were material to the disposition of the motion and included specific 

citations to the complaint and to exhibits attached to the motion. NRCP 

56(c). Although appellant opposed the summary judgment motion, as 

explained below, the district court properly concluded that she failed to 

demonstrate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. NRCP 56(e). 

First, although appellant alleged that respondent qualified as 

a debt collector under the Federal Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA) 

15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012) et seq., and NRS 649.370 (stating that violations of 

FDCPA are violations of Nevada law and give rise to independent state 

claims), the FDCPA excludes the servicing of mortgages. See 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(6); Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Additionally, respondent demonstrated that it was the successor holder of 

the promissory note based on its possession of the endorsed-in-blank note 

and its agreements with the beneficiary of the deed of trust. See Edelstein 

v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 128 Nev. , 286 P.3d 249, 258, 260 (2012). 

Thus, as the note holder, respondent was collecting its own debt and 

servicing its own mortgage note, and the district court properly entered 

summary judgment. See Perry, 756 F.2d at 1208 (holding that the FDCPA 

defines a debt collector as a party collecting debts owed to another, which 

does not include a party attempting to collect an obligation it owns). 

Second, although appellant asserted that respondent engaged 

in unfair lending practices, as the successor holder of the note, respondent 

did not make a loan to appellant, and could not be held liable for unfair 

lending practices under NRS 598D.100(1)(b). Thus, the district court 

properly entered summary judgment on that cause of action. 

Third, appellant's claim for quiet title was properly resolved 

on summary judgment, as severance of the note and deed of trust is not 

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fatal to the security interest created by the deed of trust. See Edelstein, 

128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 260 (permitting severance and independent 

transfer of deeds of trusts and notes without impairing the ultimate 

enforceability of the instruments after reunification). 

Finally, appellant's cause of action seeking a declaration that 

the notice of default was null and void was properly rejected as a matter of 

law. As noted in the order resolving appellant's related appeal arising 

from a district court order dismissing a petition for judicial review in a 

foreclosure mediation matter, respondent rescinded the underlying notice 

of default. See Brunson v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Docket No. 56899 

(Order Vacating Judgment and Remanding, November 15, 2011). Thus, 

this cause of action is moot and judgment against appellant was therefore 

proper. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. 

It is so ORDERED.' 

Hardesty 

PC*4)1 

Parraguirre 

"We have considered appellant's other arguments on appeal and 

conclude that they lack merit, and thus, do not warrant reversal. 

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cc: Hon. Steven P. Elliott, District Judge 

Terry J. Thomas 

Houser & Allison, APC 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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