J-S03026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NORMAN T. STEWARD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1634 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0002043-2006

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MAY 10, 2023

Normand Steward (Appellant) appeals pro se from the June 9, 2022,

order entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his 

serial petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),1 without 

a hearing. Appellant seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole, imposed on November 15, 

2007, following his jury convictions of second-degree murder, robbery, and 

conspiracy to commit robbery.2 On appeal, Appellant raises several claims 

regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. 

Because we conclude Appellant’s PCRA petition was filed in an untimely 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546. 

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 903(a)(1) respectively.
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manner and he failed to plead and prove that any of the exceptions to the 

PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar applied, we affirm. 

The pertinent facts and prolonged procedural history are as follows. 

Appellant’s convictions stem from the shooting death of Michelle Vasquez on 

July 31, 2005, at the victim’s apartment building in Allentown, Pennsylvania. 

On October 24, 2007, a jury found Appellant guilty of the above-stated

crimes.

3

 See Verdict Slip, 10/25/07, at 1-2 (unpaginated). On November 15, 

2007, the trial court imposed the following concurrent sentences: (1) life 

imprisonment with parole for the murder conviction; (2) six to 12 years for 

the robbery offense; and (3) five to ten years for conspiracy conviction. 

Appellant filed timely post sentence-motions,4 which the trial court denied on 

April 14, 2008. Appellant filed a direct appeal, and a panel of this Court 

affirmed his judgment of sentence on August 13, 2010. See Commonwealth 

v. Steward, 1293 EDA 2008 (Pa. Super. Aug. 13, 2010). 

On May 2, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, requesting 

permission to file a petition for allowance of appeal (PAA) nunc pro tunc with 

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3 The jury found Appellant not guilty of criminal conspiracy to commit murder. 

See Verdict Slip at 2 (unpaginated).

4

In his post-sentence motions, Appellant raised, inter alia, claims that there 

was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, the verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court improperly admitted certain 

testimony and evidence. See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motions, 11/26/07, 

at 1-6. 
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Counsel was appointed, who then filed an 

amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court granted Appellant relief and 

permitted him to file a PAA nunc pro tunc with the Supreme Court. See Order, 

3/26/12. On April 25, 2012, Appellant filed a PAA seeking discretionary review 

with the Supreme Court.5 See Trial Ct. Op., 9/9/22, at 2. The Supreme Court 

denied the petition on March 1, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Steward, 

330 MAL 2012 (Pa. March 1, 2013).

The case went dormant for several years until August 27, 2019, when 

Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition.6 On September 10, 2019, the PCRA

court treated the filing as a second PCRA petition and issued notice, pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its intent to dismiss the petition without conducting an 

evidentiary hearing. Appellant filed a pro se response. On October 9, 2019, 

the court denied his petition. See Order, 10/9/19, at 1-2 (unpaginated). 

Appellant subsequently appealed. 

While this appeal was pending, Appellant filed a “Petition of Newly 

D[i]scovered Evidence.” See Petition of Newly Discovered Evidence, 3/24/20, 

at 1-4. In the petition, Appellant alleged that the Commonwealth failed to 

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5 We note that this petition was not included in the certified record. 

6 Appellant made evidentiary claims regarding the testimony of witnesses that 

were presented at trial. See Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 8/27/19, at 4. He 

insisted that he was eligible for relief because he was mentally incompetent 

and had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital. Id. at 3.
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provide him with evidence concerning the chain of custody that would have 

helped his defense at trial, and the Commonwealth improperly withheld that 

information. See id. at 1-2. The PCRA court treated this document as a PCRA 

petition and denied it as “untimely.” Order, 4/7/20, at 1 n.1 (unpaginated). 

Additionally, the court stated that “even if the [c]ourt was inclined to respond 

to this [p]etition, this [c]ourt’s denial of [Appellant 2019 PCRA petition], which 

raises substantially the same issues, is currently under review by” this Court, 

and therefore, it did “not have jurisdiction to consider” the petition. Id.

In May 2020, Appellant filed a response7to the PCRA court’s April 7, 

2020, order, which the court again treated as a PCRA petition and dismissed 

on May 6, 2020, stating that Appellant’s first PCRA petition was still pending 

on appeal and therefore, it did not have the jurisdiction to review the matter. 

See Order, 5/6/20, at 1 n.1 (unpaginated). Appellant filed an appeal, but the 

PCRA court “did not take immediate action to address the appeal.” See

Commonwealth v. Steward, 1210 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. Dec. 21, 2021) 

(unpub. memo. at 3).

Turning back to the appeal concerning Appellant’s 2019 petition, a panel 

of this Court vacated the PCRA court’s October 9, 2019, order “and remanded 

the matter for the appointment of counsel and further proceedings pursuant 

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7 Appellant raised similar allegations to those in his “Petition of Newly 

Discovered Evidence.” See Appellant’s Response to PCRA Court’s April 7, 

2020, Order, 5/1/20, at 1-2.
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to the PCRA.” See Commonwealth v. Steward, 3009 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super. 

June 22, 2020) (unpub. memo. at 1). The panel explained: 

[T]he PCRA court determined that this is [A]ppellant’s second 

PCRA petition. That conclusion, however, is erroneous. When the 

PCRA court granted the relief that [A]ppellant requested in his 

PCRA, which was [a] reinstatement of his right to seek 

discretionary review with our [S]upreme [C]ourt with respect to 

his direct appeal, that reset[s] the clock for the calculation of the 

finality of [A]ppellant’s judgment of sentence for PCRA purposes. 

See Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (determining that where a successful PCRA petition 

neither restores petitioner’s direct appeal rights nor disturbs the 

conviction, clock is not reset for the calculation of judgment of 

sentence for PCRA purposes). As such, the instant petition must 

be deemed [A]ppellant’s first PCRA petition. 

Steward, 3009 EDA 2019 (unpub. memo. at 1) (record citation omitted). The 

panel further determined that Appellant was entitled to have counsel 

appointed to represent him for his first PCRA petition, even if the petition was 

facially untimely. See Steward, 3009 EDA 2019 (unpub. memo. at 5). 

Following this Court’s decision, the PCRA court appointed Matthew Rapa, 

Esquire, to represent Appellant. The assigned PCRA court judge then retired 

before taking any action regarding Appellant’s 2020 PCRA petition. The case 

was assigned to a new judge, who only addressed Appellant’s 2019 PCRA 

petition.

On October 1, 2020, Attorney Rapa submitted a motion to withdraw as 

counsel and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

1988). Counsel averred that Appellant’s PCRA petition was “untimely, and 
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therefore, the [PCRA] court is without jurisdiction to hear [his] claims.” Motion 

to Withdraw as Counsel, 10/1/20, at 1 (unpaginated).

8

 “The PCRA court held 

a hearing on the timeliness of Appellant’s first petition and, afterwards, 

allowed counsel to withdraw.” Steward, 1210 EDA 2020 (unpub. memo. at 

4). Thereafter, on February 10, 2021, the court denied Appellant’s 2019 PCRA 

petition, and Appellant did not appeal that decision.9

Subsequently, on December 15, 2021, a panel of this Court affirmed the 

PCRA court’s May 6, 2020, order, which disposed of Appellant’s outstanding 

2020 PCRA petition. See Steward, 1210 EDA 2020 (unpub. memo. at 1). 

The panel determined:

Appellant continue[d] to argue issues that were the subject of his 

first PCRA petition, which PCRA counsel addressed in his no-merit 

letter, and which was ultimately denied as untimely by the PCRA 

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8

In Attorney Rapa’s “no-merit” letter, he observed that “the only possible 

exception [Appellant] raised to the one-year time period for filing a PCRA 

pertain[ed] to after-discovered facts or evidence.” Motion to Withdraw as 

Counsel at Exhibit A, October 1, 2020, “No-Merit” Letter at 2 (unpaginated). 

Nevertheless, after reviewing the evidence and allegations, Attorney Rapa 

concluded that Appellant failed to meet his burden in establishing that this 

exception applied. Id. at 3-4.

9 During this time, Appellant filed a document titled, Motion for Counsel and 

Relief. See Appellant’s Motion for Counsel and Relief, 12/7/20, at 1-8. The 

PCRA court denied this motion on January 8, 2021, explaining that the 

appointed counsel, Attorney Rapa, was permitted to withdraw from 

representation of Appellant on his PCRA motion. See Order, 1/7/21. 

Appellant appealed the denial of that motion on January 26, 2021. The PCRA 

court dismissed Appellant’s notice of appeal because it was an interlocutory 

appeal, that was not appealable as of right, and it made no determination that 

an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. See Order, 

2/9/21, at 2, n. 1. 
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court on February 10, 2021. Instead, the instant appeal, filed long 

before the PCRA court rendered its February 10, 2021[,] decision, 

pertains solely to the May 6, 2020[,] order dismissing Appellant’s

third PCRA petition due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

It is well-established that “a PCRA court may not entertain 

a new PCRA petition when a prior petition is still under appellate 

review and, thus, is not final.” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 

181 A.3d 359, 364-65 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2012)). Accordingly, 

the PCRA court correctly noted that it lacked jurisdiction to

consider a serial PCRA petition until the first appeal concluded. 

See Montgomery, supra at 364-65. We find that the PCRA court 

did not err when it dismissed Appellant’s third PCRA petition due 

to the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.

See id. (unpub. memo. at 5-6). Appellant did not file a PAA with the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Instead, on April 29, 2022, Appellant filed another pro se PCRA petition, 

which is the subject of the present appeal. In his petition, Appellant raised 

several allegations of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and prosecutorial 

misconduct. See Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 4/29/22, at 4A-4E.

On May 5, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice. Appellant 

filed a pro se response on June 1, 2022. Eight days later, the PCRA court

denied Appellant’s petition as untimely filed. This pro se appeal followed.

10

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

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10 On July 18, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

to which Appellant complied. On September 9, 2022, the PCRA court filed an 

opinion stating that its May 5, 2022, Rule 907 Notice order adequately 

addressed Appellant’s concise statement. See PCRA Ct. Op., 9/9/22., at 3. 
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A) Trial Counsel was ineffective for not submitting to the jury the 

record of [the] victim[’s] cellphone that was on her person when 

found. The cellphone records [proved] that she was alive over an 

hour pas[t] the time witness Nathan Petruska stated [Appellant] 

confessed to him. [This means] Petrusa has to be lying about the 

confession at 12 to [one] o[’]clock when the cellphone records 

show on [the] night of [the] crime [that] the victim had a[n] active 

phone call at around [two] o[’]clock [in the morning]. 

B) Trial Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission 

of testimony of [the] recovered firearm to the crime without the 

actual [firearm] being turned over to the Commonwealth by 

witnesses. Meaning their testimony was [h]earsay which is 

inadmissible, doing nothing but being prejudicial to a fair trial. 

C) Trial [C]ounsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 

testimony of Jarret Hursh denying the truth of his [out-of-court] 

statement giving a new version of what happened[,] inculpating 

[Appellant,] which is inadmissible [ ] due to the fact the prejudicial 

[effect outweighed] the probative [value] which [would result in 

the] automatic retrial of the entire case. [See] 

[Commonwealth] v. Wright, 321 A.2d 625 [(Pa. 1974).] 

D) Trial [C]ounsel was ineffective for not bringing to the jury[’]s

attention that Petruska and [Appellant were] not friends but [in 

fact] had a fall out by Petruska then [Girlfriend] Daniel Corcoran 

while on the stand[,] which would discredit Petruska to be telling 

the truth that he and [Appellant were] friends and [Appellant 

confessed] to him. 

E) Prosecution committed a misconduct when submitting to the 

jury all [t]estimony of recovered [firearm] to the crime and no 

gun in evidence[,] this is [v]ouching which is a misconduct. 

Appellant’s Brief at 1-3 (grammatical errors in original; some spacing & 

paragraph breaks omitted). 

The standard by which we review PCRA petitions is well settled: 

Our standard of review in a PCRA appeal requires us to determine 

whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the 

record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal 

error. The scope of our review is limited to the findings of the 
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PCRA court and the evidence of record, which we view in the light 

most favorable to the party who prevailed before that court. . . . 

The PCRA court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, 

when supported by the record, are binding upon this Court. 

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2020). 

Before we may address the merits of Appellant’s argument, we must 

determine if his PCRA petition was properly filed. It is undisputed that:

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

[T]he PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not 

be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of the 

petition. In other words, Pennsylvania law makes clear no court

has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(emphasis, citations, & quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly,

[a] PCRA petition is timely if it is filed within one year of the date 

the judgment of sentence becomes final. A judgment becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for 

seeking the review. 

Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citations & quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 30, 2013, 

90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his PAA nunc pro tunc, 

and the time for filing a petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ 

of certiorari expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (“[A] 

petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment in any case, . . . is timely 
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when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the 

judgment.”). Appellant generally had one year, or until May 30, 2014, to file 

a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Accordingly, his petition —

filed more than seven years late — is facially untimely. 

Nevertheless, we may still consider an untimely petition if a petitioner:

(1) alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(i) to (iii); and (2) files a petition raising the exception within one 

year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(2). The three time-for-filing exceptions are as follows:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). It is the appellant’s “burden to allege and 

prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v.

Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008).

Here, the PCRA court found Appellant’s petition was untimely and 

dismissed it. See Rule 907 Notice Order, 5/5/22, at 2; see also Order, 

9/9/22. The court stated: 
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[T]he petition will [only] be entertained [if] a strong prima facie

showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice 

may have occurred; it further appearing that [Appellant] has 

failed to establish a prima facie showing that the proceedings 

which resulted in his conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage 

of justice occurred which no civilized society could tolerate, or that 

he was innocent of the crimes for which he was charged; it further

appearing that [Appellant]is attempting to relitigate the claims 

decided[.]

Rule 907 Notice Order, 5/5/22, at 2 (footnotes & quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the court’s conclusions. A review of Appellant’s brief 

reveals he fails to address, or even dispute, the untimeliness of his PCRA 

petition. See Appellant’s Brief at 1-5. Instead, he focuses on substantive

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. 

See id. at 1-3. He also maintains his actual innocence, disputing evidence 

that was presented at his 2007 trial. See id. at 4-5. Accordingly, Appellant

has not proved, or even asserted, that his claims meet any of the timeliness

exceptions. 

Moreover, as the PCRA court recognizes, since this is Appellant’s fourth

PCRA petition, he bears a higher burden in seeking PCRA relief. See Order, 

5/5/22, at 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has previously stated:

A second or subsequent petition for post-conviction relief will not 

be entertained unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to 

demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. A

prima facie showing of entitlement to relief is made only by

demonstrating either that the proceedings which resulted in

conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred

which no civilized society could tolerate, or the defendant's

innocence of the crimes for which he was charged.
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Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 176-77 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant’s arguments fail to demonstrate that “a miscarriage of justice 

may have occurred.” Id. at 176. As such, we conclude the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review the petition and it properly denied relief.11 See 

Montgomery, 181 A.3d at 365.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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11 It merits mention that 

although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special

benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must

comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania

Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if

an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citations omitted).

Here, Appellant’s brief violates the Rules of Appellate Procedure by 

failing to include a statement of jurisdiction, a statement of both the scope 

and standard of review, a statement of the case, and a summary of the 

argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a), 2114, 2117-2118. Moreover, the 

argument section of his brief consists of one sentence: “All claims therein are 

miscarriages of justice and shall be heard.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. To extent 

that Appellant raises challenges in the “Claims” section of his brief, these 

arguments are simply bald assertions with no citations to legal authority and 

reference to the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)-(c). Accordingly, even if we 

were to conclude that Appellant’s petition was timely filed, we would find the 

appeal quashed or dismissed for failure to conform to the requirements set 

forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Lyons, 833 A.2d

at 251-52.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/10/2023