeal as an alternative basis to affirm the 

bifurcation ruling. Accordingly, we do not reach that issue. See

Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Iowa 2001). 

5. Policy considerations. Courts in other jurisdictions have 

addressed the policy considerations that disfavor bifurcating the 

dissolution decree from the property division. The Illinois Supreme 

Court noted deciding those matters contemporaneously

encourages the court to decide all matters incident to the 

dissolution in a single judgment, to the fullest extent of its 

authority, in order to achieve finality, promote judicial 

economy, and avoid multiple litigations and complications 

which can result from the entry of partial judgments, 

particularly judgments which dissolve the marriage but 

reserve remaining issues for later determination.

In re Marriage of Cohn, 443 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ill. 1982) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also In re Marriage of Mathis, 986 N.E.2d 

1139, 1149 (Ill. 2012) (same). Conversely, a bifurcated divorce raises a 

multitude of problems:

Further, irrespective of whether the grounds are 

contested, entry of a bifurcated judgment of dissolution 

presents many potential complications. For example, . . . the 

court could likely be required to adjudicate marital property 

rights that have become entangled with the supervening 

rights of third parties, including subsequent spouses. 

Additionally, entering a judgment of dissolution prior to 

property disposition would complicate, rather than simplify, 

matters with respect to the rights of a surviving spouse in 

the event of an intervening death. Other complications that 

can ensue if a judgment of dissolution is not deferred until 

disposition of the other matters include the loss of ability to 

file joint income tax returns, the loss of medical insurance 

coverage, and the loss of marital-property treatment for 

property accumulated during the intervening period between 
19

the entry of the judgment of dissolution and the final 

disposition of property rights. 

In re Marriage of Cohn, 443 N.E.2d at 545. Therefore, states that allow 

bifurcation by statute have restricted the procedure:

The appropriate circumstances for bifurcating a 

judgment, as referenced in section 401(b) and enumerated in 

Cohn, are narrowly drawn. If trial courts were allowed 

unfettered discretion to bifurcate a judgment of dissolution, 

the inequities and complications envisioned by this court in 

Cohn would result. 

In re Marriage of Bogan, 506 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ill. 1986). See 27A 

C.J.S. Divorce § 327, at 464–66 (2005) (collecting cases and reviewing 

factors for bifurcation). The Florida Supreme Court cautioned:

Although we approve the granting of this final 

dissolution with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently 

determine property, custody, and support issues, we believe 

trial judges should avoid this split procedure. The general

law and our procedural rules at both the trial and appellate 

levels are designed for one final judgment and one appeal. 

Splitting the process can cause multiple legal and procedural 

problems which result in delay and additional expense to the 

litigants. This split procedure should be used only when it is 

clearly necessary for the best interests of the parties or their 

children. The convenience of one of the parties for an early 

remarriage does not justify its use. 

Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1980). Another 

court elaborated as follows:

[T]here are many disadvantages related to bifurcation. If the 

cases are not settled by the parties, then oftentimes two 

hearings are necessary, thus burdening an already 

overcrowded court calendar. Also, despite the fact that 

divorce is achieved rapidly, there is still a significant delay in 

the resolution of economic issues, thus having a dilatory 

effect on the parties’ efforts to reshape their lives. From a 

tax standpoint, bifurcation prevents the parties from filing a 

joint federal income tax return and therefore a favorable tax 

rate is unavailable. 

Another problem which arises where a case has been 

bifurcated involves the impact that the death of one of the 

parties, subsequent to the issuance of the divorce decree but 
20

prior to a determination of the economic issues, has on the 

surviving spouse’s right to equitable distribution. . . . 

Still another issue which could arise relates to the 

effect that a bifurcated divorce has on a divorced spouse’s 

right to receive the proceeds of a life insurance policy in 

which that spouse was named a beneficiary. . . .

Undoubtedly, to this list of detriments associated with 

bifurcation, numerous other possibilities can be added. 

Wolk v. Wolk, 464 A.2d 1359, 1361–62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (footnotes 

omitted) (citations omitted). 

A commentator summarized the advantages and disadvantages of 

bifurcated divorces as follows:

Where available, bifurcation may be desirable due to 

the greater likelihood of preserving a court’s jurisdiction over 

matters incidental to divorce. As with most public policy 

discussions involving the judicial system, there are trade-offs 

that may be equally undesirable for the same reasons. 

Bifurcating trials may allow parties to remarry at an 

earlier date, provide certain tax advantages (or 

disadvantages), and give parties the psychological benefit of 

putting the marriage to an end as soon as possible. Without 

bifurcation, and where complex property settlement or 

support issues are concerned, parties may be held in a state 

of indefinite limbo. Also, bifurcation may prevent a party in 

a superior financial position from leveraging the weaker 

party out of an equitable settlement agreement with the 

threat of a long, drawn out divorce trial. 

However, some commentators believe that the 

disadvantages of bifurcation greatly outweigh the 

advantages. Many times the bifurcation will have the 

opposite of the desired effect, actually increasing the length 

of the trial—firstly, because the proceeding will necessarily 

require two separate trials, and secondly, without the 

dissolution incentive, property issues may be disputed 

almost endlessly. Furthermore, subsequent marriages will 

be plagued with unforeseen liabilities and the emotional 

turmoil of continuing disputes between prior spouses, 

nullifying the intended advantages of bifurcation. 

In bifurcated proceedings, the period between the 

original granting of dissolution and the rendering of the final 

decree is a breeding ground for conflict. Questions arise as 

to when certain rights and obligations associated with 

marriage are severed and these questions lead to increased 

disputes, specifically in areas such as insurance coverage, 

tax status and liability, and bankruptcy. And there is no 
21

doubt that bifurcation leads to jurisdictional peculiarities 

and an array of unpredictable results when a party dies 

during the course of the proceeding. 

Brandon Carney, Comment, Till Death Do Us Part—And Then Some: The 

Effect of a Party’s Death During Dissolution, 25 J. Am. Acad. Matrim.

Law. 153, 165–67 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 

We share the policy concerns raised by our sister state courts and 

commentators. Ronald’s resistance to Susan’s motion to bifurcate 

argued he would be prejudiced by the bifurcation, including loss of the 

right to file a joint tax return for 2013; possible loss of health and life 

insurance coverage; disinheritance; and loss of his right to claim his 

spousal elective share of Susan’s estate in probate under Iowa Code 

section 633.238 (allowing one-third share), which would include the farm 

she inherited not otherwise subject to equitable division under section 

598.21(5) (“The court shall divide all property, except inherited property

. . . .”). Other cases may present myriad additional complications arising 

from death, remarriage, or mere passage of time between the decree of 

dissolution and final division of property. Who gains and who loses 

when property plummets or surges in value between the marital 

dissolution and the subsequent order dividing the property? Marital 

property typically is valued as of the date of the trial. See In re Marriage 

of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007) (“The assets should then be 

given their value as of the date of trial.”). Courts are divided in selecting 

the valuation date in bifurcated divorces. The Illinois Supreme Court 

recently adjudicated that question in In re Marriage of Mathis. After 

reviewing precedent and competing policy considerations, a narrow 

majority held marital property is to be valued as of the date of the marital 

dissolution. In re Marriage of Mathis, 986 N.E.2d at 1148. Three justices 

dissented, concluding property should be valued as of the date of the 
22

division of property. Id. at 1163 (Garman, J., dissenting). If we open the 

door to bifurcated divorces, we would have to answer that question 

among many others. 

Some cases will present an urgent request for an expedited divorce. 

Here, Susan wanted to die unmarried, and her death was imminent. 

Others may be eager to remarry. The new spouse’s involvement may 

complicate the property division and other issues. To allow a bifurcated 

divorce would remove the incentive to expeditiously resolve all issues and 

would result in motion practice to determine whether bifurcation is 

appropriate for a particular case. Bifurcation would thereby require at 

least one or more additional court hearings and prolong the case. The 

cure (bifurcation) may be worse than the disease (delays in resolving 

dissolutions). Our district courts already have discretion to allow an 

expedited hearing to decide the final property division and marital 

dissolution contemporaneously. A party who would be unfairly 

prejudiced by a delay in ending a marriage, or who is held hostage by a 

recalcitrant spouse, can seek an expedited final hearing without a 

bifurcation. 

The Iowa legislature is the appropriate body to make the policy 

judgments on whether to allow bifurcated divorces and, if so, under what 

conditions. We will not adopt the procedure through the guise of 

statutory interpretation. See Kakinami v. Kakinami, 260 P.3d 1126, 

1132–33 (Haw. 2011) (declining to revise standard prescribed by 

legislature for allowing bifurcated divorces). We agree with the Hawai‘i 

Supreme Court that “[i]t is not the role of [the] court to alter a statutory 

requirement in order to effect policy considerations that are vested in the 

legislature.” Id. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, 
23

“[p]olicy arguments to amend the statute should be directed to the 

legislature.” In re Estate of Whalen, 827 N.W.2d 184, 194 (Iowa 2013). 

IV. Disposition.

For these reasons, we hold the bifurcated decree of dissolution is a 

reviewable final order that erroneously failed to divide the marital 

property. That error requires reversal and a remand for an order 

dismissing this dissolution action that abated upon Susan’s death. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT DECREE REVERSED; PROCEEDINGS ABATED; CASE 

REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL. 

All justices concur except Zager, J., Cady, C.J. and Hecht, J., who 

concur specially. 
24

#13–2044, In re Marriage of Thatcher

ZAGER, Justice (concurring specially).

Although I agree with the result reached by the majority in this 

case, I write separately because in my opinion the court has the inherent 

authority to bifurcate the entry of a decree of dissolution of marriage with 

the entry of a supplemental order concerning the division of property. 

Further, while I agree with the majority that the legislature may have the 

ability to limit the court’s authority to bifurcate these proceedings, the 

legislature has not done so here. Unlike the majority, I do not read Iowa 

Code section 598.21(1) (2013) to require the court to divide marital 

property contemporaneously with the entry of the dissolution decree. 

Ultimately, however, I believe the district court abused its discretion by 

granting the motion to bifurcate dissolution in this case. Accordingly, 

although on different grounds, I agree that the order granting motion to 

bifurcate should be reversed and the case remanded for an order 

dismissing this dissolution action that abated upon Susan’s death.

As we have previously recognized:

It is fundamental to our system of government that the 

authority for courts to act is conferred by the constitution or 

by statute. Yet, it is equally fundamental that in addition to 

these delegated powers, courts also possess broad powers to 

do whatever is reasonably necessary to discharge their 

traditional responsibilities. This type of judicial authority is 

known as inherent power, and it is derived from the 

separation of powers between the three branches of 

government, as well as limited by it.

State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). 

Courts possess this inherent authority in a number of areas. See, e.g.,

State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 750 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2008) (“Of course, 

when a court is acting within its jurisdiction it always has the inherent 

authority to do what is reasonably necessary for the administration of 
25

justice in a case before the court.”); In re K.N., 625 N.W.2d 731, 734 

(Iowa 2001) (acknowledging district courts’ “authority to ensure the 

orderly, efficient, and fair administration of justice”); Johnson v. Miller, 

270 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Iowa 1978) (recognizing district courts’ authority 

“to adopt rules for the management of cases on their dockets”); Iowa Civil 

Liberties Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 569–70 (Iowa 1976) 

(recognizing district courts’ “inherent common-law power” to promulgate 

a local rule of criminal procedure); Peters v. Peters, 249 Iowa 110, 114, 

86 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1957) (“In Iowa separate maintenance has not been 

a statutory remedy, and authority to grant that relief has been based 

upon the inherent power of courts of equity.”); Hardenbergh v. Both, 247 

Iowa 153, 159, 73 N.W.2d 103, 106 (1955) (“[The] enforcement [of 

discovery] was an original and inherent power of a court of equity.”); 

Brooks v. Paulson, 227 Iowa 1359, 1361, 291 N.W. 144, 145 (1940) (“It is 

so well recognized that a court of Equity has the inherent power, in its 

discretion, to consolidate causes pending therein for the purpose of 

avoiding a multiplicity of suits, that citations are hardly necessary.”); In 

re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing 

inherent authority of trial judge to impose reasonable time limits on 

trial).

In my opinion, and as other courts have concluded, this inherent 

authority includes the authority to bifurcate dissolution and property 

division proceedings. See, e.g., Kronberg v. Kronberg, 623 A.2d 806, 813 

(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (“ ‘[E]ven without the express 

authorization of the Legislature, New Jersey courts may decide whether it 

is in the best interests of the parties to permit a separate trial of ancillary 

matters after a divorce has been granted.’ ” (quoting Leventhal v. 

Leventhal, 571 A.2d 348, 351 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989))); Sharp v. 
26

Sharp, 351 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing bifurcation 

after concluding statute did not limit court’s authority to bifurcate); 

Rogers v. Damron, 479 S.E.2d 540, 543 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (“When it 

enacted Code § 20–109.1, the General Assembly was presumably aware 

of a divorce court’s inherent equity power to adjudicate separately the 

issues associated with a divorce.”). This conclusion is further buttressed 

by the fact that we have allowed bifurcated procedures to determine 

other issues in dissolution proceedings. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 

Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2008) (allowing bifurcated trial to 

determine validity of prenuptial agreement before subsequent trial on 

property division and remaining issues); In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 

N.W.2d 609, 612–13 (Iowa 1977) (allowing bifurcated trial to determine 

whether common law marriage existed).

I recognize that “some inherent powers may be controlled or 

restricted by statute.” Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d at 889. However, “[a] statute 

will not abrogate an inherent power of the court absent clear legislative 

intent.” Id. (emphasis added). Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude the 

legislature has enacted a statute that clearly demonstrates its intent to 

limit the inherent authority of the court to bifurcate dissolution 

proceedings.

The statute itself tends to support the conclusion that bifurcation 

can occur. In relevant part, Iowa Code section 598.17 provides:

A decree dissolving the marriage may be entered when 

the court is satisfied from the evidence presented that there 

has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the 

extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been 

destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that 

the marriage can be preserved.

Nothing in this section requires the court to address all issues involved 

in dissolution proceedings within the decree. Nor is there clear language 
27

in this section that prohibits the court from entering a decree dissolving 

the marriage between the parties and reserving resolution of the 

remaining issues for a later date. See Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d at 889. In 

fact, it is not unusual for the parties to request such a bifurcation at the 

conclusion of the trial. Given trial judges’ busy schedules, everyone 

understands that it could take the court months to resolve all of the 

issues. See James Burd, Note, Splitting the Marriage in More Ways than 

One: Bifurcation of Divorce Proceedings, 30 J. Fam. L. 903, 909 (1992) 

[hereinafter Burd] (noting that “the time required to dissolve a marriage 

is substantially less than the time consumed by the disposition of 

marital property”). There are numerous circumstances in which the 

immediate entry of a decree dissolving the marriage may be necessary. 

See id. (identifying advantages of bifurcation); accord Brandon Carney, 

Comment, Till Death Do Us Part—and Then Some: The Effect of a Party’s 

Death During Dissolution, 25 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 153, 165–66 

(2012) (same). Trial judges should not be precluded from granting such 

requests, and the statute does not clearly prohibit it.

The majority also cites Iowa Code section 598.21(1) in support of 

its perceived restriction on the court’s ability to bifurcate these 

proceedings. This section provides:

Upon every judgment of annulment, dissolution, or separate 

maintenance, the court shall divide the property of the 

parties and transfer the title of the property accordingly, 

including ordering the parties to execute a quitclaim deed or 

ordering a change of title for tax purposes and delivery of the 

deed or change of title to the county recorder of the county in 

which each parcel of real estate is located.

Iowa Code § 598.21(1). From the plain language of the statute, the 

majority concludes two things. First, it concludes the statutory language 

“shall” requires the court to divide the marital property as part of the 
28

dissolution proceedings. I agree with this proposition. Second, it 

concludes the statutory language “upon every judgment” requires that 

the court contemporaneously enter its property division order when it 

enters the dissolution decree; it emphasizes the statutory word “upon,” 

asserting this language imposes a temporal limitation. For several 

reasons, I disagree with this latter conclusion.

As the majority notes, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

contains several temporal definitions for “upon,” including “immediately 

following on” and “at the time of.” Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary 2517–18 (unabr. ed. 2002). But this is not the only definition 

of “upon,” that can also mean “thereafter” or be used to represent “an 

action or condition that is beginning.” Id. In my opinion, the plain 

language of this section simply means that as a condition of every 

dissolution, the court must divide the marital property. It could be 

immediately following the entry of the decree of dissolution or sometime 

thereafter. The entry of a decree of dissolution triggers the court’s 

obligation to divide the marital property. But nowhere does the statute 

clearly establish that division of the marital property is a condition 

precedent to dissolving the marriage. See Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d at 889. In 

my opinion, the majority’s reliance on the word “upon” as demonstrating 

a clear legislative intent against bifurcation is extremely weak.

Perhaps because of its shaky textual analysis, the majority looks to 

other sources to support its conclusion. First, it turns to Iowa Code 

section 598.21(5) which, to quote the majority, “directs the court to 

consider in equitably dividing the property a number of factors that 

contemplate both parties are living when the final decree divides the 

marital property.” From this, the majority concludes the structure of 

section 598.21 clearly contemplates an equitable division of property no 
29

later than the decree of dissolution. But the majority selectively omits 

portions of section 598.21(5) that do not necessarily contemplate living 

parties. Other considerations a court is to consider in equitably 

distributing marital property include:

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The property brought to the marriage by each 

party.

c. The contribution of each party to the marriage, 

giving appropriate economic value to each party’s 

contribution in homemaking and child care services.

. . . .

e. The contribution by one party to the education, 

training, or increased earning power of the other.

. . . .

k. Any written agreement made by the parties 

concerning property distribution.

l. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.

m. Other factors the court may determine to be 

relevant in an individual case.

Iowa Code § 598.21(5). Death of a party would not significantly alter the 

length of the marriage (given that the parties are seeking to dissolve it); 

affect the property brought to the marriage by each party; change the 

contribution of each party to the marriage; modify the contribution by 

one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the 

other; or rewrite any written agreement made by the parties concerning 

property distribution or the provisions of any antenuptial agreement. 

Moreover, this is a nonexhaustive list. See id. § 598.21(5)(m). I do not 

see how the fact that some of the considerations contained in this 

nonexhaustive list contemplate living parties, while others do not, cuts in 

either direction with respect to the legislature’s intent regarding the 

authority of the court to bifurcate these proceedings. 
30

Next, the majority looks to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 

(UMDA), which expressly permits bifurcation of the dissolution decree 

and property division. See Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 302(a)(4) 

(amended 1973), 9 U.L.A. 200–01 (1998). It assumes the legislature was 

aware of the UMDA’s bifurcation provision, but expressly declined to 

follow it. In so concluding, the majority invokes the following principle: 

“We can determine legislative intent from selective enactment or 

divergence from uniform acts.” Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate of Boesen, 

805 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Iowa 2011). Notably, however, it does not apply 

this principle.

This principle would apply if the legislature had adopted some of 

the provisions of the UMDA but not others. In that case, it might be 

reasonable to infer the legislature considered the UMDA but declined to 

follow some of its provisions. For example, we have applied this principle 

in interpreting the Iowa Probate Code because “[t]he Iowa legislature has 

selectively incorporated several provisions from the [Uniform Probate 

Code (UPC)] into our state’s probate code.” Id. at 813. Because of this, 

in Boesen we concluded the fact that the legislature never adopted the 

UPC’s dower provision evidenced its intent that we not interpret Iowa’s 

dower provision consistent with the UPC. Id. at 813–14. But here, the 

majority cannot point to any provision of the UMDA that the Iowa 

legislature has adopted. In my opinion, absent some objective indication 

the legislature actually considered the UMDA and expressly accepted 

some provisions and rejected others, the mere fact that a uniform act 

exists and addresses a particular issue proves nothing about the 

legislature’s intent on the issue.
31

The majority also looks to the statutes of other states, some of 

which expressly allow for bifurcated divorces. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code 

§ 2337(a) (West, Westlaw current through ch. 2 of 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“In a 

proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court, upon noticed motion, 

may sever and grant an early and separate trial on the issue of the 

dissolution of the status of the marriage apart from other issues.”); 750 

Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/401(b) (West, Westlaw current through P.A. 99-3 of 

2015 Reg. Sess.) (“The court may enter a judgment for dissolution that 

reserves any of these issues either upon (i) agreement of the parties, or 

(ii) motion of either party and a finding by the court that appropriate 

circumstances exist.”); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-15-2-14(a) (West, Westlaw 

current through 2015 Reg. Sess. with effective dates through April 29, 2015) 

(“The court may bifurcate the issues in an action for dissolution of 

marriage . . . to provide for a summary disposition of uncontested issues 

and a final hearing of contested issues.”). The majority then assumes the 

legislature was aware of these statutory provisions allowing for bifurcated 

divorces, carefully debated the pros and cons, and consciously declined 

to adopt similar legislation. However, some state legislatures have 

prohibited bifurcation. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a) (West, 

Westlaw current through April 8, 2015 of Reg. Sess.) (“At the time a divorce 

decree is entered . . . [a]ll marital property shall be distributed . . . .”); 

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.050(1) (West, Westlaw current with

legislation effective through May 11, 2015) (“In entering a decree of 

dissolution of marriage or domestic partnership . . . the court shall . . . 

make provision for the disposition of property and liabilities of the parties 

. . . .”). Why not impute that knowledge to the legislature, assume it was 

aware of statutory provisions prohibiting bifurcated divorces, and 
32

conclude it consciously declined to adopt a similar one? The truth is, the 

legislature has done neither.

The majority also cites a number of policy considerations that 

disfavor bifurcation in support of its conclusion that bifurcated divorces 

are prohibited under Iowa law. It then concludes the legislature is the 

appropriate body to make policy judgments on whether to allow 

bifurcated divorces and, if so, under what conditions. This analysis is 

backwards. Absent a clear legislative enactment to the contrary, the 

court has the inherent authority to bifurcate dissolution and property 

division proceedings. Clearly, these policy considerations might be 

relevant in assessing whether a court abused its discretion in deciding 

whether to bifurcate these proceedings in a particular case. However, 

they should not implicitly guide this court’s statutory construction. We 

should not read this prohibition into the statute under the guise of 

construction. See Clarke Cnty. Reservoir Comm’n v. Abbott, 862 N.W.2d 

166, ___ (Iowa 2015) (“We will not write such a provision into the statute 

in the guise of interpretation.”); Doe v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 786

N.W.2d 853, 858 (Iowa 2010) (“We may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise 

change the meaning of a statute under the guise of construction.”); see 

also In re Det. of Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 2013) (“ ‘When a 

statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search 

for meaning beyond its express terms.’ ” (quoting State v. Chang, 587 

N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998))); McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 

2010) (“We do not search for legislative intent beyond the express 

language of a statute when that language is plain and the meaning is 

clear.”).

Moreover, it is significant that Iowa is a no-fault divorce state. See 

In re Marriage of Dawson, 214 N.W.2d 131, 132 (Iowa 1974) (recognizing 
33

that Iowa is a no-fault divorce state). Thus, the legislature has generally 

endorsed the view that preserving unworkable marriages is disfavored 

and correspondingly that it prefers the swift resolution of such matters. 

See In re Marriage of Cooper, 769 N.W.2d 582, 587 (Iowa 2009) (“Indeed, 

our no-fault divorce law is designed to limit acrimonious proceedings.”). 

In certain circumstances, bifurcation can further this objective. 

Specifically, bifurcation can “accelerate[] the dissolution of a marriage 

found to be irretrievably broken since the time required to dissolve a 

marriage is substantially less than the time consumed by the disposition 

of marital property.” See Burd, 30 J. Fam. L. at 909. This can allow the 

parties to “begin restructuring their lives,” and can “encourage[] parties 

to settle between the marriage dissolution and the time the property is 

distributed by the court.” Id.; accord Wolk v. Wolk, 464 A.2d 1359, 

1360–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). This counsels against reading Iowa Code 

section 598.21(1) as uniformly prohibiting bifurcation. See Burd, 30 J. 

Fam. L. at 905 (“No-fault divorce laws provide the strongest policy 

arguments for bifurcation.”).

Finally, I fear the majority’s broad-sweeping rule will preclude

bifurcation under all circumstances. This, even when both parties 

mutually agree to bifurcation, the court is presented with substantial 

evidence supporting the need for bifurcation, and after careful 

consideration, the court is convinced bifurcation is necessary to do 

justice between the parties. In this case, one party moved to bifurcate 

the proceedings and the other party objected. However, if both parties 

had consented to the bifurcation, I see no impediment to the court 

allowing a bifurcated procedure. As noted above, bifurcation can, under 

certain circumstances, be beneficial. If both parties agree to the 
34

procedure, I see no statutory impediment depriving the court of this 

authority and the litigants of the potential benefits.2

Courts have the inherent authority to bifurcate the entry of a 

dissolution decree with division of property proceedings absent some 

clear legislative enactment to the contrary. Unlike the majority, I cannot 

conclude Iowa Code section 598.21(1) clearly prohibits the court from 

bifurcating the dissolution decree and property division proceedings. 

Notwithstanding, “courts can only exercise inherent authority out of 

genuine necessity, not merely theoretical circumstances.” Hoegh, 632 

N.W.2d at 890. Ordinarily, we review a district court’s decision to 

bifurcate issues for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Helmers, 753 

N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 2008); State v. Jenkins, 412 N.W.2d 174, 176 

(Iowa 1987); Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 870 (Iowa 1983). “ ‘A 

court abuses its discretion when it exercised its discretion on “grounds 

or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” ’ ” 

Helmers, 753 N.W.2d at 567 (quoting In re J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d 748, 751 

(Iowa 2005)). Under the facts of this case, I would find that the district 

court abused its discretion in granting the motion to bifurcate 

dissolution.

Susan’s motion to bifurcate dissolution was resisted by Ronald. 

Although there was a hearing on the motion, it was unreported. See 

Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d at 890 (noting that courts should develop a record to 

2In some jurisdictions, even if a statute or caselaw generally prohibits 

bifurcation, courts permit split proceedings upon the mutual request of the parties. 

See, e.g., Forrest v. Forrest, 649 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Ark. 1983) (“[W]e see no reason why, 

if the parties so desire and specifically agree, that the trial court cannot postpone the 

division of the property until a later date.”). But see, e.g., Yeo v. Yeo, 543 N.W.2d 62, 64 

(Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding parties’ joint stipulation to bifurcated procedure was of 

no consequence because of court rule prohibiting bifurcation).

 
35

support exercise of inherent powers); Webster Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. 

Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 876–77 (Iowa 1978) (same). The district 

court’s order granting motion to bifurcate reveals that it heard no 

testimony concerning the issue; instead, it relied on the statements of 

counsel, Susan’s motion, as supplemented, and Ronald’s resistance. The 

district court summarily granted the motion one day after the hearing 

without explanation other than “for the reasons stated in [Susan’s] 

Motion.” These reasons included: (1) that a trial date had not been set, 

and Susan had very little time left such that she was unlikely to “survive 

her condition for a trial in [the] matter”; and (2) that “she would like to 

have [the] marriage dissolved prior to her passing.” The decision whether 

to bifurcate cannot be made in such a summary fashion. This was not a 

joint request by the parties to bifurcate. As the parties’ briefs make 

abundantly clear, the substantial rights of each of the parties were 

affected by the decision. The decision also had dramatic economic 

consequences for the parties. Compare Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (requiring 

the court to divide marital property equitably between the parties), with 

id. § 633.236 (establishing right to elective share for surviving spouse). 

The entry of a decree dissolving a marriage leads to direct and immediate 

statutory consequences. As noted earlier in this opinion, this is not a 

circumstance where bifurcation would further the interests of justice 

between the parties. In my opinion, there was insufficient support for 

the district court’s exercise of its discretion on the issue of bifurcation. 

The lack of a sufficient record or explanation demonstrating that the 

district court thoughtfully exercised its discretion leads me to conclude it 

abused its discretion in granting the motion to bifurcate dissolution.

For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the district court’s 

order granting motion to bifurcate should be reversed and the case 
36

remanded for an order dismissing this dissolution action that abated 

upon Susan’s death. However, I cannot sign on to the majority’s new, 

broad-sweeping interpretation of the Iowa Code that prohibits the court 

from bifurcating dissolution proceedings in all cases.

Cady, C.J. and Hecht, J., join this special concurrence.